NONALIGNMENT: CUBA AND YUGOSLAVIA IN THE
NONALIGNED MOVEMENT 1979-1986

THESIS

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This study is an attempt to clarify whether Cuba and Yugoslavia adhere to the role expectations of the nonaligned movement. Chapter I introduces the criteria for nonalignment which are also considered as the role expectations for members of the nonaligned movement. Chapter II focuses on whether Cuba and Yugoslavia do fulfill the role expectations of the nonaligned movement.

Chapter III discusses the voting behavior of Cuba and Yugoslavia on issues important to the nonaligned movement in the United Nations' General Assembly. Chapter IV concludes this study with the major finding that Yugoslavia adheres strictly to the role expectations of the nonaligned movement while Cuba's nonaligned status is questionable.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The concept of nonalignment evolved as a phenomenon in international politics as a refusal by newly independent nations to enter into any kind of bloc for military purposes. The nonaligned movement's (NAM) appearance was a response to the global situation after the Second World War. The most significant factor that contributed immensely to the formation of NAM was the bipolar configuration of power in the world. Another factor was the collapse of colonial empires in a large section of the world. The attainment of political independence encouraged a group of nations that do not want to be aligned to any of the existing superpowers to come together. These nations understood that the future progress of their respective countries would be connected largely with their ability to assume independent positions in the international arena.

There are differing views about the exact date marking the origin of the nonaligned movement. Some scholars of nonalignment such as Misra (1982, pp. 28-4) traced the evolution of nonalignment to the late 1940s when India, under Nehru, sought to have a vigorous independent foreign
policy. Misra argues that nonalignment was chosen an instrument of foreign policy by its founders, such as India, in order to give fuller meaning and content to their newly achieved independence. According to Brutent (1984, p. 20), the origins of the nonaligned movement date back to the Bandung Conference of Asian and African countries held April 18-25, 1955. In this landmark conference, 29 states from the two continents participated. The 1955 meeting was symbolically significant for two reasons. First, the conference took a collective action in the area of basic human rights by decisively condemning the practice of subjugating peoples to foreign enslavement, domination, and exploitation. Second, the conference also discussed unconditional fulfillment of a newly independent nation's right to self-determination. It is necessary to point out that this was the first time in history that newly independent nations of Asia and Africa met to discuss common problems affecting their progress (Brutent, 1984, p. 32). Although the Bandung Conference did not officially mark the origin of NAM, it represented a step in the formation of the movement (Willetts, 1978, p. 1). According to Willetts, the NAM was not widely recognized as a coherent set of principles until nations came together and articulated their common interests and similarity of outlook in the 1961 Belgrade Conference. This summit, as
Willetts asserts, originated from the cooperation between Nkrumah of Ghana, Tito of Yugoslavia, Nasser of Egypt, and Nehru of India since 1956. The position of this study regarding the various interpretations of the origin of nonalignment is that there is a distinction between the origin of nonalignment as a concept and the NAM as an organization. The NAM was formed organizationally at the 1961 Belgrade Conference in Yugoslavia. The concept of nonalignment within the context of the foreign policy of newly independent nations after World War II could be said to have originated in India on September 7, 1946, when Jawaharlal Nehru declared, "We propose, as far as possible, to keep away from the power politics of groups aligned against one another which have led in the past to world wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster scale" (Nehru, 1961, pp. 2-3).

It is interesting to note that when the NAM was in its embryonic stage of development in the late 1950s, it received hostile reaction from the Soviet Union and from the United States. For instance, the United States Secretary of State Dulles at that point characterized nonalignment as "an immoral and shortsighted conception" (Crabb, 1965, p. 172). Crabb further asserted that attitudes toward nonalignment on Capitol Hill, in the press, and among the American leadership as a whole were
antagonistic and that Dulles' assertion that nonalignment was "immoral" unquestionably described the dominant conviction of the American leadership and the prevailing sentiment in Congress at that time. In a similar vein, the Soviet Union under the leadership of Stalin refused to accept the newly freed Asian countries, including India, as genuinely independent (Prasad, 1969, p. 56). However, it must be pointed out that between 1953 and 1954, after Stalin's death, the Soviet Union began to have a relationship with third world countries such as India. The United States has also changed its attitude towards the NAM. For instance, past American presidents from John Kennedy to Ronald Reagan have always sent goodwill messages to participants attending most NAM summit meetings. This gesture of goodwill is evidenced in a letter dated February 16, 1983, from President Ronald Reagan to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. President Reagan expressed the thought that the United States remains committed in 1987 to the principles upon which nonalignment is based.

Statement of Problem

Cuba and Yugoslavia were among the founding leaders of the nonaligned movement. Though both countries belong to the socialist camp, each has evolved a substantially different position in world politics. Cuba's and Yugoslavia's contrasting positions in world politics are
evident in their perspectives of the world. Yugoslavia insists on the policy that the developing countries should maintain an independent posture in world affairs because of the power politics between the United States and the Soviet Union. Cuba espouses and strives to popularize the idea that the Soviet Union is the "natural ally" of countries which are nonaligned. In view of this obvious difference between Cuba and Yugoslavia concerning the role expectations of the NAM, this study is primarily concerned with the following core questions of investigation:

1. Between Cuba and Yugoslavia, who is the dominant leader of the nonaligned movement? Leadership in this context is defined as to whether either Cuba or Yugoslavia is at the helm of affairs in the NAM and at the same time makes binding decisions.

2. Do Cuba and Yugoslavia adhere to the role expectations of the NAM?

3. How do Cuba and Yugoslavia vote on issues important to the NAM in the United Nations?

4. Is the nonaligned movement a factor of world politics? The nonaligned movement as a factor of world politics in this context refers to whether members of the NAM as a group do participate or contribute in the activities of the United Nations and in world politics.
One of the key concepts of this study is role expectations. Role expectations refer to a set of obligations and duties which the occupant of a social position ought to display (Sarbin and Allen, 1954, pp. 488-506). In this study the five criteria of nonalignment stated later in this chapter are the role expectations of the nonaligned movement. These role expectations broadly specify the ideal required behavior of Cuba and Yugoslavia in the nonaligned movement and in world politics. The crucial question this study seeks to uncover is whether Cuba and Yugoslavia do conform to these role expectations.

The Stated Goals of the Nonaligned Movement

The stated goals of the nonaligned movement can be divided into political and economic. In the political sphere the movement in the period between 1961 and 1973 was solely concerned with and involved in the decolonization process. The other aspect of the movement's political goals is consistent support to national liberation movements and elimination of neocolonialism. In the political sphere, the NAM has also made important contributions in helping to maintain the state of equilibrium in the international system. The word "equilibrium" used in this context means a situation or condition in the international system when major actors in
the system are satisfied with the existing political and economic arrangement. The state of equilibrium does not mean equal distribution of power in the international system; rather it means absence of a major worldwide conflict and a challenger to the existing international arrangement (Gilpin, 1985, p. 10). The NAM partly contributed to the state of equilibrium in the world in the following ways. First, many countries have refused to join the blocs because the NAM serves as an alternative. Second, most of the nonaligned countries in the United Nations have encouraged the United Nations to consider the problem of security from a new angle, not from the aspect of conventional alliances of a military nature but from the aspect of establishing a new international community based on recognizing the legitimate rights of nations, and peaceful co-existence among countries regardless of social systems (Komatina, 1980, pp. 28-30).

Disarmament is an issue area that has received the attention of the nonaligned. The NAM has made positive contributions toward disarmament. In 1961, the nonaligned conference dispatched President Kwame Nkrumah and Prime Minister Nehru to Moscow and President Sukarno of Indonesia to Washington to express to the Soviet and American leaders the deep concerns of the NAM toward the arms race. In addition, in 1978, the first Special Session of the U.N.
General Assembly on Disarmament was convened by the nonaligned states which flatly declared "that mankind is confronted with an unprecedented threat of self-extinction arising from massive competitive arms race" (Jaipal, 1983, p. 164).

Another political goal of the NAM is the need for a "new information order." The nonaligned nations felt that the Western industrialized countries have dominated the media industry, which has been utilized to create a situation in the nonaligned countries which Herbert Schiller, Professor of Communication at the University of California, San Diego, described as "cultural imperialism." Cultural imperialism refers to the manipulation of peoples in developing countries by sophisticated information technologies which include movies, television programs, radio broadcasts, magazines, records, and advertising programs which will create an attitude among the people that is conducive to foreign interests (Schiller and Sivaramskrishnam, 1977, pp. 32-45). The establishment of the Nonaligned News Agency pool is an attempt by the NAM to cut back on the nonaligned dependence on the western media as a source of information (Willetts, 1978, p. 43). The Nonaligned News Agency pool started in January, 1975, when the Yugoslav Agency Tanjug agreed to take stories from
other countries, translate, and broadcast them in English, French, and Spanish (Mojosov, 1975, pp. 21-22).

It is interesting to note that since 1973, there has been a shift in the goals of the NAM from politics to economics. In the economic sphere, the nonaligned strive to promote a favorable relationship among their members and the developed nations. The major goal of the NAM in this direction is to evolve a symmetrical economic relationship between the less developed and advanced industrialized nations in such a way that their interactions and transactions will prevent any hostility or armed aggression. It is interesting to note that the economic relationship which the nonaligned seek to promote is a resemblance of Keohane and Nye's idea of complex interdependence. "Complex interdependence" in world politics refers to situations characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or actors in different countries (Keohane and Nye, 1977, pp. 8-9). According to Keohane and Nye, complex interdependence is characterized by a situation whereby nations, due to their political and economic transactions, are tied together to the extent that their interactions make it unlikely that they will go to war against each other. For instance, this kind of complex relationship may be said to exist between the United States and Canada and between Cuba and the Soviet Union. The kind
of interdependence which the NAM seeks to promote is one in which economic issues will be the essential feature of the relationship instead of military or security issues.

The nonaligned seek the attainment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO). The call for a NIEO is borne out of the condition that most members of the NAM are poor due to the asymmetrical trade relations with industrialized nations, to the lack of technology for growth, due to being the only sources of raw materials, and due to their functioning in a world capitalist structure which conditions the path of their development (Caporoso, 1978, pp. 1-12). Sanu (1978, pp. 3-4) argues that the NIEO which the nonaligned nations strive towards is characterized by the following: a reasonable share by the nonaligned countries of world production, investment, trade, technology, and a restructure of current international financial relations to allow transfer of resources and technology to places where they are necessary.

This situation of an asymmetrical economic relationship between the third world and developed countries is confirmed by the fact that during the 1960s in the developed countries the income per person grew by more than $650 while in the developing countries, the amount was about $40 per person (Kerim, 1978, p. 181). In addition, according to Kerim (1978), a Yugoslav political scientist,
the share of developing countries in world trade dropped from 21.3% in 1960 to 17.6% in 1970. Another important contribution of the NAM in the economic sphere was that its deliberations and declarations were in part a stimulus to the formation of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) which held its first conference in Geneva in 1964. This conference made a passionate appeal to developed nations to engage in reciprocal trade with the developing nations. All of the UNCTAD documents pointed to the fact that the underlying course of the developing nations' economic backwardness is the existing pattern of international economic relations within the capitalist economic system from the view of a soviet scholar (Chernyshev, 1972, p. 79).

