THE BRITISH OCCUPATION OF SOUTHERN NIGERIA, 1851-1906

THESIS

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By

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The study indicates that the motives which impelled the creation of the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria were complex, variable, and sometimes contradictory. Many Englishmen within and without the government, indeed, advocated the occupation of the area to suppress the slave trade, but this humanitarian ambition, on balance, was not as significant as political and economic interests. The importance of the Niger waterway, rivalry with France and other maritime nations, and missionary work, all led Britain to adopt a policy of aggrandizement and to proclaim a protectorate over the Niger districts, thereby laying the foundation for modern Nigeria. The London government acquired territory through negotiating treaties with the native chiefs, conquest, and purchase. British policy and consular rule between 1851 and 1906 was characterized by gunboat diplomacy, brutality, and flagrant disregard for treaty rights; nonetheless, the British presence has made a positive impact on Nigeria's historical, political, economic, intellectual, and cultural development.
An investigation of the British occupation of Southern Nigeria reveals that recent historians have neglected the genesis of this colonial enterprise and have emphasized the rise of Nigerian nationalism and federalism in the twentieth century. The materials published by the 1865 Select Committee of the British House of Commons, indeed, have gone almost unnoticed, although they indicate that the motives behind the creation of the protectorate were complex, variable, and sometimes contradictory. A study of these and other state papers evokes such questions as these: Did the humanitarian desire to suppress the slave trade play an important role in the establishment of a British sphere of influence on the west coast of Africa? Was there a difference between the theory and practice of colonial policy? How did British imperialism compare with that of France in adjacent Dahomey? And why did so many chiefs elect to cooperate with a foreign intruder?

Joseph C. Anene's _Southern Nigeria in Transition, 1885-1906_ is an excellent work on the last phase of the occupation, but it makes only brief references to events which occurred prior to 1885; moreover, the treatment of the Punitive Expedition of 1899 against Benin in retaliation for
the murder of J. R. Phillips and his party is cursory, while the campaign against Chief Ologbosere, the man responsible for the Benin Massacre, is completely ignored.

The major official, primary sources for this study are T. C. Hansard (ed.), Parliamentary Debates, Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, and House of Commons, Sessional Papers, collections which provide voluminous materials on all aspects of the penetration of Nigeria. Colonial Office correspondence and documents also were useful. The most important unofficial collections consulted are Sir Edward Hertslet (ed.), The Map of Africa by Treaty and Wilfred Cartey/Martin Kilson (eds.), The Africa Reader: Colonial Africa.

The most valuable secondary accounts are The Cambridge History of British Empire, Okoi Arikpo, The Development of Modern Nigeria, Robert O. Tilman and Taylor Cole, The Nigerian Political Scene, Obaro Ikime, The Fall of Nigeria, and Arthur Norton Cook, British Enterprise in Nigeria. These works reveal a great variety of opinion on the subject.

The only useful periodical is West Africa.

Finally, I wish to acknowledge with gratitude all who have assisted me in the preparation of this manuscript: Miss Ellie N. Whitmore, Mr. John Brewster, Miss Julie M. Hardcastle, Miss Jane Vovk, Mrs. Becky Kiel, and Mrs.
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Fig. 1--Map of Southern Nigeria*

PROLOGUE

EUROPE AND SOUTHERN NIGERIA: THE LEGACY
AND THE ENIGMA, 1851-1853

Before the arrival of British merchants, commercial contact between Europe and Southern Nigeria had existed for centuries. Papal Bulls of 1451, 1455, and 1456 authorized Portugal to explore Nigeria, and by the end of the fifteenth century, she had established trade with Benin, where gold and peppers were a much-prized commodity. In 1482, King John II built the great fortress at Sao Jorge da Mina (Elmina) to protect this commerce.1 The Portuguese also founded a factory (trading station) on the coast at Gwato, which came to be known as the port of Benin City. Benin, which soon became one of the most important kingdoms of West Africa, sent an ambassador to John II, who in turn dispatched "missionaries and factors (trading agents), together with many presents for the King" (Oba). The King of Benin reluctantly accepted the new religion and built a Christian church at Benin City. Thus began the European penetration of Nigeria, but the main thrust did not come

until the nineteenth century. In 1851, Britain occupied Lagos in order to suppress the slave trade, an action which touched off a bitter dispute with France, Spain, and Portugal, nations which hoped to control the region for selfish, non-humanitarian reasons.

French aims were commercial and imperialistic. While Britain led the anti-slavery movement, French merchants still engaged in the traffic in blacks. To promote this interest, the French government established friendly relations with the King of Dahomey, whose aggressive spirit, barbarous wars, and encouragement of the slave trade constituted the chief causes of disorder in West Africa.

Concerning this situation, Lord Alfred Churchill, a Tory, reminded the House of Commons in February 1862 of the horrible massacres which had taken place in Dahomey. Reports of similar cruelties [he declared], continued to be received, though not on so extensive a scale, some twenty or thirty miserable captives being killed every two or three nights. A letter which he had received represented the King as being friendly to France, Spain, and Portugal, but hostile to England; and being completely in the hands of the mulatto slave-dealers, it was easy to discover their motive for instigating the King to acts of barbarity.

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2Michael Crowder, A Short History of Nigeria (New York, 1962), pp. 67-78 (hereafter cited as Hist. of Nig.).

In addition to the profits derived from the slave trade, the Paris government was interested in West African cotton and sugar. To cite Churchill again,

The entire country from Dahomey to the Niger was one vast cotton field. The cotton plant was indigenous and perennial; consequently it did not require replanting year by year as in America; the crop had only to be picked and sent home. Of the sugar crop the same might be said . . .; Lagos, an important cotton producing country, was in great danger from its proximity to Dahomey.

Since the port and island of Lagos constituted a trade center, the French wanted to occupy it and thereby shatter the hopes of the British who already had occupied Sierra Leone, Gambia, and the Gold Coast (now Ghana).

Even after 1850, Spain and Portugal continued to participate in the West African slave trade. The destination of this human cargo was Cuba or Brazil. To suppress this infamous traffic, Britain put pressure on the King of Dahomey, the Lagosians, and others to cease cooperating with slave dealers and tried to enforce treaties previously signed with Spain and Portugal paying each a bounty to abandon this trade. Despite the efforts of the London

\[4\text{Ibid.}, \text{cols.} \ 275-276.\]

\[5\text{Speech of Sir Charles Adderley to Commons, February 21, 1865 ibid., CLXVII, 542; Sir Reginald Coupland, The British Anti-Slavery Movement (London, 1933), pp. 151-185.}\]
government, Spain and Portugal paid little attention to their abolitionist treaties.\textsuperscript{6}

In January 1851, Britain, therefore, became interested in Lagos in order to suppress the slave trade, promote legitimate commerce, and to civilize the tribes.\textsuperscript{7} In an effort to wean France, Portugal, and Spain away from the slave trade, Britain promoted legitimate commerce in West Africa and aided humanitarian organizations. In the later part of 1851, Prime Minister Lord John Russell emphasized these objectives to R. Doherty, Governor of Sierra Leone. British forces in the Niger area also had instructions to

\textsuperscript{6}Daniel P. Mannis and Malcolm Cowley, \textit{Black Cargoes: A History of the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1518-1865} (New York, 1962), p. 227; James Bandinel, \textit{Some Accounts of the Trade in Slaves from Africa as Connected with Europe and America} (London, 1968), pp. 150-158, 159-163; Treaties or conventions were signed between Spain and Britain on 28 August 1814 and 23 September 1817. Following these treaties, the King of Spain on 19 December 1817 issued a decree to abolish the slave trade in Spanish dominions in Europe and America. Additional Treaties were concluded between Portuguese and British plenipotentiaries on 21 January 1815 (at Vienna), 22 January 1815, 28 July 1817, 11 September 1817, 15, March 1823, and 2 October 1826 to abolish the slave trade. But neither Spain nor Portugal stopped the inhuman traffic. To learn how these conventions were being kept, the House of Commons in 1853 created a Watchdog Committee, chaired by Joseph Hume, a radical. This committee found that Spain and Portugal paid little attention to their abolitionist treaties [from Edward Cardwell to Commons on February 21, 1865, \textit{Parl. Debs.}, CLXVII, 542].

\textsuperscript{7}Speech of Sir Charles B. Adderley, February 21, 1865 \textit{ibid}, 541-542.
adopt "preventive measures against the slave trade," to accept or refuse "sovereignty over African territory," and to extend "British jurisdiction into lands over which no sovereignty was claimed." But these motives notwithstanding, "the West African policy of the British government in the nineteenth century could easily be pictured as one of vacillation and blundering, of decisions shirked or reversed, or as no policy at all." The difficulty stemmed from the lack of accurate information about West Africa. Despite George Goldie's (one of the first British explorers of Nigeria) freelance colonization, British policy rested on two tenets which politicians, civil servants, and the general public accepted. They were:

The effort to stamp out the slave trade must be continued, and secondly, . . . it was the duty of the British Government to give all reasonable assistance to the legitimate traders. The doctrine of the humanitarians that legitimate trade would drive out the slave trade by its own inherent superiority made these two attitudes complementary, and also fitted perfectly the dominant economic theory of the time--the belief in free trade. In fact the doctrine of legitimate commerce was simply free trade morality adapted to the conditions of West Africa.

