NRC Staff
Site Characterization Analysis
of the Department of Energy's
Site Characterization Plan,
Yucca Mountain Site, Nevada

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Division of High-Level Waste Management
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

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This Site Characterization Analysis (SCA) documents the NRC staff's concerns resulting from its review of the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) Site Characterization Plan (SCP) for the Yucca Mountain site in southern Nevada, which is the candidate site selected for characterization as the nation's first geologic repository for high-level radioactive waste. DOE's SCP explains how DOE plans to obtain the information necessary to determine the suitability of the Yucca Mountain site for a repository. NRC's specific objections related to the SCP, and major comments and recommendations on the various parts of DOE's program, are presented in SCA Section 2, Director's Comments and Recommendations. Section 3 contains summaries of the NRC staff's concerns for each specific program, and Section 4 contains NRC staff point papers which set forth in greater detail particular staff concerns regarding DOE's program. Appendix A presents NRC staff evaluations of those NRC staff Consultation Draft SCP concerns that NRC considers resolved on the basis of the SCP. This SCA fulfills NRC's responsibilities with respect to DOE's SCP as specified by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and 10 CFR 60.18.
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Other NRC staff, including technical personnel, Section Leaders, and upper management in the Division of High-Level Waste Management (DHLWM), and personnel from the Office of General Counsel, as well as Itasca, an NRC contractor, provided technical support and participated in internal quality assurance, management, and legal reviews of the SCA during its development. In addition, DHLWM support staff contributed significantly to the production effort.

Written comments on DOE's SCP were received from NRC's Office of Research, from NRC's federally funded research and development center, the Center for Nuclear Waste Regulatory Analyses (CNWRA), and from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), an NRC contractor. These comments were considered by NRC staff in the development of the SCA. In addition, discussions with members of the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste (ACNW) and with ACNW consultants were factored into preparation of the SCA.
Mr. Sam Rousso, Acting Director
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management
U.S. Department of Energy
Washington, D.C. 20545

Dear Mr. Rousso:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) regulations for disposal of high-level radioactive wastes in geologic repositories (10 CFR 60.16) require that the Department of Energy (DOE) submit a Site Characterization Plan (SCP) before proceeding to sink shafts at a site and to defer sinking of such shafts until such time as there has been an opportunity for Commission comments to have been solicited and considered by DOE. On December 28, 1988, DOE submitted the SCP for the Yucca Mountain Nevada site, supplementing that submittal with the Exploratory Shaft Facility (ESF) Design Acceptability Analysis (DAA) on February 9, 1989.

The NRC staff has reviewed the SCP and DAA; our concerns are identified in this letter and in the enclosed staff's analysis of the SCP, which is called the Site Characterization Analysis (SCA). We have organized our concerns into three categories. These categories are: (1) objection, which is a matter of such immediate seriousness to a particular area of the site characterization program that NRC would recommend DOE not start work in that area until it is satisfactorily resolved; (2) comment, which is a concern with a particular program area or areas that would result in a significant adverse effect on licensing if not resolved, but that would not cause irreparable damage if activities in those areas were started prior to resolution; and (3) question, which is a concern with the presentation of the program in the SCP that precludes understanding an important program area well enough for the NRC staff to be able to completely evaluate that area. A question identifies a concern that could result in a significant adverse effect on licensing if not resolved, but that would be unlikely to cause irreparable damage if activities in that area were started prior to resolution.

The NRC considers all concerns identified in this letter and in the SCA to be serious and encourages DOE to give full attention to each in an attempt to resolve them early during site characterization. In particular, DOE should give early priority to addressing those concerns which may most significantly impact the determination regarding site suitability. In accordance with 10 CFR 60.18(g), DOE should discuss modifications in the site characterization program made to address NRC's SCA concerns in its semiannual site characterization progress reports.
Overall the SCP shows improvement over the Consultation Draft Site Characterization Plan (CDSCP). Nevertheless, the staff still has many major concerns and raises two objections. These objections involve the need to implement a baselined quality assurance (QA) program before beginning site characterization, and the need for DOE to demonstrate the adequacy of both the exploratory shaft facility (ESF) design and the design control process.

The NRC staff raised a concern regarding QA in its review of the CDSCP because a program meeting NRC requirements was not then in place. That is still the case and thus the concern remains. However, as you are aware, NRC and DOE have agreed on a step-by-step approach for resolution of this concern. Several of the agreed upon steps necessary to resolve this concern have already taken place. Once the agreed upon steps have been satisfactorily accomplished, for each of the participants involved in a given area, the NRC has no QA related concern with DOE proceeding with that area of its site characterization program while it continues to complete the steps needed for other areas of the site characterization program. At a July 6, 1989 NRC-DOE QA meeting, the approach to resolution of this QA concern was discussed and reaffirmed.

The ESF concern arises because the SCP and the ESF Design Acceptability Analysis (DAA) do not demonstrate the adequacy of the design control process under which the ESF design presented in the SCP (Title I design) was developed or the adequacy of the design itself. This concern is based on the fact that the ESF will become part of the repository itself if the site is found to be acceptable. To resolve this concern, DOE needs to demonstrate the adequacy of both the design control process and the design which will ultimately be used for the ESF. An important part of that strategy needs to be timely interactions with the NRC staff as the design control process and design are developed. During a meeting on July 6-7, 1989, the DOE and NRC staffs took the first steps toward a mutually acceptable approach whereby the NRC staff can gain an early understanding of the adequacy of the ESF design control process and of the ESF design, so that this concern can be resolved in parallel with completion of the final ESF design.

With regard to the second category of concerns, NRC has a number of comments on various site characterization program areas. NRC staff offers specific recommendations for approaches to resolve each comment through improvements which should be made early in the ongoing site characterization program. These improvements should advance attainment of our mutual goal of a site characterization program which will result in sufficient information for early identification and resolution of issues and, if the site is found to be acceptable, a complete and high quality license application. Particularly important comments requiring DOE management attention are highlighted below.
(1) Total system performance assessments need to be conducted periodically, starting at an early date. Such assessments should be used to decide whether the 10 CFR Part 60 requirements, including those which implement the EPA environmental standards, will be satisfied. NRC staff also considers the use of total system performance assessments to be very important to integrate data gathering activities during site characterization. In particular, total system performance assessments need to be used together with subsystem (10 CFR 60.113) performance assessments to provide an early and ongoing evaluation of whether any of the potentially adverse conditions (10 CFR 60.122) significantly affect the ability of the site to meet the 10 CFR Part 60 performance objectives and whether data being gathered are adequate to make this determination.

(2) Investigations associated with tectonic phenomena should receive early attention. At the Yucca Mountain site, thorough understanding of tectonic phenomena such as volcanism, faulting, and seismicity is critical to the identification of potentially disqualifying conditions. The NRC staff considers that a full range of tectonic models reasonably supported by the existing data base should be considered in planning the tectonics investigations. High priority should be given to conducting those investigations which can lead to a determination of whether the site is subject to an unacceptably high probability of disruption as a result of volcanism, faulting, or seismicity. These investigations need to be conducted as early as possible in site characterization.

The full spectrum of site characterization activities should proceed, with proper coordination and integration. This recommendation is not intended nor should it be interpreted to mean that there should be a delay in any other surface-based testing or in ESF construction.

(3) The need for improved technical integration of the overall site characterization program is illustrated by both the performance assessment and tectonics concerns. Although many of the individual segments of the program are of high quality, it is unclear how they are being incorporated into a coordinated and integrated program. For example, there appear to be some situations related to tectonics investigations where geophysical and geological activities intended to gather data required as input to assessments of potentially adverse conditions, e.g., faulting, may not be carried out until well after those assessments have been initiated.
Other situations exist where it appears DOE plans to conduct intrusive activities, e.g., drilling and trenching, prior to, or without, conducting nonintrusive geophysical and geological activities that could provide information needed to optimize the locations of proposed drillholes and trenches. Likewise, it is not clear that data obtained from holes drilled for one investigation will be utilized as possible input into other investigations or, more importantly, that the number of boreholes has been minimized (hence minimizing potential damage to the site) by integrated planning to select borehole locations that could be used to obtain data for diverse investigations. Furthermore, the concern mentioned earlier regarding the need for total system performance assessments early in the site characterization program to integrate data gathering activities and guide evaluations of potentially adverse conditions also reflects a need for stronger coordination and integration.

(4) The discussion of alternative conceptual models presented in the SCP is an improvement over that found in the CDSCP. While some potentially important models may have been overlooked, the range of models considered in the SCP appears sufficiently wide that essential investigations are unlikely to be precluded. Although the NRC staff considers the objection raised during the review of the CDSCP regarding the treatment of alternative models to be resolved to the extent that it is now in the comment category, this issue is central to a successful site characterization program and should be treated more effectively in an early site characterization progress report. The NRC staff continues to be concerned that the SCP does not reflect an understanding that the models and their alternatives must be systematically integrated across the various technical disciplines. Furthermore, it is unclear that the studies proposed will, in all cases, provide the data necessary to adequately differentiate among the various alternative models in question.

Based on the specific concerns identified in the SCA, NRC has a broad programmatic concern that the pressure to meet unrealistic schedule milestones may leave DOE insufficient time to plan and to execute proper technical information-gathering activities necessary to develop a sufficient understanding of the site, and to develop a complete and high-quality license application. The NRC pointed out this danger in its September 16, 1988 letter to DOE on the Draft 1988 Mission Plan Amendment in which it noted
that the schedule for near term program activities, including in situ site characterization, was being compressed. Specifically, despite a delay in the start of both exploratory shaft construction and in situ testing, all the subsequent program milestones were unchanged. In the SCP, DOE has not demonstrated that its current schedules allow time for conducting the site characterization activities needed to support the license application. A recent development that illustrates this concern is DOE's decision to proceed with the ESF Title II design even though the baselined quality assurance (QA) program under which that design is to be developed has not been accepted by DOE. This appears to be driven by the attempt to meet milestones for construction of the ESF.

In closing, in order to ensure that DOE fully understands our concerns and to reach a mutually agreeable approach for resolving them, we stand ready to meet with you and your staff as necessary.

Sincerely,

Robert M. Bernero, Director
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

Enclosure:
Site Characterization Analysis

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

Background

The Yucca Mountain area in southern Nevada is the candidate site selected for characterization as the nation's first geologic repository for high-level radioactive waste. The Department of Energy (DOE) is required by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA), the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act (NWPA), and 10 CFR Part 60 (hereafter Part 60) to prepare a site characterization plan (SCP) to obtain the information necessary to determine the suitability of the Yucca Mountain site for a repository. The NWPA and 10 CFR 60.17 delineate what information must be contained in the SCP. At the NRC-DOE SCP Level of Detail Meeting in May 1986, NRC and DOE agreed on the level of detail to be furnished by DOE in the SCP to meet the requirements of NWPA and 10 CFR 60.17.

As part of its development of the SCP, on January 8, 1988 DOE issued the Consultation Draft Site Characterization Plan (CDSCP) for the Yucca Mountain, Nevada Site for the information of and review by the NRC and the State of Nevada. The NRC transmitted its concerns regarding the CDSCP to the DOE on May 11, 1988. The DOE subsequently prepared the statutory SCP and issued it on December 28, 1988. The NRC is responsible under NWPA and 10 CFR 60.18 to review the SCP and to provide comments to DOE in the form of a Site Characterization Analysis (SCA), i.e., this document. This SCA fulfills the NRC's responsibilities with respect to DOE's SCP and serves to continue the process that has been ongoing since the passage of the NWPA of pre-license application review and consultation for early identification and resolution of potential licensing issues.

10 CFR 60.16 specifies that the SCP be submitted to the Director of NRC's Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (hereafter the Director) before shafts are sunk at any proposed high-level radioactive waste repository site and that DOE defer shaft sinking until it has solicited and considered Commission comments. In order for NRC to have sufficient information to evaluate in preparing comments on the exploratory shaft facility (ESF) aspect of the SCP, applicable study plans relating to ESF construction-phase testing were to be provided with the SCP. DOE also agreed to furnish NRC with an ESF Design Acceptability Analysis (DAA) along with the SCP. This DAA was DOE's approach to address NRC concerns with the adequacy of the ESF Title I design and design control process resulting from NRC's concerns related to the CDSCP.

NRC Staff Review

The NRC staff has completed its review of the SCP in accordance with the NRC Division of High-Level Waste Management's "Review Plan for NRC Staff Review of DOE's Site Characterization Plan" (SCPRP), issued in December 1988. This review consisted of an acceptance review and a technical review.

Upon receipt of the SCP on December 28, 1988 the NRC staff began an acceptance review. Because the DAA and the ESF-related study plans were not submitted with the SCP, and were not received by NRC until February 9, 1989, the NRC staff did not complete its acceptance review until March 1, 1989. On that date the NRC notified DOE that the material submitted was acceptable for technical review. However, DOE was informed that review of the ESF-related study plans could not proceed because the supporting material for those study plans was incomplete. As of May 1989, this material had still not been received. Hence, concerns related to the study plans are not included in the SCA.

The NRC staff technical review of the SCP focused on the identification of issues, linkages among issues, the strategy for resolving issues, the information needs identified by those strategies to resolve issues, and the investigations designed to provide the needed information. Details of how the investigations are to be implemented in site characterization activities are reserved for study plans which, with the exception of the five ESF-related study plans discussed earlier, were not the focus of the NRC SCP technical review. The NRC staff also focused on DOE's consideration of and response to the NRC's CDSCP concerns to identify those that are resolved. Those CDSCP concerns that are unresolved have been incorporated into the SCP concerns.

The NRC staff became familiar at a broad level with the entire SCP but confined its technical review to those SCP sections and references within its purview, i.e., those that are related to Part 60. An example of material in the SCP that falls outside the scope of the NRC technical review is the information related to 10 CFR Part 960 (DOE's Siting Guidelines), except where that information also relates to Part 60.

The NRC staff technical review of the SCP encompassed both Part A (Chapters 1 through 7), which provides currently available information about the site and the conceptual designs of the repository and the waste package, and Part B, which presents the DOE's rationale and plans for the site characterization program. Inasmuch as the information in Chapters 1 through 7 establishes the basis for the plans laid out in Chapter 8, staff review of...
Chapters 1 through 7 focused on identification of concerns that bear upon the staff's assessment of the plans in Chapter 8.

Results of NRC Staff Technical Review

The NRC staff's concerns regarding the SCP are documented in this SCA, including the comments and recommendations by the Director as required by 10 CFR 60.18(d). The specific objections related to DOE's site characterization program, and the major comments and recommendations on the various parts of DOE's site characterization program as laid out in Chapter 8 of the SCP, are presented in SCA Sections 2.0–2.10, Director's Comments and Recommendations.

SCA Sections 3.0–3.8 contain summaries of the NRC staff's concerns for each specific program in Chapter 8 of the SCP. These summaries are designed to enable the reader to reach a basic understanding of the NRC staff's evaluation of each program by highlighting the most significant concerns here, while leaving the detailed discussion of the concerns and their bases to Sections 4.0–4.3 of the SCA. Two summary tables follow Section 3.9. Table 1 provides a summary of the numbers and categories of concern (objection, comment, and question) for each program, and Table 2 provides a summary of the resolution status of the NRC's CDSCP concerns, including a reference to where individual unresolved CDSCP concerns are incorporated in the SCP concerns presented in SCA Section 4.

SCA Sections 4.0–4.3 contain the NRC staff's point papers, each of which sets forth a particular staff concern regarding DOE's site characterization program. The point papers are grouped by category of concern. The papers within each category are arranged in an order determined by the number of the section in Chapter 8 of the SCP to which the paper pertains. The Chapter 8 section number and name are provided as part of the heading for each concern. The comments and questions related to the DAA follow the comments and questions respectively related to Chapter 8 of the SCP. Concerns identified during the review of Chapters 1 through 7 are factored into the point papers dealing with the corresponding plan in Chapter 8.

The three categories of concern encompassed by the SCP point papers are defined as follows (and are more fully defined in the NRC staff's SCPRP): (1) objection, which is a matter of such immediate seriousness to a particular portion of the site characterization program that NRC would recommend DOE not start work in that area until it is satisfactorily resolved (e.g., potential adverse effects on repository performance; potentially significant and irreversible/unmitigable effects on characterization that would physically preclude obtaining information necessary for licensing; or fundamental inadequacies in quality assurance (QA) programs); (2) comment, which is a concern with a particular part of the program that would result in a significant adverse effect on licensing if not resolved (and hence needing early attention), but which would not cause irreparable damage if that part of site characterization were started prior to resolution; and (3) question, which is a concern with the presentation of the program in the SCP, such as missing information that should be in the SCP, an inconsistency, or an ambiguity, which precludes understanding an important part of the program well enough for the NRC staff to be able to completely evaluate that part. A question identifies a concern that could result in a significant adverse effect on licensing if not resolved, but that would be unlikely to cause irreparable damage if activities in that area were started prior to resolution. Each objection, comment, and question contains a statement of the concern, a basis for the concern, and a recommendation for a suggested resolution.

SCA Appendix A contains the NRC staff evaluations, again in the form of point papers, of those NRC staff CDSCP concerns that the NRC considers resolved on the basis of the material presented in the SCP and its supporting references. Each evaluation includes the identity of the CDSCP concern, the verbatim statement of the original concern and of the basis for the concern as these appeared in the CDSCP point paper, and an evaluation of the information in the SCP that addresses that CDSCP concern.
2.0 DIRECTOR’S COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The material in the CDSCP has been substantially revised and, in some areas, considerably expanded during the development of the SCP. These changes have resulted in an improved document. Nevertheless, the NRC staff still has many major concerns and raises two objections to the SCP as written. One objection involves the need for a baselined quality assurance (QA) program before beginning site characterization, and the other involves the need for improvements in both the ESF design and design control process. The objections are discussed in Sections 2.7 and 2.8 below.

In addition, there are a number of major comments and recommendations on the programs and key subject areas in the SCP. Comments and recommendations are presented on each particular program and subject area in the sections below (Sections 2.1–2.8). The first area discussed is the Issue Resolution Process, which is DOE's fundamental approach to identifying the regulatory issues that need to be addressed during site characterization and determining what site characterization activities are needed to obtain the information needed to resolve those issues by the time of license application submittal. The next areas discussed are the Site Program, Repository Program, Seals Program, and Waste Package Program, all of which are programs to obtain the information needed according to the Issue Resolution Process. Then the Performance Assessment Program, which uses the data obtained during site characterization to help resolve the regulatory issues identified by the Issue Resolution Process and in particular to quantitatively evaluate whether the site meets the numerical criteria of Part 60 performance objectives, is discussed. Exploratory shaft impacts on the waste isolation capability of the site and on site characterization activities are discussed next, followed by discussion of the QA program, on which DOE will have to rely at the time of licensing to demonstrate the quality of the information used in support of the license application.

Section 2 also addresses the proposed use of radioactive materials in the site characterization program (Section 2.9) and DOE’s consideration of the NRC staff’s CDSCP concerns in the SCP (Section 2.10).

2.1 ISSUE RESOLUTION PROCESS

The SCP commits to a systematic approach to site characterization called the Issue Resolution Strategy. This approach identifies the regulatory requirements for siting and licensing a geologic repository and describes the work that needs to be completed in site characterization to resolve the issues that are developed from the regulatory requirements. While this approach is appropriate, there are significant problems with the execution of the approach as explained in the SCP. Timely corrective action is needed to avoid problems likely to have an impact on the ability of the DOE to provide, at the end of site characterization, sufficient information for a complete and high-quality license application.

One problem area involves the consideration of alternative conceptual models. The limited consideration of alternative conceptual models in the CDSCP, with the attendant potential that testing later recognized as being needed could be precluded by earlier testing, caused the NRC staff to raise an objection (CDSCP Objection 1). The SCP contains a considerably improved discussion of alternative conceptual models, in particular in tables that present alternate hypotheses, significance of the alternatives, and activities or studies designed to discriminate among them or to reduce uncertainty in the current understanding of the site. The range of alternative conceptual models is now wide enough that, even though some potentially important models may not have been included in the hypothesis testing tables, it no longer appears that essential investigations are likely to be precluded. However, the contents of the hypothesis testing tables still raise a number of concerns that, taken together, suggest that the logic used to create the tables needs to be re-examined by DOE. For example, in addition to the aforementioned concern that some potentially important alternative conceptual models appear not to be included in the tables, it is unclear in several instances how the proposed studies will provide the data needed to differentiate among alternative conceptual models. Further, there are apparent potentially significant internal inconsistencies in several tables. Finally, there is no evidence in the hypothesis testing tables or elsewhere in the SCP that systematic consideration of alternative conceptual models was integrated across the various technical disciplines.

Another problem area involves the apparent existence of logic gaps in the execution of performance allocation, which is the process that provides the rationale for the establishment of particular site characterization activities that will lead to obtaining the information necessary to resolve the issues identified in the first stage of the Issue Resolution Strategy. Inconsistencies among the selected scenario classes and the designated performance measures and inadequacies in the selected goals are gaps that suggest the information gathered on the basis of the performance allocation may not assure that Issue 1.1, Total System Performance, will be resolved. Also, performance allocation for Waste Package Lifetime (Issue 1.4) contains performance measures related to controlled release during the containment period. These performance measures are not appropriate because they should be
based on substantially complete containment during that period rather than on controlled release.

2.2 Site Program

Because the Site Program encompasses several distinct and, in most cases, major programs, comments are addressed to the individual programs rather than to the overall Site Program.

2.2.1 Geohydrology Program

There are two general technical concerns regarding the geohydrology site characterization program. The first concern is with respect to the completeness of the descriptions of the regional and site geohydrologic systems and related modeling assumptions. The descriptions do not identify all of the important features, events, and processes that need to be considered in the development of the geohydrology testing program. In addition, the simplifying assumptions that have been made about features, events, and processes are not clearly distinguished from the features, events, and processes themselves. Since a complete presentation of these modeling assumptions has not been made for the geohydrology program, the sensitivity analyses planned to provide justification for initial modeling strategies may miss justifying some assumptions because they have not been specifically identified. Furthermore, the lack of recognition of the modeling assumptions concerning features, events, and processes may result in DOE having more confidence in its initial identification of those entities than is warranted and hence to limit the sensitivity analyses that will be used to help make adjustments to the geohydrology testing program.

The second general concern is that some of the planned field studies and activities may not be sufficient to test hypotheses about individual features, events, and processes of the site geohydrologic system. In the case of the Calico Hills unit (a nonwelded tuff below the repository horizon that has been identified as an important barrier for purposes of demonstrating compliance of the site with the performance objectives of Part 60), plans to characterize its geohydrologic properties are incomplete. Surface-based testing may not provide essential data about distributions and flow characteristics of fractures and faults in the Calico Hills unit, but plans for in situ testing of the Calico Hills unit are being held in abeyance because penetration of the unit within the repository block may compromise the waste isolation capabilities of the site. Another area of insufficiency in the geohydrology testing program is the set of activities planned for the study of the saturated zone. Data from single-well tests and only one multiple-well complex may not be representative of large-scale geohydrologic conditions across the site at scales of importance to repository performance.

2.2.2 Geochemistry Program

There are three general technical concerns with the geochemistry program. First, the geochemistry program may not consider all the potentially important conditions and processes that may exist at Yucca Mountain. For example, the DOE proposes modeling chemical interactions in unsaturated rock in the same way as they are modeled in saturated rock. This approach would not consider the effect of the gas phase on chemical interactions. Other examples of processes that are not considered in the SCP are (1) the effects of three separate processes—radioactive decay heat, nuclear radiation, and introduced microorganisms—on biological sorption, and (2) the effects of colloid formation resulting from site characterization and construction activities on sorption and radionuclide transport.

Another general concern is with the adequacy of some methodologies for determining the parameter values used to characterize the site. For example, solubility techniques may not be able to completely define the thermodynamic properties of zeolites due to the metastability of the zeolite phases.

Yet another general concern is that the laboratory results obtained in the geochemistry program may not be applicable to the site environment. One aspect of the concern is that laboratory experiments are not planned to determine some parameters under certain natural conditions, e.g., fracture-flow conditions. This is the case even though it is recognized in the SCP that minerals occurring in fractures can be significantly different from those occurring in the adjacent rock matrix. A second aspect of the concern is that the use of certain parameters, e.g., distribution coefficients (Kd's), that will be derived from laboratory geochemistry investigations to determine retardation may be invalid for certain expected conditions at Yucca Mountain.

2.2.3 Rock Characteristics Program

There are two general concerns with respect to the rock characteristics program in the SCP. First, the data being collected during site characterization are unlikely to be sufficient to develop a supportable three-dimensional rock-characteristics model for the repository area or to investigate potentially adverse conditions there. The program of drifting in the northern part of the repository block in the proposed ESF, combined with the surface-based test program, may not yield data representative of conditions and processes throughout the repository block because, based on existing information, geologic conditions in the area of the proposed ESF may not be characteristic of potentially adverse conditions elsewhere in that block.

The second general concern is that the geophysics, drilling, and mapping activities associated with the rock
The characteristics program do not appear to be sufficiently well integrated with activities related to other site programs, such as those to investigate natural resources, geologic structures, and volcanic features. In particular, the geophysical investigations in the SCP appear to be aimed at individual geologic features or to cover areas of limited extent, without sufficient correlation among the different proposed geophysical investigations. With respect to the drilling program, individual drillholes appear to be specific to single investigations. The potential to obtain additional data relevant to other investigations or geologic features may not be fully considered.

The SCP does not appear to contain a program of surface-based investigations to verify features and conditions that exist in the area of the exploratory shaft. Consideration should be given to evaluating existing data and, if deemed necessary, implementing a program of surface-based geologic and geophysical investigations in the vicinity of the proposed shafts.

### 2.2.4 Post-closure and Pre-closure Tectonics Programs

Concerns with respect to these two closely related programs are most conveniently presented in one place inasmuch as the concerns apply equally to both programs. The uncertainties in this area are substantial, and in view of the potentially significant effects of volcanism, faulting, and seismicity on repository design and system performance, high priority should be given to early investigation of the tectonics-related concerns.

One concern is that alternative tectonic models do not appear to be fully considered for the pre- and post-closure programs of investigations for faulting and volcanism. The consequence of this is that because relevant tectonic models are not adequately factored into performance allocation and design considerations, many investigations associated with tectonic features, events, or processes appear not to be appropriately prioritized or sequenced. Tectonic features, events, or processes that could have a significant effect on the waste isolation capability of the repository should be identified promptly, a full range of tectonic models reasonably supported by the existing database should be considered in planning the tectonics investigations, and high priority should be given to conducting those investigations which can lead to a determination of whether the site has unacceptably adverse conditions based upon assessments of the potential for such features, events, or processes as volcanism, faulting, and seismicity.

Another concern is that the ongoing and proposed studies do not appear to be well integrated or logically sequenced. For example, although volcanism and faulting are often closely associated with each other in a given geologic setting, volcanism studies do not appear to be integrated with faulting studies. As a result, it is uncertain whether relevant tectonic processes will be factored into site characterization assessments related to volcanism.

There also appear to be some situations where geophysical and geologic activities intended to gather data required as input to assessments of faulting may not be completed until well after those assessments have been initiated. In general, it would be prudent for DOE to conduct nonintrusive geophysical and geological activities that will provide information needed to optimize the locations of proposed drillholes and trenches designed to investigate potentially adverse conditions, prior to those intrusive activities.

Still another concern is that characterization, design, and performance parameters related to pre- and post-closure tectonic programs appear to be nonconservative and the rationale for numerical goals appears to be insufficiently supported. The consequence of this is that potential impacts of various parameters on repository performance may be significantly underestimated. The use of fault slip rates, which tend to obscure the episodicity of faulting, consideration of faults as single strands of narrow width rather than as parts of larger fault zones which could have a larger impact on repository performance, and narrow limitations on the identification of "significant faults" within the repository block, which could result in not investigating faults that could have an adverse effect on waste isolation, are examples of this concern. Similar examples exist for volcanism and seismicity.

### 2.2.5 Human Interference Program

There is a concern that the program of investigations for natural resources assessment is too limited in view of recent publications, models, and discoveries suggesting the presence of mineral and/or hydrocarbon resources in the region near Yucca Mountain. Data gathering activities appear to be directed toward natural resource occurrences in tuff, whereas recognition that resources could reasonably occur in other features or horizons would lead to investigations of other features or horizons potentially favorable to mineral or hydrocarbon resources. Also, proposed investigations do not appear to be integrated with other geological, geophysical, and geochemical site program investigations that could provide data relevant to the natural resources assessment for the Yucca Mountain site.

### 2.2.6 Thermal and Mechanical Rock Properties Program

The major concern regarding the thermal and mechanical rock properties program is that the expected repository conditions are not fully considered in developing the thermal and mechanical rock properties program. The test
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plan does not include in situ testing necessary to provide a complete set of rock joint properties needed for design and performance assessment models. Also, there is uncertainty with DOE's dry core drilling technology, which is unproven for the required depth and rock conditions. If sufficient core recovery is unsuccessful, an alternative characterization scheme may have to be considered, which could require significant modifications to the mechanical rock properties program.

2.2.7 Other Site Programs

No major concerns have been identified with the following site programs: climate; erosion; rock dissolution; population density and distribution; land ownership and mineral rights; meteorology; offsite installations; surface characteristics; and preclosure hydrology.

2.3 Repository Program

There is a concern that the site characterization program and ESF design have not been sufficiently coordinated with the conceptual repository design and design information needs and hence that the testing program may be incomplete. For example, since it cannot be determined at this time that the area to be characterized will provide sufficient room for repository development, DOE has identified a designated contingency area. This area, which may be dissimilar to the primary area in its features, is not to be characterized. DOE needs to recognize that if the results of site characterization indicate that the contingency area needs to be included as part of the repository block, DOE will either have to demonstrate that site characterization data already collected is representative of this area or characterize the contingency area.

2.4 Seal Program

A major concern with the sealing program is that necessary data to support the license application may not be available because of certain program assumptions and tentative conclusions. Specifically, although DOE plans to emplace seals, DOE has at least tentatively concluded, on the basis of limited data and analyses, that seals are not needed at the Yucca Mountain site for a repository to meet the performance objectives. The DOE has proposed a seal design concept that relies primarily on an engineered drainage system and the assumption that such a system would be effective over the repository life time. There are uncertainties in the long-term performance of an underground drainage system, a concept not previously supported by any large scale tests. The result is that this concept, which would not be tested until after submittal of the license application, would necessarily be the basis of DOE's license application because, under the assumption that seals are not needed, the strategy of and schedule for seal testing is not oriented toward providing necessary and sufficient data in support of the license application. Hence, if the DOE cannot support the position at the time of license application submittal that seals are not needed to meet the performance objectives, the amount and quality of information that will be available at the time of licensing may be insufficient and inadequate to establish the acceptability of DOE's sealing program. Although the SCP does discuss proposed laboratory testing of certain seal materials, large scale in situ testing of seal concepts, including the engineered drainage system concept, are not planned during site characterization. It is important to test the sealing concepts and identify design tests at an early stage and to analyze their impacts on the ESF layout and design. The schedules presented in the SCP do not present the rationale for a decision regarding the need and bases for developing such testing.

It would be prudent for the DOE, from a strategic point of view, and as a good engineering practice, to plan ahead to evaluate and confirm the role of seals in the overall repository performance. Accordingly it is recommended that the DOE start potentially important large scale in situ tests as early as practicable during site characterization and incorporate such tests in the design of the ESF. The DOE should begin now to ensure the collection of necessary and sufficient data before the license application submittal and should seek further reduction of uncertainties regarding the long-term performance of seals before repository closure.

2.5 Waste Package Program

There are three areas of concern with the waste package program. First, while DOE has revised its CDSCP interpretation of “substantially complete containment” such that the current interpretation is in closer agreement with NRC's interpretation than the one which was in the CDSCP, there remain uncertainties about DOE’s approach, primarily due to the qualifying phrase “allowing for recognized technological limitations and uncertainties” at the end of the DOE interpretation of “substantially complete containment.” What the qualifying phrase means, what its relationship is to the SCP’s set of numerical goals, and what impact this lack of quantitative measure of limitations and uncertainties might have on DOE's compliance demonstration program are matters of concern. Resolution of this uncertainty is the subject of a potential rulemaking by NRC.

Another area of concern is the waste package testing program, which does not include substantive in situ testing. Laboratory testing is laid out in the SCP, but that testing by itself does not seem adequate to resolve the full range of waste package issues, e.g., scale-up effects from small laboratory coupons to full size waste packages; possible synergistic effects of the parameters that can affect waste package corrosion; ability to duplicate the Yucca
2.6 Performance Assessment Program

Because the post-closure and pre-closure performance assessment programs are quite distinct, each of these is addressed separately.

2.6.1 Post-closure Performance Assessment Program

The objective of the post-closure performance assessment program is to resolve Issue 1.1, Total System Performance Assessment, and the other performance issues. In the SCP a broad strategy is described involving the identification of relationships among performance issues of DOE's Issues Hierarchy and iteratively assessing performance to resolve the performance issues. There are no major concerns regarding this broad strategy, but there are major concerns about its implementation in relation to plans for site characterization to resolve Issue 1.1.

With respect to resolution of Issue 1.1, there are three concerns. Foremost is the concern that total system performance assessments based on increasing amounts of data do not appear to be phased in as site characterization data becomes available. The SCP states that performance assessments will be performed iteratively, but according to schedules in the SCP, the first total system performance assessment does not occur until 1993. This is near the end of site characterization and is only two years before the date of submittal of the license application. Total system performance assessments should be conducted periodically, starting at an early date, to reevaluate, based on the emerging data, the preliminary licensing strategies and performance allocations. This is how performance assessment can and should be used as a primary basis for demonstrating the ability to meet regulatory criteria and to integrate data-gathering activities during site characterization. In particular, total system performance assessments need to be used, together with subsystem (10 CFR Part 60.113) performance assessments, to provide an early and ongoing evaluation of whether any of the various potentially adverse conditions (60.122) significantly affect the ability of the site to meet the Part 60 performance objectives and whether data being gathered are adequate to make this determination. This problem needs early resolution to assure that the site characterization program will provide the data needed for a complete, high-quality license application.

Another concern with respect to Issue 1.1 is that there do not appear to be studies specifically addressing validation of the models used to demonstrate compliance with the quantitative performance objectives. Such studies are needed to ensure coordination of validation activities with site characterization activities. One specific aspect of this concern is that validation studies specifically derived from performance confirmation considerations are not laid out in sufficient detail to assure that an appropriate baseline will be established during site characterization. Furthermore, strategies for long-term tests do not appear to be sufficiently well-developed to assure confirmation of the performance estimates during the performance confirmation period. Radionuclide migration tests and waste package tests are examples of the long-term tests that are needed.

The last major concern with respect to Issue 1.1 is that the scenario analysis supporting performance allocation for total system performance does not assure that the information needed for performance assessment will be acquired. This is the case due to inconsistencies in the use of the term scenario and in the approaches to inclusion or exclusion of scenarios in the construction of Complementary Cumulative Distribution Functions (CCDFs). Alternative conceptual models are used interchangeably with scenarios, as are initial conditions. "Scenario classes" used in the performance allocation for Total System Performance do not meet the formal definition stated and are inconsistent with the performance measure used. Two very different approaches to scenario definitions are used in the same section of the SCP (Section 8.3.5.13) during discussions of construction of a CCDF and of scenarios considered for characterization. Human intrusion scenarios appear to still be excluded from calculation of the CCDF to demonstrate compliance, despite an NRC comment on the CDSCP indicating that the EPA standard requires consideration of these scenarios.

2.6.2 Pre-closure Performance Assessment Program

There are no major concerns regarding the program presented in the SCP to obtain the required information to perform the design and analysis necessary to determine preclosure radiological safety. However, there is a major
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2.7 Exploratory Shaft Facility Impacts

The ESF is an especially important subject area of the SCP because of the fact that the ESF will become part of the repository itself if the site is found to be acceptable. There were three CDSCP objections raised by the NRC staff involving location, design, and construction of the ESF. Two of those objections have been resolved and the third partially resolved. However, the SCP and its references do not demonstrate the adequacy of ESF Title I design control process or the adequacy of the design. As a result, resolution of the problems identified with the Title I design may result in considerable corresponding modifications to the SCP. Therefore, based upon the information provided in the SCP and DAA, there is an objection to DOE's starting construction of the ESF. DOE needs to demonstrate the adequacy of its design control process and of the ESF design.

There are two fundamental bases for this objection. The first is that in the DAA, undertaken by DOE in response to NRC concerns for evaluating the acceptability of the ESF Title I design, DOE did not consider certain design-related concerns critical to NRC acceptance of DAA conclusions. Foremost is the treatment of the applicable Part 60 requirements in the DAA. Eleven applicable regulations were not considered at all; of the 52 considered applicable, only 22 were considered quantitatively, with some of those inadequately evaluated. The other 30 were considered only qualitatively, despite the fact that some of them are potentially important in evaluating the acceptability of the ESF Title I design. Other problems regarding the DAA are that the adequacy of data used in the Title I design was not thoroughly checked and that the independence of some of the DAA reviewers is open to question.

The second basis for the objection is that the limited analyses presented in the SCP and DAA and the lack of consideration of available information related to important design features leave open a number of significant concerns relating to the ESF Title I design and the design control process. For example, analyses have not been presented to demonstrate that the main test area layout and test durations will permit all currently identified tests to be conducted without interference for the time periods required. Also, an apparent lack of integration of all available geophysical and geological data into the shaft location decision-making process has led to the possibility of potentially adverse structures (e.g., faults) near the shaft locations in violation of the shaft set-back distance from faults established in the report cited in the DAA as the basis for such decisions. The decision-making process appears to have allowed key information about the suitability of the shaft locations to be overlooked. Another design-related concern is that some of the key design criteria (e.g., seismic design basis; effect of liner removal at closure), are not sufficiently justified.

In addition to the above concerns, NRC will not be able to provide final comments on the ESF until it has had the opportunity to review the ESF-related study plans and their essential supporting information.

2.8 Quality Assurance Program

The NRC staff raised an objection to the CDSCP because a quality assurance (QA) program that meets NRC requirements was not in place at that time. That is still the case at the present time. However, NRC and DOE have agreed on an approach for NRC staff acceptance of the program, and DOE is in the process of completing the necessary milestones. While acknowledging this progress, there is an objection to DOE starting new site characterization activities in a particular site characterization program area until DOE completes the applicable milestones related to the QA program for that area and obtains NRC acceptance of them. Once NRC accepts the QA program in a given program area, DOE may proceed with that part of its site characterization program while it continues to complete the milestones needed to obtain NRC acceptance of other parts of the site characterization program.

As a fundamental part of its strategy for baselining its QA program, DOE should fill its QA management positions at the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management and the Yucca Mountain Project Office with permanent full-time individuals with appropriate knowledge and experience. There is a concern that DOE will be impeded in demonstrating the ability to implement the approach to resolve the objection because these positions have not been filled with such individuals.

Another concern with the QA program described in the SCP is that while DOE has committed to implement the appropriate NRC staff guidance for qualifying existing data (i.e., data collected prior to the full implementation of an acceptable QA program), it has yet to submit for staff review its detailed procedures implementing this guidance. It is important for these procedures to be in place so that DOE can qualify some data in accordance with the procedures and, subsequently, NRC staff can evaluate some of the qualified data to determine how appropriately DOE is implementing the procedures. In addition, it is not clear if DOE has eliminated certain tests during site characterization because it has determined that existing data will satisfy the licensing requirements. DOE needs to identify existing data that will have to be qualified.

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A major concern related to the QA program planned during the preclosure phase is that neither the SCP nor the Conceptual Design for the Repository (CDR) lists any items that will definitely be on the Q-list; rather, tables in the SCP present only potential Q-list items. The primary purpose of developing a Q-list is to assure that those structures, systems, and components essential to prevent or mitigate the release of radionuclides to the environment are subject to appropriate quality control. The approach in the SCP and CDR to the Q-list is to assume a design which is resistant to accidents and hence sufficient to prevent release of radionuclides, thereby precluding the need for design control or a Q-list. However, this assumption and its resultant conclusion are contrary to the whole purpose of the Q-list and of quality control procedures. Another significant concern related to the Q-list is that the "potential" Q-list and the "preliminary" quality activities list (the combination of which constitutes the scope of the QA program that must meet NRC's QA regulations) have bases for their identification which appear non-conservative in some areas, resulting in incomplete lists. It is recommended that DOE prepare a list of engineered items and barriers associated with handling and isolating high-level waste which have the potential for significantly affecting radiological safety or waste isolation. Items could then be removed from this list as reliable data and suitable analyses show that a low level of, or no, QA is required for such items. What remains on the list would, at any given time, be the Q-list.

Furthermore, a number of items explicitly excluded from these lists should at this time be designated as being under a Part 60 Subpart G (essentially a 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B) QA program, including the "design" to preclude criticality.

2.9 Use of Radioactive Materials

The only use of radioactive materials in site characterization proposed by DOE is neutron well-logging instrumentation routinely used in geological and hydrological exploration. These radioactive materials are introduced into boreholes and then removed after testing has been completed. The Commission concurs that this proposed use of radioactive material is necessary to provide data needed for the preparation of the environmental reports required by law and to support a license application for a geologic repository at the Yucca Mountain site submitted under the requirements of 10 CFR 60.22.

2.10 Resolution of CDSCP Concerns

Of the five CDSCP objections raised by the NRC staff, two related to exploratory shaft location and construction have been resolved. (However, while the original CDSCP objection concerning shaft location because of concerns with flooding potential has been resolved, part of the basis for the SCP objection related to the ESF is a new concern with the shaft location because of evidence suggesting the presence of faults in close proximity to the proposed locations of the shafts.) The CDSCP objection concerning alternative conceptual models has been partially resolved and is now a comment rather than an objection. While the objection based upon DOE's not having a baselined QA program in place remains an objection, NRC and DOE have agreed upon an approach for the actions required to resolve the objection, and several of the necessary audits and QA plan reviews have already taken place. The objection to the ESF design based upon possible test interferences has been partially resolved, and the unresolved aspects of the objection have been incorporated into the SCP objection regarding the ESF design control process.

Of the 162 comments and questions raised by the NRC staff regarding the CDSCP, 103 were satisfactorily resolved on the basis of the information in the SCP. Of the remaining 59, many were partially resolved. These 59 have been incorporated into SCP concerns and will be tracked as open items until they are resolved by means of information in SCP progress reports, other DOE documents, or by interactions between DOE and the NRC staff.
3.0 SUMMARY OF SCP CONCERNS

3.1 Issue Resolution Process

The SCP commits to a systematic, iterative approach to site characterization. This approach is called the Issue Resolution Strategy. The NRC staff has agreed that this is an appropriate approach; however, there are significant problems with the execution of the approach as documented in the SCP. These problems with execution concern: (1) the consideration of alternative conceptual models, (2) the application of performance allocation, and (3) the proposed Formal Use of Expert Judgment. If corrective action is not taken in a timely manner, these problems may have an impact on the ability of the DOE to provide, at the end of site characterization, sufficient information for a complete and high-quality license application.

The following describes the NRC staff's understanding of the issue resolution strategy described in the SCP.

The Issue Resolution Strategy

Section 8.1.2 of the SCP describes the Issue Resolution Strategy as consisting of four distinct processes: (1) issue identification; (2) performance allocation; (3) data collection and analysis; and (4) issue resolution documentation. These four processes are further divided into eleven distinct steps (see SCP Figure 8.1-1).

Issue identification, as described in Section 8.1.2.1, consists of three steps: (Step 1) identification of regulatory requirements, (Step 2) definition of issues (together these derive the issues hierarchy), and (Step 1a) a description of the conceptual models and working hypotheses for the site and of preliminary engineered barrier designs.

Performance allocation, as described in Section 8.1.2.2, is applied to each issue and consists of four steps that provide the rationale for the particular site characterization activities: (Step 3) adoption of a "licensing strategy" (i.e., a statement of the site features, engineered features, conceptual models, and analyses that currently are expected to be relied on to resolve the issue); (Step 4) establishment of performance measures for each of the components identified in the licensing strategy and, for each such performance measure, establishment of a goal and indication of confidence; (Step 5) identification of specific information needs through the identification of the performance (or design) parameters needed to evaluate the performance measures and the establishment of goals and indications of confidence for each such parameter; and (Step 6) identification of directly measurable quantities (generally called characterization parameters) to determine values of the performance or design parameters.

Data collection and analysis, as described in Section 8.1.2.3, is comprised of three steps: (Step 7) conduct investigations, (Step 8) analyze results, and (Step 9) establish that information needs are satisfied.

Issue resolution documentation, as described in Section 8.1.2.4, consists of two steps: (Step 10) use information to resolve issues and (Step 11) document the resolution. The SCP states: "The issue resolution process is intended to be iterative, in that information acquired during site characterization may cause revision to earlier plans and strategies." In particular, SCP Figure 8.1-2 indicates that in Step 9, if continued testing will not increase confidence, then testing strategies should be revised through reallocation of performance; SCP Figure 8.1-3 indicates that in Step 10, if confidence that regulatory criteria are met is not adequate, then testing should continue or a new strategy should be developed. With the exception of Issue 1.1, Total System Performance, the DOE appears to have proposed an iterative implementation of this strategy.

The following describe the NRC's three major areas of concern with the execution of the Issue Resolution Strategy as documented in the SCP.

(1) Alternative Conceptual Models

Alternative conceptual models form a part of the issue identification process. In response to Objection 1 of the CDSCP Point Papers, the discussion of alternative conceptual models has been substantially expanded by including a number of hypothesis testing tables. These tables represent an improvement over the CDSCP in assuring the adequacy of the site program to provide data to distinguish between alternative conceptual models of site performance. There are, however, some concerns regarding the execution of these tables:

- The hypothesis testing tables list a number of factors influencing the "Need to Reduce Uncertainties in Selection of Hypotheses," which is the table column indicating the priority of an investigation(s). There are several instances where all the factors in two different rows are the same, but the "Need to Reduce Uncertainty in Selection of Hypotheses" is different. Thus, the logic used to create the tables is unclear. An exposition of the full rationale of decision-making in this important area is needed.

- In several instances cited in the hypothesis testing tables, it is not clear how the proposed studies will provide the data needed to differentiate among alternative conceptual models.

- Some potentially important alternative conceptual models appear not to be included. For example,
there do not appear to be studies aimed specifically at certain important aspects of the geochemical interactions that are unique to the unsaturated zone and that will influence migration of radionuclides.

- The hypothesis testing tables are organized around 10 CFR 960 subjects rather than issues hierarchy issues, Part 60 performance objectives, or repository systems and subsystems. Accordingly, there is a concern that the tables have not been integrated across disciplines.

(2) **Performance Allocation**

Performance allocation, the second part of the issue resolution strategy, has logic gaps in its execution:

- With regard to performance allocation for Total System Performance, Issue 1.1 does not assure that the issue will be resolved because the selected “scenario classes” are inconsistent with the designated performance measures (EPPMs). Also, the selected goals are not adequate to assure that the issue would be resolved.

- Performance allocation for Waste Package Lifetime (Issue 1.4) contains performance measures related to controlled release during the containment period, during which containment should be substantially complete to preserve the multiple barrier concept. Performance measures related to controlled release would be more appropriately applied to the performance allocation for the NRC requirement on fractional release rate (Issue 1.5).

(3) **Formal Use of Expert Judgment**

The SCP describes a program that appears to rely too heavily on the Formal Use of Expert Judgment (Expert Elicitations) to supply licensing information and data or to substitute for quantitative analyses, because:

- Formal use of expert judgment is proposed to incorporate uncertainty about alternative conceptual models into the CCDF; this approach could lead to an incomplete license application.

- Without stating criteria for the Formal Use of Expert Judgment, it is not clear that the license application will comply with the requirement of 10 CFR Part 60.24 that the application be as complete as possible in terms of information reasonably available.

3.2 Site Program

3.2.1 Geohydrology and Pre-closure Hydrology Programs

The staff finds DOE has resolved all CDSBP concerns except one about the study to characterize the saturated zone geohydrologic system at the site. Further, the staff has not identified any concerns, consistent with the more general level of detail presented in the SCP, related to the preclosure hydrology program. However, the staff has identified additional concerns about the geohydrology program related to obtaining the information needed for a complete and high-quality license application.

General descriptions of the regional and site geohydrologic systems are presented in Chapter 3 of the SCP. These general descriptions represent the current understanding of the geologic features and groundwater flow processes in them considering the present limited data base. These descriptions have been divided into a series of “model elements” as presented in Section 8.3.1.2 of the SCP. Each “model element” represents a specific physical feature, event or process related to the regional or site geohydrologic system. For each feature, event or process, the current understanding about the feature, event or process is discussed. Initial estimates as to the significance of each feature, event or process to repository performance are made by assessing the relevant performance measure, design or performance parameter and noting the sensitivity of these parameters to each feature, event or process. These assessments form the foundation of the testing program. Thus, incomplete identification of any features, events or processes or the underestimation of their significance with respect to relevant performance measures, design or performance parameters could result in an incomplete testing program. An incomplete testing program could result in an incomplete information base for a license application. Details of the testing program (studies and activities) are provided in Section 8.3.1.2 of the SCP. To determine whether needed information will be provided, the staff has reviewed the information presented in Chapter 3 and Section 8.3.1.2.

There are two categories of technical concerns about the geohydrology site characterization program. First, there are concerns about the completeness of the descriptions of the regional and site geohydrologic systems, considering currently available information, in terms of specific features, events and processes used to plan the field testing program. Also, there is a concern about completely identifying assumptions related to those features, events and processes incorporated in the initial modeling strategies for demonstrating compliance with the performance objectives of Part 60. Second, there are concerns about the sufficiency of certain field studies and activities to test hypotheses about individual features, events and processes of the site geohydrologic system.
With respect to the completeness of the descriptions of the regional and site geohydrologic systems and related modeling assumptions, the staff has identified the following concerns:

(1) The thermal effects on the geohydrologic system caused by emplaced waste has not been identified as a process to be considered under the geohydrology program or other site programs. As a result, the limited testing program (under the waste package program) may not be sufficient to understand the response of the geohydrologic system to the thermal load;

(2) A clear distinction is not made between site-specific physical features, events and processes and simplifying assumptions about those features, events and processes (that are to be used in initial analyses of the performance objectives of Part 60). As a result, a complete presentation of these modeling assumptions has not been made for the geohydrology program. Thus, planned sensitivity analyses may not be sufficient to provide technical justification for initial modeling strategies (i.e., support all modeling assumptions);

(3) Similarly, but from a different perspective, current assessments as to whether specific performance measures, design or performance parameters are sensitive to each feature, event or process appear to be judgmental because no specific sensitivity analyses are referenced to support these assessments. While this is necessary to provide the initial basis for designing the testing program, current plans for sensitivity analyses are focused on a limited set of features, events or processes and are not directed toward a complete and systematic reassessment of the sensitivity of performance measures, design and performance parameters to each feature, event or process as a method for either confirming the correctness of the choice of relevant performance measures, design and performance parameters or making adjustments to the testing program.

With respect to the sufficiency of field studies and activities to test hypotheses about individual features, events and processes, the staff has identified the following concerns:

(1) Plans to characterize the geohydrologic properties of the Calico Hills unit (a nonwelded tuff unit underlying the repository horizon) are not complete. It is currently hypothesized in the SCP that groundwater flow through fractures and faults within the Calico Hills nonwelded unit is negligible. As a result, the Calico Hills nonwelded unit has been designated the primary natural barrier to groundwater flow and radionuclide transport. However, current plans for characterizing the Calico Hills unit are limited to surface-based studies (vertical boreholes). It is acknowledged in the SCP that the surface-based studies will provide very limited information about the distributions and flow characteristics of fractures and faults in the Calico Hills unit and thus, are of limited use in supporting the hypothesis of negligible flow through faults and fractures. Development of in situ testing in the Calico Hills unit as part of an exploratory shaft facility is being held in abeyance because of a concern that penetration of the unit within the repository block may adversely affect the performance of the site. Alternative approaches (shaft sinking and drifting in the vicinity of the site and various combinations of vertical and angle drillholes and excavation) are being considered. Potential trade-offs between the need to acquire data and the need to preserve site-performance capability are being evaluated by DOE with a risk-benefit analysis. Selection of appropriate test options will be made, and consultations with NRC staff held, prior to initiating testing. Because of the importance placed upon the Calico Hills unit in demonstrating compliance with the performance objectives of Part 60, the staff considers development and completion of an adequate testing plan for the unit to be a significant open item; and

(2) Activities presented for the study of the saturated zone are not sufficient to characterize groundwater flow paths, flow directions and magnitudes, and boundaries. Data from single-well tests and one multiple-well complex will not be representative of large-scale geohydrologic conditions across the site at scales of importance to repository performance.

3.2.2 Geochemistry and Rock Dissolution Programs

The staff finds DOE has resolved ten comments developed in the CDSCP review. Four CDSCP comments remain unresolved. Eight new comments, all relating to the geochemistry program, have been made. No comments are made relating to the rock dissolution program.

The comments on the geochemistry program are placed in three categories. First, there are concerns about the completeness of the program to consider all potentially important conditions and processes that may exist at Yucca Mountain. Second, there are concerns about the adequacy of some methodologies to determine the values of parameters used to characterize the site. Third, there are concerns about the applicability of laboratory results to the natural environment at the site.

With respect to the completeness of the geochemistry program to consider all potentially important conditions and processes that may exist at Yucca Mountain, the following are examples of concerns identified by the staff:
With regard to the adequacy of methodologies for determining the site, the following are examples of concerns identified by the staff:

(1) The present approach to modeling chemical interactions in unsaturated rock is to treat the chemistry in a way identical to that of saturated rock, except for modifying the effective porosity (p. 8.3.1.3-107). This approach would not include consideration of the effects of interactions involving the gas phase. A plausible alternative hypothesis has not been considered in the SCP in which fractures in the unsaturated zone can concentrate radionuclides and enhance transport under episodic conditions.

(2) The effects of radioactive decay heat, nuclear radiation, and introduced microorganisms on biological sorption are not considered in the SCP.

(3) Studies are not planned to evaluate the effects of colloid formation from anthropogenic sources from site characterization and construction on sorption and radionuclide transport.

With regard to the adequacy of methodologies for determining the values of parameters that will be used to characterize the site, the following are examples of concerns:

(1) The thermodynamic properties of zeolites will not be completely defined by solubility techniques due to the metastability of these phases. Additional methods for determining the thermodynamic parameters are recommended.

(2) Although a stated objective of an activity in the sorption investigation was to derive a mechanistic understanding of the sorption process involving pure minerals, the planned experimental program would not lead to this understanding.

With respect to the applicability of laboratory results to the natural environment at Yucca Mountain, the following illustrate these concerns:

(1) The application of Kd's derived from the geochemistry investigations to determine retardation may be invalid for certain expected conditions at Yucca Mountain. Thus, although the application of Kd's to modeling retardation may be valid when solute-solid reactions are reversible and fast and the isotherm is linear, it has not been demonstrated that these conditions will hold for all radionuclides considered important in repository performance.

(2) The determination of some parameters and conditions, such as speciation, kinetics, and matrix diffusion under fracture-flow conditions is not planned. This experimental approach is inconsistent with current knowledge about the site, where it is recognized in the SCP that "minerals that occur in fractures can be very different from those that occur in the adjacent rock matrix. This difference can have important consequences for retardation by sorption, particularly in situations where fracture flow becomes significant" (p. 8.3.1.3-47).

### 3.2.3 Rock Characteristics and Thermal and Mechanical Rock Properties Programs

The staff has identified several concerns regarding the rock characteristics and thermal and mechanical rock properties programs. The staff is concerned that the programs as described may not yield the necessary site characterization information for a complete license application. The rock-characteristics program is designed to develop a three-dimensional physical properties model and to provide data needed to resolve performance and design issues. Section 8.3.1.4 of the SCP describes the investigations, studies and activities associated with the rock characteristics program. The staff has the following concerns about the program as presented:

(1) The data to be collected during site characterization may not be complete enough to develop a three-dimensional rock-characteristics model for the entire repository area and to investigate potentially adverse conditions as required by 10 CFR 60.122(a)(2). These concerns were expressed in the NRC CDSCP Point Papers. The SCP contains additional information related to these concerns, but does not completely resolve all of them. For example, the program of drifting in the northern part of the repository block in the proposed ESF, combined with the surface-based testing program (systematic drilling and feature sampling drilling) appears unlikely to provide the lithologic and structural information necessary to adequately investigate potentially adverse conditions at the site. Based on existing data in the SCP, it appears that geologic conditions in the area of the proposed ESF may not be characteristic of all of the potentially adverse conditions throughout the repository block and that data collected in the proposed area of the ESF cannot be extrapolated to other parts of the proposed repository. Therefore, the NRC staff is concerned that data collected in the proposed exploratory shafts, drill holes, and drifts will not be representative of conditions and processes throughout the repository block.

(2) With respect to the description of present and expected rock characteristics for site characterization, there is an apparent lack of coordination between geophysics, drilling, and mapping activities and other site characterization activities. Concerns about the integration of various site characterization activities were previously stated in the NRC staff's CDSCP Point Papers. Although SCP discussions of the integrated drilling program and geophysical
investigations program were expanded from those in the CDSCP, the overall concern with respect to the coordination of these programs and, in particular, programs to investigate natural resources, structures, and volcanic features still exists. Specifically, the geophysical investigations program presented in the SCP appears to be generally related only to specific geologic features or to cover areas of limited extent. The need for greater correlation among the different proposed geophysical investigations has not been addressed. In addition, there appears to be little coordination among proposed geophysical investigations and existing geophysical data. Proposed drillholes appear to be specific to single investigations and the potential to obtain additional data relevant to other investigations or geologic features appears not to be fully considered.

The thermal and mechanical rock properties program, presented in Section 8.3.1.15 of the SCP, is intended to provide information on these properties and on the development of design criteria for the underground repository, seals and waste packages. However, it appears that the expected repository conditions are not fully considered in developing the thermal and mechanical rock properties program. The following examples are identified as concerns with the thermal and mechanical rock properties program:

(1) The SCP does not demonstrate coordination of planned tests with information needed for validation and verification of numerical models used to predict the thermomechanical response of the host rock. For example, the test plan does not include in situ testing necessary to provide a complete set of joint properties needed for design and performance assessment models.

(2) Activity descriptions presented in the In-Situ Design Verification Section do not include tests to verify design aspects under repository conditions.

(3) It is not clear what activities are planned to investigate the effects of radiation on thermal and mechanical rock properties.

(4) There is uncertainty with DOE’s dry core drilling technology, which is unproven for the required depth and rock conditions. If sufficient core recovery is unsuccessful, an alternative characterization scheme may have to be considered, which could require significant modifications to the mechanical rock properties program.

3.2.4 Climate and Meteorology Programs

The staff finds DOE has resolved all CDSCP concerns. Further, the staff has not identified any new concerns, consistent with the level of detail presented in the SCP, about these programs.

General discussions of present knowledge about the climate and meteorology of the site and its environs are given in Chapter 5 of the SCP. This chapter also discusses possible procedures and considerations for predicting future climatic variation. For site characterization, the investigations for climate and meteorology have been divided into two separate programs. The program for Climate is described in SCP Section 8.3.1.5, and the Meteorology program is described in SCP Section 8.3.1.12. The Climate program has been designed to provide information and data for both design issues and for the repository performance demonstration and is divided into two major investigations. One investigation is to provide information on past rates and changes in climate for use in predicting future climates, and the other to develop the information needed to evaluate the effects of future climate on the hydrologic system. The meteorology program also contributes to both design and performance issues, but primarily to design issues. It is divided into four investigations: regional meteorology, meteorology in the vicinity of the site surface facilities, locations of population with respect to wind patterns, and the recurrence probability of extreme weather events. Both programs have inter-relations with other investigations such as the erosion, geochemistry, preclosure hydrology, and geohydrology programs. In general, the staff finds these two programs quite extensive.

3.2.5 Erosion and Surface Characteristics Programs

Only one NRC staff CDSCP concern related to the Erosion and Surface Characteristics site characterization programs was not fully resolved consistent with the more general level of detail necessary for the SCP. Chapter 1 of the SCP presents a general description of the status of knowledge about erosion and geomorphic characteristics and processes relevant to the site. Using information provided in Chapter 1 as a basis, Sections 8.3.1.6 (Erosion Program) and 8.3.1.14 (Surface Characteristics Program) present the proposed site characterization studies and activities and their relationship to other studies that are part of the site characterization program. Aspects of the two programs will provide input to the Hydrology, Climate, and Tectonics Programs, in addition to providing information important to surface facilities locations.

In the CDSCP review of the Erosion Program, NRC staff noted the absence of any activity to evaluate escarpment retreat, valley incision, and uplift/subsidence. In their review of the SCP, NRC staff noted the apparent absence of an activity to evaluate escarpment retreat. An evaluation of escarpment retreat, especially a program directed toward the western slope of Yucca Mountain, is important.
3.0 Summary of SCP Concerns

to provide data related to the overall erosion hazard at the site.

3.2.6 Post-closure and Pre-closure Tectonics Programs

In view of the substantial accumulation of evidence related to volcanism, faulting, and seismicity in the geologic setting, the ongoing and planned tectonics programs appear to contain substantial deficiencies. Those are presented below.

(1) Alternative tectonic models do not appear to be fully considered for the pre- and post-closure programs of investigations for faulting and volcanism. Current hypothesized models for the site do not appear to reflect the uncertainties with respect to alternative models of fault mechanisms and processes and events likely to occur at the site. As a result of the lack of consideration of alternative tectonic models, relevant tectonic models are not adequately factored into performance allocation and design considerations and many investigations associated with tectonic features, events, or processes may not be appropriately prioritized or sequenced. Therefore, consideration should be given to prioritizing investigations giving high priority to those investigations associated with tectonic (including volcanic) features, events, or processes that could adversely impact the determination of site suitability, or lead to a substantial change in the site characterization program.

(2) Ongoing and proposed studies related to the pre- and post-closure tectonics programs do not appear to be well integrated or in a logical sequence. For example, volcanism studies appear not to be integrated with faulting studies and as a result it is uncertain whether all relevant tectonic processes will be factored into site characterization assessments related to volcanism. The sequencing of some geophysical and geological activities related to faulting may lead to the initiation of data assessments that precede the completion of investigations to gather the data required as input to those assessments.

(3) Many characterization, design, and performance parameters related to pre- and post-closure tectonic programs appear to be nonconservative and the rationale for numerical goals appears to be inadequately supported. Siting criteria defined in 10 CFR 60.122 (a)(2)(ii) require that the natural conditions at the site be "adequately evaluated using analyses...and assumptions which are not likely to underestimate" the effect of those conditions. The NRC staff is concerned that the use of nonconservative numerical or areal parameters and goals may result in an underestimation of potential impacts on the performance of the repository. Selected examples of goals or parameters of concern are as follows:

- The use of fault slip rates alone is not a conservative approach and may result in overly optimistic predictions about the effect of faulting on system performance. Slip rates provide average values of off-set along a fault over a series of events and their use appears to obscure episodicity of faulting and off-set that possibly could occur in a single event.

- Consideration of faults as single strands of narrow width may result in underestimation of the effects of faulting on the performance of repository facilities. Information presented in Chapter 1 of the SCP indicates that faults in the Yucca Mountain area are not discrete zones of narrow width; therefore, alternative fault models which treat faults as parts of larger fault zones rather than as separate features should be considered.

- Pre-closure characterization parameters for identification and characterization of "significant faults" within the repository block limit faults to be characterized to those with greater than 1 m offset of Quaternary materials or greater than 100 m offset of Tertiary rocks. Adherence to these parameters may result in faults that could have an adverse impact on waste isolation not being investigated.

- Assumptions that future faulting will follow old fault patterns are nonconservative and may result in incomplete evaluations with respect to potential surface offset or fault displacement. Examples that contradict this assumption exist within the geologic setting and should be considered in the definition of criteria for site characterization.

- Reliance on volcanic rate calculations based on cone counts and magma volume appears to be developed largely independent of consideration of underlying volcano-tectonic processes and may underestimate the potential impacts on performance of the repository.

- The tentative goal with respect to the probability of basaltic volcanism appears to be set such that, if met, the site will not meet the EPA standard (40 CFR 191.13). In the area of investigations of basaltic volcanism, the goals and effects of performance allocation need to be reexamined.

The above three general areas of technical concern are consistent with concerns identified in the NRC staff's review of the pre- and post-closure tectonics programs presented in the CDSCP. In view of the potentially significant impacts on repository design and overall system performance, high priority should be given to early resolution of these concerns.
CDSCP concerns about the 10,000 year cumulative slip earthquake concept are restated in an SCP comment. The 10,000 year cumulative slip earthquake concept appears to be a nonconservative approach to characterize fault activity and may result in an underestimation of the seismic hazard. As stated in the SCP, 10,000 years is the minimum earthquake recurrence interval typical for faults in the geologic setting. The 10,000 year cumulative slip earthquake interval concept assumes that the average cumulative slip on a fault over 10,000 years is released in a single event. However, should a longer recurrence interval (e.g., the maximum stated for the area in the SCP is 100,000 years) be assumed, the longer interval will yield larger earthquakes. NRC staff considers that site characterization activities for seismic hazard should be conducted in a manner that will allow for a clear comparison of the 10,000 year cumulative slip earthquake methodology with other alternative methodologies.

The geologic setting of the repository (10 CFR Part 60.2) must be identified and characterized for such purposes as determining and assessing anticipated process and events and potentially adverse and favorable conditions (i.e., 10 CFR Parts 60.112 and 60.122). The SCP mentions components of the geologic setting such as stress regime, seismic geologic setting, and the geologic setting of the natural resources. However, the geologic setting and its component natural systems are not sufficiently defined in the SCP. Geographic extent, 3-dimensional boundaries and geologic relationships of the natural systems (e.g., stress, seismic, resources) are not explicitly described such as they are known or can be hypothesized to exist. In several cases (involving faulting and volcanism investigations), geographic units of natural features or systems are allocated for purposes of performing relatively detailed investigations; however, the limits appear to be defined with little or no technical rationale and seem arbitrarily restrictive. In order for NRC to evaluate the adequacy of technical information relative to any component system of the geologic setting, plans with schedules are needed to identify, define, characterize and evaluate each component system.

### 3.2.7 Human Interference and Land Ownership—Mineral Rights Programs

A general description of the regional and site natural resources potential is presented in Chapter 1 of the SCP. Section 8.3.1.9 (Human Intrusion) provides the planned program of study for site characterization related to the assessment of the potential for human activities at or near the site with respect to the potential for exploration or extraction of natural resources.

NRC staff CDSCP concerns noted deficiencies in the program of investigations for natural resources assessment. The SCP comment on the program to assess natural resources reiterates the NRC staff’s CDSCP concerns. Bases for staff concerns with respect to natural resources assessment are related to the apparent lack of consideration of alternative natural resource models, a lack of apparent integration with other investigations, and a reliance on out-of-date references and models. The program of investigations for natural resources assessment as presented in the SCP may underestimate possible natural resources and the potential for human intrusion and appears to be directed toward natural resource occurrence in tuff. Alternative resource models, to include resources (mineral and hydrocarbon) associated with Paleozoic rocks, fault zones, veins, and possible plutonic rocks that may be present beneath the site, appear not to be considered. Proposed investigations appear to lack integration with other geological, geophysical, and geochemical investigations and pre-existing data. Data gathering activities such as drilling and geochemical testing may not be directed toward features or horizons favorable to mineralization. Information presented in Chapter 1 of the SCP and in descriptions of the site characterization program in Chapter 8, Section 8.3.1.9, does not reflect recent publications, models and discoveries. In view of the abundance of mining activities in the region near Yucca Mountain, a thorough and well-structured program of site investigations appears warranted.

### 3.2.8 Population and Offsite Installations, Operations Programs

No concerns with these programs have been identified by the NRC staff.

### 3.3 Repository Program

The staff has several concerns that involve the level of integration of the site characterization program and the ESF design with the conceptual repository design and design information needs.

Section 8.3.2 of the SCP describes the Repository Program including the Issue Resolution Strategies for Issues 1.11, 2.7, 4.2 and 4.4. For each issue the SCP outlines the information needs and the various design activities required to collect the necessary information. A significant amount of integration is required between the ESF and repository design and the site characterization program. The staff is concerned that current levels of integration may result in an incomplete testing program.

The following examples are identified as staff concerns regarding integration between the site characterization program and ESF design, and the conceptual repository design and design information needs.

1. It has not been demonstrated that the area needed for repository development, judged to be 1420±210 acres, will be sufficient based on the stated area.
requirements of the characterization area. Further, the 300 acres set aside for contingency purposes may not be representative of the repository development area and thus the current test plan may not obtain the necessary information.

(2) The selection of a waste emplacement mode (horizontal vs. vertical orientation) is scheduled for September 1989. The staff is concerned that this decision will be made without considering the results of the waste package emplacement/retrieval equipment demonstrations (beginning 12/91), field demonstrations of proof of concept “for horizontal drilling and waste emplacement,” and site investigations needed to support development of a prototype boring machine.

(3) The site characterization test program does not seem to have incorporated an appropriate fault displacement design basis. The staff is concerned that information necessary to evaluate this design basis will not be collected during site characterization in a timely manner and thus the license application may not be complete.

3.4 Seals Program

Concerns on DOE's seal program stem from the technical basis developed by DOE's preliminary performance assessment which concludes, based on limited data, that seals are not necessary to meet the performance objectives. These preliminary conclusions have been used as a basis not to place seals on the DOE's Q-list. The DOE's sealing concepts presented in the SCP are based on placing reliance on the engineered drainage system and the assumption that such a system would be effective over the repository life time. Such untested concepts would be the bases of DOE's license application under the proposed plans. This is not an acceptable approach.

The staff's strategy for the review of DOE's seal program is based on staff Technical Positions on: (1) Sealing and (2) Q-list methodology. The staff's guidance to DOE has been (1) sealing should be assumed necessary until proven otherwise; (2) seals should be placed on the Q-list until it can be convincingly shown that seals are not required to meet the performance objectives; and (3) testing and analyses of seal and drainage concepts should be started as early as practicable taking into account both gaseous and water pathways.

Although the SCP presents discussions on proposed laboratory testing of certain seal materials, there is concern that the amount and quality of information that will be available at the time of licensing may be insufficient to make convincing arguments on the adequacy of DOE's sealing program.

While the staff realizes that large scale in situ testing of seal design may be started as a part of performance confirmation testing after license application submittal, it is extremely important to test the sealing concepts and identify design tests at an early stage and to analyze their impacts on the ESF layout and design. In addition, there is a major concern with respect to the potential for test-to-test interference even without taking into account such large scale in situ tests of seals and drainage concepts. The current schedules presented in the SCP do not present the rationale for a decision regarding the need and bases for developing such testing.

From a strategic point of view, and as a good engineering practice, it would be prudent for DOE to plan ahead to evaluate and confirm the role of seals in the overall repository performance. Among the plans to consider are the advantages of starting large scale in situ tests as early as practicable during site characterization. The DOE needs to begin now to ensure the collection of necessary and sufficient amount of data before the license application submittal and should seek further reduction of uncertainties regarding the long-term performance of seals before repository closure.

3.5 Waste Package Program

The staff's review of the SCP resulted in the development of 16 comments and 20 questions related to waste package/engineered barrier system (EBS) issues. By way of comparison, the staff had 16 comments and 2 questions from the review of the CDSCP, including the significant comment on DOE's interpretation of the term “substantially complete containment” (SCC). Out of the 16 CDSCP comments and 2 questions, 10 comments and both questions were satisfactorily resolved in the SCP.

The staff's review of the SCP was focused primarily on (1) the general descriptions of the waste package and near-field environment in Chapter 7, (2) the waste package program and compliance demonstration strategy in Section 8.3.4, (3) the waste package performance issues in Section 8.3.5.9 and Section 8.3.5.10, and (4) the performance confirmation program in Section 8.3.5.16. The review resulted in three general areas of concern with the waste package/EBS site characterization program. Those areas of concern relate to (1) DOE's revised interpretation of the “containment” rule and related waste package performance goals, (2) the lack of a substantive waste package in situ testing program, and (3) the lack of a long-term performance confirmation program for the waste package. Each of these three areas of concern is discussed in detail below.

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Substantially Complete Containment

In reviewing the CDSCP, the staff strongly disagreed with DOE's design objectives for the waste package which reflected their interpretation of the meaning of substantially complete containment. The design objectives are important because they are used as guides for the waste package research and testing program which is designed to develop the data and related models to support a demonstration of compliance with the containment requirement. Accordingly, deficiencies in the waste package research and testing program portend inadequacies in the data base, model development and associated assessments for demonstrating compliance with the rule.

In the SCP, the DOE revised its interpretation of “substantially complete containment.” This interpretation is stated in Section 8.3.5.9 as follows. “The DOE understands substantially complete containment to mean that the set of waste packages will fully contain the total radionuclide inventory for a period of 300 to 1,000 years following permanent repository closure, allowing for recognized technological limitations and uncertainties.” In addition, “Implementation of this understanding will be based solely on reliance on the waste package as the major component of the engineered barrier system.” The SCP has established goals and laid out plans for tests to acquire the data to satisfy the requirements on SCC, controlled release rate and performance confirmation.

The staff considers that the revised interpretation is an indication that DOE has taken a more conservative interpretation of the regulatory requirement, one more consistent with the staff's interpretation. However, the SCP has not demonstrated that this revised interpretation has sufficiently altered its plans for what must be demonstrated for compliance, or its strategy for demonstrating compliance. Therefore, the staff considers it important to reach a mutual understanding that the information developed during site characterization, and the approach to limit uncertainties in the prediction of service life, can be expected to generate enough information to satisfy the regulatory requirement for SCC. To accomplish this, the staff needs to reach an understanding of the following:

1. The meaning of “recognized technological limitations and uncertainties.”
2. The relationship between the SCP's set of numerical goals and the “limitations and uncertainties.”
3. The impact introduced by this lack of quantitative measure of limitations and uncertainties on DOE's compliance demonstration program.

The staff's evaluation above is supported by the following observations:

1. Some of DOE's performance goals related to their interpretation of substantially complete containment are considered to be inconsistent with the intent of the rule.
2. There are few in situ waste package tests planned to acquire data for long-term performance predictions.
3. Only short duration tests (few years) are planned for its performance assessment models. While these tests may be appropriate to support the license application, the staff notes that the entire time period from present to the decision on closure (not just the time period until license application for construction authorization) is available for DOE to address the reduction of technological limitations and uncertainties regarding the adequacy of design for containment and prediction of release rate performance. By not initiating in situ tests during site characterization, the opportunity for collecting many years' data on waste package performance would be lost.

Staff recommends NRC and DOE interact to resolve the issues above.

In Situ Testing Program

The DOE’s existing waste package testing program incorporates very few in situ tests and the predominantly laboratory testing described in the SCP does not seem adequate to resolve the full range of waste package issues. Those issues include scale-up effects (i.e., the representativeness of data from small-scale laboratory coupons to full-size waste packages), possible synergistic effects of all parameters which can affect long-term waste package integrity and performance and the ability of DOE to duplicate the Yucca Mountain environment in the laboratory to guard against “surprises” or the “unexpected” in the testing program. The staff considers that in situ testing is desirable, and perhaps necessary, complement to the laboratory testing currently planned for waste package development and can address those issues not easily resolved in the laboratory. Accordingly, the staff is recommending that DOE establish a proper balance of in situ and laboratory testing for the waste package development program.

Performance Confirmation Program

In the review of the DOE performance confirmation program, the staff noted that the DOE has plans for a number of long-term tests which will extend beyond site characterization activities but none of the tests were related to waste package performance confirmation and the staff has determined the program is deficient in this area. The value of a long-term performance confirmation program for the waste package is that, in addition to validating the models utilized to predict the performance of the waste
package in the Yucca Mountain environment, it can provide decades worth of data which can be factored into the decision-making process related to repository closure. In this regard, even “null” results would be useful information in this process. Additionally, such a program will help to minimize uncertainties related to waste package performance, consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 60.140. The staff recommends that a long-term waste package performance confirmation program be established which recognizes the benefits that such a program can provide. The DOE should also recognize the relationship of this recommendation with the recommendation cited above for an in situ testing program.

### 3.6 Performance Assessment Program

#### 3.6.1 Post-closure Performance Assessment

The NRC staff’s review of post-closure performance assessment focused on the performance assessment strategy described in Section 8.3.4.8 and the plans for implementation of this strategy described in Sections 8.3.5.9 through 8.3.5.20. As stated in the SCP (p. 8.3.5.8–1): “The primary objective of the Yucca Mountain Project post-closure performance assessment program is to resolve Key Issue 1 in the issues hierarchy, which is ...” Will the mined geologic disposal system at Yucca Mountain isolate the radioactive waste from the accessible environment after closure in accordance with the requirements set forth in 40 CFR Part 191, 10 CFR Part 60, and 10 CFR Part 960?

