THE CAUSES OF REVOLUTION: A CASE STUDY OF IRANIAN REVOLUTION OF 1978-79

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This study investigates the causes of the Iranian revolution of 1978-79. To this end, the different theories of revolution are reviewed in Chapter One. Chapter Two provides a discussion of the historical background of the country and the role the clergy played in shaping its political development. Socioeconomic and political factors which contributed to the outbreak of this revolution are examined in the following two chapters. Finally, an attempt is made to draw some conclusions on whether existing theories of revolution can fully explain the Iranian upheaval of 1978-79 or not.

For the preparation of this study United States government documents and Iranian and English language scholarly works were consulted.

PREFACE

The present study is an attempt to explain the cause(s) of the Iranian revolution of 1978-79. This subject is chosen as a result of a dual concern of the author. The primary one is the author's scholarly interest in the cause(s) of the phenomenon of revolution. The second concern is of a personal nature. Being Iranian and profoundly concerned with the fate of my country and my people led me to choose the present subject. As a result of this last interest every possible effort was made to maintain my objectivity. Any bias that might have crept in is totally unintentional and only a result of the author's fallibility.

It is my principal concern to make a contribution toward the discovery of the cause(s) of revolution, and not necessarily to confirm or disapprove any particular ideology.

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CHAPTER I

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Introduction

The purpose of this research is to explore and analyze the cause(s) of the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79. Little is known about the cause(s) of this revolution. One reason for the dearth of information is, of course, the recency of its occurrence.

So far, no generally accepted theory of revolution exists among social scientists. Instead, there is a myriad of competing hypotheses and theories. It is, therefore, important to study each individual revolution in the world separately. Such exploratory efforts add to the treasury of information that social scientists need to formulate a theory of revolution. The findings of case studies can also help social scientists test the different hypotheses, theories, and beliefs that they presently offer. At that point, a more coherent hypothesis or even theory can be developed. Furthermore, the study of revolutions seems worthwhile because they both seriously affect the nations in which they occur and often have extensive international repercussions. Therefore, a thorough study of revolution and its cause is necessary if mankind is to create a more

stable and desirable environment in which to live. This study seeks to set the foundations for more comprehensive and theoretical studies in the future.

This paper is an exploratory case study of the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79. This type of research design was chosen because of the little knowledge that we have about this particular revolution and because there is no universally accepted theory or hypothesis of revolution in general. Consequently, it was felt that the type of research design employed in this study would best serve the purpose of this research which is to explore the possible cause(s) of the Iranian Revolution by examining the different factors which have been found to be relevant in the occurrence of other revolutions.

The data utilized in this study were gathered through an extensive review of the literature on revolution as well as on whatever could be found on the Iranian Revolution. Historical sources of the political development of Iran were examined. Documents published by international organizations and the United States Government, and journalistic reports about Iran were also consulted.

What Is Revolution?

As there is no universally accepted conceptual definiton of revolution among social scientists, it is necessary to define revolution as it will be used in this study. However, before defining revolution, one should note

the dimensions or characteristics of revolution that have been identified by the majority of the scholars of this field. In the first place, every revolution is aimed at overthrowing the exisiting political structure of a society. Secondly, the whole purpose of the transformation of a political system is to bring about some fundamental social changes--economic as well as psychological. In this sense, one may say, revolution has some resemblances to religion.* It is in the nature of both religion and revolution to set values for society.

Thirdly, most scholars who write about revolution agree that violence is an integral part of any revolutionary situation. Violence, they argue, should be viewed not only as a simple use of force, but also as a threat to use physical force. Violence, for H.L. Nieburg, has two inextricable aspects: its actual as well as its potential (threatened) use. He defines violence "as direct or indirect action applied to restrain, injure, or destroy persons or properties (16, p. 865). Chalmers Johnson has a similar view of what violence is. He sees violence "as

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*E. Royston Pike defines religion (19, pp. 319-20) as follow:

> Religion is a complex of doctrines and practices and institutions. It is a statement of beleif, in gods and God, in a world of spirits and a world or worlds that lie beyond the one in which we have our home. . . . Religion is sum-total of beleifs, sentiments, and practices, individual and social.

Fredrick Ferre, on the other hand, defines religion (8, p. 82) as "a way of valuing."

action that deliberately or unintentionally disorients the behavior of others" (12, p. 8).

Among the different definitions of revolution, that of Samuel P. Huntington comes closest to incorporating all of the above mentioned characteristics of revolution. He difines revolution as "a rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, and government activity and policies" (10, p. 264).

Revolution as we understand it today is a relatively new phenomenon in the history of mankind. It hardly goes beyond the seventeenth-century Puritan Revolt in England. Revolts, uprisings, and insurrections of pre-seventeenth century societies were mainly aimed at changing the political structure of a society, not its dominant social values. Aristotle, for example, viewed revolution as nothing but a political change. To him there was one basic cause of revolution--the perception of inequality ,which results from different conceptions of justice. If the political system were democratic, then, revolution would be brought about by men who considered themselves to be superior to the majority who were poor. If a political system were an oligarchy, then revolution would be brought about by men who considered themselves to be the equals of those who rule (1, pp. 203-14).

Today's concept of revolution involves not only changes in the political structure of the society, as Aristotle saw it, but also, and most importantly, changes in the social structure and values of society. It is in this respect that revolution is a new phenomenon.

The Revolutionary Mentality

The tie between religious and revolutionary mentality is a close one (17, p. 250). The zeal and sense of mission, without which no revolution can hope to succeed, are clearly similar to that of a religious nature. Without a sense of religious-like dedication and devotion to an ideology, the radical revolutionary mentality does not flourish.

Revolutionaries have a dichotomous view of reality which divides the world into opposing forces of absolute good and absolute evil. They derive from that world view a highly simplified set of guidelines for behavior. They tend to see the cause of all problems, no matter how diverse and logically unrelated, in a single force of evil and to see the solution of all those problems in a single force of good. Belief in goodness is so absolute that all existing institutions, values, and authorities which dominate men are considered evil, "corrupt on earth," and waiting to be exterminated. Any behavior which contributes to the victory of the forces of good over the forces of evil is considered moral, and any behavior which delays or endangers that victory is considered immoral. They also insist that all

behavior must conform strictly and explicitly to their highly simplified set of beliefs and values (4, pp. 1-10). Therefore, revolutionaries readily employ violent means to force conformity upon society.

Theories of Revolution

Revolution has been the subject of long debate and controversy among social scientists. In their search for a theory of revolution, they often reveal a disciplinary bias. Economists, psychologists, sociologists, and historians, for example, often seek to formulate a theory that incorporates factors relevant only to their discipline. As each scholar feels that he has discovered the cause of revolution, they frequently disagree with one another about why revolutions occur. Marxian theory, for example, argues that revolutions are a normal development as well as inevitable because they resolve the in-built contradictions in a society. On the other hand, some other theorists such as Johnson and Huntington, give evidence that revolutions, far from being inevitable, are altogether avoidable and generally undesirable.

Since there are various theories of revolution, it is impossible to explain all of them in a work of this scope. Consequently, they are classified into four general categories and the works of a few well-known scholars in each one are examined. The first category contains the Marxian approach. The second and third include the

economic and sociological positions, respectively. Finally, the fourth approach explains the causes of revolution in terms of human psychology.

The Marxian Approach

The whole theory of Marxism is built upon the idea of revolution. Marx's theory of revolution is one of the transformation of society in history. Marx and Engles began their Communist Manifesto with the thought that "the history of all hitherto existing societies is the history of class struggles" (15, p. 9).

The Marxian model of revolution is uni-causal rather than multi-causal. Marx's general conclusion was formulated in his "A Contribution to the critique of Political Economy." To him every society was characterized by its particular "mode of production." From the mode of production of a society arose a definite form of social relations--relations of production. The social relations of production constituted the "basis" of society from which arose the institutional superstructure with its definite forms of social consciousness (13, p. 4). The mode of production of a society which was the "basis of all history" caused society to be divided into two antagonistic classes: one class ruled and exploited, and the other class was ruled and exploited.

"At a certain stage of their development," Marx argued, "the material productive forces of society come in conflict

with the existing relations of production . . . with the property relations within which they have been at work hitherto" (13, p. 4). The members of the exploited class become "alienated" from the dominant values and/or way of doing things and eventually form a large group which is drawn together by common class consciousness, i.e., awareness of its common situation. This was the beginning of a social revolution. Once the exploited class was strong enough, it overturned the ruling class and became the new ruling group. A new mode of production with all its subordinate elements of the social complex replaced the old one.

The common characteristic of all these revolutions is that they are all minority revolutions. One ruling minority class is overthrown by another minority class. Soon after, the new ruling minority with its new mode of production starts to become a "fetter" upon the ever-developing forces of production. Such is the revolutionary dialectic of the historical process as Marx and Engels expounded it (6, p. 410).

Modern bourgeois society, Marx argued, had not done away with class antagonisms. Contradictions in the bourgeois era appear in the form of the revolutionary proletariat. The alienated proletariat gradually becomes conscious of their common situation and rebel. In its revolution against the existing mode of production, the

victory of the proletariat is inevitable. This, in Marxist theory, is the supreme and last revolution. It will bring to an end the dialectical process of history. The outcome is a communist society with no classes and no class antagonisms. There is, instead, an association "in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all" (15, p. 21).

The Economic Approach

While Marxist theory finds the root cause of revolution in the economic structure of a society, it must be separated from other contemporary economic theories of revolution. For Marxists, every economic structure, except communism, is eventually destroyed by revolution, but other economists find the cause of revolution in rapid economic changes occurring in a society. They also reject the Marxian idea of in-built contradictions in society and the inevitability of revolution. For them, revolutions are far from being inevitable; they are altogether avoidable and generally undesirable. According to this view, a particular system will have difficulties when there has been a substantial improvement or decline in the standard of living of the masses. Generally, rapid economic growth or rapid economic decline is seen as the main cause of revolution.

Some of the most important and widely cited scholars of this approach are Alexis de Tocqueville, Crane Brinton, James Davies, Raymond Tanter, Maus Midlarsky, William

Zartman, James Paul, John Entelis, and Mancur Olson. A brief examination of the theses of these scholars follows.

Tocqueville believed that the most puzzling aspect of the French revolution was that it occurred during a period in which French citizens were not suffering from a stagnant or weak economy. The economic situation had reached a "take off" stage, but government machinery was inefficient and out-of-date to effectively deal with the rapid economic growth. He argued that "revolutions are not always brought about by a gradual decline from bad to worse" (5, p. 5). Tocqueville defined revolution as an "overthrow of the legally constituted elite which initiated a period of intense social, political, and economic change" (21, p. 265).

Crane Brinton, too, arrived at the same conclusion that revolutions "were not born in societies economically retrograte; on the contrary, they took place in societies economically progressive" (2, p. 33). Examining the French, Russian and English revolutions, Brinton found out that revolutions occurred largely because of a feeling on the part of some of the chief enterprising groups that their opportunities for getting on in this world were unduly limited by political arrangements. He argued that when a general economic improvement was accompanied by a decline in the financial position of inefficient government, it imposed heavy economic burdens on its citizens. These burdens,

Brinton noted, have negative economic and psychological effects on an important portion of the population (2, pp. 29-35).

James Davies accepts the general theory of Tocqueville and Brinton but argues that "revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal" (5, p. 6). The formula that he develops is known as the "J-curve." It basically states that during a period of rising expectations, the expected need satisfaction line continues to rise. Simultaneously, the actual need satisfaction line also rises. As long as people are receiving at least a considerable part of what they expect to receive, they are unlikely to revolt. But if the actual need satisfaction declines while the expected need satisfaction continues to rise, a wide gap begins to develop between the two. Therefore, Davies argues, when the gap between what people want and what they get becomes intolerable, they will rise up to destroy whatever is obstructing the realization of their expectations. According to Davies, people are least likely to revolt when they are at the poorest level of existence because their physical and mental energies are totally employed in their fight for survival. "Far from making people into revolutionaries," Davies argues, "enduring poverty makes for concern with one's solitary self or solitary family at best and resignation or mute despair

at worst" (5, p. 7).

The solution Davies offers for the prevention of revolution in a changing society is similar to those of other scholars, including Huntington. Davies' view is that the slow, grudging grant of reforms by a government can effectively prevent the occurrence of revolution.

Tanter and Midlarsky generally agree with the findings of Davies, but they attempted to modify and refine the theory by arguing that there were various types of revolutions ranging from the palace revolution to the mass revolution. Presenting a typology of revolution, Tanter and Midlarsky examined two possible causes of revolution--changes in economic development and in the level of education. Using Davies' "J-curve", Tanter and Midlarsky defined achievement and aspirations in terms of the rate of change of the Gross National Product per capita. Expectations were defined by the drop or reversal in the rate of change of GNP/CAP. The level of education was measured in terms of the primary school ratio--number of children enrolled in primary school divided by the total population aged five to fourteen (21, pp. 270-72).

At first glance Tanter's and Midlarsky's work seem promising in finding an index or measure of the Davies "J-curve". But, a closer examination of the GNP/CAP as a measure reveal its deficiencies because improvement in the GNP/CAP does not necessarily mean that the material

well-being of ordinary people also improved. For instance, the discovery of a new source of income for the country may greatly enhance the GNP, but litle of this new found wealth may trickle down to the man in the street. Furthermore, the distorting effect of inflation and inaccurate or falsified reporting by a government will plague the GNP/CAP as a measurement of a society's material well-being.

As a result of these shortcomings of the GNP/CAP as an index of mass material satisfaction, Zartman, Paul, and Entelis suggest that the GNP/CAP be dropped and the balance of payments and cost of living indices be used. They contend that the latter indices are a better measure of the mass material satisfaction or disatisfaction in developing countries because they reflect the economic difficulties that a government experiences in its attempts to meet the demands placed upon it. Zartman, Paul, and Entelis in their study of several developing countries concluded that "socio-political unrest should occur (probably within a period of a year) when a peak in the cost of living is coincident with a balance-of-payment trough" (23, p. 310).

Another scholar who sees the economy as a major source of political instability is Mancur Olson. He maintains that both rapid economic growth and rapid economic decline may cause political instability.

Olson bases this theory on the assumption that social class is the stabilizing force in society. Contrary to

Marxist thought which argues that social class is the engine of revolutionary change, Olson contends that "those who are declasse, whose class ties are weakest, are most apt to support revolutinary changes, while those who are firmly caught up in a class are least likely to do so" (18, p. 216). The revolutionaries can be distinguished by the relative absence of bonds that tie them to the established order. They tend to lack close attachments to any of the social subgroups that comprise a society, i.e., extended families, professional groups, or social classes.

Rapid economic growth means rapid economic change; this in turn brings about social dislocation. Some gain from the rapidly changing economic situation and rise above their previous social status, others lose from their economic change and may fall behind. Both groups, the gainers and the losers, become declasse and a destabilizing force in the society. For example, the family group, and especially the clan or extended family, can be destroyed by the occupational and geographic mobility associated with economic growth. Olson argues that

> Modern business institutions are bound to weaken or even to destroy the tribe, the manor, the guild, and the rural village. The uprooted souls torn or enticed out of these groups by economic growth are naturally suceptible to the temptations of revolutionary agitations (18, p. 217).

Thus, rapid economic growth involves fast and deep changes in the ways that things are done, in the places that things

are done, and in the distribution of power and prestige. This destabilizes society.

Furthermore, for Olson, economic growth has other destabilizing effects on the society. Economic growth, for example, brings about urbanization. This concentration of large segments of the population in the cities makes agitation cheaper and the spread of new ideas faster for the declasse. At the same time that the raidly growing economy increases the number of "nouveaux riches" who use their economic power to change the social and political order in their interest, the "nouveaux pauvres" are resentful of their poverty. Economic growth also enhances the level of education, skills, and technology, especially for underdeveloped countries. It also increases the awareness of the people that their lives can be improved and that a better system of government is possible. In other words economic growth can awaken a people to the possibilities of further improvement, thereby generating discontent in the society.

The most serious political problems appear to occur in those developing countries that engage in rapid industrialization. Olson mantains that these countries today are faced with an abrupt and painful transition into modern economic life, and that the take-off stage is a traumatic one. The degree of political instability, however, can be diminished by utlilizing effective repressive measures.

Modern totalitarian regimes have their own techniques for guaranteeing stability.

The Sociological Approach

This approach relates to social changes. While it differs from the Marxian theory of the inevitability of revolution, it shares with the economic approach the idea that rapid economic change gives rise to a revolutionary environment. But rapid economic growth or decline is not the only source of social change for the advocates of the sociological explanation of revolution. Social changes might be brought about by sources other than economy. Two of the better-known scholars who explain the occurrence of revolutions in this manner are Samuel P. Huntington and Chalmers Johnson.

Huntington's theory is based upon the premise that "revolution is characteristic of modernization" (11, p. 92). Acknowledging that revolution is an aspect of modernization, Huntington argues that it will not occur in either highly traditional or highly modern societies. The most fertile ground for revolution is found in "societies which have experienced some social and economic development and where the process of political modernization and political development have lagged behind the process of social and economic change" (10, p. 265). Modernization in developing countries brings into existence different social forces characterized by conflicting interest, thereby escalating

the level of social conflict. At the same time, such change tends to undermine traditional political institutions which are unable to provide adequate channels of participation for the new social forces in politics and for the new elites in government.

Huntington argues that in order for revolution to occur, more than one group must be alienated from the existing order. That is, revolution is the product of "multiple dysfunction" in society. Two groups in particular play a crucial role in determining the onset of a revolutionary situation: the middle class in the cities and the peasantry in the countryside. Contrary to Marxist theory, Huntington does not see the industrial proletariat as a source of revolutionary activity in late modernizing countries. He argues that

> The city is the center of opposition within the country, the middle class is the focus of opposition within the city, the intelligentsia is the most active oppositional group within the middle class; and the students are the most coherent and effective revolutionaries within the intelligentsia (10, p. 290).

But the middle class by itself is unable to create a revolution. That requires the active participation of the peasantry. In fact, Huntington believes that revolution cannot succeed without the active participation of the peasantry. Thus, the occurrence of revolution "depends primarily upon parallel or cooperative action by the middle class intelligentsia and the peasantry" (10, p. 301).

While Huntington concerns himself with modernization, Johnson suggests that particular social system will encounter difficulties when the existing values are not on par with the changes taking place in the environment, or, conversely when changes in the values mean that the environment itself is seen as improperly organized. Johnson argues that the new environment would require a new set of values. Once these values are adjusted, and the environment is altered either through evolution or revolution, the system would return to balance or equilibrium, a situation in which values and environment are synchronized.

Revolution, according to Johnson, is a special form of social change in response to the presence of dysfunction in the social system. Johnson argues that "true revolution is . . . the acceptance of violence in order to cause the system to change when all else has failed, and the very idea of revolution is contingent upon this perception of societal failure" (12, p. 12).

Approaching the problem of revolution in terms of social system theory, Johnson argues that a revolutionary society is a social system thrown out of equilibrium. Disequilibrium implies a breakdown of the system's roles, institutions, functions, and values. This in turn implies the breakdown of the synchronization between the structure of social values and the pattern of change in the socio-political environment.

> Disequilibrium, therefore, is the result of,
>
> multiple dysfunction in the social system. In such a system, if one of the various component structures does not function in the way that it must in order to maintain equilibrium, then, first the affected substructure, and then if no remedial action occurs, the entire system, will move out of equilibrium (11, p. 92).

In other words, dysfuncton in one substructure may spread out into other substructures. Johnson argues that "if dysfunctions cannot be identified or isolated it will like cancer . . . metastasize and lead to revolution" (11, p. 95). In fact, dysfunction must metastasize beyond one substructure in order for revolution to occur.

Dysfunction in the social structure may be induced by various phenomena such as rapid industrialization, relative deprivation, or incoherence in the myth. But the root cause of dysfunction is the breakdown of the synchronization between social values and the sociopolitical environment.

Johnson postulates that the sources of change are four fold: "(1) exogenous value-changing sources; (2) endogenous value-changing sources; (3) exogenous environment-changing sources; and (4) endogenous environment-changing sources" (12, p. 64). Exogeneous value-changing sources might refer to the foreign education of future elites. Johnson identifies internal innovators as possible sources of endogenous value-changing sources, but he recognizes that it is very difficult for a person to become an innovator if he has never had access to ideas outside his environment.

Exogenous environment-changing sources could be in the form of a foreign invasion or the introduction of a new technology to the society. Endogenous environment-changing sources might be the sudden expansion of the population which puts pressure upon the food or land supply.

The pressures of the sources of change must be met by the political elite of the society. Johnson argues that "if the elite is not intransigent, simple change will occur, dysfunction will be resolved, and no revolution will take place" (11, p. 93). On the other hand, if the elite chooses to resist it must utilize more and more force to maintain its position. This overuse of force for non-legitimate actions is known as "power deflation." If the elite is unable to put an end to the demand or pressure for change, then the continued use of force is perceived to be illegitimate by the populace.

Taken together, elite intransigence and multiple dysfunction may be seen as necessary conditions of revolution. The sufficient condition is identified by Johnson as the X factor or the accelerators. "Accelerators," Johnson maintains, "are occurrences that catalyze or throw into relief the already existent revolutionary level of dysfunction" (11, p. 97). They do not by themselves cause revolution, but they work as a catalyst in a system. The accelerator is "the event which triggers revolution in a socity that is disequilibrated and that has a discredited

base of authority" (12, p. 99). Usually, the accelerator is the failure of the status quo elite to utilize their modern armed forces to their full capacity against the revolutionaries.

In short, the combination of multiple dysfunction, elite intransigence, and the "X" factor can cause revolution. Contrary to the Marxist view, Johnson contends that revolutions are avoidable, antisocial and wrong. Flexibility on the part of the incumbent elite will prevent the occurrence of revolution.

The Psychological Approach

Economic and social factors undoubtedly play important roles in many revolutions, but they must be analyzed in relation to social psychology which underlines the state of mind of revolutionaries. There are some who agree with the idea that "political stability and instability are ultimately dependent on a state of mind, a mood, in a society" (5, p. 6).

The psychological approach may be divided into three sub-categories. One category is comprised of theories which deal with the background of individual revolutionaries. These theories attempt to explain why a person becomes a revolutionary. They seek the cause of the revolutionary behavior of an individual in his earlier life experiences. For example, Wolfenstein, believes that revolutionary

behavior is the result of a strong unsolved oedipus complex in an individual (22, pp. 307-10).

The second category concerns itself with the repression of instincts. The instinct theories are represented, among others, by Sigmund Freud's theory of the "death instinct." Basically, Freud believed that there were two distinctive instincts which governed man's behavior: the Eros or life instinct and Thanatos or death instinct. Aggression, to Freud, was an outlet for the death instinct that might otherwise lead to suicide. According to this hypothesis, the occurrence of war and conflict were outlets for release by which groups preserved themselves by diverting their self destructive tendencies to outsiders (7, pp. 204-5).

