TOWARD A POST-STRUCTURAL MONUMENTALITY

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Thesis Prepared for the Degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS

August 2006

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Saindon, Brent Allen, *Toward a Post-Structural Monumentality*. Master of Science (Communication Studies), August 2006, 125 pp., reference list, 120 titles.

This study addresses a tension in contemporary studies of public memory between ideology criticism and postmodern critique. Both strategies of reading public memory rely on a representational logic derived from the assumption that the source for comparison of a memory text occurs in a more fundamental text or event. Drawing heavily from Michel Foucault, the study proposes an alternative to a representational reading strategy based on the concepts of regularity, similitude, articulation, and cultural formation. The reading of Vietnam Veterans Memorial and the Galveston County Vietnam Memorial serves as an example of a non-representational regularity enabled by the cultural formation of pastoral power.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to thank a number of people that have made possible the completion of this study. Collectively, the thesis committee assembled to oversee the study provided important guidance in producing a large portion of the research. Brian Lain provided much conceptual and structural assistance in developing and finalizing this project. Jeffrey Bennett and Kelly Taylor also made considerable contributions providing clarity and focus to the study.

Other University of North Texas faculty and staff members helped to shape the study, either directly or indirectly: Jay Allison, Karen Anderson, John Gossett, Danna Prather, and Justin Trudeau. A former University of North Texas faculty member, Juandalynn Taylor, offered assistance in the early development of the intellectual background required to undertake this study.

Various graduate students in the University of North Texas Communication Studies department have generously offered feedback at different points in the development of the project. In particular, Christina Wells assisted tremendously in editing and formatting the finalized product.

I also wish to thank two non-University of North Texas faculty members, Douglas Drabkin and William E. Shanahan III, for continuing to provide a positive influence in my intellectual development.
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CHAPTER 1

JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY

Introduction

Acknowledged or not, rhetorical studies has always maintained a relationship to public memory. Aristotle (trans. 1954) explicitly acknowledged the significance of deploying public memory in the structure of epideictic rhetoric, as well as forensic rhetoric’s emphasis on mining facts about the past. Cicero (trans. 1948) includes memorization as one of the five rhetorical canons. Monks replicating biblical texts act to preserve the memory of the word of God. In the movement toward division of academic disciplines in the 19th century, rhetoric’s memory intertwined with the study of literary composition and criticism, focusing on the documentation of linguistic tactics that have historically produced effective or beautiful speech (Wichelns, 1925).

Wichelns (1925), frequently considered the seminal move to inaugurate a separate academic discipline known as rhetoric, uses memory to chart the historical movements of literary criticism, ultimately deploying memory of disciplinary knowledge as the motive to justify the division of rhetoric from the rest of literary criticism (Gaonkar, 1990). Subsequently, the discipline produced a series of inquiries that unearth the memory of rhetoric in order to articulate a vision of its future (Black, 1978; McGee, 1980 provide examples). In addition, rhetoric also deploys memory in order to justify its study, whether to excavate the specific context of the rhetorical act (Hill, 1972; Parrish, 1954), to recognize the role of rhetoric in understanding the transmission of ideas (Wrage, 1947), or to create classificatory systems that divide types of speeches and judge rhetorical acts against prototypical examples (Campbell & Jamieson, 1978).

In each of the preceding cases, the use of memory as historical data operates in an
unproblematic fashion. Though rhetorical study has long attempted to remember its place within the structure of academic disciplines and the production of knowledge, it generally assumes the ability to recall accurately the memory of an event, text, speech, or line of inquiry. Only within the last 35 years has rhetorical study started to understand the problematic nature of memory and the way the construction of memory operates as a mechanism to guide thought and action.

The first real studies of public memory sought to explain the way critically arranged elements of the speech or recurrent patterns connected with the audience. For instance, Bormann (1972) introduces fantasy theme analysis in order to explain how certain speakers have more persuasive power than others do, largely because some orators produce rhetorical visions that strike a group’s psychological chord, which creates identification with that rhetorical vision. The persuasiveness of a particular vision increases with its ability to create a common past, present, and future trajectory. Though not explicitly thought, this piece provides one of the first studies in the use of memory (of the past) as a mode of persuasion used to promote audience identification.

The extension of the ideal public and the production of collective fantasy occurs in two pivotal pieces by Michael Calvin McGee: one concerning the rhetoric of “the people” (1975) and the other theorizing “ideographs” (1980).7 The former (McGee, 1975), treats “the people” as a rhetorical construction imbued with a past, present and future, rather than a natural fact. The latter (McGee, 1980) theorizes the link between high-level abstractions, both emptied and overdetermined, and the historical progression of mass consciousness. Both pieces extend fantasy beyond the production of fiction in order to understand the material effects produced by the audience identification with fantasy. Accordingly, memory of culture becomes a political act that produces specific effects, not just a matter of excavating neutral facts about the past.

Cox (1990) makes explicit the reliance McGee (1980) has on memory, while providing
insight into the subversive potential of recollection. Memory operates as a political act, but the constructions of the past also create an impetus to provide alternative memory. An intellectual working toward liberation from oppressive social conditions must attempt to re-member, to think otherwise, and to provide an alternative history. This gesture mimics Wander’s (1984) call for critics to activate their subject position in favor of those forgotten, marginalized, or oppressed.

Beginning with Bormann (1972), memory operated as both a litmus test to understand rhetorical constraints (Bitzer, 1968) and a collective backdrop that can be manipulated by the speaker to improve listener compliance. After the influence of McGee and Cox, the operative questions become the ends toward which memory of culture works and how to subvert the hegemonic use of memory. Ultimately, memory commingles with power, though this understanding of power is limited to the dialectic of domination and resistance.

Other critics focus on the relationship between public memory and cultural conditions. Blair, Jeppeson, and Pucci (1991) use the case of the Vietnam Veteran’s Memorial as a reflection on the fragmentation of memory. As such, the fragmentation of the monument reveals the fragmentary nature of memory and discloses the impossibility of meta-narrative construction to represent adequately the Vietnam War. Consistent with Blair’s (1999) belief in the continuing importance of rhetoric’s representational character, the Vietnam Veteran’s Memorial inaugurates a new typology of monument reflective of the “postmodern condition” (Lyotard, 1984). Contrasting with the use of memory as an ideological device (Cox, 1990), modes of memorializing demonstrate the values of contemporary culture.

This specific study must situate itself within both the disciplinary uses of memory and the recent turn to understand the function of public memory. In essence, the recent disciplinary conversation about public memory ought to consider seriously its own modes of production. If
nothing else, such questions serve to expose the larger disciplinary stakes at work a more limited conversation. This project seeks to begin the long process of reflexively addressing our disciplinary practices in memory production, though the provisional answers contained herein will alone prove inadequate to the task. Through probing the function of public memory in a few examples of contemporary monuments, I hope to address some of the inadequacies of current scholarship, with the paradigmatic examples of ideology criticism (Cox, 1990) and the postmodern critique (Blair, Jeppeson, & Pucci, 1991) as a guide.

The recent and explicit preoccupation with public memory provides the grounding and justification for this study. Accordingly, the rest of this chapter introduces this line of inquiry and the outline for the study, divided into three sections. First, I identify the central research question for the broader study, focusing on a few problems that have received insufficient probing thus far in the rhetorical discipline. This section also offers a justification for the limited scope of the relationship between public memory and monuments. Second, I review the literature deemed the most paradigmatic and relevant to establish the current scope of public memory study, while exposing the methodological shortcomings of current scholarship. Finally, I offer an outline of the main body chapters comprising the remainder of the study, in order to acquaint the reader with the arrangement of studious progression offered herein. If successful, this chapter ought to provide a detailed guide to both the significant conversations guiding this argument and the unfolding of future contents.

The Research Question

What conditions of possibility exist for a post-structural monumentality? Blair, Jeppeson, and Pucci (1991) raise a similar question with regard to postmodern monumentality, resulting in an observation of fragmentation that reflects contemporary culture. Essentially, the Vietnam
Veteran’s memorial exists as a sign of dispersion of meaning in our society, for it signals the
dissolution of an overarching societal meta-narrative (Lyotard, 1984). However, the classic
response from ideological criticism creates a theoretical impasse. The polysemy (Hasain, 2003)
of cultural forms only insulates them from criticism, hiding the deeper structure of imperialism
not use the same argument with regard to the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
(USHMM), if only because the museum seems to offer a unidirectional interpretation.

Rather than understanding ideology operating at the level of content, a few theorists have
attempted to find an overarching thematic with regard to public memory, such as Zelizer’s
monumental essay (1995) that surveys the work of public and collective memory. Attempting to
weave together a diversity of studies, she argues that the consistency in memory studies operates
around a certain set of identifying characteristics and functions that the critic can isolate.
Schudson (1997) performs a similar gesture with regard to identifying thematic elements that
justify the classification of public memory, but only works based on two categories:
commemorative or non-commemorative. For Blair (1999), the materiality of rhetoric in the
case of monuments also circulates around a set of five major themes of investigation, for which
she sites how a monument exemplifies each theme.

However, two major difficulties exist in these works. First, such work generally treats the
texts under consideration as autonomous agents that influence the audience to take particular
memories away from the experience, almost through a form of memory replacement (Zelizer,
2002). Deriving in some part from Althusser’s (2001) theory of interpellation (Charland, 1987),
the call toward a particular memory influences audience identification with it, external memory
aids offering a form of representative proof (Zelizer) for the interpretation. Such an
understanding of public memory treats the memory text as constitutive of identity based on the
supposed accuracy of the representations offered.

The second problem concerns the willingness to treat modes of subjective identification
as separable entities. As a result, these studies frequently follow Bodnar (1993) in setting up an
antagonistic relationship between vernacular identities and national identities, or as in the case of
Hughes (2003), the national identity of an event and the exportation of a memory for a
transnational or globalized citizen-subject. As a result, the multifarious techniques of memory
production take on a character of fragmented and diverse elements. The problem consists not so
much in an affirmation of dispersion, but instead, how one recognizes degrees of similitude
(Foucault, 1983) within this system of dispersion. Put in other words, for the study of public
memory to remain a viable disciplinary activity, rhetoric needs to confront the question of
regularities within memory studies, apart from the isolation of characteristics (Zelizer, 1995) or
themes (Blair, 1999). How ought rhetorical studies consider modes of regularity within the study
of public memory?

In asking about the conditions of possibility for a different monumentality based on the
general tenets of post-structuralism, this study seeks to negotiate the theoretical controversy
contained in the tension between ideology criticism and postmodern criticism. Both rely on
logics that fail to capture the complexity of an interwoven cultural context (Greene, 1998).
Taking a cue from Foucault (1972), one instead acknowledges dispersion, while attempting to
discern modes of regularity between disparate discourses. In essence, conditions of possibility
offer a mechanism for understanding systems of regularity based on similitude (Foucault, 1983),
rather than the identity of genres. The problem of genre identity relates to the problem of
national identity, where modes of identification seem to slip, rather than compartmentalizing into
discrete categories of the vernacular, national, or global. Instead, one ought to note the technologies of identification that operate in an agonistic relationship, creating some conflict, though not diametrically opposed. Varied levels of citizenship can coexist, exhibiting similar modes of identification and articulating similar rationalities (Foucault, 2000). Regularities occur through the ordering of statements (Foucault, 1972) into an enunciative series, which then get articulated (Biesecker, 1999) into a larger cultural formation (Biesecker, 2002).

Though the preceding and subsequent sections try to provide a broad survey of issues in the examination of public memory, no study could reasonably attempt to cover all of the objects or issues discussed therein with any degree of effectiveness. This study takes as its central focus the circulation of memory texts and wishes to provide some continuity to the research, but it has no desire to perfect or complete the disciplinary knowledge base. Instead, this act of criticism operates as an intervention into disciplinary power relations, in order to invigorate a debate over how rhetoric studies memory. According to Foucault (1980), one cannot hope to provide a broad, general view of things, especially in an era of strict disciplinary boundaries to knowledge. Instead, one must dawn the perspective of the specific intellectual: an intellectual that uses one’s area of specialization in order to reveal the tactics of power in a particular historical context and within the limits of one’s abilities. As a result, this project, for both the sake of time and space, shall limit itself to focus on one type of public address within memory studies: memory as understood through the scrutiny of monuments.

Results of the study cannot immediately ascend to the level of generalized theory, but instead if successful, ought to provoke future research along similar theoretical trajectories in other areas of public memory. In essence, an inquiry into monumentality should help to determine the desirability of future research in this area. Monumentality provides an excellent
testing ground for such an approach for a few reasons. First, public address generally emphasizes the role of the speaking subject that utters memory, making it difficult to think through memory as a self-producing process. Second, the excessive amount of study done on photography makes it difficult to delimit and isolate theoretical disputes and to differentiate approaches to memory. Third, two perspectives tend to dominate the study of monuments: ideology criticism (Hasain, 2004) and postmodern monumentality (Blair, Jeppeson, & Pucci, 1991). These theoretical approaches provide insufficient explanations for the effectivity (Greene, 1998) of the technologies of monumentality, as subsequent chapters will reveal. Finally, the diversity of monuments memorializing similar events offers a way to talk about coalescence within their modes of dispersion.

The literature review, though only focusing on a few studies that seem to confirm larger trends, reveals the complexity confronting public memory studies. Why should the discipline remain satisfied with an explanation of public memory that either resorts to a simple inventory of consumer manipulation or to a reflection of a cultural condition? This project seeks to provide a preliminary explanation to this issue that proves more satisfactory to the present trajectory of rhetorical studies.

Rhetoric’s Address of Public Memory

The following studies do not provide an exhaustive account of the scope of public memory in rhetorical criticism. However, they do provide a map of some of the major studies within the discipline, and reveal some of the gaps existing in current research, providing a trajectory for the subsequent chapters.

Memory and Public Address
Those with privilege to address publics frequently occupy important power positions. Accordingly, rhetorical criticisms of public memory begin in the area of public address. Browne (1993) discusses the generation of memory in a speech given by Daniel Webster. Webster did not simply recapitulate a set of historical facts; rather, he ordered and framed those facts in narrative form, thereby placing a memory that serves his political interests. Noting the significance of memory to culture, Browne argues symbolic acts create memory in order to name and sustain a way of life. Three characteristics of public memory exist: it operates as a performance; it is a type of social text; and it functions as a site of cultural competition. In the final analysis, Browne provides a concrete example of memory as a mechanism for ideology, while providing a few more insights into how memory works.

Two additional studies focusing on Bill Clinton shed light on the significance of public address to the struggle over public memory. First, Parry-Giles and Parry-Giles (2000) argue that Clinton’s address uses civil rights memory to align his presidency and party with the goals of progressive politics. Deflecting other controversies surrounding his behavior, nostalgia participates in image reconstruction. Second, Clinton’s address at the Vietnam Veteran’s Memorial (Snee, 2001) uses painful memories to call for collective forgetting (amnesia), providing an apologia for his controversial relationship to the Vietnam War draft. The confluence of these two commentaries on Clinton reveals the complex interplay of presence and absence that comprises public memory and provides conceptual tools to examine that interplay.

However, these studies focus on public memory used to manipulate an audience, usually identifying some material benefit conferred through the deception. Again, the dialectic between oppression and liberation confines the rhetorical analysis of memory texts to controversy concerning competing visions of memory, with an emphasis on determining relative effect on the
audience. In short, the text, or the author of the text, acts as an autonomous subject that influences a relatively passive audience.

*Memory of a Figure*

“The Fall of Wellington” (McGee, 1977) inaugurates an understanding of the relationship between collective memory of an individual and the political action in the present. The memory of Wellington operates as a political analogy to cipher the present, motivating movements toward reform. Not only does public memory influence action, but also the memory of a person becomes a site of political struggle. Consistent with the belief that such memories act as manipulation, such deceptions nonetheless carry material effects. Documenting a set of memories constructed about Sojourner Truth, Mandziuk (2003) extends this observation to discuss how multiple groups contest memory in the public sphere. The memory becomes a reflection of struggles over civic values in society. Again, this type of struggle over meaning operates according to the logic of relative domination of memory texts and relegates public memory to a site of controversy.

Hasain (2001) has a similar argument about the memory of Anne Frank. However, the nature of her memory does not remain static; it changes over time. In the case of Anne Frank, each generation had a different dominant memory of her, revealing the memory of her life to be an important site of cultural contestation. The ability for those to identify with the figure of Anne Frank has significant impact for understanding the ideological manipulation of public memory, emptying out the specific content of the holocaust. As such, memory of an individual can have significant impact by defining the cultural forms that seem important to a society, regardless of any particular interpretation of the memory. Though Hasain may deepen our appreciation for the methods of memorial manipulation by individuals, it minimizes the impact of contextual deployments of memory. The memory of Anne Frank also possesses a value within a particular
historical moment. Though the use of Anne Frank’s memory continues, the use toward which each period puts the memory of Anne Frank reveals something about modes of subjectivation active within that cultural formation. In short, analysis of this type of diachronic (de Saussere, 1986) progression decontextualizes the significance of each moment in history, subordinating it to continued unity of a cultural form.

Vivian (2002) offers one of the most insightful studies on public memory to date, exposing how the memory of Thomas Jefferson operates through his other, Sally Hemings. The inability to know the truth of his past (its undecidability) motivates a traumatic desire to produce knowledge about Jefferson’s past. Examining the multiple ways society remembers Jefferson’s relationship with Sally Hemings, Vivian argues that the crux of public memory does not exist in accuracy, but in the desire to expand knowledge. Memory does not just display a vertical relationship of representation of an event, but also has a horizontal relationship of iteration based on random mutations while maintaining degrees of similitude. Instead of understanding memory as an identity with internal struggles over definition, this study gives the discipline a glimpse of a non-identitarian understanding of public memory that still establishes regularity, though left largely underdeveloped at the end of the essay. However, two problems remain. First, Vivian reduces the relationship between desire and the subject to the reflection of the self (memory producer), making all memories a way to produce individual identity. Second, he founds the investigation of similitude and regularity of memory at the level of a struggle over identity.

Public Memory and the Multiple Layers of Identity

Though Vivian (2002) marks a significant turn from an identity driven logic of public memory, most studies in rhetoric still treat memory as a site for constituting public identity. The next set of studies moves from an emphasis from both the influence of an author and the desire to
remember an individual to examining the relationship between a memory text (which may have collective authorship) and the production of a collective identity. However, the nature of this contemporary “public” still acts as a form of antagonism within scholarly literature.

Browne (1995) captures a rudimentary form of this antagonism, reviewing several works on public memory that isolate antagonism both within a particular identity and between identities. The work of Bercovitch (1993) and Kammen (1991) provide insight into the construction of national identity as a rhetorical battleground. However, the specific content of any particular version of national identity has instability, though a recurrence of certain cultural forms, such as controversy (Bercovitch) or rituals of commemoration (Kamman), operate to define the limits of national identity. National identity does not so much have a particular meaning as a regular function. These studies collectively understand the construction of identity as an ideological function that constructs (Charland, 1987) an audience in a particular way, repeating the mistake of treating the text as agent acting on a relatively passive audience. They cannot account for how audiences use the texts as a mode of subjectivation.

Much of the analysis of public memory has operated along the lines of a national identity. Haskins (2003) discusses a Postal Service campaign to remember the century as a construction of national identity through the politics of choice, democratizing commemoration while legitimating the overall concept of national identity. In other cases, certain texts provide a specific narrative content to an identity (West, 2002), while focusing on mundane events of everyday people as part of the national narrative. Such uses of identity establish a common ground that limits and defines the politics of the present. The most paradigmatic case occurs in Biesecker (2002), who analyzes a series of memory texts as a metonymy for a larger cultural phenomenon: the anchoring of national identity around the national character of World War II.
Though these studies do loosen the directness of influence over the logic of textual persuasion, they still cannot account for the use value of the text (de Certeau, 1984), nor do they attempt to theorize the regularity between modes of subjectivation. However, Biesecker does include the development of a certain concept: the cultural formation.15

In some cases, other identities come into conflict with the politics of national remembering. Bodnar (1993) argues that an antagonistic relationship exists between local commemoration and national identity. An important development of this work is a shift in focus from the point of a text to the rules that regulate consumption of a memory event by a viewer/participant. Within this tension between the national public and a local, Jorgensen-Earp and Lanzillotti (1998) explore how negotiations occur regarding the rules of commemoration. In the case of the Oklahoma City bombing, private shrines offered a way to negotiate the need for private grief while maintaining a link to national memory practices. In the context of memories concerning Israeli experience with the Holocaust (Meyers & Zandberg, 2002), the loss of concentration camp survivors from aging transforms the official metanarratives of survival sanctioned by the state into a privatized memory, filtered through the experience of the subsequent generations. These studies, as noted in the development of the research question, treat modes of identification as separate entities, failing to theorize their regularities. However, the latter two works provide some insight into the use of memory by audiences, though they largely presume the given nature of kinship or an ethnic identity, rather than noting how people use memory texts as a site of self-production.

Memories also can participate in the formation of a transnational identity. International Studies scholars sensitive to the technologies of cultural production have also isolated the global scale on which the deployment of global citizenship operates (Cheah & Robbins, 1998).
Rhetorical critics have certainly taken notice of the enacted nature of citizen politics (Asen, 2004), though defined not as a self-making process as much as a set of ritualized activities that influence the actions of a citizen-subject. Hughes (2003) notes how international imperatives to save public memory for the world displace national narratives of atrocity. In the case of photographs of the Cambodian genocide by the Khmer Rouge, the deterioration of the Cambodian national archive for the photographs sparked a response by international organizations to save the photographs in the interest of humanity, only to relocate them in a Gallery in New York City. This removal replicates the rhetorical gesture of humanitarian intervention, where external agents intervene in the name of a human memory of atrocities. Such a gesture highlights the tension between national forms of memory and the memory of the international citizen-subject, privileging the interests of the latter, rather than understanding their modes of co-production. In addition, Hughes seems to presume an inherent desire for humanitarian intervention, without addressing the motive of that desire.

This tension between the national archive and international memory receives additional exploration with regard to the collective memory of the holocaust. The British Imperial War Museum has placed an exhibit for the Nazi Genocide in a separate space, which attempts to recover the experience of National Socialism through mediation of the exhibit and the arrangement of historical documents in a linear, narrative progression (Hoskins, 2003). This museum exports the memory of the holocaust in order to provide a post-hoc rationalization for British involvement in World War II as a service to global humanity.\textsuperscript{16} A similar gesture occurs with Hasain’s (2004) reading of the USHMM.\textsuperscript{17} With mediated technology and the narrative progression of the exhibit, Hasain isolates a series of themes that emerge from the USHMM, mostly concerning the level of atrocity, its preventability, and the U.S.’s failure to intervene in
the systematic extermination of people during World War II. The overarching point of the exhibit, accordingly, provides a reminder that U.S. citizens have an obligation to intervene in the interests of humanity, articulating a global citizen-subject with obligations to all people’s of the world. The overemphasis by both Hoskins and Hasain on the influence of the text again reveals a problem with rhetoric’s assumption of audience construction (the autonomous text), while also failing to address the desire to control the interpretation of the holocaust.

Summary

The preceding set of studies helps to define ambiguities surrounding the problems of subjective identification with a particular identity, or conversely, the difficulty understanding the desire to know a particular person or a collective past. Most of the studies examine how external memory aids help to define roles of subjects and toward what ends a community ought to direct itself. Many of the studies also highlight the way particular memories can support several different subjective identifications, creating tensions between types of citizenship. However, the conditions of possibility for those subjective productions remain unexamined. Finally, these studies also reiterate a thematic tendency in rhetorical scholarship to reduce memory to a particular political use in the present, either anchoring an identity or directing action of the stated or implied audience. After noting specific gaps in a relatively representative literature base, I now map out the progression of the rest of the study.

Preview of Chapters

Each of the preceding areas of the research question receives treatment in a substantive chapter of this study, in order to provide a preliminary answer to the research question. This study does not proclaim even an exhaustive account of the conditions of monumentality, but instead, provides instigation for future research to continue this line of inquiry. Two
monument/memorials shall comprise the texts for consideration of the research question: the Vietnam Veteran’s Memorial (VVM) and the Galveston County Vietnam Memorial (GCVM) to local dead soldiers.