The nonaligned countries as a group have become a major world force. In 1961, when the movement was formed organizationally, there were 25 members in the movement, but at the 1986 summit meeting held in Harare, Zimbabwe, there were 101 member countries. The NAM now controls two-thirds of the votes at the U.N. General Assembly sessions. The extent of NAM's size and growth is exemplified by the fact that between 1976 and 1986, 20 socialist and nonsocialist countries have joined the movement.
The Criteria for Nonalignment

The concept of nonalignment does not prohibit nations in the movement from pursuing peaceful goals in the interest of the development of their countries. In its internal dimension, nonalignment does not impinge on a nation's right to establish and maintain its own institutions and to support a way of life in accordance with wishes and culture of its population without external pressure (Sanu, 1978, p. 8). In a nutshell, nonalignment recognizes the need for economic and other aid but insists that such aid be given without strings attached. Nonalignment has many scores of meanings attached to it to the extent that sometimes it lacks a precise definition. It is necessary to point out the criteria of nonalignment which for want of anything else has become the accepted definition of a nonaligned country. The following are the criteria of nonalignment.

1. Independent policy based on peaceful co-existence with different political and social systems.
2. Nonmembership in multilateral military alliances related to great power conflicts.
3. Consistent support to national liberation movements.
4. Nonmembership in regional defense pacts associated with the superpower conflict.
5. Refusal of foreign military bases negotiated within the context of superpower conflict.

These stated conditions were drawn and adopted at the June, 1961, Cairo preparatory meeting of the nonaligned as criteria for invitation to the first summit meeting of the nonaligned which was held on September 1, 1961, in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. The June, 1961, meeting was attended by ambassadors from 19 countries to prepare for the Belgrade summit (Jackson, 1983, p. 41). It is pertinent to note that these conditions are flexible, vague, and not enforceable. This is because literal application of these conditions would have excluded some countries as members of NAM (Rajan, 1980, p. 46). According to Rajan (1980), about one-sixth of the Belgrade participants and one-third of countries that attended summit meetings in Cairo in 1964 and Zambia in 1970 had military links with a great power.

A Review of the Literature

A survey of nonalignment literature indicates that there is a broad diversity of viewpoints among nonaligned scholars about the evolution, scope, and role of nonalignment in world politics. However, an overview of the literature of nonalignment reveals the fact that it can be classified into four broad categories: studies that trace the historical development of nonalignment, nonalignment and neutrality, nonalignment in the
contemporary world, and the possible linkage between nonalignment and socialism. These categories are not mutually exclusive because sometimes they are complementary.

Misra's work (1982, pp. 1-103) is an attempt to understand the relationship between nonalignment and neutrality. There has been conceptual controversy about the relationship between nonalignment and neutrality. Misra's contention is that nonalignment is not neutrality. Misra asserts that neutrality is a legal status while nonalignment is a political one. Misra traced the origin of neutrality as an integral part of the law of warfare, the legal basis of which is mostly to be found in the 1907 Hague Convention. The Hague Convention of 1907 prohibits a neutral state from participation in armed conflict. According to Misra, a neutral state is "obliged to abstain from participation in an armed conflict and also keep away from assisting any one of the parties to a conflict who on their part are required to respect the territory of neutral countries which includes the abstention from using the territory of neutral countries for the movement of troops and ammunition of war" (Misra, 1982, p. 31). Based on this notion of neutrality, Misra argued that the distinction between nonalignment and neutrality lies in the fact that nonalignment is an active policy which seeks to take a
variety of initiatives to transform the international system in a manner which serves their national interests. Misra further pointed out that the main concern of all neutrals is nonparticipation in a war between other states. It is interesting to note that the word neutrality has connotations unacceptable to nonaligned countries. Nehru reacted vehemently to the characterization of India's foreign policy as neutrality as "total misapprehension" (Ogley, 1970, p. 10). Nehru further asserted that neutrality is an expression of bad odor; it means a country that sits on the fence and cannot decide between right and wrong.

Mates (1972, pp. 17-74) is concerned about the origins of nonalignment. Mates, Director of the Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, holds the view that nonalignment is a tendency toward independence and an answer to the formation of two blocs. According to Mates, the term "nonalignment" came into use late in the 1950s in newspapers and government statements (Mates, 1972, p. 75). Mates further asserts that the expression "nonalignment" in the 1950s was mainly used in official documents as a term denoting the nonaligned countries rather than their policies, their orientations, or their basic demands. In addition, Mates argues that nonalignment
policy was described in terms of independence, autonomy, or peaceful co-existence.

Jackson's work (1983, pp. 1-315) views nonalignment in contemporary world politics. Jackson, a career foreign service officer at the U.S. Department of State, analyzed how nonalignment has emerged as an international reality in relation with the United Nations and the super powers. According to Jackson, the nonaligned movement has evolved as a potent force in global politics because of its increased membership and because of its control of the agenda of the U.N. General Assembly by acting as the largest voting bloc in the U.N. There are also other writers who have commented on the contemporary state of nonalignment.

Willetts' work (1978, pp. 1-58) views nonalignment as the origin of a third world alliance and as an activist ideology. Willetts argues that despite the waning of the Cold War the nonaligned nations still meet every three years in their usual summit conference of heads of states of nonaligned countries. To some extent, Willetts' work also traces the diplomatic origins of nonalignment. In this regard, Willetts argues that nonalignment "was not born until 1961 as a coherent group of ideas propounded by a group of likeminded states" (Willetts, 1978, p. 14).
Prasad (1969), Professor of South Asian Studies, Indian School of International Studies, is concerned about the general historical development of nonalignment as a movement. Prasad asserts that the emergence of India as an independent country in 1947, which marked the beginning of the anticolonial revolution in the postwar world, also marked the emergence of nonalignment as a phenomenon of world politics (Prasad, 1969, p. 79). In addition, Prasad subscribes to the view that the concept of nonalignment has ideological underpinning because the nonaligned have common experiences, ideals, and aspirations and came together as a result of these shared common experiences.

Mazuri, Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan, is also concerned about the general historical development of nonalignment as a movement and the future of the movement in world politics. Mazuri argues that there may be a possibility that the Arab world, as a result of wealth derived from petrodollars, may in the future play a very vital role in the leadership of the nonaligned world which will perhaps surpass the role played by India and other founding fathers of the NAM (Mazuri, 1980, pp. 1-20).

There is one school of thought which is exploring the possible linkage between nonalignment and socialism. Bondarevsky and Sofinky (1975, p. 50; 1976) examined the
evolution of nonalignment in terms of international class analysis and espoused the idea that socialist countries and the nonaligned countries share similar material conditions. This school of thought also subscribes to Cuba's thesis that the Soviet Union is the "natural ally" of the nonaligned world. One of the arguments of this school of thought is that the nonaligned should not maintain an equal distance between the United States and the Soviet Union rather the nonaligned had to know who were on their side and who their opponents were based on history. The "equidistance theory," as used in this context, is the view that the nonaligned countries should maintain a certain distance from the superpowers.

Methods of Data Collection

The data utilized in this study were collected from various sources. One of the major sources of data is the Transdex of 1979-1985, which contains information on the major events of the nonaligned movement in the years examined in this study. Other data were collected from journals and books containing information on the activities of the NAM. These sources provided information which was used to analyze the core question of investigation in this study.
Organization of the Study

This study is an attempt to unfold whether Cuba and Yugoslavia fulfill the role expectations of the nonaligned movement. Chapter II of this study focuses on the question of whether either Cuba and Yugoslavia is the leader of the NAM. Subsequently, this chapter will examine the crucial question of whether Cuba and Yugoslavia adhere to the role expectations of the NAM by examining the overt behavior of Cuba and Yugoslavia in the NAM, and their relationships with the Soviet Union since the NAM principles prohibit the fostering of the political interest of a superpower while in pursuance of the goals of the movement.

Chapter III represents an effort to examine claims that the NAM is no longer in operation and hence no longer a factor in world politics by investigating the activities of the NAM in the United Nations (U.N.), a forum where all politically independent nations meet. This chapter also focuses on how Cuba and Yugoslavia fulfill the role expectation of NAM in the United Nations by examining their voting behavior in the United Nations on selected issues important to the nonaligned movement. Chapter IV summarizes and concludes this study.
CHAPTER BIBLIOGRAPHY


CHAPTER II

CUBA AND YUGOSLAVIA IN THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT

Cuba and Yugoslavia are two important members of the nonaligned movement which apart from belonging to the socialist camp have similar and contrasting positions in world politics. The objective of this chapter is to address two core questions of investigation:

1. Is either Cuba or Yugoslavia the dominant leader of the NAM? Leadership as used in this context refers to which country or personality at the helm of affairs in the NAM makes binding decisions.

2. Do Cuba and Yugoslavia adhere to the role expectations of the nonaligned movement? This chapter approaches the first question of investigation by describing the organizational structure of the NAM with a view to determine whether Cuba or Yugoslavia occupies a superordinate position in the NAM.

The leadership of the NAM has become a political issue because of the political feud between Cuba and Yugoslavia since 1973 over Cuba's notion that the U.S.S.R. is the "natural ally" of the NAM.

In addition, this chapter deals with the second question of investigation about whether Cuba and Yugoslavia
fulfill the role expectations of the NAM by assessing the overt behavior of Cuba and Yugoslavia in the NAM and their relationships with the Soviet Union since NAM principles prohibit a member from fostering the political interest of a superpower while in pursuance of the goals of the movement.

The Organizational Structure of the Nonaligned Movement

The nonaligned movement in its formative years did not have established concrete organizational procedures because of controversy among its members about institutionalization of the movement. During the 1960s, the NAM operated as an ad hoc group of countries which met occasionally for summit conferences with limited communication between nonaligned countries. It is necessary to mention that those countries led by India and Yugoslavia which are against the institutionalization of the NAM argue that such a measure will give the impression to the world that the NAM constitutes a third bloc. Marshal Tito argued that "a new force, not a bloc, had been created and it can play an enormous role both now and in the future. . . We have not created a third bloc but rather a collective force which will act through the U.N." (Tito, 1961a, 1961b).

Countries in favor of institutionalization of the NAM such as Tanzania posited that the movement needed an
organizational structure with institutionalized procedures to coordinate its activities. However, it was at the third summit in Lusaka in 1970 that the NAM took the first steps to establish an institutional structure by appointing President Kaunda as spokesman for the group until the next summit (Willetts, 1981, p. 34).

As a result, since 1970, the leader of the host country of each summit has been recognized as president or chairman of the nonaligned until the following summit. During his tenure of office as Chairman of NAM, the chairman's country serves as secretariat and headquarters of the nonaligned. The NAM organizational structure has other important institutionalized offices which are the Coordinating Bureau, the Conference of Heads of State or Government, the Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and offices for expert and technical groups which are concerned with problems facing the movement and finding solutions to them.

The Coordinating Bureau is a very important and influential office with the expressed functions of supervision of the deliberations of the movement, preparing an agenda for the next meeting, and coordinating policy positions among the nonaligned at the United Nations. Yugoslavia played a pivotal role in strengthening the Coordinating Bureau of the movement after its creation. In
1976, the Yugoslavs presented a proposal which was adopted and which enlarged the composition of members of the bureau from 17 to 25 members. The Yugoslav initiative was aimed at democratization of the decision-making in the NAM. The impact of the Yugoslav initiative was that it brought substantial change in the character of the Coordinating Bureau by making it less of an administrative and technical executive committee and more of a major political decision making body (Willetts, 1981, p. 34).

