CHINA'S PROPAGANDA IN THE UNITED STATES
DURING WORLD WAR II

THESIS

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The study examined China's conduct of its most important overseas propaganda activities in the United States during World War II.

The findings showed that the main characteristics of China's propaganda in the United States in the war years included: (a) official propaganda in the United States was operated by the Chinese News Service and its branch offices in several cities; (b) unofficial propaganda involved work by both Americans and Chinese, among them, missionaries, newspapermen, and businessmen who tried to help China for different reasons; (c) both China lobby and Red China lobby changed people's image about China, either the Nationalists or the Communists; and (d) propaganda toward the overseas Chinese in the United States was to collect donations and stir up patriotism.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In ancient China, the concept of getting along with people—public relations—existed under different labels—civility, address, homage, propaganda, publicity, lobby, etc. It was believed in ancient China that man could be changed for the better by the persuasion and example of his moral superiors, and that, once this was done, it could be possible to assure harmony among individuals, and justice and stability in the political and social orders. This belief in the efficacy of persuasion was a basic article of faith in later imperial Confusianism, and the concept endured through all the dynasties over the centuries.

One of the earliest examples of propaganda in China was found in The Book of War, written in Chinese by Sun Tze in the fifth century B.C. (20, P. 31) The Book contains the first recording of using the propaganda leaflets in world history of war (20, p. 31), and it was recorded in The Book that kite flyers were used to release leaflets over the enemy more than a thousand years before.

The use of propaganda and mass persuasion was recorded mostly during the period of transition of imperial powers. Sui Wei-ti (reign 581-604), for example, issued 300,000 copies of broadsheets to challenge the Ch'en Dynasty's power.
This probably was an unprecedented type of propaganda activity and flourished before the invention of printing in China (14, p. 233).

In the thirteenth century, the generals of Genghis Khan employed the technique of "directed rumors" to exaggerate their strength and confuse their enemies by planting spies in the headquarters of their foes where they reported that the armies of Genghis Khan "seemed like grasshoppers, impossible to count" (7, p. 339).

The device of propaganda was used by Chu Yuan-chang, founder of the Ming Dynasty, in 1368. He sent a message to the people of North China setting a day for a simultaneous rising against their alien master, the Mongol Yuan Dynasty. The message was circulated inside the "moon cakes" traditionally eaten at the mid-autumn festival (14, pp. 235-236).

The nearest case of international propaganda activity in China was the example of the sending of Cheng Ho, a eunuch of Yunnon, who sailed from Woosung River with a large fleet to cruise along the coasts of Cambodia and Siam twice beginning in 1405. His voyage was an attempt by the Ming Dynasty to show the strength of the Middle Kingdom (that is, China) and demand tribute from other countries. Several such expeditions were sent to countries of Southeast Asia, but they were primarily designed to established relations with other countries (8, p. 112).

China's first modern official propaganda in the United States was in 1867 when China sent a mission headed by an
American, Anson Burlingame, to the United States. Burlingame, appointed by President Abraham Lincoln in 1861, was the first American minister stationed in Peking. When he resigned in 1867, the Chinese authorities asked him to head a group of thirty secretaries and attaches (18, p. 42).

The Burlingame Mission visited various countries in Europe and the United States. Through the efforts of Burlingame, Western countries, including the United States, gradually adopted a policy of friendly treatment toward China, and the delegation paved the way for resident Chinese legations in the capitals of the West. Thus, historians gave the credit to Burlingame as the first goodwill envoy to propagate China's cause to America (18, p. 42).

During the turbulent years of foreign intervention and political upheaval, some individuals or semiofficial representatives of the Chinese government were engaged in activities designed to inform the American people about the situation in China. The Chinese government, however, failed to see the importance of propaganda activities in other countries, especially in the United States, before the Sino-Japanese War. When Japan let loose the full force of its military war in full-fledged aggression on Shanghai and the mainland, the Chinese government decided to report China's plight to the American people.

During World War II, China launched full-scale propaganda activities in the United States in order to repel Japanese
aggression by winning the friendship of the American people and getting military assistance of the United States government. Besides the work set up by the Chinese government, many Chinese sympathizers in the United States were organized voluntarily to ask the United States government to assist China in the war. The so-called China Lobby, with people supporting the Kuomintang (or the Chinese Communist Party), actively sought the attention of the American public.

Statement of the Problem

The problem of this study was to examine how China conducted its most important overseas propaganda activities in the United States during World War II.

Purposes of the Study

The purposes of this study were as follows:

1. To provide a historical perspective of China's international propaganda activities in the United States;
2. To show the development of China's propaganda organizations in the United States during World War II;
3. To examine the content of China's propaganda activities, both official and nonofficial, in the United States during World War II.

Questions

The following questions were posed for this study.

1. How was the organization structured?
2. Who was the target of Chinese propaganda in the
United States?

3. How was propaganda activity conducted?

4. How extensive was the program?

5. Was the China Lobby an arm of the Chinese government propaganda organization?

6. How were American correspondents in China used?

7. Were overseas Chinese in the United States the target of propaganda?

8. Were there Chinese organizations that cooperated with official propaganda work?

9. How successful was Chinese propaganda in the United States?

10. What kinds of propaganda were used?

Justification

The study discussed in detail the development of propaganda activities and organizations of China in the United States during the period mainly from 1935 to 1945. Some studies traced back to the early years of this century in order to show the development of the propaganda work in the United States.

The study is of value to researchers, journalists, and students who are interested in the history of Chinese propaganda, public relations, foreign affairs, and will help explain how China won American's support in the war against Japan.
Related Studies

No study on this topic was found in Journalism Abstracts. Previous studies of Chinese propaganda in the United States during World War included Propaganda From China and Japan, a case study in propaganda analysis prepared by Bruno Lasker and Agnes Roman in 1938, which gave some detailed background of skills employed by both Chinese and Japanese propagandists during the first period of the undeclared war between these two countries (13).

Dateline: CHINA was an account of Hollington K. Tong's work to reveal to the world, and to the United States especially, the condition of war-torn China. As China's wartime vice minister of information, Tong wrote the book after serving for a long time as a Chinese Joseph Goebbels (23).

This book offered both entertaining reading and worthwhile information in world journalism and the background of China's situation during the war. It is the first volume concerned with the first systematic organized propaganda work in modern China by its first American-trained journalist and the officer who was completely responsible for Chinese propaganda organizations during the war.

Tong's other book, Autobiography of a Chinese Farmer, was published in Taiwan only in Chinese. In it, he mentioned his work in the Ministry of Information during wartime in China, and gave detailed descriptions of the Chinese government propaganda organizations in the United States—its work, its staff, and its activities (22).
"China's Government Public Relations," an unpublished thesis written in 1956 by Thomas C. Li, traced the history of China's official publicity work from the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937. Li explained in detail the history of China's modern public relations and recorded step-by-step the development of China's internal and international propaganda activities and organizations. He concluded that China's wartime propaganda, generally speaking, was successful, although he said more would be required in the future to further improve China's relations with other countries (16).

C. L. Hsia, China's wartime head propagandist in the United States, wrote The Memoirs of My Career as a Diplomat in 1972. He described how he organized the Chinese News Service, Inc. to operate all propaganda work of the Chinese government in the Western Hemisphere. Hsia concluded, "It will not be bragging if I say we have founded the biggest and the most efficient propaganda organization in modern China" (10).

William E. Daugherty, a member of the Special Defense Unit of the United States Department of State during the war, wrote "China's Official Publicity in the United States" in 1942. In his article, Daugherty described Japanese war propaganda, counterpropaganda by friends of China, new reports on China's resistance, the Chinese Board of Information, organization of the Board of Information, radio broadcasting
from Chungking, censorship in China, China's publicity men abroad, This was the first reference to China's wartime propaganda written by an American (6).

The China Lobby Man (11), written by Joseph Keeley in 1969, and The China Lobby in American Politics (12), written by R. Y. Koen, 1960, each gave information about China's lobby during the war. These two books, however, were concerned more with the issue of the Institute of Pacific Relations rather than with the work of China's government publicity work.

Some documents, published by the United States Congress, which provided interesting cross-references to this study, were China & U. S. Far East Policy, 1945-1966 (1), China & U. S. Foreign Policy, 1971 (2), and "The China Lobby: A Case Study" (3). The article in The Reporter's 1952 issue about the China Lobby was helpful (24).


Methodology

This study was approached by means of historical research. It presented chronologically the development of the organizations and activities of China's propaganda in the United
States, and described how the work was done by Chinese propagandists in the United States.

All the information of this study was gathered from such secondary sources, either in English or in Chinese, as books, theses, handbooks, magazines, newspapers, and unpublished reports of the Chinese News Service.

Limitation of the Study

This study was limited to the period between 1935, when Tong was first appointed to head the Chinese government's censorship work, and 1945, when China and its allies won World War II against Japan. Some work covered the history of the establishment of the Chinese propaganda activities in the beginning of this century.

The study concerned only the propaganda work in the United States, i.e. China's propaganda for the Americans, therefore, China's internal propaganda and its propaganda activities for other countries were not included.

Definitions

Propaganda is often used as a synonym for related terms, such as publicity, press-agentry, public affairs, public relations, lobbying, and information. Although these terms may not have the same meaning today, in this study, propaganda is defined as "the planned effort to influence opinion through socially responsible and acceptable performance, based on mutual satisfactory two-way communication" (5). Its
function is "to evaluate public attitudes, to identify the policies and procedures with the public interest, and to execute a program of action and communication to earn public understanding and acceptance" (19).

International Encyclopedia of Social Science defines propaganda as:

The relatively deliberate manipulation, by means of symbols (words, gestures, flags, images, moments, musics, etc.), of other people's thoughts or actions with respect to beliefs, values, and behaviors which these people ("reactors") regard as controversial (21).

Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language defines propaganda as:

1. A group or movement organized for spreading a particular doctrines or systems of principles.

2. Dissemination of ideas, information or rumor, for the purpose of helping or injuring a person, an institution, a cause, etc.

3. (a) Doctrines, ideas, argument, facts, or allegation spread by deliberate effort through any medium or communication in order to further one's cause or to damage an opposing cause. (b) A public action or display having the purpose or the effort of furthering or hindering a cause (9).

The Institute for Propaganda Analysis, Inc. defines propaganda as:

Expression of opinion or action by individuals or groups deliberately designed to influence opinions or actions of other individuals or groups with reference to predetermined ends (15).

Paul M. S. Linebarger defines propaganda in his book Psychological Warfare as.
The planned use of any form of public or mass-produced communication designed to affect the minds and emotions of a given group for a specific public purpose, whether military, economic, or political (17).

Other definitions formulated for this study were as follows:

**International Propaganda**: Addressed to people at large, or to a regional, national, racial, religious, or professional group. Crossing of international boundaries—either real or imagined—is understood. It takes place when the citizen or government of one state transmits propaganda to the citizens of another state, regardless of the territory in which the propaganda originates.

**China Lobby**: The expression for characterizing Chiang Kai-shek’s supporters on the right. It was usually no more than a group of individuals that had a common interest and were closely knit to form a pressure group.

**Red China Lobby**: An amorphous group of liberals with its center in the universities who advocated an official United States policy of accommodation and appeasement toward Communist China during the 1940’s and 1950’s.

This group consisted of American academicians, scholars, writers, journalists, businessmen, governmental officials, religious and social leaders, and private citizens of all backgrounds and various political persuasions.
Organization

This thesis was organized into six chapters. Chapter I presented the introduction; Chapter II determined China's government propaganda efforts in the United States; Chapter III discussed the unofficial propaganda work of China in the United States; Chapter IV looked into activities made by the China Lobby and the Red China Lobby; Chapter V explained the propaganda work toward the overseas Chinese in the United States; and Chapter VI presented a summary and conclusion.
CHAPTER BIBLIOGRAPHY


CHAPTER II

CHINA'S OFFICIAL PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES

Long before China was engaged in any overseas publicity activity in the United States, America had been filled with propaganda works from other countries either friendly or antagonistic. Some of these represented nations that had been taken over by the Axis by short-of-war methods; others were active in behalf of enemy states, among which Nazi Germany had the biggest and most energetic movement (8, p. 359); and still others had programs designed by members of the Inter-Allied Information Committee, which included countries such as Australia, Denmark, Great Britain, Greece, and Poland. Before the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941, more than forty propaganda movements were competing for the attention and support of public opinion in the United States (8, p. 360).

In spite of the difficulty of covering the news in a battle-torn country, and in spite of disputed cables and mails, China had gradually found effective means of telling its story to America. First, by utilizing the hard-working foreign correspondents, then, by hiring its own loyal employees, China developed its propaganda organizations from a two- or three-men team into a more than 50-member operation.
Along with the propaganda works from other allies, China joined the Inter-Allied Committee to work in coordinating activities of the majority of the non-Axis fighting nations.

When the Sino-Japanese conflict broke out on July 7, 1937, the people of the United States began to receive a virtual avalanche of propaganda from Japan. During the first few years of war, the Japanese spent millions of dollars for propaganda activities in the United States. One New York newspaperman put the figure at not less than $3,500,000 yearly, another observer insisted it probably was close to $5,000,000, and a more reliable estimate showed that, in 1938 alone, the Japanese Diet (Congress) appropriated $2,000,000 for propaganda in the United States. Japanese businessmen were spending plenty, too (14, p. 29).

The head man in the Japanese propaganda mill was Count Aisuke Kabayama, who ran Kokusai Bunka Shinkokai, the Society for International Cultural Relations, with headquarters in Tokyo and branch office in New York. This society was organized because "the war in China had made Japan keenly realize the urgent necessity of propaganda," and its officials had the status of first secretaries of embassy (14, p. 29).

Most of the Japanese propaganda in the United States, therefore, was directed from Tokyo by this society and other coordinated agencies of the government. Much of it played upon two well-known American fears--fear of involvement in
war, and fear of Communism (3, pp. 72-73). Their propaganda always claimed that the United States did not understand Japan; that the Japanese did not want to exploit China, only to stamp out communism there; that unselfish Japan was trying valiantly to save China from itself and from the menace of the Soviet Union, which the Chinese were too naive to comprehend; and that Japan was fighting Chiang Kai-shek for love of the Chinese people (14, p. 30).

The Japanese rarely used the word "propaganda," but as a rule referred to their political warfare as "thought war." To them, this term was different from propaganda in Westerners's minds in that it was not war by thought and argument, but war on thought and argument.

In the months preceding to Pearl Harbor, Tokyo Radio, the official Domei News Agency, and the Japanese press jointly conducted an efficient war of nerves which, for all its alleged clumsiness and primitiveness, effectively deceived a good many people in the United States. It was so efficient in creating a political fog-screen, by using infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that Cordell Hull, then the Secretary of State, admitted later, "I never imaged until today any government (Japanese) on this planet was capable of uttering them" (9, p. 10).
Chinese Ministry of Information

**Background**

The Chinese, generally speaking, spent little to counteract the Japanese propaganda offensives in the United States, in part because they had little to spend, and in part because they didn't need to spend much. On the whole, America already sympathized with the Chinese. China was the underdog in the war, and the American traditionally favored the underdog. Moreover, the war was fought on Chinese soil; Chinese towns had been destroyed and Chinese noncombatants had died, and the story of their suffering had touched Americans's hearts.

Although Americans basically were in favor of China, most of the news of China reaching American newspapers in the early 1930's either came from unreliable sources or was distorted in transit. For example, before 1937 when China was involved in the undeclared war with Japan in North China, The New York Times cable desk once received a censored dispatch from its China correspondent, reading "Times New York Stop Stop Stop Stop Stop Stop Stop Stop Stop Stop Stop Stop Stop Stop Stop Signed James Wood" (12, p. 6).

In those years, China never had any systematic policy concerning censorship of foreign correspondents' dispatches, not to mention deliberate falsification or rewording of messages. Sometimes unwarranted delays of press dispatches destroyed their news value. On September 22, 1937, for instance, the historic news broke out that the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) announced that its former Red Army had been reorganized as a part of the Chinese National Army. This would be a page one story in any newspaper as it meant the only remaining separatist army in China would merge with the government forces.

When the foreign correspondents quoted the official Central News Agency story and the official statement from Nanking (China's capital) in their cables, the censor, Dr. H. H. Chang, a Harvard alumnus and former minister to Portugal who was a highly competent man in his own field but without any background of practical newspaper experience, saw the news as just another reference to the Chinese Communists and ordered deletion of all mention of the story, the communique, or the Central News Agency dispatches in the outgoing cables. Later, he explained that, having killed so many previous references to the Communists, he thought he might just as well kill this one, too (12, pp. 8-9).

During this time, press censorship was carried out by the Wartime Press Censorship Bureau under the National Military Council, which appointed censors to various places. Any "prejudicial reports to national defense, the Kuomintang, and national government, China's foreign relations, national finance and economics," or any reports "liable to disturb peace and order, or affect war efforts or good social morals" would all be suppressed (1, p. 706).
The constant complaints of unwarranted censorship were sent to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek himself from those foreign correspondents, but the Chinese government didn't see the importance of international propaganda until the war itself taught officialdom that a just cause alone was not enough to induce favorable public opinion. In 1935, the National Military Council appointed Hollington K. Tong, a journalist trained in Missouri and Columbia, to reorganize the office of censorship. The authority told him that censorship was being applied indiscriminately that telegraph editors in America and other countries actually were receiving dispatches from China with nothing but the punctuation marks left in them. Tong, therefore, was asked to accept the position as chief censor of all outgoing foreign press telegrams for patriotic reasons (11, p. 34).

The reorganization of the censorship office was only a part of the work in Chinese leaders' mind to improve its overseas propaganda. Two years later, before the Central Government withdrew to Hankow, the Fifth Board under the Military National Council was established, and Tong was appointed as vice minister. The use of the number instead of a name to designate the board was to keep the Japanese from knowing its exact functions (11, p. 34).

Although this office was set up for handling its early-stage information work abroad, it was only a temporary office before the formal international department was formed. Since
then China began to have an office that was able not only to tell foreign correspondents what they could or could not say in their dispatches, as the former censorship office used to do, but also to tell them what China itself wanted publicized.

One of the board's early contributions was the organizing of the Anti-Enemy Committee by volunteer citizens in Shanghai, which was designed to inform Shanghai's foreigners of the Chinese viewpoint about the news. Among its members were Dr. C. L. Hsia, then president of the Anglo-Chinese Medhurst College and a member of the Legislative Yuan (China's Congress), who later became the head of Chinese propaganda organization in the United States; Dr. Yuan-ning Wen, editor of T'ien Hsia (The World), a monthly literary magazine in English that was highly rated among the intelligentsia of Shanghai; Dr. Herman Liu, president of Shanghai University; and H. J. Timperley, a correspondent for the Manchester Guardian (11, p. 27).

