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NATIONAL MONARCHY AND NORWAY, 1898-1905:
A STUDY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
MODERN NORWEGIAN MONARCHY

DISSERTATION

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By

Terje Ivan Leiren, B. A., M. A.

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In 1905 the modern Norwegian monarchy was established after the dissolution of the union between Norway and Sweden, a union which had existed since 1814. For the greatest part of the ninety-one years, conflict and controversy dominated relations between the two countries, occasionally threatening the peace in Scandinavia.

In 1898, building on Norwegian popular and historical traditions, Sigurd Ibsen formulated a proposal which was intended to overcome the hostility of Sweden and to gain the support of monarchical Europe while leading to a satisfactory dissolution of the union. In addition, the proposal outlined a method of procedure which was aimed at setting future policy for separation. Following an introductory discussion on the background of the union, the study examines Ibsen's ideas as they were presented in 1898 and the reaction to them, positive and negative.

It is significant that Ibsen's views became ingrained in Norwegian thinking to such an extent that by 1905, when the union was finally dissolved, it was his scenario which gave the government of Christian Michelsen its basis for

developing a program of independence. Integral in that program was the concept of a national monarchy, the quintessence of Ibsen's views in 1898. This, in turn, served as the justification for the offer to the king of Norway-Sweden to allow a son of his dynasty to assume the independent Norwegian throne--the so-called Bernadotte candidacy.

The study then focuses on the Bernadotte candidacy as the practical expression of a Norwegian desire for a national monarchy. Reaction to the candidacy is analyzed and, although it proved unsuccessful, the strength of the idea is again evident when the government shifted its focus to the secondary candidacy of Denmark's Prince Carl. During the debate over the candidates for the throne, the underlying theme which developed was the question of Norway's form of government--monarchy or republic.

Both republicans and monarchists argued from a nationalistic outlook, with monarchists emphasizing the belief that a monarchy could be national and best answered the historical traditions and needs of the country. In doing so they were, often unconsciously, reaffirming Ibsen's arguments of 1898 in a practical setting dictated by the needs of 1905. During the debate over Norway's form of government the importance of national monarchy as a concept for monarchists and republicans alike was repeatedly affirmed.

With the plebiscite of 12-13 November 1905, the Norwegian people demonstrated that they too had been influenced significantly by the practical and idealistic character of national monarchy by choosing to institute a monarchical form of government. Further, the vote represented a reaffirmation of Ibsen's ideas as well as overwhelming confidence in the Michelsen government; the study speculates on some of the intangibles which may also have affected the final vote.

The monarchy which was instituted in November 1905 gained widespread support among Norwegians because it stood as a symbol for their unity, not only after the divisions of 1905, but with their historical past. Although republicans acknowledged their support for monarchy after the plebiscite, they, nevertheless, attacked it. The attack, however, was on the form, not the essence, of monarchy. The modern Norwegian monarchy, established in 1905, owes a significant debt to the arguments of Sigurd Ibsen and the appeal he gave the concept of national monarchy. Without both the monarchy would be largely inconceivable today.

PREFACE

Several years ago Michael Roberts, the British expert on Swedish history, wrote that "few fields of historical research have been more neglected by English scholars than the history of Scandinavia."¹ It remains true even though Scandinavian historians recently began publishing The Scandinavian Journal of History, thereby opening the historiography and history of the North to an English-reading public. Whether this will lead to an increased interest in Scandinavia is uncertain; for the time being the popular assumptions of Scandinavian history as merely Vikings and Quislings remain all too prominent.

This study is an investigation of the idea of national monarchy in Norway during the final years of the Norwegian-Swedish union. It is an attempt to discover the character, attraction and evolution of an idea which appeared to play a significant role in the dissolution in 1905; it is however, not a history of that dissolution. As recently as 3 May 1976, Michael Demarest, a senior editor of Time magazine, writing on the enduring allure of monarchy, said that: ". . .the magic persists, though democratic Kings and Queens often wield less

¹Michael Roberts, "Introduction," in Ingvar Andersson, A History of Sweden (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1968), p. xii.

executive power than a welfare caseworker."² It is ironic perhaps that three quarters of a century after the Norwegians debated the utility of national monarchy, a reporter of an American news magazine should confess that "the magic persists."³ Romanticized as this view may be, a similar thought may have occurred to Sigurd Ibsen when he introduced the idea of national monarchy into Norwegian popular consciousness in 1898. At any rate it became an integral part of Norwegian thinking which, when combined with the realistic elements of the concept, became a significant aspect of the Norwegian attempt to establish a separate existence in 1905. In 1905 the idea of national monarchy, surprisingly, was linked by the Norwegian government with an offer to the Swedish king that he allow a son of his dynasty to accept the throne of an independent Norway. It is the purpose of this study to investigate Ibsen's ideas as formulated in 1898, their evolution through developments of 1905 and their significance in the subsequent establishment of the modern Norwegian monarchy in November of that year.

²[Michael Demarest] "Royalty: The Allure Endures," Time, 3 May 1976, p. 12.

³The best-selling Norwegian book in 1977 was the monarchical study by Kjell Arnljot Wig, Kongen ser tilbake (Oslo: J. W. Cappelens Forlag, 1977), which prompted a Norwegian newspaper to write that this should ". . . indicate that no immediate danger exists for monarchy in the country." See "Kongeboka og de erotiske folkeeventyrene på topp," Arbeiderbladet, 26 November 1977, p. 13.

This study is based on original sources, published and unpublished. The immense collection by the late Norwegian historian, Jacob S. Worm-Müller, at the University library of Oslo, is used extensively. This collection contains numerous original documents, photo-copies of many documents, notes, memoirs, letters and diaries of the principals. All the available material has been examined with special emphasis on that which relates to the idea of national monarchy and its subsequent evolution. The University library, a central archival depository for Norway, also contains the papers of Fridtjof Nansen and these have been examined as have the papers of the Norwegian Labor Party in its archives--Arbeiderbevegelsens arkiv in Oslo. Thanks to special permission granted from the Royal Palace in Oslo, the surviving papers of King Haakon VII were examined, although these were, unfortunately, of less specific value for this study. Vincent Bommen, the private secretary of His Majesty King Olav V, told me that King Haakon probably destroyed many papers near the end of his life. We can, nevertheless, eagerly await a biography of Haakon by Tim Greve, the editor of Verdens Gang and former Director of the Nobel Institute in Oslo.

Of the published sources, the diaries of the principles range the political spectrum and are an integral part of this study. Johan Castberg's diary reveals a man as emotional as he is politically aware. Jacob Schønning's diary was written while he was in and out of government and contains valuable

insights written in a fascinating and pleasing style. The only members of the 1905 government who kept diaries were Edvard Hagerup Bull and Harald Bothner. Both are used extensively, but Hagerup Bull reveals a sensitivity and a more perceptive understanding which he recorded accordingly. Bothner's diary is unpublished and was examined in Riksarkivet (the National archives) in Oslo. The diary of Thore Myrvang in the Worm-Müller papers is similarly unpublished and has been used extensively for the views of an anti-monarchical Liberal politician.

Perhaps the major published source of primary material is that of J. V. Heiberg, the bureau chief of the Department of Education and Ecclesiastical Affairs, which was published in 1906 under the title Unionens Opløsning 1905 (The Dissolution of the Union 1905). The stenographic notes from the secret debates in the Storting in 1905 were finally published in 1951 as De stenografiske referater fra de Hemmelige Møter i Stortinget i 1905 (The Stenographic Minutes from the Secret Meetings in the Storting in 1905). More than anything else, this source reveals the developments in a format which allowed each member to speak frankly and openly. The papers of the parliamentary proceedings which were published contemporaneously, Stortings Forhandlingar, have been examined for the period 1903-1906 wherever they deal with, or appear to deal with, concepts and debates relating to national monarchy.

Memoirs of the participants have appeared sporadically since 1905; the first being Johan Castberg's polemical Om Begivenhederne i 1905, published in 1906. Although all memoirs have been more or less biased, they give a valuable insight into motives and actions. Many memoirs have appeared in article form through the years, but two significant books are Frits Wedel Jarlsberg's 1905: Kongevalget and Jørgen Løvland's Menn og Minner Fra 1905. Perhaps some of the most useful and unbiased memoirs are the various writings of Halvdan Koht whose prolific historical production was terminated only by his death in 1965. Equally valuable but less unbiased are the writings of Gunnar Knudsen, E. Hagerup Bull and, of course, Sigurd Ibsen who inspired it all.

Because this is a study of national monarchy in Norway, the emphasis is naturally on Norwegian sources. Since this is not a history of the dissolution of the union, Swedish sources are used only where they relate to the question of national monarchy in Norway. Within this context I believe it to be more important to understand what Norwegians thought of their neighbors rather than what may, in fact, have been true. For this reason British, Danish and American material has also been used peripherally.

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CHAPTER I

PROLOGUE

On 7 June 1905 Norway unilaterally dissolved her ninety-one-year union with Sweden by declaring the union monarch no longer king of Norway. The action of the Norwegian Storting (Parliament) climaxed a near century-long struggle between the two nations on the Scandinavian peninsula which had been initiated in 1814 as a result of developments toward the end of the Napoleonic wars. The Swedish Crown Prince, Carl Johan, formerly Jean Baptiste Bernadotte, a French marshall under Napoleon, had aided in the Battle of Leipzig against his former ruler and shortly thereafter turned his armies north to press against the Danish ally of the French emperor. With the signing of the Treaty of Kiel on 14 January 1814, Carl Johan succeeded in forcing the Danish monarch to cede Norway to Sweden, thereby fulfilling a policy which Sweden had pursued for years prior to the election of Bernadotte as heir to the Swedish throne. Norwegians objected to the transfer and declared their independence. A constitution was subsequently written, but attempts to persuade the allies, particularly Britain, to support the Norwegian action failed. During the first two weeks of August a brief war was fought, but Swedish superiority eventually convinced the Norwegians that their cause was hopeless. In signing the Convention of Moss on 14 August 1814, the Norwegians

acknowledged their loss, but retained their constitution and no mention was made of the Treaty of Kiel. On 4 November, a special Storting agreed to a revised constitution and elected and acknowledged Carl XIII of Sweden as king of Norway. The official character of the union was established on 6 August 1815 with the promulgation of the Act of Union (Riksakten); each country maintained a separate constitution and the union was, in reality, a personal union under one king with royal control over foreign affairs, while in internal affairs Norway maintained a self-governing status. T. K. Derry, the British historian of Norway, summed up the special relationship established in 1815 in his recent work, A History of Modern Norway. Derry noted that because of the tenuous position of the Bernadotte dynasty, the king of Norway-Sweden played a significant role as the head of government which was, in turn, encouraged by the lingering tradition of paternalism established during the centuries of Danish rule in Norway.¹

¹T. K. Derry, A History of Modern Norway: 1814-1972 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), p. 18. Literature on the developments of 1814 is immense; the above is a brief summary of the general development. The best work for understanding how Norwegians viewed the events of 1814 and the union by 1905 is Fridtjof Nansen, Norge og Foreningen med Sverige (Kristiania: Jacob Dybwads Forlag, 1905). This book was translated into several languages with the English title: Norway and the Union with Sweden. Also see A. C. Drolsum, Das Königreich Norwegen Als Souveräner Staat (Berlin: Puttkammer & Muhlbrecht, 1905). A day by day analysis of 1814 is the centennial publication by Halvdan Koht, 1814: Norsk Dagbok Hundre Aar Etterpaa (Kristiania: H. Aschehoug & Co., 1914). General histories also present the events more or less fully. See Derry, A History of Modern Norway, pp. 1-16; Ingvar Andersson, A History of Sweden (New York: Praeger

Throughout the nineteenth century the two countries remained at odds over the exact nature of the union, crisis after crisis being resolved; yet the seeds of many subsequent problems remained.

The first decades of the union, according to Norwegian historian Magnus Jensen, revealed hints of dissatisfaction by Norwegians, but it was not until the echoes from the 1830 revolutions on the continent reached the Norwegian valleys that a skeptical awareness began to be manifested.² In that year, Jonas Anton Hielm, a lawyer and parliamentary representative, proposed that the Storting send an address to the king noting that, in accordance with the constitution, diplomatic questions relating to Norway alone should be treated only in Norwegian council.³ Similarly, questions affecting the union should be treated in a union council. Hielm's contemporaries were not ready for such a radical interpretation

Publishers, 1956), pp. 319-323. Perhaps the best recent work from a popular point of view which incorporates recent scholarship is Sverre Steen, Drømmen om Frihet (Oslo: J. W. Cappelens Forlag, 1973). For Bernadotte's motives in 1814, see Franklin D. Scott, "Bernadotte and the Throne of France, 1814," Journal of Modern History 5(December, 1933):465-478.

²See Magnus Jensen, Norges Historie: Unionstiden 1814-1905 (Oslo-Bergen-Tromsø: Universitetsforlaget, 1971), pp. 52-53.

³J. V. Heiberg, Unionens Opløsning 1905: Officielle Aktstykker Vedrørende Unionkrisen og Norges Gjenreisning som Helt Suveræen Stat (Kristiania: J. M. Stenersen & Co's Forlag, 1906), p. 43 (hereafter cited as Heiberg, Unionens Opløsning 1905).

and, consequently, refused their support, fearing it portentous of an open break with Sweden. A compromise was finally achieved, however, when Carl Johan, king of Norway-Sweden since 1818, in separate royal resolutions of 11 April 1835 and 23 January 1836, acknowledged that Norwegians should be present when decisions affecting their interests were decided.⁴ As a result of these resolutions, and the subsequent act allowing the use of the Norwegian merchant flag on all seas in 1838, Carl Johan's popularity in Norway reached its zenith.⁵ Political awareness in Norway had not yet, however, reached the point where there was any organized support for either full equality within the union or a separate foreign office. For the most part, nationalism manifested itself in non-political ways, such as revivals in cultural and intellectual life, while leading intellectuals denied the existence of an anti-union party. That national sentiment for equality existed, however, few appeared willing to deny.⁶ Nevertheless, the union had become stabilized and generally remained so until the constitutional struggle for ministerial responsibility dominated the political scene in the early 1880's. By

⁴Ibid., pp. 43-45.

⁵Ibid., pp. 44-45. Also see John Midgaard, A Brief History of Norway (Oslo: Johan Grundt Tanum Forlag, 1963), p. 81.

⁶See especially John Sanness, Patrioter, Intelligens og Skandinaver: Norsk reaksjoner på skandinavismen før 1848 (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1959), pp. 146-154.

then, the relationship with Sweden again became the primary force in Norwegian political life and remained so until 1905. It is no exaggeration to say that interest in purely political and national questions went deeper in these decades than any other time in Norwegian history.⁷

Just as Norway moved in the direction of ministerial responsibility in the 1880's, so too did Sweden, although with less immediate success. Ironically, as a result of this, relations between the union partners were further strained when Sweden, in 1885, placed the foreign ministry more directly under the control of the Swedish parliament (the Riksdag). Prior to the change, diplomatic matters were prepared by officials responsible to the union monarch. After the spring of 1885, however, all diplomatic matters were to be prepared by Swedish officials primarily responsible to the Swedish foreign minister. According to a Norwegian historian, "the change made it even more obvious that Norway bore a mark of dependence in relations with foreign powers."⁸ The change also increased Norwegian skepticism of ever achieving equality; thereby giving radicals added cause for their agitation against the union and leaders they considered too docile.

⁷See Jensen, Norges Historie, p. 176.

⁸Ibid., p. 179. For contemporary Norwegian views of the changes see "Forandringer i den svenske regjeringsform 1885," in Heiberg, Unionens Opløsning 1905, pp. 54-57; and Arne Garborg, Norges Selvstendighedskamp fra 1814 til nu: En oversigt (Høvik: Bibliotek for de tusen Hjem forlag, 1894), pp. 49-55.

Union matters dominated Norwegian politics to such a degree that the cleavages created came to influence all other questions of national life. The emotional strains seemed on the verge of disintegrating the political party system, still in its infancy. Norwegian demands for equality within the union were met by Swedish insistence that she be the dominant power, a situation which, in reality, had existed from the beginning. By the final decade of the century, the struggle between Norway and Sweden settled primarily upon the question of foreign affairs with the Swedes demanding that the foreign minister be Swedish while Norwegians sought their own foreign office. In Norway, it became a struggle between the political parties of the Right and Left, waged openly, with increasingly more popular participation.

The election of 1891 gave the Venstre (Liberal) party a majority after an intensely nationalistic campaign based on the slogan: A separate Norwegian foreign office (eget norsk utenriks-styre). Høire (the Conservative party), on the other hand, rejected the Liberal idea, and without a united Norwegian front, the idea of a separate Norwegian foreign office was doomed to failure. Since there was no legal way in which a Norwegian foreign office could be established unilaterally, and the danger of Swedish military action against an inferior Norway was altogether too real, in the end the Norwegians limited their demand for a separate foreign office to seeking a separate consular service. In practice, this

could be justified by the increased activity of the Norwegian merchant marine and the need for additional aid and protection for Norwegian seamen.

On this issue, Norwegian radicals, however, supported the demand for a separate consular service as the first step in the eventual total separation of the two countries. The same issue had been raised during the debates on the revision of the constitution in 1814, but rejected in favor of joint consuls and a foreign minister in Stockholm who was the head of the joint consular service. Although both Conservatives and Liberals agreed that separate services ought to be established, there was no agreement on how this was to be done. Venstre sought unilateral action by Norway, while Høire sought to fulfill the demand by negotiating with Sweden.

On 9 June 1892 the Storting passed a law establishing a separate consular office, by a straight party vote of sixty-three to forty-nine. The narrow margin revealed the reality behind the political parties' principle disagreement.⁹ Oscar II, king of Norway-Sweden, refused to sanction the law and the government, in turn, refused to countersign his veto as required by law. Instead the members asked to be relieved of their offices. The king, in turn, requested that the government remain in a caretaker capacity, a proposal to which

⁹See "Stortingets konstitutionskomitees indstilling af 2den juni 1892," and "Stortingets beslutning af 10de juni 1892," in Heiberg, Unionens Opløsning 1905, pp. 64-65.

it agreed. The action, however, unleashed a crisis which would, in effect, last for three years, despite renewed attempts to reach an equitable understanding. Liberals, rejecting compromise, again pushed through a resolution establishing the consular office; again the king vetoed it.

This time when the government requested the right to resign, the king accepted and a Conservative government was formed under its leader, Emil Stang.¹⁰ Reaction from Liberals was mixed, some angered to the point of public demonstrations; others rejecting that tactic as too provocative and meaningless.¹¹ The struggle between the two countries of the union had now grown to the point of intensely bitter feeling on both sides of the border. The elections of 1894 revealed the extent of Norwegian concern when more than ninety percent of the eligible voters cast ballots.¹² The election, however, was not as decisive as Radicals had hoped. Venstre remained the largest party despite losing five seats. In Sweden, hostility towards Norwegian demands resulted in war threats and a doubling of war credits from 7.5 to 15 million kroner on 15

¹⁰See "Udenrigsministerens udtalelse af 14de januar 1893," "Stortings dagsorden af 17de mars 1893," "Den Svenske Riksdags skrivelse af 14de april 1893," and "Ministerskiftet den 2den mai 1893," in *ibid.*, pp. 68-72.

¹¹Bernt A. Nissen, Vårt Folks Historie. Vol. 7: Nasjonal Vekst (Oslo: H. Aschehoug & Co., 1964), p. 327.

¹²Only seventy-three percent had voted in the elections three years earlier. See Steen, Drømmen om Frihet, p. 151.

May the following year, as the crisis deepened.¹³ Although the party strife in Norway increased difficulties in finding a solution, the Norwegians recognized they had little choice and on 7 June 1895 voted by a margin of ninety to twenty-four to accept a resolution declaring their willingness to negotiate with Sweden on both the questions of the consulates and the foreign office.¹⁴

While many Norwegians considered the Storting vote of 7 June a humiliating retreat, it nevertheless ushered in a relative calm in the stormy union politics.¹⁵ New negotiations were initiated with the establishment of a Union Committee, the third since the inception of the union. Commonly called the third union committee, its negotiations would prove equally unsuccessful in resolving the conflict. Whereas Norwegians sought to separate consular questions from any discussion of the foreign office, Swedes insisted on joining the issues. Increasingly, Norwegians became convinced that their near century long struggle for equality was less a question of right than it was a question of power and tactics.

¹³See "Den Svenske Riksdags skrivelse af 15de mai 1895," in Heiberg, Unionens Opløsning 1905, pp. 79-80.

¹⁴See "Stortingets udtalelse af 7de juni 1895," in *ibid.*, pp. 80-81.

¹⁵Nansen, Norge og Foreningen med Sverige, pp. 40-42; Knut Gjerset, History of the Norwegian People. 2 vols. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1915), 2:566-568; Jostein Nerbøvik, Norsk Historie: 1870-1905 (Oslo: Det Norske Samlaget, 1973), p. 162.

In the words of Sverre Steen, the Norwegian historian, Norwegian politicians prior to 1895 had "lacked an understanding of political realities," but following the experiences of that year began building up their military position while awaiting developments from the negotiating table.¹⁶

After 1895 it became more obvious than it had been for a long time, that Sweden was the dominant partner in the union and had, in fact, been so since its origin. The monarch had been Swedish before he became Norwegian and he lived, for the most part in Stockholm, only occasionally visiting Oslo, Norway's capital city.¹⁷ The foreign office was Swedish and Sweden's population was twice that of Norway. Conservative Swedes had always been the most eager defenders of the union as well as Sweden's dominant role therein. Liberals and radicals, on the other hand, were more amiable to Norwegian equality; nevertheless, incessant Norwegian demands, and the seemingly endless friction, had solidified Swedes in opposition

¹⁶Steen, Drømmen om Frihet, p. 155. Also see Jørgen Lovland's comments of 7 June 1895 in Jacob Schønning, Dagbøker fra Stortinget 1895-97 og Regjeringen 1903-05 (Oslo: Johan Grundt Tanum Forlag, 1950), p. 43 (hereafter cited as Schønning, Dagbøker); Bjørn Christophersen, Forsvarets Rolle i Norges Historie (Oslo: Forsvarets Krigshistoriske Avdeling, 1965), p. 21; S. C. Hammer, Georg Stang: Et Blad af Norges Nyeste Historie (Kristiania and Kjøbenhavn: Gyldendalske Boghandel Nordisk Forlag, 1912), pp. 74-82.

¹⁷In 1925 the city of Kristiania received again its original name of Oslo which it bears today. The present name will be used throughout this study except in direct quotes where the name Kristiania will be retained.

to what many considered attacks on their national values and international prestige.

Out of this background and setting came a new twist and proposal which introduced new concepts and ideas into the bitter union debate of the 1890's. It was a subtle concept, a deceptively simple concept, which held the promise of national independence for Norwegians without military confrontation with Sweden. The idea was that of a national monarchy built on the strength of the monarchical tradition in Norway while avoiding any complications with her union partner. Based on some of the most powerful Norwegian traditions and popular consciousness, the idea of national monarchy reminded the people of Norway of their rich past, their sagas and legends and, perhaps most importantly, of the time when Norway was independent under her own kings. It was a nationalist tradition that stretched back to the Viking age, but was strongest in the case of St. Olav, the purported shaper of law and justice, the king who brought Christianity to Norway. In the words of a Norwegian professor of folklore:

Olav was the national symbol of unity and the bearer of a national tradition of independence. An indivisible kingdom was merely so-so before his time, but after him dividing the country was an impossibility. He accomplished the final union and was the one to whom everyone looked whenever the issue was national.¹⁸

¹⁸Olav Bø, Heilag-Olav i Norsk Folketradisjon (Oslo: Det Norske Samlaget, 1955), pp. 199-200.

The tradition was a vital one for Norwegians, not only in the middle ages, but into the twentieth century. It became a part of the very consciousness of the people and remained so during the years of Norway's union with Denmark until 1814 and with Sweden during the nineteenth century. Even though republican ideas captured many supporters in Norway, especially since the union struggle focused on the joint monarchy as the strongest tie to the union, there is no evidence that republican support was anything more than an intellectual aversion to the union. The ideological strength of republicanism remained to be tested against the centuries of tradition that gave monarchy a special place in the consciousness of the Norwegian people, and tested it was when the concept of national monarchy was introduced and popularized by Sigurd Ibsen, the son of Norway's literary giant, Henrik Ibsen.

CHAPTER II

SIGURD IBSEN AND THE ORIGINS OF NATIONAL MONARCHY

Sigurd Ibsen was born on 23 December 1859 in the city of Oslo where two years earlier his father, Henrik Ibsen, had become the artistic director of The Norwegian Theater (Det norske Theater). He was named after the hero of his father's most recent play, The Vikings of Helgeland (Haermaendene på Helgeland) and grew up following the peregrinating footsteps of his father. Educated on the continent, Sigurd took his doctorate in Rome in 1882. He had been a precocious child who acted, on occasion, as critic and editor of his father's writings.¹ Norwegian though he was, Sigurd possessed an unusual cosmopolitan spirit and insight. He spoke and wrote perfect Norwegian (bokmål) but without the usual trace of dialect, causing an acquaintance to note that he consequently seemed less Norwegian. The historian Halvdan Koht has written that Ibsen spoke so grammatically perfect that he violated common usage.² It was, however, not only Ibsen's speech which

¹Bergliot Ibsen, De Tre: Erindringer om Henrik Ibsen, Suzannah Ibsen, Sigurd Ibsen (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1948), pp. 22-24.

²E. Hagerup Bull, Profiler av Noen Samtidige (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1933), p. 133; Halvdan Koht, "Møte med Sigurd Ibsen," in Minnearv og Historie: Gamle og nye artiklar

isolated him in Norway, for added to the famous Ibsenesque remoteness, which so marked his father, was Sigurd's lack of boyhood friends and close companions. He was "Norwegian and yet non-Norwegian," and, like his father, seemed to carry on a love-hate relationship with Norway.³ Because he lacked the Norwegian university examination he was blocked from an official diplomatic career in Norway despite having a more comprehensive legal, linguistic and sociological background than the official diplomats.⁴ However, due to assistance from his father, he was awarded an attache post in 1885. He served in Stockholm, Washington, and Vienna gaining an intimate knowledge of consulate and diplomatic activity before resigning to begin a journalistic career in 1890.⁵

(Oslo: H. Aschehoug & Co., 1965), p. 224. Also see Wilhelm Keilhau, "Sigurd Ibsen," in Norsk Biografisk Leksikon 16 vols. (Oslo: H. Aschehoug & Co., 1923-69), pp. 487-495 (hereafter cited as NBL).

³See for example the obituary of Ibsen written by one who probably knew him better than any, Nils Collett Vogt, "Ved Sigurd Ibsens død," Dagbladet 14 April 1930, pp. 1-2. Henrik Ibsen's "withdrawnness" is repeatedly emphasized in Michael Meyer, Ibsen: A Biography (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1971), pp. 106-107, 154-156, 348-350, 372, 408-409, 584-585, 588, 594, 620-621 and 816-817.

⁴Jacob S. Worm-Müller, "Sigurd Ibsen: 1859--23 desember--1959," copy of proof sheet in Sigurd Ibsen papers, Ms. fol. 2689, Jacob S. Worm-Müllers etterlatte papirer in Universitetsbibliotek (UB), Oslo (hereafter cited as Worm-Müller papers, UB, Oslo).

⁵See Reidar Omang's transcript of notes about Sigurd Ibsen from his personnel dossier in the Swedish foreign office archives, in Ms. fol. 2689, Worm-Müller papers, UB, Oslo.

Ibsen's interest in union politics undoubtedly antedates his term as an attache fellow, but his subsequent experience clearly radicalized him. Swedish-Norwegian diplomats were required to write Swedish but Ibsen, though he mastered that language, insisted on writing Norwegian. In addition he came to regard the union's dissolution as a matter requiring action, not negotiations, which he characterized as "empty demonstrations."⁶ Ibsen's instinct for action in settling the union controversy was undoubtedly intensified when he became a member of the circle publishing Nyt Tidsskrift, a periodical which dealt with politics and culture from a liberal point of view. Most notable in this group was Norway's nationalist historian, J. Ernst Sars.

In 1891 Ibsen presented his popular study entitled Unionen (The Union) which, selling for the low price of 80 øre, reached a wide reading public. The first part of the book reviews the nature of the union and its development since 1814, reflecting the marked influence of Sars. It is in the latter half of the book that Ibsen brought his analytically trenchant pen into the cause of a separate foreign office. Norwegians could negotiate with Sweden or they could "take the matter into their own hands," Ibsen wrote, leaving no doubt as to which he favored. It was a bold pronouncement

⁶Vogt, Dagbladet, 14 April 1930; Bergliot Ibsen, De Tre, p. 116.

in 1891.⁷ In 1891, however, Ibsen, as indeed Norwegians generally, had an optimistic sense of inevitability. The union, if not dissolved, would at least develop to the point where Norway would get her own consular service. If Norway dissolved the union unilaterally there was always the problem of what the Great Powers would do. Everyone remembered how great power politics prevailed earlier, but that, Ibsen reminded his readers, was long ago in 1814. In the 1890's, he wrote, "the Powers will not lift a finger to prevent it."⁸

The event of 1895 shattered any such illusions. Folke Lindberg, a Swedish historian, in his book Kunqliq utrikes-politik (Royal Foreign Policy) has shown that when King Oscar II considered military action against Norway, the neutrality of the major powers was not as definitive as Ibsen had assumed. Part of Oscar's fear clearly related to the possibility that if Norway dissolved the union, Sweden might

⁷Sigurd Ibsen, Unionen (Fagerstrand pr. Høvik; Bibliotek for de tusen Hjem, [1891]), pp. 160, 171. In August 1891, the Norwegian minister of the interior, Wollert Konow of Hedemarken, advocated such unilateral action in a speech at Skarnes in Odalen. The ideas came from Ibsen but when they became an integral part of Venstre's program they were associated with Konow, not Ibsen. See Keilhau, "Wollert Konow fra Hedemarken," Samtiden 25(1914):44-52 and Nerbøvik, Portretter i Norsk Historie, 1900-1920: En antologi (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1969), pp. 63-70.

⁸Ibsen, Unionen, p. 176.

find herself next door to a republic, and that avoiding that prospect could well make the use of force justifiable.⁹

Force was not required in 1895 and with their "strategic retreat," Norwegians gained in realism what they lost in optimism. Sigurd Ibsen changed demonstrably as well. His writings manifested a more diplomatic tone and became decidedly less antagonistic to Swedish interests. As a co-editor of Nyt Tidsskrift he contributed numerous articles, but was less directly concerned with union matters, touching upon them, however, subliminally.¹⁰ If the position Ibsen took in Unionen in 1891 can be considered radical, if not revolutionary, it may appear that he had abandoned that stance by 1895. It was not, however, an abandonment as much as it was an intellectual propensity to re-evaluate the basic assumptions of a problem. Earlier he could urge unilateral action to change a particular problem; but as the union controversy became increasingly bitter on both sides, Ibsen discerned that the cause lay deeper than the union's various institutions. The basic problem, he would write later, was the nature of the union itself: ". . .that we were united with a larger country under one king, called a union king but who,

⁹Folke Lindberg, Kunglig Utrikespolitik: Studier och essayer från Oskar II:s tid (Stockholm: Albert Bonniers Förlag, 1950), pp. 145-158.

¹⁰See for example Ibsen, "Diplomatiet," Nyt Tidsskrift 3(1894-1895):609-619.

in reality, was Swedish and was supported by a power base outside the constitution and outside the country."¹¹

The problem, therefore, had been defined and, consistent with his thinking, Ibsen set out to correct the situation. For that purpose he did as Norwegians traditionally had come to do--use the press. In two articles bearing the title "Monarkiet," Ibsen discussed possible reforms in September 1895 in Verdens Gang, a liberal newspaper in Norway's capital.¹² If the articles created any particular sensation it is not recorded. In essence, Ibsen speculated on various ways to improve the conditions of the union. One suggestion which did get a response, was a proposal that the monarch's residence shift between Stockholm and Oslo for terms of twelve and five years respectively. This proposal was welcomed for bringing "an original thought into the currently prevailing union complications," but was rejected as disadvantageous to both countries because it would leave the king without a homeland.¹³

By 1898 Ibsen had given up hope for an improvement in the conditions of the union, but returned to, and reworked, his articles of 1895. What had transpired in the meantime

¹¹Ibsen, "Da unionen løsne," Samtiden 17(1906):208.

¹²Ibsen, "Monarkiet," Verdens Gang, 6 and 12 September 1895.

¹³Eric Vullum, "Fem og Tolv," Verdens Gang, 13 September 1895.

to give him new hope? The answer lies in two developments, one negative, the other positive. In January 1898, the recommendations of the third union committee from 1895 were presented. Meeting to discuss a revision of the Act of Union, the committee was hopelessly split with a majority and minority report from both the Swedish and Norwegian representatives. The majority reports, though dissimilar, were in essence close to agreement. It was the respective minority reports which more than anything evidenced the deep cleavage existing between the two countries. The Swedish minority report proposed a new Act of Union which would have precedence over both Norwegian and Swedish constitutions, while the Norwegian minority insisted on Venstre's union program of separate foreign ministers and a Norwegian consular service.¹⁴ The barrier of 1898 remained the same as that of 1895--Sweden's insistence and Norway's rejection of combining the consular and foreign office questions. Such was the negative influence in 1898. The positive development which caused Ibsen to retrieve his earlier views began with a member of the group, and the leading voice behind Nyt Tidsskrift, the historian Ernst Sars.

On 29 July 1897 Sars spoke at Trondheim on the occasion of the anniversary of the death of Norway's patron saint, Olav, who had died in the Battle of Stiklestad in 1030. Sars

¹⁴Heiberg, Unionens Opløsning 1905, pp. 83-85; Nerbøvik, Norsk Historie, pp. 162-163. For Ibsen's response see Ibsen, "Da unionen løsne," Samtiden 17(1906):208-209.

spoke of Norway's independent position during the middle ages and of the monarchy representing it, which he called national. In reporting the speech a liberal Swedish newspaper scorned the thought of an independent Norway with a national monarchy especially, as Sars hinted, with a son of the Swedish king on the Norwegian throne.¹⁵ Ibsen himself had broached the idea of a Bernadotte prince on the Norwegian throne in 1885, when he served as attaché in Stockholm, an idea he credited to a conservative newspaper editor, Oscar Julius Tschudi. There exists no evidence, however, as to when Tschudi made the proposal, if indeed he ever did.¹⁶ The matter is basically academic because Ibsen himself discussed it with colleagues in Stockholm, it was Ibsen who revived it in 1895, and it was Ibsen who gave it mature dress in 1898--the garb it would wear when the Norwegian government made it an integral part of its dissolution program in 1905.

¹⁵"The speech is significant by giving evidence of the Norwegian Left's understanding of Norway's political position at this time. . . . Let us have our own Norwegian king . . . and we will accept the union and many other things, but we want a king on the throne of Olav, Harald and Haakon." See "Professor Sars' tal vid Olafsfesten," Göteborgs Handel -- och Sjöfartstidning, 13 August 1897.

¹⁶Tschudi was the editor of the conservative Christianssands Tidende in 1883-1884, but the plan was not published there. In 1891 he went to Namdalens Blad but copies of it, unfortunately, do not exist until 1898. For biographical information of Tschudi see Chr. Brinchmann, Anders Daae, and K. V. Hammer (eds.), Hvem er hvem? Haandbok over samtidige Norske maend og kvinder (Kristiania: H. Aschehoug & Co., 1912), p. 270.

When Ibsen received his appointment in the foreign office and was assigned to Stockholm, the initial impression he made was nothing more than "the small son of a great father."¹⁷ By mid-summer 1885, however, he was discussing politics with his colleagues; but, probably because of his obstreperous nature and pro-Norwegian views, others were soon forbidden to discuss politics with him.¹⁸ On 2 January 1886 Carl Fleetwood, the second secretary of the foreign office, wrote a resume of Ibsen in which he noted his political proclivities. Fleetwood characterized Ibsen as a political radical, "but a realistic radical." His most striking comment related to Ibsen's views of the union:

He once told me that the development of the union ought to be the following: the union dissolved--Norway an independent monarchy under a Bernadotte (he named prince Eugen)--thereafter with independence secure, the abolition of the monarchy, and a republic.¹⁹

Fleetwood noted that Ibsen was a republican "in soul and heart," who accepts monarchy as a transitional form of government. In her memoirs Bergliot Ibsen, the wife of Sigurd Ibsen and daughter of Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson, a leading republican spokesman, renowned playwright, novelist and author of Norway's

¹⁷Carl Fleetwood, 21 January 1885, "Utdrag ur Carl A. R. Georg:son Fleetwoods efterlämnade dagböcker ang. Sigurd Ibsen," copy in Ms. fol. 2689, Worm-Müller papers, UB, Oslo.

¹⁸Bergliot Ibsen, De Tre, p. 116.

¹⁹Typewritten resume of Sigurd Ibsen by Carl Axel Reinhold Georgsson Fleetwood, dated 2 January 1886. Copy in Ms. fol. 2689, Worm-Müller papers, UB, Oslo.

national anthem, notes that he was always a firm supporter of a monarchical form of government.²⁰ His writings in the 1890's indicate nothing else. It could be that in 1885 Ibsen was indeed a republican as Fleetwood noted, but more likely, and in keeping with his character, would be the assumption that he played a devil's advocate with his Swedish colleagues. Ibsen was seldom without an opinion and he possessed an intellectual aloofness arrogant enough to challenge his opponent's basic tenets. If Ibsen's superiors were unimpressed, the same can not be said of Fleetwood. In 1890 he recorded in his diary: "He [Ibsen] has played his cards so masterfully that it may be that one day he will write the scenario for the actions of the Norwegian government."²¹ When Fleetwood wrote these words the actions were fifteen years in the future and the scenario was not to be written for another eight. Both were based on the assumption that Norway could achieve independence by instituting a national monarchy. Before the scenario could be written, however, groundwork needed to be done. This took place in a relatively

²⁰See Berghliot Ibsen, De Tre, p. 168. The idea of monarchy as transitional is echoed in 1905 by Ibsen's father-in-law in a letter to Peter Nansen, 30 October 1905, in Bjørnstjerne Bjørnsons Brevveksling med Danske, 1875-1910. 3 vols. Edited by Øyvind Anker, Francis Bull and Torben Nielsen (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1953), 3:179-180.

²¹Carl Fleetwood, 31 January 1890, in "Dagböcker ang. Sigurd Ibsen," in Ms. fol. 2689, Worm-Müller papers, UB, Oslo.

unnoticed debate in the liberal nynorsk newspaper, Den 17de Mai, which apparently picked up the idea of a Bernadotte candidate for the Norwegian throne from the speech by Sars and the Göteborg newspaper which reported it in August 1897.

Beginning with an ironic tone on 2 October 1897, the substance of such a candidacy was published on 9 October in an article signed simply "X" but written by Steinar Schjøtt, a lawyer, teacher and activist in the nynorsk language movement. Rather than subscribing to the view, the paper made it clear that it was but opening itself to a discussion of the matter.²²

In his article, Schjøtt writes that upon the death of King Oscar the two kingdoms ought to be divided between two of his sons: the eldest, Gustav taking Sweden, while the younger prince Karl would become king of Norway. It was an attractive proposal containing something for everyone. Oscar would see the Bernadotte family retaining the thrones of the North; Norwegian liberals would gain political independence, and conservatives would have their monarchy. But best of all, writes Schjøtt, "we would soon get a national royal family because Karl's children would be totally Norwegian."²³ The practical problems, also handled in the article, were reminiscent of Ibsen's articles two years earlier. According to

²²See Den 17de Mai: Norskt folkeblad, 2, 9, 16, 19 and 23 October 1897.

²³X [Steinar Schjøtt], "Prins Karl," *ibid.*, 9 October 1897.

Schjøtt: "If we lived far out to sea on an island and we were stronger than we are now; then it could be that I would rather have a republic. But such as things are now I believe Karl is the best republic."²⁴

The Norwegian liberal paper, Dagbladet, without offering its comments, noted on 13 April, and again on 15 October, that a Swedish newspaper, Stockholmstidningen, had given the idea its "unreserved, unconditional support." The Göteborg Handel-- och Sjöfartstidningen, meanwhile, insisted incorrectly that Den 17de Mai was the only Norwegian newspaper "bothering its brain with this question."²⁵ The short-lived newspaper debate might well have been of no consequence had not Sigurd Ibsen joined the issue and advanced the same general ideas he had expressed in 1885 and 1895. This time his forum was a new periodical which Ibsen founded and edited in late 1897, Ringeren.

With its editorial offices located in a five-story brick building at Nedre Slottsgate 5, Ringeren reached a level of scholarship "which no Norwegian weekly has matched before or since."²⁶ The journal's purpose, symbolized in its title, was "to wake up and admonish, to toll the bell for all contemporary questions, both at home and abroad, which call for

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Dagbladet, 13 April and 15 October 1897. Also see "Prins Karl konge i Norge," Den 17de Mai, 16 October 1897.

²⁶Wilhelm Keilhau, "Sigurd Ibsen," in NBL, p. 490.

our common attention."²⁷ Ibsen meant for Ringeren to serve as "an organ for the free word," and an article would not be refused publication merely because it was deemed inopportune."²⁸ Although Ibsen shared the fate of other editors in his concern for increasing subscriptions, he nevertheless believed he could contribute significantly to the contemporary debate, especially the question of Norway's position in the union with Sweden.²⁹

The first issue of Ringeren appeared on 27 November 1897 as a trial number. It carried a lengthy article by Ernst Sars on Johan Sverdrup, the diminutive prime minister largely responsible for the introduction of ministerial responsibility in 1884, as well as articles by Bjørnson and the editor himself.³⁰ Articles by two of Norway's foremost names were intended to attract as many readers, and subscribers, as possible. In addition, the issue contained a list of

²⁷Handwritten draft in Sigurd Ibsen papers, in Brevssamling 36, UB, Oslo.

²⁸Ibsen to Chr. Collin, 8 June 1898, in Brevssamling 99 and Ibsen to Johan Scharffenberg, 4 October 1897, in Brevssamling 383, UB, Oslo.

²⁹See Ibsen to J. E. Sars, 3 and 14 October 1897 and 16 January 1898, in Brevssamling 36, UB, Oslo.

³⁰Ringeren prøvenummer (27 November 1897). Sars' view of history is classically Whiggish, as he believed it the historian's duty to make moral judgments on events and personalities of the past. He was kind to those who served Norwegian independence, believing it a "sin" to do otherwise. See "Kristian Fredrik og Karl Johan," in Sars, Samlede Verker. Vol. 4: Portraetter og Essays (Kristiania, København: Gyldendalske Boghandel Nordisk Forlag, 1912), p. 49.

sixty-six names of expected contributors. It reads like a Norwegian who's who and attests not only to Ibsen's wide circle of acquaintances, but also to the undisputed influence the journal would have on those in society who would read it, particularly its most influential members.³¹

The trial number proved a success and on 1 January 1898 Ringeren began its regular weekly appearance. Before the month was out Ibsen himself authored a critical analysis of the psychology of the Norwegian-Swedish union. Scathing though the article was, it pointed again to Ibsen's propensity for hard analysis of a problems basic character. To a certain extent it was the necessary introduction to his revamped proposals for the final phase of the union, the dissolution of which he believed to be advantageous for all concerned. Building on his diplomatic experience, Ibsen insisted that Norway's inferior position in the union was due to two factors: Swedish conceptions of Norwegians as a lesser (sämre) people, and the Norwegian acceptance of that evaluation. The inherent weakness of the union rested on this "psychological feature:"

It is precisely Norway's natural right to equality which Swedes will not admit or understand. And it

³¹Ringeren prøvenummer (27 November 1897):18. The list includes: W. C. Brøgger, Alexander Bugge, E. Hagerup Bull, Johan Castberg, Knut Hamsun, Henrik Ibsen, Alexander Kielland, Jonas Lie, Gerhard Munthe, Fridtjof Nansen, Johan Scharffenberg, C. Sparre and Erik Werenskiold, among others. Cf. Ibsen's draft copy in Ms. 8^o 1803, UB, Oslo.

can hardly be otherwise for a people who, in a manner of speaking, have gone from hand to hand, from guardian to guardian; who straggled behind a little country for four hundred years only to straggle behind another little country for some eighty years--no, Norwegians certainly get what they deserve when they are viewed and treated as second-class Scandinavians by their kinsmen.³²

As a result of this perceived Swedish attitude of superiority, Ibsen wondered "that there must be a screw loose in our neighbors political understanding."³³ Swedes certainly had no exaggerated concept of their own glory but, nevertheless, consistently underestimated Norwegian competence and capability, at least from the Norwegian point of view. A reporter for the conservative Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten would later characterize this as an inability on the part of the Swedes to understand their neighbors to the west.³⁴ The resulting tensions, in Ibsen's view, made it a "dubious honor" for Norway to be the brother country in such a union. Equality was non-existent because Norwegians were measured with a "special criterion." Whether it was a lack of understanding or disdain, the Norwegians felt it to be the latter. With his experience from the continent, Ibsen recognized it as a trait

³²Ibsen, "Unionpsykologi," Ringeren 1(22 January 1898): 5,6.

