

379
N81
No. 6662

THE RHETORIC OF SPIRO T. AGNEW: A
NEO-ARISTOTELIAN ANALYSIS OF
AGNEW'S VIEWS CONCERNING
THE MEDIA

THESIS

Presented to the Graduate Council of the
University of North Texas in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE

By

Blain E. Voorhees, B.A.

Denton, Texas

August, 1990

Voorhees, Blain E., The Rhetoric of Spiro T. Agnew: A Neo-Aristotelian Analysis of Agnew's Views Concerning the Media. Master of Science (Communication and Public Address), August, 1990, 130 pp., bibliography, 76 titles.

In November 1969, Vice President Spiro T. Agnew delivered two speeches attacking two mediums. In the first speech, Agnew initiated charges of erroneous reporting and irresponsible actions on the part of the television networks. In the second speech, Agnew assailed the concentration of power in the hands of a few newspaper companies. In both cases, complaints and support were immediate and substantial.

This study employs the Neo-Aristotelian method of criticism to discover: 1) the extent to which Agnew was influenced by his past, and 2) how Agnew's rhetoric exhibited methods of rhetorical polarization.

This study concludes that Agnew's past played a dominant role in his rhetoric. Further research in a variety of related areas is suggested.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. FOUNDATION OF AGNEW'S PERSPECTIVE:	
PREPARATION FOR A VERBAL VICE PRESIDENT . .	29
III. EVENTS PRECEDING THE SPEECHES	50
IV. RHETORICAL ANALYSIS	62
V. FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND SUGGESTIONS	
FOR FURTHER RESEARCH	89
APPENDIX A	94
APPENDIX B	110
BIBLIOGRAPHY	123

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

For years there has been a struggle for power between the world of politics and the media. This contest has almost always concerned itself with the amount of influence each has on the other and the impact that each has on the public domain. The number of confrontations between these two players is enormous, but two disputes in particular, because of their characteristics, warrant further scholarly study.

The first dispute began in November of 1969, when the Vice President of the United States initiated an attack upon two of the nation's media, the major television news networks and a group of prominent newspapers throughout the land. In Des Moines, Iowa, on November 13th, Vice President Spiro Theodore Agnew addressed the Mid-west Regional Republican Committee, and he assailed the television networks. A week earlier, President Richard Nixon had gone on the national networks to announce his newest Vietnam plan. Agnew said the President's intention was to "rally the American people to see the conflict through to a lasting and just peace" (Lucas 120). After Nixon's presentation, Agnew declared that the media had almost immediately subjected the President's words

and policies to instant and querulous criticism. Agnew, in defense of the President, attacked the broadcast media with charges of erroneous reporting and irresponsible actions. Without question Agnew had managed to evoke emotions in almost every part of the nation. In particular the Vice President received prompt responses from the broadcast media, the political environment, and the general public (Lucas 115).

As the month of November 1969 progressed so did the tension between Spiro Agnew and the media, who he called the unelected elite. The Vice President appeared at various locations around the nation and continued his assault on a variety of audiences but primarily the broadcast media of one form or another. The response to Vice President Agnew's words was overwhelming. Even Agnew had not gauged--perhaps even the American people did not know--how deeply and how personally, millions of Americans resented the TV anchormen who nightly professed to tell the people what they should believe, trampled on their traditional values, and seemed to scorn the things they so deeply believed. As Robert Novak admitted, "There is no doubt that Mr. Agnew did scare the dickens out of the people who read and heard his word" (Lucas 126).

After Agnew attacked the broadcast media for a second time in a speech delivered in Jackson, Mississippi, the New York Times delivered a severe counterattack in response to

the Vice President's address. The Times accused Agnew of describing student dissenters with ignorant generalizations and attacked Agnew's antagonism by stating that the students of the day were far more imbued with idealism, a sense of service, and a deep humanitarianism than any generation in recent history, including particularly Mr. Agnew's (Curran 17). Following these comments by the Times, Agnew once again defended his position verbally and in an article which appeared in Time magazine on November the 28th. In his defense Agnew laid the groundwork for a second attack, this time on the newspaper press in Montgomery, Alabama, on November 29, 1969. As his targets he chose the Washington Post and the New York Times (Lucas 128).

In his address Agnew made it known that Katherine Graham, the owner of the Washington Post, also owned Newsweek, one of Washington's four television stations, and an all-news radio station. Agnew also charged her with monopolizing the information being distributed to the public. He criticized the New York Times for not publishing information of those persons in support of Nixon's Vietnam plan, primarily Congress and the Vatican. Agnew managed to pass judgment on two major forms of media, something that had not been done by a high ranking government official in recent times.

Seldom in United States history had scenes such as the ones created by Agnew been witnessed. Not only had Agnew

attacked television and the press as media, but he had directly challenged their commentators and owners. This, in retrospect, was the man from Annapolis they said "abhorred speechmaking" but who now found his speeches preserved, quoted, and reprinted by the hundreds of thousands. There were those who hated him and who shrank from the lash of his tongue. Agnew described his motives for speaking by stating:

The reason I spoke out was because, like the great silent majority, I had had enough. I had endured the didactic inadequacies of the garrulous in silence, hoping for the best but witnessing the worst for many months. And because I am an elected official, I felt I owed it to those I serve to speak the truth (Curran 1).

Statement of the Problem

This inquiry is a rhetorical-critical study of two public speeches delivered by Vice President Spiro T. Agnew during the month of November 1969. The purpose of this inquiry is to discover the extent to which Agnew's rhetoric during this period was influenced by his past and by the reports of the media and how his rhetoric exhibited various methods of rhetorical polarization. Specifically, the study seeks to answer the following questions:

1. To what extent does Agnew's past influence his motives in these specific speeches?

2. To what extent was Agnew's discourse influenced by press criticism of Nixon?
3. To what extent was Agnew's discourse centered around the various methods of rhetorical polarization?

Significance of the Study

The objective of this thesis is to determine how effectively or ineffectively Spiro Agnew dealt with the media through the rhetorical strategies which he employed. The findings of this study can then be used to determine those elements which comprise an effective strategy in dealing with the media in order that other anti-media discourse may also be analyzed. The study of the rhetoric of political-media conflict is needed for several reasons. First, no existing methodology exists in the field of speech communication which deals directly with this genre. It is the intent of this writer to establish a basis on which more research can be done to solidify the foundations for a genre in order for those in the speech communication discipline to better gauge these types of situations.

Second, this study will provide some focus for those parties which participate in the political-media conflict. Currently no research exists concerning the procedures which could be followed in order to resolve conflict of this nature, but much research has been conducted concerning ethics and morality. By focusing on procedure this study can

provide information to aid in the resolution of conflict. In this manner, the issues of ethics and morality may be communicated more effectively and orderly.

Third, this study will seek to suggest further links to research conducted in political science on public administration.¹ There already is a body of literature in rhetorical theory on the subject of presidential rhetoric, but by examining the conflict rhetoric used by Agnew, this study may clarify other important connections between political and rhetorical theory research.

Scope of the Study

This analysis examines two speeches delivered by Spiro T. Agnew during the early portion of his term as vice president. In doing so this rhetorical inquiry intends to construct a biographical account of the man Spiro T. Agnew, to reconstruct the context in which the discourse took place, and to conduct a critical survey of the speeches to be studied. Thus, the three-fold concentration of this thesis will develop an entire overview of the subject and provide outcomes. It is the intention of this researcher to exclude other speeches and public addresses delivered by Agnew in order to focus on those elements which are central in establishing Agnew's rhetorical position in his dealing with the news media. Even though other items are related to this area of research, those other than the two speeches being

analyzed do not constitute the core of Agnew's anti-media rhetoric.

Survey of the Literature

In order to evaluate the conflict which originated between Spiro T. Agnew and the media in November of 1969, it is essential to consult sources which have had significant impact on this topic. Therefore, the following is a review of those sources which this researcher believes contributed to this subject matter in the following areas: biographical accounts, scholarly studies concerning Agnew's discourse, and a review of seminal works concerning the realm of political-media conflict.

General Biographies

Most biographies of Spiro T. Agnew are dominated by the events of 1973 and 1974 concerning the downfall of the Nixon Administration and the resignation of Vice-President Agnew. Two biographies proved to be most helpful. Spiro Agnew: Spokesman For America, by Robert Curran, served as a guide concerning the origins, the early ambitions, and the setbacks which contributed to Agnew's meteoric rise to prominence and his precipitous fall from the vice-presidency. Agnew: Profile In Conflict, by Jim G. Lucas, explored in depth the background of Spiro T. Agnew including his Greek heritage, his childhood mannerisms, his educational experiences, and

his entry and rise into politics. Lucas provides a great deal of information which should lend aid in the construction of the psyche of Agnew and how this related to the political philosophy which he chose to adopt.

Scholarly Works

Although Spiro T. Agnew became a primary focus of controversy during the late 1960s, only two major pieces of scholarly work have been compiled concerning the former vice-president. One must remember that other events, such as the deaths of Robert F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr., the student uprisings, the campaign of 1968, the Chappaquiddick incident, and the war being fought in Vietnam, were very heavy on the minds of the American people. Therefore, it is the position of this researcher that the scarcity of research done on this topic is not an indicator of its insignificance but rather that it has been overshadowed by other happenings of the time.

Although the following dissertations concern themselves with the same subject as this study, it is essential to point out that the speeches being analyzed in this thesis are entirely different as is the method for analysis. Therefore, the present research supplements rather than duplicates these previous studies.

In 1972, Elbert E. Elliott's dissertation, The Rhetoric of Spiro T. Agnew: A Study of Political Conflict, concluded

that Agnew did not cause a division between the media and politics but rather fell into a gap which already existed. Elliott also revealed that Agnew was most controversial in defacing the office of the Vice President and not in the media conflict of which he was a part. Another conclusion was that Agnew may have been for many a prototype of the father authority which gave to some people a sense of security for the future, to others a feeling of fear, and to others a feeling of anger.

Mary Helen Copelin's 1974 dissertation, An Analysis of the Logical and Ethical Foundations of the Rhetoric of Spiro T. Agnew in Attacking the Mass Media Through a Systematic Analysis of the Evidence, concluded that Agnew's rhetorical strength was found in his style rather than the substance of his speeches. His conclusions were often well drawn, but the Vice President frequently had trouble with the progression of his arguments. Copelin's research indicated that he was a victim of himself rather than some insidious desire to deceive.

Although the previous two dissertations represent the body of scholarly work dealing with Agnew, one cannot ignore other works concerning the area of Presidential Rhetoric. Presidential scholars such as Theodore Windt, of the University of Pittsburgh, Kathleen Hall Jamieson, formerly with the University of Texas, and Roderick Hart, presently with the University of Texas have managed to compile a body

of knowledge which has become for many the backbone of Presidential Rhetoric today.

Political-Media Conflict

In 1961, the first major piece of work concerning the press and government conflict was published. Francis E. Rourke, in Secrecy and Publicity: Dilemmas of Democracy, stated that critics of government information activity often draw a picture of newsmen as the unwilling victims of government propaganda. Often, however, newspapers themselves are so anxious to get the inside story from official sources on an issue that they will become willing collaborators in the process by which government influences public opinions. In early 1971, Daniel P. Moynihan published "The Presidency and the Press," in which he mounted a blistering attack on the press for the problems it had caused the presidents and how the press blamed the White House for not taking responsibility for its actions, when in fact the press, according to Moynihan, was trying to avoid its own responsibilities. Also in 1971, the widely circulated T.V. Guide ran a series of articles which criticized the media for their role in government policy and recommended that government take immediate action to halt the press. In 1973, many of Richard Nixon's private papers were released. In them it was made clear the Nixon administration had declared an all out war on the media in order to restore public belief

in the White House. This statement will be analyzed later in this investigation.

In 1964, Theodore H. White published his work on the presidency, The Making of the President. In writing this book White somewhat tarnished his record. He stated, in a memorandum to the White House, that he would remain favorable as long as he acquired the information from the White House needed to complete his work. This revelation again reveals some tension between the press and the government, with the press still having the upper hand. It is obvious from White's statement that in certain situations the press has the upper hand and often sets the agenda. David Halberstam, in 1972, wrote The Best and the Brightest in which he pointed out how Kennedy actually had made changes in articles about the White House after they had gone to press. It is evident that Kennedy knew and respected the power of the press or he would not have concerned himself with the last minute alterations.

Richard E. Newstadt, in 1980, released Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership from F.D.R. to Carter. He argued that whatever becomes public about the president affects the success of efforts to strengthen the President's capacity to govern. Newstadt's book is by far the seminal piece of the 1980s, primarily because he recognizes the press as a major player in the shaping of government policy and politicians. In 1962, several papers by Kennedy were

released to the public expressing Kennedy's view of the media. Kennedy stated that each morning the press seemed to worsen its opinion on politics (Speer 97). These papers in and of themselves made it clear that the press did have a significant impact on the White House, and that the President could not overlook their doings.

David Wise, William McGaffin, and Barry Sussman all had releases in 1968 concerning the conflict in Vietnam. They each wrote in depth accounts of how the White House used the press to set the war agenda and how the press used its power to criticize the government. The authors believed the press was on the right side of the fence because the White House by this time was not a good source of information. These authors argued that the idea of checks and balances between the press and government rested primarily with the press. In 1968, several articles were also written by Patrick Anderson which highlighted the media's responsibilities. He stated that the press viewed politicians as demons using the media to spread trouble world wide. Anderson believed that the press should not only serve as gatekeepers for themselves but gatekeepers over the government itself. David Barber, in 1972, also stated in one of many publications that media proclamations mislead the public into believing that the right way was the press' way and that the President should abide by what the media persuaded the public to believe.

In 1966, Pierre Salinger released his report compiled for Kennedy in 1960 concerning the assessment of the press corps. Salinger stated that he would, in advance, brief the corps on what could be expected and it, in turn, would reveal questions. This, Salinger felt, was one of only a few ways of keeping negative connotations associated with the President out of the news, and keeping the good items in. Bernard Rubin in 1977 released Media, Politics, & Democracy which investigates the impact of social beliefs on the Press-White House conflict. He stated that the public was ruler of all including the Press-White House conflict itself. In 1978, Vermont Royster, in his article "Reflections on the Fourth Estate," made it clear that the writer's position, concerning the media's portrayal of politics, should be neither offensive nor defensive but neutral. He received little recognition.

The previously reviewed literature proved to be most helpful and of very high quality. The authors and titles reviewed are well known and well respected in their fields and the information that was provided proved itself invaluable. A problem with availability did arise though. Many of the materials utilized were either out of print or not in any local library. Therefore, many items had to be ordered or borrowed and the waiting period resulted in many time constraints.

Methods and Procedures

The primary method selected for this inquiry is the traditional or Neo-Aristotelian approach. The Neo-Aristotelian method requires a critic to describe and analyze all aspects of the historical and rhetorical elements that surround a rhetorical act (Brock and Scott 59). This method of analysis was the first formal method of criticism developed in the field of speech communication, and its origins are based upon Aristotle's Rhetoric, along with other classical works. The components of this method were originally intended to teach others effective speech and were not intended to analyze discourse. However, over time, scholars such as Herbert A. Wichelns realized the application of Aristotle's work to the evaluation of discourse. Wichelns' reasoning was that if Rhetoric was a tool used to teach speaking then its components could also constitute criteria for evaluating effectiveness in discourse.

The Neo-Aristotelian analysis intends to construct a megapicture of discourse by also analyzing the rhetor and the context of the discourse and not just the rhetoric itself. From this picture connections are made to the discourse and relevant conclusions are drawn.