Contrary to Freud's theory, Pitirim Alexandriovitch Sorokin argues that it is the repression of human instincts which causes revolution. He identifies seven instincts of human nature and argues that revolution is caused by their repression among the majority of the population in society and by the impossibility of obtaining a minimum satisfaction of these instincts. First, revolution may result when the desire for food(or the alimentary reflex) of a cosiderable number of people in a society is repressed. Second revolution may come about by repression of the individual self-preservation instinct. This may be the result of arbitrary execution, mass murders or a bloody war. Similarly, if the reflexes of collective self-preservation

of a group are repressed by desecration of the group's holy things, or mockery, arrest, and execution of its members, then the society may go through a period of social tension. If the needs for the necessities of life, such as housing and clothings are not satisfied, even to a minimum extend, then we have a fourth cause of revolution. Furthermore, the repression of the sex instinct, by rape and violations of wives and daughters, or by compulsory marriages and divorces, may also cause a revolution. The sixth cause of revolution for Sorokin is the repression of the ownership instinct. This occurs when a severe economic disparity exists in a society. Finally, revolution can occur when the instinct of self-expression or individuality of the people is suppressed by insult, under-estimation, constant and unjust ignoring of their merits and achivements coupled with the rewarding of less worthy people (20, pp. 367-85).

The third and most accepted assumption about aggression is that it occurs primarily as a response to frustration. Ted R. Gurr defines frustration as "an interference with goal-directed behavior" and aggression as a behavior designed to injure, physically or otherwise, those toward whom it is directed" (9, p. 249). One principle of the frustration-aggression theory is that "the occurrence of aggressive behavior always presupposes the existence of frustration, and counterwise, that the existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression"

(3, p. 200). In Davies' theory of revolution, the sharp decline in socio- economic development is said to produce frustration, which induces revolution. In the Marxist theory of revolution, the widening gap between burgeoisie and proletariat social enjoyments create frustration among workers who see themselves as nothing but a comodity. Marx argues that ". . . although the enjoyments of the worker have risen, the social satisfaction that they give has fallen in comparison with the increased enjoyments of the capitalist, which are inaccessible to the worker, in comparison with the state of development of society in general" (14, p. 180).

Closely related to the theory of frustration-aggression is the theory of relative deprivation. A leading advocate of this concept is Ted Robert Gurr. His basic premise is that ". . . the necessary precondition for violent civil conflict is relative deprivation, defined as the actors' perception of the discrepancy between their value expectations and their environment's apparent value capabilities" (9, pp. 252-53). Gurr defines

> Value expectations as the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are justifiably entitled. The value capabilities are to be found largely in the social and physical environment: they are the conditions that determine people's perceived chances of getting or keeping the values they legitimately expect to attain (9, p. 253).

In other words, relative deprivation to Gurr is the perception of frustrating circumstances. "The occurrence of

civil violence," he argues, "presuposes the likelihood of relative deprivation among substantial numbers of individuals in a society; concomitantly, the more severe is relative deprivation, the greater are the likelihood and intensity of civil violence" (9, p. 254). One must remember that revolution for Gurr is one form of civil violence.

Foreword to the Remainder

Revolution is not a sudden event. For a revolution to occur the government must lose its base of legitimacy among a substantial number of people. Different theories of revolution, as we saw, offer different explanations for the alienation of the people from their government. In fact what appears from these theories is that the occurrence of revolution, in the final analysis, depends upon the state of mind of the people.

In the Iranian case, it is clear that during the pre-revolutionary era many Iranians became alienated from their political system which eventualy led to the government's loss of legitimacy. This change in the state of mind of the people, then, succeeded in creating a revolutionary environment which ultimately brought about the revolution of 1978-79.

How did the people lose confidence in the government, and what socio-economic and political conditions created a change in their mood and state of mind are the questions that will be dealt with in the following pages. To

acomplish this task, we need the aid of the aforementioned theories of revolution. It is through these theories that we can come to a better understanding of the root cause(s) of the Iranian revolution. It is, however, necessary to study the political developments of the past century. This is needed because today's Iran is partly the product of its past history. Chapter Two of this study, therefore, attempts to explain the historical events leading to the recent political turmoil of the country. In this chapter we will see how the contemporary history of Iran has been shaped by the constant conflict between the secular governments and the religious leaders (the ulama). In fact, since the mid-ninteenth century no government has been immune from the ulama's antagonism. Although their opposition has, at times, been silenced by force, it has reawakened from time to time. During the times when the government has been unable or unwilling to exert tight control over the society the ulama have appeared as the major political actors. In fact all major political movements of the last century in Iran have been led by the religious class. Thus, it is quite conventional for the students of Iranian history to observe that the 1978-79 revolutionary struggle was led by the ulama.

Why are the ulama always at war with the secular governments? Where do they get their base of strenght? What makes them appear as the legitimate leaders of the

society? And finally, who are their supporters? These are the questions that Chapter Two seeks to answer. It is through an understanding of these quetions that we can better appreciate the events of 1978-79.

The important role of the ulama in Iranian history arises from their ability to communicate with and mobilize the masses of the people. In the name of Islam and Islamic justice and equality the ulama have been able to mobilize the inarticulate masses. No other group or individual has been either able or allowed by the government to reach these masses as the ulama did. Tnis was precisely the role of the ulama in the revolution of 1978-79. While no political party could voice its opinion, the ulama, with their 180,000 mosques throughout the nation, were able to reach the most obscure segments of the society.

But, did the ulama create the revolution or were they simply a vehicle? What appears from the examination of the pre-revolutionary social conditions is that the Iranian society was pregnant with a revolution, and the ulama, with their well-organized communication network and from their possition of relative impunity, played the role of a midwife. If the ulama were only a vehicle rather than the cause, then what factor(s) created the revolutionary environment? Chapters Three and Four attempt to answer this question. In Chapter Three we will see how some of the socio-economic changes of the last two decades contributed

to the creation of popular discontent. Introduction of the peasants into the political life of the nation, educational improvements and the rapid economic growth of the country created social conditions that the government never expected. Rapid socio-economic changes enhanced the expectations of the people. The inability and sometimes the unwillingness of the government to fullfil these new expectations caused many to become alienated from the existing political system, and become a potential source of political unrest.

Rapid socio-economic changes were not the only elements which frustrated the people. As Chapter Four will show, the political conditions of the country contributed to a large degree to the out-break of the revolution. First, the political demands of the newly expanded middle class were confronted with severe repressive policies of the government. This repression created a hostile attitude by the middle class towared the regime. Then the government shifted its policy and opened the gate for the forceful outflow of criticism.

Foreign influence in the country was another source of discontent which chapter four tries to explain. A society of proud and better educated people can hardly tolerate the humiliating domination of foreign countries. It was the perception of many Iranians that they were dominated and

ruled by foreign powers. As a result, revolution became a means to regain their self-esteem.

The final part of this study, Chapter Five, attempts to draw some conclusions on the preceding chapters and to offer an explanation of the cause(s) of the 1978-79 revolution. It is also the aim of this chapter to find out which one of the aforementioned theories of revolution can best explain the recent political upheaval of Iran.

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CHAPTER II

THE ROLE OF THE ULAMA IN THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF IRAN

Built into the Iranian present is her past, a living reality in this tradition-bound country. Therefore, a close examination of Iran's historical development is necessary to a better understanding of the important events that have occurred during the last few years leading to the revolution.

The first Iranian empire was the sixth century B.C. Achaemenian Empire which was overthrown by Alexander, circa 334-330 B.C. Following Alexander's rule, Parthians and Sasanians ruled Iran for many centuries. Under the reign of the Sasanians, Zoroastrianism became the religion of the state. Their Empire reached its height under Anushiravan (531-79 A.D.), but it rapidly declined after his death and was ultimately overthrown by the Arabs in 641 A.D. The Arabs quickly converted the majority of Iranians to Islam.

These early religious Arab rulers lost the Moslem empire to the secular and aristocratic Umayyad (661-750). Power held by the Umayyad caliphs was eventually transferred to the Abbasid caliphs (750-1248) and the new order, with the kin of the Prophet at its head, emphasized the Islamic character of its rule and purpose. For example, it adopted

black flags, and later black robes, as the emblems of the dynasty. This was an attempt to comply with the notion of the coming of the righteous ruler as depicted in the prophecies. However, while promising to bring justice and equality for all and to create a City of God on earth, immense political opression was laid over its subjects. Every crime and brutality was committed in the name of Islam. It became in effect more distant from Islamic ideals than that of the preceding government. In the words of Ayatollah Khomeini, "the rule became similar to that of the emperors of Persia and of Rome and of the Pharaohs of Egypt" (11, p. 25). In addition to their autocratic and oppressive form of government, the Abbasid caliphs were unable to comprehend the political realities of their time. Idealism and superstitious interpretations of Islam resulted in the breakdown of the Moslem Empire. Spain, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria became separate states. Gradually, then, the Islamic government of the Abbasids deteriorated due to its incompetent rule.

The conquest of Baghdad by Hulaqu, the grandson of Jenghiz Khan, in 1258 can be safely said to mark the effective dissolution of the caliphate type of rule. However, the Ilkhan dynasty founded by Hulaqu lasted less than 100 years and broke up into warring factions about 1335 A.D. By the end of the fourteenth century Iran was incorporated into the immense empire of Timur.

The Timurid empire eventually broke up, and the political vacuum was filled by the Safavids from 1501 to 1721. They were originally the heads of a small religious order centered in Ardabil in noth-west Iran. Shah Ismail, the founder of the dynasty, imposed the Shia form of Islam upon his subjects, most of whom had till then remained Sunnis. From this time forward the Islamic world was split into two groups, Sunnis and Shias.

The Safavid political legitimacy rested upon the claim that they would create an Islamic government. They, too, like the Abbasids, portrayed a utopian society for their subjects. Justice and equality were promised to everyone as once more the country practically became a religious state. This was caused by the close co-operation between religious leaders (ulama), such as Mohammad Baquir Majlisi and the celebrated Shaykh Ali Karaki. Shah Tahmasb, who reigned from 1524 to 1576, made Shaykh Ali Karaki sovereign of the country and declared himself his assistant. Besides political power, the Safavids granted the clerics land (waqf), the power to collect religious taxes (zekat, khums), and control over the educational and judiciary systems. In short, every aspect of life came to be dominated by the clergy.

Some historians believe that this period was the darkest period in Iranian history and of Islam. Superstition and hypocrisy became the order of the day. As Ali

Shariati, one of the most prominent students of Islamic history explains, the active and constructive Shiaism of the past was transformed into a passive religion full of superstitions and of constant sadness and mourning for its dead martyrs. Red Shiaism was changed to black Shiaism (21, pp. 20-22).

The logical conclusion of the Safavid dynasty with its incompetent ruling class could result in nothing but failure. This dynasty came to a humiliating end with the revolt of a small group of Afghans (1721-1730) who were in turn overthrown by Nader Shah Afshar (1735-47). Nader Shah, an anti-religious ruler, was succeeded first by Zand (1750-1779) and then by the Qajars (1779-1925), the first of whom was Aga Mohammad Khan (1779-97). The Qajar dynasty lasted until 1925, when it was replaced by the Pahlavi dynasty.

The Roots of the Ulama's Power in Iran

While it is part of some conventional thinking in the West to consider religion as a reactionary social force, it is equally conventional among students of Iranian history to regard religion in Iran as a revolutionary force. Many students of modern history and politics have been struck by the peculiar role of the religious class in Iranian history. At a time when most countries of the world have moved toward secularization and have pushed the political role of religion into the background, Iranian history is being shaped by religiously inspired movements. One may ask why

the Iranian clergy have been able to exercise and retain so much political power? Generally speaking, the political power of the ulama stems from (1) their strong financial position in society; (2) the Shia theory of political authority; and (3) the political developments of the last one hundred years. The following is a brief study of these factors.

The immense economic power gained by the ulama during the Safavid period was retained until the late 1960's. They retained the right to control the waqf lands as well as the power to collect the khums and zekat taxes. These grants of power to the clergy by the Safavids during the early period of their dynasty later turned into the clergy's financial base for anti-government activities. Even the widespread confiscation of waqf lands by the anti-ulama Nader Shah in the eighteenth century did not break the financial power of the ulama since it was quickly restored on the old bases by subsequent rulers, including the Qajars.

Secondly, the power of the ulama has arisen largely from the Shia theory which regards all temporal governments as illegitimate. According to Shia theory, legitimate rule passed by heredity from the Prophet Mohammad through his son-in-law Ali and his descendants, called Imams, and ended with the disappearance of the Twelfth Imam, Mohammad al-Mahdi, in 874. Pending the return of the Twelfth hidden Imam as the messiah, his will is supposed to be interpreted

by the leading religious authorities (ulama), while secular governments should be strictly regarded as usurpers. In the age of his absence, therefore, the ulama are the sole leader of the Moslems, for they are appointed by the Twelfth Imam to rule and judge over Moslems (11, pp. 61,70). In the words of a student of Islam:

> The religious power, equated with justice must always be at war with the temporal, equated with injustice. It is the duty therefore of all Muslims to fight governments, or at least to abstain from collaboration with them; such an injunction contains no value judgments. The actions of a secular government must be bad because they do not carry the authority of the Imam (4, pp. 393-4).

The fact that a government is supported by the public is all the more reason for opposing it, for in the Shia view a secular government cannot be allowed to acquire a false authority based on popular support. In the Shia form of Islam "there is no place for opinions and whims in the government of Islam" (11, p. 33). Government is a means to implement the already set laws and establish a just Islamic government (11, p. 41).

The laws and the regulations have already been set by God and "nobody else has the right to legislate" (11, p. 31). In fact, the very word "Islam" means submission, and a "Moslem" is one who submits to the will of Allah as expressed in the Sharia. The Sharia (literally "way" or "path") is the law of the land, binding both ruler and ruled. Its scope is presumed to be all-embracing,

containing various laws for a complete social system. It is believed that the Sharia contains all the rules and regulations to make human beings happy and to lead them toward perfection (11, pp. 20-21). There are two surces of the Sharia: the Quran and the Sunna (life and actions of the Prophet). During the occultation of the Imam, the Shia Islamic scholars (the ulama) can interpret this law through independent reasoning, or ijtehad (hence mujtahed). Thus, the political position of the ulama is greatly enhanced by the exclusive right conferred on them to give a final interpretation of the Sharia.

The ulama have an additional weapon over the populace. The clergy can easily arouse popular emotion with the ever-recurring theme of Shia Islam--the martyrdom of Imam Husayn at Karbala at the time of Yazid's caliphate. His death at the hands of the Umayyads is ever present in the Shia consciousness as a piece of tragedy demonstrating the battle between justice and the tyranny of an impious government. This tragedy is eternalized annually through performances known as taziya (dramatic passion plays) and rauzakhani (recitation of events). These performances are used to transform the tragedy of Karbala into an archtypal conflict between justice and tyranny. All temporal governments are held to be similar to and reminiscent of the Umayyads, and occasionally they are even accused of being descendants of that dynasty. This tendency can still be

observed in contemporary Iran, where the Shahs have often been designated "the Yazid of the age". Such statements gained particular currency during the periods of the Constitutional Revolution (1, p. 233) and of the revolutions of 1963 (10, p. 228; 12, p. 126) and 1978 (15, p. 396).

The third reason for the enhancement of the ulama's power can be attributed to the influence of the West in Iran. This influence came in the form of direct and indirect Anglo-Russian imperialism on the one hand, and of the advent of a new westernized intellectual class on the other hand.

The dynamics of the nineteenth century Russian expansion into Asia brought Russia to the borders of Iran. The deep yearning and stubborn drive of Russians, whether Tsarist or Soviet, for a warm-water port is universally recognized, and the Persian Gulf has always been alluring to them. It has been clearly recognized that British fears for her trade routes to India and for India itself had prevented the Russians from swallowing Iran. Neither power could advance further without risking a major war. In fact, as Professor Richard Cottam put it, Iran's very existence hung on the continued peaceful rivalry of these two states (3, pp. 12-13).

The roles of Russia and Great Britain in the internal affairs of Iran kept the Qajars conservative and their government decentralized. From the early ninteenth century

on, Great Britain and Russia effectively guaranteed the accession of the legitimate heirs. These took place in 1834, 1848, and 1896 (8, p. 7). Consequently, the Qajars felt they could count on foreign arms in case of dynastic revolt or territorial breakoffs. Accordingly, they felt no urgency to build their own army. Iran's only army was run by Russian officers. In 1879 an agreement between Persia and Russia created a Cossak Brigade. It was only an elite unit formed to protect the person of the Shah and the royal family. The Brigade was trained and commanded by Russian officers who received instructions from Saint Petersburg and salaries from Tehran (7, p. 463).

The continued weakness of the central government and the discouragement of any modernizing measures by Anglo-Russians and the vested interests at court provided a fertile ground for the ulama's exercise of power. They achieved a number of victories over their secular counterparts and appeared as the national heroes and true defenders of the national interest. Their most important victories in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were the cancellation of the Reuter and Tobacco concessions, the successful conclusion of the Consitutional Revolution, and the safeguarding of the constitution for years to come.

The Reuter Concession

Restricted as Russia and Great Britain were in the military field, their rivalry was expressed primarily in the

economic realm. In 1872 a British subject, Baron Paul Julius von Reuter was granted a concession for the usage of Iran's mineral resources in return for the construction of railways and the establishment of a national banking system. The Reuter Concession was of such breadth as to mortgage the country's future economic development. The Reuter Concession coincided with the premiership of Mirza Hosayn Khan Sepahsalar (1826-81), a French educated Iranian who served as premier from 1870 to 1873. He urged the Shah and his government to adopt an active policy of Westernization and reform. No place was foreseen in those policies for the ulama. Furthermore, his western ideas were alien to the ulama. Consequently, opposition was inevitable.

The ulama's opposition to Sepahsalar and his reforms on the one hand and the grant of the Reuter Concession on the other hand led to a severe confrontation between the ulama and the government. The Russians, who could not remain indifferent to the possiblity of British intrusion in the region that was considered Russian, put an immense pressure on the Shah to cancel the Concession. Thus under heavy pressure from the ulama and the Russians, the Shah cancelled the Concession and removed Sepahsalar from high office.

The Tobacco Concession

The major political earthquake, however, that shook the foundations of the Qajar dynasty resulted from the grant of the Tobacco Concession (13,14) to another British subject,

Major General Talbot, on March 8, 1890. This Concession granted the control of production and distribution of Persian tobacco for fifty years.

The Concession aroused the hostility of the Persian merchants whose freedom of action was restricted and that of the ulama who feared the influence of non-Moslems whose presence, they believed, would lead to a weakening of Islam. Nor were the Russians happy about the Concession either. Their opposition to the Tobacco Concession was declared from the outset.

Persians in exile, notably Molkam Khan (1833-1908), a western-educated intellectual, and Jamal Ad-Din Asadabadi (1838-97), a religious radical, played an important part in fostering the popular movement against the Concession. Asadabadi and some members of the ulama made much of the alleged danger of the agreement to Islam. Their outcry against this Concession, and its alleged dangers to Islam rallied the people to action in defense of Islam. Asadabadi who saw the roots of all the miseries of Moslem countries in Western imperialism, urged Ayatollah Shirazi, the most prominent mujtahed of the time, to declare a Jahad (holy war) against smoking. In a leaflet which he published in Istanbul, he clearly demonstrated the power of the ulama in Iranian society. He stated that if

> the Iranians will not disobey the command of their religious leader, then why does the great leader, Mirzay Shirazi, not order the people to bring down this atheist (Nasir al-Din Shah) from his throne?

> I swear to God this action would not cause any bloodshed, even as little as a cupping glass (5, p. 80).

Ayatollah Shirazi issued a Fatwa (religious order) stating: "In the name of God the merciful, the forgiving. Today the use of tobacco . . . in whatever fashion is tantamount to war against the Imam of the Age, may God hasten his glad advent" (13, p. 145). Telegrams were also sent to leading members of the ulama in provincial towns to the effect that orders for the resumption of smoking would not be given until "the hands of foreigners were completely severed from the countries of Islam" (13, p. 156).

The movement against smoking spread throughout the nation. Smoking was abandoned altogether and Nasir al-Din Shah found himself powerless by the fact that even ". . . in his own harem the women had obeyed the interdiction against smoking" (13, P. 150). The Muharram processions taking place at the time heightened the excitment against the Concession and the Shah became frightened by the turn of events that were taking place. He saw himself threatened by a popular movement and the possibility of Russian intervention in case civil war developed. The Concession, therefore, was hastily cancelled and life returned to normalcy in the country.

With the cancellation of the Tobacco Concession came a new spirit. It became apparent to the people that they could influence the policies of the government if they were

united. Meanwhile the ulama reached a new level of political prestige and power. This newly won prestige and the victory of the people over the Concession became a prelude for all social movements of the twentieth century, the first of which was Constitutional Revolution.

The Constiutional Revolution*

The detailed events of the Constitutional Revolution have been recounted in a number of works, thus, no effort will be made here to reiterate what has been repeatedly said. This undertaking confines itself to the role and the motives of those who brought about the movement, namely, the ulama and the Western educated intellectuals.

The events leading to the cancellation of the Tobacco Concession demonstrated how the leading ulama, from a position of relative impunity, could mobilize both the resentment and the religious feelings of the Iranian masses in a way that the Western educated intellectuals and reformers could never hope to duplicate on their own. Westernizers and reformers had lost whatever hope they had in significant reforms and for the first time came to realize the religious nature of Iranian society. Thus, from

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*According to the definition of revolution, the Constitutional movement of 1906 was not a revolution since the main objective of the movement was to curtail the power of the Shah, rather than a political takeover and an introduction of some fundamental social change. But since this event is known by almost all students of Iranian history as the "Constitutional Revolution" the same terminology is used here in order to avoid any confusion.

1892 on, we find most of them arguing that modern law is compatible with Islam. Using these types of arguments these secular intellectuals hoped to gain the support of the ulama for their political reforms. These appeals to religion on the part of the intellectuals were, of course, tactical moves rather than sincere sentiments. In a speech to an English audience Molkam Khan, a leading Armenian intellectual, clearly voiced this view. He frankly stated that Iranian reformers had jointly agreed that the only means of making European reforms acceptable to Persians was to present them in an Islamic guise (9, p. 73). Appealing to Islam, he and other intellectuals pretended to be the real allies of the ulama. The history of twentieth-century Iran has been formed and shaped by this alliance.

