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The IS Crisis and the U.S. Response

In 2014, the armed offensive of the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIL, ISIS, or Daesh) in northern and western Iraq and northeastern Syria raised significant concerns for the United States. After first ordering multiple deployments of U.S. troops to Iraq to provide security to diplomatic personnel and facilities, advise Iraqi security forces, and conduct intelligence gathering and reconnaissance, President Obama began ordering U.S. military airstrikes on IS forces in Iraq in August 2014. Later in September, after laying out plans for expanded use of military force against the Islamic State in a televised speech to the American people, the President ordered U.S. military airstrikes in Syria against both IS forces and forces of the “Khorasan Group,” identified by the President as part of Al Qaeda. The intensified U.S. military engagement has raised numerous questions in Congress and beyond about the President’s authority to use military force against the Islamic State.1 Efforts began near the end of the 113th Congress to consider enactment of a new authorization for use of military force targeting the Islamic State, and have continued into the 114th Congress. In addition, the President provided Congress a new authorization proposal in February 2015.

Presidential Authority to Use Military Force Against the Islamic State

The President in his August 2014 notifications to Congress of deployments and airstrikes in Iraq indicated his powers as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive under Article II of the Constitution gave him authority to undertake such action. Obama Administration officials and the President’s September 2014 notifications2 to Congress for airstrikes and other actions in Iraq and Syria, however, stated that two enacted authorizations for use of military force (AUMFs), the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001 AUMF; P.L. 107-40), and the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (2002 AUMF; P.L. 107-243), provide authorization for certain U.S. military strikes against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, as well as the Khorasan Group of Al Qaeda in Syria. After these notifications, however, the President indicated on November 5, 2014, that he intended to enter into discussions with congressional leaders to develop a new AUMF specifically targeting the Islamic State, in order to “right-size and update whatever authorization Congress provides to suit the current fight, rather than previous fights” authorized by the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs.3 The President called on Congress to enact a new AUMF targeting the Islamic State in his January 2015 State of the Union address, and transmitted a draft AUMF to Congress on February 11, 2015. Both houses are expected to take up consideration of a new AUMF in the near term.

2001 Post-9/11 Authorization for Use of Military Force

In response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Congress enacted the AUMF authorizing the President to use military force against “those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons....” Although the Islamic State does not appear to fall within that language, it is possible that the executive branch regards it as one of the “associated forces” fighting alongside Al Qaeda and the Taliban that it asserts are also targetable under the 2001 AUMF.4 The Obama Administration had stated previous to the latest action against the Islamic State and the Khorasan Group that it will use force against such associated forces under the 2001 AUMF only when they are lawful military targets that “pose a continuing, imminent threat to U.S. persons....” Due to Al Qaeda’s February 2014 disavowal of any remaining ties with the Islamic State, some question whether the Islamic State can be considered an associated force under the 2001 AUMF. The Obama Administration has stated that the Islamic State can be targeted under the 2001 AUMF because its predecessor organization, Al Qaeda in Iraq, communicated and coordinated with Al Qaeda; the Islamic State currently has ties with Al Qaeda fighter and operatives; the Islamic State employs tactics similar to Al Qaeda; and the Islamic State, with its intentions of creating a new Islamic caliphate, is the “true inheritor of Osama bin Laden’s legacy.”5

2002 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq

Congress enacted the 2002 AUMF prior to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq that toppled the government of Saddam Hussein, with U.S. military deployments to and operations in Iraq continuing until December 2011. The 2002 AUMF authorizes the President to use U.S. Armed Forces to enforce relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions and to “defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq....” Although the 2002 AUMF has no sunset provision and Congress has not repealed it, one view is that after the establishment of a new Iraqi government, the restoration of full Iraqi sovereignty, and the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, the 2002 AUMF no longer has force. Obama Administration officials have recently voiced support for repealing the 2002 AUMF, reflecting the Administration’s belief that it is no longer needed. Conversely, another view asserts that, although its preamble focuses on the Saddam Hussein regime and its WMD programs, the 2002 AUMF’s authorization language is broad, referring only to a “continuing threat” from Iraq, and that the 2002 AUMF could provide authority to defend against threats to Iraq as well as threats posed by Iraq. Indeed, 2002 AUMF authority was the basis for the U.S. military presence in Iraq from the fall of Saddam Hussein and completion of the WMD search to its 2011 withdrawal, a span of over eight years, a period that could be characterized as dealing with threats to Iraq rather than threats from Iraq. The IS threat in Iraq could therefore be seen as breathing new life into 2002 AUMF authority. In addition, former supporters of Saddam Hussein reportedly provide support to the Islamic State, possibly forming a link between the original aims of the 2002 AUMF and any future actions taken against the Islamic State.

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A New Authorization for Use of Military Force Against the Islamic State: In Brief

Presidential Authority Under Article II of the Constitution

Article II of the Constitution makes the President Commander in Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces, and gives the President certain foreign affairs powers. It is debated to what extent Article II authorizes the President to use force to defend the United States, its personnel, and citizens against ongoing or imminent attack has been generally accepted, while employing such force simply to further foreign policy or general national security goals is more controversial. In Iraq, the President would seem to have substantial authority to use force to defend U.S. personnel, the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, and any other U.S. facilities and property. His August 2014 notifications of airstrikes in Iraq, however, have also cited as justification furthering U.S. national security and foreign policy interests, and have described uses of force to provide humanitarian assistance, and to aid Iraqi security forces in their fight against the Islamic State. In addition, the President’s stated strategy for degrading and destroying the Islamic State, as well as his September 2014 notifications to Congress of airstrikes and other actions in Iraq and Syria, are not based primarily on immediate protection of the United States, its personnel, or citizens. Thus, it can be argued that Article II alone might not provide sufficient authorization for the use of military force against IS and Khorasan Group forces in Iraq and Syria.

