EXTERNAL INPUTS AND NORTH KOREA'S CONFRONTATION POLICY: A CASE STUDY OF LINKAGE POLITICS

DISSERTATION

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By

Yu-Nam Kim, M. A.
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In an inquiry into national behavior, students of international relations treat national data as independent variables. Students of comparative politics treat them as dependent variables in an attempt to compute foreign policy outputs. There is reason to believe that international and comparative studies can be incorporated into a system of linkage politics.

This study employs the framework of "linkage politics" of James N. Rosenau in an attempt to investigate the North Korean confrontation policy from 1953 to 1970. The basic assumption upon which this research operates is that the foreign policy of the North Korea has been a function of "fused linkages" between the nation's international environment and national conditions. "Fused linkage" is defined as a phenomenon by which certain national outputs and environmental inputs reciprocate in a continuous cycle. Thus the fused linkage case for North Korea's confrontation is defined as "circular confrontation."

Based on Rosenau's proposed linkage framework, this study presents its own analytical framework. The major linkage groups are conceived of "exogenous" and "endogenous"
conditions. Both of these conditions are divided into "constants" and "variables" and are treated as such. Each of these conditions was in turn analyzed with reference to relevant referents. Throughout the study particular attention is given to linkage processes between the two conditions.

The author reviewed a variety of data sources. The major data were collected from the following sources: (1) leading Korean newspapers; (2) Communist Party documents and publications; (3) elite writings; (4) North Korean government publications and statistical releases; (5) secondary literature on Korea; and (6) literature relevant to the concept of linkage politics.

The substantive core of this study is based on the notion that if the foreign policy of North Korea as a confrontation policy has resulted from its commitment to nation-building, the situation of conflict existent in her external environment appears to have been of great service to the growth of the regime's internal stability. In order to verify this notion, the approach taken here is quantitative, qualitative and a combination of both. A historical narrative is also used when concrete data were lacking or incongruous with policy outcomes.

This study finds that North Korea's circular confrontation policy has been a carefully chosen policy strategy which was most expedient in bringing the war-torn country to
recovery and development. The pre-1960 period is identified with the politics of "extroversion." North Korea's programs toward postwar reconstruction required a forceful mobilization at all levels. "Anti-imperialism" and other campaigns for "hatred of foreign enemies" served for attaining internal stability through voluntary supports. The post-1960 period is identified with the politics of "introversion." The people's memories of the war against America were gradually receding as their living conditions improved. Domestic issues such as nationalism or campaigns for national identity supplemented "anti-imperialism." As a result of the nationalistic attitude, North Korea not only attained considerable independence from Moscow and Peking, but also improved external relations with a number of non-Communist countries.

The author concludes that North Korea's present national and international accomplishments seem attributable to the circular confrontation policy. The general propositions emerging from the above may be stated as follows: Leading toward some theoretical propositions, the linkage frame of reference pertaining to the Korean case singles out a "circular confrontation" as a fused linkage phenomenon. The Korean linkage case was a two-phase confrontation both within and without. Each of these two referents was mutually interdependent and collectively reinforcing as if they were part of the same policy structure called "confrontation." In particular terms, they were both political capability referents composed of exogenous and endogenous conditions.
PREFACE

This study is about North Korea's confrontation policy. The confrontation is two-faced. To confront with foreign enemies is one, to conquer domestic hardship is another. A linkage between the two confrontations reveals that Pyongyang's conduct of external behavior is closely geared with its internal policy in such a way so as to systemize a chain reaction. I designate it as "circular confrontation." In an attempt to scrutinize North Korea's form of fusion between external response and internal reaction, the study applies the framework and concepts of "linkage politics" of James N. Rosenau as modified in the following chapter.

North Korea is one of few Communist countries that has been neglected by "communist watchers" in the United States. Policy-makers, as well as scholars and journalists, in the past two decades felt, at least, three major "shocks": in the Korean War of 1950, by the U. S. S. Pueblo incident of 1968, and on the North and South Korean detente of July, 1972. But, for some reason, such "irrational" behaviors of the tiny Communist regime were considered negligible. In substance, we know very little of its policy of confrontation.

As a rule for most Communist countries, North Korea's published sources are aptly colored by propaganda purposes. Consequently, this study suffers from material deficit.
Data and other research materials available through the publications of the Pyongyang Publishing House are scant and unreliable. At best, an attempt is made to obtain adjunct sources in order to supplement the government sources. At worst, if available sources are doubtful and inconsistent with each other, the study makes an educated judgment. Furthermore, recognizing that a scholarly work on adversary political systems is easily identified with either one who is "sympathetic" or one who is "critical," my own personal preference for "freeman" often pronounces a "guerrilla warfare" against the Communist philosophy.

At all events, a complete analysis and appraisal of North Korea's confrontation policy for a theoretical consideration is not intended here. Instead, this study gives special attention to theoretical significance via a case study of North Korea. The scope of this study is, therefore, determined by the fact that there is a widespread feeling that, whatever our attitude toward the Communist North Korea may be, the regime's confrontation policy may bear a policy thesis applicable to a number of other minor new nations of the Third World.¹

This study was made possible by the teachings of many professors and exchanges of educational associates. I would

¹I accept Miller's definition of the Third World, but disagree with his exclusion of all Communist governments. For his definition, see J. D. B. Miller, The Politics of the Third World (New York, 1967), pp. x-xiv, 1-17.
like to express appreciation to these professors, whose teachings made it possible to synthesize the knowledge relevant to this study. I would like to take note of the fact that this dissertation was prepared under a program of the Federation of North Texas Area Universities, and that part of the course work leading to candidacy for the degree was taken at East Texas State University.
ENVIRONMENTAL RECEPTIVITY: Even, however, for the minority whose social milieu did not speak to them of history, this exposure to the radiation of an historical social environment was not enough in itself to inspire a child to become an historian. A passive receptivity without which he would never get under way would also never avail to waft him into part unless it inspired him to travel under his own steam by awakening his mind to an active curiosity.


