TOWARD A FRAMEWORK FOR A NEW PHILOSOPHY OF MUSIC EDUCATION: 
LØGSTRUP AS SYNERGY BETWEEN THE PLATONIC AND ARISTOTELIAN 
PERSPECTIVES IN THE MUSIC EDUCATION PHILOSOPHIES OF 
BENNETT REIMER AND DAVID ELLIOTT

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In the domain of music education philosophy there are, at present, two foundational systems that purport to be self-contained philosophies of music education. These are music education as aesthetic education, often referred to as MEAE, espoused by Bennett Reimer, and the praxial philosophy of music education posited by David Elliott. The debate between these two philosophies has been contentious and has had the effect of fracturing the philosophical underpinning of the music profession in an irreconcilable way. It is the purpose of this dissertation to introduce a third voice, that of the Danish philosopher Knut Løgstrup, to serve as a synergy between the philosophies of Reimer and Elliott and lead toward a framework of thinking for music education philosophy. I assert that the philosophies of Reimer and Elliott represent a modern articulation of an ancient dialectic between Platonic and Aristotelian ideals. Thus, the Reimer philosophy has its foundation in Platonic thought and Elliott has embraced an Aristotelian philosophical perspective. Løgstrup’s position provides a third fundamental viewpoint that includes both Platonic and Aristotelian thinking and can therefore provide a synergy for these two music education philosophies. He refers to his philosophy as an *ontological ethics*. As a methodological approach, I utilize a metaphilosophical analysis in which I examine the Platonic tendencies of Reimer and the Aristotelian foundation of Elliott by examining both the content and the methodology of their prospective philosophies. I then make an application of Løgstrup’s philosophical system, which is an ethical system, to music education philosophy and bring the most important aspects of Reimer’s and Elliott’s philosophies into a synergy using Løgstrup’s ideas.
To Cecil and Gwen Wheeler

and

Nathan and Jonathan
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Philosophy of Music Education: Rationalism Verses Empiricism

Philosophy has been defined as “the most fundamental and general concepts and principles involved in thought, action, and reality.”\(^1\) Kivy suggests that various domains of study such as science, art and music may “become ‘eligible’…for philosophy…when it becomes a way of life; when it cuts so deeply into our natures as human beings that we are impelled to explore its innermost workings.”\(^2\) Scholars in the area of music education have, since the 1950s, been exploring and developing an approach to a philosophy of music education. While several modern scholars\(^3\) have added greatly to our philosophical understanding of music teaching and learning, there are two main foundational systems which purport to be self-contained philosophies of music education. These are music education as aesthetic education, often referred to as MEAE, espoused by Bennett Reimer,\(^4\) and the praxial philosophy of music education posited by David Elliott.\(^5\) Because both Reimer and Elliott view their respective philosophies as complete and self-contained, music educators have had to debate the veracity of each philosophy as independent from one another, thus unwittingly fracturing the philosophical underpinning of our profession in an irreconcilable way.\(^6\) It is the purpose of this dissertation to

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3 See Philip Alperson, Wayne Bowman, Estelle Jorgensen, Peter Kivy, and Abraham Schwadron.
introduce a third voice, that of Danish philosopher Knud Løgstrup, that will serve as a mitigating factor, or synergy, between the philosophies of Reimer and Elliott, therefore leading toward a framework of thinking for a new music education philosophy.

As a point of departure for this dissertation, I will establish the root causes of the debate by asserting that the philosophies of Reimer and Elliott represent a modern articulation of an ancient dialectic between Platonic and Aristotelian ideals. I will argue that Reimer’s MEAE has its foundation in Platonic thought and that Elliott has embraced an Aristotelian philosophical prospective for his praxial music education. Løgstrup’s position will provide a third fundamental viewpoint that includes both Platonic and Aristotelian thinking. Because Løgstrup is unknown in the field of music education, I will provide a brief background of his philosophical roots. Additional discussion will take place later in this chapter and in Chapter 2, with a complete analysis provided in Chapter 5.

The inspiration for Løgstrup’s philosophy is the proclamation of the historic Jesus of Nazareth. This religious edict, “Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself,” is found in Leviticus in the Old Testament and throughout the New Testament of the Bible. Løgstrup asserts that this admonition may be viewed in “strictly human terms.” That is, the sacred proclamation that grounds his philosophy has secular philosophical application as a universal concept rather than as a strictly religious notion. Løgstrup is suggesting that the idea contained in the edict attributed to the historic Christ is a manifestation of ontological or inborn human imperatives.

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7 Løgstrup, *The Ethical Demand*, 1-5.
9 Løgstrup, *The Ethical Demand*, 1.
10 Ibid., 1-5.
He refers to his philosophy as an “ontological ethics.” Birkelund articulates Løgstrup’s idea in this way:

The good actions one undertakes are determined very much more by the ontological prerequisites with which people are born than by insights about goodness or rehearsed deeds resulting from reason.”

This idea is based on a phenomenological analysis of the relationship between humans as we interact in social settings rather than Platonic rationalism or Aristotelian empiricism. Løgstrup is arguing that this proclamation of the historic Jesus suggests a deep fundamental truth about our relationships as humans. He uses the metaphor of the “hand” and suggests that when we confront another person in any setting, we in some basic way hold that person’s life in our hands. From the notions of this philosophy, I believe implications for the use of ontological ethics as a framework for a music teaching philosophy may emerge. I also believe that several of the ideas contained in Løgstrup’s philosophy will be useful in the incorporation of some of the tenets of MEAE and praxial music education philosophies that may help guide notions of teaching and learning music. The implications of this coherentist construction will center on the recognition of an ethical relationship between music teacher and music student.

Method

As an analytical tool, I will employ the concept of metaphilosophic analysis with an eye toward Reimer’s and Elliott’s methodology and epistemological frameworks. According to Mautner:

**References**

The term *meta-* is a Greek word element, meaning *beyond or above*. In twentieth-century philosophy this prefix signifies ‘aboutness’ and is used to form new terms which signify a discourse, theory or field of inquiry one level above its object, which is also a discourse, theory or field of inquiry. Accordingly, *metaethics* is the analysis of moral concepts and arguments, metamathematics is the theory of mathematical concepts and proofs, etc.\(^{15}\)

Moser suggests that metaphilosophy is “the theory of the nature of philosophy, especially its goals, methods and fundamental assumptions.”\(^{16}\) Double asserts that metaphilosophy as an analysis methodology is well-suited for situations where two philosophers reach a point “where neither can budge the other for any reason.”\(^{17}\) In these cases, Double suggests that metaphilosophy provides additional resources for mediating these types of conflicts.\(^{18}\) Utilizing a metaphilosophical analysis to examine the philosophies of Reimer and Elliott may illuminate the root causes of this ongoing debate.

My metaphilosophical approach will examine two interrelated aspects of Reimer’s and Elliott’s philosophies. First, I will examine the epistemologies or their respective structures of knowledge. Put another way, what types of ideas do they utilize in the foundation and structure of their philosophies? Second, I will examine the methods that Reimer and Elliott undertake to construct their philosophies. To use a rather coarse analogy, I will approach these two philosophies as though they were buildings and I, the building inspector. On the one hand, I will examine the materials of the structure, the bricks and mortar of these philosophical constructions. On the other hand, I will examine the methods of construction to ascertain how these materials were put together. The nature of this analysis will be to recast and reduce their philosophies with the intention of understanding both at a foundational level. Blackburn illuminates the nature of analysis in this way:

\(^{15}\) *A Dictionary of Philosophy*, s.v. “Meta-,” by Thomas Mautner.


\(^{18}\) Ibid., 33.
Analysis, as philosophers aim at it, attempts to say what makes true some mysterious kinds of statement, using terms from some less mysterious class…. Philosophers also talk of a reduction of statements of one kind to those of another. Analyses provide the reductions. Analysis tells us what is meant by statements made in one form of words, in terms of statements made in other words.19

Clearly, these two philosophies are not physical buildings, and at times epistemology and methodology may be intertwined. This notion of analysis is meant to serve as a tool as this philosophical study unfolds. In keeping with this analysis methodology, I will identify specific examples from both philosophies, but my intention will be to capture the general philosophical grounding or method of each approach. I will situate the music education philosophy of Reimer as heavily contingent on a rationalist framework often associated with Platonic thought. Conversely, I will show the philosophy of Elliott as based in empirical thought often associated with Aristotelian philosophic ideas. By linking rationalism to Reimer and empiricism to Elliott, I will answer why such philosophical polarity exists and illuminate the issues surrounding the ongoing debate.

Reimer as Rationalist and Elliott as Empiricist

Rationalism is the philosophical notion that we gain knowledge of a given subject through abstract ideas rather than by experience. For Reimer, the notion that music education philosophy must be reasoned from the idea of the nature and value of music situates his philosophy in a rationalist framework. Reimer states:

I began by stating the fundamental premise on which my philosophy was based: that the nature and value of music education are determined primarily by the nature and value of music. To the degree that music educators are able to construct a convincing explanation of what music is like…the profession will understand the domain to which it is devoted and be able to implement programs that effectively share its special values.20

Reimer is asserting that the idea of “the nature and value of music” will serve as the foundation for his philosophy rather than any experience of music or music making.

Elliott gives two premises of his philosophy. “The first is that the nature of music education depends on the nature of music. The second is that the significance of music education depends on the significance of music in human life.”\(^{21}\) Note that the first premise is the same as Reimer’s foundation for MEAE. Elliott’s second premise, however, situates the foundation of his philosophy in terms of human experience.\(^{22}\) This second premise leads him to the concept of *praxis*, which is a central tenet of his philosophy. He identifies the source and usage of the term praxis from the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle.\(^{23}\) He states:

> Praxis connotes action that is embedded in, responsive to, and reflective of a specific context of effort. By calling this a praxial philosophy I intend to highlight the importance it places on a particular form of action that is purposeful and situated and, therefore, revealing of one’s self and one’s relationship with others in a community.\(^{24}\)

We see here that Elliott’s philosophical framework is based on the idea of the nature and value of music coupled with the experience of music making in a cultural context.

**Two Philosophies in Opposition**

One might make the argument that having two opposing philosophies creates a healthy cognitive dissonance and maintains stimulating professional dialogue. However, I contend that neither MEAE nor praxial philosophy as a stand alone system will ultimately prove to be the best to support music teaching and learning. I propose that a new framework of thinking

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\(^{22}\) For an interpretation of Elliott’s second premise as founded in human experience, see pages 44-45 of *Music Matters*.
\(^{24}\) Ibid.
incorporating aspects of both Reimer’s and Elliott’s philosophies will be needed to advance philosophical thinking in music education. There are three reasons why I believe this:

1. Reimer’s and Elliott’s philosophies represent modern articulations of ancient Hellenic philosophies at extreme points on the epistemological continuum.

As stated above, I believe that Reimer represents a Platonic articulation in his methodology and approach. Elliott has responded to Reimer’s Platonic philosophy with his own philosophy which is explicitly Aristotelian.25 The fact that these philosophies are tied to an ancient dialectic does not, in itself, disqualify them as a useful foundation on which to base music teaching practices. What is counter-productive, however, is engaging in an intractable argument with this ancient dialectic at the center of the controversy. The contemporary philosopher Alfred North Whitehead has famously opined that “the safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato.”26 More recently, the Italian writer and philosopher Umberto Ecco offers a broader definition when he states that “all latter-day philosophy is a mere footnote to Aristotle’s and Plato’s thinking.”27 Robinson and Groves suggest that philosophers since Plato and Aristotle have had two tendencies:

Platonic tendencies – seeking hidden and ultimate mystical truths though the use of reason, or Aristotelian ones – because they are methodical, cautious, and rely only on what their five senses tell them.28

I assert that the underlying philosophical methodologies of Plato and Aristotle represent archetypes of thinking in western culture. Bowman supports this assertion when he suggests that “Aristotle and Plato represent two strikingly different temperaments, so different that it is

25 For an analysis of the Platonic foundation of Reimer’s philosophy and the Aristotelian foundation of Elliott’s see Chapters 3 and 4, respectively.
sometimes said that everyone is born either a Platonist or an Aristotelian.”29 What I will argue in the following chapters is that Reimer and Elliott have constructed philosophies that are at extreme points on the continuum of the Platonic and Aristotelian epistemological spectrum. To engage in a debate over which philosophy best supports the practice for music teaching and learning is futile, as both methodologies on which these philosophies are based are integral to the intellectual landscape of western thought. To utilize a colloquial phrase as an analogy, methodologically speaking, these philosophies are two sides of the same coin.

For the purposes of this argument, I will refer to these ideas as dialectic and will define dialectic as two ideas which, though in apparent opposition, are interdependent or have a symbiotic relationship. I assert that the methods of Plato and Aristotle exist in dynamic stasis. By contrast, I will define dichotomy as two ideas that are opposites but are not interdependent or viewed as contradictory without connection. Thus, the Platonic and Aristotelian methodologies are dialectic rather than dichotomous.30 Jorgensen articulates this argument through a different, though related, concept regarding the dialectic between theory and practice. She writes:

Dialectic tension creates problems in the relationship between theory and practice, as both retain their separateness, impact undeniably on the other, yet are integrally interrelated.31

Thus, Reimer and Elliott have captured extreme positions between the rationalist and empiricist epistemology and methodology. As these positions represent archetypes of western

30 See Simon Blackburn, “dialectic” The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy [database on-line] (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, accessed 2 April 2006); available from http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html, See also See Anthony Grayling, “dichotomy” The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy [database on-line] (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, accessed 2 April 2006); available from http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html. Dialectic is from the Greek dialektike meaning the art of conversation or debate. This term has been given several meanings and been used by philosophers from antiquity to the modern age. As I am describing the Platonic ideal and the Aristotelian ideal as related archetypes of thinking, I am using the term dialectic to indicate this relationship. The term dichotomy suggests mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive subclasses. It is my contention that Platonic and Aristotelian methodology, and by extension Reimer’s and Elliott’s philosophy, represents a dialectic rather than a dichotomy.
thinking, music education philosophy as a domain is paralyzed by this debate. Recognizing this and suggesting a third position may help move the debate forward away from this dialectic of Platonic and Aristotelian thinking.

2. Both Reimer’s and Elliott’s philosophies are constructed as closed, foundational systems. Elliott’s arguments as expressed in *Music Matters* exclude any concept of the aesthetic in music. Reimer, while his tone is more conciliatory in his *Philosophy of Music Education: Advancing the Vision*, is still very critical of Elliott’s philosophical position. A reading of Reimer’s curricular applications of his philosophy allays any sense of compromise that may have been felt during the reading of earlier chapters of his book. Both of these philosophers have constructed foundational philosophies and closed systems that purport to be complete and self-contained systems of teaching music.

A notion articulated by Thagard and Beam may help clarify my assertion that these philosophies are closed, foundational systems. They write:

> Epistemological theories can be classified as either foundational or coherentist. Foundational theories attempt to ground knowledge in a solid base such as sense experience (empiricism) or a priori reasoning (rationalism). In contrast, coherentists argue that there are no foundations for our beliefs, whose justification derives from how well they fit together with each other.

Both Reimer and Elliott have attempted to construct foundational philosophical systems designed to provide practitioners with not only a philosophical foundation, but also a complete idea of how a curriculum based in their respective systems should appear. In this way we may view both philosophies as closed systems that are foundational in nature.

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33 See Reimer’s *A Philosophy of Music Education 3rd edition* chapters 8 and 9. The curricular application of his philosophy leaves little doubt as to the exclusion of Elliott’s praxial based philosophy.
34 Paul Thagard and Craig Beam, “Epistemological Metaphors”
Blackburn notes the difference in foundational and coherent structures for philosophies. He states:

A rather different response shrugs off the need for any kind of foundation…This approach goes back to emphasizing instead the coherent structure of our everyday system of beliefs: the way they hang together…[A]n interesting feature of coherent structures…[is] that they do not need foundations. A ship or a web may be made up of a tissue of interconnections. It does not need a ‘base’ or a ‘starting point’ or a ‘foundation.’ A structure of this kind can have each bit supported without there being any bit that supports all the others without supports itself.36

In utilizing Løgstrup’s philosophy as a new framework and incorporating aspects of both Reimer’s and Elliott’s philosophy into this new framework, I will use a coherent ideal to create a new framework of thinking about the philosophy of music education.

3. Reimer’s and Elliott’s philosophies are both based on the idea of the nature and value of music.

As stated above, both philosophies have as a foundational premise that music education depends on the nature and value of music. I believe there is a more important philosophical ideal that is not well-developed in either Reimer’s or Elliott’s philosophies: that of the nature of the relationships among the participants in the music classroom. Put more directly, the nature of the relationship between student and teacher is an important and neglected aspect of many of the existing philosophies of music teaching and learning. This notion is well articulated by Bates:

Interestingly, both Reimer and Elliott seem to view the development of a philosophy metaphorically as the construction of a building; a philosophy relies upon its starting point, its foundation, for strength and integrity and once the foundation has been constructed all subsequent decisions and directions are shaped according to that initial structure….Although both Reimer and Elliott provide valuable insights regarding musical experience, I feel that this approach of basing practice in music education upon a definition for music ought to be re-considered due to some of its ethical and social implications.37

36 Simon Blackburn, *Think: A Compelling Introduction to philosophy*, 44.
The Debate in the Field

In his review of Elliott’s *Music Matters*, Reimer notes that the publication of a new philosophy of music is an important and interesting event in the history of music education scholarship, “because it brings to an end a very long period during which only one book [Reimer’s] entirely devoted to…a philosophical viewpoint on music education… was widely recognized to exist.”38 He suggests that “it is safe to say that the long drought in philosophical scholarship is now over.”39 This prophetic notion has been realized in the decade following the publication of *Music Matters*.40 While I will address the impact of the Reimer and Elliott debate in Chapter 2, I will make the argument here that the debate has stimulated much writing and discussion. Many of the scholars who have addressed the issue have attempted to incorporate both philosophical systems into a framework of thinking about the philosophy of music teaching.41 There seems to be a need to bring these two oppositional philosophies to a middle ground. Based on the published scholarship of thinkers of the field, I argue that these two philosophical systems are recognized to exist in opposition and that there is a perceived need to find a synergy between the MEAE and praxial philosophy. The incorporation of aspects of


39 Ibid.

40 See Chapter 2 for references of specific work of scholars that have attempted to address Reimer and Elliott as philosophies in opposition.

Reimer’s and Elliott’s philosophy into a new framework of thinking about teaching and learning is the goal of this dissertation.

Toward a New Framework

Another philosophical domain that supports an active profession has recognized the ancient dialectic between Platonic and Aristotelian thought and has begun a dialogue regarding how best to train students in the field. That domain is the philosophy of nursing.42 Nursing education philosophers have questioned if student nurses should be taught the correct ideas and concepts in a Platonic manner or if their students should be taught to practice the best actions in an Aristotelian way. Those who favor the Platonic method believe that teaching the correct concepts will result in the right actions, and those who espouse the Aristotelian framework believe that instruction in the right actions will lead to the correct ideas.43 Scholars in the domain of nursing philosophy,44 in an attempt to articulate a middle position between these two opposites, have engaged the ideas of a Danish philosopher, Kund Ejler Løgstrup.45 These

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42 This debate has been most prevalent in the Scandinavian countries. See citation 44 below for a list of nursing scholars who have been engaged in scholarship that utilizes the ethical ideas of Løgstrup.
43 This notion is most clearly expounded in Reger Birkelund, “Ethics and Education,” Nursing Ethics, 7 (2000): 473-480.
45 Knud Løgstrup, The Ethical Demand (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997)
nursing scholars espouse a phenomenological approach to critical care which emphasizes the relationship of nurse and patient rather than concepts or practices. While Løgstrup is influenced by Hellenic philosophy, he criticizes both Plato’s and Aristotle’s concepts of ethics, which he feels are too heavily dependent on reason.

The idea of ontological ethics is manifested in several ideas that Løgstrup refers to as life manifestations. These life manifestations include trust, sympathy, and openness of speech which are part of our human make-up. Birkelund asserts that for Løgstrup “these phenomena of life are more fundamental for human beings than their opposites: lack of trust, hardheartedness, emotional coldness, lying and pretence.” Løgstrup is not suggesting that people cannot lie or betray one another’s trust. Rather, he is suggesting that lying or betrayal goes against our natural inclination. While I will outline Løgstrup’s philosophy in greater depth below, one example may serve to illuminate his position. Dees in the introduction to Løgstrup’s *Metaphysics Volume I* asserts:

> To the extent a lie detector is an effective apparatus, it is presumed that human beings have an automatic tendency to tell the truth. In order to lie, they must overcome something, which has the physiological effect that, in turn, will be registered by the machine.

Løgstrup is not asserting that these life manifestations of trust, mercy and openness of speech cannot be overridden by an act of will. His philosophy, however, acknowledges that there is something in the human psyche that must be overridden in order for humans to ignore these ontological imperatives.

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47 Ibid.
48 Birkelund, “Ethics and Education 478
Løgstrup’s ideas of education associated with his philosophy are termed ‘education for life.’ This means that the ultimate goal of education is to “promote the ontological opportunities that exist as the basis for communal life.” Birkelund elaborates:

In holding this view, Løgstrup expresses his criticism of the predominating scientific view of education. In his opinion, good social opportunities cannot be supported by scientific education; what are really advantageous are aesthetic impressions. In this way he connects aesthetics in the sense of sensual impressions with ethics. In Løgstrup’s sense of the word, aesthetics gives people the energy that ethics lives on…

Utilizing Løgstrup’s ideas, I will examine implications of a coherentist philosophical position that might be termed a framework for an ethics of teaching and from these notions suggest a possible synergistic position between the ideas of Reimer and Elliott.

It should be noted that, like Løgstrup in his general philosophy, I am suggesting a framework of thinking about music education philosophy that is secular in nature. This is not, then, a religious dissertation. Although the notion of an ethics of teaching may be utilized in the final framework, the overall tenor of this study is one of a secular nature.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is to create a new framework for music education philosophy by suggesting a synergy between the foundational music education philosophies of Reimer and Elliott using the writings of the contemporary Danish philosopher K. E. Løgstrup. To accomplish this I will illuminate the polarity between Reimer and Elliott by demonstrating the Platonic foundations of Reimer and the Aristotelian foundations of Elliott. I will then examine the philosophy of Løgstrup, which is an ethical philosophy rather than an epistemological

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50 Birkelund, “Ethics and Education,” 478
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid., 1.
system. It has as a foundation an ontological understanding of ethics and utilizes a
phenomenological perspective in the analysis of human relationships. This implies that the
nature of the relationships between the participants in the music classroom is an under
represented element in both the philosophies of Reimer and Elliott. I assert that Løgstup’s ideas
concerning ethics and aesthetics will help incorporate the MEAE philosophy into a philosophical
synergy and that Løgstrup’s idea of the school of life will aid in incorporating the ideas of
Elliott’s praxial philosophy. This is in keeping with the nature of a coherentist system in which
one incorporates useful ideas and constructs from several philosophical systems to meet the
challenges of a specific contextualizing situation.

Assumptions

A main assumption that underlies this study is the importance of a clear and useful
philosophy of music education to the working music teaching professional. While there may be
strong disagreement in the field regarding which philosophical system should predominate, there
is general agreement as to why having a philosophical foundation is important for effective music
teaching. Leonhard articulates this need for philosophical support of music education:

When we speak of a philosophy of music education, we refer to a system of basic beliefs
which underlie and provide a basis for the operation of the musical enterprise in the
educational setting.54

Schwandron and Jorgensen make the argument that all music teachers should be philosophers.55
Jorgensen argues:

54 Charles Leonhard, “The Philosophy of Music Education-Present and Future,“ in Comprehensive
Educators’ National Conference, 1965), 42.
55 See Abraham Schwandron, “Philosophy and the Teacher of Music,“ College Music Symposium 17
(1977) : 74-81. see also Estelle Jorgensen, “Philosophy and the Music Teacher: Challenging the Way We Think,”
There are several reasons why every music teacher should be a philosopher. In essence, these reasons amount to expressions of the principle that education is primarily a philosophical endeavor and that all our objectives, methods, and organizational structures must be philosophically defensible.\(^{56}\)

Elliott states:

In this sense, philosophy refers to a grounding network of beliefs about this or that which people may find enlightening or inspiring. Music educations customary use of the term follows this tradition: ‘philosophy – some underlying set of beliefs about the nature and value of one’s field.’\(^{57}\)

Elliott notes that Reimer makes a similar argument in his text and that several earlier scholars concur with this argument for a philosophy to support music teaching and learning.\(^{58}\) This agreement for a philosophical support of music teaching by many scholars over the years may be the reason that Elliott refers to this definition as “customary” to a philosophical tradition.\(^{59}\)

This study assumes that an explicitly understood and robust philosophical idea will be more useful and provide a better guide for the day-to-day work in the music classroom than a philosophy that is understood in a vague and non-specific way. Bowman concurs with this notion when he suggests that “philosophy works to render the implicit explicit, with the ultimate intent of enriching both understanding and perception.”\(^{60}\)

The philosophical work of Løgstrup is viable, thus the implications of that philosophy to the music classroom will already have currency in the market place of ideas. It is assumed that many music teachers of different teaching assignments, backgrounds, and experience levels upon reading these ideas, will feel that they intuitively understand the philosophy and that they are already engaging many of the ideas contained herein in their every day interaction with students.

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\(^{60}\) Wayne Bowman, *Philosophical Perspectives on Music*, 5.
This should not be viewed as a weakness of the study. Rather, it points to the inherent truth contained in Løgstrup’s philosophical system. As noted above, Bowman asserts that the main purpose of philosophy is to make the implicit explicit. With that idea in mind, this study will tie into currents of thought that are already influencing music teachers specifically and the educational system in general, making those implicit thoughts and practices explicit.

Finally, Løgstrup asserts that the religious ideas contained in his philosophy have secular philosophical application as universally human ideas rather than religious ideas only. While he is using a proclamation attributed to the historic Jesus of Nazareth as a basis for his ontological ethical system, he attempts to limit the use of this proclamation to universally human terms. For Løgstrup, “there is not Christian morality and secular morality. There is only human morality.” It is my belief that he is successful in this attempt and that a philosophy of music teaching based on Løgstrup will have a secular application. A construction of a framework of thinking for a philosophy of music education for the secular classroom using Løgstrup’s ideas as a foundation is the goal of this study. It is my hope that this work may serve as a voice in the dialogue toward building a workable philosophy of music education.

Limitations

I will limit this study to a focus on music teaching specifically, however the concepts contained herein may just as easily be applied to the teaching of non-musical or general subjects. The application of Løgstrup’s ethical system to general education is set aside for future research endeavors. I will only include other philosophical ideas if they relate to the philosophies of

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61 Ibid.
62 See the introduction to Løgstrup’s *The Ethical Demand*, pages 1-5.
63 Hans Fink and Alasdair MacIntyre, forward to Knud Løgstrup, *The Ethical Demand* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), xxxvii. (emphasis in original)
Reimer, Elliott and Løgstrup or are if they are important in establishing a framework for this analysis. As noted above, there have been many fine scholars who have contributed much to the philosophy of music education debate. For the most part, I will set those ideas aside as the focus of the study will be on a synergy constructed between Reimer’s and Elliott’s philosophies using the ethical system of Løgstrup.

As Løgstrup is not well known in the United States, I include a short biography of him here as part of this introductory chapter. A conceptual overview of his philosophy will be included in Chapter 2 to aid in contextualizing the present study.

**Biography of K. E. Løgstrup**

Currently, among the Danish, Knud Ejler Løgstrup is considered the greatest philosopher since Kierkegaard.⁶⁴ During his lifetime, he was characterized as an “obstinate, headstrong thinker” who boldly embraced “the exact opposite of what the epoch accepted as stock, self-evident truths.”⁶⁵

Born in 1905 in Copenhagen into a solidly middle-class Lutheran family, Løgstrup had a stable and happy childhood that extended well into his teen years. In an autobiographical sketch written in 1966, he recalled that he and a friend (who would later become a General) were still playing with tin soldiers at age 16. He suddenly gave that up and began reading Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*.⁶⁶ After secondary schooling in one of the most prestigious schools in the Danish state system, he began theological study at the University of Copenhagen in 1923. From the beginning of his studies he was attracted to the philosophical

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⁶⁵ Ibid.
⁶⁶ See Hans Fink and Alasdair MacIntyre’s introduction to *The Ethical Demand*, XV.
issues within theology and also attended courses in the philosophy department. After taking two terms of study on the epistemology of Kant, he realized that he had not properly understood Kant in his studies and “stubbornly decided to begin all over again, making sure he understood the text line by line no matter how long it took him.” This thorough scholarship was a mark of Løgstrup’s scholarly endeavors for the remainder of his life. He read relatively few books, but took extensive notes, noting agreements and disagreements with each concept of a text.

Løgstrup came of age during a time when Husserl and the phenomenological movement was enjoying great intellectual currency, and in 1933 Løgstrup began studies with two existential phenomenologists, Heidegger and Lipps, both students of Husserl. Because of Heidegger’s alignment with the National Socialist movement, Lipps had a much more profound influence on Løgstrup’s thinking. Heidegger, however, remained an influence throughout Løgstrup’s intellectual life and “much of Løstrup’s later thinking grapples directly with how and why Heidegger went wrong.”

Lipps, a physician and philosopher, was an enigmatic thinker whose work was little known outside Germany. According to Løgstrup’s autobiographical sketch, Lipps became critical of Husserl’s method after literally living with Husserl’s *Ideen zu einer phänomenologischen Forschung* for four years (1914-1918) while in the trenches of World War I. Lipps felt that Husserl was a master of the singular phenomenological investigation but “not of a system as in the *Ideen*.”

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67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid., xv-xvi.
71 Ibid., iii.
72 See W. R. Boyce Gibson’s translation of this text *Ideas; General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1969)
73 Hans Fink and Alasdair MacIntyre, introduction to Løgstrup, *The Ethical Demand*, xvii.
Løgstrup notes that Lipps wanted to “explode the epistemological schematisms into which my generation had been indoctrinated.” Fink and MacIntyre asserted that the first and foremost epistemological schematism that Lipp was trying to explode was the subject-object schema that intellectual tradition had inherited from the Cartesian thought. This destruction of the subject-object schema is very evident in Løgstrup’s work from the beginning.

In 1931, Løgstrup wrote an essay which was awarded a gold medal by the University of Copenhagen, and in the following year he submitted a manuscript as a doctoral dissertation, a criticism of Husserl’s *Logische Untersuchungen* in the light of Lipps’s *Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie der Erkenntnis* and Heidegger’s *Sein und Zeit*. There were complaints from the theology faculty that his dissertation was not adequately theological and complaints from the philosophy department that it was not adequately founded in accepted philosophical principles. His manuscript was sent back for revisions. His dissertation criticized Husserl, arguing that he had not made a sufficiently radical break with traditional epistemology. “He argued that the characteristic illusion of all modern epistemology is that the subject has appropriated for itself the properties of sovereignty, freedom from engagement, and transcendence; properties traditionally attributed to God only.”

In 1935, Løgstrup married, and in 1936 he accepted the position as vicar of a small parish on the island of Funen. This position left time to continue his academic pursuits and he submitted completely rewritten versions of his thesis to the University of Copenhagen in 1938 and 1940. A fourth version was finally accepted in 1942.

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74 Ibid., xvii.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
77 See Hans Fink and Alasdair MacIntyre, introduction to Løgstrup, *The Ethical Demand*, xix. This idea would inform his work throughout his life and is an important concept in *The Ethical Demand*.
78 Ibid., xx.
In 1943, Løgstrup became professor of Ethics and Philosophy of Religion at the University of Aarhus where he taught until his retirement in 1975. His work there influenced a generation of theologians and philosophers and for a time made Aarhus the center of Danish theology.  

In 1956, he published his best known work, *The Ethical Demand*. In this much anticipated major work, many of the themes of his dissertation reemerge. He continues to take exception to all forms of philosophy “which make human beings the sovereign force of form and order.” However, rather than the destruction of epistemological schemes, this work focuses on “the destruction of traditional moral schemes together with a more elaborate presentation of an alternative understanding of interpersonal life.” By this time Løgstrup had broken with the existentialists, feeling that radical human freedom was simply another form of epistemological self-deception regarding human sovereignty. In *The Ethical Demand* he championed an ontological approach that aligned him closer to the natural law position. *The Ethical Demand*, he argued, is an “attempt to provide a philosophy which, without presupposing or necessitating a faith, leaves a place open for it.”

Another interesting feature of *The Ethical Demand* was his use of literary examples to illustrate and explain moral distinction. This underscored his desire to create a moral system that is actually lived rather than create a moral philosophy in the abstract. He felt that “good novelists often display a much keener moral sensitivity than most moral philosophers.”

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79 Ibid., xxii.
80 Ibid., xxiii
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid., xxiv. Løgstrup made this argument at a conference in 1959 at which Heidegger and the German theologians were in attendance. They were uncomfortable with what they perceived to be his close alignment with the natural law tradition.
83 Ibid.
When he died in 1981, Løgstrup was completing his magnum opus, the four volume treatise entitled *Metafysik*. Of the four planned volumes, only two were published during his lifetime. The two remaining volumes were edited and published posthumously in 1983 and 1984 by a group that included several colleagues and his widow, Rosemarie Løgstrup.\(^\text{84}\)

### Definition of Terms

Below is a limited list of general terms used in philosophy as well as terms specific to Løgstrup’s philosophical system.

**General terms:**

- **Archetype** – from the Greek meaning first pattern; the original model whose nature determines how things are formed.\(^\text{85}\)

- **Dialectic** – two ideas which, though in apparent opposition, are interdependent or have a symbiotic relationship.

- **Dichotomy** – two ideas that are opposites but are not interdependent; generally viewed as contradictory ideas

- **Empiricism** – knowledge gained from human experience.

- **Epistemology** – a theory of knowledge or how humans purport to know.

- **Hellenic** – of or pertaining to Greek culture or thought. This term is specific to the period of Greek history beginning with the presocratics and ending with Aristotle.

- **Metaphysics** – from the Greek words *meta* meaning after or beyond and *physics* meaning nature; a branch of philosophy concerned with the study of first principles and being or ontology.\(^\text{86}\)

- **Methodology** – the discipline which investigates and evaluates methods of inquiry.\(^\text{87}\)

- **Ontology** – of or pertaining to the metaphysics of being.

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\(^{84}\) Knud E. Løgstrup, *Metafysics Volume I*, xii.


\(^{87}\) *A Dictionary of Philosophy*, s.v. “Methodology,” by Thomas Mautner.
Phenomenology – a system or the study of a system that is a metaphysical explanation of human perception of natural occurrences or phenomenon.

Rationalism – knowledge deduced from an idea.

Synergy – a system or argument that represents a compromise between a dialectic

Terms specific to Løgstrup’s philosophical ideas:

Life-manifestations – manifestations of the ontology of goodness present in every human. Examples of these are trust, sympathy and openness of speech.

Ontological ethics – term that Løgstrup gives to the foundational idea of his philosophy. It is the idea that our knowledge of the ethical considerations in our various human relationships springs from an innate knowledge.88

Sensation – utter receptivity. Sensation for Løgstrup “takes us completely outside of the time-space continuum.” He asserts, “We do nothing in sensation. The universe swallows us up.”89

Outline of the Study

The structure of the chapters in this dissertation is as follows: Chapter 2 contextualizes the study by conceptually reviewing the ideas that will be important in the analysis stage of the study. Chapter 3 presents an overview of Reimer’s MEAE and then analyzes his philosophy as Platonic construct. Elliott’s praxial philosophy receives the same overview and analysis with a connection to Aristotelian thinking in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 is dedicated to an overview of the philosophy of Løgstrup and Chapter 6 examines implications of a new framework for music education using ideas of Reimer’s and Elliott’s philosophies in a synergistic way. The chapter also includes implications for music teaching and teacher training.

