ANGLO-AMERICAN DISCORD: THE INVASION AND
OCCUPATION OF ITALY, 1941-1946

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While personal accounts and interpretive overviews have been written about the allied invasion and occupation of Italy during World War II, this study is the first to utilize recently published American Foreign Relations volumes dealing with the wartime conferences.

Organized into five chapters, the study surveys allied conferences leading to the invasion of Italy, Italian political developments during occupation, and allied relief and rehabilitation efforts.

The conclusions are that Churchill, while correct in assessing Italy's strategic value, undermined his own policy through political meddling and a desire for revenge. In combination with Roosevelt, whose interest in Italy was political and at best marginal, Churchill needlessly delayed stabilization of Italian economic and political conditions.
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Despite the remarkable degree of Anglo-American cooperation during World War II, there were occasional conflicts and periods of tension; the invasion and occupation of Italy was a primary source of disagreement. Britain's Prime Minister Winston Churchill believed that the war would not only decide the fate of Adolf Hitler, but would reshape the entire political structure of post-war Europe. As Italy, a link between Western and Central Europe, was a pivotal nation whose future would affect the entire continent, Churchill intended to have considerable voice in deciding that future. He realized that after the war the Soviets would constitute the strongest land force in Europe, with good prospects of dominating the entire continent. Although the Americans were the most probable force for preventing such an occurrence, Churchill believed the United States would dismantle its military machine and return to a policy of isolation at the war's end, leaving Great Britain as the only check to Soviet expansion. Determined to carve out an area of British influence that would balance Soviet power, Churchill envisioned
Europe divided into two spheres of influence, British and Soviet, as the only means of preventing a complete Communist takeover.¹

Roosevelt did not share Churchill's fear of future Soviet power. He hoped for a post-war world in which balance of power and spheres of influence would no longer be necessary; the United States and the Soviet Union would become "partners in peace because circumstances had made them partners in war."²

Roosevelt's friendly attitude toward the Soviet Union precipitated a more liberal attitude towards left-wing political groups than that entertained by his British counterpart. Recognizing the dominant role of Communist and Socialist parties in the anti-fascist resistance, Roosevelt was willing to cooperate with these parties during the war and was not adverse to allowing them their hard earned places in post-war governments. Churchill, on the other hand, viewed these groups as a threat to European stability. Unimpressed by


the performance of democratic governments imposed following World War I, he desired continuation of Europe's monarchical traditions. This divergent viewpoint between Allied leaders became a major cause for conflict when applied to the Italian situation. In addition, public opinion in England and the United States also differed on international politics, especially regarding Italy, and tended to sharpen differences between their leaders.

When Italy surrendered in 1943, the Americans had been at war for only a short while and had not built up as much hatred as the British. Further, a large Italian-American population living within the United States had friends and relatives still living in Italy for whom they had sympathy and concern. The Italian-Americans were heavily concentrated in key population centers such as New York City and were politically active. Since 1944 was an election year, Roosevelt was particularly sensitive to opinions expressed by their congressmen and spokesmen for their political, social, and fraternal societies such as the Mazzini Society. The British, however, having fought the Italians for nearly three years at a cost of over 230,000 lives, and having endured considerable suffering and hardship from the war both at home and in Africa, generally desired to punish the Italians for their misdeeds. Churchill was not exempt from this desire
for revenge. British demands for punitive action and American inclination towards tolerance and aid, resulted in conflicts between the two governments over Italian international status, Allied economic aid and assistance, and post-war development of Italian self-government.

British and American differences in the Mediterranean and Italy first emerged in 1942 over plans for a North African campaign. "The British wanted to throw nearly all available resources into Mediterranean operations, while Americans were determined to fight only a limited war in that area, conserving most resources for the scheduled invasion of Northern France."3 Although American military strategists almost unanimously opposed an African campaign, they agreed to a limited expedition, regarding the Mediterranean as a temporary battleground and an "unwelcome distraction from getting on with the war." By late 1942, with the African campaign close to success, the Americans wanted to transport troops to England as soon as possible, and concentrate on a cross-channel invasion, while the British wanted to invade Southern Italy.4 The turning point in the dispute came at

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3 Ibid., pp. 186-187.
the Casablanca Conference of January, 1943, where Roosevelt and Churchill agreed to land in Sicily. This decision ultimately kept American troops fighting in the Mediterranean for two more years.
CHAPTER II

ITALY: THE DECISION TO INVADE

Anticipating American opposition to an attack on Sicily, the British carefully planned their strategy for the Casablanca Conference. Knowing that the United States Army Chief of Staff, George C. Marshall, and Harry Hopkins, President Roosevelt's most trusted advisor, considered the Mediterranean campaign as a diversion from the projected western European front, the British presented the occupation of Sicily as a means of securing a relatively safe Mediterranean shipping route.¹ They shipped an entire reference library of War Office plans and information supporting their arguments to Casablanca, complete with file clerks and research assistants.² Churchill, also fearing a reaction

¹The Japanese evaluation of the importance of control of Sicily seems to have been in line with the British. Following the Allied attack on Sicily, the Japanese Military Mission in Berlin warned Joseph Goebbels, Hitler's Minister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, that "the loss of Sicily would create a totally new military situation." They advised "extraordinary measures" be used to keep Sicily. Joseph Goebbels, The Goebbels Diaries, translated and edited by Louis P. Lochner (New York, 1948), p. 480.

from American military representatives, advised his Chiefs of Staff "not to hurry or try to force agreement, but to take plenty of time, there was to be full discussion and no impatience." American agreement to invasion of the Italian mainland would be sought later. ³ "In the meantime he himself would pursue the same tactics with the President." ⁴

In accordance with Churchill's instructions, the British encouraged the Americans to express their point of view. Their central objection was that even a successful Mediterranean campaign would not destroy Germany. Generals Marshall and Eisenhower, as well as other top military officials feared the mountainous terrain of Central Europe would bog down their troops in a snail's pace advance, with little territorial gain to show for heavy cost and effort. In addition, providing men and supplies needed for carrying out such a campaign, would result in neglect of the war in the Pacific, a threat the British did not seem to appreciate. ⁵

³Ibid., p. 544; Macmillan, Blast of War, p. 262.

⁴Bryant, The Turn of the Tide, p. 544; Macmillan, Blast of War, p. 262; Churchill was so successful in appearing to be concerned only in Sicily as opposed to all of Italy that General Marshall reported to Roosevelt that Britain was "not interested in occupying Italy..." Foreign Relations of the United States Washington Conference, 1941-1942 and Casablanca Conference, 1943 (Washington, 1968), p. 597.

⁵Bryant, The Turn of the Tide, p. 544; Foreign Relations Washington and Casablanca, pp. 545, 600. Events in Asia
Field Marshall Viscount Alanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, then presented the British case. The effective German U-boat campaign had resulted in a shipping shortage for the Allies. It was this menace, Alanbrooke argued, which was the primary cause for delay in assembling troops and supplies in England for a cross-channel invasion. He asserted that, unless the situation were changed, "any invasion of Northern France could be easily held or repelled by the far more numerous German divisions already in Western Europe," without making any call on German troops at the Russian front. However, while victory in Northern France was impossible for at least a year, a victory in the Mediterranean area could be won in 1943. Such a victory would strain Germany's inadequate North-to-South communications and force them to maintain "large forces to defend an immense additional stretch of coastline." If Italy could reinforced American belief that Churchill did not appreciate the Japanese threat. As Japan was moving westward in Asia, India was "moving ideologically towards Japan," due to British refusal to grant India dominion status. Roosevelt, fearful of what Indian support for the Japanese would mean to the war in the Pacific, attempted to mediate, but Churchill remained intransigent. Jane Calabria, "Franklin D. Roosevelt's Attitude Toward the Asian Empires of Great Britain and France," unpublished master's thesis, Department of History, North Texas State University, Denton, Texas, 1971, pp. 45-63.

6 Alanbrooke was the operational head of the British Army and co-ordinator of all army campaigns.

7 Bryant, Turn of the Tide, p. 551; Foreign Relations Washington and Casablanca, pp. 583-85.
be knocked out of the war Germany would be forced to replace the twenty-six Italian divisions now holding down the restless peoples of Southern and Southeastern Europe and Germany would not have sufficient men and aircraft to maintain her Russian front and protect herself from a cross-channel attack.\(^8\) Alanbrooke maintained that without the dispersion of German forces provided by a Mediterranean campaign, Germany could "repel any attack from the West until 1945 or even 1946."\(^9\)

\(^8\) Churchill predicted that a quick victory in Sicily would topple Mussolini; a prediction in which he was vindicated. Winston S. Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, Vol. V of *The Second World War*, 6 vols. (Boston, 1951), 53-54.

\(^9\) Bryant, *Turn of the Tide*, pp. 551-552. The British pointed out that rail communications in Europe were such that the Germans could transport seven divisions a day from east to west to reinforce the northern coast of France, while the north-south railway network could only transport one division per day. Further "the Italian railways were close to the coast and vulnerable to interruption from the sea, and in the Balkans there was only a single line of railway." *Foreign Relations Washington and Casablanca*, p. 539. Alanbrooke's assessment of the German situation was later substantiated in the diaries of Joseph Goebbels. He states that troops needed to alter the unfavorable balance of power on Germany's eastern front were tied down in Italy and the Balkans (which did become very difficult to hold), preventing Hitler from securing the reserves necessary to defend the western front. He also notes that the Allied build-up in England immobilized needed German divisions. His diary supports the correctness of British strategy. Goebbels, *The Goebbels Diaries*, pp. 488-496, 527.
Churchill argued that with the fall of Mussolini, the Italian divisions now fighting in the Balkans could be persuaded to support native partisan groups presently fighting the Germans. Further, he contended that once Turkey was assured of Allied intentions in the Balkans, it would only be a matter of time until the Turks would declare war.  

Despite British strategic justifications for a Mediterranean campaign, the Americans suspected Churchill's motives were more political than military. For the British the Mediterranean was an essential link for their empire and they were much concerned about events in this area during and after the war.  

American military and political leaders were not about to pay the cost in men, money and time to protect England's imperial system in the Middle East and Asia, the idea of empire itself being the antithesis of basic American ideals. Americans also suspected that Churchill's

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10 Churchill's latter argument was precipitously weakened, when the Turkish government not only continued to refuse to declare war on Germany after the Allies landed in Sicily, but also refused his requests for permission to have Allied military bases on Turkish soil. The Turks did not declare war on Germany until three months before Germany's surrender, when the outcome of the war was obvious to everyone.

ambitions in the Balkans were influenced by "an inner compulsion to vindicate his strategical concepts of World War I, in which he had been the principal exponent of the Gallipoli campaign."¹²

The American Joint Chiefs of Staff stubbornly resolved not to give way to the British, but they approached the conference so divided that the British position prevailed.¹³

Naval concerns centered around the war in the Pacific. Admiral King, while agreeing in principle that Germany was the primary enemy, nevertheless wanted to keep the allocation of landing craft mainly limited to the Pacific. General Marshall and the Army staff focused their attention on a cross-channel invasion of France, while GeneralArnold and

¹²Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 194. The Gallipoli campaign was an ill-fated attempt by the French and British to secure control of the Dardanelles and the Sea of Marmara, the failure of which resulted in Churchill's removal as First Lord of the Admiralty. Robert Murphy, American Political Representative to the African Theater during 1943, states that Harold Macmillan, Churchill's Political Advisor in the African Theater, confided to him that he believed the desire to justify the Gallipoli campaign was partially behind Churchill's interest in the Balkan area. Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, p. 166.