The following outline attempts to identify the major topics with which the traditional or Neo-Aristotelian critic is concerned in analyzing and evaluating discourse and suggests the kinds of questions which the traditional critic

asks about each of these topics. Critics, even advocates of traditional approaches such as Neo-Aristotelianism, often differ markedly in their procedure. This outline should thus be taken as representative of the Neo-Aristotelian approach to criticism rather than as a description of what every traditional critic does.

Part One:

Placing the Speech in a Meaningful Context²

- I. The speech is the product of a speaker
 - A. Who is this speaker?
 1. Relevant general biographical information
 2. Speaker's education
 3. Speaker's speech training
 - B. What is the relationship of this speech to the speaker's work, to the course of his life?
 1. Relationship to his long-range goals and activities
 2. Relationship to other speeches or writing
 3. Relationship to his immediate activity surrounding the preparation and presentation of this speech
 - C. What is his experience and practice as a speechmaker?
 1. His habits of speech preparation
 2. His habits of speech delivery

3. Did he articulate a theory of or venture opinions about speechmaking?
- II. A speech is part of and can only be understood in terms of its context, i.e., the political, social, and intellectual background from which it arises and which in turn it may affect.
- A. Of what series of events is the speech a part?
 - B. More particularly, where does the speech seem to fit in the sequence of immediate events of which it is a part?
- III. A speech is ordinarily directed to a specific audience which should be analyzed in order to better understand the speech.
- A. What type of speech is it? Political? Forensic? Occasional or ceremonial? Lecture?
 - B. Who comprises the immediate audience to which the speech is directed? The larger audience the speaker may be addressing?
 1. What are the attitudes of the audience toward the speaker?
 2. What are the attitudes of the audience toward the subject and/or purpose of the speech?
 - C. By what influences other than the speech is the audience affected?
 1. Previous speeches or events?

2. Features of the situation in which the speech was delivered?
- D. To what extent can the immediate audience be termed the "real" audience of the speech? Is there evidence to indicate that the speaker's purpose is to express himself or to get his ideas "on the record" in spite of the immediate audience?

Part Two:

Analyzing the Speech Itself

- I. Is the text of the speech authentic?
 - A. What is the source of the text?
 - B. Are there other texts of the speech?
- II. What ideas are expressed in the speech?
 - A. What position or thesis is propounded in the speech?
 1. Identify the speaker's stand in relation to the issue discussed and the audience
 2. Outline the major ideas as they are developed chronologically in the speech
 3. Outline the major ideas logically: are they coherent? Do they "fit" into a unified whole?
 - B. What is the purpose of the speech, either stated or implied?

- C. Are there any fundamental assumptions or premises upon which the ideas of the speech seem to rest?
- D. What is the relation of the ideas in this speech to the general thought of the speaker?

III. The canons or topics treated in traditional (classical) rhetorical theory provide a method of gaining insight into the speech.

- A. Invention: how are the ideas given substance which will make them effective?
 - 1. Argument: logical appeal or logos
 - a. Basic features of argument are:
 - (1) The thing to be proved, the conclusion
 - (2) The basis of proof, the evidence
 - (3) The relationship between the conclusion and its basis, the reasoning
 - b. The standard forms of proof or argument are:
 - (1) Inductive reasoning, including argument from example, from statistics, and by comparison
 - (2) Deductive reasoning, including the traditional or "dialectical" syllogism and the forms it takes in

rhetorical discourse, the enthymeme
and the epichyreme

- c. What kinds of argument did the speech advance, upon what premises were they based, how were they developed?
2. Non-logical appeals: emotional proof or pathos
 - a. Classical writers spoke of "putting the audience into the proper frame of mind." Modern writers speak of motivating the audience by recognizing their basic human needs, cultural values, and attitudes.
 - b. What elements of the speech were designed to motivate the audience by appealing to their emotions, needs, values, and attitudes?
 3. Persuasion based on the audience's perception of the speaker's character: source credibility or ethos.
 - a. Ethos is based on the personal qualities which the audience attributes to the speaker.
 - b. How did the two kinds of ethos operate in this speech?

- (1) Extrinsic ethos, or the speaker's prior reputation
 - (2) Intrinsic ethos, or the perception of the speaker as a person that is created by the speech itself
- B. Disposition: does the organization of the parts of the speech enhance or inhibit the speech's effectiveness?
1. Are the qualities of an orderly speech apparent: clarity? coherence? unity? emphasis?
 2. Are the traditional "parts" of the speech apparent: introduction? development? (overall pattern of the speech and effective ordering of the elements of the speech within the overall pattern) conclusion?
 3. Are structural elements of the speech used effectively: transitions? recapitulations? devices for making the organization of the speech apparent such as "signposting?"
- C. Style: is the language of the speech effective?
1. Does the language of the speech exemplify the traditional qualities of good style-- correct? clear? appropriate to the speaker, the audience, the occasion, and the subject matter? pleasingly embellished?

2. What stylistic devices are used in the speech and to what extent do they seem to add to its effectiveness? These include metaphor, attitude of the speaker (irony, invective, objectivity) and rhythm.
- D. Delivery: is it possible to determine the matter and the effectiveness of the way in which the speech was presented?
1. Mode of presentation--manuscript, impromptu, extemporaneous?
 2. Physical activity, including general bearing?
 3. Use of voice?
- IV. What were the effects of the speech?
- A. What were the immediate effects?
1. Any tangible evidence concerning audience response?
 2. Any comment or analysis of the speech from observers writing at the time?
- B. What were the ultimate effects of the speech?
1. Has there been subsequent comment by other critics and writers?
 2. How does the speech fit into subsequent history? Do subsequent events seem to justify or deny the speaker's endeavor?

The two speeches to be analyzed and criticized in this study were selected because they represent both the initial occasion upon which Agnew stated his position and a full explanation of his position. Although he repeated his charges on a number of other occasions, no new arguments were initiated on these occasions.

The speeches to be analyzed and criticized are:

November 13, 1969

Address before the Midwest Regional Republican Committee Meeting

Des Moines, Iowa

November 29, 1969

Address before the Montgomery Chamber of Commerce
Montgomery, Alabama

These two speeches may be said to contain, in a condensed version, Vice President Agnew's views of the unelected elite, the media. A careful analysis of the speeches, then, should provide insight not only into the specific conflict with the media that was promoted in November, 1969, but also into the broader genre of conflict rhetoric.

Plan of Reporting

Chapter II will discuss information relevant to the man Spiro T. Agnew, as prescribed by the Neo-Aristotelian approach. Chapter III of this study will place the relevant discourses in a meaningful context in order that one might better relate to them in their original settings. Chapter IV will investigate and analyze the texts according to the stated methodology. Finally, conclusions regarding the study and the method utilized will be discussed in Chapter V.

NOTES

¹ This method was constructed primarily by the communication faculty and doctoral students at the University of Pittsburgh.

² For greater clarity the rhetor in this methodology will be referred to in the male gender and in no way intends to overlook other options.

CHAPTER BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Agnew, Spiro T. "The Newspaper Monopoly-Censorship: A Two Way Street." Vital Speeches 36 (Fall 1969): 133-135.
- . "Television News Coverage-Network Censorship." Vital Speeches 36 (Fall 1969): 98-100.
- . "Acceptance Speech." Vital Speeches 38 (Summer 1970): 710-711.
- . Frankly Speaking. Washington D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1970.
- Andrews, James R. "The Rhetoric of Coercion and Persuasion: The Reform of 1932." Quarterly Journal of Speech 56 (1970): 187-195.
- Aristotle. Rhetoric. Trans. W. Rhys Roberts. New York: Modern Library, 1954.
- Bennett, Gordon C. "The Heckler and The Heckled In The Presidential Campaign of 1968." Communication Quarterly 27 (1969): 28-37.
- Bowers, John W., and Donovan J. Ochs. The Rhetoric of Agitation and Control. Boston: Wesley Publishing Co., 1971.

- Brock, Ronald L., and Robert L. Scott. Methods of Rhetorical Criticism. Detroit: Wayne State UP, 1980.
- Campbell, Karlyn K. Critiques of Contemporary Rhetoric. Belton: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1972.
- Cohen, Richard M., and Jules Witcover. A Heartbeat Away. New York: Viking Press, 1974.
- Congressional Quarterly. Nixon: The First Year of His Presidency. Washington: Washington Press, 1970.
- Copelin, Mary H. "An Analysis of the Logical and Ethical Foundations of the Rhetoric of Spiro T. Agnew In Attacking the Mass Media Through a Systematic Analysis of the Evidence." Diss. University of California, Los Angeles, 1974.
- Curran, Robert. Spiro Agnew: Spokesman For America. New York: Lancer Books, 1970.
- Elliott, Elbert E. "The Rhetoric of Spiro T. Agnew: A Study of Political Controversy." Diss. Southern Illinois University, 1972.
- Foss, Sonja K. Rhetorical Criticism: Exploration and Practice. Prospect Heights: Waveland Press, 1989.
- Goldstein, Joel K. The Modern American Vice Presidency. California Princeton VP, 1982.
- Hart, Roderick P. "Absolutism and Situation: Prolegomena to a Rhetorical Biography of Richard M. Nixon." Communication Monographs 43 (Fall 1976): 204-228.

- James, Fred B. Spiro T. Agnew. Boston: Wadsworth, 1971.
- Jamieson, Kathleen Hall. Eloquence In An Electronic Age.
Oxford U.P., Oxford, 1988.
- Jamieson, Kathleen, and Karlyn K. Campbell. The Interplay of
Influence. Baltimore: Wadsworth, 1983.
- Kennedy, John F. "The Responsibility of the Press." Vital
Speeches 23 (Spring 1960): 174-175.
- Knappman, Edward W. Presidential Election 1968. New York:
Facts on File, 1970.
- Light, Paul C. Vice-Presidential Power. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins VP, 1984.
- Lowry, Dennis T. "Agnew and the TV News: A Before/After
Content Analysis." Journalism Quarterly 47 (Fall 1973):
205-210.
- Lucas, Jim G. Agnew: Profile In Conflict. New York: Award
Books, 1970.
- Mardon, Fred S. "Can Public Confidence Be Restored." Time
107 (1973): 9-17.
- Meyer, Timothy P. "Agnew Meets the Student Dissenters: An
Experimental Study of Ego Involvement and Argumentation."
Journal of Communication 22 (Spring 1969): 263-276.
- Nixon, Richard M. The Memoirs of Richard Nixon. New York:
Grosset and Dunlap, 1978.
- Osborne, John. The First Two Years of the Nixon Watch. New
York: Liveright, 1971.

- Quimby, Rollin W. "Agnew's Plea Bargain: Between Rhetorics of Consensus and Confrontation." Central States Speech Journal 28 (1971): 163-172.
- Spear, Joseph C. Presidents and the Press. Boston: MIT Press, 1984.
- Stewart, Charles. Persuasion and Social Movements. Illinois: Waveland press, 1984.
- Vexler, Robert. The Vice-Presidents and Cabinet Members. Oceana Publications: New York, 1975.
- Wichelns, Herbert A. "Analysis and Synthesis in Argumentation." Quarterly Journal of Speech 11 (1965): 266-272.
- Windt, Theodore, and Beth Ingold. Essays In Presidential Rhetoric. 2nd ed. Dubuque: Kendall Hunt, 1987.

CHAPTER II

FOUNDATION OF AGNEW'S PERSPECTIVE: PREPARATION FOR A VERBAL VICE PRESIDENT

Spiro T. Agnew's arrival on the scene as a controversial political figure may seem like a brief journey of accumulated accidents and luck which occurred at just the correct moment to put him into position for the next ascending step. It may be true that Agnew arrived at the Office of Vice President as a result of unusual circumstances; however, after careful examination of the available material, it is evident that Agnew did not become a controversial figure by accident. It seems a fair assessment to conclude that Agnew planned ahead of time to say the things he said. It is public knowledge that he prepared carefully, either by himself or with the assistance of his aides, his most controversial speeches. It was reported that after he became Vice President, he rewrote parts of his speeches and inserted many of the key response-arousing words and phrases after his ghost writers had finished with them. This is unique in that normally it is thought that substantive material is usually written or researched by one's staff.

Agnew's appreciation for certain American traditions and values seemed to have been accepted from his early environment and training. Agnew insisted that through the years he had not changed his basic positions. Rather, he had been seen against different political and social backgrounds, ran against different types of candidates, and appeared to have changed more than he actually did. In order to gain as much insight as possible into the inner world of Agnew, it is necessary to inquire into his childhood environment and to make an evaluation about the effects of his early training upon him.

Childhood and Youth

Spiro Theodore Agnew was born on November 9, 1918, in Baltimore, Maryland (Moritz 3). In 1897, at twenty-one years of age, Agnew's father, Theodore Spiro Anagostopoulos, came to this country from Greece. After arriving in the United States, he shortened the family name twice from Anagostopoulos to Agnost and finally to Agnew (Lucas 9). Agnew's father was first a barber, then he owned and operated a lunchroom and finally a restaurant. The elder Agnew married Margaret Akers Pollard, the young widow of a veterinarian, Dr. William Pollard. Spiro Agnew was the only child born to them. Agnew's mother, however, had had one son by her previous marriage. Thus, Agnew has a half-brother, W. Roy Pollard ("Official Biography" 2).

Agnew described his relationship with his father and their family life style when he told David Frost, "He was no pal; he was the authority in the family" (Schlesinger 5). This was not meant as criticism, for another time Agnew said of his father, "I am proud to say that I grew up in the light of my father. My beliefs are his, and my father believed deeply in America" (Van DerLinden 126).

Ten years after the birth of Agnew the great depression hit the country, and the Agnew family, as well as millions more, felt the pressure of tight money. The Agnews eventually lost both their restaurant and their house, so they moved to an apartment. During the depression the two boys, Spiro and Roy, peddled vegetables in the streets of Baltimore. Even in the midst of great financial difficulty the elder Agnew was able to save a little money and at the close of the depression was able to go into the restaurant business again (Lucas 12).

It is difficult to assess the psychological effects of the depression upon Agnew. Times were tough, but he saw his father regain his business through diligent work and frugality. It should be noted, however, that the economy of the whole country was recovering at the same time, so hard work alone may not account for his recovered success.

Academic Career

Spiro Agnew's academic career was not what might be called outstanding; in fact, it was rather mediocre. Speaking about his early academic career at an American Legion dinner in October, 1968, he said, "I was more interested in a good time than in studying" (Wills 58). He attended the Baltimore Public Grade School 69, Garrison Junior High School, Park Hill School, and graduated in 1937 from Forest Park High School. Upon graduation from high school, he entered Johns Hopkins University with the intention of studying chemistry. At the end of the third year he switched, due to inadequate grades, from chemistry to law and went to night school at the University of Baltimore. In order to earn enough money to get through school, he worked at the Maryland Casualty Company in the day and went to school in the evening ("Official Biography" 2).

Work and a Wife

While working at the Maryland Casualty Company he met an employee there named Elinor Isabel Judefind, the nineteen-year-old daughter of W. Lee Judefind, Ph.D., from Johns Hopkins University and Vice-President of the Davison Chemical Company (Lucas 14). Instead of going to college, Elinor went to work for the Maryland Casualty Company for eleven dollars a week. In November of 1940, she met Spiro Agnew. They became engaged, but their wedding plans were postponed

because Agnew had to go into the army. Years later, Mrs. Agnew remembered that she had to finish paying for her engagement ring, because, like many soldiers, his salary was too small. As a young soldier, Agnew went to Officers Candidate School in Fort Knox, Kentucky, and graduated on May 23, 1942, as a second lieutenant. Four days later he and Judy were married (Shearer 5).