Calls for a New AUMF and Congressional Action in the 113th Congress

Although the Obama Administration has claimed 2001 AUMF and 2002 AUMF authority for its recent and future actions against the Islamic State, these claims have been subject to debate. Some contend that the Administration’s actions against the IS also fall outside the President’s Article II powers. Concerned with Congress’s constitutional role in the exercise of the war power, perceived presidential overreach in that area of constitutional powers, and the President’s expansion of the use of military force in Iraq and Syria, several Members of Congress have expressed the view that continued use of military force against the Islamic State requires congressional authorization. Members have differed on whether such authorization is needed, given existing authorities, or whether such a measure should be enacted.

Near the end of the 113th Congress, a number of Members proposed new authorization proposals (several of these are examined in greater detail in the Appendix). In December 2014, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee conducted a hearing and considered an IS AUMF proposed by Committee Chairman Robert Menendez. Prior to the committee’s markup of the proposal on December 11, the committee held a hearing on December 9 with Secretary of State John Kerry to discuss the Obama Administration’s views on enactment of a new IS AUMF. Senator Menendez’s IS AUMF proposal, as amended and reported favorably out of committee on December 13 (S.J.Res. 47), would have authorized the use of U.S. Armed Forces against the Islamic State and “associated persons or forces,” prohibited “ground combat operations” with limited exceptions, repealed the 2002 AUMF, and sunset the authorization in the 2001 AUMF and the IS AUMF itself three years after enactment.

At the hearing, Secretary Kerry reiterated President Obama’s earlier-stated position that the Administration supported enactment of a new AUMF targeting the Islamic State. The Secretary stated that the Administration agreed with the three-year sunset of the authorization contained in
Senator Menendez’s proposal, “subject to provisions for extension” of that authorization. He stated the Administration’s view, however, that such authority “should give the President the clear mandate and flexibility he needs to successfully prosecute the armed conflict against [the Islamic State],” and thus the Administration opposed limitation on the use of ground combat forces, and geographic restriction limiting operations to Iraq and Syria.6

The 113th Congress did not ultimately enact a new IS authorization bill, and many Members called upon the President to submit his own proposal. For a comparison of multiple IS AUMFs proposed in the 113th Congress and issues raised by their provisions, see the Appendix.

IS AUMF-Related Proposals in the 114th Congress

Since the start of the 114th Congress, several new proposals for a new IS AUMF or repeal of existing AUMFs have been introduced and others are reportedly being drafted.

On February 2, 2015, Representative Adam Schiff introduced the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against ISIL Resolution (H.J.Res. 27). Pursuant to this proposal, the President would be authorized to use U.S. Armed Forces against the Islamic State, but limited solely to operations in Iraq and Syria, except for U.S. Armed Forces “engaged in training of indigenous Syrian or regional military forces for the purpose of combating” the Islamic State. The resolution states that the authorization does not include “deployment of ground forces in a combat role,” except “special operations forces or other forces that may be deployed in a training, advisory, or intelligence capacity.” The resolution would terminate the new authority provided by the resolution, as well as repeal the 2001 AUMF, three years after the resolution’s enactment. The proposed resolution would repeal the 2002 AUMF immediately upon enactment.

On February 10, 2015, Representative Barbara Lee introduced the Comprehensive Solution to ISIL Resolution (H.J.Res. 30), which does not include a new authorization for the use of military force, but would repeal the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs and place new requirements on the President concerning the campaign against the Islamic State. Repeal of the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs would become effective 60 days after enactment. The proposal states that the policy of the United States is to work through the United Nations and to carry out relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, support regional efforts to counter the Islamic State, and to ensure U.S. foreign assistance is provided only to Iraqi and Syrian groups subjected to human rights vetting. It requires the President to develop a comprehensive strategy, including strategy for non-military activities, to “degrade and dismantle the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and submit to Congress a report that contains the strategy.” The President would be required to update the report every 90 days.

Representative Adam Kinzinger introduced the Authorization for Use of Military Force against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (H.J.Res. 33) on February 13, 2015. The proposal would authorize the President “to use the Armed Forces of the United States as the President determines to be necessary and appropriate against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (‘ISIL’) or associated persons or forces....” The proposal defines the term “associated persons or forces” as “individuals and organizations fighting for, on behalf of, or alongside ISIL or any closely-related

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successor entity in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.”


The President’s February 2015 IS AUMF Proposal

On February 11, 2015, the President provided Congress with a draft proposal for a new IS AUMF, stating in an accompanying letter that he “can think of no better way for the Congress to join [the President] in supporting our Nation’s security than by enacting this legislation, which would show the world we are united in our resolve to counter the threat posed by ISIL.” The President’s proposal would authorize the use of U.S. Armed Forces that he deems “necessary and appropriate” against the Islamic State and associated persons or forces. In the proposed authorization, “the term ‘associated persons or forces’ means individuals and organizations fighting for, on behalf of, or alongside ISIL or any closely-related successor entity in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.” The authorization does not include authority for the use of U.S. Armed Forces for “enduring offensive ground combat operations.” The proposal’s authorization would terminate three years after enactment, and contains a provision repealing the 2002 AUMF upon enactment. The President would be required to report to Congress at least every six months on actions taken under the proposed IS AUMF.

A number of aspects of the President’s proposal could be considered and debated among Members of Congress.

