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FROM ISOLATION TO ACTION: A METAPHORIC
ANALYSIS OF FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT'S
PRO-PREPARATION RHETORIC

THESIS

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Virtually all studies on the presidential use of metaphor focus on one particular event and speech. These studies look only at speeches that justify military actions after they have already occurred, and these researchers seek to discover a relationship between the use of the metaphor and the public's support of a military action.

In order to analyze the persuasive elements of President Franklin Roosevelt's rhetoric in developing popular and Congressional support for war preparation, this study seeks to answer three specific questions. To what extent does Franklin Roosevelt develop a common theme in selected speeches of war preparation immediately prior to World War II? To what extent was Roosevelt's development of this theme persuasive to the American public? What consequences can be anticipated if future presidents or speakers for social movements employ these procedures.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

During its first 150 years, the United States carried out a foreign policy of political isolationism, a policy first described by Thomas Jefferson in 1777 as the avoidance of entangling alliances. During the next century and a half, while the country grew and developed, this policy remained in effect, and the twentieth century found isolationism still entrenched in the foreign policy of the United States.

Political isolationism rested on two assumptions about the United States and its system of government. The first involved the geographical location of the United States. Since the country was separated from the European continent by vast oceans on both sides, attack from a European aggressor was unlikely. The United States also had good relations with the nations to the north and a weak neighbor to the south. As a result, the U.S. was safely isolated from events in Europe. The U.S. had no fear of a European invasion or of being involved in the constant conflict on the continent. This geographical isolation was a major factor in the political isolation of the United States (Spanier 1-7). The second assumption was of a more

theoretical nature and involved basic assumptions about democracy in the United States. The U.S. saw itself as the oldest democracy in the world and considered its destiny to demonstrate the proper form of government for the rest of the world. Part of this theory assumed that people were rational and moral in a democracy and could be dealt with in a rational and moral fashion (Spanier). During the 159 years between Jefferson and the start of the second world war, the politics of Europe were in direct conflict with the idea of government by the people. The European system of government relied on its feudal lords to govern. Such a system allowed for little public participation in its politics. Most Europeans acknowledged two distinct classes of citizens: the elites who ruled and the peasants who worked. The elites owed their power to years of history and did not share it with the common man. This distinction forced the commoner to stage violent revolutions in order to gain any political power in these countries, as this concept of government allowed very little rational action. The fact that Europe was and had been in a constant state of conflict, as opposed to the relatively peaceful cooperation that existed in the United States, seemed to illustrate the main difference between the two styles of government. The politics of Europe were seen as an instrument of selfish and autocratic rulers (Spanier).

In 1823, President James Monroe announced the Monroe Doctrine. This stressed the differences between the two worlds: undemocratic nations were inherently warlike and evil; and democratic nations, in which people regularly changed and controlled their leaders, were peaceful. This presumption served as the basis for our isolationist policies until the first World War (Spanier). The first world war changed ideas about isolationism in the United States. With the rise of modern military power, no country was immune from war regardless of location. Should an aggressor in Europe raise an army of power, it could easily gain control of the continent. Once this happened, nothing but the Atlantic would separate an enemy from the United States. In the past this was a vast ocean to cross, but with new technology and naval development, it was smaller than ever.

By the mid-thirties political changes in Europe would draw the U.S. even closer to ending its policy of isolationism. During this period there would be a shift in the balance of power on the European continent. This shift would allow one European nation to expand its power and pit it against the United States.

The old empires of Europe were on the decline by the middle of the 1930s. The Soviet Union was in chaos due to purges and massive industrialization. Italy was not a major power of the area. Japan was not industrialized yet, and

Britain was in the midst of its own depression. The stage was set for a conflict between the two nations who were the most economically sound during this period (Herzstein).

This battle was between Germany and the United States. Germany was technologically advanced, well disciplined, and benefiting from massive economic growth. It was a country that possessed a strong military tradition and an equally strong tradition of imperialism. Germany was coming out of an economic crisis and was led by Adolf Hitler, a strong figure who possessed persuasive skills (Herzstein).

The United States, though still shaken from the depression, was also technologically advanced. Although the U.S. did not have the military capabilities of Germany, it did have the ability to raise a large and effective army if needed. Like Germany, this country was also coming out of a depression and was led by a charismatic leader of great persuasive skills, Franklin Roosevelt. The effort to shift U.S. policy from one of isolationism to one of involvement would be a major undertaking. As events of the mid-thirties unfolded, it was clear that the U.S. would not only need economic involvement but military involvement in Europe as well. The effort to change U.S. policy would be difficult and hard fought. Isolationists had defeated the president on the floor of Congress only a few years earlier, as the president tried to defeat the Neutrality Acts by waging a low key political battle. However, the isolationists had,

through the efforts of such men as Gerald Nye, Bennet Champ Clark, and Arthur Vandenberg, defeated Roosevelt and passed the Neutrality Acts. Roosevelt would bring his battle down from Capitol Hill and to the American public. The effort to gain support for war preparation would prove to be a major watershed in the history of American foreign policy. The president would, through a campaign of rhetoric, attempt to persuade the public that it was time for America to become involved in global politics. Roosevelt's orchestration of a movement to gain support for war preparation relied on various persuasive tactics. The president used many of these tactics during his speeches on the war, but perhaps the most important technique was the metaphor. Using metaphor, Roosevelt attempted to paint a picture of aggression and irrationality by aggressor nations. This effort was significant for it marked one of the first times the president of the U.S. would go before the American people to gain support for military action before the action occurred.

Statement of the Problem

Virtually all studies on the presidential use of metaphor focus on one particular event and speech (Ivie). These studies look only at speeches that justify military actions after they have occurred, and these researchers seek to discover a relationship between the use of metaphor and

the public's support of a military action. However, no one has explored the result of the development of these metaphors before the actual exigency. Perhaps it is easy to justify military action after the event has occurred, but little study has been done on the use of metaphors to spur a movement of support before the military action itself.

In order to analyze the persuasive elements of President Franklin Roosevelt's rhetoric in developing popular and Congressional support in the United States for supplying aid to traditional allies in Europe, this study seeks to answer three specific questions:

1. To what extent does Franklin Roosevelt, through the use of metaphor, develop a common theme in selected speeches of support for U.S. allies immediately prior to World War II?
2. Given the political climate of the period between the world wars, to what extent was Roosevelt's development of this theme persuasive to the American public?
3. What consequences can be anticipated if future presidents or speakers for social movements employ procedures similar to Roosevelt?

Significance of the Study

From a theoretical standpoint, the use of metaphors to create a support movement may have implications for a wide variety of fields. The movement created by FDR and his rhetoric may have had an effect, not only on World War II, but on many military actions afterwards. The rhetoric may also have affected the formation and strategies of current social movements. Study of this topic then may benefit several groups.

Rhetorical critics will benefit from the study of the methods used to justify actions. A study of this nature will allow these researchers to examine the discourse and determine the way in which metaphors may be used to create themes in discourse. These critics may also study the influence of the societal attitudes and beliefs on the persuasion process.

This type of research will aid historians as well. The approach would allow new insight into the U.S. involvement in World War II by examining the underlying strategies of this pro-preparation movement. If the speeches worked to justify military action and to persuade the public that this action was necessary before any actual involvement in the war, then what are the ramifications? Also, if the speeches were a success, to what extent did their success alter U.S. foreign policy, and as a result, U.S. history?

A third group aided by the study would be political scientists involved in presidential studies. It is important that they understand how presidents may try to justify military actions to the populace. Also, if the metaphor is a success, then will future presidents use this method to justify action in non-military areas as well?

Finally, this study may be very important to those who are involved in current social movements. A study of this kind would be of particular interest to those who are trying to find an effective means of mobilization. If the use of metaphors developed a theme that provided means of mobilization, it not only legitimized its use by presidents for military action, but it may have also paved the way for its use in such current social movements as anti-abortion, the anti-drug campaign, record labeling, and human rights.

Definition of Terms

In order to aid in the understanding of this study, two terms require definition. First, isolationism is defined as opposition to the involvement of one's country in international alliances, agreements, or pacts. Second, entangling alliances are defined as agreements or pacts that obligate a nation to respond in a prescribed way when specified events occur. Although some scholars claim that entangling alliance is synonymous with a mutual defense treaty, for purposes of this study the two will be treated

as distinct from one another. For the purposes of this study, the terms isolationism and avoidance of entangling alliances will be used synonymously. It was the policy of the United States to announce isolationism as the policy of avoiding these alliances. In doing so, the nation would not publicly hurt the perception of the U.S. as an ally. This would allow the U.S. to maintain its position as a trusted ally and allow the country to avoid being drawn into conflicts in Europe. The motivation for avoidance of these alliances was the desire to remain an isolated nation. As a result the two terms came to mean the same thing during the period covered in this particular study. This researcher also defines the term metaphor as the application of a word or a phrase to an object or concept that it does not literally denote.

Scope of the Study

This study will concern itself with five major pro-preparation speeches of Franklin Roosevelt. While there are many more speeches dealing with preparation the study will limit itself for several reasons. First, the five speeches are exclusively directed at the question of isolationism. This allows an indepth study of the use of metaphors as they relate to the topic of study. Second, the five speeches are noted by experts as the first speeches on the subject

presented to the general public (Ryan). This is important as there may be implications for the study of movements as discussed in this study. Finally, these speeches are the most inclusive on the subject of isolationism. Many of Roosevelt's speeches dealt with specific provisions of the neutrality acts; however, these five dealt with the question of U.S. involvement on a larger scale.

Review of Literature

Much has been written about Franklin Roosevelt and his involvement in World War II. Since one might fill volumes simply identifying these works, this section will refer to representative works that will be useful in gaining a better understanding of this topic. The topic of the second world war is also a massive undertaking. As a result, the topic should be narrowed so that researchers have some clear anchors for study. This review seeks to provide those anchors by dividing the topic into several areas of study. The review examines several books on World War II, the isolationists, Franklin Roosevelt, and articles on rhetorical criticism.

World War II

There are many books written on the development and underlying causes of the second world war; however, Kee, Kingman, and Roy do the best job of describing these origins. They discuss not only the events in Europe but

also the internal struggle in the United States. These authors examine the political struggle as it developed in Germany and also look at the struggle that was occurring in the United States during this period. These were particularly helpful in providing insight into the motivation and views of various world leaders of the time. The Kail and Martin works provide an excellent assessment of the opposing views of war that existed in the United States during this period. Kail provides a clear examination of the positions and arguments of the pro-preparation groups. He also looks at the individuals of this group from the well-known politicians to the unknown general public involved in the movement. Martin takes the opposite tack and explains the view of the isolationists, those who were opposed to any U.S. involvement in the war. He views the people who were members of this group as well as the arguments they made to support their position. These two groups are central to this study, and the books are very helpful as they develop the polar positions in the political conflict.

Finally, in the area of the war, there are several books that present a well-written view of this period. Brinkley and Collier provide excellent insights into not only the causes of war but the attitude of the country as well. These authors focus more on the attitudes of the citizens of the U.S. instead of the politicians.

These books do not focus on the battles of the second world war; they choose to investigate the smaller events and views of the common citizen. Ronald Lewin provides a patriotic and well-researched investigation of U.S. involvement in the war. His book, History of the Second World War, provides insight into the feeling that our involvement in the war was justified. This is very helpful in looking at the use of propoganda during the war years and the strategy behind these tactics. These books were most useful in gaining a general knowledge of World War II. The books cited provide a valuable base of knowledge in the areas of diplomacy, public involvement, and actual military events of the second world war.

Isolationism

The examination of the isolationist faction in North America is of critical importance to this study. As a result, many works will be consulted on isolationism in pre-war United States. The following works are representative of those on the topic.

The first step will be to look at the chronological development of isolationism. Wittner provides an excellent time line analysis of the birth of peace movements. He explains the birth of the movement in 1923 and follows its development until 1983. This was helpful because it allowed not only a look at the isolationism of the second world war

but a view of the effect that first movement would have on the rest of history. Herzstein and Kinsella are more specific with their views of the movement. These two authors focus on the battle between FDR and the isolationists of the thirties, examining the strategies used by both sides to gain support. Carlisle and Miles help in the separation of the two sides in this debate. These authors state the case of the isolationists and the theories behind the movement. The Odyssey of the American Right, written by Miles, is a helpful probe of the development of the conservative movement of isolationism.

The last books in this section were perhaps the most interesting. The books examine Hitler's use of propaganda to spur the isolation movement here in the United States. This is very important because it allows one to view the hidden obstacles FDR had to overcome in his pursuit of preparation. Dodd, Dedake, and Mandell present detailed analyses of the propaganda of the Third Reich and the effect it had on Americans. The Nazi Olympics, by Mandell, assesses the use of sporting events like the 1936 Olympics as means of propaganda and presents the view that not only were the games supposed to focus on Aryan superiority but were to portray the Nazis as peaceful as well. Dallek writes in his book of the psychological warfare waged through propaganda by the Germans.

Franklin Roosevelt

Many people played a major role in this change, but the key changes occurred under Franklin Roosevelt. There are many books about Franklin Roosevelt and his involvement in the war. These are helpful in narrowing the topic and allowing one to answer this research question in particular. Fehrenbach looks at the hidden agenda of FDR and possible motives for his support of the U.S. entry into the war. He also examines the strategy FDR used in an attempt to further that goal. This type of analysis is critical if one is to view the motivations behind the strategies of FDR and his desire to push the U.S. into a state of readiness. Cole and Kinnesella also provide an examination of FDR's internal thoughts during this period. These books are helpful because they allow one to view the human side of this issue as well as the political side. These authors view the decisions FDR would have to make, not in the cold context of the office, but from a human view as well. In an attempt not to focus on the President himself these were the only books read on this particular aspect of the topic. Cole, Kinnesella, and Fehrenbach all provide an excellent description battle lines drawn between Roosevelt and the isolationists of the period. The works provide major insights into both the differences and the agreements that the two sides shared.

Brinkley and Schafer provide the most helpful analysis of the propaganda battle between FDR and the isolationists. Schafer's book takes a very detailed view of strategies each side takes toward U.S. involvement in World War II. He examines the various types of propaganda used by FDR in his effort to spur U.S. preparation for the war. This approach is not one-sided, however, as Schafer also explores the techniques used by the isolationists in their efforts to gain support for the Neutrality Acts.

Robert Herzstein provides the best look at the use of propaganda before the start of the war. He analyzes the use of propaganda by FDR, Hitler, and the Isolationists in their attempts to gain support in this country. This is a particularly strong book for looking at Hitler's use of propaganda to encourage the U.S. to remain neutral.

Neutrality Acts

The next area examined is the Neutrality Acts of the mid-1930s. These acts are important to analyze in terms of the rhetoric used by both sides in the fight for their passage. This examination was done by simply examining the texts of the congressional hearings during debate on the acts.

Theory Articles

Articles in scholarly journals provide insight into the use of metaphors. These articles look at the method of

metaphor analysis in general and past examples of the use of specific metaphors. Foss offers an excellent description on the art of metaphoric criticism. She explains the technique as well as providing examples on the use of this criticism. Foss also gives the reader a clear step by step process to use in doing this type of criticism.

Ivie's article, Images in American Justifications for War, is also important to this study. The article provides the theoretical basis for study of this type of topic, as he establishes the use of the war metaphor and the four topoi usually found in this metaphor: Savagery, Force, Rational, and Irrational action.

Michael Smith presents an illustration of the method by viewing the rhetorical use of the aggressor in Vietnam. Smith's article allows for a look at the actual use of the four topoi on an artifact. The article is also important because it allows one to view a movement that not only has communication implications but historical and political implications as well.

Cragan and Shields offer a helpful article on foreign communication dramas. They present a view of past events of this nature and the use of dramatics in justifying the event. This is important to understand if one is going to make judgments on the use of the war metaphor. Two final articles were very helpful in gaining an understanding of the process that is used for writing presidential speeches.

The first, Ghostwriting and the Rhetorical Critic, written by Ernest Borman was very instructive on the process of ghostwriting and the analyses of such rhetoric. The second, The Preparation of Franklin Roosevelt's Speeches, was written by Ernest Brandenburg and describes the process used by Roosevelt and his staff writers. This article describes the extent that these writers and FDR were involved in the speech-writing process.

In summary, much has been written about all of the areas covered in this review. To list all works, or even all good works, on these subjects would take many pages. The works listed are those of major importance to this study. These books are representative of the material that exist on each subject used for this study.

Methodology

The first step used in the research of this topic will be to collect the texts of five pro-preparation speeches, or artifacts, of FDR. These speeches will be examined because they deal exclusively with the question of U.S. involvement on the European continent and were given during the critical period before World War II.

Once the texts are collected, the next step will be the examination and study of each artifact as a whole. Many metaphors gain special significance when viewed in the contexts of time, occasion, and audience. As a result it is

important to have a strong knowledge of the speech as a whole before one can analyze its parts for metaphor use.

The third step will be the isolation of the metaphors in the texts. This will be done by isolating the rhetors use of metaphors and placing them in the appropriate clusters. These basic unchanging patterns will be examined in each speech and across the five speeches. Particular attention will be given to the themes the speaker develops through the use of these metaphoric clusters.

The final step will be the analysis of the existing metaphors. The following questions will assist in the analysis:

1. Does the speaker attempt to portray certain images in each speech?
2. What image is conveyed by the artifact?
3. Do the images fall in certain clusters?
4. What was the effect of these metaphors on the immediate audience and for those who would come years after the speeches?

Metaphor analysis is a very useful method for several reasons. First, the method allows one to determine the power of rhetoric in creating a shared reality. If through the use of metaphors a speaker can effectively create reality, how may that reality be used in persuasive discourse. Second, the method allows a look at a persuasive strategy as it develops over several speeches. This will

allow researchers to view the birth of certain movements through shared realities. Finally, this method lends itself to use in a variety of fields. By using this method one may analyze the affects of the speech in areas such as history or political science as well as communication.

Plan of Study

Chapter 2 will trace the development of isolationism during the twenty years between the world wars. Chapter 3 will place the texts of the pro preparation speeches in context so that might relate to them in their original setting. Chapter 4 will investigate and analyze the texts according to the stated methodology. Finally, conclusions regarding the study and the method will be discussed in chapter 5.

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CHAPTER 2

THE MOVE TO ACTION

The theory of political isolationism had its base in over 100 years of U.S. history and policy. Neutrality, however, enjoyed its greatest success in the twenty years between the two world wars. This chapter seeks to explore the development of isolationism and the important gains made during the years between the two world wars. It will examine, in very general terms, the rise of isolationism in the twenties and in more specific terms the development of the issues in the debate between isolationists and Franklin Roosevelt between his election in 1932 and the bombing of Pearl Harbor in December, 1941.