One of the most important outcomes of the ulama-intellectuals alliance was, of course, the constitutional Revolution of 1906. The movement was a protest against foreign influences and their luxury-loving partner, Mozaffar al-Din Shah, whose spendthrift ways resulted in the necessity of negotiating foreign loans. The movement was led by the ulama, whose grievances about tyranny and foreign expansion in the country made them undeniable allies of the reformers and of the Bazaar merchants. At the beginning, the politically naive ulama demanded the creation of an Edalat Khane (house of justice) in order to "enjoin what is good and forbid what is evil" in a way that the ruler and

the ruled would be duly warned and "just" government restored. Ayatollah Tabatabai, the most prominent religious leader of the time, wrote "we want justice, the execution of Islamic law. . . . We do not talk about constitutinalism and republicanism" (5, p. 84).

A year later, when the idea of the Edalat Khane proved to be impractical and not the solution for the problems of the country, the same ulama returned to the idea of constitutionalism which they had denounced before. Hoping that the Sharia would become the law of the land, the leading ulama accepted the western reformers' scheme of constitutionalism. Even though a few unimportant clergymen, such as Fazl Allah Nuri, rejected constitutionalism as an un-Islamic act, constitutionalism was supported by the leading ulama residing in Iran, such as Ayatollahs Tabatabai and Behbahani, and the Persian ulama residing in the Iraqi holy city of Najaf, such as Ayatollahs Khurasani, Mazandarani and Tehrani. When the leading ulama put their stamps of approval on the idea of constitutionalism, it was quickly and widely accepted. Consequently, the previously un-Islamic idea of constitutionalism became a true Islamic form of government. Thousands of religious-intoxicated demonstrators poured into the streets and called for constitutionalism.

Some scholars of Iranian history believe that the majority of the ulama who participated in the Constitutional

Revolution did not and could not comprehend the meaning of the idea of modern constitutionalism. Knowing the inaccessability of western political thought to the ulama, who were unable to read French or English, the western-educated reformers made continual and conscious efforts to keep the ulama unaware of the conflicts between modern liberal ideas and Islam. Efforts of the liberal reformers were further aided by the existence of Islamic concepts such as freedom and equality. The Islamic interpretation of these concepts, however, differs greatly from their Western interpretation. Since the liberal reformers made no effort to explain to the ulama that they were giving such concepts a Western interpretation some members of the ulama did not find them contrary to Islam and consequently interpreted them according to Islamic political thought.

The Western-educated reformers used religion somewhat dishonestly in order to acomplish their goal of modernizing the country. This is clearly recognized by modern Iranian thinkers. Even the ulama later on came to realize that they had been deceived. Ayatollah Khomeini explains that clearly,

> To further deceive and mislead the people, the agents of the British tried, on the instructions of their masters, to import foreign positional laws in the wake of a well-known revolution and of the establishment of a constitutional regime in Iran. When they wanted to draw up the country's basic law, meaning the Constitution, those agents resorted to Belgian laws which they borrowed from the Belgian Embassy. A number of those agents, whom I do not wish to

> name, copied those laws and corrected their defects from the group of French and British laws, adding to them some Islamic laws for the purpose of camouflage and deception (11, pp. 8-9).

With their limited understanding of constitutionalism, the ulama led the successful and bloodless Constitutional Revolution of 1906. Five days after the reigning Shah had approved the Constitution he died and Mohammad Ali Shah became the new Shah in 1907. His accession marked the escalation of hostilities between the Constitutionalists, led by the ulama, and the new Shah.

Mohammad Ali Shah was determined to regain absolute power, and he bombarded the Parliament Buildng (Majlis) on June 23, 1908. The country was put under martial law under Colonel Liakoff, the Russian commander of the Cossak Brigade. Thirteen months after the Shah's coup, active opposition of the ulama forced the Shah to seek refuge in Russia. He was deposed on July 16, 1909, and his twelve-year old son, Ahmad Shah, succeeded to power, a position he held until 1925. In July 1911 the ex-Shah and his Russian troops returned to Iran and civil war broke out again and continued for another year. They were defeated and Mohammad Ali Shah left for Europe.

During the civil war Russian troops moved into the northen part of Iran in order to "prevent anarchy." British forces occupied the southern part of the country for the purpose of "safeguarding British lives and properties." The country continued to be occupied throughout World War I, and

it was not until the Russian Revolution that the danger from the north ceased. The British found themselves alone in control of the country, and they moved to bring Iran into the British protectorate camp. This created a new wave of opposition, and the country was again engulfed in political turmoil. It was at this juncture that an unknown colonel in the Cossok Brigade, by the name of Reza Khan, marched into the capital and installed a new administration.

The Pahlavi Dynasty and Religion

Reza Khan, supported by the British, but not controlled by them, led his troops into Tehran and brought about the coup d'état of 1921. He made himself Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief and later Prime Minister. For the next five years Anmad Shah remained nominal King of Iran until his final ouster in 1925. In October of the same year Reza Khan, who was impressed by Kamal Ataturk's governance of Turkey, called for a republican form of government.

The Shia ulama were afraid that a republican Iran would eventually imitate Turkey in secularizing the country. They called republicanism un-Islamic and contrary to the Sharia. Hence, one more time the ulama appealed to the masses. The mobs formed, the bazaar closed, and some thirty thousand religious anti-republicanists besieged the Majlis. Reza Khan hastily withdrew the bill and wired the Shia ulama in Qum expressing his deep love for Shia Islam. He dismissed the idea of a republican form of government, and for some

time he was careful not to antagonize the ulama. He made repeated pilgrimages to the holy shrines and showed every sign of being personally devout. On December 12, 1925, the clerically dominated Majlis convened and voted that the throne be entrusted to Reza Khan, who took the name "Pahlavi" for his dynasty and for his male descendants.

The Reign of Reza Shah

Reza Shah (1925-41) was not a political theorist; he was an uneducated, forceful military man who could not accept any challenge to his authority. His regime was a repressive one, both rigid and ossified. He made extensive use of force to promote his modernizing measures. These measures appear to be similar to Huntington's theory of modernization. Huntington argues that

> In the first phase the need exists to break down traditional institutions and practices and to inaugurate modernizing reforms designed to rationalize and secularize the system of authority, to develop an efficient bureaucracy and military force, to equalize the relations of citizens to government, and to extend the effective reach of the state (6, p. 53).

To achieve these modernizing reforms, he argues, power must be centralized in the hands of the government (6, p. 53).

In spite of the ulama's opposition to conscription, Reza Shah was able to consolidate his power by creating a centralized and relatively modern army and bureaucracy. With new forces under his control, he was able to reunify the country and subdue the semi-independent tribes. New

communication systems and new roads, including the trans-Iranian railway, were built to promote effective control of the country.

He considered the ulama an obstacle standing in the way of progress. Therefore, his secularization plan started with massive anti-clerical propaganda through the use of controlled media. Clergymen were portrayed as social and political reactionaries, opposing any progress in the betterment of life. The intensity of the anti-clerical persecution and propaganda reached the point that the clerics were unable to leave their homes with their robes on. Furthermore, to reduce the ceremonial role of the ulama, in 1929 he banned the practice of self-flagellation during the holy month of Muharram. In 1928 he made European dress obligatory, and prohibited the use of religious robes and turbans. Women were forbidden to wear veils in 1935. The most devastating blow to the ulama's power, however, was the introduction of a Westernized civil code and secular education for both girls and boys.

The use of anti-ulama propaganda was accompanied by the glorification of the pre-Islamic history of Iran. He hoped to make Iranians proud of their Aryan race and thereby instill in them a sense of nationalism as opposed to the pan-Islamic view of the clergy.

Reza Shah's abdication came in the midst of World War II when he refused to cooperate with the Allies against

Germany. On August 25, 1941 the Allies entered Tehran almost without resistance and forced the Shah to abdicate. He abdicated on September 16th in favor of his twenty-two-year-old son, Mohammad Reza. A British ship carried him to exile in South Africa, where he died in 1944. Few wept over his departure and death.

The Reign of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi

The period between the Anglo-Russian deposition of Reza Shah and the crisis of 1953 marks the emergence of new and diverse political forces in the political life of the country. In fact, the significant modernization and education that had occurred under Reza Shah now reached new political meaning. Various parties ranging from socialists to liberal nationalists and religious fundamentalists appeared on the political scene.

In 1951 a new crisis developed when Mohammad Mossadeq and his National Front asked for the nationalization of the oil industry. The beginning of the campaign for the nationalization of the oil industry significantly enhanced the political activities of the ulama and of the Tudeh Party (Communist party of Iran). The ulama's dissatisfaction with the government emanated from the same duality of concern that the constitutionalist ulama had inherited from the ulama of the nineteenth century. They opposed absolutism, represented by the ever increasing power of the Shah, and

foreign domination, represented by the Anglo-Iranian oil company.

A leading clergyman who shaped Iranian history during this period was Ayatollah Kashani. The political instrument of Kashani in the Majlis was a group known as the Mojahedin-e Islam (Crusaders of Islam) under the leadership of Shams Qanatabadi. While outside the Majlis, he led a militant organization called Fedaiyn-e Islam (Devotees of Islam). The political activities of the latter included the assassination of the pro-west Prime Minister, Ali Razmara, on March 7, 1951. The assassin, Khalil Tahmasbi, who had the blessing of the Ayatollah Kashani, became a national hero. The government, under heavy popular pressure, freed Tahmasbi from jail shortly after he was arrested.

Upon the assassination of the Prime Minister, and the Minister of Education a few days later, the Majlis passed a bill nationalizing the oil industry and appointing Mossadeq as Prime Minister. The pillar of support of Mossadeq in the National Front was Ayatollah Kashani and his vast following, but the only base of their temporary alliance lay in their having common enemies. They both opposed foreign domination and absolutism.

Another political force in the 1950's was the Tudeh Party. It was the product of two developments: the political vacuum created by the abdication of Reza Shah and the physical presence of the Red Army in the northern part of

Iran. The seriousness of the Tudeh Party became apparent when one hundred thousand people participated in the demonstration of July 21, 1953 (known as 30 Tir) (17, p. 3). It was believed that the party could boast half a million affiliates in the trade unions. In addition, strong Soviet support facilitated the infiltration of the Iranian armed forces by the Tudeh Party members. The party succeeded in building a tightly organized underground communist network within the armed forces (24, p. 53).

Theoretically, the Tudeh Party had been outlawed in 1949, but its operations became more apparent in the chaotic situation of the early 1950's. Although the nationalists firmly refused the Tudeh proposal for a popular front, after July 21, 1953 anti-Tudeh propaganda by the government substantially decreased, and the party was permitted considerable freedom. It is believed that Mossadeq unchained the Tudeh Party in order to frighten Americans (3, pp. 216-26). The threat to go communist which was implicit in Mossadeq's letter of May 28, 1953 to President Eisenhower succeeded in freightening American policy-makers. The fear of a communist takeover in the cold war era led many of the American statesmen to believe that Mossadeq himself was a communist. Hans Tofte, head of all American CIA overt operations at the time, addressed this point in his letter to the editor of the New York Times in 1978. He stated that "Mossadeq was a Soviet stooge who had ousted the Shah in

order to open the door for a Soviet takeover of Iran and its oil (19, p. 26).

In addition to its implied threat, Mossadeq's letter to Eisenhower contained a request for some economic aid from the United States and an offer of the sale of Iranian oil to this country. But the American response to Mossadeq's request was the reverse of his expectations. On June 29, 1953 Eisenhower replied to Mossadeq's letter by stating that "the Government of the United States is not presently in position to extend more aid to Iran or purchase Iranian oil" (22, p. 75). Allen Dulles and John Foster Dulles, the heads of the CIA and the State Department respectively, saw the Soviet threat as genuine, dangerous, and imminent and were not satisfied with a simple refusal of help to the Mossadeq government. Kermit Roosvelt, the CIA agent who conducted the coup d'état of 1953 in Iran, disclosed that the Dulles brothers had approved the AJAX project to overthrow the government of Mossadeq four days before Eisenhower replied to Mossadeq's letter (20, p. 2-4).

On August 19, 1953 when the CIA conducted coup d'état occurred, Mossadeq was not supported by either the Tudeh Party or his one-time ally, the ulama. The Tudeh perception was that "Dr. Mossadeq and his friends in the so-called National Front are dancing to the tune of imperialistic America" (3, p.212). Thus, when the coup occurred the Tudeh Party leadership was reluctant to call on its forces.

While the passive role of the Tudeh Party contributed to the downfall of the Mossadeq government, the active participation of the ulama and their massive supporters made the coup possible. One should remember that the logical outcome of the Mossadeq-Kashani alliance could be nothing but dissension. The ulama's relations with Mossadeq deteriorated to the point that a Fedaiyn gunman wounded Hosayn Fatemi, a leading Mossadeqist, though the gunman later proclaimed that Mossadeq had been his first target. Mossadeq-Kashani relations were ruptured when Kashani started interfering in the affairs of the government, a step which Mossadeq refused to tolerate. This conflict, along with some philosophical differences between the two, encouraged Kashani and his followers to lend their support to the royalist coup d'état (3, pp. 242-45). Another prominent Ayatollah who played a decisive role in reinstalling the Shah was Ayatollah Abdollah Behbahani. Behbahani and his son utilized all their power to bring down the government and to reinstate the monarchy. Behbahani was apparently convinced that the Communists would eventually seize the power from Mossadeq. Consequently, he thought that Mossadeq should be overthrown immediately and replaced by someone who could better hold on to power.

There is a general tendency among Iranians to believe that the fall of Mossadeq was solely the responsibility of the CIA. There is now no doubt that the U.S. government and

specifically the CIA played an active part in organizing the coup of 1953. But without a fertile ground, namely the support of the ulama and of the army, it would have been impossible for the United States to organize a coup. If the Iranians had not been divided, no foreign government could have interfered in their domestic affairs in such a humiliating manner.

The Shah left the country a few days before the coup d'état and was in the dining room of the Excelsior Hotel in Rome when the news of Mossadeq's fall came. He, the Queen, and Alan Dulles, the head of the CIA, returned to Tehran on August 22. Upon his return Mossadeq was tried and sentenced to three years in solitary confinement. The reason for this mild sentence was chiefly the realization that he was to a large sector of the population a national hero and a symbol of opposition to foreign influence.

American involvement in the removal of Mossadeq, who had come to symbolize Iran's search for national dignity, stripped the Shah's regime of any legitimacy. Widespread awarness of United States involvement in the overthrow of the nationalist government of Mossadeq established a base of distrust among Iranians in American policies towards Iran. It is important to note that until 1953 most Iranians believed that the United States government was genuinly sympathetic to Iranian yearnings for national independence. This positive image resulted primarily from the services of

American financial advisors, such a Morgan Shuster, from 1911 to 1912, and A.C. Milspaugh, from 1922 to 1927 and again from 1943 to 1945.

With the fall of Mossadeq, the main objective of the new regime became the dissolution of all the political forces and the recentralization of power in the hands of the Shah. All political parties and political forces were gradually eliminated, and the monarch came to rely increasingly on the support of the military and on American aid.

During the first few years after 1953 the ulama showed no significant hostility toward the regime. Both Ayatollah Kashani, who rendered his support to the royalist coup d'état, and Ayatollah Burujirdi (1875-1961), who by the time of his death was the sole marja-e taqlid of the Shia world, communicated an attitude of quietism to their vast following.

On the death of Burujirdi, three Iranian mujtahids emerged as joint heirs to Burujirdi's position: Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini(1900-), Ayatollah Milani, and Ayatollah Shariatmadari. Out of the three, Khomeini's name is associated with the traditional position of the ulama: opposition to absolutism and to foreign domination. Khomeini's opposition to the Shah's absolutism became more pronounced when on March 19, 1962, the United States government sent a note to the Iranian government asking that all members of the United States military personnel and

civilian employees of the United States' Department of Defense and their families in Iran be given full diplomatic immunity (23, pp. 7529-40).

This request for diplomatic immunity for Americans, coupled with the dictatorial rule of the Shah, prepared the ground for the uprising of 1963. Even though the movement was led by members of the religious class, the flame was no doubt fanned by all of the discontented elements of society, including the intellectuals and those who opposed the government because of its land reform program and its intention to enfranchise women. Forthright attacks on the government in the mosques and broadsheets led to massive and violent demonstrations throughout the nation. The ringleader of the movement was of course Ayatollah Khomeini. On March 22, 1963, the anniversary of the martyrdom of the sixth Imam, Jafar as-Sadiq, Khomeini's teaching place in Qum was attacked by paratroopers and members of the security police. Hundreds of students were killed and Khomeini was arrested. The effect of such timing identified the regime with the historical persecutors of the Imams. Such identification became infinitely clearer and stronger two and a half months later when the drama of Muharram was played out in the streets of Tehran and in other Iranian cities.

Khomeini was temporarily detained and then released before the month of Muharram. Upon his release he resumed his denunciation of the government and its policies. When

finally Khomeini compared the Shah to Yazid, the Ummayyad governor who is still execrated by the Shias for the death of Imam Hosayn at Karbala, the government had no choice but action. Khomeini and twenty-eight other religious leaders were arrested on the tenth of Muharram, the anniversary of the martyrdom of the Imam Hosayn. Their arrest led to riots throughout the nation from the third through the fifth of June. The riots were so violent that Tehran was placed under martial law and were quelled only after troops were sent into the streets with "shoot-to-kill" orders. Thousands of demonstrators lost their lives. A national strike was called by the ulama for June 11th, but it failed to materialize.

It was later officially asserted that the ulama's agitation was directed against the government's program of land reform and its plan to enfranchise women. However, khomeini explicitly denied harboring any objections to the principle of land reform. Ayatollahs Shariatmadari and Milani, both associated with the events of June 1963, similarly disclaimed opposition to the land reform. The regime never produced the fatwa delivered by any of the three mujtaheds condemming land reform. In addition, the Shah rejected the authenticity of the uprising. He claimed in a speech delivered at Hamadan on June 8th that the demonstrators had received twenty-five rials (about 35 cents)

per head to rebel against the government--a modest fee for risking one's life (1, pp. 246-9).

On September 17, 1963, Prime Minister Alam held the long-promised general election. He declared that the elections would be free and that all would be permitted to participate. At the same time all heads of the National Front and religious leaders were put under house arrest, and some newspapers were closed down. The Shah explained this situation by referring to "the discipline needed to effect the revolution demanded by the people" (18, p. 6). A year later the Majlis passed the bill providing full diplomtic immunity for the American military advisors in Iran.

Khomeini was released in May 1964 with the government announcement that he agreed not to interfere in political matters. After the vote on the bill of diplomatic immunity in the Majlis, he issued a proclamation that is a full expression of his political beliefs. His criticisms were mainly aimed at what he saw as American "enslavement of Iran." He viewed the United States as a nation which "considers the Quran and Islam to be harmful to itself and wishes to remove them from its way, it is America that considers Moslem men of religion a thorn in its path" (16, p. 28). Khomeini was arrested in November for what the Shah claimed were Khomeini's instigations against the country's interests, security, independence, and territorial integrity. He was sent into exile to Turkey. In October 1965 he

left Turkey for Iraq and settled in the holy city of Najaf. With his arrival there, Najaf resumed its former position as the center of opposition to autocratic rule in Iran that it had played in the period of the Constitutional Revolution.

With the exile of Khomeini and the suppression of opposition groups by the government, those opposed to the regime tended increasingly to resort to underground activities. These activities, however, were not on the scale needed to undermine the government. Along with the National Front and the Moslem groups, two other major guerrilla organizations originated at this time: the Fedaiyn-e Khalq (People's Devotees) and the Mojahedin-e Khalq (People's Crusaders). Both of these organizations emerged from young university students. Many factors contributed to the emergence of guerrilla activities, including the exposure of Iranian youth to Western culture and the experience of study and travel abroad. During this time in their lives many Iranian youths were attracted to the romance of revolutionary violence, guerrilla movements, and the idea of national liberation. To many of them urban guerrilla operations became the means to regain freedom.

The Fedaiyn-e Khalq is a coalition of militant Marxist groups. It is an offshoot of the Tudeh Party. Unlike the Tudeh it has no known direct ties with the Soviet Union. It was, however, pro-Chinese until Mao's death in 1976 (2, p. 11). The Fedaiyn operations escalated in the 1970's with an

attack on a gendarmerie post in Siah-kal in February 1971 and a number of bank robberies and attacks on military personnel later on.

The Mojahedin, on the other hand, is an avowedly Islamic party with strong Marxist tendencies. Like the Fedaiyn, it is essentially a group comprising a number of different ideological tendencies. The Mojahedin traces its origins to the National Front. It has very close ties with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and especially with Yasir Arafat's Fatah group. Some of the earliest Mojahedin supporters took part in the Black September movement of 1970 in support of the Palestinians in Jordan. Within Iran, the Mojahedin began armed actions in 1971. Its assassinations of U.S. officials in 1973 and 1975 and of American civilians associated with military projects in 1976 were highly professional (2, pp. 14-16). The Mojahedin has accepted the compatability of Islam and Marxism, and under an Islamic guise it has enjoyed the support of many celebrated men such as Ayatollahs Taleqani of Tehran, Tehrani of Mashad, and Ali Shariati and Mehdi Bazargan.

It is important to note, however, that the practice of political violence was not confined to the two above mentioned groups. Other less important underground political organizations beefed up their violent operations. On January 21, 1965 a twenty-two-year-old youth, a member of Hizb-e Milal-e Islam (Islamic Nations Party) shot Prime

Minister Mansur. The Prime Minister died five days later. On April 10, there was an unsuccessful attempt on the life of the Shah by a soldier of the Imperial Guard. Thereafter, periodic trials of persons accused of plotting against the regime and the Shah became the order of the day.

The influence of Khomeini became apparent once again in a series of events in the summer of 1970, with the events culminating in the death of a Tehran mujtahed, Ayatollah Saidi. Amnesty International reported that Saidi was tortured to death "by the gradual crushing of his skull, and the introduction of boiling water into his intestines" (1, p. 251). Upon the death of Saidi, religious scholars and students of theology sent a telegram of commiseration to Ayatollah Khomeini. One more time a state of tension prevaled throughout the nation, and several prominent religious personalities, such as Ayatollah Taleqani, Shaybani, and Mehdi Bazargan, all members of the "Freedom Movement," were arrested.

At the same time that open hostility re-emerged between the ulama and the state, a prominent Ayatollah, Muhsin al-Hakim, died in Najaf. His death indirectly led to the enhancement of Ayatollah Khomeini's religious and political standing. Upon Hakim's death, the Shah sent messages of commiseration to Ayatollahs Shariatmadari and Khunsari intimating their supremacy in the position of marja-e taqlid of the Shia world. While Khunsari sent a polite but reserved

answer, Shariatmadari responded in a loyalistic tone that earned him widespread disapproval. Demonstrations broke out in Qum in front of Shariatmadari's residence. The demonstrators, therefore, reafirmed their loyalty to Khomeini as *marja-e taqlid*. Similar incidents took place in Tehran and other major cities, where the demonstrators were dispersed by the army. After these events of 1970, the cry of "Long live Khomeini" became the major theme in all demonstrations.

