A CASE STUDY IN THE RHETORIC OF RESISTANCE: DESEGREGATION
OF THE DALLAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT DURING
THE 1975-1976 SCHOOL YEAR

THESIS

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By

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This thesis describes, classifies, analyzes and evaluates the rhetoric of resistance to forced busing to desegregate the Dallas Independent School District during the 1975-1976 school year. This thesis also applies the characteristics of social, protest and agitational movements to the anti-busing movement in Dallas to determine the effectiveness of the resistance rhetoric. The findings of this case study demonstrate that, although the Dallas protesters did not achieve all of their goals, their resistance rhetoric did accomplish specific, effective results. However, this thesis also concludes that, in the American system of government, neither violent nor non-violent resistance can prevent implementation of court-ordered busing.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Since the 1954 Supreme Court ruling in the case of Brown v Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas, the American educational system has been interlocked with the judicial process to desegregate public schools. For more than twenty years, the Dallas Independent School District has been involved with court-ordered desegregation. Since 1970, the focus of desegregating the public schools in Dallas has shifted from the general desegregation court order itself to the specific means of implementation. In 1970, Black and Mexican-American plaintiffs filed a lawsuit charging the DISD with racial segregation (3, p. 1). The DISD responded with a desegregation plan that would bus only Black high school students and would integrate Black and Anglo elementary schools with closed circuit television (4, p. 1). Although Judge Taylor adopted most of this plan in 1971, the plaintiffs appealed the DISD proposal. Judge Taylor then stayed most of the 1971 order until the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in New Orleans, Louisiana, could rule on the case (4, p. 1). The Fifth Circuit Court's decision came after a delay of four years, but, in 1975, the appeals court ruled that "the DISD's approach to the problem of desegregating
its secondary schools fails to indicate bona fide effort to comply with the mandates of the Supreme Court" (4, p. 1). Since that court's ruling in July, 1975, there have been six major desegregation plans offered to Judge Taylor, and all of them "contain provisions for busing of at least 18,000 Dallas students" (3, p. 1). As a result, busing as a means of desegregating the DISD in the 1975-76 school year became a crucial educational, political, social, economic and rhetorical issue.

A definition of rhetoric is necessary to understand the approach of this thesis to the actions and reactions to the desegregation of the DISD. Aristotle's definition of rhetoric is an applicable and practical definition for usage in this thesis. Aristotle defined rhetoric as all available means of persuasion (1, p. 7). Rhetoric is the art of verbal and non-verbal communication to produce an intended effect on a receiver. Rhetoric transmits messages and is a communicative process; rhetoric involves all forms of communication—written, oral and non-verbal; rhetoric is purposeful because the speaker has a conscious objective in speaking (5). The term resist is defined in Webster's New World Dictionary as "actively oppose, fight against, keep from yielding to or withstand" (8, p. 1239). The combined definitions of resist and of rhetoric produce one functional definition of resistance rhetoric for this thesis. The term resistance rhetoric as applied in this thesis means all verbal
and non-verbal persuasive communication intended to oppose or fight someone or something.

Opposition to the court orders to desegregate the DISD through forced busing of pupils during the 1975-76 school year assumed various rhetoric forms; therefore, desegregation of the DISD is a valid subject for rhetorical study and a current and relevant topic for a thesis describing, classifying and evaluating rhetorical acts and techniques of resistance. Academic study of rhetorical theory in graduate speech communication courses at North Texas State University coupled with professional experience as a speech communication teacher in the DISD for the past nine years are the motivational factors of this thesis.

Purpose

The purpose of this thesis is to present a case study in the rhetoric of resistance: the desegregation of the Dallas Independent School District during the 1975-76 school year. The second chapter of this thesis will identify and describe in a narrative, chronological sequence the events, leaders, resisters, ideology and rhetorical techniques employed in the desegregation effort during the 1975-76 school year. The third chapter will classify the forms of resistance rhetoric utilized against forced busing in the desegregation of the DISD. The fourth chapter will evaluate the types of resistance rhetoric employed against desegregating the DISD to determine if the resisters were effective in accomplishing immediate and
long-range goals. Therefore, by examining theoretical writings about the rhetoric of resistance and by applying these theories to the resistance rhetoric in the desegregation of the DISD, conclusions can be drawn about the determinants of success or failure of these rhetorical acts and techniques. Thus, the three-fold concentration of this thesis will be description, classification and evaluation of a specific example of the rhetoric of resistance--the desegregation of the DISD during the 1975-76 school year.

Procedure
Some of the recognized authorities in the area of rhetorical criticism of public address are three professors of speech--Lester Thonssen, A. Craig Baird and Waldo Braden. In their book entitled Speech Criticism, they develop the premise that the role of a rhetorical critic should be to present both an objective description and a subjective evaluation (7, pp. 20, 21), and their theory is the justification for that approach in this thesis. Although the desegregation of the DISD during the 1975-76 school year was a significant socio-economic, political and educational event in Dallas, there has been no evident interest in describing, classifying and evaluating this resistance rhetoric from a rhetorical theory and social movement perspective. There is an abundance of information available for the descriptive phase of this subject since the court orders and responses about the desegregation of the DISD were reported thoroughly by the Dallas
news media. One method of gathering information for this thesis was a compilation of articles and editorials published by the Dallas Morning News and by the Dallas Times Herald. These newspaper articles supplemented with radio and television coverage have provided ample data about the desegregation of the DISD.

Additional information for this thesis was acquired by attending and tape recording public meetings pertaining to the desegregation of the DISD. Administrators from the school district met with parents at high schools throughout Dallas to explain desegregation plans, and parents and civic leaders held anti-busing rallies to resist desegregation plans. Tape recordings of both types of group meetings provide factual information and furnish insight into peoples' attitudes at that time about the desegregation issue.

In addition to compiling information from newspapers and meetings about desegregation of the Dallas public schools, a study of reactions to court-ordered busing in other major school districts throughout the country was also made. This information from national magazines such as Newsweek, Time and U. S. News and World Report is presented as part of the background of desegregation in America since the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

After documenting specific examples of resistance to desegregation in various school districts throughout the United States, and, after obtaining specific information about desegregation of Dallas public schools during the 1975-76
school year, some general principles of rhetorical theory and social movement and protest movement theories were collected for the classification and evaluation phases of this thesis. Books and articles from speech communication, education and social science journals provided communication theories pertinent to the rhetoric of resistance to desegregation of the DISD. Some of the books that afforded insight into this topic were Dissent: Symbolic Behavior and Rhetorical Strategy by Haig Bosmajian, Public Opinion by Robert Chandler and the Politics of Non-Violent Action by Gene Sharp. The most helpful professional journals of speech communication used in research of this thesis were Central States Speech Journal, Journal of Communication, Quarterly Journal of Speech, Southern Speech Journal and Speech Monographs. The main educational journal consulted was Integrated Education. Journals of social science that provided information were American Behavioral Science, American Social Review and the Public Opinion Quarterly.

This thesis is not a rhetorical study of a social movement per se, but certain theories of social and protest movements are relevant to the rhetoric of resistance against forced busing in the DISD during 1975-76. One particularly useful source was an article by Lee Griffin entitled "The Rhetoric of Movements" which was published in 1952 and is often acknowledged to be the primary rhetorical theory concerning social movements (6, pp. 184-188). Another useful source was the book by two speech professors--John Bowers
and Donovan Ochs—entitled *The Rhetoric of Agitation and Control*. Their book published in 1971 defines and categorizes stages of protest movements and is a guide for contemporary movement study (2, pp. 16-37). Their theory is another criterion for analyzing activities of the resisters to desegregation in the Dallas public schools.

**Organizational Format**

The inductive method of reasoning will be the basis for the organizational format of this thesis. After describing specific rhetorical acts and techniques of resistance, general conclusions will be presented for consideration. The next chapters of this thesis will be organized in the following manner:

- **Chapter II:** DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENTS AND TECHNIQUES OF RESISTANCE RHETORIC
- **Chapter III:** CLASSIFICATION OF THE RESISTANCE RHETORIC
- **Chapter IV:** EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE RESISTANCE RHETORIC
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CHAPTER II

DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENTS AND TECHNIQUES
OF RESISTANCE RHETORIC

Background to Desegregation

The equality of public school education has been an issue of conflict within American society for more than eighty years. In 1896, the Supreme Court upheld the legality of segregated schools in the case of *Plessy v. Ferguson* and ruled that schools could be "separate but equal" (111, p. 83). In 1927, the Supreme Court again confirmed the constitutionality of segregated schools in the case of *Lum v. Rice*, for the Supreme Court then decreed that "the separate but equal principle does not conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment and should be left to the discretion of the states" (111, p. 83). Yet there were further challenges to the constitutionality of segregated schools, and, in 1954, the Supreme Court majority opinion was a reversal from the previous rulings. In the 1954 case of *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas*, Chief Justice Warren announced the decision of the Supreme Court in stating "separate educational facilities are inherently unequal . . . and deny equal protection under the law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment . . . and, as a result, schools should be desegregated with all deliberate speed" (111, p. 83). However, the verbal rhetoric
and militant actions of uncompromising Southern segregationists impeded the implementation of the Supreme Court ruling. "By 1964, ten years after the Court's ruling, less than two percent of all Negro pupils in the eleven states in the South were attending racially mixed schools" (Ill, p. 83). Later in 1964, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act to accelerate desegregation. Then in the 1971 case of Swann v Charlotte-Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, the Supreme Court upheld the lower court's ruling for massive extensive busing to desegregate schools (Ill, p. 84). This Supreme Court decision shifted the emphasis from a general segregation-desegregation confrontation to the specific issue of busing as a means of desegregation. This decision also raised the question of whether the federal courts had the right to order busing as a tool of desegregation (17, p. 1).

There were numerous violent reactions to these mandates for desegregation of public schools by forced busing of students. In September, 1966, white racists in Grenada, Mississippi, formed mobs and attacked 150 Black students with axe handles, lead pipes and chains. Over 400 white vigilantes attacked Black students who were leaving school at the end of the day and kicked and cursed the students (101, p. 26). In March, 1970, a group of 125 white men and women in Lamar, South Carolina, attacked three school buses carrying thirty-two Black pupils coming to Lamar High School. The crowd smashed the bus windows and tried to attack the students with bricks and chains (102, p. 12).
Violent demonstrations against desegregation by forced busing were not confined to just the Southern states. In March, 1972, in Pontiac, Michigan, militant white mothers and members of the Klu Klux Klan firebombed school buses to protest desegregation plans (103, p. 24). In October, 1974, in Baltimore, Maryland, and in Racine, Wisconsin, junior high and high school students were arrested for fighting and for carrying deadly weapons to school. Schools were temporarily closed because of racial disturbance (112, p. 32).

Anti-busing violence also flared in Boston. When schools opened in September, 1974, white mothers and 200 white youths threw rocks at school buses transporting Black students to South Boston High School (104, p. 29). Police provided an escort for the buses, but the crowds charged the police cars and clubbed the policemen (106, p. 22). Over 300 State police, 450 National Guardsmen and 800 tactical police patrolled in the vicinity of South Boston High School to restore and maintain order (112, p. 35). At Hyde Park High School, six white students were beaten and one student was stabbed (107, p. 22). In the predominantly Black area of Roxbury, Black students roamed the streets and stoned white pedestrians (106, p. 22). In December, 1974, South Boston High School and seven other public schools were closed because of racial turmoil (108, p. 65). Yet agitation continued and, even as late as the closing of the 1976 school year, Anglo students were still attacking school buses and assaulting Black students (109, p. 11).
There were widespread violent protests to the 1954 Supreme Court ruling to abolish de jure segregation (segregation caused by existing laws) (113, p. 26), but there were also non-violent reactions to desegregation of public schools. Non-violence was especially characteristic of Northern and Western schools which were representative of de facto segregation (segregation caused by housing patterns) (113, p. 26). These non-violent protests primarily assumed the forms of boycotts and peaceful marches. In February, 1964, almost half-a-million students in New York City remained home to register their complaints against de facto segregation (99, p. 40). In March, 1964, over one-fourth of the students held a walkout and subsequent boycott of New York public schools (100, p. 82). Central Harlem and Brooklyn were ninety percent Black or Puerto Rican, and students in these two areas favored integration with Anglo schools (98, p. 49). However, on March 12th, 15,000 Anglos staged a peaceful march to express their opposition to forced busing and integration with other ethnic groups (110, p. 8).

There were also evidences of non-violent protests to desegregation in the South. In addition to boycotts and peaceful marches, white parents enrolled their children in private schools and thereby avoided compliance with desegregation orders. From 1973-1975, forty-three percent or 6,000 of the white students abandoned the Memphis public schools and enrolled in other types of schools (96, p. 9). During
that same time period, fifty-two percent of the white elementary and secondary pupils in Atlanta left the public school system to enroll in alternative types of schools (97, p. 56). Therefore, there have been incidents of both violent and non-violent resistance to desegregation by means of busing since the 1954 Supreme Court ruling.

History of DISD Desegregation

As anti-busing battles erupted in cities throughout the United States, Dallas also emerged as an area of conflict. For the past twenty years, Dallas has been involved in desegregation litigation, and, within this decade, a non-violent anti-busing faction has surfaced in Dallas. "In 1955, the DISD was in a lawsuit for the desegregation of colored and white" (63, p. 1). In 1961, the DISD initiated a stair-step method of desegregation (begin with the first grade the first year and desegregate one additional grade per year for twelve years). In 1965, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the DISD to speed up the process and desegregate all grades by 1967. In 1970, Black and Mexican-American plaintiffs filed a suit against the DISD for "failing to achieve meaningful desegregation" (63, p. 1), and the Fifth Circuit Court ordered the DISD to produce a new plan. The DISD responded with a plan that would bus only Black high school students and integrate Black and Anglo elementary schools through closed circuit television. In 1971, Judge William Taylor adopted most of the DISD proposal, but the plaintiffs immediately appealed this desegregation plan.
Judge Taylor then stayed the 1971 order until the Fifth Circuit Court could comment on the case. After a delay of four years, the Fifth Circuit Court ruled on July 23, 1975, that the DISD's approach to the problem of desegregating its secondary schools fails to indicate bona fide effort to comply with the mandates of the Supreme Court" (63, p. 1), and the Fifth Circuit Court ordered the DISD to "completely dismantle its dual school system by the second quarter of the 1975-76 school year" (53, p. 1). On July 24, 1975, the Dallas School Board voted six to three to appeal to the Supreme Court and to seek a stay of the Fifth Circuit order, and school district attorneys filed the appeal and the stay in August, 1975. The rationale for the DISD request for Supreme Court review was that the appeals court had misapplied the Supreme Court ruling on busing (1971 Swann decision) and that "busing was not mandatory in order to desegregate a large urban metropolitan district" (57, p. 1). The school board argued that "so long as lower courts such as the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals continue to misread Swann as the busing case, it will be impossible for inventive alternatives ever to be tested (57, p. 1). On August 22, 1975, Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell, Jr., refused to stay the Fifth Circuit Court's order.

