THE SUFFRAGETTE MOVEMENT IN GREAT BRITAIN:
A STUDY OF THE FACTORS INFLUENCING THE
STRATEGY CHOICES OF THE WOMEN'S
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL UNION,
1903-1918

THESIS

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By

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Denton, Texas
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This thesis challenges the conventional wisdom that the W.S.P.U.'s strategy choices were unimportant in regard to winning women's suffrage. It confirms the hypothesis that the long-range strategy of the W.S.P.U. was to escalate coercion until the Government exhausted its powers of opposition and conceded, but to interrupt this strategy whenever favorable bargaining opportunities with the Government and third parties developed. In addition to filling an apparent research gap by systematically analyzing these choices, this thesis synthesizes and tests several piecemeal theories of social movements within the general framework of the natural history approach. The analysis utilizes data drawn from movement leaders' autobiographies, documentary accounts of the militant movement, and the standard histories of the entire British women's suffrage movement. Additionally, extensive use is made of contemporary periodicals and miscellaneous works on related movements.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION:

THE WOMEN'S SOCIAL AND POLITICAL UNION

In post-Victorian British history, there are few, if any, social movements which have generated as much controversy as the Suffragette movement. The controversy, centering on the militant Women's Social and Political Union (W.S.P.U.), concerns the contribution of its strategies to the granting of votes for women in 1918. This thesis seeks to describe and explain these controversial strategy choices. However, before the hypothesis is stated, the history of the movement and the conventional wisdom regarding its strategies will be briefly summarized.

Historical Background

The passage of the Representation of the People Act of 1832 gave the first legal sanction to the customary exclusion of women from the British electorate during the two previous centuries. Nevertheless, the first evidence of the early constitutional (i.e., non-militant) movement for women's suffrage did not appear for more than a quarter century (5, pp. 32-33; 13, p. 32).

In 1866, a provisional committee for women's suffrage was founded by Lydia Becker in Manchester, the hotbed of northern
English politics. Within two years, permanent organizations were founded in London and other major cities (11, p. 1). During the next four decades, they led a concerted effort to secure legislation granting votes for women in Parliamentary elections. They provided lecturers, held public meetings, and produced a steady stream of propaganda. Furthermore, they sought to influence candidates in Parliamentary elections, and encouraged a persistent flow of petitions to both Houses of Parliament.

While these early suffragists called for the extension of the Parliamentary franchise to women "on the same terms as it is or may be granted to men" (13, p. 21), they would have settled for any measure breaking the sex barrier. However, despite their vigorous agitation, no degree of compliance with the women's demand was made by the Westminster Parliament. Consequently, by the turn-of-the-century, the British women's suffrage movement was virtually moribund.

On October 13, 1903, Emmeline Pankhurst founded the Women's Social and Political Union (9, p. 38). Operating from her Manchester home, the new organization initially followed the propagandistic course set by its constitutional forebearers. However, as its leaders quickly learned, party politicians considered the enfranchisement of women, an unknown quantity, as an unnecessary risk to the precarious balance of power in the House of Commons. Consequently, by late 1905, the persistent obstruction of private members' bills
(i.e., those sponsored by individual sympathizers) by these politicians convinced the Suffragette leaders that the passage of a women's suffrage measure depended on the active support of the Government.

Thereafter, since a half century of peaceful appeals had failed to win this support, the W.S.P.U. adopted an innovative, increasingly militant strategy. Between 1906 and 1910, this strategy succeeded in making votes for women a serious political issue. During those four years, the Suffragettes followed three main lines of militant action: deliberately seeking arrest and imprisonment, heckling Cabinet ministers, and opposing Government candidates at by-elections. These activities served the three-fold purpose of gaining public sympathy for the cause, embarrassing the Government, and recruiting new members.

The effectiveness of militancy was indicated in spring 1910 by the formation of the Conciliation Committee for Women's Suffrage, including representatives of all parties, to draft a measure acceptable to the House of Commons (5, p. 221; 9, p. 168). To assure the success of this effort, Mrs. Pankhurst declared a truce from militancy. Members of Parliament (M. P.s) could then change their votes without appearing to succumb to the Suffragette strategy. However, to the disbelief of constitutionalists and militants alike, the final vote on the promising Conciliation Bill was postponed for two years until it could be defeated (12, p. 255).
Outraged by the Government's abrogation of its promise not to obstruct the measure's passage, the W.S.P.U. violently retaliated by attacking public and private property. These attacks ranged from window-smashing to arson. Accordingly, between 1912 and 1914, the covert opposition of the Government to the Suffragettes developed into overt suppression, which drove the movement underground.

However, upon Britain's entry into the First World War during late summer 1914, the violent campaign of the W.S.P.U. abruptly ended. Shortly thereafter, the Government unconditionally released all Suffragette prisoners (3, p. 387; 5, p. 304; 8, p. 280; 11, p. 238). After rededicating the movement to the war effort during early summer 1915, Mrs. Pankhurst was called upon by the Government to recruit women to replace men in civilian jobs (8, pp. 293-94). By mid-1917, near the war's end, virtually all opposition to women's suffrage had evaporated. The second truce from militancy and the contributions of women to the war effort were credited for this change. In December, the Electoral Reform Bill of 1917 passed in the House of Commons by an overwhelming majority (5, p. 304). In February of the following year, it was enacted by the Royal Assent as the Representation of the People Act of 1918 (12, p. 266; 13, p. 223). (See Table I for a chronology of the major events of the Suffragette movement.)
TABLE I

A CHRONOLOGY OF THE MAJOR SUFFRAGETTE EVENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1832</td>
<td></td>
<td>Representation of the People Act of 1832 establishes first legal barrier to women's suffrage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1866</td>
<td>May</td>
<td>Petition Committee organizes in Manchester. Women's Petition delivered to Parliament by J. S. Mill on June 7.</td>
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<td>1867</td>
<td></td>
<td>First women's suffrage organizations founded in London, Manchester, Edinburgh, Bristol, and Birmingham.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>Oct. 10</td>
<td>Women's Social and Political Union founded in Manchester by Emmeline Pankhurst.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>May 12</td>
<td>R. M. Pankhurst's Women's Enfranchisement Bill (revived by Labor Party) talked out.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>Oct. 13</td>
<td>Christabel Pankhurst and Annie Kenney thrown out of Liberal Party meeting at Manchester Free Trade Hall.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>May 19</td>
<td>Campbell-Bannerman receives deputation and reveals Cabinet opposition to women's suffrage. Heckling of Cabinet ministers begins.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
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<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct. 23</td>
<td>Rebuffed deputation protests in Lobby of House of Commons. Many prominent women arrested and sentenced as common criminals. Most shortly released, rest accorded political prisoner status.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mar. 8</td>
<td>W. H. Dickinson's Women's Enfranchisement Bill rejected.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Suffragettes march to Parliament Square in protest. Met by 500 constables, 74 arrests result.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Oct.</td>
<td>The Pethick-Lawrences begin publishing <em>Votes for Women</em>.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>June 21</td>
<td>Great Hyde Park meeting. Estimated 500,000 attend.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
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<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>Oct. 11</td>
<td>Suffragettes plan to rush House of Commons. Mrs. Pankhurst, Christabel, and others arrested and convicted for inciting a riot.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>June 29</td>
<td>Bill of Rights deputation. Hundreds of Suffragettes march toward Parliament, asserting right of petition. Met by 3,000 police, 122 arrests result.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>July 5</td>
<td>Marion Wallace Dunlop adopts hunger strike in protest of common criminal status.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sept. 24</td>
<td>Government begins forcible feeding of hunger striking Suffragettes.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Lady Constance Lytton, disguised as &quot;Jane Warton,&quot; leads Suffragette deputation. Arrested, imprisoned, and forcibly fed. Released when true identity learned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Mrs. Pankhurst calls truce from militancy in view of proposed Conciliation Committee for Women's Suffrage in House of Commons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mar. 15</td>
<td>Home Secretary Churchill gives political prisoner treatment (but not status) to Suffragette prisoners.</td>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>June 18</td>
<td>Over 10,000 women march in From Prison to Citizenship Procession.</td>
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<td>July 11 First Conciliation Bill, introduced by D. J. Shackleton (Labor), passes Second Reading by majority of 109.</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>18 Black Friday. Suffragettes brutally attacked by police in Parliament Square.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td></td>
<td>18 Coronation Year. Truce renewed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May 5</td>
<td>Second Conciliation Bill, introduced by Sir George Kemp (Conservative), passes Second Reading by majority of 167.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>June 17</td>
<td>Coronation Procession. About 40,000 women march for women's suffrage.</td>
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<td>Nov. 7</td>
<td>Asquith announces Government's Manhood Suffrage Bill.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Asquith receives deputation, but refuses to make any provisions for women's suffrage.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Mrs. Pethick-Lawrence leads first window-smashing raid. Arrests number 223.</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Clement's Inn raided. Pethick-Lawrances arrested, Christabel flees to Paris.</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>May 15-22</td>
<td>Pankhurst-Pethick-Lawrence conspiracy trial. Each sentenced to nine months.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mrs. Pankhurst and Pethick-Lawrences released.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 17</td>
<td></td>
<td>Departure of Pethick-Lawrences announced by Mrs. Pankhurst at Albert Hall.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td>Christabel begins publishing the <em>Suffragette</em> from Paris.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>Feb. 19</td>
<td>Lloyd George's new house burned. Mrs. Pankhurst arrested after accepting responsibility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 25</td>
<td></td>
<td>Government's Prisoners' Temporary Discharge for Ill Health Bill passed. Known as Cat and Mouse Act.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 3</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mrs. Pankhurst sentenced to three years as mouse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>Annie Kenney arrested upon return from Paris meeting with Christabel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lincoln's Inn House headquarters raided. Grace Roe organizes underground movement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 4</td>
<td></td>
<td>Emily Wilding Davison dies after attempting to stop King's horse at Royal Derby.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>Feb. 7</td>
<td>Sylvia's East London Federation ousted from W.S.P.U.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Britain enters First World War.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
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<td>------</td>
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<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>Aug. 2</td>
<td>W.S.P.U. ends arson campaign.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>All Suffragette prisoners unconditionally released by Home Office.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>June 24</td>
<td>Mrs. Pankhurst begins women's Right to Serve campaign. Minister of Munitions Lloyd George invites her to lead women in national service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>July 17</td>
<td>Right to Serve demonstration financed by Government and reviewed by Lloyd George.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>Jan. 24</td>
<td>Compulsory Military Service Bill passed by House of Commons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sept.</td>
<td>Secretary of War Lloyd George issues statement compelling civilian employment of women.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct. 12</td>
<td>Electoral Reform Conference frames bill calling for sweeping, post-war revision of franchise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>Jan. 27</td>
<td>Conference report calls for women's suffrage with age limits 30 and 35 preferred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov. 2</td>
<td>W.S.P.U. becomes Women's Party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>Feb. 6</td>
<td>Representation of People Act of 1918 enacted by Royal Assent.</td>
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<tr>
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Conventional Wisdom

The evaluation of the Suffragette movement's strategies primarily rests upon the analysis of two pivotal events in the movement's history. These two pivotal events were the defeat of the third Conciliation Bill in 1912 and Britain's entry into the First World War in 1914. They marked the critical strategic turning points between increasingly acrimonious militancy and increasingly propitious negotiation.

Scholarly opinion regarding the first of these strategic turning points is mixed. It is generally agreed that Prime Minister (P. M.) H. H. Asquith, an anti-suffragist Liberal, cast a pall over the rosy prospects of the third Conciliation Bill by announcing that his Government would submit a Manhood
Suffrage Bill (3, p. 163; 9, pp. 206-7; 10, p. 257; 11, p. 174). M. P.s would have appeared ridiculous had they voted, on the one hand, to remove the existing property qualification from the men's vote (one of the effects of the P. M. 's bill) and, on the other hand, to grant women the franchise with a property qualification.

However, there are divergent opinions as to what sealed the surprisingly dismal fate of the Conciliation Bill. Earlier scholars suggest that the more violent militancy of the Suffragettes triggered by P. M. Asquith's announced bill alienated any remaining Parliamentary support (5, p. 257; 15, p. 233). More recent analysts argue that the rallying of the P. M. 's tenuous Liberal-Irish Nationalist coalition against the Conciliation Bill (with Liberal claims that the bill's passage would lead the P. M. to resign) caused many sympathetic to the bill to vote against it (12, p. 163; 13, p. 222). In any event, though the imprudence of the Suffragette response to the P. M. 's abrogation of his promise might be criticized, the defeat of the Conciliation Bill is usually attributed to the entangling party alliance, which was presumably beyond the movement's control.

There is much more consensus regarding the Union's strategies just before and during the First World War. It is almost unanimously agreed that the guerilla militancy initiated after the Conciliation Bill's defeat caused the Union's decline, so that, by the war's outbreak, it was no longer a
viable part of the women's suffrage movement as a whole (3, pp. 387-88; 5, p. 300; 12, p. 255; 13, p. 204; 14, p. 337). Furthermore, it is widely believed that the Union's war work for the anti-suffragist Government marked its departure from the pursuit of votes for women into an entirely new and different line of work (3, p. 388; 5, p. 304; 12, pp. 250-51; 13, p. 337). Finally, given these conditions, the intensive pre-war militancy is commonly discounted as a significant factor in the winning of women's suffrage (13, p. 255). Instead, fortuitous, war-wrought factors (e.g., increased female employment) and the persistence of constitutional suffrage organizations are given credit (5, pp. 299-300; 14, pp. 348-49).

The review of Suffragette and Government records by insightful students of the movement (and social movements in general) has only recently suggested an alternative view—one which indicates that the guerilla militancy of 1912-1914 and the war effort of 1914-1917 were, in fact, decisive factors leading to the winning of votes for women (8, p. 283). Still, the conception of the Suffragette movement as something of an historical oddity and the contention that it failed, even though its cause succeeded, retain a lot of currency.

Given this distillation of the conclusions of previous research on the Suffragette movement, the conventional wisdom regarding its strategies may be briefly summarized. While the Suffragette movement is often cited as an example of a movement which successfully gained publicity from the press and sympathy
from the public (17, p. 227), the W.S.P.U. is often dismissed as being "of little real importance" in regard to winning women's suffrage (5, p. 300). The violent militancy in reply to the P. M.'s abrogation of his repeated promise not to obstruct the Conciliation Bill is characterized as "illogical political intimidation," and "the flight of reason and of respect for authority from the battle of politics" (5, p. 301). Finally, the change of strategy upon Britain's entry into the First World War is construed as the militant movement's defeat. It is reported that "in loyal fervor . . . ended the great Woman's Rebellion" (3, p. 388), and that "Militancy faded away, and no more was ever heard of the Women's Social and Political Union" (14, p. 337).

The Hypothesis and Its Purposes

The major purpose of this thesis is to challenge the conventional wisdom regarding the Suffragette movement's strategies. Simply stated, the hypothesis is that the long-range strategy of the W.S.P.U. was to adopt increasingly militant tactics until the Government either conceded or exhausted its powers of opposition, but to interrupt this strategy whenever favorable opportunities for negotiation with the Government and third parties developed.

This hypothesis has three corollaries. First, these strategies developed in a logical pattern, alternating between increasingly militant periods and increasingly favorable
opportunities for negotiation with extra-movement groups. Second, the failure of the third Conciliation Bill in 1912 resulted from the Union's reluctance to negotiate with the Government, its refusal to acknowledge third parties, and its failure to communicate the threat of greater militancy, if defeated. Third, the success of the Representation of the People Act of 1918 (which granted women's suffrage) resulted from the Union's willingness to negotiate with both the Government and third parties, and its success in communicating the threat of greater militancy, if again defeated. Notably, the publicly unpopular guerilla militancy of 1912-1914 probably communicated this threat.

In defense of the hypothesis, this thesis draws upon the work of several theorists of social movements, including Blumer (1, 2), Dawson and Gettys (4), Hopper (6), Lipsky (7), Turner (15), Turner and Killian (16), and Wilson (17). So, in addition to filling an apparent research gap by providing an analysis of the Suffragette movement's strategies, this thesis proposes to synthesize and to test these theories.

Plan of Development

In Chapter II, the theory and method used in this thesis are presented. In Chapters III through VI, the Suffragette movement's strategy choices in each of the natural history stages are described and analyzed. Finally, in Chapter VII, the thesis is summarized, and its conclusions are presented.
CHAPTER BIBLIOGRAPHY


CHAPTER II
THEORY AND METHOD FOR STUDYING
THE STRATEGIES OF THE W.S.P.U.

Within the sub-field of social movements, several sociologists have hypothesized theories to explain the influence of various factors upon strategy choices. However, despite their apparent face value, these thinkers' ideas are still unconfirmed theories, rather than empirically verified facts. Nonetheless, a synthesis of these ideas does prove useful in developing an alternative to the conventional wisdom regarding the Suffragette movement's strategies.

The theoretical synthesis employed in this thesis is an amended version of the natural history approach developed by Blumer (1), Dawson and Gettys (4), Hopper (6), and Turner and Killian (16). This approach suggests that social movements ideally pass through four developmental stages, beginning with one of unrest and culminating in one of institutionalization. Alone, however, it is inadequate, because it tends to emphasize intra-movement factors (e. g., leadership) at the expense of extra-movement factors (e. g. public opinion).

Nonetheless, it does provide a general framework, within which other piecemeal theories may be incorporated to compensate for its deficiencies. Blumer (2) and John Wilson (28) complete and clarify the discussion of intra-movement factors
with their discussions of leadership, ideology, the constituency, and organization. Lipsky (10) and Turner (24) do the same for extra-movement factors with their discussions of the target group, reference publics, and public opinion.

Given a synthesis of these theories, within a natural history framework, a comprehensive analysis of the factors which influence strategy choices is possible. Such a synthesis is constructed in this chapter by defining the basic concepts, by explaining the method of analysis, and by reviewing the major sources of data on the Suffragette movement.

Definition of Concepts

To clarify the hypothesis and to explain the method of analysis, the basic concepts must be introduced. These include the types of strategies, the factors which influence their selection, and the principles which determine the relative influence of those factors.

The Strategic Principles

Turner (24, p. 150) suggests that the relative influence of the two sets of factors is determined by the operation, either cooperatively or conflictually, of two general principles, the rational (or strategic) and the expressive. Under the former, strategies are chosen for their anticipated effectiveness. Under the latter, they are chosen for the image (often of power) which they allow the movement to project. In the Suffragette movement, the two generally operated in
cooperation with each other, although their coming into conflict was likely one of the contributing factors to the defeat of the third Conciliation Bill in 1912. In any event, both sets of factors were influential in the selection of the movement's strategies.

In the interest of clarity, the two sets of factors will be specified and defined before the different types of strategies are introduced.

**Intra-Movement Factors**

John Wilson (28) identifies four intra-movement factors which, he suggests, influence the selection of strategies. These are the leadership, the ideology, the constituency, and the organization.

The *leadership.*—The leadership of a movement may be classified according to its types (i.e., what the leaders do) and its styles (i.e., how they do it).

Hopper (6, pp. 58-69) identifies five types of leaders: the agitator, who leads people to challenge an injustice, or—as in the Suffragette movement—intensifies existing tensions; the prophet, who formulates and promulgates the social myth (in which the hopes and wishes of the people are articulated); the reformer, who attacks specific evils, and develops a clearly defined program; the statesman, who formulates policies, and seeks to carry them into practice; and the administrator, who maintains the movement organization which executes...
the policies. (Each of these types of leadership is characteristic of a stage in the natural history approach.)

John Wilson (28, p. 201) identifies three styles of leadership: the charismatic style, in which legitimacy is found in the person of the leader, or in the higher source to whom the leader claims sole access; the ideological style, in which the ideology, as reflected in the writings of the movement, is considered sacred; and the pragmatic style, in which leadership is justified by organizational expertise and efficiency.

As the founder of the W.S.P.U., Emmeline Pankhurst was the charismatic agitator and prophet of the Suffragette movement. Her daughter Christabel, the strategist, chief writer for Votes for Women, and editor of the Suffragette and Britannia, was its ideological reformer and statesman.* Emmeline and Frederick Pethick-Lawrence, to whom the mundane legal and financial affairs of the Union fell, were the pragmatic administrators of the movement.

The ideology.—One of the most important tasks of the leadership, particularly in the early stages of a movement, is to formulate the ideology. According to John Wilson (28, p. 95), the ideology consists of three parts: "A diagnosis of

*Concerning the use of titles and surnames, the usage common within the W.S.P.U. is followed in this thesis. For instance, Emmeline Pankhurst and Emmeline Pethick-Lawrence were known to most as Mrs. Pankhurst and Mrs. Pethick-Lawrence, and Christabel and Sylvia Pankhurst, as Christabel and Sylvia. Neither subjectivity nor undue familiarity should be construed from this practice.
present problems; a solution to these problems and a vision of a better world; and a rationale for the movement."

The diagnosis states what is wrong by locating the source of discontent, and by identifying the responsible agents (28, p. 95). In the Suffragette movement, the source of discontent was the denial of the Parliamentary franchise to women, and the responsible agents, from 1906 onward, the Government.

The prognosis states what must be done by specifying immediate goals, and by proclaiming a vision of utopia (perfect space) or millennium (perfect time) in which a lasting triumph over adverse conditions is achieved (28, pp. 108-18). The immediate goal of the W.S.P.U. was to secure the Parliamentary franchise for women "on the same terms as it is or may be granted to men" (22, p. 21), which, the Suffragettes suggested, would lead to the millennium of sexual equality.

The rationale states who the change agents must be, and what precisely they are to do (28, p. 124). The W.S.P.U. was restricted to women, and followed an increasingly militant strategy. The exclusion of men from membership (with the notable exception of Frederick Pethick-Lawrence) and the resort to militancy were both justified by references to the failure of male-dominated organizations to respond to years of constitutional agitation for women's suffrage. By placing the movement in historical context, the leaders developed a sense of mission, and sought to escape the label of "fad" or "craze" (28, p. 124).
The constituency.--The ideology is directed at the constituency, which is "the group or class of potential supporters for whom the movement must be able to claim to speak" (24, p. 150). Women as a group were the constituency of the Suffragette movement. Militant women had to establish a credible claim to speak for women in general in order to sustain their movement. Notably, the charge most often leveled against the Suffragettes by P. M. Asquith was that they were not "authorized to speak" for all women (21, p. 259).

The organization.--The organization of a movement fills its need to sustain some collective existence for an indefinite period of time. It consists of the relationship established with the society and the resources appropriated through that relationship by the movement for its own use.

The most important of these resources is the membership of the organization (28, p. 173). The task of recruiting from the constituency to the membership is a perennial problem for mass-based movements. However, the Suffragettes engaged in selective recruiting, admitting only the most militant women. This practice clearly reflected their hostility toward men, whom they identified as the oppressors. This was especially evident from 1912 to 1914, when the Suffragettes repudiated any help which sympathetic men were willing to give.

The second major resource of a movement organization is capital. As Wilson (28, p. 176) notes, this problem is "so
mundane, so pedestrian that its nagging persistence is often ignored by sociological commentators. The methods of fund-raising depend on the formality of the organization. The early W.S.P.U. was so informal that it relied upon unsolicited contributions and collections at meetings or upon large donations from a few wealthy friends. Such non-rational economic arrangements are characteristic of charismatic leaders, such as Mrs. Pankhurst (28, p. 177). Another form of capital is a claim to property. Premises bring with them independence and respectability, and symbolize the group as a whole (28, p. 183). The Suffragettes were often identified with their long-time headquarters, Clement's Inn. Initially however, they borrowed the premises of sympathetic organizations (e.g., the Labor Party), rented halls (e.g., the Caxton Hall, the Royal Albert Hall), or commandeered parts of leaders' houses (e.g., Sylvia's Chelsea flat, the Pethick-Lawrences' apartments at Clement's Inn).

Extra-Movement Factors

Lipsky (10) and Turner (24) identify three extra-movement factors which, they suggest, influence strategy choices. These are the target group, reference publics, and public opinion.

The target group.--The target group is "some group of people . . . whose behavior the movement is trying to
influence," because it "can serve the movement's aims" (24, p. 147). During its incipient years, the W.S.P.U. remained closely tied to the Labor Party. However, for the greater part of its history, the Suffragette movement's target group was the Liberal Government, particularly the Cabinet.

Reference publics.—Reference publics are "third parties" (10, p. 81) who are, for various reasons, "concerned with the movement to the extent of supporting or undercutting movement efforts" (24, p. 150). In successive stages of its development, the adult suffragists, the Liberal, Irish Nationalist, and Labor Parties, and the National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies (N.U.W.S.S., the constitutional women's suffragists) were significant reference publics of the W.S.P.U.

Public opinion.—Lang and Lang define public opinion as "the standard by which an act is judged or an issue resolved" (9, p. 372). Public opinion generally finds expression in the press. Newspapers, such as the London Daily Mail—which first called the militant suffragists "suffragettes" (21, p. 65)—were agents of public opinion regarding the Suffragette movement.

Types of Strategies

Given these factors, three major types of strategies may be specified. Turner (24, pp. 148-49) identifies them as persuasion, bargaining, and coercion.
Bargaining.---Bargaining occurs "when the movement has control over some exchangeable value that the target group wants, and offers some of that value in return for compliance with its demands" (24, p. 148). Thus, when bargaining is successful, both parties emerge in improved positions. This thesis argues that, during its final stage, the Suffragette movement was able to force a bargain with the Government, in which women's wartime assistance was exchanged for an implicit promise of women's suffrage after the war.

This strategy is also employed when a movement offers to form a coalition with a reference public, as the Suffragettes might have done with the Irish Nationalists.

Coercion.---Coercion refers to "the manipulation of the target group's situation in such a fashion that the pursuit of any course of action other than that sought by the movement will be met by considerable cost or punishment" (24, pp. 148-49). Thus, when coercion is successful, the target group is forced to improve the movement's position at the expense of its own.

Tactics employed under this strategy may range from acts of civil disobedience, such as disrupting a Liberal meeting (13, pp. 46-48), to acts of terrorism, such as burning down a Liberal minister's house (12, p. 204). However, as Turner indicates, the milder forms of coercion usually suffice to place the target group in an untenable position:
Authorities are embarrassed by having to arrest otherwise law-abiding persons and by giving them the dangerous publicity of public trials. Authorities run the alternative risks of arousing public sympathy for the offenders and loss of confidence because of their own ineptness, or of weakening the entire authority structure by overlooking the law violations (24, p. 148).

This is precisely the predicament in which Christabel sought to place the future Liberal Government when she and Annie Kenney disrupted the party meeting in Manchester on October 13, 1905 (8, pp. 64-67; 13, pp. 48-52).

The threat of coercion may be distinguished from actual coercion. Turner (24, p. 148) identifies it as negative bargaining, in which the movement proposes to worsen the target group's position. He also distinguishes the threat of coercion from bargaining. In bargaining, the target group may improve its position. But, under the threat of coercion, its best hope is that its position will be unchanged. As the final stage of the Suffragette movement illustrates, the threat of coercion can be an added incentive for the target group to comply with the movement's demands.

Persuasion.--Turner (24, p. 149) defines persuasion as "the use of strictly symbolic manipulation without substantial rewards or punishment under the control of the movement. . . . to identify the proposed course of action with the values held by the target group." Persuasion was chosen during the early years of the W.S.P.U., when it sponsored speakers who lectured on women's suffrage at Labor gatherings (16,
p. 7; 21, p. 33). In contrast to its success in securing the support of the Labor Party, this same strategy failed to circumvent Liberal opposition to the enfranchisement of women on the same terms as men (i.e., with the property qualification). Persuasion is distinguished from bargaining and coercion by the fact that it calls attention to rewards and costs that the movement cannot manipulate.

