PROLEGOMENA TO A PHENOMENOLOGY OF MUSIC;
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ARNOLD SCHOENBERG
AND EDMUND HUSSERL

THESIS

Presented to the Graduate Council of the
North Texas State University in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

By

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Chapter One introduces the problem that existed in music and logic-psychology at the end of the 19th century. Both music and logic-psychology were in the cul-de-sac of relativism, which had led to obscurity of method and language. Aesthetics-criticism is seen to be in the same relativistic position. It is postulated that phenomenological method could aid in music criticism and aesthetic awareness.

The second chapter presents a motivic, or Idea, analysis of Schoenberg's second and third string quartets, showing how the twelve-tone method was developed as a way of curing musical composition of the tonal obscurity of late-Romanticism.

The third chapter is a short exposition of Husserl's development of phenomenological method from his initial work in logic and mathematics to transcendental phenomenology.

Chapter Four discusses some of the methodological parallels between Schoenberg and Husserl. Parallels are drawn from all creative periods of their respective work.

Chapter Five focuses on similar problems raised in contemporary aesthetics-criticism and their relationship to the methods of Husserl and Schoenberg. Showing how both men solved their problems, a solution is projected for aesthetics-criticism.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

All men by nature desire music. This paraphrase of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* is deliberate. As men desire to know, also they want to communicate. Along with language, the most universal form of communication among all men is music. The evidence of the desire for music is found in the universal delight in making music. Owing to this catholic character of music and its professed ability to take our most subjective creative thoughts and make them an object for all men to perceive, it seems only natural that music would be the best understood and most systematically surveyed of the arts. That this is not the case is evident when one carouses with the many extant works on music appreciation and aesthetics. Everyman is his own aesthete and everyman is "correct" in his world of aesthetic solipsism. This beautiful solipsism has led to chaos in the arts and a total lack of understanding and ability to judge the many phases of contemporary as well as older forms of music. Electronic music is judged "bad" because it does not sound like Beethoven. Such statements attest to a breach of philosophical ethics. In so judging electronic music, the ethical mistake is in transferring one set of aesthetic criteria, used for judging tonal music, to a non-tonal situation. The question is never asked
"Can the rules used in aesthetic judgements be used indiscriminately for all musics?" Of course, that is not to say that everyone so judges electronic music. It would seem obvious that there are people, in the field of electronic composition, who believe that that medium of expression is just as valid as any other form of musical expression. There are those, who profess to be musicians, who will not even countenance the existence of electronic music. Most often this disregard for their own times is not due to stupidity but merely to ignorance. The antinomy, Beethoven-Electronic, need not be the only example cited to show the fractured nature of aesthetics-appreciation; the Brahms-Wagner or Schoenberg-Stravinsky controversy will serve such a purpose and with styles that have more in common than the Beethoven-Electronic dichotomy.

Hidden in the excesses of aesthetic verbiage is that tacit assumption that some music is good and some bad. Such an assumption must be critically analyzed. The critical task is to disclose the ground of our taste and our aesthetic judgements. It must be conceded that it is a belief founded on intuition that music possesses and communicates the Universal. That it is the Universal which we partake of when we so blindly say it is good or it is bad, yet no one can say with clear vision, "that is the Universal!" The aim of a phenomenology of music must be an attempt to disclose the Universal in music by suspending belief in and
disregarding all possible obstacles to music. Through bracketing we must suspend all value and aesthetic judgments about music; we must, as far as is possible, disassociate ourselves from all knowledge and opinion about music so that we may perceive music with a clear mind and a clean ear.

Edmund Husserl felt that our ability to judge and understand our existence had become so out of focus because of logical and scientific models that a radical revolution was needed to shock us back into our "real" egological position. The science and psychology of Husserl's day had retreated into models and the study of mere physical facts that took them deeper and deeper into ever more complicated models. The Swedenborg (Kant-Laplace) nebular theory is a model that attempted to describe certain aspects of the universe just as the Steady State theory and the Expanding Universe theory attempt the same explanation in more contemporary terms. These models come in a variety of subjects: Darwinism, almost all psychological theories, linguistics, historical concepts, and even musicology. They all try to "explain" existence from the macroscopic to the microscopic. As science advanced in age these models became so complicated that any reference to reality was lost, viz., atomic theory or quantum mechanics. The nexus between theory and essence had been broken when the theory-model took on the role and the characteristics of things-in-themselves. Psychology is in the same cul-de-sac
as physical science by claiming that all experiential states
are psychological in origin. Such a model makes logical and
mathematical truths dependent upon and indeed created by
mental states. Also, science has not been able to cope with
such concepts as absolute truth, freedom, value, etc. Models
have obscured the view to the point of total darkness. Husserl's
war cry To the things themselves (Zu den Sachen) was the
beginning of the destruction of these models and psycholo-
gisms that encrusted Reality and the Ego.

Music at the end of the 19th century had turned to its
models, too. The music drama and tone poem were rampant.
Even symphonic and some chamber music had to have a program-
model before there could be any musical creation. All music
written at the close of the 19th century was not by any means
programmatic. Much of the music of Brahms is non-programmatic
in the sense that Wagner or Mahler's music is programmatic.
Critics and writers on music at that time were caught in the
battle between pure music and program music; all one has to
do is read Eduard Hanslick’s Vom Musikalisch-schönen (1) for
a vivid description of this war. It was a time when orches-
tral color was more desired than clear lines. Much of Mahler
and Wagner is color through orchestration. To produce these
hues orchestras had grown to enormous proportions. The musi-
cal forces needed to perform Schoenberg's Gurrelieder are
among the largest ever called for by any composer. Schoenberg
was no foreigner to the musical trends of his time. Husserl
too was caught in the *Zeitgeist* in his early work *Philosophy of Arithmetic*, which is a psychologistic study of the idea of number. These two works are similar in that they pay homage to the orthodox. One hears whispers of the coming revolution in both works, in which classical solutions were found unacceptable and both men struck out into unexplored territory.

Arnold Schoenberg realized that musical language had been developed to the point that our ability to understand and judge musical content was obscured by many musical clichés. The models of tonality, dissonance-consonance had to be overcome in order to regain music *qua* music. Schoenberg went back to the idea of music as Husserl went back to the idea of philosophy. Music no longer was treated in terms of its structure (models) but in an epistemological sense—as an idea. Schoenberg was in quest of the musical symbol, a symbol devoid of extramusical realities but pure and lucid in itself (2). Such a symbol is very close to Husserl's Transcendental Ego, which is "beyond this world", and is devoid of all extraphysical realities, and is pure and lucid in itself.

Husserl solved his problem by developing transcendental phenomenology; Schoenberg through the twelve-tone method. Both men radicalized philosophical and musical materials, these materials being the Ego and Sound. The connection between the two should be obvious. How else does the Ego communicate with itself and its encompassing world of experience (*Lebenswelt*) other than through the Logos?
It is hoped that through this systematic and critical study of Schoenberg's and Husserl's methods and philosophies, some kind of synthesis will emerge whereby a phenomenology of music may be attempted. The phenomenological method should help us obtain a new and fresh hearing and understanding of older music and guide us in the chaotic flux of contemporary music. Where Husserl's phenomenology of consciousness is epistemological, knowledge-oriented (how we know); and Schoenberg's pantonalism is a sort of musical ontology, that is directed towards the being of music and its existence; a phenomenology of music will be axiological, an investigation into the intrinsic value of music.
CHAPTER BIBLIOGRAPHY


CHAPTER II

ARNOLD SCHOENBERG: THE DISCOVERY OF THE EIDOS OF MUSICAL COMPOSITION.

Arnold Schoenberg's development of the method of composing with twelve tones related only one to another can be followed in a number of ways. In an unpublished master's thesis (1) Ruth George has shown such a development using the piano works (Op. 11, Op. 19, and Op. 23). The works chosen for analysis here, Op. 10 and Op. 30, the second and third string quartets, represent an homogeneous medium, as the piano works do, and will serve adequately in demonstrating the development from tonality into twelve-tone method. The string quartet in f-sharp is most admirable in this respect as its last movement is "quasi-tonal-pre-atonal", written without key signature and based on a theme that cannot be placed in an orthodox tonal pigeonhole.

The method of analysis used in this study is somewhat unorthodox in itself. The analysis can best be called an Idea analysis. A master of variation, Schoenberg carried this art to its ultimate in basing all musical material in a movement or work on an initial motive.

The motive generally appears in a characteristic and impressive manner at the beginning of a piece. The features of a motive are intervals and rhythms, combined to produce a memorable shape or contour which usually
implies an inherent harmony. Inasmuch as almost every figure within a piece reveals some relationship to it, the basic motive is often considered the 'germ' of the idea. Since it includes elements, at least, of every subsequent musical figure, one could consider it the 'smallest common multiple'. And since it is included in every subsequent figure, it could be considered the 'greatest common factor'. (3, p. 8).

The f-sharp string quartet is such a work and the Idea analysis will show how the work is built on a germ motive. The consequences of using a germ motive in a tonal idiom have a direct bearing on the twelve-tone row as it becomes the germ motive in the dodecaphonic style. Dodecaphonic techniques are already adumbrated in the last movement of the "tonal" second string quartet.

From a musico-phenomenological standpoint the analysis is a second-level analysis in a four-layered analytical technique. These four kinds of analysis are: description of perceived phenomena on a rudimentary level, eidetic analysis, which is an investigation into the basic structure of a phenomenon, aesthetic-axiological analysis, which delves into questions of beauty and value, and ontological analysis, which strikes at the very transcendental ground of music. Both axiological and ontological questions and musings will be avoided at this time.

The fundamental Idea or germ motive of the first movement of the second string quartet is stated by the first violin in measure one. The initial tonality of the quartet is also outlined in the Idea—A - F-sharp - C-sharp.

With the rhythmic cell $\frac{3}{4}$ smoothed to $\frac{1}{4}$ the second violin states the inversion of the first three notes of the Idea.


The first violin continues the Idea with rhythmic changes and the addition, or evolution, of an interval of a major second.


In measure two the second violin states a slightly altered version of the inversion of the first three notes of the Idea.

In measure three the first violin continues the initial downward motion of the Idea but with expanded intervals ending the theme in almost the same note values as the second violin's inverted answer. The dotted rhythm in measure 4 (ex. 5) is an augmentation of the dotted rhythms in the Idea. The viola,

Ex. 5--Schoenberg, String Quartet, Op. 10, first mov., measures 3-5.

in measure three, picks up the same inversion with which the second violin started the movement, adding a dotted half note as in the first measure of the lower strings. At the


same time the violoncello states the Idea rhythmically changed.

The second violin figure in measures three and four


could have been generated by the inversion of the following bracketed fragment. This small motivic cell is the foundation


of the second theme as it appears in measures twelve through twenty-three.

At the *etwas rascher* (measure 8) the Idea is repeated with octave changes and in the key area of the minor mediant. At *Hauptzeitmass* (measure 12) we come to the second thematic area, whose evolution from the Idea is thus:

The accompaniment at this point is also a development from the germ Idea. The second violin figure has its immediate ancestor in the same instrument at measures 9-10, which is the


same half-step figure at measures 2-3, transposed of course, but again from the Idea. The violoncello figure at this point could easily be from the half-step germ at measure ten. This same three-part texture is continued until measure 24 where the first violin takes the theme previously in the viola (measure 12). The accompaniment figure first heard in measure 12 is now reinforced at the octave by the second violin and viola, the violoncello keeping the previous downward chromatic line. In the second violin at measure 33 the Idea returns in the minor submediant (sm).

This leads into a return of the Idea starting on a I6 (measure 35) to close the first section before the entrance of the secondary thematic group. But, again this return has undergone an evolution which is so characteristic of Schoenberg's style. His rule is, when the form demands a repeat, repeat with variation; do not parrot. The Idea has now become


The changes made will be significant in the development section. Zeitmass (measure 43) brings us to the second section of the exposition, where the theme is stated in the first violin.


This theme bears a close resemblance to the viola part from the previous section. Schoenberg's penchant for developing
variation, as shown in the above example, is not surprising
but only shows the development of the Idea, which held su-
preme importance for him in compositional technique. Measures
52-57 constitute a transition to the section marked Belebend.
This transition section is composed of previously used material,
all related to the Idea, yet in a constant process of evolution.
The first violin part contains elements from the viola theme

in measures 12-16 in the use of the rhythmic cells $\downarrow \downarrow$ and
$\downarrow \uparrow$. The second violin and viola reiterate the accom-
paniment figure established in measures 12-24 but developed
to its present state, which the viola answers a measure later.
The violoncello, at measure 51, has taken up the violin theme
from measure 43 an octave lower.

Ex. 18---Schoenberg, String Quartet, Op. 10, first mov., measures 54-56.

For a moment let us retrace our steps and see how the theme at Zeitmass (measures 43-51) is related to the Idea.

Fig. 1--Thematic evolution of the Idea.
The melodic line at measure 58 (Belebend)


has a double ancestry:


and, the germ motive or Idea.


In Ex. 19 the last four notes are a quasi-inversion of the Idea. The theme at measure 58 is then given to the second violin, whose accompaniment figure is taken by the giver. The violoncello has a turn at the melody but inverts it freely.

These figurations begin to chase each other, some inverted, some not inverted. The influence of Johannes Brahms on Schoenberg can be perceived in measure 62-65, where the beat is obscured in the following manner.


Measures 64-69 could be said to constitute a transition to yet another step in the evolution of the Idea. The musical material of this transition is in part a continuation of the previous (measures 58-59) musical stuff. One point of change has occurred:


has become,

by a process of verticalization, and stretching the interval to encompass an octave, the melodic element \( \text{\ding{172}} \) has become \( \text{\ding{174}} \); a process which is to become important in 12-tone harmony—verticalization of the row or fragments of the row.

At measure 70 the first violin states the third theme of the second section of the exposition.

Ex. 26—Schoenberg, String Quartet, Op. 10, first mov., measures 70-76.

The third measure of the third theme closely resembles the contour of the Idea, the resemblance becomes closer in the sixth and seventh measures.

Ex. 27—Schoenberg, String Quartet, Op. 10, first mov., measures 1, 75.

The theme at measure 70 is then repeated in the same instrument transposed up a half step. The second violin and viola figure
at measure 70:

```
\[\text{Musical notation image} \]
```


has metamorphized into:

```
\[\text{Musical notation image} \]
```


The violoncello, at measures 75-76, takes the triplet phrases at measures 73-74 two octaves lower. Through a *Breiter werden* (measure 82) and a *molto rit.* (measure 85) we come to the development section. The ritard is not only called for in an Italian term but is notated in the music, where the Idea presents itself in this guise.