The Office of the Conference of Ministers of Nonaligned Nations meets every three years about a year before each summit. It is interesting to note that the position of Cuba and Yugoslavia in the NAM organizational structure is not defined. This is partly because the organizational structure has no permanent members. In addition, the current chairman of the NAM also serves as chairperson of the Coordinating Bureau, which is a very important organ of the NAM. The other members of the Coordinating Bureau are elected by the entire membership of the NAM. In view of the organizational structure of the NAM, participation of Cuba and Yugoslavia depends on their election as chairman of the NAM or as members of the Coordinating Bureau. In 1979, Cuba was both the chairman of the NAM and the Coordinating Bureau. In reaction to Cuba's position as chairman of the movement, Yugoslavia
sponsored a proposal that increased the membership of the Coordinating Bureau in an effort to insure that the bureau did not get out of step with the general membership of the movement. Some of the problems of the NAM organizational structure are that it lacks a permanent secretariat and that frequent changes of members of the organization structure increase administrative problems of meeting in a new city with members of the group inadequately prepared to deal with the major ad hoc issues of the day (Willetts, 1981, p. 12).

Another problem of the NAM organizational structure is that its president does not have coercive powers over the members of the movement. The powers of the president of the NAM are limited because he can only persuade. This apparent limitation on the office of the president of the NAM is evident in his inability to resolve 37 divisive border disputes among the nonaligned including Libya and Chad, Vietnam and Cambodia, Iran and Iraq, Malta and Libya, Yemen and Egypt, Ethiopia and Somalia. In view of these weaknesses of the NAM organizational structure, one is left with the impression that one cannot categorically assert that either Cuba or Yugoslavia is the dominant leader of the NAM. This is because the presidency of the NAM changes every three years. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that since the
formal inception of the NAM in 1961, Tito of Yugoslavia, Nasser of Egypt, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Boumedienne of Algeria, Bandavaneike of Sri Lanka, Castro of Cuba, Indira Gandhi of India, and Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe have each served once as President of NAM in the capacity as the political leader of the country that is hosting the NAM Summit Conference. The other features of NAM's organizational structure are shown in Table 1.

Cuba in the Nonaligned Movement

One of the role expectations of the nonaligned movement is that member nations should pursue the stated goals of the movement without promoting the interest of the superpowers or any bloc. Cuba and Yugoslavia differ on how to achieve the stated goals of the NAM. Cuba advocates the "natural ally" thesis of nonalignment. The "natural ally" thesis was first put forward by Cuban delegates at the 1970 Lusaka Summit and was personally endorsed by Fidel Castro three years later at the 1973 Algiers Summit Conference (Jackson, 1983, p. 199). Fidel Castro, in his analysis of the NAM, stated that the "natural ally" logic is the idea whereby a member nation of the movement aligns itself with any nation or a group of nations that shares the aims of nonalignment and engages in actions that will help in realizing the stated goals of NAM. As a result, Cuba
Table 1
Organization Structure of Nonaligned Movement

President-in-Office

Summit Conference of Heads of State of Government

Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs

Special Conference

Coordinating Bureau at the Ministerial Level

Coordinating Bureau at the Level of Permanent Representatives

Specialized Ministerial Conferences

Political Working Groups and Related Groups

Coordinator Countries for the Economic Action Programme

Expert Groups

Technical Groups

Symposia, Seminars, and other groups

---

1 The First Special Conference, Cairo 1962, took place before the establishment of the Bureau.

2 The Coordinating Bureau at the Level of Permanent Representatives also functions as preparatory committee for summits, foreign minister conferences, and meetings for the Bureau at the ministerial level.

3 If no competent expert group exists, these meetings may report to any other body of the nonaligned movement.

posits that the socialist world has this identity of interest with the nonaligned.

Cuba views the world as being divided into two classes: the industrialized and the nonindustrialized (Goyal, 1979, p. 150). The industrialized nations serve as centers of capital formation, technological innovations, capital-intensive manufacturing, including being the center of ownership and management (Caporoso, 1978). The nonindustrialized in Cuba's view are capital poor, borrowers, their economies owned and managed by the industrialized nations which have kept the developing nations in a state of perpetual economic adolescence. In propagating the "natural ally" logic, Cuba is imploring the nonaligned to join ranks with the socialist nations which it considers the "non-owning class of countries" (Goyal, 1979, p. 256). It is interesting to note that the "natural ally" logic has left Cuba in a controversial position in the nonaligned movement.

Yugoslavia and some other nonaligned countries, for example, have continuously questioned Cuba's nonaligned status. This disagreement over the status of Cuba is one of the reasons that led to the controversy for the venue of the sixth summit conference of the NAM at Havana, Cuba, in September, 1979.
Cuba has emerged as an influential member of the NAM since its extensive successful military involvement in Africa, which culminated in the establishment of Marxist governments in Ethiopia and Angola. Cuba's role in the NAM could also be viewed from the fact that its membership added geographical comprehensiveness to the movement. Cuba was the first Latin American country to join the NAM, thereby giving the organization a more global outlook. According to Goyal (1979, p. 140), Cuba's influential role in the NAM partly committed the organization to the cause of freeing the Latin American people from the multinational corporation.

The litmus test of Cuba's influential role in the NAM occurred when Cuba was accepted as the venue for the sixth summit conference. Yugoslavia reacted to this visible role by joining ranks with the United States and their allies to sabotage the Havana Conference (Goyal, 1979, p. 200-210). According to Goyal, the United States and Yugoslavia propagated the idea that Cuba would push the nonaligned into the Soviet bloc and make the movement a tool of Soviet foreign policy. Goyal further asserted that the United States engaged in a diplomatic activity to secure Cuba's expulsion from the movement and to discourage some moderate NAM members such as Saudi Arabia from attending the summit. The underlying reason for this diplomatic action is that
the United States government did not want an increase in Cuba's prestige in the world community, which would lend support to its revolutionary activities (Goyal, 1979, p. 258).

Cuba is also making a contribution to the call for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). In his report to the Seventh Conference of Heads of States of Nonaligned Countries in New Delhi, 1983, Fidel Castro called on all member nations of the movement to join together in alleviating the social and economic crisis facing poor nations. Castro argues that more than 500 million people in developing countries are starving and that 1.7 billion people have a life expectancy of less than 60 years. The deterioration of the third world's foreign economic relations, which is summed up in the growing deficits in the current accounts of their balance of payments which totaled $83.3 billion in 1974-1975, and the external debt which grew at an average annual rate of 25.1% between 1973 and 1975, while debt servicing grew at an annual rate of 61.1% in the same period, indicates the magnitude of the terrible economic situation which beset the developing countries that are nonaligned (Castro, 1983, pp. 20-30). It should also be noted that while addressing the Nonaligned Coordinating Bureau meeting in 1975, Castro, in pursuit of a New International Economic Order (NIEO), advised OPEC
nations that are nonaligned to stop investing in developed nations. There were indicators that a disproportionate amount of their oil wealth was being invested in the developed nations. For instance, of the $60,000 million accumulated in 1974 in oil sales, the investment pattern, according to western estimates, indicated that $21,000 million was invested in the European financial system, $10,000 million in public loans and direct investment in developed countries, and a meager $2,000 million or about 5% of the total was invested in developing countries (Goyal, 1979, p. 272). In spite of Cuba's opposition to the European financial system, at the end of 1980 it owed $2.6 billion in hard currency debt of which $1.7 billion was owed to European commercial banks (Gonzalez, 1982, p. 10). As a result of Cuba's attitude towards a change in the world social and economic perspectives, Cuba has placed itself in a controversial position compared to other members of the NAM because of its fostering of Soviet interests in the third world (Dominguez and Lindau, 1986, pp. 24-25). In view of Cuba's promotion of Soviet interest in the third world, Cuba fails to conform to the role expectation of the NAM because of its efforts to link the NAM with the Soviet Union through its espousal of the idea that the Soviet Union is the "natural ally" of the nonaligned movement. This strategy by Cuba is perceived by
some nonaligned countries such as Yugoslavia as an attempt by Cuba to make the movement a tool of Soviet foreign policy. Yugoslavia has its own distinct philosophy of how the NAM should achieve its stated goals.

Yugoslavia in the Nonaligned Movement

In contrast to Cuba, Yugoslavia subscribes to a nonattachment to any world major bloc in the undertakings of the NAM. Blazevic (1978, p. 150) of Yugoslavia's Institute of Foreign Relations posits that the nonaligned countries should not see themselves as allies of the superpowers. Blazevic further contends that Yugoslavia's role in achieving the goals of the NAM assumes a closer posture to the "equidistant" perspective of nonalignment than the "natural ally" thesis of nonalignment. It should be noted, however, that the "natural ally" logic and the "equidistant" theory are antithetic to each other. The equidistant theory conceptualizes nonalignment in terms of the maintenance of international relations which manifests an equally distant position from both the western and eastern bloc (Bondarevski, 1979, p. 4). The "natural ally" theory, on the other hand, insists on nonalignment in terms of the movement's members allying with the socialist community because of their common interests and goals.

The outlines of Yugoslavia's nonalignment were first presented by Kardelj to the U.N. General Assembly in 1950.
in the following words: "Yugoslavia cannot accept that mankind must choose between domination by one or other power" (Kardelj, 1951, p. 21). Kardelj argued that there is another path in world politics which Yugoslavia would subscribe to: nonalignment. Misra (1980, pp. 35-40) suggested that Yugoslavia's nonalignment emphasizes the fact that nonaligned countries ought to be self-reliant in their efforts to attain social and economic progress. According to Tito, "Yugoslavia will prefer to be naked if necessary ... until we are capable of creating with our capacity whatever we need" (Tito, 1963, pp. 22, 50). It is interesting to note that Yugoslavia's foreign policy goals are embodied in the ideas of not aligning with any of the world's major blocs, equality of relations among nations of the world, and avoidance of force as a means of settling disputes (Rubinstein, 1979, pp. 80-84). Most nonaligned nations accept Yugoslavia's view of Soviet-American rivalry as a struggle between two highly developed imperial systems seeking to encompass in their spheres the less-developed nations (Jerkovic, 1959, pp. 8-15).

Due to its bitter experience in World War II, Yugoslavia tends to avoid the aspect of world politics that would lead it into entanglement with the superpowers (Davico and Bogosavljevic, 1960, p. 40). For instance, about 1,750,000 Yugoslavs lost their lives in World War II.
Based on this experience, Yugoslavia engages in the crusade for world peace through the NAM. This is because all members of the movement share the assumption that the Cold War affects developing nations because the more money the richer nations spend on armament, the less they have left to assist developing countries (Rubinstein, 1970, p. 76).

Yugoslavia's view concerning the National Liberation Movements is different from that of Cuba. While Cuba supplies both material and human support to various liberation movements, Yugoslavia tends to be "Eurocentric"—that is, Yugoslavia believes that the decolonization process should be gradual and evolutionary rather than revolutionary (Jackson, 1983, p. 60). This explains the reason why Yugoslavia has not been as active as Cuba in its support for national liberation in Africa and Latin America.