Method of Analysis

The general framework of this thesis is the natural history approach developed by Blumer (1, pp. 167-68), Dawson and Gettys (4, p. 708), and Hopper (6, p. 54). The application of this method to the study of a social movement involves three steps. First, all pertinent facts about the movement must be investigated. This initial step requires that all extant data concerning the Suffragette movement's strategies be considered, that each fact be confirmed by references in several sources, and that the relative importance of different events be weighed as impartially as possible. Second, the operative processes must be described in conceptual terms. This intermediate step requires that the Suffragette movement's strategies and the factors influencing their selection be abstracted from the largely descriptive, historical records, and ideally typed to clarify the internal and external dynamics of the movement involved in strategy choices. Third, these operative processes must be interpreted to explain events. This final step requires
that the influence of each of the internal and external factors upon the Suffragette movement's strategy choices be explained.

This natural history approach stands in marked contrast to the commonly employed descriptive or historical method. This alternative approach reflects the sociologist's concern for the processual aspects of social movements over their content, which is the interest of history. Consequently, in addition to the mere collection of narratives and generalizations (to which the more common method is restricted), this approach provides for the conceptual description and analysis of events.

The General Framework

Several theorists of social movements, including Blumer (1), Dawson and Gettys (4), Hopper (6), and Lang and Lang (9), have suggested that social movements tend to pass through four developmental stages: a preliminary stage of social unrest, a popular stage of collective excitement, a stage of formal organization, and a stage of institutionalization. The concept "stage" is simply used to describe dominant tendencies. However, the term has misled some to believe that this framework implies either an inevitable sequence of events or clear-cut, mutually exclusive periods of time. Therefore, it should be remembered, throughout this discussion, that neither of these erroneous connotations is implied.
The unrest stage.--The beginning of a social movement suggests two things: the closing of channels of protest from the incipient movement to the target group, and the opening of channels of communication within the incipient movement (28, pp. 136-38). The former condition requires those seeking change to act in an uninstitutionalized manner, while the latter provides the opportunity to disseminate new ideas and mobilize opinion. The need for pre-existing channels of communication at this stage is usually filled by borrowing those developed by older organizations (28, p. 138).

Characteristic conditions of this preliminary stage are: general restlessness, government inefficiency, government reform efforts, the spread and socialization of discontent, and the development of class antagonisms (6, p. 56).

The typical process during this stage is milling, which results from the vague apprehension of unrest and confusion regarding goals. Uncoordinated behavior results from the lack of a plan of action (6, p. 57). There is little interaction or exchange of experience among the movement's constituents, since there is not even an informal organization. Consequently, leadership is exercised by agitators, who attempt to disseminate propaganda. Notably, because of the amorphous nature of the unrest stage, it is often unrecognized until later.

The popular stage.--During the popular stage, discontent spreads, the responsible agents are identified, conflict
emerges between these agents and the movement, the movement organizes, and it presents its demands (6, p. 58).

As the diagnosis, prognosis, and rationale of the ideology develop, milling is intensified and less uncoordinated. Accordingly, morale and esprit de corps develop under the leadership of the prophet and the reformer (4, pp. 720-21). Consequently, unity, purpose, and consistency are stimulated, and the occurrence of an exciting event leads the movement to act.

The formal stage.—After the movement's motives and aims are established at the start of the formal stage, the movement coalesces around an organization, complete with leaders, a program, and a set of norms. The ascendancy of the organization is heralded by a conflict in the ranks and the seizure of power by the dominant faction (4, p. 723; 6, p. 63).

Discussion publics form to deliberate over the issues. This type of public (not to be confused with the reference public) involves the interaction of individuals who are willing to discuss their differences on some specific matter, and to compromise with each other to reach an agreement on the issue (4, p. 683). Leadership is taken by the statesman, who formulates policies based on that agreement.

During this stage, the movement also tends to develop a literature of its own, and to influence literature in general. This literature may include hymns, histories, apologies, poetry, and propaganda. These different types of literature serve
to inspire and to unite the movement. The movement literature may take the forms of newspapers, pamphlets, books, plays, speeches, cartoons, posters, slogans, banners, insignia, and the like (4, p. 724).

The institutional stage.—Conditions marking the beginning of the institutional stage are the implementation of deterrents to revolutionary behavior, the extension of amnesty to prisoners, the psychological exhaustion and economic distress of the movement, an increase in the government's powers, and social reconstruction along the lines of the old order with the new principles intact (6, p. 67).

A movement becomes institutionalized when it is understood to have a continuing function to perform in society, and is accepted as a necessary and welcome addition to the existing arrangements (25, pp. 480-81). As consequences of institutionalization, the movement is recognized as having certain areas of competence and certain functions, which constitute its legitimate scope. Therefore, prestige is accorded by the larger society to those representatives of the movement with whom they choose to deal (25, p. 481). Finally, the movement comes to fill a fixed space in the lives of its members, leading it to diversify its activities to provide greater gratifications.

If the movement survives to this stage, administrative leaders emerge, usually occupying a formal office through which policies are implemented by the movement (4, p. 724; 6, p. 69).
However, the movement may achieve only incomplete or imperfect institutionalization. When this occurs, there is a compromise between the old order and the new society. The new values become legally, but not attitudinally, accepted. In other words, the legally defined values are held as ideals, of which behavior falls short (6, p. 68).

The dissolution stage.--This framework should not be interpreted to imply that a movement inevitably develops from the unrest stage to the institutional stage. Indeed, it should be recognized that there are any number of ways that a movement may be indefinitely postponed or completely redirected. For instance, war is sometimes used by governments to silence internal disturbances. Unrest may also be dispersed in non-political directions. However, failure to deal with the underlying causes of unrest will mean that the development of a movement will eventually continue. Still, it should be remembered that a movement may be dissolved at almost any point (6, p. 59).

The Strategic Factors

The implications of this framework for strategy choices may be considered in terms of the strategic principles, and the intra-movement and extra-movement factors which influence the selection process.

The strategic principles.--The major difference between Turner's rational (or strategic) and expressive principles is
found in the tendency to utilize minimum or maximum power (24, p. 155). Under the expressive principle, a movement shows a preference for coercion, since it takes advantage of all opportunities to exhibit power in its most extreme and dramatic forms. Coercion is popularly desired. Bargaining is lowest in order of preference, because it requires some exchange to gain concessions, and limits the movement's freedom of action. Persuasion, which seeks the target group's acknowledgement of the movement's values, lies between these two extremes.

Under the rational principle, a movement prefers to exercise minimum power to attain its goal. Consequently, persuasion is first in order of preference, because less is paid for the attained results, while coercion is last, because it provokes resentment. Bargaining, which requires some exchange to gain concessions, lies between these two extremes.

Since the selection of strategies tends to become less expressively and more rationally motivated as the movement gains experience, it follows that, as a movement progresses through the stages of its natural history, it tends to become less expressive and more rational.

The leadership.—Despite the fact that the five types of leadership are identified with the stages of which they are most characteristic, it is recognized by John Wilson (28, pp. 195, 222) that more than one of the types may be present in a movement at the same time, and that the same person may
perform more than one of the roles. The same applies for the different styles of leadership.

Insofar as the different types and styles of leaders influence strategy choices, the charismatic agitator and prophet is more willing to select coercion than the pragmatic administrator. This difference between the two extremes of leadership is probably a function of the division of labor (27, p. 222).

Turner (24, p. 154) speculates that the more sophisticated the leadership, the greater the tendency for the movement's strategies to be selected under the rational than the expressive principle.

The ideology. -- Turner (24, p. 155) also suggests that the values reflected in the ideology may influence strategy choices. Religious or humanistic values tend to inhibit the use of coercion, while extreme democratic idealism may lead to excessive reliance upon persuasion, and to the failure to take advantage of opportunities to bargain.

John Wilson (28, p. 287) adds that, when a movement is driven underground, its heightened sense of persecution may lead it to rediagnose the responsible agents as a conspiracy. This, in turn, may lead to a heightened sense of solidarity within the underground movement and to the escalation of a coercive strategy.

He also notes that ideological constraint on strategy is frequently apparent when the formation of coalitions becomes
important. However, movements may also be prevented from successfully negotiating coalitions, because of their ideological antipathies (28, p. 246).

The constituency.--The process of recruiting members from the constituency depends upon instilling commitment to the movement. Recruits must be willing to devote themselves to the movement (7, p. 499). John Wilson speculates that, for most people, the act of joining is facilitated by establishing friendship ties with movement members. Such close associations with committed members are believed to be far more empirically explanatory than facilitating conditions, such as relative deprivation (28, p. 132). Accordingly, he suggests, sympathy may be transformed into commitment by participation in the movement's strategies (28, p. 314).

Blumer (2, p. 207) notes that high levels of commitment and esprit de corps tend toward the escalation of strategies. Turner (24, pp. 154, 156) suggests that the more effectively disciplined the members, the more the movement will be directed by the rational principle, since discipline is necessary for either bargaining or coercion to be effective. Wilson (28, p. 276) identifies three types of discipline: coercive, which involves the threat or use of force; normative, which stresses symbolic rewards and value-commitments; and utilitarian, which involves the manipulation of economic assets. Notably, they parallel the three styles of leadership.
The organization.--Turner (24, p. 154) suggests that the greater the degree of organization in a movement, the more likely strategy choices are to be made under the rational principle, since both bargaining and coercion depend upon the resources of membership and capital.

In the absence of conventional organization (e.g., when a movement is driven underground), Bryan Wilson (26, p. 277) notes that the editor of a movement's official organ is likely to bear most of the leadership responsibility for organizing the movement to enact its strategies.

The target group.--Strategy choices depend greatly upon the nature of the movement's relationship to its target group, according to John Wilson (28, p. 239). Generally, he suggests, persuasion is least likely to harm a positive relationship, while coercion is most likely to cause resentment. Bargaining is intermediate, although it also indicates manipulation rather than consensus.

As the movement's perception of its relationship to its target group changes, preference is given to different strategies. Consequently, strategy changes reflect the leaders' changing perceptions of the degree of subordination of the movement to its target group. Wilson (28, pp. 239–42) identifies three degrees of subordination: partial inequality, dependency, and subjugation.
He suggests that a movement which perceives that its constituents have equal status on some grounds, but not on others, will emphasize the establishment of a favorable bargaining position, and operate from it (28, p. 240).

He suggests that a movement which perceives that its constituents are dependent upon its target group believes that it cannot improve their position without help from the target group. Consequently, there is constraint upon strategies with an emphasis upon persuading rather than defeating the target group. (28, pp. 240-41).

He suggests that a movement which perceives that its constituents are completely dominated by the target group, to the extent of deprivation of civil rights, is likely to adopt militant tactics of intimidation under a coercive strategy. The coercive strategy is typically chosen when the movement has little real coercive power in comparison with the target group. In these circumstances, a protective cover is usually provided by a larger group (a reference public) whom the target group is unwilling to punish. This cover may be provided out of fear of or sympathy for the movement, or a combination of the two. A terroristic campaign depends on the latter. (28, p. 241).

Turner (24, p. 156) theorizes that several circumstances inhibit the target group from exercising its full power against the movement: the necessity of disrupting routines, the costs and risks of severe conflict, the danger of alienating other groups, and the rules and scruples by which it is bound.
He adds that the choice between coercion and persuasion depends upon the effectiveness of these inhibiting conditions. When a movement is willing to undergo repression, it may employ coercion to try to provoke an intemperate exercise of power by the target group. If it is successful, the movement may succeed in inspiring fear and resentment in other groups, and in forming a united opposition to the target group (24, p. 157).

Of course, the relationship between the movement and its target group works both ways. As Lipsky (10, pp. 83-86) suggests, the target group may choose any number of strategies short of compliance with the movement's demands. It may appear to be constrained in its ability to comply, it may dispense symbolic satisfactions or token material satisfactions, it may seek to discredit movement leaders and organizations, or it may postpone action by committing the subject to study.

John Wilson (28, p. 147) notes that, if a relatively weak target group takes an uncompromising position, it is likely to be challenged by the movement. However, if the target group acts swiftly, forcefully, and effectively, he anticipates that the movement is likely to be driven underground.

How the target group is likely to react, he suggests, depends upon its perception of the movement (28, pp. 144-45). If the movement is not perceived to be a threat, it is likely to be ignored. If it is perceived to be a threat, it is likely
to be eliminated. However, if the target group is uncertain about a movement, it will openly tolerate the movement, while trying to inhibit its activities.

Reference publics.--The two-way relationship between the movement and its target group is further complicated by the presence of third parties. No movement stands alone in its efforts to gain concessions from a target group. Every movement coexists with reference publics, many of which are also seeking the attention of the target group. Potentially, some of these groups are conflicting, and others, cooptable. As Turner (24, p. 151) suggests, the latter groups may play influential roles in the selection of strategies, insofar as they may be convinced to support the movement as a tangible expression of their own values. He adds that, in the process of cooptation, both movements benefit from pooling their strength.

When coercion is involved, bystander publics may become a factor. Turner (24, p. 152) defines a bystander public as one whose concern for the movement is minimal, but which reacts to the disruptions and inconveniences caused to those not directly involved in the struggle. Groups such as this are likely to demand that the target group, to whom the relative cost would be least, concede in the interest of peace.

Public opinion.--John Wilson (28, p. 251) suggests that the anticipated reaction of the general public to strategies
is yet another factor influencing strategy choices. The movement must choose the strategy which will generate public sympathy, or at least not violate the norms and values of society. The adroit use of tactics, he adds, can also transform public opinion on an issue.

He identifies the immediate purpose of a coercive strategy as one of desanctifying the target group by forcing it to reveal its own coercive power to the general public (28, p. 252). However, he notes, the effectiveness of this type of strategy depends upon publicity from the press. If the movement is considered insignificant, or is ignored, Lipsky (10, p. 78) adds, the strategy will fail.

Furthermore, Turner (24, p. 160) and John Wilson (28, p. 253) propose, the degree of violence used by the movement will affect public opinion toward a coercive strategy. Although violence is generally considered a normal and legitimate response to violence, public opinion will condemn too great a degree of violence, regardless of the cause. Consequently, Turner (24, p. 161) concludes, violence is an issue in strategy selection to the degree that the movement is subjected to coercion, and to the degree that it lacks or is denied access to other strategies.

A Restatement of the Hypothesis

Restated in conceptual terms, the hypothesis defended in this thesis is that the long-range strategy of the Suffragette
movement was coercion, escalating until the target group exhausted its powers of opposition and conceded, and interrupted only when bargaining opportunities with the target group or reference publics developed.

The three corollaries may be likewise restated. First, the movement's strategies developed in a rational pattern, alternating between increasingly vigorous coercion of the target group and increasingly productive bargaining with the target group and reference publics. Second, the failure of the third Conciliation Bill in 1912 resulted from the movement's apprehension of bargaining with its target group, its refusal to acknowledge reference publics, and its failure to communicate the threat of subsequent coercion. Third, the success of the Representation of the People Act of 1918 resulted from the movement's willingness to bargain with both its target group and its reference publics, and its success in communicating the threat of later coercion.

Sources of Data

The analysis of the Suffragette movement's strategy choices presented in this thesis is based upon a rich body of descriptive, historical data. British women's battle for the Parliamentary franchise is painstakingly described (but rather casually analyzed) in many primary and secondary works. Among these are the Suffragette leaders' autobiographies, documentary accounts of the militant movement, and the
standard histories of the British women's suffrage movement in its entirety.

**Autobiographies**

Among the memoirs of the W.S.P.U. leadership are Emmeline Pankhurst's *My Own Story* (14), Christabel Pankhurst's *Unshackled* (13), Emmeline Pethick-Lawrence's *My Part in a Changing World* (18), F. W. Pethick-Lawrence's *Fate Has Been Kind* (19), and Sylvia Pankhurst's *The Suffragette* (16) and *The Suffragette Movement* (17). Sylvia Pankhurst also wrote a biography of her mother entitled *The Life of Emmeline Pankhurst* (15).

Since many of these works were written decades after the movement's end, discretion is exercised in citing quotations of conversations. However, insofar as these autobiographies provide the most reliable accounts of the leaders' perceptions of the movement's situation (which may or may not coincide with ostensibly factual records), each is important for the discussion of the leaders' role in the selection of strategies.

Equally valuable are the autobiographies of the Union's two most famous members, Annie Kenney's *Memories of a Militant* (8) and Constance Lytton's *Prisons and Prisoners* (11). Each of these memoirs provides first-person data regarding the process of recruitment from the constituency to the membership, the relationship between members and leaders, and the membership's role in strategy choices.
Documentaries

The most familiar secondary account of the Suffragette movement to students of women's suffrage is the one provided in Dangerfield's *The Strange Death of Liberal England* (3). This history of Britain's four tumultuous years prior to the First World War offers a concise narrative of the militant campaign, emphasizing the leaders' role in strategy choices. However, his analysis of the strategic turning points identified in this thesis is dated by the discovery of factual errors in his data (21, p. 237). Consequently, his critical evaluation of the movement has been superseded by more recent works.

First among these is Raeburn's *The Militant Suffragettes* (20), a less critical account which reduces the history of the movement to a series of anecdotes concerning individual members' experiences. Second is Rosen's *Rise Up, Women!* (21), which is probably the most accurate social history of the Suffragette movement. It draws extensively upon the contemporary press, public papers, and archival records, and is documented in great detail. The most recent work exclusively dedicated to the militant movement is Mackenzie's *Shoulder to Shoulder* (12), which presents the day-to-day story of the Suffragettes in diary form. Like Raeburn, Mackenzie tends to be rather anecdotal in her approach. However, her book is an invaluable documentary digest. It includes excerpts from the unpublished
private papers of the leaders, Government and Parliamentary records, and the official organs of the W.S.P.U. It is also extensively illustrated with a rare collection of Suffragette photographs.

**Standard Histories**

Thirdly, there are several standard histories of the British movement as a whole, all dating it from 1866, when the constitutional agitation began. The first of these works is Strachey's *The Cause* (23), which traces the history of both the constitutional effort and the militant campaign, but which focuses on the former (in which the author participated). A more recent history is Fulford's *Votes for Women* (5), which focuses on the militant movement. Finally, Rover's *Women's Suffrage and Party Politics in Britain, 1866-1914* (22) contrasts the two wings of the general movement, and places each in the context of British party politics.

**Other Sources**

Also, in addition to these three groups of works, extensive use is made of contemporary periodicals, which chronicled Suffragette activities, and miscellaneous secondary works on related movements, such as the Chartist, Anti-Corn Law, and Irish Nationalist movements.
CHAPTER BIBLIOGRAPHY


CHAPTER III

APPROACHING A REVOLUTION: THE UNREST STAGE

The unrest stage of the Suffragette movement may be roughly dated from the passage of the Representation of the People Act of 1832 to the defeat of the Women's Enfranchise ment Bill of 1905. The enactment of the former measure established the first statutory barrier to women's suffrage, while the obstruction of the latter measure fostered disillusionment among suffragists with strictly constitutional (i.e., non-militant) methods of agitation. This chapter provides an analysis of the Suffragette movement's strategy during its unrest stage as persuasion. The general conditions which characterized the preliminary period are delineated, and the specific factors which facilitated the resort to militancy are examined.

The first stirrings of feminist unrest in Britain may be traced as far back as 1792, when Mary Wollstonecraft published *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman* (21). In this classic treatise, the rights of women were proclaimed as a necessary expression of the democratic ideals awakened by the French Revolution. However, the seeds from which the Suffragette movement would sprout were not sown until about a half century later (2, p. 145; 20, p. 552).
Characteristic Conditions

During the movement's unrest stage, a general restlessness regarding women's status developed, government became inefficient at protecting women's rights, it attempted reform efforts, discontent spread and became socialized, and class antagonisms between the sexes developed (5, p. 56).

General Restlessness

The compulsory protection of women in mid-Victorian Britain created barriers which even exceptional women found difficult to surmount. But, as individual women did overcome the obstacles, average women began to believe that they ought to have the same rights to freedom and self-development. As Strachey simply puts it, "Discontent and dissatisfaction with the position of women began . . . in individual hearts" (19, p. 30).

A middle or upper class woman was expected to be a lifelong dependent of a man—first of her father, and later of her husband. The home was women's assigned sphere. However, since the employment of several domestic servants was required to maintain middle class status, she was not expected to do housework. Consequently, her only duty being to supervise the servants, she devoted the greater part of her days to music, reading, sewing, or other sedentary activities, which were permitted during her frequent confinement due to pregnancy. Around 1860, eight or more children were born to more than a third of the marriages which took place (17, p. 2).
Outside the home, few employment opportunities were available to women. Lower class women could find jobs as factory workers and domestic servants, but virtually the only positions open to middle class women were those of teacher and governess. Needless to say, these occupations paid only a meager wage. Since women were denied the necessary educational opportunities, they were effectively barred from lucrative professions, such as medicine and law (17, pp. 4-5; 19, pp. 226-27).

Given their tightly circumscribed status in mid-Victorian British society, it is little wonder that women whose aspirations followed unconventional lines began to question the status of women. However, as the early feminists quickly realized, they had no direct political voice, with which to express their grievances to the Government.

**Government Inefficiency**

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, custom alone prohibited women from participating in political life. As late as the early nineteenth century, there was still no law denying votes to women. Historically, the status of women under the electoral laws had been ambiguous.

In medieval times, the statutes identified "people" or "persons" who met certain property and residence qualifications as electors (1, p. 11). Consequently, some women, notably abbesses and peeresses, did vote (18, pp. 31-32).
Apparently, it was not until sometime during the two intervening centuries that the ambiguous term "men" came into use.

The introduction of the term "male persons" in the Representation of the People Act of 1832 made it the first Act of Parliament specifically excluding women (1, p. 12; 5, p. 32; 16, p. 1; 18, p. 32). A similar innovation was made in the Municipal Corporation Act of 1835 (1, p. 13). However, the Interpretation Act of 1850 supported the claim that earlier laws enfranchised women by providing that "in all acts, words importing the masculine gender shall be deemed and taken to include females . . . unless the contrary as to gender is expressly provided" (18, p. 32). Nevertheless, the complaint that this act was applied to women so far as penalties were concerned, but not with regard to privileges, was not accepted.

The series of Parliamentary actions legally disenfranchising women was defended by James Mill:

... all those individuals whose interests are indisputably included in those of other individuals may be struck off from political rights without inconvenience. In this light . . . women may be regarded, the interest of almost all of whom is involved either in that of their fathers or that of their husbands (1, p. 12; 18, p. 3).

Under English common law, a married woman was considered to be under the complete protection and authority of her husband. This additional factor had significant implications for the enfranchisement of married women. As John Stuart
Mill suggests in *The Subjection of Women*, the legal relation of wife to husband made marriage an additional electoral disability for women:

... She can acquire no property but for him; the instant it becomes hers, even if by inheritance, it becomes *ipso facto* his (10, p. 31).

Since the property qualification applied to all electors, no married women could have voted under the existing franchise, even if the disability of sex had been removed.

The argument that most women's interests were protected by their husbands included a popular demographic fallacy. About one quarter of all adult women did not have husbands. Of all women over age twenty in England and Wales in 1861, more than fifteen percent were unmarried, and almost ten percent were widowed (17, p. 3). Furthermore, due to their generally low economic status, few of these women qualified to vote as property owners.

Consequently, the extent of the women's claim for enfranchisement on the same terms as men was extremely narrow. Originally, it applied only to about 350,000 spinsters and widows. While subsequent reforms extended the claim, estimates of the potential number of women voters made as late as 1912 did not exceed 1,500,000 (17, p. 7; 18, p. 26).

Reform Efforts

Most of the Government's reform efforts during the last half of the nineteenth century are attributable to the early
women's movement. In May 1866, this movement began with an unsuccessful petition campaign directed at Parliament (1, pp. 53-56; 4, p. 7; 18, p. 16; 19, pp. 104-5). While the Women's Petition failed to stimulate legislation extending the Parliamentary franchise to women, it did provide the impetus for other reforms concerning their legal rights.

Two major reforms, for which the early suffragists deserve credit, were the Local Government Act of 1869 and the Married Women's Property Act of 1882. The Local Government Act extended the municipal franchise to women taxpayers, and forced a court case challenging the marriage disability. The court ruled that married women who were otherwise qualified could not vote in local elections (1, p. 204; 4, p. 16; 5, pp. 85-87; 18, p. 23; 19, pp. 205-8). To this decision, John Stuart Mill replied:

There is something more than ordinarily irrational in the fact that, when a woman can give all the guarantees required of a male elector . . . an exceptional personal qualification is created for the mere purpose of excluding her (9, p. 481).

A few years later, the Married Women's Property Act granted wives control of their own earnings and inheritance, as well as the right to be parties in legal suits (3, pp. 22-23; 4, p. 29; 5, p. 76; 18, p. 22; 19, pp. 73-76).

During the mid-1880's, the Government produced a reform --of sorts--of its own. In the wake of the Corrupt Practices Act of 1883, canvassing and other election work was taken off
the public payroll, and turned over to the major parties' women's auxiliaries. However, the Conservative Primrose League and the Women's Liberal Federation simply diverted the energies of many suffragists, who were anxious to play even secondary roles in party politics (1, pp. 171-72; 3, p. 30; 5, pp. 93-94; 18, p. 29; 19, p. 279).

Spread and Socialization of Discontent

During the milling period of this preliminary stage, a plethora of new feminist organizations emerged, spreading and socializing discontent among women of all classes. These groups, which widely disseminated propaganda, securely entrenched the issue of women's suffrage, despite its neglect by the Westminster Parliament.

In 1867, women's suffrage organizations were founded in Manchester, London, and Edinburgh; and, the following year, in Bristol and Birmingham (16, p. 1). In 1868, these five major groups chartered a loose federation, the National Society for Women's Suffrage, which was initially concerned with the enfranchisement of spinsters and widows (5, p. 73). However, in 1874, this federation stood against making marriage a statutory, as well as a common law, disability (3, p. 20). Lydia Becker then advised that women's demand for the Parliamentary franchise should strictly follow the precedent set by the Local Government Act of 1869 (1, p. 135; 18, p. 21). Later, during the consideration of a women's suffrage
amendment to the Electoral Reform Bill of 1884, the issue of married women's inclusion was again raised. Many believed that their inclusion would make the bill's demand too great to achieve acceptance, but Millicent Garrett Fawcett successfully pressed the wider demand (3, pp. 27-29; 5, pp. 92-93; 18, p. 22; 19, p. 277).

In 1889, in reaction against the narrower demand for a spinsters and widows franchise, Richard and Emmeline Pankhurst helped found the Women's Franchise League, which pressed for married women's inclusion. This group also supported the reform of marriage and divorce laws to provide equal rights for both sexes. However, the League was forced to disband in the early 1890's, due to a lack of funds and the ill health of several of its leaders, most notably Dr. Pankhurst. He died in 1898 (5, p. 113; 12, p. 20; 13, p. 28; 14, p. 5; 17, p. 17; 19, p. 291).

Mrs. Pankhurst, Christabel, and Sylvia did not return to organized feminism until 1901, when Christabel was appointed to the committee of the North of England Society for Women's Suffrage (11, pp. 39-41; 12, p. 37; 15, pp. 153-54; 17, pp. 24-27). Gaining impetus from the growing demand for men's labor representation in Parliament, this new organization advanced the cause on behalf of working women.

Thus, as women of all classes and statuses were drawn into the incipient movement, feminist discontent grew and endured, despite the neglect of the women's suffrage issue by
Parliament. By the turn of the century, the movement was quickly moving out of the peaceful sanctuary of the drawing room into the rough-and-tumble arena of practical politics.

