The Beauty of Environment

Yrjö Sepänmaa

Second Edition

Environmental Ethics Books
THE BEAUTY OF ENVIRONMENT

Dedicated to the Memory of Professor (h.c.)
Dr. Reino Kalliola (1909 - 1982).
the leading Finnish Naturalist and
the first public Conservationist in Finland
THE BEAUTY OF ENVIRONMENT
A general model for environmental aesthetics

BY
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The collection of extensive material over the years, the familiarization with sources, the writing in various stages of one's own thoughts - this is the order of progression of this work. The final stage of formation has been like the writing of the Kalevala: my own texts, which have arisen in various phases, and for various publishing requirements, have been the point of departure; they have been articulated by the totality I have aimed at, the possibility of which I have begun to believe in while carrying out the work for the parts. On one level the parts belong together, but in order to achieve the totality, a great amount of repetition and close variation has had to be removed, and in addition material demanded by the model has had to be added.

Wittgenstein suggests that the task of philosophy is to climb ladders of statements in order to view the world - but then those ladders must be kicked away. The same has happened to the material and many partners in discussion; is this ingratitude? The list of sources is what remains after the ladder has been climbed. For the reader it is perhaps an aid in his search for a foundation and support; few of the sources remain in the text itself. I return, however, on several occasions to a few examples from Beardsley, Carlson, Fröhlich, Hepburn, Iwansa, Jones, Makota, Wallis, and Ziff. But they are not always those who have dealt with the matter most extensively - Makota's text is a congress paper of three small pages, from Ziff I have quoted his informal intellectual games.

Nor have my authorities all been recognized representatives of their field; however, from the point of view of my model they have said something very essential. Suitable sources for quotations are best found when the work is done; a quotation serves to illustrate an idea that has already been thought. The system of references that is demanded leads one astray in a sense: what I have felt to be most important in all the material is the spectrum of views that it offers as support and provocation to thought, not so much locatable sections of text. The work has moved away from the background of references; it is not built on the sources, but is a synthesis and creation inspired by them.

The same applies to those people I have met who have influenced me at various times. The questions I deal with have occupied my mind for sixteen years, and I have introduced them under very different circumstances; in recent years this has also taken place at the initiative of others, because the publication of the parts has given rise to requests for new articles and papers, and to new contacts.

One of these stands above all the others: my Canadian supervisor in 1982, Professor Allen Carlson of the University of Alberta at Edmonton. His attitude to my work was that of a colleague - discussing, questioning, presenting alternatives; he never wished to say what opinion I should have, but rather tried to find out what I wanted to say, and then tested that point of view and clarified my message. Such is the only correct form of further education and supervision.

The commencement of my work has been very much due to Professor Aarne Kinnunen of the University of Helsinki, who immediately saw the theoretical interest of the subject. At the beginning of his period as chairman, the Finnish Society for Aesthetics organized a multi-disciplinary 'Lecture Series on Environmental Aesthetics' in the spring of 1975, the material of which we later edited as an anthology (published 1981). Each of the lecturers in the series provided useful points of view.

At the end of my undergraduate studies, while writing my final thesis on Reino Kalliola's depictions of nature, I became acquainted with that leading figure of Finnish nature conservation. His interest was binding, and I regret that on account of my slowness I was not able to finally develop my views during his lifetime.

As a folklorist, my wife Outi Lehtipuro-Sepänmaa has made me see the folk phenomena and values of the environment as equal objects of research with those of high culture. She also acted as a creative adviser during the final phase, and through her remarks has forced me to think about my text from the point of view of an interested reader. Her eyes have opened mine to aspects in my text that I have been blind to.
My respected superior, the patient and supportive Professor Maija Lehtonen of the Institute for Comparative Literature, Aesthetics and Theatre Research in the University of Helsinki, my colleagues – among whom Dr. Pekka Tammi deserves special mention – and changing students, have formed a pleasant community, from whom, it is true, I have now and then withdrawn into my own thoughts. Professor Lehtonen has demonstrated to me how important it is to make – and to dare to offer – Finnish research as a part of international discussion, and how important the creation of contacts with foreign researchers is. She has also substantially assisted me in this.

An exchange scholarship to the University of Alberta at Edmonton, granted by the Government of Canada, provided a year’s period of contact and inspiration, during which I had the possibility of relating academic work here in Finland to other models.

A second year of detachment was provided by the State Committee on the Environmental Sciences, which operates in connection with the Academy of Finland. During the critical final stage of my work the Committee granted me a temporary post as a Junior Fellow. On behalf of all researchers of the Humanities I am satisfied with the new committee’s theoretical stance on the field of research that it supports: environmental research is multi-disciplinary and inter-disciplinary work. In the words of the first chairman, Rauno Ruuhijärvi, it extends “from philosophy to technology and economics.”

The Finnish Cultural Fund has twice supported my work financially, as has, during the final stage, the Emil Aaltonen Foundation. The Finnish Academy of Science and Letters deserves my gratitude for accepting my work in its publication series.

To return to the Kalevala. My work has been literally the processing of words once the basic ideas have been thought out. By chance I encountered modern technology; I became interested in word processing. I have had at my disposal a CPT word processor, which was demonstrated to me in the spring of 1984, by sales representative Seija Kosunen. Purely from the surprise and joy of everything that it is possible to do on the screen, and how easily I could write tidy texts myself, I became interested in making the final effort. Work became play, in which now and then its painfulness was forgotten. Machines do not write better studies, as Aarne Kinnunen has said, but when they help the text to be born and achieve its form, they are benevolent spirits. Thorleif Johansson, who transferred the text that was on computer disks to a photographic compositing system, continued the progressive technology.

I also found my translator, Alan Robson, by chance. He has worked conscientiously on my tricky text. Further help was given by Mr. Tim Andrews, Mr. Mark Shackleton and Ms. Patricia Poussa – lecturers in the English Department – as well as Mr. Pekka Tammi and my wife, Outi. They together and separately have given the text a form that I recognize as my own. In places it seems fresh even to me, so that I ask from the side, like the nineteenth-century Finnish author Josef Julius Wecksell at the first night of his own play when his mind had already begun to cloud over: “How beautiful. Who has written this?”

Helsinki and Urajärvi
Kalevala Anniversary Year, 1985 (1986)
Yrjö Sepänmaa
Jeg har lett etter historikken til fugleskremslene, men hittil uten resultat.

_I have investigated the history of scarecrows, but so far without result._

— Norwegian artist
Inghild Karlsen *

*Accent i nordisk konst/
Events in Nordic art,
31/5 - 31/8 1980. (Exhibition catalogue, Helsinki 1980.)
THE BEAUTY OF ENVIRONMENT
A general model for environmental aesthetics

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Aesthetics has been dominated by three traditions: the philosophy of beauty, the philosophy of art, and metacriticism. In modern aesthetics phenomena outside of art have remained subject only to random and narrow treatment. The goal of my work is a systematic outlining of the field of environmental aesthetics beginning from the basis of analytical philosophy. I define the environment as the physical milieu; the basic distinction is between the environment in a natural state and that altered by Man. I only deal with that part of the mental environment that regulates a person's relation to the physical environment.

The first group of questions concerns ontology: what the environment is like as an aesthetic object. Above all I make comparisons in the direction of the central paradigm, art. Traditionally, art and the environment interlock in architecture, but they also meet in the experiments of so-called environmental art. The basic similarity between the environment and art lies in the fact that in both cases there is a particular institution that regulates making, transmission, and reception. In art it is the art world, in the environment the 'environment world'. Institutionally decided model cases have a central significance in outlining the field: the classics of art, and natural and cultural attractions are analogous.

The second group of questions refers to metacriticism: how is the environment as depicted? The point of departure is descriptions, interpretations, and evaluations of the environment. The objective should be criticism based on appropriate and valid natural and cultural knowledge. Aesthetics of this kind could be termed ecological and anthropological.

In the final section I deal with the practise and benefits of environmental aesthetics: in what way can environmental education, legislation, etc., build practical lines of action from theoretical conclusions. Thus I move from basic to applied research. I attempt to demonstrate that there are — contrary to the case of art — ethical limits to the treatment of the environment.

INDEX TERMS: beauty, environment, aesthetics, environmental aesthetics; environmental philosophy, art, metacriticism.
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FOREWORD

The Goals and Nature of the Work

This study is conceptual and philosophical. It is my intention to construct a model, which embraces all of the central areas of environmental aesthetics and in which there is space for additions and the possibility to continue to a more detailed analysis. When the goal is an overall model, details must be avoided.

The material I have used as a basis for the outline is dispersed, without a common standard, and generally sparse; the sources are numerous but narrow. To the best of my knowledge a comprehensive presentation of this kind has not been published previously. On the other hand partial questions have been dealt with in numerous articles; they form my central source material.

I commence with an introduction (Section I: Points of Departure), in which I present three research traditions in aesthetics and locate environmental aesthetics within their framework; in addition I present the central concepts as well as the methods and materials of the field of research thus formed.

In the first half (A: Ontology) of the Section II (In the Core Areas) I shall investigate ontology, which entails discussion of matters concerning the environment as an aesthetic object, its characteristic features, and its relationship to other aesthetic objects. In the second half (B: Metacriticism) I investigate environmental aesthetics as metacriticism, that is, problems of depiction, interpretation, and evaluation.

The questions thus divide into two: into questions concerning the essence of the object ("What kind of object?") and questions relating to metacriticism ("How is the object depicted?"). The ontological half deals with general nature philosophy, while the metacritical half concentrates on questions of description, interpretation, and evaluation. In the latter the question is what kinds of activity depiction, interpretation, and evaluation are. I am also attempting to survey the rules and procedures affecting them. (Actual depiction, interpretation, and appreciation belong to special disciplines and corresponding fields.)

In the final section III: Viewpoints, which unites and presents the possibilities for application, I place environmental aesthetics within the framework of ethics, so that questions of "active" or normative aesthetics concerning the use of environmental aesthetical knowledge and skills are met with. The two procedural parts can be regarded as "passive" or descriptive aesthetics. The final part provides guidelines for active and normative aesthetics. Using knowledge gained from basic research, I attempt to create norms affecting practice, thus moving from theoretical to applied aesthetics.

With the aid of examples I test and illustrate the use of theoretical knowledge in the aesthetic analysis of environmental depiction. The examples I use most often are drawn from the works of Reino Kalliola, a representative Finnish naturalist. Other important representative naturalists whose works could be used for the same purpose include the Finn, I.K. Inha; the Swede, Sten Selander; and the Americans, John Muir and Aldo Leopold. Because of its generality the model should be applicable to the analysis of all depiction of nature, also other than written — made by photography, films, etc. — but they must first be translated into verbal form. Of course the testing of general validity presupposes testing by the inspection of as many examples as possible. On the other hand philosophical questions are conceptual not empirical. Therefore I prefer to speak of examples rather than of tests.
I. POINTS OF DEPARTURE

A. Three research traditions

Two research traditions are clear: the philosophy of beauty and the philosophy of art. The early Baumgartenian definition of aesthetics started from a basis of the philosophy of beauty — later this basis has been extended as aesthetics generally, as aesthetic philosophy. When the aesthetic is conceived of sufficiently broadly all so-called aesthetic objects, or all objects that have aesthetic properties, or that are investigated from an aesthetic point of view, are located in its sphere. The philosophy of art deals with art: the definition of art, classification as art, artistic activity. The definition also selects the problems: those objects which are approved of as being within the area of the definition determine the problems, and also with what degree of universality they can be dealt.

The third research tradition, the philosophy of criticism, can be conceived of as an extension of the former two — in practise mainly of the philosophy of art; if desired it is always possible to include this in the first two traditions. It investigates ways of relating to aesthetic objects, usually to works of art; the central task is the theoretical analysis of the principal activities of criticism — description, interpretation, and evaluation. The object is a discourse about aesthetic objects, not the objects themselves. The question is one of metacriticism.

Questions of environmental aesthetics are located within the spheres of these three research traditions. In each I use a brief general characterization as a point of departure; it is a kind of credo, an axiomatic picture of aesthetics, on the basis of which the continuation is constructed. After that I attempt to demonstrate what a combination of them signifies in a certain area — in matters of environmental aesthetics. Thus the field and tasks of environmental aesthetics are defined.

1. The philosophy of beauty

One speaks of a beautiful flower as meaning a flower that is pleasing in appearance and scent, a beautiful deed when praising a considerate and morally worthy act. It is possible to say that furniture is beautifully made; beauty prizes are awarded in games of chess. In ski-jumping and in circus tricks the difficulty and skillfulness of the performance is acclaimed; and, for another example, a doctor can be commended for a successful operation by speaking of it as a beautiful operation. In addition one can speak of the beauty of social relations or society (this is done especially in Marxist aesthetics).

In addition to the aforementioned there are cases in which the matter is one of descriptive significance: beautiful weather is spoken of as meaning cloudless and dry. Such a statement is not an opinion of the weather in any other sense.

The word 'beautiful' has meanings belonging to different value areas, the most central of which is, however, aesthetic: aesthetically valuable. When the object is aesthetically repellant or unpleasant, it is ugly. Neutral, insignificant objects are in between. In addition to the use of 'beautiful' as a value term, 'beautiful' is in some connections descriptive too.

The various uses differ in relation to the reasons given. When it must be explained which type of beauty is in question, attention must be paid to the reasons put forward. They are not purely linguistic, but express the entire activity and situation. The beauty of different objects — works of art, motor cars, people, landscapes — is justified in different ways, first according to types and finally by dealing with each one individually. On one hand the way depends on the object, and on the other the manner of regarding it.
It is not possible to distinguish objects, only to be examined from the point of view of beauty, but rather each one can be the object of any kind of examination whatever. The problem is how to move from taste judgments to the description and interpretation of an object — or, how to move from description and interpretation to taste judgments. There are two methods for this: objectivist and subjectivist. According to the most severe application of the objectivist theories beauty is a property that can be observed in an object, so that sensitivity of observational ability is all that is required. Theories of this kind that are based on the observable properties of the object are, for example, harmony theories and the idea that beauty is unity in multiplicity (order, relations, symmetry; essential factors such as structure, harmony, the relations that are complex properties divided into parts). According to the subjectivist theories, beauty is in the state of mind of the beholder, caused by it, a reflection and projection of the mind to the external world, perhaps nothing more than a simple sense of liking.

The preconditions required of the recipient: sensitivity, knowledge (in art an acquaintance with tradition, in the environment knowledge of the operational mechanisms of nature) are external to the dispute between objectivity and subjectivity. Freedom from want is also emphasized as a general precondition, the satisfaction of basic needs [Romanenko 1969: 133 — 134, 138 — 139]. Although, on the other hand, works of art, for example, are created and appreciated even under difficult conditions.

Aesthetic beauty. The basic use of the term 'beautiful' is aesthetic. Non-aesthetic meanings and uses are moral, activistic, rational (intellectual), or religious, as well as some descriptive uses, such as when speaking of the weather.

The aesthetic use can be divided into two: Firstly, (1) beauty means the same as aesthetic, it is thus a super-concept, which covers all aesthetic forms of expression — tragic, comic, sublime, etc. The term 'aesthetic' has become general in this meaning on account of the ambiguity of the term 'beautiful'. The modifications belonging to the sphere of beautiful change all the time: new ones arise, old ones acquire fresh meanings. Secondly, (2) the term 'beautiful' has a restricted meaning: it is one of the modifications of aesthetic, "beautiful proper." The meaning is then usually beauty in the sense of harmony, order; an object is well-proportioned. Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz calls this "the great theory of beauty" and says that it has been dominant from the time of the Pythagoreans in the fourth century B.C. until the eighteenth century, more than two thousand years [Tatarkiewicz 1972: 169].

There are connections between the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic uses, which are emphasized particularly when the environment is in question. Moral and intellectual demands can for example be set for art too; this must be differentiated from the fact that the other values are in a way aestheticized as parts of a work of art — their significance is that the task of forming a totality. This change is not always recognized, but instead the work is often inspected from other points of view. Most typically, aesthetic values are emphasized by so-called aestheticism, according to which only aesthetic values are important [on aestheticism see Johnson 1969].

In art, awareness of art-form traditions becomes important. As for environment, here it is essential to see aesthetic values in an ethical framework. It is possible to speak of both surface and profound beauty, where the former is the formal beauty — of forms, colors, etc. and the latter is concerned with morals, knowledge, etc. Using terms coined by T.E. Jessop, one can speak of sensory and ideosensory beauty [Jessop 1970: 531].

Beautiful — aesthetic. Is aesthetic broader than beautiful? And what of its relation to artistic? Is everything which is beautiful, also aesthetic? In some cases moral values form a framework, within which aesthetic values must be set.

Is beautiful always pleasant? What does pleasantness mean in this connection? It means experiencing something as important or significant (cf. the terrible in art and the terrible in reality).
In aesthetic examination the object is in a way aestheticized: terribleness is not purely terribleness, but something that is investigated critically and analyzed. There is a distance to a work of art, which means that the work can be inspected externally, neutrally, and disinterestedly.

It is a different matter to see a movie of a ship in reef-filled waters or an aeroplane in a thunderstorm [see Korsmeyer 1977: 55] than to be a passenger under such circumstances. One who is present — other than a masochist — cannot experience as beautiful a natural phenomenon that threatens his existence, because the distance that makes neutral inspection possible is missing. But can an external observer of a natural phenomenon threatening the existence of others experience it as beautiful (if he is not a faithful aesthete), when he feels pity, sympathy, helplessness? (It is true that psychological participation is possible in art too.) Often there is no distance to natural objects — the observer is a part of the natural object — and this makes an aesthetic attitude difficult and not self-evident.

**Beautiful objects.** In his article "Anything viewed," Paul Ziff searches for objects that cannot be observed aesthetically. For him, candidates are dry dung and an alligator wallowing in mud [Ziff 1979: 285]. He is of the opinion that anything that can be seen can be examined aesthetically [ibid. 292]: it is the choice of the manner of observation that is decisive, and obviously the ability of the observer to make sense perceptions. Ziff compares the situation to a photograph, anything at all that is visual can be the subject of a photograph; an observer in the environment can make the same definitions and selections of a point of emphasis with his eyes as a photographer with his camera [ibid. 291]. The object puts forward its demands. There must be a psychological readiness, and there are differences in readiness. Besides the properties of the object, the readiness of the observer, his capacity, are quite as important. Works of art are objects for aesthetic examination, made for that purpose — therefore they are probably more suitable for that than other objects. Their production and reception is a well-developed institution, within the frameworks of which there are methods for handling a work.

The object of aesthetic examination can thus be anything at all that can be discerned with the senses, sometimes also conceptual — nor does it have to be limited to the visual sense, but it can be extended to smell and taste in addition to hearing and touch [see Coleman 1965]. It is true that it is possible to be of the opinion that observation can only be called aesthetic observation when the observer has practise and ability in the field.

**The aesthetic and a-aesthetic (the external to the aesthetic).** In a broad sense 'beautiful' means belonging to the field of aesthetics — ugliness also belongs to the field of aesthetics. The opposite of aesthetic is thus not ugly but non-aesthetic, or a-aesthetic, that which is external to aesthetic examination. Anything at all can be an object of aesthetic examination; on the basis of objects it is not possible to differentiate the aesthetic from other things, the differentiation takes place according to the manner of inspection. The same object can be examined from moral, intellectual, activist, etc. points of view.

It must also be noted that the object does not have to be beautiful in all parts in order to be beautiful as a whole. On the other hand the object can be beautiful in some parts, in some relations, and we can easily speak of the beauty of the parts. But when evaluating the beauty of the whole, attention must be paid to the significance of the part and its influence. For example, buildings that have little aesthetic value can be important in a townscape from the point of view of unity of style.

Do objects or states (such as chaos) exist that are located outside of the aesthetic scale? No, but they do from the point of view of aspects of examination. Nonetheless, there may be extremely complex objects about which one can say practically nothing concerning their aesthetic value. Such are, for example, works of anti-art, for the interpretation and especially the evaluation of which there are no models [see Wenz 1973. 130]. One answer is to distinguish, after the manner of Thomas Kukla, between artistic value, that is the significance from the point of view of the development of
art and history, and aesthetic value, that is what kind of works those observed are; a work of anti-art can then be artistically valuable, but aesthetically worthless. [See Kuika 1981: 338.]

When discussing beauty and ugliness the matter comes to concern the aesthetic values. What is a-aesthetic or non-aesthetic? In this one moves in other value-fields: the aspect has been chosen in another way. The object of aesthetic examination is not crucial, but the value-field is. The same object can be inspected by different scales, in different systems or discourses: the moral, the religious, the operational, etc. Art is made and intended for aesthetic examination — and even if the intentions of the artist had been different, society has approved of aesthetic examination and the recipient has a right, almost a duty, to choose that manner of examination. It is possible on this basis to explain the fact that the term 'artistic' is often used — especially in everyday language — as a synonym for 'aesthetic.' However, I wish to limit 'artistic' to the properties of a work of art seen as a work of art (literally or as if). I do not wish here to deny the fact that a work of art can be examined in other ways, and that it can be beautiful in another sense than the aesthetic.

The environment is not made in the same way as an object just for aesthetic inspection. The observer therefore is in a way freer, and the choice of an aesthetic examination is not necessary. But it can be chosen with certain limitations. The context determines the relevance; thus, for example, a landscape painting — even though it creates a complete illusion — is decidedly a different matter than the landscape itself; the beauty of a natural object and the beauty of a work of art is only partly the same. Therefore the observer must be aware of the classification of the object or make such a classification himself; deviation from classification made by society signifies the examination of the object as something other than that which it is generally regarded as. This then presupposes a new value judgment according to the new classification.

But always when one is making an aesthetic examination and value judgments accordingly one moves onto the scale: beautiful - ugly. When speaking about it one uses aesthetic terms, though in varying amounts. Nor does the praise of the object in aesthetic terms mean that in all relations it corresponds to the characterizations presented and fulfills the demands. The grounds for using the term "beautiful" also define which aspect of the object we are concerned with.

2. The philosophy of art

To the philosophical question concerning the nature of art (the arts) and a work of art it is possible to give an answer based on experience only by showing the way the art institution works and attempting to reveal the rules of the game it follows. The recognition of artistic activity, the conceptual depiction and differentiation, as well as the making of well-founded generalizations are the tasks of the philosophy of art; specialized research belongs to the sciences of art dealing with specific art forms. Aesthetics deals with artistic activity as a part of aesthetic culture.

Artistic activity. Artistic activity is a field of human culture to which the creative activity of both the artist and the audience related to the production of works of art belong. Naturally, there is also an institutional framework which makes all of this possible. A work of art is made by an individual or group using some kind of material. The work can only be appreciated by such individuals who understand the language of expression used. Normally immediate appreciation is not a prerequisite, but the work remains an object of possible appreciation; folk art is another matter in that it progresses as a communal tradition in which constant change is possible, and therefore no fixed "correct" form exists.

Forms closely related to artistic activity are aesthetic activities expressing taste and conceptions of taste: costume, interior design, environmental design, and the treatment of natural objects. They
can develop as the so-called applied arts. Activities and performances demanding skill, for example sport, are also closely related forms. It has been traditionally felt that art expresses the aesthetic goals of Man. A work of art is, on one hand, an expression of its author's aesthetic need — a result of creative activity, on the other hand, it satisfies the aesthetic expectations of the recipient.

The idea of art which includes many various forms such as painting, sculpture, architecture, music, literature, etc. is relatively young; according to Paul Kristeller it is a product of the eighteenth century [Kristeller 1951: 497]. On the other hand there can very well be aesthetic activity in communities in which there is not yet separate art. It is possible to say that only art theories make art possible. But when the concept of art arises and expands, works that had earlier another purpose are taken retroactively into the fold of art — the history of art can thus extend beyond its literal birth. Primitive art and folk art have arisen in this way. Some utensils, masks, costumes, weapons, etc. have been literally transferred into the sphere of art. The work of art always lives in a relationship to the conceptual system that regulates it: that is to theories of art and to aesthetics [see Danto 1964: 580 — 581].

Classification. Conceptual classification makes a work of art really a work of art; after that, features defined by conventions and agreements are chosen as relevant, significant, and examination is concentrated on these. It is certainly possible to ask on what grounds something is classified as a work of art, but these grounds change and can be individual, unique, idiosyncratic. It must be possible to state the grounds, otherwise classification is not a rational activity.

Classification determines how a work is to be observed, that is, to what attention should be paid. In some cases there are, with good reason, two principal classifications. The object may remain unchanged externally, but what is seen to be relevant changes according to the classification. The appreciation of works of art is regulated by communal agreements, conventional systems. The agreements are learned, and they vary from one community and culture to another. A work can be transferred from one connection to another, but then it comes under a new system of reference. In appreciation it is possible either to attempt to adopt the original connection — as in an historical examination — or to depart from a connection to any given time, which results in an ahistorical examination.

The conventional systems referred to above provide a general basis for the appreciation of art. Every form of art presupposes knowledge of the essential language and technique of expression that is appropriate to it; conventions concern the general principles of appreciation and the operational mechanisms of art. The making of art is also regulated by conventions; the form, the materials, and the rules of the game determine the framework, even if the agreements can be altered. An artistic community is never very stable — in this too there are historical differences, and there can be various kinds of sub-communities within the community. The dominant one can radically lose its position, as happened in the Cultural Revolution in China in 1966 — 1977, during which the greater part of classical Western art was condemned as being non-art.

Two principal types of definition of art can be distinguished: the classificatory and the evaluative or honorific [see Dickie 1974: 25 — 27]. In the classificatory the object is placed within the sphere of art without taking a stand on how valuable or suitable it is in practise. Works of art are then one class of objects along with tables, chairs, people, and landscapes. Classification outlines and articulates the world linguistically. Despite a fundamental difference the classificatory and evaluative types of definition can be seen as closely related: usually classification takes place on grounds that can then be used as a measure of value. In evaluative definitions it is felt that being approved as a work of art the object has to presuppose certain minimal values; in extreme cases these definitions are very laudatory. Defining something as a work of art (a 'real work of art' or some such similar phrase) is then a recognition, which is the lot of only the best, or at least of those paintings, films, or novels
that are regarded as sufficiently good. 'Work of art' is then the same kind of term as 'gentleman' or 'saint' — there is never a gentleman who behaves badly nor an evil saint [Barrett 1973: 182].

However, using the term "art" purely in a classificatory sense may be clearer than using it evaluatively. Thus the classification of an object as "art" determines the manner of treatment and examination; one is not able to work with an unclassified object. The classification can, of course, be made at first as a trial, and then a final decision be made on the basis of the results produced by the trial classification. The matter is thus one of decision, not recognition. The decision can be made on the basis of criteria of goodness or of criteria of technique and expression, sometimes also putting forward demands for content. Although in principle it is possible to make a work of art of anything at all, it would in no way be always appropriate; here the limits set by the chosen criteria appear. The classification must have sense, which is then sought or tested in the interpretation. The grounds must be applied consistently. When they have been announced it is possible to propose, what should be classified as art, and correspondingly, what should not be or should not have been.

In his work *But is it Art?* B.R. Tilghman speaks of the sense of classification. He asks what is the aim when the question is raised of the status of some object as a work of art. Points are then being sought for — in the same way as in a joke — what aspects to pay attention to, what to examine for, so that the work makes sense as art [Tilghman 1984: 52 — 55]. The question then has an extremely practical nature. It is certainly possible to know about the communal position, but the question is of the grounds of the position, why the work is a work of art.

The metaphorical classification of something as art is a special case: "the nature's work of art," "a landscape "like a painting," the "music" of the babbling of a stream or a bird's song. This is one way to praise the object, to equate it with or compare it to conventionally beautiful art, not to any art whatever. Talk about folk art is equally metaphorical. Metaphors demonstrate the affinities between phenomena, but do not as such extend the area of literal meaning.

*Use.* Classification means the implementation of the conventions of use that are in accord with it. The most important of these are the fictiveness agreement (agreement on imaginary existence) and the structurality convention (agreement on the treatment of the work as a structural totality).

Fictiveness is a given property. It cannot be seen by comparing the work to reality: the work can very well be like reality, corresponding to it, without it becoming a real presentation. Correspondingly a real presentation can be false without becoming fictive (i.e. an incorrect news item). The work constructs another reality, an imaginary world, the independent structure of which should be analyzed. On the other hand it is possible to examine the manner of presentation of that other world, the structure of the presentation. The observer is external, he has no physical entrance to or contact with the other world, but does have a psychological or emotive one. The characters of a novel or play, the places in a painting, etc. exist only in that work, in its own world.

A work of art is a limited, fixed totality: articulation, composition, structural totality arise from the definition. The external point of observation is also to a great extent predetermined. But on the other hand there is more in the world of the work than what is only visible: the recipient is forced to fill out the work, to assume that which is essential or probable. The filling out takes place on one hand according to clues given by the work itself, on the other hand from the model of real life. The work presents its own grounds of credibility, determines what is possible in its world [Macdonald 1969: 629-630].

The recipient knows — or it is assumed that he knows — how to handle a work of art. Normally he does not approach it as communication, a moral example, or a model for action, although the work can give reason for such an approach if it is examined as other than an aesthetic object. A work is regarded as some kind of a possible world; one pretends that it is true, being conscious, however, that it is a matter of an imaginative or credibility game; it extends also to the level of
ideology and principles, someone can participate in it who also does not in reality recognize the points of departure and is not thus ready to transfer the 'teachings' and models to real life.

A theatre-goer is not anyone who happens to go to the theatre, but someone who knows what to pay attention to: who is conscious of the fictional nature of the events on the stage, the "fourth wall" agreement etc. [see Dickie 1974: esp. 172 - 176]. The proper recipient is able to distinguish the so-called aesthetic object from the physical object: he does not look behind the painting or investigate the chemical composition of the paints. The physical object forms a foundation which makes aesthetic existence possible: the canvas of a painting, the paint, the letters formed by printing ink on paper are that. The work of art is made possible by the physical object without being the same as it.

Anything whatever can be set up as an object for public inspection, for example in a building trade fair, in a zoological museum, or in a shop window, without it becoming art by virtue of being displayed. The place or other connection is decisive; the display in a trade fair centre is a different matter from that in a national art museum. Any place whatever — a hayloft, byre, roadside — can in a special situation be made into a display environment for the art world — or that character can be removed from anything at all (a concert hall as a place for holding fairs and congresses, or the organizing of a Christmas sale in a gallery for the support of the museum). The same kind of limitations are in force here as are in the case of the artist: no one can unilaterally proclaim himself to be an artist. In the same way it is not possible to unilaterally declare a place of exhibition as a place of an art exhibition. A printed notice This is art in the middle of pop posters in a glass display cabinet is not by itself able to make a sales exhibition into an art exhibition and its posters art — despite this, poster art is one sub-branch of visual art.

But it is also possible to use objects that are works of art as mere physical objects: a sculpture as a paperweight or as scrap metal, a novel or a painting as a firelighter, music as a noise to frighten birds. One must be able to distinguish between permanent and temporary use, in the same way as between communal and private use. Temporary use or private use does not terminate the object's nature as a work of art, nor does it give that nature to something else. Some work of literature can be read for a special purpose as a biographical document, for instance on the basis of an authorization given by the author in an interview. The work is a work of art even though it is not treated all the time as a work of art.

The necessary conditions. In the first chapter, "What Is Art?: An Institutional Analysis," of his book Art and the Aesthetic, George Dickie lays down three necessary conditions, which every work of art has to fulfil. These are status (position), originality (genuineness), and artifactuality (factitiousness). [Dickie 1974: esp. 47 — 49].

Status is granted, and is granted by the art world, the art community. Works of art are the results of the artist acting a role; the artist is a member of the art world, which is composed on one hand of institutions, on the other of persons. The institutions are museums, research centres, schools, the art press, publishing houses. Their experts, people acting in an official position, are on the basis of their position those who determine solutions. The artist makes decisions under the authorization of the community, by right of his artist's role; the artist's status again is earned by executed and approved works. By definition every work of art is made by an artist.

The basic case is that an artist makes something intentionally as a work of art and approves it as such. But it is possible to take something else as a work of art other than that which has been specifically made as such. The classification by the maker is not binding; the community can reject it — or classify the object against the views of the maker; nor is the maker's intended classification always known (for example, children, the mentally ill, or members of a community without art cannot even intend to make a classification of which they have no knowledge). When the artist has
gained recognition in the art community he has possibilities to make surprising works of art, which would not have gained him the position of an artist earlier.

The demand of originality rejects copies and forgeries from the sphere of art. Copies have certainly their own task in teaching purposes and as easily moveable models, whereas a forgery is misleading, appearing as the original. A genuine work presents a claim; a forgery only repeats it, usually in a technically weaker form and therefore inefficiently. On the other hand art derived from art, parodies, and other similar variations, is possible; crossings of the boundaries of art forms are also then possible (for example the dinner table scene in Robert Altman's film M.A.S.H., which copies the composition of Leonardo da Vinci's painting The Last Supper). A work of art formed of a quotation is a part of a different production connections; it belongs to a different author. When a work of art is imitated or copied in any way in a later work of art, then the later work of art must be considered and evaluated as part of the later artist's production. Certain works are linked to their predecessors and parallel cases by recollections, quotations, references, but this does not destroy their individuality and uniqueness — Entertainment is very largely based on stereotyped technical and thematic solutions, in which the connections do not increase the significance. Folk art is also to a great extent self-repetitive.

In certain art forms type and token must be distinguished [Wollheim: 1980: 74-75]. The same text can be printed in numerous editions at different times and in innumerable copies, a numbered series of proofs is pulled of a graphic work, the same of a photograph; posters can be printed ad infinitum. The rules of the game determine the number of copies, to go beyond is against the rules of the game — for example such an engraving can be qualitatively equal to the official copies, but commercially it is worthless.

In the performing arts (theatre, music, dance, elocution) there is a distinguishing system of notation (the director's prompt book, score, choreographic score). A performance is first of all an exact or a free adaptation of a stated work, and secondly a unique performance irrepeateable as such. Performances have their own conventions.

Artifactuality means that the work has been made, that it is the result of human activity. Besides being the alteration of some material, creation is also selection, the separation from a connection, presenting something as a work of art (found art, ready made art). The maker is a selector. The real maker is the one under whose supervision the work takes place. The casting of a sculpture, the backgrounds of a comic strip, the erection of a building, are carried out usually by tradesmen and assistants who remain anonymous. Making is thus in the last resort approval, either of one's own work or that of an assistant, in special cases of a natural product or one that is factory-made. In some cases the making continues, as in architecture, in which a building is altered according to the circumstances of use — variability can already be taken into account in the design stage.

The significance of selection is especially clear in an art that delimits existing reality (among others photography). The photographer makes a delimitation and sets certain objects to dominate and unite the composition. Landscape gardening works with natural elements: the forms of the landscape, trees and bushes, buildings, open space.

 Tradition and innovations. Art is dominated by tradition. Every work is seen within a framework of tradition and as a continuation of it. An object made to be a work of art has a relationship to other works of art, and then it changes the earlier system of values and interaction. Whether a work of art is created within the traditional system or is presented as an original development will account for different evaluations in different ages: in present-day Western art novelty and surprisingness are emphasized. Every truly innovative work, every innovation in the field of the language and technique of expression, can make factors relevant that have previously been disregarded, and thus change conventions. Thus the accumulated methods of art continually grow. Thus also every old
work becomes more multi-dimensional — it either has the new property that has become relevant or it does not, and the lack is then also significant.

Morris Weitz is of the opinion that 'art' and 'work of art' are open concepts [Weitz 1956: 32; see also 1977: 49 — 90 (Chapter Three)]. Here he means indefinability in principle on account of the unpredictability of directions of development. That is why the conventional definitions which attempt to define the essence of art also fail, even if they have a pedagogic significance as guides for examination. The tradition of art is continual, only traditions that have stopped (classical Greek tragedy) can be defined [ibid.]. It has been characteristic especially of recent art that it has turned from traditional tasks to new areas. One such area is, among others, the work of art as a theoretical or philosophical statement ("art as a definition of art", one kind of meta-art). The work then comments on definitions and concepts of art — usually by creating art that the customary definitions do not control. Works that deviate from tradition can be made as the continuation of tradition.

Ludwig Wittgenstein — on whose views Weitz based his idea of the mutual difference of works of art — sought repeating observable groups of features, which would bind the field of phenomena without a unifying strand. According to him, empirical observation demonstrated that there is no characteristic property that is common to the objects for which we use the same name (e.g. art) [[Wittgenstein 1953: 31-36]. The critics of Wittgenstein, among them Maurice Mandelbaum, have moved the search for unifying factors to 'invisible' properties: to genetic links, to intentions, to rules. Art can be dealt with as a game after the manner of the Wittgensteinian language game, when the unity would be in the game activity, in the function, not necessarily on the surface level observable by the senses. The units of art, the works, would then be joined together — like a family and relations — by a genetic bond, a common descent, not by an external similarity or similar appearance. [Mandelbaum 1965: 221-223].

It is also possible to be, like Paul Ziff, of the opinion that there are some basic cases, paradigmatic works, by comparison with which it is possible to determine whether the new case is a work of art or not. The basic cases are indisputable classics, which certainly also can lose their position in the revolution of the art world. [Ziff 1953: 60-61.]

Art that strongly deviates from tradition and classic models, is anti-art. It is a protest against the conventional making and reception of art. It has expanded the space for manoeuvre in the direction of the so-called hard aesthetic values: the work shocks, it is unpleasant, terrifying, banal, it may be technically unfinished, incomplete, clumsy: the work is thus based on various kinds of surprise and shock effects.

These means, however, are soon used up, and finding something new becomes extremely difficult. Art has to a very great extent detached itself from beauty, perhaps also from the aesthetic. A narrow concept of beauty is no longer the basic concept of art. Among the technical extensions have been the destruction of concreteness (conceptual art), the rejection of prior designs (happenings), momentariness in place of permanence (self-destructive apparatuses), the process of change (plants and animals as works of art).

Recent anti-art has deviated from the means of traditional anti-art in that in place of, or in addition to, the making of abnormal works, conventions of presentation have begun to be broken; works have been publicized in such a way that the boundaries between performance and reality become vague or are removed altogether; reality has simply begun to be called a work of art, a work denies being a work of art, copies of works are offered as new independent works, etc. This can be conceived of as a criticism directed at the so-called institutional definition of art, in which an attempt is made to define art by depicting the operational and decision-making mechanisms of the art world. The natural form of anti-art, its next generation, is then art that breaks the mechanisms. Such is, however, always in danger of being classified as outside of the real mechanisms, of being in the area of non-art.
Art-forms. The renewal of art takes place on two levels: new art forms arise and new works are made within the frameworks of the forms. It is possible to be of the opinion that every work of art necessarily belongs to some art form — art is the same kind of all-embracing concept as fruit: there is not merely fruit, but apples, pears, etc. Art is then more a totality formed of forms than of individual works [Bond 1975: 179-181]. The birth of art forms is, in the first stage, dependent on technical innovations. Movies and still photography are the youngest of the art forms; recently there has been talk of, among other things, video and holographic art. Technical invention as such has not created art forms, but only the basis for them. All movies, photographs, dances, are not even in a classificatory sense art — not even most of them are. Most photographs are news pictures or souvenir pictures, movies are in the same way often educational or news films. Dance is above all a form of social intercourse. There are exceptions also in these cases in which the conventional form appears to be conclusively classified: philosophy and poetics may be written in verse, there are advertising songs and plays.

In these cases too the communal form of use is decisive. It must be noted that not all aesthetic use signifies classification as art. For example natural objects, household utensils etc. can be examined from an aesthetic point of view without conceptually changing their nature. Indeed a division is often made between art proper and applied art (art and craft). In the former the function is emphatically aesthetic, in the latter more practical, functional. Applied art always serves some external task (it can also be purely decorative). — Didactic art, which is used to spread political, religious, moral, and other ideas, is also one form of applied art.

The division of the fine arts into art forms is not fixed, and the forms can, for their part, be divided on different grounds into sub-forms. Recent art has often investigated the possibilities of combining art forms. Combinations of music and picture series have been created, spatial works, environmental art. The circumstances of performance also lead to co-ordinations: a concert in an art museum, opera in an old castle (Savonlinna), church paintings. In the same way that classification as art gives general points of departure, interpretation is also dependent on the division into forms. Watercolors must be criticized as watercolors, not as oil paintings, a novel as a novel. In appreciation some sense is generally more central than other — one principle for a division of art is indeed a division according to which sense the work is primarily observed with — but all presuppose rational, conceptual observation. Sight and hearing are central, whereas smell, taste, and touch are secondary; in no case, as yet, is there an art form designed to be primarily observed by these three senses. The basic case of the examination of a work of fine art is aesthetic, of a work of applied art only partially so, or aesthetic in a relatively trivial sense (decorative art, ornament) — if appropriateness, functionality, is not seen as an aesthetic factor.

Art and the external world. Concepts of art can be divided into three principal classes: (1) the imitation theory, (2) the expression theory, and (3) the object theory [see Danto 1964]. These have partly operated by directing the production of art, normatively, although their principal task has been neutrally descriptive. A normative theory can also operate the other way round by provoking art that is against the norm.

According to the imitation theory a work of art imitates the external world; it is, within the limitations imposed by the material used, a simplified presentation or picture, based on selection, of the external world (more metaphysically: of reality). An exact, illusory copy of reality — of the kind represented by the figures in Madame Tussaud’s waxworks [see Martienssen 1980] — is not then what is meant, even if hyper-realist sculpture provides examples of that too. According to the basic form of the expression theory, the artist expresses through his work internal conditions, feelings, and the work is a publicly observable substitute for them, which is also able to transmit the same feelings to the recipient (objective correlative). This can be seen as one special type of imitation. The
expression theory does not necessarily presuppose the linking of the work with the artist, but rather the work can be regarded as having an expressive value independent of its maker; joyfulfulness and sorrowfulness are then properties of the work achieved by the artist in a certain way, and are not indicative of the feelings or mental states of the artist.

The object theory, according to which works of art are additions to reality, new independent objects, differs significantly from the above two theories. It frees a work of art from dependency and gives it an independent existence, but on the other hand it binds it even more closely to concreteness. The fictive world of the work becomes problematical when the work is in a way a citizen of two worlds: a concrete object and an aesthetic object. The differentiation is only possible for those who, on the basis of theory, see the object's double role. Imitatory works are also in a way additions to reality because they are not limited only to imitation, but transfer the real to the area of imagination; a symbolic nature is their essence.

Unanimity prevails concerning the autonomy of art. It is certainly possible to recognize art's origin in the practise of religions, rites, games, etc., but a unique phenomenon cannot be explained through its genetic background. One may attempt appealing to the socio-economic background (like Marxists) or to nature and other environmental factors (as in Taine). The history of specific works of art can be linked to the personal history of the artist, either on the basis of biographical information or of the results produced by psychoanalysis. Thus perhaps causal connections will be explained, but art as an aesthetic field of phenomena remains unexplained.

Recent art theories have emphasized intrinsic research, in which it is certainly possible to utilize cultural points of reference. Such are, moving from the narrower to the broader: the artist's other works and total production, works of the same stylistic tendency or school, the other works in the same art-form, the works in other art forms and the entirety of art — moving outside: contemporary knowledge, world views, and attitudes to life, philosophy. Contextual examination locates the work within these connections while emphasizing the significance of general cultural knowledge as a precondition for reception. The work's self-generated laws and uniqueness in principle must, however, then be remembered: that which is valid for other works or the external world is not necessarily suitable to explain the world of another work, even if it may lead to the reappraisal of the work's internal relations. The appropriateness and breadth of the context must be resolved in one case at a time, nor can non-contextual examination ever be wrong, though limited certainly (most clearly in satire). The basic case and core area is autonomous, uncontextual examination, but even then the work must be understood as a work of art, for it cannot be separated from the general conventions of reception without altering its nature.

3. The philosophy of criticism, that is, metacriticism

Criticism means all that is or can be said about art. In certain cases criticism can be regarded as expressive activity: what works are to be seen or acquired, what clothes are to be worn, etc. The object of institutional criticism is above all art, but it is also other artifacts, and the environment, even in a state of nature.

The philosophy of criticism is the investigation of that critical discussion. It is thus a language of the second degree, words about words, discourse about discourse. It examines the principles of the depiction, interpretation, and evaluation of an object as well as the ontology of criticism — it is metacriticism, because the object is the practise of criticism.

Aesthetic terms. A typical example of aesthetic terms is the term 'beautiful'; therefore it can be used as a representative of the group. Normally they are understood as being evaluative. This means that
the terms are expected, in one way or another, to express the value of the work ('beautiful,' 'pretty, 'ugly, 'mediocre,' 'half-finished'). But the terms are also, among other things, characterizing, depictive and descriptive, interpretive and classificatory ('tragic,' 'rough,' 'sativical'). If Monroe C. Beardsley's classification of criticism into descriptive, interpretive, and evaluative parts is used, there are aesthetic terms in all groups. It is, however, correct to say that the terms of description and interpretation are only indirectly aesthetic. They are objective-seeking inasmuch as they create a basis for evaluation, which can certainly also be left unstated.

The playing of a saxophone can be said to be airy, as occurred on a certain music programme on the Finnish radio (23.9.84). Airiness is an epithet that characterizes and interprets playing. It refers simultaneously to the manner of playing the instrument and to the sound, the result being music. It clearly implies a positive evaluation.

The term 'beautiful' can, departing from everyday speech, be defined technically as a super-concept covering all aesthetic terms (in an aesthetic meaning). In everyday language it does not, however, have this broad significance, but rather it signifies that aesthetic modification that has traditionally been called ideally-aesthetic, or beautiful proper. On this basis it has sometimes also a negative tone: sentimental, sweet, cute, too ornamental. The ironic, reversed use is also one special case.

It is possible to imagine that there are aesthetic modifications in existence -comic, tragic, characteristic, humorous, etc. — without them being subordinated to the same term, in the same way as the various art forms were not previously regarded as belonging together: the concept of art in more or less its present form as a totality composed of the forms arose only in the eighteenth century. If an umbrella term is desired the alternatives to 'beautiful' would be 'taste, ' 'aesthetic,' 'artistic' (artistic properties can also be found in nature), or 'expressive.'

The use of the term 'beautiful' is, in any event, an indisputable fact. A similar use occurs with the terms 'unified,' 'balanced,' 'lifeless,' 'stable,' 'dynamic,' and 'strong.' Such are called aesthetic terms by Frank Sibley [Sibley 1959: 421 - 423]. He claims that there is no logical reason that some non-aesthetic features justify the use of an aesthetic term. There are no essential and at the same time sufficient conditions; there are only factors, which either support or oppose. According to him we learn the practise of taste from examples, not on the the basis of rules, and we are forced to adapt terms of taste to cases that have not been previously encountered. 'Beautiful' is known to be aesthetic from the reasons given for its use, not otherwise, for each of the above terms has other meanings besides the aesthetic one. For someone, beautiful may mean only rare, expensive, or decorative.

The criteria of evaluation. According to Helen Knight Man's work is praised for its goodness, natural objects for their beauty [Knight 1954: 147]. This is only partly true: we do indeed speak of a beautiful sunset, not of a good one. Nor do we also usually wonder how a sunset could be more beautiful, although we can state that one evening it was exceptionally beautiful. For Knight the use of the word 'good' is an example of an aesthetic term and its related rules of use. Goodness is compliance with criteria. As for a criterion, its distinctive feature is that it is used. Goodness must always be justified by pointing out the properties observable in the object: a tennis-player is good if his strokes are accurate, etc. [Ibid. 149 - 151].

There is an interplay between an object and criteria. In part the object determines what criteria are well-founded and meaningful. For example anti-art changes criteria and thus influences the picture of art. A system of taste is composed of criteria. One must be logical in its application — it is possible to make mistakes in it.

Liking is purely personal. Normally we like such works and objects that correspond to the demands we have publicly made, but there does not have to be any compulsion in this. We can like
something for purely personal reasons, because the object brings to mind something related to our private life. And on the same basis, though we like something we can censure it at the same time. In the same way we can recognize something as being beautiful without liking it (for example ascetic interior furnishing), just as we may find ourselves acting in opposition to our accepted ideals of behavior. — The analysis of activity can be misleading in that the grounds for the activity belong to another area of values (e.g. economic reasons in choosing clothes). It is possible to be forced to act in contradiction to one’s own system of taste.

Value judgments are generally applicable in the sense that they must — in order to be valid — be testable: another person must be able to repeat the same process of reasoning. The difference in judgments of taste is in part due to the fact that our criteria differ. Apart from that, it is possible when applying them, not only to make mistakes, but also to apply discretion, and make different kinds of choices. What is decisive is the convincingness of the reasoning (it is not usually binding), not the final result. In mathematics too the calculation only is significant, not the correct answer, which may depend on chance.

Sibley states that the observation of objective properties demands only sense activity, whereas the observation of aesthetic properties demands taste. His basic thesis is that there are no such non-aesthetic features which definitely would justify the use of aesthetic terms. Aesthetic terms are not in this sense regulated by conditions. It is never possible — no matter how accurately the object is depicted — to lead to the conclusion that the object would have the aesthetic properties claimed; it is only possible in this way to present support for the claim, no more than that. [Sibley 1959: 424-426]

Non-aesthetic properties do not thus automatically lead to particular aesthetic properties. But aesthetic properties have some kind of parasitic connection with non-aesthetic properties (with objective properties). The task of the one who presents the claim (a critic or other such) is to help others to see the aesthetic properties of the object: to demonstrate the relevance of some of the parts from the point of view of the whole, to direct observation, to give terms for speaking of observation. What is decisive is to talk about the properties of the object, not the internal experiences or states of mind of the observer.

Thus it is possible to speak of knowledge of taste. The observer then has knowledge of what the object is like in an aesthetic sense; he has this knowledge from the experience of the use of language and other objects that belong to the same class as that being examined. Aesthetic level is spoken about in aesthetic terms. This level of secondary properties must be linked with the primary properties by giving specific reasons, even though there is no definite connection. If the connection is not made the matter is one of subjective aesthetics. — Monroe C. Beardsley distinguishes depictive and evaluative elements. Evaluative is aesthetic approval — aesthetic value is positive — depictive is the presentation of grounds for aesthetic approval. [Beardsley 1973: 208.]

Value judgment or description? Is beauty/beautiful a value judgment of an object or its description? If a value judgment is conceived of as conformity with criteria, this tells nothing about the object, but only about the relation of the object and the criteria (the object has criterion properties if the value judgment is logical); a person, the recipient, is the one who provides relations. If on the other hand beauty is conceived of as an immediate description of the object, such synonymic terms as 'harmonic,' 'ordered,' 'functional,' are used — it only has to be made clear what is the synonym at any given time. These then are simultaneously descriptions of the object, and reasons for its aesthetic approval. A separate system of taste is also needed, within the framework of which harmony or whatever is considered a good property.

But the question in the latter is of more than the description of the object: of its interpretation. The difference is made concrete if the claims "this is blue" and "this is harmonic" are compared. The further question "in what way is it blue?" can be answered by a more accurate classification:
what blue? (indigo, marine-blue) or a spectrum analysis from the natural sciences. In answering the question "in what way harmonic?" one is forced to describe the forms, colors, etc. of the object, and the totality formed by them: one is forced to decide what are the essential components, and in what way they form one hierarchic system. Harmony and similar concepts must be broken down into their elements, to their smallest ingredients and factors. All of this presupposes interpretation of the object, not only more accurate observation, or more extended linguistic classification of the observation.

In this way it is possible to give more accurate and detailed grounds for beautiful. The fact that beauty is a secondary property, which is connected to primary properties, can be seen in the fact that it is not possible for there to be two objects that differ only in the fact that the one is beautiful, the other not. This difference presupposes a difference at the level of the primary properties (structure, color, form); classification must then also be seen as some kind of a primary property (the same object may be beautiful as a natural formation, but ugly as a sculpture). Correspondingly two objects may be beautiful even though they are very different. Beauty is a secondary property dependent on primary properties, but no primary properties as such are absolutely relevant, but rather their significance depends on the basic criteria of taste.

The tasks of the criticism of art. The use of a work of art means that the work is presented as an object for criticism — for description, interpretation, and evaluation — expressly as a work of art [Beardsley 1958: 10-11; see also 1970b]; emotional and rational pleasure are sought through examination. This is the most important sub-type of aesthetic use. In interpretation meanings that lie beneath the surface are also sought; the work is valued in relation to how well it has succeeded in its task. The activity of criticism is concentrated on what is regarded as relevant within the framework of prevailing conventions.

Depiction is the presentation of the work as in a news report; interpretation the analysis of the work according to certain methods; and evaluation the determination of the worth of the work. The criteria of worth that appear to have gained the widest support are those put forward by Beardsley: unity, complexity, and intensity [Beardsley 1958 esp. 462]. However, the manner of realization is individual. Although it is possible to be of the opinion that each work is individual, one is unavoidably forced to make comparisons: goodness is in the first place an individual's being better in relation to other representatives of the type, in the second place — in some cases — the type's being better in relation to other types (for example circus art that emphasizes technical ability does not perhaps offer quite as broad possibilities for expression as most of the performing arts).

B. Environmental aesthetics at the intersection of traditions

1. The field of research

The significance of a compound term is generally recognized as being more than the sum of its parts. However, it is possible to seek a tentative answer to the question, what is environmental aesthetics, by asking what is the environment, and what is aesthetics.

a. The environment

The environment is that which surrounds us (in the centre of which we are as observers) which we
perceive with our various senses, in the sphere of which we move and have our being. The question is thus of the relationship between the perceiver and the external, although the external would exist also without the observer.

Thus the environment is always in a way bound to the observer and his place of being. But in a broader sense the environment can be conceived of as the field in which the observer moves, and in which he chooses his place and point of vantage. The objects there again are theoretical structures formed in the mind, which do not have to be immediately observable as such. In a broad sense also imaginary scenes, dreams, thoughts, and other similar extensions of reality belong then to the environment. Works of art, too, are a part of the environment, but their role as a part of the environment is different from their role as independent works of art.

Environments are extremely varied; they may be nature in a natural state or a cultural environment, and its extreme case the completely artificial, man-made environment; interiors are also environments. In the broadest possible concept environments are also our culture with its sub-areas, even our intellectual atmosphere: science, art, and religion, as well as work and play, human relations and social systems.

On one hand the environment is composed of relatively permanent 'real estate' (the soil etc.), on the other of 'goods and chattels' (buildings, objects; plants, animals). The goods and chattels are partly in a state of nature, partly made by Man. They are usually easier to remove or change than the basic features; a built up environment can be demolished, returned to a state of nature — as such it is natural again, but has been affected by Man. The changes in the goods and chattels are not as irreversible as those in the real estate.

Nature is divided into different types according to various grounds: living and lifeless, or perhaps on the basis of human activity into original and altered, in which the extremes are an untouched original state and a large modern city, an artificial environment. Ronald W. Hepburn means by nature broadly all those objects that are not of human manufacture [Hepburn: 285]. Melvin Rader and Bertram Jessup in the same way define as nature the totality of those objects that Man has not made — rocks, clouds, animals, people [Rader & Jessup 1976: 147]. Andrew Forge attempts to demonstrate that the concept has extended to include everything that is external to the observing person — railway bridges, people living in towns, pavements, buildings, street-lights [Forge 1973: 234; see also Jackson 1984. 155-157; and Crawford 1983: 49].

b. Aesthetics

What then is aesthetics? In its entirety aesthetics is a philosophic science, the problems of which are, in the first place, conceptual, and not so much empirical. "Not all good writing must be theoretical. Aesthetics must. That's what aesthetics is about." Thus, in the leading journal of the field, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, John Fisher and Monroe C. Beardsley write in an editorial that considers the nature of aesthetics [Fischer & Beardsley 1980: 237]. In their opinion writing that analyzes individual works of art is "only interesting" — in order to be aesthetics, writings must be theoretical, examples of general problems.

The task of aesthetics is to create models; specific research belongs elsewhere. Aesthetics is thus under no circumstances the practise of art research, as is literary research, theatre research, and film research. On the other hand art theory, the philosophical questions about the various art forms, and the theory and methodology of art research, are aesthetics. The question here is of aesthetics as a field of knowledge, not, for example, as the manifesto or norm system of an art researcher or critic. In its scholarly meaning aesthetics is not proclamation but research.
c. Environmental aesthetics

What I have said above about theoreticality also concerns environmental aesthetics. Specific environmental research is not part of it, nor is everything which is theoretical. What then is environmental aesthetics?

As a theoretical, philosophical sub-area of scholarship, environmental aesthetics is a part of environmental philosophy. The term environmental philosophy has only begun to be used recently, and nearly all of the work that has been done in its name can be located within the sphere of environmental ethics: the rights of plants, animals, and inorganic nature, as well as those of unborn human generations have been treated. For example, there is the all important question of whether those living at present have the right to exploit existing natural resources for themselves and also leave future generations with pollution that is difficult to get rid of. [See e.g. Environmental Philosophy 1980.]

Ethics is always involved in nature protection, whether the objects of the protection are animals and plants, natural monuments, or air, water, and earth.

One sub-field of environmental philosophy is geographical philosophy, the character of place and space. In the same way psychological questions are partly philosophical: how Man perceives and experiences the world. Yi-Fu Tuan has spoken of topophilia, attachment to place, experience of home district, recognition of familiarity arising from one's own milieu [Tuan 1974: 93]. The philosophy of politics and social theory concern environmental philosophy: what is the significance of the environment for welfare and satisfaction, and what aspects should be taken into account in social and landscape planning?

Environmental aesthetics is the aesthetics of the real world. In this the environment means all of the observer's external world: the natural environment, the cultural environment, and the constructed environment. The opposite is the aesthetics of the imaginary world of the arts. The boundary between these two worlds of course is not fixed. Buildings, gardens, sculptures, etc. are part of our environment as works of art. Works of art as physical objects belong to environmental aesthetics, but, of course, as aesthetic objects too. They exist permanently as drawings and models, as score-like directions for realization and performance; as parts of the environment they only last for a certain time.

The primary point of departure of environmental aesthetics is aesthetics understood as the philosophy of beauty. The beauty of the environment is the object of its research, also the claims presented for the beauty of the environment, the treatment of which is metacriticism.

Two principal lines can be distinguished in environmental aesthetics: (1) research into the aesthetic quality of the environment belonging to the philosophy of beauty, which is based on the direct observation of the environment and the analysis of the reaction of someone else within the framework of one's own system of taste and observational ability. At the same time we have general ontological questions concerning the environment as an aesthetic object, and (2) the investigation of the reasons for our taste judgments concerning the aesthetic quality of the environment: metacriticism. In determining the tasks of these two lines of approach, the general philosophical nature of aesthetics must be taken into account. Specific questions belong to the different environmental sciences.

Research into judgments concerning the aesthetic qualities of the environment is one branch of this metacriticism. Its material is primarily linguistic depictions of the environment; secondarily, photographs, drawings, paintings, and maps made with the intention of duplicating the environment, and all such activity in which conceptions of taste appear such as the choice of a dwelling place, choosing a location for a summer cottage, designing a garden, and even the choice of a holiday resort. These are secondary because they demand linguistic interpretation; by simply observing such activities as mentioned it is not possible to decide for sure whether they are aesthetically motivated or not.
2. The central questions

In the foregoing chapter I have only depicted the context to which environmental aesthetics as a sub-area of aesthetics belongs. Environmental aesthetics is, however, not a fourth principal tradition; it can be divided into three main traditions. While I accept this division, I wish to emphasize the connection between the questions which make up these three traditions.

a. Questions pertaining to the philosophy of beauty

What is the position of the aesthetic in human culture? Often attitudes and the needs on which they are based are divided into (1) ethical, (2) cognitive, (3) practical-active, and (4) aesthetic. This type of division, following Kant, has been repeated by numerous aestheticians who have illustrated it also with examples from nature, and shown how it is possible to relate in different ways to the sea, a tree, the landscape. To a nature conservationist, biologist, fisherman, and artist the sea means different things; the matter is one of interests presupposed by a role, but everyone can go beyond his role.

The aesthetic attitude. How does the aesthetic attitude differ from others? It is generally felt that the need for aesthetic experiences is one of Man's basic needs: there is something in human beings that can be somewhat old-fashioned termed "a longing for beauty." Even in such communities in which there does not appear to be aesthetic activity or cultural institutions that maintain it, there are areas of life in which this need for aesthetic experiences appears, whether it is a question of landscape photography or furnishing a hut.

On account of the expressly aesthetic use of works of art, the philosophy of art and the philosophy of beauty are connected. Art need not be likened to the environment as the imitation theory does, nor do we need the notion of artistic experience for explaining the aesthetic perception of nature — and still art and its external environment both belong to what is investigated by aesthetics. It is only necessary to recognize and take account of the general and specific nature of both.