¹³Foreign Relations Washington and Casablanca, p. 509; Macmillan, 262-263; Bryant, p. 540. American members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were Admiral William D. Leahy, Chairman; General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff; Henry H. Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Force and Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations.
the Air Force believed that Germany might be destroyed by heavy air bombardment. Admiral William D. Leahy, Chairman of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff, worried that further operations in the Mediterranean would not only be wasteful, but possibly dangerous. Although Marshall believed achieving a cross-channel invasion would be possible during 1943, neither Roosevelt nor the officers of the Plans Division of the War Department at Washington shared this opinion. Believing a lack of available landing craft prevented decisive movement in the Atlantic theater, they felt, "though

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14 Macmillan, *Blast of War*, p. 262-263; *Foreign Relations Washington and Casablanca*, p. 556; Bryant, *Turn of the Tide*, p. 540. The British were extremely critical of the organization of the American military force. "In his diary of the Casablanca Conference, Brigadier General Sir Ian Jacob wrote 'apparently the operations in the Pacific are planned exclusively by the Navy Department, who in turn leave the rest of the world to the War Department. There is little or no collusion, so that the allocation of resources as between the Pacific and the rest of the world is inevitably a hit and miss affair or perhaps one could better describe it as a game of grab. The Navy have their ships and the Army have theirs. The Navy control the landing craft, so that the Army finds it difficult to squeeze out what they want for their own projects.'" Sir Ian Jacob, MS. Diary, 13th January, 1943, cited in Bryant, *Turn of the Tide*, p. 540.

15 He feared a counter-attack through Spain. Bryant, *The Turn of the Tide*, p. 540. The British argued that as Spain was economically tied to the allies, the more successful the allies were in the Mediterranean, the less likely she was to ally with Germany. *Foreign Relations Washington and Casablanca*, p. 539.
without enthusiasm, . . . a limited pressure in the Mediterranean in pursuit of what they called 'the psychological and tangible advantages' of allied victories in the African campaign might be a possible course of action. 16

The conference in general was a victory for the British. Following defeat of the Axis powers in Africa, the Allies agreed to capture Sicily. "King as a sea power man saw the enormous advantage of increased security in the Mediterranean, and Arnold as an air power man could not fail to be tempted by the prospect of obtaining such advanced bases as Foggia in Italy." 17 Marshall, although preoccupied with a cross-channel invasion, agreed Sicily would considerably increase security for Allied shipping and admitted the advantage of possibly eliminating Italy from the war. 18 In return, the British, as a concession to Marshall, agreed to an impressive

16 Bryant, pp. 540-541. "The President's instinct, as always, was to defer decision until events had unfolded sufficiently to make it, if not inevitable, politically unanswerable. Unlike his service mentors, he had no particular aversion to Mediterranean adventures, and, though he did not engage in military arguments with his service advisors like the Prime Minister, he was not prepared to commit himself in advance to their views." Ibid., p. 541.


18 Ibid., pp. 674-675.
build-up in England of forces and shipping, as it became available, in case the German eastern front should collapse, thus affording an early opportunity for a cross-channel invasion. In the report, no mention was made of an invasion of Italy, but Churchill expressed his belief to his own representatives that with the fall of Mussolini, which he believed assured, the Allies would have a unique opportunity to advance into central Europe, to which he hoped the Americans would agree.\textsuperscript{19}

By early February, events warranted preparations for the Sicilian campaign. On February 2, the first British supply ship entered the reopened port of Tripoli. By February 4, Montgomery and his advance guard reached the Tunisian southeastern frontiers.\textsuperscript{20} The British fully expected the commencement of a large flow of men and supplies from the United States in accordance with the Casablanca agreements. However, the supplies and men were not forthcoming. Instead of the 80,000 troops promised in the first three months of 1943, only 15,000 arrived.\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{19} Bryant, \textit{The Turn of the Tide}, p. 560.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., p. 582.

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., p. 601.
The British blamed the situation on Admiral King's refusal to supply the necessary shipping. Notes from British Field Marshall Lord Alanbrooke reflect the British belief in American bad faith.

Feb. 25th . . . . Am very worried by the way the Americans are failing to live up to our Casablanca agreements. They are entirely breaking down over promises of American divisions to arrive in this country . . . .

March 1st. C.O.S. [British Chiefs of Staff] mainly concerned with shipping situation and the fact that the American C.O.S. are not living up to our Casablanca agreements. Marshall now proposes to waste shipping equipping French forces which can play no part in the strategy of 1943 . . . .

April 15th . . . . A long C.O.S. meeting, as recent telegrams from America show that we are just about back where we were before Casablanca. Their hearts are really in the Pacific.

May 6th . . . . Up to the present the bulk of the American Navy is in the Pacific and larger land and air forces have gone to this theater than to Europe in spite of all we have said about the necessity of defeating Germany first. 22

Concurring with Alanbrooke's analysis of the situation, Churchill sent a message to Roosevelt in which he expressed a concern over submerged differences of opinion which were

22 Bryant, The Turn of the Tide, pp. 601, 607. In a later evaluation of his diary, Alanbrooke wrote, "I still feel that if at that stage . . . our basic strategy had been more strictly adhered to, we should have finished the war a few months sooner." Ibid., p. 611. He is supported in these conclusions by Macmillan in Blast of War, p. 187.
affecting allied cooperation. He felt the problems necessitated immediate settlement and proposed a top level conference in Washington by the second week of May.\(^2^3\)

On May 11, Harry Hopkins met Churchill, his Chiefs of Staff and over one hundred British officials and staff at New York, and accompanied them to Washington for what became known as the Trident Conference.\(^2^4\) Churchill's arguments were similar to those of Alanbrooke in January, but, at Trident, the atmosphere was decidedly different from Casablanca, where the Americans had fared rather badly. American preparation was better, and for the first time Roosevelt "was firm in his insistence on the massive invasion of Northern France."\(^2^5\) Roosevelt, in his reply to Churchill, agreed with the need to divert as many German troops as possible to the Mediterranean to prevent their use against

\(^{2^3}\) Foreign Relations of the United States, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943 (Washington, 1968), pp. 15-17; Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 727; Bryant, The Turn of the Tide, p. 603; Leahy, I Was There, p. 156.

\(^{2^4}\) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 728. British Chiefs of Staff were Alanbrooke, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound and Air Chief Marshall Sir Charles Portal. General Sir Hastings Ismay, Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defense, although not a member of the Chiefs of Staff is equated by Leahy as being his British counterpart. Pound died in October, 1943, and was replaced by Sir Andrew Cunningham, Commander of Allied Naval Operations in the Mediterranean. Leahy, I Was There, pp. 158, 163.

cross-channel invaders, but not at the expense of forces needed to execute the invasion itself. He further pointed out the necessity of attacking Japan's over-stretched supply lines before she could consolidate and noted that American public opinion was more interested in victory over the Japanese than victory over Adolf Hitler.  

By May 19, Roosevelt and Churchill reached the basic decisions of Trident. The cross-channel assault was set for May 1, 1944, before which time twenty-nine divisions were to be prepared, with four American and three British divisions diverted from the Mediterranean theater. In addition, the commander of the Mediterranean was to plan operations beyond Sicily best calculated to exploit the island's capture and to detain the "maximum number of German divisions." This meant that Eisenhower, in effect, had the power to decide whether or not the Allies were to invade the Italian mainland. Both sides had achieved a victory. The cross-channel invasion referred to as "Overlord" was now definitely planned with the only major decision remaining

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to be the commander of the operation. In turn, the British, fearful that the Americans would adamantly refuse the allocation of any more troops to the Mediterranean, were relieved to obtain the promise of continued action there.28

On July 10, 1943, the Allies invaded Sicily and defeated the Axis troops within thirty-eight days. As Churchill had predicted, the fall of Sicily resulted in the overthrow of Mussolini. Mussolini had launched his country into the war on the side of Germany under the impression that the Germans had already won. By making himself Commander-in-Chief to claim credit for victory, he made himself responsible for defeat. A less than successful attack on France, defeat by the British in East Africa in 1941, and loss of influence to the Germans in the Balkans and Northern Africa, exposed to the world Italy's weakness; and Italian enthusiasm for war waned. The Allies issued statements in the form of leaflets and radio broadcasts to induce the Italian people to surrender by promising a humane peace and threatening destruction of their country if the war continued. The fall

28 Alanbrooke recorded his relief in his diary on May 25, but expressed the belief that Admiral King would "suck into the Pacific" landing craft and shipping "irrespective of the requirements for the war in Europe." Bryant, The Turn of the Tide, p. 629.
of Sicily made clear that the Italian homeland was at the mercy of the Allied military forces. On July 16, Roosevelt and Churchill, having some knowledge of the internal situation in Italy, issued a joint appeal to the Italian people:

The sole hope for Italy's survival is honorable capitulation to the overwhelming power of the military forces of the United Nations. If you continue to tolerate the Fascist regime which serves the evil power of the Nazis, you must suffer the consequences of your own choice.

By the spring of 1943, with the Allied victory in Africa and the decline of the Italian military position, dissident elements within the Fascist Party began to plot the overthrow of Mussolini in the hope of preserving their governmental positions in the face of defeat. On July 13, the Fascist "old guard" convinced Mussolini to call a session of the Fascist Grand Council for July 24, at which time they planned to repudiate his leadership.

The king of Italy, Victor Emmanuel of the House of Savoy, was also moved to act against Mussolini hoping to retain his own rule and the throne of his family. Early in February, 1943, the King began to correspond with Pietro Badoglio, an Italian soldier who had been Commander-in-Chief.

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under Mussolini during the conquest of Ethiopia, but had been dismissed after the calamitous Greek campaign of 1940. The King convinced Badoglio to take control of the government as Prime Minister after July 26 when the King and his leading Generals planned to arrest Mussolini. The King's plot and the Fascist plot evidently were not connected, but the actions of the Fascists assisted the King in his plans. On Sunday, July 25, Mussolini went to the palace for an audience with the King. The King informed him that he was appointing Badoglio head of the government, replacing Mussolini, who was "the most hated man in Italy." Upon leaving the palace, Mussolini was taken into "protective custody" and two days later interned on the island of Ponza. The fall of Mussolini presented the Allies a uniquely favorable opportunity. Finding the air bases in Great Britain limited in their usefulness because of their distance from Germany, General Eisenhower decided to make "a limited attack on Southern Italy, having for its main object the capture of air bases in the Foggia area." This attack would

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30 Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 43-44.
31 Ibid., pp. 50-51.
necessitate only a limited number of troops, and would therefore not prejudice the number of men available for the channel crossing.

Churchill, hoping that heavy involvement would of necessity result in further commitment, worked hard to get a massive troop commitment for the invasion. He was depending on his so far successful philosophy of step-by-step engagement of American troops in Italy and perhaps the Balkans. He tried to justify his emphasis in terms of military strategy, believing that at this point in the war Hitler had two options--he could concentrate his army in one area or he could spread his forces out in Italy, the Balkans, and Western Europe, attempting to keep control of all his conquered territory. If he chose to consolidate his forces into one large army, he could easily transport enough fresh troops to France to repulse an Allied landing and perhaps decide the conclusion of the war. Realizing these alternatives were open, Churchill "wished also to have the options of pressing right-handed in Italy or left-handed across the Channel, or both."

In spite of Churchill's arguments, the Americans refused to commit the troops necessary for anything other than a limited

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33 Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 52.
invasion. President Roosevelt and Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, after agreeing to the African invasion, the invasion of Sicily, and a limited invasion of Southern Italy, had decided to take a stand.  

Robert S. Murphy, American Political Advisor in the Mediterranean, attempted to persuade Secretary Stimson, who was visiting Allied Headquarters in Algiers at the time of Mussolini's downfall, that certain political advantages would be gained if the Allies controlled northern Italy, but Stimson refused to alter his stand against Churchill. On August 12, Eisenhower received a cable from General Marshall, who was attending a meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Quebec, in which Marshall made clear that men or materials allocated to the cross-channel invasion were not to be re-allocated for use in Italy. As a result, the forces allocated for Italy were never sufficient for the task.

With the fall of Mussolini, the Allies were agreed on the advantages of obtaining a speedy surrender. General Eisenhower and General Sir Harold Alexander, the British Commander-in-Chief in Sicily, who soon replaced Eisenhower as Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, believed the

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34 Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors*, p. 187.

Allies should act immediately to arrange favorable conditions for surrender. In a note to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the British Chiefs of Staff, dated July 26, 1943, Eisenhower wrote:

We regard it as of utmost importance that full opportunity should be taken immediately of the dismissal of Mussolini. If the King of Italy remains for more than a very short time as head of a country still at war with the Allies, the full odium in our two countries now concentrated on Duce will be transferred to the King. A situation might therefore arise where it will be impossible to arrange an honorable capitulation with the King, and we may be left without any other responsible authority.