CIRCULAR PROCESS: My concept is based on the idea that organizations have stages of potential growth in their life cycles, and that each experiences crises and situations demanding certain management, and/or organizational responses that are indispensable if the organization is to achieve its next stage of growth. I call this a situational confrontation model. The confrontations of an organization, with itself and within its environments, and the question they raise, are as individual crises and a test of human fitness.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND KOREAN WORDS

Abbreviations
DPRK: Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)
ROK: Republic of Korea (South Korea)
KWP: Korean Worker's Party (Communist Party of North Korea)
KPA: Korean People's Army (North Korean Army)

Commonly Used Korean Words
Tado Mije: "Crush American Imperialism"
Haebang Nambu: "Liberation of the Southern-half"
Juche: North Korean term of nationalism of ideology
Jaju: Self-reliance or independent policy
Chosun: A short term referring to Korea. The term is used only by North Koreans. In Japanese, it is Chosen.
Chullima Undong: "Flying Horse Movement"
CHAPTER I

CIRCULAR CONFRONTATION

A Frame of Reference

Some time ago Professors Karl W. Deutsch and James N. Rosenau raised a theoretical question about internal and external political interrelationship. It was not until recently that Rosenau proposed a systematic study of national and international political convergence and conceptualized it as "linkage politics." In his critical examination of the linkage theory, Rosenau stated in the introduction to Linkage Politics as follows:

In short the need for linkage theory is multidimensional. The examples suggest that political analysis would be greatly facilitated if propositions that link the stability, functioning, institutions, and goals of national political systems to variables in their external environments could be systematically developed. They also indicate that much would be gained if hypotheses linking the stability, functioning, and organizations of international systems to variables within their national subsystems were available.

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2See James N. Rosenau, editor, Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems (New York, 1967), particularly the Introduction and Chapter 3. According to him, a "linkage is defined as any recurrent sequence of behavior that originates in one system and is reacted to in another."

3Ibid., p. 7.
Although their work was less explicit than the linkage framework of Rosenau, Harold and Margaret Sprout also conceived of national-international political processes in this perspective and stated that "what matters in policy-making is how the milieu appears to the policy-makers, not how it appears to some sideline analyst or how it might appear to a hypothetical omniscient observer." They further articulated a concept of international politics in terms of "milieu-polity" relationship. In short, perceiving political behaviors of a nation-state in this milieu-polity linkage, we may be able to embody a workable model with one that looks like this. (See Figure 1.) Milieu is thus defined by one's image, or as it is perceived; such a perceived milieu may sometimes be inconsistent with what the milieu actually is.

It is not the distinction made between the milieu as it actually is and the milieu as it is perceived that interests

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5Environment to the Sprouts is more or less restricted to non-human and tangible factors, whereas their use of milieu seems to refer to "the whole spectrum of environing factors of human as well as non-human and intangible as well as tangible." Accordingly the general concept of "milieu" is to include all phenomena to which "the environed unit's activities may be related." However what phenomena are included in the milieu depend in part on how one defines the environed units. Harold and Margaret Sprout, *The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs: With Special Reference to International Politics* (Princeton, 1965), pp. 27, 48.
Note: This hypothetical diagram suggests that Polity Y as a decision-making unit is viewed in Milieu-Polity perspectives. The input 1 and input 2, as those arrows point, are perceived external factors that presumably influence policies of Polity Y. It also suggests that such decisions made by Polity Y eventually affect Polity n and/or International System x and, in turn, they are echoed back to Polity Y's perception.

Fig. 1--Polity Y in milieu: basic model of milieu-polity linkage
us. What makes us interested is the psycho-milieu effect which governs policy-makers' behavior in the context of the milieu-polity perspective. If a nation, as a policy-making unit, perceives its milieu, for example, in reference to friends or enemies, these environments are real in its policy consequences simply because every polity in international systems has individual images about friends and enemies upon which a nation's foreign policy is dependent.  

From the basic milieu-polity linkage (Figure 1), it is not difficult to imagine that the political capabilities of a nation-state in the ocean of milieu may be viewed in reference to a linkage between polity and environment. Assuming that every nation-state does have a relative distinction between compatible and incompatible nations or that of international systems, for example, Polity Y's compatible-incompatible perception with its environment may graphically be linked in terms of enemies-friends in this way. (See Figure 2.)

The concept of enemies has a particular interest to this study. In retrospect, the role of enemies in politics

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7 The use of "capabilities" in this context is meant to include a polity's "stability, functioning, institutions, and goals" as ascertained in James N. Rosenau, Linkage Politics, p. 7. The capability, as an analytical concept, is discussed later on p. 15, footnote 22.
Key: (+) signifies a friendly image/behavior
(-) signifies an enemy image/behavior
(X) designates "Conversion Process" within Polity Y--
conversion variabilities are (+ to +), (- to -),
(+ to -), or (- to +).

Note: This diagram should read in conjunction with
Figure 1. If Polity Y perceives its external environment as
a friendly one (+), it responds with friendly policies (+);
whereas, hostile perceptions (-) tend to reciprocate with
hostile policies (-). However a change from "friend" to
"enemy" or from "enemy" to "friend" is also possible when
Polity Y somehow or for some reasons initiatively changes
its attitude in maximizing its own interests.

Fig. 2--Polity Y's milieu in friends-or-enemies
in general is probably as old as any other political concept. However the idea of enemies finds its most common expression in contemporary international politics in particular. The Cold War, for example, in the post-World War II era bears testimony to the manner in which the mutually hostile images which countries have of each other can be a dominant fact of international relations.

Through identifying an enemy and portraying him as the incarnation of evil, the individual, or the nation-state, assumes a posture of self-righteousness. Identifying and combatting enemies is inherent in political strategies for managing conflict for realizing goals.

The idea of the enemy usually presupposes the existence of conflict between at least two parties. Generally, conflict exists whenever at least one party perceives his goals, purposes or preferences are being threatened or hindered by the intention or activities of one or more parties.

If the function of enemies links between foreign hostilities and domestic stabilities and thus serves for internal progress, the process which links domestic politics with international systems can be viewed as a system of perpetual fusion. It appears that the utility of such a linkage system as a paradigm lies in the inquiry of a certain polity's national and international behavior in reference to a continuous reinforcement between international

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8David J. Finlay, et al., Enemies in Politics, pp. 4, 8, 9.
inputs and national outputs or vice-versa. In his description of linkages, Rosenau states that

The fused linkage arises out of the possibility that certain outputs and inputs continuously reinforce each other and are thus best viewed as forming a reciprocal relationship. In other words, a fused linkage is one in which the patterned sequence of behavior does not terminate with the input. Stated in positive terms, a fused linkage is conceived to be a sequence in which an output fosters an input that in turn fosters an output in such a way that they cannot meaningfully be analyzed separately.

Stated in this way, a fused linkage process not only takes account of the feedback process between polity outputs and environmental inputs but also considers the conversion mechanism of both inputs and outputs within a political system itself. Fused linkage, considered as an analytical scheme, thus radically departs from a traditional approach of

By choosing the word paradigm, I mean a frame of scientific practice which would serve as a model in research, but not as a theory. A paradigm fulfills its function as long as it serves as an explanatory scheme. For a definition, see Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolution (Chicago, 1962), p. 10.

Rosenau, Linkage Politics, p. 49. The basic claim of the linkage theory lies in a wholistic approach to national-international studies with one frame of reference.