Generalizing, it is possible to say that aesthetics deals with the manifestations of taste (beautiful — aesthetic — artistic). Activities related to art, creative acts and the reception of their results are directed towards the environment. The aesthetic attitude is a starting point. The precondition for proper aesthetic perception is an appropriate physical-conceptual distance: the preconditions for aesthetic perception vanish when one is too near the object or too emotionally involved to enjoy it, and this is also true when one is too distant from the object or too emotionally detached from it to observe anything more than mere form and technique.

It is possible to make different types of observations of the same object according to the attitude taken, even if taking an attitude does not always have to be especially active. It is possible to say that the value is in the object, not in the reaction to it; however, it is only a person's active reception that brings the value out. Observations are regulated by knowledge of reception conventions, agreements, which are loose rules of behaviour, not even always conscious ones. These frameworks determine what and how to perceive. Aesthetic perception is always regulated by taste.

The aesthetic object and its context. Dickie speaks of the aesthetic object of a work of art: not everything is significant, relevant [Dickie 1974: 147]. Conventions determine what the observer will concentrate on; they change and they are determined by the community. Art must be learned, grown into. The sign language must be understood: the community decides what it offers as objects
of inspection, such as lookout spots, natural formations, monuments, and monumental buildings.

But the conventions of art and of the environment are different, even if they are in some kind of interplay. Nature and art do not replace one another, even though art may arouse the same kind of emotions as a genuine — real — object. A work of art requires that we construct a connection, a context, for it; the environment comes complete with a context. In art, the receiver goes on constructing the fictional world of the work on the basis of most cryptic directions; gaps demand to be filled out, and the work as a whole is apprehended as a 'sample' of a larger indeterminate world. A work of art represents a slice of a fictional reality, limited in its visible parts but at the same time replete with implicit meaning. Thus, though the work may be very concrete, the meaning of the work may be very abstract.

While in the field of art it is significant that the object being considered is known to be a work of art, and that it is thus placed within a tradition, the environment also has similar knowledge contexts. It is possible to ask would the Grand Canyon or the Rocky Mountains be the same if they were moved or reconstructed elsewhere, detached from their geological connections: they have an essential native link with their environment. But a bond of this kind is not, for example, possessed by the reconstructions in Disneyland. Sights have a physical context. Prestige granted to first-class objects in the environment is shown by the valuation of lookout spots, and between them often remain aesthetically uninteresting areas. Observation has a tendency to limit itself to the most beautiful details, views, and to particular points. However, not only the very best, but also the most usual dwelling environment should be investigated — in the same way as all art, without regard to worth, belongs to the sphere of art research.

*Beauty based on the senses and intelligence.* The basic concepts in environmental aesthetics are environment, nature, landscape, view; in these, too, the emphasis on the visual aspect is apparent. The levels of beauty extend from superficial to profound beauty, from surface beauty, narrowly defined, to beauty which is rich in content, and intellectually stimulating. Colors and forms are aspects of surface beauty, an outline influenced by selection, proportion, delimitation; the beauty of structures and organisms is rich in content, as is rational beauty in general. Through an understanding of structures ecological beauty can be reached, in which the lack of disturbance and the functionality and appropriateness of the system is important. A similar conceptual beauty also exists in the game of chess and in mathematics.

The different methods of observation are illustrated by R. W. Hepburn's example of the spiral nebula called Andromeda, and an abstract work of art with the same pattern, from which the observer receives a decidedly different impression [Hepburn 1967: 301 - 302]; correspondingly we have Janina Makota's example of regarding the sea as a visual form and as a powerful mass of water [Makota 1976 36]. We may also talk about sensual and conceptual beauty. In the environment ethical values are a framework, in art there should be freedom from ethical values, too.

b. Questions pertaining to the philosophy of art

Questions of a general, rather than specific, nature concerning accepted art forms such as architecture and landscape gardening belong to environmental aesthetics. In works belonging to these fields, natural elements are used as part of the materials, but this is true in other works of art (a sculpture in a park, etc.); at its best a functional combined work of art arises; the works of different art forms contained within one another, or parallel works of the same form compose a union with each other and with the surrounding environment. The relationship may be symbiotic, dialectic, or in conflict [cf Crawford 1983]. Works of art influence both their artistic and the wider environment (for
example the loosely related picture series in the Stockholm metro stations). From the point of view of the definition of art environmental art works are interesting border area phenomena.

\textit{Natural works of art.} Metaphorical, parasitic (derivative) forms ("play," "music," "dance," "painting") that appear in nature, which may be called natural works of art, are located outside of art in a literal sense. The view from Koli hill is called a painting, the burbling of a river is called music, the tricks of apes are called dancing or play acting; Thomas A. Sebeok refers to these metaphorical instances as 'prefigurations of art' [Sebeok 1979].

The function of metaphorical speech here is praise, perhaps in some cases, when it creates a parallel with art, it is description. Koli hill, the burbling river, and other natural works of art are not literally classified as works of art or an entire type as some kind of an art form. Theories in which nature is seen as a global combined work of art, or a work of art of the Creator, also use language metaphorically. Even in everyday speech townscape or landscape architecture, landscape gardening or other similar cases are thought of as total works of art; protected areas of nature are also considered works of art. What is essential is the combined effect of the senses: the experiencing of a town is, apart from a visual perception, also a totality completed by sense perceptions of sounds, smells, and touch.

\textit{Anti-art.} The most theoretically interesting art objects are those that are ready as such. Such art is known as found art and the objects themselves, consisting of manufactured or natural objects, are known as ready mades. Offering such objects as art is part of the twentieth century phenomenon called anti-art. George Dickie has demonstrated that there is art which is not worth looking at but which is indeed worth thinking about and considering [Dickie 1975: 421].

Recently there has been discussion as to whether all art any longer belongs to aesthetics in an art philosophical sense, or only that art which is based on so-called aesthetic values [Binkley 1976: 98, 108-109] — art as art-theoretical statement, art about art, etc. would remain outside the domain of aesthetics. But aesthetic qualities cannot be a distinguishing mark of art, for they are not limited to works of art — and on the other hand recent anti-art has questioned the basic idea that there always is or should be aesthetic value in a work of art.

\textit{The maker and the observer.} One question is the position of the maker. Who is the maker in nature? A designed landscape, landscape garden, etc. indeed have a maker — a landscape gardener or a landscape architect; in these nature is the artist’s material: changeable and permanent natural elements are used. Most parks and towns have been influenced by a designer’s hand (e.g. Oscar Niemeyer’s Brasilia, or the garden city of Tapiola), but some landscapes, such as agricultural land, have not been designed although they are man-made. The former can be regarded as professional art, and the latter as folk art. A rural landscape that has been settled without any special planning is one kind of folk art. In the loose sense of the word, untouched nature is also nowadays planned, most clearly when parts of it are defined as nature or national parks, or as natural monuments; protected objects are similar to works of art.

The observer always makes some kind of definition and choice. The maker exists in the sense of a manufacturer, designer, selector, although it is not necessary to assume the existence of any metaphysical maker or creator. A proper work of art is always made by human agency, born in the sphere of human culture. Art is a type of symbol-system, and as such it recalls other artifacts. Thus art research is also linked to the research and theory of artifacts in general.

In art the number of significant objects is reduced; too many uncoordinated elements are not approved. But this is not so in the environment: usually the more natural the environment, the more diverse are its constituent parts. The observer can of course simplify the overflowing multifariousness by actively shutting a part of it out, by concentrating his perception, by making choices and definitions.
There are different types of landscape, within whose sphere species of plants and animals belong. It is possible to speak of types, but is it possible to speak of styles? Is there a style without a maker? Speaking of styles when referring to untouched nature is to use language metaphorically, one is personifying nature. There is a romantic type of landscape, but is there a romantic style? Style appears to demand an active maker and his choices; therefore only nature that has been influenced by Man can have styles [see Walton 1979: 46-47].

Environmental depictions in art. Works of art that use the environment as a raw material must be regarded as a group of its own; at the same time this area belongs to the philosophy of art. Aesthetic environmental ideals also appear in works of art, for instance in the ideal landscapes of landscape painting and in the utopias of literature, but above all its own aesthetic quality is significant for a work of art, not the environment it depicts or constructs. The composition of a work of art is not so much directed by an attempt to imitate or transmit a message as by the goal of creating a unified structure. Works of art only sometimes may depict the environment or appear to present claims about it. They are untrustworthy sources for environmental research. For example, when nature is depicted in literature it is usually the spiritual landscape of the characters in the work; what is decisively important in some of Franz Kafka’s, Herman Melville’s [see e.g. Moore 1982], or Joseph Conrad’s works is the parallelism of the minds of the characters and their world.

Environmental aesthetics without art? Can there be environmental aesthetics without art? Undoubtedly there can. But the existence of art, its position as a paradigmatic phenomenon, forces a comparison between art and the environment. Environmental aesthetics is not a separate and different fourth tradition of aesthetics, in addition to the philosophies of art, beauty and criticism, but it is a part of a larger totality, which is composed of the various sub-fields of aesthetics. The dominant and unifying factor is the (aesthetic) concept of beauty. This is the super-level by which other concepts are judged. The choice of the manner of examination is decisive — it determines what in the object becomes relevant. But the choice is not normally one of decision, but rather takes place unconsciously to a great extent: derived from a state of mind, dependent on preparedness, and of course on the nature of the object.

c. Questions pertaining to the philosophy of criticism

Environmental criticism is a sub-area of criticism, and is then also a subject for the philosophy of criticism.

Immediate environmental perceptions must be distinguished from the fact that we become acquainted with the environment through depictions. Depictions have their own sign language; they are presentations of the environment that take place within the framework of a sign language. The task of research is to explain the depictions and the related formation of a theory.

Description, interpretation, and evaluation. The material in environmental criticism is the descriptive, interpretive, and evaluative propositions presented about the environment. In principle, not only propositions presented linguistically belong to its sphere; there are also those that appear through aesthetic activity, such as wearing a costume, going to a lookout spot, summer-cottage culture. Comments, activities, and events are not, however, aesthetics in a scientific sense, but only the raw materials of aesthetics. Their scale extends from undemanding speech acts and simple actions, to depictions, which are made for example in writing, photography, cinema, or drawing. In the same way the extremes of the scale are, for example, on the one hand an outing to some sight, and on the other an entire change of way and form of life (moving from the town to the country, isolating oneself in the midst of nature, etc.).
As metacriticism, environmental aesthetics analyses descriptions, interpretations, and evaluations. The task of geography is to make clear the traditions of description, how something perceived by the senses is transferred to the language of a sign system, how to present what the object contains — and only a part of this task belongs to aesthetics. Interpretation is the task of natural history, cultural history, etc. Evaluation deals with how the environment corresponds to values adopted in a community — aesthetic values among others. In evaluation, concepts of taste, criteria, and norms are dealt with as well as the background factors influencing their change — such, for example, is the task of sociology.

The task of environmental aesthetics from the point of view of metacriticism is not to approve or say what is beautiful, but rather to investigate the taste judgments placed on objects, and the logic of those judgments in practise. However, it cannot be limited to purely sociological examination. Natural objects are not made for Man as are works of art. In explaining the nature of works of art one must start from their specific function as a source of aesthetic pleasure and as fulfillers of aesthetic needs. But the environment does not have tasks of this kind, at least not primarily; there are exceptions of course, such as cultivating ornamental gardens, breeding pets and growing ornamental plants, activities which to a great extent have been directed from an aesthetic point of view, at least in the sense of superficial decorativeness.

**Positive and critical aesthetics.** It is possible to speak of positive and critical aesthetics: the positive approves of the object as given, the critical evaluates [see Kinnunen 1981; and Carlson 1984b]. It has been claimed — in my opinion correctly — that natural objects cannot be properly evaluated, they are approved of [see Coleman 1968: 7; and Wellek 1978: 46]. The approval of untouched nature has been extended: at present it also covers undramatic natural areas. In examination, criteria of approval are sought. The history of depictions of nature is the history of the broadening of criteria. Everything in a state of nature is beginning to be approved of. For example, in the writings of Reino Kalliola one is forced to search and search for any reference to nature as ugly — one example is a birch copse destroyed by the autumnal moth [Kalliola 1941: 53] — but in Kalliola’s eyes even this can be seen as a part of a larger dramatic process.

Critical aesthetics deals with those things which have been changed and made by Man. Pseudo-natural objects fall into this category: ornamental plants, pets, etc.; but primarily landscapes and environments, which have been either professionally designed or created without plan, "vernacularly" [see Jackson 1984]. The main object of critical examination is art, a most central and typical aspect of human culture. Because a work of art is man-made, an artifact, it is possible to ask how well it is made, how good it is.

**3. The methods and material of environmental aesthetics research**

Because environmental aesthetics is concerned with aesthetics and is thus a part of philosophy, its methods are the same as in other philosophical research. Any material whatever can be the object of such research — there is no such thing as philosophical or aphilosophical material. The term ‘environment’ determines the material.

However, two principal types of environmental aesthetics can be distinguished. The first is purely conceptual and philosophical: concentrating on ontology and terminology. The second is empirical: the inspection of one’s own or other people’s reception of the environment, for example, by the means of experimental psychology. That research, in which documented environmental depictions are used as the material, is at the intersection of philosophical research and empirical research, with a bias towards the latter.
In my own work I by-pass purely experimental research, because in my opinion it does not properly belong to aesthetics. The ontology section in my research belongs to the philosophico-theoretical side, the metacriticism section to the empirical side.

a. Philosophical analysis and its material

The first area of questions concerns ontological problems: what is the environment like as an object, and, more precisely, as an aesthetic object? The link between environmental aesthetics and traditional nature philosophy, the natural sciences, questions about the perception of the environment, the environment as an aesthetic object compared to a work of art (similarities and differences), concern us here. I deal with these in the first half of the central section of my work, in the section on ontology.

Conceptual analysis is above all the task of philosophical analysis. Defining such key concepts as 'environment,' 'nature,' 'landscape,' 'beauty'/beautiful,' 'aesthetic' and 'criticism' must be its goal. — The portrayer and researcher of nature have a concept of the environment which directs their activities, and on the other hand the specific work they do in their field of research modifies their initial assumptions. Philosophical research is directed at these points of departure, environmental aesthetic research to the area that is reflected in aesthetic environmental criticism.

b. Empirical analysis and its material

Empirical analysis is based either on the self-examination of the analyser (introspection), or else on the examination of the reactions of other people and the factors that influence them (extrospection).

**Introspection.** The investigation of the immediate experiencing of the environment is possible only with the aid of introspection, self-observation; the observation of the behaviour of other people is more indirect. Introspection is a fundamental human activity, and it works — often unconsciously — to check the observations of other people, and as a criticism of common sense. But it is not possible to construct scientific research only on the basis of introspection.

Introspection is, however, more than the analysis of the experience of one person. If an individual is representative, he is Man in general, the x in the mathematical formula, in place of which it is possible to put different numerical values. Thus introspection gains general validity in expanding analytically from an empirical base and in approaching not only philosophical analysis, but also generalizations achieved through extrospection.

**Extrospection.** The starting point of extrospective research is the experience of other people expressed verbally or in their behaviour. The research can be psychological, sociological (more broadly: social scientific), or linguistically analytical.

In experimental psychology, color tests and other similar tests relating to aesthetic reaction are arranged, using material such as photographs. In experimental arrangements an attempt can be made to take into account a person's entire world of experiences, and to clarify in what way these factors influence, for example, people's satisfaction with their living surroundings. Research of this kind has also produced information that should be taken account of in social planning.

The fairly general experiments, in which reactions to different kinds of landscape have been determined (the landscape may also have been presented through a photograph) must be classified
as mainly *sociological* taste research. Through such research, information has been gained on the ways in which different groups experience and depict the environment, and it has been possible to test preferences. A great number of technical weaknesses and scientific *a priori* assumptions have, however, been attached to the research, and have undermined the value of the results, which as such appear to be very abstract [see Carlson 1977]. Still, they have revealed certain regularities underlying perception and the descriptions of perception, but these are not as extensive as has been thought by positive aesthetics. It is apparent that the taste of a lay audience is more limited than that of such experts as naturalists.

The starting point for *linguistic analytical* research can be (1) aesthetic terms, (2) aesthetic depictions, (3) the presentation and offering, selection, and even creation of paradigmatic objects, such as lookout points, ideal landscapes and such, when in certain cases it is possible to make comparisons without intervening theory, (4) art metaphors, and (5) key words, such as the 'face' of a landscape, etc.

The best way in which to achieve relevant research results concerning taste is not, in my opinion, psychological-sociological experiments, but the examination of the work of the most representative portrayers of nature through the language they use. Portrayers of nature document their own experiences through verbal, pictorial and similar means. It is environmental criticism, which can be the object of metacritical research. Its empirical analysis is inseparably linked to philosophical analysis.

**C. Summary of the points of departure**

Questions of environmental aesthetics divide themselves between the three research traditions of aesthetics. Environmental aesthetics gathers together from the different traditions the subsidiary questions that concern the environment. Natural science and common sense categories also provide additional material. Perception takes place within the framework of these categories, regulated by the conventions affecting them. Thus a network, which is attached to all human cultural activity in the same way as artistic activity is attached to an entire culture, is formed round these questions.

The methods — and schools — of environmental aesthetics are the same as in philosophy on the whole. First of all there are the questions of ontology that are resolved conceptually, then comes metacritical analysis that is based on depictive material. The latter material sets its own demands; the most useful are documented depictions of the environment, and linguistic and analytical aesthetics are especially suited to the treatment of this material.

If environmental aesthetics is treated metacritically to determine the natural/environmental aesthetic attention and the grounds and principles of depictions of nature, then the pictorial works of well-known nature photographers, the travel books of naturalists and nature researchers as well as cultural historians, are its material. They contain theoretical standpoints without themselves being theory.

R.W. Hepburn's assumption is not valid that one of the most important factors accounting for the disappearance of nature aesthetics and the corresponding rise of art aesthetics is that the material on the environment required by present-day linguistically-orientated aesthetics has not been available, but indisputably there is — as he states — a vast amount on art (Hepburn 1967: 287-288). Travel books, tourist guides, and other works that present nature in words and pictures offer the analyst a very finely tuned, aesthetically toned portrayal of nature. And, indeed the occasional superficiality, scarcity, or downright lack of such a portrayal is also significant in the history of conceptions of taste.
These depictions are always constructed on some ontology, some conception of the essence of nature; such is the natural philosophical basis of the depictions. A depiction and its basis form an inseparable pair; therefore also analytical philosophy must take in more than language and the depiction made with it.

Thus the question is not only to analyze the material of metacriticism but also quite as emphatically to analyze the environmental concepts that appear in the material, i.e. ontological assumptions. On one hand ontological problems are essential in environmental aesthetics, the environment as an aesthetic object; on the other hand metacritical problems — the description, interpretation, and evaluation of the environment are equally essential. I deal with these two in detail in the central part of my work. The chapter that examines ontology is connected to the tradition of the philosophy of beauty, the chapter on metacriticism is connected to the philosophy of criticism; elements of the philosophy of art are to be found in both.
II. IN THE CORE AREAS

The core areas of environmental aesthetics are a question of the aesthetic object, and a question of how that object is spoken about in criticism. Accordingly I have divided the treatment into two parts: (1) ontology and (2) metacriticism. Art is the point of reference for the environment in the former, whereas art criticism is the point of reference for environmental criticism in the latter.

First of all comes the object, natural or man-made, ready delimited or delimited by a decision. In dealing with the aesthetic objects of the environment they must be placed in relation to other aesthetic objects; these are fictitious objects, and they are above all works of art. In my examination the emphasis is on works of art, on the demonstration of similarities and differences through comparison. From the point of view of my conception of the environment the mental environment is a marginal environmental form. In this sphere especial reference is made to rational beauty, to such conceptual structures as scientific systems. The various meanings of beauty — those that concern skill, action, intelligence, and morals — in the final resort belong together on the level of life values; an aesthetic quality based on the synthetical nature of values is formed as a result of 'aestheticization', in which the genuine aesthetic values are one component.

The object always involves discourse on the object. By discourse in a broad sense I mean all comments concerning the object, be it in description, interpretation, or evaluation. The investigation of the language used is the metacritical side of environmental aesthetics.

In my opinion, questions of environmental aesthetics can be included in these two: the object and the speech concerning it. Thus the question is not in fact about a core area but about the whole area.

A. Ontology

The environment as an aesthetic object — its essential features and relation to other aesthetic objects

1. Environmental aesthetics as a part of environmental philosophy

Environmental philosophy is that part of philosophy which deals with questions of principle and theory connected with environmental research. Thus its sphere includes the philosophy of the natural sciences — the sciences that treat the environment as a mechanism — as well as the philosophy of the cultural and social sciences (the 'human sciences'), in which the relation of Man to the social milieu is dealt with. The human sciences are then to be conceived of as broadly as possible, in such a way that they embrace everything where there is a question of the relationship between Man and his environment: aesthetics, ethics, psychology, sociology.

Environmental philosophy is in itself an extensive and indefinite entity. On one hand its sub-areas are bound to specialized sciences, on the other they are mutually connected. Thus, for example, environmental aesthetics is dependent not only on the results obtained from the various aspects of environmental research, but also on work done in the other areas of environmental philosophy.

The general philosophical frame is natural and cultural philosophy. We do not, of course, treat the environment only as an aesthetic object, but generally as an object of moral or practical consideration. Thus, it is a question of what kind of object the environment is in its entirety, and into what kinds of objects it divides. In the same way, questions on the general level are concerned
with subjectivity or objectivity of observations, as well as the relation between the observer and the environment; the questions thus partly belong to the field of the philosophy of perception. Natural philosophy expresses a metaphysical conception of the manner of existence of reality. The principles by which aesthetic objects are given an identity are also determined on this basis.

The observer, subject. Besides the object, the subject also is significant — the environment is an environment to someone. The essential question is the relation of Man (the observer) to his environment. Is Man an external examiner or an essential part of the environment? How does the environment influence its observer? The manner is determined in the final resort by the sensory physiology characteristic of Man — sensory activity is the essential framework and point of departure — and on the basis of cultural, learned models.

An attempt to determine the share of sensory activity and culture can be made by comparing the manner of perception of Man to that of animals. It is possible to deal with what the animals’ relation to their environment is, as a parallel; for example, Thomas A. Sebeok has raised the question of whether animals have a sense of the aesthetic [Sebeok 1979]. It is often claimed that Man is unique in that he has aesthetic perceptions. However, the results of Sebeok and Charles Hartshorne [1973] appear to demonstrate that animals have related activities. At its greatest extent the question concerns the relation of a living organism to its environment. Animals probably perceive in different ways even for sensory-physiological reasons. Man cannot know how, for example, a bird that builds a decorated nest perceives its nest and motivates its activity.

But although there are signs of the aesthetic perception of animals, the material is too sparse and too speculative to be dealt with. Therefore in my environmental aesthetic model I limit myself to Man’s point of view.

Man has a certain kind of responsibility for the environment, also for those parts of it in which there is no question of his immediate advantage. Man is the guardian of the possible aesthetic and other rights of animals in as far as his activities affect nature.

2. The objects, categories, and paradigms of the environment

a. The objects, the categories, and the paradigms in general

All aesthetic questions have to be related to the general background of environmental philosophy. When answering the question what the environment is like as an aesthetic object the answer must be related to the fact of what the environment is like as an object. That is, how it can be outlined and divided into parts, into objects, in what way the objects are grouped into categories, and of what kind the relations of the objects to one another and to their own manifestations are in the area of the categories, in other words what kinds of paradigms are formed?

The division into objects. Are the objects something that exist in the environment independent of Man, or are they created by Man’s conceptions or sensory perceptions? What kinds of laws govern them? How does that which does not belong to the aesthetic objects of the environment indirectly influence the formation of aesthetic objects?

Are the objects always the same or is the environment always distributed anew for different purposes? Are the aesthetic objects some new division, or are they some aspect and characteristic group of objects? For example, works of art are (materially) more extensive than the aesthetic objects of works of art, but the basic division is the same. In her work Beauty Restored Mary Mothersill puts the question in the following way:
Does it make sense to ask, concerning my cactus, how many aesthetic properties it has? Although the question is not very clear, I suppose one could think of predicates such that the question whether one of them applies to my cactus can be settled by inspection (acquaintance is a sufficient but not a necessary condition) and then say that the number of aesthetic properties is at least as great as the number of logically independent predicates that fill the bill — but how could there be any non-arbitrary way of deciding what that number is? Analogously, although I could chop up the cactus into parts and chop up the parts into smaller parts, the question 'How many parts "are there really"?' lacks an answer. In acquaintance we encounter individuals in their full particularity.

[Mathersill 1984: 353.]

There are objects in the environment resembling works of art: animals, plants, and others conforming to the object model. But in the landscape model and in the environmental model there are numerous grounds for division: the environment can be divided on different grounds into different kinds of objects, and from these the aesthetic object can be distinguished (cf. the aesthetic object of a work of art), or it can be divided directly into several aesthetic objects and relevant properties from each point of view. The object covers, in the broad meaning intended here, objects formed according to all three models — the definitive property of the object is limitedness; the narrower meaning, which is in question in the object model, must be kept separate. (On the triple division of models see pp. 44-47. Environmental aesthetics is thus only partly dependent on the general division of objects. Ontologically, several aesthetic objects arise, for which there is no equivalent among pure objects. The same applies to cases where a work of art and the environment are unified.

The division into categories. Objects must be placed in categories, in general classes. It must be asked of what category each object is. Do the objects come first and are then the categories formed from them, or is there a controlling scheme over the perception of the division of categories? The relation of influence is certainly from both sides, however, the scheme appears to be primary. It is partly bound to culture and is learned. [Cf. Walton 1970: 364-367.]

Categories are of various types: natural scientific, religious, mythological, based on artistic models, etc. Categories direct perception: we perceive within the framework of categories. However a justified choice is not an optional matter, but rather it must be in accordance with up-to-date scientific theories.

The natural and cultural sciences create the division of categories that is suitable as the starting point for environmental aesthetics. But under no circumstances do they answer the aesthetic questions concerning the environment. It is possible that the basic knowledge which is essential for the appropriate reception of the environment may, nevertheless, be had from them.

The division into paradigms. The division of paradigms is, as such, the same as the division of categories. A paradigm is one kind of an inflection scheme within a category: it determines in what way those objects placed in the same category relate to one another. Which are the standard ("paradigmatic") members in a category to which the other members conform? The question of so-called paradigmatic objects is central, as they provide models within a category. (And it is, perhaps, possible to ask about the mutual relations of the whole paradigms, for instance: Should untouched nature be a paradigmatic model for the rest of the environment?)

b. The conventions of aesthetic perception and the aesthetic objects, categories, and paradigms that arise from that basis

In the foregoing I have inquired into the general significance of the object, the category, and the
paradigm. I will now deal with what makes these aesthetic. The solution lies in the manner of perception, and it is from an analysis of this that we must commence.

The conventions of aesthetic perception. Conventions are agreements or rules, established practises. In this case they are not agreements in an exact sense; the matter is rather one of established practise. One cannot operate with an unclassified object: classification determines the mode of operation. Art is a system regulated by conventions. A decision must be made concerning the classification of the object, or the communal classification must be known. Of course it is possible to depart from the communal classification and make temporary individual classifications.

Dickie refers to the existence of environmental conventions, but he is of the opinion that they have not been investigated, and that they may be the same or different in the environment and in art [Dickie 1974: 199-200]. He distinguishes primary and secondary conventions. The former apply to such things as why we perceive, for what purpose (aesthetic purposes), the latter apply to how something is offered. Some kind of family relationships within art indisputably exist: it is possible to ask what is the share of depictions of nature in visual art or literature as a developer of reception conventions, and what is the share of tourist guides, travel stories, and advertisements? Some of the objects are offered communally, some are perceived without being offered. Those offered are tourist sights, monuments, monumental buildings. The secondary conventions apply to such things as, how to approach a sight, what is it called, what it contains. The environment comes with a context, a work of art does not - here the context is constructed [see Herrnstein Smith 1978: 32-34].

The environment can be chosen as an object for aesthetic examination, but there is no necessity for such an examination; in that sense it is free. Different forms of examination interlock and overlap. Here again art is conceived of differently: aesthetic examination is a duty. In relation to art aesthetic examination is always an appropriate choice, even if art can be examined from other points of view as well. In the same way as what aesthetic examination means is problematic in relation to art, it is still more problematic when considering the environment.

In my opinion, what is important is the choice of and familiarity with an appropriate context of knowledge. It is not possible to examine the environment as such without a mental frame of reference. In art too, a familiarity with tradition and other works is essential. It is against this background that the examiner is able to bring out from an individual work precisely that which is essential and personal in the work. Although in a work of art everything in principle must be taken into account, not everything is equally important. What is to be brought forward must be selected [see Sharpe 1983: 146-147]. A similar concentration and selection is demanded in relation to the environment. Help in this is obtained from the conventions that have been created especially by those who have depicted nature. The observer is linked to the tradition within which the environment has been previously examined. And because in the case of untouched nature the responsibility of the artist (i.e. maker) has been transferred to the recipient, the creation of a tradition is precisely the recipient’s affair. Of course there are numerous different lines to select from, but it is sensible to accept the most lasting and competent tradition possible.

In the case of the environment that has been affected by Man — compared to a state of nature — the situation is far more reminiscent of what has been done in art and how art comes about. Makers — either individuals or a group — exist, and the recipient examines as well as he is able that which is offered to him, delimited, selected, and articulated. Too much activeness may even lead him out of his role, so that he becomes a maker.

Making the environment an aesthetic object is normally based on a decision of the recipient. He chooses the manner of examination and the object to be examined, delimits it, in place and in time. However, communally selected and delimited objects, such as viewpoints, natural monuments, etc. are strongly directive and recall the delimitation and offering of works of art. Such objects also give
the recipient general models and recommendations which he can apply in his own selection of objects. In addition, the tradition of nature depiction regulates that which is sought. Thus depictions have influenced the general taste and conceptions of the environment; they have a certain educational and guiding significance. The depictions have gained a normative character — in the same way as criticism has in the field of art. This is the communal basis from which the mode of action of the individual is loosely determined.

The aesthetic manner of examination and point of view is something that is to be learned and adopted. Francis Coleman remarks that sensory impressions are located on a scale, at one end of which are the pleasures that presuppose learning and an ability to criticize, and at the other the purely passive pleasures (sunbathing, etc.). The latter cannot be and need not be, learned, the former can. [Coleman 1968: 17-18.]

The aesthetic point of view is at the upper end of the scale, that is it is something which is to be achieved through practise. What the aesthetic standpoint is cannot be clearly distinguished: there are paradigmatic cases and borderline cases. In the cases of both art and the environment aesthetic viewpoints demand practise.

The formalistic way is the first that should be considered, and within its own limits it is a sensible starting point for examination: the environment is examined as structures and compositions, when the elements perceived through the various senses are taken into consideration. The environment is thus an overall work from which it is indeed possible to separate certain parts as objects for special examination. The definitions are frames, and what lies within them must be articulated.

A basic knowledge of natural processes is demanded in the case of the environment. The examiner must have points of comparison. Knowledge, which may be called knowledge of art, is demanded of the examiner of art; environmental knowledge is demanded of the examiner of the environment. But purely natural scientific knowledge is not sufficient: aesthetic training and aesthetic know-how is required.

One must be able to characterize an aesthetic object, in that way the object of observation is located within a group of other corresponding objects. The bases of environmental criticism are required, and from a theoretical standpoint they are very much the same as those of art criticism. Environmental criticism is performed in practise by depicters of nature, and on the part of the constructed environment by architectural critics, industrial design critics, etc.

Aesthetic objects. An aesthetic object is an entity selected according to conventions. In a work of art, for example, it is possible to distinguish the material basis and the aesthetic object. For example, the back of the canvas, the frame, the cracks in the paint surface, the reflections from the protective glass or varnish, do not belong to a painting as an aesthetic object. They can indeed be activated, that is made significant — and they are aesthetically significant, if the object of examination is a greater totality than the painting itself, for example the painting as an element in furnishing. [See Beardsley 1958: 29-43; Dickie 1974: 147-181.]

Generally, it is possible to distinguish three kinds of aesthetic objects, of which the first group is the most fundamental:

(1) works of art

(2) the environment (in a state of nature, and altered)

(3) art & environment (a combination of the foregoing).

The environment can be in a state of nature, which means untouched by Man; and the cultural environment, in which Man has had an influence. There are different degrees of influence: indirect (pollution in the atmosphere, which reaches everywhere), direct (cultural influences, livelihoods,
etc.), and an extreme artificial environment (the urban environment in which perhaps only the climate is unregulated). The most extreme artificial environments are interior spaces and dwelling environments.

The basis in the aesthetic division of objects too is categories of natural and cultural sciences, as well as of common sense. We can always ask what is the aesthetic object contained in each object in question. What is contained in it is a matter of agreement, a question of convention. But the conventions are concentrated in the arts — in the environment their influence is less. There are general agreements on how objects are to be perceived that are valid especially in the arts, but also elsewhere.

The fact that something is called an aesthetic object signifies a choice of the manner of appreciation. The manner of appreciation can be directed at anything at all. The choice of manner directs the choices of the recipient. It is possible to speak of rewarding and unrewarding choices rather than right or wrong ones. — The delimitation (determining) of the object constitutes the point of departure for aesthetic appreciation.

Any object whatsoever can be appreciated aesthetically; thus a division of categories can be made on any basis whatsoever, and yet obtain objects to be aesthetically appreciated, which are not necessarily, however, so-called aesthetic objects. It is possible to distinguish a weak and a strong sense of the term 'aesthetic object': in the weak sense an aesthetic object is defined purely by the manner of appreciation, in the strong sense a certain kind of reward is required in addition. In this the aesthetic object thus differs from a work of art. Because a work of art is so clearly regulated by institutions it does not need to be aesthetically rewarding in order to be a work of art. But in order to be a good work of art, it must be rewarding. If a reward is set as an objective, the starting point in the division of categories must be the achievement of a meaningful goal: an attempt must be made to make the division in such a way that the appreciation is as rewarding as possible. This also applies to ready-made objects. When the objects are altered or made by Man, the capacity to an aesthetic reward should be taken into account from the very beginning: the objects should be made as such.

The goal of making something that will be rewarding is apparent in art. But in other objects other points of view besides the aesthetic are very significant. For that reason when making them one is forced to reassess goals in accordance with various value areas, in which case the capacity to reward must be examined in relation to all the relevant value areas: objects cannot then be made only in accordance with aesthetic points of view. Making presupposes the reconciliation of perhaps contradictory and mutually incommensurable goals. Thus, also on the aesthetic side, the objective must in the final resort be the examiner's appropriate examination, not the maximization of the aesthetic value at the expense of other values.

The division of categories and objects is problematic in relation to natural objects, because it is possible to say that the division has been made in other sciences and that aesthetics must only follow the division that has been made. It is possible to claim that on other grounds one is forced to make artificial differentiations. And what may truly be lost is the beauty of a deeper level. In order to be able to speak of the beauty of systems, eco- and other systems must be taken into account. Thus appropriate evaluation becomes the goal, and not the maximization of the aesthetic value (which means aestheticism). If one rests content with formalistic beauty, special aesthetic divisions are possible.

Such an argument can be compared to Dickie's view of the aesthetic object of a work of art. A parallel would be the aesthetic object of the environment. Works of art are cultural objects, and the limits are determined accordingly; the limits of the objects of the environment in a state of nature are determined according to the categories of the natural sciences — the aesthetic object is a selection of these, it cannot be anything whatever. Larger units, aesthetic objects of the second and
even higher levels, arise from combinations (cf. Ziff 1979: 291); thus one moves from single object
'objects' to complexes, landscapes, and entire environments (See p. 46 - 47).

The aesthetic object appears to contain the fact that the object is suitable for such appreciation, at
least to some extent. Other objects too can be observed aesthetically, and there can even be
significant aesthetic features in them, which do not, however, make the object as a totality worthy of
such appreciation.

But if the features in question are few or not at all, it is possible to ask what aesthetic appreciation
then signifies. Anything whatever may be examined as anything whatever — a telephone as an
elephant e.g. — but if this means anything, it means that an attempt is being made to find some
desired characteristics or features in the object. Examination would thus signify an attempt to seek
for desired features, whether the attempt was successful or not. Either these features simply do not
appear in the object, or else the observer has not succeeded in bringing them out (cf. the
differentiation between aesthetic value and aesthetic worth[Beardsley 1972: 91]). Here one thus comes
up against ability, skill, preconditions — nor is it ever possible to prove that the object has no
aesthetic features, as one could argue that the features have not been perceived, or that the wrong
features have been presented, etc.

Works of art are by definition objects for aesthetic appreciation, but this too does not mean that
they should of necessity be appreciated in this manner. Other kinds of appreciation are, however,
secondary. In natural objects aesthetic examination is connected to the position Man holds in
nature; aesthetic appreciation presupposes a certain degree of independence from the necessities of
nature, or the satisfaction of basic needs.

Nature can justifiably be examined from the point of view of different value areas without
necessarily placing anything in a special position above others. In this sense nature is free also for
aesthetic examination. But if such a manner of examination is selected, it influences what is relevant
in the examination. It is then debatable whether relevances can be determined from the point of
view of what is relevant in other manners of examination. Such would mean the subjugation of
aesthetic examination to others, making it derivative of other modes of examination. However, the
goal must be to recognize as far as possible the self-legislation and independence of the aesthetic
area. It is indeed clear that some kind of frameworks come from the point of view of other value
areas. It is possible to ask, for example, what is morally to be hoped for or recommended and to set
objectives from that basis. But other value areas should not determine in what way the aesthetic
area is to be treated. It is possible to seek for the aesthetic area's own analyses and models, the basis
of which is the area's own special quality and independence. The greater the totality in question, the
greater the pressure, however, to fit the various value areas together.

Nature is not necessarily a single totality, although it can be. In the same sense art is a totality, but
the analysis of other works of art can, to a great extent, be refrained from when dealing with a work,
though prior to that attention must be paid to which group the work belongs. Membership in a
group of phenomena known as works of art provides certain preconditions and limits for
treatment, but not really more than that. Art research provides the terms and a theoretical frame of
reference for discussion.

It is not appropriate to cut the bond between art and nature, nor is it appropriate to emphasize
the differences between art and nature as aesthetic objects, because in the final analysis the question
is one of a single aesthetic field of phenomena. The recognition of the aesthetic field of phenomena
is the starting point for examination. But it must be remembered that the matter is one of a
conceptual definition, nothing else. The aesthetic field of phenomena only exists when distin-
guished in this way. Thus everything in a way belongs to that field of phenomena, but the question
is one of a selected point of view, of the aspect taken when examining phenomena. The aspect
determines what is relevant and therefore what is to be taken into account in the examination [Danto
In this case, too, changes can indeed take place in the relevance, change of emphasis, and the making of new matters significant. Such changes take place especially in art, but such has also indisputably taken place in the case of nature. In the case of untouched nature this has been influenced by depictions of nature, in the case of the constructed environment it has been particularly regulated by the conceptions of architects.

Works of art are aesthetic objects by definition. Environmental objects are made aesthetic by a certain mode of examination. In principle, objects can be subject to any kind of examination whatever. They are aesthetic only when examined in that way (cf. however Dickie's remark that some aesthetic features can be noticed without special aesthetic interest [Dickie 1984: 101 - 103]). This means that the aesthetic aspect of the object is brought out, and the object analysed accordingly (cf. Wittgenstein, seeing an aspect [Wittgenstein 1953: 213 - 214]).

It has to be asked to what class an environmental work (a real object) belongs in order for it to be examined as a member of its class. There are several possible classifications. Are the aesthetic classes determined for example on the basis of, and according to, scientific classes? Are there non-scientific classes which would be aesthetically relevant?

In my opinion it is entirely possible to start from, for example, the basis of natural scientific classes, such as in the species division of plants and animals [cf Carlson 1981: 19; Walton 1970: 350 - 351], but the landscape types of specialized sciences, or even forest and cloud types, are more questionable as a basis for aesthetic examination.

It is certainly possible to say that scientific classification is a part of the essential background knowledge. There exist two kinds of knowledge: one pertaining to scientific classes and the other to appreciation (know-how) — aesthetic concerns the latter. Therefore there are no specifically aesthetic categories; rather, the scientific (or mythical, religious, etc.) categories are seen in the light of the aesthetic.

Aesthetic categories. One of the central questions of environmental aesthetics is whether there are special aesthetic categories for the environment. Works of art are made for — and then also limited to — aesthetic examination; they are institutionally regulated from beginning to end. In the environment the rules are not so exact. The reception of both art and the environment can be influenced by conventions of the same type, but generally they only apply to those cases in which the environment is perceived through artistic models. The independence of the observation of the environment, its liberty from art models, should be recognized, but so should, to as great an extent, its relative independence from the natural sciences.

The question of whether there can be independent aesthetic categorization remains open. The categories of art are especially suitable for an examination of the environment at a formal level, but the level of significance appears to presuppose the use and adaptation of the categories of the natural sciences.

However, the environment can be appropriately depicted to a great extent on the basis of so-called common sense categories. If perception presupposes a wide acquaintance with the natural sciences, cultural history, and similar, this form of beauty would remain within the reach of only a small group.

But is it equally clear that knowledge of the natural sciences and other sciences is, by its nature, background knowledge, a necessary but not sufficient condition? A significant part of beauty is rational in the sense that only an understanding of the processes of nature helps one to comprehend it. Beauty may be in the economy, regularity, simplicity, and so on, of the process.

Matters are partially the same in art: there are works that presuppose an extremely broad expertise [cf. Allen 1982. 502 - 504]. It is then regarded without question that such a person who has an acquaintance with art, is competent, and that laymen are in danger of basing their aesthetic
statements on misunderstandings — claims made about the environment may be misinterpre-
tations in the same sense as those presented in art. It is possible to think that there is complex
beauty demanding expertise from the observer in the environment too [see Hepburn 1973: 252-253;
Carlson 1981: 25], and in this case many lay opinions would be simply false.

Aesthetic paradigms. Art has a central position as an aesthetic paradigm on account of the fact that
it is indisputably an aesthetic phenomenon. Therefore art criticism has a central position in the field
of aesthetic criticism.

I am of the opinion that nature/the environment is an independent, second aesthetic main
paradigm. However, there is an immediate connection between nature and art — not in the sense
that one should be a model for the other, but in the sense that one is forced to handle similar
questions when dealing with both. The general level is the level of the aesthetic object. It must be
asked what a work of art is like as an aesthetic object, and what the environment is like.

Environmental aesthetics must answer the question, what the environment is like from an
aesthetic point of view, especially as compared to a work of art. It must also attempt to elucidate the
perceptual psychological factors that influence a person's reaction, even though its means do not of
course suffice for reaching into the psychological field. The problems are theoretical and concep-
tual.

An answer to the question that concerns the aesthetic differences of the work of art and the
environment, must be derived from the general ontology of each, which is again different. Art
philosophy answers the general ontological questions of art; and nature philosophy (or should one
say environmental philosophy) the questions of the environment. Both express our general
conception of art and of the environment.

3. Paradigmaticity: basic cases and models

Paradigmatic objects are, on the one hand model cases used in classification and evaluation, and on
the other illustrative generally recognized examples, "concrete particulars," on the basis of which
the unknown can be characterized [Cua & Fletcher 1975. 178].

Paradigmatic cases can be indicated for all aesthetic categories and their sub-categories. Partly
they are communal characteristics of an age and culture or a certain group, partly individual, an
individual's own choices.

The significance of the exemplary cases in the community lies in the fact that with their aid — by
comparison with them — the unknown can be characterized. They also provide perceptual fixed
points for our thought. The classics have such a position in art, sights and natural monuments in
the environment. Some of them are only known in the community through depictions — thus the
importance of depictions is emphasized.

Not everything in a paradigmatic case need be significant; the object may be paradigmatic
through some features being regarded as essential (as in a caricature). In the use of paradigmatic
objects a direct similarity is thus not sought, but rather a certain family resemblance of features,
which may even be very obscure. In such cases a far-reaching ability to abstract is demanded.

In treating the relations between art and the environment on a basis of paradigmaticity I
present the characterizations on the basis of clear cases. This means that the further one departs
from a paradigmatic case the more the objects deviate from my depiction, and the more contro-
versial the contrast becomes. Nonetheless they are members of the same paradigm through the
bond created by the connecting strands.

A conceptual and intellectual space remains around art and the environment: social relations,
scientific theories, games, sport, etc. Here the environment has a very different significance; it is an area of purely intellectual beauty, which appears in the rules and conformities to laws applying to activity; skilful performances take place within their limits.

What finally belongs to aesthetics? It is possible when speaking of the philosophy of art that the aesthetic philosophy of art is the part that belongs to aesthetics: the work of art as an aesthetic object. In environmental philosophy the same precision is required: the environment as an aesthetic object. One problematic group is of objectless, conceptual 'objects'. Here the aesthetic qualities derive from skilful making or acting, from intelligent solutions to scientific problems, from individually or communally morally worthy activity.

Thus, the field of aesthetic objects divides into three, and in accordance with its triple division I shall attempt to characterize the groups of cases (paradigms), and indicate the objects to be located within them. I particularly draw attention to the position of paradigmatic objects with class characteristics as model-givers, and norm-formulators. I shall deal with the three paradigms precisely from the point of view of environmental aesthetics, not generally.

a. The first paradigm and its parasites: the work of art, from the point of view of its relation to the environment

Works of art are generally regarded nowadays as being the basic case of aesthetic objects. But their primariness was not clear historically: in an aesthetic sense natural objects may have come before. Secondly it has not always been clear that works of art should be precisely aesthetic objects; for example religious or political didactic art had other tasks.

But what nowadays generally separates art from other objects is the fact that it is made for aesthetic use on the basis of some kind of a social order.

To a certain extent we take natural objects as given. Our attitude is good-natured, understanding. But if we think that natural objects are in all cases aesthetically valuable, they should be regarded as the basic cases of aesthetic objects — for it is clear that most works of art are, in one way or another failures, incomplete. Why then should one regard as a central paradigm a class, the objects of which are usually failures, rather than a class in which the objects have always succeeded?

It has been proposed that nature is approved of because we have no points of comparison for how it could be otherwise. But there are points of comparison: nature elsewhere, in another time and another condition (a document or picture from memory is then demanded); in addition we can then develop ideas as to what nature could be, and compare the actual situation to the possible. [Cf. Chapter II, "Nature," in Newton 1950: 28-53.]

It is apparent that nature and a work of art cannot be equated as far as evaluation is concerned. Our attitude is approving in relation to untouched nature, in such a way that we seek criteria which justify approval, but critical in another way in relation to the environment affected by Man, and especially to his art (see p. 106-109). Art is a cultural phenomenon, and thus we set demands for it as an act of Man; we adapt to nature — it is true that we change nature, too, also with aesthetic intentions, but then it is more a question of wanting to replace one form of beauty with another, one made by Man or one that has arisen with his support.

It is possible to ask, is art then a paradigm of paradigms, a super-paradigm, to which others can be compared? In my view it does not have such a position, despite its position as a central paradigm, although comparisons between paradigms are possible. Art is simply one paradigm, the environment another; others are manufactured objects that are non-art (utensils etc.).

There are mixed paradigms on the border: industrial design, architecture, landscape design.
Generally they can be classed as a third main group. The groups are thus (1) art, (2) nature, and (3) art & nature, that is a mixed parasite group of the two previous ones.

The philosophy of art deals with art generally, from all sides. The philosophy of the aesthetic object contained in a work of art can be set as its parallel. The point of examination is thus the aesthetic object, not the work of art in its entirety. It is perhaps possible to say that the aesthetic object of a work of art covers the greater part of a work of art.

As a class works of art have usually a paradigmatic position in that art is used as a model in the aesthetic perception of other objects. The work of art can justifiably be thought of as being a central case, which warrants comparisons. But it does not necessarily have to be a question of anything more than similarity between it and environmental objects.

Art contains its own paradigmatic works — the classics and others that have achieved an established status — and our practical conception of art is greatly influenced by them. Art can be thought of as an area, which has a clear core and unclear boundaries. Although the delimitation is controversial in itself, which side of the border the object is placed is fundamental. The borders themselves can be thought of as being as indistinct as the ripples that advance and weaken in advancing when a stone is thrown into water.

In the border area entire forms that are on the art side are architecture, garden art, and so-called environmental art. Industrial design, handicraft, etc. are outside. Artistic and aesthetic features can also be found outside of art; besides, an external object may be, as an object, aesthetically more valuable than an art object. Art is a certain cultural phenomenon which does not necessarily have to be connected to the aesthetic. As for aesthetic objects, they are always, by definition, bound to the aesthetic. But the number of aesthetic features may be in that way small, so that one is not justified in speaking of an aesthetic object in a characterizing sense, even though an aesthetic mode of examination has been chosen. The term 'aesthetic object' is thus ambiguous: on the one hand it means an object, which has a relatively large number of aesthetic features (i.e. is beautiful), on the other anything at all that is subject to aesthetic examination.

i. Parasites of art: natural/environmental works of art

What is a natural work of art, of which especially naturalists so often speak, either generally or more precisely in terms of art forms? I take a few examples from Reino Kalliola:

(1) "A wasp's nest is a real work of art." (Its maker for its part is "an architect of the insect world.") [Kalliola 1946: 320.]

(2) "A birch wood in an old pasture — like a painting from the last century by Holmberg or Westerholm, from the times of patriotic idealism." [Kalliola 1951: 227]

(3) "Räme, neva and korpi (pine bog, grass bog and spruce marsh) — there is the triad of Finnish bog country. Our rugged landscape plays innumerable variations on this melancholy melody." [Kalliola 1946: 232.]

In such cases naturalists do not intend a literal significance. Literally, it would mean that natural objects were offered and approved of as works of art. Because one speaks of a work of art, but not literally, this practise is called parasitic: parasitic use is dependent on literal use. It would also be possible to speak of metaphorical use. — This is a very general way of speaking, and from the point of view of my work it is an important border-area problem located on the side of environmental aesthetics; therefore, I will explore it at some length.

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The natural object as a work of art. A stone polished by water, a tangle of roots, driftwood, burr-grained, or dry standing wood exhibited in an art exhibition can be a work of art. These are so-called found art (objet trouvé) [see Blocker 1979: 4-5; Herrnstein Smith 1978: 54-55]. But the choice need not be easy. The repetition of the method may be easy, once someone has invented it. The insight is more important.

Natural objects and animals can be presented as works of art or as parts of works of art — for example Menashe Kadishman’s yellow-painted tree; a Finnish tree in autumn colors may also look the same, though it would only be a work of art in a metaphorical sense. Kadishman’s tree comes close to the made ready-made or ready-made aided idea: a work has been achieved through professional skill, which would not, at least at once, be recognized as separate from a manufactured item. — Works containing animals have been made by, among others, the Greek Jannis Kounellis (parrots and horses in a gallery). [See Kounellis’ interview, White 1979.]

The making of a work of art from a natural object takes place by communal decision, which is normally made by an artist who has achieved an established position, authorized and controlled by the community. Anyone at all can make individual classifications, but he will scarcely get support for them. The status, position, of an artist must be acquired by conventional means; the acquisition of status does not succeed in the border-areas. — Is it, however, a question of an intentional fallacy if in classifying something as art one’s presupposition is that the artist is able or wishes to make a correct classification?

In choosing, the object is provisionally interpreted as a work of art, for the actual connection, the context, is still separate. The classification precedes the interpretation and thus determines what conventions of interpretation shall be used. As a work of art a natural object that has been turned into art becomes a member of the family of art, and through that an object of artistic interpretation [see Herrnstein Smith 1978: 74-75].

Found art operates above all in relation to other art; its frame of reference is formed by earlier works of art, as well as definitions and conceptions of art, among them especially the theory of imitation. The work parodies the imitation idea by combining that which imitates and that which is imitated. On account of its conceptual nature it is extremely intellectual art [see Wolfe 1980: 65, 87].

The making of a work of art is thus also conceptual making: selecting, separating, setting up for exhibition. A work of art does not necessarily have to be made by working on some material with an instrument. Skill appears in choices. The part played by the name is extremely significant (among others Robert Mallary’s In Flight, which makes it a performing work [see the picture and comments in Blocker 1979: 4-5]). What is usually additional in a work of found art is precisely the name, which provides a starting point to be taken into account in interpretation. The name, it is true, may be, for example, a common noun applied to an individual object, as in many of Marcel Duchamp’s works (Bottle drier etc.). Other additions are, for example, the placing of the object, the choice of position, the determining of the place of observation; in nature the object does not have a front and rear, nor necessarily an upper and lower part, or a certain position, they are determined first of all in observation. Made works of art that come into existence purely by exhibiting them are more problematic; Dickie has changed his previous idea of the granting of artfactuality and spoken of the achieving of the position of an artifact—he has been of the opinion that artfactuality cannot be given by such activity as indicating, and that the making of a work of art demands more [see Dickie 1974: 44-45 and 1984: 46].

Harold Osborne has criticized the ease with which artists have been able to shift work that has traditionally belonged to them onto the receivers, for example in happenings and conceptual art. Osborne is of the opinion that the artist cannot do this without losing his position as an artist. [Osborne 1979: 218.] The method is connected to the fact that anti-art has moved from the presentation of abnormal products as works of art to the breaking of presentation conventions and the rules of the game of the art world itself.
Nature as a part of a work of art. Two Finnish artists — Olavi Lanu and Annikki Luukela — have so created their work that it is an inseparable part of the environment.

Lanu’s works seem as if they are growing from nature, or that they are works of art that hide in nature. As representational sculptures the works recall objects of untouched nature.

Surrounding nature is reflected in Luukela’s mirrors that are placed at various angles; the mirrors bring out aspects of the landscape that would otherwise not be seen with the same totality. In exhibitions Luukela presents her pictures of nature as a photographic series accompanied by tape-recorded sounds from nature. Her works are parallel to nature’s own pictures: reflections on the surface of a calm lake, mirages, echoes.

My next example of an artist of this type is the internationally recognized artist, Christo.

Case study: Christo

Christo Javacheff — known simply as Christo — can be characterized as an environmental artist. His works are processes in which the exhibition of the work is only one stage. The drawings, collages, watercolors, models, designs and pictorial documentation of the realization are all shown at an exhibition, and are quite as important as the realization itself.

Christo’s art has three principal ideas. The first is packaging. The artist has packaged furniture, plants, people, fences, bridges, paths, monuments, buildings, a coast. The second idea is piling objects such as oil drums. The third idea is fencing or separation by a curtain. The works are environmental works, that are related to both sculpture and architecture.

A large part of the works have remained only as designs, and as such have the same status as unperformed plays or unbuilt buildings.

Packets

Christo’s-packagings act in different ways in different situations, but in general his methods is to remove something from the environment that belongs to it; not, however, to remove it completely, a ghostly form remains. The form is barely visible through the package, the binding brings out its principal features, usually a translucent foil lightens the colors. The object is made strange and new; the nature of an ordinary object is changed.

The significance is dependent on the packaged object, not so much on the method of packaging. But the packaging of these objects also signifies that the environment can be regarded as new and different when a certain part is made invisible. Absence is made visible.

The documentation, filming and photographing of the various stages of the process substantively belong to the work, and are supported by a verbal description of the work phases. The works generally only exist for a short time during which they are depicted, and then demolished. The work is thus a process, which begins from detailed planning that perhaps lasts for years, reaches a peak of realization for a few days or weeks, and ends with demolition, the environment being returned to its former stage. The beauty of well-planned work and performance is made apparent.

Links

Christo’s works are influential on many levels. Primarily they are, with all their stages, a great art happening, even if most people are only able to participate through the depiction.
Secondly, they continue that line within the art world that regards art as a comment about art. In his essay, *The Painted Word*, Tom Wolfe speaks of art that has changed its nature from visual to literary, to an art theoretical speech. The works participate in the debate about the definition of art and art theory [Wolfe 1980: 108-109].

What Christo's works mainly comment on is the relation between art and the environment. The environment comes to be an essential part of the work when it gains new features. Fundamentally, the works are visual, but when realized they involve the other senses — in addition they always have a symbolic significance that can only be understood through thought.

Christo's 38-kilometre *The Running Fence* is a part of the entire landscape. It divides a unified space, but also articulates it at the same time in the same way as any other fence. Its diving into the sea gives a feeling of continuity (or does it grow from the sea?).

*Valley Curtain* is like a stage curtain, behind which a play wafts, a landscape — or like a curtain covering a painting. It illustrates the landscape, it offers a sight, and asks us to look at and admire the value of the landscape. But at the same time as these works bring the frameworks of art to nature they are worthy of examination themselves. The reports of many eye-witnesses speak of the beauty in the waving of the fence or the curtain when the wind blows, or of the changes in color depending on the weather and time of day. These are living works. The fact that examination can be concentrated on the properties of the fence, although they are not central, supports the argument that the works of Duchamp and others can also be examined from the point of view of color, form, etc. There are also aesthetic properties in the actual material chosen [see Cohen 1973: 79-80].

Christo's works are — as works of art always are — problems of interpretation. Christo has said: "I don't define art, I make art." [Christo 1982: 88] The problem rests with critics and theoreticians. It is not necessary to interpret an ordinary fence running through the country in the same way and the same sense — it only has or has had a practical purpose and that can be elucidated. A work of art too has a task, but a task as a work of art: an aesthetic significance and use.

But the works are sufficiently pared-down that one easily feels guilty of overinterpretation. They are ingenious ways to extend the area of art, to remove the boundary lines between art forms, to bring art and reality closer by bringing reality into the sphere of art.

One such problem of anti-art is the question of the basis of evaluation. What is the frame of reference for discussing these works? One answer would relate value to the extent of those conceptual fields that the work is able to bring together.

It has been said that works of anti-art are not worth looking at but are worth thinking about [Dickie 1975: 421]. Some of Christo's works are undoubtedly also worth looking at, because they have indisputably formal value, but above all, they are truly worth thinking about. Their simplicity gives directions for new significances, but only suggestively, leaving the interpreter without support.

*Art metaphors: pictorial and metaphorical significance.* 'A nature's work of art' is a metaphorical phrase. It expresses praise; in some cases it merely characterizes the object through the stated analogy. Reino Kalliola's depiction of Koli hill is an example of praise:

> When artists paint a landscape, they usually leave out some irritating details, or alter some outlines or forms to create a complete entirety. At Koli it is unnecessary. From here a finished painting opens out in which there is nothing to be left out or altered. It is so immense and restful, its composition is so
beautiful, and its colors so pure. It is beautiful at all seasons, but most beautiful on a sunny day in late autumn, when Lake Pielinen shines a brilliant blue, and the deciduous forests on the slopes of the hills glow with a golden yellow and purple red.

[Kalliola 1978 (1944): 174.]

Recognition can have a social aspect, for example protected views, so-called natural monuments; or it can have an individual aspect, for example the praise of some depicter of nature.

A nature's work of art is an aesthetically significant object, but often also a curiosity, a 'natural wonder' (cf. John Muir's comment on giant Sequoias: "Nature's forest masterpiece" [Yosemite 1977: see picture 8]), a rarity and speciality, apparently made by Man, an object that apparently contains and demonstrates human intelligence, and conscious design. Such are also, among other things, the dam structures of beavers and the nests of birds, especially decorative displays of skill. Protection is based to a great extent on this kind of speciality value. In the sixth paragraph of the first section of the Finnish Nature Protection Law (Passed on the 23rd. February, 1923) it is stated that:

If on territory belonging to the state an individual tree or group of trees or other natural formation is encountered, the preservation of which is significant from the point of view of science or its speciality, may the official to whom the supervision of the territory has been entrusted, without let or hindrance by the approved plan for its use, protect the aforementioned natural monument.

[Luonnonsuojelulaki: 1977: 6 - 7.]

In the first paragraph of the same law the protection of totalities is also spoken of:

 Territory belonging to the state may, in order to preserve its nature untouched, be separated as a general nature protection area.

 In order to preserve a naturally beautiful or otherwise significant place in terms of its nature, for the future, or in order to protect some species of animal or plant, a separate reserve may also be formed.

[Ibid.: 5.]

Although art proper has freed itself from its bond to beauty, nature's works of art have not: they are based above all on the old concept of harmony. (It is certainly true that nobility has been seen in a raging sea storm; and romanticism brought wild, untamed nature into favour.)