This committee, whose chief endeavor was to give foreigners a clearer understanding of what the Chinese were actually thinking, and to enlist their sympathy with the Chinese cause, provided the non-experienced Chinese propagandists an opportunity to be familiar with the method of providing information and material in which foreigners might be interested. This experience helped them develop various propaganda techniques to deal with foreigners in the later years of the war.
The operation of the Fifth Board was somewhat abnormal, and everything was totally new to the propagandists. Although a news section was soon founded to meet the desires of foreign correspondents from different countries, and spot news and human interest stories were provided in daily news sheets, the work was far from satisfactory. The man who gathered the material could reach news sources only by walking or using rickshaws, and only twenty issues were distributed before the withdrawal of the Central Government from Nanking (11, p. 34).

At the same time, a photographic section was set up, but the lack of trained personnel and the shortage of costly equipments discouraged the officials. No pictures had ever been accepted by the foreign press, and this attempt at supplying photographs of suffering China for the newspapers abroad ended in dismay failure.

On November 15, 1937, the Supreme National Defense Council decided to make a sweeping reorganization of all government offices, including abolition of the Fifth Board. A new organization, the Ministry of Information, which was to be under the control of Kuomintang, created an International Department to handle overseas publicity of the Chinese government, and Tog was retained as the vice minister in charge of the international propaganda work. It has been only two months since the Fifth Board was formed, and the
change meant simply that the first period of China's propaganda to urge international sympathies had ended.

Organization

There were fifteen subsidiary units in the Ministry of Information (first known as the Board of Information) (1, p. 48). The function of the ministry could be subdivided into two departments, each headed by a vice minister, with one responsible for domestic propaganda and the other, the International Department, responsible for foreign publicity.

Because of the war, the ministry functioned as an organ of the Kuomintang rather than as an agency of the Central Government. Fortunately, this peculiar situation did not undermine its contribution to China's successes or failures of propaganda work in facing the challenge from Japan.

The International Department of the Ministry of Information was divided into several sections. Most important to foreign newspapermen and writers visiting wartime China was the English section, headed by James L. "Jimmy" Shen, a journalism graduate of the University of Missouri; then by Hawthorne Cheng and Wan Ho-sheng successively. This section usually consisted of six Chinese writers, most of whom had graduated from American missionary institutions in Peking and Shanghai (10, p. 131).

Releases from the English section included a daily bulletin, special handouts, state documents, such as trans-
lations of speeches by the Generalissimo, and material for a monthly magazine, *China at War*, which was first published in Hong Kong and later in New York, and soon became one of the main publications by Chinese propagandists in the United States. This section brought out from time to time, special pamphlets that included articles by Chinese government officials as well as scholarly articles by its own research staff.

Other subsidiaries included the Russian, Japanese, photographic and broadcasting sections. German and French sections were founded in the early years but became inoperative later.

The department had held weekly press conferences that usually were presided over by the Director H. P. Tseng, and attended by newspapermen as well as military and press attaches of foreign embassies. As a rule, at these conferences, a military spokesman, a major general of the National Military Council, reviewed the latest news from the military front; three other representatives—the Minister of the Information, the Secretary General of the Executive Yuan (the cabinet), and the spokesman for the Foreign Minister—reported on their respectively fields of activity.

Questions normally were answered for publication during the press conference. In the later years of the war, the conferences were divided. The military and the political conferences were held on different days, so that correspon-
dents would be able to file more comprehensive dispatches, which were limited to a fixed daily allowance of words because of the war situation.

Since the establishment of the ministry, its responsibility for China's publicity work was explicitly defined. The government insisted that at all times the ministry must tell only the facts, be they favorable or otherwise. The duty of the ministry was to make the truth "known to the outside world through all media by which information can be disseminated" (11, p. 5).

Shortly after the year that the Ministry of Information was set up in 1937, the situation in China aggravated drastically. Owing to military defeats, the Chinese government continually withdrew from the coast area to the inner continent, settling first in Hankow for eleven months and then, in October, 1938, moving to Chungking, the war capital.

The eleven months spent in Hankow were frustrating for the staff of the International Department. The only thing that could be done in such disorderly conditions was to provide information for foreign correspondents; but only a few correspondents accompanied the Chinese government. Most of others still were in Shanghai, covering the advance of the Japanese army.

Little attention was paid to the Chinese in retreat. The situation shifted only at the end of 1938 while Chungking was reconstructed as the main base of the International
Department. The world's news gatherers began to move to this remote city in far southwest of China.

It was during this period in Hankow that Chinese propagandists reexamined their policy. The lesson that sympathetic treatment of the war news from China did not necessarily bring China active support from the United States had encouraged them to make some thoroughgoing revisions in their propaganda methods. Propaganda concentrating on the economic, or political, interest of the war replaced the old way of seeking sympathy through the consideration of humanitarian principles.

It was also during this period that the Chinese propagandists began putting their primary efforts toward the American public, since the United States was the key to any possible Asiatic action by the democracies. This work was gradually increased during the years 1937 and 1938 to turn the American key.

The Activities

The first task Tong accepted was to persuade foreign correspondents to pay occasional visits to Hankow, and to the new wartime capital, Chungking, in distant Szechwan province. He believed that "a visit, even a very brief one, to Free China, would convince the foreign correspondents that the country was not, as continually claimed by the Japanese, on the verge of collapse" (3, p. 77). He believed that such visits would enable the correspondents to get a first-hand picture of events.
One of those American reporters who went to Hankow along with the Chinese government was Tillman Durdin of *The New York Times*, who became famous for his reporting on the Japanese atrocities at Nanking. His first dispatch about this event appeared in *The New York Times* on December 23, 1937, and for the next three months, the press in America was filled with accounts of the Rape of Nanking (12, p. 46).

Another famous journalist was John Gunther, author of *Inside Europe*, who was in China to gather material for his book *Inside Asia*. Gunther had opportunities to interview several government leaders, including the Generalissimo and Dr. H. H. Kung, then financial minister and later the prime minister.

Tong's next step was to invite more correspondents and international VIP's to visit China. Tong described his efforts in his book, *China and the World Press*:

Although the outbreak of the war in the fall of 1939 seemed to have eclipsed the war in China in the foreign press, it had one interesting effect upon us. A few of the more enterprising correspondents, and some of the itinerant statesmen, began to see the war as a global war and made Chungking a main stop in their trips around the world. We began receiving an increasing number of visitors who wanted to see everything, meet everyone, and have all their questions about China answered in a few days (11, p. 136).

The first of these visitors to Chungking was James R. Young, International News Service's Tokyo correspondent. He arrived in the fall of 1939 and wrote 20 widely quoted articles on his trip to China. He said that every Japanese bombing simply intensified the determination of Chunking to
resist Japan and its puppet, Wan Ching-wei. He declared categorically that there was no possibility of Japanese success against the Chinese (11, pp. 136-137).

Not long after Young returned to Tokyo, he was arrested by Japanese police and who accused him of sending extremely slanderous news items in regard to the Japanese forces operating in China. He was under detention for sixty-one days early in 1940 and was kept in a dark police cell. After considerable pressure from various American groups, Young was permitted to leave Japan after he was convicted. He returned to America in June, 1940; his story was told widely in the American press, arousing new interest in China, especially among newspapermen.

In the fall of 1940, Roy Howard, head of the Scripps-Howard chain of papers, and Royal Arch Gunnison of the North American Newspaper Alliance, arrived in Chungking. Both journalists had occasion to discuss the China situation with the Generalissimo, and wrote their interviews with Chiang Kai-shek. Gunnison’s articles were carried by forty-five American newspapers (12, pp. 130-131).

Before Henry R. Luce, publisher of Time, Life, and Fortune, and his wife, Clare B. Luce, visited China, Life magazine had sent two husband-wife teams to Chungking in 1940-41. The first couple was the widely known American novelist and playwright, Erskine Caldwell and his equally famous photographer-wife, Margaret Bourke-White. In addition
to taking several hundred photo studies of the common Chinese people (once she spent over two hours photographing a Chinese boy she had come across on the street), Bourke-White took over forty pictures of Generalissimo and Madame Chiang (12, p. 134).

Carl and Shelley Mydans, another couple, who photographed for Life magazine, the first large magazine in the United States to take a deep interest in China's war against Japan, were received by Generalissimo and Madame Chiang, who again permitted photographs to be made (12, p. 134).

The Luces arrived in Chungking in May, 1941, and spent five days in China, including a brief visit to the fighting front. Luce described his impression about the front in a message he sent to his office: "Serious battle now developing Yellow River . . . Army of Generalissimo best thing in China. Morale magnificent against appalling difficulties" (12, p. 139).

Another important visitor in 1941 was the American Military Mission to China, headed by Brigadier General John Magruder. The dispatch of this group was regarded by the Japanese as highly unfriendly to Japan but gave China hope that substantial military aid was in sight.

Without counting the number of foreign correspondents who went to Shanghai after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War (1937), more than 500 authors, writers, and journalists, representing newspapers, magazines, radio systems, and press associations as well as freelancers, had visited interior

As the situation was improving in China, and the European War and the Pacific War broke out, and China was gradually recognized as one of the Allied countries, major world news agencies began to send their reporters to China in 1941. In January, 1943, at least fourteen correspondents and photographers from different American news and picture services were stationed in Chungking to cover news in China. They were Brooks Atkinson, The New York Times; Frank Cancellare, Acme; Spenser Moosa and J. R. O'Sullivan, The Associated Press; Robert P. Martin, George K. J. Wang, and Karl J. Eskeland, United Press; John Jarrell, Francis Lee, and Robert Bryant, International News Service; Arch T. Steele, Chicago Daily News; Ernest O. Hanser, Reader's Digest; James L. Stewart, CBS; and Theodore W. White, Time. Dewitt MacKenzie of The Associated Press Stopped in Chungking briefly that month, too (1, p. 704).

Between January and November, 1942, a total of 785,882 words were sent to the United States as news dispatches by correspondents of American newspapers and magazines (1, p. 703). In the same year, the seriousness of fighting with Japanese resulted in an increase in number and length of dispatches.

Fighting in Chekiang and Kiangsi provinces, for example, pushed the Chinese to be prominent. In June, 1942, with hostilities spreading, 104,915 words were sent in a single month. The activities of the famous American air unit, American Volunteer Group (the Flying Tigers), in that month formed the topic of a number of news dispatches (1, p. 703).

Another method used to achieve Chinese news media prominence among the American public, other than inviting correspondents and government officials to Chungking, was the
enlargement of the scope of the radio connection with the United States. Chungking's International Radio Station XGOY, constructed shortly after the beginning of the war, was completed in November, 1938, and first broadcast in February, 1939. Accredited foreign reporters, thereafter, were given the right to use this facility to transmit their feature articles, whereas spot news was still sent by wireless. In 1942, 312,000 words of feature stories were sent by radio to foreign press, mainly to the United States, and 208,000 words were sent to the magazine published in New York, China at War (1, p. 704).

Photographic and film work was again tried by the International Department, which had done almost nothing in the first year of the war. At first, this work relied upon visiting photographers and local amateurs. Joris Lvens, famous documentary film cameraman and director, took thousands of feet of film to the United States, and edited a film called "The Four Hundred Million." Commentary by Frederic March, motion picture star, was dubbed in (11, pp. 108-109).

The film was a full-length feature of six reels that elicited excellent notices when first shown in New York at the end of 1938. The film was ignored by the public, and not much attention was drawn to China's resistance to Japan. However, after the attack of Pearl Harbor, the film was revived and material in it was reused in a number of other films, notably "Inside Fighting China" (11, p. 109).
Early Publicity Work in the United States

The Japanese maintained an enormous propaganda machine in the United States, and in the first two years of the Sino-Japanese War, they extended their operation widely. On November 1, 1939, all the Japanese propaganda plants were moved to a huge site in the International Building of Rockefeller Center in New York, thus putting the whole organization under one roof (10, pp. 88-89).

In order to utilize American's fear of Communism, the Japanese propaganda machine instituted full-fledged publicity work to win considerable sympathy among American Catholics, in addition to some organized or unorganized Americans with business interests. At least ten Americans were retained by the Japanese for propaganda work before 1939, and they were very active among Catholics. Frederick V. Williams, for instance, for ten years a publicity director for various Catholic organizations, headed the Japanese propaganda activities among Catholics in 1938 and 1939 (11, pp. 89-90).

In counteracting the situation, Tong soon asked the Reverend Charles L. Meeus, a Catholic priest who had worked as a missionary in Kiangsu Province, to serve as a nonpaid volunteer, with the consent of his Bishop, to do publicity work in America for the Chinese government. Before this commission, Meeus had served as a publicist for China's
cause; in 1937, he accompanied a delegation of Chinese Boy Scouts to Holland (11, p. 90).

Tong's book describes how Meeus began his work:

Father Meeus was an amateur photographer and took with him to America many pictures which portrayed China's resistance to aggression. When he arrived in Los Angeles, the Bishop of that diocese looked him over, found him handsome and smooth in talk, and asked him what he intended to do in the United States. Father Meeus replied that he would engage in publicity work for China. The Bishop, in a mood of sarcasm, remarked, 'You had better start a laundry and give the earnings to China's cause.' Pretending to take the remark literally, Father Meeus opened a laundry the next day. The Bishop told him to close it but still not realizing the dangers of sarcasm said that a chop suey restaurant might have been a better publicity medium. Within a week Father Meeus had founded a Chinese restaurant (11, p. 90).

The second Catholic representative who came to the United States was young Bishop Paul Yu-pin, Vicar Apostolic of Nanking, who earned three doctorates and served for some years as professor while completing his studies in Rome. Yu-pin visited the United States in 1939 and 1940 and explained to Catholic communities the Chinese position as seen by a Chinese Catholic leader. He made friends everywhere and won respect for himself and the church in China.

The next United States group with which Tong tried to win favor was the Jewish community because "it would be of real benefit to China to have Jewish scientists, engineers, physicians, merchants, and other experts to help us solve some of our wartime problems (12, p. 98). However, because of lack of support, this plan never got beyond the blueprint stage.
In the spring of 1938, in an attempt to enlarge the scope of Chinese publicity work in the United States, Tong proposed that a professional public relations expert be engaged in America to direct Chinese propaganda there. For several months, Carl Byoir and Associates, Inc. was hired by the Chinese government to raise money to relieve the suffering of noncombatants. The selection of this company caused much resentment and hostility among both foreign and Chinese friends of the Chungking government, because of Byoir's reputation of having represented the German Railway under Hitler. What was even more embarrassing, however, was that later, Byoir registered with the United States Justice Department as an agent of both China and Japan. This immediately resulted in a decision to end the association between Byoir and Tong's International Department (14, p. 32).

Also in 1938, the International Department widened its activities by sending official representatives to the United States, and to other countries. H. J. Timperley, an old colleague of Tong's, and Earl Leaf, former United Press correspondent, were appointed advisers to various official and unofficial groups in America. The work of these two men was threefold: intelligence, liaison, and public relations. Both of them were on the Chinese payroll and were sent to survey public opinion in order to set up organizations for publicity work in the United States (14, p. 32).
In New York, Timperley established Earl Leaf in a small office. Basically, Leaf served in a two-way capacity—reporting American trends to China and assisting in the spreading of information about China in America. His primary job, however, was to "supply the International Department with dependable reports on America opinions and attitudes, and to make suggestions for their betterment, Chinawise" (10, p. 124).

Another Chinese-paid publicist in the United States at this time was Bruno Schwartz, former editor of the Hankow Herald, who ran, from 1937 on, the semiofficial propaganda organization of the Chinese government, Trans-Pacific News Service, in New York. During the first three and one-half years of the Sino-Japanese War, this organization issued a weekly news letter and occasional pamphlets in the "China Reference Series." Before 1943, the service issued several publications, such as The Story of Japan in China (as told in American cartoons), 1938; Far Eastern Reviews (reviews of articles on the Far East appearing in periodicals from 1939 to 1941), 1941; The Japanese Way (a photographic record of Japanese destruction of civilian life and property in China since July 7, 1937), 1938; Japan's Dependence on Foreign Supplies of War Materials, 1937; League of Nations Reports, 1937; and Contemporary China, a reference digest that began publishing in May, 1941, and that later was enlarged by the
Chinese News Service becoming one of the main publications of the International Department in the United States (13, p. 666).

This agency had two secretaries and two staff members. Dr. C. L. Hsia, who later reorganized the agency into the Chinese News Service, joined the agency in 1941 and served as a counselor. The budget of the Trans-Pacific News Service was $2,000 a month, half of which came from the Chinese Foreign Ministry (5, p. i-ii).

Two other organizations, comprising mostly Chinese sympathizers, published bulletins prior to 1939: the China Aid Information Exchange, whose news bulletin circulation was limited, but which always were popular; and the Chinese Information Service, whose similar propaganda bulletin was published in Washington, D. C. Because the particular situation before the Pearl Harbor attack in the United States, Tong could only hire some native Americans to help him organize pro-China publicity agencies, such as the Chinese Information Service. In April, 1939, Tong drafted basic lines on directing publicity efforts in foreign countries, including the United States:

I recommended that we continue to emphasize the bearing of the Far Eastern conflict upon world peace, and that we emphasize the importance of such economic measures as boycott and embargo upon Japan which, combined with Chinese resistance, could reduce Japanese to a point of military and economic exhaustion . . . . I felt that if the tension in Europe heightened, we should point out China's importance as a factor in the larger struggle.
Especially in our American publicity, we pointed out that the acquisition of the Spratleys by Japan was a threat to the Philippines, which were now flanked on our sides by Japanese possessions. To the north she had her fortifications in Formosa. Since Japan dominated the China Seas, she was in control west of the Philippines. And now, by her occupation of the Spratley Islands, she had entrenched herself in the south (11, p. 113).

But the success of Tong's propaganda efforts in the United States in the first half of the Sino-Japanese War was limited because of various reasons. The most obvious one was that he had a budget of $36,000 a year for the expenses of all the overseas representatives as well as the Hong Kong office, and another $36,000 for the operation of the International Department (10, p. 101). Compared with Japan's yearly budget of $3,500,000 to $5,000,000 in America, Tong's budget was absurdly small.

Fortunately, because of the work of those volunteer American missionaries and travelers, and the efforts of American press correspondents, the American people were quick to sympathize with China in its misfortunes. American public opinion began to support China, especially after mid-1938 as a result of Japan's unlimited bombing on Chinese cities as reported both by American correspondents and sympathizers, and by the Chinese propagandists.

On July 26, 1939, the American government, to manifest its moral support for China, gave notice to Japan of its desire to terminate the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. The real turn came in 1940, however, when newly re-elected President Franklin D. Roosevelt decided to reconsider policy
to put war material under export-license. He issued the embargo on steel, oil, and other material in the summer of 1941 and announced an Executive Order, on July 26, 1941, freezing Japanese assets in the United States, thereby cutting all trade relations with Japan. The objective that Chinese propagandists had been seeking was finally achieved (7, pp. 236-237).

Chinese News Service

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December, 1941 gave the Chinese new hope to win the war. This sensational change in the world picture, with Japan assuming the role of America's No. 1 enemy, would affect Chinese responsibility of carrying on the battle on its front. The success or failure in each individual battle would directly change Allied military strategy in other parts of the world. It had become one war. There war now increased pressure for speed of action. China would need to prove itself an equal among the leading nations of the war.