The reader is reminded not to confuse the emulative process of a fused linkage with a "positive feedback" in the Systems Theory: "A positive feedback is a report that causes a subsystem to continue or to increase its particular previous action sent into the system." For a brief review on the positive feedback, see Charles A. McClelland, Theory and the International System (New York, 1966), pp. 20-27.
fixing a set of variables in order to compute dependent variables.\textsuperscript{12}

Why are we interested in such a system of interlocking and converging relations between national and international systems? The objective is simple. We wish to know a nation's external behavior in terms of its internal conditions or needs. Likewise, we want to know just how precisely a country's domestic policies are shaped by its external environment. A theoretical explanation of a certain form of fused linkages is yet to emerge, but we witness many cases of fused linkages:

An obvious example of a fused linkage is the foreign policy of a polity that serves the function of unifying its citizenry and provoking reactions abroad that further solidify the unity and thus reinforce the impetus to maintain the policies.\textsuperscript{13}

The Cold War, to a great extent, divided the world into two ideological camps. A nation-state within the same camp is customarily treated as a friend; conversely, a nation-state's relations with members of the other camp are

\textsuperscript{12}An analytical dilemma which stems from treating variables as dependent-independent is considered obsolete in the study of national-international linkages. Rosenau points out that "the student of national politics to concede that domestic process may be significantly conditioned by foreign affairs is to run the risk of introducing a number of seemingly unpredictable factors into matter that he has become accustomed to taking for granted. Likewise, for the student of international politics to treat national phenomena as variables rather than constants is to invite a seemingly endless confounding of that which has otherwise proven manageable." James N. Rosenau, rapporteur, Of Boundaries and Bridges: A Report on the Interdependence of National and International Political Systems (Princeton, 1967), p. 5.

\textsuperscript{13}Rosenau, Linkage Politics, p. 49.
unequivocally conceived as an image of enemy. The contiguous environment, too, provides a friend-or-enemy milieu in terms of geographic distribution of a nation's territorial boundary.\textsuperscript{14} Two or more neighboring countries, for some reasons, tend to perceive each other in friend-or-enemy terms. Some developing nations' contiguous environment may parallel the Cold War environment, if the line of the Cold War coincidentally passes along the geographical borderline of the countries involved. In any case the Cold War and contiguous environments, in practice, entail a black-and-white distinction between friends and enemies. With respect to the friend-or-enemy relationship, this study concerns itself only with the latter's function as related to environmental factors.\textsuperscript{15}

On the side of polity, there are a number of political systems which seem to utilize external bellicosity in their attempt to ease the political and economic conditions of

\textsuperscript{14}There are six categories of environmental milieu: the Cold War; the Contiguous; the Regional; the Racial; the Organizational; and the Resources. See Rosenau, \textit{Linkage Politics}, p. 52.

\textsuperscript{15}According to Finlay, "If enemies have not been readily available, we have created them. Enemies help identify sources of frustration and justify actions which might otherwise be improper or illegal; they serve as a focus for aggressiveness and as a means of diverting attention from other pressing and more difficult problems; and they provide a contrast by which we can measure or inflate our own worth and value." David J. Finlay, \textit{et al.}, \textit{Enemies in Politics}, p. 7.
domestic concerns. Emerging new states, for instance, seem to have set forth a self-styled revolutionary movement at the expense of foreign "enemies." In short, the foreign policy of a new state is mainly a tool for maximizing domestic interests in response to external pressures. Among the domestic interests served by identifying a common enemy are the promotion of national unity, the assertion of political legitimacy, the justification for keeping an ingroup in power, and the mobilization of national resources under centralized controls.\textsuperscript{16}

Bearing in mind the above-mentioned linkage phenomena, certain questions may be of interest.\textsuperscript{17} For example, I will ask: (1) Do the actors view the domestic and international environments in a compatible way when they are allies and in an incompatible way when they become antagonistic? (2) What impact do the confluence and incompatibility of perceptions have on the actual formulation of policy? In fact, I shall attempt to assess the effect of internal political dynamics

\textsuperscript{16}A similar view has been taken by Robert C. Good. His thesis is that "foreign policy for a new state is mainly (though not exclusively) a response to domestic conditions, not to external problems, rather than attempt to manipulate the external environment in ways suitable to the nation's interests." See Robert C. Good, "State-Building as a Determinant of Foreign Policy in the New States," \textit{Neutralism and Nonalignment}, edited by Laurence W. Martin (New York, 1962), p. II.

\textsuperscript{17}By linkage phenomena, I refer to recurrent sequences of behavior that originate in one nation-state system and react in another nation-state system in such a way that a snow-ball effect is anticipated as domestic outputs are deliberately revolved in the process of international inputs.
of a political system on its relevant international environment. This method may cross the disciplinary boundaries of comparative and international politics. Accordingly it would be of interest to our theoretical perspectives to know what are the environmental conditions that are most likely to produce fused linkages. We also wish to know what kinds of polity (or political system) are most benefitted by the fused linkages.

If we conceptualize the coalescence and convergence of national and international political systems in terms of fused linkages, we discover a phenomenon which does not fit into any form of a binary situation. In fact, we find it almost impossible to explain such a phenomenon in terms of "dependent-independent" variables. The mutually reinforcing forces between milieu and polity can be viewed as a circular nature of revolving forces fused in terms of inputs and outputs from the point of view of a particular polity. That is to say, a polity's outputs are fused into environments and, in turn, the environmental outputs are being fused into a polity as inputs. In this respect, this study expects to contribute to the synthesis of the role of enemy in politics with the milieu perception in a framework of linkage politics as a conceptual tool. The study thus suggests that the

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18A binary situation here is meant to indicate a functional relationship between two interdependent variables. A simple example of this kind can be illustrated in a mathematical formula such as $Y=f(x)$. That is, $Y$ is the function of $x$. 
theory of linkage politics in the study of national-international convergence may be better understood if a pilot study can demonstrate the significance of such a frame of reference.19

A Thesis and Analytical Scheme

In reference to the general framework of linkage politics, this study employs the system of fused linkage in an attempt to analyze the intricate nature of the North Korean confrontation policy for the period between 1953 and 1970. The basic assumption upon which this study operates is that the foreign policy of North Korea for this period has been a function of its internal conditions and external environments. Given the fact that the politics of North Korea was to a considerable extent a two-sided confrontation within and without, the ruling party in power seems to have utilized politics in a form of fused linkage.20

19 The study urges the reader not to perceive any political system isolated from its environed international setting. It is our basic departure that political systems are viewed as an entity in the sea of environmental factors. This urge may seem environmentally deterministic at the structural level but the claim may become less deterministic and more relativistic at the functional level. For a most recent elaboration on the linkage framework, see James N. Rosenau, "Theorizing Across Systems: Linkage Politics Revised," a paper presented at the 1971 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (Chicago, September, 1971).