8Rose, Newton, and Benians, CHBE, II, p. 663.
9Flint, Goldie and Nig., p. 22.
10Ibid., p. 22.
In West Africa, Britain wanted to suppress the slave trade, promote missionary work, and trade in palm oil, ivory, and other major exports. Liverpool, for example, was interested in palm oil due to its soap industry. Christian missionaries were active in Southern Nigeria, where they acquired a piece of land in Abeokuta. Some historians have discovered that apart from traders, explorers and a few administrators, the only Europeans who visited Tropical Africa were missionaries who established missions in various villages, including Abeokuta, fifty miles inland from Lagos.\textsuperscript{11}

The use of indentured Negro emigrants also strained Anglo-French relations until the twentieth century. The policy of promoting emigration of Negroes under indentures from Sierra Leone or the Gold Coast to the West Indies met with little success, because the workers refused to cooperate with the immigration agents who had recruited them. From 1842 to 1851 less than 14,000 indentured blacks were imported into the West Indies, and most of them were too refractory to work. By the latter year, it had become

apparent the slave trade was being revived in a disguised form.\textsuperscript{12}

In 1851, the British government bought Danish settlements along the Gold Coast, leaving only the Dutch as British competitors in the area. France, meanwhile, resorted to a similar practice. Her sugar colonies, like the British, had experienced an acute labor shortage. To solve this problem, the French also transported indentured Negro labor from the Kroo Coast, south of Sierra Leone. French planters, however, were no more successful than their British counterparts. Their involvement in this enterprise, therefore, is significant only because it "brought French ships and French merchants back to the African Coast far to the south of Senegal, where they had been rare since the abolition of the slave trade by France in 1830."\textsuperscript{13} Anglo-French rivalry, thus revived, remained fundamentally the same throughout the entire period of British penetration of Southern Nigeria, and in the early 1860's disturbed the political development of the region.

\textsuperscript{12}Jose, Newton, and Benians, CHBE, II, p. 669.
\textsuperscript{13}Ibid.
CHAPTER I

THE OCCUPATION OF LAGOS, 1853-1865

To the London government, the occupation of Lagos, Nigeria, seemed essential if Britain were to suppress the slave trade, promote legitimate trade, and civilize the natives. But each of these noble aims raises other questions and requires further analysis. Were these objectives accomplished after the occupation of Lagos? What problems did intervention create? Why was a Select Committee established in 1865 to consider its abandonment? And notwithstanding these avowed aims, did Britain not have ulterior (imperialistic) motives: to use Lagos as a base from which to attack Dahomey to the west and to penetrate the hinterland.¹

To understand the evolution of these objectives, it is necessary to know something about Anglo-French rivalry in Fernando Po and along the Slave Coast, located between the Gold Coast and the Oil Rivers.

Prior to 1850, Lagos and Whydah had been important in the slave trade. Britain had abandoned the trading station at Whydah in 1842, but later regretted the withdrawal. In 1849, the British West African Committee (Committee of British Parliament) recommended its re-occupation to prevent the export of slaves from Dahomey, a policy strongly endorsed by the Wesleyan Mission on the Gold Coast, because its leader had negotiated a treaty with the King of Dahomey for the suppression of the slave trade. In the same year, Captain John Beecroft, a British Consular officer, was dispatched to the Bight of Biafra to enforce this convention. He became the de facto governor of Fernando Po, and the island became a base for British trading activities.2

France's occupation of Gabon in 1849 aroused British fears of French imperialism on the Slave Coast and competition for the trade of Dahomey. In 1851, the Church Missionary Society, which had a mission at Abeokuta in the Lower Niger region, also joined African merchants in pressing the London government to occupy Whydah and Lagos to stop the aggression of Gezo, King of Dahomey. Viscount Palmerston, the foreign secretary, wanted to send Beecroft, now British Consul in the Bights of Benin and Biafra,

against Porto Novo, but he was frustrated by Earl Grey, the colonial secretary because of French opposition. Taking advantage of this indecision, the Dahomean forces (Amazons) attacked Abeokuta, in February and March 1851, but were repulsed. Portuguese slavers, meanwhile compelled Kosoko, chief of Lagos, to reestablish his town as a slave market and a "focus for anti-British activity."\(^3\)

In response to this situation, the Russell Cabinet (1846-1852) reluctantly decided in October 1851 to occupy Lagos temporarily, despite the opposition of France and the heavy financial burden this action would entail. Norman B. Bedingfield, British Naval Commander in the Bight of Benin, consequently received orders to expel Kosoko. On 1 January 1852, Bedingfield deposed the chief, exiled him to Epé in Jebu province, destroyed the town, and installed his cousin, the docile and pro-British Akitoye, as his successor. In gratitude, Akitoye on 1 March 1852, endowed the Church Missionary Society with land "for the purpose of erecting . . . churches, schools, and dwelling-houses for missionaries and native agents whom that society may employ . . . at Lagos."\(^4\) Before his death in 1853, he

\(^3\)Ibid., II, 670; Sir Cecil Rex Niven, Nigeria (London, 1967), pp. 29-31; Burns, Hist. of Nig., p. 117; Crowder, Hist. of Nig., p. 122.

\(^4\)Ibid., Edward Hertslet, Map of Africa by Treaty, ed. I (London, 1967), pp. 91-92; Burns, Hist. of Nig., pp. 116-133; Crowder, Hist. of Nig., pp. 127, 129, 134, 139, 140, and 149; Arikpo, Dev. Mod. of Nig., p. 31.
secretly arranged for the installation of his son Docemo (Dosumu).

What persuaded the reluctant Russell Ministry to occupy Lagos in 1851 was the arrival of French gunboats on the coast between Lagos and Porto Novo, the capital of Dahomey. In retaliation, Lord Russell ordered Randolph Foote, British Consul in South Africa, to occupy Lagos. The Prime Minister, however, was careful to explain to the Consul that the occupation of this important point in the Bight of Benin is indispensable to the complete suppression of the slave trade in the Bight, whilst it will give great aid and support to the development of lawful commerce and will check the aggressive spirit of the King of Dahomey.

In 1859, the French firm of Messrs. Regis, arrived in Lagos to recruit Negroes to work on the plantations of Réunion, an island east of Madagascar. Ostensibly they would be free, but indentured, workers, nonetheless, their status was indistinguishable from that of a slave. They were collected from the prisoners, taken in native wars fought in the interior. When the Foreign Office protested this traffic, the Quai d'Orsau responded that England herself had done in the 1840's in the area around Sierra Leone.

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5 CHBE, II, 671.

6 Russell to Foote from London to S. Africa (22 June 1962); Hertslet, Map of Afr., I, p. 92.
Recruitment of indentured laborers, however, convinced Lord John Russell, now foreign secretary in the second Palmerston Ministry, that stricter British control at Lagos was necessary. It was clear that disorders in Lagos at least threatened the peace of the area and the palm oil trade of the Oil River, which annually increased in value. By 1860, it was worth more than £1,000,000. Cotton exports from the interior also increased, a significant development, for the Civil War held back American cotton for four years (1861-1865).  

Unfortunately for British policy the well-meaning but weak King Docemo could neither keep order nor suppress the slave trade. To put an end to this state of chaos, the London government persuaded him in 1861 to cede the port and island of Lagos in return for a pension. The following year, a separate government, known as the "Lagos Organization" was created.

Thus in 1862 the occupation of Lagos was officially converted into a protectorate (August 6), and the port "assumed the position of a separate colony."  This transition was implemented by the Prometheus, a sloop-of-war, and a detachment of the West India Regiment but no one

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7 Ibid., II, 670-671.
then knew whether this new status would be temporary or permanent. Though the Foreign Office had announced in April 1860 the British presence would be brief, Lord Russell's dispatch of 22 June 1862 to Foote and the treaty of 6 August 1862 with King Docemo made it clear that the British government considered itself the new sovereign of Lagos. In taking possession of the area, Bedingfield and William McCoskry, the acting Consul, declared that Docemo had ceded "the sovereignty of Lagos to the Queen of Great Britain, her heirs and successors for ever . . .".⁹

Magnanimous in victory, British authorities in Nigeria took steps to assure that no harm nor injustice should come to King Docemo from converting the anomalous occupation into a more realistic protectorate. To provide for his material needs, he received an annual pension of 1,200 bags of cowries (estimated at £1,030 annually), so long as he abided by the treaty of 6 August 1862.¹⁰

During the next year, the jurisdiction of Lagos expanded. On 7 February 1863, Kosoko declared that when he had been King of Lagos, his territory extended eastward to include Palma and Leckie and that even now the King of Jebu allowed him to claim these cities as ports of trade

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⁹Ibid.; Hertslet, Map of Afr., I, 95. William McCoskry was a merchant who lived many years in Lagos, and later, at Lokoja. He acted as Consul after the death of Foote in 1861.

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 93-94; Kopytoff, Pref. to Mod. Nig., p. 142; Burns, Hist. of Nig., pp. 129-130.
"by right of his former ownership." The second Palmerston Ministry (1859-1865) also recognized this claim and recalled him from exile in order to bring Palma and Leckie under the Lagos government.  

The occupation of Lagos was a mixed blessing, for it brought Great Britain into conflict with Dahomey over the slave trade and domestic slavery, and raised the question of who had jurisdiction over neighboring tribes. The fierce Ashanti of the Gold Coast moreover, invaded Lagos in 1863, believing the British protectorate to be a refugee for runaway slaves and debtors. Governor Benjamin C. C. Pine, commanding a small force of British troops and native allies, fought well at Dodowa, but King Asantahene (or Ashantahene) decisively defeated him. Thereafter, the Ashanti perenially raided Lagosian territory.  