After their marriage Agnew was stationed at Fort Knox for a while until he was transferred to Fort Campbell, Kentucky. Shortly before the arrival of their first child, Pam, Agnew was sent overseas. He was sent first to England and then was assigned to invasion forces at Metz, France, with the Fifth Armored Infantry Battalion in the 10th Combat Command 'B' (Lucas 16). The "Official Biography" from the Vice President's office says he was a Company Commander with the 10th Army Division. An enemy bullet hit the side of his neck, and he was awarded the Combat Infantryman's Badge (Van Derlinden 126). Evidently many men involved in minor circumstances have received this medal, because no one has made much of Agnew winning it.

Spiro Agnew returned home, and in December, 1945, he enrolled once again in law school. This time he worked for Smith and Barrett, a Baltimore law firm (Van Derlinden 126). Sources showed that Agnew worked his way through law school with the help of the G.I. Bill.

Randy, the Agnew's second child, arrived in 1946 (Van Derlinden 126). Two other children were born to them, Susan in 1947 and Kimberly in 1955. This meant that there were four children in the family before Agnew graduated with his law degree from Baltimore University in 1947. The year of 1947 was both a good and bad year for the Agnew family. It was a bad year, for failure followed him. He opened his own private practice, and he does not remember having even one client (Lucas 17). Because of his failure in private practice, he took a job as a claims adjuster for the Luberman Mutual Insurance Company. In that year, however, he made a decision which was to effect his entire life. Agnew shifted from the Democratic Party and registered as a Republican for the first time (Schlesinger 5).

Another interference in his career came when he, as many other young men in the reserves, was recalled during the Korean conflict. Although he did not go overseas, it upset the family's financial progress, and they had to sell their home. After a year Agnew was discharged, and he looked for work again.

This time he found a job as an assistant personnel director for a Baltimore grocery chain, Schreiber Brothers (Lucas 18). There was some debate as to the status of his position. Different sources placed varying degrees of importance to this job. He may even have filled in as a food checker. It was reported by James Lucas that while working

for Schreiber Brothers one of Agnew's tasks had been to negotiate with two unions, the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO (Lucas 19). This seemed to indicate that Agnew was not a regular clerk. In this particular case working as a common clerk may have been a real asset, for it may have helped him to understand the deep feelings, attitudes, and tensions of the middle-class American. It was possible that when, as Vice President, he addressed thousands of Americans his insight in analyzing their feelings went back to the time when he identified himself with the generalization which might be called middle America.

A judge named Herbert Moser was on the board of directors for Schreiber Brothers at the same time that Agnew worked for that company, and Judge Moser liked Agnew and helped him get a position with an attorney named Karl Steinmann. Somehow this did not work out well, and Moser again helped him get a job with a research group working with the court of appeals rules committee. At the same time Agnew opened a small private law practice and did fairly well the first year (Lucas 19). His practice increased, and he moved into Baltimore County, first to Lutherville and then to Towson. During this time he worked as an attorney for the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO. This association lasted until Agnew became Baltimore County Executive (Lucas 22). Some of the members

in this union were fishermen on the Chesapeake Bay, many of whom were black, and Lucas reported that Agnew did a great deal for them. He said the Negro boatmen (local 315 at Kilmarnock, Virginia) thought so highly of Agnew they purchased a piece of waterfront property and offered to build him a home there. Agnew was touched but politely refused (Lucas 25).

About the same time Agnew also became vice president and president of several civic organizations, among them the Lock Raven Kiwanis, the Lock Raven Inter-Community Association, the Lock Raven Elementary School PTA, and the Rodgers Force High PTA. Evidently he was very efficient in PTA work and was able to stir enthusiasm in other members for school projects (Lucas 17).

Entry into Politics

In the early 1950s, Agnew started working seriously in Republican politics. James P. S. Devereux was campaigning for a seat in the House of Representatives and Agnew was a precinct worker (Lucas 25). Later Agnew worked to change the local form of government from a Board of Commissioners to a County Executive and a Council.

Agnew's first opportunity to enter politics came in 1958 when he served on the county zoning board as the representative of the minority party. During this time he challenged certain inappropriate board actions by the

majority party, and when time came for his reappointment, the board voted five to two not to reappoint him. Again the time was right. In 1958, Michael J. Birmingham, who was alleged to be the Democratic boss of Baltimore County, permitted Christian Kahl to run as the Democratic candidate for the office of County Executive. It seemed that Kahl did not please Birmingham, because in 1962 Birmingham attempted to gain the Democratic nomination for the office of County Executive for himself. Evidently he had lost a great deal of influence, for the party split, and there was a heavy shift to the Republican candidate Spiro Agnew (Wills 58). Agnew was the only Republican candidate, so he was not required to compete in a primary. The evidence showed that the largest contributing factor in Agnew's victory was a split in the Democratic Party. Another factor which no doubt helped him was his reputation as a reformer who possibly could smash the traditional political machine (O'Mara 176). Despite substantial odds against him, Agnew was the first Republican in 100 years to be elected head of Baltimore County (Curran 26).

One of the most difficult problems which Agnew faced was race relations. Although most of the public places in Baltimore County, which was ninety-five percent white, were integrated, the Gwynn Oak Amusement Park was not. In dealing with the situation Agnew took a firm but tactful stand on property rights and was able to convince the owners to

integrate. While some of the leaders in the civil rights movement felt that Agnew was more concerned with avoiding liability than showing real concern (Curran 28), it should be noted that he got the job done without trouble.

Since Baltimore County had almost four Democrats to every one Republican it seemed a safe conclusion that many Democrats voted against Birmingham ("Official Biography" 2). Before the next election, in 1966, Birmingham died, and the county Democratic Party was able to unite. With a united Democratic Party the chances of Agnew being re-elected were rather slim (Wills 58).

Campaign for Governor

Again the time was right, and Agnew seized a unique opportunity in 1966. It was evident to Agnew that the Democratic Party at the state level was in for a civil war. Several Democratic candidates wanted to run for Governor of Maryland. Agnew had filed as a Republican candidate in April and easily won the nomination. Compared to Mahoney, the tarnished Democratic nominee, Agnew appeared as an angel. Even those who ran against Mahoney in the primary would not support him openly. One man, to Mahoney's dismay, endorsed him. This was Xavier Edwards, who claimed to be the imperial wizard of the Ku Klux Klan of Maryland. Mahoney accused Agnew's campaigners of getting Edwards to make this claim and endorsement (Lucas 35).

The campaign became verbally vicious as each accused the other of being a racist and unfit for office. Mahoney even claimed that his life had been threatened. Agnew resented the suggestion made by the Mahoney campaigners that their candidate's life had been threatened because of his political ideologies. He also resented their attempt to get the voters to associate the assassination of John F. Kennedy with the threat upon Mahoney's life for trying to defend people's private homes (Lucas 42).

In the end the election was not very close. Agnew won by 81,755 votes (Curran 29). Fifty percent of the votes went to Agnew and forty percent to Mahoney. Agnew, it seemed, got most of the black votes because of the stand which Mahoney took against open housing rather than any overt stand which Agnew took. Agnew was the fourth Republican governor of Maryland in this century, and he was only the fifth Republican governor in Maryland's history ("Official Biography" 3). Eileen Shanahan, in an article for the New York Times, gave a rather obvious reason for Agnew's victory which aids in clarifying a complicated election:

A new alliance of poor Negroes, Jews of all economic classes and other, high-income whites has created a pro-civil rights majority in the state of Maryland.

This was the explanation given by a political scientist today for the decisive victory won in the

race for the governorship of Maryland by Spiro T. Agnew, a Republican moderate.

Mr. Agnew defeated George P. Mahoney, a Democrat, who had campaigned almost exclusively on the theme of opposition to enforced desegregation of housing (Shanahan 50).

One may say that Agnew's position remained conservative but seemed rather moderate compared to that of Mahoney. Those who voted for Agnew did not necessarily hold a position near his. It probably meant that they were afraid of Mahoney and preferred a new name not connected with the traditional political machine. On November 8, 1966, Agnew was elected Governor of Maryland, and on January 25, 1967, he was inaugurated.

Reactions to Agnew as Governor

There was a diversity of opinion concerning the abilities and accomplishments of Agnew as governor. The "Official Biography" recorded, no doubt with a certain bias, some of the positive contributions of his administration:

In the 19 months before Richard Nixon chose him to be his Vice Presidential running mate, the Agnew State Administration reformed Maryland's income tax structure, adopting a graduated basis and substantially increasing the share for local governments, particularly the City of Baltimore;

provided the first state aid to local law enforcement in the nation; enacted the first statewide fair housing legislation south of the Mason-Dixon line; launched comprehensive air and water pollution control programs financed by a \$130,000,000 bond authorization; initiated prison reforms; revised the financing of highways to accelerate construction; created a survey of State operations by a group of private businessmen which recommended economies expected to total \$74 million annually when fully implemented ("Official Biography" 3).

One man who had a different view about the Agnew accomplishments was the Reverend Robert T. Newbold, who carried great influence with the religious community in Maryland. Newbold helped Agnew while he was running for Governor by introducing him to several important groups. Newbold said:

At this point I was greatly impressed that this was a very smart man, a man of great integrity. As a matter of fact I said to him that I was seeing what I thought I'd never see, an honest politician, and that this was very refreshing. Well, he got elected.

(Curran 29)

When Newbold was asked his opinion after Agnew's term of service he answered, "Mr. Agnew provided me with one of the greatest disappointments in my life" (Curran 29). It is difficult to know what Newbold expected or why he became so dissatisfied with Agnew. If he expected him to bring in some messianic kingdom then his evaluation is unjust. If, however, he hoped for a swifter movement of civil rights legislation and more interpersonal exchange between the governor and blacks, then he probably had reason to be disappointed. Probably what Newbold had in mind in his statement about Agnew was that Agnew learned the role of a politician very quickly and took advantage of every opportunity to put himself in the limelight. Newbold was certainly correct in one assessment of Agnew's approach. During the campaign Newbold felt that Agnew had not been meeting the people. Theodore Roosevelt McKeldin, the fourth Governor of Maryland, commented about this same problem with Governor Agnew. He said:

Ted just does not like to meet people. As Governor, he refused to attend even the most important city events. When a new president was installed at the Johns Hopkins University--and that happens only once in a decade no more--presidents of other universities and men of influence come from all over America. But not the Governor of Maryland (Wills 59).

It is evident that Agnew was more popular at the beginning of his term than at the end. One of the most evident reasons was the increase in income tax which seldom makes for popularity among the voting public. If anything, it is likely to influence people to vote against one who raised the taxes for they fear that he might get the same idea again if he is granted another term. Another reason that Agnew was less popular at the end of his term than at the beginning concerned conflicts with prominent people, which can be expected when one is in office. This is especially likely to be true when both houses of the legislature are controlled by the opposite political party which was the case during the Agnew administration. But his greatest difficulty, by far, came in his dealings with the black community. At first he seemed to have done quite well. State Senator Clarence Mitchell, III, whose father Clarence, Jr., was the director of the NAACP in Washington, held the following impression of Agnew. "In Agnew's first few months in office he did more in moving in the direction of bettering black-white relations than any other Governor in the state's history" (Curran 32).

The opinions of other blacks who worked with him were not as generous as Mitchell's. Gilbert Ware, the Governor's advisor on race relations and who was himself a black, said:

. . . it was impossible to get him out into the black community. I couldn't get him even into

non-slum areas, except one trip out to Morgan State, which really isn't the black community. And the proper moral tone from the top--you couldn't even get that in the first half of his administration (Curran 33).

Transition to National Prominence

By the end of Agnew's term in office the Democratic party had had time to unite, and the chances of Governor Agnew being returned to office for a second term were relatively slim. Theodore Roosevelt McKeldin, twice Republican Governor of Maryland and former Mayor of Baltimore, said: "Republicans only get into office in Maryland when the Democrats split, and they would not be stupid enough to run another Mahoney in 1970" (Wills 59).

Agnew must have known that his chances of winning again in Maryland in 1970 were rather small; this may have been one of the reasons why he attempted to draft Nelson Rockefeller for the Republican presidential nomination in 1968. If Rockefeller had been elected he could easily have granted Agnew some type of position in the federal government. Perhaps there was even a chance at the Vice Presidency. This idea soured for Agnew when Rockefeller withdrew from the race in March of 1968. Afterward, Agnew began his meetings with Richard Nixon. The evidence suggests that these meetings involved the possibility of Agnew nominating Nixon at the

National Convention and Agnew's debut on the national scene. Eventually, Agnew did nominate Nixon, Nixon selected Agnew as his running mate, and the Republican ticket defeated Democrats Hubert Humphrey and Edmund Muskie in a very close general election in November (Curran 100).

Conclusion

The previous information at a glance may seem to many to serve as a typical biography. However, the purpose is to study the individual as a rhetor and to discover connections between the rhetor's past and his rhetorical effort. The last part of this chapter will make those connections which this author feels are pertinent to this study.

Agnew's early years were filled with continuous downfalls for him and his family. Agnew's family experienced a form of culture shock when relocating to the United States from Greece, and it is evident that the depression of 1929 took its toll on the family business and on the family spirit. At the outset of Agnew's academic, professional, and marital attempts, one witnesses Agnew's downfall to poor grades, menial jobs, and a World War. These events represent only a small portion of Spiro T. Agnew's hardships which may have affected his outlook on life and view of the conflict with the media being studied here. This author contends that all of these elements combine to create a mindset of persuasive influence which Agnew felt he must have. His

drive to succeed and be known may be a direct result of the failings in his past. Although drive is not always a negative force, for Agnew his desire to overachieve might have been his downfall, and his reason for attacking the media.

Second, Agnew's rhetorical training during his terms at the state level prepared him well for national prominence. Many say that Agnew began speech writing at the age of fourteen for politicians in his hometown (Lucas 12). His training as a lawyer probably proved to be his greatest asset during his speech making. His training in informing and persuading oppositions and juries greatly enhanced his use of the major forms of appeal. Without this rhetorical training Agnew might not have been able to move his audiences as he did.

Third, Agnew based his speech making on the philosophy and principles of the American middle class. The fact that Agnew was a family man, a veteran, and a college graduate helped him to identify with those persons supporting his positions and also to create an enemy of those who held opposing beliefs. This identification process helped Agnew create an atmosphere of tension where he could split the public and play them against each other.

Finally, one must discuss Agnew's motive as it relates to his past and pertains to the two speeches to be analyzed. Because motive is hard to identify and sometimes impossible

to prove this writer will only make a single point drawn from items which seem to be obvious in Agnew's past. It is clear that Agnew might be classified within the category of victim of circumstance. Although Agnew often found himself not always in the best position, he somehow managed to work his way through hard times in a manner which often seems non-threatening to many.

CHAPTER BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Curran, Robert. Spiro Agnew: Spokesman for America. New York: Lancer Books, Inc., 1970.
- Curtis, Charlotte. "Judy Agnew - From Obscurity to National Spotlight in 10 Minutes." The New York Times, CXVII, August 9, 1968: 24.
- Moritz, Charles. Current Biography Yearbook 1968. New York: H.W. Wilson Company, 1968.
- "Official Biography," The Vice President of the United States, February 1970. Received by North Texas State University from the Vice President's Office, December 12, 1970.
- O'Mara, Richard. "Discovering Spiro Agnew." The Nation, CCVII, September, 1968: 176.
- "Running Mate's Mate." Time, XCII, August, 1968: 15.
- Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr. "The Amazing Success Story of 'Spiro Who?' The New York Times Magazine, CXIX, July, 1970: 5.
- Shanahan, Eileen. "Maryland Vote Tied to Coalition: Agnew Victory Called Proof of Civil Rights Majority." The New York Times, CXVI, November 10, 1966: 50.