20 Some other newly independent emerging nations that fall into the category of this fused linkage may include Sukarno's Indonesia, Nkrumah's Ghana, Communist Cuba, Nasser's Egypt and North Vietnam. These nations are all willing to capitalize external enemies and excuses for their national unity and internal political control, if not for economic reasons.
If the foreign policy of North Korea has resulted from its commitment to nation-building and realization of a modern, independent nation, the situation of conflict which existed in her external environment appears to have been of great service to the growth of North Korea's internal stability. In short, if the study has a thesis, it is that the foreign policy of North Korea is a function of its internal conditions and external environments. The mechanism of such a foreign policy is a tool for internal stability at the expense of external peace with its neighbor nations and, to some extent, at the excuse of alien enemies to confront for the cause of building a socialist state.

The term "confrontation" is here conveniently distinguished from the general definition and meaning of "conflict" which is directed against one another, and where the rivals recognize one another as legitimate contestants or competitors; whereas "confrontation" is a species of opposition which differs from "conflict" in specific denotation.\(^{21}\) In "confrontation" the confronting party considers itself the only legitimate body politic in implementing its interests, whereas in "conflict," both parties in conflict recognize each other's legitimacy as well as enmity. The

\(^{21}\) Conflict is defined as "opposition between two or more political entities directed against each other." For a further discussion, see Quincy Wright, Problems of Stability and Progress in International Relations (Berkeley, 1954), p. 145; Lewis A. Coser, Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict (New York, 1957), pp. 194-195; Joseph Stalin, Dialectical and Historical Materialism (New York, 1940), pp. 11-14.
confronting party therefore expects little or no resolution; rather, it presupposes that the consequences of opposition are the real content of social progress and national interests, and that the issue at stake is merely a vehicle and remains unsolved in the main. In short, confrontation here specifically refers to a technique of disturbing the external (or internal) status quo in order to achieve internal (or external) goals or vice-versa.

A confronting party's hostility toward its neighbors in the contiguous environment usually accelerates the Cold War sensitivity in the vicinity in such a way as to make possible a policy of playing one major power against the other. If a given international setting is without the Cold War environment, a highly maneuverable confronting party may possibly invite international attention in such a manner so as to create stakes for the Cold War situation. Often cases in such a brinkmanship unmistakably reward the confronting party with economic or military aid. In this regard, a confronting party's ability to harass its neighbors and to induce the major powers into a basically regional conflict should be regarded as the technique of confrontation. As a result of the entanglement between these and other external environments and internal policy goals, a confronting nation's overall interests are almost insured as long as the internal political leadership is secured. Simply because the process of confrontation is cyclically reinforced between
domestic and foreign policy, I designate it as "circular confrontation."

In dealing with the North Korean political system, as the unit of analysis for the study of circular confrontation, let me put the concept of the "capabilities" of the polity, as previously noted, at the center of the question. The capability concept not only takes account of the question of who makes a decision and how he makes it, but also considers (1) what function does the political system perform with its internal and external environment, (2) what impact does it have on its environment, and (3) what impact does the social and international environment have on the political system.

In short, the capability consideration of North Korea thus places attention upon the significance, not of the Communist system itself, but of the results of the governmental performance, and how this influences the internal leadership and the external adaptation of the North Korean regime as a whole.

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22 The capabilities of a political system are thus regarded as a governmental performance for its internal leadership and external adaptation as well. For a discussion on the concept, see Gabriel A. Almond, "A Developmental Approach to Political Systems," World Politics, Vol. 17, No. 2 (January, 1965), 183-214. One may confuse the concept of "capability" with that of "fused linkage." The former is referred to as the outcome of a fused linkage phenomenon and the latter is referred to as the process of political capabilities which link foreign policy outputs with domestic policy inputs in mutually reinforcing patterns of a nation's total behavior.
Then, what should be regarded as environmental conditions related to the capabilities of the North Korean political system? First, these conditions can be divided into exogenous and endogenous conditions. The former designates the conditions which appear outside "the political system," the latter those occurring inside "the political system." By the political system, I mean that the North Korean political system as a unit of analysis and such conditions, for example, as economic, culture, the society, and so on are treated as conditions exogenous to the political system.

Secondly, both of these conditions can be separated into "constants" and "variables." "Constants" are conditions which are "given" and comparatively unchangeable, while "variables" are changeable conditions. To define a condition as a constant implies that this condition is difficult to change. It is possible to consider all conditions as variables, depending upon one's point of view, but I will make a simple distinction in order to provide a departure for this analysis. Accordingly let me present exogenous constants, exogenous variables, endogenous constants, and

23A note should be added to this explanation: the distinction between "exogenous" and "endogenous" is a relative one which varies according to the definition of the "political system." If I take the whole North Korean society as the unit, instead of the North Korean political system, all factors become endogenous and only geography and the international environment is counted as exogenous. Accordingly "endogenous" and "exogenous" are distinguished by whether the phenomena are found outside or inside the boundaries of the political system so defined.
endogenous variables. Exogenous conditions are categorized as follows:

I. **Exogenous Constants**

1. Geo-Political Constants (North Korea's location in the Far East, its size and peninsular co-ordinates, and its natural resources, et cetera)

2. Sociological Constants (i.e., North Korea's underdevelopmental setting, its social organizations, modernizational ideals)

3. Cultural Constants (i.e., North Korea's political culture, its national character, and its dominant system of value)

II. **Exogenous Variables**

1. International Environment (the Cold War impact)

2. Contiguous Environments (North Korea's relation with South Korea, its contiguous relation with China, and its territorial adjacency to Russia)

3. Non-political Variables (North Korea's changes in socio-economic structure, its speed and character of industrial growth, and its changes in belief system, et cetera)

Conditions outside of the political system seem qualitatively and quantitatively to govern inputs to the political system, which are usually classified as "support" and "demand" inputs. To be realistic, we also have to estimate the possibility of change in these conditions themselves and then estimate what kinds of effect this will have on the inputs to the political system.