Chapter 2 introduces the VVM and the GCVM, providing a frame of reference for the rest of the study. Through detailed description, one ought to gain an understanding of both the physical layout of the monuments and some popular culture commentaries on them. Afterward, due to the lack of scholarly work performed on the GCVM, the chapter closely attends to the literature on the VVM from rhetorical studies and related fields. Following the argument from this chapter, I maintain that scholarly work on the VVM divides roughly into two camps based on either ideology criticism (Althusser, 2001) or postmodern critique (Lyotard, 1984). Though these two reading strategies diverge with regard to the degree of freedom granted to the individual viewer with regard to possible interpretations of the memorial, both still rely on a logic of representation (Foucault, 1983), reducing components of the VVM to symbols of other phenomena. As a result, two problematic concepts outlined in Chapter 1 resurface: the search for monument themes and the emphasis on the production of national identity.

Chapter 3 outlines a different logic from which to begin reading the regularities of monuments within larger cultural contexts. It begins with Foucault’s (1972) discussion of the false unities attributed to discourse, including those of identities and themes. Instead of representations (which assume the existence of an original or archetype from which to judge other discourses), one ought to characterize regularities occurring through relative similitudes (Foucault, 1983) between statements. These similitudes do not manifest themselves through direct influence of the audience, but relate to other statements and institutional apparatuses through a logic of articulation (Biesecker, 1999). The emergence of these statements within the
rules of a larger enunciative field helps isolate cultural formations (Biesecker, 2002) at work in particular contexts. Cultural formations do not operate according to identitarian logics: they appear only through isolating relationships in the rules of relations between different fields of discursive play (Foucault, 1972).

Chapter 4 returns to the VVM and the GCVM in order to provide a practical example from which to gauge the utility of the theory outlined in Chapter 3. Keeping with the strict outline for discursive formations outlined by Foucault (1972) and slightly modified in the movement to cultural formation (Biesecker, 2002), the chapter produces an ascending analysis of regularities between statements. The rules of formation for objects, enunciative modalities, concepts, and strategies receive extensive treatment in both the VVM and the GCVM. Chapter 4 concludes by suggesting these two monuments participate in the articulation of a type of cultural formation based on pastoral power through their restrictions in the rules of use for the viewer.

Chapter 5 concludes the study by assessing both the utility and the shortcomings of this study. Commentary on the contributions of this study to rhetorical scholarship on public memory takes up much of the space in this chapter. Shortcomings concerning the ability to analyze fully the emergence of cultural formations from the reading of monuments also receive significant treatment. The chapter then makes suggestions for future directions of research in this area and provides cautionary notes for rhetorical scholars. Finally, this study ends with commentary on the placement of the VVM and the GCVM in academic scholarship.

Endnotes

1 Though modern rhetorical criticism treats this canon as the forgotten canon, the force of this thesis will contend that the memory does not drop from rhetorical criticism, but nature of memory within the rhetorical canon has changed. Memory no longer operates as a responsibility for the rhetor concerning their rhetorical text, but instead becomes the work of a larger archive in which a rhetorical act is situated.
Gaonkar (1990) does an excellent job revealing the extent to which the types of texts and the motives for production (in essence, the object) works to determine a methodological approach, and ultimately justifies the division of types of knowledge production (literary criticism or rhetoric). At base, Wichelns’ (1925) argument seeks to provide an injunction about how academics should remember oratory.

In the case of Black (1978), the Coatesville Address provides one of the most important examples of memory work in our discipline. After completing a survey of the field (including biographical accounts, movement studies, and Neo-Aristotelian criticism), the memory of the Coatesville Address is used to expose the inadequacies of previous studies. New methods become necessary to categorize sufficiently types of rhetoric and design methods that fully envision the rhetorical potential of those speech types. In the latter (McGee, 1980), the deadlock between the idealist conceptions of myth and the materialist preference for ideology requires a concept (ideograph) that negotiates the terrain that takes seriously the persuasive and seeming consensual character of values in society and the real emptiness of those values. The repetition of certain concepts operates to produce a cultural conditioning (the first hints of collective memory). In this case, memory as a double function: both an institutional catalogue of theoretical dispositions and an important technology of persuasion.

In both studies, rhetorical critics work as agents of memory, reconstructing the specific situation of the speech to provide the critic with a basis of judgment. Since speeches ought to receive judgment on their ability to adapt and respond to a contemporary situation in a way that persuades an audience, the rhetorical critic must also become a careful reader of historical archives, so that they may make an accurate and fair judgment of the speech.

Gaonkar (1990) notes that Wrage (1947) acts as one of the “first substantial challenges to neo-Aristotelianism” (p. 295), calling for rhetoric to understand the significance of minor literature in the history of ideas. As such, rhetoric becomes a supplement to the memory work of history, explaining the evolution and progression of thought.

The relation between genre and form reveals the significance of memory to genre criticism. For Campbell and Jamieson (1978), “forms are phenomena—syntheses of material that exists objectively in the rhetorical act and of perceptions in the mind of the critic” (p. 19). The need to archive institutional knowledge of rhetorical form derives from a repetition of rhetorical characteristics, which provides both a stable foundation for the classification of knowledge and an expectation for audience members regarding the “situational requirements, strategic responses, and stylistic choices” (p. 20) for a particular speech. Notably, memory of past speech forms produce an expectation for the audience of a present speech, while also providing an “objective” basis for cataloging knowledge.

Though this article also deploys the memory of disciplinary study as noted in the introduction, no thought occurred concerning the relationship between the use of collective memory in the public sphere and use of memory in understanding the identity of lines of inquiry. Consequently,
one ought to treat the uses of memory separately.

8 Though a study of the technologies rhetoric uses to remember itself would no doubt prove a fascinating study of a book (or several), such a track would likely overwhelm the confined space of this study. Instead, understanding the operation of memory within larger social practices would yield fruitful ground for criticizing the current structure of the literature review essay. However, the task of this study acts as a prior consideration to possible and subsequent reflexivity on our practices.

9 This response from rhetorical scholars derives its theoretical legitimacy from the discussion of mythic structure outlined in Barthes (1972) and McGee (1980).

10 This observation does not mean that the ideology inherent in the monument does not hide itself. Instead of polysemic interpretation emptying the content of the museum, the museum naturalizes its messages through interactivity, claims to authenticity, and the linear narrative progression of the exhibit. In sum, the USHMM naturalizes its own mode of sense making.

11 Schudson (1997) distinguishes between these types based on intentionality. Commemorative public memory includes museums, monuments, photographs, or other intentional technologies of memory. Non-commemorative, by contrast, includes a host of psychological, linguistic, and social processes that keep the past alive unintentionally. In addition to some of the other problems more directly highlighted subsequently in this chapter, Schudson does not ever answer the question of whose intentions matter in commemoration.

12 Wright’s (2005) suggestion that “when we have one memory imprinted in our mind, another is erased” (p. 70) offers insight into how most theorists treat the work of memory speeches, as well as various memory objects.

13 A lengthier discussion of both Bodnar (1993) and Hughes (2003) shall occur in a subsequent section. For now, one only needs to take note of the antagonistic relationship between competing identity formations.

14 This set of lectures given at Stanford in 1979 provides a solid basis for modes of regularity that articulate collective identity. The pastoral injunction “of each and of all” moves from a technology providing the rationality for the religious leader in early Christian tradition to the rationality of the secular state. Though religious identification and vernacular identification have distinct characteristics, one can also draw forth enough relevant characteristics in its underlying techniques to discuss pastoral rationality as an underlying regularity that makes possible a consensual identification with either one identification or many overlapping identity formations.

15 Of the three studies noted here, Biesecker (2002) nuances the directness of influence the most. However, in the end of her article, she argues that the Women in Military Service for America Memorial (WIMS) is colonized by a larger cultural formation. Though she attempts to use the logic of articulation to substantiate this claim, I believe she overemphasizes the role of the
memory of World War II soldiers as a model for civic identity. In displacing the physical norm of the white male body that dominates so much of the cultural formation surrounding World War II, one might argue that the WIMS exerts both innovative and conservative forces, working within the cultural formation while also mutating the visible representations of who performs sacrifice to the nation. I believe the references to ideology contained within the article reveal how the multiplicity of functions within the monument takes a back seat role to the production of a national identity. This subtle distinction has crucial significance for the remainder of this study.

16 The placement of this exhibit as part of the Imperial War Museum makes this link apparent, documenting the transformation of British involvement in war from colonial domination in the service of the nation to a benign desire to make the world safe against tyranny.

17 The substantive part of this thesis project seeks to take issue with the modes of analysis deployed in this article to read the USHMM, especially the drive to isolate themes that seem to emerge naturally from the museum, rather than understanding the use-value of the museum for the subject’s techniques of sense making and self-fashioning. However, documentation of the main point of the article will prove sufficient.

18 I will not provide a description of the monuments here, but instead, mention them just to provide some context for the next three chapters. Descriptions will occur with the first chapter in which each monument receives extensive treatment.
CHAPTER 2
MONUMENTALITY AND VIETNAM MEMORY

Introduction

Although occurring more than 30 years ago, the Vietnam War retains a prominent place in the American cultural landscape. Countless films present the events of the war, both at home and abroad (Sturken, 1997). Memoirs of soldiers, novels, and apologias for strategic mistakes circulate in print (Spanos, 2000). Across the nation, over 145 different memorials preserve the public memory of the war (Toynbee, 1986). Given the immense diversity of cultural objects dedicated to the Vietnam War, how ought scholars to draw connections between these varied memory objects? Taking the Vietnam Veterans Memorial (VVM) and the Galveston County Vietnam Memorial (GCVM) as an example to guide for future scholarship, this chapter seeks to provide both descriptive familiarity and scholarly backgrounds of them. Their diversity as memory objects commemorating the same event and the large amount of work done on the VVM make both excellent starting points for demonstrating regularities.

The chapter begins with physical descriptions of both the VVM and the GCVM in order to acquaint the reader with the memory objects under consideration. Though many readers ought to have some familiarity with the VVM structure, they unlikely possess a similar working knowledge of the GCVM. Scholarship possesses an equal, if not greater, imbalance of knowledge concerning the respective monuments. Accordingly, the second section situates this work within a continued scholarly conversation about the VVM that either treats the monument as an ideological marker (Althusser, 2001) or as an exemplar of the postmodern condition (Lyotard, 1984).¹ Though the two sets of studies seem oppositional, a link exists between them: the logic of representation guiding reading strategies. These two sections provide necessary
background for subsequent chapters, including an alternative reading of regularities between the VVM and the GCVM that evades the logic of representation.

Marking a Place for Veterans: Remembering Vietnam

Dedicated in November of 1982 (Scruggs & Swerdlow, 1985), the Vietnam Veterans Memorial (VVM) remains one of the most popular tourist attractions along the National Mall (Feldman, 2003). Highly regarded as one of the most controversial monuments in U.S. history (Forgey, 1983), its current form exists because of multiple designers and political compromise. Rather than owning a central place on The Mall, the VVM exists on one side of the reflecting pool, near the Lincoln Memorial, with the Korean War Memorial located on the opposite side of the reflecting pool. However, considered from the perspective of use, the VVM literally re-centers the National Mall (Petrignani & Wolf, 2004). The VVM includes three major components, the wall of names, a bronze statue of infantry, and another bronze statue dedicated to women’s service in Vietnam.

A small booth marks the opening of a path into the VVM site, providing small maps and information pamphlets, but nothing else. Starting with the southwest entryway, an array of objects enters into view, dividing the attention of the viewer. On the left, two sets of books provide a directory of names on the wall and their location, allowing viewers to direct themselves to only those panels of significant personal interest. The glass covering each book of names carries the same inscriptions as those at the chronological beginning and ending of names on the wall:

In honor of the men and women of the armed forces of the United States who served in the Vietnam War. The names of those who gave themselves and of those who remain missing are inscribed in the order they were taken from us… Our nation honors the courage, sacrifice and devotion to duty and country of its Vietnam Veterans. This memorial was built with private contributions of the American people.
On the right, a large plaque placed by the National Park Service explains the components of the monument, noting the significance of the memorial area as a site of reflection and healing.

Designed to put a human face on the war, the memorial expresses both unity (through the three servicemen statue) and individual sacrifice (the wall of names). The Vietnam Women’s Memorial (VWM) emphasizes the role of 11,000 women in the war. The center contains a 50-foot flagpole with an understated decorative base (Forgey, 1983).

Immediately after the previous scene, a small circular walking path on the right allows access to the three servicemen bronze statue. Designed by Frederick Hart, the statue exists as a compromise granted in order to make the monument politically viable (Forgey, 1983). Though each of the figures retains stoic qualities, the statue captures “the feeling of closeness and camaraderie shared by Vietnam vets” (Scruggs & Swerdlow, 1985, 115). Portraying physical dependency on one another, the bronze provides a “realistic” image of everyday life in combat. In addition, the soldier images (a white, a black, and a Hispanic) reveal the extent to which the forces of the Vietnam era integrated a plethora of ethnic identities. In short, the bronze seems to characterize a scene in which an individual requires some help from diverse others to persevere and accomplish their individual tasks. The main plaque makes this relationship apparent, highlighting the virtues of courage, sacrifice, devotion, and unity.

After visiting the bronze statue of male soldiers, one strolls along a narrow path, veering slightly left, to encounter the main wall area. Miya Lin, a 21-year-old Yale architecture student at the time, designed the wall of names, which comprises the main memorial installation (Scruggs & Swerdlow, 1985). It contains the names of over 58,000 military personnel who died in Vietnam in chronological order of death (Toynbee, 1986). A visitor walks along the surface of the wall, reading name after name of service personnel that died. The walls become larger,
finally enabling the visitor to see a distorted reflection of herself/himself in the wall. The shiny, black granite surface of the wall apexes with an obtuse angle split. Installed into the landscape (rather than protruding from it), each side tapers seamlessly into the surrounding area, the lines of sight of the wall’s sides gesture toward the Lincoln Memorial and the Washington Monument (Feldman, 2003). A narrow sidewalk abuts the lower surface edge of the black granite, allowing visitors to read the names of each fallen soldier as they walk along the wall. Called the “black gash of shame” (“Black gash”, 1985), a peace sign, the letter V (for Victory or Vietcong), or even a boomerang, Lin’s design came under attack from a number of different camps for not adequately representing the event of the Vietnam War (Feldman). However, much of the dissent quieted after unveiling the memorial, and even President Reagan eventually accepted the memorial as a site of healing (Brisbane, 1984a).

Of course, not all opposition quieted after opening the memorial. Many felt that their experiences and stories did not get included into the memorial structure (Brisbane, 1984b; Christian, 1994). On November 11, 1994, the eleventh anniversary of the opening of the VVM, the NCPC erected the Vietnam Women’s Memorial (VWM) a few hundred feet away from the main site along a walking path that connects each edge of the wall of names but bypasses a close encounter with the wall (Schulte, 1993). Though eight women who died receive recognition on the wall of names, the VWM responds to a need to heed the stories of those women that served in a non-combatant capacity, yet have a unique and important experience of the war (Loose, 1993). Understood as a triumph of women over the traditional masculine representations of patriotism and sacrifice, the VWM responds to an elision of women from Hart’s bronze statue (Hass, 1998). The statue portrays three women of diverse ethnic backgrounds attending to a male soldier. Glenda Goodacre, the statue’s designer, received sharp criticism for seeming too
straightforward in the scene. Other critics worried that the stature might usher in a new era of special interest monuments (Hass).

The Vietnam Veterans Memorial exists as an entire memorial complex (Johnston, 2001)\textsuperscript{11} designed to inspire quiet contemplation in the viewer (Sargent, 1984). The multiple sites in the complex provoke contradictory feelings in the audience, inspiring reflection about service and sacrifice (Forgey, 1984). In order to link the experiences, an oval of pathways follows the wall of names and arch across the ends of the wall, connecting like a widened baseball diamond. Both statues occupy positions to the side of the main walking path, which clears space to stop and contemplate each bronze. Though much controversy surrounded the erection of the wall of names, Maya Lin (2000) originally wished the design to overlook politics in favor of the individual sacrifice of servicepersons.

After reflecting on some of the revisions made to the memorial site, Lin now suggests that the juxtaposition of images seems to capture the controversy surrounding the politics of the conflict (Forgey, 1984). Lin’s commentary on the memorial also receives support from a series of popular culture commentaries (Blair, Jeppeson, & Pucci, 1991). Veterans’ reactions include reading the monument as a demonstration in the futility of the war, an affirmation of the cause, and a commentary on the lack of political commitment in Washington for the troops (Toynbee, 1986). The site spawns both individual remembrance and collective protests from various political groups, confirming the significance of the site as a repository for public memory of the Vietnam War (Saperstein, 1986).\textsuperscript{12} The National Park Service collects individual items left at the memorial as part of a national archive of remembrances, highlighting the link between personal grief and public memory (Palmer, 1987). Taken collectively, these uses of the VVM reveal the
difficulty of assigning particular meaning of the monument or discussing how it influences and audience.

Contrasted with the VVM, the Galveston County Vietnam Memorial (GCVM) has a much more humble existence. Completed and dedicated on July 4, 1992, the memorial honors those who fought and died in Vietnam from Texas but emphasizes those who died from Galveston County (Long, 1992). The monument occupies a 40x40 area, part of a large vehicle circle next to the Moody Gardens Hotel and Convention Center. A set of gardens set the scene directly behind the GCVM, and a beautiful water fountain lies about ten yards to the right. Behind the monument area, a large United States flag flies overhead. In the background, one sees a water park under construction, two glass pyramids housing indoor gardens, and a water inlet that leads into the Gulf of Mexico.

Twenty-five reflecting black granite pillars extend six feet from the base, each perfectly vertical. “Each of the men from Galveston County who died in the war will be memorialized on a column with his name, hometown, branch of service, rank and dates of birth and death” (“Designer”, 1992, p. 3). Seventy-five soldiers cover each face of the twenty-five pillars, with inscription of soldier information beginning approximately one foot below the top. The pillars maintain neat 5x5 rows, each with a flat surface. A red granite base gently slopes from ground level on one corner of a square area, with the opposite corner sunken in about the size of one stair step. The memorial area has a chain around the perimeter to prevent people from walking between the pillars. Walking room exists in order to allow visitor movement around the monument, creating an eight-foot circle around the perimeter of the base.
A large black granite cube sits between the driveway and the monument, with an inscription on the front side designed to give insight into the representational character of the memorial:

The Vietnam Veterans Memorial honors our fallen men from Galveston County…

A timeless concept is conceived, exhibiting the conflict that developed in our society surrounding the Vietnam War. This conflict is expressed through the irregularly sloped base, which is in direct opposition to the strong, structured formation of the twenty-five black granite pylons. The memorial is cut into a Texas Pink Granite base which represents a wound in the earth.

A major underlying concept in the design is providing each veteran a small memorial within a larger one…

Walking among the pylons, one’s own reflection is seen in the smooth finish of the black granite. The pylons serve to keep the memory of the veterans alive while the reflections remind us of our own mortality and the fragile nature of human life. The interplay of light and shadow connects us to an even greater, universal order.

Other surfaces of the cube list names of volunteers, donating parties, and dedication information.

No scholarly literature exists for the GCVM, and one would have hard time finding information on the memorial anywhere. Yet, the Moody Foundation and the Galveston County Marine Corps League spent nearly one-hundred-thousand dollars in order to install the monument (“Designer”, 1992). Moody Gardens does not occupy a central location in relation to the city of Galveston, mostly operating as a tourist resort. However, the GCVM sits away from the main resort area, and no notation of its existence happens elsewhere in the building. Consequently, the GCVM does not seem designed for tourist visitation. In fact, it does not seem to call for any particular audience.

Apparently, this vernacular breed of Vietnam memorial participates in a larger cultural phenomenon. By 1986, over 143 monuments to the Vietnam War existed in the United States (Sun, 1986). In addition, several models of the VVM now circulate throughout the country.
(Vietnam Veterans Ltd., 2006). Some receive support from a state (Schaefer, 1989) or from localities (such as Galveston). Virtual memorials for Vietnam Veterans also seem common (McBride, 2006; Smithsonian, 1995). One certainly cannot treat the GCVM as a representative example for public memory in these monuments, but perhaps some of the techniques of memory have an underlying regularity between them.

Before investigating that question, I trace a history of scholarship on the VVM, noting the general division in the literature between focus on ideology criticism and postmodern critique. These divisions create two contradictory readings of the VVM, while relying on the same fundamental logic to guide their interpretation. Departing with the logic of representation will subsequently become an imperative for understanding regularities between the VVM and the GCVM.

The Vietnam Veterans Memorial and Interpretation

Given the social controversy surrounding the construction of the VVM, rhetorical scholars have long struggled to discuss its communicative significance. Foss (1986) provides a foundational study of argument strategies utilized in the VVM that make the monument appeal to a wide range of audiences. By breaking with convention, lacking information, focusing on the dead, including minimal contextual information, and generating multiple referents, the VVM transcends political differences about the Vietnam War and brings diverse audiences together to heal wounds of the nation. For Foss, the VVM carries a perceptive anti-war statement veiled in neutral admiration for the dead. Refusal to glorify the conduct of the Vietnam War, given the context of most war memorials and the social controversy surrounding Vietnam, functionally acts as criticism of policies.
Foss (1986) does not perform a close reading of the VVM, but instead, comments on general themes unique to the VVM that makes it significant. In addition, the VVM does not act as an agent, but instead becomes a receptacle for authorial meaning. Persuasion operates as a vehicle for conveying messages effectively to the viewer about what one ought to value from the Vietnam War, while still allowing the viewer freedom to seek personal meaning. Though Foss does not explicitly align with ideology criticism, the aspects of the VVM discussed closely coincide with the foundations of ideology criticism as a mode of interpretation.

Althusser (2001) begins to provide an account for the reproduction of capitalist social formations, which lacks sufficient explanation in traditional Marxist thought. Though the economic base determines the shape of the political and cultural superstructure, elements of the superstructure help to reproduce the conditions of possibility for capitalist accumulation. The state, though a part of the superstructure, performs an important role for advancing the interests of the ruling classes through the exertion of state power. Two components of the state work to ensure the stability of the social formation: the Repressive State Apparatus (RSA) and the Ideological State Apparatus (ISA). While Althusser argues the RSA generally includes explicit organizations like “the Government, the Administration, the Army, the Police, the Courts, [and] the Prisons” (p. 96), the ISA exists as a set of specialized institutions like “Churches, Parties, Trade Unions, families, some schools, most newspapers, [and] cultural ventures” (p. 97). As Althusser argues, the capitalist social formation highlights the educational ISA over other elements, including religion and politics. Ideology and the ISA proscribe practice for the individual, though they hide their repressive function. The individual accepts ritual activity as freely chosen; one recognizes rules for appropriate conduct as natural or ideal behavior for good citizens. Ideology, as a mechanism of overcoming labor alienation, expresses a relationship
between individuals and their lived conditions of existence and provides a comfortable position for the subject within a social order. \(^{23}\) Successful persuasion of individuals to occupy specific subject positions then guarantees the reproduction of the means of production through successive generations of workers. \(^{24}\)

To return to the VVM, Foss (1986) identifies a series of elements (sunkenness, harmony with the landscape) fitting a particular theme (welcoming stance), which has a symbolic effect on an audience (called to occupy the position of the caring viewer). Presenting each individual name (which violates traditional memorial form dedicated to the collective) of war dead unites the visitors in the celebration of sacrifice, while secretly advancing the cause of anti-war rhetoric. While the VVM seems to provide freedom of interpretation (generation of multiple referents), it places rhetorical limits on interpretation through the list of names. Such a list, symbolizing death and loss, provides the foundational assumption for opposition to the war. However, one could not effectively criticize the monument for protesting the war \(^{25}\) since it contains no explicit judgment of the conflict. \(^{26}\) Though Foss ascribes the force of influence not from the VVM itself, the origin of meaning does not matter as much as its influence for Althusser (2001). Overall, the reading strategy for rhetoric \(^{27}\) closely mirrors those explained by Althusser, though not identical. However, Foss never emphasizes the material ends toward which meaning production works (Ehrenhaus, 1989). \(^{28}\)

Understanding the VVM as a mode of popular appeal, a few scholars have commented on the therapeutic nature of it in relation to public memory. Carlson and Hocking (1988), for example, focus on the viewers desire to interact with the monument by leaving material at the site. \(^{29}\) Again, Althusser (2001) might consider this phenomenon the acceptance of a subject position where one participates in the act of remembrance. By either externalizing (scapegoating)
or internalizing (mortification) blame for the deaths of soldiers, the viewer attempts to complete
the tragic narrative of the Vietnam War, ultimately purging both individual and collective guilt.
Leaving objects at the memorial has a cathartic effect for the audience: producing a feeling of
closure over the war and redeeming hope in the present (Junge, 1999). Carlson and Hocking
comment on this mode of therapy as a mode of individual healing for the memorial, not
collective (thus the different strategies of blame encountered with reactions to the memorial).
Cloud (1998) also expresses concern over this mode of therapy as a social phenomenon that
individuates desires to deal with trauma. These strategies of remembrance replay the dramatic
cycle of guilt and redemption, ultimately working through a traumatic encounter and
reestablishing social community.

