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NO. 6419

VALIDATING THE RORSCHACH DEFENSE SCALE BY EXAMINING
DEFENSIVE FUNCTIONING IN COLLEGE STUDENTS

THESIS

Presented to the Graduate Council of the
North Texas State University in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

By

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May, 1988

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Esparza, Jana Scoville, Validating the Rorschach Defense Scale by Examining Defensive Functioning in College Students. Master of Arts (Clinical Psychology), May, 1988, 59 pp., 2 tables, references, 39 titles.

This study attempted to provide validation for Lerner and Lerner's Rorschach Defense Scale by investigating the relationship between primitive defenses as measured by the Rorschach Defense Scale, level of object relations as measured by the Developmental Analysis of the Concept of the Object Scale, and characteristic defensive operations as assessed by the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory. One hundred and twenty undergraduates completed the Rorschach and MMPI, and the RDS and DACOS were applied to their Rorschach responses. The results show a significant positive correlation between use of primitive defenses and level of object relations development and a significant negative correlation between the defense Projective Identification and MMPI scale 6 (Paranoia) elevation. Overall, these results did not support the validity of the RDS.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
VALIDATING THE RORSCHACH DEFENSIVE SCALE BY EXAMINING DEFENSIVE FUNCTIONING IN COLLEGE STUDENTS	
Introduction	1
Defenses	
Defining the Concept of Defense	
Characteristics of Defensive Processes	
Pathology of Defenses	
Primitive Defense Mechanisms	
Measurement of Defenses	
Object Relations	
Conceptualizing Object Relations	
Development of Object Relations	
Relation to Defenses	
The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory	
MMPI Indications of Defense	
Related Studies	
The Rorschach Defense Scale (RDS)	
The Developmental Analysis of the Concept of the Object Scale (DACOS)	
The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI)	
Method	31
Subjects	
Instruments	
Rorschach Defense Scale (RDS)	
Developmental Analysis of the Concept of the Object Scale (DACOS)	
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI)	
Procedure	
Results.	37
Discussion	39
Appendices	42
References	62

LIST OF TABLES

Table		Page
1.	Means and Standard Deviations of the Five Defense Categories and Total Scores of the RDS	37
2.	Correlations between DRS, DACOS, and MMPI Variables	38

VALIDATING THE RORSCHACH DEFENSE SCALE BY EXAMINING
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The concept of defense is central to psychoanalytic theory. The earliest use of the word "defense" can be traced to Freud's (1894) paper, "The Neuro-Psychoses of Defense," in which he made a distinction between "defense hysteria" and other types of hysteria. He elaborated this distinction by characterizing defense hysteria as the ego's response to "incompatible ideas" (Wallerstein, 1985). The use of the term "defense" was temporarily abandoned, however, and replaced by the term "repression" as both a specific defense mechanism and as a synonym for defense. Gradually, defense became differentiated to include a number of various mechanisms.

Subsequently, Anna Freud began investigating specific defenses in her (1936) classic contribution, The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense. She discussed particular defenses, their modes of operation, their role in normal and pathological development, their relation to specific illnesses, their hierarchical organization, and their relation to developmental phases as well as their influence on development. Anna Freud's work on defense was a new and expansive investigation which had a major influence on the subsequent development of psychoanalytic theory and technique (Blum, 1985).

Over the years, Freud proposed hypotheses about the various types of defenses. These hypotheses have since been elaborated by other theorists, some of whom have advanced radical innovations. Sjoback (1973) suggests that the theory of defensive processes, both as it was originally understood by Freud and as it appears currently, contains no propositions that limit the defense mechanisms as a group.

According to Shafer (1954), an endless variety of defensive operations is encountered in clinical work. These range from some so extensive they involve complete, enduring personality structures to others that are small-scale, limited, and transient. Furthermore, any attempt to categorize defenses will reflect the theoretical and clinical orientation of the one doing the conceptualizing. As a result, there can be no single correct or complete list of defenses.

Defenses

Defining the Concept of Defense

How then may defenses be defined? Freud explicitly referred to "defenses" as the general term for all the techniques used by the ego in dealing with conflicts that may produce neurosis, including all processes that protect the ego from instinctual demands (Bellack, Hurvich, & Gediman, 1973).

Brenner (cited in Wallerstein, 1985) defines a defense as "an aspect of mental functioning that is definable only in terms of its consequence: the reduction of unpleasure

associated with a drive derivative, in other words, with an instinctual wish, or with superego functioning" (p. 125). He suggests that the same aspects of mental functioning which are observed clinically as defenses against drive derivatives are those which also further the gratification of other drive derivatives at others times.

There are no particular ego functions used exclusively for defense. Brenner (cited in Wallerstein, 1985) argues that discussing defense in terms of defense "mechanisms" is wrong because to do so implies incorrectly that there are special ego mechanisms used only for defense. The ego is instead capable of using whatever is readily available to it for the purpose of defense. It can use any ego attitude, any perception, any change in attention or awareness, or anything else classifiable as normal ego functioning or development. Modes of defense are as diverse as psychic functioning itself.

Laughlin (1970) takes a more optimistic view in proposing that the past few decades of scientific observation and research into human behavior have led to the identification of a group of internal psychological processes known as ego defenses. According to this perspective, through the evolution and defensive use of various mechanisms, an individual unconsciously seeks to resolve intrapsychic as well as extrapsychic conflicts. The mental mechanisms employed are the ego defenses. They are evolved automatically by the psyche in order to avoid

psychic pain and discomfort through the resolution of emotional conflicts. This evolution occurs within the psyche as an involuntary and consciously effortless process.

Characteristics of Defensive Processes

Freud assumed that all defensive processes have a fundamental blocking and rejecting aspect (Sjoback, 1973). He described them as "attempts at flight" from the anxiety-provoking drives or "attempts at fighting" them off. Based on his hypotheses about mental energies, Freud describes this aspect of defenses as a withdrawal of cathexis and a readying of a particular charge of energy, called counter-cathetic energy, which is directed against the representatives of the instinctual drives.

The influence exerted by the defensive processes on instinctual drives may be characterized as limited, stereotyped, rigid, and only minimally governed by reality testing (Sjoback, 1973). It is therefore assumed that defensive processes have their origin and primary functional site in a part of the ego which is described as "primitive," "regressive," or "infantile." Defense mechanisms are thus depicted as fixations on a small and rigid repertoire of primitive and insufficient attempts to solve the ego's task of adapting the demands of the instinctual drives to reality's conditions for their gratification.

In accordance with these formulations, any mental content may become involved in the defensive process.

Even conscious mental content and behaviors which seem in no way related to instinctual drives may have their sources in such drives as well as in defensive attempts against them (Sjoback, 1973). Such a phenomenon is observed in individuals who strictly adhere to certain values or ideologies to the degree to which they are part of a defensive system (Rapaport, 1967).

In his examination of Freud's and more recent leading theorists' hypotheses about the characteristics of various defense mechanisms, Sjoback (1973) concludes that they agree upon four implicit hypotheses about the functional modes of defenses. These functions are: distorting the instinctual drives, inhibiting or blocking representatives (i.e., derivatives that have penetrated the preconscious) of the instinctual drives, distorting representatives of the instinctual drives, and covering or screening the representatives of instinctual drives by investing mental energy in mental contents more or less contradictory to those warded off.