On the other hand, a polity (or a political system) has endogenous constants and variables which have a relative
autonomy of their own. Accordingly we cannot discuss North Korean politics solely by estimating inputs to the political system. I must therefore consider its endogenous constants and variables. They may be categorized as follows:

III. Endogenous Constants

2. Political Structures (Proletarian Dictatorship and People's Democracy)
3. Leadership Characteristics (Charisma and Cultism)

IV. Endogenous Variables

1. Single-party politics (The Korean Workers' Party as supra-constitutional organ, the party cadres, and the party's Front Organizations)
2. The Recruitment of the Political Elite (Elite domestication, party-line versus "professionalism," alteration in the revolutionary second generation)
3. Political Institutions (Election system, the role of the Supreme People's Assembly, and functions of the Cabinet Council)

These conditions are related to the process which converts inputs to the political system into outputs of the political system but also to the process of maintaining the political system itself. Almond calls the former the "conversion process" and the latter the "system-maintaining process."24

24Gabriel A. Almond, op. cit., pp. 190-203; Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bringham Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston, 1966), Chapter II.
The political capabilities of North Korea are to be found in the output of the political system. Capabilities, on the other hand, feed back to exogenous conditions, change them, and accordingly become inputs to the political system itself. At the same time, they also feed back to the endogenous conditions of the political system and influence them. This kind of linkage process is what Rosenau terms a "fused linkage" phenomenon. (See Figure 3.)

Though simplification is bound to be erroneous, a simple example may help in clarification. Given an output-input process in terms of fused linkage, a comprehensive diagram indicates how the North Korean system performs within those conditions. Figure 3 indicates that, if internal leadership is secured and grows strong, it may bring, for instance, success in diplomacy. From this success increased support from the people can be anticipated. At the same time, intra-party leadership may also have to be changed. As a result, the capabilities of the North Korean political system will change in accordance with the changes of these conditions.

Fig. 3--Fused Linkage Process
Circular Confrontation

The preceding pages were devoted to introducing an analytical framework and to clarifying a few concepts pertinent to the study's theoretical foundation. As previously noted in passing, I presented a phenomenon called "circular confrontation" as the essence of the North Korean policy mechanism in relation to a fused linkage process. At the same time, I suggested a research scheme, or a research guide, in an attempt to array attributes of the confrontation policy. In subsequent pages, I will discuss the confrontation policy as the study's nucleon which encompasses both the concept of fused linkage as well as the concept of enemies in politics.

As I mentioned elsewhere, this study grew out of the assumption that the foreign policy of North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea--referred to henceforth as DPRK) seems to have resulted from its commitment to nation-building and the realization of a modern, independent Communist state. In fact, the crises over the Korean Peninsula for the past twenty years seem to have contributed to the Communist regime in its process to build a nation-state.

It appears that the DPRK's leaders, confronted with political and economic difficulties internally, have assumed a correlation between their internal and external problems and materialized their beliefs in the further assumption that the "United States imperialists" and their "puppet,"
South Korea, intend to limit the DPRK's sovereignty and, possibly, to overthrow the Pyongyang regime and replace it by one amenable to the West. Consequently, the philosophical posture of confrontation as the requirement of domestic politics necessitated external enemies and perpetual tensions.

This is primarily a case study. It is not intended here to develop a new theoretical model of confrontation. However the possibility for the fruitful consideration of theory and theoretical models will not be ignored. In retrospect, whatever might have been the characteristics of the DPRK's confrontation with South Korea and the United States, its actual foreign policy towards South Korea and the United States seemed useful for pursuing its goal of realizing a "socialist" nation-state. With regard to the prospects of future confrontation, this study attempts to clarify past aspects of the DPRK's foreign policy which appears to demonstrate eagerness to embrace some new foreign crises.

In a sense, the DPRK's hostility towards South Korea and the United States can be regarded as "circular confrontation." The regime's stand on the unification of Korea has undoubtedly been a pretext to evolve a policy of confrontation in order to achieve the DPRK's internal unity. This is known as the "liberation of the Southern-half" campaign. Likewise, the regime's "crush American imperialism" campaign
served the same purpose. Behind these challenges and other belligerent slogans, the Communist government apparently has made considerable progress in the past twenty years. It appears that external bellicosity served to accelerate the DPRK's internal development, while no solution of the unification problem was attained in any degree since the invasion of 1950. On the other hand, what the DPRK today claims and demonstrates for its national prestige as a modern and self-supporting nation is significant when compared to the regime's status as a Communist "satellite-state" twenty years ago. In fact, the DPRK has been maneuvering the policy strategies of "extroversion" and of "introversion" in a consistent policy formula based on "circular confrontation."26

Tentatively, the policy strategy of "extroversion," for the purpose of this case study, is defined as an idio-syncretic type of foreign policy. This strategy pertains to the case of developing nations which are oriented toward using external issues at high stakes in order to mobilize internal capabilities for the attainment of domestic

26Assuming that the foreign policy of developing nations are shaped by their internal needs, there is an interesting aspect in regard to a cycle of involvement and withdrawal on the part of the underdeveloped states in international affairs. This cyclical attitude is classified as their policy strategies of "extroversion" and "introversion," operating within an international environment. For detailed explanation of the terms, see James N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, p. 33; James N. Rosenau, Of Boundaries and Bridges, pp. 44-46.
objectives. Conversely, the policy strategy of "introversion" refers to the foreign policy of developing nations which demands the formulation of particular domestic issues in order to obtain external interests. However, an introverted policy is necessarily preceded by an extroverted policy, simply because the former is based on the latter's relative strength.

If the foreign policy of a nation manifests itself as a positive action vis-a-vis the international environment under certain circumstances, and as a passive response to it under other circumstances, whether foreign policy should take a positive or passive form depends on its either being encouraged or restricted by domestic factors. Leaders of the DPRK were not immune from this common sense in their policy formulation. The DPRK, as a new nation born in the Cold War, had almost insuperable difficulties in its nation-building process. If domestic conditions were in such a predicament, the only insurable asset is to take positive action to play its internal-external conditions off against

27For example, numerous campaigns in Communist China in her attempt to build "new Socialist state" is an excellent case. During the Korean War, the Communist leaders launched the "Resist-American, Aid-Korea" movement by depicting the United States as Public Enemy Number 1. The significance of the movement is the fact that Peking had simultaneously mobilized millions of Chinese people for mass action. The mass were skillfully manipulated to participate in, for example, the Land Reform campaign, the Thought Reform campaign, the Increase-Production, Practice-Austerity campaign, the Three-Anti, and Five-Anti drives. The point is that these and other domestic campaigns were carefully linked with the Foreign Enemy Number 1.
each other. Obvious examples were, to mention only a few, the cases with Indonesia's "Crush Malaysia" campaign and with the "Liberation of Korea" campaign of the DPRK against South Korea. With respect to the Cold War environment, both Indonesia and the DPRK had campaigns for "anti-Colonial," "anti-imperial," or "anti-West" movements. Behind these belligerent slogans in acronym, these revolutionary governments sought mass enthusiasm and political consciousness for national development. In short, the phenomenon is not accidental. The use of mass movement is Pyongyang's formula in all phases of the socialist revolution and construction. This is what I call the DPRK's policy strategies of extroversion and introversion.