Abramson (1996) discusses ideology and the therapeutic effects of the VVM as well,
though highlighting different aspects of the monument complex. A consistent theme seems to run
through all of Maya Lin’s monuments about the 1960s: the use of chronology. In the Civil
Rights Memorial located in Montgomery, Alabama, Lin uses a list of historical events and the
death of historical figures around the edge of a circular table to represent the progression of
struggle for racial equality. For the Women’s Table at Yale University, a series of numbers,
representing the number of women enrolled at Yale in successive years, spiral from the center of
the table almost to the edge. Such a gesture celebrates the progression of time and the
progression of co-education at Yale University. The VVM lists the names of those that died in
combat during the Vietnam War in the order of death, with the beginning and the end of the
war occurring at the apex of the wall. The abutted joints of the wall allow the viewer to come full
circle and experience closure on the conflict. In addition, Abramson argues that the time line
itself participates in the ideology of American educational culture, providing a series of events
with a narrative unity that then serves the need for the culture to accumulate historical facts about itself. In the end, Abramson decides that the elements of closure and the focus on the fact of death (names of the dead) make the VVM an a-political monument dedicated to the rhetoric of therapy and healing.

Others read the VVM in a different manner, attending to the national politics embodied in the memorial and its surrounding context. Griswold (1986) conducts a closer reading of the VVM, noting how the arrangement of the memorial inspires contemplation in the audience. Both the arrangement of memorial names to begin and end at the apex of the memorial and the lines of the wall pointing toward the Lincoln and Washington monuments prompts viewers to consider the nature of sacrifice. Ultimately, the VVM poses a question to the audience: was the sacrifice worthwhile? Though it does not provide an answer, the ambiguity on the politics of the Vietnam War allows the memorial to affirm a national vision based on the virtue of sacrifice. In this instance, the specific polysemy of political interpretation allows a meta-meaning to emerge about the importance of deliberation. Similar to Bercovitch (1993), this emphasis on deliberation reveals the structure of democratic ideology through encouraging an interrogative patriotism. Rather than treating the VVM as a medium to produce individual representations, the entire monument acts as a symbolic space for citizen instruction. The individual names distract from how the VVM operates as part of the National Mall complex, which focuses on memorializing sacrifice in service of the nation. The emphasis on monument as integral to construct the national audience deemphasizes the significance of individual identification or the VVM, an aspect of the wall of names heavily important to previously mentioned scholars. However, this work again reduces the VVM to just a symbol of an idea (sacrifice to preserve the nation), reproducing a representational logic that directly influences national identity construction.
Johnston (2001) discusses the relationship between the Vietnam War and civil space in the VVM. Democratic ideology must confront the contradiction between the production of sacred space and democratic plurality. To compensate, monuments must incorporate elements of contestation into sacred space as part of the design. The structure of the VVM contests the memorial practices of other sites along the National Mall, parting with traditional memorial form. Maya Lin’s design sought deliberate ambiguity to avoid controversy, but the subsequent inclusion of the three servicemen statue and the VWM make the monument a multiplicity: a monument complex that argues with itself. The viewer, as participant in argument, then performs their citizenship through ritual acts of leaving material at the memorial site. The VVM serves as a symbol for democratic debate and dialogue. However, the VVM more directly proscribes a normative standard of conduct or the citizen subject by virtue of what it valorized. Etched into the black granite walls of the VVM and anchored by patriotic inscriptions concerning sacrifice, the names of the dead instruct the viewer about appropriate conduct. The walls refuse to name those who died outside the combat areas, those who committed suicide or died from war related illnesses (like Agent Orange), or those who died from domestic political strife about the war (the Kent State students). Thus, the VVM educates the citizen subject to sacrifice in service of the nation, rather than sacrificing in less masculine or heroic ways.

Contrasting with the reading strategies roughly characterized as ideology criticism, another group of scholars radically differs in interpretive guidelines. Ehrenhaus (1988a) seeks to explain both the symbolic power of the VVM and the arousal of intense emotions in the viewer. Traditional monuments generally advance a specific proposition for moral action, leaving little room for the viewer to complete the argument. In contrast, the VVM reveals the limits of the institutional voice; the fragmented nature of the event of the Vietnam War refuses incorporation
into the American mythic narrative. Instead, the institutional voice relinquishes control over the interpretation of the war and the nature of sacrifice, choosing instead to remain silent (Ehrenhaus, 1988b). Silence, rather than holding the place of speech absence, has a profound effect upon the viewer, forcing her/him to encounter the memorial in an authentic manner.

Ehrenhaus (1988b) identifies four possible types of encounter with the memorial, demonstrating the viewer’s need to provide an interpretation of the past. Instead of proscribing the citizen’s role in the governing apparatus, the viewer replies to an invitation (1988a) to think about the relationship between individual and government.

While Ehrenhaus (1988a;1988b) certainly sees the VVM as a therapeutic memorial that helps viewers create closure on the Vietnam War for themselves, self-therapy does not preclude questioning a prevailing mode of social organization, as it did in both Griswold (1986) and Cloud (1998). Instead, he places more emphasis on the individual exercising the freedom to encounter the memorial and construct a personal meaning; the existence of those meanings questions the American mythic narrative that proscribes citizen activity. This difference in emphasis surrounding certain symbolic interpretations of the memorial signals a shift in belief concerning the cultural context of late 20th century America.

In the 19th century, the construction of disparate disciplines of knowledge lead to the proliferation of discourses detailing minute aspects of a particular subject area, but did not provide a way to unify these discourses under an overall grid of understanding. With the proliferation of local knowledge, Lyotard (1984) argues that grand schemes of organizing information come under scrutiny. These mechanisms that proscribe and order to knowledge, parallel to the organizing function of the state, no longer can stake a claim to encompass the totality of facts and circumstances. “Postmodernism”, according to Lyotard, designates the
societal condition that generates incredulity toward grand systems of organization. “What is new in all of this is that the old poles of attraction represented by nation-states, parties, professions, institutions, and historical traditions are losing their attraction” (p. 14). As a result, the institutional voice that formerly held authority concerning the formation of social bonds no longer maintains legitimate claims to power.

Returning to Ehrenhaus (1988a; 1988b), one recognizes the close affinity between his description of the VVM and Lyotard’s (1984) description of the postmodern condition. The monument refuses the institutional voice, democratizes the means by which to produce knowledge about the past, and questions the authority of the state to proscribe the value of sacrifice as a model for good citizenry. The silence of the VVM confers the ability to participate in the production of representations about the past to the viewer. However the diversity in symbolic interpretations of the VMM, discussed as the four modes of encounter, symbolize this incredulity toward grand narratives.

Blair, Jeppeson, and Pucci (1991) detail explicitly the link between the VVM and the postmodern condition. Using Lyotard’s (1984) assessment of postmodernity as the “incredulity toward metanarratives” (p. xxiv), they argue that the VVM provides a prototype for memorializing within this cultural condition. The existence of two different memorials (the wall of names and the three serviceman statue) make the memorial text a combination of social tensions. Visitors change the VVM through leaving items at the site, further questioning an authorial or institutional control of interpretation of the Vietnam War. The list of individual names, the mirror reflection of viewers in the black granite surface, and the fissure at the apex of the wall all question the conventional elevation of a collective cause above individuals. As a
result, the monument text serves as a symbol for the postmodernity: it defers metanarrative sanctioning, and differs from other memorials on the National Mall.\textsuperscript{61}

Feldman (2003) provides one of the closest efforts to escape the logic of symbolism and representation of the afore mentioned studies. Feldman chastises scholars and popular culture commentators on the VVM for reading the memorial as a shape that represents determinate idea (a victory symbol, the black gash of shame, etc.). To treat the memorial in this fashion reduces the memorial to a propositional statement, ignoring the conditions of emergence of the object.\textsuperscript{62} Instead, the VVM takes the form of an event, participating in a complex interplay of emergent and recessional movement. The black granite surface denies depth of surface, receding into the landscape. In sharp contract, the names come forth from the surface of the wall, inundating the viewer with the experience of loss. However, two elements of Feldman’s reading reduce elements of the VVM to symbols.\textsuperscript{63} First, the names listed on the wall stand for the bodies of the dead (as a representation), forcing the viewer to connect with the experience of loss. Second, Feldman defaults to a view of aesthetic judgment provided by Kant,\textsuperscript{64} in which one experiences the object as a form of beauty, though that beauty only takes form in a personally constructed meaning of the VVM. The strategies of reading the VVM parallel Ehrenhaus’ (1988a; 1988b) interpretation of the monument as a repository for constructing personal meaning.\textsuperscript{65}

Ideology criticism and postmodern critique differ largely in reading both the interpretation and the purpose of the VVM. However, regularities exist between both sets of studies. Both sets of studies, to differing degrees, share a common logic of rhetorical effect based on the construction of meaning.\textsuperscript{66} The ultimate point of interpretation concerns either the constitution of a subject position (the national citizen), or the production of one’s personal identity in relation to the past. As a result, these studies, as a whole, highlight a tension between
individual identity and belonging to a collective identity. Finally, all of these studies discuss similar rhetorical tropes or themes found in the monument (violating general principles of memorializing, generation of multiple meanings, focusing on the names of the dead) that signal certain socially accepted interpretations.

Sturken (1997) best illustrates the connection between these two modes of criticism. The form of expression of public memory indicates its status within the culture. In the case of Vietnam, the VVM exposes the need to confront the trauma of the Vietnam War as an aberration in American culture. Accordingly, the VVM acts as a screen, projecting some elements of the event while concealing others. The VVM’s refusal to make a statement on the conduct of the Vietnam War erases the conflict over the war from public memory, serving the cause of reconciliation and closure to the conflict. The conflict over the Vietnam War resurfaces in the form of a dispute over the proper aesthetic for memorials, but the design compromise to include other statues demonstrates the need to reconnect to a shared social order, despite differing opinions. As such, the VVM neither erases conflict nor re-enacts it, but rather, it creates the physical space of symbolizing togetherness while maintaining political and aesthetic differences. Each aspect of the memorial then tells a different and conflicting story of Vietnam, yet the monument itself seems to incorporate them into a larger truth about the event. The VVM refuses to sanction a single interpretation or metanarrative, yet lends itself as a part of many agendas (including corporate interests selling memories of Vietnam). Though the cause of the war receives no recognition, the memorial also excludes the Vietnamese, writing Americans as the primary victims of the conflict.

Although all of the previous examples refrain from reading the VVM as a meaning, instead attending to the rhetorical performance of the monument, two gestures repeat the same
logic of meaning construction exhibited in previously mentioned research. Sturken’s (1997) initial discussion of public memory relates the form of memory to an expression of status. As a result, the VVM becomes a symbol communicating status of the Vietnam War in American public memory. Again, toward the end of her reading of the VVM, Sturken explains the memorial as a physical space of mediation for opposing interpretations of the war. In light of this comment, the different functions of the VVM become enablers for the production of meaning (and meaning production rises to the level of social goal). The final gesture reading the VVM also reduces the physical form to a symbol for the democratic deliberation on the interpretation and control of public memory. Although one may object that these tensions do not invalidate most of the claims advanced by Sturken, the arrangement of these two comments at the beginning and end of her reading of the VVM make them framing devices for the rest of the analysis. As such, the details of the VVM’s functions serve the interests of a representational reading of the monument.

Conclusion

Two different monuments, the VVM and the GCVM, occupy non-contiguous places, lack similar authorship, and serve radically different audiences. Though the GCVM has not received critical treatment from scholars, the plethora of studies performed on the VVM provide a foundation from which to assess the state of rhetorical theory concerning the reading of public monuments concerning the Vietnam War. Ideological criticism and postmodern critique highlight different interpretations of the VVM, yet they share an underlying regularity concerning the reading strategies for understanding the rhetorical power of the memorial. These underlying regularities emerge from a communication logic focused on the production of representations, symbols, and meanings. This logic allows for two complementary processes
concerned with the production of identifiable categories at both the level of individual identity (expressed through the tension between personal identity and the national identity) and the level of ideas (certain symbols that coalesce around a theme).

The next chapter theorizes a reading strategy that evades this logic of representation, while also allowing the critic to establish regularities between different instances of public memory. Taking cues from the work of Michel Foucault (1972), the chapter develops an understanding of cultural formations, one that refuses to reduce the divergent function of monuments to an identity category. Consequently, this reading strategy also refuses to think of memory practices as constitutive of specific subject positions (or discrete identities within a social formation). The strategies developed in Chapter 3 then become guiding rules for discussing the rhetorical effectivity (Greene, 1998) of both the VVM and the GCVM.

Endnotes

1 The lack of scholarly work on the GCVM forces the second section to focus solely on readings of the VVM.

2 The VVM attracts more visitors than any other monument on the National Mall, even after 20 years of existence.

3 In 2003, the president approved plans to include an underground visitor center for the VVM, but the facility, as of yet, does not exist (Pombo, 2006).

4 The ellipsis designates the difference between inscriptions at the chronological beginning and ending of the wall. The wall also includes the dedication date, November 11, 1982, below the final inscription.

5 Threats to block the construction of the memorial forced the compromise by members of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund. Though monument construction costs came from private donations, Congress refused to grant a permit to build on the National Mall without the compromise.

6 Oddly, the chronology begins and ends with the apex of the wall, making it unlikely that a viewer would experience the names of the missing and dead in chronological order.
Many explanations exist for dissent ceasing after the memorial’s physical construction. The New York Times (“Black gash”, 1985) put the issue in the following way:

What explains such rapid triumph over controversy? Some opposition was quieted by the addition nearby of three bronze statues. Other opponents became transfixed by the mysterious marble panels, glassy black windows reflecting the present and overlooking the past.

Most of all, the explanation is the names. Jointly and severally, as the lawyers say, they create a memorial at once national and personal. In each sharply etched name one reads the price paid by yet another family. In the sweeping pattern of names, chronological by day of death, 1959 to 1975, one reads the price paid by the nation. (p. B01)

Though one cannot accept such explanations on face, they do reveal the extent to which the physical structure of the VVM seems to have a strong affect on viewers.

President Reagan did not address or acknowledge the VVM until two years following the dedication. Interestingly, the President used the occasion (the two year anniversary of the dedication) to call for moving past the Vietnam War. Healing, in this context, dawns the connotation of removing a wound on the nation. As such, the VVM, according to Reagan, offers an opportunity to forget the divisive nature of the conflict and focus on acknowledging the sacrifice of the soldiers.

African American soldiers, who made up a very large part of the both Vietnam Veterans and casualties, did not participate in the dedication of the VVM with any proportional representation to the white Veteran community. Speculations on the reason for this phenomenon proliferate, but it certainly reveals that the influence of the VVM does not have universal appeal or the same affect on a population.

Vice President Al Gore gave an address at the unveiling of the memorial. At the address, he stated, “we never listened to their story, and never properly thanked them” (McDonald, 1993, A1). The suggestion of the VWM as a form of storytelling seems instructive for analyzing the institutional voice of the monument.

By monumental complex, I wish to emphasize the importance of arrangement as part of the rhetoric of monumentality. Much like the “exhibitionary complex” (Bennett, 1996), the rules for the use and experience of public memorials matter in determining its function. Johnston (2001) coins the term “memorial complex” to deal with the seeming juxtaposition and tension created by the memorial by the three main elements of the memorial (the three servicemen, the wall of names, and the VWM).

One significant protest occurred on October 9, 1986, when 88 Vietnams veterans walked by the wall, giving medals of honor back to the U.S. government in protest against Reagan’s policies on Nicaragua.

In fact, no reference exists on the Moody Gardens Hotel and Resort website.
For instance, Foss (1986) does not attend to the function of repetition of the names and how viewers read them, categorizing that as an aesthetic issue, not a rhetorical issue. Rhetoric does not focus on perception in this definition, but on the production of meaning. As such, one could treat the set of names as a symbol for the tragedy of war and perform rhetorical criticism, but one could not talk about the act of reading as an aspect of rhetoric.

“I do not intend to suggest that the meaning of the memorial lies in these physical attributes or that the memorial is itself a rhetor capable of producing purposive communication. Rather, I am suggesting that as a physical embodiment of its creator’s intention, the memorial can be examined as containing particular characteristics that are likely to guide the viewer’s interpretation in particular directions” (Foss, 1986, p. 331).

In fact, very few references to ideology and the VVM exist. However, if one views ideology separated from the control of a named ruling class, then one can easily expose the links between the types of communicative interactions highlighted by many rhetorical scholars and those discussed by ideology criticism. Most of the next few pages attempt to trace this link.

Althusser (2001) does not systematically define social formation. However, one might categorize them as a historically specific arrangement of the relations of production and reproduction. Relations of production operate as an eternal, conceptual category, whereas social formations express particular relations bound to both time and place. Feudalism, for Althusser, acts as a social formation. In addition, social formations seem to take on a sort of homogeneity, acting as a closed system at a particular time.

“I believe that it is possible and necessary to think what characterizes the essential of the existence and nature of the superstructure on the basis of reproduction. Once one takes the point of view of reproduction, many of the questions whose existence was indicated by the spatial metaphor of the edifice, but to which it could not give a conceptual answer, are immediately illuminated” (Althusser, 2001, p. 91) (Italics in original).

Importantly, state power and state apparatus differ conceptually. The former exists as a substance wielded by class(es) for using the latter (material mechanisms).

Althusser (2001, p. 95) credits Gramsci for first noticing the relationship between repressive mechanisms and civil society, though he did not provide a system of analysis for them.

Each ISA does not have to have the same goal, and in fact, their goals can conflict while still securing the reproduction of the means of production. For example, tensions between the philosophy of a secular state and religious organizations do not necessarily engender the possibility of revolt, but instead, occupy people with a conflict that does not contribute to their subjection. In some cases, especially in political democracies, debate between secular and religious organizations promotes passivity with regard to radical restructuring of the conditions of existence.
Ideology, in Althusser’s (2001) formulation, refers to “a system of ideas or representations which dominate a social group” (p. 107). Of course, domination here expresses both relations of exploitation and prevalence of attitude.

Importantly, the individual does not just choose from a multiplicity of possible subject positions, but instead, the social structure calls the subject into a position through the act of naming. Althusser refers to this action as the hailing function, understood as a response to an address. For an account of the communication audience as a function of hailing, see Charland (1987).

Ruling classes do not occupy positions outside of ideology; they receive similar education with regard to the proper activity of their subject position. As a result, Althusser (2001) parts with the strands of Marxism that see exploitation as an intentional act of ruling classes. Instead, they, though ritual, also participate in the reproduction of social conditions without necessarily exercising free judgment.

Though opponents forced some compromises for the memorial (Scruggs & Swerdlow, 1985), after construction opposition subsided (see footnote six). Interestingly, does not discuss the significance of the three servicement statue as part of the memorial.

Foss (1986) concludes that the VVM serves the cause of anti-war advocates by its explicit violation of norms that memorials ought to glorify a cause. Such oscillation between connotation of the memorial in a context and its literal interpretation replicates the structure of myth, a characteristic of ideology (Barthes, 1972).

Barthes (1985) defines rhetoric as “the signifying aspect of ideology” (p. 38), which highlights the relationship between symbols, interpretation, and the relations of exploitation expressed in those representations.

This short review of literature on the VVM notes the agreement of most scholars on the lack of fixed meaning in the memorial, but highlights a dispute about the question of the interests served by the multiple interpretations of the VVM. In this case, he criticizes Foss for not going far enough in analyzing the ends toward which the memorial works.

Indeed this phenomenon seems to occur regularly with the VVM, having accumulated several thousands of items left at the site. For more information, see Palmer (1987).

Junge’s article discusses the similarity between the AIDS quilt and the VVM as a form of art therapy. For Junge, the act of naming and remembering the individual dead defines a community of shared loss. In this sense, the celebration of the dead allows for the renewal of community bonds, re-establishing functional relationships with others.

According to Cloud (1998), these individual acts seem to trade off with direct collective action to take back power of the state (echoing the concern of Althusser about the function of the state).
“As a conservative ideological strategy of contemporary capitalism in the United States, therapy is clearly a political discourse, with political motives and political effects. Ironically, however, the political effect of the therapeutic is to shut down the possibility of public deliberation and collective engagement in politics” (xx).

32 Though Carlson and Hocking (1988) do not explicitly reference the issue of ideology, they do use an interpretation of tragic drama derived from Kenneth Burke, a scholar known to have affinities for some strains of Marxism. For explanation of this link, see McGee (1980).

33 Abramson’s (1996) concern over the repeated use of the time line only makes since if the author serves as the unifying element between monuments. This assumption presents considerable difficulty within even Althusser’s (2001) reading of ideology, but will also surface as a difficulty for reading unities generally (Foucault, 1972; 1977a). At this time, I only wish to highlight this aspect of the writing so that one will have a concrete example in mind for a later theoretical discussion.

34 This claim does not exactly turn out true. Some political disputes have occurred concerning what deaths count as the official dead in the combat zone, and the fate of some soldiers remained unknown until later. As a result, those names added later to the memorial do not appear in chronological order of death (Franklin, 1986).

35 Other critics have also commented on the physical structure of the memorial mimicking the progression of lifespan. According to Harrison (1997), the emergence of the wall from the earth signifies birth, the apex symbolizes full maturity, and then the final wall slowly returns the viewer to the earth (death).

36 The time line of the VVM contains two aspects that make the monument post-political. First, the time line tries to appear as a neutral ordering of facts that follow a natural, historical progression. Second, the closure of the time line at the apex of the VVM places the trauma, controversy, and other events of the Vietnam War firmly in the past, separating that turmoil from our current political conditions.

37 Abramson (1996) makes an explicit connection between the VVM and the reproduction of ideology, noting that he VVM discourages the viewer to question critically the motives for memorializing Vietnam in this manner, as well as soothing the political controversy of the war.

38 Griswold (1986) dedicates a significant amount of space in his essay to understanding how each of the individual monuments on the National Mall symbolize, while also noting the lines of sight that tie them together. The most obvious example concerns the linear connection between the Grant memorial, the Washington Monument, and the Lincoln memorial (the latter two connected by the reflecting pool).

39 Again, this mimics the structure of myth outlined in Barthes (1972).
Though Griswold (1986) never directly mentions ideology, the emphasis on the VVM as a national symbol and the National Mall as a space for citizen instruction provides room to talk about the structure of ideology. The above discussion of Althusser (2001) highlights the importance of nationality and the state to stabilizing a social formation.

Griswold (1986) devotes much attention to the Washington Monument. The minimalist construction does not allow the viewer to know anything about Washington himself, but only to think about Washington as a symbol for the foundation of the nation. By no accident, the Washington Monument occupies the central place on the National Mall, and commands attention from nearly any point in the city (due to its height).