Eisenhower and Alexander, along with many of their American and British associates stationed in the Mediterranean, considered the planned Allied invasion of Italy extremely dangerous due to insufficient forces allocated for it. Despite Prime Minister Badoglio's assurances that Italy was not going to desert her German allies, the Germans were building up their forces in Italy which already numbered eight divisions, not counting over ten thousand government workers located in Rome alone. Alexander would have from three to five Allied divisions at landing, with a subsequent build-up over the following two weeks to eight. The Italians

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36 Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., editor, The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The War Years (Baltimore, 1970), II, 1287. Eisenhower was worried about public opinion in the United States and Great Britain which was already aroused over dealings with former French Nazis in North Africa.
had sixteen divisions stationed in Italy whose cooperation General Alexander believed was absolutely necessary for Allied success. Eisenhower and Murphy, and Alexander and Macmillan wrote to their respective governments that immediate action on the part of the Allies could secure Italy before the Germans could become solidly entrenched.

In a cable to Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt noted that German armored divisions surrounded Rome and might try to impose on the country a new Fascist government led by Roberto Farinacci, a Fascist radical and a member of the Grand Council, who would undoubtedly attempt to carry on the war against the Allies. In addition, Churchill hoped that quick action would induce Italian divisions fighting in the Balkans to reverse sides and aid the native partisan groups there before the Germans could stop them.

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37 Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, p. 190. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 183.

38 Goebbels in his diaries, notes that as early as July 27, 1943, Hitler did intend to launch an immediate attack on Rome with a parachute division, occupy the city and arrest Badoglio and the Royal family, take them to Germany and set up Farinacci in a "counter-government." Why this coup was not carried out is not stated in the diaries, but there are indications that German diplomats and German Generals in Italy convinced Hitler that Badoglio would continue the war. Goebbels himself did not believe this. Lochner, The Goebbels Diaries, pp. 466-67, 475, 492.
Nevertheless, when Eisenhower tried to get the authority to negotiate with Badoglio's representatives if and when he were approached, differences of opinion between Washington and London repeatedly frustrated his efforts. Roosevelt, still sensitive from previous criticism over his dealings with French Nazis, was wary of the reaction in the United States to dealing with the King and Badoglio, both closely associated with Mussolini. To counteract criticism, the President and Eisenhower wanted to issue a statement guaranteeing future self-determination in Italy. Churchill, who supported a monarchical government for Italy, was not reluctant to recognize either Victor Emmanuel or Badoglio. On the other hand, he was not inclined to issue any statement concerning future self-determination for fear the throne would be jeopardized.39

While Roosevelt and Churchill attempted to work out a compromise at the 1943 Quebec Conference, relations between Eisenhower and Churchill soured. Eisenhower, growing impatient over the impasse between Washington and London, issued propaganda statements to the Italian people to convince them to surrender. He believed hope for independent Italian surrender negotiations was small because of the German

threat. 40 Churchill strenuously objected to Eisenhower's "assumption of prerogative" and made his disapproval quite plain in voluminous correspondence with both Eisenhower and Roosevelt. Harold Macmillan later published a note he wrote to himself on August 6, 1943

... after a long conversation on a number of rather difficult problems related to Italy and the future, Ike said to me, 'I wish you could get the P.M. to see my point of view or at least I wish I could get a really clear idea of what he wants.'

Unfortunately, there have been a number of minor incidents which have caused irritation (quite naturally) on both sides. The P.M. thinks Ike is too fond of 'propaganda' and makes too many 'statements' and 'proclamations to the Italians.' On the other hand, we have the greatest propaganda machine here, with the most powerful apparatus in the world, and it seems a pity not to use it. 41

A few weeks after Badoglio assumed power, the Italians sent feelers to the British ambassadors at Tangier, Lisbon, and Barcelona. On August 15, General Guiseppe Castellano, a professional soldier for many years, and now Chief of Staff to General Ambrosio, and an accredited representative of the Badoglio government, requested Sir Samuel Hoare, the British Ambassador in Spain, to assist him in arranging a

40 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 183.

41 Macmillan, Blast of War, p. 377.
meeting with the Allied Commanders or their representatives. Eisenhower, who by now had authority to negotiate with the Italians, sent Major General Bedell Smith and Brigadier K.W.D. Strong to meet Castellano in Lisbon.

Eisenhower compiled a set of ten conditions concerning military terms for armistice and sent copies to Roosevelt and Churchill, who approved their use. These ten conditions, known as the "short armistice," dealt mainly with "the still strong Italian fleet, the remnants of the Italian air forces, and the Italian ground forces throughout the peninsula and the Balkans." An Allied committee had been meeting in London for some time preparing formal armistice terms. These complicated terms, which were based on the fallacious assumption of Italian control of their homeland and covered economic, financial, and political questions, were still being negotiated between Washington and London. President

42 General Ambrosio was the Italian Chief of the Combined Staffs.

43 Churchill and Roosevelt agreed to giving Eisenhower authority to negotiate as a result of the Conference at Quebec in August. In addition, a decision was reached to launch an attack on Southern France, operation "Anvil," against which Churchill fought implacably until a few days before its accomplishment on August 15, 1944. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 747.

44 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 186.
Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill disagreed over whether the long terms should be used—Roosevelt, feeling the terms were unnecessary and inadvisable, preferred to let Eisenhower "act to meet situations as they arise." However, Churchill's preference for detailed surrender terms supplementing Eisenhower's military terms ultimately prevailed.45

When Smith and Strong met General Castellano in Lisbon, they presented the "short terms," making clear that the terms of the armistice were unconditional surrender and that future terms concerning economic, financial, and political conditions would be forthcoming. They explained that any assistance given by the Italians against the Germans would be considered in future Allied treatment of Italy. The Italians expressed a desire to join in alliance with the Allies. Making no promises, Smith stressed that the Allies desired at the very least an unopposed landing in Italy and Italian disruption of German communications.46

While Smith and Strong were in Lisbon, full surrender terms were agreed upon and forwarded to Eisenhower.47

45Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 65.

46Macmillan, Blast of War, p. 383. Before Castellano was able to return to Italy, Badoglio sent two more representatives to Lisbon, Italian Staff General Giacomo Zanussi and his aide Luncia de Trabia.

47Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, p. 190.
"long armistice" was a harsh document, imposing Allied control on every aspect of Italian affairs, and even included additional military provisions. According to instructions from the British and American governments, Eisenhower's negotiators were not to show the "long term" text to the Italian envoys until the latter signed the "short term" unconditional surrender and Allied troops had landed in Italy. Apparently it was feared that if the Italians knew the full agreement they might refuse to complete the deal. Allied instructions also forbade making the "long term" documents public under any circumstances. Eisenhower, distressed over the situation, called it a "crooked deal," but complied with orders, and on September 3, the Badoglio government surrendered to the Allies at Cassible, Sicily. Announcement of the armistice was scheduled for September 8 at 6:30 p.m., two hours before the scheduled landing of Allied troops at Salerno in Southern Italy.

49 Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, p. 190. Macmillan gives a slightly different version of this situation, stating that the British Ambassador at Lisbon, upon instructions from London, showed a copy of the long armistice to Italian General of Staff Zanussi, but for some reason Zanussi evidently did not report on those terms to Badoglio prior to September 3, although they were in contact with one another. Macmillan, Blast of War, p. 384.
50 Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, p. 190.
The Allies, slow to consolidate gains after the capture of Sicily, had allowed six weeks to lapse between the fall of Mussolini, and the Allied landing at Salerno. During that time, the Germans had increased their divisions in Italy from eight to nineteen, and German occupation of the air fields in Rome forced the Allies to cancel a planned Allied landing around the capital leaving Germany in control of the northern half of the country. Most of the Italian troops fighting in the Balkans were either captured or killed by the Germans or barely managed to escape to Italy, where few had any intention of returning to battle.51 Because of the excessive time lapse between the overthrow of Mussolini and the Allied landings, and the insufficient number of troops allotted for the assault, what might have been a quick and decisive victory became a slow, drawn out battle which resulted in some of the most severe fighting of the war.52 With the capture of Salerno, in accordance to prior agreements, command of the Mediterranean passed from General

51 Ibid., pp 190-95. Because the directive from the Trident Conference directed the Mediterranean Commander to exploit as much as possible the capture of Sicily, Eisenhower was able to justify a plan to take Rome due to the improved conditions created by the Italian surrender.

Eisenhower to British Field Marshall Sir Harold Alexander. Alexander continued the battle up the Italian peninsula for two long years, capturing Rome the day before the Normandy landing in June, 1944. Throughout the entire two years, the British continued to ask for additional men and supplies, but the Americans stood firm in their resolve not to become entrenched any further in the Mediterranean theater.
CHAPTER III

ITALY: FROM FASCISM TO ALLIED CONTROL

With the cancellation of the Allied landing at Rome, the Italian army stationed there collapsed, leaving the royal family and the Badoglio government at the mercy of the hostile populace and the surrounding German army.\(^1\) To avoid capture, King Victor Emmanuel and his Queen, Badoglio and a skeleton staff of government workers disguised themselves and fled the city. On September 10, they established themselves on the southeast coastal town of Brindisi and notified Allied Headquarters of their actions.\(^2\)

The question of recognizing Badoglio and the King as the Italian government precipitated heated debate between the Americans and the British. The British, while not particularly sympathetic to Victor Emmanuel and Badoglio personally, wanted the Royal family kept in power long enough for the King to strengthen the position of his family and render the rule of the House of Savoy permanent.\(^3\) Churchill was the

\(^1\) The King was especially unpopular with many Italians because of his association with Mussolini.


chief supporter of the Badoglio government, and his efforts kept Badoglio and the King in power during the months following Mussolini's fall. Secretary of State Hull and President Roosevelt were "not at all sympathetic" to the King or Badoglio; and their opinion was reinforced by Harry Hopkins, Robert Murphy and Dwight Eisenhower. The King was too closely associated with Mussolini whom he had allowed to take over the country in 1922. Further, he had abdicated his role as political leader of Italy by permitting Mussolini to launch Italy into war against Britain, France, Russia and the United States. American opinion was that the King, facing a losing battle, had made peace merely to escape the consequences of Italy's role as an ally of Germany. As far as Americans were concerned, the King had forfeited the right to claim his position as ruler of Italy. Badoglio, an appointee of the King and an ex-general under Mussolini, received little more sympathy than the King. The President and State Department felt that although the Badoglio government had been adequate for surrender negotiations, a

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4 Leftists and Liberals in Great Britain were critical of Churchill's support for Badoglio and the King as they had been critical of the dealings with ex-Nazis in Africa. Arnold Toynbee and Veronica M. Toynbee, editors, The Realignment of Europe, Vol. VI of Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1945 (London, 1955), 415.
government composed of anti-Fascist parties, and more representative of the Italian people, should be formed as soon as possible.⁵

The central figure in the Anglo-American dispute was Count Carlo Sforza, who had acquired a large Italian-American following during a twenty-year exile in the United States. The Americans regarded Sforza "as the most distinguished politician among the anti-Fascist Italians." A former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sforza had been Ambassador to France when Mussolini marched on Rome. The Count, immediately resigning his post in Paris, began the fight against Fascism which he continued unceasingly for more than twenty years. During his years in the United States, he acquired many friends and supporters both within and without the Roosevelt Administration, including Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles.⁶ In 1942, a State Department-sponsored international anti-Fascist conference meeting in Montevideo, Uruguay, provided for the establishment of a provisional Italian government in exile to be headed by Sforza and the creation of an Italian legion.

⁶Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, p. 199.
similar to the Free French units under General Charles DeGaulle. Disunity among the various Italian exile groups prevented the provisional government from actually materializing.