Disapproving criticism of the Supreme Court's refusal to stay the appeals court order was a characteristic sentiment of many people in Dallas. As a school board trustee remarked, "I'm sorry the Supreme Court didn't see fit to hear
our case. I think the mood of the country is against busing as an answer to the desegregation problem" (17, p. 1). However, the DISD had no other legal alternative except to comply with the Fifth Circuit Court mandate, and on September 11, 1975, the DISD submitted a desegregation proposal to Judge William Taylor. This was the first of six major desegregation plans filed with Judge Taylor, and all of the plans "contain provisions for busing at least 18,000 Dallas students" (23, p. 1). Consequently, busing as a means of desegregating the DISD became a crucial educational, political, social, economic and rhetorical issue during the 1975-76 school year.

Description of DISD Desegregation

The ruling by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals on July 23, 1975, for further desegregation of the DISD sparked an anti-busing battle in Dallas. After briefly presenting background information about desegregation struggles in the United States and briefly giving the history of desegregation disputes in the DISD, this chapter will next 1) describe in a narrative and sequential manner the events and rhetorical actions and reactions and 2) identify the ideology, leaders and resisters important in the desegregation of the DISD during the 1975-76 school year. In addition to identifying and describing the rhetoric against forced busing in Dallas, this chapter will also serve as a basis of information for later classification and evaluation of this resistance rhetoric.
The first instance of resistance rhetoric in the desegregation of the DISD occurred on July 24, 1975, when the Dallas School Board voted six to three to appeal to the Supreme Court to seek a stay of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal's ruling (53, p. 1). On August 18, 1975, school district attorneys filed their appeal and request for a stay with the Supreme Court (53, p. 1). The Dallas School Board's action created a precedent that became characteristic of resistance rhetoric during the Dallas desegregation case—the use of rational, non-violent, legal means to oppose court orders and busing plans. Although this legal protest by the school board did not accomplish its immediate purpose of obtaining a stay and a judicial review (62, p. 1), a prominent and prevalent type of resistance rhetoric was established.

The resistance rhetoric of parental groups evolved from verbal and written protest activities in early September, 1975. The majority of Anglo parents throughout Dallas opposed the Fifth Circuit's order for further desegregation because they dreaded increased busing. Black and Mexican-American parents feared "one-way" busing by which their children would account for most of the students bused in Dallas. A group called the Concerned Mexican-American Parents asked that the school desegregation plan be balanced among ethnic groups so that Mexican-American schools would not be closed and those children bused to Anglo schools (45, p. 1). Spokesman Guillermo Galindo stated that Mexican-Americans "are not going to be bused to the
dominant society's schools. The load must be balanced. We want to get some of the dominant society's children bused to our schools" (45, p. 1). A group of South Dallas Black parents also voiced concern that there would be "one-way busing in which mostly Black children are bused" (4, p. 1).

While minority parents feared their children would be bused disproportionately compared to Anglo children, the Anglo parents feared their children would be bused into slum neighborhoods to attend inferior-quality schools. To avoid having their children bused into predominantly minority schools, Anglo parents threatened to move into suburban school districts. The following editorial illustrates the defiant attitude of these parents--"The federal courts think of black and white children as cattle--herded meekly about the countryside. How are they going to keep them down at the bus stop when parents will move away or enroll them in private school rather than see them bused" (4, p. 1).

Anticipating that the school board would soon propose a plan for desegregating the DISD, parental groups organized rallies to protest forced busing. A North Dallas anti-busing group named CAFSB (Citizens Against Forced School Busing) staged a rally at which city councilman Richard Smith and Bill Nicol and county commissioner Jim Jackson cautioned the people not to become overly excited and hysterical so the "turmoil of Detroit, Boston and Louisville would not occur in Dallas" (47, p. 1). These men advocated a constitutional
amendment to prohibit forced busing to counter the "harsh orders and directives of the federal courts" (47, p. l).

Another group called CNS (Citizens for Neighborhood Schools) sponsored an anti-busing rally at a recreation center in the Pleasant Grove area on Tuesday, September 2, 1975. CNS members wore "Stop Busing" T-shirts and "NEVER" buttons and circulated anti-busing literature throughout the crowd (2, p. l). The audience of approximately 1,000 people heard speakers criticize the city council and other elected officials for not taking a direct stand against forced busing. CNS President Kathy Carter encouraged a recall of the mayor and city council members who refused to take a specific stand on the busing issue (2, p. l). School board member Charles Fletcher criticized the federal courts for "imposing busing on citizens who do not want it" (2, p. l), and he suggested that "federal judges be appointed for limited terms instead of life" (2, p. l). County Commissioner David Pickett told the audience they should elect only candidates who took a campaign stand against busing and should re-elect only office holders who oppose busing (2, p. l). City Councilman L. A. Murr supported neighborhood schools and a constitutional amendment prohibiting forced busing (2, p. l). Therefore, as in the North Dallas rally, the speakers did not attempt to incite the crowd to violence but rather encouraged the use of the legal electoral process to obtain change.

Shortly after the Pleasant Grove rally, CNS sponsored an anti-busing rally in another section of the city. The
rhetoric at the meeting at the Walnut Hill Recreation Center was patterned after the rhetoric of previous rallies. The speakers repeated the same criticisms and same concepts for change. Kathy Carter told the 800 persons assembled in the gym that "the politicians will have to cater to us to get elected until busing is stopped" (48, p. 1). County Commissioner Jim Jackson continued that thought by saying "if people were involved with organizations that support candidates whose views you don't support, quit supporting those organizations" (48, p. 1). City Councilman L. A. Murr urged "orderly opposition and letter writing and suggested a minimum amount of busing if any were necessary at all" (48, p. 1). City Councilwoman Rose Renfroe indicted the federal government for causing the busing problem by failing to pass a constitutional amendment against busing (48, p. 1). In response to her allegations, State Senator O. H. "Ike" Harris pledged his support to eliminate court-ordered busing through a constitutional amendment (48, p. 1). So once again civic and government leaders stressed the use of the political process to gather support for anti-busing legislation (48, p. 1).

In addition to these public anti-busing rallies, Anglo parents were organizing protests against any DISD plan for desegregation. The news media had reported that the school board plan would possibly close Woodrow Wilson High School, J. L. Long Junior High School and Robert E. Lee Elementary School and that those students would be bused elsewhere
More than 150 residents from the Woodrow Wilson and Long areas met to appoint a committee to take legal action. They also signed a statement that those three schools were already desegregated and there was no justification for closing the schools and busing the students. This letter was forwarded to the school board as an official protest. Then these East Dallas residents picketed the school administration building to publicize their grievance that the school board plan would drive residents from East Dallas at a time when families were being encouraged to move back into that area (3, p. 1). This demonstration did cause the school board to reconsider that aspect of the plan, and the DISD did not close those schools in the desegregation plan submitted to Judge Taylor.

On September 11, 1975, the DISD filed a desegregation plan with U. S. Judge William Taylor. The philosophy of the school board in developing a desegregation plan was expressed by school board president Bill Hunter.

It is now obvious to the board as it should be to the community that the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit will impose additional busing upon this school district. Recognizing that such circumstances are upon us, this board intends to develop and submit to Judge Taylor a student assignment plan which is both administratively feasible and educationally sound with the exception that the parties to this desegregation proceeding and the courts will approve it (5, p. 1).

The major conditions of the DISD plan were:

1. Bus 18,000 Dallas students.
2. Integrate seventy-three schools (mostly all-Anglo).
3. a. Retain fifty-two "naturally integrated" schools.
   b. Maintain schools in integrated neighborhoods such as Carter, Kimball, Sunset, Woodrow Wilson and Seagoville High Schools.

4. Retain forty-six minority schools with 40,000 students or twenty-nine percent of the student population in West Dallas, Oak Cliff, South Oak Cliff and Seagoville. (There were not enough Anglo students to desegregate these one-race schools without massive cross-town busing.)

5. Establish a regional concept:
   a. K-third grades would remain in neighborhood schools.
   b. Fourth through fifth grades would be bused away from the inner city.
   c. Sixth through seventh grades would be bused toward town.
   d. Each region would have eighth through ninth grade junior highs and tenth through twelfth grade senior high schools remain in that region.

6. Create ten elementary preparatory schools and seven secondary academies at which minority enrollment would be fifty-eight percent.

7. Permanently close Benito Juarez and Fred Douglass elementary schools.


10. Convert North Dallas and Adamson High Schools and James Madison Intermediate School into magnet schools (50, p. 1). This plan proposed by the DISD would bus primarily fourth through seventh graders and would require 242 buses. The cost of this desegregation plan would be five million dollars — three million dollars for creating magnet schools and two million dollars for busing (50, p. 1). The school board members were divided in their support of the desegregation plan and finally adopted the plan by a five to four vote. The five members who favored the plan were Charles Fletcher, Sarah Haskins, Nancy Judy, Eugene Smith and Glyn Strother. The four members who opposed the plan were Dr. Emmett J. Conrad, Kathryn Gilliam, Bill Hunter and Robert Medrano (52, p. 1). These four members thought the plan was inadequate, and Chairman Bill Hunter summarized the dissenting opinion by stating:

Approval of a student assignment plan by the board on September 10th may well run counter to the individual wishes and philosophies of various individual board members. The board regrets that additional busing of students must occur in order to comply with the ultimate effect of direction given by the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. However, in any organized, lawful society such as this community, all citizens, including elected officials, are obligated and expected to observe the dictates of our judicial system regardless of individual opinions with respect to the division of the courts (49, p. 1).

Although there were conflicting attitudes among the school board members about the DISD desegregation plan, the board adopted the plan on September 10, 1975, and submitted the plan to Judge Taylor on September 11, 1975.
On the same date that the DISD desegregation plan was given to Judge Taylor, the NAACP also filed a desegregation plan because that organization believed "busing in Dallas to be a one-way street" (50, p. 1). The main elements of the NAACP plan were:

1. Bus 20,000 to 100,000 students.
2. Bus twenty-five to thirty-five percent Black students into Anglo schools and bus the same number of Anglos into predominantly Black schools.
3. Require all schools to have a racial balance comparable to the racial balance in the DISD.
4. Upgrade inner city schools.
5. Create magnet schools throughout the district to draw students from all races (7, p. 1).

During the interim period between the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal's order for the DISD to implement a new plan (July 23, 1975) and the DISD's compliance by filing a new desegregation plan with Judge Taylor (September 11, 1975), there were various forms of rhetoric employed against adoption of any desegregation plan. This resistance rhetoric included filing legal appeals, verbal threats, statements of pathos and ethos, written demands, editorials, petitions and leaflets, formation of anti-busing groups, anti-busing rallies featuring local and state leaders speaking against forced busing, picketing and visual symbols such as T-shirts, buttons and placards. These same types of resistance rhetoric were used to protest the specific DISD and NAACP desegregation plans presented to Judge Taylor.
After the DISD and the NAACP desegregation plans were submitted to Judge Taylor on September 11, 1975, the DISD held public meetings for two consecutive evenings to explain the school board's proposal. These meetings were located at high schools throughout the city to establish communication with the community and to foster more favorable attitudes about the DISD plan. The DISD's purpose for the meetings was to dispel rumors, correct erroneous information and alleviate apprehension about busing; however, community leaders, parents and students used the meetings as opportunities to protest the DISD plan. During the meetings at Pinkston High School, Chicano activist Eugene Gata seized the microphone and yelled at 250 parents to join him in opposing the plan (51, p. 1). At predominantly Black Lincoln High School, "militant parents" refused to leave the auditorium and go to small-group sessions. Mrs. Olga Mae Rabbon shouted, "This is just another insult to us. We came here as a body of people, and by sending us to those classrooms they're trying another divide and conquer tactic" (50, p. 1). Thomas Jefferson High School has been three-quarters Anglo since 1971, but, under the DISD plan, a large number of minority students would be bused into Thomas Jefferson and elementary school students in the Thomas Jefferson area would be bused into the inner city. At the explanatory meeting at Thomas Jefferson High School, parents projected an attitude of resistance rather than obedience to the proposed desegregation
plan. "There'll be people moving out of the T. J. district if this busing happens. After all, there's a lilly-white enclave just a mile north of here. As long as there are places for people to keep escaping, they'll keep running (51, p. 1). At predominantly Mexican-American North Dallas High School, school board member Robert Medrano labeled the DISD plan "unfair and unequal" (51, p. 1), and he told the audience that North Dallas High School was being sacrificed to meet racial quotas at other schools (51, p. 1). His comments triggered student reactions such as "we are already an integrated school and we won't sit back and let North Dallas be closed without having something to say about it (50, p. 1) and "being bused breaks up our relationships" (50, p. 1). A parent observed that "we are in a poor area and we already have trouble keeping our kids in school. A lot of them will use this as an excuse to drop out" (50, p. 1). The following day, 200 North Dallas High School students staged an orderly thirty minute rally protesting portions of the DISD plan relating to NDHS and voicing concern that the school board desegregation plan would "split the Mexican-American community and leave it without a high school" (6, p. 1). The pupils then met for two hours with principal Pablo Armendariz to draft a petition to send to Judge Taylor so he would be aware of their feelings.

After the DISD desegregation proposal was publicized, several ethnic minority groups criticized the plan. Mrs.
Odessa Porter, president of the Dallas Council of Black Parents and Citizens, expressed that group's belief that busing of Black children would be unfairly disproportionate to busing of Anglo children. "With sentiment as high as it is right now against busing here and around the country, I feel the board didn't want to be responsible for putting their constituents' kids on buses" (6, p. 1). Another Black group—the NAACP—also reasoned that the school board plan does not seek quality education. Reverend H. Rhett James, president of the Kennedy chapter of the Metro Branches, said the school board has bent over backwards to appease a racist position, and he accused the school board of playing politics with innocent children and with the emotions of the people (7, p. 1). He further charged that the school board failed to get community input before devising the plan; therefore, the plan is not representative of or beneficial to the entire community.