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\[\text{Musical notation image} \]
```


The fermata in the score might be Schoenberg's substitute for the classical double bar at the end of the exposition. This whole section (measures 80-89) is composed mainly of downward tending scale passages.

The notes marked off in brackets in the above example show that the Idea is still acting as the motivating force behind the forward movement of the music. All this is set against a scale in the violoncello that is an augmentation of the second violin part found in the same measure.

Ex. 32—Schoenberg, String Quartet, Op. 10, first mov., measures 79-82.

This scale could be an extension of the second violin part in measure one, which is the Idea inverted.


Melodic material in the development section comes from the initial motive.

It is then developed by the second violin in which the interval of a fifth is expanded to an octave. The line at measure 94 is a smoothed-out version of the original melody at measures three and four.


In measures 96-97 the Idea appears again in the same form as in measures 88-89, only here it is transposed down a major third and the rhythm altered.


This same configuration is used in the vocal part of the third movement. At measure 98-101 the violoncello takes up the motive and treats it in a similar manner as before (second violin, measures 92-94; Ex.35).

We find the first violin-violoncello combination in measures 95-97 being immediately transposed to the two violins in 98-99, with the rests omitted.


There occurs a stretto-like version of the Idea here (measures 95-97) that returns in more elaborate form in measures 186-191.


The last measure of the preceding violoncello part (measure 100) becomes the dominating thematic influence in measures 101-105, where it is then broken into three-note fragments by the second violin (see Ex. 40). The theme found in measures

43-46 is then set up for development. The violoncello begins in measure 106, where the theme is inverted and is answered by the first violin in measure 107 in the original form.


This is a canon at the augmented second, the violoncello part the inversion of the subject. The genealogy of this fragment of development goes directly to the Idea itself (see Fig. 1). Measures 114-119 are taken from the theme as found at measures 58-62 and also contain elements of measures 43-46.

The next theme taken up for development comes from the second violin and viola parts in measures 77 et seq. This line is first given to the violoncello in measure 119 and immediately answered by the first violin in canonic fashion.

Ex. 43—Schoenberg, String Quartet, Op. 10, first mov., measures 119, 119-120.

The inner voice figure (second violin and viola), measures 120-123, is not dissimilar to the extended violoncello scale in measures 79-84; as a matter of fact, it is from this section that the development figure is taken. Thus, the violoncello scale at measures 79-84,


which was seen to be the Idea inverted, has become in the second violin and viola a multiple scale pattern with doubling at the 6th and contrary motion.
Schoenberg returns to use of melodic material from the theme at measures 43 \textit{et seq.}, at measure 123 and into the \textit{wieder ruhiger}. This material has been used before in the development section at measures 107-113. Again we have an inverted canon between the viola and the first violin.

This section of the development comes to a close (measures 130-131) using material from measures 58-61 that is related to the opening motive. From measures 132-140 the viola and violoncello develop material based on the theme at measure 43,
whose genesis is the Idea. The two violins use thematic elements (measures 137-140) that are traceable to measures 58-59; a metamorphosis produces the following.

Ex. 47—Schoenberg, String Quartet, Op. 10, first mov., measures 137-140.

The last measure of the above example exhibits the theme from measure 58 which becomes the object of development in an imitative manner, a kind of layered writing one finds in so many Beethoven string quartets. In the example below, the first violin and viola constitute one layer and the second violin and violoncello the other. In the Schoenberg example (Ex. 47) the layers occur between the violins and the viola and violoncello. In this metamorphosis the rhythmic cell $\frac{7}{4}$ is smoothed to $\frac{3}{4}$.

At noch breiter (measure 146) the figure changes to the Idea in the viola.


Here Schoenberg shows us in five measures the transformation of thematic material from the Idea. It must be noted that while this change is taking place the violoncello is stating the same Idea in a new guise.

Ex. 50—Schoenberg, String Quartet, Op. 10, first mov., measures 146-149.
At measure 148 the second violin has its original (measure 1) inversion of the Idea, lowered a whole step, with a chromatic extension.


At the *Zeitmass* (measure 160) we reach the recapitulation, but it is a recapitulation beginning, not with the initial theme, but with the subsequent theme as found in measure 12. Schoenberg possibly began the recapitulation in such a manner because he felt that to begin with the opening theme he would be driving a point to the absurd. The development section begins with the initial motive and to begin the recapitulation with the same Idea might appear redundant. To obviate such a possibility the third major section starts with a derivation of the germ motive. In the recapitulation this theme appears in the violoncello instead of the viola as in the exposition. Also, the parts have been switched around; the exposition second violin part is now relegated to the viola and the original violoncello part is now in the first and second violins in an imitative fashion. This same type of figuration continues up to measure 186 where the main theme returns in the violoncello in a minor. This theme is immediately answered

by the second violin a tenth higher, then follows the viola a sixth higher than the violoncello. There occurs an obvious tightening of the contrapuntal texture in a stretto that lends much impetus to the movement as it moves toward the final close.

For the first time in the movement (measure 187), groups of sixteenth notes occur; here they are in the first violin.


This pattern is repeated in various forms up to the closing section at measure 196, where melodic material comes from the theme at measure 43. These abovementioned sixteenth note figures could have their origin in a number of places, but the most obvious derivation is that they are a diminution of the second violin's accompaniment motive in measure 12. Thus, Ex. 55 comes from Ex. 56, which originates in the Idea.


There are several familiar themes in the closing section, the first being in the violoncello.


This fragment is taken from the theme at measure 43. Continuing in the violoncello we find the scale passage of measures 79-82, repeated here in measures 211-213 after a pedal point F-sharp of nine measures.


In measure 218 the theme as found at measure 58 reappears in the viola and is answered in the first violin and violoncello, accompanied by the inversion of part of the theme from measure 43. A similar passage occurs at measures 114-119, only here (measures 219-220) the parts are inverted.

This texture continues with slight rhythmic alterations where \( \frac{3}{4} \) becomes \( \frac{4}{4} \) as before in measure 146. The movement comes to a close with an indication of the Idea.


The final half step B-sharp to C-sharp in the viola reiterates the important half step B to C-sharp in the opening theme.

The second movement opens with a violoncello solo which is a pedal point on D and continues until measure 10. This pedal point is interrupted only once, at measure 4, when the violoncello plays the lower neighbor C-sharp.


This could be the interval of a second from the first movement (see Ex. 60). This interval of a second is immediately taken up by the second violin, and then expanded (first to a fourth, then to a minor seventh).

At the same time the viola plays the Idea from the first movement, but with a smoothed rhythm.


At measure 7 we finally have the Idea in full, but it is so changed and developed that its role has become more hidden than before (see the enclosed notes).


This in the Idea: A – G-sharp – F-sharp – C-sharp with the C-sharp in octave displacement. Octave displacement will
become important in the twelve-tone method. It should be noted that the second violin has the same fragment of the Idea as the first violin. At measure 10-11 the Idea returns, transposed (note change from a minor second to a major second).


Also in measure 10 the violoncello states a line that will shortly become the second theme of the exposition.


A taste is given here (measure 12) of theme C.

The Idea is heard again in measure 13 just before the entrance of the secondary theme; as a matter of fact, the Idea forms an elision with the secondary theme.


The first interval, F - A, of the second theme is the same cello interval at measure 10, only in the major mode. Measures 15-16 are a developed version of the above mentioned violoncello melody. The similarity of this theme and a melodic fragment from the first movement cannot be overlooked. Measures 61-62, violoncello, first movement (Ex. 22), which originated in the Idea, is very much like the secondary theme in the second movement. The third theme is announced immediately with no transition or development into it of any sort.

This theme's immediate ancestor is the viola motive in measure 12. This theme exhibits a characteristic of a succession of minor seconds, except for the A in measure 19. The interval of a minor second seems to play an extremely important role in the development of the quartet. The Idea opens the development section with a minor second A - G-sharp, the first movement closes with a minor second B-sharp - C-sharp, nearly all the major sections begin with that interval. It is, then, not surprising that we find the second major formal division of the Scherzo (measure 20) beginning with a minor second and the Idea, again developed rhythmically from its first statement in measure 7.


This is repeated in measure 22, with changed instrumentation, but not transposed as in measures 10-11. In the previous and in the following example, it will be noticed that the first three notes of the Idea are doubled at the octave.
A "new" melodic fragment has been introduced in section B.

This fragment, which is the sequence of minor half-steps, could have its origin in a number of places:

This small motive (measure 21, first and second violins) forms the major portion of section B for the next ten measures. In Schoenbergian fashion these motives are strung together, and sometimes inverted. Generally they are played by the second violin and violoncello. The remaining parts are developing the first theme (measures 5-6).
At Zeitmaß (measure 35) we are in the second portion of the B section. The second theme (measures 14-17) is now set up for a lengthy development. There are three variations that are immediately recognizable. In the following example the theme is given first, then the three developments.


This last example is given the most extensive treatment in all instruments. This treatment is canonic-like and in stretti up to measure 62. The extensive scale passages in measures 43-51 are similar to scale passages in the first movement (see Examples 32 and 45).

Etwas langsamer (measure 62) brings us to a short development of the third theme (measures 17-19). The development is accomplished mostly through changes in instrumentation and through use of part of the developed material from theme B.

![Musical notation]


After a ritardando and a fermata, we are in a quieter section whose principal musical stuff is from the first violin part at measure 7 where the Idea was much disguised. The evolutionary character of the Idea is once again most evident in the bracketed fragment in the following example.

![Musical notation]


As a matter of fact, this fragment from measure 7 could be an evolutionary product of the second measure of the main theme found in the first movement.

![Musical notation]

The fifth has been expanded to an octave—a typical evolutionary development. Another motive used in the section under question (measures 71ff.) is the line that first was heard in measure 21 (violins). Here it is most generally heard as,


Zeitmass (measure 85) brings us to the closing section before the "Trio" at measure 98. The Idea is used twice in explicit form here.


During this closing section the violoncello has a quasi-pedal point as at the beginning of the movement, but capitalizes more on the minor second interval (D-C-sharp) than it did at the beginning. After a written-out ritardando (measures 95-97), a double bar, a change of key signatures (to two sharps), and a meter change (to 2/4) we are in the "Trio" of the Scherzo.
Immediately we are confronted with a very compact version of the Idea.


This version of the Idea is spun out in alternating quadruplets and triplets from f‴ to middle C. In measure 100 we have a relatively slow violoncello line that is an augmentation of the violoncello line at measure 10 which became the secondary theme.


Measures 104-106 are a somewhat static chordal section that reflects similar passages in the first movement (see measures 6-7, 40-42, 214-216). The Zeitmass (measure 110) is the same material as at measure 100 with octave doublings between the violins. Again, it is followed by a static section similar to the one in measures 104-106. In the section immediately at hand the top line of the first violin is a rhythmically different and transposed form of the Idea as presented at the beginning of the Trio.
Measure 123 starts the middle section of the Trio. This section's musical material is the same as the A section transposed to the subtonic region.


This figure forms the major portion of the middle section until we come to measure 139 where the triplet figure dominates until the return of the Trio theme at measure 150. The violoncello melody at measure 100 is introduced by the second violin in measure 136 of the middle section.


Another short motive (measure 127) in the first violin is the first four notes of the B theme (measures 123-124), rhythmically changed. This is also in the Trio theme, which came from the Idea.
The "middle section" of the Trio (measures 140-147) is in a two-part texture, the two violins being one part and the viola and violoncello being the other part. The two violins evolve to a greater extent the triplet figure from the theme of the Trio.

At measure 151 we come to the recapitulation of the Trio theme, this time in the flat supertonic region (♯♯). The Trio theme is in parallel motion here, between the two violins. The viola and violoncello take the melody as found in the violoncello at measure 100.
Ex. 89--Schoenberg, String Quartet, Op. 10, second mov., measures 100-104.

It is then treated in canonic fashion for five measures. Immediately after sehr zurückhaltend there comes an extremely important transition section (measures 164-194). At langsamer (measure 165) there is a meter change from 2/4 to 3/4.

The second violin introduces a melody that is foreign to the Idea of the quartet. It is the Viennese street-ballad "O du lieber Augustin,"


At first hearing, this intrusion of an extraneous element is nothing short of a puzzle. Such a departure must have a meaning, for Schoenberg, other than just its mere presentation. In 1906, just one year before the second string quartet was written, Hermann Hesse published Beneath the Wheel. At the end of the book the main character, Hans, becomes a man in the traditional manner and finds himself wandering home late one night very drunk. As Hesse puts it, "Suddenly a touch of his former gaiety returned fleetingly; he made a grimace and sang:
O du lieber Augustin, 
Augustin, Augustin, 
O du lieber Augustin, 
Alles ist hin."

Musically, Schoenberg becomes a man in this string quartet. Is he not remembering his former life in the knowledge of his future direction? "Alles ist hin" (Everything is gone) in a traditional sense, and just as surely "Ich fühle luft von anderem planeten" (I feel an air from other planets blowing). The other musical materials of this transition section come from the violin's theme at measure 7. Here it takes this form.


The violoncello plays an accompanying role reminiscent of an "older" style.


At measure 180 we lose sight of Augustin and the first violin takes up a melody built on the half-step motif that first was heard in the first movement in the viola at measures 12-13. Here it has become:
This is also the same half-step with which we began the movement (see measure 4). The viola-violoncello line at measures 188-189


is a direct quote from the viola theme at Hauptzeitmass in the first movement (measures 14-15).


I. Zeitmass (measure 195) brings us to the recapitulation of the Scherzo. The recapitulation differs from the exposition in that the violoncello pedal point is missing, instead the cello is occupied with a variation of the Idea and a duple meter version of the triplets in the previous section.
The two violins answer this duet, the first violin two octaves higher than the violoncello, the second violin one octave above the viola.

With the return of the second theme of the Scherzo the key signature returns to one flat. This theme is now going to receive a development that did not occur in the exposition, as a matter of fact the exposition theme in sixteenth notes will not be heard again, at least in that form. It will be remembered that the melody under question received a rather extensive development from measures 53-61.

It receives similar treatment in the recapitulation, but in eighth note values instead of the previous sixteenths. A two measure example should be enough to show what occurs here.


Soon the three bottom instruments give way to the familiar scale passages in contrary motion (measures 211-214).

At Zeitmass (measure 219) the "O du lieber Augustin" accompaniment returns, this time an octave lower and notated G-flat instead of F-sharp.

From measure 221 to 223 the predominant motivic figure is taken from measure 21, where it occurs in the violins (this figure was shown to be from the Idea). In the recapitulation Schoenberg uses them in the original form and inverted.


The violin accompaniment figure at "O du lieber Augustin" (measure 165) returns at measure 226 in augmentation and rhythmically changed.


This figure is to be found at the beginning of the movement.
and embodies the Idea as its generating force. In many esoter
cric ways the Idea is still the foundation of musical stuff
of this movement. The following two examples illustrate the
hidden ways of the Idea. The first example shows the Idea in
partial inversion and the last note in octave displacement
(since the line moves up and not down)—two fundamental
concepts in serial technique. The second is not so hidden,
but displays a still different rhythmic treatment and inter-
val changes.

Ex. 103--Schoenberg, String Quartet, Op. 10, second mov.,
measures 231, 233-234.

At *etwas langsamer* (measure 238) the principal theme
returns again, this time in the violoncello, to be repeated
in the first violin at measure 240. The Idea occurs again,
between the viola and the first violin. From measure 240

Ex. 104--Schoenberg, String Quartet, Op. 10, second mov.,
measure 240.
to the coda (measure 259) the main driving force is the opening theme, which at measure 250 is slightly metamorphized and written in a stretto-like passage the violoncello being in augmentation.


The violoncello fulfills a two-fold purpose in measures 253-254: a reflection of "Augustin", and the tail of the first Idea development is heard (first movement, measures 3-4).


This is repeated again in the violoncello as the forward movement slows and the texture thins to the cello in the lower register (measures 255-258). After an eighth rest the movement rushes to a boisterous close in parallel octaves in all instruments on the opening theme. The final two measures are as at the beginning, the cello on its low D.

The third movement, *Litanei*, uses a poem by Stefan George for the soprano part. The translation given below is by Dika Newlin.

**LITANY**

Deep is the sorrow/which now surrounds me,  
Once more I enter,/Lord! in thy house.

Long was the journey,/weary the limbs now,  
Empty the altars,/full is but grief.

Tongue ever thirsting/longs for thy wine-cups,  
Hard was the struggle,/stiff is my arm.

Grant sweet repose/to faltering footsteps--  
Mouths that are hungry/call for thy bread--!

Weak is my breath now/calling the dream forth,  
Empty the hands/and fevered the mouth.

Lend me Thy coolness,/quench the dread burning,  
Cancel all hope,/but send me the Light!

Deep in the heart/the flames are yet glowing,  
Deep from within me/wakens a cry...

Kill all the longing,/heal thou the heart-wounds,  
Take from me Love/and give me Thy joy!