³³Ibid., p. 4.

³⁴Diplomaticus [Kristian Anastas Winterhjelm], I Sverige 1905: Erindringer og optegnelser (Kristiania: H. Aschehoug & Co., 1906), p. 191.

shared with other Europeans:

The disdain which the Swedes have for us is not a unique phenomenon. It has its parallel in the contempt which the British have for the Irish, which the German-Austrian has for the Czech, which the east European has for the Jew. In short, it is repeated wherever two people stand confronting one another; where the one has always preserved his freedom while the other has to bear the memories of centuries of subjugation.³⁵

Because of this, Ibsen questions the very policy of negotiations which Norway had entered into with Sweden-- negotiations, he said, presupposed equality between negotiators, but Norway and Sweden could negotiate "everything between heaven and earth, except 'equality'." The only solution to the dilemma was a forcing of the issue--for Norway to "take the right for which it is useless to ask."³⁶ In maintaining this view, consistent with his expressions seven years earlier, Ibsen again identified himself with the more radical element in the union controversy. To insist that a policy of negotiations "is absolutely useless" leaves little room for alternatives.³⁷

³⁵Ibsen, "Unionpsykologi," p. 5.

³⁶Ibid., p. 6.

³⁷Ibid. The Norwegians were clearly aware that military strength and preparedness was a presupposition to avoiding a retreat similar to that of 1895. The Storting had voted an extraordinary defense budget of 7 million kroner for the purchase of two panser ships and the construction of fortresses on the main sea and land routes into the country from Sweden. See Christophersen, Forsvarets Rolle i Norges Historie, p. 22; Worm-Müller, Arne Bergsgard and Bernt A. Nissen, Venstre i Norge (Oslo: Olaf Norlis Forlag, 1933), p. 195. Prior to the Storting decision, the necessity of building up the defenses had been the subject of several articles: C. Sparre, "Hvorledes

Refusing to discuss the military alternatives, Ibsen took a more moderate and mollifying position two and one-half months later in what would prove to be his most influential article. It may well be contended that it helped Norwegians turn the final corner of the maze which had grown in complexity since 1814. Ibsen finally had given his countrymen a clear and concise, if theoretical, basis for dissolving the union with a minimum of internal and external friction. The article, titled "Nationalt kongedømme" (National Monarchy), appeared in April 1898 in two installments of Ringeren.³⁸ The seed Ibsen now sowed had been nurtured since 1885. Although a premature dissemination in 1895 was met by an early frost, all indications pointed to the possibility of a warmer reception this time. Just how warm was beyond Ibsen's prognosticative powers, but his willingness to venture anew revealed an indefatigable optimism.³⁹

skal vi faa vort sjøforsvar i orden?" Nyt Tidsskrift 3(1894-1895):388-400; H. D. Lowzow, "Krigsforberedelser," *ibid.*, pp. 493-530 and Sars, "Vor unionelle forsvarspligt," *ibid.*, pp. 552-559.

³⁸Ibsen, "Nationalt kongedømme," Ringeren 1(2 and 9 April 1898):7-10, 7-13 (hereafter cited as Nat. kongedømme I or II).

³⁹This is even more remarkable when one remembers that Ibsen had only recently been rejected as a professor of sociology with the University of Oslo where he held a series of trial lectures in 1896-1897. His disappointment was bitter, more so since he saw it as a personal, not substantive, rejection. See Bergliot Ibsen, De Tre, pp. 160-168.

Nationalt kongedømme is, to a great extent, an analysis of the strength and significance of nationalism in nineteenth century Europe, especially as it related to the changing role of monarchy and republicanism. According to Ibsen, republicanism had been in decline since its zenith during the revolutions of 1848. Since 1850 monarchy was the ascending and most acceptable form of government. Knowing his audience well, Ibsen uses the metaphor of the sea and writes: "After all the tribulations it [monarchy] sailed into calmer waters and can nowadays rejoice in a more secure existence than it ever could since the great revolution."⁴⁰ This renewed security for monarchy was based, not only on its deep historical roots, but also on its ability to identify with the nation in a new and modern manner. It had, in short, adjusted to constitutional parliamentary developments. Although he never uses the word nationalism, Ibsen writes that a non-liberal monarchy can survive whereas a non-national monarchy will prove an "impossibility."⁴¹ From this general analysis of continental Europe, Ibsen turns his attention to Norway where

⁴⁰Ibsen, Nat. kongedømme I, p. 7.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 9. Ibsen insists that Switzerland, Andorra and San Marino are the only "true and lasting" republics in Europe. With sleight-of-hand arguments he insists that France cannot be considered a "true" republic, except in name: "It is called a republic because the leader of the government is an elected president instead of a hereditary sovereign; but its administration and social order rests on monarchical customs and principles. . .and bureaucracy and militarism blossom as prolifically as any monarchy." Ibid., p. 8.

the monarch is anything but national. The phrase "the Norwegian king" was considered either an irony or an obvious challenge in the divided politics of Norway. Liberals and radicals were at odds with conservatives on matters dealing with the king as well as most aspects of the union. Conservatives saw a challenge to the one as a challenge to the other. The divisions would not disappear until the Conservative Party (Høire) accepted dissolution as necessary. In 1898 it was unwilling to do so, although certain circles within conservative ranks were beginning to recognize the necessity if the party was to survive as a politically viable force.⁴² The union, meanwhile, remained a knot which refused to be loosened; the harder both sides pulled, the tighter it became. Because of this, Ibsen had become convinced that reform was probably impossible. Though losing faith in reform, he, nevertheless, retained an optimistic faith in the ability to find a solution. The king was in theory a union king but his residence in Sweden bound him to that country and formed the impressions which determined his personality. In 1895

⁴²Ibsen, Nat. kongedømme II, pp. 7, 12-13. Also see Morgenbladet, 13 March 1898. This necessity was recognized in 1894 by Ernst Sars. However, whiggish as he was, Sars saw the conjunction in accordance with his party's union policy, not as a compromise. It was simply a matter of time before conservatives realized this and agreed to "carry out the union program of Venstre." See Sars, "Vor politik," Nyt Tidsskrift 3(1894-1895):195. An excellent analysis of the problem is found in Halvdan Koht, "Historisk Innleing til 1905," Syn og Segn 61(1955):1-9.

Ibsen had recommended a solution to this dilemma by varying periods of residence in both countries. He now doubted that this was practical since Sweden's size and political strength would sooner or later tilt the scales in her favor again. Reform, it appeared, was simply out of the question; it was like putting new paint on a worn out superstructure. As long as the union existed Norway would only have a "surrogate monarchy."⁴³ The logical and most satisfactory answer would, therefore, be a mutually acceptable dissolution; a dissolution which would give Norway her independence while alleviating Sweden's fears of the consequences of such a development.

It is in this context that Ibsen revives his ideas from 1885 recast in consideration of the debate in 1895 and 1897, but remaining, fundamentally, Ibsen's own: the union monarch would abdicate as king of Norway, Prince Karl (Bernadotte) would assume the throne giving the Norwegians their own national monarch and make possible a "peaceful divorce without any bitterness."⁴⁴ But was it possible for Norway to get her own king? What about republican sentiment? A Bernadotte monarch was anathema to many Norwegians, especially the most nationalistic who might otherwise look favorably upon a truly national monarch. Ibsen believed he had prepared for the

⁴³Ibsen, Nat. kongedømme II, pp. 9-10.

⁴⁴Ibid., pp. 10-11.

arguments--after all the section of his essay on the decline of republic influence was hardly a mere intellectual exercise. Republicanism may have been a minority sentiment but it had its spokesmen. "America letters" from Norwegian emigrants to the United States spoke often of the republic in glowing terms. Probably more important had been the numerous speeches and writings of Bjørnson who, in 1877, had even written an anti-monarchical play, Kongen (The King). As a protagonist and propagandist for a republic, Bjørnson had been especially active in the first half of the 1880's.⁴⁵ Now his son-in-law was advocating a monarchy for Norway, and a Bernadotte monarch at that. Ibsen was convinced, however, that political realism had reduced the number of republican stalwarts since 1895. A republic, he reasoned, "would do nothing but harm for Norway."⁴⁶ Breaking the union with Sweden would in itself be unwelcomed by most states, but abolishing the monarchy and instituting a republic would only bring Norway into a "tense and chilly" relationship with monarchical Europe. Perhaps even worse than damaging foreign relations, a republic would be catastrophic internally, according to Ibsen. There were doubts that

⁴⁵An excellent little study of Bjørnson's political activity in these years is Helge Lervik, Bjørnstjerne Bjørnsons politiske agitasjon: 1880-1884 (Oslo-Bergen-Tromsø: Universitetsforlaget, 1969).

⁴⁶Ibsen, Nat. kongedømme II, p. 11.

conservatives would accept independence on any terms, the abolition of the monarchy would insure their hostility. In short, Ibsen argued that a republic would split Norway internally and isolate her externally. Norway needed a separate dynasty which would be acceptable to the remaining sovereigns of Europe, a group Ibsen called the "princely labor union."⁴⁷ A separate dynasty would be acceptable to conservatives because it meant a continuation of the previous regime. Liberals, especially those of Venstre, would likely accept it because it would be "our Norwegian royal house."⁴⁸ Ibsen understood republican sentiment in Norway to be less ideological than it was nationalistic and anti-Swedish. If modern monarchy could accommodate itself to national sentiment in continental Europe, Ibsen asked, why not in Norway where the union itself was so unsatisfactory?

The radical elements of society, especially the Norwegian Labor Party which was nationalist in temperament but internationalist in rhetoric and theory, saw monarchy as a hindrance to necessary social and political reforms. An anarchist movement, best represented by Ivar Mortenson and his periodical Fridom (Liberty), advocated self-help

⁴⁷Ibid., pp. 11-12. Ibsen coined the phrase "fyrstenes fagforening" which I have translated as "princely labor union." It has a generally negative connotation and will reappear with striking frequency in 1905, as do other Ibsen ideas.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 12.

and self-rule as a necessary precondition to social equality.⁴⁹ In this context a republic, of course, would best meet this demand. To such contentions Ibsen wrote that even under a king ". . .political liberty thrives and social reforms can be adopted."⁵⁰ In fact, he claimed, such goals could be more readily achieved under a monarch.⁵¹ For Ibsen the primary goal remained dissolving the union, a political question, provided that Norway could get her own monarch.⁵² Although his entire proposal was in the nature of a trial balloon, this aspect of Ibsen's article is the quintessential element.⁵³

In 1898, however, the scenario Ibsen sketched seemed less than matured. In the first place, the idea was "too new," at least as a subject of discussion among Norwegians in general. Secondly, political divisions intruded to too great an extent. Acknowledging that this was in the process of changing, Ibsen admitted that it had not yet done so. The decisive step had to be taken by conservatives,

⁴⁹See especially "Arne Garborg aa fridomen," Fridom: Tidsskrift for Sjølvhjelp og Sjølvestyre (no. 2, 1897):41-53; (no. 3, 1897):73-86; and "Soga om folkestyre," (no. 3, 1898): 3-14.

⁵⁰Ibsen, Nat. kongedømme II, p. 12.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Ibid.

⁵³Ibsen, "Da unionen løsnede," Samtiden 17 (1906):209.

and then it had to be a recognition on their part that national interests took precedence over an ideological clinging to the union. The only thing which could facilitate this, according to Ibsen, was the promise of "a national monarchy."⁵⁴

Ibsen's article, though originally published in Ringeren, was given wider dissemination when it was subsequently published as a pamphlet by Norges Nationale Forening (The National Association of Norway). As an organizational arm of Venstre, the National Association identified itself as a strong force for unilateral Norwegian action in union matters.⁵⁵ Although the organization, whose membership came mainly from the capital, supported the publication, some individual members did not. Those who were also a part of the ministry of Johannes Steen resigned from the Association claiming they could not remain in an organization responsible for such a "compromising publication." This attitude probably reflected more of a sensitivity toward possible Swedish reaction than their

⁵⁴Conservative opinion was changing markedly in the late 1890's as their belief in the defensive and economic advantages of the union was being undermined by the realization that Venstre was monopolizing nationalist sentiment. See Rolf Danielsen, Det Norske Storting Gjennom 150 År. Vol. 2: Tidsrommet 1870-1908 (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1964), p. 372.

⁵⁵Ibsen, Nationalt kongedømme (Kristiania: Norges nationale forening, 1898). Also see Nerbøvik, Norsk Historie, p. 179.

true feelings since Prime Minister Steen himself considered Ibsen's views as "purely academic."⁵⁶ The publication, nevertheless, confirmed Ibsen's position as "the leading pamphleteer against the union,"⁵⁷ and confirmed Carl Fleetwood's anticipations of 1890 that Ibsen would one day author a scenario for the actions of the Norwegian government. All that remained was for that government to acknowledge and put it into action. Ibsen himself would write in 1906 that the only acknowledgment his proposals received in 1898 was "a shrug of the shoulders" and comments about "the utopia [of]. . .Hr. Ibsen's 'national monarchy'."⁵⁸ Such comments probably say more about the expectations of his critics than about Ibsen himself. In Stockholm, the conservative and aging monarch found Ibsen's article disquieting. Therefore, when Ibsen was mentioned as the department head of the office of commerce and consular affairs in the department of the interior (handels-- og konsulat-kontoret i Indredepartementet) in 1899, King Oscar initially opposed his appointment. The king told the ministry that he wanted to undertake an investigation into Ibsen's writings; such an investigation,

⁵⁶Johannes Steen to Otto Blehr, 20 June 1899, in Sigurd Blehr (ed.), Mot Frigjørelsen: Utdrag av Statsminister Blehrs politiske korrespondanse, 1891-1903 2 vols. (Oslo: Cammermeyers Boghandel, 1948) 2:155 (hereafter cited as Mot Frigjørelsen I or II); Ibsen, "Da unionen løsne," p. 209.

⁵⁷Meyer, Ibsen: A Biography, p. 770.

⁵⁸Ibsen, "Da unionen løsne," p. 209.

he said, had already been initiated.⁵⁹ That it resulted in nothing particularly negative is reflected in Ibsen's appointment in July. Oscar accepted him despite his earlier reservations and, thereafter, showed him no hostility.⁶⁰ The pessimistic evaluation by Ibsen in 1906 must be taken as the assessment of a proud but disappointed man. Though there were no torch-light parades for him, indications are that the article was accepted seriously and that it influenced more people than Ibsen himself suspected. Bjørnson, the bellicose republican of earlier years, was converted by the realpolitik aspects of a national monarchy.⁶¹ A writer in Dagbladet noted on 8 May that national monarchy "has found strong support in the Venstre press throughout the country."⁶² Articles appeared and lectures were given which either directly referred to Ibsen's proposal or used it as a point of departure for a discussion of the wider implications of national monarchy.

⁵⁹Otto Blehr to Johannes Steen, 17 June 1899, in Blehr (ed.), Mot Frikjørelsen II, pp. 152-153, 290-291.

⁶⁰Bergliot Ibsen, De Tre, p. 181; Ibsen, "Da unionen løsne," p. 209.

⁶¹Bjørnson to Edvard Brandes, 20 December 1905, in Georg og Edv. Brandes Brevveksling med Bjørnson, Ibsen, Kielland, Elster, Garborg, Lie. Edited by Francis Bull. 2 vols. (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1941) 2:30-31. Worm-Müller, "Sigurd Ibsen," in Ms. Fol. 2689, Worm-Müller papers, UB, Oslo.

⁶²"Det nationale kongedømme," Dagbladet, 8 May 1898.

Less than a week after Ibsen's article appeared in Ringeren, Dagbladet noted a surprising agreement from Stockholmstidning. A year earlier the Swedish paper had given the idea of a Norwegian national monarchy its unconditional support; now it added that a separate monarchy would be the "crystallizing force for reform" insisting that it should become Norwegian policy, not merely a matter for newspaper discussion.⁶³ Dagbladet, on the other hand, placed considerable distance between itself and the idea of a national monarchy: "A national Norwegian monarchy can first become a part of Norwegian policy when Swedish policy has contributed to the creation of Norway's independence--in the union--with her own foreign office."⁶⁴ Evidently, the liberal Norwegian paper resented any Swede saying what Norwegian policy should be, just as it was reluctant to show any support for the union's dissolution. Independence did not mean political separation, but rather genuine equality under the joint monarch. As the paper confirmed a month later, it was unwilling to abandon Venstre's program of negotiations for a separate foreign office, especially if told to do so by a Swedish paper. On 8 May, however, it hinted at the position it would take should a separation occur: paraphrasing Montesquieu's L'esprit des lois, Dagbladet

⁶³"Nationalt kongedømme," *ibid.*, 13 April 1898.

⁶⁴*Ibid.*

wrote that "the republican form of government would be the most natural for [a small country like] Norway."⁶⁵ The paper was unconvinced that a national monarchy was preferable to a national republic, even though the Dreyfus affair in France "had brought discredit on republican ideas."⁶⁶ Dagbladet's position in 1898 was guarded; it was unwilling to venture too far from a safe harbor. North of Oslo in the Gudbrandsdal, however, was a man more willing to challenge Ibsen's arguments. On the surface he was a most unlikely agitator: Thorstein Lunde of Lillehammer.

Lunde was a merchant who had built up one of the most successful businesses in the Gudbrandsdal. Active in local politics, he was recognized as a member of radical Venstre. He was a close friend of Bjørnson who often stayed with Lunde on his frequent travels to and from his home at Aulestad. In 1898 Lunde was sixty-three years old and active in his opposition to Ibsen's plan for a national monarchy.⁶⁷

In December Lunde issued a pamphlet of his own also titled Nationalt kongedømme, wherein he attacked Ibsen and challenged Norwegian youth to oppose "the imposition of the

⁶⁵"Det nationale kongedømme," *ibid.*, 8 May 1898.

⁶⁶*Ibid.*

⁶⁷See Petter Nilssen, "Thorstein Lunde," in NBL, pp. 512-514.

middle ages in Norway."⁶⁸ Recognizing Ibsen as "talent-full," Lunde claimed that allowing him to continue with his "ramblings of national monarchy" would be dangerous: "Sigurd Ibsen should be taught," he wrote, "that it is unacceptable that he should come and write enthusiastically about such an impossible thing as a Norwegian monarchy."⁶⁹ Lunde doubted that a Bernadotte on the Norwegian throne could ever be considered national; it would, in fact, be reactionary. Similarly he attacked the National Association for establishing a committee to agitate for a national monarchy and for publishing pamphlets in favor of "the idea." Whereas Dagbladet conceded that the Dreyfus affair had discredited republican ideas, Lunde insisted that the affair would never have been made public if France had been a monarchy. For Lunde, a republic was an open society where "religious-republican ideas of liberty" prevailed. Just as Ibsen saw France as a monarchy in disguise, Lunde insisted that England was "an aristocratic republic with the monarchy as decoration." In his assessment he echoes Walter Bagehot's famous essay on the English Constitution from the mid-sixties of the nineteenth century as he derisively

⁶⁸Thorstein Lunde, Nationalt kongedømme: Et foredrag og noget af et par Avisartikler (Lillehammer: Gudbrandsdølen Bogtrykkeri, 1898). A copy of this pamphlet is in the Norsk Smaatrykk (N.S.) collection no. 415, UB, Oslo.

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 3.

insists that the Queen-Empress "takes her gilded pen and signs what Parliament dictates."⁷⁰ The important thing for Lunde is that popular will rules. The likelihood of that happening, he concedes, is less with a monarchical form of government. It was precisely the form of government for Norway which Ibsen's article had laid open for discussion, but rather than discussing the merits of monarchy contra the republic, Lunde feared, not unreasonably, that Ibsen was preparing the transition from the union to a new monarchy. Not only would this new monarchy bring Norway into a new union, "the monarchical labor union," but it would serve to corrupt the citizens of Norway's capital city where people would compete for royal favors and advantages. It would mean an unwarranted expense for the country and all its people who had to support a court, a palace, and a royal family--a new monarchy with the hope that it would become national.⁷¹

Lunde's reservations were, more or less, what could have been expected from one doubting the premise of Ibsen's basic argument. It was not the last time these same arguments were to be expressed, but, on the whole, pro-monarchical arguments served as the greater catalyst and built up a

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 7. Cf. Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution, 2d ed. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trüber & Co., Ltd., 1905), p. 57.

⁷¹Lunde, Nationalt kongedømme, pp. 10-11.

more impressive response. Two such subsequently appeared in Ringeren; one in June 1898 written by the literary critic and later professor of literature, Christen Collin, the other by Ernst Sars. Both supported the idea of a national monarchy.

Collin wrote that the British system was the example to which Norway should aspire, not to the authoritarian continental monarchies. Calling forth national and religious concepts, Collin insisted that the royal house should be one with the people, "a clergy at the nation's holy hearth."⁷² Like Ibsen, he recognized that existing conditions precluded a republic. If independence could be secured Norway ought to join the "princely labor union." It was this prospect for independence which lay at the heart of Collin's support for Ibsen. The article further crystallized Bjørnson's conversion and in October he wrote Collin thanking him for his "brilliant account."⁷³ Of greater importance, and undoubtedly of greater influence, was Sars joining the ranks in December. He held an intellectual position unequalled in influence and importance in the years around the turn of the century in Norway.

⁷²Chr. Collin, "Nationalt folkedømme," Ringeren 1 (18 June 1898):12.

⁷³Ibid. Also see Bjørnson to Collin, 19 October 1898, in Bjørnstjerne Bjørnsons og Christen Collins Brevveksling 1889-1909 (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1937), pp. 210-211.

Until Norwegian historiography took a decidedly materialistic turn in the years immediately prior to the First World War, with Halvdan Koht and Edvard Bull, it was Sars' historical perceptions which dominated the country. His historical writing was fundamentally concerned with political ideas as he analyzed the organic development of the nation from the middle ages to the nineteenth century. Sars' history had become the central element of Venstre's nationalism and political ideology. His utterances had the ring of gospel to a Norwegian's ears.⁷⁴

According to Sars, Ibsen's article "created a sensation" and was being eagerly discussed. It was an idea whose time had come and was being taken seriously as a means of dissolving an unsatisfactory union. In fact, Sars points out, a similar division had occurred in 1343 when the first union between Norway and Sweden was dissolved and the sons of the union king assumed the separate thrones.⁷⁵ In defense of

⁷⁴See Ottar Dahl, Historisk materialisme: Historieoppfatningen hos Edvard Bull og Halvdan Koht (Oslo: H. Aschehoug & Co., 1952), pp. 14-16; Dahl, Norsk historieforskning i 19. og 20. århundre (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1970), pp. 174-194; Leslie Smith, Modern Norwegian Historiography (Trondheim: Norwegian Universities Press, 1962), pp. 21-33; Trygve Raeder, Ernst Sars (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1935), pp. 219-259; Koht, Menn i Historie (Oslo: H. Aschehoug & Co., 1963), pp. 156-157; and Koht, Historikar i Laere (Oslo: Den Norske Historiske Forening i Kommisjon hos Grøndahl & søn, 1951), pp. 36-40.

⁷⁵J. E. Sars, "Unionopløsning og nationalt kongedømme," Ringeren 1(3 December 1898):8. Cf. Steinar Imsen and Jørn Sandness, Norges Historie Vol. 4: Avfolkning og union:

such an arrangement, Sars writes that while three parties must be considered--the Norwegian people, the Swedish people and the Bernadotte family--the latter should not be humiliated. The sting Oscar would feel in giving up the union crown would be softened by dividing it up in the family. For Sars it was a practical solution to a difficult problem. Similarly practical was Sars' acceptance of the retention of the monarchical form of government generally. As a non-ideological republican, Sars might favor it over monarchy, but for practical reasons he subscribed to Ibsen's point of view. He believed that monarchy would better protect and preserve Norway's independence without isolating her internationally. In addition, a separate monarch would free Norway from the stigma of subordination to Sweden. Even a Bernadotte was attractive to Sars in that case and he gave the idea his full support: "I can only find it correct and timely," he wrote, "that the idea of a 'national' or separate monarchy has been taken up for discussion."⁷⁶

1319-1448, ed. Knut Mykland (Oslo: J. W. Cappelens Forlag, As, 1977), pp. 41-48 and Asa Berglund, "Upplösningen av Den Svensk-Norska Unionen 1343," Historisk Tidsskrift 34 (1947): 365-381.

⁷⁶Sars, "Unionopløsning og nationalt kongedømme," Ringeren 1 (3 December 1898):8. Also see Letter to the editor by Berge B. Furre, New York Times, 23 June 1905, p. 6; and Raymond E. Lindgren, Norway-Sweden: Union, Disunion and Scandinavian Integration (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 53.

In his endorsement of Ibsen's ideas, Sars gave them a measure of authority which they might otherwise not have had. Like Ibsen, he saw it as a program for the future. It was a means of solving the conflict between Norway and Sweden which would only grow in intensity and frustration on both sides. National monarchy represented a satisfactory vehicle for uniting Norwegians without alienating the Swedes or their monarch. Like Ibsen, Sars saw a national monarchy as a means to an end, not an end in itself. The goal sought was Norway's full independence and sovereignty. It is perhaps natural that men born and reared in the nineteenth century would look with favor on monarchy which still played a vital role. For Ibsen it was not only a pillar for his own time, but a wave of the future. It was the focal point of national unity as well as the traditional centerpiece of national consciousness. Properly limited within a constitutional parliamentary system, it would be the preservative guardian of that system, not its reactionary opponent. Those who disagreed were just as much products of the nineteenth century, of course, and opposition to a national monarchy in Norway was based on two essential reasons: the belief that it was a contradiction in terms (ie. a monarchy could never be national in Norway), and because historical developments had moved in a decidedly anti-monarchical direction. This was Thorstein Lunde's evaluation, an

evaluation sharpened in response to Sars' article on 10 December when he criticized him for "forgetting the teachings of evolution."⁷⁷ A similar argument was put forward a year later by the young historian Halvdan Koht, in a lecture he gave at the University of Oslo on 1 December 1899. Koht, insisting that he was not discussing political questions, emphasized that the institution of ministerial responsibility in 1884 was, in reality, the same as the abolition of monarchy. After 1884, therefore, the king was merely king in name in Norway with a functionary's position of official secretary signing documents of state. Koht also pointed to the reason for the appeal of a national monarchy without realizing that he was describing its symbolic power and position for Norwegians. Monarchy, he said, was tied irrevocably to the development of Norway as a country; it "has been both our strength and our weakness, through all vicissitudes. . . the constant center of our national life."⁷⁸ Sigurd Ibsen could not have said it more clearly.

⁷⁷See Lunde, Nationalt kongedømme, p. 16. This section was first published in Gudbrandsdølen, 10 December 1898 in response to Sars's article.

⁷⁸Koht, Det Norske Kongedømmes Utvikling: Forelaesning på Universitetet den 1. desember 1899 (Kristiania: Aktiebogtrykkeriet, 1900), p. 23.

CHAPTER III

FROM NEGOTIATIONS TO ACTION: DISSOLUTION AND THE BERNADOTTE CANDIDACY

In July 1899 Sigurd Ibsen reentered government service. Receiving the news by telephone in the afternoon of 14 July, he initially feared a "misunderstanding." Seeing it publicized in the newspaper that evening however relieved his anxiety and on the following day he wrote his wife that the long wait was over--"finally, finally."¹ The appointment made Ibsen head of the newly created department of foreign affairs in the ministry of the interior. The new department was to serve eventually as the foundation for a separate Norwegian foreign office. Although King Oscar had doubted the wisdom of appointing a man eager to remove him from the throne, he acceded when the Norwegian government of Johannes Steen acknowledged that it would not be uncomfortable with Ibsen.² As an important new government official, Ibsen found himself in a peculiar position in view of his earlier

¹Sigurd Ibsen to Bergliot Ibsen, 15 July 1898, quoted in Bergliot Ibsen, De Tre, p. 181.

²Ibsen, "Da unionen løsnede," p. 209. Also see Otto Blehr to Johannes Steen, 28 June 1899, in Blehr (ed.), Mot Friqjørelsen II, p. 159.

activity in favor of a national monarchy. He accepted the limitations placed upon him, however, and recognized matter of factly that he could no longer "agitate" for a national monarchy: "I had to confine myself to assisting the government with the preparation of that matter which was its program: the establishment of a separate Norwegian consular service."³

With Ibsen in his new post, the idea of national monarchy, as Thorstein Lunde had called it, receded from public view. It was, however, not forgotten, for the subsequent thaw in tensions between Norway and Sweden which eventually led to renewed negotiations kept it a matter of peripheral concern. Any discussion of a Norwegian national monarchy, of course, inherently presupposed a dissolution of the union. Although the tensions of 1898 might have led to that end, renewed negotiations between Norway and Sweden served to limit concerns within the context of the union itself. Ibsen's acceptance of a government post was silent acknowledgment of this, and the importance of his person seems indisputable. As an outsider agitating for a national monarchy he had made national monarchy a central topic of discussion. Now that he had become an insider who turned to finding solutions within the existing structure, the focus of the country changed with him. While it would be overly

³Ibsen, "Da unionen løsnede," pp. 209-210.

presumptuous to credit Ibsen alone, his change of course did reflect a similar change for his countrymen. In addition, encouraging Norwegian hopes, Count Ludvig Douglas, the often hostile Swedish foreign minister, was replaced by the more amenable Alfred Lagerheim, former minister to Berlin. The shift, taking place 27 October 1899, had its origin in another disagreement between the union partners, namely a "pure flag" for Norway's merchant marine. In 1898 Norway had passed, for the third time in accordance with the constitutional requirements of paragraph 79, a law removing the symbol of union from her flag.⁴ Douglas sought to involve other powers in the matter, especially the German Empire and Wilhelm II. Neither King Oscar nor E. G. Boström, the Swedish prime minister, found it acceptable and Douglas was forced to resign.⁵ The resignation clearly revealed a willingness by both countries to seek a solution within the framework of the union without resorting to violence or calling forth unilateral action by one or the other nation.

⁴Jörgen Weibull, Inför Unionsupplösningen 1905: Konsulatfrågan (Stockholm: P. A. Nordstedt & Sönners Förlag, 1962), p. 21. Yngvar Nielsen, Norge i 1905 (Horten: C. Andersens Forlag, 1906), pp. 133-134, 138; Nikolaus Gjelsvik, "Flagspørgsmålet," Ringeren 2(17, 24 July 1899): 340-344, 353-355. Also see Tønnes Andenaes, Grunnloven Var, 1814-1975 (Oslo-Bergen-Tromsø: Universitetsforlaget, 1976), p. 85 for paragraph 79 of the constitution in effect in 1898.

⁵Weibull, Inför Unionsupplösningen, p. 21; Folke Lindberg, Kunqliq Utrikespolitik, pp. 188-191 gives a clear account of Douglas' efforts with foreign powers.

This moderate position was reflected by Dagbladet's comments on Ibsen's ideas for a national monarchy in May 1898, when the paper emphasized its support for "independence--in the union" with Norway instituting its own foreign office.⁶

The lack of hostility in Lagerheim's policies proved advantageous to Norwegians and reduced the bitter climate of opinion.⁷ The nationalism of the more extreme left was sufficiently neutralized by supporters of cooperation and negotiations when, in 1901, Ibsen wrote an account showing how separation between a Norwegian consular service and the foreign office could be realized.⁸ On the strength of this report, Norway and Sweden returned to negotiations following the initiative of Lagerheim.⁹ Although Lagerheim admitted that he took the initiative only after he found out that

⁶"Det nationale kongedømme," Dagbladet, 8 May 1898.

⁷This was especially noticeable in the posting of the consular service where by 1902 a majority was Norwegian born. See Lindgren, Norway-Sweden, p. 74. This had, however, no meaning of substance to the Norwegians who sought separate institutions not merely Norwegian born consuls under the direction of the Swedish foreign office. Cf. Lagerheim to Blehr, 25 October 1901 and Blehr to Steen, 30 October 1901 in Blehr (ed.), Mot Frigjørelsen II, pp. 225-227, 228-230.

⁸The account was titled "Spørgsmålet om et saerskilt norsk konsulatvaesens forhold til det felles diplomati og det felles utenriksstyre--behandlet af expidisjonschef dr. jur. Sigurd Ibsen," see Blehr (ed.), Mot Frigjørelsen II, p. 29 n.l.

⁹Lagerheim to Blehr, 17 October 1901, in *ibid.*, pp. 220-222.

Ibsen was working on his report, it was the first time Sweden appeared willing to consider the possibility of separate institutions.¹⁰ Ibsen's report was, in essence, endorsed when on 26 July the consulate committee consisting of two Swedes and two Norwegians (including Ibsen), concluded that there was no hindrance against the establishment of separate offices for the kingdoms.¹¹ The committee's conclusions were in turn discussed through the winter of 1902-1903 by the two governments, which on 24 March 1903 declared that each country's consuls would be independent of the other but "regulated by identically worded laws which cannot be changed or abrogated without bilateral agreement."¹²

With the conclusion of negotiations, it appeared to some Norwegian nationalists that a separate consular office would inevitably lead to a separate foreign office and a dissolution of the union. The consulates would undoubtedly contribute to increasing trade, but the economic advantages thereby evident were of little importance when considered alongside the prospect of complete political independence.¹³

¹⁰See Otto Blehr's comments quoted in "Hovedlinjer i Norsk politikk i årene 1893-1903," in *ibid.*, pp. 31-36.

¹¹See "Konsulatkomiteen af 1902," in Heiberg, Unionens Opløsning 1905, pp. 88-89. Ibsen, De Tre, pp. 199-200.

¹²"Overenskomsten af 24 mars 1903 (den saakaldte kommuniké)," in Heiberg, Unionens Opløsning 1905, p. 90.

¹³Jacob Schøning, Dagbøger, p. 74.

There were those, however, who saw the agreement with Sweden as tying Norway's hands by breaking with Norwegian national policy merely "for the sake of peace."¹⁴ Georg Stang and Wollert Konow, both members of the cabinet, let it be known that they looked unfavorably upon the agreement. When Ibsen threatened to resign as a result, the prime minister had little choice in the matter. Not only had Ibsen stood with the prime minister during the negotiations, but his resignation would be a signal to the Swedes that the negotiations were not considered serious by the Norwegians.¹⁵

The subsequent resignation of Stang and Konow, the two radicals, added to the tense climate during the election campaign in the Fall of 1903. As a result of the obvious disagreements, the policy of negotiations inevitably became an issue in the election. The heavy defense expenditures supported by Stang as minister of defense also came into question, particularly since the Swedes seemed willing to negotiate. Principally for the purpose of electioneering dissatisfied former members of both the Conservative and Liberal parties united to form a center coalition, the United Party (Samlingspartiet), with the slogan:

¹⁴Johan Castberg, 24 March 1903, in Dagbøker: 1900-1917, 2 vols. (Oslo: J. W. Cappelens Forlag, 1953), I:163 (hereafter cited as Castberg, Dagbøker).

¹⁵Ole Anton Qvam to Blehr, 30 May 1903, in Blehr (ed.), Mot Frigjørelsen II, p. 256.

"Negotiations and Only Negotiations" (Forhandling, Bare Forhandling). Coupled with the increased vote of the Norwegian Labor Party, this coalition returned a majority in the Storting with sixty-three seats to its opponents fifty-four (four of which were Socialists, newly elected from the radical districts of north Norway).¹⁶ The new government, led by the Conservative leader Georg Francis Hagerup, had as its first objective the continuing of the negotiations which had so marked its campaign. Although this was accepted by the new government, Christian Michelsen, leader of the liberal wing of the United Party, insisted that a break in negotiations would not bind anyone to continuing a policy of negotiations alone.¹⁷ To a certain extent it can be said that the Swedish accommodation of Lagerheim had now been met by a similar accommodation on the part of the Norwegians, although there was an obvious reluctance to support it without some cynicism. The apparent desire from both sides to settle the issue created an optimistic view of the future,

¹⁶Castberg, 18 October 1905, in Dagbøker, p. 174; Schøning, Dagbøker, pp. 73-76; Bernt A. Nissen, Nasjonal Vekst, pp. 351-352. In his recent book, T. K. Derry incorrectly gives the figure as 5 Socialists counting Adam Egede-Nissen who did not join the Labor Party until 1905. See Derry, A History of Modern Norway, p. 159.

¹⁷Schøning, 20 October 1903, in Dagbøker, p. 77. The split in the Hagerup government is the subject of an excellent recent study by Jan Harald Berg, "Forhandling eller aksjon: Regjeringen Hagerup og Linjevalget i 1905," (Unpublished hovedoppgave i historie, The University of Oslo, 1972).

but the foundation on which it rested was less than solid as evidenced by Michelsen's need to remind his colleagues that they stood free should the negotiations collapse.

The months from the election of 1903 until November 1904 saw the negotiations continue but so did the disagreements in principle between the two parties. The stresses caused thereby did not contribute to the government's instability which had shown a lack of cohesion and solidarity from the very beginning. A further indication of the potential powder keg evidenced itself, again with Michelsen, during the Storting debate on the agreements on 27 April 1904. Norwegians had grown increasingly skeptical that their view of the union could be reconciled with the Swedish view and in expressing this Michelsen spoke of "new methods and new goals" (nye linjer og nye mål):

If the negotiations now fail because it is impossible to reach an understanding which completely satisfies Norway's just demands to stand totally unbound with regard to the future foreign office--then we must consider new methods for Norwegian policy. It can no longer be possible to continue taking up new negotiations on the consulate issue, nor for that matter, on the foreign office itself. . . . We must begin to cooperate on new methods and new goals as practical union politics.¹⁸

Norwegian historians have debated the motives behind Michelsen's speech, but whatever his intentions it did

¹⁸Kongeriget Norge, Stortings Forhandlinger 1903/1904, Vol. 7b: Stortingstidende (Kristiania: Centraltrykkeriet, 1904), p. 2585. Also see Schøning, 27 April 1904 in Dagbøger, p. 146.

identify him as a potentially important figure should the Hagerup government's policy run aground.¹⁹ By the end of 1904, the negotiations were stranded and, as a result of an internal crisis in the Swedish cabinet, Laberheim resigned. It then fell on Boström as prime minister to make the decisions and he led the Swedish government into a tougher

¹⁹In a ground-breaking article, Rolf Danielsen of the University of Bergen, has contended that Michelsen's actions were determined by his fear of the socialist and a desire to create a non-socialist front against them. As a result, his "action line" in the union controversy was intended to get the union problem settled as an issue in internal Norwegian politics as quickly as possible. See Rolf Danielsen, "Samlingspartiet og unionen," Historisk Tidsskrift 41(1961): 303-319. Jacob S. Worm-Müller, on the other hand, emphasizes the union itself and claims that Michelsen's view was a result of his experiences as minister-resident in Stockholm where he became convinced that there "was a large abyss" between Norwegian and Swedish understanding; that even Lagerheim understood little of the Norwegian point of view. He returned from Stockholm "convinced for life that it would never be possible for us [Norway] to achieve equality." See Worm-Müller, "1905," Ideer og Mennesker: Utvalgte avhandlinger, artikler og taler utgitt til 70-årsdagen (Oslo: H. Aschehoug & Co., 1954), p. 60. If this contention is true it corresponds with Ibsen's earlier view that anything could be negotiated but equality which had to be an assumption of any successful negotiation. The similarity was too strong to be a mere coincidence. Michelsen himself seems to have been somewhat unclear on his own intentions, however, as he later retracted his strong statement by telling Hagerup that he had not intended to recommend that Norway take matters into her own hand. See Georg Francis Hagerup, Dagbok Ført i 1905 av Statsminister Francis Hagerup, ed. H. Falck Myckland (Oslo: H. Aschehoug & Co., 1951), p. 143 (hereafter cited as Hagerup, Dagbok). Cf. C. J. Hambro, "Hvorfor 'Morgenavisen' Ble Til," in Morgenavisen og 1905: Utgitt ved Morgenavisens 50-års jubileum 1952 (Bergen: A.s. John Griegs Boktrykkeri, 1952), pp. 7-18; and Fredrik Stang, Streiftog: Noen Artikler og Foredrag (Oslo: H. Aschehoug & Co., 1939), pp. 80-99.

stance over and against the Norwegian position. In his counter-proposals he recommended total control over the consular officers by the Swedish foreign minister. Although slight modifications were subsequently made, in his position, the negotiations broke off and the Norwegian government faced the crisis it had feared, yet had apparently anticipated in 1903.²⁰ Boström was accused of breaking his word and his proposals were dubbed "dependency clauses."²¹ It was this view which came to govern subsequent Norwegian action, although Jörgen Weibull, the Swedish historian, has recently demonstrated that Boström did not break his word. He contends that it was rather the surfacing of the same old national antagonisms in all their emotional vigor for the last time.²² Norwegians reacted to the perceived wrong as they had so often reacted before--with nationalistic indignation.²³ It was as though they considered themselves

²⁰See "Statsminister Boströms i november 1904 fremlagte 'grundlag';" "Statsminister Hagerups skrivelse af 26 november 1904;" "Det af statsminister Boström og statsraad Ramstedt i december 1904 fremlagte lovforslag;" and "Det norske statsraads prememoria af 11de januar 1905," in Heiberg, Unionens Opløsning 1905, pp. 98-106. Ibsen, "Da unionen løsne," Samtiden, pp. 197-207.

²¹Ibsen, "Da unionen løsne," ibid.; Nielsen, Norge i 1905, pp. 161-174; Hagerup to Aasmund Vinje, 26 December 1904, in Ms. fol. 2733.2 in Worm-Müller papers, UB, Oslo.

²²See Jörgen Weibull, Inför Unionsupplösningen, pp. 237-281.

²³Cf. Arne Garborg, Norges Selvstendighedskamp fra 1814 til Nu.

to be protecting their "inalienable rights," a position inherently conservative in scope. Through all this they generally refrained from attacking the monarchy as the source of their discontent. Even though Ibsen had placed the monarchy in the central position in 1898, the break off of negotiations contained no significant outburst toward the dynasty itself. It was not until 1905 that attention focused increasingly on the monarch's role, much as it had for the American revolutionaries in 1776.

As a result of the break in negotiations, the Hagerup government broke apart. Christian Michelsen was called on to form a new government with the express purpose of resolving the impasse, even though he had confessed to Hagerup in 1904 that he had no particular plan in the event negotiations broke down. Unlike Hagerup's coalition government, however, Michelsen intended to form a ministry which would have the ability to maneuver in spite of individual differences among its members and he, therefore, would not allow his cabinet the same freedom which he had articulated for the Hagerup ministry in 1903.²⁴

By early 1905, the view that Norway was a mere dependency of Sweden had become generally acknowledged among Norwegians and the central role of the king in the personal

²⁴Worm-Müller, "Det norske Standpunkt: Regjeringsdannelsen 1905," Samtiden 64(1955):241-242.

union became more and more a point of focus.²⁵ Increasingly, talk of "using the knife" to sever the bonds of the union dominated Norwegian thinking.²⁶

This thinking showed itself increasingly radicalized, yet remained seriously divided. Hagerup retained his insistent belief in the utility of negotiations, but it had become a weakening minority view when on 11 March Michelsen announced the formation of his government.²⁷ It was the Storting which became the center of activity and finally moved to the decision that a consular office should be instituted unilaterally based on Norwegian law. Divisions also remained in the parliamentary body, however, as some sought to proceed on the so-called "long law-line" (lange lov linje) which would function in accordance with paragraph 79 of the constitution. In this manner the consular law could become effective in six years after having passed by three Stortings without the king's signature. Others claimed that six years was too long, that if a break should come, it should come more speedily than that.²⁸ According

²⁵Klaus Hanssen, "Den Politiske Situation," *ibid.* 16(1905):134-138; Jørgen Løvland, "Unionen," *ibid.*, pp. 65-67.