All defensive processes are assumed to have one result in common: a mental content which is defended against is prevented from appearing in consciousness in its "original" or "unadulterated" form (Sjoback, 1973). It is generally assumed that such mental content continues to exist in its original form behind the barrier of the defense where it remains a representation of the event or idea to which it

refers. It is believed that this occurs whether the contents refer to an intrapsychic or an external event.

Another aspect of defensive functioning that Sjoback (1973) discusses is the manifestation of rigid or stereotyped behaviors. He proposes that "rigidity" can denote either a lack of flexible modulation within one particular type of dimension of behavior (such as assertiveness), or an inability to move freely between several different types of behavior. Rigidity can also be evidenced in goal setting or in the pursuit of certain goals, and this meaning implies a specific impoverishment in an individual's behavioral repertoire. Sjoback further theorizes that defensive processes represent emergency solutions in situations where there is an urgent need for a solution and no time to choose among several possibilities. The individual then resolves to an established solution which has given relief previously. Hence the fixed and rigid character of behaviors that are determined by defensive processes.

Rapaport (1951/1967) proposes that defense structures may be recognized clinically by the appearance of a behavior different than that which would be expected. This assumption reflects the general hypothesis that defenses cause suppression and distortions of mental contents and subsequent behavior.

Throughout the evolution of the concept of defense, numerous controversies have arisen over whether there are specific mechanisms of defense, whether "defense mechanism" is too mechanistic and limited in its implications, whether defense mechanisms are better understood as compromise formations or as non-specific mechanisms having multiple functions, whether a defense always has content, and whether other mental functions may just as easily be used for purposes of defense (Blum, 1985).

Numerous theoretical explanations have been attempted to clarify defense mechanisms as well as defensive attitudes, maneuvers, techniques, styles, and organizations (Blum, 1985). These explanations continue to influence and stimulate psychoanalytic discourse. Anna Freud's work, particularly her contributions to defense analysis and to developmental theory, represents a forceful and important trend in psychoanalytic thought.

Wallerstein (1985) summarizes the theoretical understanding of the concepts of defense and defense mechanisms as follows: (a) "Defense mechanisms" are constructs that define a mode of mental functioning. They are involved to explain how behaviors, emotions, or ideas block or modulate undesired discharge of impulses. Since they are theoretical abstractions rather than entities, they are neither conscious nor unconscious; (b) "Defenses" are particular behaviors, emotions, or ideas that serve

defensive purposes. Their functioning is explained by recourse to the array of defense mechanisms. Because defenses are considered behaviors, they are observable or inferable phenomenal experiences; (c) Both defense mechanisms and defenses can be understood as hierarchically organized in terms of increasing complexity; (d) Defenses or defensive behaviors can be regarded as complex layered and, depending on whether the perspective is "upward" toward the syntonic and conscious or "downward" toward the infantile and unconscious, can be viewed as serving impulsive discharge demands in relation to the higher psychic layers or defensive avoidant needs in relation to the lower psychic layers. Defenses are therefore both defensive and impulsive, simultaneously and/or sequentially, depending on the viewpoint taken; (e) Defense mechanisms can be similarly viewed as complex "compromise formations" incorporating both means of defending against unwanted impulse discharge while simultaneously providing a disguised pathway for expressing the same unwanted impulse demands; and (f) It is useful to broaden the concept of defense mechanism from simply ego defense against id impulse to the broader concept of "ego mechanisms" available simultaneously and/or sequentially for whatever organismic need or drive is perceived (at some level) as most salient at any given moment. Defense mechanisms may thus be conceptualized as mental ways of functioning designed to provide the most

effective compromise expression to the varying external and internal, past and present, needs and demands being experienced by the individual at each consecutive moment in time.

Pathology of Defenses

While defenses play a vital role in maintaining the mental health of individuals, they also play an important role in the development of mental illness. When defenses stay appropriately balanced in their functioning, they contribute to emotional health and to individual growth and maturity (Laughlin, 1970). When defensive functioning becomes exaggerated or overdeveloped, however, it can have self-defeating, destructive, and pathological consequences.

Freud was the first to suggest the notion of a continuum between pathology and normality in defensive functioning when he said that defenses become pathological only when used in exaggeration (Bellack, Hurvich, & Gediman, 1973). He later added that defenses may become harmful as a result of the amount of energy needed to maintain them and due to the ego deformations that may result from their overuse.

Loewenstein (1967) has proposed that some defense mechanisms may be either too weak in relation to some drives or too strong in relation to other types of drives. He says that some defense mechanisms are inappropriate with respect to the ego and to external reality. Their rigidity at

different developmental stages and in the face of changing reality conditions can make them pathogenic. Pathology also results when defense mechanisms are overgeneralized, that is when the behavior they elicit is not restricted to a particular person but emerges in stereotyped form and is directed at people in general.

According to Bellack, Hurvich, and Gediman (1973), defense mechanisms can be described according to their degree of pathology. Depending upon when they are used, what they are directed against, and the extent to which they adversely affect other ego functions, defense mechanisms can vary extensively in their pathology and adaptiveness. For example, while denial may hinder ego development when used against awareness of a parent's death during childhood, it can also reflect psychotic functioning if the loss itself is denied.

Primitive Defense Mechanisms

Congruous with the conceptualization of defensive functioning along a continuum between pathology and normality is the notion that defense mechanisms also form a continuum from primitive and maladaptive to high-level and adaptive. Laughlin (1979) describes more primitive defenses as extensive and automatic in their functioning. The emotional level of these defenses tends to be deeply unconscious. In addition, maladaptive defenses are more likely to be associated with less mature individuals and

tended to be more prominent as primordial mechanisms (in infancy and in the very young). Primitive defenses are also used by patients who are considered to be borderline or psychotic. Denial, projection, repression, and splitting are examples of defenses classifiable as primitive.

In contrast, higher-level or adaptive defenses are more complex in their functioning, less deeply unconscious and automatic, and operate more frequently in older, more mature individuals (Laughlin, 1970). Theoretically, high-level defenses demonstrate a more efficient, socially appropriate, and effective way of coping with conflict and anxiety. Mechanisms exemplifying this adaptive group include rationalization, sublimation, intellectualization, and isolation of affect.

Kernberg (cited in Willick, 1985) asserts that borderline patients use specific primitive defenses which distinguish them from neurotic patients who primarily use higher-level defenses. These primitive defenses are splitting, projective identification, primitive idealization, denial, and omnipotence and devaluation. He suggests that these defenses persist in borderline patients because of ego weakness and in turn contribute to further ego weakness.

Measurement of Defenses

The identification of defenses is important not only for diagnostic purposes but for clinical management of

patients (Vaillant & Drake, 1985). Mature defense mechanisms are highly related to and partially responsible for every aspect of adult mental health.

A review of the literature reveals that few measuring devices have been developed to assess either defensive functioning or the use of particular defenses. According to Vaillant and Drake (1985), defenses are difficult to identify because they reflect integrated mental processes and cannot be separated into constituent parts. Thus, defenses have not yielded easily to rating scales, to experimental analysis, to projective techniques, nor even to precise descriptions.