The opening four measures of the third movement presents the listener with a compact array of Idea juxtapositions. The first violin speaks again the important half-step motive in slow time. The viola opens with the Idea in eighth note
values followed by the same in diminution. The Idea is then juxtaposed with the second part of the second theme of the Scherzo (movement II, measures 15-16). A melody in octaves (second violin-violoncello) follows.


This is an augmented version of a secondary theme from the first movement (measures 58-59).


Interval changes do occur in this line in the first movement,
for examples see measures 140, 142, 218, 219, etc. Starting at measures 9-10, the beginning part of the theme is repeated with the parts switched, viola to first violin, first violin to second violin and violoncello to viola. The theme of the following set of seven variations is complete at measure 13.

Variation I opens with a note-exact repetition of the violoncello-second violin line at measures 5-10. In this variation it is rhythmically changed.


The violins and soprano open this variation at the octave on a line that is composed of a highly metamorphized Idea (measure 14) and an augmented version of the thirty-second note motive from measure three.


At the same time the viola reiterates over and over the interval of a second

which continues for two more measures before the viola breaks into straight triplets


which contain, in the brackets, a transformation of the Idea. The second violin figure now becomes very similar to that of the viola as at the beginning of the movement.


Ein wenig bewegter (measure 18) begins the second variation, at least for the soprano. It is difficult to determine where one variation begins and the other finishes as they all mesh together. Any clear division is therefore impossible and somewhat arbitrary. The soprano's opening here (measures 18-19), is the familiar half-step motive.

On her F-sharp the violoncello begins the instrumental variation II with a sixteenth note version of the viola's thirty-second note motive in measure three.


The viola answers this inverted, the theme is then thrown back and forth between the two instruments for the next five measures.


Let us pause for a moment and reconstruct a genealogy of this viola melody back to the Idea.

1. III Mov., mm. 19-20:

2. III Mov., mm. 3-4:

3. II Mov., mm. 15-16:

4. II Mov., mm. 10-11:
5. I Mov., mm. 61-62:

6. I Mov., mm. 58-59:

7. I Mov., mm. 50-51:

8. I Mov., mm. 1-2:

Fig. 2--Genealogy of a viola line to the Idea

The first violin in variation II is taken from the half-step motive which, it expands to an octave then a ninth in measure 24. The second violin remains silent until measure 22. It enters here with two more versions of the thirty-second note figure from measure three. Here (measures 22-23) the relationship is more closely kin to the viola and violoncello passage in measure 21.


At Pesante (measure 24), we have a stretto-like passage, the viola inverted and the second violin in augmentation. Again it must be stated, from the Idea!

The soprano ends this variation with a new form of the Idea with octave displacement, the notes in brackets contain the Idea.


Variation III begins in the middle of measure 26 and is quite obviously built of the Idea as it is announced in all four instruments in varying forms of the viola line which first speaks the Idea.

At II. Zeitmass (measure 29) the voice enters with another version of the Idea, the last interval greatly expanded.


Also in this measure, the first violin introduces a version of the Idea that is familiar to us from the first movement (see measures 58-59).


This is played against the thirty-second note viola line (measure 3), here reduced to sixteenths.


In measure 30 the voice part sings again the Idea, in much the same form as in measure 29 except this time the final interval has been widened from an E-flat - D-flat to an E-flat - F-flat. Another evolutionary juxtaposition occurs
in the viola at measures 31-32. The motive from measure three has now evolved to this state, which must be considered an Idea development.


While the viola is finishing this line the first violin is starting the fourth variation with a theme that is the same as the soprano-violin theme from measure 16-17 in variation I.


The Idea occurs almost immediately in the second violin (measure 34).

Ex. 128--Schoenberg, String Quartet, Op. 10, third mov., measure 34.

This happens again, transposed up a major second and then up a minor third. At the same time the viola is echoing the
the second violin one beat behind. This chromatic line, in triplets, is then sung by the soprano in quarters.


In measure 37, the viola varies its thirty-second note melody in the following manner.


The first movement melody (measure 58) is heard from again, this time in the violoncello. This is another Idea development.

Fig. 3—Development of a violoncello line from the Idea.
In measures 40-41 the Idea can be seen to evolve into another form in the second violin, the last interval having been filled in by the two sixteenth-notes.


At the same time the soprano sings the familiar viola motive.


The violoncello enters with the Idea at the end of this last measure.


At measure 43, we find ourselves in the fifth variation. There is quite a change in note values from the previous variation. Most musical material in this variation is from the viola part from measure three. The vocal part, throughout most of this
variation is still caught in the descending chromatic line so prominent in the fourth variation, except that here the rhythms have been changed.


The interval of a third becomes important in this variation in the following form.


Thirds have been used in two other prominent places in this movement, in the first and second violins at measures 41-42.


Another important third interval occurs near the beginning
of the second movement (measure 14).


The Idea also contains a third relationship, A - F-sharp, used in outlining the tonality of the Quartet. Another important figuration in variation V is first heard in the violins and soprano (measures 44-45).


A similar line, of which the violin motive quote above is the inversion, occurs in the first movement in the violoncello and is a direct outgrowth of the Idea.

After a short pause (measure 50), we move into variation six. The first two measures of this variation are a kind of "duet", the voice and violins forming one member of the duet and the lower strings the other. The upper three voices carry on with a chromatic line in contrary motion somewhat similar to the chromatics at measure 35, except that here, measures 50-51, the lines are in augmentation.


The viola takes up a theme that was used in the first variation which is immediately answered by the violoncello.


In variation six this viola line undergoes immediate evolution.

In measure 52 both the first violin and the voice part vary the initial viola motive (measure 3), which came from the second movement measures 36-37, generated by the Idea. The parallel vocal-violin passage is as follows.


At the same time the viola parallels the violin, an octave lower, against which is set a violoncello pizzicato in contrary motion. The second violin plays the following variation.

There is a similar passage in the first movement just before the closing section (measures 194-195).


Another serial technique, that of retrograde inversion, is adumbrated here. This figure is the transposed retrograde (not exact as the 6th is substituted by a 5th) of this figure: . The soprano, in measure 53, sings a varied retrograde version of the Idea (notes in brackets).


At Beschleunigend (measure 54) the texture, as found at the beginning of the variation, is again presented for two measures where the pace begins to slow and become heavier (measure 57). In measure 57 there occur two statements of the Idea, in the viola and first violin in Octaves. Here is the Idea as found in the viola.

In the coda or seventh variation the figure first heard in variation I returns, this time in octaves and triple forte.


The soprano sings a melody that reminds one of the theme, in the viola, found at measure 13 of the first movement. Ex. 149 shows them juxtaposed.


The remainder of the string parts is mainly variations on the triplet motive from measure 57. The soprano, as her last word in this movement, sings the Idea on the words "Give me Thy joy."
The violoncello immediately repeats its initial theme.

The other strings reiterate, in augmented triplets, the theme as in the first variation.

The movement ends with the first violin and violoncello speaking the important interval of a minor second.
The fourth movement, *Entrückung*, uses a poem by Stefan George for the soprano part. The translation given below is by Dika Newlin.

**TRANSCENDENCE**

I feel an air from other planets blowing;  
The faces that once turned to me in friendship  
Are now in darkness strangely, palely glowing.

And trees and paths that I so loved are paling  
Until I scarcely know them; and thou, light-borne  
Beloved shadow---cause of all my wailing---

Art now dissolved quite in flames deep-burning,  
After the struggle and the wild confusion  
To come once more in holy awe and yearning.

Dissolving into tones, I'm circling, weaving,  
In groundless thanks and nameless praises, will-less  
My soul unto the mighty World-Breath giving.

A mighty wind o'erwhelms me, rushing, sweeping  
O'er consecrated ground, where, spent with passion,  
The praying women in the dust are weeping.

Ah, then I see how misty clouds are rising  
Into the sun-filled brightly glowing heavens  
Beyond the distant mountain passes shining.

The ground beneath me, white and soft as curds,  
Shudders; o'er chasms vast I climb,  
And, soaring now above the furthest clouds,

Through crystalline infinity I rise.  
I am an ember of the Holy Fire,  
Am but an echo of the Holy Voice.

The fourth movement opens with an eighteen measure introduction, in which Schoenberg uses many anticipations of twelve-tone technique. The introduction starts in the violoncello with a nine-note row (the ninth note, taken by the viola, forms an elision with the next statement of the row).

The last four notes comprise the Idea, much changed, and in much the same form as the theme of the Trio section of the second movement, with rhythmic changes of course (see Ex. 81).

Ex. 155--Four forms of the Idea as found in the nine-tone row.

The nine-tone row immediately undergoes three transpositions:


Each of these contains the Idea. A five note fragment of the row is then thrown back and forth by the two violins.

Against this "non-tonal" background, the chords being used are  and , Schoenberg juxtaposes a partial circle of fifths.


When reduced to their essentials these lines, viola and violoncello respectively, appear as these fifths.


In measure five, the row segments appear in whole tone transpositions, until a quasi-inversion of the last seven notes of the nine-tone row occurs in measure six.

Measure seven contains the fifths again, this time in an extremely compact form.


The first violin part in measure seven could be a variant of the first inversion of the row.


The D-sharp - G interval, from the third transposition of the row, now receives a two measure treatment in the form originally heard at the end of measure four. At measure 10 this interval undergoes a variation that embodies the Idea inverted and transposed up a minor second.

With the extraneous notes bracketed we obtain the Idea.

Ex. 164--The Idea extracted from the viola passage from measures 11-12.

In measure 13 the horizontal fifths return, this time verticalized, in both the viola and violoncello.


In the same measure (13), Schoenberg combines the viola motive (D-sharp - G) from measure four and the first violin line from measure seven.

At measure 16 the viola D-sharp - G returns, except in diminution, as we move out of the introduction and toward the first formal division.


It will be remembered that this interval (D-sharp - G) comes from the last segment of the nine-tone row, which evolved from the Idea.

Through a five measure transition, where intervals are expanded, we arrive at section A.


The above theme comes ultimately from the Idea, but its most obvious point of origin is the secondary theme from the Scherzo (measure 15).

For a complete genealogy of both these lines see Fig. 2.

An important serial technique is adumbrated in the accompaniment at measure 24.


The first chord of this measure is a verticalization of a varied transposition of the nine-tone row. The transposition is not exact but is close enough to warrant mention.


At measure 25 the half-step motive returns, again in the violoncello, as it was at the beginning of the Scherzo. Measure 27 contains musical material that is very much like the triplet patterns from the third variation of movement III.

The violoncello, in measure 29, speaks the "Ich fühle luft" theme, but extends it to cover two octaves and in diminution.


The continuation of this cello line (measures 30-31) is the half-step motive. Measures 32-33 (first violin) contain the quarter note portion of the "Ich fühle luft" theme.


This violin line continues chromatically against which is set, in the soprano, the Idea (now in major) in eighth-note values.


The next soprano phrase is set against a line in the viola, which is the secondary theme of the second movement.

The Idea, somewhat changed, occurs at measure 38 set against the half-step motive.


These three measures present us with an array of contrapuntal devices that are important for serial music; stretto, diminution, and transposition. Keeping the nine-tone row in mind: the first violin is the row transposed (the first two notes)
and then the original in triplets instead of thirty-seconds; the second violin is the row up an octave with rhythmic changes; the viola has the first six notes of the row in repeated triplets. All of the manifestations of the row are in a three-part stretto.

In measure 42 the Idea appears in the viola.


An inversion of a permutation of the Idea, related to the subsidiary theme in the first movement (measures 58-59), occurs in the violoncello.


Immediately the viola speaks a retrograde version of the Idea, in even note values.

A third version of the D-sharp – G interval now takes over the texture. At measure 48 these thirds are combined with a chromatic scale in the second violin and viola. Measure 49 sees a return of the first six notes of the row. Use of the Idea lies hidden in these four repetitions of the row.


The arrows point to both manifestations of the Idea. The form of the Idea, as presented here, is as at the beginning of the Trio of the Scherzo.


The soprano and first violin announce the secondary theme in measure 51.

There are three readily recognizable places from which this theme could have its origin, two in the first movement and one in the second movement.


The final measures of the third movement provide musical material for measures 56ff here in the fourth movement.


These triplets, as found here and in the third movement, are a transformed Idea. Just before the B section, on the words "...the mighty World-Breath giving", occurs a startling C Major chord that makes one wonder at a little word painting. The breath of the Logos and C major had such a connection for Haydn and his Creation.

The first four measures of the development section are a canon, viola and violoncello on the "Ich löse mich" melody, and the major third from the viola part at measure 4. The canon looks like this:


The first violin then picks up "Ich löse mich" in quarters and eighths.


At Belebter (measure 74), Schoenberg puts in counterpoint a fragment of the nine-tone row and the "Ich löse mich" line.

The row then undergoes a four-measure development. At measure 81 the sextuplet figures from measure 10-12 return, this time in triplets notated in eighths instead of sixteenths. At measure 85 the first violin brings in a theme that goes back through the nine-tone row to the subsidiary theme of the first movement (measures 58-59). One manifestation of this sixty-fourth note theme bears a close resemblance to theme B of the Scherzo.


While the first violin is playing with these motives, as in the above example, the second violin continues with the triplet figure. The viola throws this triplet figure into diminution.


The violoncello, up to the end of measure 89, is caught re-iterating major and minor seconds. At measure 89 the violoncello speaks the first part of the "Ich fühle luft" theme.

This is repeated two more times, each time transposed higher than the time before. The Idea occurs in the voice part in inversion and the last interval in octave displacement.


The initial four notes of "Ich fühle luft" are in the voice part at measure 88, transposed and rhythmically changed.


This motive occurs twice, once on "die nur umfängt" and on "auf fernsten ber-". Measure 91 has the first violin playing a theme much like the first violin line in measure 27.

The last set of eighth notes look like the inversion of the last three notes of the Idea. The viola plays four four-note whole tone fragments in measure 92. Another such passage occurs, in this movement, at measure 45 in the second violin.


Zeitmass (measure 93) brings us to a new figuration, at least new in their appearance. The violoncello has the most striking figuration in this passage (measures 93-96). The first 4 sets of thirty-second notes embody the Idea in a terse form but highly figured (the arrows point to the Idea).


This whole arpeggiated figure has many antecedents in the quartet, Fig. 2 shows how many of them are related to the Idea. While the violoncello is so occupied the second violin is playing on another arpeggiated figure.

The first violin and viola play a canon that lasts for five measures. The viola starts the canon with a four-note slide which is nearly the same as the violoncello's first arpeggiated figure. The first three notes of both the viola slide and the violoncello arpeggiation remind one of "Ich fühle luft."


The subject of this canon is a varied form of the Idea and then variations on that varied form.


The soprano hints at the "Ich fühle luft" melody in measure 95 on the words "Ich fühle," except the intervening A is omitted.


As we move toward the recapitulation, the first six notes of
the row return in the second violin.


In the previous measure the violoncello has already started
the triplet figure we first found in measure 11 and then
again in measure 83. In measure 97, the violoncello adds a
pedal-point G to this triplet figure.

Ex. 204--Schoenberg, String Quartet, Op. 10, fourth mov.,
measures 96-97.

In measure 99, the viola augments these above mentioned tri-
plets in the following manner.

Ex. 205--Schoenberg, String Quartet, Op. 10, fourth mov.,
measure 99.
The return of the A theme (measure 100) has the "Ich fühle luft" melody in this changed form.


This recapitulation not only contains theme A but the quarter-triplets found in theme B at measures 56 and 59. The bass line from 100 to 110 is chromatic from F-sharp to a. Over this chromatic line the other parts play on the last measure of the soprano's recapitulation line.


This last example contains another hint, at least in line contour, at the Idea, the triplet followed by the half-note. Measure 110 sees a change in texture and intensity: tremolos, arpeggios (second violin), extreme ranges (D - a''), and everyone double forte as the soprano sings, "Am but an echo of the Holy Voice." This gradually dies away and, at measure 120 (Sehr Ruhig), we return to this planet and its familiar
air of F-sharp. The coda section is occupied mostly with this figure and its transformations and transpositions.


This triplet figuration has been heard many places, the nearest is in measure 109. Measure 120's relationship to the Idea is more harmonic than melodic, f-sharp being outlined in the last triplet (measure 120). "Ich fühle luft" returns at measure 135 and then in diminution.


The half-step motive returns at 146 in the violoncello.


Measure 151 has "Ich fühle luft" in triplets.
The quartet closes with two statements of a portion of the nine-tone row in augmentation.

The need for the 12-tone method grew out of tonality's increasing ambiguity. As composers began adding more and more "free tones" or non-harmonic tones to a tonality, that tonality grew more hazy. In the second string quartet there is an F-natural in the third measure which does not belong to the key of the quartet, f-sharp. Already the ear has been thrown off tonal balance. The strength of the tonal system lies in clear
cadential formulas. The more ambiguous a cadence, the less strong the key feeling. Eventually, as in this quartet's last movement, an atonal situation will result. Free tones become as prevalent as harmonic tones; thus any distinguishing characteristics between keys become obliterated and key feeling disappears. Formal aspects depend on tonal juxtapositions. The divisions between sections are marked by strong and clear cadences and contrasting tonal regions. As cadences become less functional, so the form becomes more amorphous. It is a close scrutiny of major cadence points (formal division lines) that will show the collapse of the tonal idiom. The twelve-tone method was developed out of the need for another organizing factor.