88 For the most cogent explanation of ontological ethics as well as education for life, see Regner Birkeland. “Ethics and Education.” Nursing Ethics 7 (2000): 473-480.
89 Knud E. Løgstrup, Metaphysics Volume I, ix.
Conclusion

The first text bearing the name “philosophy of music education”\textsuperscript{90} appeared in 1970, an indication that the domain of philosophy of music education is still quite new as an intellectual pursuit. We currently have only two principle philosophies of music education that purport to be complete philosophical systems in support of the practice of music teaching. It is my contention that these two systems are modern articulations of an ancient dialectic; that Reimer has given us a Platonic articulation, and Elliott has given us an Aristotelian articulation.

This dissertation is an attempt to seek a synergy between Reimer’s and Elliott’s epistemological systems using an ontological system, namely the ontological ethics of the Danish philosopher Knud E. Løgstrup. Because Løgstrup’s philosophical system is a coherentist rather than a foundational system, parts of Reimer’s MEAE and Elliott’s praxial philosophy may be co-opted to move toward a framework for thinking about music education philosophy.

CHAPTER 2

CONTEXTUALIZING THE STUDY

Introduction

Music education philosophy as a domain of study can be viewed in three distinct stages: paucity, unity and dichotomy. Mark notes that “there was no coherent philosophy early in the contemporary era of music education.” By the 1930s the progressive movement provided a philosophical underpinning for music education that was framed in utilitarian notions of the uses of music. Progressve education valued music in the curriculum “because of its effectiveness in the development of socialization skills in children.” By the 1950s the progressive movement was in disarray resulting in music being taught without a central unifying philosophy, and, “like other disciplines, began to operate in an isolated manner rather than as an integral part of a coherent curriculum.”

In the mid 1950s, music educators began to “assume the role of spokespersons for their own profession.”

Mark states:

Allen Britton, of the University of Michigan and Charles Leonhard of the University of Illinois, were the foremost early leaders of the movement away from the utilitarian philosophy. In the 1950s nationwide concern for the quality of education threatened to redirect educational resources from music to other subjects. Both Britton and Leonhard sought to develop a more principled rationale, one based on the inherent nature of music, to replace the old utilitarian justification.

Along with Leonhard and Britton, other educational leaders joined in the call for an intrinsic, rather than utilitarian, value for music in the public school curriculum. These leaders included

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92 Ibid, 57.
93 Ibid., 55.
94 Ibid., 57.
95 Ibid.
An important development in music education philosophy occurred in 1954 with the Commission on Basic Concepts, created by the Music Educators National Conference. This commission “was created in recognition of the need for a solid philosophical foundation for music education.” The Commission was unique in that it included members of diverse disciplines, including philosophy, psychology and sociology, in recognition that music philosophy needed a variety of viewpoints to enhance the validity of its position. The Commission’s report appeared in 1958 and had such an impact on the profession that “it set the agenda for future intellectual developments in music education.” In the final report, Britton outlined an argument for the inclusion of music in the school curriculum based on historical precedent, but he was also critical of the use of ancillary values of music to justify school music. Leonhard agreed with Britton’s position in 1965 when he asserted that “those [ancillary] values cannot stand close scrutiny, because they are not unique to music. In fact, many other areas of the curriculum are in a position to make more powerful contributions to these values than music.”

Mark also suggests the importance of Henry’s landmark work *Basic Concepts of Music Education* which called for a philosophy of music education that eschewed the utilitarian values of music in the curriculum in favor of values that were intrinsic to music. From these
beginnings, Mark notes, “a small group of music educators turned to the field of philosophy… and begin to develop what will become known as aesthetic education.”

The music education domain was poised for a comprehensive philosophical position to support music teaching and learning, and a short time later saw the publication of a philosophy based on the concept of aesthetic education by the young scholar Bennett Reimer.

Reimer: A Unifying Philosophy

Reimer entered the University of Illinois to pursue a doctorate in music education and to serve as an instructor. He later served as an assistant professor. He arrived at a time when Leonhard, who taught at the University of Illinois, and House who taught at the University of Minnesota at Duluth, were calling for music education advocacy and philosophy issues to be based on the aesthetic or intrinsic values of music and not on utilitarian values. Reimer recalls the influences of the time:

Those common ideas had been accumulating since the late 1950s, especially after the publication of two very influential books – *Basic Concepts in Music Education* in 1958, and Leonhard and House’s *Foundations and Principles of Music Education*, in 1959, both of which contained chapters with serious philosophical content. These books had revelatory effects on me as a (very) young music educator with a growing interest in matters philosophical, magnified by my graduate study with Charles Leonhard at the University of Illinois. His powerful influence helped propel me into a career of reflective scholarship.

In 1963, Reimer finished his dissertation entitled, “Common Dimensions of Aesthetic and Religious Experience.” Richmond notes that “there was nothing in the music education

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103 Ibid.
literature to prepare the profession for a discussion of the issues Reimer addressed,” but the
dissertation was also

prophetic in the way it grounded, propelled, and even predicted Reimer’s scholarly agenda in the decades that followed its publication. The rooting of his dissertation in the writings of John Dewey, Susanne Langer, Leonard Meyer, Paul Tillich, and Karl Jung was enormously influential on much of his subsequent writing in music education philosophy…In fact given the powerful influence of his famous book on philosophy of music education and the fact that it too was grounded similarly in the writings of most of the same thinkers, it seems fair to suggest that Reimer’s dissertation has shaped, at least indirectly, the philosophical conversation of the music education profession for the last thirty years.107

In his dissertation, Reimer asks three questions about the nature of religious experience:

1. Why does religious experience exist? What is in the nature of man and his condition in the world that allows for such experiences to happen and that leads him to cultivate these experiences?
2. What is the function of religious experience? What purpose does it serve in the lives of men?
3. What are the “meanings” of religious experience? How do such experiences shape men’s conceptions of themselves and of the world?

He then asks the same question again, but this time inserts the word, “aesthetic” in the places where the word “religious” had previously been. Starting from this set of almost identical questions, Reimer constructs an argument for the unity of religious and aesthetic experience.108

After completing and defending his dissertation, Reimer moved to his first position of influence at Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland, Ohio where he was Director of Music Education and subsequently named Kulas Professor of Music.109 Between the years of 1967-1973, Professor Reimer was a music education specialist for a six year research project conducted through the Central Mid-West Regional Education Laboratory where he developed his

108 Bennett Reimer. Common Dimensions, 8-16.
“Aesthetic Education Curriculum Program” which put into practice many of the notions from his dissertation.\textsuperscript{110}

The culmination of Reimer’s work was his seminal book, \textit{A Philosophy of Music Education},\textsuperscript{111} which appeared in first edition in 1970 and subsequently appeared in two more editions.\textsuperscript{112} It would be difficult to overstate the past and present influence of this text on the profession, especially on college and university music education professors across the country. Reese recalls Reimer’s influence during the 1970s through the 1990s:

In the classrooms of [fellow] teachers, the ideas of Bennett Reimer have been a constant presence influencing our planning with colleagues, preparation for instruction, daily interaction with students, and our criteria by which we assess our programs and students. In a real sense, many of my colleagues and I “grew up” professionally with Reimer’s ideas as our essential guides to good classroom practice.\textsuperscript{113}

Reese correctly notes that the two most influential Reimer contributions are his philosophy of music text and his work with Silver Burdett’s elementary music textbook series.\textsuperscript{114} First appearing in 1974, the Silver Burdett classroom textbooks, in the words of Reese, “put \textit{A Philosophy of Music Education} into motion.”\textsuperscript{115} It may also be important to note that the Silver Burdett series had an influence on music specialists and music students in the public schools. Even if those involved with music had never heard of Bennett Reimer or read \textit{A Philosophy of Music Education}, there was an almost obligatory influence of Reimerian ideas on American public school music. In this way, Reimer’s ideas had currency without his having notoriety during the decades his work was used in classrooms across the country.

In reflecting on the history and influence of his ideas, Reimer notes that:

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\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., \textsuperscript{111} A description and extensive analysis of Reimer’s text is included below in Chapter 3 below. \textsuperscript{112} Bennett Reimer’s text \textit{A Philosophy of Music Education} has appeared in a first edition (1970), a second edition (1989) and a third edition (2003). It is perhaps a measure of the influence of this text that it has been translated into French, Japanese and Chinese. \textsuperscript{113} Sam Reese, “More Than Just Words”, \textit{Journal of Aesthetic Education}, 33 (1999) : 161. \textsuperscript{114} Ibid., 162. \textsuperscript{115} Ibid., 166.
there existed in the decades from the 1960s through the 1980s a striking level of agreement about the nature and value of music and music education among those who had given serious thought to such matters… [T]he aesthetic education movement did become an important, perhaps a dominant factor in the profession’s self-image during those decades.  

Reimer has called the time between the publication of his text in 1970 and the late 1980s “a time of concurrence in music education philosophy.” In a 1989 article, Mark suggests that music education was currently in the period of Aesthetic Education; he states:

The fifth period began around 1960, when the music education philosophical literature began to emphasize the need for programs and curricula based on the aesthetic aspect of music, rather than on extra-musical benefits of the study of music.

Jorgenson’s assessment in a 1991 editorial mirrors Reimer’s and Mark’s notion of the unity of philosophical ideas in the music education community.

The appearance of Bennett Reimer’s *A Philosophy of Music Education* following closely upon Abraham Schwadron’s *Aesthetics: Dimensions for Music Education* heralded an era in North American music education sometimes described as the aesthetic education movement. Reimer’s philosophy, widely read internationally, remained largely unchallenged by philosophers of music education in the intervening years.

Clearly, Reimer’s philosophical ideas were a unifying force in music education from 1970 to the late 1980s in large part because of his often read and studied text and because of his curricular work with Silver Burdett.

By the middle of the 1980s, there was an indication that Reimer’s aesthetic education philosophy did not align with teaching practices. In a remarkable 1986 article Colwell acknowledges this disconnect between philosophy and practice:

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117 Ibid., 8.
The aesthetic education movement has left its mark on the music education profession. It has been acculturated into music education thought. But the musical, rather than the artistic or aesthetic, has become the primary educational goal. On the surface music continued to march forward under the aesthetic banner, but it is searching for a new gonfalon that is not only more understandable to the general public but is closer to what has become acceptable educational practice.\textsuperscript{120}

In summary, Reimer’s MEAE was a welcome philosophical underpinning for music teaching and learning and served as the prevailing philosophy of music education for several decades. By the mid 1980s, however, there was a recognized gap between what music educators professed as foundational philosophy and what was practiced in the classroom. This discrepancy gave rise to some dissatisfaction with MEAE, and of those scholars to express dissatisfaction, the most vocal was Elliott.

Before I turn to the development of the philosophical ideas of Elliott, I want to note that the section below devoted to Elliott includes many more articles regarding construction of the praxial philosophy than the above section regarding the development of the MEAE philosophy of Reimer. It is tempting to assume that Reimer’s MEAE philosophy sprang to life as a mature philosophy with no precursory thinking. However, the introduction to this chapter reveals that many of the notions of Music Education as Aesthetic Education were articulated long before the appearance of Reimer’s 1970 text \textit{A Philosophy of Music Education}.\textsuperscript{121} Reimer is the first to bring these ideas together in a coherent philosophical foundation. However, he does not clearly outline the development of his philosophy with a trail of articles before the publication of his

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{120} Richard Colwell, “Music and Aesthetic Education: A Collegial Relationship,” \textit{Journal of Aesthetic Education} 20 (1986) : 37, The term “gonfalon” is defined as a banner fixed in a frame made to turn like a ship's vane; with streamers or tails, generally three. A gonfalon is an ensign or flag emblematic of royalty. It is a seldom-used word, kept alive by baseball historians due to its presence in a poem called The Sad Lexicon. (accessed 6 April 2006 ) ; available from http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&lr=&defl=en&q=define:Gonfalon&sa=X&oi=glossary_definition&ct=title ; Internet
\item \textsuperscript{121} Reimer, \textit{A Philosophy of Music Education}, 1st ed.
\end{itemize}
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**Elliott: Developing a New Philosophy of Music Education**

In 1986 two back-to-back articles appeared in the journal *Bulletin of the Council for Research in Music Education*. The featured article, entitled “Structure and Feeling in Jazz: Rethinking Philosophical Foundations” is by David Elliott, a young scholar who has been a student of Bennett Reimer at Case Western Reserve University. While Reimer left Case Western for Northwestern before Elliott completed his graduate studies, Elliott notes the inspirational teaching of Reimer in the preface to his 1983 dissertation. In the same issue, the article that directly followed Elliott’s feature article was called “Aristotle on Jazz: Philosophical Reflections on Jazz and Jazz Education,” by Philip Alperson from the University of Louisville. While neither Elliott nor Alperson directly criticize the prevailing philosophy of music education as aesthetic education, both demonstrate a process of questioning that will later become important, especially to Elliott with his construction of a new philosophy.

Elliott has earlier explored the limitations of the aesthetic education model in his dissertation. In the mixed methodological study, Elliott first uses a survey instrument to gather descriptive data on the state of Canadian jazz education. In a second part of the study, he

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123 Elliott’s dissertation is also on the subject of jazz education. Elliott also noted that Reimer had helped him start the project. See David Elliott, “Descriptive, philosophical and practical bases for jazz education: A Canadian perspective” (Ph.D. Diss., Case Western Reserve University, 1983)

124 Alperson, “Aristotle on Jazz”
presents a philosophical position on the nature and value of jazz education as aesthetic education. ¹²⁵ Elliott notes that

it would be inaccurate to infer that our purpose here is to conceive a completely unique or chauvinistic rationale advocating the separation of jazz education and music education. On the contrary, by refining and expanding the current philosophical foundations of music education we intend to build a theoretical position on the nature and value of jazz education that will facilitate the full realization of its potential and place in aesthetic education. ¹²⁶

At this point, Elliott is only willing to “broaden the basic tenets of aesthetic education,”¹²⁷ but one can glean the foundations of a praxial music education philosophy embedded in the three modifications that Elliott suggests. This is especially true in the first two modifications; the “processual musical meaning,” or “engendered feeling.”¹²⁸ The processual musical meaning focuses on the process, and meaning of that process, in a jazz improvisatory context.¹²⁹ Elliott also identifies the “activity-affect—embeddedness-affect” which highlights the activity of playing jazz and the affective quality of the performance of jazz.¹³⁰

By 1988 when the featured article “Structure and Feeling in Jazz: Rethinking Philosophical Foundations” appears, Elliott is teaching at the University of Toronto. This article focuses on a critical examination of “Leonard B. Myer’s original theory of musical experiences.”¹³¹ Elliott asserts that it is a false assumption to assume that music education as aesthetic education can be a satisfactory philosophical underpinning for jazz education. This, he continues, is because:

¹²⁵ David Elliott, “Descriptive, philosophical and practical bases for jazz education: A Canadian perspective” (Ph.D. diss., Case Western Reserve University, 1983), 164-165.
¹²⁶ Ibid., 165.
¹²⁷ Ibid., 295.
¹²⁸ Ibid., 193.
¹²⁹ Ibid., 214.
¹³⁰ Ibid., 256-260.
[The philosophy of MEAE] rests upon a one-dimensional theory of musical structure and the musical-affect relationship that is inimical to jazz and jazz education: Leonard B. Myer’s original theory of musical experience (1956).  

Again, Elliott is not willing to disregard Meyer’s theory in its entirety, as he states, “The assumption is…that Meyer’s theory need not be replaced; only amended and supplemented.”

In his conclusion, Elliott forwards these ideas:

First, since the currently prevalent philosophy of music education as aesthetic education relies upon Meyer’s original theory of musical structure and musical-affective experience, it cannot adequately serve to underpin an account of the nature and value of jazz or jazz education….Furthermore, since the deficiencies noted in this paper have been acknowledged by Meyer himself…it is reasonable to assume that music education as aesthetic education may also overlook vital structural dimensions and important sources of musical-affective experience in the traditional Western European music literature, not to mention world musics.

Here, Elliott muses that perhaps MEAE is not only misaligned with jazz education, but in some instances may also be misaligned with traditional and world music. While this is not a damning criticism, it does indicate that Elliott’s thinking is moving away from modification of music education as aesthetic education and more toward a new construct. Perhaps most importantly, Elliott ends his 1988 article with a portent of his future scholarship: “Philosophical reconstruction may be the real task before us.” Thus, David Elliott reveals his intention to restructure, rather than to modify, the prevailing philosophical foundation of music education. In the next section, I will offer a critical analysis of the articles that outline the development of Elliott’s seminal work, *Music Matters.*

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132 Ibid.
133 Ibid.
134 Ibid., 31.
135 Ibid., 32.
136 David Elliott, *Music Matters*
Foundational Roots of the Praxial Model

It is interesting to note that Elliott does not mention Aristotle or the notion of praxis in his early writings. The article by Philip Alperson that directly follows Elliott’s in this 1986 issue of the *Bulletin of the Council for Research in Music Education*, does contain several novel ideas that will become the basis of Elliott’s philosophy of music education. In fact, Alperson first used the term praxial in a 1991 article. This is not to say that Elliott took ideas from Alperson whole cloth. Rather, it is to suggest that the concepts that Elliott wove into the praxial philosophy of music education had currency in the market place of ideas at a time when the prevailing philosophical underpinning of music education was beginning to be questioned.

There are several ideas in Alperson’s article that become foundational to the praxial philosophy. First, Alperson admits that he himself has written an article with an “Aristotelian flavor.” Elliott bases his philosophy almost exclusively on a recasting of Aristotelian ideas. Secondly, Alperson suggests that to learn jazz, one must play jazz. This idea may be related to Elliott’s notion of music as a human activity. Lastly, Alperson forwards the idea that jazz music is situated in a social, psychological, political, and economic setting. The idea of the importance of the social/cultural setting is an integral part of Elliott’s praxial philosophy. We can see that the undeveloped notions that would become Elliott’s philosophy of music education were being seriously discussed in the latter portion of the 1980s.

Between 1990 and 1993 Elliott produces five articles for various journals that outline a
new philosophy of music education. The first of these to appear, “Music as Culture: Toward a Multicultural Concept of Arts Education,” was published in *The Journal of Aesthetic Education* in 1990. The short biographical paragraph included in the article states: “He [Elliott] is currently writing a philosophy of music education for the Philosophy of Education Research Library…”¹⁴⁴ This suggests that, between the 1988 article and this 1990 offering, Elliott had already begun to construct the new philosophy of music education.

Under Construction: Artifacts of a New Philosophy

The most seminal ideas of music education praxial philosophy may be seen in Elliott’s first article that begins his journey forward to a new philosophy. He opens the article by challenging the notion of “a work of art.” This is the view that there is a “museum” of cultural artifacts: paintings, sculptures, and music that all cultured people should know and appreciate. His departure here is a list of these artifacts by Hirsch, who asserts that to be a truly cultured person requires that all these artifacts be known and appreciated. Elliott takes exception to this notion and in so doing, redefines the meaning of culture by asserting “[c]ulture…is not something that people have, it is something that people do.”¹⁴⁵ This leads him to articulate his definition of music, an important concept of his finished philosophy. His idea of a “four-dimensional concept of music” is well-developed in this early article,¹⁴⁶ as is the notion that music “is something that people do.”¹⁴⁷ The four dimensions of music articulated by Elliott are

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¹⁴⁵ Elliott, 149.
¹⁴⁷ Compare the notions in Elliott, “Music as Culture” on page 158 with the statements on page 39 of *Music Matters*.
“1) a doer, 2) some kind of doing, 3) something done, and 4) the complete context in which the
doers do what they do.”

This article also contains a tentative criticism of his teacher, Bennett
Reimer. This criticism will take on a decidedly more aggressive tone in the next article, which
appears as an advanced installment of Elliott’s finished philosophy.

It is interesting to note a parallel between Elliott’s rejection of Reimer’s philosophy and
Aristotle’s rejection of Plato’s epistemology. In both cases, we see former student rejecting the
teachings of the master. According to Nietzsche, this rejection is a condition for the student to
become a master. He states: “Nothing avails: every master has but one disciple, and that one
becomes unfaithful to him, for he too is destined for mastership.”

In a 1991 article, Elliott tackles the question of music as knowledge, and clearly exhibits
his disagreement with MEAE as a philosophical underpinning for music education. Elliot
asserts:

As I argue elsewhere, the philosophy of music education as aesthetic education is
severely flawed. Its central claims do not pass the test of critical analysis. In short,
music education’s official doctrine fails to provide a reasonable explanation of the nature
and value of (i) music and (ii) music education…..In sum, music education’s official
philosophy, like aesthetics in general, neglects the epistemological significance of music
making. It fails to acquit the art of music.

Due to its myopic focus on music as a collection of isolated and autonomous objects,
MEAE overlooks the more fundamental and logically prior consideration that music is
something that people do and make. Put another way, music is a verb as well as a
noun.

The next two parts of the article articulate the nature of musicing and musical performance as
a form of knowledge. This portion of Elliott’s philosophy becomes Chapter 3 of his completed

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148 Elliott, Music Matters, 40.
149 Elliott, “Music as Culture,” 159.
150 Nietzsche, Mixed Opinions and Maxims (1879) : 357, quoted in Walter Kaufmann, The Portable
152 Ibid. 22.
153 This term is one coined by Elliott to denote “musical doing.” See Elliott, Music Matters, 40.
There are three articles in 1993 that indicate that Elliott’s new philosophy is in the final stages of development. In “When I Sing,” Elliott notes that “this discussion introduces several ideas from a new philosophy of music education.” He indicates in the endnotes to the article that his *Music Matters: A New Philosophy of Music Education* is “in press” with Routledge publishers in New York. Of the articles that appear in this active 1993 year, the *Choral Journal* article is the most succinct summary of the complete philosophy of music education contained in *Music Matters*.

Another article, “Musicing, Listening, and Musical Understanding,” again focuses on Elliott’s concept of the four dimensions of music. This is a concept from the first chapter of *Music Matters*. In terms of bringing the finished work to full fruition, it is interesting to note that there is no reference to the finished philosophy text being in press. This might indicate that the article had been submitted before Elliott had found a publisher or that he had left Routledge and not yet moved to Oxford University Press. The following article, “On the Values of Music and Music Education,” published in the fall of 1993, confirms that *Music Matters* is in press with Oxford University Press. This article, which is Chapter 5 of his completed text, is a

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157 Ibid. 16. Note: The text is eventually published in 1995 by Oxford University Press which may suggest the vagaries of the publishing industry. We may assume that a complete draft of the text is existent at this point in time.
159 Elliott, “On the Values of Music and Music Education”
160 Ibid. 84-87.
summary of Elliott’s understanding of the value of music and music education to the individual student. 161

Defending the Case for a New Philosophy of Music Education

In two articles Elliott suggests that there must be some rethinking of the nature of music and music education philosophy.162 Both of these articles reiterate Elliott’s earlier criticisms of MEAE and argue the case for a “new philosophy of music education.”163 Elliott lists two reasons for the untenable qualities of MEAE: “1) it is based on the outdated philosophical ideas of Langer, Myer, Leonhard, Reimer and Swanwich, and 2) MEAE contains a faulty notion of the nature of music and aesthetic perception of music.”164 He then offers the main ideas of his philosophy as an alternative to the historically accepted Music Education as Aesthetic Education. These two articles, particularly the article from the International Journal of Music Education, are academic equivalents of a frontal assault as Elliott builds the case that will be fully realized in Music Matters.

In summary, Elliott notes that the MEAE philosophy, which has held an almost obligatory sway for the last decades, represents outmoded thinking and that his new philosophy of music education will provide a more applicable support for music teaching and learning. In the articles discussed above, Elliott carefully prepares the music education community for the appearance of his new praxial philosophy of music education.

Music Matters: The Great Debate

Finally, in 1995, the full text of *Music Matters: A New Philosophy of Music Education* is published.\(^{165}\) The concepts that Elliott has carefully meted-out in article form in the years leading up to this complete publication are contained herein in much the same form as they originally appeared. Early in the text, Elliott makes it clear that his new praxial philosophy is incompatible with the widely accepted MEAE. He states:

Thus, in contrast to the conventional music education philosophy, this book refutes the belief that music is best understood in terms of the aesthetic qualities of the pieces of music alone….In short, this praxial philosophy is fundamentally different from and incompatible with music education’s official aesthetic philosophy. As such, it offers music educators a clear alternative to past thinking.\(^{166}\)

A large section of the chapter that follows this introductory statement in *Music Matters* is devoted to a systematic criticism of MEAE.\(^{167}\) Elliott asserts:

For what reason do scholars object to the aesthetic concept of music? A full answer would fill several books. I will focus on three notions that affect music education directly: the notions of music-as-object, aesthetic perception, and aesthetic experience.\(^{168}\)

While I will offer a more detailed annotation of Elliott’s criticism of MEAE in Chapter 4, it may be useful to give a short summary here of the criticisms outlined in *Music Matters*.

The music-as-object objection to MEAE revolves around a fundamental debate between the proponents of MEAE and those who espouse a praxial philosophy of music education. That debate is whether music exists mainly as an artifact of art. In the same way that paintings, sculpture and other plastic arts exist in brute fact, music is manifested as an historical series of works.\(^{169}\) Elliott asserts that “beginning with this assumption only invites the possibility of

\(^{165}\) A description and extensive analysis of Elliott’s text is included in Chapter 4 below.


producing a narrow and implausible concept of music and, therefore, a narrow and implausible
philosophy of music education.”

Elliott contrasts his definition of the fundamental existence of music in a broader cultural context. He suggests that music is “a human activity,”
and characterizes it as the music-as-noun verses music-as-verb debate.

Elliott’s second and third objections may be viewed together as MEAE musical response objections. Elliott explains:

For an experience to be truly musical, says Reimer, listeners must perceive and respond
to the aesthetic qualities of music alone. In this view, listening for relationships between
musical patterns and matters of a religious, moral, social, cultural, historical, political,
practical, or otherwise nonstructural nature is to listen ‘nonmusically.’ Aesthetic
listening is a matter of ‘immaculate perception.’

Elliott objects here to listening to music and responding in a non-contextual way, and listening to
music only for an aesthetic response. That is, listening only for responses to musical form.

Elliott asserts that this is an older approach to art appreciation that has a foundation in aesthetic
theories of the 18th and 19th centuries.

Reimer’s review of Elliott’s philosophy appears in 1996, a relatively quick response in
academic time. In what might be characterized as polemic language, Reimer asserts that the new
philosophy is “wildly uneven.”

Reimer continues:

Two quite remarkably faulty premises are the bases for Elliott’s philosophy. The first is
tactical, or political, or perhaps psychological…. Elliott seems to be driven by the notion
that to do philosophy is to engage in a species of competitive sport in which the ultimate
goal is to “win” by defeating an opponent…. This should be of concern to all who are
devoted to the welfare of music education…. The second premise is substantive, having to
do with the foundational value Elliott espouses for music and music education – that

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170 Elliott, Music Matters, 30.
171 Ibid., 39.
and 231-32.
173 See Elliott, Music Matters, 33.
174 Bennett Reimer, “David Elliott’s “New” Philosophy of Music Education: Music for Performers Only,”
performing is the essential good and the essential goal. Here, I will propose, his position is, ironically, severely antiquated in the historical context of music education.\textsuperscript{175}

In his conclusion to the article, Reimer notes that Elliott’s book “is remarkable in both positive and negative senses.”\textsuperscript{176} On the positive side, Reimer praises Elliott’s description of the complicated nature of both performing and listening, and his inclusion of a broad array of thinkers and topics related to music and education. The negatives, Reimer asserts, “are so severe as to be alarming.”\textsuperscript{177} Reimer concludes that “Elliott’s “new” philosophy at best enshrines the status quo; at worst, it would direct us backward.”\textsuperscript{178}

Elliott’s written counter is swift and no less polemical. Elliott lists a series of 15 myths that he asserts Reimer has perpetuated in his review of \textit{Music Matters} to which Elliott offers responses.\textsuperscript{179} Elliott concludes:

\begin{quote}
I have attempted to show that Reimer’s charges against the praxial philosophy of music education are mistaken and/or untrue. I suggest that there is sufficient evidence in the foregoing discussion to conclude that (a) Reimer’s review of MM is “criticism” in the vulgar sense of unsubstantiated fault – finding, or dis-information, and that (b) Reimer’s article provides our profession with a clear example of what scholarship is not.\textsuperscript{180}
\end{quote}

The contentious debate between the primary proponents of these respective philosophies is perhaps unfortunate, but not unexpected. The response from the music education field, especially those scholars involved in philosophical research, is an important indicator of the importance of the issue in the overall framework of the domain of philosophy of music education. One contention of this dissertation is that these two philosophies, cast in opposition,

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{175} Ibid. 60. \\
\textsuperscript{176} Ibid. 85. \\
\textsuperscript{177} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{178} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{180} Ibid. 31.
\end{flushright}
have created a need in the field to address the issue of how to articulate a philosophy of music education that provides a better “ground between”\(^{181}\) than these two philosophies have provided.

Responses to the Debate

While most scholars\(^{182}\) seem to be committed to some form of compromise between the music education philosophies of Reimer and Elliott, at least one philosopher has advocated abandoning both and co-opting a new philosophical framework for music teaching and learning. Salainas-Stauffer suggests that both MEAE and praxial philosophy have fatal flaws and advocates the ideas of the contemporary American philosopher Wolterstorff as a framework for music education\(^{183}\).

Another response has been to suggest that the two philosophies must both be useful and that elements of both philosophies should be incorporated into thinking about music education philosophy.\(^{184}\) Spychiger advances the notion that, viewed through the lens of semiotic analysis, the two philosophies are both necessary. She concludes that “music is a verb and a noun.”\(^{186}\) Koopman arrives at the same conclusion through a more traditional philosophical analysis of the issues raised in MEAE and praxial philosophy. His assessment of the two systems suggests that “both approaches are valid and they should be understood as complementing rather than

\(^{181}\) For the concept of “ground between” see Jorgensen, “A Dialectic View of Theory and Practice,” 344.


\(^{183}\) Monique Salinas-Stauffer, “Musical Worlds and Works: The Philosophy of Nicholas Wolterstorff and Its Implications for Music Education” (Ph.D. diss., Michigan State University, 1997)


\(^{185}\) Semiotic theory is a field of study that examines sign or symbol systems. The analysis Spychiger uses is based on a symbolic assessment of terminology used by Reimer and Elliott.

\(^{186}\) Ibid. 39.
contradicting each other.” Koopman notes that Elliott’s cognitive approach and lack of acknowledgement of aesthetic response is flawed, as “aesthetic experience is a holistic response in which cognition and feeling are completely intertwined.”

Määttänen agrees with Koopman’s claim that lack of an acknowledgement of aesthetic experience is an issue for Elliott. Määttänen asserts that Elliott’s rejection of the notion of aesthetic response is based on a Kantian view of aesthetic experience. He suggests a Deweyan notion of aesthetic experience which is based on Aristotelian thinking that would fit within Elliott’s framework. In a second article, Määttänen argues that although Reimer articulates his philosophy as strongly based on Dewey, Reimer has “simply ignored” the philosophical framework of Dewey. Reimer has, according to Määttänen “taken one feature from Dewey,…the role of emotions in aesthetic experience.” This results in a “very narrow and idealistic definition of aesthetic experience” which results in a narrow notion of aesthetic experience that the praxialists, including Elliott, have rejected.

Westerlund explores in greater depth the intersection of the philosophy of Dewey, Reimer, and Elliott in a dissertation which analyzes the three philosophies using the pragmatic framework of John Dewey. She also argues that Reimer has fallen into the Cartesian-Kantian dualism of self against object. Westerlund continues by asserting that Elliott’s attempt to avoid Reimer’s error leads him to ignore the “sensing and feeling body.” She concludes that a lack of acknowledgement of the aesthetic experience in Elliott’s philosophy is problematic.

Westerlund suggests the addition of a Deweyan concept of aesthetics combined with the praxial

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188 Ibid.
190 Ibid., 63.
191 Ibid., 66.
192 Ibid.
194 Ibid.
approach to philosophy.\textsuperscript{195} Another scholar, Panaiotidi, also explores the inclusion of aesthetic response in a praxial framework.\textsuperscript{196} In her analysis she dissects the concept of “flow,” which Elliott suggests is the chief benefit derived from the study of music, and concludes that the concept of flow is “compatible with traditional aesthetics.”\textsuperscript{197} Panaiotidi argues that Elliott should expand the foundational statements of his philosophy to include aesthetic experience as a benefit of contextual musical practice.\textsuperscript{198} Of more import to this study, Panaiotidi suggests that the proper way to grasp the difference in the two philosophies is to view Reimerian philosophy as \textit{poiesis}-paradigm and Elliottonian philosophy as \textit{praxis}-paradigm, referring to these two ideas as super-paradigms in music education.\textsuperscript{200} She explains:

Now a look at the history of music education suggests that all theories in this domain can be subsumed under two types of paradigms based on different conceptions of music which conceive of it as a species of \textit{poiesis} or as a case of \textit{praxis}. In other words, at the most general level there exists two kinds of basic music education paradigms, or super paradigms (after Schurz), that differ in their ontological assumptions. Both purport to embrace all forms of engaging with music but the emphasis is slightly different in each of them: the \textit{poiesis}-paradigm conceives music and music education in terms of musical works; the \textit{praxis} approach places weight on the active-performance dimension.\textsuperscript{201}

Panaiotidi is attempting a metatheoretical analysis of Reimer’s and Elliott’s philosophies using the concept of \textit{paradigm}.\textsuperscript{202} “This Greek term,” she says, “…was once used to describe Platonic ideas, nowadays broadly circulates in descriptions of transformative processes in nearly every

\textsuperscript{195} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{196} Panaiotidi, “What is Music?” 86.
\textsuperscript{197} See Elliott, \textit{Music Matters}, 51-52. The notion of “flow” is a concept articulated by Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi.
\textsuperscript{198} Panaiotidi, “What is Music?” 84.
\textsuperscript{199} Ibid., 86.
\textsuperscript{201} Ibid., 52.
\textsuperscript{202} Ibid., 38.
domain of life." Panaiotidi’s ideas of employing a meta-analysis and emphasizing the Greek foundations of Reimer’s and Elliott’s philosophical dialectic support the use of a metaphilosophical analysis for this study.

All of the scholars cited above have a common desire to remedy the problem of having two philosophies of music education in opposition. This dissertation represents another voice in that debate. One unique quality of this work is the application of metaphilosophical analysis to focus on the methodology behind Reimer’s and Elliott’s philosophies. In a 2003 editorial, Jorgensen offered this succinct analysis of the metatheoretical debate:

Throughout the millennia of recorded music education history in the West, two streams of musical thought have existed side-by-side, sometimes integrated, other times disjunct, but both impacting the practice of music education. *Musica practica* traditionally focused on the doing or making of music; *musica speculativa* or *musica theoretica* on the philosophical, mathematical, scientific, and more recently, psychological foundations and elements of music.

As I posit that Reimer’s MEAE and Elliott’s praxial philosophy are based on Platonic and Aristotelian methods, respectively, I now turn to an historical background of these two ancient philosophies.