'Nature's works of art' are things or objects that are certainly chosen separately, which are not exhibited as works of art, but rather as natural curiosities. They are objects of examination, but the environment of their exhibition does not make them works of art in a literal sense. — Other expressions referring to human activity are linked to the curiosity idea (inter alia "nature's quarry" in Kalliola [1946: 63]).

'Nature's work of art' is a general expression which can be made more precise by using art forms: one speaks of the cycle of the seasons as a drama, a landscape as a painting, and progressing to sub-forms a spring landscape as a water-color and a midsummer landscape as a heavier oil painting; or a view is compared to the work of a particular artist, for example a painting by Holmberg or Westerholm. Birdsong is spoken of as music [Hartshorne 1973: 9 — 12]. These kinds of examples the semiotician Thomas A. Sebeok would refer to as the prefigurations of art [Sebeok 1979]. Literary comparisons would be a further example. In his work Kalevalan laulumaitta ('From the Song-lands of Kalevala') I.K. Inha attempts to show a similarity between the variations of folk-poems and the variations of the landscape:

But when we have written down more of the poems, our conception gradually changes. In that comparatively dispersed, almost pruned repetitive poetry, a strong unity becomes increasingly visible. The more singers we become familiar with, the more the unity is enriched, gaining features that complete it, finer shades of meaning. The view opens out in the same way as when one climbs from the clearing of a private dwelling to a high mountain, from which all the surrounding districts can be seen in a wide panoramic view. In a landscape view too, more or less the same basic elements dominate at different points, but ever changing over a large area they gain innumerable new shades,
connect in different ways, and group to form greater dominating features — which would not be noticed in a particular landscape, even though it may be a part of the greater — a line of small hills, forest and agricultural backwoods, water systems connected by sounds and rivers. In almost the same way the views of folk poetry become enriched and gain greater connecting themes, the more they collect in the consciousness of the observer. Every repetition that takes place reveals, in the same way as climbing a mountain, new features, and at the same time increasingly outlines the totality of which they are part.

[Inha 1921: 274.]

Later Inha continues:

Recognition of the variants does not, therefore, lessen the value of the Kalevala, but on the contrary establishes it. After reading one or two variants the reader easily falls prey to suspicion, but once he becomes acquainted with the entire area of variation he rises above the forest and the whole broad view, which we see in the Kalevala composed as a beautiful painting, opens out before him.

[Ibid. 331.]

In place of a metaphor it is possible to use a milder form, the comparison: 'like a painting' etc. It is also possible to speak of musical qualities, dramatic qualities, etc. What is common to these is that the totality is delimited in the manner of a work of art.

In some cases the name of the form is only apparently the name of an art form: not all building is architectural art, all dance is not part of the art of dance, all song is not part of the art of music.

Postcards speak of the 'beauty of winter' and the 'magic of winter' when showing snowy trees. The same idea is developed by Tibor Kolley in a picture in which the mist rising from the Horseshoe Falls at Niagara has, in the frost and wind, covered the otherwise naked trees with a blanket of ice. The text of the picture was "Winter's art" [The Globe and Mail, Jan. 13, 1982]. It is just as if the artist Winter has covered the trees with a party dress of lace.

The painting idea is developed furthest in the following news item in the "Topics" section after the editorial in the New York Times [Jan. 17, 1982]:

Masterpiece

Most of New York's scenic wonders are a permanent part of the cityscape. Central Park, the Flatiron Building, the Hudson River, for instance, are not (one likes to think) here today and gone tomorrow.

But one sensational view was visible only to those who passed the General Post Office the morning after the first snow. Men in yellow foul-weather gear were clearing the steps with bright blue shovels. The colors would have stopped Canaletto in his tracks. One spectator titled the scene "G.P.O. Winter" and ranks it with the world's great paintings. We wish fervently that it existed in a museum more accessible than the one in the head.

[Topics 1982]

This is a typical example of a natural/environmental work of art. What is in itself a small and transient event gains significance in the eyes of a suitable recipient. He must have points of comparison from the sphere of art, the ability to choose what is essential from the material, means to see the real landscape as a painting. He is simultaneously an artist and a critic.

The event is perceived as a work in the style of Canaletto, it is given a name, there is a wish for it to be preserved in a museum rather than the memory, it is criticized. One form of environmental art work is just like this: a momentarily significant combination of elements, which only a conscious and skilful observer who happens to be on the spot is able to assemble. — Such observers are most usually photographers.

This experience only becomes communally significant when it has been reported, verbally or as a picture. In the example above, people involved discussed their perception, but it only achieved real significance after it had jumped from a street discussion to the editorial page of the Sunday edition of The New York Times. One can only wonder for how many this experience of an editor has opened a new point of view and model for the examination of even a familiar environment: a playful view of nature as art (cf. Walton's make-believe [Walton 1978. 11-12]).
Whether the means are postcards or newspapers, picture or word, thoughts and modes of perception are influenced. The beauty of winter and environmental works of art begin to be sought and perceived according to learned models. Nor is the matter one of a formula in a bad sense, but one of the offering of an apparatus, the extension of the ability to receive, the awakening of ideas and perceptions — of aesthetic education in the everyday, significant connections.

It must be remembered, however, that the landscape is not a painting, the environment is not only a visual experience, art is not the only model even for its aesthetic examination. But this is one approach, and keeping it open must not become an obstacle to other modes of experience.

The aesthetic objects of the environment may be extremely momentary, a brief pause to examine something such as a surprising combination of elements. Generally, aesthetic examination is aroused by a feeling of newness and surprise. The object in its entirety or a combination of familiar elements may then be new. The works of art in the environment may be just like this: momentary significant combinations. Seeing such combinations presupposes a readiness in the observer, a knowledge of art, an ability to classify.

But what stops one person, may go completely unnoticed by another. The receiver must fulfill certain preconditions. On the other hand, the object indicated may reach new receivers; through teaching and examples, corresponding objects may, in other connections too, reach new people.

*The artist.* And who is the artist? It is the receiver, Man. For Man chooses an object as a nature's work of art, no matter how it has arisen. Nature — the literal maker — and the forces of nature may occupy the role of a metaphorical artist. "Water, the sculptor of the land, flows fast and free in northern rivers," write Jack Fields and David Moore in the introductory picture essay to their book *Finland Creates* [Fields & Moore 1977: 13]; and correspondingly Pekka Suhonen writes of the achievements of culture: "Oil storage tanks rise up on the edge of towns like modern statues..." [Suhonen 1977: 24]. In the picture-book *Lapinmaa/Four Seasons in Lapland* (1975) there is a photograph of an outlook tower remodelled by a blizzard (picture 120). Sebeok presents a bird as a builder. The artist may therefore, in a metaphorical sense, be an animal, a bird building its nest or singing [Sebeok 1979: e.g. 6-11], or apes dancing a rain-dance [ibid., esp. 15-16].

It is possible to examine nature just as if it had been made, and then it may be praised or reproached. Thus nature is normally bound to a connection with some model that has been mastered — such as art. One begins to examine nature through that model, not necessarily the results, but rather the entire process. In place of the missing maker a metaphorical maker is constructed. Then one begins to speak of nature as an artist, and her works as 'natural works of art'. It is possible to evaluate how well she has succeeded in each performance.

But nature can also give inspiration to those who are real artists in a literal sense (see the pair of pictures in *Finland Creates* with the text "The wet translucency of melting ice influenced Tapio Wirkkala in his design for this shallow glass bowl." [Fields & Moore 1977: 128-129]). The same exploitation of natural forms is referred to in the ten-year celebration advertisement of the Humppila Glassworks:

We have tried to depict the many-faceted beauty, the fine nuances, the expressiveness, and strength of Finnish nature through the means of glass. Our inspirations have been the surrounding landscape, a waving field of ripe grain, the markings of moss on a slab of rock, the fine stems of plants, all the many nuances of our rich nature.

[From an advertisement in leading Finnish newspapers. e.g. *Uusi Suomi* 11.11. 1979.]

Even the reception of the environment presupposes a different kind of activeness than the reception of art. In the environment the object is made by the receiver in the sense that he has delimited and selected that which he receives. Socially offered natural works of art are an exception: sights, viewpoints, etc.

What is decisive is the deliberate choice or implicit acceptance of the mode of aesthetic
appreciation. Familiarization with depictions creates a basis for the manner of aesthetic appreciation; it gives operational models.

Beautiful details. Allen Carlson distinguishes three kinds of reception of nature; he calls these methods of observation object, landscape, and environment models [Carlson 1979a]. I follow his scheme.

The object model is the narrowest: the object is examined separately from the environment. Anything at all can, in principle, be chosen as the object of such an examination; Janina Makota is of the opinion that the delimitation is to be decided by the receiver — he decides what is the centre, what the background. The outline changes as the observer changes his place of observation or the object. Paul Ziff tried to find objects that could not be examined aesthetically. Are dry dung or an alligator wallowing in mud such? — No. They too are objects of aesthetic examination just as conventional beautiful sunsets etc. are. [Ziff 1979: 285.] Are they then worse objects than some works of art? They are not, because the comparison lacks a common measure, Ziff replies [ibid. 293]. The idea appears to be that aesthetic value is individual, unique: each object is good in its own way. If something is not experienced as good, this may be due to the interpreter's failure to discover the manner of being good that is characteristic of the object. An alligator or puddle can indubitably be examined as aesthetic, and perhaps they are experienced as being impressively ugly, grotesque, macabre, provocative, and so on. Objects that leave one indifferent are more problematical.

Normally the details chosen as the objects of this examination are precisely specialities: rare and surprising looking plants and animals, decorative seashells, weirdly formed stones or trees. Skilfulness, such as that in which the trace of the hand of the designer appears, is admired. Perhaps the interest in the curiosities of buildings is explained thus.

Examination can also be directed at the micro-world: at crystals, the structure of cells, etc.; and a beauty built of regularity is found in this miniature world.

Objects can also be created for the purpose: the breeding of decorative plants and pet animals is regulated especially by aesthetic ideals. Species and individuals that are felt to be beautiful are produced. In these cases the boundary between the artifact and the natural, the made and the original, is vague.

Nature differs decisively from art in that the limits of the object are neither pre-given nor absolute as they are in art. In the case of art we know (usually) what belongs to the work, what does not — even if we do not necessarily know what is aesthetically significant in it. In nature the delimitation is free; active shutting-out is also possible; we can, for example, separate disturbing buildings from the landscape, even though we remain conscious of them. This can be compared to the discussion about a Chinese stagehand: should he be regarded as a part of the play or not — normally the stagehands are excluded from the play, even though they are seen.

The one who experiences the object is an artist in the same metaphorical sense as the object itself is a work of art; in the case of some objects he is bound to a definition made by the community. The decisive difference compared to works of art proper is the fact that the recipient of 'nature's works of art' is in the same world as the work; the world of works of art is different. The viewer enters into nature; with an actual work of art he can at the most destroy it as a physical object (cf. however, the happening, in which the viewer is part of a theatrical event). Normally only the artist has the right to interfere with the work.

Definitions are made and taught by photographic art. In the same way as Marcel Martin has characterized film as the art of cutting [Martin 1962: 131], the photography can be characterized as the art of delimitation. Delimitation achieves a formal articulation of the object [see Reading Photographs 1977]. Photographs also compose the object (see Anselm Adams' Moon and Half Dome).

The facade of the landscape. Secondly I shall examine the view- or landscape-model mentioned
by Carlson. The point of departure in this is the landscape painting or photograph: we see the landscape just as if it is framed, in the manner of a painting. The choice and the framing make the landscape. Hildegard Binder Johnson writes:

Landscape per se does not exist; it is amorphous — an indeterminate area of the earth’s surface and a chaos of details incomprehensible to the perceptual system. A landscape requires selective viewing and a frame. The “line” of a mountain crest, woods, or prairie silhouetted against the sky is imaginary; it lies in the eyes of the beholder. Landscapes need what Suzanne Langer calls the subjectivation-of nature, or interpretation in terms of human experience. [H.B. Johnson 1979: 27; cf. Tunnard 1978: 151-152 (a pair of pictures from the falls of the Rhine at Schaffhausen, Switzerland)].

A large number of sights are offered that have been regulated in the manner of art. It is predetermined from where one should go to the sight or viewspot, from where one should look and when. External regulators of this kind are paths, roads, as well as, especially for motor tourists, rest-places, signs, view-signs, quotation and name boards, guide pamphlets and books, postcards, maps. The view, the landscape, has a facade, the viewer a place, a viewing point or route, which is a path or motor road. Direction takes place through various kinds of structures, for example outlook towers (the numerous towers of Niagara, etc.). At such places there are even binoculars, with which the landscape can be viewed in greater detail, or devices that give a taped description.

An environmental object may achieve a position comparable to that of a work of art as a result of the activity of the community’s authorities (nature conservation officer, who has been able to bring a protection decision into force etc.).

The danger is that people begin to look only for outstanding objects in the environment, duplicates of objects that have been depicted; and by-pass for example, their own dwelling environment and neighbourhood as aesthetically uninteresting (cf. Freeman Patterson, the random place, from which the subject for a picture is to be found [Patterson 1979: 30-32]; cf. also the British artists at Venice 1978 [Biennale 78]). It would be important, however, that examination would not be limited to outstanding objects, but that aesthetic demands would also be set for the everyday living environment — and that it would be allowed to match those demands. If the environment is thought of as a totality, it must be recognized that outstanding objects gain their significance from being dramatic highpoints. But certain minimum demands must in any event be set for the environment, which it must fulfill in order to prepare for a visit to the outstanding places.

Besides, outstanding places change with time and tastes: Finnish marsh landscapes, or the North American prairies are landscape types that have gradually achieved an increasingly important significance.

The bases of regulation are not only aesthetic but also, for example, connected with nature preservation — the exploitation of nature must be minimized — or with safety: one must beware cliffs, poisonous plants, and dangerous animals.

The offering of views is a social activity. Sights are communal, memorable and socially recognized places in the landscape. David B. Richardson deals with the question of how nature is socially offered, and how conventions — and in his opinion especially the aesthetic conventions that have arisen in the sphere of art — direct the reception of nature [Richardson 1976: 190-191].

In the same way as a work is indicated to be a work of art by signing, a sight is indicated to be a sight by labelling it such. It is catalogued, it is given a name, signs lead to it. At the present time the offering is determined by tourist organizations and entrepreneurs. These “model” natural works of art then influence the reception of the rest of nature. They are points of comparison, whose position is the same as that of the classics of art proper: to give a measure, to be a point of comparison, but also to give examples by which the unknown can be characterized (“The Switzerland of Finland,” etc.). The recipient has to take into account the sign given and the point of view from which to see it. Nature’s works of art have a reception convention that is related to that of actual works of art. The
question is the same as in, for example, literature, when a text is defined as fact or fiction.

But the fault in the landscape or view model is that nature is not seen as a totality, but as relatively scarce sights. The greater part of the environment remains no-man's land. In addition, the model emphasizes singly the visual aspect; nature photography and landscape painting have precisely on account of formalization and visualization produced an emphasis on form. Carlson also justifiably criticizes the use of pictures in research into environmental conceptions, for pictures formalize and visualize the object at the expense of other values [Carlson 1977: 142-144].

Certain works of art placed in the landscape have clearly demonstrated the significance of delimitation. At the Venice Biennale (1978) a frame-work by a Danish artist trio was on exhibition, with which it was possible to enclose a desired part of nature; Menashe Kadishman's work *Trees in negative* is constructed on the same idea. Whereas these frames are taken into nature, the Englishman Mark Boyle brings square metre-sized pieces of framed ground surface into the exhibition — or rather creates the illusion of that, for the works are of the *made ready-made* type. His works present a pavement or sandy beach; the area to be copied is chosen, according to the statement of the artist, by a method based on chance.

A sculpture in a park or a building can be a factor that strongly articulates the landscape. The landscape can, in the same way, be articulated by its own means: planting, tree-felling, earth-moving, quarrying. Powerful articulation of this kind is carried out, for example, during the construction of roads. It is often impossible, purely on the basis of observation, to say whether the matter is one of an environment altered by Man or whether it is in a state of nature. In altering, Man can use the same implements as nature: fire, water, etc. A paradox then develops if it is regarded that untouched nature is beautiful and is approved of as such, whereas that altered by Man should be criticized [see Elliot 1982, 84].

Death Valley in California is, as its name suggests, a hot and dry desert, in which for the greater part no plant life can exist in summer. In front of a mountain view, besides a parking place, is a board with the text "Dante's View". The task of the viewer is to link this in his mind with the part of Dante's *Divine Comedy* describing Hell; this is strengthened by other names in the area that are connected with the devil, such as "Devil's Cornfield". The nameboard is like a name appearing in an exhibition catalogue or on a plaque on a painting. We do not view the landscape as such, but quite concretely in relation to the name, and in doing so through the cultural knowledge that directs our observation. We place the object in a frame of reference given by natural and cultural historical as well as ecological knowledge. In this case cultural knowledge is dominant.

The border area is that in which the term 'work of art' is used to praise, and not simply classify, something. (This also includes the fact that calling something a work of art is also used to reject something: "too fine for me!", "trivial!", "boring!"). Here the object is received in the same way as a work of art. In one sense, this represents a parasitic way of receiving objects: they are considered to be like works of art, but not literally so.

The environmental model. The third type is the environment model. Its relation to the former is illustrated by a quotation from Martti Rapola (even though his use of the terms is somewhat different):

I do not wish to mix landscape and view with one another. One stops to observe views from places where the eye carries far: from peaks, slopes, the edge of the open sea. A landscape cannot be digested by looking; one must be, live, wander, in a landscape. Certainly one can stop there too, one can look at it too. But it is also sensed other than through the eyes. The dominant element of a landscape may reside even in the invisible thunder of hidden rapids, in the scent of a wind that continually caresses an area. One is absorbed into a landscape as into a symphony by Brahms or Franck, or Sibelius' "Tapiola." I would even claim that while on the one hand views are remembered in their tens, one
only lives in one landscape for each period of development. I suspect that the landscape of childhood, cherished in its entirety, sinks in deepest. But landscapes that have been experienced can be remembered as also can views. Perhaps one can tell about them too. [Rapola 1971: 224 - 225; see also the chapter on Metacriticism.]

Reception takes place through the mediation of all the senses. A person moves through nature, he is in immediate contact with it, and all the time makes observations that articulate the environment. He uses all his senses. His experience is a process; he examines nature in series of events: sunset, the flowering of a flower, the rhythm of the seasons. Carlson is of the opinion that the only real reception is the one that takes into account the special character of the environment [Carlson 1979a: 273 - 274]. There are no formalizing frames in nature.

This kind of activity, too, can be socialized and regulated to become similar to the reception of art. It is also literally a question of works of art in, for example, garden and urban architecture. But once again a metaphorical significance is possible. At Yosemite, and Point Lobos in California, in Muir's forest, and other similar places for hiking, it is possible to move in nature, but only along precisely limited routes. The areas are clearly delimited, they have guards as museums have, the object must be changed in no way, they may have an entrance fee — the external exhibition mechanisms connected with art. The objects are chosen by a communal decision: an area is defined as a national monument, as a national reserve, as a national park. Kenneth A. Erickson states that social planning artifactualizes original nature, making it a cultural product by delimiting the areas in which nature is to be preserved untouched:

Perhaps all preserved and protected areas, even the few ostensibly reserved for science, are essentially ceremonial landscapes. If this be so, a geographical paradox is close at hand: the few remaining natural landscapes will be products of human decision and protection, and thus, in time, artifacts of culture. [Erickson 1977: 47; see also Stea 1975: 46.]

Synthesis. Man acts in accordance with all three models — that is the object model, the landscape or view model, and the environmental model. All of them come close to art when socializing objects and creating reception conventions for them. At the same time an appropriate aesthetic attitude comes with this, in which a certain degree of disinterestedness and a conceptual distance are presupposed. People do not, for example, have the right to interfere with these objects, to alter their nature. One is supposed only to examine it, but to examine it actively. However, the examination is perhaps more loosely directed and regulated by conventions than in the case of art.

In the same way that a utensil can become a work of art, the work of art character of some natural object can be emphasized so that it very closely approximates an actual work of art. A disused building can be preserved as a cultural monument; it may even increase its aesthetic character as the original practical purpose is removed or fades. Architecture does not really recognize "art for art's sake." Built ruins, which were a practise in romantic landscape gardening in the eighteenth century, are an extreme; such are also the facades of the Best chain of stores, which are designed to resemble collapsed buildings.

A natural object can also function as a 'ruin': a dead tree is left standing, and it can even be moved into the garden of a house. Living natural objects might be exhibited in the same way. John Muir writes:

If one pine were placed in a town square, what admiration it would excite! Yet who is conscious of the pine-tree multitude in the free woods, though open to everybody? [Yosemite 1977: from the text to plate 14.]

The message is clear: look at the beauty of nature in a natural state, even when it has not been specially put on exhibition for that purpose!
Nature can be articulated by the structures of Man. Especially architecture, at its best, exploits and clarifies the character of the environment. But a work of art can be the instrument of articulation, for example, in landscape architecture. A work of art may become the centre-point, as Rolf Westphal’s Builder sculpture is at Järvenpää, though it has been felt to be too dominating in the landscape. A more familiar work that articulates the environment is Eila Hiltunen’s Sibelius Monument. Works of art are not autonomous in nature — even if they can be examined as such if desired — but are units in landscape design which have a very great noteworthiness. For example it is precisely the Sibelius Monument itself that is the absolute centre of the park; the rest of the park and the environment is its background. In the same way the Järvenpää sculpture dominates a large area.

Articulation can also extend to interiors. The Sara Hildén Art Museum in Tampere frames nature with its windows. It connects some of the works of art on exhibition with the framed nature: a sculpture can be situated in front of such a window-delimited lake landscape. The work can be seen as separate and autonomous, or else in relation to the background landscape; the connection to the landscape is so strong that separate examination demands effort and feels artificial. An even stronger and more absolute connection is made in the chapel at Otaniemi, in which the cross that is part of the altarpiece is outside in the forest, behind the window.

Styles. The skilful recipient is able to recognize and distinguish the styles of nature — a metaphorical way of using language again! He is able to adapt his examination to the special demands and character of nature. Carlson states that the reception of a prairie presupposes broad panoramas, overall views; it is the details of virgin forest, on the other hand, that attract attention [Carlson 1979a: 273-274]. Concerning art, Helen Knight has stated that the techniques of oil-painting and watercolor are different; and therefore different criteria of quality must be set for works representing the different forms. These must be looked at in different ways, and different things must be sought; what is praised in one may be a minor matter or in fact a fault in the other. [Knight 1954: 155-158.]

Models. What properties do nature’s works of art have? They are in the position of a classic or exemplary work in relation to the rest of nature. Their quality is, in a way, indisputable; the properties regarded as good are crystallized in them. Besides the classics there are also cases of fashion, which are subject to seasonal changes. Different objects are in fashion at different times.

On what grounds are viewpoints and other similar things chosen? — On account of being typical? — Of being special? — Of being rare? All of these certainly have their influence. The object is normally in some way in contrast to its environment; an environment that calls no attention to itself prepares one for the move to the viewpoint (object) itself. The place is thus essentially attached to a broader frame. Such objects are the core areas of the aesthetic examination of nature. They can be compared to so-called paradigmatic works of art in the field of art, to indisputable basic or model cases. These objects can even form symbols of national identity (the lake area of Eastern Finland, the Åland Islands archipelago, Koli). Some objects are culturally significant because they are connected to some event (Runeberg’s Spring).

Natural objects have historically a primary position as a source of Man’s aesthetic experience. Art as an institution is a relatively late result of cultural development. Despite that, it is at present a more solid institution than the environment and all that is related to it. Art is also limited socially: fine art proper is not to be found in all communities, folk art is. But folk art is in some parts a metaphorical form of art in the same way as ‘nature’s art works’ are. Thus only those who have a conception of actual art are able to see folk art. In a community there may be unclassified activities: song, dance, the telling of tales, playing music, which are not felt as forming the same sphere of phenomena.

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The total work of art. The environment can be treated as a total work of art. Basically this is, however, metaphorical talk: the environment is not literally a work of art, nor does the literal meaning extend as a result of the metaphorical.

(1) In the environment the old idea of a total work of art is realized: the work appeals to several senses. In part art-forms are — in a way — combinations of various forms, e.g. film, drama. Temporary combinations also sometimes exist, for example, a concert or dance in an art museum. A sculpture in a park is, however, a looser total work of art as is a building in relation to the whole town, whereas parks, gardens, and spatial works (e.g. Kienholz’) connect with their natural environment.

(2) A work of art and the environment (a non-work of art) can together form a totality. A building or sculpture can act as an articulator of a landscape space. How far the influence of a work of art extends (cf. the works in the 1978 Venice Biennale: silhouette trees, a frame; and the Sibelius Monument) is a separate question. A work of art may also act as a fixed part of the environment (cf. Robert Smithson’s Spiral Jetty, Christo’s works).

(3) The third case is that in which only the environment is examined. The environment forms totalities, metaphorical works of art; through this one finally comes to global aesthetic in which nature and the cosmos form a totality.

The first case is in accordance with the object model, the second with the landscape model, and the third with the environment model. One thus progresses from the smaller units to the larger. The large too can be realized as a miniature version; one example of this is a miniature landscape with pruned trees in a Japanese garden or even a flowerpot, in which case all three models approach one another. The work gains the character of a work of art or a miniature model, it is one kind of demonstration.

The sum total. Nature’s works of art are nature brought close to art, but the result is not art in the literal sense. Nature must be delimited before it can become a natural work of art; the largest case is nature as a totality, as the universe [see Frohlich 1976: 25]. Man makes the objects into works of art. Nature’s works of art are the results of human decision-making and activity. A decision is not then made to make a work of art out of nature, but rather a metaphorical natural work of art, when the convention is that nature is examined just as if it were a work of art, while being conscious of the fact that it is not.

In its basic form nature certainly exists independently of Man; but in exactly the same way as 'real' works of art are the result of human activity, so also are the nature’s works of art. Besides, they are dependent on the existence of the concept of art in society: metaphorical use cannot arise without literal use, even though aesthetic objects can certainly be in existence even without art.

'A nature’s work of art' is thus normally an evaluative expression that contains esteem. But does it also have a depictive content? Nature’s works of art 'imitate' the beautiful in a narrow sense; they are based on 'mild' aesthetic values, to use Mieczyslaw Wallis' term, whereas recent art has increasingly moved to use so-called sharp aesthetic values: the works startle, surprise, shock, are repellent, etc. [Wallis 1976. 197]. From this point of view 'a nature’s work of art' is a descriptive expression.

In extreme cases natural objects really do change into works of art, and are thus located within a new convention of interpretation. But those that change into works of art do not have to be those that we call nature's works of art. It is sensible to regard the definition of a work of art as classificatory, whereas 'a nature’s work of art' contains esteem (except in those rare cases in which a similarity is spoken of). A nature’s work of art is in a narrow aesthetic sense good nature; nature taken into an actual work of art is not necessarily so. In a broad aesthetic sense ”good nature” is something for which esteem is expressed in other ways besides by calling it a nature’s work of art: a stormy sea, a tempest, a jungle.

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In the basic case the question is of metaphorical, figurative use, or comparison: a landscape is a painting/ is like a painting; birdsong or the burbling of water is music/ is like music; the cycle of the seasons is a drama/ is like a drama; animals' courtship displays are dance/ like dance. Sometimes the precision goes further: a landscape is like a painting by Hj. Munsterhjelm; a view as if it is from Dante's Hell. The last example deviates from the pattern and is problematical: Dante's View as a name suggests barrenness, dismalness. It is possible to see, for example, tragedies in nature by personifying it. 'Nature's work of art' is, however, never used as a general name for these cases.

The nature's works of art are, according to the object or landscape model, units, limited totalities or spatial works, in which one moves, into which one goes. Speaking of a work of art brings with it a definition: a work has extremities, a beginning and an end, if in no other way than in time.

The real aesthetic examination of nature must, however — in order to be truly independent — be separated from the reception of art; the environment model presented by Carlson is the most suitable as a starting point. Nature's works of art are, as a problem for research, a border area between actual art-aesthetics and environmental aesthetics. The following model would be an ecological model: nature as ecosystems, the beauty of which lies in the undisturbed functioning of the system. In such there is also a strong intellectual emphasis: only one familiar with the operating mechanisms sees beauty in the faultless functioning of a system. Therefore, that form of natural beauty is to a great extent an area for specialized researchers of nature.

b. The second paradigm: the environment

In the same way as some works of art, some environments form basic models. Some objects have a significance of a paradigm that derives purely from their depictions; some have it on the basis of their nature as tourist attractions, etc.

In the environment there are objects that have a paradigmatic nature. These are, for example, viewpoints that have a significance that creates an identity even perhaps for a whole area or country. Sights are basic cases that are parallel to the classics of art, by comparison with which it is possible to depict other unknown objects, and also to evaluate them.

But does nature in a natural state have the significance of a paradigm in relation to that of nature altered by Man? It is possible to think that the man-made should be compared to the natural. This is, however, an unjust comparison, for Man does not attempt in his activity to copy Nature, but to make that which Nature does not produce itself (or to make more of what Nature produces, to 'help' Nature as in agriculture). The significance of the use of a paradigm lies in the fact that there is something against which to make comparisons. If Nature is taken as a whole there are no sensible points of comparison on the same level — only parts can be compared to one another. This has a significance above all for communication and depiction. Evaluation easily leads to stereotyped expectations. It is even possible to warn against such a kind of environmental criticism in which one concentrates only on paradigmatic objects; and by-passes the rest of the environment as an insignificant no-man's land.

The fact that the environment is not experienced as being a clearly aesthetic paradigm is due to the fact that the aesthetic mode is one possible mode of examination, but it is not necessarily the primary one; in art, however, it is dominant. Aesthetic examination is concentrated on sights and similar phenomena.

Art is often regarded as a provider of models for the aesthetic perception of the environment. The natural sciences offer another source of models. It is true that both of these offer means and background information that is useful: art especially for the formal analysis of the object and for the search for symbolic significances, whereas the natural sciences and cultural sciences make the
functioning of the environment understandable.

In particular one's childhood environment and the milieu in which the child grows up form models for what is expected from a landscape. A second factor that provides models are environmental depictions, which prepare for, and teach, the reception of new forms of landscape. In the same way that an art critic gives a model for the reception of a work of art, so too does an environmental critic (both of the models may be rejected, but nevertheless a model is offered). When confronted with a new situation these models "tame" the environment by making it conceptually controllable and familiar. This happened to the first immigrants in Canada, in which landscape painting and depictions of nature gradually created a foundation for the reception of the environment [see Rees 1982b: 117]. The previous models were unusable. This taming has always been a task of such people as explorers; on the other hand, they have always, in transmitting depictions from another place, brought parallel and comparative objects for a familiar environment, in the light of which the familiar has also begun to be seen in a new and perhaps fresh way.

There are landscape types that have been especially problematic. Examples include the plain of Ostrobothnia in Finland, the prairies in North America, bogs, rugged coasts, and sand deserts, all which have been regarded as monotonous and unvaried. Snow changes and simplifies colours; skies turn from blue to only shades of grey. The variation of day and night, the differences of light and dark, create their own rhythms.

Surprisingly, minimalism in the visual arts has promoted the understanding and approval of a stark, and in a way monotonous, type of environment. Indirect influence must also be taken into consideration: the influence of art on those who depict nature, on communicators, on 'those who understand first', and through them to the public at large. In all this the part of photography has been especially significant.

In the case of a work of art one can speak of appropriate conditions for reception. A painting must be seen in sufficient light (or the special lighting conditions must be taken into consideration when the work is made, as in church frescoes). In the case of the environment it is generally difficult to speak of appropriate conditions. Certainly we can say that when we wish to examine something from a visual point of view we must be able to see it. What the right situation or moment, sight place or similar is, depends on the aspect we choose — and on what we want to examine. But if there are no special limitations, we adopt the manner of examination which is best suited to each situation. A natural landscape is not made or intended to be observed under certain conditions, or to be observed at all — therefore in a way all situations are equally appropriate. In the case of a cultural landscape the matter is otherwise.

i. The relation of the environment to the work of art

α. Similarities

Both a work of art and the environment can be the object of aesthetic perception. This is the basic starting point and a basic affinity. The aesthetic field of phenomena is thus basically one totality in which there are only different kinds of parts. The fact that works of art are made for examination does not mean that they would always be better. However, the basis for their entire existence is the fact that they satisfy aesthetic needs, whereas in the environment, on the other hand, the satisfaction of these needs is subordinated to other things (to natural systems in an environment in a state of nature; to cultural systems in a cultural environment). The basic assumption is thus the unity of the aesthetic field of phenomena. Fundamentally, this also signifies the unity of aesthetics; aesthetics is not only a series of questions, but a series of questions between which there is a proper
connection, and which form a hierarchic system.

Thus art and nature should not compete with one another. They can be regarded as complementing one another. Nature offers its own kind of aesthetic object, art another kind. And even though one might be a stronger group of objects, that does not make the weaker group irrelevant. An individual object can rise above the general level of the group. Apart from that, someone may only be able to appreciate objects belonging to one of the groups; that group is more significant to him, even though on the level of knowledge he may recognize the rights of the other group. — Each must be examined primarily as a member of its group. In this sense the question of superiority remains problematic.

Joseph W. Meeker attempts to demonstrate that a work of art as an organic whole is reminiscent of an ecosystem [Meeker 1972: 10-11]. Both can be learnt to be understood by analytical means, and the understanding of them as entireties is aesthetic in nature:

[...] when we experience a great work of art we often assume that the artist is trying to "tell us something," and we create elaborate systems for interpreting the "message" that must be learned from Dante, Shakespeare, or Beethoven. But great work of art are not devices for communication between an artist and his public any more than ecosystems are messages from a creator. Both depend upon internal systems of balance which constitute a self-sustaining equilibrium of multiple elements with little regard for their effects upon those who perceive them. Neither nature nor art will ever try to teach us or to change our lives.

[Meeker 1972: 12.]

In speaking of global aesthetics Fanchon Fröhlich extends the concept of ecosystem so that it covers the whole Earth; her view is in fact a modern, secular version of the idea of "God's work of art":

When this process of expansion is carried to its limit — the whole Earth as art object — the traditional values of art reemerge, transformed but recognizable. New elegant abstract simplicities emerge on a global scale out of chaotic multiplicities. The global wind pattern is abstractly elegant. Ecology, geology, and biology help elucidate the beauty of the world as a whole. This shifting of the boundaries of the ultimate work of art to the ecosystem might result in a global aesthetics — an attitude of appreciation, comprehension and conservation instead of utility toward the Earth. Such an aesthetics is closer to Eastern sensibility where man is a small but fitting part of nature. So the concept of life as art has returned but in an expanded non-anthropocentric form. (Fröhlich 1976: 25.)

β. Interaction

In her article "Without Art" Alicja Iwanska distinguishes four kinds of attitude towards the environment: scientific, moral, active, and aesthetic. She claims that all of these appear in all people and in all communities; if art as an institution does not exist, there are at least activities and phenomena that are reminiscent of art. For example, in an American farming community she observed landscape photography, talk about the beauty of nature on the basis of pictures, as well as a 'happening' type of welding practised for pleasure by one man in order to produce arches of sparks. Similarly, the aesthetic concepts of one tribe of Mexican Indians appear in the furnishing of a hut and keeping the external space clean. Under other circumstances an art form could develop from these. [Iwanska 1971: 407-410] More mundane borderline arts are garden art, landscape architecture, and industrial design.

In particular, the environmental ideals of people have been expressed in the garden and park as an artificial landscape. The garden is idealized miniature nature, a miniature landscape, a 'paradise' as a contrast to the very different type of landscape in a natural state or the cultural landscape of a technical society. Robert L. Thayer Jr. writes:
Described landscape represents the manifestation of an idealized concept of landscape form. Perhaps a more contemporary definition would regard landscape architecture as the process of expressing an "altered" state of man's environmental conscience. Designed landscapes that give form to idealized images may or may not relate to the surrounding landscape character or generic land use patterns. The earliest oasis gardens of Egypt were evidence that the ideal landscape was one of escape or paradise. The desert was unduly hot, dry, sunny, infertile, and monotonous, and the garden provided a cool, green, and protected environment embellished with abundant fruit and flowers — an extreme contrast to its surroundings. Similarly, the French baroque vista gardens were often virtual "rooms" carved rigidly and forcefully from the surrounding hardwood forests. They too indicated a significant divergence between landscape ideal and landscape reality. (Thayer 1976: 39.)

But besides some parts of nature being given the character of a work of art, by altering them to accord with aesthetic purposes, aesthetically untreated nature and the environment have also begun to be seen through the prism of art. Certain kinds of stylistic developments, especially in painting, have brought out new features in the environment, and made phenomena that have perhaps up until recently been disparaged into objects of aesthetic examination and criticism (Hepburn 1973: 243, 250 - 251, 254). Turner's paintings are an often repeated example, which made people see London fog in a new way. Generally speaking, landscape painting and photography have directed the vision of the environment as structured forms.

The dominant concepts in art are reflected in conceptions of nature, and vice versa. A certain stylistic direction in art, for example Romanticism, may raise a new kind of landscape as an object of admiration. Correspondingly, changes that take place in art can influence conceptions of nature. For example anti-art has played its part in developing the appreciation of the grotesque that is a part of nature. By depicting grotesque environments art may have influenced the development of a sense of the grotesque; such an environment is seen rendered into art. So-called negative aesthetic values have influenced the birth of a new attitude towards the environment. It is possible to ask whether the same process of development is not taking place in the case of the environment that has been altered by Man that took place earlier for nature in a natural state: more and more types are being approved.

But what one then comes up against, however, is the special quality of nature when considering the environment in which we must live. The acts that take place there have an influence on all spheres of life. If aesthetic values are set as the only ones that matter then this may well be overemphasizing the aesthetic. Values must be brought into harmony and equilibrium. One must compare different areas of values and place them in order (see Beardsley 1972: 93 - 94). Thus, although in principle measurement of this kind is impossible, in practise it must be done, and social planning must develop methods for it.

An attempt can be made to return the environment to the arts: visual impressions to the visual arts; aural perceptions to music; series of events to theatre and film (reflections in water, traffic, discussions). In this way questions of environmental aesthetics can each be placed in relation to an art-form. But the totality is lacking: the environment is not only an accumulation of sounds, colors, smells, but a totality, an organic system that is comparable to a work of art, which must also be examined as a totality — only then is justice done to its unique quality.

Experiencing the environment as art is, however, derived from outside, and concerns the application of another model. Without denying the connection between art and the environment it is still possible to free both sides from the position of model-giver and examine their independent influence.

The model of art is only an analogy, the environment should not be subjected to an examination according to this model. The essential difference between art and the environment is the option of methods of examination. Art is predetermined to be the object of aesthetic examination. The arts are more clearly concentrated on one of the senses than the environment. We receive the
environment with all our senses. A too narrow application of the art analogy leads to aestheticism: the environment is conceived of as one kind of spectacle.

Art gives the receiver schemes, in the same way as depictions of nature do. These are general frameworks, which in a way ease and deepen the reception of the environment, but which also channel it. They create models for reception.

The reception of the environment operates partly through associations. The associations can be based on stages of life and experiences, which create a sense of familiarity.

The division of art into forms and classes is one starting point for the examination of the environment. Visually the forms of painting can provide grounds for classification (according to technique: oil painting, watercolor; according to style: romantic, such as 'a romantic landscape'; according to atmosphere: picturesque, grotesque). Do these classifications come before interpretation and evaluation, or are they pure attempts at depiction and characterization? We see certain formal structures, a certain content, and we characterize — or do we see according to a chosen class (so that one who seeks the grotesque sees the grotesque, etc.)? It is certain that that which is sought determines to a great extent the results, what is found, and what is achieved. This is due to the fact that the object of the search is defined in such a way that attention is drawn to the factors and features that are being sought for — the others are passed over as inessential or inappropriate.

On the other hand, the object itself certainly determines what it is meaningful to seek. If a search for something does not produce results we must change the object of our search. A preliminary acquaintance with the object, and the possibilities it offers, is the starting point. What is sought in the object is then determined accordingly.

With respect to the environment the examination of various aspects is possible. Aesthetic attitudes are also often illustrated by giving various kinds of models of attitudes: how to relate to the sea; how to relate to a tree (Coleman 1968: 5-10). On a surface level the differences are indeed relatively clear, but these attitudes are, however, connected to one another. Nevertheless one must be wary of making the aesthetic attitude something that is only derived from, and connected to, other attitudes. It is better to understand matters in such a way that aesthetic examination and its possibilities are extended and deepened by, for example, obtaining information on the environment.

Claims presented concerning the environment must be justifiable by appealing to properties that are observable in, or are known to exist in, the object. By observation I mean normal sensory observation. It is clear that observation also is partially physiological, partially cultural. Man perceives in a manner that is dependent on the sensory activity that is characteristic to him; in addition there are certain culturally-bound, learned principles. But questions of the psychology and philosophy of perception are a foundation which does not really influence how we act in practice. — The known properties are above all derived from the natural sciences, etc. Not everything is perceptible through the senses; knowledge which makes the perceptible understandable is also involved.

Even though the articulation of the environment follows — or should follow — scientific models, in practise this does not always happen. One possibility is an articulation derived from an artistic basis, others are, for example, religious or mythical. But in the same way as it is a mistake to imagine that scientific knowledge is in itself sufficient, a mistake is also made when other possibilities are set in its place. These should rather be seen as complementing and extending the scientific model (although it is true that some of them are compatible with it; certain religious models for instance exclude the scientific).

Artistic knowledge fits more naturally into the sphere of aesthetic skill (know-how) and thus is also an essential element. In emphasizing the significance of art there is a danger of losing the special character of the environment: it then becomes examined as similar to art or even as art. Such
a model should be developed in which it is possible to analyze the environment as styles and types, which are clearly derived from its special nature. The environment is not a work of art, but neither can it be explained purely by the natural sciences: it is also an aesthetic whole or parts of the whole. Cultural environments in particular become more like works of art: in these there is also often a sign language, symbols, etc. that are related to art, the interpretation of which is the task of cultural history. Thus cultural knowledge becomes equally important, or even primary, to natural scientific knowledge.

γ. Differences

Rejection of former attempts to analyze nature artlike has meant freedom and independence for modern environmental aesthetics. The environment has begun to be examined in its own right. R. W. Hepburn recalls this line in his article "Nature in the Light of Art":

I have not been claiming that nature can be aesthetically contemplated only in the light of art, or that every sort of influence art-experience can have on nature-experience is necessarily beneficial to the latter. There can be aesthetic reward in considering a natural object, a shell or cave or fern, out of all relation to human artifice, in terms of the natural processes that produced them or maintain them in being. Aesthetic pleasure can arise in being aware of the very remoteness of those processes from the activities of artists.

[Hepburn 1973: 253.]

In order to illustrate the differences I shall concentrate in the following on the comparison of the work of art and the environment as aesthetic objects. But behind the essential differences between them is the fact that both are aesthetic objects — or that both contain an aesthetic object. It is an object discovered through a certain mode of examination; and this is influenced by the ability of the observer. Definitions, as well as background knowledge, are significant.

The relationship between the environment and art can be elucidated by means of contrasts, by demonstrating the differences between a work of art and the environment as aesthetic objects. The clarification of the basic differences is also beneficial to the definer of art: a difficult concept of art can be delimited by exclusive definition, by demonstrating what art is not. The so-called environmental arts then form a border-area problem. The differences are not observable surface differences but rather derive from rules adopted by the art institution and diverge from other rules regulating the systems of human activity.

The principal differences can be contrastively presented according to the following fourteen-point division. The technique and language of expression of the various art-forms cause deviations between the forms; what is said concerning the environment applies to the environment in a state of nature as a basic case. The differences are generalizations, not absolutes that apply to all cases; they become especially vague when one thinks of the mixed forms of the environment and art.

The examination starts from the work of art, because it is here the basic case to which other phenomena can be compared. The differences can be grouped, for example, according to the maker, the work, and the receiver. The order is 'chronological': I shall begin with the differences that relate to the making of the work (points 1 — 3); after which I shall examine the properties of the final result, the work (points 4 — 11); and finally I shall examine the differences related to the observer and the audience (points 12 — 14). — The differences are dealt with by, among others, R. W. Hepburn in his article "Contemporary Aesthetics and the Neglect of Natural Beauty" [Hepburn 1967], Aarne Kinnunen in his article "Luonnonestetiikka" ('The Aesthetics of Nature') [Kinnunen 1981, based on a lecture given in 1975] as well as in Melvin Rader and Bertram Jessup's work Art and Human Values [Rader & Jessup 1976].

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• From the point of view of making (1–3):

1) The work of art is an artifact, made by someone – the (natural) environment is given, independent of Man, or formed without an overall plan (vernacular)

A work of art is always the result of the activity of an artist and an art institution. Works of art are made by an individual acting in the role of an artist. Nowadays, they are generally made for aesthetic examination, or at least to arouse aesthetic discussion (anti-art). George Dickie is of the opinion that purely choice and exhibiting signify making [Dickie 1974: 44-45] — he has demanded more later [see Dickie 1978: 713; and Dickie 1984: 46]. In certain cases natural objects and utensils are not formed in any way; they are only given the position of works of art and thus become such [Dickie 1974: 44-45].

The environment as such — whether it is altered or not — provides material for aesthetic examination. The choice takes place in accordance with the definition of the examination.

The border between nature and art is not based on recognition but on decisions. Works of art are undoubtedly the products of human activity: without people they would not exist. But making is not purely physically making — animals and machines are also capable of that — it is also the making of choices and decisions. A work of art is defined as such within a community. Thus, it is a work of art only within that frame of reference and made possible by it; it is a work of art among those who participated — or who were represented — in making the decision, in that artworld.

If one insists that works of art are created for aesthetic examination, and that any other kind of examination is secondary, it is possible to ask what is the primary mode of examination of the environment. The difference lies firstly in the fact that the environment in a natural state exists without making, independent of Man. It can certainly be thought of in accordance with human needs; different environments have then different kinds of tasks. The choice of the aspect of examination is free in quite another way than is the case with a work of art.

It is possible to ask how well a work of art is made. This is, however, problematic in that the work may be better than the maker has intended or what he has imagined himself. The quality of the work does not necessarily depend on the maker's intentions, even though the work is made by him. The artist must take responsibility for his work, but he cannot, for example, know all of its interpretive significances. Complete responsibility for making only applies to a mechanical performance in which the maker is entirely conscious of the character and significance of his work, where the work has a model.

The environment altered by Man is reminiscent of a work of art. In such a case the environment is an artifact, it is (totally or partially) created. One person is then the receiver of another person's work. Even here the maker does not necessarily control everything, and the receiver may invent something that was not intended or thought of by the maker. The maker (architect, designer), the work (the altered environment), and the receiver all exist.

The criterion of making is the taking of responsibility. It is possible to speak of making in two senses: first, in the sense of manufacturing, which means the handling of material with some instruments in order to achieve the desired final result, secondly, in the sense of considering and approving, changing, or leaving alone (cf. ready mades in art). In the latter sense nature parks etc. can also be created.

The analysis of nature in a natural state demands a different analysis to that altered by Man. Nature (the work) and the receiver exist, but not the maker. Such 'makers' are the forces of nature (wind, flowing water, frost, etc.), but they act mechanically, not through design and consideration. Thus, neither can they be praised for work well carried out. In mythological and religious models it is possible to speak literally of intentional makers, but this way of thinking runs into contradiction with our (modern) scientific way of thinking. If we wish to operate within the scientific frame of
reference we cannot (literally) put anything in the place of the maker. The active role of the receiver is emphasized. This does not mean that he should become the manufacturer of nature, but that it is entirely dependent upon him from which point of view nature is examined.

Because nature in a natural state does not have a maker, nor is it the result of an act, the responsibility is with the receiver. He chooses the manner of examination, without nature forcing him into it. In a way Man cannot praise or rebuke nature, but must receive it as it is. If aesthetic examination is chosen, the choice is either approval or rejection. Through this we arrive at the "all or nothing" aesthetics (i.e. nothing is aesthetic or all is) mentioned by Kinnunen [1981: 44]. Approval does not, however, necessarily mean equal approval, nor does rejection mean equal rejection; there can be differences of degree.

2) The work of art is born, and received, within a framework of conventions - there are not such clear conventions in the environment

Every work of art is linked to the tradition of making art by technique and style. A work partially repeats the old, partially departs from tradition and is directed against it. With technical development entirely new art-forms have also arisen, such as the arts of photography and cinema. Art is open on two levels: on the level of forms and within the forms, within which new works are continually born. Every one of these is situated in an existing art-form or starts a new one [Bond 1975: 180 - 182]. Classification as art places a work in an immediate relationship with that which has been earlier classified in the same way.

In an environment that is in a state of nature, independent of Man, there are no conventions, nor can there be. Birth, development, and death are regulated by chemical and biological laws. Conventions certainly have a significance in what is chosen as an object of aesthetic examination, and when. David B. Richardson extends Dickie's institutional definition of art model to natural objects and to their institutional aesthetic approval:

My analysis appears to justify, within the limit of my materials, an extension of Dickie's definition of art towards a definition of aesthetic experience as follows: an aesthetic appreciation of a natural object confers upon the latter the 'status of candidate for appreciation by some person or persons acting on behalf of a certain social institution (The art world)'. [The reference is to Dickie's work Art and the Aesthetic, pp. 34 & 199.] I have extended the meaning of the idea of 'conferring of status' on behalf of the art world beyond such performative acts as hanging an artifact in a museum [cf. op. cit., p. 37] to such performative acts as travelling to favorite mountain scenes and thus conferring aesthetic status on them.


The conventions that are in fashion are thus apparent from the favouring of different view-spots and types of landscape. Some places achieve a position comparable to that of classic works of art, and for the same reason: on account of their many-sidedness that satisfies different systems of taste.

In the environment that has been altered and built by Man, aesthetic in addition to other conventions have an influence, most clearly in the work of an architect. In a traditional agrarian society technical means and the available materials set tight limits to the kinds of change that could be made in the environment, and thus the result was unified, even though there was no unifying design — only habit, the limits set by tradition. Technical possibilities have rapidly increased and alternatives to tradition are known throughout the world; on the other hand, economic factors set the limits within which the solutions must remain.

Community planning and building are regulated by different, even contradictory, conventions. At best, deviation from these extends the means at the disposal of all designers, but usually the deviations remain curiosities. There were examples of both in the travelling exhibition "Alternative Architectures in the United States" in the Finnish Museum of Architecture 12.10. - 26.11.1977 [see
Alternative 1975). Only a small fraction of alterations in the environment are carried out as the work of professional designers, architects, and under their supervision (according to information given by the architect Juhani Pallasmaa on 26.11.1977, about 2% of the building that takes place in the world). Only that part can be regarded as architectural art. Even here only a part has been designed by an architect as an artist, as the object of aesthetic perception. Architecture is, on account of its emphasis on practical objectives and connections, a border-line art.

3) The work of art is made to be perceived aesthetically, for the production of aesthetic pleasure – the aesthetic quality of the environment is either a by-product of other interests or a synthetically formed totality from the joint operation of all the values of the object.

Works of art are made for aesthetic examination and are approved as the object of public examination within the framework of the art institution; an object made for other purposes or other uses can also be approved — cf. Ellis on literature:

[–] just as the class of literary texts cannot be equivalent to the class of those texts offered for literary treatment, neither can it be confined to a selection exclusively from that class. Many texts not so offered are included; for example, Gibbons's Decline and Fall of Roman Empire.

[Ellis 1974: 48.]

The primary task of a work of art is to arouse aesthetic pleasure, which comes from the joint operation of intelligence and feeling. If they do not fulfil this task, according to separately given criteria that vary at different times, they are either excluded from art (according to a honorific, prescriptive definition of art) or are labelled as bad works of art (according to a classificatory, descriptive definition).

It is possible to speak literally of the aesthetic intentions and tasks of the natural environment only if one thinks of some god as the maker and of Nature as his total work of art. Talk of functionality is otherwise a metaphoric expression. Only Man can see functionality in nature, for to see it requires contexts of knowledge, acquaintance with, and control over, the operating mechanisms of nature. In criticizing John Passmore's work Man's Responsibility for Nature Val Routley emphasizes the significance of knowledge in articulating experience:

To many of the historical writers cited, the wilderness was limitless, chaotic and dangerous. But, as usual, information is an important adjunct to appreciation, as much so with the natural area as with the string quartet. The informed person — and few wilderness lovers are now content to simply drink in pretty scenery — sees a pattern and harmony where the less informed may see a meaningless jumble.

[Routley 1975: 183.]

Environmental aesthetics that is based on appropriateness and functionality has been called ecological [see Jung 1974: 20 — 21; and McDermott 1969: 116 — 130]. It must be emphasized that appropriateness in ecologically-based aesthetics does not presuppose a conscious intention or intertender, but that the matter is precisely of the faultless operation of the system formed by the parts. In systems of this kind it is possible to see the same properties as in a work of art that corresponds to the traditional conception. Tom J. Bartuska and Gerald Young express this as follows in their article "Aesthetics and Ecology":

The environment, as perceived holistically through the concept of the sphere, exhibits properties frequently used in ecology texts to describe the structure and function of working ecosystems, the same terms used by Smith and Smith [the reference is to R. A. Smith and C. M. Smith's article "Aesthetics and Environmental Education"] to denote formal aesthetic qualities, "unity", "balance", "integration", and "harmony." A natural system, even on a large scale, must exhibit such properties if it is to continue to
function; such qualities are not necessarily formal, do not obviously have to do with deliberate design, though they are of necessity indicative of an organic "arrangement of parts." Therefore, these qualities should not be considered "strictly [−] categories of art [a reference to the above-mentioned article]. They are working properties of a natural system; they must be there if that system is to function. The works of man become unaesthetic when these needed properties are ignored; nature becomes unaesthetic when human manipulation destroys the resulting complex fabric.

[Bartuska & Young 1975: 83.]

In a cultural environment and built environment, and in their design, there is also an apparent aesthetic aspect. The principal goal, however, except for gardens, parks, public monuments, and similar, is extremely practical. Aesthetic quality is either a by-product, a decorative extra; or else it can be regarded - as in an environment in a natural state — in terms of general practicality, appropriateness, functionality.

A work of art is the intentional result of human activity. The intentions of people also determine the development of the cultural environment. — Do animals have intentions in the same sense? Can they have intentions to make art?

Animals do not apparently have conceptual knowledge of the laws of an ecosystem, although they are capable of acting as parts of the system. Conscious activity that can be characterized as aesthetic has been claimed to appear, for example, also in the choice by some birds of a nesting place and in nest construction [see Klopf 1970: 400 - 402] and in song, which Charles Hartshorne has dealt with in his book *Born To Sing*. In an abstract of the work the author condenses its central idea into the following form:

> The basic question it [the book] seeks to answer empirically is, What is song for the birds themselves? I seek to show that bird song illustrates the truth that animals tend to avoid the twin evils of monotony and chaos, the merely expected and orderly and the merely unexpected and disorderly. It is a statistical fact that in singing birds either pause between utterances, thus achieving "immediate variety" as between singing and nonauditory experiences, or they vary the utterances themselves. In this and many other ways birds behave somewhat as human musicians do; they have a genuine though primitive aesthetic sense. Singing, for them as for us, tends to be self-reinforcing, the more so the more developed the capacity to sing.

[Hartshorne] 1976: 299]

* From the point of view of the object (4 - 11):

4) **The work of art is fictitious - the environment is real**

A work of art can always be regarded as referring to something external to itself, as expressing something — in that sense it is a symbol. But the work constructs its own object of reference. "A storyteller performs; he does not — or primarily — inform or misinform. To tell a story is to originate, not to report." So writes Margaret Macdonald [Macdonald 1969 625]. Although a work of art is necessarily made from some material (an exception being so-called conceptual art), it cannot be equated with its material, which is only its carrier, its foundation (cf. Danto's article "Artworks and real things", on being art [Danto 1973]).

The environment is in itself that which is, even if in some parts — especially in a cultural environment, i.e. an environment altered by Man — it may have symbolic significances. One kind of natural exception are mirages, reflections, shadows, and other similar pictures formed by nature. Arthur C. Danto calls them parasites on reality and compares them to copies and borrowings from works of art:

> Quotations, in fact, are striking examples of objects indiscernible from originals which are not artworks though the latter are. Copies (in general) lack the properties of the originals they denote and resemble. A copy of a cow is not a cow, a copy of an artwork is not an artwork.

[Danto 1973: 7]
In its basic nature a work of art is fictitious, whether it corresponds to reality or not. The fact that something is regarded as a work of art and not, for example, as a document or reportage, contains the fact that the question of truth is by-passed as irrelevant [see e.g. Ellis 1974: 48].

Normally the environment is real, a work of art fictitious. But fictitious environments also exist. Such are landscape gardens, which copy real landscapes by utilizing their elements, relationships, etc. (perhaps on a miniature scale). Cultural elements, such as specially constructed ruins, can be connected to this. A playground or the realization of a fictitious environment using other means is also an imaginary environment: such is Disneyland, which is based on Walt Disney’s comics and films; on the one hand a model, on the other a three-dimensional, moving, operating, picture, a fiction of real life; such is also a holograph.

5) Works of art are elliptical: miniatures, abstracts, or models — the environment is itself

Quite concretely, works of art are — as representations, and representative they often are — miniatures of their objects (sometimes they are also enlargements: a statue, faces in a film, etc.). Landscape paintings and photographs, which represent the object as a miniature after the manner of a map, are the most typical examples of miniaturization. But miniature technique is different in literature and films: here the works are usually very elliptical representations of reality, so that the world of the work must be created from the references that the work itself provides. Only a small part is told and shown, there are temporal or other cuts in the work. They are thus concentrated, selected, closely packed.

Talk of the reality of a work of art is one degree more abstract still: certainly the work contains a crystallization of some view of life or similar; the work has been conceived, for example, as a model of reality. Reality can be regarded as a raw material from which the artist selects and which he moulds — and on its basis presents an imaginary world, which has its own laws.

What does the idea of condensation and crystallization mean in the natural environment? There are few examples. One type of example are nature parks and other similarly concentrated objects, such as natural objects in a museum, which represent something larger (model, representation, sample of something). It is not only works of art that refer to something else, in some cases untouched nature and natural objects do so too; such is very often the case in an environment altered and made by Man. The difference lies in the fact that nature parks and similar things are a part of that which they represent (cf. an actor presenting himself). But usually the environment is an uncrystallized and uncondensed totality from which the receiver must make his choice.

Works of art are made to be interpreted. They are related to something else, such as symbols; the environment is not. In this sense art is relational (intentional), the natural environment is not. This means that a work of art must be interpreted: it becomes necessary to explain what that something else is that the work is about. The profound significance is that which is aimed at in the interpretation of the work. A work of art is thus an object for interpretation.

Samples, presentations, model pieces. Miniature models and presentations can be made of the environment, the task of which is to simulate the real environment in a certain way. Such is, for example, a miniature mountain range constructed in an amusement park. Rather than being a forgery it is a certain kind of three-dimensional picture of the original object. An object of which a life-sized copy is made, or which is moved elsewhere would be different. Natural objects are inseparably a part of a context and a situation; therefore, in a strict sense they cannot be moved. Certainly, some animal or plant can be exhibited in such an environment and situation in which the species does not naturally belong — in a zoo, a botanical garden — or another similar miniature environment can be created, which relate to the original.
A corresponding exhibiting takes place when, for example, a sample of some rock type is exhibited in a natural history museum. The sample represents the rock type. In the same way an animal in a zoo or a plant in a botanical garden represents its species; they are not exhibited as individuals — though as such they are certainly examined at the same time — but as representatives of their species, as model pieces.

6) The work of art is a delimited, fixed totality — the environment is limitless, ‘unframed’

A work of art has a beginning and an end; it forms, within the framework of its limits — at best — a totality which is unified, complex, and intensive. A work is an organic totality, compact, to a great extent simplified and selected, in which there must be a place and task for each part; it must not contain unassimilated elements, which are aesthetic faults. Of course an actual work of art may often deviate even a great deal from these characteristics.

What belongs to a work of art is clear and prescribed by conventions. In the case of the environment — especially the natural environment — the delimitations are decided by the observer; there is no pre-given delimitation.

An important difference is the ellipticity, the allusiveness of a work of art, compared to the plenty of the environment. The environment contains an abundance of material from which the objects of examination must be chosen and delimited.

A work of art continues in an imaginary world outside of its frame, and this must be taken into consideration in the analysis of the work. (There are differences between art-forms: does the above apply to music?). When speaking of natural objects one always comes up against the problem of delimitation. In order for it to be possible to discuss an object an investigation must first be made as to what the object is that is being spoken about, what belongs to it. In a certain sense the delimitation is free, but active exclusion is also possible.