²⁶Halvard Saeter, "Unionen," *ibid.*, pp. 4-8.

²⁷Hagerup, Dagbok, pp. 132-145. Also see Worm-Müller, "Det norske Standpunkt: Regjeringsdannelsen i 1905," Samtiden 64(1955):238-248.

²⁸Løvland, Menn og Minner Fra 1905, ed. Torkell J. Løvland (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1929), p. 90. Also see Berg, "Forhandling eller aksjon," pp. 72-85.

to Jørgen Løvland, minister-resident in Stockholm in the new Michelsen government and later foreign minister, the question was not one of procedure but of Norwegian reaction to any failure on the part of the monarch to sanction a consular law passed by the Norwegian parliament.²⁹ Løvland has written that there was considerable discussion earlier as to any possible scenario which would result from the refusal on the part of the Norwegian ministers to countersign any royal veto. If the king in turn failed to get a new ministry, the Storting would declare the monarchy out of function and institute a provisional government.³⁰ The king had obviously become the central figure in any Norwegian action. When the Storting debated and passed the law for a separate Norwegian consulate office on 18 and 23 May, the first part of the scenario had been completed.³¹ The disagreement which had initially been with the Swedish government and the Riksdag (Sweden's parliament) turned to center on the king because of the nature of the union. Because there was no ministerial responsibility in Sweden, and since the king was a union king holding the main effective tie to the union in his hands, he became the

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹See "Specialkomiteens indstilling af 10de mai til lov om norsk konsulatvaesen," and "Konsulatlovens behandling i odelsting og lagting," in Heiberg, Unionens Opløsning 1905, pp. 146-184.

natural point of attack. All evidence points to the maneuver being directed against the monarch because he was the monarch; it was not an attack on the person of King Oscar.

When the resolution passed by the Storting reached Stockholm to be placed before the monarch on Saturday 27 May, the members of the Norwegian ministry in Stockholm agreed that they would not counter-sign a royal veto. Present at the meeting were the Norwegian ministers (Løvland, Edvard Hagerup Bull, and Harald Bothner), August Sibbern, the secretary of the delegation, the Crown Prince, and the King of Norway-Sweden. The king asked that the Norwegian recommendation be read, whereupon he answered that he could not sanction the law. After some discussion on the consequences of such an action, the Norwegians requested that the king accept their resignation; he refused, insisting that he could not now form a new ministry.³² Of these events, Fridtjof Nansen, the famous Norwegian explorer and propagandist for Norway in 1905, wrote later in the year: "Norwegians had

³²Ibid., pp. 192-194. Løvland, Menn og Minner, p. 112. Edvard Hagerup Bull, Statsråd Edvard Hagerup Bulls Dagbøker Fra 1905 (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1955), pp. 39-43 (hereafter cited as Hagerup Bull, Dagbøker), Harald Bothner, 18 May 1905, in Dagbøker in privat arkiv 130, Riksarkivet, Oslo. The Norwegian government subsequently omitted the qualifying "now" in its declaration of 7 June, giving rise to no end of controversy. It appears to be of little importance, the insistence of T. K. Derry and Raymond Lindgren to the contrary notwithstanding, however, since for all practical purposes the result would have been the same. See Derry, History of Modern Norway, pp. 164, 457 n. 41; Lindgren, Norway-Sweden, pp. 123-131.

to choose between a King without a Government or a Government without a King, and they could scarcely hesitate in their choice."³³ The choice was less obvious than Nansen believed, however, because Ibsen's idea of a national monarchy would return to command the attention of Norwegians in the same instant that they rid themselves of the union monarch.

As long as negotiations between the union partners held out hope for success, a national monarchy for Norway remained merely an unspoken alternative. When King Oscar refused his sanction, Norwegians again looked seriously to the prospect of a separate monarchy as the means of gaining their separate national existence. To that end the government of Christian Michelsen had as its stated purpose ". . .the carrying out of Norway's constitutional right for her own consular office and claiming Norway's sovereignty as a free and independent kingdom."³⁴ In order to achieve this, Michelsen called for national unity over any considerations of party politics, hoping to avoid the fate of the Hagerup government. It was an appeal, the motive for which historians have debated

³³Fridtjof Nansen, Supplementary Chapter to Norway and the Union with Sweden (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1905), p. 106. An extremely bitter reaction to King Oscar's veto can be seen in Umset Jaren, Hvem tvang os ind i, og hvem tvang os atter ud af Unionen? (Kristiania: L. E. Tvedtes Forlag, 1905), pp. 3-7.

³⁴Michelsen speech of 15 March 1905, in Heiberg, Unionens Opløsning 1905, p. 35.

without clear resolution.³⁵ Showing characteristics of a political chameleon, party leader as well as a symbol of national unity, he insisted party strife should be of secondary significance. The plea for unity was, to a great extent, an expression of an already existing situation. Four days earlier Social-Demokraten, the organ of the Norwegian Labor Party, had expressed its resolve by writing: "If they [Michelsen and Løvland] are men with the ability to lead they will not lack support."³⁶

The admission by King Oscar that he could not now form a new government, as interpreted by Norwegians, left the monarch in a constitutionally untenable position of not being able to provide the country with a government.³⁷ Michelsen formulated the response by claiming that: "at the same instant that the king's personal policy makes it impossible for him to form any responsible ministry, that Norwegian monarch ceases to function and with it the union

³⁵Ibid. The most recent analyses are Thomas Christian Wyller, Christian Michelsen: Politikeren (Oslo: Dreyers Forlag, 1975), pp. 86-90 which tends to be overly sympathetic and Rolf Danielsen, "Samlingspartiet og unionen," HT 41(1961):303-319 [also published in Ottar Dahl, Andreas Holmsen and Knut Mykland (eds.), Hundre års historisk forskning: Utvalgte artikler fra Historisk Tidsskrift (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1970), pp. 317-387].

³⁶Social-Demokraten, 11 March 1905.

³⁷See "Afskrift af den i statsraadmøde den 27de mai opsatte protokol angaaende ikke-bifald af den norske regjering og statsraadsafdelingens afskedsansøgninger," in Heiberg, Unionens Opløsning 1905, p. 195.

with Sweden based on the joint monarchy."³⁸ The action by King Oscar and the subsequent Norwegian response led consequently to the unilateral dissolution of the union by the Norwegian Storting on 7 June. The government resigned and turned its offices over to the parliament for disposition. Consistent with Løvland's scenario, Carl Berner, president of the Storting and Venstre representative from Sarpsborg, read a statement asking the body to declare unanimously the Michelsen ministry a provisional government with the assumption that the union was dissolved and the king no longer functioned as king of Norway. Without debate, the 117-member Storting acceded.³⁹ Though the half-hour session revealed near total unanimity there were indications that deep divisions existed. Included in the day's business was a subsequent address to King Oscar asking that he allow a prince of the Bernadotte family to accept election as Norway's king--the so-called Bernadotte candidacy. The candidature assumed that Norway had been and would remain a monarchy. It was a blow to republicans, but the vote of 112 to 5 revealed that only the Socialists steadfastly maintained their opposition in the face of pressure for

³⁸Michelsen speech, 7 June 1905, in *ibid.*, p. 205.

³⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 206-207. Also see Danielsen, Det Norske Storting Gjennom 150 år. Vol. 2: Tidsrommet 1870-1908 (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1964), p. 378.

national unity.⁴⁰ Justified on various grounds, the Bernadotte candidacy had its origins in the debates of the 1890's. The articles by Sigurd Ibsen had been particularly influential but were, after all, only theoretical. Now, in 1905, when independence was the prime consideration, any means which served national ends had to be considered wholly acceptable and justifiable.⁴¹ Therefore, in order to show that Norwegians possessed bitterness neither towards the Swedes nor their king, the offer of a Bernadotte candidate was made. There is, however, evidence that shows the gesture was made with more regard to practical considerations than was first admitted.

The Norwegian government was mindful of the great power rivalry existing in Europe in 1905 and remembered the Hohenzollern candidacy which touched off the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. It was also believed necessary to select a monarch who could understand the language of the country.⁴² Due to these considerations, a Bernadotte candidate seemed eminently practical. Although the idea was not new, it raised a serious question as to whether King Oscar would accept the

⁴⁰Heiberg, Unionens Opløsning 1905, pp. 207-209; Løvland, Menn og Minner, p. 173.

⁴¹Michelsen speech, 6 June 1905, in Det Stenografiske referater fra De Hemmelige Møter i Stortinget i 1905 (Oslo: H. Aschehoug & Co., 1951), p. 72 (hereafter cited as Hemmelige Møter i Stortinget).

⁴²Løvland, Menn og Minner, p. 138.

offer. He had not reacted favorably to Ibsen's proposals earlier, why then should he be so inclined in 1905? But if the king's reaction to the candidacy was in question, his attitude regarding dissolution of the union seems not to have been in doubt. In 1924 Michelsen told historian Jacob Worm-Müller that "it was quite impossible to talk to him [Oscar] about a possible dissolution."⁴³ Sigurd Ibsen, the man who had originally popularized the idea insisted that Norwegians were laboring under an "illusion" to think the king would place himself at odds with Swedish interests.⁴⁴ This is consistent with Oscar's written protest of 10 June to the Storting making clear that he considered his unwillingness to sanction the consulate law as constitutional and that he refused to recognize Norway's unilateral declaration of dissolution.⁴⁵ Regardless of Oscar's response, however, the idea of a Bernadotte candidate had become locked into Norwegian thinking. The subtle impact of Ibsen's earlier arguments seem to have been decisive. On the same day Oscar refused his sanction, Michelsen and Løvland had discussed the

⁴³"Jacob S. Worm-Müller, Christian Michelsen," type-written manuscript of conversations between Worm-Müller and Michelsen, 11 December 1924, in Ms. fol. 2809, in Worm-Müller papers, UB, Oslo.

⁴⁴Ibsen, "Da Unionen løsne," Samtiden 17(1906):212.

⁴⁵"Kong Oscars protestskrivelse af 10de juni 1905," in Heiberg, Unionens Opløsning 1905, pp. 214-217.

Bernadotte candidacy as a possible reaction.⁴⁶ On 1 June, Michelsen, Løvland and Bothner discussed various alternatives, including the Bernadotte candidacy, and by the following day the plan of action, which included the Bernadotte candidature, had been formulated.⁴⁷ It appears that Michelsen adopted the plan after gaining positive responses from various individuals, although he would later claim that combining the dissolution declaration with the candidacy was his own idea.⁴⁸ In addition to Løvland and Bothner, Michelsen also seems to have gained a favorable reaction from Thore Foss, a representative from Lister and Mandal amt (county) on Norway's south coast, whom he had known for more than a decade. Foss was a valuable test case for Michelsen because he was inclined to favor a republic in Norway. Therefore, it was significant that he told Michelsen that he "liked the plan well."⁴⁹ Later in the year Foss would emerge as one of Michelsen's strongest critics and an opponent of a Norwegian national monarchy. Getting Foss to accept the plan may well have been an early coup for Michelsen, but it also reveals that the desire for

⁴⁶Løvland, Menn og Minner, p. 129.

⁴⁷Bothner, 1 June 1905, in Dagbøker, in privat arkiv 130, in Riksarkivet, Oslo.

⁴⁸See Worm-Muller, "Christian Michelsen," in Ms. fol. 2809, in Worm-Muller papers, UB, Oslo.

⁴⁹Løvland, Menn og Minner, p. 129.

independence was an important priority. While Michelsen's biographer, Thomas Christian Wyller, tends to give him pre-science in foreseeing the consequences of the dissolution and working for a stabilizing of the form of government as early as 6 June, it is probable that both Michelsen and Foss thought more of Swedish reaction in the immediate future.⁵⁰

Even though the Bernadotte candidacy was a revival of Ibsen's ideas from 1898, it was not unusual for Michelsen to claim the revived concept as his own in 1905; he often "borrowed or stole or used others' material."⁵¹ Rather than considering this description by Michelsen's biographer as an indictment, it must be recognized that the idea had become coin of the realm by 1905 and, in addition, appeared to make good political sense.⁵² Michelsen may well have used it to disarm his republican opposition, for he was cognizant of the possibility that a debate over Norway's form of government could call forth serious cleavages in the united front he sought to build and maintain.⁵³

The prime minister laid forth his plan at a meeting between the cabinet and the presidents of the Storting

⁵⁰See Wyller, Christian Michelsen, p. 85.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 84.

⁵²Løvland, Menn og Minner, p. 129.

⁵³Hagerup, 2 June 1905, in Dagbok, p. 157.

(presidentskapet) where it received a favorable hearing. The reception was based on several considerations: the response it would receive by the Swedes and their royal house; the ease whereby the changes in the status of Norway could be accepted; the difficulty in gaining a king from an acceptable royal house as long as the Bernadottes refused to recognize the dissolution; and, perhaps most important, the chance to repair quickly damages caused by the dissolution. It was agreed that an editorial committee would draft all plans in accordance with the Michelsen plan.⁵⁴

Because premature disclosure of the Bernadotte candidacy might give rise to organized opposition, it was agreed that no one could be told of the proposed action until it was necessary to do so. Edvard Hagerup Bull, a member of the Stockholm delegation and later justice minister in the Michelsen government, noted in his diary: "We understood that this was a difficult point, and that it should come as a surprise for the Storting."⁵⁵ It was further decided that the government would demand a vote of confidence (kabinettspørsmål) on the candidacy and accept responsibility only if it were accepted as a part of the whole package.⁵⁶ Not only would the government make it a matter

⁵⁴Hagerup Bull, 6 June 1905, in Dagbøker, p. 45.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 46.

⁵⁶Ibid. Also see Castberg, 8 June 1905, in Dagbøker, p. 352; Hemmelige Møter i Stortinget, pp. 6-7.

of confidence, but it also contemplated abrogating the possible use of Storting regulation 28II which provided for a two-day postponement on any matter if one-fifth of the members desired it. The government finally rejected this as unnecessary and potentially dangerous, but the fact that it was considered attests to the government's apprehensions on the issue of the Bernadotte candidacy.⁵⁷ What evidence is there to support such an apprehensive posture and a willingness to resort to extraordinary maneuvers and surprises? There had existed a real fear that a majority, or at least a significant minority, of the Storting favored the institution of a republic. Odelsting president Abraham Berge told a Danish observer that there could be as much as an eighty percent majority for a republic.⁵⁸ Another representative, Eivind Hognestad, a moderate conservative from Stavanger, said that although he doubted there were one hundred republicans in the Storting on 7 June: "The majority probably thought a republic would be the most ideal, but what was expedient played a great role. Everything had to happen so fast."⁵⁹ It was, in fact, speed and surprise

⁵⁷Hagerup Bull, 12 June 1905, in Dagbøker, pp. 47-48 and Bothner, 4 June 1905, in Dagbøker, privat arkiv 130, Riksarkivet, Oslo.

⁵⁸Halvdan Koht, Minne Fra Unge År (Oslo: H. Aschehoug & Co., 1968), p. 270.

⁵⁹"Notater om samtale med Stortingsman Eivind Hognestad," in Ms. fol. 2809, Worm-Müller papers, UB, Oslo.

which best served the government in seeking not merely a majority for its position, but a vote as near to unanimity as possible. To that end the government subsequently directed its efforts and actions while still fearing a potentially strong republican opposition.⁶⁰

The fear of republican sentiment was not without foundation. Essentially, Norwegian republicanism had its origins in the dissatisfaction with the union itself although its intellectual sources came from the European continent and the United States. The leading spokesman for a republic had been Bjørntjerne Bjørnson before his son-in-law converted him to his ideas of national monarchy. A letter written by Bjørnson in 1886 is typical of the republicanism which appears repeatedly throughout other contemporary sources. He insisted that Norway, having neither a nobility nor a national royal family, but simply living under Swedish protection, was a "born republic."⁶¹ Although Bjørnson was the

⁶⁰Hagerup Bull, "Om Kongevalget i 1905," Samtiden 39 (1928):13.

⁶¹Bjørnson to Holger Drachmann, 16 March 1886, in Brevveksling med Danske, 1:260. Bjørnson often changed his positions and loved a good fight. Halvdan Koht has written that it mattered little what the cause was as long as he had "a cause." See Koht, "Bjørnson i Norsk Historie," Samtiden 43(1932):667-680. One cause Bjørnson nurtured long was Norwegian independence. To him it was an organic living thing growing to maturity. Republicanism nurtured it for a time, but in 1905 it seems that monarchy was to serve the purpose for Bjørnson. Cf. Bjørnson's views in Verdens Gang, 27 November 1886 with "Aabent Brev," Aftenposten, 29 September 1905. Also see Bjørnson to Peter Nansen, 30 October 1905, in

most influential spokesman for a republic prior to 1905, he was not alone in emphasizing his hostility to the union with Sweden as the fountainhead of his republicanism. A pamphlet published in 1905 referred to the union as ". . .a gigantic republican hatchery which has hatched a great many fighting roosters and numerous hens and chickens."⁶² There were individuals in the government itself who were well known for their republican sentiments; most notably Jørgen Løvland and Gunnar Knudsen, minister of finance.⁶³ That it caused little problem for the prime minister reflects again the subordination of other issues in favor of independence as

Brevveksling med Danske, 3:179-180, where he writes: "We did not break out of the union for the sake of the republic, but for our independence."

⁶²Cato [Ole Invald Marius Beiningen], Kong Carl eller "Praesident" Konow: En utredning af stats-- og folkeretslige grundprinciper (Kristiania: L. E. Tvedtes Forlag, 1905), p. 41. Also see Castberg, 8 June 1905, in Dagbøger, p. 356; Andreas Andersen Grimsø, Erindringer Fra Mine 25 Aar Paa Stortinget (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1927), p. 45; Birger Steiro, Marcus Thranes politiske agitasjon (Melhus: Snøfugl Forlag, 1974), pp. 43-51; Lindgren, Norway-Sweden, p. 53; and the letter to the editor from Berge B. Furre, New York Times, 23 June 1905, p. 6. For the Labor Party's attitude toward the union see Frank Rossvall, "Det Norske arbeiderpartis unionspolitikk fram til 7. juni 1905," (unpublished hovedoppgave i historie, The University of Oslo, 1951).

⁶³See Løvland, Menn og Minner, p. 249; Bernt A. Nissen, Gunnar Knudsen (Oslo: H. Aschehoug & Co., 1957), pp. 155-159; Hagerup Bull, Profiler av Noen Samtidige, p. 111 n.1; Koht, "Gunnar Knudsen," in Minnearv og Historie (Oslo: H. Aschehoug & Co., 1965), p. 218. Knudsen resigned on 31 October to campaign for a republic but Løvland became an ardent monarchist.

the principle issue of unification and Michelsen's ability to focus on that alone in leading his coalition government. It attests to his political acumen and strength, his back-slapping style so atypical of the Norwegian parliamentary system.⁶⁴ Jacob Schønning, who had resigned from the Hagerup government on 1 March 1905 along with Michelsen, wrote of this behavior in his diary on 1 September 1904:

Michelsen is said to have been a chalk-white conservative, a blue and pale red conservative, a deep red liberal and a platonic republican, a pale liberal, a gray moderate and all this in the span of a short time. He has shown the unique ability to change convictions as necessity dictates.⁶⁵

Michelsen was all things to all people, but probably because of his political behavior he was able to hold the unanimity of his government as long as it was necessary. A consensus of the cabinet is easier to maintain, however, than is the consensus of a parliamentary body such as the Norwegian Storting in 1905. The cabinet could be cajoled and flattered, but it was, after all, they who made policy. The Storting, on the other hand, needed to be held in check by other means. It could certainly be cajoled and flattered, but in addition to this Michelsen used swiftness and

⁶⁴See Comments of Eiving Hognestad in Ms. fol. 2809, Worm-Müller papers, UB, Oslo; Fredrik Stang, Erindringer Fra Min Politiske Tid (Oslo: Grødahl & Sønns Boktrykkeri, 1946), pp. 153-154; and Wyller, Christian Michelsen, pp. 117-139.

⁶⁵Jacob Schønning, 1 September 1904, in Dagbøker, p. 179.

surprise. It was said of Michelsen that he was lazy, that he disliked work and seldom prepared himself by reading documents but that when he had a position and a plan ". . . he could get into matters as quick as lightning. . . [while] opposition only incited him. If someone opposed him the matter had to be carried out."⁶⁶ A demonstration of Michelsen's talents began on 5 June when the government met with the Storting's special committee (the same committee which had earlier drafted the resolution for the consulate law) to work on drafting a resolution of the dissolution of the union. The prime minister was blunt about his program but he did not tell them about the central feature of his plan--the Bernadotte candidacy. That was a surprise he would divulge only when he was ready. Although he carefully avoided any mention of his plans for a new monarch, Michelsen pointed out that no constituent assembly should be called and that "monarchy, for the time being, must be maintained."⁶⁷ He also contended that the constitution of 17 May 1814 would

⁶⁶See Comments of Joachim Grieg about Michelsen in Ms. fol. 2809, Worm-Müller papers, UB, Oslo. It was said that Michelsen's incisive mind was well complimented by the more cluttered mind of Løvland. Løvland provided argument upon argument, Michelsen would have only one or two, "but he saw right through a matter." "Notater om samtaler med Abraham Berge, 1923-1926," in *ibid.* Two complimentary studies of Michelsen's personality are Hagerup Bull, "Christian Michelsen: Bidrag til Hans Karakteristik," Samtiden 36(1925):389-410; and Annie Wall, Omkring Christian Michelsen och 1905 (Oslo: H. Aschehoug & Co., 1925).

⁶⁷Castberg, 5 June 1905, in Dagbøker, p. 344.

replace the revised constitution of 4 November 1814 which embodied the changes required by the Norwegian-Swedish union at its inception. No new constitution was required, he said, because the original still applied. Not only that, but any debate on Norway's form of government would "split the people" and threaten independence.⁶⁸ Always an effective polemicist, Michelsen was threatening at the same time he was seducing. Whatever reception the Bernadotte candidacy was going to get, Michelsen was preparing the groundwork and there would be little or no time to react to his "surprise" in any way he did not anticipate.

On 6 June the committee heard for the first time of Michelsen's plans for a Bernadotte candidate. It was to be the government's policy to combine the dissolution of the union with an offer to the Bernadotte king that a prince of his dynasty assume the throne of an independent Norway. Ibsen's plan had become policy. Obviously shell-shocked, Johan Castberg, a radical Venstre representative and one of the most outspoken members of the Storting, underlined "for the first time" in his diary.⁶⁹ Word of Michelsen's plan spread discreetly through the influential circles of Oslo. Schønning noted in his diary that he had been told "in confidence" of the plan and the government's hopes of thereby

⁶⁸Ibid.

⁶⁹See 8 June 1905, in *ibid.*, p. 353.

placating Swedish hostility. He thought it a pipedream and doubted its effectiveness. It would only give King Oscar the chance to draw matters out for as long as it suited him. Worst of all, Schønning feared that a republic was being "sacrificed."⁷⁰ Sensing the beginnings of a conspiracy, Schønning noted that both the conservative newspaper Aftenposten and the socialist organ, Social-Demokraten, were refusing articles dealing with the form of government.⁷¹ Discipline had become the catchword as the Storting readied for debate.

The meeting began at 7:15 P.M. with Stortings president Carl Berner reminding the members of their oath of confidentiality. The doors were locked but the bright sun of mid-summer still shone through the large northward-facing windows of the hall. A determined Michelsen rose to introduce the government plan. Wasting no time he informed the Storting that his government stood or fell on the total plan. It was a matter of confidence, Michelsen insisted, because the Bernadotte candidacy was "a decisive point, . . . a point of the greatest importance."⁷² To reject it would place the Storting in the position of having to find a new government. The matter had been clearly stated; no member

⁷⁰Schønning, 6 June 1905, in Dagbøker, pp. 355-356.

⁷¹Ibid., p. 356.

⁷²Hemmelige Møter i Stortinget, p. 6.

was going to vote his conscience on this question without accepting the responsibility of possibly subverting the independence of Norway. Michelsen demonstrated his greatest strength at the same moment he demonstrated his greatest weakness.

While recognizing the government's weakness, opponents of the Bernadotte candidacy readily understood the strength of the action. They accepted it reluctantly, however, as speaker after speaker claimed to be doing so only because of the demand for a vote of confidence on the issue by Michelsen. Perhaps typical of the reaction was Johan Castberg's remarks that he would vote for it only because the government demanded it; it was, nevertheless, " a deep disappointment."⁷³ Castberg and the others who shared his disappointment spoke of the failure to institute a republic when Norway had the chance. A republic, noted Wollert Konow, Venstre representative from Hedmark, "is best suited to our simple conditions. . .[and] needs."⁷⁴ Konow further insisted that it was a fantasy to imagine a monarchy in Norway ever becoming national; a monarchy was and would always be "a truth with a lie at the head."⁷⁵

⁷³Castberg, 8 June 1905, in Dagbøker, p. 372.

⁷⁴Hemmelige Møter i Stortinget, p. 59.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 60.

Whereas the republican liberals found themselves in a classic dilemma, the small social democratic party with its four parliamentary representatives refused to accept any loyalty other than loyalty to republican ideology. The leader and spokesman of the group was Dr. Alfred Eriksen, a minister of the Lutheran church and representative from Tromsø amt. Eriksen declared that he would vote against the address to the king because it contained the clause requesting King Oscar's cooperation in placing a Bernadotte on the throne of Norway. Rather than reduce bitterness, he said, the Bernadotte candidature would increase it.⁷⁶ It was also Eriksen's contention that the action which the Storting was about to take in dissolving the union would nullify the constitution and Norway, in essence, would be without a basic law.⁷⁷ The government, on the other hand, maintained that the 17 May constitution became the basic law ipso facto with the dissolution. For Eriksen this argument remained secondary to his determined opposition to a new monarchy, although he did broach the important question of the Storting's legal competence to decide Norway's future form of government by electing a king. It was Eriksen's contention that only a constituent assembly could settle the issue. What Eriksen clearly feared was the commitment

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 63.

⁷⁷Ibid.

to monarchy the candidacy implied. When Michelsen was asked if the Storting would be similarly bound should the Bernadottes reject the offer, he replied that Norway was a monarchy and the actions of his government were predicated on that assumption.⁷⁸ Should a Bernadotte prince not come to Norway, he added, "the Storting would, of course, be free [of the obligation]."⁷⁹ Michelsen's motives, methods and expressions of Storting sovereignty, however, are placed in a questionable light as a result of subsequent events, and some changes made in the stenographic notes of the Storting meeting on 6 June. A comparison between these notes and the diary of Johan Castberg reveal some striking differences. Castberg had used the stenographic notes in compiling his remarkable diary, but by 21 July 1905 Michelsen's replies had been edited in several places, apparently by the prime minister himself.⁸⁰ The comparison shows the changes to be subtle and, within the context of the debate on 6 June, of little importance. It is only when the likelihood of a Bernadotte on the throne decreases and a secondary

⁷⁸Ibid., p. 71.

⁷⁹Ibid., pp. 71-72.

⁸⁰Cf. Michelsen's speech in *ibid.*, pp. 71-74 with Castberg, 8 June 1905, in *Dagbøker*, pp. 374-377. Castberg, on 21 July, discovered that the changes had been made but failed to understand the importance, noting that it was "peculiar." See Castberg, 21 July 1905, in *ibid.*, p. 421.

candidate looms prominent that the changes take on a vastly different character. It appears that Michelsen changed the notes to show what he would like to have said on 6 June rather than what he did say. Essentially, the changes focus on the government's intentions to invite another candidate to the throne of Norway, a development which centered by the end of July on Prince Carl of Denmark, a son-in-law of King Edward VII of Great Britain. This fact leaves some intriguing questions about the intentions of the Norwegian prime minister, intentions that apparently came into sharp focus for him some time before 21 July when the changes were noticed by Castberg. The original account demonstrates that Michelsen, on 6 June, apparently wanted to leave the Storting with the impression that a republic was not unlikely if a Bernadotte failed to accept the throne. In addition, he conceded the possibility of a constituent assembly because the government would not conduct a "humiliating begging tour of the various royal houses in order to get a king for Norway."⁸¹ Michelsen may well have recognized the futility of such a tour even if it had been contemplated. The concession, however, rather than revealing the prime minister's intentions, show how consistent his thinking was with the earlier arguments of Sigurd Ibsen that it was best to get a truly national monarchy acceptable to Europe's ruling dynasties.

⁸¹Hemmelige Møter i Stortinget, p. 72.

It had been Ibsen's argument that a "princely labor union" existed which was partly responsible for the Bernadotte candidacy in the first place.⁸² It further demonstrates the importance of Ibsen's ideas that not only was the candidacy formulated because of it, but the very rhetoric Ibsen used had become a basic part of the Norwegian vocabulary. Even if the offer was rejected by Sweden, it was reasoned, the making of the offer itself would demonstrate Norway's good intentions to the "princely labor union" and Europe's great powers.⁸³ The arguments used by Michelsen in 1905 sound remarkably like the arguments of 1898, although they are more detailed and address practical rather than theoretical considerations. In 1898 no arguments were advanced showing that the candidacy was in accordance with the constitution, although Schjøtt had claimed that conservatives could accept it because it meant a continuation of monarchy. Whether he was willing to admit it or not in 1905, Michelsen proceeded from the same premise. His motives, on the other hand, were undoubtedly mixed--ranging from a desire to dampen radical forces, particularly the social democrats, by uniting liberals and conservatives in a greater non-socialist party, to a genuine desire to

⁸²See Ibsen, "Nationalt kongedømme II," Ringeren 1(9 April 1898):11-12.

⁸³Hemmelige Møter i Stortinget, pp. 6-7.

appease Sweden and guarantee Norwegian independence by gaining support from the international community. The arguments Michelsen used support all three contentions; it is impossible to say that one played a bigger role to the exclusion of the others. To a certain extent the evidence is contradictory, and Michelsen himself was sufficiently enigmatic so as to avoid any clear resolution. Whereas he argued effectively in favor of the Bernadotte candidacy in the Storting, insisting that his government stood or fell on its acceptance, he, nevertheless, privately said that he hoped it would not be accepted. Castberg noted it in his diary of 8 June when he wrote:

My hope is that King Oscar rejects the offer, and if Michelsen told me the truth, he hopes the same; our lucky star was over us when the king refused to sanction the consulate law, he told me privately, and--he continued--that same lucky star will continue over us and the king will also refuse this offer. The whole thing is tactical, dictated in consideration of Høire, the dynasty and foreign countries.⁸⁴

If, as Castberg suggests, the idea of a Bernadotte candidate for the Norwegian throne was a tactical move, it was not without merit. One finds it difficult to accept Castberg's view totally, however, since he had a vested interest in assuming it to be tactical. He not only opposed it but

⁸⁴Castberg, 8 June 1905, in Dagbøger, p. 379.

considered it a reactionary element in an otherwise revolutionary situation.⁸⁵

The maneuvers and arguments of 6 June gave way to 7 June and the historic day in Norwegian history when the Storting took the natural next step by declaring the monarchy out of function and the union with Sweden dissolved. When the king was asked to allow a member of his dynasty to assume the throne of Norway, the Bernadotte candidacy, so long debated, became a reality. Whether it was a revolution, a coup d'etat or a constitutionally defensible action by a sovereign parliament, it was Norway's first overt step on the road to independence, and a necessary beginning for the establishment of a national monarchy. Whether it would lead inevitably in that direction had yet to be ascertained as in the immediate future lay the assessment of the dissolution and the Bernadotte candidacy.

⁸⁵Castberg, 17 June 1905, in *ibid.*, p. 397. This point was made by Castberg's son, Frede Castberg, in an interview with the author at the Norwegian foreign office in Oslo, 7 September 1976.

CHAPTER IV

REACTION: THE BERNADOTTE CANDIDACY ASSESSED AND ASSAILED

As Christian Michelsen spoke in the Storting on the evening of 6 June, he did not hide his fears that the course of events might be dangerous. He insisted that his government would do all it could to minimize the difficulties and dangers, but the dissolution of the union had certain consequences which had to be accepted and followed. It was not mere rhetoric, therefore, when he stated: "We must cross the Rubicon; we must use the knife, but make the incision and wound as small as possible. There is nothing else to do."¹ Norwegians stood united in agreeing that Michelsen was correct in his diagnosis and call for surgery to remove the disease of the union; they disagreed, however, on the anesthetic which the government chose and the convalescence it prescribed. For this reason the Bernadotte candidacy stood as a disputed method of action. It took the initiative away from the Norwegians and gave it to the aged monarch in Stockholm. It took the shaping of events out of the hands of the more radical and gave it to the moderates.

¹Michelsen speech, 6 June 1905, in Hemmelige Møter i Stortinget i 1905, p. 17.

But the Opposition based its disagreement essentially on the argument that it was a "maneuver to preserve the monarchical form of government."² On the other hand, it was recognized by supporters and opponents alike that Norway finally stood on her own. "Finally the work of Eidsvoll is complete," Jacob Schønning wrote in his diary, "finally Norway is herself after 586 years of union!"³ Johan Castberg, who had voted for the offer only because the government had made it a matter of confidence, sat dejected later that day at an Oslo restaurant. He rejoiced, however, that the union was dissolved and the king removed.⁴ For many like Castberg it had been a matter of priorities. When Michelsen arrived home from the Storting he found Schønning, his former colleague from the Hagerup government, waiting for him. Greatly moved by the emotion of the day's events, they cried.⁵ It is likely that there were few dry eyes in the Norwegian capital that day. But tears could not wash away the bitterness and antagonism many felt toward the Bernadotte candidacy. Some characterized the day's events as revolutionary, others as a simple divorce. The Göteborg Aftonblad attacked the Norwegian leaders as men "in a pathological mental condition."⁶

²Adam Egede-Nissen, Et liv i strid (Oslo: J. W. Cappelen's Forlag, 1945), p. 91.

³Schønning, 7 June 1905, in Dagbøker, p. 358.

⁴Ibid., p. 359.

⁵Ibid., pp. 359-360.

⁶See 8 June 1905, in Ibid., p. 361.

Such extreme utterances from Sweden were not typical but they had been expected; the union, after all, had been a Norwegian-Swedish union and Sweden considered herself the aggrieved party.⁷ Whereas the dissolution was a matter between two separate countries, it was, nevertheless, an internal struggle which the Norwegians had to carry out if they were to emerge from the crisis an independent country. Similarly, the debate over national monarchy was a national, not an international matter. Since no country lives in a vacuum, however, international considerations played a role, but were not decisive. It was a matter the Norwegians had to decide on their own and did so by drawing basically on their own traditional, historical, and national perceptions. This was evident as early as the evening of 6 June when the Storting debated the dissolution and the Bernadotte candidacy; it remained evident as the debate continued outside of the parliamentary setting.

The debate of 6 June revealed that Norwegian opinion was more or less divided along four lines: (1) the Social-Democratic faction; (2) the Castberg-Konow faction; (3) the Conservative faction; and (4) the government or Michelsen faction. Of these, the least vocal was the government.

⁷For less hostile views see Koht, "Da Den Norsk-Svensk Unionen Vart Sprengt," HT 34(1947):292-314; Benjamin Vogt, Indtil 1910 (Oslo: H. Aschehoug & Co., 1941)pp. 80-87; and Koht (ed.), Norske Brev--Saerleg frå 1905--Til Ann Margret Holmgren (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1955).

It allowed some members to argue its case, but was in such a self-assured position, that little was actually said. Included in this group were representatives from Høire and Venstre, ranging from conservative to liberal. This group seems to have been attracted to the government's position as a result of the Bernadotte candidacy and required no threat of resignation to support the Michelsen plan of action.⁸

The Conservative faction, led principally by former prime minister Hagerup, was to the right of the government and consisted almost exclusively of ideological monarchists. The position taken by this group was not so much opposition to the Bernadotte candidacy as it was to the methods of the Michelsen ministry. To a certain extent they were against the very policy of action, but clearly opposed to the forth-right direction which the government had decided to take. It was Hagerup's contention that the provisional government should rule in the king's name, not in the name of the Storting.⁹ Hagerup, and the Conservative faction in general, continued to talk of exhausting all possibilities of negotiations before taking the unilateral step of dissolving the

⁸See the comments of representatives Nikolai Prebensen, Carl Aas and Gustav Martinsen in Castberg, 8 June 1905, Dagbøger, pp. 356-357.

⁹See Hagerup speeches in Hemmelige Møter i Stortinget, pp. 11-21.

union. In this same manner, it was hoped that the Bernadotte candidacy would be resolved before any break was made in the union. Hagerup seems to have been genuinely surprised when Michelsen combined the two to occur simultaneously.¹⁰ The Conservative faction, monarchist as it was, was not opposed to the candidature in principle. They believed, however, that the government's line could provoke hostility from Sweden which, in turn, could lead to a rejection of the candidacy and thereby place the entire monarchical form of government in jeopardy. If King Oscar procrastinated, the situation would be no better for as long as he did not officially accept the dissolution and his own removal; no other royal family would allow a member to assume the Norwegian throne.¹¹ Although Hagerup received support from other conservatives like Jens Brandt, Aasmund Frisak and Jørgen Knudsen, among others, Michelsen rejected the argument as too little, too late, and avoiding the real issue.¹² The issues were not avoided by the other two factions to the left of the government, the social democrats and the Castberg-Konow faction.

¹⁰Hagerup, 3 June 1905, in Dagbok, pp. 158-159. Also see Bratlies's comments in Castberg, Dagbøker, p. 355.

¹¹Hagerup, 5 June 1905, in Dagbok, p. 161.

¹²See Michelsen speeches in Hemmelige Møter i Stortinget, pp. 19-20, 20-25. Also see speeches of Brandt, Frisak, Knudsen, Hansen and Berg in *ibid.*, pp. 38, 42, 45-46.

The social democrats in the Storting consisted of four members first elected to the parliamentary body in 1903. As opposition to the government policy crystallized, it was this group, along with a fifth member, Adam Egede-Nissen, who was officially a member of Venstre, which took the most consistent ideological position in opposition to the Bernadotte candidacy.¹³ The leader of the social democrats was Alfred Eriksen from Tromsø amt. He had earned a doctor of philosophy degree in psychology from the University of Oslo in 1897 with a dissertation titled: Will.¹⁴ The small group was completed by three other representatives from Tromsø, an area clearly among the most radical in Norway at the turn of the century; Jørg Berge, John Lind Johansen and Meier Nilsen Foshaug. It is curious that none of the original Labor Party representatives were from industrial constituencies. Quite the contrary, one was an intellectual

¹³Although not an official member of the Labor Party, Egede-Nissen was closely associated with it and is often referred to as one of five Socialists in the Storting. Writing his autobiography in the late 1930's, he seemed to have considered himself a socialist in 1905. His activities do not belie his belief. See Adam Egede-Nissen, Et liv i strid, pp. 72-99. An activist in the Labor Party at the time considers Egede-Nissen as having gone "totally over to the Labor Party" in 1904, although this is technically incorrect. See Anders Buen, Erindringer (Oslo: Det Norske Arbeiderpartis Forlag, 1934), p. 75.

¹⁴A biased, passionate and charming little biography of Eriksen was written by his sons Gunnar and Henrik Eriksen, Sogneprest Dr. Alfred Eriksen (Oslo: Johan Grundt Tanum Forlag, 1939). The original manuscript is in Arbeiderbevegelsens Arkiv, Oslo. Also see Buen, Erindringer, p. 70.

minister, one a newspaper publisher, the others were a farmer and a fisherman. All represented the northernmost districts of the country.¹⁵ The character of their constituencies undoubtedly played a part in the stand which the representatives took. Equally clear is the fact that as social democrats they took no part in either the formation or the make-up of the Michelsen government. Unlike other parliamentary groups they had no ties other than to their own party's demands and had little regard for parliamentary rules and procedure. Eriksen expressed this when he claimed that the group stood totally independent of any considerations whatsoever toward the government.¹⁶ Because of this independence they were not only outspoken but stood resolutely opposed to the Bernadotte candidacy. To declare that the king had ceased to function as king then to turn around and ask him to assist in placing a member of his dynasty on the Norwegian throne was, according to Eriksen, nonsensical and an invitation to increased bitterness; obviously an illogical manner of instituting a new monarchy.¹⁷ Much the

¹⁵Kongeriget Norge, Stortings Forhandlinger 1903/1904. Vol. 7a: Stortingstidende (Kristiania: Centraltrykkeriet, 1904), p. 3. Also see Beretning om Det Norske arbeiderpartis virksomhed, 20 May 1903-15 May 1904 (Kristiania: Arbeidernes Aktietrykkeri, 1904) in Box 329(481)15, Arbeiderbevegelsens arkiv, Oslo.

¹⁶Hemmelige Møter i Stortinget, p. 65.

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 62-63.

same thought must have occurred to the editor of the New York Times who called the action "comic opera."¹⁸

As social democrats, Eriksen and his colleagues could not neglect the economic arguments that arose with the Bernadotte candidacy and a Norwegian monarchy. In addition to being "unfortunate and impractical" a monarchy was decidedly more expensive than a republic: "If we make this attempt of establishing a monarchy, of populating the palace here in Kristiania, if we begin with this attempt of instituting a court. . . I am afraid it will all turn into a downright travesty," Eriksen claimed.¹⁹ The social democrats further insisted that the Storting had no right to offer the throne to anyone, Bernadotte or not. Eriksen rejected the argument that the constitution of 17 May would become the basic law with the union's dissolution. This would authorize the Storting to elect a king, unacceptable to Eriksen. Revealing faint, and possible distorted traces of John Locke's arguments of social contract, Eriksen insisted that the powers of the king, rather than reverting to the Storting reverted to the people.²⁰ He understood that the English parliament in 1688 like the Norwegian Storting in 1905, had ousted a king. Unlike England, Norway had a

¹⁸New York Times, 15, 26 July 1905, p. 6.

¹⁹Hemmelige Møter i Stortinget, p. 65.

²⁰Ibid., pp. 63-64.

written constitution, but Eriksen insisted it, like the king, had ceased to function. Only the people, therefore, could decide what form of government the country was to have. The debate had come to focus on the basic question: monarchy or republic. The social democrats had no choice but to oppose the Bernadotte candidacy because its very existence assumed the continuance of monarchy in Norway:

It would be impossible to think that if social democrats anywhere in the world are in a position whereby they stand free to choose between a monarchical or a republican form of government. . .that they could choose to institute monarchy.²¹

When it came to a vote the socialists stood united against the government and a new monarchy in Norway and voted the only way they could--rejecting the Bernadotte candidacy. The vote of 112 to 5 is misleading, however, because a fourth faction in the Storting, the Castberg-Konow faction, stood in closer harmony with the socialists than the government with whom they eventually voted. Unlike the social democrats, this faction could not reject the government's call for a vote of confidence and as a result gave the final tally its lopsided appearance.²² Johan Castberg best

²¹Ibid., p. 64.

²²Castberg, 8 June 1905, Dagbøker, p. 352. Also see Thore Myrvang, "Dagbok fra 1905," 7 June 1905, in Myrvang papers, Ms. fol. 2708, Worm-Müller papers, UB, Oslo. This diary exists in manuscript form of fifty-eight typewritten pages from 5 March to 25 October 1905. Myrvang was very active in 1905, and, as an outspoken radical, a most useful source.

expressed the dilemma when he wrote in his diary on 12 June:

I had to acknowledge that if I demonstrated with my vote against the address, my colleagues of like opinion--perhaps a majority of the Storting--had the same right, and if all voted against, what then? Confusion and a weakening of the great decision would have resulted. With a heavy heart I found, therefore, that it was my duty to vote for the address and to do it without any public explanation.²³

For Castberg, and the others of his faction, it became a matter of priorities. All who spoke against the candidacy were republicans of conviction, but placed the form of government in a lower category of priority than independence.²⁴

It was difficult for many in this faction to accept the necessity of supporting the candidacy, but they acceded to the government which, in the words of Thore Myrvang: "forced its will through, because who dared create a split during these dangerous circumstances."²⁵ It is further apparent from the arguments that the Castberg-Konow faction rejected nearly all of the government's arguments supportive of the candidacy. The government insisted that it would be easier to achieve recognition for Norway if a Bernadotte prince accepted the throne. Konow, however, feared it would merely

²³Castberg, 12 June 1905, in Dagbøker, p. 381.