**Hellenic Philosophy as Foundation: The Presocratics**

It could be argued that all western philosophy has its foundation in the Presocratics. McKirahan notes that “Greek philosophy had been flourishing for over a century when Socrates was born (469 BCE).” The philosophers who predated Socrates, helped establish a framework of thinking that allowed later Greek philosophy to flourish. As the epistemologies of

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205 Ibid.
Plato and Aristotle directly relate to the foundational intellectual work of the Presocratics, and as I am most interested in the methodological underpinning of Platonic and Aristotelian thought, I will here give an overview of the heritage and social milieu of Greek philosophy leading up to Plato and Aristotle. It is my goal to construct the foundations of this Hellenic Golden Age of reason to create a better understanding of the epistemology of Plato and Aristotle.

While we have no contemporary manuscripts produced by these early thinkers, their positions may be extrapolated from “a variety of quotations and paraphrases of their words, summaries of their theories, biographical information (much of it fabricated), and in some cases adaptations and extensions of their views, and also parodies and criticisms.” Dewey also suggests that it is the ideas that developed from these early philosophers that give insight into their thinking. He states:

Whatever these philosophers wrote have been lost, except for fragments and quotations included in the writings of philosophers of later periods; but we know from these the nature of the problems with which they dealt, and that they laid the groundwork on which their more famous successors erected their philosophical systems.

These early philosophers were not centered in Athens, but were “more venturesome than their fellow Greeks” who journeyed to help found Greek colonies around the shores of the Mediterranean Sea. The cradle of philosophical thought, therefore, was the eastern outland of Greece, mainly centered in the Ionian region and especially in the city-state of Miletus. Copleston suggests that “while Greece itself was in a state of comparative chaos or barbarism, consequent on the Dorian invasions of the eleventh century BCE, which submerged the old

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206 Ibid.
207 John Dewey, Types of Thinking including A Survey of Greek Philosophy (New York: Philosophical Library, 1983), 204.
208 Ibid., 204.
209 McKirahan, Philosophy Before Socrates, 7.
Aegean culture, Ionia preserved the spirit of the old Aegean civilization.”

Hall agrees and asserts that “it was in Ionia that the new Greek civilization arose: Ionia in whom the old Aegean blood and spirit most survived, taught the new Greece, gave her coined money and letters, art and poetry...”

Several influences were important in the early development of Hellenic philosophy. Among these Dewey notes the adventurous nature of the Greeks who chose to settle the eastern outback. Another factor was the substitution of rational thought for the polytheistic religions of Greece. These early thinkers began to examine the causes for events around them and sought a rational answer based in their understanding of natural phenomenon. For example, rather than blame a storm at sea on the anger of Poseidon, god of the sea, these Presocratic philosophers sought cause and effect relationships that were founded in rational thinking. Dewey argues that these early settlers “were what we now would call scientists rather than philosophers.” However, Nietzsche rather poetically takes issue with relegating these early thinkers to mere scientists. While examining the life of Thales he posits that:

Philosophical thought is detectable at the center of all scientific thought, even in the lowest scientific activity, philosophical conjecture. It leaps forth on light steps: the understanding slowly huffs and puffs behind her and searches for better footing..." 

Another important factor in the development of Hellenic thought was that these outlying city-states, especially those in Asia Minor, were inevitably influenced by their contact with the highly...

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212 Dewey, Types of Thinking including A Survey of Greek Philosophy, 202.
213 Ibid., 201-202.
214 This example was suggested by Dr. Pete Gunter during a lecture in an Ancient Philosophy course at the University of North Texas during the spring of 2005.
215 Dewey, Types of Thinking including A Survey of Greek Philosophy, 203.
developed civilizations of Babylon and Egypt. Dewey states:

Whenever different cultures meet…differences in the approach to common human problems and the variations in customs naturally raise questions in both groups. People are curious about the reasons behind the differences they observe, and some of them try to satisfy this curiosity by study. Many of the citizens in Asia Minor visited, studied in, and were influenced by Babylon and Egypt, and this is probably why philosophy developed in the outlying states earlier than it did in Athens itself.

Copleston is unsatisfied with the notion that the philosophy of the Greeks had specific origin from the philosophical thinking of the Egyptians or Babylonians. He asserts:

[I]t is practically a waste of time to inquire whether the philosophical ideas of this or that Eastern people could be communicated to the Greeks or not, unless we have first ascertained that the people in question really possessed a philosophy. That the Egyptians had a philosophy to communicate has never been shown, and it is out of the question to suppose that Greek philosophy came from India or from China…Science and Thought, as distinct from mere practical calculations and astrological lore, were the result of the Greek genius and were due neither to the Egyptians nor to the Babylonians….The Greeks, then, stand as the uncontested original thinkers and scientist of Europe.

The Problems of the Presocratics

These Presocratic philosophers were concerned with two problems; first they were interested in “the one and the many” or the “the problem of unity and diversity.” That is, they searched for “some single element or principle which connects and brings order into the complexity of nature.” Secondly, they were concerned with the problem of “being and becoming.” Dewey explains the problems in this way:

In life as we know it, things come into being, and then cease to be. Nothing seems to be permanent. But man ‘feels in his bones’ that there must be some eternal principle in the universe, something that is not subject to change. The nature of the relationship between

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217 Ibid., 202.
218 Ibid., 202.
220 Dewey, Types of Thinking including A Survey of Greek Philosophy, 203.
221 Ibid.
222 Ibid., 205.
that which changes and that which is permanent and unchanging constitutes the problem of being and becoming.\textsuperscript{223}

Thales (624-546 BCE) believed everything was made of water, Anaximenes (585-528 BCE) believed everything was made of air, Anaximander (610-546 BCE) believed that there was a fundamental substance from which everything was made and to which it all must return. Pythagoras (571-469 BCE) believed that the underlying concept that held the universe together was mathematics, and Heraclitus (circa 500 BCE) maintained that the world was in a constant state of change. His example is the famous saying, “You can never step into the same river twice.” His fundamental element was fire, an element that is constantly changing and yet uniquely itself.\textsuperscript{224} Heraclitus asserted that “the universe has not been made by any god or man, but it has been, is, and will always be – an ever-lasting fire, kindling itself by regular measures and going out by regular measures.”\textsuperscript{225} Heraclitus was the first person to approach things philosophically instead of scientifically.\textsuperscript{226}

Another important transitional thinker from this period was Parmenides. McKinahan states:

Parmenides deserves recognition for introducing deductive arguments to philosophy and for acknowledging their compelling force, and for using this new tool to raise basic philosophical questions: What conditions must existing things satisfy? Is reality what our senses tell us it is? How can we tell? He was also the first to undertake explicit philosophical analyses of the concepts: being and coming to be, change, motion, time and space. And he was the first to use these concepts to analyze the nature of a logical subject, and so in an important sense, he is the inventor of metaphysics.\textsuperscript{227}

Empedocles (490-430 BCE) was another transitional thinker who posited the notion that the world consisted of earth, air, fire and water. These four elements were held to be the basic

\textsuperscript{223} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{224} Robinson and Groves, \textit{Introducing Philosophy}, 8-11.
\textsuperscript{226} McKiranhan, \textit{Philosophy Before Socrates}, 157.
\textsuperscript{227} Ibid.
substances until the middle ages.\textsuperscript{228} One of his important contributions to early philosophy was his notion that these four elements were controlled by “love and strife or attraction and repulsion.”\textsuperscript{229} Robinson and Groves note that this idea may have led him into an early conception of reincarnation as he suggested that the world was in “a constant cycle of destruction and constructive reincarnation.”\textsuperscript{230}

The Atomists are another important group of thinkers from this epoch, represented most prominently by Democritus (460-370 BCE). He held that everything in the world was made up of “tiny uncuttables or atoms” which “move and collide to form new compounds.”\textsuperscript{231} Robinson and Groves suggest that “his conjectural views about matter…startlingly anticipate the theories of the 20th century atomic physicists.”\textsuperscript{232} McKirahan agrees and states:

The claim that all qualities, events, and changes in the phenomenological world can be reduced to changes in the relative positions of eternal, unchanging, quality-less atoms is remarkably ambitious even in the presocratic tradition, and Democritus’ efforts to show how the theory works in detail are unique among the Presocratics.\textsuperscript{233}

A final group of important thinkers from the later age of early Greek philosophy were the sophists. These were “traveling teachers–or, in the vocabulary of our day, itinerant professors.”\textsuperscript{234} “The word “sophist” and “sophistry” derive from the Greek word \textit{sophos}, or wisdom; and were so named because they were generally regarded…as wise men.”\textsuperscript{235} The sophists gave instructions to adults, usually young men, in virtue. Dewey notes:

Today we use the term ‘virtue’ as though it were synonymous with ‘morality,’ but the Greeks attached a much broader meaning to the term. To them, ‘virtue’ embraced all favorable individual characteristics and abilities, physical and mental, as well as spiritual

\begin{footnotes}
\item[228] Robinson and Groves, \textit{Introducing Philosophy}, 14.
\item[229] Ibid.
\item[230] Ibid.
\item[231] Ibid. 15. Note: For a fuller explanation of the principles of atomic theory see McKirahan, \textit{Philosophy Before Socrates}, 304-324
\item[232] Robinson and Groves, \textit{Introduction to Philosophy}, 15.
\item[234] Dewey, \textit{Types of Thinking including A Survey of Greek Philosophy}, 214.
\item[235] Ibid., 213.
\end{footnotes}
and moral—the ability to manage one’s household and rule his slaves with justice, ability to fight bravely on the battlefield, ability to participate with wisdom in the governing of the city-state—in short, the development of all the graces and abilities that became a man.  

The sophists came into disrepute, and even today the term, “sophistry” has a pejorative connotation. Dewey identifies three reasons “which explain the distain with which many people began to look on the sophist.”

First, they rejected traditional customs and beliefs….In the second place they called into question the quasi-religious nature by which the Greeks had traditionally explained the phenomenon of nature….A third source of trouble for the sophists lay in the fact that some of their disciples did go to extremes, and often put self-seeking ahead of the virtue which the sophists undertook to impart.

This third reason for distain revolves around the tendency of some sophist disciples to emphasize the winning of arguments through the use of rhetoric at the cost of the truth and for selfish personal and political gain. Dewey gives the movement a sympathetic review and notes “that a minority of the sophists deserved these strictures, but the great majority worked to build a better society, promote knowledge, and to free men’s minds from the fetters of tradition and custom.”

The Presocratics and the early Greek philosophical traditions changed the nature of thinking from a “blind adherence to tradition” in the form of multiple and capricious gods as an explanation of the phenomenon of the world around them, to using rational thought to divine the great questions of human existence. This transition of the foundation of human thought created a framework for the next group of philosophers to emerge. These Presocratics ushered in a Hellenistic golden age of philosophy.

236 Ibid., 213-214.
237 Ibid., 214-215.
238 Ibid., 215.
239 Ibid.
240 Ibid., 202.
Socrates and the Athenian Revolution

By the time Socrates (470-399 BCE), “the greatest and best-known of the sophists, or itinerate professors…” began teaching the center of philosophy…had moved from the outlying city–states to Athens.” The Presocratics “had focussed [sic] their inquiry on natural phenomena; the philosophical thought that was now coming to maturity in Athens had men as its central concern,” and “Socrates was an important link between the older philosophical tradition and the new approach to life which was taking shape in Athens.” Dewey sums the period that began the Golden Age of Philosophy in this way:

Rationality, or reason, is the ultimate achievement of man, the ability which enables him to make valid references about the relationships among the phenomenon of his world. The Athenian philosophers extended what they could learn about man and built up a conception of nature patterned upon it. For them the reality of the universe was not some fortuitous combination of matter and atoms, but was the working out of a plan, to which they applied the term ‘final cause.’ This final cause is, of necessity, good. The three concepts, ‘reason,’ ‘final cause,’ and ‘good’ are related – reason leads man to recognition of the final cause, and the operation of the final cause produces good.

Copleston notes that Socrates was different than other sophists in two important ways. First:

Socrates was…concerned with universal definitions, i.e. with the attaining of fixed concepts. The Sophists propounded relativistic doctrines, rejecting the necessarily and universally valid. Socrates, however was struck by the fact that the universal concept remains the same: Particular instances may vary, but the definition stands fast.

The example Copleston uses is the definition of man; Man is a “rational animal.” Men may or may not effectively use their reason; some may even have mental defects which prevent them

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241 Ibid., 218.
242 Ibid., 219.
243 Ibid.
244 Copleston, A History of Philosophy, 104.
245 Ibid. Note: Copleston is referencing a definition used by Aristotle. As Socrates did not leave any writing, Copleston is here asserting a Socratic idea as articulated by Aristotle.
from using their reason; however all animals who potentially possess a rational self are men. Therefore, “this definition remains constant, holding good for all.”

Secondly, Socrates used inductive argument to arrive at these universal definitions. This use of inductive reasoning came about as Socrates practiced his form of *dialectic* or conversation. This is the well known Socratic method. Copleston notes:

He would get into a conversation with someone and try to elicit from him his ideas on some subject. For instance, he might profess his ignorance of what courage really is, and ask the other man if he had any light on the subject. Or Socrates would lead the conversation in that direction, and when the other man used the word ‘courage,’ Socrates would ask him what courage is, professing his own ignorance and desire to learn....The dialectic, therefore, proceeded from less adequate definitions to a more adequate definition, or from consideration of particular examples to a universal definition.

Hadot states:

when he [Socrates] talks with other people…contents himself with the role of a midwife. He himself knows nothing and teaches nothing, but is content to ask questions; and it is Socrates’ questions and interrogations which help his interlocutors give birth to ‘their’ truth. Such an image shows that knowledge is found within the soul itself and it is up to the individual to discover it, once he discovered, thanks to Socrates, that his own knowledge was empty.

This idea of an ironic ignorance represents a new approach to knowledge that may be called the Socratic revolution. Previously, there had been the great thinkers, such as Paramenides, Empedocles, and Heraclitus, “who opposed their theories to the ignorance of the mob,” and the

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246 Ibid.
247 “Deductive and Inductive Arguments,” in The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy [database on-line] (2006, accessed on 17 April 2006); available from http://www.iep.utm.edu/d/ded-ind.htm Note: the definitions of deductive and inductive arguments are as follows: A *deductive argument* is an argument in which it is thought that the premises provide a *guarantee* of the truth of the conclusion. In a deductive argument, the premises are intended to provide support for the conclusion that is so strong that, if the premises are true, it would be *impossible* for the conclusion to be false. An *inductive argument* is an argument in which it is thought that the premises provide reasons supporting the *probable* truth of the conclusion. In an inductive argument, the premises are intended only to be so strong that, if they are true, then it is *unlikely* that the conclusion is false. It should be noted that because Socrates is interested in an ongoing argument or dialectic that may be revised many times as it approaches the truth, that he is using an inductive model.
248 Ibid., 106.
249 Ibid.
Sophists who claimed to know much and worked to sell their knowledge to the mob.  

Socrates’ famous maxim was “know thyself.” Dewey states:

The basis of the Socratic method is the conviction that when a man really becomes aware of his ignorance, he will seek to remedy the situation by gaining knowledge. Although Socrates worked to make men wise, he would not let them call him sophos, or ‘wise man,’ the common form of address toward other sophists. He would say that he was rather a philos sophou, or ‘one who loves wisdom,’ and, so the story goes, his remark gave us the term we have used ever since, ‘philosopher,’ or ‘lover of wisdom.’

The Death of Socrates and the Platonic Academy

As might be imagined, Socrates’ method of dialectic, often demonstrating the lack of knowledge of those he engaged, did not always endear him to those in power, and this, coupled with an unyielding ethical code, created trouble for him over the years he taught in Athens. He was first in trouble with the eight commanders, and later the Thirty for refusing to lend support to unethical proposals. But it was after the restoration of democracy in 399 BCE that Socrates was finally arrested for “corrupting the youth” and a trial was held. As with all the words of Socrates, we have an accounting of the trial in the writing of his most famous student, Plato. Socrates shows no fear during the trial and continued to utilize the dialectical method to cross examine his accusers. He further hurt his cause by not bringing his weeping wife and children into the court to illicit pity from the jurors, because he felt it would be more ethical to “behave quietly,” than to “bring these pitiable exhibitions” before the court.
Copleston notes that his accusers probably supposed that Socrates would go into a voluntary exile while awaiting trial, or that his students would arrange an escape for their mentor before the self-execution could be carried out, but Socrates would have none of it. About a month after being sentenced to death, the 70 year old Socrates spent the day with followers discussing the immortality of the soul, cheerfully drank hemlock, and died.

Dewey states that “Socrates was the most important link between the older philosophical tradition and the new approach to life which was taking shape in Athens.” Moral philosophy begins with Socrates. By turning the attention of philosophy away from the natural world and into the soul of human life, using deductive arguments and attempting to construct universal definitions, Socrates made himself a bridge between the Presocratics and the golden age of Hellenistic philosophy.

After the death of Socrates in 399 BCE, “a number of his disciples attained preeminence as philosophers, and several of them founded schools of philosophy. The most famous of these successors was Plato, who associated with Socrates as his disciple for seven or eight years before his death, and who outlived his mentor by fifty-two years, dying in 347 BCE” Plato is viewed as the beginning of the tradition of European Metaphysics. His contributions to the history of

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259 Copleston, A History of Philosophy, 114-115
260 Plato Phaedo (trans. W. H. D. Rouse in Great Dialogues of Plato [New York: Signet Classic/New American Library, 1999]) 460-521. Note: This dialogue of Plato is subtitled The Death of Socrates and revolves around the last day up to and including the last breath of the great philosopher.
261 Dewey, Types of Thinking including a Survey of Greek Philosophy, 219.
263 Copleston, A History of Philosophy, 104.
264 Dewey, Types of Thinking including a Survey of Greek Philosophy, 226-227.
philosophy are grounded in his writings, the dialogues in which his mentor, Socrates often was a leading character,266 and his creation of the Academy.267

The Platonic Academy, while owing much to Plato’s mentor Socrates, was different in that Plato was concerned not only with moral philosophy but also with “natural philosophy” or the type of philosophical inquire with which the Presocratics had been concerned. Dewey suggests that Plato possessed “a deep appreciation of the work of Greek philosophers of earlier periods, and incorporated some to their ideas, in modified form, into his own philosophical system.”268 Also, unlike Socratic philosophy, mathematics was an important component of Plato’s Academy.269 Plato may have emphasized the study of math because of his travels. After the death of Socrates and before founding the Academy, he went to Megara to visit Euclid, Cyrene to visit Theodorus the mathematician, and Italy to see the Pythagorean philosophers Philolaus and Eurytus.270 This Academy may be regarded as the first university and “flourished for almost a thousand years.”271 Hadot refines the uses of mathematics at the Academy as he notes:

Geometry and the other mathematical sciences were crucially important in training, but they represented only the first stage in the training of future philosophers. Within Plato’s school they were practiced in a totally disinterested way. Their utility was not considered; instead they were intended to purify the mind from sensible representations, their aim was primarily ethical.272

Copelston concurs and suggests:

that the academy may be rightly called the first European university, for the studies were not confined to philosophy proper, but extended over a wide range of auxiliary sciences,

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266 Plato Great Dialogues of Plato (trans. W. H. D. Rouse)
268 Dewey, Types of Thinking including a Survey of Greek Philosophy, 226-227.
269 Ibid., 227.
like mathematics, astronomy and the physical sciences...in a disinterested and not purely utilitarian spirit.\footnote{Copleston, \textit{A History of Philosophy}, 129-130.}

This period of Greek intellectual history, from the Presocratics in Asia Minor to the Platonic Academy in Athens, was a Golden Age of Reason when humankind rejected the irrational and capricious mythology of the gods and began to rely on their own intellectual prowess to create their world. It has been my goal to construct the foundations of this Golden Age in its entire scope to create a better understanding of the epistemology of Plato and Aristotle.

**Platonic Epistemology**

While we possess the entire corpus of Plato’s works, none of these exist in original documents written by Plato himself.\footnote{Ibid., 133. Note: For an in-depth study of the writings of Plato including which writings are considered authentic and a chronology of works see Copleston pages 130-141.} “With the exception of the \textit{Letters} and the \textit{Apology}, they are in the form of dialogues.”\footnote{David Melling, \textit{Understanding Plato}, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 11.} The dialogue, a dramatic literary device, seems to be a replica of the Socratic method in which a teacher asks a series of questions and attempts to discover the truth about a philosophical question. Plato’s mentor Socrates is almost always the main protagonist and questioner in these works of drama. In later works, Socrates fades in importance, “and in the \textit{Laws} is replaced by an Athenian stranger who lacks any dramatic reality.”\footnote{Ibid.} Hadot suggests that the use of Socrates in these dialogues was “intended both to portray Socrates and to idealize him,”\footnote{Pierre Hadot, \textit{What is Ancient Philosophy?}, trans. Michael Chase, 41.} and Copleston notes that the traditional view is “that Plato did put his own theories in the mouth of the master whom he much reverenced.”\footnote{Copleston, \textit{A History of Philosophy}, 103.}
Extrapolating from these thirty-six dialogues, we may construct a theory of knowledge that might be called a Platonic epistemology.

Armstrong postulates that Platonic thinking is formed by the combination of mathematics based on Pythagorean teaching and the moral doctrine of Socrates. He states:

The doctrine at which Plato arrived by combining these two elements, and from which he never departed may be expressed as follows: There exists a world of eternal realities, ‘Forms’ or ‘Ideas,’ entirely separate from the world our senses perceive, and knowable only by the pure intellect….They are the only objects of true knowledge, the unchanging realities which our mind perceives when it arrives at a true universal definition.279

Therefore, Platonic knowledge cannot be based in sense perception, but rather must be arrived at through rational thought.280 Copleston notes:

Plato accepts from Protagoras the belief in the relativity of sense and sense-perception, but he will not accept a universal relativism: on the contrary, knowledge, absolute and infallible knowledge, is attainable, but cannot be the same as sense perception, which is relative, elusive and subject to the influences on the part of both subject and object. Plato accepts, too, from Heraclitus the view that the objects of sense-perception, individual and sensible particular objects, are always in a state of becoming, of flux, and so are unfit to be the objects of true knowledge….The object of true knowledge must be stable and abiding, fixed, capable of being grasped in clear and scientific definition, which of the universal, as Socrates saw. The consideration of different states of mind is thus indissolubly bound up with the considerations of those states of mind.281

To these universals Plato gives the name Ideas or Forms. The Forms exist in a perfect state in a transcendent place and all sensible things that humans apprehend are imperfect copies of these forms.282 Humans then may tend to point to imperfect images of an ideal form when attempting to understand an object or concept. If for instance, one is asked, “What is justice?”, an individual might point to a particular person or set of laws and, because this person or this particular set of laws is good and just, suggest that these are justice. However, these transient

281 Ibid., 149-150.
282 Ibid., 166.
people or objects might change and might then no longer be just. In order to gain true knowledge, a person must have an understanding of the unchanging Idea or Form of justice.\footnote{Note: See Copleston, \textit{A History of Philosophy}, page 152.}

An important part of Plato’s writing that can aid our understanding of his epistemology are the \textit{Platonic Myths}.\footnote{Ibid.} Armstrong states:

The Platonic Myth may be defined as a symbolic narrative in which Plato expounds some doctrine of truth of which he firmly believes but which he holds can only be expressed by symbols and not by the ordinary methods of reasoned argument.\footnote{Arthur H. Armstrong, \textit{An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy}, 35.}

Perhaps two of the most well-known Platonic myths are found in the dialogue called \textit{The Republic}.\footnote{Plato \textit{Great Dialogues of Plato} (trans. W. H. D. Rouse) 118-393.} \textit{The Republic} is Plato’s notion of the perfect city-state government based on his idealist philosophy. This dialogue begins with a discussion of the meaning of justice and continues with how to implement this definition of justice in a complete model of a society. It is a culmination of his thinking as expressed in a political analogy of the perfect form of government. In this utopia, individualism would be subsumed by the needs of the community. All things, including care of children resulting from governmentally arranged couplings, would be carried out by the state.\footnote{See Plato “Book V,” \textit{Great Dialogues of Plato} (trans. W. H. D. Rouse), 246-281.} In this way, Plato may be viewed as the first communist.\footnote{This notion was suggested by Dr. Pete Gunter in a lecture in Spring, 2005. He noted that this argument was advanced by several Russian colleagues who had lived and worked in the former Soviet Union during the 1960s and 1970s.}

Contained in the dialogue are two Platonic myths: the myth of the divided line and the myth of the cave, which serve to illuminate symbolically Platonic epistemology.

The divided line is found in the latter portion of book VI of \textit{The Republic}.\footnote{See Plato “Book VI,” \textit{Great Dialogues of Plato} (trans. W. H. D. Rouse) pages 305-311 for the text dealing with the myth of The Divided Line. There is a diagram on page 309 of the Rouse translation which might be somewhat confusing as it is set in a horizontal fashion rather than a vertical. This diagram by the author is based on one contained in the Copleston, \textit{A History of Philosophy Volume I} on page 152 which utilizes the vertical configuration but is labeled in Greek. The author utilized the diagram in the Copleston and translated the Greek}
Copleston notes that “the development of the human mind on its way from ignorance to knowledge, lies over two main fields, that of *Opinion*, and that of *Knowledge.*”\(^{290}\) The closer to an understanding of the universal forms a person comes, the more they demonstrate a true knowledge in a Platonic sense. Notice also that the development of the human understanding and the structure of knowledge or epistemology are quite close in Platonic rationalist thinking.\(^{291}\) According to Copleston, this indicates that Platonic epistemology and ontology, or nature of being in the world, are quite similar.\(^{292}\) The lower two sections of the line represent the visible world, and the upper two sections of the line represent the world of ideas. It is easy to see from

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\(^{290}\) Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, 152.

\(^{291}\) Ibid.

\(^{292}\) Ibid. See footnote on page 152 of Copleston.
this analogy that Plato believes the world of ideas to be the “real” world, and the visible world is a world of shadows and copies.

A second Platonic myth, which is perhaps the most well-known, is the myth of the cave. With this analogy, Plato again reinforces his notion that the senses cannot be trusted. What we view as the world of the real is merely unsubstantial shadows. He indicates that his listeners should “take this parable of education and ignorance as a picture of the condition of our nature.” In this analogy, Plato, through the character of his teacher, Socrates, asks his audience to imagine all of humankind in a dark cave, chained by their legs and necks so that they cannot move, facing away from the cave entrance so that all they can view is the back wall of the cave. There is a bit of diffused daylight that shines in, but the major source of light is from a fire that burns on a platform in the back of the cave opposite of the prisoners. In front of that fire is a walkway and a low wall. Over that walkway, “bearers carrying along this wall all sorts of articles which they hold projecting above the wall, statues of men and other living things, made of stone or wood and all kinds of stuff.” Here, by analogy, we see Plato’s conception of the condition of humankind. Looking at shadows on a dark cave wall and believing that they are witnessing the real, visible world. Now, Plato asks those gathered around to imagine that one of these poor souls chained in the cave is released and forcibly taken “up the rough assent to sunlight” and made to look at real objects so that he or she finally became accustomed to the world of the real. This person might remember the others still enslaved in the cave and go back down to convince them that what they are seeing is not the real world. According to Plato, the other prisoners would think he or she were mad; that they had ruined their eyes trying to gaze at

294 Ibid., 312. The authors description of the cave is a paraphrase from pages 312-316.
295 Ibid., 312.
296 Ibid. 315.
undiffused light. They might even, he reasons, “lay hands on him and kill him.” Plato summarizes his myth:

The world of our sight is like the habitation in prison, the firelight there to the sunlight here, the ascent and the view of the upper world is the rising of the soul into the world of the mind….At least what appears to me is, that in the world of the known, last of all, is the idea of the good, and with what toil to be seen!

To summarize, for Plato and Platonic thinking, the world of the idea is the world of the real and all that we see is but a misty shadow of the Ideal Form which exists in a transcendent place that few reach. This creates a picture of Platonic epistemology. His conception of truth is based in abstract ideas and his solutions to the problems of humankind are contained in an ideal reality. These notions will be important later in the study as I undertake an analysis of Reimer’s MEAE philosophy.

Platonic epistemology was challenged and a new school was formed in Athens by the most famous of Plato’s students, Aristotle. It is to his ideas that we turn now, for these two thinkers represent the archetypes of human thinking that will influence the world of western thought for the next two thousand years.

The Life of Aristotle

Aristotle was born in 384 BCE at Stageira in Thrace. He was the son of a physician to the king of Macedonia, Amyntas II. This accounts for his later appointment as tutor to the boy prince who would become Alexander the Great. At age 17, Aristotle left his birth place for

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297 Ibid.
298 Ibid., 315-316.
Athens, the center of Greek culture, where he joined the Academy and was, by most accounts, a faithful student of his mentor Plato for 20 years. There is a story, probably apocryphal, which suggests that Aristotle rebelled against Plato’s teaching and left the Academy. Diogenes Laertius, in his Lives of the Philosophers, suggests that “Aristotle withdrew from the Academy while Plato was still alive. Hence the remark of the latter: ‘Aristotle spurns me, as colts kick at the mother who bore them.’” Other scholars assert that Aristotle was a faithful student and friend until Plato’s death in 348 BCE. It was only after Aristotle’s travels that he gradually developed his own philosophy and rejected much of Plato’s epistemology.

After Plato’s death, Aristotle left Athens and traveled to Asia Minor where he lived first in Assos, whose ruler, Hermeias, was his friend. Later he lived at Mytilene on the island of Lesbos. While living in Mytilene he married Pythias, the niece of Hermeias, and in 342 BCE he returned to Macedonia where he was appointed tutor to the prince of Macedonia who would become Alexander the Great. His famous pupil became important in Aristotle’s later life as he began his work in empirical research. Alexander the Great ordered “several thousand men throughout the whole of Greece and Asia minor to be at Aristotle’s disposal.” These men were charged to bring samples of living things to Aristotle and his students for observation and classification.

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303 Ibid.

304 See Armstrong, An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy, 66. and Copleston, A History of Philosophy, 266.

305 Aristotle, The Philosophy of Aristotle with general introduction by Bambrough, xviii.

306 Ibid.


308 Ibid.
Around 335/4 BCE, Aristotle returned to Athens and began to meet with students at a place called the Lyceum, which is the name given to the school associated with Aristotle. The Aristotelian group was referred to as the *Peripatetic School* because Aristotle and his students would hold their discussions as they walked “up and down in the covered ambulatory or simply because much of the instruction was given in the ambulatory.” It should be noted that “the Lyceum [operated] side by side with the Platonic Academy, which was in the hands of Platonists whose interests were unsympathetic to Aristotle.” Bambrough continues the story:

After the death of Alexander [the Great] in 323, Aristotle was in danger from the anti-Macedonian party at Athens, who trumped up a charge of impiety against him. To save himself from the fate of Socrates, and the Athenians from a second crime against philosophy, he retired to Chalcis on the island of Euboea, where he died in 322. He left behind him a daughter who was called Pythias after her mother, and a son, Nicomachus, who was born to Herphylis, a women with whom Aristotle had formed a permanent liaison after the death of Pythias.

Barnes notes that “the Lyceum survived him, as the Academy had survived Plato.”

**Aristotelian Epistemology**

Diogenes, the third-century historian of the Greeks, notes that the catalogue of published works by Aristotle is impressive in both size and scope and lists some 150 items. In modern terms this adds up to about 550 books. Barnes notes that we have only about a third of this catalogue of works. Those works that are existent as well as those that have been lost demonstrate a wide range of expertise and interest. Bambrough suggests:

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310 Note see both Copelson, *A History* page 368 (quote is from Copleston) and Laertius Lives of the *Philosophers* trans by Caponigri page 183. Both authors tell this story, however Copleston uses the Greek term for “Peripatetic” and Caponigiri translates this term.
311 Aristotle, *The Philosophy of Aristotle* with general introduction by Bambrough, xviii.
312 Ibid.
The range and power of his achievement place him without question in the shortest of short lists of the giants of western thought. To many generations of thinkers he was known simply as “The Philosopher.” Dante, with reverence and without exaggeration, honored him with the proud title of “master of those who know.” Darwin testified to his huge achievement as a biologist: “Linnaeus and Cuvier have been my two gods, but they were mere schoolboys to old Aristotle.” All studies of formal logic until very recent times were footnotes to his work….His theological speculations are still the basis for the natural theology of the Roman Catholic Church. There is no problem in any of the branches of what is still called philosophy – ontology, epistemology, metaphysics, ethics – on which his remarks do not continue to deserve the most careful attention from the modern inquirer.315

Aristotle was a careful observer and categorizer and wanted to understand the whole of the natural world through “piecemeal empirical research,” which has become known as the Aristotelian method rather than by “large scale a priori theorizing” which might be viewed as a more Platonic approach.316 Aristotle was still, however, “The Philosopher” and he had not only “a desire to understand the world,” but also “a desire to understand man and his place in the world.”317

There is disagreement regarding Aristotle’s break with his mentor, Plato. It is unclear if there was a schism before Plato died, as Diogenes suggests, or if Aristotle’s move from Platonic epistemology was a gradual process of maturation, as Jaeger argues.318 Regardless, Aristotle’s departure from Plato’s thinking is important to understanding Aristotelian epistemology in its original form and modern articulation. His main objections may be found in his Ethics, Physics, and Metaphysics.319 As there are redundant arguments in these three works, I will examine the criticisms of Plato contained in Metaphysics.

315 Aristotle, The Philosophy of Aristotle with general introduction by Bambrough, xi.
316 Ibid., xv.
317 Ibid. xiv.
Metaphysics is a loose collection of “books,” what we might term chapters, which address what Aristotle called First Philosophy.\textsuperscript{320} For Aristotle this meant ideas that covered several general areas of questions. He asks, for example, the nature of how we know, how language reflects or does not reflect objects and ideas in the real world, humankind’s place in the world, and, just as the Presocrates had asked, the nature of substance in the world.\textsuperscript{321} Aristotle asserts the primacy of the senses for understanding the world, and in a related issue, the value of the nature of experience.\textsuperscript{322} He states:

Experience seems to be almost the same sort of thing as science and art; but, in fact, it is through experience that science and art occur among men, since, as Polus says, “experience produces art, but inexperience chance….We observe that those who have experience meet with more success than those who have grasped the principles of the subject without having any experience.\textsuperscript{323}

Clearly, there is an obvious connection here between experience and Elliott’s philosophy of music education, which emphasizes the experience of music making over being a passive listener or thinker about music. I will develop the relationship of Aristotelian thinking and Elliott’s praxial philosophy to a greater degree in Chapter 4.