Fig. 4--Major cadence points in the String Quartet, Op. 10.
All of these cadences are self-explanatory except numbers one and eight. Number one is not a cadence at all, even though it comes at a major sectional change. Instead of a definite close we have a deceptive situation where we are led into the minor submediant (sm) region of f-sharp (measure 90), to make matters more ambiguous this sm is preceded by an altered supertonic.

Cadence number eight, which is the final cadence of the quartet, is a supertonic going to a minor dominant going to the tonic major. All the while, the first measure has a pedal D, which gives a strong submediant feeling. It could be said that, stretching the system to the breaking point, the first two measures function as a dominant, and the last two measures are tonic.

It will be noticed in the following analysis of the String Quartet, Op. 30 that there is no pitch counting, no making of elaborate percentage tables, there is no great concern shown when free tones appear or the composer chose not to follow the row absolutely. The purpose of the analysis is to show how an Idea is still the binding force in 12-tone composition. After all, the quartet is a musical composition and that is far more important than the 12-tone method. In a letter to Rudolf Kolisch Schoenberg says: "Meine Werke sind Zwölfton-Kompositionen, nicht Zwölfton-Kompositionen." (My works are 12-tone compositions, not 12-tone compositions) (2, p. 131).
The third string quartet is one of those 12-tone compositions for which the second string quartet paved the way. Where the basic organizing factor of the second quartet is the tonality of f-sharp, the basic organizing factor of the third string quartet is the following set.


The tonal and 12-tone situations are analogous. Where the tonality of f-sharp furnishes all musical stuff, through transpositions, triads (for harmony), and scale patterns; so the row, through transpositions, verticalization (for harmony), and many contrapuntal devices that have been part of the musical language since the renaissance, furnishes all musical material. The basic difference is as follows: in tonal music there developed an overload of non-harmonic tones, or free tones; in twelve-tone the use of free tones is almost eliminated as the row, in all its forms, accounts for all the tones. Thus, 12-tone music is more concise and less extravagant than most late-tonal music. The analysis of the second string quartet is long and drawn out—the tonal idiom is long and drawn out and somewhat extravagant. With the third quartet, the analysis will be proportionately less verbose as the medium has become less "wordy". The analysis of the second quartet
showed that the next logical step was to free pitches from the bonds of a disintegrating tonal system. The third quartet is a full-blown product of that freedom. Once again, an Idea is the generating force in the quartet.

The Idea of the third quartet is first announced by the second violin in measure one.


The rhythmic pattern set up in this line forms a thread that connects all the parts of the first movement. There is another layer of sound, in longer note values, first spoken by the first violin. Schoenberg has marked this line (Hauptstimme - Principal voice).


There are several points of comparison between this first violin melody and the Idea: 1. the first five notes of the melody bear the same Idea contour; 2. the next five notes are in a similar contour relationship to the Idea, a superimposition of the Idea rhythm will show this relationship:
Ex. 217--The Idea rhythm superimposed on the violin line at measures 9-11.

3. the last interval of the melody, D - A-sharp is a chromatic alteration of the Ideas D-sharp - A interval. All musical material in this movement comes from these two melodies, the Idea in shorter note values and the first variation of the Idea in longer note values. The pattern at measure 1 takes on many forms of which the following are a few.


It appears in shorter fragments,


or with rests replacing one of the notes,

or the two eighths as one quarter.


The melody at measure 5 is taken through as many changes. Let us not forget that this first *Hauptstimme* is a permutation of the Idea so that when we show variants of that first violin melody we are showing Idea evolution.


The half-step E-sharp to F-sharp is a transposed inversion of the initial B to B-flat; the final G-sharp to C-sharp is a retrograde of the C-sharp to G-sharp in measure 7. The next *Hauptstimme* marking encloses this line.


In note values, this line exhibits a closeness to the violin melody at measure 5. In pitches, the first five notes are
the Idea. A rhythmically augmented version of the Idea can be found in the last segment of the violoncello line.


The Idea occurs again, in longer note values, at measures 25-27.


This same kind of treatment continues up to measure 62, Etwas ruhiger, molto cantabile, where the secondary theme occurs.

The similarity between this "new" melody and the Idea is far from abstruse.

There are one or two instances of verticalization in this secondary section, of which measure 76 is the most obvious.


In measures 91-92 the Idea is fragmented into two-note segments.


While these variations and evolutions are taking place the first violin has a long principal voice line (measures 62-93). Its rhythmic relationship to the theme at measure five will be obvious with a few measures quote.


The interval skips are wider but the relationship is clear.

The development section starts in measure 94 with a return to the Idea that occurred in the exposition. Articulation is
again as in the exposition.


The repetition is exact except for the eighth rest where a D-sharp "should be". The Idea comes again (measure 96) in augmentation, the viola taking the final C. Again we see verticalization, A - C.


The development section, up to measure 123, consists mostly of variants of the Idea. At 123 we start hearing portions of the other long-note themes.

The development section ends on a new variation of the Idea, all the pitches are here but in a different configuration.


At measure 174 we are in the recapitulation which begins with theme B. The parts are switched around here. The extended violin line is now in the violoncello and the eighth note figures have gone to the high strings. To illustrate the kind of metamorphosis that occurs in a Schoenbergian recapitulation the first three measures of the cello entrance in theme B (measures 68-70) will be juxtaposed with their recapitulation (viola measures 180-182).

At measure 207 the Idea returns, transposed up a sixth and rhythmically changed. The viola part is also a transposed inversion of the Idea.


Many familiar variations of the Idea are encountered in the recapitulation, augmentation and inversion being quite prevalent.


There are a few instances of variants of the line from measure five being used in the recapitulation, but they are in the form closer to the first violin passage as at measures 43-45.

At measure 239 we come the closest to the original *Hauptstimme*, but this time it is inverted and transposed as is the Idea, which occurs in the viola and violoncello.

Ex. 238—Schoenberg, String Quartet, Op. 30, first mov., measures 239-244.

Basically the texture does not change until we come to the coda, measure 278. At 282 the texture changes completely to a more vertical oriented writing which occurs in five two-measure segments. Each segment contains the five pitches of the Idea (the notes with arrows).

At measure 291 Schoenberg returns to his eighth-note patterns and deviates from them at measures 311-320 where rhythmic changes move to quarter and half note triplets (9/4 and 6/4 time). In measures 314-315, in the violoncello, the Idea returns in changed rhythm.


From 320 to 341 eighths predominate and the movement closes on a chord that contains all the pitches of the Idea except E and it occurs two beats before the close.


The second movement is cast in the form of a theme and variations. There are two themes, each with three variations. The first theme presents the Idea in two ways, horizontal and vertical.

The first entrance of the viola is also the Idea.


In theme B the Idea's first appearance is a little more hidden, as this example shows.


These two themes contrast with each other basically in rhythm and note values used. The rhythm of theme A is more even, there are fewer rests. Theme B has a greater forward drive in the use of longer rhythmic patterns. In theme A the smallest
note value is the sixteenth and the longest the quarter. In theme B thirty-seconds abound and sixteenths are common fare, the longest note value is one dotted quarter in measure 20. The common factor between them is that they are both built on the Idea.

Variation 1A opens with the Idea hidden in the two upper voices.


The lower strings also contain the Idea.


Variation 1B opens with the Idea stated in all voices and several pitches are duplicated in various parts of the measure. The Idea occurs first in the high strings and viola.
This variation continues with much the same texture up to measure 41, where we encounter Variation 2A, where the violins embody the Idea.


Part A of the second variation comes to a close in the middle of measure 50.

Variation 23, as might be expected, opens with the Idea distributed among three instruments.

Variation 3A starts at the *a tempo* in measure 61 with a viola pick-up in measure 60. The Idea appears in the first measure.


Variation 3B begins in measure 71. The violins speak the Idea in the first half of measure 71.

The coda (measures 85-110) is in many ways a recapitulation of the themes, while there are no exact repetitions, one would not expect that, the texture and pace is much as at the opening statements. The Idea is immediately encountered.


The coda is divided into four sections: 85-91, 92-97, 98-101, and 105-110. Each section presents the hearer with an abbreviated variation of the Idea, restating the motives and variants found in each of the longer variations.

The third movement is in the form of a minuet and trio. The viola states the Idea in the pick-up to measure one and in the first measure.
Almost immediately the Idea undergoes development as it comes in measure six rhythmically changed and in retrograde.

In this form the Idea is functioning as the second theme of the A section of the Minuet. The Idea is scattered, at least in its original pitch form, between the second violin and violoncello to form the third theme group of section A.

This texture remains three-part from measure 1 to measure 19 where the B section of the Minuet enters and the texture
becomes four-part. The time signature changes to 12/8 and there is a continuous eighth-note rhythm in the cello for four measures (measures 19-22), where this pattern then (measure 23) moves back and forth between the two violins. The Idea occurs in measure 19, in a partially vertical aspect, between the two violins and the viola.


Measures 20-22 sees this same configuration in transpositions and octave displacements. The primary thematic group returns in measure 39 where the first violin speaks the Idea in its original form.


At the beginning of the movement the Idea has a two-part accompaniment, at its recapitulation the accompaniment has
grown to five-parts. The Idea comes again, not transposed, close to the end of this recapitulation (measures 63-64).

Ex. 258--Schoenberg, String Quartet, Op. 30, third mov., measures 63-64.

This occurs six measures before the Trio (measure 69).

The Trio (measures 69-132) is in two sections with a return of the A section at measure 107. An abbreviated Idea is in the first measure of the Trio missing its A-natural.


The Idea does not seem to appear at the B section of the Trio (measure 88), at least not in explicit form. The Hauptstimme maintains a close resemblance to the minuet form of the Idea from measure one.

From measure 92 to 99 note values become smaller, giving one the feeling of acceleration. Measure 93 has the idea between the violins and the violoncello, this time complete.


The Trio's A section returns at measure 107, with the idea functioning with its A-natural this time.

The minuet returns, beginning with the latter part of measure 132, with the Idea in the violoncello. One rhythmic alteration has occurred; the D-sharp and A-natural are now dotted quarters whereas in measure one they are eighth notes.


After eight measures, the Idea returns in the retrograde form as in the exposition. As could be expected this occurrence of the Idea is rhythmically changed and in the violoncello instead of the viola (measures 6-7).


At measure 145, we see the Idea in its original pitch form, except that the notes are spread among the two violins and violoncello in another permutation. The first violin part is a partial presentation of the Idea transposed a minor third, both C and A being common pitches in the original and this transposition. The C, A, and G-sharp in the second violin part are another transposition (a fourth) of the original Idea.
Such manipulations of the Idea occur consistently throughout the quartet. Any complete codification of these Idea variations would belabor the present analysis and make it so long as to be cumbersome.

The Coda (measures 167-183) opens with the Idea in a familiar guise.

The form of the fourth movement is cast in a Rondo of A B A C A B A. The Idea is present in the first measure in vertical form. Not only does this measure contain the Idea, but also, the entire row in its original form. The first violin part in the example below comprises the thematic elements for section A of the Rondo.
Section B of the Rondo starts at measure 22 and lasts until A returns at measure 44. The Idea appears verticalized (C, E, A) at the beginning of part B. The missing D-sharp and G come in the next two measures.

The character of the B section changes drastically at measure 33, where longer note values are encountered and triplet figures enter where none have been found in the movement before now. The Idea in its original form is found distributed between the cello, viola, and first violin.

A returns at measure 44 with the theme in the form shown in Ex. 270 with the Idea present in its original form.

Ex. 270—Schoenberg, String Quartet, Op. 30, fourth mov., measure 44.

After a short pause theme C enters at measure 62.

This theme, marked Hauptstimme, contains (F, G-sharp, A) a transposed inversion of part of the Idea. This leap of a minor tenth is capitalized on in this section as it quickly evolves to an inversion and in diminution.


These sixteenths appear throughout section C as thirds, verticalized, and rhythmically changed to $\frac{7}{4}$.

Theme A is recapitulated at measure 99 in new dress.

The first beat of the preceding example is the Idea totally verticalized. Section B is recapitulated beginning in measure 128.


As one pitch was missing in the B exposition, so now another (D-sharp) is missing in the recapitulation. The texture remains generally the same until the transition to A, from measure 144 to measure 150, where triplets abound. This section is quite similar to measures 33-37 in section B. Theme A returns in the following form.

The Idea is again in its original form in the first half of the measure. The triplet patterns return from measures 173-184. The coda, measures 186-209, starts with theme A in inversion, with the Idea verticalized on the first beat.


At 192, the rhythms found in the C section (measures 68-72) return in the first violin. These continue until the A theme returns in the viola (measure 202). Juxtaposed with theme A is a sequence of half steps, D - C-sharp, F - F-sharp, B - A-sharp, and G-sharp - A, in half notes. The Idea contains one such half step as the row contains three half steps in all. The quartet ends with the first violin playing the same original half step found in the Idea.

In the essay "Criteria for the Evaluation of Music", Schoenberg, in speaking of composition, states clearly what the consequences of analysis of this sort done in this work are to be, "... of connecting, ideas through developing variation, thus showing consequences derived from the basic idea..." (4, p. 186).


CHAPTER III

EDMUND HUSSERL: THE WAY TO THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO

Introduction

Edmund Husserl's philosophical development into transcendental phenomenology has been divided into three phases (16, p. 74). The first phase or pre-phenomenological constitutes Husserl as the mathematician seeking the ground of his art in psychology. His first published work, Über den Begriff der Zahl (On the Idea of Number), follows the psychological trends of the times. Husserl argues that number would be impossible without concrete experience. Number then becomes contingent on experience and therefore has a purely psychological foundation (15, p. 61). His second published work, The Philosophy of Arithmetic (1891), sounds a similar note. In this book he "...argued that the principles of arithmetic were essentially truths of psychology. . ." (15, p. 59). Husserl's psychologistic grounding of the idea of number underwent vigorous criticism by the mathematician Gottlob Frege (1848-1925). In the foreword to the 1900 edition of Logical Investigations Husserl states clearly his, and Frege's, consternation with the psychologistic approach.

But once one had passed from the psychological connection of thinking, to the logical unity of the thought-content (the unity of theory), no true continuity and unity could be established. I became more and more disquieted by
doubts of principle, as to how to reconcile the objec-
tivity of mathematics, and of all science in general,
with a psychological foundation for logic. In this
manner my whole method, which I had taken over from the
conviction of the reigning logic, that sought to illum-
inate the given science through psychological analyses,
became shaken, and I felt myself more and more pushed
towards general critical reflection on the essence of
logic, and on the relationship, in particular, between
the subjectivity of knowing and the objectivity of the
content known. Logic left me in the lurch wherever I
hoped it would give me definite answers to the definite
questions I put to it, and I was eventually compelled to
lay aside my philosophical-mathematical investigations,
until I had succeeded in reaching a certain clearness on
the basic questions of epistemology and in the critical
understanding of logic as a science (7, pp. 42-43).

This work on logic, which attempts to formulate an objective
basis for logic that is free from psychology, takes us into
the second phase of Husserl's work. This phase places equal
emphasis "...on both the subjective and objective aspects
of experience in their essential correlations" (16, p. 74).
The third major phase in Husserl's phenomenology is a kind
of return to the subjective, but it is a subjective that has
been raised to the transcendental level and is not just the
subjective of empirical psychology.

There are four ideas that seem to remain constant through-
out Husserl's development, the idea of philosophy being a
rigorous science, philosophic radicalism, what Herbert Spiegel-
berg calls the "ethos of radical autonomy" (16, p. 84), and
the preponderance of subjectivity.

From Husserl's fundamental questions concerning the ground
of mathematical truths to his entrance into transcendental
epistemology his demand for the methods of a rigorous science are
evident. It must be pointed out that the concepts of *Wissenschaft* are more encompassing to the German than the Anglo-American. Science here is not only the inductive natural sciences but the deductive science of mathematics. It is a deductive science of philosophy that Husserl was searching for—which must become the foundation even of the inductive sciences. Husserl did not criticize inductive science from the standpoint of an anti-scientific attitude, his criticism was one of foundations. Science, by the end of the 19th century, had degenerated into the study of fact. This factual bent is exemplified in all forms of naturalism and positivism. To Husserl naturalism is the doctrine that sees the physical as the only real. In such a doctrine the ideal is excluded or admitted by making it a physical reality. In this naturalization process, psychology had naturalized consciousness and ideas. Husserl shows that the objectivity to which naturalism lays claim is ideal and thus contradicts naturalism's own principles (9, p. 9). The new science toward which Husserl was working will be rigorous in the sense that the knowledge gained is to be built upon reason and not metaphysical speculations. In such a rigor there is a natural sequence of steps. It is to be a constantly critical rigor, not the rigor of the "exact sciences" whose foundations are not flawless. A letter of Husserl's attests that ultimate clarity is the objective.