In any event, the terminology of the situation is not the crucial factor. What is crucial with it is that both of these policy measures seem to have been successful in the regime's policy of confrontation with South Korea and the United States.

There was a time when the DPRK was looking abroad and trying to solve its internal problems. During the period

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28 For an excellent study of Indonesia's confrontation policy, see John O. Sutter, "Two Faces of KONFRONTASI: Crush Malaysia and GESTAUP," Asian Survey, VI, No. 10 (October, 1966), 523-546.

29 A policy change from extroversion to introversion takes place whenever exogenous conditions change. In the same manner, we can also expect a policy shift from introversion to extroversion, if endogenous conditions alter for some reason. For this fused process, see Figure 3.
between the Armistice of 1953 and the conclusion of the regime's economic five-year plan in 1960, the leaders of the DPRK were preoccupied with solving domestic difficulties on the pretext of external threat. Subsequently, in 1961, the DPRK shifted its policy technique from the working model of the external pretext to internal issues. To a degree, it was a revisionary tactic designed to implement a transition from the policy of extroversion to a new policy model of introversion on the plea of domestic need for overall social changes related to political and ideological institutions.\(^{30}\)

By 1961, leaders of the DPRK foresaw that the policy model of extroversion would soon be obsolete because of the modifications which had occurred in both exogenous and endogenous conditions. Externally, a revolutionary mood had developed in South Korea during and after the student revolution of 1960, the military coup d'etat of 1961, and the escalation of the Sino-Soviet controversy. All these developments had effected a change in the confrontation policy of the DPRK. Internally, the organization of the Communist

\(^{30}\) The rationale behind the transition indicates us an interesting fact. The DPRK from 1961 to 1970 was deeply involved in promoting its international status under a policy of introversion. By this policy, the Juche idea (a new nationalistic tone of "self-identity") was the regime's prime slogan. However, many domestic issues precipitated by the Juche were appropriately capitalized upon to enhance Pyongyang's external prestige through the effect of an ideological independence from Moscow and Peking as well as its economic self-reliance. As a result of the regime's nationalistic stand, the DPRK gained a considerable reputation from Afro-Asian Third World nations. Juche is further discussed later. For a definition, see footnote 29, p. 106.
power structure in the Rodong Party (Korean Worker's Party) was finally unified under Premier Kim Il-sung's factional line, together with a sizeable accomplishment in economic self-sufficiency, by 1961. As a result of the changes in policy conditions, the policy of introversion as a successor to extroversion was resumed. From this internal stability, the regime, in turn, enjoyed wider foreign relations with nations other than South Korea and the United States.

The substantive goal here is neither to praise the technique of the DPRK's policy of confrontation nor to formulate policy alternatives. Instead, it argues that the DPRK is not a mere Communist satellite-state orbiting Moscow or Peking whichever becomes forceful in their competition for gravitation. Pyongyang is now an independent system that traverses between Moscow and Peking and, to some extent, hovers around the zero-gravitational zone. Pyongyang's present move toward a new system is yet to be defined, but the movement itself is identifiable in terms of the confrontation policy of the DPRK.

The theoretical scope of this study is limited as one in a number of case studies on fused linkages. Assuming that a confrontation policy, as exemplified by the DPRK, is a typical behavior of new states in Far Eastern power politics, the objective of this study is to examine the confrontation as a type of policy through the growth process of the DPRK.
The saliency of foreign policy in developing nations is the concept that would best fit in this perspective. It must be considered, therefore: (1) to what degree did foreign policy play a more or less important role at different stages in the political and economic development of the DPRK; (2) to what extent did a cycle of extroversion and introversion recur in the foreign policy of the DPRK, and (3) if it did, does the confrontation policy have room for outcomes other than hostility?

Since this study does not have ready-made hypotheses applicable to the DPRK's confrontation policy, the analytical technique employed here is to state whatever findings which appear relevant to the study of linkage theory in a form of relative and conditional terms. The approach

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31 The study employs no ready-made working hypotheses to arrive at certain propositions or statements of behavioral patterns. Michael O'Laeary's hypotheses, for example, can hardly be operative because of their lack of clarity. Michael O'Leary, "Linkage between Domestic and International Politics in Underdeveloped Nations," edited by James N. Rosenau, Linkage Politics, pp. 324-346. To put in Rosenau's terms, they are merely "typologies."

32 We may, for explanatory simplicity, use Zetterberg's five varieties of "relations" between independent and dependent variables. A modification of the varieties for the purpose of coping with dynamics and multidimensional characters of the fused linkage, I adopt the following classificatory rules: (1) Reversible: Irreversible (if X then Y; and if Y then X: if X then Y; but if Y then conclusive about X), (2) Deterministic: Stochastic (if X then always Y: if X then probably Y), (3) Sequential: Coextensive (if X then later Y: if X then also Y), (4) Sufficient: Contingent (if X then Y regardless of anything else: if X then Y, but only if Z), (5) Necessary: Substitutable (if X, and only if X, then Y: if X then Y; but if Z then also Y). See details in James L. Price, Organizational Effectiveness: An Inventory of Propositions (Homewood, Ill., 1968), pp. 11-12.
taken here is quantitative, qualitative, and a combination of both. It is quantitative when data are aggregated and processed in content analysis. It is, likewise, qualitative when the significance of behavioral implications are interpreted against policy goals. However, when concrete data are lacking or incongruent with policy outcomes, a historical narrative is also used.

The study beings by delineating contours of the external givens (or exogenous constants) of the DPRK's foreign policy in Chapter II. Those givens are broken down under the headings of geopolitical constants, sociological constants, and cultural constants in order to locate the environmental attributes of the confrontation policy. In other words, this chapter is to identify external ingredients of the DPRK's political capabilities and the limitations on her choice of external behavior. In Chapter III, the DPRK's external environments (or exogenous variables) are scrutinized as external variables. Changing intensity

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34 I am quite positive that a historical narrative of case studies can be incorporated with "casual" as well as "correlation" analysis, if interval data are periodically resilient to a certain development over a considerable time period. For a reference to this argument, see Bruce M. Russett, "International Behavior Research: Case Studies and Cumulation," Approaches to the Study of Political Science, edited by Michael Haas and Henry S. Kariel (Scranton, Pa., 1970), pp. 425-443.
of the East-West Cold War, as well as the dynamics of contiguous factors, and the varying impacts of non-political sectors are probed in order to draw a boundary line for Pyongyang's policy.

Next, essays are made on the DPRK's internal political conditions (or endogenous conditions) in accordance with conceptual criteria of the "political system." Chapter IV arrays the regime's internal givens (or endogenous constants) under the headings of ideological bases for political foundation, political structures, and leadership characteristics. Chapter V deals with internal variables (or endogenous variables) such as party politics, political elites, and political institutions.