The fictitious world of a work must be thought of as being more extensive than only that which is explicitly presented: otherwise even when discussing literature one could not speak of the narrator’s point of view or question his reliability (also for example in painting there is a similar observer situated outside the world that is presented in the work; the work is their relationship). A work is a selective depiction of a fictitious world. The receiver may formulate hypotheses about gaps in the exposition or he may speculate about events falling outside the beginning or the end of the work on the basis of probability, but no extrinsic source can provide a solution for such questions. Margaret Macdonald writes:

Assuming that the text is complete and authentic, there may be different interpretations of it and thus of a character but no new evidence such as may render out of date a biography. No one will find a diary or a cache of letters from Hamlet to his mother which will throw light upon his mental state. Nor must this be forever secret in the absence of such evidence. For Hamlet is what Shakespeare tells and what we understand from the text, and nothing more.

[Macdonald 1969: 626]

The parts of a work of art must be analysed in relation to the totality of the work. The limitless and framelessness of the environment mean that the observer can choose any point of observation whatever. He can concentrate his attention on some parts or on a combination of them: the examination is selective. Active exclusion is also possible. Anything at all can be taken as the centre of attention, in which case the remainder is grouped as its background:

Whatever lies beyond the frame of an art-object cannot normally become part of the aesthetic experience relevant to it. A chance train-whistle cannot be integrated into the music of a string quartet; it merely interferes with its appreciation. But where there is no frame, and where nature is our aesthetic object, a sound or a visible intrusion from beyond the original boundaries of our attention
can challenge us to integrate it in our overall experience, to modify that experience so as to make room for it. This, of course, need not occur; we may shut it out by effort of will, if it seems quite unassimilable. [...] If the absence of 'frame' precludes full determinateness and stability in the natural aesthetic object, it at least offers in return such unpredictable perceptual surprises; and their mere possibility imparts to the contemplation of nature a sense of adventurous openness.

[Hepburn 1967: 291.]

The parts may even be only attainable with various kinds of special instruments — for example a microscope — (a micro-environment), or they may be entireties within the cosmos, nebulae and planets (a macro-environment). Both of these can be found with the visual sense only. Within the reach of all the senses is the normal environment which is in between them (the meso-environment).

[See Fatouros 1972: 399; and Rader & Jessup 1976: 167.]

In practise the perception of the environment as a totality composed of parts does not take place completely freely: it is possible to assume that there are in the environment natural totalities, that should be chosen as aesthetic objects before artificial constructions. Janina Makota states:

[...] in an aesthetic attitude we choose such units as may appear as wholes from an aesthetic point of view, i.e. as harmonized structures (two-or three-dimensional, "closed", self-sufficient). Those structures are not fixed, they disappear whenever we move to another place or look at them in another way, not to speak of the changes in nature itself. We do not create any wholes but only discover and grasp what comes into view. Our ways of grasping nature change nothing in it.

[Makota 1976: 34-35.]

Donald Crawford too speaks of framing and selecting:

The picturesque is not equivalent to the beautiful. We speak of the beautiful colors of the sky at sunset, but not the picturesque colors of the same sky. The picturesque is applied to the entire sunset (or a selected portion of it that could constitute one's visual field), as viewed by someone at a given time from a particular vantage point. [...] We frame a portion of nature, let it become our complete field of vision in all its intricacy, while it still remains nature.

In art there is a fundamental organic connection of idea and aim; nature is open to perception — something is selected from it and something is excluded, and in this way new aesthetic objects can be formed endlessly from nature. Art is closed. In nature there is a certain kind of chaos [see Puravis 1976: 71].

The delimitation of objects is very free — however the objects are determined on other than aesthetic grounds. In recent architectural research the significance of environmental totalities has been emphasized. The fact that parts that are of little value in themselves may be significant from the point of view of the unity of the totality has been stressed [see e.g. Nikula 1981: 278]. Works of art are limited totalities — therefore their examination is in a way clearer than that of the environment: usually one is not unaware of what is a work of art and what is not. A work forms a hierarchical system in which the place of the parts and the task of the totality in the formation can be investigated.

In principle the same idea fits the environment, but in the most extensive form possible this leads to what Fanchon Fröhlich calls global aesthetics [Fröhlich 1976: 25]. The greatest totality that can be imagined is the cosmos, which as a system certainly offers a very clear model. But undoubtedly the plants, animals, cells — and the ecosystems composed of them, are extremely autonomous systems. Autonomic individuals naturally offer units of examination, in the same way as the systems composed of them. It is thus possible to differentiate different kinds of natural totalities. But the totality may also be made and constructed by the examiner, and active exclusion is also possible. The examination is concentrated on certain units, and thus that which does not belong to the constructed totalities is excluded, even though it cannot be excluded from perception; in this way the aesthetic object of examination is selected.
From series of perceptions we form totalities, which as such are not perceptible by one process of perception. Objects conceptualized in this way are the objects of our aesthetic examination.

In principle the examination can be limited in any way at all. Even in a work of art it is possible to take some unit of the work as the object of examination, for example, the character depictions and narrative technique in a novel; but it must always be related to the totality, which as such is clearly defined.

Does the environment have a frame? — The receiver selects the objects of his examination. He can concentrate on some detail or examine the environment over a broad area, as a totality; the choice is thus the person's, and the environment offers the raw materials for it. In this kind of freedom the environment differs from a work of art as an object of aesthetic examination. — The framing of the environment takes place as a result of the receiver's work. In some cases the object is certainly offered with clear limits to the receiver, but they are exceptions.

The environment can also be perceived in the same way as a film — as a series, as a process — for example, while walking or driving a car. The environment is then a continual process, and the limits change all the time; the object is like the series of frames of a film, a series of pictures that melt into one another. We can also leave some parts unnoticed.

It is possible to distinguish between total and partial beauty: the environment may be beautiful in some ways, there may be parts that are felt to be beautiful even in a poor totality. One may attempt to examine the environment as comprehensively as possible or only in some parts (limiting oneself to visual, aural, etc. aspects; or merely e.g. looking at how birds live). In this way it is possible to limit the universe of discourse.

In art, too, it is possible to separate some detail for examination (parts delimited by photographs and films made of works of art; in the same way in literary research it is possible to examine, for instance, the character depictions in a novel). In some cases only a part of the work has been preserved (ruins!). But the totality in which the part must be placed, is static; the environment is dynamic. In the environment the context changes, nor can one say what is the correct context.

Natural objects can be delimited for examination. The limits are not so much determined by properties in nature itself, however, but rather by social decisions. Such delimitations are at their clearest in among other things the borders of nature preservation areas and nature reserves. It is true that here the principal emphasis is not on aesthetic examination but rather the object has been preserved, for example, for research purposes. The preservation of small natural monuments is among such delimitations. In these too the main stress is by no means always on the aesthetic side; the matter is one of the protection of certain rarities and curiosities. — The delimited objects take on the nature of a work of art. They are made into an artifact in the same way as ready-mades are.

7) The work of art and its maker have a name, which must be taken into consideration in the aesthetic analysis of the work — the parts of the environment are nameless or else they have been named on aesthetically irrelevant grounds

The individual name of a work of art emphasizes the originality and authenticity of the work. It is not, however, purely an aid to recognition, but often a guide directing the process of reception, and directed against conventional images — such are, for example, the titles of René Magritte's paintings. The names of the objects in the environment may operate in the same way, but usually they are quite disconnected.

In some cases the name of an environmental object is significant from the point of view of definition and interpretation. Such among others is the name of the Three Sisters group of peaks in the Rocky Mountains: the name delimits the group that forms part of the mountain landscape (the name makes the group); it humanizes, personifies inanimate nature; perhaps it contains a cultural
association to Chekhov's play *The Three Sisters*. The name culturalizes nature. Giving it is one means of conceptual artfactualization.

A work may be left nameless (such as some poems), or for purely cataloguing purposes it may be listed as *Untitled* as some of Ulrich Rückriem's stone sculptures. The mark of individuality, a name, fades into nearly a class name; *Untitled* as a name is primarily a sign of the status of a work of art. Rückriem's sculptures approach in this sense the untouched blocks of stone at stoneworks. [On the connection with the demand for originality: see point 11 below.]

The maker's name places a work of art in the context of his total production; it demonstrates a relevant frame of reference. The reader reacts to the maker's name [see Dutton 1983: VIII]. In art, works are born that look the same but are not: a different maker's name places similar-looking works in different contexts in the light of his total production.

In art the maker's name quite as much as the work's name can be regarded as a part of the work. Therefore it must be taken into consideration in interpretation too. The name (the name of the object) is more problematic in the environment. For example an entry to an architectural competition has a name ("Micamoraine", etc.), but it does not usually appear in connection with the realized work. Places in nature have names, but they are not usually on display but appear for example on maps, roadsigns, etc. Is the name then a part of the object? Examined in cultural connections the name is a part of the relevant cultural information. It provides a point of view to the examination of the object; it is not based on private association but on something to which the examiner must conform. A name gives an identity, demonstrates a social definition, delimits that which belongs to the sphere of the name — it 'creates' the object (cf. Rees on the arrival of immigrants in the prairies — the naming and mapping [Rees 1982a: 3]).

8) The work of art is individual, original — the environment repeats itself in variations

Arthur C. Danto regards individuality, uniqueness, as being one of the determining properties of a work of art. A copy or forgery cannot be a work of art, because it only repeats the claim of the original work:

A fake pretends to be a statement but is not one. It lacks the required relation to the artist. That we should mistake a fake for a real work (or vice versa) does not matter. Once we discover that it is a fake, it loses its stature as an artwork because it loses its structure as a statement. It at best retains a certain interest as a decorative object. Insofar as being a fake is a defeating condition, it is analytical to the concept of an artwork that it be "original". Which does not entail that it need or cannot be derivative, imitative, influenced, 'in the manner of,' or whatever. We are not required to invent a language in order to make a statement. Being an original means that the work must in a deep sense originate with the artist we believe to have done it.

[Danto 1973: 14.]

Paradoxically a painting of a painting — i.e. a painting that perhaps completely depicts another painting — is, according to Danto a work of art if it is presented as a painting of a painting, and not, for example, as a copy or forgery [Danto 1973: 13]. The relation can be stated by, for instance, the name of the work. On the basis of the maker's name it can be placed in a new context within his total production (cf. also self-plagiarism [see Goldblatt 1984]).

The objects of the environment can also be regarded as unique, but their uniqueness is relative. The distinction type — token can be applied to them. A type is, for example, a species of plant or animal which has the determining properties of a species; a token is an individual that belongs to the species. A landscape type would be less precise: an alpine landscape; a Finnish lake landscape. Tokens would be certain local forms of these landscapes. A type is not a concrete example but — especially in the case of landscapes — a loose abstraction. The appreciation of individual animals, plants, and landscapes can take place on the basis of standard form, by relating them to the characteristic signs of the type. The popularity of types varies according to concepts of taste.

The type — token distinction is clearest in mass-production, the individuals of which closely
conform to a model; there need not be such personal deviations as appear between plants, animals, and landscapes. The mass-produced items are identical to one another. Ruth L. Saw is of the opinion that in this sense they deviate decisively from works of art:

For me, however, the decisive difference is that craft objects are not importantly individual. It would be sensible to ask craftsmen making a chair to make us another just like it, but not a painter painting a picture. We could ask him to paint another picture, but we should have to wait and see what it was like. It is no accident that craft objects cannot figure in our list of named objects. Any chair of Chippendale’s best period will do; there is a tradition of English furniture making, but it is bound up with a way of living, and part of our enjoyment derives from the realization that there were fortunate people who sat upon Chippendale chairs every day. If they had never been used, but made especially for a museum, they would be different objects.

[Saw 1972: 46-47.]

There may also be concrete examples. The view from Koli is a paradigmatic model of a Finnish lake landscape, in the same way as Poussin’s The Rape of the Sabine Women is to Paul Ziff an indisputable example of a work of art [Ziff 1953: 60-61]. The rest are recognized and appreciated on the basis of their similarity. Viewspots and similar operate in the manner of paradigmatic works of art; the general theory and criteria of the aesthetic quality of a landscape can be by-passed by making a direct comparison with model cases. Anthony S. Cua and James Fletcher write about the use of paradigmatic aesthetic objects:

Now, if the critic acknowledges certain works of art as paradigmatic, and therefore as exemplifying the criteria or standards of aesthetic excellence, he may evaluate other works of art by comparing them directly to the paradigm without explicitly invoking the criteria which the paradigm exemplifies.

In this sense the paradigmatic aesthetic object functions as a standard in a compendious way.

[Cua & Fletcher 1975: 179.]

General recognition there again does not need to be based on the knowledge through experience, the place may be known only on the basis of depictions. At one time one such was Niemivaaara, where practically nobody except Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis’ expedition had been, but which became internationally known as a result of its depiction by the expedition’s secretary, Réginald Outhier. (The influence of Outhier’s work Journal d’un Voyage au Nord [1744] has been dealt with by Yrjö Hirn and Reino Kalliola, among others.)

Forgeries in nature and in art. Once again one is forced to make a distinction between the environment in a natural state and that which has been altered by Man. Nature in a natural state is of necessity genuine; of course, it may contain repetitiveness and similarity: some species of tree may recall another tree, but neither of them is a copy of the other. Similarity is not a substantive matter in copy relationships either. What is decisive is the fact of who is responsible, who owns the rights to the work, and there is no owner of rights in nature in a natural state. The works of Man are connected with the maker and the owner of the rights. A false relationship, taking the rights of another in one’s own name, means the creation of an erroneous genetic history: the work is placed in the wrong connection.

Forgeries are possible in the environment altered by Man. They are in no way restricted to art; for example, models can be stolen in product design. The owner of the rights need not be a private person but can be a firm, or company. Rights of this kind are often infringed. The closer one comes to artistic designing in the environment the more significant the share of the maker becomes. A maker appears, whereas in nature in a natural state he did not exist at all.

There is, however, a border-line case, which externally appears to confuse the system. It is that kind of environmental design in which objects are created according to natural models, or which are reminiscent of them, in such a way that the unwitting may mistakenly regard something as being genuine which is in fact man-made. When considering the possibilities of forgeries, Robert Elliot mentions a landscaped mining area as an example [Elliot 1982: 81]. The object looks completely
natural, but it is one kind of made ready-made. Is this a matter of a forgery of nature? Problems of the same kind are produced by specially bred plants and animals.

What is decisive in the aforementioned case is in what connection the result is examined: as an act of Nature or of Man. Someone may attempt to forge nature in the sense that he presents what is his own production exactly as if nature had produced it. The activity may be deceptive. However, in these cases in which there is no clear deception the responsibility is the observer’s: he must know in which group the object is to be examined. Landscaping is a completely acceptable activity in the same way as animal or plant breeding. Externally that which is in a natural state and that which is man-made may be indistinguishable from one another, but nevertheless they belong to different groups conceptually. It is possible to repair the marks of Man by landscaping, but it only achieves an external similarity. (The case can be compared to such things as the restoration of works of art.)

The genuine environment is then that which has a genetic history independently of Man, and this history is a part of interpretation. The value of the environment in a state of nature lies in this genuineness; certainly Man can create new kinds of environment and concepts of the environment, in which case the character of the criteria changes. Most problematic are such cases as landscaping after gravel excavation or mining or similar, in which the traces of human activity are covered and the environment appears to refer to another kind of history than that which has gone before (cf. Elliot 1982: 85-89; and Frohlich 1968: 608-610). — Is a return to a state of nature possible? The environment can be returned to a former state; the visible traces of human activity can be actively removed from it, the environment can be formed to look like a natural state — a kind of made state of nature arises. The literal opposite to a built environment is a demolished environment. Demolition signifies a return to an earlier state, perhaps a state of nature. But a state of nature of this kind is not genuine in the same sense as an untouched state.

Natural objects are bound to their place and environment. Objects cannot be separated from their environment and built in another place. Certainly this kind of copying can be done, but it is a question of copying the object not of the original object. The same type of originality is essential to natural objects as is essential to a work of art. Original objects are, for example, viewspots, lakes, rivers, and similar, whereas individual plants and animals are rather representatives of their species than originals.

9) The work of art has a style — the environment does not

Works of art are connected to the entirety of the production of their maker. It is possible to compile the dominant features of the production, and by means of this to try to grasp what characterizes the production. What unites and characterizes the production or some part of it or other groups, is style. Individuality of style is also the individuality found in the total production of a creative artist.

In his article "The Status of Style" Nelson Goodman briefly considers whether nature has style. He limits his article to art but states, nevertheless, that, for example, sunrise may have a "suddenness of thunder." [Goodman 1975: 808].

Styles are grounds for grouping in which the criteria are certain similarities. But the idea of a maker and his choices is essentially linked to style. In art there is a maker; in nature there is not (unless a divine creator is thought of as a maker). The styles of Nature are a metaphorical expression. "A style is a way of doing things; but what we have in nature is just the way things happen," writes Francis Sparshott [Sparshott 1963 99; see also Goodman 1975].

In relation to the environment it is indeed more difficult to speak of styles. Style presupposes a maker which in untouched nature there is not. Similarity does not characterize anything, even though similarity can be seen in different landscape types. Of course, it is possible to speak of a maker’s styles in the built and planned environment, for it has a responsible maker.
10) *The work of art is sensory – the environment ideosensory*

A broader and a narrower form can be distinguished in the perception of beauty. The narrower is formalistic, sensory, "surface aesthetical," the broader formalistic-conceptualist, ideosensory "deep aesthetical" [Jessop 1970: 531]. A town can be examined as a spatial composition of parts, but also as a cultural historical accumulation, which is given historical depth by information on the important tasks and activities related to various buildings and places; individual memories and associations add their own significance.

There is something similar in the environment untouched by Man. Hepburn speaks of the Andromeda nebula, which may have the same outline as some abstract painting, but a nebula is not normally experienced in the same way as a painting: the knowledge of the infinite scale of space adds, according to Hepburn, a tone of sorrowful ceremoniousness to the observation [Hepburn 1967: 301-302]. A similar example is given by Janina Makota concerning viewing the sea:

> While looking at a sea we may dispose ourselves to take notice only of its surface. However, the bearing in mind of the unimaginably great masses of rolling water and the bewilderment with the might of the element are not negligible in perception if our picture is to be "true". [Makota 1976: 36.]

An expert sees natural formations against a background of geology and natural history. This is not always a direct necessity — a surface aesthetical manner of examination is also always possible. Pekka Suhonen tells of walking on the sea-ice off Helsinki:

> But because a quarter of a person's field of vision is occupied by the area ranging no farther than twenty meters from him, attention was concentrated (also for practical reasons) on the ice itself, on which the wind had etched magical pictures. They were at least a part of nature that did not belong to the sphere of human influence, as was the blinding brilliance of the sun. But it would be no wonder if the wind-scoured traces had also been unknowingly viewed by eyes accustomed to abstract, non-figurative, and informalistic art. [Suhonen 1981: 7-8.]

Monroe C. Beardsley admits that causal factors often influence aesthetic perception, but is of the opinion that this should not happen. To him aesthetic appreciations are by definition those that are based on perception:

> And I will say that if a perfect imitation of a bronze statue be carved from cheese, so that to sight and touch no difference could appear — let us ignore the smell — then as an aesthetic object the imitation is exactly similar to the original, and the characteristics in which they may appear otherwise to people who know of their actual physical basis are not their characteristics at all. [Beardsley 1958: 52; see also 50.]

At this point — as in the entire work — Beardsley speaks of a work of art; and it is open to interpretation whether he has intended that the aesthetic quality be based only on sensory properties in nature, too.

The difference in principle lies in the fact that a work of art is examined as a construction, as a self-sufficient totality in perception, to which also themes and generally a level of significance belong, whereas in nature and the environment a deep understanding presupposes contexts of knowledge; its examination is ideosensory. It is certainly possible to examine nature in terms of shapes and forms, as Suhonen's example demonstrates and as Clive Bell wishes to limit the aesthetic examination of nature:

> Who has not, once at least in his life, had a sudden vision of landscape as pure form? For once, instead of seeing it as fields and cottages, he has felt it as lines and colours. In that moment has he not won from material beauty a thrill indistinguishable from that which art gives? And, if this be so, is it not clear that he has won from material beauty the thrill that, generally, art alone can give, because he has contrived to see it as a pure formal combination of lines and colours? May we go on to say that, having
seen it as pure form, having freed it from all casual and adventitious interest, from all that it may have acquired from its commerce with human beings, from all its significance as a means, he has felt its significance as an end in itself.

Bell 1949 (1914): 53.

Aarne Kinnunen states that by isolating an object from moral, practical, and mental connections it is returned to a primary level, on which any object whatsoever can be experienced aesthetically [Kinnunen 1969: 76 - 77]. But Kinnunen is of the opinion that an aesthetic object — a work of art, too — is normally experienced through a world view and interpretation [ibid.: 95 - 102].

I want, however, to emphasize the difference of degree. A work of art is an autonomous, fictitious construction; the environment is contextual, connected to knowledge and culture. Only an acquaintance with the operating methods of nature helps one to see its functionality. On account of its reality the environment is seen in a moral context, a work of art is amoral, external to the moral.

Despite the autonomy of a work of art the perception (examination) of a work is not purely sensory. The receiver must know about the primary and secondary conventions that regulate art and its forms; he must be able to see the work in relation to other works of art; he must recognize the language of expression and the technique of the form; he must have a mastery of the methods of interpretation. Thus also a work of art is an intellectual problem and its interpretation a solution to the problem.

11) The work of art is static — the environment dynamic, a process

The static nature of a work of art is connected to its clear delimitation: once made, a work is permanent. Variations and abridgements, even parody versions, can certainly be made of it; and the work may be transferred to the sphere of another art-form (a novel filmed; an opera made from a play, etc.), but to be quite precise these are new works.

Even interpretations of the same work can certainly decisively change. Interpretation made at different times and by different people, brings out different aspects, actualizes the potential significances of the work, alters emphases and the hierarchic relations of the parts, and in various ways also fills the internal gaps in the work [Ingarden 1962: 210, 242 - 243]. As a physical object a work such as a painting and a building may degenerate, but it appears more justified to say after the manner of Roman Ingarden that with time degeneration makes it impossible to distinguish a work of art from the remaining physical object, than that the work of art itself gradually ceases to exist [ibid. 211, 231].

In the temporal arts — in literature, music, film, drama — the work forms a process that progresses in time, but the passage of the process is fixed, static. Improvisation is possible, for example, in jazz, and partially in the theatre; the result is variations that recall one another.

In the environment there are repetitive processes that are reminiscent of the temporal arts, such as the orbit of the Earth, on which the variation of the times of day and the seasons is based. The laws of nature are immutable, but new effects arise from their combination. Changes that take place in the orbit of one planet extend to the entire planetary system; the result on Earth may be climatic changes that are reflected in the flora and fauna and even in the life of mankind.

The duration of many processes or the possible cyclic duration is so long that the changes cannot be perceived by sensory observation. The flora and fauna, however, evolve continually; high places are worn down and the detritus moves to lower places; the land rises from an ice age — the differences are evened out. The changes appear only through the comparison of observations made over a long period of time. Conclusions must be made about what processes have taken place and then they must be explained. The placing of phenomena into a scientific context outlines the environment rationally.
Events. The environment as an aesthetic object is not only static; it is also dynamic. The objects of examination are not only objects but also series of events and states of change of objects (growth, development, death). Such are:

1) the regular variations and processes of the environment: the times of the day and the year; dark – light; warm – cold; wet – dry.

2) the events of the environment: the natural development and life of animals and plants; the activity of animals (hunting, nesting, etc.); the activity of Man. Man sees and makes 'stories', he unites the elements to form a series. The models and schemes of narration influence this; relations of cause and effects are obtained according to a dominant explanatory model.

Very often comparisons with art are used when speaking of the events of the environment: a drama (the cycle of the seasons; tragedies in nature), music (the song of birds), film, dance.

For example, nature films present the nesting, care of the young, hunting of animals, and the processes of nature as drama-like series of events. The activity of animals is seen to be motivated like that of Man. (Such is a film by A. Karvonen of the state of equilibrium between the wolf and the elk: The general situation is presented through individual cases; the wolves find a lone elk, they are able to wound it, they wait for it to weaken, then they attack, a 'love story' of two wolves runs parallel to this; the narration links the events all the time to the general level, to the life of the species.) The depictions of nature in literature are very much the depiction of natural events. What is aesthetic examination then? — the search for tragic and comic features, the search for excitement and romance, etc. In the cultural environment such events as a building becoming ruined, or even a whole town being deserted (for example Dawson City and so-called ghost towns), also belong to this.

Some of even the clearly observable changes are combinations of so many factors that their prediction is inaccurate and impossible: variations in temperature, wind force, dry spells and rain.

Complete similarity at different times is impossible in the environment. The change itself is aesthetically significant; even knowledge of coming changes may arouse aesthetic pleasure:

We are immersed in nature like in an ocean but, at the same time, due to the limitation of our field of vision, nature is always opposite us. It does not allow to be grasped wholly at one stroke, while unveiling one of its visage, it veils another. Neither the kind of objects in the world nor their actual arrangement depend on us (we cannot interfere as long as our attitude is purely aesthetic). All we can do is to choose a place to contemplate them, sometimes we wait for some changes (e.g. a sunset).

[ Makota 1976: 35 ]

Is there a parallel relationship between a work of art and an ecosystem? Both are articulated totalities, but the environment has the character of a process, the work of art is static. In both, the place of a part in the creation of a totality is sought. A work of art forms a closed system, but the environment receives influences all the time. Art is open only as a system, as a phenomenon, in such a way that individual new works of art can always be added.

Works of art have their own history that is reminiscent of natural history. They are thus the results of intentional activity, usually the work of an artist; but in some cases they have arisen through his choice or changes in communal use. An intention only means that attention must be paid to the fact that something has been made or classified as a work of art; not that the history of the creation and development of the work of art, the theoretical frame of reference, etc. should be brought into the interpretation. [ See Beardsley 1983: 22 - 23; on genetic history see Frohlich 1968. ]

In the case of nature, matters are otherwise. It is not possible to draw a boundary at the point at which the object and its history of development begins. The history of its formation then also belongs to the aesthetic analysis of the object. Natural objects exist in time, and they have this temporal dimension, a development history. This also means that the object can never be perceived in its entirety, for the temporal process continues into the future, until some human act or natural
catastrophe causes a decisive change: the falls at Imatra or Niagara are no longer in a natural state, but are watched and regulated. Futurological predictions, probabilities, etc. are significant. But unlike in the imaginary world of art, we obtain a confirmation or rejection of the predictions of the future of the environment.

In some cases works of art function in the same way. When they have been made degeneration begins: the colours of a painting change; the surface cracks; a building is worn down and perhaps becomes ruined. This progress of development can be taken as the object of aesthetic examination. The progress need not mean weakening but change: the object acquires new meanings in this process of destruction (Patrik 1978: 1 - 17; Ruskin 1881 (1851 - 1853) (on Venice)). There are then two modes of examining the work: either to try to aim at the work in its original condition and appreciate it, or else to examine the process of change or some phase of it.

Untouched nature forms a foundation and frame for the treatment of the man-made environment. Cultural activity need not repeat the models of nature, though such is possible, but it should, however, remain within the boundaries set by nature. A certain durability should be the goal. I would call this ecological aesthetics. Man can take a model from nature in the sense that an attempt is made to adapt activity to accord with the principles of nature.

Ecological aesthetics means such things as durability, the stability of a system, renewability, etc., being set as values and aims. This does not in itself give concrete models for what should be done. It must be emphasized that Man does not need to imitate nature but that he can freely use possibilities and imagination. Nature cannot be a norm for architecture or other artistic design.

On the one hand, the natural state of selected areas must be guaranteed, that is preservation and development outside of human influence (as far as it is generally possible). On the other, when Man alters nature certain requirements and conditions set by nature itself must be respected. These conditions must be consciously laid down in, for example, law and standards of behaviour.

That which is in a natural state, and that which is altered by Man go their separate ways. However, in the present state of culture, Man indirectly makes decisions affecting the natural environment. It is Man's decision what is preserved in a natural state. Art — in those areas in which it creates imaginary worlds — acts freely, without regulation. Between the imaginary worlds of creative art and untouched nature a regulated area remains, the treatment of which demands decision-making and consideration from the aesthetic point of view, too. Architecture among other arts belongs to this area.

Thus ecological aesthetics literally means seeing value in how nature acts independently of people. The principles and models so derived can be transferred to human activity, to how nature is treated. The question is one of the transfer of manners and models, not of the copying of untouched nature. Architecture and similar areas thus do not have to follow nature in the sense of copying (though that too can be practised), but rather the question is one of following, and taking as starting points, such principles as undisturbed operation, compatibility, etc.

A work of art — at least as a physical object — has a beginning and an end; nature continues; in the latter openness is typical, there is no final form, everything that has gone before must always be interpreted in a new light. Similar problems arise in relation to unfinished works of art and open-ended works and series. They are open, and their interpretation changes when the totality is completed.

The process of the birth of a work of art does not normally belong to the work, even if Christo and Judy Chicago have drawn it into art — in the environment the process of birth is an essential part; in art, too, the correct genetic relation to the maker is presupposed by the work. A work of art certainly arises within a framework of conventions and as a part of the art world, but the life of the work begins at the moment when it is accepted into the sphere of art. After this, the work can certainly degenerate as a physical object — it was born as such — but it is preserved as a work of art.
Nature is in a state of perpetual change. Everyone of its objects has its history, from which it can only be artificially separated and to which an attempt can be made to artificially hold it. An example of the latter is the news item from 1967 of the 'restoration' of Mount Fuji:

_Fujiyama in Danger_

Erosion threatens to destroy the symmetry of Mt. Fujiyama.

A deep fissure, extending from near the crater, about 2800 meters down the slope, is 500 meters wide, 125 meters deep, continues to grow.

Concern over the erosion is not only aesthetic. Some 300 tons of earth and rock tumble down daily, and these landslides pose a constant threat to farming communities along the foot of the mountain.

The Japanese Ministry of Construction says that massive construction work must be done near the peak of the mountain. One plan calls for building embankments on both sides of the slide area, as well as retaining walls at given intervals along the slopes.

[Eveming 1967: 7.]

In nature the process of birth is an essential part, as is the historical dimension in the cultural environment. The aesthetic object is therefore in a way indefinite and to be selected. Thus, the greater part of the activity is transferred to the receiver. In art he is bound to the choices and definitions made by the artist; a work of art is therefore predetermined as an object.

In the technical realization of a performance, too, there is a clear boundary between the production of the work and the work itself, for example in the rehearsal of a theatrical performance, or what the actors do during the play when they are off stage or preparing their roles; an actor changes into the person of his role the moment he steps on stage and loses his role when he leaves it. The spectator expands the fictitious space, the performers come from a part of the fictitious space that is invisible to the spectator, though in reality they come from the wings, the dressing-rooms, etc. That which the space of the stage contains, is a section of a more extensive fictitious space.

The objects of the environment are in a state of continual development and change. There is no way to return to the environment as it once was. Depictions are a fixed point: they preserve and thus document the environment. It is true that in practise many objects repeat the same forms. There are various kinds of cyclic systems (the times of the day and the year), in the same way individual plants and animals go through a very similar process of development from birth to death. And, for example, geological faults follow the same lines. However, uniqueness is essential to natural events. Works of art, on the other hand, are normally permanent: one can return to them.

In the environment it is possible to distinguish real estate and goods and chattels. Real estate is constituted by the slowly changing parts: the surface form of the landscape and also such cultural products as buildings, roads, etc. The goods and chattels are the moving and rapidly changing parts: animals, people, vehicles, etc. When the fixed part creates a background, the 'goods and chattels' create movement, life, surprise, unpredictability, within the background. For example, the unexpected appearance of an animal is aesthetically significant, and even the possibility that something will appear has its aesthetic value. Large changes are to a great extent predictable, small ones unpredictable. A work of art is a system that is pre-regulated (happenings, etc. are an exception), the objects of the environment change in part predictably, in part surprisingly (the weather, traffic, etc.).

A work of art can indeed contain a time dimension; one speaks of particular temporal arts (music, film, theatre). In these the work is formed of a process, but the progress is always the same, from beginning to end.
12) The place of observation of the work of art is limited – that of the environment is free

A work of art cannot be appropriately observed from too far or from too near, nor from the wrong angle. The assumption of an appropriate place of observation belongs to the conventions of making art. From too far the observation leaves the details unnoticed; from too close it prevents the formation of an overall picture. A work of art is structured only within certain limits; for example, a painting looked at too closely is only a chaos of paint splashes and particles. The order of nature extends from the micro-level to the macro-level, and aesthetic examination is possible at all levels:

[–] form in nature is many-leveled and multi-dimensional while form in art lies on the surface, and in that sense is only "skin-deep." In nature there are forms within forms within forms within forms: or, to put the same facts in reverse, there are electrons, atoms, molecules, and aggregations of molecules and in the biological sphere, elementary organisms, plants, animals, and ecological communities, forming mounting series of wider and wider integration. With the instruments of science, such as the microscope and the X-ray, we discover that there are countless layers in nature, each one exquisite in its formal structure. As Roman Vishniac, photographer of the minute in nature, has said:

Everything made by human hands looks terrible under magnification - crude, rough, and unsymmetrical. But in nature every bit of life is lovely. And the more magnification we use, the more details are brought out, perfectly formed, like endless sets of boxes within boxes.


In observing the environment there are no limitations set as to the distance. The environment is a universal totality in which Man moves and from which he can select anything at all as the object of his observation; observation may have durations of different lengths, and as the observer moves series of objects are formed. In practice even a limited area can form an unlimited number of different series.

Of course, if one wishes to make observations of a particular object, the distance of observation, the place and the time have loose limits. In this case the places of observation are regulated by factors of taste, convention, and practise, but they are not closely determined:

A visual natural object, for example, may have better and worse sides from which to view it because of, say, the colors of its various sides, and it will have directional sides (northerly, southerly), but it will not have a front and back as a painting does. Of course, people may speak of the back side of a mountain because it is the side which does not have road access or because it is the side that is not usually climbed, but this is different from speaking of the back of a painting, i.e., the side of a painting which conventionally is not viewed. One characteristic of a natural object is as properly a candidate for appreciation as any other of its characteristics; none of its characteristics enjoys the conventionally engendered status which the aesthetic aspects of works of art possess, although some of a natural object's characteristics may be preferred because they are beautiful, sublime, and so forth.

I want to be cautious here. I am not saying that there are no conventional aspects involved in the appreciation of nature; there may well be some. If conventional aspects exist, however, they may be rather different from the conventions involved in the appreciation of art or they may be somewhat similar.

[Dickie 1974: 199-200.]

It is certainly possible to point out objects in the environment that could be called natural totalities — an animal, a plant, a building, a field, a mountain - and these parts are connected to one another by bonds of a cause-and-effect nature: a car driving on a road, people walking along a street. Environmental works of art are also delimited: such as a garden, a park, a landscape designed for leisure use, a part of a town or an entire town. Such objects limit the landscape of perception; some of them presuppose moving within the object and on its various sides. Artificial totalities are also born through selection and delimitation; they are the parts of processes or of objects.

Ronald W. Hepburn emphasizes the necessity of direct perception:
On occasion he [the spectator] may confront natural objects as a static, disengaged observer; but far more typically the objects envelop him on all sides. In a forest, trees surround him; he is ringed by hills, or he stands in the midst of a plain. If there is movement in the scene, the spectator may himself be in motion, and his motion may be an important element in his aesthetic experience. Think, for instance, of a glider-pilot, delighting in a sense of buoyancy, in the balancing of the air-currents that hold him aloft.

[Hepburn 1967: 289.]

The immediacy and all-embracingness of the experience thus stamp the aesthetic perception of the environment.

13) **The work of art presupposes distance, disinterestedness in the examiner — the observer of the environment is a part of the environment, in immediate contact with it**

A demand for a certain kind of externality and the neutrality it makes possible can be imposed on the examiner of a work of art. The examiner is conscious of the fictive nature of the work, but examines it — in accordance with the reception agreement — as if it were real. The creation of an illusion, a false reality, is exceptional, and if such an illusion arises, the distance is removed, and the work is no longer examined as a work of art but as reality. Distance makes possible a total and critical examination.

Quite concretely, the receiver is external to the world of the work. On the other hand, the environment is the same reality to which the receiver as a physical person belongs. An experiencer, as R.W. Hepburn puts it, is "involved in the natural aesthetic situation itself" [Hepburn 1967: 289].

But although Man is in immediate contact with his environment, he may be intellectually distanced from it and from his experience of it: he can examine his experience while experiencing it. Hepburn continues in this way:

> We have not only a mutual involvement of spectator and object, but also a reflexive effect by which the spectator experiences himself in an unusual and vivid way; and this difference is not merely noted, but dwelt upon aesthetically. The effect is not unknown to art, especially architecture. But it is both more intensely realized and pervasive in nature-experience — for we are in nature and a part of nature; we do not stand over against it as over against a painting on a wall.

[Hepburn 1967: 289 - 290.]

**The relation to the environment.** The relation may be dynamic or static. The dynamic signifies an active relationship, the static an examination relationship; the difference is not, of course, great.

In a dynamic relationship at least the following kinds of relationships can be distinguished: symbiotic existence, a dialectic relation, and a conflict relation. The symbiotic relation is a harmonic relationship of mutual dependence and interaction, the dialectical relation is a mutually complementary relationship of opposites, and the conflict relation is an aggressive relationship in which both attempt to destroy the other.

The relation of the examiner and the observed is static. What is decisive is a change in the quality of the relation. It has developed from the mythological to become more rational, conscious, and conceptual. The articulation that arises in this way is also the background to all aesthetic perception.

Man determines his position and place in relation to nature. What is decisive is how he regards his own possibilities of influencing it, and what he feels regulates them. Ideology comes in here.

Man has a consciousness of self: knowledge of a self that is separate from the environment. He can relate to his environment in various ways: Iwanska distinguishes the cognitive, the active, the moral, and the aesthetic attitude [Iwanska 1971: 402 - 403]. The selection and emphasis between them is directed by the interests of each person. Thus, although Man is in immediate contact with his
environment, he can choose his attitude towards it, determine the aspect of examination, take a conceptual distance.

In nature one can move freely. The receiver then does not have the same kind of distance to the object as he has in the case of a work of art. The receiver is a part of the environment that he receives. All the senses form observations. Nature surrounds the observer. The world of works of art is always imaginary; the receiver has no physical access to it (cf. however, a happening, in which the border between the receiver and the maker is removed, but there, too, one has to become involved). The examiner certainly has psychological access to the work and its world [Walton 1978: 23-25]. In a way a work of art is set up as an object of examination, critical appreciation, and interpretation (cf. 'critical aesthetics', p. 105). Nature, on the other hand, — at least untouched nature — is not an object of the same kind of appreciative examination but of understanding: the examiner seeks a way that would do justice to nature as an object of aesthetic examination [cf. Wellek 1978: 46].

The aesthetic aspect is, however, also emphasized in situations in which one is in some way free of the environment: as a tourist, a rambler. The detachment is to some extent reminiscent of that separateness and distance that is often emphasized when speaking of art. There is then a certain kind of critical distance, a remoteness in examination, to the environment. Economic and similar interests do not disturb.

14) The works of most art forms are to be perceived with one sense — environmental observations are normally formed by the joint operation of several or all the senses, and all the senses are relevant

Art is an aesthetically developed and refined area. Only the senses of sight and hearing properly have their own art forms, which have developed a language of expression and a technique. On the other hand, the so-called lower senses (smell, taste, touch) do not have their own art forms; these senses are not refined in art. They have no art-forms which could act as models; nor is there a language for speaking of these perceptions, which artistic activity would have developed. Certainly there are aesthetic activities that are related to artistic activity which demand the exercise of taste and in which there is a language to speak about them — one such is gastronomy, the tasting of wines and cheeses, etc. Only experts are able to make precise differentiations. Coleman regards a characteristic of the lower senses to be the fact that only sensory enjoyment is possible, no special consciousness or developed taste is needed (for example sunbathing); these would be purely enjoyments but not aesthetic enjoyments [Coleman 1968: 17-18; see also Coleman 1965].

Music and the visual arts are most typical of the single sense art-forms. The immediate impressions of the other senses can be connected to the perception of their works, the effects of touch that arise from the sound waves of music, and the effects of touching sculptures, but they are peripheral, even if they belong to the work of art. On the other hand the warmth or quality of air of a concert hall, for example, do not in any way belong to music, even though they can be perceived during a concert. Unfavourable conditions may certainly disturb the reception of the work.

The aesthetic perception of the environment is clearly more total, the common result of several senses — this applies to the normal environment (the meso-environment). The farther the object the more exclusive sight becomes. For some area or object, even the effect of sound or smell may be characteristic. Barclay Jones depicts the aesthetic power of a city from the aspect of different senses:

There is not merely the city of pattern, texture, color, the visual city. Nor is there merely the city of sound. And how important a role sound plays in our perception of the city! Even the lack of it is significant. The silence of Wall Street on Sunday morning is overwhelming. But there is the olfactory city — the city of smell — and the pervasive smells which cover whole sections of the city and become
characteristic of it. There are local smells which are the attributes of a street or a small area and microsmells, if you will, those that are perceivable at a distance of only a few feet — smells of stalls and restaurants, of passing objects or beings in the streets or on the sidewalks, smells associated with specific buildings or rooms which you enter or pass.

Jones goes on to mention "a city of taste," "the city of touch," and finally "the vital functions":

And then there is the aesthetic effect of "vital functions" — the subtle changes in our body chemistry that affect the value of our experiences, the delight that we almost universally feel when we visit a foreign city on vacation.

All of this is based on immediate sensory influences. But later Jones mentions in addition the significance of knowledge as the outlier of experience, and the possibility of experiencing a city on the basis of a depiction, vicariously:

[—] we experience cities both in concept and in actuality and both vicariously and directly, and this is true of cities of the past as well as cities of the present. All of us have vivid images of cities we have never visited. We occasionally know as much about them as we do of cities we have lived in quite a long while. Some of these acts cities which continue to exist, some of them are cities which never existed except in the minds of men. A complete and systematic study of the aesthetic effect of cities must include an inspection of our total perception which includes vicarious as well as direct experience, cities in concept as well as actuality; and in the past as well as in the present: the city as a symbol is the product of all of these.

Environmental works that in a way are connected to the tradition of garden art and landscape architecture break this scheme; they appeal to the senses of smell and touch too, for which special art forms have not been developed.

The experience of the environment is typically multi-sensory, whereas that of art in general and the visual arts in particular is mono-sensory. Barclay Jones writes of the perception of a city as follows:

What we are concerned with is perception of the city: total perception of the total urban environment. We cannot arbitrarily choose a single aspect, a single sense, a single effect and consider that to the exclusion of others. We must be concerned with the whole process.

Certainly the dominant position of sight and hearing is clear, and in the arts, models have been developed for perception and experience based on those senses. But the perception of the environment is multi-sensory. It is not possible to exclude smells, tastes, and touches, and the combinations of the different senses. — Once again the situation is different in the case of the environment that has been altered by Man, and that in a natural state. It is, for example, easier to exclude some sensory areas from architecture, for it is possible to assume that architecture operates above all visually, even if also through touch.

What is demanded is drawing discriminations and the ability to draw them (this demand is presented by Francis Coleman among others [Coleman 1968]). Aesthetic perception is not purely a sensory activity but also one requiring practise. It can be distinguished from purely 'innocent' perception. A system can be developed in the area of any sense whatever. A language is needed for speaking about the perceptions and of course also a sensitivity for perception itself.

c. Other paradigms from the point of view of their relation to the environment

Beauty is always closely linked to other areas of values, as the treatment of the art and environment paradigm has already demonstrated. The following are not really new paradigms but fringe-areas
of the former, in which the a-aesthetic significance of the term 'beautiful' is emphasized and in border cases becomes clearly a-aesthetic. The extension areas and other areas of aesthetic life are (1) related to skill, (2) related to activity, (3) related to knowledge or intelligence, and (4) related to ethics; they appear e.g. in social relations, scientific theories, in work, in games and in sport. What is common is that beauty is a property of an activity or method; in a way it is objectless.

**Skill.** The aspect of skill is emphasized in tasks demanding dexterity, such as in handicraft. Design skill (the creation of a model, etc.) and manufacturing skill (the making of an object to a certain model) must be differentiated. The difference is clearly visible, for example, when a master of a craft makes certain traditional models of utensils, for example a rocking chair; the skill lies in following a model and in such things as taking into consideration the changes in proportions required by differences in size.

Art has always had a connection with skill, and only recent development has questioned the demand for skill; works that are purely based on an idea have arisen (ready-made etc.). The relation to skill-demanding handicraft has always been present, starting already in the philosophy of Plato. The idea of art as an independent achievement of civilization was born only in the age of the Enlightenment, in the eighteenth century [Rootmaker 1976: 72; see also Kristeller 1951 - 1952]. It was then that, according to Harold Osborne, the concept of so-called free art arose, the task of which was only to provide objects for appreciation and enjoyment [Osborne 1976: 63].

Japanese aestheticians have emphasized the unity that has been essential to their culture throughout the ages: life was ceremonial art. In Western countries various experimental trends have attempted to fill the gulf between art and skill (pop art, minimal art). Johannes Gaertner is disposed to see photocrealism as the resurrector of handicraft skill: the artist rejects his accustomed role, he no longer wishes to be a creator but once again a handicraft technician whose honour lies in the fact that he masters his copying technique as professionally as possible [Gaertner 1976: 27 - 28]. The border between art and handicraft, industrial design, and environmental design is collapsing, which means a closer connection with life than before for the problems of art.

**Activity.** The area of activistic (practical) values can be regarded as an extension of the previous one. By this I want to suggest that the totality is broader than dexterity and ability. In Darmstadt György Fukasz spoke of people's need — and right — to aesthetic satisfaction, not only in leisure, but also in work — the joy of work [Fukasz 1976: 148]. For its part art can serve as a developer of the perception of other forms of beauty; according to Nikolai Goncharenko it extends people's ability to aesthetic enjoyment by helping to find the positive sides of life in producing beauty for the human community, in the same way it acts as a means to develop personality [Osborne 1976: 148]. There is a tradition of this in Japan, where the task of art has been regarded as the beautification of life and the giving of an artistic stamp to life [Yamamoto 1976: 91].

The aesthetics of work emphasizes the significance of work as a producer of satisfaction. In this, know-how and designer skill are combined with social ideals and aims.

**Intelligence.** In skilfulness and activity there is an intellectual component. This is emphasized by such a term as 'ability,' which means above all quick intelligence, appropriate activity etc. The mistake is often made of thinking that aesthetic examination should only be based on sensory perceptions. There exists an intellectual beauty, such as the rational beauty of the game of chess, and of science. This kind of experience presupposes the interpretation and articulation of the object. Nature is some kind of raw material, which is shaped and articulated by perception. Therefore the comprehension of natural beauty presupposes knowledge of the operating mechanisms of nature and the ability to understand the beauty of the systems.
Beauty is not only limited to sensory perception. In those cases, too, in which sensory perception is central, conceptual activity has a substantial part. But there are forms of beauty in which this aspect is emphasized or exclusive. Of the arts one such is literature, and partly also theatre and film. Scientific theories, games, and even sport are those in which the beauty is in the operation of the system.

This is reminiscent of the forms of beauty in nature, in which the operation and operability of the system is emphasized. Such is, for example, an ecosystem, which must be understood, in order to be felt beautiful. In these cases the aesthetic object is by its character an abstraction or system of relationships, not so much a perception-object, which are examined with the aid of theories constructed to explain them.

Examination may emphasize the explanatory models — scientific theories, etc. However in these their reliability is at all times essential, though even a rejected model may be fascinating as a performance and structure. Its significance may be in the history of science; in certain cases the significance is in the artistic structure. Even though the values of truth and beauty can be differentiated, a theory must fulfil the demands of truth so that one can properly speak of intellectual beauty.

_Ethos._ The ethical area of values is the one in which values most clearly form syntheses. Especially when speaking of the beauty of the human environment or of the social milieu, ethical frameworks, life values, become significant. Such areas are human relations, work, social relations, the structure of society [Hillgärter 1976: 94.-95].

A 'beautiful person' takes on a Platonic significance: a good, ethically exemplary person. Such a significance can be extended to become a property of an entire community. Stefan Morawski refers to the basic idea of Marxist aestheticians: the idea of a socialist society as most beautiful, most harmonic [Morawski 1971: 282].

Behind the idea of the synthetic nature of values is the assumption of a possible equilibrium of values. The life values are ethically weighted, but they can also be regarded as containing scientific (intellectual), practical, and operational values. The differentiation of separate areas of values in everyday life is a conceptual matter: distinguishability does not mean appearing separately. And in any case in practical solutions one must be able to find a state of equilibrium in which the various areas of values are taken into consideration.

An aesthetic paradox arises: other values become aesthetic in operating and in succeeding. The fact that something (society, scientific theory, the progress of a game) works well is aesthetic in its own right. The conceptual world constructed by Man is beautiful only through its operation. (Can its parts, nevertheless, be beautiful in themselves?)

Thus real life, the real world, the environment, is a large block in which values work together, but in which it is certainly possible to emphasize different aspects.

It is otherwise in art. The world of a work of art itself can be treated as the same kind of block and totality, which contains all areas of values — and in the interpretation of a non-representational work several areas of values are present through the symbols. But the manner and sense of the existence of a work of art is different. A work is an object of perception and interpretation, an autonomous world which exists for critical examination. A different assumption makes art a part of the real world and is in danger of losing precisely the level on which it succeeds in critically operating in relation to society. In order to be a comment on, and criticism of, society art must be as independent and autonomous as possible.

If the independence of art is to some degree relatively unanimously recognized, two directions for development remain. On the one hand, the boundary between art and non-art can be clarified and sharpened conceptually by emphasizing the basic ontological differences after the manner of
Beardsley and Danto, on the other, art can be regarded as extending through experiments in environmental works of art and similar; and it is possible to recognize a broad border area in which there are the metaphorical art-forms, art-like phenomena, and such areas defying classification as industrial design, product design, and building. Between nature and art various degrees of mixed forms have developed, which cover in fact a much more extensive area than the area of art and the area of untouched nature together. The theoretical treatment of these areas demands the modification of models suitable for analyzing basic cases, and the development of new ones (or else they can be treated as forms of the cultural environment).

In fact, environmental aesthetics divides into two. One is the physical environment with theories that govern it, the other is the social environment and the mental environments. In the latter, moral significances are emphasized. In a beautiful life the moral and the aesthetic significances approach one another; environmental aesthetics becomes the aesthetics of all of life [see Khatchadourian 1982: 96-98]. The environment is then not only a world but a human situation. It is dealt with by the so-called philosophy of life.

4. Summary of the ontology section

The aesthetic object is the level on which art, the environment, etc. meet, but categorization is, however, required. The classification of an object is important: it determines the class for comparison, according to the classification the conventions to be used are determined; one cannot work with an unclassified object.

The environment is ontologically a different kind of aesthetic object than a work of art (excepting architecture and the works of other arts that deal with the real environment); the most important difference is the difference between the fictitious and the real, and it has consequences that also affect the treatment of the environment. The environment is primarily our physical environment, our milieu, in the form in which it is attainable through the senses and conceptually. In the final resort the environment also contains the mental world, one’s state of life.

The aesthetic paradigms of the environment are determined on a basis of the natural and cultural sciences and of common sense; the correct basis is given by contemporary scientific knowledge; the goal is not the general maximization of the aesthetic value but its maximization within the bounds permitted by a frame of knowledge and other values.

Paradigmatic aesthetic objects are fixed points in art and the environment, to which unknown objects are compared (for purposes of depiction); the area of transition are nature’s works of art and generally metaphorical talk about the environment using the language of art. Art is a kind of paradigm of paradigms; it is the basic case of aesthetic objects, therefore it is also a fixed point for environmental aesthetics to build upon. Thus, the special character of the environment can be investigated by a comparison with art, even though the environment should not be subordinated to art.

Anything at all — even that which is not really an object in a material sense — can become the object of aesthetic examination and in that sense an aesthetic object; the question is one of the choice of the manner and aspect of examination. Works of art and sights are made aesthetic objects by communal decision — individual, temporary and other decisions can be made about others (and correspondingly objects that have been communally decided upon as aesthetic can be examined otherwise).

The existence of an aesthetic object is decisively linked both to individual and also to communal decisions. The environment, like art, gives rise to a system of norms and conventions, although here the rules are less rigid.

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The environment exists for us not only as immediately perceived, but also represented through depictions and directed by them; and perceptions, too, demand a depiction in order to become public. Therefore, how the environment is depicted is central (the problematics of this I shall deal with in the next chapter).

B. Metacriticism

1. Aesthetics as the philosophy of criticism, environmental aesthetics as the philosophy of environmental criticism

In the same way as there are other beauties than aesthetic beauty, so there are other criticisms than that which is directed towards aesthetic objects, and which examines them from an aesthetic point of view. For example, criticism may be directed at the social system, health care, the educational institution, universities, the church, etc. — and always where there is criticism, metacriticism is possible. Here I limit myself to criticism from the point of view of aesthetic beauty; only that belongs to aesthetics and only that is aesthetically interesting as the object of metacriticism.

Monroe C. Beardsley defines aesthetics as the philosophy of criticism or metacriticism [Beardsley 1958: 4]. According to him, works of art and the criticism related to them are an essential condition for the existence of aesthetics [ibid.: 1]. The conception of aesthetics as only connected to the arts and as only connected to the philosophy of their criticism is, however, narrow. In the section dealing with ontology I have attempted to demonstrate that in addition to works of art there are other equal objects for aesthetic perception, and that the analysis of their nature, too, is a task of aesthetics. Aesthetics has thus ontological and metacritical problems located outside of the arts.

It is also possible to demonstrate the existence of a special environmental criticism: the criticism of architecture, landscape design, and the environment, as well as the depictions made by naturalists. This is the material that the philosophy of criticism may analyze. Treated in this way, metacriticism expands to cover also environmental criticism, and environmental aesthetics is then the philosophy of environmental criticism.

There are more practical goals besides the 'passive' investigation of the operation of criticism. One is the development of the language of the depiction of the environment, the creation of its technique. However, only a small part of this belongs to the field of aesthetics. The second task is the development of interpretation — it is once again mainly the task of such sciences as geography. The goal is, in addition to the depiction of the environment, the investigation of the laws that govern it. Interpretation makes the environment understandable and at least partially controllable. The third task is the development of evaluation, and that is a matter that most clearly belongs to aesthetics. Evaluation means answering questions that concern the aesthetic (or other) value of the environment: one must be able to reply to the question of what the measures of value are and how they are applied to the object in question. Evaluation always presupposes the existence of a certain system of criteria and its adaptation to the object being interpreted. The task of environmental aesthetics is the examination and analysis of that system; in my opinion, it cannot provide a ready-made system.

The task of environmental aesthetics in a metacritical sense is the theoretical control of the description, interpretation, and evaluation of the environment and the creation of a frame of reference. It constructs a model of how the environment is received, and in what way it operates as an aesthetic object.

As aesthetic objects environmental objects are a disparate group. What they have in common is
that they are clearly parts of the real world and in that sense real. A consequence of this is also that in their treatment there is a different kind of responsibility as in the treatment of works of art: we live and act together with the objects in the same world. (Works of art too can be regarded as having rights; the destruction of a work is a wrong against it. They have a right to exist unaltered, to be on view, to be available, etc.; talking of rights is a metaphorical expression, of course, literally the artist has rights.) In most cases we select environmental objects for aesthetic examination ourselves and independently. When they are offered socially the situation is more reminiscent of the reception of a work of art.

Works of art as the presenters of a fictitious world are unique, and through this comes the demand for their preservation. Destruction means the closing of the road to those worlds. The fact that the works are fictitious does not thus justify their being regarded as secondary.

The most aesthetic environment does not need to be that which pleases most, nor that which pleases immediately. There is more difficult and easier environmental beauty [cf. Hepburn 1973: 252—253]. Coleman differentiates aesthetic and critical attitudes [Coleman 1968: 7] (cf. positive and critical aesthetics). According to him, there is in the aesthetic attitude the question of the most open and unprejudiced reception; in the critical attitude there is the question of an evaluatory reception. In my opinion there is, however, no reason to make this kind of distinction, at least using those terms. This would lead to the aesthetic becoming something based on feeling, or emotions, emotive, whereas the critical is rational, conceptual. These are very closely connected.

If one puts aside pure pleasingness, the question is one of trying to understand the object; and understanding in itself produces intellectual enjoyment. The most valuable works of art are in that way so rich that they appear to be finally undefinable. The environment, too, seems to avoid final interpretation. But the interpreter must in some way and on some level find a handhold on the object, otherwise it remains only a problem. An intuitive feeling of the significance of the object may be one preliminary starting point.

In the same way as a picture is formed of a work of art by familiarizing oneself with it as carefully and diversely as possible, so a picture is formed of the environment. Thus, the object is conceptualized, and not based purely on perception. Frameworks thus mean — better than any concrete delimitation — the choice of the aspect of examination (the universe of discourse). A concrete delimitation comes into consideration when examination is limited to the visual side: then, too, the picture is formed on the basis of several perceptions.

Not all perceptions are aesthetic, even though in nearly all there are aesthetic aspects present. It is appropriate to treat an aesthetic perception, an aesthetic object, etc., in such a way that the aspect in question is clearly visible. Even though these do not differ decisively in quality from other perceptions and objects, a difference of degree is in question. When one moves on a scale that is concerned with differences of quantity, one cannot do other than decide by agreement what kind of perception is in question.

Games and roles. The environment is to a great extent a game system comparable to art. In art there are clear roles for the maker (the artist) and the experiencer (the public); in the same way as there are clear roles for the object (the work) and the institutions that maintain artistic activity. There are, thus, basically four kinds of roles, of which the first two belong to people: the artist's role, the results of the activity of which are then works of art; and the receiver's role, which is considerably more heterogeneous than the former. The receiver's role includes the devotees of art, but also those who act as intermediaries, the critic and researcher, the teacher and museum official; it is possible to distinguish interpretive and technical intermediaries. The two remaining roles belong to the objects and institutions: the role of the works of art (as distinguished from ordinary objects) and of institutions, such as museums, schools, research institutes, the press, publishers, etc.
The roles of the agents are interchangeable: the maker becomes a receiver or critic, and vice versa. Also, the institutions can change roles or connect them closely together, such as education and research in academies of art. The changes can extend outside of the institution, too: an art museum becomes a place for a natural scientific exhibition and vice versa.

As a totality the art institution is an operational system that is composed of all of these, within whose framework various roles are possible. There are rules as to how to play the art game; art theory and philosophy maintain and investigate the rules; partly the existence of the art institution appears only in the activity itself. Art is a system based on agreements, which can be changed — and in anti-art can be broken, too.

In the environment the system is less definite, a kind of shadow institution (I am not now stating an opinion on the order of appearance or of importance). It is possible to place a representative of the nature game in the place of every participant in the art game; a loose institution for the treatment, research, and relevant teaching and education exists in the environment. As maker, nature personified corresponds to the artist; the naturalist is the offerer and selector, in the altered environment the designer; the unit delimited in a depiction or perception corresponds to the work of art. The word 'depiction' has two meanings: (1) in a broad sense it means a presentation, which contains description, interpretation, and evaluation, (2) in a narrow sense it is a depictive and commentative presentation, the first part of the previous division into three parts (description).

Nature offers the object as raw-material; in preparing the depiction the naturalist chooses where to fix the attention as well as the manner in which to express the properties of the object. A good depiction gives sense and significance to the object, a poor one says nothing. Paul Ziff emphasizes the ability of a depicter to create and destroy worlds:

Do you think that something that is virtually identical to a configuration of mud could be a great work? I mean it looks like mud. If you saw just sections of it you’d think it was mud. How can that be a great work of art? Well there’s mud and there are these paintings by Dubuffet. They cost 30 40 50 thousand dollars. Rightly. They’re great works of art. They look like mud if you just look at them that way. Described in that way they are nothing. That’s the wrong way to describe them.

[Ziff 1984 40]

The depiction can be artistic by nature — sometimes becoming art — or scientific; it can be understood by the layman or may only be intended for experts. It is always concentrated, selected, and condensed, and arranged in accordance with some principle. In the game it corresponds to the work of art, together with the landscape or environment that it represents. The receiver is anyone at all who is capable of conceptual thinking. The specialists in this area are the nature researcher and the cultural environment expert; they have the principal responsibility for appreciation and critical discussion. They control the institutions: teaching and research institutes, publications, etc. All as in art?