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CHAPTER III

SOME SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS IN THE REVOLUTION OF 1978-79

Any attempt to explain the 1978-1979 revolution must take into consideration the social and economic changes of the last two decades. These changes were partly the result of the Shah's reforms, which were introduced in the early 1960's, and partly the result of the increase in oil prices. It is precisely the rapid changes of this period which provided a revolutionary environment for the anti-government forces.

In the light of communist agitation in the countries of the Middle East during the 1950's and 1960's, a series of counter-revolutionary measures seemed necessary if the Shah was to remain in power. Both the Shah and the Kennedy Administration were especially alarmed by Khrushchev's diagnosis that "the regime in Iran will fall like a rotten apple"(9, p. 160). The 1958 Iraqi revolution was a further indication that such backward countries were highly susceptible to communist agitation. To many, a similar fate awaited Iran unless some quasi-revolutionary measures were undertaken. The United States, therefore, insisted that there was an immediate need for social reform. In fact, the Kennedy Administration's "self-help" policy put severe

pressure on the Iranian government to introduce change. According to this policy Iran, in order to deserve more American aid, had to first put its own house in order by undertaking long overdue social and economic reforms(38, p. 24 ff).

As a result of this outside pressure and the internal necessity for change, the Shah launched a series of reforms known as the "White Revolution". The first Six Points (or principles as they are known in Iran) of these reforms -- later known as "The Revolution of the Shah and the People" -- were announced on January 26, 1963. Thirteen more points were later added to the original Points, bringing their total number to nineteen in 1977(30, p. 70 ff). They were as follow:

1. Land Reform
2. Nationalization of forests and pastures
3. Public sale of state owned factories to finance land reform
4. Profit sharing in industry
5. Reform of electoral law to include women
6. Formation of literacy corp
7. Formation of health corp
8. Formation of reconstruction and development corps
9. Convening houses of equity at the village level
10. Nationalization of the water resources
11. National reconstruction and development
12. Administrative and educational reforms
13. Expansion of the ownership base of industry -- worker's share plan
14. Price controls
15. Free and compulsory education
16. Protection of pregnant mothers and infants
17. Socialized medicine and social security for the elderly

18. Land speculation freeze and control of rent on housing
19. War against corruption

While it is possible that all of the above mentioned reforms might have contributed to the outbreak of the revolution, this study, due to its briefness, confines itself only to a discussion of some major reforms such as land and educational reforms and to those which are related to the economic changes of the country.

The land reform program was the core of the White Revolution. It was aimed at the breakdown of the large landholdings and their redistribution among the peasantry. The implementation of the program not only resulted in the expansion of urbanization; it also brought the rural population closer to city life. While contact with the city created a feeling that there could be a better life, the peasants also became more and more frustrated with the government's policies toward them. The educational and economic development of the country exacerbated this frustration: first, by making the peasants less fatalistic and more demanding of a better life, and, secondly, by making them aware of the severe economic disparity and the government's bias in favor of the urban dwellers. Consequently, the peasantry was gradually politicized.

The introduction of reforms coupled with the economic development of the country also immensely affected the urban population. As a result, the country went through a period

of rapid social changes. Obsessed with the idea of achieving a "great civilization" in less than two decades, the Shah pushed for unlimited econmic growth. The social effects of such rapid economic growth were devastating for the government. Social dissatisfaction and frustration were the outcomes.

Land Reform

The first and single most important portion of the reforms was the land reform program. In fact, the whole White Revolution was directly aimed at the peasants. The land reform began in 1962 and officially ended in 1971. The social and political changes it introduced were immensely important, more so than many of the other changes that took place during the last two decades of the pre-revolutionary era. The social and political changes it introduced to the then apolitical peasants of Iran deeply affected the success of the revolution of 1978-79. Huntington believes that the active participation of rural groups is required to create a revolution (13, p. 291). This appears to have occurred in Iran.

One may ask why the government introduced land reform if it only created a revolutionary environment? Basically, there are three different answers to this question, and each answer usually depends upon the ideological view of the observer.

The first view of the land reform to be discussed is that of the Marxist groups in Iran. Their overall view is that the nature of land reform can only be justified in relation to the world imperialistic system (33, p. 10). Therefore, their answer to the question of why land reform was introduced is that it was done because it was not in the interest of world imperialism to preserve the antiquated feudalistic political system of Iran. The economic needs of imperialism could not be satisfied with a backward, feudalistic Iranian economy. Land reform, therefore, was introduced by world imperialism in order to satisfy the economic needs of these countries. It was a slow, conscious and shrewd move on the part of the imperialistic countries to abolish feudalism and to enhance their domination over the Iranian economy (18, pp. 15-16; 33, pp. 7-10). Marxist groups in Iran substantiate their claim by pointing out that the land reform program was launched under heavy pressure from the Kennedy administration, which insisted on self-help as the precondition for American aid.

A similar view is held by the religious groups as well as by some other opposition groups. Ayatollah Khomeini, for example, the articulate voice of the religious community, has repeatedly claimed that the land reform was carried out on the orders of the United States in order to destroy the Iranian economy and secure a good market for its own

agricultural products. The purpose of the land reform, Khomeini believes, was to destroy the agricultural self-sufficiency of Iran and impose a uniproduct economy on Iranian society (27, pp. 100,141,155,182,193,219).

A second answer to the question of land reform is held by those who argue that the program was a political move on the part of the Shah to disarm middle class opposition to his rule and to gain the support of the neutral and still inarticulate peasantry against the new middle class. In other words, land reform measures were only political moves on the part of the Shah to keep himself in power. This view is held by the majority of the professional middle class in Iran (4, pp. 33-37; 9, p. 162; 13, p. 394). This group argues that at the time of the reform Iran faced neither agricultural difficulties nor peasant uprisings. In fact, in 1962, when the Third Development Plan began, it contained no provison for a land reform program and none seemed to be anticipated even in the remote future. Yet, a few months later a massive land reform program was introduced. Such a sudden move, this view argues, could only have been made for political reasons.

The third view holds that prior to the 1960's the government's primary goals were national independence and the centralization of power in the hands of the national government, not socioeconomic modernization. Proponents of this view add that by the 1960's these goals had almost been

completely achieved so that the government was then able to accord social and economic reforms the highest priority. In short, these advocates contend that land reform was a genuine measure to improve the economy (32, pp. 129-132).

None of these answers, however, provide a sufficient understanding of the reasons for the introduction of the land reform program. Any discussion about it must be posed in terms of the conditions under which the program was launched.

Rural Conditions Before the Land Reform

Early reports of the seventeenth and eighteenth century clearly demonstrate comfortable living conditions for Iranian peasants (21, p. 366). From the early nineteenth century to the 1950's, however, their living conditions fell drastically. Deterioration of their condition began during the early rule of the Qajar dynasty, when land became the personal property of the sovereign and was distributed among the members of the ruling class for administative purposes. The resulting system was called "iltizam" and the recipient of the grant was called "multazim". Multazims were subject to dismissal by the sovereign and were unable to pass their position to their heirs. Administration of the land and the peasants working on it was granted to the highest bidder, who in turn taxed his peasants as much as possible in order to meet the payment of the agreed bid and to realize his

expected profit. As a result of this system the peasants were heavily burdened with taxation.

This system of land tenure, however, began changing toward the end of the nineteenth century. With the economic changes of this period and Western influence and the loss of governmental authority, the concept of agricultural land as private property was introduced in Iran. In the period between 1900 and the 1920's the government became weak. Consequently, local multazims and tribal khans rebelled against the government and became the owners of the land.

In 1925 when Reza Shah emerged as the new Shah, every region of the country was ruled by a tribal khan or shik. Consequently, his first task was to centralize the government. Through military conquest of the semi-independent regions, Reza Shah changed the composition of the landownership of the country. Military officers and the new bureaucrats became the new large landlords. The Shah himself acquired vast areas that made him the wealthiest landlord in Iran.

Throughout his reign Reza Shah disfavored peasants and favored the urban middle class and landlords. Consequently, the conditions of the peasantry worsened dramatically during the time of Reza Shah. Every modernizing measure was financed primarily by indirect taxes on items of mass consumption which affected the peasantry the most. According to the United Nations, out of the $1528 million rials raised

through taxation for the fiscal year ending March 20, 1939, less than four million rials were in the form of land tax. Such biased policies also placed most of the entire tax burden of $125,000,000 needed for the building of the Trans-Iranian railway on the poor peasants (31, p. 92).

In contrast to the economic burdens placed on peasants, Reza Shah enhanced the political authority of the landlords. A law passed by the Majlis in 1935 made the village headman the representative of the landlord and held him responsible for keeping law and order in the village. No provision was made for peasant participation in village administration.

Upon his abdication, Reza Shah sold all his property to his oldest son for ten grams of sugar. Among his holdings were 3000 villages containing 3,750,000 acres of land. Due to communist agitation and the threat of the newly educated middle class, the new Shah decide to introduce land reform on his disputed lands in the 1950's. He could not go very far, however, because it was considered to be a bad precedent in the eyes of the landed ruling class.

The living conditions of the peasantry remained sad. Major General Patrick Joy Hurley, Special Representative of President Roosevelt in the Middle East during World War II, wrote, "Iran is definitely a very backward nation. It contains really a series of tribes, and 99 percent do not own land . . ." (23, p. 299).

A joint survey of rural conditions in 1954 by Americans and Iranians showed the average family income to be $47.00 a year (except in 37 prosperous nothern villages). Some peasants earned as little as eight, ten, or fourteen dollars a year. The 1954 survey found indescribable living conditions among the poorest peasants: locusts and clover were found to be the main foods in a few areas; a majority of these peasants were found to be seriously diseased; and interest rates for them were as high as 240 to 800 percent per annum (21, pp. 382-83).

Only twelve percent of the country's total land area (165 million hectares) is cultivable. Of this twelve percent, up to half may have to be left fallow at any time because of traditional farming methods. In fact, only five percent (8 million hectares) is permanently cultivated (10, p. 105). In 1960, over 83 percent of the cultivated area did not use any kind of fertilizer, and only 3.8 percent of the farm units regularly used a tractor for plowing (24, pp. 140-41).

One reason for such a backward agriculture was the uneven distribution of land among landowners. Table I (33, pp. 25-27) shows the distribution of landownership before the reform. While 37 families alone owned 19,000 villages, only seven percent of the Iranian peasants owned over three hectares, which is the minimum amount of land necessary for a person to survive (10, p. 27). According to 1960 Iranian

government statistics, there were only 1.9 million peasant families and landowning peasants with cultivating rights (nasagh) before land reforms were undertaken. In contrast, there were 1.3 million peasant families who had neither land nor cultivating rights (khosh-neshins) (33, pp. 27-31; 10, p. 107).

TABLE I

LANDOWNERSHIP BEFORE THE LAND REFORM

Type of Conversion	Number of Villages Owned by a owner	Total Number of Villages	Percentage of Villages
1. Large Proprietors	5 or more	19,000	38
2. Medium Proprietors	1 to 5	7,000	14
3. Waqf Land		6,000	12
4. Government holdings		3,000	6
5. Small Proprietors		15,000	30

Despite these economic inequalities with which the peasants were burdened, they never sought redress from the government. It was the clergy to whom they appealed when seeking justice or a change in the policies of the landlords. As a result the peasants were alienated from the government, but instead of rebelling or demanding governmental changes they turned to the clergy for relief. Consequently, the government was never faced with peasant uprisings of the kind that have often threatened the authorities of other countries. However, the government did not

have their support either. It was the clergy who were able to gradually earn the support of the peasantry and develop a base of power in the rural areas of the country, an advantage which they have used against the government when necessary. The only time the peasants could identify their interests with those of the state was when the territory of Islam was perceived to have been transgressed by infidels and non-Islamic powers.

Ironically, the absentee landlords also gave their allegiance to the clergy at the expense of the government. They did so because it suited their economic and political interests, while for the peasants Islam was the only refuge from the landlords.

The Land Reform and its Phases

In spite of the denunciations of the Iranian land reform program by Ayatollah Burujirdy (2, pp. 270-90) that the redistribution of land would be against the Sharia, the government put forward its land reform program in January 1962. This was by no means the first land reform in Iran. For example, large estates held by separatists were distributed to the peasants during the communist movement in the Gilan Republic in 1917-21 and in the communist republic of Azarbaijan in 1945-46. In the 1950's, as previously mentioned, the Shah himself attempted to sell his disputed lands to the peasants working on them. Nevertheless, it was not until 1962 that a uniform nation-wide land reform was

attempted. However, its implementation was carried out in different stages. The first phase of the land reform program was accompanied by two other phases implemented in 1965 and 1968, respectively. The first phase contained three main provisions:

> 1. Each landlord could retain only one of his villages and must sell any remaining villages to the government. Orchards, tea plantations, homesteads, groves and mechanized land with daily wage-labor. Waqf lands were exempt.
>
> 2. The land was to be bought from the landlords at a price of between 100 to 180 times the annual amount of taxes paid to the government. The purchase price was to be paid by the government over a period of fifteen years. The land was to be sold to the peasants at the purchase price plus ten percent for administrative costs. The peasants were allowed to repay the government in fifteen annual installments.
>
> 3. Only those peasants with cultivating rights (nassagh holders) were to receive any land. The khosh-neshins (agricultural laborers) who constituted 47.5 percent of the rural population, were not to receive any land. All those receiving land had to become members of cooperatives (21, p. 387).

From the beginning the highly publicized land reform program raised the expectations of the peasantry. Vigorous propaganda against the landlords and the feudalistic system aroused considerable enthusiasm among the rural population. The peasants were told that the landlords had lost their control of the land and that the "land belongs to tillers." A prosperous future was pictured for the then apolitical and fatalistic Iranian peasants. Land was promised to them. However, when the program was implemented, many soon

realized that their hopes were nothing but a mirage. In the first place, the khosh-neshins were excluded from its benefits. Secondly, as the official figures show, out of 50,000 villages about 14,646 were affected by the first phase, and out of these, about 3,920 villages (about eight percent of the total number of the villages) were wholly redistributed. In the rest of the villages, only portions of them were sold to the peasants. Out of 3.5 million peasant families throughout the nation (approximately 17 million people) only 690,466 families actually received any land (10, pp. 110-11). Moreover, many of the landlords were able to evade redistribution by transferring their lands to family members, mechanizing their farms, and changing their farms to orchards.

The second phase of the land reform was announced in January 1963, but as it was considered too radical it was watered down in a number of ways until its implementation in 1965. Most students of Iranian history believe that the second phase was a major setback for the peasant.

This phase was designed to cover the land which had not been affected by the first stage. Waqf lands, for example, were now also included in the program. They were to be leased for 99 years to the peasants working on them.

In this phase landlords were allowed to retain a maximum of 30 to 150 hectares of non-mechanized lands, depending on the region. They were directed to dispose of the rest of

the land in any of the five alternative ways set by the government. The different alternatives are listed below (33, pp. 52-67).

> 1. To rent the village to the peasants on the basis of the net income of their villages during the preceeding three years. The lease was to be for 30 years. The amount of rent was to be subject to revision every five years.
>
> 2. To sell the land to peasants according to the conditions of the first phase.
>
> 3. To divide the land in proportion to the prevailing cropsharing distribution of the harvest.
>
> 4. To set up joint stock companies in which both the landlords and the peasants were able to become shareholders.
>
> 5. To purchase the rights of the peasants on the land.

However, the overwhelming majority of landlords chose the first alternative. The result was that 79 percent (1,232,548) of the peasants ended up renting land from them, as contrasted with three percent (57,227) of the peasants who bought any land under the second alternative. Only small numbers of peasants -- 156,580; 110,126; and 17,157 people respectively -- were affected by the third, fourth, and fifth alternatives.

According to the official figures of the Bank Markazi Bulletin of July-August 1967, only 3,238 landlords chose to sell any lands under the second phase, as contrasted with landlords who chose to lease their lands (19, p. 17). As can be seen from these figures, the second phase of the

reform measures was inadequate. On the one hand the frustrated peasants resisted tenancies; on the other hand, agricultural production decreased substantially. Consequently, in 1968 a third phase of reforms was introduced to change the tenancy arrangement of the second phase.

Under the provisions of the third phase land affected by sections one and four of the second phase was to be sold to or divided according to the prevailing crop sharing rights. This was declared to be the last phase of the land reform. The government declared that there would be no other measures forthcoming to distribute land among the peasants.

In this phase waqf lands continued to be exempt from the reform, and it was not until 1971 that they were finally sold to the peasantry. Under the third phase, out of 1.3 million eligible families, 738,119 families received land, and approximately 592,000 families lost the position they had acquired under the second phase (10, p. 112).

Taken together, these three programs provided for the distribution of land to 1.6 million families. Of those who received any land, 68 percent received less than five hectares, which is below the subsistence level for a rural family. Most of these peasants, therefore, sold their land and joined the exodous of the khosh-neshins to the crowded cities, where their life remained marginal.

The land reform measures only raised the expectations of the peasantry without fulfilling them. While it is true that a few improved their standard of living, large numbers of them remained at the same level as before the land reform, and many others became worse off than before.

As previously mentioned, there were two results of the land reform. One was its relative failure to redistribute the land among the peasants, with the consequent dashing of their hopes for a better life. The second was the low agricultural production that resulted from the reforms. As a result of this last consequence, from the mid-1960's on, the government abandoned the peasants and turned its attention toward the formation of big mechanized farm units, hoping thereby to increase agricultural production.

To achieve the latter result, the state created and operated farm corporations. These corporations were modeled after the Israeli moshavin cooperatives of individual producers. Many of the managers of the Iranian units had been trained in Israel (10, p. 113). In these large units one or more villages were combined into a corporation, and the peasants were persuaded to exchange their tangible property rights for abstract share holdings. The land of those who refused to join the corporations was forcibly expropriated. As can be seen, the results of the land reform program were very different from the egalitarian land-to-the-tiller slogans of the early 1960's. Since the

corporations used modern machinery, not all shareholders could be employed, and so they too joined their comrades in the big cities. In time, the use of farm corporations turned out to be disastrous for the government. Out of 85 corporations that were created in the mid-1960's, less than thirty were in existence in 1976, and others were in the process of collapsing (40, p. 438).

A second type of farm unit favored by the government was the large privately owned commercial farm. Consequently, with the backing of the government, multinational corporations bought huge areas of land from the peasants. They created farming enterprises modeled after American agribusiness corporations. They, too, displaced thousands of small landowning peasants who later joined the rural exodus to the cities. Despite their projected large size they also were unable to reach their production targets. At least two of the ventures had gone into bankruptcy in 1976, when the government stepped in to salvage the remaining projects (40, p. 439). A study of the large mechanized units shows all measures of productivity to be higher on peasant farms than in farm corporations or agri-businesses even though the per capita investment in corporations was 400 times greater than on peasant farms (20, p. 24).

Results of the Land Reform

The overall results of the land reform after almost two decades were disastrous, both for the agricultural output

and for the peasants. First, since the land reform began, Iran became increasingly less able to feed its people. The reforms failed to increase agricultural production sufficiently to meet the growing food consumption needs of the country. For example, according to the leader of the religious opposition, Ayatollah Khomeini, the annual food production of the country could only suffice for 33 days of internal consumption (27, pp. 182,193).

As a result of the failure of the agricultural reforms to meet the growing food consumption, the government faced two choices: either curtail the supply and thereby create dissatisfaction among the middle class, or import food to satisfy the new demands. The government chose the latter. Thus, the import of food in 1975 rose to $1.5 billion and was running at $2.6 billion in 1977. It was estimated that food imports would reach a record $4 billion by the early 1980's (5, pp. 40-43).

In dollar terms, the United States was the major supplier of food stuffs for Iran. Imports of food from the United States reached 656.2 million dollars, about half of all of Iran's agricultural imports in 1974-75. In this period the United States supplied Iran with 87 percent of all its imported grain and ceral and with almost 70 percent of food oil (40, p. 445). Substantial imports of food from the United States stirred criticism of this country by the religious sector and the middle class who saw it as a new

form of colonialism (27, pp. 53,139,141,155,182,193,219). After all, this was a good opportunity for the opposition to provoke the xenophobic feelings of the masses.

The most important result of the land reform was its socio-political effects on the peasants. It caused a substantial decrease in the number of peasant families who owned land. In addition, those who lost their land joined the poor population of khosh-neshins. In fact, over two-thirds of the rural population became either khosh-neshin or received less than five hectares to cultivate. Several factors contributed to such a situation. One was the mechanization of some of the land by the landlords. A second factor was the transformation of crop land into orchards. These actions which took place before and during the implementation of the land reform measures pushed many of the nassagh holders into the ranks of the poor khosh-neshins. Then, a large number of peasants who received land but not enough to support their families, either left their land behind and migrated to the cities or sold their land to the new class of landlords. Wide expropriations of land by farm-corporations and agri-businesses also drove a substantial number of peasant famlies off the land. Mechanization of the land by these huge firms further lowered the demand for rural labor. Finally, the growth of the population in the rural area contributed to the increase in the number of khosh-neshins.

General improvement in the urban economy, coupled with the expansion of the landless peasants drove masses of the rural population to the large cities. By some estimates, eight percent of the rural population has migrated to large cities each year since 1973 (20, pp. 23-24). In fact, as the then Iranian Minister of State in charge of Planning and Budget, Abdol-Majid Majidi, said, this was a conscious government policy intended to bring about a permanent shift of surplus labor from the rural area into the towns (25, p. 273).

The economic standing of the newly uprooted peasants in the cities, however, remained comparatively low. The disparity existing between them and other social classes in the city further aggravated their frustration and made them an easy destabilizing urban force. Mancur Olson argues that this social group, "is . . . prone to join destabilizing mass movements" (29, p. 218). Such force was quickly recognized by those who defied the government.

A final result of the land reform programs was the consequent dissatisfaction among the peasantry resulting from unfulfilled expectations. From the outset, in 1962 when the government initiated land reform, it sought to end the political isolation of the peasantry and gain its support. The government facilitated its self-imposed tasks by extending education into the rural areas and building a network of feeder roads connecting the countryside with

urban centers. However, it was the massive acquisition of transistor radio sets which better acomplished the government's aim of politicizing the peasants. They helped create considerable class consciousness without, however, necessarily making them government supporters.

The massive propaganda mounted by the government in the rural areas for the first time informed the peasants of their social, economic, and political rights. It inspired new hopes and raised the expectations of the previously satisfied and apolitical rural population. They were promised that their long deferred hopes and needs would be satisfied, and that it was their right to have what they had lacked for centuries. Once fatalistic, they came to realize that things could be changed, and it was the government which could do it. Unfortunately, however, the government failed to fulfill the expectations it had awakened among them.