The strategy for post-closure performance assessment described in Section 8.3.5.8 involves identifying relationships among performance issues of the Issues Hierarchy and iteratively assessing performance to resolve the performance issues. The performance assessments are described as consisting of five major steps: (1) compile site data for in situ conditions, material properties, physical processes, and structural boundaries; (2) define scenarios and boundaries for calculations; (3) develop, test, and validate conceptual and numerical models that describe the physical systems to be assessed; (4) calculate values for the performance measures; and (5) assess uncertainty in predicted performance. As the performance assessments are conducted, the strategy calls for determinations of the need to iterate steps on the basis of whether there is a basis for the NRC to find “reasonable assurance” that the Part 60 performance objectives are met.

Based on its review, the staff has no concerns regarding the broad strategy described in Section 8.3.5.8. The staff does have concerns regarding implementation of the strategy as it relates to Issues 1.1 and 1.6.

### Issue 1.1, Total System Performance Assessment

The staff has concerns about implementation of this strategy as it relates to plans for site characterization to resolve issue 1.1, Total System Performance. The staff’s concerns are in three general areas: (1) use of performance assessments, (2) the validation program, and (3) the scenario analysis. These concerns are discussed below.

#### (1) Use of Performance Assessment

Although the SCP states that, in general, performance assessments will be performed iteratively, the first total system performance assessment as presently scheduled does not occur until near the end of site characterization (1993). The total performance assessments should be executed periodically, starting at an early date, to evaluate data acquired during the site characterization program and to reevaluate the preliminary licensing strategies and performance allocations. Total system performance assessments based on increasing amounts of data do not appear to be phased in as site characterization data became available. Thus, performance assessments do not appear to be used as a primary basis for demonstrating the ability to meet regulatory criteria and to integrate data gathering activities during site characterization. This potentially serious deficiency needs early resolution to assure that the site characterization program will provide the data needed for a complete, high-quality license application.

#### (2) Validation Program

A significant aspect of the decision on licensing will depend on the projections of performance for 10,000 years. These projections require interdisciplinary analyses, because what might be a satisfactory model validation program for any one discipline may not be sufficient for these multidisciplinary models.

There do not appear to be any studies specifically addressing validation originating from the considerations of validation in Section 8.3.5.20. There are a number of references to validation studies, but there does not appear to be a systematic, balanced, and prioritized approach. The studies specifically derived from performance confirmation considerations are not laid out in sufficient detail to assure that an appropriate baseline will be established during site characterization.

Plans for long-term tests do not appear to be sufficiently well developed to assure a complete, high-quality license application and confirmation of the performance estimates during the performance confirmation period. Examples of long term tests needed are migration experiments and waste package tests.

#### Scenario Analysis

The scenario analysis supporting performance allocation for total system performance does not assure that
information needed for performance assessment will be acquired.

"Scenario classes" used in the performance allocation for Total System Performance do not meet the formal definition stated and are inconsistent with the performance measure used (EPPMs). That is, the "scenario classes" used for total system performance assessment are broadly based on release mechanisms, while the performance measures used are derived from the very precise definition of scenarios as a sequence of events.

Alternative conceptual models are used interchangeably with scenarios. Examples of alternative conceptual models inappropriately treated as scenarios are: (1) the occurrence of horizontal flow, while the preferred site model assumes vertical flow, and (2) various corrosion mechanisms, when any or all mechanisms may operate for a variety of scenarios. Initial conditions are also used interchangeably with scenarios. An example is faulty emplacement of waste packages, which establishes an initial condition or range of initial conditions for the repository.

Quite different approaches to scenario definitions are used in the extensive mathematical discussion about constructing a CCDF in Section 8.3.5.13 and the extensive discussion of scenarios considered for characterization (later in the same section).

The DOE response to NRC's comments on the CDSCP indicates that human intrusion scenarios will be excluded from calculating the CCDF to demonstrate compliance (or, alternatively, to guide site characterization), although the SCP itself is unclear in this regard. In the NRC's CDSCP comments it was indicated that compliance with the EPA standard requires consideration of these scenarios and that arbitrary exclusion of these scenarios may result in an incomplete license application.

**Issue 1.6, Pre-Waste-Emplacement Groundwater Travel Time**

All CDSCP concerns about the planned approach to demonstrate compliance with the groundwater travel time performance objective of 10 CFR Part 60 have been resolved. However, the staff has identified additional concerns about the planned approach related to the information needed for a complete and high-quality license application.

Three concerns have been identified by the staff. These include:

1. The planned approach to delineate the boundary of the disturbed zone does not consider all physical or chemical properties that will have changed as a result of heat generated by emplaced waste to determine which resultant changes of properties may have a significant effect on repository performance;

2. The proposed method for constructing cumulative distribution curves (CDFs) for groundwater travel time by weighting "alternative conceptual models" is inappropriate and would not provide exhaustive assessments of groundwater travel time for staff review; and

3. All assumptions are not identified about features, events and processes related to the geohydrologic system, incorporated into the initial modeling strategy for groundwater travel time. It is important to identify both those assumptions that are believed to be technically justified based on currently available information and those that require additional support to determine whether plans to obtain needed information are complete.

**3.6.2 Pre-closure Performance Assessment**

In general, the SCP recognizes that requirements for preclosure radiological safety for a geologic repository are similar to the requirements for such nuclear facilities as independent spent fuel storage facilities and those portions of nuclear power plants where spent fuel is handled. This has resulted in the recognition that procedures and regulatory guides which were developed to direct the investigation and analysis of similar situations in other nuclear facilities are applicable to help guide at least the surface portion of the preclosure repository program. As is reflected in such places as Tables 8.3.5.3-2, 8.3.5.4-2, and 8.3.5.5-2, this approach has resulted in a list of investigations and information needs which should result in sufficient information to perform the design and analysis necessary to determine preclosure radiological safety.

The major preclosure radiological safety concern is related to the quality assurance program planned during the preclosure phase. Both Table 6-18 and Table 6-32 in Chapter 6 of the SCP present only potential Q-List items. Neither the Conceptual Design of the Repository (CDR) nor the SCP lists any items which will definitely be on the Q-list. It appears that the main basis for this situation is the radionuclide release calculations assumed that the design was sufficient to either prevent releases in excess of regulatory limits, or only allow releases in excess of regulatory requirements in very low probability situations. This approach becomes apparent in such places as Table 2-1 of Appendix F of the CDR. In this table the "dispersion resistance" of radionuclides, the relative likelihood of release, in different areas of the repository is estimated. In the access area, the receiving and inspection area, and during the early stages of handling in the cask receiving and preparation area, dispersion resistance is assumed to be high because the radioactive material is assumed to still be within the transportation casks, and
these casks are postulated to withstand accidents. The casks, however, are not included on the Q-List. This becomes a concern even beyond the requirements of 10 CFR Part 60, because the transportation casks will have to be designed to comply with 10 CFR Part 71 which requires a Quality Control program. This approach of assuming a design which is resistant to accidents is reflected throughout the SCP and CDR, such as on page 4-22 of Appendix F, where credit is being taken for safety factors included in the design, including the fact that the hot cells are assumed to withstand earthquake loading, and the fact that locking devices are assumed to be present to prevent a crane from derailing during an earthquake. In these last examples, as the previous example, these items are also not on the Q-list.

As has been discussed in the summary of concerns related to Quality Assurance, it is the NRC staff position that those items for which DOE is taking credit in the prevention or mitigation of release of radionuclides should be subject to a 10 CFR 50, Appendix B (or equivalent) QA program. The primary purpose of developing a Q-list is to assure that those structures, systems, and components which are essential to prevent or mitigate the release of radionuclides to the environment are subject to appropriate quality assurance. If it is assumed that the design is sufficient to prevent release of radionuclides, and hence that there is no need for quality assurance of the design as it is developed, the whole purpose of the Q-list and quality assurance procedures is negated. Section 8.6.4.2.1 of the SCP commits the DOE to review the procedures used to develop the Q-list. Upon completion and submission of this documentation, the NRC staff will review the systems, structures, and components present on the Q-list to determine if preclosure radiological safety concerns have been addressed. In general, due to the similarity between the surface facilities of an MRS and a geologic repository, the NRC staff suggests that NUREG–1168, Staff Evaluation of U.S. Department of Energy Proposal for Monitored Retrievable Storage (US NRC, 1986), could provide guidance to help determine which systems, structures and components of the surface facilities could be considered important to safety. The items so identified should be considered for inclusion on the Q-list. While NUREG–1168 can only be considered applicable for surface facilities, a similar type of analysis of such subsurface items as the ventilation system and HEPA filters from the subsurface should also be considered by DOE.

Other NRC concerns related to preclosure radiological safety are reflected in the SCP discussion concerning the use of 10 CFR Part 20 and how certain information needed to perform calculations to determine compliance with 10 CFR Part 20 will be obtained. In several instances, the SCP is unclear as to how DOE is interpreting the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20. The staff comments related to this concern are meant to assure that all applicable provisions of 10 CFR Part 20 will be considered by DOE in the design and analysis.

The main NRC concerns related to retrieval are that the SCP does not address the requirements of 10 CFR Part 60.132(a) and that there is no analysis provided to support the contention that the vertical emplacement boreholes will remain stable during the retrieval period. These are concerns primarily because there appear to be no plans to conduct tests to determine the effects of radiation on mechanical rock properties.

3.7 Potential Impacts of Site Characterization Activities

3.7.1 Exploratory Shaft Facility and Impacts

The SCP and its references demonstrate neither the adequacy of ESF Title I design control process, nor the adequacy of the design. Issues were raised prior to NRC review of the SCP regarding DOE's exclusion of critical regulatory requirements in the design, resulting in deficiencies in the design and uncertainties regarding the effectiveness of the design control process. Resolution of the problems identified with the Title I design may result in considerable corresponding modifications to the SCP. The bases for this concern are as follows:

1. The Design Acceptability Analysis (DAA) undertaken by DOE in response to NRC concerns for evaluating the acceptability of the ESF Title I design did not appropriately consider certain concerns necessary for NRC acceptance of DAA conclusions. The following are some examples:

   - Independence of the reviewers is in question. Five reviewers who were certified not to have contributed significantly to the ESF Title I design and SDRD (sub-system design requirements) are identified as authors, reviewers, and/or contributors to specific documents which were input documents to the ESF design.
   - Neither the design nor the subsequent DAA considers (qualitatively or quantitatively) 11 of the applicable Part 60 requirements.
   - Of the 52 requirements (Part 60) considered in the DAA to be applicable to the ESF design, only 22 were considered quantitatively. The remaining were said to have been considered qualitatively. Included in the remaining 30 are the requirements of Subpart F, Performance Confirmation Program, which is to be started during site characterization. Some of these requirements are potentially important in evaluating the acceptability of the ESF Title I design.
• Of the 22 requirements that were considered quantitatively, inadequacies have been identified by NRC staff. For example, in considering the regulatory requirement related to alternatives to major design features important to waste isolation (60.21(c)(1)(ii)(D)), the analysis presented was limited and incomplete.

• DAA did not thoroughly check the adequacy of data used in the ESF Title I design.

(2) Additional concerns regarding the ESF Title I design and the design control process stem from the limited analyses presented in the SCP and DAA and a lack of consideration of available information related to important design features. Examples include:

• There is apparent lack of integration of all available geophysical and geological data into the shaft location decision-making process. In the DAA, the Bertram (1984) report is cited as the basis for decisions regarding shaft set-back distance from faults (stated as exclusion of all locations within 100 feet of faults, DAA pp. 2–26 and 2–29); however, other reports such as Smith and Ross (1982) and the letter from Dixon to Veith (1982) note the presence of possible adverse structures whose presence may violate the parameters cited in Bertram. Therefore, the decision-making process appears to have overlooked key information about the suitability of the shaft locations.

• Analyses have not been presented to demonstrate that the main test area layout and test durations will permit all tests to be conducted for the time periods required without interference.

• A rationale has not been presented to demonstrate that in situ waste package testing will not be needed during site characterization to reduce uncertainties associated with long-term waste package performance prediction.

• As was discussed in Section 3.2.3 (Rock Characteristics Program), the program of drifting in the north, combined with systematic drilling and feature sampling drilling, appears unlikely to provide the lithologic and structural information necessary to adequately investigate potentially adverse conditions at the site or ensure that observations made and data collected will be representative of conditions and processes throughout the repository block.

• Some of the ESF design criteria are not sufficiently justified. Examples include: (a) seismic design basis, (b) ES–1 drainage volume and long-term drainage reliability, and (c) effect of liner removal at closure.

In addition to the above concerns, NRC will not be able to provide final comments on the ESF until it has had the opportunity to review the ESF-related study plans and their essential supporting information.

3.7.2 Surface-based Activities and Impacts

The staff's review of DOE's surface-based activities described in Section 8.4.2.2 of the SCP found no areas of concern with respect to the long-term isolation of waste.

3.8 Quality Assurance Program

With respect to the QA program for the Yucca Mountain Project, the staff's objection to the CDSCP remains open as DOE and its key contractors have not as yet completed the development and implementation of QA programs that meet NRC requirements. Three of the five CDSCP comments have been resolved, however. The two unresolved comments relate to the use of data in licensing that were collected before complete implementation of the QA programs and the items and activities covered by the Commission's QA requirements.

Section 8.6 of the SCP describes the quality assurance program to be applied to site characterization activities, including exploratory shaft design and construction, as well as the QA measures applied to site exploration activities before site characterization. It also describes the items and activities which are subject to NRC QA requirements and references Sections 6.1.4 and 6.1.5 of the SCP. These sections contain the general methodology used to identify the items important to safety and engineered barriers important to waste isolation, which comprise the Q-list, and activities associated with the assessment of the natural barriers important to waste isolation, which comprise the quality activities list.

DOE has committed to developing a QA program for site characterization which meets the Commission's requirements so that work performed during this phase is appropriately controlled to assure validity and can be used in NRC licensing. DOE and NRC agreed on an approach for staff acceptance of the program after the CDSCP objection was published, and DOE is in the process of completing the necessary milestones. The staff QA objection on the SCP states that DOE should complete the applicable milestones and obtain NRC acceptance of them before proceeding with new site characterization activities. The objection will remain open until the milestones are completed. The objection can be lifted for individual program areas if DOE demonstrates and NRC agrees on the acceptability of the QA program for a specific program area. The QA objection also conveys the staff's concern...
that DOE will be impeded in demonstrating the ability to implement the agreed-upon approach because the QA management positions in DOE's Headquarters (OCRWM) and field (YMPO) offices have not been filled with full-time individuals with appropriate knowledge and experience.

Two concerns previously identified in the CDSCP comments have been identified with the program described in Section 8.6 of the SCP. First, for existing data to support the license application (i.e., data collected prior to the full implementation of the QA program), DOE has committed to implementing the appropriate staff guidance for qualifying the data, but has yet to submit for staff review its detailed procedures implementing this guidance. These procedures are under development and are expected to be submitted in the near future. After review of these procedures, the staff will also evaluate selected data qualified in accordance with the procedures. In addition, it is not clear if DOE has eliminated certain tests/experiments during site characterization because it has determined that existing data will satisfy the licensing requirements. DOE needs to identify existing data by activity that need to be qualified.

Second, the “potential” Q-list and the “preliminary” quality activities list (the combination of which constitutes the scope of the QA program which must meet NRC's QA regulations) have bases for their identification which appear non-conservative in some areas, resulting in incomplete lists. The staff recommends that an item or activity be “Q” listed until shown otherwise. The NRC staff believes that a number of items explicitly excluded from these lists should at this time be designated as being under a Part 60 Subpart G (essentially a 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B) QA program, including the “design” to preclude criticality.

The staff also has some quality assurance concerns with the Design Acceptability Analysis (DAA) which are discussed in Section 3.7.1, “Exploratory Shaft Facility and Impacts.”
### Table 1 Status of CDSCP Point Papers

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¹Partially resolved; now a comment rather than an objection
3.0 Summary of SCP Concerns

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**TOTALS**

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- UNRESOLVED 62
### Table 2 SCP Concerns By Specific Program

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**TOTALS**

- 2 Objections
- 133 Comments
- 63 Questions
4.0 OBJECTIONS, COMMENTS, AND QUESTIONS

4.1 Objections

Section 8.4.2.3.1 Exploratory Shaft facility testing, operations, layout constraints, and zones of influence, pp. 8.4.2–93/147

OBJECTION 1

The exploratory shaft facility (ESF) is intended to become an integral part of the repository if the site is found acceptable. However, the SCP and its references do not demonstrate the adequacy of ESF Title I design control process, and the adequacy of the ESF Title I design which is the basis for the SCP. For example, neither the design nor the subsequent Design Acceptability Analysis (DAA) considers some of the applicable 10 CFR 60 requirements. Also, the process used to integrate currently available technical data into decisions regarding shaft location appears to have overlooked evidence of a potential fault near the location of the exploratory shafts. In addition, it has not been demonstrated that the underground test facility and currently identified test durations will permit all tests to be conducted for the time periods required without interference. Furthermore, resolution of the problems identified with the Title I design may result in considerable corresponding modifications to the SCP.

BASIS

• In response to CDSCP objection number 3, the SCP described an acceptable approach for assessing the potential for test-to-test and construction-to-test interference. However, the SCP has not established that this approach has been appropriately implemented to resolve potential interference problems. In responding to NRC CDSCP objection number 3, the discussions and analyses presented in the SCP did not completely address the following NRC staff recommendations:

a. In planning the underground test facility, the overall performance confirmation testing program and the need for starting certain performance confirmation tests (e.g., waste package testing) as early as practicable during site characterization should be considered.

b. The design of the ESF should take into account the need for preliminary information from in situ seal testing to be available in the License Application submittal.

c. The Design Acceptability Analysis (DAA) undertaken by DOE in response to NRC concerns for evaluating the acceptability of the ESF Title I design did not consider certain concerns critical to NRC acceptance of DAA conclusions. The following are some examples:

a. Independence of the reviewers is in question. Five reviewers who were certified not to have significantly contributed to the ESF Title I design and SDRD (sub-system design requirements) are identified as authors, reviewers, and/or contributors to specific documents which were input documents to the ESF design. (Question 63)

b. Neither the ESF Title I design nor the subsequent DAA considers (qualitatively or quantitatively) 11 of the applicable 10 CFR 60 requirements. (Comment 128)

c. Of the 22 requirements considered by DOE to be applicable to the ESF design, only 22 were considered quantitatively. The remaining were said to have been considered qualitatively. Included in the remaining 30 are the requirements of Subpart F (Performance Confirmation Program) which according to 10 CFR 60.140(b), “shall have been started during site characterization.” Several of these 30 requirements are potentially important in evaluating the acceptability of the ESF Title I design. (Comment 130)

d. Of the 22 requirements that were considered quantitatively, some inadequacies have been identified. For example, in considering the regulatory requirement related to alternatives to major design features important to waste isolation (60.21(c)(1)(iv)(D)), the analysis presented was limited and incomplete. As a result, comparative evaluation of alternatives to the major design features was limited to comparative evaluation of five alternative ESF locations. Hence other comparative evaluations such as the number of man-made openings were not considered. (Comment 132)

e. DAA did not thoroughly check the adequacy of data used in the ESF Title I design. For example, several key documents which were part of ESF Title I design were not reviewed. (Comment 131)

f. DAA has not demonstrated that DOE has considered information that indicates the presence of an anomaly in the immediate vicinity of the proposed locations of exploratory shafts 1 and 2. (Comment 127) By not considering this
4.0 Objections, Comments, and Questions

readily available information in reaching the decision on the locations of ES-1 and ES-2, uncertainties regarding the design control process are further heightened. The design itself is further questioned since the comparative evaluation of the major design features (i.e., ES-1 and ES-2) with respect to waste isolation did not assess the impact of the anomaly.

- The analysis presented did not demonstrate that the underground test area layout can accommodate currently identified tests in the ESF while avoiding interference between tests and between tests and construction operations. Also, information presented in the SCP did not clearly show that thermal tests can be conducted for sufficient lengths of time to gather necessary site characterization data without interference problems. The bases for these concerns are as follows:

a. SCP does not clearly address the potential incompatibility of some of the tests with construction operations. It has not been demonstrated that operational requirements (e.g., storage of mobile equipment, drill steel, blasting materials, vent pipes, water pipes, support/reinforcement, disabled equipment, etc.) will not encroach on some of the identified test locations. For example, sequential drift mining test, heated block test and canister-scale heater experiment are currently shown to be located adjacent to the first loop access drifts to the shafts and therefore subject to potential operational interference.

b. The zones of influence presented for thermal tests are based on short test durations. Thermal tests such as the canister-scale heater experiment, heated block test, and heated room experiment are planned to run for relatively short durations (30 months, 100 days, 36 months). The staff considers that longer durations will very likely be necessary. The need to obtain additional site characterization data beyond the planned time periods may result in larger zones of influence.

c. It is stated in the SCP that in some cases the same space can be used for more than one test by sequencing the tests. However, it is not clear if it has been fully considered that delays during initial testing could affect the timing for the tests to be followed in the same space.

d. It is not clear that uncertainties have been sufficiently considered in the calculations of zones of influence for various tests. For example, uncertainties associated with the numerical models and material properties have not been considered in calculating zones of influence.

e. The location of the canister-scale heater test shown in Figure 8.4.2-39 (p. 8.4.2-209) has been erroneously indicated on the layout. As a result, its zone of influence apparently overlays the heated block test. In addition, the SCP gives the following two constraints for locating the canister scale heater test (p. 8.4.2-120):

- located greater than 9 m from drifts or alcoves running parallel to the axis of the heater.
- located in a “low traffic” area.

Neither of these constraints has apparently been met.

f. The locations of several major tests identified in the SCP have not been specifically identified. These include some tests that could have a considerable zone of influence (e.g., Heated room experiment) and some that require extensive test area (e.g., Horizontal drilling demonstration test). Examples of other tests for which specific locations have not been identified include thermal stress measurements, development and demonstration of required equipment, three of the four diffusion tests identified on p. 8.4.2-140, seal tests and other performance confirmation tests.

g. Page 8.3.2.1-14 of the SCP states that “there are other tests that have not yet been completely defined that will investigate coupled interactions.” Information has not been presented to indicate if any of these undefined tests will be in the main test area.

h. The space designated for tests within the underground test area layout is very likely to be inadequate. DOE assumes that all the space within the dedicated test area may be or is usable. This is unlikely to be the case. For example, some areas may not be suitable for use because of faults, lithophysal content, breccia, etc. In addition, offsets from waste emplacement areas (30 m) and from proposed multipurpose boreholes (two drift diameters) may further reduce the available test area.

i. The zone of influence from the drilling activities of existing borehole USW G-4 located within the dedicated test area should be considered in evaluating the size of suitable available test space. In calculating the zone of influence for USW G-4 it should be considered that a
total of 342,255 gallons of water were lost to various formations. Over 81,000 gallons of soap were used in the operation; however, how much soap was lost is unknown.

- Potential impacts of long-term performance confirmation testing on ESF design have not been addressed (see Comment 119).

The SCP has not provided sufficient demonstration that in situ waste package testing will not be needed during site characterization to reduce uncertainties associated with long-term waste package performance prediction for license application and closure. If such testing is found necessary, an analysis of the impact on ESF design is not presented. (Question 58 and Comment 82)

- Some of the ESF design criteria are not sufficiently justified. These include:
  
  (a) Seismic design basis (Comment 121);
  
  (b) ES-1 drainage volume and long-term drainage reliability (Comment 124, Question 27); and
  
  (c) effect of liner removal at closure (Question 24)

- The subsurface drifting and exploration planned in the SCP have not been shown to be sufficient to yield the data needed for repository design and site suitability demonstration at license application. (Comment 35)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- An acceptable baselined QA process should be used during Title II design.

- The Title II design should ensure that the design process, which appears to have overlooked key regulatory requirements and information about the suitability of exploratory shaft locations during Title I design, is adequate and that the number of shafts and their locations in the final repository contribute to reduce uncertainty with respect to waste isolation.

- The DOE should evaluate existing technical data (e.g., geophysical, geological) with respect to ESF location decisions and criteria; and, if deemed necessary, the DOE should consider additional geological and geophysical surface based tests in the vicinity of the exploratory shafts to investigate potentially adverse features and conditions.

- The ESF Title II Design should present the basis for selected test durations, address the suitability of established test durations, and assess their impact on the testing program.

- The ESF Title II Design should provide a complete conceptual layout of the main test level and related test schedules. The layout and schedule should account for the following: (a) uncertainties in the zones of influence calculations; (b) construction and facilities operations; (c) contingencies for unsuitable test areas; (d) drilling effects of USW G-4; (e) contingencies for tests that will need to be running longer than planned; (f) effect of sequencing tests on the overall license application and performance confirmation test programs; and (g) coupled interaction tests mentioned on p. 8.3.2.1-14. Based on these considerations, the ESF Title II design should recognize the potential need for additional underground testing area and demonstrate sufficient flexibility to accommodate likely contingencies.

Section 8.6: Quality Assurance Program

OBSESSION 2

Section 8.6 of the SCP describes the quality assurance (QA) program to be applied to site characterization activities including the exploratory shaft design and construction. Prior to conducting activities in the various program areas, it commits to having an appropriate program in place for those site characterization activities, which meets Subpart G of 10 CFR Part 60, and to qualify site exploration data supporting the license application. DOE has developed an acceptable approach for qualifying its QA program, but some of the milestones are not yet completed. In addition, although the information presented and referenced in the SCP on the responsibilities and independence of the QA managers is acceptable, the NRC staff is concerned that DOE will be impeded in demonstrating the ability to implement the approach because the QA management positions in DOE's headquarters (OCRWM) and field (YMPO) offices have not been filled with full-time individuals with appropriate knowledge and experience. Also, staff QA concerns on the Design Acceptability Analysis (DAA) will need to be resolved.

Finally, the Overview of the Site Characterization Plan incorrectly states that all organizations participating in the site characterization program have developed and are implementing a QA program that meets the NRC's requirements.

BASIS

- CDSCP Objection No. 5 noted that DOE's QA program for site characterization was still being developed and did not yet conform to the requirements in Subpart G of 10 CFR Part 60. It recommended that DOE submit plans and procedures for NRC staff review, facilitate NRC staff verification reviews such...
as observing DOE's audits, and not start new site characterization work until additional confidence was obtained in the adequacy of the program.

- In DOE's response to the CDSCP objection, it noted that during a meeting between the NRC staff and DOE on July 7, 1988, agreement was reached on an approach for NRC acceptance of the DOE's baseline QA program for beginning site characterization. This approach and schedules for implementing it were subsequently revised in a meeting between DOE and NRC on January 25, 1989.

- DOE and NRC staffs are in the process of implementing the agreed-upon approach for qualifying and accepting the DOE baseline QA program.

- The overall objection will remain open until all of the agreed-upon milestones are fulfilled. The objection can be lifted for individual program areas if DOE demonstrates and NRC agrees on the acceptability of the QA program for a specific program area.

- The staff has identified several quality assurance concerns with the Design Acceptability Analysis (DAA) of the Title I design which need to be resolved. The specific comments are presented in the DAA section of the SCA.

- Section 4.6, "Quality Assurance," of the Overview of the SCP states that "...all organizations participating in the site characterization program have developed and are implementing a documented quality assurance program that meets the quality assurance requirements of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission." While these organizations are currently developing and beginning to implement programs to meet the NRC requirements, none of the programs yet meet these requirements.

- Section 8.6 of the SCP references the Project Quality Assurance Plan (88-9), Revision 2 and the OCRWM Quality Assurance Program Description which have both been accepted by the NRC staff. Both plans require QA management positions that satisfy criteria such as:
  - An organizational position at the same or higher organizational level as the highest equivalent manager responsible for activities affecting quality;
  - No other duties or responsibilities that are unrelated to quality assurance and that could prevent full attention to quality assurance matters.

RECOMMENDATION
DOE should complete the applicable milestones of the agreed-upon approach and obtain NRC acceptance of them prior to the start of new site characterization activities. DOE should also resolve staff QA concerns on the DAA during Title II design. In addition, DOE should permanently fill its top QA management positions at both OCRWM and YMPO as soon as possible.

4.2 Comments

4.2.1 SCP Comments
Chapter 8 Site Characterization Program
Section 8.0 Introduction
Section 8.1 Rationale
Section 8.3 Planned Tests, Analyses, and Studies
Section 8.3.1 Site Program
Section 8.3.5 Performance Assessment Program

COMMENT 1
Although the SCP commits to a systematic, iterative approach to identifying the information needed to support a license application (the Issue Resolution Strategy), the documentation in the SCP does not demonstrate that such a program is in place. While this comment includes several concerns not raised elsewhere, it also collects and summarizes concerns expressed in other comments, which collectively point to the absence of such a program.

BASIS
The Role of the Issue Resolution Strategy in Site Characterization
Section 8.0 states:
"The first three sections of Chapter 8 present the rationale for the site characterization program and develop from that rationale a detailed description of the tests to be conducted during the program. . ."

The site characterization program has three principal purposes:
- To provide the data to be used to determine the suitability of a site.
- To provide the data needed for licensing.
- To provide the data for design of the repository and the waste package.

"In planning a program to achieve these purposes, the DOE has adopted an approach that starts with the regulatory requirements that must be satisfied in siting and licensing the repository, identifies the performance and design information needed to address those requirements,
and then develops specific investigations to obtain the needed information. This approach is embodied in an issue resolution strategy, which is discussed in some detail in Section 8.1. . . . The strategy described here and in Section 8.1 will be applied in an iterative manner to develop confidence throughout the licensing phases.”

Section 8.1.2 describes the Issue Resolution Strategy as consisting of four processes: (1) issue identification; (2) performance allocation; (3) data collection and analysis; and (4) issue resolution documentation.

Process (1)

Issue identification is described in Section 8.1.2.1 as (1) identification of the regulatory requirements; (2) derivation of the issues (issues hierarchy) from these requirements; and (3) description of the conceptual models and working hypotheses for the site and of preliminary designs for these concepts.

Process (2)

As described in Section 8.1.2.2, performance allocation is applied to each issue and consists of four steps that provide the rationale for the particular site characterization activities: (1) adoption of a “licensing strategy” (i.e., a statement of the site features, engineered features, conceptual models, and analyses that are expected to be important in resolving the issue); (2) establishment of performance measures for each of the components identified in the licensing strategy and, for each such performance measure, establishment of a goal and indication of confidence; (3) identification of specific information needs through the identification of the (performance or design) parameters needed to evaluate the performance measures and the establishment of goals and indications of confidence for each such parameter; and (4) identification of directly measurable quantities (generally called characterization parameters) to determine values of the performance or design parameters. Section 8.1.2.2 also notes the heavy reliance that performance allocation makes on current conceptual models and recognizes the need for the site investigation to address uncertainties in these models.

Process (3)

Data collection and analysis is described in Section 8.1.2.3 as having three steps: (1) initiation of investigation; (2) analyses of data as they become available, the principal result being an estimate of confidence that the particular parameter goals for the study are met; and (3) determination of the need for additional information based on a comparison of estimated confidence with the needed confidence stated in the performance allocation.

Process (4)

Section 8.1.2.4 describes issue resolution documentation as consisting of two steps: (1) use of the site characterization information to resolve the issues of the issues hierarchy by doing periodic performance assessments and evaluating the uncertainties to determine whether the technical criteria are met; and (2) documentation of the issue resolution.

Section 8.1.2.5 states that the entire issue resolution strategy is intended to be iterative in the sense that as information is gathered, the performance allocation may be adjusted and subsequent steps in the issue resolution strategy repeated.

In the following, concerns about the execution of the issue resolution strategy are related to performance allocation, alternative conceptual models and performance assessment. The concerns related to performance assessment include both general concerns about its use in the program, and specific concerns about validation, scenario development and formal use of expert judgment.

- Performance allocation (see process 2, above) has logic gaps in its execution (see Comment 2 for more detail).
  - The Waste Package Lifetime Issue Resolution Strategy contains performance measures related to controlled release (see Table 8.3.5.9-1); this is not consistent with the multiple barrier concept.
  - The Issue Resolution Strategy for Issue 1.1, Total System Performance, does not assure that the Issue will be resolved because the selected “scenario classes” are inconsistent with the designated performance measures (EPPMs). Also the selected goals are not adequate to assure that the Issue would be resolved (see Comment 108).
- While the Hypothesis Testing Tables represent a significant improvement regarding the way the Issue Resolution Strategy addresses alternative conceptual models (see process 2, above), there are some gaps and inconsistencies (see Comment 6 for more detail and references).
  - The logic used to derive the hypothesis testing tables is not always clear to the NRC staff; specifically, the same antecedents cited in the table yield a different “need to reduce the uncertainty in selection of hypotheses.”
  - In several instances it does not appear to the NRC staff that the cited studies will provide the information to differentiate between
alternative conceptual models (e.g., tests on cores are of the wrong scale to determine which model to use for far field flow, the cited batch column tests cannot be used to evaluate the validity of Kd's since they presume that Kd's are valid.)

- The set of Hypothesis Testing Tables is developed and organized around 10 CFR 960 subjects, not the Issues Hierarchy 10 CFR 60 issues or performance standards, or elements of the repository system; e.g., there is no Hypothesis Testing Table for total repository system performance. Thus, there is no explicit evidence that the tables have been integrated across technical disciplines.

- Some potentially significant alternatives are not included in the Hypothesis Testing Tables:
  - No alternative conceptual model is postulated for different coupling between fractures and matrix; even though this coupling is cited as a significant determinant of transport.
  - The range of alternative conceptual models for postclosure tectonics is arbitrarily limited by the physical domain considered.
  - Two hypotheses are not stated in the Hypothesis Testing Tables: (1) that liquid water flow in the Calico Hills unit (the primary site barrier for waste isolation) is restricted to the matrix and that (2) matrix properties of the altered Calico Hills non-welded zeolitized unit are probably largely isotropic. Furthermore no specific activities to test them are found in the SCP (although plans to test the first of these hypotheses may be provided in the study plans).
  - With respect to thermal effects, the Hypothesis Testing Table and investigations appear to focus on thermal effects on flow from magmatic intrusions. Heat from emplaced waste must also be considered in assessments of repository performance and needs greater emphasis in the tables than has been given.

- The NRC staff considers that performance assessments conducted in the past (e.g., in the Environmental Assessment) could have been more fully and effectively used to formulate the site characterization program. For example, in the performance allocation, estimates of needed level of confidence are based primarily on expert judgment with no explicit relationship to past performance assessments, even though these estimates are the primary basis for terminating a study.

- The text is inconsistent (p. 8.1–11 vs. p. 8.1–16) regarding the commitment to do periodic iterative performance assessments prior to the License Application. While performing periodic performance assessments is a part of the Issue Resolution Strategy for some Issues, the present SCP schedules indicate that total system performance assessments will not be performed until very near the end of site characterization. The SCP also indicates that Issue 1.8 will be resolved, largely, “without recourse to complex calculations of releases to the accessible environment.”

- CDSCP Question 52 has been responded to in the SCP in a manner inconsistent with the NRC basis points indicating that performance assessment “should be done iteratively throughout site characterization to aid in understanding the value of the data collected,” and “should be used in directing site characterization activities.”

- Plans for validating models, an important aspect of conducting convincing performance assessments, should be more fully developed. (See Comment 120).

  - Plans for long-term tests are not documented; e.g., long-term migration studies for purpose of validation of transport models are not addressed.

  - The performance confirmation program is not addressed in Section 8.3.5.16 with enough specificity to determine which performance confirmation studies need to be baselined as part of site characterization.

  - Only one validation study appears to be initiated from the exploratory shafts in the performance confirmation program.

  - Section 8.3.5.20, Analytical techniques requiring significant development, should have been strengthened through more explicit ties to the hypothesis testing tables.

- The process described in Section 8.3.5.13 for scenario development and screening, a key initial step in performance assessment, has apparent gaps and inconsistencies. (See Comment 95 for more detail.)

  - “Scenario classes” used in performance allocation for Performance Issue 1.1, Total System Performance (and for other Performance
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Issues), do not meet the formal definition stated in Section 8.3.5.13 and are inappropriate to use with the performance measure (EPPMs).

- Alternative conceptual models are used interchangeably with scenarios in Section 8.3.5.13 (e.g., some Ross sequences are for horizontal flow even though the base case conceptual model assumes vertical flow).

- Initial conditions are used interchangeably with scenarios in Section 8.3.5.13 (e.g., some Ross sequences involving faulty emplacement of waste packages).

- Quite different approaches to scenario definitions are used in the extensive mathematical discussion about constructing a CCDF in Section 8.3.5.13 and the extensive discussion of scenarios considered for characterization (later in the same section).

- The program described in the SCP appears to rely too heavily on the Formal Use of Expert Judgment (Expert Elicitations) to supply licensing information and data or to substitute for quantitative analyses (see Comment 3).

- Formal use of expert judgment is proposed to incorporate uncertainty about alternative conceptual models into the CCDF, rather than obtaining field or laboratory data to differentiate among alternative concepts (see Comment 98).

- Without stating criteria for the Formal Use of Expert Judgment, it is not clear that the license application will comply with the requirement of 10 CFR 60.24 that the application be as complete as possible in terms of information reasonably available.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- As soon as practicable, document the performance assessment program and its relationship to the site characterization investigation in enough detail to ensure correction of the apparent programmatic deficiencies which resulted in the specific examples cited above. In addition, resolve the specific examples.

- At an early time, establish and implement a plan to use performance assessment including total system performance assessment in an iterative process through site characterization (1) to aid in understanding the regulatory value of data collected, (2) to assist in focusing the site characterization program on key areas of uncertainty and determining when those uncertainties are sufficiently low that investigations may be terminated, and (3) to refine models as data are collected. Status of implementation should be specifically reported in the 6-month updates.

- A critical element of the performance assessment plan should be the direct use of performance assessment, including total system performance assessment, to refine the initial performance allocation of the SCP. This use of performance assessments should begin at an early time and continue in an iterative fashion throughout site characterization.

Section 8.1 Rationale for the Site Program.

COMMENT 2

The initial performance allocation, as documented in the SCP, contains logic gaps and hence does not provide assurance that the site characterization program will develop the required information.

BASIS

- Discussions and diagrams of how performance allocation was used to identify the information needed to resolve each performance and design issue are included in Section 8.1.2.2, Performance Allocation, and Section 8.3.1.1, Site Overview of Site Program. The general principles articulated are consistent with NRC-DOE meeting agreements of April 1985, September 1985, and March 1987. However, they are not consistently followed in the SCP.

- The rationales for establishing performance allocation goals for Issue 1.1, Total System Performance and Issue 1.4, Waste Package Containment have logic gaps such that meeting the performance goal does not assure resolution of the issue.

- The proposed application of expected partial performance measures (EPPMs) to establish performance goals is not correctly implemented. Thus, meeting the performance allocation goals does not assure compliance with Issue 1.1, Total System performance. (See Comment 108 for detail.)

- Some waste package performance goals do not appear to be consistent with the interpretation of “substantially complete containment.” (See Comments 44 and 80 for detail.)

- A target goal is needed for a performance measure that encompasses cumulative container failure, as is
acknowledged on p. 3.5.9-25. Therefore, the waste package performance allocation is incomplete.

- Other point papers present examples of incomplete correlation and justification of goals and parameters in the performance allocation for various issues. In conjunction with the foregoing concerns they collectively suggest a pervasive problem in implementation of performance allocation.

  Studies and activities for coupled interaction tests need to be correlated with specific hypotheses about the thermal effects on the hydrologic system. Without such correlation for coupled interaction tests, the testing program for evaluating the thermal response of the hydrogeologic system is open to question. (Fourth bullet, basis of Comment 11.)

  In investigations for facilities important to safety, the basis and rationale for the design and performance parameters, characterization parameters, and goals for fault displacement do not appear to have been justified. (Comment 60)

  Characterization parameters for the identification of "significant Quaternary faults" in the area of the repository block do not appear to fulfill the requirements in 10 CFR 60. (Comment 64)

  The rationale for numerical goals specified for design and performance parameters related to preclosure tectonics is poorly supported. (Comment 43)

  The tentative goal, design parameter, and expected value relating faulting and performance allocation for System Element 1.1.2 are not sufficient for adequately characterizing the hazard posed by faulting in the repository. (Comment 71)

  Consideration should be given to establishing a direct path for the integration of data collected in the Postclosure Tectonics program into Issue 1.4 and Issue 1.5. (Comment 47)

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- A high priority should be given to determining whether the above problem indicates an underlying programmatic problem in implementing performance allocation.

- As soon as practicable, correct the problems in implementing the performance allocation so that site characterization activities can be fully integrated into the issue resolution process and interim performance assessments.

**REFERENCES**

NRC/DOE Meeting on Performance Allocation, April 17, 1985, Silver Spring, MD.

NRC/DOE Meeting on Subsystem Performance Allocation, September 26-27, 1985, Silver Spring, MD.

NRC/DOE Meeting on SCP Issues Hierarchy/Performance Allocation, March 3-4, 1987, Washington, DC.

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**COMMENT 3**

The SCP describes a program that relies heavily on the Formal Use of Expert Judgment (Expert Elicitations) to supply licensing information and data or to substitute for quantitative analyses. To the extent that a subjective approach is planned in situations where quantitative analyses based on empirical evidence are available, investigations that should be considered in the SCP are not considered. Thus, the SCP does not identify a full program of investigations needed for a complete, high-quality license application. Without stating criteria for the formal use of expert judgment, it is not clear that the license application will comply with the requirement of 10 CFR 60.24 that the application be as complete as possible in terms of information reasonably available.

**BASIS**

- As noted in CDSCP Comment 4, the use of expert elicitation will be examined to determine whether the subjective approach was necessary because objective approaches were unavailable.

- One way in which expert elicitation will be inappropriately relied on is noted in Comments 93 and 98. Weighting alternative conceptual models according to the judgment that they are likely to be correct is not a good substitute for field studies to determine which model is correct.

- Page 8.3.5.13–115 states: "The form of the joint probability distribution of state variables, and the ranges of those state variables, will inevitably be determined by judgment. Whenever possible, judgment will be enhanced and supplemented with site specific actuarial data concerning magnitudes and frequencies of the phenomenon that determine the
state variables." This joint probability distribution is central to the calculation of the CCDF, which quantifies total system performance; hence, it is crucial to demonstrating compliance with the EPA standard. There are two problems with the proposed approach: (1) the priority of the use of judgment instead of site specific data is reversed; site specific and other types of data should be supplemented by judgment when there is no other practicable recourse; (2) to the extent that judgment is used in determining the joint probability distribution, the DOE should assure that the facts, analysis, and rationale on which the judgments are based are fully documented.

- Page 8.3.5.13–126 states: "The processes and events that are determined to play potential roles in release scenarios are then subjectively arranged in series, and an attempt is made to discover the effects of realization of each series on the performance of one or more of the isolation barriers for the total system. This part of the analysis is necessarily subjective because the number of series formed in this way could be astronomical if the intuition and knowledge of the analyst is not applied to reduce the number of possibilities to a manageable size." The text then articulates two nonsubjective principles that may be used to guide the formulation of these series. The NRC advocates that wherever possible objective methods should be used preferentially over subjective methods. Development or extension of analytical procedures may render this problem largely objective. If subjective methods are used, the intuition and knowledge on which the analyst relies must be fully documented.

- Section 8.1.2.3 states:

"Two fundamental premises should be mentioned before the steps in the process are discussed. First, a full performance assessment cannot be conducted after each study to determine if the information obtained is sufficient to resolve issues. The site characterization program is extremely complex and comprehensive. While many of the critical elements needed for the full performance assessments will be completed early, others that will be needed will not be completed until much later, and some not until the end of site characterization. To wait until the complete set of information is available to evaluate the testing is not prudent. Therefore, elements of this program will be evaluated individually with respect to adequacy of the information obtained without resorting to full performance assessments. Part of this evaluation will involve some analysis. The extent of such analysis is discussed below.

"Therefore, the first steps in the process are to initiate the studies under the various investigations (step 7) and to conduct analyses as the data become available (steps 8a and 8b). For the purpose of deciding if the data are sufficient, the principal result of these analyses is an estimate of the confidence that the particular parameter goals specified for the study are met. This estimate will depend not only upon the uncertainties in those parameters, but also the uncertainties in the models and hypotheses upon which the parameters are based, and these uncertainties must be taken into account in making the estimates. In some cases, the estimates may be quantitative; but in many cases judgment, supported with appropriate documentation, will be the principal basis for the estimates. All reviews and documentation will be performed in accordance with established quality assurance procedures as described in Section 8.6."

This approach to issue resolution may not succeed because of at least three problem areas:

1. Evaluating elements of the program individually, without resorting to full performance assessments, may fail to take account of important interactions and synergisms in the very complex, interrelated repository system. Although individual components or elements may be found to perform acceptably, system performance may be inadequate if important interactions are not accounted for until a full performance assessment after all testing is complete.

2. The text correctly states that the estimates of confidence that a particular goal is met depend not only on the uncertainty in the parameter, but also on the uncertainties in the models and hypotheses upon which the parameters are based. However, the goals themselves depend on the initial concept of systems performance and the preliminary judgment of how elements of the system interact. These goals may only be re-evaluated by a full performance assessment that accounts for important interactions.

3. It is not clear that judgment is a suitable replacement for analysis in making the determination that the parameter goals are achieved with a suitable degree of confidence. Documentation of such judgments is not a suitable replacement for a quantitative analysis of the confidence in an estimate taking into account the complex interaction of various data used to arrive at the estimate.

- In discussing the Issue Resolution Strategy for Issue 1.8 (NRC Siting Criteria), the SCP states (pp.
8.3.5.17–8 to 9): “Issue 1.8 has many similarities to Issue 1.1; the two issues take many of the same site conditions into account, and both deal with the effects of site conditions on the isolation of the waste. They do not, however, have to be structured identically. Although each of the two issues will require both quantitative and qualitative arguments for resolution, the DOE expects that the resolution of Issue 1.8 will rely more heavily on expert geotechnical judgment. The resolution of Issue 1.1 will result in a definitive quantitative demonstration of compliance by the construction of the cumulative complementary distribution function. This resolution will rely on qualitative reasoning primarily for the justification of the conceptual models it uses and for showing the reasonable assurance required by 10 CFR 60.101. Because 10 CFR 60.122 makes explicit reference to meeting the waste-isolation performance objectives, the resolution of Issue 1.8 cannot be wholly qualitative. It can, however, be a forum for full expression of sound qualitative technical judgment on the site’s ability to isolate waste. The DOE expects that such judgments can frequently be made without recourse to complex calculations of releases to the accessible environment; for example, modeling of ground-water flow may be used to address increases in water-table elevations and infiltration. Such simpler calculations and the use of expert geotechnical judgment will play important roles in the resolution of Issue 1.8.” The NRC staff believes that compliance with 10 CFR 60.122 requires that performance assessments, rather than judgments, need to be used to provide an early and ongoing evaluation of whether any of the various potentially adverse conditions (60.122) significantly affect the ability of the site to meet the 10 CFR Part 60 performance objectives and whether data being gathered is adequate to make this determination.

- Pages 8.1–13 to 14 describe how judgments will be made at three levels “to determine whether to extend or curtail any of the testing originally planned.” The three levels of judgment cited are: (1) technical judgment at the study level, (2) technical and management judgment at the investigation level, and (3) management judgment at the issue level. Studies, investigations, and issues require increasing degrees of integration and interrelation of data. It is not clear that judgment rather than analysis is the appropriate mechanism to achieve the needed degree of integration and interrelation. Furthermore, it is not clear what role “management” judgment plays in resolving a set of technical issues or that such management judgments are appropriate.

RECOMMENDATIONS
- State criteria for the formal use of expert judgment to assure that objective, quantitative analyses based on empirical data are used in preference to expert elicitation wherever possible.
- Modify the site characterization plan, in an early update, to assure the requisite data will be available.

Section 8.1: Rationale for the Site Characterization Program
Section 8.3.1.15: Overview of thermal and mechanical rock properties program

COMMENT 4
The rationale provided for the specification of information needs does not appear to ensure completeness of those needs. Furthermore, the integration of testing with design and performance assessment is lacking.

BASIS
- In response to CDSCP comments 1, 43, and 44 the DOE has not presented an adequate integrated approach among field testing, design, and performance assessment.
- Although a detailed rationale for development of basic information needs is presented, it is not based on comprehensive “sensitivity studies” that can identify the potential areas of concern in rock mass performance and critical parameters to be measured in the laboratory and field.
- In DOE’s response to NRC CDSCP comment number 1, sensitivity analyses in Appendix I of the SCPCDR (MacDougall et al., 1987) and Ehgartner (1986) are cited. However, the results from these analyses have not been accurately reflected in the column labeled “needed confidences” in Table 8.3.1.15–1. For example, analyses by Ehgartner (1986) show that:
  - rock mass compressive strength, elastic modulus, and thermal gradient are highest “design impact factors.”
  - rock density, heat capacity, and Poisson’s ratio are lowest “design impact factors.”

However, SCP Table 8.3.1.15–1 is not consistent with these results.
- The approach portrayed in Table 8.3.1.15–1 focuses on obtaining parameters used primarily in drift
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stability analyses. The behavior of emplacement hole (near-field) or the repository (far-field) has not been sufficiently analyzed.

- The testing plan does not describe in-situ testing aimed at providing a complete set of joint properties that would be needed as input to design and performance assessment models. For example, in attempting to characterize the modified permeability zone, Case and Kelsall (1987) assume a stress-permeability relation based on a cubic flow rate law and an "equivalent smooth-wall fracture aperture," also known as a conducting aperture. The SCP has stated that "relating aperture to 'equivalent hydraulic aperture' is outside the scope of the SCP" (Response to NRC CDSCP Question 12, in U.S. DOE, 1988).

- The SCP has used a compliant joint model to describe joint closure (see, for example, Thomas, 1987). This model requires definition of parameters such as the half-closure stress and the maximum joint closure. Tests to determine these properties are not described.

- The testing plan in the SCP is not uniform and consistent in its attempt to relate individual tests to validation or verification of specific design or performance specifications. For example, Section 8.3.1.15.1.8, Study: In-Situ Design Verification, does not provide any information concerning design verification or validation under repository conditions which include the effects of heat.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The SCP updates should provide "parametric performance calculations (sensitivity studies) . . . that will help to refine parameter goals and associated required confidence levels" as stated in the DOE Response to NRC CDSCP Comment 44 (U.S. DOE, 1988).

- The SCP updates should provide plans for collecting all necessary data for validating the design and performance assessment models.

REFERENCES


U.S. Department of Energy, Letter from S. Rouss, DOE, to H. Thompson, Jr., NRC; Subject: Issuance of the Site Characterization Plan (SCP) for the Yucca Mountain Site to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, December 28, 1988, 4pp. plus 3 enclosures, including "Responses to NRC Point Papers on Site Characterization Plan/Consultation Draft."

Section 8.2.2.1.4 Summary of waste package containment Issue 1.4: Will the waste package meet the performance objective for containment as required by 10 CFR 60.113?

Section 8.3.5.9 Issue resolution strategy for Issue 1.4: Will the waste package meet the performance objective for containment as required by 10 CFR 60.113?

COMMENT 5

The SCP's revised technical interpretation of "substantially complete containment (SCC)" is closer to NRC's use of the phrase than the interpretation in the CDSCP but it adds a qualifier ("allowing for recognized technological limitations and uncertainties") and introduces a new term ("the set of waste packages") which in turn require explanation.

BASIS

- The qualifier, "allowing for recognized technological limitations and uncertainties," is subject to interpretation, leading to questions about how these limitations and uncertainties would be assessed and quantified.

- The term "the set of waste packages" implies that the associated text applies only to some subset of all the waste packages; otherwise, it would be sufficient to say "the waste packages."

- Table 8.3.5.9-1 proposes that, in the 300-1000 year portion of the containment period, up to 1% of the curie inventory of the breached packages may be
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released. Also, no more than 0.1% of the total packages may be breached per year. If one assumes that breach is equivalent to release of radionuclides, these two criteria would match the NRC release rate criterion at 1000 years. The staff considers that a more restrictive criterion of containment than 1% of the inventory should apply during the period dominated by fission products.

- The SCP asserts that model simplification will be necessary, and that another level of uncertainty will be introduced thereby, but gives no indication as to how this will affect the demonstration of compliance with the containment requirement.

- There is no indication in Table 8.3.5.16–1 of any plans by DOE to conduct long-term waste package performance confirmation tests. The DOE should note that the entire time period from the present to the decision on closure (not just the time period until license application for construction authorization) is available to address reduction of technological limitations and uncertainties regarding the adequacy of design for prediction of containment and release rate performance.

- The SCP (7.2.1.3.2) states that the waste package design requirements “shall be demonstrated to be technically feasible on the basis of reasonably available technology and that the associated costs be reasonable.” Further, the waste package designs are constrained in that they “shall not impose requirements on the repository packaging, handling, and emplacement facilities, equipment, or operations that are beyond reasonably available technology.” No explanation is provided about how these design requirements may impact the degree of containment that will be provided by the waste packages.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The DOE should provide more detail on the qualifying phrase in their interpretation of SCC so that NRC and DOE can reach an understanding of the phrase that is consistent with the intent of the rule.

2. The DOE should explain the impact introduced by the lack of a quantitative measure of limitations and uncertainties on DOE’s demonstration of compliance with 10 CFR 60.113.

3. The DOE should explain the meaning of “the set of waste packages.”

4. The NRC and the DOE technical staffs should interact:

   a. To provide the NRC with both a conceptual and a quantitative understanding of the DOE’s intent to develop technical solutions to the uncertainties and limitations delineated in Chapter 7 of the SCP regarding containment and release rates, including appropriate confidence limits.

   b. To permit the NRC to evaluate the adequacy of the EBS/waste package program concept and the associated specific plans, milestones, and schedules for accomplishing the objective in 4a.

   c. To develop confidence that with respect to the concept, planning and implementation of the EBS/waste package program, maximum advantage has been taken of opportunities to overcome current technological limitations and to minimize uncertainties in the design, containment and release rate performance of the waste packages.

5. The DOE should explain how the waste package design requirements related to reasonably available technology and reasonable costs will impact the degree of containment provided by the waste packages.

Section 8.3 Planned Tests, Analyses, and Studies (8.3.1 through 8.3.1.17)

COMMENT 6

The hypothesis testing (alternative conceptual model) tables included in Sections 8.3.1 (The Site Program), 8.3.2. (Repository Program), 8.3.3 (Seal Program), 8.3.4 (Waste Package) represent an improvement over the CDSCP in assuring the adequacy of the site program to provide data to distinguish among alternative conceptual models of site performance. However, the hypothesis testing tables contain some gaps and inconsistencies and in some instances cite studies that do not appear to distinguish among the alternative conceptual models listed.

BASIS

- The NRC staff’s Objection 1 to the CDSCP concerned inadequate attention to articulating and differentiating between alternative conceptual models in planning the site characterization program. The SCP provides considerable discussion of alternative conceptual models and site investigations to evaluate them. Also the issue resolution strategy has now incorporated alternative conceptual models as an important consideration. On that basis, the NRC staff has downgraded its objection. There are however, residual concerns, addressed in this comment, in that: (1) some potentially important alternatives to those conceptual models used to generate the
The rationale for the table entries in columns 2 and 3, the "Need to Reduce Uncertainty" entry (essentially the importance of a particular alternative conceptual model) has been derived from the other entries in the table in a way that the logic is not always clear to the NRC staff; (3) the rationale for the table entries in columns 2 through 7 (see p. 8.3.1.2-51) does not always appear to be supportable; (4) the studies cited to provide the information required to distinguish between the current conceptual model and the stated alternative do not appear to do so in some instances; and (5) the hypothesis testing tables do not appear to be integrated.

When viewed as an entity the internal logic of the hypothesis testing tables is, in some cases, not clear. The SCP states that the judgment entered in the eighth column of the hypothesis testing tables, "Need to Reduce Uncertainty in the Selection of Hypotheses" (i.e., the need to gather site data of a particular type), is based upon the judgments entered in columns 3, "Uncertainty and Rationale"; 7, "Sensitivity of the Performance Parameters to Alternative Hypotheses"; 6, "The Significance and Needed Confidence of Affected Performance Parameters"; and the likelihood that feasible data-gathering activities could significantly reduce uncertainty (which is not entered in the tables). There are several instances in which all the entries in two different rows are the same, but the column eight entries are different (e.g., p. 8.3.1.2-52, rows 1 and 2; p. 8.3.1.2-55, rows 1 and 2); this seems to be logically inconsistent. In other cases (e.g., p. 8.3.1.2-54, rows 1 and 2) all entries are the same except for column 3, uncertainty in current conceptual models; again it seems inconsistent that for this condition the need to reduce uncertainty is the same.

Other comments support the concern that the treatment of alternative conceptual models in the hypothesis testing tables does not assure that the site characterization program will adequately explore the full range of potentially important alternatives. See for example: Comment 109, different regimes of coupling time are not treated in the hypothesis testing tables; Comment 46, the range of alternative conceptual models for postclosure tectonics is arbitrarily limited by the physical domain considered; Comment 11, no hypotheses are presented about thermal effects on the hydrologic system caused by emplaced waste; and Comment 12, hypotheses that liquid-water flow in the Calico Hills is restricted to the rock matrix and that matrix properties of the altered Calico Hills nonwelded zeolitized unit are probably largely isotropic.

- **The hypothesis testing tables are organized around 10 CFR 960 subjects rather than Issues Hierarchy issues, 10 CFR 60 performance objectives, or repository systems and subsystems. Accordingly, there is a concern that the tables are not integrated across technical disciplines such as hydrology, geochemistry, geology, etc.**

- **The hypothesis testing tables are difficult to interpret in several instances. For example, it is not clear that all significant alternatives to the current representation are treated in Table 8.3.1.5-3, Current representation and alternative hypotheses for regional model for the climate program. Table 8.3.1.5-3 presents "subsets of alternative hypotheses," some of which appear to be included in the primary current representation. Also the "subset" current representations appear to be inconsistent with the primary current representation. Thus it is not clear what current representation or alternatives are considered. On p. 8.3.1.5-20 the current representation is given as: "During the 10,000-year isolation period, natural and anthropogenic processes will cause changes in sea-temperature patterns, composition of atmosphere, and orbital parameters; as a result, shifts in temperature, precipitation, wind, and evapotranspiration will occur." "Subsets of alternative hypotheses" include little impact on precipitation from the greenhouse effect, for the first 1000 years, paired with a current representation of significantly increased precipitation from the greenhouse effect. On p. 8.3.1.5-21 the current representation of significantly decreased precipitation after 1000 years is paired with an alternative hypothesis of no significant changes in temperature or precipitation.**

**EXAMPLES**

- **Column 3 (Uncertainty and rationale). The rationale provided for the level of uncertainty stated is questionable: e.g., p. 8.3.1.2-60, row 2; p. 8.3.1.2-61, row 3; p. 8.3.1.2-65, row 3.**

- **Column 4 (Alternative hypothesis). The stated entry does not appear to be an acceptable alternative to the current concept stated in column 2: e.g., p. 8.3.1.2-54, row 1; p. 8.3.1.2-55, row 2; p. 8.3.1.2-56, row 3; p. 8.3.1.2-64, row 3; p. 8.3.1.2-65, row 1.**

- **Column 7 (Sensitivity of parameter of performance measure to hypothesis). The rationale provided for the stated level of sensitivity seems questionable: e.g., p. 8.3.1.2-55, row 3; p. 8.3.1.2-61, row 3.**

- **Column 8 (Need to reduce uncertainty). "Need to reduce uncertainty" logic may be faulty: e.g., p. 8.3.1.2-56, row 3; p. 8.3.1.2-57, row 2; p. 8.3.1.2-58, row 1; p. 8.3.1.2-61, row 3; p. 8.3.1.2-62, rows 1, 2 &
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3; p. 8.3.1.2-63, row 1; p. 8.3.1.2-66, row 2; p. 8.3.1.2-66, row 3; p. 8.3.1.2-67, row 1.

- Column 9 (Studies or activities to reduce uncertainty). Studies cited do not appear to be directed toward the acquisition of data required to clearly distinguish between the current concept and the alternative: e.g., p. 8.3.1.2-56, row 1; p. 8.3.1.2-59, row 1. See also Comments 15, 18, 23, 29, and 31.

RECOMMENDATION

As soon as practicable, the hypothesis testing tables should be amended to address the concerns identified above and appropriate modifications should be made to the site characterization program.

Section 8.3: Planned Tests, Analyses, and Studies

COMMENT 7

The clarified role of subjective methods (e.g., formal use of judgment) in site characterization has not been applied to all segments of site characterization to determine when it is best to use experts in the analysis itself and when it is best to call for peer review of investigations, calculations or judgments.

BASIS

- In response to CDSCP Comment 4 (and CDSCP Question 2), overview sections have been revised to describe generally the need for using expert judgment in some aspects of site characterization. Examples of such general sections are Sections 8.1.2, Issue Resolution Strategy; 8.3.1.1, Overview of the Site Program; Role of Alternative Conceptual Models; and 8.3.5.8, Strategy for Post-closure Performance Assessment.

- In the description of many of the specific activities, the need for using expert judgment or peer review has been properly identified. An example is the use of peer review in the activity: Studies of calcite and opaline silica vein deposits (p. 8.3.1.5-111).

- However, the “subjective weighting of alternatives (conceptual models) based on peer review” (p. 8.3.5.12-17, 3rd paragraph) is an example of two kinds of misapplication of expert judgment. The first is described in Comment 98; the second misapplication is the use of peer review to make an initial judgment. Peer review should be reserved for review of information or judgments reached by other means.

- Section 8.3.5.8, pp. 8.3.5.8-6 to 7, states:

“The process shown in Figure 8.3.5.8–2 requires numerous applications of judgment. Each decision on whether data are sufficient requires such judgment. The need for iterations and further developments will be decided through judgments of whether the work has provided a basis on which the NRC may find the “reasonable assurance” called for by 10 CFR Part 60. These decisions may involve the routine use of expert judgment, the formal use of expert judgment, or the use of peer review as defined in Altman et al. (1988). The DOE will subject the licensing assessment work to rigorous peer review, using experts from its repository programs as well as from the outside technical community. The use of subjective methods involving judgment through peer review is an important process in all the activities shown in Figure 8.3.5.8–2. The general role of subjective methods (i.e., use of expert judgment) in site characterization is discussed in Section 8.1.”

This paragraph is ambivalent about whether the decisions indicated in Figure 8.3.5.8–2 are to be aided by a variety of uses of expert judgment or whether peer review alone will be used. In the essential area of performance assessment, the uses of expert judgment should be clearly stated.

RECOMMENDATION

In further developing and implementing the site characterization program, the DOE should assess the activities to ensure that problems to be addressed by experts are clearly identified, and that appropriate uses of peer review and initial application of expert judgment are distinguished from each other.

Section 8.3.1.1 Overview of the site Program:
Role of alternative conceptual models

Section 8.3.1.17.12.2 Activity: Evaluate tectonic models

COMMENT 8

Alternative tectonic models for the site do not appear to be fully integrated into the site characterization plan and as a result alternatives are apparently not considered in the preliminary performance allocations and the design of the Engineered Barrier System (EBS). The site characterization program appears to be directed toward providing data that confirm the preferred tectonic model rather than determining what the “preferred model” should be.

BASIS

- Tectonic models, as used in the SCP, do not form a conceptual basis from which to make conservative judgments about the likelihood and magnitude of future tectonic events. For example, Table 8.3.1.8–3b
indicates that the current estimate related to the performance parameter of the probability of offset of greater than 2 m in 10,000 yrs is slip-rates on faults of less than 0.01 mm per yr with moderate confidence in that estimate. This estimate does not consider reasonably conservative alternative fault models that suggest slip-rates may be higher than the estimate. The confidence expressed in the estimate is unsupported by statements in the text that indicate the amount of strike-slip motion along faults is unknown (e.g., Spengler and others, 1981; Spengler and Chornack, 1984).

- The response to CDSCP Comment 37 states that it is proper to distinguish between faults within and outside the waste emplacement areas. This response does not consider alternative fault models in which faults within and outside the waste emplacement areas may be related to each other. In a model where faults are related, consideration of slip-rates on faults outside of the waste emplacement areas has a direct bearing on the prediction of expected movements on faults within the waste emplacement areas.

- Section 8.3.1.17.2.1.2 states that the program does not expect to encounter faults in the waste emplacement areas (p. 8.3.1.17-62) even though Figs. 8.4.2-4 and 8.3.1.4-10 imply that an imbricate fault zone (in one conceptual model these faults could be associated with the Bow Ridge fault system) may occur in the waste emplacement areas.

- North-trending normal faults are not considered in the context of a realistic conceptual tectonic model that indicates that the current stress field may be such that all favorably oriented faults, even those that do not display demonstrable Quaternary offset, are susceptible to failure (i.e., an anticipated process). The SCP appears to favor the development of imprecise categories of faults (i.e., "potentially significant Quaternary faults," Section 8.3.1.17.4.6.2) rather than use conceptual models of faulting in the performance allocation process.

- The approach to the use of alternative tectonic models in the SCP deemphasizes the importance of characterizing the underlying tectonic processes for use in predicting future tectonic events at the site. For example, Table 8.3.1.8-8 (p. 8.3.1.8-41) states that it is more important to reduce uncertainties about the nature of local faulting than to resolve faulting mechanisms. This statement implies that characterizing the underlying processes responsible for faulting (i.e., anticipated process) is of secondary importance to characterizing movements on particular faults (i.e., anticipated events). In this approach, conceptual models of faulting such as fault segmentation, episodic faulting, and fault imbrication may not be adequately addressed.

- Alternative tectonic models are not adequately factored into performance allocation and design considerations. Specifically, Investigation 8.3.1.17.2 assumes that the slip-rate and recurrence interval on individual faults is an accurate and conservative method for determining hazard to surface and subsurface facilities. However, conceptual tectonic models (e.g., detachment faults) that link faults of higher slip with others displaying lower slip inject considerable uncertainty into the future behavior of individual faults within a structural block. The current design of the EBS appears to be based on the assumptions used in 8.3.1.17.2. No contingency EBS designs, to encompass the effects of alternative tectonic models, are presented in the SCP.

- Current representations of model hypotheses do not accurately reflect the uncertainty that alternative models of fault mechanisms bring into judgments about future fault behavior. Specifically, the preferred representation listed in Table 8.3.1.17-7 concludes that slip-rates are low and that the uncertainty is medium. In addition, Section 8.3.1.8 (p. 8.3.1.8-27) states that "...faults (such as Windy Wash and Paintbrush Canyon . . .) have very low slip rates..." suggesting that a conclusion about the slip rates on faults has already been made. Doubt is cast on these two assumptions about fault movement by the considerable evidence suggesting strike-slip motion may be a significant (e.g., Spengler and others, 1981; Spengler and Chornack, 1984), and as yet unassessed, component on faults near Yucca Mountain.

- There is no indication in the SCP that alternative tectonic models have been used to form the basis for prioritizing those investigations associated with tectonic features, events, or processes that could lead to a determination of whether the site has unacceptable adverse conditions, or to a substantial change in the site characterization program.

- Alternative tectonic models are not fully factored into investigations to address volcanism. Volcanism studies appear not to be sufficiently integrated with regional faulting studies or geophysical tests to provide an integrated tectonic model. The physical domain in which tectonic investigations are to be carried out is likely to limit the range of conceptual tectonic models for volcanism.
4.0 Objections, Comments, and Questions

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Alternative tectonic models should be thoroughly integrated into preliminary performance allocations and the design of the EBS.
- Consideration should be given to prioritizing investigations giving high priority to those investigations associated with tectonic features, events, or processes that could lead to the determination of whether the site has unacceptable adverse conditions, or to a substantial change in the site characterization program.

REFERENCES


Section 8.3.1.1, p. 8.3.1.1–6, 7, 8 Overview of the site Program: Role of Alternative Conceptual models.

Tables 8.3.1.2–2a,b, 8.3.1.3–2, 8.3.1.4–2, . . .

COMMENT 9

Expert judgment used in developing the hypothesis testing tables does not appear to have been based on a consistent logic and thus may not be traceable and defensible.

BASIS

- NRC’s CDSCP Comment 4 pointed out that the facts and reasoning used by experts to reach conclusions will be examined independently to determine not only whether the approach of using expert judgment is necessary, but also whether expert judgment was used in a traceable, defensible manner.
- DOE has explicitly stated (Section 8.3.1.1) that expert judgment was used to evaluate the alternative conceptual models to be used in describing site behavior. However, examination of the hypothesis testing tables (e.g., 8.3.1.2) indicates that the logical pattern for drawing conclusions is not consistent and thus not clearly evident. Examples of inconsistency are given in the basis of Comment 6.
- Contrary to the statement in paragraph 3, p. 8.3.1.2–353 that conceptual model development, being largely a mental exercise, does not lend itself to the establishment of formalized procedure, a mental exercise can be based on formalized procedures. There exists a body of literature on systematic procedures for using expert judgment. An example cited in the SCP is Loudon, 1979.
- The potential effect on site characterization of the apparent logical deficiencies in hypothesis testing tables is inappropriate assignment of priorities to investigation(s) to discriminate among alternative conceptual models.

RECOMMENDATION

Applying the principle cited in bullet 3 above, reevaluate the final four columns of all hypothesis testing tables to assure that they are based on a consistent logic pattern.

Section 8.3.1.2 Overview of the geohydrology program: Description of the present and expected geohydrologic characteristics required by the performance and design issues

COMMENT 10

The technical basis for initial assessments of the significance of individual features, events and processes of the hydrogeologic system to performance measures or design and performance parameters is not discussed. In addition, some aspects of the current descriptions of the regional and site hydrogeologic systems are not well stated.

BASIS

- General descriptions of the regional and site geohydrologic systems are presented in Chapter 3. These general descriptions represent the overall “conceptual models” for these systems. Further, these “conceptual models” have been summarized by dividing them into a series of “model elements” as presented in Section 8.3.1.2 (Tables 8.3.1.2–2a and 8.3.1.2–2b). Each “model element” represents a specific physical feature, event or process related to the regional or site hydrologic system. For each feature, event or process related to the regional or site hydrologic system, the current understanding about the feature, event or process is discussed. Initial estimates as to the significance of each feature, event or process to discriminate among alternative conceptual models.
4.0 Objections, Comments, and Questions

To determine whether proposed studies will provide all the information necessary to describe the regional and site hydrologic systems, the staff has reviewed the information presented in Chapter 3 and Section 8.3.1.2. As a result of that review, the staff has made the following observations:

1. A clear distinction between specific physical features, events, processes, techniques for deriving hydrologic parameters and simplifying modeling assumptions that may be used in performance analyses is not made. For example, in Table 8.3.1.2-2a the assumption that discrete fractures and fracture flow can be modeled as equivalent porous media is not differentiated from such hypotheses as “matric potential is definable and measurable in terms of capillarity/adsorption theory (Kelvin equation)” (p. 8.3.1.2–65), “the rock-matrix hydrologic properties within distinct hydrogeologic units can be characterized by using classical-statistical and geostatistical methods” (p. 8.3.1.2–67) and “laboratory-scale measurements of matrix hydrologic properties can be extrapolated to evaluate field-scale problems” (p. 8.3.1.2–67; all under the category of “data-reduction models.” Although it may well be that these hypotheses need to be confirmed in order to support the modeling assumption, the significance of the lack of distinction is that a complete presentation of initial modeling assumptions (that are to be used in planned analyses of the performance objectives of 10 CFR 60) has not been made for the geohydrology program.

2. Some statements of hypotheses are unclear. For example, in Table 8.3.1.2–2a, under the model element entitled “conservation of energy,” the current representation reads “although the presence of the geothermal temperature gradient vitiglobal isothermal approximation, local thermodynamic equilibrium (LTE) can be assumed for localized regions within the system” (p. 8.3.1.2–60). Without a clear presentation of hypotheses, it is difficult to evaluate the hypotheses as they relate to existing evidence from field or laboratory tests. Determining the appropriateness of the planned testing program also is difficult.

3. Assessments presented in Tables 8.3.1.2–2a and 8.3.1.2–2b as to whether specific performance measures, design or performance parameters are sensitive to each hypothesis about features, events or processes related to the hydrologic system appear to be judgmental because no specific analyses are referenced to support these assessments. The need to reduce the uncertainty in individual hypotheses is dependent on these assessments.

4. For almost all features, events or processes presented for the unsaturated zone hydrologic system, the related performance measure, design or performance parameter is either groundwater travel time, water inflow to the repository, or both. Of the 48 items presented representing features, events or processes, only 4 are explicitly identified as relevant to radionuclide transport to the accessible environment. If the intent is to propose that most aspects of the hydrologic system are irrelevant to radionuclide transport to the accessible environment, considerable justification is necessary which has not been provided in the SCP.

RECOMMENDATION

The geohydrology program should be reevaluated considering these observations.

Section 8.3.1.2 Overview of the geohydrology program: Description of the present and expected geohydrologic characteristics required by the performance and design issues

Section 8.3.2 Repository Program

Section 8.3.4 Waste Package Program

COMMENT 11

There are no hypotheses presented about thermal effects on the hydrologic system caused by emplaced waste. As a result, it is unclear whether the limited testing program will be adequate to understand the response of the hydrologic system to the thermal load. Further, some information from the geohydrology program expected by other program areas cannot be provided.

BASIS

• Hypotheses about the hydrologic system presented in Tables 8.3.1.2–2a (current representation and alternative hypotheses for unsaturated-zone hydrologic system conceptual models for the geohydrology program) and 8.3.1.2–2b (current representation and alternative hypotheses for the saturated-zone hydrologic system conceptual models for the site geohydrology program) in Section 8.3.1.2 (Geohydrology Program) relate both to ambient and future state conditions of the system. Hypotheses related to future state conditions are incomplete because there are no hypotheses presented about
4.0 Objections, Comments, and Questions

In other instances, hypotheses about the effects on the hydrologic system resulting from various causative events (external forcing functions) are presented in other sections of the SCP. For example, hypotheses about the effects of tectonics on the hydrologic system are presented in Table 8.3.1.8–7 (p. 8.3.1.8–38) of Section 8.3.1.8 (Postclosure Tectonics Program). No hypotheses regarding thermal effects on the hydrologic system caused by emplaced waste are presented in other sections of the SCP dealing with the various site programs.

Chapter 7 (Waste Package) provides a description of the waste package components, emplacement environment, design, and status of research and development supporting the waste package program. Section 7.1 (Emplacement Environment) provides some of the “anticipated conditions of the setting relevant to waste package design and performance” (pp. 7–8 through 7–10). Further, on p. 7–52 it is noted that the “essential features of a conceptual model of the near-field hydrothermal response to the emplacement of the waste packages are described in Preuss et al. (1984).” While it is clearly stated in the SCP that “there is very little information, experimental or theoretical, on thermally driven flow in partially saturated rocks” (p. 7–46), these “anticipated conditions” and “essential features” are not clearly categorized in terms of which ones are unsupported hypotheses and which ones are supported by available data or analyses so as to form a foundation for developing a sound testing program.

There are planned studies and activities for coupled interaction tests such as Study 1.10.4.2 (Hydrologic properties of waste package environment; laboratory activities and modeling analyses) and Study 1.10.4.1 (Engineered barrier system field tests; larger scale tests to validate the laboratory activities). Although lists of activity parameters are presented for these studies, little detail is provided in terms of a discussion of complex processes to be evaluated. Further, these studies and activities for coupled interaction tests are referenced in Table 8.3.4.2–4 (pp. 8.3.4.2–11 through 8.3.4.2–22) wherein they are correlated only with performance parameters and characterization parameters for the waste package program. Correlation of these studies and activities with performance and design parameters for repository design criteria for radiological safety are provided only in general terms (program level) in Section 8.3.2.3–3 (such as Table 8.3.2.3–3; pp. 8.3.2.3–30 through 8.3.2.3–35). In neither case are studies and activities correlated with specific hypotheses about the thermal effects on the hydrologic system in the vicinity of the repository. Thus, no clear statement of the specific technical issues (complex processes) to be addressed by these activities is provided. As a consequence, it is unclear whether these limited studies and activities are adequate to evaluate all significant coupled thermo-hydrologic processes.

Failure to present hypotheses regarding thermal effects on the hydrologic system has resulted in problems integrating information needs with planned characterization activities. For example, a parameter required for Issue 2.7 (Repository design criteria for radiological safety) is the “water content of the host rock as a function of temperature and time” (Table 8.3.2.3–3; p. 8.3.2.3–30). That table indicates the parameter is to be provided by the geohydrology program. Review of the geohydrology program indicates that there are no studies or activities presented to evaluate future changes in water content of the host rock resulting from thermal effects (temperature) from emplaced waste, although there are activities presented for testing the response of the hydrologic system to the natural geothermal gradient.

RECOMMENDATION

Hypotheses regarding thermal effects on the hydrologic system should be presented and related to the specific studies and activities that will evaluate them. Assure that the information to be provided by the geohydrology program satisfies the needs of other program areas.