Despite general enthusiasm among Americans for Sforza, Churchill found the man personally repugnant. Following the capture of Sicily, Sforza had written London asking for safe passage from London through North Africa to Italy. Churchill had refused. Sforza then appealed to Secretary Hull. Churchill, justifying his refusal of safe passage, claimed that Sforza would use his influence to discredit the Badoglio government. The Prime Minister attempted to persuade Hull to withhold American approval of Sforza's plan to return to his homeland. In a conversation with Sir Ronald Campbell, a spokesman for Churchill in Washington, Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle, Jr. explained that although the British were entirely within their rights in denying Sforza passage from London, "we should have a very great difficulty in explaining to several million Italians here why we were preventing him from leaving the country and going to a point near Italy." Hull, out of

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7 Kogan, Italy and the Allies, pp. 20-21.

deference to Churchill, extracted from Sforza a promise to support Badoglio's government as the price of his return to Italy. The United States then offered him safe passage to Algiers where Sforza would have to deal with the Allied commanders in Africa.\(^9\) Realizing he had failed in his efforts to prevent Sforza's return to Italy, Churchill asked the Count to stop in London on his way to Algiers. Obliging, Sforza had lunch with Churchill and dutifully reiterated his promise to support Badoglio. Nonetheless, the meeting heightened the antagonism between the two statesmen who differed deeply on policies and were personally irritating to each other. In a memorandum to Allied headquarters, Churchill described Sforza as a "foolish and played out old man, incapable of facing, let alone riding the storm." Murphy disagreeing with Churchill's evaluation, explained that "The difficulty is that both of them wish to do all the talking."\(^10\)

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The Badoglio government which Churchill so fondly supported was basically a government of technicians chosen by the King, a government which did not include representatives of the various anti-Fascist parties. Following the signing of the long armistice, the United States put pressure on Badoglio to form a more representative government. The King, supported by Churchill, was adverse to this American suggestion, but both Badoglio and General D'Acquarone, Minister to the Italian Royal Household, advised the inclusion of Italy's six anti-Fascist parties because the limited base of Badoglio's government rendered it weak and therefore an inadequate prop for the Monarchy.  

Shortly after the Allied landings in Africa, a number of Italian political parties combined to form an anti-Fascist coalition. The original five parties were the Italian Communist Party, the Party of Action, the Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity, the Christian Democratic Party, and the Liberal Party. The Italian Communist Party, led by Palmiro Togliatti, a former Secretary of the Communist International, was Marxist-Leninist in philosophy and aggressively anti-clerical. Togliatti, in exile in Moscow from the early days of Mussolini's rule, returned to Italy.

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in March, 1944. The Communists, due to their leadership in anti-Fascist activities, had a large following and were rapidly becoming the most powerful political organization in Italy. The Socialist Party was led by Pietro Nenni, a classical Marxist who advocated close cooperation with the Communist Party. Both the Communists and Socialists were especially strong in industrial northern Italy and among the peasants of Central Italy. The Party of Action, founded in 1943, was considered to be the party of the "universities and intellectuals," combining a philosophy of republicanism and anti-clericalism with an interest in social and economic reform.12 The Christian Democrats, under Alcide de Gasperi, were traditionalist with respect to the Church and, although later becoming more conservative, were at this time reformist in economic policies, advocating government programs to turn the proletariat into small property holders, and government regulation of industry with socialization of monopolies which were guilty of flagrant abuse of their position. The Liberal Party, led by Benedetto Croce, an internationally respected historian and philosopher, was the party of classical liberalism. The party of big business and large landowners, the Liberal Party championed the Monarchy, the

Church and laissez-faire economics. A latecomer to the coalition was the Democratic Labor Party, a small, left of center group whose leader was Ivanoe Bonomi, a Prime Minister of the pre-Fascist period. While professing republican sympathies, this party still supported the institution of the Monarchy. These parties collectively constituted the Committee of National Liberation, or the C.L.N. The C.L.N. was divided into factions: a central faction headquartered in Naples and the northern, more radically anti-Fascist faction, headquartered in German-occupied Rome.

In accordance with his agreements with the Allies, Badoglio attempted to form a representative, broad-based government, but by November, it was apparent that he was unable to do so. In mid October, Acquarone had visited C.L.N. representatives in Naples to discuss the possibility of their participation in Badoglio's cabinet. Enrico de Nicola, the last President of the Italian Chamber of Deputies and the present leader of the anti-Fascist forces, stated that he would find it impossible to participate in a government

13 Kogan, *Italy and the Allies*, p. 17.

14 Ibid., pp. 14-18. The Labor Democrats were not represented in Rome.

15 "Representative" to the Americans meant including elements of the Committee of National Liberation.
headed by Badoglio, because Badoglio was not a civilian. He agreed, however, to Badoglio's presence in some post such as Minister of Defense.16

Badoglio's next hope was Sforza, who by this time had returned to Italy. However, after consultations with other anti-Fascist leaders, Sforza refused to consider participating in any government while Victor Emmanuel remained King.17

Sforza had long been an outspoken critic of the Italian King. Following Victor Emmanuel's flight from Rome, which Sforza and other anti-Fascist leaders considered a desertion of the people, Sforza from America had publicly demanded the King's abdication. Taking advantage of both the King's and Badoglio's desires that he enter the government, Sforza offered a plan for Victor Emmanuel's abdication. Sforza favored succession of the King's grandson, the Prince of Naples, then living in Switzerland, and the appointment of Badoglio as regent. This plan bypassed Prince Humbert of Piedmont, the King's son, who was as unacceptable as his father to the anti-Fascist elements.18 Sforza's plan was

18Ibid., pp. 1551-52. Prince Humbert is also referred to as Prince Umberto.
agreeable to the Central C.L.N., over which he now assumed leadership. Badoglio generally supported the plan, although he would not become involved in any attempt to force the King to abdicate if he refused to do so.19

The British took a very dim view of Sforza's plan. They believed the plan was a threat to the Monarchy and a betrayal of Sforza's promise to support Badoglio. Washington considered the proposal "a happy solution" and was suspicious of Churchill's opposition to it.20 Secretary of State Hull expressed his attitudes in a note to the American Ambassador to Great Britain.

While many of the British arguments against a fundamental change at this time in the Italian political structure are valid, their attitude is probably dictated by their desire to protect, particularly in Europe, the dignity and prerogatives of monarchical institutions. Our policy is fundamentally to support that regime and authority which at present time is in a position to furnish greatest aid and cooperation to the Allied war effort. If for any reason, General Eisenhower should in the future decide that to force the abdication of the King would benefit the Allied war effort in Italy the Department would approve of such a policy.21

Churchill agreed with this goal and maintained that his reasons for supporting Badoglio were purely military. He told Roosevelt that the Allies could review the whole situation after the capture of Rome.

The present regime is the lawful government of Italy with whom we have concluded an armistice in consequence of which the Italian Navy came over, and, with some of the Italian Army and Air Force, are fighting on our side. This Italian Government will obey our directions far more than any other that we may laboriously constitute. On the other hand, it has more power over the Fleet, Army officials, etc., than anything else which can be set up out of the worn-out debris of political parties, none of whom have the slightest title by election or prescription.22

Churchill believed Roosevelt's support of the six-party coalition government was not the result of Allied military needs as much as political pressure among liberal elements in the United States.23 The Anglo-American press was against Badoglio and the King, characterizing Victor Emmanuel as a "Fascist-minded opportunist who abandoned Fascism only when it was beaten and whose sole interest now was in clinging to his shaky throne." As for Badoglio, the press reminded the British and American public of Italian atrocities that had occurred during the Ethiopian campaign, a campaign which Badoglio had directed.24 Heated correspondence passed between London and Washington over Sforza and his plan, but

22Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 497-98.

23Ibid., pp. 496-503. Macmillan supported Churchill's views in these early days of the Badoglio government, but Murphy did not. Macmillan, Blast of War, p. 466.

in view of the King's absolute refusal to abdicate, the American government decided to accept a compromise proposed by General Eisenhower in November. Eisenhower, under the impression that Rome would soon be captured, recommended that if the stalemate between the six parties and the King could not be resolved, Badoglio and the King should continue to govern until the Allies captured Rome. Badoglio accepted the compromise and continued his cabinet of technicians.25

The Eisenhower compromise was acceptable until January, 1944, when the Allies landed at Anzio and hopes for reaching Rome looked promising. The debate began again with increasing intensity.26 In correspondence dated January 25, Cordell Hull informed the British he was "receiving indications continually from various serious sources that there is widespread feeling in this country concerning what appears to be our continued support of a discredited King." Hull also pointed out that political pressure from within the United States would make necessary a public statement of the President's position.27 Also influencing American attitudes

26 Ibid., pp. 1552-54.
were reports from the front that Italians from the North filtering through the lines had stated that Northern Italy desired the King's abdication and the establishment of a republic. Such a political change would increase Italian resistance against the Germans.\textsuperscript{28} The President and State Department felt that the Italian government should be reorganized on a broad political basis without further delay. Believing that political reconstruction under Victor Emmanuel was impossible, Roosevelt wanted his abdication. Because the King did not want to abdicate and would not willingly do so, the President and the State Department wanted him off the throne before the Allied armies captured Rome, fearing that the King's return to that city would increase his determination to retain power.\textsuperscript{29}

The British pressed for the King's return to Rome and suggested that an early Allied victory in Italy would benefit from a return to the capital of Badoglio and the King who would maintain the loyalty of the Italian armies and people.\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{28} Butcher, \textit{My Three Years with Eisenhower}, p. 442.


\textsuperscript{30} Foreign Relations, 1944, III, 1004.
Churchill argued that while allowing the King to return to Rome would seem to indicate Allied support, refusal would be "tantamount to direct opposition."\(^{31}\)

General opposition to the King became organized in early 1944. On January 28 and 29, representatives of the six anti-Fascist parties of liberated Italy held a meeting at Bari, which came to be known as the Bari Congress. Representatives from the Northern C.L.N. managed to attend by slipping through the front lines. Hoping to get leaders of the Communist and Socialist party organizations in the moderate Central C.L.N. to participate in a cabinet at least until the liberation of Rome, Badoglio also attended the conference. Again they refused.\(^{32}\) Becoming deadlocked over retention of the monarchy, the parties finally accepted a resolution calling for abdication of the present King and creation of an executive junta composed of one representative from each of the six parties.\(^{33}\)

The position taken by the Bari Congress received additional support from several sources. The Provisional

\(^{31}\)Ibid., pp. 1002-03.

\(^{32}\)Ibid., pp. 1010-11.

\(^{33}\)Ibid., pp. 1016-17. Kogan, Italy and the Allies, pp. 55-56.
Government of France wanted Victor Emmanuel removed. On January 24, their representative on the Allied Advisory Council in Algiers, Rene Massigli, had presented a formal demand for the "immediate abdication of the King."  

Adlai Stevenson, special assistant to the Secretary of the Navy, heading a mission sent to Italy during the winter of 1943 and 1944 to investigate reports of a dire economic situation, returned to the United States in January and reported:

It is the mission's observation that the present Italian government of the King and Marshall Badoglio command little respect or support among the people . . . . The present unhappy political situation will constitute a formidable obstacle to orderly and effective realization of our economic aims and operations.  

Frederich Reinhardt, who with Samuel Reber represented the political section of the Allied Control Commission while

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34 Macmillan, Blast of War, p. 478. The Advisory Commission was created at the Moscow Conference in October, 1943, in order to give Allied nations not active in the military theater in Italy some representation there. It consisted of representatives of Britain, the United States, the French National Committee, Greece and Yugoslavia.  


36 The Allied Control Commission was an organ of the United Nations which worked through the Italian government in areas governed by the King as opposed to replacing the Italian government as did the Allied Military Government in areas not under the King's control, but liberated from the Germans.
Robert Murphy was in America on leave, wrote to the State Department that he believed the Allies held the balance of power on the fate of the King and the Monarchy. He recommended that the six anti-Fascist parties be urged to design a program for government to be adopted at the liberation of Rome. On February 16, Harold Caccia and Samuel Reber approached several members of the executive junta created by the Congress at Bari and requested them to draw up a plan of government.

In response to the request of Reber and Caccia, the executive junta of the six anti-Fascist parties presented a policy statement which included:

1. Organization promptly of a government possessing all necessary powers and including representatives of each of the six parties.

2. A constituent assembly to be created immediately upon cessation of hostilities.

3. Abdication of Victor Emmanuel, although the constitutional question as a whole would have to be deferred out of necessity till all hostilities were ended.

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38 Kogan, Italy and the Allies, p. 56. Caccia was the British head of the Political Section of the Allied Control Commission. Macmillan had returned to London on February 12, for a three-week rest.