One instrument, the Defense Mechanism Inventory (DMI) of Gleser and Ihilevich (1969), was developed to measure the relative intensity of usage of five major clusters of defenses: turning against object, projection, principalization, turning against self, and reversal. The inventory uses a forced-choice format in which subjects choose among alternative response that correspond with the five defenses after reading a series of stories intended to tap six general conflict areas. High scores on particular defense clusters indicate a relatively stable response pattern to a broad range of frustrating situations. Psychometric data on the DMI have demonstrated adequate reliability (Gleser & Ihilevich, 1969) and favorable

validity data by both researchers (e.g., Kipper & Ginot, 1979) and clinicians (e.g., Klein, Gonen, & Smith, 1975).

A second method that has been used empirically to assess defensive functioning is the Holt primary-secondary process analysis. Holt (cited in Blatt & Berman, 1984) has developed a complex conceptual scheme for utilizing the Rorschach to assess (a) the extent and type of drive-laden, illogical, and unrealistic thought ("Defense Demand"), and (b) the effectiveness with which drive-laden, illogical primary process thinking is integrated into appropriate, reality-oriented responses ("Defense Effectiveness"). The Holt system also includes a measure called "adaptive regression" which is a composite measure of defense demand and defense effectiveness. High scores on this measure indicates a fair amount of primary-process material that is integrated into meaningful and realistic Rorschach responses, while low scores indicate extensive primary process material that is poorly integrated. In their use of the Holt system to differentiate opiate addicts and psychiatric patients in terms of ego functioning, Blatt and Berman (1984) found the opiate addicts demonstrated significantly less thought disorder and primary process thinking than the psychiatric patients. They report reliability estimates ranging from .96 to .99, and these figures are consistent with prior reports (e.g., Oberlander, 1968; Blatt & Feirstein, 1977).

Lerner and Lerner (1980) have developed the Rorschach Defense Scale (RDS) to assess and score the primitive defenses most often associated with borderline patients. Rorschach responses containing human figures are first scored for form level using a system devised by Mayman (1970), and each response is then scored for five defenses: splitting, devaluation, idealization, projective identification, and denial. Data assessing the original Rorschach Defense Manual's reliability and construct validity was derived from a study by Lerner and Lerner (1978) which compared borderline and neurotic patient samples. The percentage of agreement between two independent raters ranged from 83 to 100 percent for the major scoring categories and from 76 to 95 percent for the subratings.

Object Relations

Conceptualizing Object Relations

Object relations is an aspect of ego organization referring to specific intrapsychic structures (Horner, 1979). These intrapsychic structures are mental representations of self and other (the object) and are manifest in interpersonal relationships. They result from the individual's relations with people upon whom he or she depended for satisfaction of primitive needs in infancy and during early stages of development. The structural and dynamic relationships between self-representations and object-representations thus constitute object relations.

The roots of object relations theory are found in Freud's work on the Oedipus complex and the phenomena of transference and resistance in treatment (Guntrip, 1973). In the 50 year period following Freud's first major theoretical formulations, advancement within the psychoanalytic field has been described as primarily centrifugal. However, the past 20 years has seen a reversal in this centrifugal movement to more convergence in increasing the focus of attention on interpersonal relationships and interactions (Green & Mitchell, 1983).

Greenberg and Mitchell (1983) propose two major schemas for understanding the theoretical construct of object relations. The first is that which was used originally by Freud. Within this conceptual framework, the role of objects can be understood largely in relation to drive discharge: objects can inhibit discharge, facilitate it, or serve as its target. The second schema, and that which is fundamental to this investigation, replaces the drive theory model with a framework in which relationship with others constitute the basic building blocks of mental life. This schema therefore replaces drive discharge with the creation or recreation of specific ways of relatedness with others.

As postulated by object relations theory, the quality of an infant's early relationships is hypothesized to be internalized, or introjected, resulting in the development of self and object representations. These representations

are based primarily on early experiences with significant others in the infant's environment, especially on the maternal relationship (Bornstein, Galley, & Leone, 1986).

By emphasizing interactions between early object relations and the development of intrapsychic structures, these contemporary theoretical advances make psychoanalytic theory less mechanistic and more experiential. According to these recent formulations, object relations become internalized as mental representations, therefore becoming part of an individual's personality structure (Blatt & Lerner, 1983).

Development of Object Relations

Psychoanalytic theorists base their formulations of the development of cognitive structures primarily on studies of children in states of relative comfort and discomfort in interpersonal relationships (Blatt & Lerner, 1983). These formulations are typically expressed in terms of concepts of the self and others. According to Jacobson, Mahler, A. Freud, Fraiberg, and others, representations of the self and others initially are vague and unstable and develop gradually into consistent, relatively realistic representations. Based originally on pleasurable and unpleasurable experiences of frustration and gratification, the child begins to develop stable representations of the self and of others and to establish lasting investments and affective commitments.

At the earliest stage of the development of object relations, the self, the object, and interpersonal

experiences are all perceived as one undifferentiated, affective, sensorimotor experience of pleasure or displeasure (Blatt & Lerner, 1983). As proposed by Mahler, in the early "autistic" and "symbiotic" stages, the infant is in a state of undifferentiated fusion and attachment to the mother or primary caretaker. Gradually, the infant begins to perceive need gratification as coming from the mother, and there is a corresponding shift from the internal state of pleasure to an awareness of a need-satisfying object. Initially, the object is identified primarily in terms of its need gratifying functions. Slowly, the child becomes capable of distinguishing representations of self and others. With further development, these representations become more stable and continuous, blending into a growing sense of identify.

Based on his work with borderline patients, Kernberg (1977) has postulated four stages to explain the intrapsychic development of object relations. His schema has been chosen for elaboration because, according to Smith (1980), it is generally consistent with those of other major object relations theorists and because it is the one upon which Lerner and Lerner (1980) have based the Rorschach Defense Scale. Kernberg's first stage of development is characterized by a complete lack of differentiation between self and other. The next stage is distinguished by the development of a dim awareness of an "other" and the

adaptive splitting of experience into "good" and "bad" parts. The third stage is marked by a further differentiation of self and other. Fixations at this developmental stage are thought to result in borderline ego functioning. Borderlines typically have difficulty maintaining clear boundaries between "self" and "other" experiences. Kernberg's final stage is characterized by a somewhat complete separation of self and non-self representations and by the attainment of an integration of good and bad representations, beginning with the integration of non-self representations and proceeding to the integration of self-representations. This integration of good and bad part-object representations is termed by all object relations theorists "the achievement of the whole object." An individual achieving this state would function at least within the neurotic range and optimally within the normal range of ego functioning (Smith, 1980).

Relation to Defenses

According to Kernberg (1985), all character defenses represent a defensive pattern of self and object representations directed against a contradictory, dreaded, and repressed self and object pattern. For example, an excessively submissive individual may be influenced by a representational schema of a self-representation submitting happily to a powerful parental (object) representation. However, this set of representations is defending him or her

from a repressed self-representation rebelling angrily against a harsh and cruel parental representation.

Anna Freud (cited in Sandler & Freud, 1985) notes that while defenses are not immediately associated with the object, they are indirectly connected with the object insofar as one cannot think of ego and superego development without object relations.

The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory MMPI Indications of Defense

The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) is currently the most widely used and researched objective personality inventory in both clinical practice and personality research (Green, 1980). Originally devised by Hathaway and McKinley in 1940, the MMPI provides an objective method of assessing abnormal behavior. Trimboli and Kilgore (1983) have suggested that certain MMPI scale elevations and configurations can be viewed as reflecting an individual's characteristic defensive operations as well as the quality of his or her object relations.