- First, the President’s proposal would prohibit “enduring offensive ground combat operations,” instead of specifically prohibiting the use of ground combat forces, or execution of ground combat operations, with exceptions for certain types of units or operations, as some of the previous IS AUMF proposals have. It is not clear what that limitation, expressed as it is, would mean in practice, although the President’s letter states that it is designed to allow the same excepted units and/or operations.
- Second, the President’s proposal does not include any geographical limitation, possibly enabling the use of military force in countries other than Iraq and Syria.
- Third, the definition of “associated persons or forces,” especially the inclusion of the phrase “fighting ... on behalf of ... ISIL,” might be considered lacking in precision, leading to confusion in the future interpretation of what constitutes a lawfully targeted entity.

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7 This definition is the exact language included in the President’s IS AUMF proposal. See “The President’s February 2015 IS AUMF Proposal,” below.


• Fourth, the President’s proposal, unlike many of the previous IS AUMF proposals, does not provide a purpose or objective for the use of U.S. Armed Forces against the Islamic State in the authorization language itself. This could lead to concerns that the authorization does not sufficiently direct the President’s actions or provide a definition of victory, and therefore authorizes military operations without an endpoint or measurable goal.

• Fifth, although the President states in his letter that he still intends to engage Congress in reforming the 2001 AUMF, his proposal does not contain a provision that repeals or sunsets that measure, unlike most of the IS AUMF proposals previously introduced.

• Finally, the reporting requirement is for a basic periodic “actions taken” report, and is similar to certain reporting requirements already in place concerning deployed U.S. Armed Forces. This is in contrast to other IS AUMF proposals, which have required information concerning all targeted entities, specific reports on operations and effectiveness of those operations, and the budget effects of operations.

Types of Proposed AUMF Provisions and Related Issues

In general, language in a new AUMF targeting the Islamic State and other groups (IS AUMF) could either broaden the purpose of military force to include unspecified U.S. national security interests, or narrow the scope of authorization to specific objectives related to the Administration’s stated goal of “degrading and ultimately destroying” the Islamic State. Congress could limit the IS AUMF’s geographic scope, authorizing force only in Iraq and/or Syria. With continued uncertainty surrounding the Iraqi government, Congress might include authorization to use U.S. Armed Forces in Iraq in furtherance of political stability objectives. Provisions in any IS AUMF targeting the Islamic State might address the possible effect that targeting the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq could have on the ongoing conflict in Syria. Congress might also include a prohibition on the use of appropriated funds for the use of military force outside the scope of the specified authorization. Proposals for a new IS AUMF might contain provisions to limit presidential authority to use military force against the Islamic State as to scope and duration, and in some cases to sunset or repeal the existing authority in the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs.

The President has stated that an IS authorization should provide the flexibility to carry out “not just our strategy [for the military campaign against the Islamic State] over the next two or three months, but our strategy going forward.” It could be argued, however, that even if limitations are enacted and perceived later to have a deleterious effect on the U.S. campaign against the Islamic State, such limitations could be removed or modified through subsequent legislative action if the need arises. Such limitations and an overall lack of flexibility in any IS AUMF, however, might be difficult to change legislatively if Members of Congress cannot agree to changes; neither the 2001 nor 2002 AUMF has been amended, for example, despite the stated need for amendments by observers and Members over the lifespan of those two measures.

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The following sections address some specific aspects of an AUMF that may come under debate in the 114th Congress.

**Authorization Purpose and Scope**

Some observers and Members of Congress have argued that recent open-ended, broadly worded authorizations can empower a President to continue military operations outside of Congress’s intent. An IS AUMF could include language in the authorizing provision identifying the specific purpose for and scope of the President’s use of U.S. military force, narrowing or broadening the President’s flexibility. An authorization that authorizes force to defend “U.S. national security” against the threat posed by the Islamic State would seem to provide a broad “national security” basis for possible long-term, open-ended military operations. Authorizing force to protect U.S. “interests” generally would seem to provide even wider authority to the President, while including the goal of protecting both the United States and U.S. allies could expand the range of purposes for military action. As to scope, many past AUMFs include language stating that the President can use all “necessary and appropriate” force to achieve the purpose of the authorization. While this could provide the President with the flexibility he needs to effectively employ U.S. Armed Forces, such language leaves the determination of the form and extent of U.S. military force generally to the President. Congress could decide to place limitations and conditions on any broader purpose and scope provisions in an attempt to shape the President’s use of U.S. military force. (See “Limitations and Conditions,” below.)

**Identifying Targeted Entities**

Any new IS AUMF would be expected to name the Islamic State (or one of its other monikers, including ISIS, ISIL, or Daesh) as the primary entity to be targeted by authorized U.S. military force. As evidenced by the implementation of the 2001 AUMF, however, a number of issues arise in determining exactly who can be lawfully targeted under such a provision, and the extent to which Congress desires to define and/or limit the universe of lawful targets in an IS AUMF. First, while specifically targeting the Islamic State provides a basic starting point for determining authorized targets, in many cases it might be unclear whether individuals are in fact part of the Islamic State, are part of groups fighting alongside the Islamic State, or are merely part of non-aligned groups also fighting in the region, either against the United States and its allies or otherwise. Congress might also wish to include language providing for future iterations of the structure of the Islamic State group. The Islamic State might splinter at multiple points in time into several new entities with different names and different affiliations, or combine with other groups to form new entities. Indeed, the Islamic State itself was formerly known, among other things, as Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), and its former close relationship and subsequent reported split with Al Qaeda has complicated determinations of whether the 2001 AUMF could be applied against it. An IS AUMF could include language that extends the authority to use military force against any successor entities of the Islamic State.