With these structural components as contributing factors, Chapter VI explains the nature of the confrontation policy maneuver and its processes in the early stage (1953-1960) in terms of the effects of "extroversion," Chapter VII deals with the final period, from 1961 to 1970, in terms of the motives for "introversion," in order to consider the two stages as parts of a total system (or a system of fused linkage). Finally, the implications of the confrontation policy for the study of the interrelationship between the processes of nation-building and the development of foreign policy characteristics are explored. At the same time, the theoretical aspects of the confrontation policy are considered with regard to the clarification of Linkage Politics.
PART ONE

EXOGENOUS CONDITIONS

In his attempt to deal with the foreign relations of the DPRK, Professor Scalapino stated that "the foreign policy of the DPRK government is a product of geography, historical tradition, and the ideological proclivities of the current ruling group." Taking this multifaceted approach, Scalapino considers the foreign policy of the DPRK as a function of the government enterprise in the solution of problems posed by both internal and external factors. I consider his approach is indicative to the linkage framework. Accordingly Part One raises methodological and definitional considerations of the DPRK's exogenous conditions. A point to be made here is that no judgment on its foreign policy can be sound unless all relevant factors are kept in perspective with regard to the DPRK's political capabilities and against its ability to adapt governmental policy to internal demands and its ability to gain a respected place among the nations of the world.

1See Robert A. Scalapino, "The Foreign Policy of North Korea," The China Quarterly, No. 14 (April-June, 1963), p. 49. This analytical style as an approach to foreign policy can be regarded as a "taxonomy of policy sources" to the extent that it classifies policy ingredients in order to relate policy factors with policy characteristics.
Before beginning our discussion of these conditions for evaluation, it might be advisable to devote a word or two to the nature of the data available. As we previously noted, one must remember that information reaching us from the DPRK tends to be exaggerated for propaganda effect. Using such data as is released by the regime, it is almost impossible to estimate the degree of validity that its policy statements possess in regard to its true intent. In this respect, our discussion about the exogenous conditions of the regime is particularly significant because these conditions are by definition, propaganda-free data that would verify whatever the official policy claim of the DPRK is.

Exogenous conditions are defined as policy factors originated outside the political system and the manner and durability of these factors governing inputs to the political system determines whether they are treated as "constants" or as "variables." Exogenous constants are thus external policy conditions which persistantly control and restrict policy margin as given conditions. Defined as such, they are restricted to change.

Categories to be considered in Chapter II are geopolitical constants, sociological constants, and cultural constants. Geopolitical constants refer to the location of the

2These exogenous constants and exogenous variables to be discussed in Part One are to be read as marginalia to the analytical scheme mentioned in pages 17 and 18, and as an introductory note to Chapters II and III.
DPRK on the continental shelf of Asia, its need to maintain broad exchange with other powers around the Korean peninsula, and the necessity for national interdependence because of scarcity of its natural resources. These are, in fact, a physical setting of the Korean politics and governments (either South or North Korea's) to be taken into consideration as natural givens whatever regime it may have.

Sociological constants refers to a societal setting inherent to the DPRK's environmental conditions. They are problems of underdevelopmental conditions, revolutionary changes in socio-economic structure, and tensions created by the social change. Cultural constants refer to, for example, the political cultural, national character, and aspirations and expectations of the political subjects of the DPRK (system of values).³

³The term political culture is used here to refer to cultural factors in politics, in relation to an individual's understanding of politics in general. In this way, the connection between an individual's personal tie to the total functioning of a political system and the parochial nature of cultural persistency is compared in order to find some lines which may link each stage of political development within the culture. For discussions of political culture, see Lucian W. Pye, editor, Political Culture (Princeton, N. J., 1965), p. 514. The conception of "national character," on the other hand, is a more difficult one to define. A few examples may explain what I meant by national character better than a simple definition. For instance, it is said that Latin people are both easily excited and pacified; that while the Slavs are amiable—they are also severe at times, like a rigorous winter. It is also said that Japanese are "economic animals" and Americans are rather pragmatic than of principle. It is pointed out, for example, that certain national characteristics of the Russian people, such as amicability and perseverance, can be found both in Czarist Russia and in present-day Russia. Such a national character may be admitted as one of the factors which influences the form of expression of demands and support of the people.
These givens are, so to speak, an external frame which provides for the maintenance of the DPRK's political system. The external frame alone, of course, is never a fully sufficient for its maintenance. What is recognized here is that there exists relatively unchangeable conditions called exogenous constants, and also that it is necessary to take account of them separate from other variables.

On the other hand, certain policy conditions are thought to be variables. Before coming to the examination of the DPRK's exogenous variables in Chapter III, only an annotation to indices of the exogenous variables is made here.

In the first place, there is the international environment or the international system. It is needless to say that when we think of the present and the future of the DPRK, the international environment which surrounds this political system is an important condition. Considering the international environment around the DPRK as a variable, it may be said that if the East-West Cold War, either between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, or between the United States and Communist China changes into a hot war, then, not only Pyongyang's policy inputs change, but also the whole constellation of political power will change drastically. On the contrary, if

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4This study deals with the Cold War environment, Contiguous environment, and Resources environment out of Rosenau's six environmental categories. Other environmental
international tensions are reduced and the international system is pluralized or multi-polarized, then this impact will change not only the political consciousness of the people but also the processes within the political system. For example, when we talk about the "Pyongyang-Seoul Talk of 1972," we must admit that this internal change is partly determined by President Nixon's trip to Peking and Moscow, which is external to the DPRK.

The contiguous environments of the DPRK are closely related with its geopolitical location and its ideological proclivities. If Russia and China have been Korea's traditional neighbors as giant powers, their present influence over the DPRK is inextricable. Premier Kim Il Sung had in fact to defend his power against both the so-called Moscow and Yenan (or Chinese) factions, as well as against the previously existing indigenous Communist and nationalist groups.\(^5\) In practice, the Sino-Soviet dispute has been an unusual opportunity for Kim to balance one external power

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\(^5\) According to Professor Scalapino, there was a linkage effect between Pyongyang's contiguous powers in her north (Russia and China) and internal factions. This point is further discussed later. See Robert A. Scalapino, op. cit., p. 39.
with the other, as well as to check one opponent against another in synchronism.

The DPRK's relations with South Korea are more important than any other exogenous variables. Because of the sharp differences in the nature of the regimes established in the North and in the South immediately after World War II, the immediate environment of the DPRK has influenced both its foreign and domestic policies more than more remote environmental factors. In short, the incompatible environmental tie with South Korea can be considered as the crucial variable of the DPRK's external linkage group.