Essential to the interpretive approach of defenses from the MMPI is the hypothesis that scales 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, and 0 are considered "character scales" and reflect an individual's typical defense mechanisms while scales 1, 2, 7, and 8 are viewed as "symptoms scales," fluctuating with experienced distress.

The first character scale discussed by Trimboli and Kilgore (1983) is scale 3 (Hysteria). While much of the literature typifies individual with elevations of 60T or higher as using "denial," these individuals are frequently described as attempting to avoid facing internal conflicts by either keeping them out of conscious awareness or by channeling them into vague physical complaints. According to Trimboli and Kilgore, scale 3 elevations may therefore be conceptualized as reflecting the more primitive defense mechanism of repression.

With regard to defenses on scale 5 (Masculinity-Femininity), Trimboli and Kilgore (1983) propose that any extreme deviation may indicate a defective identification process that could impair the development of effective defensive functioning. More specifically, mild to moderate "feminine" scale 5 scores (high for males and low for females) may reflect some capacity for sublimation, one of the higher level and more adaptive defense mechanisms. Because moderate to high "feminine" scores are viewed as reflecting extreme passivity (Lachar, 1974), it is hypothesized that these individuals tend to use suppression, a consciously regulated and relatively less adaptive defense mechanism. On the other hand, moderate to high "masculine" scale 5 scores (low for males and high for females) are generally associated with assertiveness or aggressiveness. Deviations of this type would seem to imply a limited

defensive capacity to channel aggressive impulses appropriately (Trimboli & Kilgore, 1983).

High scores on scale 6 (Paranoia) generally exhibit overtly psychotic symptoms such as ideas of reference, delusions, and grandiosity (Hathaway, cited in Trimboli & Kilgore, 1983). More subtle symptoms are also displayed such as suspiciousness, excessive interpersonal sensitivity, and rigidity in opinions and attitudes. According to Trimboli and Kilgore, these characteristics suggest that individuals obtaining T scores of 65 or above may be conceptualized as using various forms of projection and primitive variants of externalization. Externalization refers to the outward displacement of emotional drives, problems, conflicts, and emotions (Laughlin, 1970).

Based on clinical experience, Trimboli and Kilgore (1983) suggest that individual with even moderate elevations on scale 9 (Hypomania) tend to demonstrate a rather inefficient form of overactivity and a grandiose self-concept. In addition, they show difficulties with impulse control, frustration tolerance, and affective regulation. It may therefore be hypothesized, according to Trimboli and Kilgore, that moderate scale 9 elevations reflect the use of denial and acting-out.

Gough (cited in Trimboli & Kilgore, 1983) describes individuals with elevations on scale 0 (Social Introversion) and submissive, compliant, and uncomfortable in social

situations. These individuals also tend to avoid direct confrontation of problematic situations by either making concessions or passively resisting pressures by staying uninvolved. From a psychodynamic perspective then, high scorers on scale 0 would seem to use the defensive maneuvers of avoidance and withdrawal.

The validity scales of the MMPI are also theorized by Trimboli and Kilgore (1983) as reflecting certain types of defensive operations. Elevations on scale K may demonstrate a guardedness or reluctance to acknowledge psychological weaknesses (Dahlstrom, Welsh, & Dahlstrom, 1975). In addition, it has been suggested that such elevations are related to excessive constraint of affect and considerable inhibition. This, according to Trimboli and Kilgore, implies that scale K elevations may indicate the use of the defense mechanisms of repression and rationalization. Elevated scores on the L scale, in individuals of adequate intelligence, are suggestive of more primitive variants of repression such as denial (Dahlstrom, Welsh, & Dahlstrom, 1975). Finally, elevations on the F scale, combined with low L and K scores, implies inefficient defensive functioning in general. In contrast, a low F score, combined with high L and K scores, would suggest the use of repression or denial (Trimboli & Kilgore, 1983).

Related Studies

The Rorschach Defense Scale (RDS).

Lerner and Lerner (1980) developed a Rorschach Scoring Manual to systematically assess and score the primitive defenses associated with borderline patients. Consistent with the theoretical work of Kernberg, Lerner and Lerner propose that these ego defenses are fundamental to and become manifest in an individual's object relations. Central to the personality structure of borderlines is a certain defensive structure that underlies and organizes internalized object representations, becoming manifest in ongoing object relations. The primary defense used is splitting, a mechanism maintained to prevent diffusion of anxiety within the ego and to protect good introjects from bad ones (Kernberg, 1975). Other supplementary defenses include primitive idealization, devaluation, projective identification, and primitive denial. These defenses are considered intrinsic to the nature and quality of the borderline's object relations.

The Rorschach Defense Scale (RDS) was designed to assess primitive defenses through a systematic appraisal of human figure responses on the Rorschach. The human figure response as an indicator of object representation has been demonstrated by several investigators (e.g., Blatt et al., 1976; Blatt & Lerner, 1982; Krohn & Mayman, 1974; Mayman, 1967).

The RDS scoring system has been applied to neurotic and borderline outpatient samples (Lerner & Lerner, 1980) and to hospitalized borderline and schizophrenic patients (Lerner, Sugarman, & Graughran, 1981). In both studies, borderlines were found to use the test indices of splitting, projective identification, low-level devaluation, idealization, and low-level denial significantly more often than either neurotics or schizophrenics, with projective identification being observed exclusively in borderlines. The combined findings of both studies give empirical support to the construct validity of the RDS and illustrate that borderlines exhibit a specific defensive pattern, different from that of neurotics or schizophrenics.

Grier (1986) used the RDS in her unpublished report of patterns of defense mechanisms and object relations in college students. Although she found no systematic relationship between RDS scores and subject's levels of object relations, a relationship was revealed between patterns of defenses and some of the subject's level of relations with their mothers. There was a tendency for the middle range of mother object relation scores to be associated with higher RDS scores.

The Developmental Analysis of the Concept of the Object Scale (DACOS)

The Developmental Analysis of the Concept of the Object Scale (DACOS), developed by Blatt, Brenneis, Schimek, and

Glick (1976), is applied to human movement responses on the Rorschach. Based primarily on Werner's notion that an individual's capacity for articulation, differentiation, and integration of object concepts increases with development, Blatt et al., developed a detailed structural scoring system for assessing the formal/cognitive aspects of inner object relations. This system defines structural characteristics in terms of (a) the type of figure represented (human, quasi-human, or human/quasi-human detail), (b) the perceptual and functional aspects of the figure presented (e.g., sex, age, size, clothing), and (c) the nature of integration between the object and its activity (e.g., passive vs. active, intentional vs. unmotivated).

Blatt et al. (1976) report that reliability of scoring, in terms of the selection and determination of scorable responses and of scoring the six subcategories, showed above 90 percent agreement between two independent judges.

Blatt et al. (1976) used the DACOS in a longitudinal study of normal subjects over a 20-year period from early adolescence to young adulthood and found it successful in discriminating age groups. When the normal sample was compared to seriously disturbed adolescent and young adult inpatients, the DACOS also successfully discriminated levels of psychopathology.