Perhaps the aspect of identifying lawful targeted entities considered most fraught is the matter of “associated forces.” One of the central criticisms of the application of authority in the 2001 AUMF has been the expansion of military force to target entities that successive Administrations have designated “co-belligerent” with Al Qaeda and the Taliban. In the context of the current campaign against the Islamic State, the Obama Administration has asserted that the Islamic State
can be targeted as it can be considered a branch or in some ways a successor to Al Qaeda.\textsuperscript{11} It can be argued that this opens the possibility of military force being used now and in the future against a number of groups associated with the Islamic State, further expanding the universe of targeted entities, possibly in countries other than Iraq and Syria.

Some recent IS AUMF proposals have attempted to better define what constitutes “associated forces,” or requires presidential reporting on or certification of newly designated associated forces, in an attempt to circumscribe the number of lawfully targeted entities and ensure congressional input into any expansion of such entities. The term “associated forces” would seem to apply to forces that are not part of IS forces but are fighting in concert with such forces. Some proposals, however, such as the President’s IS AUMF proposal, include language that seems to define both IS and associated forces, stating the term means “individuals and organizations fighting for, on behalf of, or alongside ISIL....” This language might be seen as overly broad and vague; Members of Congress may desire to more precisely define the term, ensuring that only those forces that are determined to directly engage in military operations in cooperation with IS forces are lawfully targeted under any IS AUMF. On the other hand, given the President’s stated policies of defending U.S. national security, stabilizing and maintaining a democratic Iraq, and supporting moderate Syrian groups fighting the Syrian forces of the Asad government, an IS AUMF could eschew the “associated forces” term in favor of targeting the Islamic State and any other individuals or groups that pose a threat to those policies.

Limitations and Conditions

In considering any proposals to limit the authority of an IS AUMF, for example, by prohibiting the use of ground forces or constraining operations to a certain geographic area, Congress must weigh competing interests. The President’s proposal would not allow “enduring offensive ground combat operations,” while several previous IS AUMF proposals prohibited the use of ground combat forces or operations with specific carve-outs regarding special forces and training, among other units/operations. Understanding the expected effect of these different provisions would likely be key to Congress’s decision on including them into a finalized IS AUMF. The limitation on the use of ground forces or prohibiting ground combat operations might, as some argue, significantly restrict the ability of the President and U.S. military leadership to prosecute conflict against the Islamic State in the manner they feel is most effective. Some in Congress might consider such restriction acceptable, however, if it is determined to avoid the involvement of the U.S. Armed Forces in another large-scale ground conflict following so closely upon the end of two such conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

A geographic limitation might hinder the President’s ability to strike IS and associated forces in countries other than Iraq and Syria, despite these forces’ proven ability to cross state borders when it suits their purposes. In addition, as more groups pledge to fight alongside the Islamic State, or identify themselves as parts of the Islamic State itself, in countries such as Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, it could be reasonably expected that the President might determine that U.S. military operations should expand outside Iraq and Syria in the future. Congress, however, might wish to include such a limitation to prevent a similar geographic expansion of military operations to the President’s expansion under the 2001 AUMF’s authority to several countries other than Afghanistan.

\textsuperscript{11} See “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest,” supra note 5.
Repealing Previous AUMFs and Sunset Provisions

The President’s proposal includes a three-year sunset provision automatically terminating the IS-specific authorization; H.J.Res. 27 would terminate the new authorization and repeal the 2001 AUMF after three years. There is concern that Congress placing time limitations on the campaigns against the Islamic State, as well as Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups targeted under the 2001 AUMF, would send the wrong message to such targeted groups and the world about U.S. resolve to defeat these groups. On the other hand, a sunset on authority to use military force could be utilized to ensure that the IS and 2001 AUMF authorizations are not interpreted to authorize the use of military force in perpetuity, and in a manner that some perceive as outside the scope and intent of the original authorizations. Given the Obama Administration’s continuing reliance on that authorization to conduct the current campaign against the Islamic State, for example, leaving the 2001 AUMF in place without amendment might be a continuing source of confusion and contention concerning presidential authority to use military force against the Islamic State, and in Iraq, Syria, and the Middle East/North Africa region in general. In any case, some argue, automatic terminations of authority might force Congress to reconsider previous AUMFs and their provisions in light of changed circumstances, amending and reauthorizing as Congress sees necessary.

Reporting and Certification

Although the President has provided information both publicly and in briefings to Members of Congress concerning the campaign against the Islamic State, Congress may decide to require the President to report to Congress both before a new authorization can enter into effect, and at regular intervals as the campaign moves forward. Ensuring Congress is being presented with substantive, up-to-date information might serve to mitigate concerns over unchecked expansion of the scope and duration of military operations taken under any IS AUMF. The President’s proposal would require general reporting on the actions taken under the authorization every six months, which is in line with the existing reporting requirements in the War Powers Resolution.12 Previous IS AUMF proposals have contained more frequent and detailed reporting requirements.13 Members of Congress might wish to have clear strategy presented before agreeing to authorize military force, requiring a report explaining such a strategy to Congress (such as the report required in H.J.Res. 30), and make it a condition of authorization. Periodic reporting could require updated information on the effectiveness of previously stated strategy, and the extent to which strategic goals are being achieved.