Art and part of the nature game form together an aesthetic game. From this an aesthetic unity is formed: from the parallel between art and the environment (nature) as objects of aesthetic examination. Art is the central paradigm; it is not, it is true, a giver of direct models, but the environment is to a great extent analogous as a paradigm. The common highest abstract level is the level of the aesthetic object.

2. Environmental criticism

a. What is environmental criticism?

In the same way as there is a separate and specific research and criticism on art, so, too, is there
separate and specific research and criticism on the environment. Partly it belongs to architectural
research, which, however, has concentrated on the analysis of visual significance; and in the
environment all the sensory areas must be taken into consideration. So far specific criticism and
research that takes into consideration all the sensory fields does not exist; its development is an
interdisciplinary matter. But aesthetics cannot take this role. It must remain within theoretical and
conceptual questions; nor can it provide, nor can it be expected to provide, very concrete answers.
Aesthetics can certainly demonstrate the nature of the criticism required, influence its formation,
investigate and even control it.

Is it possible to imagine that naturalists create new modes of reception, and that nature is seen in
a continually renewed way from the point of view of depictions of nature? Depictions of nature are,
normally, documents of some person’s way of viewing environmental objects, nor does the depicter
have to recommend his way of seeing to others — he only tells how he himself has perceived the
object. But despite that, the depictions may become a model of how the objects can be observed —
and if the depicter has authority, of how the objects should be observed.

What do naturalists document or what are they persuasively presenting? — Their way of seeing?
— Experiences? Objects just as they are? Personal reactions? The depiction is a document of all of
these, but it may contain means that are foreign to a document proper: it may exaggerate; it may
shut out features from the depiction that do not suit it; it may select. On the basis of the depiction
alone it is impossible to know how truthful and faithful to the object the depiction is. The receiver
knows the depiction, not that which is depicted; he forms an image on the basis of the depiction,
and it need not be the same as the original object. The testing of the truthfulness of the depiction
always presupposes comparison: the examination of the internal logic of the depiction, relating it to
other depictions and one’s own observations.

Why are depictions of the environment important? Why are the environment itself and the
related experiences insufficient? Depictions present their object as thought out, considered, and
analyzed; they do not, of course, replace genuine experience, even though a certain kind of
vicarious experience that takes place through a depiction is possible. The paradox is that the
number of depictions grows all the time, even though the areas of unspoilt nature are diminishing:
we do not destroy old depictions, but rather we take greater care of their preservation in libraries
and museums than we do of the objects themselves. A future can be imagined in which depicted
objects no longer exist in a natural state, only the depictions. The depictions provide a temporal
dimension — the object itself is variable, lasting for a shorter or longer time; a depiction makes it
static, and in some sense immortal, as a photograph or as a process shown in a film; and also a
verbal depiction may show physical and abstract states of affairs and changes in them.

Technically, depictions can be based on various means. The most important method is, without
a doubt, the use of language: a travel book, a report, a piece of research. The second important
method is the photograph, which visualizes the object where a verbal depiction verbalizes it. The
object can be ‘seen’ through a photograph; a picture is not only examined as a photograph, but as
an intermediary; the object seen through its depiction, whether it exists in the external world or not.
A photograph, too, can be partly studio work. The colors, trimming, angle of vision, retouching,
and the combination of photographs are artistic means. The properties of the presentation and of
the object itself must be distinguished from one another.

Alternative methods of depiction are drawing, a map, a model, a film. All non-verbal methods
presuppose a final translation to language and concepts, a change of technique, the expression of
aims within a linguistic framework.

Depictions are one means of articulating an object aesthetically, too. They are able to reveal in
the object such things as are not directly obvious and which would not be perceivable by everyone.
A depiction can thus be an aid in the reception of the environment, in the same way as art criticism
and research help one to gain a hold of a work of art. On the other hand, a depiction also creates its own object by selection, emphasis, forgetting. But in any event depictions mean the contemplation of the object, the deepening of its examination, the differentiation of the essential and inessential.

The intention is not to replace experiences of nature with nature books, nor to by-pass individual experience but to analyze it, make it public and communal. Experience only becomes communal through depiction. A personal experience of nature must be translated into a language of signs before it can be used as a document in scientific work. On the other hand, it is not necessary that all experiences of nature become the objects of common consideration; someone interested in nature can learn from his own experiences, from their comparison, and internal differentiation. But communality presupposes public depiction.

What should environmental criticism be? The task of criticism is the description, interpretation, and appreciation of an object. It is the many-sided treatment of an object, which helps other receivers to gain an impression of the object, to draw their attention to certain essential aspects, to lead them to ask the right questions. This does not mean that another receiver must come to the same conclusions, but that an expert presents grounds for his analysis and sets it up to be tested and examined in connection with the object, beside it. In dealing with the same objects environmental critics also criticize and test one another’s work, and present various expert views. As in other criticism nothing in this is self-evident: everything is used for some task and purpose, as the bases of interpretations. And rather than final solutions, the interpretations are hypotheses for which and against which one may present arguments.

Aesthetic environmental criticism presupposes a general aesthetic familiarity with the object. Therefore, art is not entirely foreign to it, although it is clear that art and the environment differ substantially from one another in many respects. Because, however, works of art belong to the same general class of aesthetic objects with environmental objects, there is no reason to deal with them entirely separately. Environmental criticism cannot take its models only from the natural sciences, because there, however, one moves in different areas of values (the scientific); it takes part of its models from art criticism. Mainly, however, environmental and art criticism are different forms of expression of the same activity rather than one having priority over the other.

The theoretical research on art criticism is also suitable for environmental criticism. The same demands of justifiability and objectivity apply to environmental criticism.

Published observations and experiences (documented and imagined). One measure of the aesthetic appreciation of a community is the depictions of nature that it approves of. Thus, the best way of becoming acquainted with the concepts of nature of a community is to become acquainted with its depictions of nature. They are realizations and applications of general aesthetic theory and ways of thinking which can be regarded as models. I.S. MacLaren depicts his research results as follows:

An aesthetic mode of perceiving nature, as has been argued by perceptual geographers, art historians, and literary critics, constitutes one way that a society forms its understanding of reality. For the eighteenth and early-nineteenth-century Briton, the Sublime and the Picturesque were the aesthetic modes of perception by which he described nature. When he travelled, these made up his aesthetic baggage. Their application to new lands told him where he stood aesthetically in relation to home landscapes just as his measurements of latitude told him where he stood spatially in relation to Greenwich.

[MacLaren 1984 3073A.]

Random samples, mainly interviews of laymen, are another way. Quite a number of such inquiries have been made and through them attempts have been made to map aesthetic appreciations of the environment empirically. This method has been criticized by Allen Carlson in his article "The Possibility of Quantifying Scenic Beauty"; the argument is that in such cases expert opinion is
by-passed and the opinion of anyone at all is held to be equally important. However, it is possible to think that, as in art, in the aesthetic treatment of the environment there are tasks requiring expertise. [Carlson 1977: 152 - 153.] It demands in a similar fashion knowledge and experience (cf. Beardsley's differentiation of aesthetic value and aesthetic worth: what is the value-potential of an object and how can one use it? [Beardsley 1972: 91]). Thus interview researches do not really measure the objective aesthetic value of the environment but investigate environmental concepts, the opinions of the population — therefore, it is rather a field for psychology and the social sciences or folklore.

Depictions that are presented of the same objects are revealing when investigating the individual differences between the various depicters during which analysis differences in time and the delimitation of the object of depiction have to be taken into consideration — the object is not always the same.

Depictions of nature form a tradition which has the same character as the tradition of depicting works of art. Parallel to the literary tradition there is, of course, an oral tradition. In addition, there is learned behavior, which is not expressed verbally. These are cultural traditions, from which it is difficult to deviate essentially. A radical change in the tradition of depiction is reflected in the viewing of nature. We see nature by way of depictions, through them and their articulation; and the manner of depiction again is determined by the aesthetic systems behind it — the depictor, too, does not operate alone or independently. Depictions are a communal model for the reception of nature, and therefore they have a special significance as a regulator and director of modes of reception. Depictions take a hidden authoritative significance. On the one hand, this by itself makes reception stereotyped and uniform, on the other, depictions indisputably expand the possibilities for reception. To the layman they give points of view and stimuli for the examination of nature.

Depictions have their own interest purely as depictions, as linguistic and photographic performances. But their real interest lies in the way in which they promote the perception of the environment. It must always be asked about depictions whether they are capable of convincing. They may give a precise form to what the layman has intuitively aimed at; they influence the conceptions of taste and the formation of the systems of taste of the public. They also create interest in environmental questions and arouse activeness towards them. Thus, they remove indifference and apathy.

*Documentary depictions* - *fictitious depictions.* The objects of documentary depictions are factual; fictitious objects exist only within fiction, in its world (see Macdonald 1969: 625 - 628); fiction makes them possible. It is certainly possible to speak about fiction just as if it was real, but it must be noted that in this case one can only speak about truth as an internal matter in fiction. All the statements of a depiction (or claims other than those expressed verbally) do not hold good within fiction; one must be able to distinguish what is constructive in fiction and what is matter that comments on it.

For real texts the context exists; in fictitious ones it is created. A fictitious text must be interpreted, and in that the traditions of presentation and the conventions of interpretation must be taken into account (cf. Culler 1975: chapter 6, "Literary Competence", 113 - 130; Olsen 1978; and Beardsley 1977a). Fiction is, above all, made to be interpreted; reality exists and it must be understood and described.

It is a philosophical problem whether a picture can be transmitted unambiguously in words; correspondingly, can a verbal depiction be transformed into a visual picture, can it be visualized? Max Black assumes that complete translatability between a picture and a word is impossible [Black 1977: 109]. (Practical attempts at this are e.g. computer-drawn identikit pictures of wanted criminals.) One comes up against the same question in relation to nature and the various kinds of its depiction:
is it possible to present nature completely by any depiction? In both one arrives at approximate values and probabilities. Some depictions can indisputably be excluded, but from those that remain it is impossible to choose a correct one.

The pictorial and verbal presentation run naturally side by side, complementing each other. This happens normally in picture books presenting nature. Both the picture and the word guide one to see individual details and nature in general in a certain way.

How is it possible to enjoy nature without moving in it? The question appears to be a paradox, but there are several possibilities as has been shown: the intermediary may be maps, photographs, drawings, and literary depictions of nature. On the basis of them it is possible to investigate the aesthetic demands and expectations directed towards the environment and to follow their development.

The materials of environmental aesthetics are the records made by word and picture. They are also, for example, travel advertisements and other such things that reveal our concepts of nature and the factors that create them. But aesthetics is not really the sociology of taste. Of course the elucidation of concepts of taste has its own interest as has the analysis of the factors that influence their change, but only what taste is and how it appears — what taste is in art and what it is in the environment — is a question of aesthetics.

Verbal depictions of nature are a way that is generally valid, tried, and one that fulfils the requirements of scientific repeatability. We can examine how each person expresses his experiences of nature linguistically. In this, as in the analysis of art, three components can be distinguished. Nature and the mental images that arise from it can be described; the processes of nature interpreted with the aid of the natural sciences — in the case of nature altered by Man the cultural sciences are also significant; and nature can be evaluated.

From an aesthetic point of view the most essential are, of course, the evaluations presented concerning nature, which in the basic case are expressed by individual adjectives revealing delight or repulsion or through depictions that contain broader statements of the reasons, in which case reference is made to the properties of the object. A good depiction helps one to see and experience nature more intensively, besides expanding knowledge with its aid. Depictions of nature are information obtained for the reader, which complement information gained by direct experience, from one's own observations.

A verbal depiction can be compared to a photographic presentation of nature. A photograph also expresses the concepts of the photographer: the choice of subject, the angle of vision, grouping, delimitation. A depiction is not a mechanical copying of reality. A picture is rather constructed or formed than taken; Arthur Dobrin follows Anselm Adams' views:

A button is pressed but the mountain remains just where it was before. The photograph is not the mountain but the image of the mountain mediated by the camera and the person behind the camera, as well as the paper on which it is printed, the chemicals used in the printing and the manner in which those chemicals are applied. In other words, a photograph is made, not taken. It is something created.

[Dobrin 1984: 4]

This kind of photographer's activity has decisively assisted a large public to see nature — and part of the interest in nature can undoubtedly be traced to the stimuli provided by photographs. All of this means that the photograph approaches, from a purely reflective relationship, the manner in which art operates: the meanings are transmitted by a visual language; symbols are used, etc. When speaking of a photograph the question of genuineness must be remembered: printed photographs are copies of the originals made by a printing technique.

An advantage of the photograph that can be compared to painting is the ability to bring out the essential from even a large amount of material. A photograph can create order and reveal the structural principles that are hidden in an object that appears to be random. A picture can stop in
the fleeting processes of nature, a moment that remains unnoticed in the flow of events; in special cases it contains in itself a temporal dimension too, such as a pair or series of pictures that present the same object under different lighting or weather conditions, or at different times of the year; continuity can be created by overexposure or photographing on the same negative.

A photograph is flexible: it can present a landscape panorama or limit the view to a small detail and enlarge it to a size many times greater than in nature. Appealing to Roman Vishniac, a photographer of micro-nature, Rader and Jessup state that the aestheticality of nature extends without bounds to the small and the large — order is preserved, whereas, for example, the enlarging of a painting reveals it to be after a certain stage only blotches of paint (Rader & Jessup 1976. 167 (see p. 72 for citation)). It is also possible to say that a painting ceases to be a work of art and becomes purely material and physical when there is, of course, an order on the microlevel as in the rest of nature. Nature is, of course, even further structured into atoms.

This is one form of the framelessness of nature mentioned by Hepburn. He sets as a condition for the aesthetic observer the ability to move from one aspect to another — one must be able to select and articulate that which is within the sphere of observation in the most appropriate manner to each (Hepburn 1973: 252). The photographer makes this delimitation on behalf of the viewer, but at the same time he binds him to the choices and emphases that he has made — the photograph is like any other work of art: it has a frame. Movability is truly possible only in nature itself.

**Aesthetic ideals and examples.** The development of conventions can be examined, for example, even as far as the formation of viewpoints. Maupertuis’ expedition found one: Niemivaara, a mountain, which through literary depictions became an ideal place from the standpoint of Romantic interest in nature. It is paradoxical that Maupertuis’ truthful picture became an ideal landscape for the Romantics. Certain mountain landscapes, lake views, etc., have become models, basic cases, to which a similar kind of nature is compared.

David B. Richardson sees that in the aesthetic appreciation of nature corresponding institutions to those in art operate: a landscape and a viewpoint is given a status similar to that of a work of art, a social approval, by setting it as an object for critical examination — the creation of this kind of position means, among other things, that people travel to the place purely to see it. (Richardson 1976. 190-191) To a great extent verbal and visual landscape depiction is a recording of these ideals and an offering of new finds. These clichés are the continually renewing legacy of culture, stores which are transferred from one generation to another. And in the same way as there are model cases of good works of art, paradigmatic works, there are also quality examples of a good landscape. Viewspots and other special places operate in the same way as paradigmatic works of art: theories and criteria of general landscape aestheticality can be by-passed by making comparisons directly with model cases [see Cua & Fletcher 1975. 178 - 179 (see p. 65)].

A paradigmatic landscape does not even need to be a real landscape. It may be an ideal landscape created with the aid of various kinds of depictions, such as Niemivaara as depicted by Maupertuis. Practically nobody had gone to the place itself for years but the depictions lived and had an influence. Literature has also created these ideal pictures, in the light of which real nature, too, has begun to be viewed. Photographs, and other natural depictions create models, in accordance with which reality is then seen. Nature begins to be seen in the light of depictions: in order to achieve the goals presented by them the rights mentioned by Hepburn to select, to combine, to simplify, to remove, even to add, are used [cf. Hepburn 1967: 292]. The viewing of nature in the light of art and even more general depictions of nature is a real fact, not a paradox.

But perhaps, however, more than creating clichés, depiction frees one from them. The intermediary measure of a good photograph and a good depiction of nature lies in the extent to which they free one from a clichéd way of seeing. Thus an unreal, exaggerated picture which offers a
special angle can be defended on other bases than its self-sufficient beauty. Matti A. Pitkänen helps one, for example, to see clouds and the sky in a new way, as an essential part of the landscape. The dramatic black cloud formations loom the landscape with their restrained energy; dark tones in lake and forest pictures show the hidden faces of a sleepy Finnish summer day; or he destroys the sense of the reality of a landscape, and makes it a strangely colored fairy-tale landscape, or changes the three-dimensional views into an abstract composition of color surfaces. In the afterword to Suomalainen maisema/The Finnish Landscape he presents as criteria of a good landscape picture that "it should transport the viewer's imagination beyond the actual picture and it should stand up to critical examination even with age" [Pitkänen 1973: (no page numbers)].

Man does not only examine the environment but changes it. In this changing aesthetic ideals appear, although it is true that in many cases they are subordinated to economic and other factors. But, for example, town planning and building is an attempt to fulfill the needs of people — also the aesthetic needs - in the environment.

In the same way ideals appear in small details and in small environments: in parks, in gardens etc. In these one meets with refined nature; very often plants are used that perhaps on account of their rarity are especially worthy of note. Rarity — which as such may be a relative matter — means that the object becomes more easily observed in the new environment than in its accustomed one. However, mere rarity cannot be regarded as an aesthetic point.

Examination is not limited to the actual world, but is also directed towards reminiscences, dreams, imaginary scenes, visions of the future. Often their basis can be observed in the perceived environment, even the object observed as such, which becomes a dream to be fulfilled in another situation. A difficulty in scientific analysis is very often the individual private nature of objects of this kind. But the depictions are even then a common basis.

The tasks and use of depiction. The aim in a depiction is the creation of a conceptual model with which it is possible to conceptually control the environment: to understand and explain it. Additionally, the aim may be to transmit one's own experience and impression. A depiction is the selection of the object, making a decision as to what is relevant and worth presenting as such. From pure nature one must move to depicted nature. Of course, nature may be the object of our perception even without depictions, a challenge to the skill of pure seeing, but it is extremely difficult for it to be freed of the conceptual tools.

Often our depictions are limited to talk and comments that are not recorded. Only a very small part is documented and thus preserved; the most usual cases remain temporary, only as remarks and descriptions from companions in a discussion, photographs for a collection taken on a journey, and so on. From a large number of documented depictions that part is selected which is commonly valued as important and with which several people have at different times become acquainted. Thus, the communal basis directing the observation is, in the final resort, quite similar — such as classics and their presentation in art. It is always possible to bring out what has been forgotten and to demonstrate its values — the same thing happens in the case of art in the selection and preservation of classics and in the gradual change in their hierarchy.

The tasks of depictions differ. They transmit the experience of a person, they show to another that which has not been an immediate sense impression to him. They form a framework and a model as to how to perceive, and in what way to examine nature.

Depictions operate as if one 'travelled' through them — this explains why travel books have been so popular. Now their place has been partly taken by pictorial works of a similar nature and illustrative nature films, especially on television. Of course, depictions can be examined as such, without relating them to the surrounding reality, as if they were art — and also through the models given by nature.
Not all nature depiction operates as reportage. Monroe C. Beardsley distinguishes between portrayal and depiction; for example, a painting may be a portrayal of a certain person or landscape, or it may depict people or landscapes in general (Beardsley 1958: 270–273; and 1978: 4-6). A documentary depiction is a presentation of a recognizable object and has the nature of a portrait. Instead of the object as such we have then the object and its depiction, for example the Yosemite and John Muir’s depictions of the Yosemite. We see the object through depictions and in relation to them. Borderline cases are naturalistic depictions of nature such as in Thomas Hardy’s novels: representative (apparently representative) recorded from the point of view of a reliable external observer. In art fiction a change in status has taken place from documentary depictions to clearly creative or constructing depiction, even if works such as Hardy’s can perhaps be given a special status outside of art fiction, too, on the basis of other sources (in the same way as certain landscape paintings, etc.).

The basic difference lies, however, in the fact that the object depicted in art fiction is constructed, created within the framework of the work. The depiction creates an object, constructs an imaginary world, which exists only through its depiction; the depiction constructs the imaginary world — nonetheless within its own framework it is possible to ask what is right, that is, what is incontrovertibly depicted in correspondence with the events contained in the world of the work. We try when we read to construct the world based on that which is said, and then we must pay attention, among other things, to the reliability of the narrator. Nor is it necessary in the case of a fictitious depiction to be able to return to its models in reality; we have to interpret the result, separated from its background and basis; we must seek its sense and significance.

Normally depictions of nature are only one part of the totality of a work, in which case they have tasks as symbols, as metaphors, as motives, etc. If fables are not taken into consideration there are only rare examples of purely fictitious depictions of nature. (J.M.G. Le Clézio’s short story “The World Lives” is one of the purest.) The fictitious depiction is in a certain sense separate from reality as the creator of a second reality; documentary depictions, on the other hand, present — truthfully or defectively — that which exists; such are, among other things, the depictions in travel books — in which too, it is true, the world as depicted may appear different to the object of the depiction.

b. Who are environmental critics?

The best model and aid for the receiver of the environment are the depictions made by experts. But when the question is one of the aesthetic reception of the environment not all depictions will do, but only such in which the aesthetic aspect is primary. These are at least a part of scientific-artistic depictions of nature; of photographs; of travel books. Environmental criticism as such does not exist except for a limited border area, architecture; it is true that what landscape architects do comes very close to what can and should be demanded of environmental criticism. The above-mentioned works also give the background of knowledge demanded for the reception of the environment.

Environmental critics are naturalists in the case of untouched nature and the agrarian cultural landscape; in the case of the urban environment they are architects, art and cultural historians, etc. They have information of the nature of the object they depict and the ability to appreciate it. Research through interviews provides information on the sociology of taste; and research of this kind has an application in, among other things, the planning of leisure areas, leisure activity, etc. But lay opinion cannot carry the weight of that of an expert.
Dissidents and total criticism. Many famous naturalists regard towns, and especially technical culture, with distaste — usually they do not approve of development beyond the stage of some kind of agrarian society. These sympathizers with nature can, after the manner of Henry Thoreau, flee from the sphere of civilization to primitive conditions, retaining, it is true, their critical sense and their intellectual activeness. They are the dissidents of a technological age. From their voluntary exile they criticize what they have left behind using the informative and conceptual means offered by it. They are at the same time observers and reporters of their new environment and radical cultural critics through their sympathy with nature [Tobin 1981: 196].

Flight to a depiction of wild nature, or at least of an agrarian landscape and to an appropriate way of life is in fact surprisingly common among naturalists, even to the extent that it is more difficult to find expert depicter of the cultural environment of towns and settlements. There are some at least among ethnographers; but, still, the tradition of cultural depiction appears to have always been most closely linked to research into, and interest in, art, through which the human environment has been dealt with as if a work of art and through the models provided by it.

But whether the question is one of nature or culture criticism, the main point in general criticism is not the evaluation of individual objects and performances but the examination of aims and lines of development, that is, cultural philosophy.

The person of the depicter. When one speaks of a naturalist it seems that emphasis is being placed on the person instead of the depiction. However, my intention is precisely the analysis of texts and presentations. The depicter is then a person within the text, a person constructed from the text; not a living person. Certainly, the examination can be extended to people, when the text is one form of their activity and existence.

The following degrees can be distinguished in this:

1) the life of the person as a totality (the production as one part of it),
2) the totality of role activity (the role of a naturalist: literary production, photographs, speeches, pedagogic work, etc.),
3) literary/photographic production etc.
4) separate works as their own totalities.

The first level deals with the person in social and private connections. Biographical and historical research makes an examination of this kind. The second level deals with the role activity as an entirety, all of the acts that are performed in roles and tasks (these are discussed in Carlson's "Introduction" [Carlson 1982: unpublished MS.]), no matter how they are expressed. The third level is contained within the works themselves. The person is a mask, a role figure, that can be separated from the physical background. It is possible to examine an author's oeuvre independently of his intentions; and it is also possible to construct on the basis of his individual works a unifying persona: Kalliola, Muir etc. as they appear in those works that are published under their name. [Cf. Booth 1983: 73, 83; later (p. 431) Booth introduces the term "Career-Author" which he defines thus: "The Career-Author," Who Persists From Work to Work, a Composite of the Implied Authors of All His or Her Works."

It is not possible in all cases to reach significant generalizations by assembling a single persona from the images of makers occurring in separate works. Not all authors create a unified oeuvre. An interesting problem arises, for example, when John Muir in the year 1914 finishes his book on Alaskan travels thirty years after the journey; the later role regulates the earlier that has created the basic version of the text. [See Teale 1979. IX - X.]

Between fiction and scientific literature (or material) there is an essential difference: the person in an art work is a role figure, for which the actual writer need not take the responsibility either for the
content or the interpretation (although he does have author's rights: the right to decide on the authorized form of the work as well as financial rights). The created person is quite as imaginary to the creator who is responsible for it. We demand or assume a different kind of relationship in documentary material: the person has a role which he is responsible for. Thus, it is closely linked to the physical person, even if a difference in principle remains. There may be a different kind of person behind the public role, but the situation becomes schizophrenic if the difference is radical. In extreme cases the name is only a trade mark.

A real text and a fictional text are different systems, different kinds of game systems. Because in scientific literature propositions are presented concerning the real world, the presenter of the propositions is present as a person of the real world and answers for the statements as such. In fiction statements are constructed and the role of the real author is that of a constructor.

What we are interested in, in depictions of nature, is the role figure that appears in the depictions. The depiction is always made by someone and presented in someone's name. Thus, it is not purely a construction of significances presented through linguistic or other means, but one created using language (or other means). The significance intended by the depicter and the significance of the depiction may be in contradiction. Beside the depicter a shadow-being may develop, who says something other than what the depicter intends. This shadow being is an internal depicter in the text, and it is in him that work-based criticism is interested.

Depictions of nature can thus also be examined without taking the depicter as a physical person into consideration. It is possible to construct the person behind the texts from the texts, a person who is purely literary (the same can be done from photographs etc.). He is the principle governing the work.

The role of the environmental critic. In a way, depicted nature becomes the achievement of its depicter. The depicter selects what to present, makes a general delimitation and then further selects the points that are to dominate; he decides the emphasis. The depiction either stops the process of nature at one stage (photograph, drawing), or presents some series of events (film, verbal presentation). After such a depiction, and even during it, the object continues its own independent process, whereas the environment in the depiction remains the same. A depiction is, besides a document of the object itself, also a kind of document of the value system of the depicter. A document of this kind may be faithful to its object, scientifically reliable, but is may also be idealized; and of course the opposite, belittled.

Depiction has several principles of organization. Reino Kalliola has outlined his trilogy Suomen luonnnon kirja ('The Book of Finnish Nature'; 1946, 1951 and 1958) in accordance with different kinds of approaches: the first part Suomen kauinis luonto ('The Beautiful Nature of Finland') deals with natural and cultural history; the second Suomen luonto vuodenaikejen vaihteluissa ('Finnish Nature in the Changing Seasons') divides the cycle of the year into four acts; and the third, Suomen luonto mereltä tuntureille ('Finnish Nature from the Sea to the Fells') examines natural geographical areas moving from the south to the north. The principal variants are thus historical processes, cycles, and areas; the subsidiary variants are — or may be — natural phenomena, such as thunder and rain, the various journeys of the researcher or depicter, attention-demanding objects, the fauna, the flora, and the underlying geology.

The depicter must make the object permanent within the framework of his medium, choose and frame, must change it to be humanly understood, and interpret it. More active measures can then be based on this: the creation of a reserve, the protection of something old, the design of something new, repair, all kinds of treatment of the environment. The naturalist is an opinion-former; his depictions easily become a directive and a standard, even though he had not intended this. He influences attitudes and values, actions and measures.

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What are the rights of the depicter towards his depiction? In a way the depicter creates the object, but he cannot prevent others from making a new depiction from what he has depicted. He has no author's rights to his definition, his creation as a part of the real world; for him his rights are only to a text, a photograph, etc. Therefore, the depiction can be attempted over and over again. Works of art are "patented," natural objects are not; it is true that nowadays works of art can be used very directly as the point of departure for new works: be quoted, painted anew, etc. — there were many examples of this in the 1984 Venice Biennale, in which one theme was "Art in Mirror" [see Biennale 84]. (Other cultural artifacts — for example, the products of industrial design — are often literally protected models, registered and patented.) Natural objects can be given the position of being an object of appreciation (criticism) over and over again; for example, John Muir can depict the Yosemite, but that does not prevent others from depicting the same area of mountains. The first depiction is certainly in a special position in that it also specifies; and in that sense it creates the object by defining it. Even giving a name gives an identity by separating the object conceptually from its environment [cf. Ziff 1984: 92].

The naturalist is partly in the critic's role, partly in the artist's; the point of view may change in the same text, and now and then both roles are taken at the same time. Such scientific-artistic depicter as Reino Kalliola or Aldo Leopold create syntheses of knowledge through the medium of the essay. In art the conventions say what belongs to the aesthetic object of a work of art, but, for example, a depiction of a mountain is that which decides what belongs to the mountain as an aesthetic object; the depiction sets the conceptual frameworks. Even this kind of depicter is not entirely free: he is directed by the conventions and traditions of his form. The tasks of the depicter-critic are invention, revealing, the outlining of features, the interpretation of significance, evaluation. Then he is among all those who have tried the same, whether he knows it or not.

In a work of art, besides choice, the name, siting, and placing of the work have an effect, especially in those marginal cases in which the object is a so-called ready-made work. The work is physically presented in a certain way to be received. There are many similarities in the offering of environmental objects. The depiction may direct even in the name giving — a place name is, in fact, a narrow depiction, even an order. The private associations of the namer may be in the background, but because the name is an agreement, one can mainly discuss only the appropriateness of the name, not really of its justice. Is Three Sisters a reference to Chekhov's play? Does Dante's View as the name of barren mountains refer to the Hell section of the Divine Comedy? Some analogies appear to be found, and then the name does more than identify. The name is the first that outlines and defines; by it Man also tries to capture the characteristics of the place. Paul Ziff gives an example:

Somewhere around Phoenix or Tucson there is a rather famous range of mountains called the Superstition Mountains. When I was down there I wanted to go and see them and I tried to find out where they were. Someone told me just to drive down the road and there will be several mountain ranges and then I would come to the Superstition Mountains. And I said 'How will I know that I'm at the Superstition Mountains?' I mean how do I tell these from any other mountain ranges because there is just one range after another? And they said 'Don't worry about it when you get there you'll know it.' So I drove and when I got there I knew it because they were impressive they were awe-inspiring. You could see why these would be mountains that would be sacred to Indians whereas the other mountain ranges didn't have these characteristics at all.

[Ziff 1984: 92.]

There are then two ways in interpretation: with the name or without it. As a social agreement it is a part of our store of codes (the same object may have several names) and our models from which we cannot escape when we know the name. Art codes and tries our possibilities of perception, and in the same way codification is made by depiction of nature. In this way even the wilderness is for us a product of culture. The matter is presented in a pointed way by David Stea in his article "Landscape Dichotomies":

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Since humans have near-total domain over the environment, all our landscapes are human-made rather than natural, because they are human-defined. All our landscapes are designed in the sense that, if we do nothing else, we design to leave them undesign. And all our landscapes are planned in the sense that we plan either to plan them or to leave them unplanned. [Stea 1975: 46.]

The directing of a depiction can be compared to the mechanisms that exist, for example, in tourism: how and from where to go to a sight or viewspot, what to look at there, what else to do. The action of the tourist is directed. As an example of the offering of a sight, take the Mendenhall Glacier near Juneau in Alaska: a tourist bus takes the tourists to the place; a nature path is marked and the objects it passes explained; the history of the glacier is presented in words, diagrams and films; and even a spot to take photographs is indicated.

*The demands set for the environmental critic.* The aesthetic area has its own conventions of depiction which are based on tradition. It provides models and also, to a great extent, the possibilities that are available to the depicter. The question is not only one of bonds but of the possibilities opened by the tradition of depiction. Thus, acquaintance with the tradition of depiction gives the depicter tools of analysis. The depicter is not, however, bound to the means such as they are; he has the possibility to alter them, to develop them to be more suitable to his purpose, and also to develop them in a personal direction, to create scientific variations, etc. The depicter thus develops his own more or less individual system of depiction, which demands its own expertise. Depiction is thus a continually renewing attempt to find the character of phenomena. In it nature is turned into the language of depiction, changed into a system which has a reference relation to that which is depicted. The object is then always presented to some extent selectively and with emphasis. One must decide what is worth depicting; depiction is always elliptic. On the other hand elliptic depiction is not read as such but is filled out by the reader, removing the vagueness and seeking causes and effects, etc. Thus, to some extent the depiction recalls shorthand, in which reference signs are filled in later and the vagueness is removed.

But depiction is not purely a presentation and repetition of that which is depicted, but its interpretation. In interpretation one tries to comprehend the nature of the object; in aesthetic depictions to comprehend the object as an aesthetic object, which is an object to be interpreted. Interpretation presupposes the understanding of the aesthetic nature of the object, as well as stating it and making it known. The naturalist attempts to interpret the object first to himself and then in depiction to the receiver. The problem is in the fact that only a small part of depictions of nature are an attempt to investigate the object as an aesthetic object: the aim is usually of a different kind — especially a natural scientific — understanding. Understanding that takes place in other areas of value does not yet automatically lead to the understanding of the aesthetic area, even if it creates a basis for it. Yi-Fu Tuan sees the demands set for a depicter as follows:

If to portray the face of the earth is a worthy aim, the problem of means remains. As a geographer, my feeling on the matter is this. To receive and then give the full flavor of a landscape we first need to concentrate on its parts; its climate, land forms, seasonal coloring, history, land use, architecture and the like. But we must not stop here as we so often are tempted to do. It seems that relaxation, a mood of attentive waiting (the French word *attente* best expresses this), must follow the period of concentration before the landscape will yield to us its personality. [—] As to the poets, I am content to offer the weighty opinion of W.H. Auden. He says that if a Texas billionaire were to give him carte blanche in running a training school for poets, he would make them study — besides prosody, rhetoric and history of the language — natural history, geology, meteorology, archaeology, mythology, liturgics and cooking. So poets too need facts; they too need to see nature with trained and attentive eyes. [Tuan 1961: 32.]
The task and the goal is thus correct perception, not the maximization of aesthetic value at all costs: aesthetic value cannot be paid for at the expense of other values. A depiction must be based on a contemporary scientific conception of nature and the environment. When the goal is a correct — right and justified — description, interpretation and evaluation, people are required who have the same kind of preparation as in art. Even art, it is true, cannot be limited only to the use of those who have demonstrated that they fulfil the demands set for the receiver. The environment is also received and enjoyed by all. For justified experience qualification is, however, required. Aesthetic experience must be thought out, meditated upon, considered, and not simply be a pleasant sensory perception. And when it is common property it must be required to be presented as a depiction. No one can experience on behalf of another, but the road to experience can be prepared.

Aesthetic comprehension means the articulation of the object as a perceptible object and the visualizing and revealing of the values that are contained in that articulation. All sensory areas, and cognitive and other such factors that influence the background, come into the question. The object is articulated. The degree of articulation is also a natural measure of the degree of aestheticality; the object cannot be chaos. What is essential is that one is able to include all the factors that belong to articulation. Thus, no object can be condemned beforehand as unaesthetic (or as a-aesthetic), because aesthetic articulation may sometimes be revealed in all. The aesthetic value of the object is thus partly dependent on the fact of how one is able to handle and examine it. Nevertheless, the matter is to do with the discovering of value, not with what the receiver should bring to the object. In this way the view is in accordance with value-objectivism. The aesthetic values are properties of the object, but they must be brought out from it. Value criteria, from which it appears what properties are being aimed at and in what way they are realized, are essentially linked. But a system in which there are value criteria and rules for their use is too mechanical in a real situation. It is always possible to construct new criteria, in which case anything at all can be 'saved' [cf. however, Allen 1982: 501-504; and Walton 1970: 354-363 on standards].

The primary means of presenting a description, interpretation, and appreciation is language. Therefore, the making of a depiction is also dependent on the capacity of the language, on the power of expression. The history of nature depiction is thus also the history of the development of means. In depictions with an artistic flavor the development is linked to the general nature of literature. The language of art criticism is an important model-giver. (On the other hand, it is partly based on, for example, the natural sciences: 'organic' etc., or on the metaphors of everyday language: 'living,' 'dead,' etc.)

But, however, depiction appears to depend on the personal skill of the depicter rather than on the general possibilities of language. A skilful depicter develops language: creates new terms, but is also capable of using the existing range of expressions by expanding its area of significance with metaphor, comparison, symbol. Thus the language may appear ordinary on the surface, but may contain an extended significance. The tradition of depiction is partly the accumulation of means: a later depicter has at his disposal the earlier store of means.

In a certain broad sense the environment can be read; and it is a cultural practise. Italo Calvino has said:

Our sight is programmed to read and I notice that I'm trying to read the landscape, the meadow, the stormy sea.

[---] Reading, more than an optic exercise, is a process involving mind and eyes, a process of abstraction, or rather an extraction of concreteness from abstract operations, like recognizing distinctive marks, breaking down everything we see into minimal elements, assembling them in meaningful segments, discovering all around us regularities, differences, recurrences, exceptions, substitutions, redundancies.

[Calvino 1983: 39.]
The same idea is also presented in Vladimir Nabokov's novel *The Real Life of Sebastian Knight*:

[---] it was like a traveller realizing that the wild country he surveys is not an accidental assembly of natural phenomena, but the page in a book where these mountains and forests, and fields, and rivers are disposed in such a way as to form a coherent sentence; the vowel of a lake fusing with the consonant of a sibilant slope; the windings of a road writing its message in a round hand, as clear as that of one's father; trees conversing in dumb-show, making sense to one who has learnt the gestures of their language... Thus the traveller spells the landscape and its sense is disclosed, [---].

[Nabokov 1941: 167.]

In the environment there is a language of signs, which is known and recognized by the natural or cultural researcher. There are natural and conventional languages and signs. The former appear above all in the environment in a natural state, the latter in the cultural environment. The nature and content of natural signs is learned through natural scientific research.

Art can be examined as a part of the general theory of artifacts [Margolis 1980: 91]. Sign systems are systems of symbols, developed by Man, and they are investigated by semiotics. There is no strong difference between art and other sign languages (different art-forms and tendencies of style have their own sign language). The command of language is a condition of understanding.

The environment as comprehended is conceptually made, outlined by Man. Language acts as its articulator; it creates possibilities for perception. Seeing is bound to culture, too [cf. Honko 1981: 19-23]. It is unclear to what extent nature in a natural state is changed into a cultural object, for example, through depictions of nature. It is made into a symbol system, it is problematized. Nature ceases to be purely nature when it becomes a continuation of Man's consciousness, a reflection of culture. Nature in a natural state, too, can be made metaphysical; for example, Eastern philosophies of nature, a Japanese miniature garden etc. It is a very different form of treatment from the goal of the natural sciences.

There are two forms in reception:

1) the reception of the (depicted) world (=basic case)
2) the reception of the world created by depictions (=parasitic case)

There are models for two activities:

1) models for depiction (the creation of a tradition)
2) models for reception (they are created by depiction; perception takes place through depictions).

The aesthetic perception of the environment always means that the perceiver's choices and articulation of the object, his role as a former of totalities, are linked to observations and knowledge. There are certainly also objects in the environment that are offered socially and ready-formed, but in most cases the choices are made, and to be made, by the receiver and the depicter. This activity presupposes some kind of skill such as is demanded of artists: the composition and creation of totalities. Thus, the reception of the environment is from the beginning creative activity; the part of the receiver is active at all times. His skill lies in the fact that he is able to arrange the available material into the best possible object — in this way a positive attitude can be demanded of him. There must also be the skill and capacity for the reception of very different kinds of objects and situations — one and the same model cannot be used.

The demand of flexibility applies to the reception of art and works of art: the receiver must be able to begin from the special nature of the work. Forms, tendencies of style, etc. are schemes which ease the examination of the object, but their use does not mean the reduce of the object to these schemes.

*Art models.* Ronald Rees and Dick Harrison demonstrate how it was only the depiction of the prairies that domesticated that landscape type, made it controllable, familiar, and homely [Rees
— myths and folk poetry have done the same in providing directions how to live and act; the models of the old country left the immigrants helpless or led them astray — it took time to become free of those models and develop new ones.

Art is not only a giver of models of sensory perceptions but also a reflector of ways of thinking, a creator of conceptual models. Therefore there is not only one way to present nature. Jean-Paul Sartre's novel Repulsion may lead one to see the real world in accordance with the work; a work of art provides codes. One begins to think about life through art. Such is among other things the seeing of everyday tragedies, even if we do not regard it as suitable to look too closely and coldly at the tragedies of real life — we examine them better in art than in reality.

Art may help one to see something of the nature of life, but it also develops into a substitute activity, a play of the imagination. What would be condemned as elitist or morally questionable if adapted to life itself is possible in art; empathetic experience also takes place for we may participate in the experiences of the characters of a work without, of course, taking part in the events. Art also speaks the language of emotions; Yrjö Kokko’s book Laulujoutsen (Whooper Swan) [1950], which influenced the preservation of an entire species of bird, is a good example of the marginal area between art and science. At a general level, art models are of the same type as the models of the philosophy of life: they exceed testable limits. Philosophies of life — no matter how and where they are expressed — are views which cannot be directly proved right or wrong, but can certainly be proved suitable and applicable.

Models of the language of art criticism. One important second degree model that relates to art models is the language used when speaking of nature. We use vocabulary developed by art criticism and art research especially about the cultural environment: we speak of harmoniousness, tension, composition, etc. Partly the language has originally been borrowed from the natural sciences: we speak of organic unity, or of animation, etc. The significance may be literal; usually, however, it is figurative.

Because in actuality only art-forms based on the senses of sight and hearing exist these senses have been emphasized in environmental observation too and in the use of language that reports on such observation; of course our orientation is to a great extent based on those senses in any event. Gastronomy has developed a terminology related to the sense of taste and to tastes, but there is practically no aesthetically analytic vocabulary for perception of smell, feel, and touch (of course metaphorically one speaks of, for example, roughness or coarseness, of warm colors, etc.).

These senses are often regarded as being in some way lower in comparison to sight and sound. The effects produced by them, it has been thought, may be pleasant only in the same trivial way as, for example, sun-bathing is; an aesthetic reaction would presuppose an ability to distinguish and analyze, a skill and its possibilities of refinement that are not possible within the framework of the lower senses. The senses of taste, smell, and touch operate as complementary elements, and they may even be dominant: the breath of a summer wind, the scent and feel of a sauna switch, the aroma of a wild strawberry.

c. The components and tasks of environmental criticism

Beardsley’s division of critical language as applied to art criticism can be used as such also in the differentiation of depictions of the environment. In these, too, it is possible to distinguish a description, interpretation, and evaluation, not necessarily as separate parts but conceptually.

Both the environmental and the artistic object must be described, interpreted, and evaluated. But the activity may take place in different ways in different areas of values: scientific, operational,
and aesthetic description, interpretation, and evaluation are different matters. They also belong to different branches of science.

A description attempts to characterize the object as accurately as possible. In the environmental sciences it is the task of geography, otherwise it has been carried out in particular by writers of travel books and naturalists.

Interpretation is an inseparable continuation of description. Such natural historical questions as surface formations, the development of flora and fauna, and the operating mechanisms of the living environment belong to it. The research of the operating modes of ecosystems is the field of ecology.

Evaluation entails value judgements of the environment presented within the framework of some value systems. Evaluations may concern aestheticality, morality, or economic benefit. The field of tasks for aesthetics is especially the investigation of evaluations. But evaluation as such — without a basis created by description and interpretation — would be without foundation. Every evaluation is connected, not only to the value system adopted by the evaluator, but also to the picture of the environment formed by the evaluator. He must recognize what the object to be evaluated is like (the information is given by a description of an immediate sensory perception); and it is useful to him, even if not essential from the point of view of all systems of taste, to understand how what is being evaluated has developed and how it operates at each moment (information is given by an interpretation). The aspects of description and interpretation relevant to aesthetic evaluation can be called aesthetic description and aesthetic interpretation; in these one may have to seek recourse to other values.

Aesthetic evaluation particularly belongs to aesthetics. Therefore, evaluation rather than aesthetic description and interpretation (in this connection they are dealt with mainly through evaluation) is my major concern.

**Aesthetic terms.** One aim of metacriticism is the analysis of the use of so-called aesthetic terms. I mean such terms as 'magnificent', 'rugged', and 'beautiful', which may be plentiful in depictions of nature. What are the principles that regulate their use? The task of research is to investigate the given grounds. One must always ask, when an aesthetic term is used, in what way is its use justified, what is presented in support of it. The aim is to reveal a logic, a grammar. According to Helen Knight a characteristic of a criterion is simply the fact that it is used [Knight 1954: 159]. In depictions of nature those criteria must be revealed that justify the use of a term — or whose absence or contradictory application make the use unjustified.

By an aesthetic term I mean a term that contains a notion of aesthetic value; its use is based on some aesthetic primary properties to which reference must be made when objectively justifying its use. However, there is no such logical connection that would always entail certain primary properties behind certain terms:

There are no sufficient conditions, no non-aesthetic features such that the presence of some set or number of them will beyond question justify or warrant the application of an aesthetic term. [---]

Things may be described to us in non-aesthetic terms as fully as we please but we are not thereby put in the position of having to admit (or being unable to deny) that they are delicate or graceful or garish or exquisitely balanced.

[Sibley 1959 426]

There is thus no mechanical way of recognizing aesthetic terms; one cannot prepare a list of terms that would be always and only aesthetic. Every case must be investigated separately.

There are differences in the 'pureness' of aesthetic terms. That which is most typical and which appears most often is 'beautiful,' but even it is not always and in all situations aesthetic (cf. 'a
beautiful act'). 'Beautiful' is also the broadest and most ambiguous term of all. The beauty of a landscape, animal, and plant — and of each type of landscape, and species of animal and plant — is different, of a different kind. Other aesthetic terms that often appear are inter alia, 'graceful,' 'pretty,' 'comely,' 'charming'; 'rugged,' 'handsome,' 'barren,' 'gloomy'; 'melancholy,' 'dismal,' 'joyful,' 'lively,' 'calm,' 'restful.' A part of these are positive, recognitions of value, a part negative, denying value. Besides aesthetic quality, a part depict primary properties or the manner of reaction of the receiver.

My starting point is thus in accordance with linguistic aesthetics: the use of an aesthetic term in a normal case is an expression of an aesthetic feeling or experience, the cause and basis of which is an aesthetic object. Behind the use of language, when there is no reason to assume that it is deceitful, false, or playful, one must think that there is some experience or observation which with the aid of language is to be classified and by which it is characterized. In some cases experience can be analyzed and classified wrongly, in which case the result is a strange word in this context; the meaning of the word can also where applicable be consciously expanded by giving new criteria for its use; or a rare sub-meaning can be taken into use.

**Aesthetic depictions.** An aesthetic term may appear either as an individual definition and characterization (most often as an adjectival attribute or a predicative, although the term of course need not be an adjective), or a part and constructor of a broader aesthetic depiction. Individual appearances of the term are relatively useless for the purpose of discovering a system, for the decisive grounds are missing. What is most important is in what way the use of the term is motivated in appealing to primary properties (objectively) or to the state of the observer (subjectively). The use of the term can also be regarded as one kind of an inference, as a classification made on the basis of information presented. It can be thought that an aesthetic depiction could be made without that crystallization, only by describing the primary properties of the object or the influence on the receiver. In any event there is some doubt whether it is possible to trace all aesthetic depictions by only paying attention to terms.

The doubt is justified, but it does not nullify the starting point. A depiction without aesthetic terms can only be classified as aesthetic if a precedent or model case exists in which a classification has already been made using aesthetic terms on the basis of more or less corresponding primary properties or effects. If there is no reason to assume that there has been a change in criteria, one must proceed in the same way in the other case: thus unclassified cases can be classified and models can be adapted to quite new cases. If this kind of application is successful, it demonstrates the logicality of the system — and possibly suspicious simplicity. The term is in any case a fixed point from which the examination is then extended to its linguistic context.

Depictions offer plentiful material for analysis; environmental criticism does exist. Nor does the depiction need to be linguistically presented, even if non-linguistic depictions must first be transferred to linguistic means. One method is to pay attention to the behavior and activity of people: where do they travel to; to see what; how do they behave there?

Depictions operate in three ways: they describe (portray, report, present); interpret (explain, make comprehensible); and evaluate (determine the level of quality). These activities are only partially directly aesthetic: they may be geographical, biological, etc. The use of depictions of nature is multifarious; and the aesthetic point of view is only one aspect. It connects, however, with other aspects and needs them. Thus environmental aesthetics cannot be separated from the natural and cultural sciences or points of view. Art models give a feeling for what is relevant in this area, but the analogy is not absolute. From art a road runs to the environment, but it also runs from the sciences and philosophies; it has run from myths and religions, and still runs as a by-road.
When progressing along all these roads one must outline the environment as it appears communally in depictions. Thus, our depictions show in the final resort what our conception of the environment is; what the environment is to us, as cultural beings. The real nature of the environment lies of necessity beyond depiction. But is there outside of perceptions and depictions any environment any more — even the term "environment" implies Man's point of view: Man in the centre, everything else around him. We cannot break free of our existence as observing subjects, although we know our place. Nature is not anthropocentric nor anthropomorphic, even though we might wish to see and interpret it in that way. However, only when it is seen and interpreted is nature anything to us — and in this we need expert guides. Essentially it depends on them what and how much nature means to us.

i. Description

A description creates the object anew on the verbal or other level (photograph, film, drawing, or similar means). It must concentrate on the essential, must 'look like'. Description also preserves the object from change; it is therefore in a way a more trustworthy form of material than the original object. Description is the reconstruction of the object within a certain philosophical framework, and by using certain tools.

The aspect determines what parts and questions are relevant. The goal is the repetition (presentation, reconstruction) of the observable features of the object, selected according to relevance. In it the visible features perceivable with the senses are presented; the environment is reduced to its components (pre-iconographic analysis); sensory perceptions are reported, with the co-operation of the senses as a starting point. From the aesthetic point of view the problem is, how does aesthetic description differ from others (scientific, artistic, etc.).

Description is the creation of a foundation with interpretation and evaluation in mind. The intention of description is to lead to something else; what it contains is determined according to the goal.

ii. Interpretation

The interpretation of the environment is indirectly the demonstration of the values of the environment; it is a precondition and the creator of a basis for evaluation. Interpretation makes the environment comprehensible. It shows what to appreciate but does not yet say how. That must be decided in the evaluation.

In one way or another an aesthetic explanation always includes Man and his reaction to the object; it places the object in his world of experience and values. Arthur Danto speaks of "deep interpretation," by which he means, for example, psychoanalytic interpretation in art or Marxist analysis of the development of society in the social sciences [Danto 1981a: 698-699].

The goal in interpretation is the understanding and explanation of the object. In what sense then are natural and environmental objects to be interpreted? The role of the natural and cultural sciences is clear: let the interpretation given there also be a basis for aesthetic interpretation. The more so-called "deep beauty" is dealt with in aesthetic interpretation, the more it connects with those sciences; but the more it is limited to formal properties, the more clearly the interpretation is reminiscent of the process of interpretation of the visual arts and of art in general. Certainly it must be remembered that art also operates on the level of symbols, etc. In any event another connection is to the art-sciences.
The contexts of interpretation

Interpretation does not take place in a vacuum; rather it has two frames of reference: knowledge and associations. The information preconditions are the general condition of a correct interpretation and thus a relevant background, whilst associations are private connections that are not a part of correct interpretation but rather an addition which should be disposed of in interpretation or whose nature should at least be recognized.

(1) Knowledge

In his article "Text and Context" Peter Winch deals with how the information context influences the understanding of literature. He states, in my opinion correctly, that even though it is possible for certain purposes to distinguish between research that is internal to the text and research that is external to the text, no purely internal research is possible. We have at least information of a very general nature, which is a condition of understanding. [Winch 1982: 48 - 52.] There must be information of the same type about nature and the environment; the question is one of the amount of the information about the environment. Even being able to deal with everyday situations presupposes environmental knowledge. An amount of information that exceeds everyday practical information clarifies and reveals new forms of beauty.

However, there is a difference in the nature of information that concerns the genesis of a work of art and that which concerns nature. It is possible to decide about a work of art when it is ready; it is thus possible to distinguish the making and the finished phase. In nature there is not the same kind of making phase, even though nature also changes all the time. Nature is a process; in character it mainly parallels a play or a film. The cultural environment, too, is a process, even though it is possible here to distinguish — at least in the planned environment — a construction phase and a (relatively) finished phase. It is then possible to concentrate on dealing with the final result. In a work of art how one relates to it is clearly influenced by, for example, information about the technique and the possibilities it permits.

Information gives a reference background and framework: we know how natural forms have arisen; we know cultural history. Our perceptions are thus regulated by a natural and cultural historical (as well as synchronic) framework; it may deepen aesthetic experience, but it may also make it more difficult — or it simply changes one experience into another. Yuriko Saito emphasizes that there may be several justifiable categories in addition to natural scientific:

There can, however, be no reason why the scientific category is always aesthetically more appropriate than other categories. Historical, literary and picturesque categories for a natural object often satisfy Walton’s conditions equally well as a scientific category. Moreover, sometimes it may be aesthetically more interesting to view a natural object in a category other than the scientific category. For example, a particular battlefield may be eloquently expressive of the past violence with its shattered rocks, disfigured landscape, and poor vegetation, while from a scientific point of view, it may be a plain, ordinary field of little importance. These considerations lead me to believe that there is no aesthetic reason to insist that the correct category of a natural object is always a scientific category. [Saito 1984c: 41.]

John Hospers, basing himself on D.W. Prall, has distinguished thin (surface) and thick (deep) aesthetics. Surface aesthetics is the formal examination of an object; deep aesthetics places the perceived object in broader connections of significance, in which case information about life outside the work as well as life values become pertinent [Hospers 1946: 8 - 14]. Examination can be limited too: in the same way as in a concert it is normally presupposed that a hearer excludes the
architecture of the hall, and the rest of the audience - even though he observes them too — in the same way an observer of the environment may concentrate his attention on some part, on a combination of details he has selected, on the field of some sense, or on some combination of values. But the delimitation must be such that the totality is not distorted. Categorization thus is not an optional matter.

It is customary to limit aesthetic values to appearance, to sensory perceptions. Parallel to these, scientific, operational, moral, and religious values are mentioned. But the appearance of values independently of one another is not necessarily normal. In art they all appear, even if the other values can be regarded as subordinate to the aesthetic. Works of art are designed to be the object of aesthetic perception, and their appropriate perception presupposes that attention is paid to the essential.

And what of the environment? We can look at a landscape as such, distinguish its proportions, colors, sense sounds, feel the mildness of the air, touch objects, smell. The object is a totality: an environmental impression is the result of the joint activity of the senses, even though sight is usually central; in addition, the objects that lie outside observation but that nevertheless exist are included in this impression: knowledge that there are (perhaps) bears moving in the forest adds a moment of tension and danger. But the impression is also a totality of various values; the aesthetic values are connected to others, they depend on them too.

Here is a further quotation from Jones' article:

> When we search our minds for the knowledge we have of cities and our experience of them, we find that there is quite a bit that cannot be attributed to direct experience. The fact is that we experience cities both in concept and in actuality and both vicariously and directly, and this is true of cities of the past as well as cities of the present. All of us have vivid images of cities we have never visited. We occasionally know as much about them as we do of cities we have lived in quite a long while. Some of these are cities which continue to exist, some of them are cities which never existed except in the minds of men. A complete and systematic study of the aesthetic effects of cities must include an inspection of our total perception which includes vicarious as well as direct experience, cities in concept as well as actuality, and in the past as well as in the present. The city as a symbol is the product of all of these.

[Jones 1960: 424.]

This is applicable to the perception of nature (of all of the environment). Our knowledge provides us with a foundation, an angle of vision, and a basis for the observation of the environment. Kalliola emphasizes the intensifying significance of this informational aspect in the "Prologue" to his Suomen lounnon kirja ('The Book of Finnish Nature'):

> It is true that beautiful views, the brightness of a summer night, the aurora borealis in winter, the poetry of clouds or birdsong, and the flowery brilliance of a meadow already as such light our sense of nature into a fierce fire and provide immense stimulation and pleasure especially for an artistic mind. But it is only for one who also knows nature in its details, its geological formations and its living inhabitants and their biology, that a new world opens out in its full richness and beauty.

[Kalliola 1946: 13.]

Kalliola's trilogy is indeed principally the creation of a background for deeper comprehension; Kalliola presents the history and operating mechanisms of nature and thus assists the understanding of the functionality and lawfulness appearing in nature — in a broad sense the beauty. Beauty is thus not only a surface property, a matter of appearances, but the beauty of processes. Kalliola does not regard formal and content-based aesthetics as opposites, but rather he sees a difference of degree between them: the content-aesthetics is more multi-dimensional.

T.E. Jessop presents this oft-repeated distinction in aesthetics as follows:

> Keeping to beauty I find one difference which I cannot overcome, the difference between sensory and what, through inability to find a better term, I will call ideo-sensory beauty. The first has an obvious exemplification in painting, the other in literature.
Important, then, as sound-beauty may be in verbal art, it is subordinate; its whole office is not to present itself, but to introduce and reinforce a system of images and meanings and emotions; and since images and meanings and emotions are the distinctive stuff and life of human experience, verbal beauty is indefensibly humanistic; not only properly but inescapably ideal, representative, expressive and evocative — which is another way of saying that it is inescapably related to that system of needs, interests and evaluations which make us practical and moral beings. [Jessop 1970: 531.]

The connection of aesthetic values to other values is especially emphasized in the manner in which Kalliola sees the tasks of nature protection. The common basis of environmental values is in biology, not in fashion.

The environment presupposes at least a general level of knowledge. But in many places it also presupposes the knowledge of specialists, of naturalists and researchers. It colors their depictions of nature. The depictions are thus interpretations of the environment and scientific or scientific-type explanations of phenomena, attempts to understand them. The naturalist cannot merely copy the object in words or photographs, he must rather make an explanatory model.

Environmental knowledge complements and deepens aesthetic experience, but it also limits it. Together with ethical values it forms a framework that regulates aesthetic experience. Knowledge is basically of two types: diachronic (historical) and synchronic (functional).

**Diachronic knowledge.** According to whether the matter is one of the environment in a state of nature, or of the cultural environment, it is possible to speak of natural historically or cultural historically relevant knowledge. Information on the development of surface formations, flora, fauna, climate, etc. is natural historical; information on the development of the forms of dwelling and livelihoods of Man is cultural historical, as is the history of buildings and sites, the various expressions of culture and its values.

Stratification is an important factor influencing the examination of the environment. On the one hand there is natural historical stratification, which the researcher of nature is able to see; and on the other the stratification created by culture, which is seen by the cultural historian; it is true that nature and culture can also be examined ahistorically, synchronically, and structurally, in the way they act and appear at this moment, but temporal differences indisputably add a significant dimension to this.

Practical conclusions can be drawn from stratification and directions given on its basis: for example, in building and planning the historical dimension should be preserved. Anachronisms, which refer to a time other than their own — buildings built in the style of another period; destroyed buildings that have been rebuilt (is this forging the environment?); as well as restoration — form a problem of their own. Post-modern architecture consciously uses anachronisms; various kinds of anachronisms are 'forgeries' of nature: the breeding of pedigree animals; covering traces after having removed natural material (sand, peat, and such), etc.

A temporal continuity arises through stratification. Processuality is typical of the environment: events are series which are linked to one another through relations of cause and effect. Fröhlich — and in practise also Elliot — speak of a correct genetic history [Frohlich 1968. 608-610; and Elliot 1982. 85-89]; this demand also applies to art.

**Synchronic or functional knowledge.** Synchronic knowledge is conceptual mastery of the operating mechanisms of the environment - natural scientific and cultural. Such is, at its most typical, ecological knowledge, knowledge of the operation of ecosystems, of nature's ways of operating, of 'purposes' and 'appropriateness'; in this way one arrives at ecological aesthetics.

In nature altered by Man there are above all symbols. Communal symbols are places of administrative power, great events, etc.; private symbols are, for example, those related to one's
own home and to stages of life. Many associations are based on the latter: memories of events in childhood and other immediately unobservable factors. Barclay Jones speaks of the symbolic systems of a city, and in the last resort of the entire city as a symbol ('total perception') [Jones 1960: 421]. This can be compared to Italo Calvino’s novel Invisible Cities, in which the cities have symbolic significances of varying degrees [Calvino 1972].