To Chinese propagandists, this change simply meant an even heavier responsibility than before. For more than four years, Chinese publicity services had had to fight a battle against foreign apathy and indifference. The Pearl Harbor attack, with the United States engaged in a war with the same Japanese aggressor, meant a significant turning point. The American people would be hungry for news from all Chinese fronts, regardless of the unpronounceable Chinese names, and
the relatively unknown battle areas. American would be eager for background information, spot news, still and motion pictures, and interpretations of important developments. An organization was needed that would supply all official information from distant China.

Under the circumstances, the Chinese government soon made its decision to cope with this turn of the event. The Trans-Pacific News Service was reorganized and a Chinese director, C. L. Hsia, was appointed. Hsia, an experienced Chinese diplomat who received his Ph.D. degree from the University of Edinburgh, Britain, in 1922, had undertaken a number of important diplomatic and public relations missions for the Chinese government before his newly appointed work in the United States. From 1938 to 1940, he was the representative of the International Department, stationed in London. In his memoirs, Hsia described how he accepted the job as the head of Chinese propaganda operation in the United States:

In the summer of 1938, I was invited by the International Department to do some publicity work in Britain, but it lasted only a short time and included only a few limited activities. In mid-1940, when I stopped in New York during a trip to America, Ambassador Hu Shih insisted that I should help him organize and coordinate overseas propaganda programs in the United States for the Chinese government. I tried but the work was soon suspended because I had to go back to Chungking with the newly appointed Foreign Minister Kuo Tai-chi.

While I finished all the work in Chungking, Dr. Hollington K. Tong urged me to be the representative of the International Department in New York and to be in charge of all the governmental publicity work in the United States. I was soon summoned by the Generalissimo, and was told the necessity and importance of this work. He then ordered me to fly back to New York in the shortest
time in order to start my work there immediately. I
had no time to check the budget of the new organization,
nor had time to ask the salary I might be paid, but
just returned to the United States without delay.

The work at first was filled with difficulties.
There were only two secretaries and two staff members
in the Trans-Pacific News Service, of which I changed
the name into the Chinese News Service. Then I went to
San Francisco and Chicago, tried to get spiritual and
economic support from the leaders of the local Chinese
communities. Finally, two branches of my service were
established.

After a period of hard working, the Chinese News
Service gradually had a better reputation. Since Dr. Tong
promised more budget, I started to hire more competent
personnel and develop various kinds of work. In 1943,
my office had expanded into five branches in the Western
Hemisphere: three in the United States, San Francisco,
Chicago, Washington, D. C.; one in Montreal, Canada;
and the other one in Mexico City; with the larger
headquarters in New York, I also established a radio
transmission station in Ventura, south California. The
total staff members in all my services were over 50 (4,
p. 122-123).

What Hsia did not mention was that he reorganized the
Trans-Pacific News Service in September, 1941, within only
two weeks after his return from Chungking. This new service
was later registered at the United States Department of
Justice as the official publicity agent in the United States
working for the Chinese government. In the same month, he
set up the Chicago branch of the service, headed by Henry
Evans, a publicist who had long worked for the United China
Relief, and the San Francisco branch, led by Malcolm Rossholt,
former reporter of Shanghai's Ta Lu Pao (The China Press).
Both Evans and Rossholt were drafted into the army shortly
after the Pearl Harbor attack, and Hsia hired two Chinese
journalists to take their jobs. This marked the first time
that Chinese propagandists took the complete public relations burden upon themselves, after the establishment of two offices that were financially supported by local Chinese in Chinatowns in Chicago and San Francisco (10, p. 125).

Main Office and Its Work

During the war years, the Chinese News Service (CNS) was divided into eight sections: The first six divisions were organized before 1942; the other two followed. CNS headquarters was situated on Sixth Avenue in New York City and remained there until the spring of 1943, when Tong went to the United States with Madame Chiang Kai-shek. Then the office was moved to the forty-second floor of the RCA Building and stayed there for the remainder of World War II. The office had room space on the thirty-fourth floor and a storeroom on the fifty-first floor (5, p. ii).

The branch offices of the New York headquarters included the press section, visual section, radio section, speakers's bureau, information division, library, and mailing and circulation department. Contemporary China, the CNS fortnightly magazine, was separated from these sections and had its own editors.

The press section.—This unit was the largest one in CNS's main office, which kept in constant touch with the newspaper and editorial offices in New York, supplying them with the latest information on China received from Chungking. The press section edited and published all the CNS news
releases and publications, with the exception of the fortnightly magazine Contemporary China. It received and processed all of the Chungking output in the way of the printed word and endeavored to serve it to the American public in different forms.

Its news bulletin, Voice of China, was published six days a week, and occasionally on Sunday. The content of this bulletin was based entirely on the Chungking shortwave broadcasts; items were edited, headlined, and classified by the New York staff. Each week, an index of the week's releases was made for filing reference. The total number of bulletins issued in 1944 was 954 sheets, and more than 572,400 words. The areas this bulletin covered included items from overseas Chinese to relations between China and the United States, from war fronts to war prisoners (5, p. 7).

Beginning in January, 1944, teletype machines were installed in all the branches of the service, so that the day's Voice of China broadcasts from Chungking could be teletyped from the service's listening post at Ventura, California, to all CNS offices directly. Once the news items were received in the New York office, if there were any news of particular significance, the press section would call up the three wire services--The Associated Press, United Press, and International News Service--The New York Times, and New York Herald Tribune.

The press section published CNS Special Feature Releases, beginning in October, 1943, to the general press and radio
people who did not receive the daily news bulletin. The feature releases were issued two or three times a week on yellow paper in contrast to the white sheets of the daily Voice of China. The type of releases included news features, background stories, basic advance stories on anniversaries and other important events, interpretation and roundup of important news events, and full texts of documents and speeches. In 1944, ninety-seven items of features were placed in publications or radio spots of the varying importance (5, p. 14).

Another important work of this section was to publish and edit the monthly magazine, China at War, the oldest magazine in English of the CNS, which was founded in China in April, 1938, but transferred to the publication office to New York in 1943. The main reason for continuing to publish this magazine was to disguise serious or propagandistic material by clothing it in a more attractive format. Another reason was to establish an organic connection between material going into China at War and material used in the news and feature releases (5, p. 22).

Like that of other news releases issued by this section, the main body of the monthly China at War was compiled by the staff of the International Department in Chungking, transmitted by shortwave broadcast, and made up by the press section in New York. The duty of the editors in the New York office was to see that as many of the articles received from
Chungking, which may or may not have been used in other ways, sooner or later got published in *China at War*.

Because of the special interest and type of this magazine, twenty-one magazines requested permission to reprint *China at War* articles during 1944 alone (5, p. 24). More special interest readers chose to subscribe to the magazine and this made its circulation in the same year over 3,800 copies (5, p. 112).

The press section was assigned to take care of pamphlets and other nonperiodical publications published by this service. At least seven books were distributed in 1944, and several articles from *China at War* were reprinted and sent out for free distribution upon request. Madame Chiang's speeches in 1942, for example, were edited into the book, *We Chinese Women*, and were published by the John Day Company. This book sold more than 10,375 copies in one year (5, p. 27).

*Contemporary China*—This fortnightly review aimed to offer the American public authoritative interpretations and analyses of war affairs in China. Initiated in May, 1941, the periodical was edited by Dr. Lin Mousheng, who earned his doctorate in political science. Contributors of the magazine came primarily from a number of Chinese leaders and writers; for this reason, the magazine was even more interesting than *China at War* and soon became one of the most favored publication of the CNS. Its circulation increased from an initial list of 2,000 to 8,700 at the end of the war (5, p. 32).
Visual section.--This section, which handled still pictures, motion pictures, and exhibition material, mainly was responsible for editing films received from Chungking, which usually were in a rough condition and needed many changes before distribution to American audiences. There were two functions of this section during the war: first, to advise on distribution of photographs from Chungking; second, to advise producers in Hollywood concerning the production of better film about the Chinese people (3, p. 85).

Upon the request of the International Department, the United States Department of State sent George Alexanderson, staff photographer of The New York Times, to Chungking in 1943 to help Chinese amateur cameramen develop new techniques; his advice and assistance proved invaluable. At the same time, this section began placing news pictures with the United States photography pool, which included the three large photography services—The Associated Press, Acme, and International News Photos. Through this pool, pictures were sent to all large newspapers in the United States, and all countries where these services had branches. The same pictures were immediately placed with the United States Office of War Information (OWI), which sent them to countries not covered by the pool, and to Life magazine. In this way, still photographs produced by this section became widely effective in mass propaganda, reaching newspaper readers throughout the United States, and in other countries. Eighty magazines and
other publications purchased Chinese photos from the visual section, and almost all the larger newspapers in the United States carried photographs on China (11, p. 184; 5, pp. 36-42).

This section took care of the motion picture work, previewing unedited footage from China for the United States newsreel pool and other agencies and organization wishing to use footage from China, and selling or giving such footage as needed. These agencies included OWI, United States Office of Strategic Service, United China Relief, United States Army Signal Corps Photographic Center, and Combat Film Service of the United States Army (5, pp. 36-42).

The radio section.--The activities of this unit included regular and specially transcribed and direct broadcasts from Chungking, and regular and special programs on local stations and networks. A total of 501 radio broadcasts were handled and distributed to stations in the United States in 1944 (5, p. 43).

The speakers's bureau.--More than 400 speaking engagements were filled, either by staff members of this section making the speeches or by having speakers sent out under the direct auspices of the bureau. Taking 500 as an average audience for each speech, more than 200,000 people were contacted through the services of this section (5, p. 52).

The main speakers were Dr. Y. C. Yang, former president of Soochow University and then director of the bureau; and
Dr. B. A. Liu. People who had listened to their speeches included groups such as: colleges, universities, and educational associations; civic clubs, and public forums; and churches and church references. Some speeches were also made on special occasions.

Information division.--This department handled all inquiries that reached CNS by telephone, personal interviews, and letters. Members of this division usually were assigned to read manuscripts, articles, and books on China for those people who wish CNS to check up on facts and citations for them. A total of 824 requests were made during the period from July 12, 1944 to December 31, 1944 (5, p. 98). Besides serving individuals who were seeking information and material on different subjects about China (writers and speakers, either Chinese or foreigners), many public opinion-formulating organs were served, such as The New York Times, Time, Life, Collier's, The Associated Press, United Press, CBS, MGM, and OWI.

Library.--This was a specialized reference library used by CNS staff members and the general public. Many teachers, students, writers, radio commentators, librarians, and lecturers visited the library. The library had a highly praised collection on the Far East: about 1,000 books, over 1,000 pamphlets published by different organizations in the United States concerning countries in the Far East, forty-
seven magazines, ten New York newspapers, and three out-of-town papers, and a large portion of CNS material. The library provided a special selected booklist on China (5, p. 106).

**Mailing and circulation department.**—This section handled all the daily mail, consisting of letters, packages, and insured and registered matters. It took care of various news releases, special features releases, *Contemporary China, China at War*, and other CNS publications.

**Branch Offices**

Five CNS branch offices in the Western Hemisphere were primarily responsible for the distribution of the CNS publications. Each office, however, published its own daily news bulletins, *Voice of China*, compiled from radio broadcasts to newspapers and other press associations in its own area.

Three to five members were hired by each of these offices. Yui Ming, an overseas Chinese from Hawaii, served as director of the San Francisco office for two years, and in 1943, James Shen, former head of the English section of the International Department, replaced him. Cheng Paonan, vice consular of the Chinese Consulate in New York, shifted to preside over the CNS Chicago office, and Chen Yih was the director of the Washington branch. The Chinese Embassy in Washington D. C. and nine consulate offices were responsible for the distribution of CNS publicity material (5, pp. 1-5).
Shortwave Broadcasts from Chungking

Before the United States entered the war, Chungking used some of the nonbelligerent districts, such as Hong Kong, Manila, and the International Settlement in Shanghai, as relay stations for air mail, radio and cable communications between China and America. After the United States entered the war, these places could no longer be used because the Japanese controlled them. A safe and inexpensive line of communication between Chungking and its office in New York was therefore urgently needed to solve the problem of transmitting Chinese information to the outside world.

Beginning in the early part of 1940, Earl Leaf, the International Department representative in the United States, visited the West Coast from New York, seeking someone to intercept broadcasts from XGOY in Chungking. The person Leaf approached was Dr. Charles E. Stuart, a dentist and a widely known radio amateur who had received a substantial amount of publicity in connection with his international transmitting and receiving activities (6).

The negotiations were carried out, and a radio transmission station was soon set on the beach of Ventura, California, in front of Stuart's house. His work to record and transcribe the Chungking shortwave broadcasts began in May, 1940, and the first broadcast, a copy of Voice of China, was received on May 3 (6).
Stuart was responsible for transmitting materials broadcast by XGOY in English from Chungking during scheduled periods and forwarding the written copy to Leaf, and, after 1941, to the various offices of the Chinese News Service. The broadcasts originated in Chungking at 9 p.m. and were received in Ventura at 6 a.m. Stuart recorded the transmissions each morning and his wife, or his assistants, did all the transcribing. The main announcer in Chungking XGOY was Mike Peng (3, p. 81).

The first period of transmission from Chungking to Ventura was not satisfactory. Tong described the embarrassing phase:

These voice broadcasts, which included feature material for our overseas offices, as well as a certain number of programs for radio stations in America, were sent from a studio which had been built close to my home. It was a quickly constructed wartime studio, and had no soundproofing at all.

We had constant complaints from Dr. Charles Stuart, our Ventura man, that reception was bad, and that he could hear dogs barking and ducks quacking along with the news. I had to plead guilty to the dogs and the ducks. They were a part of my household, and my yard was just outside of the studio. But I could think of no way to control them while Mike Peng was on the air, and my family would not let me get rid of them. In one sense, the destruction of that flimsy studio was a blessing. It eventually forced the Broadcasting Administration to erect a respectable building with a soundproofed studio for its international programs (11, p. 131).

As soon as the circuit became well established, Stuart erected two rhombic antennas on eight 90-foot-tall poles. Each day, from 5,000 to 10,000 words were received by employing
this facility. Material transmitted through this station included news recording about the Chinese situation, which was transcribed on a teletype transmitter and sent to the New York headquarters and other offices to issue the daily bulletin, *Voice of China*; feature articles from American correspondents in China for various newspapers and magazines, which were transcribed and sent by air mail to home offices; a daily feature article on some phase of Chinese reconstruction or resistance, for publication in *China at War*; and some personal "mailbag" messages from people in China; correspondents, missionaries, soldiers, and businessmen. Stuart forwarded these mailbag messages monitored from the radio to the addressees in the United States or in Canada after clearance by the Office of Censorship and served without any charge (6).

Stuart was paid a salary of $1,200 per month by the Chinese government for the service he rendered, plus certain expenses related to the operation. Material handled for news associations or publishers was charged at the rate of one cent per word. From November, 1943 to June, 1944 Stuart received $1,774 in all for this kind of service (6).

A lot of work had been done simply by using this daily radio transmission. In addition to the monthly magazine, *China at War*, and the daily bulletins, *Voice of China*, two books, *China After Five Years of War* and *China After Seven Years of War*, which were symposia of stories and articles
by various numbers of Chinese writers describing the moral and social conditions in China, were both finished by this word-by-word operation of the devotion by Stuart and his assistants, a work that Hsia called "the first time in history that the manuscript of a complete book was transmitted in this manner" (6).

Summary

China's publicity work in the United States, generally speaking, began in 1937 when the Sino-Japanese War broke out in North China. Because of the lack of preparation for the war, there were only limited overseas propaganda operations sponsored by the Chinese government. The main task of this period was to expose the Japanese atrocities in China so principles of humanitarians could be aroused and the Japanese invasion could be stopped. During this time, the International Department of the Ministry of Information was established as China's most significant government office to handle all the overseas propaganda work in the modern history.

The second phase of China's official propaganda program ranged from the withdrawal of the Central Government to Hankow in November, 1937 to the beginning of the European War on September 1, 1939. At this time, the appeal to get international sympathetic treatment was replaced by the revised policy of concentrating on economic and political interests. The United States, during this time, became the
most important country that China would urge during the war years; thereafter, organized and unorganized propaganda works were gradually developed in the United States.

Some official publicity activities were executed; several representatives were sent by the Chinese government to America, in part to help Chinese diplomats in the United States to supply with reports on American public opinions and attitudes, so the preparation of the propaganda program for the next stage could be completed; and in part to explain the Chinese situation to American friends. In addition, VIP's and correspondents of press associations were invited to visit China to get first-hand impressions of the Chinese efforts against Japanese invasion. Photographs, exhibitions, and radio broadcasts to the United States were processed.

Then, between the European War and Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, work was continued to appeal to the American government not only to give moral, economic, and military support to China, but also to stop supplying war material to Japan. The official agent of the Chinese government in the United States, the Chinese News Service, was set up at the end of this period, after reorganizing the semiofficial Trans-Pacific News Service. A shortwave broadcast station was established in Ventura, California, with the help of an American radio amateur, Charles Stuart. These facilities made it possible to transmit Chinese information to the
outside world after the Japanese won control of China's relay stations in Hong Kong, Manila, and the International Settlement in Shanghai.

The last-period effort of Chinese overseas propaganda in the United States was from the time when the separated wars in Asia (China) and the European War were combined into one global conflict. China became one of the Allies, and its propaganda activities expanded to include five branch offices in the Western Hemisphere. The International Department in Chungking was the center of all the publicity abroad, and the CNS headquarters in New York executed every program with its staff in eight sections. Their budget was increased, and personnel were added. In addition, the importance of the work was more understood by the authority of the Chinese government. The coordination between the International Department and the Chinese News Service in New York was one of the few times that China ever had to promote overseas propaganda activities.
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CHAPTER III

UNOFFICIAL PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES

In addition to efforts made by Chinese propagandists, groups of Americans and Chinese were involved in the business of propaganda, supporting war-torn China in the United States during World War II. Most of these people received no payment from the Chinese government, nor were they interested in following any kind of order from either the Ministry of Information or other governmental offices, such as the Chinese Embassy in Washington, D. C., although these people might have maintained unofficial relationships with some Chinese government propagandists.

There were several exceptions to this rule, however. One was Mademe Chiang Kai-shek, who could be regarded both as an official representative, because of her status as the first lady of China, and as a civilian who merely did publicity for her government without pay. Moreover, Madame Chiang did not have any idea that she would engage in propaganda activities in the United States when she first arrived in America.

Nevertheless, the aims of those Chinese sympathizers were varied. Businessmen regarded China as a four million-customer market, and missionaries tried to convert China
into a Christian country, especially after Generalissimo Chiang's marriage with the Methodist Mei-ling Soong (Madame Chiang) in 1927 (8, p. 12). Some groups of people were interested in keeping China from being defeated by the Japanese, whereas many others worked hard to change Nationalist China into Communist China.