Section 8.3.1.2 Overview of the geohydrology program: Description of the present and expected geohydrologic characteristics required by the performance and design issues

Table 8.3.1.2–2a Current representation and alternative hypotheses for unsaturated-zone hydrologic system conceptual models for the geohydrology program

COMMENT 12

The hypothesis that liquid-water flow in the Calico Hills unit is restricted to the rock matrix and the hypothesis that matrix properties of the altered Calico Hills nonwelded zeolitized unit are probably largely isotropic (because chemical alteration can be expected to destroy preferred orientations of rock properties) are not stated in Table 8.3.1.2–2a and no definite activities to test them are found in the plan.
BASIS

- The Calico Hills nonwelded unit has been identified in the SCP as a principal barrier to unsaturated ground water flow and transport of radionuclides from the repository. Therefore, it is critical to have a good understanding of this unit’s hydrologic processes.

- Two important hypotheses concerning the Calico Hills unit are not identified in Table 8.3.1.2-2a. First, while the table does contain a hypothesis (current representation) on p. 8.3.1.2-66 that “liquid-water flow in the Topopah Spring is restricted to the rock matrix,” it does not include a similar hypothesis for nonwelded units such as those of the Calico Hills unit. This is identified as an hypothesis in Chapter 3 where it is stated that flow in the Calico Hills nonwelded units is predominately vertical through the matrix (page 3–196). Second, in Section 3.9.2.1, it is stated that the matrix properties of the altered Calico Hills nonwelded zeolitized unit are probably largely isotropic, “because chemical alteration can be expected to destroy preferred orientations of rock properties” (p. 3–175).

- No definite activities are found in the plan to test these hypotheses. However, it may be that the first hypothesis will be tested by activities 8.3.1.2.2.4.6 and 8.4.2.1.6.1 when details of these activities are available. No planned activities were found that test the second hypothesis. This hypothesis which assumes that the matrix properties of the altered Calico Hills nonwelded zeolitized unit is largely isotropic can probably be best tested in the saturated zone. The use of multiple wells in saturated rocks to test for anisotropy is an established technology that allows a much larger volume of rock to be tested than unsaturated zone technology.

RECOMMENDATION

Activities should be developed to test the hypothesis that liquid-water flow in the Calico Hills unit is restricted to the rock matrix and the hypothesis that matrix properties of the altered Calico Hills nonwelded zeolitized unit are probably largely isotropic, because chemical alteration can be expected to destroy preferred orientations of rock properties. Testing the hypothesis that the matrix of the altered Calico Hills nonwelded zeolitized unit is largely isotropic, by using multiple well tests in the saturated zone, should be considered.

Section 8.3.1.2.1.2 Study: Characterization of Runoff and Streamflow
Section 8.3.1.2.1.2.1 Activity: Surface-water Runoff Monitoring
Section 8.3.1.2.2.1 Study: Characterization of Unsaturated-zone Infiltration
Section 8.3.1.2.2.1.2 Activity: Evaluation of Natural Infiltration

COMMENT 13

The stream flow, precipitation gage and micrometeorological station locations for the site watershed study may need to be redistributed and increased to adequately support the studies of natural infiltration.

BASIS

- Characterization of the upper flux boundary condition at Yucca Mountain is an essential data need for evaluating site performance with respect to groundwater travel time and the EPA release standards. One advantage of vadose zone studies is that the land surface area, the upper boundary which is an important boundary with respect to moisture migration, is everywhere accessible at the site, and directly amenable to investigations of shallow subsurface conditions. This accessibility creates a unique opportunity to evaluate moisture flux into the repository block over large areas.

- The stated objective of the study on unsaturated zone infiltration is “to characterize present-day infiltration processes and net-infiltration rates in the surficial soils and rocks covering Yucca Mountain.” Numerous activities under this study are proposed, including the use of neutron access holes and investigations using both natural and artificial infiltration plots. As stated on p. 8.3.1.2–169, water budget studies will be used to supplement direct measurements of infiltration. The discussion on pp. 8.3.1.2–169 and–170 mentions the difficulties encountered in attempting to perform water budget studies. However, the activities planned will require comprehensive and exacting measurements of precipitation, runoff, meteorological phenomena, and soil moisture.

- Evaluating the natural water budget on a selected range (in sizes and configurations) of site watersheds (such as the set proposed in Activity 8.3.1.2.1.2.1 (Surface-Water Runoff Monitoring) incorporates the net effects of soil thicknesses, geologic structure, varied slopes and floral cover, etc. The site water budget studies on the site watersheds (Section 8.3.1.2.1.2.1), which extend the planned plot activities (8.3.1.2.2.1.2 and 8.3.1.2.2.1.3), will rely on careful measurements of surface-water runoff, precipitation, evaporation-transpiration, and soil moisture.
4.0 Objections, Comments, and Questions

with depth. However, the number and distribution of precipitation gages and meteorological stations as shown in Figure 8.3.1.2-7 and Table 8.3.1.2-4 may not be adequate to properly estimate the water balance for these site watersheds.

- As stated on p. 8.3.1.2–165, prototype work has not begun on water budget studies. However, given that extreme precipitation events in arid southern Nevada are very infrequent, it is important to allow as much time as possible during the site characterization phase for natural water budget investigations.

RECOMMENDATION

Allow flexibility in the plans of Study 8.3.1.2.1.2 (Runoff and Streamflow) to relocate and expand the instrumentation of the site watersheds to adequately complement the activities of Study 8.3.1.2.2.1 (Unsaturated-zone Infiltration). Consider establishing the site watershed studies as soon as possible to capture information from events that will occur during the site characterization period.

Section 8.3.1.2.2.3.2 Activity: Site Vertical Borehole Studies

COMMENT 14

There are no plans to collect in situ hydrologic properties of the tuffaceous beds of the Calico Hills nonwelded unit in the northern and central areas of the site.

BASIS

- Vertical boreholes will be used to provide the only in situ data on hydrologic parameters such as matrix potential, water potential, thermal potential, pneumatic potential, pneumatic bulk permeability, and hydraulic bulk permeability of the Calico Hills nonwelded unit.

- The boreholes that will be used to collect data on the Calico Hills unit are located in three general locations. Two of these locations are located outside and south of the repository block and one is located inside the southern end of the repository block. Boreholes at these locations will not provide any information on in situ conditions in the central and northern areas of the repository. To the south, the Calico Hills unit is more vitric and contains fewer zeolitized rocks than the central and northern areas of the repository (Activity 8.4.2.1.6.1, p. 8.4.2–33 and Nimick et al., 1988). Further, the saturated matrix permeability of the Calico Hills zeolitic tuff is generally several orders of magnitude less than that of the vitric facies of the Calico Hills tuff (Peters et al., 1986; Montazer and Wilson, 1984). As a result, distributions of hydrologic parameters in the central and northern areas of the repository block will likely be very different than the southern areas. By not testing the Calico Hills nonwelded unit in the central and northern areas of the repository, a primary barrier will not be adequately characterized.

- The twelve boreholes of the Systematic Drilling Program will be drilled from the surface, through the Calico Hills unit, to a depth of approximately 100 meters below the water table (Activity 8.3.1.4.3.1.1, p. 8.3.1.4–89). The unsaturated portion of each borehole will be drilled dry, without the use of water or other conventional drilling circulation liquids. The unsaturated zone will be protected by casing or other means from water produced while drilling below the water table. Of the 12 boreholes, 6 will be drilled in the northern and central areas of the site (SD Holes 1–6, Figure 8.3.1.4–11a, p. 8.3.1.4–90). However, none of the Systematic Boreholes is part of the Site Vertical Borehole Study.

RECOMMENDATION

Consider expanding the Site Vertical Borehole Study to characterize the in situ hydrologic conditions of the Calico Hills unit in the northern and central areas of the site. This expanded characterization need not require the construction of any additional drill holes from the surface through the Calico Hills unit, because 6 holes will be drilled in the northern and central areas of the site as part of the Systematic Drilling Program.

REFERENCES


Section 8.3.1.2.2.3.3 Activity: Solitario Canyon Horizontal Borehole Studies

COMMENT 15

The Solitario Canyon Horizontal borehole activity is inadequate to discriminate between the hypotheses that...
faults are everywhere barriers to fluid flow in nonwelded
tuff units or are everywhere conduits for liquid-water flow
in nonwelded tuff units. Further, it is doubtful that this
activity is adequate to discriminate between the hypothe-
theses that faults are conduits or barriers to liquid water flow
in welded tuff units, depending on ambient matrix satu-
ration or alternatively, faults are everywhere conduits for
liquid water flow in welded tuff units.

BASIS

- Activity 8.3.1.2.2.3.3 (Solitario Canyon Horizontal
  borehole study) is identified as the sole activity to
discriminate between the hypotheses that faults are
either barriers to fluid flow in nonwelded tuff units
for all matrix saturations or that faults are every-
where conduits for liquid-water flow in nonwelded
tuff units (Table 8.3.1.2–2a; p. 8.3.1.2–53). However,
because this activity does not contain any tests in
nonwelded tuff units these hypotheses will not be
tested. In addition, it is not evident that any other
planned activities will test these hypotheses.

- This activity is also identified as the sole activity to
discriminate between the hypotheses that faults are
conducts or barriers to liquid water flow in welded
tuff units, depending on ambient matrix saturation
or alternatively, faults are everywhere conduits for
liquid water flow in welded tuff units (Table 8.3.1.2–2a; p. 8.3.1.2–53). However, it is very doubt-
ful that this can be accomplished with a single hori-
zontal borehole.

RECOMMENDATION

Specific activities should be developed to discriminate be-
tween the hypotheses that faults are either barriers to
fluid flow in nonwelded tuff units for all matrix satu-
rations or alternatively, faults are everywhere conduits for
liquid-water flow in nonwelded tuff. The adequacy of this
activity to discriminate between the hypotheses that
faults are conduits or barriers to liquid water flow in
welded tuff units, depending on ambient matrix satu-
rations or alternatively, faults are everywhere conduits for
liquid-water flow in welded tuff units should be re-
evaluated because it is very doubtful that this can be ac-
complished with a single horizontal borehole.

Section 8.3.1.2.2.4.6 Activity: Calico Hills Test in the
Exploratory Shaft Facility

Section 8.4.2.1.6.1 Characterization of the Calico
Hills Nonwelded Unit

COMMENT 16

The SCP does not contain a plan to adequately character-
ize the hydrologic properties of the Calico Hills unit,
which has been designated the primary barrier to ground
water flow and radionuclide transport.

BASIS

- In Section 8.4.2.1.6.1 it is stated “the Calico Hills
  nonwelded unit has been designated as the primary
  barrier to ground-water flow and radionuclide trans-
  port. As such, the flow processes and conditions in
  that unit must be sufficiently understood to have a
  high degree of confidence in the effectiveness and
  limitations of that barrier” (p. 8.4.2–32). Specifically,
it is important to understand the effects that frac-
tures and faults have on flow paths and travel times,
and the conditions under which fracture flow may
occur.

- To collect these data the present plan commits only
to using vertical boreholes drilled from the surface.
However, this plan will provide “little information
about the distributions and flow characteristics of
fractures and faults in the Calico Hills nonwelded
unit” (p. 8.4.2–34). Specifically, it is doubtful that
the sole use of vertical boreholes will allow an im-
portant hypothesis with respect to repository per-
formance to be tested. The hypothesis is that flow in
the Calico Hills nonwelded units is predominantly
vertical through the matrix (although a lateral com-
ponent may occur parallel to the bedding within the
Calico Hills nonwelded vitric unit) and continues di-
rectly to the water table wherever the water table
transects the Calico Hills nonwelded unit (Section
3.9.3, Ground-water Flow System Conceptual
Model, p. 3–196). This hypothesis is important, be-
cause if flow in the Calico Hills unit is predominantly
through the matrix, the Calico Hills unit may pro-
vide an effective barrier that would contribute sig-
ificantly to meeting the groundwater travel time
and radionuclide solute transport criteria.

- In activities 8.3.1.2.2.4.6 and 8.4.2.1.6.1, it is recog-
nized that “the planned boreholes of the feature-
sampling program and the systematic drilling pro-
gram have some limitations, because they provide
little information about the distributions and flow
characteristics of fractures and faults” (p. 8.4.2–34).
Therefore other methods of collecting this informa-
tion are being considered such as shaft sinking, drift-
ing and angled boreholes. It is also recognized that
whatever methods are chosen to characterize the
Calico Hills unit, assurance must be given that the
gathering of data should not jeopardize the effec-
tiveness of this unit as a barrier (pp. 8.3.1.2–300 and
8.4.2–32). Therefore, the decision on how hydrologic
data will be gathered on the Calico Hills unit will be
“based on a review of the data needs for this unit, an
analysis of the risks and benefits of acquiring these
data with a variety of techniques, and an evaluation
of the potential impacts on site performance. Before
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...taking action, DOE will consult with the NRC on the basis for the decision" (p. 8.4.2-33).

RECOMMENDATION

Provide a complete plan to adequately characterize the hydrologic properties of the Calico Hills unit.

Section 8.3.1.2.2.4.9 Activity: Multipurpose-Borehole Testing Near the Exploratory Shafts

COMMENT 17

No plan for sampling and analyzing pore and fracture fluids from rock core samples in order to detect the possible presence of the LiBr tracer used to identify drilling fluid from USW G-4 is included in the activity on multipurpose-borehole testing near the exploratory shafts.

BASIS

- Matrix hydrologic property measurements will be conducted on consolidated rock samples taken from excavations and boreholes in ES-1 as part of the investigation designed to develop a comprehensive matrix-property data base to be used in the calculation of matrix flux within the unsaturated zone at Yucca Mountain (8.3.1.2-183; paragraph 4). Water will also be extracted from rock samples for geochemical analyses (8.3.1.2-184; paragraph 2). An important assumption of this investigation is that samples represent ambient hydrologic and geochemical conditions of the unsaturated zone.

- The two multipurpose boreholes are to provide confirmation of conditions expected to be encountered during shaft construction (8.3.1.2-312; paragraph 2).

- A potential condition that could be encountered in ES-1 is the presence of water used in the construction of test hole USW G-4, which contained 20 ppm LiBr tracer. This would be the result of lateral migration of USW G-4 drilling fluid to areas of exploratory shaft excavation.

- One task of the multipurpose-borehole activity is to sample any perched water discovered in either of the multipurpose boreholes. However, the absence of perched water alone does not preclude the possibility that some pore and fracture fluids near the areas of ESF excavation is the result of water lost during the drilling of USW G-4. Thus, if traces of LiBr are detected in fluids from rock core samples, the ability to measure ambient moisture content, matric potential, and water chemistry at the ESF location will have been compromised.

- Under Activity 8.3.1.2.2.7.2 (Aqueous-phase chemical investigations), samples of pore and fracture fluids will be collected from selected wells in the unsaturated zone (Figure 8.3.1.2-20; p. 8.3.1.2-326). These samples will be checked for the presence of various tracers that will be used during the drilling of wells and the construction of the exploratory shafts. The multipurpose boreholes are not among the wells selected for inclusion into this activity.

- No discussion is provided on how needed hydrologic and hydrochemistry data will be obtained should it be determined from the multipurpose boreholes that plans for tests at the proposed ES-1 location have been compromised.

RECOMMENDATION

The multipurpose boreholes should be added to the wells sampled under Activity 8.3.1.2.2.7.2 and pore and fractures fluids from rock core samples analyzed for the LiBr tracer used to identify drilling fluid from USW G-4. In addition, it would be prudent to consider preparing a plan for collecting needed hydrologic and hydrochemical data should it be determined that samples from the multipurpose boreholes contain the LiBr tracer.

Section 8.3.1.2.2.9.3 Activity: Simulation of the natural hydrogeologic system

Section 8.3.1.2.3.3.2 Activity: Development of a fracture network model

Section 8.3.1.2.3.3.3 Activity: Calculation of flow paths, fluxes, and velocities within the saturated zone to the accessible environment

COMMENT 18

Technical issues to be addressed by these activities represent only a partial consideration of all features, events or processes that may be essential for a valid mathematical representation of the hydrogeologic system for use in performance assessment analyses. As a consequence, planned activities are insufficient to provide technical justification for initial modeling strategies.

BASIS

- A primary objective of the activity on simulation of the natural hydrogeologic system (unsaturated zone only) is to "identify those hydrogeologic processes and concepts that are essential for a valid mathematical representation for performance assessment analyses and to eliminate those that can be shown to be of sufficiently negligible effect" (p. 8.3.1.2-357). Thus, it is evident from that objective that results of this activity are to provide technical justification for
simplifying assumptions incorporated into planned modeling strategies for performance analyses. Specific technical issues to be addressed by this activity include: (1) strategies and methodologies for constructing three-dimensional, fluid-flow models for the site hydrogeologic system; (2) relative contributions of liquid-water and water-vapor fluxes to the net moisture flux within the three-dimensional system; (3) likelihood for the occurrence of upward diffusion or advection of water vapor in fractures coupled to a corresponding downward return flow of liquid water within the rock matrix; (4) limiting conditions under which capillary barriers and perched water body zones can be expected to occur; (5) effects produced by variations with space and time in assumed land-surface net-infiltration rates; and (6) the impact of time-dependent stress and thermal fields [ambient] on the unsaturated-zone hydrogeologic flow system (p. 8.3.1.2-357). Although the issues that are identified are reasonable, they cannot be correlated directly with modeling assumptions incorporated into planned modeling strategies for performance analyses because all initial assumptions have not yet been identified (refer to Comment 94). Thus, there is no basis to conclude that planned work to provide technical justification for those simplifying assumptions that relate to the unsaturated zone is complete.

- The objectives of the activities on development of a fracture network model and calculation of flow paths, fluxes, and velocities within the saturated zone to the accessible environment are not explicitly associated with identifying "those processes and concepts essential for a valid mathematical representation for performance assessment analyses" as is the similar activity for the unsaturated zone. However, complete review of the text indicates that it is reasonable to conclude that the primary objective of these activities is essentially the same, that is to "identify processes and concepts essential for a valid mathematical representation." However, the only technical issue discussed in any detail that is to be addressed in these activities is to "identify geohydrologic conditions at Yucca Mountain where groundwater flow and conservative solute transport can be properly evaluated using the porous-medium assumption" (p. 8.3.1.2-436) and similarly to "evaluate the porous-media concept and fracture-network concept for determining flow paths, fluxes, and velocities" (p. 8.3.1.2-441). Because the current modeling strategy for groundwater travel time, for example, assumes that "for purposes of conservatively evaluating groundwater travel time, the saturated zone will probably be treated solely as an equivalent porous medium where fracture properties characterize the medium" (p. 8.3.5.12-70), it is necessary to provide technical justification for calculating groundwater flow using the porous-medium assumption. However, there are other technical issues related to the saturated zone that need to be evaluated under these activities. For example, numerous hypotheses about physical features, events and processes related to the saturated zone are presented in Table 8.3.1.2-2b (e.g., hydrogeologic units, faults, lineaments, upper boundary, lower boundary, lateral boundary, coupled effects, volcanism effects, stress/strain effects, future climate effects and geothermal effects). These have not been discussed. Therefore, plans need to be presented as to how these features, events and processes will be evaluated and incorporated in the performance assessment models by specifying what are the simplifying assumptions and what analogous technical issues will have to be evaluated to provide technical justification for the simplifying assumptions. Thus, the planned activities are insufficient to determine significant flow processes and provide technical justification for potential modeling strategies.

**RECOMMENDATION**

Technical issues to be addressed by these activities should be developed in a more complete and systematic manner so as to allow correlations to be made with initial modeling assumptions being used in performance analyses and increased confidence that technical justification for all features, events or processes that will be omitted from performance analyses will be provided.

**CDSCP Comment 19**

Activities presented for the study of the saturated zone flow system are not adequate to characterize saturated zone hydrologic boundaries, flow directions and magnitudes, and flow paths.

**Basis**

- In review of the CDSCP, the staff commented (CDSCP Comment 13) that activities for characterizing the saturated zone at the site do not appear to be adequate for characterizing saturated zone hy-
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drologic boundary conditions, flow directions, and magnitudes. It was recommended that the hydrologic influence of faults within and east of the repository block be studied. In response, Section 8.3.1.2.3 was revised to explain why the present program is considered to be sufficient to define the influence of faults, within and east of the repository block, on saturated zone flow directions and magnitudes. On p. 8.3.1.2-367 of the SCP, it is stated that the normal faults east of the repository block are assumed to act as conduits because the faults occur in an area of nearly flat hydraulic gradient. Based on that assumption, no tests are designed to specifically evaluate the hydrologic nature of those faults. The observation that the faults occur in an area of nearly flat hydraulic gradient does not support the assumption that those faults act as conduits to water flow (i.e., zones of relatively high hydraulic conductivity). Without large-scale pumping tests, the assumption that the faults act as conduits cannot be tested, and thus the response to the comment was unsatisfactory.

- The objectives of the study to characterize the saturated zone are “(1) to determine the internal and external boundary conditions that can be applied to the saturated zone model and (2) to determine the ground-water flow magnitudes and directions at the site” (Section 8.3.1.2.3.1, p. 8.3.2–297, paragraph 4). Eight activities are described under the study to characterize the saturated zone groundwater flow system.

- One activity (Solitario Canyon fault study in the saturated zone) is designed to assess the influence of the Solitario Canyon fault on the saturated groundwater flow system. The Solitario Canyon fault is on the west side of the repository block. West-dipping normal faults lie within and east of the repository block. The faults within and east of the repository block lie generally across the assumed groundwater flow path from the repository to the accessible environment. Because groundwater flow can be influenced by faults (CDSCP Section 8.3.1.2.3, p. 8.3.1.2–292, paragraph 7), an important objective of studies of the saturated zone will be an evaluation of the effects of structure on hydrologic boundary conditions (CDSCP Section 8.3.1.2.3, p. 8.3.1.2–292, paragraph 5). The influence of the repository block (and faults east of it) on flow directions and magnitudes is not evaluated by this study and will not be adequately evaluated by testing at the C-hole complex.

- The first step in the activity on multiple-well interference testing will include many tests at the C-hole complex (SCP, p. 8.3.1.2–370). Further, it is stated that “The second step in well testing will consist of either a series of single-well tests at existing wells throughout Yucca Mountain, or drilling and testing at a second multiple-well complex. The purpose of the second step is to refine and confirm the understanding of geologic structure and saturated flow parameters determined during tests at the C-hole complex.” Additional single-well testing is considered in the SCP to be a possible alternative to constructing an additional cluster well site. However, for reasons given below, it is the opinion of the staff that this proposed alternative will not provide the information necessary to describe physical features and determine flow parameters representative of the bulk behavior of the saturated zone.

- The discussion presented on p. 8.3.1.2–369 acknowledges the limitations of single-well testing. Specifically it is stated that “In general, multiple-well tests will be needed to evaluate complex heterogeneous flow models. While useful for investigating many aspects of saturated-zone hydrology beneath Yucca Mountain, results of single-well tests have limited use in understanding the nature and areal distribution of bulk aquifer properties.” The importance of multiple-well testing for characterizing saturated flow has been expressed previously by staff (NRC, 1983a). The staff’s position has been that “Such tests would facilitate objective verification of any conceptual model, provide bulk values of hydraulic parameters including vertical hydraulic conductivity, improve hydraulic head data, provide information on hydrogeologic boundaries, and permit calibration of the numerical model so that defensible groundwater travel times can be estimated” (NRC, 1983a, p. 3–11). However, the staff also recognizes that there are conditions where single-well testing is necessary (NRC, 1983b). For example, if no response to well-pumping is observed in piezometers a short distance away from a pumping well, then the only viable exploratory technique available may be single-hole testing. However, compared with multi-well tests, results from single-borehole testing will not be representative of large-scale hydrogeologic conditions across the site and at scales of importance to repository performance.

- Proposed multi-well tests at the C-hole complex will be used to evaluate hydrologic conditions along flow paths east-southeast of the repository block. However, there is an area of 12 square km to the south and south-southeast in which there is only one well, WT-17. Included in the western part of this area is a zone of high horizontal gradient that is poorly defined. This area, which is entirely within the controlled area, includes potential groundwater flow paths from the repository to the accessible environment. Numerous faults occur in this area, including the Solitario Canyon, Abandoned Wash, Bow Ridge,
Midway Valley, Paintbrush Canyon, and other faults. Multi-well testing in this area would provide information necessary for evaluating flow system parameters, hydrologic boundaries and bulk hydrologic properties, and for making estimates of groundwater travel time in the saturated zone.

- Testing at only one multiple-well complex will not be adequate to develop the geometrical and structural models and flow parameters of the groundwater flow system between the repository site and the accessible environment. Although the SCP refers to additional “multi-well” testing at sites USW H-6 and USE H-7, this testing is not planned for an area that includes probable transport paths to the accessible environment.

- Data from tests at additional well complexes are necessary to confirm hypotheses formulated from tests at the C-hole complex. In particular, it is important to obtain representative values of effective porosity at one or more additional multi-well complexes. This is perhaps the most difficult aquifer coefficient to obtain, and representative values at appropriate scales cannot reliably be obtained from single-well tests.

- In Figure 8.3.1.2-32 (Schedule for studies in Site Program), a decision point occurs in late 1990 regarding a decision to proceed with additional saturated-zone tracer tests at new sites. However, it is not clear whether these tests are proposed for single-well sites or multiple-well sites.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Additional activities need to be planned to adequately characterize the saturated flow system, such as:

(1) Construction and testing of one or more additional multiple-well complexes similar to the C-hole complex should be included in plans for study 8.3.1.2.3.1 (Characterization of the site saturated-zone groundwater flow system).

(2) Large-scale pumping tests are needed to evaluate assumptions about the role of faults within and east of the repository block.

(3) Activities should be planned to evaluate saturated zone conditions in the Solitario Canyon fault zone, including a corehole drilled through the fault below the water table interface.

REFERENCES


Section 8.3.1.2.3.1.2 Activity: Site potentiometric-level evaluation

Figures 3.28 and 8.3.1.2-21 Preliminary composite potentiometric surface map of the saturated zone

COMMENT 20

The potentiometric surface in the controlled area is not adequately defined by existing well locations, and will not be adequately defined by proposed additional well sites.

BASIS

- As stated in the SCP, the objectives of the activity to evaluate site potentiometric levels (p. 8.3.1.2-375) are:
  1. Refine time and configuration of the spatial dependence of the potentiometric surface.
  2. Measure water-level variations with time in existing boreholes and calculate average levels, as input data for hydraulic gradient calculations.
  3. Analyze the character and magnitudes of water-level fluctuations to determine their causes, and, if possible, to estimate formation elastic and fluid-flow properties.

- Based on a review of existing and proposed well locations, few wells are located to monitor the saturated zone in an area south and south-southeast from the site. Only one well (WT-17) occurs in an area of over 12 square km, located south of wells WT-1 and G-3 and east of well WT-10. Included in the western part of this area (near well WT-10) is a zone of steep horizontal hydraulic gradient that is poorly defined. This area with few wells is entirely within the controlled area and more detail is needed on the potentiometric surface to support performance assessments of the site.

- Potentiometric contours in the vicinity of well USW G-1 are questionable based on data from borehole USW UZ-1, which suggests that the potentiometric surface is significantly different from that shown in the present SCP figures. This possibility should be
investigated through additional saturated zone activities in the vicinity of the Solitario Canyon borehole study.

- One of the objectives for drilling USW UZ-1 was to check for the presence of perched water zones (Whitfield, 1985). Prior to drilling, the unsaturated section had been estimated to be about 470 m thick at UZ-1. However, drilling was stopped when a large volume of water was encountered at a depth of 387 m, the level of which could not be significantly lowered. Whitfield (1985) interpreted the water to be either (1) derived from the drilling of nearby USW G-1 or (2) a naturally occurring perched water zone. In a report prepared for the NRC, Water, Waste and Land (1986) concluded that a discontinuity may exist between wells USW UZ-1 and USW G-1 causing the piezometric surface of the regional aquifer to be significantly different from that currently assumed [in other words, the groundwater encountered in UZ-1 is the water table and not a perched zone]. If the groundwater encountered in USW UZ-1 is in fact the water table and not a locally perched zone, then a very steep hydraulic gradient exists between this well and USW G-1.

RECOMMENDATION

Additional wells should be constructed, and other data collected, in the controlled area south of the perimeter drift in the area south of wells G-3 and WT-1 and east of WT-10 to adequately characterize the potentiometric surface in that area.

REFERENCES


Section 8.3.1.2.3.2 Study: Characterization of the Saturated Zone Hydrochemistry

Section 8.3.1.2.3.1 Activity: Assessment of Saturated-Zone Hydrochemical Data Availability and Needs

Section 8.3.1.2.3.2 Activity: Hydrochemical Characterization of Water in the Upper Part of the Saturated Zone

Section 8.3.1.2.3.3 Activity: Regional Hydrochemical Characterization

COMMENT 21

Technetium-99 and iodine-129 are not explicitly included in studies to characterize groundwater flow and radionuclide background concentrations in groundwater.

BASIS

- The study to characterize saturated zone hydrochemistry has three principal objectives: (1) describe the chemical composition of, and spatial compositional variations in, saturated-zone groundwaters using new and existing data; (2) identify the chemical and physical processes that influence groundwater chemistry; and (3) aid in the identification and quantification of fluxes to, from, and within the saturated zone. Existing hydrochemical data from previous sampling will be compiled and evaluated. Additional groundwater samples will be analyzed for inorganic chemical concentrations; activities of selected radioisotopes, including tritium, carbon-14, chlorine-36; and ratios of selected stable isotopes, including those of carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, strontium, and sulfur. The radioisotopes to be analyzed do not include the highly mobile and long-lived radioisotopes technetium-99 and iodine-129. These radioisotopes, like tritium and chlorine-36, are potentially of great value as groundwater tracers, and can provide important data about groundwater flow paths and groundwater travel time.

- Iodine-129 and technetium-99 are among those radioisotopes identified in Appendix A of EPA (1985) regarding release limits for containment requirements. The background levels and variability of these radioisotopes in the saturated zone at the site should be assessed as part of site characterization to provide baseline information for a performance confirmation program at the site. Insofar as perched groundwater represents localized zones of saturation, any perched zones that are discovered during drilling or excavations should likewise be sampled and analyzed for these radioisotopes.

- The need for data on technetium-99 and iodine-129 in the saturated flow system is consistent with guid-
ance provided in Regulatory Guide 4.17, Standard Format and Content Guide for HLW SCPs (NRC, 1987). In Section 3.9.1.3 of that document (hydrochemistry), it is stated that "at sites where human activity may have introduced radioactivity into the ground water, analysis should be done for those radioisotopes that are known or suspected to have been added to the system. Using this information, provide assessments of temporal and spatial variations of the hydrochemistry." At Yucca Mountain, anthropogenic sources of mobile radioisotopes, such as iodine–129 and technetium–99, would include underground nuclear testing at the nearby Nevada Test Site, and groundwater recharge from precipitation containing contaminants from past atmospheric nuclear tests.

- Analyses of radioisotopes in the saturated zone will be used in interpreting data from the infiltration and transport studies in the vadose zone. The analyses of technetium–99 and iodine–129 at the water table and in perched zones may provide insight about groundwater travel time and rates of migration of these isotopes in the vadose zone.

- Further, characterization of technetium–99 and iodine–129 in the saturated zone may help support modeling work under Section 8.3.1.2.3.2.2 Activity: Hydrochemical Characterization of Water in the Upper Part of the Saturated Zone.

**COMMENT 22**

Use of packers to isolate saturated zone intervals for water sample collection has the potential to compromise sample collection.

**BASIS**

- Sampling from the top of the saturated zone below the repository block has the potential to detect the presence of high flux or high velocity pathways. Identification of modern water in the upper portion of the water table may be indicative of rapid groundwater flow from the surface through the unsaturated zone. Hence, data integrity from the hydrochemical tests is potentially very important with respect to groundwater travel time.

- Use of packers lessens confidence in the quality of the data collected. Representative data from the partitioned interval could be compromised by failure to provide an adequate seal in the borehole or prior mixing with waters from some depth. Presence of vertical gradients will increase the likelihood of mixing (and dilution). Scalf et al. (1981) discuss the need to avoid vertical intercommunication within wells.

- Withdrawal of water samples when the water table is encountered during drilling will increase the confidence level in the representativeness of the water quality data.

**RECOMMENDATION**

In order to avoid potential contamination (or modification of the water quality due to mixing), it is recommended that plans be made to collect water samples first in the upper portion of the saturated zone and then in deeper portions (as necessary) as drilling advances into the units beneath the water table.

**REFERENCE**

Section 8.3.1.3 Overview of the geochemistry program: Description of the present and expected geochemical characteristics required by the performance and design issues

**COMMENT 23**

The geochemistry program does not plan to study the potential process of concentrating radionuclides on fracture surfaces and subsequent episodic transport.

**BASIS**

- Table 8.3.1.2–2a describes the current representation of faults and fractures as structural features which act as barriers to or conduits for liquid-water flow, depending on the ambient matrix saturation.

- Table 8.3.1.2–2a also describes the current representation of faults and fractures as structural features which act as conduits for air and water-vapor flow in fractured tuffs.

- Table 8.3.1.2–2a states that the current representation of open faults and fractures are as structural features in which transient nonequilibrium flow occurs.

- Coupling the three basis points above, it is possible to conceive of faults and fractures as structural features where radionuclides could be concentrated. Under transient flow conditions, the radionuclides concentrated at/on the fractures might be readily leached and transported to the accessible environment (Bradbury, Brooks, and Mo, 1988).

- A description of this possible transport mechanism is provided below:

  **During the dry period** the dewatering of the fractures increases their connectivity with regard to the gas phase. Consequently, chances for gas phase advection are enhanced.

  The advecting gas within the fractures is moisture laden. Thus, the system containing the fractures is open with respect to water.

  Liquid water, driven by a water potential gradient, flows in the porous matrix toward the drying fractures. This water contains radionuclides.

  On reaching the walls of the fracture, evaporation of some of the water may occur, promoted by the gas flow. Concentrations of radionuclides in the liquid film along the fracture wall will increase, possibly resulting in precipitation of solids.

  During the wet period, water flows down the fractures that intersect the ground surface.

  At the same time, by capillary action the matrix imbibes water flowing down the fracture.

  The radionuclides precipitated during the dry period may be leached from the fracture surface.

- This possible transport is not discussed in the geochemistry program. As a result, there are no tests planned to demonstrate whether radionuclides could be concentrated in faults and fractures.

- It is stated in the SCP that “the present approach to modeling chemical interactions in unsaturated rock is to treat the chemistry in a way identical to that of saturated rock, except for modifying the effective porosity” (p. 8.3.1.3–107).

**RECOMMENDATION**

The SCP should include plans to evaluate processes and conditions that could result in concentrating radionuclides on fractures and subsequent episodic transport.

**REFERENCE**

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Section 8.3.1.3.2.2 Activity: Determination of end-member free energies for clinoptilolite-heulandite, albite, and analcime

Section 8.3.1.3.3.2.3 Activity: Solid solution descriptions of clinoptilolite-heulandite and analcime

COMMENT 24

Standard solubility approaches alone are not sufficient for determining reliable thermodynamic properties of zeolites.

BASIS

- NRC staff previously made this comment as NRC CDSCP Comment 17 in its review of the CDSCP. DOE claims to have responded (U. S. Department of Energy, 1988); however, the NRC staff cannot find a response in the SCP (Section 8.3.1.3.3.2.1).

- It is stated by DOE that “solubility measurements will be used as a means to collect data from which free energies can be calculated” (p. 8.3.1.3-61), and that “the equilibrium solution compositions will be combined with knowledge of the thermodynamics of the aqueous phase to calculate mineral free energies for the specific compositions studied” (p. 8.3.1.3-61).

- However, it has been shown by Hemingway and Robie (1984) that “because many zeolites are metastable, they are formed through irreversible reactions that do not attain thermodynamic equilibrium, e.g., Dibble and Tiller (1981).”

- Hemingway and Robie (1984) states that “unlike most of the phases of importance to geologists, the stability of zeolites cannot be completely determined from reversed phase equilibrium reactions because, in this system, the metastable equilibria can only be reached experimentally from conditions of supersaturation.” Furthermore, Hemingway and Robie (1984) states that “zeolites can be expected to show disorder in the cations, water, and the aluminum and silicon tetrahedra in the framework. Therefore, traditional calorimetric procedures also will not be able to completely define the thermodynamic properties of zeolites. The best estimates of the thermodynamic properties of zeolites will be obtained from simultaneous analysis of synthesis and stability data, calorimetric data, and various metastable equilibrium measurements, each of which will place limits upon one or more of the thermodynamic properties of a given zeolite phase.”

RECOMMENDATION

Plan additional activities needed to determine the thermodynamic properties of zeolites for input to models.

REFERENCES


U.S. Department of Energy, Letter from S. Rousso, DOE, to H. Thompson, Jr., NRC; Subject: Issuance of the Site Characterization Plan (SCP) for the Yucca Mountain Site to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, December 28, 1988, 4 pp. plus 3 enclosures, including “Responses to NRC Point Papers on Site Characterization Plan/Consultation Draft.”

Section 8.3.1.3.4 Investigation: Studies to provide the information required on radionuclide retardation by sorption processes along flow paths to the accessible environment

COMMENT 25

The SCP does not provide the rationale for deciding on additional testing to obtain information on the effects of waste package degradation products and the interactions between and among radionuclides on sorption.

BASIS

- NRC staff previously wrote CDSCP Comment 18 noting the absence of sorption tests that would use solutions containing waste package degradation products and CDSCP Comment 20 noting the lack of sorption tests that would involve multiple radio-
nuclides. A response to the CDSCP Comment 18 is found in Table 8.3.1.3–5 (p. 8.3.1.3–77) that says that future tests may involve well J–13 water spiked with probable contaminants (e.g., iron and zirconium) from the near field. In addition, it is stated in Section 8.3.1.3.4.1.3 (Sorption as a function of ground-water composition), that “Although not part of the present investigation, additional testing may be necessary in future studies to evaluate the effects of waste package degradation products in altering sorption characteristics in the ground-water chemistry of the far field.” As a response to the CDSCP Comment 20, it is stated in the SCP that “other studies may be initiated at a later time to measure the effects of competition and interaction among radionuclides, such as possible increases in iron and zirconium concentrations” (p. 8.3.1.3–77). The SCP does not state the criteria that will be used to determine how future studies will be required to evaluate the effects of waste package degradation products and the interactions between and among radionuclides on sorption.

Consideration of the effect of waste package degradation products on sorption is important because:

1. Contaminated solutions that move away from the waste package may not establish equilibrium conditions in the new location. Thus, solution compositions may not reequilibrate or change on contacting minerals downstream. For example, “the kinetics of sorption are apparently slow for plutonium” (Rundberg, 1987).

2. Groundwater chemistry and mineralogy do not necessarily control the speciation and oxidation state of dissolved waste elements. For example, “plutonium feed solutions have contained a mixture of oxidation states from IV to VI” (Rundberg, 1987).

3. Complex chemical systems such as those expected at Yucca Mountain commonly behave in a nonequilibrium manner (Lindberg and Runnells, 1984).

- To evaluate the effects of waste package degradation products on sorption, experiments using actual or simulated solutions generated from waste package tests were suggested in CDSCP Comment 18.

- In addition to the interactions between radionuclides and nonradionuclides in the liquid phase and competition on/in the solid phases, interactions can also occur between and among radionuclides in the liquid or on/in the solids. The need to measure such effects when evaluating sorption in geologic

systems has been recognized in the literature (Serne and Relyea, 1981).

- To evaluate the effect of interactions and competition between and among radionuclides on sorption, experiments involving multiple radionuclides were suggested in CDSCP Comment 20.

RECOMMENDATION

Provide the rationale to be used in deciding on the need for additional testing using solutions containing waste package degradation products and for additional testing to measure the effects of competition and interaction between and among radionuclides.

REFERENCES


Section 8.3.1.3.4.1 Study: Batch Sorption Studies

COMMENT 26

Evidence presented is not adequate to conclude that existing sorption characterization data for alkali and alkaline earth elements are sufficient for performance assessment analyses. As a result, data collection plans are not complete.

BASIS

- Numerous variables can affect sorption (p. 8.3.1.3–28). For example, if the standard deviations given in Table 4–15 are taken as the uncertainties in the measurements, most of the sorption ratios (12 out of 15) measured using a batch method do not agree with those determined with a circulating system within the uncertainties of the two methods.

- The information required to characterize radionuclide retardation by sorption is delineated in the SCP (p. 8.3.1.3–66). Information includes:

  Sorption coefficients as a function of:

  a) Groundwater composition

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b) Mineralogy and surface structure

c) Sorbing species

d) Waste element concentration

e) Atmosphere

f) Temperature

g) Colloidal material

h) Organic Complexation

i) Sorption Kinetics

j) Biological sorption and transport

- References (SCP Chapter 4) regarding the adequacy of sorption data for alkali and alkaline earth elements did not provide information concerning sorption as a function of (a) Ground-water composition, (b) Mineralogy and surface structure, (c) Sorbing species, (d) Waste element concentration, (e) Atmosphere, (f) Temperature, (g) Colloidal material, (h) Organic Complexation, (i) Sorption Kinetics, and (j) Biological sorption and transport.

RECOMMENDATION

Provide evidence to adequately support the conclusion that existing data for alkali and alkaline earth elements are sufficient for performance analyses, or expand sorption characterization work to include the collection of the needed information.

REFERENCE


4.0 Objections, Comments, and Questions

- Isotherms are plots of radionuclide sorption versus radionuclide concentration. Thus, tests must be run at more than one concentration.

RECOMMENDATION

Correct the inconsistency so that a mechanistic understanding is obtainable.

Section 8.3.1.3.4.1.4 Activity: Sorption on Particulates and Colloids

Section 8.3.1.3.5.2.1 Activity: Colloid Formation Characterization and Stability

COMMENT 28

The SCP does not include studies to evaluate the effects of colloid formation due to stable (non-radioactive) elements formed from anthropogenic sources such as corrosion of the waste canisters, and organic compounds from drilling muds and explosives used in site construction.

BASIS

- According to Siegel (1988) colloid transport is important as a factor for radionuclides in geologic repositories. There are three sources of colloids that could affect radionuclide mobilization: (1) radioactive colloids formed directly from waste radionuclides, (2) radioactive colloids formed from natural colloids interacting with radioactive elements in groundwater and, (3) colloids formed from anthropogenic sources interacting with radioactive elements in groundwater.

- Activity 8.3.1.3.4.1.4 evaluates colloids formed by interactions of radionuclides with natural colloids in the ambient groundwater system.

- Activity 8.3.1.3.5.2.1 evaluates colloid formation behavior of waste radionuclides.

- There are no activities that evaluate colloid formation due to the interaction of waste radionuclides with colloids formed from anthropogenic sources. One complication for the interaction of waste radionuclides with colloids formed from inorganic elements such as iron, manganese, zirconium, and aluminum is that the radionuclides can also coprecipitate with the oxyhydroxides of these same relatively abundant elements. These particulates...
and coprecipitates may move with the saturated flow of groundwater if they are of the right particle size distribution. Coprecipitation of trace amounts of radionuclides with macro quantities of nonradioactive particulates, colloids and precipitates called “carriers” is a well studied and established process (Hahn, 1936 and Friedlander, Kennedy and Miller, 1964).

RECOMMENDATION

The SCP should include an analysis of colloids and colloid formation of stable, nonradioactive elements such as iron, zirconium, which can be present in the repository as corrosion products, or iron, manganese and aluminum from the minerals in the bedrock and/or from the organic compounds in drilling muds and explosives used during site construction activities on the hydrologic transport of radionuclides. The analysis should also include the other mechanism for enhancing the transport of high-level waste radionuclides by concentration on particulates and precipitates by coprecipitation with oxyhydroxides of iron and manganese or other stable elements such as aluminum and subsequent release of these radionuclides through dissolution of the iron and manganese or aluminum particulates and precipitates by ground water.

REFERENCES


Section 8.3.1.3.4.2 Study: Biological Sorption and Transport

COMMENT 29

Activities to evaluate the effects of radioactive decay heat, the nuclear radiation field, and the effect of non-site specific microorganisms (introduced during site construction) on microbial activity and ecology, and the subsequent effects of these microbial processes on the groundwater chemistry, mineralogy, biogeochemical cycling and transport of high-level radioactive waste radionuclides are not included in the SCP. As a result, there is no way to evaluate the adequacy of this aspect of the DOE program.

BASIS

- The objective of this study is to determine the effects of microorganisms on the movement of radionuclides from the high-level waste repository (i.e., effects on sorption) and to determine if microbial activities play a role significant enough to be included in a performance calculation for Yucca Mountain.

- A sorption ratio, Rd, of 10,000 for plutonium–239 by microorganisms native to the NTS is quoted (unreferenced) in the Objective Section of Section 8.3.1.3.4.2. Mo and Lowman (1975) found a similar sorption ratio of 10,000 for plutonium–239/240 by marine microorganisms. Therefore, biological (microbial) sorption and transport must be considered as a potentially significant transport mechanism for radionuclides.

- Section 8.3.1.3.4.2 acknowledges that Study 8.3.1.3.4.2 (p. 8.3.1.3–80) is being undertaken because (1) large amounts of biodegradable organic materials have been, or will be, introduced into or near the potential repository area, (2) microorganisms isolated from the NTS are capable of biodegrading these organic materials and have been shown to bind plutonium–239 and (3) the mobility of the microorganisms through the tuff and their effect on the solubility of radioactive wastes is unknown.

- The current site characterization plans do not adequately consider the presence (in the repository after closure) of anthropogenically introduced microorganisms such as sulfate reducing bacteria, genus-desulfovibrio (Stanier et al., 1963; Landa et al., 1986). In addition, other microorganisms that could be introduced into the repository include (but are not limited to) iron and manganese oxidizing and reducing bacteria, genera-thiobacillus ferroxidans, bacillus circulans, gallionella (Lundgren and Dean, 1979), conventional bacteria (Arthrobacter, Pseudomonas), prosthecate bacteria and sheathed bacteria (Marshall, 1963). For example, researchers at the DOE’S Savannah River Plant, Aiken, South Carolina reported the discovery of 2,000 new and different species (principally bacteria) in groundwater at depths as deep as 1,000 feet beneath the soil surface (Nuclear Waste News, 1988). Thus biological (microbial) sorption and transport must be considered as a potentially significant transport mechanism for radionuclides.

- After site closure, the temperatures in and around the immediate vicinity of the waste package environment will be in the range of 190 to 230 degrees centigrade at 10 to 20 years and 9 years respectively, after

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waste package emplacement (SCP Section 7.4.1.2, p. 7-40). If the moisture content is also appreciable due to other initiating events or scenarios, it is conceivable that these conditions might lead to a small hydrothermal system where microorganisms introduced during site construction which are resistant to heat (Brock 1985) and the nuclear radiation fields (U.S. DOE, 1986; West, et al., 1985) might thrive on the anthropogenically introduced organic materials, proliferate and significantly enhance the transport of high-level radioactive waste radionuclides.

RECOMMENDATION

The SCP should include the activities, procedures and methods under the study in Section 8.3.1.3.4.2 which are designed to evaluate and consider the effects of radioactive decay heat, the nuclear radiation field, and the role and impact of non-site specific microorganisms introduced during site construction on microbial activity and ecology and the subsequent effects of these microbial processes on the groundwater chemistry, mineralogy, biogeochemical cycling and transport of high-level radioactive waste radionuclides.

REFERENCES


4.0 Objections, Comments, and Questions

RECOMMENDATION

Develop and describe the methodology and procedures for evaluating existing thermodynamic data that are to be used in solubility modeling.

REFERENCE


Section 8.3.1.3.6 Investigation: Studies to provide the information required on radionuclide retardation by dispersive, diffusive, and advective transport processes along flow paths to the accessible environment

COMMENT 31

The determination of some parameters and conditions, such as speciation, kinetics, and matrix diffusion under fracture-flow conditions are not planned.

BASIS

- This comment was made previously by the NRC staff as a result of the NRC review of the CDSCP. In response to the CDSCP Comment 22, Table 8.3.1.3–2 has been included in the SCP, which lists the current and some alternative hypotheses for geochemical models for site characterization. However, no apparent change has been made to the experimental geochemistry Investigation, 8.3.1.3.6, Studies to provide the information required on radionuclide retardation by dispersive, diffusive, and advective transport processes along flow paths to the accessible environment with regard to fracture-flow conditions.

- Current representations (Table 8.3.1.2–2a) state that "fractures are conduits or barriers to liquid water flow in welded tuff units, depending on ambient matrix saturation."

- The geochemical retardation testing program concentrates most of its effort into evaluating processes in the matrix. Only one activity, 8.3.1.3.6.1.4, is planned that will measure transport and diffusion through naturally fractured tuff.

- From Table 8.3.1.3–7, only some of the parameters needed to characterize radionuclide retardation will be determined in experiments under fracture-flow conditions. For example, the effects of the "parameters," R_d, speciation, kinetics, and matrix diffusion will only be observed on the parameters measured in the fractured tuff column experiments. These "observed parameters" will be fit or derived from other experiments involving nonfractured tuff.

- The primary source of data for speciation will come from the crushed tuff column tests (Activity 8.3.1.3.6.1.1). However, speciation may be different in groundwater contacting crushed or intact rock versus fractured rock, inasmuch as minerals associated with the fractures can be different from those in the matrix (Carlos, 1985). Consequently, radionuclide retardation could be different.

- The primary source of data for kinetics will come from the mass transfer kinetics tests (Activity 8.3.1.3.6.1.2) which involve only crushed and intact tuff. Reactions and their rates may be different in the fractures than in the matrix due to the different mineralogy.

- The primary source of data for matrix diffusion will come from the diffusion experiments (Study 8.3.1.3.6.2). These experiments neither simulate diffusion at natural fracture surfaces nor advection in the fracture.

- In 8.3.1.3.7.1 Study: Retardation sensitivity analysis, modeling investigations of geochemical processes affecting transport will be used to design future experiments are discussed (p. 8.3.1.3–119). However, no criteria are provided concerning how this study might direct experimentation in Investigation 8.3.1.3.6.

RECOMMENDATION

Include plans to determine the effect of speciation, kinetics, matrix diffusion and any other conditions or processes on radionuclide retardation in fractures.

REFERENCE

Carlos, B. A., 1985, Minerals in Fractures of the Unsaturated Zone from Drill Core USW G–4, Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada, Los Alamos National Laboratory, LA–10415–MS.
4.0 Objections, Comments, and Questions

Section 8.3.1.4 Overview of the rock characteristics program: Description of the present and expected rock characteristics required by performance and design issues

Section 8.3.1.17 Overview of the preclosure tectonics: Description of tectonic and igneous events required by performance and design requirements

COMMENT 32
The program for geophysical integration as presented in the SCP is insufficiently described. The correlation between the different geophysical investigations is not presented and, in addition, the approach that will be used to integrate the geophysical activities and how these different geophysical activities will complement each other does not appear to be discussed in the SCP.

BASIS
- This comment addresses the concerns expressed in CDSCP Comment 26 and CDSCP Question 33.
- The geophysical program proposed in the SCP is the same program proposed in the CDSCP including figures and tables. The locations and scopes of the geophysical program in the SCP are generally related only to specific geologic features or cover areas of limited extent. According to the figures presented in the SCP each geophysical investigation appears to cover a specific area of the site. For example, the seismic reflection survey proposed in the SCP mainly covers the area outside the perimeter drift (Fig. 8.3.1.4-7), and only one seismic refraction line (Fig. 8.3.1.4-6) is proposed for site characterization. The SCP does not address the possibility of a 3-D seismic program at the site.
- It is noted on p. 8.3.1.4-27 that the integration of geophysical activities will include “planning,” “review,” and “development of strategy”; the NRC staff considers that these elements should have been present in the SCP, rather than as future events. “Changes in planned activities” may be anticipated, but the planning should be much more descriptive than that presented in the SCP.

RECOMMENDATIONS
- Integrate and evaluate existing geologic and geophysical data and provide overlays of the existing coverage and evaluations.
- Based on this integration, provide a coherent geophysical program to be implemented in the Yucca Mountain area that would provide sufficient characterization of the site.
- Consider initiating a program to obtain a 3-D seismic image at the site.

Section 8.3.1.4 Overview of the Rock Characteristics Program, page 8.3.1.4-1/24

COMMENT 33
Engineering rock parameters are not adequately integrated in the plan to develop the three-dimensional rock characteristics model.

BASIS
- The items “fracture geometry and properties” and “fault geometry and properties” are not given equal weighting in terms of parameters in Table 8.3.1.4-1. The “fault geometry and properties” may be more significant in terms of repository performance.
- No category for geomechanical parameters is included in Figure 8.3.1.4-1.

RECOMMENDATIONS
The SCP updates should:
- Integrate the “rock unit geometry and properties,” “fracture geometry and properties,” “geologic framework,” and “geologic model,” in the “three-dimensional rock characteristics model.”
- Complete and make consistent the integration logic presented in Figure 8.3.1.4-1 and the corresponding SCP text.

Section 8.3.1.4.1.1 Activity: Development of an integrated drilling program
Section 8.3.1.4.2.1 Study: Characterization of the vertical and lateral distribution of stratigraphic units within the site area

COMMENT 34
Discussions of the integrated drilling program are unclear as to how data from various holes will be used in support of different studies; how uncertainty in core retrieval and data analysis will be handled; and how the large volume of existing information will be used to plan the drilling program.

BASIS
- Although discussions of the integrated drilling program have been expanded in the SCP to address CDSCP Question 13, the SCP still does not clarify or resolve concerns stated in CDSCP Question 13.
4.0 Objections, Comments, and Questions

- It is unclear to what extent the proposed drilling program will be implemented. For example, page 8.3.1.4-33 states that “three additional continuously cored holes may be drilled.”

- It is not clear whether data obtained from holes drilled for one particular investigation or discipline will be utilized as possible input into other investigations (e.g., data from water level drilling as input to geologic studies; utilization of core from proposed holes USW G5, G6 and G7, if drilled, for collection of data as input to natural resources studies in addition to the proposed stratigraphic, lithologic, and structural studies).

- Information from core may be limited with respect to mineral fillings, fractures, and faults due to the small sample size and the difficulty in recognizing certain features in core. Vertical holes may not intersect many major rock discontinuities such as near vertical faults and fractures.

- Difficulties may arise in interpretation of core, as “core recovery is typically poor in the unsaturated zone” (p. 8.3.1.4-35).

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The integrated drilling program should supply relevant data from drillholes to all investigations requiring such data and coordinate the proposed program of exploration with the information needs of planned investigations.

- Drill core may be inadequate to provide information on some parameters; the SCP should propose alternative methods for determination of parameters.

- Angled drillholes should be considered as a means to identify and characterize vertical/near vertical features.

- At an early stage in planning the drilling program, qualified existing information should be identified, integrated, and evaluated to identify information still needed.

- Planned drilling programs should be integrated with planned drifting and geophysical programs.

Section 8.3.1.4.2  Investigation: Geologic Framework of the Yucca Mountain Site
Section 8.3.1.4.3  Investigation: Development of three-dimensional models of rock characteristics at the repository site.
Section 8.4.2.1  Rationale for planned testing

COMMENT 35

The program of drifting in the north, combined with systematic drilling and feature sampling drilling, appears unlikely to provide the lithologic and structural information necessary to adequately investigate potentially adverse conditions at the site or insure that observations made and data collected will be representative of conditions and processes throughout the repository block. Also, it has not been demonstrated that the proposed site characterization plan provides for a sufficient amount of underground drifting to collect data necessary for designing the repository and analyzing repository performance.

BASIS

- Activities described in the SCP are not sufficient to resolve the concerns expressed in NRC CDSCP Comment 28. For example, the response to NRC CDSCP Comment 28 on the ability of site characterization activities to adequately characterize the site indicates that additional information on rock property values will be collected during the construction phase of the repository. This response does not satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR Part 60, in that Section 60.122(a)(2) requires that potentially adverse conditions be adequately investigated during site characterization.

- The response to CDSCP Comment 100 has not demonstrated that the amount of subsurface drifting and exploration planned in the SCP would be sufficient to yield the data needed for repository design at license application.

- Data collection activities appear to be heavily biased to the northern part of the repository and to non-welded to moderately welded tuffs, an attribute that will lead to population densities that are highly skewed to rock characteristics found in nonwelded to moderately welded tuffs in the northern part of the repository. For example, data collection in the northern third of the repository will include 5 coreholes, 2 shafts, and 3 drifts, while in the southern third of the repository, data collection will be largely restricted to several unsaturated zone test holes. Coring in most holes will be continuous in nonwelded tuffs, but due to problems in core recovery, densely welded tuffs are generally only to be spot cored.
• Barton and Scott (1987), citing Spengler (R.W. Spengler, USGS, oral communication, 1986), state that “The general depth at which abundant lithophysal cavities will be found can be interpolated from drillhole data, but the exact depth, with the precision necessary for repository construction cannot be predicted” (p. 12).

• The SCP indicates that fracture and fault zone characteristics will be determined in the ESF excavation (p. 8.4.2-26). However, the SCP also indicates that faults decrease in both offset and abundance northward through Yucca Mountain (p. 1–119). For example, the Ghost Dance fault has 38 meters of vertical offset at the southeastern margin of the perimeter drift and is unmeasureable at the northeastern boundary of the perimeter drift (p. 1–128). All excavation associated with the ESF will take place in the northern part of the repository where the number of faults and amount of offset along faults do not appear to be representative of the rest of the repository block.

• Portions of two structural blocks, the Central block and the Abandoned Wash block, appear to be included within the Conceptual Perimeter Drift Boundary (CPDB). Excavations related to the ESF will test only the Central block. The Central block contains a scarcity of large-displacement faults and a uniform 5° to 10° eastward dip of beds (USGS, 1984). The Abandoned Wash block is characterized by many north-northwest-striking faults and fractures with dips of beds of the Central block steepening eastward into the Abandoned Wash block (USGS, 1984). Excavations in the Central block may not provide representative data on the characteristics of faults and fractures in the Abandoned Wash block.

• Planned drifting to the imbricate fault zone is not sufficient to characterize the full range of conditions to be expected in an imbricate fault zone. Chapter 1 (p. 1–332) indicates that the repository would be bounded on the east by the western edge of an imbricate fault zone and Section 8.3.1.4.2 states that the perimeter drift is “limited” on its eastern extent by structural features. Both citations suggest that the main part of the imbricate fault zone is east of the perimeter drift and east of drifting related to the ESF. Figure 8.4.2–4 and other Figures and statements in the text emphasize that drifting will occur to the imbricate fault zone and not through that zone. Therefore, the character of imbricate fault zones will not be tested across the full range of conditions that may occur.

• Section 8.4.2 states that boreholes are unsuited for a statistical evaluation of fault and fracture characteristics and that studies in long drifts from the ESF will be used to collect data on the hydrologic and geomechanical significance of faults and fractures that are believed to be similar to those encountered in the southeastern part of the site. However, Barton and Scott (1987) state that “The presence or detailed character of faults in any one part of the repository is not predictable from studies of any other part of the repository, particularly within the older and non-exposed Topopah Spring Member of the Paintbrush Tuff (p. 4)” suggesting that observations of fault and fracture characteristics in the northern part of the repository cannot be extrapolated to other parts of the repository.

• SCP Section 8.4.2.1.6 (p. 8.4.2–32) states that “Discussed below are options for obtaining the needed information for the Calico Hills unit and for the southern part of the repository, and factors that will be considered in determining which approaches will be used.” However, options for obtaining information ‘for the southern part of the repository’ are not explicitly addressed in the sections following Section 8.4.2.1.6.

• If additional drifting is not accounted for in planning, a potentially significant disruption to characterization schedules may occur and substantially reduce the ability of DOE to obtain information necessary for licensing.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

• Demonstrate that from a scientific perspective, the program of drifting in the northern part of the repository combined with the systematic drilling program and feature sampling program will provide the information necessary to ensure that conditions and processes encountered are representative of conditions and processes throughout the site and that potentially adverse conditions will be adequately investigated.

• Demonstrate that the planned site characterization will provide sufficient data for designing the repository and analyzing the repository performance.

• Compare and evaluate the benefits and disadvantages between more extensive drifting during site characterization (including supplemental horizontal core drilling) and the surface-based systematic drilling program with respect to the data derived and effects on repository performance. In the event that additional drifting is determined to be necessary by DOE, SCP updates should discuss the bases that will be used to determine the extent and direction of drifting.

**REFERENCES**

Barton, C.C., and Scott, R.B., 1987, Rationale for a continuous map of geologic features in the exploratory shaft


Section 8.3.1.4.2 Investigation: Geologic framework of the Yucca Mountain site

COMMENT 36

The technical rationale for this investigation states that the perimeter drift defines an area of a significantly lower concentration of faults than has been mapped in surrounding areas. However, based on other parts of the SCP, this concept may not be accurate. Further, there is no apparent indication that studies in the SCP address the potential impact on system performance of the presence within the perimeter drift (i.e., in emplacement areas) of a significant number of faults, some of which may be favorably oriented for failure under the present stress regime.

BASIS

- "The perimeter drift defines an area where a significantly lower concentration of faults has been mapped relative to surrounding areas" (8.3.1.4-29).
- The technical rationale for this investigation suggests that the imbricate fault zone "limits" the repository to the east.
- Section 8.3.1.2.3 indicates that "Numerous normal, west-dipping faults occur east of the block. . . ."
- In Chapter 1 (p. 1-332), it is stated that the repository "...would be bounded. . .on the east and southeast by the western edge of an imbricate normal fault zone."
- Section 8.3.1.17.2.1.2 states that the program does not expect to encounter faults in the waste emplacement areas (p. 8.3.1.17-42).
- Figure 8.4.2-4 (p. 8.4.2-92) depicts the imbricate fault zone on the east side of the repository block as being well within the perimeter drift.
- Figure 8.3.1.4-10 (p. 8.3.1.4-76) depicts the imbricate fault zone on the east side of the repository as being well within the perimeter drift.

- Page 1-207 implies that consideration is being given to emplacing waste in or near recognized fault zones.
- 10 CFR 60.133(h) requires that the engineered barriers be designed to assist the geologic setting in meeting the performance objectives. The apparent inclusion within the waste emplacement area of a major zone of imbricate faulting, possibly associated with faults having known Quaternary movement (e.g., Bow Ridge fault), suggests that the design of the engineered barrier may not be such that it will assist the geologic setting in meeting the performance objectives.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Rectify the apparent contradiction as to whether a zone of imbricate faulting is present within the perimeter drift.
- If the imbricate fault zone is present within the perimeter drift, an assessment should be made to demonstrate that the requirements of 10 CFR 60.133(h) will be met.

Section 8.3.1.4.2.2 Study: Characterization of the structural features within the site area, p. 8.3.1.4-65.

COMMENT 37

The SCP (p. 8.3.1.4-65, 4th paragraph) states that "geologic mapping in the underground can aid in recognizing blast-induced fractures. . . ." It is not clear whether the techniques given for identification of blast fracturing are adequate to differentiate them from natural or stress-induced fractures.

BASIS

- Fractures on the walls of exploratory shaft and drifts may be classified as natural, blasting-induced, or stress-relief induced fractures.
- Some natural fractures may be readily identified due to their pronounced patterns or existence of mineralization on the fracture surface. However, for those without these evident features, identification may be difficult.
- Characterizing fractures with absence of mineralization on fracture surfaces as blasting-related may underestimate frequencies of natural fractures.
- Identifying blasting-induced fractures using a "tracing back" method as described in the SCP may be difficult and this method may not be able to account for stress-relief induced fractures.
RECOMMENDATION

Procedures for recognizing blast-induced and stress-relief induced fractures should be provided in a study plan.

Section 8.3.1.4.2.4 Activity: Geologic Mapping of the Exploratory Shaft and Drifts.

COMMENT 38

One of the objectives of Activity 8.3.1.4.2.2.4 is to characterize major faults and fault zones in the subsurface. There is no justification given for not characterizing minor faults and fault zones, although these features potentially present the same kinds of hazards as do major faults, even though on a smaller scale.

BASIS

- Item 2 under objectives (p. 8.3.1.4–74) states that one of the objectives of this activity is to “characterize major faults and fault zones in the subsurface.”

- As this item is presently written, the question arises as to what are the standards and criteria by which a fault is to be judged to be major or minor, and whether or not significant to safety. Such judgments would have to be made under difficult conditions underground and in a brief time interval.

- Minor faults and fault zones may have had significant Quaternary movement (i.e., are anticipated events) or may be preferred pathways for radionuclide transport and thus affect waste isolation.

- The significance of a fault or fault zone can only be judged when its significance is integrated and analyzed on the basis of regional tectonics, stress field, its relationship with other nearby faults, and in the light of design criteria.

- There are no criteria provided for distinguishing a major from a minor fault or fault zone nor a justification for mapping one and not the other.

RECOMMENDATION

All faults and fault zones encountered in the shafts and drifts should be mapped in situ and characterized in detail or justification should be given for not characterizing those features.
4.0 Objections, Comments, and Questions

(3) accommodation of basic geostatistical principles; and (4) integration with other boreholes, both existing and planned, that can provide additional supporting data for modeling spatial variability of rock characteristics (p. 8.4.2-75).

- With respect to areal coverage of the CPDB, “two quantities were considered in adopting the 3000 foot spacing: (1) the correlation length for variability of basic physical properties (e.g., matrix porosity and pneumatic conductivity) and (2) the minimum number of boreholes in the feature sampling program with which data from the systematic program will be compared for bias” (p. 8.3.1.4-89). Hand samples, collected from the Calico Hills nonwelded unit along an arbitrarily selected horizon in outcrop, “indicated that the maximum range of statistical correlation for porosity and air permeability was roughly 3000 feet” (Rautman, et al., 1988). However, this assessment of statistical correlation for porosity and air permeability (Rautman, et al., 1988) was not available for NRC staff review.

- Much of the analysis of spatial variability will “depend upon detailed knowledge of a few selected rock characteristics (e.g., porosity, saturated hydraulic conductivity, saturation)” (p. 8.3.1.4-101). It is indicated in the SCP that “these parameters will serve as surrogates in determining the spatial variability of several other parameters needed by performance assessment and design issues in preliminary stages of the analyses. Because the basic spatial distribution of properties of the rock mass at Yucca Mountain is that produced by the processes of volcanic eruption, transport, deposition, and post-depositional alteration (including welding and devitrification), the quantitative description of the distribution should correspond to parameters that derive their distribution from some part of those emplacement and alteration processes” (p. 8.3.1.4-101). The “several other parameters needed by performance and design issues” are not specifically identified in the SCP. This approach implies a statistical relationship between the parameters that represent the characteristics of the rock mass (or various rock types). The assumption that a statistical relationship exists between porosity, conductivity or saturation and the unspecified “other parameters” does not appear to be based on an analysis of statistical cross-correlations between the parameters because no such analyses are provided to justify the assumption. Further, no specific plans to test that assumption by assessing cross-correlations are provided. Estimating the spatial variability of any particular parameter using the spatial variability of a few selected rock characteristics needs to be technically justified.

**RECOMMENDATION**

Provide the assessment that establishes the estimated range of statistical correlation of porosity and air permeability of the Calico Hills nonwelded unit. Provide technical analyses, or plans to obtain technical analyses, to justify the assumption that the spatial variability of porosity, saturated hydraulic conductivity and saturation can serve as surrogates for the spatial variability of other parameters.

**REFERENCE**


**COMMENT 40**

The “rule of thumb” stating that the number of pairs that is acceptable for each spacing range should be at least 30, represents a lower bound for geostatistical analyses and may not ensure that parameter values can be estimated with the desired confidence. The SCP text is unclear on this topic.

**BASIS**

The following two SCP statements appear to be contradictory:

- “The two figures show that the systematic drilling program, together with existing boreholes and additional planned drilling, result in greater than 30 borehole pairs in spacing ranges up to 10,000 ft. Thus the systematic drilling program meets the requirements for geostatistical evaluation, and will provide significant additional information for a subset of rock characteristics if integrated with existing boreholes” (p. 8.3.1.4-93, third paragraph).
- “The actual number of pairs that is acceptable for each spacing range will depend heavily on the data values” (p. 8.3.1.4-93, first paragraph).

**RECOMMENDATION**

The SCP updates should discuss other aspects of the geostatistical approach, such as viewing the variogram estimation process as estimating the variance of difference and applying the standard formula for confidence of variance estimates using correlated data. For example, see Cressie (1985).

**REFERENCE**

4.0 Objections, Comments, and Questions

Section 8.3.1.4.3.1.1 Activity: Systematic drilling program, pp. 8.3.1.4/87-100

COMMENT 41

The tight clustering of sample locations SD-8 through SD-12, shown on Figure 8.3.1.4-12a, has not been justified to be an appropriate method of increasing the number of sample pairs for short distances and provides no assurance about the quality of the resulting variogram.

BASIS

- The DOE response to CDSCP Comment 30 states that the location and drilling of the exploratory boreholes are coordinated with the repository design. However, it is not clear how tight clustering of systematic drilling boreholes SD-8 through SD-12 outside the repository block considers integration of site-specific subsurface information needs with repository design.

- Counting the number of sample pairs entering into the variogram computation without regard to sample spacing has not been established as an appropriate method of assessing the ultimate quality of the variogram. For example, SD-10 and SD-11 are quite close to each other (200 meters); thus, they are highly correlated (using the assumed 3,000 ft. range of influence). If SD-10 and SD-11 are correlated, any two pairs with SD-10 in one pair and SD-11 in the other pair will likewise be correlated. The net effect is that there are significantly fewer equivalent uncorrelated pairs in any spacing than a simple count would indicate.

- The tight cluster of sample locations outside of the target area and centered around SD-11 may succeed in characterizing the small area quite well; however, this may be of little value in characterizing the entire area within the repository block.

RECOMMENDATION

The SCP updates should justify reasoning for clustering systematic drilling holes outside the repository block.

Section 8.3.1.6 Overview of the Erosion Program

COMMENT 42

The overall erosion program does not include an evaluation of escarpment retreat.

BASIS

- Previous NRC Comment 35 suggested that the DOE include an evaluation of valley incision, sediment yield, uplift/subsidence, and escarpment retreat.

- DOE has identified and included sections in the SCP which address hillslope erosion (which includes valley incision) and uplift and subsidence (1.1.3.1.1, 8.3.1.6.1.1 and 8.3.1.8.3).

- The DOE has also presented a justification for estimating approximate volumes of sediment eroded off hillsides instead of sediment yield studies for the short term (8.3.1.1.6), and also expects to quantitatively estimate debris flow hazards (8.3.1.16.1.1).

- Evaluations of escarpment retreat have not been included in the SCP. DOE suggests that escarpment retreat is indirectly treated in Activity 8.3.1.6.1.1.3 (an analysis of hillslope erosion); however, no studies of escarpment retreat are described under that activity. Because of the critical relationship between the westernmost extent of the waste repository and the western face of Yucca Mountain, direct studies of escarpment retreat are necessary to provide sufficient data to evaluate the overall hazard of erosion at the proposed Yucca Mountain site (Purcell, 1986).

RECOMMENDATION

A direct evaluation of escarpment retreat, especially as it relates to the western face of Yucca Mountain should be included in the erosion program to evaluate the overall future erosion potential required by performance and design issues.

REFERENCE

Purcell, C.R., 1986, Potential erosion at the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste site: Letter report from LLNL to NRC.
Section 8.3.1.8 Overview of the postclosure tectonics program: Description of future tectonic processes and events required by the performance and design issues.

Section 8.3.1.17 Overview of preclosure tectonics: Description of tectonic and igneous events required by performance and design requirements.

COMMENT 43
The rationale for numerical goals specified in Tables 8.3.1.17-3a, 8.3.1.17-4a and b, and 8.3.1.17-7 is poorly supported and the use of averaged values or rates for establishing acceptable limits for fault movement, rates of volcanism, and rates of erosion does not provide for conservative assessments of potential hazards.

BASIS
- 10 CFR 60.122 (a)(2)(ii) requires that the natural conditions on the site be “adequately evaluated using analyses . . . and assumptions which are not likely to underestimate” the effect of those conditions.
- Regional, long-term rates of erosion averaged over time and applied to specific areas do not provide a conservative estimate of potential erosion which could occur over a short time period during a single erosive event. Failure to consider maximum conditions in predicting erosion over the next 10,000 years may result in an understimation of the effect of potential erosion.
- Numerical goals assigned for acceptable limits for fault movement appear to be unrealistic. The performance measure of the probability of 5 cm of fault displacement on faults in the repository area or at the location of facilities important to safety (FITS) may be unattainable in light of difficulty in ascertaining lateral movement along faults in the Yucca Mountain area. (See Comment 48.)
- The use of slip rates provides an average value for fault offset of a number of faulting events over time, but fails to consider the potential for single events of maximum slip or offset. (See Comment 48.)
- The use of the 10,000 year cumulative slip earthquake concept normalizes and averages the amount of fault displacement over time and does not provide a conservative estimate of maximum fault movement resulting from a single episode. (See Comment 66.)
- Averages of cone counts through time are likely to underestimate the rates of volcanic eruptions over a given period of time (in this case, the Quaternary or 2.0 million years) (Geological Society of America, 1988). This method of calculation does not appear to provide a process for accurately estimating the potential of volcanic activity and, therefore, the potential disruption of the repository that could occur as a result of a volcanic eruption. (See Comment 45.)
- Faulting potential based on the “average spacing of Quaternary faults that is estimated for the structural domain” (p. 8.3.1.17–62) is a nonconservative parameter which may underestimate the potential for faulting.

RECOMMENDATIONS
- DOE should provide goals that are not likely to underestimate maximum single-event disruptions, rather than providing estimates of cut-off values or goals which are based on averaging of established values over time.
- Alternatively, DOE should plan to demonstrate that average values are conservative values.

REFERENCE
the total radionuclide inventory closure, allowing for recognized technological limitations." In our view, full containment is not obtained in a system which permits the levels of failure stated in the above paragraph.

RECOMMENDATION
Reexamine design goals for the various components of the repository system to ensure that they are consistent.

Section 8.3.1.8 Overview of the postclosure tectonics program: Description of future tectonic processes and events required by the performance design issues (p. 8.3.1.8-40)

COMMENT 46

The current representation of the physical domain for postclosure tectonics issues (i.e., brittle crust, southern Great Basin) appears to be inadequate to evaluate the full range of processes and events likely to occur at the site and should not act as a limit on conceptual tectonic models or site investigations.

BASIS

- Table 8.3.1.8–8 lists the physical domain for postclosure tectonics issues as the brittle crust, southern Great Basin.
- Processes acting in the lower, ductile crust and upper mantle may be the driving forces for events that occur in the upper, brittle crust.
- Physiographic subdivisions in the southern part of the Basin and Range include the southeast Great Basin, southwest Great Basin and Walker Lane belt (Fig. 1-3). Limiting the physical domain to the southern Great Basin would appear to either exclude the Walker Lane belt or include only the southern part of the belt.
- Major faulting activity has occurred in the central Walker Lane belt. Possible shifts in the locus of faulting within the belt would appear to necessitate that an understanding of the fault processes in central Walker Lane belt be developed in order to understand processes that might affect the site in the postclosure.
- The Death Valley Pancake Range volcanic belt extends through the site and outside of the southern Great Basin. Processes that resulted in the formation of the Lunar Crater volcanic field are applicable to the site as possible natural analogs. This area provides an opportunity to characterize processes that may be active at the site.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Consideration should be given to extending the area of consideration for alternative conceptual tectonic models to areas outside of the southern Great Basin including the lower crust and upper mantle.
4.0 Objections, Comments, and Questions

- Areal restrictions should not be limiting factors in the consideration of alternative conceptual models.

- Relate the term “Physical Domain” to Geologic Setting as defined in 10 CFR 60.

Section 8.3.1.8 Overview of the postclosure tectonics program: Description of future tectonic processes and events required by the performance design issues

COMMENT 47

The approach to incorporating data derived in the postclosure tectonics program into an assessment of whether performance issues related to the waste package and engineered barrier system (EBS) requirements (10 CFR 60.113(a)) will be met is confusing and may result in an inaccurate assessment of performance.

BASIS

- 10 CFR 60.113(a) requires that containment of HLW be “substantially complete during the period when radiation and thermal conditions in the engineered barrier system are dominated by fission product decay,” and that following the containment period any release from the EBS shall be a gradual process which results in small fractional releases to the geologic setting over long times.

- Faulting in the repository could result in releases to the geologic setting.

- Section 8.3.5.10.3 describing information need 1.5.3 (p. 8.3.5.10–55) indicates information is needed from the Postclosure tectonics program. Scenarios developed under Information Need 1.5.3 will also be used to describe the waste package near-field environment (p. 8.3.5.9–87).

- The characterization program specified in SCP Section 8.3.1.8 (Figure 8.3.1.8–1) does not directly address performance Issues 1.4 (Will waste package meet the performance objective) and 1.5 (Will the waste package and repository engineered barrier systems meet the performance objective), but relies on information needs generated by Issue 1.11.

- Fulfillment of information needs related to Issue 1.11 is largely accomplished through Activities 8.3.1.17.4.6.1 and 8.3.1.17.4.6.2 (Table 8.3.1.8–2b) that, at least in part, specify characterizing “potentially significant Quaternary faults” (8.3.1.17–158).

- One characterization parameter for addressing Issue 1.11 (Table 8.3.1.8–2b) indicates that faults with > 10 m of offset will be characterized. The tentative goals for establishing fault descriptions for positioning the underground facility (Table 8.3.2.2–5) are locations within ± 30 m and displacements of ± 2 m.