This gesture replicates the theoretical function of myth (Barthes, 1972). One can always refer to the names as a gesture to include forgotten Vietnam veterans into the national narrative of sacrifice, while hiding the symbolic connection of the VVM to other memorials.

Sacred space for the state includes public displays designed for the celebration of the nation. The Washington Monument and the Lincoln Memorial qualify as examples of sacred space for the United States.

The height of both the Lincoln Memorial and the Washington monument imply awesome power that subsumes the individual viewer, reducing them to passive spectator. The VVM, by contrast, invites participation with the viewer with an open, welcoming stance. As a result, the viewer feels a desire to enter and participate with the monument. Johnston’s observations echo those of Foss (1986) on this point.

The continual layering of new elements into the memorial complex helps to explain some of the impetus for personal participation at the VVM. This act mimics the description of ritual given in Althusser (2001) as part of the production of subject positions. Those rituals then get internalized as choice on the part of the subject, giving a perception of relative freedom.

Sturken (1997) also includes the omission of the Vietnamese dead, both friend and foe, to argue that the VVM mostly concerns itself with national instruction on citizenship.

Biesecker (2002) discusses the valorization of the masculine citizen subject in the context of World War II memory.

Most memorials dedicated to war attempt to affirm the purpose of sacrifice in order to justify future sacrifices to the viewer and provide closure to the conflict.

Other scholars have also noted the significance of the Vietnam War as a signal of cultural fragmentation. Spanos (2000) notes that the conduct of the war by the Vietnamese shook the foundational presuppositions of American culture (especially the belief in visibility). In addition, the domestic social unrest over the war effort risked implosion of the American Mythic narrative of progress and manifest destiny.
Ehrenhaus (1988b) does not define silence as the absence of speech, but instead, as the limit of symbolic expression. However, this limit does not eliminate symbolism, but instead, shifts the burden of symbolic creation to the viewer.

A note of caution is required about the use of authenticity. Ehrenhaus (1988b) explicitly refuses to connect authenticity to the recovery of a true meaning. Instead, authenticity refers to the degree of exploration and openness available in a dialogic encounter between subject and object.

Ehrenhaus (1988a) does not include either the flagpole or the statue of the three servicemen as part of the memorial encounter, suggesting that the wall contains the real locus of power.

While both Griswold (1986) and Johnston (2001) both put a lot of emphasis on the inscriptions giving tribute to sacrifice as a virtue of the soldier, Ehrenhaus (1988a) de-emphasizes this element of the wall, suggesting the viewer questions the both the need and the efficacy of the sacrifice in the context of the Vietnam War. A possible reading of the VVM then must include understanding the names as an example that disproves the need to sacrifice for the nation in all cases.

Other factors informing this shift include technological advances in the production and dissemination of knowledge, and the increasing availability of technologies of knowledge production to wider audiences. For example, the internet (especially Wikipedia) allows any average viewer of content to modify it, thus helping to produce new knowledge for others.

Accordingly, Lyotard (1984) would seriously doubt Althusser’s (2001) formulation of the social formation that consists of a homogenous system of relations. “It is the absence for which the ideology of the ‘system,’ with its pretensions to totality, tries to compensate and which it expresses in the cynicism of its criterion of performance” (65).

Lyotard (1984) does a good job tracking this phenomenon briefly in the state, the corporation, and in civil society (education, the church, etc.)

Ehrenhaus (1988a;1988b) never makes an explicit reference to the postmodern condition in his work. However, the reading of the VVM’s refusal to use the institutional voice because of the social fragmentation over the Vietnam War reveals his understanding of fragmentation as a cultural context.

The use of the term “prototype” reveals some of the assumptions of Blair et. al.’s (1991) reading of culture. Much of the article dedicates itself to providing a historical account of architectural movements, contrasting modernism and postmodernism. Each of these movements exists during a particular period, reflecting trends of larger cultural phenomenon. As a result, the field of architectural technique becomes a microcosm for expressing (symbolizing) cultural attitudes, and the VVM provides a paradigmatic example of architecture’s physical expression of
the postmodern condition.

59 The multivocality of the VVM requires situating the memorial as a text: a “multidimensional space in which a variety of meanings…blend and clash” (Barthes, quoted in Blair, Jeppeson, & Pucci, 1991, p. 269).

60 Marling and Silberman (1987) trace the political controversy of the memorial design, and comment that the outcome represent the continued tension of attitudes on the Vietnam War. Rather than providing a place of reconciliation between opposing viewpoints, the VVM physically embodies the inability to reconcile differences on the war.

61 Though the authors refer to architecture as “a verb, an action” (Jencks, quoted in Blair, Jeppeson, & Pucci, 1991, p. 267), the action of architecture refers only to the continual additions to the memorial made by both institutions and individuals. The activity of the memorial stands as a representation of the refusal of metanarrative sanctioning within the contemporary cultural context of postmodernity.

62 Drawing heavily upon Heidegger, Feldman (2003) suggests that the possibility of reading the VVM as a proposition occurs only from the monuments movement to become visible. The movement toward visibility exists prior to the categorization of the VVM as an object.

63 Another minor example occurs when Feldman refers to the list of names inscribed into the physical structure of the VVM as a book of names.

64 Providing extensive quotations from The Critique of Judgment, the perception of the memorial as object forecloses experiencing the monument as an aesthetic pleasure.

65 Earlier commentaries on Foss (1986) reveal the link between representations, symbols, and meaning construction.

66 References to meaning occur under a number of different names, including symbol and representation.

67 Bodnar (1993) discusses a similar tension between national identity and vernacular (local) identity in contemporary American public memory. In this context, studies of the VVM highlight different aspects of this antagonism between identity categories.

68 Even Ehrenhaus (1988a; 1988b) recognizes limits on interpretation placed on the memorial, like the socially accepted convention of using a name to symbolize a person (in this case a dead person).

69 One might layer onto this metaphor the notion of the screen as filter. Certain contents of an event are separated from the rest, suggesting that public memory works and refines desirable elements of an event to serve a particular function in the present.
Again, this gesture echoes Ehrenhaus’ (1988a; 1988b) discussion of VVM as an invitation for the viewer to produce meaning. The functions of the memorial cannot operate separate from the desire to assign meaning to the event of Vietnam.
CHAPTE 3
REGULARITIES AND CULTURAL FORMATIONS

Introduction

At this point, this study still does not have the ability to approach appropriately the monuments under consideration, but instead, must continue to outline in general some of the theoretical dispositions for investigation. Chapter 2 served two functions within the larger question concerning the conditions of possibility for a post-structural monumentality. First, it provided a rough outline or description to the specific memory texts examined in this study, acquainting those readers unfamiliar with the Vietnam Veterans Memorial (VVM) or the Galveston County Vietnam Memorial (GCVM) with those respective structures. Second, it outlined a set of studies commenting on the VVM, establishing a point of regularity animating nearly all studies surveyed in the chapter: the logic of representation (Foucault, 1983; Greene, 1998). This logic provided the basis for two different types of representations at work in the VVM. Scholars focused on the use of themes in relation to the VVM, in which it either conformed or diverged from previously established forms of memorializing, it provided wider latitude for generating referents, or it designated a specific object like the names of the dead. In addition, scholars discussed a tension that existed in the VVM, with two identity positions competing for primacy: national identity and personal identity. As a result, the provisional unities described in discussing scholarly research on the VVM, ideology criticism and postmodern critique, share a logic that makes them part of a larger formation with regard to the reading strategy appropriate to the study of memorializing.

Taking The Archaeology of Knowledge (Foucault, 1972) as a starting point and supplementing it with other texts from both Foucault and select rhetorical scholars, this chapter
provides a reading strategy for monumentality that does not center on the logic of representation. As a result, most of the commentary contained within the chapter does not focus directly on either the VVM or the GCVM, but instead remains at the level of a general schema for formulating regularities and defining the conditions under which an examination of regularities can occur. Refusing to treat memorials as either an example (or embodiment) of a theme or a vehicle to construct specific subject positions for the viewer, critics should reveal the complex interconnections between many levels of discursive analysis that condition the emergence of a specific memorial. Ultimately, this chapter provides a theoretical background to consider both the VVM and the GCVM as statements that participate in a larger cultural formation (Biesecker, 2002). The specific nature of the statement, the modes of interaction between them, and the type of cultural formation in which they exist receive treatment in Chapter 4.

To accomplish this task, this chapter divides into five subsequent sections. First, I outline the false unities of discourse described by Foucault (1972), in order to clear a conceptual path for the rest of the study. Second, before talking about the formation of regularity, a discussion ensues about the notions of regularity and similitude that exist in several Foucaudian texts. These concepts operate according to a different logic: the logic of articulation (Biesecker, 1999; Greene, 1998). Third, I trace the significance of the discursive formations in Foucault (1972) and then discuss the importance of shifting to cultural formation (Biesecker, 2002). Fourth, after establishing the conditions for understanding regularity within post-structural analysis, the chapter defines the elemental units of analysis available for the rhetorical critic: the statement. Finally, the chapter concludes with a commentary on the significance of this theoretical perspective, and prepares one for the application to occur in Chapter 4.
Pseudo Unity

Foucault (1972) begins with a theoretical assumption that guides the rest of his study: discontinuity creates theoretical and procedural difficulties with any attempt to unify discourse. Accordingly, he sketches a broad outline of those concepts that establish continuity in historical investigation. Appeals to tradition “give a special temporal status to a group of phenomena that are both successive and identical” (p. 21); they reduce all new forms to a reiteration of the same thing originating at some prior historical juncture. At its best, tradition can only serve as a backdrop in order to measure the divergence of new historical forms from the old, but it then simultaneously serves to provide the basis of judgment for those newly emergent forms.

Influence designates unities according to the transmission of ideas, reducing historical work to tracing the causal repetition of similar contents. Development and evolution both designate “a succession of dispersed events” linked “to one and the same organizing principle” in order to “master time through a perpetually reversible relation between an origin and a term that are never given, but are always at work” (p. 22). Spirit collects “simultaneous or successive phenomena” under “the sovereignty of collective consciousness to emerge as the principle of unity and explanation” (p. 22). Each of these previous concepts uses a principle of unity in order to schematize diverse discursive events. The unique characteristics of each discursive event become irrelevant; historical treatment of discursive events only attends to those elements that maintain resemblances with prior discursive events. To embrace discontinuity and to understand events in their specific space of emergence, all of these unifying concepts (tradition, influence, development, and spirit) must fall into critical disuse.

Two other unities receive more extended treatment by Foucault (1972). First, the book, or the work, establishes unity through either the spatial delimitation of writing or the unity of the
pages to elaborating a theme or concept. However, the work always exists in reference to other texts, responding or affirming their descriptions, making the work an unstable unity. In the case of unification by concept, the concept takes the primary significance for defining the unity, and the physical appearance of the text serves as an effect of this delimitation. Second, the author collects a series of texts under the banner of a proper name, making the subject who writes texts a unifying feature of discourse. Of course, even a cursory examination of this function reveals it only to exist as “the result of an operation” (p. 24): an interpretive decision of what to include and exclude (published works, unpublished works, notes, drafts, laundry bills, etc.). Rather than treating the proper name as a natural or logical mode of unification of texts, Foucault (1977a) shifts to discussion of the author-function; a scholar must examine not the name that writes, but the conditions of possibility for the emergence of the author-function.

After discussing a set of unities that one ought to suspend provisionally at the outset of the investigation, Foucault (1972) attempts to define unities according to four other sets of principles: object, form, concept, and theme. Undertaken in *Madness and Civilization* (Foucault, 1965), an archaeology of the object “madness” reveals that references to madness do not refer to the same object over different periods of time or in different disciplines of knowledge. Instead, the unity occurs at the level of “the interplay of the rules that make possible the appearance of objects during a given period of time” (Foucault, 1972, pgs. 32-33). Another possibility concerns the categorization of unities according to form, defined as “manner of statement” (Foucault, 1972, p. 33). However, as soon as one surveys a particular field, the degree of variation between manner of statements makes the production of a classificatory schema based on either the statements themselves impossible to accomplish without creating arbitrary divisions in the field of knowledge. In short, each manner of statement possesses unique characteristics,
locations for speaking, and relationships to the speaking subject (areas that will receive a bit more explanation later), such that reliable methods of classification do not exist. Another attempt: one could consider a dispersion of statements as a group if they called forth the same coherent concept. Again, this classificatory schema would both fail to account for the production of new concepts and presume the unity of concepts deployed in quite different ways across discursive fields, effacing difference in a particular dispersion. Finally, the persistence of themes offers a possible option for establishing regularity between statements “capable of linking, and animating a group of discourses” (Foucault, 1972, p. 35). Though such a level of generality of commentary seems desirable, these groupings usually do not provide distinctions for two phenomena: extremely similar examples, upon closer examination, have different themes, and that two cases with similar themes produce very different theories of value associated with them, depending upon other factors in the field of discourse.

The preceding paragraphs reveal two important tendencies that characterize the work of Foucault (1972). First, one must, in order to maintain any degree of methodological rigor, willfully ground the study of regularities in an understanding of dispersion. Accordingly, a statement, or group of statements, requires attention to the singular event of their emergence at a particular time and place. Second, the analysis of regularities must not occlude the singularity of discursive events (otherwise known as statements) in the production of a particular unity. As a result, one must theorize a different understanding of discursive unity, one that does not privilege the production of the homogenous over respect for the heterogeneity of events, but instead, holds together (links) their diversity together. Next, one must attempt to re-theorize the process of coming together, of regularized phenomena, and provide a different logic that discusses the occurrence of transformation.
Regularity Similitude Articulation (RSA)

At this point, one might think of Foucault’s (1972) project as a purely negative task that disrupts any attempt to theorize a historical unity out of any set of heterogeneous events. For most of the previously described unities, they distill to a couple of issues: “that of resemblance and that of procession” (Foucault, 1972, p. 142). Resemblance covers broadly the question of identity relating to a category. “In what sense and in accordance with what criteria can one affirm: ‘that has been said’” (p. 143)? Here, we notice the inner workings of the logic of representation (Foucault, 1983; Greene, 1998), reducing the value of a statement to fidelity with another already circulating statement. Put another way, representation thinks about the two discursive events, such that a rule treats one as an original and the other as a copy. Incorporating the second component, procession, reveals the logic by which, under the banner of representation, one assigns a particular discursive event the status of the original, while relegating the other to the space of the duplicate or copy. “It presupposes, in effect, that one can establish a sort of single, great series in which every formulation would assume a date in accordance with homogenous chronological guide-lines” (Foucault, p. 142). In other words, the logic of these unities presupposes an original temporal iteration that serves as a standard by which the identity of a subsequent discursive event receives judgment. Time, as least a particular model of time, only emerges as model to judge discursive events as a regulating statement: it exists in a relation of hierarchy to other elements to justify the production of unities based on resemblance. However, this logic does not expose primary relations between statements, but instead only reveals what the analyst wishes to reveal at the outset; the logic becomes circular, working to justify assumptions made at the beginning of analysis (“this represents something else for which I have been looking all along”).
This indictment of representational logic also applies to the logic of influence (McKerrow, 1989). Recall the discussion of causal relationships in the previous section, and Foucault’s (1972) quick objections. The difficulty with causality concerned the degree to which a prior discursive event holds responsibility for a later discursive event. Only by positing the concept of a specific temporal succession can one link directly an effect to the cause. In all cases, the prior event makes necessary, or more likely in the case of influence, the consequent event. All concepts of audience effect that directly link a statement to a specific response rely upon this logic.25 Given the indictment of both the logic of representation and the logic of influence,26 how can one begin to discuss grouping of discursive events?

Transforming the study of historical dissemination, Foucault (1972) suggests a new use of discursive regularity: “it designates, for every verbal performance (extraordinary, or banal, unique in its own kind or endlessly repeated), the set of conditions in which the enunciative function operates, and which guarantees and defines its existence” (p. 144).27 Regularities correspond to the rules that enable the emergence of statements, not either the frequency of the statement’s emergence or its orthodox characteristics. Enunciative regularity differs from both analogical reasoning and logical equivalence of statements; the latter two presume the ability to substitute statements with the same meaning through application of exacted rules for determining meaning. Determining the degree of regularity requires critics to assess the extent to which two statements share their conditions of existence. The relative homogeneity of enunciative fields characterizes a discursive formation.28

One might object that the use of “relative homogeneity” suggests that Foucault (1972) lapses into a representational logic when discussing regularity. Although successfully demonstrating that two discursive events never share the exact same characteristics, one
statement still acts as a standard by which the critic judges another statement. Does this example demonstrate an untenable contradiction to Foucault’s efforts to relinquish using a representational logic? Perhaps Foucault at this point did not find a statement that adequately expressed enunciative regularity. Alternatively, perhaps the conditions of emergence of enunciative regularity, ordered within a series of statements to which scholars refer conveniently as *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, required that he state the argument in such a manner.

Regardless of whether Foucault (1972), consciously or unconsciously, slips into the logic of representation, another text that bears the same name provides a concept to escape this impasse.

Foucault (1983) discusses the problem of deciding between an original and a copy in another context: the paintings of Magritte. Through a discussion of two paintings with seeming realistic portrayals of pipes, both grounded on a blackboard floating above a board, a statement in both paintings reads, “this is not a pipe”. The question for Foucault and for the reader concerns the proper location of the object (where is the real pipe). After exhausting several possibilities and discussing several other paintings that make problematic the ability to represent through portrait, Foucault introduces the reader to a very frightful possibility: no pipe exists at all. In fact, these pipes do not just exist as representations of an original, or of an abstract concept like “pipeness”; the idea of pipe existing in one’s head also exists as a representation. As an alternative to a theory of resemblance, Foucault (1983) posits similitude as a way to discuss a relative relation between discursive events:

> Resemblance has a “model,” an original element that orders and hierarchizes the increasingly less faithful copies that can be struck from it. Resemblance presupposes a primary reference that prescribes and classes. The similar develops in series that have neither beginning nor end, that can be followed in one direction as easily as in another, that obey no hierarchy, but propagate themselves from small differences among small differences. Resemblance serves representation, which rules over it; similitude serves repetition, which ranges across it. Resemblance predicates itself upon a model it must return to and reveal; similitude circulates the simulacrum as an indefinite and reversible
relation of the similar to the similar. (Foucault, 1983, p. 44).

This passage provides clarification for Foucault’s (1972) use of “relative homogeneity”. A critic evaluates relative differences, rather than identity, of two or more statements. Moreover, one never measures difference according to an ideal (or typical) example. Regardless of some of the possible shortcomings in other texts (Foucault, 1972), the concept of similitude provides a possibility for grounding the study of regularities that evades the logic of identity categories and representation.31

Another difficulty presents itself, focused on how to discuss specific relations between discursive events. Once one parts with a logic of representation and a logic of influence, how criticism theorizes differences in relations (primary, secondary, etc.), only focusing on those of particular importance, becomes tenuous ground to negotiate. Another possible answer surges forth, though less clearly discussed than the previous two concepts: articulation. The following constitutes one of the clearest attempts by Foucault (1972) to define articulation:

These *rapproachements* are not intended to uncover great cultural continuities, nor isolate mechanisms of causality. Before a set of enunciative facts, archaeology does not ask what could have motivated them (the search for contexts of formulation) nor does it seek to discover what is expressed in them (the task of hermeneutics); it tries to determine how the rules of formation that govern it – and characterize the positivity to which it belongs – may be linked to non-discursive systems: it seeks to define specific forms of articulation. (p. 162)

Here, a couple of implications present themselves. First, articulation differs from the search for unities and the attribution of causal processes; it obeys a different logic. Second, articulation designates a linkage between the emergence of discursive events and other non-discursive formations; it regulates the association between elements. In short, articulation, taken as a logic,32 provides a principle of arrangement between statements (Stormer, 2004).

Biesecker (1999) provides one of the first attempts to theorize articulation in rhetorical
studies by thinking of the rhetorical situation as a space of articulation. Rather than speaker and audience existing within a set of situational constraints, the rhetorical situation exists as a space of emergence for provisional identities of speaker and audience, as well as a space that establishes relations between them. As such, the speaker and the audience operate as an effect of rhetorical practice.

Greene (1998) shifts slightly from Biesecker’s (1999) functional equation of the rhetorical situation with articulation, positing that “rhetorical practices function as a technology of deliberation by distributing discourses, institutions, and populations onto a field of action” (p. 22). Here, articulation does not define a condition, but instead, takes the form of a logic of distribution of both discursive and non-discursive practices. Instead of presuming a direct audience effect from discursive practices, “effectivity” designates an audience effect produces through the accumulation of several overlapping and conflicting fields of discursive practice. No necessary correspondence between prior and subsequent statements exists.

Stormer (2004) further clarifies Greene’s (1998) position, discussing articulation as the process of ordering and configuration in a network that renders intelligible a series of practices. Treating articulation as a similar mode of thought to the ancient rhetorical canon of arrangement while separating the process of arrangement from the training of the cunning rhetor, arrangement acts as a bond allowing the discursive event to emerge as part of a series. Articulation, in this sense, does not refer to the speaking action of the subject so much as a property of a series of objects.

The concepts of regularity, similitude, and articulation collectively establish a way to theorize an affirmative project that refuses to hierarchize dispersions of discursive events according to grids of linear temporal succession. As a result, one avoids both the question of
resemblance and progression, two key components in the logic of representation. Regularity designates a space of emergence for the discursive event, otherwise known as the conditions of possibility for a statement. Similitude provides the capacity to discuss relationships between discursive events as a form of repetition that refuses to reduce those events to an identity grouping based on certain shared characteristics. Finally, articulation then allows for discussion of the ordering of particular statements within other non-discursive elements, such that a grid of intelligibility or sense making (Biesecker, 1992) emerges, enabling deliberative apparatuses to render judgment (Greene, 1998). The study of rhetoric, in this context, becomes cartography of a series of practices that articulate discursive and non-discursive elements into a field of deliberation (Greene).

**Discursive Formations and the Practice of Culture**

Having now established a conceptual background for rhetorical study of the regularities within dispersion, one must venture to discuss the particulars of the investigative process. Unable to establish regularity based on objects, forms, concepts or themes, what other resources present themselves to discuss pertinent degrees of similitude between discursive events? In Foucault’s (1972) formulation, object, form, concept, and theme do not lose all importance for criticism. “Whenever one can describe, between a number of statements, such a system of dispersion, whenever, between objects, types of statement, concepts, or thematic choices, one can define a regularity… we will say… that we are dealing with a *discursive formation*” (p. 38). Stated in another fashion, the regularity between discursive events does not occur based on an identity of objects, characteristics, ideas, or abstract categories referenced in a statement; regularity occurs in the relationships that enable the emergence of similar statements. Foucault subsequently outlines the rules of formation for the emergence of each set of dispersions.
The formation of objects (Foucault, 1972) requires attention to three different fields of conditions. First, surfaces of emergence require attention to the details of a named domain of objects encompassed in the statement; the statement confers the status of object to particular phenomena. Second, authorities of delimitation concern the positions enabled, through general recognition, to name and designate objects of knowledge. Finally, grids of specification govern the division of objects into a discrete system of classification, separating and relating object domains. Importantly, simply detailing the attributes of each of these areas does not render the rules of formation of objects visible. Instead, one defines discursive formations by the way in which these different aspects of object formation relate to one another; rules of formation dictate relationships between authorities of emergence, delimitation, and specification.41

The formation of enunciative modalities (i.e. manner of statement) (Foucault, 1972) defines the rules for the place of emergence for statements. The position of the speaking subject establishes rules for competence and knowledge, delimiting which subjects can make certain statements. This function both differentiates between possible statements made by different subject positions within a class and regulates statements across classes in society. Institutional sites of emergence provide both a source of legitimacy for subject positions within an institutional apparatus and a domain of application for the legitimacy of the subject’s speech. Finally, positions of subjects also establish a regulation on legitimate practice in relation to an object (can one affirm its existence, can one question it, can one classify a series of them, or can one act as an audience for the statement). Again, the discursive formation exists in the rules that relate these fields of enunciative formation, collectively conferring the right of utterance of statements.42 However, this position of authority does not unify the identity of the speaking subject (even provisionally). “Instead of referring back to the synthesis or the unifying function
of a subject, the various enunciative modalities manifest his dispersion” (Foucault, p. 54).