In the background of the aesthetic perception of nature and the aesthetic evaluations of nature there is knowledge of nature — a cultural product. In criticizing John Passmore’s work Man's Responsibility for Nature, Val Routley claims that for many historical naturalists nature was boundless, chaotic, and dangerous — simply on account of a lack of natural scientific knowledge. According to him knowledge is quite as important to the critic of nature as to the critic of a string quartet: he who knows sees a pattern and harmony where there is an unspeakable jumble in front of the naive perceiver [Routley 1975: 183].

The rejection of natural and ecological environmental aesthetics is in danger of leading to aestheticism, the over-emphasis of aesthetic values and aesthetic pleasure, in a narrow sense. If activity that is in contradiction to ecological laws is approved of in the name of beauty, and if indifference is shown towards them, the foundation is removed from the chosen system: systems that forget the ecological basis are of necessity short-lived — the environment they value will be destroyed. There are, of course, many questions in which the ecological basis permits several kinds of alternatives. Nature can camouflage or reveal; Man can hide the products of culture in the forms of nature or create strong and influential contrasts. A system of aesthetics in accordance with nature only gives general lines; it is unreasonable to expect from this system answers as to how one should proceed in all individual cases.

The system cannot even determine how one should relate to nature in all cases. We regard Inha’s tourist point of view as being cold and superficial humanly seen, and the sympathetic point of view as being deep. But in by no means all cases does the difference depend on whether the moral aspect is present or not. The same sensory perception receives a different content in different conceptual connections: this is illustrated by R.W. Hepburn’s examples:

As we look at the rock face in nature, we may realize imaginatively the geological pressures and turmoil that produced its pattern. The realizing of these need not be a piece of extra-aesthetic reflection: it may determine for us how we see and respond to the object itself. If we interpreted and responded to the abstract painting in the same way (assuming, of course, that it is a thoroughgoing abstract and not the representation of a rock face!), our interpretation would this time be merely whimsical, no more controlled or stabilised than a seeing of faces in the fire. If we arbitrarily restricted aesthetic experience both of nature and art to the contemplating of uninterpreted shapes and patterns, we could, of course, have the rapprochement. But we have seen good reason for refusing so to restrict it in the case of nature-experience, whatever be the case with art. [Hepburn 1967: 301.]

The oft-presented formalist demand that one concentrate only on the visible properties leads to nature being experienced as colors and forms, and thus leaves the experience as indeterminate —conceptual connections provide an articulating frame of reference. The exclusion or 'forgetting' of knowledge would be artificial: to us the Andromeda nebula is not only a phenomenon of light. Phenomena that are visually similar are not aesthetically similar.

The significance of knowledge as a regulator of experience is emphasized by many others too. Theodore M. Greene says that nature is no "aesthete" and compares it to a skilful handcraft worker, for whom beauty is not an end in itself but rather utility; therefore someone who is in close contact with nature, and who lives in connection with it and respects it, is best able to understand and enjoy natural beauty [Greene 1961: 243]. Acquaintance with nature and enjoying it are not alternatives, but are complementary to one another [cf Kalliola 1946: 13].

A sense of nature and the entire environment is thus in the best cases extremely all-embracing.
Experience is connected to — and is intensified by — knowledge of natural history, the stages of development of culture, and the meaning of its products. Only this kind of knowledge helps one to understand that kind of appropriate beauty that appears especially in unchanging nature. In a state of nature the basis of development is natural selection, the struggle for survival, which eliminates the unnecessary and the unsuccessful. Several researchers have admired the beauty of functional simplicity in the products of folk culture. Kustaa Vilkuna praises the practical attitude informing old Finnish peasant culture:

All the various forms and methods, customs, implements, and equipment are at a certain time in a certain environment the best solutions, that is they are appropriate. Practical common sense has always decided what is the most suitable form and the best method. What new forms come are truly new inventions or, more usually, new cultural loans, inventions begun by others, that we for our part adapt for use in our own environment, we set our own stamp on them.

[Vilkuna 1974: 20.]

The same attempt towards simplicity and appropriateness was behind the success of Finnish industrial design and architecture in the nineteen-fifties.

(2) Associations

The individual's associations and recollections, which the environment — in the same way as art — clearly arouses, must be separated into their own particular groups. Something nostalgically recalls one's home district, brings to mind some events, etc. These are not properly the aesthetic significances of the environment itself but are set there by the receiver. The receiver can make of the environment a language that refers to individual experiences.

Associations are in addition communal, cultural. This is true, for example, when a Western person hears the name Three Sisters applied to a group of mountains; the history of the name may have nothing in common with the title of Chekhov's play, but it does not cancel an association that has a common base in our knowledge and education.

iii. Evaluation

The task and goal of evaluation is the determining of the aesthetic value of the object. In this it is possible to distinguish in the manner of Beardsley aesthetic value and aesthetic worth; that is, the worth actually obtained from the object and the value potentially being in the object [Beardsley 1972: 91].

The precondition of appreciation is categorization, after which it is possible to compare members of the same category, and possibly also the categories [cf. Walton 1970]. It is thus possible to ask how beautiful some animal is and compare it to animals of the same species, but it is also possible to ask what the beauty of the species in question is compared to other species; the next stage — which is in practise difficult and questionable — is the comparison of the beauty of animals in general with the beauty of plants; the next the comparison of the beauty of the organic world to that of the inorganic etc. Particularly the last mentioned are not so much placing in a hierarchy as elucidating the character of various kinds of beauty contrastively: for example, one can say that movement is usually a part of the beauty of animals (see Kalliola's example of an elk [Kalliola 1946: 289-290]), whereas it is not essential in plants (however, there may be movement, such as trees bending in the wind; the slow process of growth, etc.).
The degrees of beauty can be placed on a scale in which there is a certain minimum limit for approval. Everything that is located above it belongs to the area of positive aesthetics. It is possible to be of the opinion that untouched nature is located on the approved side, but there may be differences of degree (especially in that a mountain can be compared to another mountain and one can speak of the most beautiful mountain.

In certain appearances of natural beauty a far-reaching unanimity prevails (a Finnish lake landscape etc.). This can be compared to the position achieved by some classics in the field of art.

Unanimity is also supported by the tradition of depictions of nature. Its formation takes time. Even the depictions become clichéd, they form a self-repeating tradition. Depictions of nature have — in the same way as reception has — a tradition which can certainly be developed and altered. Lavina Fielding deals with how the first depicter of America did not have a preparedness to depict the environment of the new continent, because it differed from the familiar European one. In depiction one must artificially deal with an object on the basis of an old model, a paradigm, before one is able to create a new one:

Americans had been trained by European romanticism in the aesthetics of the sublime and the beautiful; but nothing prepared them for malevolence, desolation, and utter silence, the culture shock of the Great Plains and Rocky Mountains. That took another century to assimilate. We had to learn how to look at the West; we had to be taught what to see and how to feel about it, for the rules that worked for Europe and forested America simply didn't here. Travelers were in an alien landscape, among an alien people, living by the half-guessed rules of an alien culture, and struggling to learn the aesthetics of an alien geometry. The American West caught Americans flat-footed, and literary travelers on its horizon either had to adapt their rules violently or deny the experience they were having.

[Fielding 1975: 4-5]

Is it possible to be mistaken in the evaluation? To lie? To say something that was not intended? All these are possible: we cannot assume the truth of a statement: how it is grounded is most important.

But, however, a difference remains: something is said to be (regarded as) beautiful; and something is beautiful independently of what is said, or how it is regarded. Beauty is not a primary property; rather it is always an interpretation of primary properties. Beauty is thus not a property of the object as such, but it is based on an interpretation of the object, and thus presupposes the interaction of the examiner and the object.

The task of metacriticism is to construct the criteria that are a basis of evaluation, by analyzing depictions — often these are not presented in clear terms. The investigation as to whether the appreciation is logical, whether it is a consequent application of the stated criteria to the object, does not demand commitment to the value system in question.

Directive depictions. Depictions of nature have a very great significance for modes of reception and the choice of objects. Depictions provide a standard and model for reception. Ludwig Wittgenstein mocks the excessive reliance of tourists on a guide-book:

People who are constantly asking 'why' are like tourists who stand in front of a building reading Baedeker and are so busy reading the history of its construction, etc., that they are prevented from seeing the building.

[From Winch 1982: 43]

John Muir remarks on the same power of authorities:

Most people who travel look only at what they are directed to look at. Great is the power of the guide-book maker, however ignorant.

[Muir 1979 (1914): 276]
The waterfalls of the Yosemite can be seen through Muir's depictions; there are quotations on signboards beside the path in front of the falls. The viewer feels that he is standing on the same spot as Muir, feels the mist raining on his head and sees a rainbow forming in the mist; he is conscious of the temporal distance between himself and Muir, but knowledge of the relative unchangingness of the object gives a sense of continuity. Something has halted; a comparison can also be made from photographs that are presented.

Runeberg's Spring is supposed to be examined in relation to J.L. Runeberg's poem "Lähteellä" ('At the Spring'), even though the poem is probably not connected with the actual spring: the connection is a social connection that has been made afterwards. There is a signboard at the Spring, headed with the first words of the poem: "Sua lähde kaunis..." ('Thou comely spring ...'), and which provides the observer with basic information on the flora and fauna of the area, and in addition ready-made evaluative adjectives and aesthetic terms: "delicate — fresh — attractive."

The board in some ways is like a theatre programme.

Mediating depictions. Everything does not take place by traveling to the object. Photographs are one way of moving an object, and also a teacher that directs examination. For example Harri Einola's picture book Luento laihikuvina ('Nature in close-up') (1953) teaches one to examine the miniature world: bees, butterflies, flowers. But photographic art also teaches formal factors: the outlining of the object, articulation, the perception of tensions. Concrete frames are not a necessary condition for tensions and connections, for the frames may also be conceptual or metaphorical.

The object may only be reachable through a depiction. This does not concern only of those objects that have already vanished. Some naturalists have only hesitatingly — or not at all — revealed the most impressive of them to the public, because precisely a presentation of that kind increases tourism and endangers the object.

The object may be depicted at some rare moment, demanding great patience from the observer. Going to the place in no way guarantees, due to weather, light, and similar conditions, that the sight will live up to expectations (see Anselm Adams' photograph "Moon and Half Dome").

And especially earlier, certain objects were at the end of a difficult journey, so that they could be received only through intermediaries, such as explorers. Even nowadays the rarity of exotic lands is emphasized in tourist advertising, so that anyone who leaves on the journey gains the role of an intermediary. For example, Sudan has been advertised as follows: "A cruise by ship along the routes of the explorers to the heart of unknown Africa." [Helsingin Sanomat 2.12.1979.]

Ideal landscapes, objects that appear only in depictions and the imagination, that clearly influence the reception of the real world, are outside of the real world. These have offered a romanticizing depiction of nature in landscape painting or literary embellishment.

In any event, empirical research has demonstrated that all-approving positive aesthetics by no means always operates in practise. It is possible to show a general direction: the more knowledgeable a person is, the more likely he is to regard things positively [see Carlson 1984b: 21-24]. But untouched nature and the cultural environment presuppose very different kinds of knowledge, and for this reason good depicter of wild nature are not necessarily good depicter of the cultural environment. In the latter one meets with mastery of the architectural sciences, knowledge of art, and knowledge about the functioning of society.

β. The criteria and standards of beauty

(1) Can the environment be evaluated?

"On the whole we commend the works of man for their goodness, and the works of nature for their beauty." Thus Helen Knight writes in an article on the problematics of the word 'good' [Knight
The intention of the distinction is to demonstrate that in the case of the man-made we can always ask how well it is made and how it could be better made. Untouched nature, however, is in a way given: it must be approved (or rejected) as such. In it there is no human intention or goal — nature is indifferent towards them.

Therefore, it would be possible to conceive of nature as outside an aesthetic as well as a moral scale: we do not disapprove of predatory beasts or accuse fire of a forest fire. René Wellek, the literary scholar, remarks:

> Works of art are made by man, and therefore they are criticizable. They can be changed, improved, and condemned, while we cannot really criticize the crocodile or snail or cucumber. But we can criticize works of literature.

[Wellek 1978: 46.]

We can certainly demand of people a certain kind of moral attitude and way of acting towards nature. In an aesthetic sense the best that we can do is to develop means of understanding nature and trust that it produces pleasure. We then act considerately on nature’s terms, not as masters — though it is true that plants and animals are bred for human purposes (and breeding demonstrates an indirect dissatisfaction with the state of nature).

Natural objects are neither made nor intended to be aesthetic. Therefore it seems unjustified to give them a special position so that they should automatically be regarded as beautiful. In practice this would mean the same as regarding animals etc. as morally perfect. Rather one should say that in the same way as they are outside of the moral scale they are also outside of the aesthetic scale. They can, of course, be brought to that scale, but then they are in the same way objects of criticism. Elliot writes that that which is in a natural state is beautiful on account of its natural state [Elliot 1982: 90 - 92; cf. also Kalliola: one’s home district is taken as given, not evaluated; in the same way as the beauty of one’s own parents is not evaluated; Kalliola 1978 (1965): 212].

The man-made environmental objects are in that sense in a different position that from the beginning they have been — or they should have been — objects of aesthetic consideration. In every change in the environment aesthetic points of view should of necessity be taken into consideration. Even though they were not kept in view during planning they should be remembered in criticism, in the examination and analysis of environmental objects.

Positive and critical aesthetics. There are two very different types in environmental beauty: the beauty of the environment in an untouched state and the beauty of the environment altered by Man (i.e. the cultural milieu, the built environment). It can be argued that one should learn to understand and approve of the former and to evaluate the latter. (On the level of description and interpretation there is no difference in principle.) The understanding of nature in a natural state means the appropriate reception of its various types; the history of depictions of nature is the history of expanding criteria. Due to this expansion, approval nowadays covers all types of landscape. The area of approval has especially expanded through the so-called negative aesthetic values such as dreadful and gloomy [see Wallis 1976: 197]. When these are aesthetic properties the question is one of the examination of the special nature of their position, not only of dreadfulness but of examinable and analyzable dreadfulness (which means aestheticization). — In the environment altered by Man the grotesque and related forms have been correspondingly emphasized.

It is possible to speak of positive and critical aesthetics [see Carlson 1984b; and Kinnunen 1981]. The positive aesthetics seeks for criteria and grounds for approval; the critical aesthetics evaluates the results of all human activity, even negatively when necessary. The area of the positive aesthetics would then be everything in a natural state — the criteria would be chosen in such a way that they correspond to what is to be dealt with, nature; in the same way as the natural sciences, too, must
conform to what exists, to explain it. The area of critical aesthetics would be everything man-made and altered; when a work has been made for some purpose its suitability can be evaluated: it is always possible to ask how well the object suits aesthetic purposes whether it was then made for them or not. — In the case of untouched nature our task is thus to learn to understand in a positive sense why nature is beautiful; the task of critical aesthetics is to answer how well something is made in the environment altered by Man.

The grounds for approval have become broader: one starts from the assumption that everything in a state of nature is beautiful; what is to be decisive is the selection of a suitable manner of reception and range of criteria. One can certainly be of the opinion that only a natural state as such is an advantage [cf. Eliot 1982: 84]. The criteria have become more diverse; and finally everything in a natural state has come within the sphere of aesthetic approval. Hepburn, it is true, states in his article "Nature in the Light of Art", that there is no reason to deny a priori that natural objects and landscapes can sometimes be trivial, characterless, and aesthetically insignificant [Hepburn 1973: 252]. There are also activities, in which an attempt is made to improve nature aesthetically.

The development of taste can be seen in the expansion of the area of approval and the moving of points of emphasis. It took millenium before Man was able to approve of everything in a natural state, in an aesthetic sense. The reason for the slowness has been the fact that a barren environment has meant poverty, difficult conditions of life; aesthetic liberation is connected to the technical-intellectual mastery of the laws of nature and to the rejection of attempts at mythological mastery [see Romanenko 1969: 138 - 139]. The approval of marsh landscape and of ascetic and monotonous landscapes in general has come last of all. Barren landscape types are strongly connected to a scarce livelihood; the negative symbolic value has been preserved for a long time after livelihood was not directly dependent on nature. Still for I.K. Inha, a journalist and photographer of nature who traveled round Finland at the turn of the century, the forest was a "gloomy, mercilessly cold, and hostile force," a clearing for agriculture, however, "breathed warmly" [Inha 1909: 168].

Only exceptional cases, such as a forest fire, a plant disease, an avalanche, a volcanic eruption, a hurricane, and other traces of natural catastrophe are regarded as ugly [see Meeker 1972: 11; and Kalliola 1941: 53]. It is possible to 'save' them too if they are placed in a broader context; as a stage in a process, in which case a dramatic change of high and low points arises.

The area of critical, evaluative aesthetics is that in which Man is present actively as a changer; it thus applies to the environment made and altered by Man, in which no one appears to have demanded that everything existing should be approved. Leonald A. Fels has also emphasized in his article "Aesthetic Decision-Making and Human Ecology" that every man-made change in the state of nature can be criticized in relation to the earlier state: the result is better or worse, uglier or more beautiful. According to him it is possible to take as a basic assumption that everything in a state of nature is beautiful [Fels 1977: 369].

Man alters the environment in accordance with his goals, and these are in all areas of values. But there is an ethical limitation to action: the Earth is not only used by Man and is not only his dwelling place; animals and plants, and perhaps even natural formations too, also have their rights, which must not be injured.

The aesthetic aspect is always present in change, whether it is intended or not. Monroe C. Beardsley demands that minimum requirements and standards for the aesthetic approval of the environment should be set, and that there should be social control over their being followed [Beardsley 1972: 95 - 96]. The basic difficulty is the stating of the standards with the precision required by legal documents — it is not possible to forbid the ugly and demand the beautiful without being more precise about the requirement [see Bufford 1977: 277]. Control should apply to environmental wholes, facades, and valuable interiors, communal places in general, as well as industrial design; in the private area — in home furnishings, etc. — control is not so much needed.
A similar expansion and opening of systems of taste to that which has taken place in the appreciation of untouched nature is required in the case of the environment altered by Man too. It must not, however, mean that everything that is approved is of the same value; the goal need not be the replacement of critical aesthetics by positive aesthetics. The question is of systems of taste that permit individuality, but every realization needs criticism; there is no reason to disparage planning and consideration.

The architect Juhani Pallasmaa stated about the French traveling exhibition "Architectural Alternatives from the U.S.A." that it demonstrated to him the possibility of the comic and of humor in architecture. There were striking examples of these in the exhibition: of grotesque, confusing contrasts. But their use in architecture and building demands the same skill or good luck as in the other arts.

I am not quite sure whether we should unhesitatingly approve of everything even in a state of nature. The fact is that by no means all have done so. There are three types of problem cases, each of which can be illustrated by an example: (1) snakes, that is visually and associatively unpleasant and even dangerous objects; (2) mountains and marshes, that is objects that are opposed to or useless to human welfare; and (3) forest fires, that is phenomena that from the point of view of nature are at least temporarily detrimental [examples by Carlson]. We habitually — rightly or wrongly — compare one mountain with another and one lake with another. We make comparisons between the individuals of a species no matter what our conception of the species itself is: at an agricultural show both the most beautiful cow and the most beautiful pig are chosen — pedigree animals and plants are more man-made than natural. (Is that why in these cases "the most beautiful" usually means the best?) What is considerably more questionable is, for example, the mutual comparison of a mountain and a marsh landscape, in which we may praise the former for ruggedness and magnificence and blame the latter for monotony; in the same way we delight in the elegance of a horse's movements and laugh at the clumsiness of a hippopotamus.

Approval is controlled and limited by an ecological frame of reference: the natural and the durable are beautiful, to be approved aesthetically. The share of the grotesque and comic in the environment is a question by itself — as is that of the ugly in a positive sense. These values can undoubtedly be positive in the arts. According to Karl Rosenkranz such animals and plants can be seen in nature. [Rosenkranz 1853: 22.]

The first task in appreciation is not to say, how good or beautiful some object is; rather we must begin from interpretation and understanding, and derive a value from these. One must be able to describe the object correctly; and must be able to interpret its character and operation: historical dimensions, symbolism, function. The condition of aesthetic comprehension is overall understanding; for example, the appreciation of a city in depth presupposes a mastery of the entire cultural system.

The most indisputable area of tasks in critical aesthetics is that which is literally art in the environment (the products of architecture; garden art; various kinds of combinations of art and the environment). But quantitatively the most extensive is the environment that has been altered in various ways, that which has not been made into art, but which also is not untouched nature either.

The practical task of positive aesthetics is above all the creation of a theoretical basis for protection and control tasks: nature must be preserved as national and nature parks, individual natural monuments must be protected, as must species of animals and plants. All renewal belongs to the field and responsibilities of critical aesthetics: the artistic design related to new building and repair; the analysis of planning principles; the preservation and protection of cultural historically and architecturally valuable objects.

The difference between positive and critical aesthetics concerns above all the level of evaluation; the possible differences in description and interpretation come from the fact that they are always
made for certain purposes: for example, they show the way to a certain conception of value, and through that they act in a different way in positive and critical aesthetics.

Four preconditions can be set for *competent evaluation*:

1. the evaluator's material liberation from the necessities of nature, which makes possible the distance required in examination;

2. intellectual change from a mythical-religious world view to a scientific one; this means the mastery of contemporary and relevant background knowledge;

3. knowledge of the processes of nature and culture: it is only possible to see the beauty of a system when the system is understood, the apparent chaos articulated (and correctly; see above);

4. the ability to place the object in the correct category (related to the former); it is possible to distinguish natural and artificial categories [cf. Walton 1970; and Allen 1982]; the goal should not be the maximization of aesthetic value but evaluation built on the correct foundation.

*Taste, the system of taste, the justification of statements of taste*. In aesthetic matters the question is also one of the experience and reaction of the receiver. The presentation of evaluations presupposes the existence of certain value systems and their application. When aesthetic terms are used about the environment, that application is practised: environmental observations are placed in contact with concepts of taste. But concepts of taste must be expressed, made explicit, so that it is also possible to test them. It should be possible to say of these concepts whether they are consistent with the preconditions. Even though the criteria are at the beginning freely choosable, their application must be systematic, nor can they be changed just like that.

What does taste and good taste mean? Taste is a system to make and present evaluations. If the matter is one of a system that we approve of, we speak of good taste; if it is one we reject, we speak of bad taste. A lack of taste is thus either (1) bad taste, or (2) unsystematic application of criteria. — In art taste is on the one hand a property of the maker, on the other of the receiver. In the case of the environment everyone is in a way a maker and also a receiver.

How are aesthetic evaluations investigated? The first and most important possibility is the investigation of the use of language. Descriptive, interpretive, and evaluative claims are presented concerning aesthetic objects. The task of the investigator is to explain the logic of this use of language. What is decisive is how the evaluative claims are justified with the aid of the descriptive and interpretive components. The criteria of evaluation can be directly expressed in words, but usually they are unexpressed, in which case they must be decided from the practise of evaluation.

The other possibilities, too, return in the final resort to language. Without linguistic interpretation they are, however, only circumstantial evidence, symptoms that speak for or against. How is a place to live chosen; where to go on holiday; how to dress; what kind of garden to make; what kind of photographs to take; what kinds of Utopia to present? An aesthetic culture can, however, exist without a corresponding language, as Iwanska's example of the furnishings of American Indian dwellings demonstrates [Iwanska 1971: 407-408 (see p. 114)].

In aesthetic language the so-called aesthetic terms are most important, those in which there may be simultaneously a descriptive, interpretive, and evaluative aspect (for example 'delicate' means small size, slenderness, and frailty, but at the same time also light stylishness). Terms are positive and negative. However, no complete catalogue of aesthetic terms can be presented; in textual contexts practically anything can have an aesthetic shade of meaning; and there again an accustomed aesthetic term may have an a-aesthetic one [see Hermerén 1973: 87-91; and Kivy 1975: 198]. Kivy writes:
one way we cannot distinguish aesthetic terms from other terms is simply by enumeration. We cannot make a list of aesthetic terms because aesthetic terms are not a distinct subgroup of the terms in ordinary language; rather, they are terms in ordinary language which at times and in certain contexts we call "aesthetic."

[Kivy 1975b: 198.]

But not only individual terms are aesthetically significant. From the point of view of text linguistics, totalities larger than words, sentences and even paragraphs are important: the development of the argument; the variation of emphasis, from which a rhythm arises. The style may become more ceremonial and dignified in tone, so that the emphasis comes when the depiction is at its peak. The textual environment may color even neutral terms aesthetically (for example in Kalliola 'sterile', which in botany means a plant that does not develop seeds). Certain words and expressions may develop into key words ("the face of the landscape," etc.); and as metaphor expressions they are to a great extent peculiar to each writer. The key words are revealed by the analysis of textual entireties. Aesthetically evaluative terms are the core and key points of the text; one can progress from them to an analysis of the textual environment, to the grounds for the use of the terms. By classifying the grounds a hold is gained on the systems of taste.

Art similes and metaphors can be quite as revealing and personal ("a nature's work of art"; "like a painting," etc.). The repeated comparison of a landscape to a painting or the comparison of the cycle of the seasons to a play appears to contain more than merely an analogy: the idea of the dignity of a landscape and the cycle of the seasons. The starting point is then a prescriptive, evaluative definition of art.

Comparisons with paradigmatic, generally known, and in an aesthetic sense recognizedly valuable, landscapes must be seen in a social context. When some view is compared to the view from Koli, not only is information given about the unknown, but also an evaluation is made of the aesthetic nature of the object in question. There is something of the specific quality of Koli in the depicted landscape. The view opening out from Koli is a paradigmatic Finnish lake and hill landscape — in the same way as The Rape of the Sabine Women is a paradigmatic work of art [see Ziff 1953: 58]. Comparisons can take place without an intervening theory.

In environmental depictions a clear line can be discerned from narrower value systems to broader ones. In antiquity only an agricultural landscape was approved of — that in a state of nature meant chaos and threat [see e.g. Hughes 1975]. In the early stage of Romanticism the appreciation of a certain kind of wild nature arose: boulder fields, wind-swept trees, the stormy sea. In Finland it is only in this century that monotonous landscape has received approval — marshes, the outer archipelago, etc.; but then it occurred so completely that, for example, in Reino Kalliola's depictions of nature one finds only rare examples of nature in a natural state that are regarded as being ugly, and even in these cases the question is generally of a process in which the later stages balance the stage that was felt to be unpleasant. But in the depictions of Kalliola's predecessor, I.K. Inha, clearly negatively flavored evaluations can be found. In the book Finland i bilder / Suomi kuivissa ('Finland in Pictures') he writes in connection with the picture showing the view from the Mariehamn Spa hill:

The nature of Åland greets the traveller who has negotiated the complicated labyrinth of the outer skerries first of all with a dark cold smile of high steep hills, pine woods, that appear dark against the gray rock, and with water that nowhere looks as clear as here.

But behind the hills and in these bays that run deep into the islands, luxuriant pastures, meadows, and idyllic villages meet the viewer; that smile suddenly becomes charming, bright.

But nowhere, however, does that nature make a convincing warm impression, for beneath even the most delicious turf by the water lurks hard rock, washed by the icy, translucent wave of the open sea.

[Inha 1896: 108.]

Later, positive criteria have been formulated to evaluate this kind of nature; paradigms of barren nature have arisen.
On the other hand, the demands set for nature built and altered by Man are more absolute. For Inha and Kalliola the acts of Man usually mean aesthetic destruction, especially in that stage when the environment created by cultural tradition, the beauty of culture has not yet developed to replace natural beauty. They make no attempt to 'save' the man-made. Behind this there is the statement of the famous geographer, Sir Francis Younghusband (1863 - 1942), to which Paul B. Sears refers:

Certainly, sound and satisfying design is integral to good conservation, and it has been true in my experience that Sir Francis Younghusband, the British explorer, was quite right in his belief that there are only two kinds of landscape that are tolerable — one where man has never been; the other where he has achieved harmony.

While I do not doubt that human aesthetics has profound roots in biological evolution, I am equally certain that it can be modified, even perverted, by cultural experience during the development of the individual.

[Sears 1958: 107 - 108; cf. also Tobin's dissertation on "nature sympathizers" as modern dissidents, Tobin 1981.]

The aesthetic value of a traditional uniform agrarian landscape or a townscape that contains historical layers is not problematic: they are generally recognized and approved. What is problematic is the transitional stage, the changeover; and the various by-products of urban culture are difficult. One kind of attempt to save the border areas is made by Susan Sontag in speaking of "Camp," by which she means the unnatural, the artificial, and the exaggerated [Sontag 1967: 275]. It is a related phenomenon to Kitsch. Kitsch as such is an expression of bad taste, but used as a parody its character becomes positive. Camp is a certain kind of aestheticistic game; it is typically a phenomenon connected to culture. In Sontag's 58 paragraph Camp-notes dedicated to Oscar Wilde, paragraph 7 deals with nature and Camp:

All Camp objects, and persons, contain a large element of artifice. Nothing in nature can be campy... Rural Camp is still man-made, and most campy objects are urban. (Yet, they often have a serenity — or naiveté — which is the equivalent of pastoral. A great deal of Camp suggests Empson's phrase, "urban pastoral.")

[Sontag 1967: 279.]

All Camp need not be negative in an ecological sense. Nonetheless in Carlson's opinion it can be directed against positive life values. Carlson examines Mark Sagoff's example of life-sized plastic trees, which he regards as representing some kind of a combination of resignation and ingenuity:

Consider the lifesize, plastic "trees" previously mentioned. I admitted that in one sense such "trees" may be as aesthetically pleasing as the real thing. This is in the thin sense. If these "trees" are good replicas, they will have a physical appearance and form very similar to real trees and consequently in the thin sense be equally aesthetically pleasing. In this case as in the roadside clutter case, however, it is expressive qualities that are important. I think that we find plastic "trees" aesthetically unacceptable mainly because of the life values they express. And although it is difficult to describe exactly what they express, I suggest it is something like a combination of resignation and ingenuity. This expressive quality is not as objectionable as those of roadside clutter, but it is still rather disconcerting, disconcerting enough to make such "trees" difficult to enjoy aesthetically (and yet perhaps not disconcerting enough to prevent them from being paradigm objects for camp sensibility).

[Carlson 1976. 80; cf. Sagoff 1974.]

Starting from this basis the aesthetic evaluation of the environment formed by Man is stamped with a certain kind of conservative caution. The point of departure in planning and appreciation has been classical taste, which has emphasized demands of symmetry and harmony and regarded with reserve, for example, strong contrasts and grotesque elements.

A looser range of criteria than at present, applied to the aesthetic appreciation of the environment, such as has long been in use in art criticism, appears to be forming on the basis of the Camp idea. It is not, however, desirable that ecological limitations be overthrown. Ecological demands can be set for the natural environment in a deep-aesthetic sense. What is ecologically suitable is also appropriate and thus in a broad sense aesthetic. Yuriko Saito also comes to this final
conclusion in her dissertation *The Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature: Western and Japanese Perspectives and their Ethical Implications* [1984a]. Saito crystallizes her ideas as follows:

[-] the most fundamental reason for preserving nature concerns its functional unity which is indispensable to our health and survival. In this sense, the aesthetic appreciation of nature that incorporates the scientific considerations regarding such unity helps us develop an ecologically sensitive attitude toward nature.

[Saito 1984b: 3716A.]

The same principles of appropriateness can with adaptation be applied to cultural products too; it does not, however, need to lead to a resurrection of Functionalism as the dominant stylistic trend.

Ecological disturbances are, among other things, single-species ecosystems; the disproportionately plentiful appearance of some species; over-large cities; and construction that exceeds humane proportions. Aesthetic ecology means the creation of a harmonious relationship between Man and the environment; this harmony does not demand commitment to the idea of harmony at a surface level. — Culture has acted as a destroyer, but also as a diversifier: it has created entirely new ecosystems, influenced the extent and composition of species of plants and animals, changed landscapes, and given birth to artificial environments. The possibilities of combinations have diversified and become more demanding.

*The various areas of values and the connections between them.* In his later writings Monroe C. Beardsley has given up the definition of aesthetics as purely the philosophy of the criticism of arts. In the Sixth International Congress on Aesthetics at Uppsala in 1968 he dealt with the nature of the aesthetic values of art and the environment, and at that time distinguished between the dependent values of the environment and the independent values of art. On the basis of this he constructed a policy of two areas of value: minimum demands should be set for the aesthetic approval of the environment, in the same way as standards are set for air pollution or the bacteria content of milk; and society should see to it that these standards are maintained; for art, on the other hand, only the economic preconditions for development should be guaranteed — it does not need control but independence:

[-] we should make a distinction between dependent and independent aesthetic value. Dependent aesthetic value is what appears in works designed first of all for another function: new government office buildings, bridges, public transportation systems, urban design. I think it would be bad for the government to ignore aesthetic considerations completely in these matters, but since we have no units of measurement, we cannot state how many minutes of delay in waiting for a train should be traded for aesthetically satisfying railroad cars. What we can do is set some standards of aesthetic acceptability for all such designs — as we set standards, so far unsuccessfully, for air pollution, and, quite successfully, for the bacterial count of milk. We can require a modest level of harmony, expressiveness, good proportion, symbolic congruence with social function.

[-]

With respect to independent aesthetic value — the value of works of art as such — the government must be far more cautious. The aim must be to insure the economic and political conditions favorable to the free creation and enjoyment of a wide variety of works of art, including at least some of a high order. Subsidies of theatres and of creative work will sometimes be necessary for the underprivileged artistic areas; but the chief requirement is freedom from government interference, and a generally healthy economy.

[Beardsley 1972: 95-96]

One might think of very different starting points for the evaluation of the environment, but location within an ecological frame of reference eliminates the greater part. A system which stands up to an ecological test can be regarded as natural.

We are accustomed to limiting aesthetic values to appearance, to sensory effect. Parallel to these mental, operational, moral, and religious values can be mentioned. But the appearance of values independent of one another is not necessary or even usual. They all appear in art, even if other values can be regarded as subordinate to the aesthetic.
The contradictory situation caused by values is illustrated by Réginald Outhier's travel narrative *Journal d'un Voyage au Nord* [1736-1737; published 1744]. Outhier was a priest, a representative of the Roman Catholic Church, whose primary task was to take responsibility for the spiritual requirements of the research group, but at the same time he was a representative of empirical natural science, and the reporter of Maupertuis' journey. How is it possible to combine in the same person religious faith and scientific empiricism? In the preface to the Finnish edition Toivo Harjunpää states that a change took place in the world view:

A great revolution had in fact taken place in the view of the world. From the geocentric explanation of the world a change had taken place to a heliocentric world view. In place of a flat area of earth inhabited by people came an earth that moved in a predetermined orbit round the sun and revolved around its own axis, in an infinite cosmos. In place of a mythical explanation of the world came a new mathematical and natural scientific view of the world, which rested on exact observations.

[Harjunpaa 1975: 7.]

At no point does Outhier show a consciousness of this contradictory pressure, to say nothing of suffering from it. But it must be noted that at no time does he offer — even metaphorically — anything supernatural as an explanation of natural phenomena; at most he mentions some folk tale of spirits that move above the water in the form of mist. In this sense Outhier represents logically the line of natural scientific depiction, from which there is a direct connection with modern natural science.

Marxist aestheticians in particular have attempted to demonstrate that so-called life values and ethical values are at least as important as the aesthetic in a formal sense; from this basis it is possible to derive the idea of the synthetic nature of values. The beauty of nature is connected to the ecological aspect; the beauty of utensils to usability, to utility.

From the point of view of syntheticality it is possible to polemicize against aestheticism. Bohdan Dziemidok has defined aestheticism in the theory of value as being the idea that the object's only, or at least principal, value should be its aesthetic value (the former is aestheticism proper, the latter its moderate version):

By aestheticism in the theory of values and evaluation of the work of art I understand the view which maintains that the sole or at least the main value of the work of art is its aesthetic value. By formalism in the theory of the value of the work of art I understand the approach which holds that it is solely or at least principally the formal factors which constitute the aesthetic value of the work of art.

[Dziemidok 1976b: 21.]

In my opinion aestheticism should be limited to the concept that the only value is aesthetic; that the aesthetic value precisely in art is the principal value is generally accepted [cf. inter alia Tilghman 1984: 118-121].

John Hoaglund opposes the separation of aesthetic and non-aesthetic properties — a difference cannot be made, because no property can be classed entirely on one side or the other: (1) the unit of aesthetic value is the work of art as a totality, nor can the presence of any individual value guarantee aesthetic value; and (2) we must experience an individual work of art as a totality in order to decide whether it has aesthetic value [Hoaglund 1976: 40-41.]

Mihai Pastragus also emphasizes that aesthetic value is not a separate value: the material structure, life values, political, ethical, and scientific elements, philosophical concepts, form an organic network in which the aesthetic is intertwined [Pastragus 1976: 65]. There are such aesthetic concepts as 'noble,' 'tragic,' 'comic,' 'monumental,' which signify nothing without a connection to the ethical. In art and life values appear together, but without joining [Pascadi 1976: 64].

Due to the synthetic nature of values it is difficult or impossible to limit the area of aesthetics, even though an aesthetic aspect can be delimited. Aesthetics has connections to everyday life — to the living environment, to nature, to utensils, to works of art; there is an aesthetic aspect in all of these, which is, nevertheless, inseparably dependent on other aspects.
The need for the aesthetic can, however, only be aroused if there is some place for it. What form the satisfaction of that need takes at different times and in different situations is to a great extent learned, a tradition that is handed down from one generation to the next. The environment is the first object that all people of necessity come up against. It would be possible, for example, to investigate to what extent attachment to a home district is aesthetic — and on the other hand also to what extent the nature of the home district creates basic models, something corresponding to which is then demanded elsewhere.

In her article "Without Art" Alicja Iwanska distinguishes four basic types of relating to the world: cognitive, moral, activistic, and aesthetic. Iwanska claims that all these four appear in all cultures; it is true with different emphases and with varying forms. She examines the forms of the expression of the aesthetic in two communities, both of which lack art as a concept and an institution. The one is a modern farming community in the state of Washington, the other an Indian village in Central Mexico. In neither did anyone make a living from art and in neither did artistic pastimes appear. But the lack of familiar artistic institutions did not mean the lack of aesthetic activity, nor of a sense of the aesthetic [Iwanska 1971: 402-404].

The farmers lived in an area that was famous for its natural beauty. Never once, however, did the researcher hear the inhabitants speaking of the beauty of the landscapes whilst they were in the natural environment — when the environment was spoken about only the healthiness of the climate and the value of the district from the point of view of tourism were spoken of. The farmers themselves went for trips by car and they enthusiastically photographed and filmed landscapes. The aesthetic appreciation of the environment began only when looking at pictures; then they spoke of the shape of lakes, of trees and roads, of the sunset, and of the colours of clouds. Photographs and films were the intermediaries that made the aesthetic examination of the environment possible. [Ibid.: 405.]

Iwanska gives also an interesting example of a range of standards for the appreciation of the dwelling environment from the Mexican Indians. Iwanska drew attention to the fact that in no way did the Indians decorate their dwellings, nor was there any furniture. On the walls there were only some clay pots; and strings, on which clothes and blankets were spread, ran through the room. There were no unnecessary objects visible — the only exceptions were photographs borrowed from friends and acquaintances, which were placed on a kind of domestic altar. The ideal was an empty, clean space, which was divided according to precise rules by hanging clothes. The surrounding of the dwelling was swept quite as often and as carefully as the dwelling space, which was not a matter of hygiene or household care, but was carried for aesthetic reasons. Behind all of this were three basic principles of taste: spaciousness, symmetry, and order. [Ibid.: 408.]

These examples demonstrate how an aesthetic culture may develop from extremely meager elements; and even where it is highly developed it may remain unnoticed from the outsider: it cannot be immediately interpreted as aesthetic. Iwanska indeed assumes that a Japanese researcher who was used to the significance of empty space should, rather than her, a European, have discovered the nature of the Indians' rules on furnishing. The flourishing of traditional arts is thus in no way an essential condition for an aesthetic culture. Of course, the inhabitants themselves are not able to classify these and certain other activities mentioned by Iwanska as art, because the classification in question is lacking in their culture. For — as Arthur Danto states — only theories of art make art possible [Danto 1964: 580].

The area in which aesthetic activity appears even in the absence of art, is the treatment of the environment. The methods of operation may be passive or active. Nature conservation is passive; changing nature at any given time according to certain purposes and principles is active. There is very little in the way of forms of dealing with the environment in which the goal would be purely the
production of aesthetic pleasure. A most obvious form is the design and care of an ornamental
garden; otherwise the alteration of the environment starts primarily from the demands of
livelihood, dwelling, or traffic. The Finnish author Lauri Viita has seen this alteration process as
gigantic everyday sculpture:

Not only building, but all of modern industry is based on sculpture. Mechanical saws, pneumatic
drills, explosives, excavators, are the means with which the friendly face of mother Finland is
sculpted. Only the living sensitivity of art can now decide whether conscience will also grow here, or
will the ground only crumble and the water thicken.

[Vusa 1961: 92-93.]

Ideally, aesthetic objectives are involved in all the activities of Man. The reason for altering the
environment is a necessity of life, not the production of beauty in the sense of decoration; this must
be taken into consideration in all aesthetic demands.

Aestheticism, the emphasis of aesthetic values above all others is not at all possible to the same
extent in the environment as it is in the arts. Gardens are a small exception. A certain kind of
aestheticism appears also in the breeding of ornamental plants and pet animals, in which forms are
created that would not withstand natural selection for a moment. The increase of this kind of
phenomena can be regarded as a sign of disturbance in culture, a symptom of the distortion of the
set of values. These artificial natural forms do not match the genuineness that Man is inclined to
demand of the environment. Antero Rinne writes in his book *Unelma kauneimmasta ihmisestä* ('A
Dream of the Most Beautiful Person'):

That is precisely why people so much love flowers, trees, and nature in general: these do not lie. Even
the most corrupt and vain person loves children, because he feels instinctively that children do not lie,
that children are sincere.

[Rinne 1951: 93.]

*Life values*. What is aesthetically approveable? It is relatively easy to give an answer within the
framework of special value systems, but a general answer is difficult. What distinguishes a good
from a bad value system?

The arts are not to be controlled; the principle of freedom suits them, and the aesthetic value
systems do not in this case have a frame provided by other value systems. But what is suitable for
the imaginary world is not suitable for the real one. Limits to action must be decided on in relation
to the environment, and they are determined in accordance with life values. Aesthetic goals cannot
injure them; thus aesthetistic systems which do not take consequences into consideration are
excluded. A direct infringement of life values would be, for example, the admiring of the sheen of
colors of a layer of oil floating on water or of beautiful sunsets caused by layers of pollution in the
atmosphere — on a surface level, a primary level, this is possible — to say nothing of these kinds of
changes being produced in the environment on aesthetic grounds. The infringement takes place
through a language of symbols.

In Junk Art as compared to junk there is — as Allen Carlson demonstrates — a question of a
certain kind of exploitation of material, which makes the method defendable [Carlson 1976: 80-81].
The decisive difference is, in my opinion, that art is intrinsically fictive, imaginary, a world
presented with the aid of certain material, whereas reality is our real, physical living environment.
Even then when the artist alters it, as in Earth Art, his act has a motive; it is not vandalism, even
though in extreme cases the final result is the same in external appearance; someone who puts
graffiti on natural stones with spray paint injures the environment, the artist does not [Carlson 1984a:
unpublished Congress paper]. A work of art functions as such, so too does the environment: both must be
adapted to their task; they must operate appropriately. Functionality is a general and common
aesthetic principle.
The imaginary world is limited and final — it is intrinsic to the work of art in question — the real world is continuous. In the world of fantasies everything is possible and safe, as long as one knows that it is a question of fantasy; models for action can certainly be obtained, but the control of action rests with the individual and society. The realization of aesthetic and other values causes in actual reality consequences that extend to physical existence: the using of natural resources or leaving them unused; the breaking of natural forms and their replacement with man-made structures, etc.

In the environment Man cannot in a deep sense even aesthetically approve of that which is related to destructive forces. Everything — even the piles of bodies in Auschwitz — can be examined from the surface level, as a composition and as colors, but to do so would be aberrant without a frame given by life values or ideology [see Kinnunen 1969: 77-78]. For when life values subtract something by limitation, they compensate by opening up dimensions of significance; they deepen the ornamental into a symbolic activity that aims at the whole of life.

Genuine nature does not give rise to a feeling of artificiality and pretense, even though malformations and disturbances belong to it. That "honesty" and genuineness makes perhaps even barren nature basically approvable. And a lack of honesty, Man's insincere attempt at beautification, explains the fact that the forest aesthetics marketed at the turn of the century by Heinrich von Salisch [see von Salisch 1885] did not spread — all kinds of improvements of nature generally have a bad reputation; the principle itself, taking aesthetic points of view into consideration in felling forests, etc., seems important, nonetheless. The same kind of practical aesthetics exists, for example, in choosing the line of a road; a road that includes varying views promotes safety by keeping the motorist's attention awake. An expert road designer can reveal the diverse faces of a landscape [see Jaatinen 1967].

An aesthetic attitude to the landscape is most usual in those who are themselves strangers in the environment. Tourists have a tendency to aestheticize conditions in Mediterranean countries: signs of poverty and decay are only picturesque. The relation to the entire environment remains external, and precisely this externality may be in cases of this kind a condition for appreciation. Paul Shepard claims that farmers do not appreciate the beauty of agricultural land, and even if they do feel it they do not proclaim it aloud; agricultural land is not admired by those who work it, but by town-dwellers who travel through the countryside [Shepard 1967: 131]; however, it is precisely their concept that is in danger of remaining aesthetic in a superficial sense.

An explanation that is often repeated is that it is only when Man has been liberated from subordination to nature that preconditions are created for an aesthetic attitude to nature. When all an individual's time and strength go into making a living there is, according to this theory, no time to enjoy nature: the necessary distance for aesthetic examination is lacking. The relation has been colored by fear. Nature is felt to be the dwelling place of good and evil forces, which people must placate with suitable gifts, thanks, and prayers. Victor Romanenko emphasizes this concept of the liberation from slavery to nature that technology has brought; he regards it as having created the material preconditions for the understanding and enjoyment of natural beauty [Romanenko 1969].

The view of the world has, generally speaking, changed from a mythological-religious one to a natural scientific one [cf. Romanenko 1969: 138]. Walter O'Briant depicts the difference between religious and scientific thought as follows: the religious person thinks of certain moral and aesthetic values as being a fixed part of the world order, and that God supervises the observance of values, whereas for the scientifically orientated person the world order is morally and aesthetically neutral — the universe is not supportive or hostile in relation to Man, but simply neutral [O'Briant 1974: 85].

Earlier by appealing to certain naturalists and theoreticians I attempted to demonstrate that a relation of equality between Man and nature prevailed when nature still preserved a part of its fearfulness without, however, retaining its absolute grip (see p. 107). Man had then to follow the reactions of Nature very closely and take them into consideration. Technology has led to an
alienation from nature; the interaction between Man and nature does not operate sensitively as it still did in an agrarian society. Romanenko's belief in progress appears too optimistic when thinking of the immense possibilities which technology has already opened up.

In the change from slavery to nature to equality and from that to the, at least temporary, supremacy of Man, the question is of a general development of the human species, the speed of which is very different for different cultures and their individual members. I.K. Inha tells of a moving example from Finland at the turn of the century. While travelling from Eno Inha travelled backwards down that line of development, leading him to a sympathy with those people living in primitive conditions. Inha, a journalist from Helsinki, met open famine. All the backwoods romanticism vanished; the wilderness appeared to him, as to the peasant, as a threatening force, against which a hopeless struggle had to be waged:

Previously I had seen the forest through the eyes of a folk poem, I had seen it as a treasure house of the backwoodsman, in which game and plants had freely arranged their lives each according to its own pleasure. Heath, stands of spruce, thickets, marshes, and the backwoods - all of these had their dwellers, which the woodsman asked for from the spirits of Tapiola, dressing his most ideal concept of the beauty of the forest in a poem. Here I viewed it with the eyes of the toiler, I saw its gloominess, its merciless coldness, I saw it as a hostile force, the foe of Man and his cultivation. It shot through my mind how warmly the broad farm clearing breathed when, after an exhausting journey through the forest, I burst forth from the trees and began to walk on a meadow path. The Finnish peasant sees the forest with the eyes of a toiler, remembering his own and his forefathers’ work, and in that are the roots of the congenital mercilessness with which he treats the forest at present.

[Inha 1909: 167-168]

The experience could be called a reality experience; here it is utterly sombre. The tragic futility of the struggle for life suddenly penetrated Inha’s consciousness. The oscillation between feelings of futility and strong experiences of the beauty of nature create an ambivalence in his travel depictions that is so typical of them. Inha sets the aesthetic experience of nature in a moral scale. He experiences the beauty of nature, but he asks whether he has a moral right to it in all cases; aesthetic values are placed in ethical scales.

Aestheticism wishes to absolutely deny ideas of benefit and detriment in connection with the experience of the beautiful. In 1835 Théophile Gautier, the first notable theoretician of aestheticism wrote in the foreword to his novel Mademoiselle de Maupin that beauty exists in those things from which there is no kind of benefit — everything that is useful is ugly, for it is an expression of some need, and the needs of men are quite as base and repugnant as his own disgusting and weak nature [Gautier n.d. (1835): XXV]. Environmental beauty would be extremely rare according to Gautier’s criterion! We can perhaps regard Inha’s original way of seeing as being a way of examination that by-passes thoughts of benefit and detriment, but can we regard it as sufficient? As soon as Inha felt sympathy with the situation of another person his relation to nature changed: the aesthetic was connected to the ethical. Humanistically viewed it cannot be a mistake.

The same question — relation between aesthetic and ethical values — is also met with in the philosophy of art, but the problem is of a different type. A work of art may provide unfavorable models of behavior, but it is up to our discretion whether we implement them. Consciousness of the imaginariness of the events in a work of art makes by-standing possible; in real life, for example, when we find suffering and violence we cannot withdraw as observers in the same way. (These art-forms, in which the material used is the real world: architecture, etc., form a group of their own; a building is real not fictitious.) Environmental questions demand activity on all levels.

The goal of the aesthetic understanding of the environment is the maximization of the appropriate aesthetic value; the goal is thus not the maximization of purely aesthetic value - which would be aestheticism. The objective set by Hepburn [Hepburn 1973: 252] thus moves to the upper
level: it is various values in a relation of equilibrium — the maximization of aesthetic value in such a way that it does not injure the life values.

In order to achieve the goal the object must be understood correctly. Thus aesthetics alone does not set the goal, rather it is synthetic by nature. The goal is a world in balance and its complete understanding. Aesthetics seeks a place in that. But this principle also means the recognition of aesthetics and aesthetic values as being fully competent.

An attempt must be made towards a harmony of values. In a way one must make a comparison of values. We cannot speak of values separately; the combination defines what is possible in the combination. We should find a combination in which different values are maximized. The state of equilibrium that thus arises — in which the aesthetic is one element — is itself aesthetic. Aesthetical is thus on two levels: aesthetic values are values among other values; and the aesthetic may be a constellation formed from various values. The harmony of values is also the most satisfactory from the point of view of ecology and culture. It means the stability and durability of systems: ecological aesthetics is not only aesthetics. — In the case of art one comes to similar situations by asking what is its place in a balanced human life; what kind of place does art have.

The destruction of boundaries, which is typical of relations of art and life, appears between aesthetic values and life. On the one hand — as in the Darmstadt Congress (1976) — it is thought desirable to separate artistic values from aesthetic as a work of art contains, among other things, not only aesthetic but moral and political values as well; on the other aesthetic values themselves can be thought of as being composed of different types of values. The Polish participants in the Congress reproached Ingarden, whom they esteemed highly, for the fact that he had regarded aesthetic values as the principal values of art and not dealt with the others, even though he recognized their existence [cf. esp. Dzembdok 1976a]. Because of this Ingarden was regarded as being a representative of moderate aestheticism. The Marxists emphasized the fact that in art the so-called life values are at least as important as the aesthetic in a formal sense. Once again the idea of the syncretism of values is dominant. If the division adopted in Western aesthetics is applied here it becomes possible to speak of favoring deep beauty over surface beauty.

Istvan Szerdahelyi distinguishes two kinds of aesthetic values: artistic truth values and beauty values. The true is not usually beautiful, and beauty again cannot be measured by a scale of true and false; both kinds of beauty are required [Szerdahelyi 1976: 83]. These paradoxes could be resolved if the ambiguity of the word 'beauty' is taken into account: on the one hand beauty is one kind of aestheticality, on the other a class name for the kinds of aestheticality.

According to the idea of the syncretism of values, aesthetic values are no more separate in art than in the environment or in human relations, but rather a property of the whole; and on that account they should be investigated in their combinations. Aestheticism and formalism can be criticized for dividing values into the spheres of interest and areas of responsibility of different sciences. — In my opinion, however, a clear distinction in principle should be made between what is in its basic nature imaginary — i.e. art — and reality. An intention or fantasy does not equal an act. In the world of art complete freedom can be permitted, which again is not possible in life as it is lived.

Mihai Nadin wishes to take taste or sense as basic concepts; their manifestations are investigated by environmental aesthetics, production aesthetics, and the aesthetics of human relations — there is an aesthetic component in all human activity [Nadin 1976: 58].

The values of art change rapidly: it has been especially characteristic of recent art that it emphasizes the new and previously unseen, the surprising. As for environment, there is something similar in the manner in which tourist spots and various kinds of specialties are offered. Tourists want to see landscapes and places that are strange and surprising to them. It is, however, questionable whether their interest in nature is aesthetic or something else.
What kind of nature is regarded as interesting changes with different periods. These changes are in some way connected with the progress of development in art and art theories, but above all they are connected with how urban dwelling has developed. Untouched nature is felt to be an alternative and contrast to the city. Peace and quiet is expected of nature as a counterweight to the city.

Interest in ecology has increased interest in nature. Nature is seen as a model of undisturbed life that can only be damaged by human activity. A condition of the aesthetic examination of nature is an interest in the operating mechanisms of nature. Nature is then not simply a place in which one can move but an object to be observed and analyzed. The recipient must be active in order to receive something.

When life values exclude something they open such dimensions of significance as a substitute that deepen ornamentation into a symbolic activity that aims at the whole of life. It is through this that tragedies and comedies, for example, become possible.

Antikallism — mild and sharp aesthetic values. In his article “Environmental Aesthetics and the Dilemma of Aesthetic Education” Allen Carlson considers how one should regard the littering of the environment. The detriment is aesthetic in a surface sense, more concretely it is cosmetic: ecosystems are not damaged by it. Carlson states that logically there are two possibilities to remove the detriment: either be prepared to approve of the environment as it is — which means an extension of positive values — or else to repair the damage to satisfy the earlier system of taste. [Carlson 1976: 71.]

Through the ironical use of Kitsch the area of aesthetic values has extended to the banal, the tasteless, the styleless, etc. Mieczyslaw Wallis speaks of mild and sharp aesthetic values. According to him the grotesque, the gloomy, the shocking, the aggressive, the brutal, the repulsive, the unpleasant, are appearing in place of the mild - the beautiful proper, the elegant, etc. He calls the tendency antikallism (kalon = 'beautiful'). [Wallis 1976: 197.] In art these negative values are recognized and there are long traditions in their use. To a great extent art has given up attempts to please and has adopted new tasks: to shock; to surprise; to arouse displeasure; to break its boundaries. The principal tasks of anti-art, which deviates from the familiar, have been to participate in the discussion on the nature of art by breaking expectations and definitions.

Has the same development taken place in the environment and people's relating to it? The old has been repaired using new materials; buildings of various periods and styles are placed next to one another; traffic arrangements break unified landscape entities. Untouched nature has suffered severe damage from pollution — at least that is felt to be extremely unsatisfactory. It has been stated that Man quickly adapts to practically anything at all. On the other hand the result of unsuccessful environmental planning can be clearly demonstrated in social problems, crime, and general dissatisfaction. Changes in the direction of the grotesque have taken place without a program; the possibility of programming has only recently been aroused. One kind of manifesto for a new cultural environment originates from Andy Warhol:

The most beautiful thing in Tokyo is McDonald's. The most beautiful thing in Stockholm is McDonald's. The most beautiful thing in Florence is McDonald's. There is still nothing beautiful in Peking and Moscow.

[From the year 1975.]

The problem of the ugly environment. The opinion of positive aesthetics in the question concerning the ugliness of nature is clear: that which is in a state of nature is aesthetically valuable and therefore as such worthy of preservation. Nonetheless, it is possible to ask whether there is something absolutely ugly in the untouchable nature: the aftermath of a storm, flood, or fire; a forest destroyed by pests; sick and deformed plants and animals? Meeker is of the opinion that nature which has suffered a catastrophe in which the processes of life have been disrupted, is ugly:
A beautiful landscape is one in which the processes of life, including of course death and pain as well as satisfactions, are provided for in all their complexity. Perhaps there is a common ground between our delight in temporal art and the pleasure we find in the stable processes of a biological ecosystem. When we admire a wilderness landscape we are responding to a complex image of processes which we can easily associate with our own well-being. A burned forest is ugly because it represents a truncated system of growth, and a rich mixture of trees, grass, and wildlife is a working system that is productively oriented in time.

[Meeker 1972: 11.]

One rescue attempt would be precisely to see nature as a process in which one phase replaces another; a rhythm arises, for which intermediate phases that are unpleasant in themselves may be dramatically necessary. Examined separately the parts may indeed be ugly.

Concerning ugliness as a product of culture, a representative of a new kind of critical aesthetics could ask, after the manner of Susan Sontag, whether too much had been moved to its sphere that quite simply does not agree with traditional demands of harmony and symmetry [see Sontag 1967]. Is it possible and is there reason to rescue at least a part of the cultural environment and built environment as well as industrial products that are condemned as ugly by approving the grotesque, the comic, the macabre, etc. for positive use? Satisfaction in the midst of Kitsch and a low quality environment is surprisingly common. The aesthetic value and stimulation of even slums has been emphasized [Pred 1964].

The value of barren nature. Outhier’s travel diary (see pp. 65, 112 - 113) is an excellent example of the earlier frugality of aesthetic depictions of nature. Outhier, the priest and secretary of the expedition in Southern Lapland lead by the Frenchman Maupertuis, faithfully recorded the stages of the expedition that had been sent to make measurements to settle the old dispute whether the Earth was flattened at the poles or not. Outhier reported the stages of the journey, the methods of carrying out the tasks, social intercourse, and ethnographic matters. [Outhier 1975 (1744).]

But even though Outhier was so faithful and observant, he treated aesthetic questions in a summary fashion. The evaluations he presents are mainly concerned with only the cleanliness and manner of construction of the towns seen on the journey and the agriculture of the surrounding countryside. In Outhier the Roman tradition of admiring an agricultural landscape can clearly be seen. The admiration of barren nature, its analytic aesthetic depiction, had obviously no background, no tradition; the convention was only beginning to be born after a complete break caused by Classicism. Outhier does not — as one might expect — say practically anything about the wild nature of Southern Lapland and the ruggedness of the fell landscapes that were later much praised. The lack of depiction does not of course logically prove that Outhier might not have experienced these matters — to be exact we can only prove the sparsity of the depiction. But the choice of matters to be depicted is also the depicter’s choice of what to him is most important.

The Swedish king's statement of a "terrible journey" to be expected seems in part to have colored the manner of seeing, but on the other hand Outhier is not guilty of painting anything black. He seems only to have had as indifferent an attitude as the famous Erasmus of Rotterdam crossing the Alps — nature as an aesthetic phenomenon does not interest him. Certainly the Frenchmen could climb to see a sunset, but even then the interest is the interest of scientists in an easily explicable caprice of nature — the midnight sun. About Niemiavaara Outhier states laconically that it enchanted the leader of the expedition completely, but he refuses to describe the cause of the captivation in greater detail, because Maupertuis had prepared his own description of the fell. Outhier satisfies himself with stating: "On this fell there are such contrary and varying rock formations that the sight is quite as attractive as it is unique." [Outhier 1975 (1744): 79.] On the other hand, Outhier admires the beauty of the aurora borealis almost as often as he uses various kinds of superlative expressions to complain about the "dreadful anguish" caused by the mosquitoes [ibid.
42. 51, 59, 60-61, 64-65, 69, 73, 156, 163 among others].