A second critical development in Aristotle’s epistemology that runs contrary to Plato’s system of Universal Forms is Aristotle’s assertion that the understanding of individual particulars gives rise to the understanding of the universals.\textsuperscript{324} For Aristotle, the universal form is contained in the individual particular and does not exist in a transcendent dimension as in the Platonic epistemology. Later in Book I, Aristotle is more openly critical of Platonic Forms when he writes:

\textsuperscript{320} Aristotle, The Philosophy of Aristotle with general introduction by Bambrough, 5.
\textsuperscript{322} Ibid., 15.
\textsuperscript{323} Ibid., 15-16.
\textsuperscript{324} Ibid., 19.
…the Platonic view is not reasonable….The first point about those who maintain the
theory of forms is this. In seeking to find the causes of the things that are around us, they
have introduced another lot of objects equal in number to them….Further, the existence
of the forms is not made evident by any of the arguments by which we try to prove it…it
would seem impossible for the substance and that of which it is the substance to be
separate. Then how can the ideas [or forms] be substances of things even though they are
separate from them.325

A third important notion in the Aristotelian epistemology is the nature of cause. The
“wise man,” Aristotle notes, is “wiser the more accurate he is and the more he can tell us about
causes.”326 Aristotle posits four causes as follows:

Now causes are talked of in four different ways: one cause is the being and essence of a
thing,… a second is a thing’s matter and substratum; a third is the source of its
movement; and a fourth is the purpose of the thing and its good.327

Aristotle extends this argument when he asserts that it is often the substratum which remains
constant or universal when a change occurs in an object:

Certainly the substratum does not cause itself to change. Neither wood nor bronze, for
instance is the cause of its own change: the wood does not make a bed, nor the bronze a
statue; something else is the cause of the change.328

It is on this point that the Presocratics notions failed in Aristotle’s view. In Book I, Aristotle
recalls several of the Presocratic arguments and suggests that they were attempting to describe
the substratum as the universal element, but failed to address change. The change of the form of
the fundamental substratum, according to Aristotle is the cause. All this is set in motion, he later
asserts in Book XII, by an immovable mover or a first cause which many thinkers equate with
God.329

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325 Ibid., 26-27., 30.
326 Ibid., 18.
327 Ibid., 23.
328 Ibid.
329 Ibid., See pages 119-129. Note that in an Aristotelian cosmology, God did not create the universe as it
was always here. God first set it into motion and so is the first cause or first mover. All creation strives to return to
this first cause.
In summary, Greek intellectual accomplishments set the tone for all of western thought, and as Copleston notes, educated people everywhere should continue to read the ancient philosophers. More than this, as I argued above in Chapter 1, the two capstone philosophers of this age, Plato and Aristotle, represent archetypes of western thinking—that people are born with either a Platonic or an Aristotelian bent. I will now turn to several thinkers of the modern age who have noted the Platonic and Aristotelian tendencies in the analysis of music or of music education.

Platonic Tendencies in the Philosophical Analysis of Music

There has not been a previous discussion of Platonic tendencies in the philosophy of music education. There have, however, been several evaluations of Platonic influences in regard to music in general. The University of Texas philosopher Higgins suggests that there is a type of musical platonism which she refers to as a type of extreme formalism. Her ideas may be useful in identifying the Platonic tendencies in Reimer’s philosophy, especially regarding his ideas of the nature of music and musical performance. Higgins states that musical Platonists “all hold that the essence of a musical work is a kind of ideal entity, akin to a Platonic form.” Higgins continues:

The Platonists reminds us that we often do compare actual performances of a work with a mental conception of how it ought to be performed. When we think this way, the Platonist argues, we are considering our mental idea to be what the work really is and considering performances to be better or worse depending on how well they correspond to it….The Platonist assumes that a static, constant structure is the best explanation of what a work’s various performances have in common, even if we can never find a

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331 This idea is expressed by Bowman in *Philosophical Perspectives on Music*, 48. and by Dewey in *Types of Thinking including A Survey of Greek Philosophy*, 241 where Dewey gives the source of the statement as “a British wit,” but fails to identify of whom he is speaking.
performance that fully corresponds to it and even if we are not able to indicate it with precision.  

In her book, *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works*, Goehr outlines an analytical approach to musical works which includes a “Nominalist” or Aristotelian theory of musical works and a “Platonist” theory of musical works. Goehr notes that there are several “articulations” within the Platonic view of musical works. Goehr states:

> In one of its articulations, musical works are argued…to be universals – perhaps even natural kinds – constituted by structures of sounds. They lack spatio-temporal properties and exist everlasting. They exist long before any compositional activity has taken place and long after they perhaps have been forgotten. They exist even if no performances or score-copies are ever produced. To compose a work is less to create a kind, than it is to discover one.

In an alternative view, musical works “exist over and above their performances and score copies.” Works in this case are “quasi-Platonic entities” because they are created. She argues:

> …works retain their Platonic status because they are instantiated in performances. In this account, works are spatio-temporally bounded –dependent on the compositional activity that brought them into existence and upon the spatio-temporal properties of particulars (performances and score-copies) that instantiate them.

Goehr distinguishes what she refers to as the “strong Platonic view” from the “modified Platonist view.” In the strong view, musical works are independent of human performance. In the modified view, musical works are dependent on human interaction in the form of composing or

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333 Ibid., 29-31.
335 Ibid., 14.
336 Ibid.
337 Ibid.
338 Ibid.
339 The definition of *instantiat*e is “To represent (an abstract concept) by a concrete or tangible.” For example the concept of “redness” is instantiated by a red apple. From *The Free Dictionary by Farlex* [database on line] ; available from http://www.thefreedictionary.com/instantiated ; Internet ; accessed on 8 May 2006.
341 Ibid., 15.
performing.\textsuperscript{342} She suggests:

> Only dependent kinds require a specific, human interaction to stay in existence. In both views, however, works are distinct entities. Distinctness is not the same as independence. To say that works are distinct is to say they have existence over and above, or unexhausted by, the existence of performances and score-copies, regardless of the relation in which they stand to the latter. Distinctness characterizes a work as an abstract or concrete entity \textit{per se}; dependence, the relation of works to their performances and score-copies.\textsuperscript{343}

Thus, the nature of the musical entity as a distinct work is one important way that the Platonic view of music and musical performance is manifested in modern, western thinking.

Goehr offers a caveat to her analysis that will be important to the Platonic and Aristotelian analysis in this work. She states:

> Present use of Platonic (and later, Aristotelian and nominalist) terminology is standard and modern. Its use does not imply that Plato ever spoke about music in these terms.\textsuperscript{344}

In point of fact, neither Plato nor Aristotle ever spoke of music in these terms. Goehr is using, she suggests, the “standard and modern” idea of Platonic and Aristotelian epistemology as an analysis tool, as is the intention of this author in this dissertation. Therefore, in this analysis of overall methodology, our understanding of the large scale tenets of both of these philosophies will guide the analysis. That is not to say that an understanding of the ideals of the ancient philosophy is unimportant. Rather, it is to suggest that the ancient methodology and the modern interpretation of that methodology will both be important in the analysis of these two philosophical systems.

\begin{quote}
\textbf{Aristotelian Tendencies in the Philosophical Analysis of Music}

Goehr continues with an Aristotelian analysis of music in which “works [of music] are
\end{quote}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{342} Ibid.
\bibitem{343} Ibid.
\bibitem{344} Ibid., 14.
\end{thebibliography}
essences (types and structures) exhibited in performances and score-copies.”  She argues:

As with Platonist views, works are abstract in so far as they are sound-patterns exemplified in different performances. Yet works are essential strictures or patterns belonging to and inhering in other things, rather than distinct entities in their own right….Here, one moves away from considering the vertical relation between a work and its performances, a relation obtaining between abstractum and its concreta. One considers, instead, the horizontal relations obtaining between performances and score-copies.

She later expands this concept to include the cultural context of the musical performance, which is quite close to Elliott’s view of musical performance. Goehr states:

A work is embodied in physical objects to which it is not identical. The work-type…is a culturally emergent entity, emergent in the sense of its being embodied in particular objects within a defined cultural space.

So here we see several articulations of both the Platonic and Aristotelian methodological especially as their respective positions view the existence of music and musical performance. This will be important to the analysis of both Reimer’s and Elliott’s philosophies, as they state that the nature and value of music are the foundation of their philosophies.

Unlike Reimer’s text, which makes few references to ancient philosophy, Elliott’s text makes references to Aristotle and Aristotelian terminology, and so I argue that Elliott’s philosophy text may be used as a reference to itself in an evaluation of the methodological underpinning of the philosophy. I suggest that Reimer’s Platonic foundation is a suppressed methodological foundation and that Elliott’s is an explicit methodological foundation.

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345 Ibid., 15.
346 Ibid.
350 The idea of a suppressed methodological foundation is mine, but was suggested by my reading of Blackburn’s *Think: A Compelling Introduction to Philosophy* in his discussion of a suppressed premise.
Also, unlike Reimer’s MEAE, Elliott’s philosophy has had an outside article that explicitly gives an Aristotelian analysis to the praxial music education philosophy. In this article, Regelski carefully outlines the three-part Aristotelian theory of knowledge or *episteme*. The first part of knowledge, *theoria*, reveals Aristotle’s connection to Plato and the Academy. This type of knowledge is “pure or eternal truth that existed to be contemplated for its own sake.” Thus, while Aristotle objects to the notion of the Platonic forms, he retains the notion of *theoria* in the “sense of knowledge that exists for the mind alone.” The second and third type of knowledge in the Aristotelian system are two types of practical and down-to-earth knowledge “that are more distinguished by the ends to which they are put and by the processes by which such knowledge is created” than by any real difference in type of knowledge. *Techne* is “knowledge needed for ‘making,’ ‘producing,’ or ‘creating’ certain objects or other overt results.” “The knowledge that characterizes *techne* is, in modern terms, ‘technical know-how.’” Praxis, on the other hand is “centrally concerned with the critical and rational knowledge of both means and ends needed to bring about ‘right results’ for *people*.” In this way, the idea of praxis subsumes the skills of *techne*, but also includes “the ethical discernment needed to make rational judgments concerning the ‘goodness’ of such goals and ends in the first place.” Regelski argues that “praxis involves judgments that are both rational and ethical, and that bring about the ‘good’ or ‘right results’ for others or for one’s own life.”

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352 Ibid., 23.


354 Ibid., 24-25.

355 Ibid., 25.

356 Ibid.

357 Ibid., 28. (emphasis in original)

358 Ibid.
Another important distinction between techne and praxis that helps to articulate praxis as a concept on which to base a philosophy is the notion that:

…any instance of praxis that falls short of appropriate conditions…cannot be undone, nor can the agent just start over as though nothing had happened….Thus, while a technician – craftsman can just throw away an ill-made product of techne, the ethical dimension of praxis – its human element – puts a very strong obligation on the standards of care and excellence of the actions chosen to begin with because a poor result of agency must be contended with: the agent cannot just dismiss the result and start over….359

Regelski continues:

Praxis thus entails the kind of knowledge required (a) to make the ‘practical judgments’ needed to discern and then to conform action to rational ‘right results,’ (b) to guide the actions taken as they unfold (i.e., action feedback), and (c) to evaluate the ‘goodness’ of results in terms of the individual or group served (i.e., learning feedback). And ‘right action,’ in turn, amounts to successful or ‘good results’ as judged in terms of particular situations and individuals according to their important differences.360

Based on the above annotations of Aristotle’s knowledge system, it is understandable why Elliott would base his philosophy on the concept of praxis. In this article, however, Regelski is critical of both Reimer and Elliott’s philosophies. He criticizes MEAE as being disconnected from “direct and personal somatic experiences.”361 The aesthetic philosophy tends to emphasize ‘form’ and listening to music in a “decidedly ‘detached’ and disinterested’ manner.”362 Regelski concludes:

In other words, aesthetic accounts give a false impression that musical contemplation is a matter of conspicuous connoisseurship by an elite that possesses knowledge and resources well out of reach of ordinary listeners.

Regelski is also critical of Elliott’s use of the term praxis because “Elliott…makes only a few direct references to praxis and only a brief analysis of its derivation in the philosophy of Aristotle.”

359 Ibid.
360 Ibid., 28-29.
361 Ibid., 36.
362 Ibid.
It is true that Elliott make only a cursory mention of praxis, although, when it is mentioned, it is clear that Elliott means to attach the term praxis to his philosophy of music education.\textsuperscript{363} As to the charge that Elliott omits a complex and complete annotation of Aristotle’s original concept, I would submit that Elliott holds true to the essence of the Aristotelian concept and makes modern adaptations which strengthen the concept for his philosophical use without taking away from the original meaning. For example, Elliott suggests that “praxis connotes action that is embedded in, responsive to, and reflective of a specific context of effort.”\textsuperscript{364} While this is a slightly different view of praxis than Aristotle may have intended, it does no harm to the concept and fits well into Elliott’s idea of music as culturally embedded. Secondly, Elliott argues that his “praxial philosophy of music education holds that musicianship equals musical understanding” which he refers to as “knowledgeable music making,” and he does distinguish this from Aristotle’s idea of techne, which he identifies as “merely completing tasks correctly.”\textsuperscript{365} “Praxis,” Elliott states, is concerned “with ‘right action’: enlightened, critical, and ‘situated’ action.\textsuperscript{366} This is, in fact, fairly close to Aristotle’s original meaning of the word. He has, perhaps, left as unsaid the notion of this action resulting in a good or ethical outcome for the person engaged in praxis.\textsuperscript{367} Certainly it is implied that an ethical and good outcome may result from a person who practices all the attributes of “knowledgeable music making” or praxial philosophy as defined by Elliott.\textsuperscript{368}

\textsuperscript{363} See Elliott, \textit{Music Matters}, pages 14, 68-70.  
\textsuperscript{364} Elliott, \textit{Music Matters}, 14. 
\textsuperscript{365} Ibid., 69. 
\textsuperscript{366} Ibid. 
\textsuperscript{367} This idea is annotated by Regelski in “The Aristotelian Bases of Praxis for Music and Music Education as Praxis” but may also be found in Aristotle, \textit{The Philosophy of Aristotle} with general introduction by Bambrough. See “Ethics” especially pages 313-315, 320-327, and 331-333 for an explanation of Aristotle’s concept of the \textit{good}, and 384-393 for an explanation of \textit{praxis}. 
\textsuperscript{368} Elliott, \textit{Music Matters}, 68-70.
Summary

The philosophical ideas explored above demonstrate a tension between the ideas as stated by Plato and Aristotle in their original writing and the interpretation of these ancient philosophers by modern thinkers. I believe it is important to understand the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle and the context in which they were working to understand the original intention and framework of their thinking. At the same time, their ideas have become embedded in the intellectual world of western history and continue to have currency in the intellectual marketplace of ideas, often with a modern articulation.

In the above studies, Higgins, Goehr and Elliott are tending to take what Goehr calls the “standard and modern” interpretation of Platonic and Aristotelian terminology. Regelski is taking a more conservative approach to the interpretation of Aristotle’s concepts of knowledge. Keeping both the ancient philosophies and the modern articulations of them in mind during the following analysis will be important to achieve a rich and complete analysis of Reimer’s and Elliott’s philosophical positions. Demonstrating the Platonic and Aristotelian foundation of Reimer and Elliott, respectively, will complete the first goal of this dissertation. Establishing a framework of thinking that allows a synergy between the MEAE and praxial philosophy using the ideas of the Danish philosopher Løgstrup will be the second goal. In the following section, I will introduce the work of K. E. Løgstrup, followed by a summary of representative studies in nursing philosophy that use his ideas as a philosophical analysis tool or as a framework for training student nurses. I will turn now to Løgstrup and his philosophical ideas.

Toward a New Framework: The Philosophy of Kund Løgstrup

The Danish philosopher Knud Løgstrup has taken issue with both the Platonic and Aristotelian epistemological notions and has offered “a third way” of understanding how we know and do in our relations with the world and with one another. Løgstrup calls his third way *ontological ethics* articulated in his text *The Ethical Demand*. The *Ethical Demand* will be the primary source for a new framework of thinking about the philosophy of music education, one that will also incorporate specific tenants of Reimer’s and Elliott’s philosophies. Løgstrup’s philosophy is well-suited as a model for incorporating aspects of Reimer’s and Elliott’s thinking because, while he is influenced by Plato and Aristotle, he believes there is a more fundamental element that guides our relationships with others. Løstrup’s work will also provide a framework for thinking deeply about the relationship between students and teachers inherent in the process of music teaching, which is lacking in the philosophies of Reimer and Elliott. A detailed conceptual analysis of Løgstrup’s philosophy taken from *The Ethical Demand* is articulated in Chapter 5.

There are additional Løgstrup works that may also play an important part in framing the implications of a new thinking about the philosophy of music education. One such article is “Ethics and Ontology” in which Løgstrup articulates his objection to the ethical notions of Plato and Aristotle. Løgstrup argues that there are “two completely different ethical traditions in our western culture: a *teleological* tradition for which goals or purposes are fundamental, and a *deontological* tradition according to which duty is primary.” Løgstrup notes that Plato and

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372 Løgstrup, *The Ethical Demand*
373 See Birkelund, “Ethics and Education,” 478.
375 Ibid., 265. Teleology: The supposition that there is a design, purpose, directive principle that guides actions. From *thefreedictionary.com* [dictionary on-line] (accessed 10 May 2006); available from
Aristotle are both teleological in their ethical systems. Both Plato and Aristotle “operate with a ranking of goals, ends, and goods, in all their different degrees.”\textsuperscript{376} Løstrup is critical of this system because it is based on an intellectual foundation.\textsuperscript{377} Plato and Aristotle, Løstrup asserts, are both teleological in their understanding of how we know and do. This being the case, I will forgo discussion of the notions of deontolgical understanding as it is unimportant to this specific study.\textsuperscript{378}

It should be noted that Løstrup’s criticism of Plato and Aristotle is focused on their notions of an ethical system. I am framing the debate between them in a somewhat broader context to include their overall epistemological system or methodology. This is in keeping with my argument that Reimer and Elliott have captured the methodology of Plato and Aristotle respectively. Løstrup’s interests are more narrowly focused on ethics, as that is his primary philosophical concern. This does no damage to my notion that Løstrup’s philosophical ideas can provide a new framework of thinking about music education philosophy. Plato and Aristotle’s ethical system is contained within their respective epistemological systems. Therefore, Løstrup’s notion that Plato and Aristotle are too intellectual in their ethical systems is still a valid argument for the purposes of my analysis. I will extend his criticism to suggest that the Platonic and Aristotelian methodologies are based too much on idea and not enough on relationship. This criticism, by extension, is also applicable to Reimer and Elliott’s methodologies. Also, I believe that a framework for the ethical interaction between students and teachers in the music classroom is an under-represented idea in MEAE and praxial philosophy,

\textsuperscript{376} Løstrup, “Ethics and Ontology” trans. Watkins, 265.
\textsuperscript{377} Birkelund, “Ethics and Education,” 478.
which strengthens the use of Løgstrup’s ontological ethics as a viable framework for thinking about music education philosophy. Fortunately there are other translated works of Løgstrup as well as other studies in the domain of philosophy of nursing that may aid in creating a new framework of thinking about music education philosophy. I will turn to those sources now.

A shorter article that is helpful in providing a framework for the ethical ideas in Løgstrup’s philosophical system is “The Exaggeration of the Importance of Principles in Moral Reasoning.” This article contrasts contemporary British moral philosophy with Løgstrup’s notions of ontological ethics. Løgstrup uses several examples from everyday life which may prove helpful in annotating his often complicated ideas.

Most of the books and articles needed to construct a framework for a new music education philosophy exist in translation from Danish or German into English. One exception is the book Etiske Begerber og Problemer [Concepts and Problems in Ethics]. This work is quoted in a secondary source, Birkelund’s “Ethics and Education,” that has been utilized in several sections above and will be important in later analysis.

In addition to The Ethical Demand, there are two other translated publications Metaphysicis Volume I and Volume II which will also be utilized to construct a framework of thinking for a philosophy of music education. These two volumes are, for the most part, excepts taken from Løgstrup’s magnum opus that he was “in the process of completing at the time of his death in 1981.” This was a four-volume treatise entitled Metafysik. The first translated volume of Metafysik consists of Løgstrup’s Metafysik Volume IV called Skabelse og

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383 Ibid.
tilintetgørelse [Creation and Annihilation]. This work deals with Løgstup’s criticism of the “modern scientific worldview” which he argues is not “false, but is too one sided.” It also contains Løgstrup’s notions of “being-in-the-world” which he argues is “inextricably bound” to annihilation. Løgstrup states:

Annihilation is present in everything that is, in the transitoriness of its being. Death is present in everything living, in the temporariness of its life. From the moment that which exists comes into being, it is the prey of annihilation.

For Løgstrup this is not a notion to bring despair. Rather it, raises a question of how anything exists at all. The answer for Løgstrup is power:

The religious answer is power: A power which is at once present in and different from the existing or the living thing. This is the answer of Judaism and Christianity, and the answer contains a triad: Annihilation, being and power.

This metaphysical triad of annihilation, being and power is a condition for our being-in-the-world. Løgstrup stops short of naming a deity as a source for the power that exists in the universe that sustains our being as we move inexorably toward annihilation. What he does is examine the work of a poet, Lars Gyllensten, and a painter, Max Beckmann, to demonstrate his notion of the metaphysical triad. Løgstrup relies on experience to help support his philosophical positions, but he defines experience broadly to include the worlds of literature, art and music.

In his phenomenological examination of being-in-the-world, Løgstrup demonstrates his connection to both Husserl and Heidegger, but Løgstrup differs from both in his emphasis on what he calls sensation and the utter receptivity to sensation that is another way of knowing our world or another way of being-in-the-world. At the core of the argument, Løgstrup differs

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384 Ibid., vi.
385 Ibid.
386 Ibid.
388 Ibid.
389 Ibid., vi-xi.
from Husserl and Heidigger’s notions of being-in-the-world in his idea that the universe is our source not simply our surroundings.390 “Linked to Løgstrup’s view of sensation is his theory of the so-called sovereign ‘life manifestations,’ such as trust, sympathy and openness of speech.391 Dees reflects on this idea:

As Løstrup formulated it…life is more than the ego; human beings are not their own sovereigns. We can detect certain phenomena, independent of our consciousness or will, which break through them in our conduct and behavior. The sovereign life manifestations are not ‘human’…but derive from the universe which is our source. Thus, along with Freud, Foucault, Derrida and many other modern or postmodern thinkers, Løgstrup agrees that the equation of the ‘self’ and ‘consciousness’ is a delusion, that there are other phenomenon that constitute our being in just as fundamental a way. However, for Løgstrup in contrast to the others, these phenomena have ethical implications for the good.392

Our openness to the power of the universe allows us to let the life manifestations guide our actions. In this way Løgstrup constructs his ethics which are ontological, or part of our being-in-the-world.

Volume II “consists of excerpts of the remaining three volumes of the Metafysik, together with certain sections from System og symbol.”393 Three portions of this work may prove important to this dissertation project. The first is Part I, Excerpts: Source and Surroundings, in which Løgstrup further develops his notion of the importance of sensation and the structure of the knowledge we glean from sensation.394 The second is Part III, Excerpts: Art and Knowledge, in which Løgstrup works with the idea of the nature of sensation in artistic work, what it means to create a significant work of art, and perhaps most importantly for the purposes of this project, the nature of the aesthetic experience. This section also underscores the

390 Ibid. vi.
391 Ibid., ix.
392 Ibid.
393 Ibid. xii.
important role art plays in the structure of human knowing.\textsuperscript{395} The third section is Part V, \textit{Excerpts: System and Symbol}, which further develops the idea of life-manifestations, trust, mercy, openness of speech.\textsuperscript{396}

The above works by Løgstrup will be utilized in the conceptual analysis of his philosophical system and in the construction for a music education philosophy outlined in Chapter 6. Another important link in the analysis will be provided by several articles in the domain of nursing philosophy. As stated above in Chapter 1, scholars in the domain of nursing philosophy have been concerned with the dialectic between Platonic and Aristotelian foundations for teaching and some have suggested that Løgstrup’s philosophical system would prove helpful as a philosophy to support the training of nursing students. It is my suggestion that these ideas, based in the practice of teaching, will provide a link to aid in the construction of a new framework of thinking about teaching and learning music.

An examination in the domain of nursing philosophy reveals a strong interest in the philosophy of Løgstrup.\textsuperscript{397} Many scholars in nursing philosophy are constructing an application of Løgstrup’s philosophical notions to inform the work of nurses and direct the instruction of

\textsuperscript{395} Ibid., 291-336.
\textsuperscript{396} Ibid., 375-391.
student nurses. In reviewing this literature, the following ideas are revealed as important in creating a new framework about music education philosophy based on Løgstrup’s ideas:

- Provide opportunities for the recognition of ontological life-manifestations such as trust, mercy, and openness of speech. For music teaching this may have to do with creating a community that allows for the recognition of these life-manifestations.
- A creative closeness, balanced with a form of distance that protects the integrity of both student and teacher.
- Ability to “hear” students who may not be able to articulate their needs as contained in the silent demand.
- Recognition that the relationship of teacher/student may often be asymmetrical in nature.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to contextualize the present study based on the history of the domain of music education philosophy, the development of philosophical thinking in ancient Greece, and the philosophical ideas of the Danish Philosopher Kund E. Løgstrup. The first section of this chapter outlined the history of the development of modern philosophical thinking, especially since 1970, with the first publication of a book devoted solely to the notion that music education needed a well-defined philosophy.398 When Reimer’s *A Philosophy of Music Education* appeared, it heralded several decades of a unitary approach to the philosophy of music education.399 The appearance of Elliott’s *Music Matters* in 1995 as a direct philosophical challenge to Reimer’s MEAE, signaled the end of unity in the domain of philosophy of music education. The debate between the MEAE of Reimer and the praxial philosophy of Elliott has been contentious and unresolved since that time, as evidenced by the journal articles referenced in the first section of this chapter. I argue that Reimer has constructed a foundational philosophy

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that is Platonic in approach and Elliott has responded with a foundational philosophy that is Aristotelian in approach. This debate, then, is an ancient dialectic and, places the philosophies of Reimer and Elliott on extreme points of the epistemological spectrum. Reimer, then, is in a far rationalist position and Elliott is at the empirical extreme.

The second major section of this chapter outlined the development of Greek philosophy from which these two epistemological positions, rationalism and empiricism, were first developed. I have chosen to begin with the presocratics and trace the history of Greek thought through Socrates and finally to Plato and Aristotle to give the fullest picture possible of the development of the two epistemological positions: Platonic rationalism and Aristotelian empiricism.

In the final section of this chapter, I turned to the philosophy of Løgstrup and introduced the studies that will be utilized in the development of a new framework of thinking about music education philosophy that will create a synergy between the rationalism of Reimer’s philosophy and the empiricism of Elliott’s philosophy. As an application model of Løstrup’s thinking, I referenced the domain of nursing philosophy, which I believe is analogous to the mission of teaching. Therefore, the application of the philosophical ideas of Løstrup in the field of nursing and nursing training can inform the development of a new framework for thinking about music education philosophy and implications for its application in the music classroom.
CHAPTER 3

THE PHILOSOPHY OF BENNETT REIMER

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of Reimer’s philosophy followed by a critical analysis utilizing a metaphilosophical approach. In the analysis portion I will compare and link the epistemology and methodology of Reimer to Plato, moving from narrower issues of epistemology to broader issues of overall methodology. As explained below, the third edition of Reimer’s text, *A Philosophy of Music Education: Advancing the Vision*, will be used as the single source for this overview and analysis.

Bennett Reimer’s *A Philosophy of Music Education* was first published in 1970, followed by a second edition published in 1989, and a third edition in 2003, which included an additional subtitle: *Advancing the Vision*. All three follow the same foundational premise. Reimer notes:

> In both the first (1970) and the second (1989) editions of this book, I began by stating the fundamental premise on which my philosophy is based: that the nature and value of music education are determined primarily by the nature and value of music.

> A section that is not present in the 2003 edition is the idea that the “music education field is trying to become ‘aesthetic education.’” Reimer notes in the preface of the 2003 version of his text that many new developments have occurred in “the field of aesthetics…and important related fields” since the previous editions. He is clear, however that the present text is based in “the ongoing domain of aesthetic theorizing and all the many domains that influence it.”

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400 Reimer, *A Philosophy of Music Education* 1st - 3rd edition
401 Ibid., 2.
402 Ibid.
403 Ibid.
However expanded, the 2003 publication is still a philosophy based firmly in the domain of aesthetics and not fundamentally different from the previous two editions.

Reimer’s philosophy is guided by the notion that music enables a deeper understanding of complex, often inexpressible, feelings and by interacting with music we have a deeper understanding of ourselves and our world. He extends this idea by suggesting that music education is directly related to the nature and value of music. He states:

the nature and value of music education are determined primarily by the nature and value of music. To the degree that music educators are able to construct a convincing explanation of what music is like – its diverse yet distinctive features and the many contributions it makes to human welfare – the profession will understand the domain to which it is devoted and be able to implement programs that effectively share its special values.

Reimer also articulates what he considers to be the nature and value of music and, incidentally, the other arts:

Put simply, it is that music and the other arts are basic ways that humans know themselves and their world; they are basic modes of cognition. The older idea, prevalent since the Renaissance, that knowing consists only of conceptual reasoning is giving way to the conviction that there are many ways humans conceive reality, each of them a genuine realm of cognition with its own validity and unique characteristics….These burgeoning ideas allow educators to affirm, with great courage, with great hope, and with great relief, that music must be conceived as all the great disciplines of the human mind are conceived – as a basic subject with its unique characteristics of ways to know and ways to be intelligent, that must be offered to all children if they are not to be deprived of its values.

Reimer notes that a definition of MEAE is “changeable and flexible” but that there are “several characteristic beliefs of aesthetic education in music [that] may be identified.” In the list of beliefs that follow he states:

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404 Ibid., 85.
405 Ibid.
406 Ibid., 5.
Any single aspect of the music program – a performing group, a general music class, a composition lab, a listening-focused course, and so on – can be, in and of itself, a valid instance of aesthetic education. Aesthetic education attempts to nurture characteristic interactions with music, and those interactions can be achieved in any and all aspects of a total music curriculum.\textsuperscript{408}

Further, Reimer asserts that a definition of aesthetic education is difficult and limiting, suggesting that a “description” may be more useful.\textsuperscript{409}

Aesthetic education in music attempts to enhance learnings related to the following propositions:

1. Musical sounds (as various cultures construe what these are) create share meanings available only from such sounds.
2. Create musical meanings, and partaking of them, require an amalgam of mind, body, and feeling.
3. Musical meanings incorporate within them a great variety of universal/cultural/individual meanings (ideas, beliefs, values, associations, etc.) transformed by musical sounds.
4. Gaining its special meanings requires direct experience with musical sounds, deepened and expanded by skills, knowledge, understandings, attitudes, and sensitivities education can cultivate.\textsuperscript{410}

To summarize, Reimer is constructing a notion of the human emotional framework and the ways music informs us about this important part of our existence. In Reimer’s view, it is the very nature and value of music that facilitates this deeper understanding of the emotional life of human beings. Reimer turns now to how music education becomes, in his philosophy, the education of feeling.\textsuperscript{411}

The Education of Feeling

The concept of the nature of feelings in the musical experience is at the heart of Reimer’s philosophy of aesthetic education.\textsuperscript{412} Reimer notes a substantive difference between emotions

\textsuperscript{408} Reimer, A Philosophy of Music Education: Advancing the Vision, 10.
\textsuperscript{409} Ibid, 11.
\textsuperscript{410} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{411} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{412} Reimer, A Philosophy of Music Education: Advancing the Vision, 72.
and feelings, with emotions serving as categories or labels for feelings, and feelings as the ineffable experience. He creates a compelling analogy of the individual and subjective ocean of feelings. He writes:

In the vast realm of human subjectivity some guideposts exist, marking off large areas of feeling that are somewhat related to one another or that share a particular quality. These guideposts, which are little more than occasional buoys in an ocean of subjective responses, have been given names. One of them, for example is called ‘love.’ …Our feelings are better envisioned as the surging waters underneath the buoys that have been given names.  

According to Reimer, music allows us to experience feelings in a direct and embodied way, and this access to the feelings in our own vast subjective ocean is a unique way of knowing our world. Music does this, he suggests, by creating “musical worlds.”

“We experience musical works as objects – in creating them, in performing them, in listening to them, we are aware of them as full realities.” Musical works are experienced as belonging to a world of their own and are heard inside us, or in the “listening mind.” Reimer explains:

It is important to understand, here, that ‘the listening mind’ is the composer’s, performer’s, the improviser’s, as well as the listener’s. All engagements with music activate the ‘listening mind,’ each in its own way and each calling for its own creativity and intelligence.

Therefore, in Reimer’s construction, music exists apart from our consciousness, but is experienced uniquely and subjectively in each individual. Reimer further expounds this notion using the concepts of inherent and delineated meanings. Reimer argues:

There is no neat ‘line’ of either – or between the inherent and delineated aspects of musical experiencing, between the either ‘musical’ or ‘extra musical,’ either ‘intrinsic’ or ‘extrinsic’ dimensions, a line that, crossed in either direction, immediately changes the nature of the experience….In our efforts to reveal as much inference as we can…in each

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413 Ibid., 83.
414 Ibid., 86.
417 Ibid., 87.
particular musical experience we are sharing with our students, we must make room for, and give all due recognition to, what our students add to the experience from their own, individual perspective. 418

In articulating the framework of how this education of feelings occurs, Reimer outlines an analogy of reading, writing and conceptual reasoning. Reimer notes that “writing and reading deepen our thinking” and suggests that, by analogy, engaging with music deepens our feeling selves. 419

![Diagram of Writing and Reading](image)

**Figure 2. Reimer’s Diagram of Writing and Reading** 420

Utilizing the figure above, Reimer is asserting that “in this profound sense, writing and reading can educate reasoning. Based on that explanation of the role of writing and reading in the education of conceptual reasoning, the claim about music (and music education) as an education of feeling can now be made.” 421

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418 Ibid., 89.
419 Ibid., 92. (emphasis in original)
420 Ibid. Note for figure 2 and 3 see pages 92 and 93 of Reimer’s *A Philosophy of Music Education: Advancing the Vision*.
421 Ibid, 93.
For Reimer, “experiencing music as an ‘affecting presence’– as a source of meanings gained through feeling – is a primary end of being involved with music.” Based on this pronouncement, Reimer delineates between four types of knowing: knowing about, knowing why, knowing how and knowing within. He states that

music is a direct presentation of the feelingful dimension of experience. We get the feelings directly from the music – not from ideas about music, information about music, the vocabulary of music, facts about music, the history of music, cultural backgrounds of music, music theory, philosophy of music, or any of the other associated learnings in the music education enterprise. All those learnings (knowing about and knowing why) serve a purpose – the purpose of enhancing the quality of the direct engagement with the sounds of music themselves – of knowing within music. Knowing about and knowing why are means. The end is enhanced knowing within music (and knowing how) in direct, immediate musical experiences.