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12 See Section 4(c) of the War Powers Resolution (P.L. 93-148; 50 U.S.C. § 1543(c)).
13 See Table A-2 in the Appendix, below.
Appendix. Comparison of IS AUMF Proposals from the 113th Congress

Near the end of the 113th Congress, a number of Members proposed several new authorizations to use military force against the Islamic State:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bill or Resolution</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Sponsor</th>
<th>Date Introduced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S.J.Res. 43</td>
<td>Authorization for Use of Force Against the Organization Called the Islamic State</td>
<td>Senator James Inhofe</td>
<td>September 8, 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.J.Res. 44</td>
<td>Authorization for Use of Military Force against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant</td>
<td>Senator Tim Kaine</td>
<td>September 8, 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.J.Res. 125</td>
<td>Authorization for Use of Military Force Against ISIL Resolution</td>
<td>Representative Adam Schiff</td>
<td>September 16, 2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Each proposal was referred to either the House Foreign Affairs Committee or Senate Foreign Relations Committee, except H.J.Res. 128, which was referred to both the House Foreign Affairs and House Rules Committees, and S.J.Res. 47, which originated in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and was reported favorably to the full Senate.

The analysis provided below compares similar types of provisions included in IS AUMF proposals from the 113th Congress and issues related to those provisions. Table A-2 provides a breakdown of seven out of eight of these proposals by type of provision. Treatment of S.J.Res. 47 is included in the section entitled “Calls for a New AUMF and Congressional Action in the 113th Congress” in the main text of this report.

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14 This section does not include proposals introduced earlier in the 113th Congress that would, for example, repeal existing AUMFs or express a sense-of-Congress about military action in Iraq and/or Syria. Another proposal, H.J.Res. 127, introduced September 8, 2014, would recognize a state of war exists between the United States and the Islamic State, and authorize the use of military force against the Islamic State and associated forces.
Scope of Force and Military Activities Authorized

All but one of the proposed IS AUMFs listed above are substantially similar in their description of the scope of authorized force, stating that the President is authorized to use “necessary and appropriate force.” Two of the proposals grant the President the authority to determine what type and degree of force is necessary and appropriate, while four others state that “necessary and appropriate force” is authorized, without stating who is authorized to make such a determination. H.J.Res. 125 does not limit the scope of the use of force in this way, however, stating that the President is authorized to “use the Armed Forces of the United States,” without requiring such use of force to be “necessary and appropriate” as determined by the President or otherwise. While it might be expected that the President, as Commander in Chief, will make the “necessary and appropriate” determination in all cases regardless, explicitly granting the President that role in the authorization might preclude congressional challenges to presidential decision making after an authorization is enacted.

S.J.Res. 44 also specifies the scope of military activities authorized and the objective of those activities. Under this proposed IS AUMF, the President is authorized “to participate in a campaign of airstrikes ... to degrade and defeat ISIL.... ” Coupled with a general prohibition against the President’s use of ground troops against the Islamic State, this provision might be effective in preventing expansion of the military activities that the President might utilize against IS forces.

Targeted Entities

Each of the proposed IS AUMFs identifies the Islamic State (using that moniker or one of the ISIS/ISIL aliases) as the target of authorized U.S. military force. S.J.Res. 43 specifies “ISIL” but also “any successor organization” to the Islamic State. S.J.Res. 44 extends the authorization to IS-associated forces, subject to the President’s identification of such groups to Congress through a certification process set out in the resolution. While these provisions seem straightforwardly effective in ensuring they authorize force against the Islamic State, they might be considered less than sufficient in their coverage of the overall situation in Iraq and Syria. In late September, President Obama notified Congress of strikes against IS forces in Syria, but also made a separate notification of airstrikes in that country against the “Khorasan Group,” identified by the President as part of Al Qaeda. If Congress intends to enact an AUMF to direct the President to conduct military activities in Iraq and Syria, it might craft authorization language that can encompass non-IS associated groups, of which the Khorasan group might be an example. On the other hand, Congress might choose to deliberately exclude such groups from a new authorization.

H.R. 5415 includes the Islamic State as a target, but also covers a number of other named terrorist groups and expansive categories of terrorist threats. The lawful targets of the bill include those countries, organizations, or persons associated with or supporting terrorist groups, including al Qaeda and its regional affiliates, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, al Shabaab, Boko Haram, and any other emerging regional terrorist groups that share a common violent extremist ideology with such terrorist groups, regional affiliates, or emerging terrorist groups....

This broad language would significantly expand the authorized use of military force not only with regard to the current crisis with the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, but also in terms of U.S. counterterrorism activities worldwide. The authorization seems to include every state, other entity, or person that is part of or supporting a terrorist group, authorizing use of U.S. Armed
Forces against each. In this regard, H.R. 5415 would seem to essentially serve as an expansive replacement for the authorities in the 2001 AUMF, delinking U.S. military action from the September 11, 2001, attacks that serve as some limitation on the use of military force in that earlier authorization.

**Purpose of Authorization**

Most of the proposed IS AUMFs state that their purpose, at least in part, is to “defend the national security of the United States” against the Islamic State. Some of these proposals include additional elements, however, that expand the purpose past U.S. national security. S.J.Res. 44, for example, states that the authorization is also intended to protect the United States and “other countries” from terrorist attacks. Should the Islamic State expand its operations or shift its tactics toward an expansive transnational terrorist agenda, such authorization could prove to be far reaching. S.J.Res. 44 also authorizes the use of force to “protect individuals from acts of violence in clear contravention of international law and basic human rights....” Read as an additional purpose to authorize the use of military force against IS forces, this language might be read to allow the President to use U.S. Armed Forces to fight the Islamic State even in cases where the United States is not facing a threat to its security. If the additional language were interpreted to be a second purpose, the authorization could be read to include military action against actors other than the Islamic State in order to stop human rights violations, greatly increasing the scope of the authorization.