39 Foreign Relations, 1944, III, 1012. The Constitutional question was the question of the monarchy.
On February 7, the State Department sent a message to Allied Headquarters in Algiers demanding the King's immediate abdication. Macmillan expresses the British reaction in his memoirs:

The State Department have suddenly gone mad and sent the most extraordinary instructions to Reinhardt, who is acting in Murphy's place . . . . The State Department have told Reinhardt . . . (a) to tell Massigli that they agree with the French note and that they think the King should be 'removed' at once and a new Government be formed (apparently on a purely revolutionary basis and without any legal sanction), and (b) to tell the same thing to Sforza.

It would be difficult to imagine any diplomacy more crude or more futile. The French will immediately publish this demarche . . . of course emphasising the fact that they are in agreement with Washington and against London in the matter . . . .

Fortunately I was able to persuade Reinhardt not to carry out either of these instructions (without) . . . sending over to consult with Reber. Meanwhile I must telegraph the F.O. [Foreign Office] and get Winston to take it all up with the President direct and get Reber's instructions changed.

Macmillan went on to say that General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, who had recently replaced Eisenhower as Allied Commander in the Mediterranean favored strong action against the monarch but Macmillan persuaded him to abstain from doing anything until Churchill conferred with Roosevelt on the subject.


41 Ibid., p. 481. At this same time, Victor Emmanuel had informed British General MacFarlane, Chief of the Allied
By the middle of February, the Anzio advance which had begun so well for the Allies bogged down, and the capture of Rome once again no longer seemed imminent. In a memorandum Acting Secretary of State Edward Stettinius advised Reinhardt and Reber that the State Department was reversing instructions to force Victor Emmanuel's abdication. The Department wanted no effort made to alter the existing situation because the military situation in Italy was such that the Allies could not risk losing support of those Italians now aiding the Allied cause. At the same time, he also requested the British to announce a joint policy statement with the Americans assuring the C.L.N. of Allied consideration of their policy recommendations. Ignoring the State Department's request of assurances for the C.L.N., Prime Minister Churchill, in a speech to Parliament on February 29, publicly opposed any change in the Italian government at that time.

Control Commission for Italy, that since his position had become almost untenable 'because the Allies had permitted him to be openly discredited and attacked through the Psychological Warfare Board and lax censorship' he proposed to 'announce his son Prince Umberto' as his lieutenant with full powers." Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, pp. 1554-55. The King, however, never willingly made this announcement.

42 Foreign Relations, 1944, III, 1012-21.

The executive junta quite naturally considered Churchill's speech to be the Allied reply to their policy statement. The Prime Minister's statement infuriated Roosevelt who informed Churchill and the junta that it was no such thing. The President noted that the Combined Chiefs of Staff were still considering the subject and their reply was the only valid one. Throughout the month of March, Roosevelt and Churchill exchanged many cables seeking in vain to reconcile American and British viewpoints. Churchill, wanting delay, feared that a change in government at that time might result in the allies losing support of Italian military, naval, and air forces which were then aiding them. He believed it would be a grave error to yield to agitation and threats by politicians seeking office, and he emphasized that he did not believe they represented Italy or Italian democracy. He requested that Britain's 232,000 casualties and "extensive ship losses" prior to Italy's surrender be considered in any decision on the part of the President or the State Department. He asked the United States not declare for any solution in

44 Ibid., pp. 1554-55.
46 Macmillan, Blast of War, p. 481.
47 Churchill is referring to the six anti-Fascist parties.
Italy. Hull refused saying no declaration would in effect aid the King and Badoglio. Macmillan felt Washington simply did not understand the situation in Italy and lamented that since Eisenhower's command in the Mediterranean had been transferred to General Wilson, the British had lost influence in Washington.

With the President and Prime Minister unable to reach a satisfactory agreement, Secretary of State Hull referred the problem to the Advisory Council on March 24. The Advisory Council reached no solution either. The Americans, Soviets, and French supported by the military commanders in the Mediterranean favored change while the British government opposed it. Despite efforts by both sides, Anglo-American cooperation had broken down. The two nations had reached opposing positions which no compromise seemed able to reconcile, but outside factors intervened to impress upon the war-time allies the need for formulating common policy.


49 Macmillan, Blast of War, pp. 481-82. Macmillan wrote "the State Department would not venture to intervene against the recommendations of an American general. Or if they did, General Marshall and the War Department would come out in full cry and haunt the State Department to death. Now all that is changed.


51 Macmillan, Blast of War, pp. 482-87.
The decision of Palimiro Togliatti to form a cabinet under Badoglio regardless of who occupied the throne broke the deadlock. Following the occupation of Southern Italy, Togliatti, then in exile in Moscow, had requested permission to return to Italy. In January, 1944, the British and Americans had informed the Soviets that they were not opposed to Togliatti's return. Shortly after his return to Italy on March 28, Togliatti, under orders from Moscow, proposed that the anti-Fascist parties form a cabinet under Badoglio at once whether the King abdicated or not. This announcement placed the "liberal and moderate" parties in the awkward position of either reversing their staunchly anti-monarchical position or of watching Badoglio form a cabinet dominated by Communists and Socialists. Simultaneously, the Soviets unilaterally announced formal recognition of the Badoglio government, a move which infuriated both the United States and Britain and caused Churchill concern over possible growth of Soviet influence in Italy.

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53 Macmillan, Blast of War, pp. 489-90. The Socialists were still led by Nenni and consequently could be expected to follow a policy of cooperation with the Communists.
Churchill sent word to Macmillan that he no longer objected to the King's retirement provided "Umberto is created Lieutenant and Badoglio remains at the head of the Government."  

Robert Murphy's subsequent proposal to Macmillan that they demand the King's retirement to ease the position of the "liberal-moderate" parties, now received some support.  

On April 10, Murphy and Macmillan visited the King at his villa and demanded his immediate retirement, which he refused to give.  

After much deliberation, they reached a compromise in which the King agreed to announce immediately that he had "decided to withdraw from public affairs," and was appointing his son, Umberto, Lieutenant-General of Italy, with the transfer of power to go into effect when the Allied troops entered Rome.  

Macmillan recorded his own reflections on the American position concerning the compromise. "Although this was not what Murphy had wanted for the American public and the forthcoming

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56 Macmillan, *Blast of War*, p. 491. Macmillan was a sort of silent support in this venture. Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors*, p. 203.

elections, it was really good enough." In response to the King's announcement the executive junta agreed to form a government under Badoglio.

On April 24, a six party coalition took office, with Badoglio as Prime Minister, five Ministers without portfolio including Bennedeto Croce, Sforza and Togliatti, with the remaining offices distributed evenly among the six parties. "Churchill was pleased at our work, chiefly because Badoglio remained Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary and Sforza was only one of five Ministers without Portfolio." He was also pleased that a Christian Democrat had been appointed Minister of the Interior, a position Churchill feared might go to a Communist. Churchill's pleasure was short-lived, however, as Badoglio's cabinet remained in existence for only two months.

On June 4, the Allies captured Rome and on June 5, Victor Emmanuel transferred his powers to Umberto. Three days later, Umberto, Badoglio, Count Sforza and a representative from each of the C.L.N. parties met with the Roman

58 Macmillan, Blast of War, p. 494.
59 Ibid., pp. 495-96.
60 The King wanted to go to Rome and Churchill still favored this, but Roosevelt refused to agree.
Committee of National Liberation including Bonomi, de Gasperi, and Nenni. The proceedings were held in the presence of British General Mason MacFarlane. The Roman C.L.N. refused to form a cabinet under Badoglio. Badoglio and Umberto agreed to the formation of a new cabinet with Bonomi as Prime Minister and Count Sforza as Minister for Foreign Affairs. The United States considered the new cabinet very satisfactory. 

Churchill exploded. In a sharp communication he charged that the Allies had formal agreements only with Badoglio and that General MacFarlane was without authority to recognize a new government. MacFarlane, realizing the delicacy of his position, quickly amended his opinion to say that "the appointment of Count Sforza as Foreign Secretary would not meet with much approval on the part of the Allied governments . . . ." MacFarlane's decision made without consulting the Combined Chiefs of Staff, provoked an angry "protest from Washington . . . ." Churchill responded with an "irate telegram to the President" asserting that he considered Badoglio's replacement by 'this group of aged

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61 Macmillan, Blast of War, pp. 499-500.
62 Ibid., p. 500.
63 Ibid.
and hungry politicians' was a great disaster." He argued that the Advisory Council had not been consulted and that he had no recollection of giving the Italians "who had cost us so dearly in life and material, the right to form any government they chose."64

Churchill's diplomatic intemperance was matched by Secretary Hull's. The Secretary of State cabled the Prime Minister that the United States fully approved SforZA's appointment and strongly objected to MacFarlane's presumptuousness in speaking as though for both nations. Hull charged that the Prime Minister more basically "objected to the formation of the Bonomi Government itself."65 Hull personally concluded that any interference by the Allies at this time to alter the Bonomi government, a government both "friendly to the Allies and bitterly anti-Fascist and anti-Nazi" would be detrimental to the Allied policy "of encouraging the development of a truly democratic, representative government and would be generally misunderstood." After consulting General Wilson and the Advisory Council for Italy, Roosevelt advised Churchill that he opposed any attempt to

prevent the "prompt installation of Bonomi" and that Badoglio's withdrawal, while regretted, had to be considered in the light of "allaying charges at home" of Allied dealings with Fascists. Although Churchill had to accept the retirement of Badoglio, he prevented Sforza's appointment as Foreign Minister.

Bonomi remained in power until November, 1944, when a split between the left wing C.L.N. parties and the moderates caused a cabinet crisis. No single cause precipitated the November crisis; the cabinet itself was weak. Sumner Welles and Harold Macmillan offered different explanations for the situation:

Shifts in the Italian cabinet took place with great frequency. The cabinet's authority looked shadowy. No important decision could be reached without the prior approval of the Allied representatives. Even the most urgent measures for relief or reconstruction proposed by the cabinet were often vetoed for no understandable reason by the British members of the Allied Control Council.

The British government continued to pursue a policy which came to be regarded by the Italian people as primarily vindictive.

A series of intrigues and manoeuvres on the part of the parties of the left—in which the hand of Count Sforza was also plainly discernable—and their

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66 Ibid., p. 1564.
67 Welles, Where Are We Heading, p. 133.
attempt to gain a preponderance in the more important Cabinet offices finally induced Signor Bonomi on 26 November to tender his resignation. 68

The discord between the United States and Great Britain reached unprecedented heights when Bonomi attempted to form a new cabinet. Unable to come to terms with the Socialist and Action parties, Bonomi formed a cabinet with the other four, with himself as Prime Minister and Sforza as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Once again the British vetoed Sforza's appointment and Bonomi acquiesced, leaving de Gasperi, the leader of the Christian Democrats and Togliatti as the two most powerful members of the cabinet, aside from the Prime Minister. American liberals, tired of Churchill's use of military necessity for backing conservative elements in occupied countries to oppose liberals or leftists who had been the most aggressive in resisting Germans and Fascists, exploded over the veto and criticized the American State Department for its compliance. The new Secretary of State, Edward R. Stettinius, and Harry Hopkins, realizing Roosevelt's need for liberal support on future issues, decided Stettinius must reply. 69 On December 5, he publicly stated that the

68Macmillan, Blast of War, p. 558.

"composition of the Italian government is purely an Italian affair except in the case of appointments where important military matters are concerned." He reaffirmed United States' support for Count Sforza and announced that the State Department had informed the British that the United States expected the Italians to work out their governmental problems along democratic lines without outside influence. 70

Churchill's answer to Roosevelt has been termed "the most violent outburst of rage in all their historic correspondence." 71 He stated that he believed himself fully entitled to make the Italian Government aware of British views in this matter because they had been accorded the Mediterranean command, as the Americans had command in France. Further, he intended to defend his position in the House of Commons, asserting that in 1944, Sforza had broken his pledge to support Badoglio and that he was an intriguer and mischief-maker who could be trusted only to advance his own personal ambitions over the welfare of the Italian nation. Reminding Roosevelt of British support in other situations such as Allied dealings with French ex-Nazis, Churchill was


71 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 839.
personally hurt that Stettinius would publicly rebuke His Majesty's Government. He closed by stating that he "was much astonished at the acerbity of the State Department's communique to the public," and he intended to do his best to avoid an imitation of it in his reply. 72

In his reply to Churchill, Roosevelt apologized for any embarrassment caused by the State Department press release, but pointed out that while the British held command in the Mediterranean, Italy was still a combined Anglo-American responsibility. The British veto, made without any type of prior consultation with United States officials, had put the government in an untenable political position. Roosevelt advised that if future decisions of that magnitude were discussed prior to the issuing of public statements, repetition of the present embarrassing situation would be avoided. 73

The same afternoon, Michael Wright, Counselor of the British embassy brought a telegram to Stettinius from Anthony Eden indicating that British reaction to the Secretary's press release had been prompt and violent. Eden was concerned

72 Foreign Relations Malta and Valta, pp. 430-34.
73 Ibid.
lest Stettinius' statement might be applied to other liberated areas, especially Greece. Wright refused to leave the message with the Secretary, considering it "very personal" and "too unpleasant."