Activities of these people, with different objectives, are discussed and divided into these three subsections in this chapter: American attitude toward China before 1937; American sympathizer groups; and Madame Chiang Kai-shek's visit to the United States.

American Attitude Toward China Before 1937

Americans, generally speaking, have contradictory images about the Chinese since their first contacts almost 200 years ago (14, p. 8). In one way, Americans retained a healthy respect for the merits of Chinese tradition and civilization and its great age; in another way, they described the Chinese as "the absence of nerves," "the cruel Chinese," savage, ruthless, barbaric, brutal, or having no regard for life or suffering, etc., an image acquired mostly from the Chinese laborers in the United States (10, pp. 101-105).

For many Americans, their first impressions of China or the Chinese came from the reports of missionaries: how wonderful the Chinese were, how much they needed to be helped, and how receptive they were to help. It was because of these missionaries that Americans began to have a feeling
of sympathy for the Chinese. It was mainly through efforts of missionaries that the Open Door Policy of John Hay in 1899 was started and the United States assumed its role as the protector not only of access to China but of China's accessibility (10, p. 126).

In this century, different images of the Chinese have been made by Hollywood movie producers and free-lance writers. Stories of Dr. Fu Manchu and Charlie Chan introduced various faces of the Chinese, either true description or not, in American minds. And then, Pearl Buck's *The Good Earth* published in the early 1930's greatly strengthened American's will to protect the "underdog" Chinese in the war against the Japanese. "For a whole generation of Americans she [Buck] 'created' the Chinese, in the same sense that Dickens 'created' for so many of us the people who lived in the slums of Victorian England," says Harold R. Issacs in his book *Scratches on Our Mind* (10, p. 155). It was estimated that book and film together, *The Good Earth* probably reached twenty-five million Americans in the early 1930's (8, p. 13).

Other famous authors whose writings influenced America's image about the Chinese before 1937 were Lin Yutang, a Chinese scholar who published *The Importance of Living* and *My Country and My People*, and Carl Crow, a journalist-turned-businessman who published *400 Million Customers* and *The Chinese Are Like That* (8, p. 13; 10, p. 151).
Before the Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1937, the American press generally was favorable toward the Chinese situation. The Chinese Cultural Society of New York, for example, published in October, 1937 a reprint of thirty-nine editorials from American papers on the Far Eastern crisis. The editor, Lin Hsitien, wrote in the Foreword:

Of some five thousand editorials which have been examined, there is none that justifies Japanese aggression or condemns Chinese resistance. In the American press Japan is almost universally treated as the aggressor and China as the victim in the undeclared war. As to American policy, the press generally favors neither extreme isolation nor political entanglements or alliances, but a golden mean, whereby world peace, it is hoped, may be maintained (4, p. i).

Another research made by Quincy Wright and Carl J. Nelson indicated that from July to December, 1937, the period after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, American opinion generally was not impartial, and the unfriendliness to Japan became more intense after hostilities with China began in July. The authors found out that American unfriendliness came mainly from the impression that Japan juridically was wrong (18, p. 47). A public opinion poll during this period showed that the American people were overwhelmingly sympathetic to the Chinese in their struggle with Japan but were still very reluctant endorse steps that might involve the United States in the hostilities (1, p. 599).

With the assistance from missionaries, writers, businessmen, newspapermen, and other interested people, China gradually gained great friendship from the American public during
the Sino-Japanese War. It was with help from these civilian groups that China successfully countered the strong offensive of Japanese propaganda work in the United States.

American Sympathizer Groups

Missionaries' Efforts

When the Japanese invaded Manchuria in 1931, the first group that responded immediately to report the situation in Manchuria to the American public at home were the missionaries. To them, China was their adopted land, and they soon sent their reports to scores of church periodicals, presented their views directly to church audiences and to the Committee on Reference and Counsel of the Interdenominational Foreign Missions Conferences of North America so the conference could utilize its connections with Washington to influence those who determined foreign policy (17, p. 253).

From the time of the 1931 Manchurian Incident to the outbreak of the first Shanghai battle of 1932, many missionaries witnessed awful scenes of bombed-out homes, of refugees, and of thousands of wounded and killed. Their feelings of sympathy went out to the Chinese. Japan was portrayed as a "militaristic nation, callous to all humanitarian considerations, bent on reducing China to a servile status" (17, p. 252). Many letters to mission boards and to friends in the United States told of the Japanese attack on China in tones of righteous indignation. Some of them volunteered for relief work; others joined in denouncing Japan's action.
The influence of the missionary enterprise on American politics at this time was clearly revealed in United States Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson's later explanation of why he issued the famous nonrecognition doctrine in 1932, in which he stated that the United States would not recognize territorial change resulting from use of force and violation of treaty agreements. Stimson explained that before he made the doctrine, he had been moved by a knowledge of the incalculable harm which would be done immediately to American prestige in China and ultimately to the material interests of America and her people in that region, if after having for many years assisted by public and private effort in the education and development of China towards the ideals of modern Christian civilization, and having taken the lead in the movement which secured the covenant of all the great powers, including ourselves, "to respect her sovereignty," we should now cynically abandon her to her fate when this same covenant was violated (15, p. 90).

Missionary antagonism to Japan continued during the interlude of peace between 1933 and 1937. When war broke out again in North China in 1937, missionaries took up China's cause with renewed vigor. Their first response to the crisis was to praise Generalissimo Chiang as the "most enlightened patriotic and able ruler in her history" (17, p. 255). A flood of stories was focused on the figures of Chiang and his wife; they became the very symbol of all that was heroic, selfless, fearless. Articles about them appeared in great profusion in the domestic newspapers in the United States. Missionary and press propaganda concentrated on
highly favorable accounts of the Chinese government and high Chinese officials, especially Chiang and his wife, who had been educated in a Christian family since childhood (8, p. 14).

Henry Luce, *Time* magazine publisher, who was a missionary's son and a "China-born," named Chiang and Madame Chiang "Man and Wife of the Year" for 1937. In the story, *Time* said:

But while Japan launched her great adventure without outstanding leadership, China, the victim of the adventure, has had the ablest of leadership. Through 1937 the Chinese have been led—not without glory—by one supreme leader and his remarkable wife . . . . Her rise and that of her husband, the Generalissimo, in less than a generation to moral and material leadership of the ancient Chinese people cover a great page of history.

If Chiang Kai-shek and Mei-ling can maintain their will as China's will—the same will which said that 'any sacrifice should not be regarded as too costly'—Chinese prospects are good (8, p. 15).

After 1937, the war between China and Japan became more intense, missionaries sought to help the Chinese in camps for refugees, to encourage the Chinese to continue to resist the invader, and to help maintain the morale of the people. Many missionaries made their contributions by writing more letters to religious periodicals, the press, and other organizations in the United States, such as the Committee on the Far East of the Foreign Missions Conference, telling of Chinese sufferings and of Japanese atrocities (17, p. 259).

A small group of missionaries, led by Frank Price of the Theological Seminary at the University of Nanking, es-
tablished the Chinese Information Service in September, 1938. From the headquarters in Washington, D. C., they sent out a small mimeographed bulletin. The articles and news stories came largely from missionaries in China who had seen the Japanese in action. Every item in the pages of this bulletin aimed at arousing the people in the United States to the justice of China's cause (17, p. 260).

The bulletin told of indiscriminate Japanese bombing, criticized the United States for selling war material to Japan, and ardently advocated an embargo against Japan. Articles from China written by missionaries who witnessed the bombings of the Chinese made possible by the sale of scrap iron and oil to Japan, supported an embargo of these materials and thought it would seriously hurt Japan (17, p. 261).

Early in his work, Price enlisted Helen Loomis, former teacher in Ginling College at Nanking, as director of the service. In a report to Hollington Tong in spring, 1938, Earl Leaf, representative of the Chinese Information Ministry, said "The home of Price had become a clearing house for editors, writers, research experts, professors, missionaries, boycott organizers, and others devoted to the China cause" (16, p. 104). Price's information service operated for two years and was "helpful for China's [early] publicity work during the least understood period of the war" (16, p. 104).
The Price Committee

In June, 1938, Frank Price and his brother, Harry, created with some friends an organization called the American Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression. The committee, usually referred to as the Price Committee, was designed to campaign to stop American "assistance" to Japan. During the war years, this committee was probably one of the first organizations formed to support the Nationalist government. Many of its members continually contributed their support in the postwar years and some even maintained close relations with Chiang's government after his withdrawal to Taiwan. A score of Price Committee members were labeled as the core of the so-called "China Lobby" in the 1950's and 1960's.

Frank and Harry Price were members of a Nanking missionary family. Frank, the elder, had returned to China as a missionary and had become Dean of the Nanking Theological Seminary. He had a good command of Chinese and had from time to time volunteered to do translations of Chinese material into English for the Chinese government. In the Price Committee, Frank served as the executive secretary but was responsible for most of the affairs (7, p. 214).

Once the committee was formed, financial support was soon forthcoming from the Chinese government. Other evidence that showed that the Chinese government was interested in this committee from the beginning was that one of its founders,
Earl Leaf, was employed as a registered propagandist for the Chinese government and served as the representative of the Chinese Ministry of Information in the United States. However, because of the rejection of Roger S. Greene, an opinion leader in China's cause who joined the committee in July, Price returned money to Chinese officials (7, p. 214).

Greene, who had a close relationship with the Rockefeller Foundation and worked as vice president of the foundation, committed all of his energies to the cause of collective security from 1938 to 1941. As an opinion leader Greene generally functioned privately through access to decision-makers until he became a lobbyist in 1938 for the Price Committee. His close ties to the Rockefeller Foundation and its affiliated China Medical Board and Peking Union Medical College had provided him with access to American diplomats in China and to policy-makers in Washington, D. C.

Greene had unusually extensive personal and individual ties to key members of the United States Department of State. His years at Harvard alongside Franklin D. Roosevelt and the prominence of his brothers, especially Jerome, long-time secretary of Harvard Corporation, sometimes president of the American Asiatic Association and of the Institute of Pacific Relations, provided other doors for him to maintain a close relationship with decision-makers, both on an institutional and on an individual basis (7, pp. 276-277).
Before 1938, Greene put his attention on the urge of the punishment of aggressors and the provision of aid to their victims. By doing this, Greene continued to submit his opinion on Chinese affairs and on Sino-Japanese relations to Nelson T. Johnson, Stanley K. Hornbeck, who served as chiefs of the Far Eastern Division of the Department of State, and even to President Roosevelt. After 1938, Greene became a professional opinion-submitter. Although his access to decision-makers on the basis of personal ties still existed, his access to the Department of State and to an attentive public, however, was a function of his offices with the Price Committee, and later with the White Committee.

Roosevelt and Hornbeck were both receptive to his opinions and eager to have him work to change the climate of opinions both in Congress and among the American people. Some other decision-makers used Greene in an effort to transmit their opinions to nongovernmental opinion leaders or to segments of the public. In the years of the war, on the single issue of American policy toward China and Japan, no one outside the government was in a better position to exercise influence than Greene, (7, pp. 276-278).

Another important figure of the Price Committee was Dr. Walter Judd, a medical missionary who came back from China in order to carry on a national speaking campaign in the United States. Judd was a convincing speaker who reached large audiences from coast to coast. During a two-year span
from 1939 to 1941, Judd toured the United States lecturing on the immediate dangers of Japanese imperialism and the longer threat of Asian communism. Judd delivered 1,400 lectures on behalf of the Price Committee. The China he perceived during this time was a free and independent society liberated from Confucianism and imperial traditions (3, p. 13).

In 1943, Judd was elected a member of Congress, thus beginning his twenty-year legislative career. His maiden speech deplored the discriminatory Exclusion Acts, and included a lecture on a plea for keeping both Russian and China in the war, denouncing American diplomacy of the 1920's and 1930's, and on the observation for understanding the Japanese enemy (3, p. 13). Judd later organized the Committee for One Million Against the Admission of Red China to the United Nations in 1952 (3).

On the executive committee of the Price Committee was an industrialist Frederick C. Mckee, who was associated with other foreign policy interest groups in the late 1930's and early 1940's, such as an organizer in 1939 of the Non-Partisan Committee for Revision of the Neutrality Act, as national treasurer in 1940 of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies (White Committee), and as national chairman in 1942 and 1943 of Citizens for Victory (3, p. 16).

Dr. B. A. Garside, Price Committee's vice-chairman from 1938 to 1941, played an important role in committee's activities. Garside, who was Henry Luce's biographer, returned
to the United States in the late 1920's from various missionary assignments in China to become secretary of the China Union University Central Office in New York City and then executive secretary of the Association of Boards of Christian College in China (3, p. 16).

In the beginning, the Price Committee was associated closely with the collective security wing of the peace movement. What it supported was that the United States should cease cooperating with Japan in its war with China, should cease serving as Japan's "partner." Both the pacifists and advocates of collective security were the objectives of the committee to be drawn to the movement to embargo the sale of war material to Japan.

On August 1, 1938, the committee began its campaign by mailing 22,000 copies of a booklet entitled "America's Share in Japan's War Guilt." The addressees included congressmen, selected officials of the Department of State, and key people in a variety of academic, civic, and church organizations (7, p. 215). In May, 1939, the committee collected 156,231 signatures from seventeen states and forwarded them to the Congress, urging legislators to halt the stream of supplies to Japan. One month later, the committee issued a statement drafted by Robert E. Speer and signed by sixty-nine clergymen, calling for an embargo against Japan (17, p. 217).

Greene, Price, and their followers continued their efforts in 1939 to impose economic sanctions on Japan. The
committee worked with Hornbeck and various members of Congress to have bills introduced in both the House and the Senate. Despite intensive lobbying and indications in the polls of strong public support, however, these efforts never were successful. And in the late spring and early summer of 1939, when the imminence of war in Europe overshadowed concern for China, of the major private groups attempting to influence American foreign policy, only the Price Committee concentrated on the war in East Asia (7, p. 223).

In 1940, German forces invaded Belgium, Holland, and France. The Nazi onslaught resulted in the United States in the National Defense Ace, one section of which authorized the president to prohibit the export of material necessary for the defense of the United States, an act that could be used to embargo the sale of war supplies to Japan. This section, of which the Price Committee might have played a part in its formulation and acceptance by the Congress and the administration, symbolized the change of the policy of the Price Committee: stressing national defense rather than discrimination against aggressors and treaty violation. Greene and Price had campaigned for this for some time, and it was Greene who suggested to Roosevelt to obtain legislation to enable him to withhold from export any basic war material and equipment as a means of conserving America's national resources (7, p. 223).
However, disagreement on internal affairs among the Price Committee's members were enlarged in 1940 and hindered its progress for campaigning for more movements on the embargos. The committee ceased to be of significance by July, 1940 and stopped its activities in February, 1941 (7, p. 229).

The desire for a complete embargo on war supplies was never fulfilled during the years of the Price Committee's existence. Some of its members later joined the work with the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies (White Committee). However, this committee had little inclination to include China among the "allies" until America joined the war against Japan, and only then was the embargo made possible.

**American Relief Groups**

In addition to those pressure groups that sought to influence American China policy during World War II, a number of American organizations had been involved in promoting fund-raising activities to help the Chinese refugees who suffered under Japanese bombings. These relief agencies and causes, each vying for funds to aid specialized appeals, proliferated as the Sino-Japanese War continued.

In order to combine the duplicated efforts of the various kinds of relief groups, it was suggested in spring, 1941 that the major agencies should be consolidated into one large organization—the United China Relief (UCR), which eventually
coordinated the activities of eight different agencies. These agencies included: the American Bureau for Medical Aid to China (ABMAC), American Committee in Aid of Chinese Industrial Cooperatives, American Committee for Chinese War Orphans and Chinese Aid Council, American Friends' Service Committee, Associated Boards of Christian Colleges in China, China Emergency Relief Committee, Church Committee for China Relief, and World Student Service Fund (5, pp. 740-741).

In 1943, UCR ceased to raise funds independently; ninety-percent of its income was then coming from the United States National War Fund, which represented a joint effort by a large number of fund-raising organizations. In the period between 1941 and 1945, UCR raised an impressive total of $40,000,000 (14, p. 115).

United China Relief was supposed to be interested primarily in raising money for humanitarian causes; it was not a pressure group. But because its "real boss" was Henry Luce, who put up $60,000 in the first era of UCR and lent it two Time publicity men, persuaded several business leaders to join the board, and sent a personal appeal to Time subscribers that brought in $240,000, the organization was soon turned into a powerful propaganda center. A person who was prominently involved in the management of the UCR financial campaigns later said, "We did a lot to sell China to the
United States as an ally. We overdid it. We did it through high-powered salesmen in connection with our fund-raising efforts! (14, p. 115).

United China Relief's programs for relief and rehabilitation in China generally fell into six categories; the medicine and public health project was the most important one, in which UCR appropriated 35 percent of its grant to the organizations like the Chinese National Health Administration, China Defense League, or the Army Medical Administration. Thirty percent of UCR's fund was given to social relief and rehabilitation programs, such as operations done by the Chinese Association Advisory Committee (which worked mainly on disaster relief), the Emergency Service to Soldiers of YMCA, and some local branches of these organization. Thirty-five percent of UCR's money was distributed to cover child warfare, economic reconstruction, and education programs (5, pp. 542-553).

Before the UCR campaign was launched, at the suggestion of President Roosevelt, the American Red Cross began its financial campaigns in January, 1938. After that date, substantial quantities of medical supplies, cereals, and cloth were shipped to China for distribution through American Red Cross committee. From the beginning of the operations until 1944, the total United States purchase value of supplies delivered to China was over $3,000,000 (6, p. 554).
In addition to these two organizations, other American groups helped the Chinese by donating money and material. Among them, the YMCA and YWCA were the most prominent groups. In 1944, the YMCA was active in fourteen cities in China, and eighty-two YMCA student associations and fellowship groups were active in various schools and universities. The membership in Chungking alone was above 30,000. The budget for its activities in China for 1945 was $103,000,000 (6, pp. 566-568). Other than putting some programs on relief work, the YMCA conducted lecture tours and fund-raising activities in the United States aimed at promoting international understanding and goodwill. This work acquainted America with the true situation in China and aroused sympathy and support.

Madame Chiang Kai-shek's Visit to the United States

Once the author of *The American People and China*, A. T. Steele, remarked that the relationship between China and the United States in the war years was like a marriage process. He said in his book:

> When China and the United States became allies after Pearl Harbor, it was like marriage after an over-long engagement— a shot-gun marriage, but still a happy union . . . . The climax of the Sino-American honeymoon was reached early in 1943 in the triumphal American tour of Madame Chiang Kai-shek (14, p. 22).

Today, most historians would not argue with Steele's point. Many of them agreed that the year 1943 was the height of amity in the history of the Sino-American relations. Madame Chiang's goodwill visit to the United States early in that
year was the main reason for the popular and official enthusiasm in China with which the United States greeted various steps to help the Chinese.