- Shearer, Lloyd. "Judy Agnew - What It's Like Being Married to the Most Controversial Man in America." Sunday Courier and Press, August 9, 1970: 5.
- Van DerLinden, Frank. "Spiro T. Agnew: Vice President Extraordinary," Readers Digest, XCVII, October, 1970: 123-127.
- Wills, Gary. "For God So Loves Spiro Agnew That He Made Him Vice-President," Esquire, LXXI, February 1969: 58.

CHAPTER III

EVENTS PRECEDING THE SPEECHES

It is necessary to connect some rhetorical artifacts with their context to aid in discovering how discourse is formulated. The present chapter attempts to place Agnew's discourse in a proper context in order that his speeches might better be understood.

Jim Lucas states that Agnew exemplified the "old politics," i.e., irrelevant rhetoric and the status quo that the young people were so incensed about. The younger generation attacked this leadership in political and social establishments, colleges, and the Church (Lucas 59). Herbert Klein, Nixon's press agent, said that Agnew's role as Vice President was the formal and traditional role of defense of the President's policies ("T.R.B. from Washington" 8). The Vice President also took every opportunity to preside over the Senate in his constitutional role. His vote in 1969 did ensure adoption of the Nixon Administration's antiballistic missile programs which gained wider attention through a number of speeches on the subject (Encyclopedia Americana, 1971: 336). In hopes of gaining the support of the Great

Silent Majority, Agnew's own tough vocabulary countered the extreme rhetoric of the American Left ("Spiro Agnew: The King's Taster" 17).

After less than nine months in office, Agnew began to launch verbal assaults at opponents of the administration. At a White House news conference on October 15, 1969, Agnew read an excerpt from a letter received the previous day from Premier Pham Van Dong of North Vietnam and addressed to the American people. In the excerpt, the premier refers to a bond between the Vietnamese people and the "United States progressive people," and he encourages these progressive people to fight the aggression of the United States government (U.S. President 1419). At the news conference, Agnew responds to the letter, calling it ". . . a shocking intrusion into the affairs of the American people by an enemy power," and he claims that the letter ". . . reflects a gross lack of understanding on the part of a dictatorial regime of the meaning of free expression and open dissent in a free country" (U.S. President 1420).

During the news conference, Agnew responded to a reporter's question about the link between the North Vietnamese people and students participating in the Vietnam Moratorium March by stating:

. . . I think the letter has a significant effect on the march itself. . . .

I certainly feel it is at the very least incumbent upon them to disassociate themselves with the aims of this North Vietnamese Government, a government which obviously believes that the American people are demonstrating in its own support (Agnew 87).

Agnew concluded that the march participants were associated with the North Vietnamese people, and he assured the reporters that Hanoi certainly felt a relationship with the demonstrators.

Agnew's comments during this news conference established his position and strategy for subsequent confrontations. His remarks illustrate his perception of his role as Nixon's vice president and suggest that he was willing to challenge any and all administration opponents.

The Moratorium

The Moratorium was organized as a nationwide protest against the conflict in Vietnam. These protests ranged from noisy street rallies to silent prayer vigils and involved high school and college students, ministers and priests, and businesspersons. Standard symbols included the following: church bells tolled at regular intervals in several communities; the black armband was worn; the flag was flown at half-staff to show resistance against President Nixon; and motorists drove with their headlights on during the day, as

suggested by the pro-war Committee for Responsible Patriotism (Herbers 18).

Nixon had said that he would not be moved in his policy determination by the Moratorium (Kenworthy 18). Among those who disagreed with the President's statement were former Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey (King 18) and Bill D. Moyers, former press secretary to Lyndon B. Johnson (Bigart 20). The final result of the Moratorium was a true polarization of the people. Herbers said, "If the Moratorium strengthened the 'dove' position on the war, it also seemed to have polarized even further the 'hawkish' position of some conservatives" (18).

Events Preceding the Des Moines Speech

Vice President Agnew's indictment of the networks in his televised speech at Des Moines, Iowa, on November 13, 1969, before the Mid-West Republican Committee, was entitled, "Television News Coverage, Network Censorship." This speech may be seen as a response to television newscasters' instant critical analysis of President Nixon's Vietnam speech, given on November 3, 1969.

Newsweek magazine revealed that the Administration began gathering basic research material for Agnew's Des Moines speech immediately after the President's Vietnam Speech ("Agnew's Complaint" 89). The New Yorker magazine said that Agnew spoke on the subject because many people, including the

President and Vice President, had been bothered by the networks' practice of "instant analysis" of a President's speech (Rovere 165).

Newsweek magazine quoted Alan Roche, a Brandeis University political science professor, who assessed the dangers in television news coverage:

Competitiveness is needed in the news media, because in the last four years television has given one-sided coverage of Vietnam, riots, and the demands of black militants. The danger is from the junior producer level--young, college educated men who decide which film clips to run and which shots of civil rights marches will be used. The vigor of the tapes they produce determines how much time is given to a single project ("Agnew's Complaint" 92).

Roche described the scene in National Review, as follows:

From about 1966 onward, the President and his Administration were "getting the leather." The anti-war groups escalated their rhetoric to a level that would constitute sedition just about any place else in the world. When you turned on television, some militant was calling the President a "murderer," and calling for a revolution. . . . Into this polemical vacuum came Spiro Agnew ("Agnew's Complaint" 878).

Network Criticism of President Nixon's Speech

Commentators' criticisms of President Nixon's Vietnam speech will follow. These will be compared with comments from President Nixon's Vietnam speech, his letter to President Ho Chi Minh of Hanoi, North Vietnam, and Ho Chi Minh's letter in reply. Students of Presidential Rhetoric also may consult the opposing critical essays of Forbes Hill and Robert Newman.

1. Correspondence with Ho Chi Minh. Prior to President Nixon's Vietnam speech, his letter to Ho Chi Minh stated a desire to settle the war at the conference table (Nixon 70a). In his Vietnam speech, President Nixon said that Ho Chi Minh's letter rejected his initiative, instead, it reiterated the public position North Vietnam had taken at Paris (Nixon 67b).

Ho Chi Minh's letter specified these terms to resolve the war: the United States must cease the aggressive war, withdraw its troops from South Vietnam, and let the South make disposition of the war without foreign influence. This would "allow the United States to get out of the war with honor" (Ho Chi Minh 70).

Marvin Kalb, CBS reporter, contradicted the President's statement concerning the above correspondence with Ho Chi Minh. Kalb said there was disagreement over the interpretation that Ho's letter was a rejection of the President's letter. Kalb said there were statements in Ho's

letter that suggested flexibility in negotiations. He further stated that Ho Chi Minh's letter contained "some of the softest, most accommodating language found in a Communist document concerning the war in Vietnam in recent years" ("Agnew vs. the Networks" 27).

2. Challenge to the President as a politician. ABC reporter Bill Lawrence's commentary following President Nixon's speech challenged the language and appeal of the speech. Lawrence said the impact was on those who were moved by words and not by deeds. The appeal was not to the youth who had been causing trouble, but rather to the Silent Majority who presumably had been favorable to the President. Lawrence also stated that the Democrats had talked about a cease-fire to end the war and that President Nixon said nothing about it.

3. The Pentagon line. Another ABC reporter, Bill Downs, asserted that the President was following a Pentagon line. Downs said that the key statement in the President's speech was that the United States' defeat or humiliation in South Vietnam would provoke recklessness among powers who have not abandoned their goals of world conquest. This, according to Downs, was the argument of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the credibility of the American commitment must be honored ("Agnew vs. the Networks" 28).

4. Averell Harriman's criticisms. Governor Averell Harriman, a guest newscaster on ABC, gave his reactions to

President Nixon's speech by saying first that South Vietnam President Thieu was not representative of the people of South Vietnam. Harriman criticized the President's speech for the following omissions: (1) President Nixon said nothing about General Big Minh's proposal of a national convention of all the non-Communist groups and that the United States had been talking to them about the expansion; (2) President Nixon omitted the fact that the United States had expected President Thieu's representative in Paris on November 2; (3) Nixon omitted saying anything about the North Vietnam lessening the fighting in the northern two provinces and that the United States never had a chance to talk about it; (4) the President neglected to say that the North Vietnamese stated that if we wanted to accept the status quo, progress could be made, and (5) the President omitted to say anything about President Thieu's refusal to talk privately and that arrangements had to be made for the four leaders to have private discussions ("Agnew vs. the Networks" 27).

Harriman criticized the President's policy of Vietnamization, whereas President Nixon's speech explained that Vietnamization had begun. Concerning the above omissions, the President indicated there were secret negotiations that were not properly reciprocated (Nixon 68b).

Harriman recommended twice that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the Congress should debate Vietnam. Harriman said that based upon talks with the North Vietnamese

or their colleagues, the Vietcong, they did not want a military take-over of South Vietnam, instead they wanted a settlement. Harriman's opinion of the North Vietnamese representative was that he was a responsible man.

Harriman's disappointment in the President's speech reflected Harriman's disapproval of Nixon's choice of advisors. Harriman's final comment was, "This is not the whole story" ("Agnew vs. the Networks" 28).

Agnew's Des Moines speech responded to the rhetorical situation created in many commentaries and Agnew's response will be further evaluated in chapter four.

Events Preceding the Montgomery Speech

Two weeks after the Des Moines address, on November 29, 1969, Agnew spoke before a friendly audience, the Montgomery, Alabama, Chamber of Commerce, on "Censorship: A Two Way Street." The main theme of this speech was "Newspaper Monopoly." This speech, like the one at Des Moines, was arguably inspired by the White House and represented Nixon's thinking.

In the weeks after Agnew's Des Moines speech, there were several reported criticisms of his comments concerning the television industry. The New Yorker reported that Representative Jacobs, a liberal Democrat from Indiana, professed to find in Agnew's Des Moines speech "a creeping, Socialistic scheme against the free enterprise broadcasting

industry" (Rovere 165). America magazine referred to the "fear voiced by Democratic leader Hubert H. Humphrey that the address could open a Pandora's box of reaction, backlash, and repression ("Television and Vice President Agnew" 519).

The presidents of the three major television networks criticized Agnew's Des Moines speech. Frank Stanton, president of the Columbia Broadcasting System, said the speech was an attempt to intimidate a news medium which depended for its existence upon government licenses. Goodman, president of the National Broadcasting Company, said that Agnew's attack on television news was an appeal to prejudice and that evidently Agnew would prefer television reporting that would be subservient to whatever political group was in authority. Goldenson, president of the American Broadcasting Company, said that ABC news had always been and would continue to be fair and objective. ABC will continue to report the news accurately and fully, and will rely upon the judgment of the American public ("Network Answers to Agnew" 10).

In this context, Agnew set out to discredit his opposition. The following chapter will analyze Agnew's discourse and will demonstrate how he worded and structured his speeches not only to discredit Administration opponents but to glorify the ideals of the Nixon administration.

CHAPTER BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Agnew, Spiro Theodore (1918 -). Encyclopedia Americana;
I, 336.
- "Agnew's Complaint, the Trouble With TV," Newsweek, 74
(November 24, 1969), 88-92.
- "Agnew vs. the Networks: (Network Commentary on President
Nixon's Speech of November 3, 1969)," Weekend
Magazine, New York Post, November 15, 1969, 26-29.
- Bigart, Homer. "Dimensions in City, Lindsay Leads Protest
and Is Met by Jeers as Well as Cheers." The New York
Times, October 16, 1969, 1,2.
- Curran, Robert. Spiro Agnew: Spokesman For America. New
York: Lancer Books, 1970.
- Herbers, John. "Opponents React, Many Show Support by
Flying Flags Full-staff." The New York Times,
October 16, 1969, 1,18.
- Ho Chi Minh. Letter to President Richard Milhous Nixon
dated August 25, 1969, received in Paris on August
30, 1969. Vital Speeches of the Day, 36 (November
15, 1969), 70.
- Kenworthy, E.W. "Protests Staged in Capital as Nixon and
Aides Meet, Thousands Mark Day." The New York Times,
October 16, 1969, 1,18.

- King, Seth S. "A Pledge by Humphrey." The New York Times, October 16, 1969, 1,18.
- "Network Answers to Agnew." U.S. News and World Report, 67 (November 4, 1969), 10.
- Nixon, Richard M. Letter to Ho Chi Minh, dated July 15, 1969. Vital Speeches of the Day, 36 (November 15, 1969), 70. (a)
- Nixon, Richard M. "A Vietnam Plan, The Silent Majority." Vital Speeches of the Day, 36 (November 15, 1969), 66-70. (b)
- Rovere, Richard H. "Letter from Washington." The New Yorker, 45 (November 29, 1969), 165-169.
- "Spiro Agnew: The King's Taster." Time, 94 Summer 1961: 170-174.
- "Television and Vice President Agnew." America, 121 (November 29, 1969), 519.
- "T.R.B. from Washington." The New Republic, 159 (September 1968): 8.
- U.S. President. "Letter from Premier Pham Van Dong," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents. Vol. 5, No. 42. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration, October 20, 1969, pp. 1409-1437. (a)

CHAPTER IV

RHETORICAL ANALYSIS

Agnew's reputation as a controversial Vice President was enhanced greatly by the two speeches dealing with the news media which he delivered in November of 1969. The first speech dealt with television and was entitled "Television News Coverage: Network Censorship." The speech was also called "The Responsibilities of Television," and was delivered at the Midwest Regional Republican Committee in Des Moines, Iowa, on November 13, 1969 (Agnew 62). Agnew's second speech entitled "The Power of the Press" was delivered on November 29, 1969, in Montgomery, Alabama. These two speeches were originally selected because they represent two separate medias which Agnew attacked. However, because of marked similarities, much of these two speeches will be analyzed together.

Television News Coverage

None of the sources studied revealed that Agnew asked for television time. In fact he seemed to question whether his speech would receive any coverage. This was supported by

one sentence in the speech: "Whether what I've said to you tonight will be heard and seen at all by the nation is not my decision, it's not your decision, it's their decision" (Agnew 72). He, of course, was referring to the television networks. Martin Mayer reported that the networks received copies of the speech about four o'clock in the afternoon on the day that the speech was to be delivered. After reading the speech, the networks arranged for the speech to be televised, which may have had an impact on how it was received by the public (Mayer 119).

In the "Television News Coverage" speech, Agnew made six important points. To paraphrase Agnew's six major points: (1) the importance of the news media to this country for the purpose of providing information to its citizens, (2) the presence of bias in reporting and, therefore, media newsmen practicing censorship, (3) the right of citizens to hear from and communicate with the president they elect, (4) the control of the media by only a handful of persons, (5) the new stereotypes created by the media which sought out, overemphasized, and broadcasted the controversial, and (6) the positive action which could be taken by the people of the United States. According to Agnew, the people should press the press for responsible reporting.

The Power of the Press

In his second speech, primarily directed at prominent newspapers, Agnew again structured his arguments through the following five stages: (1) Agnew declared his speech as his right to dissent, meaning his right to disagree; (2) he pointed out his disagreement with censorship as related to biased news slants and news selections; (3) He pointed out apparent monopolies within the news industry; (4) Agnew voiced his opinion on the reaction of youth the Vietnam war; and (5) Agnew introduced a call for a more aware society concerning the issues mentioned. These five items are once again condensed but representative of Agnew's speech structure.

Purpose For Speaking

The chief purposes of Agnew's speaking, as far as the Republican Party was concerned, were to gain votes and to raise money for the Party. Agnew, no doubt, often had these goals in mind, but his purposes seemed to have been more distributed, including the purpose of calling the American people back to more traditional values and beliefs.