Mexican-Americans from the Dallas Chamber of Commerce also doubted the DISD plan would deal impartially with all races. Rene Martinez held a press conference to announce that the group had presented a position paper to Judge Taylor to outline what the desegregation order should contain. Martinez stated, "We have great confidence in Judge Taylor. He has always had great sensitivity towards the plight of the Chicano, and we are sure any order he makes will incorporate our recommendations" (6, p. 1).
Anglo groups as well as minority groups opposed the school board desegregation plan. Spokesmen for the anti-busing group Citizens for Neighborhood Schools reiterated they hated to see any busing at all but felt confident that the DISD plan would not be acceptable to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals (50, p. 1).

The primary reason that all ethnic groups were skeptical about the DISD plan being approved by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was concisely stated by city councilwoman Lucy Patterson: "The DISD plan will not wash with either the community or the courts. It is unacceptable because it leaves too many one-race schools and because Blacks bear the brunt of busing" (50, p. 1).

While both minority and Anglo groups condemned the DISD proposal, these groups differed in their approach to solutions. Mexican-American and Black groups directly confronted the desegregation issue and submitted their own desegregation plan. Anglo groups, however, preferred to evade the court's desegregation order by creating alternatives to forced busing. The concept of "freedom schools" was introduced in Dallas and was vigorously supported by anti-busing advocates such as Rose Renfroe. Freedom schools are private schools funded by a twenty-five dollar monthly tuition per student (50, p. 1), and they are intended to preserve neighborhood schools (51, p. 1). Enrolling in these freedom schools, private schools or moving to suburban school districts were recommended methods of avoiding forced busing.
Other alternatives to forced busing were suggested in editorials and letters-to-the-editor of the daily newspapers. "The DISD should get a voluntary busing plan as Richardson has and involve only persons interested in busing" (52, p. D-2). Other articles stressed working within the legal framework to prohibit forced busing. "Since busing is the law of the land, those who oppose it should band together and hire lawyers and fight it within the system and not in the schools and streets" (52, p. 1). Another tactic was to "call and write to your representative now. Let's make it perfectly clear to our elected representatives that if they expect to return to their posh, high-paying federal and state positions, they'd best listen to their constituents and leave our children alone now and forever" (8, p. 1). Thus, dissent was again channeled through the media and through appeals to elected officials.

On September 16, 1975, Judge Taylor rejected both the DISD and the NAACP desegregation plans. His opinion faulted the DISD with leaving forty-six one-race schools and declared that plan "patently unconstitutional." He further stated that he could not present such a plan to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and expect it to be accepted (10, p. 1). Judge Taylor dismissed the NAACP plan because it went too far in the other direction (10, p. 1).

Judge Taylor's next decision was to replace court-appointed desegregation consultant Dr. John Finger.
Previously a professor of education at Rhode Island College, Dr. Finger had served as a consultant to federal courts on desegregation cases in Denver, Detroit, Oklahoma City and Austin and had been nominated as the consultant in the Dallas case by the plaintiff's attorneys (53, p. 1). Judge Taylor fired Dr. Finger on September 22, 1975, to avoid any claims the consultant might have acted improperly by meeting with plaintiffs prior to his appointment (9, p. 1). Judge Taylor then appointed Dr. Josiah Hall as the court expert to draft a desegregation plan. Dr. Hall is a retired professor from the University of Miami and a former superintendent of Dade County Schools in Florida. His prior experience as a court consultant in desegregation cases had been in seven Florida subdistricts, Mobile, Alabama, and Nashville, Tennessee (11, p. 1). Dr. Hall began formulating a plan that he submitted to Judge Taylor in December, 1975.

In retrospect, the month of September, 1975, was an active period of resistance against both the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' ruling for further desegregation and against the DISD's specific desegregation plan. The resistance rhetoric during this month assumed written forms such as a request for a stay of the court order, editorials and petitions, verbal forms such as speeches at meetings and antibusing rallies and symbolic forms such as picketing and wearing of anti-busing T-shirts and buttons. Groups of parents and students organized rallies to protest forced
busing, and community groups already in existence held anti-busing meetings. All of these rhetorical tactics established a pattern of legal, non-violent resistance to forced busing that continued through the 1975-76 school year.

The desegregation hearings to adopt a specific plan were to have begun on October 6, 1975, but Judge Taylor postponed the hearings until November 3rd (11, p. 1). Judge Taylor also announced that regardless of the busing plan he accepted, he would delay implementation of any procedure until August, 1976. He cited the Equal Educational Opportunity Act of 1974 as his rationale, for that legislation prohibits initiating transportation of students by forced busing in the middle of a school year (12, p. 1). Since the DISD was operating under the quarter system, Judge Taylor did not want to reassign students in the middle of the second quarter and disrupt the educational system. "It appears to the court that, practically speaking, it would be educationally unsound and administratively impractical to implement an order in March with less than three months remaining in the school year" (12, p. 1). Implementation of the desegregation order would entail renovating school buildings for special programs, rescheduling courses not available at all schools, moving library books, films, typewriters and reorganizing extra-curricular events. Due to these pragmatic reasons, Judge Taylor stated, "In our haste to bring this matter to conclusion, we should not forget the impact of
an ill-prepared and hastily implemented plan on the children who are our primary concern" (12, p. 1).

During the months of October, civic and government leaders continued to speak publicly in opposition to forced busing. Robert Medrano believed busing for integration would polarize the community because the DISD plan placed the burden of busing on minorities (54, p. 1). U. S. Representative Olin Teague extended the argument heard in September that a bill or constitutional amendment was necessary to prohibit forced busing (12, p. 1). Senator Tower also favored legislation to curb busing and said, "Justice, logic and three-fourths of the voting population are on the anti-busing side" (14, p. 1).

In addition to this verbal rhetoric, data was published to refute supposed advantages of busing. Test scores of bused and non-bused Black students were compared, and the conclusion was that a desegregated environment did not motivate or enhance academic achievement (55, p. 1). Other statistics documented a ten percent decline in Anglo enrollment in the DISD during the past school year. This decrease of almost 7,000 whites was the largest reduction since the ten percent drop immediately after the 1971 desegregation order (13, p. 1). Some DISD officials attributed the loss of Anglo students in 1971 and in 1975 to white flight—the reaction to the rumors of increased busing within the DISD. Therefore, the statements of civic and state leaders and the publication of data were the main examples of resistance rhetoric during the month of October, 1975.
During the month of November, 1975, the type of protests were similar to those of the previous month. Judge Taylor again postponed the desegregation hearings from November 3rd until December 1, 1975 (15, p. 1). Senator Lloyd Bentsen and Representative Alan Steelman both emphasized the necessity of a constitutional amendment to prohibit busing. Steelman specified negative results of court-ordered busing—"...financial burdens, unreasonable administrative requirements, student violence... we are kindling violence and disruption in the lives of people who are otherwise law-abiding citizens of this country" (20, p. 1).

Data was again dispatched to depict the disadvantages of busing. The Coleman report seemingly documented the threat of white flight. "There is no way to reassign students without reducing white enrollment. The loss of white enrollment is greatest when predominantly white suburbs are nearby or when the majority of children in city schools are minorities (56, p. 1). This report further stated that desegregation in large central cities has increased the loss of white children from central city systems thereby contributing to racial segregation between Black children in predominantly Black schools and white children in predominantly white schools in the suburbs" (56, p. 1). The findings of the Coleman report were substantiated by the enrollment statistics of the DISD. Within the past five years, Anglo enrollment decreased by almost 35,000 pupils, and the ethnic majority within the
school system changed from Anglo to Black. In 1970, the racial composition in the DISD was fifty-seven percent Anglo and thirty-five percent Black. In 1975, the racial composition was forty-one percent Anglo and forty-five percent Black (58, p. 1).

Concerned that forced busing would cause white flight from the DISD, the Oak Cliff Chamber of Commerce asked Judge Taylor to allocate more money for renovating schools rather than increase busing (19, p. 1). This group also requested Judge Taylor to consider the effect the desegregation order would have on housing patterns in integrated neighborhoods. "The community is presently integrated. To destroy it by further pressure would eliminate any possibility of expecting other communities to stand fast when integration is approached. To bus in or out of an integrated school zone or to permit majority-minority transfers would further disrupt ethnic balance" (59, p. 1).

A group of Pleasant Grove residents joined the Oak Cliff group and filed a motion in federal court for Judge Taylor to stop busing Blacks into one high school and three junior highs by March 1, 1976, and for Judge Taylor to issue an interim order to reassign students in these four schools to schools nearest their homes (18, p. 1). These two groups claimed that Blacks and Mexican-Americans were presently being bused into schools that had become majority Black and Mexican-American since the 1971 desegregation order (Carter High School--
thirty-one percent Anglo, Comstock Junior High—twenty-five percent Anglo, Hulcy Junior High—eighteen percent Anglo and Atwell Junior High—thirty-four percent Anglo) and theorized that additional busing would resegregate the neighborhoods and the schools (18, p. 1). Therefore, in November, 1975, resistance rhetoric continued against forced busing in Dallas. Data was released to support the position that white flight would result from forced busing of DISD students, and community groups advanced the argument that busing would disturb the racial composition of currently integrated neighborhoods and schools and would resegregate these areas.

In the months of November and December, 1975, antibusing factions in Dallas pressured the city council to withdraw as an intervenor in the desegregation case. The opponents of busing thought that "if the city council were out of the case, the city could not be ordered to provide buses for one year due to back orders for buses to be filled" (60, p. 1). The city council debated this issue for several weeks before reaching a decision. Finally, at the end of December, 1975, the group voted six to two to ask city attorney Alex Bickley to approach Judge Taylor about the city withdrawing as an intervenor (64, p. 1).

In early December, 1975, Judge Taylor again rescheduled the desegregation hearings and postponed the court date until February 2, 1976. He also gave a deadline of January 2, 1976, for filing additional desegregation plans (61, p. 1). Dr.
Josiah Hall, appointed court expert on September 27th, filed his desegregation plan on December 17, 1975. The primary elements of his plan were:

2. Leave forty predominantly minority schools (almost 30,000 Blacks would remain in these one-race schools).
3. Close two West Dallas schools--Juarez and Douglass.
4. Convert North Dallas High School into a sixth and a seventh grade school.
5. Form nine school clusters.
6. Leave schools with a current student ratio of thirty to seventy-five percent minority.
7. Use 352 buses at a cost of five and six-tenths million dollars.
8. Limit travel time to a maximum of thirty minutes.
9. Retain kindergarten and first grades as neighborhood schools (64, p. 1).

Dr. Hall's plan was heavily criticized by both Anglos and Blacks. The Oak Cliff Chamber of Commerce opposed the plan because Black students would continue to be bused into majority Black schools in Oak Cliff (64, p. 1). Two minority school board members thought the Hall plan was as unfair as the DISD plan in busing a disproportionate number of Black students. "It sounds like the school board proposal warmed over" (22, p. 1).
On Saturday afternoon, December 13, 1975, a unique form of protest was staged by sixteen Black students attending a predominantly Anglo high school. They invited parents to the Edgar War Community Center to expose them to the problems of busing and integration. These Black students felt they were being stereotyped and treated unfairly so they sang gospel songs and performed skits to convey these attitudes of discrimination. The setting of one skit was the inside of a bus with the Black students talking loudly, braiding their hair and fighting. This skit was to illustrate the myth that all Blacks are noisy and rowdy. A second skit presented the generalization that all Blacks are stupid, for all the Black students in the high school were placed into an English class for slow learners. In the last skit, Black students were punished for committing an offense, but white students who committed the same offense were not punished (21, p. 1). Therefore, during the month of December, 1975, some community leaders, the city council and students protested forced busing in general as well as Dr. Hall's specific busing plan.

As the new year began, three city council members renewed their efforts to get the council dismissed as an intervenor in the Dallas desegregation suit. Thinking the court would be less likely to order the use of Dallas Transit System buses for forced busing if the city were not involved, John Leedom, L. A. Murr and Rose Renfroe cast votes to withdraw
However, the other six members of the council voted to remain in the case to monitor the desegregation events and to maintain some influence in the decision-making process. As councilman William Cothrum explained, "Staying in the suit will give the council some control over how a desegregation plan is to be carried out. Getting out of the suit would not stop a busing plan" (66, p. 1).

Although desegregation plans had already been submitted to Judge Taylor by the DISD, the NAACP and Dr. Hall, the plaintiffs also filed two desegregation plans on January 12, 1976. Plan A entailed:

1. Busing 55,484 pupils--27,710 Blacks, 21,143 Anglos, and 6,255 Mexican-Americans.
2. Regrouping the DISD into seven subdistricts.
3. Desegregating every school.
4. Pairing or clustering thirteen elementary schools that were already integrated.
5. Redrawing attendance zones and establishing sixteen zones for high school and twenty-two for junior high.
6. Ensuring a student would attend no more than three elementary schools, one junior high and one high school.
7. Limiting bus rides to forty-five minutes or less.
8. Financing would total thirteen and four-tenths million dollars (65, p. 1).

Plaintiffs' Plan B would involve:
1. Busing 37,847 pupils--18,139 Blacks, 17,406 Anglos and 2,033 Mexican-Americans.

2. Leaving fifteen one-race schools (twelve in Oak Cliff).

3. Pairing or clustering seventy-nine elementary schools.

4. Closing Juarez, Douglass and Austin elementary schools.

5. Redrawing attendance zones and establishing fourteen zones for high schools (including converting Crozier, Hillcrest and Thomas Jefferson High Schools into elementary magnet schools).

6. Ensuring a student would attend no more than two elementary schools, one junior high and one high school.

7. Limiting a bus ride to thirty minutes or less (65, p. 1).

While Black and Mexican-American plaintiffs could endorse both Plan A and Plan B, Anglos rejected the plans for being unrealistic and undesirable. School board vice-president Sarah Haskins was convinced nobody would tolerate the busing of 55,000 students (65, p. 1), and school board trustee Nancy Judy proclaimed the "plan is outrageous. Whenever an existing high school becomes fifty percent Black, white students are not going to go there" (65, p. 1). Another school board trustee--Eugene Smith--compared the two plaintiff plans to the 1971 desegregation order and felt Dallas parents would leave the city before busing their children under Plan A or Plan B. "Orders in other school districts have shown that
students from upper and middle class income neighborhoods find it hard to mix with lower income neighborhoods (such as those near Lincoln)" (65, p. 1). In 1971, 350 white students were assigned to Lincoln High School, but they never complied with that desegregation order. Under Plan A, 1,161 white students would be assigned to Lincoln High School (65, p. 1), and the obvious inference was that these students would also ignore that desegregation order. Therefore, the primary Anglo reaction to plaintiffs' Plans A and B was threatened white flight rather than compliance.