Madame Chiang arrived in the United States late in November, 1942, but spent her first three months in the Presbyterian Medical Center in New York undergoing treatment for an injury suffered in a traffic accident. Later, it was found that her trouble was a rare skin affliction known as urticaria, caused by a nervous condition, not by cancer, and she remained hospitalized until the middle of February, 1943 (16, p. 199).

While she was hospitalized, though her stay in the United States was initially kept secret, thousands of Americans sent letters to her and asked her to tour the United States, to speak to them, showing the American public interest both in her and in China. "Madame Chiang's mailbag reached the figure of 1,000 a day," said Hollington K. Tong, a member in her entourage. "It was necessary to set up a regular secretariat just to handle the correspondence!" (16, p. 200). Tong remembered, "It had not been Madame Chiang's intention . . . . to tour the United States. She and the Generalissimo looked upon the trip purely as a necessary health measure. But the avalanche of request for her to speak, the tremendous number of letters she received" had made Madame Chiang decide to accept the invitations arranged by committees of American citizens, organized by American groups friendly to China (16, p. 200).
Madame Chiang began her trip on February 17, 1943. In the following 46 days, she visited Washington, D.C., New York, Wellsley College in Massachusetts (her alma mater), Boston, Chicago, San Francisco, and Los Angeles (9, p. 4).

At the invitation of President and Mrs. Roosevelt, Madame Chiang spent the first week after leaving the hospital as their guest in the White House, and made her first public speech to the Senate and her second to the House of Representatives, a distinction reserved usually for heads-of-state, and only once before for a woman, the Netherlands's Queen Wilhelmina. Newsweek reported her addresses as this:

Vividly but with classic Oriental courtesy, the 'Missimo' (a nickname used by some journalists to match her husband's abbreviation title 'Gissimo') speaking faultless and polysyllabic English, reminded her hearers of the 160-year-old tradition of Chinese-American friendship, described the hardships her countrymen have endured in six years of war with Japan, and then pointedly urged us [Americans] to regard Japan as a No. 1 enemy—a vital potential threat... a waiting sword of Damocles, ready to descend at a moment's notice! (13, pp. 38-39).

The United States Senate was not in the habit of rising to its feet to applaud. For Madame Chiang, it rose and thundered. Time magazine described the incident, "When she finished, tough guys were melted. 'Goddam it,' said one grizzled Congressman, 'I never saw anything like it. Madame Chiang had me on the verge of bursting into tears'" (12, p. 22).

From then on through the next six weeks, Madame Chiang was constantly in the public eye in America. She met the press in each of the large cities she visited. She had a
press party traveling with her on the train. She spoke at tremendous mass meetings; in New York, for instance, 17,000 people attended a rally in Madison Square Garden where she delivered one of her most moving messages (9, pp. 38-73). In Los Angeles, more than 30,000 persons crowded at the base of the Hollywood Bowl and were amazed by her speech. "All Hollywood had contributed talent toward making this event a triumph of showmanship," Life reported. "But it was Madame Chiang's gracious charm, her indomitable spirit and her deeply stirring accounts of China's six-year war against Japanese aggression which made the dramatic climax of the afternoon" (11, p. 34).

In her tour, she met with mayors and governors, motion picture stars, labor groups, and business leaders. She visited Chinatown in each big city she toured. Her voice was heard not only by thousands of people who attended mass meetings, but also by millions who listened to the broadcasts transmitted by all the radio networks of the country. Totally, Madame Chiang delivered fourteen speeches to the American people, including the four she delivered speeches to the Chinese communities especially.

"She has presented her argument ably, deftly, to the House, to the President and to the American people themselves," U. S. News said. "In the Senate and House, she got an ovation. As a guest of the President and Mrs. Roosevelt,
she had a friendly and sympathetic hearing" (2, p. 26). And the newspapermen, as said by Hollington K. Tong, "were completely captivated" by her style (16, p. 200).

There was saying that the Generalissimo had once said to a visiting journalist that his wife was worth twenty divisions to him (16, p. 199). In terms of her influence on American public opinion, this was no exaggeration. Even Felix Greene, a writer who was in favor of the Chinese Communists, admitted:

The peak of national heroine worship [to China] was not, however, reached until 1943 when Madame Chiang Kai-shek came to the United States to plead for more American aid. She had an enormous public success. To millions she appeared to represent in her slight figure all that was most noble, most virtuous, most self-sacrificing, most courageous in the Chinese (8, p. 15).

Summary

American's images about the Chinese has experienced a long and winding road. Generally speaking, the Americans respected the merits of Chinese tradition and civilization; on the other hand, they described the Chinese as barbaric and brutal, an impression acquired from the Chinese laborers in the United States before this century.

Before the Sino-Japanese War broke out in North China, missionaries tried different ways to arouse America's sympathy toward the "underdog" Chinese. Several books published in this period had created the new image of the Chinese in American minds. Pearl Buck's The Good Earth alone reached an estimated 25 million Americans in the early 1930's.
After 1937, the first group formed to speak for the Chinese interest in the United States was the American Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression (the Price Committee). The major objective of this organization was to urge the American government stopping assisting the Japanese by selling them strategic material. Important members of the Price Committee included Frank and Harry Price, Roger S. Greene, Walter Judd, and B. A. Garside. This Committee existed until 1942.

American relief groups played an important role in helping the Chinese by doing propaganda work in the United States; nevertheless, their work mainly was limited in fund-raising campaigns. The most important relief group was the United China Relief (UCR), which was formed by eight major agencies. American Red Cross, YMCA, and YWCA provided relief programs in war-time China.

Madame Chiang's visit to the United States in 1943, however, was the peak of the Sino-American friendship in the war years. In her 46 days spent in the United States, Madame Chiang visited six cities—Washington, D. C., New York, Boston, Chicago, San Francisco, and Los Angeles. She delivered fourteen speeches, both to the American public and to the Chinese communities in big cities, and presented press conferences five times. Her visit gained ovation from the Congress and friendship and sympathy from President Roosevelt.
CHAPTER BIBLIOGRAPHY


CHAPTER IV

THE CHINA LOBBY AND RED CHINA LOBBY

Starting from the 1940's, a number of Americans and Chinese dedicated their time and energies to supporting different Chinese regimes. The first group was labeled as the China Lobby because they claimed to hold up the Nationalist interest, while the other group advocated the Chinese Communists and tried to change China's government from Nationalist to Communist.

Both groups, however, had some journalists and writers for supporting what they claimed. Both groups published magazines, wrote books, or influenced newspaper opinion in order to creating a better world for their own interests. These people's stories were not clearly known to the American public in the war years, and it was not until the 1950's when they attacked each other that the truth was disclosed.

In this chapter, two subsections are used. In the first part, such topics as the beginning of the China Lobby, T. V. Soong and his efforts, Henry Luce and his press empire, Kohlberg--the China Lobby Man, and other China lobbyists are discussed. In the second part, the background of the Red China Lobby and the sympathizer groups and lobbyists are
talked, which included the China Today, journalists and writers, and Service-Davies clique.

The China Lobby

The term "China Lobby" was generally applied rather loosely to the organizations and individuals which, in the 1940’s and 1950’s, attempted to influence the United States and the American public in favor of supporting the Chinese Nationalists (i.e. Chiang Kai-shek) and opposing compromising with the Chinese Communists. The first use of this term, paradoxically, was in the "Information Release, to All Sections and Counties," a report issued by the Communist Party of New York State on March 1, 1949, to its "comrades," in which it said that "a strong China lobby is at work in Washington . . . trying to influence our Government authorities to continue support of the antidemocratic and unpopular Kuomintang elements" (10, pp. 29-30). In another case during the same period, a former chief of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department, Stanley Hornbeck, received a letter from Alfred Kohlberg, the "China Lobby Man" as called by his opponents, who said that he recalled having heard the term used at a Communist-front meeting he attended in January, 1949 at the Roosevelt Hotel in New York (9, p. 114).

But it was the March 1 release that was to be followed from that time on, not only by the Communist comrades themselves in the United States but by many others who somehow absorbed ideas from Communist sources and were motivated by
them. This term next showed up in two Communist newspaper articles, Jewish Life and Daily Worker, in September, 1949. In April, 1950 the term burst into newspaper headlines when Owen Lattimore charged before the Tydings Senate Committee that he was being persecuted by the China Lobby because he refused to conform to its line in support of Chiang Kai-shek, that he was the victim of that group (9, p. 114).

Subsequently, numerous articles and books discussing the China Lobby appeared. By mid-1951, the Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report issued a special report and listed ten registered agents of the Nationalist Chinese government and seven whose registration had been terminated before 1950 (2). The following April, The Reporter magazine published a sensational, two-part expose, in which it painted an unsavory picture of what it called the tricky, influence-peddling China lobby, and said that the saga of the China lobby really began in Shanghai at the turn of the century, where a Christianized printer named Charlie Jones Soong fathered six children, four of whom earned a page in the contemporary history of the United States (20).

Although many of these discussions agreed that the China Lobby was "no more than a series of individuals and groups which had a common interest and were more or less closely knit to form, in the collective capacity, a pressure group" (10, p. 31), critics stressed that there were
Certainly of the individuals, both Chinese and Americans, did act overtly as lobbyists. Certain of the groups also employed paid lobbyists to further their cause among members of Congress. Furthermore, there was an inner core of Chinese and paid lobbyists who supplied the direction and continuity to the large and somewhat amorphous groups of affiliates who shared the interests of the inner core in gaining support for Chiang Kai-shek (10, p. 31).

Nevertheless, some of these critics admitted that "The China lobby was never as highly organized or as integrated as some of its critics imagined it to be" (15, p. 113). Even the publisher of *The Reporter*, Max Ascoli, who adversely criticized the China Lobby, stated clearly in his conclusion of the two-part report, "One of the most astonishing things about the China Lobby is that, as far as one can find out, it has no leaders, only mouthpieces" (20, p. 24).

**T. V. Soong and His Efforts**

Whether there was the so-called China Lobby is still doubtful today, but most critics separated the development of it into two stages. The first, the World War II phase, began in 1940, a time that China still stood alone against the invading Japanese, when T. V. Soong, brother of Madame Chiang Kai-shek, arrived in Washington in the summer of that year (5, p. 47). Soong, a Harvard and Columbia graduate, held no official title when he arrived in America, but his mission was clear: to secure American help for the Chinese government (10, p. 32).

Soong's major assistant during that time was Ludwig Rajchman, a Pole who had been a League of Nations health
expert, according to *The Reporter* (20, p. 4). The couple sized up Washington rapidly and soon made many influential friends there. Soong himself developed close contacts with friends such as White House intimates Harry Hopkins and Lauchlin Currie (both of the administrative assistants to the President), Henry Morgenthau (Treasury secretary), Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, and such powerful journalists as Henry Luce (*Time, Life* publisher), Roy Howard (Scripps-Howard newspaper chain), and columnist Joseph Alsop (20, p. 6).

In 1940, Soong and Rajchman set up China Defense Supplies, Inc., to control and augment the supply of arms to war-torn China, shortly after the Congress passed the first Lend-Lease Act in March. As Soong retained as head of the company, a few Chinese were staffed as the technique experts, while some Americans, such as Thomas G. Corcoran, William S. Youngman, Jr., both of friends of Roosevelt's, and Whiting Willauer, served as advisers (20, p. 5).

With the way made smooth from top to bottom, Chinese request for Lend-Lease items was endorsed easily, either by Currie or by Hopkins, both Soong's close friends. On February 7, 1942, a bill was approved by Congress granting China $500,000,000 in the form of a Treasury loan, and made the total amount that the United States had financially aided China up to $645,000,000 in loans and $825,700,000 in Lend-Lease aid from 1940 to the war's end (10, pp. 32-33).
Soong became the Chinese Foreign Minister in December, 1942, and left the United States in 1943. During the period after his departure from Washington, some of the Americans he had courted were placed in strategic posts. Whiting Willauer moved from China Defense Supplies to a Foreign Economic Administration post that gave him supervision over both Lend-Lease to China and purchase from China. Joseph Alsop went to China on a Lend-Lease mission and stayed on as assistant to General Claire Chennault. Moreover, because of Soong's influence, President Franklin D. Roosevelt was firmly convinced that China could be made a great power, and began to send high-ranking American civilians to Chungking at regular intervals. Vice President Henry Wallace, Wendell Willkie, and Donald M. Nelson all took turns at helping to convince Generalissimo Chiang that his interests were being served (10, p. 34).

The activities of Soong and his group were carried on under a happy circumstance in Washington, D.C. The extent of his contribution to form a pressure group was praised even by The Reporter as good lobby work.

**Henry Luce and His Empire**

Many other Americans were labeled as involved in the affairs of the China Lobby. Among them, Henry Luce and Alfred Kohlberg probably were the most prominent.

Luce, a China-born missionary's son, had from the beginning of the 1930's zealously promoted Chiang Kai-shek
and the Nationalist government as the heroes of China. Since the early of the 1930's, he began introduce ideas about China to the American public through using his press empire: themes such as China's importance to America's defense, its traitorous enemies in and after the war (Japan and Red Chinese), and its gallant leader, Generalissimo Chiang. These themes soon became celebrated topics repeatedly given by Luce's publications. The Generalissimo was adulated as the "greatest ruler Asia has seen since Emperor Kang Hsi [Chin Dynasty], 250 years ago" (16, pp. 183-184), and by 1945, the Chinese leader had been honored by six *Time* cover stories, one of the largest number conferred on any individual.

Although there was no absolute measure of "Lucepress" influence on American attitude toward China, Chiang, and the Nationalist government, however, according to Stanley D. Bachrack in his *The Committee of One Million*, "the greatest concentration of mass media attention of themes that Chiang embodied—a democratic, united and free China—came from the holdings of Henry Luce" (1, p. 13). These holdings included, in pre-television 1944, *Time* magazine which circulated 1.16 million weekly; *Life* magazine, which published four million copies weekly; *Fortune*, which circulated 170,000 monthly; *Architectural Forum*, which circulated 40,000 monthly; "Time Views the News," a daily radio announcement; "Radio March of Time," a weekly program heard by estimated eighteen million people in the United States; and movie "March of
Time," which showed in 10,000 United States and foreign theatres (16, p. 214).

Because of so many related communication tools, Luce's biographer W. A. Swanberg estimated that "a Luce theme communicated through all of his outlet many have reached at least one third and perhaps considerably more of the total literate adult population of the country" (1, p. 17).

Luce joined the Price Committee in the war years, and in 1940 organized the United China Relief (UCR) to provide help and succor to the suffering Chinese (6, p. 193 n.). His wife, Clare B. Luce, was active in the pro-Chiang organizations and served as president of the American China Policy Association in the post-war years. Both visited China during World War II.

Alfred Kohlberg—the China Lobby Man

The other important China lobbyist, Alfred Kohlberg, was a different story. Kohlberg, who usually was described as the "Big Wheel of the China Lobby" (15, p. 119) or the "China Lobby Man" (9), had strongly supported early in the war the Institute of Pacific Relations, of which he was a member. Later, he helped wreck the institute after becoming convinced that it was promoting the Communist line through its publication Pacific Affairs, and that its staffs were involved in working for the Communists. Kohlberg destroyed the institute by associating with Senator Joseph McCarthy
and was reputed to have fed the Senator a great deal of information for his campaign against Communist influence in the government.

Nevertheless, Kohlberg's pro-China activities during war years were not known by many people until the argument about the Institute of Pacific Relations was aroused in the 1950's which showed that Kohlberg involved in a few activities in support of the Nationalist China. A few reports also showed that Kohlberg became chairman of the executive committee of IPR in 1941 and this close relationship with the institute later enabled him to submit letters to the policy-makers in Washington, members of Congress, and newspaper and magazine editors, expressing his opinion toward America's China policy. He traveled to China, Japan, and Washington, and frequently contributed his articles to a magazine called The China Monthly, of which editors before and after 1944 were the Right Reverend Monsignor G. Barry O'Toole and Father Mark Tsai respectively (10, pp. 53-57).

The magazine was known to be supported by a Catholic mission group. Over a period of five years, Kohlberg wrote seventeen articles on the subject of Far East (9, p. 195). According to R. Y. Koen's The China Lobby in American Politics, however, The China Monthly usually "served as the official mouthpiece of Chungking government on matters which could not diplomatically be published in the official propaganda organs [i.e. the Chinese News Service in New
York) of that government" (10, p. 55).

The magazine was consistently at the forefront in every phase of pro-Chiang propaganda in the United States. Koen said:

The influence of The China Monthly was far greater than its relatively small circulation might indicate. It was probably unique among English-language American periodicals not under the direct control of the Chinese Nationalist Government in the consistency with which it denounced United States policy in China... it has been cited as a source of China lobby propaganda in congressional publication, and information which first appeared on that publication was after quoted again and again in other publications. The magazine frequently served as the major organ for the dissemination of the views and attitudes of a number of Americans who were most prominently associated with the cause promoted by the China lobby (10, pp. 54-55).

Kohlberg's connection with the China Lobby in the end of World War II was found when he served as treasurer of the American China Policy Association, a pro-Nationalist group sponsored by Christopher Emmet, a New York lecturer and writer who claimed to be the father of the China Lobby (15, p. 116). Emmet said that, early in 1944, he organized a small meeting at the home of Emily Hanhn, a writer, to discuss illusions about the Chinese Communists then so widespread in the United States press, radio, magazine, book publishing and book review fields. "This meeting," Emmet said, "as far as I know, was the first gathering of private citizens concerned with the problem of the Chinese Communists. You might say that it was the genesis of the so-called China Lobby" (15, p. 116).
The American China Policy Association was formally organized in 1945. It was not long, however, before the association came under Kohlberg's domination, and several of the founding members, including Emmet, withdrew. The association performed in the 1950's as one of the most important private organizations supporting Chiang's government.

Other Lobbyists

A number of institutes and individuals registered at the United States Department of Justice before 1945 were claimed by critics as the part of the China Lobby. William S. Lawrence, for example, whose registration terminated on September 28, 1942, worked as consultant to the China Defense Supplies (18, p. 219).

Chinese Institute in America, Inc., an organization formed to promote the study of Chinese culture in the United States and to act as a general information center on things Chinese and to all Chinese students in the United States, had sponsored, in cooperation with the Harmon Foundation, New York, various advertisements and disseminated eleven films on China, including "China's Gifts to the West," "Burma Road," and "Smile with the Children of China." The institute published a periodical, China Institute Bulletin; a handbook, Facts and Figures Concerning the Far Eastern Situation; and other publications, such as abstracts, newsletters, and monographs (18, pp. 219-220).
Nordlinger, Riegelman, Cooper, and Benetar Company of New York worked as legal service for the Chinese Embassy and the Chinese News Service since 1942 (18, p. 225), while William J. Goodwin was hired for being public relations consultant since 1945. Westel W. Willoughby served as honorary adviser rendering occasional advice upon technical questions of international law or procedure to the Chinese government representatives in the United States (18, p. 226).