The materials studied in this investigation indicated that a number of people on the American scene felt that they really had no part in the decision making process and had no power to alter the direction of national affairs and trends. One of the factors in Agnew's success was the fact that a

large segment of society felt that in Agnew they had a representative, one who would speak out for the values in which they believed. It was a type of identification of Agnew's value system with their own. Agnew seemed well aware of the attitudes and beliefs of the individuals who composed his audience.

Speech Writers

Agnew said he began working on speeches as a lad when he helped his father write some political speeches. He did not, however, mention the fact that his father was a Democrat (Lucas 12).

This study discovered that there were several hypotheses about who wrote Agnew's speeches. Agnew claimed he wrote his own. Mrs. Cynthia Rosenwald, one of Agnew's ghostwriters, admitted working on the speeches but refused to take credit for their effectiveness. She said, "I did the part where the audience went to sleep. The really great lines were always his" ("Agnew's Pungent Quotient" 12). There was, among commentators, fairly general agreement that ghost writers wrote the speeches and Agnew revised them. One reporter said:

Vice President Agnew prefers to write out in long hand many of those remarks that attract national attention and controversy. It is not unusual for his staff to learn for the first time

about such a statement when it suddenly comes out from the boss's office in his own penmanship ("Washington Whispers" 9).

Another commentator reported that Agnew's staff wrote the first drafts of his speeches. Agnew read them, made the desired changes, and added the potent phrases (Curran 135). Those potent phrases were not accidental and were probably one of the most important factors in Agnew's rise to fame and controversy. The phrases were important because the news media could pick these up very quickly and report that Agnew had made some type of controversial statement. The phrases added a note of humor and tended to break the monotony of the news reporting. It seemed that the phrases really became the whole speech for much of the general public. They seemed not to hear what he said between the colorful phrases. Agnew himself admitted:

I suppose if you want to get a point across, you say it in exciting language, and then bland out everything else. . . . Of course if you use punchy language, you're automatically attacked for intemperance. But that risk is counterbalanced by the attention you get for what you say. If you can get your thought through to people, it can be worth the risk (Lucas 79).

Without question, Agnew would have remained in the background and almost unknown if it had not been for the electronic media which, by its coverage, helped to make him famous.

Aspects of Style

Agnew's style was described as both exciting and dull. Hugh Blair defined style as "the peculiar manner in which a man expresses his concepts, by means of language" (Blair 212). Whether Agnew's style was dull or exciting depended upon the listener. His style was characterized by a deliberate and confident delivery. The most distinctive characteristic of his style was the long, tongue-twisted words and phrases. Some of the phrases and words used by Agnew in his media speeches were so powerful that they were later incorporated into the Administration's 1972 campaign ("Spiro Agnew vs. the 'Radic-Libs'" 35). Speaking about his style of using strong words, Agnew once said, "The Vice Presidency is sort of an ancillary job. You're not in the mainstream. . . You have to use strong language to get attention of the sort that lands page one" (source unknown).¹ He also told one British Broadcasting Company interviewer the following:

So, in a desire to be heard, I have to throw them what people in American politics call a little red meat once in a while, and hope that in spite of the damaging context in which those remarks are often

repeated, that others that I think are very important will also appear.

(Osborne 10)

His style was straight forward even with the frills and large words that were incorporated. His delivery was calm, confident, and easy, just as if this type of speaking was expected of a Vice President.

It has become evident through this research that another factor in the rise of Agnew to popularity and controversy was his ability to use wit, humor, and invective. In the past, American politics has been filled with the rough elements of entertaining invective. However, not for a long time had the political arena had anyone with the stature of Agnew who had the ability and power to cut his opponents with serious and humorous invective. Agnew's invective was rarely directed to any person in particular. Instead it was stated in such a way that the audience applied the invective to anyone they wished. But when Agnew's invective was directed, it was aimed directly at individuals whom he called by name or referred to so clearly that his audience immediately knew about whom he was speaking (Appendix A paragraph 6).

Aspects of Delivery

Although one might argue the position that delivery is often equally as important as content in speech delivery, such was not the case with Agnew. Even though Agnew was

articulate, had effective eye gaze, adequate volume, and excellent rate, other areas were lacking considerably. Due to the fact that Agnew delivered his speeches in manuscript style, he often appeared rigid, tense, and unmotivated. One might feel that this type of delivery is indicative of formal speaking, but this researcher contends that in any case, it is not indicative of the best speaking form. Although Agnew's content and style were worthy of study, the same cannot be said of his overall delivery. Agnew's delivery was found to be monotonous, frenetic, and lacking in the correct qualities that must be incorporated into a well rounded presentation.

Use of Proofs

Every speaker uses appeals, whether aware of it or not. Aristotle recognized three modes of persuasion in a speaking situation. The first, ethical proof, is concerned chiefly with the character of the speaker as he presents himself to his audience. The second, logical proof, is concerned with the speaker's understanding of the problem and solutions, the wisdom, and the rationality of his arguments. The third, emotional proof, is concerned with the deep underlying current of feeling which the audience has toward the speaker and his message. It is difficult to divide a speech into these various categories, for frequently the three are interwoven and offered together. One aspect of a speech may

be ethical proof to one person and emotional proof to another depending upon previous experiences and attitudes. It is possible, however, to classify in general terms which of the three types of proof a speaker uses most. Based upon quantity, this study discovered that Agnew's major emphasis was upon logical proof, which will be covered at a later time. He, however, used all three types in both speeches. The wise speaker examines his audience and decides where the emphasis should be placed. This was true with Agnew. The setting of Agnew's speaking, which was presented earlier in this study, indicated the general mood of the nation both in the private and public sectors.

Logos - As mentioned on page seventeen of this study, logos can be defined as argument based upon rational appeals or logical reasoning. Logic is considering and evaluating available information and basing future or present happenings upon that information.

Agnew centered his media speeches primarily upon the use of argument and did so very effectively. His structure of argument, although very basic, was well developed and rather easy to follow. Agnew was clear in presenting the item to be proved, presenting a certain amount of evidence, and then presenting the relationships between his proposal and the information given as support. Often though, this information was not supported and did harm to his credibility, which will be discussed under ethos.

Agnew's use of deductive reasoning, or argument based on examples, statistics, or comparison, seemed to be the foundation for a great number of the arguments. In his Des Moines speech, Agnew justifies the power of the media by a positive example from the past. He declares the potency of the media by citing their impact on disease and social problems (Appendix A paragraph 18). By using this example, his intention was to make his audience aware of the media's impact on society. Also by beginning on a positive remark, Agnew makes his negative remarks seem warranted by his concern and not by some malicious attack. Agnew again strongly negates his opposition by giving examples of the media's role in the 1968 Democratic convention in Chicago. Agnew argues that the media often acts as a catalyst for actions that would otherwise go unnoticed or have little impact. Agnew concludes in both speeches, through example, that the media are more concerned with what sells, not what the most important news is. He states that bad news drives out good news and gives an example of labor crisis being settled without uprisings and marches.

In his Montgomery speech, Agnew drew a rather unique comparison which was extremely intense (Appendix B paragraph 23). Agnew comments on the fact that many had accused him of polarizing the nation by voicing his opinion but points out that others who also voice their opinions, namely those taking part in the moratoriums, receive little or no

criticism from the press. By drawing this comparison, Agnew seems to portray himself as the martyr of his own cause. He goes on to say that it is his duty as a leader to actively use his freedom of speech to make certain that other's rights will be preserved.

Although Agnew's use of statistics is not widely used, it is used effectively to support a rather major occurrence. In both speeches, Agnew mentions the fact that 300 individual congressmen had endorsed Nixon's speech of November the third. By introducing this fact, Agnew mentions that the media had little to say about this statistic and the people who those 300 votes represent.

Even though both of Agnew's speeches contained arguments, it was found that his Des Moines address relied more heavily on the use of logos (Appendix A paragraphs 11,13,18,35). It is believed that this stems from the fact that the Des Moines address was his first primary attack upon the media and needed to be filled with tangible aspects. Although Agnew incorporated the use of deductive reasoning as well, his use of it was somewhat hard to follow. His major premise seems to fall under the realm of media reform and overall better judgment by the gatekeepers. But his conclusions always seem to be directed at a greater moral responsibility by the American citizen. Is the problem Agnew has with what is being printed or how it is being interpreted? This researcher believes both, but by the

manner in which Agnew develops and especially closes his arguments, it is often difficult to tell.

Pathos - Agnew's use of pathos, emotional appeal, was not as prevalent as logos and not employed nearly as well. Agnew seemed to anger the American people into change, as is often done in polarization. If you were not part of his solution then you were part of his problem. Agnew's use of anger seemed to create more enemies for him than it did supporters. Used as a persuasive technique, anger, when used by Agnew, greatly reduced the spectrum to which he could appeal to. He probably lost the attention of those which did not hold his exact views. If he would have appealed to both sides, holding firm but recognizing his opposition through empathy, his use of pathos would have been more mild and more widely accepted.

Agnew portrayed well the typical pathos of any politician. Agnew almost always seemed to formulate a feeling, for some, that America was a great nation undermined by the great evil of the media and that it was our duties as citizens to react properly to this dilemma. Although this was effective use of the enemy device, it was and still is overused. People then and now seem to overlook this procedure as formality. Although done well, it was probably not as effective as Agnew intended it to be.

Ethos - By far, Agnew's use of ethos, speaker credibility, was his weakest form of proof. His extrinsic

ethos, prior reputation, was not known well enough to those nation wide to have had a significant impact. One must remember that Agnew had only been on the national scene one year and remained a political unknown to many. Admittedly, the office of the Vice President had been held in awe but had greatly been reduced by presidents who gave it little recognition.

Agnew's intrinsic ethos, his perception created by the speech itself, was extremely weak. The administration took no credit for the address, Democrats looked at Agnew as a new weak link, and, frankly, Agnew's radicalism scared many into taking another point of view (Osborne 11).

Although Agnew was weak in the above two areas, he did manage to quote and tie in key names and instances such as Churchill and Kennedy's addresses along with a Harris Poll and congressional voting records. These lent aid to his believability and the quality of material that he delivered to the public.

The appeals which Agnew used were related to motivating his audience. As a result of this study it was decided that fear-threat appeals, which are classified under emotional proof, played a significant part in Agnew's speaking. This was especially true during the Des Moines speech in which Agnew's rhetoric bordered the realm of war rhetoric. Terms such as "attack," "challenged," and "bombarded" appear to represent the type of fear threat strategy which Agnew chose

to follow. Threat appeal was the term used by Houland, Janis, and Kelley, now used by Robert Ivie, to refer to those contents of a persuasive communication which allude to or describe unfavorable consequences that are alleged to result, or continue, from failure to adopt and adhere to the communicator's conclusions (Houland 60). They also say:

The various types of assertions that are likely to have a motivating effect on an audience are those which predict, explicitly or implicitly, that by adopting the communicator's recommendations one can avoid social disapproval or avert forms of physical danger or deprivation (Houland 60).

Agnew tried to convince his audiences by charging that the media would allow certain evils, such as a media monopoly in our society, to become rampant and would be a large contributing factor in the continual decline of traditional American values. People of the broad middle class generally fear social change. One reason they fear change is that there is always a possibility they may lose the status which they hold. Agnew wanted to make people afraid of placing their trust in the media for he believed great changes would occur.

Polarizing Elements

Polarization may be defined as the process by which an extremely diversified public is coalesced into two or more

highly contrasting, mutually exclusive groups sharing a high degree of internal solidarity in those beliefs which the persuader considers salient (Stevens 170). In one sense, polarization implies a powerful feeling of solidarity and group cohesiveness. In another sense, polarization also presupposes the existence of a perceived common foe which a group must oppose if it is to stay intact and hold sacred its ideals and values. A rhetor using the technique of polarization must create an atmosphere which portrays his ideals as being superior to those of his opponents.

A rhetoric of polarization always encompasses two principal strategies: a strategy of affirmation and a strategy of subversion. The rhetoric of affirmation is concerned with a careful selection of those images which will advance a strong sense of group identity. A strategy of subversion is concerned with creating an image of the opposition which will undermine the ethos of the institution (Stevens 170). Although Agnew incorporated both of these techniques, he did so very strategically. Agnew usually sandwiched the technique of subversion between a strong opening and closing filled with affirmation. By doing this, Agnew could open and close on a positive note for the institution which he represented while still throwing hard punches to the opposition in between. A typical opening for many of Agnew's speeches began with praise for the administration, which probably intended to reestablish

credibility. Agnew almost always went on to batter and discredit the opposition through verbal attack. In closing, Agnew was well known for his influential call for public interest and awareness which intended to place his views in the arena of goodness.

One charge brought against Agnew was that he polarized the nation. This study found that the national setting for Agnew's speaking indicated that the nation was probably already polarized before Agnew's arrival and that Agnew was easily absorbed into the total picture. It was determined that Agnew relied upon three major techniques of polarization which include: scapegoating, contrast, and identification (Stevens 171). Under each of these three categories several rhetorical techniques were used to enhance each method. Description of purpose was Agnew's most used rhetorical technique in the method of scapegoating (Appendix B paragraphs 3,8). Contrast was the most frequently used method. While Agnew's use of examples was the chief technique in the establishment of contrast, description of purpose, enumeration, and statistics were often used techniques. In identification, the Vice President's appeal to reference groups, specifically to the Great Silent Majority, was the dominant technique used (Appendix A paragraph 10). The study of Agnew's use of polarization is an extremely indepth topic, one which might warrant a study within itself.

Considering the national political situation as a whole and the polarized position which existed during 1969, it probably would have been impossible for anyone in such a high position as Vice President to have dealt with the issue Agnew confronted without ultimately becoming controversial. The importance of the relationship between what he said and the high office which he held cannot be overemphasized.

At the time of Agnew's media speeches there was a great deal of anarchy in the country. This anarchy violated the ethics and politics of the American culture. Agnew felt that all of this social turmoil needed to be brought to an abrupt halt. In November of 1969, he chose to halt the media. In the light of his office of Vice President there was justification for his speaking about the situation. Even though much criticism has come about from Agnew's attacks, one must not over look the fact that Agnew subjected the office of the Vice President to a new level. The ethics and politics of the American culture have traditionally held the office of Vice President in high esteem and have expected the man holding the office to exercise restraint in his dealings with others. Agnew's threats against the media were extreme and ceased to be simply providing the people of the nation with alternatives. Instead, his speaking became subtle suggestions of possible intimidation for those who disagreed with the administration.

This writer also feels that Agnew correctly analyzed his audience, which was the nation as a whole and not any particular segment or segments. He seemed to have known that one of the paramount questions in the mind of a large portion of the American voter was, "What could be done to restrengthen the country's moral position?" In these two particular speeches Agnew advocated a return to a more traditional life style.

Short Term Effects

There were a variety of responses to the media speeches. On June 7, 1970, the three presidents of the major television networks were presented awards for their defense of the free flow of information and their responses to Vice President Agnew (Stein 178). Other responses were not so subtle. Some people heard in the Agnew speeches a threat to the freedom of broadcasting and the press. They thought they could feel the purpose of the first amendment being warped in an improper direction. One editorial in The Nation saw great danger implied in his speeches. The editorial stated, "Those who fail to read the danger in it [the media attack] should not be heard to complain when, in the future, the squeeze catches them" ("Freedom to Cheer" 587). Hubert Humphrey, commenting on the television speech, said that it would "alarm those who believe in the right of dissent and in a free press" ("A Hidden Benefit in Agnew Fallout?" 61). Speaking to

journalism students, George McGovern expressed his opinion in very forceful terms when he commented, "The deliberate effort of the Nixon-Agnew administration to harass and intimidate the press is a serious threat to our free society. . . ." (Craford 31).