- Faults that have had episodes of movement > 5 cm (performance parameter for fault displacement) may be of significance to fulfilling the requirements of 10 CFR 60.113(a).

RECOMMENDATION

Consideration should be given to establishing a direct path for the integration of data collected in the Postclosure Tectonics program into issues 1.4 (Will waste package meet the performance objective) and 1.5 (Will the waste package and repository engineered barrier system meet the performance objective).

REFERENCE

4.0 Objections, Comments, and Questions

Section 8.3.1.17.2 Studies to provide required information on fault displacement that could affect repository design or performance

COMMENT 48
The use of fault slip rates to determine the level of hazard posed to repository facilities by faults does not appear to be a conservative approach and may result in overly optimistic predictions about the effects of faulting on system performance.

BASIS
- The concern expressed by this comment reiterates and expands on CDSCP Comment 37.
- In the response to CDSCP Comment 37, the DOE indicates that the "goals established for performance measures properly distinguish between faults within and outside the waste emplacement area, take into account for present uncertainties in slip rates and appear to be readily achievable." The NRC staff does not consider that the approach for distinguishing similarly oriented faults in the geologic setting based on their location is a reasonably conservative approach because it appears to overlook alternative models of faulting that could physically link faults with higher apparent slip rates with faults with lower apparent slip rates.
- Section 8.3.1.8 (p. 8.3.1.8-27) indicates that since faults in the area of the repository have "very low slip rates" then it can be demonstrated that offset of 5 cm in 1,000 years is a very low probability. Therefore, 5 cm was determined as a value at which displacement becomes significant over a 1,000 year period.
- Slip rates average offset along faults over a series of events and appear to obscure the episodicity of fault events and relatively high offsets that could be expected in single event. For example, the last major episode of movement (Holocene in age) on one strand of the Windy Wash fault zone (slip rate estimated to be .0015mm/yr, p. 1-133) had approximately 10 cm of vertical offset.
- The use of slip-rates is likely to obscure the uncertainty in the total offset on a fault due strike-slip motion.
- The statement made in 8.3.1.8 (p. 8.3.1.8-27) that faults in the area have "very low slip rates" suggests that fault characteristics have been pre-judged prior to the completion of site characterization. However, the SCP acknowledges that the lateral component on most faults in the area has not been assessed.

RECOMMENDATIONS
- Demonstrate that the use of slip rates for determining hazard does not provide overly optimistic predictions of the effects of faulting on repository performance.
- Consider alternative methods (e.g., maximum event offset) or a combination of methods (e.g., maximum event offset and slip rates) to assess the level of hazard to the surface facilities and EBS posed by faulting.

Section 8.3.1.8 Overview of the postclosure tectonics program: Description of future tectonic processes and events required by the performance and design issues.

Investigation 8.3.1.8.1 Studies to provide information required on direct releases resulting from volcanic activity.

Section 8.3.5.13 Issue Resolution strategy for issue 1.1: Will the mined geologic disposal system meet the performance objective for limiting radionuclide releases to the accessible environment as required by issue 10 CFR 60.112 and 40 CFR 191.137?, Disturbed case (A-1): direct release in basaltic volcanism.

Table 8.3.5.13–10. Performance parameters for scenario class A–1 (extrusive magmatic events)

COMMENT 49
If the results of the investigations on direct release resulting from volcanic activity do not provide information which shows that either the probability and/or consequence resulting from such a scenario is lower than the tentative parameter goals stated in Table 8.3.1.8–1b and Table 8.3.5.13–10, the Yucca Mountain site will fail to meet the requirements for overall system performance.

BASIS
- The concern expressed by this comment was the main basis for CDSCP Comments 36 and 95.
- The tentative parameter values were not revised within the SCP. The response to CDSCP Comments 36 and 95 focused primarily on what effects the expected values may have on the CCDF, and on justifying the use of the EPPM.
- The NRC staff agrees, with the discussion in Section 8.3.1.8, 8.3.5.13, and the comment responses pre-
4.0 Objections, Comments, and Questions

Presented for CDSCP Comments 36 and 95, that if the expected values of probability of volcanism are obtained, this scenario by itself would not cause the site to fail the EPA standard. The goals, however, are 2 orders of magnitude or more higher than the expected values.

The annual probability of 10E-6 stated in the tentative goals is higher than one chance in 1000 in 10,000 years, and therefore a process or event with such a probability would have to be included in the CCDF to determine compliance with the overall system performance objective if the results of such a process or event were significant.

- Disruption and release of on the order of one tenth of one percent of the repository inventory, the other tentative goal, would result in a release to the accessible environment on the order of 170 times the EPA standard ratio based on the reference inventory presented in Table 8.3.5.13-6. Such a release, combined with the above probability, would cause the site to fail the overall system performance objective and is therefore considered significant.

- Even assuming radioactive decay through 10,000 years, the EPA ratio would exceed 1 at all times, and would exceed 10 for a sufficiently long period of time such that the standard would not be met, assuming the annual probability goal presented above.

- The conditional probability presented in Table 8.3.5.13-10 only states that the consequence goal will have a low probability of exceedance, and therefore has no direct effect on the calculations.

- While, as stated on page 8.3.5.13-18, an EPPM of greater than .01 does not necessarily imply a violation of the EPA standard, if the EPPM were calculated in accordance with the methodology presented on page 8.3.5.13-18 and using the reference inventory presented in Table 8.3.5.13-6, the resultant value would be on the order of 1.7, which is much more than the tentative goal of less than .1 listed in Table 8.3.1.8-1a and Table 8.3.5.13-8. The NRC staff considers that an EPPM on the order of 1.7 would imply a violation in most cases.

- If radioactive decay is considered, the average release value times the value of the probability goal would result in an EPPM of greater than .01. The goals presented in the various tables do not appear to be internally consistent.

- Furthermore, as can be determined from the discussion on page 8.3.5.13-18, the significance of an EPPM of greater than .01 cannot be determined without performing other calculations. While the EPPM may have some use, in this specific case the goal for the EPPM is above .01, therefore by itself it provides no guidance to the persons performing the investigations. (See also Comment 108.)

- The purpose of performance allocation is to determine what components of the natural and engineered system are significant in determining if the site can meet the various performance objectives to assure that the proper emphasis is placed on the various investigations. To assure that the investigator understands the significance of the technical finding, the goals should be set so that the performance objectives can be met if the goals are met.

RECOMMENDATION

DOE should review the various performance measures, performance parameters and goals presented for basaltic volcanism. Goals should be set which will assure that the performance objectives could be met.

REFERENCES


U.S. Department of Energy, Letter from S. Rosso, DOE, to H. Thompson, Jr., NRC; Subject: Issuance of the Site Characterization Plan (SCP) for the Yucca Mountain Site to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, December 28, 1988, 4 pp. plus 3 enclosures, including "Responses to NRC Point Papers on Site Characterization Plan/Consultation Draft."

Section 8.3.1.8 Overview of the postclosure tectonics program: Description of future tectonic processes and events required by the performance and design issues

Table 8.3.1.8-2b Investigation 8.3.1.8.2-Studies to provide information required on rupture of waste packages due to tectonic events

Section 8.3.1.17 Overview of preclosure tectonics: Description of tectonic and igneous events required by performance and design requirements
Table 8.3.1.17-3b  Characterization parameters related to surface facilities and preclosure fault displacement

COMMENT 50

Faults appear to be considered as single strands of narrow width, an approach that may underestimate the effects of faulting on the results of planned tests and on the performance of repository facilities.

BASIS

- Table 8.3.1.8-2b indicates that the current estimate of the width of Quaternary fault zones in and near the site is < 5 m.
- Chapter 1 (p. 1–332) indicates that “Breccia zones in the Ghost Dance fault are as wide as 20 m.” Cross-section A-A’ of Scott and Bonk (1984), indicates that the breccia zone associated with the Solitario Canyon fault zone, the Windy Wash fault zone, and the Bow Ridge fault zone are all significantly greater than 5 m.
- Table 8.3.1.8-2b indicates that the characterization parameter for investigating faults in the repository is characteristics of faults with > 10 m of offset. Individual fault strands within a fault zone may not exhibit > 10 m of offset but the cumulative offset along faults in a fault zone may be greater than 10 m.
- Table 8.3.1.17-3b indicates that the current estimate for “potentially significant faults” within 5 km of facilities important to safety (FITS) is four. This estimate appears to overlook models involving fault imbrication in which major fault zones might contain more than one “potentially significant fault.”
- One model resulting from seismic studies in Midway Valley (Neal, 1986) could suggest that in the vicinity of the location of the surface facilities, the Paintbrush Canyon fault zone could represent a zone of imbricate faulting extending from the east side of Exile Hill to the main trace of the Paintbrush Canyon fault.

RECOMMENDATION

The approach to characterization of faults in the vicinity of repository facilities should consider alternative models of faulting in which faults are not independent entities but may be parts of larger fault zones.

REFERENCES


Section 8.3.1.7  Overview of the postclosure tectonics program: Description of future tectonic processes and events required by the performance and design issues

Section 8.3.1.17  Overview of preclosure tectonics: Description of tectonic and igneous events required by performance and design requirements

COMMENT 51

Geophysical survey programs as indicated in the SCP may not be sufficient to identify and characterize both the deep crustal and shallow geologic features and their interrelationship.

BASIS

- In response to CDSCP Comment 49, a new activity of integration was added in Section 8.3.1.4.1.2. Since the subject of the CDSCP Comment 49 was the insufficiency of geophysical coverage to characterize the Yucca site and the geologic setting, a response that only addresses an integration of geophysical activities is not sufficient.
- A single long refraction line as noted in Figure 8.3.1.4.6 is generally inconclusive and/or no definition of an anomalous trend is possible. With a single line of investigation as planned, there is a significantly increased probability that ambiguous data and/or incorrect interpretations will occur.
- Most of the proposed geophysical activities such as shown in Figure 8.3.1.4.7 (seismic reflection) and Figure 8.3.1.4.8 (gravity and magnetic) indicate coverage that is isolated and not crossed or tied to other lines.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Provide a geophysical investigation program plan that is comprehensive, integrated and sufficient to identify and understand the interrelationships of the deep crustal structure and shallow geologic structural features, and to assure that no significant structural features have gone undetected.
- Consider including a gridded program of exploratory surveys and measurements that would allow for cross-line correlations and more complete spatial definition of anomalies at the site and specifically at the locations of the exploratory shafts.
4.0 Objections, Comments, and Questions

Section 8.3.1.8.1 Investigation—Volcanic Activity
Section 8.3.1.8.5.1 Study—Volcanic Features
Section 8.3.1.8.5.2 Study—Intrusive Features
Section 8.3.1.17.1 Studies—Volcanic Activity

COMMENT 52
No specific geophysical program appears to be planned to identify volcanic/igneous features and their extent under or close to the site.

BASIS
- This comment restates the concern expressed in CDSCP Comment 51.
- The SCP includes a re-written Activity 8.3.1.8.1.1.3 and includes cross references between Activity 8.3.1.8.1.1.3 and 8.3.1.17.4.3.1; however, the SCP is not specific about a planned program for volcanic/igneous features identification.
- Activities 8.3.1.8.1.1.3 and 8.3.1.17.4.3.1 indicate that a number of geophysical parameters exist for the activities; however, there is no indication of a coherent plan in these two sections or elsewhere in the SCP to indicate that the volcanic/igneous investigation will be accomplished in a consistent and coherent manner.

RECOMMENDATION
The DOE should include and integrate into its geophysical program a subprogram designed specifically for consideration of volcanic/igneous features.

Section 8.3.1.9.2.1 Study: Natural resource assessment of Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada

COMMENT 53
The program of investigations for natural resources assessment as presented in the SCP appears to be unsatisfactory for consideration of potential natural resources and natural resource models at the site.

BASIS
- This comment addresses concerns expressed in unresolved CDSCP Comments 38 and 39.
- Although conceptual models directed toward natural resource occurrence in tuffs have now been considered in the SCP, alternative resource models to include hosts other than tuffs appear not to be considered. For example, the resource assessment program does not specifically provide for testing structures as potential ore hosts, nor does it provide for testing of possible tactites on the margin of the hypothesized Crater Flat caldera complex.
- The suite of elements selected for analysis in the geochemical sampling program is limited to those commodities known to exist in silicic tuff (p. 8.3.1.9–30) and excludes those elements or commodities associated with resources in tactites (skarn), carbonate and other sedimentary rocks, and possible plutonic rocks that may be present beneath the site.
- Proposed investigations still appear to lack integration with other geological, geophysical, and geochemical investigations and pre-existing data. No geophysical investigations directed toward natural resources assessment and evaluation appear to be considered as recommended in CDSCP Comment 39. Results of geologic/geophysical activities planned for other purposes may provide a portion of the information to delineate areas for more detailed study.
- Drillholes proposed for other tests may not uniformly cover the controlled area and may not be directed at or intersect features favorable to mineralization such as high-angle fault zones, detachment zones, or veins. Drillholes as planned may not be favorably placed or extend to the depth necessary to provide sufficient information to assess resource potential of pre-Cenozoic rocks and volcanic rocks underlying the proposed repository. A large degree of uncertainty exists that vertical drill holes would intersect vertical to near vertical faults or mineralized zones. (See Comment 34.)
- Mineral and/or hydrocarbon resource potential of pre-Cenozoic rocks cannot be adequately assessed based on surface samples. Drillholes that penetrate the Paleozoic rocks, postulated detachment zone (Scott, 1986), and lowermost volcanic rocks are necessary to test for possible mineral resources in light of gold discoveries and mines near Yucca Mountain associated with low-angle faulting, Paleozoic rocks, and the lower Tram Member of the Crater Flat Tuff (Sterling Mine at Bare Mountain, Bullfrog District, and GEXA gold claims in northern Crater Flat).
- Information in Chapter 1 and Section 8.3.1.9.2.1 does not reflect recent publications, models, and discoveries (See NRC, 1986 and CDSCP Comment 38; see information in Raney, 1988 and Price, 1988). Reliance has been placed on out-of-date models, parameters (production figures in dollars rather than
in tonnage and grade), and references (e.g., McKee, 1979 and Hewitt, 1968).

**RECOMMENDATION**

Consider and develop a program of planned technical procedures which demonstrate integration and application of geological, geochemical, and geophysical studies in support of the resource assessment investigations, as well as those to be employed in the probability estimation of unidentified resources.

**REFERENCES**


NRC, 1986, NRC staff comments on the DOE final environmental assessments.


**COMMENT 54**

Numerous inconsistencies exist in Chapter 8 of the SCP. Examples of some of the inconsistencies found in the geomechanical area are listed below by the sections in which they occur.

**BASIS**

Section 8.3.1.15, Table 8.3.1.15-1, pp. 8.3.1.15-2/3

- On p. 8.3.1.15-12, it is indicated that the current estimate of ambient temperature in TSw2 is 23°-25°C. In Section 8.4, the ambient temperature is stated to be 31°C. On p. 2-45 of the CDR, it is indicated that the range of temperature is 23°-29°C, with an average of 26°C.

- On pp. 8.3.1.15-10, 11, the reference to "tentative goals" for empirical design parameters is given as "See Table 6-15." The correct reference should probably be Table 6-13. However, even Table 6-13 does not give "goals." It gives "design values" (some of which are NA = not applicable).

Section 8.4.2.3.1, pp. 8.4.2-117/120

- The CDR gives an average ambient temperature of 26°C (p. 2-45).

- On page 8.3.2.2-20, the expected value for initial temperature is given as "23°C to 26°C ± 1.5°C."

Section 8.4.2.3.1, pp. 8.4.2-93/147, Section 8.4.2.3.3.3, pp. 8.4.2-167/175

- Figures 8.3.1.2-16 and 8.4.2-27 show ES-1 to be significantly deeper than indicated in SCP Figure 8.4.2-33.

- Radial borehole tests are shown at different depths below the repository horizon in Figures 8.3.1.2-16 and 8.4.2-27.

- Descriptions regarding width and length of Upper Demonstration Breakout Room in Figures 8.4.2-112 and 8.4.2-17 (p. 8.4.2-138) are inconsistent.

- Figure 8.4.2-27 shows a shaft convergence test at the deepest point in shaft ES-1. This location conflicts with the description of shaft convergence activity on p. 8.4.2-109.

Section 8.3.5.2.1, Tables 8.3.5.2-7 and 8.3.5.2-8, pp. 8.3.5.2-27/30

- The following potential abnormal conditions in Table 8.3.5.2-8 are not consistent with retrieval-related performance goals in Table 8.3.5.2-7:
  - Rockfall in a vertical emplacement borehole due to a seismic event, faulting, variability in
4.0 Objections, Comments, and Questions

rock strength, or excessive thermal loading resulting from human error is considered as a potential abnormal condition; however, rockfall with an average of less than 250 lb. per foot of an emplacement borehole is considered normal and used as a design or performance goal in Table 8.3.5.2-7.

- The tilt of a waste container is a potential abnormal condition in Table 8.3.5.2-8. However, a maximum allowable displacement of 2 in. for borehole wall or liner of a vertical emplacement holes is one of the design criteria for retrieval (Tables 8.3.5.2-3 and 8.3.5.2-7). A relative-displacement of borehole wall or liner between the top and bottom of a vertical hole will no doubt cause a tilt of a waste container.

Section 8.3.2.2, pp. 8.3.2.2-1/96

- Several different tentative goals are listed for limiting excavation induced permeability changes in rock mass:
  - Table 8.3.2.2-3 (p. 8.3.2.2-15): less than one order of magnitude change beyond 3 m.
  - Table 8.3.2.2-5 (p. 8.3.2.2-28): 50% of in situ permeability change around excavations
  - Page 8.3.2.2-38 (3rd paragraph): less than one order of magnitude change beyond 75 percent of the distance to the boundary of the disturbed zone.

Section 8.3.1.15.1.3.2, p. 8.3.1.15-42

- According to the first paragraph on p. 8.3.1.15-42 all samples for (mechanical) testing of units other than unit TSw2 will be obtained from the walls of the exploratory shafts. According to Figure 8.4.2-33 the exploratory shaft ES-1 will not penetrate the CH units.

- On p. 8.3.1.15-80, there is a description of overcore stress measurements from “a drilling alcove excavated laterally from the ES at the Calico Hills test level.” According to Section 8.4 the exploratory shafts are not currently planned to extend into the Calico Hills unit.

- Upper temperature limits for test conditions are different or unspecified on the following pages:
  - the upper limit for volumetric heat capacity characterization is 275°C (p. 8.3.1.15-34);
  - the upper limit for laboratory determination of intact rock mechanical properties is 250°C (p. 8.3.1.15-42);
  - the upper limit for laboratory determination of fracture segments is 200°C (p. 8.3.1.15-44);
  - the upper temperature limit for in-situ testing in Section 8.3.1.15.1.6 is not presented; and

Section 8.3.1.4, pp. 8.3.1.4-1/24

- Figure 8.3.1.4-1 and Table 8.3.1.4-1 are incomplete and inconsistent.

- There is a close correspondence between parameter categories in Figure 8.3.1.4-1, with the exception of the following categories, which appear in the table but not in the figure: (a) geologic model synthesis; and (b) geologic framework.

- The first sentence of the third paragraph on p. 8.3.1.14-16 indicates that a “geologic framework” is given in Figure 8.3.1.4-1 as a “broad group of geologic and geophysical information.” This “Geologic Framework” does not appear on the referenced figure.

Section 8.3.1.4 pp. 8.3.1.4-87/100

- On p. 8.3.1.4-89, it is stated that boreholes in the systematic drilling program will be drilled to a depth approximately 100 m below the water table. On p. 8.4.2-75, the depth mentioned is approximately 200 feet.

- The location of systematic drilling holes shown on Figure 8.3.1.4-11a (p. 8.3.1.4-90) does not agree with locations shown in Figure 8.4.2-2a (p. 8.4.2-41).

RECOMMENDATION

Inconsistencies in the SCP regarding parameters or tentative design goals should be removed or justified in SCP updates.

REFERENCES

F. B. Nimick, and B. M. Schwartz, “Bulk, Thermal, and Mechanical Properties of the Topopah Spring Member of

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4.0 Objections, Comments, and Questions

Section 8.3.1.15.1 Investigation: Studies to Provide the Required Information for Spatial Distribution of Thermal and Mechanical Properties, pages 8.3.1.15-23/31

COMMENT 55
The discussion and/or use of statistics in this chapter is not clear. A statistical approach has been suggested to determine numbers of tests required to determine various rock properties, but the approach suggested is confusing and apparently overlooks several considerations that should be factored into such an approach. Also, needed confidences of "low," "medium," or "high" have been assigned without explaining the basis for such assignments.

BASIS
- In response to CDSCP Comment 45, the DOE has revised Section 8.3.1.15.1 of the SCP to include some additional information on the statistical rationale for proposed experiments. However, this discussion is incomplete and relies heavily upon the results of future parametric or sensitivity studies. Appendix N of SNL, 1987, referenced in the SCP (p. 8.3.1.15-14), contains only a few analyses which can be considered sensitivity parametric analyses.
- The discussion regarding means and standard deviations of required properties is confusing. It is not clear from what sample population the mean and standard deviation are to be determined. Furthermore, the confidence to which these parameters must be known (the standard deviation) has apparently been estimated from "expert judgment" and may not be reliable.
- An acceptable way of determining test needs is to conduct sensitivity or parametric calculations of repository performance in which the input parameters are varied and the response examined. Only limited calculations have been referenced. (See Comment 4.)
- A statistical analysis is given to determine the number of measurements required to obtain a standard deviation of any given property. This analysis has apparently not considered the following:
  1. The properties to be determined are not evenly distributed throughout the mass.
  2. The measured values are a function of testing sample size (and possibly, direction).
  3. Populations may not be normally distributed.
  4. Sampling may be biased due to jointing, hole direction, etc.
  5. The determination of the necessary number of samples is based on a Gaussian tolerance interval. The Gaussian assumption may not be appropriate for most of the variables of interest. Also, the method outlined in the text ignores spatial correlation.
  6. "For convenience, (1-alpha) is assumed to be the same as gamma" (p. 8.3.1.15-28). The selection of the "alpha" and "gamma" levels should be based on the sensitivity of the design decisions to the parameters and the potential impact of decision errors.
  7. The arbitrary selection of the necessary number of samples (see p. 8.3.1.15-29) potentially results in too few samples.

RECOMMENDATIONS
In the SCP updates:
- The proposed statistical approach to determine the number of tests required to determine various rock properties should be clarified.
- Results of on-going sensitivity studies as the bases for assigning needed confidence levels of "low," "medium," or "high" should be presented.

Section 8.3.1.15.1 Investigation: Studies to provide the required information for spatial distribution of thermal and mechanical properties, p.

Section 8.3.5.20 Analytical Techniques Requiring Significant Development

COMMENT 56
The validation of models should be a part of the overall test program. It is not clear that these aspects have been addressed by the test program.
4.0 Objections, Comments, and Questions

BASIS

- On p. 8.3.1.15-31 (2nd paragraph), it is stated that "temperature fields induced during the heater tests will be modeled using numerical techniques, with values for thermal properties being varied until an optimum match of predicted and actual temperatures is obtained." Such an approach does not address the uniqueness of the final set of thermal properties.

- Chapter 6 of the SCP discusses several potential constitutive models and numerical model types to be used for performance assessment and design analysis. However, the discussion does not clearly show how testing will be used to resolve the issue of proper constitutive model and numerical method, and how this testing will feed into design and license application.

- The discussion on validation in Section 8.3.5.20 is general in nature. However, it does discuss two (2) parts to the validation process: "(1) ascertaining when the model has achieved a good representation of the system, and (2) comparing predictive results to appropriate observations and experimental results" (p. 8.3.5.20-8). It is not clear how the second part of the validation procedure will be evaluated.

RECOMMENDATION

A testing rationale which addresses validation of models should be presented in the study plans.

Section 8.3.1.15.1.5 Study: Excavation investigations, pp. 8.3.1.15-45/52
Section 8.3.1.15.1.8 Study: In situ design verification, pp. 8.3.1.15-70/76
Section 8.3.2.2.5 Information need 1.11.5, p. 8.3.2.2-63
Section 8.4.2.3.4.4 Exploratory shaft facility underground construction and operations—blasting, pp. 8.4.2-180/195

COMMENT 57

Studies relating to design verification do not consider investigating the effects of underground excavation in the tuff using alternate excavation methods.

BASIS

- Section 8.3.2.2 (p. 8.3.2.2-63) indicates that continuous mining methods are being considered but the method has not yet proved practical in welded tuff.

However, no substantiation of this statement has been made through references.

- Planned testing of emplacement holes appears to be limited. At present the only data planned to be obtained to study mechanical excavation results from these emplacement hole size tests.

RECOMMENDATION

Alternate methods of excavation should be evaluated and results provided in SCP updates.

Section 8.3.1.15.1.8 Study: In-Situ Design Verification, p. 8.3.1.15-70

COMMENT 58

Activity descriptions presented in the In-Situ Design Verification Section do not include tests to verify design aspects under repository conditions.

BASIS

- The repository will be subject to thermal effects as a result of emplaced waste. None of the activities described in this section evaluate thermal effects.

- According to the SCP Conceptual Design Report (CDR) (MacDougall et al., 1987), mechanical mining is planned for some parts of the repository. However, Section 8.3.1.15.1.8.1 (Evaluation of mining methods) describes tests to study only the effects of drill-and-blast excavation.

- Section 8.3.1.15.1.8.4 (Air quality and ventilation experiment) does not explicitly indicate whether or not thermal effects will be considered. If thermal effects are to be considered, the ventilation experiment should determine parameters in addition to those identified on p. 8.3.1.15-75. For example, if the convective heat transfer coefficient is to be determined by experiment, the surface rock temperature must be known. In addition, ventilation calculations in Appendix C of the CDR use a "wetness factor." There is no explanation for how this factor will be determined by this experiment.

RECOMMENDATION

An identification of the activities to verify the design under repository conditions should be presented in a study plan.

REFERENCE

Section 8.3.1.17 Overview of preclosure tectonics: Description of tectonic and igneous events required by performance and design requirements

COMMENT 59

The information presented for the program of investigations for faulting does not allow the NRC staff to determine what investigations will actually be conducted. In addition, the sequencing of many geophysical and geologic activities related to faulting may lead to data collection activities that are inadequate to support assessments of performance and design bases.

BASIS

- Many planned geophysical tests (e.g., Activity 8.3.1.17.4.7.8) must await the results of prototype testing (Decision 10/90).
- Tables 8.3.1.17-9 and 8.3.1.4-4 provide a summary of site geophysical programs. Page 8.3.1.17-115 states however, that locations of surveys and data collection techniques will not be finalized until the review by activity 8.3.1.4.2.1.6 is complete. This also appears to be true for such activities as drilling (see SCP Section 8.3.1.4.1.1). While the SCP provides a general description of tests that may be done and locations at which they may be conducted, certain tests such as those under activity 8.3.1.4.2.1.6 must be completed before final locations or types of surveys will be determined. Until this review activity (8.3.1.4.2.1.6) is complete and a program is presented which lays out actual tests and locations, the NRC staff cannot evaluate the adequacy or appropriateness of the DOE program.
- The SCP indicates (p. 8.5-32) that logs of trenches to investigate for possible faulting in the vicinity of the surface facilities will be complete by 12/89. Completion of these logs precedes completion of geophysical testing that could possibly provide valuable input into the selection of the location of the surface facilities and in the location of trenches.
- Table 8.3.1.8-9 indicates that the calculations of the number of waste packages intersected by a fault will be completed by 9/90. This date precedes completion of most site characterization activities related to faulting.
- Studies related to faulting at prospective surface facilities (8.3.1.17.4.2) will be completed (6/90) prior to the determination of geophysical methods used to examine subsurface characteristics of faults (i.e., 8.3.1.17.4.7, 10/90), the mapping of surficial deposits (Activity 8.3.1.5.1.4.2, 5/91), and the results of the photogeologic investigation of Quaternary scarps (8.3.1.17.4.3, 12/90).
- Siting and initial construction of the exploratory shafts will have occurred prior to the determination of geophysical methods that will be used to examine subsurface characteristics of faults (i.e., 8.3.1.17.4.7, 10/90), completion of the mapping of surficial deposits (Activity 8.3.2.5.1.4.2, 5/91), and the results of the photogeologic investigation of Quaternary scarps (8.3.1.17.4.3, 12/90).

RECOMMENDATION

Consideration should be given to re-examining the sequence of all activities dependent on input from other activities.

Section 8.3.1.17 Overview of preclosure tectonics: Description of tectonic and igneous events required by performance and design requirements

Table 8.3.1.17-3a Design and performance parameters related to surface facilities and preclosure fault displacement

COMMENT 60

The NRC staff does not consider that the basis and rationale for the design and performance parameters, characterization parameters, and goals proposed in the SCP for fault displacement, in particular for fault investigations for facilities important to safety (FITS), have been justified. The staff is concerned as these values appear to be used to limit the exploration program prior to having sufficient data to evaluate the site.

BASIS

- The concern expressed by this comment is part of the concern expressed in CDSCP Comment 50. This comment specifically is in reference to the requested justification of the design, performance, and characterization parameters.
- In the response to CDSCP Comment 50 and in the tables the DOE gives the following design and performance parameters:
  
  Table 8.3.1.17-3a gives design and performance parameters related to surface facilities and preclosure fault displacement as "total probability of exceeding 5 cm fault displacement at locations proposed for FITS, with a goal of less than 1 chance in 100 of exceeding 5
4.0 Objections, Comments, and Questions

cm displacement beneath surface FITS in 100 years."

Table 8.3.1.17-3b gives characterization parameters as "the identification and characterization of potential Quaternary faults within 5 km of FITS," "Identification and characterization of faults within 100 m of FITS that have apparent Quaternary slip rates greater than .001 mm/yr or that measurably offset materials less than 100,000 years old," and "estimate of total probability for greater than 5 cm displacement beneath FITS, considering known and possible concealed faults and tectonic interrelationships among local faults."

- The NRC does not consider that DOE has presented a justifiable basis for the use of 100,000 years as a base age to determine if the offset is significant. The basis for most information within 10 CFR Part 60 is the Quaternary, and other similar nuclear facilities such as those licensed under 10 CFR 72 have used Appendix A criteria for determining the significance of fault activity (i.e., once in 35,000 years or more than once in 500,000 years).

- The DOE has presented no analysis of the proposed design to demonstrate that 5 cm of fault movement is acceptable. The DOE appears to assume that structures can be built to withstand that amount of movement, however, the staff has seen no analysis to support this assumption.

- The NRC also does not consider that the probability cut-off values on the parameters and goals which are being used to limit the investigation, such as 1 chance in 100 in 100 years, have been justified. The NRC staff does not agree with the attempted justification presented in the response to CDSCP comment 50 because:

  The use of the probability cut off has not been accepted for use in determining the items on the Q-List (see Comment 126), and

  The work of Reiter and Jackson (1983) was not intended as guidance for making a licensing decision, but rather to evaluate the relative safety of existing plants. In addition, the authors themselves state that no great confidence can be placed on the absolute probabilities.

- The SCP discusses "potentially significant faults," however, the NRC staff is unsure as to what is meant by this term. It appears that DOE intends this to be related to the above probability values, age of movement or limit of movement; however, as stated above, the NRC staff does not see justification for the values. Until site characterization is complete, the interrelationship of faults is known, the interrelationship of the site parameters to the design parameters has been established, and the potential effect of the various faults on meeting the various performance objectives has been determined, the staff cannot determine what faults are significant. (See also Comment 64.)

- The SCP states on p. 8.3.1.17–27 that probabilistic methods will be used for evaluating the adequacy of deterministic final results; however, the question of what investigations will be conducted appears to be controlled by a priori probabilistic assumptions. For example, the response to CDSCP Comment 50 states that the total probability of faulting will be assessed prior to trenching. The NRC staff is unsure how DOE intends to assign probability values related to various features prior to completing the site characterization program. If the characterization program is overly limited by a priori probability assumptions, the NRC staff is unsure how a sufficient understanding of the site characteristics will ever be obtained.

- While the NRC staff recognizes that "goals" are not "criteria," when goals are set which do not appear to be justified, or which appear to unwisely limit the necessary investigations, the NRC staff does not see a rationale for the investigation which can be supported.

RECOMMENDATION

DOE needs to strengthen its justification for the design and performance parameters, characterization parameters, and goals for preclosure fault displacement as related to FITS, or revise these values. The justification should include a discussion of the interrelationship of the characterization parameters, performance and design parameters, and goals with the design criteria and the performance objectives of 10 CFR Part 60.

REFERENCES


U.S. Department of Energy, Letter from S. Rouss, DOE, to H. Thompson, Jr., NRC; Subject: Issuance of the Site Characterization Plan (SCP) for the Yucca Mountain Site to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, December 28, 1988, 4 pp. plus 3 enclosures, including "Responses to NRC Point Papers on Site Characterization Plan/Consultation Draft."
Section 8.3.1.17 Overview of preclosure tectonics: Description of tectonic and igneous events required by performance and design requirements

Table 8.3.1.17–3a Design and performance parameters related to surface facilities and preclosure fault displacement

COMMENT 61

The program of investigations for faulting appears to assume that any future faulting will follow old faulting patterns. The NRC staff considers that this is not a reasonably conservative assumption, and does not consider that this assumption is technically justified.

BASIS

- In the basis for CSDCP Comment 50, the NRC staff discussed surface offsets which have been observed in Nevada, and requested DOE to evaluate this information to assure that the program of investigations would be sufficient to produce a design which was safe and performance parameters for fault displacement which were reasonably conservative. The faulting investigations not only appear to be driven by criteria which the NRC staff does not feel have been justified (see Comment 60), but also by unconservative assumptions of future faulting patterns.

- In the response to CDSCP Comment 50, the DOE states it expects to meet the probabilistic goal conservatively because of the expectation that future main, branch and secondary faulting will generally recur at the same location as previous faulting. As support, the DOE quotes studies of the 1983 Borah Peak earthquake and the 1932 Cedar Mountain earthquake.

- While in many cases it is true that faulting will generally follow old patterns, there are many examples, some within the Basin and Range, where this was not true. For example:

  For most of the August 23, 1954, Rainbow Mountain event fault ruptures coincided with or extended the July 6 faulting patterns, but some of the new ruptures were subparallel to the older ones (Bonilla, 1970).

  Part of the December 1954 faulting north of Fairview Peak coincided with ruptures formed about 1903, but over most of the rupture length it did not coincide. The 1954 faulting crossed the earlier faulting and was located more than 1000 feet from it in some places (Bonilla, 1970).

  One of the conclusions reached by Depolo and others (1989) in their study of fault segmentation in the Basin and Range was that “...some earthquake discontinuities may be difficult to identify and significant faulting may occur beyond postulated discontinuities.”

  The pattern displayed by a fault, especially at or near the surface, will change through its developmental history. Fault patterns do not spring forth fully developed, but change through time.

  The assumption that faulting will recur at locations of old faulting has also been discounted in a recent report by Sandia (Subramanian and others, 1989), as it was recognized that “unknown faults” must be considered in the probabilistic evaluations of surface facilities in Midway Valley that this report was attempting to quantify.

RECOMMENDATION

The DOE needs to review the assumptions used to plan the exploration program for FITS to assure unconservative assumptions, such as future faulting only occurring at the exact locations of past faulting, do not bias the program.

REFERENCES


Section 8.3.1.17 Overview of preclosure tectonics: Description of tectonic and igneous events required by performance and design requirements

Table 8.3.1.17–3a Design and performance parameters related to surface facilities and preclosure fault displacement

COMMENT 62

The information presented for the program of investigations for study of faulting at the surface facilities does not allow the NRC staff to determine how DOE is proposing to use standoff distances in designing the program of investigations and in performing the resultant design and analysis.

BASIS

- The concern expressed by this comment is a continuation of the concern expressed in CDSCP Comment 50 regarding standoff distance from faults.

- The SCP states on p. 8.3.1.17–96 “Note that the 100 meter distance is not intended to represent an appropriate standoff distance for FITS from faults that have a potential for displacement. Should the faulting investigations identify a fault within 100 meters of the proposed FITS locations, the appropriate standoff distance and/or mitigative engineering measures will be assessed.”

- The NRC staff is unsure what DOE is proposing for appropriate standoff distances. The statement in the SCP seems to suggest that the DOE considers less than 100 m as an appropriate standoff distance for faults which have a potential for displacement. The NRC has seen no justification for such a position.

- The DOE response to CDSCP Comment 50 states that trenches will likely be excavated beyond 100 meters past FITS, but does not state that trenches will be excavated past 100 meters. The NRC, therefore, is not sure what is the extent of trenching which is planned, and how faults greater than 100 meters from FITS will be investigated or evaluated.

- 10 CFR Part 60.122(a) requires that DOE demonstrate, among others, that:
  
  (i) potentially adverse conditions have been adequately investigated, including the extent to which the condition may be present and still be undetected;

  (ii) potentially adverse conditions be adequately evaluated using analyses which are not likely to underestimate its effect; and

  (iii) the condition will not significantly affect the ability of the site to meet the performance objectives, can be compensated for, or can be remedied.

- While 10 CFR 60.122 is directed at postclosure concerns, the information used in the evaluation of FITS will be used to help evaluate the postclosure conditions, and the basic principles laid out within 10 CFR 60.122(a) will apply to all phases of the licensing process. The program laid out for evaluation of faulting near or at FITS appears to be ignoring these principles.

RECOMMENDATION

The DOE needs to demonstrate that:

(i) the program of investigations for faulting at or near FITS will adequately evaluate all faults which have a potential of movement, and/or

(ii) that the evaluation of the effects of faulting, taking into account the degree of resolution of the investigation, will not underestimate the effects, and

(iii) the effect of faulting will not compromise the ability of the FITS to meet the performance objectives

REFERENCE

4.0 Objections, Comments, and Questions

- SCP Section 8.3.1.17.4.2 suggests that possible locations for trenching will be based on air photo interpretation, geologic mapping, and possible use of geophysical investigations. Geologic mapping and geophysical investigations have been conducted in the area of the proposed surface facility and suggest the presence of many closely spaced normal faults and a high degree of fracturing in the subsurface (Neal, 1986). The NRC staff is unsure as to how this information has and/or will be used to plan additional trenching, mapping, and geophysical investigations in the area of the surface facilities. Neal (1986) appears to identify many areas which have questionable geologic structure; however, there appear to be no present plans to investigate these areas.

- This work is being planned to be used in licensing; however, the NRC staff is unsure as to how much of the preexisting information is planned to be qualified, can be qualified under the Quality Assurance program, or the potential effect on schedules if some of the planned information cannot be qualified (see also Comment 126). Much of the work which forms the basis for many of the assumptions within this section has been ongoing and is considered by DOE to be substantially complete. For example, mapping of trenches on the Bow Ridge fault system is considered to be 50% complete (SCP p. 8.3.1.17-160), a Quaternary-fault map has been published and mapping of surficial geologic deposits is considered to be 25% complete (SCP p. 8.3.1.17-156). The NRC has not seen any official results from the investigations.

RECOMMENDATION

Prior to the NRC staff being able to evaluate the program of site investigations, the DOE needs to complete at least the planning step of integration of the site program. This should include not only a separate integration of drilling, or a separate integration of geophysics, but a complete integration of the planned program of investigations. This integration should show how ongoing activities and pre-existing information has been incorporated into the program, and should demonstrate what assumptions are being made on the qualification of pre-existing data.

REFERENCE


Section 8.3.1.17.2 Investigation: Studies to provide required information on fault displacement that could affect repository design or performance
Table 8.3.1.17–4a Design and performance parameters related to underground facilities and preclosure fault displacement

COMMENT 64

The characterization parameters for the identification and characterization of "significant Quaternary faults" in the area of the repository block do not appear to fulfill the requirements in 10 CFR 60, such as investigating and evaluating the effects of potentially adverse natural conditions.

BASIS

- Activity 8.3.1.17.4.6.2, an activity that provides input into the postclosure tectonics program (Fig. 8.3.1.8–4), suggests that primary emphasis will be placed on characterizing "potentially significant Quaternary faults," although other faults will be examined.

- The characterization parameters for the identification and characterization of "significant faults" in the repository block limit those faults to ones with > 1 m of offset of Quaternary materials or with > 100 m of offset of Tertiary rocks.

- The NRC staff is uncertain as to what is meant by the term "potentially significant Quaternary fault." The NRC staff considers that until site characterization is complete, the interrelationship of faults is known, the interrelationship of site parameters to design parameters has been established, and the potential effect of the various faults on meeting the various performance objectives has been determined, the staff cannot determine what faults are potentially significant.

- Strike-slip faults with little to no surface expression could well be overlooked by using an approach in performance allocation that considers only "significant Quaternary faults." For example, Swadley and others (1984, p. 19) indicated that faults in the vicinity of the repository with a "few meters or less" of pure strike-slip movement in the Quaternary may be undetectable with current technology.

- Numerous shear fractures with predominately strike-slip motion have been reported in boreholes in the repository block (Spengler and others, 1981; Spengler and Chornack, 1984). No assessment of the amount of displacement along these fractures was made.
4.0 Objections, Comments, and Questions

- 10 CFR Part 60 Subsection 122(a)(2)(ii) states that potentially adverse natural conditions should be evaluated using analyses and assumptions which are not likely to underestimate their effect.

RECOMMENDATION

The site characterization program and performance allocation process should be designed to assure that any fault that could have an adverse impact on waste isolation will be characterized.

REFERENCES


COMMENT 66

The use of domains to define areas of "faulting potential" does not appear to be a reasonably conservative and technically justifiable approach to assess the potential for faulting at the site area and could underestimate the fault displacement hazard to the repository.

BASIS

- The assumption that significant faulting will, in the future, be restricted to domains is not adequately supported by existing data.

- The domainal concept of faulting potential appears to overlook the in-situ stress state in the vicinity of the site that indicates that, in part of the tuff section, favorably oriented faults might fail under current stress conditions (Stock and others, 1985). This condition may cross domainal boundaries near the site.

RECOMMENDATION

Domains can be used to describe areas of similar fault characteristics but should be reconsidered as mechanisms for determining the hazard to repository systems via poorly defined quantity termed fault potential.

REFERENCE


COMMENT 65

The use of domains to define areas of "faulting potential" does not appear to be a reasonably conservative and technically justifiable approach to assess the potential for faulting at the site area and could underestimate the fault displacement hazard to the repository.

BASIS

- The assumption that significant faulting will, in the future, be restricted to domains is not adequately supported by existing data.

- The domainal concept of faulting potential appears to overlook the in-situ stress state in the vicinity of the site that indicates that, in part of the tuff section, favorably oriented faults might fail under current stress conditions (Stock and others, 1985). This condition may cross domainal boundaries near the site.

- The assumption that significant faulting will, in the future, be restricted to domains is not adequately supported by existing data.

- The domainal concept of faulting potential appears to overlook the in-situ stress state in the vicinity of the site that indicates that, in part of the tuff section, favorably oriented faults might fail under current stress conditions (Stock and others, 1985). This condition may cross domainal boundaries near the site.

According to the 10-kyr CSE sample calculation, the 10-kyr CSE is derived from the displacement determined by multiplying the average annual displacement by 10,000 years, assuming all the displacement occurs in one 10,000-year event. The use of a 10,000
The 10-kyr CSE presented in year recurrence interval, which is the minimum interval suggested by the available data (see page 8.3.1.17-72 and Section 1.3), in this manner results in a minimum cumulative displacement, which in turn results in a minimum magnitude being estimated for the relevant earthquake source.

- The reliance on fractional fault length for the determination, or justification, of maximum magnitude, which is presented in the 10-kyr CSE sample calculation, can be very region dependent. For example, studies cited by URS/John A. Blume and Associates (1987) in their discussion of normal and strike-slip faulting in extensional environments indicate that earthquakes can rupture normal faults with rupture lengths that are not small in comparison to mapped fault lengths, and are occasionally larger. In addition, those authors indicate that ruptures occupying the entire length of strike-slip faults of the Basin and Range may be possible. Also, in another study (Matsuda, 1974), certain faults in Japan have been shown to rupture along their entire length during one earthquake.

- It is apparent from a review of SCP Section 8.3.1.17, Preclosure Tectonics, that since the 10-kyr CSE is intended to be the primary means for establishing the vibratory ground motion design basis for facilities important to safety, it is very important that the methodology for determining 10-kyr CSE's is clearly understood and that it is accepted as a reasonably conservative and technically sound approach for the characterization of vibratory ground motion.

- It may be argued that earthquakes with recurrence intervals longer than 10,000 years may have such low probabilities of annual exceedance that they need not be considered for the preclosure design, but it is not known just where in the normal recurrence interval a particular fault may be at the present time. This critical uncertainty does not appear to be addressed in the 10-kyr CSE sample calculation.

- The methodology does not appear to constrain magnitudes in a manner that results in a design-basis ground motion for facilities important to safety that would have an annual probability of exceedance between 1 chance in 1000 and 1 chance in 10,000 per year, which is typical of nuclear power plants, according to the SCP. In addition, to assure the same level of design basis exceedance between nuclear power plants and a geologic repository, it would be necessary to have consistent methodologies and, to the extent possible, consistent inputs. This may be quite difficult because there are no nuclear power plants in the Basin and Range.

- It must be more clearly demonstrated that there is sufficient seismic margin to conservatively withstand the larger maximum earthquake before the rationale for accepting maximum magnitude earthquakes less than that determined by fault parameters such as length and displacement can be accepted.

RECOMMENDATION

Recurrence-rate estimates should be given special emphasis. In particular, differences between the true maximum magnitude and the 10-kyr CSE, based on evaluations of the recurrence interval associated with the maximum earthquake determined from magnitude-frequency relationships, should be thoroughly explained. The planned site characterization activities, which are designed to provide all types of information that are material to the characterization of seismic hazard, should be conducted in a manner that will allow for a clear comparison of the 10-kyr CSE methodology with other alternative methodologies.

REFERENCES


4.0 Objections, Comments, and Questions

Section 8.3.1.17.4 Study: Effects of local site geology on surface and subsurface motions. (p. 8.3.1.17-77)

COMMENT 67

The data, compiled according to Activity 8.3.1.17.4.1.2, i.e., having a magnitude cutoff of 5.5, may not be sufficient to support an evaluation of the effects of local site geology on surface and subsurface motions.

BASIS

- Changes to the SCP in response to CDSCP Question 52 are insufficient.
- The provisions of §60.122(c)(14) require an investigation into the degree to which the local effects of an earthquake compare with those typical of the area in which the geologic setting is located.
- The objective of this study is to develop local correction factors for ground motion with respect to regional values by comparing ground motion parameters obtained from a more densely-spaced network of seismic instruments in the site area with those from a less densely-spaced regional network.
- The parameters listed under Activity 8.3.1.17.4.1.2 that are applicable to the determination of local correction factors, such as peak ground acceleration and velocities, durations, spectral amplitudes and so forth, will only be compiled for the larger (M greater than or equal to 5.5) earthquakes. Since earthquakes of this size are not common in the Yucca Mountain vicinity, considering the period of time allotted for characterization of the site, no regional data may be collected except for data from underground nuclear explosions.
- Current references of compiled seismic data for the Yucca Mountain vicinity such as Harmsen and Rogers (1987) include focal mechanism information for several events, none of which is greater than magnitude 3.
- The upgrading of the southern Great Basin seismograph network to digital recording, which is currently underway, should permit the routine determination of some of the parameters listed in Activity 8.3.1.17.4.1.2 that are reserved for earthquakes of magnitude greater than 5.5.

RECOMMENDATION

The distinction between those parameters that are to be compiled for all recorded seismic events and those that are to be compiled for events greater than magnitude 5.5 should be dropped. If it is reasonable and practical, information for any of the nineteen categories of parameters listed in Activity 8.3.1.17.4.1.2 should be compiled for earthquakes in the Yucca Mountain vicinity, without regard to their size.

REFERENCE


Section 8.3.1.17.4.5 Study: Detachment faults at or proximal to Yucca Mountain

COMMENT 68

Other aspects of detachment faulting in addition to those described in Section 8.3.1.17.4.5 regarding key questions to be answered on earthquake sources do not appear to be treated as similarly potentially significant.

BASIS

- Section 8.3.1.17.4.5 states that the key questions regarding detachment faults are whether they represent a significant earthquake source and whether they conceal a significant earthquake source.
- As outlined in Section 8.3.1.17.4.5, detachment faults could also be key to developing a conceptual model of faulting that could lead to conclusions about fault potential and expected magnitudes of fault events at the site. For example, if major faults (for example, the Bare Mountain and Midway Valley faults) are connected at depth, then the controlling feature of fault movement is the regional detachment surface. Recurrence intervals and offset magnitudes of faults tied to a common detachment surface should be, in a conservative view, considered as that expressed by the most active and most significant fault tied to the detachment surface.
- The characterization program related to detachment faults does not provide input into postclosure tectonics except in the digested form of tectonic models (Fig. 8.3.1.8-4) even though detachment faults may be of significance to addressing to postclosure performance issues.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The significance of detachment faulting as a key element in assessing the potential for faulting at the site needs to be readdressed giving consideration to other key concerns related to detachment faulting.
4.0 Objections, Comments, and Questions

- Consideration should be given to having the results of Study 8.3.1.17.4.5 input directly into postclosure tectonics performance issues.

Section 8.3.1.17.4.5.5 Activity: Evaluate the age of detachment faults using radiometric ages

COMMENT 69
The SCP does not appear to integrate and synthesize data resulting from the planned activities characterizing northwest-trending faults.

BASIS
- The Walker Lane belt, a major zone of northwest-trending faults, continues through the Yucca Mountain area (p. 1-208) and may be expressed by the northwest-trending washes north of the repository (Scott and others, 1984).
- Several conceptual tectonic models for the site (i.e., continuation of the Stagecoach Road-Paintbrush Canyon breakaway zone) could involve northwest-trending faults at the site.
- Movement along northwest-trending faults could occur as subsidiary movements related to movement along differently oriented faults.
- Planned activities (e.g., northeast-trending ESF drift) will, at least in part, address northwest-trending faults.
- No specific study appears to exist to integrate investigations that will collect data on northwest-trending faults in the vicinity of the repository.

RECOMMENDATION
Consideration should be given to specifically outlining a program of study to integrate and synthesize all activities that will collect data on northwest-trending faults.

REFERENCE

Section 8.3.2.2 Issue Resolution Strategy for Issue 1.11 Function 3: Limit potential for excavation-induced changes in rock mass permeability. Permeability modification associated with excavation process, p. 8.3.2.2-14

COMMENT 70
The statement in the SCP (p. 8.3.2.2-14, paragraph 3) that the blast control procedures are less important to postclosure performance has not been justified.

BASIS
- The supporting Section 6.4.1 of the SCP-CDR essentially states this position but does not provide any supporting analyses.
- Reliance is placed on the concept of matrix flow to support the conclusion that blasting-induced fractures are less important to postclosure performance (SCP p. 8.3.2.2-4, paragraph 3). However, the DAA Review Record Memorandum, Appendix J, p. 2-4, paragraph 3 states that potential for flow in fractures is a special concern because this flow mode could provide a mechanism for . . . rapid movement of radionuclides . . . to the saturated zone underlying the repository.

RECOMMENDATION
Significance of blast control procedures and blasting-induced fractures should be discussed in SCP updates.

Section 8.3.2.5 Issue resolution strategy for Issue 4.4: Are the technologies of repository construction, operation, closure, and decommissioning adequately established for the resolution of the performance issues?

Table 8.3.2.5-2 Preliminary performance allocation for System Element 1.1.2, subsurface (pp. 8.3.2.5-13 through 8.3.2.5-17)

COMMENT 71
The tentative goal, design parameter, and expected value relating faulting (e.g., "significant Quaternary fault") and performance allocation for System Element 1.1.2 are not sufficient for adequately characterizing the hazard posed by faulting in the repository.

BASIS
- The concern expressed by this comment is part of the concern expressed in CDSCP Comment 62.
- The response to CDSCP Comment 62 revises the performance measure and eliminates the term "po-
tentially active fault." However, a new term, "significant Quaternary fault," is introduced. The definition of the term "significant Quaternary fault" implies that only faults with demonstrable Quaternary offset represent a hazard to the repository in the preclosure and that the magnitude of offset along faults that may contain a significant component of lateral movement (i.e., strike-slip) can be accurately determined. Due to the potential for large uncertainties associated with both of these assumptions, use of this term "significant Quaternary fault" does not appear to be reasonably conservative approach to address preclosure tectonics issues.

- The design parameter indicates that "significant Quaternary faults" will be identified and characterized; however, the NRC staff continues to be concerned (Comment 35) that the site characterization program is inadequate to characterize potentially adverse conditions in the southern part of the repository block.

- The expected value for “significant Quaternary faults” indicates that none are expected to be found. This value does not consider alternative models for faulting in the geologic setting or the implication from Figures 8.4.2-4 and 8.3.1.4-10 that an imbricate fault zone may occur in the waste emplacement area.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Consideration should be given to using alternative fault models as a conceptual basis for assessing the preclosure hazard to the repository.

- Demonstrate that from a scientific perspective, the program of drifting in the northern part of the repository combined with the systematic drilling program and feature sampling program will provide the information necessary to ensure that conditions and processes encountered are representative of conditions and processes throughout the site and that potentially adverse conditions will be adequately investigated.

BASIS

- In response to CDSCP Comment 65, the SCP has not included analyses to evaluate the need for seals in the repository shafts and ramps.

- The following specific concerns have not been addressed.

**Man and Materials Shaft**

Assuming that the surface plug is likely to deteriorate with time, settlement of shaft backfill (proposed seal) could cause a depression at the location of the shaft collar and additional rock fracturing of the unsupported rock around the shaft walls, and could become a possible source of recharge because of ponding of water in the depression.

**Location of Waste Emplacement Ventilation Exhaust Shaft**

The location appears to be susceptible to the hazards of flooding and debris deposits. The slope of the ground surface in this area appears to be approximately 4%. High flow velocities can be expected on such a slope, particularly in localized channels and gullies.

**Muck Handling Ramp Portal**

The ramp entrance is proposed to be located in an area of numerous gullies. Potential hazards of flooding and deposition across the alluvial fan coming from Pagany Canyon appear to exist.

**Waste Handling Ramp Portal**

At the proposed location, the eastern slopes of Exile Hill are relatively steep (approximately 25%) and are subject to gullying. Surface runoff may be a potential problem, particularly if the runoff becomes channeled in the immediate vicinity of the surface entrance. Very high water velocities can be expected on 25% slopes of Exile Hill and the 8–10% slopes in the immediate ramp vicinity.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- DOE should plan its sealing program on the basis that seals will be needed until and unless it can be demonstrated otherwise.

- The SCP updates should evaluate the need for temporary and permanent seals for accesses based on conditions inherent at each location of proposed shafts and ramps.
COMMENT 73
Conservative design approach has not been used to determine required backfill hydraulic conductivity.

BASIS
- CDSCP comment 70 expressed concern about the narrow basis for determining backfill requirements. According to the SCP response, the recommended analysis is given in Fernandez et al. (1987). As stated in the original CDSCP comment, the design chart Figure F-10 is developed for a single rock mass permeability (Fernandez et al., 1987, p. F-12 through F-14). The sensitivity analysis claimed in the SCP response cannot be located in Fernandez et al. (1987).
- The CDSCP concern about other inflow and outflow scenarios, and, specifically preferential channel flow, remains unaddressed.
- The determination of the required backfill hydraulic conductivity \( (10^{-2} \text{ cm/s}) \) appears to be driven by comparisons of relative flow, i.e., allowable shaft inflow as a fraction of total flow (Fernandez et al., 1987, p. 3–22, top paragraph). The basic reference design chart (Fernandez et al., 1987, Fig. F-10) is developed for the case where the hydraulic conductivity of the rock mass is taken as \( 10^{-2} \text{ cm/s} \). It is not clear that a broad range of possible hydraulic conductivities of the rock mass has been considered in determining the required backfill hydraulic conductivity.
- On p. 8.3.3.2-34, it is stated that “The rock mass hydraulic conductivity for one analysis (Fernandez et al., 1987) was varied from \( 10^{-2} \) to \( 10^{-5} \text{ cm/s} \).” It is not clear that the results of this variation were considered in selecting the required backfill hydraulic conductivity.

RECOMMENDATION
It is recommended that the sensitivity analysis in which the broad range of possible hydraulic conductivities of the rock mass (e.g., \( 10^{-2} \) to \( 10^{-5} \text{ cm/s} \)) was considered, be specifically referenced. In-situ tests should be planned and initiated to obtain the needed data as soon as practical. Alternative inflow and outflow scenarios (e.g., preferential channel flow) should be presented in SCP updates.

REFERENCE

COMMENT 74
This section describes a four-step process to determine the need for in-situ testing of seal components. However, no indication is given as to whether and when testing “to initiate in-situ testing to evaluate the behavior of selected sealing components under realistic in-situ conditions as well as under unlikely conditions” (p. 8.3.3.2-41) will be initiated.

BASIS
- In response to CDSCP comment 64, the SCP has not included details of in-situ testing of the proposed seal design concepts.
- Section 8.3.3.2.5, Schedule for Seal Characteristics (Issue 1.12), does not discuss when steps 3 and 4 of the four-step process mentioned above will be completed, or when a decision can be expected relative to the need for in-situ testing.
- Table 8.3.5.16–2 (p. 8.3.5.1-8) indicates that in-situ testing of seal components will commence by approximately January 1993. It is not clear that all information for steps 3 and 4 discussed in Section 8.3.3.2.2.3 will be available by that time.
- No in-situ sealing concepts testing is presently included in ESF in-situ test plans, and no provisions are made in the ESF layout for such testing.
- The Safety Analysis Report to be submitted by the DOE for License Application is required to include an evaluation of the performance of the proposed geologic repository after permanent closure (10 CFR 60.21(c)(1)(i)(C)). Figure 8.3.3.1-1 of the SCP shows that the DOE plans to complete the performance analysis without results of any in-situ tests on sealing concepts.

RECOMMENDATIONS
- The SCP updates should indicate when a decision will be reached concerning the need for in-situ sealing concepts testing and when such tests might be carried out.
- A plan should be in place for in-situ sealing concepts testing prior to license application in case site characterization data indicate a need for reliance on seals.
4.0 Objections, Comments, and Questions

- The in-situ tests for seal components should commence as early as practical during the site characterization program, such that preliminary information would be available at License Application submittal and to ensure that long-term data are available by time of closure.

REFERENCE

10 CFR 60 (Subpart B)

Section 8.3.4.2.4.4 Study 1.10.4.1: Engineered barrier system field tests (p. 8.3.4.2-57).

Section 8.3.5.7 Issue resolution strategy for Issue 4.1: Can the higher-level findings required by 10 CFR Part 960 be made for the qualifying condition of the preclosure system guideline and the disqualifying and qualifying conditions of the technical guidelines for surface characteristics, rock characteristics, hydrology, and tectonics? (p. 8.3.5.7-11).

Section 1.8.1.1 Geomorphology (p. 1-325)

Section 1.8.1.4 Seismology and seismicity (p. 1-335)

Section 1.8.1.7 Mineral and hydrocarbon resources (p. 1-342)

COMMENT 75

The term “geologic setting” is cited frequently throughout the SCP in reference to diverse subject areas comprising the “geologic setting”, however, the term itself has neither been defined (see SCP, Volume VIII, Part B: Glossary and Acronyms) nor used consistently, that is, the component natural systems have not been systematically identified and described in plans to characterize them.

BASIS

- Given the complexity of the natural systems (this includes the geologic, hydrologic, and geochemical subsystems) of the region in which a geologic repository operations area is or may be located, each subsystem must be evaluated separately, using the technical information considered appropriate for that component system.

- The NRC’s evaluation of the adequacy of the technical information relative to any component system of the geologic setting is directly dependent upon the DOE’s definition and description of that natural system component as well as a depiction (appropriate figures) of the geographic extent (both laterally and vertically) of that component system.

- There is no clear definition of the term “physical domain” (Table 8.3.1.8.8) documenting how it relates to “Geologic setting” as used in 10 CFR Part 60.

- The SCP basis underlying the 70 km limit (Section 8.3.1.8.5) on volcanic activities (a natural system within the geologic setting) is not clear, but appears to exclude the Lunar crater volcanic field from consideration.

- Because of public comments received on a draft GTP on “anticipated processes and events and unanticipated processes and events,” the NRC staff is reevaluating its position on the definition of the geologic setting. A proposed rulemaking to clarify the issue of the determination of anticipated processes and events and unanticipated processes and events, including redefinition of the term geologic setting and the concepts underlying the term, is currently being prepared. For purposes of site characterization, the 10 CFR 60.2 definition of the geologic setting should be broadly interpreted.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Describe the site characterization plans for identification of the natural component systems (such as volcanic, seismologic, mineral resources, geochemical) making up the geologic setting of the region in which the geologic repository operations area is or may be located.

- Describe the plans for characterizing the interacting or interdependent components that form each of the above natural systems and provide the bases for such descriptions.

- Define and depict the plans for characterizing the geographic extent (this includes the vertical as well as the lateral dimensions) of each of the above components of the natural systems making up the geologic setting.

- Describe the characterization plans aimed at identification, description, and developing schedules for any investigations, studies, and activities necessary to define each of the above components of the natural systems.

REFERENCE

4.0 Objections, Comments, and Questions

Section 8.3.5 Performance Assessment Program

COMMENT 76

It is inappropriate to rely on NRC staff reviews of DOE’s work as peer reviews.

BASIS

- In several instances, the SCP calls for a peer review that involves NRC staff review. An example is to be found on p. 8.3.5.8-6 in the last paragraph.
- NRC staff agrees that peer review in accordance with the guidelines of NUREG–1297 is an acceptable technique for increasing confidence in analyses, arguments, and lines of evidence presented in the license application.
- However, it is inappropriate to imply that the regulatory agency participates in preparing the license application itself.

RECOMMENDATION

Do not identify the NRC regulatory review as a peer review of material (design, analyses, testing) submitted to support licensing.

REFERENCE

NUREG–1297 (1988)

Section 8.3.5.2 Issue Resolution Strategy for Issue 2.4 (pp. 8.3.5.2–1/52)

Section 8.3.5.5 Issue Resolution Strategy for Issue 2.3 (pp. 8.3.5.5–1/35)

COMMENT 77

In evaluating potential effects of credible accidents on projected preclosure radiological exposures, the SCP has not sufficiently considered retrieval operations.

BASIS

- In response to CDSCP Comment 72, it is stated that “retrieval looks much like the reverse of emplacement and, in that sense, retrieval operations may be considered to have been addressed in existing accident analyses.” The NRC staff considers that the operations related to waste retrieval may be more complex than emplacement operations, primarily due to the environmental effects of waste disposal. These may include: (1) operational problems due to the increased temperature of the rock mass and disposal room; (2) potential physical deterioration of the emplacement room and emplacement boreholes; and (3) potential deterioration or breaching of the waste package.
- The SCP has not adequately addressed the effects of credible accidents on projected radiological exposures during retrieval operations.

RECOMMENDATION

SCP updates should discuss retrieval operations in evaluating the effects of credible accidents on radiological exposures.

Section 8.3.5.3 Issue resolution strategy for Issue 2.1: During repository operation, closure and decommissioning (a) will the expected average radiation dose received by members of the public within any highly populated area be less than a small fraction of the allowable limits and (b) will the expected radiation dose received by any member of the public in an unrestricted area be less than the allowable limits as required by 10 CFR 60.111, 40 CFR 191 Subpart A, and 10 CFR Part 20?

Regulatory basis for the issue, pp. 8.3.5.3–3 to 8.3.5.3–18

COMMENT 78

It cannot be determined if all the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20, specifically those in 20.105(b)(1) and 20.105(b)(2), are being considered in the design requirements for the preclosure.

BASIS

- 10 CFR 20.105(b) requires that “Except as authorized by the Commission pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section, no licensee shall possess, use, or transfer licensed material in such a manner as to create in any unrestricted area from radioactive material and other sources of radiation in his possession:

  (1) Radiation levels which, if an individual were continuously present in the area, could result in receiving a radiation dose in excess of two millirems in any one hour, or (2) Radiation levels which, if an individual were continuously present in the area, could result in his receiving a dose in excess of 100 millirems in any seven consecutive days.”
- While the requirements of 10 CFR 20.105(n) are based on assuring that the actual exposure is main-
tained below the level of 500 millirems per year, the requirements of 10 CFR 20.105(b) are based on radiation levels in the unrestricted area, not actual exposure.

- While this section of the SCP appears to commit to meeting all requirements of 10 CFR 20, the staff can find no place within either the SCP or SCP-CDR which displays that the requirements of 10 CFR 20.105(b) have been directly incorporated into the design requirements.

RECOMMENDATION

DOE should review the various design requirements to assure that all the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 20 are being considered in design.

Section 8.3.5.9  Issue resolution strategy for Issue 1.4: Will the waste package meet the performance objective for containment as required by 10 CFR 60.113?

COMMENT 79

It has not been demonstrated that the test environment used in waste package corrosion tests is fully representative of the repository environment.

BASIS

- None of the studies described in this section (e.g., Section 8.3.5.9.2.3.2) mentions the use of test solutions which are fully representative of the potential near field waste package environment. Waste form leach products and canister corrosion products in near field solutions can alter the results of the studies and consequently the validity of the performance models for the degradation modes.

- Contaminated solutions migrating from the vicinity of the waste package (which may have been breached) may have inherited characteristics which are considerably different from the near field vadose water. It is not clear for example if “composition of water” in the list of container degradation model inputs (Table 8.3.5.9–5, p. 8.3.5.9–42) includes leached products from failed waste packages.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Determine the potential composition of contaminated solutions migrating from the vicinity of failed waste packages and use such solutions in waste package studies.

- Use leach solutions in waste package corrosion studies with compositions which would conservatively bound the range and variance of the constituents and products expected from all anticipated failure scenarios.

Section 8.3.5.9  Issue resolution strategy for Issue 1.4: Will the waste package meet the performance objective for containment as required by 10 CFR 60.113? (Tentative goals for release from the waste packages) p. 8.3.5.9–19 Paragraph 3.

COMMENT 80

Some performance goals related to the requirement for substantially complete containment do not appear to be consistent with DOE’s revised interpretation of the containment requirement and the intent of the rule.

BASIS

- This comment addresses the subject of performance allocation discussed previously in CDSCP Comment 109. In response to CDSCP Comment 109 (which is closely related to CDSCP Comment 3), the DOE extensively revised Section 8.3.5.9 with respect to the allocations of performance to waste package components and the associated quantitative goals for these components. The DOE also revised its interpretation of “substantially complete containment.” The revised DOE interpretation is in substantial agreement with NRC’s intent in 10 CFR 60.113. However, there appear to be inconsistencies among the tentative performance goals. For example, the SCP states that DOE understands substantially complete containment to mean that the waste package will fully contain the total radionuclide inventory. Nevertheless, the stated overall goal for waste package performance is for all failures to be less than 5 percent in 300 yr or less than 20 percent in 1,000 yr. (See Comment 44) Other inconsistencies are discussed in Questions 33, 34, 35, 38, and 39.

- As tentative goals to address the substantially complete containment requirement, the SCP states that DOE considers it appropriate to require that release of isotopes with long half-lives from the waste packages be controlled at a stricter standard during the containment period than during the post-containment period. Accordingly, the DOE has established the tentative criterion that release of these isotopes (listed in Table 8.3.5.10–3b) from the waste packages will be controlled such that their annual rates of release are less than 1 part in 1,000,000 for
those isotopes present in sufficient quantity in the 1,000-year inventory. It further states that the DOE has elected to limit releases of all other radioactive isotopes to an annual release rate of less than 1 part in 100,000 of the current inventory of that isotope in the waste packages.

- While the first goal stated above is a stringent one for controlled release, it may not be consistent with NRC's interpretation of "substantially complete containment" because the NRC has not set numerical limits on the release of radionuclides during the containment period.

- The second goal is clearly unacceptable and inconsistent with the containment requirement inasmuch as it would permit a rate of release during the containment period greater than that permitted during the post containment period.

- As indicated in Table 8.3.5.9-1, the goal of less than 0.001 for the fraction of containers failed in any given year in the 300 to 1000 year time frame appears inconsistent with the containment requirement.

RECOMMENDATION

Establish goals which are consistent with the requirement for "substantially complete containment." While the first goal may be adequate, the second goal is judged to be unacceptable.

Section 8.3.5.9 Issue resolution strategy for Issue 1.4: Will the waste package meet the performance objective for containment as required by 10 CFR 60.113?

Section 7.4.2.6.4 Activities to determine transgranular stress corrosion cracking susceptibility

COMMENT 81

Investigations into the stress corrosion cracking behavior of the container alloys assume that the container surface will be either homogeneously dry or homogeneously wet, but in the corrosion model (7.4.5.4.6), it is stated that "the waste package will most likely not be uniformly wet."

BASIS

- While it is obvious why assuming a homogeneous environment is desirable from a modeling standpoint, it is not clear that this is a valid assumption.

- Since the rock and the placement of the container in the borehole will not be expected to be a homogeneous environment over the entire surface of the container at all times, inhomogeneous exposure conditions are expected.

RECOMMENDATION

Evaluate effects of inhomogeneous exposure conditions on the stress corrosion cracking behavior of waste package components.

Section 8.3.5.9 Issue resolution strategy for Issue 1.4: Will the waste package meet the performance objective for containment as required by 10 CFR 60.113?

Section 8.3.5.10 Issue resolution strategy for Issue 1.5: Will the waste package and repository engineered barrier systems meet the performance objective for radionuclide release rates as required by 10 CFR 60.113?

Section 7.4.5.2 Processes affecting waste package performance

Section 7.4.5.4 Yucca Mountain Project waste package system model description

COMMENT 82

There is inadequate discussion on how performance of the waste package may be verified at the time of license application.

BASIS

- Section 7.4.5.4 discusses how the DOE plans to model the processes affecting waste package performance (Section 7.4.5.2) to resolve issues 2.2 and 1.4. These issues are:

1. Issue 2.2 (Section 8.3.5.4); Can the repository be designed, constructed, operated, closed, and decommissioned in a manner that ensures the radiological safety of workers under normal operations as required by 10 CFR 60.111, and 10 CFR Part 20?

2. Issue 1.4 (Section 8.3.5.9); Will the waste package meet the performance objective for containment as required by 10 CFR 60.113?

- Sections 8.3.5.9 and 8.3.5.10 include discussions of laboratory tests to obtain information for waste package performance assessment models but no discussion on how well the models represent what actually might happen in the repository environment or how the models will be validated at repository depth in the host rock environment. If in situ test data are

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not obtained during site characterization, the
needed information may not be available at the time
of license application.

- It is not clear how the large scale coupled effects of
prolonged thermal, radiation, and geochemical
phenomena are planned to be investigated for the
waste package in the current test plan.

- It is not clear how DOE plans to investigate stress
related effects for container base metal as well as the
weld-affected region after long-term thermal and
radiation exposure without large scale waste pack-
age tests under repository conditions.

- DOE has not demonstrated that the potential effect
of the container coming in contact with dissimilar
metals, resulting in galvanic corrosion, can be suffi-
ciently investigated without large scale waste pack-
age tests under repository conditions.

**RECOMMENDATION**

The SCP should be modified to include in situ waste pack-
age tests to obtain the data needed to verify waste package
performance at the time of license application. Alterna-
tively, DOE should demonstrate that the plan laid out in
the SCP is sufficient to obtain the needed waste package
behavior information to support the license application.

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**Section 8.3.5.9** Issue resolution strategy for Issue 1.4 Will the waste package meet the performance objective for containment as required by 10 CFR 60.113?

**Section 7.4.5.4.6** Corrosion model

**Section 7.5.4.6** Metal barriers

**COMMENT 83**

The term "uniform corrosion" is misleading.

**BASIS**

- "Uniform corrosion" implies the same corrosion
rate over the entire surface of the canister.

- In the SCP, there is no information on the degree of
surface roughness. Surface roughness develops
gradually on an originally smooth metal surface un-
dergoing general corrosion.

- The amplitude of the various frequency components
of the roughness (and their conceivable variations as
a function of the orientation of the metal surface
with respect to the gravitational field) will affect the
time when the metal container will be breached.

- Other factors, such as macroscopic inhomogeneities
of any component undergoing corrosion, can con-
tribute to the uniformity, or lack thereof, in the cor-
rrosion process.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Use the term "general corrosion."

- Define the variability of corrosion over the container
surface and explain how the variability will be fact-
tored into the assessment of expected container life-
time.

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Section 8.3.5.9 Containment by Waste Package.
Section 8.3.5.10 Engineered Barrier System Release Rates.

**COMMENT 84**

The issue resolution strategies and testing programs for
design of the waste package (Section 8.3.5.9 of the SCP)
and engineered barrier system (Section 8.3.5.10 of the
SCP) do not take into account the full range of reasonably
likely natural conditions ("anticipated processes and
events") that, with current understanding of the site,
might be expected to affect performance of these barri-
ers.

**BASIS**

- This comment was presented as CDSCP Comment 73. In response to the comment, the DOE has re-
vised sections of the SCP to "explain the interaction
between the scenarios developed in Section 8.3.5.13
(Issue 1.1) and those developed to resolve Issues 1.4
and 1.5 (Sections 8.3.5.9 and 8.3.5.10). Section
8.3.5.10.3.1 has been expanded to include four
closely linked subactivities that are designed to de-
develop appropriate scenario identifications, separate
the scenarios into anticipated and unanticipated
categories, develop the parameters of the near-field
environment that describe the scenarios, and deter-
mine the adequacy of the design envelope resulting
from those parameters."

- The NRC considers that while Section 8.3.5.10.3 of
the SCP commits to consideration of anticipated
processes and events in analyzing release from the
engineered barrier system, the program of testing
and analysis for the waste package and engineered
barrier system does not appear to reflect this phi-
losophy. As is stated in Chapter 7, p. 7-8 for exam-
ple, the DOE is assuming that the waste package will
not be subject to any lithostatic loading. The site is
bracketed by the Solitario Canyon fault on the west
and the Paintbrush canyon fault on the east, both of
which have demonstrated evidence of Quaternary
movement. There are numerous other faults in the site vicinity which have not yet been explored to a sufficient degree to show that Quaternary movement has not occurred. In addition, as is stated on p. 1-145 of the SCP, the measured magnitudes of the smaller component of horizontal stress are near and perhaps even below the minimal values required to provide the lateral support necessary to prevent expansional failure on moderately dipping faults trending parallel to the larger component of horizontal stress. In other words, favorably oriented faults at Yucca Mountain may be in a state of incipient failure.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- It is recommended that Yucca Mountain faulting be considered as just one example of "anticipated processes and events." This position is in agreement with the draft generic technical position "Guidance for Determination of Anticipated Processes and Events and Unanticipated Processes and Events" which was published for public comment in February 1988, and which represents the NRC's present position on this subject.
- DOE should explore the full range of "anticipated processes and events" that can affect the performance of engineered barriers.

Section 8.3.5.9.1.1.4 Subactivity 1.4.11.4: State of stress in the container

COMMENT 85

The SCP does not take into account temporal changes in the state of stress due to corrosion of the container.

BASIS

- This comment was presented as CDSCP Comment 77. In response, the DOE has pointed out that all candidate canister materials are corrosion resistant (as opposed to providing a corrosion allowance); therefore the increase in state of stress resulting from oxidation and aqueous corrosion will be low. It also states that DOE will consider the effects of pits and other localized corrosion phenomena as stress raisers and potential sites for crack nucleation. However, the justification given for neglecting general corrosion is insufficient. As a result, DOE should reconsider the CDSCP comment.
- Corrosion resistant materials corrode at a finite rate. While the wall thinning due to this corrosion may be insignificant over a few years, it could be significant for the design lifetime of the container.
- The minimum wall thickness (resulting from maximum allowable wall thinning) before failure by mechanical loads is not zero and it must be determined.
- General corrosion is not truly uniform and irregular surface features may evolve with continued corrosion, particularly at welds.
- To avoid tensile residual stresses at welds, it has been proposed that the weld and weld heat-affected zone be treated such that the surface layer is in compression (7.4.2.7, 7.4.2.5.5, and 8.3.5.9). However, removal of this layer may alter the state of stress.

RECOMMENDATION

When analyzing the state of stress at different locations, consider the influence of corrosion on wall thickness and surface flaw geometry, particularly at the weld and weld heat-affected zone.

Section 8.3.5.9.2.2.1 Subactivity 1.4.2.2.1: Assessment of degradation modes in copper-based materials

COMMENT 86

The basis for degradation modes of copper-base alloys given in the SCP does not appear to agree with scientific literature. Future testing plans may therefore be improperly designed.