²⁴See speeches of Konow, Aaen, Arneson, Bjørnaali, Bryggesaa, Hanssen, Kahrs, Myrvang, Skilbred and Stousland in Hemmelige Møter i Stortinget, pp. 60-62, 68, 70-71, 74, and 77-79.

²⁵Myrvang, 7 June 1905 in Dagbok in Ms. fol. 2708, Worm-Müller papers, UB, Oslo.

lead to a "begging tour" around the various royal houses of Europe and serve as a provocation to Europe's great powers.²⁶ Whereas the government claimed that it would have a positive influence on Swedish relations, Castberg and Konow argued that it would be advantageous to avoid any relationship with Sweden, that a Swedish prince would become ". . .a tool for Swedish intrigue and Swedish influence."²⁷ The Castberg-Konow faction also saw internal politics as portending differently than did the government. Michelsen feared a split in the people if the form of government became an issue; Konow, on the other hand, insisted this would not be the case because "the great majority in Norway is for a republic."²⁸

The Castberg-Konow faction articulated views which were, on the whole, strikingly similar to the social democrats, but their respective stands diverged on the effect which the dissolution had on the Norwegian constitution. Whereas the social democrats insisted that the constitution had been abrogated, Castberg and Konow accepted Michelsen's argument that the constitution of 17 May 1814 became the nation's basic law with the union's dissolution.²⁹ By accepting the

²⁶Hemmelige Møter i Stortinget, pp. 60-61.

²⁷Ibid., p. 59; Castberg, 8 June 1905, Dagbøker, p. 358.

²⁸Hemmelige Møter i Stortinget, p. 60.

²⁹Ibid., p. 75.

government's position the faction effectively gave up its opportunity to argue against the retention of the monarchy on legalistic, constitutional grounds; if the constitution remained in effect, so too did paragraph one which stipulated that Norway was a monarchy: "The kingdom of Norway is a free, independent and indivisible state. The form of government is a limited and hereditary monarchy."³⁰ In spite of this, it is intriguing to note that Castberg was rather firm in his belief that a revolution took place when Norway dissolved her union with Sweden.³¹ It may be argued that a true revolution would have abrogated the constitution requiring the calling of a constituent assembly. This was, in fact, the view of the social democrats and the view which both Castberg and Konow would later support--a position more consistent with their belief that a revolution had taken place. The Michelsen government maintained consistently that the constitution had never been abrogated, that Norway was, and remained, a monarchy.³²

³⁰See the "Constitution for the Kingdom of Norway" in Tønnes Andenaes (ed.), Grunnloven Vår: 1814 til 1975 (Oslo-Bergen-Tromsø: Universitetsforlaget, 1976), p. 61.

³¹Castberg, 8 June 1905, in Dagbøker, p. 352; Myrvang, 7 June 1905, in Dagbok in Ms. fol. 2708, Worm-Müller papers, UB, Oslo.

³²See for example Michelsen's speech of 28 July 1905 in Hemmelige Møter i Stortinget, p. 127; Løvland, Menn og Minner, p. 134; Hagerup Bull, "Fra 1905: Erindringer og Betragtninger," Samtiden 37(1926):451-452.

Perhaps no single word was used so widely to characterize the Norwegian action as was the word "revolution." The Swedes, of course, saw it as revolutionary. Johan Ramstedt, the Swedish prime minister since 13 April, termed the Storting action a "revolutionary decision."³³ Jacob Schøning, who was sympathetic with the Castberg-Konow faction but not a member of the Storting, noted in his diary the reactions of numerous newspapers: Stockholms Dagblad, Aftonbladet, Dansk Nationaltidende, Vorwärts, Pall Mall Gazette and the Daily Mail all reported the dissolution as "revolutionary."³⁴ Jørgen Løvland later wrote in his memoirs that the action was "to defend the constitution, not to revolutionize the kingdom."³⁵ Such was the view of the Conservative and Michelsen factions. A modern Norwegian scholar of constitutional law has also addressed himself to the question, coming to some interesting conclusions. Frede Castberg, the son of Johan Castberg and former member of the European Human Rights Commission and curator of the Academy of International Law at The Hague, sees the unilateral dissolution

³³Quoted in Nansen, Supplementary Chapter to Norway and the Union with Sweden, p. 116. For Swedish reaction see Diplomaticus [Kristian Anastas Winterhjelm], I Sverige 1905 (Kristiania: H. Aschehoug & Co., 1906), pp. 55-76.

³⁴Schøning, 8 June 1905, in Dagbøker, pp. 361-363. For American press views see the author's "American Press Opinion and Norwegian Independence, 1905," Norwegian-American Studies 27(1977):227-228.

³⁵Løvland, Menn og Minner, p. 134.

of 7 June as a violation of international law, but he denies that it was revolutionary.³⁶ The Act of Union (Riksakt) of 1815 was violated, he contends, because it came into conflict with Norwegian national law.³⁷ In his book, Rett og revolusjon i Norge (Jurisprudence and Revolution in Norway), Castberg defines his terms more precisely as he claims that the lack of violence and the retention of the constitution (albeit revised) argue against characterizing the Storting action as a revolution.³⁸

International law and legalistic definitions had little influence on Norwegians in 1905, however. For them it was an emotional issue; separation from a union to which they were increasingly embittered. Oscar II personified that bitterness, as indeed did the Bernadotte family generally. This feeling helped bring forth yet another argument and

³⁶Interview with Frede Castberg, 7 September 1976. Castberg said his view would undoubtedly have disappointed his father.

³⁷See F. Castberg, Juridiske stridsspørsmål i Norges politiske historie (Oslo-Bergen-Tromsø: Universitetsforlaget, 1961, rev. ed., 1971), pp. 32-33. For the Act of Union see "Rigsakt: oprettet imellem Norges Riges Storting og Sveriges Staender, indeholdende Bestemmelse af de imellem begge Riger opkomne konstitutionelle Forhold," in Andenaes (ed.), Grunnloven Vår, pp. 90-95.

³⁸F. Castberg, Rett og revolusjon i Norge, pp. 16-17, 116-121. The same point was made in a 1928 thesis which is badly outdated and, otherwise, overly simplistic. See Knute Ovregaard, "The Union of Norway and Sweden and Its Dissolution," (Unpublished master's thesis, University of Washington, 1928), p. 54.

attack against the candidacy. In its address to the king, the Storting accepted the government's argument that the candidacy was a "demonstration of the lack of bitterness toward Swedes and the dynasty." Opponents, on the other hand, insisted this was hypocritical and shameful: "I believe there is bitterness in our people toward the dynasty," Johan Castberg said, "and we ought not say in the address that none exists."³⁹ Just as George III became the bête noir for the American colonists, so too had Oscar II achieved a similar status for many Norwegians. Earlier demands for justice and attacks on the union had been aimed, not at the king, but the Swedish government. Oscar had come to personify the frustrations Norwegians felt toward the union in 1905.⁴⁰ That the Storting should then insist no bitterness existed must be seen as the result of the strength of the government in a time much less cynical of power than has become the case three-quarters of a century later. Michelsen certainly had no less reason to feel bitter toward Sweden and the king than did Castberg. As prime minister, however, he recognized the impracticality of emphasizing the bitterness, and Michelsen was nothing if not practical. The Bernadotte candidacy was evidence of this

³⁹Hemmelige Møter i Stortinget, pp. 61, 67.

⁴⁰A typical earlier view of opposition to the union is Arne Garborg, Norges Selvstendighedskamp fra 1814 til Nu, pp. 49-53.

as was the effectiveness of his arguments. His practicality and ability to lead was surely tested in the Storting, but the strength of it was not apparent until the issues began to be debated nationally. As was true in the Storting, the Bernadotte candidacy, not the dissolution, became the dominant issue.

Debate on the actual dissolution was almost non-existent in Norway. There were some moments of tension, however, when on 11 June Christopher Bruun, a well-known minister in Oslo, criticized the dissolution from his pulpit at Johanneskirken (The Church of St. John) during his Pentacostal sermon. Bruun claimed that the government consisted of "free-thinkers" who had taken the country into unnecessary difficulty. In reality, the Bruun affair was a minor issue, but it so excited the government that Oslo was moved to silence the minister by forbidding him to preach an announced sermon on the 14th.⁴¹ More than simply the dissent of one clergyman, the Michelsen government feared violent public protest against Bruun. Nils Vogt, the editor of the Conservative newspaper, Morgenbladet, told Bruun that he would speak against the minister in his own church if the clergyman

⁴¹Hagerup Bull, Dagbøker, pp. 49-51; Castberg, Dagbøker, p. 388. Bruun's activity was sympathetically received in the Ibsen household where he was considered as sharing the views of Sigurd Ibsen on the mistaken line of action taken by Michelsen. See Bergliot Ibsen, De Tre, p. 214.

dared criticize the dissolution.⁴² As evidenced by the Bruun affair, there was an extraordinary strong sense of support for the dissolution in Norway. That support was not as unanimous, nor for that matter as vital, when it came to the Bernadotte candidacy. At any rate, expressions of opposition to the candidacy appeared acceptable to the government. The sharpest criticism came from the Left, particularly the socialists who held meetings throughout the country in favor of a republic.⁴³ The dissent focused on the retention of monarchy inherent in the candidature, but a republican Storting representative noted in his diary that if Sweden rejected the offer ". . .the question of monarchy or republic will arise again in all seriousness."⁴⁴ For the Labor Party, however, the issue remained in doubt from the very beginning. On the evening of 7 June the socialists gathered an assembly to protest the candidacy and insist that Norway should become a republic. Having developed in a climate of ripe nationalism in Norway, the Labor Party reflected that nationalism to a greater degree than probably any other social democratic party in Europe. An example of this is the speech of O. G. Gjølsteen, chairman of the Norwegian

⁴²Hagerup Bull, Dagbøker, p. 50.

⁴³Myrvang, 18 June 1905, in Dagbok, in Ms. fol. 2708, Worm-Müller papers, UB, Oslo.

⁴⁴Ibid.

labor society: "When King Oscar ceased to be our king," he said, "he ceased to be Norwegian and he and his house stand outside our politics; it is therefore a foreign prince who has been offered Norway's throne."⁴⁵ This same nationalistic theme was echoed by party spokesman Christopher Hornsrud, who claimed that "monarchy planted in Norwegian soil is a foreign plant."⁴⁶ Student groups joined with the socialists in protesting the candidature. On 9 June the historian Halvdan Koht spoke to a receptive group of young farmers (Bondeungdomslag) telling them that monarchy had fulfilled any purpose and mission it may once have had in Norway.⁴⁷ A member of the National Student Association told Storting representative Myrvang that the group was "disappointed" over the candidature, but hoped that it was true that the offer was only a "chess move. . . [which] will not be accepted."⁴⁸ While such individual expressions of opinion reveal the intensity of the issue, equally important was the role and conduct of the newspapers. Although the Norwegian press was tied to political parties, or perhaps because of it, the fourth

⁴⁵Quoted in Social-Demokraten, 8 June 1905.

⁴⁶Ibid. Hornsrud would become the first Labor Party prime minister of Norway with a short-lived government in 1928.

⁴⁷Ibid., 10 June 1905. Cf. with Koht's earlier views of monarchy in Koht, Det Norske Kongedømmes Utvikling.

⁴⁸Myrvang, 7 June 1905, in Dagbok, Ms. fol. 2708, Worm-Müller papers, UB, Oslo.

estate presented the varying range of opinion forcefully and, on the whole, honestly. It may well be that no other country views its press with as much esteem as do the Norwegians-- this appears, at any rate, to have been the case in 1905. In his history, Norge i 1905, Yngvar Nielsen, a conservative historian, praised the press for its "inestimable" service to the country.⁴⁹ As a conservative, however, Nielsen's views were colored by what he considered expedient. Writing within less than one year of the events, he was not in a particularly good position to evaluate the importance of that service. Because of his national and political biases, Nielsen also considered what the papers failed to report as being of equal value to what they did report: "Each paper was its own censor," he writes.⁵⁰ Unlike the Storting, the newspapers neither expressed a wide variety of opinions nor nuances in reacting to the Bernadotte candidacy. Except for the social democratic press, they generally followed the line of the government. This was to be expected from the Conservative newspapers, but less so from the Liberal press. Bergens Tidende, a Venstre paper on Norway's western coast, expressed strong doubts about the wisdom behind the offer of a Bernadotte for the Norwegian throne but supported it

⁴⁹Yngvar Nielsen, Norge i 1905 (Horten: C. Andersens Forlag, 1906), p. 361.

⁵⁰Ibid., pp. 361-362.

nevertheless.⁵¹ Another Venstre paper, Stavanger Avis, reminded its readers that it had supported a republic previously. Nationalism, however, held a stronger attraction than ideology as the paper reported that "Norway's Storting has today raised again our own Norwegian throne."⁵² As a part of that action, then, the Bernadotte candidacy was defensible. In fact, it was probably nationalist sentiment which sparked the tendency of self-censorship described by Nielsen. Perhaps nowhere was this more evident than in Norway's capital city which served as a microcosm of the nation at large. The newspapers in Oslo had the added advantage of being close to the events as they unfolded; similarly they could both manipulate and be manipulated.

As could generally be expected, the conservative press welcomed the dissolution looking most favorably on the Bernadotte candidacy. While admitting the candidacy created bitterness and disappointment, Morgenbladet praised the Storting for its loyalty in allowing the Bernadottes to secure the Norwegian crown, "a step which will win just as much approval outside the nation's borders as inside."⁵³ Along with Ørebladet and Aftenposten, Morgenbladet saw the

⁵¹Bergens Tidende, 7 June 1905, Cf. with the paper's republican support on 3 June 1905.

⁵²Stavanger Avis, 7 June 1905.

⁵³"Hvad Brast?" Morgenbladet, 7 June 1905; "To kongelinjer," *ibid.*, 15 June 1905.

candidacy as reconciliatory toward Sweden; Norway has given proof, it wrote, that she has "done her duty to the old royal family."⁵⁴ The conservative press also agreed that Norway had done her duty toward the country's traditions and constitution and, unlike the Swedish Nya Dagligt Allehanda, considered the offer to be seriously meant.⁵⁵ The nature of the new monarchy prompted Ørebladet to support a king which would not be mediocre whereas Morgenbladet sought a citizen king with a small court consisting, preferably, of Norwegians.⁵⁶ Seeing no problems either with the offer to the Bernadottes or the competence of the Storting, the conservative newspapers came, naturally, to the point of discussing possible monarchs should the Swedish dynasty accept.⁵⁷ As heir to the Swedish throne, Crown Prince Gustaf Adolph was never seriously considered. The three sons of the crown prince, however, were likely candidates: Wilhelm, Carl and Eugen. Ørebladet preferred Wilhelm,

⁵⁴"To kongelinjer," *ibid.*; "Sverige Har Ordet," Aftenposten, 11 June 1905; "Det Bernadotteske Kandidatur," *ibid.*, 27 June 1905; and "Den store Afgjørelse," Ørebladet, 8 June 1905.

⁵⁵see "Er det ikke Alvor?" Morgenbladet, 28 June 1905.

⁵⁶"Husmands-konge?" Ørebladet, 26 June 1905; "De norske Hof," Morgenbladet, 29 August 1905.

⁵⁷"Er det ikke Alvor?" *ibid.*, 28 June 1905; "Det fryder seg," *ibid.*, 22 September 1905; "Statsformen," Aftenposten, 21 September 1905.

the second oldest while Aftenposten chose Carl. The Norwegian cabinet had been contemplating the same names.⁵⁸

Frits Wedel-Jarlsberg, former minister to Madrid, was sent by Michelsen to discuss this matter with King Oscar and, at an audience on 16 June, mentioned Prince Carl. The king, in his reply, made his position clear: he would never allow any member of his family to go to Norway.⁵⁹ Wedel-Jarlsberg understood the king's position as definitive and, thereafter, proceeded to work for a secondary candidate. Until Oscar officially rejected the offer, however, the Norwegian government had to assume he might accept. If there was doubt about the government assumptions, the Storting, the press, and the people of Norway continued to assume that he would not refuse, no matter what signs pointed to the contrary. Both Aftenposten and Morgenbladet expressed skepticism that Oscar would send a member of the family to Norway, but hoped, and recommended, that he do so.⁶⁰

Like the conservative press, the Venstre press generally followed the lines of the Michelsen government and accepted

⁵⁸"En Prins af Huset Bernadotte," Morgenbladet, 17 June 1905; "Prins Wilhelm," Ørebladet, 8 June 1905; and "Kongedømmet," Aftenposten, 28 September 1905. Also see Hagerup Bull, 17 June 1905, in Dagbøger, p. 61.

⁵⁹F. Wedel-Jarlsberg, 1905: Kongevalget (Oslo: Gylden- dal Norsk Forlag, 1946), pp. 37-38.

⁶⁰"Sverige har Ordet," Aftenposten, 11 June 1905; "Det store Opgjør: En Kongeslegt og et Folk," Morgenbladet, 9 June 1905; "To kongelinjer," *ibid.*, 15 June 1905.

the Bernadotte candidacy. Just as several Venstre representatives, especially those of the Castberg-Konow faction, had supported a republic in theory but voted for the offer because of other considerations, Dagbladet, on 15 July, insisted that "the form of government can never have the same worth as independence and peace."⁶¹ The paper accepted the argument that the Bernadotte candidacy could best secure independence while working conciliatorily toward Sweden.⁶² Similar arguments appeared in the moderate liberal Verdens Gang which, through Ola Thommessen, the editor, was very close to the Michelsen government. Thommessen and his paper remained consistent supporters through the year and, when the form of government became the overriding issue, staunchly favored a monarchy.⁶³ Neither Dagbladet nor Norske Intelligenssedler, another liberal paper, supported the candidacy

⁶¹"Politiske Idealer," Dagbladet, 15 July 1905.

⁶²"Tilstanden og Fremtidsudsigtene," *ibid.*, 8 June 1905; "Statsformen," *ibid.*, 20 September 1905; "Nødvendighetens Mandat og Monarkiets 'Fordele'," *ibid.*, 21 September 1905.

⁶³"Norges Sag: Hvad gjør Sverige?" Verdens Gang, 11 June 1905; "Maalet," *ibid.*, 30 August 1905; and "En letsindig Agitation og dens Frugter," *ibid.*, 8 September 1905. Also see Nissen, "O. Thommessen," 16:233-234. Verdens Gang was not well regarded among the radical left; Castberg considered it "the screeching organ" (hyleorganet) and "the mouthpiece of cowardice," (feighedens livorgan) because of its later support favoring a peaceful settlement with Sweden. See Castberg, 26 August 1905, in Dagbøger, p. 461 and 12 September 1905, in *ibid.*, p. 472.

for ideological reasons, however, stated clearly that they favored a republic in theory.⁶⁴ The support for the candidacy extended only to its national implications that this was the manner whereby independence could be secured. None of the Venstre papers picked up the argument from the Storting that the parliamentary body lacked competence in determining the future form of government, but then this was essentially a social democratic view in early June. On the contrary, the papers held that the constitution was in order and the necessity of the moment compelled and empowered the Storting to act.⁶⁵

Like the other papers, Social-Demokraten supported the dissolution, but unlike the others expressed unreserved opposition to the Bernadotte candidacy calling it ". . . a step history will judge and contemporaries must reject."⁶⁶ Those who supported the offer to the Bernadotte monarch were characterized as monarchists out of tune with the Norwegian

⁶⁴"Forfatnings-Spørsmålet," Norsk Intellegenssedler, 17 August 1905; "Teorier og Virkelighed," *ibid.*, 17 July 1905; "Politiske Idealer," Dagbladet, 15 July 1905; "Nødvendighetens Mandat og Manarkiets 'Fordele'," 21 September 1905.

⁶⁵"Statsformen, Stemninger og Udsigter," Dagbladet, 28 August 1905; "Statsformen og Stortinget," *ibid.*, 25 August 1905; "Nødvendighetens Mandat og Monarkiets 'Fordele'," *ibid.*, 21 September 1905; "Norges Grundlov bestaar; Beslutningen av 7. juni," Verdens Gang, 15 July 1905; "Med Tilfredhed," Norsk Intelligenssedler, 7 June 1905.

⁶⁶"Unions opløsning," Social-Demokraten, 7 June 1905.

people.⁶⁷ No distinction was made for those who expressed their reservations in supporting the candidacy, but then the debate had been closed and the paper likely had no way of knowing the nuances of the debate. All of the 112 monarchists, the paper claimed, would be swept away and "replaced by republicans" in the first election. Obviously sensitive to the criticism, Johan Castberg confided in his diary that he voted reluctantly for the Bernadotte candidacy while favoring a republic.⁶⁸

An examination of the views of Social-Demokraten and the behavior of the Norwegian Labor Party, reveals a consistent solidarity among the socialists. On all levels of activity they opposed the candidacy of a Bernadotte for the Norwegian throne. The socialists united, not behind the government but behind their own ideological insistence that no social democrat would ever choose a monarchy over a republic. This point had been clearly stated in the Storting debate by Alfred Eriksen and was echoed in the social democratic press.⁶⁹

⁶⁷"Revolution," *ibid.*, 8 June 1905; "Bjørnson og Løvland," *ibid.*, 16 August 1905.

⁶⁸"Revolution," *ibid.*, 7 June 1905; Castberg, 12 June 1905, in Dagbøker, p. 381.

⁶⁹See Edv. Olsen, "Kongedømme eller republik?" Social-Demokraten, 17 June 1905. Cf. with Eriksen's speech in Hemmelige Møter i Stortinget, p. 65.

Although they were not serious, the Bernadotte candidacy clearly put some cracks in the united front which Michelsen sought to form. While Norwegians were all but unanimous in their support for the dissolution, the debate, and subsequent press reaction, showed a less favorable response to the address to the king and the Bernadotte candidacy contained therein. That it achieved majority support was due to Michelsen having combined it with the dissolution and subsequently making it a matter of confidence. This was obvious in the Storting debate and implicit in the press reaction. It was also apparent that should the government fail to maintain the initiative, events could work against it successfully continuing. This concern was probably the key to the next phase of activity suggested by Wedel Jarlsberg's audience with King Oscar on 16 June. If the implications inherent in the Bernadotte candidacy were to be sustained, that is a monarchical form of government for Norway, a secondary candidate had to be cultivated. Such a development, however, depended on the fate of the Bernadotte candidacy and political developments that would formalize the dissolution.

CHAPTER V

ALTERNATIVES: THE FATE OF THE BERNADOTTE CANDIDACY AND A SECONDARY CANDIDATE

Discussions about a Bernadotte candidacy, as late as the beginning of June 1905, generally assumed that the dissolution would occur first and only then would an offer be made to a prince of the ruling family. Christian Michelsen discussed the matter superficially before 27 May but always within the context that the two actions would be separate and unjoined: "The view was then that it [the Bernadotte candidacy] should come later and separately, but I thought later that in consideration of the European situation it was correct to join them."¹ Judging by Michelsen's opening remarks to the Storting on 6 June, it was likely that the perceived existence of the "princely labor union" was the decisive reality, although the Moroccan conflict, the Russo-Japanese War, and the subsequent Russian Revolution played a significant part.² When the offer was made by the Storting, Sweden did not react in the manner which

¹Worm-Müller notes of interview with Christian Michelsen in Ms. fol. 2809, in Worm-Müller papers, UB, Oslo.

²See Michelsen speech of 6 June 1905 in Hemmelige Møter i Stortinget, pp. 5-7.

the Norwegians had expected. Rather than ally their bitterness, Swedes viewed the offer "with aversion."³ An observer in Sweden noted that:

It is looked upon as an unworthy 'chess-move' to win support from foreign countries. It is said to be an insult to offer King Oscar this after having removed him; unworthy to ask him for help in getting Norway out of the difficulty. . . .⁴

Once the offer had been made, however, there was little the Norwegians could do but wait for a reply. Folke Lindberg, the Swedish historian, has written that it gave Sweden "a trump card" which could be used to force the Norwegians into a negotiating position ". . . more suitable to accepting the conditions for the dissolution of the union which would be presented from the Swedish side."⁵ The danger of giving up the initiative to the Swedes in this manner must have been recognized by Michelsen, but the widespread disapproval in Sweden for the Norwegian action clearly surprised Michelsen, especially the opposition expressed in liberal circles where accommodation to Norway had always been a positive feature of an otherwise bitter union controversy.⁶ Fears of a military response to the dissolution caused the government to consider a covert propaganda campaign, especially

³Diplomaticus, I Sverige 1905, p. 70.

⁴Ibid., pp. 70-71.

⁵Folke Lindberg, Kunlig Utrikespolitik, p. 214.

⁶See Hagerup Bull, 14 June 1905, Dagbøker, p. 52.

among Scandinavians in the United States. It was believed that President Theodore Roosevelt could be convinced to make public statements that no war should result from the tensions on the Scandinavian peninsula; because of his work in mediating between Russia and Japan, the Norwegians looked hopefully toward American support and recognition.⁷ The Oslo government had reached an impasse in which it was trying to contain the effects of its action as much in Norway's favor as possible. Michelsen maintained a public posture of confidence while anxiously awaiting word of the fate of the Bernadotte candidacy. Those who expressed opposition originally thought the wait futile, and this was merely reinforced when on 8 June King Oscar sent a telegram to the Storting denouncing the dissolution as revolutionary and refusing to meet a Storting delegation planned to present the address to him. The telegram, however, did not reject the offer, only the delegation which would present it.⁸

⁷Ibid., 16 June 1905, p. 56; and Castberg, 21 June 1905, in Dagbøker, p. 411. This was unsuccessful and, as an official action, soon abandoned. A negative response from the Norwegian-American Senator Knute Nelson of North Dakota, greatly surprised the Norwegians. There was a great deal of indigenously activated support, however. See H. Fred Swansen, "The Attitude of the United States Toward Norway in the Crisis of 1905," The Norwegian American Historical Association Studies and Records 4(1929):43-53.

⁸"Kong Oscar negter at modtage den paatenkte deputation til adressens overbringelse," in Heiberg, Unionens Opløsning 1905, pp. 213-214.

Wollert Konow read Oscar's refusal as a rejection of the candidacy: "It is impossible for King Oscar to give one of the dynasty's younger sons the chance to accept the Norwegian throne," Konow said, "after having expressed that the Storting has . . . taken a revolutionary step."⁹ The monarchists on the other hand, saw nothing as ominous as a rejection of the candidacy in the telegram. Quite the contrary, they believed it was a personal and perfectly natural, but far from official, response.¹⁰ The debate over Oscar's telegram points to the uncertainty existing within official Norwegian circles as well as the tendency of the politicians to let their political and philosophical assumptions determine their understanding of events. Michelsen, equally uncertain and surprised by Swedish response, seems to have been searching for a policy that could carry his greater objective of independence to a speedy resolution. Impulsive by nature and eager to regain the initiative which the candidacy had given Sweden, Michelsen moved on a bold personal initiative which involved dealing himself a trump card to neutralize that held by the monarch. His trump card was to be Frits Wedel Jarlsberg, the former minister to Madrid. On 5 June, two days prior to the dissolution, Wedel Jarlsberg,

⁹Hemmelige Møter i Stortinget, p. 88.

¹⁰See comments of Jørgen Knudsen, Knut Taraldset and Jørgen Brunchorst in *ibid.*, pp. 89, 92-93.

somewhat prophetically, had sent Michelsen a telegram from Madrid wherein he mentioned the importance of British recognition in the event of a break in the union as well as the name of a prince who could not only guarantee that recognition, but the retention of monarchy as well.¹¹ With the dissolution, Wedel Jarlsberg returned to Oslo and met with Michelsen on 14 June where he told the prime minister that he had a full program and plan which involved negotiations with Sweden, but if that proved fruitless, negotiating with the Danish royal house to gain Prince Carl of Denmark for the throne of Norway.¹² The plan consisted of a demonstration that Norwegians were serious in their offer to the Bernadotte dynasty by negotiating terms for a Swedish prince on Norway's throne. If, however, this failed and no satisfactory answer was forthcoming within a reasonable length of time, Norwegians had to look elsewhere to gain support in a Europe where they were presently isolated. They would then turn to Denmark offering the throne to Prince Carl and his wife Maud, a daughter of Britain's King Edward VII.

¹¹Wedel Jarlsberg to Michelsen, 5 June 1905, in Wedel Jarlsberg, 1905: Kongevalget, pp. 17-18. For Wedel Jarlsberg's earlier career see Wedel Jarlsberg, Reisen Gjennem Livet (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1932), pp. 9-234.

¹²Wedel Jarlsberg, 1905: Kongevalget, pp. 295-296. This document was written by Wedel Jarlsberg and its accuracy was attested to by Michelsen on 22 August 1924.

Michelsen considered the plan "absolutely outstanding."¹³ Three days earlier Benjamin Vogt, former member of the Hagerup government and brother of the editor of Morgenbladet, had suggested he go to Stockholm as an unofficial representative to negotiate a peaceful conclusion to the increasingly tense crisis. Michelsen had accepted and Vogt left Oslo on the day prior to Wedel Jarlsberg's arrival.¹⁴ By accepting Wedel Jarlsberg's proposal the Norwegian government would have two unofficial representatives in Sweden, a situation which caused some embarrassment to all concerned. This little incident helps illustrate, however, Michelsen's tendency to make hasty decisions as well as his propensity for secretiveness. Whereas Vogt's mission bore little fruit other than giving him some personal impressions of Swedish intentions, Wedel Jarlsberg made some specific determinations which would influence Michelsen's position inestimably.¹⁵ He went to Stockholm with the express purpose of making a definitive offer to the monarch and met with him on 16 June. Wedel Jarlsberg told the king that the Norwegians would welcome Prince Carl (of Sweden) with open arms; he would

¹³Ibid., pp. 24, 295-298.

¹⁴Benjamin Vogt, Indtil 1910, p. 80.

¹⁵Vogt, "Notater fra hans reiser til Sverige, 13-18 juni 1905," in Ms. fol. 2734, Worm-Müller papers, UB, Oslo. Also see Bothner, 17 June 1905 in Dagbok, privat arkiv 130, in Riksarkivet, Oslo.

receive an appanage of 720,000 kroner, a palace in the country, a yacht and the right to dissolve the parliament. In addition, should Carl and his wife (Ingeborg) have no male children the line of succession would go to another Bernadotte.¹⁶ None of these terms tempted the aged monarch who insisted that he would never allow any member of his family to go to Norway.¹⁷ Pleading proved unsuccessful; before leaving Wedel Jarlsberg told the king that the Norwegians wanted neither a republic nor anarchy and must, therefore, look elsewhere. "Yes, you go," the king replied, "you will not be welcomed anywhere."¹⁸ Wedel Jarlsberg had satisfied himself that the candidacy of a Bernadotte would never be accepted in Stockholm. The king's reply probably reflected as much disappointment as it did bitterness or a faith in the "princely labor union" standing solidly against the upstart Norwegians. At any rate, Wedel Jarlsberg began to look west toward Denmark and across the North Sea to Britain for a way out of the impasse.

On 17 June Michelsen presented the results of Wedel Jarlsberg's mission to the cabinet. In their diaries both Hagerup Bull and Bothner revealed genuine surprise at his behavior while Sophus Arctander, the minister of commerce,

¹⁶Wedel Jarlsberg, 1905: Kongevalget, p. 37.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 38.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 39.

viewed it as disrespectful to the point of being a farce.¹⁹ Their reactions seem to have been prompted by Michelsen's failure to inform them of his previous conversation with Wedel Jarlsberg. Michelsen himself received a full report from his representative on 23 June and by 27 June Michelsen, Løvland and Wedel Jarlsberg agreed that the Bernadotte candidacy was, in principle, abrogated because of the monarch's negative attitude. It was further determined that an offer would be made to the Danish prince in the hope that this might bring Norway out of her isolated position.²⁰ The offer, of course, could not be definitive as long as the Norwegian government was officially bound to the Bernadotte candidacy. The surprise expressed by Hagerup Bull and Bothner, and probably reflected in the other cabinet members as well, was the direct result of Michelsen's secretiveness and his unwillingness to share the contents of his various maneuvers. It was, in fact, not until 11 July that Michelsen brought them up to date on his activity. By then it was the cabinet's turn to experience the tactic of surprise which he had so expertly used on the Storting on 6 June. In his memoirs, Jørgen Løvland insisted that these contacts with

¹⁹Hagerup Bull, 17 June 1905, in Dagbøker, pp. 60-61; and Bothner, 17 June 1905, in Dagbok, privat arkiv 130, in Riksarkivet, Oslo.

²⁰See Document No. 3 in Wedel Jarlsberg, 1905: Kongevalget, pp. 303-305.

Denmark in no way bound the government or the country to the secondary candidacy of Prince Carl.²¹ While this is technically true it, nevertheless, demonstrated Michelsen and Løvland's intentions in that regard. Michelsen's secretiveness most certainly was as much a product of his evaluation of the crisis as it was a feature of his personality. It was perhaps natural that increased hostility in Sweden forced him to seek alternatives, but that does not fully explain the covert nature of his behavior, especially towards his own cabinet.²² Michelsen insisted that his secretiveness and the decision to turn toward Denmark was a result of the uproar in Sweden and his need to counter it. He believed this could be done either through inquiries to foreign countries or by trying to get Prince Carl to come to Norway. The decision, he said, had been taken fourteen days earlier; but in fact he had determined the direction of his policy as much as one month earlier on 14 June.²³ It may have been that he wanted

²¹Løvland, Menn og Minner, p. 139.

²²This feature of Michelsen's personality is seen in comments by several contemporaries: Joahim Grieg, "Om Christian Michelsen," in Ms. fol. 2809, Worm-Müller papers, UB, Oslo; Schøning, 18 May 1905, in Dagbøker, p. 341, and 1 December 1905, p. 433. Also see Wyller, Christian Michelsen, pp. 92-93; Hagerup Bull, Profiler av Noen Samtidige, pp. 77-78. Norwegian comment on Swedish hostility to the candidacy can be seen in Diderich Brynildsen, "Dagbøker," 17, 27 June 1905, in Ms. fol. 2674, Worm-Müller papers, UB, Oslo.

²³Hagerup Bull, 11 July 1905, in Dagbøker, pp. 83-86 and Bothner, 11 July 1905 in Dagbok, in privat arkiv 130, Rikarkivet, Oslo.

to present his cabinet with a fait accompli, but that would have been suspiciously antiparliamentarian. There appeared, in the sources, to have been little disapproval within the cabinet, perhaps because it had become accustomed to Michelsen's manner of procedure, or perhaps because it was swayed by his persuasive arguments. At any rate, Michelsen was able to use the development of events to justify his actions and thereby gain support from the government. Even the republican-inclined minister of finance, Gunnar Knudsen, seems to have given his tacit approval, objecting only briefly to the high appanage which would be paid the Danish prince when he came to Norway.²⁴ That Michelsen convinced the cabinet to accept his secret negotiations so readily undoubtedly had its cause in information which the Norwegians had received from Sweden regarding the fate of the Bernadotte candidacy. Not only had King Oscar told Wedel Jarlsberg that he would not allow a Bernadotte on the throne of Norway, but this had also been transmitted to the Swedish Riksdag on 27 June and made public in an article in the conservative Swedish daily, Nya Daqligt Allehanda. An official communique from the palace stated that Oscar would not allow a Bernadotte to sit on the Norwegian throne, but the Riksdag could, if it so

²⁴Nissen, Gunnar Knudsen, pp. 155-156.

desired, reconsider the matter.²⁵ The likelihood of such a reconsideration was slight, if it existed at all. The Bernadotte candidacy never came under debate in the Riksdag but, on the same day, a särskilda utstkottet (a special committee to deal with the dissolution question) was instituted. Morgenbladet believed this meant a "peaceful and worthy settlement" of the crisis.²⁶ The Swedish Riksdag seemed hesitant in expressing an opinion on the candidacy because it might affect the Swedish contention that the Norwegian throne was not vacant until the union was officially recognized as dissolved. King Oscar's expressions, therefore, stood as the only official pronouncement from Sweden on the matter.

Because Norwegians considered the union dissolved on 7 June, regardless of Sweden's appeals to international law, negative pronouncements from Sweden gave Michelsen the incentive to institute negotiations with the Danish royal house.²⁷ The activity in Sweden reinforced Michelsen's belief that the candidacy no longer applied. Michelsen's

²⁵Schøning, 27 June 1905, in Dagbøker, p. 372. For reaction to the article in Nya Dagligt Allehanda, see "Kong Oscar imod Bernadottekandidaturen: Tilbudets Afvisning sansynlig," Dagbladet, 27 June 1905 and "Det Bernadotteske Kandidatur," Aftenposten, 27 June 1905.

²⁶"De Valg," Morgenbladet, 27 June 1905.

²⁷For a discussion on points of law see Frede Castberg, Juridiske Stridsspørsmål i Norges Politiske Historie, pp. 20-33; Harald Thomas, "Om Unionsoppløsningen," Samtiden 64(1955): 456-461.

explanations at the cabinet meeting of 11 July, however, that only after 27 June did he focus on a secondary candidate, and only then did he get into contact with Wedel Jarlsberg, were untrue.²⁸ He did not tell them of his earlier contact with Wedel Jarlsberg because it probably would have given his finance minister, at the very least, justification for protest and, thereby, threatened his policy. He told them, in effect what he knew they would accept and added, as had become his method of procedure, a well worked out plan, the deviation from which might threaten Norway's independence. The fait accompli was complete when he told his cabinet that King Christian IX of Denmark had approved his grandson's candidacy "with pleasure."²⁹ It was also noted that the Danish prince was willing to take a Norwegian name and Løvland recommended Haakon VII.³⁰ Everyone's nationalistic sentiments

²⁸Hagerup Bull, 11 July 1905, in Dagbøker, p. 83; Bothner, 11 July 1905 in Dagbok, in privat arkiv 130, Riksarkivet, Oslo.

²⁹Ibid. Also see Wedel Jarlsberg, 1905: Kongevalget, p. 94. The changes in the stenographic notes were probably made around this time as Michelsen seems to have come to a clear understanding of the contradictions in his earlier statements with his intentions for a secondary candidate.

³⁰Hagerup Bull, 11 July 1905, in Dagbøker, p. 84. Michelsen has said that Prince Carl was given three names to choose from--Haakon, Harald and Olav--and that Løvland did not especially conceive the idea of the names: "Det la jo i luften omkring alle nationalt interesserede mennesker i de dage." Michelsen to Koht, 21 December 1922 in Koht, "Da Den Norsk-Svensk Union Vart Sprengt," HT 34(1947):320. Løvland also proposed changing the name of Oslo's major street (Karl Johans gate) to remove the name of the first Bernadotte. See Fredrik Stang, Erindringer Fra Min Politiske Tid, p. 156 n.1.

seemed to be rising to the surface as the crisis took a distinctly new direction with the national monarchy seemingly on the way to realization. The optimism expressed in the cabinet meeting was tempered only by the reality that Sweden had not yet acceded to the dissolution; however, with a Danish prince in reserve the prospects for independence and a national monarchy seemed brighter than ever. No sooner had the cabinet been informed of the negotiations with the Danes than the newspapers in Oslo were also carrying the story. During the meeting, the cabinet was informed that the London Standard had published a telegram containing news of a Norwegian offer to Prince Carl. That same afternoon it also appeared in Morgenbladet and Verdens Gang.³¹ In Copenhagen, Wedel Jarlsberg disclaimed the information as a canard, believing that it would be no trouble to deny another rumor at a time when rumors over Norway's vacant throne came and went like a summer storm.³²

Until 11 July Michelsen had depended on Wedel Jarlsberg to negotiate the candidacy of Prince Carl. Contacts had been established not only with Denmark, but Britain and France as

³¹Hagerup Bull, 11 July 1905, in Dagbøker, p. 85; Schøning, 12 July 1905, in Dagbøker, p. 380. Americans also got word of it first on 11 July. See St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 11 July 1905, p. 6.

³²Wedel Jarlsberg, 1905: Kongevalget, p. 95.

well.³³ While the negotiations centered on the Danish prince becoming king of Norway, the primary motive remained the desire by Norwegians to gain full and complete independence. A monarchical form of government would signal Norway's intentions of maintaining a responsible international posture in foreign affairs throughout Europe thereby gaining speedier recognition than might be possible if a republic were instituted or if the country faced a protracted struggle over its constitutional forms. It would further demonstrate Norway's legitimacy and thereby her standing with other countries which might intercede to prevent any armed conflict as a result of the dissolution. The possibility of Swedish armed resistance to Norway's actions had been real, albeit remote. Signs pointed to a peaceful settlement, but it remained an ever present danger for Norwegians. It was a recurring theme in the cabinet discussions and on the minds of the members of parliament.³⁴ None was more occupied by the prospect than Fridtjof Nansen, Norway's famous arctic explorer and scientist. Nansen was forty-four years old in 1905 and had become a living legend for Norwegians. In his ship Fram he had

³³Ibid., pp. 93-94, tells of his early contacts with Britain and the surprising support from the Third French Republic. Also see Sir Sidney Lee, King Edward VII: A Biography, 2 vols. (London: The Macmillan Company, 1927), 2:315-318.

³⁴The diaries of Hagerup Bull, Harald Bothner and Johan Castberg repeatedly stress the dangers of an armed conflict, as do newspaper reports almost daily.

braved the icy waters in an attempt to reach the North Pole by drifting in arctic pack ice. The journey of nearly three years captured the imagination of his countrymen and upon his return in 1896 he became internationally famous with his writing and lecture activity. Although never active politically, he followed union developments with an intensity rivaled only by his scientific activities. In early 1905 he wrote an article in Samtiden wherein he became one of the first to publicly call for a policy of action by urging Norwegians to settle the consulate question quickly and reclaim Norwegian sovereignty.³⁵ It was Nansen who had presented his country's position to the world in Norway and the Union with Sweden published just prior to the dissolution.³⁶ Earlier the Times (London), Le Temps (Paris) and the Kölnische Zeitung had simultaneously published a Nansen speech on 25 March 1905 giving the official Norwegian viewpoint of the crisis with Sweden.³⁷ Nansen's private and public writings reveal not only his zealous devotion to

³⁵Nansen, "Hvad Nu?" Samtiden 16(1905):304.

³⁶The book written in Norwegian with the title Norge og Foreningen med Sverige was translated into English, French and German then sent to several foreign leaders.

³⁷Much of the writing of the book was done by Norwegians in the Norwegian ministry of the interior, later the foreign office. See A. H. Winsnes, ed., Nansens Røst: Artikler og Taler av Fridtjof Nansen, 2 vols. (Oslo: Jacob Dybwads Forlag, 1942), 1:317-328 and Tim Greve, Fridtjof Nansen, 2 vols. (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1973, 1974).

Norway in 1905, but also to a peaceful settlement of the crisis. A letter to James Bryce, the English scholar of American political institutions, revealed his anxiety for peace as he wrote: "War agitation in Stockholm is rapidly increasing, and we are afraid here some fatal step may be taken that may have consequences which the Swedes themselves do not foresee."³⁸ Similar expressions appeared in Nansen's letters to his wife, Eva. On 10 July he wrote that ". . .there is no prospect for war," but, in order to keep the peace, he would keep his lines of communication to Britain open.³⁹ Combining Nansen's concern with his international status and contacts, it was only natural that Michelsen would call him to serve in some capacity other than the propaganda agent he had been heretofore. With Wedel Jarlsberg's telegram of 10 July and the real prospect of gaining the Danish prince for Norway's throne, Michelsen met with the explorer-scientist and asked him to go to Copenhagen to evaluate the possibilities of acquiring Prince Carl for Norway's throne. Since Michelsen and Nansen had known each other for a long time and had acquired a genuine rapport, Nansen's involvement would also give Michelsen a

³⁸Nansen to Bryce, undated, in Ms. fol. 2^o. 1924/10b, in Nansens etterlatte papirer, UB, Oslo. The letter was probably written in late June or early July as a reply from Bryce was dated 5 July 1905.