Tito's aim in international relations consisted of restricting the influence of the major power blocs and enhancing that of small developing and nonaligned nations (Borowiec, 1977, pp. 1-40). Borowiec states that while promoting nonalignment Yugoslavia has also tried to promote its brand of socialism. This is exemplified by the way Yugoslavian leaders carry out economic and political transactions with the West and with the Eastern bloc. Though a socialist country, Yugoslavia is economically
dependent on the West in its effort to achieve rapid industrialization. So far, Yugoslavia has adhered to the nonaligned principle of advancing the goals of the movement without pursuing the vested interests of the superpowers. This is exemplified by the manner in which the Yugoslavs stress the independent capability approach of nonalignment which implores nonaligned nations to be self-reliant in efforts to attain economic and technological progress.

Both Cuba and Yugoslavia are socialist countries. It is necessary to examine how their relationships with the Soviet Union, which is a socialist nation, have affected their various conceptions of nonalignment in an effort to clarify how Cuba and Yugoslavia conform to the role expectations of the NAM of abstaining from superpower relations of a military nature.

Cuban Relationship with the Soviet Union

Fidel Castro came to power January 1, 1959. Following his ascendance to power, the U.S.-Cuban relationship deteriorated. Cuba formally launched its protest against the United States on September 26, 1960, in the United Nations General Assembly when Fidel Castro formally charged the United States with subversion and aggression against Cuba (Mezerik, 1960, pp. 1-4). The Cuban charges of economic aggression and the United States' countercharges of confiscation of property were followed by the U.S. ban
on exports to Cuba on October 19, 1960. The genesis of Cuba's dependence on the Soviet Union for its economic survival became inevitable the moment that U.S.-Cuban economic relations were severed in February, 1962 (Goure and Rothenberg, 1975, p. 41). Cuba entered into commercial agreement and close political relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist nations in Europe. The first major move toward cementing these relationships came on February, 1960, when Anastas Mikoyan, first Deputy Premier of the Soviet Union, visited Cuba (Goure and Rothenberg, 1975, p. 19). The agreement entered into on this occasion made the Soviet Union the most important as well as the largest supplier of essential goods to Cuba (Mezerik, 1960, p. 11). In addition to these trade pacts with the U.S.S.R., Cuba also established commercial and political relations with other socialist countries, namely China, Poland, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia.

It is also necessary to note that there are many views about the Soviet-Cuban relationship. According to one school of thought, Cuba has been little more than a pawn because of heavy dependence on the Soviet Union (Volsky, 1975, pp. 20-40). The implication of this view is that Cuba's actions in the international arena are motivated by a desire to reciprocate the economic and military assistance from the Soviet Union. Another school of
thought posits that Cuba has not been a subservient tool of the Kremlin but essentially an independent actor pursuing its own policies as a result of its revolutionary ideology (Valdes, 1982, p. 70). This view implies that the Soviet Union's control of Cuba's action is limited and that its activities in Africa are a result of mere coincidence of interest. The implication of this view is that where Soviet and Cuban actions are identical, it is a result of convergence of interest of the two countries and not necessarily action dictated to Cuba by the Soviet Union. What is more, it has been argued that elements of both the dependent and autonomous Cuban behavior have characterized the Soviet-Cuban relationship which can be described as a complex partnership arrangement involving mutual interest. Dominguez (1986, pp. 122-125), a professor in the Department of Government at Harvard University, argues that the Soviet Union does not always initiate third world action and drag Cuba along. Instead, Cuba may sometimes initiate conflict such as sending troops to Ethiopia and Angola, thereby making it necessary for the Soviets to get involved. However, Durch (1979, p. 20), while not disagreeing with any of these views, states that Cuba's relationship with Moscow, as a surrogate or not, is open to debate.
Cuban military and economic aid from the Soviet Union has been enormous. Between 1973 and 1976, for instance, Cuba received about $2.4 billion in economic aid from the Soviet Union (Hosmer and Wolfe, 1979, p. 25). Cuba, on the other hand, has facilitated the Soviet Union's intervention in third world politics under a framework which Hosmer and Wolfe (1979) described as "cooperative intervention." Under this plan, the Soviet Union provides the military material, mobility, planning, communication, and command functions while Cuba, in pursuance of its revolutionary ideology, furnishes the combat forces in an effort to keep Cuban troops in war readiness.

In view of the Cuban dependence on the Soviet Union, some scholars, such as Gonzalez (1982, pp. 64-65), have argued that Cuba espouses the "natural ally" thesis of nonalignment. Fidel Castro vividly acknowledged this in his remarks at the Havana Conference of the NAM, stating: "We are a socialist country, friends of the Soviet Union because their generous support helped us to survive and overcome a very difficult and decisive period in our people's lives when we were in danger of being wiped out" (Castro, 1983, p. 102).

Cuba's dependence on the Soviet Union very much suggests the fact that Soviet political, economic, and military ties with Cuba have been instrumental in the
survival of the Castro regime. For instance, the Soviet Union buys sugar from Cuba at a rate above the world price. By 1978, 73% of Cuba's exports went to the Soviet Union while 65% of Cuban imports came from the Soviet Union (Theriot, 1980, p. 10). According to Goure and Rothenberg (1975, p. 53), Cuba has been integrated into the Soviet economic system. According to these scholars, Cuba's integration into the Soviet economic system occurred in 1970 with formation of an intergovernmental Soviet-Cuban commission for economic, scientific, and technological cooperation which stressed Soviet collaboration in the development of Cuba's nickel industry, electric power, irrigation, civil aviation, electronic computers, and hydro engineering construction. Integration, as used in this context, means a condition in which separate political units, such as that of Cuba and the Soviet Union, have attained a relationship of mutual interdependence and jointly produce system properties which they would separately lack (Deutsch, 1968, p. 159). This relationship has enabled Cuba to obtain more levels of Soviet economic and military assistance. The extent to which Cuba has been able to command greater economic assistance from the Soviet Union is shown in Table 2, which shows a remarkable increase in Soviet assistance to Cuba in a four-year period from 1976-1979. A total of about $9.5 billion was spent by
the Soviet Union on Cuba between 1976-1979. Table 2 also indicates that Cuba was receiving over $3.1 billion in total Soviet assistance each year by 1979 (Gonzalez, 1982, pp. 66-67).

Table 2
Soviet Economic Assistance to Cuba 1961-1979
(in millions of US $)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative yearly total</td>
<td>3,568&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>7,099</td>
<td>8,606</td>
<td>10,588</td>
<td>13,556</td>
<td>16,664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand total&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1,018&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>901</td>
<td>1,357</td>
<td>1,672</td>
<td>2,638</td>
<td>2,667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total assistance</td>
<td>1,501</td>
<td>1,507</td>
<td>1,982</td>
<td>2,968</td>
<td>3,107</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


a. Figures represent cumulative totals for entire 1961-70 period.
b. Includes sugar, petroleum, and nickel subsidies as well as nonrepayable aid.

Cuba's dependence on the Soviet Union, as illustrated by Table 2, exemplifies the extent of its relationship with the Soviet Union. According to Valenta (1981, pp. 46-47), the backbone of the Cuban and Soviet relationship is the "surrogate thesis" which posits the idea that the Soviets have capitalized on Cuba's economic and strategic
vulnerabilities to create a dependency relationship that gives them a predominant role in Havana's decision making processes. In view of Cuba's obvious reliance on the Soviet Union, Cuba has sought and is still seeking to broaden significantly the traditional focus of the nonaligned movement by injecting hostile political factors into the stated objectives of the NAM which include nonmembership in a military bloc. This position of the nonaligned was criticized by Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez in 1976 during the fifth summit in Sri Lanka when he said: "We must stress the fact that to abstain from being a member of a military bloc is not enough to merit belonging to the movement" (Erisman, 1983, p. 159).

Cuba's advocacy of the Soviet Union as the natural ally of the NAM has polarized the movement into radical and moderate members. The radical members are those countries that cluster around Cuba and are for the most part heavily dependent on Soviet aid. Based on opposition to a General Assembly resolution calling for troop withdrawal from Afghanistan on November 29, 1982, these countries included Angola, Cuba, Ethiopia, Laos, Libya, Madagascar, Mozambique, South Yemen, Syria, and Vietnam (Jackson, 1983, p. 198). It has been argued by some scholars of nonalignment such as Erisman (1983, p. 164) that the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan with thousands of troops in late December, 1979, to insure a pro-Moscow regime in Kabul undermined Cuba's prestige in the NAM in its role as being in the vanguard in pursuit of problems of developing countries. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan undermined Cuba's prestige in the NAM because a vast number of nonaligned countries have condemned the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and have also given their wholehearted support of General Assembly calls for withdrawal of foreign troops by margins of 104-18 in 1979, 111-22 in 1980, 116-23 in 1981, and 114-21 in 1982. It is interesting to note that only the Soviet bloc and the radical fringe of NAM led by Cuba voted against these resolutions in view of the fact that Afghanistan is also a member of the NAM (Jackson, 1983, p. 34). The Afghanistan issue weakened Cuba's leadership role because many African, Middle Eastern, and Asian countries of the NAM began to doubt and question Cuba's credibility as a champion of third world problems (Erisman, 1983, p. 166). The moderate members of the NAM are those countries that have insisted that the determination as to whether a state is nonaligned should be based on its military ties. An example of a moderate nonaligned nation is Yugoslavia. The moderate's position is that the nonaligned should adopt antibloc behavior so that the NAM would not regularly play a partisan role in
Cold War bipolar politics (LeoGrande, 1980, p. 9). In turn, it is necessary to take a look at the Yugoslav-Soviet relationship.

The Yugoslav Relationship with the Soviet Union

Cuba's complex relationship with the Soviet Union was a stimulus to its efforts to advance the "natural ally" thesis of nonalignment. The Yugoslavs and their government are not extremely dependent on the Soviet Union in the same fashion as Cuba. This is because the Soviet Union trades with Cuba and provides more military and economic assistance to Cuba, more than to any other country in the world (Gonzalez, 1980, pp. 147-149). It is interesting to note that despite Yugoslavia's importance to the Soviet Union as a supplier of certain commodities, it currently ranks as only the U.S.S.R.'s eighth or ninth most important trading partner (Haberl, 1985, p. 8). The tables indicate the Soviet share in Yugoslavia's foreign trade from 1971 to 1983 in percentages and the Yugoslavs' share in Soviet foreign trade.

According to Table 3, between 1979 and 1983 the Soviet Union had a 15.3% to 23.4% overall share of Yugoslavia's foreign trade. The overall average of the Soviet share of Yugoslavia's foreign trade from 1971 to 1983 was 17.3%. In turn, Table 4 indicates that the Yugoslavian share in
Table 3
Soviet Share in Yugoslav Foreign Trade 1971-1983 (in percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Overall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>23.4</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


Soviet foreign trade between 1973 to 1983 fluctuated between 2.1% to 3.9%.