**Class Antagonisms**

The final pre-condition before the founding of the Women's Social and Political Union (W.S.P.U.) was the development of class antagonisms between the sexes. The early constitutional organizations often aligned themselves with the major English parties by campaigning for those Conservative or Liberal candidates who expressed sympathy with the movement. However, the emergence of the militant movement marked a loss of faith in the male-dominated parties.

In summer 1903, Sylvia, an artist, was commissioned to paint a mural in Pankhurst Hall, a meeting house named in memory of her father. The hall was constructed to accommodate the North Salford branch of the Labor Party, as well as a men's social club. Richard and Emmeline Pankhurst had been among the earliest members of the Labor Party, because its membership was open to both men and women. However, Sylvia learned, the new North Salford branch intended to restrict its membership to men, since it shared facilities with an exclusively male club (8, p. 17). While it is certain that this incident did not reflect the sentiments of the party's National Administrative Council, of which Mrs. Pankhurst was an influential member, she was understandably outraged.
Indeed, it was bitterly ironic that the late Dr. Pankhurst's name was connected with an organization which discriminated on the basis of sex (12, p. 40; 15, p. 3).

Thus, alienated by the male political establishment, and skeptical about the future efficacy of constitutional agitation, Mrs. Pankhurst and her daughters resolved to form a new organization of women, whose permanent motto was to be "Deeds, not words" (12, p. 38). On October 10, 1903, Mrs. Pankhurst invited about twenty women to her Nelson St. home in Manchester. During that meeting, of which scant record survives, the Women's Social and Political Union was founded (17, p. 30).

The Strategic Factors

Notwithstanding the last characteristic condition, the initial strategy of the Suffragette movement may be identified as persuasion. This strategy choice was influenced by several factors.

The Strategic Principles

At its inception, the W.S.P.U. had neither the intra-movement resources (i.e., the ideological justification, the constituent support, and the systematic organization) nor the extra-movement resources (i.e., independence from its target group, support from its publics, and public sympathy) to effectively employ the strategies of bargaining or coercion. Consequently, the Suffragettes chose persuasion,
the strategy which displays the least amount of power. Thus, the rational principle was paramount.

**The Leadership**

As an influential member of the Labor Party, Mrs. Pankhurst hoped to identify the women's demand for enfranchisement with the men's demand for labor representation in Parliament (12, p. 38; 17, pp. 29-30). Originally, she had even wanted to call the W.S.P.U. the Women's Labor Representation Committee, but Christabel reported that the name had already been taken (18, p. 30).

As the founder of the W.S.P.U., Mrs. Pankhurst was the charismatic agitator of the Suffragette movement. From late 1903 to late 1905, she, her daughters, and a handful of other speakers tried to instill enthusiasm for women's suffrage in the Labor Party. They implemented the Union's persuasive strategy by lecturing at meetings of the Labor Party and related organizations, such as trade unions, trades councils, Labor Churches, and Clarion Clubs (17, p. 31).

**The Ideology**

Although the ideology of the Suffragette movement was only beginning to develop during this stage, several of its enduring elements did emerge. At the Union's inaugural meeting, it was resolved that the new organization should be exclusively composed of women, free from party affiliation, and satisfied with nothing but action on women's suffrage. These
three elements comprised the distinctive rationale of the militant movement (14, p. 7).

The Constituency

During its incipient years, the Suffragette movement was essentially a local, working class movement. From late 1903 to early 1906, the W.S.P.U. drew most of its membership from a constituency of working women, who were usually members of the Labor Party. Little is known about the approximately twenty women who attended the first meetings (17, p. 30). However, a few of them did later publish autobiographies. The most widely available of these is Annie Kenney's Memories of a Militant (7), in which she describes how she was recruited into the movement through her developing friendship with Christabel. She exemplified the total commitment to the leaders which was expected of W.S.P.U. members, and even went so far as to characterize herself as "Christabel's blotting paper" (7, p. 193).

In summer 1905, the constituency of the new movement did expand somewhat, when Union speakers toured the north of England. During the movement's early years in Manchester, the scope of its constituency remained rather provincial. However, the decision of the W.S.P.U. not to keep membership records makes it impossible to provide any reliable figures on the growth of the movement during this period (17, p. 46).
The Organization

In late 1903, the newly-founded W.S.P.U. lacked any of the formal trappings of a movement organization. However, the ad hoc nature of the Union's organization was entirely consistent with the charismatic style of Mrs. Pankhurst's leadership.

There was no constitution, but Teresa Billington (later Mrs. Billington-Grieg) reported that "So far as I know, there was never any distress on this account" (17, p. 31). Consequently, there were no elected leaders. Originally, neither Mrs. Pankhurst nor Christabel held any office, since neither wished the W.S.P.U. to be discredited as "just Mrs. Pankhurst and Christabel," or to be known as "a family party" (11, p. 44).

Equally consistent with the charismatic style of leadership, meetings were held irregularly, and its finances were arranged unsystematically. Meetings, which were held on a more or less weekly basis in the Pankhurst home, were open to all women. The Union's funds consisted of small contributions from members, as well as large donations from wealthy sympathizers. However, for this period, there is no evidence that any accounting of W.S.P.U. finances was made (17, p. 31).

The Target Group

During its unrest stage, the target group of the Suffragette movement was the Labor Party, which united the many Labor and Socialist organizations in Great Britain. Among
these constituent bodies were the Social Democratic Federation, the Fabian Society, the Scottish Labor Party, and several trade organizations. The Chairman of the Labor Party was Keir Hardie, who was a Member of Parliament, a fierce supporter of women's suffrage, and a close friend of the Pankhursts (8, p. 11).

Beginning as an unofficial affiliate of the Labor Party, the W.S.P.U. was entirely dependent upon it for publicity, lecture platforms, and audiences, as well as funds. Therefore, it is unsurprising that the Suffragette movement chose persuasion as its initial strategy (17, p. 57).

The Labor Party's status as the Union's target group effectively ended with its concession of support for the late Dr. Pankhurst's Women's Enfranchisement Bill in 1904. At the Annual Conference of the party in that year, Mrs. Pankhurst had been shrewdly aware of the struggling Labor Party's precarious political position:

... Theoretically, of course, a Labor party could not be satisfied with anything less than universal adult suffrage, but it was clear that no such sweeping reform could be effected at that time ... Besides, while a large majority of members of the House of Commons were pledged to support a bill giving women equal franchise rights with men, it was doubtful whether a majority could be relied upon to support a bill giving adult suffrage, even to men (12, p. 41).

Recognizing the party's predicament, she had little difficulty obtaining its cooperation. She simply identified women's suffrage as the first practicable step to full adult suffrage.
Reference Publics

During its unrest stage, the Suffragette movement dealt with two potentially cooptable reference publics, the constitutional women's suffragists and the adult suffragists. The W.S.P.U. made no effort to ally itself with the constitutional organizations, but did, at least temporarily, obtain the acquiescence of the adult suffrage forces.

The constitutional women's suffragists.--On the opening day of the 1903 Parliament, Mrs. Pankhurst accompanied the annual constitutional deputation to the House of Commons. As she described it, this annual event had degenerated into a pitifully empty ritual:

The ceremony was of a most conventional, not to say farcical character. The ladies made their speeches and the Members made theirs. Then, the deputation . . . took its departure, and the Members resumed the real business of life, which was support of their parties' policies (12, p. 39).

Mrs. Pankhurst alienated her colleagues, and shocked their Liberal host by interrupting the polite formalities with a direct question as to what the supporters of women's suffrage in Parliament were willing to do:

Of course, the embarrassed Sir Charles was not prepared to tell us anything of the kind, and the deputation departed in confusion and wrath. I was told that I was an interloper, an impertinent intruder. Who asked me to say anything? And what right had I to step in and ruin the good impression they had made? No one could tell how many friendly Members I had alienated by my unfortunate remarks (12, p. 40).
The adult suffragists.—Mrs. Pankhurst dealt quite differently with the adult suffragists, whom she confronted at the 1904 Labor Conference. She knew that the Pankhurst Bill "would be bitterly opposed by a strong minority, who held that the Labor Party should direct all its efforts toward securing universal adult suffrage for both men and women" (12, p. 41). Consequently, she argued for the extension of the existing franchise to women on the grounds that, while adult suffrage was desirable in principle, it was unattainable in practice. She indicated, quite accurately, that there was insufficient support among either the Liberals or the Conservatives for a complete revision of the franchise (17, pp. 33-34).

Thus, by expressing sympathy for the demand that property and sex be abolished as electoral qualifications, Mrs. Pankhurst was able to convince the adult suffragists that their demand was not politically expedient. She persuaded them that women's suffrage was a practicable and desirable alternative, since it would eliminate one of the two qualifications which they challenged.

Public Opinion

Throughout its unrest stage, the Suffragette movement stirred little response from the general public. Christabel charged that there was a "Press silence on votes for women that . . . by keeping women uninformed . . . smothered and
strangled the movement" and "at the same time, protected politicians from criticism of their offenses, omissive and commissive, against the suffrage cause" (8, pp. 31-32; 11, p. 49). However, there is no reliable evidence that anything like a conspiracy of silence was perpetrated against the movement. In fact, it can be argued that there was simply nothing newsworthy about the early Suffragette movement, since it was following the same peaceful course as its constitutional counterparts. Nonetheless, the deleterious effects of the lack of press coverage were the same as those which Christabel suggested.

Conclusion

During its unrest stage, the Suffragette movement successfully, if temporarily, elevated the issue of women's suffrage to the level of party politics by securing the Labor Party's endorsement. However, in exercising that endorsement, the leadership learned that minority party support was inconsequential when confronted by Government opposition. Furthermore, they realized that additional constitutional agitation, under these circumstances, would be fruitless. As Emmeline Pankhurst later remarked to an American audience:

'England is the most conservative country on earth. Nothing has ever been got out of the British Parliament without something very nearly approaching a revolution!' (16, p. 1).
Consequently, the ensuing events of late 1905 and early 1906 marked the Suffragette movement's transition from the unrest stage to the popular stage.
CHAPTER BIBLIOGRAPHY


CHAPTER IV

RISE UP, WOMEN!:
THE POPULAR STAGE

The popular stage of the Suffragette movement may be roughly dated from the Suffragettes' ejection from the Liberal Party meeting in October 1905 to the decisive General Election of January 1910. The former event confirmed the culpability of the new Liberal Government for the future obstruction of women's suffrage, while the latter event evidenced the perceived effectiveness of Suffragette militancy.

This chapter provides an analysis of the Suffragette movement's strategy during its popular stage as coercion. The general conditions which characterized this actuating period are delineated, and the specific factors which led to the choice of more intimidating methods are examined.

By the Opening of Parliament on February 13, 1905, women's suffrage was a dead issue in British party politics. The diligent constitutional agitation of more than four decades was inconsequential to most Members of Parliament (M. P.s). Various M. P.s had successfully diffused the movement by insisting that women's suffrage was not a party issue. Thus, they diverted attention from the major parties (i.e., distinct collectivities) to individual politicians.
(i. e., an amorphous mass). This maneuver prevented the early suffragists from identifying the agents responsible for women's disfranchisement. Unable to identify these agents, the constitutional movement had no one against whom to rally its supporters, to direct its activities, and to make its claim.

However, during its popular stage, the militant movement forced the Government to address the women's suffrage issue, thereby focusing, spreading, and intensifying feminist unrest.

Characteristic Conditions

During the popular stage of the Suffragette movement, the responsible agents were identified, discontent spread, conflict between the Suffragettes and the Government emerged, the movement organized, and it presented its demands (8, p. 58).

Identification of Responsible Agents

Two events in 1905 exposed the Government's identity as the agents responsible for women's disfranchisement: the derisive defeat of the revived Women's Enfranchisement Bill by the House of Commons, and the censorious ejection of Suffragette representatives from the Liberal Party meeting in the Manchester Free Trade Hall. The former incident identified the culpable party as the Government, while the latter
incident specified it still further as the Liberal Government, which came to power in 1906.

The Women's Enfranchisement Bill.--The late R. M. Pankhurst's Women's Enfranchisement Bill was the first women's suffrage measure to reach Parliament in eight years. For this reason, and since it was being submitted for its Third Reading (i.e., its final vote), it caused great excitement among the women's organizations. However, because it was being revived by the Labor Party, it had to be submitted as a private member's bill. Since such bills receive lower priority than Government measures, it was placed as the second order of the day on May 12.

The first order of the day was a Roadway Lighting Bill, merely providing that carts used on public roads at night should carry lights. The Suffragettes asked both the bill's sponsor and the Conservative Government to withdraw it to allow time for the necessary discussion of the suffrage measure, but both refused. Instead, the routine bill's sponsor proceeded to filibuster, telling humorous anecdotes and jokes to the laughter and applause of his fellow M. P.s. Thus, having its allotted place on the agenda usurped, the Women's Enfranchisement Bill was effectively killed (12, p. 22; 15, pp. 41-43; 16, pp. 50-51; 17, pp. 14-15; 20, pp. 5-6; 21, pp. 37-38; 22, p. 221; 23, p. 292).
This defeat, added to the defeats of countless similar bills during the early constitutional agitation, convinced the Suffragette leaders, particularly Christabel, that a women's suffrage bill could only be passed as a Government measure (14, pp. 53-54).

The Manchester Liberal meeting.—Later in 1905, it became clear that the Conservatives would not be returned to power, and that a Liberal Government would be elected. This changed the climate for women's suffrage, or so it was believed, since the Liberal Party had promised to widen the franchise. Nevertheless, skeptical as to whether this pledge would be applied to women, the Women's Social and Political Union (W.S.P.U.) sent Christabel Pankhurst and Annie Kenney to question the future Liberal Cabinet.

These two young women attended the Liberal Party meeting in the Manchester Free Trade Hall on October 13. In an orderly fashion, first in writing and later aloud, they asked, "Will the Liberal Government give votes for women?" In both instances, they were ignored by those on the platform, including Sir Edward Grey and Winston Churchill, two professed women's suffragists. The Suffragette pair proceeded to unfurl a crude banner, carrying the simple slogan, "Votes for Women." Likewise, it was ignored. Finally, when they persisted in asking their question—loudly—and resisted being ejected from a public meeting, they were arrested (5, pp. 127-
The answer to the Union's question was clear, if implicit. After the General Election, which expectedly brought the Liberals to power, the W.S.P.U. made it clear whom they would hold responsible for women's subsequent exclusion from the electorate.

**Spread of Discontent**

In early 1906, no one fully realized how greatly feminist unrest was swelling in the wake of the Manchester incident's national publicity. However, in January, Emmeline Pankhurst commissioned Annie Kenney to rouse London for its first W.S.P.U. meeting (8, p. 69; 14, p. 53).

Bearing no specific instructions and only two pounds, she joined Sylvia, who was a student at the Royal College of Art in London (16, p. 49). On the advice of Keir Hardie, the two young women hired a hall near Parliament Square, announced a demonstration, and had leaflets printed.

When Mrs. Pankhurst arrived to supervise the final preparations, she was shocked by the proportions of the planned meeting, and feared that the W.S.P.U. would be made a laughingstock. However, it was too late to cancel the event. So, in the remaining weeks, the hopeful Suffragettes chalked pavements, distributed leaflets, typed letters, called on
allies, and canvassed from door to door (15, pp. 54-55; 16, p. 54, 17, pp. 54-56; 21, p. 59).

This first London meeting, which was deliberately planned to coincide with the Opening of Parliament on February 16, was also the first Women's Parliament. It became an annual event, for which women gathered with the specific intention of taking immediate action (20, p. 32). On its inaugural observance, processions marched through London as the King's Speech (i.e., the formally announced Government program) was read in the House of Lords. About 400 women marched from London's East End slums to the Caxton Hall (capacity: 700), where they were joined by women of all classes (16, p. 55; 17, pp. 56-58; 20, p. 32; 21, p. 60).

After a prolonged delay, word was received that women's suffrage had been omitted from the King's Speech. Angrily, the packed house marched through nearby Parliament Square toward the Strangers' Entrance to the House. For the first time in memory, its doors were barred to women. Pressure from sympathetic M. P.s compelled the admittance of a small deputation, but they were unable to find a single M. P. who was both willing and able to introduce a bill on their behalf (5, p. 136; 15, pp. 55-56; 22, p. 16).

At first glance, the factual accounts of this event suggest that it was a failure. However, it served as a dramatic indicator of women's readiness to act. Thereafter, the
Suffragette movement's leaders were armed with the knowledge that growing numbers of women were prepared to protest the disfranchisement of their sex. As Emmeline Pankhurst declared:

Out of the disappointment and dejection of that experience I yet reaped a richer harvest of happiness than I had ever known before. Those women . . . were awake at last. They were prepared to do something that women had never done before—fight for themselves. Women had always fought for men, and for their children. Now they were ready to fight for their own human rights. Our militant movement was established (15, p. 53).

Emergence of Group Conflict

In the ensuing two years, from mid-1906 to early 1908, the Suffragette movement adopted three lines of militant activity: they deliberately courted arrest and imprisonment, they heckled Cabinet ministers, and they campaigned against Government candidates at by-elections. These methods of agitation were described as being militant more for the vigor than for the violence which they involved. Each was chosen as much for its shock value as for its anticipated effectiveness.

Premeditated martyrdom.—Premeditated martyrdom (i.e., deliberately courted arrest and imprisonment on behalf of a just cause) was a tactic which the W.S.P.U. acquired from the Labor Party.

During summer 1896, Mrs. Pankhurst had been cited several times for occasioning an annoyance in Boggart Hole Clough, a Manchester public park where the local branch of the party
regularly held its outdoor meetings. Despite repeated judgments against her, she had been dismissed without a fine or a jail sentence, while other speakers had been fined and imprisoned. She and other Labor leaders claimed that she had received preferential treatment as a prominent, upper-middle class woman (16, pp. 39-40; 21, pp. 19-23).

This charge and the other speakers' imprisonments had generated much favorable publicity for the Manchester branch, which it could not have afforded to purchase. Almost a decade later, martyrdom was similarly premeditated and achieved by Christabel, when she and Annie Kenney defied the police at the Manchester Free Trade Hall.

During the early London years, this tactic proved equally effective. Its three-fold purpose was to embarrass the Government, to draw new members to the W.S.P.U., and to rally public opinion behind the Suffragettes. Following are brief accounts of some of the major clashes between the Suffragette movement and the Government.

On October 23, 1906, a deputation of ten prominent women, which was led by Emmeline Pethick-Lawrence, was permitted to enter the Lobby of the House of Commons. After being snubbed by the M. P.s whom they wished to petition, some mounted chairs and spoke, while the others shielded them. All ten were arrested, convicted, and sentenced to two months. However, in response to the public outcry against the imprisonments, all were released by November 24, most having served
less than half of their sentences (5, pp. 147-49; 18, p. 167; 20, p. 27; 21, pp. 73-74).

At the second Women's Parliament on February 13, 1907, the Exeter Hall was hired to handle the overflow from the Caxton Hall. Notably, at the suggestion of Mrs. Pethick-Lawrence, tickets were sold, and even more women paid to attend the meeting than had come freely the previous year. However, as before, women's suffrage was omitted from the King's Speech. After announcing this, Mrs. Pankhurst exclaimed, "Rise up, women!" Her battle cry was answered by a chorus of "Now!" Then, the occupants of both halls poured into the streets, heading toward the Houses of Parliament. Fifty-four arrests resulted from women's attempts to enter the Palace of Westminster (i.e., the seat of Parliament) (5, pp. 156-57; 16, p. 66; 20, p. 33; 21, p. 80).

On March 8, 1907, a private member's bill, submitted by W. H. Dickinson (Liberal), was predictably killed (5, p. 157; 20, p. 35; 21, p. 82). On March 20, hundreds of Suffragettes peacefully marched, in protest, toward the House of Commons. In Parliament Square, they were met by a cordon of 500 constables. When the women orderly attempted to pass, seventy-four were arrested and, ironically, charged with obstructing the police (5, pp. 158-59; 20, p. 36; 21, p. 82).

Lastly, during the demonstration following the third Women's Parliament on February 13, 1908, Mrs. Pankhurst was
first arrested as a Suffragette (5, pp. 176-77; 15, p. 75; 20, pp. 51-52; 21, p. 99).

While no membership records were kept, it was reported that W.S.P.U. membership increased "beyond all expectation" (19, p. 26), as the result of these incidents of premeditated martyrdom.

The anti-Cabinet heckling campaign.—On May 19, 1906, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Liberal Prime Minister (P. M.), finally consented, after much evasion, to receive a deputation of constitutional and militant suffragists. While he pledged his own support to women's suffrage, he revealed that there was a serious split within his Cabinet over the issue, leaving him powerless to help them. After this meeting, Christabel further identified the responsible agents as the Cabinet ministers, especially H. H. Asquith (then Chancellor of the Exchequer, later P. M., and ever a staunch opponent of women's suffrage) (5, pp. 140-41; 20, pp. 17-20; 21, p. 67).

Beginning in June 1906, the Suffragette movement began an intensive heckling campaign against Cabinet ministers, particularly anti-suffragists, like Asquith. Mrs. Pethick-Lawrence declared, "So far as the power lies in us, we do not intend to allow a single Cabinet minister to speak in public" (21, p. 112).
By October 1908, this campaign was highly organized (20, p. 244). It reached its height on December 5, when David Lloyd George attempted to address a Liberal Party meeting. He was so persistently heckled that it took him two hours to deliver a twenty minute speech (21, p. 113). Thereafter, women had to have signed tickets to attend party meetings. However, this obstacle did little to deter them:

They . . . learnt how to circumvent the police by stratagems and surprises. They arrived in all sorts of guises, and appeared in all sorts of places. Now one would appear as a messenger boy, now another as a waitress. . . . They sprang out of organ lofts, they peered through roof windows, and leapt out of innocent-looking furniture vans; they materialized on station platforms, they harangued the terrace of the House from the river, and wherever they were least expected there they were (22, pp. 311-12).

While none of the anti-suffragists in the Cabinet were persuaded to change their opinions by this tactic, it did serve a purpose. "All this was extremely annoying to the authorities, who felt that they were being put into a ridiculous position" (22, p. 312).

The anti-Government by-election policy. -- During the early years of the new Liberal Government, there was a constant flow of by-elections (i.e., those called between general elections). In addition to the normal vacancies, which were caused by death and illness, each M. P. who was appointed to head a ministry had to stand for re-election (5, p. 159).
The W.S.P.U. by-election policy was to independently oppose all Government candidates, until votes for women were given. From 1906 to 1914, the lifetime of the existing Government, this policy impelled the Suffragettes to campaign against the Liberal Party, and to remain neutral toward the Conservative, Irish Nationalist, and Labor Parties (4, p. 67; 5, p. 160; 16, p. 63; 17, p. 95; 18, pp. 159-60; 19, p. 84; 20, p. 22; 21, p. 84; 22, p. 76). Notably, the Union's subsequent impartiality toward the non-Government parties effectively severed any remaining ties with the Labor Party, save the support of Keir Hardie.

This policy was reportedly inspired by that of the Irish Nationalist leader, Charles Parnell (5, p. 160; 15, p. 18; 16, p. 66):

His policy was a definitive one. He allied the Irish Party to neither of the great English Parties, but aimed at holding the balance of power between the Conservatives and Liberals, while each Party realized that the price of the Irish vote was a pledge to introduce Home Rule. This policy . . . made the Irish question one which British statesmen could no longer treat with contempt (10, p. 51).

Mrs. Pankhurst learned of this policy when her husband was defeated as a Liberal candidate for Parliament in 1885:

... in spite of the fact that Dr. Pankhurst was a staunch supporter of home rule, the Parnell forces were solidly opposed to him, and he was defeated. I remember expressing considerable indignation, but my husband pointed out to me that Parnell's policy was absolutely right. With his small party, he could never hope to win home rule
from a hostile majority, but by constant obstruction, he could in time wear out the Government, and force it to surrender. That was a valuable political lesson (15, p. 18).

The similar W.S.P.U. policy was initiated by Christabel at the Cockermouth by-election of 1906 (15, p. 72; 17, p. 92; 20, pp. 22-23; 21, pp. 69-70).

Notably, however, the policies dictated by Parnell and Christabel were significantly different. Parnell's policy may be interpreted as an example of bargaining. He offered a substantial reward, namely the Irish vote, in exchange for active Conservative or Liberal support of Irish Home Rule. Consequently, the deadlocked English parties had everything to gain by extending support to the Irish Nationalist movement. However, Christabel's policy must be interpreted as an example of negative bargaining (or the threat of coercion). She merely threatened to undercut the Liberal Government's strong majority. Consequently, it had nothing to gain by supporting the Suffragette movement, and nothing substantial to lose by opposing it. Nonetheless, this was the closest the W.S.P.U. could come to duplicating the Irish policy, since it was agitating for the very political weapon which the Parnell forces so adroitly used.

One of the factors contributing to the perceived effectiveness of the W.S.P.U. policy was the uncertainty of its actual effect. Although Liberal candidates were defeated, or at least lost considerable support, in the vast majority
of the by-elections, at which the Suffragettes campaigned, there is considerable controversy concerning their actual impact upon the electorate. There is no indisputable way to measure this effect. However as Mrs. Pankhurst freely admitted:

As to the result as a whole, you must remember we have never pretended that women's suffrage was the dominant issue for the bulk of the electors in the contests. What we do claim is that the force we were able to bring to bear was super-imposed on the other forces which were at work in such a way that it often turned the balance against the Liberal candidate (24, p. 227).

Regardless of the Suffragette movement's actual effect, its perceived effect continually grew, culminating during the Mid-Devon by-election of 1908. The constituency had been a Liberal stronghold since its creation in 1885. In fact, the seat had never been held by any except a Liberal M. P., until the Liberal candidate was defeated in 1908. The ensuing riot testified to the perceived effect of the W.S.P.U. policy. As Mrs. Pankhurst attested:

We were warned that our safety demanded an immediate flight from the town. I laughed and assured our friends that I was never afraid to trust myself in a crowd, and we walked on. Suddenly we were confronted by a crowd of young men and boys . . . who wore the red rosettes of the Liberal party . . . and they were mad with rage and humiliation. One of them pointed to us, crying: "They did it! Those women did it!" A yell went up from the crowd, and we were deluged with a shower of clay and rotten eggs . . . to escape them we rushed into a little grocer's shop . . . but the poor grocer cried out that his place would be wrecked . . . so I asked him
to let us out by the back door... But when we reached the yard we found that the rowdies, anticipating our move, had surged round the corner, and were waiting for us... I was flung violently to the ground... my next sensation was of cold, wet mud seeping through my clothing...

...At that very moment came shouts, and a rush of police who had fought their way through the hostile crowds to rescue us (15, pp. 91-93).

So, while at first, the Government had ridiculed the Suffragettes, saying that their work at the by-elections "produced absolutely no effect upon the electorate," by 1908, the situation was considerably different (5, p. 161; 16, pp. 72-73; 17, p. 181; 20, pp. 44-45; 21, p. 99; 22, p. 80).

Organization of the Movement

During the same period that conflict emerged between the Suffragette movement and the Government, the W.S.P.U. developed into a systematically run organization. (See Table II for a summary of the major events in the organization of the W.S.P.U. through the popular stage.)

