Analysis of insider threats against computerized nuclear materials accountability applications

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DOE Order 5633.3B requires that nuclear material accountability (MA) systems provide for (1) tracking material inventories, (2) documenting material transactions, (3) issuing periodic reports, and (4) assisting in the detection of- unauthorized system access, data falsification, and material gains or losses. Insider threats against the MA system represent the potential to degrade the integrity with which these requirements are addressed (e.g., altering data to misrepresent the quantity or location of nuclear material). In this paper, we describe a methodology for evaluating potential insider threats against both current and future (e.g., client-server network) MA software applications. The methodology comprises a detail ... continued below

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6 p.

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Jones, E. & Sicherman, A. July 1, 1995.

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Description

DOE Order 5633.3B requires that nuclear material accountability (MA) systems provide for (1) tracking material inventories, (2) documenting material transactions, (3) issuing periodic reports, and (4) assisting in the detection of- unauthorized system access, data falsification, and material gains or losses. Insider threats against the MA system represent the potential to degrade the integrity with which these requirements are addressed (e.g., altering data to misrepresent the quantity or location of nuclear material). In this paper, we describe a methodology for evaluating potential insider threats against both current and future (e.g., client-server network) MA software applications. The methodology comprises a detail yet practical taxonomy for characterizing various types of MA system/software applications and their implementation options. This taxonomy facilitates the systematic collection and organization of key information that helps spotlight such things as stag of information flow, transaction procedures, or auditing procedures potentially susceptible to inside falsification. Methodology benefits include helping MA managers and policy makers: (1) examine proposed software designs or modifications with respect to how they might reduce or increase exposure to insider threats; and (2) better understand safeguards cost (e.g., operational hindrances) and benefit (resistance to falsification) tradeoffs of different system/software alternatives.

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6 p.

Notes

OSTI as DE95016053

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  • 36. annual meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management, Palm Desert, CA (United States), 9-12 Jul 1995

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  • Other: DE95016053
  • Report No.: UCRL-JC--121005
  • Report No.: CONF-950787--29
  • Grant Number: W-7405-ENG-48
  • Office of Scientific & Technical Information Report Number: 102518
  • Archival Resource Key: ark:/67531/metadc618951

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Office of Scientific & Technical Information Technical Reports

Reports, articles and other documents harvested from the Office of Scientific and Technical Information.

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  • July 1, 1995

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  • June 16, 2015, 7:43 a.m.

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  • Feb. 18, 2016, 11:39 a.m.

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Jones, E. & Sicherman, A. Analysis of insider threats against computerized nuclear materials accountability applications, article, July 1, 1995; California. (digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc618951/: accessed November 21, 2017), University of North Texas Libraries, Digital Library, digital.library.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.