The general public, however, reacted to the media speeches in quite a different manner. Evidently, Agnew sheltered a buried resentment toward the individuals who ultimately choose the news which is presented on television during the hours when working men view the television news. When Agnew began his attack they watched with glee because someone was finally representing them.

Some of the responses illustrated how many Americans felt. From Ohio came this response, "Let me encourage you to continue to speak out on behalf of all the silent Americans who I feel have found in you their champion (Curran 133). Many of the opinions expressed by the general public were ardently in favor of Agnew's blasting the media. Some of the responses, however, were violently opposed to him as a person and to what he said. Other persons believed that they were intelligent enough to make up their own minds whether they listened to the various commentators or to Agnew.

Immediately after the first media speech there was a small disagreement over what the Administration's reaction to the speech would be. Many, of course, felt that Agnew's words carried little potency. Others saw it as an individual

action by Agnew. Silence, however, was the best word to describe the Administration's response. After Agnew made his second media speech there was little doubt in most people's minds that the Administration either propagated or at least approved of the first speech or there would have not been a second one.

The American Civil Liberties Union, in a news release, decried Agnew's "Television News Coverage" speech as a great danger to American democracy. The news release said:

It is our entire free democratic society which is at stake. It is clear that the First Amendment protects the right of government officials to engage in uninhibited debate with their critics, an exercise which we applaud. But this is far different from threats which could easily result in silencing criticism. Our free democratic society is imperiled by such government action.

("The Role of the Mass Media" 45)

This news release seemed to be an exaggeration of the threats which Agnew supposedly made to our American system. This article, however, made one very important point:

Efforts to curb dissent are often exerted in the name of national unity when social conflict stirs high public emotion. Yet it is precisely at such a time, when there is danger that speech may be diminished, that our unique and most prized

freedom of discussion should be fully protected against all attacks, from whatever source.

("The Role of the Mass Media" 45)

One of the better defenders of Agnew's speeches was columnist Roscoe Drummond. He believed that Agnew's oral involvement was a healthy thing, for it provided a two-sided debate. He contended that before Agnew it had been a one-sided debate which in the end would divide the country more than when both sides were represented. Drummond stated that Agnew's purpose was to urge listeners to be alert to news and commentary bias and to let the media know how they felt (Drummond 44).

The effect of the two media speeches on Agnew's popularity among large segments of the American people was most interesting. According to one report, he was interrupted by applause seventeen times during his Des Moines speech ("Broadcasting Journalism Under Siege" 28). The statistical breakdown of the responses were examined. One report after the first media speech said:

In five cities, NBC received 9,312 pro-Agnew calls and 6,627 endorsing its news policies; CBS reported the same 9 to 7 breakdown, while at ABC the ratio was about 6 to 4. At the Vice President's Office, however, the ratio was 35 to 1 in favor of the speech, and White House sources said the favorable response received there was much

larger than that accorded President Nixon's plea for similar expressions of support this month for his Vietnam policy.

Long Term Effects

The immediate as well as the long-range effects of the speech were very difficult to assess. No doubt the speeches caused the general public to observe more carefully news commentators and their biases. It was reasonable to suspect this was true of those who were sympathetic to the news media as well as those who were not. Just how much effect this had upon the reporting of the news was impossible to determine. Opinions varied on this question. Eric Sevareid of CBS did not think that he or his colleagues had toned down any of their handling of the news about the Nixon Administration after the media speeches. He did, however, admit that commentators were, as John Osborne put it, "forced to function in an atmosphere of public and official surveillance" (Waters 89). Sevareid presented his own theory of the media speeches. He thought that one way for a government to protect itself from having its own credibility gap was by discrediting the media (Osborne 15). Agnew felt that the media speeches had some effect. For example, he felt that the media treated him with much more respect after he delivered his two attacks (Osborne 14).

NBC's Reuben Frank commented that, "There has been no substantial change in what we do. We're doing more evaluating of the news but we're not bending backward for anyone" (Stein 180). An ABC public relations man commented that, "We've always evaluated our news content but now we're doing more evaluating. We're more vigilant about what we do" (Stein 181). CBS and ABC both had a content analysis of coverage done to discover if their positions had changed and to compare the amount of time given to the Administration's view and opposing views. The thing that shook the networks the most was the responses they got from the owners of affiliated stations. Fred Friendly, former president of CBS, said that his meetings with affiliate managers were like talking to 182 Agnews. Cronkite said that some stations wanted to end any news analysis after a presidential speech (Stein 181). It was difficult to believe that Agnew's media speeches had no effect upon the networks. Some effects were observed, such as a Washington, D.C., educational station's cancellation of a critical televue of the Vietnam War (Osborne 15).

Conclusions

This chapter found that even though Agnew incorporated almost all the traditional components of the traditional method, he relied heavily upon the use of logical appeal and a strong style which centered around his use of invective.

Agnew's delivery proved to be most interesting in that it was dull, slow, and deliberate, which leads to the conclusion that his material was by far the most influential factor and not the mode of delivery. Although it was discovered that Agnew did use ghostwriters, none of them took the credit for any of Agnew's catchy phrases and puns, which seemed to capture the attention of his audience and the media. Overall this analysis revealed how traditional components of speech making, when used well, are directly related to the effectiveness of the speaker, in this case even over delivery qualities.

NOTES

¹ Quoted as source unknown in Robert Curran's book, Spiro Agnew: Spokesman For America.

CHAPTER BIBLIOGRAPHY

- "A Hidden Benefit in Agnew Fallout?" Broadcasting, LXXVII
(November 24, 1969), 61.
- "Agnew's Pungent Quotient," Time, XCV (June 29, 1970), 24.
- Agnew, Spiro T. Frankly Speaking, A Collection of
Extraordinary Speeches. Washington, D.C.: Public
Affair Press, 1970.
- "Broadcasting Journalism Under Siege," Broadcasting, LXXVII
(November 17, 1969), 28.
- Crawford, Kenneth. "They Answer Agnew," Newsweek, LXXVI
(August 31, 1970), 31.
- Curran, Robert. Spiro Agnew: Spokesman for America. New
York: Lancer Books, Inc., 1970.
- Drummond, Roscoe. "A Tempest or a Portent," Current, CXIV
(January, 1970), 41-46.
- "Freedom to Cheer," The Nation, CCIX (December 1, 1969),
586-587.
- Houland, C.I., I.L. Janis, and H.H. Kelley. Communication
and Persuasion: Psychological Studies of Opinion
Change. New Haven: Yale UP, 1953.
- Hugh, Blair. Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres.
London: Plummer and Brewis, 1820.

- Lucas, Jim G. Agnew: Profile In Conflict. New York: Award Books, 1970.
- Mayer, Martin. "The Brilliance of Spiro Agnew," Esquire, LXXIII (May, 1970), 117-119, 207-208.
- Osborne, John. "Agnew's Effect," The New Republic, CLXII (February 28, 1970), 15.
- Osborne, John. "Agnew and Red Meat," The New Republic, CLXIII (July 25, 1970), 10-12.
- "Spiro Agnew vs. the "Radic-Libs." Newsweek, LXXVI (September 21, 1970), 35-36.
- Stein, M.L. "The Networks: First Round to Agnew," The Nation, CCXI (September 7, 1970), 178-181.
- Stevens, Walter W. "Polarization, Social Facilitation, and Listening." Western Speech, 25 (Fall 1960), 170.
- "The Role of Mass Media," Current, CXIV (January, 1970), 41-54.
- "Washington Whispers," U.S. News and World Report, LXVIII (March 23, 1970), 9.
- Waters, Harry. "Agnew's Complaint The Trouble With TV," Newsweek, LXXIV (November 24, 1969), 88-92.

CHAPTER V

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND SUGGESTIONS

FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

The previous three chapters have provided information concerning Agnew's personal and political background, the situations which prompted Agnew to speak out in November of 1969, and an analysis of the two speeches in which Agnew attacked the media. The purpose of this chapter is to summarize findings, present conclusions, and to propose recommendations for further research.

Spiro T. Agnew changed his political affiliation from Democrat to Republican early in his career. The first test for Agnew occurred on civil rights issues when he was County executive of Baltimore County, Maryland, and again when Governor of the state. Richard M. Nixon chose Agnew as his running mate in the Presidential campaign of 1968. As Vice President, his traditional role was defense of the President's policies. He played that role in delivering the two speeches in late 1969 that were the focus of this study.

The continued activity of the United States in the Vietnam conflict had not been well received by all the

citizens. By 1969, the country had watched students demonstrate on many campuses, dissidents and revolutionaries protest political activities of both parties, and a younger generation which seemed to deny all of the present-day standards of life. In short, the country was divided into distinct and almost mutually exclusive groups.

There were important and decisive events, which did nothing to bring the disparate groups together, and which preceded each of Agnew's speeches in this study. President Nixon's televised Vietnam speech to the nation on November 3, 1969, was the significant event preceding Agnew's speech on November 13, 1969, at Des Moines, Iowa. In Des Moines, Agnew refuted the network criticisms of the President's speech.

The Vice President encountered severe criticism of his Des Moines speech, and this criticism was his first concern in the Montgomery speech on November 29, 1969. The growing trend toward newspaper monopolies was his main theme in this speech, but he also spoke about the radical youths.

It was within the political and social context that the two speeches were analyzed to determine the extent to which Agnew employed traditional aspects of speech making. This study found that even though Agnew incorporated almost all the traditional components, he relied heavily upon the use of polarization, emotional appeal, and invective. Agnew's polarization techniques included: scapegoating which placed blame upon others and displaced aggression; contrast in which

he made available choices, his being the most advantageous; and identification which appealed to reference groups, mainly the Great Silent Majority, and occasionally the youth. Of all of Agnew's appeals his appeal toward logical argument was by far his most effective. Agnew was able to arouse those who held traditional values highly and fill them with his own points of view. Agnew's use of invective, or verbal attack, seemed to be his strongest rhetorical technique. Agnew had the ability to either generalize or pinpoint target audiences and pound them with his verbal tactics of hyperbole and alliteration. Agnew displayed his ability to work around an audience or to blast them with his strong stance for a return to traditional values and ethics, something with which the middle class could easily identify.

Conclusions

In the view of the biographical and social contexts of the times, and the analysis of the speeches, this writer comes to the following conclusions:

1. Based on Agnew's background and struggle to maintain the status quo of the times, it is evident that his prior family and political lives played a dominant role in the discourse he employed.
2. Agnew's discourse in the two speeches studied was primarily a response to the criticism Nixon received from the press.

3. Although Agnew employed the rhetoric of polarization, it is difficult to measure to what extent he polarized his audiences. Many other factors probably also polarized Agnew's audience; therefore, one cannot isolate a single cause for this outcome.
4. Agnew's discourse was greatly influenced by Nixon's discourse. In several instances, especially in the area of contrast, Agnew attempted to duplicate Nixon's rhetorical strategy.
5. Agnew's rapid rise to national prominence was greatly aided by the type of controversial discourse which he chose to use.

Suggestions For Further Research

This writer further concludes that Agnew's speeches have been worthwhile contributions to the history of American public address, and are worthy of scholarly attention.

Suggestion for further research regarding Vice President Agnew are:

1. A study of Vice President Agnew's changing image from 1968 to 1973.
2. A comparative image study between President Nixon and Vice President Agnew.
3. A rhetorical analysis of Agnew's role in both the student movement and Vietnam conflict.

4. An entire study dealing only with Agnew's use of polarization.
5. A comparative study of the polarization in President Nixon's speeches with the polarization in Vice President Agnew's speeches.
6. An analysis of Agnew's discourse using Robert Ivie's War Rhetoric to determine if rhetoric outside of literal war can be categorized into this genre.

This study set out to discover Agnew's motives for speaking in defense of President Nixon, and the study argues that Agnew deliberately used certain strategies of polarization to achieve identification with certain audiences. Additional study in the areas suggested above will contribute greater understanding to the political discourse of the late 1960s.

APPENDIX A

DES MOINES, IOWA

NOVEMBER 13, 1969

1 Tonight I want to discuss the importance of the television news medium to the American people. No nation depends more on the intelligent judgment of its citizens. No medium has a more profound influence over public opinion. Nowhere in our system are there fewer checks on vast power. So, nowhere should there be more conscientious responsibility exercised than by the news media. The question is: are we demanding enough of our television news presentations? And, are the men of this medium demanding enough of themselves?

2 Monday night, a week ago, President Nixon delivered the most important address of his Administration, one of the most important of our decade. His subject was Vietnam. His hope was to rally the American people to see the conflict through to a lasting and just peace in the Pacific. For thirty-two minutes, he reasoned with a nation that has suffered almost a third of a million casualties in the longest war in its history.

3 When the President completed his address--an address that he spent weeks in preparing--his words and policies were subjected to instant analysis and querulous

criticism. The audience of seventy million Americans--gathered to hear the President of the United States--was inherited by a small band of network commentators and self-appointed analysts, the majority of whom expressed, in one way or another, their hostility to what he had to say.

4 It was obvious that their minds were made up in advance. Those who recall the fumbling and groping that followed President Johnson's dramatic disclosure of his intention not to seek reelection have seen these men in a genuine state of non-preparedness. This was not it.

5 One commentator twice contradicted the President's statement about the exchange of correspondence with Ho Chi Minh. Another challenged the President's abilities as a politician. A third asserted that the President was now "following the Pentagon line." Others, by the expressions on their faces, the tone of their questions, and the sarcasm of their response, made clear their sharp disapproval.

6 To guarantee in advance that the President's plea for national unity would be challenged, one network trotted out Averell Harriman for the occasion. Throughout the President's address he waited in the wings. When the President concluded, Mr. Harriman recited perfectly. He attacked the Thieu government as unrepresentative; he criticized the President's speech for various deficiencies; he twice issued a call to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to debate Vietnam once again; he stated his belief

that the Viet Cong or North Vietnamese did not really want a military take-over of South Vietnam; he told a little anecdote about a "very, very responsible" fellow he had met in the North Vietnamese delegation.

7 All in all, Mr. Harriman offered a broad range of gratuitous advice--challenging and contradicting the policies outlined by the President of the United States. Where the President had issued a call for unity, Mr. Harriman was encouraging the country not to listen to him.

8 A word about Mr. Harriman. For ten months he was America's chief negotiator at the Paris Peace Talks--a period in which the United States swapped some of the greatest military concessions in the history of warfare for an enemy agreement on the shape of a bargaining table. Like Coleridge's Ancient Mariner, Mr. Harriman seems to be under some heavy compulsion to justify his failures to anyone who will listen. The networks have shown themselves willing to give him all the air time he desires.

9 Every American has a right to disagree with the President of the United States, and to express publicly that disagreement.

10 But the President of the United States had a right to communicate directly with the people who elected him, and the people of this country have the right to make up their own minds and form their own opinions about a Presidential address without having the President's words and thoughts

characterized through the prejudice of hostile critics before they can even be digested.

11 When Winston Churchill rallied public opinion to stay the course against Hitler's Germany, he did not have to contend with a gaggle of commentators raising doubts about whether he was reading public opinion right, or whether Britain had the stamina to see the war through. When President Kennedy rallied the nation in the Cuban Missile Crisis, his address to the people was not chewed over by a round-table of critics who disparaged the course of action he had asked America to follow.

12 The purpose of my remarks tonight is to focus your attention on this little group of men who not only enjoy a right of instant rebuttal to every Presidential address, but more importantly, wield a free hand in selecting, presenting and interpreting the great issues of our nation.