Roosevelt's relations with American isolationists from 1932 until 1941 had an enduring significance in the history of American foreign policy, and the battle between these two sides altered American policy making for years to come. As a result, study of these years allows researchers the best insight into the topic of Roosevelt and isolationism.

When the European portion of World War II began with the German invasion of Poland in 1939, United States policy reflected an extreme level of isolationism (Schneider 1-2). This isolationism emerged as a result of many circumstances

that began in the years immediately after the first war. The isolation that existed during this period owed much to the work of Harry Elmer Barnes. Barnes was a well-known academician who had been anti-German during the war, but he came to see the Treaty of Versailles as an unjust tool of victors' vengeance. He believed that selfish interest groups had worked to deceive the American public about the conflict (Barnes 277-278).

By 1924, Barnes had allied himself with several German organizations that sought to revise foreign attitudes toward the war and Germany. His portrayal of Germany as an innocent victim aroused interest and some support in the United States as well as admiration in Germany. Barnes spoke often of the publication, Die grosse Politik der Europaischen Kabinette (the great power politics of European cabinets), which influenced the debate over the outbreak of the war (Herzstein 72-74).

In the mid-twenties, Barnes made several trips to Germany where he was accepted into the highest social circles because of his revisionist ideas. During this period, several well-known diplomatic historians began to raise questions about the guilt of the German people. Americans were beginning to open up to the German people as well during this period, and Americans were investing large amounts of money in Germany, tourism was increasing in the country, and German theatre and film enchanted many

Americans. These people knew very little about the German form of government or the German people.

Americans knew nothing of the widespread "stab in the back" credo which blamed the collapse of the reich in 1918 on the Jews, pacifists, communists, and Wilsonians--on everyone except the German people (Herzstein 72). To most Americans the Germans were no significant threat as a future military foe. Very few Americans knew of Adolf Hitler, and those who did saw him as a national curiosity. Those who had visited Germany saw the Germans as warm and friendly hosts who were preferable to the arrogant British and French.

As the question of German guilt became popular and the military infrastructure of World War I was dismantled, revisionism gained many supporters. Homer T. Bone, Democrat of Washington, declared that:

The Great War . . . was utter social insanity, and was a crazy war, and we had no business in it at all, . . . If war was wrong, and that war to end all wars was crazy, then all wars were wrong. (Wiltz 7-8)

Although there were very few American losses in World War I, the slaughter inflicted upon men from all nations seemed enough to justify a revulsion towards war itself.

The European nations might still be inclined to fight, as they had been for hundreds of years, but Americans wanted no more part in the tragedy of a world war. In this setting in

the United States, no one wanted to be branded an interventionist. The popular belief was that the Europeans had lured the U.S. into the first world war, and there was no need to let them drag the country into another conflict (Herzstein 75).

During the mid and late twenties the isolation sentiment began to grow and enjoy a wide base of support. At the end of the twenties the stock market crash in the U.S. meant that Americans could spare even less involvement in foreign affairs. The country was economically ravaged and fighting for its very survival and, as a result, had neither the time nor the desire to engage in the politics on the European continent. The stock market crash meant the rise of economic nationalism and protectionism. The United States had to rebuild itself, by itself, and could afford to trust no one. This made it impossible for the concept of selective security to gain acceptance in the country (Schneider).

By 1928, Barnes, a respected newspaperman, continued to preach both revisionism and isolationism to the country. With problems mounting in the U.S. there was no time to become involved in entangling alliances. Soon even Hollywood took up the cry for isolationism and had a profound effect on the American public. In 1930, the film, All Quiet on the Western Front, opened across the nation. This movie told the story of a group of young men

who were destroyed by the war. The setting of the movie was the German home front and followed a group of young German students. The students were led to believe that war was glorious and grand, and the honorable thing to do was to fight. The movie, however, showed the horror of the war and the confusion of the boys who became men. In the end the whole war effort seemed meaningless, and a graphic image was depicted as the dead marched off toward a military cemetery. The film affected Americans who saw the harsh realities of war for the first time. Until then the war had been illustrated through tales from those who had served. With the release of the movie, Americans saw the graphic violence of military conflict (Wittner 2-3).

Reviewers of the movie were overwhelmed. The noncommunist left wing and the pacifists loved the movie, while the mainstream New York Times described it as "vivid and graphic." Liberty reviewed the film in glowing terms, as did Film Daily and other trade publications. The movie increased pacifist sentiments in the United States, as one could easily contrast the stirring rhetoric of President Wilson with the carnage in northern France. Confused and disenchanted, Americans saw that the great Wilsonian crusade had led to the rise of bolshevism and Fascism. The Europeans and their endless wars, many claimed, were to blame for the depression engulfing the country (Herzstein 74-75).

Isolationists and the World Court

In early 1933, as Roosevelt took office for his first term, isolationism enjoyed a wide base of support not only from intellectuals such as Barnes but from the American populace. During the 1930s, most Americans were isolationist, and these people came from all sections and all groups. Their greatest concentration was in the midwest and among middle class Republicans. Most isolationists tended to be farmers and small businessmen from the working middle class (Smuckler 386-401).

Millions of Americans were isolationists during the Roosevelt years, and many of them played an active role in the foreign policy debates. The prominent leaders were senators William Borah, Hiram Johnson, Gerald Nye, Bennett Champ Clark, and Arthur Vandenburg (Cole 8-9).

During Roosevelt's first term in office, an uneasy alliance existed between the president and the isolationists. During this period the focus of the government was on domestic affairs, attempting to get the country back to economic security. American isolationism enjoyed most of its success during this period as it won adoption of the Johnson Act, Senate rejection of the World Court, and, in 1935, the Neutrality Acts. Roosevelt focused, for the most part, on the domestic affairs of the country. As Wayne Cole notes, these domestic affairs dominated the early relations of FDR and the isolationists:

The key word then was progressive not isolation . . . Roosevelt actively solicited political support from progressives in his election and for enactment of the New Deal . . . Most progressives were isolationists concerned with ending the depression and returning prosperity. (Cole 9)

As a result of this domestic focus, an uneasy alliance existed between the two for most of Roosevelt's first term in office. Both sides, however, knew that this alliance would soon come to an end and that a major battle between the two sides was imminent.

As the U.S. economy slowly gained strength and the European situation worsened, foreign policy became a more important issue on Roosevelt's agenda. The first area that Roosevelt addressed was U.S. membership in the World Court. It was this action that created the first conflict between FDR and the isolationists. Like Wilson, Roosevelt favored U.S. participation in the World Court and the League of Nations. Unlike Wilson, Roosevelt was more patient and willing to wait for the right moment to join the league. Roosevelt realized that the anti-league sentiment in the states mandated a slow and easy move toward the league. While the United States did not seek active membership to the court, Roosevelt did begin to take subtle action to open the membership door in 1933. Cole noted the subtle first

step in the battle between Roosevelt and the Isolationists over the World Court:

Norman Davis's major policy statement at the World Disarmament Conference did not explicitly focus on the League of Nations Davis announced that if the conference reached an agreement on disarmament, the United States would be willing to consult the other states in the case of a threat to peace. Also if any nation were to be found guilty in the World Court and also by the United States that the U.S. would not seek to disrupt the justice of the court. (Cole 115)

In effect, Davis, on instruction from Roosevelt, had given U.S. backhanded support to the World Court without indicating our desire to join.

The need for a slow course was confirmed by an incident in September of 1933. Roosevelt had been seeking ways to help the World Court without getting the U.S. involved in direct membership. He devised a covert plan which would help the league pay expenses for causes from which the United States benefitted.

Roosevelt called Arthur Sweetster, who served as U.S. representative at the league, and told him of the plan. During this period the State Department had also been looking for ways to cooperate with the league (Cole 115). In September, however, someone in Sweetster's office issued an official release on the matter of U.S. monetary support

for the league. This release went further than even the president had wanted as it described U.S. plans for a firm commitment and a wide sweeping cooperation with the World Court. Secretary Hull denied the whole affair and privately remarked that "the outlook for any sort of international cooperation was at its near lowest ebb" (Moffat).

The discovery of this action set the stage for the first great battle between the isolationists and Roosevelt. His covert plan out in the open, Roosevelt was forced to take a firm stand on the World Court. Hull convinced the president that he must now push for U.S. entry into the World Court through the Senate and publicly. In October 1934, Secretary Hull and Assistant Secretary R. Walton Moore drafted a resolution that would be issued at the next session of Congress. The resolution made it through committee, and on January 10, 1935, it was reported to the Senate with the committee recommendation that it be adopted. While there was debate on both sides about the resolution, most assumed it would win the needed two-thirds majority. The debate passed without much excitement until Senator Hiram Johnson of California rose and walked to the podium.

Johnson's speech was in the grand traditions of Senate oratory and a textbook example of the use of nationalism to evoke the patriotic feelings of an audience. Cole noted this use of oratory in the following passage:

He began by noting that the day was also his grandson's twenty-first birthday and that he could not do better by his grandson and others like him than to endeavor to preserve the traditional policy of the American Republic and to keep this country free and independent in its every action in regard to other nations. (122)

During the course of the speech Johnson went on to use other patriotic metaphors as well. He added that "he did not speak as a citizen of the world he spoke as a citizen of the United States." This speech would motivate the isolationists and serve as a starting point for their fight against the resolution.

Soon the debates became very exciting as the isolationists began to assert themselves through oratory. None was as formidable as William Borah of Idaho, who would do much for the isolationists in this battle. The Idaho Republican focused particularly on the advisory opinion issue and on legal subtleties that persuaded him that neither the protocols nor the resolution sufficiently guarded American independence. Borah charged that the World Court was more of a political organ of the league and its member states than a court of law (Cole 122).

Borah's attack, which questioned legality of the resolution, came as a surprise to those who supported it and to the president as well, because they had not expected a battle over the inner workings and legality of the

resolution. They had expected only the same generic battle over isolation or action that was normal between the isolationists and the internationalists. Soon the isolationists were gaining support in their attack on the legality of the resolution. The administration lost a key ally as the debate on the resolution began to climax. Senator George Norris of Nebraska, who had voted for the court in 1926 and had supported Roosevelt on most issues, was expected to vote for the court resolution but changed his position. Citing the rejection of his proposed amendment to the resolution, he indicated that he would oppose adherence. This was a major defeat to both the resolution and the President.

Still the vote on the resolution was very much in question even during the last days before balloting. The resolution vote came on Tuesday, January 29, 1935. Both sides mobilized for one last effort at victory in the final days. Pacifists who supported the resolution urged their members to write or telephone their senators with pleas to vote for the World Court. Mrs. Roosevelt met with women's groups and peace organizations in an attempt to rally support. The Friday before the vote she went on national radio on behalf of the World Court. While these efforts were going on, the president was also working on passage of the resolution by meeting with as many senators as possible in the remaining time (Cole 123).

The isolationists were also busy during this period. Cole described the effort of these people in the last critical hours before the vote. A Movietone newsreel helped the opposition to the resolution explain their position to the public. Noted isolationist and clergyman Father Charles Coughlin appealed to his radio audience to make opposition known. His broadcast on Sunday, January 27, brought thousands of letters and telegrams to senate offices opposing the Court. William Randolph Hearst brought newspapers into the fray, and the humor of Will Rogers may have done as much as any angry words (123).

The final vote on the resolution was fifty-two senators for the resolution and thirty-six against, seven votes short of the required two-thirds needed for passage. The senate vote was a solid victory for the isolationists in the first battle with President Roosevelt.

The vote over the World Court was an important one for several reasons. Initially, the vote marked the first confrontation between Roosevelt and the isolationists and set the tone for later fights. Second, the victory proved that the isolationists could mobilize a strong base of support and turn that support into political action. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Roosevelt realized that he must slowly take a stronger stance overtly against isolationism if he were to gain the public support that would be so critical in this debate.

The Munitions Investigation

The second major confrontation between Roosevelt and the isolationists began innocently in 1935, and marked one of the most significant schisms between the two sides. Senator Gerald Nye headed an investigation of the munitions industry that, by the time it was completed, would alienate President Roosevelt and many of the ruling elites. Like America's isolationism, the munitions investigation emerged from such grass-roots ideas that there was very little opposition during its early stages. In its early stages the investigation focused on the common foe of all men during the depression, big business. President Roosevelt paid little attention to the investigation initially and even promised the cooperation of his administration in the committee's efforts (Nixon 311-14).

However, by the time the investigation was over, it had polarized many interest groups that were powerful and influential. One might cite an extensive list of those whom the investigation alienated, including industrialists, financiers, military leaders, foreign statesmen, State Department officials, and the administration (Cole 142).

By 1936, when it focused on big government, the executive branch, the presidency, and more specifically on former President Woodrow Wilson, criticism of the investigation had become intense. Reactions to the committee attacks on what later generations would call the

military industrial complex and the imperial presidency brought about its undoing (Smith 11-52).

The Nye munitions investigation had its foundations in the disillusionment that followed World War I. The investigation was as much a political attack on big business as it was a struggle for isolationism. The poor economic conditions in the country were blamed on the concept of big business, and the market crash and depression were seen as examples of the failure of big business.

It was also the manifestation of a mistrust of Europe and of the Great War schemes of President Wilson. The investigation was spawned out of a desire to keep the United States from becoming involved in any future wars that were not its own. In addition, the investigation grew out of domestic considerations within the United States. It was based on economic and psychological interpretations of the causes of wars. The assumption of the investigation was that munitions manufacturers encouraged arms races, imperialism, and internal friction in their quest for profit (Cole 142).

Many people who did not share the isolationist views of Senator Nye threw their support behind his committee because of the attack on big business. This meant the consolidation of two very powerful political groups: the isolationists and the small and independent businessman. These groups had a grass-roots fundamentalism that attracted the majority of

the voting populace. As a result of this consolidation, the Nye investigation enjoyed much success during its first year of action. Although Roosevelt was no longer in support of the effort of the committee, his hands had been tied politically by the isolationists and the Nye committee. If he took a strong stance in opposition to the committee, it would appear that he were in support of those big business men who sought to wage wars for profit. This was not a politically sound statement to be made by any elected official, much less the president of the United States. Roosevelt knew that he must wait for a better time to disagree with the conduct of the Nye committee. The isolationists had won the first round. On September 21, 1934, the Nye munitions investigation committee took a recess until the first of December.

During the first session of the Nye investigation, there was a storm of protest over the hearings from diplomatic sources. Evidence in the hearings indicated that many diplomats had accepted bribes from the American munitions companies to secure the purchase of American hardware. While some of the allegations were backed with evidence, most were unsubstantiated rumor and hearsay. These allegations angered the leaders of other nations and made diplomatic affairs in other areas very difficult. In addition, the committee was implicating many Latin American countries in the "arms for profit" scheme. This came at a

critical period in the development of the Good Neighbor Policy and endangered the outcome of that program.

In an effort to cool the Nye investigation and the inflammatory effect it was having, President Roosevelt dispatched Secretary Hull to meet with Senator Nye and the committee. After this meeting it was announced that neither the committee nor the administration wanted to offend any countries or their diplomats.

In a swipe at the committee, Hull also made public a letter from Senator Nye in which he stated that insertion into the records of statements by witnesses did not mean that those statements were necessarily true. This admission had the effect of decreasing the credibility of the Nye Committee (Cole 145).

During the committee's break between September and December the isolationists hit the public relations trail. In speech after speech the isolationists stressed to the public the importance of the committee. They also stressed that the evidence showed that war preparations were carried on not in defense of the country but for the profit of big business and even branches of the federal government.

While this strategy was successful with the public, it had an undesired affect in the political arena. Many of the politicians who had supported the investigation were now questioning that support. These political leaders were not happy with the committee's investigation of the

administration and their unfounded charges against foreign governments during the hearings. Many now viewed the investigation as a dangerous use of power to increase the appeal of isolationists and their beliefs. While the majority of these politicians were not ready to publicly question or criticize the investigation, many were watching closely. The theme of massive government corruption was again echoed by Nye in January of 1935, when he told a reporter:

I suppose nothing has astonished me so much as to discover the large amounts of evidence which indicate that, instead of munitions-makers promoting the military activities of governments, especially our own war and navy departments-have been actively promoting the munitions makers for years. (Allinson 80-81)

Despite the growing trend away from the support of the munitions investigation, Roosevelt still did not have the support he needed to make a stand against Nye and the isolationists. The committee still had the support of the public and despite certain misgivings it had the support, or at least acceptance, of most political figures. Despite the increased animosity toward Nye and the committee, they still enjoyed strength that prevented an open attack from the administration.

Perhaps the only blunder that Senator Nye made during the entire investigation came during the month of January

and may have had repercussions not only on the munitions investigation but the political popularity of the isolationists as a group. This mistake gave Roosevelt the chance to make the investigation a political fight and a grand opportunity to attack Nye and all isolationists.

At the senate hearings on the fifteenth of the month, evidence was read into the record showing, among other things, that President Woodrow Wilson and Secretary Robert Lansing knew of allied secret agreements very early. Senator Bennet Clark based his statement on "information from official sources which has not yet been released for publication therefore I am unable to put into the record" (Cole 157). Nye added more fuel to the growing fire by adding that Wilson and Lansing had falsified their knowledge of the secret treaties. Newspapers the next day ran headlines that accused Nye of saying that Wilson had lied. Nye had blundered politically by giving Roosevelt and the Democrats an issue to rally around. Until this mistake, the democratic party had been divided over the issue of isolationism. Now the question was no longer over isolationism but partisan politics. The Democrats quickly rallied around their former president and attacked both Clark and Nye. The State department asked for all material that was not open for public viewing be returned. On January 17, Senator Carter Glass, a conservative Democrat, rose to speak in a way that would unite the Democrats in

their fight. Cole described the powerful oratory given by Senator Glass that day:

The old senator trembled with emotion that day as he told the packed gallery that Nye's allegation about Wilson was the most shocking exhibition that had occurred in his thirty-five years in congress and hit his hand so violently on his desk that it bled. (157)

This was all the ammunition Roosevelt needed to take the fight to the isolationists. He questioned the motives of the investigation and wondered aloud if its purpose was to simply try to place blame on past administrations for the first war. He repeated his claim that he was for an investigation of the munitions industry but now wondered if this committee and its findings were impartial. The Nye committee continued its work, but much of its power was now gone. In its final report the committee conceded that the evidence did not show munitions makers were the sole causes of wars. The committee made several recommendations for changes in the munitions industry in the United States. The Nye committee proposed specific legislation designed to implement its proposals Congress did not enact any of the proposed bills.