Reimer insists that he is not discouraging the other forms of musical knowledge; rather, he is asserting that music teachers must keep the ultimate goal of music teaching in the forefront of their minds, that is “knowing within.” While Reimer does not explicitly define what he means

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422 Ibid., 94.
423 Ibid., 95.
424 Ibid.
by the term “knowing within” or “taking within,”\textsuperscript{425} we may surmise that he is speaking of
greater levels of internalized understanding of music through the study of all aspects of musical
knowledge. He suggests:

A major way to encourage knowing within…is to help reveal to both musicians and
listeners more and more of the inherent workings of music so that the possibilities of
feeling they contain become more available. That is a major, foundational role for all
music educators – being the expert guides to the inner workings of a great variety of
musics.\textsuperscript{426}

In deference to a synergistic position, Reimer suggests that music teachers must
recognize and make room for the extra-musical content of music.\textsuperscript{427} But it is clear from a careful
reading that he views the immediacy of music’s inherent, embodied meanings as a higher calling
and a more important benefit from engagement with music. Reimer states:

Our emphasis, or balance, must, I think, never neglect…the root of music that the
feelings it explores are inherent within its sounds. Music ‘is directly and presently what
it is, and precisely is, in those physical-significant terms in which it is presented for our
witnessing.’ Those ‘physical-significant terms,’ in music are ‘sounds organized’
(Sloboda), the ‘structural properties’ or ‘musical means’ (Sparshott) that set music apart
as the unique phenomenon it is, with the unique values it offers. The organized sounds of
music may refer, but they also embrace and incorporate references, change them,
metamorphosing them (‘changing in form, structure, or substance’) into felt meanings
inherent in the sounds and what they do.\textsuperscript{428}

Pulling the above thoughts into summary, Reimer is asserting that the emotions are
another way of knowing and are as important as the linear, logical,
linguistic/mathematical way of knowing. Music, he suggests, embodies these emotions in a
formal way and may help humans understand this type of knowing.\textsuperscript{429} Reimer concludes his
section on the education of feelings with these remarks:

\textsuperscript{425} Ibid., 98.
\textsuperscript{426} Ibid., 98.
\textsuperscript{427} Reimer, \textit{A Philosophy of Music Education: Advancing the Vision}, 95.
\textsuperscript{428} Ibid., 96.
\textsuperscript{429} Note: I have included in a later section a similar notion of music and its effect on the human emotions
as articulated by the 19\textsuperscript{th} century philosopher Schopenhauer, an overt Platonic thinker, to help substantiate my claim
that Reimer is Platonically based in his philosophy.
Qualities of improved subjectivity...stem from this process of composing and listening to music. The higher quality of affective experience is a direct result of a process that enables feelings to be precise, accurate, detailed, subtle, lucid, complex, discriminating, powerful, meaningful. In this profound sense, composing and listening to music educate feeling.\textsuperscript{430}

Curricular Applications of MEAE

I am including several of Reimer’s suggestions for curricular applications of MEAE here for use in the critical analysis later in this chapter. It is my contention that several aspects of Reimer’s curricular applications reinforce Reimer as a Platonic thinker and MEAE as a Platonic construct.

The curricular applications of Reimer’s philosophy are used both in advancing a comprehensive general music program and advancing a comprehensive specialized music program. Reimer begins by offering a seven-phase model of the total school curriculum. He asserts:

Nothing less than inclusiveness, in both our concept of what an effective curriculum is and how our programs can be carried out, will be sufficient for accomplishing what people learning music deserve – the broadest possible opportunities to discover and fulfill their potentials to incorporate fulfilling musical experiences in their lives.\textsuperscript{431}

His model of the total curriculum is a seven phase construct that asks four questions dealing with why, what, when, and how. Reimer states:

1. The ‘Why’ questions – the questions addressed by philosophy – are the starting point for all conceptualizations of education.
2. The ‘what’ questions – questions of what education must do to fulfill its purposes – provide broad guidelines (as conceptualized goals education should attempt to achieve) from which actions can proceed effectively.
3. The systematized phase of the curriculum, addressed to the question of ‘when?’, is now called for, in which a map of sequential learning is provided, yielding directionality to teaching and learning over the span of the school years.

\textsuperscript{430} Ibid., 101. (emphasis in original)
\textsuperscript{431} Ibid., 241.
4. The first aspect of the ‘how’ phase is how the professionals responsible for providing schooling interpret the previous phases.

5. Finally, we arrive at the operational phase of teaching and learning – the interface of professionals and students.

6. At the experience phase of the curriculum – what students take from and make of their education – how well learning takes place and what will be learned depend on all that makes each individual student what she is.

7. Finally, underlying all these phases of the total curriculum is another dimension that has significant determining influences on each of them – the expectations people have of education.

The flow chart in figure 4 below taken from Reimer’s text may serve to illuminate the above phases and questions.432

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432 For this figure see Reimer, *A Philosophy of Music Education: Advancing the Vision*, 242.
Reimer notes that “a valid general education in music aims to enhance every person’s abilities and natural propensities…recognizing that most will be involved as aficionados, some as amateurs, and a (very) few as professionals.”

(See Figure 5 Appropriate Balance of Levels of Expertise in General Music)

![Figure 5. Appropriate Balance of Levels of Expertise in General Music](image)

This balance of expertise as an appropriate emphasis in general music is noted by Reimer as “general music emphasizes the cultivation of the most widespread involvement with music, that of aficionado, while including amateur and professional commitments as an aspect of study and experience.”

Reimer articulates his view of the specialized music program and the balance outlined above shifts slightly. He suggests that “the elective program rearranges [the] balance, emphasizing the most widespread special involvement – that of the amateur – with concomitant

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433 Ibid., 255.
434 Ibid., 275.
attention to the professional and aficionado."\textsuperscript{435}

Figure 6. Appropriate Balance of Levels of Expertise in a Specialized Music Program

In general, he argues for the same framework as the general music curriculum, but at this level, he suggests using various elective offerings. Students, he asserts, may want to focus on one musical intelligence that they find particularly interesting, and so elective courses in improvisation, composition, listening, musicology, and music criticism should be offered. He is adamant that performance classes should also be offered, along with these more broadly conceived electives. I suggest that in Reimer’s curricular model, the art of listening holds a special place. Reimer posits: “if singing, playing, improving, composing, and arranging are to be accomplished genuinely, they also need to be studied in courses devoted to developing genuine listenership.”\textsuperscript{436}

In summary, Reimer is suggesting a broad curricular structure for specialized music programs that emphasize the skills that many musical amateurs and aficionados will find useful

\textsuperscript{435} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{436} Ibid., 294.
in their interaction with music. Skillful listening is an important part of this curriculum. Reimer asserts that this is currently not the structure of specialized music programs, his ideas, he argues, would bring transformation to our profession. He states:

We have historically been unconscionably limited in our offerings for aficionados and amateurs in the ways most pursue, regard, and enjoy music, thereby ensuring limited participation. Opening our electives to the realities of diverse musical enthusiasms young people possess, and teaching them with the specialized expertise they need and deserve, would transform our curriculum, our value, and our status in education.

In the above quote, Reimer implies that his philosophy, including his curriculum articulation, is not currently common practice in the United States. One reason this may be true is that his philosophy is based from the viewpoint of a rationalist framework. That is, he has based his philosophy on an abstract idea rather than emphasizing empirical practice. I will now examine this notion using a conceptual analysis of Reimer’s philosophy as a Platonic construct. While Reimer asserts that he is interested in a “synergistic philosophical stance,” this version of his philosophy is as steeped in rationalism as earlier versions have been. As I examine Reimer’s philosophy as Platonic construct, I will illuminate the foundational ideas that are related to Platonic epistemology and methodology. These foundational ideas are the nature and value of music and the education of feelings. The broader issues of methodology are Reimer’s use of several Platonic-like myths in his application of his curricular model. My plan for this analysis is to move from smaller issues of epistemology toward broader, more inclusive issues of methodology.

Reimer’s Rationalist Epistemology as Platonic Construct

The first aspect of Reimer’s epistemology that I will relate to Platonic thinking is his

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437 Note: See discussion in Chapters 1 and 2.
438 Ibid., 30.
foundational premise and his assessment of the “nature and value of music.”

As was stated above, the underlying premise of Reimer’s philosophy is an indication of the Platonic roots of his philosophy. He states:

I began by stating the fundamental premise on which my philosophy was based: that the nature and value of music education are determined primarily by the nature and value of music. To the degree that music educators are able to construct a convincing explanation of what music is like…the profession will understand the domain to which it is devoted and be able to implement programs that effectively share its special values.

The notion that music education philosophy must be reasoned from the idea of the nature and value of music situates his philosophy in a rationalist framework. The connection to Platonic epistemology emerges in the fact that MEAE is founded in an abstract idea: the idea of music and its value. This is related to the Platonic notion of the Ideal Form or Idea. Recall Plato’s concept of “The Divided Line.” For Plato, all apparent images and thoughts are transitory and are based on Ideal Forms. These forms are objects that create the copies that we see in the real world. The perfect transcendent form of a tree, for instance, creates all the imperfect copies of trees that we apprehend in this, so called, real world. The concept of music, for Reimer, is defined in a manner after this Platonic notion of the Ideal Form. Rather than an abstract organization of sounds, music becomes, in Reimer’s epistemology, a work or object that allows humans to engage with feelings in a direct or embodied way.

Further, Reimer asserts that his interest in writing a new version of his philosophy is based in a theoretical framework. He states emphatically that “I always relate theoretical ideas to the practice of music education.” He argues:

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439 Ibid., xi.
440 Ibid.
441 Note: These terms, “Ideal Form” and “Idea,” seem to be used interchangeably. For the sake of clarity, I will utilize the term “Ideal Form” throughout the remainder of this analysis.
442 See page 72 above for a diagram of The Divided Line and cited sources.
443 Ibid., 86.
444 Reimer, A Philosophy of Music Education: Advancing the Vision, x. (emphasis in original)
I have a pressing sense of vocation to use my expanding theoretical understanding to help clarify what music education is all about so that it can be more valid and effective in its actions. As my understanding grows, so grows my sense of what an effective music education might consist of.445

These thoughts from Reimer indicate his commitment to the abstract understanding of concepts as apart from the notion of experience or empirical understanding. He is always, he indicates, driven in his philosophy by the idea, or in Platonic terms, the Ideal Form, (in this case, music) as a transcendent and objective world that engages human feelings.

From this definition of music as concept or Ideal Form, Reimer takes the next Platonic step in defining the value of music. “The value of music,” he argues, “and the other arts, are basic ways that humans know themselves and their world.”446 Again recall the Platonic analogy of The Divided Line.447 The closer to an understanding of a universal form a person comes, in this case the Ideal Form of music, the more they demonstrate true knowledge in a Platonic sense.

To clarify this line of reasoning, Reimer first suggests that the abstract idea of the nature and value of music is the foundation of his philosophy. He then notes that the value of music is contained in the fact that it is one of the basic ways humans know themselves and the world. Therefore, Reimer’s idea is that the understanding of the abstract notion of music brings humans into a fuller knowledge of themselves and the world. This relates directly to the Platonic idea that the closer one comes to an understanding of the Ideal Forms, the closer one comes to true knowledge.

Reimer suggests that while culture, context, messages, beliefs and other representational

445 Ibid., x.
446 Ibid., 5.
447 Ibid. Note see page 72 above for a diagram of The Divided Line and cited sources.
elements are present in music,\textsuperscript{448} they are subsumed into music’s “inherent nature as ‘sounds-in-meaningful-configurations.’”\textsuperscript{449} More than the other arts, Reimer asserts, music brings us into the “the sounds directly.”\textsuperscript{450} This idea is very similar to the 19\textsuperscript{th} century German philosopher Schopenhauer’s notion of music, suggesting that the Platonic foundation of MEAE is supported in the historic philosophical literature. I want to take an aside at this point and examine a portion of the work of the philosopher Schopenhauer that relates to Reimer’s understanding of music.

Reimer’s idea that music brings us into the sounds directly, is very similar to Schopenhauer’s notion of music in his philosophical work, \textit{The World as Will and Idea}.\textsuperscript{451} He examines all the arts individually and suggests that music is such a powerful and glorious art, its effect on man’s inmost nature is so powerful, and so deeply understood by him in his inmost conscious as a perfectly universal language whose clarity surpasses even that of the perceptible world itself.\textsuperscript{452}

After asserting music’s supreme place among the arts, Schopenhauer suggests why this is true, thus illuminating the connection to Reimer’s idea of the inherent and direct nature of music to represent meaning. Notice that Schopenhauer invokes Platonic Ideas. He argues:

\begin{quote}
The (Platonic) Ideas are the adequate objectification of will. To stimulate the knowledge of these by depicting particular things (for works of art are themselves always representation of particular things) is the aim of all the other [non-musical] arts (and is possible only by a corresponding change in the knowing subject). Thus all these arts objectify the will only indirectly by means of the Ideas….Music is as \textit{direct} an objectification and copy of the whole will as is the world itself, indeed, as are the Ideas whose multiplied manifestation constitute the world of individual things. So music is by no means (as are the other arts) the copy of the Ideas, but the \textit{copy of the will} itself, whose objectivity the Ideas are. This is why the effect of music is so much more
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{448} Ibid., 95. Note: Reimer states: “Music, as has been pointed out, is not separate from the larger world in which it functions and could not possibly be. But at root it goes beyond such functions, immersing them as \textit{one determining factor} in the immediacy of sounds configured to be felt.
\textsuperscript{449} Ibid., 95.
\textsuperscript{450} Ibid., 95.
\textsuperscript{452} Ibid., 162.
powerful and penetrating that that of the other arts, for they speak only of the shadow while music speaks of the essence.\textsuperscript{453}

Later, Schopenhauer articulates this notion using emotional response rather than an abstract idea of will and thus the connection with Reimer’s thought is strengthened. Schopenhauer articulates this notion:

Thus it [music] expresses not this or that particular and definite joy, this or that sorrow, or pain, or horror, or delight, or merriment, or peace of mind; but it expresses joy, sorrow, pain, horror, delight, merriment, peace of mind themselves, to a certain extent in the abstract, their essential nature, without incidentals and so also without the motives for these emotions. Yet we understand them perfectly in this extracted quintessence.\textsuperscript{454}

Just as Schopenhauer does, Reimer suggests that music directly expresses feelings. Reimer states:

Feelings are the “nonverbal, ‘newly minted’ crossings into consciousness of felt information, or knowing, consisting of ‘feeling-beyond-language.  It is such knowing – knowing through experiencing what ordinary language cannot express – that music is so potently able to bring to the level of awareness.\textsuperscript{455}

Note that both Schopenhauer and Reimer suggest that music may provide an awareness of feelings that transcend language and reveal the subjective nature of the feeling in itself. This discussion of Schopenhauer’s ideas is offered as further support for my contention that Reimer has constructed a Platonically based philosophy.

Another Platonic construction in Reimer’s philosophy of music is his notion of music as a catalyst to inspire feelings in humans. Recall his notion of the internal, subjective oceans of feeling with buoys of emotional words.\textsuperscript{456} Reimer asserts that music allows us to engage with these feelings in a direct and embodied way.\textsuperscript{457} Music, he suggests, “has the power to heighten, sustain, refine, and extend human emotional life [by] its organization of sounds, or structural

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{453} Ibid., 164.
\item \textsuperscript{454} Ibid., 168.
\item \textsuperscript{455} Reimer, \textit{A Philosophy of Music Education: Advancing the Vision}, 82.
\item \textsuperscript{456} Ibid., 83.
\item \textsuperscript{457} Ibid., 86.
\end{itemize}
properties, or musical means.”458 Here then, is another abstraction that suggests Reimer’s philosophy is based in a rationalist conception.

Reimer makes a distinction between emotions and feelings when he suggests that “emotions can be thought of as broad categories of possible feelings – as guideposts marking off feeling-potentials.”459 Reimer states:

> Emotions are namable in words. Feelings are nonverbal, ‘newly minted’ crossings into consciousness of felt information, or knowing, consisting of ‘feeling-beyond-language.’460

Therefore, emotions demark the abstract structure of feelings that are impacted by the abstract nature of musical being-in-itself. Reimer’s idea of codifying this abstract ideal is, again, related to the Platonic Ideal Form.

Reimer then poses the question: “How do those sounds become transformed into felt experience?”461 Reimer quotes the philosopher Sparshott who suggests that, “We experience musical works as objects – in creating them, in performing them, in listening to them, we are aware of them as full realities.”462 Reimer comes full circle to the notion that music exists in an abstract way as a “full reality” and as an “object.”463 Music as an abstract construction of sounds becomes for Reimer, worlds that engage the abstraction of subjective human feelings. This connects to the Platonic idea of the forms, which, although abstract and transcendent in nature, create the worlds of reality we experience around us.

By way of summary, Reimer’s foundational premise regarding the nature and value of music is indicative of the roots of his philosophy in Platonic thinking. The abstract organization
of sounds become in Reimer’s philosophy, worlds of meaning. These embodied objects or worlds enable humans to engage with their inner subjective worlds of emotion. The objectification of the abstract is related to Plato’s idea of the Ideal Form in which the forms of all apparent objects are taken from one, transcendent form. This notion of music as a direct embodiment also has a strong relationship to Schopenhauer, another historic philosopher who defines music as a direct embodiment of emotions. Schopenhauer openly relates this concept to the idea of Platonic form and thus provides a related link between Platonic ideas and Reimer’s philosophy.

Reimer’s Methodology as Platonic Construct

There is a methodological notion in Reimer’s philosophy that is traceable to a Platonic methodology. This notion is related to the above notions of music and emotion. In his methodology, Plato uses the form of the myth. Recall from Chapter 2, the purpose of the myth in Platonic philosophy. Armstrong states:

The Platonic Myth may be defined as a symbolic narrative in which Plato expounds some doctrine of truth of which he firmly believes but which he holds can only be expressed by symbols and not by the ordinary methods of reasoned argument.

For instance, Plato suggests that there are two worlds, the world of the Ideal Form and the world of our everyday perceptions known as the myth of The Divided Line, or a related myth, The Myth of the Cave. Reimer creates several myths that relate to his ideas of emotion, meaning and music. First, he suggests that music creates its own virtual world. He states:

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Note: I am using the term *methodology* to denote the philosophical construction of argument used to construct a philosophical system or reinforce a philosophical position. See definition section in Chapter 1.

Note: See pages 70-71 above.


Note: See Chapter 2 of this dissertation to review these Platonic myths.
'Musical worlds are experienced as belonging to a world of their own.' In this musical world the feelings one has not only are distinctive to it but also are experienced, for many people, 'more intensely than any other sort of object.'

I suggest that this notion that music represents a musical world, abstract, yet distinctive, is a structural myth that highlights Reimer’s connection to the methodology of the Platonic myth.

A second myth that Reimer posits is the myth of the “ocean of subjective responses.” In this compelling myth, Reimer invokes the vision of a vast, inner ocean of feeling. This “human subjectivity is endlessly varied and infinitely complex. Its possibilities are inexhaustible, both in breath and depth.” This vast ocean of feelings has, at the surface, “occasional buoys” that have been given names. These names, called emotions, give a general label to the “subjective responses” or feelings below. Reimer’s example is the word, “love.”

Love is a category word, and what it categorizes is an infinite number of possible ways to feel. The breath and depth of feeling that falls under the category love is so large and complex, so subtle and varied, that the word used as a category for it can only indicate its most general character.

These subjective feelings are ineffable or are beyond language. To name them is to create a category or buoy, called an emotion, or a general category for the ebbing and flowing feelings below. Reimer suggests:

So the difference between emotion and feeling is a real one – it is the difference between words on the one hand and experiences on the other, the one being a symbol (or sign) of certain possibilities in the other…Human emotion is always accompanied by feeling, but our ability to stipulate what is being felt is bound by the extreme limitations of category...
words, which are incapable of pinpointing the immense complexity and fluidity of subjective responsiveness. Notice that Reimer is suggesting that a limited, concrete idea; the idea of words or emotions, is inexorably connected to an unbounded, abstract ocean of feelings. This parallels the Platonic myth of The Divided Line, in which perfect Ideal Forms are related to imperfect copies of our everyday perception. In this myth, Reimer has captured both the methodology and epistemology of Plato.

To summarize the analysis thus far, the “underlying purpose of music education,” for Reimer, is “to harness the power of music to enhance people’s felt lives.” This is the heart of the matter for Reimer. He is suggesting that music enhances or opens our awareness of the vast ocean of feelings in a much more complete way than spoken language. Put another way, the abstract worlds of music, illuminate the abstract oceans of subjective feelings in humans. This construction is clearly based in rationalism, and, for the reasons articulated above, have a reliance on the epistemology and methodology of Plato. The above ideas are central themes of Reimer’s philosophy and show his epistemology and methodology to be related to the ideas of Plato. I will now take a broader view, metaphorically speaking, and examine some larger methodological issues that point to Platonic constructs.

Broader Methodological Issues

In Plato’s dialogue, The Republic, he outlines a complete and perfect city-state. This Republic of Plato encompasses every aspect of government and suggests a complete, self-
contained city-state in a utopian framework. I assert that Reimer has constructed a \textit{Republic} of sorts, in the application of his philosophy to the curriculum.

One important idea involving Reimer’s music curriculum relates well to Plato’s \textit{Republic}. That of the “appropriate balance of emphasis in general music” and the corresponding idea as applied to a specialized program.\footnote{Reimer, \textit{A Philosophy of Music Education}, 255, 275. See above (figures 5 and 6) for diagrams of appropriate balance of emphasis models.} In this model Reimer is suggesting that students will have differing interests and needs and will fall into groupings of Aficionados, Amateurs and Professionals.\footnote{Note: Reimer suggests a slightly different model for the specialized music program, but for the purposes of this argument, it is no a substantive difference.} This idea is related to Plato’s idea of the division into various classes of members of the society involved in the government of \textit{The Republic}. Plato outlines a division that includes unskilled workers, technicians, guardians, and finally rulers or philosopher-kings.\footnote{For the outline of the division of labor see the latter half of “Book II” pages 167-182. from Plato \textit{The Republic} (trans. W. H. D. Rouse in \textit{Great Dialogues of Plato} [New York: Signet Classic/New American Library, 1999]).} I am not suggesting that Reimer’s and Plato’s ideas are related in their subject matter, but rather that they are related structurally.

Reimer also suggests a model of the total curriculum in which not only music, but all subjects will be taught.\footnote{Reimer, \textit{A Philosophy of Music Education}, 242. See page 114, (figure 4) above for the diagram of the model curriculum.} Thus, Reimer is offering an organization for all schooling that is reminiscent of Plato’s offering in \textit{The Republic}.\footnote{Note: See page 71 for a description of \textit{The Republic}.} That is, a total philosophy of education that Reimer suggests \textit{should} be applied to all curriculum at every level, Kindergarten through 12\textsuperscript{th} grade, in order to provide “inclusiveness in both our concept of what an effective curriculum is and how our programs can best be carried out.”\footnote{Ibid., 241.} Therefore, Reimer is not only suggesting a better curriculum, but is asserting that his curriculum should be implemented in order to
effectively carry out the music curriculum as outlined by his philosophy. He then proceeds to outline a complete curriculum for both general music and specialized music programs. This is structurally similar to Plato’s *Republic*. In the *Republic*, Plato constructs a utopian form of government based on an idea: the idea of justice.⁴⁸⁴ Reimer has constructed a complete curriculum based on the idea of the nature and value of music. These two myths are methodologically similar in that they are both descriptions based on rational idea rather than empirical evidence. Both are descriptions of a utopia; a world that does not exist at present, but one that, if created, would support the Ideal Form of Platonic and Reimerian philosophy.

**Conclusion**

After an overview of Reimer’s philosophy, I have analyzed his philosophy examining the epistemological and methodological concepts in MEAE and linking them back to the epistemological and methodological concepts in Plato’s philosophy. As it has unfolded, the analysis has taken place on several levels. On the epistemological level, this analysis has focused on reducing specific foundational premises and ideas from Reimer’s philosophy and comparing them to specific portions of Plato’s philosophy: namely, the notion of the Ideal Form. On the level of methodology, I have compared myths created by Reimer with several important Platonic myths. Finally, taking a broader view, I have compared the general methodology of Plato’s *Republic*, with the general methodology of Reimer’s construction of a curriculum. Thus, this metaphilosophical analysis has been utilized to analyze and compare epistemologies and methodologies of Reimer’s and Plato’s philosophies. This analysis has moved from smaller

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issues of epistemology toward broader, more inclusive issues of methodology. I will now turn to an overview and critical examination of the praxial music education philosophy of Elliott.
CHAPTER 4

THE PHILOSOPHY OF DAVID ELLIOTT

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to review the philosophy of David Elliott, followed by a critical examination of his praxial philosophy utilizing a metaphilosophical analysis. In the analysis portion of this chapter, I will compare and link the epistemology and methodology of Elliott and Aristotle, moving from narrower issues of epistemology to broader issues of overall methodology.

Elliott offers a three-fold purpose to his philosophy: “…the first is to develop a philosophy of music education,…the second is to explain what this philosophy means,…the third is to encourage a disposition in teachers to think philosophically as a regular part of their daily professional efforts.”485 The premises of his philosophy are twofold: “The first is that the nature of music education depends on the nature of music. The second is that the significance of music education depends on the significance of music in human life.”486

Anticipating what will transpire as his philosophy unfolds; Elliott suggests that his line of argumentation will point to “a basis for explaining the nature and significance of music education.”487 He notes:

…that music making and music listening are unique forms of thinking and unique forms of knowledge that human beings can gain. The reasoning that supports these propositions allows music educators to affirm to themselves and others that music – as a unique form of thinking and knowing – deserves a central place in the education of all people.488

Elliott also suggests a “shorthand term for the philosophy developed in this book.”489 Notice that

485 Ibid., 12.
486 Ibid.
487 Ibid., 14.
488 Ibid.
489 Ibid.
he is not giving this philosophy a name, but rather he is offering a shorthand term for his philosophy. He states:

An appropriate shorthand term for the philosophy developed in this book is a praxial philosophy of music education. As Aristotle used the word in his Poetics, praxis connotes action that is embedded in, responsive to, and reflective of a specific context of effort. By calling this a praxial philosophy I intend to highlight the importance it places on music as a particular form of action that is situated and, therefore, revealing of one’s self and one’s relationship with others in a community. The term praxis emphasizes that music ought to be understood in relation to the meanings and values evidenced in actual music making and music listening in specific cultural contexts.\footnote{Ibid. Note: Elliott is quoting Aristotle, Poetics, trans., Gerald F. Else (Ann Arbor, MI.: University of Michigan Press, 1967), 27.}

A critical comparison of Reimer’s and Elliott’s philosophies is outside the scope of this dissertation. However, in the interest of clarity, I want to highlight similarities of terms, but divergence of meanings between these two philosophies. Note that both Reimer and Elliott state that the nature of music determines the nature of music education. They also suggest that music provides a unique form of knowledge. However, the nature of that unique form of knowledge is quite different in Reimer’s and Elliott’s philosophical systems. For Reimer, music (and all the arts) provides an education of feeling.\footnote{Reimer, A Philosophy of Music Education: Advancing the Vision, 89.} For Elliott, music provides meanings and values in actual music making and music listening in specific cultural contexts.\footnote{Elliott, Music Matters, 14.} The activity of music for Elliott is valuable in itself, within a specific cultural context. Elliott is clear that he intends his philosophy to represent a break with the past. He notes:

in contrast to conventional music education philosophy, this book refutes the belief that music is best understood in terms of the aesthetic qualities of pieces of music alone. In short, this praxial philosophy is fundamentally different from and incompatible with music education’s official aesthetic philosophy. As such, it offers music educators a clear alternative to past thinking.\footnote{Ibid.}

To summarize, Elliott is suggesting that his philosophy will point to the value of music
education by outlining the nature and value of music. While Elliott and Reimer utilize similar language regarding these foundational statements of their philosophies, they arrive at quite different conclusions based on their differing definitions of music and its value to education.

A Definition of Music and Musicing

Elliott suggests “that what we are in the middle of building is not a theory of music but a comprehensive way of proceeding to say what music is.” In addressing the nature of music, he reveals his Aristotelian methods. He suggests:

I wish to suggest that there is a self-evident principle lying behind, beneath, and around our musical involvements that provides us with an indisputable starting point for building a comprehensive concept of music. This principle has been hit upon directly and indirectly in centuries of writing and thinking about music. It is implicit in the repertoire of procedures and guiding questions Aristotle used to address difficult questions….This self-evident principle is best expressed as an orienting question that Aristotle might have used to get an inquiry such as this under way. Regarding the human phenomenon we call music, let us ask the following: Is there any sense in which music is a human activity? Both common sense and logic answer yes.

Elliott concludes by suggesting that “what music is, at root, is a human activity.” He argues that this activity of music is situated in a cultural context. As examples he uses the music of Beethoven, Duke Ellington, the kete drumming of the Asante people and a Zuni lullaby. These examples of music, Elliott argues, are “not simply a collection of products or objects. Fundamentally, music is something that people do.” However, Elliott suggests that this description is incomplete, “for in any instance of human activity, doers do what they do in a

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494 Ibid. Notice that Elliott is assert a description of what music is, rather than proposing a new theory of music. In an Aristotelian way he is describing what is, rather than in a Platonic way (see Reimer above) what should be.

495 Elliott, Music Matters, 39.

496 Ibid. (emphasis in original)

497 Ibid.

498 Ibid. (emphasis in original) Note: This idea is related to the notions of Blacking, who suggests “that all music is folk music, in the sense that music cannot be transmitted or have meaning without associations between people….Thus all music is structurally, as well as functionally, folk music.” See John Blacking, How Musical is Man? (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1974), x-xi.
specific context.” Thus, Elliott is suggesting a more ethnomusicological notion of music in an attempt to include music in all cultural contexts, both notated and improvised. This leads him to the definition of music on which he will base his notions of music education. He states:

Music then is a four-dimensional concept at least. Music is a tetrad of complementary dimensions involving (1) a doer, (2) some kind of doing, (3) something done, and (4) the complete context in which a doer does what they do. Let us refer to musical doers as *musicians*, to musical doing as *musicing*, and to the musical “something done” as *music* in the sense of performances, improvisations, and other kinds of audible musical achievements.\(^{500}\)

This four dimensional concept is visually demonstrated below in figure 7.

![Figure 7. Musicing: Four Dimensions](image)

In clarifying the terms *music* and *musicing*, Elliott demonstrates that these terms are imbedded in *action* or *actions*.\(^{502}\) He argues:

The word *musicing* may sound odd at first. This is understandable. The aesthetic concept of music-as-object obscures the more fundamental reality of “music!” as a form of

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\(^{499}\) Ibid., 39-40.  
\(^{500}\) Ibid., 40.  
\(^{501}\) For this diagram see Elliott, *Music Matters*, 40.  
\(^{502}\) Ibid., 49. (Elliott emphasizes the word *action* in this passage.)
deliberate doing and making. But consider how easily people speak of dancing, drawing, or painting, or how we use the word *dance* in multiple ways to mean the dancing a dancer does, a gathering of dancers, or the outcome of a dancer’s dancing.\(^{503}\)

Note that Elliott is emphasizing the action of making music, rather than the artifact of a musical event in the form of a musical score. Elliott suggests that the question, “What is music? subdivides first into two closely related questions: (1) What is the nature of musicing? (2) What does it mean to be a music maker?”\(^{504}\) Elliott notes that since “improvising,...composing, arranging, and conducting usually imply the presence of musical performers, it seems reasonable to start with an emphasis on performing.”\(^{505}\) Thus, he suggests that the term “*musicing* may be used interchangeably with *performing.*”\(^{506}\)

Elliott asserts that each of these four dimensions have context as seen visually represented below in figure 8.

\[ \text{Figure 8. Musicing: Four Dimensions with Contexts}^{507} \]

\(^{503}\) Ibid.
\(^{504}\) Ibid.
\(^{505}\) Ibid.
\(^{506}\) Ibid. (emphasis in original)
\(^{507}\) Ibid. For this diagram see page 42.
Elliott suggests that there is another dynamic link in this multidimensional framework: that of music listeners. He asserts:

Linked to each kind of music making is a group of people who act specifically as listeners (auditors, or audiences) for the musical products of that kind of music. In the case of Bulgarian bagpiping, there are Bulgarian bagpipe listeners; for Baroque choral singing there are Baroque choral audiences; for dixieland jazz there are dixieland fans. Viewed in context, music makers are influenced by why and how their audiences (including themselves) listen to what they do. Conversely, listeners are influenced by why, what, and how musicers do what they do.\footnote{Ibid., 42.}

Elliott asserts that the intentional human activity of listening forms another four-dimensional set of relationships. There is the “listening,” the “listener,” a “listenable” and the complete context in which this listening is taking place, as seen in figure 9.\footnote{Ibid. Note: Elliott is utilizing “listenable” from Sparshott. See Fransis Sparshott, “Aesthetics of Music: Limits and Grounds,” in \textit{What is Music? An Introduction to the Philosophy of Music}, ed. Philip Alperson (New York: Haven Publications, 1987), 52.}

In summarizing his definition of music thus far, Elliott states:

Consider how far we have traveled. Beginning with the self-evident principle that music
is a human activity, we have arrived at the more elaborate view that music is a multidimensional human phenomenon involving two interlocking forms of intentional human activity: music making and music listening. These activities are not merely linked; they are mutually defining and reinforcing. Let us call the human reality formed by this interlocking relationship a *musical practice*.\(^{510}\)

For a visual articulation of the idea of the interlocking forms of musical activity that creates a musical practice see the diagram below. (See Figure 10: A Musical Practice below)\(^{511}\) Elliott distinguishes between the use of the term “practice” as musicians often use the word to denote the rehearsal and perfecting of music, and the use of the term “‘practice’ in the larger sense of a shared human endeavor.”\(^{512}\)

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**Figure 10. A Musical Practice**

Elliott states:

> A human practice…is ‘something that people do, and know they do, and are known to do.’\(^{513}\) For example, whereas precise surgical cutting is not a practice, heart surgery is;

\(^{511}\) Ibid., See page 44-45 for figure 11.
\(^{512}\) Ibid., 42.
and whereas singing pitches in tune is not a practice, operatic singing is (and blues singing is, and so on).\textsuperscript{514}

He continues:

The fundamental theme I wish to draw from this discussion, and emphasize strongly, is the following: \textit{Music is a diverse human practice}. Worldwide, there are many (many!) musical practices, or “Musics.” Each musical practice pivots on the shared understandings and efforts of musicers who are practitioners (amateur or professional) of that practice. As a result, each musical practice produces music in the sense of specific kinds of musical products, musical works, or listenables. There products are identifiable as the outcomes of particular musical practices because they \textit{evince} (manifest, or demonstrate) the shared principles and standards of the musical practitioners who make them.\textsuperscript{515}

Elliott asserts that “a useful way to tie these ideas together is to alter the visual form of the word music in three different ways – MUSIC, Music, and music.”\textsuperscript{516} He suggests that

MUSIC is a diverse human practice consisting in many different musical practices or Musics. Each and every musical practice (or Music) involves the two corresponding and mutually reinforcing activities of music making and listening….The word music (lowercase) refers to the audible sound events, works, or listenables that eventuate from the efforts of musical practitioners in the contexts of particular practices.\textsuperscript{517}

Elliott concludes with the notion that, in order to be complete, his philosophy must explore “the concept of music in all its dimensions. We must consider,” he states, “all these dimensions and their interrelationships as they contribute to our understanding of the nature and significance of MUSIC as a human practice.”\textsuperscript{518}

\begin{flushright}
The Value of Music
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Elliott asserts that “the keys to understanding the human values of MUSIC (including the values of musical works) are most likely to be found in the nature of human consciousness and

\textsuperscript{514} Elliott, \textit{Music Matters}, 43.
\textsuperscript{515} Ibid., 43-44.
\textsuperscript{516} Ibid., 44.
\textsuperscript{517} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{518} Ibid., 45.
the human tendencies it spawns.” Here he incorporates an idea of human self-growth through activities that produce “flow,” attributed to the educational psychologist Csikszentmihalyi. Elliott asserts that “music making, music listening, and the involvements that result from these forms of action are distinctive sources of self-growth, self-knowledge, flow and self-esteem.”

Note that in constructing a self-reflective personhood who may exercise volition to engage in the procedural activity of musicing or performing music, Elliott has focused on the material aspect of music making. He has shunned the notion of music as “education of the feelings” or the aesthetic portion of Music Education as Aesthetic Education. He has eliminated the duality of the “oceans of feeling” and the “buoys of emotional words” that, according to Reimer, music illuminates. With what does Elliott replace this aesthetic value of music? Elliott is making the argument that the act or procedural practices of musicing are their own reward. He states:

What I am urging…is that a musical performance ought to be valued for what it is: an embodiment of a student’s musical understanding of a given work and its related practice. The same holds for all other kinds of musical outcomes (improvisations, compositions, and musical arrangements)…This is so, I suggest, because performance provides authentic and tangible evidence of a person’s moment-to-moment musical understanding (including his or her music listening ability) with regard to all relevant dimensions of a musical work and the musical practice in which it is embedded….Authentic music making is a valid and valuable end for all students.