Reacting to this situation, the House of Commons on 11 February 1865, created a Select Committee, chaired by Charles Bowyer Adderley, Tory M. P. from Staffordshire, to study the problems of the British West African colonies (Sierra Leone, Gambia, the Gold Coast, and Lagos) and to

11 Hertslet, Map of Afr., I, 95-96; Burns, Hist. of Nig., p. 128; Arikpo, Dev. Mod. of Nig., p. 32; Crowder, Hist. of Nig., p. 153.

12 Ibid., pp. 195-196; Sir Stephen Cave to the Commons 21 Feb. 1865, Parl. Debs., CLXIV (1865), 275-277; CHBE, II, 672-673.
make recommendations. Adderley doubted that the occupation of these territories was of any value in the suppression of the slave trade, but he wanted to know if the British colonial system of government was working satisfactorily on the west coast of Africa. Stephen Cave, Tory M. P. and a member of the Select Committee, charged that these settlements had been justified by false principles from the beginning. Under the influence of the Anti-Slavery Society, crowds of recaptured Africans were maintained in idleness at the public expense, at a time when laborers ... [in England] were only able to obtain precarious, and in many cases insufficient means of livelihood.

Cave, nonetheless, did not suggest that West African settlements should be abandoned. The problems which attended the occupation, he thought, stemmed from maladministration, not from any "inherent defect." He insisted that if Britain did not put her colonial affairs in order, she would suffer a great loss of prestige. If she had not occupied Lagos when she did, another maritime power, probably France, would have, and he distrusted France, "in the matter of slave trading and territorial expansion."

Lord Frederick Stanley, Tory M. P. for Preston, proposed that British subjects injured by the slave trade

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14 Adderley to the Commons, 21 Feb. 1865, Parl. Debs., Col. S46.

15 Ibid.
should receive compensation, but he did not admit the slave trade had been created by any European nation. He traced its origin to the interior of Africa, "to a period anterior to any recorded history;" Englishmen had only exaggerated its evils.16

Edward Cardwell, a Whig (liberal) M. P. and former colonial secretary, staunchly denied that the Atlantic slave trade had an African origin. It originated with Europeans, not Africans.

The slave trade, of which we all speak in terms of horror, which it deserves, was instituted originally between the Spanish colonies in America and the Coast of Africa and in it unfortunately Great Britain for many years bore a large and disgraceful part.17

He concurred with Adderley and cited the King of Dahomey's statement: if the white man had not been there to buy the slave, the Atlantic slave trade would never have expanded to its present volume, though many African tribes, of course, had slaves of their own.18

Members of the 1865 Select Committee also had differing views about why Britain had occupied Lagos: why was it necessary to establish legitimate trade at this time and in that remote part of the world? Some answered that

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16 Speech of 21 Feb. 1865, ibid., CLXXVII (1865), 550-551. Lord Stanley was a civil lord of the admiralty and a member of the Privy Council and Cabinet.
17 Ibid., col. 554.
18 Ibid.
legal commerce could become an adequate substitute for the slave trade; moreover, the export of cotton and palm oil was beneficial to British merchants and Africans alike.

The British occupation of Lagos and the surrounding area, however, had not stimulated the British economy as anticipated. In Adderley's opinion, this settlement was productive of more trouble than treasure. Citing an unidentified high authority, he declared the government had made a great mistake in acquiring territory around Lagos, since this action had embroiled colonial officials in serious quarrels with native chiefs. British agents and merchants, he added, had insinuated themselves among powerful chiefs and then had told them to do exactly as they bade or they would blockade or bombard their towns. But they did not "have the means of carrying out such threats." He recommended, therefore, that the island of Lagos be abandoned forthwith, for it brought no returns.

Adderley also stressed the importance of trade in the Bights of Benin and Biafra, where more palm oil was produced "than in all the British settlements put together." Manchester, a famous textile center, of course, wished to develop the cotton fields of West Africa. More and more raw materials were needed to fuel the Industrial Revolution. These observations led him to conclude that Britain

\[\text{Ibid., col. 540.}\]
was more interested in stimulating her own economy than in suppressing the slave trade in Nigeria.

Lord Stanley concurred and loudly proclaimed that the purpose was not at all to civilize the Africans; it was not fair to justify intervention by saying it was necessary to civilize the African people, when there were "plenty of people in Britain who also needed civilizing." He wanted the British presence in West Africa to be viewed as a matter of trade so that the question could be narrowed and understood in its true light. \(^\text{20}\)

Lord Alfred Churchill, the Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was certain the vast resources of West Africa (including Lagos) could supply British factories with all the raw materials they required. Declaring that African cotton was superior to the Asiatic variety, he urged the London government to continue to encourage trade along the West African coast. For example, an increase in cotton production would compete favorably with slave-grown cotton, thereby reducing the value of slave labor. And once there was no demand for slave labor, slavery would become extinct. Lord Stanley complained of the huge military and civil expenditure which served no

\(^\text{20}\)Ibid., col. 551.

useful purpose. As for civilizing the natives and/or philanthropic activities, he, too, argued that British authorities acted "under a delusion." It was quite erroneous for Englishmen to consider themselves "responsible for the fortunes and destiny of the African race." 22

Cardwell, however, praised the humanitarian work of missionaries who had denied themselves the comforts and happiness of home and gone abroad to spread the Gospel, thereby christianizing and civilizing pagan people. 23 Cave thought, too, the activities of the Basle Missionary Society in West Africa was helping to civilize the natives. Aside from instructing them in the Christian faith, they taught them "the occupations of civilized life, such as carpentry, blacksmith's work, and other useful employment." 24 Cardwell, however insisted that Britain had occupied Lagos to suppress the slave trade and to engage in legitimate trade, not to colonize the region. 25

The Select Committee, nonetheless made out a prima facie case for withdrawal from Gambia, the Gold Coast, and Lagos, but these posts were not abandoned, because the slave trade continued to flourish and the threat of French

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22 Ibid., col. 551.
23 Ibid., col. 554.
24 Ibid., col. 549.
25 Ibid., col. 556.
annexation remained. This resolution was presented to the House on 24 March 1865.26

On 26 June 1865, Parliament accepted the Committee's recommendations that British forces withdraw from Lagos, but events in Nigeria prevented the enforcement of this decision. Continuing tribal warfare in the interior and opposition by British officials within and without Lagos frustrated Parliamentary action. Lagosian authorities--British and Nigerian--could not alone suppress the foreign and domestic slave trade. An increase in legitimate commerce and foreign investment was urgently needed to finance the local government and its projects. A perennial problem, moreover, remained: how could the Lagosian government establish peace in the interior "without extending colonial jurisdiction beyond the economically unviable island"?27

Great Britain in résumé intervened in Southern Nigeria (Lagos) for several reasons, the most important of which was the suppression of the slave trade--then increasing between West Africa and Brazil. Other motives were rivalry with France, establishment of legal trade (palm oil, cotton, etc.), and christianizing/civilizing the natives.


27 Kopytoff, Pref. to Mod. Nig., pp. 149-151.
CHAPTER II

ESTABLISHING THE PROTECTORATE, 1865-1906

Having rejected the recommendations of the 1865 Select Committee, the Lagos government began the pacification of the hinterland in order to protect British political and economic interests. Lagosian merchants urged Captain John H. Glover, the governor, to intervene in Yorubaland, for peace would benefit trade. In the Niger Delta, the British consul attempted to moderate "bitter competition for the oil markets between the various states and European traders." In sum, expanding trade, the importance of the Niger as an excellent river highway and the threat posed by French and German imperialism, all led Britain to adopt a policy of aggrandizement and to proclaim a protectorate over the Niger districts, thereby laying the foundation for modern Nigeria. Toward this end, the Foreign Office embarked on a series of punitive expeditions, negotiated treaties with native chiefs, and occasionally bought land. The Colonial Office, of course, saw to it that the introduction of the British administrative system kept pace with the march into the interior. The London government also took steps to keep French and
German soldiers and civilians out of Southern and Northern Nigeria. ¹

The chief administrator of the typical British protectorate in Africa was the Consul-General, who was responsible to the Colonial Office. But the Vice-Consul, charged with all problems arising from tribal districts, constituted the backbone of the administrative system and served as a liaison between the several departments in Lagos and the districts. He was assisted by two junior officers, one a judge and the other a crown prosecutor. The former established consular courts and presided over cases involving Europeans and natives. In chronological order, the most important departments of British administration in Nigeria were: political, customs, postal, military, marine (navy), treasury, and medical. The Political Department, of course, was the most important, because it had the difficult problem of converting tribal chaos into civilized order. Its offices had to be tactful and courageous in order to secure native cooperation in persuading many tribes to accept British authority and to abandon such brutal customs as human sacrifice.

Mindful that powerful chiefs would respect only force, Vice-consul Ralph Moor recruited, armed, and trained a regiment of about 500 Yorubas in the later part of the 1880's. Recalcitrant local chiefs soon learned that they were no match for this skilled and disciplined legion.

The methods employed by the Customs Department to collect duties were similar to those then used in England. About fifty native clerks staffed this service.\(^3\) The Postal Department, as the name suggests, was responsible for carrying the mail. The military and marine (navy) departments were concerned primarily with expansion and defense. The treasury department collected taxes and handled all financial transactions. The Medical Department made great progress in conquering tropical diseases, plagues, and epidemics. Figure 1 (p. 24) indicates the government structure.