Stettinius replied that he regretted the situation, but believed his statement was merely a reaffirmation of the principles agreed to by the Allies at the Moscow Conference in 1943, and was therefore justified. Reiterating Roosevelt's reply to Churchill, he stated that the British must take responsibility for the incident because they had not consulted their American allies prior to the Sforza veto.

Wright agreed, but advised that such disputes were better aired in private not in public. He also explained that the American statement had come at a very bad time for Churchill and Eden, who were having to defend Allied positions in Italy and Greece in the House of Commons that same week. In order to relieve the situation, Stettinius promised to send a conciliatory telegram to Eden and to hold a press conference supporting Churchill's position in Greece.

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74 Ibid.
75 Ibid., pp. 430-434. At the Moscow conference the Allies had formed the Allied Advisory Council to discuss Allied policy in regard to liberated areas, and the British making a unilateral decision violated this agreement.
76 Ibid.
Stettinius' actions combined with a vote of solid support by the House of Commons for Eden and Churchill on the veto of Sforza succeeded in reducing tensions. Exigencies of war and the necessity for close cooperation convinced both sides to let the matter die, but in the spring of 1945, the Allies renounced the right to veto appointments by the Italian government. With this announcement, followed shortly by the expulsion of the Germans from Italy, the major political differences over Italy ended.
CHAPTER IV

ITALY: RELIEF AND REHABILITATION

After the overthrow of Mussolini and the initial attempts to arrange peace, Italy's primary diplomatic objectives were to ease the wartime misery of its people and to improve its negotiating position for post-war settlement. Italy requested material aid, moved to wrest control of its internal affairs from the Allies, and attempted to improve its low status as a defeated nation. American leaders, holding no particular vendetta against the Italian people per se and influenced by a large, vocal Italian-American population, were generally willing to consider Italian requests. The British, on the other hand, bitter over three years of fighting, found any Italian request that was not absolutely necessary to further the Allied military campaign difficult to consider.

Economic Relief and Rehabilitation

The King and Badoglio had surrendered to the Allies hoping thus to spare the Italian populace the economic

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1Roosevelt made a clear distinction between the Italian people whom he felt had been forced into an unpopular war and their criminal Fascist leadership.
hardship and deprivation resulting from a war on their native soil. However, the Allied failure to secure a quick victory in Northern Italy resulted in the very conditions they hoped to avoid. Southern Italy, with its mountainous terrain and lack of raw materials, had always been an impoverished section of the country. Industrialization and agriculture were concentrated in the northern and central sections of the peninsula. Beginning in 1942, effects of the war were felt in growing shortages of food, fuel and consumer goods. By the fall of 1943, Allied bombing of transportation facilities, the loss of northern supplies, and the presence of an occupying army combined to produce a desperate situation.

From 1943 to 1947, the Allied powers assumed responsibility for Italy's well-being. Harold Macmillan, who by November, 1944, as President of the Allied Control Commission, was responsible for the Italian economy, expressed Allied attitudes.

The invasion and occupation of one country by another necessarily bring with them many difficulties and responsibilities. The more primitive nations in the past have solved the former by evading the latter. Conquest has often meant the slaughter of the aged and the mass deportation of the able-bodied, male and female, into slavery. The Germans followed these horrible precedents of savage times, especially in Eastern Europe. But civilised armies, defending high
principles cannot find this easy way out. They start as conquerors, but soon find themselves trustees.\textsuperscript{2}

Allied armies began relief assistance under a joint British-American directive issued in December, 1943, ordering that food rations be administered to the population in the amount necessary to prevent disease and unrest behind the lines. The military carried the burden of relief until the spring of 1945, when the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency was authorized to provide a limited program and when private relief which had been collecting in the United States for over a year began to arrive in Italy.

From the outset of Allied relief activities, the Americans and the British disagreed over the amount and the type of aid. Churchill, bitter over three years of battle with Italian armies was not inclined to be overly indulgent in feeding and rebuilding that country. In June, 1944, he wrote Macmillan, "that the Italians should be made aware that their troubles were their own fault, first because of years of unsound policy, and secondly because Italy had declared war on us and that was the only reason we found ourselves now on Italian soil."\textsuperscript{3} Roosevelt, anxious to secure

\textsuperscript{2}Macmillan, \textit{Blast of War}, p. 453.

\textsuperscript{3}Ibid., p. 543. Macmillan was shocked by Churchill's attitude which he thought, while true, was neither generous nor constructive.
political support from the Italian-American community for the 1944 elections, continuously pressed Churchill for additional concessions which would at least appear generous.

In response to Italian-American agitation for assistance to Italy, Roosevelt appointed Adlai Stevenson, special assistant to the Secretary of the Navy, to head a fact-finding mission under the sponsorship of the Foreign Economic Administration. After investigating conditions in Italy during the winter of 1943-1944, the mission reported the situation as deplorable with malnutrition prevalent and disease threatening. Taking issue with the minimum subsistence concept in the December directive, the mission advised a shift in emphasis from mere relief to rehabilitation of agriculture and selected industries in order that the country might soon become self-supporting in food and essential consumer goods. The American government then presented proposals to the British that the Allies allocate necessary provisions to implement Stevenson's recommendations. Roosevelt wanted a public announcement of this new Allied policy. The British rejected the proposals on grounds that such a policy would be objectionable to British public opinion and to Allied powers, such as Greece and Yugoslavia, still under axis occupation. Further, public declaration
of a policy of rehabilitation would limit Allied prerogatives at the peace table, as the Allies could hardly demand reparations from a nation they had publicly pledged to rebuild. The British requested that the President reconsider his proposal, adding that if a public statement still seemed necessary, it would be unwise to reveal their differences of opinion.  

Unhappy with Britain's refusal to accept the United States proposals, but not prepared to break with Churchill over the matter, Roosevelt hoped to impress Italian-American political groups with his concern by appointing Colonel William O'Dwyer, a leading New York Democratic politician, as head of the economic section of the Allied Control Commission on June 23, 1944. O'Dwyer then took a second fact-finding mission to Rome, spending approximately eight weeks in Italy. Upon his return in September, he told reporters that the Italian situation regarding food, health and infant mortality rates was so alarming that he had rushed back to Washington to place facts and figures before Roosevelt and the American public. To impress upon reporters the urgency of Italian problems, he informed them that the

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4 Kogan, Italy and the Allies, p. 82.

infant mortality rate had risen from 287 per 1000 in June, 1943, to 397 per 1000 in June of 1944, and to a high of 438 per 1000 one month later.\textsuperscript{6} In his report to the President, O'Dwyer advised that low Italian morale was threatening the survival of the Bonomi government, and that unless hunger, disease and unemployment were relieved by additional aid and partial rehabilitation of industry, rioting, bloodshed and anarchy would occur. He recommended the allocation of increased shipping space for supplies, provision of trucks for supply transportation and increased Italian self-government to buoy the faltering Bonomi cabinet.\textsuperscript{7}

Not satisfied by Roosevelt's gestures, Italian-Americans made Italy an issue in the Presidential campaign by demanding increased aid to Italy. Thomas Dewey, Governor of New York and Republican Presidential candidate, charged that the Roosevelt administration was doing very little for Italy. The Mazzini Society followed Dewey's charges with their own investigation into what the American government was doing. Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson informed them in a letter dated November 3, that the Allies had provided over

\textsuperscript{6}\textit{New York Times}, September 5, 1944, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{7}\textit{Foreign Relations Washington and Quebec}, pp. 210-11.
2,300,000 tons of basic foodstuffs and supplies, repaired and restored transportation, sewage and electrical facilities, restored postal services and had allocated over 15,000 tons of additional food and $8,000,000 of medical supplies for children and expectant mothers. Added to the Italian-American community's influence was the weight of the Catholic hierarchy. On September 1, Pope Pius XII made a public appeal for aid to Italy.

Certainly, knowing as we do the deep misery into which vast areas of Italy have fallen, we remind those whose countries have ample resources and abundant food harvests not to hold them back for the sake of greater profits from those who are starving, mindful of the terrible punishments that the Eternal Judge reserves for those who have no pity for their suffering brethren.

Following the Pope's appeal, the State Department advised Roosevelt that survival of the Bonomi government was

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8 United States and Italy, 1936-1946, pp. 94-95. The food and medical supplies had been allocated by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, the organization Acheson intended to distribute them. The United States, against strong opposition, had convinced delegations at the UNRRA conference in Montreal in September to authorize fifty million dollars for aid to Italy in violation of the organization's charter which forbade aid to belligerent states. Due to shipping shortages, the food and medical supplies actually did not become available until April, 1945. Hajo Holborn, American Military Government: Its Organization and Policies (Washington, 1947), p. 14.

essential for development of a stable democratic Italy. Because "The economic well-being of a country is the prime factor in its internal stability and its peaceful relations with other states" and because the United States was providing most of the supplies for relief, the department concluded that it was "sound American policy to help Italy become self-supporting and to regain a measure of economic independence at an early date."\textsuperscript{10}

In response to domestic pressures, Roosevelt had concluded simultaneously that it was sound political policy to provide Italy with more substantive concessions before November, and he worked to secure Churchill's cooperation at a series of meetings in Quebec in September of 1944. Churchill finally agreed to several general measures to ease the Italian plight. Specific details were to be worked out through subsequent negotiations. British and American representatives to the UNRRA council were to declare in favor of sending medical aid and other essential supplies to Italy. At the same time, measures for reconstruction of power systems, roads, railways and other communications were to be initiated. In addition, Trading with the Enemy Acts were to be modified to enable restoration of Italian

\textsuperscript{10} \textit{Foreign Relations Washington and Quebec}, pp. 207, 413.
business contacts with the Allied powers. In deference to Churchill, Roosevelt agreed that reconstruction measures would be primarily military for utilization of Italy's full resources in the war. This reservation was to be an integral component of the new Allied policies which were announced on September 26 by the President and Prime Minister in a joint statement on their agreements at Quebec.

Roosevelt still felt compelled to make further gestures toward the Catholic-Italian-American political coalition. In a press statement on October 4, the President announced the scheduled shipment of 150,000 tons of wheat and flour to Italy along with 1,700 trucks to facilitate transportation of goods. To reemphasize this increase of wheat, a week before the election, Roosevelt allowed leakage of information concerning Presidential instructions to Secretary of War Stimson advising Allied Headquarters to provide liberated Italy an increase in the bread ration from one hundred to

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11 The United States and Italy, 1936-1946, p. 89.

12 Leahy, I Was There, p. 265. Industrial rehabilitation for war purposes had been going on since 1943. This pledge amounted to very little because military reconstruction was already an accomplished fact. What was needed was rehabilitation of consumer industries and this was left until after the war. Kogan, Italy and the Allies, p. 86.

13 The United States and Italy, 1936-1946, pp. 89-90.
three hundred grams a day.\textsuperscript{14} In addition to increased wheat shipments, Roosevelt announced that the United States unilaterally, was granting the Italian government a credit in dollars equivalent to Italian lire issued to American troops in Italy. This credit made United States dollars available to Italy for the purchase of essential civilian supplies and for stemming rampant inflation.\textsuperscript{15}

The promise of wheat shipments and dollar credits aggravated the British who had no advance knowledge of the announcement. Roosevelt's offer of an increase in wheat and flour shipments came at a very inopportune time. Lack of shipping had resulted in a drastic wheat shortage throughout the Mediterranean and implementation of Roosevelt's orders was impossible. As Italians bombarded local Allied military government officers with demands for the increased rations, Allied Headquarters was forced to countermand publicly the President's policy. The British angrily complained that Roosevelt's promise of goods that could not be delivered undermined Allied prestige.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{14}Kogan, \textit{Italy and the Allies}, p. 87.