The move to London.--The move to London in 1906 wrought several changes in the Union's leadership. The original Central London Committee of the W.S.P.U. consisted of Sylvia, secretary; Annie Kenney, treasurer; and Mrs. Pankhurst and Flora Drummond, members. In late February, Mrs. Pethick-Lawrence assumed the treasurership, while Annie Kenney became the first paid organizer. In May, Teresa Billington (later Mrs. Billington-Grieg) became the second paid organizer, and
## TABLE II
THE MAJOR EVENTS IN THE ORGANIZATION OF THE
W.S.P.U. THROUGH THE POPULAR STAGE,
1903-1910

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spring-Summer</td>
<td>Local branches founded throughout provinces, making W.S.P.U. national organization. Relationship between London committee and local branches is vague.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>June 21</td>
<td>Great Hyde Park meeting is called by W.S.P.U. to demonstrate extent of demand for women's suffrage. Procession of 30,000 women is estimated to have been attended by about 500,000 spectators.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
in June, Sylvia resigned as secretary to return to her studies at the Royal College of Art. She was replaced by Charlotte Despard and Edith How-Martyn as joint secretaries. With these personnel changes, committee meetings moved from Sylvia's Chelsea studio flat to the Pethick-Lawrences' spacious apartments in Clement's Inn. Finally, upon receiving her law degree (with first class honors) from Victoria University, Christabel moved to London to become the Union's organizing secretary. Arriving in October, she lived with the Pethick-Lawrences for the next six years (15, pp. 154-58; 20, pp. 24–25; 21, p. 68).

Emmeline Pethick-Lawrence, a seasoned social worker and a veteran of many reform movements (18, p. 112), was recommended to Mrs. Pankhurst for the post of treasurer by their mutual friend, Keir Hardie, who highly regarded her executive abilities. After a persuasive visit from Annie Kenney, Mrs. Pethick-Lawrence accepted the herculean task of administering the debt-ridden finances of the fledgling W.S.P.U. (15, p. 147). Almost immediately after taking office in February 1906, she began to bring order to the chaos. She, her husband, and Keir Hardie donated enough money to clear the outstanding debts, and Alfred Sayers, an accountant friend, agreed to audit the Union's finances (21, p. 64).

In September 1906, the W.S.P.U. established its official headquarters in two adjoining rooms on the ground floor of
Clement's Inn. This was the first of many steps to put the Union's operations on a more independent, businesslike basis. However, as F. W. Pethick-Lawrence, who leased the offices, confessed, "Incidentally, I was not sorry to recover undisputed possession of my own flat, which was just above!" (19, p. 71). Furthermore, the securing of premises provided a neutral rallying place for "women from every walk of life" (20, p. 26), and "from all grades and classes" (16, p. 62).

The London Committee and the local branches. -- As a result of its by-election work, the W.S.P.U. became a national organization. In every part of England where the Suffragettes campaigned, they left a group of local women who, having been recruited through the by-election campaigns, would form a local W.S.P.U. branch. From summer 1906, such organizing activities kept the movement busy. Teresa Billington, one of the senior organizers, wrote, "We tried to leave a 'cell' or group or at least one worker" (21, p. 83). By 1907, the number of new branches was growing so quickly that it multiplied from 47 in February, to 58 in May, to 70 in August (20, p. 39; 21, p. 88).

No minimum membership was required, and the relationship between the Central London Committee and the local branches was poorly defined. In many respects, the branches were autonomous. While they were encouraged to contribute funds to Clement's Inn, they were under no obligation to contribute
regularly or in a fixed amount. As long as Christabel's policies were followed, they were generally free to run their own affairs. However, in the event that a branch failed to comply with those policies, it could be disaffiliated (21, p. 83).

The Split.—By late 1907, several of the elders of the movement began to resent the stranglehold of the Pankhursts and the Pethick-Lawrences on the de facto leadership of the W.S.P.U. In an effort to democratize the Union, Mrs. Billington-Grieg drafted a constitution. The clauses concerning the objects, methods, and membership of the W.S.P.U. merely codified the existing policies. However, those concerning the organization sought to dilute the influence of the Pankhurst-Pethick-Lawrence faction:

**Organization**

1. The National Officers shall be an Honorary Secretary and an Honorary Treasurer, and such Organizers as are from time to time appointed by the Emergency Committee with the approval of the National Council.

2. The National Executive Council of the Union shall consist of the Officers and one Delegate from every Branch, making due contribution to the Central fund.

3. The contribution required shall be not less than two d. per month per member.

4. The Branches shall pay their Delegate's expenses to the Council Meetings.

5. The Council shall meet every quarter in London.

6. The Emergency Committee shall consist of the Officers and Organizers, and two additional National Representatives appointed by the Annual conference.
7. The Annual Conference of Delegates shall be in October of each year (21, pp. 72-73).

Perceiving the threat of the impending Annual Conference to their autocratic control of the movement, the Pankhursts and the Pethick-Lawrences held an Emergency Committee meeting in September, at which they elected a new Executive Committee, abandoned the Annual Conference, and annulled the Constitution (5, pp. 165-66).

The subsequent events of September and October 1907 irreparably split the militant movement. The Women's Freedom League, a democratic militant organization, was founded by Mesdames Despard, How-Martyn, and Billington-Grieg, who denied the legitimacy of the early September meeting. The coup d'état of the Pankhursts and the Pethick-Lawrences was achieved by ceasing to ask for financial support from the branches, in return for the following pledge of unqualified support:

I endorse the objects and methods of the W.S.P.U., and I hereby undertake not to support the candidate of any political party at Parliamentary elections until women have obtained the Parliamentary vote (20, p. 40; 21, p. 91).

In defense of the Pankhurst-Pethick-Lawrence autocracy, the following excerpt appeared in a letter, which was sent to all W.S.P.U. organizers on September 19, 1907:

We are not playing experiments with representative Government. We are not a school for teaching women how to use the vote. We are a militant movement and we have to get the vote next session. The leaders of this movement are practical politicians;
they have set out to do an almost impossible task— that of creating an independent political party of women. They are fighting the strongest Government of modern times and the strongest prejudice in human nature. They cannot afford to dally with the issue. It is after all a voluntary militant movement; those who cannot follow the general must drop out of the ranks (20, pp. 40-41).

The letter was unsigned, but was almost certainly written by either Mrs. Pankhurst or Christabel, on behalf of the two of them and the Pethick-Lawrences. Most subsequent documents appeared over the signatures of these four leaders.

At its inception, the Women's Freedom League (W.F.L.) consisted of fourteen seceding W.S.P.U. branches. While no membership figures are available, the reportedly small size of its demonstrations suggests that it carried no more than twenty percent of the Union membership. The W.F.L. engaged in activities similar to those of the W.S.P.U., only on a smaller scale (21, p. 92).

After The Split, as this episode was later known, the Pethick-Lawrences jointly founded and edited Votes for Women as the official organ of the W.S.P.U. Its first issue was dated October 1907 (18, p. 76; 19, pp. 179-80).

The growth of the national W.S.P.U.—Credit for the phenomenal growth of the London-based W.S.P.U. is universally given to Emmeline and F. W. Pethick-Lawrence (nee Emmeline Pethick and F. W. Lawrence). Other than the Pankhursts, Mrs. Pethick-Lawrence, the Union's treasurer, was the only person to acquire any officially recognized power (21, p. 64).
After her arrival, the Union's operating budget expanded rapidly. She filled its empty treasury by initiating the sales of literature, seats at meetings, and the like—things which the Suffragettes had trouble giving away the previous year. One of her most ingenious fund-raising schemes was Self-Denial Week. During the week of February 15, 1908, Suffragettes were asked to forego luxuries, perform extra work, or otherwise raise funds for the W.S.P.U.

On March 19, during a meeting in the Royal Albert Hall, she announced from the stage that 2,382 pounds had been raised, and added, "The time has come to pour as much money as women can get together into this movement; we must neither stint nor spare in a crisis like this" (20, p. 52). The crisis was the first Suffragette imprisonment of Mrs. Pankhurst. A chair was prominently placed on the stage. It was empty, except for a placard, which read "Mrs. Pankhurst's Chair." Everyone assumed that she was still in prison. But, at the last possible moment, Christabel announced her release. To the audience's astonishment, Mrs. Pankhurst appeared, and walked slowly to the steps of the stage (20, p. 53). By the end of the evening, over 5,000 pounds in additional pledges were made. The Pethick-Lawrences alone jointly pledged 1,000 pounds annually, in addition to donating their services (18, pp. 181-82).

F. W. Pethick-Lawrence was the only man ever to enter the inner sanctums of the otherwise exclusively female
organization. When his wife was first imprisoned in October and November 1906, he assumed her duties as treasurer for the duration of her confinement and recuperation. Thereafter, he devoted himself fully to the legal and financial affairs of the W.S.P.U. Through February 1909, he held no official post. However, in March, after his wife was again imprisoned, he was formally named joint treasurer. After Mrs. Pankhurst, Christabel, and his wife, Mr. Pethick-Lawrence was the most influential Suffragette leader (18, p. 169; 19, p. 81).

At his insistence, in early 1906, staff work became more regulated. He convinced Harriet Kerr, the owner of a secretarial service, to give up her business to become the Union's office manager (19, p. 71; 20, p. 25). In late 1906, he overhauled the accounting system, separating the sales of literature into a misnamed trading department, the Women's Press. (The W.S.P.U. never did any printing itself.) Alice Knight, a shopkeeper was enlisted to manage this enterprise, which offered pamphlets, badges, postcard photographs of the leaders, and books on the movement (19, p. 73). The Women's Press also sold articles in the Suffragette colors—purple, green, and white—including picture hats, baby bonnets, and scarves stamped "Votes for Women" (20, pp. 38-39; 22, p. 57).

The growth of the W.S.P.U. under the efficient, businesslike management of the Pethick-Lawrences was astronomical.
(See Table III for figures illustrating the rapid financial growth of the Union during the popular stage.)

### TABLE III

**THE FINANCIAL GROWTH OF THE W.S.P.U.**

**DURING THE POPULAR STAGE,**

**1906-1910***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year **</th>
<th>1906</th>
<th>1907</th>
<th>1908</th>
<th>1909</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Surplus</td>
<td>. .</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>981</td>
<td>1,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Income</td>
<td>2,939</td>
<td>7,081</td>
<td>20,233</td>
<td>31,687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Income</td>
<td>2,939</td>
<td>7,546</td>
<td>21,214</td>
<td>33,027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditures</td>
<td>2,494</td>
<td>6,565</td>
<td>19,874</td>
<td>27,908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Income</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>981</td>
<td>1,340</td>
<td>5,119</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**The fiscal year of the W.S.P.U. ran from February to March. All figures are in British pounds sterling.**

The W.S.P.U. also consistently expanded its staff and facilities. As the size of the membership and the scope of their activities grew, there was a concomitant change in the size of the staff, which was necessary to maintain and coordinate the movement. During fiscal 1906, the number of paid organizers in London more than tripled from two to seven, and
the following year, it doubled from seven to fourteen (21, p. 100). There was a corresponding increase in the number attending the weekly At Homes (strategy sessions). During 1907, about 200 attended each session, requiring the expansion of the facilities at Clement's Inn (19, p. 39; 20, p. 71). By February 1908, the figure more than doubled to about 500, and At Homes had to be moved to the larger Portman Rooms to accommodate the participants (21, p. 100). By July, attendance doubled again to about 1,000, at which point the W.S.P.U. leased the Queen's Hall (21, p. 147).

Likewise, the Suffragettes were forever outgrowing their offices at Clement's Inn. Beginning with two adjoining rooms in 1906 (21, p. 71), they occupied six by 1907 (19, p. 71), thirteen by 1908 (21, p. 98), nineteen by 1909 (21, p. 114), and twenty-one by 1910 (21, p. 147).

Finally, the organization's growth during this period is indicated by the growth in size and circulation of Votes for Women, the official W.S.P.U. organ. It began publishing in October 1907 as a 12-page monthly with a circulation of about 2,000. By May 1908, it was a 16-page weekly with a circulation of about 5,000. By February 1909, it was a 24-page weekly with a circulation of about 16,000. And, by February 1910, its circulation was estimated at about 35,000 (21, pp. 115, 133).
The great Hyde Park meeting.—While no membership records were kept, the Union's great Hyde Park meeting exemplified the size and organization of the Suffragette movement. Ironically, this meeting, which was probably the largest ever held for women's suffrage, was inspired by Home Secretary Herbert Gladstone, a Cabinet minister. In the House of Commons on February 28, 1908 (22, p. 221), the Home Secretary suggested to the Suffragettes:

Comes the time when political dynamics are far more important than political argument. You have to move a great inert mass of opinion. . . . Men have learned this lesson and know the necessity for demonstrating the greatness of their movement and for establishing that force majeure which actuates and arms a Government for effective work. That is the task before the supporters of this great movement. Looking back at the great political crises . . . it will be found that people did not go about in small crowds . . . they assembled in their tens of thousands all over the country (5, p. 179; 16, pp. 81-82).

Taking up the challenge, the W.S.P.U. called upon the Pethick-Lawrences to orchestrate an enormous outdoor meeting for sometime during mid-summer. Permission to use Hyde Park was obtained, and a date, June 21, was announced. (A Sunday was chosen, since that was the only day of leisure for many working women, and the only day on which parades could be easily marshalled in the London streets.) Seven processions were scheduled to converge on the park, where the public would be invited to gather. Each procession was organized by a chief marshall, and the entire march was under the control
of "General" Flora Drummond. A massive barrage of publicity was launched to ensure the success of the event (18, p. 183; 19, p. 78).

On the appointed day, 30,000 women peacefully marched to Hyde Park from every corner of London. To accommodate the anticipated crowd, the 20 platforms had been placed about 100 yards apart. However, the immense throng waiting in the park was densely packed between them. The Times, the leading anti-suffragist newspaper, estimated the crowd at about 500,000. However, the Government discounted the event's success by claiming that the vast majority of the spectators were simply curious, rather than sympathetic (19, p. 79; 21, p. 105).

**Presentation of Demands**

The Suffragette movement had persistently presented its demands to the Liberal Government ever since its election in 1906. However, the events from 1908 to 1910 reiterated those demands more forcefully than before, thereby forcing the Government to take some sort of action (6, p. 400).

**Asquith's promise of electoral reform.**—In early 1908, H. H. Asquith, an avowed anti-suffragist, succeeded Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman as Prime Minister (P. M.). On May 20, the new P. M. promised that the Government would introduce an Electoral Reform Bill before the next General Election in 1910. He refused to include women's suffrage in the original
bill, but said he would not object to its being proposed as a private amendment, if it was framed on democratic lines, and "had behind it the overwhelming support of the women of the country, no less than the support of men" (21, p. 106).

Asquith, a shrewd politician, knew perfectly well the fate of private members' legislation, and had found no difficulty in discounting the "overwhelming support" for women's suffrage demonstrated in Hyde Park. In effect, the P. M. was saying that he would allow an amendment, but only one which stood no reasonable chance of passing in the House of Commons, much less the House of Lords.

The Government's continued inaction after the Hyde Park meeting, added to the fact that no larger peaceful demonstration could be imagined, led the Suffragette movement to resume militancy with renewed vigor.

**Rushing the House of Commons.**—On October 13, 1908, about 60,000 people assembled in Parliament Square at the invitation of a W.S.P.U. leaflet to "Help the Suffragettes to Rush the House of Commons" (5, p. 186; 20, p. 64; 21, pp. 110-11). Only 6,000 police were available to control the crowd (21, p. 112). The next day, charges were brought against Mrs. Pankhurst, Christabel, and Mrs. Drummond for inciting a riot. Their trial was postponed for a week to allow time for the defense to subpoena Cabinet ministers Lloyd George and Gladstone, who had witnessed the gathering (18, p. 205).
On October 21, the three Suffragettes' trial began in Bow Street Police Court, and was presided over by a single judge, Curtis Bennett. There was no jury, save the press, which widely publicized the proceedings. Christabel, a Bachelor of Laws (who was denied admittance to the bar because of her sex), acted as counsel for the defense. The prosecution rested its entire case on the violent connotation of the word "Rush" in the leaflet (5, p. 186; 18, pp. 201-2; 21, p. 110).

Challenging the alleged portent of the word, Christabel asked Chancellor of the Exchequer Lloyd George to define "rush":

"I cannot undertake to do that," replied the Chancellor. "Well," she went on, "I will suggest some definitions to you. . . . one of the meanings of the word is 'an eager demand'." "I accept it," said Mr. Lloyd George. "There is another sense in which the word 'rush' is used, and I think it will be of interest to you—we use it in this connection, to rush Bills through Parliament." "Yes, I think I have some experience of that" (18, p. 201).

While examining Home Secretary Gladstone, the other witness for the defense, Christabel implied that, if anyone had incited a riot, it was he:

Chris.: On the action we took on the 13th, is it within your knowledge that we were acting on advice given by yourself?
Wit. : I wish you would take my advice. . . .
Chris.: Did you say . . . that men knew the necessity of demonstrating that force majeure which actuates and arms a Government for effective work?
Wit. : Yes, I think it was a most excellent speech.
Chris.: I agree with you. Did you say that this was the task before the leaders of this great movement?

Wit. : Yes.

Chris.: . . . do you know we have done it in Hyde Park . . . and in other places?

Wit. : Yes.

Chris.: Why don't you give us the vote, then? she flashed out amid laughter from the Court (18, p. 203).

Three additional points made by Christabel further emphasized the absurdity of the charge. First, Lloyd George had brought along his ten year old daughter, Megan, to watch the spectacle. Second, the ability of a mere 6,000 police to control an intently violent crowd of 60,000 was doubtful. Third, the one woman who reached the floor of the House was not only not arrested, but heard. Nevertheless, despite these arguments, the two older women were sentenced to three months, and the younger to ten weeks (18, pp. 202-6; 20, p. 64; 21, p. 111).

The Bill of Rights deputation.--On June 24, 1909, Marion Wallace Dunlop succeeded in stamping a passage from the Bill of Rights of 1869, concerning the right of petition, on a wall in the House of Commons. On June 29, a deputation, attempting to assert that right, marched into Parliament Square. They were met by 3,000 police. The largest number of arrests to date, 108 women and 14 men, resulted from the demonstration (5, pp. 204-5; 15, pp. 138-40; 17, pp. 379-81; 20, pp. 100-5; 21, pp. 118-19).
Hunger striking.--In protest of the treatment being meted out to Suffragettes by the police on the evening of June 29, thirteen women broke windows in Government buildings (e.g., the Privy Council, Treasury, and Home Offices). W.S.P.U. sanctioning of this action was retroactive on July 1.

In the wake of this event, one of the most effective Suffragette tactics was introduced. On July 2, Marion Wallace Dunlop was sentenced to one month. In protest against Second Division (criminal, rather than political) treatment, she began a hunger strike, and was released in four days. Convicted on July 12, the stone throwers obtained release by the same tactic on July 20. Thereafter, hunger striking, which was only encouraged, became a routine practice among Suffragette prisoners sentenced to the Second Division (5, pp. 204-8; 15, pp. 142-49; 17, p. 392; 20, p. 102; 21, pp. 120-21).

Forcible feeding.--Forcible feeding, the Government's tactical response, began later that year. On September 17, P. M. Asquith was scheduled to speak at Bingley Hall in Birmingham. Expecting some action by the Suffragettes, the police cordoned off the entire area surrounding the hall. However, Mary Leigh and Charlotte Marsh managed to reach the roof of a building across the street, from which they rained shingles upon the P. M. as he arrived. In retaliation, the police
drenched the two women, with the use of fire hoses from the street below. Upon their descent, the two Suffragettes were battered by the waiting crowd, with the acquiescence of the authorities (5, p. 206; 15, p. 156; 17, pp. 431-32; 20, p. 117; 21, p. 123).

On September 22, they were sentenced to three months and two months, respectively, in the Second Division. During the previous two and a half months, thirty-seven women had obtained release by hunger-striking. On September 25, the Government announced that it would begin forcibly feeding hunger striking Suffragettes (15, p. 157; 17, pp. 432-33; 21, p. 124). Mary Leigh was the first to be subjected to this treatment:

I was . . . surrounded, forced back on the chair, which was tilted backwards. There were about ten of them. . . . While I was held down a nasal tube was inserted. It is two yards long, with a funnel at the end . . . The one with the funnel end pours the liquid down . . . Before and after use, they test my heart and make a lot of examination. The after effects are a feeling of faintness, a sense of great pain in the diaphragm or breast bone, in the nose and the ears. . . . I was very sick on the first occasion after the tube was withdrawn (12, pp. 126-29).

Within a few days, H. N. Brailsford, a suffragist journalist, resigned his position with the London Daily News to protest its condoning the procedure (20, p. 245; 21, p. 125).

The public outcry against forcible feeding reached its height in early 1910. Lady Constance Lytton had joined the
Suffragette movement some months earlier. Since then, she had protested against receiving preferential treatment (5, p. 213), and had exercised her influence as a peeress to ameliorate the conditions of Suffragette prisoners (10, pp. 190-21; 20, pp. 65-68). However, she is most remembered for her actions in January 1910. On January 14, she disguised herself as a working class woman, and led a demonstration in Liverpool. As "Jane Warton," she was arrested, imprisoned, and forcibly fed. Before being forcibly fed, she did not receive the same thorough medical test, which earlier revealed Lady Lytton's heart murmur. On January 23, after learning her true identity, the horrified Government released her, seriously strained and never to recover (10, pp. 234-95; 15, p. 187; 18, p. 246; 20, pp. 134-39).

The General Election of 1910.—At its dissolution in December 1909, Parliament had been composed of 373 Liberals, 168 Conservatives, 83 Irish Nationalists, and 46 Labor members. After the General Election of January 1910, it consisted of 275 Liberals, 273 Conservatives, 82 Irish Nationalists, and 40 Labor members (5, p. 235; 21, p. 130).

It is impossible to know what the actual effect of the Suffragette movement was upon this election. However, its perceived effect was clearly considerable:

The question which . . . seemed almost dead is now burning. At first . . . it was said that their work at the by-elections produced absolutely no effect upon the electorate. Now however the situation is changed (25, p. 100).
The Strategic Factors

The strategy of the Suffragette movement during its popular stage may be interpreted as having changed from persuasion to coercion, and from lesser to greater degrees of coercion. These strategy changes were influenced by several factors.

The Strategic Principles

The rational and expressive principles operated cooperatively during the popular stage of the Suffragette movement. As the W.S.P.U. acquired the intra-movement resources (i.e., sophisticated leadership, ideological justification, constituent support, and systematic organization) and the extra-movement resources (i.e., independence from its target group, support from its publics, and public sympathy) to effectively employ coercion, both principles came into play. After being implemented, coercion was escalated as much because it seemed to bring the movement nearer its goal (i.e., getting the Government's serious attention) as because it developed a positive image for the movement (in its constituency, as well as in public opinion). As the London Daily Mirror commented in November 1907:

When the Suffragettes began their campaign they were mistaken for notoriety hunters, featherheads, flibbertigibbets. Their proceedings were not taken seriously. Now they have proved that they are in dead earnest, they have frightened the Government, they have broken through the law, they have made votes for women practical politics (20, p. 31).
The Leadership

During the popular stage, the leadership of the Suffragette movement became diversified and highly sophisticated. Emmeline Pankhurst was the charismatic prophet; Christabel, the ideological reformer; and the Pethick-Lawrences, the pragmatic administrators. As F. W. Pethick-Lawrence explained the situation subsequent to The Split:

Mrs. Pankhurst, though theoretically the autocrat of the W.S.P.U., did not, in fact, during the years that immediately followed, choose to exercise any direct personal control. A consummate evangelist, she preferred to expound the gospel of militancy in an endless succession of great meetings up and down the country. . . . she had implicit confidence in Christabel's judgment on matters of policy, and had only a general interest in the expansion of the organization. Thus it came about that the daily executive control of the agitation passed for a time unobtrusively and almost unconsciously into the hands of an unofficial committee of three persons—Christabel, my wife, and myself (19, p. 75).

Though strategy was dictated by Christabel, the influence of the Pethick-Lawrences in her decision to escalate coercion gradually is clear. As Emmeline Pethick-Lawrence disclosed:

While Christabel lived with us she agreed that we had to advance in militancy by slow degrees in order to give the average person time to understand every move and keep pace (18, p. 278).

Furthermore, as Rosen reports:

F. W. Pethick-Lawrence's concern with the relationship between the nature of militant tactics and the likely response of both the public and the Government to use of those tactics . . . distinguished his handling of the practical side of the militant campaign (21, p. 179).
The Ideology

The identification of the responsible agents (or target group) during the popular stage completed the diagnostic component of the Suffragette movement's ideology. This accomplishment facilitated the strategy change from persuasion to coercion, which requires a more specifically identified target group than the former.

Also, having passed through the unrest stage, the movement was able to develop the ideological justification needed to undertake a coercive strategy. As Mrs. Pankhurst explained:

The methods of the National W.S.P.U. are based upon the recognition of the fact that governments act only in response to pressure. Men who wish to bring pressure to bear on the government can do so in a constitutional and orderly manner by exercising their votes.

Women to whom votes have been denied are obliged to substitute other methods. After long years of quiet, patient propaganda, they have now adopted more forceful tactics (25, pp. 99-100).

As the events of The Split illustrated, the positive value placed on autocratic leadership enabled the W.S.P.U. to effectively employ coercion, which requires the orchestration of great numbers of people (e.g., the Hyde Park meeting).

Finally, the ideological constraint (located in the rationale) against forming coalitions with the male-dominated parties prevented the Suffragette movement from establishing alliances, which might have brought it early success.
The Constituency

The W.S.P.U.'s reforming nucleus was originally working class. However, this group attracted the allegiance of other classes. Consequently, during its popular stage, the Suffragette movement came to place increasing emphasis on recruiting middle and upper class support. Thus, its constituency grew (7, p. 529).

The abandonment of the myth that the W.S.P.U. was a working class organization contributed significantly to the subsequent growth of its membership. After October 1906, women of all political persuasions and social classes were equally welcome. Thereafter, the Union began to attract wealthy supporters, who would never have donated to a Labor organization (21, p. 77). For instance, on May 30, 1907, at the Exeter Hall, the W.S.P.U. launched a drive to raise 20,000 pounds. Seeking support and donations, Mrs. Pethick-Lawrence said to the audience, "If you have an influential position, socially or professionally, we want you . . . if you are a working woman, we want you" (21, p. 86). During its Manchester years, the Suffragette movement would never have openly courted the rich.

Commitment and esprit de corps were heightened by participating in demonstrations, attending At Homes, and reading Votes for Women, and these resulted in the escalation of the coercive strategy. However, being a disciplined movement, the Suffragette movement tended to be rationally motivated
(i.e., to move gradually from persuasion to coercion, and from lesser to greater degrees of coercion).

The Split, which resulted in the founding of the democratic Women's Freedom League (W.F.L.), illustrated the use of utilitarian and normative discipline. The Pankhurst-Pethick-Lawrence faction's manipulation of the W.S.P.U.'s financial structure exemplified the former, while its subsequent emphasis upon the quasi-military aspects of its leadership exemplified the latter.

The Organization

The W.S.P.U. acted through a well-organized administrative machine, of which the core was the London headquarters. Its efficiency may be traced, in large part, to the businesslike character of the people, such as the Pethick-Lawrences, from whom the Union drew much of its support (13, p. 172).

The Suffragette movement was the first highly organized movement to successfully adapt itself to the new publicity methods introduced by the national daily papers. Their processions, demonstrations, and bazaars; buttons, badges, and ornaments; parlor games, photographs, and postcards have all been copied by other movements, and exemplified the ingenuity with which constituents were won to the cause.

As has already been suggested in discussing the Pethick-Lawrences' leadership, organization and rational motivation seemed to go hand in hand. Bargaining and coercion, it
should be remembered, depend on the availability and manipulation of organizational resources.

The Target Group

The target group of the Suffragette movement changed from the Labor Party to the Liberal Government during the popular stage. Simultaneously, the perceived relationship of the movement to its target group changed. While the Suffragettes had been dependent upon the Labor Party, they felt subjugated to the Liberal Government. Consequently, the movement's strategy changed from persuasion, emphasizing propagandistic tactics, to coercion, emphasizing tactics of intimidation.