The mistake by Nye had been a costly one to the cause of isolationism. The isolationists had enjoyed power because they took a non-partisan approach to the issue of U.S. involvement in Europe. Nye's blunder made it appear

that isolationists were rash and hasty and, more importantly, were as politically motivated as any party. While they still enjoyed the support of the general public, the investigation incident had lost them the ability to transcend party politics. This loss of power would enable President Roosevelt to take action, as he needed only to convince the public that the country must move away from isolation. This would be much easier if he could be assured of political support from his party.

The Neutrality Acts

In the three months after the munitions investigation, the events in Europe increased America's fear of war. These events would once again polarize the President and the isolationists, and prove to be the motivating factor in Roosevelt's new war on isolationism.

In February 1935, Mussolini responded to a two-month-old border dispute with Ethiopia by increasing his forces in Africa. In March, Germany violated the Treaty of Versailles by revealing the existence of a 50,000-man army. The French and British responded to both acts by increasing their military forces as well. Roosevelt assessed the situation in a letter to Ambassador Breckinridge Long in Rome, "These are without a doubt the most hair-triggered times the world has gone through in your times or mine. I do not exclude June and July 1914" (Fridel 106).

As a result of the growing unrest in Europe, Roosevelt sought to increase the defense budget to a total of 1.1 billion dollars, the largest peacetime budget America had ever considered. The European problems and the defense request of the president were enough to start one more showdown between the isolationists and Roosevelt. The isolationists, who had been very quiet following the munitions investigation, began to mobilize on the issue. Oswald Villard, editor of The Nation, voiced the dissatisfaction of all isolationists:

We are rapidly sinking to the level of Hitler and Mussolini in our bowing down before the god of war . . . that a Christian nation such as we pretend to be is actually planning to spend \$1,125,000,000 . . . upon military expenditures when more than 20,000,000 Americans are on bread lines. (p. 41)

The isolationists, having lost the bi-partisan power in the Senate, sought to utilize the remaining power that they had, the people. While most politicians did not care for the isolationists after the munitions investigations, they still had the support of the public. Most blue collar workers of the day knew little about the munitions investigations or the politics of partisanship. These middle class workers only cared that the isolationists offered them a simple and grass-roots approach to which they could relate in governing the country.

In the discussion of how the United States should respond to the events in Europe, the isolationists were quick to cite the concepts of Walter Millis, a best selling author who wrote Road to War: America, 1914-1917. This book argued that the culprit of the first war was traditional neutral rights. Millis believed that America's defense of its trade with allies made her "a silent partner of entente," and Millis suggested that a truly impartial America could have avoided war (Dallek 102). Published in the spring of 1935, the book encouraged demands for a law that would assure genuine neutrality and prohibit Americans from supplying a belligerent in another conflict.

Isolationists were eager to support this concept of neutrality as the only way to prevent U.S. involvement in another war. They proposed that an embargo on arms, loans, and trade of any kind with either belligerent be voted into law. These isolationists mobilized public support and took to the streets in April, 1935. On April 6, they organized a peace march in Washington that consisted of 50,000 veterans of World War I. On April 12, some 175,000 college students across the country staged a one-hour strike against war. In Boston, New York, Washington, Chicago, and Los Angeles, students by the thousands left their classrooms to demand "schools not battleships" and abolition of the R.O.T.C. (Dallek, Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy 105).

President Roosevelt had never been totally opposed to neutrality. On the contrary, he argued for neutrality on many occasions. However, Roosevelt saw the need for presidential discretion and not total neutrality. It was his position that with the ever-changing status of Europe, the President should have the power to decide what level of neutrality the country should have. Events abroad convinced Roosevelt that America would need to take a stand against Berlin. The day after Hitler declared his intention to build a half-million-man army, Roosevelt outlined a peace plan in which the United States was assigned a significant part (Dallek, Roosevelt and Foreign Policy 103). Roosevelt thought that the president should have the necessary power not to enter a war, but to force other nations to enter a peace. The president felt it was necessary that the United States keep peace by using trade as a weapon of peace. This was, of course, in direct conflict with the isolationists who argued the only way to maintain peace was for the U.S. to stay completely out of the European conflict.

The isolationists picked up momentum in late March when representatives put a large number of neutrality resolutions before the Congress. Between March and May, Senators Nye and Clark of Missouri, and Kaleb of Ohio introduced bills to prohibit arms, loans, and contraband from all belligerents. They also introduced bills designed to make American travel on belligerent ships illegal.

Roosevelt pressed several Democratic senators to introduce bills that would allow presidential discretion. However, the isolationists had popular support on their side in this particular fight. Public opinion polls showed that the populace was in favor of the isolationists by an almost two to one margin. This fact was not lost on the elected senators who knew they must soon ask the public to vote for them again. Many senators did not agree with total neutrality or the isolationists but few were willing to publicly oppose the wishes of the populace.

Roosevelt hoped that the intense drive for a law would permit him to trade executive support of neutrality legislation for a flexible bill. As he stated in a cabinet meeting on July 26, he would back neutrality legislation in exchange for "freedom of action in applying an embargo." (Divine, The Illusion of Neutrality (100-107). The Senate quickly dashed Roosevelt's hopes for a compromise; in the first week of August it rejected the administration's proposal for a flexible law (Devine, The Illusion of Neutrality 100-107).

On August 20, a group of senators, led by Nye, Vandenburg, and Clark, began a filibuster which they vowed to continue until a mandatory neutrality law was passed. In an effort to head off the impending legislation, the Democrats introduced a compromise bill. The compromise bill would place a ban on the imports of arms, ammunition, or

implements of war to a belligerent. The new bill allowed the president to decide what were implements of war.

Roosevelt, still remembering the powerful public support that the isolationists had, as well as the strong political power they still had, was forced to agree to this compromise. He did this with one qualifier, however. He agreed to accept the bill only if Congress limited the embargo to six months.

Roosevelt hoped that by doing this he would accomplish three things. First, he hoped to stall for time to devise some means of gaining support for pro-preparation that he was beginning to view as necessary. Second, he hoped that executive power given up here would quiet the furor over the alleged abuse of power in the court packing scandal. Third, Roosevelt hoped that the European situation would require more drastic measures in six months time. This would not only allow him to submit his proposals but would also vindicate his actions in the neutrality hearings.

The neutrality hearings were not as exciting as the debates over the World Court or the munitions investigations, but they may have been more important. This was because Roosevelt discovered that the real power behind the isolation movement lay with the people. Even though the isolationists had lost some clout in the senate after the munitions investigation, they were still able to gain political victories because of great public support.

Roosevelt realized that if he were to defeat the isolationists and prepare the country for war he would have to launch a campaign designed to gain the support of the people and not of Congress.

On October 5, 1937, Roosevelt took his campaign for action to the American people in an address known as the Quarantine speech. The events of the thirties had convinced him that was where the real political power lay. In a letter to his headmaster at Groton he wrote, "As you know I am fighting against a public psychology of long standing---a psychology which comes very close to saying 'peace at any price'" (Divine, Roosevelt and W.W. II 19).

In a letter to Joseph Tumulty, Wilson's press secretary, the president blamed the "peace at any price" theory on the Republicans and added that he was combating it now. It would seem, then, that these three political battles proved that the president could no longer rely on the political games he played so well. Roosevelt knew he must now take his message of preparation to the American people.

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CHAPTER 3

ANALYSIS OF ROOSEVELT'S PRO-PREPARATION RHETORIC

This chapter will analyze the five pro-preparation speeches of Franklin Roosevelt given between October 5, 1937, and September 11, 1941. These particular artifacts were chosen because they are the five speeches, delivered by the president during this period, that focus on the European question. These speeches deal exclusively with the military situation in Europe and what the U.S. response to that situation should be.

The method used to analyze and evaluate these artifacts was adapted from three articles by Robert Ivie that employ three steps in the metaphoric analysis of war rhetoric. The first step requires examining the context of the speech. The second step is the clustering of metaphors into areas with similar themes. Finally, one must analyze the existing metaphors to gain some insight into the persuasive techniques of the rhetor. This analysis will seek to answer several questions. First, what arguments does the rhetor use to justify his position? Second, what are the important characteristics of the artifact? Finally, what was the audience reaction to the speech?

Robert Ivie established the main theme of war rhetoric by saying:

Insofar as there exists a genre of American pro-war rhetoric, its essential characteristics are circumscribed by the doctrine of just wars. According to this doctrine, the just war must be a defensive one in response to an armed attack on the nation or its allies, and for the purpose of reestablishing moral law. (Ivie, Polk's Justification for War 311)

In Presidential Motives for War, Ivie indicated that the doctrine of just wars is established by development of four themes or topoi. These themes are: A Savage Enemy, Force vs. Freedom, Rational vs. Irrational action, and Defense vs. Aggression. It is through the use of metaphor, said Ivie, that the rhetor hopes to develop these themes so that military action can be justified.

As a result, this study will analyze the speeches of President Roosevelt to locate the images they project in justification of war preparations. The rhetorical critic seeks to gain insight into the motivation of the speech by placing it in some sort of useful context. This is done to give the text a general sense of its dimensions (Foss 191). For clarity this chapter will set the context of and analyze the speeches according to the four topoi of justification used by Ivie. Wherever possible, audience reaction to the speech will be analyzed to give the reader an indication of the effect of the speech on the audience. The speeches will

be covered in chronological order so the reader can maintain a focus on the events of each speech as it was given.

The text of each speech is included as an appendix, and paragraphs are numbered to assist in evaluation. Specific passages from each speech will be noted by using the # sign. Thus the parenthetical reference "A #12" will indicate that this particular passage can be found in Appendix A, paragraph 12.

The Quarantine Speech
[October 5, 1937]

Context

The political isolationism that took shape in America during the thirties gave much attention to the European continent. There were constant debates between the administration and the isolationists over the role of the United States in Europe. While the isolationists were strong in the fight over involvement in Europe, they were not united entirely in their policy views toward Asia. This lack of agreement gave President Roosevelt an opportunity to begin his campaign of public rhetoric designed to defeat the isolationists (Divine 14).

On July 7, 1937, a minor skirmish between Japanese and Chinese troops at the Marco Polo Bridge, ten miles west of Peiping, triggered the undeclared Sino-Japanese war. The war began with sporadic fighting and, by August, was a

full scale military conflict, though neither side declared war (Divine 14).

The major issue that confronted Roosevelt was whether to invoke the neutrality legislation that had been revised in the early part of 1937. The arms embargo would hurt the Chinese, who lacked weapons and depended on imports (Divine 14). Roosevelt took advantage of the wording of the neutrality acts in an effort to help the Chinese. He noted that the acts only called for action if a state of war existed between two countries. Since neither the Japanese nor the Chinese had declared war, no action could be taken under the neutrality acts (Divine 14).

However, Roosevelt argued that the Japanese aggression violated the open door policy, the traditional American pledge to uphold Chinese independence. Also, Japan's efforts to control East Asia put American interests in the Pacific under extreme danger. This aggression convinced Roosevelt that there was a real possibility that war overseas would affect the United States (Borg 349-350). The president, largely at the urging of Secretary Hull and other advisers, decided to comment on the Japanese aggression.

Divine gives a summary of the speech's intent: "Though he [FDR] made no mention of Japan, it was apparent that the war in China was uppermost in his mind" (Divine 14).

Isolation of Metaphor

In the topoi of Savagery the rhetorical critic looks for the depiction of the enemy as an unfeeling, uncaring, and savage antagonist. The president began his speech by noting that Americans had made great strides in the last few years both spiritually and economically. He went on, however, to note that things are not as good in other parts of the world. Roosevelt began by describing the situation that existed around the world: Some fifteen years ago the hopes of mankind for a continuing peace were raised to great heights when more than sixty nations solemnly pledged themselves not to resort to arms in furtherance of their national aims. The high aspirations expressed in the Kellogg-Briand pact have given way to a haunting fear of calamity (A #6).

Then the president analyzed the situation overseas and began his depiction of aggressive action by a savage enemy. Roosevelt described the events in other parts of the world and then noted that this action was lawless and amounted to a reign of terror. He described the fate of many small nations and their people at the hands of the aggressor. These nations, he said, had been "cruelly sacrificed" by a nation which had "a greed for power and supremacy" (A #9). Perhaps the best development of the Savage Foe theme came when the president described the effects of letting such action continue:

Perhaps we foresee a time when men, exultant in the technique of homicide, will rage so hotly over the world that every precious thing will be in danger, every book and picture and harmony, every treasure garnered through two millenniums. . . . (A #7)

He continued to develop this theme in the last paragraphs of the speech when he discussed the aggressor nations as being foolhardy and ruthless countries.

Although there are not a large number of examples of the depiction of the enemy as a savage foe, Roosevelt does develop this theme by using the examples noted above.

Force vs Freedom

In this particular topoi, the rhetor focuses on the significance of the actions taken by both sides. The speaker seeks to portray the struggle as one in which the antagonist will destroy freedom if allowed to win. The protagonist is then forced to respond in an effort to protect the ideas and concepts of freedom and democracy. The president placed the burden on those who seek freedom in several parts of his speech. He called on those who "cherish freedom and recognize the free rights of their neighbors" to take some action to stop the aggressor nations (A #13).

Roosevelt described the threat as one of international anarchy and described the need for the restoration of

international morality (A #16). The concept of morality that Roosevelt developed in the speech was peace and freedom. The German army was a threat to this peace and freedom and therefore a threat to morality. As a result, the theme of Force vs Freedom was also developed in lines in which president talked about the threat to moral laws.

Roosevelt used moderation in the development of the theme of Force vs Freedom. While there were only a few examples of metaphorical development of this theme, there are enough to justify its inclusion as a metaphor cluster in this particular speech.

Rational vs Irrational

The next topoi is that of Rational vs Irrational Action in the justification for action. In this topoi the rational action of the protagonist is countered by the illogical and irrational action of the antagonist.

Roosevelt began the use of this topoi when he described the rational act of those nations who because of a desire for peace signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact (A #6). This action was then countered by the irrational action of the aggressor who fought an undeclared war, violated treaties, and interfered in the internal affairs of others (A #7). The president struck a blow at the isolationists and at the same time described the rational action that the threatened countries should have taken when he said:

The peace-loving nations must make a concerted effort in opposition to those who violate treaties and ignore human instincts which today are creating a state of international anarchy and instability from which there is no escape through mere isolation or neutrality.

(A #12)

Roosevelt continued this development by describing the rational action of seeking peace and economic gains for all countries, as opposed to the goals of domination and control exhibited by the aggressor nations (A #16-18). Finally, Roosevelt left the audience with a final statement to depict the country as a rational actor: "America hates war; America hopes for peace; therefore, America actively engages in the search for peace" (A #25).

Roosevelt, in development of this topoi, tried to show that the United States and other non-aggressors sought only to obey existing treaties and seek economic prosperity for all nations. This action was portrayed as the rational approach to co-existence in the world and was in direct conflict with the actions of aggressor nations. Roosevelt characterized these nations as being unable to act in accordance with the existing treaties or logic for world development and their actions as being irrational as a result.

Aggression vs Defense

The final topoi is Aggression vs Defense. In this analysis one country is reluctantly forced to defend itself against the aggressive acts of another. This topoi was first established when Roosevelt described the action of the aggressor nation as occurring without a declaration of war, warning, or justification of any kind (A #14). This topoi was also used when Roosevelt described the massive military buildup of some nations in the world. This was given more impact by comparing the percentage of national income the aggressors spend on the military with the expenditures of the United States (A #17). The speech was given its name because of two of the last paragraphs in which this Aggression vs Defense theme was established. Roosevelt first described the concept of the quarantine when he said:

When an epidemic of physical disease starts to spread, the community approves and joins in a quarantine of the patients in order to protect the health of the community against the spread of the disease. (A #19)

Roosevelt also painted the situation as one of Aggression vs Defense. He described the aggression of the Japanese by saying:

It began through unjustified interference in the internal affairs of other nations or the invasion of alien territory in violation of treaties; and now has

reached a stage where the very foundations of civilization are threatened. (A #7)

This aggression was also noted when Roosevelt described the military build-up of certain countries in the world (A #17). He continued this portrayal by describing the action that took place "without a declaration of war" and "without warning" and needlessly took the lives of many women and children (A #8).

Analysis

Having examined Roosevelt's development of the war metaphor in the isolation of passages above the critic should then analyze the speech based on three questions posed at the beginning of the chapter. First, what other means of argument does the president develop during the Quarantine speech? Roosevelt began his campaign for preparation with development of a subtle approach. Knowing that any drastic action would be met with opposition, the president sought to slowly change the mind of the American public. As a result, the president's rhetoric during the Quarantine speech called not for any change in policy but only a change of American attitudes. This appeal did not signal a policy change for the United States. Roosevelt did not ask for any new military build-ups or changes in American foreign policy. The president, through the subtle use of metaphor clusters, simply asked Americans to realize

that there were other nations committing aggressive acts throughout the world.

The speech was a problem-solution address with the metaphors of theme being the solution. If the president felt the events constituted the right time to begin his move for preparation, then he would want to start by working on public support. The best way to gain that support would be to suggest solutions to the problem in this early speech.

In this early stage of his preparations movement, Roosevelt may have wanted simply to place the aggression of Japan in the back of the public's mind for use at a later time. If this speech was the first in a series of speeches designed to move the country from isolation to action, then such a subtle approach might have been the necessary opening step.

The fact that Roosevelt used this speech to take only a subtle approach seems to indicate that he knew he would speak on this topic many times. If the first step of a movement is identification as several rhetorical scholars contend (Gronbeck 389), then perhaps this speech was the start of the preparation movement, and the president sought nothing more than that identification.

The second question asks what important characteristics come from the artifact? In order to exploit this public psychology, the president needed to establish that there

were questions of morality involved in the Japanese aggression. He did so through the use of the metaphors of justification analyzed earlier in this chapter. However, the president also developed the concept of nationalism to justify action. He asked the public not to take any particular action as Republicans or Democrats but to think of the problems as Americans.

Perhaps most important in the opening speech for preparation was that Roosevelt called for no policy action. He stressed what should not be done over what should. In a time when tensions over the role of U.S. involvement in other nations was so high, the president respected the power of the isolationists. As a result the man who would become famous for his ability to persuade men to take action would be forced to abandon that strategy and take a more subtle approach.

The final question in the analysis is, what was the audience reaction to the speech? Opinion polls conducted after the address showed most Americans in support of the president.