\textsuperscript{15}United States and Italy, 1936-1946, pp. 91-92.

\textsuperscript{16}Kogan, \textit{Italy and the Allies}, p. 87.
Italy's monetary problems had been a topic of discussion between the English and Americans for some time and no agreement had been reached. Under article twenty-three of the "Long Armistice," the Italians were responsible for lire spent by Allied troops in Italy. An arbitrary rate of exchange had been set, with one hundred lire and four hundred lire equivalent to the dollar and the pound sterling respectively. The Italians, believing this exchange rate greatly undervalued the lire, blamed the Allies for Italy's inflation and continually requested an adjustment. At the Quebec Conference in September, 1944, Roosevelt proposed crediting Italy with a dollar equivalent of the lire issued to American troops as pay. Britain's ambassador, Lord Halifax sent an aide-memoire to Secretary Hull in which he rejected the American proposal on the grounds that Allies still under Axis domination would not understand such generosity. Further, the British feared that such a concession to Italy would result in requests from allies for

17 In July, 1944, Secretary Hull suggested inviting an Italian representative to the Financial and Monetary Conference in Bretton Woods, but was unable to do so because of strong British and French opposition. He then invited an Italian technical mission to the United States for discussions of Italian financial problems. Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, p. 1569. Foreign Relations Malta and Yalta, p. 277.
at least equal concessions--requests that would be justifiable on the grounds that allies certainly deserved better treatment than an ex-enemy. In spite of British arguments, the State Department, concerned over Italy's internal situation and the upcoming election, decided to implement the American proposal.\(^1\) British irritation over this decision was further aggravated by the fact that they themselves were so far in debt that they were not in an economic position to follow suit.\(^2\)

Roosevelt's re-election reduced the necessity for publicizing Allied aid to Italy, and this in turn reduced the necessity for public conflict with Churchill. Nonetheless the United States continued to make a genuine effort to improve the Italian situation and the British resisted each American move.\(^3\) After agreeing to extend UNRRA assistance to Italy, the British tried to prevent the shipment of any additional aid.\(^4\) Ignoring this opposition, American Relief for Italy, a private organization established by Myron Taylor,

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\(^{3}\) The British carried this policy all the way to 1947, when they tried to prevent Italy from participating in the Marshall plan. Kogan, *Italy and the Allies*, p. 170.

\(^{4}\) The British attitude was influenced by the shortage of Allied vessels available for any type of shipping.
the President's personal representative to the Pope, shipped considerable supplies beginning in the spring of 1945.  

By February, British and American negotiators completed proposals to implement the Quebec agreements. These proposals were presented to the State Department, but the Department, very disappointed, felt the agreements fell far short of what was needed to preserve Italian stability and refused to consent to a public statement on the proposals. After several days of negotiations, this decision was reversed in the hope that further British concessions would be made in the near future. On February 26, Macmillan issued an aide-memoire which included a promise of Allied assistance in rehabilitating Italian industry. He also promised a continuation of the flow of supplies into Italy but persisted in relating this to military necessity. In spite of their limited nature, Macmillan's promises were jubilantly received by the Italian population.

After Roosevelt's death, President Harry Truman continued the American policy of concern for the pathetic economic

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22 Welles, Where are We Heading, p. 137. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, II, 1093-1095.

23 Foreign Relations Malta and Yalta, p. 985.

24 Ibid., pp. 963-64.

situation in Italy. In a response to a report by Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commissioner Rear Admiral Ellery Stone, in which he stated that Italian hardship was making the country ripe for communism, Truman stepped up shipments and gained congressional approval for increased funds for Italian aid. By 1947, the situation was greatly improved and the crisis was over, largely because of American efforts.

The Search for Status

When Bedell Smith and Brigadier General Strong met General Castellano at Lisbon in 1943, they were surprised to discover that Italy was not actually interested in surrender, but in switching sides in the war. In reply to Italian queries, the Allies explained that the only official terms were unconditional surrender, but unofficially, the Italians were led to believe that they would be allowed to "work their passage" to better status through aid to the Allies. For the next three years every Italian government worked to achieve the status of ally.

26 Foreign Relations Potsdam, I, 688.

27 A phrase coined by Norman Kogan, in Italy and the Allies.

28 Churchill originally discussed the Italians "working their passage" to describe Italy's role in her own status improvement and the phrase was later generally adopted.
Immediately after the Italian surrender, the Badoglio government began efforts to gain Allied status for Italy. The United States and Great Britain believed that such status at that time would be unacceptable to public opinion in both countries, and would jeopardize the Allied position at the negotiating table. Eisenhower suggested a compromise between surrender and alliance—a status of co-belligerency. Several reasons recommended this idea. First, an Italian declaration of war would provide a psychological advantage to the Allies by isolating Germany in Europe. In addition, the shortage of Allied manpower available for governing Southern Italy necessitated some Italian assistance, and improved status might encourage more active Italian participation and cooperation. Further on September 12, German troops had rescued Mussolini and had established a puppet regime in Northern Italy; this regime was challenging the legitimacy of the Badoglio government, and Eisenhower hoped improved status might bolster Badoglio's position. Accordingly, the Allies offered the compromise position of co-belligerency in return for which the King was expected to declare war on Germany, and Badoglio to broaden the base of his government. On October 13, Badoglio announced a

29 Butcher, My Three Years With Eisenhower, pp. 423-25.
formal declaration of war against Germany, and Italy became a co-belligerent. This constituted Italy's first advance toward Allied status.\footnote{Co-belligerency was an undefined term with no real status in international law. The Viscount Cranborne noted in a speech to the House of Lords that Britain was technically still at war with Italy until the peace treaty was signed. In effect, "Italy was an enemy state fighting at the side of its enemies, against a former ally." Kogan, \textit{Italy and the Allies}, pp. 45-46.}

Upon attaining co-belligerency Badoglio requested the right to announce Italy's adherence to the Atlantic Charter. Roosevelt was ready to agree to this request, but the British objected strenuously, believing such a concession would hinder Allied imposition of sanctions in the final peace treaties. "The French, Greek, and Royal Yugoslav governments, all of which had claims against Italy, territorial and otherwise," concurred with the British. Although the Americans argued the point for three months, they finally yielded in the face of united opposition.\footnote{Ibid., p. 67. Hull, \textit{The Memoirs of Cordell Hull}, p. 1559.}

In April, 1944, another attempt by Italian leaders to achieve Allied status for their country failed. Earlier, in February, Victor Emmanuel had written to King George on the subject of an alliance. The British King, replying through Prime Minister Churchill, flatly stated that "there
never had been any question of an alliance," so far as Italy was concerned. At the same time Badoglio had written to Roosevelt. Roosevelt had replied that although he could not agree to Allied status at that time, he would reconsider when Badoglio broadened the composition of his government to include representatives from each of the six anti-Fascist parties. In April, following expansion of his government along the lines that Roosevelt had indicated, Badoglio reminded the president of his promise. Subsequently Roosevelt, under pressure from important Italian-American groups, wrote the British that although he was aware that Allied status for Italy would not be viewed favorably by Britain, Yugoslavia, Greece, and the Free French, he desired to grant Badoglio's request with the understanding that a peace treaty would still have to be signed at the end of the war. The British still rejected any change in Italy's status. While admitting that co-belligerency did warrant consideration, they maintained that further improvement in Italy's position was not needed for the war effort, and granting Allied status would jeopardize unnecessarily Allied

32 Kogan, Italy and the Allies, pp. 42-43.
claims at the peace table. Again, the President decided to bow to the wishes of his allies, and Badoglio received no reply.

In addition to application for Allied status, the Italian government worked for full use of Italian military power against Germany, hoping to gain indirectly what had been denied upon direct application. A degree of evidence encouraged their belief that this means might be successful. At the time of Italian surrender Eisenhower had been directed to make "vigorous use" of Italian troops, and Churchill had indicated a willingness to allow Italy to improve her position through military assistance. However, in spite of his encouraging words, Churchill repeatedly blocked the employment of Italian troops. Part of his opposition was based on purely practical rationale. Following Allied landings, the Italian army, for the most part, had disintegrated, and that which remained intact was ill-equipped and of low morale. Further, British soldiers who had been fighting

34 Ibid., pp. 1559-68. Throughout the spring of 1944, Italian pressure groups demanded improvement of Italy's position. Mayor Fiorella La Guardia, Republican Mayor of New York City, began "a strong drive to have Italy recognized as an Ally, and made the recipient of lend-lease aid, the Italian-American Council came to La Guardia's support." Kogan, Italy and the Allies, pp. 67-68.

Italians for three years found that built-up resentment was difficult to overcome. Churchill's basic opposition was the same as he gave for other Italian requests: his fear of strengthening Italy's peace-table position. The British successfully resisted the use of Italian troops until August, 1944, when diversion of Allied troops to Southern France necessitated their replacement with 45,000 Italian soldiers.\(^{36}\)

Use of Italian prisoners of war also raised questions for the Allies. In propaganda statements to the Italians prior to signing the short armistice, Eisenhower indicated Italian prisoners of war might be released in exchange for Allied prisoners. Because Germany removed Allied prisoners from areas in danger of being captured by the Allies, the exchange was not made. In October, 1943, the Chief of the Allied Military Mission requested the right to use Italian prisoners of war for non-combat duty. Seeing this request as an opportunity to participate more fully in the war, Italy agreed, provided the prisoner status was changed, as required by Article thirty-one of the Geneva Convention, which prohibited their use in work directly connected with war efforts. Facing a labor shortage, the Americans negotiated

\(^{36}\)Kogan, *Italy and the Allies*, pp. 70-75. Alexander's replacement of Eisenhower as commander in Italy put Churchill in the position to rule on the use of Italian troops.
a compromise with the Italians in which Italian officers under an Allied command would form Italian labor and combat units. The Americans were pleased with this arrangement and submitted the proposal to the British. Churchill, determined to avoid any measure which might give Italy additional bargaining power at the peace conference vetoed the proposal, while at the same time maintaining that necessity justified use of Italian prisoners for war work. Churchill thus preferred violating international law to any improvement in Italy's status. The following January, the Allies asked Badoglio to relinquish Italian protections under the Geneva Convention by allowing use of prisoners with no change in status. Badoglio refused. But, in May, he learned that the prisoners were being activated despite his objections. He filed a protest through the Chief of the Allied Control Commission, but received no reply. Throughout the remainder of the war, Italian prisoners were used in the Allied war effort without change of status.

In May, 1944, the question of improved status for Italy was raised again, but this time by the American public. On May 5, Congressman Vito Marcantonio of New York introduced

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37 Ibid., pp. 68-71.
38 Ibid.
a resolution in the House of Representatives calling for resumption of full diplomatic relations with Italy.\textsuperscript{39}

On June 13, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House held open hearings on Congressman Marcantonio's resolution. Italian-American groups rallied to the cause with Mayor La Guardia as one of their chief spokesmen. By early October, the subject of Italian status had become an election issue with both President Roosevelt and Governor Dewey supporting diplomatic recognition.\textsuperscript{40} The State Department again negotiated with Britain describing recognition not as a reestablishment of peace, but as acknowledgment of Italy's war effort.\textsuperscript{41} The British reaffirmed their previous position maintaining British public opinion would not sanction such a move at this stage of the war. They questioned the wisdom of establishing full relations with Italy while refusing to accord the same courtesy to the French government in Paris. In addition, such a move might establish a precedent upon which other enemy nations such as Bulgaria and Rumania could claim equal privileges.\textsuperscript{42}


\textsuperscript{40}Ibid., p. 81.

\textsuperscript{41}Hull, \textit{The Memoirs of Cordell Hull}, p. 1568.