Spear (1980) used the DACOS in a comparative study of structural/cognitive aspects and thematic/affective aspects of object representations using Blatt et al.'s (1976) system for analyzing the structure of Rorschach human figure responses and Krohn and Mayman's (1974) scale for analyzing the thematic content of manifest dream reports. The DACOS revealed significant differences between young adult schizophrenic and borderline inpatients. Schizophrenics scored significantly lower than borderlines in their production of object representations.

Blatt and Lerner (1983) used the DACOS in their examination of the quality of object representation in several patients selected as exemplifying different clinical disorders. They found unique and consistent differences in the structure and content of object representations in patients with different types of psychopathology. In nonparanoid schizophrenia, the representations were typically inaccurate and at the lower developmental levels of differentiation (quasi-human and part properties rather than full human figures). They were briefly and sometimes inappropriately articulated and elaborated and often described as motionless or involved in unmotivated action. There was relatively little interaction between unmotivated figures. In the narcissistic borderline patient, there was a progressive deterioration of object representations. Initially intact, accurately perceived, full human figures

gradually become inaccurate, inappropriately described, quasi-human representations. There was appropriate yet shallow interaction between figures, but the action was generally unmotivated. In a severely depressed patient, there was an alternation between object representations at a high developmental level and seriously impaired representations.

In a study of therapeutic change in long-term hospitalization, Spear (1978) and Spear and Schwager (1980) (both cited in Blatt & Lerner, 1983) use DACOS scores to compare changes in object representations in paranoid and nonparanoid schizophrenic inpatients. Paranoid schizophrenics showed an increase in the number of Rorschach responses and thought disorder but a decrease in the developmental level of object representations. In contrast, nonparanoid schizophrenics had a decrease in the number of responses and thought disorder but an increase in the development level of object representation.

The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI)

Normed on a psychiatric population, the MMPI was originally intended as an aid to psychiatric diagnosis. The test is scored for 10 clinical or personality scales and for three "validity" scales, and an individual's scores are then plotted to obtain a profile.

One approach to MMPI interpretation involves using the scale elevations and the relationships among the scales. This

approach is supported by a vast amount of empirical research that identifies behavioral correlates of various 2- and 3-point code types and is most helpful in describing and predicting behaviors which have a high likelihood of occurring and/or characteristic ways in which the individual deals with his or her world (Trimboli & Kilgore, 1983). In using the overall elevations as a general indicator of psychopathology, Graham (cited in Trimboli & Kilgore, 1983) found that the probability of serious disturbance and impaired functioning increases as the number of scales elevated above 70 increases and as the elevations of the scales become greater.

According to Dahlstrom, Welsh, and Dahlstrom (1975), MMPI research in the area of personality dynamics began with Eriksen's studies of high scorers on scale 7 (reflecting intellectualizing and obsessional characteristics) and scale 3 (reflecting denial and repressive tendencies). In a series of laboratory tasks, Eriksen found that high scorers on scale 3 demonstrated repressive reactions to threatening or discomforting cues, while high scorers on scale 7 showed vigilance or sensitization to such cues. In addition, the performance of high scale 7 subjects was found to resemble the behavior of individuals scoring high on Taylor's Manifest Anxiety Scale (MAS). Several subsequent studies have found high correlations between the MAS and scale 7, suggesting that the research based on Taylor's MAS and that

using the basic MMPI scales, particularly scale 7, to examine defense mechanisms may be considered one general field of study.

A series of special measures of defenses mechanisms, based on the MMPI item pool, has been developed by Haan (cited in Dahlstrom, Welsh, & Dahlstrom, 1975). She devised a set of preliminary scales including measures of both repression and intellectualization which corresponds well to scales 3 and 7 in the standard MMPI profile. Her scales also include a measure of projection as well as a measure of "tendency to regress."

Some additional scales proposed by Haan can be considered derivatives of these basic defense styles (Dahlstrom, Welsh, & Dahlstrom, 1975). Thus, denial seems to be a more modulated, less primitive form of repression, displacement is a more adaptive manifestation of projection, and doubt is a milder derivative of intellectualization. Haan also included a general measure of the effectiveness of the defensive structure which she refers to as "primitive defense." Lower scores on this scale indicate more pathological modes of self-defense against anxiety. Although Haan attempted to develop further MMPI scales to measure less pathological defense styles, these analyses were generally unsuccessful.

The purpose of this study was to provide validation for Lerner and Lerner's (1980) Rorschach Defense Scale by

investigating the relationship between the use of primitive defenses as measured by the RDS, the developmental level of object relations as measured by the Blatt et al. (1976) Developmental Analysis of the Concept of the Object Scale, and characteristic defensive operations as assessed by the MMPI, using the interpretive approach of Trimboli and Kilgore (1983). Given that the use of primitive defenses is associated with less mature individuals and more psychopathological functioning, it was expected that those individuals obtaining high scores on the RDS (indicative of high usage of primitive defenses) would obtain low scores on the DACOS (signifying low levels of object relations development). This prediction is also based on the theoretical proposition that object representational capacities are inextricably related to defensive structure (Rinsley, 1980).

Each of the five specific defenses measured by the RDS was examined separately to determine their relationship with subjects' DACOS scores and MMPI profile elevations. Given that the RDS is a valid instrument for assessing lower-level defenses and based on the theoretical propositions of Trimboli and Kilgore, several specific predictions were made about the relationship between subjects' RDS scores and certain MMPI "character scales": a positive correlation was predicted between RDS "denial" scores and MMPI elevations on scales 3 (Hysteria), 9 (Hypomania), L, and K; a negative

correlation was predicted between "denial" scores on the RDS and MMPI scale F elevations; and a positive correlation was predicted between RDS "projective identification" scores and MMPI scale 6 (Paranoia) elevations. In addition, a negative correlation was predicted between "denial" scores on the RDS and MMPI scale 1 (Hypochondriasis) elevations.

METHOD

Subjects

One hundred and forty-one undergraduate college students were recruited from various undergraduate psychology classes at a large southwestern state university. The age of the sample ranged from 18 to 48 ($M = 22$, $SD = 5.06$). Sixty-two percent of the sample was female ($N = 74$) and 38 percent was male ($N = 46$). Subjects were awarded extra credit points in exchange for their voluntary participation in the research.

Instruments

Rorschach Defense Scale (RDS)

The Rorschach Scoring Manual of Lerner and Lerner (1980) was used to identify the use of primitive defenses in the Rorschach responses. A copy of the manual appears in Appendix A. Before applying the system, all responses are first scored for form level using a method devised by Mayman (1970). The RDS manual is divided into five sections on the basis of particular defenses: splitting, devaluation, idealization, projective identification, and denial. Each

section defines the defense and presents Rorschach indices and clinical examples.

The basic unit to be scored are those responses containing an entire human figure, either still or in movement. There are two exceptions to this rule. Several of the indices of splitting involve two responses, and in these cases, only one score is given. Likewise, one of the scores for projective identification involves the scoring of human detail responses. The denial, devaluation, and idealization sections require the identification of these defenses as well as a ranking on a health-pathology continuum of high versus low order. Any one response can receive more than one score. In assessing the human percept, attention is paid to the action attributed to the figure, the way the figure is described, and the exact figure seen.