After the deadline of January 12, 1976, there were five plans to be deliberated in the Dallas desegregation case. On February 2, 1976, the hearing began in the Judge Taylor's courtroom, and the parties in the suit began testifying about their desegregation plans.

School superintendent Dr. Nolan Estes conceded that the DISD plan would leave ninety-seven schools where students of one race would comprise seventy-five to eighty percent of the student body (68, p. 1), and two-thirds of all Black students would remain in predominantly Black schools (67, p. 1). However, Dr. Estes defended the retention of these schools and testified that once a school becomes more than thirty percent Black, that school is likely to become predominantly Black within three years. As an example, he cited twenty schools in the South Oak Cliff area that had changed from all Anglo to all Black after the thirty percent "tipping point" (68, p. 1).
Dr. Estes also credited busing as the cause of declining enrollment in the DISD and predicted more massive busing would result in an even greater loss of white students. "If you want to drive this school district eighty to eighty-five percent minority in twelve months, all this court has to do is order a more drastic plan than we're (DISD) presenting" (68, p. 1).

To substantiate Dr. Estes' testimony, the North Dallas intervenors called Dr. David Armor, an educational sociologist, as a witness to establish the existence of white flight resulting from court-ordered busing. Dr. Armor used Dallas as an illustration to prove that there is "apprehension in the South that moderate court orders would be broadened and expanded later" (72, p. 1), for there was a large decline in white enrollment in the DISD after the 1971 court-ordered desegregation plan with moderate busing. The school board and the North Dallas intervenors attempted to establish a causal relationship between busing and white flight and thereby justify the large number of one-race schools in the DISD desegregation plan. However, their data did not prove conclusive, and Dr. Armor also stated there was "no strong relationship between the actual amount of desegregation and the amount of white flight that followed. White flight occurred regardless of the number of students bused" (72, p. 1).

Judge Taylor also heard testimony pertaining to Dr. Hall's desegregation plan. That evidence confirmed that there would
be forty one-race schools with 35,000 Black and Mexican-American students never assigned to integrated school. Brice Cunningham, attorney for the NAACP, reprimanded Dr. Hall for the fact that fewer than 7,000 Anglo students (out of a total of 23,233 students) would be bused and then for only the sixth and seventh grades (24, p. 1). Therefore, the main criticisms of both Dr. Hall's plan and the DISD's desegregation plan were the large number of one-race schools and the disproportionate number of Black students bused.

During the courtroom controversy about busing in the proposed desegregation plans, Judge Taylor expressed his philosophy about desegregation. Referring to the Atlanta case, he stated "racial integration is not the goal of school desegregation" (27, p. 1). He further expounded his judicial views by saying the aim of the Fourteenth Amendment is not to achieve racial integration in public schools but to ensure that state supported educational opportunity is afforded to all without regard to race (27, p. 1). So Judge Taylor seemingly indicated that impartial and equitable education was a priority factor in selecting a desegregation plan rather than the extent of busing and integration.

In September, 1975, Judge Taylor had requested business leaders to become involved in the desegregation issue because it would be impossible to attract "businesses to Dallas if it's torn by racial strife and if public education is inferior" (8, p. 1). The Dallas Alliance, a group of forty
business, government and civic leaders who organized in January, 1975, responded to Judge Taylor's plea to recruit broad-based community support for a desegregation plan. A Dallas Alliance Task Force was appointed in October, 1975, to submit an alternate busing plan after Judge Taylor rejected the DISD and NAACP plans in September, 1975 (70, p. 1). Noting that anti-busing groups had been holding rallies and attracting public support, the task force wanted to avert a "Boston-like violent reaction" (46, p. 1) to a school desegregation plan in Dallas. "Let's get going and get out of the court and come up with an agreement instead of having one imposed on us" (46, p. 1). Judge Taylor endorsed the intentions and endeavors of this group and allowed extra time for them to submit a desegregation plan. On February 16, 1976, the Dallas Alliance filed a plan that reflected the work of three major ethnic groups attempting to find a middle ground that may allow peaceful co-existence and an improved educational system within three years. Individual opinions differed considerably on busing, and the diversity of the task force, ethnically and philosophically, mandated compromise for the sake of submitting a consensus plan (71, p. 1).

The provisions of the Dallas Alliance Task Force plan were:

1. Busing of 20,000 students.
2. Leaving 14,000 to 15,000 students in all-Black schools. These five all-Black high schools would be South Oak Cliff, Roosevelt, Lincoln, Pinkston, and Madison.
4. Creating five geographic attendance areas with the Northwest, Northeast, Southwest and Southeast zones having a racial quota of forty-five percent Black, forty-one percent Anglo and thirteen percent Mexican-American.

5. Kindergarten through third grades would be in neighborhood schools; fourth through eighth grades would be bused and ninth through twelfth grades would be in neighborhood schools.

6. Building four magnet schools to be used in August, 1976, with three additional magnet schools to be completed by September 1, 1979.

7. Establishing racial quotas for top administrators by September 1, 1979, of forty-four percent Black, forty-four percent Anglo and twelve percent Mexican-American.

8. Expanding the bilingual program.

9. Assuring educational quality through an outside auditing firm.

10. Funding would be on a "need" basis (26, p. 1).

Just as there had been negative reactions to the DISD, NAACP, Dr. Hall and plaintiffs' desegregation plans, so there was opposition to the Dallas Alliance Task Force Plan. The school board held a three hour closed meeting and reached a consensus to instruct their attorneys to inform Judge Taylor that the school board could not support the task force plan.
Trustee Sarah Haskins said "the task force plan is a hodgepodge of beautiful words, but when you get down to the fine print it's nothing" (69, p. 1). Trustee Charles Fletcher summarized the school board's position by declaring that "if we supported the Alliance's plan we would be in effect abandoning our own plan" (71, p. 1).

In addition to school board members, leaders in the Black community rejected the Dallas Alliance's plan. The NAACP and SCAR sponsored a protest rally, and attorney H. Ron White proclaimed that the task force plan's three year phase-in period was intolerable. "Blacks, especially in the city of Dallas, are already twenty years behind" (71, p. 1).

During the month of February, 1976, resistance rhetoric assumed the varied forms of court testimony, another desegregation plan, a school board vote, a protest rally and finally a picket of Sunday morning worship services at the First Baptist Church in downtown Dallas where Dr. Estes and prominent business leaders attend church. Before the 9:30 a.m. worship service, four Blacks carried picket signs saying "One-Way Busing--No Way!" and "Plan A has been used as a dumping ground for our Black students" (25, p. 1). Plan A is a program for students whose learning problems are less severe than special education students but who are classified as slow learners. Mrs. Verna Thomas, leader of United Parents of Quality Education Committee, distributed pamphlets claiming Black students were not tested properly and were "dumped" into
Plan A classes because of racial prejudice (25, p. 1). By the end of the second service at noon, twelve picketers were gathered outside the church to protest the Dallas Alliance Plan and the lack of integration in the public schools. This peaceful demonstration ended when church members talked with the picketers and offered them coffee and doughnuts.

Despite the resistance rhetoric employed throughout February, testimony in the Dallas desegregation case continued in March, 1976. North Dallas intervenors called an expert in educational sociology—Dr. Lawrence G. Felice of Baylor University—to testify that busing would not effectively desegregate Dallas schools or improve race relations. He also presented facts from a three-year study of desegregation in Waco, Texas, to illustrate that bused Black students did not significantly improve their academic achievements (73, p. 1). Through Dr. Felice's testimony, the North Dallas intervenors tried to persuade Judge Taylor that busing would be counterproductive (28, p. 1).

The defendants in the desegregation case also introduced findings from the Coleman report to document "white flight occurs at a rapid rate in a city of high percentage of Blacks and predominantly white suburbs" (28, p. 1). Coleman's basic premise was that busing as a method of school desegregation results in white flight and re-segregation. However, plaintiffs in the Dallas case attacked the validity of the Coleman Report and refuted his conclusions. Statements by Coleman
himself were introduced as evidence, for Coleman admitted his opinions surpassed his data and that his conclusions were erroneous (28, p. 1). Dr. Karl Taeuber, a social researcher from the University of Wisconsin, testified that the Coleman report was not reliable because of unsound research techniques and faulty judgements. On the basis of more recent studies by numerous researchers, Dr. Taeuber determined that there is no direct causal relationship between school desegregation and white flight (28, p. 1).

This controversy about the effects of busing was a major factor in Judge Taylor's selection of a school desegregation plan. He stated that "white flight cannot be used as an excuse for denying others their constitutional rights. Nevertheless, this court cannot control the prejudice or anti-busing sentiment which might exist in the minds of some private individuals" (76, p. 1). Recalling the previous desegregation order in 1971, Judge Taylor reflected,

The court tried the student assignment method in 1971, and it has not proven wholly successful. The evidence shows that of approximately 1,000 Anglos ordered to be transported to formerly all-Black high schools under this court's 1971 student assignment plan, fewer than fifty Anglo students attend those schools today (76, p. 1).

Thus, the substantial loss of white students (40,000) since the 1971 desegregation order was an important consideration in Judge Taylor's decision to accept the Dallas Alliance Task Force plan and leave intact seven or eight one-race schools.

The desegregation hearings ended on March 5, 1976, and Judge Taylor announced his decision on March 10, 1976. He
praised the Dallas Alliance for their cooperation and reiterated the necessity of broad-based community support for a desegregation order to be successful. He also commended the Dallas Chamber of Commerce for its pledged support in establishing the magnet schools and in providing jobs for graduates of these special schools (81, p. 1). Judge Taylor thought another valuable aspect of the Dallas Alliance Task Force plan was the magnet school concept, for he believed voluntary attendance at magnet schools was the most realistic and effective means of integrating the DISD and preventing white flight (76, p. 1). By August, 1976, there were to be four magnet schools--creative arts, business and management, health careers and transportation--with enrollment on a fifty percent Anglo and a fifty percent minority ratio (76, p. 1).

In addition to the magnet school concept, Judge Taylor preferred the Dallas Alliance Task Force Plan over the other five desegregation plans for the following reasons:

1. shorter transportation distances;
2. stabilized neighborhood;
3. voluntary racial integration;
4. upgraded quality of education (through required programs);
5. more minority administrators;
6. court-monitored plan (76, p. 1).

Judge Taylor instructed the DISD to implement the concepts of the plan rather than specific examples and assured the school
board it could "alter ideas to fit the characteristics of the DISD" (29, p. 1). Judge Taylor further stated he would retain Dr. Hall as an advisor and review the student assignment portion of the plan annually because the "court is aware of the fact that demographic changes may necessitate revisions in student assignment in the future" (29, p. 1).

On March 11, 1976, Superintendent Nolan Estes briefed DISD employees about their role in the implementation of the court order, and school officials conferred with business, religious, government and civic leaders and representatives of parent and community groups to enlist positive support for desegregation of the public schools. Dr. Estes explained the DISD had two weeks to submit a student assignment plan to Judge Taylor, and the school board voted to purchase 303 buses at a cost of four and eight-tenths million dollars (29, p. 1). Dr. Estes stressed "it's time this school district gets out of court and stays out of court. There has been too much you vy me" (77, p. 1). Mayor Adlene Harrison also urged acceptance of Judge Taylor's decision. "I am certain that Dallas citizens as mature adults and knowledgable youth will accept the order of the court as the law and seek to implement it in full cooperation with the school board for the benefit of our city now and as a priceless legacy for the future" (75, p. 1).

Although some prominent leaders in Dallas supported compliance with Judge Taylor's decision, many groups in the
city opposed the ruling. Dr. Emmett Conrad voice the pre-
dominant Black concern by stating there were too many kids
left in segregated situations (76, p. 1). Dr. Charles Hunter,
the psychologist who drew up the plan for the NAACP, also
objected to the decision on the basis that the Dallas Alliance
plan left too many one-race schools. Bill Stoner, a repre-
sentative of the Dallas Legal Services, called the Alliance
Plan a "sell-out" because it did not fully integrate (29,
p. 1). A Black group called the Student Coalition Against
Racism accused Judge Taylor of doing little to improve unequal
education of Dallas minorities (29, p. 1).

In addition to the Black discontent with Judge Taylor's
order, a group of North Dallas Anglo parents called ANSWER
decided to form a network of private schools as an alterna-
tive to obeying the court order for increased busing. Mrs.
Carolyn Mueller, a parent in ANSWER, said, "A busing order
denies parents a basic freedom—the right to say what kind
of education their children should receive. Courts don't
have any business in the education of our children" (74,
p. 1). Thus, both Black and Anglo groups objected vocally
to the court decision to bus DISD children to desegregate the
DISD.

Legally obligated to formulate a specific student assign-
ment plan by March 24, 1976, the Dallas School Board approved
a plan to:

1. Divide the DISD into six subdistricts or geographical
areas—Northwest, Northeast, Southeast, South Oak Cliff, Seagoville and Southwest.

2. Bus only fourth through eighth grade students while kindergarten through third grades and ninth through twelfth grades would remain in neighborhood schools.

3. Bus only students in three subdistricts—Northwest, Northeast and Southeast.

4. Leave 27,497 Black students in all-Black schools in the South Oak Cliff subdistrict.

5. Bus a total of 18,223 students—6,544 Anglos, 9,162 Blacks and 2,517 Mexican-Americans (79, p. 1).

The school board passed this plan by a five to one vote with three minority trustees abstaining (30, p. 1). The board also voted six to three to ask Judge Taylor to delete all references to staffing policies according to racial quotas (31, p. 1).