Before World War I, the protectorate changed name four times. Originally called the "British Protectorate of the Niger Districts," it was known as the "Oil River Districts" between 5 June 1885 and 13 May 1893, when the area became the "Niger Coast Protectorate," and finally in 1906, the "Protectorate of Southern Nigeria." The Northern Region was always called the "Protectorate of Northern Nigeria." In 1914, the colony of Lagos and

\(^3\)Ibid.
A. Government Officials

Colonial Office

Chief Administrator of Lagos (Consul-General)

Vice Consul

Judge

Prosecutor for Crown

Protectorate

District Officer

District Officer

District Officer

B. Government Departments in Chronological Order

Political

Customs

Postal

Military

Marine

Treasury

Medical

Fig. 1--Government Structure

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4 Cook, BEN, pp. 70-71. Before 1900, the administrator of Lagos was responsible to the Colonial Office; the Consul-General of the Protectorate, to the Foreign Office; and the Agents General of the Royal Niger Company (RNC), to the Board of Directors. With the cancellation of the Charter of the RNC in 1900 and the establishment of Northern Nigeria,
the southern and northern protectorates were merged to form the modern political entity of Nigeria.\(^5\)

As the Lagos authorities actively encouraged trade with the hinterland their contact with interior tribes increased apace. They established relations with the Egbas and Yorubas, who provided palm oil, then the most important export of West Africa. The center of this trade was Ibadan in Yorubaland, and to get there one had to cross the country of the Egbas. Though bitter foes of the Yorubas, the Egbas had profited as middlemen in this commerce. Perceiving that direct contact between Lagos and Ibadan would seriously undermine their prosperity, the Egbas interdicted the oil trade. To reopen the trade routes, Captain Glover in 1862 first tried negotiation, but when this effort failed, he led a company of West India troops into England and reestablished trade with Ibadan.\(^6\)


Lagos so prospered under Glover that by 1873, the year of his retirement, he commanded the respect of the native population. By 1880, however, the tribes of the interior had resumed their internecine warfare. The trouble began when the Yorubas attacked the Ebgas and provoked enemies on every side to counterattack. Fighting valiantly, the Yorubas repelled the invaders, but the situation degenerated into a series of raids that brought trade to a standstill.7

Hit in the pocketbook by declining production and trade, the twin consequences of tribal warfare, Lagos authorities again intervened to end the Egba-Yoruba dispute. A truce was arranged in 1886, but it was soon broken and anarchy resumed its sway. To the Lagos government, the only permanent solution was the establishment of British hegemony over Yorubaland.8

In July, 1886, Sir William MacGregor, the new governor of Lagos negotiated a treaty of peace, friendship, and commerce with the Alafin (King) of Oyo, the Oni (King) of Ife, the Owa (King) of Ilesia, the Awujale (King) of Ijebu, and other Yoruba local chiefs habitually involved

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7 Ibid.; Cook, BEN, pp. 52-53; Burns, Hist. of Nig., pp. 143 and 145; Geary, Nigeria, p. 50.

8 Cook, BEN, pp. 52-53. For a detailed account of the wars between Nigerian tribes and the attempts of the Lagosian government to mediate these disputes, see Commd. 4957: "Lagos (West Africa)," Sess. Paps., LX (1887), 167-199.
in civil strife. (The Alake of Abeokuta was the only ruler who had remained neutral in this conflict.) The treaty required the tribes to maintain peace, to preserve existing boundaries, and "refer all their disputes to arbitration by the Governor of Lagos." It served the dual purpose of restoring peace to Yorubaland and checking French aggression in Western Nigeria, where some areas of Yorubaland were still free of foreign domination. To meet this threat, the Lagos government in 1886 declared a protectorate over Ilaro and Egbado. The next year, Lagosian troops occupied Ijebu Ode.

Governor G. Carter and Captain G. C. Denton, who usually acted as Colonial Secretary while the former was on leave, tried to solve inter-tribal commercial disputes, but their efforts were frustrated by native middlemen, fighting for their existence against the encroachment of European merchants. Nonetheless, they accepted the treaty of Abeokuta which recognized Egba independence, subject to a British protectorate. The Governor of Lagos now had the authority to adjudicate all disputes between natives and British subjects, to establish freedom of trade and to abolish human sacrifice.

9 Comnd. 4957: Africa, No. 2, Parl. Paps., LX (1887), 128-161; Arikpo, Dev. of Mod. Nig., p. 35.

concluded a similar treaty with the Yorubas which imposed upon them the additional obligation not to cede any territory nor contract any arrangement with a foreign power without British consent.\textsuperscript{11}

Another enemy of the Yorubas was the Fulani Emirate of Ilorin. Turning to these old antagonists, the aggressive and imperious Carter in 1886 forced both to withdraw their armies, but he failed to persuade the Yorubas to accept a resident in Ibadan.\textsuperscript{12}

Soon thereafter, the Emir of Ilorin, a friend of Carter, died. His successor, angered by Britain's suppression of the slave trade, attacked Ogbomosho, a town garrisoned by Lagosian troops. In retaliation the Lagos government tried to interdict trade to and from Ilorin, but the blockage failed due to smuggling.\textsuperscript{13} Late in 1886 the Emir of Ilorin, moreover, besieged Ibadan, another town garrisoned by Lagosian soldiers, but was repelled with heavy losses. A year later, native and merchant forces employed by the Royal Niger Company defeated the Fulani Emirate and brought the region around Ilorin under British control.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., p. 32; Cook, \textit{BEN}, pp. 53-54.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., p. 54. Captain R. L. Bowers was appointed resident in the same year (1886).
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{14} Cook, \textit{BEN}, p. 54.
Under British administration, peace returned to Southern Nigeria and with it trade revived. Envious of these successes, the French government in 1879, at the urging of Leon Gambetta, then President of Chamber of Deputies, formed two commercial associations: the Compagnie Francaise de L'Afrique Equatoriale of Paris, and the Compagnie du Senegal et de la Cote Occidentale d'Afrique of Marseilles. These companies concluded treaties with native chiefs and established twenty trading posts on the Lower Niger. This challenge, however, came to a halt with Gambetta's unexpected death on 31 December 1882. In 1884 these firms merged with the British United African Company; thereafter, the British flag flew unchallenged over the Lower Niger.15

Encouraged by the absorption of the French companies, Sir Taubman Goldie, one of the first British explorers of Nigeria and now a director of the United African Company founded in 1879, asked the Foreign Office to accept the company's treaties with the tribes who occupied the area between the Delta and the confluence of the Niger and Benue rivers. The Foreign Office obliged and used these

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conventions to support British claims advanced at the Berlin Conference (1884-1885), which recognized them. The Berlin Conference, sponsored by Prince Otto von Bismarck, the German Chancellor, held its opening session on 15 November 1884. The Final Act (also called the Berlin Act), signed 26 February, 1885, "recognized British paramountcy on the Lower Niger" and established rules for the occupation of the West Coast of Africa. It also called for the partition of Africa and laid down "the principle that formal notification was necessary, if claims to African territory were to be made by Treaty Powers." Due to this understanding, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Portugal had to notify other powers about their various protectorates. Great Britain and other interested powers agreed, moreover, to define "their respective boundaries and spheres of influence."

As described in the London Gazette of 5 June 1885, these territories, which constituted the Protectorate of the Niger Districts, extended along the coast from Lagos in the west to the right bank of the Rio del Ray in the east. In the interior, it stretched from the sea along

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16 Ibid., p. 84; Cook, BEN, p. 58.

either side of the Niger to its confluence with the Benue at Lokoja and thence eastward to Ibi.\textsuperscript{19}

In the 1880's Consul Edward H. Hewett found himself on the horns of a dilemma: he could not effectively forestall the encroachments of France and Germany, while returning frequently to England for his health. To assist him in this problem the Foreign Office appointed Harry Johnston in 1887 to serve as his vice-consul. At the time, the two men also faced a serious domestic crisis fomented by King Ja Ja, a middleman between the white traders along the coast and interior tribes. Since Ja Ja was not bound by the prevailing prices in the European market, he could (and did) charge whatever he wanted for products sold to European traders. They, of course, complained of being bilked, but Ja Ja refused to lower prices. In desperation they formed the Amalgamated Association to boycott the trade. Ja Ja, however, broke their resistance by detaching Alexander Miller and Bros. from the Association. This firm paid Ja Ja his usual commission in return for a monopoly of his business, which included palm oil and palm kernels, as the main trade items. The frustrated Association then referred the dispute to Johnson who,


\textsuperscript{19}Hertslet, Map of Afr., I, 445; Cook, \textit{BEN}, p. 58; Crowder, \textit{Hist. of Nig.}, p. 187.
despite his own venality, admitted the King had a strong legal case, since the Treaty of 1873 had recognized him as an independent ruler. Consul Hewett, moreover, had affirmed in 1884, when he needed an ally against France and Germany:

The Queen does not want to take your country, or your markets, but at the same time she is anxious that no other nation should take them. . . . Her gracious . . . protection . . . will leave your country still under your Government; she has no wish to disturb your rule. . . .

Ja Ja, of course, insisted that Hewett's definition of "Protectorate" was correct and sanctioned by international law, but Vice-Consul Johnston, determined to remove the King, officially proscribed him in 1887. He then accused Ja Ja and his agents of bringing trade to a standstill, thereby stopping further penetration of the interior. Hurt by this commercial interdiction, Alexander Miller and Bros. in July, 1887, protested and sued for damages. Johnston, however, advised Miller to bypass Ja Ja and trade directly with the interior, as other firms were doing. This Miller refused to do. Instead he defied the consular embargo on trade with Ja Ja, an action which impelled Johnston to fine the company £500 and threaten to use the navy to enforce the boycott.  