A logical derivative of Chalmers Johnson's theory of revolution is that the Iranian peasant who had grown up in a small rural community had a particular perception of what life ought to be. In this environment, life centered around the extended family, and its dominant values were strongly influenced by Islamic teachings. When these peasants migrated to the new industrial centers of the country in search of better economic opportunities, they found themselves in a new environment which could hardly be

compared to the social surroundings they had left behind. Since this process was occurring on a rather large scale, the new group of city dwellers became a potential danger to the stability of society because they sought to alter their new environment according to the traditional Islamic values to which they were accustomed.

Education

Another set of reforms which changed the face of Iranian society within the last two decades were the educational reforms. The educational system of a country is a product of its political system. This has been true of the educational system of Iran throughout its history. With the intermittent rise and fall of the ulama's political influence in the country, the educational system has repeatedly fluctuated between religious and secular domination.

Prior to the rule of the Reza Shah the ulama exerted practicaly complete control over the educational system of the country. With the ascendance of the anti-clerical Reza Shah to power, the educational system underwent a complete transformation -- religious instruction for all students was banned; coeducational primary schools were opened; women were admitted for the first time to institutions of higher learning; a program of adult education was introduced; and thousands of students were sent abroad to study. The reign of Reza Shah marked an astonishing increase in the number of students. For example, the number of students enrolled in

higher education rose from 91 in 1922 to 3394 in 1944, the number of elementary students increased from 100,600 in 1928-29 to 262,200 ten years later, and the number of secondary students from 3,300 in 1924 to 28,200 in 1940 (34, pp. 39-41).

This educational development affected the country deeply. In fact, the roots of the 1953 crisis can be traced directly to the educational developments of this period. Hundreds of thousands of educated people possessing new hopes, goals, values, and expectations wished to change the colonial rule of foreigners. It is no surprise that the major political events of this period were brought about by the people of Tehran and a few other large cities, since this is where the majority of the educated people lived.

While the 1953 civil disorders were nationalistic in nature and limited mainly to the capital and to a few large cities, those of 1963 were nationwide, due to their religious nature. The popular mobilization of 1963 was possible because, although there had been a substantial numerical increase in the number of literates, the overall literacy rate was one of the lowest in the Middle East. According to the 1956 census, only 14.9 percent of all Iranians over ten years of age were literate (30, p. 137). In other words, about 85 percent of the people were illiterate. This politically inarticulate mass of illiterates has been the pillar of support for the clergy

throughout Iranian history. Consequently, the clergy was easily able to mobilize the whole nation, while the secular leaders of the 1953 upheaval were successful mainly with the educated. This does not mean that students and intellectuals did not participate in the 1963 movement; on the contrary, both played an important role in it. What is important to note is the religious nature of this upheaval and its mass-based support.

The Effects of Educational Expansion in the Rural Areas

Due to the high illiteracy rate in the country, despite the earlier educational reforms during Reza Shah's reign, further reforms were planned under Mohammad Reza Shah. The first comprehensive educational program in Iranian history was envisaged in the Third Developmental Plan, 1963-67. This Plan sought to expand free and compulsory education for all children from seven through twelve years of age. The principal instrument of the government for the expansion of education under the Plan was the Literacy Corps, created in 1963 by the Sixth Point of the "White Revolution". It was composed of high school graduates who were sent to villages and remote areas of the country to educate the children. In this way they also fulfilled their two years of compulsory military service. In a fifteen-year period, from the introduction of the White Revolution in 1963 through 1977, over one hundred thousand high school graduates were dispatched

to the rural areas under the Literacy Corp act. Ironically, the exposure of the young people to rural life did not lead to a positive appreciation of the problems and difficulties involved in rural development. Rather, being already discontented, they were further radicalized and became more critical of the government's policies. Some of the ex-corps participants returned to the villages as provocateurs. To counteract these activities SAVAK's (the Shah's secret police) presence was widely expanded in the rural areas of the country.

While the educational impact of the Literacy Corp might have been limited, the psychological and political consequences of it on the rural population were of great importance. First, the expansion of education to different ethnic rural areas reinforced the sense of ethnonationalism in some areas, such as among the Kurds. Education made the people of the different ethnic groups aware of their past and gave them a sense of self-identity which was often expressed in violent demands for autonomy. In order to head off such uprisings the government used its secret police, SAVAK. This agency effectively suppressed all potential major uprisings during the past two decades. Violent ethnic uprisings, however, began to occur once more during the immediate pre-revolutionary period of 1978 and have continued into the present post-revolutionary one. This was partly due to the weakness of the central government during

this period as well as the reinforced feelings of ethno-nationalism among the different ethnic groups.

The second destabilizing effect of the rural education program was the substantial increase it caused in the expectations of the peasants. It is believed that ". . . the extension of primary education has led to changes in consumption and aspirations for consumption and in new career choices" (12, p. 553). Such increase, in their expectations led peasants to demand more from the government.

Furthermore, rural education brought the peasants closer to city life. It enabled them to see that there was a better way to live, and that there were more things to consume than their own limited products. The peasants' expectations were hightened also by the constant bombardment of government propaganda. However, the government failed to respond to the new aspirations and hopes that it had created within them. This failure can be seen in the ever-widening income gap between the city dwellers and the rural population. The urban-rural income ratio rose from 2.13 in 1959 to 5.0 in 1976, and it was estimated that it would reach 8.0 or even 12.0 in the 1980's before it began to decline (10, p. 166).

This inequality was partially a result of substantial improvements in higher education. Thousands of university graduates and specialists were able to receive a larger share of the economic development of the country, leaving

the poor and illiterate empty handed. Consequently, many peasants became frustrated. This led to the migration of millions of peasants to the cities in search of better job opportunities. The standard of living of these uprooted and frustrated new urban dwellers, however, remained marginal and they became disillusioned with the government. This reinforced their long-held belief that Islam was their only refuge, the only way through which they could establish justice and equality.

Educational Expansion Throughout the Nation

The expansion of educational opportunity was not limited to the rural areas; it occurred throughout the nation. The total number of students rose from about 1.8 million in 1960 to approximately 8.5 million in 1977. It was estimated that this number would reach 13,730,000 by the end of the Sixth Developmental Plan (1978-1983). In 1977, 22 per cent of the total population of the country was being served by the different levels of education, and this percentage was expected to reach 30 per cent in ten years (30, pp. 137-46). Such an increase was the direct result of the heavy investment in education by the government. The following Table (30, p. 141) shows the substantial increase in the government's investment in education.

TABLE II

INVESTMENT IN EDUCATION
(In billions of rials)

Third	Developmental Plan	45
Fourth	Developmental Plan	172
Fifth	Developmental Plan	551
Sixth	Developmental Plan	2,500-2,700

As the following Table (35) demonstrates the increase in the number of the students has been spectacular within the last two decades. Right before the revolution, in the year 1977/78, for example, the total number of the students was estimated to be: 430,000 of pre-school age; 5,300,000 in primary school; 1,600,000 in guidance level school; 930,000 in secondary school; 421,150 in vocational and teachers' training; 170,000 in higher education; and well over 100,000 studying abroad (11, pp. 375- 76).

TABLE III

NUMBER OF STUDENTS

Year	Pre-Primary	Primary	High School	Higher Education	Total
1950	3,107	756,683	50,939	5,624	816,353
1960	22,007	1,431,626	297,955	19,815	1,771,403
1970	19,308	3,002,858	1,056,787	74,708	4,153,661
1971	21,237	3,230,880	1,468,340	97,338	4,817,795
1973	40,987	3,646,241	1,778,469	123,114	5,588,811
1974	88,854	4,119,157	1,989,567	135,354	6,332,932
1975	175,424	4,468,299	2,183,137	--	6,962,214
1976	211,869	4,768,588	2,356,878	154,212	7,491,547

The overwhelming majority of students abroad were being trained in the United States and Western Europe. It appears that the regime was purposely encouraging such choices, hoping that familiarity with the West would promote a positive attitude among the students toward Western values, thereby diminishing the possibility that they would become attracted to communist ideology. Given the government's pro-Western stance, it appears that the government hoped that the development of such an attitude would cause the students to be less critical of the government. The attitude of the counterelites and students, however, revealed a different reality. Familiarity with the West resulted in neither a positive attitude toward the West nor toward the Iranian government. As one observer of Iranian politics noted, "almost always, Iran is compared to the United States and Western Europe, [but], a primary result of these envious comparisons is to minimize the achievements of Iran and maximize her weaknesses. Irrespective of what it does Iran can never win" (41, p. 185). Furthermore, since their knowledge of other countries was limited to those of the West, the Western educated intellectuals have hardly ever sought to compare Iran with other third world countries. This has prevented them from being better able to perceive what Iran has and has not accomplished as compared to other countries at a similar level of political and economic development. Ironically, at the same time that they

use the West as a yardstick to measure the accomplishments and shortcomings of the Iranian government, they have a contemptuous attitude towards the West. Whether this is a tactical move to gain the support of xenophobic Iranians, or whether their projected hostility has resulted from a sense of guilt, it is a subject for further investigation which will not be pursued here.

It appears that there is a reciprocal relationship between education and politics. With every increase in the educational level of the society, political participation is affected in direct proportion. This relationship has always contributed to political instablity in Iran. For instance, the expansion in the number of educated Iranians since the late 1960's, especially of those in higher education,marked the advent of guerrilla warfare by students in the country. Student riots and demonstrations became a continuing problem for the government. The academic year of 1974-75 was almost lost as university students went on strike to defy the political system of the country.

As far as the university students' activities in the revolution of 1978-79 are concerned, suffice it to say that they were the first group to initiate the revolutionary movement months before the takeover by Khomeini. They were the most radical and revolutionary class of the society. They were, for example, the first to participate in violent clashes against the army during the months of January and

February 1979. By February 9, they were even able to take over some army garrisons. The students, therefore, played a leading role in the weakening and division of the armed forces.

A contributing cause of such political activities on the part of Iranian students was the fact that the government was incapable of politically indoctrinating school children. Its inability to politicize them in a desired manner lies in the fact that, first, there has never been an indigenous Iranian ideology, and secondly, it was hard for the government to find a loyal, sincere, and qualified teaching staff to promote a positive attitude toward the socioeconomic and political systems of the country. This was partially the result of the CIA involvement in the return of the Shah in 1953. This event was so deeply rooted in the minds of teachers and students that they could grant the government no legitimacy.

The Economy

Iran has for a long time been part of the club of countries which the United Nations politely calls the "developing countries". During the decades of the 1950's and 1960's Iran was able to feed its people only through charity -- in other words, economic aid from foreign countries -- provided because of Iran's important strategic location.

By the mid-1960's hunger, disease, and illiteracy were an integral part of Iranian life. The majority of the population lived in primitive villages. As late as 1966, for example, 42 percent of the families were living in one-room homes, only 25 percent of the housing units had electricity (these were mainly in the urban areas), and only 14 percent of the housing units had access to piped water systems (26, pp. 296-97).

The Age of Rapid Economic Growth

Since then, Iran has had tremendous economic and industrial developmental growth. All the conventional indicators of growth clearly demonstrate this fact. National Income per capita rose from $176 in 1960 to $1986 in 1976 (36, p. 13). The Gross National Product (GNP) increased from 7.7 billion dollars in 1965 to 37 billion dollares in 1975 (at 1972 constant prices). The per capita GNP during this same period more than tripled. It rose from approximately $300 to about $1125 at 1972 constant prices. It was expected that the GNP would reach 232 billion dollars at current prices and about 100 billion dollars at 1972 constant prices by the year 1985 (25, pp. 268-69). During the fiscal years of 1973-4 and 1974-5, the GNP grew at the rate of 34 and 42 percent in constant prices, respectively, one of the highest sustained growth rates of any third world nation (5, p. 27).

There has been a spectacular improvement in the output of the manufacturing sector also. In 1947 Iran had only 175 so-called large industries, that is, industries employing over 9 persons, but by 1976 this number had risen to 6000 (10, p. 158). In its annual report of March 1978, the Industrial and Mining Development Bank of Iran indicated that the annual compounded rate of growth of the country's Gross Domestic Product, exclusive of the oil sector, was over 12 percent at constant prices during the Fifth Development Plan (March 1973 - March 1978). The same report pegged the annual rate of growth for the same period for the manufacturing sector at 15 percent (15, p. 3). While many statistics are exaggerated, it cannot be denied that the growth rate of the mid-1970's was exceptionally high.

The basis of this growth was, of course, oil. As a result of the intimate link between oil income and economic growth, the country was confronted with both opportunities and problems. On the economic side the country's economic dependancy on oil increased substantially, while concurrently sacrificing efficient economic planning. The share of oil in the GNP rose from 17 percent in 1967-8 to 38 percent in 1977-8. In 1977, 88 percent of the government's revenue came from oil and the share of oil revenue in the government development plans was even higher. As a result, the money allocated for these plans skyrocketed from $274 million during the First Plan to over $69 billion for the

Fifth Plan. Table IV (6, p. 10) demonstrates the importance of oil income in the development projects of the country.

TABLE IV

OIL INCOME AND INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPMENT PLANS
(in millions of dollars)

National Development Plans	Total Oil Income	Investment in the Plans
First Plan (1949/50-1955/56)	230	274
Second Plan (1956/57-1962/63)	1,791	1,098
Third Plan (1963/64-1967/68)	2,736	3,067
Fourth Plan (1968/69-1972/73)	7,356	10,588
Fifth Plan (1973/74-1977/78)	84,270	69,608

The Arab-Israeli War of June 1967 provided Iran an opportunity to boost its oil production. But it was not until 1973 that Iran really gained a substantial income from oil. Following the October Arab-Israeli War the Organization of Petrolum Exporting Countries (OPEC) unilaterally increased the price of oil, thus raising Iran's per barrel take from $1.75 to $7.00. As the leading hardliner in OPEC, Iran pushed for further price increases and succeeded in attaining a price of $10.21 per barrel in 1974. Consequently, Iran increased its oil revenue from $593 million in

1966 to about $22 billion in 1974 -- an increase of over 3700 percent in less than a decade.

Owing to the substantial increase in Iran's oil revenue in the mid 1970's, from $6.5 billion in 1973 to $22 billion in 1974, the Fifth plan was revised upward in 1974. The original Fifth year Plan had called for $32 billion of fixed investment, but the sum was hastily increased to over $69 billion. The magnitude of this upward trend can be better appreciated when the final budget of the Fifth Plan is contrasted with that of the Fourth Plan which called for only $10.6 billion. Injection of such large sums of capital into the premature economy greatly affected the society.

As the sole recipient of oil revenues the government forged ahead with a policy of rapid economic growth. Within a short period of time thousands of foreign investors moved to establish businesses in Iran. It is reported that in late 1974 and early 1975 there were so many foreign businessmen in Tehran that they were sleeping in hotel lobbies or even spending their nights in hospitals (8, p. 25). Construction of thousands of industries were initiated as the country drove to become industrialized. Contrary to the expectations and demands of the opposition, however, Iran did not become one of the advanced industrialized countries of the world during this period of time. Instead, the import-substitute economic policy of the government provided an opportunity for local industries to produce and

market goods needed for internal consumption. Over 20 percent of the investment funds of the Fifth Development Plan were allocated for the industrial development and production of goods for domestic use (1, p. 121). In 1975, 60 percent of all industrial investments were directly made by the government (10, p. 149). Another consequence of the economic development policy of the government was the creation of millions of jobs in a country which suffered chronic unemployment and underemployment. Soon the opposite was true, and Iran was confronted with a serious shortage of skilled and unskilled workers. By the time the revolution started, over 85,000 foreign workers were registered and legally employed. This figure excludes foreign military and other foreign government personnel (16, p. 8). In addition, over 50,000 unskilled Afghans and Pakistanis were believed to be working illegally in Iran. The general employment trend, of course, had been away from agriculture and toward industry and services. The following Table demonstrates such a trend (3, p. 478; 17, p. 8).

The new oil revenues enabled Iran to initiate a variety of trade agreements, joint ventures, and economic assistance to other countries. By far the largest of the trade agreements were with the United States. An agreement signed by the two countries in 1977 called for $40 billion of trade items. For the next five years, trade, excluding military items, was expected to run from $2 to $3 billion annually

(37, pp. 308-10). Similar agreements were signed with France, England, Canada, Germany, Italy and a number of Socialist countries. In one year alone, 1974, Iran bought

TABLE V

ALLOCATION OF LABOR FORCE IN IRAN

Field	1963 %	1978 %
Agriculture	53.5	33
Industry	21.9	35
Services	24.1	32

25 percent of two of West Germany's important industries: Krupp Steelworks and Bobcock and Wilcox (a major manufacturer of power-generating machinery). A $5 billion contract was agreed upon in the same year with France to build one steel plant, a subway system for Tehran, and five atomic power plants of 1000 mega-watts each. France also agreed to sell Iran a large amount of military equipment. Iran pumped $3 billion into Italy for several joint business ventures and $1.2 billion into Britain in industrial loans. In the same year, Iran extravagantly poured over $7 billion into developing countries (28, pp. 55-56).

Barriers to Economic Growth

After a short period of high economic growth, the economy became overheated. A number of major economic

bottlenecks created a variety of social and economic problems. These economic buttlenecks included 1) limitations in the infrastructural capacity of the economy, such as the limited capacity of the country's electrical power plants, roads, railways, and ports; 2) a shortage of skilled workers; 3) an inefficient government and private sector; and 4) an extremely high inflation rate as a result of large domestic investments. These problems were accompanied by waste, corruption, and inequality in income distribution.

As early as 1975 the inadequacy of the available infrastructure produced serious economic problems. It retarded the implementation of plans and brought about a serious waste of resources. For example, as a result of the substantial increase in the import of goods, ships were forced to wait up to 250 days for unloading, due to the limited capacity of Iranian ports. Once the ships were unloaded, the goods often waited for weeks in the docks, causing wastage due to spoilage. Consequently, there were enormous increases in costs, and significant delays in government projects. In 1975 alone such delays cost the country $1.5 billion, which was over 7 percent of all its oil income (10, p. 163). Millions of dollars worth of goods decayed in the ships, and many vessels left the ports without unloading their cargoes.

Another problem was an increasing shortage of electric power and the disastrous effect it had upon the economy. At

first the government announced measures to conserve electric power by scheduling black-outs on a rotating basis once a week all over the country. However, when the seriousness of the problem became evident, the length of the black-outs was changed to several hours every day, with the result that millions of dollars were lost in spoiled food supplies. The situation grew worse when the government forced over 180 factories to close down for several months. Some of the factories forced into inactivity were food processing industries. Their closing down aggravated the food shortage and pushed the prices of food stuffs even higher than the already skyrocketing general inflation rate called for. The food shortage was also induced by bad storage facilities, inefficient transportation, bad roads, and the government's agricultural policies.

Another bottleneck in the economy was the shortage of skilled and managerial personnel that the rapid economic growth required. Despite the import of tens of thousands of foreign workers, the industrial employment remained highly noncompetative. On the one hand, heavy capital-intensive investment in large industries called for an increasingly larger number of skilled workers, while the technologically sophisticated military machinery absorbed huge numbers of highly skilled workers who were needed badly for the rapid industrialization of the country. This not only pushed the wages very high -- which in turn increased the overall

inflation rate -- but it also contributed to the existing income disparity.

The shortage of skilled and managerial personnel had other repercussions -- it contributed to a high degree of wastage and to the creation of a dependent and inefficient industry. Most Iranian plants produced assembled finished goods but did not manufacture the component parts of those goods. As a result, Iran could not have an independent technology. She relied mainly on foreign firms.

Low industrial productivity was another headache for the government's policy-makers. For example, in 1978 it took 45 hours for Iranian workers to assemble a General Motors Chevrolet, while the same process took only 25 hours in West Germany (10, p. 158).

Part of the economic difficulties can be attributed to the outdated state machinery. Excessive bureaucratic rules and regulations and widespread corruption aggravated the economic problems. In addition, there was no effective planning machinery. Some scholars believe that the only kind of planning that existed in Iran was what the Shah wanted (10, p. 156). In fact, the main cause of all the economic problems of the mid 1970's can be attributed to this single factor -- lack of economic planning.

The Social Impact of Economic Growth

With the flow of oil money in the country, wages moved upward. The following Table (7, pp. 226-29) demonstrates

the skyrocketing wage increase in the period of 1970 to 1978. Besides higher wages, some workers acquired additional further earnings through participation in government programs aimed at workers. Two of these measures were the "profit sharing" of 1962 and the "worker share"

TABLE VI

INDEX OF WAGES*
(1970=100)

Year	Wages	Rate of Increase
1970	100	--
1971	120.89	21.0
1972	145.89	21.0
1973	158.62	8.7
1974	242.81	53.1
1975	342.47	41.0
1976	478.08	39.6
1977	617.81	29.2
1978	792.46	28.3

*Computations by the author.

program of 1975. These were created by the fourth and thirteenth principles, respectively, of the White Revolution. Under the first program, the workers of large industries (industries of ten or more employees) were scheduled to receive up to twenty percent of the profits, distributed according to seniority and wages. The second scheme called for the sale of 49 percent of the shares of all the major private industries to employees or to the public if employees refused to buy. This transfer of

ownership was to be completed by 1978. Setting aside all the government populist propaganda about these two schemes, some workers did benefit from them.

The immediate effect of the increase in income was a spectacular rise in the consumption of goods. It was reckoned that food consumption was growing at the rate of 12.5 percent as opposed to approximately a three percent increase in the population (11, p. 371). People went wild buying. For example, the demand for red meat, which is highly income-elastic, rose from eight kilos per capita a year to eighteen kilos in the mid-1970's. Red meat imports in 1975-76 were up 75 percent over the previous year (40, p. 446). The country's overall imports in three years rose from $3.56 billion in 1972-3 to $18.45 billion in 1975-76 (10, p. 159). While some of this rise can be justified on the grounds that it was needed to meet the capital goods requirments, over a third of the imports went for consumer goods. Since a cutback in the importation of consumer goods would eventually have had negative political consequences, the government was reluctant to put a stop to it due to the people's rising expectations.

The flow of oil revenues into the country was not without its negative repercussions. A hasty move on the part of the Shah to double the budget of the Fifth Plan overheated the economy and created serious economic and social problems. Politically ,some believe, this decision

cost him the throne. A leading Iranian economist noted that the 1978-79 revolution was mainly caused by this ill-thought move (6, p. 10).