The five defenses to be scored are defined as follows:

(a) splitting - a tendency to polarize affective descriptions of objects into "all good" and "all bad." It may also involve a division of internal and external into parts as distinct from wholes. (b) devaluation - a tendency to depreciate, tarnish, and decrease the importance of one's inner and outer objects. It is considered a muted form of spoiling. (c) idealization - a denial of unwanted characteristics of an object and then enhancing the object by projecting one's own libido onto it. The object is thus described in positive terms. (d) projective identification

- a process in which parts of the self are split off and projected into an external part of whole object. Actual features of the external object are disregarded, there is diffusion of boundaries between self and other, and there is a strong need to control the object. (e) denial - in this system, denial refers to a broad group of defenses arranged on a continuum based on the severity of reality distortion involved in the response. In general, denial involves a contradiction between the human figure perceived and the actions or characteristics ascribed to that figure. Subsidiary defenses in this group include negation, intellectualization, minimization, and repudiation.

Lerner and Lerner report inter-rater reliability ratings between two independent judges ranging from 83 to 100 percent for the major defense categories of the RDS and from 76 to 95 percent for the devaluation, idealization, and denial subratings.

Developmental Analysis of the Concept of the Object Scale (DACOS)

Developed by Blatt, Brenneis, Schimek, and Glick (1976), the DACOS is applied to responses containing human movement on the Rorschach. Responses are scored in three major areas: (a) differentiation - defined as the nature of the response, these responses range from partial details of quasihuman figures to full human figures. (b) articulation - articulation is defined as the specification of perceptual

(e.g., size, clothing) and functional details (e.g., age, role). (c) integration - defined as the quality of interaction between the object and the action, integration scores have four aspects: (1) the degree of internality of the motivation of the action (unmotivated, reactive, intentional); (2) the degree of integration of the object and the action (fused, incongruent, nonspecific, congruent); and (3) the nature and (4) the content of the integration of the interaction with another object (active-passive, active-reactive, active-active, and malevolent-benevolent). Within each category, ratings range from developmentally lower to developmentally higher levels. The scoring manual used in applying this scales appears in Appendix B.

Blatt et al. report reliability of scoring, both in the selection of scorable responses and in scoring the subcategories, as greater than 90 percent agreement between two independent judges. The inter-rater reliability level was replicated in a study by Lerner and St. Peter (1984). These authors obtained agreement ranging from 70 to 93 percent.

Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI)

Originally developed by Hathaway and McKinley, the MMPI is widely employed as a broad-based objective test for assessing psychopathology.

The test-retest correlations for both the validity and clinical scales range from .68 (L scale) to .89 (Depression

scale). These figures apply to male psychiatric patients tested with a one to two week interim between assessments. Female psychiatric patients tested with a similar time interval received test-retest correlations ranging from .59 (Psychopathic Deviate Scale) to .86 (F scale).

Procedure

Subjects read and signed an informed consent form which stated the purpose of the study and guaranteed confidentiality of their test data and their anonymity as participants. Because this study is one of a series of related studies, subjects were administered additional tests not relevant to the present study. After completing a demographic information form, subjects were administered five personality tests in the following order: The Role Construct Repertory Test (REP), Blatt's "Significant Others Scale" (SOS), the Rorschach, the Self Scale, and the MMPI. Seven doctoral students in clinical psychology participated in the administration of the tests.

The personality tests used in the present study are the Rorschach and the MMPI. Subjects were administered the Rorschach using the Rapaport administration method (Rapaport, Gill, & Schaefer, 1945). Rorschach responses containing human movement were then scored for form level using the Mayman method (1970). The Rorschach Defense Scale (RDS) was later applied to the subjects' Rorschach responses. Scores for each of the five defenses as well as a total RDS score for

each subject were computed. Inter-rater reliability for two independent RDS scorers ranged from a correlation coefficient of .86 to .98.

The Developmental Analysis of the Concept of the Object Scale (DACOS) was also later applied to subjects' Rorschach responses. A total DACOS score was were computed for each subject by summing the response categories and then dividing this sum by the total number of responses in the record minus the total number of human responses in the record. Inter-rater reliability for three independent DACOS scorers ranged from a correlation coefficient of .79 to .95.

The 399 item version of the MMPI was administered and scored in the standard manner. Subjects' K-corrected raw scores on the three validity and 10 clinical scales were converted into T scores, and comparisons were made against the Dahlstrom, Welsh, and Dahlstrom (cited in Green, 1980) college norms. In addition to scoring each scale separately, a Maladjustment score was also computed for each subject. The variable of maladjustment was defined as the number of clinical scales with T score elevations of 70 or greater (Heilbrun, cited in Nicholson, 1982). The number of MMPI clinical scale elevations above 70 can range from zero to 10 with higher numbers of scale elevations indicating greater degrees of maladjustment.

Twenty-one subjects had to be dropped from the study due to either incomplete or missing test data or to invalid

MMPI profiles. The remaining 120 comprised the sample for the present study.

RESULTS

The means and standard deviations of scores on the five defense categories of the Rorschach Defense Scale (splitting, denial, projective identification, devaluation, idealization) and the total RDS scores obtained for the sample are presented in Table 1.

Table 1

Means and Standard Deviations of the Five Defense Categories and Total Scores of the RDS

Defense	Mean	SD
Splitting	.10	.30
Devaluation	2.38	2.91
Idealization	1.10	2.37
Projective Identification	.03	.16
Denial	.48	.82
RDS Total	4.09	4.20

Pearson r correlations were computed on the variables of interest, including each separate defense category of the RDS, the RDS total score, the Developmental Analysis of the Concept of the Object Scale total score, and certain MMPI scale scores. The results of the correlations between all variables are presented in Table 2.

Table 2

Correlations between RDS, DACOS, and MMPI Variables

	RDS					
	Split	Denial	Ideal	Proj Ident	Denial	Total
DACOS						
Total	.16	.37	.27	.06	.04	.43**
MMPI						
L	-.09	-.01	.23	-.00	.02	.12
F	.20	-.02	-.10	-.00	.06	-.04
K	.00	-.12	.18	.10	-.08	.01
1	.08	-.08	-.04	.11	-.12	-.09
3	.12	-.11	.05	.11*	-.05	-.05
6	.08	.08	-.07	-.16	.03	.02
9	.19	.02	.05	-.03	.08	.07
Maladj	.14	-.01	-.15	.02	-.03	-.08

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Of the nine correlations predicted, two reached significance although in the opposite direction from that which was expected. A significant positive correlation was obtained between subjects' RDS total scores (usage of primitive defenses) and DACOS total scores (level of object relations development) ($r = .43$, $p < .001$). A significant negative correlation was obtained between Projective

Identification scores on the RDS and MMPI scale 6 (Paranoia) elevations ($r = -.16$, $p < .05$).

DISCUSSION

The results of the present study fail to provide validation for Lerner and Lerner's (1980) Rorschach Defense Scale. An examination of the relationship between subjects' scores on each of the five defense categories of the RDS and elevations on the MMPI character scales reveals no significant correlations. Although Trimboli and Kilgore's interpretive approach to the MMPI is based on theoretical propositions, these hypotheses are, for the most part, founded on substantial empirical research. The two exceptions to this are the propositions that moderate scale 9 (Hypomania) elevations reflect denial and that low F scores, combined with high L and K scores, indicate repression or denial. It therefore seems unlikely that the failure to find a relationship between MMPI measures of defense and RDS scores is attributable to invalid assumptions in Trimboli and Kilgore's interpretive system.