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21 Cook, BEN, p. 63.
Miller then urged Ja Ja to appeal his case to the Foreign Office. The King agreed, but Prime Minister Salisbury, a conservative, not only refused to receive the Nigerian delegation but also authorized Johnston to arrest and try Ja Ja. Upon receiving these orders, the vice-consul on 15 August 1887, summoned the obstinate King to a conference in Opobo, East Central Province. Ja Ja had no choice but to comply or be deposed. At the conference, Johnston informed Ja Ja that he must proceed to Accra, the Gold Coast (now Ghana), to stand trial for undermining British authority. Failure to comply would result in his being treated as the Queen's enemy. Threatened by the guns of the Goshawk, the King repaired to Accra for trial. 22

The Gold Coast government appointed Admiral Walter Hunt-Grubble to serve as judge, and the Nigerian Legislative Council passed a special ordinance, granting the governor of the Gold Coast power to detain Ja Ja. The trial was a farce, and much of the evidence adduced against Ja Ja probably was false. 23 Found guilty of greed in 1887, he was deposed and sentenced to a five-year exile. After languishing in a West Indian prison for four years, he was

22Burns, Hist. of Nig., p. 161; Johnston, My Life, pp. 179-82; Obaro Ikime, The Fall of Nigeria (New York, 1977), pp. 41-42 (hereafter cited as Fall of Nig.).
23Ibid., p. 42; Burns, Hist. of Nig., p. 162.
pardoned by the Consul-General Sir Claude Maxwell MacDonald but he died on the way to Opobo.\textsuperscript{24}

The deportation of King Ja Ja clearly illustrates, as historians like Obaro Ikime and Arthur Norton Cook have observed, that native chiefs were not equal partners with British authorities and merchants under a benevolent protectorate. If given the chance, perhaps King Ja Ja could have assisted British administrators in creating an indirect rule system, for the European element was too small and subject to change to govern the natives. But the experiment was not really tried in the nineteenth century. The establishment of the British Protectorate meant the removal of any Nigerian ruler who attempted to defend his rights as Ja Ja had done.\textsuperscript{25}

Johnston's dream of developing hinterland markets directly also failed to materialize, for British traders soon discovered that it was much cheaper to work through coastal (native) middlemen than to bear the expense of interior installations. Lord Salisbury, moreover, came to regard Johnston's deportation of Ja Ja as "kidnapping," but he did not stop it nor pardon Ja Ja. It appears, therefore, that Salisbury knew Anglo-Nigerian relations

\textsuperscript{24}Ibid., pp. 151-6, 172, 332-5.

\textsuperscript{25}Ikime, \textit{Fall of Nig.}, pp. 40-43; Cook, \textit{BEN}, p. 62.
would not be decided by the niceties of the law but by the dictates of the new imperialism of the late 1880's and 1890's." Thus the Ja Ja episode marks the beginning of the "gradual dismantling of the sovereignty of the peoples and rulers of . . . Nigeria in the age of the partition."\(^2\)

The removal of Chief Nana of the Benin River paralleled the Ja Ja affair.\(^2\)\(^7\) A man of much ability, he had used his position as "Governor" to accumulate considerable wealth and strengthen his position as a middleman. In August, 1894, before the arrival in Nigeria of Claude M. MacDonald, the new Consul General, Ralph D.R. Moor, Acting Consul-General, accused Nana of paralyzing trade in the Benin River and charged that he constituted a threat to the protectorate's peace and prosperity. When Moor resorted to "peaceful coercion in the form of a trade blockade," Nana plundered a small town at the mouth of the river. The Lagos government, of course, retaliated to sustain British prestige. After a month of severe fighting, Nana unconditionally surrendered to Lagosian troops. He was deposed, declared a political prisoner, and exiled to Accra.\(^2\)\(^8\)

\(^2\)\(^6\) Ikime, *Fall of Nig.*, pp. 42-43.

\(^2\)\(^7\) MacDonald to the Early of Kimberley: Report on the Administration of the Niger Coast Protectorate, 1894-95 (Africa No. 1, Incl. 5), *Sess. Paps.*, LXXI (September, 1895), 65.

Chief Nana's deportation strengthened the policy of forcible removal of native rulers who opposed the British advance inland. This penetration, however, did suppress the slave trade and the barbarious practice of human sacrifice, which Nana allegedly encouraged. Finally, it enhanced the new administration and paved the way for the decisive struggle with Benin City, "the most powerful native state within the Protectorate."^29

In 1896, King Ovonramwen of Benin had closed his city to Europeans who wished to trade for bronze and ivory. The British Foreign Office at first refrained from using force against Benin territories, partly out of admiration for the old kingdom, which had defended a high culture against the attacks of numerous invaders, and partly because the Niger Coast regiment could not be reinforced with troops from Lagos and the Gold Coast, as these forces then were engaged in a campaign against Asante. Nonetheless, Ralph Moor in the Foreign Office and J. R. Phillips, his deputy in the Protectorate, were determined to wage war against Benin, at least to reopen trade. But before starting hostilities, Phillips, then Acting Consul-General, and a party of six decided to make an exploratory visit to Benin City.^30

^29 Cook, BEN, p. 72.

^30 Ibid., pp. 72-74; Burns, Hist. of Nig., pp. 45, 175-81, 289; Andrew R. O. Igbinede, "A Trip into the Past,"
In January 1897, the Phillips party arrived at Ughoton (near Gwato), where a detachment of Benin soldiers lay in ambush. Phillips was told not to proceed to Benin City until the King had finished the performance of some customary ceremonies, but he misunderstood the message. Considering it an affront to his dignity, he continued his journey, whereupon, the hidden Benin troops killed Phillips and three of his entourage. (This is known as the "Benin Massacre.") The survivors lived in the jungle on a diet of plantain and dew.  

Rear Admiral Rawson of the Foreign Office urged a punitive campaign or expedition to obtain revenge for their deaths and to extend British hegemony. 'The destruction of Benin City, the removal and punishment of the King, the punishment of the fetish priests, the opening up of the country,' he declared, 'will prove a wonderful impetus to trade in this part of the Protectorate. . . . If not already removed, the ivory at Benin should fully pay the cost of the expedition.'

The Moat (Ibadan, Nig., 1967-1968), 58; Geary, Nigeria, 114.


32 Acting Commissioner Gallwey to Foreign Office, No. 54, Benin, 21 Jan. 1897, ibid., pp. 55-56.
This time the British Colonial Office and Cabinet were swift to answer the challenge and to punish those responsible: Chief Ologbosere, who had planned the Phillips' massacre and Ebohon and Oviawe, his lieutenants. Brevet-Major Charles Carter, Niger Coast Protectorate Force, commanded the Benin Expedition. Second in command was Brevet-Major Norman Burrows, South Wales Borderers, and other officers with twelve Hausa scouts. Many friendly chiefs, however, assisted in the capture of the rebels:

(A) Chiefs Oshodin, Shellu, and Ngagwe, with several minor chiefs, in charge of the towns--Ojogbo, Sobe, Orobaton, Iyere, and Efoge; (B) Chiefs Osawe and Obayagbon, with Petty Chief Omayejeme, to accompany the expedition; (C) Chief Ine and Petty Chief Jewige at the towns of Sokosha, Iguojewaru, Iguowehiame, Idehen, and Iguoviobo; (D) Petty Chief Obazuaye Eguavon, with Omorogbe, and to go to Obada and Uhi, and to hold the Ishan District.

The chief function of the Hausa warriors was to hold roads and capture fugitives; however, when called upon to fight, they responded with great courage and ésprit de corps. For a job well-done, they received five shillings (ca. sixty cents) a day.

The expeditionary force left Benin City on 20th April 1899. After much resistance from the Binis they

departed that same day in two columns, marched eleven miles north eastward to Oviakuri, and reached that village at 6:00 p.m. Arriving at Jeduma on the 22nd, Carter obtained from the King of Iho useful information about the movements of Chiefs Ologbosere and Ebohon, but the next day, Ologbosere surprised a reconaissance platoon of Hausas and scouts, led by Captain Fitzgerald of the Royal Niger Company, killed him, and inflicted heavy losses on his command. Their ammunition exhausted, the platoon retired to the main camp for reinforcements.34

At 7:00 a.m. on the 24th, Carter advanced with three companies of Hausas, seventeen rifles, two Maxim machine guns, and one rocket tube, to attack Okemue, the stronghold of Chiefs Ologbosere and Ebohon. Captain Gabbetta protected the baggage column. The enemy stoutly resisted all along the line, especially at a ravine which guarded the approach to Okemue. A strong natural feature in the Bini's defense, this gorge was about 250 feet deep and ninety yards across. A stream cut through it, and the only pathway was extremely narrow. The Binis had built a stockade along the top of the ravine at the head of the pathway and also had dug

34 Charles H. P. Carter to Her Britannic Majesty's Commissioner and Consul-General, Niger Coast Protectorate, Old Calabar, 17 May 1899 (Report), ibid., pp. 464-465. The platoon carried on 105 carbine shells. In response to the Benin massacre a Punitive Expedition under Sir Harry Rawson attacked Benin City on 12 February 1897. After six days of heavy fighting, the city was captured, partly burnt, and the King was arrested.
numerous rifle pits and entrenchments on the high ground on both sides of the ravine. Finally, they had cut ambush paths parallel to the British line of advance. The town was 200 yards behind the stockade. Despite these strong fortifications, Carter used the rocket tube and twenty-four-pound rockets to set fire to the houses in Okemue. He then charged the town with three platoons of Hausas and drove the Binis from their citadel, which was destroyed. Ologbosere, however, escaped into the bush.35

Pursuit began on April 25, with the expeditionary force again advancing in two columns. Carter sought information from village headmen and urged them to assist in capturing rebel chiefs. In return, he would provide them with food when he found some. That day, "A" column captured one of Ologbosere's war boys at Dumojo, while "B," under Brevet-Major Burrows, marched to Isubeni. On the 26th, both divisions converged at Iswa, where they spent the night.36

On the 27th, the "Deji" (slave) of Iswa and the "Ikeron" (chief) of Esure were arrested and charged with aiding the rebel chiefs and spying. Also captured at Iswa were twenty Yoruba and Bini civilians. Captain Heneker, meanwhile, destroyed Idumere, a neighboring town loyal to Ebohon, but not before Bini troops had taken two prisoners.37

36 Ibid., p. 466.
37 Ibid.
After marching and fighting in the bush for thirty days, Carter on May 3 captured Ologbosere at Udo and held him as a prisoner of war. The same day, Ebohon, his second in command, was captured, but soon died. The King of Ugiami, an ally of Ologbosere, escaped. On the 4th, Captain Heneken burned Udo, the capital city of Ugiami. Not even the royal palace was spared.  