Another proposal, S.J.Res. 42, does not include the “defend the national security” language, instead stating the authorization’s purpose is “to prevent terrorist attacks on the people and interests of the United States and our allies.” While the focus on the prevention of terrorist attacks is arguably more limited than a general protection of undefined national security interests, the inclusion of protecting of U.S. “interests” and allies generally from such attacks could be seen as broadening the authorization beyond the “U.S. national security” language of other proposals. Limiting the purpose to preventing terrorist attacks also might narrow the authorization insofar as it would not necessarily include a broader purpose to “defeat” the Islamic State completely or stop the Islamic State’s ability to operate in a non-ally state such as Syria. H.R. 5415 has similar purpose language to that of S.J.Res. 42, but also states it is also the authorization’s purpose “to eliminate” a wide range of terrorist groups (explained in the “Targeted Entities” section, above). This purpose language, therefore, might not require a known threat to the United States or its allies prior to the President using military force against a terrorist group. Criteria for assessing the “defeat” or “elimination” of targeted entities are not included.

**Conditions on Use of Military Force**

Three of the proposals include authorization language that states the President has authority to use military force when the United States is part of an effort by the broader international community, or part thereof, to meet the threat posed by the Islamic State. H.R. 5415 states that the President may use military force “with the close consultation, coordination, and cooperation with NATO and regional allies....” S.J.Res. 44 authorizes the President to use military force “as part of a multinational coalition....” H.J.Res. 128 includes two authorizing provisions, one of which seems to be intended to operate when the U.N. Security Council has passed a resolution authorizing its membership to use force against the Islamic State. Although each of these proposals seems to indicate an intent to ensure the United States does not use military force without international
support, it is difficult to say whether the language might strictly require such multilateral action, or to what extent cooperation and coordinated action with other nations might be required.

**Limitations on Use of Military Force**

The proposed IS AUMFs contain a number of provisions intended to limit the authority to use military force. Some of the proposals include language excluding the deployment of U.S. ground troops from the President’s authority, except for certain types of military units or to carry out certain activities. These proposals include language excluding authority for “deployment of ground forces in a combat role,” “Armed Forces in direct combat operations,” “rotational ground forces,” or “United States ground combat forces.” Each of these descriptions might be interpreted to affect the President’s authority differently. Excluding deployment of ground forces “in a combat role” might be more restrictive than excluding forces that engage in “direct combat operations,” as there might be combat roles for U.S. Armed Forces that do not fall within the interpretation of the term “direct.” A number of types of ground combat forces might also fall outside the definition of “rotational” ground forces. These differences in language might result in authorizations with limitations on presidential authority of varied effectiveness. In addition, two of the proposed IS AUMFs provide exceptions to the limitation on ground troops. H.J.Res. 125 would allow deployment of ground troops that are “special operations forces” or forces “deployed in a training, advisory, or intelligence capacity.” While these exceptions might still exclude most U.S. Armed Forces units from deployment under the proposed AUMF, the overall number of troops that could be deployed under the exceptions could be sizeable, and their roles could place them in harm’s way in many cases. S.J.Res. 44 also includes exceptions to the ban on ground troops, allowing deployments for military assistance and training, protection or rescue of U.S. Armed Forces or citizens, and “limited operations against high value targets.”

H.J.Res. 125 and S.J.Res. 44 also include geographic limitations to their respective overall authority to use military force. Both limit that authority to Iraq and Syria. In light of the Islamic State’s expansive ambitions and operations close to the borders of Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, and potentially other countries, such language could prove more restrictive in an evolving conflict than might be initially assumed. In the context of implementation of recent AUMFs, especially the 2001 AUMF, such limitations seem to be important, as successive Presidents have interpreted the 2001 AUMF to allow for use of military force in multiple countries that might not have been contemplated when Congress enacted the original authorization. S.J.Res. 44 also limits any use of force against IS associated forces, stating that there is no authority to use force against those forces unless the President identifies such forces in periodic reports to Congress. Again, this seems to be a response to the executive branch’s implementation of the 2001 AUMF; both President Bush and Obama have independently interpreted that authority to extend to associated forces that are “co-belligerents” with Al Qaeda and the Taliban, including forces in multiple countries outside the original target of U.S. military action, Afghanistan.

Five of the proposed IS AUMFs include a provision that automatically terminates their respective authorizations after a certain period of time, with sunset provisions of 120 days, one year, 18 months, two years, and three years.

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15 H.J.Res. 125 states that the limitation does not apply to foreign military training, although this type of activity would not be expected to raise questions concerning the authority to use military force.
S.J.Res. 44 also includes an interpretive provision, stating that its authorization should not be construed as “authorizing support for force in support of, or in cooperation with, the national government of Syria ... or its security services.... ”

Repeal of Previous AUMFs

Four of the proposals would repeal the 2002 AUMF authorizing the use of military force against Iraq. Two of these four, H.J.Res. 125 and H.J.Res. 128, would also repeal the 2001 AUMF with a delay, with repeal taking effect 18 months and two years after enactment, respectively. The Obama Administration had recently adopted the position both that the 2002 AUMF could be repealed without detriment to U.S. Armed Forces or U.S. interests, and that the 2001 AUMF could be amended or repealed once the planned U.S. Armed Forces withdrawal from Afghanistan was completed and a bilateral security agreement with Afghanistan is finalized.\textsuperscript{16} These repeal provisions seem to generally correspond with these recent Administration positions. Recent statements by the Obama Administration and the President’s September 23, 2014, notification to Congress of strikes against IS forces, however, indicate that the President considers the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs as authority to conduct a military campaign against the Islamic State as well as other Al Qaeda-related groups. Given this presidential application of existing AUMFs, the repeal provisions might take on the role of repudiating the President’s positions on his existing authority to use military force against the Islamic State and other terrorist groups. Repeal of these AUMFs could be seen as an indication that Congress disagrees with the President’s interpretation of his existing authorities to use force and that it intends to replace his existing authority with a possibly narrower authority in an IS AUMF.