The Suffragette movement had little real power, especially during the early London years. However, the Government was inhibited in its treatment of the women, particularly as prisoners, by its own rules and scruples. Until it began forcibly feeding hunger striking Suffragettes, it was quick to release them once their health was endangered.

As the 1904 constitutional deputation described by Mrs. Pankhurst suggests, the Government strategy consisted largely of dispensing symbolic satisfactions, such as pledges of support (but not votes) for women's suffrage, and of claiming that it was constrained from acting, as P. M. Campbell-Bannerman suggested when he shifted the blame to his Cabinet. During the unrest stage, it had simply ignored the women.
As for its perception of the movement, the Government appears to have been uncertain about the Suffragettes, overtly tolerating their activities, while covertly working to suppress them. For instance, Mrs. Pankhurst reported being silently heckled by young pea-shooters during one by-election campaign:

While I was speaking the fire ceased, to my relief—for dried peas sting. I continued my speech with renewed vigor, only to have one of my best points spoiled by roars of laughter from the crowd. I finished somehow, and sat down; and then it was explained to me that the pea-shooters had been financed by one of the prominent Liberals of the town, another man who disapproved of our policy of opposing the Government. As soon as the ammunition gave out this man furnished the boys with a choice supply of rotten oranges. These were not so easily handled, it appeared, for the very first one went wild, and struck the chivalrous gentleman violently in the neck. This it was that had caused the laughter, and stopped the attack on the women (15, p. 88).

Reference Publics

Granting that hindsight is better than foresight in analyzing strategy errors, the failure of the Suffragette movement to form a coalition with either the adult suffragists (with whom they agreed in principle) or the Irish Nationalists (who inspired their by-election policy) was probably its single glaring mistake during its popular stage. They were prevented from doing this by their ideological constraint against allying themselves with the men's parties, and by their single-minded determination to win
their own demand. The latter is illustrated by the remarks of Mrs. Billington-Grieg regarding the adult suffragists:

To make our struggle the more difficult, we had to fight the adult suffrage demand, to which most of us were not in principle opposed, but which was obviously raised to postpone our equality measure (22, p. 23).

Public Opinion

A final factor leading the Suffragette movement to choose and escalate a coercive strategy was public opinion. After Christabel Pankhurst and Annie Kenney disrupted the Manchester Liberal meeting in 1905, the W.S.P.U. gained substantial publicity, albeit negative. As Mrs. Pankhurst complained:

Ignoring the perfectly well-established fact that men in every political meeting ask questions and demand answers of the speakers, the newspapers treated the action of the two girls as something quite unprecedented and outrageous (15, p. 49).

However, regardless of its nature, such publicity generated great public interest in the movement, attracting new members, and providing the impetus for the move to London—where the Suffragettes became a rich source of news copy. In time, precisely as planned, deliberately sought arrest and imprisonment produced an appearance of martyrdom, which turned public opinion in favor of the W.S.P.U. Furthermore, the later forcible feeding of hunger striking Suffragette prisoners by the Government merely served to amplify the cries of public opinion on behalf of the Union.
To a degree, even the older constitutional suffragists rallied behind the Suffragettes. As Millicent Garrett Fawcett, the constitutionalist leader, wrote in late 1906:

I hope the more old-fashioned suffragists will stand by them . . . in my opinion, far from having injured the movement, they have done more during the last 12 months to bring it within the region of practical politics than we have been able to accomplish in the same number of years (21, p. 75).

Similarly, many London newspapers supported the W.S.P.U. In October 1906, the Daily News (which coined the term "suffragette") claimed: "No class has ever got the vote except at the risk of something like revolution." Simultaneously, the Daily Mirror asked: "By what means, but by screaming, knocking, and rioting, did men themselves ever gain what they were pleased to call their rights" (21, p. 74). And, as Bernard Shaw exclaimed in the London Tribune:

If I were a woman I'd simply refuse to speak to any man or do anything for men until I'd got the vote. I'd make my husband's life a burden and everybody miserable generally. Women should have a revolution. They should shoot, kill, maim, destroy until they are given the vote (20, p. 16).

In late 1906, the words of the playwright were not just supportive; they were prophetic.

**Conclusion**

During its popular stage, the Suffragette movement succeeded in obtaining widespread support in the press, the overwhelming sympathy of the public, and a solid majority
in the House of Commons. However, the leadership failed to recognize the importance of securing the support—or merely the acquiescence—of key third party groups, such as the adult suffragists and the Irish Nationalists. Nonetheless, the events of early 1910, which were based upon the perceived effect of the W.S.P.U. by-election policy, marked the Suffragette movement's transition from its popular stage to its formal stage.
CHAPTER BIBLIOGRAPHY


CHAPTER V

BRICKBATS FOR WINDOWS AND VOTES FOR WOMEN:
THE FORMAL STAGE

The formal stage of the Suffragette movement may be roughly dated from the creation of the Conciliation Committee for Women's Suffrage in spring 1910 to the close of the violent campaign of 1912-1914. The former development was the Government's response to the perceived impact of militancy (especially the anti-Government by-election policy), while the latter development was the movement's response to the Government's sabotage of the Conciliation Bill. (The resort to window-smashing and arson also indicates the breakdown of the negotiations characteristic of this period.)

This chapter provides an analysis of the Suffragette movement's strategy during its formal stage as a combination of negative bargaining and coercion. The general conditions which characterized this initially peaceful period of discussion are delineated, and the specific factors which led to the truce and the subsequent outbreak of violence are examined.

When the Liberal Government resumed office in 1910, its 205 seat majority over the Conservatives was virtually eliminated. In the new Parliament, the two major parties were practically in a stalemate, holding 275 seats and 273 seats,
respectively. However, the Liberal Party was able to maintain its weakened grip on the Government by allying itself with the 82 Irish Nationalists and the 40 Labor members (45, p. 488; 50, p. 130; 53, pp. 100-1).

By the dissolution of the previous Parliament, the Lord's Veto controversy (19, p. 173) and the Irish Home Rule question (1, p. 191) had surged to the fore. Both of these great constitutional problems were of a kindred nature to women's suffrage, insofar as all three dealt with the basic elements of democracy, and seemed about to be decisively settled (54, p. 318). Indeed, the settlement of these two other issues had significant implications (which become apparent) for the settlement of the women's claim.

From 1906 to 1910, the Suffragette movement had successfully compelled the House of Commons to cease considering votes for women as an issue to which it could safely continue to pledge support in principle without implying further commitment. By 1910, women's claim for enfranchisement was no longer a marginal issue in British party politics.

Characteristic Conditions

During the formal stage of the Suffragette movement, a discussion public was formed, motives and aims were established, conflict in the ranks resulted in a seizure of power, the movement coalesced around an organization, and its literature developed (26, p. 63).
Formation of Discussion Public

On January 31, 1910, at a Queen's Hall meeting of the Women's Social and Political Union (W.S.P.U.), Emmeline Pankhurst declared a truce from militancy. Although the Suffragettes maintained their anti-Government by-election policy, only constitutional methods were used in subsequent campaigns. Despite the omission of votes for women from the King's Speech, read at the Opening of Parliament on February 21, the truce continued to be honored. The cessation of militancy was complete (21, p. 222; 41, pp. 166-67; 43, p. 95; 44, p. 489; 46, p. 248; 47, p. 87; 49, p. 140; 50, p. 131; 51, p. 68; 54, p. 316).

This surprising change of strategy was unprecedented in the history of the Suffragette movement. Consequently, many rumors began to circulate. The most widely rumored explanation for the truce was that:

...the militant leaders have reached a diplomatic agreement with the leaders of the Government, by which the question of suffrage will be laid before Parliament next year if not sooner, and will be given ample opportunity for consideration (58, p. 532).

The Conciliation Committee.—In early spring, the rumor was confirmed by the formation of the Conciliation Committee for Women's Suffrage in the House of Commons. This body was headed by the Earl of Lytton (Lady Constance Lytton's brother) as chairman, and H. N. Brailsford (the suffragist
journalist and the only member of the committee not a Member of Parliament), as Secretary; and composed of 28 Liberals, 17 Conservatives, 6 Irish Nationalists, and 6 Labor members (21, p. 221; 41, p. 168; 43, p. 95).

The committee framed a private member's bill, which they believed could obtain the support of Members of Parliament (M. P.s) from all parties. Particularly wary of possible opposition from Conservatives and moderate Liberals, they made the bill sufficiently narrow to receive their support. It would only enfranchise about 500,000 women, few of whom would be married (since husband and wife could not qualify with respect to the same property) or working class (due to the property qualification) (20, p. 73; 44, p. 491; 46, p. 248; 47, p. 87; 49, p. 140; 51, p. 129). The bill read as follows:

A Bill to Extend the Parliamentary Franchise to Women Occupiers

1. Every woman possessed of a household qualification, or of a ten pound occupation qualification, within the meaning of the Representation of the People Act of 1884, shall be entitled to register as a voter, and, when registered, to vote for the county or borough in which the qualifying premises are situated.

2. For the purposes of this act, a woman shall not be disqualified by marriage for being registered as a voter, provided a husband and wife shall not both be qualified in respect of the same property (33, p. 158; 41, p. 189; 50, p. 134).

The leaders of both the National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies (N.U.W.S.S.) and the W.S.P.U. gave their
official endorsements to the proposed Conciliation Bill. Following are the brief statements issued by Millicent Garrett Fawcett and Emmeline Pankhurst, respectively:

The present electorate consists of 7,705,717 men. This bill would add to it approximately one million women. It falls short of the demand made by the suffrage societies, but on the other hand, it admits the great principle for which we stand—that sex should not, like crime or lunacy, form a disqualification for the most elementary of the rights of citizenship (25, p. 1443).

It is better that a million women should have the ballot than that none should, and the granting of suffrage to that vast number must inevitably lead to its extension, just as it has done in the case of men (25, p. 1443).

Accompanied by these statements of measured optimism, the proposed measure was widely published as part of the propaganda effort to stir discussion and to gather support. In his own statement as chairman of the Conciliation Committee, Lord Lytton placed the ultimate responsibility for the fate of the bill squarely upon the shoulders of the Liberal Government:

There must be bitter reaction of feeling if the newly awakened hopes are disappointed, and this golden opportunity is lost. Everything depends on the Government; the issue is in their hands alone. An overwhelming majority of the present House of Commons supports the bill, a majority drawn from the Liberal, Conservative, Irish and Labor parties alike. Nothing is now wanting, but for the necessary time for putting the bill into law (25, p. 1443).

Prison Rule 245a.—When the Liberal Government resumed office in February 1910, Winston Churchill succeeded Herbert
Gladstone (who was made Governor of South Africa) as Home Secretary (37, p. 366; 50, p. 133). On March 15, as a concession to the truce declared by the W.S.P.U., Churchill issued a new prison rule, 243a, designed specifically for the Suffragettes. The rule read as follows:

In the case of any offender of the Second or Third Division whose previous character is good, and who has been convicted of, or committed to prison for, an offense not involving dishonesty, cruelty, indecency, or serious violence, the Prison Commissioners may allow such ameliorations of the conditions prescribed in the foregoing rules as the Secretary of State may approve in respect of the wearing of prison clothing, bathing, hair-cutting, cleaning of cells, employment, exercise, books, and otherwise. Provided that no such amelioration shall be greater than that granted under the rules for offenders of the First Division (33, p. 183; 47, p. 83; 49, p. 151; 50, pp. 133-34).

Since it would greatly improve prison conditions for Suffragettes, should militancy be resumed, the new rule was welcomed by the W.S.P.U. as a positive step. As Emmeline Pethick-Lawrence reported, after her next imprisonment:

A change for the better had taken place since my first imprisonment. From the older part of the prison, suffragettes were now entirely excluded. They were housed in a recently built part of the prison. The cells in this wing were clean and well-lighted. There was twice the window space and the glass was transparent. Ventilation was improved, though it remained far from adequate until suffragettes took to breaking the windows, and as a consequence obtained for Holloway prisoners windows that could be opened. A nightdress, a new or at any rate thoroughly cleansed brush and comb, and a new toothbrush had been added to the supply of necessities. No longer was food supplied in tins that were cleaned with brick dust. Each cell now retained its own earthenware mug and plate and the unhygienic wooden spoon was replaced by a bright metal
one. Three hours of the twenty-four were now spent in associated labor... the mere fact of association with other human beings was a relief in the day's monotony (46, pp. 224-25).

This new "one-and-a-half class" (46, p. 83), as F. W. Pethick-Lawrence later dubbed it, was equally valuable from the Government's viewpoint, since it allowed them to grant Suffragette prisoners First Division treatment, while still withholding First Division (i.e., political prisoner) status, and thus to effectively undercut the rationale previously given by hunger strikers to gain public sympathy.

**From Prison to Citizenship Procession.**--The largest suffrage demonstration to date was planned for May 28, but was postponed, due to the death of Edward VII on May 6. On June 18, 1910, the W.S.P.U. led a procession of all the suffrage organizations supporting the Conciliation Bill. Crowded ranks of over 10,000 women marched from Trafalgar Square to the Royal Albert Hall. Heading the three mile long procession, under a banner inscribed "From Prison to Citizenship," were 617 former Suffragette prisoners, clad in white (20, p. 76; 21, pp. 236-37; 33, pp. 158-59; 43, p. 95; 49, p. 143; 50, p. 137; 54, p. 316). As Mrs. Pankhurst later reported:

The immense Albert Hall, the largest hall in England, although it was packed from orchestra to the highest gallery, was not large enough to hold all the marchers. Amid great joy and enthusiasm, Lord Lytton delivered a stirring address in which he confidently predicted the speedy advance of the bill (41, p. 171).
The first Conciliation Bill.--The Second Reading debate of the first Conciliation Bill (introduced by D. J. Shackleton, Labor) occurred on July 11 and 12, 1910. Although the bill passed its Second Reading with a majority of 109 in favor, it was also referred to a Committee of the Whole House, which is tantamount to killing a bill (51, p. 222). Consequently, the vote appears to have been one for the principle of women's suffrage, but against the particular bill.

To the horror of the Suffragettes in the galleries of the House, the bill was attacked by two professed suffragists, David Lloyd George and Winston Churchill, on the grounds that it was "undemocratic," and according to the Speaker, incapable of amendment in its present form (21, p. 226; 43, p. 96; 44, pp. 495-96; 49, pp. 147-48; 50, pp. 136-37; 51, p. 129). (See Table IV for the legislative history of the Conciliation Bill from 1910 to 1912.)

Forseeing the controversy which arose over the property qualification, the Conciliation Committee had commissioned a study to determine the representativeness of their household suffrage proposal. Following is a brief summary of the results and the conclusions:

The Conciliation Bill . . . would, if passed, enfranchise approximately 1,000,000 women, and it was proved conclusively, by careful analysis of the social status of women householders in a large and representative group of constituencies, that the overwhelming majority of these would be working class women. In London (1908) the proportion
of working class women was shown to be 87 percent, in Dundee (1910), 89 percent, Bangor and Carnarvon (1910), 75 percent. The average in about fifty representative constituencies, where the investigation was conducted under the auspices of the . . . Labor Party, was shown to be 82 percent. The Bill gave no representation to property whatever. The only qualification which it recognized was that of the resident householder (21, p. 75).

The proposal of household suffrage for women was, indeed, no innovation. More than forty years earlier, it had been the basis upon which the local vote was granted to women. However, the householder qualification was not as controversial as the clause dealing with married women.

Apparently, the provision that a husband and wife could not qualify with respect to the same property convinced Lloyd George and Churchill that the majority of the proposed women electors would be propertied spinsters and widows, who would probably vote Conservative. However, while it is true that few married women could have qualified, spinsters and widows could only have qualified with respect to their premises of residence. Consequently, as the Conciliation Committee study suggested, many working class women homeowners would have qualified. Thus, the fear that property would have been over-represented appears to have been unfounded.

*The proposed Conciliation Bill (quoted on p. 116) actually recognized all women occupiers. The two classes of occupiers were householders, who paid rates (i.e., local taxes) on their premises of residence; and occupants, who tenanted shops, offices, and other non-residence premises on which their landlords paid at least ten pounds annually in rates. However, since a negligible number of women were occupants, the bill was commonly referred to as a household suffrage measure (51, pp. 26-27).*
Regardless of these complexities, the Suffragettes felt that they had been betrayed by the two professed supporters. As Lady Rachel Strachey reflected:

All the real supporters of the Cause, whatever their Party, were agreed that the only form of Bill which was likely to succeed was one on the limited "Conciliation" basis. The Labor men, much as they wanted to see adult suffrage on its merits, admitted that it was vain to expect to get votes for women by that road, and not only supported the "limited" measure but forced its endorsement upon their Party. But some of the Liberal friends were not so single-minded. They saw in the adult movement a chance of escaping from the difficulty of having to deal with the question at all, and accordingly they used the basis of the franchise to sidetrack the whole unwelcome and distasteful affair (54, p. 317).

From the end of July through November, Parliament was recessed over the Lord's Veto controversy. The House of Lords had vetoed the Liberal budget of Chancellor of the Exchequer Lloyd George, and the Government had decided to call a new election in the hope of increasing its majority and overriding the House of Lords. Consequently, no further facilities were available for the Conciliation Bill (50, p. 137).

Black Friday.—On November 18, Parliament reconvened. Asquith announced that the Crown had been advised to dissolve Parliament in ten days, and that, until that time, Government measures would take precedence. When word of the Prime Minister's (P. M.'s) omission of the Conciliation Bill from his speech reached the waiting W.S.P.U. meeting in the Caxton Hall, a deputation of 300 women, divided into detachments of
twelve, was directed toward the House of Commons. As usual, the Suffragettes rushed the police in Parliament Square, but on this occasion, they experienced unexpected brutality. Instead of arresting the women as soon as they committed technical obstruction, the police violently assaulted them. Women were kicked, their arms were twisted, their noses were punched, their breasts were gripped, and knees were thrust between their legs. After a 6 hour struggle, 115 women and 4 men had been arrested. The next day, Home Secretary Churchill ordered most of the charges dropped (11, pp. 158-62; 21, p. 230; 33, pp. 162-67; 41, pp. 178-82; 43, p. 502; 46, pp. 248-50; 49, pp. 152-54; 50, pp. 138-39; 51, pp. 133-34).

The W.S.P.U. blamed Churchill for the travesty. However, as he later reported to the House of Commons, the police had acted under orders previously issued by Gladstone to curb arrests for merely technical obstruction. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that this factor alone resulted in such violence (50, p. 138).

A more likely explanation may be found in the seemingly innocuous decision to bring in a fresh detachment of police for the occasion. Previously, the Suffragettes had been peacefully—indeed, somewhat sympathetically—restrained by the constables of the A Division, the regular police guard for the House of Commons. But, on Black Friday (as the day
was later known), detachments had been called up from the East End slums. Doubtless, the inexperience of these officers in handling Suffragettes and the prevalence of police brutality in the poorer districts of London account for the unjustified violence against the women (21, p. 231; 33, pp. 168-69; 41, pp. 182-83; 49, pp. 154-55).

The special General Election of December 1910 left the new House of Commons virtually the same as the old. The Liberals won 272 seats; the Conservatives, 272; the Irish Nationalists, 84; and Labor, 42 (9, p. 828; 50, p. 145).

The second Conciliation Bill.—In 1911, the truce was resumed in honor of the Coronation of George V. When the new Parliament opened, the Conciliation Bill received no mention in the King's Speech. However, Sir George Kemp (Liberal), who drew the first place in the private members' ballot, announced that he would introduce the revised bill, thereafter titled "A Bill to Confer the Parliamentary Franchise on Women," which was capable of free amendment to eliminate the objections of Lloyd George and Churchill (41, pp. 194-95; 50, p. 146).

During early spring, the passage of resolutions in support of the new Conciliation Bill by eighty-six city and town councils evidenced the widespread popularity of the bill (22, p. 236; 25, p. 401; 50, p. 147; 51, p. 117).
In its revised form, it passed its Second Reading with a majority of 167 in favor, and was referred to a Committee of the Whole House. However, unlike the previous year, the latter action was regarded as a challenge to the P. M. to promise to provide facilities, rather than as a defeat (11, p. 163; 20, pp. 77-78; 33, p. 172; 43, p. 99; 46, pp. 251-52; 47, p. 87; 49, p. 161; 54, p. 318). (See Table IV for the legislative history of the Conciliation Bill from 1910 to 1912.)

**TABLE IV**

**THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CONCILIATION BILL FROM 1910-1912**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Bill and Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>Jul. 11</td>
<td>2nd Reading debate on 1st Conciliation Bill, introduced by D. J. Shackleton (Labor). Majority of 109 in favor. Referred to Committee of Whole House.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>May 5</td>
<td>2nd Reading debate on 2nd Conciliation Bill, introduced by Sir George Kemp (Liberal). Majority of 167 in favor. Referred to Committee of Whole House.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>Mar. 28</td>
<td>2nd Reading debate on 3rd Conciliation Bill, introduced by J. T. Agg-Gardner (Conservative). Majority of 14 against.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources: See footnotes in text.*
In subsequent statements by Cabinet ministers, the Government announced that the balance of the 1911 session would be required for Government measures, but pledged to provide a week for the final stages of the Conciliation Bill (provided, of course, it passed the Second Reading a third time) in the first session of 1912 (10, p. 93; 20, p. 78; 21, p. 236; 41, p. 195; 43, p. 99; 46, p. 252; 47, p. 87; 49, p. 161; 50, p. 148; 51, p. 130). The suspicions of the Suffragettes were allayed somewhat when, on June 16, Asquith wrote to Lord Lytton clarifying his pledge:

In reply to your letter... it follows (to answer your specific inquiries), that the "week" offered will be interpreted with reasonable elasticity, that the Government will interpose no reasonable obstacle to the proper use of the closure, and that if (as you suggest) the bill gets through committee in the proposed time, the extra days required for report and third reading will not be refused.

The Government... are unanimous in their determination to give effect, not only in the letter but in the spirit, to the promise in regard to facilities which I made on their behalf before the last general election (41, p. 196; 43, p. 99).

The Coronation Procession.—Reassured by the unequivocal declaration that the Government would permit the Conciliation Bill to pass before the end of the existing Parliament, the Suffragette movement was permeated by a state of euphoria. On June 17, 1911, the W.S.P.U. sponsored a magnificent gala pageant from the Victoria Embankment to the Royal Albert Hall, where Christabel confidently spoke of Asquith's assurances.
The procession of about 40,000 women, 5 abreast and 7 miles long, was headed by about 700 former Suffragette prisoners, marching under the "From Prison to Citizenship" banner. Also included in the parade were floats, historical costumes, and emblems of women's trades and professions (21, p. 237; 24, p. 401; 46, p. 253; 49, pp. 161-62; 50, p. 149).

Among the organizations taking part were the Conservative and Unionist Women's Franchise Association, the Actresses' Franchise League, the Free Church League for Woman Suffrage, the Men's Political Union for Women's Enfranchisement, the Women Writers' Suffrage League, the Fabian Women's Group, the Catholic Women's Suffrage Society, and most notably, the National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies, which had never previously accepted a W.S.P.U. invitation (50, p. 149; 54, p. 320).

The torpedoing of the Conciliation Bill.--Throughout spring and autumn 1911, everything pointed to the adoption of the Conciliation Bill by March 1912. However, as Lloyd George later put it, Asquith "torpedoed" the measure. On November 7, 1911, the P. M. received a deputation from a little-known adult suffrage organization called the People's Suffrage Federation (P.S.F.). While upholding his promise regarding the Conciliation Bill, he declared that the Government intended to introduce a Manhood Suffrage Bill, which would be capable of amendment to include women. There had been absolutely no
demand for such a bill either within or outside the Liberal Party. Both the Labor Party and the P.S.F. sought full adult suffrage for both sexes, but pledged to withhold support for any further extension of the franchise to men until women were included (6, p. 1218; 11, pp. 163-64; 20, p. 77; 24, p. 401; 43, p. 101; 46, p. 257; 54, p. 319).

Scathing editorial comments and indignant letters to editors flooded the press. The Manchester Guardian called the exclusion of women:

an outrage and, we hope, an impossibility. . . . 
No Government calling itself Liberal could so far betray Liberal principles without incurring deep and lasting discredit and ultimate disaster (20, p. 80).

The Saturday Review said:

With absolutely no demand, no ghost of a demand, for more votes for men, and with--beyond all cavil--a very strong demand for votes for women, the Government announce their Manhood Suffrage Bill and carefully evade the other question! For a naked, avowed plan of gerrymandering no Government surely ever did beat this one (41, pp. 206-7).

As for the chances of a women's suffrage amendment, the London Evening News declared:

Mr. Asquith's bombshell will blow the Conciliation Bill to smithereens, for it is impossible to have a manhood suffrage for men and a property qualification for women. True, the Premier consents to leave the question of women's suffrage to the House, but he knows well enough what the decision of the House will be. The Conciliation Bill had a chance, but the larger measure has none at all (41, p. 207).
Speaking on behalf of the Labor Party, M. P. Ramsay McDonald issued the following statement to the Manchester Guardian:

We shall take care that the Manhood Suffrage Bill is not used to destroy the success of the women's agitation, because we have to admit that it has been the women's agitation that has brought the question of the franchise both for men and women to the front at the present time (20, p. 80).

And, expressing the individual woman's indignation at being so put upon by the Government, Mrs. Bernard Shaw wrote to The Times:

I am overwhelmed by an impulse of blind rage at the thought that the vilest male wretch who can contrive to keep a house of ill-fame shall have a vote, and that the noblest woman in England shall not have one because she is a female (20, p. 79).

Ironically, Lloyd George openly rejoiced that the Conciliation Bill had been "torpedoed" to make way for a democratic amendment to the Manhood Suffrage Bill. The W.S.P.U. called upon him to either produce a Government measure granting women's suffrage or to resign. His only response was to charge that the Suffragettes wanted to "pack the Register for the Tories" (43, p. 102). Likewise, having received yet another—and now an even more suspect—promise from the Government not to obstruct a householder amendment to its bill, the National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies believed that victory was at hand (20, p. 81).

However, sharing the sentiments of the editors of the London Evening News, Christabel declared that if the anomaly
of a sexual double standard did not defeat such an amended franchise bill, the lack of Government support—which Asquith, as a professed anti-suffragist, would surely withhold—would (50, p. 151).

Brickbats for windows.—On November 17, Asquith received a women's suffrage deputation, claiming that the introduction of the Manhood Suffrage Bill would have no adverse effect on the chances of the third Conciliation Bill (11, p. 164; 20, p. 82; 21, p. 244; 41, p. 208; 43, p. 103; 46, p. 258; 49, p. 164; 50, p. 153; 54, p. 321). However, by this juncture, even the anti-suffragist newspaper, The Times, was suspicious of the P. M., admitting:

We confess to some difficulty in gathering with any certainty what the Government's real intentions are, and experience warns us against interpreting Mr. Asquith's words in their plain and obvious sense (50, p. 153).

On November 21, a decoy deputation was led by Mrs. Pethick-Lawrence from the Caxton Hall to Parliament Square. Meanwhile, a select group of Suffragettes was chosen for the actual mission. While 1,800 police approached and dispersed the official deputation with unexpected ease, the other women, in twos or threes or alone, made their way along the Strand, using stones or hammers provided by the W.S.P.U. to break the windows of Government offices and, for the first time, business premises. Windows were smashed at the Treasury Building, the Scottish Office, the National Liberal Club,
the War Office, the Home Office, the Daily Mail and the Daily News, the Westminster Palace Hotel, and several small businesses. The Independent reported: "There was scarcely a building on the left side of Parliament Street, as far as Trafalgar Square, that did not suffer from the raid" (55, p. 1169). The amount of damage was estimated at 1,000 pounds. The number of arrests, 220 women and 3 men, set a new record for a single demonstration. Mrs. Pankhurst's defense of Suffragette violence recalled Black Friday:

Why should women go into Parliament Square and be battered about and be insulted, and, most important of all, produce less effect than when they use stones? We tried it long enough. We submitted for years patiently to insult and to assault. Women had their health injured. Women lost their lives. We should not have minded that if that had succeeded, but that did not succeed, and we have made more progress with less hurt to ourselves by breaking glass than ever we made when we allowed them to break our bodies (7, p. 393).