The reaction to the school board's student assignment plan was again one of protest and opposition. The Mexican-American community had supported Judge Taylor's earlier ruling for desegregation, for Chicanos would gain improved educational facilities and programs and would have more Chicanos hired as teachers and administrators (78, p. 1). However, the Mexican-American community condemned the DISD plan for implementation of the court order, for they felt they would lose the advantage they gained under the Dallas Alliance Plan (80, p. 1).
Another group that objected to the DISD implementation plan was the NAACP, and this group pledged to appeal the student assignment portion if Judge Taylor did not modify the plan (80, p. 1). NAACP attorney Brice Cuningham claimed "the DISD differed from what the Dallas Alliance had intended. The burden of busing is still on Blacks" (80, p. 1). Reverend Marshall Hodge of the NAACP continued this thought by saying, "The final order does nothing to dismantle the remnants of Dallas' segregated school system" (32, p. 1). He was referring primarily to retaining the four all-Black schools in the South Oak Cliff area, and this concern was also launched by Mrs. Olga Mae Rabon--spokesman for the Concerned Parents to Save Children. She advised young Blacks to organize and vote "because older folks have been selling you down the river to the establishment. You're not going to get a quality education under the new busing plan, and if you don't get a good education, you will be carrying a mop and a broom for the rest of your life" (33, p. 1). She encouraged the young people to protest the plan by joining a march of 100 demonstrators--mostly Black parents. These people marched from the DISD Administration Building to the Earle Cabell Federal Building in downtown Dallas and chanted "we want quality education" and sang "We Shall Overcome" as they marched (33, p. 1).

Thus, in the month of March, 1976, there were several examples of resistance rhetoric against Judge Taylor's approval of the Dallas Alliance's plan for desegregation and
also against the DISD's specific student assignment plan. These rhetorical acts included verbal statements conveyed by the media, suggested alternatives to busing such as private schools, and a protest march with chanting and singing. In response to these protests, Judge Taylor issued a statement to justify his position.

The NAACP has cited no cases and the court is aware of none which have held that some one-race schools cannot exist, that majority-minority transfers are improper or that magnet schools are impermissible. There is not one tool used by the court in its final order which has been held to be a constitutionally impermissible tool of desegregation (33, p. 1).

On March 10, 1976, Judge Taylor had ordered the school board to implement the Dallas Alliance desegregation plan, and within two weeks the school board had responded with a specific plan. Shortly thereafter, Jack Lowe, the Dallas Alliance Task Force Chairman, suggested several changes to be made in the DISD student assignment plan. After reviewing the Dallas Alliance revisions, Judge Taylor issued a final desegregation order for the DISD on April 7, 1976. Details of this order in addition to or differing from his March 10th ruling included:

1. Dividing the DISD into five subdistricts and busing within the subdistricts only.
2. Busing 17,328 students (fourth through eighth graders).
3. Providing free transportation to
   a. Majority-minority transfer students.
   b. High school students who were bused under the 1971 court order if they chose to attend the same school.
4. Creating seven magnet schools for ninth through twelfth graders by 1979-1980. (If a student's high school would be converted to a magnet school, that student could attend any high school if the racial balance in that school were not upset. Students could attend their own high school for one half day and attend a magnet school for the other half day or students could enroll fulltime in a magnet career center.)


6. Rezoning other boundaries as needed to promote further desegregation and increased use of facilities.

7. Having an annual auditor's report.

8. Reflecting a racial quota of forty-four percent Black, forty-four percent Anglo and twelve percent Mexican-American in the top administrative positions by September 1, 1979 (83, p. 1).

The DISD anticipated relying primarily on Black majority-minority transfers to Anglo schools and Black students attending magnet schools to meet desegregation requirements (84, p. 1). Community meetings were scheduled by the DISD so school officials could explain implementation of the plan. However, unlike the high level of involvement by parents at the fall meetings, attendance by parents at these meetings was poor. At Carter High School, there were only thirty parents; at
Lincoln High School there were only eight parents; at North Dallas High School there were no parents (84, p. 1).

Although Judge Taylor publicly defended his choice of the Dallas Alliance Plan to desegregate the DISD, there were numerous negative reactions to his decision. A group of North Dallas parents formed ANSWER, Incorporated, to use parochial schools as alternative schools (82, p. 1). Another group--Concerned Parents to Save the Children--protested the desegregation order by staging a mock funeral. The funeral procession which consisted of a hearse, casket, fifty people and sixteen cars formed at Lincoln High School in South Dallas and proceeded to the Earle Cabell Federal Building in downtown Dallas. There a man in a flowing black judge's robe read a mock version of the desegregation order (34, p. 1). Al Lipscomb stated the purpose of the demonstration was to make the community aware of the inequities of Judge Taylor's ruling: "We can best express our organization's dislike of the ruling with a funeral" (34, p. 1). He added that another objective was to kick off a drive to back any party planning to appeal (34, p. 1). This group of parents felt that the ruling would resegregate schools in South Oak Cliff and remove all fourth through eighth graders from South Dallas. Mrs. Olga Mae Rabon claimed "Lincoln is completely resegregated and most of its teachers who are not actually concerned with teaching our kids are Anglos" (34, p. 1).

The Dallas Times Herald publicized its position of opposing forced busing to desegregate public schools and
favoring a constitutional amendment to eliminate forced busing (87, p. D-2).

In addition to these public protests, four groups registered their opposition by filing appeals to the final desegregation court order. The NAACP was the first organization to indicate intentions to appeal Judge Taylor's April 7th order. Their main objections to his ruling are as follows:

1. Black students would bear the burden of busing—over half the students to be bused would be Black (8,919 of 17,328).

2. Zoning in and confinement of 27,497 Black students into all-Black schools in the East Oak Cliff subdistrict.

3. Failure to establish any magnet schools in the East Oak Cliff area to attract Anglo students.

4. Locating only one-fourth through sixth grade school and only one seventh through eighth grade school in the East Oak Cliff subdistrict.

5. Exclusion of Black high schools in East Oak Cliff from the majority-minority transfer program.

6. Allowing the DISD a three-year grace period to comply with faculty and administrative ethnic ratios and to complete the magnet school program (37, p. 1).

The NAACP issued a summary of their reasons for appeal and stated that the April 7th court order would not desegregate
the DISD because magnet schools would not attract a significant number of Anglo students and the plan did not integrate all-Black East Oak Cliff (85, p. 1). Brice Cunningham, the NAACP attorney in Dallas, reiterated that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had ordered the DISD to "eliminate one-race schools and dismantle the dual system by 1975-76" (85, p. 1), but he contended Judge Taylor's April 7th court order had not accomplished these goals. The Dallas J. F. K. branch of the NAACP joined the South Dallas and Oak Cliff branches in filing a three-page motion to forbid the DISD from spending any money to implement the desegregation plan and asked a stay until the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals could rule on Judge Taylor's order. If the stay were granted, implementation of the plan would be postponed past the beginning of the new school year. The NAACP leaders also reasoned that if the DISD spent money to institute Judge Taylor's order and if the Fifth Circuit Court later overturned his order, then DISD officials could claim fiscal problems prohibited their enacting a new desegregation plan (37, p. 1). After filing their motion and request for a stay with Judge Taylor, the three branches of the NAACP in Dallas also urged the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to "abolish all vestiges of a dual system by abolishing the large number of one-race schools in the East Oak Cliff subdistrict" (37, p. 1).

The Dallas School Board was the second group to react in protest to the April 7th desegregation court order, and
they asked Judge Taylor to delete the sections of his ruling pertaining to educational programs and to personnel staffing policies because the court was "meddling in the operation of the schools" (83, p. 1). School board member Charles Fletcher declared the desegregation order forced "taxation without representation. Taxpayers in Dallas are sixty-one percent Anglo, thirty-one percent Black and eight percent Mexican-American and therefore the racial quota on administrators is unfair" (86, p. 1). The Dallas School Board was first contemplating filing an appeal only if other parties filed an appeal, but on April 21, 1976, the school board defeated a resolution to withdraw if the NAACP decided not to appeal. The board further passed by a five to three vote a motion to cross appeal the entire desegregation order, and the DISD filed notice of appeal on April 22, 1976 (35, p. 1). One week later school district attorneys filed a counter motion opposing the stay request by the NAACP (37, p. 1), and the school board announced it would argue for the DISD's original desegregation plan or for Dr. Hall's plan if the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the Dallas Alliance Plan (36, p. 1).

Minority plaintiffs comprised a third group who opposed Judge Taylor's court order for desegregation. Although the Coleman Report was cited as the basis for the March 19th and April 7th rulings, Black and Mexican-American plaintiffs accused Judge Taylor of omitting some basic findings of the
Coleman Report that were a discreditable appraisal of the DISD. Ed Cloutman, attorney for the plaintiffs, asserted that the Coleman Report showed that minority high schools in Dallas "fared poorly compared to predominantly Anglo high schools in terms of curriculum, resources, facilities and faculty. Therefore, there is still a gap between intent to provide equal educational opportunities and achievement of this goal in Dallas Schools" (81, p. 1). Although the plaintiffs strongly opposed the desegregation order, they agreed not to appeal until another party appealed the ruling. Hence, after the NAACP and the DISD filed their appeals, six of twenty plaintiffs filed notice to appeal also (88, p. 1).

A group of North Dallas intervenors was the fourth group to take legal action to protest Judge Taylor's court order. This group had presented evidence during the desegregation hearings to show that court-ordered busing would cause white flight, and after the April 7th ruling, they affirmed their resistance to forced busing of DISD students (36, p. 1).

In the month of April, 1976, some Anglo parents planned to avoid forced busing by placing their children in religious alternative schools, and some minority parents staged a mock funeral procession to publicize their objections with the desegregation order. These forms of resistance rhetoric prolonged the public battle against forced busing in Dallas, but these rhetorical acts did not alter Judge Taylor's decision. The majority of the resistance rhetoric in the
month of April was use of the legal process of filing appeals and cross appeals to influence the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in New Orleans.

Early in May, 1976, Judge Taylor again defended his decision in spite of the maintenance of all-Black schools in the East Oak Cliffs subdistrict. "If circumstances are such that some one-race schools cannot be avoided, then a plan is not constitutionally deficient because they exist" (89, p. 1). During May, controversy about the court order waned and the emphasis shifted to details for implementing the desegregation plan. In terms of cost, the DISD would spend ten million dollars in local operating funds the first year to phase in the plan. This amount included three million dollars for magnet schools, two and seven tenths million dollars to purchase 200 new buses and eight hundred and fifty thousand dollars to move portable classrooms to schools (92, p. 1).

Recruitment for the magnet schools was also a priority in May, and toward the end of the month 3,770 applicants (800 more than estimated) had been accepted. The initial enrollment at the magnet schools was 1,087 at the Business Management Magnet, 863 at the Health Careers Magnet, 816 at the Transportation Magnet, 507 at the Creative Arts Magnet and 497 at the Skyline Career Development Center (93, p. 1).

The DISD was now obviously interested in a tranquil transition into the 1976-77 school year, and DISD attorneys
asked the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to deny the NAACP request for a stay of the desegregation order. At this time, the school board believed delaying the deadline would result in more racial isolation within the school system, and they thought additional litigation would impede and interrupt the educational process during the new school year (90, p. 1). The Dallas Alliance also stressed immediate implementation of their desegregation order and hired attorneys to defend their plan in the appeals court (38, p. 1). After Judge Taylor refused to delay implementation of the desegregation order, the DISD and the Dallas Alliance preferred to proceed decisively with his order rather than extend court hearings into the next school year. However, the NAACP attorney mailed a motion to the Fifth Circuit Court to stay Judge Taylor's April 7th desegregation order and asked that court to prohibit the DISD from spending money to hire personnel for the magnet schools and for renovation and equipping these schools (39, p. 1). According to this NAACP motion, Judge Taylor's decision is "a device to allow resegregation of the races and does not dismantle the dual school system . . . the plan fosters racial isolation in an attempt to convince black students they're receiving a quality education" (91, p. 1). Cunningham charged that because the DISD would still have a large number of one-race schools under the desegregation order, the plan could not possibly comply with the Supreme Court ruling in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North
Carolina, case. The NAACP appeal was based upon the following criteria:

1. Judge Taylor's order does not comply with the July 23, 1975, Fifth Circuit Court's ruling for abolition of segregated schools immediately.
2. Judge Taylor's order does not create a desegregated school system (all-Black schools in East Oak Cliff).
3. Judge Taylor's order does not comply with the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteeing equal protection under the law.
4. Judge Taylor's order does not achieve the highest degree of desegregation when compared with the plaintiff's plans to bus 35,000 to 55,000 students (40, p. 1).

During the month of May, 1976, resistance rhetoric to Judge Taylor's order was confined to the NAACP appeal, for the DISD and the Dallas Alliance began to comply with the court order and began to execute the desegregation plan. Public protests from parental groups subsided, but during June, 1976, editorials in Dallas newspapers still reflected opposition to forced busing. The Dallas Morning News advocated freedom of choice and realistic, practical approaches to desegregation. There are "no official quotas for eating together or sitting at the same table; in real life situations people are grouped by interests, vocation, age, sex and religion and this may or may not be along racial lines" (41, p. 1).
This newspaper later printed anti-busing statements by U.S. Attorney General Edward Levi in the editorial section. "Busing is counterproductive because educational opportunities get worse, not better. Busing polarizes whites and blacks and turns them into mob groups" (42, p. D-2).

During May, the initial response to the magnet school concept for desegregation of the DISD seemed favorable, for enrollment was larger than estimated. However, during June, published data verified earlier predictions that not enough Anglo students voluntarily would choose to attend magnet schools to desegregate the DISD. Through the month of June, 1976, only twenty-one percent of the applicants at the fourth through six grade level were Anglo, only eight percent of the applicants at the seventh through eighth grade level were Anglo, and only twenty-six percent of the applicants at the ninth through twelfth grade level were Anglo (94, p. 1). Statistics also documented "white flight" during the decade of litigation and projected a continued decline of Anglo students in the DISD. Since 1970, 34,000 Anglo students had withdrawn from the DISD and had enrolled in private and suburban educational systems. Four suburban school districts accounted for sixty percent of Dallas' decline in Anglo students (43, p. 1). The trend in the Dallas schools was from an Anglo majority to a "minority" majority, and predictions for the student racial composition in the DISD by 1982 were sixty percent Black, twenty percent Anglo and
nineteen percent Mexican-American (compared to current enrollment ratios of forty-four percent Black, forty-one percent Anglo and thirteen percent Mexican-American) (95, p. 1).

During June, there were no further legal appeals to the final April 7th court order, and there were no rallies, public demonstrations or protests marches against forced busing in Dallas. The only overt examples of resistance rhetoric were editorials, but the results of prior resistance were evident indirectly in data about declining Anglo enrollment in the DISD.