What emerged from the flow of oil income into the country which was suffering from an obsolete state machinery were very high inflation and income disparity rates. Although official government statistics indicated a 30 percent annual rate of inflation, it was generally believed that the rate was between 40-50 percent annually (14, p. 2; 11, p. 381). According to Central Bank statistics, in 1977 the annual rate of increase in food prices was 36.6 percent and 35 percent for clothing. Unofficial estimates, however, put these rates at 50 and 40 percent, respectively (11, p. 381). The increase in housing costs was even worse. In 1974-75 alone, rents in Tehran rose by as much as 200 percent. A year later, 1975-76, rents increased another 100 percent (10, p. 164). It was believed that people in the cities would pay 60 to 70 percent of their income on rent alone (11, p. 370).

Contrary to government claims that domestic inflation was caused by international factors, the contribution of international inflation to domestic inflation did not exceed 25 percent (39, p. 723). Thus, about 75 percent of the domestic inflation could be attributed to domestic factors. Excessive government spending and the lack of economic

planning were found to be the major sources of the enormous high inflation rate.

The fruits of oil income also were not shared equally by different segments of the population. This is because, as the Minister of State in charge of Planning and Budgeting, Abdol Majid-Majidi, put it,

> Oil revenue accrues centrally to the government, and the government, being eager to promote growth, has tended to allocate these oil-based resources to the areas most endowed with the complementaries of production (i.e. infrastructure: skilled labor, and entrepreneurship)" (25, p. 271).

Such governmental policy was justified on the grounds that, economic disparity was an unavoidable misfortune in the initial stage of economic development. It argued that inequality in income distribution tends to widen in the initial stage of growth, then to stabilize as the economy develops, and, finally, to narrow as the industrialization process continues (22).

While during the immediate pre-revolutionary era there had been a substantial improvement in the living standards of virtually all Iranians, the existing economic inequalities had became more and more severe along regional and social class lines. According to Plan and Budget Organization statistics, the gap in the urban-rural ratio rose from 1.91 in 1965 to 3.16 in 1973 and it was expected to reach the peak value of 12.0 before equilibrium was restored (39, pp. 724-25). Such income inequality between urban and

rural sectors encouraged millions of peasants to leave their villages in search of higher pay. Within the towns, however, the same danger existed, with the rich getting richer and the poor, in comparative terms, poorer.

The new urban dwellers were mainly absorbed by the construction industry -- an industry which was seasonal and characterized by centers of growth which changed from year to year. The newly arrived peasants created large slums in the cities, but they were not the only segment of society living in such slum areas. Many urban unskilled workers were in no better shape. It was this group of workers along with the newly arrived peasants who suffered most from the high inflation rate and income disparity.

By contrast, the industrialists, the professionals, and the middle class benefited highly from the boom. It was estimated in 1976 that the top 10 percent of the population consumed 40 percent of the total amount of goods' consumption leaving only 60 percent for the remaining 90 percent of the population (10, p. 166).

When the first signs of economic difficulties appeared in the summer of 1975, the Shah launched three new measures which were primarily aimed at political, as opposed to economic goals. They were the previously mentioned workers' share program, a price control campaign, and an anti-corruption campaign. The workers' share program, calling for the major private enterprises to sell 49 percent

of their shares either to their employees or to the public, was mainly intended to gain the support of the workers as well as to break the control that a minority of wealthy families had acquired over some of the nation's key industries. The second measure, the price control campaign, put the blame for high inflation upon profiteers and hoarders. Under government direction thousands of university students were dispatched to the markets and ordered to denounce shopkeepers who sold goods above "official prices." This campaign led to the arrest of some 8000 Iranian businessmen, among them a handful of Iran's richest industrialists (5, p. 22). Finally, the anti-corruption measure was employed to quell popular dissatisfaction with government policies. This, however, touched only some minor officials and some foreign firms such as the British sugar firm, Tate & Lyle, and the German firm Siemens. This campaign, therefore, became a particularly sensitive issue because it ignored the corruption scandals that involved the armed forces and the royal family.

The immediate results of these measures were unfortunate for the government. Their intimidatory tactics frightened many Iranian and foreign businessmen. Within a few months some $2 billion had been taken out of the country, and private investment fell off dramaticaly. Another example of the economic uncertainty perceived by

many Iranian businessmen was the purchase of houses in and around London by 20,000 Iranians (10, p. 165).

Their feeling of insecurity was exacerbated when the government in early 1977 introduced two bills which might have resulted in the control of private enterprsises by the government. The first bill, approved on 15 February, empowered the government to take complete control of private industries in case of a national emergency. A second bill, approved in late May, empowered the Ministry of Justice to deal with what was considered "economic crime."

The econmic insecurity perceived by the business community aggravated the economic problems of the country. By mid 1977 it was clear that the government's economic policies had failed. The seriousness of the problems became obvious when, as a result of the 1977 split in OPEC, Iranian oil exports dropped by as much as 30 percent (10, p. 145). This reduction in revenue led to the government's curtailment of its developmental programs. Furthermore, with the country's industry working at about 60 percent of its capacity, the economy could not satisfy the high expectations of the people (11, p. 370).

As a sign of admitting the economic failures, the Shah asked the Prime Minister to resign. On 6 August 1977 Amir Abbas Hoveyda, after 13 years of premiership, announced his own resignation. A day after Hoveyda's resignation, Jamshid Amouzegar, the new Prime Minister, introduced his cabinet.

Amouzegar was a staunch advocate of spending restraints, and his appointment was a clear sign that the policy of unlimited growth had been abandoned. The new prime minister announced the main objectives of his program on 18 August: (1) the reduction of public expenditures; (2) the rationalization of the bureaucracy; (3) a radical campaign against inflation; (4) the promotion of the agricultural sector; and (5), the most important of all, the elimination of economic bottlenecks and the maintenance of balanced, as opposed to unlimited, economic and social growth (11, p. 383). As a result of this new economic policy the once high flying Iranian economy took a nose dive. The decline in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), as it can be seen in Table VII (7, pp. 226-29), clearly demonstrates the economic depression of 1977.

The economic failure and the induced depression of 1977 and 1978 alienated a number of social groups. High inflation, expensive and scarce housing, and -- most importantly -- the fear of loss of employment further upset the already frustrated poor urban class. For example, the government's anti-inflationary measures, such as the restriction on the issuance of new building permits, threatened millions of unskilled workers with the loss of their jobs. On the other hand, the workers' share program, the profit sharing plan, and the rent freeze alienated the property owners, industrialists, and other capitalist

groups. The confidence of the business community was so low

TABLE VII

GDP IN CURRENT AND CONSTANT PRICES FROM 1966 to 1977
(in billions of rials)

Year	GDP in Current Prices	Annual Rate of Growth* (%)	GDP in 1975 Prices	Annual Rate of Growth* (%)
1960	328.4	--	4879.7	--
1961	346.0	5.4	908.1	3.2
1962	367.0	6.1	965.5	6.3
1963	394.2	7.4	1028.7	6.5
1964	436.1	10.6	1117.5	8.6
1965	478.2	9.7	1254.8	12.3
1966	522.6	9.3	1380.6	10.0
1967	577.1	10.4	1536.1	11.3
1968	658.8	14.2	1727.4	12.5
1969	741.9	12.6	1936.6	12.1
1970	841.5	13.4	2183.5	12.7
1971	1014.3	20.5	2458.4	12.6
1972	1268.4	25.1	2873.4	16.9
1973	1868.6	47.3	3210.7	11.7
1974	3137.0	67.9	3461.1	7.8
1975	3561.1	13.5	3561.1	2.9
1976	4606.6	29.2	3940.9	10.7
1977	5393.3	17.1	3859.4	(2.1)

*Computations by the author.

that businessmen were afraid to invest and even gradually grew apprehensive about their investments in the country.

Another policy which resulted in social discontent was the "price control" policy. Its implementation upset the shopkeepers, big businessmen, and especially the peasants. The severe price controls on food products further aggravated the already frustrated and dissatisfied peasantry.

The price of seeds, fertilizers, machinery, and the cost of living in general had all gone up while the prices of agricultural products were forcefully kept down in order to please the politically active and articulate people of the cities.

While inefficiency and corruption in the governmental bureaucracy and high inflation upset almost everyone, the slowness in the economy frustrated those people whose expectations had been nurtured by the economic boom of a few years before. In fact, one may argue that the Davies' theory of revolution (J-curve) can be used to explain the cause of the 1978-79 revolution in Iran. As Figure 1 demonstrates (7, pp. 226-29), a prolonged period of economic growth was followed by a short, but sharp, decline in the economic conditions of the country. In other words a prolonged period of rising expectations was followed by a time in which the economy could not satisfy the expectations of the people. As a result, a wide gap developed between what people expected to get and what they were actually getting.

On the other hand, the severe income disparity between the urban and rural areas, as well as within the urban areas, aggravated the existing social discontent. Consequently, a large number of the people became frustrated by the existing socioeconomic conditions, and their attitudes reflected a strong potential for aggressive behavior. This potentiality was fully recognized by the

traditional anti-government forces such as the ulama and the middle class. They effectively utilized the frustration of the people by providing them the opportunity to express themselves in an aggressive manner.



Fig. 1--Rate of growth in GNP (in 1975 prices, year ending March 21).

It must be noted that the economic improvements of the last decade facilitated the job of organizing and mobilizing anti-government action. For example, urbanization with its large concentration of people made the task of organizing anti-government activity relatively easy. The development of mass communication systems made communication between the opposition and the Iranian people easier.

Whatever theory of revolution one may use to explain the Iranian revolution, he must recognize the substantial contribution made to that eruption by the economic improvements of the last decade. Furthermore, it must be noted that the revolution did not happen in a period in which the standard of living was going from bad to worse. On the contrary, people were better off than they had been.

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CHAPTER IV

POLITICAL FACTORS IN THE REVOLUTION OF 1978-79

Socioeconomic dissatisfactions resulting from the reforms and the rapid economic development of the country were not the only issues which turned the people against the government. The political structure of the country and foreign influence also played major roles in the development of the revolution.

First, socioeconomic changes were not accompanied by appropriate changes in the political structure of the country. Socioeconomic changes, for example, expanded the middle, class who wished for greater participation in the political affairs of the country. But, contrary to their wishes, political power became more and more centralized in the hands of the Shah. In fact, it appears that the introduction of the social reforms of the early 1960's were mainly aimed at securing the traditional power of the regime. James Bill, for example, stresses that "the White Revolution in Iran [represented] a new attempt to introduce reform from above which, it [was] hoped, [would] preserve traditional power patterns" (2, p. 33). Unwilling to adjust itself to the new socioeconomic changes, the government came to rely excessively on its oppressive apparatus to deal with

the political demands of the people. Consequently, many Iranians became alienated from the existing political system.

Secondly, the perception of being dominated by a foreign country aroused the nationalistic feelings of the masses of the people. To many, anti-government movements became fights for national independence. Freedom from foreign infuence was seen to be, first, a means to gain self-respect and, second, a solution to all the evils of the country.

Dictatorship

Dictatorship is a by-product of political insecurity. This was the case during the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah, whose feeling of political insecurity resulted in dictatorial rule. Consequently, a variety of oppressive instrumentalities were created to secure the monarchy. Every segment of society was kept under constant supervision, control, and manipulation. Gradually, the Shah became the sole arbiter and decision maker. The overwhelming majority of the society was excluded from political participation, and those who did participate gradually found it more and more difficult to challenge the system. The political system moved toward a one-party arrangement and the major responsibility for social and political stability was turned over to the secret police.

The failure of the country to achieve political stability was a direct result of the Shah's loss of legitimacy. The latter was brought about by the involvement of the CIA in his return to the throne. This loss of legitimacy resulted in the withdrawal of popular support from the Shah and in the development of serious opposition which threatened his reign. Not wishing to lose his power once again, he faced two alternative ways of handling the opposition. He could either choose to accomodate the forces of opposition or to resist them. At the urging of the United States government in the early 1960's, he chose the first alternative, that is, that of seeking a compromise with his opposition. His first offer was to open the channels for wider political participation. The opposition, composed mainly of members of the National Front, reacted to the Shah's liberalizing policy by holding public meetings, promoting demonstrations, and calling strikes. Soon the Front emerged as the single most powerful source of opposition against the Shah. Enjoying the relaxed political atmosphere and given the Front's close ties with Mossadeq, the Front called for a mass meeting on July 21, 1961, to ask for the return of Mossadeq to power. This was a demand which the government could not tolerate. Realizing the grave consequences of the demand, the government quickly moved to cancel its liberalizing policy. The leaders of the National Front were arrested, and the liberalization plan

came to an end. The Shah gradually came to realize that no compromise of cooperation could be worked out with the opposition and that any move toward liberalization would cost him the throne.

Given the uncompromising attitude of the opposition the Shah saw no other alternative but to forcibly resist it. The opposition forces had become so strong that he could not remain in power and stabilize the country without the help of a strong and friendly foreign government. Marvin Zonis, for example, found in his study of The Political Elite of Iran that the most trusted advisors of the Shah were American and British representatives (21, p. 300). It can, therefore, be argued that if the opposition had not been so uncompromising and ossified, foreign infuence could have been minimized and political change might have been accomplished with less economic, social, and human cost. It appears that the counter-elite, like the Shah, were after their own self-interest, namely the monopolization of political power. The struggle was not for the welfare and the long-term interest of the people. It was mainly to gain political power.

Confronted with such a grave threat to his regime, the monarch was forced to mobilize all the available resources to monopolize power. With foreign support he hastily introduced some social and political reforms. Control over the mass media was tightened, and different types of secret

police agencies were established. These were only a few of the instruments he utilized to strengthen his control over the populace.

All segments of society became subject to some kind of political supervision and control. Interestingly enough, the political elite of the country was also subject to a similar kind of control and suppression. The result was "insecurity, cynicism, mistrust and the political attitude of xenophobia . . . and government disdain" on the part of the political elite (21, p. 329). When the revolution started, not only the political elite of the country did not enthusiastically support monarch, but on some occasions they secretly helped the revolutionaries. One example of such cooperation was the secret involvement of General Fardust, the number three person of the twelve-member group of the elite of the elite. He is currently the head of the new regime's secret police.

It is helpful at this point to present a more detailed discussion of the Shah's methods of political control and their effects on society. As previously mentioned, the Shah exerted political control upon the masses of the population as well as upon the country's elites. The latter will be discussed after the regime's method of elite recruitment is briefly examined.

Elite Recruitment

The pre-revolutionary political elite of Iran were those who clustered about the person of the Shah. It included a variety of professionals: physicians, royal secretaries, scribes, entertainers, valets, stablemen, fortune tellers and astrologers, and ladies-in-waiting (2, p. 187; 21, p. 25). Basically, the overwhelming majority of them were selected from national elite families. One study shows that there were forty national elite families (2, p. 3). Another study, maintains that 75 percent of the elite had at least one influential relative. This latter study also shows that 64.4 percent of the elite for whom data were available had fathers with a high government position. The elite families were politically very powerful, as well as very wealthy.

Political recruitment was not limited to the members of national elite families. A small group of middle class technocrats were brought in through the policy of "co-option through seduction." Despite the recruitment of a small group of selected technocrats, however, the middle class intelligentsia remainded alienated. The Shah himself acknowledged this fact by stating that "I believe that the peasantry is with me but it is not so true with the younger intelligentsia. . . . They are a problem to me" (2, p. 39). Regardless of their alienation, the Shah was compelled to make use of as many members of the middle class

intelligentsia as possible. The rapid economic development of the early and middle 1970's and the role the government played in it made a highly specialized and skilled bureaucracy necessary. Initially, the regime was able to carefully screen incoming bureaucrats and to select only those who supported the political philosophy of the government. However, by the mid-1970's the bureaucracy had become so large that it was not feasible for the regime to screen out political undesirables. Consequently, the doors were opened to a flood of highly educated and specialized bureaucrats who were ideologically at odds with the regime. Necessity and compulsion forced the Shah to dig his own grave. This hostile and resentful intelligentsia grew in numbers until it dominated the gigantic governmental apparatus. It eventually became an independent center of political power. When the revolution started, the civil servants welcomed it by slowing their work down as a sign of protest and of solidarity with the revolutionaries. Later, as the revolution proceeded, the entire civil service stopped working, almost completely paralyzing the government. This broke the backbone of the regime.

As far as the elite were concerned, the process of recruitment was not based upon a merit system. It is alleged that the Shah was unable and unwilling to work with persons of high caliber. Members of the elite were carefully handpicked by the Shah, whose feelings of

insecurity and mistrust prevented him from picking the most qualified persons. Evidence of such feelings is present in his appointment of governmental agency heads and his manner of decision-making. Empress Farah, for instance, headed 26 different governmental agencies and organizations (2, p. 24). Thousands of routine governmental decisions were personally made by the Shah himself instead of lower echelon officials. Due to his feelings of distrust and insecurity, then, the number of political elites was limited to those who could be easily controlled and who did not pose a threat to the regime. Timidity and obedience were among the qualities the Shah preferred in his subordinates.

Elite Control

Although the method of elite recruitment, as well as the required elite characteristics, were forms of control, they did not seem to satisfiy the Shah. They were, therefore, supplemented by several severe forms of punishment for the wrong doers. Any uncalculated move by a member of the elite could result in exile (either by the government or self-imposed), assignment to foreign posts, removal from office, or imprisonment and even murder. Zonis described the situation as follows:

> Ceaseless vigilance is maintained in interpersonal relationships along with timidity and apprehension. Caution and conservatism mark their approach to innovation and political policy. Cooperation with others is unwise, for joint behavior represents both a direct threat and a loss of personal control. Independence in

> thinking is as unwise as independence in behavior. Any marked display of intelligence may single one out as too threatening (21, p. 336).

Beside selective recruitment and constant supervision by the secret police, other methods were also employed to keep the elite under control. One of these methods was periodical shuffling and change of the elite. The idea was to prevent anyone from gaining public popularity or establishing a base of power. In an absolute monarchy, popularity is known as the greatest sin. The elite was helpless and it was beyond its control to alter the Shah-imposed turnover of government officials. It was well understood that the Shah was the source of political power and of social and economic status.

Another interesting method the Shah used to keep his political elite under control, was the divide and rule policy. Inimical individuals were appointed as major heads of governmental agencies so that rivalry was ever present. The Shah hoped that by creating universal rivalry no one could come to dominate the political arena. As the ultimate source of power, he played the role of balancer among the different political elites. He was careful that political power did not crystalize anywhere else but in his hands. This situation is best explained by James Bill:

> When power begins to concentrate within groups, the groups are splintered; when an individual becomes too influential, he is likely to be demoted, dismissed, retired, or penalized. The system is structured in such a way that this occurs automatically through the intervention of countervailing rivals (2, p. 20).

The flow of information among and within the governmental departments was highly controlled and supervised. Horizontal communication within and among the departments was prevented. Vertical communication was forced throughout the bureaucracy (21, pp. 83-95). Severe control of the mass media also prevented the elite from communicating with each other.

One obvious result of such manipulations was the elite's unwillingness and inability to challenge or to alter the system. They sought to minimize their role in decision-making for fear of royal retaliation. This result was welcomed by the Shah since he wished to make as many decisions as possible in order to enhance his control over the political system. In spite of their cautious and conservative behavior, the elite still felt that their political position was not secure. This fear created a sense of insecurity among the political elite. Job insecurity forced them to seek economic security. Maximum efforts were made to accumulate wealth at all cost for the day when they would fall from grace. Interestingly enough, the dishonest acquisition of wealth received the silent approval of the monarch. It is reported that the Shah kept a file for each member of the elite and encouraged them to be dishonest in order to fatten their files. Then, when time arose, the Shah could confront the elite with inescapable evidence of corruption. Enough evidence was

available in the file to convict, imprison, or exile an individual (21, pp. 67-69). One example of the Shah's complacency toward corruption was the multi-million dollar bribery arms deal. While the U.S. Congressional investigation clearly shows Prince Shahram, the Shah's nephew, and General Khatami, the head of the Air Force and the Shah's brother-in-law, in the bribery arms deal, they were not even investigated in Iran (18, pp. 145 ff.).

The effect of such political policies and manipulations was disastrous for the country. Inefficiency, mismanagement, and corruption at the top level of decision-making did not only hurt the economy; it created increasing distrust, hatred and frustration in the society. Ironically, the elite itself came to despise the political system too. They grew to become more and more insecure, cynical, and mistrustful of the government. Fundamental social and political change appeared to be the only solution.

Considering Chalmers Johnson's theoy of revolution, one interesting observation that can be made of the Iranian political process is that a dysfunction on the part of the monarch metastasized like a cancer and created other social and political dysfunctions. The Shah's feeling of insecurity was transmitted down to the elite, the bureaucracy, the economy, and finally to the people, resulting in multiple dysfunctions. It can be safely said, for example, that the economic failure of 1977-78 was solely due to the

inefficiency and mismanagement of the top level decision-makers.

Repression and Social Control

Methods similar to those employed to control the elite were utilized by the Shah to control the Iranian masses. Every segment of society was closely watched by the various intelligence agencies of the country. Students, intellectuals, businessmen, civil servants, army personnel, industrial workers, and peasants were all subject to the regime's oversight. No breathing space was allowed for the voicing of political grievances; not even genuine non-political grievances were tolerated. The nation was kept under a permanent state of fear and suspicion by the various governmental repressive agencies. Under such an atmosphere of fear and suspicion the regime was able to secure a superficial political stability.

Various instrumentalities were created in order to control the Iranian people and thereby secure the traditional structure of the government. In addition to the regular police force, gendarmerie, army, and the Imperial Guard (a military unit of 2,000 elite officers to safeguard the royal family), four intelligence agencies were created to function as the ears and the eyes of the Shah. They were as follows:

1. Military Intelligence (Rokn-i Do or J-2)
2. Imperial Inspectorate (Bazrasi-i Shahanshahi)

3. Special Bureau (Daftar-i vizhe)

4. SAVAK (Sazeman-i Amniat Va Etelaat-i Keshavar)

Besides performing the function for which each agency was created, all units were also charged with two additional responsibilities: to duplicate some of the functions performed by the other agencies in order to insure that no anti-government plot would go unnoticed, and to check upon the activities of the other units. For example, the main function of the Military Intelligence Organ was to keep an eye on the military officers to ensure that they did not create a conspiracy. No officer above the rank of major could visit Tehran or meet with another officer without the specific permission of the Shah. If any unauthorized meetings were discovered, the officers would be dismissed, jailed, or even hanged by the government. Furthermore, the Shah frequently shuffled commanders to ensure that they did not form power bases in the Army. SAVAK and the Imperial Inspectorate were also secretly charged with the responsibility of keeping Army officers under surveillance. In 1973 twenty-five Army officers and fifty civilians were found by several intelligence agencies to be conspiring against the government. The alleged conspirators were quickly executed (1, p. 28).

The Imperial Inspectorate was the Shah's personal secret agency for watching the armed forces and ensuring that no conspiracy was developing in the Army.