While the speech had no immediate measurable effect on the public in terms of action, the attitude-without-a-program that was reflected in Roosevelt's speech was also evident in the public's reactions. They supported the president's stand as long as it did not involve belligerency. A letter signed by 38 members of the College

of Liberal Arts at Northwestern University declared their desire to commend the principles of cooperation for obedience to international law. A writer from Boston stated, "We want peace but we also want justice;" from California, "We believe the strength of character and courage must be expressed by nations" (Cole). The people's approach for Roosevelt's rhetoric, but their avoidance of any action to implement it, was basically his persuasive problem until the day of infamy (Ryan 141).

Repeal of the Embargo Speech
[September 21, 1939]

Context

The outbreak of war in Europe on September 1, 1939, caused Roosevelt to question the effect of the neutrality acts and the U.S. role in foreign affairs. He began to see the necessity of some level of United States involvement in the events in Europe, although he was not sure what the extent of involvement should be. At the same time the president felt he could still keep the U.S. out of another war. He announced in a fireside chat on September 1, that the government was still seeking peace (Dallek 199).

While Roosevelt's commitment to peace was still strong, the president rejected strict neutrality by saying:

I cannot ask that every American remain neutral in thought. . . . Even a neutral has the right to take

account of facts. Even a neutral cannot be asked to close his conscience. (Dallek 199)

Roosevelt believed that the United States should amend the acts of neutrality that had been passed several years before.

The outbreak of war was more effective in converting congressional sentiment to neutrality change. By the second week in September, there were strong indications that the Congress would repeal the arms embargo: a number of congressmen and senators told Roosevelt this, while surveys indicated that 60 per cent of the senators supported cash and carry neutrality (Langer and Gleason 219-220).

An effective isolation drive against neutrality reform created considerable concern. The isolationists mounted a national radio campaign which generated a large number of pro-embargo mail. In three days alone, a million telegrams, letters, and postcards reached congressional offices. Some senators received 4000 messages a day (Dallek 201). Public opinion surveys also gave Roosevelt cause for alarm. Polls during the first three weeks of September suggested that any indication of White House readiness to aid the allies at the risk of war would produce an outpouring of opposition to neutrality change (Langer and Gleason 202).

In an effort to counter this growing isolationist sentiment Roosevelt called on Congress to reassemble in a special session. Roosevelt spoke directly to Congress to

gain its support for the repeal of the embargo and amendments to neutrality legislation.

Isolation of the Metaphors

This particular speech is different from others examined in this study, because it contained very few metaphors for analysis. The speech argued that the Neutrality Act should be repealed because, if left unchanged, it could lead the United States into war. Roosevelt's argument was that incomplete implements of war could be carried by U.S. ships and sold to either side putting the ships in direct danger (B #28). Repeal of the embargo would keep American ships away from the immediate perils of the war zones (B #28). The same, he said, was true of the cash and carry proposals. After each of these examples Roosevelt pre-empted objections that the isolationists might have and made it clear that repeal of the embargo might actually keep the United States from being pulled into the war (Ryan).

If one were to ignore the metaphor use and attempt to place this particular speech into one of Ivie's categories, it would belong in the rational vs irrational group. Perhaps this placement is a result of the audience to which the speech was presented. It would seem that in Congress the more appealing approach would be to set up the question in terms of rational vs irrational action. If there are

certain metaphors followed in political speech, then these metaphors would not be as effective when presented to other politicians who are proficient in the same persuasive techniques. In this speech Roosevelt presented the action that he sought as a rational path to follow. This action was in contrast with the irrational action of allowing the embargo to remain.

Analysis

Again, in analysis of the president's speech, the question of arguments that justify the preparation movement must be examined. FDR described the policy of non-aid and its past failures, and he described the consequences of a second failure. Roosevelt effectively set up a series of rational actions that he sought to take and answered the anticipated arguments of the isolationists.

Perhaps the most important characteristic to come from this speech is that it uses none of the theme development of the war metaphor. Such a lack of the metaphor might be explained by looking at the intended audience. Roosevelt had already given a speech to the public in support of preparation. In the almost two years since he had asked the public to think about preparations, events in Europe had proven the president correct in his analysis of the situation.

While the public was not in total support of preparation, it was not totally against the concept either. Roosevelt knew that he still faced a major task in getting congressional support for his position. The lack of metaphor in this particular speech may be related to the persuasive requirements of the speech. Roosevelt's goal in the speech is not to gain support of the populace but only support of the Congress. As a result of the formal setting of speaking before the Congress Roosevelt seeks only to focus on the irrationality of those who want to keep the embargo intact.

While there was no clear public reaction to this speech, there was clear congressional reaction. This speech marked the first time Roosevelt would receive any support for his preparation ideas. Congress voted to make the changes that the president sought in the existing embargo laws. While the victory was a narrow one it was important for several reasons.

First, it was the first victory for Roosevelt in the long battle with the isolationists. Roosevelt had tried up to this point, to avoid a battle with the isolationists in Congress. In this speech he not only chose to do open battle with them, but also defeated the isolationists. Second, it was a victory in Congress where the isolationists were most dominant. Third, it appeared to mark the

political weakening of the isolationists and the beginning of a change of the mindset of politicians toward the war. The isolationists political machine had slowed down since the early thirties. The isolation movement was still one to be reckoned with, but it was no longer a movement to fear.

Arsenal of Democracy Speech
December 29, 1940

Context

During the year between the time of the Embargo speech and the Arsenal of Democracy speech, things grew very dim for the European allies of the United States. In 1940, Hitler was poised to strike against England, having already taken Poland and France. The president had won a victory with the repeal of the embargo, but he felt this was still not enough to turn back the German threat.

As the war in Europe raged on, Roosevelt had many difficult decisions to make. He sought to support publicly the war effort of England and other countries and at the same time keep American forces out of the war. To meet this difficult task, Churchill suggested that the only option to prevent U.S. involvement would be to give England a gift or loan of American warships. Churchill believed these ships were vital to the English if they were to keep Atlantic shipping lanes open. He underscored this in a telegram to Roosevelt in which he stated:

Unless we can establish our ability to feed this island, to import . . . munitions of all kinds . . . unless we can move our armies to various theatres . . . we may fall by the way, and the time needed by the United States to complete her defense preparations may not be forthcoming. (Dallek 254)

As 1940 drew to a close, Great Britain was on the verge of bankruptcy in terms of dollar credits. Her balances, which had totaled over \$4.5 billion before the war, were now gone. It was obvious that even though Roosevelt had pledged 50 per cent of the U.S. war production to the allies, they could not, under the cash and carry law, obtain the supplies without money (Sherwood 221). Roosevelt's advisers underscored the problem on December 10, 1940, when they informed the president that London apparently had less than \$2 billion available to pay for their current \$5 billion in orders (Kimball 105-115).

Roosevelt's answer to the problems of England was Lend-Lease. He sought to increase United States production of military hardware and to give the English all the supplies needed to fight the war. After the war was over and Germany had been defeated, the English would then return the guns and ships she had been loaned. The president announced his intentions at a news conference on December 17, 1940. Two weeks later, on December 29, he took his proposal to the American people in a fireside chat.

Savagery

Roosevelt began his depiction of the enemy as a savage one by explaining that the "Nazis had made it clear that they intended to enslave all of Europe and dominate the whole world" (C #9). He highlighted this depiction in the speech by referring to them as the Nazi murderers, who sought subjugation of the rest of the world. This depiction continued throughout the speech as he talked about the Nazi aims and the brute force by which they sought to gain control. He described the enemy as one that used secret forces within the confines of the United States and described the Nazis as an evil force that undermines and corrupts (C #32). The president tried to play on domestic fears when he spoke of the enemy and his efforts to "reawaken long sleeping racial and religious enmities" (C #33). He continued to play on the fears of the American public when he described the concentration camp and "servants of God who are put in chains" (C #40). Through these depictions, the president sought to portray the enemy in terms of savage actions and evil will.

Force Vs Freedom

Roosevelt developed this topoi in several parts of his speech. He led the audience to draw conclusions on the freedom of the country when he said:

Some of our people like to believe that wars in Europe and in Asia are of no concern to us. But it is a matter of most vital concern to us that European and Asiatic war makers should not gain control of the oceans that lead to this hemisphere. (C #14)

While the president did not explicitly say so, the general inference the audience was expected to make was that if Europe fell then the United States would be next. Roosevelt continued when he asked the audience to decide what it thought the outcome of Axis victory would be (C #17). Later in the speech, Roosevelt described the situation that would exist should the Axis powers win and bring their military might toward the United States (C #18-42).

Finally, and perhaps most effectively, Roosevelt portrayed the English as defenders of freedom as well when he described the British as "the spearhead of resistance to world conquest" (C #47). By the use of subtle inference Roosevelt was able to place the conflict into the cluster of Force vs Freedom. He set up the situations and then led the audience to make its own conclusions. This was done, however, by using techniques and arguments that would allow the audience to only one conclusion: that if the U.S. did not help the British, then America might be the next target.

Rational vs Irrational

There are several examples of the use of this cluster in the Arsenal speech. Roosevelt began by justifying his

talk of war and helping the allies. He argued that in the face of the threat from the aggressors, the United States had no choice but to talk of war instead of peace (C #12). He continued this idea later in the speech when he noted that the U.S. had always felt that neighbors could settle disputes in a rational fashion (C #17).

The president brought to light the irrational actions of the Nazis by describing their breaking of treaties that had existed with other countries and the fraudulent excuses they gave for attacks on these countries. Finally, the president exposed this irrationality when he illustrated that one could not reason with the Nazis:

The experience of the past two years has proven beyond doubt that no nation can appease the Nazis. No man can tame a tiger into a kitten by stroking it. There can be no appeasement with ruthlessness. (C #36)

Aggression vs Defense

Roosevelt described the aggression of the Axis powers when he discussed the ideology of the aggressors in the Arsenal speech. He spoke of their desire to destroy nations and their belief that they were the masters of the world (C #9). He told of how the three powers had announced that they were intent on controlling the world and would attack the United States if it dared say anything (C #8). Based on the announced goals of the three Axis powers and their desire for world control, the United States would then be

forced to defend itself and to help its allies, and only by doing so could the European nations and the U.S. remain free. Though the United States sought peace and rational action, the aggressive desires of the Axis powers would force America to defend itself.

Analysis

Roosevelt used a blend of metaphor clusters as his main argument in this speech. The speech was delivered to the public as a fireside chat, and the president sought to arouse the moral and religious feelings of the public. He portrayed the enemy as a savage foe, fueling the morally repulsive views of racism and the persecution of religious men. He effectively demonstrated the aggressive doctrines to which the Axis powers had publicly admitted. Finally, he wanted to demonstrate how the United States had always sought the rational idea of peace, but that the Axis powers had violated treaties and through aggressive acts had been an irrational pact making it impossible to deal with them peacefully.

The president, again speaking to the public, sought to develop themes that justified the action he was seeking. He used fear appeals to secure those who already supported his position and to convince those who did not. He also used the scapegoat technique in a guilt-by-association application to lessen public opinion of the

isolationists. Finally, FDR developed the patriotic approach telling the public that it was their duty to support him.

The speech was important in the next step of preparation for war. So far, the president had only received support for the alteration of existing policies. Roosevelt sought to institute a new policy of Lend-Lease in this speech. If the president could gain public support for such policy action, then the United States would have taken the next step in preparation.

The responses to Roosevelt's rhetorical appeal were important. The best indicators of this public support were national polls. Of those who heard or read the address, 61 percent agreed with FDR's views, while 9 percent disagreed. Approximately the same amount of respondents, about 50 percent in early 1940, and rising to 70 percent by late 1940, believed that the United States should aid Britain and France. Moreover, the public polls from 1937 to Pearl Harbor demonstrated that consistently over 60 percent of those polled favored increased spending on the Army, Navy, and Air Force even if it meant paying more taxes (Cantril 588).

Four Freedoms Speech
[January 6, 1941]

Context

For Lend-Lease, as he had done in the fight over the Supreme Court, Roosevelt gave a second speech in support of his proposals immediately after the first. Due to the short period of time between the two speeches, the context is the same.

Isolation of the Metaphor

This speech contained only isolated examples of metaphors and none in the cluster of Savagery. There were several examples of use of the metaphors that are found in justification rhetoric, but no constant theme was developed.

Roosevelt did, at several points in the speech, point out that democratic values were at stake in the conflict. He used the Force vs Freedom metaphor to describe the situation:

Every realist knows that the democratic way of life is being directly assailed in every part of the world . . . During sixteen long months this assault has blotted out the whole pattern of democratic life . . . The assailants are still on the march, threatening other nations great and small. (D #12-13)

During the course of the speech the president at several points spoke about the battle that was being fought all over the world for democracy.

Roosevelt championed four essential human freedoms during the speech. These freedoms were the focus of the speech and included freedom of speech, expression, worship of God, from fear, and want.

Analysis

In the Freedoms speech, Roosevelt attacks the isolationists with a wide range of appeals designed to show the folly of the isolationists' position. He began by showing that the isolationists had actually helped the Axis powers in the efforts to run over other European nations. Roosevelt cleverly focused his speech on domestic issues, making these the focus instead of weapons and war. The famous four freedoms that he spoke of in the speech were in direct conflict with the image of Hitler and the Nazis running roughshod over democracy in the world. The president sought to focus the Lend-Lease question on freedom for people around the world, not guns and war.

As with the Repeal of the Embargo this speech was given to Congress. The speech contains little of the clusters used in justification of war. This researcher speculates that there are two reasons for the lack of this theme development. First, Roosevelt had already given his public speech on this topic days earlier. If, as Ivie writes, the goal in using these metaphors is persuasion of the people, then the first speech should have been enough. In addition,

experts on persuasion will note that if a certain appeal is be used too often this will hurt the ethos of the speaker. Most experts will argue that the most effective means of persuasion is to hit the audience hard in the initial speech and then subtly lead them in subsequent speeches. If the theorists are correct then it would appear that Roosevelt uses this technique to his advantage in this speech.

Roosevelt had already developed the metaphors in the first speech. Perhaps Roosevelt had already attempted to persuade his target audience. Second, the speech was given in Congress which, as suggested earlier in this study, may limit the usefulness of such metaphors.

If the formality of the setting of the speech has an effect on the speaker then so might the demographics of a particular audience. If the audience is well versed in the techniques that the speaker is using for persuasion, then these techniques may not be as effective, and as a result will not be tried. Perhaps this theory might explain why the president does not use the metaphor of war in justifying action in the Congress but does use the metaphor in addressing the public.

Freedom of the Seas Speech
[September 11, 1941]

Context

During the winter of 1941, Hitler continued to devastate U.S. allies in Europe. The German Luftwaffe

destroyed the cities, and the German Navy destroyed British shipping. As a result, the United States began sending more ships to Britain in April. In May, the United States sent 50 oil tankers to England, and that same month, after the American freighter Robin Moore was sunk by a German submarine, Roosevelt declared an unlimited emergency (Tugwell 571).

During the month of June 1941, the United States sought to accept the responsibility for keeping sea lanes open to protect the ever-increasing Lend-Lease shipments. As tensions increased throughout the summer, the United States began to prepare for naval operations in the Atlantic Ocean. On September 17, the Germans sunk another American ship. This convinced Roosevelt that a naval confrontation in the Atlantic was on the horizon (Greer 186).

On September 4, 1941, the Germans made an unsuccessful attempt to sink a U.S. naval destroyer during operations in the Atlantic, and the attempt on the Greer sealed the fate of confrontation between the United States and Germany. The American public waited to see what Roosevelt's reaction to the incident would be. On September 11, 1941, in his first speech since the "Four Freedoms," the president gave his answer.

Savage Foe

Roosevelt, early in the speech, set the tone for his depiction of the event as a savage act by Germany.

The German action was seen as an act of piracy and an act that was immoral and illegal (E #8). The attack was called "outrageous" and "an indiscriminate violence" (E #7). As Roosevelt described the indiscriminate sinking of ships in the Atlantic, he hoped to portray the German actions in terms of savage attacks by a savage foe. Roosevelt said the time for action had arrived when he declared:

There now has come a time when you and I must see the cold inexorable necessity of saying those inhumane, unrestrained seekers of world conquest and permanent domination by the sword: you seek to throw our children and our children's children into your form of terrorism and slavery (E #36).

The president also described the German threat as "not only from a military enemy but from an enemy of all law, all liberty, all morality, all religion" (E #35).

Force vs Freedom

Throughout the speech Roosevelt focused on the concept of Force vs. Freedom. He reminded the listener that the Germans were seeking dominate control of the world, and he described the effect of Hitler's possible control of the sea by saying:

For with control of the sea in their own hands, the way can obviously become clear for their next step, domination of the United States domination of the Western hemisphere by force of arms. Under Nazi control

no merchant ship of the United States or of any other American republic would be free. . . . (E #18)

The text went on to describe the goals of the Nazi leaders once they controlled the seas. If they were to gain control, the next place to invade would be the United States.

Perhaps the most famous line of the speech fell into the cluster of Force vs Freedom. The President said:

But when you see a rattlesnake poised to strike, you do not wait until he has struck before you crush him.

These Nazi raiders are the rattlesnakes of Atlantic.

They are a challenge to our sovereignty. They hammer at our most precious rights when they attack ships of the American flag, symbols of our independence, our freedom our very life. (E #43-44)

Through these two passages and the general wording of the speech Roosevelt was able to portray the struggle as one of Force vs. Freedom.

Rational vs Irrational

Roosevelt described the irrational action of the Germans in the opening paragraph when he told of an attack that occurred in daylight against a ship that was only carrying American mail and flew the American flag. He also gave two possible explanations for the German actions and then showed how neither explanation gave the Nazis a rational answer for the attack (E #6).

He continued to tell of several ships that were sunk in the Atlantic in the weeks prior to this particular incident. In each case he noted that the ships were clearly marked as United States ships (E #10-11).

The president followed this cluster of metaphors with emphasis on the rational action of the United States. Roosevelt said that the United States had outgrown attacking another nation on the basis of a few isolated incidents. He continued by saying that the country was not hysterical or losing its sense of proportion. Roosevelt described a nation that had been attacked on several occasions but was rational enough not to declare war based on any isolated episodes (E #12-15). In this manner, Roosevelt presented an excellent contrast between the Germans, who would attack clearly marked ships of a non-belligerent, and the Americans, who though already attacked would seek rational and logical action in response.

Aggression vs Defense

Roosevelt sought to describe the aggression of the German submarines by describing the sinking of American ships. He gave one example after another in an effort to illustrate this aggression (E #10-11). Roosevelt described the lawless aggression of the Nazis in denying the United States freedom of the seas and seeking domination of these waters (E #17).