The lack of active protests also characterized the month of July, 1976. President of Citizens for Neighborhood Schools--Kathy Carter--said that organization had no rallies planned as it did last summer and would not initiate protests or support boycotts to disrupt public schools. "To have rallies at this time would serve absolutely no purpose. It is difficult to keep people involved in an issue for extended periods of time. Every movement has periods of action and periods of planning. The only way we can do anything now is through the political system" (44, p. 1). The resistance to forced busing in Dallas had reached a standstill, and the resisters were waiting for a decision from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals before they again became actively involved. That decision came at the end of July, 1976, when the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals denied the NAACP request for a stay and thereby confirmed implementation of desegregation of the DISD through forced busing beginning August 23, 1976.
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CHAPTER III

CLASSIFICATION AND ANALYSIS OF RESISTANCE RHETORIC

The preceding chapter outlined a brief history of desegregation of the Dallas Independent School District and described the events involved in the desegregation of the DISD during the 1975-76 school year; and this chapter will classify and analyze those activities according to the rhetorical theories of Lee Griffin, John Bowers, and Donovan Ochs. As stated in his article entitled "Rhetoric of Movements," Lee Griffin divides social movements into three phases--the inception, the crisis and the consummation phases. In their book entitled The Rhetoric of Agitation and Control, John Bowers and Donovan Ochs categorize protest movements into several successive stages of agitation--the petition, promulgation, solidification, polarization, non-violent resistance, escalation/confrontation, Gandhi/guerilla, guerilla and revolution stages. Both Lee Griffin's and Bowers and Ochs' rhetorical theories will be defined within the context of this chapter as the rhetoric of resistance to desegregation of the DISD is classified and analyzed.

A prerequisite for the inception of a social or a protest movement is social unrest--dissatisfaction with existing policies and with established programs (1, p. 6; 47, p. 184).
This discontent with the status quo often produces agitators--people who advocate significant social change but are unable to exert enough influence in the decision-making process to obtain their desired goals. As a result, they abandon the normal discursive means of persuasion and encounter opposition from established authority (1, p. 4).

A precondition for the existence of social unrest is the condition of relative deprivation—the realization by a group of people that they do not have certain rights or privileges that other groups in their society possess. This discrepancy between the expectations of what a group of "deprived" people believe they deserve and the lack of means to attain equal status helps produce social unrest. The previously content group of people are then motivated to challenge established authorities and institutions to gain what they perceive they do not have (50, p. 2).

In the DISD desegregation issue, two minority groups were representative of the theory of relative deprivation. Black and Mexican-American groups realized minority students did not have equal educational opportunities because segregated minority schools had inferior facilities compared to Anglo schools, and these minorities thought efforts to desegregate the DISD were slow and ineffective. These minority groups expressed their dissatisfaction and contested the lack of integration in the DISD through law suits and legal appeals for more than twenty years. After the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals ordered the DISD to "completely dismantle its dual school system" (27, p. 1) on July 23, 1975, social unrest about desegregation was intensified in Dallas. Black and Mexican-American groups assumed the DISD desegregation plan would bus more minority students than Anglo students and voiced displeasure about "one-way" busing. An editorial in the *Dallas Times Herald* summarized the attitude that minority parents were helpless to gain improvements in schooling for their children under the present power structure. The two minorities also believed that not until Anglo parents personally experienced relative deprivation would desegregation in the DISD be initiated. "When children of white middle-class citizens of Dallas are sent to inferior schools in minority sections of Dallas, then there will be parents at City Hall asking for improvements in schools. But under the status quo there is no reason to improve" (26, p. 1). Thus, the discontent of Black and Mexican-American groups stemmed from relative deprivation— the realization that minority students had unequal educational opportunities and apprehension that the school board solution would have inequitable busing to desegregate the DISD. Anglo parents experienced a reverse sort of deprivation because they foresaw a loss of quality in their children's education in the DISD, and these "majority" parents contributed to the social unrest about desegregation of the DISD. Anglo parents feared their children would be bused into inferior-quality "minority" schools and predicted
the calibre of majority-white schools would diminish because more minority students would be bused into those schools. Therefore, Anglo parents were discontent with the Fifth Circuit Court ruling for additional desegregation, and Black and Mexican-American groups were discontent with anticipated implementation of the DISD desegregation plan.

When such an atmosphere of social unrest prevails in a community, the protesters can then instigate action for social change. The first development in a social or protest movement Bowers and Ochs call the "petition stage." In this petition phase, the protesters act only in accordance with acceptable standards to accomplish desirable social change. These protesters use "all normal discursive means of persuasion" to represent their grievances to the established authorities (1, p. 17).

Rhetorical acts of petition were the most prevalent types of protest during desegregation of the DISD. In 1955 and in 1970, Black and Mexican-American plaintiffs filed law suits against the DISD for practicing segregation. In 1971, these minority plaintiffs appealed the DISD desegregation plan that would bus only Black high school students (36, p. 1). Another example of petition occurred on July 24, 1975, when the school board voted to file an appeal with the Supreme Court and to request a stay of the Fifth Circuit Court's ruling for more thorough desegregation of the DISD. School district attorneys submitted these requests to the Supreme Court on August 18, 1975
but the Supreme Court decided in favor of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the DISD had no further legal channels of appeal. Rather than blatantly defy the court's order, the school board complied and designed a desegregation plan that was given to Judge Taylor on September 11, 1975.

Although the school board fulfilled its obligation and submitted a proposal, the DISD desegregation plan was itself a mild form of resistance to the court order. The DISD plan still entailed only moderate busing (18,000 students), failed to desegregate fifty-two "naturally integrated schools" and confined 40,000 minority students to forty-six one-race schools (24, p. 1). The school board plan did not force radical changes throughout the DISD and appeared to be a weaker form of compliance than was demanded by the court order. Minority groups viewed the DISD plan as an inadequate token of desegregation and protested the DISD plan by producing their own plan for more complete and equitable desegregation of the school district. On September 11, 1975, the NAACP also submitted to Judge Taylor a desegregation plan that would bus 20,000 to 100,000 students to create an equal racial balance in all schools in the DISD (6, p. 1). After Judge Taylor rejected both the DISD and the NAACP plans on September 16, 1975, minority groups continued to use petition tactics to protest segregation in the DISD. On January 12, 1976, Black and Mexican-American plaintiffs filed two desegregation plans. Plan A would bus over 55,000 students and
desegregate every school, and Plan B would bus almost 38,000 students but would retain fifteen one-race schools (38, p. 1).

To counter the vast structural changes and the large number of pupils bused under these plans, the Dallas Alliance filed a compromise desegregation plan on February 16, 1976. This plan would bus 20,000 fourth through sixth grade students, maintain three all-Anglo high schools and five all-Black high schools and would rely on magnet schools to promote desegregation (15, p. 1). Judge Taylor adopted the Dallas Alliance plan on March 10, 1976, and instructed the school board to develop a specific student assignment plan to implement the Dallas Alliance plan. However, Judge Taylor also permitted the school board to make any revisions or adjustments deemed necessary. The school board submitted the student assignment plan on March 24, 1976, and this plan would have bused 18,000 students (half of those bused would be Black students) and would leave over 27,000 Black students in all-Black schools (18, p. 1).

Many groups were outraged by this implementation plan, and several groups used the strategy of petition to protest the plan. The NAACP, the DISD, the Black and Mexican-American plaintiffs and a group of North Dallas intervenors all filed appeals or cross appeals about the implementation plan (43, p. 1), but Judge Taylor and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to delay enactment of the plan. The dominant form of petition thus continued to be the judicial process of
filing desegregation plans, appeals, and requests for stays with Judge Taylor, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court. This use of the judicial system for legal, non-violent resistance established a rhetorical pattern of petition during the DISD desegregation conflict.

A second rhetorical tactic of petition was the use of data and expert testimony prior to and during the desegregation hearings. In the petition stage of a movement, protesters usually present arguments and evidence to support their demand for a change. Opponents of forced busing in Dallas reasoned that increased busing would not improve academic achievement or enhance the social relationships of students.

There is little evidence to support the position that being in a desegregated environment for low-scoring Black students in a secondary school succeeded in motivating them or exposed them to opportunity to behave academically in such a way as to score on achievement tests differently from their non-bused peers. Desegregation had no substantial effect on the academic achievement of minority students and did not improve race relations (29, p. 1; 41, p. 1).

The North Dallas intervenors claimed busing fosters segregation rather than integration and the result is therefore contradictory to the purpose. "School desegregation in large cities hastens isolation of Blacks and whites and does not strengthen ties between the races" (8, p. 1). Data was also released to show that increased busing has caused "white flight" and that "desegregation in large central cities has increased the loss of white children from central city systems..."
and has contributed to racial segregation between Black children in predominantly Black schools and white children in predominantly white schools in the suburbs" (30, p. 1).

Statistics that revealed the decrease of white pupils within the DISD were published by the newspapers. From 1970 to 1975, white enrollment declined by 34,801 students. From October 10, 1974, until October 10, 1975, white enrollment declined by more than ten percent. From October, 1975, to March, 1976, the number of white students in the DISD decreased by 1,700 (31, p. 1; 10, p. 1). During the desegregation hearings, courtroom testimony reported that white flight was a realistic reaction to more busing in the DISD (39, p. 1). Superintendent Estes stated that "once a school becomes more than thirty percent Black, that school is likely to become predominantly Black within three years" (39, p. 1).

Dr. Estes asserted that the school district would become eighty to eighty-five percent minority in one year if a more drastic desegregation plan than the DISD plan were adopted. Projections about the racial balance of the DISD indicated that white students would continue to leave the Dallas public schools and enroll in private, parochial or suburban schools and that the DISD would have a "minority" majority of sixty percent Black and nineteen percent Mexican-American students by 1982 (20, p. 1). Thus, supplying data that increased busing does not improve academic achievement and does result in "white flight" was a form of petition employed by Anglo groups to resist court-ordered busing in the DISD.
In the initial petition stage of protests, resistance rhetoric against desegregation of the DISD by forced busing was displayed through legal, logical and non-violent tactics. As Lee Griffin mentions in his article about the rhetorical study of movements, dissatisfaction with the status quo and the desire for change should induce efforts to alter the establishment. When the balanced order of society is disturbed, a period of rhetorical crisis occurs and rhetorical conflicts ensue (47, pp. 184-186). According to Bowers and Ochs, protesters should begin with the strategy of petition but should also employ more severe strategies of agitation if they are necessary to cause change (1, p. 17). As resistance to forced busing in Dallas was accelerated, the rhetoric progressed to the second stage of agitation—"promulgation." The purposes of promulgation are to publicize the agitators' ideology and policies and to win public acceptance and sympathetic support of those people outside the movement and thereby recruit new members. The protesters attempt to expose their ideology and their demands through the media by staging an event and featuring a legitimizer—a well-known person in the establishment who partially endorses the ideology of the protesters (1, pp. 18, 19). Such promulgation tactics to gain media coverage might include informational picketing, distribution of handbills and leaflets, displaying posters and holding protest meetings (1, p. 17).

There were several instances of promulgation rhetoric during the DISD desegregation controversy in the 1975-76
school year. In early September, 1975, 150 East Dallas residents picketed outside the school administration building to protest the rumored closing of an elementary school, a junior high school and a high school in their area. The school board plan would possibly have closed these three schools, and the protesters declared such action would force residents from East Dallas and destroy the racial balance of schools and neighborhoods in that area (22, p. 1; 4, p. 1). Dallas newspapers printed articles about the pickets' concerns, and local television stations broadcasted the demonstration on the evening news, and, as a result, the school board desegregation plan did not include closing of the three East Dallas schools. Thus, by publicizing their ideology, the picketers accomplished their goal of retaining the three schools.

Another type of promulgation rhetoric in Dallas was the protest meeting. An organization called Citizens for Neighborhood Schools planned anti-busing rallies in different sections of the city to publicize their opposition to forced busing and to enlist more members. On Tuesday evening, September 2, 1975, 1,000 people attended a CNS rally at the Pleasant Oaks Recreation Center, and on Sunday evening, September 7, 1975, 800 people attended a CNS rally at Walnut Hill Recreation Center (2, p. 1; 23, p. 1). The two main speakers at these protest meetings were CNS president Kathy Carter and City Councilwoman Rose Renfroe, and these two women emerged as the leaders of the 1975-76 anti-busing campaign in Dallas.
Other prominent citizens who were associated with the antibusing faction and who spoke at these rallies were City Councilmen L. A. Murr and John Leedom, school board member Charles Fletcher, and Dallas County Commissioner Court members David Pickett and Jim Jackson. The speakers at these two rallies repeatedly presented the ideology of the group—support neighborhood schools, support only officials who oppose forced busing, and support an anti-busing constitutional amendment (2, p. 1; 23, p. 1).

In addition to Anglo groups using promulgation tactics to protest forced busing in the DISD, minority groups also used promulgation rhetoric to protest the DISD and the Dallas Alliance desegregation plans. Immediately after the details of the school board plan were released, the DISD organized community meetings at various high schools to explain the proposed plan. Students and parents at predominant Mexican-American North Dallas High School and at predominant Black Lincoln and Pinkston High Schools disrupted the informational sessions by seizing the microphones and urging the crowd not to be complacent about the desegregation issue. School board members Kathlyn Gilliam and Robert Medrano berated school officials and decried the school board plan for the injustice of one-way busing (24, p. 1). On Thursday, September 11, 1975, 200 students at North Dallas High School staged a rally to protest their school being closed and students being bused into other high schools (34, p. 1). On Sunday, February 15, 1976,
twelve Black parents picketed outside the First Baptist Church in downtown Dallas to protest the lack of integration in the DISD (8, p. 1). Late in March, 1976, 100 Black parents marched three miles from the DISD administration building to the Earle Cabell Federal Building to demonstrate their displeasure with Judge Taylor's acceptance of the Dallas Alliance plan (36, p. 1). In mid-April, 1976, fifty members of Concerned Parents to Save the Children organized a funeral procession that began at Lincoln High School in South Dallas and ended in front of the Earle Cabell Federal Building where a mock version of the desegregation order was read (19, p. 11). The protest meetings, the picketing, and the protest marches were promulgation tactics that minority groups employed during the 1975-76 school year to publicize their objections to desegregation plans for the DISD.