³⁹Nansen to Eva Nansen, 10 July 1905, in Brevsamling 48, Nansens etterlatte papirer, UB, Oslo.

chance to gauge the situation from the viewpoint of a trusted confidant and private citizen, rather than that of the professional diplomat Wedel Jarlsberg. Stories had been circulating, as well, about the latter's insistent behavior and arrogant bearing; this could well have been another reason why Michelsen wanted Nansen in Copenhagen--to keep an eye on Wedel Jarlsberg.⁴⁰ Much more likely was the prestige which Nansen would give the monarchical cause--especially since many believed him to be a republican with aspirations of becoming Norway's first president. The speculation included both Norwegian and foreign sources, but was repudiated by Nansen himself. In a letter to his wife he revealed his frustrations: "People apparently cannot think anything but that everyone wants to be a president, it is probably hopeless to want to eradicate such views."⁴¹

Nansen and Wedel Jarlsberg were cousins and, although possessing vastly different styles and temperaments, worked well together. When he came to Copenhagen on 17 July, Nansen

⁴⁰See especially Worm-Müller, "Fridtjof Nansen og 1905," in Fridtjof Nansen, Dagbok Fra 1905 (Oslo: H. Aschehoug & Co., 1955), p. lvi. Worm-Müller relates here a conversation he had with Nansen that Michelsen believed he was a republican but was still willing to trust him with the mission. For the relationship between Nansen and Michelsen see Greve, Fridtjof Nansen, 2:29-32.

⁴¹Nansen to Eva Nansen, 18 July 1905, in Brevsamling 48, Nansens etterlatte papirer, UB, Oslo. This letter is published in Fridtjof Nansen Brev, ed. Steinar Kjaerheim (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1961), pp. 153-154 (hereafter cited as Nansens Brev).

was still ignorant of what had preceded his joining the negotiations. Following his first orientation meeting with Wedel Jarlsberg, his eagerness for the secondary candidacy of Prince Carl was reflected in a letter to Michelsen wherein he insisted that all which remained was to "compel a final rejection from the Bernadottes."⁴² Impatience, however, was not his style for he also recognized the delicacy of the situation. He wished to offend neither the Swedes nor the Danes in his desire to reach an understanding that would give Norway her own national monarch.⁴³ Similarly, the Danish royal family, although anxious to see one of its members on the Norwegian throne, was unwilling to antagonize King Oscar by appearing too eager too publicly. Lacking a definitive answer from Sweden regarding the Bernadotte candidacy, the matter was effectively held in limbo even though Prince Carl and Princess Maud both expressed their determination to go to Norway.⁴⁴ Carl had said he would go to Norway as soon as a final refusal from the Bernadottes was official. Nansen speculated that such a refusal was "highly probable."⁴⁵ Anticipating the probability, the prince also

⁴²Nansen to Michelsen, 17 July 1905 in Kjaerheim, ed., Nansens Brev, p. 153.

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴Nansen to Eva Nansen, 18 July 1905, in Brevsamling 48, Nansens etterlatte papirer, UB, Oslo.

⁴⁵Ibid.

agreed to change his name upon assuming the throne and accepted the Løvland-recommended name Haakon VII. The couple also agreed to rename Alexander, their two-year old son, Olav.⁴⁶ For all intents and purposes plans for the trip to Norway were made and the family was ready. In Norway, the government believed itself sufficiently prepared to welcome the new king. With the exception of the cabinet, which had been informed on 11 July, only published rumors, generally denied, hinted at the intentions of the government. The Storting was kept effectively ignorant for the express purpose of nullifying hostile reactions not only to the new monarchy but the whole manner of proceeding which the government used. Having assumed an extra-parliamentary posture with the candidacy originally, the government seemed determined to effectively limit opposition by presenting the nation with an accomplished fact. Foreign minister Løvland appears to have been particularly caught up in the intrigue which this required, and when added to his fervent nationalistic zeal, the former republican was willing to force the election of Prince Carl through the Storting. The nationalistic justification for his actions and the appeal of national monarchy is evident in a letter he wrote to Wedel

⁴⁶Wedel Jarlsberg, 1905: Kongevalget, p. 98. The name Harald was not forgotten as Olav's son (the present Crown Prince) was given that name in 1937.

Jarlsberg on 14 July.

Although we naturally have many theoretical republicans, I do not doubt that King Haakon VII and his English queen will be accepted with deep and warm jubilation by the people. You remember that Henrik Wergeland, as early as 1842, cried out to Akerhus:

"Oh, what joy your towers acclaim
to see the days of Haakon again."

.....
Our worry now is that the matter will be delayed in Sweden. If only the Bernadotte question was clear. I assume that it would only be a matter of a few hours to complete the election of Prince Carl in the Storting and it can be a fait accompli.⁴⁷

Løvland noted in his postscript that he had read the letter to Michelsen who approved it. Apparently the two leaders were ready to engage once again in surprise politics by springing Prince Carl on the Storting and the Norwegian people. That the plan went awry cannot be blamed on any second thoughts by Michelsen or Løvland, but to continuing questions of how the Norwegians could justifiably establish that the Bernadotte candidacy no longer existed. The "trump card" had given the Swedes a strong hand and they seemed to be holding it to the last. The Norwegians, meanwhile, had effectively built up support from Germany and Britain as well as Denmark in their efforts on behalf of a secondary candidate. Count Frederik Raben-Levetzau, the foreign minister of Denmark, was as eager as the Norwegian government to see Prince Carl on the throne. Kaiser Wilhelm II, although

⁴⁷Løvland to Wedel Jarlsberg, 14 July 1905, in Wedel Jarlsberg, 1905: Kongevalget, pp. 105-106.

originally favoring another candidate, supported the Norwegian decision and declared German's intention to remain neutral although he remained skeptical of the increased influence Britain would have in the north with a British princess on the throne. The British, of course, were delighted to have a member of their royal family as queen in the nation across the North Sea.⁴⁸ The only remaining questions were when and how Sweden would play her trump card and what effect this would have on a Norwegian national monarchy.

Through the month of July the Norwegian government had been working on its plans for the candidacy of Prince Carl, specifically when he would be coming to Norway. In accordance with Swedish wishes that a precondition to consenting to the dissolution would be a plebiscite in Norway, the Michelsen government entertained the thought of combining such a vote with the candidacy of Prince Carl.⁴⁹ It was Michelsen's hope that Carl would come to Norway before the

⁴⁸Ibid., pp. 67, 72; Løvland, Menn og Minner, pp. 163-166; Hagerup Bull, 13 July 1905, in Dagbøker, pp. 86-87 relates a meeting between Michelsen and Alexander von Faber du Faur, the German consulate general in Oslo, wherein the latter expressed the Kaiser's friendly disposition toward Norway.

⁴⁹Hagerup Bull, 20 July 1905, in Dagbøker, pp. 90-92. For a study of Norwegian attempts to sound out Swedish opinion prior to an official declaration see Worm-Müller, "Karl Staaff, W. C. Brøgger og Stortinets adresse av 19de juni 1905," HT 35(1951):589-629.

dissolution was officially recognized by Sweden, thereby strengthening his standing with Norwegians much as Christian Fredrik had done in 1814. It would give him an added aura of legitimacy, important within the context of establishing a truly national monarchy. It became apparent, however, that the Danish government, as well as the Danish king and crown prince (Carl's grandfather and father respectively) were having second thoughts about this because of the effect it would have on relations with Sweden, both for Denmark and Norway.⁵⁰ The candidate himself told Wedel Jarlsberg on 26 July that he was willing to come to Norway immediately; he did not believe it was necessary to wait until everything was in order between Norway and Sweden. He was determined to ". . . stand by Norway through thick and thin."⁵¹ It was clear to everyone concerned, no less so to Prince Carl, that the final decision on the matter belonged to the aged Danish monarch, Christian IX. This was made clear to the thirty-three year old prince on 27 July when he was told that the king insisted that a definitive refusal of the Bernadotte candidacy must first come from Oscar.⁵² The situation remained uncertain with the principles looking for a

⁵⁰Hagerup Bull, 27 July 1905, in Dagbøker, pp. 94-95; Wedel Jarlsberg, 1905: Kongevalget, pp. 73-75, 124.

⁵¹Wedel Jarlsberg, *ibid.*, p. 123.

⁵²*Ibid.*, p. 124.

breakthrough when the Swedish Riksdag concluded its debate on 27 July and made public the conditions it required before the dissolution would become official. By then the stakes were higher than they had been originally and the number of players had also increased; but Sweden had apparently finally played her trump card.

The debate in Sweden had been bitter and divisive. One faction believed that war was necessary to maintain the union, a second sought a cession of Norwegian territory, while a third, consisting of liberals and social democrats, rejected any pre-conditions to a dissolution.⁵³ A special committee, Sekretautskottet, was eventually able to achieve a satisfactory compromise based on a point on which all factions could agree--that the Storting resolution of 7 June did not dissolve the union. Such a dissolution would require Swedish approval and this approval would presuppose agreement between the two countries after Norwegians either held a plebiscite on the matter or new parliamentary elections. If, at the conclusion of such a vote, Norwegians approached Sweden, the Riksdag would, in turn, declare its willingness to negotiate conditions for an eventual dissolution. The conditions were effectively spelled out in a lengthy document which reviewed the history of the union from the Swedish

⁵³Løvland, Menn og Minner, pp. 180-181.

point of view.⁵⁴ First, the Swedes demanded that a neutral zone be established on the southern part of the border between the two countries. In this zone no fortresses could be built and those already existing had to be razed. Second, the Lapps had a preexisting right to move back and forth across the mutual border each year with their herds of reindeer; and, finally, an agreement not to interfere with the free transportation of goods in transit or the unreasonable exploitation of waterways flowing from one country to the other. Jørgen Løvland commented that alongside the unanimous 7 June resolution now stood an equally concordant Swedish resolution of 27 July.⁵⁵

While the conditions created bitter expressions of indignation in Norway, particularly among the radical Venstre, the government of Christian Michelsen saw it as an opportunity to re-affirm the 7 June resolution by holding the required plebiscite. On the same day a proposal for a plebiscite was placed before the Storting after having been prepared by Hagerup Bull's justice department.⁵⁶ The

⁵⁴See "Sveriges vilkaar for at anerkjende Norge som en fra unionen med Sverige adskilt stat--Första urtima riksmöte 1905," in Heiberg, Unionens Opløsning 1905, pp. 239-303.

⁵⁵Løvland, Menn og Minner, p. 182.

⁵⁶"Dem norske regjerings proposition til Norges riges Storting om afholdelse af en folkeafstemning angaaende spørgsmaalet om ophaevelse af foreningen med Sverige," in Heiberg, Unionens Opløsning 1905, pp. 219-221.

plebiscite offered the Norwegians the opportunity to demonstrate that the dissolution had popular support and expressed a genuine national sentiment. Although the government recommended 13 August as the date for the holding of the plebiscite, it faced debate and final approval by the Storting. Again the wider issue of Norway's form of government would be opened to discussion by those who had originally opposed the Bernadotte candidacy and disapproved of the government's method of proceeding. In addition, it released a chauvinistic sentiment in reaction to what many considered a subversion of the integrity of the resolution of 7 June by submitting to Swedish dictates.⁵⁷ Gunnar Heiberg, a playwright and dramatist, probably reacted as negatively as anyone to the Swedish conditions when he wrote "Rør ikke 7de juni!" (Do not touch the 7th of June). According to Heiberg, the Swedish demands were intended to "humiliate" Norway. Should Norway accept and hold the plebiscite, it would be an abrogation of the step of independence taken on 7 June, he insisted.⁵⁸ Heiberg represented a radical and republican wing of Norwegian opinion, a segment constituting an extremely vocal group of individuals, but a relatively small

⁵⁷Castberg, 28 July 1905, in Dagbøker, pp. 427-428.

⁵⁸"Rør ikke 7de juni!" in Gunnar Heiberg, 1905 (Kristiania: H. Aschehoug & Co., 1923), pp. 66-69. This book is a collection of articles written by Heiberg in 1905; this particular article is dated 28 July 1905.

minority of Norwegians. However small the group, it was a thorn in the side of the Michelsen government as Heiberg's views showed affinity with several Stortings representatives, Wollert Konow, Adam Egede-Nissen and Johan Castberg, among others.⁵⁹ As evidenced by the discussion of the proposed plebiscite in special committee, the opposition accepted the need for a plebiscite but on Norwegian, not Swedish, terms. The fears as expressed by Heiberg were somewhat mollified with the phrasing of the plebiscite resolution: that the vote would be on the already existing dissolution.⁶⁰ The Norwegians were not prepared to concede that the dissolution required Swedish approval, at least not yet. Above and beyond the debate over the existence or non-existence of the union, however, basic questions on the form of government were also raised. Alfred Eriksen noted his failure to understand why such an unusual step as a plebiscite should be taken when the Storting could more easily set an election for a constituent assembly to settle all the prevailing constitutional questions. He contended that the form of government was the critical issue raised by the 7 June resolution and the removal of the king, not the dissolution as such.⁶¹ Castberg raised the issue of the validity of the

⁵⁹Hemmelige Møter i Stortinget, pp. 120-121, 124.

⁶⁰See comments of Carl Berner in Castberg, 28 July 1905, in Dagbøker, pp. 427-428.

⁶¹Ibid., p. 428.

Bernadotte candidacy, suggesting that if it was no longer a viable policy there ought to be a simultaneous vote on the dissolution and the form of government.⁶² The members of the Storting, of course, had not been informed of the government's approaches to the Danish prince. It may be assumed they read the newspapers and were well aware of the rumors, however, with a lack of general cynicism toward the government coupled to the denials and specific silence of the ministry, it was assumed that the Bernadotte candidacy was still being pursued by Michelsen. Of course, Michelsen was no longer interested in the Bernadotte candidacy and sought to avoid any debate on the form of government until he could set the terms by revealing his own initiative. It was, therefore, imperative that the Storting be kept ignorant of his intentions by limiting debate to only those matters directly before it. According to the prime minister:

The question [of Norway's form of government] is not now before us and should not therefore be discussed. The Bernadotte candidacy is not contained in the resolution of 7 June. As far as the plebiscite is concerned it is necessary that we observe the customary polite considerations toward foreign countries. Our position after a plebiscite will be better than before, recognition from Europe will then be easier to attain. . . .⁶³

The conservative newspaper, Morgenbladet, reflected much the same sentiment in a lead article of 28 June which criticized

⁶²Ibid.

⁶³Quoted in Ibid., p. 429.

the special committee's apparent procrastination in bringing the resolution to a general Storting vote. The paper accused the committee of unnecessarily taking up the controversial question of monarchy or republic. According to the paper, there were two reasons why the time was not ripe for discussing the matter of Norway's future form of government: first, because no one was prepared to vote on it since it had been so little discussed, and second, because the Bernadotte candidacy still existed.⁶⁴ The conservative paper was unable to acknowledge what the government had already determined--that the candidacy of a Bernadotte prince no longer existed. Naturally the government maintained the candidacy as its official facade and this, in turn, was what Morgenbladet reflected. As a conservative organ, Vogt's paper also maintained its attachment to the dynasty in particular and monarchy in general. Privately Michelsen raised objections to the special committee much like those published in Morgenbladet. He recommended the abolition of the committee which he saw as a threat to his direction of Norwegian policy, a threat he probably perceived as interfering with his plans for the candidature of Prince Carl.⁶⁵

⁶⁴"Spesialkomiteens," Morgenbladet, 28 July 1905.

⁶⁵Johan Castberg noted Michelsen's objections and threats in his diary and commented that even the prime minister had to acknowledge that he would rather get the criticism in special committee than in the Storting itself. See Castberg, 28 July 1905, in Dagbøker, p. 430.

When the proposal was finally placed before the Storting on 28 July, it was the Swedish conditions which dominated the debate. Egede-Nissen, however, took up a secondary question and insisted that since the people were to vote on the validity of the 7 June resolution they ought also vote on which form of government they wished to have.⁶⁶ In reply, Michelsen reiterated his belief that the form of government was not the subject of debate; he also stated, more clearly than he had until that time, his conviction that a monarchical constitution remained the basic law of Norway. Any change in that, he said, would have to be decided by the Storting at some future date.⁶⁷ This exchange typifies what had become standard operating procedure for the prime minister: concentrate on one matter at a time and put off the republicans as long as possible. It also demonstrates that he was beginning to feel more secure with the Storting and showed no compulsion to reply when Egede-Nissen warned the Storting that the government was preparing to force a Danish candidate onto

⁶⁶Hemmelige Møter i Stortinget, pp. 121, 126. Also see Kongeriget Norge, Stortings Forhandlinger 1904/1905. Vol. 7b: Stortingstidende (Kristiania: Centraltrykkeriet, 1905), p. 3205 where Egede-Nissen alone voted to include a question on the form of government in the plebiscite. Castberg and Eriksen tried to persuade him to retract his proposal, without success, insisting it would "cause confusion." Cf. Castberg, 5 August 1905, in Dagbøker, p. 438 and Myrvang, 28 July 1905 in Dagbok in Ms. fol. 2708, Worm-Müller papers, UB, Oslo.

⁶⁷Hemmelige Møter i Stortinget, pp. 126-127.

the throne of Norway. Storting president Berner insisted that it was merely an example of "the numerous rumors swirling in the air," and an unworthy topic for discussion.⁶⁸ The subsequent vote on the government proposal left Michelsen unchallenged as to the veracity of the rumors. The prime minister's frequent calls for unity were still holding as few, with the exception of the socialists, considered the matter of monarchy or republic important enough to challenge Michelsen's leadership when faced with questions on the dissolution itself.⁶⁹ Nevertheless, Egede-Nissen's comments caused some anxious moments for the government. Hagerup Bull noted in his diary that the Storting must have assumed the accuracy of Egede-Nissen's accusations since Michelsen failed to reply to them.⁷⁰ On the other hand, Hagerup Bull's fears may simply have been an expression of a conspirator's anxiety at the prospect of being discovered. He conceded, however,

⁶⁸Ibid., pp. 128-129. In a letter of 26 July, Nansen had recommended that Michelsen say nothing about either the Danish candidature or the form of government. See Nansen to Michelsen, 26 July 1905, in Kjaerheim, ed., Nansens Brev, p. 158.

⁶⁹For a further example of this see "Opraab til det norske vaelgerfolk fra samtlige landets politiske organisationer," in Heiberg, Unionens Opløsning 1905, pp. 230-231, where conservative, moderate, liberal and socialist leaders urged the public to vote "Yes" on August 13. Cf. Castberg, 5 August 1905, in Dagbøker, p. 441.

⁷⁰Hagerup Bull, 1 August 1905, in Dagbøker, p. 98.

that it might be difficult to get Prince Carl's candidacy accepted in the Storting.⁷¹

As the nation awaited the 13 August plebiscite, activity continued in Oslo and Copenhagen on the candidacy of Prince Carl. The thinking was now going in the direction of bringing the prince to Norway immediately after the plebiscite so he could lead the Norwegian government in its negotiations with Sweden over the conditions for dissolution. Nansen and Wedel Jarlsberg proposed that Norway agree to negotiations while Sweden, in turn, declared the Act of Union abrogated with King Oscar relinquishing the throne for himself and his family. The Storting would thereupon elect Prince Carl king, who would come to Norway as Haakon VII bringing with him the coveted foreign recognition.⁷² Both Michelsen and Løvland favored such a scenario but Sophus Arctander, the minister of commerce, rejected any proposal which presupposed the acceptance of any Swedish condition as a basis for negotiations.⁷³ The government accepted the proposal, however,

⁷¹Ibid.

⁷²Nansen to Eva Nansen, 6 August 1905, in Brevsamling 48, Nansens etterlatte papirer, UB, Oslo. Hagerup Bull, 1 August 1905, in Dagbøker, p. 102. Cf. Wedel Jarlsberg, 1905: Kongevalget, pp. 130-135.

⁷³Nansen to Eva Nansen, 6 August 1905, in Brevsamling 48, Nansens etterlatte papirer, UB, Oslo. Hagerup Bull and Kristofer Lehmkuhl, minister of labor, supported Michelsen and Løvland while Bothner favored Arctander's position. Nansen to Wedel Jarlsberg, 7 August 1905, in Wedel Jarlsberg, 1905: Kongevalget, pp. 149-150; Bothner, 6 August 1905, in Dagbok, Privat arkiv 130, in Riksarkivet, Oslo.

because it emphasized having a definitive and recognized government, with a monarchical head of state, before entering into negotiations with Sweden.⁷⁴ From the Swedish point of view, however, the conditions set forth on 27 July stood. There would be no vacant throne before a Norwegian plebiscite led to negotiations and these negotiations, in turn, led to a settlement of the crisis with Norway.⁷⁵

As the plebiscite neared, the Swedes were still procrastinating with a final reply to the offer. Despite the approval of Prince Carl, the government hesitated in unilaterally declaring the offer void although waiting for Sweden to reject it caused increased anxiety. It must have seemed to Michelsen that Norway's national monarchy was close enough to grab, yet evasive enough to frustrate. Michelsen was too unsure of monarchical support to risk the kind of commitment involved with a unilateral rejection without first having an alternate plan ready. As August 13 approached, Social-Demokraten advised its supporters to mark their ballots in an unmistakable manner to show they favored a

⁷⁴Løvland to Wedel Jarlsberg, 8 August 1905, in Wedel Jarlsberg, 1905: Kongevalget, p. 152.

⁷⁵This became obvious to the Norwegians after the plebiscite when Sweden's Prince Gustaf sent a letter to Edward VII insisting that the Swedish position assumed an agreement with Norway before Carl of Denmark could be elected. See Hagerup Bull, 12, 14 and 17 August 1905, in Dagbøker, pp. 109, 112, 117; Edward VII to Gustaf, 13 August 1905, in Wedel Jarlsberg, 1905: Kongevalget, pp. 178-180. See also Ibid., pp. 162-163.

republic--thereby ". . .making the Norwegian crown a crown of thorns which no one will accept."⁷⁶ Morgenbladet warned that such a demonstration would only succeed in nullifying the ballot.⁷⁷ The suggestion by the socialist paper was somewhat bewildering considering the Labor Party's position that its members vote in favor of the dissolution. It was even more so since Christopher Hornsrud, the Labor Party Chairman, had signed an appeal to Norwegian voters which stated that the matter of Norway's form of government was not an issue in this vote.⁷⁸ It is unlikely that the advice of the paper had any effect since of the 371,911 votes cast on the 13th, less than one percent was voided. The low percentage of voided ballots also reflected the relatively simple question and overwhelming support for dissolution. When the ballots were counted they revealed 368,208 favoring the 7 June dissolution and 184 registering a negative response.⁸⁰ The day was a festive one for the Norwegians who are among the most nationalistic people in the world. The historian, Yngvar Nielsen, has written of the day in a style

⁷⁶Social-Demokraten quoted in "For Aa Fremtvinge," Morgenbladet, 29 July 1905.

⁷⁷Ibid.

⁷⁸See footnote 69 above.

⁷⁹The statistics are found in Heiberg, Unionens Oppløsning 1905, p. 322.

⁸⁰Ibid.

which more or less still reflects the style of Norwegian historiography:

On the uppermost mountain farms, on the most remote islands, in every single valley, no matter how inaccessible--everywhere where Norwegians had settled in Norway, there was but one thought: To place the ballot in the ballot box and thereby preserve that which had become the country's first right--the right to determine for oneself one's own fate.⁸¹

With the election results official the government introduced a resolution in the Storting requesting the authority to negotiate with Sweden for the annulment of the union.⁸² Originally the resolution was meant to declare the Bernadotte candidacy no longer applicable while, simultaneously, the Storting would elect Prince Carl as king of Norway. This action, according to Hagerup Bull, would be eased by the qualification that he brought with him the unequivocal recognition of Britain and Denmark.⁸³ By the eve of the Storting's meeting, however, it was evident that Denmark, although anxious to see Carl on the throne, still worried about antagonizing Sweden. On 16 August Nansen wrote to Oslo that the

⁸¹Yngvar Nielsen, Norge i 1905, p. 440. As a boy of twelve, Frede Castberg solicited signatures from women in his home area since they could not vote. He told me it was a "natural expression of patriotism" in 1905. Interview with F. Castberg, 7 September 1976.

⁸²"Angaaende en henvendelse til de Svenske statsmagter i anledning af unionens ophaevelse m.v.," in Heiberg, Unionens Opløsning 1905, pp. 327-328.

⁸³Hagerup Bull, 14 August 1905, in Dagbøger, p. 114.

situation had become "somewhat complicated," and the prospect of seeing Prince Carl in Norway before negotiations began seemed doubtful at best.⁸⁴ The plan, as it had been worked out by the government, would have given Norway an advantageous position in her negotiations. It is unlikely that the outcome would have been significantly different, however, because Sweden steadfastly held to her original position. The reaction by Storting representatives, on the other hand, show the power Michelsen had on that body. One opponent of the monarchy wrote in his diary on 22 August that:

The plan struck me as somewhat fantastic but when such bright heads as L. [Løvland] and M. [Michelsen] had independently arrived at it, then there must be something practical in it, and we were in agreement that recognition from one or more Great Power had to strengthen negotiation initiatives to Sweden.⁸⁵

The Swedish royal family found itself unwilling and unable to go against the Riksdag decision of negotiations before Oscar could give up his throne in Norway. Prince Carl, determined as he was to come to Norway, felt he could neither accept the throne nor leave Denmark without the permission of the royal family.⁸⁶ The royal family of Denmark, in

⁸⁴Nansen to Løvland, 16 August 1905, in Kjaerheim, ed., Nansens Brev, pp. 162-164.

⁸⁵Knut Johannes Hougen, "Spredte Dagboksopptegnelser fra 1902 og framover," in Ms. fol. 2688.2, Worm-Müller papers, UB, Oslo.

⁸⁶Nansen to Løvland, 16 August 1905 in Kjaerheim, ed., Nansens Brev, pp. 162-164. The royal family in this case was Prince Carl's father and grandfather.

effect, echoed the decision reached by the Danish cabinet, specifically Foreign Minister Raben-Levetzau who maintained that "a unilateral declaration from the Norwegian side that the Bernadotte candidacy no longer applied because King Oscar had not answered cannot be regarded as adequate."⁸⁷

The Norwegian government had been unable to carry out its bold plan as originally intended. The hopes Michelsen had to secure the throne before negotiations began were dashed by a Danish government fearing for its future relations with Sweden. It is also clear, however, that a Norway which stood isolated in the days following its action of 7 June, no longer stood totally alone. With qualifications the prediction of Oscar to Wedel Jarlsberg on 16 June had not come true. As a result Sweden had to take cognizance of probable Danish and British support for Norway if they pressed too hard. For the time being Sweden's point of view prevailed, but only so long as she maintained a moderation that would not drive Norway into a political or diplomatic corner. That war was avoided on the Scandinavian peninsula in 1905 may be to the credit of Swedish sensibility and moderation, even though the dissolution unleashed hostile and bitter feelings toward her neighbor to the west. A comment

⁸⁷Raban-Levetzau, quoted in Worm-Müller, "Prins Carl Blir Konge i Norge," Haakon VII: Utgitt til 75 Årsdagen 3 August 1947 av Den Norske Regjering (Oslo: Den Norske Foleggerforening, 1947), p. 109.

by Nansen probably reflected the delicate situation best: "everything seems complicated and I still do not see how it will develop, but if Sweden does something dumb we will need to elect prince C. [arl] and thereby gain the recognition of Europe."⁸⁸

As the month of August drew to a close, attention focused on the negotiations between Sweden and Norway. Norway could feel generally assured that even without a king she did not stand isolated. It must be recognized, however, that Danish and British support more or less hinged on the Norwegian's implicit intention to remain a monarchy and choose Prince Carl for their throne. Intentions and realities do not always meet, however. Republican sentiment in Norway could still swing the country away from any declarations which the government might make. The negotiations with Prince Carl had been carried out without the knowledge of the Storting or the Norwegian people; should Michelsen's position prove to be tenuous enough to erode confidence the monarchy might go the same route as the union.⁸⁹ It was one

⁸⁸Nansen to Eva Nansen, 23 August 1905, in Brevsamling 48, Nansens etterlatte papirer, UB, Oslo.

⁸⁹Given Michelsen's standing in 1905 this was not very probable, although it was possible. Though a group of representatives had no confidence in Michelsen, this was not threatening to his position. On the whole his power over the Storting was remarkable, and led one opponent to characterize it as "slave-like confidence." See Hougen, "Dagboksopptegnelser fra 1902 og framover," in Ms. fol. 2688.2, Worm-Müller papers, UB, Oslo.

thing for Michelsen to force his will on the Storting as long as sovereignty and independence were called upon to solidify a united front, but what would happen when the question was merely that of Norway's form of government? How strong was the concept of national monarchy when it alone was the issue before the country? Whether or not the opposition could focus on that question alone depended, to a great extent, on the government's willingness to concede that it was that simple. Through all the debates since 6 June, Michelsen had successfully put off serious discussion on the form of government, but the time of testing came nearer every day and only awaited the outcome of the negotiations which began on 31 August at Karlstad in Sweden, a city half-way between the capital cities of Oslo and Stockholm.

Karlstad was named in paragraph three of the Act of Union as the meeting place where important decisions affecting the two countries were to be taken--such as questions over the succession to the throne. Negotiations continued for more than three weeks, until 23 September, when the delegates finally cabled that agreement had been reached. Two days later terms of the agreement were made public. Although cries of "humiliation" were heard, most of the world admired the Treaty of Karlstad, especially the section on

arbitration of disputes.⁹⁰ In the enthusiasm there was also bitterness. Most adamant in opposing the treaty was the Castberg-Konow faction which labeled it "surrender" and "humiliating." On the same day the negotiation results were made public, Castberg and Konow wrote a resolution which would have Norway's future form of government determined by plebiscite or a new Storting election. They felt so strongly about the negotiations at Karlstad, however, that opposition to the agreements took precedence over any questions of the form of government.⁹¹ The subsequent postponement of the Castberg-Konow resolution suited the government and because of the chauvinistic manner in which Castberg, Konow and Alfred Eriksen attacked the agreement they came to be labeled as "war-mongers." Morgenbladet took the opportunity to

⁹⁰For examples of the responses see Diplomaticus, I Sverige 1905, p. 117; Halvor Storm, ed., Nils Vogt, "Morgenbladet," og Unionsopløsningen: Artikler og Brev, 1903-1905 (Oslo: Johan Grundt Tanum Forlag, 1944), pp. 220-221 gives reactions from London, Berlin and Paris; The Reverend Thomas B. Gregory, "A Real Sign of the Millenium," San Francisco Examiner, 18 October 1905, p. 16 gives an optimistic quasi-religious American view.

⁹¹Myrvang, 26 September 1905, in Dagbok, in Ms. fol. 2708 Worm-Müller papers, UB, Oslo. Also see "Debatten om Karlstad overenskomsterne," in Heiberg, Unionens Opløsning 1905, pp. 415-616; and Hemmelige Møter i Stortinget, pp. 296-349. The treaty, published in French, Swedish and Norwegian is found in Heiberg, Unionens Opløsning 1905, pp. 647-672. The Castberg-Konow resolution is in "Forslag fra repraesentantane Konow, Castberg, Hougen m. fl. om folkets afgjørelse af spørsmålet om Norges regjeringsform m.v.," Document 79 in Kongeriget Norge, Stortings Forhandlinger 1904/1905, Vol. 5: Documenter (Oslo: O. Fredr. Arnesens bog--og accidenstrykkeri, 1905), pp. 1-3.

condemn both the faction's stand against Karlstad and support for a republic. It branded as naïve the insistence that the government invited difficulties and the humiliation of Karlstad because a republic had not been instituted on 7 June.⁹² In essence, Castberg agreed with this interpretation in a pamphlet he wrote in 1906 on the events of 1905, claiming that the humiliating Karlstad agreements would not have been signed by a republican government.⁹³ It is difficult to say to what respect the anti-Karlstad arguments hurt the subsequent struggle for a republic, but it certainly did not hurt Michelsen's position as the man who had brought Norway through her toughest trial in a century without war. Michelsen himself must have sensed his strengthened position for on returning from the negotiations he could be found joking with several representatives in the rotunda of the Storting "where he entertained them for about two hours by telling humorous stories from Karlstad."⁹⁴ No wonder Michelsen could joke; until then his every maneuver had brought him

⁹²"Den Store Debatt," Morgenbladet, 7 October 1905.

⁹³Johan Castberg, Om Begivenhederne i 1905 (Kristiania: Feilberg & Landmark, 1906), p. 31.

⁹⁴Myrvang, 26 September 1905, Dagbok, in Ms. fol. 2708, Worm-Müller papers, UB, Oslo. Halvdan Koht, in reminiscences from 1905, has stated that the republicans got no worse hindrance in their work for a republic than to be associated in the popular mind as "Karlstad-stormers." See Koht, "Da Den Norsk-Svensk Union Vart Sprengt," HT 34(1947):315-316.

success. He had kept the opposition off guard and divided. He had settled matters with Sweden without the feared military confrontation, and when the Storting finally voted to accept the Karlstad agreements on 9 October, all that remained was to put the form of government in order.

On 9 October Michelsen publicly admitted what he had privately assumed for months--that the Bernadotte candidacy no longer existed. It had, in reality, ceased to be valid when King Oscar understood it to be insincere and requiring too great a sacrifice on his part.⁹⁵ Republican newspapers were eager to follow suit and admitted that, for all intents and purposes, the candidacy of a Bernadotte for the Norwegian throne was a thing of the past.⁹⁶

With the candidacy no longer valid, the restraints it placed on the Opposition were also terminated. Both sides stood, more or less, free to support the form of government each thought best without the restrictions that had prevailed since 7 June. A preview of what was to come took place at the side of the president's chair during the debate

⁹⁵See Heiberg, Unionens Opløsning 1905, p. 548. Also see "Et Interview med statsminister Michelsen," Norsk Intelligenssedler, 29 September 1905. This, in effect, meant that Michelsen believed the offer to be no longer valid as early as mid-June, but he also insisted on its sincerity when first made. All evidence shows that it was sincere.

⁹⁶"Prinsetilbudet," Social-Demokraten, 11 October 1905, and "Kandidaturene," Norsk Intelligenssedler, 11 October 1905.

over the Karlstad agreements on 6 October. Wilhelm Olsson, the minister of defense, was giving a speech and answering questions when he used the phrase, "when this is over." At that same moment Michelsen happened to walk past Thore Myrvang who whispered to the prime minister, asking when it would be over. The exchange revealed more than a tense opposition and a self-assured Michelsen; it reveals the inevitability of a confrontation between monarchists and republicans to decide finally if Ibsen's national monarchy was a theoretical dream or a viable, practical reality:

"Ah yes, the day after tomorrow we will come and present you with a king, what do you say to that?" said Michelsen. "Yes, just try it and then you will see the sparks fly,"--I said. The whole thing was naturally to be a joke, but judging by the signs, especially after the government's actions and the tremendous agitation which it is conducting "in order to get working peace [arbeidsro]" I am afraid that it is devising plans to take the Storting and the Norwegian people by surprise with a foreign prince, apparently the Danish Karl. We will soon know.⁹⁷

⁹⁷Myrvang, 8 October 1905, in Dagbok, Ms. fol. 2708, Worm-Müller papers, UB, Oslo.

CHAPTER VI

PASSIONS OF OCTOBER AND A SECONDARY CANDIDATE SECURED

By the time the Storting voted to accept the Karlstad agreements on 9 October it was becoming apparent that a major debate in the Norwegian parliament over the form of government was coming. Primarily because of other considerations, such as the need to show a united front against Sweden, it had been successfully postponed. Widespread enthusiasm and joy had greeted the Storting resolution of 7 June releasing a patriotic passion making it relatively simple for the government to enforce its restrictions on a willing nation. Those present in the Storting on 7 June marvelled at the "great moment," and Christopher Knudsen, the minister of ecclesiastical affairs, wrote that it was "one of the most memorable days" in Norwegian history: "During the solemn ceremony emotions were strong on the floor and in the gallery. Many cried. Everyone felt the responsibility and seriousness as well as the joy of the event."¹ Even so, there were those who, although similarly

¹Statsraad Christopher Knudsen, Spredte Minder fra 1905 (Kristiania: J. Aass Forlag, 1906), pp. 47-48; Koht, Minne Fra Unge År, p. 270; Fridtjof Nansen, Supplementary Chapter to Norway and the Union with Sweden, p. 115; Schønning, 7 June 1905, Dagbøger, pp. 358-359; Castberg, 8 June 1905, Dagbøger,

affected by the joy, remained suspicious of the government and its intentions. This suspicion was reinforced by the announcement of the Bernadotte candidacy which dampened the spirits of many that morning. Among them was Thore Myrvang who noted that "had not the paragraph about a new Bernadotte as Norwegian king been included, the joy would have been perfect."²

The tactics adopted by the Michelsen government effectively stifled dissent and with the government's threats of resignation had kept the attention of the Storting focused away from constitutional questions and directed toward the settlement of the crisis with Sweden. As the summer months turned to fall, and that settlement approached, a vigorous campaign for or against monarchy was generally acknowledged. Castberg had told Halvdan Koht in September that the agitation against Karlstad was merely a tactical maneuver in order to organize a popular movement strong enough to carry over into defeating plans for a new monarchy.³ In his own

p. 352; Bothner, 7 June 1905 in Dagbok in privat arkiv 130, Riksarkivet, Oslo; Løvland, Menn og Minner, pp. 132-136; C. J. Hambro, Du Herlige Studentertid (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1956), pp. 64, 80.

²Myrvang, 7 June 1905, in Dagbok in Ms. fol. 2708, Worm-Müller papers, UB, Oslo.

³According to Koht, Castberg believed that the struggle against the Karlstad agreements would not succeed, but was necessary to avoid the imposition of a new monarchy on Norway. See Koht, "Da Den Norsk-Svensk Union Vart Sprengt," p. 315.

way, Castberg had taken up a struggle which had more or less been just below the surface since 7 June by attacking the Karlstad agreements. Since June the form of government had been an avoided issue in the Storting, although it gained considerable attention in the printed media. That there was relatively little newspaper debate was probably the result of government pressure. At a meeting on 29 July Michelsen had convinced a group of leading editors that they ought to avoid discussing the issue because of the dangers in creating splits among the Norwegian people.⁴ As a result, the press never seriously challenged the government on this sensitive issue until it was, in effect, too late. This is not to say there was no debate; the newspapers made their respective positions clear but undertook no organized appeal, other than in general terms.⁵ Less restricted than the newspapers, an intriguing pamphlet campaign grew up in 1905 centered

⁴Michelsen's comments at this meeting must have been meant to mislead and thereby avoid serious opposition, if he was correctly quoted in subsequent newspaper reports. He reportedly stated that: "If the Bernadotte candidacy is voided the government will seek recognition by the Powers on the situation as it stands, and thereafter the government will present the question of the future form of government for a decision by the voters." Quoted in "Regjerings løfte: Et merkeligt pressemøte," Social-Demokraten, 31 October 1905. Also see Lars Oftedal's comments in Stavanger Aftenblad, 4 November 1905.

⁵The first, and most extensive, examination of press activity in 1905 is Worm Eide, "Kongedømme eller Republik i Norge i 1905," (unpublished hovedoppgave i historie 1931), in Ms. Ho. 140, UB, Oslo.

basically on the issue of monarchy or republic. This campaign has never been studied for its own sake and, with the exception of occasional references to its existence, has been generally neglected. It was, however, an integral part of the activity in 1905 and related directly to the subsequent Storting debate in that most of the issues discussed there had been developed earlier in the pamphlet literature. Because of their intense opposition to the Michelsen government and the Bernadotte candidacy, the most active group was, naturally the socialists.

As early as 7 June the socialist newspaper Social-Demokraten had called for a referendum on the issue of Norway's form of government, insisting that the Storting had "no right to bind the people to either a monarchy or a republic."⁶ On 23 August the Norwegian Labor Party sent to local chapters manifestoes and pamphlets on the matter of the form of government with a recommendation that they be handed out to politically interested people. In order to get the message out, they also recommended mass meetings and an active agitation for a republic. The party's official position called for a plebiscite rather than allowing the sitting Storting to settle the matter by going to an immediate election of a king. The socialists wanted a popular vote

⁶Johan Scharffenberg, "En advarsel," Social-Demokraten, 7 June 1905.

and opposed the Storting deciding without first hearing from the people. They feared their view would not prevail unless a grass roots movement was organized.

The position of the Storting and government circles is apparently that monarchy will be restored in the country without the voters being asked if the people do not raise a strong and unanimous protest against it. . . . It is the will of the people which must govern in Norway and the question monarchy or republic must be decided by vote of the people.⁷

Unceasingly, the socialists organized mass meetings, distributed leaflets and promoted pamphlets with an appeal that was directed basically toward the working class. According to M. Ormestad, the chairman of Norway's iron and metal workers, a king would "poison the spirit of the people" because he would have nothing to do. A president, on the other hand, would work and understand working people as evidenced by the United States where "even a Roosevelt can step down to the workers and arbitrate wage struggles."⁸ The naiveté notwithstanding, the labor leader probably reflected a general view among Norwegian socialists who appear to have

⁷Christopher Hornsrud and Magnus Nilssen, "Til Organisationerne," Leaflet distributed by the Norwegian Labor Party from the Central Committee, 23 August 1905, copy in Box 329 (481) 15 in Arbeiderbevegelsens arkiv, Oslo.

⁸"Folkeaftertning over Statsformen," Social-Demokraten, 13 October 1905. Also see "Folkevelstand: Kongedømme eller republikk," *ibid.*, 17 October 1905. Bergens Tidende also called on the government to show confidence in the people who had been so loyal to it. Bergens Tidende quoted in Social-Demokraten, 17 October 1905.

been convinced that monarchy and democracy were mutually exclusive concepts. Their emphasis remained, therefore, on demands for a plebiscite and a popular vote, naturally convinced that it would result in a favorable decision. This same emphasis was also evident in republican pamphlets which seem to have focused on two basic issues: the qualifications of the Storting to undertake an election immediately; and the form of government itself. Without question the most outspoken of those opposing the election of the king by the sitting Storting was Nikolaus Gjelsvik, a lawyer from western Norway with radical political persuasions, who had long been active in the new-Norwegian (nynorsk) language movement as well as a recognized member of the intellectual elite in Norway. Gjelsvik had often written for the new-Norwegian newspaper Den 17de Mai and was an acknowledged expert on Norwegian constitutional law.⁹ During the Summer of 1905 Gjelsvik published an article in the periodical Samtiden, wherein he questioned the authority of the Storting to choose a king without the matter first having been placed before the people in a plebiscite. It was his contention

⁹For a brief history of nynorsk see "Introduction," in Einar Haugen, ed., Norwegian English Dictionary: A Pronouncing and Translating Dictionary of Modern Norwegian (Bokmål and Nynorsk) With a Historical and Grammatical Introduction (Madison: University Wisconsin Press and Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1965), pp. 23-25. See for example Gjelsvik, "Forhandlingsgrunnlaget," serprent etter Den 17de Mai in N.S. 1291, UB, Oslo.

that the action of 7 June had left Norway without a viable constitution, and that it was "pure nonsense" to claim that the constitution of 17 May 1814 became the effective basic law when Norway unilaterally dissolved the union.¹⁰ He advocated the same argument which Alfred Eriksen had so perspicaciously presented on 6 June in opposing the Bernadotte candidacy and, like Eriksen, Gjelsvik insisted that the constitution must be set in order prior to any election of a king.¹¹ The introduction of a republic in 1905, Gjelsvik claimed, would be no more revolutionary than the introduction of a constitutional monarchy had been in 1814; but the people, he believed, should be allowed to express themselves on the principal question--monarchy or republic.¹² Gjelsvik's views were further disseminated when the Studenternes nationale forening (The National Union of Students) published and distributed his Riksskipnaden (The Constitution), a pamphlet which contained his arguments from the Samtiden article.¹³ The student organization was a group

¹⁰Gjelsvik, "De nuvaerende Stortings kompetense med Hensyn til Forfatningsspørgsmaalet," Samtiden 16(1905):503.