At 6:45 a.m., the 6th, both columns advanced towards Oviawe's camp (near Uhi) with the aid of a compass. They encountered resistance from about twenty-five Binis, but Captain Heneker returned the fire until Chief Oviawe, mortally wounded, surrendered. Hours later he died.

On May 8, Carter left Okemue under the command of Captain Gabetta and returned to Benin City. Captains Heneker, Sheppard, and Widenham Fosbery, Resident of Benin City, with three platoons (ca. 150 men) and a Maxim gun advanced toward Igbaki on a "political mission." Their professed objective was to rehabilitate, reconstruct, and reconcile Igbaki politically. Fosberry also compelled the chiefs to obey the Benin Native Council and to send 200 Carriers to Benin City. The Bini, moreover, had to pay tribute to King Ovonramwen. 

38 Ibid., pp. 466-467; Cook, BEN, pp. 74-75.  
40 Fosberry to Colonial Office, Benin City, 18 May 1899: Report on Expedition against Ologbosere and Ebohon, ibid.,
With the collapse of his kingdom, King Ovonramwen and some of his principal supporters, unwilling to accept British sovereignty, abdicated. The King was exiled to Calabar for life, and his eldest son Aguobasimwin, captured on May 11, was taken to Igbaki, where he stood trial on three counts: opposing the government, mutilating a native of Ewosa, and kidnapping. Aguobasimwen pleaded not guilty to all charges and asked the Agent-General of the Royal Niger Company to intercede with Ralph Moor, Commissioner and Consul-General to spare his life. He argued that he had been falsely accused by people like Korea of Bwanga, slave of Oagbe and others who did not want him to become King of Benin. Mindful of the circumstances surrounding the case and the importance of having a legitimate heir to the old dynasty, the British tribunal not only dismissed all charges, but also recognized him as King Eweka II.

Following the fall of Benin, its people soon saw the advantages of cooperating with the new administration. Aware of this new spirit, Resident Fosberry predicted:

There will be no difficulty in controlling this country as the people now realize that the Government intends to remain, and will soon regain confidence and act the part they should. The presence

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41 Ibid., p. 472.
42 Ibid., p. 478.
of the detachment at Okemue will also have a most excellent effect throughout the country.

His confidence grew as he took steps to establish administrative centralization. At his direction, the Benin Native Council sent deputies throughout the Benin district to re-assert its authority. Traveling Commissioners also were appointed to visit and supervise the rule of local chiefs. Village headmen and other natives were made responsible for the upkeep of roads. To stimulate the economy, Fosbery expanded production of cotton, tobacco, rubber, kola nuts, and palm oil. Observing that the palm kernel was not used as a trade item in most places, being thrown away after the oil had been extracted from the husk, Fosbery pointed out the kernel's value and showed the natives how to extract more oil from the nut inside the kernel.

The economic revival promoted by the new government encouraged émigres to return to Benin City and rebuilt their houses. With them the Smiths, the brass-workers, and ivory-bronze-wood carvers came back and re-established themselves. Ralph Moor soon announced with pride that:

The old market of the city has been reopened and is attended by large crowds; each trade has its own area . . . in the market, and [all are] . . .

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43 Fosbery to Colonial Office, Benin City, 18 May 1899, ibid., p. 472.
44 Ibid., p. 473.
now well represented. [All territories have been virtually returned] . . . to the Native Council to deal with [under] the supervision of [British] . . . officers.45

Due to the cooperation of the Bini inhabitants, Moor anticipated that domestic affairs would soon return to normalcy, but to serve as a deterrent to others who might wish to resist British hegemony, Chief Ologbosere was tried in the Native Court of Benin City for the murder of Europeans and natives in and near Egbini on 4 January 1897. On Tuesday, 27 June 1899, he was convicted after fellow chiefs gave testimony against him. The next day he was executed by hanging.46

During the first decade of the twentieth century, the British government put the finishing touches on the foundation for modern Nigeria. In 1900, the Colonial Office canceled the charter of the Royal Niger Company, and by 1906 it had the "Protectorate of Northern Nigeria." Also in 1906 the "Niger Coast Protectorate" and the colony of Lagos were merged to form the "Protectorate of Southern Nigeria."47

45 Moor to Joseph Chamberlain, Colonial Secretary, No. 3, 2 July 1899: Report on expedition against Ologbosere and Ebohon, ibid., p. 474.


47 Cook, BEN, p. 78; Burns, Hist. of Nig., pp. 223-24.
Great Britain, in résumé, acquired Southern Nigeria through negotiating treaties with the native chiefs, conquest, and purchase. These territories were bounded by the Atlantic Ocean on the south, French Dahomey on the west, and the German Cameroons on the north and northeast. After Southern Nigeria had attained the status of Protectorate in 1862, the London government assumed hegemony over the area, established inter-tribal peace and controlled Nigerian foreign relations. In sum, the suppression of the slave trade, the search for profit in legitimate commerce, (and/or expanding trade), the importance of the Niger waterway, the threat posed by French and German imperialism, and missionary work, all led Britain to adopt a policy of aggrandizement and to proclaim a protectorate over the Niger Districts, thereby laying the foundation for the modern state. But as Joseph C. Anene, a Nigerian historian, has observed, the basic problem in Nigeria (as in other protectorates) was the disparity between theory and practice in British policy. Consuls and vice-consuls not only were misled by the Foreign Office, but frequently, in the absence of instructions, acted as gubernatorial rulers. The London government, indeed, regarded consular rule a "temporary expedient, and for this reason the moral and political implications of a protectorate relationship
were at no time seriously analyzed much less understood."48 The Foreign Office and native chiefs clearly had different concepts of the meaning of protectorate. In practice, Consul Hewett used the "protectorate" (c.f. p. 32) as a pretext for removing any Nigerian ruler who attempted to defend his rights in his homeland. Because colonial officials, above all, prized commerce in Southern Nigeria, especially in the Oil River region, they did not hesitate to depose kings like Ja Ja of Opobo and Nana of the Benin River, and force Ovonramwen of Benin to abdicate, despite specific treaty guarantees of local sovereignty and evidence that these men had ruled their kingdoms well.

British consular rule during the establishment of the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, in sum, was characterized by gunboat diplomacy, brutality, and flagrant disregard for treaty rights. But be that as it may, British policy or rule, in comparison to that of France, Germany, Portugal, or Spain, was more moderate. While the British took effective measures to suppress the slave trade in West Africa, French merchants between 1898 and 1906 still participated in it in the Upper Niger Region.49 In states

like Dahomey (Benin) and Western Sudan, French rule was decidedly more military and brutal in character.  

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CHAPTER III

A RETROSPECT

The suppression of the slave trade was, indeed, a major cause of Britain's interest in Nigeria in the 1850's. But by the end of the century, this motive had been displaced by other interests: economic, political, international, and religious. By 1865, the largest slave markets had disappeared, and with them, the slave trade except to Brazil, which did not abolish slavery until 1888. Great Britain had forbidden this infamous practice in 1837, France in 1830, and the United States following the Civil War. Thereafter, the primary forces which pushed British enterprise deeper into Nigeria were the demand for raw materials created by England's growing industrialization and competition for colonies with other European powers, especially France and Germany.

When the Civil War in the United States stopped the export of American cotton, Nigeria became essential to support the slumping British economy. The London government reacted to this situation by establishing a protectorate over Lagos in 1862. The London government thereafter assumed hegemony over the area, established inter-tribal
peace and controlled Nigerian foreign relations. Some profits were spent to develop Nigerian infrastructure.

By 1860, competition for colonies among European powers had become intense, and Britain regarded Nigeria as vital to her interests in West Africa. The strategic port and island of Lagos, of course, served as a base from which to attack French Dahomey (Benin) on the west and penetrate the interior.