The development of a German policy of aggression and domination of the seas was established throughout the speech (E #19-20). The best example of the president's feeling that the Germans were involved in a search for aggressive control of the seas came when he said:

Unrestricted submarine warfare in 1941 constitutes a defiance-an-act of aggression against an historic American policy. It is now clear that Hitler had begun his campaign to control the seas by ruthless force (E #30)

Analysis

Perhaps the most important aspect of this speech was that Roosevelt justified action before he had taken it. He described the aggressive acts of the German submarines and talked about the Greer incident. This strategy differs from the presidential approaches before and after because it justified an action that had already occurred.

The most important characteristic of this particular speech would affect many presidents in the future. Roosevelt seemed merely to report the aggressive actions of an enemy and suggest a course of action as a result of the aggression. Rhetorical scholars have noted several problems with this speech that will be used by other presidents. This speech illustrates the complaints that Windt lodged against presidential crisis rhetoric. First, the policy is

often enacted as the president announces it, thus bypassing democratic debate. President Johnson announced that we had taken action during the C. Turner Joy incident in the Gulf of Tonkin hours after the action had already been taken. President Nixon did the same with the Cambodian invasion and President Reagan used this method in the invasion of Grenada. In all of these cases the president announced new policy and action after they had been taken. This method allows for no discussion of what policy options should be used in a situation. It only seeks to legitimize action that has already occurred. President Bush's speech on the deployment of U.S. troops in the Middle East is a more current example of this method. If a president has been successful in gaining any support for his actions then it is inevitable that he will ask that an action already taken be justified on the same grounds. Second, the president often lies about or misrepresents the new facts (Windt 61-70).

Many believe that Roosevelt used the incident as a way to justify a policy of freedom of the seas that had already covertly been adopted. The evidence on this issue was split and neither side was very conclusive.

Whatever the truth may have been public opinion after this speech was in support for the president and the actions indicated in the speech. The president had succeeded in generating public support for another step of war preparation.

Summary

President Roosevelt, during the period of the speeches analyzed in this chapter, developed an effective strategy for public persuasion. Through a combination of two persuasive techniques the president persuaded the general public and political leaders. FDR used the metaphor to persuade the general public and logical arguments to persuade Congress.

In using these techniques he was able to overcome the political power of the isolationists and win the support of the populace as well. Doing so allowed FDR to convince the nation that it should not seek war but should be prepared if war ever sought the United States. In addition it allowed the president to portray Germany as the savage protagonist in the coming conflict. The events on December 7, 1941, would seem to have justified this approach.

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CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The previous two chapters provided information concerning political battles between Franklin Roosevelt and the isolationists. These battles were fought over the question of war preparation in the United States prior to actual involvement in World War II. The purpose of this chapter is to summarize findings, present conclusions, and to propose recommendations for further research.

As Roosevelt began his second term in office, he became involved in a bitter political conflict with those who sought isolation for the United States. The president did not want to drag the United States into war, but he did want the U.S. to be prepared in case war came. This was in direct conflict with the isolationists who wanted no involvement or preparations of any kind. These isolationists enjoyed both public and political support for their position. As events grew worse in Europe and war seemed inevitable, the president sought to take action to prepare the United States. However, Roosevelt was not strong enough to defeat the isolationists in a political battle, and after several decisive defeats at the hands of the isolationists, he changed his political strategy.

The president hoped that he could persuade the American people of the benefits of preparing for military action. FDR felt if he could persuade the public then perhaps the people would do the work of persuading the politicians that they had elected to office.

Several questions guided this researcher in drawing conclusions and making recommendations based on this particular study. These questions allowed one to look at the effectiveness and the development of the war metaphor in presidential rhetoric.

First, to what extent did Roosevelt, through the use of metaphor, develop the common theme of war justification? The president developed the themes of the war metaphor in all but two of the speeches. However, this development took a different approach than the one described by Robert Ivie.

Ivie argued that presidents would seek to set a crisis address using each of the four categories of the metaphor. In other words, each *topoi* of the metaphor would be used and developed in the speech, none being stronger than the others. Ivie also argued that this justification would be done in a single speech.

Roosevelt did develop the metaphor themes in each of these speeches; however, there are several differences in the theme development. First, Roosevelt played on certain themes of justification in each speech. Second, the main theme of justification was not given in one speech; it was

developed through a combination of the five speeches. Based on the information, this researcher concludes that in an attempt to justify action and create a movement of support for preparation, Roosevelt developed constant themes over a period of time, using several speeches. This was done in an effort to slowly gain public support for the preparation idea.

There are two exceptions in the development of the metaphor. These were the two speeches that were not presented to the public but to Congress. While there are no real metaphor clusters in these two speeches, there may be a reason for their absence. This researcher contends that the speeches had different persuasive requirements. Since the speeches were presented to a legislative body which may very well have utilized the same techniques, perhaps a different approach was required. If this nationalistic metaphor was effective, then members of Congress would naturally have been well-versed in its use as well. These leaders spoke in defense of isolation or preparation and in all likelihood used the same persuasive techniques more often than the president. As a result, this technique would have had little effect. Also, it is important to remember that the speeches to this particular audience were designed not to persuade but merely to test the effect of two earlier speeches. For this reason, Congress would not be considered the target of the speaker.

Second, given the political climate of the period between the two wars, to what extent was Roosevelt's development of theme persuasive to the American public? It is difficult to show a direct correlation between public opinion and the speeches given by Roosevelt. Other events that were happening during this time period may have had the same effect in terms of forming pro-preparation feelings in the general public. Certainly the events of December 7, 1941, would end all speculation on this question. Still, public opinion polls of the day showed an increase in support of President Roosevelt and war preparation after each of the five preparation speeches. As a result of these polls and the sudden victories the president won in Congress, this researcher concludes that the speeches did have an affect on the American public. However, it would be impossible to determine or measure the exact persuasiveness of the speeches, especially since the methods used for analysis in this particular study as they only look at the effective use of the method itself.

The final question used for analysis of this topic is as follows: What consequences can be anticipated if future presidents or speakers for social movements employ procedures similar to the ones Roosevelt used? The research done for this particular study could find no instance where this method has been used through several speeches. Most examples of the method occur in one speech of justification.

President Johnson used the metaphor in both domestic and military affairs, but it is important to note, however, that in both cases only a single speech was presented. Johnson used the war metaphor to seek action against poverty in the United States and to justify military action after the C. Turner Joy. The result in both situations was immediate approval followed by discontent and protest.

President Nixon used the metaphor in describing various military action taken while he was in office; however, this was not a technique well-developed by Nixon. The use of the metaphor did nothing to quiet the protest over military involvement.

President Reagan used the method to justify the invasion of the island of Grenada and seemed to have limited success in gaining support for that operation. In each of these examples the justification for military action was given only after the event itself had already happened. As a result it is difficult to predict the effect this method might have on a movement.

Perhaps the most fertile ground for such a study is taking place in 1991. One might analyze the rhetoric of President Bush between the time troops left for Saudi Arabia in August 1990 and the time they actually became involved in fighting in January 1991.

Past examples of the metaphor use and the result of this study would allow one to make conclusions about the

future use of the metaphor. This researcher concludes that the metaphor is more effective when the president has time to develop themes of war before the actual event has occurred. When the speaker has time to present a series of speeches and to slowly develop the theme of savagery, the result appears to be stronger support for the military action taken. However, the study concludes that while the method chosen for this particular study is very effective in evaluating the use of the metaphor, it is not particularly effective in evaluating potential outcomes or precise effects in terms of persuasion.

Based on the answers to these questions, this researcher draws the following conclusions about Roosevelt's use of the war metaphor. First, President Roosevelt did develop the themes that Ivie argued were inherent in pro-war justification. Second, Roosevelt sought to create a movement of support for preparation by developing these themes in a series of speeches aimed at the public. Third, while there is no exact way to tell, the president was somewhat persuasive and effective in his appeal. Finally, it is argued that future leaders would be more effective in developing these metaphors through a series of speeches. Throughout history, this style appears to have been more effective than simply presenting a justification after the action has occurred. Based on these conclusions, this researcher also has several recommendations for future

research on this topic. First, researchers may want to look at the rhetoric of isolation during this period in an attempt to determine the persuasive strategies of that group. Second, study might also be done on the particular persuasive requirements of certain audiences such as Congress. This would allow scholars to determine best available means of persuasion for a given audience.

Another interesting method of study might be to focus on the rhetoric of the isolationists and determine the persuasive techniques used by that group. Doing so would allow for a comparison and contrast of the two sides. These studies would help determine if this method of persuasion is really unique to the president or is a common means of mobilization. Also, researchers might look at public opinion polls of the day in an effort to determine the actual persuasiveness of the metaphor to an audience.

The rhetorical critic might want to study a variety of speeches given on these issues prior to the second war. For example, the critic could focus on the rhetoric of the munitions investigation in an effort to determine what type of appeals were deployed.

In conclusion, this study allows a method of analysis to determine the use of a particular means of persuasion. This is done by analyzing the rhetoric in a search for constant themes. While the study answers questions concerning technique, it raises many more questions about

technique and style as well. This should provide fertile ground for future study and prediction based on the use of the war metaphor.

APPENDIX A
QUARANTINE SPEECH

1. I am glad to come once again to Chicago and especially to have the opportunity of taking part in the dedication of this important project of civic betterment. On my trip across the continent and back I have been shown many evidences of the result of common sense cooperation between municipalities and the Federal Government, and I have been greeted by tens of thousands of Americans who have told me in every look and word that their material and spiritual well-being has made great strides forward in the past few years.

2. And yet, as I have seen with my own eyes, the prosperous farms, the thriving factories, and the busy railroads, as I have seen the happiness and security and peace which covers our wide land, almost inevitably I have been compelled to contrast our peace with very different scenes being enacted in other parts of the world.

3. It is because the people of the United States under modern conditions must, for the sake of their own future, give thought to the rest of the world, that I, as the responsible executive head of the Nation, have chosen this great inland city and this gala occasion to speak to you on a subject of definite national importance.

4. The political situation in the world, which of late has been growing progressively worse, is such as to cause grave concern and anxiety to all the peoples and nations who wish to live in peace and amity with their neighbors.

5. Some fifteen years ago the hopes of mankind for a continuing era of international peace were raised to great heights when more than sixty nations solemnly pledged themselves not to resort to arms in furtherance of their national aims and policies. The high aspirations expressed in the Briand-Kellogg Peace Pact and the hopes for peace thus raised have of late given way to a haunting fear of calamity. The present reign of terror and international lawlessness began a few years ago.

6. It began through unjustified interference in the internal affairs of other nations or the invasion of alien territory in violation of treaties and has now reached a stage where the very foundations of civilization are seriously threatened. The landmarks and traditions which have marked the progress of civilization toward a condition of law, order, and justice are being wiped away.

7. Without a declaration of war and without warning or justification of any kind, civilians, including vast numbers of women and children, are being ruthlessly murdered with bombs from the air. In times of so-called peace, ships are being attacked and sunk by submarines without cause or notice. Nations are fomenting and taking sides in civil warfare in nations that have never done them any harm. Nations claiming freedom for themselves deny it to others.

8. Innocent peoples, innocent nations, are being cruelly sacrificed to a greed for power and supremacy which is devoid of all sense of justice and humane considerations. To paraphrase a recent author, "perhaps we foresee a time when men, exultant in the technique of homicide, will rage so hotly over the world that every precious thing will be in danger, every book and picture and harmony, every treasure garnered through two millenniums, the small, the delicate, the defenseless--all will be lost or wrecked or utterly destroyed."

9. If those things come to pass in other parts of the world, let no one imagine that America will escape, that America may expect mercy, that this Western Hemisphere will not be attacked, and that it will continue tranquilly and peacefully to carry on the ethics and the arts of civilization.

10. If those days come, "there will be no safety by arms, no help from authority, no answer in science. The storm will rage till every flower of culture is trampled and all human beings are leveled in a vast chaos."

11. If those days are not to come to pass--if we are to have a world in which we can breathe freely and live in amity without fear--the peace-loving nations must make a concerted effort to uphold laws and principles on which alone peace can rest secure.

12. The peace-loving nations must make a concerted effort in opposition to those violations of treaties and those ignorings of humane instincts which today are creating a state of international anarchy and instability from which there is no escape through mere isolation or neutrality.

13. Those who cherish their freedom, and recognize and respect the equal right of their neighbors to be free and live in peace, must work together for the triumph of law and moral principles in order that peace, justice, and confidence may prevail in the world. There must be a return

to a belief in the pledged work, in the value of a signed treaty. There must be recognition of the fact that national morality is as vital as private morality.

14. A bishop wrote me the other day, "It seems to me that something greatly needs to be said in behalf of ordinary humanity against the present practice of carrying the horrors of war to helpless civilians, especially women and children. It may be that such a protest might be regarded by many, who claim to be realists, as futile, but may it not be that the heart of mankind is so filled with horror at the present needless suffering that force could be mobilized in sufficient volume to lessen such cruelty in the days ahead. Even though it may take twenty years, God forbid, for civilization to make effective its corporate protest against this barbarism, surely strong voices may hasten the day."

15. There is a solidarity and interdependency about the modern world, both technically and morally, which makes it impossible for any nation completely to isolate itself from economic and political upheavals in the rest of the world, especially when such upheavals appear to be spreading and not declining. There can be no stability or peace either within nations or between nations except under laws and moral standards adhered to by all. International anarchy destroys every foundation for peace. It jeopardizes either the immediate or the future security of every nation, large or small. It is, therefore, a matter of vital interest and concern to the people of the United States that the sanctity of international treaties and the maintenance of international morality be restored.

16. The overwhelming majority of the peoples and nations of the world today want to live in peace. They seek the removal of barriers against trade. They want to exert themselves in industry, in agriculture, and in business, that they may increase their wealth through the production of wealth-producing goods rather than striving to produce military planes and bombs and machine guns and cannon for the destruction of human lives and useful property.

17. In those nations of the world which seem to be piling armament on armament for purposes of aggression, and those other nations which fear acts of aggression against them and their security, a very high proportion of their national income is being spent directly for armaments. It runs from thirty to as high as fifty percent. We are fortunate. The proportion that we in the United States spend is far less--eleven or twelve percent. How happy we are that the circumstances of the moment permit us to put

our money into bridges and boulevards, dams and reforestation, the conservation of our soil and many other kinds of useful works rather than into huge standing armies and vast supplies of implements of war.

18. I am compelled and you are compelled, nevertheless, to look ahead. The peace, the freedom, and the security of ninety percent of the population of the world is being jeopardized by the remaining ten percent who are threatening a breakdown of all international order and law. Surely the ninety percent, who want to live in peace under law and in accordance with moral standards that have received almost universal acceptance through the centuries, can and must find some way to make their will prevail.

19. The situation is definitely of universal concern. The questions involved relate not merely to violations of specific provisions of particular treaties; they are questions of war and of peace, of international law, and especially of principles of humanity. It is true that they involve definite violations of agreements, and especially of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Briand-Kellogg Pact, and the Nine Power Treaty. But they also involve problems of world economy, world security, and world humanity. It is true that the moral consciousness of the world must recognize the importance of removing injustices and well-founded grievances; but at the same time it must be aroused to the cardinal necessity of honoring sanctity of treaties, of respecting the rights and liberties of others, and of putting an end to acts of international aggression. It seems to be unfortunately true that the epidemic of world lawlessness is spreading.

20. When an epidemic of physical disease starts to spread, the community approves and joins in a quarantine of the patients in order to protect the health of the community against the spread of the disease.

21. It is my determination to pursue a policy of peace. It is my determination to adopt every practicable measure to avoid involvement in war. It ought to be inconceivable that in this modern era, and in the face of experience, any nation could be so foolish and ruthless as to run the risk of plunging the whole world into war by invading and violating, in contravention of solemn treaties, the territory of other nations that have done them no real harm and are too weak to protect themselves adequately. Yet the peace of the world and the welfare and security of every nation, including our own, is today being threatened by that very thing.

22. No nation which refuses to exercise forbearance and to respect the freedom and rights of others can long remain strong and retain the confidence and respect of other nations. No nation ever loses its dignity or its good standing by conciliating its differences and by exercising great patience with, and consideration for, the rights of other nations.

23. War is a contagion, whether it be declared or undeclared. It can engulf states and peoples remote from the original scene of hostilities. We are determined to keep out of war, yet we cannot insure ourselves against the disastrous effects of war and the dangers on involvement. We are adopting such measures as will minimize our risk of involvement, but we cannot have complete protection in a world of disorder in which confidence and security have broken down.

24. If civilization is to survive, the principles of the Prince of Peace must be restored. Trust between nations must be revived. Most important of all, the will for peace on the part of peace-loving nations must express itself to the end that nations that are tempted to violate their agreements and the rights of others will desist from such a course. There must be positive endeavors to preserve peace. America hates war. America hopes for peace. Therefore, America actively engages in the search for peace.

APPENDIX B
REPEAL EMBARGO SPEECH

1. I have asked the Congress to reassemble in extraordinary session in order that it may consider and act on the amendment of certain legislation, which, in my best judgment, so alters the historic foreign policy of the United States that it impairs the peaceful relations of the United States with foreign nations.

2. At the outset I proceed on the assumption that every member of the Senate and of the House of Representatives, and every member of the Executive Branch of the Government, including the President and his associates, personally and officially are equally and without reservation in favor of such measures as will protect the neutrality, the safety, and the integrity of our country and at the same time keep us out of war.

3. Because I am wholly willing to ascribe an honorable desire for peace to those who hold different views from my own as to what those measures should be, I trust that these gentlemen will be sufficiently generous to ascribe equally lofty purposes to those with whom they disagree. Let no man or group in any walk of life assume exclusive protectorate over the future well-being of American, because I conceive that regardless of party or section the mantle of peace and or patriotism is wide enough to cover us all. Let no group assume the exclusive label of the "peace bloc." We all belong to it. I have at all times kept the Congress and the American people informed of events and trends in foreign affairs. I now review them in a spirit of understatement.

4. Since 1931 the use of force instead of the council table has constantly increased in disputes between nations--except in the Western Hemisphere where in all those years there has been only one war, now happily terminated.

5. During those years also the building up of vast armies and navies and storehouses of war has proceeded abroad with growing speed and intensity. But, during these years, and extending back even to the days of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the United States has constantly, consistently, and conscientiously done all in its power to encourage peaceful settlements, to bring about reduction on armaments and to avert threatened wars. We have done this not only because any war anywhere necessarily hurts American security and American prosperity, but because of the more important fact that any war anywhere retards the progress of morality and religion and impairs the security of civilization itself.