Thus, the essence of the procedural practice of music and engaging in this kind of practice is valuable as an end-in-itself.

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519 Ibid., 109.
521 Elliott, Music Matters, 128.
522 See Reimer, A Philosophy of Music: Advancing the Vision, 89.
523 Ibid., 83.
524 Elliott, Music Matters, 76. Note: Elliott calls on an Aristotelian notion that as humans we “desire to know.” And that music is one way we can know. That self-discovery and the construction of self are benefits of engaging in the act of music making. See Elliott, Music Matters, pages 118-119
Elliott also introduces another modifying concept to his notion of flow and self-growth as a benefit of music making: that of “balancing or matching the cognitive challenges involved in making and/or listening for aural patterns in this concept of MUSIC.” What Elliott is suggesting is that the musical challenge that a person pursues should be within a range that is achievable and yet provides appropriate challenges for the individual involved.

Implications for Music Education

After articulating the value of music, Elliott outlines the contextual application of these ideas to the aims and goals of music education. He argues:

The aims of music education, and the primary goal of every music teaching-learning situation, are to enable students to achieve self-growth, self-knowledge, and musical enjoyment by educating their musicianship in balanced relation to musical challenges within selected musical practices. It follows from this that musicianship is also a unique and major source of self-esteem.

There are two implications suggested in these aims and goals. The first implication is that there is a relationship between musical challenges and musicianship. A second is that these musical challenges must spiral “upward in complexity in relation to recognized criteria.”

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525 Ibid., 129.
526 Ibid.
527 Ibid.
528 Ibid., 133.
529 Ibid.
To clarify, a fictional music student, Sara, is represented by the letter S. In order for Sara to experience self-growth, she must meet musical challenges in a manner that keeps her in the zone of self growth and musical enjoyment represented above in figure 11 by the shaded area.\(^{530}\) If the musical challenges are too trivial, she may move into the area represented by S2 and become bored. If they are too advanced she is in danger of moving into the area represented by S3 and become frustrated.

Elliott has laid the foundations of his philosophy by articulating his definition of the nature of music as action, and the notion that this action is an important way of achieving self growth in humans who participate in the activity of music. For the music educator, he is suggesting a balance between musical goals that are too easily achieved and musical goals that may be too difficult and frustrating for the students.

\(^{530}\) Ibid., Note: See pages 132 for figure 12 and pages 131-133 for the example of the fictional student, Sara.
Elliott argues that “in this praxial view, a music education curriculum-as-practice is both a means and an end.” Just as Reimer has done in his text, Elliott first suggests that the total curriculum must be revamped to be a more multidimensional curriculum ideal. He argues “that making ought to be central in all domains of education,” and “decries the mentality that separates product from process in education.” Thus, Elliott is suggesting a praxial philosophy for all subjects. He notes that this is in opposition to the current model of curriculum building called the “technical-rational curriculum” also called the Tyler rationale, referring to Ralph Tyler’s 1949 work. It is perhaps not surprising that Elliott suggests “a useful approach to organizing and resolving the problem of curriculum making begins with Aristotle’s *Topica.*”

Elliott notes:

> Aristotle suggests that when people encounter a problem that involves a number of considerations and competing views, it is useful to develop a set of flexible topics or categories that describe the problem realistically while making allowances for competing ideas.

Elliott utilizes a list developed by Schwab referred to as “curriculum commonplaces,” and develops a visual model based on the notion of Aristotle and the taxonomy of Schwab. (See Figure 13. Music Curriculum Making: A Four Stage View below) Elliott elaborates:

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531 Ibid., 129.
532 Ibid., 242.
538 Ibid. Note: This Figure is found on page 255.
Curriculum commonplaces are open categories; they remain empty until filled in by each teacher’s beliefs, understandings, intentions and actions…[This] curriculum-making procedure involves moving from general curricular decisions to specific decisions-in-action (and back again) in a four stage process.\textsuperscript{539}

Elliott continues:

Individual teachers and students put their personal stamps on the educational aims, subject matter knowledge, teaching processes, learning processes, and assessment procedures (and so on) that teaching, learning, and curricular are highly fluid and unpredictable. The decisions that teachers make in the first two stages of curriculum making can and do determine the nature and values of the teaching-learning stage in a fundamental ways. In the end, however, an excellent curriculum is an excellent teacher interacting with students in educationally sound ways.\textsuperscript{540}

Figure 12. Music Curriculum Making: A Four Stage View

\textsuperscript{539} Ibid., 255.
\textsuperscript{540} Ibid., 258.
Elliott concludes by suggesting that “the first stage of curriculum making is complete…and can be summed in one phrase: Curriculum-as-practice. This praxial philosophy of music education holds that all music education programs ought to be conceived, organized, and carried out as reflective musical practicums.”\(^{541}\) He notes:

- Learning [occurs] by induction. Musical practices are little social systems, or musical worlds. Teaching students to make and listen for music with an understanding of the relationship between musical works and cultural influences requires music teachers to engage their students in the interplay of beliefs, actions, and outcomes at the core of music cultures…
- Music Education is multicultural in essence…If MUSIC consists in a diversity of musical cultures, then MUSIC is inherently multicultural. And if MUSIC is inherently multicultural, then music education ought to be multicultural in essence.\(^{542}\)

Elliott suggests that time and resources may be limited and “our central responsibility (to deepen students’ musicianship) indicates that music education curricula ought to build on a foundation of several closely related musical practices that spiral upward in the demands that they make on students’ growing musicianship. Once established, music curricula may then move out toward more unfamiliar cultures.”\(^{543}\) He suggests that it, “makes sense to use the musical variety of one’s own local region or nation as a launching pad to teaching of more ‘distant’ Musics.”\(^{544}\)

In summary, the curriculum as praxis, as Elliott suggests, is both a “means and an end.”\(^{545}\) Thinking about the general curriculum itself should be revised to emphasis doing or action more. Developing a model of curricular commonplaces may aid the educator in an application of the praxial philosophy to the curriculum. Elliott has outlined a definition of music as action or praxis that is situated in a cultural context. Engaging in this activity of music is an end-in-itself that may result in a greater sense of self-knowledge and self-growth for the

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\(^{541}\) Ibid., 267.
\(^{542}\) Ibid., 206 – 207.
\(^{543}\) Ibid., 211.
\(^{544}\) Ibid., 129.
\(^{545}\) Ibid.
individuals involved. The music curriculum, (as well as the general curriculum) should be viewed as a curriculum-as-practicum, with a curriculum design that is open-ended and is viewed as creating authentic opportunities for students and instructors to engage in a form of musical practice that is culturally situated in a practicum.

Elliott notes that “there is a happy confluence between this philosophy’s concept of curriculum and the professional practices of many educators past and present.”546 Elliott argues:

As I see it, the essential characteristics of the reflective musical curriculum are exhibited in many school choral and instrumental programs, in many excellent Kodály and Orff programs, and in many Suzuki programs. This is not surprising. For expert teachers often know more than they can explain (or have time to explain) in philosophical or psychological terms….From this perspective, philosophy only reminds the expert practitioner of what he or she already knows.547

Notice that Elliott is not inventing a new curriculum. Rather, he is identifying and describing the current practice. This is in keeping with his empirical outlook and is further evidence of the Aristotelian influence in his thinking.

The Philosophy of Elliott as Aristotelian Construct

Elliott opens his text by quoting Aristotle’s Politics: “It is not easy to determine the nature of music, or why anyone should have a knowledge of it.”548 A view of Elliott’s own references to his Aristotelian influences seems a fitting place to begin this conceptual analysis. Recall in Chapter 2,549 my assertion that Elliott’s philosophy is openly based on Aristotelian ideas and Ideals. Therefore, Elliott has an explicit foundation in the philosophy of Aristotle. This contrasts with Reimer’s text, which I argue has a suppressed philosophical foundation in the

546 Ibid., 271.
547 Ibid., 271.
549 See page 85 above.
ideas and methodology of Plato.\footnote{As I indicated in Chapter 2, the idea of a suppressed methodological foundation is mine, but was suggested by my reading of Blackburn’s \textit{Think: A Compelling Introduction to Philosophy} in his discussion of a \textit{suppressed premise}. See Simon Blackburn, \textit{Think: A Compelling Introduction to Philosophy} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 23.} Therefore, I begin this conceptual analysis using the explicit foundation of Aristotelian thinking in Elliott’s praxial philosophy of music education.

In examining the opening Aristotle quote cited above, an important aspect of his philosophy is illuminated. Notice that Aristotle suggests that “it is not easy to determine the nature of music.” This idea is in keeping with the empirical structure of Aristotle’s philosophical thinking. He is implying that it is difficult to know the nature of music, however, it may be known. This highlights the notion that Elliott, following Aristotle’s example, believes that ideas and structures exist as objects, and through careful thought and observation, may be known.

Bambrough articulates this notion in his commentary on Aristotle’s \textit{Politics}. He states:

> On numerous other questions both of principle and detail, it will be clear that Aristotle is paying very close attention to the institutions of the actual city-states of his own time. Once again we notice the importance to Aristotle of the description of \textit{how things are} as an essential element in any reflection on \textit{how things ought to be}. In later books, when he makes his own proposals for an ideal community, he is as down-to-earth, as directly concerned with the light that the actual concrete specimens can throw on the abstract consideration of the formal and the ideal, as in his works on biology, ethics, and literature.\footnote{Aristotle, \textit{The Philosophy of Aristotle} with general introduction by Bambrough, 427-428. (Emphasis in original)}

This notion of the material world as foundation of an empirical philosophy is not to suggest the absence of a metaphysical structure. Rather, it is to suggest two divergent paths to the truth. For Reimer as Platonic construct, the path is in the world of rational idea; for Elliott as Aristotelian empiricist, it is in the material world and the accurate description of that world that truth may be found. Copleston notes this difference with an analogy. He argues:

> It should not be supposed that Aristotle, in his enthusiasm for facts and his desire to set a firm empirical and scientific foundation, was lacking in systematic power or ever renounced his metaphysical interest. Both Platonism and Aristotelianism culminate in
metaphysics. Thus Goethe can compare Aristotle’s philosophy to a pyramid rising on high in regular form from a broad basis on the earth, and that of Plato to an obelisk or a tongue of flame which shoots up to heaven.552

As I will suggest through this conceptual analysis, Elliott, like Aristotle, is constructing a pyramid founded in empirical materialism.

By way of summary, Elliott is demonstrating his empirical thinking in his examination of what is the case in music education. His ideas are based in his interpretation of current practice rather than in abstract ideas. This is not to suggest an absence of a metaphysical structure in either Elliott’s or Aristotle’s philosophical thinking. Like Aristotle (as noted by Copleston above), Elliott can be said to be constructing his philosophy as one would construct a pyramid, with a firm foundation in the world of experience.

Aristotle as Foundation for Praxial Philosophy

The first substantive mention of Aristotle surfaces when Elliott reveals that his philosophy is based on an Aristotelian notion: that of “praxis.”553 He suggests:

An appropriate shorthand term for the philosophy developed in this book is a praxial philosophy of music education. The noun Praxis derives from the verb prasso, meaning (among other things) ‘to do’ or ‘to act purposefully.’ But when we use prasso intransitively its meaning shifts from action alone to the idea of action in a situation. As Aristotle used the word in his Poetics, praxis connotes action that is embedded in, responsive to, and reflective of a specific context of effort.554

Elliott’s commitment to music as situated action is a theme that runs throughout his philosophy and is a foundational idea in his praxial philosophy.555 Recall from Chapter 2 Aristotle’s

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552 Copleston, A History of Philosophy, 276.
553 Elliott, Music Matters, 14.
555 For more examples and further development of the Aristotelian concept of praxis as active participation in music making see also: Elliott, Music Matters pages 175, 181.
assertion of the value of the nature of experience. He states:

Experience seems to be almost the same sort of thing as science and art; but, in fact, it is through experience that science and art occur among men, since, as Polus says, “experience produces art, but inexperience chance….We observe that those who have experience meet with more success than those who have grasped the principles of the subject without having any experience.

Note that by basing his philosophy on the notion of praxis, or action embedded in a specific context, and by referencing the idea as an Aristotelian philosophical notion, Elliott has founded his philosophy in the empirical framework of Aristotle.

Elliott also situates his methodology on an Aristotelian approach to inquiry. As he explores a definition of music, he suggests that he will proceed “in the repertoire and procedures and guiding questions Aristotle used to address difficult questions.” He notes:

This self-evident principle is best expressed as an orienting question that Aristotle might have used to get an inquiry such as this underway. Regarding the human phenomenon we call music, let us ask ourselves the following: Is there any sense in which music is a human activity? Both common sense and logic answer yes. Without some form of intentional activity, there can be neither musical sounds nor works of musical sound. In short, what music is, at root, is a human activity. Here is a certain starting point that leads to a multipart way of explaining what music is and why it matters.

In the above quote, Elliott is utilizing an “orienting question” in a manner that might be used by Aristotle. He is also reinforcing his contention that music is “at root, is a human activity.” Elliott’s overt citation of Aristotle’s philosophy places his philosophy, both methodologically and substantively, in an Aristotelian framework.

A second overt example of Elliott’s use of Aristotelian methodology is his use of broad

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557 Ibid., 15-16.
559 Ibid.
560 Ibid.
561 Ibid.
562 Ibid.
categories for the development of curriculum commonplaces. Elliot utilizes the concepts of categorizing developed in Aristotle’s *Topica* and notes that “Aristotle suggests that when people encounter a problem that involves a number of considerations and competing views, it is useful to develop a set of flexible topics or categories that describe the problem realistically.”

Aristotelian epistemology is another area from which Elliott freely borrows. Elliott coins the word, *musicizing*, to denote the idea of music as “a form of deliberate doing and making.” He asserts that focusing on doing and making requires an expanded definition of thinking and knowing. He states:

> There is a consensus among scholars that thinking and knowing are not one-dimensional phenomena: verbal expression is not the only form that thinking and knowing take. Instead, there are varieties of thinking and knowing. Aristotle made the same point long ago when he distinguished between theoretical knowledge (*epistémé*), practical knowledge (*politiké*), and productive knowledge (*technē*).

Elliott notes that “the way has been opened for a more complex epistemology, one in which thinking and knowing (and intelligence) are not restricted to words and other symbols but are manifested in *action*.” Thus, Elliott is not only directly appealing to the terms and methodology of Aristotelian thinking, but is also utilizing the epistemological ideas in his praxial philosophy.

Elliott gives an even more complete definition of praxial philosophy of music and a more finely grained analysis of the Aristotelian epistemology to which it relates. He elaborates:

> I recommend *praxis* to summarize the essential nature of music making and musicianship. As I noted in Chapter 1, Aristotle used *praxis* to mean informed and deliberative ‘doing-action’ in which doers…are not merely concerned with completing tasks correctly (*technē*), but with ‘right action’: enlightened, critical, and ‘situates’

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563 Ibid., 254.
564 Ibid.
565 Ibid., 49.
567 Ibid., 53. (emphasis in original)
action. *Praxis* means action committed to right goals (*telos*) in relation to standards, traditions, images, and purposes (*eidos*) viewed as Ideals that are themselves open to renewal, reformulation, and improvement.\(^{568}\)

Here Elliott is constructing a more vibrant notion of the Aristotelian epistemology, including the nature of several kinds of thinking-in-action.

In examining the value of music and music making, Elliott again suggests a notion found in Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* and *Poetics*. “Aristotle,” he notes “emphasizes that human beings possess the desire to know.”\(^{569}\) Elliott does not cite a specific reference to Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* or *Poetics*. However, the first portion of the first paragraph of Book I of *Metaphysics* will prove his point. “All men by nature desire to have knowledge. An indication of this is the delight we take in the senses; quite apart from the use that we make of them, we take delight in them for their own sake.”\(^{570}\) Thus, for Aristotle, the desire to know is an innate quality; a good in-and-of itself. Compare this with Elliott’s notion of the value of music to the human experience. Elliott notes that “music making is something people find worth doing for the sake of musicing itself.”\(^{571}\)

Elliott reinforces this point, and his connection to Aristotelian thinking when he states; “It seems a characteristic tendency of human beings that we deploy our powers of consciousness not merely to survive but to understand. As Aristotle noted, we desire to know.”\(^{572}\) Later Elliott expands this notion of the inherent good in music making. He argues:

It is difficult to distinguish the *pursuit* of musical competency and excellence from the internal goods of self-growth, self-knowledge, flow, and self-esteem. Aristotle explains why: ‘Enjoyment supervenes upon successful activity in such a way that the activity

\(^{568}\) Ibid., 69.
\(^{569}\) Ibid., 113.
\(^{570}\) Aristotle, *The Philosophy of Aristotle* with general introduction by Bambrough , 15.
\(^{571}\) Elliott, *Music Matters*, 76.
\(^{572}\) Aristotle, *The Philosophy of Aristotle* with general introduction by Bambrough , 15.
achieved and enjoyed are one and the same state….’ In conclusion, music making is a viable educational end for all students.\textsuperscript{573}

Again, note Elliott’s explicit connection to the thinking of Aristotle in the construction of his praxial philosophy.\textsuperscript{574}

To summarize, Elliott has utilized Aristotelian thinking in several ways. First, he has adopted specific terms, such as \textit{praxis}, from Aristotle’s philosophy and has defined these terms for his own praxial philosophy. Second, Elliott has called on the methodology of Aristotle’s philosophy in the construction of questions to help clarify his definition of music and the use of broad categories or flexible topics in creating and organizing curriculum commonplaces. Third, Elliott has offered several notions of Aristotelian epistemology to articulate the types of knowings or the epistemological concerns of his praxial philosophy.

\textbf{Aristotelian Influences in Elliott’s Methodology}

The previous references to Aristotle are overt and form the core of Elliott’s philosophical construction. These overt references offer ample evidence of Elliott’s allegiance to an empirical approach that owes much to the philosophical ideas of Aristotle. There are, however, methodological approaches that Elliott uses that also suggest his Aristotelian roots. I will turn to those approaches now.

Recall the Copleston analogy when he compares Aristotle’s philosophical constructs to a pyramid: “a wide foundation rising from the earth.”\textsuperscript{575} A review of the first two chapters of Elliott’s \textit{Music Matters} will also put one in mind of a pyramid. The entire structure of Elliott’s philosophy is contained in these chapters. The remainder of the text is an extended treatment of

\textsuperscript{573} Ibid., 119.
\textsuperscript{574} Ibid., 181.
\textsuperscript{575} Copleston, \textit{A History of Philosophy}, 276.
the ideas presented in this first section of the book. Loading the foundational core of his ideas in the opening pages of his book belies the empirical nature of his philosophical construct. Elliott, like Copleston’s view of Aristotle, is also constructing a pyramid of his ideas that has a broad foundation in experience.

A review of the first two chapters of Elliott’s Music Matters will reveal a careful and categorical method of presentation. Elliott is organizing his philosophy in lists that categorize carefully each concept as his philosophy is constructed. This is indicative of the empirical structure of Aristotle’s thought. Aristotle utilized categories to “reflect on the most general types of questions that can be asked about a given thing: What is it? How much? What kind? Where? When? and so on.”

Elliott is also offering commonly held beliefs about the nature of music with the intention of demonstrating that these notions are unsatisfactory. He suggests that twelve ways of explaining music come to mind, but in the interest of brevity, only the most common will be examined. After articulating each of these four commonly held beliefs about the nature of music, he rejects them all. This parallels an essential feature of Aristotle’s notion of dialectical arguments: that of andoxa (common beliefs, reputable views).

In a broader sense, praxial philosophy is an Aristotelian construct by virtue of its foundation in materialism. Recall the several philosophical myths articulated by Reimer: the virtual world created by music and the ocean of feelings delineated by the buoys of emotions are two examples. Elliott rejects outright these rationalist constructions and suggests that “in

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577 Elliott, Music Matters, 20.
578 Ibid., 21.
579 Barnes, The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, 60.
580 See pages 125-126 in Chapter 3 above.
581 Elliott, Music Matters, 51.
opposition to dualism, materialism holds that there is no special ‘mental stuff’ distinct from the
physical brain.”\textsuperscript{582} Music, then for Elliott, affects those things that may be observed such as
human actions, rather than some transcendent place in the human mind that resembles an ocean.
In this way, praxial philosophy is grounded in the ideas of Aristotle.

Conclusion

After an overview of Elliott’s philosophy, I have analyzed his philosophy by examining
the specific references to Aristotelian thinking contained therein. Recall my earlier assertion that
Elliott had constructed a philosophy with an overt foundation in the philosophy of Aristotle. As
a consequence, the bulk of this conceptual analysis referenced the overt development of
Aristotle’s ideas contained in Elliott’s philosophy itself. The picture of this connection with
Aristotle’s philosophy would not be complete, however, without an examination of the broader
issues of methodology articulated at the close of the section above. Thus, this metaphilosophical
analysis has been utilized to analyze and compare epistemologies and methodologies of Elliott’s
and Aristotle’s philosophies. This analysis has moved from more overt references to Aristotle’s
philosophy to broader methodological issues.

Recall from Chapter 1 my premise that Reimer’s philosophy is based in rationalist
thought and is therefore Platonic in nature, and that Elliott is based in empirical thought and has
an Aristotelian foundation. Utilizing a metaphilosophical analysis, I have demonstrated in this
and the previous Chapter, that these two modern philosophies are
articulations of an ancient dialectic between the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophical ideals.
These ancient ideas are the root cause of a fractious debate in the field of philosophy of music

\textsuperscript{582} Ibid., 51.
and it is this underlying Platonic and Aristotelian epistemology and methodology that has kept this debate alive more than any substantive differences between Reimer’s and Elliott’s philosophy.

It is my intention to bring these dialectical philosophical positions into a synergy utilizing the philosophy of Løgstrup. Løgstrup’s philosophical notions are not based in rationalism or empirical thought, but are grounded in the phenomenon of the everyday interaction between humans. It is to Løgstrup’s philosophy that I now turn.

CHAPTER 5
THE PHILOSOPHY OF KNUD E. LØGSTRUP

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview and analysis of the philosophy of Knud Løgstrup as presented in *The Ethical Demand*. It must be recognized that the original work was first published in Danish and subsequently translated into English. The translated version was the primary source utilized as the basis for this overview and analysis. It is also important to note that Løgstrup is not a particularly felicitous writer. Dees notes:

Løgstrup’s prose cannot be called mellifluous. He was little concerned with niceties and did not go out of his way to ease the task his readers have before them. Yet every so often, Løgstrup rewards readers who are patient with a moving and elegantly phrased distillation of his thinking.\(^{584}\)

I highlight this notion to warn the reader that Løgstrup’s concepts must often be teased out of the language and I must make meaning and sense from language that may be difficult and non-specific.

One such example is Løgstrup’s use of the term *proclamation*. Recall from Chapters 1 and 2 that Løgstrup uses the proclamation of the historic Jesus of Nazareth to examine the inherent ethical connections present when humans meet. Because this proclamation is used as a framework for his secular ethical system, it is essential to clarify the definition of the term within the context of his philosophy.

Løgstrup never overtly defines the term proclamation in his text, but from the context of his usage we may take it to mean the commandment of the historical Jesus of Nazareth “when he repeated the injunction of *Leviticus* to love our neighbor as ourselves.”\(^{585}\) Fink and MacIntyre

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\(^{584}\) Kund Løgstrup *Metaphysics Volume I*, with translator’s introduction by Richard Dees, xi.

\(^{585}\) Hans Fink and Alasdair MacIntyre, forward to Knud Løgstrup, *The Ethical Demand*, xxxxxvii. Note: See Leviticus 19. 18 and 19. 34.
are clear that “for Løgstrup…the ethical demand is not laid upon Christians rather than non-
Christians. There is not Christian morality and secular morality. There is only human
morality.”

Another clue as to the meaning of the term proclamation for Løgstrup is his suggestion
that “once the proclamation has shown us this feature of our existence…we are able to recognize
it by ourselves without recourse to the proclamation.”

This suggests that the proclamation is
not a mere statement, but something more on the order of an ethical imperative. This
proclamation creates something metaphysically that may be transcended or moved beyond.

A second term that I want to examine is the term demand. Løgstrup utilizes several
modifying words to distinguish the various facets of the ethical demand. Depending on what
subject is under discussion, he may refer to it as the ethical demand, the silent demand, the
radical demand, the one-sided demand and sometimes as just the demand. All of these terms
describe various facets of the same phenomenon. For Løgstrup, we come under a demand when
we meet other people, and this demand charges us to take care of the portion of their lives that
have been placed in our hands. I believe that it is part of Løgstrup’s methodological approach
of creating distinctions that he uses the various terms to illuminate the many aspects of the
phenomenon he refers to as the demand. In the interest of clarity, I will only utilize the terms
demand or ethical demand for this chapter.

For purposes of conceptual clarity, this chapter will be organized into six sections, each
of which will highlight central concepts or ideas expressed in *The Ethical Demand*. While his
text is not organized in this manner, it is my belief that this structure will provide the best means
to present an overview and analysis of Løgstrup’s philosophy. The six sections are:

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586  Ibid., xxxvii-xxxviii. (emphasis in original)
587  Ibid., 1.
588  Note: For a discussion of this concept see Løgstrup, *The Ethical Demand*, 14-15.
• The proclamation of Jesus understood in purely human terms
• The ontological nature of trust
• The gift of life, love and the paradox of the demand
• The importance of mediation
• The radical nature of the demand
• Objections to the demand

The Proclamation of Jesus Understood in Purely Human Terms

Løgstrup introduces his philosophy by arguing that the proclamation of the historic Jesus of Nazareth speaks to something in our existence and that this something may be viewed in strictly human terms.589 Put another way, Løgstrup is attempting to construct a secular philosophical system that is based on a sacred idea: the idea of a religious proclamation. Løgstrup suggests:

If the proclamation in question is of a religious nature, then the task becomes one of defining in strictly human terms those features of our existence to which the proclamation speaks and which – possibly for the first time – it helps us see.590

Løgstrup is arguing that once we see this proclamation as a feature of our existence, “we are able to recognize it by ourselves without recourse to the proclamation.”591 Therefore, for Løgstrup, the proclamation is a tool to examine our relationships with a new understanding. To this end, he notes that this “religious proclamation is not limited to what it discloses.”592 Thus, the

589 Løgstrup, *The Ethical Demand*, 1. Note: *The Ethical Demand* is Løgstrup’s main articulation of his philosophy. Other writings will be examined as they illuminate Løgstrup’s thinking, however, *The Ethical Demand* will be the main reference for this conceptual analysis of Løgstrup’s thinking.
590 Ibid., 1-2.
591 Ibid., 1.
592 Ibid., 2.
proclamation is redefined in relation to an individual’s fundamental relationship to his neighbor.\textsuperscript{593}

Løgstrup suggests that there are two halves to the proclamation. In the first part, it is noted that “the individual’s relationship to God is determined wholly at the point of his relation to his neighbor.”\textsuperscript{594} He argues that this implies a connected relationship with the neighbor. He states:

This implies, further, that the other person must to such a degree be dependent upon me that what I do and say in the relationship between us – I alone and nobody else, here and now and not at some other time or in some other manner – is of decisive importance. If my relation to the other person is the place where my relation to God is determined, then it must be the place where that person’s existence is so totally at stake that to fail him is to fail him irreparably….What I withhold from him, in one situation he will not be able to recoup in another situation, either from me or from anyone else.\textsuperscript{595}

If we were independent of one another and “the words and deeds of one were only a dispensable luxury in the life of another…then God’s relation to me would not be as intimately tied up with my relations to the neighbor as the proclamation of Jesus declares it to be.”\textsuperscript{596} In summarizing this important point, Løgstrup notes:

The intimate connection in which Jesus places our relation to God and our relations to the neighbor presupposes that we are, as Luther expressed it, ‘daily bread’ in the life of one another. And this presupposes the intimate connection in the proclamation of Jesus between the two great commandments in the law can indeed be described in strictly human terms.\textsuperscript{597}

Thus, Løgstrup is suggesting that the religious proclamation of the historic Jesus of Nazareth may be viewed as a tool to invoke a secular approach to ethics. This proclamation

\textsuperscript{593} Ibid., 3.
\textsuperscript{594} Ibid., 4. Note: In a seemingly paradoxical way, Løgstrup is arguing that the notion that our relationship to God is determined wholly at the point of our relationship to our neighbor suggests that the relationship to neighbor may be argued in a secular way. Jesus tied these two concepts together and for Løgstrup that points to a transcendental view (which may be described in secular terms as a part of our fundamental existence) of the human relationship revealed in the second half of the proclamation.
\textsuperscript{595} Ibid., 5.
\textsuperscript{596} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{597} Ibid.
points to something essential in our lives: that we are intimately connected to one another and that this connection creates an ethical demand.

The Ontological Nature of Trust

The source of the ethical demand is trust. Løgstrup asserts that trust “belongs to human existence. It is a characteristic of human life that we normally encounter one another with natural trust.” There are several common notions about the nature of trust that Løgstrup articulates. “To associate with or encounter personally another person always means to be ‘in the power of’ his or her words or conduct.” And “in its basic sense trust is essential to every conversation. In every conversation we deliver ourselves over into the hands of another.” However, we often recognize the basic nature of trust, Løgstrup suggests, when this trust is abused. He states:

This may indeed seem strange, but [trust] is a part of what it means to be human. Human life could hardly exist if it were otherwise….To trust, however, is to lay oneself open. This is why we react vehemently when our trust is ‘abused,’ as we say, even though it may have been only in some inconsequential matter….We see it fully as much in those conflicts which are caused not by one person having wronged another, but by a collision between their two spirits and worlds.

The example Løgstrup uses to illustrate this collision between two spirits and worlds is an account from E. M. Forster’s novel Howards End regarding a rift between Leonard Baast and the Schlegel sisters. Løgstrup recounts the story:

Leonard was a penniless office clerk…whose entire existence would be bleak indeed were it not for his consuming interest in culture. However he was not equal to this interest; his hunger for books and music was and remained artificial. The Schlegel sisters

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598 Ibid., 8.
599 Ibid., 14.
600 Ibid., 8-9.
601 Note: Løgstrup believes that experience is an important tool for understanding philosophical concepts. However, these experiences may be articulated by references to literature or art. To that end he utilizes fictional stories as examples. See Løgstrup, The Ethical Demand, 7.
on the other hand, had never known anything but economic security. Since they had
grown up in an atmosphere of cultural appreciation… their life was rich in terms of
experience and delightful variety.\footnote{602}

When Leonard received an invitation for tea, he hoped to discuss books and music and avoid any
reminders of his otherwise drab life. The Schlegel sisters had an altogether different, very
practical reason for inviting Leonard. They had secret information that the firm that employed
Leonard was about to go into bankruptcy. Leonard was deeply disappointed that the afternoon
was not devoted to high cultural discussions and was blind to the Schlegel sisters’ desire to help.
He accused them of inviting him to tea to spy on his firm. Løgstrup continues:

\begin{quote}
The ensuing conflict was inevitable. It could not be warded off. For the Schlegel sisters’
idea in issuing the invitation was entirely different from Leonard’s idea of accepting it.
The two parties were blind to one another’s world….Those who are implicated in it
never, or at least seldom, are aware that the conflict has nothing to do with right or
wrong. Only observers on the outside who have an insight into the worlds of both parties
– dramatists and novelists, theatergoers and readers – are able to see this.\footnote{603}
\end{quote}

What we see from the recounted story above are two worlds, each desiring a good thing,
colliding because of the expectations of the other. Trust is the source of the ethical demand and
is the foundation of all human interaction. “We see it fully,” Løgstrup suggests, “as much in
those conflicts which are caused not by one person having wronged another, but by a collision
between two spirits and worlds.”\footnote{604}

Løgstrup suggests that trust implies surrender. “Through the trust which a person either
shows or asks of another person he or she surrenders something of his or her life to that
person.”\footnote{605} Løgstrup posits:

\begin{quote}
Therefore, our existence demands of us that we protect the life of the person who has
placed his or her trust in us. How much or how little is at stake for a person who has thus
\end{quote}

\footnote{602} Ibid., 11-12. Løgstrup is recounting a story from Edward Forster, \textit{Howards End}, (New York: G. P.
Putnam’s Sons, 1910)
\footnote{603} Ibid., 12-13.
\footnote{604} Ibid., 9.
\footnote{605} Ibid., 17.
placed his or her trust in another person obviously varies greatly. But in any event this trust means that in every encounter between human beings there is an unarticulated demand, irrespective of the nature of the encounter.  

Løgstrup asserts that this trust is not dependent on a theological revelation or on a discursive agreement between the parties involved.  “Our life is so constituted that it cannot be lived except as one person lays him or herself open to another person and puts her or himself into that person’s hands either by showing or claiming trust.” Thus, this “trust is not of our own making; it is given.” This is related to, or perhaps dependent on, the notion that “life has been given to us. We have not ourselves created it.” These two issues form an important component of Løgstrup’s notion of the ontological, or given, nature of this trust.

But how is this acceptance of the trust that is placed in our hands carried out? Løgstrup suggests that it is accomplished with some difficulty. He notes:

But nothing is thereby said about how this caring is to be done. The other person him or herself cannot say anything about this, even though he or she is the one directly concerned, since, as we said before, it might very well involve something diametrically opposed to his or her own expectations and wishes. It is of the essence of the demand that with such insight, imagination, and understanding as he or she possesses a person must figure out for him or herself what the demand requires.

Therefore, it is our creative understanding, based on what Løgstrup refers to as an “understanding of life” that guides us in our acceptance and consummation of the trust placed in our hands. However, “does the demand encourage intrusion and encroachment upon the other

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606 Ibid.
607 Ibid., 17-18
608 Ibid., 18. Note: Løgstrøp argues that “trust and distrust are not two parallel ways of life. Trust is basic; distrust is the absence of trust.” In this way “distrust is the ‘deficient form’ of trust.” See footnote 5 on page 18 of Løgstrøp, The Ethical Demand.
609 Ibid.
610 Ibid., 19.
611 Ibid., 22.
612 Ibid.
person?” Løgstrup notes that there are “two different perversions of communication between people.” He suggests:

The one is the kind of association which, due to laziness, fear of people, or propensity for cozy relationships, consists in simply trying to please one another while always dodging the issue. An opposite form of perverted communication consists in our wanting to change other people. The mania for perfection turns everything which is said and done into something provisional and preparatory. Understanding must be postponed until perfection has been attained. Taking these two perversions of communication into consideration we are, in other words, caught in a conflict between a regard for others which is in fact indulgence, compliance and flattery on the one hand, and a disregard for others which in the interest of our own outlook turns into arrogance and violation on the other hand.

The above two ways are both inauthentic or, as Løgstrup refers to them, perverted ways to respond to the quest for trust that is inherent in every meeting of humans. Although Løgstrup believes that “this conflict can be resolved only in specific instances by the exercise of one’s own individual judgment,” he does offer some general notions to guide our judgments.