The Special Bureau had broader powers. It was an elite organization responsible for keeping an eye on SAVAK. It was headed by General Hossein Fardust, one of the most trusted men of the Shah.

The most notorious and feared of all the agencies was SAVAK. It was the product of post-Mossadeq repression and the U.S. involvement to secure the monarchy and to resist Soviet penetration. SAVAK's establishment was carried out under the supervision of the CIA and the Mossad (The Institution for Inteligence and Special Tasks) of Israel in 1957 (9, p. 9). The close ties between the CIA and SAVAK grew closer in 1973 when CIA headquarters in the Middle East were transferred from Nicosia to Tehran. Close ties between SAVAK and Mossad were the result of their common hostility toward Arab nationalism and the fear of Soviet domination in the region.

SAVAK carried a wide range of responsibilities in and out of the country. It conducted foreign espionage, spied on Iranians living inside the country as well as abroad, and exercised surveillance of the civil police force as well as of the military forces. The SAVAK organ responsible for the domestic repression of civilians was known as the "Internal Securiy and Action" unit headed first by General Moqadam and later by Parviz Sabeti. The Shah, who like Louis XIV believed that he was the law, granted vast extralegal authority to this unit. It was this grant that made SAVAK

one of the most feared secret police forces in the world. The government publicized the existence of this organization and warned that violators would be swiftly identified and eliminated. Officials like Sabeti would appear occasionally on radio or television interviews to convey to the public the image of an omnipresent SAVAK , thereby contributing to the creation of an atmosphere of fear.

No civil liberties, such as freedom of speech, press, and assembly were tolerated by the government. Those who refused to abide by the government's policies were imprisoned, tortured and occasionally killed. There is no accurate information on the number of political prisoners in Iran at the time. The Shah frequently denied to foreign journalists that there were any political prisoners in Iran. Foreign observers, however, estimated that there were between 25,000 and 100,000 political prisoners. They also estimated that there were betwen 25,000 and 100,000 Iranians in exile (14, p. 67; 5, p. 86).

When Iran came under severe criticism from international organizations and from the Carter Administration for the violation of human rights, the Iranian government initiated a new policy of publishing the names of released political prisoners. The following Table (6, p. 378) gives the official date and the number of political prisoners released during approximately a one year period.

The brutalities and inhumane practices of SAVAK have been well documented. In the words of Martin Ennals, Secretary of Amnesty International, "no country in the world has a worse record in human rights than Iran" (14, p. 75). Torture and other inhuman treatment of prisoners and their next of kin have been frequently reported by independent international organizations such as Amnesty International, the International Association of Democratic Jurists, the International Association of Catholic Jurists, and Congressional hearings in the United States.

TABLE VIII

DATE ANE THE NUMBER OF THE POLITICAL PRISONERS RELEASED IN THE YEAR OF 1976/77

Date of Order for Release	Nunber of Prisoners
21 March 1976	305
23 April 1976	179
30 June 1976	862
24 October 1976	451
26 October 1976	1,146
07 December 1976	282
02 Febraury 1977	317
28 Febraury 1977	1,165
17 March 1977	653
26 March 1977	91
TOTAL	5,451

Some of these cruel and inhumane practices are reported to be scourging with a metallic whip, slow roasting on electric grills, electric charges to the sex organs, avulsion of nails, the introduction of a broken bottle in the anus, injection of convulsive drugs such as Cardiazol,

use of ultrasound waves, hanging heavy weights from the testicles, and rape and maltreatment of children in front of their captive parents (14, pp. 76-78). Many people reportedly have been killed under torture while others succumbed in confrontations with the secret police.

Relaxation of Repressive Policies and Its Social Consequences

The world wide reports of brutalities and inhumane practices by the Iranian government became an irritant to the Shah. Such reports constituted a source of international pressure, calling for the immediate end to all torture and the observance of the basic human rights. One of the most important and effective sources of pressure upon the Shah was the human rights policy of the Carter Administration. As a result several Congressional hearings were held to look into the condition of human rights in Iran (13,14,15). Further sale of arms and continuing assistance by the United States became contingent upon the observance of human rights by the Iranian government (11, p. 615; 12, p. 31). Despite the statements by Iranian officials that the government would not submit to foreign governments' interference in Iran's internal affairs, there were signs that the Shah had submitted to the American policy. In February 1977, the Shah instructed SAVAK to put a stop to torture. A month later a political trial of a group of eleven was held in public for the first time, and two days

before the arrival of the U.S. Secretary of State in Iran an appeal was heard and the sentences were reduced. In August, the Majlis provided new guarantees for political dissidents. For the first time political prisoners were given the right to choose their own lawyers. The right to a public trial was granted, unless there were strong reasons against it.

In line with its human rights policy, the Carter Administration, encouraged the Shah to adopt a more democratic policy. The Shah, apparently, had no choice but to accept the American suggestion, and he attempted once again to democratize his policies. In mid-June, 1977 for example, Empress Farah publicly condemned censorship by stating that neither Rembrand nor Hafez, one of Iran's national poets, could have created their works had they been subject to censorship. Shortly after, the Prime Minister voiced a similar statement. Such political attitudes and the promise of more freedom encouraged the newspapers to adopt a highly critical tone against the government.

As a consequence of these new policies, the opposition quickly inundated the media with news of their long repressed grievances. At first, hundreds of critical open letters, declarations, and pamphlets addressed to the Shah and his government appeared in the newspapers and in nationwide broadsheets. These letters at first contained only mild criticisms of the government. When it became apparent that the government was not going to act against

its critics, the intellectuals grew bolder. Greater demands were made for political reform and social freedom. A well known intellectual, Haj Seyyid Javadi, wrote a 200-page open letter calling for the implementation of the principle of separation of powers and accusing the government of being responsible for the country's economic failure. Shortly thereafter, a former senator and a celebrated historian, Ibrahim Khajenuri, denounced the one party system of the country and called for a multi party system. His letter and debates with the Secretary General of the semi-official newspaper, Rastakhiz , were fully published in the same paper. Hundreds of lawyers, writers, and poets sent telegrams to the Shah and issued public declarations calling for full freedom of speech and press and asking for political reforms. A nationwide two-page letter to the Shah was released by the National Front leaders Shahpur Bakhtyar, Karim Sanjabi, and Daryush Frohar. The letter demanded that the regime

> end despotic government, observe the principles of the Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; forego a one-party system; allow freedom of press and of association; release political prisoners; permit exiles to return; and establish a government based on majority representation (6, p. 379).

The effect of these criticisms was tension and excitment among the students and the dissatisfied middle class. Nationwide student riots, encouraged by the intellectuals, were so severe that their influence was felt

in the United States and in Europe. By the end of 1977, when the Shah went to Europe and the United States to purchase more arms, thousands of Iranian students abroad demonstrated and called for his removal.

Despite the success of the intellectuals in arousing students and the middle class to action, they soon realized, like their predecessors in the Constitutional Revolution, that without the support of the ulama and their vast followers, no fundamental political change would be possible. It was well recognized that over fifty percent of the Iranians were still illiterate, and that the only way to communicate with them and mobilize them was through religion. Furthermore, the ulama's influence was not limited to this group. They also enjoyed the support of some students and businessmen. Bazaar merchants, the backbone of Iranian economy, were also traditional supporters of the ulama. In fact, the intellectuals and professional middle class constituted only a small fraction of the society. In addition to their relative small size, they were divided into different factions and groups, each adhering to a different ideology. The only common goal the intellectuals had was their opposition to the Shah's absolutism. Beyond that point no consensus existed among them. In contrast, the ulama and their followers formed a large group unified by a single ideology -- Islam as well as a common goal -- the overthrow of the Shah and his regime.

It is no surprise, therefore, that when the ulama joined the movement early in 1978 they were able to dominate it.

The Shah's response to the intelligentsia's opposition was to emulate a Western-style political campaign. The Shah, whose options were limited by American pressure for human rights, moved to gain the support of the masses. Frequent trips were made to the holy cities and populated areas. The purpose of such tours by the Shah and Empress Farah was to demonstrate their religious piety and their dedication to the people's welfare. But at a time when economic difficulties had exacerbated social grievances, such tactics proved to be ineffective and the popular tide against him grew. Meanwhile, American policy-makers appeared to be surprised by the destabilizing results that President Carter's human rights policy was having in Iran.

While the Shah's liberalization policy by itself did not cause the revolution, it opened the gate for a deadly flood. The effect of Carter's human rights policy can be equated with the role Chalmers Johnson's concept of "accelerators" plays in the occurrence of revolution. While the accelerator does not cause the problem, it acts like a catalyst in bringing about revolution. The manner in which the American human rights policy ignited the Iranian revolution can be best described by Tocqueville's study of the French Revolution. He stated that "nations that have endured patiently and almost unconsciously the most

overwhelming oppression often burst into rebellion against the yoke the moment it begins to grow lighter" (4, pp. 5-6).

Foreign Influence

Foreign influence in the country has been one of the main concerns of the opposition since the late nineteenth century, when the ulama forced the king to cancel the Reuter Concession. To what extent foreign governments have influenced Iran is a subject which requires a thorough investigation, one that is beyond the scope of this study. What is evident is that foreign influence has played a role in the internal politics of the country. From the late nineteenth century on, however, foreign intervention has never been in the form of direct colonial domination; rather it has been exerted through indirect means. Given the physical absence of the foreign interventionists, those who have opposed the government have been able to picture for the masses an ever-present, invisible monster of foreign domination. All the backwardness and the miseries of the country have been attributed to the presence of this external foe in the political life of the nation. Consequently, the perception of being dominated by foreigners has become an integral part of the Iranian mentality. The national heroes of the people became those who were best able to echo these xenophobic sentiments and to defy foreign governments. It must be noted, for example, that Ayatollah Khomeini draws his popularity in part from his ability to

defy foreign influence and not for his achievements as a religious scholar. These sentiments of xenophobia have affected the manner in which many Iranians viewed the revolution of 1978-79.

The educational improvement of the last two decades embittered such feelings. Many educated Iranians, therefore, became obsessed with the idea of liberating their country from foreign domination. Such feelings were also intensified by the government's glorification of Iran's imperial historical past. The perception of being dominated by foreign governments, on the one hand, and the glorification of the country's history, on the other, outraged large numbers of Iranians. Their yearning for national independence became a means to resolve their conflicting feelings of humiliation and pride and to regain their lost self-esteem.

United States Involvement in Iran

Since the early 1950's the United States has been perceived by many Iranians as the invisible ruler of the country. Consequently, it became the main target of the opposition. A brief discussion of American-Iranian relations will contribute to an understanding of this development.

By the mid 1940's the United States began to gradually replace British influence in Iran. Involvement of the

United States in Iran has been mainly a by-product of the Cold War, and its initial interest appears to have been mainly political. Its policies were principally aimed at containing Russian expansionism in the region. This can be observed from the nature of American assistance provided to Iran. For instance, it was with the help of the United States that Iran was able to drive Russian forces out of the country after World War II. Once this was accomplished the United States began providing Iran with massive military and economic aid. In 1947 both countries signed a military agreement establishing an American military mission in Iran to improve the efficiency of the Iranian army. This pact was continued throughout the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah. In this same year an American engineering consulting firm, Morrison-Knudson Co., prepared Iran's first Seven Year economic plan, aimed at the recovery of this country's war-stricken and destroyed economy. In the late 1950's Harvard University helped Iran set up a Planning Organization for the economy. Many American economists went to Iran to study the economic conditions there. Believing that an economically weak country was highly susceptible to communist influence, the United States tried to reshape the economic structure of the country and poured millions of dollars into Iran. Between 1953 and 1967 the United States poured almost a billion dollars in aid into Iran (16, p. 54).

American cold war strategy in the Middle East was intended to guarantee stable pro-Western governments in the region. United States involvement in the overthrow of the Mossadeq government in 1953, for instance, was based on the American assumption that Iran's pro-Western stance could not be guaranteed if Mossadeq remained as Prime Minister. Following Mossadeq's fall, Iran became part of "the northern tier", a group of pro-Western states along the southern border of the Soviet Union. These states received massive military and economic aid from the United States in order to establish them as a fence around the Soviet border. This was done with the hope of containing the spread of Soviet influence into the countries of the region. Two years later Iran was encouraged to sign the Baghdad Pact, later known as The Central Treaty Orgaization or CENTO, as an extension of the containment policy of the United States.

U.S. economic aid to the Shah's regime terminated on November 30, 1967 when according to the then Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, Iran had reached a point where she could attain a self-sustaining growth (10, pp. 32,627). By 1969 Iran-American relations entered into a new stage. At this time American interest in Iran changed from primarily political to political and economical. On the political side the Shah's status was transformed from that of merely a protected client to that of a junior partner in the American efforts to maintain regional stability. The Shah's status

as a regional power was especially boosted as a result of what has come to be known as the "Nixon Doctrine." The intent of the Doctrine was to create pro-Western regional superpowers to protect the global interests of the United States and the West against Soviet incursions. Consequently, President Nixon agreed to sell Iran any conventional weapons it asked for (19, p. vii). By the mid-1970's Iran had become the largest single purchaser of U.S. arms. From the year 1950 until the downfall of the Shah, Iran signed sales agreements with the United States for some $20 billion worth of military equipment and services. When the Shah fell from power, weapons valued at about $12 billion were in the pipelines (17, pp. 17,73).

The Social Impacts of the American Involvement in Iran

With the flow of American sophisticated weaponry in the 1970's came thousants of American military experts into Iran. Iranian nationalists did not appreciate the presence of so many American military advisors and resented the new values that the United States was introducing into their country. Consequently, Americans became the target of Iranian guerrillas. In a three-year period, from 1973 to 1976, six Americans were assassinated while installing security devices in Iran for the United States. Furthermore, the massive flow of arms into the country created other serious difficulties for the government. The

most serious problem, as previously mentioned, was that the sophisticated military machniery absorbed a huge number of skilled workers from the civilian economic sector, which was already suffering from a shortage of skilled personnel. Secondly, it increased corruption among high-echelon government officials and among the royal family. The complacent attitude of the Shah toward this type of corruption did nothing to quell the anger that people felt towards the royal family. A third consequence of the flow of arms into Iran was the encouragement it provided for Iran to become involved in foreign military adventures. Few Iranians, for example, understood the reason for their country's military involvement in Somalia or the reasons for sending Phantom jets to keep President Thieu in power in South Vietnam. Iran also sent military supplies to Morocco, Jordan, Oman, and Zaire. While Iran's military involvement in the Dhofar uprising in Oman and its military operations against Baluchi dissidents in Pakistan could be justified by the government on the grounds that the political problems of these two countries threatened Iran's national security, few Iranians could understand how the conflicts in far-off countries such as Vietnam or Zaire could endanger their national security. The only explanation that appeared plausible to many Iranians was that they became involved at the behest of the United States. Consequently, they came to see the Shah as an "American stooge."

Economic relations between Iran and the United States did little to avert the growing dislike of Iranians for the United States. On the contrary, the relations only seemed to confirm the Iranian perception that the Iranian-American relationship was imperialistic in nature. For instance, for every dollar Iran earned from trade with the United States, it spent two dollars on American goods (7, p. 205). Close economic ties between the two countries provided the opposition in Iran with plenty of ammunition to proclaim that the United States was a colonialist power whose imperialistic behavior ran counter to the interests of the Iranian people.

As the economic situation of the country began to worsen in 1977, anti-American feelings heightened. To many Iranians the United States was the source of all their social, political and economic problems. Such anti-American feelings are best voiced by Ayatollah Khomeini in his speech of October 28, 1979. He declared that, "all the problems of the East stem from these foreigners, from the West, and from America at the moment. All our problems come from America. All the problems of the Moslems stem from America" (8, p. 30).

President Carter's human rights policy did not change the attitude of Iranians toward Americans. On the contrary, Iranians saw Carter's policy as a new hypocritical instrument for deceiving them. Such perceptions gained more

credibility when the American President interrupted the Camp David Summit meeting to telephone a message of full support to the Shah. This occurred shortly after the Iranian army had killed thousands of unarmed people on September 8, 1978, a massacre that came to be known as Black Friday. This publicized and ill advised telephone call raised a new surge of anti-Americanism. It also reaffirmed the conviction of the Iranian people that the human rights policy of the Carter Administration was hypocritical.

As a result of the massive military and economic assistance that the Shah received from the United States, as well as the Shah's support of American policies, Iranians identified the Shah's regime with that of the United States, and the slogan of "American Shah" gained popularity. T. Cuyler Young described this development in 1962 as follows,

> During the last decade . . . the United States has furnished Iran more than a billion dollars in economic and miliatry aid. Like it or not, justly or unjustly, this has served to identify the United States with the Shah's regime, together with responsibility for what the regime has done, or failed to do. . . . For this reason the United States is distrusted, if not indeed thoroughly disliked, by all those who have come to distrust the Shah and oppose his policies (20, pp. 291-92).

Since that date, 1962, the American position in Iran has deteriorated from a feeling of distrust to one of hatred. This dislike for the United States was especially intensified after it requested diplomatic immunity for its personnel in Iran. The request antagonized both the Iranian

nationalists and the masses of people whose attention was called to the petition by Ayatollah Khomeini. By 1976 the anti-American feelings of Iranians became apparent even to the American policy-makers. A report by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in July of that year stated that "Anti-Americanism could become a serious problem in Iran . . . if there were to be a change in government in Iran" (19, p. x).

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CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Most theories of revolution are unicausal. Scholars often tend to explain revolution by taking into considreation only those variables important in their discipline. Due to this disciplinary bias we find theories which, for example, purport to explain the cause of revolution in terms of one variable--that of the economy, or of frustration-aggression. Scholars, like blind men describing an elephant, are able to substantiate their own theories as a result of the complexity and variety of factors involved in the occurrence of revolution. No theory of revolution, at this time, appears to incorporate the rich variety of factors which may affect the outburst of a revolution in a nation. However, due to the multiplicity of factors involved in most social phenomena, if a theory of revolution is going to be formulated it must necessarily be comprehensive enough to include all the major factors which contribute to the occurrence of such upheavals.

The Iranian case clearly demonstrates the richness and complexity of the many factors which can be involved in a revolution. This mulitiplicity allows the scholars of diverse fields to use the Iranian case to substantiate their own theories. Historians, for example, can see the events

of 1978-79 as a continuation of the Constitutional Revolution. They may argue that nothing could have changed the course of events in Iran.

Marxists, on the other hand, can find plenty of evidence in the Iranian revolution to substantiate their own theory. They can easily argue that Iran was trapped in the web of international capitalism and imperialism. The decline of the dollar and Iran's inability to increase the price and the production of oil frustrated the developmental programs in the country. More orthodox Marxist theorists can emphasize the great income disparity between the lower and the higher classes.

Economic theorists can also substantiate their own explanation. To them the cause of the 1978-79 revolution should be found in the rapid economic development of the 1970's. Sociologists or modernization theorists, on the other hand, can point to the incongruity between the political institutions and the political participation in the country as the cause of the upheaval. They can even explain it as the result of the cultural shocks experienced by the traditionalists. The uprooting of large numbers of peasants from their traditional environments resulted in cultural alienation. The flow of Western values into the traditional life of Iranians produced hostility towards these new values. This hostility was eventually transferred to the

regime which encouraged the entry of such values into the country.

Finally, psychological theorists can justify their own theories by pointing to the frustration of the Iranian people at the time of the revolution. In addition, they may find the cause of the revolution in the charismatic leadership of the opposition.

While we are not able at this time to determine the exact degree of influence which each factor contributes to the occurrence of revolution, I believe that there is an element of truth in each of the existing theories of revolution. A close examination of the Iranian case clearly demonstrates that there is more than one factor involved in the political explosion of 1978-79. These factors, I believe fall into two general categories: subjective and objective conditions. By subjective conditions I am referring to the mood and the state of mind of the people. For a revolution to occur, the government must lose its base of legitimacy for substantial numbers of people. Historical developments, as well as existing socio-economic developments, may greatly affect the dissatisfaction people feel about a government. When dissatisfied and frustrated, people seek to change radically their environment. It is the function of ideology at this stage to provide hope and peace of mind to frustrated individuals. With its oversimplified answers to the existing social problems,

ideology instills in its followers a utopian idealism. It is precisely the inculcation of this idealism which makes millions of politically naive people fervent adhererents of revolutionary change. Without such a hope no revolution is possible.

Objective conditions necessary for a revolution refer to the social, economic, and political conditions at the time a revolution occurs. Whenever socio-economic grievances are coupled with the government's irresponsiveness and inability to control effectively the society, revolution appears to be the answer for the masses. In fact, some argue that when the chains of effective control are loosened after a long period of repression, revolution becomes inevitable.

The Iranian revolution of 1978-79 occorred when the regime was suffering from an absence of legitimacy among the people. The historical development described and analyzed in Chapter Two bears out this point. Frustrating effects of the socio-economic reforms of the 1960's and 1970's further aggravated the crisis of legitimacy for the government. At a time when many were alienated from the government, Islam produced hope and a solution to the existing problems.

The Shia form of Islam was able to gain ascendance through its traditional defiance of temporal governments. The Shia theory of government had always undermined the legitimacy of the secular governments while legitimizing the

rule of the ulama. The ulama have had an image among the people as the true protectors of their interests. Secondly, the ulama's interpretation of Shiaism provided the masses with highly oversimplified solutions to the diverse and sometimes unrelated problems of the country. Willing to accept simple and emotionally-laden solutions, the unsophisticated majority of Iranians threw their support behind the ulama. In fact, it can be argued that the intellectuals' failure to win the support of the masses stems from their inability to present simple and acceptable answers to the complex social problems of the country. Finally, the ulama were able to win the minds of the people because of their ability to picture a utopian Islamic society for those who adhered to Islam. This was to be a perfect and unique society governed by justice, equality, brotherhood, and astonishing socio-economic progress. This utopy provided the frustrated Iranian with a hope which could not be fulfilled by anything short of revolution.

But, one may ask, why were the ulama able to gain overwhelming popularity without any serious challenge from other intellectuals and ideologies? An answer to this question involves several factors . First, Iran is an underdeveloped and traditional society with the majority of its people living in the rural area of the country. As usual under such conditions, religious ties and loyalties are very strong. Intensive religious socialization since

early childhood has given the ulama an added advantage over their rivals. Their historical opposition to tyranny and foreign domination provided the ulama with the necessary ammunition to strengthen their own position in the minds of the people, as well as to discredit other opposition groups or individuals.

While the masses of the people were brought up to believe in Islamic utopianism and in the ulama, the works of Ali Shariati, a contemporary Western educated scholar, greatly influenced the younger educated generation. His revolutionary Islamic ideology, or "red Shiaism", as he called it, instilled a new enthusiasm among the youth and the university-educated students of Iran. The ulama's popularity among the students and many others was also substantially enhanced by a sudden shift in the political views of Ayatollah Khomeini regarding his interpretation of what an Islamic government should be like. Although it is not the intention of this brief study to concern itself with the analysis of anyone's political ideology, a brief treatment of Khomeini's political ideas may serve our purpose here.