Outhier is no exception among the depicters of Lapland of his time. In the ethnographically oriented *Lapponia* of Johannes Schefferus a few decades earlier one can find only one clear aesthetic evaluation, and the direction is the same as later in Outhier:

The country is not fat, nor is it lean either, it is middling. In places it is rocky, in other places there are boulders and slabs of rock, the ruggedness and unevenness of which spoil the entire landscape.

[N Schefferus 1963 (1684): 57]

Nicolaus Örn follows Schefferus' footsteps in his "Lyhyt kuvaus Lapinmaasta" ("A brief description of Lapland"), which appeared in 1707 [Örn 1976]. Only the small chapter 'Trees' contains aesthetically admiring statements, this time certainly without reservations: the forests of Lapland look like "the most beautiful pleasure parks" and "smell sweetly" [ibid : 180]. Also in Carl von Linné, who made his journey three years before Outhier, can be found scattered signs of genuine interest. Midsummer's Day makes von Linné lyrical:

24.6. **Midsummer.** The summer and spring sweetness of the land must be set above all else on account of the air, the water, the plants, the colors, the songs of praise of the birds and sixty-six other reasons.

[Von Linné 1969 (1732). 98.]

The sparsity of aesthetic depictions is connected to the then current disparagement of wild and unproductive nature, which it is true was changing into absolute admiration thanks to the romantics at that time in France lead by Rousseau — and by the unknown predecessors who prepared the way for them. During the period of Classicism unsettled nature was not appreciated at all — to some extent it was during the Renaissance, the Middle Ages, and even in Antiquity. But taken generally the disparagement of wild nature is a characteristic of the Western and especially European, tradition; in Japan and China the admiration of wild nature, especially of a mountain landscape, is ancient.

Urpo Häyrinen and Martti Linkola refer to the change and the slowness of its arrival in the north in the text of *Lapinmaa/Four Seasons in Lapland*:

The concept of Lapland as a beautiful and unique natural region is of very recent origin. Only two hundred years ago this remote land, abundantly praised today for its natural beauty, was considered desolate and frightening and hardly at all interesting. The prevailing ideal was a mellow cultivated landscape transformed by man to profitable use; the beauty of nature was thought to be that finishing touch which the hand of man had added to nature. Up to our days there have been but few marks left by man in Lapland. This uninhabited country has a barren ground, a meager vegetation and an extremely severe climate. People have only lately begun to appreciate these traits.


Of course one cannot even attempt to give any simple reasons for change in systems of taste. However, it does seem as if there is a clear dependence between the aesthetic appreciation of a landscape and its fertility for as long as men's livelihoods have been determined by natural conditions; the admiration of cultivated, or at least cultivable, usable landscapes has lasted through the ages.

It is also not a coincidence that superstition has peopled precisely wildernesses, boulderfields, dismal backwoods, and mountain ranges with, in addition to real predators, evil spirits and imaginary beings such as fire-spitting dragons. Yrjö Hiri tells in his essay "Ödemarkernas lockelse" ("The Allurement of Wildernesses") that the Punkaharju district was avoided even at the beginning of the last century [Hiri 1924: 65]. At the turn of the century I.K. Inha, who had travelled back and forth across Finland and faithfully depicted his journeys, still saw the backwoods with the eye of the pioneer; his report of how the tragedy of the dweller in the backwoods suddenly became clear to him still has the power to shock [Inha 1909: 168] (see p. 117).
The general admiration of marshes, backwoods, and fells - the forms of landscape most typical of Finland — is of a late date, and is only a few decades old. Marshes form a third of the land surface, forests a little less, whilst the areas of low productivity in Lapland, which can only be used for reindeer herding, is immense. But 'uselessness' has protected these areas from destruction. Häyrinen and Linkola are forced to state quite cynically that the preservation of the fell-area of Lapland in a natural state is not based on planning, on a desire to save irreplaceable natural values, but on the paucity of possibilities for exploitation [Häyrinen - Linkola 1975: 41]. The same uselessness has for a long time protected marshes, until they began to be drained in the hope of new forest land or to dig out peat.

Culture has often caused what is undisputably ugly. Matti A. Pitkänen, for example, complains of how difficult it is to find harmonious totalities:

It is already becoming difficult to find pure-water lakes or untouched beautiful groves, forests still in a natural state or horizons with pure unspoiled features.

[Pitkanen 1975: no page numbers, last text page. Translation by Aaron Bell.]

In most cases ugliness is indisputable, even if magnificent rock cuttings through which a road runs, or the sea of roofs of a town can be experienced more positively as symbols of human power and skill, of progress. At the heart of civilization, however, lives a nostalgic longing for the past, which only becomes stronger as the external signs of an increased standard of living become more manifest.

When the one-sided admiration of fertility and luxuriant greenery was abandoned, the simplified clear-featured beauty of barren nature was noticed. Is there such a thing as ugly untouched nature? In Lapinmaa Häyrinen and Linkola recognize the existence of natural ugliness, even if the variation that comes with the cycle of the seasons relieves it of absolute ugliness. The writers speak of the prevailing appearance of Lapland, of "a quietly monotonous landscape, melancholy in its enormity, a wilderness of close to impenetrable spruce forests" [Häyrinen - Linkola 1975: 84]. Speaking of the Norwegian fishing town of Berlevåg they state that it is situated "on the bleak and chilly rocky coast" [ibid.: 90], in connection with the new post-war settlements they refer to "the general bleakness and inhospitality of the surrounding landscape" [ibid.: 96] — but, however:

If the marshland in southern Lapland sometimes appears monotonous, the infinity of the pale green birches in the low country north of the timber line can be even more numbing. In gnat-time in hot July weather this is the true "green Hell" of Lapland. It is a peculiar fact that the vast birch areas of Lapland are less monotonous when the trees are bare, when the mighty distant landscape can be glimpsed through the branches. The birches are at their most beautiful as summer is just beginning and the leaves are starting to form; the visibility is still good and the colors are fresh and clear. This is the best time of year in the Lapland tundra, when the air is fragrant with burgeoning leaves as the cool spring turns into a warm summer, while the gnats are still larvae in the water puddles. At this time the landscape fills with colors shimmering in the sunlight.

[Ibid.: 86-87. Translation by Sirkka Kurikka.]

Here it is clear that for many naturalists the ugliness of nature is relative. A landscape, which at some stage can be regarded as ugly, is beautiful at another moment — and its beauty is based decisively on that change, on the contrast. Nature makes good her losses. "If summer is indeed shorter here than elsewhere in the world, then it is, I grant, that much more delightful", wrote von Linné in his diary on the twenty-third of June [1969 (1732). 98].

Hepburn states that undoubtedly natural objects — in the manner of works of art — can be meaningless and even characterless. But much of the feeling of chaos, monotony and general lack of interest is because of the inexperience of the receiver. In order to maximize the aesthetic experience of nature the receiver must be able to flexibly move his attention from one detail to another, from close view to distant view, from a detail to the overall atmosphere and basic tone,
and must be able to break stereotyped groupings and free himself from standardized manners of seeing [Hepburn 1973: 252-253].

The second basic reason for condemning something as ugly is the unfavorable psycho-physical state of the receiver. Dull indifference changing to deep experience has often been depicted. In his dialogue "Syystauluja" ('Autumn paintings') Eino Kaila sets forth the idea that nature is raw material, from which the conscious and unconscious selves of the observer create a "painting" that reflects moods [Kaila 1943: 46-47]. The change is only amplified by an objective change that takes place in nature itself. There is a dialectic relation between man and nature. Von Linné, who praises the gentle Midsummer of Lapland eloquently, is also prepared, when he is soaked from head to foot by rain, bitten by mosquitoes, and sinking in a bog in boots slopping with cold marsh water, to damn the entire "land of the Lapps" as a worse Hell than any painted by a priest, and as more ugly than the Styx [von Linné 1969 (1732): 67-68]. A good example of the interaction between a state of nature and the state of mind of a person is to be found in Samuli Paulaharju's book Vaelitaja tunturien maassa ('A Wayfarer in the Land of the Fells'):

But when the Great Spirit of the fells runs ahead as a statue of cloud and cuts the heavens into grey strips and starts the water pouring, hiking through the wilderness becomes quite dreary. The high surroundings of Halde are then a dismal place. The whole world is grey and cold, the tent drenched with water, the wet dwarf birches smoke and sizzle as they burn. Shivering with cold and wet the guests of Haltia can crouch by a miserable campfire. The fire only sputters, blowing your mouth and eyes full of smoke, nor will the kettle boil. [-]

But when the Almighty draws the curtains of heaven aside and opens before you His wilderness at least as far as Halde, the world is verily from the great hand of God and is a marvellous work of creation. There are no trees or bushes and one doesn't even miss such small things when everything is so immense and rugged. The long lake of Pitthusjärvi is blue and sparkling at the foot of Halde itself, and lovely it is as it vanishes into the blue recesses of the fells. [Paulaharju 1947: 132.]

In this kind of process the experience of the ugly acts as a contrast, as a creator of variation and rhythm. Thus, the significance and character of the part changes in connection with the whole. The process is the same as with a work of art. The difference is only in the fact that a work of art is a totality with a fixed limit, and as such it must also be examined. Nature can be split into units of examination almost at will — in this one only comes up against the questions related to categorization, and on its basis the questions of appropriate observation.

(2.) Criteria

The concept of criterion and the use of criteria. A criterion means a ground of evaluation that is presented (or to be presented) in a form reminiscent of a law. In it it is stated what property of the object makes it good or bad. The application of criteria presupposes the demonstration of the fact that the object has or does not have criterion properties. Thus, evaluation is inseparably connected with the description and interpretation of the object.

In principle it is possible to choose and decide on any kind of criteria at all. For both an art critic and an environmental critic it is possible to demand flexibility, the appropriate choice of criteria. In her article "The Use of 'Good' in Aesthetic Judgments" Helen Knight has demonstrated by illustration, that a critic may praise different works on different grounds; the grounds must be found from the art-form and character of the object. The fact that criteria for the use of 'good,' 'beautiful' and other such terms cannot be presented as a complete catalog does not make them unusable. Goodness is conformity to criteria:
I have tried to show that the goodness of pictures depends on their possession of criterion-characters. We give reasons for goodness by pointing them out. The judgment 'this is good' or 'this is bad' depends on their presence or absence. And this means that we understand the 'good' of aesthetic judgments by understanding the goodness-criteria relation. Its meaning is determined by criterion-characters, but the proposition 'this is good' is not equivalent to any criterion proposition. And there are rules which determine the truth of the former in relation to the truth of the latter.

[---] Our puzzle started when we became convinced that 'good' does not name an indefinable quality, and we tried to remove the puzzle by defining 'good' in naturalistic terms. We now see that 'good' may be indefinable and yet not stand for an indefinable quality, and that it has significance even though in one sense it stands for nothing. [Knight 1954: 154-155.]

[Knight 1954: 154-155.]

But even though it is possible to choose the criteria in any way at all, there are limits to their sensible selection. First of all, the ecological limitations of nature must be taken into account; secondly, there are types and styles in the environment that must be taken into account in order to do justice to objects. The goal can be regarded as the maximization of the aesthetic value of the objects, its full realization within ecological and cultural limits. It is therefore natural to select the criteria on that basis; any other kind of selection leads to systems that do not do all-round justice to objects.

The presence of human purposes distinguishes altered nature from that in a natural state. But nature approaches altered nature in the sense that its selection, for example as an object of preservation, is a kind of communal decision that in a sense artifactualizes the object. Preserved nature recalls a ready-made work; it is possible to ask on what grounds it has been chosen for preservation. These grounds need not be — nor are they usually — openly aesthetic, but aesthetic consideration must be present.

It is clear that any object can be made to correspond to a criteria system that has been developed to suit it: it is possible to tailor-make such a system so that it does justice to the object. But once again a question has to be confronted: if it is possible to build a system in accordance with the object, why should it be tailor-made in the case of a natural object, but not in the case of other environmental objects (cf. positive and critical aesthetics)?

The dual levels of criteria. Aesthetic criteria can be divided into the formal and the content-based. The difference is not very marked, nor need they be mutually contradictory; they have only their own area of use. In the basic case the formal criteria are those that concern appearance; the content-based are connected with the significance of the content. But it is quite as difficult to differentiate form and content in relation to the environment as it is in art; the differentiation is a conceptual simplification.

(a) Formal criteria. Formal criteria concern the surface level, and therefore they are common to the environment and art. Such are harmony, symmetry, order, relations, rhythm. [See Patterson 1979; and Tunnard 1978.] To this group I would also include the use of symbols, allusions, etc. that connect formal criteria with those pertaining to content.

(b) Content-based criteria. These criteria have to do with conceptual or conceptualized significance, or the position and operation of the object within a larger totality. Such properties are not immediately recognizable but appear through knowledge and comprehension: appropriateness, operability, ecological durability, identity, diversity - in the environment they can be generally grouped as ecological and cultural, even if the same criteria can operate on both sides.

As examples I shall deal with (1) genuineness and the related identity, and (2) appropriateness.

- Genuineness, identity. The reason why untouched nature is experienced as being beautiful is based on the use of the criterion of genuineness. If we know that the object is genuine we reject proposals for improvement. A genuine object in a state of nature is generally very highly esteemed.
Genuineness means unchangedness, lack of falseness, the authenticity of the object. With genuineness the results of a long natural process of development appear.

Genuineness is also a criterion in the evaluation of the environment altered by Man; for example, different stylistic trends are temporally bound in such a way that the neo-ancient is felt to be some kind of an anachronism and forgery, like old houses that have been built anew. Beardsley, however, is of different opinion:

> And I will say that if a perfect imitation of a bronze statue be carved from cheese, so that to sight and touch no difference could appear — let us ignore the smell — then as an aesthetic object the imitation is exactly similar to the original, and the characteristics in which they may appear otherwise to people who know of their physical basis are not their characteristics at all.

[Beardsley 1958: 52.]

Culture is on the one hand a creator of aesthetic values, on the other a destroyer of them. The genuineness of the object suffers, but Man creates culturally-based values for the environment, and changes it so that it becomes suitable for him. If aestheticicality is considered as a purely human need it is possible to think that in this way nature that is altered in accordance with these goals also fulfills the needs of people better. In a way nature is refined, but it also loses its genuineness. The demand for genuineness must then be regarded as cultural; and following and taking account of tradition must be demanded.

Elliot — in the same way as Fröhlich and John Martin — speaks of genetic bonds in connection with nature, of the fact that natural formations really do have the history that they hint at [Elliot 1982: 85-92]. A genuine object has such a bond, in an inauthentic object this bond is broken; and these cases have their parallels in art forgeries. In the same way as a forged work of art hints at a false history, the same happens, for example, when the traces of gravel excavation are landscaped in the environment, etc. The substitute does not correspond to the genuine object; in his article "The Rehabilitation of Nature" Martin says the following:

> There would be no problem reproducing imitations of historical artifacts like the Declaration of Independence or art objects like the paintings of Vermeer. The technology exists. Likewise one could, with astro-turf and landscape horticulture, reproduce copies of wild nature. But we do not want the copies, we want the originals. Here, built into the concept of irreplaceability, appears to be a genetic condition. Part of the value of historical objects, works of art, and natural objects is their mode of generation. Part of what is valuable about a natural object is that it is natural.

[Martin 1976: 256-257.]

But genuineness and a certain kind of irreplaceability are not as such a sufficient value for the preservation of the object:

> [−−] it does not follow that all irreplaceable objects should be preserved. Value judgments independent of the concept of irreplaceability are needed to distinguish the good from the bad.

[Ibid.: 257.]

In the cultural environment the related criteria to genuineness are appropriateness (from the point of view of Man), usability, and so on. Uniformity could be one criterion for the built environment. This need not mean monotony or even similarity of style, but rather means that the environment is articulated as some kind of totality, that it does not remain a chaos. Uniformity and harmony are demands often set for building, especially additional building [cf. Nikula 1981: 278-283]. But contrasts, too, can be significant, and on these it is possible to build tensions that hold the environment together.

A criterion of a good environment in untouched nature might be — besides appropriateness — viability, durability, stability. An ecologically balanced environment also has these qualities.

The demand of identity is related to genuineness. How does the identity of the environment — of
a landscape etc. — arise? The principal aim of works that depict nature is to bring out the specific qualities of the area depicted, to create an identity for it. A bleak wildness, which arises from the plenitudefulness of lakes, marshes, and pine woods, is specific to Finnish nature. The principal features are the clear lines that almost approach monotony, balanced by a richness in detail, e.g. the fine features of a lake landscape or the coastal archipelago. The variation in the climate and the clear cycles of the seasons create rhythm and liveliness even in a monotonous landscape. The surface forms are the more durable hillocks of the ancient bedrock that have been smoothed by the ice age, the lake basins gouged out by the continental ice and sand eskers, the accumulations that were left when the ice melted; the flora and fauna came back to the north after the Ice Age. Only the first and last pages of the book of natural history remain, says Reino Kalliola in his Suomen kaunis luonto ('Finland’s Beautiful Nature') (Kalliola 1946: 454), and he ends his prose presentation with the lines "Thus Finland is an ancient, youthful land. / Finnish nature:/ a trembling flower on a grey granite rock."

Finnish nature repeats itself in a unique manner. The coast and the lake area of Finland are the reversed images of one another. Raimo O. Kojo writes about the "Archipelago-Finland":

The land and the water complement each other in Finland in ways which are not to be found anywhere else in the world. In the lake-country of Finland the land is the background on which the water traces a knotted, blue network — while the opposite picture is presented by the sea-shore where the blue sea is broken by a mass of islands, a beautiful labyrinth.

[ Kojo 1975: no page numbers. Translation by Aaron Bell.]

A clear identity is one measure of aesthetic worth. Paul Ziff is of the opinion that there are variations in music, not in nature; in nature there are only individuals, no matter how far the similarity of natural forms goes:

The striking fact about the identity of pieces of music is I think this: a piece of music can have a variant but there is no such thing as a variant of a person or a stone or a pea in a pod. (At least not yet.) If you have a person and you have another person who’s sort of like him he’s a different person no matter how much like him. He’s a different person. You have two persons. And the same goes for stones and for peas in a pod. No matter how much alike they are if they are two then there are two of them distinct and individual.

[Ziff 1984: 56-67.]

It is true that in nature everything is, to be quite precise, unique, but the differences are often small: the individuals of each species of plant normally repeat the features of their species; animals conform to their species; the variation of the years and seasons follow an exact global and cosmic timetable. But permanence can be apparent in change too: the rise of a continent links separate islands and finally makes a continent of the seabed, and correspondingly a new archipelago has similar features. It rises from the sea, and with time "moves" outwards towards the open sea. "Each island is changing all the time, but the archipelago's general character remains the same," Teuvo Suominen describes the phenomenon. [Suominen 1973: no page numbers.] Original nature is — in the development of culture — a fixed point desired and valued by Man. Veikko Huovinen says of Kainuu:

But much of the past remains — things you can rely on and enjoy. People in remote areas are still hospitable and friendly. The waters of Lake Kiantajarvi and Vuokatti still murmur, the hills of Puolanka and Paltamo are still a genuine blue, and the Vuokatti ridge just keeps right on rising out of those dark woods.

[Huovinen 1976: 7.]

- Appropriateness. One can speak of appropriateness literally only in connection with the products of culture. Gheorghe Achitei characterizes the most important property of utensils as being
functionality; he states that a utensil, no matter how beautiful it is, loses the greatest part of its interest if it does not work. The practical and the aesthetic aspects are connected; other characteristic properties — cheapness and transience — follow from the method of manufacture. [Achitei 1976: 4.]

Jutta Fischer comments on Henry van de Velde’s theories of women’s dress and refers to his expression “Prinzip der vernunftgemässigen Schönheit” (‘the principle of sensible beauty’). A dress is beautiful if it is designed to fulfil its task; secondly the designer must bring out the specific beauty of each material. For the beauty of the totality it is not sufficient that the dress harmonizes with the appearance and entire personality of its wearer; rather it must also be in harmony with the rooms in which the user moves and with the objects that surround her — this means being aware of the whole. [Fischer 1976: 23.]

However, the aesthetic nature of utensils cannot be explained purely on the basis of functionality. Frigyes Pogány and Gheorghe Achitei state that functionality is decisive from the point of view of aesthetic value, but when technical development progresses and new kinds of products are invented design must also follow suit, and the external appearance of the objects must harmonize with the properties of the product. Besides this the influential factor is purely fashion, which is dependent on sociologically and socio-psychologically measurable factors. [See Jochimsen’s comments 1976: 156.] Fashion can — even though it is in its basic character irrational — be regulated consciously, and it has indeed become a medium of aesthetic manipulation. So-called commodity aesthetics has arisen to describe the commercial methods of influence [see Haug 1984].

Aesthetic and practical values are closely connected especially in architecture: a building is almost never made to be merely examined; it is also made for use.

(3.) Norms

**Normative and descriptive aesthetics.** One basic division in aesthetics is the differentiation between the normative (prescriptive) or direction giving and the descriptive. Normative aesthetics states what is good and valuable; the aesthetician is then a judge of taste. The descriptive aesthetician is more modest: he is satisfied with describing various kinds of taste and value systems.

The line of normative aesthetics is at present continued most clearly through Marxist philosophy, but otherwise aesthetics has transferred to the descriptive line. This change is illustrated by Roger Scruton’s statement in an article dealing with the aesthetics of architecture: the task of the philosopher is not to answer the question why Lincoln Cathedral is considered to be better than York Minster, but what it means in principle to consider one cathedral better than another — what kind of superiority it is that is meant here [Scruton 1973: 327]. Teddy Brunius tells as an example of the general misunderstanding of the position of the aesthetician, that he — a professional aesthetician — is now and then asked to be a judge of taste when someone wants to know if a house or painting is beautiful, an artist a genius, or municipal interior furnishings appropriate. Questions that belong to an expert are then presented to an aesthetician to answer, which he, as an aesthetician, is no more competent than an ordinary layman to solve. [Brunius 1968: 8–9.]

Ruth Saw and Harold Osborne compare the aesthetician to a moral philosopher, who is no more a guardian of morals than an aesthetician is a judge of taste:

The final question raises an important problem for any normative science. Do moral philosophers know, qua moral philosophers, what particular actions or kinds of action are right and wrong, or is their concern merely to elucidate the concepts occurring in any given belief about what is right or wrong? Both points of view have been held, and we may describe the latter view of the function of moral philosophers by saying that they do not make first order moral judgments, that is directly upon
conduct, but second order judgments, that is, judgments about judgments about conduct. Similarly, we may say that it is the function of aesthetic philosophers to make second order judgments and that this is the demand which disqualifies Plato and Aristotle as aesthetic philosophers. They accept unquestioningly, the belief natural to their circumstances of time and place, that value is to be defined in terms of the best life for men, that is, life within a small community such as their own city state. To hold a given belief uncritically about morals or art is to disqualify one as a philosopher of morals or aesthetics though of course, a philosopher may hold beliefs as a private man.

There is one further difficulty here. It is natural to say that a moral theory which had as a consequence that it is right to break promises and to tell lies is absurd, and that a theory of aesthetics from which it followed that a peasant song at a village wedding had greater aesthetic value than an opera by Mozart or Wagner is equally absurd. There must be some kind of, at any rate provisional, acceptance of moral codes and great works which have passed the test of critical judgment over a long period, though this acceptance must also be examined.

[Saw & Osborne 1960: 17-18]

Thus Saw and Osborne support the line of descriptive aesthetics, but they are prepared to make a concession in the name of common sense: values are not after all completely dependent on agreement in practical life. In this way the principal lines — the normative and the descriptive — approach one another.

Normative aesthetics is generally connected with the idea of the general validity of values. Even aesthetic values are regarded as forming a system independent of people; something beautiful is beautiful as such, independent of liking, especially of the conception of an untrained person. In this sense the attempts at systematization of normative aestheticians should not necessarily be understood as giving rise to a desire to dominate or meddle; rather the presenter may well believe that he is on the trail of a system that is waiting to be discovered. When the system has been revealed as the truth it becomes a system of norms. — Descriptive aesthetics, on the other hand, is more connected with the idea of the relativity or dependence on agreement of ideas: what is good or beautiful is that which fulfils the demands presented at a particular time; and aesthetics investigates these systems, it does not make them. Value means that the object is in accordance with criteria, but the criteria are dependent on agreement. It is certainly possible to ask whether some criterion is sensible, but not whether it is right or wrong. This is, of course, something other than the vulgar way of thinking that it is possible to have any opinion whatsoever about anything at all on any grounds you care to mention.

It is clear that in a community very different kinds of aesthetic value systems are simultaneously in use. The existence of such systems belongs to the nature of culture and its degree of development is proved in part by the internal logicality and applicability of this kind of system. But the recognition of the multifariousness of systems need not lead to all of them being regarded as of the same value. The task of aesthetics is — whether the basic choice is made in favor of the normative or descriptive tendencies — in all cases to clarify the discussion concerning values by drawing attention to the use of aesthetic concepts, to the grounds of claims, and the logicality of conclusions. Aesthetics thus always has the position of metacriticism.

Ecological aesthetics — a new form of normative aesthetics. In dealing with the arts the change from normative to descriptive has been welcome: when aesthetics has become careful in issuing rules or has totally refused to do so, it has also officially freed art to try new forms of expression. Modern aesthetics recognizes the creativity of art; it does not give rules for creative activity, because unpredictability is regarded as belonging to its nature. The aesthetician does not give advice on how to build an inspiring cathedral or paint an impressive painting; on the other hand, he certainly investigates what kind of relationship a work has to prevailing and previous systems of values.

However, the maker of art should be reciprocally careful in explaining the aims of his work or even of the entire art institution, for then he exceeds the limits of his own competence; a manifesto is
not aesthetics in a scholarly sense. The freedom to make does not, of course, mean that works born without the control of aestheticians would be better than those made in subordination to clear rules. The pedantic following of rules, however, usually produces conventional clichéd art.

In relation to the environment the arrangement is different: the general trend of development is towards normativeness. Normativeness has traditionally a strong base in the environmental arts, garden design and architecture. Garden design appears to be the most standardized of all the art-forms; in urban and building design relatively clearly defined stylistic tendencies predominate, the demands of which are in the final resort linked to practical purposes. The rural building culture has been regulated by vernacular tradition, which has acquired its own local character in different parts of the country. But in these cases the norms are the traditions of trades, not those given by aestheticians. The greatest part of built-up areas and areas of dispersed settlement is, however, the result of some kind of a pioneer mentality, the product of only nominal control. The common environment should not be left to be the testing ground for individual creative activity, nor does this demand apply only to construction but all treatment and use of the environment. In the victory of industrialism it has become clear that there is a limit to the exploitation of the Earth: nature is not eternally available for conquest. It is illustrative that while the liberation of Man is otherwise emphasized it has become necessary to increasingly limit the treatment of nature by legal means. Freedom is limited to the individual area: to gardens and interiors.

The difference between the imaginary nature of works of art and the reality of the environment is decisive — environmental works of art form an exception. It is easier to permit freedom in the formation of fantasies than of reality. Images are fundamentally private; the environment is social, common reality.

The demands for the aesthetic quality of the environment are related to other demands: for healthiness, for economy, for communications. Ecological or natural environmental aesthetics represents modern normative aesthetics. The basis of the norms are the necessities of nature, not fashions or agreements. The existence of a system with this kind of base does not, of course, exclude systems dependent on agreement. In the best cases they act to complement the natural system, for nature itself permits alternatives. But they can act against it as well, in which case the matter is one of an aesthetically distorted system; in environmental aesthetics that means disregarding those values on which even our physical existence depends.

The ecological principle. In nature a system is healthy when the process of a natural cycle is continuous and self-sufficient. Birth, growth, and destruction form a cycle. Disturbances can certainly appear — for example, some species can increase beyond the possibility of their survival — but nature has means to correct its mistakes; in this sense the balance of nature is dynamic, not static. An aesthetic principle is realized in the economy of the system and the harmony of the parts. Everything is necessary, nothing is superfluous.

Even though untouched nature contains a large number of many-faceted elements, its activity is nonetheless stamped by appropriateness. What kind of nature is most appreciated at different times is then an effect of culture: wild and romantic, or a verdant Arcadian pastoral idyll. — The demand for "naturalness" extends to individual plants and animals, too. We expect conformity within species — every deviation is a deformation and therefore reduces aesthetic value. The principle can be extended from the visible properties of animals to the characteristic properties of the species. The rabbit should not be blamed for cowardice or the lion praised for bravery, as Mark Twain's satire "In the Animals' Court" tells us [Twain 1962: 170-171]. In his work Aesthetik des Hässlichen (1853), Karl Rosenkranz emphasizes the fixity and unity of the organism of an animal compared to that of a plant: we can pluck a flower from a rose bush without damaging the plant and without the form suffering, but cutting the wing of a bird or the tail of a cat makes the animal
formless [Rosenkranz 1853: 23]. In plants and in animals the principle of standard form is realized. Deviation from the type of the species on account of, for example, congenital deformity, accident, or sickness, is an aesthetic weakness. A species permits individuality and variation, but only within certain limits.

The totality formed by groups of species in their living environment is more significant than single species and individual members of species. The limits of variations are extremely flexible. It is certainly possible to speak of landscape types, and each type may rise to the position of an ideal landscape, but the landscape types are more often only the implements of thought, not so much models that individual landscapes should "imitate" and from which deviation would be an offense. Rosenkranz reduces the types of landscape to three - the monotonous, the contrastive, and the harmonic — that each appear in innumerable forms in the changes of the day and seasons:

A landscape is either monotonous if it is dominated singly by some natural form: a mountain, a river, a forest, a desert, etc.; or it is contrastive if two forms are in conflict; or harmonic if the conflict resolves into a great unity. Each one of these can, during the change of the day or seasons, go through an endless number of different phases. The kind of effect a landscape is capable of producing is principally the result of lighting. A desert may be sublime, terrifyingly sublime as when the tropical sun bakes it from high above as in the Sahara; melancholically sublime when the moon of the temperate zone creates a silver glow over it as in the high Gobi. But each basic landscape form can be varied to become both beautiful and ugly. Monotony, which has an ugly reputation, is worthy of its reputation only in the indefiniteness of absolute formlessness, as in a lead colored sea lying entirely becalmed under a grey sky.

[Rosenkranz 1853: 26. Translated from the German original.]

In principle every change in a component of the landscape changes the expression of the entirety. The landscape is thus a continuous process in which some parts regularly recur (light — darkness; summer — winter) or reproduce themselves according to species (animals, plants). Some aspects of the environment, however, are used up and finally vanish, until a new natural upheaval creates them anew (mountains, watercourses). Man himself, the observer and experiencer, is present in these processes. The same notion is enunciated in the time-honored phrase attributed to Heraclitus: "No man steps into the same river twice."

The philosophy of harmony of Man and nature. How is the principle of appropriateness applied to culture? Can the intentions of Man and nature be reconciled? Hwa Yol Jung has compared the directions given by Western and Eastern religions and ideologies for the arrangement of relations between Man and nature [Jung 1972; and 1974]. He claims that harmony between Man and nature in its purest and most absolute form is presented by Zen Buddhism; according to him it does not contain the idea of Man as the master of nature as in the Christian religion, nor the idea of nature as a source of technological welfare as in Marxism [Jung 1974: 8 - 13]. In the disinterestedness of this kind of relation with nature there is its aesthetic aspect; this kind of relation is the opposite of self-interest, it signifies the respecting of nature as a value in itself and caring for it as it is. Jung calls this kind of harmonic interaction of an organism with its environment aesthetical ecology. [Ibid.: 21. The term is also used by Mc Dermott 1969.]

J. Donald Hughes presents the idea that from the stand-point of the Western philosophy of nature a fateful choice occurred in Ancient Greece. Aristotle taught that all beings had a purpose which they were created to fulfill and that when a being fulfills its purpose it is useful and beautiful. No animals are ugly, because they are each made to fulfill their own purpose. But the final purpose of all of them is — to serve Man. This has been used to justify the exploitation of nature, the lordship of Man. Theofrastus — to whom Hughes gives the honorary title The Father of Ecology — held the view, based on observations, that nature was a system of living beings. Man was a part of

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this system and his sole purpose was to ensure his own continuity. This view in time was forced to
give way to the doctrine of Aristotle. [Hughes 1975b: 122-123.]

Aristotle’s idea of nature as the servant of Man and the Christian doctrine of Man as the lord and
master of nature gained a modernized form in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when
Francis Bacon charted a road running to an "Earthly Paradise" through technology and natural
science [Jung 1972: 27-28]. In the dualism of René Descartes Man had the role of an intermediary: Man
was an angel of lower degree, who on his journey to an intellectual, living, and incorruptible heaven
could exploit material, inanimate, and corruptible nature as much as he pleased [O’Brien 1974: 84].
But Spinoza and Leibniz, critics of Descartes, attempted to overturn the dualism: Spinoza
explained that nature and God were the same thing seen from two different points of view, and
Leibniz was of the opinion that the universe was formed of a continuous series in which there are
only differences of degree between the parts, not contraries of the animate — inanimate or Man —
animal type. Walter O’Brien sees their views as forming a philosophical basis for the monism that
present ecologists and nature conservationists have arrived at on the basis of the natural sciences.
[Ibid.: 88.]

The idea of harmony that was subordinated in Western philosophy was, however, continued by
writer-philosophers: Goethe, who spiritualized nature, the Romantics under the leadership of
William Wordsworth, Ralph W. Emerson, Henry D. Thoreau, and the philosopher of religion,
Martin Buber [Jung 1972: 27]. The opposition of East and West is then not absolute; but, nonetheless,
what has been an exception in the West has been the rule in the East. When in the West the relation
between Man and nature has been exacerbated, in the East it has been levelled into harmony. Jung
writes:

The Zen idea of harmony between man and nature is the coming together of the two as distinctive
elements in their own right in the cosmic processes. The Zen idea of "man in nature" implies the
principle of plentitude in nature, that is, each in its own way contributing to the making of the whole
called "nature." Harmony, therefore, is not the affirmation of the One but a unity-in-differentiation
of the many, a unity of the Multiple. In this way, Zen rejects both anthropocentrism and anthropo-
morphism in man-nature relationships. From an ecological perspective, moreover, the one-sided
emphasis of man’s individuality to the point of narcissism in Western social and political thought will
not produce a happy result. The possessive individualism of man-man relationships affects man-
nature relationships (and vice versa).

[Jung 1974: 24-25.]

Jung demands a general change in attitude starting from the basis of Eastern philosophy, an
ecological ecumenism; humanity forms a "family," which lives in a "global village," in a cosmos in
which everything is related to everything else, and in which the basic relations must be arranged on
the basis of harmony between Man and nature [Ibid.: 26-28].

Harmony in the cultural environment and in the built environment. Many principles which are in
sympathy with the harmony idea have been presented for the aesthetic appreciation of the
environment. One such is the demand for the diversity of the range of plant and animal species.
Monocultures — ecosystems of one or very few plants — have been shown to be ecologically
unbalanced in agriculture, as susceptible to disease and pests, so that once again one is forced to
resort to chemicals to protect plants. Present industrialized agriculture has become caught in this
circle. Single-species areas of agriculture are also relatively generally regarded as aesthetically poor,
as monotonous, whereas the old agrarian landscape has been seen as an ideal example of a
balanced relation between Man and nature. In part this restfulness has a very simple explanation,
which Martti Linkola has expressed: agricultural methods were as recently as a few decades ago,
before machine power, still undeveloped. Man was not able to break the total expression of the
landscape; there was no attempt to bring under cultivation marsh or stony ground that was difficult to clear. Thus, the varied expression of the agricultural landscape and its adaptation to natural forms remained. [Linkola 1981.] Now that means have been developed, there should be a conscious avoidance of what it was impossible to do earlier.

In the development of towns Lewis Mumford sees — in keeping with the ideas of Oswald Spengler, Arnold J. Toynbee, and Patrick Geddes — a logical line of development from village communities to gigantic megalopolises, and from these to necropolises, to cities of death: "Cycle of Growth and Decay" [Mumford 1938: 283-292]. To Mumford, an admirer of medieval urban culture, the town is to a certain extent an economic and nature-saving form of dwelling, but in large cities transport and other maintenance costs rise out of all proportion, and the town becomes uneconomical. Once growth has got out of hand it is extremely difficult to bring it back under control. Cities like New York and Chicago are in their outskirts formless amoebas that expand without plan over their boundaries. [Ibid.: Chapter IV.]

But the lack of design need not lead to formlessness, as John B. Jackson states in analyzing the structures of spontaneously grown primitive towns and residential areas [see Jackson 1984]. In these too the "human measure" has been best preserved: proportions are understandable and imaginable as whole. On the other hand the buildings of many tens of storeys, the multi-level traffic lanes, and distances between operating units in large cities are solutions that exceed the human measure: the town cannot then be envisaged. This was known already by Aristotle, for whom size was of aesthetic significance:

But, besides this, a picture, or any other composite object, if it is to be beautiful, must not only have its parts properly arranged, but be of an appropriate size; for beauty depends on size and structure. Accordingly, a minute picture cannot be beautiful (for when our vision has almost lost its sense of time it becomes confused); nor can an immense one (for we cannot take it all in together, and so our vision loses its unity and wholeness) — imagine a picture a thousand miles long! So, just as there is a proper size for bodies and pictures (a size that can be kept in view), there is also a proper amplitude for fables (what can be kept well in one's mind).

[Aristotle 1968: 27.]

Even from these kinds of objects a picture can certainly be gained through descriptions — maps, models, etc. — or, for example, from an aeroplane or simply when viewed from far enough away. Any scale can be altered to become envisageable by Man (even outer space).

Though anthropocentrism must be rejected in the appreciation of original nature, it is in a certain sense essential when speaking of the products of culture. The breaking of conventions, the radical exceeding of human measures, belong to natural formations and phenomena that are classified as sublime, magnificent, or rugged. A stormy sea, thundery weather, a mountain range, and waterfalls give the impression of being untamable. We grant the same right to, and even demand it of, certain human creations. A religious person regards it as correct that a church building makes a person feel small; we expect solidity and firmness from administrative buildings and national monuments, monuments recall the significance of their object by exceptional scale. But, for example, an ordinary block of flats that rise above the forest line; a water tower that dominates the outskirts of a village with its silhouette; or tower-like grain silos that rise above a plain seem to lack style in their everyday overbearingness. There is then a conflict between nature and culture, which is lacking in fruitful contrast.

The ethical basis of the demand of harmony. Basically, culture has enriched the landscape: it has changed the composition of forests so that they are now dominated by mixed forests, created the agricultural landscape and centres of settlement, and decisively improved the living conditions of some species of animals and plants. On the other hand, the price of this richness has been the
reduction of untouched land and the extinction of many species. More than any other species Man has changed and been able to regulate the environment. Man has risen from subordination to nature to becon.e its master. Work has made Man equal to nature; it is only this more independent relationship that has made an aesthetic feeling for nature possible - thus, especially, the Marxist aestheticians explain. [Cf. Romanenko 1969; and Silayev 1969; and Astakhov 1969: 177 - 178.]

In this situation — with methods for the manipulation of nature still being developed — an important question must be settled: to what degree of change does Man have a moral right? The question can also be presented in another way: is it right for a victor to tyrannize over his beaten opponent? In the application of Jung's doctrine of harmony Man and nature belong to the common economy of the same land [Jung 1974: 25]. As a consequence of that, it can be seen that human culture has no privilege to change conditions in accordance with the special requirements of the human species. Culture must not totally destroy any species of plant or animal or type of landscape, nor may it even decisively reduce the number of the individuals of species [cf. Fenberg 1974]. The medieval schoolmen's principle of plenty is suitable and ecologically justified to be a directive for environmental ethics and aesthetics. But ecological research has demonstrated that the hierarchy of nature is not a static system. Everyone knows from practical experience that culture not only destroys but creates what nature itself cannot. But the richness of the totality only increases if the earlier layers of nature and culture are not forced aside.

A state of nature is the foundation of everything. Representative and extensive samples of different kinds of landscape types must be preserved as nature parks; and outside of the preservation areas proper the fullfulness of species of plants and animals must be ensured. The same demand for preservation applies to the products of stages of cultures that have been left behind. It is easy to collect old material culture in museums, but how to preserve, for example, slash-and-burn forests and meadows? In their case the question is one of a delaying battle. Even vanished forms of landscape can of course, if wished, be born anew by using the cultural forms that gave rise to the landscape: cut leaf fodder; use slash-and-burn methods; mow rushes — all of these activities form a landscape. It would be possible to create living outdoor museums through these kinds of activities, as has been done e.g. in Gotland in Sweden.

The last genuine marks of many cultural activities are vanishing; the continuing of the activity for aesthetic reasons would, however, be the creation of stage props — the sight would be the same, but the content would be lacking. This kind of activity in free nature, outside of museum areas, would be quite as misleading as making an old-style facade for a new modern building. In its deeper form the aesthetic experience is a whole, which knowledge also influences.

The principal emphasis in a developing culture must, of course, be on the creation of the new. Antero Sinisalo has demonstrated that the design of environmental entireties, landscape design in its present form, began only with industrialism. Up until then it had been limited to gardens and parks and town centres [Sinisalo 1981]. It is clear that the greater the possibilities of people influencing their environment become, the more important decision-making affecting environmental design and the realization of designs will be felt to be. The "own hut, own right" system that suited agrarian society is not appropriate when technical possibilities increase and capital becomes concentrated. The increase in public control threatens, however, to standardize everyday architecture: the folk tradition has in practical terms already been extinguished. Fewer and fewer designers determine the principal lines of the forming of the environment. This development unavoidably means impoverishment of the cultural environment, the leveling of provincial and even national differences. Bruce Allsopp states at the beginning of his book on humane architecture that modern architecture is above all accused of monotony: architecture is the same "from Melbourne to Minnesota and Hamburg to Johannesburg, from London to Istanbul and Tokyo to Toronto" [Allsopp 1974: 6].

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The demand of naturalness and value systems based on agreements. Does ecological environmental aesthetics, which is in accordance with nature, have a dominant position compared to conventional aesthetics, which is dependent on agreement? First of all, it must be emphasized that the system I present does not mean a straight road to ultimate beauty — there are different degrees of accordance with nature too. Naturalness is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for beauty.

In nature seen through human eyes a cruel appropriateness prevails. Only those species and individuals which are able to adapt to their conditions are able to survive in the diverse elimination of natural selection. Individual plants and animals are continually destroyed as parts of the food chain.

The same goal — survival — can be achieved by aesthetically contrary methods: one species camouflages itself to be as unnoticeable as possible, another frightens with brilliant colors or a threatening form. The means to achieve harmony are many — but can all be accommodated in the sphere of harmony? Aristotle thought that everything had a purpose and was therefore beautiful. Rosenkranz thought otherwise: he did not consider there was any necessary connection between appropriateness and beauty. Therefore, he could list a great number of animal species that are positively ugly (certain spiders, squids, worms, rays, toads, rodents); in addition there are others that are comical by nature (stork, penguin, ape, mouse). [Rosenkranz 1853: 22.] Thus, not all species are beautiful, and deviation from the characteristics of the species meant for him — and apparently even for modern general opinion — aesthetic impoverishment. Such an individual may only arouse interest as a freak of nature.

In nature, processes may take place in time and space that are held to be ugly: a lake may die from oxygen depletion; pests may destroy vegetation; animals eat each other. Theofrasstus, who believed in functionality, was struck dumb in front of drought and floods — what was their purpose (from Hughes 1975: 123)? But of course even those processes can be placed within the framework of longer chains of events, in which case the significance changes. Self regulation and repair are only examples of the appropriateness of nature. The construction of the aesthetically best possible world recalls Leibniz’ theory of the best possible world — or rather Voltaire’s parody of it, Candide.

"A priori we have no ground for denying that natural objects and scenes may sometimes be irremediably inexpressive, unredeemably characterless and aesthetically null," states R.W. Hepburn [1973: 252]. But he also speaks of the maximization of the aesthetic yield of nature: one must be able to flexibly move attention from one detail to another, switch from close-up to distant view, from details to general atmosphere, and must be able to break stereotyped groupings and clichéd ways of seeing. Skilful naturalists operate in precisely this way; they have a great number of possibly even undefined criteria of beauty from which they select that which does most justice. A precondition of that kind of method is a practised ability to observe nature. Under unfavorable conditions that ability may fail. When in 1732 Carl von Linné had waded mosquito-bitten through the flooded marshes of Lapland he made the following entry in his diary, which expresses complete weariness:

The whole of this land of the Lapps was bog, its right name should be Styx. No priest could ever picture a Hell that would be worse than this. Poets could never have been able to depict a Styx so ugly that it would be uglier than this.

[Von Linné 1969 (1732): 68].

But even von Linné experienced the same rugged nature considerably more positively — in a different frame of mind and under different lighting. The fact is, however, that it is only in the depictions of the last fifty years that examples of the admiration of barren fell, outer archipelago, and marsh landscapes, can be found. The area of untouched nature that is regarded as ugly or
aesthetically uninteresting has significantly diminished. Certainly, during the Middle Ages at the height of the Christian tradition it was possible to speak of nature as a work of art of the Creator, but beauty was then thought of metaphysically. It is a product of the natural sciences to see nature as economical and purposeful; purposefulness has become the leading aesthetic principle in the thought of modern man, which is dominated by the natural sciences. Even purposefulness does not appear to finally resolve the problem of the naturally ugly.

On the other hand, culture's ability to produce ugliness is unanimously undisputed. From depicter of the environment there are endless examples of disharmony, lack of proportion, stylistic errors. Ugliness produced by culture indisputably exists. The most typical situation for it to arise is in the early stages of a change in the environment: nature has been destroyed but a real cultural landscape has not yet been formed. Paul B. Sears confirms from his own experience the opinion of Sir Francis Younghusband, the British explorer and best-known representative of aesthetic geography: only a landscape that is untouched by Man, or one in which equilibrium has been achieved, is acceptable [Sears 1958: 107-108].

We can see whether support for beauty in accordance with nature finds support from general opinion. One possibility to find this out is to examine how, and in what connections, so-called aesthetic terms are used ('beautiful,' 'handsome,' 'elegant,' 'rugged,' etc.). The most important thing to determine are the grounds for use. We will note that there are widespread national clichés, objects that are unanimously approved of as beautiful; such may be a labyrinthine lake view seen from high above, a rolling agricultural landscape, or an idyllic area of a wooden town. All of these are examples of the genuine state of nature mentioned by Younghusband, or of views in which Man and nature have achieved a harmonic state of balance. Reino Kalliola depicts this finely-tuned, vanishing stage of equilibrium as follows, referring also to his illustrious predecessor, I.K. Inha:

> It does not appear to be merely romanticization or admiration of the good old days when we say that the period of natural economy and peasant culture represented a kind of natural charm in our land. "The wilderness had not yet lost its ruggedness nor terror, but in its bosom Man had cleared for himself a peaceful dwelling place, restful meadows and home pastures, on which his merry-making rang out [—]."

Even at the end of the last century the image of the landscape shines in our mind with a poetic glow, recalling *Kalevala*, and as such it has been immortalized in Runeberg's and Topelius' verse as well as in the paintings of the old Finnish masters. It is as if a premonition that nature's reign would soon be over had made that time's sense of nature more delicate and made the admiration of nature one of the characteristics of the age.

[Kalliola 1958: 543.]

We find hardly one example of a case that would be against the laws of ecology, but which would be regarded as beautiful. Our conception changes when we discover that it is against these laws. It has been said that sunsets have become more beautiful — because there are more pollution particles in the atmosphere that refract light. But is the effect on a person who knows this the same as *before* he knew it? The claim that that which is against ecological laws cannot be beautiful appears to be analytically true. From this it does not, however, follow that anything that is in accordance with these laws is without question regarded as beautiful; but a conclusion in accordance with the previous claim should be that that which is in accordance with ecological laws should by definition be beautiful no matter how it is regarded.

The ecological basis creates the preconditions for beauty. It is my thesis that being in accordance with nature is also normally regarded as aesthetically significant — terms that refer to this, 'genuine,' 'unaffected,' 'fresh,' already contain a strong aesthetic coloring. The respect of that which accords with nature also appears in such small matters as our rejection of alien plant species which remain to our mind detached from the home environment; their luxuriance is considered
exaggerated, ostentatious. At most we approve of them in a clearly defined garden.

Ecology provides the norm to which concepts of beauty must conform.

4. Summary of the metacriticism section

Metacriticism deals with the practise of criticism: its points of departure, methods, language, grounds of evaluation. In this sense environmental aesthetics is criticism of the second degree, the criticism of environmental criticism.

We might suspect whether aesthetics can do more than reveal implicit assumptions and possibly demonstrate mistakes in conclusions; that is, can aesthetics have a point of view as to what kind of criticism is best and thus create models for criticism?

Positive and critical aesthetics are aesthetics in a programmatic sense; they thus mean general operational models, ideology, program, adopted by art or environmental critics or makers (a designer, such as an architect; and similar). Metacriticism sets them up as the object of investigation. Aesthetics in a scientific sense can recognize the basic model used and reveal what the value system of the critic is like. The means of metacriticism end here. The question of some models being better than others presupposes the connection of ontological knowledge with this information: it must be understood what a work of art and environment are like as aesthetic objects. On the basis of this understanding, possibilities also arise for the critical analysis of the description, interpretation, and evaluation systems used.

When ontological information is used one comes to normative aesthetics. It is possible to evaluate how good a system of taste is, and through that to arrive at ecological aesthetics. Aesthetics then changes from descriptive to normative. Either half may be the object of metacriticism; the mode of operation and the character of both may be examined.

After this it can be asked what is it possible to do so that the recommended systems would become established practise, and what it is possible to do with the aesthetic knowledge that these systems produce. I shall deal with these points in the final section and move on to questions concerning the application and use of the information.
III. PERSPECTIVES

Applied environmental aesthetics

I have limited the aesthetic to human activity. Rudimentary aesthetic activity in a literal sense can be observed in animals. Only someone can sensibly demand rights who has practical use for them. Thus, it is only possible to speak of aesthetic rights — and the related duties — in the case of people, and marginally in the case of animals. It is possible to speak metaphorically of the rights of plants, natural monuments, etc. Is Man the guardian and representative of the rights, or does he further his own interest in demanding the preservation of natural monuments and suchlike? Who watches over aesthetic rights in decision-making between people?

Should the aesthetician have a place on public building committees, as a nature protection official, etc.? What kind of joint activity would be possible between theoreticians and those acting in practical tasks? The theoretical and philosophical character of aesthetics must be taken in consideration. Specialist matters no more belong to the field of aesthetics in art than they do in the environment. Concerning description, interpretation, and evaluation it is mainly the latter that belongs to the sphere of aesthetics; and here it is principally the investigation of depictions in a metacritical sense.

The importance of the aesthetician lies in the fact that by analyzing value systems, by making implicit criteria and norm systems explicit, he makes the appreciation of the environment a conscious activity. The investigation of systems is a first step in deciding on their validity. The second significance lies in making descriptions more precise, in the investigation of the logic of aesthetic language.

However, the ecological frame of reference appears to limit the sensible value systems that are being established. The demonstration of such connections brings with it the aspect of knowledge; the knowledge aspect is aesthetically significant - when it is in use. In some cases it extends the sphere of aesthetic approval, in others it narrows it. Without it the aesthetic examination of the environment would be in danger of becoming aestheticist. The cognitive context provides an ethical framework for statements about aesthetic value.

In the following I shall deal with ways in which the theoretical knowledge produced by aesthetics can be transmitted, and influence practise. In order to work in practise, this knowledge must be combined with specific knowledge of the environmental and cultural sciences as well as with the general background derived from environmental philosophy. The more precise development of these viewpoints demands co-operation between different fields of science — pedagogy, the social and cultural sciences, psychology, research in the arts — and their practical applications the participation of those working as architects, psychologists, educators, and teachers.

A. Environmental education

1. Environmental education in general and aesthetic environmental education in particular

Environmental education is from one point of view a sub-area of aesthetic education. The goal of aesthetic education is to teach the means to investigate aesthetic objects and their nature and to develop reception. In a way, the environment also presupposes the competence of a maker: the ability to select and articulate objects; the ability to find something that is valuable in objects that have been overlooked. Thus, on the one hand the aim is positive — the finding of value — on the other it is critical, the revealing of deficiencies.
The understanding of the aesthetic nature of the environment creates a basis for nature protection and for the protection of the built environment; for when value is seen in something, there is a willingness to protect it. An aesthetic aspect is always present in the grounds for protection. The greatest part of environmental protection is of course, of another nature: the preservation of habitability, but that is not the only ground. Aesthetic value affects satisfaction, and is one factor in welfare. But this would be a selfish ground in support of the aesthetic quality of the environment. Aesthetic values must be preserved — because they are values; not only because they are values in use by someone, but because they are a good thing. [Cf. Knight 1954: 148.]

The aesthetic area of value is specific to Man, and it must be exploited in all ways: art is one area of value, and so is the environment. The field of aesthetics is to be seen as a totality composed of these and other formations (social relations, work, etc.), in which the goal is the fullest possible development of everything. A private citizen may only move in certain sub-areas, but society must take care that all of them are available and developed. Aesthetics as a philosophic science creates a basis and supports that development, but the detailed work is transferred elsewhere: to special sciences, to naturalists, etc.

The task of environmental education is to assist in the outlining of the internal tensions of the environment; the relations that prevail in it; to acquaint Man with the laws that predominate in the environment. There is practically no special aesthetic environmental education. It would mean the development of the same kind of skills as those that are required in the analysis of a work of art. By giving information on the operating mechanisms of nature and on natural history, as well as the phases of culture and the ideals and goals that Man has given himself, a basis is created for the comprehension of the environment and thus also for its aesthetic understanding.

The more limited objectives of art education point in three directions, all of which have their parallels in environmental education:

1) in educating the understanding of art, in the mastery of symbolic language, in learning the rules of the game; for example, a child may have delusions that works of art have always existed, that anyone at all can take a painting to an exhibition, that works are always made on the basis of a model; these delusions can be removed through education.

2) in education with the aid of art, whether it is moral education, emotional education, or the development of imagination.

3) in the training of active artists, in the provision of the professional skill of an artist; the training of the maker and handler of the environment is a parallel.

Aesthetic education should be understood as an umbrella concept under which on the one hand art education, and on the other environmental education, belong. In addition in both of them — and especially in environmental education — there are areas that have nothing directly to do with the aesthetic. As general phenomena, both are more diversified than aesthetic education.

The need for aestheticality itself exists; we can leave aside the consideration of whether the need is specific to Man (see p. 28, 59) or whether it has arisen at a certain stage of culture. In any case the need appears nowadays in the most various forms and connections where it is least expected. Iwanska’s examples demonstrate that systems of the unnoticed kind may be revealed as highly refined once their forms of expression have been discovered, and once their internal laws can be analyzed. Rebukes that certain peoples or classes lack a sense of the aesthetic appear to be shown on the basis of practical experience to be unjust; they derive from a narrow and clichééd definition of aestheticality. Art may indeed be lacking, but scarcely the aesthetic.

Kitsch is a misdirected attempt to achieve aestheticality. Roland Simon-Schaefer states that no one consciously wants Kitsch and that what certain social classes esteem as art is often condemned by the avant-gardists and critics of art as Kitsch. Kitsch can certainly be produced consciously and
calculatingly for a public whose taste is undeveloped, which favors sentimentalism, and does not recognize nuances. Kitsch is a trivialized form of high art. [Simon-Schaefer 1976: 76–77.]

According to Osborne's conception only a small number of people are creative, the greatest number are imitators. He asks provocatively whether creativity is even universally desirable. According to him the question is how to encourage the creative minority so that the non-creative majority can best benefit from the few gifted. The creative interest and activity of most people is directed towards clothes, home furnishings, etc., but a serious interest in the arts is lacking. [Osborne 1976: 148–149.]

Skill in examination must be practised and developed — according to Osborne perhaps people differ most of all in relation to this ability; and those who possess the basic preconditions should be guaranteed the opportunity of developing their ability. New creative, revolutionary, art is — independent of the kind of social system — almost always in opposition to the official stereotyped art; innovative art should be guaranteed the preconditions to develop freely without control "by Academies, by bureaucracies or by a monolithic state." [Ibid.: 149.] The significance of aesthetic education and its subspecies, art education, in the development of people's creative abilities should be emphasized.

Aesthetic education as the developer of concepts of taste. One developer of taste is aesthetic education: one must learn to pay attention to matters of this kind. It must be realized that every change also has aesthetic consequences, and it must always be decided what kind of consequence is desirable. The means must be known, its possibilities and limitations learned; developed to a high degree this is work for a professional. There must be a control system, the practise of criticism and research. It should be possible to develop a related system for the environment as that which exists for art; even though, of course, there is no guarantee of good results. It is undoubtedly possible to develop an ability in reception, but not to guarantee results.

The receiver must be flexible, understanding, able to select a suitable angle of vision. Theoretically it would be possible to achieve the same in the examination of the environment altered by Man as in the case of untouched nature: everything would be beautiful, good — when examined in an appropriate way. This becomes possible if "antikallism" and the negative values that it encourages are approved; when, for example, the ironical possibilities of using Kitsch are seen. Concepts of taste can be developed, but then at some stage one comes up against moral values, and in maximizing aesthetic values the rights of other values must be recognized.

But the extension of taste can also be conceived of in such a way that the goal is to develop the control and treatment of different kinds of situations and objects. The examiner need by no means always approve of the object, but he must always be able to operate with it, conceptually and in other ways. Aesthetic education is thus aimed at competence and skills.

2. The teaching of the means of description, interpretation, and evaluation

a. Environmental criticism as a provider of models

Nature and the environment are most usually seen through depictions and are guided by them; the depicter are the transmitters of tradition (they are also bound by it); in part the depicter are also the popularizers of environmental information. The goal could be the learning/teaching of the language of the environment, in which case one must (1) master the language of symbols, the precondition of which is again a basic knowledge of the natural and cultural sciences, and (2) develop observational ability, sensory sensitivity, and the ability to make distinctions. One must be
able to see more precisely, with greater nuances, and be able to understand what one sees in a more diverse way.

Environmental education starts from the teaching of the fundamentals of environmental criticism. Knowledge of how the environment is described, interpreted, and evaluated, gives points of departure for the reception of the environment. As a social task this is the work of professionals. In environmental education only a small part of the aim is professional skills; the task of education is to develop the ability to receive the environment in the general public. It is then sufficient as a point of departure if the person in question is capable of normal sensory perceptions and conceptual thought.

It is not only a question of influencing taste but also of developing better methods. In the same way as there are works of art that are difficult to approach, there are also difficult environments. It is precisely here that the distinctions and help of experts are needed in order to see connections and make comparisons. The environment is in this sense a problem to the interpreter. These problems are resolved by naturalists, and above all by aestheticians on a theoretical level.

Aesthetic education, discussion, and practise in analysis is needed. Harold Osborne has hoped for courses in the comprehension and criticism of natural beauty after the manner of the organized interpretation and criticism of art [Osborne 1962: 322 - 323]. They should be conducted as courses in the comprehension and criticism of the beauty of the entire physical environment.

The aesthetic value of some of the environment is not self-evident. It is resolved by paying attention to the grounds of evaluation. It is possible that they are only found later in the same way as some work of art can be understood and appreciated only when it has been appropriately analyzed, sometimes considerably later than its time of birth. In this way it is extremely difficult to set norms. In the same way as in art it is possible to set as a goal the "rescuing" of a work by concentrating on its positive aspects, so in the same way an attempt can be made to describe the environment in as positive light as possible.

Monroe C. Beardsley, who in his early work defines aesthetics as the philosophy of criticism (of the arts), divides the tasks of criticism into three in his work on literary criticism, The Possibility of Criticism: it must report truthfully, interpret precisely, and evaluate correctly — and in this way criticism is put on a rational basis [Beardsley 1970: 12]. In an article which appeared at about the same time, "Aesthetic Welfare" (an earlier Congress paper), he develops a logical system of measurement which would make possible the relating of different kinds of values to one another, the assessment of values, and the making of rational choices [Beardsley 1972]. — Beardsley does not directly apply the three-way division to the appreciation of the environment, but is there anything to prevent his line from being extended in the manner wished for by Osborne? Environmental aesthetics would then be the investigation of the grounds for the description, interpretation, and evaluation of the environment, the philosophy of environmental criticism.

First of all, a language adopted to the description and reporting of the environment would have to be developed by which an object could be depicted as exactly and truthfully as possible, and the impressions to which it gives rise expressed with as rich nuances as possible. Language development work of this kind has been done by above all travel writers and literary naturalists. It is due to them that — apart from their having taught the reader to examine nature -ordinary everyday language has been developed so that at present it offers scope for the expression of a feeling of nature to those who know and feel the possibilities of language. But from ancient times a science that has specialized in the development of even the most technical systems of depiction of the environment has existed: geography. It may still use the map and photograph as an aid — but in the final resort both these resources must be interpreted by means of language.