Promulgation rhetoric is directed outward to capture the attention of the media and the public and thereby publicize the ideology and recruit members. However, the rhetoric of the next stage of a protest movement is directed inward to reinforce the cohesiveness of the group members. Bowers and Ochs label this third stage of agitation the solidification stage because these activities are to strengthen the unity of the group. Plays, guerilla theater, in-group publications, songs, slogans, clothing and hair styles and both esoteric and exoteric symbols are rhetorical tactics of solidification (1, p. 20).
There were occasional solidification situations in the anti-busing movement in Dallas during the 1975-76 school year. At the CNS rally in Pleasant Grove on September 2, 1975, group members wore "Stop Busing" T-shirts and "NEVER" buttons. CNS members were given membership cards and CNS leaflets about how to fight busing (2, p. 1). At the Edgar Ward Community Center on December 13, 1975, sixteen Black students sang gospel songs and acted in skits to dramatize racial discrimination and stereotyping. One scene depicted Black students riding a bus, and the students were noisy and rowdy and were plaiting hair. A second situation presented all-Black students as being stupid, for the only students in a slow-learner English class were Black. The last skit showed Black and Anglo students committing the same offense at school, but only the Black students were punished (10, p. 1).

There was limited in-group rhetorical activity during the DISD desegregation conflict, and the anti-busing movement in Dallas did not develop beyond the solidification stage.

During the petition, promulgation and solidification stages of protest against desegregation of the DISD through forced busing, the rhetoric served various functions. This rhetoric drew attention to the issue of forced busing in the DISD, established and sustained the non-violent mood of the movement, identified the ideology and leaders of this movement, created slogans and stereotypes, intensified antagonisms, personalized the opposition, and recommended courses of action and
inspired people to protest (45). The resistance rhetoric against increased busing in the DISD also displayed some elements of the agitational rhetoric of conflict. By definition, the rhetoric of agitation is abrasive, disorganized, unstructured, symbolic, offensive, emotional, moralistic, exaggerated, illogical, disrespectful, unpleasant, derogatory, and obscene. Agitational rhetoric attacks traditions and institutions and demands immediate action to change the establishment (51).

The editorials printed in the Dallas newspapers were characteristic of some of these elements of agitation rhetoric.

The federal courts think of black and white children as cattle herded meekly about the countryside. What idiocy is busing (3, p. D-2)!

If Rose Renfroe had been bused by force, she would have won the hearts of bus drivers by her fighting spirit. Bus drivers would have gone on strike and no drivers would have been available for forced busing (5, p. 1).

If they don't change this stupid law they are going to suffer just as they are making us suffer. No busing for our children is our goal and we parents are going to continually fight for what is right (6, p. 1).

Let's make it perfectly clear to our elected representatives that if they expect to return to their posh, high paying federal and state positions, they'd better listen to their constituents and leave our children alone. Call and write your representative now or be reconciled to losing your liberty (7, p. 1).

No one told the Wright brothers they had to have two Black men working on their invention with them. No one told George Washington Carver he couldn't invent another use for the peanut until he got a white partner. God didn't establish racial quotas for entry into Heaven (7, p. 1).
When that government loads our children into yellow buses against our will and transports them away from their homes and families, are we so very far away from being told where we must live and to whom we must sell our homes? Our federal masters are fast becoming a cruel and oppressive tyranny (28, p. 1).

Speeches given at protest rallies also produced instances of agitational rhetoric. Kathy Carter blasted U. S. Senator Lloyd Bentsen for not favoring an anti-busing amendment. "If Teddy Bear Kennedy feels unwelcome in Boston, just let Bentsen come back here again" (2, p. 1). She also criticized a NAACP pro-busing rally and labeled Reverend James a hypocrite. "He's a typical limousine liberal who says do as I say, not as I do" (35, p. 1). Carter based her accusations upon the fact that Reverend James lived in an elite section of North Dallas and had enrolled his own child in a private school. At one of the CNS rallies, Representative Alan Steelman blamed busing for "kindling violence and disruption in the lives of people who are otherwise law-abiding citizens" (12, p. 1).

Minority spokesmen also resorted to agitational rhetoric to voice their grievances about desegregation in the DISD. Reverend H. Rhett James stated at a NAACP rally that "the real issue is not busing by racism. This meeting is for intelligent people who are here because you can think. It's the ignorant folk who attend the anti-busing rallies" (33, p. 1). City Councilwoman Juanita Craft exclaimed, "I don't understand how one mother can say to another who has also known the pangs of childbirth, your child can't have what my child has. Blacks, especially in the city of Dallas, are already twenty years
behind" (37, p. 1). Mrs. Olga Mae Rabon, speaking at a meeting of Concerned Parents to Save the Children, stated that "young Blacks are not going to get a quality education under the new busing plan . . . and you'll be carrying a mop and broom for the rest of your life" (18, p. 1). These examples of vocal and written rhetoric illustrate that resistance rhetoric to the DISD desegregation through forced busing was emotional, exaggerated, illogical and unstructured. However, this protest rhetoric was always of a non-violent nature and encouraged the protesters to use the method of petition to enact change. This rhetoric never resulted in the people performing symbolic or actual acts of violence.

Dallas was not the only city that resisted forced busing in a non-violent manner. Throughout the country, opponents of busing recognized they had no power to dissuade the federal government and the courts from ordering busing as a tool of desegregation; therefore, busing foes in many major cities only engaged in the non-violent petition, promulgation, and solidification stages of protest. "Desegregation can proceed uneventfully with support from city and school-board leaders, parental participation and in the formulation of plans and precautionary measures as rumor control centers" (63, p. 64). In a survey conducted throughout the country, the courts provided the major impetus for desegregation in one-third of the school systems surveyed, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare was the main catalyst for desegregation in one-fourth of the school
districts, and local pressures prompted desegregation in more than forty percent of the school systems (63, 64). On September 10, 1968, Berkeley, California, had the first school system to totally desegregate public schools by busing students, and desegregation success was attributed to strong leadership by the school board and the school administrators, and to community input in formulating a desegregation plan (46, p. 291).

In 1972, a federal court ordered the Metropolitan Public Schools of Nashville and Davidson Counties to desegregate through busing. The school districts established a communication center to relay information to the public and organized orientation sessions with parents to acquaint them with desegregation procedures. School officials also met with clergy and with community leaders and recruited their support for desegregation efforts (48, p. 17). Therefore, there were few problems because the community was constantly informed and citizens were involved in the decision-making process about a desegregation plan. In 1976, union leaders, prominent businessmen, ministers and parents formed PRO Detroit--People Responsible Organizations for Detroit--to provide leadership in peaceful compliance of desegregation of the Detroit public schools. This organization launched a public-relations campaign to stress the importance of obeying the law and avoiding violent reactions to busing (61, p. 50). Thus, in Dallas and in other cities, protests to busing were non-violent and rhetoric encouraged peaceful compliance with court orders.
Although they were not evidenced in the resistance to desegregation of the DISD, there are additional stages of protest movements as defined by Bowers and Ochs. The fourth stage is polarization in which the agitators pose an "either-or" choice—either people join the protest group or they are aligned with the establishment. The agitators discount neutral sympathizers and proclaim an individual must consciously commit himself to the agitators or to the establishment (1, p. 26). The fifth stage is non-violent resistance or the deliberate violation of customs and laws considered to be unfair. Civil disobedience tactics such as boycotts, sit-ins, teach-ins, and strikes are directed against status quo policies, and the protests must remain peaceful (1, pp. 28, 29). The sixth stage is "escalation/confrontation" when the agitators force a clash with authorities through the tactics of rumor, threatened disruptions, verbal and non-verbal obscenities, negotiable demands and token violence. If this rhetoric succeeds, control groups will become apprehensive and confused and will be pressured into over-reacting (1, pp. 35, 36). The seventh stage is the combination of Gandhi and guerilla strategies with part of the agitators participating in non-violent resistance and part of the agitators physically attacking the establishment. The last two stages of agitation are the most violent strategies. Guerilla tactics involve subversive plots and actual terrorist attacks on property and people, and the revolution stage is overt warfare.
Although Dallas resistance to forced busing never progressed beyond the petition, promulgation and solidification stages, there were places where protests to court-ordered busing advanced beyond those initial stages of agitation. Non-violent resistance such as protest marches against City Hall, boycotts of public schools, walkouts, sit-ins and teacher strikes occurred in New York City and in Chicago in 1964 and are examples of the fifth stage of agitation. Threatened disruptions, rumors and token violence of the escalation/confrontation stage led to destruction of property and to physical attacks upon students and police. The Gandhi/guerilla, guerilla, and revolution stages of agitation were witnessed especially from 1966 to 1976. In 1966, in Grenada, Mississippi, whites armed with axe handles, lead pipes, and chains attacked Black students (54, p. 26). In Oakland, California, Black students firebombed buildings and attacked white teachers (64, p. 12). In 1970, in Lamar, South Carolina, a group of whites overturned school buses and tried to attack Black pupils inside the buses (53, p. 12). In Oklahoma City in 1974, racial fighting, attacks on buses, schools, students, and police, numerous arrests, and some school closings occurred in Louisville; Charlotte, North Carolina; Racine, Wisconsin; and Baltimore (58, p. 88; 10, p. 35; 66, pp. 32, 34). From 1974 to 1976, violence flared in Boston. Angry mobs stoned buses, clubbed students, and damaged schools. State troopers, national guardsmen, and police were attacked as they tried to
disperse the crowds and protect the students (49, p. 48; 54, pp. 29, 88; 55, p. 108; 56, p. 22; 62, p. 11; 66, pp. 32, 35; 67, p. 22). These examples of the last stage of agitation illustrate that anti-busing violence did erupt in several cities and was a contrast to the limited development of anti-busing agitation in Dallas.

The intensity and frequency of protests to desegregation of the DISD through forced busing dwindled during May and June, 1976, and resistance to the desegregation plan almost completely subsided during July, 1976. According to Lee Grif- fin's rhetorical analysis of movements, these months would be the "period of consummation" because the protesters lost interest and/or were defeated (37, p. 186). On April 7, 1976, Judge Taylor ordered implementation of the Dallas Alliance plan, and all appeals to the Fifth Circuit Court for a stay of that order had been denied. Therefore, implementation of the desegregation plan for the DISD in August, 1976, seemed unavoidable. The resigned attitude of anti-busing advocates was summarized by Kathy Carter, president of CNS. "There are no plans for rallies, and we shall not initiate protests or support boy-cotts. To have rallies at this time would serve absolutely no purpose. It is difficult to keep people involved in an issue for an extended period of time" (21, p. 1). Apparently discouraged by their failure to achieve their goals, the protesters in Dallas suspended their resistance efforts and awaited the inevitable busing of DISD pupils in the new school year.
Having classified the types of protests against desegregation of the DISD during the 1975-76 school year, one must also classify the responses of established authority to the resistance rhetoric. When the authoritative regulatory agencies within society react to "proposals requiring change in the establishment's structure, policy, or ideology or power... the response of the decision-making establishment is termed control" (1, pp. 41, 4). There are four main rhetorical control strategies—avoidance, suppression, adjustment, and capitulation, and there are specific rhetorical tactics associated with each general strategy. If the establishment wants to change the issues or delay a decision about the protesters' demands, avoidance can be demonstrated in the following ways:

1. counterpersuasion—attempting to convince the protesters they are wrong or convince them to alter or modify their demands.

2. evasion—avoiding confrontation with the protesters by "buck-passing" or by "the-run-around".

3. postponement—delaying a decision about the protesters' demands, referring those grievances to a committee for future consideration or prolonging discussions and meetings about the demands.

4. secrecy with a rationale—publicly declining to comment or respond.

5. denial of means—physically prohibiting the protesters from publicizing their demands (1, pp. 41-46).
The judicial power within the establishment often reacted to the protesters with the strategy of avoidance. After Judge Taylor rejected the DISD and NAACP desegregation plans on September 16, 1975, he repeatedly practiced the tactic of postponement. Desegregation hearings were to have begun on October 6, 1975, but he postponed the hearings until November 3, 1975, then until December 1, 1975, and finally until February 2, 1976 (9, p. 1; 11, p. 1; 34, pl 1). This process of postponement allowed additional time for Dr. Hall and the Dallas Alliance to design and submit desegregation plans.

Judge Taylor illustrated the avoidance tactic of counter-persuasion in late September, 1975, when he appointed Dr. Hall as the court's desegregation expert and requested Dr. Hall to produce an acceptable desegregation plan. After denouncing the DISD plan for not providing enough desegregation and reprimanding the NAACP for initiating too extreme desegregation measures, Judge Taylor obviously wanted a modified plan on which Anglos and minority groups could compromise. Judge Taylor again hoped for a moderate desegregation plan that both Anglos and minorities would agree upon, and he believed a plan originating with community leaders would be more readily accepted by all parties than a plan he might impose upon them.

The second control strategy of suppression serves to weaken the power or totally eliminate the leaders of a movement. Suppression can be manifested by these tactics:

1. harassment—raids, arrests, confinement in jail, destruction of property, threats, and attacks on protesters' lives.
2. denial of agitators' demands—refusal to grant the protesters' demands.

3. banishment—excommunication, expulsion, academic suspension, forcing protesters to leave an area, confinement in jail.

4. purgation—killing the leaders and members of the protest group (1, pp. 47-51).

The suppression tactic most often used by "control" was denial of demands. On August 22, 1975, the Supreme Court refused the school board's request for a stay of the Fifth Circuit Court's order to desegregate the DISD. Congress also slowed the momentum of the agitators by defeating antibusing bills. The Senate voted to kill an antibusing amendment on September 3, 1975, and the Democratic Caucus in the House of Representatives stalled an antibusing amendment in late November, 1975 (31, p. 4; 32, p. 1).

Another judicial example of denial of agitators' demands happened on September 16, 1975, when Judge Taylor rejected both the DISD and the NAACP plans and thereby denied these two groups their respective approaches to desegregation. A crucial instance of rhetorical suppression occurred on March 10, 1976, when Judge Taylor selected the Dallas Alliance desegregation plan instead of Dr. Hall's plan or the plaintiffs' Plans A and B. Thus, from September, 1975, till March, 1976, five of the proposed desegregation plans were rejected by the court. The protesters' demands were stifled at final time by the
authority of control when in July, 1976, the Fifth Circuit Court denied the NAACP request for a stay of Judge Taylor's implementation order. Therefore, the Supreme Court, Congress, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and Judge Taylor all exercised their judicial and legislative powers of control to suppress resistance to DISD desegregation by denial of the protesters' demands.