In a host of interviews in Paris,in late 1978 and early 1979, Khomeini made two points clear. First, he stressed the point that he would not occupy any government position. Second, he promised to establish a democratic form of government with elected representatives. He also promised a

variety of political freedoms for both men and women (5, pp. 16,75,82,105,107,302). Such ideas led many Iranians to believe that the future government would be a government of the people and not a government of conservative clerics. Promises of this kind even deceived many members of religious minorities, to the extent that many Christians marched into the streets of large cities on the day of Ashura (the tenth day of Muharram) chanting: "Din-e ma masihi-st, rahbar ma Khomeini-st" meaning, our religion is Christianity, our leader is Khomeini (3, p. 229).

While Khomeini's new political views converted many to his side, these views were completely contradictory to Islamic political philosphy as well as to his own previous political position in his volume, Islamic Government. Republicanism and democracy contradict the type of government the Prophet Mohammad and Imam Ali established, and which Khomeini vehmently adhered to himself, in his book. Regarding the ulama's role in the affairs of government, he wrote, "in view of the fact that the government of Islam is the government of law, only the jurisprudent [Faqih, or religious expert of Islamic Cannon law] and nobody else, should be in charge of the government" (4, p. 55). On the matter of democracy he stated, "there is no place for opinion and whims in the government of Islam," because Islamic government is based upon the unchangeable laws of God, and it is the duty of the leaders of the government to

enact those laws and not the will of the people (4, pp. 32,39).

A second reason for the ulama's massive popularity stems from the sudden outpouring of Western technology and its subsequent style of life and new values in Iran. To many this style of life and its values were alien. As a reaction to these new and foreign phenomena, the people retreated more and more into Islam. To many Iranians, the emergence of new values was a preconceived plan by infidels to disarm Moslems from their superior beliefs with its powerful potentiality to bring the world under its flag. It is also important to mention that it is part of Islamic socialization to inculcate in the minds of every Moslem Iranian that the West seeks an opportunity to destroy Islam in order to be able to dominate the Moslem people, since it is only through the destruction of Islam that Moslems can be enslaved. With such a mentality, the people saw the new values as a threat to Islam and to their very independence. To fan the flame the ulama repeatedly chanted, "O people Islam is being taken away from us." The Shah became, to many, a traitor to Islam and to the people, since he was seen as being the one responsible for bringing Islam and Moslems under foreign domination by encouraging the entrance of Western values and styles of life into the country.

The third reason for Islam to appear as the dominant ideology can be found in the policies of the Shah himself.

Suffering from a lack of legitimacy, the Shah's future became more and more insecure. Since 1953 he was forced to manipulate the society in order to secure his throne. The result was a series of policies which he felt would be effective in preserving it. One such policy was an attempt to prevent anyone from gaining popularity. By heading off any possible popular messiah or savior, the Shah left the scene with no other players in it but the ulama and himself. In fact, it can be argued that the ulama owe part of their political power to the concentric polices of the Shah, because he was unwilling to let people of high caliber appear in the political life of the country. Had the Shah not prevented many intellectuals from operating freely in the society, the ulama might not have been able to grab and then monopolize political power almost single-handedly.

Knowing the culture, the people's state of mind, and the troubled social conditions, the ulama used Islam to its fullest advantage to tople the government. Religious practices, holy days and places became the major vehicles for promoting revolution. It is not surprising that the anti-government demonstrations reached their climax during the month of Muharram. On the day of Ashura over two million people in Teheran and many millions in other parts of the country marched in defiance of martial law while chanting "Death to the American Shah" and demanding an Islamic government.

The Karbala paradigm and the idea of martyrdom had been so deeply rooted in the minds of the people that the army virtually lost its effectivenes. The emotional fervor of Muharram broke the backbone of the government. The Army itself went on a rampage. Although many high-ranking officers maintained their loyalty to the regime, the allegiance of the enlisted soldiers and some officers belonged to Islam. Most of the conscripts came from rural areas with a strong religious orientation. Some city conscripts and some officers were staunch supporters of Ali Shariati and his revolutionary Islamic ideology. As a result, hundreds of soldiers and many officers deserted the Army; others refused to shoot at the people and instead fired at their own commanders. There are numerous reports of officers and commanders being shot by their soldiers. On the day of Ashura, for example, three Imperial Guardsmen killed twelve officers and injured fifty men at Lavizan Base; in Hamadan a twenty-two-year-old conscript, Mohsen Mobashsher Kashani, shot and killed the Governor General and wounded many in protecting a cleryman (3, pp. 206,215).

That Islam played a crucial role in the revolution of 1978-79 is hardly questionable. But whether or not Islam and the ulama were the cause of the revolution is a question which requires further examination. The term "Islamic Revolution" and the role Islam played in mobilizing the people have caused many to underestimate the revolutionary effects

of the socio-economic changes of the last two decades. In fact, these changes contributed more than anything else to the emergence of a revolutionary environment in Iran.

Socio-economic changes of the 1960's and 1970's induced a wide range of political participation, while no genuine political reforms were made available to match the new demands. First, the reforms of the 1960's thrust the peasantry into the political life of the country. Initially, their hopes and expectations were pushed to a new height; then they were dashed by governmental policy shifts. High income disparity, both between the rural and the urban areas as well as within the urban area, led many to believe that the government was the government of the rich people and not of the poor.

The economic reforms of the late 1970's further aggravated the conditions of millions of displaced peasants living in the slums of the large cities. For the frustrated peasantry, Islam and those who advocated an "Islamic Revolution" were the only solutions to thier problems. Once apolitical, the peasantry stepped into the political scene in support of the revolution. The ulama were the sole beneficiary of this support.

Secondly, the reforms coupled with the oil price increases greatly expanded the size of the middle class in the country. This generation of more educated people with their new social and economic power put immense pressure on

the government for more political participation. The government, on the other hand, appeared to be concerned only with economic improvments and not with the political liberalization which was being demanded. It is reasonable to believe that the Shah was hoping to acquire some legitimacy through the rapid economic development of the country. His declared objective was to put Iran among the most advanced industrial nations of the world in less than two decades (7, pp. 289-90). To this end he went all out for growth without considering the socio-economic impediments of growth. His response to the political pressure of the middle class was further curtailment of political freedoms. He even made Iran a one-party political system. As has been seen, he relied heavily on repressive instruments to deal with the ever-increasing political demands created by the socio-economic development of the country.

By the mid 1970's most of the remaining channels of communication between government and the people were destroyed. The secret police gradually evolved as the main political stabilizer of the country. The gross violations of human rights by SAVAK, placed Iran at the top of the human rights violators list of the different international human rights organizations.

While the repressive policies of the Shah brought a superficial stability at home, it triggered immense pressure from some international quarters, including human rights

advocate, President Carter of the United States, to respect human rights. United States pressure forced the Shah to relax his oppressive policies at home.

The relaxation of government policies toward the opposition coincided with the economic failures of the late 1970's. The combination of the two ignited a political explosion. The timing of the revolution resembles the classical pattern outlined by James Davies concerning revolution discussed in Chapter One. A society with a prolonged period of socio-economic development was hit by a short period of reversal. The government, in trouble, tried to undertake some corrective measures; they soon led to further enhancement of the peoples' grievances. Not only the lower and middle classes were hit by the economic slowdown and the subsequent government corrective measures, but the upper class, businessmen, and industralists also lost their confidence in tne government. The government's confusion over the economy alienated almost everybody.

Popular discontent within every segment of the society, coupled with the Shah's relaxed policies toward the opposition, left the government unable to keep its cover tight on the boiling pot. All grievances, new and old, fair and unfair, reasonable and unreasonable, burst into the open. Students, intellectuals, technocrats, ulama, traditional landowners, bazaar merchants, industralists, civil servants, construction workers, factory workers, slum dwellers,

peasants, and even the old, traditionally oriented grandmothers had their own reasons to defy the government. The combination of all these grievances created a fundamental question about the legitimacy of the regime. The opposition was quick enough to direct the attention of the masses from specific grievances towards the person of the Shah. He was depicted as the source of all evils and his removal was touted as the solution to all the exisiting problems of the country. To the man on the street the Shah was blocking the gate to a wonderful utopia. He was seen to be the only problem Iran had.

The ulama, with their 180,000 well-organized clerics (molas), 80,000 mosques throughout the country (6, p. 13), and the support of the majority of the people, were the logical group to assume the leadership of the revolution. The intellectuals, like their predecesors in the Constitutional Revolution, soon realized the importance of the ulama in mobilizing the masses. Consequently, they also threw their support behind the clergy, hoping to strengthen their bid to run the post-revolutionary government.

Two incidents served as the catalystic events of the outbreak of the revolution. First, Mostafa, the oldest son of Ayatollah Khomeini, both living in Iraq, at the time died on November 3, 1977. The rumors soon spread that he had been murdered by the Iranian government. Secondly, an indiscreet and officially inspired article insulting

Khomeini appeared in a January 6, 1978 issue of Ettelaat newspaper (2, p. 170). The popular reaction exceeded the expectations of the government. Demonstrations broke out in Qum and in some other large cities. The Shah, who saw things getting out of hand, attempted to reestablish his old repressive measures to take control of affairs. Troops were dispatched to put down the demonstrations, and the Army killed some clerical students before dispersing the demonstrators. The murder of these religious students at Qum precipitated a chain of mob demonstrations, each demonstration in mourning for those killed in the previous one. Religious mourning traditions in the mosques and in the streets became a major vehicle for mobilizing the masses.

When things appeared to be getting completely out of hand, the government found itself with no choice but to declare martial law. However, the military government of General Azhari also soon proved to be ineffective in controlling the streets of the major cities. The Army itself was so demoralized that it is said that the government had to bring in Israeli soldiers for the Black Friday massacre (1, p. 160; 3, p. 226). Toward the end of Muharram, on December 31, 1978, General Azhari had to resign because of a heart attack in the aftermath of severe violence as the Army appeared to be losing discipline. Shortly after, on January 4, 1979, the Shah saw the failure of the military government in bringing the situation back to normal and appointed

Shahpour Bakhtiar to form a civilian government. Bakhtiar, an old opponent of the Shah, accepted the position on the condition that the monarch leave the country. The Shah apparently had no choice but to leave Iran. On January 16, 1979, he left the country, hoping to return when the situation had calmed down. His departure brought jubilation. People poured into the streets embracing each other and chanting, "After the Shah, now the Americans."

The final stages of victory for the revolutionaries began on Friday evening, February 9, when junior officers and technicians (homafars) clashed with senior officers and the Imperial Guard at Doshan Tapeh Air Base near Tehran. Armed civilians rushed in to aid the technicians. The clash ended with the occupation of the Base by the revolutionaries. On the next day Saturday, February 10, Eshratabad Air Base fell into the hands of the revolutionaries. The news of a military breakdown immediately spread throughout the nation and encouraged mutiny in other military bases. On Sunday, February 11, the Army withdrew its support from the Bakhtiar government and declared its neutrality. Immediately after, Bakhtiar went into hiding and the government appointed by Khomeini and headed by Mehdi Bazargan moved into the Prime Minister's offices. The revolution had succeeded, and the Islamic government was again reestablished.

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APPENDIX A

CHRONOLOGY OF POLITICAL EVENTS IN IRAN

641	Iran is conquered by the Arabs, who convert Iranians to Islam.
661-750	Umayyad Caliphs rule the Moslem world.
750	Umayyads is overthrown by the Abbasids, who claim to establish an Islamic government.
1258	Hulaqu Khan, the grandson of Jenghiz Khan, conquers Baghdad. Abbasids are overthrown.
1501	Small group of religious leaders by the name of Safavids take control of Iran. Iranians are converted to the Shia form of Islam. Safavids attempt to establish an Islamic government.
1721	The Safavid dynesty is overthrown by a small group of Afghans.
1735-47	Nader Shah, an anti-religion ruler, drives Afghans out of the country. He curtails the power of the religious leaders.
1750-79	Zand rule.
1779-1925	Qajar dynesty.
1872	Reuter Concession and its cancellation by the ulama.
1890-92	Tobacco Concession and its cancelation by the ulama.
1896	Naser ad-din Shah Qajar is assasinated by a religiously inspired Moslem. Mozaffar ad-din Shah Qajar becomes the Shah.
1906	Constitutional Revolution. Iran gets a constitution and a parliament (Majlis). Mozaffar ad-din Shah dies.

1907	Mohammad Ali Shah Qajar becomes the new Shah.
1908-9	Civil war between the Shah and his foreign supporters,on the one hand,and the ulama and the masses of the people on the other hand.
July 6, 1909	Mohammad Ali Shah is deposed and his twelve-year old son, Ahmad, becomes the Shah.
1921	Reza Khan's coup d'etat.
1925	Reza Khan becomes Reza Shah Pahlavi. A new dynesty is established in Iran.
1941	Allaied forces occupy Iran. Reza Shah is forced to abdicate and is sent into exile by the British. His son Mohammad Reza Pahlavi becomes the Shah of Iran.
April 30, 1951	Mohammad Mossadeq is appointed Prime Minister.
May 1, 1951	The oil industry is nationalized.
Aug. 16, 1953	The Shah escapes from the country due to nationwide political unrest.
Aug. 19, 1953	CIA and the pro-Shah forces conduct a coup against the government of Mossadeq. He and many others are arrested.
Aug. 22, 1953	The Shah returns to Iran. Zahedi becomes Prime Minister.
Dec. 21, 1953	Mossadeq is sentenced to three years of solitary confinement.
Jan. 22-24, 1963	Severe political unrest in major cities. National Front leaders are arrested. Troops and police storm the University of Tehran.
Jan. 26, 1963	The "White Revolution" is introduced by the Shah.
May 22-24, 1963	The Theological School in Qum is attacked by troops as a result of student riots.
June 5, 1963	Nationwide demonstrations against the Shah. Troops are called out, thousands of people lose their lives.

Oct. 13, 1964	A bill is passed giving diplomatic immunity to United States military personnel.
Nov. 4, 1964	Ayatollah Khomeini is arrested and sent into exile after severe nationwide political unrest.
Jan. 21, 1965	The Prime Minister, Hassan Ali Mansur,is assassinated by a Moslem religious group.
Jan. 27, 1965	Amir Abbas Hoveyda becomes the new Prime Minister.
April 10, 1965	An attempt is made on the Shah's life by a member of the Imperial Guard.
Sept. 15, 1965	The Shah is given the title of Arya Mehr (Light of Iran) at a joint session of the Majlis and Senate.
Mar. 5, 1966	Mossadeq dies at the age of ninety.
Oct. 26, 1966	The Shah crowns himself.
Nov. 30, 1971	Iran occupies Tunbs islands in the Persian Gulf one day before the ending of British treaties of protection of the Trucial Sheikhdoms.
Mar. 2, 1975	Iran officialy becomes a one-party state. The Rastakhiz (Resurrection) party, with the Shah at its head, becomes the only legal party in the nation.
Mar. 21, 1976	A new calender is adapted. Its Islamic base is changed to the year in which Cyrus the Great was crowned (559 B.C.), making March 1976 to March 1977 the year 2535.
Aug. 6, 1977	Prime Minister Hoveyda resigns as a result of problems with the economic infrustructure.
Aug. 7, 1977	Jamshid Amouzegar is appointed as the new Prime Minister by the Shah.
Aug. 10, 1977	Under severe international pressure, especialy by the United States government, a bill is passed guaranteeing the basic legal righs

to civilians who are being tried for national security crimes.

Nov. 3, 1977 — Mostafa, the oldest son of Ayatollah Khomeini dies unexpectedly. The government is blamed for killing him.

Jan. 6, 1978 — An officially inspired letter insulting Khomeini appears in Ettelaat newspaper.

Jan. 7-9, 1978 — Riots in Qum. Many people are killed, many are arrested.

May 7, 1978 — Tehran bazaar merchants riot in support of religious leaders.

June 17, 1978 — A national day of mourning is declared by the opposition. A nationwide demostration by the anti-Shah forces.

Aug. 6, 1978 — The government of Amouzegar is replaced by the government of Jaafar Sharif-Emami.

Aug. 12, 1978 — Martial law is imposed in Esfahan.

Aug. 19, 1978 — Fire in the Cinema Rex in Abadan kills 430 people. The government is acused of arson.

Aug. 27, 1978 — One party system is replaced as the ban on additional parties is lifted.

Sept. 8, 1978 — Hundreds of people are killed in a demonstration in Tehran. The day is called Black Friday by the anti-Shah forces.

Nov. 5, 1978 — Anti-Shah riots culminate in worst rampage so far.

Nov. 6, 1978 — Military government headed by Gen. Gholam Reza Azhari replaces the government of Sharif-Emami. Martial law is declared throughout the nation.

Dec. 10, 1978 — The day of Ashura. Millions of people pour into the streets of cities calling for an Islamic government.

Dec. 31, 1978 — Gen. Azhari resigns as the Premier in aftermath of nationwide demonstrations and the loss of discipline in army.

Jan. 4, 1979	Civilian government of Shahpor Bakhtiar is appointed.
Jan. 16, 1979	The Shah and his family leave the country into exile.
Feb. 1, 1979	Ayatollah Khomeini returns to Iran, after 15 years of exile.
Feb. 5, 1979	Mehdi Bazargan is appointed Prime Minister by Ayatollah Khomeini.
Feb. 11, 1979	Army withdraws its support from the Bakhtiar government. Bakhtiar goes into hiding and Bazargan moves into the Prime Minister offices. The revolution has succeeded.

APPENDIX B

Glossary

Ashura. The tenth day of the first Moslem month (Muharram). This day is the anniversary of Imam Husayn's martyrdom, who fought against Yazid ebne-Muawiya in the year of 681 A.D. It is,therefore, the greatest day of mourning for the Shia world.

Ayatollah. Lit., "Sign of God." In Shia Islam, an Ayatollah is one who has reached the highest religious position among the clergymen.

Faqih. One who possesses knowledge of Islamic canon law (Sharia).

Fatwa. A formal legal opinion given by a high ranking Moslem cleric.

Ijtehad. A particular right given to a Moslem cleric to form an opinion (zann) in a case (ghaziya) or as to a rule (hukm) of law.

Iltizam. An agrarian system where land is the private property of the sovereign. The government in turn rents the land to others for tax purposes. One who rents the land from the government is called a Multazim.

Imam. Lit., "Leader." In the Sunni sect of Islam it refers to the leaders of the congregational prayers. In the Shia form of Islam, the term usually applies to the twelve leaders of this sect, all direct decendents of Imam Ali.

Imam Husayn. The son of Imam Ali (653-80 A.D.) He was cruelly slain by the Yazid forces at the battle of Karbala. His martyrdom is celebrated by the Shias every year during the month of Muharram.

Imam Mohammad al-Mehdi. The twelfth Imam of the Shias. He is believed to have gone into occultation at the age of fourteen. Imam Mehdi is the expected messiah who arises at the end of the world.

Jahad. Lit., "An effort, or a striving." A religious war against those who are unbelievers in the mission of Islam. It is an incumbent religious duty, for the purpose of advancing Islam or repelling evil from Moslems.

Karbala. A city in Iraq, fifty miles south-west of Baghdad. It is celebrated as the scene of the martyrdom of Imam Husayn.

Khosh-neshin. A Persian word for those peasants who have cultivating rights on the land, but not its ownership. While they do not own the land they keep the right of working on it.

Khums. Lit., "A fifth." The fifth of property which is given to the public treasury as a form of religious tax.

Majlis. Lit., "Assembly." The house of represantetives in Iran is called Majlis.

Marja-e Taqlid. Lit., "Source of simulation." According to the Shia Islamic theology, Moslems are supposed to choose a Marja among the living mujtaheds and follow his religious instructions.

Mola. In Iran it usually refers to a clergyman.

Moshavin. An agrarian system used in Israel where production is based on farm coopratives.

Mossad. (The Institution for Intelligence and Special Tasks.) The Israel's intelligence service.

Muharram. The first month of the Moslem lunar year. The month of mourning for Shias.

Mujtahed. One who has the right to pass judgments on religious matters. In the Shia form of Islam a Mujtahed is regarded as the interpreter of the Hidden Imam's will (Mohammad al-Mehdi).

Nasagh. Cultivating right given to the khosh-neshins.

National Front. Coalition of several parties originally formed by Mossadeq..

Rauzakhane. Recitation of the events at Karbala which led to the martyrdom of Imam Husayn.

Sharia. Lit., "The clear path to be followed." A technical term meaning the canon law of Islam.

Shia. Lit., "Follower." A sect of Islam which believes in Ali, the first cousin of the Prophet Mohammad and the husband of his daughter Fatimah. The Shias maintain that Ali was the first legitimate Imam and the rightful successor to the Prophet. Therefore, Shias reject the Sunni Caliphs.

Sorokin, Pitirim Alexandrovich (1889-1968). A Russian born sociologist. He participated in the Russian revolution and became a member of the Constitutional Assembly and secretary to Prime Minister Kerensky. In 1922 he was exiled for his opposition to the Bolshevik regime. Since then he lived in the United States until his death. In the U.S. he was elected president of the International Institute of Sociology, president of the American Sociological Association, and president of the School of Sociology at Harvard University.

Sunna. Lit., "Path or way; a manner of life." A term used in Islam to refer to the tradition which records the sayings and deeds of the Prophet Mohammad. This tradition is one base of the Moslem canon law (Shria).

Sunni. Lit., "One of the path; traditionalist." The term is generally applied to the large sect of Moslems who acknowledge the first four caliphs: Abubakr, Umar, Usman, and Ali, as having been the rightful successors of Mohammad.

Tasua. The ninth day of the month of Muharram, in which Shias mourn the martyrdom of Imam Husayn.

Tocqueville, Alexis de (1805-1859). A French stateman, and writer born of an aristocratic familly.

Tudeh Party. Lit., "People's Party." The Communist party of Iran.

Ulama. Plural of Alem. "One who knows; learned; a scholar." In its plural form it is used as the title of those bodies of learned doctors in Moslem divinity and law whose religious orders are binding on their followers.

Waqf. Lit., "Standing; stoppage; halting." A term which in the language of Islamic law signifies the appropriation or dedication of property to charitable uses and the service of God. An endowment. The object

of such endowment or appropriation must be of a perpetual nature, and such property or land cannot be sold or transferred.

Yazid. The son of Muawiyah. The second Caliph of the house of Ummayah, who reigned from A.D. 679 to A.D. 683. He is known in Moslem history as the opponent of Imam Husayn.

Zekat. Alms tax.

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