Geography — in its widest sense — comprises interpretation in its entirety. The birth and stages of land forms must be investigated; the development and spread of flora and fauna; and finally the
effect of Man and his culture. The synthetic, all-embracing general science corresponds poorly, however, to the present image of a science — this has been noted by geographers themselves, who have attempted to limit the area of their science.

As the branches of science diverge and grow more specialized, one way to preserve the unity of aesthetically-oriented interpretive questions is to gather them under a new title expressing the potential object of research. Yi-Fu Tuan uses the term *topophilia*, by which he means attachment to a place. The environmental attitude characterized by topophilia would then be the object of psychological-aesthetical research. Topophilia is a certain kind of interpretation of the environmental experience:

The word "topophilia" is a neologism, useful in that it can be defined broadly to include all of the human being's affective ties with the material environment. These differ greatly in intensity, subtlety, and mode of expression. The response to environment may be primarily aesthetic: it may then vary from the fleeting pleasure one gets from a view to the equally fleeting but far more intense sense of beauty that is suddenly revealed. The response may be tactile, a delight in the feel of air, water, earth. More permanent and less easy to express are feelings that one has toward a place because it is home, the locus of memories, and the means of gaining a livelihood.

[Tuan 1974: 93.]

Thus Beardsley's third component of criticism, evaluation, which is the most essential from the point of view of aesthetics, is strongly present. Aesthetics cannot in my opinion significantly assist in the development of systems of environmental depiction (certainly it can, among other things, elucidate the rules of the use of aesthetic terms, and in that way make language more precise) - nonetheless it cannot be unconscious of the problems of depiction and attempts to solve them. The interpretation of the environment concerns the natural and cultural sciences — aesthetics, however, cannot on a practical level provide very much in addition (the investigation of topophilia certainly seems to be specific to aesthetics). A dependency in another direction is on the other hand absolute: the aesthetcian who investigates environmental questions needs knowledge of the stages of nature and culture in order to be able to understand the grounds for an aesthetic experience and for its expression.

b. Art as a provider of models

*Institutional models.* At the present moment art is the most highly developed and refined aesthetic system. We hold it to be necessary that the interpretation and evaluation of the arts are taught in schools, and we regard an acquaintance with the most significant works of art as belonging to general education. We also hold it to be necessary that the arts are the subject of research in universities, that we are informed of new works, that they are criticized in the press, and that artists are supported from public funds. The sphere of making, interpreting, and investigating forms an extensive and many-branched art institution. But how are matters in the environment? Harold Osborne replies:

While the cultivation of the arts grows more esoteric, concern in the multitudinous natural beauties which the world still offers percolates more widely and the average man now vaunts himself a connoisseur. People who are precluded by boredom from circumambulating a gallery of contemporary paintings spend time and money in the pursuit of landscape and architectural beauties. Interest in physical beauty is also fostered by the cult of the film star, by beauty contests and by the voluminous literature of fashion. Admiration for the beauties of flowers and gardens and trees, even birds and fishes and almost every species of animal, has been found worth economic exploitation. And all this is considered to be the outcome of a spontaneous, untutored faculty. There are no educational courses in the appreciation of natural beauty. No degrees are given. Each man is his own
expert, with the help of his favourite advertisement reading. There is no 'criticism' of natural beauty. The products of the fine arts are subject to an ever more ebullient barrage of appreciative commentary, critics dispute one another's judgements and aestheticians question the validity of the grounds upon which the judgements are made. But whether they expressly restrict aesthetics to the principles used in the appraisal of fine art or whether they admit principles of beauty common to art and to nature, the books of aesthetics which are written today have nothing concrete to say about natural beauty. In this regard we find their most striking difference from the corresponding literature in the eighteenth century.

[Osborne 1962: 322 - 323.]

This being the case, what is needed is analysis of the perception of the environment, the systematization of types of landscape; the investigation and particularization of value systems that appear in everyday language and depictions of nature; and training to develop the ability to perceive the environment. Continuous public criticism of the environment and discussion on the principles of change in the environment are also needed. In a few words: what is needed are corresponding activities and institutions to those that have already been in art for a long time.

Through Osborne's words it is certainly possible to hear an aesthetician's irritation with the fact that everyone considers themselves to be an expert and interested party in environmental questions. No elitism, however, required: research and educational work can start from the basis of everyone's own world experience. First of all, the prevailing environmental aesthetic systems should be charted. In our own culture we are in the same situation as Iwanska in a strange one (see p. 114).

Art aesthetics has not been developed for the treatment of environmental beauty. We must get away from our present situation in which environmental questions are examined only as footnotes to research. Hepburn complains in his article, "Contemporary Aesthetics and the Neglect of Natural Beauty," written in the 1960s, that contemporary aesthetics deals almost exclusively with art - aesthetics is still defined as the philosophy of art or the philosophy of criticism (the analysis of the language and concepts used in the description, interpretation, and evaluation of works of art) [Hepburn 1967: 285]. A change is, however, taking place; this is shown by the fact that in the congresses on aesthetics organized in the 1970s and 80s - most recently in Montreal in 1984 — one theme has been environmental aesthetics. The fact that the German system builders of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Kant, Schelling, Vischer, Volkelt, Hartmann, Dessoir, or Lipps, allowed a place in their system for the discussion of natural beauty, suggests a model for modern general presentations too. If aesthetics is thought of as the philosophy of beauty there is no reason to divide the treatment of art and the environment into separate sciences. It must be clearly seen, however, that the environment is not in the position of an individual art-form, but that it differs from all art-forms generally, as a block, more than art-forms differ from one another.

In the aesthetic perception of a work of art and the environment it is not sensible to even attempt to reduce them to one another. But the differences are not theoretically irreconcilable, for in the same way as aesthetics can gather together the most diverse art-forms and deal with them generally on philosophical grounds, it can still enclose the environment and aesthetic questions related to everyday life within its area, and deal with the entire sphere of aesthetic phenomena.

In what way does art teach? Freeman Patterson gives advice to the photographer in the making of observations, the selection and delimitation of objects, and the articulation of the picture [Patterson 1979: 27 - 37] (see p. 45). No landscape or place of observation is without interest to him; one form of exercise is to choose a place at random and there find a subject for a picture.

The prairie landscape in Alberta in Canada or the flat plain of Ostrobothnia in Finland correspond well to Patterson's picture examples: sparse, well-considered color arrangements and compositions. Here forms and colors that support one another can be sought; an attempt can be made to see, breaking the rules of preformed attitudes, to find a theme for a picture from every view.

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The agricultural landscape is the result of aesthetically unplanned work. But it is clear-featured and simply beautiful; in some way the same simplicity is repeated in the sky-scrappers of the centers of modern cities, in buildings composed of geometric forms. Often the facade material is metal or tinted glass, which reflects other buildings and the colors of the sky—bright, light. It is a paradox that something from the prairie landscape is repeated in that completely artificial environment that attempts to reach the sky.

Lonely farms in the countryside are pleasing; they are fixed points in the landscape, adapted to it, but they also articulate it, in the same way as small houses in a town, whose uniformly light colors balance the diversity of forms. But why does the clarity and sparseness of the landscape not qualify as a point of departure for the furniture, utensils, etc.? Why are the landscape and culture so often in open contradiction?

Does nature help one to see art; does art help one to see nature? To what does the fading of the boundary between nature and art lead? I return to the examples of the 38th Venice Biennale (in 1978).

Even though the boundary between art and nature has been relaxed it has not been removed entirely. The viewer did not go into the Israeli pavilion containing 18 sheep with all the necessary sheep-rearing equipment like a sheep rancher into a sheep shed; he went purely to see what was on view as art. What then distinguished him from a visitor to the sheep section of an agricultural show, and what distinguished the Israeli stand from the sheep section? The visitor to both an agricultural show and an art exhibition are in a sense disinterested; the visitor does not have the duties or responsibility of a keeper or owner. Additionally, in both the visit has in the first place an informative significance. The sheep rancher is interested in the lessons in applied information offered by the agricultural show; in the Israeli exhibition the visitor does not seek information on sheep farming but on art; he relates what he sees and experiences to other works of art and to conceptual connections, to the theme of the exhibition, to the name of the work—-if he succeeds in that intellectual pleasure also arises. What he sees and experiences is not new but old in a new environment, new as art. (Whether the question is of a real artistic innovation or only of the visitor’s limited acquaintance with art, we shall leave to an art historian to resolve!) The work is made interesting by its context, its presentation in an exhibition; therefore it is paradoxically very conceptual and very intellectual art.

The works in the Biennale can certainly be examined as such too, on the surface, but then their yield remains small. The analogy I see is with a nature researcher examining the processes of nature who is not satisfied with recording and observing the part of phenomena that can be perceived with the senses, but who attempts to explain life diachronically from the point of view of natural history, or synchronically as operating ecosystems. The possible analogy of the examiner of art and nature leads one to think also of the fact that many works are not only pictures of processes but also processes themselves; the relation of art and nature is circular in the way that art is made from the processes of nature, in the light of which other natural processes too are examined. Art does not only help one to see static landscapes through landscape painting, but allows us to see the chains of events of nature as a drama through the new experiments in the visual arts.

The primary frame of reference for this art is not nature but other art, earlier works, and, in the final resort, concepts of art. The works are interesting as breakers of traditions, and as parodies and comments on both definitions of art and of the artist’s role.

When the theme is the relation between nature and art one may ask how this kind of art
furthers conservation of nature. There are committed works, too. An interest in the primitive stages of culture and in their relics in present culture appears now and then. The text of exhibition catalogs confirms the suspicion that this is a question of a search for cultural alternatives; ecology has found its way into the discussion on art.

The intention is to expand the scale of aesthetic examination and approval. Anything at all can be taken as an object for artistic imitation; it is possible to make imitations that are so natural that the viewer does not know whether he is looking at a square metre of worn brick wall or pavement or at a relief painting representing them. The scale of beautiful - ugly has been renewed, sometimes entirely rejected or made of secondary importance; speaking of the aesthetic seems to be artificial. The scale good - bad is changing into interesting - uninteresting or new - familiar.

What is admired is inventiveness, which even embraces the shocking. Comic strips, neon lights, crumbled cardboard boxes are already established practise in modern art. Insights apply to the “artisticness” of new objects, new materials, new ways of exhibiting, the nature of internal boundaries between art-forms, and between art and the rest of the world. Arthur C. Danto is of the opinion that art is expanding, becoming more complicated, when new features become significant. Along with each new feature its absence also becomes relevant; therefore all works are equally complex; every new invention also makes all previous art more complicated. [Danto 1964: 582 - 584.] Therefore the examination of the history of art from the viewpoint of the newest art is continually necessary; the exhibition “Six stations for Art-nature. The Nature of art” in Venice was a critical re-reading of modern art (art of the twentieth century) from the point of view of the environment theme, as the exhibition commission set up by the Biennale stated [Ammann et al. 1978: 11].

Modern anti-art is not at all primarily a search for the aesthetic values contained, for example, in a crumpled cardboard box, but a turning of the entire art institution and exhibition situation into the absurd. The viewer is forced to wonder why he has to see these things in an art exhibition. But this art may certainly act in other ways than against traditional art. Viewing can also open one’s mind up: why can’t I look at such things everywhere? The environment breaking into art and art breaking into the environment also make the environment that is external to art into the object of a new kind of examination. In the best cases this art increases general sensitivity and readiness for reception. The artistic (anti-artistic!) values of anti-art may open the road for a broader conception of aesthetic values than at present. The values of our civilized environment — also the aesthetic ones — are for the most part conceptual values, which are revealed in various information contexts. Therefore, for example, the understanding of untouched nature — which presupposes its own base of information — does not travel a direct road to the reception of the altered environment.

The border between art and nature has been broken open. One essential task of modern aesthetics is to examine the lines of that break - this task has also been grasped, as was shown by the Eighth International Congress of Aesthetics held in Darmstadt in 1976, which had the general theme of “Aesthetics, Daily Life, and the Arts” and which in one group session dealt with the aesthetics of nature; corresponding themes were present also in Montreal in the Tenth Congress held in 1984. The aesthetics of nature is to a great extent contrastive: the investigation of the differences between art and nature as aesthetic objects. The successful completion of the task demands unprejudiced reforms in the arrangement of the tasks of aesthetics. Essential questions are the relations between aesthetic values and artistic values, and the border between art and non-art. In my opinion the solution lies along the lines opened by George Dickie [see 1974: 19 - 52; and
The border between art and nature (non-art) lies on the level of agreement. It is quite as real and quite as invisible as the equator is on the ground.

From nature there is an open road to art, from art an open road to nature; border crossings are a matter of a classification carried out according to certain rules of the game, not necessarily of anything else. But changes of this kind, even though nothing observable need alter, cause worlds to arise and collapse on a conceptual level.

A familiar complaint is that a specific environmental criticism is lacking. In the case of untouched nature this exists in travel books and the works of naturalists; at least those cases of the cultural environment are dealt with in which the environment is the object of artistic design and its means, such as in garden and building art and in landscape architecture. In some of these cases the question is literally of art. The intermediate area is quantitatively the most important, but least dealt with: that in which nature and Man are connected in such a way that part is designed, part undesigning; and in which the designs have not been directed by consciously expressed aesthetic objectives.

It is possible to proceed to this area through more controlled areas, and one such area is art. Because works of art are made for aesthetic use in their sphere, a corresponding technique for analysis has also been further developed than elsewhere. Quite especially it has been developed of course in the area of those two senses on which works of art are normally based: sight and sound. A certain one-sidedness follows from this: the other three senses — touch, smell, and taste — are also important in environmental perceptions, but there is no proper technique and language for their treatment. Art does not only provide concrete examination models — what is more important is that it provides an aesthetic language, which is used, and with which it is possible to speak of other matters than those for which it was specially developed. Compared to the strict rules of the game of art the aesthetic systems of the environment are less precise; in art one knows more exactly what to examine and how — the aesthetic criticism of the environment is only just being formed.

Art models can be of two kinds. First of all, works of art may be — when they are representational — more or less similar to the environment. Then the formal principles which are suitable for the treatment of one are by analogy suitable for the other. The relation may also be only linguistic in such a way that the language, terminology, etc. of art and environmental criticism are mutually interchangeable. It is possible to imagine that the language of the criticism of the visual arts can also be used when speaking of the visual aspects of the environment, for example.

The goal is correct or justified appreciation, not the maximization of aesthetic value on perhaps temporary grounds and those that do wrong to other values. This means that appreciation must be based on contemporary information that corresponds with modern research; and one must concentrate on the relevant factors of this information - the examiner must be able to select what is important. He must be able to actively exclude the irrelevant and inessential; the environment as such is endless, in examination an attempt must be made to bring out its order.

One must learn to read the sign language used in the environment altered by Man, whether it is a general cultural sign language — on the basis of which we recognize e.g. buildings designed to serve different purposes — or a more specialized stylistic language: an architect's personal solutions, selections of color, form, and material, loans, references, symbols. In the extreme case this leads to a situation where only a researcher who is acquainted with the languages of architecture is able to read such environmental writing.

The cultural environment is also conceptually made and outlined by Man: language acts as an articulator; it creates perception habits. All seeing and perception is in the final analysis bound to the sphere of culture.

Certainly there are signs in nature too, but they are of a different character than the agreed signs of culture. We know what the aurora borealis and rainbow mean; we think we know what a red
sunset portends; we have an answer to what happens physiologically when the leaves turn yellow in autumn; some people can feel the coming of changes in the weather. But the difference is in the fact that no one means anything by the signs in nature — unless we think of nature as a language used by gods and supernatural forces to communicate with Man.

In art, and in all that we do, we intend and aim at something, even if the work does not always correspond to our intentions — neither is it necessary to know the intentions of its maker. Cultural goals nevertheless exist. Man speaks to man directly or through intermediaries; nature does not speak, it only appears to do so.

*The use of art as a document.* One special case is the circular situation that arises with the depictions of the environment in art. A work of art necessarily obtains its models and influences from reality, but the artistic combination is new — it is true that it may also be an extremely accurate picture of reality. This picture in turn influences our conceptions and fantasies, independent of whether the world of the work of art is like reality or not. Thus art — even though the works as such are imaginary — gives perception and interpretation models for the real world (research of "the town in literature" type). [See Jones 1960: 424 - 429.] The works are documents of a way of thinking [cf. Melville research by Moore, 1982].

### B. Influencing the environment

#### 1. The private and communal execution of ideals

Man alters the environment in accordance with his goals, and these exist in all areas of value. But there is an ethical limitation to action: the Earth is not only used by Man and as his dwelling place; but also animals and plants, possibly even natural formations have their rights, which may not be infringed.

Goals appear in environmental ideals. These are the various Utopias and model societies depicted in literature, or the ideal landscapes in painting; and they are miniature artificial environments, no matter how unadulterated they may be: gardens, parks, objects for preservation. In these, large-scale ideals are realized on a small scale, and a longing for a paradise, an ideal state, can be seen.

Ideals also appear in so-called paradigmatic landscapes and other objects, in model cases, such as viewspots (Koli, Saana), tourist routes (the Silver Line), unique areas (the lake landscape of Saimaa), natural sights, to which cultural memories may be attached (Runeberg's Spring), unified areas of towns (old Rauma), architecturally designed totalities (Tapiola). People travel to see them, they spread as depictions in literature, as photographs, as films, as paintings. It is possible to speak of other similar objects in comparison with them. Even national identity rests to a great extent with them: they are its symbols.

We are unanimous about the necessity of preservation of model cases. Objects comparable to works of art operate to a great extent as directors and regulators of taste. Existing ideals give a concrete objective for things other than nature and environmental protection, too. They recall the aesthetic aspect that is always essentially connected to protection.

It is paradoxical that the town, which as a man-made environment should be designed precisely for his needs, has so often failed to fulfil one essential area of value and related needs. A town-dweller must then seek environmental aesthetic pleasure from untouched nature and from the deserted rural cultural landscape. Of course, the values of untouched nature and a well-designed town are constructed differently; they do not replace one another, but they may
complement one another. When acting wisely Man does not attempt to follow nature as a copyist; rather he builds a miniature environment with its own laws within a frame of nature [see Tuan 1978: 31-33].

As Francis Younghusband has already stated, a landscape is bearable only (or more mildly: at least) in two cases: when Man has not been there, and when he has succeeded in creating harmony within the landscape (see p. 135). The problematic cases of landscape disturbance, which are in the vast majority, lie in between.

The industrial areas surrounding towns are more depressing. These transitional zones are undesigned in the urban environment. The urban area proper is at least in some ways established and organized, even if not always successfully.

Modern architecture as an art-form has sought forms and solutions that are surprising, deviating from the conventional, and aimed at something more than conventional beauty. Such an experiment is, for example, the Centre Georges Pompidou in Paris, which can be regarded as anti-architecture. The formal solutions are based on technical possibilities and new materials; in this, too, it appears to hold true that if something is possible it will be done!

A return to gingerbread houses is in the opinion of architects hopeless nostalgia, even if the public likes them; such a building refers falsely to a past stage of culture. A free right to build would easily lead to curiosities and motleyliness; on the other hand the possibility for the continuation of a folk building tradition and experimental architecture should be permitted. Historical allusion can certainly also have a creative significance as in post-modernism; it gives the receiver once again a new kind of challenge.

The environment cannot be dealt with just any way. Besides ecological limits one comes up against hidden significances. The alterers collide with the symbol network created by culture, which is, of course, also changing. A second problem is that in design it is not ordinarily possible to start from the beginning, rather the new has to adapt to the old: in this way layers of reference arise, a cultural historical dimension on top of a vastly longer natural historical dimension, and both are significant in the experience of the environment.

Attempts can be made to realize ideals privately and communally. People have their Utopias; plans are made of work before it is executed, they are criticized in advance and adjusted according to the criticism.

Cost factors set a clear limit on what technical possibilities are economically possible. The artistic freedom of the architect is considerably more limited than that of artists in other areas if he wants to see his designs realized. The possibility for the designer of Brasilia to execute his aesthetic ideals was absolutely unique in the present day. But the city-artwork did not touch the popular imagination with its sophisticated idiom. It must be remembered that it should also speak to the inhabitants on their own level. Town plans must be flexible, open-ended, and lead to constructive development, not slums. And the language which the designer must be able to continue and develop is the language of nature. It does not pay for culture to begin to argue with its foundation, nature.

Designed or not designed? One of the goals of our life is the aesthetic. Mere survival does not suffice, neither does a merely cognitive apprehension of the environment, nor moral rules, nor health and safety. Man aims at aesthetic welfare. It means that he attempts to realize some demands of harmony, completeness, richness, variety — in the environment and in all of life.

Artistic activity has developed precisely for those purposes; it is the production of objects intended for aesthetic use, the achievement of such objects and phenomena that are thought to have the ability to satisfy aesthetic needs. Some of those works and acts are made to be a part of our real environment, such as in architecture or industrial design, as well as, of course, in so-called

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environmental art (cf. Christo, Robert Smithson).

The greatest part of aesthetic design occurs, however, outside art in the literal sense. And the greatest part of that is unfortunately made without much design, consciousness, and intention. Aesthetic points of view can, of course, even then be realized, but why leave it to chance?

When published, a work is available to anyone at all. Often that communication fails, or aesthetic comprehension may come only later or it may vanish. Many phenomena in folk culture are subject to booms and slumps. Folk-style buildings may not be appreciated by their inhabitants, although they may well be praised by outsiders; referring to standardized houses of the 1950s Martti Linkola has proposed that everything that achieves a certain age will come to be approved of in culture [Linkola 1981: 145].

Only when the environment has begun to be critically examined — and this is made allowance for in the making stage — is the proper aspect of design present. It is possible to make conscious and justified selections: what to preserve, what to change, how? As soon as the environment is changed it ceases to be in a natural state and becomes a cultural phenomenon (and already pure examination takes place through cultural models). Given aspects certainly remain — in fact most objects are combinations of a natural state and a made one. But the environment that is formed without a design is also a problem for the observer; it should be able to be understood and interpreted — and even though Man is the maker it does not mean that the task need be any easier. The processes of explaining and understanding produce new information for the solution of what then to do with that environment, in what way to deal with it.

The designed environment is formed so that there is a foundation of untouched nature or an environment already altered by Man. Secondly, there is a design, drawings prepared by an architect or a goal otherwise expressed, and the means for achieving the goal. The points of departure are in two places: in the existing situation, and as realizable ideas.

There are two extremes of how to design. We may decide to do nothing about untouched nature and reserve it as a natural conservation area, or as a nature park; or we may decide to preserve an individual object as a natural monument. We do this by delimiting the object and providing rules for its treatment; we motivate our act on scientific, pedagogic, aesthetic, or other grounds. The other extreme is a plan which produces an entirely artificial environment such as the densely built-up centers of large cities and of course interiors. Such an environment is a complete artifact, man-made; only some raw material from nature has been used as a necessary substance. Nature is then reduced to the position of purely a substance — possibly it is even approved of as a model provider for such bizarre products as plastic trees and plants, pet animals, etc.

But in most cases we make a combination. We not only improve nature cosmetically by landscaping the traces of a sandpit or by planting new seedlings in place of a felled forest. We make cultural environments and we attempt to make a harmony of the work of Man and nature. We do not design for only one moment, but rather we attempt to co-ordinate processes so that they form an operating and durable totality.

It may also happen that the design remains as drawings on paper, which are never realized or whose realization remains only half completed. Or a model from a social planner or a Utopia of a philosopher exists, which is never executed, or which never could be executed. These form parallels with unperformed music, dramas for reading, or perhaps even a sculpture represented by a miniature plaster cast.

The place of Man. If our ideal is untouched nature we easily fall into regarding Man as only a nuisance and a mistake: everything that he does influences the state of nature and alters it. If everything in a natural state is beautiful, and if only a part of what Man does may be, then the result of changes is probably a worsening. Or should only that be approved which Man does as an animal,
as an inseparable part of nature? This seems unsatisfactory, after all it means relinquishing culture. In some extraordinary sense, that cultureless world would be the best possible, but not the best for Man; not from the point of view of the general conditions of life, not even aesthetically, because it would not offer possibilities for creation and fulfilling oneself. It would exclude diversification, the realization of which only Man as a cultural being is capable. Culture produces something extra. This interaction is illustrated in the examples that Harold F. Searles presents in his article, "The Role of Nonhuman Environment":

One can sense this relatedness between man and nature when one stands on the darkening land at twilight and sees, high above the sunset, a transcontinental jet-liner drawing its golden vapor trail, thin as a pencil line and straight as an arrow, slowly at this vast distance across the sky. Here is beauty which man could not create alone, and which nature could not create alone; here is beauty which man and nature, working through man's increasing knowledge of nature's processes, can create only in their mutual relatedness. [Searles 1961 - 1962: 34.]

When Man realizes his potentialities, he creates culture and separates himself from nature, striving towards an equal relation with nature. It certainly may lead to the subjugation of nature and the destruction of the foundation, to the using up of unrenewable natural resources, etc. The abuse of nature is in danger of leading to radical changes, of destroying delicate systems, of even ruining the physical basis of existence. Man must at least secure his physical position, but is that all?

*The town as a total work of art.* One of the most complex yet typical examples of an environment that has taken shape either with or without Man's design is the town. It is limited, but is so extensive that it is not perceptible as a whole. Some parts are very precisely designed; partially it has arisen under loose control; partially through human activity and natural conditions "without the care of a particular maker" — as Elias Lönnrot pictured the manner of birth of a folk poem [Lönnrot 1840: IV; see also Jackson 1984, about vernacular landscapes].

The town is stratified: it has a historical dimension, for example, buildings of different ages and other elements. It is renewed, repaired, extended. The perception of a town is multi-sensory; it is not only based on sight, but also on hearing, smell, and touch. Even when a town is planned it is really only considered from the visual point of view. In addition there are the factors that Yi-Fu Tuan, the representative of humanistic geography, has dealt with under the name of *topophilia*, the love of place; "all of the human being's affective ties with the material environment" belong to *topophilia* [Tuan 1974: 93] (see p. 141). The town is a home and dwelling place, the milieu of historical and personal events; memories and associations are connected with it.

In a town there are all the ingredients of a total work of art — which in a metaphorical sense it is, and which it is sometimes also literally. But not only the town operates in this way; in principle villages and other small communities are of the same type, generally they are less designed.

The totality is the result of many factors and many forces. In planning the most difficult problem is to make the goals and lines somehow connect, to agree even over the rules of the game. A film and play have directors, a town does not. Only exceptionally does an architect gain the kind of position that Oscar Niemeyer had when planning Brasilia. But the director-architect cannot control the situations that arise to any great extent. Niemeyer could do nothing about the fact that the dream town he realized began sprouting slums, nor could the architects of the Torpparinmäki housing exhibition area in Helsinki know in what way the residents would begin to change the picture of the area by small means — by curtains in windows, by using glass verandahs as storing places, etc.

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2. Legislation

The goal should be a regulatory system that would be capable of officially intervening in the forming of the environment. This is a matter for law. But people must be ready for it. They are not ready if they see no concrete benefit in it. How can individual freedom and control be combined? Should freedom be restricted to interiors and control to exteriors? Are not interiors also in need of protection? How does one take into account different tastes? How does one permit and provide private people with an opportunity for creative activity in the environment without the result being a tasteless mixture of different tastes?

The environment can be formed in accordance with many different interests. But necessarily that formation causes changes in the aesthetic character and value of objects, whether the changes are intended or not. Thus, in an aesthetic sense the environment is formed for the greatest part without design; even in the built environment, the factors that are borne in mind during design may belong to other areas of value, for instance, they may be economic. Even in the planned environment there are thus unplanned parts (aspects) that have simply arisen.

One practical task for environmental aesthetics would be to draw attention to the fact that all essential aspects should be taken into consideration during planning. Every change in the environment must therefore be considered from the aesthetic point of view as well. Taking an aspect into consideration is ensured through legislation: the protection of the air, water, and land; building legislation; the protection of natural and cultural monuments [see Bufford 1976; and 1977].

In change the aesthetic aspect is always present, intentionally or not. One can agree with Monroe C. Beardsley's proposal that minimum demands, standards, for the aesthetic approval of the environment should be set, and that society should ensure that they are followed [Beardsley 1972: 95-96]. Then one is forced to compare and make parallel various areas of value. This presupposes — besides the development of methods of comparison — means to reach some kind of an agreement as to what are the aesthetic values to be aimed at.

The basic difficulty is in stating the standards with the precision demanded by the texts of laws — it is not possible to forbid the ugly and demand the beautiful without making the demands more precise [Bufford 1977: 227]. This kind of control should apply to environmental entireties, facades, and valuable interiors, public places in general, and industrial design; in the private area — in home furnishings, etc. — control is not required to the same extent, even if there is also cultural responsibility for the character of interiors.

When changing the environment one must reconcile the aesthetic views of different people, and in the same way resolve contradictions between different kinds of values (for example, the economic value of a beach or sand esker may make exploitation attractive, aesthetic value on the other hand demands their preservation). It should be possible to develop the kind of regulatory system and procedure for the resolution of conflict which Beardsley — though without conviction — outlines. In any event situations of the following kind must be resolved in some way, whether there is a procedure or not:

On one side, the Commissioner of Streets, Mr. Smallwood, wants to paint all 13,000 of the city's traffic light standards the most arresting shade of yellow, so they will be highly visible, and thus more drivers will notice traffic lights. On the other side, the Art Commission prefers the standards to be a "warm shade of light gray," on the ground that they will be a more aesthetically pleasing part of the urban environment. When aesthetics and safety conflict, says Mr. Smallwood, safety comes first. Now suppose (if you can bear the thought) we could measure safety in units called safs and aesthetic worth in units called aesths. The problem would then be to find the correct formula for converting one unit into another. Suppose we wanted to establish that 1 saf equals approximately 5 aesths. How would we go about it?
The only method I can think of would be to devise situations in which one could choose to sacrifice either safs for aesths or aesths for safs; if we substituted them for one another at the rate of 1 to 5, without making any right choices wrong, or any wrong choices right, then the rate of interchange-ability for that kind of situation would be established. But we know that values are interdependent in complicated ways, and, generally speaking, if one saf equals 5 aesths in some kinds of situation (e.g. the traffic standard situation), it is more than likely that in other kinds of situation, where different clusters of values are involved, this rate of exchange-worthiness will not hold up. [Beardsley 1972: 93.]

Nature (and the environment in general) is important for aesthetics for the reason, as Rader and Jessup state, that it is quantitatively the source of most aesthetic experiences. All people must unavoidably deal with it, only a part of them with art. Nature is for most of them the only school for aesthetic perception. [Rader & Jessup 1976: 103, 354.] Many environmental designers have appealed to this when emphasizing the significance of an aesthetically balanced environment that provides stimuli.

3. Active and passive aesthetics

Active aesthetics — or more correctly the activity based on it — attempts to influence taste and objects; either the object can be changed to become aesthetically more satisfactory, to correspond to current concepts of taste; or else concepts of taste can be changed in such a way that the special character of each object is taken into consideration as diversely and thoroughly as possible [cf. Sontag 1967; and Carlson 1976]. Both are forms of normative aesthetics.

Passive aesthetics examines systems of taste without taking a stand in their favor. The task of aesthetics is then to investigate and describe rules and laws. Indirect influence exists in such a way that by making implicit systems known and visible aesthetics influences their conscious choice and application. This kind of aesthetics may be influential by revealing internal contradictions and illogicalities and in this way making the removal of them possible. The goal is uncontradictory, and in that sense correct, action. [See JF's "Editorial" on the tasks of aesthetics; F(isher) 1975: 3-6.]

Questions of value and taste are the special area of aesthetics. In this one should not be satisfied with only classifying what landscape types, places, or entities have been held to be beautiful at what times. The task of aesthetics is to investigate as precisely as possible the criteria from which systems — clearly aesthetic or those only appearing in practise — are constructed, and the recommendations and norms that are presented for fulfilling the criteria.

But aesthetics should also be able to take a stand on which value systems are better. I mentioned at the beginning that in the treatment of art much has been achieved when aesthetics has moved to the more cautious lines of descriptiveness and the depiction of systems of values. On account of the reality of its objects, however, environmental aesthetics differs decisively from art aesthetics. I believe that it has the possibility of going considerably further in the ranking of systems, even though the calculation system outlined by Beardsley seems to be Utopian. (Those geographers and social planners who have attempted to develop systems for the measurement of the beauty of the environment are also optimistic [see Carlson 1977].)

I regard the distinction made by Beardsley between dependent and independent aesthetic values as useful. Aesthetic values that appear in works of art are independent — the state should not interfere in these, but only guarantee the most favorable conditions for the practise of art. Dependent aesthetic values are those that appear in objects made for something other than aesthetic use. Precisely for these, products demanding design — buildings, bridges, traffic lanes, the whole town — standards for aesthetic acceptability should be decreed. [See Beardsley 1972: 95-96.]

Such an extension and opening of value systems that has taken place in the appreciation of
untouched nature, is required also in the case of the environment altered by Man. It nevertheless need not mean that everything is approved of as being of the same value; the goal need not be to reduce critical aesthetics to positive aesthetics. It is a question of a system of taste that permits individuality, but every realization demands criticism; there is no reason to disparage design and consideration.

Negative values in particular are an area in which great differences of opinion prevail. Environmental design has perhaps been directed by a more conservative attitude in that planning has been based on values of harmony. The environment has been formed on the basis of a safe majority opinion. Because anti-art has practically no contact with the general public its values are not reflected in general opinion. A clear distinction must be made between the Kitsch that the public favors and ironically treated Kitsch (cf. Sontag's *Camp*), such as is found in post-modernism. Kitsch as such is only a sign of bad taste. Kitsch ironically used may demonstrate brilliant taste. The same applies to the environment; the American urban environment especially offers examples.

There are no reasons casually to free environmental culture from such popularly accepted norms for harmony as guarantee at least some kind of quality and unity, for otherwise we may soon have sheer chaos instead of operating aesthetic values.

The basis and foundation of everything must in my opinion be set to be a system that I have called aesthetics in accordance with nature or ecological aesthetics. It only provides general lines; in the case of cultural products it needs exact specifications such as Beardsley presents. This system was earlier followed in practise, because quite simply in most cases there was no way of breaking it — however, one must remember the Mediterranean lands in which even in Antiquity the felling of forests caused degeneration, or the sand deserts in Africa and Asia which formed after over-grazing.

There are now no longer the restraints to ensure accordance with nature: technological development has broken them. Accordance with nature, the harmony of Man and nature, the choice is now basically a duty of Man; the knowledge of the operating mechanisms of nature given by ecology requires and forces a choice. The recognition of that necessity leads to obligations to make all necessary, and only necessary, changes to the environment in a spirit of accordance with nature, so that even the products of culture would be appropriately beautiful in the same way as everything is in nature.

*The aesthetic life.* The American Haig Khatchadourian speaks — as Yrjö Hirn has already spoken in Finland — of the aesthetic life. By this he means a way of life that is characterized by harmony, completeness, etc. [Khatchadourian 1982: 96-97]. Aesthetic values are not then any special aspect but something synthetic, a property of totality. Achieving it depends on the possibilities of the experiencer, a result of life experience and wisdom, not intellectual control of the world.

Fanchon Fröhlich uses the term "global aesthetics," by which she means the character of the entire physical world as a work of art [Frohlich 1976: 25]. The Pole Stefan Morawski refers to the Marxist aesthetician's view of *pankalia*, all-embracing beauty; such could even be a property of a social system [Morawski 1971: 282]. When those two views are combined one comes close to what Khatchadourian means.

Aims like those depicted can be partially achieved through social planning; partially again it is a matter of the possibilities opened by knowledge and its articulating force. But basically in the aesthetic life the question is still of the subject's, of each individual's active ability to arrange harmony between his inner and outer world. The better the outer world is arranged the more probable it is that the individual achieves that goal. The acts of Man must be criticized setting as a goal that everything in culture — as in nature — finally become approvable, well-made, and as such beautiful. That the world should improve.
C. Crystallization of perspectives

Ethics becomes a frame within which environmental aesthetics operates; in this there is a decisive difference to art. Ethics sets the boundaries to environmental aesthetics, but does not determine the practice inside those boundaries; thus, it does not properly have the position of a norm. The internal practice is influenced by the natural and cultural sciences, the information they give being an element in the description, interpretation, and evaluation of the environment.

The first task of environmental aesthetics is to investigate the ontology of the environment, the second is the practical analysis of environmental criticism—and it can have an influence by making those principles known. But we can also demand of it a more active role, for example in legislation, in environmental education, etc. Because, however, aesthetics is a philosophical discipline, it cannot give answers to specific questions, even if acquaintance with the philosophical foundation is a condition of specialization. Conversely, the philosopher must also have at least relative expertise in some other field besides his own, that is philosophy.
AFTERWORD

I have presented the totality of environmental aesthetics. The task has been to construct a general model — therefore it has been impossible to deal in detail with those sub-questions that relate to the model. The model has been weighted; I have given most space to those questions that appear most essential. These are especially the question of the nature of the environment as an aesthetic object compared to others — especially art and its objects; the importance of the depiction of the environment; and the position of ethics as a frame for environmental aesthetics. All the time I have aimed to bring out the significance of natural and cultural knowledge; beauty extends from the surface to the depths.

This model should in all parts be further developed theoretically; I have been forced to choose broadness and an all-embracing approach in place of the detailed treatment of sub-questions. The second direction for continuation is the adaptation of the model to the specification of views and ideas appearing in depictions of the environment: what kind of ontology appears in these depictions; in what way is the environment described, interpreted, and evaluated? Any documentary environmental depiction at all can be taken as material — written texts, photographs, films, drawings; and on certain conditions even a fictive artistic work. The basic cases are verbal depictions, for with other methods of depiction one must first return to the verbal level in analysis. In order to be illustrative, the depiction must be relatively extensive, diverse, and complex, so that questions and points of view are revealed most precisely. The best object would be the works of some naturalists. After an analysis dealing with a depicter, an attempt should be made to compare means, types, and the personae of depicters, and to investigate the possibilities and limitations. My earnest hope is that the presented model might lead to such investigations — for my part: explicit!
The Beauty of Environment was originally published by the Finnish Academy of Science and Letters seven years ago in April 1986. This second edition is an unaltered reprinting of it except for this postscript, a bibliography for 1986 to 1993, and a revision of the index. Although I have clarified and developed my views further in subsequent articles, using examples of applications as an aid, this book still corresponds to my view of how the field of environmental aesthetics should be articulated.

To be sure, the analogy of two aesthetic cultures—of art and the environment—and the interlocking and intertwining of the two have gradually become clearer to me: landscape architecture, environmental art, ready-made art, and conceptual art have forced me to wonder whether anything will ultimately remain outside of the realm of art and talk about art. Nevertheless, even though art can now be anything at all, it is still the case that not everything that can be art has as yet been actualized. Computer games and their related art experiments, which emphasize immediacy and interaction, have almost eliminated the role boundary between maker and receiver. Although I would like to avoid the analogy of art and the environment, in fleeing from it I have in fact continued to come up against it—and art has come even closer to fitting my definition of the environment. For example, the environmental artist Alan Sonfist, using human-made replicas, has shown the ready-made nature of such real, natural “things” as legislatively delimited nature protection areas (see Battin et al. 1989, p. 18).

What then has been achieved in the world in the last seven years? What has remained undone? In what ways have the emphases altered? The great leap that I expected in environmental aesthetics in 1986 has remained unrealized (though the need for a reprinting of my book is indeed a welcome sign of the continuation of activity in the field). It is true that seven years is not a long time in research in the humanities; nor does everything that has been prepared appear immediately. Despite signs of progress, the situation is, in general, the same as in Eugene C. Hargrove’s characterization of environmental philosophy (1989b): too slow in relation to the speed of worsening problems. However, environmental philosophy is an ascending field, and aesthetics is establishing a place for itself within it; its rise is apparent from recent congress programs and in such journals as Environmental Ethics (first published in 1979) and Environmental Values (first published in 1992).

Environmental philosophy, in general, and ethics, in particular, have won a position in public debate and in the academic world. Special programs in environmental ethics or philosophy have been developed for students and professionals in the environmental field (at the University of North Texas, Colorado State University, and the University of Georgia in the USA and at the University of Lancaster in Great Britain). The International Institute of Applied Aesthetics, to be established in Lahti, Finland, will promote aesthetics with its applications, whether in the field of the arts or the environment.

Aesthetics must come—and some of its parts have come—out into the world. Nonetheless, the criticism made by Thomas Munro (1966) remains valid: aesthetics needs to get a better grip on contemporary problems, in place of conceptual analysis. It is also worth recalling John Fisher’s discussion (1975) of the fact that aesthetics cannot be limited to the schooling of new generations of academic teachers. Philip Meeson (1992) repeated similar ideas when he examined the direction of recent interests among aestheticians. The road to an active, applied aesthetics has certainly been opened, but there are few travelers on it. Still, there is a desire in many places for the expertise of the field: the social demand exists.

A Glance Backwards

Harold Osborne, the leading British aesthetician who had an essential influence on the awakening of the 1960s, is no longer with us; R. W. Hepburn, whose articles, “Contemporary Aesthetics and the Neglect of Natural Beauty” (1966; abridged version in 1963) and “Nature in the Light of Art” (1973), meritiously drew attention to the neglect of natural beauty, has not to the best of my

1 Sources marked with an asterisk (*) can be found in the index to the main text.
knowledge published anything new in the field of environmental aesthetics. Many of the writers known to me, such as Arnold Berleant, Allen Carlson, Yuriko Saito, and Barbara Sandrisser, have certainly published more and have developed their views in congress publications, and a whole new generation has appeared: Steven C. Bourassa (1991), Cheryl Foster (1992a & b), and Stan Godlovich.

Perhaps the most significant new contribution has been Hargrove’s broad outline of environmental philosophy in his book, *Foundations of Environmental Ethics* (1989a), which also provides historical depth. He takes as his basic point of departure aesthetics, not as a branch of scholarship—as the study of beauty—but rather as beauty in itself. Berleant, who has been active in the field of environmental aesthetics, has complemented and articulated his articles to form a book, *The Aesthetics of Environment* (1992), in which he utilizes the idea of aesthetic engagement, which he developed in his previous book, *Art and Engagement* (1990), in place of the distance of traditional thought. Berleant convincingly demonstrates that the aesthetic examination of the environment is most typically immediate: the examiner is a part of the object. Another significant addition is the recently published anthology, *Landscape, Natural Beauty, and the Arts* (1993), edited by Salim Kemal and Ian Gaskell. Mara Miller, who has dealt with the aesthetics of garden art (1986), will soon publish a book on the subject (*Gardens as Art*), which is influenced by environmental art, a rising form of art.

There is also a great deal of earlier work that I should have known better and treated more broadly. Sociological and empirical research into the concept of taste as well as environmental psychology were left out; much research has been carried out in both fields and collected in the anthology, *Environmental Aesthetics: Theory, Research, and Applications* (1988), edited by Jack L. Nasar. Landscape architecture is one significant area; humanistic geography is another. A month after my own book appeared, Pauli Tapani Karjalainen’s study, *Geodiversity as a Lived World* (1986), was published in Finland. Its point of departure is the landscape as it is experienced—and the experiential material comes to a great extent from *belles-lettres*. Karjalainen brought to my attention a whole new school of writers, the humanistic geographers! Although I had heard of one, Yi-Fu Tuan (especially *1974), I did not know, for example, of Anne Battimer. It is also possible to go far into the past. Kant and Schopenhauer, for instance, have recently been treated in terms of traditional exegetics, that is, textual analysis; German nature aesthetics—the work of Alfred Biese (1905) and others—is an area in which finds of contemporary interest can be made, including, for example, Heinrich von Salisch’s forest aesthetics of the last century (*1885, 1902*).

**Trends**

The passage of even a short period of time can clarify an image: paths traveled are often more clearly seen when looked at in retrospect. Experiments in environmental art and public art have rapidly expanded and increasingly extended their application to the environment. The avant-garde of landscape architecture in particular, borrowing the ideas of futurism and continuing its traditions, has been an extension of this kind—becoming a threat to the traditional cultural landscape and to urban construction, but simultaneously liberating designers to permit them to make new experiments. The anti-phenomena of art—first unconventional works and then breaches of rules—have of course raised the question of what they would mean if transferred to the environment. The answer is frightening. The futurism of the beginning of the century, when creating a vision of a new world, proclaimed the necessity of destroying the old. The rejection of an established system, without bringing forth a new one to replace it, is a Pandora’s box, the opening of which is an ethical, not primarily an aesthetic question. But of course it will be opened.

It becomes ever more difficult to speak of art as a totality—ever more difficult to set art and the environment next to each other by work—because art is in so many ways no longer representational, and, as a result, now complements the environment and offers alternatives to it. Representationality has certainly been preserved at the level of meaning so that art, through interpretation, can continue to be *about something*. The boundary between the two aesthetic cultures is not a chasm; rather, the phenomena interlock. With increasing clarity they place themselves parallel to one another as *institutions*; talk about the art institution or art world has moved from philosophical writing to everyday criticism. Its environmental partner has not, as far as I know, been theoretically developed by others; nor has it for this reason of course gained currency in thought and
language. There is a place and a need for it, and the demonstration of this need is what I regard as my most significant contribution. Nevertheless, because George Dickie floated the idea at the end of his book (*1974) and David B. Richardson briefly considered the conventions of the examination of nature in his article (*1976), the honor due to the providers of the stimulus goes to them.

Comparative pairs cannot be purely—or even primarily—individual works and objects, which in all their variety avoid every generalization: the examination of the connection of all aesthetic levels and characteristics must develop through an analogic model. One important unifying factor is talk about the environment, the partner of talk about art. Years ago I emphasized the significance of the depicter of nature as a developer of the use of language and as the proclaimer of experience; Berleant (1992) devoted an entire chapter to environmental criticism, the journal CEA Critic published a thematic number on the literature of nature (Literature) (1991), and Aldo Leopold, as a classic writer, aroused permanent interest. Specific environmental criticism is also increasing. A good example is the half-page criticisms of architectural objects every Sunday in The New York Times.

The trend that promises a change in direction for the whole of aesthetics is the move toward applied aesthetics. Marcia Muelder Eaton began explicitly to speak of this trend in her book, Aesthetics and the Good Life (1989), especially in chapter four, “Applied Aesthetics,” which deals with architecture and environmental design. Throughout the book Eaton emphasizes the connection of various values. Applied aesthetics is moving naturally toward applications in aesthetically significant subareas: in legislation, tourism, environmental protection and planning, and advanced criticism. A taste of what such criticism might be on a concrete level is provided by Puzzles about Art (Battin et al. 1989), in which dozens of writers examine specially selected case studies. Aesthetics has brought its own point of view to these matters, but of course that is not by itself sufficient. Theory and practice interlock; participant observation is required. Practice does not bypass the aesthetician; rather it demands that he or she come along too. A good example of practical co-operation is the extensive research project (1988-1991) into the possibilities of computer-aided architecture carried out in the Technical Research Centre of Finland; it was also used to develop advanced criticism by exploiting animation and other visualization.

A corresponding move away from pure theory has taken place in the framing of questions related to art and in art itself. In addition to taking a position as an investigator of the theoretical basis of art administration and policy, aesthetics can provoke the presentation and demonstration of aesthetic programs by artistic means. Folk art has developed outside the established institutions of art by adopting the example of high art; increasingly, the result has been straight-forward environmental art. On the other hand, folk artists, such as the makers of graffiti, have been drawn into the sphere of gallery art. The theatrical environmental actions of the environmental movements are rooted in ritual—recalling activist art and even changing into it.

All of the subareas I have mentioned require group work. Although it is not possible to demand specific knowledge from aestheticians as aestheticians, they cannot remain entirely external to the debate either if they wish to study and understand technical issues. The skill of an aesthetician, and of a philosopher in general, lies in the conceptual analysis of questions—in their dismemberment into manageable sizes and in their reassembly after analysis. Aestheticians must work in cooperation with nature protectors, architects, ecologists, restorers, builders, foresters, ecologists, and farmers—not only in research but at a grass-roots level—so that their knowledge remains linked with practical ability. The aesthetician is someone who acts, but who is also simultaneously a critical onlooker. Knowledge and ability are, in the final resort, combined into such an extensive totality that no single person can handle all aspects of it.

Ecology and Aesthetics

Aldo Leopold, one of the founders of the ecological movement, is also one of the classic originators of environmental philosophy. My earlier, broader work concentrated on the classic Finnish author Reino Kalliola. (Leopold published his famous A Sand County Almanac in *1949, and Kalliola’s Suomen kaunis luonto [The Beautiful Nature of Finland], the first part of a trilogy, appeared slightly earlier in *1946.) These naturalists, scientifically trained friends of nature, laid a foundation for the present environmental movement.

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It is becoming increasingly apparent that modern environmental aesthetics began only in the 1960s, as a product of the environmental movement and its way of thinking. The ecological emphasis separates present environmental aesthetics from the previous one-hundred-year-old German version; I too began from this later starting point. In this tradition beauty is found in the undisturbed operation of nature. The criteria of a beautiful environment are then the same as the traditional criteria for a good work of art: unity, complexity, and intensity. The goal in aesthetic examination is an interpretation of the environment, and an evaluation based on it, compatible with contemporary knowledge of the natural sciences and culture—not the maximization of beauty from premises of some kind. In art and design the ecological awakening is a recent development, from the 1980s and 1990s. It is illustrative of this awakening that the world’s oldest continually published art journal, ARTnews, ended its ninety-year cavalcade in the autumn of 1992 with an article on the “explosion” of ecological art (Cemallest 1992, p. 119). The same consciousness has been awakened in the applied arts. In accordance with ecologically responsible design, products are now being manufactured using renewable natural resources that in time will be recycled.

Environmentally conscious art tends to propagate these ideals. A Polish competition proclaiming global solidarity—the results of which were on view at the seville World Exhibition in the summer of 1992—tried to find a symbol that would unite the entire world, and emphasize mutual dependence and responsibility: an Earth flag, which would join all people—and in addition every living thing—together and to their common foundation (see Earth Flag Designs 1992). The writer of the foreword to the exhibition catalogue, the organizer of the competition, Wladyslaw Servatowski, points out that when humans went to the Moon in 1969, they had to raise a national flag there for lack of a common symbol (1992, p. 7); nevertheless, the image of the Earth viewed from the outside, brought back in photographs taken by the astronauts in space, did emphasize this connectedness. Slightly earlier a Czechoslovakian poster competition called for environmental posters very similar in spirit, which contained the same message: we are dependent on each other and in the final resort on the Earth (see EKO 1990). The Earth has already been personified as Gaia, the nurturing and caring Earth Mother, and perfection of this kind recalls what Fanchon Fröhlich (*1976) has called global aesthetics. Why shouldn’t it be extended to the galactic and the cosmic?

Ironically, the drive toward perfection, toward global aesthetics and the total work of art, has also focused attention on the beauty of incompleteness and the half-completed; chaos theories are in fashion. Order is something so complex that it becomes unpredictable. The activity of the receiver is now being emphasized; the public expects the opportunity to realize its own choices. The demand of total beauty has led to a kind of totalitarianism and to a passive role for the receivers: their concern is only to approve or disapprove of what is offered, not to disturb an easily injured totality, which is best known and understood by a master planner. The objective is to create an object that is perfect and unchanging, the self-sufficiency of which limits the users to a passive role in which the only acceptable activities are preservation and protection. This dilemma becomes a paradox: how do we create a complete totality while leaving space for the user as well? How do we move simultaneously toward perfection and toward an incompleteness permitting self-realization? In the built environment and in interior design, openness offers possibilities for choice that respects the user’s taste. In the pastoral environment, which is close to a state of nature, the answer provided by ecological restoration is to care for a sick environment up to the point where it is again capable of functioning by itself. In this way, for example, it has been possible to restore prairies and natural meadows.

In this book I have made a distinction between passive and active environmental aesthetics, the passive being basic research and the active applied research. There is no ranking order here, even if there is a certain kind of organization at work: in order for the applied work to be carried out, interdisciplinary research must be undertaken. Basic research, uninterested in its consequences, is specialized professional work; applied research, which tries to have an effect, consists of cooperative activity. In lay circles, there is clearly an awakening interest in what is being done in aesthetics, and it comes as a surprise to many professionals in the environmental field that there are those whose work it is to consider questions related to beauty. Among environmental professionals, the habit has been to answer such questions purely on the basis of personal experience and feelings. There is even a branch of philosophy specializing in the solution of questions of this kind!
The Future of Aesthetic Culture

The development of new kinds of works of art and art forms, the testing and breaking of boundaries, is, in principle, positive in art (even when it gives rise to debate), but it is more problematic in the context of the environment. Gene manipulation has been used to breed animals and plants, and even new species have begun to be produced. Ever more complex artificial trees and entirely artificial environments are also being manufactured. North American shopping centers (West Edmonton Mall in Edmonton and Mall of America in Minnesota) are beginning to be self-sufficient better worlds ("Shopper's Heaven!" "Incredible Universe!") with hotels, cinemas, fun parks, and skating rinks (see Variations 1992). Even an entire city, Las Vegas, is to a substantial degree built on artificiality. Robert Venturi gave us the first lesson in this matter as early as 1977 (Learning from Las Vegas), and there is more to be learned (especially during this period of postmodern rule). Innovations from the natural sciences and technology have been adopted in aesthetic activity, which in addition to the new branches of art, have influenced product design, fashion, and other fields, producing immediate benefits.

To too great an extent, environmental aesthetics has been the aesthetics of the natural environment. This emphasis can best be understood as a product of the search for the purest possible pair of opposites: it is untouched nature alone that remains conceptually separate and distinct from human skill and art—yet, the ready-made has brought even this distinction into question. When we consider the cultural environment, environmental aesthetics is referred to less often, but I have been quite prepared to apply it in this direction. Artificial nature gains ground all the time, as does its fictive accessories: from stage settings to the imaginary environments of theme parks (see Variations 1992), and most recently to virtual reality (see Rheingold 1991). When artificial nature threatens to destroy genuine nature, a conflict of aesthetic worlds arises: between nature and human creation. But a link can also be seen in a note by Walter H. Clark, Jr. (1988), where he examines a photograph of a man paddling a kayak: aestheticity lies not simply in the properties of the kayak, the water, and the landscape, but above all in how the man with his kayak forms a part of nature and how he survives by means of this skill in adaptation. Here, at its clearest, is the aesthetic engagement, emphasized by Berleant, which becomes an inseparable part of the examined. It appears to be only by chance that Berleant too, himself a canoeist, included in his book a personal episode, "A Paddle on the Bantam River" (1992, pp. 29-34), representing "descriptive aesthetics," which he then proceeded to analyze as a theoretician. This example recalls Hepburn's depiction of a parachutist (*1966). Nowadays a similar attempt to gain a peak experience is bungee jumping. These jumps are not primarily displays intended for an audience; rather, they are carried out for the sake of the pleasure gained from daring and surviving the jump.

Clark (1988) concluded that interest in the natural environment can serve as a model for interest in the created environment, "[that which is] so difficult to see because [it is] so close to us, so hard to see whole, and so exceptionally hard to see in harmonious consort with the natural world" (p. 99). Depictors of nature have finally succeeded in convincing us to approve of everything in a state of nature. In the cultural environment the challenge is different, and the final solution still one of wait-and-see: do we approve of it too or do we try to find the criteria of a quality or a good environment and move toward them? Art and environmental education collect the skills of different fields and arouse critical consciousness. Sociological research certainly ascertains likes and expectations, but provides no answer to the question of what a high-quality environment would be like. It unassumingly tells us what is generally liked. If these results are taken as norms, the result is environmental entertainment, which pleases all, but inspires no one. Aesthetic culture is a matter of making and understanding, even to the point of devotion.

Ultimately, art is an organized form of aesthetic creation. Even though environmental culture is not defined with the same clarity, it exists. It is even developing into something as highly refined as the art system. To a great extent we have already made it, and as individuals we internalize it when we grow up in our culture. However, because environmental culture has not fulfilled the demands of externality and disinterestedness of traditional aesthetics, we have classified it as something else. The transformation of art into something involving interaction has undoubtedly made it easier to
see the connection, but perhaps what has been most significant has been the change originating in aesthetic theory itself: these trends point toward the activation of the tradition of the philosophy of beauty.

I have emphasized that environmental aesthetics is not a fourth tradition of aesthetics alongside art philosophy, the philosophy of beauty, and metacriticism. It is a part of all of these. Environmental aesthetics need not, nevertheless, vanish into its roots; it is more than the sum of its parts. As a member of the family of aesthetics, it has its own identity; nor need it try to encompass everything.

Hargrove (1989a) presents another vision: a separate environmental philosophy will become unnecessary (and impossible) when all philosophy becomes environmental philosophy. Is it possible for the same thing to happen to aesthetics: could everything become environmental aesthetics? If art is considered to be a kind of environment, then it is on the road to such an amalgamation. Should it occur, the two levels, emphasized by Danto, which make art about something, may then vanish. Because what art is about is a matter of interpretation, we can assume that art realized in the natural and human environments is made to be interpreted. The apparent similarities, close relationships, and various associations of these phenomena can be accepted without adapting them to one another. A conceptual boundary remains, and throughout his work Danto has emphasized the depth of culturally created boundaries, most recently in the essay, "The Art World Revisited: Comedies of Similarity," included in his book Beyond the Brillo Box (1992). This boundary remains even if the relationship between art and reality is seen in the way that composer John Cage reputedly expressed it when comparing his own music with Thoreau's depictions of nature: "He let things speak and write as they are. I have tried to do nothing else in music." The book of nature is copied into depictions of nature: it is repeated over and over again in various branches of art. This repetition, however, is not an echo, but a personal picture—Leopold's, or Kalliola's, or Cage's.

Boundaries should not be obscured by defining everything possible as environment. The separateness or connectedness of phenomena is dependent simply on what is regarded as being a boundary at a particular time. Even art, most clearly as landscapes and buildings, is a concrete environmental phenomenon; nevertheless, it is a second world that is worthy of examination in its own right, built on that which exists concretely. Although the environment is a kind of total work of art, all such talk involves a metaphysical use of language. The environment is, in its broadest sense, the entire space in which our actions and thoughts take place, real and imagined. If one wishes, aesthetics, as environmental aesthetics, can escape from our vicinity to engage in adventures on a global and cosmic level, from questions of architectonic interior and urban space to space research! The boundaries of reality are broken on this journey, as in Arthur C. Clarke and Stanley Kubrick's space adventures, whether the year is 2001 or 2010.
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...the book is of great value. As a summary of a vast field it is unsurpassed, as a stimulus to further consideration of the nature and role of environmental aesthetics it is provocative. It should be read by those who are interested in aesthetics but also by those practising planning and conservation.

—The British Journal of Aesthetics

The book is worthwhile for those engaged in environmental education, but perhaps even more for those who feel that the concept of "environment" is itself in a somewhat unclarified state and that this lack of clarification may be linked in some ways with the struggle now going on to reenvision [the human] relation to both natural and shaped worlds. The book is useful to this end because the comparison of art objects and natural objects stretches both concepts in ways which are unusual and therefore potentially illuminating. For the same reason the book should prove suggestive to those considering the limits of the aesthetic in the realm of art. The bibliography is extensive and useful.

—The Journal of Aesthetic Education

...such a work is long overdue and should be welcomed by everyone with an interest in aesthetics. The fact that it has been so long in coming is probably due in part to the sheer magnitude of the task, and the author deserves great credit for even having attempted to draw together the diverse and numerous sources that relate to its topic. The book's bibliographic utility alone would be ample justification for acquiring it. Furthermore, its organization makes it a kind of microcosm of the whole field of aesthetics. It would certainly make an ideal text for course work in this area, and in fact it does such a careful job of interrelating environmental aesthetics with the general field of aesthetics that it would very nearly be sufficient as a sole text even for students who had no prior exposure whatsoever. Certainly there will be debate over some of the author's methods or conclusions, but the book forms a substantial and scholarly base for future discussion on this subject.

—Environmental Ethics

Yrjö Sepänmaa is a Senior Research Fellow of the Academy of Finland. He holds docent positions at three Finnish universities: Helsinki, Jyväskylä, and Turku. He has been a Senior Fulbright Scholar at the University of Georgia and a Visiting Research Professor at the University of North Texas. Research for this book was supported by an exchange research grant at the University of Alberta from the Canadian government.