BASIS

- This comment was presented as CDSCP Comment 80. DOE indicates that it has accepted the comment. However, the text in Section 8.3.5.9.2.2.1 has not been changed. Our comments stated here are limited to the major discrepancies between the description of the corrosion behavior of Cu-base materials on p. 8.3.5.9-71, as well as in Section 8.3.5.9.3.1.6 (p. 8.3.5.9-95 to -97) and our understanding of the corrosion behavior of Cu-base materials.
- It is not true that the role of NH₃ is to dissolve protective films. Cracking occurs in the so-called tarnishing solutions, where Cu₂O forms a film on the metal, as well as in conditions where no film is ever present because the aqueous ammonia solution is unsaturated with respect to Cu₂O. In the case of pure copper, cracking has been observed only when an oxide film was present.
- Cracking is not usually transgranular. Intergranular SCC is at least as common as T-SCC, and is prevalent in the case of certain alloys.
- Oxidizing conditions are not a universal requirement. T-SCC has been observed in cuprous ammo-
The search for a critical potential below which SCC does not occur is of very questionable value.

The above considerations lead to concern that future testing plans may not adequately consider published literature.

RECOMMENDATION

Evaluate the corrosion of Cu-based alloys using accepted thermodynamic and kinetic arguments and factor this evaluation in the testing program for copper-based materials.

Section 8.3.5.9.2.3 Subactivities 1.4.2.3.2 – 1.4.2.3.9 Laboratory Test Plan for Austenitic Materials

COMMENT 87

The possibility that the container may come into contact with dissimilar metals (resulting in galvanic corrosion) is not addressed adequately in this section.

BASIS

- In all instances the choice of materials is limited. For example, for the spent fuel canister the DOE is considering austenitic stainless steels and copper/copper-base alloys, and the fuel is clad in Zircaloy. It is unclear whether DOE plans to select the canister material to minimize the potential of galvanic corrosion on the inside of the canister. This could be a problem if the material selected on this basis is not suitable or is less suitable than another material from external canister corrosion considerations. Again, for the glass waste form the only material that DOE is considering for the pour canister is Type 304L stainless steel. If copper/copper-base alloy is found to be more suitable for the outer canister from corrosion considerations in the repository environment, it is unclear how DOE plans to minimize the galvanic corrosion effects in such a situation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Discuss the approach that DOE will take to select materials to minimize galvanic effects addressing the constraint of limited material choice.

- Discuss how the approach chosen will be applied to the design of different parts of the engineered barrier system, outer and inner canister, bottom support plate, partial liner and waste package dolly.

Section 8.3.5.9.3.2.7 Subactivity 1.4.3.2.7: Transgranular stress corrosion cracking

COMMENT 88

In the SCP, the implication is made that by going from the saturated zone to the unsaturated zone of the repository, the uncertainties with respect to corrosion are reduced.

BASIS

- The corrosion of stainless steels in aqueous solutions is probably the most thoroughly studied alloy/environment system. Hence, one must ask how the scientific uncertainty can be less in the environment where there is less scientific data and empirical experience.

- The discussion in Section 7.4.2.6.4 demonstrates the difficulty of predicting SCC behavior in unsaturated conditions as illustrated by the discussion in Westerman’s U-bend experiment (p. 7–95, third paragraph). It was noted that 40 specimens of 304 and 304L stainless steel, both in the solution-annealed and sensitization-treated conditions, were exposed to unirradiated well J–13 water at 200 degree C in an autoclave. After 50 cycles (1 yr) of alternate wetting and drying, only the sensitization-treated 304 specimens had cracked, and these had cracked intergranularly, even though the experiment was planned primarily for investigating and accelerating transgranular cracking.

RECOMMENDATION

Thorough and unbiased scientific investigations of the potential problems in the unsaturated zone should be con-
ducted and the uncertainties regarding corrosion processes should not be assumed to be less than those in the saturated zone.

- Increases in rock permeability of up to three orders of magnitude (Lin and Daily, 1984).
- It is reported that the transition from alpha to betacrystalobalite causes a 5% volume increase in the rock matrix (see p. 7-40).
- The above two processes could lead to sealing of cracks in the rock and to the formation of an almost airtight envelope around the metal canisters.
- An airtight envelope would starve the corrosion process of oxygen and this could alter the corrosion of the canisters in this system.
- On the other hand, heating of the rock caused by radioactive decay could generate a stream of air and water vapor, which, flowing by the metal canisters, could significantly accelerate the degradation processes over and above the air flow caused by atmospheric pressure variations.

RECOMMENDATION
Determine the effects of air infiltration on the processes affecting the corrosion of the metal waste container.

REFERENCE
BASIS

- As stated in p. 8.3.5.9–34, carbon–14 present in the spent fuel waste form both in the fuel and on or near the exterior surfaces of the fuel cladding and assembly hardware can be released rapidly as carbon–14 in dioxide form when air contacts the waste form at elevated temperature.

- The presence of liquid is not required for transport of gases to the environment.

- The SCP suggests (in Section 8.3.4.1.2) that the alternative containers may provide additional control of the release of gaseous radionuclides, such as carbon–14.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Provide discussions to address how well the proposed alternative container designs may contribute to mitigating the release of gaseous carbon–14 from the EBS.

- Waste package design improvements should be considered to satisfy the controlled release requirements of 10 CFR 60.113(a) before considering variation in allowed release of carbon–14 from EBS under 10 CFR 60.113(b).

The approach for delineating the disturbed zone boundary should include consideration of all physical and chemical properties which will have changed as a result of heat generated by the emplaced radioactive wastes. The significance of these changes on repository performance should be ascertained and the delineation of the disturbed zone boundary based on those changes significant to repository performance.

REFERENCE

“alternative conceptual models” is theoretically inappropriate and would not provide exhaustive (complete) assessments of groundwater travel time for NRC staff review.

BASIS

- It is stated in the SCP that, “...the uncertainty in the travel time caused by alternative conceptual models will be incorporated in the cumulative distribution curves, perhaps by subjective weighting of the alternatives based on peer review” (p. 8.3.5.12-17; paragraph 2). It is also stated in the SCP that, “...the curves will represent the uncertainty associated with parameter measurements as well as the uncertainty associated with many professional judgments about the effects of the various sources of parameter and conceptual model uncertainty on flow mechanisms” (p. 8.3.5.12-17; paragraph 3).

- The NRC staff interprets “alternative conceptual models” in the above quoted statements to mean reduced or simplified models (supported by defensible technical evaluations) that represent the complex natural physical system and hydrologic processes (i.e., geologic structure, hydrologic system flow boundaries, and flow and transport processes) that will be used in generating a cdf.

- The combining of two or more simplified hydrologic flow-transport models to generate a CDF is inappropriate. The effect of combining weighted “conceptual models” into one overall CDF is in effect a “shrinkage towards the mean” for the predicted variable (i.e., groundwater travel time) of the CDFs that would have been generated for each individual and distinct “conceptual model.” Thus, information about the extremes of individual CDFs would be lost. The demonstration of shrinkage towards the mean was made in studies by Hill (1982) and Hill et al. (1984) using Stein’s estimators for finding the best estimator of several CDFs for nuclear reactor failures.

RECOMMENDATION

Generate, individually, groundwater travel time cumulative distributions for each defensible “alternative conceptual model” so that information from the extremes of CDFs can be evaluated by the NRC technical review staff.

REFERENCES


Section 8.3.5.12 Issue resolution strategy for Issue 1.6: Will the site meet the performance objective for pre-waste-emplacement groundwater travel time as required by 10 CFR 60.113?

COMMENT 94

Identification of all assumptions about features, events and processes related to the hydrologic system incorporated into the initial modeling strategy for the performance analysis of groundwater travel time is not complete. Initial assessments as to whether these assumptions are technically justified are not presented.

BASIS

- It is stated in the SCP that “the first step in the five-part process to establish a strategy to resolve Issue 1.6 (Groundwater travel time) is to identify all hydrogeologic units along potential flow paths to the accessible environment and identify all potentially operating processes within each of those units” (p. 8.3.5.12-6). Hypotheses posed about the geometric configuration of “hydrogeologic units and potentially operating processes within those units” are listed in Tables 8.3.1.2–2a and 8.3.1.2–2b in Section 8.3.1.2 (Geohydrology Program).

- In Table 8.3.1.2–2b, it is noted that the “current hypothesis” on flow in the saturated zone is that “fractures in Tertiary volcanic rocks serve as principal pathways for groundwater flow” (p. 8.3.1.2–70). Various field tests are planned to evaluate this hypothesis. However, on p. 8.3.5.12–70 it is noted that “for purposes of conservatively evaluating groundwater travel time, the saturated zone will probably be treated solely as an equivalent porous medium where fracture properties characterize the medium.” This example of a simplified modeling assumption demonstrates a general modeling procedure for performance analyses wherein physical features or complex flow processes are simplified with respect to what information from the field testing program would indicate (in effect, the complexity of features or processes is reduced or specific features or processes are omitted from the analysis). This modeling procedure is clearly acknowledged in the SCP as is the need for analyses to support these simplifying assumptions (p. 8.3.5.12–41). This example also demonstrates that certain simplifying
assumptions have been incorporated into the initial modeling strategy with out a technical justification to indicate that the effect of these simplifying assumptions on performance predictions is negligible (it is noted that technical justification for eliminating those processes that can be shown to be of sufficiently negligible effect in performance analyses is to be provided by Activity 8.3.1.2.2.9.3; Simulation of the natural hydrogeologic system, although results of work completed to date, if any, have not been presented). Further, the discussion on p. 8.3.5.12-5 indicates that the only flow process of significance in calculating groundwater travel time is whether flow in the unsaturated zone is predominately in the matrix or alternatively, flow in fractures is continuous. Although it may be that these alternatives are the most significant in calculating groundwater travel time, the manner that other physical features or complex flow processes are treated in performance analyses may also be significant. For example, neither the method for, or significance of, defining upper, lower or lateral boundaries of the unsaturated zone in performance analyses is considered in the strategy presented.

- It is the position of the staff that “the use of models to represent features, events, processes, or repository components or subsystems should be justified through a discussion of the assumptions, application(s), and limitations of the mathematical model. These should not contradict any of the hypotheses embedded in the corresponding conceptual model(s). While mathematical models should not be unnecessarily complex, all processes that could affect model results should be considered and decisions to omit certain processes should be technically justified. The assumptions, application(s) and limitations of the procedures identified should be discussed.” (Review Guide 3.2.4.4.2; p.35.) That has not been done in this section. Further, that has not been adequately done elsewhere in the SCP. (Refer to Comments 10 and 18.)

RECOMMENDATION

Identify all assumptions about features, events and processes, related to the hydrologic system, that are incorporated into the initial modeling strategy for the performance analysis of groundwater travel time. Indicate which assumptions are believed to be technically justified based on currently available information. Indicate which assumptions require additional support before they can be considered to be justified and reference specific plans to obtain needed supporting information.

Section 8.3.5.13 Total System Performance

COMMENT 95

The underlying methodological logic that is used to develop and screen scenarios and its implementation in the SCP appears to be deficient for the generation of a CCDF representative of total system performance; therefore, this approach is unsuitable for guiding the site characterization program, even if allowances are made for the current lack of knowledge about the site and the expediences required to develop the site characterization program.

BASIS

- Comment 94 on the CDSCP was addressed by providing more detail in additional text. However, as discussed in the points below, the new text does not resolve the comment. Although Question 46 on the CDSCP was answered in part, the text does not address important issues of mathematical robustness and does not provide confidence that site characterization will obtain data needed to analyze all the scenarios that need to be treated in the CCDF.

- With regard to the recommendation in CDSCP Comment 94: (1) the scenario selection and screening procedures articulated in the SCP do not contain explicit criteria or the justification for them; (2) the scenario selection and screening procedures are not systematic, nor do they provide assurance of completeness; and (3) the inappropriate formal use of expert judgment is discussed in Comment 3.

- The five scenario classes listed in Table 8.3.5.13–3 are used to develop the performance allocation for total system performance (Table 8.3.5.13–8) that guides the site characterization program for resolution of Issue 1.1. Table 8.3.5.13–2 correlates the 5 scenario classes with 49 other scenario classes of unspecified origin (column 2 of the Table), some of the 99 Ross scenario sequences, and some of the scenarios considered in the Decision Aiding Methodology. Neither the tables nor the accompanying text provide a suitable relationship among the various sets of scenarios and scenario classes to show: (1) how these scenario classes relate to the discussions of constructing the CCDF and (2) how the particular set chosen is adequate for the purposes of site characterization.

- The “scenario classes” listed in Table 8.3.5.13–3 are used as the basis for performance allocation; however, because one scenario may fit into more than one of these groupings, they are not mutually exclusive and, therefore, not appropriate for development of a CCDF. Also, it is not clear that these groupings include all significant scenarios (another requirement of the CCDF). For example, the SCP adds 15 scenarios to the set of scenarios developed
The approach to defining scenarios used in the Ross report is deemed incomplete; however, no analysis is provided to assure that the current set of scenarios is complete.

1. As defined in the SCP, the "nominal scenario class" is so improbable as to be of marginal significance. It does not seem appropriate to plan site characterization based on a set of "scenarios" which are unlikely to even occur.

2. As a practical matter it does not appear that the DOE will be able to generate the joint distribution function $F(V)$, or that the site characterization program will provide any input to define this distribution function given that the five "scenario classes" (A-E) which form the basis of performance allocation are defined in a manner inconsistent with the mathematical definitions of this text. Equation 8.3.5.13-6 defines the conditional CCDF for a "scenario." Equation 8.3.5.13-4 defines the basis of calculating the CCDF as the expectation integral given by Equation 8.3.5.13-3. The expectation integral is defined in terms of the joint distribution function $F(V)$, which is defined as the distribution over the entire set of state variables and their range for all eventualities. It does not appear that the use of the expectation integral as implied in Equation 8.3.5.13-6 has a precise mathematical meaning, since the expectation integral has not been explicitly defined for a "scenario."

3. The approach to defining scenarios used in the Ross report is to begin with a comprehensive list of events and processes that could contribute to release of radioactivity from a repository and screen these entities and their combinations for significance for Yucca Mountain. An alternative approach is to look at the Yucca Mountain repository, to determine which subsystems are critical to waste isolation, and to define conditions or events that will compromise these subsystems; this is the central focus of most PRA. At the bottom of p. 8.3.5.13-25 and in Table 8.3.5.13-2 the idea is articulated that some combination of these two approaches is being used to define scenarios for the purpose of guiding the site characterization effort. (Table 8.3.5.13-2 attempts to relate the Ross scenarios to scenarios defined on the basis of major barrier affected.) It is not clear how consistency, completeness, and mutual exclusivity of scenarios is achieved where a combination of approaches is used since this is conventionally assured by consistent use of one approach or another.

4. The nominal scenario class, E, is cited Table 8.3.5.13-3 as: "Undetected and nominal performance of all barriers" and "Undisturbed performance of all natural barriers." However, on p. 8.3.5.13-8 the text indicates that Ross scenarios related to flooding, geochemical change, undetected features, faulty waste emplacement, increase in recharge due to climate control, differential elastic response to heating, nonelastic response to heating, temperature-driven fluid migration, local mechanical fracturing, corrosion, chemical reaction of waste package with rock, geochemical alteration, and microbial activity are all included in the nominal scenario class. The text broadly states that aggregating such diverse scenarios into the "nominal" scenario class is justified because site characterization will investigate a large range of conditions, features, and parameters sufficient to include these scenarios.

5. The various processes and events, that form the bases of scenarios and sequences by which they can cause failure of barriers to the release of radio nuclides, used in the Ross report are based on a list of 57 events and processes published by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, 1983). Although this listing is useful for some purposes, the NRC staff does not believe that this is an appropriate basis for developing scenarios pursuant to demonstrating compliance with 40 CFR 191. Unlike the European approaches to regulating a repository, the US approach is deeply rooted in the systems approach, wherein the term scenario has a very specific and constrained meaning. In particular, scenarios should not represent the response of the repository system to anticipated or unanticipated external events of environments; rather, scenarios should be limited to descriptions of the external constraints, in time, on the system.

6. Page 8.3.5.13-44. Five "undetected features" are included in the set of "agents" used to estimate how many independent scenario classes must be considered. The NRC staff does not advise treating undetected features as scenarios. Instead, undetected features should be treated as uncertainties in the conceptual model or as alternative conceptual models to be resolved during site characterization.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The approach to scenario analysis and how it is being employed to guide the site characterization program should be clarified or redone. In particular, as stated in the first Recommendation from CDSCP Comment 94, the methodology for scenario development and screening should (1) be systematic and (2) provide assurance of completeness.

2. In particular, the following aspects require correction:

   a. Performance allocation and consideration of alternative conceptual models should be performed in the context of a reasonable number
of real, mutually exclusive, important scenarios or scenario classes—not the objects listed in Table 8.3.5.13-3.

Consideration of sets of scenarios, sets of scenario classes, and sets of other objects derived in various references and other sources should be used considering their derivation and logical consistency.

REFERENCES


Section 8.3.5.13 Issue resolution strategy for Issue 1.1: Will the mined geologic disposal system meet the system performance objective for limiting radionuclide releases to the accessible environment as required by 10 CFR 60.112 and 40 CFR 191.13?

Section 8.3.1.3.4 Investigation: Studies to provide the information required on radionuclide retardation by sorption processes along flow paths to the accessible environment

Section 8.3.1.3.5 Investigation: Studies to provide the information required on radionuclide retardation by precipitation processes along flow paths to the accessible environment

COMMENT 96

The Investigations to characterize radionuclide retardation are focused on the determination of a $K_d$ for use in the equations $R_m = 1 + Q_v K_d/\theta_m$ and $R_p = 1 + Q_f K_d/\theta_d$. Equations 8.3.5.13-14a and b. It has not been demonstrated in the SCP that the use of these equations to model the complex heterogeneous medium of Yucca Mountain is valid for all expected (i.e., anticipated) states of the natural flow system (i.e., full range of unsaturated and saturated).

BASIS

- It is stated in the SCP that radionuclides showing consistently high sorption coefficients will not need further testing (p. 8.3.1.3-28). In fact, because numerous variables can affect sorption, for those radionuclides for which sorption credit is required, sorption coefficients greater than 0 are more likely to be an indication of where further work is needed.

- The use of maps contouring iso-$K_d$'s and iso-$P$'s in two and three dimensions at Yucca Mountain (8.3.1.3-75) suggests that these parameters are invariant for the total system performance calculations. Thus, the $K_d$'s assigned to the various portions of Yucca Mountain in the total system performance calculations will be held constant over the history of the repository. Further evidence suggesting the time independence on $K_d$’s comes from Tables 8.3.1.3-3, 4 and 5 (pp. 8.3.1.3-72, 73, and 75) which describe the matrix of batch sorption experiments that are planned. These tests will not simulate all conditions expected in the repository.

- Current representations of the sorption model state that sorption is a function of many parameters including the specific sorbing element, water composition, solids, temperature, rock texture, hydrologic properties and to a lesser extent, colloids and particulates. In turn, the current representation of the water chemistry model states that the water composition is controlled by water-rock interactions. Furthermore, the current representation of the mineral evolution model states that the alteration of secondary minerals (particularly sorptive minerals) will be predictable based on thermodynamic considerations and is a function of time. Thus, $K_d$’s should vary over the history of the repository.

- Fuentes et al., (1987) provides an example of contaminant migration in a time-dependent chemical environment. The simulation involves a chromatographic column on which contaminant, uniformly distributed initially, is flushed from the column by addition of a pulse of solution of lower pH. The contaminant migrates as a front with the pH front. Contrary to the results if a constant $K_d$ model were used, the contaminant front is not retarded relative to the liquid flow. Furthermore, the contaminant front accumulates the entire inventory of the contaminant. The Fuentes et al., (1987) study concludes that

"Because front formation has been observed (referring to studies of a low-level nuclear waste site and uranium mill tailings) and could be the common case rather than an anomaly, repository environments that provide various degrees of chemical isolation should be investigated with respect to their stability against accumulation scenarios."

- Tripathi et al., (1989) provide another example in which one dimensional transport of uranium is
simulated in a column packed with two different sorbing solid phases—a less sorptive phase followed abruptly by a more sorptive phase. This simulation uses HYDROGEOCHEM, a finite element method that computes mass transfer, with equilibrium and disequilibrium speciation, sorption, ion exchange and dissolution/precipitation. The results of the simulation demonstrate that concentrations of uranium downstream can exceed even the inlet concentration. Furthermore, $K_d$ determined along the column length vary over orders of magnitude as a function time. The reason for the variation is that at some points along the column the chemistry of the water changes with time.

- Not all nonzero $K_d$'s result in retardation. Comment 8 of the NRC staff review of the Yucca Mountain Environmental Assessment (1986) provides an example:

  "Rundberg (1987) states that precipitation which would yield an apparent sorption ratio, cannot be ruled out in the batch measurements. If precipitation instead of sorption has occurred in the batch test, retardation is not proven. In such a case, concentration of a radionuclide species in the solution would be limited by the solubility of the radionuclide-bearing solid and insensitive to the presence of other solids in the substrate. For example, if precipitation occurred in a batch test using a nonsorptive solid and a radionuclide-bearing solution, an 'apparent sorption ratio' could be determined. This 'apparent sorption ratio' could be erroneously inserted into equation 8.3.5.13-14 for calculating a retardation factor. However, if the liquid from the batch test were then decanted into a column containing the same nonsorptive solid, the concentration would not exceed the solubility limit (i.e., no additional precipitation would occur) and the radionuclide would travel down the column as fast as the liquid (no retardation). Thus, if precipitation is not disproved in a sorption test, credit cannot be taken for retardation of the radionuclide."

- Table 8.3.5.13–4 lists typical distribution coefficients and approximate retardation factors for welded and nonwelded Yucca Mountain hydrogeologic units. Values for radium are included in the table that have been derived from experiments (Daniels et al., 1982) using barium as a chemical analogue. In some of the sorption experiments involving barium the ion activity product exceeds the solubility product (Weast, 1970) for barium sulfate. Thus, it can be assumed that precipitation occurred in these sorption experiments. Nevertheless, Table 8.3.5.13–4 converts the distribution factor for radium (barium) to a retardation factor.

- Further evidence suggesting that credit will be taken for precipitation as a retardation mechanism comes from 8.3.1.3.5 Investigation: Studies to provide the information required on radionuclide retardation by precipitation processes along flow paths to the accessible environment.

- The appropriate application of $K_d$ in the Equation 8.3.5.13–14 requires that the solute-solid reactions are reversible and fast and the isotherm is linear (Freeze and Cherry, 1979). These limitations are recognized in the SCP (p. 4–60). However, the existing sorption data has been fit using a Freundlich isotherm formulation. Cesium, strontium, barium, europium, and plutonium exhibit nonlinear behavior in welded tuff (pp. 4–81 and 4–82). However, these elements are included in Table 8.3.5.13–4 and retardation factors are calculated from corresponding distribution coefficients.

- The $K_d$ appropriately applied to Equation 8.3.5.13–14 is not the ratio of the radionuclide on the solid to that in the liquid but the slope of the isotherm measured at points along its length. Thus, although a nonzero $K_d$ calculated as the ratio of radionuclide on the solid to that in the liquid exists at the cation exchange capacity, the tangent to the isotherm at the CEC has a slope of zero and no net sorption occurs. Consequently, no retardation would be expected.

- Daniels et al., 1982, show that sorption ratios can vary over four orders of magnitude in distances less than one hundred feet. Considering that the sorption ratios will determine the distances contaminants will travel when coupled with a given flow rate, uncertainties in the sorption ratios lead to uncertainties in the chemistries of the contaminant plume with respect to space and time. The method for handling sorption heterogeneities of this magnitude and whether the Equation 8.3.5.14 will remain valid for modeling the complex system at Yucca Mountain is not described in these Investigations.

- Although not explicitly stated, it appears that the mobile moisture content in Equation 8.3.5.13–14 will be determined in the laboratory. Wierenga and Van Genuchten (1989) mention that “in some cases the retardation factor can be less than one, indicating that only a fraction of the liquid phase participates in the transport process.” Plans to determine mobile versus immobile water in unsaturated fractured rock at the scale of the repository are not described in these Investigations.
4.0 Objections, Comments, and Questions

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that those Investigations of the geochemistry program studying retardation demonstrate that Kd's are appropriate for use under the conditions expected at Yucca Mountain or that information is obtained for developing the transport model(s) needed for performance assessment.

REFERENCES

Daniels, W.R. et al., 1982, Summary report on the geochemistry of Yucca Mountain and environs, Los Alamos National Laboratory, LA-9328-MS.


Section 8.3.5.13 Issue Resolution Strategy for Issue 1.1: Will the mined geologic disposal system meet the system performance objective for limiting radionuclide releases to the accessible environment as required by 10 CFR 60.112 and 40 CFR 191.13?

COMMENT 97

Evidence presented is not adequate to conclude that iodine can be eliminated as an important radionuclide which can be transported in the gaseous phase. As a result, data collection plans are not complete.

BASIS

- Section 8.3.5.13 of the CDSCP asserted that the transport of gaseous iodine will not be a concern because "elemental iodine is extremely reactive and likely to be released in a liquid or solid phase" (p. 8.3.5.13-36). NRC CDSCP Question 47 asked about the existence of DOE analyses or assessments which support this assertion. Section 8.3.5.13, p. 8.3.5.13-75 of the SCP made the same assertion without any supporting documentation. Therefore, the SCP response is inadequate and does not address the basic NRC concern regarding the effect of repository temperatures on the vapor pressure of some low boiling iodine compounds and their potential transport to the accessible environment.

- The NRC staff was particularly interested in the assessments that may have been done to show that the vapor pressure of iodine will be low enough such that gaseous iodine will not be formed in the repository system and transported in the vapor phase to the accessible environment.

- The NRC staff concern about the potential for vapor phase transport of iodine from the repository is based on the work by Binnall et al. (1987) which pointed out that iodine and some of its tin compounds will have considerable vapor pressures at repository temperatures and must also be considered as candidates for vapor phase transport.

RECOMMENDATION

Provide evidence to adequately support the conclusion that iodine can be eliminated as an important radionuclide which can be transported in the gaseous phase, or expand characterization work to include the collection of that needed information.

REFERENCE

• Important objectives of site characterization are (1) to provide the basis for the analysis of a set of sufficiently complete, mutually exclusive scenarios (or scenario classes) and (2) to provide the basis for choosing between significant alternative conceptual models. If site characterization fails to establish a sufficient information base to distinguish between significant alternative conceptual models, expert judgment can be used only to a limited extent. A site characterization plan that presumes recourse to a strategy of relying on expert judgment to substitute for missing analyses or data may result in an incomplete license application. (See also Comment 7.)

• 10 CFR 60.122(a) requires, in part:

"In order to show that a potentially adverse condition does not so compromise the performance of the geologic repository the following must be demonstrated:

(i) The potentially adverse human activity or natural condition has been adequately investigated, including the extent to which the condition may be present and still be undetected taking into account the degree of resolution achieved by the investigations; and

(ii) The effect of the potentially adverse human activity or natural condition on the site has been adequately evaluated using analyses which are sensitive to the potentially adverse human activity or natural condition and assumptions which are not likely to underestimate its effect;

The analytical approach stated in the SCP has the potential to underestimate the effects of potentially adverse conditions and, because alternative concepts are averaged, may not be sensitive to such conditions. Further, this approach does not indicate that criteria will be set to determine whether various potentially present conditions have been adequately investigated. Neither does the approach indicate how "the extent to which the condition may be present and still be undetected" will be incorporated into the weighting factors for various alternative conceptual models.

• In discussions of the strategy to show compliance with the EPA standard, alternative conceptual models of site behavior are still considered to be in the same category as "scenarios" as used in the context of the EPA HLW standard. Such a rendering misconstrues the intent of the EPA standard and the NRC interpretation of it, in which only uncertainties related to future states of nature (scenarios) and variation in model parameters are incorporated in the CCDF. The approach is suspect because the subjective probability that a particular conceptual model is correct is a different type or meaning of probability from the occurrence probability of future events and from the possible system realizations based on spatial variability of geologic parameters. Although the approach may be mathematically satisfactory from a purely theoretical perspective, from a decision theoretic viewpoint it is undesirable, because it mixes uncertainties rather than segregating them so decision-makers can more readily evaluate their import.

• Page 8.3.5.13–7. Item 7 in the list of "highly aggregated state variables for the Yucca Mountain system" is "The effective weights assigned by professional judgment to alternative conceptual models of some site phenomenon or the response of the system to a known site phenomenon." Unlike the occurrence or nonoccurrence of some future event or the realization of certain parameter values, the correctness of a conceptual model is not a "state variable."

• Page 8.3.5.13–13 and Figure 8.3.5.13–2. Alternative conceptual models of recharge are treated in the same fashion as event occurrences. Site characterization should be conducted to distinguish between important alternative conceptual models or to calculate the CCDF in a conservative fashion given insufficient evidence from site characterization to eliminate alternative conceptual models.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• The SCP should recognize that the approach of incorporating alternative conceptual model likelihoods into the computation of the CCDF of cumulative releases of radionuclides may not provide information about repository performance in an acceptable format because uncertainties are not delineated distinctly.

• Plan to incorporate consideration of unresolved alternative conceptual models into the CCDF in a conservative fashion by choosing the alternative that gives the poorest performance (greatest releases of radionuclides) or by some combination of the two alternatives that ensures no underestimates of releases and develop the site characterization program accordingly.
4.0 Objections, Comments, and Questions

Section 8.3.5.13 Total System Performance

COMMENT 99

For some scenario classes in which a particular release mode is thought to dominate or, at least, dominate for a particular time period, the consequences that are calculated may not be adequately represented unless all the release modes are quantified, especially the residual part of the inventory continuing to participate in the nominal or undisturbed mode(s) of release. Premature and inappropriate limiting of the consequence analysis in this way may distort the performance allocation process so that insufficient priority is placed on some data or important data acquisition activities may be omitted from site characterization.

BASIS

- Page 8.3.5.13-25 (first paragraph) states "...for some scenario classes, such as drilling scenarios, the direct-pathways mode may be considered to dominate." Although the direct pathway mode may dominate at the time of excavation of some waste during drilling, the remainder of the waste not excavated by drilling will continue to release radionuclides to the accessible environment in a manner that prevailed prior to drilling, as modified by the effects on liquid and gas pathways by the drilling. Although the excavated waste may provide a substantial "spike" of releases at the time of excavation, the waste released in a less disturbed fashion may still be considerable and make a substantial contribution to the CCDF.

- Page 8.3.5.13-53. "Some of the scenario classes result in direct discharge of radionuclides to the surface. Others result in indirect releases; that is, they produce movement of radionuclides through the barriers of the repository system to the accessible environment. The table labels the scenario classes according to these modes of release." In fact, virtually all scenarios produce releases by several modes. If the intention is to classify scenarios by the "featured" mode of release, that may be appropriate for certain applications. Recognize, however, that the "featured" mode of release may not be the same as the dominant mode of release because without a calculation to support the assertion it is not clear that specifically a particular featured mode of release, such as direct exposure to a small fraction of the emplaced waste, may be smaller than the ongoing mode(s) of release from the unaffected waste. Therefore, use of a single mode of release to calculate consequences for a given scenario is acceptable only when calculations show that the releases by modes that have been omitted do not contribute to the CCDF in a substantial fashion, either individually or aggregated over the entire range of scenarios.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Plan to include all appropriate modes of release in calculating the consequences of every scenario class; these modes should not be eliminated unless an analysis is provided that shows that leaving them out of the analysis has no significant effect on the CCDF.

- In calculating consequences of a scenario it is acceptable to partition the waste inventory according to the mode of release, but the release from all modes should be calculated. It is not acceptable to partition the waste and not account for the ultimate fate of part of the waste.

- The confidence and goals in the performance allocation process should be determined by considering all modes of release from each scenario with appropriate consideration of the magnitudes of release from different modes.

Section 8.3.5.13 Total System Performance

COMMENT 100

There are two problems with the sequences for faulty waste emplacement (pp. 8.35.13-32 to 33): (1) sequences for faulty waste emplacement establish the initial condition for the repository at time of closure and should not be included in the set of scenarios, and (2) the sequences are so limited, it is not clear that the site characterization program will acquire the data to analyze the likelihood and consequences of such initial defects.

BASIS

- Sequences related to faulty waste emplacement establish the initial condition of the repository at the time of closure. The likelihood of such sequences could be used to establish the "most likely" configuration of the ensemble of waste packages in the repository or to establish a set of initial repository configurations with their associated probabilities. In either case such configurations would be acted upon by all postclosure scenarios, so a treatment of the initial repository configuration(s) as a separate scenario(s) is incorrect, because such combinations would be precluded.

- There is no clear indication that the sequences cited in this part of the SCP are sufficiently complete to assure that the data required to analyze the given examples and other sequences related to human error will be acquired during site characterization.

- Human reliability analyses have been performed for the repository system, but are not cited here as the
basis for the set of sequences listed (e.g., Harris, 1985).

- Some important sequences are omitted, e.g.: (1) canisters are emplaced in such a way that the air gap which is an integral part of the design for the package is eliminated by drilling the hole too small, tilting the canister in the hole, or placing the canister in the hole off-center; (2) extraneous materials may be introduced into the repository during construction or operation which will help to mobilize the radionuclides, enhance corrosion, or otherwise adversely affect performance.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Use these sequences to establish (by modeling) the initial configuration for the repository; do not use these sequences as objects parallel to scenarios. Prudent engineering practice would dictate instituting design, operational, and QA controls sufficient to reduce the occurrence of this type of sequence to a level sufficiently low so as not to affect materially the performance of the repository.

- Systematically analyze human reliability in terms of the effect on postclosure performance to assure that all required data are obtained during site characterization. This could be provided in a periodic update.

REFERENCE


Section 8.3.5.13 Total System Performance

COMMENT 101

Equation 8.3.5.13-21, which is used to estimate "the partial performance measure for the jth scenario class involving releases along the water pathway" [sic; see Comments 95 and 99 for an explanation of why it is not appropriate to define scenario classes in terms of release mode] appears to have been derived on the basis of inconsistent assumptions and may be in error.

BASIS

- The cited reference (Sinnock et al., 1986) confirms that the effective solubility limit is defined as the lesser of the solubility of the matrix or the solubility of the ith radionuclide. The use of the solubility limits in this way presumes that the amount of radionuclide i released from the waste package depends on solubility of the matrix and the fractional amount of radionuclide i contained in the waste matrix.

- The cumulative release of radionuclides to the environment (Equation 8.3.5.13-21) is based on the time varying concentration of each radionuclide at the boundary of the engineered barrier system. In calculating this concentration (Equation 31 in Sinnock et al., 1986), it is assumed that the amount of radionuclide i released from the waste package depends upon the amount of mass of radionuclide i remaining in the waste package. This appears to be at variance with the use of solubility limit and the associated condition that the amount released depends on the fractional amount of radionuclide i contained in the waste matrix.

- In other words Equation (25) of Sinnock et al., 1986 relates mass release rate of radionuclide i to the amount of mass of radionuclide i remaining at any time. The assumption of solubility limited release from the waste package appears to imply that the release rate should only depend on the fractional content on nuclide i in the waste matrix, not the absolute amount present.

- Equation 8.3.5.13-21, which estimates the partial performance measure for the water pathway, contains a term related to the mass release fraction, which may underestimate the partial performance measure.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The development of the performance measure for liquid pathway release should be reconsidered to assure that the method of estimating the performance measure is derived using consistent, compatible assumptions.

- If a reconsideration of the development of this performance measure causes a reevaluation of the performance allocation, any necessary changes to the site characterization program should be made.

REFERENCE


4-81 NUREG-1347
4.0 Objections, Comments, and Questions

Section 8.3.5.13 Total System Performance

COMMENT 102

The model for Ross sequences Number 10 (p. 8.3.5.13-29), 14 and 15 (p. 8.3.5.13-30) seems to be at variance with the hydrologic model of flow at Yucca Mountain; because (as in this case) the basis for developing scenarios to guide the site characterization program appears to be inconsistent, site characterization may fail to provide the information needed for licensing.

BASIS

- In discussing conceptual models for the site p. 8.3.5.8-7 states, "The most probable water flow path from the repository to the accessible environment is currently thought to be vertically downward through the unsaturated Topopah Spring, Calico Hills, and Crater Flat units to the water table, and then horizontal below the water table."

- In discussing Ross sequence number 10 the text states, "Occasional major floods provide sufficient infiltration to overcome the capillary barrier that usually diverts flow laterally..."

- In discussing Ross sequence number 14 the text states, "...The fault thus forms a 'trap' for laterally moving moisture in the Tiva Canyon welded unit..."

- In discussing Ross sequence number 15 the text states, "Fracturing along a newly mobilized fault creates a permeable pathway through the flow barrier north of the repository block. The magnitude of the resulting change in the flow system is sufficient to raise the water table under the repository..." This assumes a significant horizontal groundwater gradient and induced lateral flow.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Events in scenarios can certainly change the prevailing conceptual model of the site; however, the effect of events should not be predicated on differing conceptual models, except in an exhaustive and systematic fashion.

- The discussion of Ross sequences should be consistent with the current conceptual model of site hydrology or, if non-vertical flow is anticipated near the ground surface, the description of Ross sequence number 10 should be clarified; any added text in 8.3.5.8 and the hydrology chapter should be cross-referenced.

Section 8.3.5.13 Total System Performance

COMMENT 103

Ross sequence numbers 59–62 and 64–69 appear to characterize either anticipated conditions or alternative conceptual models, rather than scenarios.

BASIS

- Ross sequences 59–62 characterize the effect of heat from the emplaced waste on the hydrologic environment (the movement and chemistry of the water) near the repository.

- Ross sequences 64–69 characterize different types of corrosion or different manifestations of corrosion.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Such effects should be included in the model of repository behavior or proposed as alternative conceptual models and investigated during site characterization.

- These should not be classed as scenarios or sequences.

Section 8.3.5.13 Total System Performance

COMMENT 104

The Ross sequences appear to be based entirely on spent fuel as the waste form; since these sequences presumably form a basis for the site characterization program, it is not clear that important scenarios that may be peculiar to vitrified HLW have not been omitted.

BASIS

- Sequences 68, 72, and 83 specifically mention "cladding" or "Zircaloy cladding," which is characteristic of spent fuel.

- No sequences specifically for vitrified HLW were identified.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Reconsider scenario analysis for the site characterization program with the likelihood that a significant amount of vitrified HLW will be deposited in the repository.

- Augment or modify the site characterization program, performance allocation, and hypothesis testing strategy as necessary to effectively treat vitrified HLW.
Section 8.3.5.13 Total System Performance

COMMENT 105

Although DOE may incorporate material by reference in the licensing application and although scenarios already eliminated may not need to be treated in calculating the CCDF in the license application, sufficient data, and analyses, or justification should be accumulated during site characterization to substantiate the decision to eliminate these scenarios.

BASIS

- Page 8.3.5.13–46, 2nd paragraph states: “In general, the scenarios eliminated by Ross (1987) and those scenarios screened out as part of the DOE decision-aiding methodology (1986a) are assumed to be inapplicable at Yucca Mountain.”
- The study by Ross was conducted to assist the Yucca Mountain Project; the decision-aiding methodology report was performed to assist the DOE in selecting sites to recommend for nomination by the President, under the NWPA.
- 10 CFR 60.21(c)(1)(ii)(C) requires that the SAR contain an evaluation of postclosure performance of the repository; this requirement mandates a justification of the anticipated and unanticipated processes and events (scenarios) used as the basis for estimating performance.
- 10 CFR 60.23 allows incorporation of material by reference in the license application; such incorporation by reference does not mean the conclusions of the references are exempt from challenge, review, and litigation during the licensing hearing.
- Elimination of certain scenarios, as in the cited references, may be appropriate for the purposes of site characterization; however, the justification for such eliminations must be included in the documentation for the SAR.
- The current NRC staff interpretation of 10 CFR 60 is that resolution of issues key to licensing and the technical basis supporting the resolution cannot be concluded prior to licensing, except by rulemaking, and then only when supported by a factual basis.

RECOMMENDATION

The DOE should re-examine and re-evaluate the scenario screening process in the SCP and the proposed investigations in the SCP to assure that sufficient data will be obtained during the site characterization program to support the scenario screening presented in a complete, high-quality license application.

REFERENCES


Section 8.3.5.13 Total System Performance

COMMENT 106

There appears to be a missing coupling term in equation 8.3.5.13–12B; this equation is the primary basis for calculating liquid-phase radionuclide transport to the accessible environment.

BASIS

- The matrix/fracture coupling terms represented by lambda subscript 1 for the advective coupling constant and by lambda subscript 2 superscript i for the diffusive coupling constant both appear in equation 8.3.5.13–12A but only the diffusive coupling constant appears in equation 8.3.5.13–12B. This lack of reciprocity in coupling could be inadvertent or it could be deliberate, based on unstated assumptions about the size of these terms. If deliberate, the basis should be stated.
- Equation 25 of the cited reference (Wilson and Dudley, 1987), which appears parallel to equation 8.3.5.13–12B of the SCP contains both coupling terms.
- The importance of these coupling terms in determining system performance is cited repeatedly, pp. 8.3.5.13–62,–71, and –75.

RECOMMENDATION

DOE should clarify equations 8.3.5.13–12 and make any adjustments necessary in the plans for site characterization that could result from changing these fundamental equations describing radionuclide transport through the primary geologic barrier.

Section 8.3.5.13 Total System Performance

COMMENT 107

Although the introduction of a waiting time in equation 8.3.5.13–24 may, in general, be acceptable from a
theoretical viewpoint, care must be taken to assure a correct implementation of the concept, both in generating an empirical CCDF and in approximating performance for purposes of guiding site characterization.

**BASIS**

- Comment 93 on the CDSCP has been responded to by adding clarifying text. Some of the important caveats cited in the “Responses to NRC Point Papers” documents are not captured in the SCP text. Many facets of the comment still stand, but concerns are now more focussed.

- On p. 8.3.5.13-70 “waiting time” is defined as the “time, after closure, before the first occurrence of an initiating event or process that may lead to a release (yr).”

- Clearly this definition of “waiting time” presumes a random variable; it is not clear from the discussion of the use of waiting time to calculate performance, as in equation 8.3.5.13–21, that a random variable, rather than a fixed value (perhaps the mean) is intended. Because of the way that time enters these equations, use of the mean waiting time will virtually never yield the average performance.

- The time frame from which waiting time is reckoned is implied to be $t = 0$, i.e., the time of repository closure. For events described by a Poisson process (waiting times described by the exponential distribution) or similar memoryless processes, the waiting time must be reckoned from time $t = 0$. However, for many if not most geological processes, a weighting time measured from closure of the repository rather than last occurrence of event will introduce considerable error because the underlying processes should not be described by a Poisson distribution.

- For example, evidence appears to indicate that the site is in a state of incipient faulting, so the appropriate waiting time for these events is zero.

- The use of the waiting time concept could preclude accurate representation of certain events and processes, like tectonic activity, known to occur in clusters. Use of waiting times based on data where event occurrence is rare may underestimate true waiting time over the period of performance of the repository, estimation of waiting time based on data where occurrences are frequent may be too pessimistic. In either case this may be an unnecessary limitation in how to treat such occurrences.

- Since alternative conceptual models, undetected features, and scenarios are put on an equal footing, it is unclear how DOE proposes to define waiting times for alternative conceptual models and undetected features.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- At an early opportunity the DOE should clarify the limitations on the use of “waiting times” and discuss how these limitations will be reflected in the proposed DOE use of the concept.

- In the event that an inappropriate or incorrect use of the waiting time concept has led to the premature removal from consideration of a scenario or an incorrect performance allocation, the DOE should amend the site characterization program at an early opportunity.

Section 8.3.5.13 Total System Performance

**COMMENT 108**

The use of the EPPM (expected partial performance measure) to screen scenarios and to establish goals for the performance allocation used to guide site characterization may be justified on a theoretical basis, but does not appear to be appropriately implemented in the SCP.

**BASIS**

- DOE has responded to NRC comment 92 on the CDSCP by providing further explanation of the mathematical substantiation for the use of the EPPM (expected partial performance measure). Pages 8.3.5.13-16 to 18 provide an expanded mathematical basis for the use of EPPMs in screening scenarios.

- Although equation 8.3.5.13–9 provides a sufficient condition (sum of EPPMs over all scenario classes is less than or equal to 0.01) for compliance with the EPA standard, the performance allocation table for Issue 1.1 (Table 8.3.5.13–8) erroneously departs from the more-or-less well founded mathematical basis by: (1) stating goals in terms of individual EPPMs instead of the sum; (2) setting goals as high as 0.2 for individual EPPMs; and (3) stating goals for EPPMs for objects (release scenario classes) that are not scenarios or scenario classes in the sense used to derive the mathematical substantiation for the use of EPPMs. As a consequence, meeting the goals stated in this performance allocation table will not assure compliance with the regulation and resolution of the issue.

- Page 8.3.5.13–18 (first paragraph). DOE discusses how an upper bound for an EPPM can be constructed and then used to screen out potentially disruptive agents. However, the discussion does not
consider the possibility that many individually insignificant EPPMs could be screened out but whose sum might be significant. For example, if the screening criteria is that an EPPM be less than $10^8$, and if 10,000 EPPMs are screened out, their sum might conceivably be as large as 0.01 (the limit in Equation 8.3.5.13-9).

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Assure that the tentative goals listed on Table 8.3.5.13-8, if met, will guarantee compliance with the containment standard.

- Reconsider the performance allocation for Issue 1.1 with the proper use of EPPMs or some other valid mathematical approach and adjust the site characterization program accordingly.

- State that, in applying the screening methodology, it is necessary to check that the sum of all EPPMs screened out must be less than 0.01.

Section 8.3.5.13 Total System Performance

COMMENT 109

Coupling times for the transfer of mass (radionuclides) between matrix and fracture flow is repeatedly cited as a key factor in determining the appropriate model for radionuclide transport at Yucca Mountain, yet alternative models depending on the nature of the coupling do not appear to be treated in the hypothesis testing tables.

BASIS

- Page 8.3.5.13–62 cites three “possible cases of transport of dissolved radionuclides through Yucca Mountain rocks” depending on the nature and speed of coupling between the flow in fractures and the flow in the rock matrix.

- Page 8.3.5.13–71 states that if the coupling between the matrix and fracture flow is strong in the unsaturated zone, then equation 8.3.5.13–25 may be used to estimate the effective transport velocity for a given radionuclide.

- Page 8.3.5.13–75 states how important the “coupling times” are in determining the nature of radionuclide transport in the saturated zone.

- The issue of coupling times and mechanisms does not appear to be treated in the hypothesis testing tables of either hydrology or geochemistry, but is treated in the performance allocation Table 8.3.5.13–17 (p. 8.3.5.13–110), where the need to determine the matrix-fracture interface permeability and constrictivity is cited. Given the importance of this issue (as evidenced by repeated discussion of the point in the SCP), it seems inappropriate to treat these substantially different cases by parameter determination (in the Performance Allocation Table), rather than by alternative conceptual models in the hypothesis testing tables. Although this is just one example, it points to the possibility that in producing the SCP no clear distinction was made between alternative conceptual models and verifying that a performance parameter goal was met. No general guideline or rule seems to have been stated, further contributing to the lack of demonstration that the SCP is complete and logically consistent.

- Discussions on pp. 8.3.5.13–64 to –65 indicate that there are at least three different conceptual models for the coupling coefficients (Wilson-Dudley, Rasmussen-Neretnieks, Sudicky-Frind), while the entries (especially the parameter goals) in Table 8.3.5.13–17 (p. 8.3.5.13–110) assume that the Wilson-Dudley model is correct and will be used to interpret the test data. This appears to be another example of designing the test program to support current representations, rather than allowing for alternative concepts.

- The tests proposed in SCP section 8.3.1.3.6 to determine the coupling constants are to be performed on cores in the laboratory. It is not clear how such tests will be able to determine coupling constants on the spatial and temporal scales indicated by equations 8.3.5.13–12, –25, and –26.

RECOMMENDATION

The testing program to determine the correct models for radionuclide transport in the saturated and unsaturated zone should be redesigned to assure that data to distinguish alternative models for matrix/fracture coupling will be obtained.

Section 8.3.5.13 Total System Performance

COMMENT 110

The response to CdSCP comment 90 indicates that human intrusion is intended to be left out of the calculation of the CCDF, but the SCP text is unclear as to how human intrusion will be handled.

BASIS

- The DOE Responses to NRC Point Papers document (U.S. DOE, 1988) clearly states: “Releases initiated by human activities will be considered separately. A CCDF accounting for human activities
must be separate from a CCDF for natural processes and events because the scenario classes associated with human activities are likely to be highly speculative and would easily dominate a single CCDF.”

- However, on p. 8.3.5.13–1, the SCP states that the EPA standard, which reads, in part: “. . ., based upon performance assessments, that the cumulative releases of radionuclides to the accessible environment for 10,000 years after disposal from all significant processes and events that may affect the disposal system . . .” while on p. 8.3.5.13–2 the text states:

“The phrase significant processes and events that may affect the geologic repository is interpreted as meaning likely natural events and such other processes and events that could affect a geologic repository and are sufficiently credible to warrant consideration. Significant processes and events that may affect a geologic repository may either be natural processes and events or processes and events initiated by human activities other than those licensed under 10 CFR Part 60. Processes and events initiated by human activities may only be found to be sufficiently credible to warrant consideration if it is assumed that: (1) the monuments provided for by this part are sufficiently permanent to serve their intended purpose; (2) the value to future generations of potential resources within the site can be assessed adequately under the applicable provisions of this part; (3) an understanding of the nature of radioactivity, and an appreciation of its hazards, has been retained in some functioning institutions; (4) institutions are able to assess risk and to take remedial action sufficient to prevent persistent or systematic releases resulting from human-induced disruptions of a repository; and (5) relevant records are preserved, and remain accessible, for several hundred years after permanent closure.”

The above text clearly indicates DOE’s intent to include events derived from human activities in the calculation of the CCDF, if the five assumed conditions are met. Ross sequences 31 through 53 and especially Ross sequences 40 and 44 for direct exposure through waste excavation, indicate this type of scenario is under consideration for calculation of the CCDF.

- As mentioned in Table 8.3.5.13–3 and elsewhere, scenario category A-2 “direct release associated with human intrusion” indicates DOE is considering this type of scenario to plan for acquiring data for the resolution of this issue.

- On p. 8.3.5.13–24 in discussing “The U.S. Department of Energy approach to constructing the complementary cumulative distribution function” the SCP states: “Disruptive scenario classes will also be developed for the analysis . . . These scenario classes would also include those developed for human interference activities discussed earlier (sic).” Many, if not most, readers would conclude that some human intrusion scenarios would be used to calculate the CCDF.

- Page 8.3.5.13–23 (last paragraph). DOE states: “The scenarios and scenario classes associated with human activities are often highly speculative and often do not involve significant impacts on the variables important to waste isolation. Therefore, the specification of highly speculative, low-impact human activity-related scenarios and scenario classes . . . will not be allowed to dominate the testing program.” There is no discussion of how to deal with human activities which might involve significant impacts.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Develop a consistent, rational approach to the resolution of issue 1.1 such that human intrusion scenarios are included in the calculation of the CCDF or such that these scenarios are excluded in such a way that compliance with the EPA standard can be demonstrated.

- Make appropriate adjustments to the site characterization program, if any, corresponding to the revised issue resolution strategy.

REFERENCE

U.S. Department of Energy, Letter from S. Rouss, DOE, to H. Thompson, Jr., NRC; Subject: Issuance of the Site Characterization Plan (SCP) for the Yucca Mountain Site to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, December 28, 1988, 4 pp. plus 3 enclosures, including “Responses to NRC Point Papers on Site Characterization Plan/Consultation Draft.”

Section 8.3.5.13 Total System Performance

COMMENT 111

Numerous inconsistencies exist in the SCP section on Total System Performance.

BASIS

- Page 8.3.5.13–45 “2” is raised to the exponent “13” and the result given is an odd number.

- Page 8.3.5.13–74, equation 8.3.5.13–28 uses the subscript “s” in two senses; as the index for
geohydrologic units and to denote the saturated zone.

- Page 8.3.5.13-10 (line 3). Change "sample size (*)" to "sample size S".

- Page 8.3.5.13-12 (second paragraph, third line from bottom). Change "G(0) = 0 and" to "G(0) = 1, ".

- Page 8.3.5.13-13 (second paragraph, line 7). Insert the following sentence: "Furthermore, the occurrence of E1 and E2 are assumed to be independent of the presence of F1."

- Page 8.3.5.13-17 (second paragraph).
  (a) Supply a derivation or a reference for the first inequality.
  (b) Replace "K" in Equation 8.3.5.13-7 and immediately follow it by "L".

- See Comment 113 on the definition of the unit step function inconsistent with the definition of the CCDF.

- See Comment 114 on confusing the terms "mutually exclusive" and "statistically independent."

- Page 8.3.5.13-10 (last paragraph). DOE states that "the entire CCDF would have to be constructed to see whether Equation 8.3.5.13-2 is satisfied" in the case where

\[ E[M] \geq 0.01 \]

In fact, it is only necessary to check the CCDF at two points, i.e., \( m = 1.0 \) and \( m = 10.0 \). That is, if \( E[M] \geq 0.01 \), it is necessary to check only that \( G(1.0) \) and \( G(10.0) \) satisfy the containment standard stated in Equation 8.3.5.13-2.

**RECOMMENDATION**

Inconsistencies in the SCP Total System Performance Sections should be removed or justified in the SCP update.

**BASIS**

Page 8.3.5.13-8 (third paragraph). DOE states that a state variable can be treated as a constant if its coefficient of variation (the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean) is "very small" but may have to be treated as a random variable if its coefficient of variation is "nearly one or larger." There is no discussion of the case where the coefficient of variation is not small but is less than one (e.g., 0.5).

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Introduce the term "coefficient of variation" for the ratio discussed in the paragraph. This is standard statistical nomenclature.

- Be more explicit about the conditions for treating a state variable as a constant.

- State that a state variable must be treated as a random variable whenever it fails to satisfy the conditions for treating it as a constant.

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Section 8.3.5.13 Total System Performance

**COMMENT 113**

The definition of the unit step function is not consistent with the definition of the CCDF.

**BASIS**

- On p. 8.3.5.13-5, the CCDF is defined as

\[ G(m) = \Pr \{M > m\} \]

This implies that there is no contribution to the CCDF if \( M = m \).

- On p. 8.3.5.13-9, \( G(m) \) is represented as

\[ G(m) = E[u(M-m)], \text{ where } u(x) \text{ is the unit step function defined by} \]

\[
\begin{align*}
  u(x) &= 0 \text{ if } x < 0 \\
  u(x) &= 1 \text{ if } x \geq 0
\end{align*}
\]

This implies that there might be a contribution to \( G(m) \) if \( M = m \) (if \( \Pr [M = m] > 0 \))

**RECOMMENDATION**

Change the definition of the unit step function to

\[
\begin{align*}
  u(x) &= 0 \text{ if } x \leq 0 \\
  u(x) &= 1 \text{ if } x > 0
\end{align*}
\]
4.0 Objections, Comments, and Questions

Section 8.3.5.13 Total System Performance

COMMENT 114

The term “independent” is incorrectly used instead of the term “mutually exclusive.”

BASIS

- Page 8.3.5.13-11 (third paragraph). DOE equates the terms “statistically independent entities” and “mutually exclusive events.” Instead of being equivalent, these terms are in fact opposites. If events A and B are independent, then the occurrence of A implies nothing about the occurrence of B. If, on the other hand, they are mutually exclusive, then the occurrence of A implies that B cannot occur.

- There are numerous other places in Section 8.3.5.13 where this mistake is made.

RECOMMENDATION

Replace the term “independent” by “mutually exclusive” throughout Section 8.3.5.13 whenever the concept of mutual exclusivity is meant.

Section 8.3.5.14 Individual Protection

COMMENT 116

The strategy for issue 1.2, Chapter 8.3.5.14, incorrectly assumes that if there is no significant source of groundwater at the Yucca Mountain site, then all environmental pathways for individual exposure related to radionuclides borne by groundwater are precluded.

BASIS

- The logic diagram for resolution of Issue 1.2 (Figure 8.3.5.14-1) indicates that if there is no “significant source of groundwater” (as defined in the EPA standards) at the Yucca Mountain site, then positive resolution of the Issue depends only on gaseous release of carbon-14. If there is a significant source of groundwater, only consumption of drinking water is considered as an environmental pathway.

- The EPA standard requires limiting individual dose at 1000 years after closure. Although guidance is provided by EPA for daily consumption of groundwater, individual dose is not limited to this pathway. Other pathways could include: (1) use of groundwater for irrigation, (2) rapid transport by groundwater to the surface followed by air dispersion of dusts and evaporites, (3) contamination without irrigation of soil used to grow crops.

- The proposed resolution strategy does not include DOE spelling out its proposed 560.121 controls and evaluation of their efficiency as part of the evaluation of which pathways to include.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Change the resolution strategy for this issue.

- There are two points: (1) if there is no “significant source of drinking water,” pathways other than drinking water need to be included in the demonstration of compliance, and (2) if there is not a “significant source of drinking water,” exposure of one or more individuals may still be plausible via drinking water and other liquid pathways.

- Change performance allocation to conform to a modified issue resolution strategy.

COMMENT 117

The discussion of individual exposure through the gaseous pathway indicates that “residence time” of carbon-14 in the overburden is required, but the discussion of planned activities and information needs does not
indicate that the advective and diffusive flow rates of radionuclides transport will be obtained; without these fundamental quantities, information on retardation will be of no use and calculation of residence time will be impossible.

**BASIS**

The discussion on p. 8.3.5.14–11 does not indicate that the diffusive and advective transport of gaseous radionuclides will be obtained specifically to resolve Issue 1.2, nor is it indicated how this information will be imported from activities to resolve other issues.

**RECOMMENDATION**

Amend the performance allocation table for this Issue and, if necessary, modify the site characterization program.

**Section 8.3.5.16 Issue Resolution Strategy for Issue 1.7**

**COMMENT 118**

The monitoring and testing activities listed in Tables 8.3.5.16–1 and 8.3.5.16–2 should include long term in situ and long term laboratory waste package activities.

**BASIS**

- 10 CFR 60 Subpart F (Part 60.140) provides the performance confirmation program requirements for natural and engineered system components.
- As stated in Objective 2 (p. 8.3.5.16–5), there is a need to confirm baseline information for waste package performance with the waste package environment.
- Waste package in situ monitoring and testing can provide source data for the long term prediction (modelling) of post closure performance.
- Collection of in situ or laboratory data for time durations longer than the short term data needed for the license application can reduce uncertainties related to the performance requirements (Part 60.113) of the Commission's rules.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Use the in situ tests to support waste package model development.
- Initiate long term in situ and laboratory waste package tests and monitoring during site characterization.
- Use the in situ tests to support waste package model development.

**Section 8.3.5.16 Issue Resolution Strategy for Issue 1.7, pp. 8.3.5.16–1/10**

**COMMENT 119**

The information presented in the SCP, Section 8.3.5.16—Performance Confirmation Testing, is insufficient to allow NRC staff to determine if the confirmation program meets the requirements of 10 CFR 60, Subpart F.

**BASIS**

- The SCP indicates, in its response to NRC CDSCP comment 103, that Section 8.3.5.16 has been revised to clearly define the phased volume of the DOE's performance confirmation program. The SCP recognizes that 10 CFR §60.140(b) requires that a performance confirmation program shall have been started during site characterization (p. 8.4.2–147). However, the staff considers that the SCP does not adequately address NRC CDSCP comment 103. The SCP does not provide sufficient details on confirmation of geotechnical and design parameters, design testing and monitoring and testing waste package required by 10 CFR 60, Subpart F. Potential impacts of performance confirmation testing on ESF design have not been addressed.

- Section 60.137 of 10 CFR Part 60 requires a performance confirmation program that meets the Subpart F requirements.
- 10 CFR 60.140(b) requires that the performance confirmation program shall have been started during site characterization.
- The Annotated Outline for the SCP (DOE, 1987, pages) states that one of the objectives of the SCP is to provide details of the performance confirmation testing program. This information is needed to allow evaluation of the effects of performance confirmation activities, in particular, the ability of the natural and engineered barriers of the repository system to meet the performance objectives.
- The USNRC Generic Technical Position on In Situ Testing During Site Characterization for High-Level Nuclear Waste Repositories, Section 5.6 states that “DOE should identify in its test plan which tests will be completed at the time of construction authorization application, and which tests and long-term monitoring activities will continue after that.”
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- It is not clear if the laboratory tests of intact rock mechanical properties under various environmental conditions (see Section 8.3.15.1.3.2) would be continued during performance confirmation. Although Blacic et al. (1986) has reported strength changes in intact tuff as a result of exposure to repository conditions over time, further quantification of these effects during performance confirmation may be necessary.

- No testing is described in the SCP to verify by direct observation the behavior of the waste package and waste package environment under repository conditions.

- No in-situ sealing concepts testing is presently included in ESF in-situ test plans, and no provisions are made in the ESF layout for such testing.

RECOMMENDATION

The SCP updates should demonstrate that the performance confirmation program meets the requirements of 10 CFR 60, Subpart F.

REFERENCES

10 CFR 60.


USNRC Generic Technical Position on In Situ Testing During Site Characterization of High-Level Waste Repository.


BASIS

- The SCP correctly notes the importance of model and code validation for evaluating repository acceptability.

- Page 8.3.5.20–10 of the SCP concerns states, “In terms of setting priorities for validation activities, for example, it was suggested that the priority given to the validation of a model be determined by the role the model has in evaluating safe operation. This is equivalent to the priority the model has in demonstrating compliance with the EPA system performance requirement and the NRC subsystem performance requirements. Thus, the importance of a given validation effort is linked to the importance of the given application to the overall demonstration of regulatory compliance, and resources will be allocated accordingly.”

- Many potential validation studies require long lead times for planning and execution, and some may be impossible to carry out if not planned for before the site is disturbed by characterization and development activities.

- Failure to properly plan for model and code validation could cause a potential significant disruption to characterization schedules or sequencing of studies that would substantially reduce the ability of DOE to obtain information necessary for licensing.

- Only short-term tests are planned to be conducted as the basis for waste package predictive models, even in view of the large uncertainties acknowledged in the SCP (p. 7–238). See Comment 82.

- Question 23 articulates a concern regarding the criteria for the need to validate aspects of the general models for design analyses.

- The SCP (p. 8.3.5.20–11) correctly points out the interrelationship of the validation activities and the alternative conceptual models listed in the hypothesis testing tables in Section 8.3.1.1.

- Comment 6 points out that not all significant alternative conceptual models appear to be considered in the SCP. Until a complete set of alternative models has been identified, it is impossible to be assured that all necessary model validation studies have been included in the site characterization plans.

- Insufficient explicit ties between Section 8.3.5.20 and the hypothesis testing tables are presented to assure a complete, integrated validation program.

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- Comment 23 points out that the testing program does not consider the effects of transient episodic flow on geochemical reactions and therefore will not be able to affirm the preferred model.

- Comment 18 points out that not all features, events, or processes that may be essential for a valid mathematical representation of the hydrologic system for use in performance assessment have been addressed by site characterization activities.

- Comment 56 raises general concerns about the validation program as documented in the SCP.

- Comment 82 discusses the lack of information demonstrating that adequate validation of waste package performance models will be achieved at the time of license application and later milestones.

- The SCP (p. 8.3.5.20–10) correctly points out that the validation program is closely related to the NRC requirements for performance confirmation.

- Insufficient information on the performance confirmation program is presented in Section 8.3.5.16 to allow NRC staff to assess specifics of the program. (See Comment 119.)

- The performance confirmation program is not addressed in Section 8.3.5.16 with enough specificity to determine which performance confirmation studies need to be baselined during site characterization.

- In Table 8.3.5.16–2 (Testing activities initiated during site characterization planned to be continued as performance confirmation), only one study (the percolation test—row 2) has validation listed as its purpose.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- At an early time an SCP update should provide a comprehensive, integrated plan for model and code validation.

- Validation plans should focus on validation of models used to demonstrate compliance with the four quantitative performance standards, to ensure coordination of validation and site characterization activities.

- After DOE has identified a full range of alternative conceptual models, DOE should ensure that adequate plans have been developed for validating the models and the codes associated with them.

Section 8.4.2.1.2 Principal data needed for preclosure performance evaluations and design—Data needed for underground facility design, pp. 8.4.2–14/15

COMMENT 121

Seismic design criteria for the ESF are not sufficiently described in the SCP.

BASIS

- The implicit assumption appears to be that the jointed rock mass in which the shafts are to be constructed will exhibit continuum behavior in the modified local stress field around the shaft. Effects such as local slip or separation on joint surfaces are not taken into account.

- The analysis of dynamic interaction of the peripheral rock mass with the shaft liner assumes continuous deformation of the rock. Under the conditions of dynamic loading imposed on the medium, it is possible that rock deformation will be discontinuous, resulting in highly localized loading of the shaft liner.

- The ground motions which are to be the basis for shaft design and performance assessment are stated in terms of probable bounds on the orthogonal components of peak acceleration and peak velocity which may be induced by earthquakes and underground nuclear explosions (UNEs). However, seismic loading results in cyclic loading of the rock mass. Experiments on jointed rock show that it is the number of excursions of dynamic loading into the plastic range of joint deformation which determines the performance of the joint (Brown and Hudson, 1974). A particular effect is that joint peak-residual behavior is modified. Further, tuff-like materials demonstrate strength loss under dynamic loading. Both effects (i.e., shear strength reduction of joints and reduction of material strength) are analogous to fatigue of metals under cyclic loading. These observations suggest that the design basis motions should be prescribed in terms of full time histories of acceleration and velocity, and not merely the peak ground motions (Lemos, 1987).

RECOMMENDATION

The seismic design basis for the exploratory shaft facility should be clarified in SCP updates.

REFERENCES

4.0 Objections, Comments, and Questions


Section 8.4.2.2.3 Basis for surface-based testing construction controls, pp. 8.4.2-80/87

COMMENT 122

The SCP (p. 8.4.2–81) states that “A key aspect of construction control for surface-based testing, including infiltration testing, unsaturated-zone hydrology testing, and the systematic drilling program, is the selection of dry drilling or coring methods.” The technology for a dry coring method is yet to be proven. The SCP (p. 8.4.2–86) does include a program to demonstrate the method. However, the SCP does not contain the criteria to be used to determine the acceptability of the dry coring method.

BASIS

- The SCP states (p. 8.4.2–86) that “based on prior drilling history at Yucca Mountain, dry drilling is the only demonstrated means of controlling formation invasion by fluid” (emphasis added). The SCP (p. 8.4.2–87) further states that “dry drilling methods are therefore specified for planned drilling in the unsaturated-zone within the conceptual perimeter drift boundary (CPDB) and immediate vicinity.” Thus, the need to develop technology for a dry coring method is emphasized in the SCP.

- The SCP (p. 8.4.2–35, Section 8.4.2.1.6.2) also states that “a practical drilling method for dry, continuous coring to depths of up to 2,600 ft in fractured tuff is needed for site characterization, but has not yet been demonstrated.”

- It is not clear what criteria will be used during prototype testing to determine acceptability of dry coring method.

RECOMMENDATION

The SCP updates should discuss the impact on the site characterization program if the dry coring method with continuous coring is not proven feasible. The criteria to be used to determine acceptability of the dry coring method should be provided in SCP updates.

Section 8.4.2.3.6.2 Potential for construction and operations interference with testing.

Section 8.4.3.2.5.3 Potential impacts to the site from construction of the exploratory shafts.

COMMENT 123

The effects of ventilation of the exploratory shafts and the underground testing rooms may have been underestimated in the evaluation of the potential interference with testing and the potential for irreversible changes to baseline site condition; also, there is not an adequate analysis of the effects of ventilation in the ESF on the ability of the site to isolate waste.

BASIS

- The SCP describes, on p. 8.4.2–211 “the approach taken to evaluate the potential impact of construction and operation on the testing program” as consisting of “both a forward and backward evaluation method.” The SCP states further that “the backward evaluation consisted of looking at each constraint placed on the design by the experiment plans” and that “the experiments were evaluated with regard to their sensitivity to such operational considerations as ventilation changes; traffic; potential of excess water from surface flooding; and vibration, over-pressure, and dust from nearby mining.”

- Beginning on p. 8.4.2–215 of the SCP the backward analysis is described. Among the aspects discussed are: (1) operational interference considerations including ensuring early tests were located close to shafts and drifts mined first, experiments requiring isolation from the mining environment were located far from shafts, and fluids in the underground area were adequately controlled; (2) infiltration of surface water down the shafts; (3) hydrologic disturbance from construction water.

- The effects of ventilation of the shafts and testing rooms is not mentioned in the backward analysis. Elsewhere on p. 8.4.3–22, the text indicates that a drying front from ventilation will penetrate 2 m into the undisturbed rock. Such rapid movement of the drying front could interfere with hydrological, geochemical, and waste package testing.

- Section 8.4.3.2.1.4 discusses the movement of water vapor and air through the exploratory shafts and the potential for long-term effects on waste isolation.

- Four studies, (discussed in numbered paragraphs 1–4 in the text, pp. 8.4.3–19 to –21), consider air flow in the exploratory shaft or Yucca Mountain; however, none of these studies appear to discuss the potential for drying the rock surrounding the shaft.
Two studies (discussed in numbered paragraphs 7 and 8, respectively, p. 8.4.3–22) consider the effects of ventilation on saturation of drift walls in the exploratory shaft (Eaton and Peterson, 1988) and on saturation over longer time periods (Hopkins et al., 1987).

These studies predict penetration of a drying front 2 m into the drift wall in one year and penetration of 15 m for constant ventilation over 20 years. These calculations may underestimate ventilation, because they are based on calculations using the computer code SAGUARO, which solves transient problems on single-phase water and energy transport through partially or fully saturated porous media. Because SAGUARO does not consider the additional transport of water vapor in gaseous flow that could be induced by the exploratory shaft, the penetration of the drying front is likely underestimated. Based on the studies of air and water vapor flow (paragraphs numbered 1–4), the induction of substantial flow of gas is likely. In addition, the induction of larger-scale movement of gas and water produced by the introduction of the exploratory shaft singularly in the existing quasi-equilibrium hydrologic field has not been estimated.

The temporary and irreversible changes in geochemical conditions in rock experiencing drying from ventilation and the possible migration of fluids not in equilibrium with the rock has not been estimated.

Based on the discussions above the NRC staff concludes that the analyses presented are not sufficient to assure that construction and operation of the exploratory shaft will not interfere with the ability to acquire data needed for the license application and that damage to the ability of the site to isolate waste will be avoided.

**RECOMMENDATION**

At an early date, but before construction of the exploratory shafts is begun, the DOE should provide an analysis that considers the effects on ventilation of the ESF, including both liquid and gas flows, on the rock adjacent to the ESF.

**COMMENT 124**

The discussion of the potential causes for a reduction in the drainage capacity of the shaft bottom does not include certain plausible mechanisms.

**BASIS**

- Of several possible ways in which the sump drainage could be rendered ineffective, silting is the only mechanism addressed (Fernandez et al., 1988). Dissolution and remineralization effects are not mentioned. Omitted from consideration are thermal, mechanical, and geochemical effects (e.g., p. 8.4.3–58: Geochemical changes).
- Permeability tests on fractured tuff suggest a high risk of rapidly reducing permeability during flow tests as a result of precipitation (e.g., Lin and Daily, 1984, as summarized in SCP section 7.4.1.5).

**RECOMMENDATION**

SCP updates should include a broader range of scenarios that could affect drainage.

**REFERENCES**


DOE has not identified the existing data that will be used in the licensing process and needs to be qualified, nor have they submitted the procedures which will be used to qualify existing data.

**BASIS**

- 10 CFR Part 60, Subpart G requires that a QA program be implemented for all systems, structures and components important to safety; design and characterization of barriers important to waste isolation; and activities related thereto. These activities include the development of site characterization data which will be used in support of the license application. Data used in support of the license application and not originally collected under the QA requirements of 10 CFR Part 60, Subpart G should be qualified to meet these requirements.

In the response to CDSCP comment 108, DOE committed to meeting the staff's guidance on qualifying existing data in NUREG-1298 and to submit a procedure for doing so.

- Section 8.3.1.4.2.1.5 of the SCP states that samples have been collected prior to the implementation of an acceptable QA program, and the data will subsequently be used in the licensing process.

It is not clear what existing data DOE plans to use in licensing or if, based on existing data, DOE has determined that it is not necessary to collect certain types of data during site characterization.

- For the NRC to be able to completely evaluate the sufficiency and viability of the proposed program, the NRC needs to understand what preexisting information the DOE is planning on qualifying.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

As soon as practicable, DOE should:

- Submit the procedures which will be used by the Yucca Mountain Project (YMP) Office and the major participants on the YMP to qualify data which has not been gathered under a QA program which meets the requirements of Subpart G to 10 CFR Part 60.

- Provide a general listing by activity of existing data that will be qualified for use in licensing and areas where DOE has determined, based on existing data, it is not necessary to collect certain types of data.

**REFERENCE**


- Section 8.6.4.2 Quality Assurance during Site Characterization
- Section 8.3.5.5 Preclosure Performance

**COMMENT 126**

The lists of items and activities covered by the 10 CFR Part 60, Subpart G quality assurance programs are incomplete and the analysis provided for their identification is non-conservative in some areas. (This is the same as Comment 106 on the CDSCP.)

**BASIS**

- The seven basis statements in Comment 106 on the CDSCP involved use of a nonconservative source term for accident analyses, failure to put any mitigating features on the Q-list, lack of a basis for the probability cut-off for screening events, failure to consider a criticality event in defining Q-list items, and failure to provide a quality activities list (including design and performance assessment activities).

- The DOE has provided a "potential" Q-list (Table 6-18 of the SCP) which does not contain any mitigative items and a "preliminary" quality activities list (Section 8.6.4.2.2 of the SCP) which includes some performance assessment items. Reanalysis of the source term used in the dose consequence analyses, and criticality control, are identified as requiring further analysis. The basis for the probability cutoff is still inadequately justified.

- Numerous statements in Appendix F to the SCP-Conceptual Design Report (SCP/CDR) indicate that the input data and bounding condition used in various analyses assume proper design, manufacture, installation/construction, testing, operation and maintenance of systems, structures and components without the need for proper application of QA. Such assumptions are valid only if an adequate quality assurance program is utilized.

- The original NRC recommendations in CDSCP Comment 106 are generally unresolved.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- The use of probability risk assessment/preliminary radiological safety analysis techniques as was
implemented within the SCP and SCP/CDR should be reevaluated, particularly considering the reliability of the input data.

- Section 6.1.5 of the SCP states that only the waste "container" and not the waste form is on the proposed Q-list of items important to waste isolation; however, the analyses appear to rely on the waste form in performance allocation. If this is the case, the waste form (or at least the glass waste form) should be on the Q-list.

- The Q-list should include significant items such as the "design" to preclude criticality, or another means should be provided to identify such items requiring 10 CFR 50 Appendix B QA controls which do not fit the definition of Q-list or quality activities list items.

- The NRC staff suggests that DOE should start by making a list of all engineered items and barriers associated with handling and isolating high-level waste. Items could then be removed from this list as reliable data and suitable analyses show that a low-level of, or no, QA is required for such items. What remains on the list would, at any given time, be the "Q-list."

REFERENCES
10 CFR Part 60, Subpart G and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B.

4.2.2 DAA Comments
Section: Design Acceptability Analysis, Chapter 3: Assessment of Alternative Shaft Locations

COMMENT 127
The process used to integrate all available technical data into decisions regarding shaft location appears to have been inadequate because an apparent lack of data integration raised concerns about the suitability of shaft locations and about a process that has resulted in a possible violation of the criteria specified in the Design Acceptability Analysis (DAA) for set-back distances from faults. BASIS
- The Design Acceptability Analysis cites Bertram (1984) as the basis for decisions regarding shaft setback distance from faults and concludes that "...all five shaft locations are more than 100 feet from the nearest faults and this factor is nondiscriminating..." (DAA, p. 3–7). The DAA states that "Thus, consideration in this report of fault locations as a surrogate for performance essentially adopts the use of the same characteristic by Bertram" and "Because Bertram (1984) excluded all areas within 100 feet of faults, all five alternative locations compared by Bertram are in an acceptable zone" (DAA, pp. 2–26, 2–29). However, the Bertram (1984) report, while publishing the results of siting activities conducted in early 1982, does not include the results of recommended activities to determine the presence of potentially adverse structures near the shaft locations. Therefore, the Bertram (1984) report does not support the conclusion made in the DAA regarding faulting as a factor in shaft location.
- The activities of DOE's shaft related Technical Integration Group conducted in 1982, and reported on by Bertram in 1984, made several recommendations regarding geologic mapping and geophysical evaluations in the vicinity of the preferred shaft locations. Some of the recommended mapping and evaluation was carried out in the two years (1982–1984) preceding publication of the Bertram (1984) report; however, there is no indication in either Bertram (1984) or a subsequent report on shaft location by Gnirk and others (1988) that the results of the geologic mapping and geophysical surveys were ever integrated into the decision on shaft location.
- In 1987, in response to concerns raised by the NRC staff, the locations of the exploratory shafts were moved from the center of Coyote Wash to the rock slope that bounds the wash to the north (Gnirk and others, 1988). There is no indication that data other than that presented in the outdated Bertram (1984) report was used in the decision-making process that led to the determination of the new locations.
- In 1982, the NNWSI Technical Integration Group (TIG) recommended that the sites of the shafts be re-evaluated should the recommended sites contain surface joint densities significantly higher than other sites. The SCP indicates that scientific criteria were used so that the exploratory shaft would not be constructed in areas of fractures associated with structural features (8.4.2–153). The area near the present sites on the northern slope of the wash is said to contain "fracture sets...so intense that they are essentially breccias..." (Dixon to Vieth, 1982). Based on the recommendations made in 1982, a re-evaluation of the recommended site should have been...
conducted to determine the significance of the fracturing near the sites selected in 1987. While the DAA refers to the Dixon to Vieth letter and suggests that the mapping "tends to support the data set used in the original selection." (p. 1.6–8), there is no indication that the site selection process included a detailed analysis of these fracture data.