Reporting and Certification Requirements

Five of the proposed IS AUMFs require presidential reporting to Congress to include various information, including

- the Administration’s strategy for military action against the Islamic State and in Iraq and Syria generally, and implementation of or changes to the strategy;
- the status of military actions taken under a given authorization;
- descriptions of plans for further military action, as well as redeployment of U.S. Armed Forces after military action is completed;
- expenditures made pursuant to the authorization, or the budgetary effects of military action taken; and
- the status and actions of any multinational coalition cooperating with the United States to engage the Islamic State and other groups militarily.

S.J.Res. 44 requires the President to report to Congress every 90 days on his identification of IS associated forces in order to gain the authority to use military force against such associated forces. In order for the President to have authority to use military force without a relevant U.N. Security Council resolution, H.J.Res. 128 requires the President to certify that the United States

\textsuperscript{16} See testimony of Mary McLeod and Stephen Preston, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, hearing on Authorization for Use of Military Force, 113\textsuperscript{nd} Cong., 2\textsuperscript{nd} sess., May 21, 2014.
A New Authorization for Use of Military Force Against the Islamic State: In Brief

sought approval of such a resolution, that the Security Council is unlikely to approve such a resolution, and that the President has instead sought to build a broad coalition of nations to counter the IS threat.

War Powers Resolution and Expedited Consideration Provisions

Each of the proposals states that its respective provision authorizing the use of military force is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution (WPR; P.L. 93-148; 50 U.S.C. §§1541-1548). Section 5(b) of the WPR states that the President shall withdraw U.S. Armed Forces from active or imminent hostilities within 60 days after a presidential notification of the introduction of U.S. Armed Forces into such hostilities is made or is required to be made under Section 4(a)(1) of the WPR, unless Congress has enacted a declaration of war or authorization to use military force, among other exceptions. The statement that these proposals are intended to act as authorization under the WPR might indicate Congress’s desire to approve the President’s current military actions, within the scope and limitations explained above. Although the President ordered the first airstrikes against IS forces in early August, there does not seem to be clear consensus among experts or Members of Congress on when the 60-day period began running, and whether it is running currently. The President’s reliance on the existing AUMFs to conduct military operations against the Islamic State and other groups in Iraq and Syria, if accepted by Congress, would have stopped any running of the 60-day clock, whether or not a new IS AUMF is enacted, as there would be existing congressional authorization for his actions.

Section 6 of the WPR provides for expedited consideration of legislative proposals introduced in accordance with Section 5(b); it is not apparent that any of the current IS AUMF proposals are currently being subjected to these expedited procedures. Although the WPR sets out these procedures in legislation, such procedural provisions do not take precedence over the rulemaking and procedural prerogatives of either house of Congress, and each house maintains the authority to enforce its own rules at its discretion. H.J.Res. 128 sets out its own procedures for expedited consideration of a further resolution authorizing military force against the Islamic State, if such resolution meets H.J.Res. 128’s definition of a “qualified resolution.” The process is described in Table A-2 below, in the “Expedited Consideration” section.