¹¹Ibid., p. 504. Cf. Francis Hagerup's comments in Kongeriget Norge, Stortings Forhandlinger 1905/1906, Vol. 7a: Stortingstidende, pp. 73-74.

¹²Gjelsvik, "De nuvaerende Stortings kompetense," p. 506.

¹³Gjelsvik, Riksskipnaden (Kristiania: Arbeidernes Aktietrykkeri, 1905), copy of the pamphlet is in N.S. 273, UB, Oslo.

of republican university students who, finding themselves at odds with the larger Student Society, broke with that group, ostensibly because of its monarchical sympathies. Halvdan Koht, who had been instrumental in the break, was chosen the splinter group's chairman and principal spokesman.¹⁴ As such he became an important figure in the events of the year, speaking often and writing several pamphlets of his own. Koht was an intellectual, a historian who tended to view philosophical questions in a broader historical context. This was first evident in his lecture on the development of the Norwegian monarchy in 1899 and had been reinforced several times thereafter. During the Karlstad debates, Koht had taken a pacific point of view in opposition to the Castberg-Konow-Eriksen faction and supported the agreements with Sweden as necessary no matter how humiliating they appeared.¹⁵ Koht's independent and historically-oriented

¹⁴Koht, "Da Den Norsk-Svensk Union Vart Sprengt," p. 316, and Koht, Minne Frå Unge År, pp. 274-277.

¹⁵Koht, Minne Frå Unge År, pp. 273-274. This was also the view of the Labor Party. See Beretning om Det Norske Arbeiderpartis virksomhed 1904/1905, in Box 329(481)¹⁵ in Arbeiderbevegelsens arkiv, Oslo. Cf. Anders Kirkhusmo, "Det norske arbeiderparti fra 7. juni til Karlstad 1905," (Hovedfagsoppgave i historie, The University of Oslo, 1961). Because he opposed the Karlstad agreements and voted against the position of the Party, Alfred Eriksen was censured in April 1906 at the national convention and, in subsequent years, became a pariah of the party as a price for his independence and breach of solidarity. See Anders Buen, Erindringer, p. 83; Oscar Pederson, "Alfred Eriksen," in NBL, p. 564; Kåre Kjeldsholm Tveito, "Alfred Eriksens Brot med Det Norske Arbeiderparti," (Hovudfagsoppgåve i historie, The

thinking is further evidenced in his pamphlet, Respekt for folket (Respect for the People) where he argued that the final decision on the Bernadotte candidacy should be decided by a plebiscite. According to Koht, the men of 1814 faced many of the same decisions which presented themselves in 1905; principally the question of merely electing a king, or building a constitution on the concept of popular sovereignty. Faced with such a choice, he wrote, the men of 1814 chose the latter.¹⁶ It was the young historian's contention that, although the Storting had the judicial right to elect a king, it had the moral obligation to wait until the people had expressed themselves.¹⁷ Like his fellow republicans, Koht was anxious to repeat the form of the 13 August plebiscite on the direct question about Norway's future form of government. Whether the arguments for a plebiscite were justified by judicial or historical arguments, they remained secondary to the real issue which the pamphleteers confronted--monarchy or republic. While the government of Christian Michelsen was concerned with how the throne would

University of Oslo, 1954). The biography of their father by Henrik and Gunnar Eriksen, Sogneprest Dr. Alfred Eriksen, makes no mention of the convention or the controversy.

¹⁶Koht, Respekt for folket (Kristiania: Arbeidernes Aktietrykkeri, 1905), pp. 1-2, copy is in NA/A 0-7513, UB, Oslo.

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 2-4.

be filled, the pamphleteers debated whether it should be filled at all. The literature is not extensive and probably represented a small percentage of what was written in 1905; it was, however, emotionally charged and an aspect central to the problem of national monarchy in Norway, particularly in revealing how it was viewed by an articulate and involved intellectual group. Because the government supported monarchy and argued that the 7 June dissolution in no way affected the monarchical constitution, the burden of persuasion fell heavily on the shoulders of the republicans. Their battle was that of an underdog struggling against the power and prestige of a government which had dissolved the union and maintained the peace. Abandoning the government, personified in the popular mind by Christian Michelsen, was a serious step indeed for a Norwegian citizen to contemplate in 1905. To do so would require a conviction, an ideology, perhaps a faith, which was capable of standing against overwhelming odds.¹⁸ It was partly to strengthen such convictions

¹⁸Melodramatic as this sounds, one is left with the distinct feeling that it is nevertheless true in light of contemporary comments and writings. A good example of the strength of Michelsen and the popular appeal of monarchy with religious Norwegians was the children's magazine of the Mission School of Stavanger, which in its January 1906 issue published two pages of photographs of the royal family and the three most prominent men in the Storting and government: Michelsen, Løvland and Berner. A patriotic editorial and a patriotic hymn, "By the Lord's Bounteous Grace" (Af Herrens rige Naade), were also included. See O. E. Mohr, ed., Missionselskabets Barneblad (Stavanger: Den norske missionselskabs bogtrykkeri, 1906).

that republican writers aimed their reasoned arguments. Reason, however, did not always prevail when opposed by faith. At any rate the struggle was intense, and perhaps the most reasonable of all republican pamphleteers was Halvdan Koht who turned to history and the concept of progress to convince his fellow citizens that a republic was the logical next step on the path to popular sovereignty. Further developing his ideas on the history of the Norwegian monarchy, Koht asks the rhetorical question: Kann vi faa nationalt kongedømme i Noreg? (Can we get a national Monarchy in Norway?) Again, it was Ibsen as much as Michelsen that the republicans were attacking when Koht claimed in his pamphlet that monarchy had fulfilled its purpose and had become a thing of the past. It was popular sovereignty which had been growing since 1814, and on 7 June 1905 the Norwegian people saw the end of the Norwegian monarchy.¹⁹ According to Koht:

No one can deny that monarchy and royalist thought has been a consistent thread in Norwegian history. But the thread has long since broken. Monarchy has lost that position it had in our striving for progress and has itself alone to thank for no longer standing as a mark of independence for the people.²⁰

¹⁹Koht, Kann vi faa nationalt kongedømme i Noreg? (Kristiania: Arbeidernes Aktietrykkeri, 1905), pp. 3-4. Cf. Koht, "Kongedømmets Gjerning i Norge," Norsk Intelligenssedler, 31 August 1905 and "Hvad slags Republik?" *ibid.*, 8 November 1905. Also see "Det republikansk landsoppraab," in Heiberg, Unionens Opløsning 1905, pp. 946-947, which was co-authored by Koht.

²⁰Koht, Kann vi faa nationalt kongedømme i Noreg?, p. 4.

In short, Koht insisted that monarchy had ceased to be a symbol of either progress or independence; that the people themselves had replaced it. "A Norwegian monarchy," said Koht, "can never be anything but a hollow name."²¹ Similarly, Nikolaus Gjelsvik insisted in a pamphlet that the half-millennium during which Norway was ruled by a foreign king, had taught the Norwegians to distinguish between the monarchy and the state--between the king and the independence of the country. Unlike Prussia, he wrote, the king and country are not one in Norway.²² Unlike Koht, Gjelsvik revealed a bitter tone in his pamphlet, Skal det norske folket innføra republikken eller skal det føra inn ein prins? (Shall the Norwegian people institute a republic or shall they import a prince?), a bitterness directed particularly to those like Bjørnson who advocated a monarchy after a lifetime of agitating for a republic. It was incomprehensible to Gjelsvik how Bjørnson could have changed, but then he did not know the subtle impact of Ibsen's ideas on his father-in-law. For his monarchical stance Gjelsvik castigated Bjørnson as a "sheep" and a "defense nihilist" who supported a prince for the throne

²¹Ibid.

²²Nikolaus Gjelsvik, Skal det norske folket innføra republikken eller skal det føra inn ein prins? (Kristiania: Den 17de Mai, 1905), p. 4. Copy in NA/A 6-436, UB, Oslo.

because of "good connections."²³ With or without good connections, Gjelsvik feared that a monarch would merely place the country in jeopardy of dynastic intrigue. That prospect troubled him, not so much as an ideological republican but as a Norwegian nationalist. Evidence of this is seen in Gjelsvik's analysis of what the monarchy would do for socialist strength. In an apparent retort to the fears of conservatives, he claimed that bringing a foreign prince to the throne would not neutralize socialists but would give them success as never before. Unfortunately he failed to explain why this is so, but one can surmise from what he did say that he believed it would drive Norwegians into supporting the one party which consistently opposed the monarchy.²⁴ That opposition, he claimed, showed the socialists to be "more Norwegian than socialists" and that they thought more of their country than their party.²⁵ Like Koht, Gjelsvik doubted that a monarchy could ever be national; it was, he believed, only the republicans who represented the national spirit and progress.

Time and again the republican pamphleteers returned to the idea of progress. It was a vaguely defined term which

²³Ibid., p. 6. "Defense nihilist" is a term used because of Bjørnson's support for the Karlstad agreements, particularly the neutral zone and disarmament of the fortresses along the border.

²⁴Ibid., p. 8.

²⁵Ibid.

in context usually seems to have meant democracy or the progressing toward a democratic society. This was probably a natural inclination considering the trend in Norwegian political life during the nineteenth century and especially since the establishment of ministerial responsibility in 1884.²⁶ An overwhelming characteristic of Norwegians in 1905, seemingly reinforced when they studied their historical development, was optimism. It was an optimism akin to what historian Oron J. Hale has called "the great illusion."²⁷ This optimistic faith in humanity was nowhere evidenced as strongly as in a pamphlet by Nikolai Lundegaard, titled Republik eller Kongedøme (Republic or Monarchy) published by the Student Language Association, a radical republican student group headed by Olav Midttun.²⁸ Lundegaard had

²⁶See for example the analyses of Koht, 1814: Norsk Dagbok Hundre Aar Etterpaa (Kristiania: H. Aschehoug & Co., 1914), pp. 532-535 and Arne Bergsgard, "Spørsmålet um folkesuveraeniteten i 1814," HT 28(1929):225-249. This concept of progress has fit well for the Marxist historian's interpretations of Norwegian history, especially in Koht, "Bonde Mot borgar in nynorsk historie," ibid. V.R. 1(1910): 29-60, 79-85. On the events of 1884 see Jens Arup Seip, Et Regime Foran Undergangen (Oslo: Johan Grundt Tanum Forlag, 1945) and Alf Kaartvedt, Kampen Mot Parlamentarisme, 1880-1884: Den Konservative Politikken Under Vetostriden, 2d ed. (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1967).

²⁷Norwegians, like other Europeans, had seen nineteenth century promises become realities in an era dominated by the ideologies of Samuel Smiles and Karl Marx. See Oron J. Hale, The Great Illusion: 1900-1914 (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1971), pp. 1-4.

²⁸Midttun would serve for more than fifty years as editor of the Norwegian periodical Syn og Segn and remained an unrepentant republican. See Midttun, "Strid og Stemningar Hausten 1905," Syn og Segn 61(1955):433-444.

himself served previously as chairman of the Association. The pamphlet, forbidden to be sold on the streets by the police of Oslo, carried many of the same themes evident in other pro-republican writings. Lundegaard argued against the expense of a monarchy as well as the fact that it represented a "tool against the popular will."²⁹ Stated simply, he insisted that "a republic is a tool for progress, monarchy a tool for reaction."³⁰ Like many other republicans, Lundegaard believed that Norway had, in reality, been a republic since 7 June. The monarchy had ceased to function while the Michelsen government and the Storting exercised the executive and legislative functions:

Since 7 June it has become obvious that we are grown enough to live in a republic, and now we can get a republic. . . . Since 7 June . . . [the republic] has grown so firm in Norwegian thought and Norwegian feeling that no power can dislodge it.³¹

²⁹Nikolai Lundegaard, Republik eller Kongedøme (Kristiania: Johansen & Nielsen, 1905), p. 6. Also see Midttun, "Stid og Stemningar Hausten 1905," pp. 439-440.

³⁰Lundegaard, Republik eller Kongedøme, p. 6.

³¹Ibid., p. 8. The concept that Norway was, in fact, a republic in principle after 7 June was expanded by Fredrik Stang, Stattholdersak og Unionstrid, 1856-1862 (Oslo: H. Aschehoug & Co., 1943), p. 80 n.l., to include the situation existing in the nineteenth century as well when he writes: "it was as though we had a republican and monarchical constitution running side by side." Cf. Stang, Die nörwegisch-swedischen Vorgänge in staatsrechtlicher Beleuchtung, "Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung 10(1 July 1905):610-615.

Lundegaard's optimism could well have been infectious, but it was countered by similar optimism from the monarchists. Although generally satirical, they could generate bitterness and hostility to match their opponents when necessary. Unlike the republicans, however, who could only weave promises of the future, monarchists entwined past progress under a monarchical constitution with the hopes of greater progress and stability under a form of government the Norwegians popularly understood. Such was the basic strength of the monarchical pamphleteers and they used it to their advantage, perhaps none better than Hamid, in his Giv Folket Hvad Folkets Er (Give the People What belongs to the People).³² Although he supported a monarchical form of government, Hamid would not deny the people the chance to express their feeling. To republicans he wrote:

We are convinced that a democratic monarchy is best for the country internally and externally but-- should you who believe that a republic is best be in the majority we will loaylly accept that; therefore let it be decided quickly . . .let the people themselves choose.³³

³²Hamid [pseudonym], Giv Folket Hvad Folkets Er (Kristiania: Rob. Pettersen & Co., 1905). The real name of the author is apparently now known as I have tried, unsuccessfully, to find out. It remains unknown to anyone at the University library in Oslo and the bibliography of literature lists it only under the pseudonym. See Kaare Haukaas, Litteraturen om 1905: Ein Bibliogafi (Oslo: Det Norske Samlaget, 1956), p. 27.

³³Hamid, Giv Folket Hvad Folkets Er, p. 6.

To elect a king without first holding a plebiscite, he insisted, would be "irresponsible." The government ought to inform the people as to which prince would be willing to come before the plebiscite was held, but it should be held.³⁴ Whereas Hamid revealed himself to be reasonable and moderate, such was not the case with another monarchist also using a pseudonym. Ole Beiningen, writing under the name Cato, revealed himself to be sarcastic and cynical, but also an effective pamphleteer with his Kong Carl eller "Praesident" Konow.³⁵ Beiningen takes issue with the idea of progress so prominent with republicans arguing for a democratic republic, claiming that "the prospect is remote that we will become gods in the near future."³⁶ His lack of faith in the prospect of human progress is further emphasized by his cynical disregard for the ability of the people to make any choice at all, let alone a wise one:

When one sees how wise, enlightened people can be led astray by a political con man, a totally talentless agitator, what can we expect of the great masses who grope in the darkness because they lack suitable insight, are ignorant of what they really want and can therefore often let themselves be duped by those who scream the loudest.³⁷

³⁴Ibid., pp. 10, 13. Cf. Hamid, Kongedømme eller Republik? (Kristiania: Eget Forlag, 1905), p. 16.

³⁵Cato [Ole Ingvald Marius Beiningen], Kong Carl eller "Praesident" Konow: En utredning af stats--og folkeretslige grund-principer (Kristiania: L. E. Tvedtes Forlag, 1905). Konow was the personification of the evils of republicanism for Beiningen.

³⁶Ibid., p. 46.

³⁷Ibid., p. 39.

For Beiningen the screamer was, of course, none other than Wollert Konow, perceived as a revolutionary, a republican and a democrat. It is difficult to determine which he considered the worst, for they were all damning. While castigating the rebel Konow, he lauded the authoritarian figure of Michelsen. Using the favorite Norwegian metaphor of the sea, Michelsen was the captain, Konow the mutinous sailor lusting for power and seeking to launch the ship of state on a revolutionary sea. Nothing written in 1905 has the fierce, attacking style of Beiningen's pamphlet and this alone justifies an extensive quote to gain a full perspective of his passionate partisanship:

Fortunately Captain Michelsen holds the vehement seaman by the ears; naturally he does not lay him in fetters and hand irons as is done with mutinous sailors who seek to excite the crew against the captain and the laws of the sea by stranding the ship between the reefs and the skerries; he only silences him, and that he has done solidly and remarkably. In the meantime, skipper Michelsen has also saved the ship of state without so much as using any coercive measure against the rebel seaman; therefore everyone knows it is a lie when the rebel himself claims to have been muzzled. . . .

Konow always tries to fish in troubled waters, only then can his Roman talents apply. Let us just once think about Konow in place of Michelsen. It would not be Konow who shudders at the thought, but I do. His lack of insight, ability and judgment have been amply demonstrated; his talent for navigation is limited to leading a flat-bottomed boat from Kristiania to Hovedøen [an island in the inner Oslo Fjord].

Michelsen has shown that in spite of dangerous hurricanes he can bring the ship of state securely into harbor. The rebellious leader should therefore be admitted to the insane asylum as soon as possible. That would be the surest safeguard against a man who

would sacrifice the country's peace, equality and independence in order to satisfy his own ambition and lust for power.³⁸

The vehemence and personal attack is almost overwhelming. Beiningen's outburst was undoubtedly a reaction to the perceived behavior of Konow, especially in his opposition to the Karlstad agreements and verifies Koht's contention that the opposition to Karlstad severely hurt the republican cause. Certainly no other individual was so viciously attacked in the passionate debate over the form of government as was Konow in this pamphlet. Quite the contrary, the debate was generally a remarkably well-mannered campaign with a preponderant majority of individuals on both sides of the issue discussing it rationally. Beiningen proved an extreme exception. This is not to say that he did not also discuss the issues of monarchy contra republic; he did so with a remarkable facility, but in allowing himself to indulge in personalities he betrayed his passion and revealed a side of the debate that Norwegians have generally forgotten or ignored.³⁹

Undoubtedly equally passionate, but decidedly more controlled, the government in mid-October found itself in a

³⁸Ibid., pp. 41-42.

³⁹Ibid., pp. 3-32 for Beiningen's more scholarly and well thought out arguments in favor of a monarchy. That the passions have been largely forgotten can probably be credited to the role of Haakon VII in winning support from many who otherwise might have been second and third generation Beiningens (or Catos as he might have referred to them).

quandry over the secondary candidacy of Prince Carl. Calls for a plebiscite clashed with those who sought an immediate election by the Storting. All along it had been Michelsen's consistent position that any matter which arose had to be dealt with and resolved as quickly as possible. Postponing the election would risk leaving Norway's constitution in an unresolved state of affairs, undesirable from Michelsen's point of view. For this position he received considerable public support from the conservative business community of Norway. Numerous messages and petitions were sent to the Storting requesting an immediate election of a king. A petition of 3 October is typical in citing full confidence in the government and Storting for "what they have accomplished for our country up to now."⁴⁰ Opposition expressions and appeals for a plebiscite came largely from labor organizations which cited the pronouncements of the Labor Party and its support for a plebiscite.⁴¹ Johan Castberg still believed that a majority favored a republic, but recognized that the government controlled the situation making opponents feel "insecure and feeble." Consequently, he wrote in his diary: "I am afraid that we will now, without hesitation, sail into a Danish 'national monarchy' forced

⁴⁰"De naeringsdrivendes adresse til Stortinget," in Heiberg, Unionens Opløsning 1905, pp. 678-679.

⁴¹"Udtalelser angaaende Norges fremtidige statsform," in *ibid.*, pp. 674-678.

through by a ruthless and energetic leadership."⁴² Ruthless or not, Michelsen was convinced that an immediate election was the best way to settle the matter quickly. Fridtjof Nansen explained it in a letter to Lord Lansdowne, the British foreign secretary. He told Lansdowne that the prime minister sought to avoid a referendum "if it can be avoided; and if he can get a sufficiently great majority in the Storting, he proposes to have the King (Prince Charles) elected at once."⁴³ It was expected that the election would be a mere formality presenting the government no great problems.⁴⁴ The situation was uncertain, however, for within the cabinet itself there were mixed feelings. Sophus Arctander told Nansen on 11 October that he believed a referendum was desirable in order to "smash future republican agitation to the ground."⁴⁵ The decision on whether to go for a vote in the Storting immediately rested with the prime minister. Anticipating a decision he sounded out opinion on the matter and estimated that the Storting favored an immediate election by a majority of at least seventy against

⁴²Castberg, 11-18 October, in Dagbøker, p. 508.

⁴³Nansen to Lord Lansdowne, 9 October 1905, in Nansen, Dagbok, pp. 105-106. The British referred to Prince Carl as Charles.

⁴⁴Ibid. Also see Nansen to Charles Rabot, 13 October 1905 in Kjaerheim, ed., Nansens Brev, p. 184.

⁴⁵Nansen, Dagbok, p. 107.

twenty-four, with about twenty undecided. Privately he expressed satisfaction with the support and was inclined to favor an immediate election; cognizant that his government might divide on the issue. It was known that Knudsen, Michelsen's finance minister, favored a republic, and Bothner tended to support Knudsen.⁴⁶ Because of this division, Michelsen apparently modified his private view at a cabinet conference with the presidents of the Storting on 13 October. He told the assembly that although an immediate election was the most desirable, he could support a plebiscite if it was not a plebiscite on the form of government but rather a simple question on whether a king ought to be elected. The ensuing debate revealed that Michelsen played a tactical game placing himself in a passive role while others supporting an immediate election did the arguing. During the evening of 13 October, Michelsen read accounts of increasing republican agitation in reports published in Dagbladet and Social-Demokraten. Plans had been made for a major demonstration supporting a plebiscite which was to take place on Sunday, 15 October. Fearing that the issue would be "dragged into the streets," Michelsen became more convinced than ever that the Storting should proceed with an immediate election

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 109. Also see Hagerup Bull, 14 October 1905, in Dagbøker, p. 188.

of Prince Carl.⁴⁷ The firming up of the prime minister's position, which surprised his colleagues in the cabinet, was the result of two things; the increasing republican agitation, and word from the British through Nansen that a renewal of the Treaty of Integrity of 1855 was conditional upon the retention of monarchy and the election of Prince Carl. If the criteria were not fulfilled Britain could give no guarantee to Norway thereby endangering any definitive and speedy settlement.⁴⁸ On 14 October Michelsen met with Nansen and expressed his displeasure over the agitation; Nansen, in turn, convinced his brother-in-law, Ernst Sars, to write an article protesting demonstrations which only "drew the matter into the streets." Sars used the very words of Michelsen in his 15 October article in Verdens Gang; whether or not Nansen told his brother-in-law what to write, he obviously informed him accurately of Michelsen's views.⁴⁹

⁴⁷Nansen, Dagbok, p. 108; Hagerup Bull, 14 October 1905, in Dagbøker, p. 195.

⁴⁸Nansen, Dagbok, pp. 109-110; Nansen to Lansdowne, 14 October 1905, in *ibid.*, p. 110; and Lansdowne to Nansen, 15 October 1905, in *ibid.*, p. 111. Hagerup Bull, 14 October 1905, in Dagbøker, pp. 193-197.

⁴⁹Nansen, Dagbok, p. 111. Koht, "Da Den Norsk-Svensk Union Vart Sprengt," p. 317. Koht, Minne Frå Unge År, p. 275; and Koht, "Minne Frå 1905-1907," HT 53(1966):9. See Nansen, "Afgjørelsen straks," Verdens Gang, 16 October 1905 where he calls for an immediate decision and the need to keep Norway's future from being dragged into the streets. Cf. Winsnes, ed., Nansens Røst I, pp. 350-352.

When confronted by Halvdan Koht, Sars admitted he had been somewhat hasty, but wrote it because Nansen "had pestered him to write."⁵⁰

Mid-October also saw some members of the Storting trying to prevent Prince Carl's election. On 11 October a group of fifteen representatives held a meeting to plan strategy for opposing that prospect. The prime movers of the meeting were the nemises of the government, Castberg and Konow.⁵¹ Although some at the meeting expressed reservations, it was agreed that attempts would be made to get others. A subsequent meeting was held on 16 October with forty representatives present. Paul Andreas Aklestad, Venstre representative from Romsdal, protested that the meeting was a "sign of division" at a time when the whole country had to remain united.⁵² Thore Myrvang, on the other hand believed there was already unity, just the wrong kind.

There seems to be no small danger now that, without asking the people and without bringing the constitution into order, the government will surprise the country with a new king. Agitation for it is great,

⁵⁰Koht, Minne Frå Unge År, pp. 275-276.

⁵¹Members who attended included: Castberg, Konow, Myrvang, Egede-Nissen, Hougen, Meier Foshaug, Ivar Tveiten, Ole Gillebo, Aasulv Bryggesaa, Hans Konrad Foosnes, Nils Skilbred, Tore Aaen, Gjermund Grivi, Anton Bjørnaali and Christian Havig. See Myrvang, 12 October 1905, in Dagbok, in Ms. fol. 2708, Worm-Müller papers, UB, Oslo.

⁵²Ibid. Also see Knut Johannes Hougen, "Spredte Dagboks-opptegnelser," in Ms. fol. 2688.2, Worm-Müller papers, UB, Oslo.

especially here in Kristiania where people seem to have become pure king-crazy.⁵³

As always, the agitation of opponents was perceived as being the greatest and most dangerous. Like Michelsen, Myrvang feared its consequences because each was convinced he was right, yet unsure of the country as a whole. The dilemma was soon answered for them, however, as Prince Carl contemplated the agitation and decided to intervene in a personal way.

Until mid-October, the prince had loyally accepted the Norwegian government's contentions that republicanism was of little significance and he had been ready to go to Norway as soon as possible. Even republican literature which had been sent him from Norway failed to dissuade him.⁵⁴ For a

⁵³Myrvang, 16 October 1905, in Dagbok, Ms. fol. 2708, Worm-Müller papers, UB, Oslo. Further evidence of this attitude is reflected in Michelsen's position in the popular mind as something resembling hero worship. Schøning noted in his diary that ". . . up to now we have had Michelsen fever with Michelsen ties, that splendid Michelsen cigar, cutlets à la Michelsen, Michelsen in countless photographs, Michelsen in medallions [and] Michelsen in designs for monuments. Now a new fever is beginning, prince fever." Schøning, 24 October 1905, in Dagbøker, p. 421.

⁵⁴See Hagerup Bull, 27 October 1905, in Dagbøker, p. 211 and Johan Scharffenberg, "Kritisk Tilbakeblikk på Politikken i 1905," Samtiden 64(1955):319. Scharffenberg sent a copy of the republican constitution, which he had written, and a Labor Party declaration to Prince Carl. The constitution, a revised form of the official constitution, is found in Udkast til Grundlov for en norsk fristat (Kristiania: Arbeidernes aktietrykkeri, 1905). The copy I have used formerly belonged to the historian Yngvar Nielsen and was purchased by me in a second hand book store in Oslo. A copy can also be found in the University library in Oslo.

time he had expressed himself willing to go to Norway before the formal dissolution of the union. Not only would this have allowed him to lead negotiations with Sweden, but it would have placed him and his dynasty in a strengthened position on the new throne. It was not to be, and as Norwegians negotiated the dissolution terms without him, Carl remained in Denmark following the events with a full and intense interest. October 16 was the fateful day for the government, the prince and the country, for on that day a group of republicans issued a proclamation calling for a plebiscite on the form of government. On the surface there was nothing unusual or new in that; similar calls and numerous proclamations had preceded it. But it was different this time. The five paragraphs and the forty-four signatures made this document something beyond mere propaganda. The text was simple enough, calling for a plebiscite; but what struck the young prince was the presence of three names in particular: Otto Blehr, Håkon Hansen and Christian Sparre.⁵⁵ Blehr was a former prime minister, Hansen the chief of the general staff, and Sparre, Norway's vice admiral. The latter two were individuals with whom the king would need to work closely--and now they had signed a proclamation advocating a

⁵⁵The proclamation was published, with the names of the signers, in Heiberg, Unionens Opløsning 1905, pp. 684-685. The conservative press ridiculed it for containing "all those names which we guessed would have been found there." See "Det Opprob," Morgenbladet, 16 October 1905.

republic and the holding of a plebiscite. If the two leading military figures in Norway were so disposed what of others? Similarly, how would a young king hope to avoid the pitfall of becoming a tool at the hands of the monarchists, or any other group for that matter, if he did not come to Norway as one who stood above parties. Prince Carl determined that he was going to be either a national monarch of all Norwegians, or he was going to stay in Denmark.⁵⁶ A plebiscite, he decided, had to be held on his candidacy.

On 17 October the Norwegian government was informed of the latest development which the Danish prime minister said was based on the agitation in Norway.⁵⁷ Prior to Prince Carl's decision it had been the intention of the Michelsen government to go to the Storting with a proposal authorizing it to negotiate with the prince and soon thereafter elect him king without holding any plebiscite.⁵⁸ That was now impossible and any such government resolution had to be postponed until a new strategy could be worked out. Foreign minister Løvland asked Nansen to telegraph either Prince Carl or the Danish foreign minister that the demand for a plebiscite was based on exaggerated fears. In his telegram

⁵⁶Nansen, 21 October 1905, Dagbok, p. 127. Hagerup Bull, 19 October 1905, in Dagbøker, pp. 200-201.

⁵⁷Hagerup Bull, *ibid.*, p. 200. Cf. Hemmelige Møter i Stortinget, p. 359.

⁵⁸Hagerup Bull, 19 October 1905, in Dagbøker, p. 200.

Nansen told the prince that the republican agitation had "no roots in the people" and that it was "superfluous" for him to insist on a plebiscite.⁵⁹ Michelsen feared that any delay might jeopardize Storting support for an immediate election; there were signs that the agitation was telling on the representatives as well.⁶⁰ Michelsen determined that Nansen had to go to Copenhagen to convince the prince that his demand was "inopportune."⁶¹ It had certainly destroyed Michelsen's timing for the presentation of his plans for the election and each day which passed threatened to erode it further. He had lost the initiative with the Swedish procrastination over the Bernadotte candidacy earlier and now it seemed on the brink of happening again.

Nansen arrived in Copenhagen on Saturday, 21 October meeting that same evening with Prince Carl at the home of the Danish foreign minister. The prince held firmly to his position, telling Nansen that a movement supported by his future vice-admiral, general staff chief and a member of the present government (Knudsen), had to be reckoned with. He insisted that he did not wish to come to Norway against the will of the Norwegian people, nor would he allow himself to

⁵⁹Nansen to H.R.H. Prince Carl, 19 October 1905, in Nansen, Dagbok, p. 123.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 124.

⁶¹Nansen, 20 October 1905, in Dagbok, p. 125; Hagerup Bull, 20 October 1905, in Dagbøker, p. 201.

to be a king of one political group or party (partikonge). He was convinced that the king had to be in a position above political parties and only a plebiscite would guarantee him that position; he was ready and willing to go to Norway, but not merely for the sake of acquiring a crown.⁶²

Nansen tried to convince the prince that a referendum or plebiscite was not recognized by the constitution, that only because peace dictated it had the 13 August plebiscite been held at all. Further, he claimed that a plebiscite would break the parliamentary principle that the Storting alone acted on behalf of the people. To hold an extraordinary election would subvert the principle and create a dangerous precedent for the future. Nansen also told the prince that if he truly wished to avoid becoming a partikonge a plebiscite would not do it. On the contrary, he said, with a plebiscite people will be forced to take a position one way or the other which they otherwise would not have done. Once that had occurred it would be a difficult matter to change their mind and an opposition to the king's person could grow up where it could have been prevented.⁶³ The prince listened stiffly to Nansen's arguments, but reiterated his insistence on the plebiscite. He was, however, willing to consider the ramifications, but told

⁶²Nansen, 21 October 1905, in Dagbok, pp. 127-128.

⁶³Ibid., pp. 129-130.

Nansen to inform his government that a plebiscite would be necessary. Of his meeting with the prince, Nansen has recorded some remarkable impressions of an equally remarkable young man:

During the summer I had spoken with a relatively immature boy; but now he had grown to be a mature man, and my respect had grown accordingly. I had come in the belief that it would be easy enough to convince him to see matters differently, but met a man who had carefully thought out the matter from various perspectives and answered my objections with agility and with sharp arguments.

He lay exaggerated weight on how he accepted the crown, and believed that it would have consequences throughout his whole reign and neutralize all opposition. . . . He believed that the people had a right to express themselves on such an important question, and here he said he was more open-minded than I.⁶⁴

On the following day the Norwegian cabinet was told of the prince's position. Hagerup Bull saw the choices of the cabinet as limited to either supporting a plebiscite or causing chaos: "As little as a plebiscite pleases me," he wrote, "after this I may as well retreat on that point. It is no use that we can get a large majority in the Storting for the election of a king, if we cannot get a king."⁶⁵ In Copenhagen that same day, Nansen met with Crown Prince

⁶⁴Ibid., pp. 132-133. Also see Liv Nansen Høyer, Eva og Fridtjof Nansen (Oslo: J. W. Cappelens Forlag, 1954), p. 256; Greve, Fridtjof Nansen, 1905-1930, p. 52; and Nansen to Eva Nansen, 23 October 1905 in Brevsamling 48, Nansens etterlatte papirer, UB, Oslo.

⁶⁵Hagerup Bull, 22 October 1905, in Dagbøker, p. 204.

Frederik, Carl's father, whom he convinced that a plebiscite was unnecessary. In the meantime, Michelsen had telegraphed back to Nansen that he had to postpone further debate in the Storting but wanted to know if the prince would accept election if the government recommended a plebiscite and that plebiscite showed a bare majority for his selection to the throne. Nansen replied that he would.⁶⁶ The reply revealed that although Prince Carl maintained his demand for a plebiscite, he had moderated that demand and might withdraw it if the government felt it was in the best interests of the country. If this were the case, Nansen recommended that his demand be noted in documentary evidence, thereby ensuring a record of the prince's wishes and countering any future attacks on the person of the prince. Fearful of its own position, the cabinet hesitated in accepting this proposal concluding that only if the prince withdrew his demand for a plebiscite absolutely could an election in the Storting proceed.⁶⁷ Few now doubted that there had to be a plebiscite.⁶⁸ On 23 October the cabinet received another telegram from Nansen indicating that Prince Carl remained insistent upon demanding a plebiscite, but that he would not make it a

⁶⁶See Michelsen to Nansen, 22 October 1905 and Nansen to Michelsen, 22 October 1905, in Nansen, Dagbok, pp. 136-137.

⁶⁷Hagerup Bull, 22 October 1905, in Dagbøker, pp. 205-206.

⁶⁸Ibid.

condition if the government thought it damaging to the interests of the country. Preferable would be a solution which could satisfy both Norway's interests, and the personal wishes of Prince Carl.⁶⁹ This left the cabinet in a position of forcing through a Storting election if it wished, but several members of the cabinet hesitated doing so against the wishes of Prince Carl.⁷⁰ Consequently, Prime Minister Michelsen proposed a compromise which would satisfy the prince's wishes while still maintaining the integrity of the Storting and the parliamentary system. In short, it stated that the Storting would authorize the government to open negotiations with Prince Carl (which had in fact been going on for months) on accepting the throne, and this authorization, in turn, would be conditional upon its ratification by a plebiscite to be held under the same rules as the voting of 13 August. In this manner parliamentary integrity would be maintained by having the government and the Storting take the initiative and the responsibility, while the plebiscite would satisfy Prince Carl and the demands to let the people decide on Norway's form of government.⁷¹ Michelsen was convinced that a plebiscite in this form would give "a large majority," while Hagerup Bull only conceded

⁶⁹Hagerup Bull, 23 October 1905, in *ibid.*, p. 207.

⁷⁰*Ibid.*

⁷¹*Ibid.*

that it would make the results more secure.⁷² On the afternoon of 24 October the cabinet met with the presidents of the Storting who accepted Michelsen's new plan after he once again insisted that his government would ". . . stand or fall on this proposal."⁷³ True to form the prime minister was using all his power to push through his new compromise plan. It soon became obvious that Gunnar Knudsen had great difficulty in accepting the compromise and his days in the government were limited. He had by then committed himself to working for a republic, and that alone would sooner or later force him to choose between remaining finance minister or following his convictions and leaving the government. Events of the previous week had left him with "uncomfortable" feelings, not only over Michelsen's new plan but the whole method of procedure used by the prime minister. Recognizing his dissenting views, he wrote his wife that "everyone wanted to pressure me to keep silent. . . ."⁷⁴ With the exception of Knudsen, the cabinet accepted the new compromise plan and it was presented to the Storting on 25 October. The government proposal was joined, for the purposes of debate, with

⁷²Ibid.; Nansen, Dagbok, p. 144.

⁷³Hagerup Bull, 25 October 1905, in Dagbøker, p. 209.

⁷⁴Gunnar Knudsen to Sofie Knudsen, 20 October 1905, quoted in Nissen, Gunnar Knudsen, p. 158. Also see Knudsen, "Fra 1905," Samtiden 38(1927):91-92; and Arne Bjørnberg, Parlamentarismens Utveckling i Norge efter 1905 (Uppsala and Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksells Boktryckeri, 1939), p. 20 n.l.

the proposal earlier introduced by the Castberg-Konow faction. Once again the government had managed to take the initiative in the Storting with a definitive proposal. Only the subsequent debate would tell how effective it had been; but the passionate debate for a plebiscite, and the government maneuvering to avoid it, had led inexorably to the same result. By rapidly changing course, Michelsen proved again that he was a practical politician with a keen sense of timing and the ability to turn the flow of events into an advantage. The agitation of monarchists and republicans alike converged with the introduction of the respective proposals and it now became a matter for the Storting and the Norwegian people to decide whether or not national monarchy would become a reality.

CHAPTER VII

PLEBISCITE: THE NATIONAL MONARCHY REALIZED

As the Storting doors were locked for the private meeting at noon, 25 October 1905, a new phase began in the long struggle for national monarchy in Norway. Although relatively short, lasting barely three weeks, it was perhaps the most significant phase of the entire year. The debates, and decisions resulting from them, would not only affect Norwegians in 1905, but generations yet to be born. The form of government Norwegians would live under was finally going to be decided.

When Prime Minister Michelsen rose to present the recently agreed upon government compromise, he also faced a proposal which the Castberg-Konow faction had introduced a month earlier. By parliamentary maneuver the plan had been delayed, but now the government had a counter-proposal. Nothing Michelsen had done up until 25 October had given the opposition any meaningful initiative; his proposal of the 25th and the demand for confidence did not change his record. The opposition recommendation, which had been introduced in the Storting on 27 September, proposed finalizing the form of government. Known commonly as the "proposal of the ten" (timandsforslag), after the ten representatives who signed

it; it also questioned the Storting's competence in determining the future form of government without first holding a plebiscite:

Since the monarch's power ceased to exist on 7 June the form of government in the country has, in fact, been republican. It is also apparent that a large majority of our people wish a republican form of government which is the most suitable for our country.¹

With a confident bearing, the prime minister countered the republican proposal for a plebiscite with a plebiscite proposal of his own. No matter that it failed to address the essential questions sought by the republicans; it gave Michelsen the initiative he needed to win support from the wavering liberals and the staunchest conservatives. It was the form of democracy without its basic substance. Probably because he wanted to gauge parliamentary reaction before making his proposal public, the prime minister requested the meeting be closed.² Wasting no time, Michelsen requested authority for the government to negotiate with Prince Carl on the condition that a plebiscite be held in which the Norwegian people would express their view on that

¹"Forslag fra 10 repraesentanter om folkets afgjørelse af spørgsmaalet om Norges regjeringsform m.v.," in Heiberg, Unionens Opløsning 1905, pp. 334-336; Kongeriget Norge, Stortings Forhandlinger 1904/1905. Vol. 5: Dokumenter, pp. 1-3. The ten who signed the document are: Castberg, Konow, Eriksen, Hougen, Myrvang, Havig, Inderberg, Andr. Hansson, A. Arnesen and Kahrs.

²Hemmelige Møter i Stortinget, p. 379.

authorization.³ Michelsen told the Storting that there could be no doubt that the Bernadotte candidacy was no longer valid and, consequently, the government had to proceed with the election of a new king. Approaches to Prince Carl, he said, were made by Nansen, whom the Danish prince told of his decision to come to Norway only if the offer of a throne from the Storting was in accord with the wishes of the people.⁴ The prime minister gave a short, but factual, resumé of the involved negotiations and exchange of telegrams that had ensued as a result of the prince's decision to demand a plebiscite. He noted that the situation required extraordinary action, but claimed the constitution remained in effect and the Storting could, if it so wished, reject any popular vote.⁵ Reaction in the Storting was by and large predictable; the apparent switch of position favoring even a limited plebiscite surprised the liberal opposition and infuriated conservatives.⁶ The conservatives had expected a king to

³Ibid., p. 380. The government proposal is found in "St. prp. nr. 26," Kongeriget Norge, Stortings Forhandlinger 1905/1906. Vol. 2: Kongelige propositioner og meddelser (Kristiania: Flere bogtrykkerier, 1906), pp. 1-3.

⁴Hemmelige Møter i Stortinget, pp. 381-382. Also see Myrvang, 25 October 1905, Dagbok, in Ms. fol. 2708, Worm-Müller papers, UB, Oslo.

⁵Hemmelige Møter i Stortinget, pp. 382-383.

⁶See Castberg, 21 November 1905, in Dagbøker, pp. 516-517; Myrvang, 25 October 1905, Dagbok, in Ms. fol. 2708, Worm-Müller papers, UB, Oslo.

be elected by the Storting and considered a plebiscite as not only unnecessary but flagrantly unconstitutional. Some still held out hope for a Bernadotte candidate, although any such prospect was obviously non-existent. As late as 11 October, Francis Hagerup had written to King Oscar requesting that he allow a Bernadotte to come to Norway.⁷ Hagerup's failure to understand the reality of the situation reveals how totally out of touch with Norwegian opinion he had come to be. Even Oscar's firm rejection seemed to have had no influence on Hagerup's thinking.⁸ Only the apparent prospect of getting no king at all finally convinced some conservatives to support the government proposal as the least offensive alternative.⁹

The liberal opposition, on the other hand, favoring a republic, was surprised by the government's proposal of a plebiscite, but rejected the implication that such a plebiscite take place only after the Storting, in principle, had determined the form of government to be monarchical.¹⁰ This was, of course, exactly what the government had in mind.

⁷Hagerup to King Oscar, 11 October 1905, in Hagerup, Dagbok, pp. 191-193.

⁸Oscar to Hagerup, 15 October 1905, *ibid.*, pp. 194-195.

⁹Castberg, 18 November 1905, in Dagbøker, p. 517. Also see Hagerup Bull, 25 October 1905, in Dagbøker, p. 209.

¹⁰See for example the comments of Castberg and Konow in Hemmelige Møter i Stortinget, pp. 386, 404.

The chances for a favorable vote were likely increased with the wording of the plebiscite question and the force of a Storting resolution behind it. It was obvious to all, however, that the people could still reject it when the election was held, and for that matter there was still no guarantee that the Storting would approve it. The government position would stand, however, regardless of the opposition in or outside the Storting. Hagerup Bull's expression best typifies the attitude of the cabinet as he wrote: "I am more and more convinced that this is the only correct thing to do for the young prince. . . . Who could guarantee how he would stand against the unloyal opposition he undoubtedly would face if he came here without a plebiscite?"¹¹

Although a plebiscite was a condition agreed to by both sides, it still remained to see which form it would take: the republican "proposal of the ten" or the Michelsen-worded proposal. This time the debate would not be held behind closed doors, thereby allowing every interested person the chance to follow developments. Seldom does any nation get an opportunity to discuss rationally, and in an open parliamentary setting, such vital questions as faced the Norwegians during the final week of October 1905.

The lines were clearly drawn as the government of Christian Michelsen faced the task of convincing a Storting

¹¹Hagerup Bull, 27 October 1905, in Dagbøker, p. 211.

and a people that monarchy could be national in Norway. As far as they were concerned they had the perfect candidate in Prince Carl; not only because he was a guarantee for the Norwegians that British support was assured, but because of his attitude toward the responsibility he would undertake. His discussions with Nansen during the efforts to persuade him not to insist on a plebiscite revealed a mature individual, conscious of his role in a parliamentary democracy. In addition, some of the country's most prominent men had publicly acknowledged their support for him and monarchy in general. The tremendous influence of Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson had swung to support monarchy publicly when, on 29 September, he wrote an open letter to Løvland stating that, like Garibaldi in Italy, he would serve the king after a lifetime of serving the republic.¹² Likewise Norway's national historian, Ernst Sars, had expressed favor for a monarchical form of government. Although neither of these announcements should have been too surprising they appeared somewhat sensational to contemporaries. Bjørnson's close affinity for the ideas of his son-in-law, Sigurd Ibsen, brought him to the monarchical camp. Similarly, Ernst Sars nationalism and attraction to "national monarchy" as a concept, evident as early as 1898 with his article in Ringeren, foreordained his support.