- The TIG also recommended that a geophysical evaluation be made in the washes near Yucca Mountain to explore for structures not exposed at the surface. Many of the geophysical surveys (most are regional studies) cited in the Gnirk and others' (1988) report as addressing the TIG recommendation were completed after the final decision on shaft locations was made (August, 1982). In addition, there is no indication that the results of resistivity surveys suggesting the presence of a fault at the current shaft locations (Smith and Ross, 1982) were considered in the selection of the site.

- There is no indication that the results of the geologic mapping, showing a high degree of fracturing present in rocks near the present shafts sites, were integrated and assessed with the results of the 1982 geophysical survey that suggests the possible presence of a fault in the vicinity of the mapped breccias.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- DOE should reconsider whether the design process, which appears to have overlooked key information about the suitability of exploratory shaft locations, is adequate to assure that the shafts will not adversely impact waste isolation.

- DOE should address apparent conflicts between the design criteria specified (i.e., set-back of 100 feet from faults) in Bertram (1984) and Gnirk and others (1988) and the presence of a possible fault near the exploratory shafts as suggested by the geophysical testing (Smith and Ross, 1982).

- The present shaft locations should be re-evaluated based on an assessment of available technical data.

- Consider conducting further tests (e.g., geophysical testing and trenching) in the vicinity of the proposed shafts to verify features and conditions that exist in that area.

REFERENCES


Section: Design Acceptability Analysis

COMMENT 128

Several applicable 10 CFR 60 requirements have not been considered in evaluating the acceptability of ESF Title I design.

BASIS

The DAA lists fifty-two (52) 10 CFR 60 requirements that are considered in ESF Title I Design Acceptability Analysis (DAA). This list of (52) requirements does not include all applicable 10 CFR 60 requirements. The following requirements are missing from the list and are not considered in the DAA:

- 60.17 Contents of Site Characterization Plan

The ESF will be used to obtain information called for by (a) the SCP, (b) the waste package program, and (c) the repository design. As such, this requirement could potentially affect ESF requirements.

- 60.24(a) Updating of Application and Environmental Report

This section requires various applications (e.g., license application) to be as complete as possible in light of information that is reasonably available at the time of docketing. This requirement is applicable to ESF design because it provides guidance regarding scope and possible sequencing of activities.

- 60.113(a)(2) Performance of Particular Barriers After Permanent Closure—Geologic Setting

This regulation is applicable because the ESF design could impact the location of the disturbed zone boundary.
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- **60.113(b)(2), (3), and (4) Performance of Particular Barriers After Permanent Closure**

  These requirements are applicable to the ESF design, as the ESF design should allow gathering of information necessary to evaluate factors which bear upon:
  
  - the time during which the thermal pulse is dominated by decay heat from the fission products
  - geochemical characteristics of the host rock
  - sources of uncertainty in predicting the performance of the geologic repository

- **60.122 Siting Criteria**

  This requirement is applicable, as it provides detailed descriptions of the information which must be obtained (largely in ESF) to assess the adequacy of the site and to assess other adverse conditions. In particular, 60.122(c)(1) imposes a design criterion on the location of underground accesses.

- **60.131(a) General Design Criteria for the Geologic Repository Operations Area—Radiological Protection**

  This requirement is applicable because it imposes requirements on all components of the ventilation systems, not just mechanical equipment. DOE's statement that "Compliance with the specified criteria is a function of equipment design and operational procedures, which imposes future requirements on equipment and operation, but not on the ESF permanent components" (Attachment I, p. 32) is too narrow. See, also, Attachment J (TOG Members' Statement, filed by D. Michlewicz).

  Also, 10 CFR 60.15(d)(4) requires coordination of subsurface excavation with the geologic operation area design and construction. As currently planned, ESF shafts and drifts will be part of ventilation system for the repository.

- **60.131(b)(4)(ii) General Design Criteria for the Geologic Repository Operations Area—Emergency Capability**

  See Attachment H, p. 7. (TOG report)

- **60.131(b)(8) General Design Criteria for the Geologic Repository Operations Area—Instrumentation and Control Systems**

  This requirement is applicable, because it could impact ESF design by requiring allowances for instrumentation and control systems.

- **60.131(b)(10) General Design Criteria for the Geologic Repository Operations Area—Shaft Conveyances Used in Radioactive Waste Handling**

  If radioactive wastes are to be placed in the ESF, then this requirement is applicable.

- **60.134 Design of Seals for Shafts and Boreholes**

  This requirement is applicable, because it provides design guidance relative to future sealing requirements. The SCP recognizes the relevance of this requirement in Section 8.3.3 (see, for example, p. 8.3.3.2-52, Table 8.3.3.2-9b).

- **60.143 Monitoring and Testing Waste Packages**

  This requirement is applicable for the same reasons that 60.131(b)(10) is applicable—namely, that 10 CFR 60.74 requires flexibility in testing.

**RECOMMENDATION**

Design criteria corresponding to the applicable 10 CFR 60 requirements, not considered in the DAA, should be developed and used for the Title II design.

**REFERENCE**


Section: Design Acceptability Analysis

**COMMENT 129**

Various appendices of the DAA and the YMP ESF TITLE I Design Report do not consider the applicability of 10 CFR 60 requirements to the ESF Title I design in a consistent manner.

**BASIS**

The following is a listing of sources that itemize applicability of 10 CFR 60 requirements to ESF design in an inconsistent manner:

A. Yucca Mountain Project Exploratory Shaft Facility, Title I Design—Volume I, Narrative Report

  Section 7.2 of this report is entitled “Repository Licensing Requirements Applicable to the ESF” and

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gives a "list of repository licensing requirements that are considered applicable to the design of the ESF" (p. 7–2).

B. Applicability of 10 CFR Part 60 Requirements to the Yucca Mountain Exploratory Shaft Facility (Technical Oversight Group Report)—Attachment I (TOG Conclusions)

Attachment I documents, in the form of a table, the consensus reached by TOG members "regarding Part 60 applicability" (p. 3).

C. Applicability of 10 CFR Part 60 Requirements to the Yucca Mountain Exploratory Shaft Facility (Technical Oversight Group Report)—Attachment H (Expanded TRG Rationales for Applicability)

Attachment H provides "rationales for applicability provided in the TRG Report, reflecting the discussions that took place at the TRG review meetings" (p. 3).

D. Review Record Memorandum—Exploratory Shaft Facility (ESF) Title I Design Acceptability Analysis and Comparative Evaluation of Alternative ESF Locations, Volume 2, Appendix I, Supporting Documentation for Design Acceptability Analysis

Appendix I contains the following four sub-appendices, each of which list 10 CFR 60 requirements:

I–1 Association of SDRD Functional Requirements with Relevant 10 CFR 60 Requirements

I–2 Association of Supplemental SDRD Information with Relevant 10 CFR 60 Requirements

I–3 ESF-Applicable Criteria Related to 10 CFR 60 Requirements for NRC Concerns 1, 2, 3

I–4 ESF Criteria Addressed in Title I SDRD

RECOMMENDATION

The inconsistencies and incompleteness identified in this comment should be resolved in the Title II design.

Section: Design Acceptability Analysis

COMMENT 130

Out of the fifty-two (52) 10 CFR 60 requirements considered applicable to ESF design by the DOE in reviewing the acceptability of Title I design, the DAA focuses on only 22 requirements that belong to the three areas specifically outlined by NRC. Other requirements (e.g., retrievability, preclosure radiological safety, performance confirmation, and QA program) are said to be qualitatively evaluated (see p. 2–1, second paragraph). The approach adopted in the DAA raises questions about completeness and rigor of the design acceptability analysis, as detailed design criteria were not developed for all applicable requirements.

BASIS

• The DAA has considered only 52 requirements from the applicable 10 CFR 60 requirements as stated in Comment 128; the DAA did not consider all applicable 10 CFR 60 requirements in evaluating the acceptability of ESF Title I design.

• On page 2–1 of the DAA, it is stated that out of the 52 requirements considered applicable to ESF Title I design “30 requirements were outside the scope of this Technical Assessment Review and, hence, were not considered further. These requirements addressed the areas of preclosure radiological safety, retrievability, types of tests to be conducted during performance confirmation, the QA program, and procedural requirements.” These 30 requirements are as follows:

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</table>

• Qualitative evaluation of the above listed 30 requirements does not ensure that they have been adequately considered because detailed design criteria were not developed in evaluating if those requirements were considered in ESF Title I design.

• Some of these requirements are potentially important in evaluating the acceptability of the Title I design. Examples follow.
60.15(d)(4)—As pointed out in the ESF Title I summary report, this requirement "imposes constraints on the design of the ESF in order to limit adverse effects on the long-term performance of the repository" (p. 7-3). As pointed out in Attachment I of the TOG report, this requirement also calls for "the ESF to be coordinated with the geologic repository operations area" (p. 4).

60.111—ESF should be designed to meet the two performance objectives of this requirement because the ESF will be incorporated into the geologic repository operations area and, for example, "this potential use dictates that the drift stability be designed to meet repository requirements for the operational and retrieval life of the repository." As pointed out by Attachment I of the TOG report, "the ESF may contribute to waste retrieval by conveying ventilation supply air to the retrieval area. Therefore, the design, construction, and operation of the ESF must bear in mind its later utility" (p. 26).

60.131(b)—Because the ESF is intended to become part of the operating repository if the site is found suitable, it should be determined if any of the structures, systems or components could potentially impact radiological safety (see p. 7-5 of the ESF Title I Design summary report). As pointed out by Attachment I of the TOG report, "the ESF may contribute to waste retrieval by conveying ventilation supply air to the retrieval area. Therefore, the design, construction, and operation of the ESF must bear in mind its later utility" (p. 26).

60.140(b) and (c), 60.141, 60.142—These sections impose requirements on the ESF. The ESF must be designed to accommodate performance confirmation testing (see attachment 1, pp. 49 and 54 of the TOG report).

RECOMMENDATION
The SDRD used in Title II design should consider all applicable 10 CFR 60 requirements.

REFERENCES


Section: Design Acceptability Analysis

COMMENT 131
One of the key steps in the DAA process was to review the adequacy of data used in Title I design. It appears that the DAA does not reasonably address this step.

BASIS
- A basic step in evaluating the adequacy of the data should have been to identify what data were used in the Title I design. The DAA focuses attention only on reviewing supporting documents in Section 8.4 of the SCP. This raises concerns about the relevance of the documents reviewed in Section 2.4 of the DAA. For example, it is not clear why the following Title I design documents were not reviewed.

(1) "Free Field Load Calculations for ESF Drifts," 1988, by B. L. Ehgartner, manuscript dated 9/30/88;
(2) "Design of Shaft Liner," 1988, by H. Gieser, Fenix and Scisson, FS-CA-0004;
(4) "Seismic Design Analysis," 1988a, by M. J. Mrugala, Fenix and Scisson, TI-ST-0053; and

- The DAA includes a review of DOE's Reference Information Base (RIB), Version 3.001; however, it is not clear to what extent parameter ranges have been included in the RIB. The ESF Title I design summary report does not discuss ranges for any parameters.

- The ESF Title I design references only the RIB values, but numerous parameters used in the design are not included in the RIB.

- Although it is evident that the adequacy of the RIB data was reviewed, there is no indication that other relevant design data were reviewed as part of the DAA. The following are examples:

  1. In-situ ground stresses are given on p. 2-9. The vertical stress is said to be derived
4.0 Objections, Comments, and Questions

from the product of the unit weight of rock and the depth at which the stress is required. Because not all rock units have the same unit weight, it is not clear how the vertical stress is determined or how the stress components conform to RIB Version 3.001.

2. Seismic design considerations are discussed on p. 2–10 and in Tables 2–6 and 2–7. All of the seismic design components are not discussed in the RIB.

3. Design basis events are discussed in Section 5.2.4 of the ESF Title I design. The events address important design considerations, such as flood potential (p. 5–4). It is not clear that any of these design basis events are covered by the RIB. The DAA reviews of RIB Version 3.001 did not cover meteorological data because they were not "primary information related to subjects of this technical assessment review" (p. 1.6–107).

- Some of the documents reviewed as part of the DAA Section 2.4 used RIB Version 1.001 (see, for example, Bauer et al., 1988). Other documents were written prior to the development of the RIB. In both cases, it is not clear how the data used relates to data used in Title I design.

- Introduction of data through documents referenced in SCP Section 8.4 complicates the acceptability analysis and understanding because some documents use RIB 3.001 and others use RIB 1.001, and still others use no RIB values at all. For example, Bauer et al. (1988) use RIB Version 1.001 and give an ambient temperature of 31°C at the main test level. Appendix B–2 of the Title I design uses RIB Version 3.001 and indicates an ambient temperature at the main test level of 18°C.

- Review of documents in Appendix I–6 is not consistent. Some reviewers simply provided summaries of documents (see, for example, the review of Appendix B–2 of the ESF Title I Design Summary Report) without critical evaluation of the appropriateness of data, approach, etc.

- As pointed out on p. C.6–40, comparison of the RIB to EA and/or SCP data does not necessarily assure reasonableness because, in many cases, data are derived from the same source.

- There is little, if any, indication of how the documents reviewed for Section 2.4 were used in Title I design (i.e., what conclusion do they support, what decision they affect, etc.). Table 2.4–2 is a summary of DAA Reasonableness Reviews and includes a heading entitled "Use of Analysis in Title I Evaluation." However, entries under this heading relate almost exclusively to use in SCP Section 8.4.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The Title II design should be based on a complete set of appropriate data which indicate to designers the expected ranges, not just average values. It should be clarified if all ESF design data are contained in the RIB or additional design data are given in other documents including, for example, the SEPDB (Site and Engineering Properties Data Base).

- The DOE should explain the differences between end uses of the RIB and SEPDB.

- Recommendations of document reviewers presented in the DAA should be considered for Title II design. In particular, the following recommendation (for one document) should be applied to most, if not all, supporting documents: "The objectives and use of the analyses should be clarified if used to support Title II design. The section's discussion of the results of the analyses should be expanded and focused on design considerations" (p. 1.6–2).

- A consistent set of coordinate axes should be used to avoid confusion over left- and right-handed axes. (See, for example, Appendix B–4 of Title I design).

REFERENCES


Ehgartner, B. L. Free Field Load Calculations for ESF Drifts, manuscript dated 9/30/88.


4.0 Objections, Comments, and Questions

COMMENT 132

The requirements of 10 CFR 60.21(c)(1)(ii)(D) [i.e., consideration of major design features], in particular, have not been adequately addressed in evaluating the acceptability of ESF Title I design.

BASIS

- In considering the requirement of 10 CFR 60.21 (c)(1)(ii)(D) DOE has limited the analysis primarily to comparative evaluation of five alternative ESF locations. Comparative evaluation of alternatives to the major design features could include evaluations of such alternatives as number of man-made openings; comparison of the alternatives of drilling and blasting excavation method and mechanical excavation method; and comparative evaluation of the several possible layouts for main test level.

- Conclusion No. 1 on p. 4-6 of Appendix J states that "Differences among the alternative shaft locations for currently expected conditions are not significant to waste isolation. This is because all the locations are expected to have conditions that would allow regulatory requirements to be met by wide margins." The evidence for this conclusion is not convincing, as the supporting analyses are based largely on assumptions of vertical matrix flow, average fluxes, ambient conditions, etc., which are not shown to lead to conservative conclusions with respect to waste isolation.

- Appendix J (pp. 2-34 to 2-40) includes discussion that indicates that the northeast part of the repository has the poorest waste isolation performance and, therefore, requires characterization. Appendix J does not provide convincing arguments that indicate that a shaft at the present location is the only possible way to characterize this area.

- Conclusion No. 3 on p. 4-6 of Appendix J states that "The presence of a shaft at any of the locations is not expected to affect significantly the waste isolation capability of a repository." This conclusion, derived from Section 3, is questionable, as certain conditions and processes (e.g., topography, fracture flow), which were included in the analyses supporting Conclusion No. 1, were not factored into the analyses presented in Section 3 in support of Conclusion No. 3.

- The anomaly near the ESF, shown on SCP Figure 1-40, does not appear to have been considered in evaluating the requirements of 10 CFR 60.21(c)(1)(ii)(D).

- In the analysis by Nimick et al. (1988), the data from borehole USW G-4 along with four other boreholes were used to evaluate representativeness of the ESF location. Only one out of seven categories of data from USW G-4 was determined to be representative; others were determined to be inconclusive or non-representative.

- Surface uplift/subsidence induced by waste emplacement surrounding the shafts has not been sufficiently considered.

- Blockage of shaft sump drainage by geochemical changes (SCP p. 8.4.3-58) does not appear to have been explicitly considered.

RECOMMENDATION

The Title II design should be expanded to fully address the 10 CFR 60.21 requirements.

REFERENCES

10 CFR 60.21


COMMENT 133

To examine the thoroughness of the DAA, the NRC staff has reviewed the adequacy of one of the documents used in Title I design, as an example. The document selected by the staff was Appendix B.4 of ESF Title I design report, "Free Field Seismic Load Calculations for ESF Drifts." This document was not reviewed by the TAR team. This appendix has errors and raises concerns as to whether the calculations were checked.

BASIS

- As an example, on p. 4 of the Appendix:

  (1) In Section 4, for $\theta=30^\circ$, Combination 1, Case 2, $\sigma_{\text{crown}} = 0.44$, $\sigma_{\text{wall}} = 5.69$ (not 4.69).
4.0 Objections, Comments, and Questions

(2) In Section 4, for $\theta = 30^\circ$, Combination 2, Case 2, $M_2 = 1.10/2.34$ (not $1.10/2.64$), $= 0.47$ (not 0.42).

Related boundary stresses are

$\sigma_{\text{crown}} = 5.92$ and $\sigma_{\text{wall}} = 0.96$ (not 6.81 and 0.69);

- and on p. 5 of the Appendix:

In the conclusions, the combination expression should be $1.0 S_v + 0.4(P + S_H)$, not $1.0 S_v - 0.4(P + S_H)$.

RECOMMENDATION

The design control process for the Title II design should assure that calculations for the ESF Title II design are thoroughly checked.

4.3 Questions

4.3.1 SCP Questions

Section 8.3.1.2.2.1.1 Activity: Characterization of hydrologic properties of surficial materials

Section 8.3.1.4.2.1.1 Activity: Surface and subsurface stratigraphic studies of the host rock and surrounding units

Section 8.3.1.4.2.2.1 Activity: Geologic mapping of zonal features in the Paintbrush Tuff

Section 8.3.1.5.1.4.2 Activity: Surficial deposits mapping of the Yucca Mountain area

Section 8.3.1.5.1.4.3 Activity: Eolian history of the Yucca Mountain region

Section 8.3.1.5.2.1.1 Activity: Regional paleoflood evaluation

Section 8.3.1.5.2.1.3 Activity: Evaluation of past discharge areas

Section 8.3.1.5.2.1.5 Activity: Studies of Calcite and opaline silica vein deposits

Section 8.3.1.6.1.1.1 Activity: Development of a geomorphic map of Yucca Mountain

Section 8.3.1.8.5.1.3 Activity: Field geologic studies

Section 8.3.1.8.5.2.2 Activity: Chemical and physical changes around dikes

Section 8.3.1.8.5.3.1 Activity: Evaluation of folds in Neogene rock of the region

Section 8.3.1.14.2.1.1 Activity: Site reconnaissance

Section 8.3.1.16.1.1.1 Activity: Site flood and debris hazards studies

Section 8.3.1.17.4.2 Study: Location and recency of faulting near prospective surface facilities

Section 8.3.1.17.4.3.2 Activity: Evaluate Quaternary faults within 100 km of Yucca Mountain

Section 8.3.1.17.4.3.4 Activity: Evaluate the Bare Mountain fault zone

Section 8.3.1.17.4.3.5 Evaluate structural domains and characterize the Yucca Mountain region with respect to regional patterns of faults and fractures

Section 8.3.1.17.4.4 Study: Quaternary faulting proximal to the site within northeast-trending fault zones

Section 8.3.1.17.4.5 Study: Detachment faults at or proximal to Yucca Mountain

Section 8.3.1.17.4.6 Study: Quaternary faulting within the site area

Section 8.3.1.17.4.9.2 Activity: Evaluate extent of areas of Quaternary uplift and subsidence at and near Yucca Mountain

Section 8.3.1.17.4.9.3 Activity: Evaluate variations in the nature and intensity of Quaternary faulting within 100 km of Yucca Mountain through morphometric and morphologic analysis

Section 8.3.1.17.4.12.1 Activity: Evaluate tectonic processes and tectonic stability at the site

QUESTION 1

The SCP lists many surficial mapping projects, some of which are currently on-going or are near completion. How does the DOE plan to integrate these various mapping tasks and the resultant information?

BASIS

- The SCP provides only a listing of mapping studies and provides little information as to how information obtained from one study may provide input or be integrated with each other.

- Individual mapping studies and activities will be conducted by investigators from Los Alamos National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, and the U.S. Geological Survey resulting in the potential for non-integrated investigations and products.
4.0 Objections, Comments, and Questions

- Map scales for studies and resultant maps do not appear to be compatible (e.g., Tectonic geomorphology, 8.3.1.17.4.9, at 1:20,000 and Surficial deposits mapping, 8.3.1.5.1.4.2, at 1:24,000).

- Many mapping studies appear to cover overlapping areas (e.g., Activities 8.3.1.5.1.4.2 and 8.3.1.16.1.1.1).

- Map scales do not appear to be appropriately detailed to provide information necessary to the study (e.g., Quaternary faulting, 8.3.1.17.1.6, at 1:24,000).

**RECOMMENDATION**

Consider developing a program to integrate mapping studies to provide integrated products at scales appropriate in detail to fulfill the objectives of the proposed activities.

### Section 8.3.1.4 Overview of rock characteristics program—Table 8.3.1.4–2, current representation and alternative hypotheses for models for the rock characterization program, p. 8.3.1.4–22

**QUESTION 2**

What is the current understanding of the relation between mechanical and hydraulic apertures, and how will the data from “aperture” measurements made during site characterization be used in design and performance assessment analyses?

**BASIS**

- The aperture information alone may not be useful in design and performance assessment analyses. In particular, it is widely accepted that “fracture aperture is very sensitive to small changes in stress” (p. 8.3.1.4–22). This suggests that measured apertures are to be related in some fashion to stress. It is not clear in the SCP how this relation will be evaluated.

- The effects of blasting on measured apertures may need to be accounted for.

- In response to NRC’s CDSCP question number 12 it is stated that, “relating aperture to equivalent hydraulic aperture is not within the scope of the SCP.” Fracture flow is discussed in Section 8.4, where it is related primarily to hydraulic conductivity. It has been shown that the Cubic Law (Witherspoon et al., 1979), relating flow rate to aperture cubed, is not physically correct when values of mechanical aperture are used to represent aperture (Barton et al., 1983). However, an acceptable model results when values of conducting (equivalent hydraulic) aperture are used (Barton, 1982). Hydraulic aperture has been empirically related to mechanical aperture through a roughness coefficient (Barton, 1982).

- Geometric observations may not be the source of the best estimates currently available, and an integration of direct and indirect approaches is likely to be more useful.

**RECOMMENDATION**

Plans to characterize aperture dependence on stress and relations between mechanical and hydraulic apertures should be described in the SCP updates.

**REFERENCES**


### Section 8.3.1.4.1.1 Activity: Development of an Integrated Drilling Program pp. 8.3.1.4–24/26

**QUESTION 3**

What rationale was used for selecting the total area that may be needed for repository development?

**BASIS**

- In response to CDSCP Question 49, the SCP does not provide sufficient basis for the investigation of area with adequate flexibility in repository development or for demonstrating that the area to be characterized is representative of the planned expansion area.

- The development of an integrated program must be based on the total area needed for the repository. The SCP states that the area needed for repository development is judged to be 1,420 ± 210 acres, based on uncertainty in the areal power density of 40 to 80
kw/acre (p. 6-227). Furthermore, as much as 300 additional acres may be needed to ensure availability of adequate area for contingency (p. 6-227). Therefore, the final repository may encompass up to 1,930 acres. It is not specified in the SCP how much area is contained within the repository perimeter drift shown in Figure 8.3.1.4-2.

- The area coverage rationale for development of the systematic drilling program is based on the CPDB (conceptual perimeter drift boundary) as stated on p. 8.3.1.4-89.

**RECOMMENDATION**

The SCP updates should address the total area requirements, including the area required for adequate flexibility in the repository development, in planning the site investigation program.

**QUESTION 4**

The work of Sass and others (1988) indicates that the site is in an area of anomalously low heat flow. How will the temperature logging described in the above sections be sufficient to evaluate the significance of this preliminary conclusion?

**BASIS**

- The quality of the data used to prepare the above report does not permit unambiguous interpretations; however, possible reasons for the apparently anomalously low heat flow include the result of a higher downward flux of groundwater than is presently being assumed, vaporization and advective transport of heat in upward movement of air, or such phenomena as shallow lateral flow in the saturated zone.

- To obtain unambiguous data on heatflow it would be necessary to perform temperature logging using procedures which may be substantially different from that used by standard commercial logging.

- Such heatflow data may help resolve various tectonic and hydrological questions about Yucca Mountain, such as the rate and direction of groundwater flow in both the saturated and unsaturated zone, and the characteristics of various fault zones.

- The information presented in the SCP appears to allow for only standard commercial temperature logging.

**RECOMMENDATION**

The DOE should include provisions for performing temperature logging which can supplement the information obtained by Sass and others (1988), to evaluate the significance of the anomalously low heat flow values.

**REFERENCE**


**QUESTION 5**

In the CDSCP (p. 8.3.1.4-91) reference was made to drilling vertical and angled exploratory boreholes. Discussion of angled holes has been removed from SCP, which raises a concern regarding the collection of representative data. What is the rationale for planning only vertical exploratory holes?

**BASIS**

- The SCP recognizes, in this section and elsewhere, that vertical jointing is likely to be strongly dominant.

- The SCP (p. 8.3.1.4-72) states the severe limitations of trying to characterize vertical jointing with vertical holes.

- If vertical discontinuities are encountered in the borehole, they may break up core and make core recovery difficult, possibly biasing the results.

- At only a very small number of locations will other planned access allow characterizing vertical fractures below and above the repository horizon.

- The CDSCP (DOE, 1988) mentioned that “several angled boreholes approximately minus 60 degrees to the west may be drilled” (p. 8.3.1.4-91, paragraph 1). The SCP does not discuss angled boreholes in Section 8.3.1.4.

**RECOMMENDATION**

The basis for deleting plans given in CDSCP for drilling several angled boreholes for site characterization should
be explained in SCP updates. Alternatively, plans to drill angled exploratory boreholes should be described.

REFERENCE


QUESTION 6

Explain what is meant by the statement in the last paragraph of p. 8.3.1.4-75 that the discontinuities and other features of interest to be mapped “will be identified based in part, but not exclusively, on predetermined criteria.” Also, what are the “criteria”?

BASIS

The above wording is vague and suggests that some discontinuities and features may or may not be identified in a consistent manner.

RECOMMENDATION

The “criteria” should be provided for review prior to the onset of ESF mapping.

Section 8.3.1.4.2.4 Activity: Geologic Mapping of the Exploratory Shaft and Drifts.

QUESTION 7

Why is face mapping of exploratory drifts restricted to areas where anomalous conditions are exposed?

BASIS

- Mapping the face of the exploratory drifts will provide an opportunity to map in a plane perpendicular to the drift direction, thus greatly reducing the bias introduced by mapping only on surfaces parallel to the drift direction.

- Cording et al. (1975) provide the following guidelines for mapping the face of advancing excavations. “The face of each heading advance in the vicinity of instruments should be mapped. . . Observations at the heading are useful, because the relation of geology to initial support can best be observed at the time of scaling and initial support placement.”

- Three-dimensional descriptions of fracture systems can be evaluated by systematic mapping of exploratory shafts and drifts, including mapping of some reaches of shaft floor and drift faces. Such mapping or photography evaluation permits direct characterization of in-situ fracture networks instead of being inferred from fractal analyses of surface data.

RECOMMENDATION

Mapping and/or photographing floors and faces of shafts and drifts over short reaches should be considered in a study plan to characterize fracture networks and provide supplementary information for instrumentation and for correlating required support.

REFERENCE


Section 8.3.1.4.3 Investigation: Development of Three-Dimensional Model of Rock Characteristics at the Repository Site, pp. 8.3.1.4-84/86

QUESTION 8

What measure of predictability will accompany the computer models, maps, and other illustrations? How will uncertainties be explicitly transmitted to the model users?

BASIS

- The SCP states that “The principal result of this investigation will be the development of computer-based representations of the three-dimensional distribution of physical property data. Contour maps or cross sections will show the spatial distribution of such parameters as rock compressive strength, thermal conductivity, or gas permeability” (p. 8.3.1.4-85). A local estimate (as rendered by a map, for example) without an associated local quantitative measure of certainty may permit model users to view the model as uniformly “good,” while, in fact, certain areas may be well understood and others not, and certain parameters may be well predicted and others not. A global confidence interval for the average of a particular parameter does not adequately address the issue of local uncertainty.

- The SCP also states that “The quantitative descriptive data will then be interpolated and projected
4.0 Objections, Comments, and Questions

using a standard mathematical algorithm to create a model of the desired property(ies) as requested by performance assessment and design issues" (p. 8.3.1.4-86). A contour map generated by interpolating from a relatively small number of measurement locations is not likely to represent the entire range of values for the parameter in question. The fewer the measurements upon which an interpolation is based, the more uniform the results. For example, the probability of a small number of measurements (i.e., a small sample) capturing both the highest and the lowest values across the entire field of interest is zero; yet, the interpolation will estimate values between the highest and lowest values in the sample.

RECOMMENDATION

SCP updates should describe how local variability in the data will be presented in the block model.

Section 8.3.1.4.3.1.1 Activity: Systematic drilling program (Analysis and sampling strategy), p. 8.3.1.4-98

QUESTION 9

The SCP (p. 8.3.1.4-98) states that “determination of multiple properties from the same specimens is important for correlating variability of different parameters with non-uniform measurement support.” How will this testing strategy be implemented?

BASIS

The sampling program in Section 8.3.1.15.1 discusses only the number of samples necessary. It neither discusses how and where those samples are going to be selected nor does it discuss integration with the sampling program for Section 8.3.1.4.3.4.1.1 for the purpose of correlating variability of different parameters.

RECOMMENDATION

Integration between the sampling and testing programs in Section 8.3.1.4.3.1.1 and Section 8.3.1.15.1 should be discussed in the SCP updates to provide a basis for correlating variability of different parameters.

Section 8.3.1.4.3.2.1 Activity: Development of three-dimensional models of rock characteristics at the repository site, p. 8.3.1.4-102.

QUESTION 10

The proposed method for formulation of a three-dimensional block model by dividing it into numerous orthogonal blocks is based on the assumption that each block is sufficiently small and that the parameter of interest may be treated as constant within the block. How will the method described in the SCP account for possible variability within the blocks?

BASIS

• The SCP states that “The most detailed approach to this phase of modeling involves the formulation of a three-dimensional block model, wherein the site is divided into numerous orthogonal blocks and each block is sufficiently small that the parameter of interest may be treated as constant within the block” (p. 8.3.1.4-102). The implication appears to be that a model will be built with each block being homogeneous and perfectly predicted. However, proper block size is a function of the density of available information, not need. A computer can subdivide the blocks into finer and finer units, but in doing so, the resulting estimation accuracy disappears. Different parameters have different levels and forms of in-situ variability. Some parameters (e.g., thickness of a continuous unit) may change gradually and will not vary significantly within the block. Other parameters (e.g., rock mass permeability) will be erratic and may vary greatly across a single block. Thus, scale of local variability cannot be used to determine the model block size.

• The available site characterization data must dictate the precision of the block model. If some areas are much more densely sampled than the average, then the size of the blocks can be reduced in these areas but only in these areas. Figure 8.3.1.4-12a indicates that the minimum block size in plan would be roughly 1/4 mile on a side. If this is too coarse for the ultimate purposes of the model, then more measurements may have to be taken.

• The large volume of rock to be characterized suggests that individual blocks may be relatively large.

• Given the origin of welded tuff, considerable variability in properties over short distances can be expected.

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that analyses in the SCP updates accompany determinations of necessary block sizes, and
that justification be provided for implementing block models which assume constant parameter values within each block.

Section 8.3.1.4.4 Schedule for the Rock Characteristics Program, p. 8.3.1.4-105

QUESTION 11
What is the rationale for the plan to start drilling prior to approval of study plans for drilling?

BASIS
- Figure 8.3.1.4-16 indicates that drilling will begin in early 1989, whereas approval of study plans for drilling are all shown as occurring at a later time.
- The proposed schedule does not appear to make provision for air drilling feasibility demonstration.

RECOMMENDATION
It should be explained in the SCP updates why drilling is scheduled to begin without approval of study plans for that activity.

Section 8.3.1.8.1.1.1 Activity: Location and timing of volcanic events

QUESTION 12
Why has the Lunar Crater area not been included as a possible natural analog for detailed study of the processes related to basaltic volcanism in the Death Valley-Pancake Range volcanic belt?

BASIS
- 10 CFR 60.21 requires that models, including tectonic models, be supported by an appropriate combination of such methods as field tests, in situ tests, laboratory tests which are representative of field conditions, monitoring data, and natural analog studies.
- Both the Crater Flat and Lunar Crater basaltic fields are part of the Death Valley-Pancake Range volcanic zone.
- The 70 km limit on volcanic activities (Section 8.3.1.8.5) appears to exclude the Lunar Crater volcanic field from consideration.
- Section 8.3.1.8.5.1.5 implies that similar trends in geochemistry and eruptive patterns have been noted between the Yucca Mountain area and Lunar Crater.
- The Lunar Crater volcanic field has 110 volcanic centers of probable Quaternary age (Crowe and others, 1983) and provides an opportunity to study basaltic volcanism in great detail.
- Crowe and others (1986) indicate that they have completed geologic mapping in the Lunar Crater volcanic field, but the mapping is unpublished.

RECOMMENDATIONS
- The 70 km limit on activities to investigate volcanic processes should be reconsidered.
- The Lunar Crater volcanic field should be considered as a possible natural analog important to the understanding of volcanic processes in an area where numerous Quaternary volcanic events have occurred.

REFERENCES

Section 8.3.1.8.5.1.5 Activity: Geochemical cycles of basaltic volcanic fields

QUESTION 13
What is the basis for statements made about the migration, structural boundaries and stage of volcanism at Yucca Mountain. These statements appear to be unsupported by data presented in the SCP. Data in the SCP references and conclusions made in the SCP appear contradictory.

BASIS
- The concern expressed by this comment expands on CDSCP Question 20.
- Section 8.3.1.8.5.1.5 implies that similar trends in geochemistry and eruptive patterns have been noted between the Yucca Mountain area and Lunar Crater and that these patterns “may be” indicative of the terminal stage of basaltic activity at a volcanic field.
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- No data are presented to indicate why these trends should be considered as indicative of the terminal stage of basaltic activity. Crowe and others (1986) indicate that the Lunar Crater volcanic field is the youngest and most active field in the Death Valley-Pancake Range belt and that data suggest that the field is still active. No data are presented to adequately support the interpretation that the field is in a terminal stage of activity.

- Naumann and Smith (1988) suggest that compositional trends of single volcanic centers are more complex than previously believed and that specific trends may not be indicative of termination of volcanism in a specific area.

- No data appear to be presented in the SCP to indicate that the tectonic processes that initiated the volcanic activity that resulted in the Lathrop Wells and Lunar Crater volcanic fields have changed or stopped.

- No data appear to be presented in the SCP to adequately support the statement made in Activity 8.3.1.8.5.1.5 that a southwestwardly migration of basaltic activity has occurred.

- Section 8.3.1.8.5.1.5 states that eruptions near Yucca Mountain were characterized by early hypersthenic hawaiites with subsequent, smaller eruptions with increasing undersaturation and that similar trends have been noted at Lunar Crater. Crowe and others (1986, p.22) state that rocks of the Lunar Crater volcanic field are characterized by increasingly undersaturated basalts whose patterns are distinctly different from the volcanic patterns of the NTS region.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Assumptions and preferred models of processes in the geologic setting should be fully supported.

- Consideration should be given to presenting alternative models in cases where the data do not fully support a preferred model.

REFERENCES


Section 8.3.1.9 Human Intrusion
Section 1.6.1 Drilling and Excavation History

QUESTION 14

The SCP does not appear to consider historical records of claims and/or leases in its evaluation of previous drilling or excavation at Yucca Mountain. What consideration has been given to historical maps and claim and lease information in establishing the position that “no further investigation of previous drilling or mining is needed” (p. 1–213) in the proposed repository area?

BASIS

- The statement that “all known drilling within 10 km of the perimeter drift outline has been under the control of either the Nevada Test Site Office or the Nuclear Rocket Development Station” (p. 1–213) is misleading. The crest of Yucca Mountain and the area to the west of the mountain are not under the control of those two entities.

- Excavation and/or drilling may have occurred in the Yucca Mountain area prior to the withdrawal of the land to the east of the mountain crest for establishment of the NTS in the 1940's.

- An early 1900's map of Nevada (Clason Map Company, 1906) shows a possible mining area on the east flank of Yucca Mountain.

- Mapping or surface inspection may not delineate relatively inconspicuous surface disturbances (e.g., drilling).

RECOMMENDATION

Prior to the evaluation that “no further investigation of previous drilling or mining is needed” at the Yucca Mountain site, a thorough search of historical information pertinent to the evaluation should be made.

REFERENCE

Clason Map Company, 1906, Map of Nevada and the southeastern portion of California, Denver, Colorado.
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Section 8.3.1.9.2.1 Study: Natural resource assessment of Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada

**QUESTION 15**

What is the basis for SCP statements with respect to resource exploration and mineral resource potential? The following statements are inconsistent and/or fail to consider or integrate alternative information.

**BASIS**

- The conclusion that “on the basis of currently available data and regional comparisons, the mineral resource potential of the site is considered low” (p. 8.3.1.9–31) is not justified in the SCP. It appears to be in error, because the site’s mineral resource potential may be perceived as high. For example, Yucca Mountain is surrounded by mineralized areas such as Bare Mountain, Wahmonie, and Calico Hills (NRC, 1986) and is in proximity to faults, breccia zones, and veins and overlies zones that may host resources (e.g., Tram Member of the Crater Flat Tuff).

- The statement that it is “standard practice to exclude evaluation of mineral resources below 1 km” (p. 1–258) is without merit. There are precedents in the literature for resource exploration at depths greater than 1 km (Mining Ann. Rev., 1987). Deposits at depth, whether large tonnage or high-grade or not, may be economic at higher, but reasonable, values (i.e., $1,000/oz gold is not inconceivable; gold prices reached $800/oz in 1980).

- The SCP (p. 1–258) states that evaluation of hypothetical resources in the Paleozoic rocks cannot be accomplished due to the “constraints” of depth. However, on p. 1–280 it is stated, “Exploration for precious metals in a deeply buried Paleozoic terrain, such as at Yucca Mountain, cannot be dismissed.”

**RECOMMENDATION**

Resolve inconsistencies and consider and integrate alternative information that may be relevant to the program to address the potential for mineral resources at the proposed HLW site.

**REFERENCE**


Section 8.3.1.13.2.4 Activity: Evaluate the Impact of Ground Motion from Nuclear Testing Activities at the NTS, p. 8.3.1.13–11

**QUESTION 16**

What methods will be used to determine the impact of ground motion from underground nuclear explosions (UNEs) on repository design?

**BASIS**

- The response to CDSCP question number 25 and referenced SCP sections do not provide a discussion of the type of analysis which will be done to evaluate the effects of UNEs on the repository design.

- The only statement in this section related to evaluation of the impact of ground motion from nuclear testing is: “This activity is addressed in the resolution of Investigation 8.3.1.17.3.” However, the referenced investigation relates only to determining vibratory ground motion and does not indicate how to evaluate its impact.

- Item 5 on p. 8.3.2.1–24 states that “Ground motion at any point in the repository horizon will be analyzed to determine its effect on the state of stress and deformation, and the stability of underground openings.” Analysis methods are not discussed.

**RECOMMENDATION**

Methods to evaluate impact of vibratory ground motion from underground nuclear explosions on repository design should be explained in a study plan.

Section 8.3.1.15 Performance and Design Parameters, Tentative Goals, and Characterization Parameters for Thermal and Mechanical Properties Program, Table 8.3.1.15–1, pp. 8.3.1.15–2/13

**QUESTION 17**

What activities are planned to investigate the effects of radiation on thermal and mechanical rock properties?

**BASIS**

- The response to NRC CDSCP Question 51 implies that no direct investigations of radiation effects on thermal and mechanical properties are planned. The DOE response gives no indication as to how the radiation effects will be evaluated in terms of potential rock damage or deterioration.

- The SCP (p. 6–205) states that “the effects of radiation on thermal and mechanical rock properties
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have been identified as needed information in issue 4.4.” However, an activity to investigate this effect has not been included in the SCP.

RECOMMENDATION

Activities planned to evaluate the potential for rock damage induced by radiation should be presented in SCP updates.

Section 8.3.1.15.1 Investigation: Studies to provide the required information for spatial distribution of thermal and mechanical properties, pp. 8.3.1.15–23/31.

QUESTION 18

How will the allowable movement on joints be related to rock-mass strength?

BASIS

- On p. 8.3.1.15–26, the SCP defines rock-mass strength as “allowable movement on joints, the strength of the intact rock, or a combination of the two.” It is not clear how allowable movement on joints can be interpreted as rock-mass strength. How will the allowable movement for a rock with multiple joints be determined?
- Section 2.3.3 of the SCP discusses the relation between intact rock, discontinuities and rock mass properties. Table 2–9 (p. 2–65) presents data pertinent to methods used to estimate rock mass properties from laboratory data. Movement on discontinuities is not listed as one of the fracture properties.
- In Section 8.3.1.15.1.7.2, p. 8.3.1.15–68 (Activity: Rock-mass strength experiment), rock-mass strength means uniaxial load-bearing capacity of large blocks (up to 1 m by 1 m by 2 m) of rock that include multiple joints.

RECOMMENDATION

The SCP updates should explain how proposed tests will be used to correlate allowable movements on joints to rock-mass strength.

Section 8.3.1.17 Pre-Closure Tectonics

QUESTION 19

What consideration is being given to the use of side looking airborne radar (SLAR) at Yucca Mountain?

BASIS

- SLAR missions have proved effective in establishing a consistent base for regional fault scarp assessment (USGS, 1966).
- Low-sun angle photography is planned for selected fault assessment, and various other remote sensing methods are scheduled for determination of a regional geologic model (Section 8.3.1.4). No mention is made regarding use of SLAR.
- SLAR missions have been planned and/or obtained by the USGS for the region (USGS, 1966), but no indication of the use of such data was found during this review.

RECOMMENDATION

An east-look and west-look regional SLAR mission should be considered at an early date to provide a consistent remote sensing base for regional structure.

REFERENCE


Section 8.3.2.2.3 Information Need 1.11.3, Design Concepts for Orientation, Geometry, Layout and Depth of the Underground Facility That Contribute to Waste Isolation, Including Flexibility to Accommodate Site-Specific Conditions, pp. 8.3.2.2–48/50

Section 8.3.2.5.6 Information Need 4.4.6, Development and Demonstration of Required Equipment.

QUESTION 20

What site information will be used for product 1.11.3-3, Vertical vs. Horizontal Emplacement Orientation Decision (pp. 8.3.2.2–48 and 8.3.2.2–50)?

BASIS

- According to Table 8.3.2.2–15 (p. 8.3.2.2–89), the selection of waste package orientation will be made by September 1989. Site information and the results of field demonstrations at the repository horizon will not be available until after this date.
- The field demonstrations and proof of concept “for horizontal drilling and waste emplacement” are not discussed in detail in Section 8.3.2.2.3. It is not clear where or how they will be made.
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- Site data are needed to support development of a prototype boring machine (p. 8.3.2.5-59).
- According to Table 8.3.2.5-18 (p. 8.3.2.5-104), the waste package emplacement/retrieval equipment demonstrations will begin in December 1991.

RECOMMENDATION

The role of site characterization activities and field demonstration in the decision process for emplacement orientation should be clarified in SCP updates.

QUESTION 21

What process was implemented to assure that the list of parameters for performance goal C2 (radiation shielding properties of the host rock), given on p. 8.3.2.3-30, is comprehensive, and the expected parameter values (e.g., 65% saturation of host rock) are realistic?

BASIS

- The response to CDSCP question 37 answers a subsidiary part of the question dealing with local rock saturation. However, it does not address the main question dealing with how the radiological shielding properties of the host rock will be determined. Several aspects that might influence rock radiation shielding have not been considered.
- Given the proximity of the package to the floor for vertical emplacement, the influence of vertical jointing and of a damaged rock zone around the emplacement drift might need to be considered.
- It is unlikely that a 65% saturation will be maintained in this zone.

RECOMMENDATION

The SCP updates should include a complete list of parameters for performance goal C2.

Section 8.3.2.5 Issue resolution strategy for Issue 4.4: Are the technologies of repository construction, operation, closure and decommissioning adequately established for the resolution of the performance issues? pp. 8.3.2.5-7/17.

QUESTION 22

What is the rationale for selecting some of the tentative performance goals given in Tables 8.3.2.5-1 and 2?

BASIS

- Slope stability safety factors of 1.5, 1.3, 1.2 (p. 8.3.2.5-9) are presented. For critical slopes adjacent to important installations, a factor of safety of 1.5 is usually preferred (Hoek and Bray, 1977, p. 28).
- Allowable scour and bed erosion of 13 m in 100 yr., 5 m in 100 yr. (p. 8.3.2.5-10).
- Allowable displacements and settlements of 3 in., 2 in., 2 in., 4 in., etc. (p. 8.3.2.5-10/11).
- Probability of 0.1 in 100 yrs. (i.e., 1 in 1,000 yrs.) of 7 cm fault displacement in areas of waste emplacement. (p. 8.3.2.5-13)

RECOMMENDATION

More detail should be provided in SCP updates regarding rationale for determination of tentative goals.

REFERENCE


Section 8.3.2.5.7 Information Need 4.4.7, Design Analyses, Including Those Addressing Impacts of Surface Conditions, Rock Characteristics, Hydrology, and Tectonic Activity, pp. 8.3.2.5-61/83

QUESTION 23

Section 8.3.5.20 discusses verification of computer codes and validation of models, and makes the following points.

1. “Verification studies are used to demonstrate that the numerical values produced by a computational procedure correspond to mathematical formulas on which they are based” (p. 8.3.5.20-2). (Note that no site characterization data are required for verification studies.)
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2. The validation problem can be separated "into two aspects: 1. ascertaining when the model has achieved a good representation of the system, and 2. comparing predictive results to appropriate observation and experimental results" (p. 8.3.5.20-8).

What are the plans for code verification and model validation, presented in Section 8.3.2.5.7, for each analysis type?

**BASIS**
- This section introduces "qualification" of codes (e.g., HEFF qualification, pp. 8.3.2.5-79, 83) as being different from verification or validation.
- Many analyses in Table 8.3.2.5-16 include two analyses for a single test (i.e., pre-test and post-test analyses). It is not clear from this section what procedures will be followed if test results do not agree with predictions. For example, is the process a sequential one in which knowledge gained by post-test analysis is used in the next pre-test analysis, and so on?
- On p. 8.3.2.5-83 it is stated that "codes used for the design of the ventilation system should not require additional work for validation." The two reasons given for this statement are not convincing, since they do not address the aspects of validation given on p. 8.3.5.20-8.
- Code verification and model validation are not discussed with respect to seismic codes. On p. 8.3.2.5-83, it is stated that methodologies for predicting ground motion and seismic hazards "require testing through the planned field program (Section 8.3.1.17.3.5)." The referenced section discusses only synthesis and compilation of data collected by other activities. It is not clear how the collected data will be used to validate the seismic codes; i.e., what component will be predictive?
- On p. 8.3.2.2-16, it is stated that "the present design basis is that the underground excavations will be backfilled before closure of the underground facility." On p. 8.3.2.2-73, it is stated that "Because primary reliance will be placed on performance assessment to evaluate the acceptability of the system, detailed validation of thermomechanical models of the backfilled drifts is not considered necessary."
- The DOE acknowledges "that one of the difficulties associated with model validation is that the nature of validation need, and even the meaning of validation, may change at different stages of the modeling and research process" (p. 8.3.5.20-10). The program given in Section 8.3.2.5 does not address this concern.

**RECOMMENDATION**

Plans for verification and validation for each analysis type (e.g., thermomechanical, ventilation, seismic, etc.) should be presented in SCP updates.

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**QUESTION 24**

What is the justification for concluding that the shaft liner does not provide structural support for the formation and that the removal of the liner does not significantly modify the permeability?

**BASIS**
- No specific analysis of the effect of liner removal has been found in SCP Section 8.4.3.2.3, referenced in response to CDSCP point paper comment number 66.
- In response to CDSCP comment number 66, the SCP states that the shaft liner does not provide structural support for the formation. In view of this SCP statement, the purpose of a liner is not clear.
- According to p. 8.3.3.1-1, last sentence of second paragraph, "Because the liner does not provide structural support for the formation, removal of the liner is not expected to cause significant additional stress redistribution or to significantly modify the permeability." This statement is contradicted by several shaft analysis summaries in Section 8.4.3.2.3.1, which indicate a high probability of stress/deformation interactions (in particular 8.4.3.2.3.1, Items 2 and 3). None of these account for concrete, rock bolt and rock deterioration over a period of nearly 100 years.
- In Section 8.4.3.2.3 it is stated that "the MPZ model implicitly includes the effect of liner removal." (p. 8.4.3-26). The MPZ (modified permeability zone) model discussed is that presented by Case and Kelsall (1987). In developing this model, no liner was assumed to be present and no thermal, time, or three-dimensional effects were considered. If the rock or lining exhibits time-dependent behavior, or if thermal loading is experienced, or if the liner is installed near the face of an advancing shaft, then the liner will be stressed and will provide some support to the surrounding rock. It is not obvious, therefore,
that the MPZ model adequately accounts for liner removal.

- The supporting reference (Fernandez et al., 1988) does not provide an analysis to justify the conclusion that the shaft liner removal at closure is not expected to cause stress redistribution, and implies that a supporting function may be required (e.g., Fernandez et al., 1988, Sections 8.1.1, 8.1.3).

- Cumulative displacement and convergence rate limitations imposed by other SCP sections (in particular Tables 8.3.2.4-1/2/5/8) recognize the potential for rock movements sufficient to stress the shaft liners.

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that analyses be provided in SCP updates in support of the statement that shaft liner removal is not expected to cause additional stress redistribution or significant permeability changes.

REFERENCES


SECTION 8.3.3.2 ISSUE RESOLUTION STRATEGY FOR ISSUE 1.12, pp. 8.3.3.2-1/62

QUESTION 26

There is an apparent inconsistency between Tentative Design Goals (Table 8.3.3.2-1) and Design-Basis Performance Goals (Table 8.3.3.2-5) for shafts and ramps inflow for the first 400 years after closure. What are the potential impacts of inconsistencies in tentative design goals and design-basis performance goals for shafts and ramps?

BASIS

- Based on a review of the response to CDSCP question number 41, the inconsistency in Tentative Design Goals (Table 8.3.3.2-1) and Design-Basis Performance Goals (Table 8.3.3.2-5) for shaft and ramp inflow for the first 400 years after closure seems to remain. The inconsistency is not addressed by the response which essentially deals with goals beyond 500 and 1,000 years.

- Table 8.3.3.2-1 (Item 1) shows a tentative design goal as 1,700 cu m/yr., whereas Table 8.3.3.2-5 (lines 1 and 2) shows design-basis performance goal as 0 cu m/yr.

RECOMMENDATION

The impact of the inconsistency noted above on the results of the preliminary performance analysis should be clarified in SCP updates.
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Section 8.3.3.2-2

Issue Resolution strategy for Issue 8.12, Table 8.3.3.2-2

General Design constraints passed to Issue 8.11, configuration of underground facilities (post-closure) for major repository features from sealing program, p. 8.3.3.2-13.

QUESTION 27

Does ES-1 have 150 m$^3$ water storage capacity at base of shaft for attaining the tentative design goal identified on p. 8.3.3.2-13?

BASIS

The height required to accommodate 150 m$^3$ of water, assuming a 12-foot internal diameter and backfill porosity of 0.3, would be 155 feet. Figure 8.4.2-27 indicates a depth below repository level of less than 155 feet. ES-1 (Title I design (Figure 8.4.2-33)) has only a 50-foot depth below the main test level.

RECOMMENDATION

The means for attaining a tentative design goal of 150 m$^3$ of water storage capacity at base of shaft assuming backfill porosity of 0.3 should be presented in the SCP updates.

Section 8.3.3.2-2

Issue resolution strategy for Issue 8.12, Table 8.3.3.2-2, p. 8.3.3.2-13

QUESTION 28

If it is decided that ES-1 will penetrate the Calico Hills unit, what will be the impacts on the current sealing program and issue resolution strategy for Issue 4.4?

BASIS

- Penetration into the Calico Hills unit by ES-1 is currently under evaluation by the DOE. The SCP states that the decision on the penetration will be made at a later date (Section 8.4.2.1.6.1, p. 8.4.2-35).
- Current design or performance goals for sealing and System Element 1.2.1.1 (access construction) of Issue 4.4 are that no shaft should penetrate into the Calico Hills unit. If a decision is made at a later date that such penetration is necessary, the potential impact of such penetration on the sealing program and resolution of Issue 4.4 would have to be considered.

RECOMMENDATION

If a decision is made to penetrate the Calico Hills unit, an analysis of the impact on the sealing program should be presented in SCP updates. Corresponding changes for the sealing program and Issue Strategy 4.4 should be included.

Section 8.3.3.2.2.3

Study 1.12.2.3: In situ testing of seal components, pp. 8.3.3.2-41/62

QUESTION 29

What is the basis to justify that the references cited on p. 8.3.3.2-58 present results representative of the conditions present at the Yucca Mountain site?

BASIS

- Contrary to what is stated in the second paragraph of SCP p. 8.3.3.2-58, Kelsall et al., 1984, does not describe the laboratory test on anhydrite.
- Lingle and Bush (1982) is incomplete in the reference list. A related reference, Bush and Lingle (1986), and a more detailed materials study of this test by Scheetz et al. (1986) describe an anhydrite sealing test in which the permeability of the seal and interface was many orders of magnitude larger than the values reported here.
- Whereas it is correct that Daemen et al. (1983) have measured extremely low interface permeabilities in many tests, it is also true that they have observed relatively high interface flows under certain conditions which may be more representative for Yucca Mountain sealing; e.g., in dry environments (Adisoma and Daemen, 1988).

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that a more representative set of results be selected for determining test conditions to be implemented in sealing study plans.

REFERENCES


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Section 8.3.4 Waste Package Program.
(Waste package postclosure compliance strategy, p. 8.3.4–4 para. 4)

QUESTION 31
It is stated that, for spent fuel, reliance (i.e., performance allocation) is placed on the cladding during the early years to limit the release of the radionuclides with short half lives. How can performance allocation or reliance be placed on the cladding of those spent fuel elements which fail or “leak” during reactor operation? Will spent fuel “leakers” be identified and fixed prior to packaging for emplacement in the repository?

BASIS

- During normal reactor operation, the cladding of a small percentage of the fuel elements can be expected to fail or leak, exposing the fuel elements to leaching conditions.
- Existing spent fuel rod consolidation technology appears to damage the cladding of an additional small percentage of those fuel assemblies undergoing rod consolidation.
- The spent fuel of those elements with damaged or failed cladding will be directly exposed to the leaching conditions of any water which may collect or develop in the repository horizon.

RECOMMENDATION

Provide justification for allocating performance to spent fuel cladding, given the knowledge that a small percentage of the spent fuel will have failed cladding on emplacement, and identify any plans to repair fuel with damaged cladding prior to emplacement.

Section 8.3.4.1.2 Waste package components.
(p. 8.3.4.1–5 para 3.)

QUESTION 32
It is stated that the borosilicate glass waste form inside a stainless steel pour canister will be placed in a metal container similar to that to be used for spent fuel.

What is meant by “similar”?

BASIS

- Similar can mean nearly identical shape and size, design, wall thickness, or same class/family of materials.
- In the context, the SCP seems to imply that the container will be fabricated from the same family
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of materials i.e. austenitic stainless steels (304L, 316L, alloy 825) or copper/copper-base alloys (CDA 102, CDA 613, CDA 715).

- If “similar” means “of the same family of materials,” then it is not clear how DOE is considering copper/copper-base alloys and any other alternative canister materials (candidates for 1000 yr design life canisters) since Type 304L austenitic stainless steel is the only pour canister material under consideration for the borosilicate glass waste form.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- What is meant by “similar” should be clearly stated in the section cited to avoid any incorrect interpretation.

- Explanation should be provided to describe what DOE would do if dissimilar materials were selected for these containers and how this selection would affect or alter the site characterization program and waste package testing.

Section 8.3.4.2.C Emplacement hole drainage
Design goal for drainage of emplacement boreholes. p. 8.3.4.2-27 para. 3.

QUESTION 33

It is stated that the accumulation of standing water in boreholes would lead to deleterious effects on the waste package performance. For that reason, as part of the performance allocation process, a design goal (#2) for drainage from boreholes is to allow no more than 5L of standing water per package to accumulate in the emplacement hole for the first 1,000 yr following repository closure.

How can the presence of standing water during the first 1,000 yr be justified? What is the basis for 5L of standing water per canister being acceptable?

BASIS

- During the early period of HLW canister burial (up to 1,000 yrs following repository closure), the temperature of the canister is expected to be greater than the boiling point of water. As such, any water coming in contact with the canister will presumably vaporize. A finite volume of the tuff surrounding the borehole is also expected to be dehydrated during the first 1,000 yr after the repository closure.

- Should there be any possibility of an accumulation of standing water in the borehole, the waste container design should take it into consideration.

- Since the design goal allows accumulation of standing water, there is a possibility of an accelerated localized (crevice) corrosion rate on the bottom end of the HLW canister due to the existence of a crevice between the canister and the base support plate. The SCP neither provides any plans to investigate this mode of canister failure nor addresses the possibility of galvanic corrosion between the canister and the base support plate.

- It is well-known that when a metal is partially immersed in water there is much higher corrosion at the water-vapor interface than on the parts in water or in the vapor phase. This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as the “water-line” corrosion. The SCP does not provide any test plans to study “water-line” corrosion in the candidate canister materials.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Higher corrosion on the part of the canister that may be submerged in standing water during the first 1,000 yr after repository closure should be considered in canister design.

- The likelihood of an accelerated localized corrosion rate on the bottom of the canister due to the existence of a crevice, and also galvanic corrosion between the base support plate and the canister should be addressed.

- The possibility of accelerated “water-line” corrosion of the canister at the water-vapor interface needs to be investigated.

Section 8.3.4.2.G Waste package fabrication and handling before emplacement
Design goal for closure. p. 8.3.4.2-30 para. 6.

QUESTION 34

It is stated that the level of undetected defective closures will be shown to be less than 1%.

What is meant by undetected defective closures? Does it mean undetected defects? What is the rationale for 1%? If the “defects” are “undetected” how can it possibly be shown conclusively that the number of “defective closures” is anything other than 0%? Furthermore, if the defects are “undetected,” it is reasonable to assume that their characteristics/features and precise location cannot be determined with certainty, and that they cannot be repaired. Under such circumstances, what assurance is there that these defects will not get any larger or increase in number prior to emplacement or during the period requiring “substantially complete containment” of radio-nuclides?
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BASIS

- If the defects are "undetectable," how can it be demonstrated/proven that they are below a certain limit.

- Existence of "undetectable" defects raises concerns about their nature and if and/or when they will increase in number or size, making the task of repair/rework difficult or impossible and raising further concerns about these "undetectable" defects leading to premature failures of closure joints.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Provide a more precise definition of a "defect," and explanation about "undetectable" defects. Give examples of "undetectable" defects.

- The acceptable level of defects (detectable and undetectable) should have a rationale which relates to the performance objective for "substantially complete containment" by the waste package during the first 300 to 1,000 yrs after closure of the repository.

- Techniques should be referenced and/or development plans provided for assuring that, in the aggregate, closures with an acceptable level of "undetectable" defects and defect-free closures will meet all pre-closure and post-closure requirements regarding containment and isolation of waste.

QUESTION 35

It is stated that the closure process will be capable of being performed and inspected under remote conditions with a reliability such that the containment would be capable of passing a standard helium leak test at the level of $10^{-7}$ atm-cm$^2$/sec.

What is the basis for the helium leak test acceptance criteria?

BASIS

10 CFR Part 60.113 includes requirements for the performance of the engineered barrier system and it is not clear if the criteria are consistent with these requirements.

RECOMMENDATION

Provide the basis for the helium leak test acceptance criteria and demonstrate that the criteria are consistent with the performance requirements of 10 CFR Part 60.113 for the engineered barrier system.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Provide a more precise definition of a "defect," and explanation about "undetectable" defects. Give examples of "undetectable" defects.

- The acceptable level of defects (detectable and undetectable) should have a rationale which relates to the performance objective for "substantially complete containment" by the waste package during the first 300 to 1,000 yrs after closure of the repository.

- Techniques should be referenced and/or development plans provided for assuring that, in the aggregate, closures with an acceptable level of "undetectable" defects and defect-free closures will meet all pre-closure and post-closure requirements regarding containment and isolation of waste.

QUESTION 36

It is stated that containers will not be allowed to contact corrosive chemicals during surface-handling and emplacement operations except as needed for surface finishing.

What kind of surface finishing would be anticipated or required for the HLW canisters prior to emplacement? Would any corrosive chemicals be necessary or allowed for surface finishing of the canisters? What chemicals would be allowed/prohibited? How long will they be in contact with the canister surface? What techniques will be used to verify that they have been completely removed prior to emplacement in the repository and that they have had no adverse impact on the containers?

BASIS

- Bases for the need to surface finish HLW canisters, using corrosive chemicals, are not given in the SCP.

- Testing of the effects of such surface finishing techniques on waste package performance is not included in the SCP.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Need for any specific surface finishing/conditioning of HLW canisters should be justified.

- Need for using corrosive chemicals for surface finishing/conditioning of canisters should be justified.

- Plans for evaluating the long-term effects of using corrosive chemicals on HLW canisters should be provided.

QUESTION 37

One of the design goals (#2) to avoid damage from handling that affects performance is not to emplace any
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container that is subjected to an impact load equivalent to a free-fall of 10-cm or more during handling.

What is the basis for the 10-cm free-fall acceptance criterion? Is this criterion based on the damage to the canister and/or its contents?

BASIS

- Damage will be a function of several factors including: container material and thickness, package weight, location of impact, and rigidity of the surface upon which it falls.

- Calculations and/or test results were not provided which would establish 10-cm as “conservative” for all anticipated container drop scenarios.

- Internal and/or external damage may affect waste package container performance.

- It would be impractical to verify the equivalent free-fall distance after an accidental drop.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The 10-cm free-fall acceptance criterion should be based on appropriate testing and assessment of external and internal damage to the canister and/or its contents.

- Techniques to be used for determining the suitability/unsuitability of a canister for emplacement after a drop should be provided.

- Plans should be provided for testing that will be performed in establishing the free-fall acceptance criterion.

Section 8.3.4.2.G Waste package fabrication and handling before emplacement. Design goal for handling. p. 8.3.4.2-31 para.1.

QUESTION 38

One of the design goals (#3) to avoid damage from handling that affects performance is not to emplace any container that is scratched so that the metal is thinned by 1-mm or more.

What is the basis for the 1-mm thinning criterion? How does this relate to the variation/tolerance in the nominal wall thickness of the canister material? What is the allowed variation in canister wall thickness? Is the scratch design goal of 1-mm depth independent of the canister material? Would a scratch depth of a mm or less create a potential location for crevice corrosion?

BASIS

- Corrosion response of a scratch/scratched region will depend upon the characteristics of the scratch, e.g., its width, depth, root radius, scratch density, any chemical contamination of the scratched region with the object that produced the scratch, etc. The SCP does not provide any characteristics of the scratch other than its depth.

- Techniques that will be used to measure the wall thinning at the location of the scratch are not given in the SCP.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Provide a more complete definition of the pertinent characteristics of a scratch.

- Scratch acceptance criteria should provide the maximum acceptable scratch length, depth, width, areal density, total number of scratches per canister, total length of scratches per canister, and other features of a scratch that could affect the performance of the canister.

- Criteria for evaluation of the suitability of a scratched canister should be supported by experimental evidence of material performance of a scratched region.

- Techniques that will be used to detect scratches and measure wall thinning at the location of the scratch should be provided.

Section 8.3.4.2.G Waste package fabrication and handling before emplacement. Design goal for handling. p. 8.3.4.2-31 para. 1.

QUESTION 39

One of the design goals (#4) to avoid damage from handling that affects performance is not to emplace any container that has experienced an unusual process history that would cause new corrosion considerations to arise.

What is an “unusual process history”? What kinds of new corrosion considerations can arise? Give examples over the range of anticipated or potential process histories. What are DOE’s plans for disposition of this kind of waste?
4.0 Objections, Comments, and Questions

BASIS

- There is little discussion in the SCP about what constitutes an "unusual process history."
- In the absence of a clear definition and discussion of "unusual process history" there is difficulty in judging what constitutes such a history for the purpose of developing plans to address the problem.
- Simply stating that this kind of waste will not be emplaced does not solve the problem of dealing with this waste which will require eventual disposal.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- "Unusual process history" should be defined clearly or illustrated.
- New corrosion considerations that would arise from "unusual process history" should be explained.
- Plans should be described for the eventual disposition of this kind of waste.

Section 8.3.4.2.H  Alteration to the environment caused by nonwaste package components
Design goals for the borehole liner.  p. 8.3.4.2-31 para. 5.

QUESTION 40

One of the design goals (#1) for the liner is that the corrosion rate of the borehole liner by uniform corrosion will be within a factor of 2 of that for the container material.

What is the basis of the factor of 2? Is it two times greater or half the corrosion rate of the canister material? Since the borehole liner will be in contact with the geologic formation of the region, what testing plans have been developed to test the corrosion behavior of the candidate liner materials in the presence of tuff geologic formations? What will be the effects of the water containing liner corrosion products on the materials response of the HLW canister?

BASIS

Corrosion products from the borehole liner would change the chemistry of water coming in contact with the canister. This could have an impact on the long-term corrosion behavior or other life-limiting canister degradation mechanisms. The SCP does not address this issue.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Explain the basis for the "factor of 2" corrosion rate design goal for the liner.
- Provide information on the studies/tests to address liner corrosion.
- Provide information on the studies/tests to address the issue of possible deleterious effects of liner corrosion products on the performance of the canister.

Section 8.3.5.2  Issue resolution strategy for Issue 2.4: can the repository be designed, constructed, operated, closed, and decommissioned so that the option of waste retrieval will be preserved as required by 10 CFR 60.112?, pp. 8.3.5.2–1/3.

QUESTION 41

Why is 10 CFR 60.132(a), "Facilities for receipt and retrieval of waste" not given as a regulatory basis for the resolution of Issue 2.4?

BASIS

- 10 CFR 60.132(a) relates directly to waste retrievability.
- 10 CFR 60.15(d)(4) requires that subsurface exploratory drilling and in situ testing should be planned and coordinated with geologic repository design. The design of surface facilities for repository needs to allow for safe handling and storage of wastes whether these wastes are on surface before or as a result of retrieval from the underground facility (10 CFR 60.132(a)). However, the SCP does not identify site characterization information needs to design repository surface facilities for retrieval operations.

RECOMMENDATION

SCP updates should include Regulation 10 CFR 60.132(a) in the regulatory basis for the resolution of Issue 2.4, or a rationale should be provided for not considering it.

REFERENCE

10 CFR 60 (Subpart E)
4.0 Objections, Comments, and Questions

Section 8.3.5.2.3 Information Need 2.4.3, logic, p. 8.3.5.2-39, Point 2

QUESTION 42
Where are the analyses given to support the expectation that vertical emplacement holes will remain stable throughout the retrieval period?

BASIS

- It is stated on p. 8.3.5.2-39 that “For the vertical emplacement concept, the borehole is expected to be stable with negligible amounts of rockfall into the emplacement borehole under normal conditions.” Analyses to support this expectation are not included.

- Neither in SCP Section 8.3.5.2 nor in Appendix J of the SCP-CDR are any supporting references provided for the analysis of vertical emplacement holes.

- Given the high frequency of vertical jointing, the potential for anisotropy in the horizontal stresses, and the potential for rock deterioration with time and temperature, unlined vertical emplacement holes may not remain stable.

RECOMMENDATION
SCP updates should provide a reference (or analysis) to support the expectation that vertical emplacement holes will remain stable throughout the retrievability period.

Section 8.3.5.3.1 Information Need 2.1.1: Site and design information needed to assess preclosure radiological safety; pp. 8.3.5.3-20 to 8.3.5.3-23. Table 8.3.5.3-2. Parameters required for issue 2.1 (public radiological exposure—normal conditions)

Section 8.3.5.4.1 Information Need 2.2.1: Determination of radiation environment in surface and subsurface facilities due to natural and manmade radioactivity. Table 8.3.5.4-2. Parameters required for issues 2.2 (worker radiological safety—normal conditions)

 QUESTION 43
Are Anticipated Operational Occurrences being considered as part of normal conditions in the preclosure design and analysis?

BASIS

- Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, defines “Anticipated Operational Occurrences” to mean “those conditions of normal operation which are expected to occur one or more times during the life of the nuclear power unit and include, but are not limited to, loss of power to all recirculating pumps, tripping of the turbine generator set, isolation of the main condenser, and loss of all offsite power.”

- The NRC staff considers that a similar concept is applicable for the repository and that Anticipated Operational Occurrences would include those conditions of normal operation which are expected to occur one or more times during the preclosure period.

- Neither Table 8.3.5.4-2 nor Table 8.3.5.3-2 appears to consider such phenomena as the effects from weapons testing and natural seismic events, which the staff consider should be evaluated under normal and anticipated operational occurrences.

- Review of Section 4.0 of Appendix F of the Site Characterization Plan Conceptual Design Report lists many internal and external events which have a frequency such that they would be expected to occur one or more times during the preclosure period. While these events are being considered under accident analysis, the staff is unsure that these events are also being considered under normal operations.

- Review of Section 8.3.5.5 in general, however, appears to indicate that the type of information needed for evaluations of the various external events which are not specifically listed in Sections 8.3.5.3 and 8.3.5.4 will be gathered under different programs of site characterization.

RECOMMENDATION
DOE should assure that the design and analysis for normal conditions includes anticipated operational occurrences, both internal and external.

Section 8.3.5.5.1 Information Need 2.3.1: Determination of credible accident sequences and their respective frequencies applicable to the repository

 QUESTION 44
The magnitude of the dose to members of the public during accident conditions (and consequently the Q-list) is highly dependent upon the numbers of fuel assemblies (or waste canisters) assumed to be breached in those accidents. What are the bases for the assumed numbers of breached assemblies or canisters?
BASIS

- This question, which was originally posed as CDSCP Question 43, is repeated here since no changes or additions were made to the SCP in response to the question.

- As indicated in paragraph 2, p. 5–16, Section 5.1.3 of the CDR, Fuel Pellet and HLW Glass Pulverization Factors: "Estimating the airborne source term from impact accidents is a major requirement in performing realistic dose assessment calculations."

- As indicated in Equations 5.18 and 5.22, pp. 5–48 and 5–49, Section 5.3 of the CDR, Approach for Event Tree Scenario Quantifications, the magnitude of the dose (to both workers and to the public) is directly proportional to the number of fuel assemblies and high-level waste canisters that are assumed to be breached.

- Dose is also used to determine those structures, systems, and components important to safety in accordance with 10 CFR Part 60.2.

RECOMMENDATION

A rationale needs to be provided in SCP updates for the numbers of fuel assemblies (or waste canisters) breached in the accidents considered.

REFERENCE


REFERENCES


QUESTION 45

The SCP does not identify whether additional data are needed to establish particulate source terms for the waste package, particulate retention factors by containing vessels, or plateout or gravitational settlement factors for the geologic repository operations area during accident conditions in the preclosure phase. What investigations are planned?

BASIS

- This question, which was originally posed as CDSCP Question 44, is repeated here since no changes or additions were made to the SCP in response to the question.

- Several statements in Sections 5.1.2–5.1.5 of the CDR seem to indicate that better bases for waste package source terms and releases from the geologic repository operations area are needed.

- The SCP does not discuss the need for investigations to characterize the magnitude (or particle sizes) of radionuclides that could be released from the waste package when subjected to impacts (such as a crane falling on a fuel assembly) nor does it discuss the need for investigations to develop realistic radionuclide retention fractions for containment systems and structures.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Existing information on the source terms for the waste package and plateout and retention factors for the geologic repository operations area in the preclosure phase needs to be evaluated in SCP updates and the need (if any) for additional information (e.g., data gathering, models, etc.) to be obtained during site characterization needs to be identified.

- If new information is to be obtained, the investigations should be discussed in SCP updates.


REFERENCES


QUESTION 46

It is stated that DOE considers it appropriate to require that release of isotopes with long half-lives from the waste...
packages be controlled at a stricter standard during the containment period than during post-containment period.

What is the basis of this statement?

**BASIS**

Isotopes with long half-lives will have practically the same inventory during the containment period (300 to 1,000 yr) as at the beginning of the post-containment period. On the other hand, strictly controlling the release of shorter-lived isotopes during the containment period will assure (safe) substantial reduction in the inventory of the short-lived isotopes (through radioactive decay) prior to the beginning of the post-containment period.

**RECOMMENDATION**

Justification for requiring stricter control on the release of long-lived isotopes during the containment period should be provided.

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**QUESTION 47**

It is stated that some preclosure container breaches will escape detection and that a very small fraction of containers will breach during containment. Further, it is stated that these breaches may not constitute failure since failure is defined as a breach large enough to allow significant air flow (1 x 10^-4 atm-cm^2/s) into the container. It is also stated that this test is a general standard accepted by the nuclear industry.

What is the origin of the stated definition of a failure? What is the basis for its applicability for canisters containing HLW? What segment of the nuclear industry accepts it as a general standard? For which component(s) is this standard used?

**BASIS**

Breaches constitute failure of containment. Such breaches and their effect on performance must be known to judge whether containment is "substantially complete."

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**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Present plans for testing and demonstrating that canisters with breaches of the size stated will meet all preclosure radioactive release requirements imposed on canisters with no breaches.

- Present plans for testing and demonstrating that the composite of canisters with and without breaches of the size stated will meet the postclosure radioactive release requirements ("substantially complete containment" and "gradual release").

- Present plans for testing and demonstrating that breaches of the size stated will not propagate or increase in time during the containment and post containment periods.

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**Section 8.3.5.9.2.1 Subactivity 1.4.2.1.1: Establishment of selection criteria and their weighting factors**

**QUESTION 48**

The composition of the peer review panel is very important. These seven individuals should be recognized as being among the top experts in metallurgy and materials science in the United States. How are these individuals to be selected?

**BASIS**

- A peer review conducted by the expert panel would serve to put to use the best knowledge available on the given subject.

- Peer review would be for the purpose of sanctioning, improving, passing judgment and commenting on the given subject.

- Peer review indicates a strict and knowledgeable review, and this can best be accomplished by a recognized panel of experts.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Select individuals for peer review from a cross section of leading experts representing academia, industry, government and other individuals or establishments.

- Include in the SCP update discussions of criteria used for selecting peer review panel members.
Section 8.3.5.9.2.3.2 Subactivities 1.4.2.3.2 through 1.4.2.3.9: Laboratory test plan for austenitic materials. Description p. 8.3.5.9–78 para. 1.

QUESTION 49

It is stated that long-term, low temperature oxidation is expected to condition the surface of the container and will influence all the other subsequent degradation modes. It is also stated that these points are taken into account in the modeling activities.

What is meant by “condition the surface”? What is meant by long-term? What tests/analyses have been performed to understand the conditioning effects of low temperature oxidation? How have the surface conditioning effects been factored into the canister materials selection process? How have the surface conditioning effects been taken into account in the modeling activities?