Yugoslavia's economy is not extremely dependent on the Soviet economy for growth. This is because Yugoslavia is also partly dependent on the West (Staar, 1971, p. 210).
Table 4

Yugoslavia's Share in Soviet Foreign Trade 1973-1983
(in percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Overall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
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<td>3.3</td>
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<td>2.9</td>
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<td>1976</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>3.3</td>
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<td>1978</td>
<td>3.1</td>
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<td>1979</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
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<td>1980</td>
<td>4.2</td>
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<td>1981</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>5.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
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<td>1983</td>
<td>3.9</td>
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</table>


According to Staar, within a decade of Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform, an estimated $3.5 billion worth of aid was provided by the West due to the fact that the West did not want Yugoslavia to slip back into the hands of the Soviet Union. According to Drachkovitch (1963, p. 121), by 1962 American economic aid to Yugoslavia amounted to more than $1.5 billion and military assistance
to about $719 million. Drachkovitch further asserted that one of the hopes of the West had been to bring Yugoslavia indirectly into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The move in this direction culminated in the signing of a treaty of friendship and cooperation at Ankara in February of 1953 by Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey. Soviet and Yugoslav relations may not be characterized as "complex interdependence." The Soviet Union imports only shoes, clothing, and Bauxite from Yugoslavia. These commodities are scarcely of existential significance for the Soviet Union; hence, Yugoslavia cannot exert pressure on the Kremlin through these exports (Haberl, 1985, p. 290). According to Haberl, Professor of Contemporary History of Eastern Europe, University of Essen, Germany, Yugoslavia imports oil from the Soviet Union, and this accounted for half of its imports from U.S.S.R. because since the Iran-Iraq war Yugoslavia has been dependent on the Soviet Union for the supply of its oil. In this study Cuba's relationship with the Soviet Union has been characterized as complex interdependence because the U.S.S.R. gives Cuba extensive economic and military assistance which it cannot receive elsewhere, and the U.S.S.R. uses Cuba as a strategic base because of its close proximity to the United States and other countries in Latin America.
The excommunication of Yugoslavia from the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) compelled Yugoslavian leaders to forge new policies. On June 28, 1948, a resolution of the Cominform declared: "The Cominform hereby expels the Yugoslav heretics from its ranks, and openly appeals to the rank and file of the Yugoslav party to oust its leadership" (Bass and Marbury, 1959, p. 40). Since this declaration, Yugoslavia has intensified its efforts to develop its own brand of socialism though guided by the theoretical experience of the Soviet Union (Rubinstein, 1979, p. 85). Yugoslavia's brand of socialism recognizes the fact that Yugoslavia is a small country and cannot self-sufficiently industrialize. Hence Yugoslavia looks to the west for technology and financial aid which will speed the process of development. The implication of Yugoslavia's excommunication from the Cominform was that it culminated Yugoslavia's attempt to carve out a role in the form of nonalignment for the less powerful independent states. This assertion is buttressed by George Kennan, United States Ambassador to Belgrade from 1961-1963, when he said, "Tito's indefatigable commitment to the NAM was a means to justify the 1948 excommunication by the Soviet Union" (Jackson, 1983, p. 60). The differences between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia did not entirely freeze Yugoslav-Soviet relations. After the expulsion from the
Cominform, Tito was less vocal against the Soviet Union and its policies. Even at the United Nations, Yugoslavia always voted with the Soviet Union during the initial stages of their conflict (Rubinstein, 1970, p. 240). On June 17, 1953, the Soviet Union indicated its intention of working for a normalization of relations with Yugoslavia by reappointing an ambassador to Belgrade. As a result of normalization of relations, Khrushchev visited Yugoslavia on May 26, 1955, and expressed the need for mutual accommodation and cooperation between the two countries (Clissold, 1975, pp. 248-252). Khrushchev's statement on this visit is known as the Belgrade declaration of 1955. Under the Belgrade declaration, the Soviet Union committed itself to noninterference in questions of internal order of different social systems, and of different forms of development of socialism which are the exclusive concern of the people of the respective countries (Haberl, 1985, p. 280). Overall, the Soviet and Yugoslav relationship still subsist amidst differences. On March 21-15, 1983, Soviet Premier Tikhonov visited Yugoslavia. On this occasion, Soviet and Yugoslav officials signed an agreement for a long-term program of economic, scientific, and technical cooperation for the period up to 1990.
Analysis of Cuba's and Yugoslavia's Nonaligned Status

One of the objectives of this chapter is to examine whether Cuba and Yugoslavia do fulfill the role expectations of the NAM. One of the ways this study seeks to deal with this question is by relating the actual behavior of Cuba and Yugoslavia in both the NAM and in world politics to each of the five stated role expectations of the NAM in an effort to determine whether they are really nonaligned. The stated role expectations of the NAM are as follows:

1. Independent policy based on peaceful coexistence with different political and social systems,
2. Non-membership in multilateral military alliances related to great power conflict,
3. Consistent support to national liberation movements,
4. Non-membership in regional defense pact associated with the superpower conflict, and
5. Refusal of foreign military bases negotiated within the context of superpower conflict. The implication of this stated role expectation is that every member of the nonaligned ought to abide by it so that the general behavior of the members of NAM can be predictable.

One of the stipulated role expectations of the NAM is that member nations should not belong to multilateral military alliances related to great power conflict. The
military alliances referred to in this context are as follows: North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Warsaw Pact, Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Cuba and Yugoslavia are not members of any of these military alliances so both adhered to this role expectation of the NAM. It must be mentioned that Cuba was a member of the Organization of American States (OAS), a regional defense pact, which may perhaps contravene one of the role expectations of the NAM which prohibits non-membership in a regional defense pact. Yugoslavia is not a member of any regional defense pact. The refusal of foreign military bases negotiated within the context of superpower conflict represents one of the cardinal expectations of the NAM which Cuba has violated. Cuba clearly violated this principle by allowing the Soviet Union to install missiles in Cuba in 1962. This incident degenerated into a big international crisis between the United States and the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia did not have any foreign military bases.

Consistent support to the National Liberation Movement is one of the NAM role expectations which Cuba has upheld. The indicator of Cuba's consistent support to the National Liberation Movement is based on the number of troops which Cuba has in nonaligned countries which in its opinion is to help guarantee the fragile political independence of newly
sovereign states by maintaining military presence in those countries. As Table 5 indicates, by 1978 there were 38,400 Cuban troops in nonaligned countries, and by 1981 the number of Cuban troops had slightly decreased in these countries to 36,060. To the members of the NAM, this represents an active contribution geared toward finishing the decolonization process. Yugoslavia has given moral support to National Liberation groups. The Algerian National Liberation Movement is the only group fighting for independence to which Yugoslavia has provided military and economic aid. The Cuban-Yugoslav differing consistent support to the National Liberation Movement may be based on ideology. This may be attributed to the factor that Cuba embraces Fanon's (1967, p. 10) approach of oppressed people's gaining freedom and independence through armed struggle based on the fact that there is no place in history where an oppressive ruling class has voluntarily given power. Many members of the nonaligned movement regard the Yugoslavs support to the National Liberation Movement as "Eurocentric" which means a gradual evolutionary process of achieving freedom.

Overall, Yugoslavia fulfilled all the role expectations of the NAM and, in fact, exemplified the qualities of a genuinely nonaligned country. Cuba did not adhere to some of the role expectations of the NAM because
Table 5
Cuban Military and Paramilitary Personnel in Nonaligned Countries

<table>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
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<td>15 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td></td>
<td>20,000 19,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td></td>
<td>10 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo-Brazzaville</td>
<td></td>
<td>400 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td></td>
<td>few few</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td></td>
<td>150 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td></td>
<td>15,000 13,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Granada</td>
<td></td>
<td>150 few</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td></td>
<td>few few</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td></td>
<td>200 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td></td>
<td>140 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td></td>
<td>10 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td></td>
<td>150 few</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td></td>
<td>few</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td></td>
<td>200 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td></td>
<td>few</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries</td>
<td>Countries in Which Formerly Present</td>
<td>Approximate Number of Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>few</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Vietnam</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Tome</td>
<td>few</td>
<td>few</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Yemen</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>few</td>
<td>few</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>38,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

of its ideology which has led to its own different interpretation of the role expectations of the movement. As a result of Cuba's violations of some of the role expectations of the NAM, many members of the organization have increasingly questioned Cuba's nonaligned status.

Independent policy based on peaceful co-existence with different political and social systems is one of the role expectations of the nonaligned movement which is broad and ambiguous. In the absence of any existing reliable and objective indicator to determine how Cuba and Yugoslavia conform to this NAM role expectation, this study examined how Cuba and Yugoslavia co-exist with different political and social systems by looking at the number of countries with which Cuba and Yugoslavia do not have diplomatic relations. The underlying assumption in this regard is that if Cuba and Yugoslavia do have a pattern of diplomatic relations with a certain group of countries based on their political and social system and not with others, one may attempt to conclude that they are not fulfilling the expectation of being genuinely nonaligned. Cuba and Yugoslavia substantially do have diplomatic relations with countries with different political and social systems. The only country worthy of note that Cuba does not have diplomatic relations with is the United States. Diplomatic relations as used in the context of this study means
official contact with a particular country which is symbolized by having an embassy in that country.

This chapter has discussed the leadership of the nonaligned movement and how Cuba and Yugoslavia conform to the role expectations of the nonaligned movement. The next chapter will examine the activities of the nonaligned in the United Nations.
CHAPTER BIBLIOGRAPHY


CHAPTER III

THE NONALIGNED AND THE UNITED NATIONS

This chapter refers specifically to the activities of the nonaligned in the United Nations (U.N.). In this regard, this chapter focuses on two questions of investigation which are as follows:

1. How do Cuba and Yugoslavia adhere to the role expectations of the NAM in the U.N. by voting in favor of the issues important to the movement that relate to decolonization and economic issues facing the movement?

2. Is the NAM a factor of world politics?

This study deals with the first question of investigation in this chapter by stating the goals of the NAM in the U.N., by discussing the activities of Cuba and Yugoslavia in the U.N., and by analyzing Cuba's and Yugoslavia's voting behaviors in the General Assembly on selected issues in an effort to determine whether both countries conform to the role expectations of the movement in the U.N.

The second question of investigation in this chapter is an attempt to refute critics' claims that the NAM is dead and hence no longer a factor in world politics. Critics' claims emanated due to the inability of the NAM to convene a seventh summit in 1982 which was rescheduled and
held in India in 1983. The approach of this chapter to the second question of investigation is enumeration of the various activities and contributions of the NAM in the U.N. General Assembly and the Security Council. At this juncture, this chapter compares the frequency of meetings of the U.N. Security Council and the frequency of meetings of the nonaligned in their informal consultation in an effort to ascertain whether the NAM is no longer in operation.

The Stated Goals of the Nonaligned Movement in the United Nations

The nonaligned movement has three stated goals in the United Nations. The movement wants to maintain and strengthen its role and to restructure and democratize the numerical strength of employees of various organs of the U.N. to reflect the composition of the General Assembly. This is because nonaligned members dominate the membership of the General Assembly, but this representation is not reflected in membership of the other organs of the U.N. due to criteria for membership which are based on the percentage of each country's contribution to the U.N. budget. In addition, the nonaligned want to maximize the nonaligned voting power within the U.N. The nonaligned hope to strengthen their role in the U.N. by insuring that representation to key committees is no longer based on
population, wealth, industrial production, or any other indicator of power capability but on the basis of national independence and geographic distribution.

The criteria for recruitment of 3,350 professional level U.N. posts have undergone changes in response to building pressure by the nonaligned. As a result, by January 1, 1983, U.N. professional positions were allocated on the basis of 57.2% by membership and 7.2% by regional population (Jackson, 1983, p. 161). According to Jackson, political advisor to the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, although changes in the allocation of U.N. professional staff reduced the 100% weight once given to financial contribution, it continued to provide the United States between 414 and 560 positions largely on the basis of paying for the 25% of the budget.