On March 1, 1912, after persistent warnings to which the Government gave no response, the W.S.P.U. announced a second window-smashing raid for March 4. At a dinner celebrating the release of the November stone throwers, Mrs. Pankhurst declared: "The argument of the stone, that time-honored political weapon, is the argument I am going to use!" (43, p. 104; 49, p. 166). Then, unannounced, a mass window-smashing raid was conducted in the wealthiest shopping district of London's fashionable West End. Bands of women, "all dressed like the well-to-do" (7, p. 390), invaded the Strand, Charing
Cross Road, Regent Street, Piccadilly Circus, Grosvenor Crescent, Oxford Street, Kensington, and Bond Street. They broke the large plate-glass windows of jewelry shops, tailoring establishments, hotels, and the usual Government buildings. The authorities were taken completely unaware, but by sunrise, "true skirmishing in a guerilla sense" (7, p. 390) had occurred between the Suffragettes and the police (33, p. 187; 43, p. 105; 49, p. 167). The damage was estimated at 5,000 pounds, and police arrested 124 women, including Mrs. Pankhurst (21, p. 249; 50, p. 157).

After this raid and a further outbreak on the announced date, the Government raided Clement's Inn, arresting the Pethick-Lawrences, and impounding the contents of the Union's offices. Christabel had been out of the building when the authorities descended. Upon learning of the raid, she realized that she was now the only free W.S.P.U. leader. She fled across the Channel to Paris as "Amy Richards," an American tourist. Thereafter, safe from extradition, she dictated strategy through Annie Kenney or other liaisons, who would rendezvous with her at her apartment in the Hotel Cite Bergere (33, p. 188; 41, pp. 221-22; 43, pp. 105-6; 46, pp. 245-47; 47, p. 89; 49, pp. 169-70; 50, pp. 163-64).

The third Conciliation Bill.---On March 28, 1912, the third Conciliation Bill (introduced by J. T. Agg-Gardner, Conservative) received its Second Reading. The bill---the same
bill for which a majority of 167 had been in favor the previous year—was narrowly defeated by a majority of 14. (See Table IV for the legislative history of the Conciliation Bill from 1910 to 1912).

The constitutional suffragists claimed that the "desperate" (6, p. 1218) militancy of the Suffragettes in November 1911 and March 1912 alienated Conservative support for the bill, and consequently blamed them for the defeat (7, p. 394; 21, p. 257). However, this criticism had been effectively disarmed prior to the Second Reading vote. As the Liberal London Daily News asked:

Can it be said that to grant women the suffrage after a succession of outrages would be to create a dangerous precedent and set the seal upon violence as a political weapon in a free country? It would be historical pedantry to inquire whether the history of our franchise legislation contains no instances of concession to violence.

Something less than a century ago . . . the Chartists rioted, destroyed property, resisted the military, and caused the loss of many lives . . . before the passing of the Reform Bill (18, p. 1218).

And, as Labor M. P. Philip Snowden countered:

The members who declare that they will vote against the bill because they will not be intimidated by violence are allowing themselves to be intimidated from doing what they believe to be right because one woman in 1,000 has done something of which they disapprove. The courageous thing for those members to do is to do what is right, and if they do that they can depend upon it that rebellion and revolution will cease, because revolution cannot continue unless based upon a justifiable sense of grievance (18, p. 1218).
A more likely explanation of the death of the Conciliation Bill may be found in the dynamics of Parliamentary party politics in Great Britain. For some time, P. M. Asquith had frankly admitted that the majority of his Cabinet and the great majority of the House of Commons were in favor of enfranchising women. However, he said:

I am the head of the Government and I am not going to make myself responsible for a measure which I do not believe to be in the interests of the country (24, p. 401).

His opposition to women's suffrage was rooted in his equivocal answer to his own fundamental question:

Would our political fabric be strengthened, would legislation be more respected, would our public and domestic life be enriched, would our standards of manners—and in manners I mean the old-fashioned virtues of chivalry and courtesy—and of the reciprocal deference and reliance of the two sexes; would this standard be raised and refined if women were politically enfranchised? . . .

Every man must answer that question as his judgment and experience dictates. I answer it in the negative. I believe such a negative answer to be in no way derogatory to the honor and dignity of the other sex (18, p. 1218).

Asquith's personal ascendancy over his own party, and still more over the Irish Nationalists, was responsible for the defeat of the Conciliation Bill by such a small majority. As far as the Irish Nationalists were concerned, he was "the one English statesman whom they trusted to give them Home Rule" (5, p. 98). Consequently, fearing that the success of the women's suffrage bill would lead to the P. M.'s resignation, the Irish Nationalists, who had previously voted for
the bill, voted against it in a block. Since the Irish M. P.s held the balance of power between the deadlocked Liberals and Conservatives, their votes were decisive. Notably, a few other votes were lost, due to the absence of several Labor M. P.s who were negotiating a coal miners' strike in the north (5, p. 98; 43, p. 107; 50, p. 163; 54, p. 323).

Ironically, the Government's own highly-touted Manhood Suffrage Bill did not reach the House floor until January 1913. Following the guidelines laid down by Lloyd George and Churchill to make the women's suffrage amendment "democratic," the bill was "killed by kindness" (10, p. 93; 13, p. 390). After it was amended beyond recognition, Asquith submitted it to the Speaker, who ordered it withdrawn (13, p. 390; 54, p. 328). The Literary Digest reported:

The Franchise Bill is withdrawn and woman suffrage will find no place in the business of the House of Commons until after the recess. It will then be introduced as a private member's bill, and given the same facilities as a measure introduced by the Government. . . .

We have never doubted Mr. Asquith's sincerity in dealing with the suffragists. . . . But sincerity is one thing and care is another (13, p. 391).

Needless to say, the promised private member's bill suffered the same dismal fate as the Conciliation Bill and its countless predecessors. As Lady Rachel Strachey concluded:

The public is left to attribute to Mr. Asquith and his colleagues either a stupid mistake or an elaborate wickedness (54, p. 328).
Establishment of Motives and Aims

Prior to 1910, votes for women had been commonly spoken of as a merely academic question. However, from 1910 to 1912, it became apparent to the Suffragettes that the only way to raise the women's claim to enfranchisement from the academic stage to the stage of practical politics was to force it upon the attention of the Government by some form of violence. Every peaceful avenue of protest had been tried, and found ineffective. Women had been patient for a half century.

If the peaceful militancy of 1906-1910 had sufficiently coerced the recalcitrant M. P.'s for them to take any opportunity to concede gracefully, they had been given about two years of truce (1910-1912) during which to do so. They had not taken the opportunity. Time after time, the women had piled up majorities that would have easily carried any other question, only to see their bills voted into legislative oblivion.

After 1912, the Suffragette movement determined to convince the Cabinet that the women of Great Britain had withdrawn their consent from a Government in which they had no share, and that there were only two courses open to it — repression or concession. Both history and experience had taught that this was the "English tradition" (48, p. 837), as far as electoral reform was concerned.
As an anonymous Suffragette's husband reflected, with a touch of black humor:

I suppose those English Militants stick in your crop more or less. But they are not so much rougher than the last people who won the vote in England. You know, the men of Bristol broke miles of windows, burned most of the public buildings in town, killed, and got killed. That was 80 years ago, and all anyone remembers of them now is that—they got the vote (28, p. 62).

And, as Dangerfield reports:

Mrs. Pankhurst... was determined that the W.S.P.U. should be more downright in its methods; for experience had taught her that nothing short of a profound and prolonged shock would ever persuade Mr. Asquith's Government to give women the Vote (11, p. 156).

Thus, the Suffragette movement was motivated by the lessons of history and experience, and resolutely aimed to force the Government to concede women's suffrage. Having been tried and found wanting, the methods of propaganda and negotiation were now closed to the militant women. Accordingly, Christabel directed the strategy of the W.S.P.U. from Paris.

**Conflict in the Ranks and Seizure of Power**

On May 15, 1912, the conspiracy trial of Mrs. Pankhurst and the Pethick-Lawrences opened at the Old Bailey Court. They had been charged with conspiring to incite the March window-smashing raid on the West End. Mrs. Pankhurst movingly argued the political nature of their offense. Nevertheless, on May 22, the jury found all three defendants guilty. However, in an unprecedented move, they added a rider asking for
leniency, due to the political nature of the offense. As F. W. Pethick-Lawrence later wrote, it was "surely the nicest rider that a jury ever attached to an adverse verdict" (47, p. 93):

We desire unanimously to express the hope that, taking into consideration the undoubtedly pure motives underlying the agitation which has led to this trial, you will be pleased to exercise the utmost leniency (33, p. 192; 41, p. 246; 43, p. 108; 46, p. 270; 47, p. 93).

Despite the intercession of the jury, the presiding judge, Lord Coleridge, sentenced the Suffragette leaders to nine months each (21, pp. 251-53; 33, pp. 189-92; 41, pp. 225-48; 43, pp. 107-8; 46, pp. 266-71; 47, pp. 91-93; 49, p. 173; 54, p. 325).

Originally sentenced to the Second Division (i.e., as common criminals), the three obtained First Division (i.e., political prisoner) treatment on June 10, after threatening to hunger strike. Later, when it was learned that other Suffragette prisoners were still being held in the Second Division, they adopted hunger strikes in protest of preferential treatment. On June 24, Mesdames Pankhurst and Pethick-Lawrence were released, and on June 27, Mr. Pethick-Lawrence was released (33, p. 198; 41, p. 255; 43, p. 109-10; 46, p. 276; 47, p. 97; 49, p. 180; 50, p. 167; 54, p. 326).

As soon as she was able to travel, Mrs. Pankhurst joined Christabel in Paris. The Pethick-Lawrences, who planned to recuperate in Switzerland, were asked to make a detour to meet the Pankhursts in Boulogne, France.
Of the several available accounts of the ensuing meeting (33, pp. 198-99; 40, p. 226; 43, p. 110; 46, pp. 277-78), the one provided by Mr. Pethick-Lawrence is the clearest and most detailed. He revealed that the counsels of the W.S.P.U. leadership were dividing:

The talk developed unfortunately, for we found that during our separation we had been thinking along different lines. I had always had a very high opinion of Christabel's political genius. She had had in my view an almost uncanny instinct for diagnosing public opinion and for choosing a line of action that would make the greatest appeal to it. But I did not feel the same about her present attitude. It seemed to me that her impressions, obtained for the most part second-hand, did not fully accord with the facts, and that the policy, based on them, that she proposed to adopt would not have the reactions she anticipated (47, p. 98).

In short, the Pankhursts revealed that they were determined that Christabel remain in Paris, and dictate an even more violent campaign—the next logical step being organized arson. The Pethick-Lawrences protested that a new propaganda campaign, reaping the fruits of the publicity accompanying the conspiracy trial, was necessary to quell the rising tide of anti-Suffragette sentiment produced by the window-smashing raids. The couple had assumed that Christabel would return to London, and challenge the Government to prosecute her. However, having only second-hand knowledge of the serious situation in London, Christabel discounted the developing popular opposition as merely the usual anti-suffragist reaction to a strategy change.
From Switzerland, the Pethick-Lawrences travelled to Canada to visit her brother in Vancouver. While there, they received "a surprising letter" from Mrs. Pankhurst, suggesting that they remain in Canada, and remove their private fortune from London, where it was vulnerable to confiscation by the Government (46, p. 280). In her mother's eyes, Sylvia noted, their friends' wealth, "once a great asset to the Union, had become a disability" (43, p. 111). However, oblivious to this fact, and willing to be made bankrupts for the cause, the Pethick-Lawrences enthusiastically returned to London in early October 1912 (43, p. 113; 46, pp. 280-81; 47, p. 99; 50, p. 173).

Returning to their apartments at Clement's Inn, the couple learned that the W.S.P.U. had moved to new offices in palatial Lincoln's Inn House, Kingsway, during the previous week. The following day, they met with Mrs. Pankhurst, who bluntly informed them that their association with the Suffragettes was being terminated. Shattered, they refused to believe that Christabel had agreed to the decision. So, for another meeting a few weeks later, Christabel crossed the Channel in disguise to confirm her mother's announcement (33, pp. 210-13; 41, p. 261; 43, pp. 114-15; 46, pp. 281-82; 47, pp. 99-100; 49, p. 181; 50, pp. 173-75; 54, p. 326).

Bitter as they were over their ouster, the Pethick-Lawrences left the Union intact, realizing that publicly
opposing the Pankhursts would fatally split the movement to which they had given six years of their lives. In the settlement, the Pankhursts assumed complete control of the W.S.P.U. and the Women's Press, while the Pethick-Lawrences resumed exclusive control of their paper, Votes for Women. Christabel brought out a new official W.S.P.U. organ, the Suffragette. A public statement was drafted, issued to the press, and published simultaneously in the October 18 issues of Votes for Women and the Suffragette.

Grave Statement by the Leaders

At the first re-union of the leaders after the enforced holiday, Mrs. Pankhurst and Miss Christabel Pankhurst outlined a new militant policy which Mr. and Mrs. Pethick-Lawrence found themselves altogether unable to approve.

Mrs. Pankhurst and Miss Christabel Pankhurst indicated that they were not prepared to modify their intentions, and recommended that Mr. and Mrs. Pethick-Lawrence should resume control of the paper, Votes for Women, and should leave the Women's Social and Political Union.

Rather than make schism in the ranks of the Union, Mr. and Mrs. Pethick-Lawrence consented to take this course.

In these circumstances, Mr. and Mrs. Pethick-Lawrence will not be present at the Meeting at the Royal Albert Hall on October 18th.

Emmeline Pankhurst
Emmeline Pethick-Lawrence
Christabel Pankhurst
F. W. Pethick-Lawrence
(46, p. 282)

Coalescence Around Organization

The excommunication of the Pethick-Lawrences should not have been a surprise. In the previous six years, beginning
with the coup d'état over the Women's Freedom League faction, anyone independent enough to challenge the Pankhurst autocracy had been systematically eliminated, once becoming a serious threat. It is one of the many ironies of the Suffragette movement that this process attained its logical end with the elimination of the two people who were chiefly responsible for the growth of the organization, as well as the establishment of the Pankhurst leadership. In 1907, the Pethick-Lawrences had upheld the legitimacy of that autocracy; in 1912, they were forced to re-affirm it.

By their departure in late 1912, Lincoln's Inn House was completely staffed by political novices, who were committed to, and subject to the discipline of, Christabel. Her residence in Paris, where she was safe from extradition as a political offender, had become public knowledge in September (46, p. 283; 50, p. 178).

The arson campaign.—The arson campaign began in January 1913. On February 18, Emily Wilding Davison and several anonymous colleagues successfully burned to the ground Lloyd George's new house near Walton Heath. Although Suffragette literature was left on the scene to identify the arsonists, the Suffragettes themselves eluded arrest. Mrs. Pankhurst accepted full responsibility for the attack (43, p. 125; 50, p. 189). On February 24, she was arrested under the Malicious Injuries to Property Act of 1861, and on April 2, at Old
Bailey Court, was found guilty, and sentenced to three years penal servitude (38, p. 838; 50, p. 191).

Finding the suddenly elusive Suffragettes difficult to arrest for their secretly conducted acts of arson, the Government began attacking the W.S.P.U.'s constitutional activities. On April 10, the Union held its last meeting in the Royal Albert Hall; and on April 15, its last outdoor meeting in Hyde Park (49, p. 192; 50, p. 193).

The Cat and Mouse Act.—On April 25, the Prisoners' Temporary Discharge for Ill Health Bill was passed. F. W. Pethick-Lawrence dubbed it the Cat and Mouse Act, because it empowered the Home Office to release hunger striking Suffragettes long enough for them to regain their health, and then to re-arrest them virtually at will (41, p. 304; 43, p. 126; 49, p. 192; 50, p. 193). The new Home Secretary, Reginald McKenna, had persuaded the Cabinet, on March 6 and 12, that such a measure would allow him to curb forcible feeding (50, p. 193), against which there had been fresh outcries of public indignation (17, p. 33; 42, p. 89).

The Underground W.S.P.U.—On April 30, the police raided Lincoln's Inn House, arresting Mrs. Drummond, Harriet Kerr, and the staff of the Suffragette. Simultaneously, the Victoria House Press, which was then printing the paper, was raided, and its manager, Sidney Drew, arrested. The following day, while returning from Paris, Annie Kenney was also
arrested. All were charged with inciting attacks upon private property (41, p. 309; 43, p. 131; 49, p. 199; 50, pp. 193-94). Grace Roe, who automatically succeeded Annie Kenney as Christabel's liaison, kept the agitation going for another year. With the assistance of Gerald Gould and the Daily Herald, the Suffragette never missed an issue (49, pp. 194, 232; 50, p. 195).

One of the most spectacular acts of the underground movement was the explosion of a bomb beneath the Coronation Chair behind the High Altar in Westminster Abbey. However, the only damage was the breaking of some of the carving on the chair and the altar screen (4, p. 514).

Mrs. Pankhurst called the Suffragettes to "guerilla warfare." "One thing we regard as sacred: human life. With that exception, we are justified in using all methods resorted to in time of war" (43, p. 124). As Sylvia summarized:

Street lamps were broken, "Votes for Women" was painted on the steps at Hampstead Heath, keyholes were stopped up with lead pellets, house numbers were painted out, chairs flung in the Serpentine, cushions of railway carriages slashed, flower-beds damaged, golf greens all over the country scraped and burnt with acid. . . . Old ladies applied for gun licenses to terrify the authorities. Bogus telephone messages were sent calling up the Army Reserves and Territorials. Telephone and telegraph wires were severed with long-handled clippers; fuse boxes were blown up (33, p. 216). . . .

Railway stations, sports pavilions, and refreshment-houses, great mansions, wherever they could be found empty, were burnt to the ground;
pictures were hacked in the public galleries, a jewel-case smashed in the Tower, windows broken in the Archbishop's Palace (43, p. 124).

The death of Emily Wilding Davison.--The most bizarre incident of the entire Suffragette movement was the death of Emily Wilding Davison. Whether or not her death was a deliberate suicide remains a mystery.

On June 3, 1913, she and her roommate planned to disrupt the Derby at Tattenham Corner by merely waving the purple-white-and-green W.S.P.U. flag. They hoped that the suddenness of the act would sufficiently startle everyone to stop the race, which would be attended by the King and Queen (33, p. 242; 45, p. 478; 50, p. 198).

Instead, just as the King's horse, Anmer, approached the Royal Box, Emily Davison unexpectedly scrambled out of the crowd, and darted into the path of the oncoming steed. Her skull was fractured, and she died within the week, never having regained consciousness (41, p. 314; 43, pp. 132-33; 46, p. 299; 49, p. 314; 50, p. 198; 62, p. 14).

The Suffragette's morbid fascination with the strategic potential of the most extreme martyrdom was widely known within the W.S.P.U. As Mrs. Pankhurst later wrote: "Miss Davison . . . expressed to several of her friends the deep conviction that now, as in days called uncivilized, the conscience of the people would awaken only to the sacrifice of a human life" (41, p. 315). Nonetheless, there was considerable circumstantial evidence suggesting that suicide had
not been her intention. The W.S.P.U. flags, which were pinned inside her coat, were quite large (one and a half by three-quarter yards each), suggesting that they were intended for waving, rather than for identification. Also, a return railway ticket was found in her coat pocket, indicating a clear intention to return home afterward (50, p. 199). Furthermore, her roommate insisted that she would never have committed suicide without first writing a note to her mother (33, p. 242; 45, p. 478). Finally, despite the risk involved, it could hardly have been a matter of certainty that darting onto the track would result in death.

In any event, although this was definitely an act of the individual—committed without the prior knowledge of the W.S.P.U.—the incident serves as an indicator of the depth of commitment to the cause which the Suffragette movement inspired in many, less impetuous women.

**Movement Literature Develops**

By its entry into its formal stage, the Suffragette movement had developed a rich literature of its own.

Its hymns were "Rise Up, Women!" (sung to the tune of "John Brown's Body") (49, p. 32), the "Women's Marseillaise" (49, pp. 76, 141, 159, 191), and the "March of the Women" (49, pp. 159, 173).

In *Votes for Women*, the official W.S.P.U. organ from 1906 to 1912, Christabel was the apologist of the movement, dictating and vindicating its strategies; and Sylvia, its historian,
recounting the story of the world-wide women's movement. Sylvia also published the first of many autobiographical histories of the movement, *The Suffragette* in 1910 (43, 49, p. 41). Furthermore, feminist poetry, both serious and humorous, frequently appeared in the Union's paper, as well as in the regular press (49, pp. 48-49, 80-81, 159-60).

A wide variety of propaganda items was manufactured and sold:

Everything was turned to good account—meetings, processions, posters, leaflets, flags, banners, drums, shows, ribbons, coaches, omnibuses, and even boats; anything, in fact, which could be used to make a noise and a stir and keep enthusiasm burning and the Cause shining in the public eye (54, p. 311).

By February 1911, fourteen additional rooms at 156 Charing Cross Road had to be taken to house the burgeoning Women's Press (50, p. 147). In addition to *Votes for Women*, and later the *Suffragette*, the press sold pamphlets, posters, banners, and insignia.

Members of the Actresses' Franchise League appeared only in one-act suffragist plays, which were performed throughout Britain (33, p. 105). And, of course, the Suffragettes were constantly portrayed, both favorably and unfavorably, in the political cartoons of the dailies' editorial pages.

However, once the *Suffragette* was driven underground, after the police raided Lincoln's Inn House, many of these outlets for propaganda disappeared. Then, the W.S.P.U. took up commenting on famous art with hatchets. The two most
famous victims of Suffragette attacks were Velasquez's Venus and Sargent's portrait of Henry James (56, p. 1434; 57, pp. 1545).

The Strategic Factors

The strategy of the Suffragette movement during its formal stage may be interpreted as having changed from coercion to negative bargaining (i.e., the offer to withdraw coercion, implicit in the truce)—in lieu of bargaining—and later from negative bargaining back to coercion (e.g., window-smashing and arson). The latter move marked the deterioration of the negotiations characteristic of this stage. These strategy changes were influenced by several factors.

The Strategic Principles

The W.S.P.U.'s truce from militancy (i.e., negative bargaining) and its later return to militancy (i.e., coercion) were both motivated by the rational principle. Supporting the latter strategy change, while disapproving of the choice of violent tactics, Israel Zangwill said:

_Hari-kiri, the one resource of the Suffragettes, turns out to be their strongest weapon._

. . . Militancy is only successful insofar as it brings suffering to the militants (64, p. 1165).

However, despite the accuracy of this statement so far as public opinion was concerned, premeditated martyrdom made little impression upon the Government. Ultimately, the Conciliation Bill fiasco proved this.
In reply to those who argued for a continuation of peaceful militancy, Mrs. Pankhurst said:

Our words have always been—be patient, exercise self-restraint, show our so-called superiors that the criticism of women being hysterical is not true, use no violence, offer yourself to the violence of others (64, p. 1165).

But, by 1912, she maintained that the time had come to take stronger measures:

We don't want to use any weapons that are unnecessarily strong. If the argument of the stone, that time-honored official political argument is sufficient, then we will never use any stronger argument. I believe myself it is. And that is the weapon and the argument that we are going to use (7, p. 393).

However, by 1913, the Suffragette leaders became convinced that still greater violence was necessary. In justifying the next, inevitable step—the destruction of unoccupied buildings—Annie Porritt claimed:

What men won long ago—not without bloodshed and much destruction of property—women are now demanding; and a cause, which has always been considered sacred, cannot now be judged ignoble or of no account. . . .

. . . The destruction of private property was the convincing argument of men who wanted to be admitted to the franchise, and the House of Lords—then the obstacle of reform—admitted the validity of the argument and passed the Reform Act of 1832 (48, p. 836).

Peaceful agitation had been carried on persistently and patiently for a half century. Again and again, it was conceded by Cabinet ministers and M. P.s alike that as far as argument was concerned, the women's case was won, and that there was no necessity for further propaganda efforts.
However, as with the Chartists (27, p. 305), there was little sincerity in the Suffragettes' use of force. The appeal to violence was a game of bluff, calculated to terrorize the Government into submission. But, in the eyes of public opinion, it was simply another blatant device for attracting attention.

The Leadership

By January 1910, H. N. Brailsford and Lord Lytton had convinced Mrs. Pankhurst that, in view of the rumored Conciliation effort, a declaration of truce would be statesmanlike (21, p. 222). Reluctantly, she announced the truce from militancy (46, p. 278). For reasons which reinforce the claim that the Suffragette movement was rationally motivated, Christabel welcomed it:

My own strongest, but unspoken, reason for welcoming the Conciliation movement was that it might avert the need for stronger militancy and would at least postpone the use thereof. Mild militancy was more or less played out. The Government had, as far as they could, closed every door to it, especially by excluding Suffragette questioners from their meetings. Cabinet Ministers had shown their contempt for the mildness of our protests and had publicly taunted us on that score. And neutral onlookers had warned us that these milder acts would, by their "monotony," grow futile, because they would cease to impress anybody, and therefore would cease to embarrass the Government. . . . Strategically, then, a pause in militancy would be valuable, for it would give time for familiarity to fade, so that the same methods could be used again with freshness and effect (40, pp. 153-54).
Clearly, the W.S.P.U. leaders were reluctant to use any stronger militant tactics than were absolutely necessary. Christabel's statement bears this out.

Once the Pankhursts were convinced that a more coercive strategy was necessary, the departure of the Pethick-Lawrences was ordained. From 1906 to 1912, this wealthy couple had given the Suffragette movement "an appearance of solidarity and respectability" (35, p. 35). However, after the conspiracy trial over the West End window-smashings, the Government began attacking their private fortune. As the only defendants with assets, they were ordered to pay the costs of the Crown and witnesses—about 1,100 pounds. Refusing to pay, Mr. Pethick-Lawrence stated:

The warfare between us and the Government has now been carried on to the financial plane, and the only course consistent with my principles is to fight every inch of the way (33, p. 199).

Thereafter, all their assets were seized, including their home, the contents of which were auctioned by the court. Several civil suits followed, leading the Pethick-Lawrences to declare bankruptcy. After the Government and other creditors were paid from their estate, the bankruptcy was annulled (47, p. 99). Hence, even had they agreed to the arson campaign, their involvement with the W.S.P.U. could not have continued. The vulnerability of their wealth undercut the effectiveness of Suffragette violence, and threatened to leave them penniless.
Furthermore, once the Government forced the movement underground, destroying their carefully built political machine, the need for administrative leadership virtually vanished. Conspiracy succeeded legal and financial wizardry as the order of the day.

The Ideology

Entering upon the arson campaign, Christabel reinforced the rationale of the militants' ideology by comparing the Suffragette movement with other great historical movements. To the question of the value of militant tactics, she pointed out that they had won for Americans a separate national existence, and for British men, the vote. Furthermore, she added:

Militancy has destroyed public apathy and indifference with regard to the question of votes for women. It has roused women themselves and has extended the membership of all suffrage societies, militant and non-militant alike. It has arrested the attention of the politicians and has compelled them to face the question as an immediate issue (7, p. 392).

And, unlike the men of history, the Suffragettes were merely destroying property, not life.