To deal with the formation of concepts (Foucault, 1972), one must describe a field of statements in their appearance. First, the forms of succession account for the ordering of enunciative series, the types of dependence between statements, and the rhetorical combination of statements. These issues both set regulations on the possible arrangement of statements and assign relative value to particular concepts in an enunciative field. Second, forms of coexistence occur around three different discursive fields: the field of presence (the occurrence or non-occurrence of statements), the field of concomitance (statements concerning different objects that interplay at the level of analogy, premises of reasoning, or models for the production of new contents), and the field of memory (statements no longer accepted as knowledge, yet establish filiations or relations of mutation). Finally, procedures of intervention broadly cover processes of translation, transcription, and transplantation of concepts to different areas of application. Discursive formations occur in establishing regularity for rules of relation between these different fields to form concepts and to describe how certain statements reappear in a variety of different areas of application.43

Finally, the formation of strategies deals with the distribution of themes and theories in history (Foucault, 1972). One must attend to points of diffraction (the incompatibility of enunciative series, the systematization of enunciative series to form coherence, and the modes of equivalence that enable choices among certain possibilities), points of authority (the regulation of proper domains for statements, modes of exclusion for statements, relations of application to other discursive constellations), and points of connection to non-discursive practices (rules of appropriation of discursive constellations, the modes of connection to institutional practices). Discursive formations individualize through the relation of rules appropriate to the articulation of
strategies.

Returning to a concept that has circulated in our discussion but lacked some explanation, “a discursive formation… determines a regularity proper to temporal processes; it presents the principle of articulation between a series of discursive events and other events, transformations, mutations, and processes. It is not an atemporal form, but a schema of correspondence between several temporal series” (Foucault, 1972, p. 74). In other words, the rules of relation between those the formations of objects, enunciative modalities, concepts, and strategies set the conditions of emergence for a discursive formation.\textsuperscript{44} Though this formation exists in temporal relations, it exists across modes of defining specific ways of conceptualizing temporal progression in discourse.

A difficulty present in the *Archaeology of Knowledge* (Foucault, 1972) concerns the neglect in discussing power relations. Foucault’s next work, *Discipline and Punish* (1977c), begins to document relations of power that exist in particular practices. Documenting the work of penal institutions in France over the course of several centuries, Foucault (1977c) traces a transformation from punishment grounded in relations of spectacle to practices of discipline, aimed at the reformation of the errant subject, performed upon the body.\textsuperscript{45} The practices of disciplinary knowledge production enable economic techniques of power exercised on specific bodies, producing a form of self-surveillance of behaviors. How can one discuss discursive formations given this shift in the thought gathered under the pseudonym “Michel Foucault”?

Biesecker (1992) provides a novel insight into this difficulty. Quoting Gayatri Spivak at length, she discusses the problems of translation of the concept of power into English:

It is a pity that there is no word in English corresponding to *pouvoir* as there is ‘knowing’ for *savoir*. *Pouvoir* is of course ‘power.’ But there is also a sense of ‘can-do’-ness in *pouvoir*… Try to get some of that homely verbness into *pouvoir*, and you get something like this: if the lines of making sense of something are laid down in a certain way, then
you are able to do only those things with that something which are possible within and by
the arrangement of those lines. *Pouvoir/savoir*—being able to do something—only as
you are able to make sense of it. (Spivak, quoted in Biesecker, 1992, p. 355)

As a result, a more proper way to characterize power/knowledge concerns the range of possible
practices within a “grid of intelligibility” (Biesecker, p. 356). In the above case, the practices of
disciplining become possible only through knowledge production concerning the economy of
bodily pain and pleasure as an efficient site for reforming errant behavior. Thus, the grid of
intelligibility concerning the space of the body makes possible a new set of practices. The major
shift in Foucault’s thinking concerns the movement from archaeology to genealogy, one that
characterizes the will to know not as a neutral emergence of discourses, but as part of the
contingent matrix of practice in western culture (Foucault, 1977b). Thus, all discursive
formations emerge from the particular practices roughly characterized as culture.

Biesecker (2002) discusses the emergence of cultural formations, albeit in a veiled
manner, around the discourses of World War II memory in the contemporary United States
context. Analyzing spaces of coexistence between statements about the war, including film texts,
photo essays, personal narratives, and the construction of monuments, Biesecker suggests the
Women in Military Service for America Memorial (WIMS) participates in the cultural formation
of World War II memory based on the sacrificial masculine subject.46 Though the physical
bodies glorified as part of the WIMS do not conform to masculine identities, the ideals for which
they stand articulate into a larger, masculine identity formation:

Hence, in addition to advancing an account of U.S. military history that, for the first time,
duly acknowledges women’s role in it, the Women’s Memorial scripts a version of
normative U.S. identity in which service to the nation is the *arche* and *telos* of what it
means for any American—man or woman—in the words of the *Self Guided Tour*, to
“exercise full citizenship.” Thus, out of a memorial “dedicated to the women who have
served” emerges an abstract category of civic agency that folds feminine subjectivity into
universal (masculine) virtues. (p. 405)
Although Biesecker does a wonderful job explaining how statements, in general, articulate into a larger cultural formation and that the grid of intelligibility for particular practices presumes a cultural background of dissolving national identity, she frames the article within a logic of representation of identities that effaces the difference of discursive events to the production of national identity.\textsuperscript{47} The difficulty here occurs because the cultural formation is explained as a regularity occurring in the resemblance of an identity category (an object of knowledge), rather than the rules for the formation of diverse memory objects.\textsuperscript{48}

However, one ought not wholly abandon the usage of cultural formation for slipping back into a logic of representation. Instead, perhaps some of the previous work by Biesecker (1992) still provides a way to transform cultural formation into a useful tool of analysis. Instead of seeking regularities based on the repetition of particular identities, one might discuss a series of rationalities enabled by a grid of intelligibility. In the case of World War II memory, one might ask what rules of formation enable the articulation of similar concepts of national service across several institutional sites of production, memory objects, and enunciative modalities. Such a question would refuse to treat the concept of national service articulated in the arrangement of the WIMS as copy of concepts found in other memory texts. In addition, it refuses to think of the formation of identity as a mechanism of ideological control propagated by a more basic mode of production in U.S. culture. A research question similar to the one discussed here animates the investigation of the VVM and GCVM in Chapter 4.

Statement and Enunciation

Discussions of regularity have thus far taken for granted the material dispersed for analysis; this study has, up to this point, elided a definition of the primary units of analysis: the statement. “At first sight, the statement appears as an ultimate, undecomposable element that can
be isolated and introduced into a set of relations with other similar elements” (Foucault, 1972, p. 80). One defines the statement by the inability to subject it to further reduction. However, this gives little ground to understand what Foucault wants to discuss about statements. He does discuss much of what they do not consist. First, the statement does not exist based on a “defined propositional structure” (p. 80). Second, the statement “grammatically cannot be judged by the same criteria that, in a natural language (langue), make it possible to define an acceptable, or interpretable sentence” (p. 82). Finally, the statement operates distinctly from the category of speech acts. In short, the statement does not, as an intrinsic property, include any mechanism by which to categorize and judge its function. Blair’s (1987) characterization of statements as written speech acts reduces the statement to the status of signs “to which a status of knowledge may be ascribed” (p. 368); it replicates the logic of representation. A theory of the statement lies elsewhere.

Foucault (1972) describes statements as “a function of existence that properly belongs to signs” (p. 86), yet they remain irreducible to the play of signs in a system. In short, the statement exists as the function of emergence that makes possible the structure of signification. This function requires four characteristics of enunciation. First, it exists in references to its laws of possibility. Second, it has a particular relationship with its subject, taken as the position necessary to allow a description of the statement, not the speaker. Third, the statement must exist in coexistence with other statements, but it can exist without delimiting a domain of associations. Fourth, it must have a material existence. These four characteristics define the enunciative function of statements. “We will call statement the modality of existence proper to that group of signs... a modality that allows it to be in relation with a domain of objects, to prescribe a definite position to any possible subject, to be situated among other verbal
performances, and to be endowed with repeatable materiality” (Foucault, p. 107). In short, the statement acts as the building block for establishing relations of regularity, relations that may then ascribe a structure of signification, but one cannot presume the existence of that structure at the outset of the investigation.

Conclusion

Investigating the conditions of possibility of a post-structural monumentality requires attention to regularities in discourse without reducing that discourse to an abstract, unified category based on the logic of representation (Foucault, 1983). Concepts like tradition, causality, development, spirit, the work, and the author all posit false unities based on specific identity categories (Foucault, 1972). For the same reason, critics should refuse to define regularities according to the identity of objects, forms, concepts, or themes. The conspiracy between ideology criticism and postmodern critique concerns the reliance, consciously or not, on an interpretive strategy that assumes the VVM and the GCVM (in theory) exist as representations of prior discursive (or non-discursive) events. The logic of influence constructs a necessary relationship between prior and subsequent statements. Resemblance and procession characterize the overall concerns with the logic of representation: one presumes the existence of the original to judge the quality of a copy, while the other constructs a necessary relationship between prior and subsequent statements based on temporal succession.

Regularity, similitude, and articulation establish a theoretical backdrop for understanding relationships between statements. Regularity occurs according to the rules of formation for a statement, which provides a basis to assess relative difference between the material existences of two or more statements (Foucault, 1972). These statements relate to one another through degrees of similitude; they link together in a series, rather than through the presumption of an original
and a copy (Foucault, 1983). Articulation (Biesecker, 1999; Greene, 1998; Stormer, 2004) designates a mode of ordering between statements that collectively make intelligible a grid of understanding (Biesecker, 1992) to deliberate on possible actions for subjects in particular contexts (Greene, 1998). Importantly, these concepts do presume some mode of audience effect, but they temper the desire for a critic to draw a direct connection between statements and a specific audience effect. Greene (1998) suggests effectivity as an important concept to grasp the difference from rhetorical effect. Criticism instead turns attention to the conditions that place limits on the possibilities of relations between statements.

Cultural formations provide a way to discuss the set of relations that limit the emergence of statements. Derived from Foucault’s (1972) outline of discursive formations, they occur in the rules of formation for objects, enunciative modalities, concepts, and strategies. None of these four fields of formation exists in a primary relation to the others in all cases. Each field places limits in the others. The rules of relation between these fields of emergence that govern the statement define the discursive formation. The move to discuss cultural formations includes the fields of emergence for discursive formations, but it additionally requires critics to investigate the relationship between knowledge and material practices available to subject positions articulated within a particular formation (Biesecker, 1992; Biesecker, 2002). However, cultural formations, contrary to Biesecker (2002), delimit a series of possible subject positions and relations between them, rather than proscribing an identity with specific characteristics.

In order to prevent slippage into the logic of representation, Chapter 4 investigates both the VVM and the GCVM as statements. Rather than presuming these statements necessary contain propositions (meanings), the enunciative function of statements enables a structure of signification to emerge (Foucault, 1972). What, if any, regularities exist in the conditions of
possibility for both the VVM and the GCVM? In what cultural formation, if any, do they participate? In accordance with the discussion concerning the emergence of discursive formations, each set of rules for formation (objects, enunciative modalities, concepts, and strategies) receives treatment. Detailing the rules of formation for each field of emergence, the degree of similitude (Foucault, 1983) between the VVM and the GCVM in each of these areas provides a basis to assess the extent to which they participate in similar cultural formations.

Chapter 4 does not place an endpoint to analysis, but provides a concrete application of some of the theoretical issues outlined in the previous three chapters.

Endnotes

1 A cautionary note about the understanding of texts: contrary to the definition proffered by Barthes (quoted in Blair, Jeppeson, & Pucci, 1991) understanding them as closed field of forces for the clash of interpretation, Foucault (1972) notes that one ought to not place any particular description as a final construction. Other aspects, elements, and connections of a text make possible alternative constructions, leaving “the final placing of the text in dotted outline” (p. 75).

2 Though Greene (1998) equates the logic of representation with a particular mode of ideology criticism, his definition provides instruction for widening its range of application: “the mediating role of speech is now understood as a symbolic representation that makes ‘sweet’ the forms of social control operating to support asymmetrical relations of domination” (p. 24). The definition highlights important the important components of the logic of representation: communicative texts act as symbols that seem to make natural forms of social control. Representations that denaturalize control, or move control from the locus of society to the locus of the individual, obey the same patterns of reason, but produce different results with regard to the degree of social control symbolized in a text.

3 These diverse consequences within the same logic do not designate a separation of studies, as if one set covered thematic issues while others covered the construction of national identity. Instead, both consequences emerge to varying degrees in each study surveyed.

4 One might object that these unities themselves work according to a logic of representation, as unities of categorization. Such a criticism may indeed act as a shortcoming of this research, but one must risk this problem in order to provide a starting point for study. “This explains the de facto privilege that I have accorded to those discourses that, to put it very schematically, define the ‘sciences of man’. But it is only a provisional privilege… [I]t is no more than an initial approximation that must allow relations to appear that may erase the limits of this initial outline” (Foucault, 1972, p. 30). As a primer for thinking of these two discourses as a tension to

5 Of course, this work does not seek to deny any validity to previous studies, but instead it suggests that these types of investigations do not provide sufficient conditions for establishing regularities between discursive events. Foucault (1972) makes a similar gesture: “my intention was not to deny all value to these unities or to try to forbid their use; it was to show that they required, in order to be defined exactly, a theoretical elaboration” (p. 71).

6 “We will ask them where they came from, toward what historical destination they are moving without being aware of it, what naivety blinds them to the conditions that make them possible, and what metaphysical enclosure encloses their rudimentary positivism” (Foucault, 1972, p. 202).

7 By discontinuity, Foucault seeks to designate “the raw material of history, which presented itself in the form of dispersed events” (p. 8).

8 Wrage (1947) inaugurates the study of the history of ideas as part of rhetorical study, discussing the need for rhetorical critics to trace a history of speech content across generations. Though this work does contain a revolutionary call to change the domain of rhetoric to include more than just great speeches, Wrage simultaneously reduces the rhetorical scholarship to a subset of historical research.

9 This particular unity has received a lot of attention in rhetorical studies, and one can notice an echo of several theorists. Foucault actually conflates two different perspectives of communication: causality and influence. McKeerrow (1989) discusses the difference between the logic of influence and the logic of causality, though the difference comes down to the degree of power one accords discourse. Rather than determining behavior, it acts as one influencing factor of behavior, among many. Ultimately, Greene (1998) suggests that these two perspectives of communication rely on the same logic of rhetorical action. Though Foucault remains open to the accusation of not attending carefully to distinctions, scholars ought also to recognize the applicability of his argument to both causality and influence.

10 This form of unity has had some significance for rhetorical studies, including defining specific works to provide a foundation for the discipline (as prescribed in Parrish, 1954). However, an even larger unity that relates to the spatial delimitation of the book concerns the spatial and temporal delimitation of the speech. Much of early rhetorical scholarship concerned the study of specific orations given at a particular time and place (Wichelns, 1925).

11 In the case of the VVM, Abramson (1996) uses the author function for memorial architecture to explain unities based on time. Though the function of the author acts as a secondary concern to the concept of time in three different memorials designed by Maya Lin, the author does create a sufficient condition to rationalize an ideological unity that exists in all three memorials.

12 Rhetorical scholars have long recognized the inability to discuss rhetoric as the function of the
author, since doing so risks reducing the persuasive appeal of a text to the psychology of an author (Black, 1978). However, some limited examples of this unity still exist in rhetorical scholarship. For example, Crick (2005) attempts to resurrect the use of rhetorical invention through the construction of consciousness in the Darwin notebooks.

13 In “What is an Author” (Foucault, 1977a), he isolates four different features of authorship in western cultural discourse, though they exist in rough outline. First, discourses circulate as “objects of appropriation” (p. 124): a legal mechanism to attribute responsibility of a discourse to a subject, establishing the possibility of both legal punishment and ownership. Second, the function changes depending on the type of discourse, whether scientific or literary, for example. Third, “it is not formed spontaneously through the simple attribution of a discourse to an individual” (p. 127); it designates the end-point of an operation that constructs a rational actor behind discourse. Finally, “it does not refer, purely and simply, to an actual individual insofar as it simultaneously gives rise to a variety of egos and a series of subjective positions that individuals of any class may come to occupy” (p. 131).

14 “[T]his group of statements is far from referring to a single object, formed once and for all, and preserving it indefinitely as its horizon of inexhaustible ideality; the object presented as their correlative by medical statements of the seventeenth or eighteenth century is not identical with the object that emerges in legal sentences or police action” (Foucault, 1972, p. 32).

15 “[A] corpus of knowledge that presupposed the same way of looking at things, the same division of the perceptual field” (Foucault, 1972, p. 33).

16 “But neither the idea of an originally expressive value of sounds, nor that of a primitive body of knowledge enveloped in words and conveyed in some obscure way by them, nor that of regularity in the mutation of consonants, nor the notion of the verb as a mere name capable of designating an action or operation, is compatible with the group of concepts” (Foucault, 1972, p. 35).

17 One ought to keep in mind that this notion of theme remains ill defined in the text. Operationally considered mostly through examples like “the economic and political primacy of agrarian property” (Foucault, 1972, p. 35), the notion of the theme seems intimately related, through allusion and inference, to the concept of ideology. Discussed later the heading of strategies (pgs. 64-70), ideology criticism seems intent on reducing a series of specific economic analysis under a particular theme that signifies control over the means of production. Foucault (1972) does not develop this objection in depth, but leaves enough textual traces in order for the reader to at least seriously entertain the notion that investigating the formation of strategies acts as a more careful substitute to ideology that refuses to reduce diverse statements to a self-same instrument of control.

18 “Hence the idea of describing these dispersions themselves; of discovering whether, between these elements, which are certainly not organized as a progressively deductive structure… one cannot discern a regularity” (p. 37).
The distinction between change and transformation has some importance, especially in the context of devaluing explanations based on evolution. Gaonkar (1982) characterizes Foucault’s (1972) project as attending to difference, not becoming. As a result, change, which examines mutation against a stable or permanent backdrop, does not have the same valence as transformation, which only designates the continued mutation of elements in a cultural field without direct relation to old cultural forms. “The historians of ideas, for instance, habitually think of change in terms of successions… For them, change is either a general container of all events or an abstract principle of their succession. In either case, the concept of change is emasculated. In contrast, Foucault wants to analyze the different types of transformations which constitute change” (Gaonkar, 1982, p. 256) (footnote omitted). Though transformation and change relate to one another, Foucault wishes to diverge from the concept of linear temporal succession in isolating differences.

In the case of both ideology criticism and postmodern critique broadly mapped in Chapter 2, each type of criticism treated the VVM as a discursive event, but then laid it against a larger cultural backdrop. Goal, in each case, was to determine its degree of fidelity or divergence from a thematic category (Foss, 1986), the degree to which it conformed to therapeutic theatrical models (Carlson & Hocking, 1988), or the degree to which it modeled the components of a currently existing cultural condition inscribed into architectural texts (Blair, Jeppeson, & Pucci, 1991).

“There is no immediately recognizable resemblance between the formulations: their analogy is an effect of the discursive field in which it is mapped” (Foucault, 1972, p. 143).

Here, one notes the difficulty with Blair, Jeppeson, and Pucci’s (1991) formulation of postmodernity. In both the periodization of architectural movements and the presumption in the linear progression in history from modernism to postmodernism, the presumption of chronological succession guide the ordering of discursive events to particular time periods.

In this passage, the entire hierarchy of relations between the infrastructure and superstructure in Althusser (2001) is destabilized. Even the use of the terms “production” and “re-production” make clear that his model of ideology criticism presumes a prior form (the relations of production) get represented at the level of superstructure in order to assure the stability of a cultural form (the identity of the social formation).

“The mapping of antecedents is not enough, in itself, to determine a discursive order; on the contrary, it is subordinated to the discourse that one is analyzing, at the level that one chooses, on the scale that one establishes. By deploying discourse throughout a calendar, and by giving a date to each of its elements, one does not obtain a definitive hierarchy of precessions and originalities; this hierarchy is never more than relative to the systems of discourse that it sets out to evaluate” (Foucault, 1972, p. 143).

Even in the case of constitutive rhetoric (Charland, 1987), the concept of hailing presupposes
the call from the rhetor requires a response. Though a specific response is not required, the need to turn around and say “no, not me” provides sufficient reason to attend to the force of rhetoric (see also Althusser, 2001).

26 Greene (1998) treats these two logics as separate, though they do intertwine with certain theorists. At some points, one finds it difficult to discern whether representation acts as a logic or a politics, and Greene does an insufficient job discerning them to make a final judgment. However, as an alternative possibility, one can read Greene’s blending of logics as part of a larger difficulty discerning their contours in Foucault as well, since, at base, very little significant difference exists in their theorization from Foucault’s point of view. Not to suggest that they are the same, but instead, to suggest that sufficient regularity exists in the relations of rules of formation to warrant devoting significant space to untangling their connections.

27 Foucault’s apparent emphasis on discourse shines here, especially the notation of verbal performance. However, one ought not to take this formulation literally, since he next designates these as a practice. His general historical focus on written texts also should inspire pause in the reader. In addition, some later discussion will help to expand the use of regularities beyond verbal usage.

28 “One can thus describe a tree of enunciative derivation: at its base are the statements that put into operation rules of formation in their most extended form; at its summit, and after a number of branchings, are the statements that put into operation the same regularity, but one more delicately articulated, more clearly delimited and localized in its extension” (Foucault, 1972, p. 147).

29 The first painting, made in 1926, receives the title “this is not a pipe”. The second, made forty years later, translates as “the two mysteries”. The second painting bears two pipes, one on a blackboard on an easel and the other floating above.

30 “In fact, whether conflicting or just juxtaposed, these elements seem to annul the intrinsic resemblance they seem to bear within themselves, and gradually sketch an open network of similitudes. Open—not onto the ‘real’ pipe, absent from all these words and drawings, but onto all the other similar elements (including all the ‘real’ pipes of clay, meerschaum, wood, etc.) that, once drawn into the network, would take the place and function of the simulacrum” (Foucault, 1983, p. 47) (footnote omitted).

31 Similitude, though it resists hierarchization at the outset, does not preclude the possibility of talking about primary and secondary relations within a particular formation. However, the relative value of statements in relation to others always maintains possibility of reversal or redeployment, as the conditions for emergence of statements transform.

32 In discussing logic in this fashion, I do not mean to ascribe to articulation the properties of a propositional structure. Instead, I prefer another understanding of logic, in the process of the ordering of phenomena.
33 Bitzer (1968) provides one of the first discussions of rhetorical situation, defining it as a set of structural constraints that limit the choices of the speaker. The ability to influence the audience requires attention to constraints existing in a particular situation. Vatz (1972) proposes, in contrast, that the rhetor constructs the rhetorical situation. However, opposed these two positions seem, they rely on a logic of influence, only differing over the degree to which constraints exist prior to the rhetor’s speech.

34 "We would see the rhetorical situation as an event that makes possible the production of identities and social relations… Differance obliges us to read rhetorical discourses as processes entailing the discursive production of audiences, and enables us to decipher rhetorical events as sites that make visible the historically articulated emergence of the category ‘audience’" (Biesecker, 1999, p. 243).

35 Greene seeks to provide an alternative view of rhetoric’s materialism that negotiates the tension between a view that treats all material conditions as discursive (McKerrow, 1989), or maintains a strict opposition between discursive practices and material conditions (Cloud, 1994). The process of distribution treats rhetoric as a material practice without reducing all other material elements to the level of discursive formulation. “In other words, the materiality of rhetorical practices exist in how they occupy a position in different institutional structures historicizing those institutions at the same time as those institutions put rhetoric to work for the purpose of governing” (Greene, 1998, p. 35).