A basic domestic problem in Nigeria (as in other protectorates) was the contrast between theory and practice in British policy. The Foreign Office occasionally misled its consuls and vice-consuls and they in turn, frequently exceeded their instructions or acted without any. Since the London government regarded consular rule as temporary, it did not analyze the moral and political implications of the protectorate relationship. The Foreign Office and native chiefs clearly had different views of what "protectorate status" meant. In practice, it meant the removal of any Nigerian ruler who disregarded the consul's advice. Between 1885 and 1900, British colonial officials, primarily in defense of commercial interests, deposed Ja Ja of Opobo and Nana of the Benin River, and forced the abdication of Ovonramwen of Benin, despite treaty guarantees and evidence that they had ruled their kingdoms well. British consular rule during the establishment of the Protectorate
of Southern Nigeria, in sum, was characterized by gunboat diplomacy, brutality, and flagrant disregard for treaty rights. The suppression of the slave trade, on balance, was not as important as political and economic interests, the importance of the Niger waterway, rivalry with France and other maritime nations, and missionary work, all led Britain to adopt a policy of aggrandizement and to proclaim a protectorate over the Niger districts, thereby laying the foundation for modern Nigeria.
EPILOGUE

THE BRITISH LEGACY AND NIGERIAN FEDERALISM

Although states have been evolving since the beginning of history, no person or school has yet developed a comprehensive theory of nation-building. The British protectorate, of course, formed a political framework, and even some colonial policies helped to create the nation of Nigeria. On the other hand, some of the social evils of modernization stem from the changes forced by the British.

The focus of this study is the British occupation of Southern Nigeria, but the conquest of the Northern Region should not be ignored. It, too, became a protectorate in 1906. By the Letters Patent and Order-in-Council of 22 November 1913, the two territories were merged under one government, effective the next year, with Lagos a separate colony under its own governor.¹

The area of Nigeria is 356,700 square miles, or about four times the size of Great Britain, and her population (estimated in 1977 to total 78,660,000) consists of about ten tribal groups and sub-groups, the four largest of which are Hausa (21 per cent), Yoruba (20 per cent), Ibo

¹Hertslet, Map of Afr., I, 120-121.
(17 per cent), and Fulani (9 per cent). These, in turn, speak different languages and dialects. Two people from distant tribes may not be able to understand each other unless they speak English. Most of these great Negro-race tribes migrated into the area at different times, each bringing its own customs and traditions. The population, therefore, is heterogeneous, consisting of three major ethnic groups: Hamitic, Sudanic, and Bantu. The majority in the North speak Hausa, a Hamitic language family which includes Egyptian and Berber; in the Southwest, Sudanic predominates, while most of the Southeastern tribes speak Bantu or semi-Bantu. The population of each region is further divided into many subgroups: Edos, Yorubas, Ibos, Ibibio, Fulani, Hausa, Kanuri, Tiv, Nupe, "Non-Nigerians" (i.e., Europeans, Levatines, Asians, etc.). Most tribal languages, however, are related to Sudanic; e.g., Kwa, semi-Bantu, Negritic. Due to these languages and dialects (about two hundred) some of which are oral only, English became the official language.

A century of British rule has united all these races, ethnic groups and tribes into a nation. The establishment


of the Nigerian Legislative Council in 1914 was the first step toward a constitutional government. Despite the name, it was primarily an advisory body. The governor, of course, was responsible to the Queen through the colonial secretary, who appointed British officials to assist the gubernatorial office. The Nigerian Legislative Council and the appointed officials proposed laws which they wanted the governor to promulgate. A Nigerian Executive Council also advised him on policy.

World War I (1914-1918), the great depression of the thirties, and World War II (1939-1945), all interrupted the development of Nigeria; nonetheless, the Nigerian Legislative Council set up in 1914 and the Nigerian Executive Council were superceded in 1922 by a new Legislative Council, which included some African unofficial members and four elected members, three for Lagos, and one for Calabar. In 1939, Governor Bernard Bourdillon of Nigeria urged that the number of Nigerians employed in the civil service be increased, despite their lack of training or experience. He also wanted to delegate more responsibility to native authorities. Above all, he desired Africans to play a greater role in their government so that they would feel themselves to be part of it. In 1943, Bourdillon was succeeded by Arthur Richards (after Lord Milverton). 4

In 1945, Governor Richards negotiated with the London government for a new constitution which would promote national unity, provide for the diverse ethnic and tribal elements, and would give Africans a greater share in the direction of their own affairs. To achieve these aims, the Richards constitution created a national (federal) Legislature and divided the country into (unequal) regions: West, East, and North. A fourth, the Mid-West, was created later. Each area had its own Assembly, responsible to the Governor and Central Legislature. In 1951, John Macpherson, who succeeded Richards as governor, revised the Nigerian constitution. The new document, promulgated on June 30, provided for a Central Executive Council, styled "the Council of Ministers," established bicameral legislatures in the Western and Northern provinces; and a unicameral legislature in the East, for a total of three assemblies. The Nigerian people were more satisfied with the Macpherson Constitution than its predecessor, because the new governor had consulted them at the national and local levels before drafting the federal act. This instrument, however, suffered from two major weaknesses: the ministers served without portfolio, and it did not create the Office of Prime Minister. In 1954, the country forged a stronger

\footnote{Ibid., pp. 271-295; Lois Mitchison, Nigeria: Newest Nation (London, 1960), pp. 87-88 (hereafter cited as Nig: N.N.).}
federation, when the national bicameral legislature (House of Representatives and Senate) and the three provincial assemblies (with the exception of the upper houses in the East and West) became fully elective. The lower house of the Nigerian parliament also obtained the power to initiate money bills. In short, the House and Senate were comparable to the British House of Commons and Lords.

From 1954 to 1960 the crusade for independence and a responsible Ministry became an internal struggle among the Nigerian politicians themselves, rather than a campaign against the British. Nationalist movements emerged, and educated Africans--at home and abroad--pressed for greater popular participation in their "democratic form of government." Nigerian independence also stemmed in part from the irrepressible opposition to colonialism and imperialism, a theme which characterized African nationalism in general. In response to the mounting pressure for independence, Oliver Lyttleton (later Lord Chandos), colonial secretary, had held several conferences in London in 1951 to arrange dominion status for Nigeria. Despite general agreement, additional conferences met in Lagos in 1954 and London again in 1957 to complete the constitution. All these


7 Ibid., pp. 156-164; Coleman, Nigeria, pp. 386-408; Mitchison, Nig.: N.N., pp. 78-115.
meetings were necessary to find solutions to many legislative, judicial, and executive problems. The North, for example, demanded autonomy as a guarantee that the less populous Southern Region (East and West) would not dominate its domestic affairs. How should the nation choose a prime minister who would treat all regions impartially. Table I (pp. 57-58) shows the major constitutional changes made between 1951 and 1958. In sum, most of the important changes that occurred before the "final phase and self-government" are indicated.

Following the adoption of the Federal Constitution on 16 September 1960, general elections were held in December. The results of those elections for the Federal House of Representatives were as follows:

Northern People's Congress Party (NPC) --142 seats
The National Council of Nigeria and the
Cameroons (NCNC) -- 89 seats
Action Group (and allies) (AG) -- 72 seats
Independent -- 9 seats
Total -- 312 seats

In accordance with the majority rule provision of the Constitution, the NPC (which entered into a coalition with the NCNC) formed the government. Alhaji Tafawa Balewa, a teacher and a member of the NPC party became Prime

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8Burns, Hist. of Nig., p. 260.
### TABLE I

PRINCIPAL CHANGES IN THE CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA, 1951-1958

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Constitution of 1951</th>
<th>Constitution of 1954</th>
<th>Constitutional Agreements of 1957</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Territorial distribution of powers</td>
<td>Devolution to regional governments of legislative and financial powers on specified range of subjects</td>
<td>Allocation of subjects to federal government; specified list of concurrent subjects; residual powers to regional governments</td>
<td>Essentially same as 1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central legislative</td>
<td>Unicameral; 148 members (north and south each 50 per cent) elected by and responsible to regional legislatures</td>
<td>Unicameral; 184 members (north and south each 50 per cent) elected separately from and not responsible to regional houses</td>
<td>Bicameral in 1959; House of Representatives of 320 elected directly; Senate of 52 members representing regions and Lagos, plus special and ex officio members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central executive</td>
<td>18 members (6 ex officio; 4 nominated by each regional house); all ministers equal; initially no direct individual ministerial responsibility</td>
<td>13 members (3 ex officio; 3 from each region and 1 from Cameroons recommended by majority party leaders); individual ministerial responsibility</td>
<td>11 members; prime minister plus any 10 other members drawn from either House or Senate, recommended by him and serving at his discretion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigerian heads of government</td>
<td>All ministers equal; no premiers or prime minister</td>
<td>Three regional powers</td>
<td>Federal prime minister; three regional premiers; premier, Southern Cameroons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British heads of government</td>
<td>Governor of Nigeria; regional lieutenant-governors</td>
<td>Governor-General of Federation; governors of regions</td>
<td>Same as 1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject</td>
<td>Constitution of 1951</td>
<td>Constitution of 1954</td>
<td>Constitutional Agreements of 1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public service;</td>
<td>Unitary public service under control of governor; centrally controlled</td>
<td>Regional public services; regional judicialities and marketing boards established</td>
<td>Same as 1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>judiciary; marketing boards</td>
<td>judiciary and marketing boards</td>
<td>alongside similar federal boundaries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status of Cameroons</td>
<td>Northern Cameroons integral part of Northern Region; Southern Cameroons part of</td>
<td>Northern Cameroons same; Southern Cameroons a quasi-federal territory</td>
<td>Same as 1954; but greater regional autonomy for Cameroon to decide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eastern Region</td>
<td></td>
<td>own status upon Nigerian independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status of Lagos</td>
<td>Integral part of Western Region</td>
<td>Excised from Western Region; created federal capital under federal government</td>
<td>Same as 1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-government</td>
<td>Ultimate self-government implied only; timetable unspecified</td>
<td>Full-internal self-government in 1956 for regions so requesting; independence for all Nigeria undecided</td>
<td>Eastern and Western regions ask for and secure internal self-government in 1957; Northern Region defers to 1959; leaders propose Nigerian independence April, 1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future constitutional review</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>Review conference to be held August, 1956</td>
<td>Resumed conference to consider reports of special commissions on minorities and other matters</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Coleman, Nigeria, p. 372.*
Minister. Dr. Nwamdi Azikiwe, a member of the NCNC party became President of the Senate and later was appointed Governor-General by the British Government, when independence was proclaimed officially on 1 October 1960. Obafemi Awolowo, a Nigerian lawyer and leader of the AG party, became the opposition leader in Parliament to establish a two-party system. In another plebiscite, held on 19 September 1963, the nation voted to adopt a republican form of government. Nigeria thus became a sovereign republic within the Commonwealth on 1 October 1963. Following British practice, the tenure of the Nigeria government was five years. 9