It was also at this point that the millenarian prognosis of the militants' ideology developed. Increasingly, votes for women were touted as a panacea to social problems ranging from venereal disease to prostitution. During May 1913, Christabel wrote:
The militancy of women is doing a work of purification. Nowhere was purification more needed than in the relationship between men and women. . . . A great upheaval, a great revolution, a great blasting away of ugly things— that is militancy. . . . The bad and the old have to be destroyed to make way for the good and the new. When militancy has done its work, then will come sweetness and cleanliness, respect and trust, perfect equality and justice into the partnership between men and women (50, p. 197).

Finally, when the movement was driven underground by the Government, the conspiracy theory permeated the militants' ideology, creating a sense of persecution, which heightened the solidarity of the Suffragettes and led to greater destruction of property.

The Constituency

Illustrating a coercive disciplinary threat, Mrs. Pankhurst reportedly exclaimed to the Pethick-Lawrences, during their Boulogne meeting: "If you do not support Christabel's policy, we shall smash you!" (43, p. 111). However, since this comment was reported by neither of the Pethick-Lawrences in their autobiographies, Sylvia's quotation must be considered apocryphal.

Nevertheless, with the Pethick-Lawrences' departure, discipline within the W.S.P.U. reached an unprecedented high. In the absence of membership records, it is impossible to determine how severely the couple's ouster and the violent campaign depleted the movement's ranks. However, it is unquestionable that those who remained after October 1912 were
totally committed to, and subject to the discipline of, the Pankhursts.

The Organization

The Pethick-Lawrences' legacy, the organization, was effectively crushed, and driven underground by the police raid of April 30, 1913. However, unaware of the clandestine organization which took its place, the Government was unable to seize the Suffragette funds. As the anti-suffragist London Standard reported:

The difficulty turns out to be that no one seems to be in authority but the lady herself. No clue to the place of deposit of the funds has been found (22, p. 454).

Subsequently, the underground leaders conspired in the private residences of individual sympathizers and in certain splendid cafes of the West End (22, p. 455).

The claims of the Home Office to the effect that they had successfully suppressed the movement were, in fact, false. While it was indeed true that, by August 1913, only twenty-one Suffragettes were imprisoned (including twelve released under the Cat and Mouse Act), this was clearly due to the fact that the militants had begun evading arrest, rather than freely offering themselves to the police (12, p. 204). Likewise, in view of the apparent extent of the arson campaign, it was unsurprising that, upon being driven underground, the W.S.P.U. reduced its vulnerable office staff from more than 200 to less than 50 (12, p. 204).
The Target Group

After the failure of the Conciliation effort, the Union's perception of its relationship to the Government as one of subjugation was intensified. In April 1912, Lloyd George said of H. H. Asquith:

He is like a great counsel in whom solicitors and clients have faith. . . . He has splendid judgment, but . . . He never initiates anything (34, p. 199).

The Suffragette movement had learned this from experience. As a witty but anonymous Suffragette's husband put it: "Asquith has told the women things that if he was fifty years younger would get him spanked" (28, p. 62).

Openly opposing the movement from 1912, the Government sought to discredit the W.S.P.U. and its leaders with charges of financial mismanagement:

. . . money success . . . killed the movement. It was destroyed by fullness of bread. The workers became social parasites. . . . they lived on the subscriptions that poured in (32, p. 9).

This charge was especially directed against Mrs. Pankhurst. However, for some time, she had supported herself with the revenues from her personal tours in the United States and Canada (3, p. 187; 23, V, p. 267; 63, p. 199).

The anti-suffragist London Standard charged:

. . . the doctrines and tactics of the militants, it cannot be too strongly urged, are subversive of the very foundations of social stability . . . Every morning brings its new tale of outrage, deliberately planned, and carried out with the skill and resolution of the practiced criminal. . . .
Appeals are made to the enthusiasm of hysterical girls. Sober married women are urged to defy their husbands, to neglect their homes, to bring disgrace on their children, in order to enable Mrs. Pankhurst and her highly paid colleagues to pose as the leaders of a successful movement (22, p. 455).

After the burning of Trevethan, Lady White's house in Surrey, the Standard responded:

It could only be the work of those whose crazed brains are obsessed by the notion that they will somehow get what they want by making a nuisance of themselves and a danger to society at large. It is the mania for destruction, a malady long recognized in our lunatic asylums. The victims of this mental disease must always be destroying something (37, p. 368).

Finally, of the carefully laid plans of the Suffragette arsonists to bomb only unoccupied buildings, causing injury only to themselves (61, p. 981), it was said:

That they have as yet taken no lives appears to be partly due to accident, and partly due to the clumsiness of the criminals (59, p. 497).

As for the Government as the target group, it sought to crush the movement, but merely succeeded in driving it underground, thus making the Government's task more difficult. Rather than curbing the attacks of arson, their action increased them (31, p. 172).

When the arsonists were caught and imprisoned, they merely adopted the hunger strike, thus obtaining release under the Cat and Mouse Act of Home Secretary McKenna. In this regard, the Government was still inhibited in its treatment of the women by its own rules and scruples.
Various alternative methods of handling the Suffragettes were suggested—including letting them die, deporting them, and classifying them as lunatics—but none of these was seriously considered (4, p. 514; 14, p. 764; 15, p. 151; 29, p. 96; 30, p. 839; 37, p. 365; 60, p. 883).

Reference Publics

The failure of the third Conciliation Bill might have been averted had the Suffragettes effectively bargained for the support of the Irish Nationalists, or perhaps the adult suffragists. However, the ideological constraint upon working with the male-dominated parties (illustrated by the anti-Government by-election campaigns) prevented the W.S.P.U. from exchanging women's support at the polls for votes in the House of Commons. Yet, based on its previous record with the constitutionalists, there could have been little certainty that the Government would honor such a bargain.

A similar alliance might have been made with the Liberal and Labor adult suffragists to persuade them to buck the Asquith Cabinet when women's suffrage came to a vote. However, it is even less likely that this avenue would have led to success.

The short-term failure of the movement at this juncture resulted from its insistence on the elimination of the sex bar as a matter of principle, and its indignation at having its issue mixed up with the further enfranchisement of men.
However, in the long-term, the possibilities of the W.S.P.U. having made alliances with the Irish (38, p. 91) or the adult suffragists became a purely academic question. By early 1913, it was indisputably clear that P. M. Asquith would obstruct any private member's bill, while continuing to withhold Government support.

The failure of the Pankhursts in settling upon a campaign of attacks on private property was precisely the one which the Pethick-Lawrences had tried to warn them of before being ousted. By abandoning the campaign of explanatory propaganda which the couple had planned, the Suffragettes succeeded in creating a bystander public of London shopkeepers, who were understandably less than sympathetic to the women's cause (7, p. 392).

However, when the W.S.P.U. did undertake the arson campaign, they were successful in shielding themselves with a cover group whom the Government was both unwilling and unable to attack—namely, the wealthy but anonymous donors (doubtless some constitutionalists among them) whose contributions were the life blood of the underground movement. As the Nation suggested:

The suffragist movement in England today is . . . truly a terrorist movement; one part by active cooperation and the other part by reinforcement of its sympathy (16, p. 688).
Almost unanimously behind them during the Conciliation effort, public opinion turned bitterly against the W.S.P.U. upon its resumption of militancy in the forms of window-smashing and arson. The anti-suffragist The Times declared:

Now the women have only themselves to blame for their lost cause, for they have alienated the sympathy of their fellow-countrymen (18, p. 1218).

However, a few remaining sympathizers, such as Samuel Merwin, tried to implement the explanatory propaganda which the Pethick-Lawrences had suggested:

Soberly, each of us knows that whatever we enjoy today of liberty and equality and the right to live has been won for us by our rebels. If ever-widening classes of human beings had not protested, and fought to make their protests good, civilization would not now be what it is (2, p. 423).

Others emphasized that the militants had been "victims of brutal and stupid if not illegal repression during the years when they first sought ... to place their views insistently before the voting public" (8, p. 439), and that "their behavior shows fine moral quality" (36, p. 614). However, none of these arguments made much of an impression on the window-less shopkeepers of the West End.

The exception to the anti-Suffragette sentiment which proved the rule was the Cat and Mouse Act, which allowed the Government to release and re-arrest Suffragette prisoners almost at will, thus extending their sentences indefinitely and destroying their health. As Bernard Shaw responded:
As we have neither sufficient conviction to starve the militants to death nor the common sense to pledge ourselves to the inevitable reform, there is nothing to be done but to wait until the women provoke a mob to lynch them and the Government hangs a satisfactory number of the mob in expiation. Then the women will get the votes after the last inch of mischief and suffering has been squeezed out of a situation which several civilized, reasonable countries have already disposed of without the slightest trouble. That is England all over (29, p. 97).

Conclusion

During its formal stage, the Suffragette movement succeeded in forcing the House of Commons to address women's suffrage as a major political issue. However, since the leadership had failed to secure the support of key third party groups, the promising Conciliation Bill was sabotaged by the Government. In the ensuing two years of unprecedented Suffragette violence, the movement lost much of its support in the press, its sympathy from the public, and its advantage in the House of Commons. However, Britain's entry into the First World War, which marked the Suffragette movement's transition from its formal stage to its dissolution stage, offered the W.S.P.U. leadership a fresh opportunity to force the Government to grant votes for women.
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CHAPTER VI

SHOULDER TO SHOULDER:
THE DISSOLUTION STAGE

The dissolution stage of the Suffragette movement may be roughly dated from Britain's entry into the First World War during late summer 1914 to the enactment of the Representation of the People Act of 1918 and the defeat of the women candidates in the next General Election. The former event allowed the W.S.P.U. to force the Government to concede votes for women as a fait accompli, while the latter events marked the movement's victory and its failure to secure a post-war niche in British party politics, respectively.

This chapter provides an analysis of the Suffragette movement's strategy during its dissolution stage as a combination of bargaining and negative bargaining (i.e., the threat of coercion). The general conditions which characterized this final period are delineated, and the specific factors which led to the achievement of votes for women and the dissolution of the movement are examined.

The standard works on the Suffragette movement—Dangerfield (7), Raeburn (24), and Rosen (26)—and of the British women's suffrage movement in its entirety—Fulford (9), Rover (27), and Strachey (28)—abruptly skip from the arson campaign
of the pre-war years (1912-1914) to the extension of the franchise to women at the war's end (1918). Little attention, let alone credit, is given to the activities of the Women's Social and Political Union (W.S.P.U.) during the First World War. However, as public documents provided by Mackenzie (17) and personal comments made by Emmeline Pankhurst (19) and Emmeline and F. W. Pethick-Lawrence (21, 23) suggest, these activities comprised the decisive, albeit the quietest, battle in the militant campaign to obtain votes for women.

Characteristic Conditions

During a movement's institutional stage, deterrents to revolutionary behavior are implemented, amnesty is extended to prisoners, the movement is psychologically exhausted and economically distressed, the government's powers increase and it recognizes the movement, and society is reconstructed along the lines dictated by the movement (12, p. 68). Insofar as the Suffragette movement was unable to achieve the last condition, it did not become institutionalized.

Implementation of Deterrents

While it would be ludicrous to suggest that the British Government entered the First World War solely to quell Suffragette disturbances, this was doubtless one of the expected by-products of its entry. To an extent, this by-product followed.
On August 2, 1914, the arson campaign suddenly ceased. As Kitty Marion, a W.S.P.U. arsonist, later wrote:

... the first Sunday in August ... I was on danger-duty in Leicester, ready to send another reminder to the Government that women still wanted to vote, when a telegram arrived from headquarters, to stop all activity (26, p. 247).

However, the arson campaign hardly ended in "loyal fervor" (7, p. 388). In an article written for the first August issue of the *Suffragette*, Christabel wrote:

This great war ... is Nature's vengeance -- is God's vengeance upon the people who held women in subjection. ...
That which has made men for generations past sacrifice women and the race to their lusts, is now making them fly at each other's throats, and bring ruin upon the world. ...
Women of the W.S.P.U. we must protect our Union through everything. It has great tasks to perform; it has much to do for the saving of humanity (26, p. 247).

However, in the following two weeks, events occurred to change the outlook of the Pankhurst leadership. During that time, it became increasingly clear that, as far as the Government and the public were concerned, the war was the paramount issue, and that by taking advantage of this concern, the Suffragettes could regain the favor of public opinion, and force the Government to concede votes for women as a fait accompli.

**Extension of Amnesty to Prisoners**

On August 7, Reginald McKenna, the Home Secretary, announced that he would only release those Suffragette prisoners
who would "undertake not to commit further crimes or outrages" (26, p. 247). When word of this offer reached Holloway Jail, Grace Roe, the imprisoned underground organizer, reported:

The prisoners were now calling, "G. R., G. R.!", and, lying very weak in my cell, I heard them telling how officials and prominent persons were trying to persuade each one to give an undertaking. With a strength not my own I climbed up to the window of my cell and answering the calls said: "Give no undertakings, all will be done from outside." This was picked up by a nearby prisoner and echoed and re-echoed around the prison court yard (24, p. 238).

Three days later, on August 10, all Suffragette prisoners were unconditionally released (7, p. 387; 9, p. 304; 15, p. 253; 17, p. 280; 24, p. 238; 26, p. 247; 31, p. 639). The announcement was accompanied by the following statement from McKenna:

I have advised His Majesty to remit the remainder of the sentences of all persons now undergoing terms of imprisonment for crimes committed in connection with the suffrage agitation. This course has been taken without solicitation on their part, and without requiring any undertaking from them. . . . His Majesty is confident that the prisoners . . . will respond to the feelings of their countrymen and countrywomen in this time of emergency, and that they may be trusted not to stain the causes they have at heart by any further crime or disorder (26, pp. 247-48).

**Psychological Exhaustion and Economic Distress**

A second truce from militancy was subsequently welcomed by the W.S.P.U. During the preceding months, many within the movement had suggested that another truce would be propitious (24, p. 236). In the previous two years, violent militancy
(e. g., window-smashing, arson and bombing, evading arrest, hunger striking, forcible feeding, the Cat and Mouse Act treatment) had taken an even greater toll upon the Suffragettes than had the more peaceful forms of the four years prior to the first truce.

However, as Mrs. Pankhurst stated in her open letter to the membership of August 13, "Even the outbreak of war could not affect the action of the W.S.P.U. so long as our comrades were in prison and under torture" (17, p. 282).

Furthermore, the readiness of the Government, particularly the Home Office, to release the Suffragette prisoners, even though they refused to give undertakings to keep the peace, indicates that they were equally fatigued from having hounded the women's every step for almost two years.

Lastly, after the two-year campaign of violence and the declaration of war by the Government, many of the wealthy supporters of the Union's expensive clandestine activities began to reconsider their positions. As Janie Allen, one such supporter, wrote on August 15:

I am completely unsettled as to my future action about Suffrage work. . . . I am at the moment completely tired out, and have orders to rest (26, p. 249).

**Government Powers and Movement Recognition**

In mid-July 1913, publicist Hamilton Fyfe suggested in the London Daily Mail that the Suffragettes "must be allowed to 'do something' in the administration of public affairs"
To what extent, if any, this suggestion inspired the subsequent actions of the Suffragettes and the Government is unknown. However, these words were prophetic.

The Right to Serve Campaign.--At the suggestion of the Cabinet Committee on Munitions, meeting on December 23, 1914, Minister of Munitions Lloyd George made several efforts to expand the pool of available civilian labor. The first systematic attempt to enlist women to replace male workers was made by the Board of Trade. Between March 16 and June 4, 1915, almost 79,000 women were enrolled on the Special War Register for women. However, only 1,800 of these women were given jobs in munition factories (16, I, p. 255).

On June 24, at the London Polytechnic, Mrs. Pankhurst delivered her "Right to Serve" speech, which included the following remarks:

Women are eating their hearts out with desire to see their services utilized in this national emergency.

... we realize that if this war is to be won, the whole energy of the nation and the whole capacity of the nation will have to be utilized in order to win.

... we here and now this afternoon offer our services to the Government, to recruit and enlist the women of the country for war service, whether that war service is making munitions, or whether that war service is replacing skilled men who have been called up, so that the business of the country may go on (17, p. 293).

This speech met with such an overwhelming response that sacks of mail poured into the Union's Lincoln's Inn House headquarters by every available post (24, p. 241).
On June 28, Lloyd George received a letter from Buckingham Palace by royal messenger. The brief note from George V to the Minister of Munitions simply read:

His Majesty the King was wondering whether it would be possible or advisable for you to make use of Mrs. Pankhurst (17, p. 294).

Sometime early in the first week of July, Lloyd George asked Mrs. Pankhurst to organize a demonstration asserting women's "right to serve," and offered a 2,000 pound Government grant to finance the event. Notably, this was the first of many concrete indications that the Government recognized the Pankhurst's claim to speak for women. The W.S.P.U. leadership (i.e., Mrs. Pankhurst, Christabel, Mrs. Drummond, Annie Kenney, and Grace Roe) organized the parade in less than two weeks. On July 17, Lloyd George reviewed the women's "Right to Serve" procession of over 30,000 women. The demonstration was highly successful, insofar as it pressured employers and the Trade Union movement to admit women to industry (16, I, p. 255; 17, p. 294; 24, p. 241).

Women's war work.—However, by late 1915, these changes had not yet been wrought. On October 5, in a speech at the London Pavilion, Mrs. Pankhurst tried to quicken their pace:

I believe that the Minister of Munitions, Lloyd George, is undoubtedly exceedingly anxious to fulfill those pledges made to women when we waited upon him some weeks ago.

How is it then that we are not getting this work done? . . .
the reason that women are not getting skilled training today is that it has been, and I think is still to a certain extent being, opposed by organized skilled workmen (17, p. 294).

In the new year, an Act of Parliament and the promotion of Lloyd George to the War Office facilitated the entrenchment of women workers.

On January 24, 1916, the Compulsory Military Service Bill passed its Third Reading (i.e., the final vote) in the House of Commons with an overwhelming majority of 347 in favor (6, pp. 241-42). Needless to say, conscription greatly reduced the number of men in civilian employment, and thus encouraged their replacement by women.

On July 19, the Government announced that Lloyd George would succeed Earl Kitchener as Secretary of War for his "marvelous efficiency in solving the munitions problem" by encouraging women's war work (3, p. 634). This promotion for Lloyd George was a vicariously conferred accolade for Mrs. Pankhurst. In September, the new Secretary issued a statement from the War Office on "Women's War Work":

Employers . . . readily admit that the results achieved by the temporary employment of women far exceed their original estimates, and even so are capable of much farther extension. If this is true in their case, how much greater must be the scope for such substitution by those employers who have not attempted it for reasons of apprehension or possibly prejudice? The necessity of replacing wastage in our Armies will eventually compel the release of all men who can be replaced by women, and it is therefore in the interests of employers to secure and train temporary substitutes as early as possible, in order to avoid any falling off in production.
Women of Great Britain, employers of labor, remember that:

(a) No man who is eligible for Military Service should be retained in civil employment if his place can be temporarily filled by a woman or by a man who is ineligible for Military Service.

(b) No man who is ineligible for Military Service should be retained on work which can be performed by a woman (for the duration of the War) if the man himself can be utilized to release to the Colors one who is eligible for Military Service, and who cannot be satisfactorily replaced by a woman (17, p. 306).

Notwithstanding it being wartime, this was a phenomenal statement coming from a hitherto adamantly anti-suffragist Government.

Those authorized to speak.--Lady Rachel Strachey (28, p. 337) claimed that the National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies (N.U.W.S.S.) represented British women to their Government during the war. However, surviving documents cast doubt upon this claim. On May 4, 1916, Millicent Garrett Fawcett, the president of the constitutional N.U.W.S.S., wrote to Prime Minister (P. M.) Asquith:

A very general rumor has prevailed since last autumn supported by statements made by responsible persons, and by its own inherent reasonableness, that the Government will, before the general election following the end of the war, find it necessary to deal with the franchise question . . .

... We trust that you may include in your bill clauses which would remove the disabilities under which women now labor.

... We believe that it is the recognition of the active, self-sacrificing, and efficient national service of women which has caused the recent access of strength to the movement we represent.
We should greatly value an expression of your views upon the subject . . . (17, pp. 320-21; 26, pp. 256-57).

In his May 7 reply, the P. M. politely but flatly denied any knowledge of the impending Electoral Reform Bill:

I have received your letter of the 4th. . . . No legislation such as you refer to is at present in contemplation; but if and when it should become necessary to undertake it, you may be certain that the considerations set out in your letter will be fully and impartially weighed . . . (17, p. 321; 26, p. 257).

Furthermore, when the N.U.W.S.S. requested that a deputation be received to discuss the matter on July 19, he refused them (17, p. 322). These events do not suggest that the Government held the constitutional suffragists to be representative of vote-seeking women.

On the other hand, the fact that Lloyd George turned to Mrs. Pankhurst, rather than his constitutionalist friends, when women's services were needed suggests that their representation of the female constituency was recognized. Like it or not, the war had made de facto political leaders of the Pankhurts. On August 14, in the House of Commons, he abandoned his long-held argument that the W.S.P.U. leaders did not speak for women by referring to "those who are authorized to speak for them" (17, p. 324; 25, p. 288; 26, p. 259).

Working out their own salvation.—By early 1917, most of the major opponents of women's suffrage in the Government had announced their conversion to the women's cause. After being
the subjects of derisive commentary for more than a decade, the Suffragettes suddenly found that prestige in the movement translated into prestige in society. Furthermore, after having been told, for all those years, that "Woman's place is in the Home," they found that their Government not only encouraged women to work, it even ordered employers to hire them as a patriotic duty.

In early 1917, H. N. Brailsford (2, p. 97) claimed that "the discovery that women are as indispensable as men in modern war" softened most of the hardened opponents of the reform. This appears to have been the case. On March 28, in the House of Commons, H. H. Asquith conceded:

My opposition to woman suffrage has always been based, and based solely, on considerations of public expediency. I think that some years ago I ventured to use the expression "let the women work out their own salvation." Well, Sir, they have worked it out during this War. How could we have carried on the War without them? (17, p. 326; 26, p. 266; 31, p. 639).

As Minister of Munitions, Lloyd George had asked the women for their help, and sought to establish equitable working conditions, including a fair minimum wage and—in some cases—equal pay for equal work (16, I, 256). As Prime Minister at the close of the war, he declared:

When, after the War, the nation comes to recast the whole industrial fabric, it would be an outrage to give women no voice therein; it would be inequitable, unjust, and ungrateful (8, p. 60).

Andrew Bonar Law, Chancellor of the Exchequer and Leader of the Conservative Party, declared that he would do his best to
prevent any extension of the franchise to men, if women were to be left out (8, p. 60). And lastly, Walter Hume Long, Secretary for the Colonies and a lifelong anti-suffragist, stated that he would not raise his voice against granting recognition to women, without whom "the country could never have faced its hour of crisis" (8, p. 60).

**That detestable campaign.**—In addition to "the service that women had rendered to the country behind the lines" (20, p. 321), none of these leaders had forgotten the violent campaign of 1912-1914. Asquith, particularly, had underestimated the Suffragette movement during its first truce, thinking that he could postpone them into Parliamentary oblivion. In 1917, he saw—and this time took—a second chance to concede to women's suffrage without appearing to concede to militancy:

... since the War began, now nearly three years ago, we had no recurrence of that detestable campaign which disfigured the annals of political agitation in this country, and no one can now contend that we are yielding to violence what we refused to concede to argument (17, p. 326; 26, p. 264).

As Sylvia succinctly put it:

The Party leaders were now even more anxious to get the question settled and done with than they had till lately been to shelve it. Mrs. Pankhurst and the militant movement had achieved that change; not a man of them but shrank from a recommencement of the militant struggle (20, p. 162).

Post-war Britain was quite accurately anticipated to be fraught with social problems. As even those who merely
considered the Suffragettes a nuisance agreed, women's suffrage was a problem Britons could easily do without.

The Electoral Reform Conference.—Toward the end of the First World War, it was impossible for the British Parliament to avoid a major reform of the franchise. During the war, the Parliamentary Register had lapsed into chaos. Soldiers sent to the front and munition workers moved to other parts of the United Kingdom "for the duration" lost their qualifications as voters. So, as H. N. Brailsford wrote, it would have been perfectly ludicrous "to elect a new Parliament for five years on the basis of a Register containing only an imperfect list of the elderly men left in England" (2, p. 98).

Consequently, the Electoral Reform Conference was called. It met from October 12, 1916 to January 26, 1917, and reported to the House of Commons on January 27. The conference was unanimously in favor of all proposals with the exception of women's suffrage. The major obstacle was the question of how many women to enfranchise. The effective demand was for full adult suffrage. However, it was realized that a bill including such a proposal would not be passed by the House of Commons, much less the House of Lords. So, it was decided that a higher age limit would be set for women—ages thirty and thirty-five being preferred—to expedite the bill's passage (4, p. 391; 14, p. 574; 17, p. 325; 25, p. 288).
On June 19, 1917, when the House of Commons considered the Committee Stage of the Electoral Reform Bill, Labor M. P. Ramsay McDonald said, "this matter has already been fought and won." The bill passed its Committee Stage with an overwhelming majority of 330 in favor (17, p. 328; 26, p. 266). Later, in December 1917, the bill passed its Third Reading by a vote of 364 to 23 (9, p. 304). As Fulford describes the scene:

There was no demonstration, but when the clerk read out the figure "23" there was heard, clearly audible from the Ladies' Gallery, the sound of a woman's derisive laugh (9, p. 304).

The bill passed in the House of Lords on January 9, 1918, by a vote of 134 to 71. Of the many comments made during the debate in the Lords, those of Lord Hugh Cecil, a suffragist, served best to put the entire matter in a more realistic light:

Roundly chaffing the extremists on both sides, Lord Hugh Cecil gave a synopsis of two romances illustrating the opposing points of view. The title of the first romance, written for the extreme suffragists, would be "Saved by the Vote: A Tale of Lawless Love." The author, Lord Hugh said, would work the romance up to the point at which female virtue would be saved by the franchise. The title of the second romance, however, written for the anti-suffragist, would be "How Mother Voted; or, the Ruined Home." In this romance the author would show that the wear and tear of the franchise would speedily drive the woman into an inebriates' home, where she would only be able to give an absentee vote (14, p. 575).

The Representation of the People Act of 1918 received the Royal Assent on February 6 (26, p. 266; 27, p. 223).
Under its terms, women over 30 who were householders, wives of householders, occupiers, or university graduates were enfranchised.

Social Reconstruction

Despite its efforts, the Suffragette movement was unable to achieve complete institutionalization. On November 2, 1917, the W.S.P.U. changed its name to the Women's Party, and issued a program. In addition to calling for the vigorous prosecution of the remainder of the war, for better housing, and for better maternity and infant care, it supported the following women's issues:

Equal pay for equal work.
Equal marriage and divorce laws.
Equality of parental rights.
Equality of opportunity in employment.
Equal rights and responsibilities in regard to social and political service (17, p. 316).

Soon after its founding, the Women's Party stated that women could "best serve the nation by keeping clear of men's party political machines" (17, p. 317; 26, p. 268). However, following Coalition P. M. Lloyd George's decision to endorse Parliamentary candidates, the Women's Party ignored its own advice. In November 1918, shortly after the Armistice, Christabel contacted the P. M. concerning her possible candidacy for the Parliamentary seat of Smethwick. In a letter to Chancellor Bonar Law, Lloyd George intimated his pleasure in giving his support to her Coalition candidacy:
I am not sure that we have any women candidates, and I think it is highly desirable that we should. The Women's Party, of which Miss Pankhurst is the Leader, has been extraordinarily useful, as you know, to the Government --especially in the industrial districts (26, p. 269).