¹²Bjørnson, "Aabent Brev," Aftenposten, 29 September 1905; also published in Wedel Jarlsberg, 1905: Kongevalget, pp. 242-245. Also see Løvland, Menn og Minner, pp. 236-237.

Johan Scharffenberg, the author of the proposed republican constitution, and head of the Oslo mental hospital for women, appears to have been genuinely surprised by Sars' support for monarchy. This is in itself surprising, since Scharffenberg was also a contributor to Ibsen's Ringeren and must have been aware of Sars' earlier statements. Nevertheless, in an open letter to Sars, Scharffenberg expressed his disappointment and reflected on his own republicanism while doubtless speaking for many others preparing for the final phase of the struggle of 1905:

I have hated the union and despised monarchy ever since I have had an independent opinion on these things, and have always been an enemy of the idea proposed by Sigurd Ibsen, especially that prince Karl (Bernadotte) become king of Norway. In my opinion this idea had very few supporters in Norway before 7 June and therefore the princely candidature . . . was met partly with bitterness, partly with indifference; nowhere have I seen joy over it.¹³

If Scharffenberg saw joy nowhere, he surely confined himself to a limited circle of acquaintances. It was probably stated for rhetorical effect since not all the reactions were bitter or indifferent. Less bombastic in his rhetoric, and more realistic in his evaluation, was another republican, Thore Myrvang who noted in his diary that he had received a letter

¹³Johan Scharffenberg, "Aabent brev til professor J. E. Sars," Social-Demokraten, 18, 23, and 24 October 1905. Further expressions of republican disenchantment with Sars, Nansen, Løvland, among others, is found in an article "Vent--Deres Kongelige Høihet!" Gunnar Heiberg, 1905, pp. 107-128. Cf. Schøning, 22 October 1905, Dagbøger, p. 420.

from "editor H." apologizing for the lack of republican enthusiasm among workers: "Yes, there are still many workers who want to have a king," he said. "And if there is a plebiscite now, he greatly fears that there will be a majority for monarchy."¹⁴ It may be that on 7 June a majority of Norwegians favored a republic; there was no way to tell, of course. Theoretically there seemed no reason to doubt that it was so. On the eve of the debate over the form of government, however, the popularity of the Michelsen government, combined with the influence of men like Bjørnson, Nansen and Sars, kept it an open question but with the momentum favoring a monarchy. A member of the cabinet, tending toward a pessimistic evaluation, nevertheless was stoic about the prospects:

Let it go as it will. I hope and believe it will go well. Nevertheless, it is certain that we [the government] . . . have placed all of our political prestige on this card. . . . From the mood of the Storting it appears that we are finished, no matter how well it goes with the plebiscite.¹⁵

The debate lasted for three days--28 through 31 October with no meeting on Sunday the 29th. Although the debate technically centered on the proposals for what form the plebiscite would take, it was recognized by all that it possessed another character. The three days would decide

¹⁴Myrvang, 25 October 1905, in *Dagbok*, Ms. fol. 2708, Worm-Müller papers, UB, Oslo.

¹⁵Hagerup Bull, 27 October 1905, in Dagbøker, pp. 211-212.

whether Norway's form of government was to be monarchical or republican. Although the debate was strident and often bitter, both sides demonstrated their nationalist sentiment with monarchists clinging to the concept of 1898 that a national monarchy was possible whereas the republicans claimed a president best personified the national aspirations of Norwegians. Wollert Konow broached the subject when he took the floor to initiate the debate. A national monarch, he insisted, was a naive and impossible concept:

If there is any way not to get a national head of state who has absorbed all of that which comprises the national, that which we learn from childhood by hearing our national language, by reading our literature and history, by studying our political history; if there is any way this can be alien to a head of state, it is by electing a foreign prince as king of Norway.¹⁶

Only by electing a president, Konow claimed, could Norway get a true Norwegian as the head of state. A similar concern was expressed by Andreas Hansson, who had been a signatory of the "proposal of the ten" and represented Østerrisør in the Storting: "[Our] only memory of monarchy in the last ninety-one years," he said, "is namely the memory that when our people wanted to develop themselves in a political area, or in a national sense, we have had the king against us--that is our memory of monarchy."¹⁷ Hansson was

¹⁶Kongeriget Norge, Stortings Forhandlinger 1905/1906. Vol. 7a: Stortingstidende, p. 40.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 48.

attacking the monarchy certainly, but also the monarchists tendency to reflect on the past glories of the Norwegian monarchy since the Viking Age. Monarchists emphasized the monarchs of the Middle Ages whereas republicans tended to criticize the monarchs of the Danish and Swedish unions. To this extent each was blind to the priorities of the other. Hansson was attacking the Bernadottes as much as he was attacking monarchy in general.

Perhaps the most bitter memories of monarchy were shared by the socialists. As a basic tenet of the Labor Party, republicanism was coupled with nationalist sentiment and a Marxian concept of class struggle. Monarchy represented the upper classes, the privileged, the exploiters. Republicanism, on the other hand, represented the working classes, the exploited of society. Even though he was chief spokesman for the socialists in the Storting, Alfred Eriksen was less an ideological socialist than he was a humanitarian. As a Lutheran minister he was attracted to socialist principles for basic idealistic and religious reasons and his republicanism reveals as much nationalism as does that of the most rabid conservative. Monarchy to him would always be "rootless, foreign and non-national;" it was "an empty, dead shell."¹⁸ Similar nationalistic concepts convinced Thore Foss of the virtues of a republic.

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 52, 56.

Prior to the break with Sweden on 7 June, Foss had told Michelsen that he "liked the plan" of the Bernadotte candidacy, but during the crisis and the subsequent debates came to advocate a president over a king whom he considered to be distant and foreign.¹⁹ In both cases, before and after 7 June, Foss was guided by nationalist sentiment. To those who insisted that a king coming to Norway would be foreign and non-national, Sophus Arctander replied, matter of factly: "Let him first come and live with us, then he will be national enough."²⁰ Hagerup Bull reflecting stoically and often pessimistically in his diary over the prospects of government success, reminded the Storting that although hereditary monarchy may seem irrational to the democratically inclined Norwegians, "life itself is a little irrational."²¹ Somehow this was a statement which one cannot conceive as coming from a republican, but reflected a conservative intellectual which, in fact, Hagerup Bull was. His quip revealed more than an ability to retain a sense of humor, it seemed to demonstrate an intrinsic confidence which the monarchists possessed even though they privately may have feared for their chances. Similarly, the insistence by republicans that a president would be more Norwegian than a king, demonstrated an inherent weakness in their position. Like Shakespeare's admonition

¹⁹Ibid., p. 65.

²⁰Ibid., p. 86.

²¹Ibid., p. 98.

that one can protest too much, the republicans had to convince the country that a republic would be national. Monarchists, on the other hand, held the distinct advantage in that they spoke about a national monarchy. The difference is subtle, but none the less psychologically powerful. National monarchy had been the title of Ibsen's articles in 1898 and was a phrase on the mind of most Norwegians in 1905. That it had an effect on the nationalistic Norwegians, a people like the violinist Ole Bull in the nineteenth century who referred to himself as a Norwegian Norseman from Norway (Norsk Nordmann fra Norge), is obvious. The difficulty, of course, is in actually measuring this effect, but that it existed can hardly be denied. The nationalist imprint on Norwegians was immense, though immeasurable in 1905, and remains an equally important factor of Norwegian life today.²² Although nationalism cannot be overexaggerated as influencing decisions in 1905, it was not the only important element in the debate. Because it was shared in the rhetoric and

²²A striking example of this is the nationalism exhibited by the Left in Norway--especially during the plebiscite over the Common Market in 1972. On 16 March 1976 the Norwegian Storting rejected a proposed change in the Constitution, which would have made Norway a republic. The vote was 117 to 19. See Jens Henrik Stemland, "Et klart nei til republikken Norge," Verdens Gang, 17 March 1976, p. 4. Also, the conservative magazine NÅ recently conducted a poll at random on the popularity of the monarchy today and 86 percent expressed a favorable opinion. See "La oss beholde Olav sa folket," NÅ 25(20 November 1976):10-15.

symbolism of both sides, and because Norwegians responded readily to nationalistic arguments, it is difficult to say either side won any significant advantage thereby. There were several other aspects which also must be seen as significantly contributing to the debate in a more or less decisive manner. Undoubtedly one of the most important was the government insistence that the Storting accept the plan or find a new government. If the Bernadotte candidacy had been a trump card for the Swedish monarch during 1905, the threat of resignation served as Michelsen's trump card in his game against the Storting. Michelsen had told his cabinet and the presidents of the Storting that he would, once again, demand a vote of confidence. Similarly, Løvland informed the Storting that a rejection of the government's resolution meant the ministry would resign.²³ Whereas Carl Berner accepted this as a straight forward declaration, Arctander understood that the plebiscite, not the Storting vote, would determine whether the government remained.²⁴ By making the vote a question of confidence, Michelsen was merely following the pattern he had set with the 6 June debate over the candidacy of a Bernadotte prince. An

²³See Løvland's comments in Kongeriget Norge, Stortings Forhandlinger 1905/1906. Vol. 7a: Stortingstidende, p. 47; and Heiberg, Unionens Opløsning 1905, p. 716.

²⁴Schøning, 28 October 1905, in Dagbøker, p. 423; and Castberg, 21 November 1905, in Dagbøker, p. 518.

opposition member of the Storting considered the action as "exploiting" the popularity of the government as Michelsen "forced" his proposals through.²⁵ In essence this is true, because by calling for a vote of confidence the prime minister was not only making it a question for or against monarchy and Prince Carl, but for or against the government itself. The portent of rejecting the government made the subsequent plebiscite less than free--precisely what Michelsen seems to have intended. In protest to this obvious threat, Gunnar Knudsen placed his name on the list of speakers in the debate and breaking the restrictions his colleagues had put upon him and he, in turn, had accepted. He insisted that he had agreed to keep silent on the understanding that no vote of confidence would be demanded, that everyone should be able to vote on the issue without strings attached. As far as Knudsen was concerned that promise had been broken.²⁶ A cabinet conference was hastily called where the finance minister was asked to avoid "the scandal" of one minister speaking out against the rest. He refused. As a result Michelsen was faced with the resignation of his entire cabinet if Knudsen did not go. At 2:00 P.M., 31 October, Knudsen delivered his resignation, undoubtedly

²⁵Hougen, 22 January 1906, in *Spredte Dagboksopptegnelser*, Ms. fol. 2688.2, Worm-Müller papers, UB, Oslo.

²⁶See Hagerup Bull, 31 October 1905, in Dagbøker, p. 213; Schøning, 30 October 1905, in Dagbøker, p. 425.

relieved and clearly ready to campaign for the republic.²⁷ But what kind of republic did Knudsen and his fellow republicans want for their country? In answering that question the debate revealed some interesting attitudes, some surprising for their prescience.

Throughout the year republicans had used the examples of three republics in particular when pointing to examples which Norway might follow: France, Switzerland and the United States. The United States was cited, but more often as an example to be studied rather than emulated. Wollert Konow compared hereditary monarchs of Europe with "the great men of America who have clothed the office of the president," and found the former lacking.²⁸ To this the monarchist Gjert Holsen from Nordre Bergenshus, replied sarcastically: "It was said here . . . by Mr. Konow that in America there have been a series of exceptional statesmen as presidents. It is far from my intention to deny it, but it is amazing how many have been shot over there, and perhaps the best have been shot."²⁹ Hagerup Bull saw other disadvantages with the American republic as an example for Norway to follow. Because the United States did not have a parliamentary system,

²⁷Hagerup Bull, 31 October 1905, in Dagbøker, p. 213; Nissen, Gunnar Knudsen, p. 159.

²⁸Wollert Konow in Kongeriget Norge, Stortings Forhandlinger 1905/1906. Vol. 7a: Stortingstidende, pp. 41, 134.

²⁹Gjert Holsen in ibid., p. 230.

it would serve as no useful example. Republicans in Norway spoke of a president with authority, Hagerup Bull said, but a president in a parliamentary system has no real power; like the French president, he would be "an absolute zero."³⁰ Because power does not rest with a parliamentary majority, the American president has wide authority: "He is a man who . . . is somewhat of an autocrat, who is independent of the rest of the elected officials under the Constitution, namely the Congress."³¹ Except for Hagerup Bull, one is left with the impression from the debates that knowledge of the United States was superficial at best and republicans were not totally committed to more than citing it as a republic, successful in its own way. On the whole, the electoral system and the bureaucracy, admittedly in its infancy, were considered too expensive as an example for Norway to follow.³²

More pleasing to republicans was the Swiss example, but here too the parliamentary governmental system was non-existent. Republicans, especially the more radical, favored the plebiscitory form of government because it meant

³⁰Heiberg, Unionens Opløsning 1905, p. 751.

³¹Ibid.

³²Hagerup Bull, in Kongeriget Norge, Stortings Forhandlinger 1905/1906. Vol. 7a: Stortingstidende, p. 101; Carl Herman Aas, *ibid.*, p. 115. The role of the United States in Norwegian history is the subject of a recent work by Sigmund Skard, USA i Norsk Historie: 1000-1776-1976 (Oslo: Det Norske Samlaget, 1976). The book has been translated into English but is of much poorer quality than the original. See Skard, The United States in Norwegian History (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1976).

democracy without parliamentary hindrances. The president was basically the chairman of an elected governing body: Because of these features, Johan Scharffenberg had deliberately used the Swiss model for his projected constitution for a Norwegian free state.³³

In the end, examples from Switzerland and the United States were really only that. The arguments using other countries as examples served principally a didactic purpose for both republicans and monarchists. To a certain extent the entire debate served didactic and propaganda purposes. It has much the flavor of a national party convention where the speeches and the planning lead to the campaign itself. The debate, however, was far from inconsequential; neither was it superfluous. Three days of parliamentary time and 241 pages of text in the official documents can hardly be written off as a testimonial to superfluity.³⁴ The passions revealed in the debate reflect the anxiety in the pages of the diaries of the participants, and the fact that this debate was the first important debate open to the public, the Norwegian people saw immediately what the respective sides

³³Scharffenberg, "Kritisk Tilbakeblikk på Politikken i 1905," Samtiden 64(1955):319. Cf. Udkast til Grundlov for en norsk fristat.

³⁴In his thesis, Worm Eide insisted that "the debate had no meaning" because the members had their minds made up beforehand. See Worm Eide, "Kongedømme eller republik i Norge i 1905," in Ms. Ho. 146, UB, Oslo.

stood for and why.³⁵ Perhaps everyone had made up their respective minds by the time the debate was held, but even so that does not negate its importance. Evidence points to republicans winning the debate technically, and that fact created a state of near panic in the cabinet.³⁶ Michelsen, who suffered from chronic illness and was often absent from the Storting during critical moments, was incapacitated by influenza during most of this debate. When the outlook seemed most in doubt, Løvland told the cabinet that Michelsen had to come to the Storting, "because he had created this situation."³⁷ The implication being, of course, that he alone could save the monarchical cause.

On the evening of 31 October the debate ended and the votes were taken. The first proposal to be voted on was the

³⁵See for example Castberg, 21 November 1905, in Dagbøker, p. 518; Hagerup Bull, 31 October 1905, in Dagbøker, p. 212. Cf. Stang, Streiftog, pp. 87-88.

³⁶Castberg noted that even the republican's opponents acknowledged them to have been superior in the debate. See Castberg, 21 November 1905, in Dagbøker, p. 518 and Hagerup Bull, 31 October 1905, in Dagbøker, pp. 213-214.

³⁷Hagerup Bull, *ibid.*, p. 214. Michelsen's health was constantly a matter of concern and often seemed to coincide with important events. The psychological nature of his illnesses is hinted at by his biographer, Wyller, but left without comment. See Wyller, Christian Michelsen, p. 214. Fredrik Stang, a friend and colleague has written that Michelsen was "undoubtedly neurotically minded" suffering from claustrophobia and only by force of will could he ride on a train. "That he could be sick showed itself all too soon . . . [and] there is surely much to it. As far as I know and from what I have heard, Michelsen was never healthier or happier than he was in 1905." Stang, Erindringer Fra Min Politiske Tid, p. 152.

so-called "proposal of the ten." Should the Storting postpone any decision on the form of government until after the next parliamentary elections of 1906? It was rejected 86 to 30. The next proposal was that which Thore Foss had raised during the debate asking that a plebiscite decide whether the Storting should proceed with the election of a king. Again the Storting rejected it: 84 to 32. Thirdly, the government's proposal for authority to negotiate with Prince Carl and the approval of this by a subsequent plebiscite. The proposal passed by a vote of 87 to 29.³⁸ "The pessimistic expectations have been put to shame!" Hagerup Bull wrote in his diary.³⁹ It was also decided that the plebiscite would be held on two consecutive days, 12 and 13 November. That meant that the actual campaign would be incredibly short; only twelve days until the Norwegian people were once again to go to the polls.⁴⁰

³⁸Voting results are found in Heiberg, Unionens Opløsning 1905, pp. 941-943.

³⁹Hagerup Bull, 1 November 1905, in Dagbøger, p. 214.

⁴⁰A fourth proposal by Konow aimed at postponing the plebiscite until 26 November but it too was defeated, 82 to 34. Heiberg, Unionens Opløsning 1905, p. 943. The reasons for holding a Sunday and Monday vote were stated by Hagerup Bull on 30 October. Conceding that 13 August had been a special case, he said that many may not vote on a Sunday. Those who lived far from a voting place could travel Saturday, vote Sunday and return to their farms by Monday. Finally, the weather is often unpredictable in November making travel difficult. Two days would help ensure a good turnout. See Kongeriget Norge, Stortings Forhandlinger 1905/1906. Vol 7a: Stortingstidende, pp. 83-84, 106-107.

Raymond E. Lindgren, the American historian, has written that the two weeks which preceded the plebiscite were "a nightmare of meetings and demonstrations for and against monarchy, the election of Prince Carl and republicanism."⁴¹ Although violence unfortunately occurred, the epithet "nightmare" must be regarded as exaggeratedly rhetorical. No evidence exists that what did occur was anything more than isolated and sporadic, an outburst of accumulated passion. For the most part it was limited to window-breaking and rabble-rousing by local elements. If the term revolution can be used about 7 June, as the Castberg-Konow faction maintained, even the scattered violence of the final phase could not reverse the verdict of 1905 as "a revolutionary act of Chesterfieldian grace and politeness."⁴² It was passionate speeches and constitutional arguments which dominated the two weeks, not violence. Although the plebiscite was worded in such a way that the struggle appeared to be over Prince Carl personally, everyone knew that it was a struggle over the question of monarchy or republic.⁴³ This very fact was made clear on 31 October when the government, minus Knudsen, signed a proclamation to the Norwegian people. In the

⁴¹Lindgren, Norway-Sweden, p. 205.

⁴²New York Tribune, 10 June 1905, p. 6, used this phrase to characterize the dissolution.

⁴³See for example Koht, "Kong Haakon VII," in Menn i Historie (Oslo: H. Aschehoug & Co., 1963), p. 183.

document the government maintained, as it had always maintained, that the constitution remained in order and only the throne was vacant: "Our existing constitution . . . should not be surrendered for untried innovations and unclear experiments."⁴⁴ The republican proclamation issued on 2 November bore the stamp of Castberg and Koht, but it is the latter who seems to have given it its distinct mark. The republic, according to the proclamation, would not be a break in the continuity of Norwegian politics, but would "coincide naturally with our national development."⁴⁵ In Koht's words it was monarchy, not the republic, which would mean a break in tradition because "for centuries monarchy has been foreign to us."⁴⁶ The 214 signatures on the republican proclamation read like a who's who of Norwegian political and intellectual life. Two former prime ministers, Johannes Steen and Otto Blehr signed it, as did most of the republican Storting representatives. The list also included lawyers, farmers, merchants, newspaper editors and academicians.⁴⁷ It was a list of names well capable of challenging the government list. But since campaigns are

⁴⁴"Regjeringens oppraab til det norske folk," in Heiberg, Unionens Opløsning 1905, p. 944.

⁴⁵"Det republikanske landsoppraab," in *ibid.*, p. 947.

⁴⁶*Ibid.* Cf. Koht, "Da Den Norsk-Svensk Union Vart Sprengt," pp. 318-319.

⁴⁷See Heiberg, Unionens Opløsning 1905, pp. 947-950.

not won by proclamations and names alone, the first two weeks in November witnessed a flurry of appearances and speeches throughout the country by some of the country's most prominent people. The cabinet had agreed on 27 October to hold speeches throughout the country. They would support the struggle to the very end.⁴⁸ Because of his health, Michelsen would necessarily have to limit his own campaign activity. It was agreed that Løvland would visit areas near the capital while Berner, Bothner and Arctander could undertake longer trips. Upon his arrival from Copenhagen on 30 October, Nansen was also asked by Michelsen to participate.⁴⁹ It was agreed that he would begin at Kristiansand on the southern coast. He held subsequent speeches at stops along the coast stopping at Sandnes, Stavanger, Bergen, Volden, Kristiansund and Trondheim.⁵⁰ Although the flavor of the speeches varied somewhat in consideration of local conditions and interests, the content was essentially unchanged. Nansen based his appeal on the two things closest to the hearts of his listeners, nationalism and independence, while emphasizing

⁴⁸Hagerup Bull, 27 October 1905, Dagbøker, p. 211.

⁴⁹Bothner, "Valgkamp, 4-13 november 1905," Dagbok, in privat arkiv 130, Riksarkivet, Oslo; Nansen, 30, 31 October 1905, in Dagbok, pp. 161-162.

⁵⁰3-12 November 1905 in *ibid.*, pp. 166-167.

the monarchical tradition of Norway.⁵¹ Frequent speaking to large crowds in the preelectronic campaign, he had almost no voice left when he concluded in Trondheim on the 12th.⁵² In Trondheim he was joined by Abraham Berge and Harald Bothner who had also spent the previous two weeks travelling and speaking in favor of the monarchy. Berge had been in the northern districts of the country while Bothner remained mainly around the Trondheim area.⁵³ The impressions received by the itinerant propagandists were, according to Bothner, surprisingly positive and "much better than . . . [he] expected."⁵⁴ It appeared that the mood of the country favored the government; even republicans were noting the response. Knut Hougen, in memoirs written in 1928, reflected on the changes that had taken place since 7 June:

When I was in Kristiansand during the summer of 1905 to give a talk in support of a republic, I met Matias Hansen on the street. During the heady days of June [under junidagens rus] he had seen a republic as natural, I assumed he still held the same point of view, but he became very embarrassed and claimed he had changed his mind.⁵⁵

No matter that some individuals had been converted to the

⁵¹"Professor Nansens foredrag i Frimurerlogen," in Winsnes, ed., Nansens Røst, pp. 352-360, Cf. Nansen, Dagbok, p. 167.

⁵²Bothner, "Valgkamp, 4-13 november 1905," in Dagbok, privat arkiv 130, Riksarkivet, Oslo.

⁵³Ibid.

⁵⁴Ibid.

⁵⁵Hougen, "Erindringer Nedtegnet i 1928," in Ms. fol. 2688.2, Worm-Müller papers, UB, Oslo.

monarchist cause, the republicans maintained a schedule as full as did their opponents. Wollert Konow followed much the same route as did Nansen, even returning to Oslo on the same train from Trondheim on 12 November.⁵⁶ Castberg spoke ten times in nine days at Ringeby, Eidsvoll, Lillestrøm, Fredrikshald (Halden), Moss and Gjøvik. At the latter three stops he appeared with the playwright, Gunnar Heiberg. It was at Fredrikshald that some of the violence came to the fore, with stone-throwing and window-breaking incidents. Violence became so ominous that police finally escorted them from the building.⁵⁷ Fredrikshald, situated in the southeastern tip of Norway, was the site of one of the fortifications which had been so instrumental in Castberg's attacks on the Karlstad agreements. That violence broke out here in reaction to Castberg is probably due to two things: First, his generally abrasive personality inspired a hostile reaction, and secondly, his reputation as a "war-monger" made him greatly mistrusted by the citizens of the town which, by reason of its strategic site, would have borne a heavy burden in any war with Sweden.

Like the politicians, newspapers contributed to the debate in much the same manner they had to the crisis itself

⁵⁶Castberg, 21 November 1905, Dagbøker, p. 519; Nansen, 12 November 1905, Dagbok, p. 167.

⁵⁷Castberg, 21 November 1905, Dagbøker, p. 519. Cf. Midttun, "Strid og Stemningar Hausten 1905," p. 441.

ever since 7 June. Because they were more or less under the control of the various political parties, the papers reflect the alignment of the parties and the respective wings they represented. The conservative Aftenposten and Morgenbladet were joined by the moderate-liberal (and very pro-Michelsen) Verdens Gang in supporting monarchy, while Norsk Intelligenssedler, Dagbladet, Den 17de Mai, and Social-Demokraten were the principal republican newspapers of the capital.⁵⁸ In their support for the respective sides, the newspapers naturally displayed most prominently the side which they supported. As an example of this, Dagbladet published the republican proclamation prominently on the front page, whereas the government proclamation was placed inside the paper on page two.⁵⁹ The paper did, however, closely follow the speeches of republicans and monarchists alike, noting Nansen's journey as well as speeches by Gjelsvik, Erling Bjørnson and Knudsen in support of a republic.⁶⁰ On the eve of the first day of the plebiscite, Dagbladet published a remarkable letter from a "William A." of Eau Claire, Wisconsin, a letter which may well have represented the

⁵⁸See Worm-Eide, "Kongedømme eller republik i Norge i 1905," pp. 426-445, in Ms. Ho. 146, UB, Oslo. Also see Castberg, 26 July 1905, in Dagbøker, p. 426 and Gunnar Christie Wasberg, Aftenposten i Hundre År: 1860-1960 (Oslo: Chr. Schibsteds Forlag, 1960), pp. 146-150.

⁵⁹Dagbladet, 2, 3 November 1905.

⁶⁰Ibid., 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 November 1905.

majority feelings of Norwegian-Americans. It was given the nationalistic headline: "Norway for Norwegians" by the editor. The Norwegian-American writer noted that others like him supported a republic for Norway so that closer bonds could be created with the United States rather than with Sweden or Britain, as would occur if monarchy were adopted. He reminded Norwegians that he, like many others, left Norway because "the country is not democratic enough."⁶¹ Reflecting the Horatio Alger myth, the letter stated that in the American republic "poor boys," such as Grant, Johnson, Harrison and McKinley, could grow up to be president:

It does not damage a poor American to walk around with such potential presidents inside them. It will not damage a Norwegian boy either to possess such ideals rather than stand with his hat in hand glaring and staring at a carriage with gold trim in which sits a little boy born to rule whether he wants to or not, whether capable or not.⁶²

Again the apparent appeal of the republic was meant to be a nationalistic appeal. Better a Norwegian boy growing up to president than a Danish prince on the throne as king. If the writer did not mean it that way, the newspaper editor probably sensed it. Self-help and self-rule would be the

⁶¹Wm. A., "Norge for Nordmaendene: Fra vore landsmaend i America," Dagbladet, 11 November 1905.

⁶²Ibid.

quickest way to national independence and realization.⁶³
A king need not apply.

On the whole the campaign was hectic, vigorous and heated, but far from the "nightmare" Lindgren contends it to have been. For the most part, it was a campaign which dealt with the issues, however emotional these were at times; monarchists and republicans alike insisted they would abide by the outcome. In the end it was apparent that the Norwegian people had more faith in its government and Christian Michelsen than in the opposition, for when the votes were counted monarchy triumphed 259,563 to 69,264.⁶⁴ The result appears not to have been too surprising to anyone. Social-Demokraten appeared disappointed, but far from surprised. This may have been due to the young labor movement's perennial lack of success, yet the disappointment is evident as its editors commented: "Our people have republican feelings, that we do not doubt, but they lack a solid conviction and, at the last moment, have thrown their republican feelings overboard."⁶⁵ Similarly, Jacob Schønning noted that the Norwegian people were "much more monarchical than anyone had

⁶³This was consistently the emphasis of Social-Demokraten. See especially H. Østerholt, "Nei," SD, 1 November 1905; "Anledning," ibid., 7 November 1905; "Bibelen og Kongedømmet," ibid., 10 November, 1905.

⁶⁴Heiberg, Unionens Opløsning 1905, p. 976.

⁶⁵"Socialdemokratiet og afgjørelsen," SD, 14 November 1905.

dreamed of."⁶⁶ Schøning believed the vote reflected a weariness after the exhaustive events of 1905, the unquestionable popularity of the government, and the threat of external isolation and internal anarchy.⁶⁷ Castberg may well have remembered Halvdan Koht's earlier warnings when he wrote in his diary that his, Konow's and Eriksen's opposition to Karlstad scared many people who viewed them as war-mongers who might lead a government, if a majority voted against the Michelsen regime. Castberg also believed that the insistence by the government that the constitution remained monarchical after 7 June may have been decisive, while the monarchical support of earlier republicans like Bjørnson, Sars and Løvland, among others, "confused or hypnotized" the voters.⁶⁸

None explained the outcome of the vote with the novelty or "scientific" argumentation of Andreas Martin Hansen, an anthropologist who had for years written articles on the racial characteristics of Norwegians and its effect on their social, political and religious life. Hansen held a doctor of philosophy degree, and mixed his racist theories with Spencerian and Darwinian logic, claiming to have scientifically demonstrated the affinity of political and social

⁶⁶Schøning, 18 November 1905, in Dagbøker, p. 429.

⁶⁷Ibid.

⁶⁸Castberg, 21 November 1905, in Dagbøker, pp. 519-520.

habits, and the intellectual ability of Norwegians, with their racial characteristics.⁶⁹ Hansen placed the Norwegians in two basic categories: the long-skulled and the short-skulled. A head which had a width more than four-fifths its length he considered short-skulled; whereas a width less than 80 percent of its length placed an individual in the long-skulled classification. To clarify for his readers the various types, Hansen used the example of Fridtjof Nansen as representing the long-skulled. Generally these individuals, he said, "have narrow faces, a light complexion, light hair, blue eyes, are thin and very tall, 172 cm. [approx. 5'8"] or more."⁷⁰ The short-skulled, on the other hand, are shorter in stature, under 170 cm., have rounder faces, wider noses, and darker hair, eyes, and skin.⁷¹ In politics, according to Hansen, racial characteristics determined ones party affiliation.⁷² With this "empirical,

⁶⁹The author of several books on the subject, Hansen introduced his ideas in articles in Ibsen's magazine, Ringeren. See especially Hansen, "Norsk folkepsykologi," Ringeren 1(2 July 1898):10-13. Hansen has been the neglected Norwegian scholar of the nineteenth century, perhaps rightly so, was cited briefly in a 1957 article on the differences between eastern and western Norwegians, although his initials were there given as M. A. Hansen. See Gabriel Øidne, "Litt om motsetninga mellom Austlandet og Vestlandet," Syn og Segn 63(1957):97-98.

⁷⁰Hansen, "Norsk folkepsykologi," Ringeren 1 (2 July 1898):11.

⁷¹Ibid.

⁷²According to Hansen: "The empirical law for the connection between race and politics in Norway can therefore

scientific data," Hansen analyzed the results of the plebiscite in a regular column he wrote for the monthly periodical Samtiden under the title "Thoughts of the Times" (Tidens Tanker). He maintained that "republicans in Norway are essentially tied to the instincts of the long-skulled [i.e., idealism] which puts them on a higher level than those built on the economic considerations of the short-skulled or on socialism."⁷³ He further insists that: "It can not be denied that precisely those in the no-area are recognizable straight-backed farmers who believe they can govern the country without a king."⁷⁴ In addition to his racial theories, Hansen did reveal some striking insight in his column when he looked at the role of monarchy in general and the Norwegian national monarchy in particular. He reminded his readers that an incompetent king could easily be neutralized in a democratic parliamentary system, whereas a capable monarch "can actually make a positive contribution to the public life."⁷⁵ As if to calm the worst fears of republicans,

be thusly formulated: the moderate party is composed almost exclusively of short-skulled, Venstre and a part of the eastern Høire of long-skulls. Or to put it another way: the tall, light, long-skulled type is racially determined Venstre or partly eastern Høire, the shorter, darker short-skulled type is racially determined 'moderate' in western Norway, Høire in the east, but in any case conservative." Ibid., p. 13.

⁷³Hansen, "De to folkeafstemninger," Samtiden 16(1905): 615.

⁷⁴Ibid.

⁷⁵Hansen, "Tidens Tanker," Samtiden 16(1905):572.

Hansen reiterated that which was likely apparent to most observers of the election:

That king who owes his crown to a plebiscite and a Storting majority, can never have the feeling of any mystical religious right, neither can he assume that the obsequious adulation is directed at his person rather than his position.⁷⁶

Similar observations were made by American commentators as they reflected on the significance of electing a king.⁷⁷ All agreed with Hansen that the election itself placed the Norwegian monarchy in a unique situation. The near 80 percent majority in favor, however, is neither reflective of the sharp debate which preceded the election nor the uncertainty with which even members of the government awaited the results. Support for the government of Christian Michelsen and the attraction of national monarchy was greater than anyone seems to have expected. An example of this is seen in the predictions made by the members of the cabinet on the final vote. On 27 October, Løvland, Bothner, Hagerup Bull, Olssøn, and Kristoffer Lehmkuhl, minister of labor, sealed their predictions in envelopes. Opened on 15 November they revealed a far less optimistic cabinet than the final election results might have warranted, although all predicted a majority for monarchy. Bothner guessed 190,000 to 110,000; Lehmkuhl:

⁷⁶Ibid.

⁷⁷See for example St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 24 November 1905, p. 14; San Francisco Examiner, 27 November 1905, p. 16; Atlanta Constitution, 19 November 1905, p. 4B and New York Times, 16 November 1905, p. 10.

150,000 to 100,000; Hagerup Bull: 200,000 to 100,000; Løvland: 160,000 to 150,000 was the most pessimistic while Christian Olssøn, the defense minister, guessed a nearly accurate 250,000 to 85,000.⁷⁸ Even the winning guess, however, revealed a smaller difference than the actual vote. To paraphrase Schønning's observation: the Norwegian people were more monarchical than anyone had guessed. An examination of the election results further reveal the truth of this, as republicans found themselves in a minority almost everywhere. As would be expected, a greater portion of those voting in districts represented by republicans in the Storting opposed the monarchy than in districts which monarchists called home. This was particularly true in the county of Lister and Mandal, where a republican vote of 31 percent gave eight of the nineteen electoral districts a republican majority.⁷⁹ The largest percentage of republican votes was registered in Bratsberg (now called Telemark) where more than 40 percent favored a republic, a figure twice the national average. Whereas all four representatives were republicans, it may well be that this area also reflected the influence of the large amount of emigration to America in the nineteenth century. Because all either had a relative in

⁷⁸Hagerup Bull, 15 November 1905, in Dagbøker, p. 220.

⁷⁹See Table I in the Appendix. Three of the four representatives here were outspoken republicans: Foss, Stousland, and Bryggesaa. A list of all representatives is found in the Appendix.

America, or knew someone who did, it is likely that the example of the American republic (perhaps through American letters) helped in part to create the unusual deviation from the national pattern, although no evidence is available to demonstrate conclusively the influence of the transatlantic contact.⁸⁰ This speculation is strengthened, however, upon examination of the results from the north of Norway where emigration to America was less significant. Tromsø was represented by three of the more radical republicans in the Storting (Eriksen, Lind Johansen and Foshaug), yet voted for a republic at only slightly above the national average. Overseas emigration from Troms in the decade of the 1890's was the lowest in the country at two persons per one thousand of population. It shows to be among the lowest since emigration to America became a factor in the 1860's.⁸¹ Pointing out this particular aspect behind the voting does not, however, minimize the importance of other explanations. It reveals an intriguing parallel but, by no means, does it serve as the only, or for that matter, the principal explanation. The mystique of national monarchy to Norwegians

⁸⁰Immigrants from Telemark remained close knit even after arriving in America, forming, along with other immigrants, regionally oriented associations called Bygdelager. See Odd Sverre Lovoll, A Folk Epic: The Bygdelag in America (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1976). Official emigration statistics are found in [Julie Backer], Ekteskap, Fødsler og Vandringer i Norge, 1856-1960 (Oslo: Statistisk Sentralbyrå, 1965), pp. 164-165.

⁸¹See Table 91 in Backer, *ibid.*, p. 165.

brought up on a steady diet of the sagas of the Vikings and their kings, as well as possessing, probably, more patriotic songs than any other people, is immeasurable, but significant nevertheless. This latter explanation is likely the more significant since Kristians (Oppland) had a high percentage of emigration but also a high vote for the monarchy. Another factor must be considered in explaining this difference; it may well be that the relative economic well-being and nearness to the capital, which marked this eastern county of Norway, as opposed to Bratsberg, contributed to its greater support for the Michelsen proposal.

Furthermore, the county of Kristians was considerably less isolated and shared a common border with Sweden, something which likely strengthened its support for the government which had preserved the peace during the crisis over dissolution. This fact would correspond with the expressions of antagonism symbolized by the rock-throwing incidents in Fredrikshald when Castberg was speaking there. The distant towns of Narvik and Vardø, far to the north and lacking any apparent strong sense of the Swedish threat, were the only towns which reported a republican majority. In Kristiansand, on Norway's south coast, only fifteen votes separated the two sides. Knut Hougen wrote later that the city "could have been won for a republic if there had been more time for

agitation."⁸² That may have been true, but the evidence points to a steady shifting away from republican support in that city and more time may have meant a greater monarchical majority instead. Hougen himself had noted that change in his conversation with Matias Hansen. At any rate, a republican victory in the election would have required a more substantial switch than fifteen votes in the city of Kristiansand; throughout the country on 12 and 13 November, Norway overwhelmingly supported the election of Prince Carl of Denmark as King Haakon VII, the first king of a modern, independent Norway.

On 18 November the Storting met to elect officially its new national monarch. Alfred Eriksen, on behalf of the Norwegian Labor Party and Johan Castberg, as spokesman for the non-socialist republicans, both acknowledged their acceptance of the plebiscite and accepted the resolution to elect the new king.⁸³ That same day a deputation was sent to Copenhagen to present the new monarch with the notice of his election and, in return, gain his official acceptance. The seven-man delegation travelled by train through Sweden then by ferry across the narrow sound separating Hålsingborg in

⁸²Hougen, "Erindringer nedtegnet i 1928," in Ms. fol. 2688.2, Worm-Müller papers, UB, Oslo.

⁸³See "Norges Storting Kaarer til Norges konge: Hans kongelige høihed prins Carl af Danmark," in Heiberg, Unionens Opløsning 1905, p. 1012.

Sweden from Helsingør in Denmark. There was evidence of a residue of Swedish hostility when a stone was thrown at the passing railroad car while on Swedish territory, but in Denmark the mood was a happy one.⁸⁴ Several thousand people had assembled at the station in Copenhagen to greet their visitors, and when Haakon met with them for the first time he spoke of his purpose in demanding a plebiscite: to demonstrate that he came to Norway as king of all the people seeking to unite, not to divide them.⁸⁵

On 23 November, aboard the Danish royal yacht Danneborg Haakon left Denmark sailing for Oslo. North through the Oslo Fjord, the new monarch was met at Drøbak, near Oscarsborg fortress, by the Norwegian government and there boarded the Norwegian ship, Heimdal. Prime Minister Michelsen greeted the young king with sentiments undoubtedly echoed by his countrymen in words illustrative of the hold and mystique which national monarchy had for them: "For almost 600 years," Michelsen said, "the Norwegian people have not had their own king. Never has he been totally our own. We have always had to share him with others. Never has he made his home among

⁸⁴Andersen Grimsø, Erindringer, p. 63.

⁸⁵Ibid., p. 64; Heiberg, Unionens Opløsning 1905, pp. 1015; Wedel Jarlsberg, 1905: Kongevalget, p. 278.

us. There where the home is, is also the fatherland. Today it is different."⁸⁶

In spite of the fog and snow, the people of Oslo also waited in a capital city decorated for the occasion. Shortly before 1:00 P.M., 25 November, Haakon VII stepped ashore in his new country. What a journey!--not only for the king, but for the country. Less than six months had passed since the union was dissolved; seven years since the debate over Ibsen's proposals for a national monarchy. Both remarkably short spans of time. Writing to a friend in England, Fridtjof Nansen probably echoed the feelings of most Norwegians on that cold November day:

. . .it has been a marvellous year for Norway. I hear in this moment that our new king has passed Faerder lighthouse at the entrance to Christiania Fjord, and now he consequently is in Norwegian waters. Who would have thought this, say, only seven months ago? That the union should be dissolved without shedding a drop of blood for it, and we should peacefully elect our own king; it would then have sounded like a fairy tale; but now it is fulfilled.⁸⁷

⁸⁶"Haakon kommer til Norge," Heiberg, Unionens Opløsning 1905, p. 1017; Wedel Jarlsberg, 1905: Kongevalget, p. 288; Øverland, Da vort Kongeparet kom: Mindeblad fra Norges nyeste historie (Kristiania: J. H. Kuenholdts Forlag, 1906), p. 92.

⁸⁷Nansen to R. Spence Watson, 24 November 1905, in Kjaerheim, ed., Nansens Brev., p. 194.

CHAPTER VIII

EPILOGUE AND RETROSPECT

The plebiscite of 12 and 13 November, and the festive aftermath culminating in the arrival of the new king, left Norway in an intensely nationalistic mood. In greeting the new king, Oslo's mayor emphasized that the thousand-year throne of Harald, Haakon and Olav had been raised again within Norway's own borders.¹ Still mindful of the strong republican sentiment, however, after the welcoming speeches, Haakon stopped and spoke for a noticeably long time with Admiral Sparre, one of the men whose name on the republican proclamation had convinced the prince that he had to demand a plebiscite.² Republicans appeared, nevertheless, to accept the judgment of the people and proclaimed their loyalty to the new monarchy. Johan Castberg privately noted that although the plebiscite had not been a free question on the form of government: "Done is done."³ But was it done? Although republicans professed their loyalty, did they, in

¹"Kong Haakon kommer til Norge," in Heiberg, Unionens Opløsning 1905, p. 1018; Øverland, Da Vort Kongeparet kom, p. 103.

²Nansen, 25 November 1905, in Dagbok, p. 170.

³Castberg, 28 November 1905, in Dagbøker, p. 524.

fact, accept the judgment of the plebiscite? Serious questions remained, they believed, because the wording of the plebiscite had not definitively answered the questions they had raised during the crisis. As long as the festive nationalism surrounding the new king's arrival prevailed, however, republicans deliberately seemed to keep a low profile. New issues were debated in the Storting, but the issues of 1905 were not entirely laid to rest. In the government's proclamation of 31 October Michelsen had used the phrase "the new workday" (Den nye arbeidsdag) to reflect the nation's emphasis on work to be done. It became a motto symbolizing the need to face social and economic questions now that the union no longer prevailed to distract the nation.⁴ To a certain extent this was deceptive because, for all the professions of loyalty and intentions to concentrate on substantive issues in the nation's life, republicans continued to nibble at the gilded edges of the monarchy and the government showed itself equally ready to revive the strife if there was political advantages to be gained. The nibbling began in earnest with the first Spring of the new monarchy as, on 21 March 1906, the government proposed 100,000 kroner

⁴The most recent study of post-1905 Norway is a fascinating little book by Sverre Steen, På Egen Hånd: Norge Etter 1905 (Oslo: J. W. Cappelens Forlag, 1976), pp. 34-42 especially. The phrase "Den nye arbeidsdag" was first used by Michelsen in a speech on 12 October. See Kongeriget Norge, Stortings Forhandlinger 1905/1906. Vol. 7a: Stortingstidende, pp. 8-9.

for the coronation of Haakon and Maud, and a 50,000 kroner allotment for the refurbishing of a royal residence in Trondheim.⁵ Prior to its introduction in the Storting, four members of the budget committee protested that the expense was excessive and unnecessary. Their contention was that the monarch could better serve his people by staying in private homes on his travels around the country rather than have the government maintain separate royal residences.⁶ On 6 April the issue was placed before the Storting for debate. A reading of the debate leaves the impression that nothing had been settled by the plebiscite of the previous November, for the old arguments were revived and, not too surprisingly, the same voices were raised in opposition. The most outspoken was the obstreperous socialist Alfred Eriksen, who immediately took the floor in protest. Eriksen not only questioned the principle of coronation, but also objected to using 100,000 kroner "of taxpayer's money for an empty, meaningless, medieval custom."⁷ It must be remembered that Eriksen was a radical Lutheran minister and,

⁵St. prp. nr. 73(1905-1906): Ang. bevilgning af utgifterne ved Deres majestaeters Kroning i Trondheim samt ved Trondheims stiftgaards indredning til fremtidig kongebolig," in Heiberg, Unionens Opløsning 1905, pp. 1051-1065.