I have been through enough torments (Qualen) from lack of clarity and from doubt that wavers back and forth. Only one need absorbs me: I must win clarity, else I cannot live; I cannot bear life unless I can believe that I shall achieve it (16, p. 82).

Philosophic radicalism is one of the characteristics of Husserl's phenomenology that set it apart from other trends of his day. While science and psychology were thrusting knowledge and human experience into models and pigeonholes and discarding that which would not fit the presupposed, Husserl radicalized thought in trying to grasp its very essence and that of consciousness. The radicalism consists in a going to the roots of knowledge—to its ultimate foundation. Such a thoroughgoing philosophizing had not been attempted since Descartes' Meditations. To discover the ultimate roots of our knowledge we must turn to that of which we have knowledge—things-in-themselves—or phenomena. In using the epoche and reduction, Husserl dug deeper and deeper into things known, continually trying to give a completely honest and rigorous account of "things". He became aware that the roots of the known world lay deeper than in the phenomena themselves; this led him to turn to consciousness as the root of our knowledge. The initial "turn to the object" was supplanted by a "turn to the subject." Such a turn led to a presuppositionless philosophy (Voraussetzungslos). A presuppositionless program does not mean a "total rejection of any beliefs whatsoever" (16, p. 83). For Husserl, presuppositionlessness meant merely to eliminate all presuppositions that have not been rigorously
examined. "It is thus not freedom from all presuppositions, but merely freedom from unclarified, unverified, and unverifiable presuppositions that is involved". (16, p. 83). In Logical Investigations, Husserl says this of the principle of freedom from presuppositions: "This principle, we think, only seeks to express the strict exclusion of all statements not permitting of a comprehensive phenomenological realization" (7, p. 263).

The third constant in Husserl's philosophy is the ethical motive. Spiegelberg calls this the "ethos of radical autonomy" (16, p. 84). In 1934 Husserl wrote in these terms on the ethical character of philosophy.

Philosophy is the expressive tool (Organ) of a new type of historical existence of mankind, namely existence based on the spirit of autonomy. The genuine shape of autonomy is that of scientific responsibility to oneself. The prime shape of cultural products coming from such a spirit is the sciences, which in turn are dependent members of the one full and complete science, philosophy (16, p. 84).

"Scientific responsibility to oneself" starts with self-knowledge and responsibility to oneself. Husserl calls this a "universal self-examination" and at the end of the Cartesian Meditations quotes St. Augustine, "Do not wish to go out; go back into yourself. Truth dwells in the inner man" (3, p. 157). This affair with the self is not a personal affair. The philosopher, illuminated through self-knowledge, becomes the agent (Funktionär) of all mankind. Through a social and cultural self-examination there must emerge a reconstructed humanity. The spirit of Sokrates and Plato loom on the
phenomenological horizon. Talk of ethics, self-examination, reconstitutions of humanity smacks of theology, religions and dogmata. Husserl's attitude toward theology is somewhat hazy because he rejected, on moral grounds, all territory that he had not examined himself. There are three areas of contact with theology: he hoped that phenomenology could in some way be helpful in theological insight, he repudiated any kind of theological dogma, and he disclaimed theism. Quoting extensively from unpublished Husserl manuscripts, Carlos Astrada, in Fenomenología y Praxis, maintains the idea that Husserlian phenomenology is nothing but teleological theism (teleología teístico) (1). Phenomenology is described as "a teleological philosophy, as a non-confessional road towards God" (MS, E III 10, pp. 18-19) (1, p. 41). "Teleology guides us to know that God speaks in us, that God speaks in the evidence of the decisions that, through all the manifestations and aspects of the finite world, point to infinity" (MS, K III 10, p. 106.) (1, p. 44). The relationship between Husserlian phenomenology and theology will remain a moot point until all Husserl's manuscripts are published and available to the general public.

The fourth constant has probably had the most far reaching effects on subsequent philosophy, and is a constant thorn in

1Translations are by the author of the present study.
the side of some phenomenological heretics and the uninitiated. "The wonder of all wonders" is subjectivity (Ideen III).

The rigorous quest among objectivities led Husserl to the I AM—the subjectivity through which all objectivities are known. Subjectivity is the primal stuff out of which the cosmos has its Being.

Whether convenient or inconvenient, and even though (because of no matter what prejudices) it may sound monstrous to me, it is the primal matter-of-fact to which I must hold fast which I, as a philosopher, must not disregard for a single instant. For children in philosophy, this may be the dark corner haunted by the spectres of solipsism and, perhaps, of psychologism, of relativism. The true philosopher, instead of running away, will prefer to fill the dark corner with light (5, p. 237).

This "dark corner" is the starting place of each individual in quest of self-knowledge. Illumination of the self through knowledge will bring the knower into pure and lucid contact with the transcendental self and radically reconstruct his whole life-style. Understanding of subjectivity and the consequent individual ethical renewal cannot help but spill over into the Lebenswelt. The very nature of transcendental subjectivity excludes the possibility of ethical solipsism. The wonder of all wonders truly is subjectivity.

Pre-phenomenological Period

In this period of Husserl's development the main shift was from logical-psychologism to a middle ground between psychologism and anti-psychologism. While abandoning the psychologistic camp, Husserl would not go as far as Frege in
making logic completely normative and thus into a completely anti-psychologistic stance (14, p. 56). Initially psychologism was limited to making psychology both a necessary and a sufficient foundation for logic. Later, Husserl's concept was widened to include any attempt to convert objects of any type into psychological experience. Psychologism is seen as finally leading to sceptical relativism which in itself is an absurdity. Sceptical relativism denies the possibility of knowledge while asserting its own truth. The consequences of a complete psychologism are succinctly put by John Wild in the essay "Husserl's Critique of Psychologism."

I. To speak of what is true for a certain species or kind of being implies that the very same content is false for another species or kind of being. But the same content cannot be both true and false.

II. To make truth dependent upon the constitution of a certain species is to base it upon a fact which is individual and temporally determined. The truth about a fact must not, of course, be confused with the fact.

III. If truth is essentially qualified by the human constitution, it follows that should this factual constitution cease to exist, truth would cease to exist. It would thus hold true that no truth holds true.

IV. If the factual existence of a species (for example man) causes its own existence, we are led to conclude this factual being is causa sui.

V. We cannot subjectivize truth without subjectivizing all that which such truth intends (2, pp. 22-23).

Husserl attacked psychologisms on the assumptions: that all thinking is derived from psychology; the subject matter of logic is nothing but psychological phenomena; and, that logic is the proper study of psychology. Husserl's answers to the above assumptions were that any truth could be relevant for rules of thinking; logic is not "concerned with the operations
in which we form concepts, judgements," but with the products of these operations; logic does not concern itself with feelings of self-evidence qua feelings (16, p. 95).

Out of this critique of logical-psychologism there evolved a concept of pure logic. The idea of a pure logic was not original with Husserl. Kant, Herbart, Lotze, Leibniz, and Bolzano must be counted among the advocates of pure logic (16, pp. 95-96). The appellation "pure" simply means that it is a logic that is unmixed with anything sensuous or empirical as psychology would have it be. To this older concept of pure logic Husserl added several original features. The main addition is a two-layered logic. The first layer is that of apophantics (the theory of predicative judgements). The statements studied by logic are composed of meanings that are there before logic "judges" them. The second layer is the "things" to which these meaning-full statements refer. The study of these "things" Husserl termed formal ontology. Later, in Formal and Transcendental Logic, Husserl added another important third concept to pure logic: the ideal, transcendental structure of speech, i.e., "identical sentences that express propositional meanings: ideal because when spoken at different times the meaning does not change" (16, p. 97). They are transcendental in that the meaning transcends the limitations of time and space. The meaning of the statement: "The cat is on the mat" is the same whether spoken by Husserl in German or by Plato in Greek—the meaning transcends.
The Beginnings of Phenomenology

Phenomenology began as a search and a "descriptive study of the processes in which the entities studied in pure logic are presented" to consciousness (16, p. 102). Husserl wanted to found pure logic in experience, albeit experience of a special nature; whereas pure logic in an orthodox sense had always separated logic from psychic phenomena and from psychology. What was needed was a psychology of thinking. The initial thrust of "phenomenology" was not descriptive psychology in a new suit of clothes. Phenomenology was not to be a description of the actual objects of experience but a radical study of the "ideal types of logical experience corresponding to the ideal logical laws" (16, p. 102). Whether or not such types of logical experience had an objective counterpart has no bearing on the case. The fact that they exist in consciousness is enough to warrant phenomenological scrutiny. Thus, phenomenological insight will be a priori. "Phenomenological statements are a priori because they are true independently of facts of this world. . ." They are a priori "to the extent that the statement's truth is logically independent of the truth or falsity of empirical statements."

"These statements will be non-empirical because they are statements about appearances of objects and not the object itself" (11, p. 25). This a priorism is not a pie-in-the-sky metaphysics that forgets the object intended through consciousness. The objects intended become better illuminated by a
complete phenomenological understanding of their conscious parallel. The parallelism between the subjective act and its objective referent must never be lost in analysis.

This parallelism forms the basis for a correlative investigation under which both aspects of any phenomenon are to be studied and described in conjunction. To study one without the other would be an artificial abstraction which may have its uses, but which ultimately requires reintegration into the context of the concrete experience from which they have been isolated. This is what Husserl later on came to call the parallelism between the "noetic" (act) and the "noematic" (content) (16, p. 103).

The concepts of noesis and noema are extremely important in that they stand in direct relation to the two layers of logical thought. They also allow the phenomenologist to keep separate his act of thinking (noesis) and the content of his thought (noema). Phenomenological illumination would be impossible without the basic distinction between the act of thinking and the thought-content. The distinction between the thing perceived and the act of perception then and only then becomes clear. It is through this clarification that one can back away from phenomena and view them-as-they-are (6, pp. 255-281).

Having reached the grounding of pure logic in consciousness it might be a good idea to look at some of the concrete investigations in the areas of semantics, universals, intentionality, and intuition.

Husserl distinguished four areas in his study of semantics. The manifestation of meaning or what an expression
signifies can change from person to person.

The presentation I have of Greenland's icy wastes certainly differs from the presentation Nansen has of it, yet the object is the same. Just so the ideal objects straight line and shortest line are identical, but the presentations - 'straight' being suitably defined - different (7, p. 590).

Different meaningful statements can refer to the same object, for example "Husserl," "a phenomenologist," "a mathematician," "the father of Gerhard," etc. There are also self-contradictory meanings; that is, statements that are not matched by an object meant: a square circle. There are also symbolic meanings and intuitive meanings. The statement 'This tree is green' is an intuitive statement because the statement includes its contents—the tree and its greenness. This same intuitive statement can be made symbolic: 'This S is P,' "an ideal form whose range of values consists solely of independent (propositional) meanings" (7, p. 511). This symbolic statement points to its object and does not contain the object. Finally, the one ideal meaning that a multiple of meaningful statements points toward is an ideal entity and not just a psychological datum (16, p. 105). The integer 4 is an ideal entity at which one may arrive through various meaningful statements, for example, $2 + 2; 1 + 3; 6 - 2; \text{etc.}$

From such numerical expressions, as those above, it is easy to be lead to the problem of universals. These universals come from "identical meanings for numerically separate expressions. . ." (16, p. 105). The essences thus apprehended are brought to light through a process called ideation. Ideation becomes a
referral from concreteness to the idea of that concreteness. Thus, "we rise to the inwardly evident recognition of the identity of these ideal unities which are meant in our single acts" (7, p. 149). Ideation and abstraction from particulars are a cornerstone in the totality of phenomenological method. Without the act of ideation "the adequate survey of conceptual essences, and of the universal validity rooted in those essences" would be impossible (7, p. 833). Ideation allows us to go beyond the "thatness" of an object and contemplate its "whatness". Universals not only can be derived from concrete objects but also from objects of our fantasies. No judgemental priorities as to reality can be drawn when confronted with experience. I can, in fantasy, experience a unicorn. The validity of that unicorn is in no way compromised, nor are its universal qualities prejudiced, by there being no physical referent.

The Red, the Triangle exemplified in mere phantasy is specifically the same as the Red, the Triangle exemplified in our percepts. Our consciousness of the universal has as satisfactory a basis in perception as it has in parallel imagination, and, wherever it arises, the idea Red, the idea Triangle, is itself apprehended, is intuited in the one unique way which permits no distinction between image and original (44, p. 801).

That these universals apprehended are entities of their own does not imply that they are real, eternal, or changeless as Plato thought them to be (see Phaedo, 78). Universals are not superior in any way to the particulars from which they are intuited. No hierarchy is ever set up upon which great metaphysical theories could be spun. Such non-judgemental action
is part of the phenomenologist's credo to accept things as they are without demanding credentials of relative value from experience. These universals are not discovered and 'cleared' by objective consciousness but through the agency of the subjective side of consciousness. The universal is derived from the objective perceptual experience of particulars. Ideation then distills the essence from these particular experiences.

Intentionality, the next of Husserl's concrete investigations, is a dark corner for all non-phenomenologists. With a little concentration maybe we can light that dark corner and help dispel its chimeras. Quite simply, intentionality means that consciousness is always conscious of something. Consciousness is object-directed whether that object be intra- or extramental. In this sense of directedness towards, consciousness intends the object. The act of creation is inextricably bound with the mind's intentionality. Such a concept is in direct line to Husserl from Brentano back to St. Thomas. We participate in the being of other objects through the mind (13, p. 52). In reality, this intentionality goes back to Aristotle where he states that "the soul is in a way all existing things" (De Anima III, 8, 431b, 21). The mind is the matrix out of which all existing things become knowable. Things are intended by the mind—extended from consciousness. Existence is in a real sense objectivated subjectivity, but in such a way that things fold back on the intender. Subjective thought becomes object which is in turn
synthetically subjectivated to essences. Subject-object becomes a meaningless tautology in the transcendental nature of consciousness. The most apt example is that of the cycle of musical composition, performance, and reintegration into the subjective life of the listener.

Franz Brentano, in his reintroduction of the concept of intentionality, made it the distinguishing mark between physical phenomena and psychical phenomena, physical phenomena being non-intentional and psychical phenomena being intentional. Husserl maintained that a clear distinction between physical and psychical phenomena is not always possible. Intentionality was not the distinguishing characteristic of all psychical phenomena (7, pp. 552-556).

Through intention we are able to connect the parts of an object to make it a whole. In looking at any object the sides not within my perceptual horizon arouse expectations as to their composition. Intentionality will synthesize into a whole object a series of seemingly unconnected perceptual stances. There occurs in consciousness a concatenation of perceptions which produces knowledge of all the perceptual aspects of an object, either concrete or fanciful.

Intention also constitutes the intentional object. "Hence the intentional object is no longer conceived as the pre-existent referent to which the intending act refers as already given, but as something which originates in the act" (16, p. 110). This gets us into the realm of phenomenological
constitution which will be considered later when we discuss transcendental phenomenology and time consciousness.

The final area of investigation in this early period of phenomenology is intuition. Spiegelberg rightly labors over a correct translation of *Anschauung* (the German word for intuition), for intuition in English has many connotations that are in no way connected with phenomenological intuiting. Intuition is not something that women are supposed to have in abundance. Intuition is not used in "the sense of an inspirational idea or an instinctive anticipation" (16, p. 117). Intuition is a mode of viewing objects, that mode being phenomenological. Looking at objects, studying their configuration, synthesizing various intuitions, varying these *Anschauungen* in imagination in order to gain insight into the limits to which a phenomenon can be varied before it loses its character; then and only then will one have *Wesensschau*, that glance at the universal aspects of a class of phenomena. From the previous consideration of ideation it should be obvious that intuiting general essences is closely allied to ideation. Genuine verifiable knowledge is only possible after intuition of phenomena occurs on both the particular and the universal levels.

"First Philosophy"

So far, the function of phenomenology has been to rebuild pure logic. Husserl became aware of the possibilities of a much wider application of phenomenology other than just to
logic. He began a new philosophical approach by a repudiation of phenomenology as descriptive psychology in the style of Franz Brentano. "Now it became the study of the essential structures of the acts and contents of consciousness, a study to be based not on mere empirical generalizations but on the intuitive grasping of the essences of the phenomena, the 'Sachen'" (16, pp. 118-119). The main areas of consciousness that came to interest Husserl phenomenologically were perception, imagination, image consciousness, memory, and the consciousness of time. It is this last area of study that Husserl developed most fully his ideas on intentionality (10).