It is possible that the sample of college students used in the present study is inappropriate for validating a scale intended to measure the primitive defenses associated with borderline personality organization. Perhaps the incidence of borderline pathology is too low in the sample to permit conclusive findings regarding the RDS's validity.

Another potential problem with the present study lies with the initial hypothesis that the defenses measured by the RDS are the same ones assessed by the MMPI character scales. Although the same labels for the defenses are used by both instruments, it is conceivable that they measure different defensive processes. The RDS's category of "denial," for example, may actually be a lower-level variant of the defense of "denial" associated with scale 3 (Hysteria) of the MMPI.

Two additional problems with the present study involved the use of the Rorschach test. Both the RDS and the DACOS were applied to the same set of Rorschach responses; however, different scorers were used for each scale. It may thus be an artifact that the same test data was used for both measures and also that different scorers were used for each scale. Furthermore, in regard to the use of the DACOS, it is questionable whether the Rorschach test is an appropriate instrument for measuring object relations development due to the limited number of human responses obtained in an average Rorschach record. Perhaps a more suitable personality test for assessing object relations is the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) due to the greater number of human responses acquired in a typical TAT record.

For reasons which are unclear, a positive correlation was found between greater use of primitive defense and lower levels of object relations development. To test the

notion that the sample overall did not evidence enough pathology, the data was reanalyzed using 35 of the most pathological subjects from the original sample. The criterion for inclusion in this group was a minimum of two elevated scales on the MMPI. The results of the reanalysis varied little from those of the original analysis.

Preliminary studies assessing the RDS's validity used clinical samples. It is not known if other studies have been conducted with nonclinical samples. Although it is anticipated that borderline personality organization would be present in a college population, the expected incidence is low. The results of the present study fail to provide support that the Rorschach Defense Scale is a valid instrument for assessing primitive defenses in a college sample.

APPENDIX A

ROSCHACH MANUAL FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF
DEFENSE IN BORDERLINE PATIENTS

RORSCHACH MANUAL FOR THE ASSESSMENT
OF DEFENSE IN BORDERLINE PATIENTS

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General Scoring Considerations

1. In general, the basic unit to be scored are those responses containing an entire human figure, either static or in movement-(H response). There are two exceptions to this principle. Several of the indices for splitting involve two responses. In these instances only one score is awarded. Also, one of the scores for projective identification involves the scoring of human detail responses.
2. Before applying the system all responses should be scored for form level using a system devised by Mayman (1962).
3. The sections on devaluation, idealization and denial call for an identification of these defenses as well as a ranking of the defense on a continuum of high versus low order.
4. Any one response may receive more than one score.
5. In assessing the human percept attention should be paid to the following aspects of the response: the action ascribed to the figure, the way in which the figure is described, and the exact figure seen.

Specific Defenses

Splitting-Splitting refers to what a person does to and with his inner and outer objects. Specifically, it involves a division of internal and external into parts as distinct from wholes and good and bad objects. Splitting is manifest in a tendency to perceive and describe objects in terms of overruling polarities. To denote splitting use the letter (S).

- A. In a sequence of responses a human percept described in terms of a specific, non-ambivalent, non-ambiguous affective dimension is immediately followed by another human response in which the affective description is opposite

to that used to describe the preceding responses.

- i. "Looks like an ugly criminal with a gun" immediately followed by "Couples sitting together cheek to cheek."
- B. In that description of one total human figure a clear distinction is made so that part of the figure is seen as opposite to another part.
- i. "A giant. His lower part here conveys danger but his top half looks benign."
- C. Included in one response are two clearly distinguished figures and each figure is described in a way opposite to the other.
- i. "Two figures, a man and a woman. He is mean and shouting at her. Being rather angelic, she's standing there and taking it."
- D. An implicitly idealized figure is tarnished or spoiled by the addition of one or more features or an implicitly devalued figure is enhanced by the addition of one or more features.
- i. "A headless angel."

Devaluation-Devaluation refers to a tendency to depreciate, tarnish and lessen the importance of one's inner and outer objects. It is thought of as a muted form of spoiling. In addition to identifying this defense, devaluation is also rated on a 5 point continuum. Underlying the continuum are the following three dimensions: the degree to which the humaneness of the figure is retained, a temporal-spacial consideration, and the severity of depreciation as conveyed in the affective description. For scoring, to denote devaluation use the symbol (DV). Add to this score the number below corresponding with the appropriate level of devaluation. For example, "an angry man" would be scored DV1.

1. The humaneness dimension is retained, there is no distancing of the figure in time or space, and the figure is described in negatively tinged but socially acceptable terms.
 - i. "Two people fighting."
 - ii. "A girl in a funny costume."

2. The humaneness dimension is retained, there may or may not be distancing of the figure in time or space, and the figure is described in blatantly negative and socially unacceptable negative terms. This score would also include human figures with parts missing.
 - i. "A diseased African child."
 - ii. "A woman defecating."
 - iii. "Sinister looking male figure."
 - iv. "A disjointed figure with the head missing."
3. The humaneness dimension is retained, however, involved in the percept is a distortion of human form; there may or may not be distancing of the figure in time or space; and if the figure is described negatively it is in socially acceptable terms. This rating would include figures such as clowns, elves, savages, witches, devils and figures of the occult.
 - i. "Sad looking clowns."
 - ii. "Cannibal standing over a pot."
 - iii. "The bad witch."
4. The humaneness dimension is retained however, implied in the percept is a distortion of human form; there may or may not be distancing of the figure in time or space; and the figure is described in blatantly negative and socially unacceptable terms. This rating would involve the same types of figures as in 3; however, the negative description is more severe.
 - i. "A couple of evil witches."
 - ii. "Two people from Mars who look very scary."
 - iii. "A sinister Klu Klux Klansman."
5. The humaneness dimension is lost, there may or may not be distancing of the distorted form in time or space, and the figure is described in either neutral or negative terms. This rating would include puppets, manikins, robots, creatures with some human characteristics*, part-human part-animal responses, and human responses with one or more animal features.
 - i. "Manikins with dresses but missing a head."
 - ii. "Two people but half male and half animal. From outer space."
 - iii. "A woman with breasts, high heeled shoes and bird's beak for a mouth."

his rating does not include monsters with or without

Idealization-Idealization involves a denial of the unwanted characteristics of an object and then enhancing the object by projecting one's own libido onto it. It aims at keeping an object completely separate from persecutory objects, and thus, preserves the object from harm and destruction. As in the case of devaluation, idealization is also rated on a 5 point continuum. Underlying the continuum are the same three dimensions. For scoring, denote idealization with the letter (I). Add to this score the number below corresponding with the appropriate level of idealization. Thus, "a person with a big smile" is scored II.

1. The humaneness dimension is retained, there is no distancing of the figure in time or space, and the figure is described in a positive but not excessively flattering way.
 - i. "Two nice people looking over a fence."
 - ii. "A person with a happy smile."
2. The humaneness dimension is retained, there may or may not be distancing of the person in time or space, and the figure is described in blatant and excessively positive terms.
 - i. "Two handsome, muscular Russians doing that famous dance."
 - ii. "What an angelic figure. Long hair, a flowing gown and a look of complete serenity."
3. The humaneness dimension is retained; however, implied in the percept is a distortion of human form; there may or may not be distancing of the figure in time or space; and if the figure is described positively, it is in moderate terms. This rating would include objects of fame, adoration, or strength such as civic leaders, officials and famous people.
 - i. "Charles De Gaulle."
 - ii. "An astronaut, one of those fellows who landed on the moon."