36 The distinction here is subtle, but one toward which the reader should turn attention. Relations between elements do not maintain a natural or stable link, but always participate in the process of arrangement. The emergence of another discursive event may mutate the relationships between elements. One can read Biesecker (1999) as performing this same move, but the statement of articulation in this fashion remains somewhat unclear. My purpose is not to defame or fault any particular formulation so much as try to clarify, as much as possible, how critics ought to discuss relations between elements.

37 The concept of arrangement, or taxis, emerges from Aristotle’s (1954) discussion of rhetoric, where arrangement refers to the linear progression of a speech designed to produce maximum persuasive effect on an audience. Good rhetors arrange proofs to skillfully woo an audience adopt the same thoughts and actions as the rhetor prescribes.

38 “Articulation typically refers to enunciation of clear speech that produces intelligible sounds or, in a more general sense, when a speaker expresses an idea with eloquence and lucidity. It also refers to the linkage between parts of a body or a train. It is also about the formation of order, of the body and of speech, bringing together the material world, language, and spatial arrangement in one act” (Stormer, 2004, p. 263).

39 “The unspoken rule that individuals articulate society through words has been confronted by another, that symbols, things, and practices articulate a culture, its environment, and its people…"
As opposed to analyzing the rhetoric of individuals, analyzing the rhetoric of practices means one does not necessarily start from a given point nor end in a given place. One may start with a space, an image, a canonized activity, or a network of relationships, and study their importance to the formation of culture” (Stormer, 2004, p. 259).

40 “The conditions to which the elements of this division (objects, mode of statement, concepts, thematic choices) are subjected we shall call the rules of formation. The rules of formation are the conditions of existence (but also of coexistence, maintenance, modification, and disappearance) in a given discursive division” (Foucault, 1972, p. 38).

41 “The formation is made possible by authorities of emergence, delimitation, and specification. One might say, then, that a discursive formation is defined (as far as its objects are concerned, at least) if one can establish such a group; if one can show how any particular object of discourse finds in it its place and law of emergence; if one can show that it may give birth simultaneously or successively to mutually exclusive objects, without having to modify itself” (Foucault, 1972, p. 44).

42 “But as the establishment of a relation, in medical discourse, between a number of distinct elements, some of which concerned the status of doctors, others the institutional and technical site from which they spoke, others their position as subjects perceiving, observing, describing, teaching, etc. It can be said that this relation between different elements… is effected by clinical discourse: it is this, as a practice, that establishes between them all a system of relations that is not ‘really’ given or constituted a priori; and if there is a unity, if the modalities of enunciation that it uses, or to which it gives place, are not simply juxtaposed by a series of historical contingencies, it is because it makes constant use of this group of relations” (Foucault, 1972, pgs. 53-54).

43 “In fact one does not pose the question at the level of discourse itself, which is not external translation, but the locus of emergence of concepts… one describes the conceptual network on the basis of the intrinsic regularities of discourse… one replaces the pure aims of non-contradiction in a complex network of compatibility and incompatibility; and one relates this complexity to the rules that characterize a particular discursive practice” (Foucault, 1972, p. 62).

44 “In this way, there exists a vertical system of dependences: not all positions of the subject, all types of coexistence between statements, all the discursive strategies, are equally possible, but only those authorized by anterior levels… But relations are also established in a reverse direction. The lower levels are not independent of those above them. Theoretical choices exclude or imply, in the statements in which they are made, the formation of certain concepts” (Foucault, 1972, pgs. 72-73). Here, Foucault destabilizes the convenient hierarchy of infrastructure and superstructure theorized by Althusser (2001) by allowing reversible relations within a system of dependences.

45 “What is now imposed on penal justice as its point of application, its ‘useful’ object, will no longer be the body of the guilty man set up against the body of the king; nor will it be the
juridical subject of an ideal contract; it will be the disciplinary individual” (Foucault, 1977, p. 227).

46 No mention of cultural formation occurs in the main portion of the text. However, in endnote 41, Biesecker (2002) reveals the force of her position. “I am not arguing that WIMS never could perform a radical, interruptive politics. I am claiming that at this particular time and place, in the context of the cultural formation of which it is part, it is not doing so now.” (p. 409)

47 The end of the article provides an excellent example of this problem. “I have also tried to show how the potentially innovative or progressive political force of the Women in Military Service for America Memorial is colonized by its articulation into this broader popular culture frame or formation. Taken together, then, these memory texts assist in the reconsolidation and naturalization of traditional logics and matrices of privilege that today traverse the various arenas of collective life, from political to juridical, the economic to the social.” (p. 406)

48 The usage of ideology at the beginning of the article, for instance, reveals this sleight of hand. “I will suggest that the historic decision to place the WWII Memorial at the very center of the Capitol is symptomatic of the pivotal ideological role WWII has begun to play in U.S. public culture in the present” (p. 394).

49 “The referential of the statement forms the place, the condition, the field of emergence, the authority to differentiate between individuals or objects, states of things and relations that are brought into by the statement itself” (Foucault, 1972, p. 91).

50 The author, in this sense, is a subject position produced by the conditions of possibility for the statement.

51 “The repeatable materiality that characterizes the enunciative function reveals the statement as a specific and paradoxical object, but also as one of those objects that men produce, manipulate, use, transform, exchange, combine, decompose, and recompose, and possibly destroy” (Foucault, 1972, p. 105). In short, the statement operates as the condition of possibility for relationality, yet the emergence of a specific statement only occurs based on another set of conditions.
CHAPTER 4
EVERY SINGLE ONE: VIETNAM MEMORY AND PASTORAL POWER

Introduction

At this point, one finally possesses at least a general outline of the way in which regularity emerges out of dispersion, and consequently, how one might go about conducting a post-structural analysis of monuments. After conducting a general survey of monumentality related to the Vietnam Veterans Memorial (VVM) in Chapter 2, this study drew a general conclusion that previous scholars had, to varying degrees, relied upon a representational reading strategy, which limited commentary to both the symbolic value of different elements of monuments and the interaction amongst symbolic elements in its composition. Though these studies did not directly relate to the Galveston County Vietnam Memorial (GCVM), they do provide an avenue from which one must diverge in reading the regularities between the VVM and GCVM. Chapter 3 then discussed the problems with this reliance upon representation, particularly the problem with two different unity structures frequently ascribed to the VVM: themes and identity formation. Instead of reading the structure of monuments as a form of representation that symbolizes other phenomena, one ought to think of the monument as a statement that exists in relation to other statements, making possible the emergence of a cultural formation (Biesecker, 2002). The arrangement of discourses and practices within and across monuments exist in relations of similitude, thus participating in a cultural regularity concerning the value of particular elements of the statements.¹

In order to concretize the change in orientation required to read regularities without recourse to a representational logic, this chapter applies the principles outlined in Chapter 3 to the emergence of a specific cultural formation circulating through the VVM and GCVM. The
two monuments both seek to memorialize the same conflict, but their spatial diversity and peculiarity warrant some degree of investigation for regularities to emerge. Toward that end, this chapter answers two related questions. Do the VVM and the GCVM participate in the same, or similar, cultural formations? If so, then what type of cultural formation makes them possible? To preview the product of the analysis, the answer advanced here suggests that they both participate in a cultural formation articulating the strategies of pastoral power. The objects formed and the rules of reading that emerge from each of the monuments order the formation of a deliberative rationality based on the care of each and all (Foucault, 2000).

Later writings organized under the name Michel Foucault lend insight into the formation of specific strategies (Foucault, 1972). In Discipline and Punish (Foucault, 1977c), the transformation of punishment based on a strategy of spectacle to disciplinary power based on the exclusion of the criminal from the sphere of public visibility marks a shift in tactics for controlling the conduct of subjects. A series of mutations in the discourses of scientific knowledge and in the relationship of state to the individual subject allows for a more effective economy of reformation to emerge as a strategy for curbing criminality. The History of Sexuality: An Introduction (Foucault, 1978) layers another mechanism of control into the deliberative apparatus: biopolitics. Not exclusive of disciplinary power, advances in statistics and medicine enable a new concern for the population as an aggregate measure of normality, health, and well-being. Biopolitics operates not at the level of the individual body, but at the level of abstract biological processes, of which the body only enters through reduction into statistical measure. Biopower names the overlap between biopolitics and disciplinary power. In each case, the transformation or introduction of a set of knowledge links to a deliberative apparatus (Greene, 1998) of the state to provide a new grid of intelligible practices (Biesecker, 1992).
Pastoral power operates in a similar fashion, articulating a reason of state based upon a relationship of care accorded to both individuals and population (Foucault, 2000).

Since this chapter explains the value of the approach outlined in Chapter 3, each section follows rigorously (insofar as possible) the protocol outlined in Chapter 3 for the analysis of the conditions of possibility of cultural formations (Foucault, 1972). Each section establishes regularities between the VVM and the GCVM based on the degrees of similitude in the rules of formation for the memorials. First, an outline of the formation of objects in both the VVM and the GCVM occurs, emphasizing regularities not in the objects themselves, but in the rules of formation that enable the emergence of specific objects of the statement. Second, the chapter attends to the formation of enunciative modalities, including all of the difficulties and complexities in elaborating on the question of who speaks through inanimate objects. Third, the formation of concepts within both monuments receives treatment, emphasizing the valuation of sacrifice in relation to other concepts circulating through both the VVM and the GCVM. Finally, the fourth section concerns the formation of strategies and the outline of pastoral power as a provisional moniker to discuss the process by which both monuments participate in the apparatuses of deliberation (Greene, 1998).

The Formation of Objects

An initial difficulty occurs in the application of Foucault’s (1972) discussion of object formation and the objects under consideration in both the VVM and the GCVM. He discusses the work he did in *Madness and Civilization* (Foucault, 1965) mapping the contours and transformation of a disciplinary field (psychology) over a series of different times, and the disparate objects considered as madness in several major psychological texts. Can one consider the objects of the VVM and the GCVM part of the same disciplinary domain? Herein lies part of
the significance for discussing objects relating to the Vietnam War; they form a grouping at two different levels, both that of public memory and that of Vietnam memory. However, this statement does not require the assumption that each of the memorials directly take the Vietnam War as an object of knowledge, but only that an indirect relationship exists in the act of naming both memorials as specifying a similar object domain: Vietnam. The particular objects taken as knowledge within that domain may diverge, but provide a provisional basis from which to discuss the relationships (Foucault, 1972).

The objects of knowledge articulated as part of the VVM most clearly concern the dead servicepersons of the Vietnam War. The main exhibit, the wall of names, makes this immediately clear through inscription of the dead in the face of polished black granite. Though one might not recognize the names as the dead immediately upon encountering the wall, the apex toward which one must proceed (in accordance with the narrow walking path that connects with the wall’s surface) makes such objects apparent as dead. An inscription at the top of the right leg of the wall describes the list as applying to those both officially dead or missing in action. As such, the names have a metonymic relation to the dead soldiers of the conflict (in the way that names frequently act as a convenient shorthand description of the whole person). However, the wall only proclaims to have knowledge of the objects insofar as they (presumably) gave their lives in combat.

The use of chronology in the naming process also reveals a link between the domains of objects memorialized and the authority of delimitation. As one walks along the surface of the wall, one reads an order of names, or skims along a series of names, that seem to exist in no particular order. Only at the apex, dealing with the same inscription as above, does one recognize the rationality to the list: “the order they were taken from us”. No entrance exists to the memorial
at this point, preventing viewers from accessing that chronology. The chronology of the war becomes an object of knowledge for the monument: the order provided by those who know the chronology. The bottom inscription suggests that the nation participates in the design and ordering of the monument, one authorized by the public (a reference to private donation which made the construction of the VVM possible). However, the specific steward, as noted in the entrance, becomes the National Parks Service, thus, the authority delimiting becomes collective expressions of the viewer, though they, in their immediate individuality, do not have the authority to make such a decision.

In a distinct way, the individual viewer occupies a place within the domain of knowledge of the memorial. The black granite surfaces reflect the image of the viewer into the surface of the wall. The names distort the image of the viewer, inscribing part of an other into the self. As a result, the object of knowledge does not consist of more than the surface of the viewer, the reflection of their complexion, and their relationship with the dead. The viewer participates, or consents, to their entry into the domain of knowledge by walking the face of the wall. In a sense, the act of viewing becomes a sufficient condition to consummate a relationship with the dead on these walls, and only the individual has the authority to confer that knowledge as part of the VVM. In addition, some viewers feel they must leave objects at the site in order to establish a relationship with the names.

Two other elements appear as objects of knowledge. The first commonly carries the name “three servicemen” statue, though no official name exists. The men appear in an anti-climatic “action scene”, not in the heat of combat, but dressed in combat gear, war-weary, yet stoic. The plaque at the entry to the memorial complex, authorized by the National Parks Service, claims the statue “reflects the shared experience of Vietnam veterans.” These men, diverse in ethnic and
racial background, lived a shared experience, one conveyed through the statue, yet they turn their attention (i.e. the eyes of the men in the statue) back toward the wall, witnessing the dead. The experience they share includes the experience of loss of other service persons, a loss they saw (and continue to see) with their own eyes.

The Vietnam Women’s Memorial (VWM) not only specifies a domain of knowledge, its addition to the VVM monument complex also rearticulates the domains of knowledge in other areas of the memorial (Foucault, 1972). The National Park Service plaque at the entry to the VVM discusses the VWM as follows: “The Vietnam Women’s Memorial is located on a path to your right. More than 11,000 American women served in the military during Vietnam.” This minimal statement clearly defines the fields of nationality and gender as characteristics delimiting knowledge of objects. It also broadens the sphere of experience claimed as represented herein: no longer just the battlefield, but also those that treat the injured or even just serve in the military at the time. The VWM uniquely includes those that served domestically as part of an important Vietnam experience and a worthy object of memory. This memory, through racial diversity in the statues of women, includes a number of different experiences irreducible to a single image, performed through the fragmentary nature of the memorial (multiple scenes exist). As such, the statue confronts its own inability to encompass comprehensively all experiences, leaving the power to define the domain of experiences included with both the viewer and the individual women veterans. Finally, the VWM refutes the claim of shared experience of veterans in the “three servicemen” statue, suggesting that the masculinized vision literally reified therein only cover the experiences of male combatants on the front lines, not all veterans. As a whole, the VWM’s introduction into the VVM complex more clearly delineates the divisions and contrasts between domains of objects within the memorial, and the enormous
amount of space between different objects in the memorial complex physically demarcates the divisions of objects.\textsuperscript{15}

Several objects of knowledge also emerge from the GCVM. Obviously, the names of the dead bear remarkably similar attributes to those inscribed into the walls of the VVM. Yet, the objects do not just possess the attributes of death; they are sons, soldiers with positions in a branch of service, and products of a community ("Designer", 1992). In addition, no ambiguity with regard to object domain exists; all soldiers listed are presumed dead, excluding those missing in action. As the inscription at the front of the memorial suggests, each face of the pillars provides "each veteran a small memorial within a larger one".\textsuperscript{16} Each individual, celebrated in their uniqueness of place, family, span of life (with dates of birth and death), and order within a military hierarchy. The Marine Corps League and the Moody Foundation confer this knowledge of death and life relationships to the memorial, taking responsibility for delimiting its domain. The larger public, including local businesses, took responsibility only for construction.\textsuperscript{17}

Again, the viewing self also transforms into object of knowledge through the reflecting surfaces of black granite. Giving the soldiers each a memorial on the differing sides of six foot tall triangular pillars places the top of each name at eye level; their slim design ensuring that parts of the viewer’s body are not reflected.\textsuperscript{18} Rather than a sea of names carving into the reflection of the viewing self, each individual’s characteristics implant themselves into the reflection of the face, but only one at a time. Again, the reflection establishes knowledge of the relationship between self and other, though that relationship requires the movement of the viewer in order to arrange a proper line of sight with the pillar to consummate the relationship. Passersby may reflect in the surface without knowing or desiring to participate in that relationship; yet reflection does not always become available for those who want it.\textsuperscript{19} The
mirroring function in the GCVM displays some similitudes with the VVM regarding the production of the viewing subject as an object of knowledge, but differs in the degree of action required by the viewer to establish that relationship.

Another restriction in rules of use also specifies a domain of knowledge: temporal progression. The physical space of the GCVM communicates the separation of past from present; the chain enclosing the pylons exists in a liminal relation between the two, marking a difference in domains of knowledge. The pylons exist on one side, in the midst of war, and the viewer exists on the other, removed from that context. The chain restricts the movement between domains, only allowing a reflection of the viewer (mostly the head) to travel across the threshold. As such, the memorial marks the process of individual remembrance as the prerequisite for a transfer of objects across these domains of time.

The inscription at the front of the memorial also takes domestic life during the Vietnam War as an object of knowledge. Establishing credibility as an authority for assigning symbolic value in the GCVM:

A timeless concept is conceived, exhibiting the conflict that developed in our society surrounding the Vietnam War. This conflict is expressed through the irregularly sloped base, which is in direct opposition to the strong, structured formation of the twenty-five black granite pylons.

The conduct of the soldiers opposes itself to the rest of domestic life during the Vietnam War. However, the irregularity of domestic conduct of the war does not shake the upright character of the soldiers. “The memorial is cut into a Texas Pink Granite base which represents a wound in the earth”; the caption appends to the preceding section, making knowledge of domestic life limited to two qualities: conflict and aberrance. In opposition, if we know anything of the soldiers, we know they displayed uprightness, strength, cooperation, and order. As such, the demarcation of object domains helps to define clearly the object’s field of presence.
The VVM and the GCVM take different objects as the domain of knowledge, though some similarities exist. They both name the dead, though the VVM lacks the individuality and specificity of the GCVM and the latter encompasses a smaller community of honored dead. Both take time as object, yet differences exist in physical relationships between the audience members and the temporal progression of the war. A remarkable difference exists with regard to what parts of the Vietnam War era receive treatment. The VVM focuses on the experience of the veterans, regardless of sex and race differences, while the GCVM memorializes the conduct of soldiers and domestic controversy. Authorities of delimitation seem remarkably similar: the executive branch of the United States government (including the Department of the Interior and the Marine Corps League) take responsibility for establishing and maintaining the technical details of the names honored, while a collective group (the nation or the county) take responsibility for the physical production of the memory space. Grids of specification divide and contrast different objects of knowledge in different ways (the VVM through complementarity and the GCVM through opposition). Taken together, the objects of the two memorials seem not incredibly similar.

On the other hand, the relationships between objects, their authorities of delimitation, and the grids of specification (Foucault, 1972) bear a remarkable degree of repetition in character. Names receive their legitimacy through confirmation of records maintained by entities of the government. That knowledge receives additional affirmation through popular support, exemplified through authorization of the memorial. Physical arrangement of objects in the memorials also designates grids of specification regarding the objects of the memorials. As such, some degree of regularity exists between them regarding the conditions of object formation,
though the ties between the two do not seem incredibly strong. Examining other rules of formation will help in establishing relationships between the VVM and the GCVM.\textsuperscript{22}

The Formation of Enunciative Modalities

Enunciative modalities (Foucault, 1972) characterize the emergence of the speaking subject in relation to the statement, and what position that subject occupies in relation to the emergent audience. These characteristics more easily emerge from both the VVM and the GCVM with a degree of relative homogeneity. As such, their treatment absorbs less space than the proliferation of objects.

Although several architects and designers worked collectively to design the monument complex, they lack the status of speaking subjects in relation to the VVM. As discussed in the previous section, the subject that honors the dead takes the form of a collective expression: the nation. The National Park Service, as stewards for the public memorial spaces of the nation, take charge of maintenance and presentation of the memorial, yet they only act as proxies for the nation. The National Park Service receives conferral of competence through a structure of consent between the collective of the nation and the particular caretakers of the area. This structure of consent obtains confirmation through the resolution of controversy surrounding the design of the monument and the act of leaving memories at the site. As such, the viewer participates in the consent structure that allows the nation to speak.\textsuperscript{23}

The National Mall, maintained by the National Park Service (a subdivision of the Department of the Interior), provides an institutional gathering place for the display of public memory. The park acts as a public trust for the edification of citizens of the United States and tourists from across the world. The frequency of visitation by children to the various sites also confirms the National Mall as an institutional arrangement for the education of both young and
old. The Park Service, as direct speaker, also occupies a position of maintenance and good order within this space. They provide plaques to assist visitors in experiencing and interpreting the monuments, maintain the good order of multiple walking paths to assist the experience of tourists, and protect these institutional statements from deterioration or defacement. As previously noted, the National Park Service acts as steward for the cultivation and preservation of public memory.

In the case of the GCVM, the architectural voice has a stronger role to play in the layers of speaking subjects at work in the memorial. Named on the top of the cube that introduces the memorial, Corvin Alstot bears responsibility for the arrangement of symbolic elements by virtue of specialization. Architecture designates a field of technical and cultural knowledge in order to guide the interpretation of the arrangement of physical features. As such, the discussion of the front face of the cube that designates the symbolic value of different elements in the memorial derives legitimacy from an institutional training conferred upon the subject. The architect operates as the informant on how to make structures speak to people.

However, the architectural speaker only mimics another voice, that of the local population and organizations that commissioned the object. The Marine Corps League and the Moody Foundation do not participate in local governmental formations: one participates as an appendage of the national government, and the other exists in civil society as a private foundation. Nevertheless, in another fashion, their relative status in an institutional structure allows them to describe the lives of the dead and proscribe the types of conduct worth remembering and repeating. Each entity operates as a liaison between a collective structure and the individual. They take the position of the instructing subject, granting the architect the right to translate the content of instruction into a physical object. Again, this movement relies on a
consent structure from the people, though confirmation occurs not through the acts of the viewer so much as the lists of active contributors on both sides of the black granite block, both individual and corporate. The Marine Corps may authorize the memorial, but the placement of the GCVM as part of a tourist space controlled by the Moody Foundation makes it the recognized steward for public memory.

In each memorial, the speakers of each statement differ, yet their relationship and relative position within an institutional apparatus entail remarkable similarities. Both maintain a direct connection to branches of nationality and civil society. Though the groups responsible for the production and maintenance of the memorials differ, with the VVM administered by a public trust and the GCVM cultivated by private entities, they display similarities in the relative position and value of enunciative modalities in relation to both the individual viewer and collective identification. Both entities work in civil society to cultivate a respect for collective endeavors and for the social advancement of individuals in society. The contractual nature of the bond between the people and these institutional speakers reproduce a strong regularity between the monuments on the mechanisms by which the ability to speak confers itself.

The Formation of Concepts

In opposition to some of the previous commentary, the formation of concepts deals with a series of abstractions that present some difficulties to analysis. As an example, Foucault (1972) references *The Order of Things* (Foucault, 1970) as a possible procedure of division in concepts, while explaining the relations of formation. In addition, not all components of the different fields of examination present themselves in a particular situation, making connections more tenuous in this area.
The walking paths in the VVM complex strictly order the encounter of concepts. Starting at the southwest entrance, the National Park Service plaque introduces a series of recurrent concepts within the memorial: “courage, sacrifice, and devotion to duty and country.” These characteristics of servicepersons deserve honoring, which becomes the function of the VVM. That honor “inspires a contemplative experience”, proscribing contemplation as an outcome of honor of veterans, the latter becoming a prerequisite for the former. Honor directs attention to those concepts and characteristics worthy of valuation, yet the plaque gives a dedifferentiated list of qualities. Their valuation in relation to one another must occur elsewhere.

Encountering the “three servicemen” statue, the shared experience of conflict portrayed in the scene emphasizes the importance of the soldiers as the focus of honor, not the conduct of the war (or else, why not honor soldiers using the battle scene). These experiences connect both the living and the dead through the conduct of duty in the soldiers. The gaze of the soldiers back to the wall of names sets a relation of dependence of the Vietnam experience to those values articulated through the wall; the memory of everyday experience passes the test of inclusion, but exists at the margins of the VVM. A small sign at the foot of the statue reiterates the need to honor the veterans, while strictly delimiting the possibilities of viewer’s physical arrangement: “honor those who served/stay on walks/stay off statues.”