Løgstrup notes that “up to this point we have spoken metaphorically of having something of the other person’s life ‘in our hands’ or ‘delivered over to us.’ Precisely what in the other person’s life is in our hands, what of the other person has been delivered over to us, may vary greatly...from his or her passing mood to his or her entire destiny.” This does not mean, however that we have control over the other person’s will. Løgstrup explains:

The fact that we are one another’s world does not mean that we hold another person’s will in our hands. We cannot intrude upon his or her individuality and will, upon his or her personhood, in the same way that we can affect his or her emotions and in some instances even his or her destiny.

In other words, we do not control how other sentient individuals respond to our attempt to meet the ethical demand in our interpretation of how that meeting of need must be accomplished. We

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613 Ibid., 24.
614 Ibid., 24-25.
615 Ibid., 25.
616 Ibid.
617 Ibid., 26.
should, he argues, attempt to meet this demand in a way that allows “the other person…ample
time and opportunity to make his or her own world as expansive as possible.”

He argues:

The will to determine what is best for the other person…must be coupled with a
willingness to let him or her remain sovereign in his or her own world. The demand is
always also a demand that we use the surrender out of which the demand has come in
such a way as to free the other person from his or her confinement and to give his or her
vision the widest possible horizon.

In summary, Løgstrup asserts that trust between human agents is not discovered or agreed
to by those involved. It is a trust that is given (as our life is given) and in that way is an
ontological foundation that permeates all human interaction. But how do we carry out this
acceptance of trust? Our own life experience guides us, and this requires “insight, imagination,
and understanding.”

Løgstrup notes two ways to pervert communication and not to meet the
demand. In one instance we may try to please the other person “while always dodging the
issue.” On the other hand, we may pervert communication by being too inflexible and
wanting to change the other person. We must recognize that we cannot usurp another person’s
will. We respond to the demand in such a way as to “free the other person from his or her
confinement and to give his or her vision the widest possible horizon.”

The Gift of Life, Love and the Paradox of the Demand

Løgstrup draws the distinction that in natural love, (i.e. the love of a lover, child, brother,
sister, or parent) we are connected in a way that “the other person is in a real sense a part of our
world….His or her flourishing or failing to flourish is an essential part of our own flourishing or

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618 Ibid., 27.
619 Ibid.
620 Ibid., 22.
621 Ibid. 24.
622 Ibid., 25.
623 Ibid., 27.
failing to flourish.” Løgstrup notes:

Natural love and the one-sided demand have a common understanding of life. What is peculiar to natural love is that it takes for granted the understanding of life of the one-sided demand – without the demand itself. When then, does the one-sided demand address us? When the other person whose life we are to care for is not a part of our own life which we have received – or, more correctly stated, when we do not wish him or her to be a part of it.

Thus, the ethical demand is made evident more in our dealings with those others who are not members of the tight circle of our loved ones and family. He continues by suggesting that natural love does teach us something about the love of a neighbor even though they are different forms of love. Both come from the same notion – that life is a gift. He elaborates:

The difference between natural love and the love of neighbor is that natural love is biologically and sociologically conditioned. The similarity between them is that they have a common understanding of life. This is why, despite the difference between them, natural love teaches us something about love of neighbor. It is no accident that the same word is used in both instances; in both cases we speak of ‘love.’ … For out of the acceptance of our life as a gift – out of living life as a gift – spring the works of love.

Løgstrup continues to delineate what the ethical demand is and is not. Here he is conducting an examination of how the ethical demand does and does not resemble natural love. He suggests that it is “no accident that the same word is used in both instances;” for both of these types of love spring from our understanding and acceptance of life as a gift.

The ethical demand requires love. Løgstrup notes that “love alone corresponds to the fact that something of the other person’s life is delivered over to us. Only love is able to measure up to the demands of this fact.” But can we create love? Løgstrup suggests that we cannot.

“Where natural love was once present but later vanished, it cannot be re-created by the demand.

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624 Ibid., 125.
625 Ibid., 127.
626 Ibid., 142.
627 Ibid.
628 Ibid., 143.
And where there never was love, the demand cannot bring it about.”629 Løgstrup notes that there are moments in our lives where, “though we do not possess love, we do the deed which love would have us do, albeit for all sorts of other motives.”630 Løgstrup continues:

Though love may be absent, the demand remains. The works that a person knows within him or herself that love would have him or her do are therefore constantly demanded – which cannot be said of the reasons why he or she might possibly do them. These various reasons represent the individual’s compromise with the demand….If a person does not wish to entangle him or herself in illusions concerning his or her own position, it is essential that he or she not confuse his or her compromise with the demand with the demand itself.631

Løgstrup notes that, in the best of circumstances, where a person operates out of duty, or for the sake of their own outlook on life, the word responsibility might be inserted rather than the word love.632 “In other words,” Løgstrup argues, “people can substitute the word ‘responsibility’ for the word ‘love’ because they regard it as more important that love is demanded than that love is demanded.”633

Løgstrup does not offer a judgment as to whether there are better or worse compromises with the demand. He has already noted that the demand is invisible; our actions and motivations are not discernable.634 To cloud the matter further, he notes a “sharp contradiction”635 that amounts to a paradox. The demand arises out of the fact that “we are to live our lives as something which has been given us. This demand comes to us because we want to be sovereign in our own lives. But thereby we have brought ourselves into a sharp contradiction.”636

Løgstrup argues:

629 Ibid.
630 Ibid.
631 Ibid., 144.
632 Ibid.
633 Ibid., 146.
634 Ibid. Note: See Chapter 5 in Løgstrup, The Ethical Demand, 105.
635 Ibid., 146.
636 Ibid., 146.
In a sense, our attempts at obedience actually work against the demand, for every attempt at obedience is an expression of that which the demand opposes, namely the will to be sovereign in our own life. By willing to be sovereign in our own life, by refusing to receive life as a gift, we place ourselves in sharp contradiction: every attempt to obey the demand turns out to be an attempt at obedience within the framework of a more fundamental disobedience. In other words, what is demanded is that the demand should not have been necessary. This is the demand’s radical character.

Thus, for Løgstrup this love that springs from our recognition of the demand must be a spontaneous incarnation. “Either love is something which a person receives, and then, so far as love is concerned, the situation calling for the demand cannot arise; or a person knows nothing about love, and then the situation of decision does arise, without his or her being able to meet its challenge.” Løgstrup is, however, characteristically uncompromising in his articulation of the needs of the demand. He states:

Nevertheless, he or she finds him or herself involved in the necessity of making decisions, and then he or she probably does what he or she believes love would do. However he or she has thereby transformed the situation into a challenge to the courage, attitude, outlook, or whatever it may be which might also result in the same action. But this is not obedience to the demand, because what the demand demands is love. The demand does not, out of consideration for our lack of love, revise its intention so as to make obedience or anything other than love its aim.

I believe what Løgstrup is articulating is a type of revealed love. When we are confronted with a person who has placed a portion of his or her life in our hands and we respond to this need without stopping to consider what we may gain from this, or whether what we are doing is a good thing, we have experienced a revelation of the spirit that may only be viewed after the fact, if at all. If, however, we stop to consider that we would rather not meet this person’s needs, but we attempt to meet their needs out of a sense of responsibility, or out of a life outlook that suggests that this is the right thing to do, we have accomplished the same thing, but our motivations are not true to the ethical demand.

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637 Ibid., 147.
638 Ibid.
To summarize, the ethical demand requires love on our part. We must not act out of dry obligation. However, when we attempt to answer the demand, it reveals the fact that we wish to be sovereign over our lives and are not accepting life as a gift. I believe the love that Løgstrup is articulating must be revealed to us by the situation in which we find ourselves and is dependent on the nature of the person attempting to meet the demand.

The Importance of Mediation

Løgstrup suggests that “the problem is far from solved, however, simply by acknowledging that the demand to care for the other person’s life never means to deprive him or her of his own responsibility.”\textsuperscript{639} Løgstrup then returns to the starting point. He states:

We pointed out that the individual, if he or she is not to become merely a tool of the other person, must from the standpoint of his or her own understanding of life try to determine what is best for that other person. But for this very reason he or she is in danger of violating that other person, because the understanding of life of one person may not be pertinent to another. If the understanding of life can thus bring people into conflict with one another, this is because our relations with one another are normally mediated.\textsuperscript{640}

Mediation may be viewed as something that acts as an intermediate between humans engaged in some type of relationship. He notes:

This gap between persons may be bridged in many different ways. But one thing is certain: if persons are to encounter one another in a manner which is redeeming and liberating to the individual’s spirit and energies, it will be effected through something intermediate. We must be united in some common enterprise, some common interest or distress.\textsuperscript{641}

I suggest that to advance his argument of the ethical demand, Løgstrup is turning his analysis to

\textsuperscript{639} Ibid., 29.
\textsuperscript{640} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{641} Ibid., 40. Note: While I will offer implications toward a new philosophy of music education in Chapter 7 below, I will note the implications for an ethics of teaching, and specifically, an ethics of music teaching, may well serve as a mediating subject or ‘common enterprise.’
the nature of human interaction. Another idea for mediation is the norms and conventions that surround us as we move through our daily existence. Thus, Løgstrup’s notion of mediation may be seen as the norms and conventions that surround us in a school, church, the work environment, or even in a loving relationship. Løgstrup notes that “it is precisely when our relation to the other person is mediated by an ideology which we believe meets the need of everyone that such a violation is inevitable. But to seek the solution of the problem in immediated relationship is not possible either.” He suggests “that which mediates may lead to violation, but the lack of mediation may do so as well.”

Løgstrup asserts that an unmediated relationship will lead to violation even when two people share in a loving, sexual relationship. Consistent with his methodology, Løgstrup utilizes an example from literature to illuminate his position. He uses several short stories and novel ideas of the writer D. H. Lawrence, and asserts that D. H. Lawrence characters often lack “any form of ethical understanding of life beyond their horizon.” This lack of ethical knowledge is a “case neither of innocence nor of rebellion; it is rather in the nature of a defect.” Løgstrup asserts that these stories illustrate the point that even in a love relationship, there must be the

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642 Note: Because this philosophy is utilizing a phenomenological approach, Løgstrup is drawing his ideas in as broad a framework as possible. He is attempting, I suggest, to avoid the ready concept and move “behind the scenes” of our daily interactions with one another.

643 Note: Løgstrup does not offer a definition of mediation. On page 40 Løgstrup suggests that “[The] gap between persons may be bridges in many different ways.” One may take from this that the term is related to having something (i.e. “a common enterprise, interest or distress”) in a relationship that reconciles humans around a commonly understood goal. Løgstrup notes that this unifying aspect may also serve to separate people and that a complete lack of a mediating function may serve to separate people.

644 Ibid., 29. Note: The translators have created the term “immediated” to suggest a human relationship that has no mediating qualities. It is important for Løgstrup’s idea that a person may not engage in a relationship, even a loving relationship, without something between the two that binds them besides the emotional feeling. A common shorthand saying might be “what we have in common.”

645 Ibid.

646 Ibid.

647 Ibid., 29-30. Løgstrup illustrates his notion with the synopsis of several D. H. Lawrence stories. He offers a rather long recounting of the marriage of Will and Anna Brangwen in which they both become isolated in their relationship. See D. H. Lawrence, The Rainbow (New York: Viking Press, 1961) According to Løstrup this unmediated relationship will often turn to hate as hate is, by definition, an unmediated emotion. See footnote 3 and 4 in Løgstrup, The Ethical Demand, 34.
mediation of an ethical understanding that allows for personal development of the two individuals involved in the relationship. Løgstrup suggests:

Lawrence can describe love in such a manner that one partner will not tolerate having the other partner develop himself in all directions and realize his nature as fully as possible. Love has no place for being enlivened by the other person’s joy in life. Love has no mediation of which it is the bearer. For example, love is not able to manifest itself in joy over the other person’s work; it cannot bear such joy. Love is such that it cannot allow the individual to share with the other person what each has experienced. It does not admit any sharing of activities or interests. The one partner simply wants to possess the other.

Having examined what might be characterized as the strongest negative, that is, a loving relationship without mediation, Løgstrup continues to examine objective and personal mediation. By objective, Løgstrup is referring to a relationship based around a convention (school, work environment, church) which he references as an object. Even then, “the objective relationship between individuals is not maintained solely by the object in question, for…the most objective relationship is personal. The objective and the personal are intertwined in one mediation.” The line between these two is fluid and “will…vary according to the different kinds of relationship.”

Løgstrup argues that “the object of common concern to teacher and student calls for a greater degree of personal contact than the object of common concern to merchant and customer.”

Løgstrup makes the point that the norms and conventions that make up the mediation of relationships may be the cause of conflict. He posits:

That the relationship is personal means that we are, as we say, sure of one another. We can count on one another. Each of the parties involved has so committed himself to

648 Ibid., 31.
649 Ibid.
650 Ibid., 39. I suggest that Løgstrup has offered what he views as the most compelling example of a relationship, that of the loving, sexual relationship. I believe his point is that if this relationship may not exist without mediation, then a casual relationship may certainly not exist without mediation.
651 Ibid., 40.
652 Ibid.
653 Ibid.
norms that there is unity and constancy in their makeup….But this naturally means that persons may be at odds with one another. The unity and consistency which characterize some persons’ makeup mean at one and the same time that you can depend upon him or her and that you may come into conflict with him or her.654

Løgstrup has already argued that an unmediated relationship is not a solution. His suggestion is to acknowledge the validity of the norms, but to hold them at a distance. He argues:

The answer is that this need not happen if a person, not only for himself, but also as regards the other person, can at one and the same time remain committed to the norms but also keep his distance from them….To keep my distance is to acknowledge that the norm is not my own. It is not I who have set it up or given it content. Nor is it I who have endowed it with power to stimulate, regulate, educate, protect, and whatever else it has power to do. To understand the norm and consent to it but without regarding it as something we have ourselves set up, to accept it in such a way that we master it only as we bow before it – this is what is meant by simultaneous commitment to and distance from the norm.655

What Løgstrup is suggesting is that when a norm or convention is violated, it should not be used to cut someone out of our lives without recourse. Thus, while we use the norms and conventions as tool to mediate relationships, we maintain a distance from the norms and this “distance means that we concede that [the other person] is something other and more than his action.”656 It is in this space, the distance between the person and the norms and conventions of a given situation, that one may exercise judgment regarding how best to answer the ethical demand without violating the will of the other.657 I believe this space may help us see the other in a given situation, and is an important part of Løgstrup’s philosophy. Recall that a form of distance that protects the integrity of both student and teacher is one of the four issues that are revealed from the survey of the nursing philosophy studies as articulated in Chapter 2.658 I believe that this

654 Ibid.
655 Ibid., 41.
656 Ibid., 42.
657 Note: See Chapter 2 above and note that one of the four notions of practice that were extrapolated from the nursing literature was “A creative closeness, balanced with a form of distance that protects the integrity of both student and teacher.” Note also that Birkelund articulates this Løgstrupian concept of space for reflection or judgment. See Regner Birkelund, “Ethics and Education,” 479-480.
658 Note: See Chapter 2 of this dissertation.
space or distance is an important notion for the application of the ethical demand toward a new framework of thinking about music education philosophy.

To summarize, Løgstrup is examining the nature of mediation. In mediation we exist in a web of norms and conventions that act as intermediaries between our relationships. Løgstrup’s task with this notion is to demonstrate that the norms and conventions may cause conflict, may cause a person to violate the will of another, or may, as he suggests, cause us to liquidate, or completely write off another. From the contrary position, he shows that an unmediated relationship is not an answer and may also cause conflicts. His solution is to remain committed to the norms but also keep a distance from them.

The Radical Nature of the Ethical Demand

Løgstrup notes that the ethical demand is radical for several reasons. First, it is an unspoken demand and the person responding to the demand must determine how to take care of the other person’s life. Second, the demand may be met with an act or word that is very significant or very insignificant. Third, we must answer the demand even when we are dealing with other people we may not like or enjoy being around. Løgstrup notes:

The demand, precisely because it is unspoken, is radical. This is true even though the thing to be done in any particular situation may be very insignificant. Why is this? Because the person confronted by the unspoken demand must him or herself determine how he or she is to take care of the other person’s life. Regardless of how significant or insignificant that which is to be done may appear on the surface, the demand is radical because in the very nature of the case no one but he or she alone, through his or her own unselfishness, can tell what will best serve the other person.

Note: Løgstrup refers to the Ethical Demand variously as the Radical Demand, the Silent Demand, and the Invisible Demand. These distinctions are meant to clarify the multiplicity of the nature of the Demand and do not imply separate notions.

Ibid., 44.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Løgstrup also asserts that “the radicality of the demand consists, further, in the fact that it asks me to take care of the other person’s life not only when to do so strengthens me but also when it is very unpleasant, because it intrudes disturbingly into my existence.” He suggests:

Even in distrust the other person is still delivered over into my hands. Even my enemy is to a large degree dependent upon me and upon the manner in which I respond to him or her. How much thought is bound up with animosity. [sic] How often a person is more dependent upon someone he hates than upon someone he loves.  

Løgstrup also argues that the nature of the demand “prevents the encounter in which the demand arises from becoming a fellowship in which we lose ourselves completely.” Thus, “ethically speaking the demand isolates” the person to whom it is directed.

Løgstrup suggests that while we may be guided by social norms, “there is no prevailing norm to guide us” as regards the ethical demand. Løgstrup posits:

The demand gives no directions whatever about how the life of the person thus delivered is to be taken care of. …To be sure, the other person is to be served through word and action, but precisely which word and which action we must ourselves decide in each situation. And we must learn this from our own unselfishness and our own understanding of life.

Løgstrup notes that even though there is no “prevailing norm to guide us,” this does not imply that the demand is limitless. To attempt to be responsible in an unlimited fashion will lead inevitably to encroachment. This type of “concern for everything and everybody…has the appearance of selflessness. However, it can equally well be an attempt on the part of a frustrated person to give content to his or her own life.” Thus, “it is actually he or she, him or herself

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663 Ibid., 45.  
664 Ibid.  
665 Ibid.  
666 Ibid., 46.  
667 Ibid., 56.  
668 Ibid., 46.  
669 Ibid., 47.  
670 Ibid., 46.
who is making the demand, and he or she him or herself who is to be served thereby.\textsuperscript{671}

Løgstrup notes that social demands such as “law, morality and convention,”\textsuperscript{672} have a purpose. They protect us in specifically articulated ways. He suggests the difference between these and the ethical demand:

The radical\textsuperscript{673} demand says that we are to care for the other person in a way that best serves his or her interest. It says that but nothing more. What this means in a given situation a person must discover for him or herself in terms of his or her own unselfishness and in the light of his or her own understanding of life.….The social norms, on the other hand, give comparatively precise directives about what we shall do and what we shall refrain from doing. We are usually able to conform to these directives without even having to consider the other person, much less take care of his or her life.\textsuperscript{674}

Therefore, while social norms are important to communal society, they do not provide adequate guidance to direct us in meeting the radical nature of the ethical demand.\textsuperscript{675}

A concept that is related to the understanding of social norms is the notion of asymmetrical relationships. Løgstrup argues:

That life together with and over against one another consists on one person being delivered over to another person means that our mutual relationships are always relationships of power, the one person being more or less in the power of another person.\textsuperscript{676}

The concept of an asymmetrical relationship is an important one for teaching. A Relationship is always, according to Løgstup, one of greater to lesser power. As teachers we must always recognize that we hold our students in our hands and that we hold the greater portion of the power in that relationship. This knowledge requires us to be vigilant as we attempt to meet our students and their individual ethical demands.

\textsuperscript{671} Ibid., 47.
\textsuperscript{672} Ibid., 54.
\textsuperscript{673} Løgstrup does not give a definition of of the term radical, however, from the context one may assume he means that the demand stands apart or above the norms and conventions of a situation. Notice in the quote cited above he suggests that social demands such as “law, morality and convention,” have a purpose. The ethical demand is radical in the sense that it goes beyond these norms and conventions.
\textsuperscript{674} Ibid., 55.
\textsuperscript{675} Ibid., 60.
\textsuperscript{676} Ibid., 53.
To summarize, Løgstrup notes the radical character of this demand, irregardless “of how significant or insignificant that which is to be done may appear on the surface.” He suggests that the demand is also radical because we may be charged with caring for an enemy. Social norms provide a guide for our collective lives, but are inadequate for understanding the nature of the radical demand. The ethical demand transcends these social norms. Finally, Løgstrup argues that our relationships are always relationships of power, “one person being more or less in the power of another person.”

Objections to the Demand

Many philosophers will, in the interest of intellectual rigor, offer possible objections to their systems and attempt to meet these objections. As part of his philosophy, Løgstrup articulates several objections to the ethical demand and formulates an answer to each. First, he suggests an objection in the name of reciprocity in which one may say “why am I not also delivered into the hand of the other?” In other words, why is the demand not treated in a way that is reciprocal? For Løgstrup, we have no right to make a counterdemand upon the other person because of the understanding of life inherent in his philosophy. Løgstrup insists that life is a gift and within this idea the notion of the demand stands or falls. He posits:

According to this particular understanding, life and all that it contains has been given us, and there is nothing in our life to justify our making a counterdemand upon another person; in view of the fact that we possess nothing which we have not received, we cannot make counterdemands. A person is a debtor not because he or she has committed some wrong but simply because he or she exists and had received his or her life as a gift. The demand that he or she take care of the other person’s life is rooted in the very fact of

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677 Ibid., 44
678 Ibid., 53.
679 Ibid., 115. Note: This question is formed by the author based on the notions articulated on page 115.
680 Ibid., 116.
his or her indebtedness for all the different potentialities he or she has him or herself received: intelligence, speech, experience, love and many others.\footnote{Ibid.}

I suggest that what Løgstrup means is that we must live our lives as though we are always the recipient of the demand. Stated as an ethical directive, we should live as though some portion of the other’s life is always in our hands. It stands to reason that there may be times that our lives are in the hands of others as well, and as a matter of logical reasoning, this must be the case. However, I believe that Løgstrup might suggest that this is none of our concern. If life is a gift, we are debtors to the other. This notion leads to the explicit stating of an idea that has been implied earlier in the philosophy of Løgstrup: We are not sovereign over the aspects of our lives. He notes:

From the question concerning the one-sidedness or reciprocity of the demand we are lead to another theme: We can take no credit for our life. We have only been entrusted with the task of managing it by assuming responsibility for what we are and what we have. We have not called ourselves into existence.\footnote{Ibid., 117.}

The fact that our life is a gift leads Løgstrup to articulate the limits of the ethical demand. He argues:

From this understanding of life in which the demand is rooted we learn at least one thing about what the demand means and what it does not mean: Care of the other person’s life can never consist in words or deeds which prevent his or her discovering that he or she has received his or her life as a gift. Our care of his or her life must never support him or her in his or her ingratitude or aid him or her in oppressing others, thereby denying that his or her own life is a gift.\footnote{Ibid.}

Here Løgstrup is reiterating and clarifying three notions articulated earlier. First, that the “circumstances of the situation determine what will best serve another person. In advance it is not possible to say wherein care of the other person’s life will consist.”\footnote{Ibid.}

\footnote{Ibid.}

\footnote{Ibid.}
the other person’s life never consists in our making ourselves the master of his or her will.”685

Third, “care of the other person’s life can never consist in words or silence, in action or inaction which would hinder the other in understanding that his or her life has been received as a gift.”686

Another issue that would run contrary to Løgstrup’s concept of the demand is the formation of overriding theories. He notes that we may be tempted to formulate “a theory so handy and coherent that the fresh reflection demanded by every new situation will turn out to be nothing but the application of a theory already thought out.”687 In this way “the new situation is then almost entirely a matter of calculation. The basic reflection has been carried out once and for all; it has been reduced to a theory.”688 Løgstrup suggests that this is the case with most moral theories that are built on notions of reciprocity.689

He notes that, to meet the ethical demand, one must “do some thinking and arrive at knowledge of what he or she will do.”690 However, Løgstrup asserts that the individual solution to a particular situation can never be reduced to a theory that may be applied “to each new situation without having to go through the rigors of basic reflection once again.”691 He states:

There is in fact no handy readymade theory. Certainly the directive of the one-sided demand is anything but that. In a sense the demand forces us to start afresh in each new situation precisely because it provides no explicit directive. This is why in order to become clear about what will best serve the other person we must use imagination quite as much as calculation.692

Løgstrup notes that there is always this “tension between knowledge and formulation on the one hand, and the demand with its understanding on the other hand.”693 He suggests:

685 Ibid.
686 Ibid., 117-118.
687 Ibid., 118.
688 Ibid.
689 Ibid.
690 Ibid., 119.
691 Ibid.
692 Ibid.
693 Ibid., 120.
The tendency inherent in knowledge to regard its object as something mastered, and the impulse implicit in all formulation to leave out of the picture one’s own relation to the object formulated, gain the upper hand over the demand and its understanding.\footnote{Ibid.}

According to Løgstrup, this tendency to fall back on theory and formulation, rather than “to start afresh in each new situation”\footnote{Ibid., 119.} causes us to leave ourselves out of the relationship to the situation and thus, apart from the individual who is presenting the demand. He suggests that this struggle is inherent in each new situation in which we find ourselves.\footnote{Ibid. Note: Situated as it is in a phenomenological framework, Løgstrup’s philosophy is anathema to a theoretical construct.}

Finally, Løgstrup takes up the notion of suffering and death as an inhibitor of the view that life is a gift. He asks if someone whose life has been bereft through the loss of a loved one might still be able to view life as a gift. He suggests that the answer is yes in as far as the person who has suffered the loss would not wish to have never known the departed person. In this way the departed person may continue to be viewed as a gift. Løgstrup acknowledges that there is a difference in someone who is singularly suffering physical or mental pain. In that case it is up to those persons that surround this unfortunate individual to supply “an indispensable and living part of his or her existence”\footnote{Ibid., 122.} so that the person suffering may view their life as a gift.

Conclusion

The purpose of this dissertation is to utilize Løgstrup’s philosophy to suggest implications for a new framework of thinking regarding music education philosophy and to bring important aspects of Reimer’s and Elliott’s philosophies, which are based in the arts, into synergy under the umbrella of Løgstrup’s ethical philosophy. Interestingly, artistic experiences are especially meaningful in Løgstrup’s system. Recall from Chapter 1 Burklund’s assertion that
“in Løgstrup’s sense of the word, aesthetics gives people the energy that ethics lives on.”

Løgstrup notes that ontological ethics allows for the artistic world view. He suggests:

All poetry, all valuable art, arises in the living consciousness that one should understand something other than the world that we have made for ourselves and dominate in practice and in theory and for this reason is an image of ourselves. Poetry and art know that there is a kind of understanding other than understanding and perfecting what has already been set up and dominated. A piece of art thus calls forth a world that is other than the one that we have been able to create on our own initiative and with our own instruments and in which we usually move.

The world of art for Løgstrup may be a fictional world, but it is not a false one.

“Paradoxically,...the true world is fictitious for us, because we do not live in it but rather know it only as a world called forth.” What Løgstrup is suggesting, I believe, is that in a work of art, we see a totality of truth. In our everyday lives we may access only the limited sliver of reality available to our senses. But the artist may reveal a greater picture of a subjective truth.

Thus, art is a unique way of knowing in the world and is an especially important source of sensation that provides a special way of knowing. The impression we receive from art, he asserts “contains a knowledge, which – if we could only articulate it – would perhaps appear more essential than all our conceptually determined and oriented knowledge.” It is the core belief that perhaps best represents the link between the philosophies of Bennett Reimer, David Elliott, and Knud Løgstrup. Chapter 6 will examine the intersection of these three philosophies in an effort to develop a framework for a new philosophy of music education.
CHAPTER 6
FRAMEWORK: A NEW PHILOSOPHY OF MUSIC EDUCATION

Introduction

The purpose of this dissertation was to utilize the philosophy of Kund Løgstrup to move toward a framework of thinking about music education philosophy. Toward this goal, I first linked the two principle contemporary music education philosophies, Reimer’s Music Education as Aesthetic Education and Elliott’s praxial philosophy, to ancient philosophical thinking.\[^705\] It was my contention that the often divisive debate in music education philosophy is a reflection of Reimer’s Platonic or rationalist position in conflict with Elliott’s Aristotelian or empirical position. Chapters 3 and 4 argued that these two modern philosophies represented a modern articulation of an ancient dialectic between Platonic and Aristotelian philosophical ideals. Chapter 5 introduced the thinking of Løgstrup.

The second and final purpose of this dissertation is to move toward a framework for a new philosophy of music education utilizing the ideas of Løgstrup to create a synergy between the philosophies of Reimer and Elliott. I believe that there are aspects of both Platonic and Aristotelian thinking evident in the philosophy of Løgstrup. By extension, the Platonic aspects of Reimer’s philosophy and the Aristotelian aspects of Elliott’s philosophy may integrate with Løgstrup’s philosophy to suggest a new framework of thinking for music education philosophy. The notions of Reimer’s and Elliott’s philosophy that will be folded into this new framework will be determined by how they intersect with Løgstrup’s view of ontological ethics. The ideas of Løgstrup will hold a central role for this new framework, with portions of Reimer’s and Elliott’s philosophy as a synergy of support. This should be thought of as moving from the philosophical theory of Reimer and Elliott to a greater sense of the phenomenological experience.

\[^705\] Note: See discussion in Chapter 1.
of teaching as represented by the ideas of Løgstrup. Before proceeding into the synergy and implications for music teaching and learning, a few ideas may serve to clarify the study.

As the process of this dissertation has evolved, I believe it has become clear that Løgstrup’s philosophy is a strong fit for the creation of a synergy between Reimer’s and Elliott’s philosophy. In the closing section of his text, Løgstrup reveals what I believe are his connections to Platonic and Aristotelian epistemology. He argues that the ethical demand has two components. He posits:

First, it receives its content from a fact, from a person to person relationship which can be demonstrated empirically, namely, that one person’s life is involved with the life of another person. The point of the demand is that one is to care for whatever in the other person’s life that involvement delivers into his or her hands. Second, the demand receives its one-sidedness from the understanding that a person’s life is an ongoing gift, so that we will never be in a position to demand something in return for what we do. That life has been given to us is something that cannot be demonstrated empirically.

Løgstrup is here articulating the two elements of the ethical demand. First, Løgstrup suggests that the fact that our life is involved with the life of another may be demonstrated empirically. I believe this relates the demand to the empirical methodology of Aristotle. Second, the understanding that life is a gift may not be demonstrated empirically and must be accepted as idea only. I suggest that this aspect of the demand may be related to a Platonic approach to knowledge. In this concept, I assert that Løgstrup has revealed his philosophy as wedded both to the empirical epistemology of Aristotle and the rational epistemology of Plato. Løgstrup notes that these two elements are close despite the difference in quality. He suggests:

There is, therefore, the closest possible relationship between the two elements comprising the demand. Despite the fact that the demand receives its content from empirical life situations which can be demonstrated, it receives its one-sidedness from an understanding of life which is of nonempirical character.

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705 Ibid., 123.
706 Ibid.
707 Ibid.
I believe that this combination of the empirical and non-empirical elements of the ethical demand suggests the synergistic position of Løgstrup’s philosophy between the empirical approach of Aristotle and the non-empirical notions of Plato and, by extension, the philosophical ideas of Reimer and Elliott.

The main aspect of Reimer’s MEAE is the notion that music enhances and illuminates the inner, subjective world of human feeling. Thus, music education for Reimer becomes the “education of feeling.” Emotion, especially emotion that a human feels in response to art, is extremely important in Løgstrup’s philosophical system. He articulates this notion in great detail in his “Art and Knowledge.”

The principle aspect of Elliott’s praxial philosophy is the notion of contextualized experience. Music for Elliott is an “intentional human activity.” Recall from Chapter 5 Løgstrup’s suggestion that it is our “experience and insight” that allow us to adequately meet the ethical demand placed on us by another. This notion articulated by Løgstrup is also important in Elliott’s praxial philosophy. Løgstrup suggests that the overall goal of education be termed ‘education for life.’ His belief is that we must experience life to understand it. This means that the ultimate goal of education is to “promote the ontological opportunities that exist as the basis for communal life.” As Løgstrup’s approach is phenomenological, each situation in which one finds him or herself must be viewed in the unique and specific context of that event. Løgstrup suggests that our “perspectives must be found in the contexts, contradictions, and

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710 Elliott, *Music Matters*, Note: For specific references to contextualized practice see especially pages 42-45.
711 Ibid., 42.
712 Birkelund, “Ethics and Education,” 478
713 Ibid.
conflicts of our own existence.” The notion of context in musical practice is also an important concept in Elliott’s philosophical system. Thus, utilizing Løgstrup’s philosophical approach toward a framework of thinking about music education philosophy can capture both of the overriding aspects of Reimer’s and Elliott’s philosophy within a synergistic position.

**Toward a Synergistic Position: Reimer and Løgstrup**

To begin to create a synergy between Reimer’s philosophy and Løgstrup’s philosophy, I want to examine the importance of the aesthetic experience in both philosophers’ thinking. Remember Reimer’s notion of the vast ocean of feelings delineated by buoys of words. Reimer states:

> In the vast realm of human subjectivity some guidepost exist, marking off large areas of feeling that are somewhat related to one another or that share a particular quality. These guide posts which are little more than occasional buoys in an ocean of subjective responses, have been given names.

Reimer then suggests that “the nature of feeling is ineffable in essence.” Music, according to Reimer, “affords us a very powerful way to embody and share the infinite subtleties and complexities of feeling.” Thus, music provides a vehicle for the deeper understanding of the ineffable qualities of human feeling.

Løgstrup posits a similar notion. He suggests that the world of sensations and thoughts surround us at all times. We take our energy for life from these sensations, but we are often unable to express these. Art provides us with a framework of meaning for these ineffable

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717 Ibid., 85.
718 Ibid., 86.
719 Note: Løgstrup does not draw this analogy, but one might say that, according to Løgstrup, we are surrounded by an “ocean of sensation.” Recall from Chapter 1 Løgstrup’s notion about sensation: He asserts, “We do nothing in sensation. The universe swallows us up.” (See Knud E. Løgstrup, *Metaphysics Volume I*, ix.)
feelings and sensations. Løgstrup notes:

   Every motion of the senses, every thought, every expression of life, as weak as it might be, is the expression of a certain energy, a certain excitement….It is spiritual nourishment for us that we imbibe every day and every second without being aware of it, because we do not consider to what end we use those things that we take in; rather we let things enter us only because they are there. Art hopes to relieve this excitement and satisfaction from its inarticulate state and liberate our joy about what we see and hear.720

Thus, for Løgstrup, art provides meaning to the overwhelming cacophony of sensation. I suggest that many of these unarticulated sensations of which Løgstrup speaks are manifested in human feelings and that art may aid in the construction of meaning for these ineffable feelings. In this way, we see the connection between Reimer’s and Løgstrup’s notions of art and music as a means to provide meaning for the ineffable ocean of feelings and sensations that surround us as humans.