The Red China Lobby

As A. T. Steele wrote in his book *The American People and China*, the year 1943 symbolizes "the climax of the Sino-American honeymoon," partly because of Madame Chiang's successful visit in the United States however, this year also represents, when viewed from another angle, a big reverse in the Chinese-American relationship. This change was destined not only to destroy the goodwill which Madame Chiang just brought to the United States, but also to damage the good relations between Chiang Kai-shek and Roosevelt, between the Nationalist Chinese government and the United States government, and between the Chinese people and the
American people. It was in this year that the International Communists decided to change its policy on maintaining the cooperation of the Communist Chinese and the Nationalist government; thereafter, a series of attacks on Chiang himself and his government was begun (12, p. 285).

**Background**

The Chinese Communists never projected a very clear image in the United States before the 1920's, nor had Americans ever paid any serious attention to them. They began to be known by Americans probably in the early 1920's, and when they were dispelled by Chiang Kai-shek's army into the mountains in Kiangsi province in central China, the outside world almost forgot them completely.

In 1936 when they intervened in the kidnapping of Chiang Kai-shek at Sian that they made headlines. In the following year they were in the news again, when they concluded a truce with the Kuomintang for the extensible purpose of presenting a united front against the Japanese. Some of the earliest Communist sympathizers, such as Agnes Smedley, Anna Louis Strong, and Edgar Snow, began their work to promote images of the Chinese Communists in American minds during this time.

Agnes Smedley, who was in Sian when Chiang was kidnapped and who was later identified as an important cog in the Sorge spy machinery that had operated for the Kremlin in Japan and China, published her two books in favor of the Chinese Communists, *Chinese Destinies*, 1933, and *China's Red Army*
Marches, 1934. Smedley's books were noticed by only a few readers, and it was Snow's Red Star Over China, published in 1938, that aroused people's interested in the Chinese Communists.

Before Snow wrote Red Star Over China, his first best-selling book, he made a number of attempts to see the Generalissimo, but in vain. As a result, Snow did not get a first-hand viewpoint of the Generalissimo before he wrote the book. "Whether one interview [with the Generalissimo] at that time would have changed Snow's opinion, I cannot say," Tong said, years later. "But I do know that he is a man to whom reason might appeal and who would well have been influenced by a frank statement on the whole question by the Generalissimo at that time" (17, p. 158).

Snow then made his famous trip to the Communist area and was the first American correspondent to visit this area. His book Red Star Over China gave a laudatory account of the Chinese Communists, their program, their methods, and their practices. Snow was one of the first writers to describe the Chinese Communists as "rural equalitarianism" and "agrarian reformers." The book was among the first few publications that introduced the Chinese Communists to the West; it had an impact hardly measured by its relatively small sale: seven editions with a total of 23,500 copies (7, p. 163).
In 1937, 1938, and 1939, the Chinese Communists had been comparatively quiet, and refrained from stirring up feelings among foreigners against the Central Government. Anthony Kubek analyzed the reason in his book, *How the Far East Was Lost*:

The united front idea, which applied to Communists in all countries, had been developed in Moscow as a means of safeguarding the Soviet Union against the threat of so-called "facist aggression" and of expanding the influence of the Communist in "capitalist" democracies. Under the terms of the united front, the Chinese Communists pledged themselves to cease subversive activities against the Nationalist government, and to integrate the Chinese Red Army with the government (11, p. 222).

Another reason for the Chinese Communists's quiescence at this time was that the Communists's uncertainty that China could survive the struggle with Japan, and the Soviet Union still needed Chiang's army to keep Japanese troops in the China Theatre so it could fight against the Germans in Europe. Geraldine Fitch, a writer, said in her book:

It was highly important [to Communist sympathizers] to make the American people believe the China Lobby began in 1940. Because before those of us who have stood for the Open Door and the territorial integrity of a free and independent China, and the left-wingers and pro-Communists who were with us during Stalin's united front—but with the Chinese Communists, and against the rest of us, from 1940 on (3, p. 29)!

Things changed in 1940, when it became clear that China would be able to survive to continue the war, and that there was a possibility of America and England joining in, there was an immediate shift in Communist tactics. The Communist leaders began to aggressively expand the areas of their
influence, and Red troops began to infiltrate regions garrisoned by the Central Government. This expansion naturally led to frictions, and frictions soon made good stories. The Communists designed their propaganda work to attack the Generalissimo and the Kuomintang and its officials in the government (17, p. 157).

The change, however, lasted only for a short time, because Stalin found out he was facing the Nazis' offensive and still needed the Generalissimo's army to hold the Japanese, therefore, the attack and expansion soon stopped. The situation in 1943, represented another change of Communist tactics. Stalingrad had been successfully defended, and with United States aid making it obvious that Nazi Germany would be defeated in the west, the Communist line immediately reopened its accusations of Chiang and his government. This time the united front was no longer important, Mao Tse-tung rapidly stepped up his divide-and-conquer tactic against Chiang and Communist sympathizers the world over took their cue from their Kremlin masters, so attacks were begun on people and policies that since 1937 had been tolerated or even praised (9, p. 55).

Sympathizer Groups and Lobbyists

China Today.—The American Communist Party began to contact their "comrades" in China in the 1920's; the American Communist Party even set its "Chinese bureau" in
Shanghai. One of its leading members, Chi Chao-ting, whose Communist Party name was Doonping, was a Chinese student in the United States. In May, 1933, Chi and a few of his comrades-friends formed one of the Communist front organizations, the American Friends of the Chinese People, in New York (8).

Beginning in this year, the organization published a multigraphed bulletin, first announcing its birth and then reproducing releases sent to them from the Chinese Communist Party underground in Shanghai. In January, 1934, the bulletin was changed to a mimeographed magazine, China Today, one that concentrated on Far East problems, and supported the Chinese Communists. For prestige purposes, the first issue of the magazine was designed as Volume 2 instead of Volume 1. Beginning with October, 1934, the magazine changed its format again, added photographs of Chinese Communist leaders, illustrations of the life in Yenan (the Communist capital), and included two-color illustrated cover.

At its height, the magazine's circulation reached seven thousand, including subscriptions and book store sales. The editors included Chi, Philip J. Jaffe, and T. A. Bisson, all Communist members or pro-Communists. In July, 1934, Frederick V. Field, the prominent figure in both the Amerasia and the Institute of Pacific Relations events, joined the editorial board (8). Among other editors, Maxwell Stewart, Theodore Draper, Haru Mitsui, and Edgar Snow all were active, or constantly contributed their stories. Max Granich,
identified in the McCarran hearings as a Russian Communist, whose wife was an important Communist member, served on the editorial board (3, p. 34).

China Today was regarded by Geraldine Fitch as the "birth of the [Red] China Lobby" (3, p. 34). Judging from what the magazine was doing in the early 1930's, the title was suitable. But it was less important in the early 1940's, after some of its editors moved to organize another Communist magazine, Amerasia (3, p. 34).

Some other periodicals were important to the Communists during World War II: Daily Worker, Political Affairs (both listed as subversive by the United States Attorney General), The Communist, and New Masses, all served as the Communist organs and continually supported the Chinese Communists. Jewish Life, Far East Spotlight, and People's World published many articles favoring Chinese Communists.

Journalists and Writers. -- One of the most successful efforts by the Chinese Communists to influence American public opinion was providing information for foreign correspondents in China and finding a way to change those newspapermen's image of the Chinese Communists. As early as January 23, 1941, when the Communists first shifted their policy toward Chiang's government, the American Ambassador in China, Nelson Johnson, noticed that the methods utilized by
the Communists were highly successful. In his letter to Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, Johnson said:

The Department will, of course, be aware that the Chinese communists have hitherto had and still appear to have a good press abroad. They have exercised much subtlety and skill in their relations with foreign press correspondents, especially Americans. Perhaps the one American who has done more than any other to portray and to explain the Chinese Communists and their principles and objectives in a favorable light has been Edgar Snow, author of Red Star Over China. Through the agency of that book alone the Chinese Communists were colorfully dramatized and made known to millions of Americans and Europeans.

It seems no unlikely that the favorable foreign press which the Chinese Communists enjoy is ascribable to a variety of reasons: the Communists encourage contact; they utilize propaganda skillfully; they are adept in seeing that their versions of incidents and problems are promptly placed before correspondents and other third-power nationals of consequence. Moreover, they are in a sense the "underdog"; as the chief opposition party they are often recipients of sympathy (11, p. 365).

One item that Johnson did not mention (and this fact was not disclosed until the 1950's) was that many of these foreign press were related to the International Communists. For example, the first foreign correspondent who wrote two books about the Red Army in the early 1930's, Agnes Smedley, was identified as a member of the spy ring headed by Richard Sorge (11, p. 365). And, when Chiang Kai-shek was kidnapped in Sian, she was there with the Communists to broadcast in English for the Reds, although she had been sent to China be the Manchester Guardian.

As mentioned before, Stálin changed his policy toward China probably in mid-1943. On June 7, 1943, the first anti-
Chiang Kai-shek article for some time appeared in Moscow's newspaper, Red Star, which attributed all of China's fighting effort with Japan to the Chinese guerrillas (the Communists) (12, p. 285).

Then, on August 8, Vladimir Rogoff, Tass correspondent in China, wrote an authoritative article "The Serious Problem in China" in a Moscow magazine, War and Working Class. The article was considered a signal of change in Communist policy toward China, in which the Nationalist government was described as filled with appeasers, defeatists, and persons trying to destroy the Communist armies and to foment civil war (9, p. 56).

The first response to Stalin's new policy in the United States was on July 14, 1943 by T. A. Bisson's article "China's Part in a Coalition War," on the Far Eastern Review, the Institute of Pacific Relations' publication. Bisson was on the editorial board of China Today and Amerasia and was identified before the MacCarran Committee in 1951 by witnesses as a member of the Communist Party. In his article, he said that there were two Chinas: one feudalistic, chained to the past (Chiang's Kuomintang); the other, a democratic China that truly expressed the will of the Chinese people (9, p. 56).

According to Louis Budenz, an ex-Communist and an ex-editor of the Daily Worker, the official organ of the American Communist Party, he received the order and the
article of Rogoff's in the summer of 1943, and the Daily Worker and Amerasia immediately published the story (9, p. 56).

Bisson's story was praised by Owen Lattimore, who said "the article is fundamentally sound and says a lot of things that many people felt ought to have been said before this" (9, p. 56). Lattimore, who created the terms of "McCarthyism" and "the China Lobby" both in his testimony before the Tyding Committee in 1950 (9, pp. 101-102), was the most important author dealing with Far Eastern matters in the 1930's and 1940's. Kubeck said in his book How the Far East Was Lost, "Perhaps Lattimore was not the 'architect of our Far Eastern policy' as declared by the late Senator Joseph McCarthy, but at the very least he was its chief propagandist" (11, p. 365).

Lattimore held no academic degrees, but he had served in a number of important positions related to Far Eastern issues. He was editor of the Institute of Pacific Relations quarterly Pacific Affairs, served as a special consultant to the Department of State, was adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, was Pacific Coast director of the Office of War Information (OWI), and was political adviser to Vice President Wallace on his trip to China. He was a close friend of John C. Vincent, Far Eastern Affairs Director of the State Department, and Lauchlin Currie, president executive assistant in charge of Far Eastern matters, and who was identified as a Communist. Lattimore had such a wide opportunity to implement his work
for building up the Chinese Communists and undermining Chiang's government that he was considered "paramount among experts (who) had a wide influence on American books through his numerous books, articles, and book reviews" (11, p. 367).

In the years from 1928 to 1945, Lattimore wrote eight books about Asia and China; in almost every book he was "in defense of the Communists in China" (4, p. 46). These books were *Desert Road to Turkestan* (1928), *Mongols of Manchuria* (1934), *Manchuria: Cradle of Conflict* (1935), *Mongol Journeys* (1941), *Asia in a New World Order* (1942), *America and Asia* (1943), *Making of Modern China* (1944), and *Solution in Asia* (1945). In most of his works, Lattimore constantly reveals a very marked tolerance of Russian aims in Asia, such as

He [Stalin] brackets the three principles of Sun Yat-sen, Russian collectivism and the New Deal as all akin and aimed at lifting society forward as a whole and restoring to the common man the opportunity for growth (4, p. 48).

In their [Asiatic peoples'] eyes... the Soviet Union stands for strategic security, economic prosperity, technological progress, miraculous medicine, free education, quality of opportunity, and democracy; a powerful combination... The face that the Soviet Union also stands for democracy is not to be overlooked. It stands for democracy because it stands for all the other things (11, p. 370).

In MacCarran Committee's final investigation report, Lattimore was concluded as "from some time beginning in the 1930's, a conscious articulate instrument of the Soviet conspiracy" (9, p. 388). However, Lattimore's books were only a part of his contributions to the Communist interest.
According to John T. Flynn, the author of *While You Slept*, who surveyed a list of twenty-nine books on the general political situation in China published between 1943 and 1949, that

Every one of the 22 pro-Communists books, where reviewed, received glowing approval in the literary reviews, I have named—that is, in the *New York Times*, the *Herald Tribune*, *Nation*, the *New Republic*, and the *Saturday Review of Literature*. And every one of the anti-Communists was either roundly condemned or ignored in these same reviews. (4, pp. 55-56).

The report of the McCarran Committee told how this brazen books promotion operated:


Among the above list of authors and reviewers, all of whom were involved in the IPR investigation in 1950 and 1951, Stein was accused by General Douglas MacArthur's intelligence service of being a Soviet agent; in 1950, he was expelled from France for espionage. He was a member of a Communist-front organization, *Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy*, which was listed by the Attorney General as subversive.
His book has been very effective in perpetuating the legend that "the Chinese Communists are not Communists, and are not like or in any way connected with Soviet Union," said Charles A. Willoughby in his *Shanghai Conspiracy* (21, pp. 76-77).

Rosinger published two books in the war years, *China's Wartime Politics* (1944) and *China's Crisis* (1945). He was identified by Louis Budenz as a Communist, as were Harriet Morre, and John Fairbank, who is today's expert on China issues at Harvard (11, pp. 374-375).

Author Flynn revealed of twenty-two pro-Communists books, Lattimore, Snow, Smedlley, Fairbank, and Rosinger wrote twelve. Moreover, this group turned in forty-three reviews of the books to different periodicals or newspapers in the same period. Of the seven anti-Communists books, Lattimore wrote three reviews; Annalee Jacoby two; Edgar Snow two; Agnes Smedlley one; John K. Fairbank one; and Harrison Forman one (4, p. 59).

For a period of only five years, from 1945 to 1950, these people wrote a total of 162 book reviews: Richard Watts, forty; Owen Lattimore, twenty-six; John K. Fairbank, twenty; T. A. Bisson, eighteen; Nathaniel Peffer, fifteen; Eleano Lattimore, Owen Lattimore's wife, thirteen; Theodore White, three. All of these people were friends and associates, and all propagandized for the Chinese Communists (11, p. 329).

Moreover, Stein worked for the *Christian Science Monitor* in
China in the 1940's; Theodore White was *Time* correspondent in Chungking; Harrison Forman worked for the *New York Herald Tribune* in China; and Edgar Snow was the correspondent for the *Saturday Evening Post* in China. All these reporters traveled to Yenan, praised the Communist industrial and agricultural achievement, and applauded the fighting spirit and military achievements of Communist troops.

In general, these authors assumed a common pattern arguing three fundamental points, according to Kubek's analysis:

First: the Chinese Communists "are not Communists," not according to the Russian definition of the term; second: the Chinese Communists are fighting the Japanese, and the Chinese National Army was not; third, Chiang Kai-shek was a fascist, and his totalitarian regime was preventing the Communists from establishing democracy (11, p. 379).

The few authors who tried to warn Americans of the Communist peril in the Far East were subject to severe criticism. "Whenever a book came out that was critical of the Chinese Communists, entire anti-Nationalist crowd would marshal their efforts to kill it" (11, p. 380), said Kubek.

Edgar Snow was one of the most effective propagandists on matters dealing with China, second only to Owen Lattimore. He wrote not only books and reviews, such as *Red Star Over China*, but also a number of articles praising Communist contributions to the war. In his article "Sixty Million Lost Allies," he said:

They should not be called Communists at all . . . there has never been any Communism in China; the old
Communist Army is now defunct and it ceased to have any contact with Moscow. . . . Chu Te [a general of the Chinese Communist Army] had the kindless of Robert E. Lee, the tenacity of Grant, and the humility of Lincoln (11, p. 372).

After Snow was made associate editor of the Saturday Evening Post, he exercised more influence on the China issue. From 1943 to 1945, the Post printed twenty-five articles by Snow about China, Russia, India and other areas in Asia (4, p. 66). During this period, every article about Russia, with one exception, was written by Snow.

Another periodical which became victim of the Communist propaganda was Collier's. In the period in 1944 and 1945, Collier's opened its columns to Mark Gayn, one of pro-Russian writer, who continually contributed articles attacking Chiang Kai-shek describing wonderful things that the Red China was doing (4, pp. 69-76).

Service-Davies clique.--During the war years, American foreign service officers in China played a significant part in working for a change in American support from Nationalist China to the Communists. Their reports sent to the State Department were very complimentary to the Communists and frequently derogatory of the government under Chiang Kai-shek's leadership. Among those foreign service officers in China, John Service, John Carter Vincent, and John P. Davies, Jr., were the most important. And the relationship
between these foreign service officers and General Joseph Stilwell played a significant role in American foreign policy shift.

Pressures against Chiang began from John Davies, Jr., early in 1942, following General Stillwell's appointment as Chiang's chief of staff in the China Theater. Davies was the American consul in Kunming, a city in South China, before he was invited by General Stilwell to become his political adviser. Stilwell and Davies met each other in 1938 when Stilwell was the military attache and Davies was the consul quartered in Hankow (12, p. 405). At that time, Davies was familiar with some Communist leaders, among them, Chou En-lai was his most frequent contact.

In 1943, Stilwell ordered him to organize an intelligence section to analyze the future of the Chinese Communists. Davies then suggested inviting John Service, John K. Emerson, Raymond Pl Ludden, and Kenneth C. Krentz to join the group. Ludden was the second secretary of the American Embassy in China and both Service and Emerson served as third secretaries. This was the beginning of the clique that worked for Stilwell (13, p. 264).

As early as 1942, Chou En-lai, who was stationed in Chungking as the Communist representative, outlined the Communist program for control of China. Foreign officers in Chungking were Chou's objective to be influenced, and John Davies and John Service were among the most important foreign
officers. Because Davies was familiar with the Chinese language, beginning in 1942, he had ample opportunity to handle top secret affairs between China and the American government. Sometimes he translated cables between Chiang and Roosevelt; when Vice President Wallace visited China, Davies was his political adviser associating with Owen Lattimore (12, p. 405).

Between 1942 and 1943, Chou discussed five times with Davies and Service about the Nationalist blockade of the Communist territory and said that Chiang's government had tried to conserve military strength by refusing to fight the Japanese. Chou's message was immediately transmitted to the United States government by the Davies and Service clique, as follows:

The anti-Japanese united front has been abandoned. The Central Government deployed large number of well-trained troops to blockade Communist areas, thus preventing Communists from fighting the Japanese. The Nationalists deem it advantageous to eliminate Communist-held border areas before conclusion of the war against Japan (13, p. 405).