BASIS

- Plans for testing of the effects of surface conditioning of HLW canisters as a result of long-term, low temperature oxidation on the performance of the waste package are not discussed in the SCP.
- The role of this presumed protective mechanism in material selection is not stated.

RECOMMENDATION

Plans for evaluating the effects of surface conditioning of the HLW canisters due to long-term, low temperature oxidation should be provided in the SCP.

Section 8.3.5.9.3.2.7 Subactivity 1.4.3.2.7: Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking

Section 7.4.2.6 Pitting Corrosion, Crevice Corrosion, and Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking

QUESTION 50

In this section and throughout the SCP is there an assumption that stress corrosion crack propagation results from anodic dissolution and removal of metal from the crack tip?

BASIS

- Not all viable mechanisms will require a liquid phase at the crack tip. For example, three alternative mechanisms for T-SCC of stainless steels have been proposed: hydrogen embrittlement, film-induced cleavage and surface diffusion. These mechanisms may not require liquid phase water at the crack tip.
- If a liquid phase is not required at the crack tip for environmentally induced cracking, then cracking may be possible in the unsaturated zone during the containment period and should be evaluated.
- The assumption that SCC propagation results from anodic dissolution and removal of metal from the crack tip is not generally accepted throughout the corrosion research community and is contrary to recent research results, particularly for transgranular stress corrosion cracking (T-SCC).
- The mechanism of SCC is not thoroughly established and more than one mechanism may be capable of causing crack propagation.
- Since the mechanism of SCC is not known, then all viable mechanisms should be evaluated.

RECOMMENDATION

Modeling efforts should include all viable mechanisms of SCC and testing should include evaluation of cracking resistance in vapor phase environments.

Section 8.3.5.10 Issue resolution strategy for Issue 1.5: Will the waste package and repository engineered barrier system meet the performance objective for radionuclide release rates as required by 10 CFR 60.113?

Section 7.3.1.1.2 High-level wastes

Section 7.4.3.2 Glass waste form performance research

QUESTION 51

Has the DOE considered the impacts to the waste package site characterization program related to INEL and Hanford high-level wastes?

BASIS

- Section 7.3.1.1.2 discusses receipt of high-level wastes from the West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) and from the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF). High-level wastes from INEL and Hanford are not mentioned.
- Section 7.4.1.1.2 discusses waste form research addressing wastes from WVDP and DWPF but does not mention research addressing INEL and Hanford wastes.
- High-level liquid waste generated at INEL by the processing of spent fuel from the national defense
(naval propulsion nuclear reactors) and reactor testing programs and by the reprocessing of fuel from nondefense research reactors is stored in large, doubly contained, underground stainless steel tanks. The liquid waste is converted to a calcine, then stored underground in stainless steel bins housed in reinforced concrete vaults. The INEL wastes are acidic.

- The Hanford waste was generated by reprocessing of production reactor fuel for recovery of plutonium, uranium, and neptunium for defense and other federal programs. Most of the high-heat-emitting isotopes (90Sr and 137Cs) have been removed from the waste, converted to solid strontium fluoride and cesium chloride, placed in double-walled capsules, and stored in water basins. The liquid sludge, slurry, and salt cake are stored in underground concrete tanks with carbon-steel liners. The Hanford wastes are alkaline.

- The total volume of unprocessed wastes from INEL and Hanford is approximately 500 thousand cubic meters which is much larger than the 115 thousand cubic meters of DWPF and WVDP wastes (DOE/NE-0017/2).

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Include discussions of INEL and Hanford wastes in the SCP.

- Examine the quantity and characteristics of wastes from INEL and Hanford and plans for ultimate disposition, consider their impact on SCP planning and tests, and make appropriate changes to plans and tests.

**REFERENCE**


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**RECOMMENDATIONS**

Section 8.3.5.10. Issue resolution strategy for Issue 1.5: Will the waste package and repository engineered barrier systems meet the performance objective for radionuclide release rates as required by 10 CFR 60.113?

A. Waste form definition. Specification 1.3. Leaching properties. p. 8.3.5.10-34 para. 4.

**QUESTION 52**

It is stated that the leaching properties specification will require the producer to control the leaching characteristics of the glass waste form such that the release rates in a 28-day MCC–1 leach test in deionized water do not exceed certain specified limits.

Why is the specification based on release rates in deionized water when the specific water chemistry of the repository may produce different and, certainly, more representative results?

**BASIS**

Leach testing in deionized water may not be able to detect some variability in the glass waste form production which might significantly affect the waste form response to leaching in a solution representative of the repository environment.

**RECOMMENDATION**

Provide the rationale for the use of deionized water instead of simulated repository water.

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Section 8.3.5.10. Issue resolution strategy for Issue 1.5: Will the waste package and repository engineered barrier systems meet the performance objective for radionuclide release rates as required by 10 CFR 60.113?

Waste form definition p. 8.3.5.10-34 para. 4.

**QUESTION 53**

Why has the cooling rate of the glass waste form not been specified?

**BASIS**

- Cooling rate of glass can significantly affect fracturing of the monolith and the production of fissures prior to emplacement and can substantially increase the surface area of the glass waste form available to water in the event of a canister breach.
Cooling rate of glass can influence the level of residual stresses in the pour canister and could also have an effect on the sensitization of the 304L stainless steel pour canister.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- An appropriate specification should be developed and presented for controlling the cooling rate of the glass waste form.
- The basis for such a specification should be developed and presented, as well as any plans for testing to establish the basis and/or specification.

**QUESTION 54**

Does the proposed SCP test for rate of release of radionuclides from spent fuel in J-13 water take into consideration the effect of ground water contamination by container metal ions, or the possible concentration of J-13 salts in the repository?

**BASIS**

The SCP proposes to investigate release rates of radionuclides from spent fuel in reference J-13 water. If the waste containers fall through some corrosion related phenomenon, the J-13 water will, very likely, be contaminated by the container metal ions (Fe, Ni, Cu, etc.). These charged ions will affect the chemical reactions in the container and the dissolution of the radionuclides in J-13 water. Furthermore, the evaporation of J-13 water may increase the concentration of J-13 water above its proposed reference level.

**RECOMMENDATION**

Testing of release rates in J-13 water should include water that contains the various metal ions that will be made available from the corrosion of the metal container. The solute concentrations should include those found at and above the concentration levels in reference J-13 water.

**QUESTION 55**

Since the plans for the development of the ESF call for construction and use of various water handling facilities, including a water storage tank, a septic field, and a waste water lagoon, but the analysis for test interferences do not appear to analyze the potential for interference from these facilities, can the data required for site characterization be obtained without interference?

**BASIS**

- Figure 8.4.2-23 of the SCP and Figure 4-5 of the Overview show a 150,000 gallon water storage tank, a septic leach field, and a 575,000 gallon waste water lagoon.
- The SCP text indicates on pages 8.4.2-162-163 that the water storage tank will be located west of and above the ESF site and that the waste water treatment facilities will be located about 2000 feet beyond the repository block boundary.
- Tables 8.4.2-10 and 11 on water use do not include estimates for sanitary uses of water.
- The potential for test interference or potential impacts on postclosure performance from these waste handling facilities do not appear to be analyzed in sections 8.4.2.2.3, 8.4.2.3.6.1, or 8.4.3 under normal or upset conditions.
- The potential effects of a failure of the water storage tank on testing do not appear to be analyzed.
- Part 60.17 (a)(2)(iv) requires a description of "plans to control any adverse impacts from... site characterization activities that are important to safety or that are important to waste isolation."

**RECOMMENDATION**

An analysis of the effects of the water handling facilities on testing and postclosure performance should be performed before these facilities are constructed, operated, and their ultimate disposition is decided.

**QUESTION 56**

What is the justification for selecting a tolerance of 5 cm fault displacement?
4.0 Objections, Comments, and Questions

BASIS

- If a 5 cm fault displacement does occur at the emplacement area, the container may be subjected to extension, shear, and bending stresses due to borehole deflection. Containers may be damaged during this deformation process. Also, high stress in the container may accelerate corrosion and consequently compromise its design function. It has not been demonstrated in the SCP that the current design of the air gap between the waste package and the borehole wall (or liner) will accommodate the movements along discontinuity planes.

- The SCP states that stability of emplacement borehole openings is of concern during preclosure and for the 1,000-year period after closure (Section 7.4.1.1). It also recognizes the possibility of translational movement of rock blocks into the emplacement holes. However, the potential adverse impact of these types of movement does not appear to be reflected in assuming a tolerance of only 5 cm.

RECOMMENDATION

The SCP updates should provide:

- A justification for the 5 cm allowance for fault displacement.

- An analysis of the effects of potential fault displacement on the stability of exploratory shaft facilities, drifts, ramps, emplacement boreholes, and liners.

- An evaluation of the effect of potential change in corrosion rate of containers due to changes in stress.

- The design of emplacement holes and the corresponding ESF tests, taking into account potential effects of displacements along faults.

due to potential interference, and (ii) interference with underground testing at the main test level.

BASIS

- The SCP (p. 8.4.2–145, third paragraph) states that “The holes are planned . . . operating with the 10 CFR 60.15 requirement that, to the extent practical, shafts and boreholes be located where large, unexcavated pillars are planned.” The upper demonstration breakout room and the main test area layout need to be planned to meet this requirement.

- It is not clear if the effect of drilling the proposed three multi-purpose boreholes on the flexibility of locating upper demonstration breakout room has been considered.

- The holes are planned to be at least two drift diameters away from any mined openings in the dedicated test area in the ESF. Due to the potential for deviation of the borehole from verticality during drilling, the maximum expected deviation should be considered in selecting borehole locations.

- The SCP (p. 8.4.2–145) states that “A decision on the need for a third multi-purpose borehole would be made on the basis of additional analyses before constructing ES–2.” This borehole would be drilled between ES–1 and ES–2. However, potential interference between this third borehole and underground layout of ESF has not been considered in the SCP.

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that the SCP updates evaluate the influence of the location of multi-purpose boreholes on (i) design flexibility of Upper Demonstration Breakout Room due to potential interference, and (ii) interference with underground testing at the main test level.

Section 8.4.2.3.1 Exploratory shaft facility testing operations, layout constraints, and zones of influence, pp. 8.4.2–93/147

QUESTION 58

How does the ESF design described in the SCP provide the flexibility to accommodate in situ testing of waste packages should it be considered desirable or necessary by DOE?

BASIS

- 10 CFR 60.140 (b) requires that the performance confirmation be started during site characterization.

- There is inadequate discussion on how performance of the waste package may be verified at the time of license application. (See Comment 82.)
4.0 Objections, Comments, and Questions

- Impact of potential need for in situ waste package testing on ESF design has not been presented in the SCP.

- Other similar projects have proposed tests including prototypical radioactive waste packages in the waste package environment to collect needed data.

- The SCP has not demonstrated that in-situ data on waste package interaction with the host rock under repository conditions involving coupled hydrological-mechanical-thermal-geochemical-radiological effects are not required before license application.

- The SCP notes (p. 8.3.5.2-19) that the ability of the host rock to provide an acceptable level of shielding is "of primary concern." The SCP does not discuss testing aimed at evaluating rock radiation shielding which accounts for jointing, damaged rock, etc. (See CDSCP Question 37 and SCP Question 17).

RECOMMENDATION

Should it be desirable or necessary to perform in situ waste package testing, an analysis of the impact of such testing on ESF design should be presented in the SCP updates.

REFERENCE

10 CFR 60

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Section 8.4.2.3.1 Activity: Radial borehole tests, p. 8.4.2-136/137

QUESTION 60

What is the timing of the exploratory shaft radial borehole tests? What is the basis to justify that operational interference for these tests has been considered?

BASIS

The radial borehole tests will require extensive drilling, borehole logging and testing, instrument installation and instrument monitoring in ES-1. Yet, according to Table 8.4.2-13, p. 8.4.2-100, there are no constraints for this test. It is not clear if sequencing, construction and/or (shaft) operational interferences for these tests have been considered.

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that the timing of the radial borehole tests be specified in the SCP updates, and that their potential interference with shaft construction and/or operations be identified.

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Section 8.4.2.6.4 Design Flexibility (pp. 8.4.2-218/219)

Section 8.4.2.1.6 Conditionally Planned Subsurface Characterization Activities (p. 8.4.2-32).

QUESTION 61

How will design changes (as outlined in 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Item III, paragraph 4) be made in a timely and appropriate manner during the design and construction of the ESF?

BASIS

- The SCP makes numerous references to possible design changes during ESF construction (e.g., Section 8.4.2.3.1).
8.4.2.3.6.4, Design Flexibility, Section 8.4.2.1.6, Conditionally Planned Subsurface Characterization Activities and elsewhere). The time and effort required to effect such design changes may bear on the decision to suggest and/or implement changes.

- In many cases, ESF Title I design changes which were discussed at TPO meetings took on the order of six (6) months or more to implement.

**RECOMMENDATION**

The SCP updates should discuss procedures to be used and estimated time required to implement both design and field changes.

**REFERENCE**

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Item III.

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Section 8.4.3.2.4 Design features that may contribute to performance, (1) Separation of ESF tests from potential emplacement drifts, p. 8.4.3-34

QUESTION 62

What is the basis for the design requirement of a 30 m separation between the ESF and potential waste emplacement panels, and for a design decision to allow waste emplacement within approximately 500 ft. of the exploratory shafts?

**BASIS**

- It has not been shown that the close proximity of waste to the exploratory shafts will not compromise the waste isolation. For example, it has not been demonstrated that the flow is likely to be primarily vertical under repository conditions. Thermally driven water flow is likely to include a lateral component in the vicinity of the repository.

- Thermal conditions in the repository may lead to saturation at some horizontal distance from the emplaced waste and may cause enhanced hydraulic conductivity and water flow.

**RECOMMENDATION**

The SCP updates should provide a basis for the design requirement of a 30 m separation between the ESF and waste emplacement panels, and for the design decision to allow waste emplacement within 500 ft. of the exploratory shafts.

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**4.3.2 DAA Question**

Section: Design Acceptability Analysis

**QUESTION 63**

What is the justification for certifying (Appendix C.3 of DAA) that all TAR reviewers were not principal contributors to ESF Title I Design or to the Subsystem Design Requirements Document (SDRD) which was used for ESF Title I Design in view of the documentation in the DAA showing that some of the TAR reviewers worked on the ESF Title I Design and/or SDRD?

**BASIS**

- Documentation in the ESF Title I Design Acceptability Analysis (DAA) indicates that some of the same people participated in both Exploratory Shaft Facility (ESF) Title I Design and the DAA process. This raises concerns of conflict of interest, where reviewers may not be independent of the design report preparation.

- There are five (5) individuals listed on both Table 5 of the ESF Title I Design Control Process Review Report and on pages C.2–1 or C.2–2 of DAA Vol. 1. Some of the individuals are given different titles in each of the two documents (e.g., geotechnical engineer vs. mechanical engineer).

The following listing provides a summary of what each individual is credited for on the ESF Title I Design.

**One Hydrologist**

- prepared “Subsystem Design Requirements Document (SDRD)”
- prepared and reviewed “Test Requirements”
- prepared and reviewed “Identification of Interfaces Among Different Aspects of the ESF Program”

**One Civil Engineer**

- prepared “ES Location and Diameter”
- provided analysis and consultation on “second shaft need”

Note: The individual is listed as mining engineer on C.2, DAA Vol. 1, but his questionnaire does not appear in C.5 of DAA Vol. 1.
4.0 Objections, Comments, and Questions

One Mechanical Engineer

- prepared and reviewed “Shaft Separation”
- prepared and reviewed “Identification of Interfaces Among Different Aspects of the ESF Program”

Note: The individual is listed as Performance Assessment Specialist and Geotechnical Engineer in C.2. of DAA Vol. 1.

In addition, he reviewed the following principal support documents:


He had previously reviewed these same documents in his capacity as supervisor of the underground design activities for the repository. (See p. C.5–43 and C.5–45 of the DAA).

Another Mechanical Engineer

- prepared and reviewed “Shaft Separation”
- prepared and reviewed “Identification of Interfaces Among Different Aspects of the ESF Program”

Note: This individual is listed as Geotechnical Engineer in C.2 and states that he authored Sections 8.4.2.3.1 and 8.4.2.3.6 of the Site Characterization Plan (SCP).

One Geotechnical Engineer

- reviewed “Title I Design”

Note: This individual is listed as Mining Engineer in C.2 and claims review of the following:

Technical Assessment Review (TAR), of ESF Title I Design (50%)
Technical Assessment Review (TAR), of ESF Title I Design (100%)
ESF-SDRD Licensing Review

RECOMMENDATION

For ESF Title II design, the DOE should ensure that there is no conflict of interest for the development and review process. The NRC staff recommends that the DOE should make arrangements to reach mutual agreement with the NRC staff on mutually acceptable standards that establish criteria for no conflict of interest and for independence.
APPENDIX A
RESOLVED CDSCP POINT PAPERS

N.B. Each resolved CDSCP point paper presented in Appendix A includes the identity of the CDSCP concern, the verbatim statement of the original concern and of the basis for that concern as these appeared in the CDSCP point paper, and an evaluation of the information in the SCP that addresses the CDSCP concern.
Section 8.3.1.2.2.4.6 Calico Hills Test in the Exploratory Shaft Facility

Section 8.4.2.1 Exploratory Shaft 1, pp. 8.4–23, paragraph 4 and 5

CDSCP OBJECTION 2

The NRC staff considers that the need for extending the Exploratory Shaft 1 (ES-1) approximately 400 ft below the proposed repository horizon into the zeolitic zone of the Calico Hills unit has not been established in the CDSCP, nor has the need been established for tests requiring drifting (horizontal excavation) through the Calico Hills unit. It has not been demonstrated that the proposed shaft (ES-1) penetration into the Calico Hills unit (an important barrier between the repository horizon and the underlying groundwater table) or the proposed drifting through it will not have potential adverse impacts on the waste isolation capability of the site.

BASIS

- 10 CFR 60.17(a)(2)(iv) requires that, “The SCP shall contain plans to control any adverse impacts from such site characterization activities that are important to waste isolation.”
- The last tentative goal on page 8.3.2.5–21 indicates that high confidence is needed that ES-1 shaft will terminate no less than 150 m above ground-water table. It does not appear that this goal would be reached under the present ES-1 design.
- The CDSCP has not identified associated site characterization activities whose benefits would outweigh potential adverse impacts of penetrating the Calico Hills unit, an important barrier below the proposed repository horizon. The CDSCP has not provided a detailed discussion of the need for conducting the identified activities from within the Calico Hills rather than obtaining the necessary data by alternate means that meet isolation constraints.
- Section 8.3.5.13 (Total System Performance) and Section 8.3.5.12 (Groundwater Travel Time) identify the Calico Hills unit as a primary barrier. Section 8.3.1.2.2.4.6 (Calico Hills Test In The Exploratory Shaft Facility, page 8.3.1.2–242) states that “it is critical to have high confidence in the understanding of these aspects of the unit” (Calico Hills), but “on the other hand exterior penetration or excavation of the unit for testing purposes may jeopardize the integrity of the unit as a barrier.” This section also states that the preferred approach to testing in the Calico Hills unit is to drift horizontally from the shaft in the up-dip direction, through the Ghost Dance fault. However, the CDSCP does not consider the effects of drifting on the Calico Hills unit, nor does it consider alternate means of obtaining the necessary data that meet isolation constraints.
- The CDSCP does not consider potential connection of flow-paths from underneath the repository waste emplacement areas to the proposed ES-1 excavation below the repository horizon or to the proposed drifts in the Calico Hills unit.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

- In response to this objection, the SCP (page 8.4.2–167, fourth paragraph) states that the ES-1 shaft will be sunk to a total depth of approximately 1,105 ft. from the surface. Thus, the ES-1 shaft will not penetrate into the Calico Hills unit. In addition, the ESF design has been modified so that there will be no drifting through the Calico Hills unit.
- The response further states that the DOE will defer the decision on penetrating and drifting in the Calico Hills unit from ES-1 pending completion of analyses for the need for this penetration.
- The NRC staff finds DOE’s approach to be reasonable and acceptable. If the DOE decides to penetrate into Calico Hills unit at a later date, the NRC staff will evaluate the justification and impact of that decision.
- The SCP contains numerous references to penetration of Calico Hills, for example:
  - Figure 8.3.1.2–16 (pp. 8.3.1.2–283)
  - Table 8.3.3.2–3 (pp. 8.3.3.2–18)
  - Section 8.3.1.15.2.1.2 (pp. 8.3.1.15–80)
  - and elsewhere

The NRC staff assumes that these Figures, Tables and Text were overlooked in revising the CDSCP. The NRC staff considers that DOE’s position is as stated in the response to this objection.

- Based on our review of the response to this objection and the corresponding modifications made to the ESF design, the objection is considered resolved.

CDSCP OBJECTION 4

The CDSCP does not sufficiently consider the potentially adverse impacts resulting from the proposed locations of ES-1, ES-2, other shafts and ramp portals in areas which may be susceptible to surface water infiltration, sheet flow, and lateral and vertical erosion (Refs. 1 and 2). For the proposed locations, there is a possibility of
(a) potentially significant and unmitigable long-term adverse impacts on the waste isolation capability of the site and/or (b) affecting the ability to adequately characterize the site.

**BASIS**

- The planned shaft locations may be susceptible to surface water infiltration. The DOE has proposed a seal design concept that would encourage the surface water entering the shafts to drain through the exploratory shaft (ES-1) bottom below the repository horizon (Ref. 3). The NRC staff considers that it is important to minimize/avoid infiltration or intrusion of surface water into the shafts because of the uncertainties about the planned drainage system to remain effective for a long period of time during the postclosure phase.

- With particular reference to ES-1, although the exact location of the shaft is not indicated on the map showing the flood potential, it is evident from Section 6.1.2.6 that the shaft location will be outside the channel area for the probable maximum flood. However, according to the flood potential map presented in Reference 4, large areas of the east side of Yucca Mountain are subject to sheet flow. Such flow could cause flooding of the shaft and adjacent areas.

- Potential for fracturing of rock around a shaft due to construction, lateral erosion, vertical erosion, and the possibility of the shaft's exposure below the ground surface have not been sufficiently considered.

- The likelihood of these processes being modified by tectonic events during the postclosure period and by surface uplift/subsidence induced by waste emplacement has also not been sufficiently considered.

**EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE**

In response to this Objection, the DOE has evaluated the potential effects of locating ES-1 and ES-2 near Coyote Wash on long-term performance and the ability to characterize the site. Although the data used in the evaluation are preliminary in nature, we concur with the DOE that the shaft locations will be outside the channel area for the calculated probable maximum flood. This objection is considered resolved.
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- A performance goal for breaching of containers by tectonic processes was set at less than 0.5% of containers and goals were set for maximum load on the waste package (Table 8.3.2-3).

- Based on DOE's acceptance of the NRC recommendation to include such anticipated processes and events as tectonic disturbances on the waste package lifetime and release rates for the EBS and its commitment to develop scenarios specifically for Issues 1.4 and 1.5, the NRC staff considers this comment resolved.

Section 8.3.1.2 Geohydrology

CDSCP COMMENT 5

It is questionable whether the results of ponding studies at Yucca Mountain can be applied to Fortymile Wash.

BASIS

- The CDSCP states (page 8.3.1.2-55, Table 8.3.1.2-2) under "saturated zone hydrologic hypotheses," Activity 8.3.1.2.2.1.3, that the activity objective is: "to characterize the range and spatial variability of infiltration rates, flow velocities, and flow pathways in approximately the upper 15 feet of both consolidated and unconsolidated surficial materials, using ponding studies at Yucca Mountain. The results can be applied to conditions at Fortymile Wash."

- Infiltration into Yucca Mountain will occur primarily as direct inflow into fractured tuff. Fortymile Wash consists primarily of alluvium underlain by fractured tuff. The results of infiltration tests on the mountain surface probably will not be transferable to the alluvium of Fortymile Wash.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

Ponding studies are to be conducted on Yucca Mountain, as part of Activity 8.3.1.2.2.1.3 (evaluation of artificial infiltration), on various surficial units, including alluvial deposits similar to those underlying Fortymile Wash. The text of Activity 8.3.1.2.2.1.3 (Fortymile Wash recharge study; p. 8.3.1.2-127) was revised to note that ponding tests conducted under Activity 8.3.1.2.2.1.3 are expected to show the relationship of thickness, texture, and porosity of unconsolidated deposits to net infiltration rates and thus, once these relationships are established, the results from the ponding tests may be extrapolated to Fortymile Wash, which has deposits with a similar range of properties. In addition, the results of studies conducted under Activities 8.3.1.2.2.1.1 (Characterization of hydrologic properties of surficial materials) and 8.3.1.2.2.1.2 (Evaluation of natural infiltration) will be considered in the Fortymile Wash recharge study to aid in estimating annual average estimates of recharge occurring along Fortymile Wash for use in the regional and site models of groundwater flow. Thus CDSCP Comment 5 is resolved.

Section 8.3.1.2.2 Investigation: Studies to provide a description of the unsaturated zone hydrologic system at the site.

CDSCP COMMENT 6

The CDSCP does not describe the prototype (research) testing program, which will develop the technology and ability to successfully conduct unsaturated zone percolation tests.

BASIS

Sections 8.3.1.2.2.3 and 8.3.1.2.2.4, which describe percolation tests in the unsaturated zone, identify many areas where prototype tests must be done before field testing can begin. Characterization of the sites will depend heavily on the design and results of this prototype testing. However, the CDSCP does not describe the plans and objectives of prototype testing.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

Unsaturated prototype testing is described in the SCP. What will be tested is identified in the following sections of the SCP:

(1) 3.9.2.1 Hydraulic characteristics of the unsaturated zone, Page 3-171
(2) 8.3.1.2.2.1.1 Activity: Characterization of hydrologic properties of surficial material, Pages 8.3.1.2-161 and 162
(3) 8.3.1.2.2.1.2 Activity: Evaluation of natural infiltration, Pages 8.3.1.2-165 and 169
(4) 8.3.1.2.2.3 Activity: Characterization of percolation in the unsaturated zone—surface based study, Page 8.3.1.2-182
(5) 8.3.1.2.2.3.1 Activity: Matrix hydrologic properties testing, Page 8.3.1.2-189
(6) 8.3.1.2.2.3.2 Activity: Site vertical borehole studies, Page 210
(7) 8.3.1.2.2.4 Study: Characterization of Yucca Mountain percolation in the unsaturated zone—exploratory shaft

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being done to estimate the time required for the rock mass to return to a condition close to its original in situ hydrologic condition. The drilling method to be used to drill the boreholes was chosen to minimize the in situ disturbance of the hydrologic system. It is not known at this time if in situ conditions will return within the time period allotted for monitoring (3 to 5 yr). The objectives and extent of this part of the surface-based borehole investigations study will be evaluated at the completion of the cross-hole prototype testing and the numerical analyses. Prototype testing will also investigate the capabilities and limitations of the instrumentation to be used in the long-term monitoring of the hydrologic characteristics. Because prototype testing will be conducted to determine instrument failure rates and because the objective and extent of the long term monitoring of in situ conditions will be evaluated at the completion of cross-hole prototype testing, CDSCP Comment 7 is resolved.

Section 8.3.1.2.2.3.2 Activity: Site Vertical Borehole Studies

CDSCP COMMENT 7

Alternative data collection techniques have not been considered should the planned instrumentation of the site vertical borehole studies fail or prove infeasible.

BASIS

In Section 8.3.1.2.2.3.2 (page 8.3.1.2-158) it is stated that “downhole sensors, consisting of pressure transducers, thermocouple psychrometers, heat dissipation probes, and thermal sensors will be installed in each of the 17 vertical boreholes.” Further, “These will be monitored for an extended period of time (estimated at from 3 to 5 yrs.).” The text also states that “drilling the holes will disturb the hydrologic system,” and “it is not known if in situ conditions will return within the time period allotted for monitoring (3 to 5 yrs.).” Two potential problems are identified by these statements which could result in a loss of data or information needed to characterize the site: (1) there may not be enough time to complete long-term monitoring of the unsaturated zone and prototype testing of the instrumentation; and (2) many of the instruments may fail or drift out of calibration during the long period of monitoring.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

On page 210 of Section 8.3.1.2.2.3.2 (Site Vertical Borehole Studies) it is stated that “It is recognized that drilling of the borehole will disturb in situ conditions in the rock mass adjacent to the borehole. Numerical analyses are...
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drifts to the Ghost Dance fault, beneath Drill Hole Wash and to the Imbricate-Normal fault zone.

**BASIS**

- The CDSCP indicates that it is important to gain hydrologic information on major faults through the repository. As a result study activities are described to conduct hydrologic tests of:

  1. the Solitario Canyon fault in Solitario Canyon (Section 8.3.1.2.2.3.3)
  2. the Ghost Dance fault in the Calico Hills Formation (Section 8.3.1.2.2.4.6)
  3. the Ghost Dance fault in the Paintbrush non-welded unit (Section 8.3.1.2.2.6).

- It is also stated in the CDSCP that drifting will take place in the Topopah Springs Member to investigate the geology and hydrology of the Ghost Dance fault, the Imbricate-Normal fault zone, and beneath Drill Hole Wash. However, no study activities are described for these locations.

**EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE**

In response to this comment, a new activity (Activity 8.3.1.2.2.4.10, Hydrologic properties of major faults encountered in the main test level of the exploratory shaft facility) was added to Study 8.3.1.2.2.4. This activity describes the hydrologic testing program for major faults observed during geologic mapping of drifts at the main test level. Major faults or fault zones expected to be tested are the Ghost Dance fault, a suspected fault in Drill Hole Wash, and the Imbricate normal fault zone. Other faults will be tested if flow is observed. Testing methods include hydraulic and pneumatic tests in boreholes drilled from faults through fault zones and tests on core collected from coreholes. CDSCP Comment 9 is resolved.

**EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE**

Section 8.4.3.2.1.2 (Ground-water flow in matrix and fractures) presents an evaluation of drilling fluid losses from constructing USW G-4. The evaluation concludes that it is reasonable to assume that most of the drilling fluid lost to the unsaturated zone would have drained back into the borehole and flowed downward to the water table. This conclusion is based on: 1) much less water was used to drill USW G-4 than to drill USW G-1, 2) the borehole was drilled with an air-water-detergent mixture which would tend to inhibit imbibition of fluid into the surrounding rock matrix, 3) low fluid injection pressures were used in drilling, and 4) fluid would drain back into the borehole following well completion, as observed on video logs.

In addition, a multipurpose borehole activity (8.3.1.2.2.4.9) has been designed, among other things, to identify any occurrence of perched water in the vicinity of the exploratory shafts. "Because drilling fluid used during construction of nearby test hole USW G-4 contained water, the occurrence of perched water in either of the two multipurpose boreholes could be the result of drilling fluids lost from USW G-4. Drilling fluids used in USW G-4 contained 20 ppm LiBr tracer; thus, analyses for this tracer will establish whether any perched water samples contain drilling fluid that has migrated laterally from USW G-4 to areas of ESF excavation" (Section 8.3.1.2, page 313). SCP Section 8.4.2.3.1 (Exploratory shaft facility testing operations, layout constraints, and zones of influence) indicates that observations or measurements made in the multipurpose boreholes could result in some changes to present ESF test plans. CDSCP Comment 10 is resolved.

**CDSCP COMMENT 10**

Hydrologic and geochemical tests planned for the exploratory shaft may have been compromised by past drilling activities associated with hole USW G-4.

**BASIS**

- Test hole USW G-4 was drilled at the end of 1982 using an air foam system. During the drilling, coring, and completion activities, a total of 342,255 gallons of water were lost to the various formations. Over 81,000 gallons of soap were used in the operation, however it is unknown as to how much soap was lost.

- Hole USW G-4 is located 708 feet from the proposed exploratory shaft. Wells located farther apart have previously been shown to have influenced the rock between their well bores. Holes USW UZ-1 and USW G-1 are located about 1000 feet apart, but water found in USW UZ-1 was shown to contain polymer used in the drilling fluid of USW G-1. Drilling activities at USW G-4 may have changed the hydrologic characteristics of the rock where the exploratory shaft will be located.
Section 8.3.1.2.2.4 Characterization of Yucca Mountain Percolation In The Unsaturated-Zone Exploratory Shaft Facility Study

CDSCP COMMENT 11

No laboratory or field tests to confirm the current concept of moisture characteristic relations for fracture/matrix flow in unsaturated fractured rocks, which form a major part of the Yucca Mountain hydrologic conceptual model, are scheduled to be conducted early in the site characterization program.

BASIS

Groundwater Travel Time and Total System Performance evaluations depend on the current conceptual model of fracture/matrix flow, which has not been experimentally demonstrated by tests on unsaturated fractured rock. The CDSCP states (Section 3.9.2.1, Page 3-170) that “Standard laboratory methods are not yet available by which to determine the moisture-characteristic relations for fractures and fractured rocks, and reliance must be made on theoretically based models and approximations.” Further, the CDSCP states that (page 3-172) “the flow of liquid water within and across fractures is not yet well understood” and that “Theoretical models for liquid-water flow in single fractures have been developed, but have not been field or laboratory tested.” In Section 8.3.1.2.2.4, planned tests are described to confirm the current moisture-characteristic relation concepts for fractures and dry fractured rocks in the exploratory shaft and drifts. The problem is that these tests will require new techniques and devices, which are unproven and experimental. Further, because these tests will be conducted in the exploratory shaft and drifts, they will be conducted at a late date in the exploratory program. If these tests fail, a fundamental premise of the hydrogeologic conceptual model will not have been demonstrated and the program could be significantly delayed. In addition, should these tests require revision to the current concept of fracture/matrix flow, the design of other tests may have to be changed at a date in the program when changes might be difficult or impossible.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

Determination of moisture characteristic relations and moisture flow processes for fractured, porous unsaturated media will be included in several activities, especially in the percolation test in the exploratory shaft facility (Activity 8.3.1.2.2.4.2). In Study 8.3.1.2.2.4 on page 8.3.1.2-234 of the SCP it is stated that the percolation test will be prototyped on a large scale and various pretest numerical analyses will be performed to evaluate test feasibility.” Furthermore in Section 3.9.2.1 (page 3-171) it is stated that “Standard field and laboratory methods are not yet available by which to determine the moisture-characteristic relations for variably saturated fractures and fractured rocks. Prototype testing to develop such methods will be conducted on welded tuffs from G-Tunnel which are similar to those expected to be encountered in the exploratory shaft facility. The benefits of this testing are twofold: first, the program will permit development of quality level 1 methods and procedures for ESF testing, and second, the results of the tests will provide preliminary data regarding the hydrologic behavior of fractured, welded tuff. Thus, preliminary assessment of the appropriateness of the models of flow processes will be possible.” Because prototype testing at laboratory and field scales is planned, prior to the exploratory shaft tests, to evaluate the current concepts of moisture characteristic relations for fracture/matrix flow in unsaturated media, and because tests are planned for developing the technology to conduct these tests in the exploratory shaft, CDSCP Comment 11 is resolved.

CDSCP COMMENT 12

Diffusion tests in the exploratory shaft may be affected by capillary effects in the unsaturated zone.

BASIS

- According to the CDSCP (page 8.3.1.2-253, paragraph 1 and 2), “A small volume of nonsorbing tracers in aqueous solution will be introduced into the bottom of the borehole. Next, the borehole will be sealed with a packer of appropriate size to isolate the diffusion volume from the remainder of the underground environment.”

- According to the CDSCP, nonsorbing tracers in aqueous solution will be introduced into the bottom of the borehole in the unsaturated zone. The addition of aqueous solution to the bottom of the borehole in the unsaturated zone will produce movement of the solution away from the borehole under a capillary pressure gradient.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

DOE made no revision to the consultation draft in response to this comment. The NRC staff recognizes that the study plan for Study 8.3.1.2.2.5 (diffusion tests in the exploratory shaft facility) will describe the details and objectives of the tests and that this comment is a study plan level comment; therefore CDSCP Comment 12 is resolved.

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Section 8.3.1.2.3.1.5 Activity: Testing of the C-hole sites with conservative tracers

CDSCP COMMENT 14

One objective of the C-hole tests is to determine matrix diffusion. It is not apparent that matrix diffusion can be determined from these tests as designed.

BASIS

In order to determine matrix diffusion, at least two types of tracers are required, one that diffuses into the matrix and one that does not.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

A response to the comment was made with the following statement in SCP Activity 8.3.1.2.3.1.5 (Testing of the C-hole sites with conservative tracers; page 8.3.1.2-401):

"To determine the effect of matrix diffusion on the migration of tracers, colloids of various sizes will be considered for use in conjunction with conservative tracers, such as 3-trifluoromethylbenzoate. Colloidal and other tracers will be selected such that some tracers will be expected to diffuse into the rock matrix whereas others will not."

Also, in Activity 8.3.1.2.3.1.7 (Testing of the C-hole sites with reactive tracers; page 8.3.1.2-418) the following statement is made:

"This task will also evaluate manufactured polystyrene spheres as colloid tracers. Thesecolloid tracers will be evaluated as to their interaction with other tracers. These spheres have been shown to be conservative, and their size (1 micron) is larger than the dissolved chemical species so the spheres travel through the paths with the largest fractures or pores. It is anticipated that in fractured media, the polystyrene spheres will provide some information on fracture aperture."

Based on these responses in the SCP, CDSCP Comment 14 is resolved.

Section 8.3.1.2.3.1.7 Activity: Testing of the C-hole sites with reactive tracers

CDSCP COMMENT 15

Geohydrology Activity 8.3.1.2.3.1.7 will provide information on fundamental sorption mechanism. It is not clear how this activity will be integrated with the geochemistry program.

BASIS

- The Description section of Activity 8.3.1.2.3.1.7 discusses an extensive laboratory effort to collect information concerning sorption mechanisms such as chemisorption, molecular-sieve adsorption, ion exchange, and electrostatic adsorption.
- For all four types of sorption, adsorption kinetic constants and sorption equilibrium constants will be determined.
- No references to work in the geochemistry program are supplied in the description of this activity.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

The SCP has been revised to explain in more detail integration of the work described in the geohydrology activity (8.3.1.2.3.1.7) with work characterizing sorption in both the saturated and unsaturated zone described in the geochemistry program (8.3.1.3). Refer to the evaluation of SCP response for CDSCP Comment 19, a related comment, for additional details. This CDSCP comment is resolved.

Section 8.3.1.3.5 Investigation: Studies to provide the information required on radionuclide retardation by precipitation processes along flow paths to the accessible environment.

CDSCP COMMENT 16

It is stated that gamma radiation will not be important in the solubility experiments as it will be relatively minor over the time of the repository. This ignores the potential importance of kinetics.

BASIS

- Although the period of significant gamma radiolysis is short relative to the time scale of the repository it does have the potential for significantly altering the redox state and speciation of the waste elements.
- If conversion of radionuclide species generated in a high gamma flux environment to other forms is kinetically inhibited, the effects of radiolysis may indirectly influence reactions over a much longer time scale than the period over which the gamma flux is high.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

Section 8.3.4.2.4.1.5 (Activity 1.10.4.1.5: Effects of radiation on water chemistry), describes experiments simulating nearfield conditions in a gamma radiation field. The
information from this activity will be used as input in modeling of water rock interactions in the presence of a radiation field. Geochemical modeling code EQ3/6 will be used to extend to long time periods the chemical behavior of the tuff-water system in the presence of other materials or radiation.

However, statistical models based on the results of experiments simulating a limited range of geochemical conditions may not accurately predict sorption at Yucca Mountain. For example, Palmer, et al., 1978 show that without an understanding of the mechanism(s), prediction of sorption can be unreliable.

Activity 8.3.1.2.3.1.7 will provide information concerning the actual mechanisms of sorption.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

The integration of the Investigation 8.3.1.3.4 with the Activity 8.3.1.2.3.1.7 will lead to a more fundamental approach to explain sorption. Section 8.3.1.3.4 (p. 8.3.1.3–68) has been revised to reflect a planned mechanistic approach to sorption studies, which is to be applied to the whole Yucca Mountain site. It is stated in the SCP Section 8.3.1.3.4.4 (p. 8.3.1.3–84) that the overall sorption program described in Section 8.3.1.3.1.4 will be augmented by the C-hole work described in Section 8.3.1.2.3.1.7 while acknowledging that the C-hole sorption mechanism study is very specific to the saturated zone, to one particular stratigraphic unit, and to the particular mineralogy of the unit in which the pump tests will be performed.

The stated objective of the C-hole sorption mechanism work is to characterize the chemical and physical properties of the geologic media in the saturated zone in the vicinity of the C-holes that will affect radionuclide retardation during ground water flow. This work is designed to characterize and select a set of reactive tracers that exhibit certain types of exchange phenomena to enable them to be used in the planned field tests to hopefully yield useful results which can be modeled and interpreted. The work to elucidate radionuclide sorption mechanisms, especially for the actinide radionuclides, is described in Section 8.3.1.3.4. It was also stated in the SCP Study 8.3.1.3.4.1 (p. 8.3.1.3–69) and Section 8.3.1.3.4.4 (p. 8.3.1.3–85) that the available empirical sorption data, when used together with the new mechanistic data, will allow extrapolation of sorption data such that a three-dimensional spatial representation of sorption for each radionuclide species can be obtained. These data will then be evaluated in radionuclide transport calculations using solubility data and variable water compositions. Commitments are made in the SCP Section 8.3.1.3.4.4 (p. 8.3.1.3–85) as follows: “The study plan for the sorption work (8.3.1.3.4.1 and 8.3.1.3.4.3) and for the reactive tracer tests (8.3.1.2.3.1.7) will provide more detail regarding the study integration.” Therefore, CDSCP Comment 19 is resolved.

BASIS

- Numerous tests are planned to determine distribution coefficients (Kd) for a few conditions (groundwater chemistry, rock type) and to investigate other potentially mitigating factors (e.g., colloids, particulates, etc.). This information will be used in statistical models to predict sorption characteristics in the vicinity of Yucca Mountain.
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Section 8.3.1.3.5 Investigation: Studies to provide the information required on radionuclide retardation by precipitation processes along flow paths to the accessible environment

CDSCP COMMENT 21

It is stated that solids (tuff) are not needed in the solubility experiments as they have no effect on the water chemistry. However, the presence of a solid phase can be important in trying to reach equilibrium or steady state.

BASIS

- Precipitation of some phases is kinetically inhibited unless a seed crystal is present; the presence of a solid phase can therefore be important in trying to reach equilibrium or steady state.

- The solubility of radionuclides expected in groundwater in the repository can be predicted most accurately if the effects of physical and chemical conditions on precipitation have been determined from experimental studies.

- From phase rule considerations, the number of restrictions placed on a system involving a precipitation/dissolution reaction must make the system invariant (Crerar et al., 1978). Otherwise, the solubility information acquired may not be reliable to extrapolate to repository conditions. Solids in contact with groundwater can buffer the solution and, thus, provide a means of restricting the system.

- It is recognized that inclusion of solids in the solubility experiment will make separation of precipitated phases difficult. However, experiments containing solids should more reliably simulate the repository conditions.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

In 8.3.1.3.5.1.1 Activity: Solubility measurements, it is stated that “data from tests measuring changes in water chemistry resulting from interactions with the host rock or waste package materials indicate only minor compositional changes. No solubility measurements are planned in which the water compositions are modified to account for these effects. If future data from experiments involving Yucca Mountain water and local minerals of waste package material show significant water composition changes, this decision will be reviewed” (p. 8.3.1.3-90).

It is further stated in this activity that “there are no plans in the present investigation to include other solids such as tuff from Yucca Mountain in the solubility experiments. The presence of tuffs may compromise the ability to obtain meaningful data on the solubility of radionuclides. Including tuffs in the tests greatly increases the complexity of the solubility work because it may not be possible to deconvolute the effects of two operative processes, sorption and precipitation. When sufficient data have been gathered to generate a fundamental understanding of solution chemistry, then the Project will consider expanding the scope and complexity of the testing to include solubility experiments with tuff. The potential effects of solids on solubility will be addressed in Study 8.3.1.3.6.1.”

Based on the testing approach presented in the SCP, CDSCP Comment 21 is resolved.

REFERENCE


Section 8.3.1.3.6.1 Study: Dynamic transport column experiments

CDSCP COMMENT 23

Column tests may not provide an adequate assessment of the effects of matrix diffusion and colloid transport on released radionuclides.

BASIS

- In order to carry out fractured column tests of radionuclide transport, tuff samples containing fractures must be recovered from the rock units of interest.

- Disturbances may produce changes in the physical properties (e.g., fracture aperture) or in the fracture surfaces that will be contacted by the test solutions (e.g., fresh mineral coatings on the fracture surfaces may be exposed).

- If such disturbances occur, these tests may produce results which are not characteristic of in situ repository conditions.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

The SCP includes tests to determine the effects of matrix diffusion at several different spatial scales. In addition to studying the effects of matrix diffusion and colloid transport in laboratory experiments (8.3.1.3.6.1 Study: Dynamic transport column experiments), tests are also planned in the exploratory shaft (Section 8.3.1.2.2.5) and C-wells (Section 8.3.1.2.3.1.5). Furthermore, consideration will be given to information from radionuclide
migration work relating to the bomb tests on the Nevada Test Site. Based on these planned studies, the CDSCP Comment 23 is resolved.

Section 8.3.1.3.6.1.3 Activity: Unsaturated Tuff Columns

CDSCP COMMENT 24

The effect of rock-water ratio on radionuclide sorption will not be determined because, as stated in this section, “Most of the adsorption isotherms show linear behavior; therefore, the rock-water ratio is not expected to cause a change in the apparent Kd.” This statement is invalid.

BASIS

- Adsorption isotherms describe the effect of radionuclide concentration on Kd.
- The linear region of an adsorption isotherm indicates that there is no effect of radionuclide concentration on Kd.
- Changing the rock-water ratio can cause changes in groundwater chemistry which can affect radionuclide sorption reactions and consequently Kd.
- By decreasing the rock-water ratio of a system it is possible to shift the position on the isotherm from the linear to the nonlinear region.
- Most of the mass of the rock in the repository could be discounted if groundwater is confined to fractures. As a result, the rock-water ratio of some flow systems of the repository may be less than that in crushed tuff experiments.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

In Activity 8.3.1.3.6.1.3 it is stated that “it is unclear whether or not the rock-water ratio affects radionuclide sorption. The nonlinear behavior exhibited by some adsorption isotherms may be explained by irreversible adsorption on small numbers of sites, such that increasing the rock-water ratio effectively increases the Kd. Conversely, zeolites generally show a decrease in Kd as the rock-water ratio increases. This may be an experimental artifact related to the difficulty of separating phases. At any rate, the effects of varying rock-water ratio will be investigated and details will be in the study plans” (p. 8.3.1.3–107). Based on the plans to investigate the effects of rock-water ratio on radionuclide sorption, the CDSCP Comment 24 is resolved.

Section 8.3.1.3.7.2 Study: Demonstration of applicability of laboratory data to repository transport calculations

CDSCP COMMENT 25

The statement in Chapter 8 of the CDSCP that natural analogs will probably not be used to study radionuclide migration does not agree with a statement made in Chapter 4 discussing the importance of natural analogs.

BASIS

- Section 8.3.1.7 (p. 8.3.1.3–124) states that “The study of natural analogs to radionuclide migration has not been given attention in this program because these environments typically have chemistry and mineralogy radically different from the potential candidate site.”
- Section 8.3.1.7 (p. 8.3.1.3–124) states “It is not considered worthwhile to pursue this technical approach since the applicability of data from such natural analogs in licensing would be questionable.”
- In Section 4.3.1.1 (p. 4–129) on Warm and Hot Springs the statement is made that “The study of warm and hot springs in tuffaceous rocks provides information about several important aspects of a repository environment in tuffaceous rock including the transport of certain elements (e.g., strontium, cesium, uranium, thorium, etc.) found in radioactive waste in a hydrothermal system.”
- Natural analogs are important to determine the effect of time and scale on geochemical processes and mechanisms expected in a HLW repository (Birchard and Alexander (1983)).
- Results of short-term experiments and models can be partially validated using natural analogs.
- Natural analogs have been used to study radionuclide migration (e.g., Gascoyne, 1987).

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

The SCP has a discussion in 8.3.1.3.7.2 Study: Demonstration of applicability of laboratory data to repository transport calculations, on the reasons why natural analog studies are important to site characterization along with warnings as to the difficulties of choosing and studying analogs applicable to the repository. Although details concerning the use of natural analogs are not provided in the SCP, the possibility is raised that uranium-series disequilibrium studies could provide information on sorption behavior of selected radionuclides (Finnegan and Bryant, 1987).
Appendix A

A statement is made that "natural analogs will probably be required for several geochemical topics. These include (1) validation of sorption models for individual waste radionuclides, (2) evaluation of the retardation models for elements showing complex and variable geochemical behavior in the natural environment (actinides), (3) validation of transport models involving flow through fracture networks, and (4) validation of 502-kinetics models concerning the stability of secondary alteration minerals in Yucca Mountain." Consequently, the CDSCP Comment 25 is resolved.

REFERENCES


Section 8.3.1.4.1.1 Activity: Develop a position on drilling within the boundary of the repository perimeter drift, p. 8.3.1.4–24

Section 8.3.1.4.1.3 Activity: Evaluation of drillhole and other subsurface data for the purpose of siting additional drill holes, p. 8.3.1.4–27

Section 8.3.1.4.1.2 Study: Integration of the drilling proposed during the first year of site characterization, p. 8.3.1.4–28

Section 8.3.1.4.1.3 Study: Ongoing integration of the NNWSI drilling, p. 8.3.1.4–29

Section 8.4.1.1: Preparation for Surface-based Testing, p. 8.4–2

Section 8.4.2.5.1: Exploratory Shaft facility studies, p. 8.4–37

CDSCP COMMENT 27

The CDSCP (Section 8.4.1.1) states that current plans call for drilling approximately 300 to 350 shallow holes (50 ft to 150 ft deep), and 45 to 80 exploratory holes (presumably deep). Several trenches are also planned to be excavated for site characterization. In addition, Section 8.4.2.5.1 includes a summary of proposed numerous activities that would involve drilling from or very close to ES–1. The individual, the cumulative, and the synergistic effects of these holes have not been considered in the evaluation of the potential impacts of exploratory shaft construction and testing on the waste isolation integrity of the site (Section 8.4.2.6, and supporting references, in particular Fernandez et al., 1987; Case and Kelsall, 1987).

BASIS

- The number of shallow and deep exploratory boreholes is sufficiently large to require analysis of their impact on enhancing water inflow/outflow or air outflow from the repository directly or through interconnected faults.

- The proposed trenches, particularly along or across washes could become sources of enhanced water infiltration (e.g., along faults or fractures), especially with excavated material stored next to the trench.

- The large number of holes located at least partially within the zone mechanically influenced by the shaft raises numerous concerns that need to be addressed. Some examples:
  - Potential exists for development of preferential air flow or waterflow channels, e.g., partially along the shaft/shaft liner interface/joints/holes.
  - Given the presently preferred shaft seal design of a simple shaft backfill, shaft deformations are to be expected over the time period of interest. Given the present preferred borehole seal design with cement grouts, such seals for boreholes near ES–1 are likely to fracture.
  - Horizontal holes are known to be difficult to seal.
  - Air drilled holes are likely to require extensive preparation in order to obtain satisfactory hydraulic bond between hole wall dust coat and cementitious seals.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

In response to the CDSCP Comment 27, Table 8.4.2–4 of the SCP shows a much smaller number of planned shallow and deep surface holes. Based on an evaluation of the analyses of potential impacts of surface and subsurface testing presented in Sections 8.4.2 and 8.4.3, the DOE has concluded that the cumulative or synergistic effects of these tests are unlikely to have potential adverse impact on the isolation potential of the site. The
NRC staff considers that the DOE has adequately responded to this comment and considers this comment resolved.

REFERENCES

Section 8.3.1.4.2.2.2 Activity: Surface-Fracture Network Studies (p. 8.3.1.4–71)
Section 8.3.1.4.2.2.4 Activity: Geologic Mapping of the Exploratory Shafts and Drifts (p. 8.3.1.4–75/76)

CDSCP COMMENT 29
CDSCP's approach to characterizing the complex threedimensional nature of fracture systems in the repository block appears to rely on fractal analysis of outcrop exposures and geologic mapping of ES–1, drifts and boreholes (excluding floors and working faces). Also, the CDSCP limits the objectives of fracture network studies to providing fracture parameters and analyses to supporting hydrologic modeling. The approach and objective to characterization described in the CDSCP may not lead to sufficient descriptions of the fracture networks.

BASIS
- Characterization of fracture networks, including persistence and/or fracture geometry, is necessary to understand and model geomechanical behavior. It may also be useful in assessing the radiation shielding capacity in the vicinity of waste packages.
- Three-dimensional descriptions of fracture systems can be evaluated by systematic mapping of ES–1 and drifts, including mapping of some reaches of shaft floor and drift faces. Such mapping or photography evaluation permits direct characterization of in situ fracture networks instead of being inferred from fractal analyses of surface data.
- The CDSCP emphasizes the desirability of obtaining a three-dimensional description of fracture systems (p. 8.3.1.4–70/71) and presents the shortcomings of borehole and shaft wall mapping (p. 8.3.1.4–70 and 8.3.1.4–74).
- Fractal analysis is identified as "the best available technique," as stated on pg. 8.3.1.4–71, yet it is not included in the section on shaft and drift mapping (Section 8.3.1.4.2.2.4).

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE
- The DOE has broadened the objectives for Section 8.3.1.4.2.2, Study: characterization of the structural features within the site area. This alleviates the concern that fracture studies may be intended for hydrological purposes only.
- The DOE has also clarified its description of the planned fracture characterization and analysis activities.
- The DOE has presented a rational plan for characterizing fracture systems at the Yucca Mountain site. Based on the DOE response and the referenced supporting SCP sections, CDSCP Comment 29 is considered resolved.

Section 8.3.1.5 Investigation: Studies to Provide the Information Required on Nature and Rates of Change in Climatic Conditions to Predict Future Climates

CDSCP COMMENT 31
Dendroclimatology is absent from the list of activity parameters included in evaluation of regional paleoclimatology. Although tree-ring studies are mentioned briefly in sections on literature review and modern regional climate (Sections 5.2.1.2.3 and 8.3.2.5.1.1.1, respectively), it is not specifically included in the proposed study plans as a separate activity.

BASIS
Dendroclimatology is a major, and usually high-resolution, research tool for reconstructing the latest Holocene paleoclimatology at both local and regional scales (Bradley, 1985). Specifically, dendroclimatology is useful for estimating precipitation, temperature, and runoff data over time intervals that extend beyond historical or instrumental records. Techniques exist for cross-correlation and calibration of present precipitation, temperature, and runoff with time-correlative tree-ring indices. This can provide quantitative calibration for evaluating pre-historic tree-ring data and interpreting past climate over 100 to 1000 year time scales. Dendroclimatology can provide high-resolution proxy
data for paleoclimatic interpretations of other proxy data, such as pollen, sedimentology, recent lake stands and paleofloods, that are already included in the paleoclimatology study.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

In the SCP (Study 8.3.1.5.1.2, Paleoclimate: Lake, Playa, Marsh Deposits, and Activity: 8.3.1.5.1.2.4: Chronologic Analyses of Lake, Playa and Marsh Deposits) there are references to "other chronological methods" in which dendrochronology (tree-ring) data collected in central and western Nevada may be used in the development of "paleoclimate transfer functions" on the scale of 10 to 1,000 years. Reference is made in this activity to Chapter 5 for consideration of dendrochronology. The discussion in Chapter 5 (pp. 5-72) is derived from three references—Brubaker and Cook (1983), LaMarche and Marney (1972), and LaMarche and Marney (1974). In the Chapter 5 discussion, it is mentioned that dendrochronology has been used to reconstruct seasonal temperature variations for the past 5,500 years in the western U.S.

Staff acknowledges that the duration of past climates (paleoclimates) that can be reconstructed from tree-ring data is quite short (about 5,000 years) in comparison to the reconstruction of past climates for 50,000 to 1,000,000 years by other methods, as are being pursued through activities 8.3.1.5.1.2.1, 8.3.1.5.1.2.2, 8.3.1.5.1.2.3, 8.3.1.5.1.2.4, 8.3.1.5.1.3.2, 8.3.1.5.1.4.1, 8.3.1.5.1.4.2, 8.3.1.5.1.4.3. Staff also acknowledges that appropriate trees do not exist within the controlled area for dendrochronology studies. Staff only notes that the cited literature in Chapter 5 is limited.

Staff concludes that the commitment in the SCP to consider tree-ring data and the published findings of such studies for the region suffices with respect to the entire program of studies and activities for reconstructing past climates at the site. Thus, CDSCP Comment 31 is resolved.

Section 8.3.1.5.1.5.1 Activity: Paleoclimate-paleoenvironment Synthesis

CDSCP COMMENT 32

The diverse number of theories on the nature of late Pleistocene and Holocene climates derived from various paleovegetation data have not been addressed in this section.

BASIS

• The impact on repository performance of anticipated and unanticipated processes and events related to future climate must be evaluated. This impact is generally assessed considering Quaternary climate and climatic trends and cycles. The basis for this comment is summarized in the literature review of regional climate hypotheses in Section 5.2.1.2.5. For example, a major controversy exists at present concerning whether vegetation changes observed in packrat middens reflect primarily variations in temperature, precipitation or some combination of these two factors (Bradley, 1985). The proposed studies will probably not provide definitive answers to these types of questions. Possible climatic variations that can produce most of the observed paleovegetation changes can range between: a) increase in precipitation only; b) decreases in temperature only; and c) same intermediate combination of both types of changes. These simple scenarios do not even consider the potential effects on climatic modeling of specific assumptions about seasonal distribution of climate parameters and the location of storm tracks or air masses.

• While recognizing that the effects of either lower temperature or higher precipitation might be about the same with respect to infiltration, the confidence in the interpretations would be greater if there were not confounding physical processes.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

SCP Activity 8.3.1.5.1.5.1 is a summarization (synthesis) of information to be collected in paleolacustrine, terrestrial paleoecology and paleoenvironmental studies (i.e., Studies 8.3.1.5.1.2 [p. 8.3.1.5-42], 8.3.1.5.1.3 [p. 8.3.1.5-54], 8.3.1.5.1.4 [p. 8.3.1.5-57]). Also see Table 8.3.1.5.-2 for a listing of the planned "activity parameters" (pp. 8.3.1.5-7 to 10) for these studies. These several studies are expected to provide complementary data sets and information that will be used to reconstruct climates for the past 50,000-1,000,000 years. The staff's concern about interpretation of packrat middens is just one facet of the many methods that will be used to reconstruct the past climates and the appropriateness of its use will have to be judged at the planned "synthesis" stage.

Also provided in the SCP are Tables 8.3.1.5-3, 4, and 5, "Current representation and alternate hypothesis for regional model, paleoclimate modeling, and paleohydrology modeling for the climate program" (pp. 8.3.1.5-18 through 31) which provide some idea of the considerations that will be made in synthesizing the information from the three studies.

Staff concludes that the plan in the SCP for synthesis of data and information to determine past climates incorporates the issue raised by CDSCP Comment 32. Thus, CDSCP Comment 32 is resolved.
REFERENCE


Section 8.3.1.5.2.1.1 Activity: Regional Paleoflood Evaluation

CDSCP COMMENT 33

This activity is concentrated only at the site itself; however, paleoflood data are sparse, and given the regional distribution patterns of rainfall now and probably in at least the recent past, the paleoflood studies should be expanded to the entire region.

BASIS

Modern meteorological studies indicate that summer thunderstorms are major sources of extreme flood events in the study area (Section 5.1.1.2). The magnitudes and frequencies of these types of storms and related floods are difficult to predict or estimate at a given locality (Sharon, 1981).

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

Section 8.3.1.5.2.1.1 (Regional paleoflood evaluation), where the original plans were for study activities south of Coyote Wash and in the NTS vicinity has been revised. The study activities have been expanded to be “south of Coyote Wash and throughout the region surrounding Yucca Mountain and the Nevada Test Site...” (p. 8.3.1.5-94). This revision of the activities satisfies the recommendation of the NRC comment. Thus, CDSCP Comment 33 is resolved.

REFERENCE


Section 8.3.1.6 Overview of Erosion Program

CDSCP COMMENT 34

The CDSCP does not specifically address the evaluation of erosion/sedimentation at the surface facility locations.

BASIS

Overall erosion programs are likely to result in an understanding of the potential future erosion in the Yucca Mountain area, but these programs are not likely to result in satisfactory evaluation of erosion/sedimentation potential at the proposed specific surface facilities such as portals and shafts (Purcell, 1988).

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

The DOE plans site-wide studies to evaluate the overall erosion/sedimentation potential in the Yucca Mountain area (Sections 8.3.1.6 and 8.3.1.16). Although not specifically directed toward the surface facilities mentioned in NRC CDSCP Comment 34, the proposed studies should cover any presently proposed facility locations or any likely location changes. It is therefore concluded that CDSCP Comment 34 is resolved.

REFERENCE


Section 8.3.1.12.1 Investigation: Studies To Provide Data On Regional Meteorological Conditions

CDSCP COMMENT 40

The site precipitation monitoring plan will not collect enough data to determine spatial or temporal distribution of extreme events.

BASIS

- The precipitation monitoring plan states that “the data collected at the site (Section 8.3.1.12.2) will supplement the regional meteorology characterization and provide the relationship between the regional data and site-specific data.” Based on the location and extent of existing precipitation stations the adequacy of the planned network is questioned for detection of extreme events producing flash flooding. “These data (specifically precipitation amounts used to track storm trajectories)” (page 8.3.1.12-8) do not appear to be sufficient to track storm trajectories.
- The statistics of extreme precipitation events that cause flash flooding requires both temporal and spatial data, both of which appear insufficient in the plan outline.
- In desert regions, most intense precipitation of the type causing flash flooding occurs as thunderstorms, often of limited time and areal extent. A long term, dense station network is required to characterize accurately these events. On page 5-20 (Vol. 2,
Chapter 5), it is stated that “A more comprehensive precipitation monitoring network is needed both in the immediate vicinity of Yucca Mountain and in sections of the Fortymile Wash drainage to fully evaluate the recharge potential. Plans for such a network are given in Sections 8.3.1.2 and 8.3.1.12. If the “comprehensive precipitation monitoring network” is only that proposed in these sections, it is questioned whether that will be adequate for the needed investigations.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

The staff recognizes that the purpose of Investigation 8.3.1.12.2 is to collect site-specific meteorological data for calculating dose amounts for accidental surface releases. The five stations provide more meteorological detail than is normally required at other nuclear facilities (such as reactors, reprocessing plants, and spent fuel storage areas). Staff acknowledges that Study 8.3.1.12.2 will, in addition, provide meteorological data to investigations 8.3.1.2.1 (Regional hydrologic system), 8.3.1.2.2 (Unsaturated zone hydrologic system), 8.3.1.5.1 (Change in climate conditions to predict future climates), and 8.3.1.14.3 (Schedule for surface characteristics programs). Further, the meteorology data will be used to augment data from such activities as 8.3.1.2.1.2.1 (Surface-water runoff monitoring) in which a network of 28 continuously recording precipitation gages is planned with an additional ten “weather stations” in the area (see Figure 8.3.1.2–7). The short duration of operation (approximately 5 yrs.) of the precipitation gage network prior to performance evaluation necessitates that the site specific rainfall data must be used to condition spatial and temporal properties known for rainfall in the region to obtain the needed modeling information by methodologies, and relationships that can be applied or have been developed for the region (i.e., Corotis, 1976; Fennessey et al., 1986; Marshall, 1980; Osborn et al., 1980; Rodriguez-Iturbe and Mejia, 1974; Waymire and Gupta, 1981, Wilkinson and Valaderes-Tavares, 1972; Woolhiser, 1983; and Woolliser, 1988). Specific details of precipitation instrumentation and analyses will be scrutinized in the study plans. Given the purpose of the meteorological stations, possible use of data as a supplement to data from the proposed network of 24 precipitation gages, and the use of existing knowledge about precipitation characteristics in the region, CDSCP Comment 40 is resolved.

REFERENCES


Section 8.3.1.12.2 Investigation: Studies to Provide Data on Atmospheric and Meteorological Phenomena at Potential Locations of Surface Facilities

Section 8.3.1.12.2.1 Study: Meteorological Data Collection at the Yucca Mountain Site

CDSCP COMMENT 41

Plans for coordinating meteorological monitoring do not justify the rationale for establishing a fixed averaging period.

BASIS

- The time period of importance for different meteorological phenomena is not necessarily the same for either the phenomena or for the studies using the data. In Section 8.3.1.12.1.2 (Study: Plan for synthesis of NNWSI project meteorological monitoring) it is stated that a plan will be developed to coordinate meteorological monitoring efforts to satisfy the requirements of different investigations. Yet in this investigation plan, it is stated that a selection of seven meteorological parameters from five towers already established are recorded as hourly averages.
Several examples are provided in which hourly averages may not be sufficient for input data. The first is precipitation amount: for investigations of flash flooding, particularly in desert areas, rainfall intensity, i.e., precipitation during time periods much shorter than 1 hour are often required. A second is atmospheric stability: the most dangerous time for local high concentrations of airborne gases and particulates is often during periods of fumigation in the lowest atmosphere. The fumigation period is usually associated with the breakup of ground-based temperature inversions. Often the fumigation period is short, on the order of 15 minutes. Hourly average atmospheric stability would normally not provide information on the frequency, time of occurrence, and duration of fumigation periods. A third is peak gusts: the magnitude of peak gusts, their frequency and duration are of importance for determining blowing dust. Wind gustiness indices are not based on hourly average wind velocities.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

Activity 8.3.1.12.2.1.1 states that the meteorological parameters at the four remote stations (meteorological towers) “will be monitored using continuous analyzers” from which the hourly average values will be obtained. At the main site (meteorological tower with line power) the “continuously recorded meteorological parameters will be reduced and averaged” (page 8.3.1.12-19) for the information needed to assess radiological doses by guidance provided by both the Environmental Protection Agency and NRC (refer to page 8.3.1.12-23 for the list of guidance documents used by the DOE).

The data will be reduced by methodologies that “will be in accord with referenced EPA and NRC rules, regulations, and guidelines” (page 8.3.1.12-19).

From the description of how the data will be recorded, there are possibilities that the data (with time increments of less than 1 hour) could be used in other investigations. Considering the purpose of Investigation 8.3.1.12.2 and the stated type of recording equipment, CDSCP Comment 41 is resolved.

BASIS

Several Issues that require thermal and mechanical rock properties are not listed on page 8.3.1.15-1. For example:

- Issue 1.4 Waste Package Containment Performance, pg. 8.2–73, 3rd paragraph
- Issue 1.7 Performance Confirmation Program, pg. 8.2–84, last paragraph
- Issue 1.9 Postclosure Siting Guidelines, pg. 8.2–91
- Issue 1.10 Waste Package Characteristics, pg. 8.3.1.15–1
- Issue 2.2 Worker Radiological Safety: Normal Conditions, pg. 8.2–119, 2nd sentence of first paragraph
- Issue 2.4 Retrievability Sections 8.2.2.2.1.4 (pgs. 8.2–125/130) and 8.3.5.2

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

- The DOE has provided clarification regarding the indirect linkage between some issues and data requirements as summarized in SCP Section 8.3.1.15. The tie-in for Issue 2.4 is clear and unambiguous. The tie-in for Issue 1.10 remains less explicit, but the required parameters appear to be addressed adequately in Section 8.3.4.2.4.3.
- In light of the satisfactory guidance provided in the SCP with regard to indirectly supported issues, the comment is considered resolved.

Section 8.3.1.15.1.6.2 Activity: Canister-scale heater experiment, p. 8.3.1.15–52

CDSCP COMMENT 46

In order to examine the margin of safety engineered into the stability of emplacement holes from the standpoint of retrievability, the canister-scale heater experiment needs to be run beyond the average design heat load. The CDSCP does not include provisions for such testing. Also, no mention is made of testing of lined versus unlined holes, backfilled holes, etc.

BASIS

The degree of conservatism in design cannot be assessed without examining behavior outside of “average” conditions.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

- The DOE has included a commitment to a thermal overdrive experiment on the canister-scale heater
experiment, as well as to multi-year (e.g., performance confirmation) heater tests on a similar scale.

- The DOE response leaves the planning for heater testing of lined holes as uncertain. A decision on lined-hole testing can be deferred until an emplacement configuration is final. This question may need to be raised/clarified if horizontal emplacement in long, lined holes is ultimately selected.

- In light of the DOE commitment to thermal overdrive testing, the comment is considered resolved.

Section 8.3.1.15.1.6.5 Activity: Heated room experiment, p. 8.3.1.15–58

CDSCP COMMENT 47

This experiment is one of the more important rock mechanics experiments proposed; yet, virtually no detail is given regarding it. There seems to be a lack of integration between this experiment and the modeling activities and design.

BASIS

See the comment on Section 8.3.1.15, Overview of Thermal and Mechanical Rock Properties Program, p. 8.3.1.15–1/14.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

- DOE has provided additional information about the heated room experiment in Section 8.3.1.15.1.6.5 of the SCP. In the description of the test, it is pointed out that the objectives of the test are to evaluate the thermomechanical response of the tuff, collect thermomechanical data and predict drift response, presumably through the use of numerical models.

- DOE states that the design of the test is in a preliminary stage and thus details are not currently available. However, information has been presented in the SCP regarding the parameters to be obtained and the method of collection to gain limited insight into the heated room test plan. The staff finds this information to be sufficient for review at this time.

- The staff considers this comment resolved.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

- In response to this comment, the DOE has made changes to the description of the plate-loading tests in Section 8.3.1.15.1.7.1. In this discussion, the DOE has alluded to the possible anisotropic nature of the rock mass.

- DOE has recognized the limited value of the data obtained from the plate-loading tests.

- The staff considers this comment resolved.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

- Plate-load tests do not necessarily provide a means of determining in-situ (i.e., undisturbed) rock mass deformational properties. Data obtained from such tests may be useful in assessing spatial variability, effects of different excavation procedures, etc. as part of the overall program to characterize deformational relations of the rock mass adjacent to underground openings but may not be useful in thermomechanical calculations.
Section 8.3.1.17.4 Preclosure Tectonics Data Collection and Analysis

CDSCP COMMENT 53

The program of activities outlined for study of northeast trending faults in the area of Yucca Mountain appears inadequate to determine the significance of some of these features.

BASIS

- The Spotted Range-Mine Mountain Structural zone is currently seismically active and has a long history of tectonic activity (Carr, 1984). The Mine major northeast trending faults within this zone and could be within approximately 15 km of the site.

- Activity 8.3.1.17.4.4.2 (Evaluate the Mine Mountain fault system) indicates that the activity will only synthesize and evaluate data collected as an adjunct to the NTS weapons program.

- A large portion of the existing data on the Mine Mountain fault has already been synthesized by McArthur and Birkhard (1986) who noted that this feature was a major fault system that trends toward Yucca Mountain.

- The Mine Mountain fault zone is the locus of substantial normal faulting and possibly detachment faulting (McArthur and Birkhard, 1986). Detachment faulting and its relation to north-trending normal faults is an unresolved issue at Yucca Mountain.

- Left-lateral offset of the Timber Mountain tuff along the Mine Mountain fault is 1 km (Chapter 1-114). Quaternary movement has been noted along the Mine Mountain fault (McArthur and Birkhard, 1986) but the amount of offset and exact timing are unknown.

- The Mine Mountain fault is comparable to the Bare Mountain Fault in length, offset, and proximity to the site, but the Bare Mountain fault has a much more extensive program of investigation.

EVALUATION OF SCP RESPONSE

The text of Activity 8.3.1.17.4.4.2 has been revised to note the significance of the Mine Mountain fault system to the repository, including the possible association with a detachment ("low-angle extensional fault") and the possibility of Quaternary offset. The text of Activity 8.3.1.17.4.4.2 has also been expanded to more completely describe activities that will address the possible extension of the Mine Mountain fault into Jackass Flats. These activities include possible trenching of Quaternary scarps and geophysical testing (Activity 8.3.1.17.4.7.8) in Jackass Flats. However, characterization of the Mine Mountain fault system appears to be largely contingent on the actual implementation of the geophysical testing (Activity 8.3.1.17.4.7.8 is an activity to evaluate the suitability of the technique). Although the NRC staff cannot evaluate the program to investigate the Mine Mountain fault system until Activity 8.3.1.17.4.7.8 is complete, the proposed studies are likely to address the concern. Therefore, it is considered that CDSCP Comment 53 is resolved.

CDSCP COMMENT 54

The CDSCP has limited its consideration of how jointed tuff can be treated to equivalent continuum models. Although several possible models are described in Chapter 2 (pp. 2-19 and -20), representation of jointed tuff by equivalent continuum models only and disregarding of other models such as quasi-discrete or distinct element models has not been justified.

BASIS

- Equivalent continuum models may be misleadingly simple and miss essential behavior features even if one or two calculated results match. For example, these models may adequately represent the behavior of a block of jointed rock subject to low stress gradients but may not yield representative results when high stress gradients are introduced (Singh, 1973). If validation testing does not include tests with a stress gradient boundary condition, then an important deformation mechanism may be overlooked.

- Another limitation of equivalent continuum material models concerns the issue of intersecting joints. For a rock mass cut by two intersecting joint sets, relative movement on one joint set produces a stepped surface on the second set. The shear strength is then a function of applied shear direction. The initial shearing does not involve dilation but subsequent shearing does. Most current continuum models do not adequately account for this behavior. Equivalent continuum models must either be restricted to slip motion on a particular joint set or assume very small joint spacing (Gerrard, 1983).

- Other models, such as quasi-discrete or distinct element models, may be equally valid. For example, the CDSCP states that equivalent continuum models do not address block failure and that distinct element models may be required (p. 8.3.2.2-82). Blanford and Key (1987) demonstrated that a quasi-discrete approach of isolating joints from the rock matrix can...
be appropriate, particularly near areas of high stress gradient.

**EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE**

- In response to this comment, the DOE has revised Section 8.3.2.1.4.1 of the CDSCP to include a discussion on the use of discrete element models and quasi-discrete models in the development of constitutive models.
- The staff finds DOE's response to be adequate, and, therefore considers the comment resolved.

**REFERENCES**


**CDSCP COMMENT 55**

Geomechanical analyses do not consider the effects of emplaced support components or the effect of elevated temperature on the support system components.

**BASIS**

- Emphasis is placed on the function of rock reinforcement in limiting deleterious rock movement. Only empirical approaches are discussed in relation to selection of rock reinforcement components.
- System element 1.2.12, drift construction, recognizes the need for designing ground support to accommodate the long-term thermal considerations. However, consideration of thermal effects is limited to thermally-induced stresses in the rock mass, not in support components.

**EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE**

- In response to this comment, the DOE has revised Section 8.3.2.1.4.1 of the CDSCP to include a discussion on the use of finite element models to evaluate the rock-support interactions. DOE states that the thermal effects on the support system will be considered.
- The staff finds DOE’s discussion on the use of finite element models to be adequate and considers this comment resolved.

**CDSCP COMMENT 56**

The first section of the next to the last paragraph on pg. 8.3.2.2-55 expresses the anticipation that contingency measures might strongly emphasize contractability based on semi-empirical rock mass classifications. These classifications bear no direct relation to the primary long-term repository performance requirements of containment and isolation. It is not clear, therefore, whether the selected criteria are appropriate for guiding emplacement decisions and, specifically to perform system performance studies for off-normal conditions, as proposed in the first sentence of the last paragraph on pg. 8.3.2.2-55.

**BASIS**

Contrary to the second sentence of the last paragraph on pg. 8.3.2.2-55, product 1.11.3-3 does not site data required to perform such assessments.

**EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE**

- In response to this comment, the DOE has revised Section 8.3.2.2.3 of the CDSCP to indicate that total system performance concerns will be factored into the contingency procedures.
- DOE's response identifies methods that can be used for system performance studies for off-normal conditions, with particular attention to the primary long-term repository performance requirements.
- Section 8.3.2.2.3 (pp. 8.3.2.2-52/53) identifies the site data required by reference to product 1.11.3.1.
- The DOE response and referenced SCP sections provide the information requested by the NRC. The staff considers the comment resolved.
EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

- In response to this comment, the DOE has revised Section 8.3.2.2.6 of the CDSCP to state that the thermal loading history used in the key block will be obtained through independent thermomechanical analyses.
- The SCP has been adequately revised to address the NRC comment. Therefore, the staff considers the comment resolved.

Section 8.3.2.2.6 Information Need 1.11.6, Far-Field Analyses, p. 8.3.2.2.2-82

CDSCP COMMENT 59

The description of far field analysis in the CDSCP does not address potential for thermally induced movement along faults or fractures.

BASIS

Heat sources in the repository will induce perturbations to the in situ stress field. If faults are presently at limiting equilibrium, thermally or excavation induced stresses may cause slip on some sections of the fault. Heating may also increase pore pressure and decrease effective stress on the fault. Similar effects may be induced on fractures.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

- In response to this comment, the DOE has revised Section 8.3.2.2.6 of the CDSCP to indicate that thermally-induced movement along fractures and faults will be considered in the Far Field analysis.
- DOE has also indicated in Tables 8.3.2.2-5 and 8.3.2.2-14 that fault locations are required as parameters for thermal modeling and far-field thermomechanical analyses.
- The staff considers the SCP revisions and DOE's response to be adequate, and considers the comment resolved.