⁶See the Budget Committee recommendations in *ibid.*, p. 1067.

⁷Kongeriget Norge, Stortings Forhandlinger 1905/1906. Vol. 7b: Stortingstidende, p. 1520.

as such, possessed many of the anti-papal, anti-Roman Catholic presuppositions that dated back to Martin Luther in the sixteenth century. To attack the "medieval custom" of coronation was synonymous with attacking the Roman Church, as foreign and undesirable as monarchy itself. According to Eriksen:

Everyone knows that the monarchy which we got with the help of Michelsen's policy, bad luck, the play of disastrous circumstances and an unworthy agitation is not a national monarchy. To talk about a national holiday when we crown our first king, who is a Danish prince, has no meaning. This monarchy will never be national, it is foreign to everything which is Norwegian and will remain rootless all its day.⁸

One would never guess the issue had been settled by a plebiscite, nor would one suspect that Eriksen himself publically professed loyalty to its result. Clearly, for Eriksen at any rate, the vote in November was far from the definitive last word. He not only protested against the monarchy itself, but objected to the expenditure of money to provide a royal residence in Trondheim--guided by a levelling republican philosophy. He insisted that the palace in Oslo ought to be sufficient, but if the king wanted to travel he ought to do so at his own expense, using the 700,000 kroner appanage he received; he could surely pay his own railway ticket and, in lieu of a royal residence, "Trondheim is not so unfortunately

⁸Ibid., p. 1528.

situated that they do not have hotels. . . ." ⁹ Though Eriksen was the most outspoken of the die-hard republicans, he received general support from a majority of those who earlier had also opposed the monarchy. Knut Hougen, Ivar Svendsbøe, Gjermund Grivi, and Adam Egede-Nissen all sought to postpone the coronation. ¹⁰ Johan Castberg and Wollert Konow, although rejecting the extreme position taken by Eriksen, both agreed that they accepted "monarchy as an institution" as a result of the plebiscite, but added that the coronation was an "out-dated" ceremony. ¹¹ For the monarchists it was relatively easy to raise the spector of disloyalty against the opposition, particularly the socialists. Whereas the Venstre opposition protested charges of disloyalty toward the government, such as Konow arguing that there was a difference between supporting monarchy as an institution and sheepishly following all government proposals; no such objections were raised by Eriksen. ¹² On the contrary, the socialist representative wore the charge as a badge of honor rejecting any responsibility of loyalty to the plebiscite because the plebiscite itself was purported to be "meaningless."

I maintain . . . [Eriksen said] that the plebiscite held last year . . . can not be given any value as

⁹Ibid., pp. 1522, 1524.

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 1523, 1528.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 1530, 1539.

¹²Ibid., p. 1537.

an expression for the will of the people; I am convinced that if the people had been allowed to vote on the form of government in peace and quiet without false terror and threats, the result would have been quite different. Therefore I do not accept it.¹³

Although Eriksen reminded the Storting that the position he took was his own and not his Party's, it was consistent with the Labor Party's refusal to have anything to do with the monarchy, such as attending functions at the palace or refusing to form a government if called upon to do so without first controlling an absolute majority in the Storting.¹⁴ Even though Eriksen was alone in the extreme position he took, expressions of opposition by the same people who had opposed the monarchy initially caused Gjert Holsen to proclaim that "opposition to the coronation comes exclusively from the same flock which did not want to have a king."¹⁵ As a result, much the same alignment appears in the Storting vote here as existed with the vote of 31 October. The attempt

¹³Ibid., p. 1539.

¹⁴This was for years a delicate point for the socialists, and a matter of serious debate in 1928 when, without an absolute majority they did accept the call to form a government. In large part this was due to the confidence the party had in Haakon. See especially chapter 3: "Reforisme--Revolusjon--Minsitersosialisme," in Ivar Arne Roset, Det Norske Arbeiderparti og Hornsruds regjeringsdannelse i 1928 (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget [n.d.]), pp. 17-31. Cf. Björnberg, Parlamentarismens utveckling i Norge efter 1905, pp. 288-311.

¹⁵Heiberg, Unionens Opløsning 1905, p. 1081; Kongeriget Norge, Stortings Forhandlinger 1905/1906. Vol. 7b: Stortings-tidende, pp. 1530, 1540.

to delay the coronation was finally rejected 91 to 24, but the proposal for funds for the coronation and the royal residence in Trondheim showed much smaller majorities: 66 to 47 and 65 to 49 respectively.¹⁶

The issues were inflamed again in June when the Storting was presented with a recommendation from the Budget Committee that 250,000 kroner be spent on refurbishing the royal palace in Oslo.¹⁷ As part of this refurbishing, sanitary standards would be upgraded and a fence would be erected around a portion of the huge park surrounding the palace. Naturally, those who opposed the monarchy, in principle, returned to oppose this. Eriksen, Egede-Nissen, Skilbred and Hougen, among others, pointed to the unreasonable expense of such repairs. Although a foreign observer had called the palace "one of the meanest palaces in Europe," Egede-Nissen called it "theft of the state's money" to use 250,000 kroner for the project; but the worst theft was taking part of the park around the palace and fencing it in for the exclusive use of the royal family.¹⁸ Fencing in the royal family, Egede-Nissen claimed, would only sever their contact with the people. He believed that there should instead be the

¹⁶Heiberg, Unionens Opløsning 1905, pp. 1094-1095, 1100, 1117.

¹⁷Kongeriget Norge, Stortings Forhandlinger 1905/1906. Vol. 7b: Stortingstidende, p. 2725.

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 2727-2728; Mary Bronson Hartt, "Haakon VII, The New King of Norway," The Outlook 83(23 June 1906):470.

greatest possible contact between them, but his argument failed to convince his listeners. Several felt obliged to state their acceptance of his arguments, in principle, that it was an unwarranted expense; they nevertheless, voted for the expense because the results of the plebiscite demanded it. It was best expressed by Ivar Tveiten who had himself voted for a republic when he said that he had no wish to "sacrifice more on the altar of monarchy," but:

When our people decided to accept monarchy and the king, and showed it in such an explicit manner so as there can be no doubt about it, then we must respect that fact.¹⁹

Even though several republicans joined with Tveiten, the vote revealed sixteen intransigents--including Castberg, Myrvang, Inderberg, and the implacable socialists.²⁰

On 15 June, one week before the king was to be crowned in Trondheim's gothic cathedral, Michelsen himself questioned the loyalty of some of his opponents. Quick to reply, and obviously sensitive on the issue, Castberg insisted his loyalty may have gone too far, especially when he had supported the vote of confidence and the Bernadotte candidacy a year earlier.²¹ The implication that he regretted it was

¹⁹Kongeriget Norge, Stortings Forhandlinger 1905/1906. Vol. 7b: Stortingstidende, p. 2733.

²⁰For expressions of agreement with Tveiten see Ibid., pp. 2729-2730, 2736.

²¹Ibid., pp. 2840-2841, 2847, 2853. This debate is also published in Heiberg, Unionens Opløsning 1905, pp. 1130-1163.

apparent. Michelsen returned to the same theme in October 1906 during the debate following the speech from the throne (Trontaldebatten). He expressed his skepticism of the professions of loyalty claiming that "some may wish to forget that the opposition has not been as loyal as it has claimed. . . ." ²² The worst offenders were, of course, the socialists whom Michelsen characterized as consciously seeking to undermine the institution of monarchy in their debates and their actions. ²³

Throughout 1905 the debate over monarchy and republic had, to a great extent, transcended political parties and party politics, as did the union question itself. These post-plebiscitory debates, on the other hand, revealed a stabilizing of the parliamentary system along more traditional party lines. Old animosities lingered primarily because they had been such a substantial part of the Norwegian conscious, and unconscious, mind for so many decades. National monarchy had been a unifying concept which Michelsen had used, in all his practicality and subtlety, to rid Norway of an undesirable union. His genius for persuasion and quick action had given the parliamentary system an extra-parliamentary character. It was his apparent hope

²²Kongeriget Norge, Stortings Forhandlinger 1906/1907. Vol 7a: Stortingstidende (Kristiania: Centraltrykkeriet, 1907), p. 56.

²³Ibid., pp. 56-57.

that this could be continued into the future, perhaps as Rolf Danielsen has concluded, in order to keep the socialists from any modicum of success. Nevertheless, having been successful with his coalition government in 1905, it seems natural that Michelsen would continue to utilize the concept for whatever reason. That he failed and resigned as prime minister in 1907 may be blamed on the return to more normal parliamentary alignments evidenced by the debates of 1906. More than any other man, however, Michelsen was responsible for the development of events in 1905 and has justifiably come to be associated with the history of that year. Certainly aware of the heroic proportions with which contemporary Norwegians endowed him, Michelsen could use it both as a lever and a club, as late as October 1906. He refused to disassociate himself from the events of 1905, but neither would he allow his political opponents to escape his criticism for their "unsuccessful attempts to undermine what the Karlstad compromise and the form of government had shaped."²⁴

Just as Michelsen continued to exploit his position through 1906, the socialists likewise maintained their intransigence toward the monarchy. On 30 October 1906, Eriksen presented the scenario for an eventual socialist action:

As soon as we gain power to put it through we will reduce the salary of the king and we will arrange the acceptance of such rules that the king will be

²⁴Ibid., p. 86.

what it has been said he should be: a hereditary president. It may be that this attempt to democratize the monarchy--I am myself inclined to believe it--will not be accepted. But even if we think that the monarchy will not accept this attempt, it is still our conviction, and we will do it.²⁵

Eriksen's scenario, for all its optimism, fails to account for the amazing resilience of the institution of monarchy. In his articles on Nationalt kongedømme, Sigurd Ibsen had written about that resilience after the revolutions of 1848 and how, by 1898, monarchy had achieved a new purpose and had meaningfully adapted itself to the parliamentary democratic systems of western Europe.²⁶ Because of that Ibsen had become convinced that Norway's only real chance for independence was in acquiring a national monarchy, a monarchy which could reestablish the traditional national glory and pride of Norwegians while being acceptable to the influential "princely labor union." It had led him to suggest a Bernadotte for the Norwegian throne; a prince from the ruling dynasty of the Norwegian-Swedish union necessary in order to unite the various political divisions in Norway. Ibsen's study had a tremendous impact on Norwegians both on a conscious and unconscious level. Norwegians of varying points

²⁵Ibid., p. 78.

²⁶Recently an American writing about the monarchs of Europe called them ". . .the Houdinis of history." He claimed: "They have survived the French Revolution, the Napoleonic Wars and the socialist governments that rule some of their nations." Ibsen would have concurred. See [Michael Demarest], "Royalty: The Allure Endures," Time, 3 May 1976, p. 12.

of view came to consider the utility of the proposal, and when negotiations for a satisfactory arrangement within the union failed, it was Ibsen's national monarchy which became the plan of action for the dissolution of that union. As prime minister, Michelsen was a practical politician who, with slight variances more of form than substance, initiated into reality what Ibsen had conceived in theory. Difficulties with the Bernadotte candidacy forced a shift to a secondary candidate, but it too was a change in form not substance. The arguments used by Michelsen and his government were, in essence, the arguments of Sigurd Ibsen updated to fit the exigencies of the moment. Internal peace and external recognition--two basic elements of Michelsen's program in 1905--were substantive arguments which had earlier been advanced by Ibsen. The real aim of Michelsen in 1905, as he so often insisted, was independence for Norway. To secure that goal he patterned his tactics and plans on Ibsen's concept of national monarchy. Any reading of Ibsen's ideas lead to the conclusion that he, too, held independence as the primary goal with national monarchy as the best way of achieving it with Norwegian and Swedish support. The nationalistic response of both republicans and monarchists bear out the practicality of the proposal. When the day of decision came, Norwegians opted for monarchy because it alone represented continuity with the traditions of the past.

Haakon VII stood as a symbol of Norwegian unity, not only after the differences of 1905, but with their historical past. The observations of Walter Bagehot, the nineteenth century English commentator on The English Constitution, were substantiated with the Norwegian experience of 1905. He had stated in his perspicacious book that monarchy was an intellectual form of government understood by the people. Although it may sound naive in the more sophisticated latter-half of the twentieth century, monarchy remained for Norwegians as it was to the British, ". . . a government in which the attention of the nation is concentrated on one person doing interesting actions. A Republic is a government in which that attention is divided between many, who are all doing uninteresting things."²⁷

Ibsen probably understood this, and the Norwegians, better than they understood themselves. In 1905 that understanding, coupled with the pragmatic plan and unbending will of Michelsen, achieved in reality what Ibsen had written as theory.

The proof of both would be seen in the fifty-two year reign of Norway's national monarch, Haakon VII. Whether or not his time spent in England had exposed him to Bagehot's views is not recorded, but it did give him the opportunity to witness firsthand the monarchy of which Bagehot had

²⁷Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution, p. 39.

written. The constitutional monarchy which Haakon initiated is too reminiscent of that which developed in Britain during the centuries after 1688 to be merely coincidental. The Whig and Tory cooperation of 1688 to 1689 was reflected in the Liberal-Conservative coalition in Norway which preceded the Norwegian "bloodless revolution" of 1905. In both cases the foreign element was a point of irritation; in England the Catholicism of James II, in Norway, the Swedish sympathies of Oscar II. Both had their intellectual apologists before the fact--in England, John Locke, in Norway, Sigurd Ibsen--and both were nationalistically inspired and sustained. Although it may be a mistake to exaggerate the apparent similarities, it is clear that although national monarchy in Norway was based on the intellectual precedent of Britain, emotionally it had an attraction which was uniquely its own. That it has survived and remains viable reinforces the impression that the monarchical tradition was the decisive element. Combined with a democratic and personal appeal, Haakon VII had strong political instincts and set the pattern for his reign in the final days of October 1905 when he negotiated with Nansen and demanded the plebiscite. No better testimony to the correctness of his decision can be given than the words of Arne Ording, the Norwegian historian, who during World War II spoke of the king's position in Norway:

What is the reason for the King having received such a unique position in the mind of the people. In critical times a people will always go back into

their history for strength from their historical memories. The old Norwegian kingdom of saga times has always captured our imagination and many feel that the monarchy is the bearer of a national-historical tradition. But it is not alone. The King has been able to gather the people because he has never led any personal politics. He has actually stood apart from the Parties; and while we have had, for example, a Communist Party after 1905, we have never had any republican movement. The King has shown in all his activity a real democratic temperament, and he did not hide the fact that Naziism and all its essentials were abominable to him.²⁸

²⁸Arne Ording, "Kong Haakon VII," in Festskrift til Arne Ording på 60-års dagen, 7 mai 1958 (Oslo: H. Aschehoug & Co., 1958), p. 133. Cf. Worm-Müller, "Kong Haakon 70 år," in Til Norge: Taler og Artikler gjennom krigsårene, 1939-1945 (Oslo: H. Aschehoug & Co., 1946), pp. 202, 203-204; Henning A. Nilsen, "Einar Gerhadsen 80 år: Pensjonist for full maskin," Norsk Ukeblad, 3 May 1977, p. 12; Magne Skodvin, "Haakon VII: folkekongen," A-Magasinet Nr. 52: Uketillegg til Aftenposten, 23 December 1972, pp. 24-33; Norsk Rikskringkasting, 50 År For Norge: Taler og Foredrag i Norsk Rikskringkasting ved H. M. Kongens Regjeringsjubileum 1955 og Kroningsjubileum 1956 (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1956). See especially F. Castberg, "Kongen og Statsideen," in *ibid.*, pp. 58-61.

APPENDIX

TABLE I

PLEBISCITE ELECTION RESULTS: 12, 13 NOVEMBER 1905
ELECTORAL DISTRICTS (VALGSOGNENE)

Smaalenenes amt.	Eligible to Vote	Number of Votes	Ballots Voided	Yes	No
Trøgstad	797	604	3	535	66
Askim	645	492	1	402	89
Spydeberg	497	374	1	265	108
Rakkestad	1,152	879	3	780	96
Skiptvet	468	336	1	284	51
Eidsberg	1,180	1,015	8	799	208
Rødnes	429	315	0	268	47
Aremark	790	577	3	544	30
Id	786	644	6	583	55
Berg	919	854	6	839	9
Skjeberg	911	740	5	678	57
Hvaler	687	533	1	520	12
Borge	1,132	970	5	824	141
Varteig	269	241	3	228	10
Tune	1,471	1,253	2	1,123	128
Glemminge	2,039	1,781	3	1,460	318
Onsø	1,420	1,168	1	1,013	154
Raade	562	437	2	399	36
Rygge	703	575	2	564	9
Moss land-distrikt	388	290	3	257	30
Vaaler	498	361	3	356	2
Hobøl	489	368	2	331	35
Total	18,232	14,807	64	13,052	1,691
Akershus amt.					
Vestby	790	662	14	610	38
Kraakstad	640	509	1	470	38
Aas	629	525	0	469	56
Frogn	442	358	0	340	18
Nesodden	469	384	2	334	48
Østre Aker	2,260	1,756	26	1,467	255
Vestre Aker	2,189	1,820	2	1,366	452

TABLE I--Continued

Akershus amt. (Cont'd)	Eligible to Vote	Number of Votes	Ballots Voided	Yes	No
Østre Baerum	1,244	1,016	3	689	324
Vestre Baerum	676	594	0	492	102
Asker	896	714	18	627	69
Urskog	902	720	3	648	69
Høland	1,267	1,082	0	1,016	66
Enebak	628	435	4	395	36
Fet	844	722	5	683	34
Sørum	536	449	0	392	57
Skedsmo	1,789	1,512	11	1,157	344
Nittedalen	513	388	5	353	30
Gjerdrum	343	287	0	243	44
Ullensaker	1,219	905	6	742	157
Nes	1,624	1,318	11	1,262	45
Eidsvoll	1,811	1,591	0	1,216	375
Nannestad	866	716	3	694	19
Hurdalen	702	602	5	574	23
Total	23,239	19,065	119	16,247	2,699
Hedemarkens amt.					
Ringsaker	1,984	1,604	16	1,399	189
Nes	636	521	0	439	82
Vang	1,865	1,582	40	1,306	236
Løiten	1,078	845	5	572	268
Romedal	879	673	7	441	225
Stange	1,238	992	1	862	129
Søndre Odalen	1,353	1,052	7	934	111
Nordre Odalen	868	711	1	650	60
Vinger	927	670	6	587	77
Eidskogen	1,119	889	4	824	61
Brandval	711	496	5	460	31
Grue	1,193	999	3	802	194
Hoff	579	468	2	420	46
Aasnes	931	721	11	557	153
Vaaler	736	560	7	454	99
Elverum	1,810	1,467	10	1,043	414
Trysil	1,173	917	20	570	327
Aamot	652	587	3	482	102
Stor-Elvedalen	684	563	15	268	280*

TABLE I--Continued

Hedemarkens amt. (Cont'd)	Eligible to Vote	Number of Votes	Ballots Voided	Yes	No
Sollien	92	67	1	24	42*
Rendalen	800	616	10	302	304*
Lille-Elvedalen	709	525	4	276	245
Tønset	688	602	5	387	210
Tolgen	734	586	4	245	337*
Kvikne	283	210	2	115	93
Total	23,722	18,923	189	14,419	4,315
Kristian amt.					
Dovre	452	331	0	302	29
Lesje	568	462	1	441	20
Skiaaker	486	227	13	155	59
Lom	506	365	6	173	186*
Vaage	1,241	886	13	774	99
Nordre Fron	849	745	10	694	41
Søndre Fron	556	399	1	320	78
Ringebu	897	823	7	730	86
Øier	646	565	1	522	42
Østre Gausdal	541	458	0	403	55
Vestre Gausdal	495	417	1	398	18
Faaberg	1,088	906	1	812	93
Biri	939	757	6	671	80
Vardal	862	712	2	497	213
Østre Toten	1,635	1,341	11	1,142	188
Vestre Toten	1,555	1,274	2	1,162	110
Jevnaker	1,372	1,087	2	932	153
Gran	855	695	16	634	45
Brandbu	1,037	849	1	732	116
Søndre Land	1,001	858	4	814	40
Nordre Land	1,021	886	0	871	15
Søndre Aurdal	870	713	1	685	27
Etnedalen	474	334	4	323	7
Nordre Aurdal	1,009	743	8	703	32
Vestre Slidre	607	490	10	412	68
Østre Slidre	569	447	2	410	35
Vang	478	449	1	445	3
Total	22,609	18,219	124	16,157	1,938

TABLE I--Continued

	Eligible to Vote	Number of Votes	Ballots Voided	Yes	No
Buskeruds amt.					
Hole	717	602	0	591	11
Norderhov	1,673	1,227	15	1,088	124
Aadalen	561	514	0	500	14
Nes	904	589	1	531	57
Gol	887	660	0	644	16
Aal	826	668	16	521	131
Hol	525	360	3	324	33
Sigdal	1,274	1,101	44	1,004	53
Modum	1,830	1,503	1	1,297	205
Øvre Eker	1,257	1,131	23	957	151
Fiskum	266	225	0	207	18
Nedre Eker	922	793	0	701	92
Lier	1,393	1,128	0	1,090	38
Bragernes land- distrikt	127	116	0	114	2
Røken	798	633	1	528	104
Hurum	776	573	12	552	9
Sandsvaer	958	802	12	616	174
Kongsberg land distrikt	38	33	0	26	7
Flesberg	482	384	3	351	30
Rollag	288	233	3	205	25
Nore	606	497	1	455	41
Total	17,108	13,772	135	12,302	1,335
Jarlsberg and Larvik amt.					
Strømmen	532	412	1	406	5
Skoger	854	673	3	595	75
Sande	751	601	0	553	48
Hof	461	358	4	354	54
Botne	461	377	10	338	29
Vaale	526	444	1	408	35
Borre	728	535	0	513	22
Horten	1,835	1,639	19	1,504	116
Ramnes	612	447	1	411	35
Andebu	556	452	5	422	25
Stokke	1,027	720	13	680	27
Sem	1,258	924	0	899	25

TABLE I--Continued

Jarlsberg and Larvik amt. (Cont'd)	Eligible to Vote	Number of Votes	Ballots Voided	Yes	No
Nøtterø	1,179	679	0	665	14
Tjømmø	631	399	1	391	7
Sandherred	1,418	974	18	863	93
Tjølling	753	587	0	559	28
Fredriksvern	192	163	3	152	8
Brunlanes	922	730	3	709	18
Hedrum	837	678	1	647	30
Lardal	499	438	2	419	17
Total	16,032	12,230	85	11,434	711
Bratsberg amt.					
Drangedal	837	671	3	461	207
Sannikedal	540	412	1	391	20
Skaatø	822	665	0	546	119
Bamle	1,334	1,060	17	825	218
Eidanger	755	576	10	422	144
Slemdal	178	154	0	82	72
Gjerpen	1,389	1,150	2	576	572
Solum	1,617	1,285	12	617	656*
Hollen	864	678	4	480	194
Lunde	496	399	6	262	131
Bø	545	373	18	114	241*
Saude	684	519	7	300	212
Hitterdal	731	573	2	372	199
Tinn	537	413	0	113	300*
Gransherred	412	282	4	107	171*
Gransherred- Jondalen	37	33	0	6	27*
Hjartdal	515	364	0	210	154
Seljord	660	383	0	129	254*
Kviteseid	664	512	17	153	342*
Nissedal	330	227	4	56	167*
Fyresdal	422	307	4	122	181*
Mo	354	227	2	110	115*
Laardal	271	198	0	85	113*
Vinje	387	303	0	75	228*
Rauland	223	135	1	22	112*
Total	15,604	11,899	114	6,636	5,149

TABLE I--Continued

	Eligible to Vote	Number of Votes	Ballots Voided	Yes	No
Nedenes amt.					
Gjerstad	905	634	0	494	140
Sønedeled	630	449	1	387	61
Dybvaag	1,097	589	8	524	57
Tvedestrand	306	230	1	208	21
Holt	869	581	0	528	53
Aamli	561	323	0	228	95
Herefoss	465	325	1	205	119
Froland	488	330	0	273	57
Østre Moland	452	324	2	258	64
Tromø	464	293	0	287	6
Hisø	561	352	3	341	8
Øiestad	911	566	7	451	108
Fjaere	1,089	645	13	494	138
Hommedal	678	446	2	382	62
Vestre Moland	763	507	2	396	109
Høvaag	459	269	6	190	73
Evje	723	608	2	196	410*
Bygland	464	325	0	43	282*
Valle	488	316	0	94	222*
Birkenes	419	264	2	131	131
Total	12,792	8,376	50	6,110	2,216
Lister and Mandal amt.					
Tveid	337	267	0	52	215*
Oddernes	1,086	826	2	424	400
Øvrebø	744	649	1	112	536*
Søgne	760	552	4	224	324*
Mandal	1,388	1,029	12	825	192
Holme	575	537	3	269	265
Bjelland	565	417	4	22	391*
Aaseral	231	157	0	79	78
Nordre Undal	316	225	0	112	113*
Søndre Undal	956	630	0	514	116
Vanse	1,533	1,195	22	1,005	168
Herred	429	292	0	247	45
Lyngdal	889	571	0	484	87
Haegbostad	427	209	1	64	144*
Fjotland	205	123	0	48	75*
Kvinesdal	841	495	0	389	106

TABLE I--Continued

Lister and Mandal amt. (Cont'd)	Eligible to Vote	Number of Votes	Ballots Voided	Yes	No
Flekkefjord land-distrikt	784	528	0	448	80
Bakke	535	356	0	215	141
Siredalen	321	234	8	103	123*
Total	12,922	9,292	57	5,636	3,599
Stavanger amt.					
Sogndal	601	337	9	362	76
Lund	581	412	4	236	172
Helleland	629	328	0	120	208*
Egersund	1,323	1,018	4	818	196
Haa	731	628	4	557	67
Klep	491	384	2	355	27
Lye	855	698	2	526	170
Høiland	1,261	1,037	8	796	233
Haaland	671	506	7	457	42
Hetland	1,132	926	13	797	116
Høgsfjord	657	509	5	387	117
Strand	474	420	4	383	33
Finnø	286	244	3	181	60
Rennesø	437	350	0	319	31
Skudenes	733	572	7	527	38
Avaldsnes	700	474	0	414	60
Kopervik	851	598	1	570	27
Torvestad	413	297	1	268	28
Haugesund land-distrikt	621	408	3	321	84
Tysvaer	528	340	6	277	57
Skjold	624	464	0	438	26
Vikedal	485	330	4	307	19
Nerstrand	428	327	3	269	55
Hjelmeland	754	590	3	424	163
Jelse	454	326	6	297	23
Sand	617	432	3	345	84
Suldal	441	296	4	160	132
Total	17,818	13,361	106	10,911	2,344
Søndre Bergenhus amt.					
Strandebarm	1,020	848	1	570	277

TABLE I--Continued

Søndre Bergenhus amt. (Cont'd)	Eligible to Vote	Number of Votes	Ballots Voided	Yes	No
Kvinnherred	1,023	840	4	654	182
Skaanevik	594	446	4	406	36
Etne	434	316	1	303	12
Fjelberg	649	483	13	393	77
Sveen	811	586	2	544	40
Finnaas	945	346	9	676	61
Stord	447	364	3	217	144
Fitjar	522	436	1	428	7
Tysnes	997	682	12	619	51
Fuse	748	553	5	401	147
Os	996	787	6	713	68
Fane	1,160	949	8	800	141
Sund	1,046	802	10	764	28
Fjeld	744	558	8	510	40
Askøyen	1,518	1,192	7	946	239
Aarstad	929	679	1	431	247
Haus	976	849	5	614	230
Bruvik	690	573	1	414	158
Hosanger	675	497	2	341	154
Hammer	900	740	1	628	111
Alversund	623	515	0	392	123
Herlø	674	574	0	573	1
Manger	1,028	834	1	797	36
Lindaas	1,269	1,034	6	910	118
Masfjorden	425	335	5	271	59
Røldal	184	145	1	117	27
Ullensvang	1,088	721	11	412	298
Ulvik	927	595	15	211	369*
Vikør	743	592	1	260	331*
AEvanger	476	356	0	156	200*
Voss	1,634	1,167	3	681	483
Vossestranden	401	258	2	112	144*
Total	27,296	21,052	149	16,264	4,639
Nordre Bergenhus amt.					
Jostedal	181	136	3	71	62
Lyster	644	479	7	352	120
Hafslo	600	415	5	333	77
Aardal	238	152	1	116	35

TABLE I--Continued

Nordre Bergenhus amt. (Cont'd)	Eligible to Vote	Number of Votes	Ballots Voided	Yes	No
Laerdal	578	419	2	278	139
Sogndal	717	614	3	463	148
Aurland	604	461	15	408	38
Leikanger	490	410	0	299	181
Balestrand	485	372	0	284	88
Vik	703	559	3	524	32
Lavik	809	495	8	290	197
Gulen	669	494	4	426	64
Sulen	408	324	0	311	13
Hyllestad	511	431	2	412	17
Askvold	576	453	2	409	42
Ytre Holmedal	809	658	16	481	161
Indre Holmedal	704	640	8	587	45
Jølster	545	398	4	318	76
Førde	1,301	1,078	7	981	90
Kinn	1,141	949	4	860	85
Bremanger	484	422	0	345	77
Selje	1,125	945	4	892	49
Daviken	678	559	2	499	58
Eid	654	524	9	292	223
Hornidalen	330	245	0	130	115
Gloppen	1,134	887	8	596	283
Indviken	642	516	14	402	100
Stryn	518	413	2	218	193
Total	18,278	14,448	133	11,507	2,808
Romsdals amt.					
Vannelven	631	486	0	413	73
Sande	592	464	1	423	40
Herø	740	595	7	562	26
Ulstein	660	592	4	552	36
Volden	991	773	7	570	196
Ørsten	701	617	3	477	137
Hjørundfjord	403	353	0	330	23
Sunnelven	382	306	0	245	61
Norrdalen	541	432	0	365	67
Stranden	536	418	0	381	37
Ørdkog	901	792	1	760	31
Skodje	670	505	0	461	44

TABLE I--Continued

Romsdal amt. (Cont'd)	Eligible to Vote	Number of Votes	Ballots Voided	Yes	No
Borgund	1,435	1,168	12	1,133	23
Haram	726	518	3	412	103
Vestnes	791	549	0	292	257
Eid og Vold	336	232	1	171	60
Grytten	566	410	3	369	38
Veø	544	398	1	262	135
Nesset	712	485	18	359	108
Bolsø	773	576	1	535	40
Fraenen	623	438	9	406	23
Akerø	716	393	10	352	31
Bud	618	388	1	316	71
Kvernes	1,603	1,120	3	939	178
Frei og Grip	273	173	0	99	74
Øre	656	436	0	246	190
Tingvold	778	505	2	322	181
Øksendalen	221	171	7	58	106*
Sundalen	338	161	0	113	48
Stangvik	625	408	0	235	173
Surendalen	579	293	4	99	190*
Rindalen	503	293	0	132	161
Aure	874	678	11	350	317
Halse	635	402	8	306	88
Edø	718	409	0	306	103
Total	23,391	16,937	117	13,351	3,469
Søndre Trondheims amt.					
Bjørnør	971	634	3	547	84
Aafjorden	832	514	9	420	85
Bjugn	939	395	1	316	78
Frøien	1,064	741	21	621	99
Hitteren	1,073	632	11	560	61
Hevne	1,036	737	0	628	109
Ørlandet	975	554	4	485	65
Stadsbygden	1,248	832	15	561	256
Orkedalen	1,381	941	0	679	262
Meldalen	659	444	6	343	95
Rennebu	514	311	7	180	124
Opdal	803	520	4	390	126

TABLE I--Continued

Søndre Trondheims amt. (Cont'd)	Eligible to Vote	Number of Votes	Ballots Voided	Yes	No
Røros	1,005	828	0	228	600*
Holtaalen	958	784	0	341	443*
Støren	1,465	994	2	857	135
Melhus	1,166	855	4	607	244
Børsen	747	595	8	506	81
Byneset	537	383	0	291	92
Strinden	995	727	6	617	104
Malvik	498	400	1	309	90
Klaebu	279	215	0	166	49
Selbu	1,097	752	9	584	159
Total	20,242	13,788	111	10,236	3,441
Nordre Trondheims amt.					
Øvre Stjørdalen	922	647	10	414	223
Nedre Stjørdalen	1,328	1,016	10	763	243
Leksviken	591	384	3	363	18
Frosten	951	634	1	425	208
Skogn	668	461	1	263	197
Levanger	416	311	1	207	103
Vaerdalen	1,220	667	0	311	356*
Ytterøen	664	439	0	349	90
Inderøen	1,039	563	2	339	222
Sparbuen	870	585	3	154	428*
Stenjkaer	747	607	0	337	270
Beitstaden	815	461	14	149	298
Stod	507	354	2	122	230*
Snaasen	550	425	4	203	218*
Lierne	315	183	0	174	9
Grong	806	497	0	288	209
Overhallen	532	386	11	183	192*
Namsos	955	813	3	496	314
Fosnes	606	426	14	306	106
Flatanger	346	264	6	234	24
Naerø	1,017	563	4	447	112
Leka	432	321	10	287	24
Kolvereid	579	364	1	281	82
Total	16,876	11,371	100	7,095	4,176

TABLE I--Continued

Nordlands amt.	Eligible to Vote	Number of Votes	Ballots Voided	Yes	No
Bindalen	519	278	2	91	185*
Vik	525	381	0	301	80
Brønnø	643	439	1	396	42
Vega	490	310	3	297	10
Velfjorden	312	181	1	145	35
Tjøtta	660	422	0	374	48
Vefsen	1,227	757	6	278	473*
Hatfjelddalen	200	134	0	20	114*
Alstahaug	782	559	6	441	112
Herø	710	385	2	363	20
Hemnes	995	648	20	483	145
Mo	1,320	639	1	165	473*
Lurø	552	303	0	295	8
Nesne	892	588	8	523	57
Rødø	504	318	8	296	14
Melø	617	411	1	375	35
Gildeskaal	815	529	0	483	46
Beieren	376	246	0	226	20
Bodin	885	536	0	497	39
Skjerstad	383	262	0	241	21
Fauske	937	558	3	391	164
Saltdalen	644	432	0	333	99
Folden	742	388	0	377	11
Kjerringø	142	102	0	93	9
Steigen	701	557	9	507	41
Hammerø	641	442	0	428	14
Tysfjorden	452	245	0	245	0
Ofoten	1,312	915	13	791	111
Lødingen	778	479	10	446	23
Vaagan	938	714	21	654	39
Grimso	286	213	1	205	7
Borge	671	479	1	467	11
Buksnes	933	609	0	600	9
Flakstad	498	450	1	443	6
Vaerø	230	171	0	168	3
Hadsel	1,437	952	19	776	157
Bø	746	453	7	420	26
Øksnes	521	384	5	371	8
Sortland	609	302	2	258	42
Dverberg	780	631	1	556	74
Total	27,405	17,802	152	14,819	2,831

TABLE I--Continued

Tromsø amt.	Eligible to Vote	Number of Votes	Ballots Voided	Yes	No
Kvaefjord	649	464	15	392	57
Trondenes	1,816	1,267	24	992	251
Bjarkø	340	254	2	214	38
Ibbestad	1,788	1,359	6	1,147	206
Tranø	1,120	746	0	647	99
Berg	438	325	4	276	45
Lenviken	1,280	585	34	316	235
Maalselven	1,013	659	9	393	257
Balsfjorden	944	498	1	261	236
Tromsøundet	891	504	22	249	233
Lyngen	1,199	506	10	247	249*
Karlsø	618	171	13	27	131*
Skjaervø	1,148	667	2	536	129
Total	13,244	8,005	142	5,697	2,166
Finmarkens amt.					
Kautokeino	209	83	0	83	0
Alten	456	327	5	259	63
Talvik	615	413	14	379	20
Loppen	383	254	16	229	9
Hammerfest land- distrikt	406	222	5	204	13
Maasø	661	353	9	314	30
Kistrand	344	249	25	222	2
Karasjok	105	54	0	51	3
Lebesby	267	129	2	95	32
Tanen	497	221	3	172	46
Naessey	319	96	2	49	45
Vadsø land- distrikt	255	148	3	88	57
Sydvaranger	280	143	6	85	52
Vardø land- distrikt	192	124	2	86	36
Total	4,989	2,816	92	2,316	408
Electoral Districts Totals	331,833	246,163	2,039	194,189	49,935

Source: Heiberg, Unionens Opløsning 1905, pp. 965-976.

*Denotes a republican majority.

TABLE II

PLEBISCITE ELECTION RESULTS: 12, 13 NOVEMBER 1905
CITIES (KJØPSTAEDERNE)

	Yes	No
Fredrikshald	1,578	107
Sarpsborg	709	235
Fredrikstad	1,871	325
Moss	1,194	134
Drøbak	330	18
Kristiania (Oslo)	24,027	5,960
Hønefoss	293	49
Kongsvinger	249	19
Hamar	646	280
Lillehammer	437	108
Gjøvik	353	203
Drammen	3,133	439
Kongsberg	750	210
Holmestrand	345	25
Tønsberg	1,012	83
Sandefjord	589	91
Larvik	1,375	134
Kragerø	694	95
Brevik	239	75
Porsgrunn	566	183
Skien	923	825
Østerrisør	476	76
Arendal	1,119	175
Grimstad	311	53
Kristiansand	1,099	1,084
Flekkefjord	240	46
Stavanger	3,117	1,149
Haugesund	738	305
Bergen	7,418	3,156
Aalesund	1,592	357
Molde	267	44
Kristiansund	1,390	376
Trondheim	4,110	1,651
Levanger	188	55
Bodø	524	77
Narvik	244	322*
Tromsø	699	326

TABLE II--Continued

	Yes	No
Hammerfest	212	120
Vadsø	151	138
Vardø	166	221*
Totals	65,374	19,329
Total Vote for the Country	259,563	69,264

Source: Heiberg, Unionens Opløsning 1905, pp. 965-976.

*Denotes a republican majority.

TABLE III

STORTING REPRESENTATIVES:
1903-1906

Representative From	Name
Aalesund and Molde	Edward Apoloniussen Liljedahl
Akershus amt.	Bernt Holtsmark Jens Carl Peter Brandt Johan Thoresen Albert Bøhn Edward Hagerup Bull
Arendal and Grimstad	Nikolai Christian Grove Prebensen
Bergen	Kristofer Didrik Lemkuhl Christian Meidell Kahrs Diderich Anton Brynildsen Jørgen Brunchorst
Nordre Bergenhus amt.	Knut Andersen Taraldset Gjert Martinus Mardvardsen Holsen Ivar Lyche Falch Lind Otto Kristian Schreuder Fredrik Fraas
Søndre Bergenhus amt.	Peter Christian Hersleb Kjerschow Michelsen Ivar Beresen Saelen Magne Johnsen Rongved Iver Jonassen Svendsbøe Gerhard Meidell Gerhardsen
Bratsberg amt.	Nils Gregoriussen Skilbred Gjermund Nilsen Grevi Torgrim Matiassen Kleppen Ivar Petterson Tveiten
Brevik	Paus Bacher
Buskerud amt.	Truis Aslesen Strand Carl Herman Aas Jon Anton Andersen Engen Halvor Johansen Berg

TABLE III--Continued

Representative From	Name
Kristiania, Hønefoss, Kongsvinger	Georg Francis Hagerup Jens Kristian Meinich Bratlie Birger Kildal Gustav Martinsen
Kristians amt	Ole Knudsen Ødegaard Erik Mathiassen Enge Halvor Jacobsen Johan Castberg Ole Torgersen Gillebo
Kristiansand	Knut Johannes Hougen Thorvald Bernard Heistein
Kristiansund	Arne Arnesen
Drammen	Hans Christian Albert Hansen Hans Hansen
Finmarkens amt.	Edvard Kornelius Opdahl Jakob Peter Helmer Andersen
Flekkefjord	Cornelius Bernhard Hanssen
Fredrikshald	Wilhelm Christian Suhrke
Fredrikstad	Peter Collett Solberg
Hamar, Lillehammer, Gjøvik	Axel Andreas Thallaug
Hammerfest, Vardø, Vadsø	Adam Hjalmar Egede-Nissen
Haugesund	Håkon Magne Valdemar Wrangell
Hedemarkens amt	Tore Embretsen Aaen Wollert Konow Olav Peter Nergård Monther Eriksen Haug Thore Embretsen Myrvang

TABLE III--Continued

Representative From	Name
Holmestrand	Gunnar Magnus Kjølstad Graarud
Jarlsberg and Larvik amt.	Magnus Gothilf Oppen Aasmund Frisak Nils Christian Larsen Ullenrød Christian Olsen
Kongsberg	Adolf Teodor Hansen Strengenhagen
Kragerø	Godske Joachim Weidemann Nielsen
Larvik and Sandefjord	Magnus Hesselberg Oppen
Lister and Mandals amt.	Abraham Theodor Berge Aasuly Olsen Bryggesaa Throdor Neilsen Stousland Thore Thokildsen Foss
Moss and Drøbak	Oluf Iversen
Nedenes amt	Lars Olsen Skjulestad Niels Jacobsen Molland Gunnar Torgeirson Rysstad Ole Eriksen Graendsen
Nordlands amt	Andreas Cristian Andersen Grimsø Sofus Anton Birger Arctander Anton Mikal Bjørnaali Johan Mechael Jørgensen Christian Fredrik Nergaard Havig
Porsgrund	Jørgen Christian Knudsen
Romsdals amt.	Ole Ingebrigtsen Langeland Paul Andreas Jetmundsen Aklestad Nils Johansen Hestnaes Erik Olsen Tokle Wilhem Ludvig Børresen
Sarpsborg	Carl Christian Berner
Skien	Carl Stousland

TABLE III--Continued

Representative From	Name
Smaalenenes amt	Ole Herman Jacobsen Gunnar Anton Jahren Peder Olu Pedersen Johan Henrik Paasche Thorne
Stavanger amt	Aasmund Halvorsen Vinje Lars Konrad Bjørnsen Jelsa Eivind Hansen Hognestad Erik Kristensen Austbø Tønnes Ingvald Aarstad
Stavanger	Adolf Theodor Pedersen Berge Sigval Natanael Bergesen
Tromsø, Bodø and Narvik	Jorg Berge
Tromsø amt.	John Lind Johansen Meier Nilsen Foshaug Alfred Eriksen
Trondheim and Levanger	Bernhard Cornelius Braenne Andreas Berg Ole Peter Schølberg Rinnan Johan Magnus Halvorsen
Nordre Trondheims amt	Harald Bothner Andreas Petersen Galtvik Hans Konrad Henriksen Foosnaes Jacob Christoffer Inderberg
Søndre Trondheims amt	Jakob Tørgersen Hoff John Iversen Wolden Anders Olsen Bergan Paul Andreas Olsen Fjemstad Martin Nikolai Sivertsen
Tønsberg	Nils Riddervold-Jensen
Østerrisør	Andreas Hansson

Source: Kongeriget Norge, Storting's Forhandlinger 1903/1904.
Vol. 7a: Stortingstidende (Oslo: Centraltrykkeriet, 1904), pp. 1-3.

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