Chou suggested to Davies that the United States government should send a military mission to visit Yenan to gather intelligence about possible Japanese attack on Siberia (12, p. 230). This suggestion was reported on January 15, 1944 to the State Department by Davies:

Now Chinese Communist leaders are ready to welcome us for observation and intelligence tasks. We should send there a military observation group on a fourfold mission as soon as possible to:
--- Gather intelligence on Japanese military activities.
--- Prepare a plan for U.S. forces fighting in Communist areas.
--- Investigate the strength of Chinese Communist forces.
--- Explore the possibility of a Soviet puppet regime in North China and Manchuria. (13, p. 201).

This suggestion of sending a military observation group later was adopted by the American government. In July, 1944, the United States Army Investigation Section, headed by Colonel David Barrett, flew to Yenan. Davies was in the group and was replaced by Service. In their 106 reports sent to the State Department, both Davies and Service clearly showed their favorable attitudes toward the Chinese Communists. In Service's first report from Yenan, dated July 28, 1944, for example, he reported, "In Yenan, officialdom is identified with the people. There are no beggars, no signs of destitute poverty" (13, p. 206). In his sixth report, Service reported:

Economic progress is remarkable in the Communist base areas. The people are tilling their land in their tradition of independence and spontaneity. Private investment is encouraged. The standard of living has been raised and taxes lowered. This is sharp contrast to the situation in the Kuomintang area. (13, p. 207).

In Professor Liang Chin-tung's book, General Stilwell in China 1942-44: The Full Story, he concluded that all the reports sent by Davies, Service, and their colleagues followed a pattern: first, slighting of and defaming the Chinese National Government; second, heaping praise on the
Chinese Communists over the Kuomintang in their controversy; and finally, demanding changes in United States policy toward Nationalist China. Liang said:

The National Government was accused of undemocratic political conduct, reluctance of refusal to fight the Japanese, making preparations for civil war, corruption and incompetence, loss of popular support, theft and sale of lend-lease aid goods, and capitulation to the enemy through secret negotiations. By contrast, the Communists were presented in the best possible terms—practicing democratic government, not really being communistic, indifferent to Soviet backing, eager for friendship with the United States, willing to fight the Japanese alongside United States forces and accepting American command of Communist forces. Subsequently it was said that the National Government's hostility toward the Chinese Communists would antagonize the Soviet Union. United States support of the National Government could only produce the undesirable twofold result of increasing the probability of civil war in China and driving the Chinese Communists into the Soviet fold (13, p. 228).

Davies and Service's reports were based mainly on the discussion with Communist leaders, such as Mao Tze-tung and Chou En-lai. His pro-Communist attitude was so appreciated by the Chinese Communists that once Mao said to Davies, "Your coming to Yenan was helpful to our (Communist) resistance against the Japanese. But the greatest advantage for us of your support was that the Kuomintang has been disappointed so badly since then" (14, p. 232).

The influence of these men was probably greatest in the Department of State where their reports, constantly emphasizing the defects of the Kuomintang were even more convincing and persuasive than their analysis of the Communist regime at Yenan. For example, on October 10, 1944,
Service reported from Yenan:

Our dealing with Chiang Kai-shek apparently continues on the basis of the unrealistic assumption that he is necessary to our cause. . . . In the present circumstance, the Kuomintang is dependent on American support for survival. But we are in no way dependent on the Kuomintang. . . . We need not fear the collapse of the Kuomintang government.

We need not support Chiang in the belief that he represents pro-American or democratic groups. All the people and all other political groups of importance in China are friendly to the United States and look to it for the salvation of the country. . . .

Our policy toward China should be guided by two facts. First, we cannot hope to deal successfully with Chiang without being hardboiled. Second, we cannot hope to solve China's problem without consideration of the opposition forces--Communists, provincial and liberal. . . . We should not be swayed by pleas of the danger of China's collapse. This is an old trick of Chiang's (13, p. 215).

Davies and Services' political ideas not only affected General Stilwell's attitude toward the Generalissimo, but also changed President Roosevelt's impression of Chiang's will to resist the Japanese. According to Kuo-Jung-chao, Roosevelt's good image of Chiang and his Kuomintang was kept until the end of 1943. In the Cairo Conference, although the Generalissimo was invited to the meeting, Roosevelt's opinion about the Chinese situation had been drastically changed. First, Roosevelt forced the Generalissimo to accept the idea of forming a coalition government in the post-war years. Second, Roosevelt told Stilwell after the meeting, "If Chiang collapsed, we could find another one" (12, p. 425).
The Davies-Service clique seriously affected the Sino-American relationship in the war years. In his book, *How the Far East Was Lost*, Kubek said:

There can be no doubt that the Foreign Service Officers in General Stilwell's staff were determined to destroy the Nationalist Government and remove Chiang Kai-shek as head of state. The Roosevelt Administration formulated its policies largely on the information reported by these men (11, p. 229).

Summary

In the 1950's, several news media disclosed the secrecy of the so-called "China Lobby," which actively existed during World War II. The beginning of the China lobby, according to these reports, was in 1940 when T. V. Soong came to the United States to secure American help for the Chinese government. Soong stayed in America for three years, and during this time, he met a lot of influential friends. Because of Soong's efforts, China easily gained a $500,000,000 loan from the United States Treasury Department.

Henry Luce, publisher of *Time* and *Life* magazines, was claimed to be the most powerful China lobbyist in the war years. Luce was China-born missionary's son, and had from the beginning of the 1930's zealously promoted Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist government as the heroes of China. His press empire influenced American public opinion greatly in World War II.

The Red China Lobby was a group of American journalists, writers, and book reviewers who were actively advocating
the Communist cause in the war years. Among these people, Edgar Snow and Owen Lattimore were the most important. Snow's *Red Star Over China*, written in 1938, was America's first introduction to the Chinese Communists. Lattimore wrote eight books in favor of the Chinese Communists during 1928 and 1945. He worked as editor of *Pacific Affairs*, special consultant to the Department of State, adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, Pacific Coast director of the Office of War Information (OWI), and political adviser to Vice President Wallace on his trip to China.

During the early 1940's, Snow, Lattimore, and their friends successfully controlled book reviews filed in America. They praised the Chinese Communists and ignored books favoring Chiang's government.

Other important Red China lobbyists were the Foreign Service officers in China: John Service and John Davies were among the most important. They sent a great number of reports to the State Department indicating that the Communists were democratic, and that Chiang Kai-shek's government was corrupt. These American government officers's viewpoints affected Roosevelt's policy toward China.
CHAPTER BIBLIOGRAPHY


CHAPTER V

PROPAGANDA TOWARD THE CHINESE IN THE UNITED STATES

Standing shoulder to shoulder with their brothers at home, the overseas Chinese have in the war years shown their loyalty and unwavering spirit in the defense of their motherland. Their material and spiritual contributions to China have in many ways been vital to the nation's successful resistance and reconstruction.

According to a report issued by the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission of the Executive Yuan (the cabinet), there were 74,954 Chinese living in the United States before 1937 (2, p. 37). More than 50 percent of these Chinese were congregated on the West Coast; San Francisco, alone had more than 25,000 Chinese. New York, Brooklyn, Chicago, Boston, New Orleans, and Philadelphia were other cities in which Chinese settled (12, pp. 68-69).

The Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission of the Executive Yuan was not the only office in charge of overseas Chinese matters. In fact, the Kuomintang's Board of Overseas Affairs was the main department responsible for the overseas business. This board was headed by a minister and two vice ministers. Three departments of the board were responsible for:
(a) secretarial, business affairs and statistical work; (b) direction, training, and registration; and (c) publicity, editing, and social service (2, p. 48).

In addition to these two offices, the Ministry of Education dealt with overseas Chinese affairs, mainly with cultural exchange programs. Some newspapers and news agencies, which maintained branches in the foreign countries, were involved in the propaganda activities toward the Chinese abroad.

In this chapter, four subsections are included: (a) a brief history of the propaganda work toward the Chinese in the United States; (b) activities and organizations in the war years; (c) cultural exchange operations; and (d) Chinese newspapers and correspondents in the United States.

A Brief History of the Propaganda Work Toward the Chinese in the United States

Although China sent its first minister Chen Lan-pin to Washington, D.C. as late as in 1876, formal contact between these two countries can be traced back at least to 1832, when Edmund Robert went to the region of the Indian Ocean on business and later as an official in the United States Consular Service (13, pp. 16-17).

In 1867, another early contact was established. Anson Burlingame, the former American minister in Peking, was committed by the Chinese authorities as an envoy to head a mission to America and Europe. Having associated with
Chi-kang and Sun Chia-ku as officials of the second civil rank, Burlingame led a group of thirty secretaries and attaches, who were all commissioned as "Our High Minister Extratordinary and Plenipotentiary" (13, p. 36).

Through Burlingame's efforts, Western countries, including the United States, adopted a policy of friendly treatment toward China. Although this effort met with ultimate failure with the outbreak of the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, as pointed out by Liu Ta-jen, an historian, "Burlingame will be recorded in modern Chinese history as the first goodwill envoy to propagate China's cause to America" (13, p. 41).

The first Chinese who went to the United States with a propaganda purpose after Burlingame, was revolutionalist Kan Yu-wei, who, instead of seeking American sympathy, mainly tried to arouse the Chinese in support of his revolutionary cause, both financially and politically. Kang arrived in America in 1889. First he went to Vancouver and contacted members of the Hung League, a Chinese secret society. He told them he had a secret order from the Boy Emperor Kuang Hsu to organize a revolutionary party in America to depose the Empress Dowager, and reform Kuang Hsu's government. In Vancouver, Kang established his "Protect the Emperor Society," or Pao Huang Hui, by successfully using all democratic means to elect officers and employing the Hung League members (6, pp. 161-163).
From Vancouver, Kang visited other cities in Canada and then went to the United States. His first branch in the United States was established in Boston. As the Pao Huang Hui grew in strength, the whole of North and South America was divided into eleven zones, each zone having a head branch and subbranches.

As a front to hide its activities, the Pao Huang Hui established commercial agencies so the Chinese could openly buy stock. It set up a newspaper in San Francisco in 1902 called the Tai Tung Daily (the *Cosmopolitan*). The aim of this newspaper was to "reform our society (or party) (in the United States) from a private to a public organization, from a people's group to a political party!" (6, p. 163).

In 1903, Liang Chi-Chao, Kang's student and coordinator of the revolutionary party, went to America. While in the United States, he not only spoke to the Chinese in various cities, but also tried to influence American capitalists and politicians. In Washington, he visited President Theodore Roosevelt, Secretary of State John Hay, and General Homer Lee, commander of the party's Reform Army in Los Angeles (10, p. 20).

Kang and Liang's activities in the United States soon prompted Dr. Sun Yat-sen to launch his propaganda operations toward the Chinese in America. Sun leaned from Kan and Liang how to establish his own newspapers to promote ideas for founding a republic country in China.
When Sun began his effort of establishing revolutionary strength in the 1880's, he had only three followers. In November, 1894, he went to Honolulu and organized his first revolutionary party, the Hsing Chung Hui (Revive China Society), predecessor of the Kuomintang (the Nationalist Party). This group had a combination of traditional Chinese secret society practices and Western political purpose, the members of the Hsing Chung Hui numbered not over 500 (19, p. 41).

After more than fifteen years of effort, Sun not only earned the confidence of the overseas Chinese, but also gained the financial support of secret society members, which occupied 90 percent of the Chinese population in the United States. During the ten armed revolts that Sun instigated, at least five were conducted by secret society members. More than $1,000,000, mostly from small donations, was contributed to Sun; later Sun organized a fund-raising bureau in San Francisco to handle his party's financial transactions (19, p. 41).

Sun's most frequently used propaganda method was control of the news media, particularly newspapers. Sun often told his followers, "Successfully employing propaganda determines 90 percent of the outcome of our revolution; military strength decides only ten percent. . . . The newspaper is the mother of public opinion, and decides whether our revolution is successful or not" (14, pp. 14, 339). Before the 1911 Revolution, Sun established at least four Chinese newspapers in Honolulu, two in San Francisco, and two in Van-
couver (14, pp. 403-412). Additionally, magazines and pamphlets were used often by his revolutionaryists.

Because Sun was fluent in both Chinese and English, he frequently used personal contacts to approach his countrymen in the United States in order to arouse their nationalism for the homeland, to draw their sympathy for his revolutionary organization, and to enlist them physically and financially into his revolutionary party. Encouraged by the response he received from overseas Chinese, he traveled the world, including the United States, at least three times (5, pp. 6-7).

Sun's next target for his revolutionary propaganda was to influence the American people and the American government to support him both in spirit and with material assistance. In Sun's eyes, the United States stood as his best hope. In 1904, Sun issued an English written pamphlet, The True Solution of the Chinese Question, appealing directly to the American people by saying that the Chinese expected sympathy and support from them more than from any other people in the world. Because Americans were a Christian people, the leaders of Western civilization, and inspiring examples for a new China, he reasoned, there must be many Lafayettes among them willing to give a helping hand (9, p. 30).

Unfortunately, both the American people and government did not pay too much attention to him. Probably because his fame and popularity in this country could not match that of his rivals, Kan and Liang, who could barnstorm Americans,
draw thousands of listeners and willing contributions, and be received by the Secretary of State and President. To many Americans who cared to read about Sun, he was an outlaw, a revolutionary, thus an enemy to law and order and the existing peace. News media ignored him; even The New York Times reported his activities only sporadically. Most reports from the Peking Legation to Washington, prior to the 1911 Revolution, stressed the negative aspects of Sun's character and activities (5, p. 62). "The whole political climate in Washington was unfavorable to him," said Thomas W. Ganschow (5, p. 41).

Although Sun failed to gain support from both the American public and government, his successful agitation among overseas Chinese enabled him to be remembered as one of the most significant propagandists in the modern Chinese history (14, p. 18). His method of stirring up Chinese nationalism abroad was employed in later years by his party members.

Before the Sino-Japanese War, only a few insignificant activities were attempted either by the Chinese government or by the Kuomintang to seek support from the overseas Chinese. This condition changed in the early 1930's when the Chinese government found that it needed assistance from the Chinese abroad both spiritually and materially. Then more propaganda activities were carried out.
Organizations and Activities in the United States

Although there were scores of organizations in China towns, most of them were only local clubs and served limited members. A few exceptions to this rule were groups like the Chinese Chambers of Commerce. During the war years, it was the Chinese Six Companies in San Francisco, the Chinese Benevolent Association in New York, and the Kuomintang that controlled most activities supporting the Chinese government in Chungking.

The Chinese Six Companies and the Chinese Benevolent Association

San Francisco and New York drew the largest number of Chinese for a long time. When the Chinese arrived in the United States in a large numbers, there were generally several Chinese groups established in these cities to help new immigrants adapt to a new environment. In San Francisco, the Chinese Six Companies, comprising the six largest local associations, sometimes worked as a semiofficial organization before the Chinese government established any consulate in the city. This association was normally a benevolent group, but it served as a spokesman for the whole Chinese community.

When dealing with the Chinese in San Francisco, the American government would contact this association first. It solved Chinese problems, worked to increase Chinese welfare, and developed activities to improve the Chinese position in
American society. The association ranked as the top social organization in Chinatown in San Francisco. In New York, an association of the same type was called the Chinese Benevolent Association (4, pp. 172-182).

Long before Chinese propagandists started working in the United States to seek American support and sympathy, these associations, composed of the Chinese in different cities, began organizing both Americans and Chinese to advocate the homeland government. The first lobby group they formed was the United Relief Association of the Chinese in the United States, established in the early 1920's in San Francisco (4, p. 373). The association wrote to President Roosevelt and urged him to stop selling military supplies to Japan; $1,000,000 was collected in a few years.

After 1937, many relief groups were organized by the overseas Chinese in the United States, including organizations for the Japanese boycott, for the "Bowl of Rice" activities, for fund-raising works, airplane-raising operation, and movements for collection of medical supplies. For example, thousands of Chinese in San Francisco prevented a Greek ship from loading 2,500 tons of scrap iron to Japan on December 16, 1938. Another incident happened in Seattle in the same period when a Japanese ship was forced by the Chinese to return to Japan empty (4, p. 581).

The greatest contribution of these Chinese abroad toward the war in their homeland was money. From the outbreak of the
war in 1937 to 1945, the Chinese in America contributed more than $56,000,000 to relief work in China. A much bigger amount was remitted for investment, and for subscriptions for government bonds, aviation, and other needs. Some contributions were sent directly to civilian organizations such as the Chinese Red Cross (1, p. 155).

For collecting great amount of money, the Benevolent Association and the Six Companies devised a method to assess the Chinese according to income and business and volume of gross sales (8, 144). The fund-raising leaders made trips to China to hand over the money and to call on the heads of the Nationalist government. Their fame spread as the Chinese papers praised their patriotism and public spirit (8, p. 155).

There were monthly contributions, special contributions, "offer money to the States" movements, special sales, and other means. The average monthly pledge in America was $5. Special donations included money given for war orphan relief, winter garments, gas masks, and wounded soldier relief. Money was raised through entertainment, athletic matches, art exhibits, lectures, and free collections. Special days, such as marriages, birthdays, and burials were used to collect money. Flowers, badges, and souvenirs were sold in Chinatowns to swell donation funds, and the "offer money to the State" movement was usually held four times a year: on New Year's Day, Revolutionary Martyr Day (Memorial Day) on March 29, War Anniversary on July 7, and National Day on October 10 (1, p. 155).
More than $100,000,000 worth of government bonds were sold among overseas Chinese worldwide during the war years. Many of these Chinese went further by launching a "burn your bonds" movement to lessen the cost of the national treasury. When China launched another appeal for winter garments for refugees and soliders, overseas Chinese responded with great enthusiasm. San Francisco alone collected $1,000,000 in one year in 1939 and 1940 (1, p. 156).

One method that the Six Companies and the Benevolent Association used in the war years to collect money was through the intervention of women. Since Chinese women had never had any important role in community affairs until the war, they were flattered by this sudden importance and cooperated wholeheartedly. They raised money by sponsoring fashion parades of authentic Chinese garments from old dynasties to the present (8, p. 151).

Besides money, the Chinese were urged to donate material. In the early 1940's, the Chinese government sent Air Major General Chen Ching-yun to America on a publicity tour and he reported that $6,500,000 was raised to buy airplanes during his trip to seventy cities in the United States. In San Francisco alone, the Chinese presented ten pursuit planes to the Chinese Air Force to form a special squadron (1, pp. 156-157). Many young Chinese-Americans who received flight training then formed a squadron of flyers and fought in China. Dr. Margaret Chung, the commander-in-chief of this squadron, was
hailed by the press as "Ma Chung, Mother of Chinese-American flyers" (8, p. 151).