6. For many years the primary purpose of our foreign policy has been that this nation and this Government should strive to aid in avoiding war among nations. But if and when war unhappily comes, the government and the nation must exert every possible effort to avoid being drawn into the war.

7. The Executive Branch of the Government did its utmost, within our traditional policy of non-involvement, to aid in averting the present appalling war. Having thus striven and failed, this Government must lose no time or effort to keep our nation from being drawn into the war.

8. In my candid judgment we shall succeed in those efforts. We are proud of the historical record of the United States and of all the Americans during all these years, because we have thrown every ounce of our influence for peace into the scale of peace.

9. I note in passing what you will all remember--the long debates of the past on the subject of what constitutes aggression, on the methods of determining who the aggressor might be, and on who the aggressors in past wars had been. Academically, this may have been instructive, as it may have been of interest to historians to discuss the pros and cons and the rights and wrongs of the World War during the decade that followed it.

10. But in the light of problems of today and tomorrow, responsibility for acts of aggression is not concealed, and the writing of the record can safely be left to future historians.

11. There has been sufficient realism in the United States to see how close to our own shores came dangerous paths which were being followed on other continents.

12. Last January I told the Congress that "a war which threatened to envelop the world in flames has been averted, but it has become increasingly clear that peace is not assured."

13. By April new tensions had developed; a new crisis was in the making. Several nations with whom we had had friendly, diplomatic, and commercial relations had lost, or were in the process of losing, their independent identity and their very sovereignty.

14. During the spring and summer the trend was definitely toward further acts of military conquests and away from peace. As late as the end of July I spoke to members of the Congress about the definite possibility of war. I should have called it the probability of war.

15. Last January, also, I spoke to this Congress of the need for further warning of new threats of conquest, military and economic, of challenge to religion, to Democracy, and to international good faith. I said, "An ordering of society which relegates religion, democracy, and good faith among nations to the background can find no place within it for the ideals of the Prince of Peace. The United States rejects such an ordering and retains its ancient faith..." And I said, "We know what might happen to us of the United States if the new philosophies of force were to encompass the other continents and invade our own. We, no more than other nations, can afford to be surrounded by the enemies of our faith and our humanity. Fortunate it is, therefore, that in this Western Hemisphere, we have, under a common ideal of democratic government, a rich diversity of resources and of peoples functioning together in mutual respect and peace."

16. Last January, in the same message, I also said, "We have learned that when we deliberately try to legislate neutrality, our neutrality laws may operate unevenly and unfairly--may actually give aid to an aggressor and deny it to the victim. The instinct of self-preservation should warn us that we ought not to let that happen any more."

17. It was because of what I foresaw last January from watching the trend of foreign affairs and their probable effect upon us that I recommended to the Congress in July of this year that changes be enacted in our neutrality law.

18. The essentials for American peace in this war-torn world have not changed since last January or since last July. That is why I ask you again to re-examine our own legislation.

19. Beginning with the foundation of our constitutional Government in the year 1789, the American policy in respect to belligerent nations, with one notable exception, has been based on international law. Be it remembered that what we call international law has always had as its primary objectives the avoidance of causes of war and the prevention of the extension of war.

20. The single exception to which I refer was the policy adopted by this nation during the Napoleonic Wars, when, seeking to avoid involvement, we acted for some years under the so-called Embargo and Non-Intercourse Acts. That policy turned out to be a disastrous failure first, because it brought our own nation close to ruin, and, secondly, because it was the major cause of bringing us into active participation in European wars in our own War of 1812. It is merely reciting history to recall to you that one of the results of the policy of embargo and non-intercourse was the burning in 1814 of part of the Capitol in which we are assembled today.

21. Our next deviation by statute from the sound principles of neutrality, and peace through international law did not come from one hundred and thirty years. It was the so-called Neutrality Act of 1937--only four years ago--an Act continued in force by the Joint Resolution of May 1, 1937, despite grave doubts expressed as to its wisdom by many Senators and Representatives and by officials charged with the conduct of our foreign relations, including myself.

22. I regret that the Congress passed that Act. I regret equally that I signed that Act. On July fourteenth of this year, I asked the Congress in the cause of peace and in the interest of real American neutrality and security, to take action to change that Act.

23. I now ask again that such action be taken in respect to that part of the Act which is wholly inconsistent with ancient precepts of the law of nations--the embargo provisions. I ask it because they are, in my opinion, most vitally dangerous to American neutrality, American security and, above all, American peace.

24. These embargo provisions, as they exist today, prevent the sale to a belligerent by an American factory of any completed implements of war, but they allow the sale of many types of uncompleted implements of war, as well as all kinds of general material and supplies. They, furthermore, allow such products of industry and agriculture to be taken in American flag ships to belligerent nations. There in itself--under the present law--lies definite danger to our neutrality and our peace.

25. From a purely material point of view what is the advantage to us in sending all manner of articles across the ocean for final processing there when we can give employment to thousands by doing it here? Incidentally, and again from the material point of view, by such employment here we automatically aid in building up our own national defense.

And if abnormal profits appear in our midst even in time of peace, as a result of such an increase of our industry, I feel certain that the subject will be adequately dealt with at the coming regular session of the Congress.

26. Let me set forth the present paradox of the existing legislation in its simplest terms: If, prior to 1935, a general war had broken out in Europe, the United States would have sold to, and bought from, belligerent nations such goods and products of all kinds as the belligerent nations, with their existing facilities and geographical situations, were able to buy from us or sell to us. This would have been the normal practice under the age-old doctrines of international law.

27. Our prior position accepted the facts of geography and of conditions of land power and sea power and air power alike, as they existed in all parts of the world.

28. If a war had broken out in Europe prior to 1935, there would have been no difference, for example, between our exports of sheets of aluminum and airplane wings; today there is an artificial legal difference.

29. Before 1935 there would have been no difference between the export of cotton and the export of gun cotton. Today there is. Before 1935 there would have been no difference between the shipment of brass tubing in pipe form and brass tubing in shell form. Today there is. Before 1935 there would have been no difference between the export of a motor truck and an armored motor truck. Today there is.

30. Let us be factual, let's recognize that a belligerent nation often needs wheat and lard and cotton for the survival of its population just as much as it needs anti-aircraft guns and anti-submarine depth-charges. Let those who seek to retain the present embargo position be wholly consistent. Let them seek new legislation to cut off cotton and cloth and copper and meat and wheat and a thousand other articles from all of the nations at war.

31. I seek a greater consistency through the repeal of the embargo provisions, and a return to international law. I seek reenactment of the historic and traditional American policy which, except for the disastrous interlude of the Embargo and Non-Intercourse Acts, has served us well from the very beginning of our Constitutional existence.

32. It has been erroneously said that return to that policy might bring us nearer to war. I give you my deep and unalterable conviction, based on years of experience as a worker in the field of international peace, that by the repeal of the embargo the United States will more probably remain at peace than if the law remains as it stands today. I say this because with the repeal of the embargo, this government clearly and definitely will insist that American citizens and American ships keep away from the immediate perils of the actual zones of conflict.

33. Repeal of the embargo and a return to international law are the crux of the issue that faces us.

34. The enactment of the embargo provisions did more than merely reverse our traditional policy. It had the effect of putting land powers on the same footing as naval powers, so far as seaborne commerce was concerned. A land power which threatened war could thus feel assured in advance that any prospective sea-power antagonist would be weakened through denial of its ancient right to buy anything anywhere. This, four years ago, began to give a definite advantage to one belligerent as against another, not through his own strength or geographical position, but through an affirmative act on the part of the United States. Removal of the embargo is merely reverting to the sounder international practice and pursuing in time of war, as in time of peace, our ordinary trade policies. This will be liked by some and disliked by others, depending on the view they take of the present war, but that is not the issue. The step I recommend is to put this country back on the solid footing of real and traditional neutrality.

35. When and if--I do not like even to mention the work "if," I would rather say "when"--repeal of the embargo is accomplished, certain other phases of policy reinforcing American safety should be considered. While nearly all of us are in agreement on their objectives, the only questions relate to method.

36. I believe that American merchant vessels should, as far as possible, be restricted from entering war zones. But, war zones may change so swiftly and so frequently in the days to come, that it is impossible to fix them permanently by act of Congress; specific legislation may prevent adjustment to constant and quick change. It seems, therefore, more practical to delimit the actual geography of the war zones through action of the State Department and administrative agencies. The objective of restricting American ships from entering such zones may be attained by prohibiting such entry by the Congress; or the result can be

substantially achieved by executive proclamation that all such voyages are solely at the risk of the American owners themselves.

37. The second objective is to prevent American citizens from traveling on belligerent vessels or in danger areas. This can also be accomplished either by legislation, through continuance in force of certain provisions of existing law, or by proclamation making it clear to all Americans that any such travel is at their own risk.

38. The third objective, requiring the foreign buyer to take transfer of title in this country to commodities purchased by belligerents, is also a result that can be attained by legislation or substantially achieved through due notice by proclamation.

39. The fourth objective is the preventing of war credits to belligerents. This can be accomplished by maintaining in force existing provisions of law or by proclamation making it clear that if credits are granted by American citizens to belligerents, our Government will take no steps in the future to relieve them of risk or loss.

40. The result of these last two objectives will be to require all purchases to be made in cash and all cargoes to be carried in the purchasers' own ships, at the purchasers' own risk.

41. Two other objectives have been amply attained by existing law, namely, regulating collection of funds in this country for belligerents, and the maintenance of a license system covering import and export of arms, ammunition, and implements of war. Under present enactments, such arms cannot be carried to belligerent countries on American vessels, and this provision should not be disturbed.

42. The Congress, of course, should make its own choice of the method by which these safeguards are to be attained, so long as the method chosen will meet the needs of new and changing day-to-day situations and dangers.

43. To those who say that this program would involve a step toward war on our part, I reply that it offers far greater safeguards than we now possess or have ever possessed, to protect American lives and property from danger. It is a positive program for giving safety. This means less likelihood of incidents and controversies which tend to draw us into conflict, as they unhappily did in the last World War. There lies the road to peace!

44. The position of the Executive Branch of the Government is that the age-old and time-honored doctrine of international law, coupled with these positive safeguards, is better calculated than any other means to keep us out of war.

45. In respect to our own defense, you are aware that I have issued a proclamation setting forth "A National Emergency in Connection with Observance, Safeguarding, and Enforcement of Neutrality and the Strengthening of the National Defense within the Limits of Peace-Time Authorization." This was done solely to make wholly constitutional and legal certain obviously necessary measures. I have authorized increases in the personnel of the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard, which will bring all four of them to a total still below peace-time strength as authorized by the Congress.

46. I have authorized the State Department to use, for the repatriation of Americans caught in the war zone, the sum of \$500,000 already authorized by the Congress.

47. I have authorized the addition of one hundred and fifty persons to the Department of Justice to be used in the protection of the United States against subversive foreign activities within our borders.

48. At this time I ask for no further authority from the Congress. At this time there's no need for further executive action under the proclamation of limited national emergency. Therefore, there is no impelling reason for the consideration of other legislation in this extraordinary session of the Congress. It is, of course, possible that in the months to come unforeseen needs for further legislation may develop but they are not imperative today.

49. These perilous days demand cooperation among us. Our acts must be guided by one single, hard-headed thought--keeping America out of this war. In that spirit, I am asking the leaders of the two major parties in the Senate and the House of Representatives to remain in Washington between the close of this extraordinary session and the beginning of the regular session on January 3rd, 1940. They have assured me that they will do so, and I expect to consult with them at different intervals on the course of events in foreign affairs and the need for future action in this field, whether it be executive legislative action.

50. Further, in the event of the future danger to the security of the United States or in the event of need for any new legislation of importance, I will immediately reconvene the Congress in another extraordinary session.

51. I should like to be able to offer the hope that the shadow over the world will swiftly pass. I cannot. The facts compel my stating, with candor, that darker periods may lie ahead. The disaster is not our making; no act of ours engendered the forces which assault the foundations of civilization. Yet we find ourselves affected to the core; our currents of commerce are changing, our days are filled with new problems, our position in world affairs have already been altered.

52. In such circumstances our policy must be to appreciate in the deepest sense the true American interest. Rightly considered this interest is not selfish. Destiny first made us, with our sister nations on the Hemisphere, joint heirs of European culture. Fate seems to compel us to assume the task of helping to maintain in the Western world a citadel wherein that civilization may be kept alive. The peace, the integrity, and the safety of the Americans must all be kept firm and serene.

53. In a period when it is sometimes said that free discussion is no longer compatible with national safety, may you by your deeds show the world that we of the United States are one people, of one mind, one spirit, one clear resolution, walking before God in the light of the living.

APPENDIX C
ARSENAL OF DEFENSE SPEECH

1. This is not a fireside chat on war. It is a talk on national security, because the nub of the whole purpose of your President is to keep you now, and your children later, and your grandchildren much later, out of a last-ditch war for preservation of American independence and all the things that American independence means to you and to me and to ours.

2. Tonight, in the presence of a world crisis, my mind goes back eight years to a night in the midst of a domestic crisis. It was a time when the wheels of American industry were grinding to a full stop, when the whole banking system of our country had ceased to function.

3. I well remember that while I sat in my study in the White House, preparing to talk with the people of the United States, I had before my eyes the picture of all those Americans with whom I was talking. I saw the workmen in the mills, the mines, and the factories; the girl behind the counter; the small shopkeeper; the farmer doing his spring plowing; the widows and the old men wondering about their life's savings.

4. I tried to convey to the great mass of American people what the banking crisis meant to them in their daily lives.

5. Tonight, I want to do the same thing, with the same people, in this new crisis which faces America.

6. We face this new crisis--this new threat to the security of our nation--with the same courage and realism.

7. Never before since Jamestown and Plymouth Rock has our American civilization been in such danger as now.

8. For, on September 27, 1940, by an agreement signed in Berlin, three powerful nations, two in Europe and one in Asia, joined themselves together in the threats that if the United States of America interfered with or blocked the expansion program of these three nations--a program aimed at world control--they would unite in ultimate action against the United States.

9. The Nazi masters of Germany have made it clear that they intend not only to dominate all life and thought in their own country, but also to enslave the whole of Europe, and then to use the resources of Europe to dominate the rest of the world.

10. It was only three weeks ago their leader stated this: "There are two worlds that stand opposed to each other." And then in defiant reply to his opponents, he said this: "Others are correct when they say: With this world we cannot ever reconcile ourselves . . . I can beat any other power in the world." So said the leader of the Nazis.

11. In other words, the Axis not merely admits but proclaims that there can be no ultimate peace between their philosophy of government and our philosophy of government.

12. In view of the nature of this undeniable threat, it can be asserted, properly and categorically, that the United States has no right or reason to encourage talk of peace until the day shall come when there is a clear intention on the part of the aggressor nations to abandon all thought of dominating or conquering the world.

13. At this moment, the forces of the states that are leagued against all peoples who live in freedom are being held away from our shores. The Germans and the Italians are being blocked on the other side of the Atlantic by the British, and by the Greeks, and by thousands of soldiers and sailors who were able to escape from subjugated countries. In Asia, the Japanese are being engaged by the Chinese nation in another great defense.

14. Some of our people like to believe that wars in Europe and in Asia are of no concern to us. But it is a matter of most vital concern to us that European and Asiatic war-makers should not gain control of the oceans which lead to this hemisphere.

15. One hundred and seventeen years ago the Monroe Doctrine was conceived by our Government as a measure of defense in the face of a threat against this hemisphere by an alliance in Continental Europe. Thereafter, we stood on guard in the Atlantic, with the British as neighbors. There was no treaty. There was no "unwritten agreement."

16. And yet, there was the feeling, proven correct by history, that we as neighbors could settle any disputes in a peaceful fashion. The fact is that during the whole of this time the Western Hemisphere has remained free from aggression from Europe or from Asia.

17. Does anyone seriously believe that we need to fear attack anywhere in the Americas while a free Britain remains our most powerful naval neighbor in the Atlantic? Does anyone seriously believe, on the other hand, that we could rest easy if the Axis powers were our neighbors there?

18. If Great Britain goes down, the Axis powers will control the continents of Europe, Asia, Africa, Australia, and the high seas, and they will be in a position to bring enormous military and naval resources against this hemisphere. It is no exaggeration to say that all of us, in all the Americas, would be living at the point of a gun--a gun loaded with explosive bullets, economic as well as military.

19. We should enter upon a new and terrible era in which the whole world, our hemisphere included, would be run by threats of brute force. To survive in such a world, we would have to convert ourselves permanently into a militaristic power on the basis of war economy.

20. Some of us like to believe that even if Great Britain falls, we are still safe, because of the broad expanse of the Atlantic and of the Pacific.

21. But the width of those oceans is not what it was in the days of clipper ships. At one point between Africa and Brazil the distance is less than from Washington to Denver, Colorado--five hours from the latest type of bomber--and at the north end of the Pacific Ocean America and Asia almost touch each other.

22. Even today we have planes that could fly from the British Isles to New England and back again without refueling, and remember that the range of the modern bomber is ever being increased.

23. During the past week many people in all parts of the nation have told me what they wanted to say tonight. Almost all of them expressed a courageous desire to hear the plain truth about the gravity of the situation. One telegram, however, expressed the attitude of the small minority who want to see no evil and hear no evil, even though they know in their hearts that evil exists. That telegram begged me not to tell again of the ease with which our American cities could be bombed by any hostile power which had gained bases in this Western hemisphere. The gist of that telegram was: "Please, Mr. President, don't frighten us by telling us the facts."

24. Frankly and definitely there is danger ahead--danger against which we must prepare. But we well know that we cannot escape danger, or the fear of danger, by crawling into bed and pulling the covers over our heads.

25. Some nations of Europe were bound by solemn non-intervention pacts with Germany. Other nations were assured by Germany that they need never fear invasion. Non-intervention pact or not, the fact remains that they were attacked, overrun, and thrown into the modern form of slavery at an hour's notice, or even without any notice at all. As an exiled leader of one of these nations said to me the other day, "The notice was a minus quantity. It was given to my Government two hours after German troops had poured into my country in a hundred places."

26. The fate of these nations tells us what it means to live at the point of a Nazi gun.

27. The Nazis have justified such actions by various pious frauds. One of these frauds is the claim that they are occupying a nation for the purpose of "restoring order." Another is that they are occupying or controlling a nation on the excuse that they are "protecting it" against the aggression of somebody else.

28. For example, Germany has said that she was occupying Belgium to save the Belgians from the British. Would she then hesitate to say to any South American country, "We are occupying you to protect you from aggression by the United States?"

29. Belgium today is being used as an invasion base against Britain, now fighting for its life. Any South American country, in Nazi hands, would always constitute a jumping-off place for German attack on any one of the other Republics of this hemisphere.

