A role for arms control and technology in peace-keeping operations Page: 1 of 9
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A ROLE FOR ARMS CONTROL AND TECHNOLOGY
IN PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS*
Josph Indusi & Jack Allntuck
Safeguards, Safety & Nonproliferation Division
Department of Advanced Technology
Brookhaven National Laboratory
Upton, New York 11973-5000
This paper describes a potential
role for arms control monitoring
technology in peace-keepi
operations. The basic idea is to utilize
monitoring technology developed or
suggested for treaty verification
(primarily Conventional Forces
Europe (CFE), but other treaties as
well) to minmie the exposure of
humans as part of "peace-keeping
forces in various trouble spots
throughout the world. The impetus
comes from the dangers and high costs
of stationing peace-keeping forces in
areas such as Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Aside from the costs associated with
such efforts, the loss of life has
escalated recently from 743 peace
keepers lost from 1948 to 1988, to 183)
lives lost in 1993 alone.) Some
potential advantages to using
technology fbr certain monitoring roles
are discussed in the paper and include:
* Myimizing exposureisk to
peace-keeping personnel from
hostile fire, hostage taking, etc.
* Sharable technology will allow all
parties to view results, assess
violations or transgressions, etc.
* This work was performed under the auspices
ofthe U.S. Department of Energy under
Contract No. DE-A002-76H00016.
DISTfIBUT1ON OF THIS DOCUMENT IS UNtUotE
* Can be applied to equipment,
railways, roads, etc., to confirm
human and other monitoring
* Provides data to settle disputes
on which side initiated hostilities.
During the negotiations, which
led to the signing in November 1990,
of the Treaty on Conventional Forces
in Europe (OFE Treaty), many
technology-intenve asures and
procedures were discussed.
Ultimately they were rejected. Table 1
techniques rejected in CFE
negotiations. Those accepted for use
in the Treaty on Open-Skies are noted
as are those which found applications
in a peacekeeping mission. The
reasons for concluding that
technology-intensive procedures were
not required for CFE verification were
* Violation of the CFE Treaty
would be a lare-scale event.
Detecting large-scale events does
not depend on sensing small
* The parties to the Treaty realized
that the benefits from adhering to
its terms (i.e. preventing a
surprise offensive in Europe) far
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Indusi, J. & Allentuck, J. A role for arms control and technology in peace-keeping operations, article, August 1995; Upton, New York. (digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc625100/m1/1/: accessed October 18, 2018), University of North Texas Libraries, Digital Library, digital.library.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.