Moving in the direction of the servicemens’ gaze, the viewer walks closely along the face of the wall. As one descends toward the wall’s apex, names of serviceperson’s emerge, yet reaching the center, one realizes the incompleteness of the list. The wall only valorizes the dead and missing, elevating the sacrifice of life in relation to the value of duty. The text at the top of the right-hand side of the wall makes this elevation apparent: “the names of those who gave their lives and those that remain missing.” Sacrifice does not become a requirement of service, but a
gift given to another. Here, the relationship of honor connects to the value of sacrifice; the
reflection of the self, distorted by the inscription of names, relates the gift to the viewer. The
viewer becomes the beneficiary of the gift. However, this gift confers itself through an
intermediary: the nation. The nation honors those that gave the gift of their life by constructing
the VVM (something that the individual could not do), yet the individual receives the gift. An
abstract collective expression (the nation) operates as the principle of exchange between self and
other, making possible the transfer of sacrifice as gift. The individual accepts the gift by entering
into the VVM and walking along the surface of the wall, but acknowledgement of gift enters the
viewer into a relation of exchange with the nation. To accept this give requires the act of
honoring on the part of the viewing subject. Thus, a relation of dependence exists between
concepts of sacrifice and honor established through both naming the gift and the mediation
function of the nation.

The names on the wall must also give through the nation; their status as part of the
collective identity also makes the exchange of gifts possible. The exclusion of Southern
Vietnamese who fought along side these soldiers confirms that those people did not give
something to the viewer; thus, their actions may warrant description as dutiful or heroic, but they
do not require the viewer’s honor. As one continues up the other side of the wall and back
around toward the southwest entrance, the collective display of names comes entirely into view.
One, at this distance, cannot read the names of each serviceperson that died, but they, through
memory (Foucault, 1972), exist as a backdrop, highlighting the way the view of the names
mutates at a distance. Through giving, they occupy a space of collective identity; they all form
part of the wall. This gift of sacrifice does not exist uniquely in the bodies of the dead, but
instead exists as potential in each member of the nation. Thus, the specific list of names stands
in as synecdoche for any possible list of names, or even all names in relation of identification with the nation.

The VWM only comes into view by turning ones back to the wall of names, juxtaposing the statue with sacrifice on the wall. In the VWM, one receives several images of women performing military roles. A nurse attends to a wounded soldier, articulating their service as a different experience than the prototypical male soldier. However, her role as facilitator to the soldier paints the experience of women as important, but in a relation of dependence to the male soldier’s ultimate sacrifice. Without his willingness to sacrifice, she could not perform her role. She bears witness to his courageous deeds; she sees and attends to his wounds. The relationship of care becomes worthy of honoring, yet receives less value in the economy of the memory of Vietnam. Only eight names of women exist on the black granite wall. Making a sacrifice of life, similar to the male soldier, becomes the only qualification worthy of the highest honor. Yet, the only trace of sexual difference in the wall exists in the cultural presumptions of sexuality in the name; their sexual difference becomes secondary when it comes to the highest forms of sacrifice. The VWM intervenes to increase the accuracy of elucidation of the Vietnam experience, yet an effacement of sexual difference occurs when the individual, in relation to the nation, crosses the threshold of death (gives their life). This same effacement of experience occurs along the axes of race and ethnic origin.

That the wall of names articulates a line of sight to both the Lincoln and Washington Memorials also does not lack significance. The Washington Monument and the Lincoln Memorial connect through a direct line across the center of the National Mall, with the Reflecting Pool between them. On either side, you can see the reflection of the other monument in the pool. This arrangement physically articulates an ideal founded on the establishment
(Washington) and preservation (Lincoln) of the nation. The words of Lincoln, chiseled into the marble walls lining the inside of the Lincoln Memorial, articulate a specific vision and set of ideals of the nation, but they do not exist in view of the VVM. The angles of connection establish the VVM as a swerve off the direct path of national ideals, but the physical structure also points the way back to the ideal path. The sunken nature of the VVM contrasts with the imposing physical structures the Washington and Lincoln memorials, communicating the aberrant character of Vietnam. Washington and Lincoln, at certain angles of viewing, also reflect in the surface of the memorial, suggesting their recognition of sacrifice of those inscribed in the face of the wall. Perhaps, they provide instruction on the appropriate relation of acknowledgement in the viewer as well.

The ordering of elements in the GCVM comes more from the institutional voice of the plaque anchoring the rest of the memorial; it strictly delimits the modes of interpretation available to the viewer. One has more freedom in physical movement around the memorial, but one cannot enter into part of the memorial space. Multiplicities of memorials to individuals stand in physical relation to the collective arrangement of the GCVM. The possibility of memorializing the individual receives conditioning from their collective relationship to each other; they stand together, as a group, and their sacrifice receives notification upon entry into the collective. Notably, sacrifice does not act as a gift, but a duty that makes possible the ascribing of value to their conduct as upright in character. However, their connection to a collective occurs at the level of locality, not the nation. All honored soldiers here have one thing in common: they came from Galveston County.

The upright pillars bearing the names and information of dead soldiers emerge from the base of domestic controversy; they overcome the aberrant character of domestic conflict. The
ordering of the objects in this fashion elevates the collective sacrifice of soldiers above public
debate. The pillars receive the attention of the face, standing right in front of the viewer. The
viewer looks down upon the domestic situation during the Vietnam era, articulating its memory
as less worthy of emulation. By existing at this place, in their county, whether one faces the
memorial or not, one establishes a relationship with the soldiers. Their sacrifice impresses upon
the image of the passerby as well as the attentive viewer, yet one only sees this relationship by
facing the names of the dead. To look back acknowledges what they did for the viewer,
consummating a relationship with them. Again, the structure of acknowledgement enters into a
mediating agent, but this time the local community act as the mediators of the relationship
between viewer and soldier.43

The division between past and present places the two in juxtaposition. Controversy
existed at that time, but the present maintains a stable base or footing. The tumultuous nature of
the base, perpendicular to the face of the pylons, cannot acknowledge the sacrifice of the
soldiers. As such, the domestic controversy operates as a field of memory (Foucault, 1972) from
which one can assess the transformation of conditions in the present.44 The reality of that
situation no longer presents itself. At a distance, the viewer exists in a time in which a proper
acknowledgement of the soldiers’ accomplishments can occur.

The backdrop of the resort enables one to ascertain the concrete benefits of sacrifice. The
beautiful scenery of Moody Gardens sets the scene of the present. Their sacrifice directly or
indirectly enables one to enjoy this area, as the rest of the scenery also reflects, at certain angles,
in the black granite pylons of the GCVM. Not only can one enjoy recreation and leisure, but the
accumulation of wealth in this locality also receives support from the troops. An American Flag
waives at the top of the hotel in the background, set against the background of the sky. The
nation, though in a distant relation, still connects to the local formation of Galveston County. This county, then, gave its due in sons to serve the nation, and that gift to the nation requires honoring.45

In this case, similar concepts exist in the GCVM and the VVM. Sacrifice, though articulated differently, occupies a central place for honoring in both memorials. In both cases, death of the individual takes center attention, though differences occur in considering this sacrifice as a gift or a duty. In the case of the GCVM, the concept of gift occurs in establishing the relay between local collective expressions and the national, though the national, in exchange, confers a level of security in the present (it centers the hotel and resort area, and the flag stands above and surveys the rest of the locality). Though existing in different locations, the structure of the gift allows a relation of depending to occur between the concepts of honor and sacrifice. In both, sacrifice elevates in value above other dependent concepts, like the experiences of survivors or the domestic conflict of the war. The monuments differ with regard to some of the dependent concepts articulated (domestic conduct in the GCVM and courage in the VVM), but the primacy of sacrifice establishes a relevant similitude between them. Moreover, in both the VVM and the GCVM, the sacrifice of life acts as the condition for entry into the collective arrangement of soldiers, while acknowledgement of their sacrifice conditions the entry of the viewer in relationship to the collective.

The Formation of Strategies

Under the formation of strategies, Foucault (1972) gives the critic very little direction from which to work, roughly outlining points of diffraction, points of authoritative choice, and the statements articulation with non-discursive practices. As a result, commentary in this area will not easily conform to just one of these rules for the formation of strategies, but will take
them as guidance in the conduct of criticism. The formation of strategies sets in motion a series of relations between objects, enunciative modalities, and concepts, defining their domains of relation and exclusion. Foucault suggests that this mode of analysis will occupy him in subsequent works, directing attention to the modes of relation between the early and late Foucault, as outlined in Chapter 3 and the introduction to this chapter.46

The relation of exchangeability between objects of knowledge in both the VVM and the GCVM establish a connection of each individual to a population. In the case of the VVM, the economy of exchange between the individual and the collective occurs through the mediation of the nation. The circular walkway that gives the viewer a close experience of the names and the distant experience inscribes a dual function of the name: they relate the individual to the population. At the moment one loses sight of the names, one also loses sight of the individual viewing self in the surface of the wall. For the GCVM, this same relationship between individual and collective identity manifests itself, but though focusing on a different mechanism of collective mediation. The locality acts as the locus of concern of each and all; it replaces the structure of the family.47 In both cases, the mirroring function of the black granite also allows for a similar relation of equivalence between the name of the dead and the viewing subject. In essence, it communicates the equivalence between the values of human life. Each single soldier and viewing subject within the collective matters the same as any other. In each, the rules of use also establish an immediacy to those names that highlights the significance of the individual performing a role within a collective identity formation.

Both the VVM and the GCVM also display similarities in according the nation the power to secure the relation of exchange between individuals. For the VVM, the announcement of the gift of sacrifice puts in place a relationship between the viewing subject and the soldier. The
viewer receives the benefit of the gift through the national structure. Even while establishing an individual relationship with those that sacrificed, the nation, acting as the organizational entity for the population, regulates this relationship. The GCVM seems to center the locality as the mediating agent for individual relationships. However, the detachment of the Marine Corps League, as an enunciative modality, provides an institutional exchange between the locality and nationality. The flag flying above the Moody Garden Hotel, in the line of sight of the GCVM, also articulates this link between the individuated locus of care of the locality and a larger apparatus of security that arranges relationships of exchange between localities, the nation. As such, the locality operates as a liaison between the individual and the nation, securing extra benefits and care to the local population, while also sacrificing some of its population for the good of the whole. That the gift structure returns in the relationship between locality and nation allows a broader audience to appreciate the sacrifice of soldiers displayed in the GCVM. The viewing subject of another locality can link the sacrifice of the locality in service to the nation, and yet nothing in particular makes Galveston County special. As a metonymic marker for the general relation between the vernacular and the national, any other locality ought to obligate themselves to give that same sacrifice if called upon to do so. This gift structure establishes regularity between the VVM and the GCVM and arranges an ascending ladder of deliberative apparatuses that guarantee the happiness of each and all. The tranquility of the setting, either as a part of a public park or as a tourist resort, confirms the importance of this deliberative apparatus to ensure happiness of the viewer.

The consent structure of the VVM, through the honoring of sacrifice, affirms the nation as the mediating agent of the common welfare (Foucault, 1991). The nation operates as the authority of administration of security to individuals and the population. Certain domains of
objects remain inaccessible to the viewing individual (such as the conduct of the Vietnam War), yet the nation has the technologies of knowing in place that can order the conduct of the war, rendering the death of individuals according to the logic of temporal progression. Honor completes as gesture in which the viewing subject consents to enter part of the population, rendering a relation of dependence between the viewer and the names of the dead. As a lesson in civics, the VVM thus allows the viewer to see their own conduct in the shadow of those that gave the ultimate sacrifice, and modify their conduct accordingly. In this sense, one’s own conduct becomes subject to self-policing in the name of regulating the whole, a function that Foucault (1988) refers to as the police. For the GCVM, in an interesting twist, the obligation to participate in this formation does not occur through consent, but instead, through the practice of enjoyment at the resort. People gather in that context not to honor the dead, but to relax and have fun. The GCVM demands the gaze of the viewer as an acknowledgement of sacrifice, yet it articulates an obligation to even the inattentive passerby. One does not have to live in Galveston County to acknowledge the importance of the sacrifice. The viewer’s obligation becomes retaining the memory of the sacrifice of these soldiers as a model for good conduct of the self, again displaying remarkable similitude to the educative function of the VVM and the ordering of the police (Foucault, 1988).

Collectively, these functions (exchange of individuals within a collective, significance of individual actions to the collective, nation as mediator of relations and cultivator of sensibilities, the dependence of other values in relation to honor and sacrifice) comprise a strategy articulating the reasoning of the state based on pastoral power (Foucault, 2000). Tracing the importance of care for others in the early Christian tradition, Foucault noticed that pastors, as leaders of a religious congregation, put remarkable emphasis on care for the moral rectitude of each
individual. They also saw this concern with the individual as part of the care of the entire group. Using the metaphor of the shepherd, the pastor tends to his\textsuperscript{50} flock, making sure each individual learns the glory of god, and guiding all on to the correct moral path of development.

Enlightenment secularism transforms this rationality into the function of the state.\textsuperscript{51} In Foucault’s (2003) commentary on Hobbes, he notes the importance of theorizing the state of nature as brute power, and opposing it to the disinterested ordering of the state. The state, then, exists to secure the population for threat, and thrives when each person receives guidance to live a good life.\textsuperscript{52} This dual concern for each and all (‘omnes et singulatum’ in Latin) provides justification for state power, since leaving people to their own affairs would result in a brutal deprivation of rights. To reform the individual and to care for the population strengthens the stability and security of the state. As such, pastoral power predicates itself on ensuring the goodness of each and every citizen (Foucault, 1988).

One other aspect of this the articulation of pastoral power deserves attention: the importance of enunciative modalities in the formation of the reasons of state (Foucault, 2000). In the lectures discussing the transformation of pastoral power from the context of religious technology to a technology of deliberation situated to justify the existence of the state, Foucault spends a lot of time analyzing texts that form the domain of political science. This new domain of knowledge emerges along with the apparatus of population as a concept, deriving its legitimacy from bridging a gap between an economy proper to the sciences and the decision-making procedures of state power. As a result, the structure of pastoral power exists to provide a strategy of valuation proper to securing the health and happiness of both individuals and population. That the National Park Service acts as the specific steward for the VVM’s memorial space happens not by accident, but its enunciative authority performs a central role in cultivating
a respect for the nation as a security structure. Collective elements of civil society, like The Moody Foundation, and branches of military service dedicated to supporting the state perform similar functions. As a result, the relation of the enunciative modalities in both the GCVM and the VVM confirm the link between the memorials as statements and the larger cultural formation centered on a reason of state as pastoral power.

Conclusion

The preceding analysis performs an example of how critics can establish regularities within systems of dispersion. Reading the VVM and the GCVM as participating in cultural formation (Biesecker, 2002) based on pastoral power (Foucault, 2000) shifts from the presumption of direct audience effect to a more subtle understanding of the effectivity of memorials (Greene, 1998). Similitudes in the formation of objects of knowledge (dead soldiers, the viewing subject, temporality), enunciative modalities (various subject positions tied to the function of public education in service of a governing community), and concepts (personal identity, collective identity, duty, sacrifice, honor) organize according to a strategic formation (Foucault, 1972) that grids possible practices (Biesecker, 1992) into a deliberative assemblage for the viewing subject (Greene, 1998).

Several relationships existing in the VVM and the GCVM solidify their function in articulating a reason of state (Foucault, 1988), providing both limits in which the structure of signification emerges and rules to judge the relative validity and utility of specific practices in American culture. The mirror function of black granite in both monuments articulates a relation of exchange between subject positions of the sacrificing soldier and the viewing subject. The immediacy between the names inscribed in black granite and the viewing subject focuses attention to the role of the individual in relation to collective identity. A collective identity takes
responsibility for both securing the relation of exchange between subject positions and cultivating a viewer’s sense of responsibility to remember sacrifice. Honor toward those that sacrificed in service to a collective identity places the practices of the viewing subject in a relation of dependence to the practices of the dead soldier. Enunciative modalities attached to the education of subjects within a collective identity establish the roles of both monuments as working to advance the deliberative sensibilities of individuals within the purview of the collective formation (Foucault, 2000).

The VVM and the GCVM do not have the same function for the exact same audience, yet they display a similar relation in the formation of strategies or theories of power centered around the structure of the pastorship (Foucault, 2000). This reason of the state links to the larger structures of governmentality (Foucault, 1991), isolating appropriate deliberative apparatuses capable of protecting the welfare of each and all. Techniques of policing the self (Foucault, 1988) articulate themselves through the production of public memory sites. Finally, the rules of use for the memorial constrain the viewing subject in order to articulate more clearly the lines of connection between the statements of the VVM and the GCVM to the larger cultural formation of pastoral power.

The conclusion attempts to place this example within the larger context of public memory studies, isolating the specific contribution of this study to rhetorical scholarship. A summary of some of the gaps in current scholarship will occur, followed by commentary on the deficiencies of this work. At the end, I wish to trace a series of related questions that might provide direction for future research in this area and comment on the significance of the VVM and GCVM to the future of memory studies.
Endnotes

1 At this point, it may seem that the reading strategy lapses back into a logic of representation. One might suggest that a series of similitudes stand in for a larger idea, and that the idea represents a cultural value. On the contrary, the suggestion made here does the opposite: one considers the monuments as part of cultural production. As concrete practices, they circulate as part of the culture, placing limits on what type of valuations can occur. Yet, at the same time, they do not emerge from nothing; other cultural practices also place limits on the formation of monumental statements. As a result, for the critic to carefully examine the emergence of a cultural regularity, they must oscillate between the level of the statement and the larger cultural formations in which they participate, and must refuse to provide particular causes or origins to both microphysical and macrophysical cultural practices.

2 “From the eighteenth century onward (or at least the end of the eighteenth century onward) we have, then, two technologies of power which were established at different times and were superimposed. One technique is disciplinary; it centers on the body, produces individualizing effects, and manipulates the body as a source of forces that have to be rendered both useful and docile. And we also have a second technology which is centered not upon the body but upon life: a technology which brings together mass effects characteristic of a population, which tries to control the series of random events that can occur in a living mass, a technology which to predict the probability of those events (by modifying it, if necessary), or at least to compensate for their effects. This is a technology which aims to establish a sort of homeostasis, not by training individuals, but by achieving an overall equilibrium that protects the security of the whole from internal dangers.” (Foucault, 2003, p. 249).

3 Although the chapter on the formation of objects takes madness as an example, a direct relationship does not get articulated until the second paragraph in the section outlining the formation of strategies. “In Madness and Civilization, I was dealing with a discursive formation whose theoretical points of choice were fairly easy to locate, whose conceptual systems were relatively uncomplex and few in number, and whose enunciative rules were fairly homogenous and repetitive; on the other hand, the problem lay in the emergence of a whole group of highly complex, interwoven objects; it was necessary above all to describe the formation of these objects, in order to locate in its specificity the whole of psychiatric discourse.” (Foucault, 1972, p. 65)

4 Both Spanos (2000) and Sturken (1997) discuss the memory of the Vietnam War as part of a domain of public memory that participates in larger cultural phenomena, particularly due to the unique attributes of conduct during the war.

5 This provisional assumption has a similar function to using a provisional division of the literature as a starting point from which to investigate. See Chapter 3, endnote 4.

6 Most of the commentary by Feldman (2003) derides other scholars for overlooking this most obvious aspect of the memorial. They treat the list as a metaphor for something else, but refuse to take into consideration the literal content of the memorial: names of the dead.
7 Though missing in action does not technically designate dead, the length of time before both construction and viewing allow a presumption that those missing are probably dead. For a complete text of the inscription, see Chapter 2.

8 Of course, visitors could elect to begin reading the names from left to right at the apex of the wall, looping back around to finish the list. However, one would neither know anything of the wars progression other than orders of death, but even then, the number of names overwhelms the perception of the viewer to keep them in good order without an extraordinary amount of effort memorizing.

9 This structure of consent designates a range of freedom in action or the viewer. The paths of movement heavily regulate traffic through the memorial area, but one could always stop short of the wall and refuse to walk along the surface. Other scholars (Blair, Jeppeson, & Pucci, 1991; Griswold, 1986) ignore this domain of viewer freedom just to attend to the physical construction of the monument and its physical configuration.

10 Carlson and Hocking (1988) almost exclusively focus on this relationship when reading the memorial. Though they really do an excellent job outlining a range of actions available to the viewer, they treat the memorial as a physical scene or background from which to enact drama, rather than an ordering mechanism that enables a consensual relationship between the names and viewer to actualize.

11 Very few scholars pick up on this relationship (Griswold, 1986, is an aberration in this respect).

12 Interestingly, many veterans felt like they did not have a place in the memorial until the plan for the statue occurred (Van Gelder, 1985). The actions of some decorated veterans leaving their medals of honor in protest against the campaign in Nicaragua also confirms the relation that the living veteran establishes to the wall of names; the dead provide the reason to fight other unjust wars (Saperstein, 1986). Their specific politics, in this instance, become less important than the relationship established to the wall as acknowledging a debt that one must continue to repay in the present.

13 Kinsey (1993) makes this extension of object domains apparent by discussing the range of experiences honered by the VWM. “Now, with the installation of the Women's Memorial between the Washington Monument and the Lincoln Memorial, the American women who served - military nurses, USO and Red Cross workers, State Department staffers and others - are also receiving recognition” (p. E2).

14 Even the assumption that the scenes in the VWM occupy separate spaces seems suspect. Though each figure in the memorial has a different focal point, such that one must walk around the statue to see everything, they could have the same setting. On the other hand, the inability to make this decision only further confirms the inability to represent all experiences of women.
Physical space in the VVM thus establishes a relationship between the presence of objects and their grids of specification (Foucault, 1972).

Chapter 2 gives the most of the text of this inscription at length.

Each of these authorities receives recognition on different sides of the black granite cube in front of the GCVM.

Though monument does not state he exact width of each pylon, a reasonable guess would place their width at no more than one foot across each of the three faces.

Certainly, this phenomenon also could occur with the VVM, but the placement of the structure makes it unlikely. Other walking paths allow someone to bypass the wall of names, if they choose not to view it. In the case of the GCVM, its proximity to a major waking path connecting the hotel to the convention center lobby make the likelihood of passing by without acknowledgement of the memorial increase.

The chain encloses the memorial at the same point as the irregular base of the GCVM buts against the solid, flat surface of the walking path.

Recall that relations of similitude never reach exact precision and that these similitudes exist without origin or original (Foucault, 1983).

I will not replicate the exact format of comparison at the end of each section. I use a larger amount of detail at the beginning to emphasize points of divergence between objects before accessing heir points of regularity in the rules of formation. These two methods of comparison will commingle in later commentaries, especially since the abstractions produced make these relationships more difficult to untangle.

Here the interplay between objects places limits on the possibilities for enunciative modalities, as per commentaries by Foucault (1972). See Chapter 3, endnote 44.

However, I do not wish to grant the degree of autonomy of the architectural voice given in Blair, Jeppeson, and Pucci (1991). Their, the architectural voice acts as the determining factor in reading the VVM as a symbol of the postmodern condition. Other interests also speak through the memorial, and in some ways, the architectural voice operates as an effect granted permission to speak by another institutional agent.

Here, another domain of objects forms as part of the knowledge of the GCVM. The monument, by virtue of its speaker, claims to have superior knowledge of symbolism produced by architectural forms, a claim to legitimacy that grants the anchoring inscription truth-value.

Even Althusser (2001) acknowledges how some of the civil apparatuses of the formal state
blend with the informal functioning of civil society. They do not occupy the same position, but a similitude in the function of both occurs here.

27 Again, this relationship only receives treatment explicitly when discussing the formation of strategies. “In *The Order of Things*, my attention was concentrated mainly on the networks of concepts and their rules of formation (identical or different) as they could be located in General Grammar, Natural History, and the Analysis of Wealth” (Foucault, 1972, p. 65).