The nonaligned objective in the U.N. is to pursue the goal of decolonization of countries under colonial rule. The nonaligned countries partly contributed in making the U.N. attach a great sense of urgency to the decolonization process. Previously, from 1946, when the U.N. became operational, to 1960, the impact of the U.N. on decolonization was negligible. By 1960, with admission of 17 new members to the U.N. who were former dependent colonial territories, there was an increase in the call for the liberation of colonial peoples partly due to pressure
of newly independent countries to make decolonization a matter of top priority in the U.N. agenda. In reaction to the newly independent nations' emphasis on decolonization, the General Assembly on December 15, 1960, adopted by a vote of 89 to 9 a declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries. This declaration, known as Resolution 1514, was initiated and submitted by 43 nonaligned countries.

It is interesting to note that the decolonization process had impact on the United Nations and the nonaligned movement (Claude, 1967, pp. 1-50). The decolonization process increased the members of the NAM which in turn resulted in the quantitative change in the membership roster of the United Nations. The U.N. had 51 members when it began operation in 1946. Presently, the U.N. has 157 members. The change of the composition of U.N. membership is significant for many reasons. First, the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council have increased their membership to satisfy the demands of the nonaligned for adequate representation in the world forum. This numerical growth of the organization poses difficult housekeeping, procedural, and political problems (Claude, 1967, p. 62). The impact of decolonization on the U.N. could be viewed from the fact that it has increased the agenda of the General Assembly, and there has been shift in
focus of the world community from the Security Council to the General Assembly as a forum to solve international problems. In a positive sense, the NAM activities in the U.N. brought the de-Europeanization of world politics, which means that international affairs have finally come to be the politics of the whole world instead of only European nations. This is because when the United Nations was formed it was dominated by European nations; even its procedures and practices reflected the democratic ideals of European nations. These ideals include the idea of sovereign equality of all nations that are members of the U.N. Apart from increasing the number of newly independent countries in the U.N., the decolonization process added cultural and geographical comprehensiveness to the United Nations. According to Tikhomisav (1979, p. 22), the decolonization process has radically changed the agenda of the United Nations to that of the nonaligned movement. Tikhomisav argues that all summit declarations of the nonaligned always appear in the agenda of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Having looked at the stated goals of the nonaligned in the U.N., it is necessary to examine the activities of Yugoslavia and Cuba in the United Nations.
Yugoslavia in the United Nations

Yugoslavia became a member of the United Nations on October 24, 1945. Yugoslavia discovered the U.N. as a forum where complaints could be lodged in 1949 when the government was concerned about a possible armed invasion by the Soviet Union as a result of Yugoslavia's excommunication from the Communist Information Bureau on June 28, 1948. The dispute between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union was first raised in the United Nations on September 29, 1949, by Yugoslavia's foreign minister Edvard Kardelj who criticized Soviet interference in Yugoslavia's affairs. The significance of Kardeji's speech lies in the fact that for the first time the Soviet Union was identified by an Eastern European ally as a threat trying to subvert the Tito regime. According to Rubinstein (1970, p. 18), the political motivation of the government of Yugoslavia at the U.N. in the years 1949-1952 was to use the U.N. to gain widespread support in the event of Soviet aggression.

Yugoslavia's early role at the United Nations is evidenced by the fact that it was first elected a member of the Security Council by the General Assembly on October 20, 1949. It is pertinent to point out that between 1948 and 1951, after Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform, very often it supported the Soviet position in the U.N.
During the Korean War Yugoslavia played a crucial role as a member of the Security Council. What is more, Yugoslavia gained more prominence in the U.N. when it was appointed one of the members of the committee on decolonization. The Committee on Decolonization was formed after the General Assembly adopted a declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries on November 27, 1961 (Bebler, 1964, pp. 15-18). The Yugoslav representative to the Committee on Decolonization, Misa Pavicevic, urged the committee to make a recommendation to the General Assembly that would push Great Britain to give priority to granting independence to its colonies. In addition, Yugoslavia more than any other nonaligned country considered the United Nations as the main diplomatic instrument to be used by the NAM for the advancement of nonalignment and democratization of international relations. In contrast to Cuba, Yugoslavia strives to maintain a moderate position on issues in order not to alienate any NAM member so that the nonaligned will reach consensus on issues pending in the U.N. Another area in which Yugoslavia played a pivotal role was the creation of the Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED). The SUNFED program was designed to provide very small but regular economic and technical assistance to developing countries.
Overall, Yugoslavia's behavior in the U.N. conformed to the NAM's role expectations in two ways. First, as a member of the U.N. Committee on Decolonization, Yugoslavia urged the committee to expedite action on the granting of independence to colonial territories by putting pressure on Great Britain to grant independence to its colonies in Africa. Second, Yugoslavia was a strong advocate of special United Nations' funds for economic development to developing countries. This kind of economic aid is important to the NAM because it has no strings attached to it that will lure members of the NAM to the superpowers.

Cuba is another member of the NAM whose active role in the decolonization process in the U.N. is worth examination.

Cuba in the United Nations

Cuba became a member of the U.N. on October 24, 1945. It is necessary to examine Cuba and Yugoslavia's respective contributions in the U.N. This is because the U.N. is the major world organization where the nonaligned seek to translate their goals into action. Cuba began to gain serious attention in the United Nations between 1961 and 1962. The issues that brought Cuba into the agenda of the U.N. were the Bay of Pigs Invasion of April, 1961, and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. As a result of these two events, the United States' relations with Cuba deteriorated. The
Cuban missile crisis was an important event that demanded attention of the U.N. because it was one of the most serious international disputes since the Second World War that involved a major confrontation between the superpowers. The Bay of Pigs invasion was an attempt by Cuban refugees in the United States, with the logistic support and other forms of help from the United States, to initiate uprisings in Cuba that would lead to the overthrow of Castro's government (Plank, 1967, pp. 1-40). On the other hand, the Cuban missile crisis was an attempt of the Soviet Union to make Cuba a Soviet base, which would be a nuclear threat to the United States and other countries in the South and Central Americas. The Soviet Union sent offensive surface-to-air missiles, fighters, and nuclear bombers (Theberge, 1974, p. 10). When the Kennedy administration became aware that ground-to-ground missiles were being installed in Cuba by the Soviets, it insisted that the Soviet Union remove these weapons from Cuba. Following the Bay of Pigs invasion, Cuba reported its case against the U.S. to the U.N. in a series of meetings (Mezerik, 1960, pp. 18-20). The United Nations served as a very useful forum for Cuba because after Cuba's isolation from the Organization of American States (OAS), the U.N. served as a forum for Cuba to conduct much of its diplomatic relations with other developing countries. It
is interesting to note that Cuba was barred from the OAS secret session on hemispheric defense on April 26, 1961, at the insistence of the U.S. because of Cuba's "evident military alliance with the Soviet bloc" (Rusk, 1951, p. 10). Cuba was also in the spotlight in the United Nations in 1979 during its chairmanship of the nonaligned movement. As a result, Fidel Castro was invited with the unanimous consent of 95 countries to address the thirty-fourth session of the U.N. General Assembly in September, 1979. In his address, Castro urged the General Assembly to strengthen the role of nonaligned in the United Nations by including its members in all the organs of the U.N. system. In 1979, Cuba campaigned for a seat on the Security Council but lost to Colombia after a protracted struggle because more than one-third of the nonaligned countries voted for Colombia (Segal, 1983, p. 141). According to Segal, in recent years at the U.N. on votes involving Kampuchea and Afghanistan, only a few nonaligned countries such as Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique have voted with Cuba, which indicates how Cuba's unpopular position on some of these issues is opposed by moderate nonaligned members.

Cuba's activities in the U.N. do not meet the role expectations of the NAM in two ways. First, Cuba voted in favor of foreign interference in the internal affairs of another country specifically on the issues of the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan and the Vietnam invasion of Kampuchea. Second, Cuba often voted with the Soviet Union when the position of the NAM on any pending matter was incongruent with its own position. This is buttressed by the fact that in 1982 Cuba voted 93.5% of the time with the Soviet Union on 302 votes for which the Soviets were present and voting in the General Assembly (Jackson, 1983, p. 139).

Yugoslavia and Cuba have different positions on some issues important to the NAM in the General Assembly. It is important to analyze or compare their positions on some of these issues in an effort to determine whether they do fulfill the role expectations of the NAM in the U.N.

Analysis of Cuba's and Yugoslavia's Voting in the General Assembly on Selected Issues

The nonaligned movement requires its members to vote together on issues that reflect the principles and cardinal objectives of the movement in the United Nations. This study seeks to ascertain how Cuba and Yugoslavia react to this expectation by examining their voting behavior in the U.N. General Assembly on selected issues important to the NAM. The issues are identified in Table 6.

The Afghanistan issue is about the Soviet withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan. On December 25 and 26, 1979, the Soviet army moved into Afghanistan with an
Table 6
Adopted Resolutions Relating Political Issues and Economic Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Resolution No.</th>
<th>Cuba</th>
<th>Yugoslavia</th>
<th>USSR</th>
<th>USA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>36/100</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kampuchea</td>
<td>34/100</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>33/206</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>33/182</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New International Economic Order</td>
<td>29/32,024</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

initial 10,000 troops to shore up a crumbling pro-Soviet regime. This event brought to the forefront on the agenda of the United Nations the problem of military interventions and the interference in internal affairs of other countries. It is interesting to note that the principle of noninterference and nonintervention is a cardinal principle of the policy of nonalignment and of the U.N. charter. According to Minic (1980, p. 11), most nonaligned countries in all their actions faithfully upheld the principle of nonintervention and noninterference. This is exemplified during the debates and voting in the U.N. on the issue of Afghanistan. It must be stressed that in 1982 Cuba and other radical members of NAM voted against the Afghanistan
issue while Yugoslavia and other moderate members of the movement voted in favor of Soviet withdrawal of their troops from Afghanistan by margins of 114-21.

Another important issue on which Cuba and Yugoslavia differed is Kampuchea. Vietnam invaded Kampuchea in December, 1978. In the process, the Chinese-backed Pol Pot regime was overthrown by the Vietnamese Revolutionary Council led by Heng Samrin. The issue before the U.N. General Assembly was a resolution of the conflict of having two factions, namely the Pol Pot delegation and the Heng Samrin delegation, vying for one U.N. seat. Yugoslavia voted in favor of the Pol Pot delegation on the grounds that no country has the right to topple the government of another country no matter how badly that government has treated its people. Cuba voted in favor of the Heng Samrin delegation backed by the Vietnamese and the Soviet Union. The thirty-fourth session of the U.N. General Assembly voted to award the seat to the Pol Pot delegation. The Kampuchea question showed divisions among the nonaligned with about one-third of the countries supporting, just under one-third opposed, and the remaining third abstaining (Willetts, 1981, p. 17). Willetts asserted that one of the reasons why the divisions occurred among the nonaligned on the Kampuchea question is the complexity of the issue.
arising from the powerful and appealing arguments for each side, as follows:

1. The main argument for Pol Pot was that the nonaligned have a long record of opposing foreign intervention and the use of force. In addition, some Asian countries such as Malaysia and Singapore feared the likelihood of Vietnam becoming a regional power with the invasion of Kampuchea and, therefore, resisted this aggression.