30. Analyze for yourselves the future of two other places even nearer to Germany if the Nazis won. Could Ireland hold out? Would Irish freedom be permitted as an amazing pet exception in a unfree world? Or the Islands of the Azores which still fly the flag of Portugal after five centuries? You and I think of Hawaii as an outpost of defense in the Pacific. And yet, the Azores are closer to our shores in the Atlantic than Hawaii is on the other side.

31. There are those who say that the Axis powers would never have any desire to attack the Western Hemisphere. That is the same dangerous form of wishful thinking which has destroyed the powers of resistance of so many conquered peoples. The plain facts are that the Nazis have proclaimed, time and again, that all other races are their inferiors and therefore subject to their orders. And most important of all, the vast resources and wealth of this

American Hemisphere constitute the most tempting loot in all the round world.

32. Let us no longer blind ourselves to the undeniable fact that the evil forces which have crushed, undermined, and corrupted so many others are already within our own gates. Your Government knows much about them and every day is ferreting them out.

33. Their secret emissaries are active in our own and in neighboring countries. They seek to stir up suspicion and dissension to cause internal strife. They try to turn capital against labor, and vice versa. They try to reawaken long slumbering racial and religious enmities which should have no place in this country. They are active in every group that promotes intolerance. They exploit for their own ends our natural abhorrence of war. These trouble-breeders have but one purpose. It is to divide our people into hostile groups and to destroy our unity and shatter our will to defend ourselves.

34. There are also American citizens, many of them in high places, who, unwittingly in most cases, are aiding and abetting the work of these agents. I do not charge these American citizens with being foreign agents. But I do charge them with doing exactly the kind of work that the dictators want done in the United States.

35. These people not only believe that we can save our own skins by shutting our eyes to the fate of other nations. Some of them go much further than that. They say that we can and should become the friends and even the partners of the Axis powers. Some of them even suggest that we should imitate the methods of the dictatorships. Americans never can and never will do that.

36. The experience of the past two years has proven beyond doubt that no nation can appease the Nazis. No man can tame a tiger into a kitten by stroking it. There can be no appeasement with ruthlessness. There can be no reasoning with an incendiary bomb. We know now that a nation can have peace with the Nazis only at the price of total surrender. Even the people of Italy have been forced to become accomplices of the Nazis; but at this moment they do not know how soon they will be embraced to death by their allies.

37. The American appeasers ignore the warning to be found in the fate of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and France. They tell you that the Axis powers are going to win anyway, that

are all this bloodshed in the world could be saved, and that the United States might just as well throw its influence into the scale of a dictated peace and get the best out of it that we can.

38. They call it a "negotiated peace." Nonsense! Is it a negotiated peace if a gang of outlaws surrounds your community and on threat of extermination makes you pay tribute to save your own skins?

39. Such a dictated peace would be no peace at all. It would be only another armistice, leading to the most gigantic armament race and the most devastating trade wars in all history. And in these contexts the Americans would offer the only real resistance to the Axis powers.

40. With all their vaunted efficiency, with all their parade of pious purpose in this war, there are still in their background the concentration camp and the servants of God in chains.

41. The history of recent years proves that shootings and chains and concentration camps are not simply the transient tools but the very altars of modern dictatorships. They may talk of a "new order" in the world, but what they have in mind is only a revival of the oldest and the worst tyranny. In that there is no liberty, no religion, no hope.

42. The proposed "new order" is the very opposite of a United States of Europe or a United States of Asia. It is not a Government based upon the consent of the governed. It is not a union of ordinary, self-respecting men and women to protect themselves and their freedom and their dignity from oppression. It is an unholy alliance of power and pelf to dominate and enslave the human race. The British people and their allies today are conducting an active war against this unholy alliance. Our own future security is greatly dependent on the outcome of that fight. Our ability to "keep out of war" is going to be affected by that outcome.

43. Thinking in terms of today and tomorrow, I make the direct statement to the American people that there is far less chance of the United States getting into war if we do all we can now to support the nations defending themselves against attack by the Nazis than if we acquiesce in their defeat, submit namely to an Axis victory, and wait our turn to be the object of attack in another war later on.

44. If we are to be completely honest with ourselves, we must admit that there is risk in any course we may take. But I deeply believe that the great majority of our people agree that the course that I advocate involves the least risk now and the greatest hope for world peace in the future.

45. The people of Europe who are defending themselves do not ask us to do their fighting. They ask us for the implements of war, the planes, the tanks, the guns, and the freighters which will enable them to fight for their liberty and for our security. Emphatically we must get these weapons to them in sufficient volume and quickly enough so that we and our children will be saved the agony and suffering of war which others have had to endure.

46. Let not the defeatists tell us that it is too late. It will never be earlier. Tomorrow will be later than today. Certain facts are self-evident.

47. In a military sense, Great Britain and the British empire are today the spearhead of resistance to world conquest. They are putting up a fight which will live forever in the story of human gallantry.

48. There is no demand for sending an American Expeditionary Force outside our own borders. There is no intention by any member of your Government to send such a force. You can, therefore, nail any talk about sending armies to Europe as deliberate untruth.

49. Our national policy is not directed toward war. Its sole purposes is to keep war away from our country and our people.

50. Democracy's fight against world conquest is being greatly aided, and must be more greatly aided, by the rearmament of the United States and by sending every ounce and every ton of munitions and supplies that we can possibly spare to help the defenders who are in the front lines. It is no more unneutral for us to do that than it is for Sweden, Russia, and other nations near Germany to send steel, ore, oil, and other war materials into Germany every day in the week.

51. We are planning our own defense with the utmost urgency; in its vast scale, we must integrate the war needs of Britain and the other free nations which are resisting aggression.

52. This is not a matter of sentiment or of controversial personal opinion. It is a matter of realistic, practical military policy, based on the advice of our military experts who are in close touch with existing warfare. These military and naval experts and the members of the Congress and the Administration have a single-minded purpose--the defense of the United States.

53. This nation is making a great effort to produce everything that is necessary in this emergency--and with all possible speed. This great effort requires great sacrifice.

54. I would ask no one to defend a democracy which in turn would not defend everyone in the nation against want and privation. The strength of this nation shall not be diluted by the failure of the Government to protect the economic well-being of its citizens.

55. If our capacity to produce is limited by machines, it must ever be remembered that these machines are operated by the skill and the stamina of the workers. As the Government is determined to protect the rights of the workers, so the nation has a right to expect that the men who man the machines will discharge their full responsibilities to the urgent needs of defense.

56. The worker possesses the same human dignity and is entitled to the same security of position as the engineer or the manager or the owner. For the workers provide the human power that turns out the destroyers, the airplanes, and the tanks.

57. The nation expects our defense industries to continue operation without interruption by strikes or lock-outs. It expects and insists that management and workers will reconcile their differences by voluntary or legal means to continue to produce the supplies that are so sorely needed.

58. And on the economic side of our great defense program, we are, as you know, bending every effort to maintain stability of prices and with that the stability of the cost of living.

59. Nine days ago I announced the setting up of a more effective organization to direct our gigantic efforts to increase the production of munitions. The appropriation of vast sums of money and a well-coordinated executive direction of our defense efforts are not in themselves enough. Guns, planes, ships, and many other things have to be built in the factories and arsenals of America.

They have to be produced by workers and managers and engineers with the aid of machines which in turn have to be built by hundreds of thousands of workers throughout the land.

60. In this great work there has been splendid cooperation between the Government and industry and labor, and I am very thankful.

61. American industrial genius, unmatched throughout the world in the solution of production problems, has been called upon to bring its resources and its talents into action. Manufactures of watches, farm implements, linotypes, cash registers, automobiles, sewing machines, lawn mowers and locomotives are now making fuses, bomb packing crates, telescope mounts, shells, pistols, and tanks.

62. But all our present efforts are not enough. We must have more ships, more guns, and more planes--more of everything. This can only be accomplished if we discard the notion of "business as usual." This job cannot be done merely by superimposing on the existing productive facilities the added requirements of the nation for defense.

63. Our defense efforts must not be blocked by those who fear the future consequences of surplus plant capacity. The possible consequences of failure of our defense efforts now are much more to be feared.

64. After the present needs of our defenses are past, a proper handling of the country's peace-time needs will require all the new productive capacity--if not more.

65. No pessimistic policy about the future of American shall delay the immediate expansion of those industries essential to defense. We need them.

66. I want to make it clear that it is the purpose of the nation to build now with all possible speed every machine, every arsenal, and every factory that we need to manufacture our defense material. We have the men, the skill, the wealth, and above all, the will.

67. I am confident that if and when production of consumer or luxury goods in certain industries requires the use of machines and raw materials that are essential for defense purposes, then such production must yield, and will gladly yield, to our primary and compelling purpose.

68. I appeal to the owners of plants, to the managers, to the workers, and to our own Government employees to put every ounce of effort into producing these munitions swiftly and without stint. With this appeal I give you the pledge that all of us who are officers of your Government will devote ourselves to the same wholehearted extent to the great task that lies ahead.

69. As planes and ships and guns and shells are produced, your Government, with its defense experts, can then determine how best to use them to defend this hemisphere. The decision as to how much shall be sent abroad and how much shall remain at home must be made on the basis of our over-all military necessities.

70. We must be the great arsenal of democracy. For us this is an emergency as serious as war itself. We must apply ourselves to our task with the same resolution, the same sense of urgency, and the same spirit of patriotism and sacrifice as we would show were we at war.

71. We have furnished the British great material support and we will furnish far more in the future.

72. There will be no "bottlenecks" in our determination to aid Great Britain. No dictator and no combination of dictators will weaken that determination by threats of how they will construe that determination.

73. The British have received invaluable military support from the heroic Greek army and from the forces of all the governments in exile. Their strength is growing. It is the strength of men and women who value their freedom more highly than they value their lives.

74. I believe that the Axis powers are not going to win this war. I base that belief on the latest and best information.

75. We have no excuse for defeatism. We have every good reason for hope--hope for peace and hope for the defense of our civilization and for the building of a better civilization in the future.

76. I have the profound conviction that the American people are now determined to put forth a mightier effort than they have ever yet made to increase our production of all the implements of defense, to meet the threat to our democratic faith.

77. As President of the United States, I call for that national effort. I call for it in the name of this nation which we love and honor and which we are privileged and proud to serve. I call upon our people with absolute confidence that our common cause will greatly succeed.

APPENDIX D
FOUR FREEDOMS SPEECH

1. I address you, the Members of the Seventy-seventh Congress, at a moment unprecedented in the history of the Union. I use the word "unprecedented," because at no previous time has American security been as seriously threatened from without as it is today.

2. Since the permanent formation of our Government under the Constitution, in 1789, most of the periods of crisis in our history have related to our domestic affairs. Fortunately, only one of these--the four-year War Between the States--every threatened our national unity. Today, thank God, one hundred and thirty million Americans, in forty-eight states, have forgotten points of the compass in our national unity.

3. It is true that prior to 1914 the United States often had been disturbed by event in other continents. We had even engaged in two wars with European nations and in a number of undeclared wars in the West Indies, in the Mediterranean, and the Pacific for the maintenance of American rights and for the principles of peaceful commerce. But in no case had a serious threat been raised against our national safety or our continued independence.

4. What I seek to convey is the historic truth that the United States as a nation has at all times maintained clear, definite opposition to any attempt to lock us in behind an ancient Chinese wall while the procession of civilization went past. Today, thinking of our children and of their children, we oppose enforced isolation for ourselves or for any other part of the Americas.

5. That determination of ours, extending over all these years, was proved, for example, during the quarter century of wars following the French Revolution.

6. While the Napoleonic struggles did threaten interests of the United States because of the French foothold in the West Indies and Louisiana, and while we engaged in the War of 1812 to vindicate our right to peaceful trade, it is nevertheless clear that neither France nor Great Britain, nor any other nation, was aiming at domination of the whole world.

7. In like fashion from 1815 to 1914--ninety-nine years--no single war in Europe or in Asia constituted a real threat against our future or against the future of any other American nation.

8. Except in the Maximilian interlude in Mexico, no foreign power sought to establish itself in this Hemisphere; and the strength of the British fleet in the Atlantic has been a friendly strength. It is still a friendly strength.

9. Even when the World War broke out in 1914, it seemed to contain only small threat to danger to our own American future. But, as time went on, the American people began to visualize what the downfall of democratic nations might mean to our own democracy.

10. We need not overemphasize imperfections in the Peace of Versailles. We need not harp on failure of the democracies to deal with problems of world reconstruction. We should remember that the Peace of 1919 was far less unjust than the kind of "pacification" which began even before Munich and which is being carried on under the new order of tyranny that seeks to spread over every continent today. The American people have unalterably set their faces against that tyranny.

11. Every realist knows that the democratic way of life is at this moment being directly assailed in every part of the world--assailed either by arms or by secret spreading of poisonous propaganda by those who seek to destroy unity and promote discord in nations that are still at peace.

12. During sixteen long months this assault has blotted out the whole pattern of democratic life in an appalling number of independent nations, great and small. The assailants are still on the march, threatening other nations, great and small.

13. Therefore, as your President, performing my constitutional duty to "give to the Congress information of the state of the Union," I find it, unhappily, necessary to report that the future and the safety of our country and of our democracy are overwhelmingly involved in events far beyond our borders.

14. Armed defense of democratic existence is now being gallantly waged in four continents. If that defense fails, all the population and all the resources of Europe, Asia, Africa, and Australia will be dominated by the conquerors. Let us remember that the total of those populations and their resources in those four continents greatly exceeds the sum total of the population and the resources of the whole of the Western Hemisphere--many times over.

15. In times like these it is immature--and incidentally, untrue--for anybody to brag that an unprepared America, single-handed, and with one hand tied behind its back, can hold off the whole world.

16. No realistic American can expect from a dictator's peace international generosity, or return of true independence, or world disarmament, or freedom of expression, or freedom of religion, or even good business.

17. Such a peace would bring no security for us or for our neighbors. "Those, who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty or safety."

18. As a nation, we may take pride in the fact that we are softhearted; but we cannot afford to be soft-headed.

19. We must always be wary of those who with sounding brass and tinkling cymbal preach the "ism" of appeasement.

20. We must especially beware of that small group of selfish men who would clip the wings of the American eagle in order to feather their own nests.

21. I have recently pointed out how quickly the tempo of modern warfare could bring into our very midst the physical attack which we must eventually expect if the dictator nations win this war.

22. There is much loose talk of our immunity from immediate and direct invasion from across the seas. Obviously, as long as the British Navy retains its power, no such danger exists. Even if there were no British Navy, it is not probable that any enemy would be stupid enough to attack us by landing troops in the United States from across thousands of miles of ocean until it had acquired strategic bases from which to operate.

23. But we learn much from the lessons of the past years in Europe--particularly the lesson of Norway, whose essential seaports were captured by treachery and surprise built up over a series of years.

24. The first phase of the invasion of this Hemisphere would not be the landing of regular troops. The necessary strategic points would be occupied by secret agents and their dupes--and great numbers of them are already here and in Latin America.

25. As long as the aggressor nations maintain the offensive, they--not we--will choose the time and the place and the method of their attack.

26. That is why the future of all the American Republics is today in serious danger.

27. That is why this annual message to the Congress is unique in our history.

28. That is why every member of the Executive Branch of the Government and every member of the Congress faces great responsibility and great accountability.

29. The need of the moment is that our actions and our policy should be devoted primarily--almost exclusively--to meeting this foreign peril. For all our domestic problems are now a part of the great emergency.

30. Just as our national policy in internal affairs has been based upon a decent respect for the rights and the dignity of all our fellow man within our gates, so our national policy in foreign affairs has been based on a decent respect for the right and dignity of all nations, large and small. And the justice or morality must and will win in the end.

31. Our national policy is this: First, by an impressive expression of the public will and without regard to partisanship we are committed to all-inclusive national defense. Second, by an impressive expression of the public will and without regard to partisanship, we are committed to full support of all those resolute people everywhere who are resisting aggression and are thereby keeping war away from our Hemisphere. By this support, we express our determination that the democratic cause shall prevail; and we strengthen the defense and the security of our own nation.

33. Third, by an impressive expression of the public will and without regard to partisanship, we are committed to the proposition that principles of morality and considerations for our own security will never permit us to acquiesce in a peace dictated by aggressors and sponsored by appeasers. We know that enduring peace cannot be bought at the cost of other people's freedom.

34. In the recent national election there was no substantial difference between the two great parties in respect to that national policy. No issue was fought out on this line before the American electorate. Today it is

abundantly evident that American citizens everywhere are demanding and supporting speedy and complete action in recognition of obvious danger.

35. Therefore, the immediate need is a swift and driving increase in our armament production.

36. Leaders of industry and labor have responded to our summons. Goals of speed have been set. In some cases these goals are being reached ahead of time; in some cases we are on schedule; in other cases there are slight but not serious delays; and in some cases--and I am sorry to say very important cases--we are all concerned by the slowness of the accomplishment of our plans.

37. The Army and Navy, however, have made substantial progress during the past year. Actual experience is improving and speeding up our methods of production with every passing day. And today's best is not good enough for tomorrow.

38. I am not satisfied with the progress made thus far made. The men in charge of the program represent the best in training, in ability, and in patriotism. They are not satisfied with the progress thus far made. None of us will be satisfied with the progress thus far made. None of us will be satisfied until the job is done.

39. No matter whether the original goal was set too high or too low, our objective is quicker and better results. To give you two illustrations: we are behind schedule in turning out finished airplanes; we are working day and night to solve the innumerable problems and to catch up.

40. We are ahead of schedule in building warships but we are working to get even further ahead of that schedule.

41. To change a whole nation from a basis of peacetime production of implements of peace to a basis of wartime production of implements of war is no small task. And the greatest difficulty comes at the beginning of the program, when new tools, new plant facilities, new assembly lines, and new shipways must first be constructed before the actual material begins to flow steadily and speedily from them.

42. The Congress, of course, must rightly keep itself informed at all times of the progress of the program. However, there is certain information, as the Congress itself will readily recognize, which, in the interests of our own security and those of the nations that we are supporting, must of needs be kept in confidence.

43. New circumstances are constantly begetting new needs for our safety. I shall ask this Congress for greatly increased new appropriations to carry on what we have begun.

44. I also ask this Congress for authority and for funds sufficient to manufacture additional munitions and war supplies of many kinds, to be turned over to those nations which are now in actual war with aggressor nations.

45. Our most useful and immediate role is to act as an arsenal for them as well as for ourselves. They do not need manpower, but they do need billions of dollars worth of the weapons of defense.