Through his spiritual espousal of Descartes and Kant and an intensive critique of consciousness, Husserl came to see phenomenology as the only way to knowledge.

The insight will be awakened that genuine philosophy, the idea of which is to realize the idea of Absolute Knowledge, has its roots in pure phenomenology, and this is so earnest a sense that the systematically rigorous grounding and development of this first of all philosophies remains the perceptual precondition of all metaphysics and other philosophy "which would aspire to be a science" (6, pp. 45-46).

At this time Husserl introduced a new method of securing pure and lucid intuitions of phenomena. He called it "epistemological reduction." It is suspension of belief in the phenomena to help free them from all transcendent preconceptions and interpretations. It is a way of getting back to things themselves. Husserl closed his essay on a rigorous science (9) with the battle-cry Zu den Sachen selbst.
In returning to things, it is not to the objective correlate that we return, but to their appearance in consciousness. It is a subjective reflection that is called for.

What the phrase does mean is the refusal to make philosophical theories and the critique of such theories the primary and, at times, the all-absorbing concern of philosophy, as does much linguistic analysis and criticism (16, p. 122).

It would not be a distortion of the meaning of Zu den Sachen if one were to substitute for "philosophical", "musical" in the above quote. A phenomenology of music will make "music" the primary concern, not musical theories nor "the critique of such theories."

Phenomenology and the Transcendental

Every type of first-hand intuiting (originär gebende Anschauung) forms a legitimate source of knowledge (Rechtsquelle); whatever presents itself to us by "intuition" first hand, in its authentic reality, as it were (sozusa gen in seiner leibhaften Wirklichkeit), is to be accepted simply for the thing as which it presents itself, yet merely within the limits within which it presents itself (6, p. 92; 16, p. 128).

Whatever presents itself is the given. This is not the first time givenness has been proclaimed in philosophy. Empiricism and positivism would not exist without presupposing a well developed concept of what the given is and is not. Where roads diverge between empiricism and phenomenology is in the interpretation of the given. The fight turns out to be, not over particular 'givens!', but over the possibility of universals as being genuinely given in perception. Positivism and empiricism say that universals are not given in
the sense that experiences are given, that is, as sense data. Husserl says that these two schools are guilty of a negative prejudice which does not allow them to see beyond particular sense data (6, pp. 85-87). Husserl used mathematical insights as a primary example of universal givenness. Phenomenology has no real fight with positivism other than the latter's restriction of givenness to sense data. "If by 'Positivism' we are to mean the absolute unbiased grounding of all science on what is 'positive', i.e., on what can be primordially apprehended, then it is we who are the genuine positivists" (6, p. 86).

The principle of givenness, as Husserl seems to advocate it, remains dubitable. It seems that preceptions are to be accepted at face value at the risk of there being no illusion. Later steps in the transcendental will show that such a fundamentalistic interpretation of givenness is probably not what Husserl had in mind.

Whatever Husserl's own final meaning is, I submit that it would be unsafe to claim for the given more than apparent authenticity. It would certainly be uncritical, not to say unphenomenological, to accept phenomena at their face value. Such an interpretation of the elliptical expression "self-givenness" would prejudice the issue, if not beg the question (16, p. 130).

There are four areas in self-givenness that remain ambiguous. Phenomenology has not yet clarified the distinguishing features between "(1) the total object given, (2) its sides confronting the subject face to face, (3) the perspective aspects which these sides present from different positions
(frontal, lateral, close, or removed), and (4) the sense data (Husserl's 'hyletic data'). . ." (16, pp. 130-131).

In spite of the furor that the concept of self-givenness always raises, there are several points that cannot be overlooked. Givenness is seen as being the view that the world is made up of items just waiting to be perceived. In the transcendental Husserl, such an accusation does not fit in view of the idea of tracing "the given to certain constituting acts" (16, p. 131) by consciousness. There are elements in the objective perception of the concrete over which we seem to have no control. Givenness, then, is meant to draw attention to these non-subjective elements in perception.

The given is not the only philosophical concept which has remained ambiguous over the centuries. The act by which we perceive the given, whether it be particular or universal or a combination of both, has received as much verbiage as the given. This act is, of course, perception. There are several places where Husserl defines perception: "That which is self-evidently given is, in perception, experienced as 'the thing itself,' in immediate presence, or, in memory, remembered as the thing itself. . ." (4, pp. 127-128);
". . .it is to see it, to touch it, to smell it, to hear it, etc. . . ." (4, p. 157). Perception is an act which gives us mere presentations of objects (7, p. 712). Husserl's paradigm object was always the three-dimensional thing in space. Modality in the perception of objects in space becomes important
in phenomenological description. Objects are known face to face but the mode of appearance becomes more shaded as parts of the object recede from view as corners are rounded until the back of an object can be known only in imagination or memory. Modes of clarity and modes of vagueness will emerge in phenomenological description of perceived objects. It is necessary to be cognizant of the limits of such shadings if particular object-knowledge is desired and is even more important when intuiting essences. Such modality and perceptual shadings do not seem to exist when considering objects of purely inner perception.

In *Erfahrung und Urteil*, Husserl distinguishes three steps in perception which usually occur in one unified act, but nevertheless make up the totality of perceptual acts. These steps are plain seizing and retention, explicating contemplation and explicative synthesis, and seizing the percept in relation to other objects (16, p. 132).

For Husserl, the highest criterion for knowledge is that it be self-evident. In writing about knowledge in *Logical Investigations* he says this about evidence: "... if it is to be called 'knowledge' in the narrowest, strictest sense, it requires to be evident, to have the luminous certainty that what we have acknowledged is..." (7, p. 60). At the time of writing *Logical Investigations*, self-evidence was for Husserl a fool-proof guarantee of truth; however, towards the end of his life he felt the need for a new critique
of self-evidence, having abandoned the fool-proofness of self-evidence. Working out the nuances of self-evidence in regard to its adequateness or inadequateness allows us to decide how fully an object is represented to us by its self-evidence (16, p. 133).

The central concept around which ideation, intuition of universals, and perception turns is that of reduction or époque. There are basically two kinds of reduction, philosophical and phenomenological, the latter also goes under the synonymous terms "transcendental reduction" and "intentional analysis." Of philosophic reduction Husserl writes:

The philosophic èpoque, which we propose to adopt, should consist, when explicitly formulated, in this, that in respect of the theoretical content of all previous philosophy, we shall abstain from passing any judgment at all, and that our whole discussion shall respect the limits imposed by this abstention (6, pp. 80-81).

Husserl came to apply this abstention "from passing any judgement at all", in respect to past philosophy, to the whole range of phenomena, formulating what is termed the phenomenological reduction. "What it does imply is best indicated by the literal meaning of the term: a leading back to the origins of which our all too hasty everyday thought has lost sight" (16, p. 133). Husserl took as his philosophical mentor Descartes and Descartes' radical return, but does not doubt, as Descartes doubted, the existence of the things reduced. "The primary function of all reduction is to prepare us for a critical stock-taking of what is indubitably given, before
our interpreting beliefs rush in" (16, p. 134). "The purpose of such a stance is to enable the perceiver to obtain unclouded and unprejudiced perceptions—to accept phenomena on their terms instead of prejudging them and forcing them to fit preconceived models" (11, p. 23). At another place, Husserl termed the phenomenological reduction as "this ubiquitous detachment from any point of view regarding the objective world." (8, p. 8). In the same work, Paris Lectures, he describes the man before epoché as living "immersed naively in the world" (8, p. 14); whereas, after epoché "I become the disinterested spectator of my natural and worldly ego and its life" (8, p. 15).

In performing the reduction Husserl distinguished two stages, **eidetic reduction**, and the **phenomenological reduction proper**. These two stages are to be distinguished from philosophical reduction, which is an historical reduction in that it brackets past philosophy and philosophical systems. Eidetic reduction involves the previous concept of "ideation" as it is the intuiting of essences, thus the use of the Platonic term eidos. The most that eidetic reduction accomplishes is to purify phenomena from the cloudiness that can result in reflecting on a multiplicity of phenomena. Phenomenological reduction involves a suspended belief in the existence of the object and indeed our everyday life. It asks that you intuit essences, analyse and describe without ever giving thought to the reality of the phenomena. Husserl uses the mathematical
term "bracketing" for this suspended belief. Bracketing does not mean we suspend completely our consciousness of the existence of phenomena and our beliefs in phenomena. What we must do is to stop attaching so much weight to such beliefs. "We are merely to stop identifying ourselves with such beliefs in the sense of a definite commitment" (16, p. 135). At this point in the development of bracketing techniques Husserl grew more obscure in just what the subsequent steps were to involve. He often referred to it as "the most difficult thing ever attempted in philosophy" (16, p. 135). Increasingly époché became a reduction toward something (Reduktion auf...), rather than a movement away from the whole natural world. "The goal of this movement is none other than transcendental subjectivity" (16, p. 136). Transcendental reduction becomes the preferred term for phenomenological reduction. It seems to imply that its purpose is to inhibit all references to the "transcendent" as the intentional correlate of our acts and to trace them back to the immanent or 'transcendental' acts in which they have their source" (16, p. 136). In Crisis, Husserl explains the results of the transcendental reduction:

And there results, finally, taken in the broadest sense, the absolute correlation between being of every sort and every meaning, on the one hand, and absolute subjectivity, as constituting meaning and ontic validity in the broadest manner, on the other hand (4, p. 151-152).

The ethical renewal spoken of earlier is possible only after the individual has experienced and lived in a phenomenological stance and done transcendental époché. The religious overtones
become increasingly louder the deeper into phenomenological reflection one delves, and phenomenological reflection amounts to a kind of conversion. In Husserl's words:

Perhaps it will even become apparent that the total phenomenological attitude and the corresponding epoché is called upon to bring about a complete personal transformation (Wandlung) which might be compared to a religious conversion, but which even beyond it has the significance of the greatest existential conversion that is expected of mankind (Husserliana VI, 140; 16, p. 136).

It is not a sterile bleak universe that we are left with after epoché, it is a clear, lucid and well-illuminated consciousness in all its rich facets that remains. Believing consciousness is not affected during the reduction; it is the content of consciousness that remains suspended. This phenomenological residue Husserl liked to term the "ego cogito cogitata," I think thoughts.

The phenomenological ego characterized in the statement ego cogito cogitata was at first rejected by Husserl (see the first edition of Logical Investigations). When he published Ideas (1913) there had been an about face on his part.

The Ego appears to be permanently, even necessarily, there, and this permanence is obviously not that of a stolid unshifting experience, of a "fixed idea". On the contrary, it belongs to every experience that comes and streams past, its "glance" goes "through" every actual cogito, and towards the object. . . But the Ego remains self-identical. . . The pure Ego appears to be necessary in principle, and as that which remains absolutely self-identical in all real and possible changes of experience, it can in no sense be reckoned as a real part or phase of the experience themselves (6, p. 172).
This ego is not a substance à la Descartes. There is a strict distinction between the Ego and any psychological self which has not been scrutinized under the phenomenological eye (16, p. 140-141). Husserl finally adopted Leibniz's term "monad" for the phenomenological Ego. The monad comprises not only the immediate "vividly streaming present", but also transcendental characteristics comprising its past, future and all potentialities (Husserl quoted in 16, p. 141).

The absolute cogitations are the same as those enumerated by Descartes in the second Meditation. They comprise doubting, understanding, affirming, denying, willing, refusing, imagining, and feeling. Husserl added to these all intentional acts and parts of acts that have been uncovered and clarified phenomenologically. One example is the shades and nuances uncovered in doxa (implied beliefs). Such cogitations are made of two parts, the hyletic data (its raw material) and the intention that gives it "life". It is here that Husserl distinguishes between noesis and noema, noesis being the act of cogitating and noema being the content of such cogitations (6, pp. 255-281).

The cogitata, or the noematic content, are the "intentional objects of our cogitations in their capacity of being referred to: for instance, the perceived page as being perceived, the imagined author as being imagined, etc." (16, p. 142). What, if any, is the connection between the cogitata and its cogitations? In a manner of speaking they have an
indubitable being. Continuing Spiegelberg's example, the reader being faced with a white page with black marks on it is being faced with something the being of which he cannot doubt. Again, it is important to remember that it makes no difference whether the reader be in a sleeping or waking state or hallucinating. Such a phenomenon is pure and cannot be endangered by questions of physical reality. There is another sense in which a cogitatum refers to a real object. This page is a reality which exists in and of itself and is potentially capable of being written upon or converted into smoke. From these thoughts on cogitata we are lead to another perennial philosophical problem: Idealism.

Traditionally, idealism is any philosophical concept that emphasizes the mind, soul, or spirit as the pre-eminent reality. This concept of idealism is completely subjective and makes "all being dependent on psychological consciousness" (16, p. 143). As early as the Logical Investigations Husserl disavowed this subjectivistic-psychologistic interpretation of idealism.

To talk of 'idealism' is of course not to talk of a metaphysical doctrine, but of a theory of knowledge which recognizes the 'ideal' as a condition for the possibility of objective knowledge in general, and does not 'interpret it away' in psychological fashion (7, p. 338).

Husserlian idealism, not being a psychological entity, is intimately tied to transcendental consciousness. Once the reduction has been performed it will become immediately
evident that all that is and exists for the pure ego is constituted by that reduced consciousness "and that transcendency is nothing but an immanent existential characteristic, constituted within the ego itself" (12, p. 223). The world and consciousness belong together in essence, they are concretely one, and this concretion is effected through the agency of transcendental subjectivity. Thus, phenomenology is eo ipso transcendental idealism. This idealism is not psychological idealism which would construct a meaningful world from sensuous data. Nor is it a Kantian idealism which splits the world into the concrete and things-in-themselves (12, p. 224).

Husserl's two basic arguments for transcendental idealism are the deductive, that is the self-contradictory nature of materialism, and, "direct phenomenological evidence, supplied by analysis of transcendental constitution" (16, p. 144).

"Phenomenological constitution has been for us, up to now, constitution of any intentional object whatever. It has embraced the full breath of the topic, cogito -- cogitatum" (3, p. 56). Initially, constitution meant the static structure of an object. In this sense, the constitution of a cat is that formal, hyletic structure, seemingly unchanging that makes "cat" recognizable as "cat" and not "mountain goat". As Husserl delved deeper into the structure of consciousness he was led to conclude that constitution was not
a static state but a "dynamic process by which it is built up as an object with a static 'constitution' of its own" (16, p. 146). Here constitution is taking on a transitive nature to the point that our intentional consciousness is what creates the constitution. There is a sharp distinction within constitution between the active and passive. Active constitution involves perceptual experience, passive constitution is one of judgement. Passive constitution is dependent upon the active for its judgemental synthesis as it depends on hyle for the synthetic process of judgement. (Judgement is not being used in an evaluative sense.)

Husserl felt that the key to understanding constitution could be found in our consciousness of time and it is in this area that he did his most extensive constitutional analyses. His thoughts on time-consciousness are contained in the book Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness (10) which was highly edited by the then pupil of Husserl, Martin Heidegger. A rough structure of time-consciousness can be reconstructed as

A primal impression (Urimpression) of a streaming present surrounded by a horizon of immediate "retention" of the past (to be distinguished from active recollection) and of immediate "protention" of the future (to be distinguished from active expectation) (16, p. 148).

Husserl came to believe that a full understanding of the

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2 The job of editing was not considered satisfactory by Husserl.
constitution of inner time-consciousness would help in understanding the constitution of all other objectivities. Husserl wanted to show that the primal constitution of the stream of time is one of the hidden achievements of the transcendental ego in a process called Zeitigung (the production of time itself). Kant, in the Critique of Pure Reason, spoke of a similar function of the transcendental ego.

This pure original unchangeable consciousness I shall name transcendental apperception. That it deserves this name is clear from the fact that even the purest objective unity, namely, that of the a priori concepts (space and time), is only possible through relation of the intuitions to such unity of consciousness (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A107).

The ultimate productive root or ground of all hyletic data and intentional objectivities would then become the transcendental ego. "Thus transcendental idealism would be finally established" (16, p. 149). Husserl was never able to take his analyses as far as saying that everything that has being owes that being to transcendental subjectivity, but it is highly possible that he would have gone that far in the light of his work on time-consciousness and constitution.