2. Some nonaligned countries that voted against Pol Pot did so because of human rights violations committed by his regime while other NAM radical members such as Cuba voted to support the Soviet position on this issue.

There are also issues on which Cuba and Yugoslavia agree in the U.N. Some of these issues include apartheid, Namibian independence, and the call for a New International Economic Order. Apartheid consists of legal segregation, subjugation, and exploitation of blacks in South Africa by the white minority government. The apartheid question before the U.N. deals with the imposition of mandatory sanctions by the U.N. on South Africa. Both Cuba and Yugoslavia voted for stiff sanctions against South Africa in the U.N. The Namibian question before the U.N. is
primarily about independence for the people of Namibia. Namibia, formerly called South West Africa, became a German colony after the European powers divided Africa up at the Berlin Conference in 1895. Namibia was a German colony until 1915 when South Africa occupied the territory and later administered it on behalf of the British Crown. In 1946 South Africa made application to the U.N. to annex the territory, but its application was rejected. Since then South Africa has refused to recognize the authority of the U.N. over the territory. It is interesting to note that both Cuba and Yugoslavia are in support of Namibian independence.

The call for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) is an issue that has enjoyed the widespread support of members of the General Assembly. The NIEO represents a call for a reordering of international trade relations and restructuring of international financial institutions in order to enhance the prospects for third world economic development. It must be stressed that Cuba and Yugoslavia support the call for NIEO.

Overall, Cuba's voting behavior in the U.N. is being shaped by its relationship with the Soviet Union. This position is buttressed by Jackson (1983, pp. 137-145), a political advisor to Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick at the
U.N. from 1980-1983, who studied the nonaligned voting in the U.N. with the following findings:

1. That the nonaligned nations had average voting agreement of 96.1% in 1981 and 1982.

2. That there is a voting cohesion among nonaligned nations on questions of decolonization while divisions showed where the context was clearly between the Eastern and Western bloc.

3. Finally, Jackson (1983) found that Yugoslavia enjoys more support from nonaligned nations than Cuba because its position on most of the issues pending for vote in the U.N. General Assembly meets the role expectations of the nonaligned movement.

It is necessary to discuss the activities of the members of the nonaligned movement in general in the Security Council and the General Assembly in an effort to determine how the NAM has become a factor in world politics.

The Nonaligned Group in the Security Council

The nature and function of the Security Council in politico-legal terms will be made before discussing the role of the nonaligned in this forum. The Security Council is one of the principal organs of the United Nations. According to Article 24 of the Charter, United Nations members confer on the Security Council the primary
responsibility for the maintenance of world peace and security. The functions of the Security Council are as follows: the proscription of the use of armed force, the provision of mechanism for the pacific settlement of disputes, and the establishment of a credible system of collective security (Pogany, 1984, p. 1). The Security Council consists of 15 members which is just less than 10% of the entire membership of the United Nations. The 15 members of the Security Council comprises of five permanent members and 10 nonpermanent members. The permanent members are France, China, the U.S.S.R., U.S.A., and the United Kingdom. In accordance with Article 23, the nonpermanent members are elected by the General Assembly for a term of two years. The nonpermanent members are elected according to the following pattern: five from African and Asian states, one from eastern European states, two from Latin American states, and two from western European states (Nicol, 1980, p. 16). The presidency of the Security Council is held in turn by each member of the Security Council in the Roman alphabetical order of their names for a period of one calendar month (Nicol, 1980, p. 20). It is pertinent to point out that the five permanent members of the Security Council have veto power to block a decision.

The importance of the nonaligned group in the Security Council lies in the fact that their numerical strength in
the council can significantly influence the decisions of the body. For instance, in 1983 eight of the 10 nonpermanent members were members of the nonaligned. In the absence of a negative vote by one or more of the permanent members on substantive matters, these eight members need only obtain the support of one member of the council to insure the passage of any draft resolution on which they are agreed (Nicol, 1980, p. 15). This vivid example gives an insight into the influence of the nonaligned nations in the Security Council.

The nonaligned activity in the Security Council began in 1961 when Egypt, India, and Yugoslavia were members of the council during the critical debates on situations in Vietnam and Korea. The nonaligned pressure resulted in the expansion of the Security Council from 11 to 15 members in August, 1965. The Security Council has served the nonaligned as a forum and a natural meeting place in two ways. First, the council provided opportunities for nonaligned states to present partisan points of view before a world audience and to make points in a diplomatic duel with another state. Second, for the nonaligned the Security Council serves as a forum for the expression and development of world opinion on international issues (Hiscocks, 1973, p. 248).
The importance of the nonaligned countries in the Security Council is often demonstrated by the informal consultation which takes place outside the formal meetings of the council. As its name implies, "informal consultation" is a caucus of the nonaligned in the United Nations. It is during these meetings that members coordinate their positions and determine how to vote on crucial issues coming up for vote in the United Nations. This "informal consultation" in the Security Council was started in 1975 by the nonaligned group when they formed the group of seven (G-7). Through these informal consultations, information is obtained, imparted, and exchanged, and consensus can be reached or negotiated. The significance of these informal consultation meetings to the United Nations is that when the public meeting of the Security Council is called positions of diplomatic conflict that may arise among members during debate are avoided and steps toward the achievement of consensus enhanced (Nicol, 1980, p. 15). Table 7 shows the frequency nonaligned members meet in caucus in relationship to the number of Security Council meetings.

The information in Table 7 is significant for two main reasons. First, it reflects the regularity and the importance the nonaligned group attaches to issues in the U.N. by coming together to iron out its differences and
Table 7
Nonaligned Informal Consultation Meetings
at the United Nations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Security Council Meetings</th>
<th>Informal Consultations</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jackson, Richard. 1983. The Nonaligned, the U.N., and the Superpowers. New York: Praeger Special Studies, p. 120.

build a consensus on an issue. Second, the frequency of the informal consultation partly refutes critics' claims that the NAM is no longer operating or declining in importance in the world arena. The importance of the nonaligned movement continued to grow in the 1970s in the Security Council to the extent that many Western and socialist states of the council, for instance, prefer issues of importance to them to be considered when the presidency of the council is held by a representative of
the nonaligned group because of their supposed image of noninvolvement in bloc politics (Minic, 1980, p. 12). In addition, the impact of the nonaligned in the Security Council can be viewed from different angles. According to Falk (1983, p. 14), the nonaligned have been in the vanguard of ensuring that issues of national liberations such as those in Namibia, South Africa, and Israel are on the agenda of the Security Council. This strategy has contributed a great deal to refocus peoples' and governments' attention all over the world on the victims of apartheid in South Africa. Nonaligned nations' activity is not limited to the Security Council alone; the group also plays an active role in the General Assembly.

The Nonaligned Group in the General Assembly

The General Assembly is the focal point for the nonaligned diplomatic action in the United Nations. This is because the nonaligned group in the U.N. shares the assumption that whatever constructive resolution they submit for consideration may be vetoed by any of the permanent members of the Security Council. In view of this, the nonaligned direct their action a great deal in the General Assembly where the nonaligned nations constitute the majority of the membership.

The General Assembly of the United Nations has become over the years the predominant political body of the world
organization. This is because the frequent inability of
the Security Council to discharge the functions assigned to
it by the charter has brought about a change in the
relative power of the council and the General Assembly
(Lande, 1968, p. 227). Lande argues that the failure of
the Security Council to reach urgent and timely decisions
due to the veto power of the permanent members is
unintentionally giving the General Assembly broader powers.
The General Assembly is not like a world parliament because
it cannot legislate on political matters but can only make
recommendations. The stated function of the General
Assembly is as follows: To consider and make
recommendations on the principles of international
cooperation in the maintenance of peace and security. In
addition, the General Assembly performs the function of
electing the nonpermanent members of the Security Council.
The General Assembly also receives reports from the
Security Council and other organs of the United Nations

Regarding the sessions of the General Assembly, the
delegates meet once a year in regular session commencing on
the third Tuesday in September. Special sessions can be
convened at the request of the Security Council.

The General Assembly offers the nonaligned group a
unique opportunity since voting in the assembly is not
impeded by a veto (Haviland, 1965, p. 72). The General Assembly, through the use of the Uniting for Peace Resolution, resolves a conflict when the Security Council cannot reach a decision. The Uniting for Peace Resolution was introduced in 1950 by U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson as a result of the paralysis of the Security Council between 1946-1950 due to the increasing number of Soviet vetoes (Jackson, 1983, p. 104). Jackson argues that the impact of the nonaligned nations has been felt as a result of the introduction of the Uniting for Peace Resolution which is exemplified by the fact that since 1980, the nonaligned group had four emergency sessions specifically on Palestine in 1980, Namibia in 1981, and on the issue of Golan Height annexation in 1982. This mechanism gives the nonaligned the opportunity of putting forward third world issues in a forum beyond the reach of the permanent members. The importance of the nonaligned group is evidenced by the group monopoly of the presidency of the General Assembly. The President of the General Assembly is usually elected at the beginning of General Assembly sessions every year. There have been about eight members of the NAM that have served as presidents of the General Assembly between 1965 and 1985 (Wilcox and Marcy, 1986, p. 50). At this point it is necessary to analyze the
voting strength of the nonaligned at the General Assembly based on the resolutions adopted by the body.

The Nonaligned and Voting in the General Assembly

The voting procedure in the General Assembly is based on the fundamental principle of the legal equality of states. The voting in the General Assembly to some extent is characterized by what has come to be known as bloc voting. A bloc, as used in this context, is a group of states that meet regularly in caucus and the members of which are bound in their votes in the General Assembly by caucus decision (Hovet, 1960, p. 30). According to Hovet, by pooling or combining their voting strength on particular issues, groups of small states are able to exert an influence far out of proportion to their political importance. The tendency toward bloc voting in the United Nations was developed in 1947 by the Soviet Union (Hovet, 1960, p. 48). Between 1948 and 1958, the Soviet Union encouraged bloc voting to coordinate and centralize the political role of satellites in the U.N., which at that point included Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, East Germany, Rumania, and the Ukraine. Other blocs emerged during this period. They included the seven Arab states that often voted as a unit, especially with respect to Israeli-Arab problems, and two-thirds of the 20 Latin American States.
In recent years, bloc politics still remains a constant factor in the operation of the General Assembly. According to Jackson (1983, p. 145), the nonaligned is the largest cohesive bloc in the United Nations. Another voting bloc in the U.N. in recent years includes the countries of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Jackson further asserts that the consistency of nonaligned voting varies depending on the issue. Votes on the question of decolonization tend to be unanimous while divisions show up on issues more peripheral to the nonaligned.