The democratic republic, however, was short-lived. On 15 January 1966, it fell victim to a military coup which in turn provoked a Hausa-supported coup in the Western Region on July 29. When Ibos in "Biafra" committed reprisals and threatened secession, a long civil war ensued. On 30 May 1967, the Eastern Region, the center of the strength, proclaimed its independence as the "Republic of Biafra" and elected Lieutenant Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu president. The army meanwhile suspended the constitution and ruled the country by decree. The two coups of 1966 and the civil war, all stemmed from tribalism and religious/structural

imbalance in Nigeria. The population of the Northern Region outnumbered that of the three southern regions, a fact which always had caused rivalry among major ethnic groups. The 1963 census indicated that 47 per cent of the population was Moslem and 34 per cent Christian. (The rest were pagans and/or animists.) The immediate causes of the January coup were the "horrible" elections of 1964 and fear of Ibo or southern domination in a unitary state.\(^{10}\) Horrible, because the voting--especially in the Western Region--was marred by corruption and fraud, yet governmental authorities did nothing.\(^{11}\) Nigeria now hopes to return to civilian rule on 1 October 1979. The ban on political parties has been lifted, and new ones have been formed. A new constitution has been drafted, amended, and adopted. The new political structure, however, marks a shift from the British to the American system, in the hope that the latter will be more suitable to Nigeria's polyglot demography. The country has organized into a federation of nineteen states, all of which have a "capitalistic mixed economy."\(^{12}\) Most of these influences can be attributed to the British presence in Nigeria.

\(^{10}\) Arikpo, Dev. of Mod. Nig., pp. 148-166.


The British introduced into Nigeria a well-defined division of authority between the federal (central) and regional governments and among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. In matters of defense, foreign affairs, communications, customs, banking, and other subjects, exclusive authority rests with the national government. The areas in which only the Federal Parliament can legislate constitute the Exclusive List. The concurrent Legislative List, on which the regional assemblies also may legislate, include antiquities; commercial and industrial monopolies; fingerprints, identification, and criminal records; higher education; industrial and agricultural development; statistics and water power. In case of a conflict, the national legislature takes precedent. Any area not covered by either of the above lists is reserved to the regional legislatures.\textsuperscript{13} This division of authority is, of course, one feature of federalism.

Another example of federalism in Nigeria is the judicial procedure. Having inherited from Britain a judicial system based on common law, the Supreme Court interprets the law and/or defines the Constitution, but the Nigerian high court is nothing like the American Supreme Court, which has the power of judicial review. Parliament was/is supreme in Britain and Nigeria. Rule of

\textsuperscript{13}Burns, \textit{Hist. of Nig.}, p. 259.
law, separation of powers (or the fusion of powers) and all other features of common-law tradition are entrenched in the Nigerian Federal Constitution to promote "social justice" and democratic rights (so long as the military respects the constitution). The independence of the Judiciary is protected, too, at least in theory. But courts in Nigeria, as in Britain and America, shape the law by following precedents or decisions held on similar cases in the past. Most Nigerian lawyers, too, were trained in the Inns of Court before Nigerian law schools opened.14

A common characteristic of modern nations, like ancient China, is the institutionalization of the bureaucracy. Nigeria, with other nations in Anglophone Africa, "counts among the greatest contributions to its successful process of nation-building the heritage of a sound Civil Service."15 This success may be due to the calibre and loyalty of its personnel and to the high status enjoyed by civil servants. Before the January 1966 coup, the Nigerian bureaucracy constituted a part of the executive branch, headed by the Prime Minister. (The President under the Republican Constitution of 1963 was just a figurehead, like the Monarch in


15 Ibid., pp. 215-216.
But after the return to civilian rule in 1979, the President will have extensive executive powers. The Vice-President will be Chairman of the Senate and become President upon the resignation or death of the latter. The British government, to say the least, was determined to depoliticize the Nigerian bureaucracy.

Concerning the Nigerian economy, Arthur Cook, argues that British enterprise in Nigeria was motivated to a large degree by the economic forces that gave rise to imperialism. The desire to open new markets for the products of British industry and the importance of controlling the important raw materials available in Nigeria were of much greater significance than the investment of capital or desire to find new houses for England's surplus population under the British flag...

Before the advent of the British, however, Nigerian commerce existed primarily on a barter basis. British merchants introduced a money economy, and with it, they established the Nigerian central and commercial banks. The Nigerian banking system, however, is different from that developed in nations like Britain and the USA. Nigerian banks, for example, do not provide adequate financial incentives to businessmen, farmers, and merchants to

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17Cook, BEN, p. 276.
increase their trade.\textsuperscript{18} When the British came to Nigeria, the economy was chiefly agrarian, and it still is. Even today about 75 per cent of the labor force is engaged in non-mechanized farming, but productivity is now less than it was in the 1960's, accounting for only 4.6 per cent of export profits. One reason for this situation is the British refusal to make diversified investments in Nigeria. British capital in Nigeria amounts to only £200,000, and most of it is invested in tin mines. The oil industry employs only 20,000 Nigerians.

Nonetheless, of all the emerging African nations, Nigeria's prospects for successful economic and political development probably are the best, as a recent survey indicates. Its population is by far the largest of any African nation. British enterprise, moreover, has done much to increase the productivity of agriculture, forestry, and animal husbandry; the development of mineral resources, particularly petroleum; the development of the infrastructure, like sewage, roads, and rail transport; a substantial industrial growth; and a continued increase in commerce.\textsuperscript{20}


\textsuperscript{19}Cook, \textit{BEN}, p. 276.

Before 1960, Nigeria's national income was assumed to be increasing with her population, but the standard of living then was low and still is, though it is rising. On the basis of per capita income, Nigeria remains one of the hundred countries and territories in the world classified as underdeveloped. It is expected, however, that Nigeria, which has the resources for a viable, diversified economy, will increase productivity and thus raise the standard of living. The nation, indeed, has sufficient raw materials, water resources, and manpower. 21

The social impact of British culture also may be seen in Nigeria's educational and religious ideas and practices. Since missionaries considered education necessary for production in a capitalistic and democratic society, they civilized the natives while christianizing them. Christianity, moreover, became an integrating force in Nigeria, providing a trans-tribal bond which united individuals of different and formerly hostile communities. 22

The typical Nigeria, however, reacted not only against the stiff-necked attitudes of some missionaries, but also against their aim of Europeanization, especially when rejection of many old customs and useful institutions was made a sine qua non for entry into the Kingdom of God. 23

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cases, education in Nigeria was based on reading, writing and calculating in the English language. The curriculum later included British Empire history, European geography and some practical courses in gardening, sanitation, and personal hygiene. It is regrettable that African history was considered either non-existent or unimportant by those well-meaning teachers, who emphasized European wars, colonial campaigns of pacification, the evolution of the British constitution, and the growth of the British Empire. Most readings in English literature were taken from Shakespeare and the Bible. Thus, it is quite common in Nigeria today to find semi-educated people, doing menial jobs, who can name the principal English cities, quote the Bible, and recite Hamlet, but who have little knowledge of the geography, proverbs, folk tales, or prominent leaders and historical events of their own country.24

The importance of the missionary monopoly of education lies in the evangelical approach of mission schools. These schools, and perhaps mission hospitals and clinics, were powerful instruments for rapid christianization (and hence Europeanization) of the Nigerians.25

Before the coming of the missionaries, Northern Nigeria was predominantly Moslem, and the south, pagan. But

24 Ibid., p. 115.
25 Ibid., p. 113.
today Southerners are mostly Christian.\textsuperscript{26} Christianity, moreover, by emphasizing human dignity and the value of the individual, has aided the abolition of the slave trade. By contrast, the slave trade flourished next door in the French colony of Dahomey (now Republic of Benin).

Despite many close ties with Britain and the Commonwealth, some Nigerians are contemptuous of British weakness in world affairs. But this attitude does not mean most Nigerians do not appreciate Commonwealth immunities and commercial benefits. "As one of the more prosperous and contented nations in Africa, Nigeria is at present attractive to international communist efforts to establish their party."\textsuperscript{27}

The British presence in Nigeria, in sum, has made a significant impact on the nation's historical, political, economic, intellectual, and cultural development. Within the last decade, however, Nigerian political leaders have turned toward the American federal system to find redress for old grievances and to provide stability for a better future.\textsuperscript{28}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{26}Moody, \textit{Nigeria}, pp. 49-71.
\item \textsuperscript{27}Mitchison, \textit{Nig.: N.N.}, p. 115.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Fig. 2--Twentieth Century Map of Nigeria*

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