It might be wise to discuss phenomenology and its relationship to psychology, since Husserl felt that it was in the direction of psychological analysis that phenomenology could do the most effective work.

Scientific psychology of Husserl's day was grounded in psychophysics and physiological psychology, "whose dominating interest was to determine quantitatively and experimentally
the relationships between objective stimuli and subjective responses" (16, p. 150). In such a psychology, the psychological data were presumed to be on a par with the organism and its physical parts. Husserl claimed this was a misplaced objectivism and contended that psychology should study psychic phenomena in and of themselves. He also postulated a psychological reduction which would allow the psychologist to bracket all non-psychological entities. Phenomenological psychology would study the "intentional structure of consciousness" in its subjective aspects only (16, p. 150-151).

Transcendental Monadology and the Lebenswelt

It is impossible to completely bypass the question of solipsism when considering any brand of subjectivism. One can "subjectivize" the world right out of existence and be left with the solus ipse. This is just what Husserl has been accused of doing. The problem of solipsism as a result of epoché has been, and still is, a stumbling block for many. Husserl has shown that, phenomenologically, a strict solipsistic philosophy is an impossibility. Transcendental idealism shows that the single human monad does not exist in an objective sense because it is always found as objectivated towards another similar monad.

If, with my understanding of someone else, I penetrate more deeply into him, into his horizon of owness, I shall soon run into the fact that, just as his animate bodily organism lies in my field of perception, so my animate organism lies in his field of perception and
that, in general, he experiences me forthwith as an Other for him, just as I experience him as my Other.

To this community there naturally corresponds, in transcendental concreteness, a similarly open community of monads, which we designate as transcendental intersubjectivity (3, p. 130).

Husserl also liked to use the term empathy (Einfühlung) when talking about the community of intersubjective monads. Nevertheless, our knowledge of the other is always an appresentation rather than a direct presentation. An alter ego is apperceived and through analogy we assimilate the alter ego as our own. We can put ourselves into the other man's shoes and become him through an egological coupling (Paarung). We form a community, in that my ego is constituted by the same transcendental subjective that constitutes all alter egos.

Husserl's last work, *The Crisis of European Sciences* and *Transcendental Phenomenology* (4), has been seen by many as the work of a senile man who was doing a great deal of philosophical backsliding. Husserl reintroduces such things as had been bracketed in the past; for example, history and the history of philosophical systems, and man's surrounding world of lived experience, the Lebenswelt (16, p. 159). The Lebenswelt was to yield, according to Husserl, a confirming note to transcendental phenomenology, and uncover the transcendental ego more fully. There was to be a study of the style of individual life-worlds in what was termed an "ontology of the life-worlds." It seems as if the proper
avenue to the function of intentionality and the transcendental ego is through the Lebenswelt. "The first step in this direction would be the thorough inspection, analysis, and description of the life-world as we encounter it before the transcendental reduction" (16, p. 161). The Lebenswelt was at the end seen as "an oriented world with an experiencing self at its center..." (16, p. 162).

The introduction of the Lebenswelt into his philosophy should not be seen as a backward glance or an admission of failure on Husserl's part. Where before he concentrated his critical-phenomenological gaze on reason and consciousness, now through the same method, epoché, reduction, etc., he proposes to gaze at that same reason and consciousness as it has manifested itself, not in the individual, but in civilization and culture, that is in an historical context. Having uncovered the eidetic structure and transcendental character of human consciousness, Husserl now seeks to unearth the reasons why this consciousness went astray in its historical manifestation. Why did it create for itself this "crisis" and how can the true path of the historical ego be rediscovered? The foundation for the understanding of the historical ego begins in yourself. "Do not wish to go out," says St. Augustine, "go back into yourself. Truth dwells in the inner man" (3, p. 157). The ancient Greek offers an even more terse answer: γνῶθι σεαυτόν, Know Thyself.
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CHAPTER IV

PARALLELS IN METHODOLOGIES

Clarity seems to be the ultimate goal of both twelve-tone music and phenomenology. In Husserl's last work he states that the purpose of his investigation

...is to make comprehensible the teleology in the historical becoming of philosophy, especially modern philosophy, and at the same time to achieve clarity about ourselves, who are the bearers of this teleology, who take part in carrying it out through our personal intention (2, p. 70).

Almost as if uttered in the same breath Schoenberg says, "Composition with twelve tones has no other aim than comprehensibility" (8, p. 103). This simultaneous need and necessity (again Schoenberg's word) for clarity grew out of a dissatisfaction with respective disciplines. Both music and logic were in the same cul-de-sac in the late 19th century. Logic, and eventually all philosophy, was given a method of getting out of its blind alley through phenomenology and its way of "seeing." Music regained a sense of clarity and lucidity through a new method of organizing musical material the twelve-tone way.

There were three major steps along the way to twelve-tone composition and transcendental phenomenology that are analogous to each other. Tonality and descriptive psychology: both Husserl and Schoenberg working in forms and models
bequeathed them by tradition and current in the late 19th century; both pushing to see how far they can go before breaking loose into new territory. Representative works for Husserl are **Über den Begriff der Zahl** (1887) and **Philosophie der Arithmetik** (1891). For Schoenberg, the major works in a tonal idiom are the string sextet **Verklärte Nacht** (Op. 4, 1899), **Pelleas und Melisande** (Op. 5, 1903), **String Quartet in d minor** (Op. 7, no. 1, 1905), and **Gurrelieder** (1900-1911).

Music whose tonal center has become so disoriented that the music is atonal and phenomenological psychology form the second phase of development. We are now definitely on the path to a new music and a new philosophy whose ultimate goal is clarity and illumination. These works are perhaps the most difficult to grasp and understand because, in them, Husserl and Schoenberg are searching for new forms, new idioms, and clearer means of expression. Schoenberg's **Das Buch der Hängenden Gärten** (Op. 15, 1909), **Erwartung** (Op. 17, 1909), **Pierrot Lunaire** (Op. 21, 1912) are such atonal works. Husserl's main middle period publication is **Logische Untersuchungen** (1900-1901). Still a transitional work in many respects is **Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und Phänomenologischen Philosophie** (1913).

In the last period of twelve-tone composition and transcendental phenomenology we are finally planted in the new land. From Schoenberg's hand we have such works as **Quintet** (Op. 26, 1923), **String Quartet** (Op. 30, No. 3, 1927), **Concerto**
for Violin and Orchestra (Op. 36, 1934-1935). Husserl produced Formale und Transzendentale Logik (1929), and Cartesianische Meditationen (1931). At the close of this period both men readmitted former idioms and styles, but on the terms of the logic and clarity found in their new endeavors. These latest works should not be looked upon as an admittance of failure, but a constant search for new avenues and a remembrance of the past. These creations not only light the way to come, but serve as beacons for illuminating the past. Husserl's major, and unfinished, work of this sort is Die Krisis der Europäischen Wissenschaft und die Transzendentale Phänomenologie (1936). Schoenberg's tonal-twelve-tone works are Variations on a Recitative (Op. 40, 1941), Ode to Napoleon Buonaparte (Op. 41, 1942), and Concerto for Piano and Orchestra (Op. 42, 1942).

The concept of ethos connects all these works. Such an ethical character can be found in a letter dated April 1951 (7, p. 286) where Schoenberg writes,

I have always felt the urge to discover what can most help beginners and how they can be made thoroughly acquainted with the technical, intellectual, and ethical demands of our art; how to teach them that there is a morality of art, and why one must never cease to foster it and always combat to the utmost any attempt to violate it.

Morality and ethics are conveyed by art, in this case music, through the agency of the composer, from the Logos, the Word that was in the beginning. In an interview with José Rodriguez, Schoenberg says, "What else can I do than express
the original Word, which to me is a human thought, a human idea or a human aspiration?" (1, p. 148). In "Self-revelation and the Law: Arnold Schoenberg in His Religious Works," printed in Yuval (5), Dika Newlin shows Schoenberg's constant awareness of the Logos or the Breath of God. The final words of the libretto to Moses and Aaron demonstrate the highly ethical character and teleological leanings in Schoenberg's life and work, "But in the wilderness ye shall be unconquerable and achieve the goal: United with God" (5, p. 217).

As was stated earlier (p. 129), Husserl's thoughts on God and the theological nature of his quest must remain dubious at present because many of the incomplete works and almost all personal letters have remained unpublished. However, in the first part of The Crisis Husserl makes it very clear that the purpose of any true philosophy is to help, not only the individual, but mankind, to realize his place and direction in the universe. "The quite personal responsibility of our own true being as philosophers, our inner personal vocation, bears within itself at the same time the responsibility for the true being of mankind; the latter is, necessarily, being toward a telos..." (2, p. 17). Sister Adelgundis Jaeger-schmidt recalls Husserl as saying, when discussing his final phenomenological method: "Man's life is nothing but a way to God. I am trying to reach this end without theological proofs, methods, or aids, in other words, to get to God without God" (6, p. 77).
Who is doing this getting to God? Who is it that is making this ethical plunge as exemplified in artistic and philosophical morality? It is none other than the Ego. The Ego, glancing inward upon itself, suddenly finds itself the community of monads—even such designations as "musical" or "philosophical" lose their objective meanings in the light of absolute knowledge of the self. Both twelve-tone method and phenomenology offers us a path through a highly subjectivized self to a clear lucid logic of music and philosophy—yes, even of life!

This new musical-philosophical language becomes a means of clearly "expressing" the inner self where Saint Augustine claims truth dwells (see his De Vera Religione, 39, n. 72). Music-philosophy becomes an expressionism, an introspective experience that throws open the windows of the soul and allows her to experience and express herself unencumbered by cliché-ridden tradition. With a cleared eye and "seeing" for the first time, the soul will be able to look upon the past and tradition in a new fashion that will permit deeper and broader understandings of that past. The chiasma of the past will emerge purified and knowable in its essential qualities which before were obscured by lack of vision.

There are two more parallelisms that must be discussed before quitting the topic. Musical intuition falls into two layers which can be termed Kapellmeistermusik-intuition and twelve-tone-intuition. Kapellmeistermusik-intuition is
superficial. It is mere hearing without understanding or knowledge. It is like the polyphony to which it refers, a sort of filler or easy way out. Anschauungen correspond to Kapellmeistermusik in that Anschauungen are views of things without intuition of general essences. Twelve-tone allows us to intuit musical essence without the superficial layer of Kapellmeistermusik. Wesenschau goes deeper than mere Anschauung in its intuition of universal qualities.

Finally, any kind of bracketing or reduction involves certain negative aspects. That which has been reduced is negated. Twelve-tone method negates tonality and dissonance-consonance; transcendental reduction negates the world in its physical aspects. But, it is a "positive" negation as the reducer is left with essential qualities with which to view that initially bracketed phenomenon whether it be tonality or human consciousness.

The following table shows, point by point, some of the major areas of correspondence between Husserl and Schoenberg. The table is followed by some relevant quotations from their writings.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arnold Schoenberg</th>
<th>Edmund Husserl</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1.</strong> Crisis felt in state of music. Tonality outlived itself. Early work pushed tonality to its extreme limits.</td>
<td><strong>1.</strong> Crisis felt in logic/psychology. Psychologism ruled the day. Early work done in a psychologistic grounding of logic/math. Pushed descriptive psychology to the extreme limits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2.</strong> Aim was seen to be a purified music, clean of all musical cliches that were prevalent in late Romanticism. A search for the boundaries of tonality.</td>
<td><strong>2.</strong> Aim was seen to be a purified and well grounded logic and psychology. A search for the borders of psychology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3.</strong> Ethos: this purified music to be the Logos.</td>
<td><strong>3.</strong> Ethos: an ethical renewal for all mankind, a clearer hearing and understanding of the Logos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4.</strong> Subjective side of composition emphasized, the objective models such as tonality done away with. Music more introspective.</td>
<td><strong>4.</strong> Transcendental subjectivity becomes the universal matrix.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **5.** Two-layered musical intuition:  
  a) Kapellmeistermusik  
  b) twelve-tone | **5.** Two-layered phenomenological intuition:  
  a) Auseinandsetzung  
  b) Wesenssichtung |
| **6.** Three major steps in development:  
  a) tonality  
  b) atonicity  
  c) twelve-tone method | **6.** Three major steps in development:  
  a) descriptive psychology  
  b) phenomenological psychology  
  c) transcendental phenomenology |
| **7.** Readmitted tonality on 12-tone terms. | **7.** Readmitted "history" on phenomenological terms. |
TABLE Continued

Arnold Schoenberg                Edmund Husserl


language for music.


In all the writings examined, Schoenberg never uses the term phenomenological nor alludes, in so many words, to phenomenological method. However, there are several instances, especially in the letters (7), where Schoenberg seems most strongly to advocate phenomenological procedures in connection with musical composition and appreciation. The following are a few examples.

1. Letter 143, p. 165: "The only sort of analysis there can be any question of for me is one that throws the idea into relief and shows how it is presented and worked out. It goes without saying that in doing this one mustn't overlook artistic subtleties." Here we have an analysis that is a sort of "decomposition" back to eidetic structures. It is a finding of the basic common factor that makes a musical object that specific musical object and not some other piece of music.

2. Letter 230, p. 261: "I can assure you, Olin Downes, that I am still ready to change my opinions, 1948, to learn
something new, to accept the contrary and to digest it, the contrary of all I have believed in my whole life—if it is capable of convincing me." Schoenberg is telling us that he is capable of bracketing what he knows in order to admit that which is either new or beyond his ken, and to accept it on its own terms. One must have great courage to do this as he later states, "No courageous man would hesitate to do this."

3. Letter 99, p. 127: "Incidentally, for years now I have never shown any music to anyone who pretends to have an opinion about it." Opinions blur, they grow into theories and eventually into Weltanschauungen. If I have an "opinion" that old music is lifeless, then that will be the way it will be, lifeless to me, unless I can bracket that opinion, or better have no opinion at all! Let music appear to you without being filtered and possibly distorted by doxa.

4. Letter 111, 135-136:

**Answers to a questionnaire**

1. Are you satisfied with the present German educational system?  
   No.

2. What defects strike you as (sic!) most serious?  
   The way the young are stuffed with 'ready-made' knowledge and acquire only 'tangible' qualification.

3. What is your idea of good educational methods?  
   Encouraging young people to look at things, for themselves, to observe, compare, define,
4. What cultural ideal should modern youth strive to attain?

(a) knowledge in the sense of understanding,
(b) skill that is constantly refreshed and enlarged from the depths of the knowledge that is understanding.

5. Can and should teachers try to influence the young in this direction?

Yes.

6. By what methods?

By training the mind. By bringing the pupil (according to the stage he has reached) face to face with the difficulties, problems, and inherent terms of the given material; by helping him to recognize them; by forcing him to help himself in this respect, which means letting him make his own mistakes and correcting them afterwards, but also being of assistance to him in finding the solution.

This is a polemic against "ready-made knowledge", against models and theories that one is to accept without qualification or question. At the same time, it is a polemic for letting pupils approach things as they are and gaining understanding through knowledge, not doxa.

5. Letter 196, p. 223.

And finally I want to mention what I consider of the greatest value for a possible appreciation of my music: that you say one must listen to it in the same manner as to every other kind of music, forget the theories, the twelve-tone method, the dissonances etc., and, I would add, if possible the author.
6. Letter 258, 287-288: "In Grove's Dictionary of Music there is quite a good article that includes a discussion of 'Moses and Aaron'. Partly nonsensical; in that it brings the artist in. That's late-19th-century stuff, but not me." The major obstacle to so much music is the composer and his "romantic" image. Schoenberg asks us to bracket him and his method if we are to understand (see also Letter 196).

7. Letter 168, p. 195: "I know from my experience of nearly forty years that a real understanding for music has to be based on a sound capacity to distinguish between value and non-value." At the risk of reading additional meaning into this sentence, let us say that one can never know the difference between value and non-value without knowledge gained through first-hand experience. This calls for phenomenological method.

Husserl's mentions of music are usually couched in analogous terms and are never directly related to any one musical school or system. His interest in music, from a philosophical standpoint, is the same as his interest in any other mode of perception. A few examples should illustrate this point.

1. *Idea of Phenomenology* (3, pp. 30-31):

Here is an illustration: A man born deaf knows that there are sounds, that sounds produce harmonies and that a splendid art depends upon them. But he cannot understand how sounds do this, how musical compositions are possible. Such things he cannot imagine, i.e., he cannot "see" and in "seeing" grasp the "how" of such things. His knowledge about what exists helps him in no way, and it would be absurd if he were to try to deduce the how of music from his knowledge, thinking that thereby he could achieve clarity about the possibility of music through conclusions drawn from things
of which he is cognizant. It will not do to draw conclusions from experiences of which one knows but which one cannot "see."

2. **Idea of Phenomenology** (3, pp. 53-54):