\textsuperscript{42}Ibid., p. 1567.
While negotiating with Britain, the State Department garnered support elsewhere. By late October, the Soviet Union and the South American republics agreed to grant Italy full diplomatic status. On October 26, Acting Secretary of State Edward Stettinius announced that on November 14, the President would ask the Senate to approve the nomination of Alexander C. Kirk, the American Advisory Council Representative, as American Ambassador to Italy. The Senate confirmed the nomination and by spring, Ambassadors were presented by both Italy and the United States. The Latin American nations followed suit. The Soviet Union had had an Ambassador in Italy since their unilateral recognition of Badoglio. The British refused, and although they gave their High Commissioner in Italy the rank of Ambassador, full diplomatic relations were not restored until ratification of the formal peace treaty.

At the same time that the American Congress and public pressed for resumption of formal diplomatic relations with Italy, the Bonomi government, fearful of the detrimental
effect of the long armistice on its political position, requested a revision. On August 23, Hull responded that he was not unsympathetic to their request. He believed the chances for revision were good as Churchill himself had suggested an early peace treaty in the spring of 1944. The Americans had responded favorably at that time but little was done. When Hull reopened the question following Bonomi's request, Churchill reversed his previous position. Still angry over the replacement of Badoglio by Bonomi, he replied that while he had favored an early peace treaty designed to support Badoglio's government which he considered the only legally established one, he would not consider supporting a regime which did not represent the whole of Italy.

At the Quebec Conference, Roosevelt did not attempt to force Churchill to accept a complete armistice revision, but he did insist on a favorable adjustment of the terms. The Roosevelt-Churchill statement of September 26 promised a relaxation of control by the Allied Control Commission, symbolized by the removal of the word control from the commission's name. In Macmillan's aide-memoire of February 26, the Allies outlined the promised relaxation of controls more specifically. The Allied Commission was returning control

47 Ibid., p. 88.
of day to day administrative problems to the Italian government and withdrawing most of its local and regional staffs, closing all regional offices in the areas of Italy under the King's control. Allied veto over Italian legislation and appointments was relinquished and censorship over Italian arts and education relaxed, with arrangements to be made to facilitate the flow of books and other publications between Italy and Allied nations. Roosevelt and the State Department were disappointed with Churchill's meager concessions, and although they agreed to allow Macmillan's announcement, they continued to work for further improvement in the Italian situation.

The Italians made one other attempt to improve their status. In the spring, 1945, they requested permission to participate in the San Francisco Conference for the establishment of the United Nations organization. While not willing to grant Italy delegate status, the United States supported their participation as observers. However, France, Britain and the Soviet Union were against Italian participation in any form, and Italy's request was denied.

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48 Ibid., pp. 107-10.
49 Kogan, Italy and the Allies, p. 112.
In the summer of 1945, changing circumstances raised Italy's hopes for obtaining Allied status. Churchill, long the primary obstacle to advancing the Italian position, lost the July election to the Labor Party. Ernest Bevin, the Labor Foreign Minister, was quoted as saying "we must not continue to treat Italy as if Mussolini were still in power." In addition, the Allies allowed Italy to declare war against Japan, something the Italians had been asking since the early days of co-belligerency.

In view of this declaration of war, President Harry S. Truman, who had succeeded Roosevelt after his death in April, tried to get agreement on Italian admission to the World Organization. On July 14, the United States informed the British ambassador that as Italy had declared war on Japan, the State Department planned to support Italian membership in the United Nations. The British, angrily requested delay until after the Potsdam Conference. Resentful of the "take it or leave it" tone of the American note, the British were irritated further by the short notice made more crucial by the absence of both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary from the country, an absence which

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50 Ibid., p. 116.
51 Ibid., p. 117.
the American State Department was fully aware. In their reply, the British stated that "in view of all Great Britain had had to put up with from Italy during the war, they were entitled to more consideration from United States authorities." Nevertheless, on July 17, the first day of the Potsdam Conference, Truman proposed the admission of Italy to the United Nations. The British rejected the proposal, again referring to Italy's early attacks on France and Britain and heavy British losses in the Mediterranean. Although Truman's proposal was defeated, Italy received assurance from the Allies that following a peace settlement admission would be secured.

When Truman took office in April, he immediately asked Stettinius to prepare a report on United States relations with various foreign nations. In this report, the Secretary of State discussed the "anomaly of Italy's dual status," that of co-belligerent and enemy; he pointed out that any improvements in Italy's situation had resulted from American

52 Foreign Relations Potsdam, I, 304, 622.

53 In spite of his earlier assessment of Italy's treatment under Churchill, Bevin did not significantly alter British behavior.

54 Kogan, Italy and the Allies, p. 117.
efforts against "the British policy of keeping Italy dependent." The following June, Secretary of State ad Interim Joseph Grew reiterated Stettinius's sentiments in a pre-Potsdam briefing. He advised Truman that a moderate left movement in Italy was inevitable, but that unless Italian morale was raised and the Italian government given more autonomy and recognition, a radical leftward movement would develop. Truman, after reviewing the situation, decided that dual status was slowing Italy's return to economic and political stability. A peace treaty would solve the situation, but would take months to prepare. However, for the interim, Truman favored a revised armistice, negating both the long and short armistices. He concluded that Italy's continued designation as a co-belligerent did not recognize her contributions to the war effort, and allowed other allies to oppose every attempt to facilitate her return to the family of nations on grounds that she was an ex-enemy, not an ally.

At Potsdam, Truman presented a proposal for revision of the Italian armistice. His proposal was rejected but an

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55 Truman, Memoirs, pp. 14-16.
56 Foreign Relations Potsdam, I, 681-82.
agreement was reached providing that negotiations on the Italian peace treaty would be the first order of business for the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in the fall.

The following month the Council of Foreign Ministers met in London and negotiations began on the Italian peace treaty which were initially unsuccessful. When the Council reached no agreement, Truman again raised the question of new armistice terms and negotiations between the Allies on revision continued for several months. In the meantime, Britain agreed to relax controls, hoping these concessions would strengthen the Italian government against challenge from the left, while avoiding invalidation of the original armistice agreements. The Soviets supported the United States on this issue, and on May 16, 1946, the Foreign Ministers at Paris agreed on a revised armistice. The Allies recognized Italy's co-belligerent status and invalidated the long armistice. Months of American diplomatic efforts finally succeeded.

58 Most military controls were removed, the Allied Military Government returned control of Northern Italy to the Italian government, the Allied Commission was abolished and replaced by a small supervisory committee set up to oversee the Italian armed forces and prisoners of war were repatriated. Kogan, Italy and the Allies, pp. 117, 126.
CONCLUSION

What Yalta and Potsdam were to the post-war settlements, the Casablanca conference was to the conduct of the war, for it was there that Allied strategy for the rest of the war in Europe was decided. The British believed that victory could be achieved only by employing the traditional method of forcing the opposition to overstretch their armies and supply lines. In addition, they perceived more clearly than the Americans the significance of the geographic disposition of Allied armies at the war's end and the implications of such dispositions for Europe's political future. Churchill believed if the Americans pulled out of the Mediterranean, that theater would remain closed to Anglo-American forces permanently. Even a successful Anglo-American cross channel invasion would merely result in an exchange of Soviet for German military control of the area. Realizing that Casablanca would irrevocably decide the future strategy of the war, Churchill put everything he had into that conference. In other conferences he would allude to British sacrifices, argue his case eloquently, and compromise reluctantly, but he would never again use the extreme tactics used at Casablanca.
Until Casablanca, the Americans had considered the Mediterranean only a temporary phase of the war, a phase which was to be concluded early in 1943. Underestimating German strength, General Marshall believed that a direct cross channel invasion would bring the quickest end to the fighting. The Americans were caught completely unprepared for the British onslaught of evidence to support their arguments supplied by the War Office's floating reference library, and any attempt to marshall their forces against the persuasive British was defeated by their own lack of unity and Roosevelt's lack of support and leadership in contrast with Churchill's dominance and British unity.

In spite of the fact that the Americans tried to renege on the Casablanca agreements and that the Mediterranean front was never given adequate men or supplies, German preoccupation with protecting southern and southeastern flanks, as predicted by Churchill, resulted in her being unable to supply adequate troops to repel the Allied cross channel invasion when it did occur. To further support Churchill's position, it is only necessary to study the difficulties the Allies experienced with the invasion of Western Europe in 1944, after a considerable increase in Allied men and supplies, and a considerable dispersement of German men and supplies.
One can only conclude that a cross-channel invasion in 1943 would have been at best premature, at worst fatal.

The strong desire of most Americans to get on with the war in the Pacific leads the historian to conjecture what effect a disastrous and humiliating defeat of an attempted cross-channel invasion in 1943 might have had on the future of western Europe. If Hitler had offered the United States a generous peace with a free hand in the Pacific in exchange for equal German rights in a Europe already effectively dominated, could Roosevelt have refused? Events have vindicated Churchill's strategy. His assessment has been supported by historians, verified by German leaders and recognized by their Japanese allies.

Churchill must be applauded for his performance at Casablanca and his sound military judgment, but the failure of the Allies to exploit their victory in Sicily to full advantage and take control of all Italy while the opportunity was ripe must be attributed in the main to Churchill's overpreoccupation with Italy's political future with a secondary condemnation of Roosevelt's inaction. Political questions could have been dealt with after military priorities had been met, and probably dealt with more effectively. Churchill clearly misplaced his priorities in defiance of the opinions
of both American and British military and political advisors in the Mediterranean. Roosevelt, rather than back up his own advisors, allowed Churchill to waste precious time, again displaying a critical lack of leadership. Churchill's efforts to protect the monarchy and his insistence on detailed surrender terms (many of which were already obsolete and later negated) resulted in a six-week lapse between the fall of Sicily and the Allied landing on the Italian mainland, during which time most of Italy was lost to the Germans as well as the opportunity to occupy territory close to Germany's own Southern border, area it later took two years to capture.

Churchill's preoccupation with future political control of Italy not only damaged Allied military strategy, but also unnecessarily prolonged political and economic chaos for the Italian people. His natural conservatism and his desire to preserve the Italian monarchy led him to support a discredited monarch who was a Fascist and an incompetent with little regard for his own people. Churchill's position is made even more indefensible by his persistent persecution of Count Carlo Sforza, a proven anti-Fascist who was basically as conservative as Churchill himself. The British Prime Minister's attitudes were based on personal prejudice and not political judgment, and he carried these prejudices to
the point where he would rather have seen a potentially stable Italian government fall than Sforza in a position of power. In addition, Churchill's vindictiveness against the Italian people because of their role in the early years of the war prevented him from rendering the aid that would have made living conditions tolerable, irrespective of the fact that economic problems undermined the very governments and monarchy he hoped to keep in power.

Roosevelt, on the other hand, desired to see a republican form of government installed in Italy and exhibited a benevolent attitude toward left-of-center political groups. A lack of unified policy between Churchill and the President as to what form of government Italy should have thus further prevented the effective functioning of any Italian government. However, Roosevelt's attention to Italy was in direct proportion to domestic political pressures in the United States. Not until the 1944 election did he personally attempt to actually interfere with Churchill's handling of Italian political or economic problems. His interference at that time was generally confined to grandiose announcements of relief programs made without adequate prior consultation with the British and which later had to be refuted as impracticable by Allied Headquarters. His unilateral
announcements did little to ameliorate conditions in Italy, but did much to exacerbate friction with the British. Following his reelection, however, Roosevelt did little to implement his expressed intentions and tensions eased. In view of Roosevelt's inclination to leave Italy to Churchill except when domestic political pressures forced him to take a stand, it is somewhat doubtful that Roosevelt himself had any genuine interest in Italian problems at all.

Roosevelt was basically uninterested in military strategy, preferring to leave it to his generals unless political forces compelled him to do otherwise. His lack of interest carried over into the occupational period until such time as political forces again compelled him to take a strong, though short-lived stand. Italy's desperate economic situation as reported by both Stevenson and O'Dwyer was not noticeably improved until late 1946, when Harry Truman had become President. Part of the reason for this was an actual lack of shipping for transportation of goods. However, the most important reason for the situation was the attitudes of Roosevelt and Churchill, neither of whom heeded the advice of their own advisors who repeatedly warned them of the need to correct the Italian situation. Churchill deserves a great deal of credit for his perceptive understanding of the European military situation.
and for his ability to outmaneuver the Americans, keeping them fighting in an area in which they had no desire to be. However, he undermined his achievement through his inability to adjust properly military and political priorities and to overcome his own personal prejudices.
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