Large fleets of ambulances and Red Cross trucks were presented by overseas Chinese, too. In New York alone, enough money was raised to buy 100 fully equipped ambulances (1, p. 157).

Another important visitor from China to come to see Chinese communities in the United States was Madame Chiang Kai-shek. In her 46-day tour in the United States, she visited Chinatowns in New York, Chicago, and San Francisco; made speeches especially toward the Chinese four times; and received almost $65,000 for her "warphans" (7, p. 104).

She visited the Chinese Six Companies headquarters in San Francisco, and urged her countrymen to be "good citizens in the United States, to respect and obey the laws of the country" (7, p. 146). She told her compatriots that "China will carry on the struggle against the enemy until the Japanese are driven from every inch of Chinese territory—until all the towns of our country are freed from the enemy" (7, p. 147). Additionally, she urged her people to buy war bonds. "In buying war bonds, you are helping China win the war," she said in San Francisco (7, p. 147).

The Kuomintang

The other important organizations in most Chinatowns were the regional branches of the Kuomintang (the Nationalist Party). Since 1894, when Sun Yat-sen established his first
revolutionary party, the Hsin Chung Hui (Revive China Society) the overseas Chinese were considered one of the most important customers of his revolution business, both financially and spiritually. In 1914, the Hsin Chung Hui changed its name to the Kuomintang, but remained as the largest political organization in Chinese communities in the United States (12, pp. 445-462).

From the beginning, Sun emphasized the importance of overseas Chinese by extolling their role as "mother of the revolution" (12, p. 461). The Kuomintang had many members in the United States; one time its members were more than 10 percent of the Chinese population in America.

In the war years, the headquarters of the Kuomintang was set up in San Francisco. Five regional branch offices were established in New York, San Francisco, San Antonio, Chicago, and Portland, and each had branch offices. In addition, there were branches in thirteen states: Arizona, California, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, Oklohoma, Oregan, Pennsylvania, Utha, and Washington, and in Washington, D. C. (17, pp. 222-223).

Branches of the Kuomintang generally held periodic meetings in the war years to stimulate Chinese interest in the home government by presenting political discussions, and showing Chinese films. They edited several Chinese newspapers, directed societies which solicited funds for Chinese relief purposes, and sponsored broadcasts on international

A Youth Corps was formed in the large Chinatowns to ensure replacement of Kuomintang members. A special Kuomintang organizer was sent from China when Madame Chiang visited the United States (8, p. 177).

The Kuomintang cooperated with the cabinet’s Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission in publishing the proper kinds of materials used by language schools in the United States. The party encouraged the operation of special schools in the United States to educate the young Chinese; there were thirty-one Chinese schools in America during the years shortly after the war (4, p. 323).

**Cultural Exchange Activities**

In cooperation with the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, the Kuomintang’s Board of Overseas Affairs, and the Ministry of Information, the Ministry of Education directed a number of works to improve Chinese cultural relations abroad. Most of its job involved dealing with Chinese students in foreign countries, including the United States; sometimes it developed its own operations to invite foreign scholars to visit China.
Chinese Students in the United States

In modern times, the first Chinese student who studied in the United States and then returned to China was Yung Wing, who was taken to the United States by an American missionary, Samuel R. Brown. After his graduation from Yale in 1854, Yung returned to China so that succeeding generations could enjoy a similar educational advantage (18, pp. 42-43).

From 1872 to 1875, mainly because of Yung's efforts, 120 Chinese students were sent by the government to study in the United States in military science, navigation, ship building, and surveying. This was the first time a group of Chinese students had been sent abroad by the government (18, p. 43). From 1888 to 1892, four Chinese women went to the United States under the sponsorship of American missions. The four received medical degrees from American colleges and became not only the first Chinese women to study abroad, but also the first women doctors in China (18, p. 49).

Before the outbreak of the war, 2,338 Chinese students were in the United States. In 1941-42, only 1,749 remained in America to continue their studies. In 1942, because of the difficulties in their studies during the war, the number of the Chinese students diminished to 1,057. Only after the war did more students gradually come return to the United States; in 1945, the number was 3,022 (18, p. 511).

Because of the war, many students were cut off from their financial support. Before the war, only fifty Chinese
students were recipients of Chinese government, or quasi-government scholarships. After the Pacific war, the United States State Department granted scholarships to some of these students. By 1944, 400 students received monthly grants from the State Department, with 160 on the rolls at a time. The State Department gave special scholarships to more than thirty Chinese students to receive practical training in American government and private institute (3, p. 159).

The action of the American government prompted China to appropriate a similar sum to help Chinese Students. Under the chairmanship of T. V. Soong, the Committee on Wartime Planning for Chinese Students in the U.S.A. was formed in June, 1942. Awards were made on the same basis as the United States State Department grants and carried the same time terms. At least 318 scholarships were granted from June, 1942 to October, 1947. Additionally, a large number of Chinese students was placed in industry and government department, and was engaged in teaching the Chinese language. In May, 1943, 347 Chinese students or former students were reported to be employed; in May, 1945, the number had risen to 654 (18, p. 134).

The Committee on Wartime Planning published and disseminated the Directory of Chinese University Graduate and Students in America, and an English-language periodical, National Reconstruction. Three other publications were published during the ear years: What Chinese Exclusion Really Means, by Tso-Chien Shen; the China Institute Bulletin, and a Chinese language monthly, National Reconstruction Forum Newsletter (17, p. 226).
Programs of Exchange

The Chinese government began its exchange programs with foreign countries before the Sino-Japanese War. In 1936, China instituted programs with Poland and Italy; in 1937, Germany proposed to exchange six students with China. The United States government started requesting the same program as late as 1942, when the State Department invited six Chinese universities each to send a professor to the United States. As a result, these scholars, including Fai Hsiao-tung and Chang Chi-yun, spent a year in the United States (18, pp. 134-135). These scholars were not official representatives; their objective was to foster closer relations between Chinese and American educational institutes.

Beginning in 1944, the State Department extended invitations to Chinese universities to nominate professors to go to America for a one-year span. They were given posts to teach or to do research work in American institutes (3, p. 159).

In the same period, the Chinese government was interested in improving cultural relations with other friendly nations. It sent some college professors abroad to do research or teaching. In 1943, ninety-five were senior professors, ten were research fellows of the Academia Sinica, and the ten were experts in educational administration selected by the Ministry of Education. Seventy-four of them went to the United States and stayed for two years (18, p. 135).
Many Western scholars were invited to China as part of the cultural exchange programs. A number of technical experts, for instance, came to China and worked as a team with various Chinese government departments. Roscoe Pound of Harvard, G. B. Cressey of Syracuse, and Henry Sloone Loffin of Union Theological Seminary all were invited to visited China in this time (18, pp. 134-135).

Chinese Studies in the United States

The teaching of Chinese in the United States dates back to courses at Harvard in 1870. Prior to World War II, the Chinese language courses were devoted largely to teaching classical Chinese in order to train Sinologists. Universities that offered these courses included Harvard, Columbia, Chicago, University of California at Berkeley, and Pennsylvania (11, p. 47). With the help of major foundations and later the federal government, teaching posts were established in universities, thus, Chinese studies began to infiltrate various disciplines in the humanities and social sciences (11, p. 35).

Before World War II, the American Oriental Society provided an occasional forum for the presentation of Sinological papers. The major organization which mobilized a wide variety of Americans, from missionaries to newsmen and scholars, interested in contemporary Chinese problems was the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, whose publications, Pacific Affairs and Far Eastern Survey, were the
most important magazines on China issues. In June, 1941, another magazine, the *Far Eastern Quarterly*, was published by the Far Eastern Association, with the financial support of the Rockefeller Foundation (11, pp. 36-37).

To promote the study of Chinese studies in the United States, the Chinese government set up the China Institute in America, Inc., in New York in the early stage of the war. In order to bring about a better understanding of Sino-American cultural relations, the institute sought to aid groups making a study of China through a lecture service which gave seventy-two lecturers a year on cultural topics; through social workshops at seven American universities for teaching Chinese subjects, and through the assignment of Chinese students in various parts of this country to assist the public schools in the use of study material (17, pp. 219-220). The institute carried out an intensive program for the guidance of all Chinese students in the United States. It conducted several studies of Chinese-Americans, including the compilation of a list of the American-born Chinese skilled workers and trade school graduates and a survey of Chinese communities in America, with a view to improving their economic and social conditions (17, p. 220).

In 1945, the Chinese government offered five scholarships, of $1,500 each, for the purpose of encouraging Chinese studies, known as "Chinese Cultural Scholarships." The scholarship provided students other than Chinese nationals to concentrate on studies of Chinese culture for at least one year (3, p. 159).
Chinese Newspapers and Correspondents
In the United States

Newspapers

Chinese newspapers had been published in the United States since the middle 1850's. The earliest one was a weekly published in San Francisco in 1854 called The Golden Hills' News. And for a long time, San Francisco, New York, and Honolulu were the main cities having Chinese newspapers (12, p. 395).

Among Chinese newspapers published in the United States, many were the organs of the Kuomintang and were begun after 1900. These papers had enough financial support and better personnel system, thus were more important than other private newspapers in Chinatowns. Kuomintang newspapers published in the war years included: the Morning Youth Chinese and the Nationalist Daily, both in San Francisco; the New China Daily in Honolulu; the American Daily and the China Times in New York; and the Central Daily News, the Three Principles Daily in Chicago (16, pp. 777-784).

Chinese Correspondents

During the eight-year resistance war against Japan, the Central News Agency (CNA) was one of the two information services that acted as spokesmen for war-torn China. Its operations during the war years were concentrated in reporting developments of fighting, and the Ministry of Information was devoted to propagating the progress of China to both foreigners and the Chinese public (3, p. 511).

The Central News Agency was, and remains, the oldest and the most powerful news gathering and distributing institution in the Republic of China. It set its first overseas branch office in Hong Kong in July, 1933; and before 1937 it maintained five overseas correspondent offices in the world (15, pp. 50-51).

The first branch office of the CNA in the United States was established in Washington, D. C. in February, 1941, and the next one was added in New York in December, 1943. In addition to the overseas offices in the United States, the agency had several of staff correspondents accredited as war correspondents to Allied headquarters of the Southeast Asia Command, the Pacific China, and Burma-India Theaters of War (3, p. 511).

For its international news service, the agency had an exchange agreement with United Press in the war years. Another news exchange agreement with the International News Service was discontinued during the war.
The Central News Agency was serving not only the foreign correspondents in China, with its English news releases background material, *The China Fortnightly*, started in January, 1939, but also newspapers and radio stations in the United States and Canada. Overseas Chinese publications demanded CNA services not out of patriotism alone. Trade and investment information were probably their biggest concern, because, having lived in the United States for several generations, many of them had become businessmen and industrialists.

Other Chinese correspondents stationed in the United States included a bureau in Washington, D. C. established by the Ta-Kung Pao, the biggest newspaper in China during World War II. The first correspondent of the Ta-Kung Pao was appointed in 1941, and the second in 1944. *The Central Daily News* maintained one correspondent in the United States in the same period (3, p. 511).

**Summary**

Chinese propaganda toward the Chinese in the United States started in the last century when three great propagandists came to the United States to disseminate their political ideas. Kang Yu-wei and Liang Chi-chao urged the Chinese to support their Pao-Huang Hui, Protect the Emperor Society, and Sun Yat-sen told his countrymen that he wanted to establish a republican government in China. All of them had successfully developed some propaganda work in the United States.
The program to ask for support of the overseas Chinese by Chiang's government was initiated before 1937. A variety of activities was executed generally by the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission and the Ministry of Education in coordination with the Kuomintang's Board of Overseas Affairs. The Chinese organizations in Chinatowns, such as the Chinese Six Companies in San Francisco and the Chinese Benevolent Association in New York, designed many kinds of programs persuading the Chinese to donate money and other material to their homeland. More than $56,000,000 was collected from 1937 to 1945 from the Chinese communities in the United States. A much higher amount was remitted for investments, and subscriptions for government bonds, aviation, and other activities.

From 1941 on, the Chinese government was interested in promoting its cultural relations with other nations. Many scholars, thereafter, were invited to visit the United States, either to teach or to do research, for one or two years, and some American academicians were invited by the Chinese government to visit China.

In order to handle the problems of the Chinese studies and Chinese students in America, the Chinese government set up two organizations in the United States in the war years. These organizations, the Committee on Wartime Planning for Chinese Students in the U.S.A. and the China Institute, both published a number of periodicals and were involved in cultural exchange works.
Additionally, the Chinese government used some Chinese newspapers in America to provide its information to the Chinese people in the United States, and acquired goodwill and support. Some Chinese newspapers and agencies sent correspondents to the United States to collect news about Chinese life.
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CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Summary

The purposes of this study were to provide a historical perspective of China's international propaganda activities in the United States during World War II, to show the developments of its propaganda organizations, and to examine the content of these propaganda operations. Organization of this study was both chronological and topical, because in some cases material could be more clearly presented by ignoring the strict chronological sequence of events. The historical descriptive methods of presentation was emphasized throughout the study.

The main characteristics of China's propaganda in the United States during World War II have been found to be as follows: (a) China's propaganda operations generally were executed as a threefold function: official propaganda, unofficial propaganda, and propaganda toward the overseas Chinese; (b) official propaganda in the United States was operated by the official Chinese News Service and its branch offices in several cities; (c) unofficial propaganda involved work by both Americans and Chinese, among them, missionaries, newspapermen, and businessmen who all tried to help China for different reasons; (d) both China Lobby and Red China
Lobby changed people's image about China, either about the Nationalists or Communists, in the war years; and (e) propaganda toward the overseas Chinese in the United States was for the purpose of collecting donations and stirring up patriotism.

All these propaganda operations, therefore, were aimed at three kinds of publics in the United States: the American public, the decision-makers in the American government, and the overseas Chinese. Additionally, American correspondents were considered a medium to transmit information about China by both the Nationalists and the Communists. To propagandize the overseas Chinese in America, some Chinese correspondents were sent to the United States to collect news about Chinese communities and Chinese Life.

Conclusions

There was no exact method to measure what China's propaganda achieved in the war years. However, it is evident that the Nationalists lacked of effective propaganda techniques vis-a-vis the Communists changed irrevocably Sino-American relations and the world view of China.

After a series of Japanese boycott movements were launched by China's propaganda machine and the pro-China groups, the United States government gradually changed its attitude toward the Japanese. The American government, thereafter, did not insist on following its traditional principle of freedom of trade. On July 26, 1939, two years after the beginning of
Japan's undeclared war, the American government gave notice to Japan to terminate the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Japan signed in 1911. As a result of this action, the United States was in a position of taking decisive economic measure against Japan.

In the mean time, propagandists's and lobbyists's appeals to win American sympathy and support of China was successful at least in the early stage of the war years. On March 15, 1941, President Roosevelt stated in his address, "China through the Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek, asks our help. America has said that China shall have our help" (2, p. 237). Later, Roosevelt labeled the defense of China vital to the defense of the United States.

In 1943, when Sino-American relationship was at their peak of amity after Madame Chiang's successful visit to the United States, the American government announced its intention to cancel both the American Extraterritoriality in China and the Chinese Exclusion Acts. Also in this year, President Roosevelt invited Generalissimo and Madame Chiang to attend the Cairo Conference with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. After the meetings, the three leaders issued a joint communiqué of the Three Great Allies; China enjoyed the highest international reputation it has not had for many years.

After 1943, however, Chinese Communist propaganda became more widespread. Not only did America change its image about
the Chinese government in a short time, but American policy
toward China shifted drastically because of the efforts by
the Red China Lobby. This propaganda effort was summed up
in the Yalta Conference, in which the Chinese interest was
seriously jeopardized by the commitment to the Communists
by the American and British governments.

Generally speaking, what the Chinese propagandists achieved
in the later stage of the war, from Pearl Harbor in 1941 to
the war's end, was greater than what they achieved in the
first years. Part of the reason for this may be because
after 1941, when America was involved in the war, the American
public was more interested in news about China, ally. An
Another explanation for this, however, may be that Chinese
propagandists did not have sufficient support from their
own government, either financially or spiritually.

In the first half of the Sino-Japanese War, when the
Japanese spent millions of dollars in the United States to
inform the American public that it was China who violated
the treaty, Chinese propagandists had only $36,000 yearly
for all their overseas propaganda work (3, p. 101). Before
1941, only a few representatives were sent to the United
States by the Chinese government, whereas the Japanese
had established myriad offices with different functions.
Even after the war, Chinese propagandists had an annual budget
of only $24,000 for its entire propaganda machine in the
United States (1, p. iii). Most of propaganda work, therefore,
was completed by pro-China pressure groups and China lobbyists.
Another drawback of China's propaganda program in the United States was that most of its activities were concentrated in the Northeast or the West Coast areas. Not many propaganda operations were designed for people living in the South or the Midwest. Moreover, most of China's propaganda was concentrated in cities; people living in the country generally were ignored. Madame Chiang's visit to the United States was an example of the problem. In her seven-week visit, she stopped only in such cities as New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles. Small towns were not on her list.

However, the biggest mistake made by Chinese propagandists was their lack of an overseas propaganda plan for the post-war years. During the last few years of the war, enough signals indicated that the Communist issue would be important after the war. The propagandists, unfortunately, did not heed these signals. As this study demonstrated, there were not enough propaganda activities in the United States concerning the issue of Communist problem in the war years, except for a small amount of work done by American lobbyists.

On the other hand, Chinese Communists were the winners in this propaganda battle in the United States. They began noticing the problem as early as the 1930's, and enlarged their activities in the early 1940's. Their propagandists changed Chiang Kai-shek's image in America's mind. Chiang's government was painted as corrupt—which before 1943, American journalists had praised him as the hero of the Chinese
people and the head of the most efficient government in Asia. Communist propaganda was so powerful that even the head of Chiang's propaganda machine, Hollington K. Tong, would admit that no way for him to control the situation.

In general, the most successful work of the Chinese propagandists in the United States was agitation of the overseas Chinese to support their homeland government. Not only were millions of dollars donated by the Chinese in Chinatowns after the efforts of propagandists, but also hundreds of garments, trucks, airplanes, and other material were presented to the Chinese government or to private relief groups by these Chinese compatriots. It was these propagandists's broad scale use of various media that inspired their countrymen's patriotism.

In summary, China's propaganda efforts in the United States during the Sino-Japanese War and World War II fell short of their potential, largely because of lacking of money, trained personnel, experience, authority's support and understanding, and a farsighted view on the post-war situation.

Recommendation for Further Study

Recommendation for further study is to find out what propagandistic activities were made during the post-war years by the Chinese Communists, which was so successful that Chiang's government was forced to withdraw to Taiwan in only a few years after World War II.
Although the full-scale civil war did not erupt until 1946 or terminated until 1949, the template cut during World War II has set the pattern for American policy toward the Chinese Communist victory and the subsequent revolutionary and Nationalist upheavals in Asia. Therefore, a study that considers the American foreign policy during the war from 1940 to 1945 is recommended, too.
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