28 Contrasting with Ehrenhaus’ (1988a; 1988b) description of encounter as open to authentic experience, one in which the subject confronts the freedom to construct interpretation, I conceive of encounter as a limited space opened for directed movement. On the other hand, I also do not suggest that the viewer remains docile during this encounter (for example, Griswold, 1986). Instead, the arrangement of objects within a structure that limits choices of movement available to the viewer guides one’s relationship to the VVM.

29 The entire text reads: “the Vietnam Veteran’s Memorial honors the courage, sacrifice, and devotion to duty and country of the men and women of the armed forces of the United States who served in America’s longest war. By virtue of its design, the memorial inspires a contemplative experience and outs a human face on a divisive conflict. Veterans, their families, and others find the memorial a place for reflection and healing.”

30 Conceiving of the VVM as a space for contemplation also drives another series of governmental regulations preventing protests from occurring at the site (Perl, 1983).

31 Here one deals with specific directions that confine the space of encounter with the memorial complex, contra Ehrenhaus (1988a; 1988b). These restrictions order enunciation, roughly conforming to Foucault’s (1972) description of forms of succession.

32 Honoring the dead acknowledges the receipt of the gift, though the viewer cannot directly communicate with the dead. Instead, one acknowledges the receipt of the gift with the intermediary. One dedicates attention and respect, and one follows the rules of honor in the formal arrangement of the monument: walking in certain places while silently contemplating.

33 Derrida (1992) meditates on the structure of the gift, suggesting that the nature of gift eludes the process of exchange. “For there to be a gift, *it is necessary* [il faut] that the donee not give back, amortize, reimburse, aquit himself, enter into a contract, and that he never have contracted a debt… It is thus necessary, at the limit, that he not *recognize* the gift as gift” (p. 13) (italics in original). However, the directive to honor the gift, to recognize the gift given by these soldiers, effaces the sacrifice as gift. “If he recognizes it as gift, if the gift *appears to him as such*, if the present is present to him *as present*, this simple recognition suffices to annul the gift. Why? Because it gives back, in its place, let us say, of the thing itself, a symbolic equivalent… The symbolic opens and constitutes the order of exchange and debt, the law or order of circulation in which the gift gets annulled” (p. 13) (italics in original). As such, the nation, through construction of the monument as an abstract expression for the American population,
appropriates the gift of soldiers’ lives in order to mediate a series of exchanges with the viewer. The gives converts itself into a debt that gets partially repaid through honor.

34 This exclusion certainly does not go unnoticed by other scholars (Johnston, 2001; Sturken, 1997).

35 Again, the earlier commentaries on the gift reveal this conceptual development as another part of converting the gift into the symbolic realm of exchange. See this chapter, endnote 33.

36 This relation of dependence also occurs at another level. The placement of the VWM in relation to the wall of names makes it entirely possible that one completely overlooks this statue. At the end of the walk along the wall, one could continue away from the rest of the VVM complex, walking roughly in the direction of both the White House and the Washington Monument. If one does not return to the entrance, the VWM does not get treatment. However, if one eludes the wall of names or elects to start at the opposite end of the wall, the VWM becomes the first element of the VVM complex that one encounters.

37 Others have commented on the lackluster and dependent portrayals of women in this monument. Certainly, one can make a case that the VWM rearticulates a very traditional role for women within military operations (Hass, 1998).

38 I would not suggest here that the VWM, in valorizing the sacrifice of life, reproduces a masculine view of the national subject as the ideal, as Biesecker (2002) does with the WIMS. Instead, life, as the ultimate sacrifice, transcends one’s race or sexual difference. This quality of the dead becomes the ultimate valor, trumping the need to know other differences between experiences or personal identity. That they had an identity, marked by a name, that they gave up for the viewer commands the utmost respect.

39 This relationship receives extensive comment in both Griswold (1986) and Johnston (2001).

40 The nature or cause of this swerve do not receive commentary, nor elucidation of particular attributes. As such, the judgment over the problems of the Vietnam War occur with the viewer, as a space of freedom for interpretation.

41 Griswold (1986) alone comments on this aspect of the VVM’s arrangement in relation to the rest of the National Mall.

42 The text of the inscription replicates the anchoring function of photo captions (Barthes, 1985). However, an addendum to this function deserves attention. Rather than conceiving of the anchor as something that exists apart from the image, Foucault (1983), addressing Magritte’s paintings, argues that the textual anchor forms part of the image; the inscription makes an image of words. It does not comment on the statement, but participates in the emergence of the statement. In this particular instance, the text receives a lot of attention due to its relationship with the voice of authority.
43 Here, symbolic exchange already permeates the concept of duty, placing the soldiers by virtue of connection to locality in the service of a collective abstraction of people. The acknowledgement does not annul a gift, but participates in an already assumed economy of debt paid through honoring of the dead and attention to virtuous conduct.

44 In fact, standing on stable footing enables one roughly to equal the pylons in stature. Here, the field of memory activates in order to describe a domestic condition that no longer exists.

45 The gift reenters discourse here at another level, the gift given by Galveston County to the United States. The flag, by looking back and surveying the land, acknowledges receipt of the gift, transforming the gift into the logic of symbolic exchange across categories of identity. The individual soldier, in a dual-service role, occupies multiple, overlapping identity formations.

46 Of course, to state the agenda in this fashion risks reading Foucault as an author function that unifies a series of texts. My goal here does not concern finding the true Foucault of the books, but instead, to suggest that a series of relationships enabled through the text (especially the element of foreshadowing in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, 1972) might provide some insight into the practical analysis of the formation of strategies. Other connections to earlier texts have also served the same function.

47 Here, the reference on the top of the black granite cube to “our sons” allows the transference of individuals from the structure of the family to the structure of security in localities. They are “our sons” by virtue of belonging to the county, not by virtue of their familial lineage. In fact, other than the last name, no other trace of the family structure exists (and even then, who could argue that some of them parted with their family or were orphans). Foucault (1991) discussed that the modern instruments of political rationality relegate the family to a secondary relation to the identification with the larger population. “In other words, prior to the emergence of population, it was impossible to conceive the art of government except on the model of the family; from the moment when, on the contrary, population appears absolutely irreducible to the family, the latter becomes of secondary importance compared to population, as an element internal to population: no longer, that is to say, a model, but a segment… Thus, what makes it possible for the theme of population to unblock the field of the art of government is the elimination of the family as a model.” (Foucault, 1991, pgs. 99-100)

48 This relationship articulates a point of compatibility between to distinct deliberative mechanisms, effacing the antagonism between them outlined in Bodnar (1993).

49 Foucault (1988) comments on the theory of the police, suggesting that it exceeds the disciplining arm of government. Policing includes a series of technologies for ordering the conduct of individuals, rendering them useful and docile in service of the state.

50 I retain the masculine pronoun here to highlight the gendered implications of pastoral power. Women did not occupy the position of pastor, and the stoic virtues of the pastor embody several
masculine virtues centered on saving another: the heroic subject.

51 By state, I do not suggest something like the United States Federal Government. These types of governments exist as effects of statist rationality. Instead, I wish to understand the state as a complex relay of practices concerning governance, one that exists in both private and public, and includes the function of civil society.

52 As such, the government itself exists as an effect of statist rationality.
CHAPTER 5
RE-THEORIZING REGULARITY IN PUBLIC MEMORY

Introduction

In the preceding chapters of this study, I have tried to advance a few key arguments. First, a historical overview of the role in public memory studies provided insight into the importance of memory to the continued vitality of rhetorical studies. Second, the problem of generalizing from the conclusions of specific studies received attention, limiting the coherence and vision of the field. Third, those studies that generalized from the study of public memory generally proceeded from the identification of false unities centered on identity characteristics or thematic concerns. Fourth, these problems generalizing from false unities related to a general methodological impasse between ideology criticism (Althusser, 2001) and postmodern critique (Lyotard, 1984) applied to particular public memory objects, both relying on a logic of representation (Foucault, 1983). Fifth, and finally, theorizing regularities between memory objects from a poststructuralist perspective, defined operationally through Foucault (1972), avoids the impasse between ideology criticism and postmodern critique, providing an alternative way for rhetorical studies to relate diverse memory objects into a larger project of cultural study (Biesecker, 2002).

This chapter provides some closure to the study, allowing critics to draw some preliminary conclusions for future investigation. Toward this end, the rest of the chapter will address some general issues raised in the previous chapters. First, a summary of results occurs, focusing on provisional answers to the research question and implications for previous research. Second, I will assess some of the shortcomings of this study and the limits to generalization inherent to the some of the methodological claims made. Third, I will offer some suggestions for
future researchers for the study of public memory. Finally, the chapter concludes with commentary on the significance of the VVM and GCVM to the study of public memory.

Summary of Results

What are the conditions of possibility for a post-structural monumentality? Returning to this question requires a shift in perspective from the rest of the study, inquiring into what made it possible. Shifting from either ideology criticism (Althusser, 2001) or postmodern critique (Lyotard, 1984) to a post-structural reading strategy entails a break with a logic dictated by signification. Instead, one isolates the conditions of emergence for a particular statement, characterized as rules of formation (Foucault, 1972). Statements relate to one another not according to a representational or identity driven logic (one that isolates an original or prototype in order to classify information), but based on degrees of similitude (a relative relationship that refuses to demarcate the boundaries of genre or class) (Foucault, 1983). These similitudes relate based upon their arrangement and rules of ordering, roughly characterized as a logic of articulation (Biesecker, 1999), which then make possible the emergence of a particular formation of practices in a culture linked through a circulating network of strategic possibilities. The accumulation of the rules of ordering across a series of statements allows a provisional grouping, understood as a cultural formation (Biesecker, 2002).

In addition to repudiating a set of tactics of interpretation designed to reduce a statement to a particular identity representing a more original statement (Foucault, 1972), I also hope to have highlighted some of the dangers in this mode of investigation. In the context of Biesecker’s (2002) discussion of the cultural formation, some critics may desire to reduce the cultural formation to a particular concept of identity articulated through a tightly knit network of statements emerging at a particular moment in time. Although some regularity may exist in the
memory of certain identities over that period, each articulation of national identity takes on
distinct characteristics; they may display a great deal of similitude, but they cannot take on the
exact same character. The cultural formation occurs pre-conceptually (Foucault) in the rules of
formation of concepts, not in the essence of the concept’s identity. As a result, one must turn
attention to the rules of relation between objects, enunciative modalities, and concepts, which
form strategies for the production of identity, not the presumed existence of a particular strategic
choice.⁸

To satisfy the research question, the conditions of possibility for a post-structural
monumentality emerge through a grid of intelligible investigative practices that break with the
logic of representation in reading monuments (Biesecker, 1992). A critic reads regularities
between conditions of emergence for statements and assesses their degrees of similitude within
an ordered formation. Attending to the relations between the formation of objects, enunciative
modalities, concepts, and strategies allows the critic to attend to a network of practices that place
limits upon one another and upon the possible subject positions available within a cultural
formation. In the cases of the VVM and the GCVM, some degrees of similitude exist in the
formation of objects, enunciative modalities, and concepts, but a high degree of similitude occurs
in the formation of strategies. The VVM and the GCVM participate in a cultural formation based
upon the strategy of pastoral power (Foucault, 2000).

Accordingly, this study operates as an effect of power relations that enable critics to
isolate and to speak into existence a different mode of research practice. Acting as a specific
intellectual (Foucault, 1980) conferred the privilege to speak to these relations, I hope to have
made visible (in conjunction with many others with similar enunciative modalities) an alternative
reading practice that enables critics not to dispose of signification, but to ask about what makes a
particular structure of signification possible. However, this study, especially due to its limited circulation, cannot act as a sufficient condition for the emergence of a post-structural monumentality in rhetorical studies. Other scholars must also participate in making intelligible another logic of investigation for the discipline.9 Hopefully, isolating the formation of important concepts for reading, as well as placing other concepts used for interpretation (by ideology criticism and postmodern critique) within the field of memory (Foucault, 1972) will limit the formation of strategies available to the critic, but no guarantee exists that this study will either influence or cause a shift in perspective (as per the logic of articulation).

The purpose of asking the research question becomes not to provide a definitive answer, but to articulate a path of inquiry that provides new insights into the emergence and proliferation of memory objects in American culture. Limiting the research question to monuments does not deny the value of this approach in studying other memory objects, but instead delimits the scope of the inquiry to a manageable task given the space of enunciation provided for this study. Even then, I cannot proclaim a shift to a different methodological agenda, but can only participate in articulating a possible mode of sense making for other scholars (Biesecker, 1992).

Shortcomings of the Study

Of course, this study, in addition to repudiating the possibility of the perfect prototype for criticism (the model by which all others receive judgment), commits itself to remaining an incomplete outline (Foucault, 1972) of an alternative textual reading strategy. Some shortcomings are identified easily. First, the use of only one example of regularity in Chapter 4 provides little proof that the reading strategy outlined in Chapter 3 has any long-term benefits for rhetorical scholars. Second, that the memory objects both are monuments concerning the Vietnam War makes the identification of regularity relatively easy. Much more work must occur
with objects displaying less apparent similarity and dedicated to different memories. Third, this study isolated only a few reading practices that made for easy contrast with the approach articulated in Chapter 3. However, all of these problems with the research do not necessarily devastate the overall project, and future research would easily provide remedy to those limits.

In the case of discussing the movement from discursive formation (Foucault, 1972) to cultural formation (Biesecker, 2002), some more disturbing shortcomings emerge. First, this study has largely characterized the movement from discursive formation to cultural formation through recourse to Foucault’s (1977c) inclusion of power into the subject of study and a larger emphasis on enabling practices (Biesecker, 1992). Yet, at the same time, this study has failed to define explicitly the culture element in cultural formations. At best, culture seems to have an operational definition as a set of material practices enabled for a grouping of subject position. Future work in this area must delimit more carefully the object of study.

A related problem concerns the inability to examine how monuments function in relation to other statements in the cultural formation. In the case of pastoral power, both the VVM and the GCVM seem to participate in the articulation of a particular strategy for delimiting memory practices. However, very little work occurred in linking these two memory statements to other non-monument statements in the cultural formation. For all the criticism given to Biesecker (2002), this seems to be a place where she has provided a more appropriate avenue for analyzing cultural formations. Rather than seeing the cultural formation as intrinsic to monuments, the cultural formation circulates through a diversity of statements in a culture. This study does not incorporate a large enough diversity of memory texts to make a definitive statement on the formation of pastoral power. As such, it can only provide a small example for future research.
Taken together, these shortcomings do not deny all productive value for the overall project. Instead, they mark pitfalls to guide future researchers in different directions. Hopefully, noting these conceptual difficulties will not relegate this work to a scrapheap of failed attempts to re-theorize the relationship between memory texts and the practices of culture, but will provide a matrix of reason to aid others with a similar desire to contribute to advancing disciplinary practices.

Suggestions for Future Research

This study acts as a touchstone for future research. As for my own criticism, I hope to build upon this work in future endeavors. Toward that end, I would like to outline a few directions for others in the field (as well as myself) to proceed in the isolation of cultural formations.

First, I think rhetorical theorists should pay attention to the relationships between Foucault’s (1972) earlier work, and some of the later projects that he undertook (1977c; 1978; 1991; 2000). The discussions of disciplinary power, biopower, governmentality, and pastoral power all seem to incorporate this movement to understand the formation of strategies that shape material practices in culture. Bennett’s (1997) discussion of the exhibitionary complex already provides a supplement for understanding cultural practices of viewing with visual art objects. In the case of public memory, scholars need to think through alternative possibilities for understanding the articulation of memory objects into certain material arrangements. Do other forms of practice emerge because of certain rules of formation for public memory?10

A second, related direction concerns the need to link the regularity between diverse types of public memory objects. Biesecker (2002) has already outlined a possible strategy by reading the memory of monuments, memorials, books, and photographic essays a part of a larger cultural
arrangement. More work in this direction seems necessary, not attending to the material divisions in the form of expression (monuments, photography, etc.), but to understand how they all participate in larger strategies of memorializing in American culture and across the globe.

Third, a large body of research exists attempting to trace the developments of our disciplinary practices (Black, 1978; Gaonkar, 1990; Wichelns 1925; and Zelizer, 1995). Scholars ought to re-theorize how rhetoric understands its own transformations. Rather than couching scholarship in terms of a development and diversification of tools at the disposal of the critic (especially characteristic of the pluralist movement spawned by Black), these moments of creation ought to receive treatment as internal transformations in the relations between concepts and the strategies for the formation of the text (McGee, 1990).¹¹

Finally, if no other worthy conclusion emerges from this study, scholars need to make a break with the logic of representation in favor of understanding similitudes between rhetorical objects (Foucault, 1983). Such a change in orientation will help to avoid the continually re-emerging tension between the multiple meanings of a particular text and the fact that certain interpretations gain privilege in a culture. Instead, rhetorical scholars ought to direct their attention to rules of formation that allow the circulation of multiple meanings, while also articulating a relation of dependence between a primary reading and subversive readings. In short, one should begin to ask what conditions set in motion the dialectic of domination and resistance, rather than attempting to choose sides within a set of interpretive conditions. The treatment of articulation as a concept (Biesecker, 1999; Greene, 1998; and Stormer, 2004) already provides a fruitful basis for making this conceptual schism in the field.

If this study has succeeded, some of these directions for future research ought to receive treatment in the near future. The movement in productive directions in many of these areas has
already begun. This study only hopes to participate in the proliferation of post-structural lines of research. Only time will tell if sufficient conditions exist for the formation of an alternative monumentality that refuses to reduce memory objects to an imperfect mimetic repetition of the same.

Significance of the Memorials

Chapter 4 provides a corrective for previous literature on the VVM. Ideology criticism (Althusser, 2001) and postmodern critique (Lyotard, 1984) both presume the rhetorical effect of the VVM emerges from the memorial’s ability to signify, or represent, something else. Ideology critique suggests that the VVM acts to impart specific meanings to a viewer. Postmodern critique reads the VVM as a representation of a cultural condition in which the proliferation of audience interpretations occurs without limit. These two interpretive strategies both rely upon a logic of representation (Foucault, 1983; Greene, 1998), differing only in the degree to which the viewer exercises control over the interpretation of the VVM. Both presume that the structure of the VVM influences a particular response from the audience.

Reading the rules of formation for the VVM offers a solution to the impasse between singular and multiple meanings emerging from the VVM. The rules of formation for the VVM as statement put into play an ordered regulation of the rules of use for the memorial, limiting the possibilities for signification of the VVM. The participation of the VVM within a larger cultural formation based on pastoral power (Foucault, 2000) also attaches the limited possibilities of signification to a deliberative apparatus that renders judgment on the validity of respective possibilities. Signification emerges within a formation of constraints, while the extent of the formations influence still allows a number of strategic possibilities for reading the VVM. One could read the VVM as either a pro-war or anti-war memorial, but the rationality by which one
renders such a judgment occurs within the deliberative strategy of pastoral power. In essence, one can maintain that the nation fought unjustly to preserve the security of the nation; that the sacrifice of soldiers did not produce desirable results for the collective. However, the reasoning for this decision emerges from the presumption that the state, in this instance, did not properly act to care for each and all. As such, the Vietnam War swerved (as the VVM physically swerves on the National Mall) from the ideal path of security for the nation.

The regularities between the VVM and the GCVM also disclose a problem with scholarly research focused on the production of a specific identity formation. The GCVM, in particular, reveals a relay that exists between overlapping modes of collective identification, both vernacular and national. Scholars that presume a tension between the vernacular and the national (Bodnar, 1993), or the national and international (Cheah & Robbins, 1998), fail to link the modes of reasoning that allow multiple, overlapping identifications for the subject to emerge. In the case of the VVM and the GCVM, the strategy of pastoral power reveals the extent to which a particular cultural formation can rely upon a relay of identities between the personal and the national. Although this study failed to analyze the link between the national and international, I suspect that certain modes of public memory (perhaps the Korean War Memorial on the National Mall) also link the rationality of pastoral power to the structure of international organizations. At the very least, this study certainly ought to make critics wary of the presumption that capitalism or world governments have come to replace the collective identity of the nation as the driving force in world affairs (Hardt & Negri, 2000).

The remarkable amount of focus given to discussing the formation of national identity in rhetorical scholarship (Biesecker, 2002; Browne, 1995; Haskins; 2003; and West, 2002 provide a few examples) seems shortsighted. The lack of work on the GCVM, coupled with the lack of
scholarship generally on vernacular memorials to Vietnam, reveals the extent to which the national voice receives privilege in rhetorical scholarship to articulate its own parameters. This study calls attention not to the identities themselves, but the rules of formation and the strategies of deliberation that enable them. To paraphrase Biesecker (1992), the identity of the nation (much like the identity of the critical rhetorician) only exists as an effect of power relations. Rhetorical scholarship must shift from analyzing the constitutive character of an identity formation in a text (Charland, 1987) to the strategies of identification that allows the constitutive function to emerge. The rules of formation for identities provide the grounds by which the performance of citizenship occurs (Asen, 2004). In this sense, the analysis the VVM and the GCVM offers the possibility, as an example, to shift entirely a scholarly understanding of public memory’s relationship to identity.

Endnotes

1 At the beginning of Chapter 1, I provided an indication of the centrality of memory studies to rhetorical scholarship. Implicitly, a relationship to public memory exists in most, if not all, rhetorical criticism. As a result, theorizing the role of public memory in objects of study provides an important supplement to scholarly knowledge in the field.

2 The review of literature in Chapter 1 detailed the broad scope of types of memory studies performed within rhetorical scholarship (and closely related fields), noting a large disparity in types of public memory objects. However, the field has produced very little material that seeks to theorize explicitly relationships between diverse memory objects.

3 These types of studies, exemplified by Blair (1999) and Zelizer (1995) frequently do very little close investigation of the relationships between objects, opting to provide categories based on the methods of investigation. Deficiencies in these methods received treatment in the second section of Chapter 3.

4 Chapter 1 defined this impasse in relation to memory studies generally, while Chapter 2 revealed the same impasse occurred in scholarly work on the Vietnam Veterans Memorial (VVM).

5 Chapter 3 theorized Foucault’s (1972) view of discursive regularities, with some modifications from supplementary texts and the academic movement toward cultural studies. Chapter 4 served
to provide an example of the theoretical contribution of Foucault (1972) to the study of monuments.

6 My intention here has not been to provide a dichotomous identity to all previous studies, but to highlight antimony in modes of interpretation roughly characterized by these two figures. That these two possible modes of interpretation have received some treatment before in other texts within the discipline makes them convenient markers to begin an investigation. Many studies lumped into these camps would not proclaim an affinity with other studies provisionally grouped together. However, they share a regularity in reading strategies with these other studies (which occupies a central place in this work), enabling a provisional grouping to occur. In fact, Chapter 3 attempts to dissolve the antimony between these two perspectives explicitly, while maintaining the terms as a convenient reference point.

7 Biesecker’s (2002) article deals with five different memory objects, all formed within the same decade, which formulate a national identity from representations of World War II.

8 Taking the World War II memorial as an example, one might ask what rules of formation make possible the articulation of a state identity (produced by the pillars of the World War II memorial) in a relation of dependence to a national identity (performed through the identification of the entire structure).

9 Breaking with a representational logic, this study also cannot claim to serve as a prototypical example of post-structural analysis of monuments. Instead, the formation of a post-structuralist monumentality has yet to occur, and only at another time can one then place this study as a statement in a relation of similitude with other attempts at revising the tolls available for investigation.

10 The use of pastoral power in this study occurred primarily as an example already outlined by Foucault (2000) for understanding the formation of strategies. Through closer investigation, one might find that the VVM and the GCVM participate in the articulation of a different power strategy, one more aligned with contemporary global culture (Cheah & Robbins, 1998).

11 However, rather than proceeding with the assumption, as McGee (1990) does, that the critic makes a text suitable for criticism, one ought to supplement this understanding with the observation made by Biesecker (1992) that the rhetorical critic is an effect of power relations. As a result, one sees the act of criticism as a mode of intervention that re-arranges textual traces enabled by a mode of sense making.
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