The essence of phenomenological tone-quality, tone-intensity, of color quality, or brightness, etc., is itself given whether the eidetic abstraction carries out its operation on the basis of a perception or on that of a realization in imagination; and it is irrelevant to either of these whether we suppose the objects to exist in actuality or in some other way.

The realization that of two tones one is lower, the other higher, and that this relation is asymmetrical, is developed within "seeing". The instances must stand before our eyes, but not necessarily in the manner of facts of perception.

The perceived tone together with its intensity, pitch, etc., exists in a certain sense, that the imagined tone, to put it bluntly, the fictitious tone, does not exist, that the former is obviously present in a genuine sense, the latter not, that in the case of memory the tone is posited as having existed rather than as existing now and is only presented at this moment—all this belongs to another investigation. In a consideration of essence none of this is to the point. . .

3. **Ideas** (4, p. 220):

At first we are unreflectively aware in memory of the flow of a piece of music, it may be, in the mode of what is "past". But to the essence of what we are thus aware belongs the possibility of reflecting on what has been perceived.

It appears that Schoenberg comes closer to phenomenology than Husserl comes to music, but that is only natural. Schoenberg is concerned with only one of the possible manifestations of human consciousness. Husserl's area of study is consciousness itself and therefore more fundamental. It is not chance that led Schoenberg to the transcendental
nature of music, it is that his own consciousness is transcendental and gravitated toward the most lucid and clearest form of expression.

Husserl laid the foundation for a future phenomenology of all the facets of the human mind and its creations. It is, then, not surprising that there is little or no mention of music or musical systems in the published works. What is contained in the unpublished material is moot and open to speculation. That one will find any thorough analysis of music is highly unlikely.
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CHAPTER V

SYNTHESIS TOWARDS A PHENOMENOLOGY OF MUSIC

It might well be asked how an in-depth study of the methods of Husserl and Schoenberg will help in doing a phenomenology of music. This question is premature, first it must be determined what the telos of a phenomenology of music should be. After this is determined, the first methodological question can be explored fully.

A phenomenology of music will admit clarity of understanding that will lead to knowledge and obliterate the doxastic approach to music. There are a few preliminary thoughts and views, which might be termed musicologisms, that must be bracketed. In a one-to-one relationship, piece of music to listener, for a knowledgeable understanding to "happen" one should bracket the composer and the abundance of biographical information that clutters the mind, an overemphasis on cross-cultural stimulation, compositional technique and everything connected with all phases of composition, and finally, all personal opinions that one may have formed about the music before hearing it. A diagram might be of assistance. In the diagram, A is the musical event aurally perceived by the listener F and filtered through the models mentioned above, here B-E. The arrows represent not the sound perceived but the
Fig. 5 -- Music and the listener

Musical understanding, or essentials perceived. How is this understanding hindered or clouded by our filters? An over-emphasis on biography or cultural considerations can have a tendency to metamorphize the music into a psychologism. Psychologism has been shown to be a highly questionable stance when considering purely mental phenomena or creations. Making the understanding of a musical event contingent upon biographical data and psychological states is the same as making logic contingent upon psychological states, which is an unwarranted contingency. It is just this kind of attitude that leads to relativism and its more devastating form, scepticism.

Cross-cultural or sociological models will have the same effect as biography, only on a larger scale. We have moved from personal psychologism to herd psychologism. Mass musicologism is most manifest in the temporal delineations such as Baroque, Classical, Impressionism, etc. Musics must fit into these temporal models. If a particular musical example does not fit, either there is something wrong with the piece of music, or the composer did not know what he was doing, or we create a new model for that instance of music. It never
seems to occur to us to just accept it as a piece of unqualified music. What happens, generally, is that we hear, first, a classical symphony by Mozart. Already we are three steps away from the music. We have imposed between us and the direct intuition of that instance of music the models "classical", "symphony", and "Mozart." Where the understanding ability is inhibited is not in calling that piece of music a "classical symphony by Mozart", it is in the weight attached to such a classification. The fact that Mozart composed this classical symphony sometimes receives more weight and importance than the music itself. Arnold Schoenberg has a stigma attached to his name that will automatically relegate his musical compositions to the dregs. Somehow the twelve-tone method, and therefore Schoenberg, have the reputation of being cerebral and without feeling or emotion. Those musicians who have this feeling about Schoenberg are usually operating from a prejudice based on hearsay having never heard much Schoenberg, if any at all. I played the Six Orchestral Songs (Opus 8) and Erwartung for a fellow musician without giving the composer's name. My friend waxed emotional over the beauty of the music, the clarity of line, and the well-balanced sense of form of the composer. Upon hearing Schoenberg's name mentioned in connection with these works, his face showed great surprise. Instantly qualifications and models began to form and fall into place. Opus 8 was called a freak of nature, "If Schoenberg could really compose he would have continued
to write in that style."

Overindulgence in the consideration of the formal compositional aspects of music, on the part of the listener, can and will obscure the content. That fine balance between form and content will then become so unbalanced that any essential understanding of the piece of music will be seriously impaired. It is possible to become so involved with the technique of fugue, that the music is lost in the mental machinations about fugue. Schoenberg admonishes us to forget twelve-tone technique in approaching his music, he adds we should approach all music with that kind of naiveté.

Personal opinions are like the Sirens, they summon us to the musical death of relativism with their beautiful song. They are so multifarious and beautiful that it is one of the most difficult models to bracket. We fear them and their song, yet in our fear we hold them as sacred cows not to be touched either by reason, logic, or such an outlandish idea as phenomenology. The doxastic attitude toward music is so individual that no rules can be given for sufficient reduction other than close self-examination and an active indulgence in suspension of belief in the importance of these opinions. Not only must one critically examine the opinions but the source of these opinions must come under the purging scrutiny of the phenomenological eye, else they emerge in another disguise.

The relationship of the performer to the music is somewhat different than that of the listener. While it would be
advisable for the performer to bracket opinions that may color his interpretation, he must take certain sociological and biographical data into consideration in order to render an adequate performance.

Style is the most important socio-biographical consideration that a performer must not bracket. Musicological research in the area of style is most important and such research must be geared toward better performances. Assuming music to be a vehicle for the Logos and for a man's most subjective thoughts, it behooves every performer to render that music as clearly and logically as possible. These musical thoughts are going to be reproduced, by the composer, within a certain Zeitgeist. The categorical mistake performers make when taking a Baroque piece and forcing it to conform to the musical Zeitgeist of the late 19th century is probably more obvious to musicologists than to performers. The gravest sin against music is committed by the performer who passes off such a performance as a genuine representation of a Baroque piece. There are those who do not think twice about performing a Bach orchestral suite with a large romantic sized orchestra. Given that kind of logic, with equal validity, one should be able to perform Mahler with an 18th century orchestra. Style is important if, as a performer, you are going to do justice to the music regardless of who the listener may be. A performer must execute an époque far more difficult than any listener is asked to perform. A stylistic
epoché by nature will have to be selective. It must vary from century to century, from nation to nation, and from composer to composer. Indeed, one composer may present an eclectic body of works. Such a composer is J. S. Bach. Bach has a synthetic style all his own, but composed some works in the French or Italian manner. Yet, all this is sheltered under the canopy of the Baroque *Zeitgeist*. Style then presents itself as many sided and difficult to view in its completeness. What the performer is being called upon to know is the spirit of the times as well as performance practices. Performance practice is not something to be relegated to the past and old music. Each musical age, including the 20th century, has its own musical standards that must be heeded.

Formal and compositional considerations must also be thoroughly accounted for. An intimate understanding of the whole range of musical architectonics is indispensable for the performer. To play and communicate the spirit of fugue the performer must know what it means to be a fugue. The whatness of fugue must be fully explored. From the listener's standpoint that it is a fugue is a nonessential—the performer must communicate the essential qualities of fugue, must give them to the listener in as clear a manner as possible so that the hearer receives the essentials "fugue," the label remaining unimportant. Even these formal considerations are superficial in a courageous performer, for he will have so
assimilated them into his being that they too can be sus-

pended in performance.

The twelve-tone method, as discovered by Schoenberg, created a unified form of musical expression transcending the traditional clichés of tonality, which had become relatively unexpressive. Schoenberg applied to tonality a method very similar to phenomenological method. By means of the twelve-tone method, he reduced music to a more fundamental aspect. Logic and psychology, before Husserl investigated human consciousness and uncovered its essential nature, were on the road to sceptical relativism and a complete de-spiritualization of human existence. The understanding of music, of all periods, is in a similar relativistic cul-de-sac. A unified aesthetic theory does not exist, simply because music has never been scrutinized in a rigorous, radical manner. We are drowning in assumptions that have gone uncontested far too long.

We are working on the hypothesis that, since Schoenberg set us firmly on the road to the telos of musical creation, and Husserl uncovered the universal nature of the mind and its empathetic transcendental qualities, the combination of their methods should enable us to throw some light on the obscurity that surrounds the understanding of music. We must apply phenomenological method to this plethora of aesthetics and reduce out a fundamental aesthetic idea applicable to the whole class "music".
In following the three major periods of methodological development in Schoenberg's and Husserl's works we can venture what a parallel aesthetics could be. Schoenberg began by pushing tonality to its limits, and finally transcended those limits. Immediate problems of form and organization arose because of the breakdown of the prime organizing factor, tonal centers. Husserl pushed his number psychology to the limits by trying to force logic to answer all questions in psychological language. He found himself in the lurch when psychologizing to the extreme. Problems arose when the content of consciousness did not match the form it was presupposed to have. Up to the present almost all aesthetic theories have used psychology as a foundation. Aesthetic experiences are accounted for through psychological states. This, of course, will lead to wholesale psychologism and relativism.

When Schoenberg finally left the tonic behind and was experimenting with atonicism, the major problem was the organizing factor. The atonal period can be seen as a search for a unifying factor that had been left behind with tonality. In Husserl's phenomenological psychology we have a search for a balance point between subjective truth and its objective correlate. This is the same problem of form and content. Aesthetically there must exist a balance point between subject and object. A complete psychological explanation is untenable in the light of Husserlian consciousness studies.
The creations of the transcendental mind cannot be studied psychologically with any degree of validity.

Schoenberg discovered that the unifying factor for compositional theory is the twelve-tone method, a reduction of the two modes, major and minor, to one mode, the chromatic. The organizing principle being discovered, the twelve-tone row, the form-content problem is solved. With the discovery of the essential transcendental nature of human consciousness, subjectivity was found to be the universal matrix and constitutor of all that has being. Aesthetic understanding should occur on the broad spectrum of the universal matrix. Musical understanding will then become a fully illuminated tripartite occurrence within a unified field that is the composer -- music-performer -- listener. The flow of understanding and musical awareness will become omnidirectional as understanding obliterates the distinctions among the three parts. Participation in objectivated subjectivity will be complete.
GLOSSARY

a priori: all judgements whose validity is independent of all sense impression

act: any conscious experience referring to an object; later restricted by Husserl to actualized

Anschauung: a mode of viewing a phenomenon in which it is contemplated and explored directly

atonical: music composed without reference to a tonality or tonal center, but not yet organized as in the twelve-tone method

augmentation and diminution: the presentation of a melodic line in doubled time values (augmentation) or halved time values (diminution)

bracketing: see reduction

canon: a contrapuntal device whereby an extended melody, stated in one part, is imitated strictly and in its entirety in one or more parts

causa sui: the cause of its own being

chromaticism: pitches not present in the diatonic scale but resulting from the subdivision of a diatonic whole tone into two semitonal intervals, e.g., of f-g into f-f sharp and f sharp-g

constitution: a) phenomenological constitution is the act by which an object is built up in consciousness; b) transcendental constitution is constitution originating in transcendental consciousness

deduction: analytical reasoning from general to particular or the less general

development: central section of a sonata form movement; should differ radically from exposition in developing the exposed material using many compositional devices, i.e., rapid harmonic changes, contrapuntal devices, melodic fragmentation, etc.
doxa: the character of all modes of believing and all modifications of belief such as doubting, disbelieving, affirming, denying, and assuming; opinion

doxastic: attitudes or theories based on opinion as opposed to knowledge

egology: the study of the ego and its types, especially the transcendental ego and its role in transcendental constitution

eidetic: used by Plato for Idea (Form) and by Husserl to mean universal essences

empirical: reference to actual fact; knowledge gained a posteriori

epistemology: the branch of philosophy which treats all phases of knowledge

epoché: Greek term used by the Skeptics for suspension of beliefs; phenomenological reduction

exposition: in sonata form the first section which exposes the musical material of the movement

given: whatever is immediately present to the mind before it has been elaborated by inference, interpretation or construction

horizon: the edges of our perceptual field; the fringes of the field of intentional consciousness

hyle (hyletic): the immanent material for an intentional act; the stuff of which a thing is made

idealism: any system or doctrine whose fundamental interpretive principle is ideal (mental); transcendental or phenomenological idealism is the doctrine that the being of all intentional objects is bestowed upon them by the constituting acts of transcendental consciousness

ideation: the act by which a universal essence or eidos is obtained, starting from particulars; opposed to isolating abstraction of parts within a whole

induction: it is the sort of inference which attempts to reach a conclusion concerning all the members of a class from observance of only some of them
intentionality: the property of consciousness of being conscious of

intuition: see Anschauung

inversion: a melody inverted by changing each ascending interval into the corresponding descending interval

Lebenswelt: life world; the encompassing world of our immediate experience

model: any hypothesis or theory which tends to encompass all physical or psychical reality and offers itself as the only possible explanation to which all phenomena must refer

monad: the fully concrete ego with its constituted as well as constituting components, its potentialities, its actualities, and other adjunct phases of its private life

naturalism: that view which sees the whole world as either physical or psychical, hence to be explored merely by the natural sciences, including psychology

noema: the object-referent of a conscious act

noesis: any act directed to an intentional object

objective: possessing the character of a real object existing independently of the knowing mind

ontology: study of the essential or a priori structure of possible beings

pedal point: a long-held note, normally in the bass, sounding with changing harmonies in the other parts

phenomena: that which appears to us in immediate experience

positivism: belief that the highest form of knowledge is simple description presumably of sensory phenomena

psychic: applies only to mental phenomena

psychologism: any attempt to reduce non-psychological entities to psychological phenomena

recapitulation: in sonata form, the final section which normally contains all the material of the exposition transposed where necessary
reduction:  a) eidetic reduction is the act which leads from particulars to universal "pure" essences; b) phenomenological or transcendental reduction is the act by which the general thesis of belief in factual existence characteristic of the natural attitude is inhibited, suspended, bracketed, or turned off, and which uncovers in transcendental subjectivity the acts which constitute pure phenomena; c) philosophical reduction is the adoption of a neutral position toward past philosophy

retrograde:  a melody (row) read backward

retrograde inversion:  combination of retrograde motion and inverted melodic line or row

row:  a series of notes in any order chosen by the composer none of which can be repeated until all have been heard

solipsism:  the individual self of the solipsistic philosopher is the whole of reality

solus ipse:  alone + self

stretto:  the imitation of a melody in close succession, one melody entering before the other is finished

tonality:  loyalty to a tonic; the key center of a composition

transcendental:  that area of consciousness which is not effected by phenomenological reduction

twelve-tone row:  a series of notes involving in turn all twelve tones of the chromatic scale in any order chosen by the composer

subjective:  knowledge that is restricted to the knowing subject; the world exists only for the mind; the sphere of the subject and his consciousness

universal:  the whatness of things, as opposed to their thatness; that which is experienced as having unchanging and eternal meaning and content

Wesenschau:  intuiting of essences and essential relations

Zeitigung:  temporalization; constitution of time
APPENDIX

The following two pages show all the possible transpositions of the row or Grundgestalt of the String Quartet Op. 30. The five notes of the Idea have been marked off by a bar line in all the transpositions.
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