Section 8.3.2.2.7 Information Need 1.11.7 logic, p. 8.3.2.2.2-89

CDSCP COMMENT 60

The comment that "...drifts will not be relied on to be open. They may have caved in or settled on the backfill" raises concerns because it is formulated as a very broad option.
Appendix A

BASIS
If drifts through faults or fault-zones are allowed to cave in, it could extend considerably the potential for connections between potential flowpaths and the repository. It could also enhance permeability at larger distances than calculated for stable conditions.

Examples:
- cavities above drifts could greatly reduce resistance to airflow, and link the repository to preferential air flow channels along a fault, hence facilitating upward flow of airborne radionuclides.
- large open space above failed drifts could become preferential condensation locations for water vapor, thus enhancing water flow down faults.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE
In response to this CDSCP comment, it has been acknowledged that the role of backfill and the consequences of caving require further evaluation. This comment is considered resolved.

CDSCP COMMENT 61
Systematic studies or calculations may be needed to determine the heat and moisture transfer from the rock to the ventilation air.

BASIS
Some aspects of the transfer are mentioned (e.g., in situ moisture), but the most difficult parameters to determine usually are the ones governing transfer to the air.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE
- In response to this comment, the DOE has revised Section 8.3.2.4.1.2 of the CDSCP to explicitly identify that heat and moisture transfer in the ventilation system will be evaluated in the ventilation system design.
- The DOE has also revised Section 8.3.1.15.1.8.4 of the CDSCP to identify the activity which will evaluate parameters needed for the ventilation system design.
- The DOE response and SCP revisions adequately respond to the NRC comment and, thus, the comment is considered resolved.

CDSCP COMMENT 63
The last tentative goal on pg. 8.3.2.5-21 indicates that high confidence is needed that ES-1 shaft will terminate no less than 150 m above ground-water table.

It does not appear that this goal is reached under the present ES-1 design.

BASIS
- According to the last sentence on pg. 81 of the CDSCP Overview volume: “The (first exploratory) shaft..., leaving about 280 feet of the Calico Hills tuff undisturbed above the static water table.”
- According to Section 8.4.2.6.1 (pg. 8.4-66, first paragraph), “…would still provide almost 85 m to the water table.”

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE
- In response to this comment, the DOE has stated that the current ESF design requires the ES-1 shaft to terminate at a distance of about 200 m above the water table.
- The response further states that the DOE’s tentative design goal in the CDSCP should have read “The thickness between the bottom of ES-1 or any drifting and the ground-water table should be greater than the minimum thickness of the Calico Hills unit above the water table anywhere else within the repository boundary.”
- In view of the modification to the ESF design changing the depth of ES-1 below the ground surface, we find that the comment is no longer applicable.
- This comment is considered resolved because it is no longer applicable to the revised ESF design configuration.

Section 8.3.3.1.2 Seal Components, p. 8.3.3.1-4, next to last paragraph

CDSCP COMMENT 67
The statement near the end of the next to the last paragraph on pg. 8.3.3.1-4 that “boreholes that are
upgradient or long distances from the repository may not require sealing" appears to be driven largely by considerations of the vertical downward flow in the pre-repository rock environment, and does not represent a conservative sealing approach.

**BASIS**

- Thermally induced gas flow is likely to be upward.
- Thermally induced (or disturbed) water vapor/steam flow may be upward.
- Repository induced flow may not be one dimensional.

**EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE**

- In usual engineering practice, one would allow for uncertainties by providing a safety margin between "Maximum Allowable" and "Design Basis" performance goals. This would be particularly true for structures that require a very long life, and hence are subject to considerable uncertainty.

**REFERENCE**


**Section 8.3.3.2** Issue resolution strategy for Issue 1.12 Have the characteristics and configurations of the shaft and borehole seals been adequately established to (a) show compliance with the postclosure design criteria of 10 CFR 60.134 and (b) provide information for the resolution of the performance issues, page 8.3.3.2 to 27 step D: Performance and design goals

**CDSCP COMMENT 69**

The performance and design goals for the sealing subsystem do not consider a comprehensive set of anticipated processes and events and unanticipated processes and events.

**BASIS**

- 60.112 requires that ..... the shaft and boreholes and their seals shall be designed ..... with respect to both anticipated processes and events and unanticipated processes and events.
- Processes and events considered in Section 8.3.3.2. for the sealing subsystem do not appear to be as complete as the scenarios and categories of processes and events considered in CDSCP Section 8.3.5.13.
- This section does not consider the effects of such anticipated processes and events and unanticipated processes and events as faulting on the performance of the sealing subsystem, on the status of the waste package and the engineered barrier system, and the
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interrelationship of the waste package, engineered barrier system and seal system on the total performance of the repository.

- This section does not appear to account for the effects on the natural system caused by the perturbations of waste emplacement.

- This section, and the referenced report, considers only 62 cubic meters of water per year can contact the waste under anticipated processes and events and 5600 cubic meters per year under unanticipated conditions (Fernandez and others, 1984, pages 5-4 and 5-5).

- Thordarson (1965) estimated 30 to 50 million gallons discharged over a five year period in tunnel U12e at Rainer Mesa. The very large difference in the estimated inflow values at U12e and estimated values of water that can potentially contact the waste package in Yucca Mountain do not appear justified, despite the recognized differences in the hydrological conditions at Rainer Mesa and Yucca Mountain.

- Rush and others (1984) noted 14 zones of water inflow in the unsaturated zone in borehole H-1. While the source of this water cannot be identified, the possibility that the water is perched water cannot be discounted, at present.

- This section only assumes 1 mm per year infiltration even though Montazar and Wilson (1984) estimated that net infiltration, under present conditions, is between .5 and 4.5 mm per year.

- This section does not appear to account for the nonuniformity in which precipitation events occur within the Yucca Mountain geologic setting.

- This section does not consider the effects of either potential "anticipated climatic changes" or "unanticipated climatic changes" and the potential change in net infiltration such processes and events could cause.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

The DOE has modified and expanded section 8.3.3.2 and in doing so has demonstrated a need to consider a broad range of information needs in designing and evaluating seal performance. This is especially evident in areas such as section 8.3.3.2.1, which discusses information needed for design of seals and their placement methods, Tables 8.3.3.2-3 and 8.3.3.2-4 which list information needed to support resolution of issue 1.12, and Table 8.3.3.2-7 which lists site properties needed for issue 1.12.

While the NRC staff is not necessarily in agreement with the "expected parameter values" assumed by DOE, the information needs required in this section appear adequate with respect to both anticipated processes and events and unanticipated processes and events and with respect to required parameters that will allow the design and performance of the seals to be evaluated; therefore, this CDSCP comment is considered to be adequately resolved.

REFERENCES


Section 8.3.4 Waste Package Program

Section 7.4.2.6.5 Environmental considerations in localized corrosion initiation

CDSCP COMMENT 71

The CDSCP states that the quality of the water that will contact the waste packages is expected to have little impact on their long-term integrity. The conceptual model and resulting calculations to determine the composition of water contacting the waste packages are overly optimistic.

BASIS

- The corrosion rates and mechanisms are dependent, in part, on the composition of groundwater contacting the waste packages.

- The conceptual model chosen for concentrating salts in the vadose zone water results in a maximum TDS of only 20 times that of J-13 well water (Morales, 1985).

- Alternative scenarios are possible that would describe groundwater compositions first contacting the
waste packages much in excess of the maximum concentration listed above.

- It is conceivable that the first groundwater to contact the waste packages will be a brine, saturated with salts.
- The scenarios selected drive the testing program on waste package corrosion.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

The SCP still includes in Chapter 7 the discussion from Morales (1985) on mechanisms for concentrating salts in the water that will contact the waste packages. This discussion does not present the complete picture on the current understanding about groundwater compositions that will contact the waste packages. For example, no consideration is given to “heat pipe” effects where solutes are concentrated toward the heat source. However, plans described in Chapter 8 appear to address mechanisms for concentrating salts, such as open-system behavior (p. 8.3.4.2-47), and “heat-pipe” effects. Furthermore, it is stated in the SCP that “the water chemistry plays a critical role in determining the performance of the waste package components.” Thus, CDSCP Comment 71 is resolved.

REFERENCE


Section 8.3.5.9.1 Information Need 1.4.1: Waste Package Design Features that Affect the Performance of the Container

CDSCP COMMENT 74

There is no description of the development and use of standardized test methods.

BASIS

- Standardized test methods are needed for determining the stability and durability of the nuclear waste and the waste package materials.
- Standardized test methods are those developed and approved by an appropriate cross-section of producers, users, and academics.
- The tests must be acceptable in terms of reliability and reproducibility.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

- In response to this comment, the DOE has added an acknowledgment of the use of standardized test methods and procedures governed and issued by the American Society of Testing and Materials (ASTM) to Section 8.3.5.9.1.
- DOE procedures for development and approval of test methods are discussed in Section 8.6 (quality assurance program). However, their appropriateness and adequacy for use in HLW canister or waste form testing cannot be assessed until they are available for NRC’s review.
- Based on our review of the response to this comment, it is concluded that the comment has been adequately addressed within the scope of NRC’s SCP review.

REFERENCE


Section 8.3.5.9.1.2 Microstructural Properties

CDSCP COMMENT 75

Metallographic and microscopic characterization techniques given in this section (Section 8.3.5.9.1.2) for copper, copper-based alloys, and austenitic stainless steels are insufficiently described.

BASIS

- Some microstructures cannot be observed using conventional metallographic techniques.
- Grain boundary structure, precipitate formation, and dislocation structures affect material properties and stability, and these features should be viewed at high magnifications using electron microscopy.
- Advanced analytical techniques are needed to analyze for oxygen, hydrogen, or other elemental diffusion into metals.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

- In response to this comment, the DOE has accepted the NRC recommendation to use advanced techniques for resolution of the microstructure and microchemical analysis of the canister materials.
- A paragraph identifying several advanced techniques for examination and characterization of the microstructure has been added to Section 8.3.5.9.1.2 of the SCP.
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- However, the DOE believes that details on which techniques and detailed procedures that will be used are beyond the scope of the SCP.
- Based on our review of the response to this comment, and the DOE's acceptance of the NRC recommendation to use more advanced techniques to resolve and characterize the fine microstructural details, the comment is resolved.

Section 8.3.5.9.1.1.2 Microstructural Properties. (Phase stability in austenitic stainless steels)

CDSCP COMMENT 76

Data are not presented to show that structural stability of the container will be maintained after prolonged exposure to 100 to 250°C temperature (p. 7-42).

BASIS
- Microstructures of austenitic stainless steels are unstable in terms of transformation to martensite, precipitation of sigma or other embrittling phases and sensitization.
- Small amounts of martensite increase the steel's susceptibility to stress corrosion cracking.
- Embrittling phases provide initiation sites for cracking and increase susceptibility to cracking.
- Sensitization or carbide formation may be enhanced by initial high temperatures and by extended temperatures of the repository. Beneficial effects of carbide forming alloying elements such as titanium and of specified cooling rates during manufacture could be negated by the extended time at temperature after emplacement.
- Phase precipitation causes chemical changes in the microstructure which may result in decreased resistance to localized corrosion such as pitting and stress corrosion cracking.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE
- In response to this comment, the DOE has added text in Section 8.3.5.9.1.1.2 to explicitly identify microstructure stability as a criteria to be evaluated in the material selection process. Specific parameters that include aspects of phase stability effects are also identified, e.g., resistance to environmentally accelerated cracking, localized corrosion attack, and mechanical embrittlement.
- DOE has also had a peer review of its canister material selection criteria. However, the report of the review panel and the reviewed criteria have not been made available as yet.
- Based on our review of the response to this comment, the corresponding additions to the appropriate sections of the SCP dealing with the canister material selection criteria, the comment is resolved.

Section 8.3.5.9.1.5 Characterization and inspection of weld integrity

CDSCP COMMENT 78

The effect of microstructure and chemistry on weld integrity has not been sufficiently treated.

BASIS
- Welds are areas of chemical inhomogeneity, and effects of this inhomogeneity under repository conditions should be established.
- Welds of austenitic stainless steels are areas subject to sensitization that may lead to failure.
- Weld solidification shrinkage can result in localized increases in stress that can promote stress corrosion cracking and other cracking.
- Weldments have the potential for contamination and local segregation, either of which may promote premature failure.
- Welded areas are potential sites for galvanic corrosion and localized corrosion.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE
- The DOE has agreed with the NRC's concern expressed in this comment and has included in its plans the determination of the metallurgical and microstructural properties of the welds, and also plans to conduct studies and tests to evaluate the effects of welding on residual stresses in the canister and closure joint and on the corrosion behavior of the canister.
- Discussion to reflect plans for testing and studies on welds has been added in the SCP.
- Based on our review of the response to this comment, the comment is resolved.
Section 8.3.5.9.2.2 Degradation Modes Affecting Candidate Copper-Based Container Materials

CDSCP COMMENT 79
There is no discussion of the basis and reasons for choosing three specific copper-base alloys as candidate container materials.

BASIS
- Three materials—CDA 102, CDA 613, and CDA 715—are going to be tested.
- Other copper-based alloys could perform as well or better than the three listed.
- Except for these three materials, no tests, not even scoping tests, have been performed on other potential, or candidate copper-base alloys.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE
- DOE has provided references to relevant studies that were undertaken by the Yucca Mountain Project in FY-85 and FY-86 in conjunction with the copper industry.
- Additional text has been provided in Section 8.3.5.9.2.2 to briefly discuss the feasibility study on using copper/copper-base alloys for the HLW canister.
- Based on the response to this comment, and the relevant references provided by the DOE, this comment is resolved.

Section 8.3.5.9.2.3.2 Subactivities 1.4.2.3.2.–1.4.2.3.9. Laboratory Test Plan for Austenitic Materials

CDSCP COMMENT 81
Investigation of the effects on the corrosion behavior of the containers that may result from any metallurgical changes associated with fabrication in large sections is not identified as a specific topic of a test program.

BASIS
- The influence of fabrication in large sections on the corrosion behavior of the container is not identified as a specific topic of a test program.

- The size of the section and the welding procedures govern metallurgical conditions and thus alter the corrosion behavior.
- Other fabrication processes and procedures (such as surface peening) may alter the surface and metallurgical condition of the container and thereby alter the corrosion behavior of the container.
- Residual stresses present in large vessels after post-weld stress-relief heat treatment can be significant.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE
- The DOE has accepted the NRC's recommendation and has included plans in the SCP for testing of full-scale fabricated canisters. The testing program will include evaluation/measurement of mechanical, physical, and metallurgical properties. Characterization of metallurgical conditions in the fabricated canister will also include microchemical analyses and corrosion properties of coupons cut from the full-scale container.
- The DOE plans to conduct these investigations only on the material finally selected as the prime candidate material for the HLW canisters.
- Based on our review of the response and incorporation of additional plans in the SCP for testing full-scale fabricated canisters and test coupons from such canisters, the comment is resolved.

Section 7.4.5.4.6 Corrosion Model
Section 8.3.5.9.3 Information Need 1.4.3: Scenarios and models needed to predict the rate of degradation of the container material

CDSCP COMMENT 83
The corrosion models described in the CDSCP are not specific and/or adaptable to specific metals, environmental conditions, and forms of corrosion.

BASIS
- The electrode potential of a metal or a phase within an alloy and the repository environment will control initiation or absence of corrosion. Electrode potentials should be known for various possible conditions and for expected times of exposure.
- Changes in water chemistry such as pH and/or ionic content will affect the electrode potential and corrosion rate must be established.
- Localized stresses, brittle phases, precipitates, different phases and other microstructural variations.
will result in variations in electrode potential and corrosion processes.

- Corrosion processes expected should be correlated with the material and environment.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

- In response to this comment, the DOE acknowledges the NRC's concerns, and plans to develop corrosion models only for the selected metal barrier material.
- Text has been added to Section 8.3.5.9.3 in the SCP that states that deterministic models linked to the relevant degradation models will be developed as part of the advanced design work. These models will be based on physical, chemical, metallurgical, and mechanical parameters covering the range of expected repository conditions.
- Based on the DOE response, this comment is resolved.

Section 8.3.5.9.3.2.1 Subactivities 1.4.3.2.1
Metallurgical Aging and Phase Transformations

CDSCP COMMENT 84

The resistance of an alloy to corrosion, intergranular corrosion, and stress-corrosion cracking is a function of the combined effects of radiation, temperature, stress, and time on the metallurgical stability of the alloy. These combined effects are not sufficiently discussed in the CDSCP.

BASIS

Changes in the metallurgical condition of metastable austenitic materials can have dramatic effects on the resistance of these materials to degradation by chemical as well as mechanical processes.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

In response to this comment, the DOE has added text in Section 8.3.5.9.3.2.1 on metallurgical aging and phase transformation to address the NRC's concerns. Based on the response to this comment, and incorporation of additional text in the SCP, the comment is resolved.

Section 8.3.5.10 Corrosion of Zircaloy

CDSCP COMMENT 85

The tests discussed in this section of the CDSCP are insufficient in that they do not account for the previous history of the Zircaloy, all modes of hydrogen embrittlement, and other types of localized corrosion.

BASIS

- The type of reactor exposure, the composition of the residue that collects on the fuel rods, and the manner in which the fuel rods were cleaned will affect corrosion of Zircaloy.
- Residue deposits that contain copper have especially destructive effects on Zircaloy's protective oxide film, and local corrosion or pitting may result.
- Zircaloy, in reactor service, is subject to stress corrosion cracking from the fuel side of the cladding due to fission products such as iodides.
- Examples of hydrogen embrittlement failures in Zircaloy cladding have been reported.
- Zircaloy is not immune to pitting corrosion; and pitting can occur in hydrochloric acid containing ferric or cupric ions and in the presence of all the halogens either in liquid or gaseous form.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

- In response to this comment, the DOE has agreed with the NRC's CDSCP comment and has added text in Section 8.3.5.10.2.1.3 on corrosion of Zircaloy to address the NRC's major concerns.
- The DOE has included plans to perform additional experiments and failure mode investigations of Zircaloy cladding within the range of expected water and vapor chemistry in the Yucca Mountain repository site.
- Based on our review of the response, and the additions made by the DOE to the testing plans in the SCP, this comment is resolved.

Section 8.3.5.12 Issue resolution strategy for Issue 1.6: Will the site meet the performance objective for pre-waste-emplacement ground-water travel time as required by 10 CFR 60.113?

CDSCP COMMENT 86

Procedures for calculating pathways and groundwater travel times presented in the strategy for Issue 1.6
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(Regulatory Requirements for Groundwater Travel Time) may not be adequate for determining the groundwater travel time along the fastest path of likely radionuclide travel from the disturbed zone to the accessible environment.

**BASIS**

- The CDSCP states that the performance measure for groundwater travel time is the probability or frequency distribution expressed as a cumulative distribution function (cdf) of calculated groundwater travel times for each hydrogeologic unit (Section 8.3.5.12; page 8.3.5.12-17; paragraph 1). The amount of spreading or flattening of the cdf’s of groundwater travel time results from the following interrelated factors.

  1. Calculating groundwater travel time as a random process, viewed as the time taken by inert tracer particles, released at the disturbed zone boundary, to reach the accessible environment (Section 8.3.15.12; page 8.3.5.12-17; paragraph 2).

  2. Variable flow path lengths (Section 8.3.15.12; page 8.3.5.12-15; paragraph 2).

  3. Parameter uncertainties in “Monte Carlo” realizations of groundwater travel time for generating groundwater travel time cdf’s (Section 8.3.5.12; page 8.3.5.12-43; paragraph 2).

  4. Effects of matrix diffusion and dispersion (Section 8.3.5.12; page 8.3.5.12-17; paragraph 3).

  5. Uncertainty caused by alternative conceptual models (Section 8.3.5.12; page 8.3.5.12-17; paragraph 3).

- The groundwater travel time cdf’s may be construed to represent groundwater travel times for ensembles of pathways, flow tubes or particle tracks as opposed to travel times along the fastest path of likely radionuclide travel as required by regulation. Furthermore, the cdf’s do not represent “true” travel times (Section 8.3.5.12; page 8.3.5.12-17; paragraph 4). Therefore, the NRC staff presently has a concern that the use of cdf’s, as described in the CDSCP, will not fulfill the regulatory requirement.

**EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE**

The text of Section 8.3.5.12 (Issue 1.6, Groundwater Travel Time) has been revised to delineate a strategy for identifying and calculating groundwater travel times along any significant groundwater flow path of likely radionuclide travel. Travel times along each identified path of likely radionuclide travel will be calculated to determine whether there are travel times less than 1,000 years. Information needs (1.6.1 through 1.6.4) to resolve the groundwater travel time issue have been revised to more clearly focus on identifying, through obtaining site information and modeling, fastest paths of likely radionuclide travel. The groundwater travel time issue resolution strategy utilizes the hypotheses-testing tables (Tables 8.3.1.2-2a and 8.3.1.2-2b) to link required information needs to the geohydrologic program of investigations. Hydrologic data on characterizing faults and fracture zones, data for model validation of unsaturated flow process, and data for groundwater flow system models will be among the data obtained to satisfy groundwater travel time information needs. Although the NRC staff still has concerns about SCP approaches to constructing groundwater travel time cumulative distribution curves, CDSCP Comment 86 is resolved.

**CDSCP COMMENT 87**

The performance parameters for Groundwater Travel Time listed in Tables 8.3.5.12-2 and 8.3.5.12-3 cannot be correlated with tests described in Sections 8.3.1 to 8.3.1.16

**BASIS**

- It can be inferred from the CDSCP that the hydrologic investigations are intended to obtain sufficient data for addressing adequately all performance and design issues or regulatory concerns related to hydrology. However, as acknowledged (Section 8.3.1.2; page 8.3.1.2-39; paragraph 1), the process of connecting the geohydrologic program of investigations to the Issue Resolution Strategy for groundwater travel time is incomplete with respect to providing logical, direct ties to the parameters defining the bases of the testing program.

- The NRC staff concludes that it is not possible to evaluate effectively the adequacy of the geohydrology program of investigations, with respect to resolving Performance Issue 1.6, unless a connection between the issue resolution strategy and the testing program is provided.

**EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE**

The comment response acknowledges, as did the CDSCP, "that direct links between performance parameters listed in the issue resolution strategies and the parameters to be obtained from the test programs [activity parameters] are not always clearly identified" (U.S. Department of Energy, 1988; page c-115). Although the CDSCP was not revised in response to this comment, the comment response notes that SCP Table 8.3.1.2-1 does provide a
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cross reference between the performance and design issues and the activity parameters to be provided by the geohydrology program of investigations. In providing this linkage, the table identifies performance parameter categories that are more directly related to specific performance and design parameters. In conclusion, the CDSCP comment response (USDOE, 1988) states that, “More explicit identification of the linkages between the performance parameters needed for issue resolution and the information to be provided by the testing program to evaluate these parameters will be part of a continuing reevaluation of the basis and adequacy of the testing program during the course of site characterization” (page c-115).

The NRC staff concludes that the performance parameters needed for issue resolution and geohydrology program of investigations are sufficiently linked (through the performance parameter categories and activity parameters shown in Table 8.3.1.2-1) to allow the NRC to evaluate effectively the adequacy of the geohydrology program. Thus CDSCP Comment 87 is resolved.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

Section 8.3.5.12 (Groundwater Travel Time)

CDSCP COMMENT 88

No plan incorporating technical or management activities is presented to track progress in providing and closing out information need 1.6.1 with respect to validating flow model concepts as was done for mathematical model validation in Section 8.3.5.12.2. As a consequence, the ability to resolve a potentially significant technical concern related directly to the performance issue on groundwater travel time is reduced.

BASIS

- The term “geohydrologic” model, used periodically in the CDSCP, is considered to be synonymous with “conceptual” model of the groundwater flow system. The CDSCP emphasizes the importance of developing a “credible geohydrologic model” (Section 8.2.2.4.1, page 181) and “testing the validity of these models” (Section 8.3.5.12.1, page 27) because “descriptions of the conceptual models and associated uncertainties” are “crucial information required by this issue [1.6]” (Section 8.3.5.12.1, page 25). Further, it is stated that “although little scientific information is called out within Table 8.3.5.12-3 [Supporting performance parameters used by Issue 1.6] to define the conceptual hydrologic models, it is evident that definition of alternative conceptual hydrologic models and assessments of their relative likelihood for the unsaturated and saturated zones is an important requirement for evaluating groundwater travel time.”

- Although the CDSCP indicates that the means by which flow models will be developed and plans that describe how specific parameters values will be obtained are described within the geohydrology program (Section 8.3.5.12.1, pages 25-26), only one specific parameter need with respect to “validation of flow models” is presented within the overall issue resolution strategy. Further, the role of expert judgment in formulating and establishing the credibility of conceptual models is not described.

REFERENCE

U.S. Department of Energy, Letter from S. Rousso, DOE, to H. Thompson, Jr., NRC; Subject: Issuance of the Site Characterization Plan (SCP) for the Yucca Mountain Site to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, December 28, 1988, 4 pp. plus 3 enclosures.

Section 8.3.5.13 Activity: Total System Performance

CDSCP COMMENT 89

The performance allocation for the contribution of the geochemical characteristics of the site to waste isolation indicates that the tentative parameter goal for chemical retardation factors is a value of 1 or greater. It is unclear how this performance allocation will influence the credit taken for chemical retardation in performance assessment calculations.

BASIS

- No details are provided in the CDSCP concerning the conditions under which a chemical retardation
factor of 1 (no retardation) may be used in performance assessment calculations.

- No information is provided in the CDSCP describing how a chemical retardation factor of "greater than or equal to 1" will adequately describe radionuclide retardation in fractures, where enhanced transport of released radionuclides could occur under certain conditions.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

Performance allocation considers the parameter goal for geochemical retardation of 1 (no retardation) only for the initial "preferred" flow/transport model of the site (i.e., advective/dispersive/matrix flow and transport). The SCP (Section 8.3.1.3) accommodates the comment by stating that for the initial model, no credit is needed for geochemical retardation. Thus, no revisions have been made that incorporate geochemical retardation in this model of site flow conditions. Since this initial model and associated performance allocation is predicated on DOE's judgment, based on their evaluation of available site information, and it is not the purpose of performance allocation to include alternative conceptual models (i.e., fracture flow), CDSCP Comment 96 is considered resolved.

CDSCP COMMENT 96

The CDSCP does not identify the presence or absence of a "significant source" of groundwater outside of the controlled area as an information need to be incorporated in the logic (approach) to resolve Issue 1.2 (regulatory requirement for limiting individual doses).

BASIS

- Individual protection requirements of 40 CFR 191.15 demand that all potential pathways (associated with undisturbed performance) from the disposal system to people shall be considered, including the assumption that individuals consume 2 liters per day of drinking water from any "significant source" of groundwater outside of the controlled area. A significant source of groundwater is defined in 40 CFR 191.12 as indicated on page 8.3.5.14-1 of the CDSCP.

- The CDSCP does not reach a preliminary conclusion on the presence or absence of a "significant source" at the site and does not include this as an information need to be included in the resolution logic presented in Figure 8.3.5.14-1 (page 8.3.5.14-3).

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

In response to the NRC comment, the issue resolution strategy for Issue 1.2 (Will the mined geologic disposal system meet the requirements for limiting individual doses in the accessible environment as required by 40 CFR 191.15?) has been revised. On page 8.3.5.14-9, a fourth parameter has been added to the list of parameters required for resolution of the issue: Determination of whether a significant source of groundwater is present or absent (Information Need 1.2.1). The logic diagram shown in Figure 8.3.5.14-1 has been revised to include a decision point for evaluating whether significant sources of groundwater are present. Thus, CDSCP Comment 96 is resolved.

CDSCP COMMENT 97

Plans should be made to correlate persistence of geologic features from ES–1 to ES–2 which might provide preferential pathways and to develop a photographic record of ES–2 for possible future use.

BASIS

- If interconnection of ES–1 and ES–2 occurs during construction (i.e., drill water), mapping in each shaft will aid in interpretation of flow paths and flow mechanisms in unsaturated rock.

- The CDSCP states (pg. 8.4–21) that “Unanticipated structural or hydrological features and stratigraphic contacts will be mapped as they are encountered in ES–2.” It appears that unless special provisions are made, the concept of “mapping when needed” could be difficult to implement.

- The CDSCP also states (pg. 8.4–31) that “significant structural or hydrologic features and stratigraphic contacts may be mapped if encountered or as needed to verify data obtained in ES–1.” Verification of data obtained in ES–1 may be difficult, at least for the lower section of the shafts, given that ES–2 is planned to be completed before ES–1.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

- In response to this comment, the DOE has accepted the NRC staff recommendation to develop a photographic record of both exploratory shafts (ES–1 and ES–2).

- The response also states that on-site geologists will determine whether additional, detailed geologic
Appendix A

mapping of specific features in ES-2 may be required.

- We find DOE's response to this comment to be reasonable and acceptable.
- The comment is considered resolved as the DOE has accepted the recommendation to photo-log the ES-2 shaft and to provide for additional geologic mapping in this shaft.

Section 8.4.2 Underground Test Facilities, p. 8.4–21, paragraph 3

CDSCP COMMENT 98
A reasonable assurance that the shafts are adequately separated so that construction in ES-2 does not adversely affect the ability to obtain required data in ES-1 and adjacent test areas has not been provided.

BASIS
- The CDSCP discusses only the potential mechanical interference of the shafts. Potential hydrologic interferences along intersecting fractures has not been discussed. No analysis of possible interference is presented or referenced.
- The effects of presence of faults, high density of fractures in the area, possibility of creation of blast-induced radial fractures, or extension of existing fractures have not been accounted for.
- Relevant locations and distances between sensitive instruments (installed in long boreholes from ES-1) and ES-2 are not given. Also, locations of radial core holes from ES-1 are not provided.
- Interaction effects resulting from drill and blast excavation (e.g., contamination of some of the test samples by drill water, blasting fumes and blast vibrations) are not adequately addressed.
- Past experience at Yucca Mountain suggests that hydrological interference between holes may have occurred (e.g., Ref. 1)
- Consequences of ES-2 failure have not been considered.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE
In response to this CDSCP comment, SCP Sections 8.4.2.3 and 8.4.3.2 have provided discussions and evaluations to show that separation between the exploratory shafts (ES-1 and ES-2) is adequate to avoid adverse effects. The NRC staff considers these evaluations to be reasonable and sufficient to resolve this comment.

REFERENCE
NRC comments on the DOE's Draft Environmental Assessment for the Yucca Mountain Site, March 20, 1985.

Section 8.4.2.1.1 Smooth Wall Blasting in Shafts, p. 8.4–24, first paragraph
Section 8.4.2.1.2 Construction of the Upper Demonstration Breakout Room and Stations, p. 8.4–27, third paragraph

CDSCP COMMENT 99
The CDSCP does not present appropriate information on blasting to reflect the most recent strategy for minimizing shaft wall damage as outlined in DOE's "Response to NRC Information Requests from the April 14–15, 1987, Meeting Between DOE and NRC" (Ref. 1).

BASIS
- The design criteria for rock excavation [10 CFR 60.133(f)] require that "the design of underground facility shall incorporate excavation methods that will limit the potential for creating a preferential pathway for groundwater to contact the waste packages or radionuclide migration to the accessible environment."
- 10 CFR 60.17(a)(2)(iv) requires that "The site characterization plan shall contain plans to control any adverse impacts from such site characterization activities that are important to safety or that are important to waste isolation."
- The NRC guidance about shaft construction requirements is contained in its Borehole and Shaft Sealing GTP (NRC, 1986, especially Sections 3.2 and 4.4).
- Statements in the CDSCP (Sections 8.4.2.1.1 and 8.4.2.1.2) imply the possibility of a strictly conventional, highly empirical approach and give little or no indication of a tightly controlled and supervised approach to blasting, with emphasis on the need to minimize the shaft wall damage as the prime objective.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE
- In response to this comment, the DOE has stated that smooth blasting will be used to minimize shaft-wall damage during excavation.
- The response further states that drilling agents, blasting materials, and water, which could interfere
with gathering uncontaminated in-situ data will be closely monitored.

- We find DOE's commitment to minimize shaft-wall damage to be reasonable and acceptable.
- This comment is considered resolved on the basis of DOE's commitment to minimize shaft-wall damage and to monitor drilling agents, blasting materials and water, as appropriate.

REFERENCE

Letter from C. P. Gertz, DOE, to J. J. Linehan, NRC, dated October 29, 1987, on the subject “Response to Information Requests From the April 14-15, 1987, Meeting Between DOE and NRC.”

CDSCP COMMENT 101

Plans for remedial measures that may be required to minimize potentially adverse impacts of penetrating the target features are not given.

BASIS

Details of remedial measures are needed to evaluate potential adverse impacts of penetrating target structures (i.e., Ghost Dance fault, Imbricite Normal Fault Zone and Drill Hole Wash) on long-term isolation capability of the geologic repository. These structures could become air or water flowpaths.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

In response to this comment, the SCP has been modified to discuss potential remedial measures to isolate and stabilize target structures. This comment is considered resolved.

CDSCP COMMENT 102

In several activity descriptions, it is proposed that air coring will be used to drill holes to be used for permeability testing (e.g., Infiltration test, pg. 8.4-52; bulk-permeability test, pg. 8.4-53; radial borehole tests, pg. 8.4-53; Calico Hills tests, pg. 8.4-54; diffusion tests, pg. 8.4-54).

BASIS

- The large volumes of pressurized air injected into the holes for bit cooling and cutting removal are likely to change the degree of saturation, hence permeability, of the surrounding rock.
- Dust particles are likely to be injected into fractures and pores, thus changing the permeability.
- A significant dust coat is likely to be blown onto the hole walls, affecting measured permeability.
- If major difficulties are encountered in completing these holes, it could cause a significant delay or reduction in data available for License Application.
on Qualification of Existing Data for High-Level Nuclear Waste Repositories” defines methods for qualifying data for licensing.

- As described in Section 8.6.2, the QA requirements for QA Levels II and III do not meet the QA requirements of 10 CFR 60, Subpart G or the above Generic Technical Position.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

Subsection 8.6.4 of Section 8.6 “Quality Assurance Program” of the SCP states that all data used to support the license application will either be obtained under the controls of a QA program which meets the requirements of 10 CFR 60 Subpart G or will be qualified via procedures which meet the requirements of NUREG-1298 “Qualification of Existing Data for High-Level Nuclear Waste Repositories.” DOE has also committed to follow the guidance in NUREG-1318, “Technical Position on Items and Activities in the High-Level Waste Geologic Repository Program Subject to Quality Assurance Requirements,” for quality level classification of data collection activities. Based on our review of the response to this comment, the comment is resolved.

Section 8.6.4.1 Quality Assurance During Site Exploration

CDSCP COMMENT 105 (QA-5)

The acceptance review process for data collected after August 1980 (the date when the NNWSI Project QA Plan, NVO-196-17, was first issued) appears to be insufficient.

BASIS

- NRC regulations (10 CFR 60, Subpart G) require that a QA program be implemented for all systems, structures and components important to safety, to design and characterization of barriers important to waste isolation and to activities related thereto. These activities include the development of site characterization data which will be used in support of the license application. Data used in support of the license application that are important to safety or waste isolation and not originally collected under the QA requirements of 10 CFR 60, Subpart G should be qualified to meet these requirements.

- The NNWSI QA plan (196-17) has not been found acceptable by the NRC. A number of outstanding comments remain. An unacceptable or unimplemented QA program could jeopardize the use of data collected under such a QA program in licensing.

- For example, Section 8.3.1.4.2.1.5 refers to specific drill core samples, collected after the August 1980 date, which will be used to measure magnetic properties and consequently, to make stratigraphic correlations. However, numerous concerns have been identified by the NRC staff related to the handling and logging of core collected for the NNWSI project. These data were generated under the NNWSI QA program but may not be defensible in licensing. These data must also be “qualified” to meet the requirements as described in 10 CFR 60, Subpart G.

- NNWSI procedure SOP-03-03, Rev. 0 “Acceptance of Data or Data Interpretations Not Developed Under the NNWSI QA Plan,” dated January 31, 1986 describes a process for qualifying data collected after August 1980. According to this procedure, all data or data interpretations generated by the NNWSI participants after the NNWSI QA Plan implementation date (August 1980) will be processed as a nonconformance. This approach may be acceptable to the NRC staff if the proposed corrective action consists of the data qualification methods described in the NRC’s “Generic Technical Position on Qualification of Existing Data for High-Level Nuclear Waste Repositories,” or some other method proposed by DOE and accepted by NRC. However, to treat “unqualified data” under the traditional nonconformance system—which has less rigor than the methods in the GTP—does not appear adequate.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

DOE has committed in Subsection 8.6.4 to meet the guidance in NUREG-1298 for the qualification of data to be used to support the license application. Based on our review of the response to this comment, the comment is resolved.

Table 8.6-2 Quality Assurance Plans and Procedures in Effect During Site Exploration and Table 8.6-3, NNWSI Project Procedures Generic to Site Characterization Tasks

CDSCP COMMENT 107 (QA-7)

The plans and procedures listed in Table 8.6-3 do not appear to address all of the applicable criteria of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 for the NNWSI Project office and contractors.

BASIS

- In accordance with the requirement of 10 CFR 60.152, “DOE shall implement a quality assurance program based on the criteria of Appendix B of 10 CFR Part 50 as applicable....”
The NRC staff recognizes that all of the 18 criteria of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 do not apply to each participant involved in the NNWSI Project. However, in the NRC staff review of Tables 8.6–2 and 8.6–3, and the associated CDSCP descriptions for these tables, the CDSCP does not address why certain parts of the Appendix B criteria have not been covered by the quality assurance plans and procedures in Tables 8.6–2 and 8.6–3, (e.g. the USGS quality assurance plans and procedures referenced in Table 8.6–2 do not appear to address the Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 criteria for inspection, test control, calibration and nonconformances). Similarly, the H&N quality assurance plans and procedures in Table 8.6–3 do not appear to address the Appendix B criteria for procurement; instructions, drawings and procedures; document control; control of purchased material; equipment and services; and test control.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

DOE has provided a listing of procedures in the various tables of 8.6 in the SCP, which address all the applicable criteria of Appendix B, 10 CFR Part 50 for the Yucca Mountain Project Office and principal contractors. There are a few areas where those procedures are listed as “to be determined” since the applicability of particular criteria for an organization has yet to be evaluated. The latest approved and issued procedures will be used during site characterization. Based on our review of the response to this comment, the comment is resolved.

CDSCP COMMENT 110

The effect of oxidation on the leaching of spent fuel has not been sufficiently addressed in relation to meeting the performance objectives for radionuclide releases.

BASIS

- The solubility or leachability of spent fuel will be enhanced if it is oxidized in a repository environment.
- The rate of spent fuel oxidation has not been determined.
- The leaching behavior of spent fuel has not been determined.
- The leach rate of fission products may be greatly increased depending on their distribution in the spent fuel. For example, if fission products concentrate in grain boundaries and oxidation along grain boundaries is the dominant mechanism, leach rates may be greatly increased.
- Radionuclide release, because of spent fuel oxidation, may result in an unexpectedly high source term to the engineered barrier system.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

In response to this comment, the DOE has agreed with the NRC’s concerns and has recognized the need for determining spent fuel oxidation related parameters. The response references pertinent sections of the SCP dealing with the planned testing activities to generate the necessary technical data in meeting the modeling information needs. Based on our review of the response, this comment is resolved.

Section 6.2.6 Subsurface design
Section 7.3.1.3 Reference waste package design
Section 7.4.1.3 Figure 7–5 Example of temperature histories of thermal waste package components and host rock for a vertically emplaced spent fuel container

CDSCP QUESTION 1

Is the site characterization testing related to thermal loading for the site based on the maximum waste package and areal loading?

BASIS

- The subsurface design is using a design basis areal power density of 57 kw/acre, based on an average waste package heat input of 3.03 kw. The maximum design heat output of a waste package is 5 kw. Figure 7–5 shows typical modeled thermal histories of a vertically emplaced spent fuel waste package and its immediate surroundings with waste package average power of 3.3 kw.
- Design basis information should include the maximum design case.
- The areal power density and the maximum heat output of a waste package can be exceeded if 5 year old high burnup fuel is consolidated and placed in boreholes of close proximity to other 5 year old high burnup fuel.
- Any analysis must consider the margins of safety under normal conditions and anticipated operational occurrences (10 CFR 60.21(e)(ii)(F)(3)).
EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

- In response to this question, the DOE has added a statement to Section 6.2.6 to clarify the basis for thermal loading conditions (p. 6-147 of the SCP). The statement indicates that: (1) the current design is based on the emplacement of reference waste packages as described in Section 7.3.1.3 and (2) development of a waste emplacement program with a thermal management strategy is planned as information becomes available.

- The DOE response has clarified that the 5 kw per package is used for waste package testing because of waste form temperature limits. This loading provides a reasonable basis for testing until further information is available.

- Based on the response to this question, the question is resolved.

Section 8.3.1.2.1.2.1 Surface Water Runoff Monitoring

CDSCP QUESTION 3

How will the hydrologic response from the proposed monitored watershed on the unnamed tributary of Fortymile Wash be transferred to Drill Hole Wash?

BASIS

- One of the current four continuous stream gages is operated on an unnamed 4 square mile tributary in the head waters of Fortymile Wash near Rattlesnake Ridge, at least 20 miles from the proposed repository site. Presumably, the purpose of this site is to obtain data from a small watershed such as those that exist within Drill Hole Wash where the surface facilities will be located.

- It is a common hydrologic technique to monitor one watershed and then transfer information to one or more additional watersheds. The reasons for this approach vary widely, i.e., length of existing monitoring, accessibility, representativeness, etc. However, it is necessary to have a thorough plan to gather sufficient information about all basins involved in the evaluation to ensure that a defensible transfer of information can be accomplished.

- It is apparent from the CDSCP that extensive information about the Drill Hole Wash basin and subwatersheds will be gathered. This information includes meteorological, geologic and topographic data about the watersheds within the Yucca Mountain area. While such information is necessary, similar information on the Rattlesnake Ridge watershed and a methodology to transfer the information appropriately to the watersheds of interest are also needed.

- It is not clear how the surface-water monitoring data from the headwaters of Fortymile Wash will be used to help define the hydrologic characteristics of the watersheds of primary interest. Appropriate meteorological, soils and topographic information needs to be gathered at the headwaters of Fortymile Wash for comparison to the Drill Hole Wash watersheds.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

Section 8.3.1.2.1.2.1 has been modified to state more explicitly the purpose of monitoring streamflow in the upper drainage basin of Fortymile Wash. As stated in the SCP, there is no intent or need to transfer the information to Drill Hole Wash. The monitoring will support the Fortymile Wash recharge study, Activity 8.3.1.2.1.3.3, and resulting data will be used to help develop rainfall-runoff models of the Fortymile, Wash drainage basin. Based on this response, CDSCP Question 3 is answered.

Section 8.3.1.2.3.2.2 Activity: Hydrochemical Characterization of Water in the Upper Part of the Saturated Zone

CDSCP QUESTION 4

Why is isotope sampling to date the groundwater in the upper part of the water table not a part of the hydrochemical characterization of the saturated zone?

BASIS

- The collection of isotope water samples from the top of the saturated zone immediately beneath or adjacent to the proposed site will help determine if modern water is present at this location and provide additional information on the rate of water movement from the surface to the water table.

- Current plans consist of drilling a well to total depth and then pumping the well for a water sample. This water sample would be composed of waters from all depths below the water surface, and therefore would not clearly indicate how fast water might be flowing from the surface to the water table.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

Section 8.3.1.2.3.2.2 has been revised. On page 8.3.1.2-427, it is stated that "If determined to be feasible, a packer will be installed at appropriate locations in selected boreholes to enable collection of [water] samples from both the upper and lower parts of the saturated..."
interval..." The text also specifies analyses for selected radioisotopes and specifies sampling and isotope analyses for the upper 10 m of the saturated zone. Based on this response, CDSCP Question 4 is answered.

Section 8.3.1.3.1 Investigation: Studies to provide information on water chemistry within the potential emplacement horizon and along potential flow paths.

Section 8.3.1.3.1.3 Schedules and Milestones

CDSCP QUESTION 5

What information will be obtained through Activity 8.3.1.2.2.2.2?

BASIS

- The second paragraph of this section states that this study is constrained by Activities 8.3.1.2.2.4.2 and 8.3.1.2.2.2.2.
- Activity 8.3.1.2.2.2.2 is not described anywhere in the CDSCP.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

The SCP does not have reference to Activity 8.3.1.2.2.2.2; thus, CDSCP Question 5 has been answered.

Section 8.3.1.3.4.3 Study: Development of sorption models (isotherms)

CDSCP QUESTION 6

How will iso-betas and iso-Kds be used in performance assessment tasks?

BASIS

- The "Description" section of this study states that it may be possible to use empirical sorption coefficients to develop maps with iso-betas (curves of equal sorption heterogeneity) and iso-Kds (curves of equal average sorption behavior) for the Yucca Mountain domain.
- It is stated that these maps will provide a convenient representation of sorption behavior for purposes of the performance assessment tasks of the Information Needs 1.1.3, 1.1.4 and perhaps 1.1.5 (Sections 8.3.5.13.3 through 8.3.5.13.5).
- No further information is presented concerning the use of iso-betas and iso-Kds in either Section 8.3.1.3 or 8.3.5.13.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

In 8.3.1.3.4.1.2 Activity: Sorption as a function of sorbing element concentrations (isotherms) it is stated that "The interpretation of these contours could support the selection and development of strategies to model radionuclide transport by providing basic information on the distribution and variability of sorptive characteristics of each radionuclide throughout and within stratigraphic units" (p. 8.3.1.3–75, 76). This approach allows for flexibility concerning the use of iso-betas and iso-Kds. CDSCP Question 6 is resolved.

Section 8.3.1.3.4.5 Schedule and Milestones (for 8.3.1.3.4 Investigation: Studies to provide the information required on radionuclide retardation by sorption processes along flow paths to the accessible environment)

CDSCP QUESTION 7

Is there an error in the placement of milestones on the figure in this section?

BASIS

- Milestone Z372, Final progress report available on sorption modeling; This report, which completes the study, is placed earlier in time than Milestone R385, Sorption model complete.
- This appears to be an error in logic since it seems that the final report cannot be written (completing this Study) before the completion of the sorption model.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

The error in 8.3.1.3.4.5 Scheduling and Milestones in the CDSCP has been corrected in the SCP. Thus, this question has been answered.

Section 8.3.1.3.5 Investigation: Studies to provide the information required on radionuclide retardation by precipitation processes along flow paths to the accessible environment.

CDSCP QUESTION 8

The term "Eh" is used several times in this section as one of the parameters necessary to determine inclusion in the
modeling activities. What assumptions are used in defining an Eh for model calculations?

**BASIS**

- The use of the parameter Eh implies that an overall potential determining reversible reaction(s) is controlling the oxidation state of all other redox-sensitive species.

- Such a condition is rarely achieved in the laboratory and certainly not in the field (Lindberg and Runnells, 1984, Meyer et al., 1983). The use of oxygen saturated solutions will not define a reversible redox reaction that will define a numerical value of Eh because reactions with oxygen are not generally reversible.

- Groundwater data from Yucca Mountain and vicinity (Kerrisk, 1987) show that various redox couples give different results for Eh values, which also differ from Eh measured in these waters.

**EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE**

The term, Eh is not found in the SCP sections reviewed. CDSCP Question 8 is resolved.

**REFERENCES**


**CDSCP QUESTION 9**

Photoacoustic spectroscopy will be relied upon to determine speciation in experimental groundwaters. Can the development and application of photoacoustic spectroscopy be completed in the time frame indicated on page 8.3.1.3–76 (prior to sinking of the exploratory shaft)? Is it essential to rely on an unproven method for a critical part of the program?

**BASIS**

- On page 8.3.1.3–88 it is stated that the photoacoustic spectroscopy method is in its infancy and that it “is considered critical in interpreting and validating the results of these two studies that will support total system performance assessment.”

- The spectra associated with complex natural groundwaters may be difficult to interpret (e.g., Doxtader et al., 1987).

- Reference spectra of actinides in simple systems will need to be acquired to help interpret spectra of complex groundwaters.

**EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE**

It is stated in 8.3.1.3.5.1.2 Activity: Speciation measurements, that photoacoustic spectroscopy is the most promising technique for obtaining speciation data at low concentrations. CDSCP Question 9 is answered.

**REFERENCE**

significant after 1000–10,000 years. Thus, thorium is considered one of the “important” elements (Section 4.1.3.1.1).

- The tetravalent actinide ions undergo extensive hydrolysis in solutions with near-neutral values of pH, leading to polymers of high molecular weight which can disperse as colloids. These processes have been studied extensively for thorium, largely because of its availability and stability of the (IV) oxidation state (Ahrland, Liljenzin, and Rydberg, 1973). In view of its well known chemical tendency to form high polymers, thorium colloids might provide a means for affecting radionuclide transport.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

Activity 8.3.1.3.5.2.1 has been revised to make the following commitment: “Although only plutonium and americium will be investigated during the initial phase of the study of waste element colloids, work will be extended to other radionuclides if performance assessments of engineered barrier system and other field and laboratory data show that other radionuclides are potentially important in colloid formation.” Based on this commitment, CDSCP Question 10 is answered.

REFERENCE


Section 8.3.1.3.7 Investigation: Studies to provide information required on radionuclide retardation by all processes along flow paths to the accessible environment
8.3.1.3.7.1 Study: Retardation sensitivity analysis
8.3.1.3.7.1.3 Activity: Transport models and related support

CDSCP QUESTION 11

How will the validation of transport and chemical codes be accomplished through this activity?

BASIS

- The goal of this activity is to “...verify and validate computer codes....”
- To comply with the Quality Assurance procedure NNWSI-SOP-03-02: Software Quality Assurance, and NRC requirements, the codes being used under this study must be verified and validated.
- The activity gives no information on code validation.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

The Geochemistry program verification and validation sections 8.3.1.3.7.1.3 and 8.3.1.3.7.2 have been revised to reflect the validation strategy. Thus CDSCP Question 11 has been answered.

Section 8.3.1.4 Rock Characteristics Figure 8.3.1.4−1, p. 8.3.1.4−3; also next to last paragraph on p. 8.3.1.4−16; also Sections 8.3.1.4.2.2.2, 8.3.1.4.2.2.3, and 8.3.1.4.2.2.4

CDSCP QUESTION 12

What are the definitions of the terms fracture “aperture” and “length”?

BASIS

“Aperture” could refer to an equivalent hydraulic aperture, or to a true physical aperture, and is a function of stress. It is less of a purely geometrical property than orientation, distribution, or frequency. “Length” of a two-dimensional feature such as a joint is not a well defined parameter.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

- The DOE has responded to the question and has provided the definitions of the terms fracture “aperture” and “length.”
- The DOE response satisfactorily answers the NRC question. This question is considered resolved.

CDSCP QUESTION 14

Does this program include all drilling or only surface-based drilling?

BASIS

- Only surface-based drillholes are listed in Table 8.3.1.4–2 (pg. 8.3.1.4–19/22).
- Drilling from the ESF is mentioned in Sections 8.3.1.4.2.2.4 (Table, pg. 8.3.1.4–79) and 8.3.1.4.2.2.5 (second paragraph, pg. 8.3.1.4–81).
Appendix A

- Extensive additional drilling from the ESF is planned, according to other sections (e.g., 8.3.1.15, Thermal and Mechanical Properties).

- In the analysis of “Potential impacts of exploratory shaft construction and testing on the waste isolation integrity of the site” (SCP Section 8.4.2.6) only holes already completed are discussed.

- 10 CFR 60.17(a)(2)(iv) requires that the site characterization plan shall contain plans to control any adverse impacts from such site characterization activities that are important to waste isolation.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

- The DOE has clarified that section 8.3.1.4.1 addresses surface-based drilling only. This clarification adequately answers the question.

- The DOE has stated that section 8.3.1.4.1 has been revised to indicate the focus on surface-based drilling.

- The question has been adequately answered and is considered resolved.

REFERENCE

10 CFR 60

Section 8.3.1.4.1.3 Ongoing Integration of the NNWSI Project Drilling

CDSCP QUESTION 15

What are the types and sources of data, and what is the interpretation of geologic and geophysical data used in identifying the limits of the region of investigation around the site? Explain.

BASIS

- On page 8.3.1.4–33 it is stated that “The northern, eastern, and southern limits of a region of investigation around the site are selected primarily on the basis of differences in structural styles inferred from existing geologic and geophysical data.”

- The boundary of the tectonic region/region of investigation is one of the parameters needed in calculating probabilistic seismic hazard. The response to this question will provide valuable information which will be used in the seismic hazard analysis.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

The DOE has revised the SCP and clarified the basis for their identification of the site area boundary to the north, east and south and has referred to the identification on the basis of geologic data, not geophysical data. Therefore this question is considered to be resolved.

Section 8.3.1.4.2.2.3 Activity: Borehole evaluation of faults and fractures, p. 8.3.1.4–72

CDSCP QUESTION 16

How is the roughness coefficient parameter measured in a borehole? What is the difference between roughness coefficient listed here and “roughness” discussed elsewhere in Section 8.3.1.4.2.2.3?

BASIS

On page 8.3.1.4–74 it is stated in Item 4 that roughness cannot be measured in a borehole. Geometric descriptions of fracture geometries are central to developing some joint constitutive relations. Roughness relates to dilation angles and shear displacement required to reduce asperities.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

- The DOE has modified the SCP to differentiate between the terms “roughness” and “roughness coefficient.”

- The DOE has also clarified its objectives for roughness measurements in a borehole which are found to be reasonable.

- This question has been answered satisfactorily and is considered resolved.

Section 8.3.1.4.3 Investigation: Development of three-dimensional models of rock characteristics at the repository site (Also Section 8.3.1.4.3.3), p. 8.3.1.4–87

CDSCP QUESTION 17

What role, if any, will the data presented in Chapter 2 play in the proposed model development and in scoping the amount of planned site specific in situ testing?

BASIS

The list of CDSCP sections given in the lower half of pg. 8.3.1.4–87 does not appear to be complete. This raises concerns about the adequacy of the information transfer.
mechanism proposed on pg. 8.3.1.4-88 (first paragraph of purpose and objectives), and of the information integration itself. As an example, not a single section from Chapter 2, Geoengineering, is included in the list. According to the first paragraph on pg. 8.3.1.4-88 "Contour maps or cross sections will show the spatial distribution of such parameters as rock compressive strength, thermal conductivity,..." Information on these parameters is given in the CDSCP Sections 2.1.2.3.1 and 2.4.2.1, which apparently belong on the list on pg. 8.3.1.4-87.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

- The DOE has revised section 8.3.1.4 of the SCP to reference the data presented in Chapter 2.
- The DOE has stated that the Chapter 2 data will be used for planning future sampling requirements and for preliminary analyses and evaluations.
- The DOE has adequately addressed this question. The question is considered resolved.

Section 8.3.1.5.1.4 Climate

CDSCP QUESTION 18

In addition to regional climate influences on erosion and deposition at the site, how have local variables such as uplift, subsidence, and stream piracy been considered?

BASIS

The climatic model developed for the Yucca Mountain area should correspond/correlate well with regional models of the Great Basin, but, in addition, the model also needs to evaluate local variables in order to provide an understanding of the history of erosion and deposition at the site (Purcell, 1986).

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

The DOE has provided a detailed site specific program to evaluate the influences of tectonics and geomorphic processes on erosion (8.3.1.5, 8.3.1.6, 8.3.1.16, and 8.3.1.17). In light of the addition and clarification of these specific programs, the SCP has addressed Question 18. It is therefore concluded that this question is resolved.

REFERENCE

Purcell, C.R., 1986, Potential erosion at the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste site: Letter report from LLNL to NRC.

Section 8.3.1.6 Erosion

CDSCP QUESTION 19

What is the source for hillslope erosion rates (page 8.3.1.6-7) and attendant uncertainties? Explain.

BASIS

Substantiation of average downwasting rates over the last 1 to 5 million years should be provided.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

The hillslope erosion rates referred to in Section 8.3.1.6 have been cross-referenced to Section 1.1 which includes a discussion of long-term erosion rates for the southern Great Basin with references to support the data. This question is considered to be resolved.

Section 8.3.1.8.3 Investigation: Studies to provide information required on changes in unsaturated and saturated zone hydrology due to tectonic events, p. 8.3.1.8-75

CDSCP QUESTION 21

The CDSCP states that initiating events considered in investigation 8.3.1.8.3 "probably will have no significant impact on repository performance because of the very low rates at which the related tectonic processes operate at Yucca Mountain." What is the basis for this low level of effort with respect to assessment of initiating events?

BASIS

- Significant effects on the groundwater regime have been observed to occur during earthquakes of the size and type anticipated at the proposed Yucca Mountain HLW repository vicinity.
- These effects, which have lasted up to several months in some cases, could possibly adversely affect the capability of the underground facility to limit release of radionuclides.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

The following sentence has been added to Section 8.3.1.8.3 (p. 8.3.1.8-75) of the SCP: "A higher level of effort will be given to those initiating events judged to have a higher probability of affecting repository performance (i.e., faulting and strain effects)." This sentence indicates that the level of effort related to initiating events involving uplift, subsidence and folding will be less than the effort devoted to potentially more significant initiating events involving faulting and strain. This CDSCP question is considered to be resolved.
Section 8.3.1.8.3.1.5 Activity: Assessment of the effects of faulting on the flux rates and Section 8.3.1.8.3.2.6 Activity: Assessment of the effect of faulting on water-table elevation, p. 8.3.1.8-85 and p. 8.3.1.8-93

CDSCP QUESTION 22
What is the basis for considering that significantly large, or significantly cumulative, offsets are those offsets that are greater than two meters?

BASIS
- According to studies by Bonilla and others (1984), a displacement of one meter is the equivalent of a magnitude 7 earthquake in western North America.
- Earthquakes of magnitude 7 may have a significant effect on flux rates and water-table elevation.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE
The response to the CDSCP question correctly points out that the thrust of the particular sections of CDSCP, and equivalent sections of the SCP, is to assess the static effects of fault offsets on flux rates and water-table elevations. The reviewer is referred to other sections of the SCP, namely Sections 8.3.1.8.3.3.2 and 8.3.1.8.3.3.3, where the dynamic effects of faulting are treated. In these sections of the SCP no minimum limits on significant faulting are cited. This CDSCP comment is considered to be resolved.

REFERENCE

CDSCP QUESTION 23
Question 23 of the CDSCP draft point papers was deleted from the CDSCP final point papers.

Section 8.3.1.12.2.1.1 Activity: Site Meteorological Monitoring Program

CDSCP QUESTION 24
Are the location and number of meteorological monitoring sites sufficient for characterization of the wind flow patterns?

BASIS
Five sites were selected to collect meteorological data at potential locations of surface facilities and at a “sufficient number of additional locations deemed necessary to characterize the wind flow patterns in the vicinity of Yucca Mountain.” The accurate characterization of wind patterns under different background directions and atmospheric stability is crucial to the correct prediction of trajectories of radionuclides or other materials.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE
A review of the meteorology program (Investigation 8.3.1.12.1, Studies 8.3.1.12.1.1 and 8.3.1.1.12.1.2) indicates that there will be computerized and on-line meteorological instrumentation that is capable of providing changing wind flow patterns and other relevant meteorological parameters needed for rapid radiation dose assessment every fifteen (15) minutes at five (5) key locations in accordance with EPA standards and NRC regulations and guidance. Five stations placed strategically as planned should be adequate considering that usually only one monitoring station is required of other nuclear facilities, such as a commercial nuclear power plant. Furthermore, the Description section of Study 8.3.1.12.1.2 (p. 8.3.1.12-12) of the SCP has the following commitment; “Some of the monitoring programs involved are ongoing or will be expanded as site characterization proceeds.” Thus CDSCP Question 24 is answered.

CDSCP QUESTION 26
How will the heated block experiment be used for model validation if there are no imposed stress gradients or temperature gradients inside the block?

BASIS
The heated block test is designed to allow application of constant stresses to a large block so that shear may be minimized. However, for model validation, stress and temperature conditions need to exist which may result in shearing of discontinuities.
EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

- The DOE has addressed the application of normal and shear stresses across the joints. In addition, DOE has stated that the effects of temperature gradients will be evaluated in other tests.
- The DOE has adequately addressed this question. The staff considers this question resolved.

Section 8.3.1.15.7.2 Activity: Rock-mass strength
experiment, p. 8.3.1.15-64

CDSCP QUESTION 27

What are the parameters and the strength model for which the strength experiment(s) are designed, and how will a substantial volume of rock be driven to failure?

BASIS

- The term “strength” has not been defined rigorously. It is not clear if it refers to strength of joints in direct shear or some large-scale mass strength as implied by the Hoek-Brown criteria.
- Attempting to load a substantial volume of “randomly” jointed rock to failure by mechanical means would require extremely large loads.
- The definitions of “field scale” joint length (actually, area) and “representative volume” are not given. Shearing a large joint surface in situ could be an extremely difficult test.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

- The DOE has revised the strength experiment to focus on deformation of the rock mass rather than failure. DOE has also removed reference to “representative volume.”
- The staff finds the DOE response to be adequate and thus considers this question resolved.

Section 8.3.1.16.1.1 Site Flood And Debris Hazard Studies

CDSCP QUESTION 28

How will the debris-hazard study approach presented in the CDSCP produce data sufficient to raise confidence regarding the debris flow process from the existing “very low” level of confidence to the needed “high” confidence (Table 8.3.1.16-1)?

BASIS

- Flash floods, and the associated debris flows with some floods, are among the most active geomorphic processes in the southern Nevada region and Yucca Mountain area (Section 3.2.1). Debris flows appear to be most hazardous in small, steep drainages (Campbell, 1975) such as exist just west of the proposed surface facilities at the Yucca Mountain site. Debris flows could be a hazard to the surface facilities. The conceptual design of the repository calls for dikes and diversion channels to convey potential flood water around the surface facilities. These dikes and diversions appear to be sited and sized on preliminary estimates of “clear water” flood flows. Channel slopes west of the surface facility area range from 5% to 25% where debris flows are possible. Material movement initiated upslope from the surface facilities would encounter channel slopes of no more than 1% to 2% around the facilities. These lower slopes could result in deposition. Thus, the potential would appear to be substantial for debris blockage in diversion facilities.
- Site-specific information about debris hazards will mainly be derived from about six fluvial suspended sediment samplers (Activity 8.3.1.2.1.2.1) and qualitative field evaluations during post flood evaluations. This short-term monitoring of the infrequent, poorly understood process of debris flow may not result in a level of understanding sufficient for adequate engineering design.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

In Activity 8.3.1.16.1.1, page 8.3.1.16-11 of the SCP, it is stated

“As part of Activity 8.3.1.2.1.2.2 (transport of debris by severe run-off), field judgments of the nature and severity of debris transport by flood flows will be evaluated to determine the characteristics of debris hazards from flood flows. No standard techniques are available to sample moving coarse-grained debris, which constitutes the major debris hazard, but flood investigators will describe both qualitatively and somewhat quantitatively (by careful field observations) the character of debris that has moved within and through the drainage during severe runoff events. Also, some debris movement characteristics will be deduced through analysis of the debris deposits. Fresh erosion that has resulted from recent flooding will be noted on maps to allow an assessment of potential slope instability. Assembling this type of semiquantitative information will, with time and experience, form the bases for designating the degrees of debris hazards on different types of slopes. Much of the debris hazard assessment is experimental at this time, and more precise
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investigative plans cannot be formalized until experience with debris movement during flooding increases.

After a reasonable amount of experiences and data are gained through field investigations, laboratory experiments would seem to be the next logical step in the study process. However, laboratory efforts are not planned at this time. Scaling problems associated with laboratory models may be insurmountable, and the technology of physical modeling of debris movement is not sufficiently advanced to be a reliable alternative or supplement to the planned activities.”

The staff accepts this discussion as a satisfactory response and CDSCP Question 28 is answered.

Section 8.3.1.17 Preclosure Tectonics

CDSCP QUESTION 29

How will studies of rock varnish dating be integrated with other data for site characterization?

BASIS

- The use of rock varnish dating is not tied to other studies in the CDSCP.

- Rock varnish dating is a viable instrument to aid in determining the age of a surface. However, it should be used in conjunction with various other parameters, such as degree of dissection, desert pavement development, and soil profile development.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

The DOE has identified and discussed the use of rock varnish dating throughout various sections of the SCP including 8.3.1.6, 8.3.1.8, and 8.3.1.17. It is therefore concluded this question is resolved.

CDSCP QUESTION 30

Question 30 of the CDSCP draft point papers was deleted from the CDSCP final point papers.

Reference

Section 8.3.2.2.3  Information Need 1.11.3, Product 1.11.3-4: Drainage and moisture control plan, p. 8.3.2.2-54

CDSCP QUESTION 34

Why is there no link (other than that indicated in Figure 8.3.2.1-1) established between this plan and Issue 1.12—Repository Sealing?

BASIS

The sealing requirements determination relies heavily on controlled water flow, and moisture migration, in combination with (long term) drainage. (SCP Section 8.3.3)

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

- DOE has adequately identified the Sections (SCP Sections 8.3.2.2 and 8.3.3.2) which link the Information need 1.11.3 and Issue 1.12.
- DOE has adequately responded to this question and, therefore, the question is considered resolved.

Section 8.3.2.2.3.4  Design Activity 1.11.3.4 Drainage and moisture control plan, p. 8.3.2.2-56/57

CDSCP QUESTION 35

According to the last sentence of this section, the approach to develop this plan is given in Section 8.3.2.3, and the data requirements for this plan are given in Section 8.3.2.2.1. Both of these referenced sections cover extremely broad topics. What are the relevant items for this section?

BASIS

The drainage and moisture control plan is discussed briefly on pg. 8.3.2.2-37/38, where it is clearly stated that the plan for drainage and moisture control plan is still under development. This section (pg. 8.3.2.2.2-37, last paragraph) also states that “This approach would require the same site data as that used for Information Need 1.11.6” (SCP Section 8.3.2.2.6). While the information from this latter section (Repository thermal loading and predicted thermal and thermomechanical response of the host rock) may indeed provide necessary data, it is not obvious that it would provide sufficient data (e.g., with respect to flow properties in particular).

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

- DOE has adequately identified the Sections (SCP Sections 8.3.2.2.2 and 8.3.3.2) which link the Information need 1.11.3 and Issue 1.12.
- DOE has adequately responded to this question and, therefore, the question is considered resolved.

Section 8.3.2.2.5.1  Design Activity 1.11.5.1: Excavation methods criteria, p. 8.3.2.2-71

CDSCP QUESTION 36

Where in Section 8.3.2.2.1 are the data requirements for this activity discussed?

BASIS

The last sentence in this Section 8.3.2.2.5.1 states that the data requirements for this activity are discussed in Section 8.3.2.2.1. Section 8.3.2.2.1 does list a broad range of rock mass properties, but does not directly address the rock mass response to excavation, e.g., blasting.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

In response to this question, data requirements for excavation method criteria have been identified to be in SCP Table 8.3.2.2-11. The question is considered resolved.

Section 8.3.2.4.1.1  Design activity to verify access and drift usability, p. 8.3.2.4-27/30

CDSCP QUESTION 38

Use of mechanical excavation is considered not feasible in some parts of the document and plausible in other parts. The next to last paragraph on pg. 8.3.2.4-28 mentions the possibility that mechanical excavation may be used. Does this contradict other implications in the CDSCP (e.g. p. 8.3.2.2-70) that mechanical excavation is not feasible?

BASIS

Second paragraph of Product 1.11.5-1 Section on pg. 8.3.2.2-70: “continuous mining has not yet been proved practical for welded tuff.” Within the context of this product section, it appears that mechanical excavation will receive no further consideration.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

- In response to this question, the DOE has revised Section 8.3.2.2.5 of the CDSCP to indicate that...
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mechanical excavation is still being considered feasible, although it has not yet been proven to be practical.

- DOE has removed the inconsistency regarding the feasibility of mechanical excavation techniques. The question is considered resolved.

Section 8.3.2.5 Table 8.3.2.5-4 Preliminary performance allocation for System Element 1.2.1.2, drift construction, p. 8.3.2.5-23

CDSCP QUESTION 39

Why are the requirements for some items on pg. 8.3.2.5-23 different from the requirements for System Element 1.2.1.2 identified in Table 8.3.2.4-2, non-radiological health and safety?

BASIS

- Pg. 8.3.2.4-13 limits air velocities to less than 1,500 ft/min (supply) and less than 2,500 ft/min (return). On the other hand, pg. 8.3.2.5-23 limits air velocities to less than 2,000 ft/min (both supply and return).

- According to pg. 8.3.2.5-23 no site characterization data is required for ventilation routing. However, according to Section 8.3.2.4.1.2, Design activity to verify air quality and ventilation system include wall roughness, in situ moisture, formation gas, dust generation, etc.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

- DOE has adequately revised Tables 8.3.2.4-2 and 8.3.2.5-4 to remove inconsistencies between various sections of the SCP.

- DOE has adequately addressed the NRC question and therefore it is considered resolved.

Section 8.3.2.5 Table 8.3.2.5-5 Preliminary performance allocation for System Element 1.2.1.4, borehole construction, p. 8.3.2.5-24

CDSCP QUESTION 40

What is the justification for the statement on pg. 8.3.2.5-24 that “no site characterization data is required to develop the high level of confidence needed for installation of borehole liners.”

BASIS

Inserting a steel liner in a borehole (in particular, a 350 ft long horizontal hole), will require that the hole not deform excessively. Close tolerances are needed on the straightness of the hole that may be difficult to achieve. Providing assurance that a straight hole can be drilled that will remain stable may involve analyses of mechanical response of the structure (i.e., the hole) using site-specific rock properties and parameters.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

- DOE has responded by revising Table 8.3.2.5-5 to indicate that no additional site characterization data, beyond that already planned, is required for installation of borehole liners.

- DOE has adequately addressed the NRC question and therefore it is considered resolved.

Section 8.3.3.2 Table 8.3.3.2-1 Sealing Components and Associated Functions, Processes, Material Properties, Performance Measures and Goals, pp. 8.3.3.2-8 to 8.3.3.2-11

CDSCP QUESTION 42

Description of items included in Table 8.3.3.2-1 need further clarification in several areas. Why have not all the seal components been included in the list?

BASIS

- The list of sealing components seems to be incomplete and inconsistent with the description in the CDSCP text. For example, the list does not include the following:

  In shaft and ramp sealing components—ramp flow where ramp drainage is relied on, ES-1 base rock (Calico Hills) which is the present design in the CDSCP, and drift and room floors where drainage is relied on.

  In Underground facility sealing components—fault seals.

  In exploratory borehole sealing components—borehole seals above repository horizon to control gaseous radionuclide release and to minimize water flow into repository.

- Many “functions” (in step B of the Table 8.3.3.2-1) for certain components are not listed. For example, no air flow control function is assigned to either the anchor-to-bedrock plug/seal or the station plugs.
Many important "material properties" (in step C of the Table 8.3.2-1) for certain components are not listed. For example, the anchor-to-bedrock plug/seal must have strength degradation parameters and the general fill must have some porosity.

**EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE**

- In response to this question, the SCP has been satisfactorily modified in Section 8.3.3.2 to address the points raised in this question.
- Because the SCP has been adequately revised in response to various points, the question is considered resolved.

**CDSCP QUESTION 45**

The experimental approach for each possible degradation mode to be tested should be designed and evaluated prior to testing. How will "more severe" environments be identified and proven to be "more severe" for a given failure mode?

**BASIS**

- Since the design of an experiment can influence the outcome, each experiment should be thoroughly evaluated as to its appropriateness for testing a possible failure mode or for yielding information for use in a given model.
- Various investigators will disagree as to the value of experimental designs, and their differences need to be considered and then resolved or accommodated.
- The relative severities of environments can be difficult to evaluate and quantify. Proving that a given environment is "more severe" may become difficult.

**EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE**

In response to this question, the DOE has added text to Sections 8.3.5.9.2.3.2 and 8.3.5.9.2.3.9. Laboratory Test Plan for Austenitic Materials

**CDSCP QUESTION 48**

There are many apparent inconsistencies in the write-up of the proposed activities presented in this section when compared with the details given in other sections of the CDSCP and reference documents. What are the impacts of such inconsistencies?

**BASIS**

A few examples of inconsistencies are as follows:

- CDSCP page 8.4-58, last paragraph states that "averaged (matrix) percolation flux (will) not exceed 0.5 mm/yr," while Fernandez et al. (Ref. 1), bases sealing requirement calculations on an average matrix inflow magnitude of 0.1 mm/yr (e.g., Fernandez et al., 1987, pg. 2-10; pg. 4-5). The draft EA used an influx of 1 mm/yr, and that value was considered to be potentially too low by the NRC staff (NRC 1985, pg. 5; Comment 3-11, pg 10-11; Comment 6-43, 6-45, pg. 61-63).
- CDSCP page 8.4-61, first paragraph states that "Fernandez et al., (1987) also described methods to remove the liner." The said description of the methods to remove the liner cannot be found in the referenced document.
- CDSCP page 8.4-73, second paragraph, 4th sentence states that "Analyses presented in Fernandez et al., (1987) indicate that these precipitates will be deposited very near to the point of their nucleation so that these effects will be very localized." It is not clear where in Fernandez et al., (1987) the analyses of precipitates showing only very localized effects are given.
- CDSCP Section 8.4.2.5.1; Activity: Heated Room Experiment, pg. 8.4-50, second sentence states that "Either a preexisting drift will be used or a drift will be constructed specifically for this experiment." Figure 8.4-11 suggests that the heated room test is planned to be conducted in the central drift of the sequential drift mining test.
- CDSCP Section 8.4.2.5.1; Activity: Excavation effects test in the ESF, pg. 8.4-53, first sentence states that "six vertical, small diameter holes will be drilled parallel to the unexcavated shaft wall." The referenced Section 8.3.1.2.2.4.5 (pg. 8.3.1.2-226) indicates that 18 vertical and 9 inclined holes will be drilled.
- CDSCP Section 8.4.2.6.1, potential impacts on the pre-waste-emplacement ground-water travel time
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postclosure performance objective, pg. 8.4-66, continuing paragraph states that "...activities described in Section 8.3.5.12.5 will justify a definition for the disturbed zone as a boundary 10 m or less below any underground opening...." Description in Section 8.3.5.12.5 does not seem to justify the stated definition for the disturbed zone. Page 8.3.5.12-62, 3rd paragraph states that "...The NNWSI Project believes that the distance to a contour of minimal changes in permeability is more likely to be two to three diameters...." This would result (page 8.3.5.12-61, last paragraph) in a disturbed zone to some 14 m to 24 m below the lowest opening.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

This question is considered resolved because the DOE has rewritten section 8.4 in its entirety and the discrepancies identified in the question are no longer applicable.

REFERENCES


NRC, 1985, NRC Comments on DOE Draft Environmental Assessment for the Yucca Mountain site, March 20.

Section 8.3.1.4.3.1.1 Activity: Systematic Drilling Program, pp. 8.3.1.4–89 to 8.3.1.4–95

CDSCP QUESTION 50

It is difficult to tell from various depictions in the CDSCP what are the actual boundaries of the area that may be involved in repository development and that therefore may need to be characterized intensively. What are these actual boundaries?

BASIS

Figure 6–88 presents an outline of the "revised usable portion of the primary area and expansion areas." Figure 8.3.1.4–2, Figure 1–71, and others depict the "repository perimeter drift." The outlines of the figures do not appear to be the same.

EVALUATION OF DOE RESPONSE

In response to this question, it has been clarified that the current conceptual perimeter boundary (CPDB) is shown in SCP Section 8.4.2.2, in Figures 8.4.2–1a and 8.4.2–2a. The question is considered resolved.
**Title and Subtitle:**
NRC Staff Site Characterization Analysis of the Department of Energy's Site Characterization Plan, Yucca Mountain Site, Nevada

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**Abstract:**
This Site Characterization Analysis (SCA) documents the NRC staff's concerns resulting from its review of the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) Site Characterization Plan (SCP) for the Yucca Mountain site in southern Nevada, which is the candidate site selected for characterization as the nation's first geologic repository for high-level radioactive waste. DOE's SCP explains how DOE plans to obtain the information necessary to determine the suitability of the Yucca Mountain site for a repository. NRC's specific objections related to the SCP, and major comments and recommendations on the various parts of DOE's program, are presented in SCA Section 2, Director's Comments and Recommendations. Section 3 contains summaries of the NRC staff's concerns for each specific program, and Section 4 contains NRC staff point papers which set forth in greater detail particular staff concerns regarding DOE's program. Appendix A presents NRC staff evaluations of those NRC staff Consultation Draft SCP concerns that NRC considers resolved on the basis of the SCP. This SCA fulfills NRC's responsibilities with respect to DOE's SCP as specified by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and 10 CFR 60.18.

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