If the establishment decides to adapt or alter inherent institutions, personnel, goals, or ideology according to the protesters' demands for change, the following tactics of rhetorical adjustment can be adopted:

1. Changing the name of the regulatory agency.
2. Sacrificing personnel.
3. Accepting some of the means of agitation.
4. Incorporating some of the protesters' personnel or ideology (1, pp. 52-54).

Judge Taylor reflected the strategy of adjustment when he accepted the Dallas Alliance desegregation plan on March 10, 1976, and subsequently permitted the school board to adjust the Dallas Alliance plan to fit the characteristics of the DISD. Judge Taylor further stated that the aim of the Fourteenth Amendment is the guarantee of equal educational opportunity and not racial integration.

The U.S. Constitution does not require racial quotas in every school but rather equal educational opportunity. If circumstances are such that some one-race schools cannot be avoided, then a plan is not constitutionally deficient because they exist. The NAACP has cited no cases and the court is aware of none which have held that some one-race schools cannot exist (16, p. 1; 43, p. 1).
Although minority desegregation plans had emphasized mass busing and integration of almost all DISD schools, Judge Taylor's acceptance of the Dallas Alliance plan revealed his concession to Anglo demands for moderate busing and retention of several one-race schools. Judge Taylor's sanction of the Dallas Alliance plan and the DISD student assignment plan demonstrated partial adjustment of the court to the agitators' ideology.

Resistance rhetoric to the desegregation of the DISD conformed to Lee Griffin's theory that a social movement has a period of inception, a period of rhetorical crisis and a period of consummation. Resistance rhetoric to desegregation of the DISD in 1975-76 was also characteristic of a protest movement. Social unrest and dissatisfaction in Dallas stimulated the organization of protest groups with identifiable goals and leaders. This resistance rhetoric in Dallas also exemplified the first three stages of Bowers and Ochs' theory of agitation. The strategies of petition, promulgation and solidification were countered with the control strategies of avoidance, suppression and adjustment. Therefore, resistance to desegregation of the DISD during the 1975-76 school year can appropriately be classified according to rhetorical theories of social movements, protest movements and agitation.
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CHAPTER IV

EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE RESISTANCE RHETORIC

After describing and classifying the rhetorical actions and reactions, the final function of rhetorical criticism according to Thonssen, Baird, and Braden is evaluation of the effectiveness of the rhetoric (24, p. 21). The description, classification, and analysis of the rhetoric of resistance to desegregation of the DISD during the 1975-76 school year were presented in the second and third chapters. This chapter will provide an evaluation of that resistance rhetoric by presenting standards for gauging the effectiveness of rhetoric, giving the goals of the protesters, and examining the reasons those goals were not reached. Lee Griffin indicates the final focus in a movement study should be an analysis of the effectiveness of the rhetorical efforts to change the establishment to determine the degree of success or failure of that movement (21, p. 186). The effectiveness of protests may also be based upon how completely the short-range and long-range goals of the protesters are accomplished. Short-range goals are immediate and attainable goals granted by authorities without major changes in society; long-range goals are changes in inherent conditions in society and are economically, politically, socially
or educationally inadvisable at the current time because the agitator's changes would be more harmful to society than the alleged problems in the status quo (23).

"The object of protests is determined by specific grievances against local segregation" (2, p. 119) and to ascertain the effectiveness of the resistance rhetoric to desegregation in the DISD, the stated and/or intended goals of the protesters must be compared to the results of the protests. The resisters to the DISD desegregation plans had differing short-range goals. Anglo groups protested any additional busing and further desegregation of the DISD and endorsed the long-range goal of an anti-busing constitutional amendment. Black and Mexican-American groups protested one-way busing but advocated increased busing with equitable ethnic ratios to integrate the DISD.

The Dallas Alliance plan that Judge Taylor adopted was a compromise version of the Anglo and minority plans so no protest group fully achieved its short-range goals. Judge Taylor's April 7, 1976, desegregation order involved the moderate busing which Anglo groups preferred (18,000 students), instead of the more extreme busing which minority groups favored (20,000 to 100,000 students under the NAACP plan, 55,000 students under Plaintiffs' Plan A, and approximately 38,000 students under Plaintiffs' Plan B). Under the final desegregation order, almost 28,000 Black students were restricted to one-race schools and some majority-Anglo schools still existed, but voluntary
integration was encouraged through expansion of the magnet-school program (11, p. 1). As a result, racial quotas were not consistently established or strictly enforced throughout the school district, but more thorough integration would be possible if students elected to be bused to magnet schools. Hence, Anglo groups were not effective in achieving their short-range goal of preventing implementation of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals order for additional busing in the DISD. Black and Mexican-American groups were not effective in achieving their short-range goals of obtaining a significant increase in the number of students bused, in achieving more equitable busing, or in eliminating one-race schools in the DISD.

The discrepancies between the short-range goals of the protesters and the conclusions of the final desegregation order can be attributed to the social, political, and educational milieu of the busing and desegregation issues. "When a community senses that change is going to take place regardless of what you do, you don't get violence . . . but there will be violent action if the people think integration can be prevented" (25, p. 25). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruling on July 23, 1975, to desegregate the DISD and the Supreme Court's reinforcement of that ruling on August 22, 1975, were illustrations of the exercising of legitimate power (3, p. 11). The school district had no social power influential enough to counter or supercede the authoritative power of these two
judicial groups. Perceiving that implementation of the courts orders was unavoidable and that additional busing in the DISD was inevitable, the school board had no legal recourse except to yield to the courts' orders for desegregation and thereby acknowledge the legitimate power of the judicial process. This initial compliance with the Fifth Circuit Court's and the Supreme Court's rulings established the precedent of conformity by the DISD and the pattern of non-violent resistance by citizen groups to court orders during the desegregation conflict in Dallas.

Another example of legitimate power of "control" to nullify the effectiveness of the protesters was the legitimate action to defeat an anti-busing constitutional amendment. The Senate voted on September 3, 1975, to kill an anti-busing amendment, and the Democratic Caucus in the House of Representatives voted to kill a similar bill (4, p. 1). Therefore, the accomplishment of the long-range goal of anti-busing factions was obstructed by the legislative process.

The principle that, in the American system of government, neither violent nor non-violent resistance can prevent implementation of court-ordered action was demonstrated by the anti-busing movement. Regardless of the types of protest or the degree of agitation, no anti-busing movement in a major city was effective in stopping forced busing as a tool of desegregation. Whether there was violent resistance to busing as occurred in Mississippi, South Carolina, Michigan,
and Boston, or whether there was non-violent resistance to busing like that in New York City, Chicago, Memphis, Berkeley, and Dallas, busing as a court-ordered mandate for desegregation in public schools was unavoidable.

Another reason the protesters to desegregation of the DISD did not totally achieve their short-range goals was the anti-busing rhetorical strategy in Dallas never progressed beyond the solidification stage of agitation. This resistance was always within the confines of acceptable, normal discursive means of persuasion, and, as a result, the rhetoric of resistance never developed to the Gandhi/guerilla and token violence stages of agitation. The anti-busing movement in Dallas reflected moderate rhetorical characteristics:

1. Distribution of pamphlets but not manifestoes.
2. Verbal rhetoric is always within the value structure of social mores.
3. Rhetoric is used as an alternative to force (22, p. 7).

Because the rhetoric of resistance to forced busing in the DISD was moderate and non-violent, the anti-busing movement in Dallas did not attract enough followers to foster and sustain the movement. One requirement for the effectiveness of a protest movement is for the movement to have broad-based community support. A large segment of the population must be involved (20), for "the more participants are seen as constituting a major part of a group whose grievances are known, the more credible they are as protesters" (1, p. 101). The main anti-busing
organization in Dallas was CNS, and that protest group did not recruit enough members to be representative of "broad-based community support," and only 1,000 people at the most attended the protest meetings. When CNS sponsored a protest rally in one section of the city, only the people living in that area would attend the meeting. Therefore, CNS groups were not supportive of each other, and this autonomy and fragmentation kept membership relatively small.

In addition to having few members to perpetuate the movement, the anti-busing movement in Dallas did not have strong enough leadership or a substantial enough budget to be effective. Kathy Carter and Rose Renfroe were the two main spokesmen for CNS, and civic leaders spoke at protest rallies, but these people did not attract, maintain, and mold workers into an efficiently organized unit or secure adoption of an ideology by the establishment as effective leadership would have done (22, p. 3). Contributions were the main source of income for the resistance movement in Dallas, and these donations provided meager and inconsistent financial backing.

"Protests are terminated by either the success or by waning enthusiasm" (2, p. 125), and the anti-busing movement in Dallas was not effective because of disinterest, lack of active resistance, and resignation to the inevitability of court-ordered busing (13, p. 1).

Kathy Carter also stated that "anti-busing groups are stronger when people didn't know what was coming but now most
people will place their children in other schools anyway" (13, p. 1). Another reason the anti-busing movement in Dallas faded was because there were practical methods of avoiding busing. Anglo parents had the option of enrolling their children in private or parochial schools or moving to a suburb of Dallas and enrolling their children in a suburban school district. These alternatives to forced busing in the DISD were desirable and practical courses of action available to Anglo parents. These choices decreased the need for protest to court-ordered busing in the DISD.

The "establishment can diminish the effect of a social movement by anticipating and acting on demands for the protesters or by appointing a group to study the problem" (22, p. 4). Judge Taylor thwarted the effectiveness of the Dallas resisters by urging the Dallas Alliance—a group of forty business, governmental, religious and civic leaders—to design and submit a desegregation plan. "It is time for business leaders to stand up and be counted. We cannot attract businesses to Dallas if its town by racial strife and if public education is inferior" (5, p. 1). Judge Taylor adopted the Dallas Alliance plan on March 10, 1976, and expressed his pleasure with that group's efforts. "This plan is a wonderful sign. At least they're not telling people to fight or violate the law" (5, p. 1). Judge Taylor was influenced by the protesters claims that further desegregation would destroy naturally integrated communities and that forced busing
would cause "white flight" (15, p. 1). He publicly stated that loss of white students from the school district after the 1971 court order "was an important factor in making my decision" (9, p. 1).

The final reason the rhetoric of resistance was not totally effective in Dallas was because the community leaders urged peaceful compliance with the court order. Preserving law and order in Dallas was a priority among many religious, business, education, and civic leaders, and their attitude set the mood for non-violent acceptance of the desegregation order. The Dallas Alliance urged citizens to accept the desegregation order and emphasized, "Let's get out of the court and come up with an agreement instead of having one imposed on us. We're going to get another Boston if we don't get going" (14, p. 1). Dr. Robert McGinnis, chairman of the Religious Community Committee for Support of Law and Order, stressed that peaceful acceptance of the court order will enhance the local economy by reducing the number of people moving to the suburbs and eroding the Dallas tax base (7, p. 1). Dr. John Anderson, a pastor in that organization, said that "when the whole leadership of a city comes together and says we want law and order, then the people will go along with it" (19, p. 1). Dallas school officials also asked leaders in Dallas and citizens to work together toward peaceful implementation.

The Dallas School Administrators Association affirmed that
group would obey the law and encouraged parents and students to do likewise. The DISD and the Chamber of Commerce worked together to plan magnet schools, and business leaders pledged their time, equipment, money and personnel to help the magnet-school program get started (10, p. 1). A city official summarized the attitude of the leaders who urged peaceful compliance by saying "I am certain that Dallas citizens as mature adults and knowledgable youth will accept the order of the court for the benefit of our city now and as a legacy for the future" (17, p. 1).

In summary, the rhetoric of resistance to forced busing to desegregate the DISD during the 1975-76 school year was not effective in achieving specific short-range goals. Anglo groups did not prevent implementation of court-ordered busing in all public schools, and minority groups did not obtain equitable ethnic ratios in busing and did not attain elimination of one-race schools in the district. The specific reasons these protesters failed to achieve their goals were (1) the non-violent rhetoric failed to recruit a sizable number of members to sustain the movement, (2) there was no strong leadership for the movement, (3) financial support was inadequate to support the movement for an extended period of time, (4) groups within the movement were not supportive of each other, (5) interest and active participation in the movement dwindled and (6) resisters had a viable alternative to avoid busing of their children by enrolling them in private, parochial, or suburban schools.
In addition to these specific factors about the antibusing movement itself, there were influences by the establishment that contributed to the lack of effectiveness of resistance rhetoric. Business, religious, education, and civic leaders urged peaceful compliance of the desegregation order and thereby created a mood of non-violent acceptance in Dallas. However, the main obstacle to resisters achieving their goals was the legitimate use of power by the judicial and legislative systems. The legitimate power of the courts prevented the Dallas resisters from accomplishing their short-range goals. The Supreme Court supported the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruling for additional busing to desegregate the DISD, and Judge Taylor accepted the Dallas Alliance plan which retained some one-race schools. The legislative power of Congress prevented passage of an anti-busing constitutional amendment so anti-busing groups throughout the country could not achieve this long-range goal. Hence, neither violent nor non-violent resistance to forced busing could accomplish the goal of preventing implementation of court-ordered busing.

Although the rhetoric of resistance to desegregation of the DISD failed to achieve all of the short or long-range goals of the protesters, the resistance rhetoric did result in some accomplishments for the protesters. Anglo groups were effective in persuading Judge Taylor to accept a compromise desegregation plan and thereby prevent racial upheaval
in the DISD. Anglo protesters did not completely stop forced busing in the DISD, but they did influence Judge Taylor to order a modified desegregation plan that contained a minimal amount of busing. In addition, Anglo protesters prevented more extensive and total integration of the DISD, for segregation still existed under the court-ordered desegregation plan. Many all-Black schools remained intact and several thousand Black students were still assigned to these one-race schools. Anglo students could enroll in private, parochial, or suburban schools and thereby avoid being bused. The main attempt at desegregation in the Dallas Alliance plan was the magnet-school concept, but only by students voluntarily choosing to attend magnet schools would more thorough integration be accomplished. The rhetoric of resistance in Dallas also prevented violence and racial turmoil from happening in Dallas. Protesters were intent in avoiding violent reactions to desegregation of the DISD, and there were no violent outbursts about forced busing in Dallas. Therefore, the rhetoric of resistance in Dallas (1) did persuade Judge Taylor to compromise and order only a moderate amount of busing, (2) did retain some segregation in the DISD and (3) did prevent violent reactions to more forced busing in the DISD. In conclusion, the rhetoric of resistance to desegregation of the DISD during the 1975-76 school year did not fully achieve specific short- or long-range goals of the protesters, but this rhetoric of resistance did result in some accomplishments for the protesters in Dallas.
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