Another important dimension of this study is the voting behavior of both Cuba and Yugoslavia in the General Assembly. The members of the NAM vote more in agreement with Yugoslavia than Cuba in the General Assembly of the United Nations (Jackson, 1983, p. 145). For instance, in 1982, on all 341 votes of the General Assembly, the nonaligned voted with Yugoslavia 97.6% of the time and with Cuba 94.5% of the time. Also, on all 287 votes during 1981, the nonaligned voted with Yugoslavia 98.2% of the time and with Cuba 92.1% of the time. The comparison of Cuba's and Yugoslavia's voting behavior in the General Assembly between 1981 and 1982 is important because it was the era of the Cuban presidency or chairmanship of the NAM, a position which Yugoslavia seriously challenged prior and
during the Havana Summit in 1979. The assumption underlying this comparison is that being the chairman of the NAM during these years from 1979 to 1982, one might expect that Cuba would enjoy more support from the nonaligned members in the U.N. General Assembly in terms of agreement on the issues for vote than Yugoslavia would. The result was the opposite because the nonaligned voted more in agreement with Yugoslavia during the 1981 and 1982 General Assembly sessions. One of the issues where Cuba differed with Yugoslavia in terms of support from the majority of the nonaligned was the Afghanistan issue. The Afghanistan issue made a great difference because most members of the nonaligned voted with Yugoslavia in calling for the Soviet's withdrawal of their troops from Afghanistan. In addition, the Afghanistan issue has consistently appeared on the agenda of the General Assembly since the December, 1979, Soviet invasion. Cuba voted against the Soviet withdrawal of their troops from Afghanistan with some few radical members of the nonaligned. According to Cuba's U.N. Ambassador Raul Rao, Cuba voted against the resolution calling for withdrawal of troops in Afghanistan because Cuba viewed it as an exercise by the U.S. to resurrect the Cold War (Erisman, 1983, p. 164). Ambassador Raul Rao argued as follows: "As far as Cuba is concerned, this debate poses a need to take a stand
in the face of a historic dilemma. The gross manipulation of events in Afghanistan by the U.S. Imperialists and their efforts to capitalize on events there to conceal their cynical backing for the worst forces on the international scene and to promote warlike policy. . . We will not vote against socialism" (Rao, 1980, p. 12). This Cuban rationale for voting against the General Assembly resolution calling for the Soviet withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, which is also a nonaligned nation, was not convincing and appealing to most NAM members. Instead, there was an erosion of Cuban credibility among members of the nonaligned to the extent that it lost in its bid for a seat on the U.N. Security Council (Blaiser, 1979, p. 229).

In view of the foregoing, Cuba's and Yugoslavia's rivalry did not greatly disrupt the nonaligned activities in the United Nations. For instance, according to Jackson (1983, pp. 142-145), the nonaligned had an average voting agreement of 96.1% in 1981 and 1982. This chapter has discussed how Cuba and Yugoslavia adhere to the role expectations of the NAM in the United Nations including how the NAM is a factor in world politics by enumerating the various NAM activities in the United Nations. The next chapter will summarize and conclude the findings of this study.
CHAPTER BIBLIOGRAPHY


CHAPTER IV

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This study has examined how Cuba and Yugoslavia adhered to the role expectations of the nonaligned movement including the current state of affairs of the movement. At the beginning of this study four questions were raised to guide the entire study, which are as follows:

1. Whether either Cuba or Yugoslavia is the dominant leader of the NAM. Leadership within the context of this study is defined as to whether Cuba or Yugoslavia is at the helm of affairs in the NAM including making binding decisions. This question is partly geared toward unfolding the state of affairs in the NAM through a close examination of the organizational structure of the movement.

2. The second question of investigation is concerned as to whether Cuba and Yugoslavia fulfill the role expectations of the NAM. This question is designed to focus on whether Cuba and Yugoslavia are really nonaligned based on the stated role expectations of the nonaligned movement.

3. The third question of investigation is an attempt to demonstrate how Cuba and Yugoslavia vote on selected
issues that are important to the NAM in the United Nations' General Assembly.

4. The last question of inquiry is an attempt to grapple with the issue of whether the NAM is dead or a factor of world politics. The issue of the NAM being a factor of world politics within the context of this study refers to whether members of NAM as a group do participate in the activities of the United Nations and in world politics.

This study is divided into four chapters. Chapter IV states the conclusions reached concerning the major arguments of each chapter and its findings. Chapter I was an effort to unfold the conceptual meaning of nonalignment as it relates to third world countries. It introduced the fact that nonalignment evolved as a trend in international politics as a result of refusal of newly independent countries to enter any kind of bloc for military purposes. One of the major arguments embodied in this chapter, as advocated by Misra (1982, pp. 1-103), is that the concept of nonalignment does not mean the same thing as neutrality. Misra argues that neutrality is a legal concept which is based on the international law of warfare, the legal basis of which is mostly to be found in the Hague Convention of 1907. The Hague Convention of 1907 prohibits neutral nations from participation in armed conflict. Misra argues
that nonalignment is a political concept that seeks to take a number of initiatives to usher in peace and cooperative relationship in the world as evidenced in the nonaligned calls for a New International Economic Order and New Information Order. Another important contribution of Chapter I is that it defines the criteria of nonalignment which in this study is also considered as the role expectations of the nonaligned movement.

Chapter II focused primarily on the two questions of investigation. The first question of investigation deals with whether either Cuba or Yugoslavia is the leader of the NAM. This study approached this question by examining the NAM's organizational structure to determine whether either Cuba or Yugoslavia is at the helm of affairs of the movement. One of the findings of this study is that the position of Cuba and Yugoslavia is not defined in NAM's organizational structure. The organizational structure of NAM does not have fixed members. Membership changes every three years at the end of each summit conference. In view of the nature of NAM's organizational structure, this study concludes that one cannot categorically assert that either Cuba or Yugoslavia is the dominant leader of the movement. In addition, one of the findings of this study with regards to the question of leadership of the movement is that although the organizational structure is hierarchical, the
powers of the president of the organization are limited because he can only persuade. This partly explains why the NAM has not been able to resolve 37 border disputes among its members.

Question 2, as discussed in Chapter II, examined how Cuba and Yugoslavia adhere to the role expectations of the nonaligned movement. This study examined this question in three ways: First by looking at Cuba's and Yugoslavia's activities in the NAM, second by considering their relationship with the Soviet Union, and third by looking at Cuba's and Yugoslavia's behavior in world politics in relationship with the stated role expectations of the NAM. The findings of this study as regards the second question of investigation are as follows. Yugoslavia does adhere to the role expectations of the NAM in the following manner. First, Yugoslavia emphasizes the independent capability approach of nonalignment which stresses that developing nations should strive to be self-reliant in their efforts to achieve economic and technological progress. Second, Yugoslavia has no foreign military bases, is not a member of any regional defense pact, and is not a member of any multilateral military alliance. In addition, Yugoslavia has been supportive of the national liberation movement. As a result of Yugoslavia's conformity to NAM role expectations, this study concludes that Yugoslavia is
genuinely nonaligned because it adheres strictly to the role expectations of the NAM.

In contrast to Yugoslavia, this study uncovered that Cuba does not entirely conform to the role expectations of the NAM in the following ways. Cuba's "natural ally" thesis of nonalignment is a clear violation of the role expectations of the NAM because it fosters the political interest of a superpower. The "natural ally" thesis advances the notion that the Soviet Union is a natural friend of the nonaligned. Second, Cuba used to be a member of the Organization of American States, a regional defense pact until it was expelled because of its evident military relationship with the Soviet Union. In addition, the Cuban missile crisis incident of 1962 clearly contravenes the NAM role expectation of refusal of foreign military bases negotiated within the context of superpower conflict. In view of these Cuban violations of the role expectations of the NAM, this study concludes that the status of Cuba as a nonaligned country is questionable.

Question 3, as discussed in Chapter III, focused on whether Cuba and Yugoslavia do adhere to the role expectation of the NAM by voting in favor of issues important to the NAM which are as follows: Kampuchea issue, Afghanistan, Namibia, South Africa, and the call for a New International Economic Order. The findings of this
study in this regard conclude that Yugoslavia is an example of a genuinely nonaligned country. The Yugoslavs voted in favor of all the issues in which the nonaligned have an interest at stake. In contrast, Cuba voted against some of the popular issues important to the NAM. One issue was the Soviet withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan, and another was support of the Vietnam invasion of Kampuchea because Cuba supported the seating of Heng Samrin's delegation for Kampuchea's seat in the United Nations' General Assembly.

Question 4 deals with the issue of whether the NAM remains a factor in world politics. This question of investigation refers to the participation of members of the NAM as a group in the activities of the United Nations and in world politics. This question of investigation is designed to unfold whether the NAM is dead or is participating in world politics.

Chapter 3 focused on this research problem by revealing the entire activities of the nonaligned in the United Nations' General Assembly and the Security Council. The findings of this study show that the NAM remains a factor of world politics in the following ways:

1. According to Jackson (1983, pp. 142-145), members of the NAM had an average voting agreement of 96.1% which places the movement between the NATO and Warsaw PACT when
compared on voting consistency. It is on this basis that Jackson concludes that the NAM is the largest cohesive voting bloc in the United Nations.

2. Members of the NAM in the United Nations meet more frequently in a caucus to coordinate their positions on issues than the number of times the formal meetings of the Security Council are held.

3. The membership of the United Nations' General Assembly largely consists of members of the NAM. This has afforded the NAM the opportunity in recent years to elect its members as president of the United Nations' General Assembly.

4. The NAM has grown from a membership of 25 in 1961 to 101 in 1986.

This research has tried to demonstrate whether Cuba and Yugoslavia fulfill the stated role expectations of the NAM including the current state of NAM in world politics. Some difficulties were encountered in an effort to clarify the four questions of investigation of this study. Although the NAM broadly specified the role expectations of the movement, it failed to indicate how members of the movement should conform to these expectations and the penalty for noncompliance to the role expectations. This loophole has given some members of the NAM such as Cuba the opportunity to give their own interpretation of how to
achieve the goals of the movement. In addition, some of the role expectations of the NAM are broad and ambiguous which make it difficult to define the boundaries of what constitute an acceptable behavior of a nonaligned country. In spite of these limitations, some members of the NAM have adhered to these role expectations. These countries include Nigeria, Tanzania, Cameroon, Yugoslavia, and Ivory Coast. In a similar vein, there are countries that have failed to adhere to the role expectations of NAM either because of their interpretation of the role expectations of the movement stemming from their own political ideology or because the NAM has failed to specify precisely the how to aspect of achieving the goals of the movement. Cuba is an example of such a member of the NAM.

In view of the foregoing, this study has reached the general conclusion that Yugoslavia adheres strictly to the role expectations of the NAM while Cuba's nonaligned status is questionable because of its violations of some of the stated provisions regarding the expected behavior of a nonaligned country. The nonaligned movement remains a factor in world politics evidenced by the growth of membership of the movement from 25 in 1961 to 101 in 1986 and its activities especially in the General Assembly of the United Nations.
Finally, this study may have raised other questions. One of these questions may be "How do other members of the NAM conform to its role expectations?" As a result, future research may investigate the extent to which members of the NAM who cluster around Cuba for economic and military aid from the Soviet Union and other members of the NAM adhere to the role expectations of the movement. This effort, perhaps, may clarify the extent to which other members of the NAM are genuinely nonaligned and any possible linkage between nonalignment and socialism.
CHAPTER BIBLIOGRAPHY


APPENDIX A

PREVIOUS SUMMIT CONFERENCES OF THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT
### Previous Summit Conferences of the Nonaligned Movement

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<th>Venue</th>
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<td>Lusaka, Zambia</td>
<td>September 8-10, 1970</td>
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<td>Colombo, Sri Lanka</td>
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<td>Havana, Cuba</td>
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<td>New Delhi, India</td>
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APPENDIX B

MEMBERSHIP OF THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT: SEPTEMBER, 1986
Membership of the Nonaligned Movement: September, 1986

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