4. The humaneness dimension is retained; however, implied in the percept is a distortion of human form; there may or may not be distancing of the figure in time and/or space; and the figure is described in blatant and excessively positive terms. This rating would include the same types of figures as in 3; however, the positive description is more excessive.
- i. "A warrior. Not just any warrior but the tallest, strongest and bravest."
 - ii. "Attila the Hun but with the largest genitals I have ever seen."
5. The humaneness dimension is lost; however, implied in the distortion is an enhancement of identity; there may or may not be distancing of the distorted form in time or space; and the figure is described in either neutral or positive terms. This rating would include statues of famous figures, giants, supermen or superwomen, space figures with supernatural powers, angels and idols. Also included would be half humans in which the non human half added to the figure's appearance or power.
- i. "A bust of Queen Victoria."
 - ii. "Powerful beings from another planet ruling over these softer creatures."

Projective Identification-This refers to a process in which parts of the self are split off and projected into an external object or part object. It differs from projection proper in that what is projected onto the object is not experienced as ego alien. As part of this process real characteristics of the external object are disregarded, there is a blurring of boundaries between self and other, and one purpose is to control the object. Two indices of projective identification have been developed. To denote this score use the symbol PI.

1. Confabulatory responses involving human figures in which the form level is Fw- or F-¹ and the percept is overly embellished with associative elaboration to the point that real properties of the blot are disregarded and replaced by fantasies and affects. Most typically, the associative elaboration involves material with aggressive or sexual meaning.
 - i. "A hugh man coming to get me. I can see his huge teeth. He's staring straight at me. His hands are up as if he will strike me."
2. Those human or human detail responses in which the location is Dr², the determinant is F(C)³, and the figure is described as either aggressive or having been aggressed against.
 - i. "An ugly face." (With forehead and features seen in reference to the inner portion of Card IV).
 - ii. "An injured man." (Card VI upper, center area).

Denial-Denial in this system refers to a broad group of defenses arranged on a continuum based on the degree of reality distortion involved in the response. Higher level forms of denial involve a minimum of reality distortion whereas middle and lower level manifestations of denial include increasingly greater degrees of reality distortion. Indices of denial at the highest level include

-
- . These scores are taken from Mayman's (1962) manual for form level scoring. The Fw- score is assigned to unconvincing, weak form responses in which only one blot detail is accurately perceived. The F- score refers to arbitrary form responses in which there is little resemblance between the percept and the area of the blot being responded to.
 - . Dr is a location score used when the area chosen is small, rarely used and arbitrarily delimited. (Holt, 1968).
 - . F(C) is a determinant used when the subject makes out forms within a heavily shaded area without using shading as shading or uses the nuances of shading within a colored area (Holt, 1968).

several mechanisms devised by Holt (1976) and presented in his manual for the scoring of manifestations of primary process thinking. Middle level denial includes responses in which there is a major contradiction between the human figure perceived and the actions or characteristics ascribed to that figure. Lower level manifestations of denial involve significant distortions of reality to the point that a segment of subjective experience or of the external world is not integrated with the rest of the experience. There is a striking loss of reality testing and the individual acts as if he were unaware of an urgent, pressing aspect of reality. To score denial use the symbol (DN). Add to this score the number below corresponding to the level of denial. Thus, the response "I know they are not fighting" would be scored DN1.

1. Higher level denial-Denial at this level consists of several subsidiary defenses manifest in responses in which the form level of the percept is F+, FO, or Fw+.

a. Negation-Negation involves a disavowal of impulse. The disavowal may be manifest in two ways. In one instance the disavowal is smoothly blended into the response itself, whereas in the other instance the response, or aspects of the response are couched in negative terms.

- i. "virgin."
- ii. "angel."
- iii. "These figures are not angry."

b. Intellectualization-In this process the response is stripped of its drive and affective charge by its being presented in an overly technical, scientific, literate or intellectual way.

- i. "Two homosapiens."
- ii. "Two Kafkaesque figures."

- c. Minimization-With minimization, driven laden material is included in the response but in a reduced and/or non threatening way. This would include changing a human figure into a caricature or cartoon figure.
- i. "A shadow cast by an evil person."
 - ii. "A child with his hand clenched in a fist."
 - iii. "A funny man, more like a caricature."
- d. Repudiation-With repudiation, a response is retracted or the individual denies having ever given the response.
- i. "No, not a person, but a gorilla."
 - ii. "I never said that."
2. Middle level denial-Denial at this level involves responses in which the form level is F+, Fo, or Fw+ and involved in the response is a basic contradiction. The contradiction may be on affective, logical or reality ground.
- i. "A sexy Santa Claus."
 - ii. "Two nuns fighting."
 - iii. "A man reading while asleep."
3. Lower level denial-At this level reality adherence is abrogated but in a particular way. Specifically, an acceptable response is rendered unacceptable either by adding something that is not there or by failing to take into account an aspect of the blot that is clearly to be seen. This would correspond to Mayman's (1962) form spoil (Fs) response.⁴ In addition, this level would also include responses in which incompatible descriptions are ascribed to the percept.
- i. "Two people but their top half are female and bottom half male. Each has breasts and a penis."
 - ii. "A person but instead of a mouth there is a bird's beak."
 - iii. "Person sitting on their huge tail."
-
4. The form spoil response differs from the F- response in that a basically acceptable response is spoiled by a perceptual oversight or distortion. In the F- response the percept is totally unacceptable.

APPENDIX B

DACOS SCORING OUTLINE

DACOS Scoring OutlineCategories of Analysis

I. Accuracy of Response --

Accurate (F+, F±) or Inaccurate (F~~±~~, F-)

II. Differentiation

- (a) Human (4 points)
- (b) Quasi-Human (3 points)
- (c) Human Detail (2 points)
- (d) Quasi-Human Detail (1 point)

III. Articulation

- (a) Perceptual Attributes (1 point for each)
 - (1) Size or physical structure
 - (2) Clothing or hairstyle
 - (3) Posture
- (b) Functional Attributes (2 points for each)
 - (1) Sex
 - (2) Age
 - (3) Role
 - (4) Specific identity

IV. Integration: Motivation of Action

- (a) No Action (0 points)
- (b) Unmotivated Action (1 point)
- (c) Reactive Action (2 points)
- (d) Intentional Action (3 points)

V. Integration: Object and Action

- (a) No Action (0 points)
- (b) Fusion of Object and Action (1 point)
- (c) Incongruent Action (2 points)
- (d) Non-Specific Action (3 points)
- (e) Congruent Action (4 points)

VI. Integration: Interaction with Another Object

- (a) No Interaction (0 points)
- (b) Active-Passive (1 point)
- (c) Active-Reactive (2 points)
- (d) Active-Active (3 points)

VII. Integration: Content of Interaction

- (a) No Interaction (0 points)
- (b) Malevolent Interaction (1 point)
- (c) Benevolent Interaction (2 points)

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