13 First, let us define that power. At least forty million Americans each night, it is estimated, watch the network news. Seven million of them view ABC; the remainder being divided between NBC and CBS. According to Harris polls and other studies, for millions of Americans the networks are the sole source of national and world news.

14 In Will Rogers' observation, what you knew was what you read in the newspaper. Today, for growing millions of Americans, it is what they see and hear on their television sets.

15 How is this network news determined? A small group of men, numbering perhaps no more than a dozen "anchormen," commentators and executive producers, settle upon the 20 minutes or so of film and commentary that is to reach the public. This selection is made from the 90 to 180 minutes that may be available. Their powers of choice are broad. They decide what forty to fifty million Americans will learn of the day's events in the nation and the world.

16 We cannot measure this power and influence by traditional democratic standards for these men can create national issues overnight. They can make or break--by their coverage and commentary--a Moratorium on the war. They can elevate men from local obscurity to national prominence within a week. They can reward some politicians with national exposure and ignore others. For millions of Americans, the network reporter who covers a continuing issue, like ABM or Civil Rights, becomes in effect, the presiding judge in a national trial by jury.

17 It must be recognized that the networks have made important contributions to the national knowledge. Through news, documentaries and specials, they have often used their power constructively and creatively to awaken the public conscience to critical problems.

18 The networks made "hunger" and "black lung" disease national issues overnight. The TV networks have done what no other medium could have done in terms of dramatizing the

horrors of war. The networks have tackled our most difficult social problems with a directness and immediacy that is the gift of their medium. They have focused the nation's attention on its environmental abuses, on pollution in the Great Lakes, and the threatened ecology of the Everglades.

19 But it was also the networks that elevated Stokely Carmichael and George Lincoln Rockwell from obscurity [sic] to national prominence. Nor is their power confined to the substantive.

20 A raised eyebrow, an inflection of the voice, a caustic remark dropped in the middle of a broadcast can raise doubts in a million minds about the veracity of a public official or the wisdom of a government policy.

21 One Federal Communications Commissioner considers the power of the networks to equal that of local, state and federal governments combined. Certainly, it represents a concentration of power over American public opinion unknown in history.

22 What do Americans know of the men who wield this power? Of the men who produce and direct the network news the nation knows practically nothing. Of the commentators, most Americans know little, other than that they reflect an urbane and assured presence, seemingly well informed on every important matter.

23 We do know that, to a man, these commentators and producers live and work in the geographical and intellectual

confines of Washington, D.C. or New York City--the latter of which James Reston terms the "most unrepresentative community in the entire United States." Both communities bask in their own provincialism, their own parochialism. We can deduce that these men thus read the same newspapers, and draw their political and social views from the same sources. Worse, they talk constantly to one another, thereby providing artificial reinforcement to their shared viewpoints.

24 Do they allow their biases to influence the selection and presentation of the news? David Brinkley states, "Objectivity is impossible to normal human behavior." Rather, he says, we should strive for "fairness."

25 Another anchorman on a network news show contends: "You can't expunge all your private convictions just because you sit in a seat like this and a camera starts to stare at you I think your program has to reflect what your basic feelings are. I'll plead guilty to that."

26 Less than a week before the 1968 election, this same commentator charged that President Nixon's campaign commitments were no more durable than campaign balloons. He claimed that, were it not for fear of a hostile reaction, Richard Nixon would be giving into, and I quote the commentator, "his natural instinct to smash the enemy with a club or go after him with a meat axe."

27 Had this slander been made by one political candidate about another, it would have been dismissed by most

commentators as a partisan assault. But this attack emanated from the privileged sanctuary of a network studio and therefore had the apparent dignity of an objective statement.

28 The American people would rightly not tolerate this kind of concentration of power in government. Is it not fair and relevant to question its concentration in the hands of a tiny and closed fraternity of privileged men, elected by no one, and enjoying a monopoly sanctioned and licensed by government?

29 The views of this fraternity do not represent the views of America. That is why such a great gulf existed between how the nation received the President's address--and how the networks reviewed it.

30 Not only did the country receive the President's address with a warmer reception than the networks; so, too, did the Congress of the United States. Yesterday, the President was notified that 300 individual Congressmen and 59 Senators of both parties had endorsed his efforts for peace.

31 As with other American institutions, perhaps it is time that the networks were made more responsive to the views of the nation and more responsible to the people they serve.

32 I am not asking for government censorship or any other kind of censorship. I am asking whether a form of censorship already exists when the news that forty million Americans receive each night is determined by a handful of men responsible to their corporate employers and filtered

through a handful of commentators who admit to their own set of biases.

33 The questions I am raising tonight should have been raised by others long ago. They should have been raised by those Americans who have traditionally considered the preservation of freedom of speech and freedom of the press their special provinces of responsibility and concern. They should have been raised by those Americans who share the view of the late Justice Learned Hand that "right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues than through any kind of authoritative selection."

34 Advocates for the networks have claimed a first amendment right to the same unlimited freedoms held by the great newspapers of America.

35 The situations are not identical. Where the New York Times reaches 800,000 people, NBC reaches twenty times that number with its evening news. Nor can the tremendous impact of seeing television film and hearing commentary be compared with reading the printed page.

36 A decade ago, before the network news acquired such dominance over public opinion, Walter Lippmann spoke to the issue: "There is an essential and radical difference," he stated, "between television and printing . . . the three or four competing television stations control virtually all that can be received over the air by ordinary television sets. But, besides the mass circulation dailies, there are the

weeklies, the monthlies, the out-of-town newspapers, and books. If a man does not like his newspaper, he can read another from out of town, or wait for a weekly news magazine. It is not ideal. But it is infinitely better than the situation in television. There, if a man does not like what the networks offer him, all he can do is turn them off, and listen to a phonograph."

37 "Networks," he stated, "which are few in number, have a virtual monopoly of a whole medium of communication." The newspapers of mass circulation have no monopoly of the medium of print.

38 A "virtual monopoly of a whole medium of communication" is not something a democratic people should blithely ignore.

39 And we are not going to cut off our television sets and listen to the phonograph because the air waves do not belong to the networks; they belong to the people.

40 As Justice Byron White wrote in his landmark opinion six months ago, "It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount."

41 It is argued that this power presents no danger in the hands of those who have used it responsibly.

42 But as to whether or not the networks have abused the power they enjoy, let us call as our first witnesses, former Vice President Humphrey and the City of Chicago.

43 According to Theodore H. White, television's intercutting of the film from the streets of Chicago with the "current proceedings on the floor of the convention created the most striking and false political picture of 1968--the nomination of a man for the American Presidency by the brutality and violence of merciless police."

44 If we are to believe a recent report of the House Commerce Committee, then television's presentation of the violence in the streets worked an injustice on the reputation of the Chicago police.

45 According to the Committee findings, one network in particular presented "a one-sided picture which in large measure exonerates the demonstrators and protestors." Film of provocations of police that was available never saw the light of day, while the film of the police response which the protestors provoked was shown to millions.

46 Another network showed virtually the same scene of violence--from three separate angles--without making clear it was the same scene.

47 While the full report is reticent in drawing conclusions, it is not a document to inspire confidence in the fairness of the network news.

48 Our knowledge of the impact of network news on the national mind is far from complete. But some early returns are available. Again, we have enough information to raise serious questions about its effect on a democratic society.

49 Several years ago, Fred Friendly, one of the pioneers of network news, wrote that its missing ingredients were "conviction, controversy and a point of view." The networks have compensated with a vengeance.

50 And in the networks' endless pursuit of controversy, we should ask what is the end value--to enlighten or to profit? What is the end result--to inform or to confuse? How does the ongoing exploration for more action, more excitement, more drama, serve our national search for internal peace and stability?

51 Gresham's law seems to be operating in the network news.

52 Bad news drives out good news. The irrational is more controversial than the rational. Concurrence can no longer compete with dissent. One minute of Eldridge Cleaver is worth ten minutes of Roy Wilkins. The labor crisis settled at the negotiating table is nothing compared to the confrontation that results in a strike--or, better yet, violence along the picket line. Normality has become the nemesis of the evening news.

53 The upshot of all this controversy is that a narrow and distorted picture of America often emerges from the televised news. A single dramatic piece of the mosaic becomes, in the minds of millions, the whole picture. The American who relies upon television for his news might conclude that the majority of American students are

embittered radicals; that the majority of black Americans feel no regard for their country; that violence and lawlessness are the rule, rather than the exception, on the American campus. None of these conclusions is true.

54 Perhaps the place to start looking for a credibility gap is not in the offices of the government in Washington, but in the studios of the networks in New York.

55 Television may have destroyed the old stereotypes--but has it not created new ones in their place?

56 What has this passionate pursuit of "controversy" done to the politics of progress through logical compromise, essential to the functioning of a democratic society?

57 The members of Congress who follow their principles and philosophy quietly in a spirit of compromise are unknown to many Americans--while the loudest and most extreme dissenters on every issue are known to every man in the street.

58 How many marches and demonstrations would we have if the marchers did not know that the ever-faithful TV cameras would be there to record their antics for the next news show?

59 We have heard demands that Senators and Congressmen and Judges make known all their financial connections--so that the public will know who and what influences their decisions or votes. Strong arguments can be made for that view. But when a single commentator or producer, night after

night, determines for millions of people how much of each side of a great issue they are going to see and hear, should he not first disclose his personal views on the issue as well?

60 In this search for excitement and controversy, has more than equal time gone to that minority of Americans who specialize in attacking the United States, its institutions and its citizens?

61 Tonight, I have raised questions. I have made no attempt to suggest answers. These answers must come from the media men. They are challenged to turn their critical powers on themselves. They are challenged to direct their energy, talent and conviction toward improving the quality and objectivity of news presentation. They are challenged to structure their own civic ethics to relate their great freedom with their great responsibility.

62 And the people of America are challenged too-- challenged to press for responsible news presentations. The people can let the networks know that they want their news straight and objective. The people can register their complaints on bias through mail to the networks and phone calls to local stations. This is one case where the people must defend themselves; where the citizen--not government-- must be the reformer; where the consumer can be the most effective crusader.

63 By way of conclusion, let me say that every elected leader in the United States depends on these men of the media. Whether what I have said to you tonight will be heard and seen at all by the nation is not my decision; it is not your decision; it is their decision.

64 In tomorrow's edition of the Des Moines Register you will be able to read a news story detailing what I said tonight; editorial comment will be reserved for the editorial page, where it belongs. Should not the same wall of separation exist between news and comment on the nation's networks?

65 We would never trust such power over public opinion in the hands of an elected government--it is time we questioned it in the hands of a small and unelected elite. The great networks have dominated America's airwaves for decades; the people are entitled to a full accounting of their stewardship.

APPENDIX B

MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA

NOVEMBER 29, 1969

1 One week ago tonight I flew out to Des Moines, Iowa, and exercised my right to dissent.

2 There has been some criticism of what I had to say out there. Let me give you a sampling.

3 One Congressman charged me with, and I quote, "A creeping socialistic scheme against the free enterprise broadcast industry." That is the first time in my memory anybody ever accused Ted Agnew of entertaining socialist ideas.

4 On Monday, largely because of this address, Mr. Humphrey charged the Nixon Administration with a "calculated attack" on the right of dissent and on the media today. Yet, it is widely known that Mr. Humphrey himself believes deeply that unfair coverage of the Democratic Convention in Chicago, by the same media, contributed to his defeat in November. Now, his wounds are apparently healed, and he casts his lot with those who were questioning his own political courage a year ago. But let us leave Mr. Humphrey to his own conscience. America already has too many politicians who would rather switch than fight.

5 Others charged that my purpose was to stifle dissent in this country. Nonsense. The expression of my views has produced enough rugged dissent in the last week to wear out a whole covey of commentators and columnists.

6 One critic charged that the speech was "disgraceful, ignorant and base," that it "leads us as a nation into an ugly era of the most fearsome suppression and intimidation." One national commentator, whose name is known to everyone in this room, said "I hesitate to get into the gutter with this guy." Another commentator charges that it was "one of the most sinister speeches I have ever heard made by a public official." The president of one network said it was an "unprecedented attempt to intimidate a news medium which depends for its existence upon government licenses." The president of another charged me with "an appeal to prejudice," and said it was evident that I would prefer the kind of television "that would be subservient to whatever political group happened to be in authority at the time."

7 And they say I have a thin skin.

8 Here are classic examples of overreaction. These attacks do not address themselves to the questions I have raised. In fairness, others--the majority of critics and commentators--did take up the main thrust of my address. And if the debate they have engaged in continues, our goal will surely be reached: a thorough self-examination by the

networks of their own policies--and perhaps prejudices. That was my objective then; it is my objective now.

9 Now, let me repeat to you the thrust of my remarks the other night, and make some new points and raise some new issues.

10 I am opposed to censorship of television or the press in any form. I don't care whether censorship is imposed by government or whether it results from management in the choice and the presentation of the news by a little fraternity having similar social and political views. I am against censorship in all forms.

11 But a broader spectrum of national opinion should be represented among the commentators of the network news. Men who can articulate other points or view should be brought forward.

12 And a high wall of separation should be raised between what is news and what is commentary.

13 And the American people should be made aware of the trend toward the monopolization of the great public information vehicles and the concentration of more and more power over public opinion in fewer and fewer hands.

14 Should a conglomerate be formed that tied together a shoe company with a shirt company, some voice will rise up righteously to say that this is a great danger to the economy; and that the conglomerate ought to be broken up.

15 But a single company, in the nation's capital, holds control of the largest newspaper in Washington, D.C., and one of the four major television stations, and an all-news radio station, and one of the three major news magazines--all grinding out the same editorial line--and this is not a subject you have seen debated on the editorial pages of the Washington Post or the New York Times.

16 For the purpose of clarity, before my thoughts are obliterated in the smoking typewriters of my friends in Washington and New York, let me emphasize I am not recommending the dismemberment of the Washington Post Company. I am merely pointing out that the public should be aware that these four powerful voices hearken to the same master.

17 I am merely raising these questions so that the American people will become aware of--and think of the implications of--the growing monopolization of the voices of public opinion on which we all depend--for our knowledge and for the basis of our views.

18 When the Washington Times-Herald died in the nation's capital, that was a political tragedy; and when the New York Journal-American, the New York World-Telegram and Sun, the New York Mirror and the New York Herald-Tribune all collapsed within this decade, that was a great, great political tragedy for the people of New York. The New York

Times was a better newspaper when they were alive than it is now that they are gone.

19 What has happened in the city of New York has happened in other great cities in America.

20 Many, many strong independent voices have been stilled in this country in recent years. Lacking the vigor of competition, some of those that have survived have, let us face it, grown fat and irresponsible.

21 I offer an example. When 300 Congressmen and 59 Senators signed a letter endorsing the President's policy in Vietnam it was news--big news, Even the Washington Post and the Baltimore Sun--scarcely house organs of the Nixon Administration--placed it prominently on the front page.

22 Yet the next morning the New York Times, which considers itself America's paper of record, did not carry a word. Why?

23 If a theology student in Iowa should get up at a PTA luncheon in Sioux City and attack the President's Vietnam policy, my guess is that you would probably find it reported somewhere the next morning in the New York Times. But when 300 Congressmen endorse the President's Vietnam policy, the next morning it is apparently not considered news fit to print.

24 Just this Tuesday, when the Pope, the Spiritual Leader of half a billion Roman Catholics applauded the President's efforts to end the war in Vietnam, and endorsed

the way he was proceeding--that news was on Page 11 of the New York Times. But the same day, a report about some burglars who broke into a souvenir shop at St. Peters and stole \$9,000 worth of stamps and currency--that story made Page 3. How's that for news judgment?