   Related to the above concept is the notion that, for Reimer, music education is the “education of feeling.”721 Music for Reimer is a unique way of illuminating our feelings to enrich our lives and music education may “harness the power of music to enhance people’s felt lives….That enhancement of the extent and depth of what we feel, as musical experience uniquely provides and as music education attempts to cultivate, can be called an ‘education of feelings.’”722 Compare this position with the notions of aesthetic experience articulated by Løgstrup. Recall from Chapters 1 and 3 Burklund’s assertion that “in Løgstrup’s sense of the word, aesthetics gives people the energy that ethics lives on.”723 Løgstrup suggests that works of art create unique worlds of understanding. He notes:

   All poetry, all valuable art, arises in the living consciousness that one should understand something other than the world that we have made for ourselves and dominate in practice and in theory and for this reason is an image of ourselves. Poetry and art know that there

    720 Løgstrup, The Ethical Demand, 271
    721 Ibid., 89.
    722 Ibid.
is a kind of understanding other than understanding and perfecting what has already been set up and dominated. A piece of art thus calls forth a world that is other than the one that we have been able to create on our own initiative and with our own instruments and in which we usually move.\textsuperscript{724}

There is also an obvious similarity between Reimer’s and Løgstrup’s position with regard to the creation of a special world created by the artwork. Reimer invokes Sparshott when he writes that, “We experience musical works as objects – in creating them, in performing them, in listening to them, we are aware of them as full realities.”\textsuperscript{725} He also suggests the notion that music exists in an abstract way as a “full reality” and as an “object.”\textsuperscript{726} Music as an abstract construction of sounds becomes, for Reimer, worlds that engage the abstraction of subjective human feelings. In much the same way as Reimer, Løgstrup suggests that “our existence is enlightened or revealed by the work of art.”\textsuperscript{727}

Løgstrup and Reimer also agree as to the importance of music (and all arts) as a special way of knowing the world. Reimer suggests that “music and the other arts are basic ways that humans know themselves and their world.”\textsuperscript{728} This knowledge for Reimer represents “feeling-beyond-language”\textsuperscript{729} or a subjective, often inexpressible mode of knowledge. Løgstrup suggests that art represents an “attuned impression”\textsuperscript{730} or a sensation to which we give a special attention. These attuned impressions we receive from an interaction with art contain “an articulation of knowledge.”\textsuperscript{731} This knowledge for Løgstrup is often subjective and non-verbal. He suggests

\textsuperscript{724} Løgstrup, \textit{The Ethical Demand}, 271.
\textsuperscript{726} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{728} Ibid., 82.
\textsuperscript{729} Reimer, \textit{A Philosophy of Music Education: Advancing the Vision}, 5.
\textsuperscript{730} Ibid., 82.
\textsuperscript{731} Løgstrup, “Excerpts from Art and Knowledge,” in \textit{Metaphysics Volume II}, 293. Note: Attuned impression may be defined as a special attention to sensation in which the artist actively engages while most of us allow sensation to pass without engaging the special attention that the artist requires.

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that art “contains a knowledge, which – if we could only articulate it – would perhaps appear more essential than all our conceptually determined and oriented knowledge.”

Finally, note the importance both Løgstrup and Reimer place on the art of music. Recall the similarities of Reimer’s view of music to Schopenhauer’s view. Schopenhauer argues:

Thus it [music] expresses not this or that particular and definite joy, this or that sorrow, or pain, or horror, or delight, or merriment, or peace of mind; but it expresses joy, pain, horror, delight, merriment, peace of mind themselves, to a certain extent in the abstract, their essential nature, without incidentals and so also without the motives for these emotions. Yet we understand them perfectly in this extracted quintessence.732

Both Schopenhauer and Reimer view music as the most direct representation of emotions.733 Løgstrup’s notion of music is also analogous to Schopenhauer’s and by extension, Reimer’s view of the nature of music. Løgstrup suggests that sensation is made independent in music more than any other art form.734

Summarizing the synergy thus far, Reimer’s notion that the aesthetic experience is central to the importance and purpose of music is also an important notion in Løgstrup’s philosophy. Both philosophers also conceive of music as an object and as an aid in creating a special world of meaning. The view that music is the most immediate representation of the felt-world is an idea shared by Schopenhauer, Løgstrup and Reimer. This last idea is particularly a Platonic idea and demonstrates the Platonic side of Løgstrup’s philosophy. Thus, Løgstrup’s philosophical ideas may be viewed as compatible with the most important notions of Reimer’s philosophical system.

732 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, 168.
733 Reimer, A Philosophy of Music Education: Advancing the Vision, 95. and Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, 164. Note: For my comparison of Schopenhauer’s and Reimer’s ideas of music, see pages 121-123 of this dissertation.
734 Løgstrup, “Excerpts from Art and Knowledge,” Metaphysics II, 291. Note: Løgstrup’s position is that sensation itself is a form of knowledge of our world that we may often fail to recognize. This is related to his notion that in sensation “the universe swallows us up.” (see Logstrup, Metaphysics I, xi.) The artist, however, “considers the sensible element in itself” (See Logstrup, 291.) and that sensible element is “made independent in music more than in any other art form.” (Logstrup, 291.)
I will now turn to a synergistic position involving Elliott’s praxial philosophy and Løgstrup’s philosophical ideas.

Toward a Synergistic Position: Elliott and Løgstrup

A critical aspect of Elliott’s praxial philosophy is the belief that music is a “human activity”\(^{735}\) that is contextualized by the specific situation in which the human activity takes place. Specifically, Baroque choral singing is generally performed with an audience of people who enjoy Baroque choral singing in attendance. The same could be said of dixieland jazz, or African dance music.\(^{736}\) Elliott makes the point that all of these contexts denote a musical practice\(^{737}\) and, “worldwide, there are many (many!) musical practices.”\(^{738}\)

The idea of practice and the recognition of context are also very important in Løgstrup’s thinking. In meeting the ethical demand, Løgstrup asserts that one must engage with life and possess “an understanding of life.”\(^{739}\) It is in interacting and understanding life, rather than simply following an overriding theory, that one is able to meet the ethical demand.\(^{740}\) And, because of his phenomenological perspective, each situation must be seen as a new situation and met with respect to the context of that particular singularity of experience. Løgstrup suggests that “it is of the essence of the demand that with such insight, imagination, and understanding as he or she possesses a person must figure out for him or herself what the demand requires.”\(^{741}\) In this broad way Løgstrup’s notions intersect with Elliott’s ideas of practice and context. Løgstrup

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\(^{735}\) Elliott, *Music Matters*, 42.

\(^{736}\) Ibid. Note: The first two examples are Elliott’s and may also be found on page 42. The third example is an idea based on a concert of African dance music witnessed by the author of this dissertation.

\(^{737}\) Ibid., 44-45.

\(^{738}\) Ibid., 43.

\(^{739}\) Løgstrup, *The Ethical Demand*, 22.

\(^{740}\) Ibid.

\(^{741}\) Ibid.

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also addresses art and the making of art in a manner that suggests active, rather than passive reflection. Løgstrup asserts:

Sensation gives us access in an immediate way to the world and in such an immediate way that we do not give a thought to how it occurs. This access is, so to speak, always already over and done with. It is always behind us. We are always out among things and events. However, the artist considers the sensible element in itself.742

Thus, Løgstrup argues that the examination of sensation through the use of an “attuned impression”743 allows the artist to create works of art. This is an active engagement and therefore, while Løgstrup does not specifically discuss the activity of artistic endeavor, it is implied in his analysis of the artistic act. In this way, Løgstrup’s notions of a school of life744 and his emphasis on the context of every situation, coupled with his ideas of the activity of the artist intersect with Elliott’s principle ideas of contextualized activity.

Finally, Løgstrup suggests that in our efforts to meet the ethical demand of the other, we must never violate his or her will. Løgstrup states:

The will to determine what is best for the other person…must be coupled with a willingness to let him or her remain sovereign in his or her own world. The demand is always also a demand that we use the surrender out of which the demand has come in such a way as to free the other person from his or her confinement and to give his or her vision the widest possible horizon.745

I believe that Løgstrup is suggesting that we must let people be true to who they are. I suggest that this concept is related to Elliott’s emphasis on context and specific musical practice. Elliott notes:

In any instance of human activity, doers do what they do in a specific context. (‘Context’ comes from contextere, meaning ‘to interweave, join, or weave together.’) By ‘context’ I

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743 Ibid., 293. Note: Attuned impression may be defined as a special attention to sensation in which the artist actively engages while most of us allow sensation to pass without engaging the special attention that the artist requires.
744 Løgstrup, *The Ethical Demand*, 22.
745 Ibid., 27.
shall mean the total of ideas, associations, and circumstances that surround, shape, frame, and influence something and our understanding of that something.)

I suggest that Løgstrup’s notion of allowing other people to maintain the sovereignty of their individual world has a relationship with Elliott’s important notion of context. Both imply the importance of the nature of context as we meet others and are engaged in common enterprise together.

To summarize, the principle aspect of Elliott’s praxial philosophy is the value of contextualized practice. This notion is analogous to Løgstrup’s ideas of practice in the understanding of life and the context of each situation. That is not to say that these two ideas are exactly the same. It is, however, to note that Elliott’s ideas may be fruitfully incorporated into the framework that Løgstrup has articulated as regards active experience. Further, Løgstrup’s general ideas as regards the artistic endeavor are also analogous to Elliott’s notions of music as practice. Finally, Løgstrup’s belief of sovereignty for the individual and Elliott’s concept of a musical practice in context are important intersections of these two philosophies.

Thus far in this synergy, I have examined how Reimer’s and Elliott’s ideas, from the lens of music education, may be incorporated into Løgstrup’s philosophy, and therefore create a synergy between these two oppositional systems. This is but one part of the process. I now turn to a critical analysis of Løgstrup’s philosophy as a framework of thinking about a new philosophy of music education.

Løgstrup: Toward A Framework of Thinking for Music Education Philosophy

As articulated above, Løgstrup is proposing a secular ethical system based on the religious proclamation of the historic Jesus of Nazareth. This secular system takes its impetus

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from the proclamation that we should love our neighbor as ourselves. However, Løgstrup asserts that “once the proclamation has shown us this feature of our existence…we are able to recognize it by ourselves without recourse to the proclamation.” What then is the feature of our existence that Løgstrup is teasing out of this proclamation for our recognition? It is that when two people meet, there is a demand created and that this demand charges us to take care of the portion of the life of the other that has been placed in our hands. A practical outcome of the demand is that humans, according to Løgstrup, have a natural tendency to trust. Løgstrup suggests:

To associate or encounter personally another person always means to be ‘in the power’ of his or her words or conduct….In its basic sense trust is essential to every conversation.

Thus, when people meet there is an inborn or ontological impulse to trust the other. Trust for Løgstrup, “is part of what it means to be human. Human life could not exist otherwise.” It is against this ontological background that I suggest that these notions may be instructive as a framework of thinking about a philosophy of music education. Recall Bowman’s admonition that the purpose of philosophy is to make the implicit explicit. The notions below may seem self-evident; however, an explicit articulation of these may enrich a music teacher’s notion of his or her classroom or rehearsal hall. Also recall Løgstrup’s notion that once our understanding of the proclamation reveals the part of our being that recognizes the ethical demand, we are then able to recognize the demand by ourselves without resorting again to the proclamation. It is my belief that an understanding of Løgstrup’s philosophical ideas as

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747 Note: this proclamation may be found in Mathew 22, 37-38.
748 Løgstrup, The Ethical Demand, 1.
749 Note: For a discussion of this concept see Løgstrup, The Ethical Demand, 14-15.
750 Ibid., 14.
751 Ibid., 8.
752 Bowman, Philosophical Perspectives on Music, 5.
753 Løgstrup, The Ethical Demand, 1.
articulated below will illuminate the opportunities that a music teacher may have to recognize and fulfill the ethical demand of the individual students in his or her care.

To utilize Løgstrup’s thinking in the classroom, a teacher must recognize that each individual student who comes under his or her influence is to some extent giving the instructor their trust. We are, to use Løgstrup’s analogy, holding a portion of each student’s life in our hands. It must be our intention as music teachers to take care of the portion of each life placed in our hands.754

One notion that may prove helpful is to view each of our students as individual “spirits and worlds.”755 Recall Løgstrup’s notion that we recognize that trust is the source of this ethical demand when the expectations of trust are not met. Løgstrup suggests that “we see it fully as much in those conflicts which are caused not by one person having wronged another, but by the collision between two spirits and worlds.”756 A view of our students as individual worlds of need and expectation might serve to enrich our interaction with the individuals in our care.

Recall that, according to Løgstrup, this trust is not something that is revealed or agreed on by the parties involved.757 This “trust is not of our own making; it is given.”758 The task for music teachers is to recognize the fact of this trust and to respond as best we are able to the individual demands of our students. Recall Løgstrup’s notion of the radical character of the demand. He states:

The demand, precisely because it is unspoken, is radical. This is true even though the thing to be done in any particular situation may be very insignificant. Why is this? Because the person confronted by the unspoken demand must him or herself determine how he or she is to take care of the other person’s life. Regardless of how significant or insignificant that which is done may appear on the surface, the demand is radical because

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754 Note: For a discussion of this concept see Løgstrup, The Ethical Demand, 14-15.
755 Ibid., 9. Note: see Chapter 5 for the discussion of individual spirits and worlds.
756 Ibid.
757 Løgstrup, The Ethical Demand, 17-18.
758 Ibid., 18.
in the very nature of the case no one but he or she alone, through his or her own unselfishness, can tell what will best serve the other person.759

What this suggests is that there may be all manner of demands from the students in our charge. Løgstrup notes that “what of the other person has been delivered over to us may vary greatly. It may vary all the way from his or her most passing moods to his or her entire destiny.”760 Løgstrup asserts that we determine these demands and how we may meet them using “our own understanding of life.”761

It is admittedly a difficult task to teach large groups of students each day and recognize that each student requires an awareness of them as an individual and in all your best efforts, meet their singular demands. That is, however, the requirement, and the inherent difficulty of the task in no way absolves us from attempting to meet this goal. One is put in mind of Lee Shulman’s assertion that the practice of teaching is complex in the extreme. He argues:

The practice of teaching involves a far more complex task environment than does that of medicine. The teacher is confronted, not with a single patient, but with a classroom filled with 25 to 35 youngsters. The teacher’s goals are multiple; the school’s obligations far from unitary….The only time a physician could possibly encounter a situation of comparable complexity would be in the emergency room of a hospital during or after a natural disaster.762

Recall that Løgstrup suggests that “it is of the essence of the demand that with such insight, imagination, and understanding as he or she possesses a person must figure out for him or her self what the demand requires.”763 It is the “understanding of life”764 of the individual teacher that must determine how this difficult task will be met. Thus, to the extent that the teacher is a caring, authentic person, with a multi-layered understanding of life and a desire to recognize and

759  Ibid., 44.
761  Ibid., 22.
763  Løgstrup, The Ethical Demand, 22.
764  Ibid.
meet the individual demands of the students, will those individual needs be met. This notion may be related to Elliott’s idea that “an excellent curriculum is an excellent teacher interacting with students in educationally sound ways.” While Elliott is making specific reference to curriculum, his position may be used to underscore the idea that an excellent teacher is an excellent practitioner in ways of both content and interaction with those involved in the educational endeavor.

To summarize the analysis thus far, utilizing Løgstrup’s thinking, the teacher must view each student in his or her care as an individual spirit or world. Each of these human worlds has demands that must be met and may only be met by the music teacher in their lives. These demands may vary greatly and it is an instructor’s understanding of life that determines what these demands are and how best to meet them. This is a difficult task given that most musical instruction is carried out in large group settings. The difficulty does not excuse us as music teachers from attempting to meet the ethical demands of each student in our care.

The above ideas are challenging. However, the difficulty does not end with the responsibility of meeting many individual demands in a group setting. Recall that Løgstrup also articulates the notion that we must not violate the will of the other as we attempt to meet the individual ethical demand. Løgstrup states:

The fact that we are one another’s world does not mean that we hold another person’s will in our hands. We cannot intrude upon his or her individuality and will, upon his or her personhood, in the same way that we can affect his or her emotions and in some instances even his or her destiny.

Put another way, the music teacher attempting to creatively meet the individual needs of his or her students must do so with the idea that the world and will of the student must be respected in
the process. Løgstrup suggests that the demand should be met in a way that allows “the other person...ample time and opportunity to make his or her own world as expansive as possible.”

Allowing our students to make their “worlds as expansive as possible” should be a goal of all teachers of every subject. That is, allowing our students to explore how a particular knowledge, skill, or social interaction changes them as a person: how it impacts their individual world. This concept is at the heart of good teaching.

Another important notion of Løgstrup’s philosophy that is important in a music teaching context is the idea that we are charged with the lives of our students even when they may not be students we particularly like or enjoy being around. Løgstrup notes:

When then, does the one-sided demand address us? When the other person whose life we are to care for is not a part of our own life which we have received – or more correctly stated, when we do not wish him or her to be a part of it.

This suggests that we are charged to meet the ethical demand in students who are, frankly put, not lovable. Therefore, the concept of the demand is more palpable when one interacts with people to whom we are not related by family ties, or those that one does not intrinsically love. Løgstrup is clear that you must approach even these students with love. He notes that some people will carry out the ethical demand from a sense of duty or obligation. Løgstrup states:

In other words, people can substitute the word ‘responsibility’ for the word ‘love’ because they regard it as more important that love is demanded than that love is demanded.

This notion suggests that the view of students and the philosophy of interaction that a music teacher adopts are of paramount importance. Love is demanded! If the music teacher loves music, but does not equally love the students who are being taught, then the learning

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768 Ibid., 27.
769 Ibid., 27.
770 Ibid., 127.
771 Ibid., 146. (emphasis in original)
environment is not all it could be from either a musical ideal or a social/ community ideal. Or, if the music teacher is more concerned with his own glory in the spotlight, or her own aesthetic gratification, then the musical learning environment is deficient in important ways. This, then, highlights a greater responsibility for the music teaching professional. Music teachers must have as a personal philosophy the notion that the music students in their charge must be approached with love.

Thus far in the analysis I have spoken in general terms about meeting the ethical demands of the students in a music class. One may wonder what needs are under discussion: musical needs, personal needs or social needs. The answer is that we may not be able to predict what needs or what portion of their lives our students will place in our hands. We must be ready to meet the demand of each student as these demands are revealed to us. Does this mean that we do not attempt to teach music in the process of meeting the ethical demands of our students? Extrapolating from Løgstrup’s ideas suggests that music teachers must be, first and foremost, competent and effective music teachers as they attempt to ethically meet the demands of their students. The concept to which I am referring is called mediation. Recall from Chapter 5 that mediation may be viewed as something that acts as an intermediate between humans engaged in some type of relationship. Løgstrup states:

if persons are to encounter one another in a manner which is redeeming and liberating to the individual’s spirit and energies, it will be effected through something intermediate. We must be united in some common enterprise, some common interest or distress.

I suggest that music is our “common enterprise” that mediates the relationship between and among teachers and students in the music classroom. Løgstrup suggests that the line between the

772 Ibid., 40. Note: This concept is referred to as mediation and is discussed in this dissertation in Chapter 5.
773 Ibid., 40.
774 Ibid.
personal and the mediating enterprise is fluid and “will...vary according to the different kinds of relationship.”\textsuperscript{775} He notes that “the object of common concern to teacher and student calls for a greater degree of personal contact that the object of common concern to merchant and customer.”\textsuperscript{776} Teaching in Løgstup’s philosophy is not a business and students are not customers. The art of teaching, in Løgstrup’s framework, requires love more than responsibility and music can provide the aesthetic energy that will help to engender a realization of this love in both music teachers and students.\textsuperscript{777}

Music then, viewed through Løgstrup’s lens, is “redeeming and liberating to the individual’s spirit and energies.”\textsuperscript{778} Thus, music, and our interaction with music as music teachers and learners, provide the energy that aids us in recognizing our human connections through the ethical demand. In this way, Reimer’s emphasis on the aesthetic response to music intersects with Løgstrup’s notions that it is the energy generated by interaction with art that aids us in recognition of our relationships one with the other. Birkelund suggests that “in Løgstrup’s sense of the word, aesthetics gives people the energy that ethics lives on.”\textsuperscript{779} Recall also that Løgstrup’s idea of education associated with his philosophy is termed “education for life.”\textsuperscript{780} This implies that the ultimate goal of education is to “promote the ontological opportunities that exist as the basis for communal life.”\textsuperscript{781} Thus, Elliott’s notion of the contextual practice of music intersects with Løgstrup’s ideas of the school of life. I suggest that we must be about the business of teaching music in a vigorous and authentic way. At the same time, we must be aware of our students’ needs and utilize all our creative powers to meet their demands in a way that

\begin{footnotes}
\item[775] Ibid.
\item[776] Ibid.
\item[777] Birkelund, \textit{Ethics and Education}, 478.
\item[778] Ibid.
\item[779] Ibid.
\item[780] Birkelund, “Ethics and Education,” 478
\item[781] Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
allows our students the widest possible horizon for personal growth. In so doing, we may engage the notions of Reimer and his aesthetic emphasis, Elliott with his idea of contextual practice, and Løgstrup and his ethical philosophy.

At this juncture, I want to suggest an idea of Kivy when he notes that one aspect of any philosophy may be called a “vacuous truism.”\footnote{Kivy, Introduction to a Philosophy of Music, 2. Note: A vacuous truism is a short axiom that captures a foundational idea or encapsulates a fundamental notion about a complete philosophy. Kivy notes that the complete philosophy is certainly much more complex than the vacuous truism, however the vacuous truism reveals an important truth about the philosophy to which it refers.} For Kivy this short, aphoristic summary of a philosophy may reveal broad truths about the philosophy that may help enlighten the reader.

Kivy states that when we invoke a vacuous truism we

\begin{quote}
 are according it the status of a foundational axiom: something from which everything else follows. It is so basic it hardly needs stating; but stating it brings a form of enlightenment we would not have had were it to have been left, as it normally is, unspoken.\footnote{Ibid., 3.}
\end{quote}

I want to suggest that the foundational axiom or vacuous truism that is applicable to this framework of thinking about music education philosophy is \textit{I teach people, not music}.

This vacuous truism suggests an important difference between the philosophy of Reimer and Elliot and the philosophical ideas of Løgstrup. Namely, that Reimer’s and Elliott’s philosophies are based on the idea of the nature and value of music, and that Løgstrup’s philosophy takes its fundamental ideas from the nature of human relationship. The Reimer and Elliott approach is illustrated in figure 13 below.
This figure illustrates the notions of Reimer and Elliott. By placing the nature and value of music at the center of their philosophies of music education, they have inserted the idea of music between the instructor and the students. This is not to suggest that teachers teach in this manner. I hypothesize that very few music education professionals teach in a way that would resemble this model. It is rather to suggest that if one were to consciously follow either of the philosophies set forth by Reimer or Elliott, the above figure would resemble the classroom pattern of interaction. An illustration of the interaction model that resembles a classroom based on Løgstrup’s ideas is found in figure 14 below.

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784 Figure by the author
The illustration above suggests that it is the relationship of music teacher and music student that is the foremost aspect of the teaching enterprise and music is an important mediating factor in this relationship. In this figure, our vacuous truism holds true; I teach people, not music. It is my belief that many more music teachers would feel that the above illustration is a more accurate depiction of their teaching philosophy than the model depicted in Figure 13.

In summary, the difficulty of meeting the individual demands of our students in group settings is further complicated by the imperative that we not violate the will of the individual as we meet the demand. Recall Løgstrup’s notion that the demand should be met in a way that allows “the other person…ample time and opportunity to make his or her own world as expansive as possible.” It is impossible to predict what portion of their lives a student may place in our hands. Therefore, we must be ready to meet these demands in imaginative and creative ways. Music and music teaching are the mediating factors in the music classroom. Thus, we should strive to teach music in as best a manner as we are able. Music is the reason for

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785 Figure by the author
786 Løgstrup, *The Ethical Demand*, 27.
the community; however the relationship between the people in the music classroom must
always be in the forefront of importance in the musical community.

One aspect of music teaching that may aid the music teacher in this difficult task is the
nature of the content in a music classroom. Recall that for Løgstrup, the aesthetic experience and
engagement with art provides humans with an opportunity to recognize the ontological nature of
human relationships. Engagement with art helps us recognize the life manifestations of trust,
mercy and openness of speech. Thus, engaging students with music in a way that allows them to
have an aesthetic experience may aid both teacher and students in their efforts to create a caring
community of music makers. This will, in turn, aid the instructor in his or her quest to meet the
demands of each student in their charge.

There are several notions revealed in a review of the literature in nursing philosophy that may help to bring a broader scope to this synergy. Recall from Chapter 2 the four main
aspects of Løgstrup’s philosophy that inform the application of Løgstrup’s ideas to the practice
of nursing.

- Provide opportunities for the recognition of ontological life-manifestations such as trust, mercy, and openness of speech. For music teaching this may have to do with creating a community based on the mutual love of the art of music that engenders the recognition of these life-manifestations.

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• A creative closeness, balanced with a form of distance that protects the integrity of both student and teacher.

• Ability to “hear” students who may not be able to articulate their needs as contained in the silent demand.

• Recognition that the relationship of teacher/student may often be asymmetrical in nature.

The above ideas suggest ways in which a music teacher may think regarding the individual members in his or her ensembles or music classroom. First, the use of music and a feelingful engagement with music may engender a community which recognizes the ontological nature of trust which we share in every human meeting. Second, the music teacher must engender a closeness among instructor and students and among students and other students that is balanced by a form of distance. Recall that Løgstrup suggests that the social norms protect us and, while the ethical demand transcends the social norms, these norms are not to be disregarded. They will aid us in maintaining this form of distance. I suggest that this distance also implies that the music teacher must be engaged in building a life outside of the classroom and rehearsal hall.

Many music teachers may feel that they must work long hours and completely dedicate their lives to music teaching to the exclusion of all other outside interests. I believe that Løgstup is suggesting a space that allows for calm reflection and supports his notion that the “education for life”788 is necessary for the music teacher if they are to meet the ethical demands of their students in creative and affirming ways. The third notion is a willingness to hear students who may not be able to articulate their own silent demands. This may be actualized in a desire of the music teacher to discern the intentions of a student, rather than just to hear what they may or may not be saying. The fourth idea is the notion that our relationship with our students is always one of power and will always produce an asymmetrical relationship. Løgstrup argues:

788 Birkelund, Ethics and Education, 478.
That life together with and over against one another consists in one person being delivered over to another person means that our mutual relationships are always relationships of power, the one person being more or less in the power of another person.  

Therefore, teachers must always be sensitive to the asymmetrical nature of the teacher/student relationship as they interact with students.

Note also that, for Løgstrup, the demand is not limitless. He suggests that an attempt to be responsible in an unlimited fashion will inevitably lead to encroachment. “The radical demand says that we are to care for the other person in a way that best serves his or her interest. It says that and nothing more.” This leads us to the conclusion that in order to utilize this framework of thinking toward a new philosophy of music teaching requires a change of thinking regarding the teacher/student relationship. Music teachers must teach music to the best of our abilities while always keeping in mind that each of our students are their own individual world and spirit. Each has individual demands that must be met with great creativity and care. We are fortunate that music is our content area and that authentic engagement with music may aid us and our students as we strive to see each other through the lens of a trusting relationship. It is this shift of focus in our thinking as music teachers that I believe will make the difference in our approach to authentic music teaching and learning as a tool for a richer understanding of our human relationships.

Implications: A Framework of Thinking for Teacher Training

As regards teacher training and the ethical demand, several notions may prove helpful to the important work of training preservice teachers. First, university faculty might explicitly
include the framework of Løgstrup’s philosophy of ontological ethics as part of the subjects covered in course work that supports a major in music education. This would be in concert with a framework of thinking about music education philosophy in which the relationships between the people engaged in the music making process are an explicitly recognized priority in the teaching and learning situation. Again, recall that I am not suggesting that music teachers not teach music at the highest level their individual skills allow. I am suggesting, however, that whether or not a music educator acknowledges the ontological nature of the relationships that are created in the music classroom or rehearsal hall, the relationships remain as part of the fabric of the teaching situation. Recall what Løgstrup suggests regarding the ontological nature of our relationships. He states:

Each of the relationships is a particular form of the fact out of which the radical demand comes. Or stated differently, it is not within our power to determine whether we wish to live in responsible relationships or not; we find ourselves in them simply because we exist.792

I believe this concept to be true and it seems better to acknowledge the ontological nature of the relationships created in the music classroom in an explicit way; to attempt to raise the awareness of our future teachers regarding this ontological relationship, than to hope they come to this understanding on their own in the field.

Second, many preservice teacher training programs include observations of exemplary music teachers in the field. If ontological ethics is used as a framework of thinking about music education philosophy, these students may observe situations in which the ethical demands of individual students are being met by the music teacher they are observing.793 If the preservice

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792 Løgstrup, *The Ethical Demand*, 107.
793 Note: It is my hypothesis that many music teachers are already operating in a way that might be defined as utilizing many of Løgstrup’s philosophical ideas. That is, if Løgstrup is correct about the nature of ontological ethics the concepts already have currency in present practice although there would almost certainly not be an explicit understanding of Løgstrup’s philosophy by the practicing teacher.
teacher has an awareness of Løgstrup’s philosophical thinking, they may have a greater understanding of the nature of the relationship between the music educators and the students who make up the music community. This understanding coupled with their observation of an exemplary teaching professional may serve to aid the preservice teacher in an understanding of this framework of thinking about music education philosophy.

Third, preservice teachers could reflect on the personal autobiographies of their teaching and learning experiences through the lens of Løgstrup’s philosophical ideas. Reflecting and writing about experiences they have had in which a teacher met an individual demand for them could help clarify the preservice teachers’ understanding of the concepts of Løgstrup’s ontological ethics. Also, a negative experience in which the preservice teacher’s trust was not met by a teacher might be utilized to aid in their understanding of the framework of ontological ethics. Recall that Løgstrup suggests that we often understand the nature of trust when that trust is abused.794

In summary, there are several implications that may aid in preservice teacher training as regards Løgstrup’s ontological ethics. The university teaching faculty charged with courses leading to teacher certification could implicitly teach the philosophy of Løgstrup as a framework for the philosophy of music education. With this framework as a guide, the preservice teacher may then be able to view the working music teaching specialist in a manner that may enhance the preservice teacher’s understanding of Løgstrup’s philosophy in application. Finally, reflecting and writing on their own educational experiences as students, may give the preservice teacher a more phenomenological understanding of the application of ontological ethics. The goal of this training is to attempt to engage the preservice teacher in a reflective way about the nature of trust and relationship that exists in the music classroom. Recall that Løgstrup argues

that the ethical demand “not only says what a person *ought* to do; it also says *who* a human being is.”795 This idea is related to Elliott’s notion that an excellent teacher is an excellent curriculum.796 This concept implies that there must be an ethics of teaching and that a good teacher is one who acknowledges and engenders the best of their ethical selves as they approach the teaching act.

Conclusion

This study gives rise to the question of whether or not the concepts articulated by Løgstrup have currency in practice. If Løgstrup’s assertions regarding the ontological nature of trust are true, then one would expect to see indications of this in the teaching of exemplary practitioners. It would be interesting to engage in a qualitative observation study of exemplary music teaching specialists at all levels using Løgstup’s ontological ethics as an evaluative tool. The question posed might be related to discovering if music teachers who are recognized as exemplary tend to value relationships in a way that would corroborate Løgstup’s arguments, especially those arguments in *The Ethical Demand*.

Another study may involve music teachers’ attitudes and perceptions regarding their roles in the lives of their students. A quantitatively-oriented questionnaire could be developed which would help measure a large sample of music instructors’ concerning their perceptions of the main objectives of teaching music.

I believe that this philosophy, while it works well as a framework of thinking about music teaching and learning, may also have application to the general curriculum at all grade levels. There are possible studies that could apply Løgstrup’s notions to the teaching of other content

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795 Ibid., 170.
areas besides music. Again, it is my hypothesis that many of the best teachers are already approaching their teaching in a way that would fit well into the framework as outlined by this dissertation.

There is further work to do on the development of a framework of thinking about music education philosophy utilizing Løgstup’s ideas. This is admittedly an initial work and should be considered only a beginning. The challenge with all music education philosophy is to outline a framework that will aid in the practice of teaching music. I hypothesize that many music teachers, as well as teachers of every subject, may resonate with this philosophy. In this philosophy it is the small things that engender the big differences. While teachers work diligently to teach content and motivate and inspire students, beneath that work is the work of meeting the ethical demand for all the individual students in their care. It is my belief that in small and great ways, teachers of music are engaging in many of the concepts of this philosophical framework in their daily teaching. A richer understanding of these concepts may make explicit what has been in the past, only understood implicitly.797

It may be unsettling to some that there is no overriding theory of action; that each situation must be met with a new approach that is appropriate only for that situation. I believe that this phenomenological approach approximates more closely the actuality of our collective lives as teachers than any closed, foundational theory ever could and thus has a greater chance of having a positive impact on teaching and learning than any other philosophical position that is currently under study and practice in the field.

Another issue that might cause consternation for those who study and think about music education philosophy is the notion that this framework does not put the nature and value of music at the core of its foundational premises. Recall that this foundational premise is present in

both Reimer’s and Elliott’s philosophy. This notion that in order to effectively teach music one must understand the nature and value of music strikes me as odd. The concept of the nature and value of music and the practice of sharing music in an educational setting do not seem to be contingent concepts. The philosopher Kivy suggests a similar idea when he argues that one does not need to know what philosophy is to do philosophy. He states:

> I freely confess that I do not myself *know* what a philosophy is. Should the reader put this book down and read no further?...Such a decision to reject outright what follows in my book would be quite unwarranted by the argument given. The philosophy of anything is a practice. Like all practices, one need not have a philosophy of it to know how to do it....To appropriate a distinction made famous by the late English philosopher Gilbert Ryle, being able to do philosophy is a matter of knowing *how*..., knowing what philosophy is a matter of knowing *that*...One needn’t have the latter knowledge to have the former.

The understanding of the nature and value of music is a philosophical problem, and one that may not yet be solved. I believe the analogy to the above Kivy concept is an apt one; one needn’t have a philosophical understanding of the nature of music to be able to share that music with students. One must, however, have some type of relationship with the people who are involved in the musical endeavor. The quality and authenticity of those relationships may have a profound impact on the lives of those who enter our music classrooms and rehearsal halls. In this way, a new framework of thinking about music education philosophy based on the philosophy of Knud Løgstrup may be effective in enhancing our practices of teaching and learning music.

Finally, I note that communication in language symbols is challenging at best and many of the concepts articulated in this dissertation have been challenging to express. This difficulty of expression has been more pronounced from my viewpoint, because a phenomenological

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analysis may be more difficult to articulate than an overriding theory might be. What I have suggested above is a framework toward a new way of thinking regarding music education philosophy with implications for music teaching and learning. This framework and the implications it engenders may be thought of as a map or guide and, as such, may appear poor in detail. This is a conscious attempt on my part, following the work of Løgstrup, to avoid the creation of an overriding theory. I wanted to suggest implications rather than pronouncements so as to remain in a phenomenological framework. Put another way, individual situations must dictate actions. The ideas of the difficulty of language and its use in constructing a map of our thinking are captured admirably by Burke in his “Definition of Man.” He states:

In being a link between us and the nonverbal, words are by the same token a screen separating us from the nonverbal – though the statement gets tangled in its own traces, since so much of the ‘we’ that is separated from the nonverbal by the verbal would not even exist were it not for the verbal (or for our symbolicity in general, since the same applies to the symbol systems of dance, music, painting, and the like). A road map that helps us easily find our way from one side of the continent to the other owes its great utility to its exceptional existential poverty. It tells us absurdly little about the trip that is to be experienced in a welter of detail. Indeed, its value for us is in the very fact that it is so essentially inane….Language is but a set of labels, signs for helping us find our way about.\(^{800}\)

What I am suggesting is that this dissertation resembles a road map that reflects an “exceptional existential poverty.”\(^{801}\) It will be left to those in practice to use this guide as they make their way through the “welter of detail”\(^{802}\) that constitutes the daily activities of the music teaching professional.

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801 Ibid.
802 Ibid.
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