In the General Election of December 1918, J. E. Davison (Labor) defeated Christabel by a small margin. He received 9,389 votes, and she, 8,614, making him the winner by only 775 votes (9, p. 305; 26, p. 269). Several women formerly associated with the W.S.P.U.--including Mesdames Pethick-Lawrence, Despard, and How-Martyn--also stood for Parliament unsuccessfully (9, p. 305).

Having failed to make a place for itself in post-war Britain, the Women's Party ceased to exist by 1919. The last issue of its official organ, Britannia (nee the Suffragette), was post-dated December 20, 1918 (26, p. 269).

The Strategic Factors

During its dissolution stage, the Suffragette movement's strategy may be interpreted as having changed from coercion to a combination of bargaining and negative bargaining (i.e., the threat of coercion). This strategy change was influenced by several factors.

The Strategic Principles

The dissolution stage of the Suffragette movement was cooperatively influenced by the rational and expressive principles. With the outbreak of the First World War, the
W.S.P.U. regained the intra-movement resources (i.e., the ideological justification, the constituent support, and the systematic organization) and the extra-movement resources (i.e., partial equality with its target group, support from its reference publics, and public sympathy) to effectively employ a bargaining strategy, reinforced with the threat of coercion. As the encyclopedic *History of the First World War* suggests:

> It is significant that the way in which the female suffrage organizations of Great Britain suspended their agitation, and threw themselves heart and soul into the war, resulted in the concession of their demands in 1918 . . . (11, p. 655).

**The Leadership**

Whether the ultimate success of the Suffragette movement in inducing the Government to grant women's suffrage is credited to historical coincidence or strategic genius depends upon the interpretation of the events of late July and August 1914.

Speaking with regard to the first truce from 1910 to 1912, Christabel said: "Much depends in militancy, as it depends in other things, upon the timing and placing, upon the dramatic arrangement and sequence of acts and events" (17, pp. 133-34). At the final strategic turning point in the history of the movement, however, it was Mrs. Pankhurst, not Christabel, who recognized and acted upon this knowledge.
As the excerpt from Christabel's first wartime Suffragette article indicates, she did not initially realize the opportunity for a women's suffrage victory which the First World War presented. She could only see the war as "God's vengeance upon the people who have held women in subjection" (26, p. 247). Like all issues of the Suffragette, the first wartime issue (August 7, 1914) was post-dated (25, p. 246). Therefore, given the additional logistical factors involved in printing the then-underground paper, it is a reasonable speculation that the article had to have been written during the last days of July.

On August 1, 1914, Christabel travelled from Paris to St. Malo, on the coast of Brittany, to join her mother. It is from Mrs. Pankhurst, who was writing the final paragraphs of her autobiography "in the late summer of 1914," that the first hints of a bargaining strategy come:

... in the black hour that has just struck in Europe, the men are turning to their women and calling on them to take up the work of keeping civilization alive.

... Time alone will reveal what reward will be allotted to the women (19, Foreword).

In the closing paragraph of her book, Mrs. Pankhurst suggests that she either knew or strongly suspected that the war would put Lloyd George in a position (Minister of Munitions) in which she could effectively strike a bargain with him, exchanging the W.S.P.U.'s services in wartime for votes after the war:
What will come out of this European war . . . no human being can calculate. But one thing is reasonably certain, and that is that the Cabinet changes which will necessarily result from warfare will make future militancy on the part of women unnecessary (19, pp. 363-64).

However, unnecessary though it might be, Mrs. Pankhurst made it crystal clear in her open letter of August 13, 1914, that the threat of coercion loomed over the Government, in the event that it did not honor their bargain:

... the W.S.P.U. will at the first possible moment step forward into the political arena in order to compel the enactment of a measure giving votes to women on the same terms as men (17, p. 282).

The bargain—women's surplus labor in wartime for votes in peacetime—was presented to the Government in the Union's Right to Serve campaign. As Mrs. Pankhurst predicted, Lloyd George was exceptionally cooperative, going so far as to provide a Government grant to finance the Right to Serve procession.

The irony of this coup d'etat is that those who played such a prominent part in it were oblivious to what occurred. Lloyd George was at a loss to explain the Suffragettes' suddenly changed attitude toward the Government:

... It was one of the many curious revolutions effected by the War that the lead in organizing women and girls for national service was taken by the very people who, prior to the War had been, in the cause of women's suffrage, the thorniest opponents of the Government (16, Y, p. 255).
The *Manchester Guardian* report of Christabel's triumphant return to Britain in late 1914 suggests that the subtler but intended effect of the Suffragette movement's war campaign was something of a private joke between the movement and the general public:

There could not have been more amazing proof of the complete change brought about by the war than the use by Miss Pankhurst of such phrases as the following:

"I agree with the Prime Minister that we cannot stand by and see brutality triumph over freedom."

This . . . remark startled her followers into laughter such as greets a particularly bold piece of repartee (17, p. 286; 18, p. 269).

The Ideology

The single greatest change wrought by the war in the Union's ideology was the elimination of the ideological constraint upon alliances with the male-dominated parties. This occurrence permitted the Suffragettes, for the first time, to genuinely bargain with the Government.

The second most significant change wrought by the war in the Union's ideology was the equation of being a part of the movement with patriotism rather than rebellion. This is apparent in Christabel's address to an American audience in Carnegie Hall on October 24, 1914:

You must not suppose that because the Suffragettes fight the British Government for the sake of the vote, and because we have refused to allow the Government to crush our movement by imprisonment and by torture, you must not suppose on that account the Suffragettes are not patriotic. Good heaven!
Why should we fight for British citizenship if we do not most highly prize it?

And, reinforcing the threat of coercion after the war made by her mother:

... Our country has made mistakes in the past—or rather, the men have done so who governed the country. But we are going to do better in the future—above all, when British women cooperate with the men in the important work of government (17, p. 289).

Finally, it is unsurprising that the Suffragettes had so little trouble stirring up anti-German propaganda. Just prior to the war, they had been harangued by the German press for their militant strategy. The Berliner Tageblatt reported in July 1914:

... the German police would never permit in Germany the outrages that are being perpetrated right along by the militant suffragettes in England ... (10, p. 12).

The Constituency

The most important occurrence with regard to the constituency during the dissolution stage was the movement's success in re-establishing, and forcing the Government to recognize, their claim to speak for women.

However, the constituency did change. Many pacifists were led away from the war campaign of the W.S.P.U. by their beliefs, and by their apparent failure to recognize that campaign's true end. Sylvia, the Pethick-Lawrences, and their followers exemplified this group, who considered the Union's
change of strategy something of a betrayal of the cause (15, p. 209; 17, p. 284; 22, p. 230).

Doubtless the variety of types of people who were drawn into the Suffragette movement lends a clue to its failure to completely institutionalize. Mrs. Pankhurst and Christabel exemplified the feminists, who considered the vote an end in itself. For them, the Government's granting of women's suffrage was equated with its recognition of the equality of the sexes. The Pethick-Lawrences and Sylvia exemplified the reformers, who considered the vote merely a means to an end. For them, the vote was anticipated as a tool of social reform. Hence, what Hovell said of the Chartists applies equally well to the Suffragettes:

Chartism . . . was the union of men who agreed in a negative policy of protest against restrictions which were the source of infinite misery and unrest, but whose positive policy was narrowed down to a sensible but limited political program which, when realized, left the root of social evils hardly touched (12, p. 279).

The Organization

The organizational responsibility for the Right to Serve campaign devolved upon the Government, which sponsored events such as the procession of July 1915. None of the funds raised for the usual suffrage work were used to subsidize the war campaign (26, p. 254).
The Target Group

The most marked change during the dissolution stage was the movement's perception of its relationship to its target group. For the first time in its history, the movement was in a position of partial equality with the Government. As the manpower demands of the military increasingly taxed the civilian labor force, the Government was compelled to seek a surplus labor supply to fill the gap. The W.S.P.U., which had often proved its ability to orchestrate the activities of large numbers of women, provided that supply.

Equally changed was the Government's attitude toward the movement. In large part, this resulted from personnel changes wrought upon the advent of the Coalition Government in late 1916. Balfour, Bonar Law, Lord Robert Cecil, and Lord Selbourne—all suffragists—replaced anti-suffragists in the Cabinet. Notably too, Lord Lytton became a junior minister (26, p. 258).

Even more so, the promotion of Lloyd George from Chancellor of the Exchequer, to Minister of Munitions, to Secretary of War, to Prime Minister enhanced the relationship between the Suffragettes and the Government. Notably, within a week of Lloyd George's succession to the Prime Ministry, two anti-suffragist members of the Electoral Reform Conference were replaced by suffragists (26, p. 261).
Reference Publics

Whereas the Suffragette movement had failed to establish alliances with the Irish Nationalists and the adult suffragists earlier in its history, they succeeded in creating such alliances with the sailors, soldiers, and munition workers of the First World War. When, at the Electoral Reform Conference, some members tried to play the soldiers and sailors vote against the women's vote, the Suffragettes, to the disbelief of many, declared that either both would vote or neither would (1, p. 407; 2, p. 99; 26, p. 265; 29, p. 19).

The elimination of the ideological constraint against such alliances allowed the Suffragettes to see the wisdom of the old cliche, "United, we stand; divided, we fall."

Also, although no formal alliance existed between the militants and the constitutionalists during this stage, the constitutionalists provided indispensable support in leading women into national service (28, p. 337).

Public Opinion

The war campaign of the Suffragettes was as successful a diplomatic coup with the public as it was with the Government. The movement rose from an all time low in the eyes of the press (1, p. 407), to an unprecedented popularity. Indeed, the overwhelming unanimity of public support for the enfranchisement of women after the war was one of the most
influential factors influencing the anti-suffragists to surrender without a final fight (4, p. 391).

The statement of the Daily Herald on August 11, 1914, was indicative of public opinion regarding the Suffragettes from that time onward:

The remission of sentences on the suffrage prisoners was a natural step; for people have not been slow, at the very outset of this war, to turn to the women for aid. Let us note above all that is has not been aid in the task of destruction.

To ask the aid of women at a period of national crisis involves two things. It means in the first place that we recognize them as a part of the nation. It means in the second place that their help is a thing worth having. The first point is the recognition of their citizenship and of that the vote is the one adequate symbol. The second point is the recognition of our stupidity in so long delaying what we now acclaim as a thing of value (24, p. 239).

Conclusion

During its dissolution stage, the Suffragette movement succeeded in obtaining votes for women. However, since it failed to win any seats in the General Election of December 1918, it can only be claimed that it achieved incomplete institutionalization. The vote was won. But, after the movement dissolved, it was never utilized as the instrument of reform it had been anticipated by many to be. Nevertheless, the legal recognition of women as individuals and as citizens, which the vote necessarily entailed, was a victory in itself.
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This thesis provides a defensible alternative to the conventional wisdom regarding the strategy choices of the militant Women's Social and Political Union. By systematically analyzing these choices, it fills an apparent gap in the extant research on the Suffragette movement. This analysis was achieved by utilizing the natural history approach to apply a synthesis of the work of several theorists of social movements. Therefore, in addition to summarizing precisely how the hypothesis is confirmed, this final chapter reviews the evidence from this particular movement which supports the synthesized theories.

The General Framework

The general framework of the thesis is the natural history approach developed by Blumer (1), Dawson and Gettys (4), Hopper (6), and Turner and Killian (20). This approach hypothesizes four developmental stages for social movements. The Suffragette movement is clearly divisible into the unrest, popular, formal, and institutional stages. Furthermore, with the exception of the institutional stage, which was its dissolution stage, each stage was characterized by the prescribed conditions.
The unrest stage of the Suffragette movement may be roughly dated from 1832 to 1906. During this stage, a general restlessness developed, government became inefficient, reforms were attempted, discontent spread and became socialized, and class antagonisms emerged (6, pp. 56-57).

In mid-Victorian Britain, unrest regarding women's status stemmed from the democratic ideals awakened by the French Revolution. However, the Representation of the People Act of 1832 abolished women's theoretical right to vote (15, p. 1). Consequently, feminist unrest was merely aggravated by later reform efforts, such as the Local Government Act of 1869 (granting the local franchise to women) and the Married Women's Property Act of 1882 (5, pp. 32-33; 17, p. 32). The growing number of constitutional organizations during this period spread and socialized discontent. Eventually, due to the Government's persistent refusal to recognize the women's claim, class antagonisms developed between the sexes (e.g., the Pankhurst Hall incident). Thus, this series of conditions led to the emergence of the Suffragette movement with the founding of the Women's Social and Political Union in 1903.

The popular stage of the Suffragette movement may be roughly dated from 1906 to 1910. During this stage, the responsible agents were identified, discontent spread, the discontented were organized, conflict between the movement
and the responsible agents developed, and the movement presented its demands (6, p. 58).

In 1905, the sabotage of the Women's Enfranchisement Bill by the Conservative Government and the ejection of the Suffragettes from the Manchester Liberal meeting led the W.S.P.U. to identify the Government, particularly the incoming Liberal Government, as the agents responsible for women's electoral status (10, p. 22; 11, pp. 41-43; 12, pp. 50-51). The first Women's Parliament, which coincided with the Opening of Parliament in February 1906, evidenced how greatly feminist unrest had spread in the wake of the Manchester incident's national publicity (15, p. 5; 18, p. 292). In the ensuing four years, the W.S.P.U. grew rapidly. The militant organization, which grossed less than 3,000 pounds in fiscal 1906, grossed over 33,000 pounds in fiscal 1909. Simultaneously, as the Suffragette movement insistently presented its demand to the Government, increasingly intense conflict between the two groups emerged. In mid-1906, Suffragettes created publicity by committing purely technical assaults upon police who obstructed their deputations, to provoke arrest (14, p. 167; 15, p. 27; 16, pp. 73-74). By late 1909, Suffragette prisoners were hunger-striking, and being forcibly fed by the Government (11, pp. 142-49; 13, p. 392).

The formal stage of the Suffragette movement may be roughly dated from 1910 to 1914. During this stage, a discussion public was formed, the movement's motives and aims
were established, a conflict in the ranks resulted in a seizure of power, and the movement coalesced around the organization (4, p. 723; 6, p. 63).

After the General Election of January 1910, which returned the Liberal Government with a reduced majority, the Conciliation Committee for Women's Suffrage was formed in the House of Commons to encourage the parties to discuss and resolve the issue. After this promising effort was sabotaged by the Government, the Suffragette movement became more firmly resolved than ever to escalate its militant strategy (5, p. 221; 11, p. 168; 16, p. 255). However, this decision was not unanimous. The Pankhursts and the Pethick-Lawrences strongly disagreed over the wisdom of attacks upon private property. This conflict in the ranks led to the seizure of power by the Pankhursts, around whom the movement coalesced. Subsequently, from the safety of Paris, Christabel dictated increasingly violent tactics, ranging from window-smashing to arson. Her autocratic leadership was firmly secured by 1914, when Sylvia's East London Federation was disaffiliated from the W.S.P.U.

The dissolution stage of the Suffragette movement may be roughly dated from 1914 to 1918. During this stage, deterrents to revolutionary behavior were implemented, amnesty was extended to prisoners, the movement was psychologically exhausted and economically distressed, the government's powers
increased, and it recognized the movement. The Suffragette movement failed, however, to completely fulfill the final condition: social reconstruction along the lines suggested by the movement (4, p. 724; 6, pp. 67-69).

Britain's entry into the First World War in late summer 1914 effectively deterred subsequent militant activity by the W.S.P.U. In early August, shortly after the arson campaign ended, the Government extended unconditional amnesty to all Suffragette prisoners (3, p. 387; 5, p. 304; 10, p. 280; 15, p. 238). Notably, at this juncture, the movement was too psychologically exhausted and economically distressed to continue its guerilla militancy. However, as Mrs. Pankhurst first recognized, there was no need for it. The wartime Government's need for surplus labor in civilian jobs forced it to recognize the Suffragette movement. Mrs. Pankhurst and her colleagues had repeatedly proven their ability to mobilize women en masse. Furthermore, with its wartime powers, the Government could compel civilian employers to hire women (10, pp. 293-94). The Representation of the People Act of 1918 granted the Parliamentary franchise to women over age thirty (16, p. 266; 17, p. 223). It was generally agreed by previous opponents of women's suffrage that this was just recognition for services rendered by women during the war. However, having won the vote, the Suffragette movement dissolved. Several leaders and ex-leaders of the W.S.P.U. (renamed the Women's Party) stood for Parliament in the next
elections, but all lost. Thus, with the war's end, the Suffragettes achieved their goal, but lost their niche in the nation's life, and thereby their survival as an institution.

The Strategic Factors

The evidence, which confirms the hypothesis regarding this particular movement, also supports the synthesized theories, which speculate about the influence of various factors upon strategy choices.

The Strategic Principles

Turner's (19, p. 155) hypothesis that strategy choices tend to become less expressive and more rational as a movement develops is supported in this thesis. Insofar as the Suffragette movement's strategies generally became more combative over time, the reverse appears to be true.

First, however, the W.S.P.U. never initiated or escalated coercion without justification. Its originally mild coercive strategy had been preceded by almost a half century of fruitless, peaceful agitation. Coercion was escalated in 1908 only after the Government failed to respond to the Union's great Hyde Park meeting, which was probably the largest women's suffrage gathering ever held. Coercion was further escalated from 1912 to 1914 only after the Government sabotaged the promising Conciliation Bill, which the Prime Minister had pledged not to obstruct.
Second, truces from coercion were declared whenever propitious opportunities for negotiation developed. The Suffragettes ceased all militant activity (with minor exceptions) between 1910 and 1912, in view of the proposed Conciliation Bill, and from 1914 onward, in view of the war. If the Government had allowed the Conciliation Bill to reach a final vote, sufficient time had passed for Members of Parliament to change their votes without appearing to yield to coercion.

Third, and notably, the Suffragette movement was not always able to choose between all possible strategies. However, it always pursued the least combative available strategy which was perceived to be effective. When its strategy was changed from persuasion to coercion, upon the move to London in 1906, it had to forego bargaining, since it had no exchangeable resources with which to negotiate. Even during the truce from 1910 to 1912, the closest the Suffragettes could come to bargaining was negative bargaining (i.e., to offer to stop coercion). But, when the latter was attempted, the movement was betrayed by the Government. It was not until 1914, upon Britain's entry into the First World War, that the Suffragette movement commanded an exchangeable resource (i.e., women's surplus labor) with which to bargain.

**Intra-Movement Factors**

The analysis of the Suffragette movement's strategy choices presented in this thesis verifies the hypothesized
influence upon strategy choices of the four intra-movement factors: the leadership, the ideology, the constituency, and the organization.

Wilson's (21, p. 222) conjecture that the charismatic agitator is more willing to select coercion than the pragmatic administrator is illustrated by the disagreement among the leaders which led to the Pethick-Lawrances' departure from the W.S.P.U. Mrs. Pankhurst and Christabel insisted upon undertaking the arson campaign, while the Pethick-Lawrences planned a publicity campaign to exploit the conspiracy trial, which followed the West End window-smashing raid.

Turner's (19, p. 155) suggestion that the values reflected in the ideology influence strategy choices is supported. The religious and humanistic values endorsed by the movement prevented the Suffragettes from attacking persons, whose lives they considered sacred, but allowed them to attack property, to which they believed people had been enslaved. The constraint upon the use of bargaining and coercion created by extreme democratic idealism was evident among the faction which split with the W.S.P.U. to form the Women's Freedom League. They would not tolerate having any strategy, least of all coercion, dictated to them by the autocratic Pankhurst-Pethick-Lawrence leadership.

Wilson's (21, p. 287) proposal that the heightened sense of persecution in an underground movement may lead, in turn,
to the rediagnosis of the responsible agents as a conspiracy, to a heightened sense of solidarity, and to the escalation of coercion precisely characterizes the violent campaign of 1912-1914. Also, his speculation that strategy choices are constrained by coalition formation is evident in the truces from militancy of 1910-1912 and 1914 onward.

Blumer (2, p. 207) also suggests the idea that a heightened sense of commitment and esprit de corps tends to lead to the escalation of strategies. These changes in the constituency, which may be caused by the changes Wilson suggests in the ideology, also characterize the violent campaign of 1912-1914.

Wilson's (21, p. 132) belief that the act of joining is facilitated by friendship ties with movement members is illustrated by the cases of Annie Kenney, a friend of Christabel, and Constance Lytton, a friend of Mrs. Pethick-Lawrence (7, 9). Neither of these very different women, a former mill worker and a peeress, would otherwise have been considered likely to become Suffragettes. As Wilson also adds, their sympathy for the movement was transformed into commitment by their participation in tactics. Furthermore, the three types of discipline he (21, p. 276) discusses are clearly illustrated: the coercive type by the Pethick-Lawrences' ouster, the normative type by Sylvia's ouster, and the utilitarian type by the W.F.L. split.
Turner's (19, p. 154) proposition that the more organized the movement, the more rationally motivated its strategies is clearly supported by the reports of the exceptional financial growth of the W.S.P.U. from 1906 to 1914.

Extra-Movement Factors

The analysis of the Suffragette movement's strategy choices presented in this thesis verifies the hypothesized influence upon strategy choices of the three extra-movement factors: the target group, reference publics, and public opinion.

Wilson's (21, p. 239) position that the interrelation of the movement and its target group influences strategy choices is supported. The Suffragette movement's strategies changed from persuasion to coercion to bargaining as its perceived relationship to the Government changed from dependency to subjugation to partial inequality. Furthermore, when the anti-suffragist Government was weak, it was challenged by the W.S.P.U. The confrontation between the two groups after the failure of the Conciliation Bill is an obvious example of such a challenge. During its early years, when the movement was not perceived as a threat by the Government, it was ignored. During the middle years, when the Government was uncertain about the movement, it was overtly tolerated, but covertly inhibited. During the later years, when it became
recognized as a threat by the Government, the movement was driven underground in an attempt to eliminate it.

Lipsky's (8, p. 81) and Turner's (19, p. 151) observation that some reference publics are potentially cooptable either by persuasion or bargaining is supported. Mrs. Pankhurst successfully used persuasion to coopt the adult suffragists in the Labor Party in 1904, and bargaining to coopt soldiers and munition workers during the Electoral Reform Conference in 1917.

Wilson's (21, p. 251) suggestion that the adroit use of tactics can change public opinion on an issue is clearly supported by the Suffragette movement's great success in winning the sympathy of the press and the public between 1906 and 1910. This success was largely due to the effectiveness of mild coercion in desanctifying the Government's authority. Furthermore, violence was an issue in strategy selection to the degree that the movement was subjected to coercion or denied access to other strategies (19, p. 161). But, as Turner (19, p. 160) and Wilson (21, p. 253) anticipated, too great a degree of violence (e. g., the attacks upon private property between 1912 and 1914) will not be considered justified, regardless of the circumstances.

The Hypothesis

This thesis confirms the hypothesis. The long-range strategy of the Suffragette movement was coercion. This
strategy was escalated until the target group exhausted its powers of opposition and conceded. It was interrupted only when bargaining opportunities with the target group or reference publics developed.

During its unrest stage (1866-1906), the Suffragette movement learned that persuasion, the strategy established by its constitutional forebearers, was ineffective. The leaders concluded that subsequent propagandistic activities along those lines would be ineffective.

Consequently, during its popular stage (1906-1910), the movement adopted coercion, beginning with mild tactics, such as heckling Cabinet ministers. As its effectiveness became apparent, this strategy was escalated to include more militant tactics, such as hunger-striking. However, despite its success, the Suffragette movement still had no exchangeable resources with which to bargain. Nonetheless, it did discover the threat of coercion as a negative bargaining resource.

By 1910, this coercive threat proved sufficiently effective to compel the Liberal Government to recognize women's suffrage as a serious political issue. Therefore, the formation of the Conciliation Committee in the House of Commons in 1910 marked the beginning of the movement's formal stage (1910-1914). However, due to an entangling alliance between the Liberals and the Irish Nationalists, which the W.S.P.U.
failed to take into account, the promising Conciliation Bill was defeated. Thereafter, this stage degenerated as the movement resumed coercion with unprecedented violence against property between 1912 and 1914.

Britain's entry into the First World War abruptly ended the violent campaign. Between 1914 and 1917, the Suffragette movement succeeded in forcing a bargain, backed by the threat of coercion, upon the Government. The offer made by the Suffragettes was one which the Government could not afford to refuse. In exchange for the surplus labor of women recruited by the Suffragettes, the Government was forced to accept votes for women as a fait accompli. By 1917, virtually all opposition to women's suffrage had evaporated, since the militants abandoned domestic violence to aid the Government with its own war abroad. The Electoral Reform Bill of 1917 (granting women's suffrage) passed in the House of Commons in December, and was enacted as the Representation of the People Act of 1918 in February. Thus, the Suffragette movement's long-range strategy of coercion, coupled with negative bargaining and bargaining, proved successful.

The three corollaries of the hypothesis are likewise confirmed.

The movement's strategies developed in a rational pattern, alternating between increasingly vigorous coercion and increasingly productive bargaining with the target group and reference publics.
British advocates of women's suffrage did not resort to coercion until a half century of persuasion failed. They were forced to bypass the intermediate strategy of bargaining because they had no exchangeable resources, such as votes, with which to bargain. Furthermore, violence was only adopted after the Suffragettes were subjected to unjustified violence themselves, and then only against property, not persons. Short of allowing their movement to quietly die, the unprecedented violence of the post-Conciliation years was the only alternative left to the movement after its betrayal by the Government. Failing to foresee that betrayal, the Suffragette movement failed to form coalitions with reference publics (e.g., the Irish Nationalists), which might have enabled it to override the Government's opposition. This was its only effective alternative to escalating coercion.

The failure of the third Conciliation Bill in 1912 resulted from the movement's apprehension of bargaining with its target group, its refusal to acknowledge reference publics, and its failure to communicate the threat of subsequent coercion.

The half century of Parliamentary obstruction of women's suffrage bills, which led to the emergence of the Suffragette movement, made its leaders justifiably apprehensive about the possibilities of successfully bargaining with the Government. However, this apprehension also led the movement to refuse to
acknowledge its reference publics by dismissing them as men's parties. Therefore, ironically, the very cautiousness toward the male political establishment which brought the movement into being may also have prevented it from realizing its goal eight years sooner. However, this possibility is problematic. What the Suffragette truce during the Conciliation effort actually did was to undercut the movement's threat of coercion. Prime Minister Asquith interpreted the first truce as an opportunity to abrogate his promise not to obstruct the Conciliation Bill, believing that the Suffragette movement would then quietly die. But this was a serious miscalculation on the part of the target group's chief representative.

The success of the Representation of the People Act of 1918 resulted from the movement's willingness to bargain with both its target group and its reference publics, and its success in communicating the threat of later coercion.

With the British entry into the First World War, Mrs. Pankhurst realized that, for the first time in its history, the Suffragette movement had an exchangeable resource—the surplus labor of women—with which to bargain. In fact, with the introduction of conscription, her offer of women's services was an offer which the overtaxed, wartime Government could not afford to refuse. However, if the possibility of refusing to honor the bargain after the war did occur to the Government, Mrs. Pankhurst's threat to renew the coercion of
the pre-war years after the war laid the idea to rest. Thus, after eight years of militancy and four years of war work, the Suffragette movement was able to exhaust the Government's powers to oppose the granting of votes for women.

Conclusion

In brief, the hypothesis is confirmed, and the evidence from this particular movement supports the synthesized theories. The analysis of the strategy choices of the W.S.P.U. was achieved by applying a synthesis of the work of several theorists of social movements, utilizing the natural history approach as a general framework. By systematically analyzing these choices, this thesis fills an apparent gap in the extant research on this movement. Finally, it provides a defensible alternative to the conventional wisdom regarding the strategy choices of the Suffragette movement.
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