25 A few weeks ago here in the South, I expressed my views about street and campus demonstrations. Here is how the New York Times responded:

26 "He [that's me] lambasted the nation's youth in sweeping and ignorant generalizations, when it is clear to all perceptive observers that American youth today is far more imbued with idealism, a sense of service and a deep humanitarianism than any generation in recent history, including particularly Mr. Agnew's."

27 That seems a peculiar slur on a generation that brought America out of the Great Depression without resorting to the extremes of either fascism or Communism. That seems a strange thing to say about an entire generation that helped to provide greater material blessings and personal freedom--out of that Depression--for more people than any other nation in history. We are not finished with the task by any means--but we are still on the job.

28 Just as millions of young Americans in this generation have shown valor and courage and heroism in fighting the longest and least popular war in our history--so it was the young men of my generation who went ashore at

Normandy under Eisenhower and with MacArthur into the Philippines.

29 Yes, my generation, like the current generation, made its own share of great mistakes and blunders. Among other things, we put too much confidence in Stalin and not enough in Winston Churchill.

30 But whatever freedom exists today in Western Europe and Japan exists because hundreds of thousands of young men in my generation are lying in graves in North Africa and France and Korea and a score of islands in the Western Pacific.

31 This might not be considered enough of a "sense of service" or a "deep humanitarianism" for the "perceptive critics" who write editorials for the New York Times, but it's good enough for me; and I am content to let history be the judge.

32 Now, let me talk about the younger generation.

33 I have not and do not condemn this generation of young Americans. Like Edmund Burke, I would not know how to "draw up an indictment against a whole people." They are our sons and daughters. They contain in their numbers many gifted, idealistic and courageous young men and women.

34 But they also list in their numbers an arrogant few who march under the flags and portraits of dictators, who intimidate and harass university professors, who use gutter obscenities to shout down speakers with whom they disagree,

who openly profess their belief in the efficacy of violence in a democratic society.

35 The preceding generation had its own breed of losers--and our generation dealt with them through our courts, our laws and our system. The challenge now is for the new generation to put their own house in order.

36 Today, Dr. Sidney Hook writes of "storm troopers" on the campus; that "fanaticism seems to be in the saddle." Arnold Beichman writes of "young Jacobins" in our schools who "have cut down university administrators, forced curriculum changes, halted classes, closed campuses and set a nationwide chill of fear through the university establishment." Walter Laqueur writes in Commentary that "the cultural and political idiocies perpetrated with impunity in this permissive age have gone clearly beyond the borders of what is acceptable for any society, however liberally it may be constructed.

37 George Kennan has devoted a brief, cogent and alarming book to the inherent dangers of what is taking place in our society and in our universities. Irving Kristol writes that our "radical students . . . find it possible to be genuinely heartsick at the injustice and brutalities of American society, while blandly approving of injustice and brutality committed in the name of 'the revolution'."

38 These are not names drawn at random from the letterhead of an Agnew-for-Vice-President Committee.

39 These are men more eloquent and erudite than I. They raise questions that I have tried to raise.

40 For among this generation of Americans there are hundreds who have burned their draft cards and scores who have deserted to Canada and Sweden to sit out the war. To some Americans, a small minority, these are the true young men of conscience in the coming generation. Voices are and will be raised in the Congress and beyond, asking that amnesty should be provided for "these young and misguided American boys." And they will be coming home one day from Sweden and Canada, and from a small minority they will get a heroes' welcome.

41 They are not our heroes. Many of our heroes will not be coming home; some are coming back in hospital ships, without limbs or eyes, with scars they shall carry the rest of their lives.

42 Having witnessed firsthand the quiet courage of wives and parents receiving posthumously for their heroes Congressional Medals of Honor, how am I to react when people say, "Stop speaking out, Mr. Agnew, stop raising your voice."

43 Should I remain silent while what these heroes have done is vilified by some as "a dirty and immoral war" and criticized by others as no more than a war brought on by the chauvinistic, anti-communism of Presidents Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon?

44 These young men made heavy sacrifices so that a developing people on the rim of Asia might have a chance for freedom that they will not have if the ruthless men who rule in Hanoi should ever rule over Saigon. What is dirty or immoral about that?

45 One magazine this week said that I will go down as the "great polarizer" in American politics. Yet, when that large group of young Americans marched up Pennsylvania and Constitution Avenues last week--they sought to polarize the American people against the President's policy in Vietnam. And that was their right.

46 And so it is my right and my duty, to stand up and speak out for the values in which I believe. How can you ask the man in the street in this country to stand up for what he believes if his own elected leaders weasel and cringe?

47 It is not an easy thing to wake up each morning to learn that some prominent man or institution has implied that you are a bigot, a racist or a fool.

48 I am not asking any immunity from criticism. That is the lot of the man in politics; we would have it no other way in this democratic society.

49 But my political and journalistic adversaries sometimes seem to be asking something more--that I circumscribe my rhetorical freedom, while they place no restrictions on theirs.

50 As President Kennedy once observed in a far more serious matter, that is like offering an apple for an orchard.

51 We do not accept those terms for continuing the national dialogue. The day when the network commentators and even gentlemen of the New York Times enjoyed a form of diplomatic immunity from comment and criticism of what they said--that day is past.

52 Just as a politician's words--wise and foolish--are dutifully recorded by the press and television to be thrown up to him at the appropriate time, so their words should likewise be recorded and likewise recalled.

53 When they go beyond fair comment and criticism they will be called upon to defend their statements and their positions just as we must defend ours. And when their criticism becomes excessive or unjust, we shall invite them down from their ivory towers to enjoy the rough and tumble of public debate.

54 I do not seek to intimidate the press, the networks or anyone else from speaking out. But the time for blind acceptance of their opinions is past. And the time for naive belief in their neutrality is gone.

55 But, as to the future, all of us could do worse than take as our own the motto of William Lloyd Garrison who said: "I am in earnest. I will not equivocate. I will not

excuse. I will not retreat a single inch. And I will be heard."

COMPREHENSIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY

- "A Hidden Benefit in Agnew Fallout?" Broadcasting, LXXVII
(November 24, 1969), 61.
- "Agnew's Complaint, the Trouble With TV," Newsweek, LXXIV
(November 24, 1969), 88-92.
- "Agnew's Pungent Quotient," Time, XCV (June 29, 1970), 24.
- "Agnew vs. the Networks: (Network Commentary on President
Nixon's Speech of November 3, 1969)," Weekend Magazine,
New York Post, November 15, 1969, 26-29.
- Agnew, ag'noo, Spiro Theodore (1918 -). Encyclopedia
Americana; I, 336.
- Agnew, Spiro T. "The Newspaper Monopoly-Censorship: A Two
Way Street." Vital Speeches 36 (Fall 1969): 133-
135.
- . "Television News Coverage-Network Censorship." Vital
Speeches 36 (Fall 1969): 98-100.
- . "Acceptance Speech." Vital Speeches 38 (Summer
1970): 710-711.
- . Frankly Speaking. Washington D.C.: Public Affairs
Press, 1970.
- . Frankly Speaking, A Collection of Extraordinary
Speeches. Washington, D.C.: Public Affair Press,
1970.

- Andrews, James R. "The Rhetoric of Coercion and Persuasion: The Reform of 1932." Quarterly Journal of Speech 56 (1970): 187-195.
- Bennett, Gordon C. "The Heckler and The Heckled In The Presidential Campaign of 1968." Communication Quarterly 27 (1969): 28-37.
- Bigart, Homer. "Dimensions in City, Lindsay Leads Protest and Is Met by Jeers as Well as Cheers." The New York Times, October 16, 1969, 1,2.
- Bowers, John W., and Donovan J. Ochs. The Rhetoric of Agitation and Control. Boston: Wesley Publishing Co., 1971.
- "Broadcasting Journalism Under Siege," Broadcasting, LXXVII (November 17, 1969), 28.
- Brock, Ronald L., and Robert L. Scott. Methods of Rhetorical Criticism. Detroit: Wayne State UP, 1980.
- Campbell, Karlyn K. Critiques of Contemporary Rhetoric. Belton: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1972.
- Cohen, Richard M., and Jules Witcover. A Heartbeat Away. New York: Viking Press, 1974.
- Congressional Quarterly. Nixon: The First Year of His Presidency. Washington: Washington Press, 1970.
- Copelin, Mary H. "An Analysis of the Logical and Ethical Foundations of the Rhetoric of Spiro T. Agnew In Attacking the Mass Media Through a Systematic Analysis

- of the Evidence." Diss. University of California, Los Angeles, 1974.
- Crawford, Kenneth. "They Answer Agnew," Newsweek, LXXVI (August 31, 1970), 31.
- Curran, Robert. Spiro Agnew: Spokesman For America. New York: Lancer Books, 1970.
- Curtis, Charlotte. "Judy Agnew - From Obscurity to National Spotlight in 10 minutes." The New York Times, CXVII, August 9, 1968: 24.
- Drummond, Roscoe. "A Temptest or a Portent," Current, CXIV (January, 1970), 41-46.
- Elliott, Elbert E. "The Rhetoric of Spiro T. Agnew: A Study of Political Controversy." Diss. Southern Illinois University, 1972.
- Foss, Sonja K. Rhetorical Criticism: Exploration and Practice. Prospects Heights: Waveland Press, 1989.
- "Freedom to Cheer," The Nation, CCIX (December 1, 1969), 586-587.
- Goldstein, Joel K. The Modern American Vice Presidency. California Princeton VP, 1982.
- Hart, Roderick P. Verbal Style and the Presidency, Orlando: Academic Press, 1984.
- Herbers, John. "Opponents React, Many Show Support by Flying Flags Full-staff." The New York Times, October 16, 1969, 1,18.

- Hill, Forbes. "Conventional Wisdom--Traditional Form: The President's Message of November 3, 1969." Quarterly Journal of Speech 58 (December 1972): 373-386.
- Ho Chi Minh. Letter to President Richard Milhous Nixon dated August 25, 1969, received in Paris on August 30, 1969. Vital Speeches of the Day, XXXVI (November 15, 1969), 70.
- Houland, C.I., I.L. Janis, and H.H. Kelley. Communication and Persuasion: Psychological Studies of Opinion Change. New Haven: Yale UP, 1953.
- Hugh, Blair. Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres. London: Plummer and Brewis, 1820.
- James, Fred B. Spiro T. Agnew. Boston: Wadsworth, 1971.
- Jamieson, Kathleen, and Karlyn K. Campbell. The Interplay of Influence. Baltimore: Wadsworth, 1983.
- Kennedy, John F. "The Responsibility of the Press." Vital Speeches 23 (Spring 1960): 174-175.
- Kenworthy, E.W. "Protests Staged in Capital as Nixon and Aides Meet, Thousands Mark Day." The New York Times, October 16, 1969, 1,18.
- King, Seth S. "A Pledge by Humphrey." The New York Times, October 16, 1969, 1,18.
- Knappman, Edward W. Presidential Election 1968. New York: Facts on File, 1970.
- Light, Paul C. Vice-Presidential Power. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins VP, 1984.

- Lowry, Dennis T. "Agnew and the TV News: A Before/After Content Analysis." Journalism Quarterly 47 (Fall 1973): 205-210.
- Lucas, Jim G. Agnew: Profile In Conflict. New York: Award Books, 1970.
- Mardon, Fred S. "Can Public Confidence Be Restored." Time 107 (1973): 9-17.
- Mayer, Martin. "The Brilliance of Spiro Agnew," Esquire, LXXIII (May, 1970), 117-119, 207-208.
- Meyer, Timothy P. "Agnew Meets the Student Dissenters: An Experimental Study of Ego Involvement and Argumentation." Journal of Communication 22 (Spring 1969): 263-276.
- Moritz, Charles. Current Biography Yearbook 1968. New York: H.W. Wilson Company, 1968.
- "Network Answers to Agnew." U.S. News and World Report, LXVII (November 4, 1969), 10.
- Newman, Robert P. "Under the Veneer: Nixon's Vietnam Speech of November 3, 1969." Quarterly Journal of Speech 56 (April 1970): 168-178.
- Nixon, Richard M. Letter to Ho Chi Minh, dated July 15, 1969. Vital Speeches of the Day, XXXVI (November 15, 1969), 70. (a)
- . The Memoirs of Richard Nixon. New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978.
- . "A Vietnam Plan, The Silent Majority." Vital Speeches of the Day, XXXVI (November 15, 1969), 66-70. (b)

- "Official Biography," The Vice President of the United States, February 1970. Received by North Texas State from the Vice President's Office, December 12, 1970.
- O'Mara, Richard. "Discovering Spiro Agnew." The Nation, CCVII, September, 1968: 176.
- Osborne, John. "Agnew's Effect," The New Republic, CLXII (February 28, 1970), 15.
- . "Agnew and Red Meat," The New Republic, CLXIII (July 25, 1970), 10-12.
- . The First Two Years of the Nixon Watch. New York: Liveright, 1971.
- Quimby, Rollin W. "Agnew's Plea Bargain: Between Rhetorics of Consensus and Confrontation." Central States Speech Journal 28 (1971): 163-172.
- Rovere, Richard H. "Letter from Washington." The New Yorker, XLV (November 29, 1969), 165-169.
- "Running Mate's Mate." Time, XCII, August, 1968: 15.
- Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr. "The Amazing Success Story of 'Spiro Who?'" The New York Times Magazine, CXIX, July, 1970: 5.
- Shanahan, Eileen. "Maryland Vote Tied to Coalition: Agnew Victory Called Proof of Civil Rights Majority." The New York Times, CXVI, November 10, 1966: 50.
- Shearer, Lloyd. "Judy Agnew - What It's Like Being Married to the Most Controversial Man in America." Sunday Courier and Press, August 9, 1970: 5.

- Spear, Joseph C. Presidents and the Press. Boston: MIT Press, 1984.
- "Spiro Agnew: The King's Taster." Time, XCIV Summer 1961: 170-174.
- "Spiro Agnew vs. the "Radic-Libs." Newsweek, LXXVI (September 21, 1970), 35-36.
- Stein, M.L. "The Networks: First Round to Agnew," The Nation, CCXI (September 7, 1970), 178-181.
- Stevens, Walter W. "Polarization, Social Facilitation, and Listening." Western Speech, 25 (Fall 1960), 170.
- Stewart, Charles. Persuasion and Social Movements. Illinois: Waveland press, 1984.
- "Television and Vice President Agnew." America, CXXI (November 29, 1969), 519.
- "The Role of Mass Media," Current, CXIV (January, 1970), 41-54.
- "T.R.B. from Washington." The New Republic, CLIX (September 1968): 8.
- U.S. President. "Letter from Premier Pham Van Dong," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents. Vol. 5, No. 42. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration, October 20, 1969, pp. 1409-1437.
- Van DerLinden, Frank. "Spiro T. Agnew: Vice President Extraordinary," Readers Digest, XCVII, October, 1970: 123-127.

Vexler, Robert. The Vice-Presidents and Cabinet Members.

Oceana Publications: New York, 1975.

"Washington Whispers," U.S. News and World Report, LXVIII

(March 23, 1970), 9.

Waters, Harry. "Agnew's Complaint the Trouble With TV,"

Newsweek, LXXIV (November 14, 1969), 88-92.

Wichelns, Herbert A. "Analysis and Synthesis in

Argumentation." Quarterly Journal of Speech 11 (1965):

266-272.

Wills, Gary. "For God So Loves Spiro Agnew That He Made Him

Vice-President," Esquire, LXXI, February, 1969: 58.

Windt, Theodore, and Beth Ingold. Essays in Presidential

Rhetoric 2nd ed. Dubuque: Kendall Hunt, 1987.