17 For more information, see CRS Report 98-888, “Fast-Track” or Expedited Procedures: Their Purposes, Elements, and Implications, by Christopher M. Davis; CRS Report RS20234, Expedited or “Fast-Track” Legislative Procedures, by Christopher M. Davis; CRS Report RL30599, Expedited Procedures in the House: Variations Enacted Into Law, by Christopher M. Davis.
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<tr>
<td>“The President is authorized ... to use all necessary and appropriate force”</td>
<td>“The President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United States as the President determines to be necessary and appropriate”</td>
<td>“The President is authorized to use the United States Armed Forces as the President determines to be necessary and appropriate”</td>
<td>Same, except subject to conditions (see Reporting/ Certification row, below) and enactment of a second joint resolution under expedited procedures</td>
<td>“The President is authorized to use appropriate force”</td>
<td>“the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force”</td>
<td>“the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force”</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Types of military action</td>
<td>none specified</td>
<td>none specified</td>
<td>none specified</td>
<td>none specified</td>
<td>none specified</td>
<td>none specified</td>
<td>none specified</td>
<td>“to participate in a campaign of airstrikes in Iraq, and if the President deems necessary, in Syria, to degrade and defeat ISIL.”</td>
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<td>authorized</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>The resolution would also authorize the President to “provide military equipment and training to forces fighting ISIL in Iraq or Syria”</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Target of use of military force</strong></td>
<td>“those countries, organizations, or persons associated with or supporting terrorist groups, including al Qaeda and its regional affiliates, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, al Shabaab, Boko Haram, and any other emerging regional terrorist groups that share a common violent extremist ideology with such terrorist groups, regional affiliates, or emerging terrorist groups”</td>
<td>“Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)”</td>
<td>“Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)”</td>
<td>“Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)”</td>
<td>“Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)”</td>
<td>“Islamic State (or ‘IS’), formally known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, as well as any successor organization”</td>
<td>“Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)”, as well as ISIL-associated forces, subject to requirements in Section 4 (see below)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Purpose</strong></td>
<td>“to eliminate all such terrorist groups and prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States or its allies by such terrorist groups, countries, organization, or persons”</td>
<td>“to defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)”</td>
<td>none specified</td>
<td>“to defend the national security of the United States against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL); and enforce a United Nations Security Council resolution” that authorizes a multilateral coalition to take several types of action against ISIL</td>
<td>“to defend the national security of the United States against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)”</td>
<td>“to prevent terrorist attacks on the people and interests of the United States and our allies”</td>
<td>“to defend the national security of the United States against the threat posed by the organization called the Islamic State (or ‘IS’), formally known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, as well as any successor organization”</td>
<td>“to protect the United States and other countries from terrorist attacks by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and in order to protect individuals from acts of violence in clear contravention of international law and basic human rights”</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Geographic limitation</strong></td>
<td>none specified</td>
<td>none specified</td>
<td>“authority ... shall be confined to the territory of the Republic of Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic” Limitation does not apply to foreign military training activities</td>
<td>none specified</td>
<td>none specified</td>
<td>none specified</td>
<td>none specified</td>
<td>Authorization applies to Iraq and Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military unit limitation</strong></td>
<td>none specified</td>
<td>none specified</td>
<td>“does not include the authority for the deployment of ground forces in a combat role” Limitation does not apply to “special operations forces or other forces that may be deployed in a training, advisory, or intelligence capacity”</td>
<td>none specified</td>
<td>use of U.S. Armed Forces authorized “other than the use of such Armed Forces in direct ground combat operations”</td>
<td>“does not include authorization for the use of rotational ground forces”</td>
<td>none specified</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Targeting associated forces limitation</strong></td>
<td>none specified</td>
<td>none specified</td>
<td>none specified</td>
<td>none specified</td>
<td>none specified</td>
<td>none specified</td>
<td>none specified</td>
<td>“does not include ... use of United States ground combat forces, except for [military assistance and training] or as necessary for the protection or rescue of members of the United States Armed Forces or United States citizens..., or for limited operations against high value targets”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Government of Syria limitation</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>“Nothing in this resolution shall be construed as ... authorizing support for force in support of, or in cooperation with, the national government of Syria ... or its security services”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunset</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>120 days after date of enactment</td>
<td>18 months after date of enactment</td>
<td>2 years</td>
<td>3 years after date of enactment</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>1 year from date of enactment</td>
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<tr>
<td>AUMF Repeal</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>Resolution would repeal 2002 AUMF</td>
<td>Resolution would repeal 2002 AUMF immediately, and repeal the 2001 AUMF 18 months after date of enactment</td>
<td>Resolution would repeal 2002 AUMF immediately, and repeal the 2001 AUMF 2 years after date of enactment</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>Resolution would repeal 2002 AUMF</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reporting/Certification</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>Not later than 60 days after enactment, President is required to report on “status of all actions taken”; “description of all proposed actions”; “status of engagement of allies of the United States and international coalitions in combating” ISIL; and “estimated budgetary effects of actions proposed”</td>
<td>none specified</td>
<td>“The President shall, at least once every 60 days” after enactment, report on relevant matters including actions taken and planned actions under the authorization</td>
<td>none specified</td>
<td>President must certify that the United States has sought, but the United Nations Security Council has not approved, a resolution authorizing the use of force, and is unlikely to; and that the President has sought to build a broad international coalition to counter ISIL</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>Not later than 15 days after enactment, President is required to submit comprehensive strategy to defeat the Islamic State; not later than 90 days after the first report is required, President must report on implementation of the strategy; any substantive change to strategy requires an immediate additional report</td>
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<tr>
<td>Consultation</td>
<td>none specified</td>
<td>none specified</td>
<td>none specified</td>
<td>“The President shall consult on a regular basis with the congressional committees of jurisdiction to provide updated information on actions being taken pursuant to this joint resolution in either public or closed sessions”</td>
<td>none specified</td>
<td>none specified</td>
<td>none specified</td>
<td>none specified</td>
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In both cases, every 60 days the President must report on uses of lethal force and their circumstances, civilian casualties resulting from such use of force, estimate of expenditures resulting from the use of force, and planning for redeployment of U.S. Armed Forces after military action against ISIL is completed.
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<tr>
<td>War Powers Resolution</td>
<td>Bill states authorization section is “intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution”</td>
<td>Resolution states authorization section is “intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution”</td>
<td>(in both cases) Resolution states that authorization sections are “intended to constitute specific authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution”</td>
<td>Resolution states authorization section is “intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Expedited Consideration</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Provides expedited consideration for a second resolution, if such resolution is introduced by the majority or minority leader in the House or Senate within the next legislative day after a required presidential certification is submitted. In both houses, second resolution is to be placed on the calendar, considered within one legislative day, debated for a maximum of 20 hours, and voted upon immediately following debate; passage of resolution in one chamber requires immediate action by the second chamber on the resolution received.</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
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</table>

Source: Congress.gov.

* H.J.Res. 128 contains two separate authorization provisions. Section 3 of the resolution operates when the U.N. Security Council has adopted a resolution authorizing the use of military force against the Islamic State; Section 4 operates when no such resolution has been adopted. Section 4 does not in fact authorize the use of military force, but instead creates a process of presidential reporting and certification and expedited consideration procedures for a separate resolution to be introduced after such reporting and certification has been made to Congress. The table therefore sets out the operative provisions and language in H.J.Res. 128 in two columns to separate the operative language of the two authorization sections. For provisions that apply no matter which authorization section is operative, or where the resolution does not contain the type of provision being explained, the two columns are combined.
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mweed@crs.loc.gov, 7-4589