46. The time is near when they will not be able to pay for them all in ready cash. We cannot, and we will not, tell them that they must surrender, merely because of present inability to pay for the weapons which we know they must have.

47. I do not recommend that we make them a loan of dollars with which to pay for these weapons--a loan to be repaid in dollars.

48. I recommend that we make it possible for those nations to continue to obtain war materials in the United States, fitting their orders into our own program. Nearly all their material would, if the time ever came, be useful for our own defense.

49. Taking counsel of expert military and naval authorities, considering what is best for our own security, we are free to decide how much should be kept here and how much should be sent abroad to our friends who by their determined and heroic resistance are giving us time in which to make ready our own defense.

50. For what we send abroad, we shall be repaid within a reasonable time following the close of hostilities, in similar materials, or, at our option, in other goods of many kinds, which they can produce and which we need.

51. Let us say to the democracies: "We Americans are vitally concerned in your defense of freedom. We are putting forth our energies, our resources, and our organizing powers to give you the strength to regain and maintain a free world. We shall send you, in ever-increasing numbers, ships, planes, tanks, and guns. This is our purpose and our pledge.

52. In fulfillment of this purpose we will not be intimidated by the threats of dictators that they will regard as a breach of international law or as an act of war our aid to the democracies which dare to resist their aggression. Such aid is not an act of war, even if a dictator should unilaterally proclaim it so to be.

53. When the dictators, if the dictators, are ready to make war upon us, they will not wait for an act of war on our part. They did not wait for Norway or Belgium or the Netherlands to commit an act of war.

54. Their only interest is in a new one-way international law, which lacks mutuality in its observance, and, therefore, becomes an instrument of oppression.

55. The happiness of future generations of Americans may well depend upon how effective and how immediate we can make our aid felt. No one can tell the exact character of the emergency situations that we may be called upon to meet. The nation's hands must not be tied when the nation's life is in danger.

56. We must all prepare to make the sacrifices that the emergency--almost as serious as war itself--demands. Whatever stands in the way of speed and efficiency in defense preparations must give way to the national need.

57. A free nation has the right to expect full cooperation from all groups. A free nation has the right to look to the leaders of business, of labor, and of agriculture to take the lead in stimulating effort, not among other groups but within their own groups.

58. The best way of dealing with the few slackers or trouble makers in our midst is, first, to shame them by patriotic example, and, if that fails, to use the sovereignty of Government so save Government.

59. As men do not live by bread alone, they do not fight by armaments alone. Those who man our defenses, and those behind them who build our defenses, must have the stamina and the courage which come from unshakable belief in

the manner of life which they are defending. The mighty action that we are calling for cannot be based on a disregard of all things worth fighting for.

60. The nation takes great satisfaction and much strength from the things which have been done to make its people conscious of their individual stake in the preservation of democratic life in America. Those things have toughened the fiber of our people, renewed their faith, and strengthened their devotion to the institutions we make ready to protect.

61. Certainly this is no time for any of us to stop thinking about the social and economic problems which are the root cause of the social revolution which is today a supreme factor in the world.

62. For there is nothing mysterious about the foundations of a healthy and strong democracy. The basic things expected by our people of their political and economic systems are simple. They are:

Equality of opportunity for youth and for others.
 Jobs for those who can work.
 Security for those who need it.
 The ending of special privilege for the few.
 The preservation of civil liberties for all.
 The enjoyment of the fruits of scientific progress in a wider and constantly rising standard of living.

63. These are the simple, basic things that must never be lost sight of in the turmoil and unbelievable complexity of our modern world. The inner and abiding strength of our economic and political systems is dependent upon the degree to which they fulfill these expectations.

64. Many subjects connected with our social economy call for immediate improvement.

As examples:

We should bring more citizens under the coverage of old-age pensions and unemployment insurance.

We should widen the opportunities for adequate medical care.

We should plan a better system by which persons deserving or needing gainful employment may obtain it.

I have called for personal sacrifice. I am assured of the willingness of almost all Americans to respond to that call.

65. A part of the sacrifice means the payment of more money in taxes. In my Budget Message I shall recommend that a greater portion of this great defense program be paid for from taxation than we are paying today. No person should try, or be allowed, to get rich out of this program; and the principle of tax payments in accordance with ability to pay should be constantly before our eyes to guide our legislation.

66. If the Congress maintains these principles, the voters, putting patriotism ahead of pocketbooks, will give you their applause.

67. In the future days, which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a world founded upon four essential human freedoms.

68. The first is freedom of speech and expression everywhere in the world.

69. The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way everywhere in the world.

70. The third is freedom from want which--translated into world terms--means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants everywhere in the world.

71. The fourth is freedom from fear which--translated into world terms--means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor anywhere in the world.

72. That is no vision of a distant millennium. It is a definite basis for a kind of world attainable in our own time and generation. That kind of world is the very antithesis of the so-called new order of tyranny which the dictators seek to create with the crash of a bomb.

73. To that new order we oppose the greater conception--the moral order. A good society is able to face schemes of world domination and foreign revolutions alike without fear.

74. Since the beginning of our American history, we have been engaged in change--in a perpetual peaceful revolution--a revolution which goes on steadily, quietly adjusting itself to changing conditions--without the

concentration camp or the quick-lime in the ditch. The world order which we seek is the cooperation of free countries, working together in a friendly, civilized society.

75. This nation has placed its destiny in the hands and heads and hearts of its millions of free men and women, and its faith in freedom under the guidance of God. Freedom means the supremacy of human rights everywhere. Our support goes to those who struggle to gain those rights or keep them. Our strength is our unity of purpose.

76. To that high concept there can be no end save victory.

APPENDIX E
FREEDOM OF THE SEAS SPEECH

1. The Navy Department of the United States has reported to me that on the morning of September 4th, the United States destroyer Greer, proceeding in full daylight toward Iceland, had reached a point southeast of Greenland. She was carrying American mail to Iceland. She was flying the American flag. Her identity as an American ship was unmistakable.

2. She was then and there attacked by a submarine. Germany admits that it was a German submarine. The submarine deliberately fired a torpedo at the Greer, followed later by another torpedo attack. In spite of what Hitler's propaganda bureau has invented, and in spite of what an American obstructionist organization may prefer to believe, I tell you the blunt fact that the German submarine fired first upon this American destroyer without warning, and with deliberate design to sink her.

3. Our destroyer, at the time, was in waters which the Government of the United States had declared to be waters of self-defense--surrounding outposts of American protection in the Atlantic.

4. In the North of the Atlantic, outposts have been established by us in Iceland, in Greenland, in Labrador, and in Newfoundland. Through these waters there pass many ships of many flags. They bear food and other supplies to civilians; they bear material of war, for which the people of the United States are spending billions of dollars, and which, by Congressional action, they have declared to be essential for the defense of our own land.

5. The United States destroyer, when attacked, was proceeding on a legitimate mission.

6. If the destroyer was visible to the submarine when the torpedo was fired, then the attack was a deliberate attempt by the Nazis to sink a clearly identified American warship. On the other hand, if the submarine was beneath the surface of the sea and, with the aid of its listening devices, fired in the direction of the sound of the American destroyer without even taking the trouble to learn its identity--as the official German communique would indicate--then the attack was even more outrageous. For it indicates a policy of indiscriminate violence against any vessel sailing the seas--belligerent or non-belligerent.

7. This was piracy--piracy legally and morally. It was not the first nor the last act of piracy which the Nazi Government has committed against the American flag in this war. For attack has followed attack.

8. A few months ago an American flag merchant ship, the Robin Moor, was sunk by a Nazi submarine in the middle of the South Atlantic, under circumstances violating long-established international law and violating every principle of humanity. The passengers and the crew were forced into open boats hundreds of miles from land, in direct violation of international agreements signed by nearly all nations including the Government of Germany. No apology, no allegation of mistake, no offer of reparations has come from the Nazi Government.

9. In July, 1941, an American battleship in North American waters was followed by a submarine which for a long time sought to maneuver itself into a position of attack. The periscope of the submarine was clearly seen. No British or American submarines were within hundreds of miles of this spot at the time, so the nationality of the submarine is clear.

10. Five days ago a United States Navy on patrol picked up three survivors of an American-owned ship operating under the flag of our Republic of Panama--the S.S. Sessa. On August 17th, she had been first torpedoed without warning, and then shelled, near Greenland, while carrying civilian supplies to Iceland. It is feared that the other members of her crew have been drowned. In view of the established presence of German submarines in this vicinity, there can be no reasonable doubt as to the identify of the flag of the attacker.

11. Five days ago, another United States merchant ship, the Steel Seafarer, was sunk by a German aircraft in the Red Sea two hundred and twenty miles south of Suez. She was bound for an Egyptian port.

12. So four of the vessels sunk or attacked flew the American flag and were clearly identifiable. Two of these ships were warships of the American Navy. In the fifth case, the vessel sunk clearly carried the flag of our sister Republic of Panama.

13. In the face of all this, we Americans are keeping our feet on the ground. Our type of democratic civilization has outgrown the thought of feeling compelled to fight some other nation by reason of any single piratical attack on one of our ships. We are not becoming hysterical or losing our sense of proportion. Therefore, what I am thinking and saying tonight does not relate to any isolated episode.

14. Instead, we Americans are taking a long-range point of view in regard to certain fundamentals and to a series of events on land and on sea which must be considered as a whole--as a part of a world pattern.

15. It would be unworthy of a great Nation to exaggerate an isolated incident, or to become inflamed by some one act of violence. But it would be inexcusable folly to minimize such incidents in the face of evidence which makes it clear that the incident is not isolated, but is part of a general plan.

16. The important truth is that these acts of international lawlessness are a manifestation of a design which has been made clear to the American people for a long time. It is the Nazi design to abolish the freedom of the seas, and to acquire absolute control and domination of these seas for themselves.

17. For with control of the seas in their own hands, the way can obviously become clear for their next step: domination of the United States--domination of the Western Hemisphere by force of arms. Under Nazi control of the seas, no merchant ship of the United States or of any other American Republic would be free to carry on any peaceful commerce, except by the condescending grace of this foreign and tyrannical power. The Atlantic Ocean which has been, and which should always be, a free and friendly highway for us would then become a deadly menace to the commerce of the United States, to the coasts of the United States, and even to the inland cities of the United States.

18. The Hitler Government, in defiance of the laws of the sea, and in defiance of the recognized rights of all other Nations, has presumed to declare, on paper, that great areas of the seas--even including a vast expanse lying in the Western Hemisphere--are to be closed, and that no ships may enter them for any purpose, except at peril of being sunk. Actually they are sinking ships at will and without warning in widely separated areas both within and far outside of these far-flung pretended zones.

19. This Nazi attempt to seize control of the oceans is but a counterpart of the Nazi plots now being carried on throughout the Western Hemisphere--all designed toward the same end. For Hitler's advance guards--not only his avowed agents but also his dupes among us--have sought to make ready for him footholds and bridgeheads in the New World, to be used as soon as he has gained control of the oceans.

20. His intrigues, his plots, his machinations, his sabotage in this New World are all known to the Government of the United States. Conspiracy has followed conspiracy.

21. For example, last year a plot to seize the Government of Uruguay was smashed by the prompt action of that country, which was supported in full by her American neighbors. A like plot was then hatching in Argentina, and that Government has carefully and wisely blocked it at every point. More recently, an endeavor was made to subvert the Government of Bolivia. And within the past few weeks the discovery was made of secret air landing fields in Columbia, within easy range of the Panama Canal. I could multiply instance upon instance.

22. To be ultimately successful in world mastery, Hitler knows that he must get control of the seas. He must first destroy the bridge of ships which we are building across the Atlantic and over which we shall continue to roll the implements of war to help destroy him, to destroy all his works in the end. He must wipe out our patrol on sea and in the air if he is to do it. He must silence the British Navy.

23. I think it must be explained over and over again to people who like to think of the United States Navy as an invincible protection, that this can be true only if the British Navy survives. And that, my friends, is simple arithmetic.

24. For if the world outside of the Americas falls under Axis domination, the shipbuilding facilities which the Axis powers would then possess in all of Europe, in the British Isles, and in the Far East would be much greater than all the shipbuilding facilities and potentialities of all of the Americas--not only greater, but two or three times greater--enough to win. Even if the United States threw all its resources into such a situation, seeking to double and even redouble the size of our Navy, the Axis powers, in control of the rest of the world, would have the manpower and the physical resources to outbuild us several times over.

25. It is time for all Americans, Americans of all the Americas, to stop being deluded by the romantic notion that the Americans can go on living happily and peacefully in a Nazi-dominated world.

26. Generation after generation, American has battled for the general policy of the freedom of the seas. And that policy is a very simple one--but a basic, fundamental one. It means that no nation has the right to make the broad oceans of the world at great distances from the actual theatre of land war unsafe for the commerce of others.

27. That has been our policy, proved time and time again, in all our history.

28. Our policy has applied from the earliest days of the Republic--and still applies--not merely to the Atlantic but to the Pacific and to all other oceans as well.

29. Unrestricted submarine warfare in 1941 constitutes a defiance--an act of aggression--against that historic American policy. It is now clear that Hitler has begun his campaign to control the seas by ruthless force and by wiping out every vestige of international law, every vestige of humanity. His intention has been made clear. The American people can have no further illusions about it.

30. No tender whisperings of appeasers that Hitler is not interested in the Western Hemisphere, no soporific lullabies that a wide ocean protects us from him--can long have any effect on the hard-headed, far-sighted, and realistic American people.

31. Because of these episodes, because of the movements and operations of German warships, and because of the clear, repeated proof that the present Government of Germany has no respect for treaties or for international law, that it has no decent attitude toward neutral Nations or human life, we Americans are now face-to-face not with abstract theories but with cruel, relentless facts.

32. This attack on the Greer was no localized military operation in the North Atlantic. This was no mere episode in a struggle between two nations. This was one determined step toward creating a permanent world system based on force, on terror, and on murder.

33. And I am sure that even now the Nazis are waiting to see whether the United States will by silence give them the green light to go ahead on this path of destruction.

34. The Nazi danger to our Western world has long ceased to be a mere possibility. The danger is here now, not only from a military enemy but from an enemy of all law, all liberty, all morality, and all religion.

35. There has now come a time when you and I must see the cold, inexorable necessity of saying to these inhuman, unrestrained seekers of world conquest and permanent world domination by the sword: "You seek to throw our children and our children's children into your form of terrorism and slavery. You have now attacked our own safety. You shall go no further."

36. Normal practices of diplomacy--note writing--are of no possible use in dealing with international outlaws who sink our ships and kill our citizens.

37. One peaceful nation after another has met disaster because each refused to look the Nazi danger squarely in the eye until it actually had them by the throat.

38. The United States will not make that fatal mistake.

39. No act of violence, no act of intimidation will keep us from maintaining intact two bulwarks of American defense: First, our line of supply of material to the enemies of Hitler; and second, the freedom of our shipping on legitimate business.

40. No matter what it takes, no matter what it costs, we will keep open the line of legitimate commerce in these defensive waters.

41. We have sought no shooting war with Hitler. We do not seek it now. But neither do we want peace so much that we are willing to pay for it by permitting him to attack our naval and merchant ships while they are on legitimate business.

42. I assume that the German leaders are not deeply concerned, tonight or any other time, by what we Americans or the American Government say or publish about them. We cannot bring about the downfall of Nazism by the use of long-range invective.

43. But when you see a rattlesnake posed to strike, you do not wait until he has struck before you crush him.

44. These Nazi submarines and raiders are the rattlesnakes of the Atlantic. They are a menace to the free pathways of the high seas. They are a challenge to our sovereignty. They hammer at our most precious rights when they attack ships of the American flag, symbols of our independence, our freedom, and our very life.

45. It is clear to all Americans that the time has come when the Americans themselves must now be defended. A continuation of attacks in our own waters, or in waters that could be used for further and greater attacks on us, will inevitably weaken our American ability to repel Hitlerism.

46. Do not let us be hair-splitters. Let us not ask ourselves whether the Americans should begin to defend themselves after the first attack, or the fifth attack, or the tenth attack, or the twentieth attack.

47. The time for active defense is now.

48. Do not let us split hairs. Let us not say, "We will only defend ourselves if the torpedo succeeds in getting home, or if the crew and the passengers are drowned."

49. This is the time for prevention of attack. If submarines or raiders attack in distant waters, they can attack equally well within sight of our own shores. Their very presence in any waters which America deems vital to its defense constitutes an attack.

50. In the waters which we deem necessary for our defense, American naval vessels and American planes will no longer wait until Axis submarines lurking under the water, or Axis raiders on the surface of the sea, strike their deadly blow first.

51. Upon our naval and air patrol now operating in larger number over a vast expanse of the Atlantic Ocean falls the duty of maintaining the American policy of freedom of the seas now. That means, very simply, very clearly, that our patrolling vessels and planes will protect all merchant ships--not only American ships but ships of any flag--engaged in commerce in our defensive waters. They will protect them from submarines; they will protect them from surface raiders.

52. This situation is not new. The second President of the United States, John Adams, ordered the United States Navy to clean out European privateers and European ships of war which were infesting the Caribbean and South American waters, destroying American commerce.

53. The third President of the United States, Thomas Jefferson, ordered the United States Navy to end the attacks being made upon American and other ships by the corsairs of the Nations of North Africa.

54. My obligation as President is historic; it is clear. It is inescapable.

55. It is no act of war on our part when we decide to protect the seas that are vital to American defense. The aggression is not ours. Ours is solely defense.

56. But let this warning be clear. From now on, if German or Italian Vessels of war enter the waters, the protection of which is necessary for American defense, they do so at their own peril.

57. The orders which I have given as Commander in Chief of the United States Army and Navy are to carry out that policy at once.

58. The sole responsibility rests upon Germany. There will be no shooting unless Germany continues to seek it.

59. That is my obvious duty in this crisis. That is the clear right of this sovereign nation. This is the only step possible, if we would keep tight the wall of defense which we are pledged to maintain around this Western Hemisphere.

60. I have no illusions about the gravity of this step. I have not taken it hurriedly or lightly. It is the result of months and months of constant thought and anxiety and prayer. In the protection of your nation and mine it cannot be avoided.

61. The American people have faced other grave crises in their history--with American courage and with American resolution. They will do no less today.

62. They know the actualities of the attacks upon us. They know the necessities of a bold defense against these attacks. They know that the times call for clear heads and fearless hearts.

63. And with that inner strength that comes to a free people conscious of their duty, and conscious of the righteousness of what they do, they will--with Divine help and guidance--stand their ground against this latest assault upon their democracy, their sovereignty, and their freedom.

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