Other variables of non-political systems as external linkage groups consist of the DPRK's socio-economic changes, its speed and character of industrial growth, and its changes in belief system. First, the impact of the regime's highly collectivized economic structure is considered significant. It is said that the centralized system of production has resulted in political centralization. The agricultural collectivization, for example, changed the social structure which, in turn, changed the communication structure of the regime's political control.6

The industrial growth in the DPRK is believed to be successful. By 1967, statistics indicated that the DPRK's

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6A communication structure here refers to the components of communicational networks observed in terms of cybernetics—the science of communication and control. For a brief review, see Richard R. Gagen, Politics and Communication (Boston, 1966), Chapter III.
industrial sector accounted for 76 per cent of the gross national product, as opposed to 1946's account for 28 per cent of the total.\(^7\) Allowing some marginal revision of this figure, the ratio and speed of industrial growth (11 times higher than in 1949, the last pre-war year, and 37 times higher than 1946, the year after the Japanese left) is still a significant index for the DPRK's external policy inputs.

Finally, the rise of the level of aspirations and expectations as a belief system should be added to the DPRK's policy indices on the side of input variables. Even when the increasing ratio of income is above the rising ratio of consumer's prices, and as a result, real income increases, the aspiration level goes up more than the increased real income. The people will then feel a kind of discontent—even if the feeling is not as strong as frustration. These phenomena are particularly apparent in developing countries where a system of open competition and a free enterprise exists. In a "closed society" such as the DPRK, on the other hand, a phenomenon of the "revolution of rising expectations" is not likely to come.\(^8\) The reason is simple.

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\(^8\)Among American political scientists it has been a popular notion that there is a revolution of "rising expectations" in emerging new states. I argue that this kind of
That is, the aspiration level never surpasses the minimum income level (of what the government can offer) because minor material incentives are periodically rewarded to the people in due time and, at the same time, major frustration is diverted to external enemies. In other words, the belief system of the people of the DPRK is again intimately linked with the way in which the political system is operating.

In the final analysis, a logical extension of these exogenous conditions suggests a clue as to what combined elements of the DPRK's policy produce a confrontation policy in its pursuance of national interests. It is probably true that not all of these categories are taxonomically exclusive. However the analytical justification here is not made in the interest of taxonomy per se. Instead, the study expects to produce some conclusive evidence as regards the thesis of "circular confrontation" by regrouping these taxonomic fractions in terms of synthetic unity. For analytical validity, we must therefore presuppose a typology of policy conditions.9

phenomenon occurs only in neo-mercantilist society where a system of free enterprise prospers. Contrastingly, political instabilities caused by frustrated majority in "closed society," a revolution may come only with declining income. This is a thesis of the "revolution of decreasing realizations." For a brief explanation, see Theodore Keller, "A New Vocabulary for the Left: Some Reflection on U. S.-Underdeveloped Area Relations," Journal of Contemporary Revolution, I, No. 1 (California State University, June, 1967), 10-31.

9A typology of policy conditions is used here to refer to such an analytical technique, in contrast to a taxonomy of policy sources, which are concerned more or less with regrouping the catagories of policy forces in terms of
This attempt to define categories is quite necessary for an investigation of the making of foreign policy, especially as it relates to the specific mechanisms of the confrontation policy.

behavioral patterns. Therefore, this analytical school, in its approach to foreign policy, is interested in formulating policy models in terms of appropriate analogies that explain behavioral patterns of investigation. See Quincy Wright, *Problems of Stability and Progress in International Relations* (Berkeley, Calif., 1954), pp. 127-140.
CHAPTER II

EXOGENOUS CONSTANTS

Geopolitical Constants

In this chapter, one is reminded that Korea as a whole is both a symbol and a place in Far Eastern politics. Historic Korean politics serves as an analogy of the "power politics" characteristic of the Cold War. As a geographic location, the Korean Peninsula is an important crossroads in Far Eastern geopolitics. The characteristics of the Korean polity must therefore be understood as crucial in an analysis of Korean politics in general, and in a consideration of the geopolitical facet of its foreign policy in particular. In terms of the DPRK's location in the Far East, it is said that the Korean Strait is the place where the southern sea current meets with the northern sea current. Likewise, the political currents of continental and oceanic political pressures met at the Korean Peninsula in the early twentieth century.¹ Sandwiched between the two pressures, Koreans have historically experienced confrontations with these neighbors.

¹Historically, two major confrontations had taken place in the Korean Peninsula prior to the Korean War of 1950. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894 was fought for power and supremacy in Korea, between the competing powers of China and Japan. At the turn of the century, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 was waged over the Korean Peninsula for a test of the Japanese muscle in joining the twentieth century power circle. For an account of these wars and Korea's geopolitical location, see
Lying at the strategic crossroads of the Far East as a small, peninsular nation among the great powers of the continental and insular nations, Korea has repeatedly suffered from invasion by China, Mongolia, Czarist Russia and Imperial Japan. Again, the war of 1950 was fought among more than twenty nations, contending for this land of 85,000 square miles, roughly the size of the state of Minnesota.\(^2\) The map of northeast Asia connotatively indicates the continental constraints under which any ruler of Korea must operate today. These geopolitical conditions typical of Korean politics throughout her history of 4,000 years, have been worsened by the division of Korea into north and south after World War II.

The DPRK, occupying northern half of the divided Korea, must therefore reconsider the meaning of its continental neighbors (Communist China and Communist Russia) in confrontation with South Korea and the United States' "threat" to its existence. In this sense, the DPRK shares common concerns with Communist China and North Vietnam to the extent

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\(^2\) The territory of the Korean Peninsula shares its northern frontier with mainland China and Russia. It lies between 124.11 and 31.55 degrees east longitude, and between 33.7 and 43.1 degrees north latitude. It consists of the main peninsula, stretching from northern Manchuria to the south in Northeast Asia and comprises some 3,300 islands. The total area is 220,840 square kilometers or 85,956 square miles, scarcely larger than a medium-sized Chinese province, say Kwangtung or Kwangsi provinces of China.
that they all consider that the division of their territory into two opposing units is primarily attributable to the United States "imperialism."

All of these aspects of geographic location are incidental factors conditional to exogenous variables, which we will discuss later. They are fundamental factors that basically govern the regime's political position, which, in turn, influences and restrains its foreign policy in many ways. In fact, the DPRK's national viability is subjected to its external compatibility with these powers of the continental governments whatever regimes they may have. Perhaps Pyongyang government's national existence today is intimately connected with the future political development with Moscow and Peking; that is to say, the ideological alliance with Soviet Russia and the Chinese Communists as regards the DPRK's external conditions is further interlinked in terms of their common territorial boundaries.\(^3\) To a great extent, these facts of the DPRK's location in the contemporary politics of the Far East may account to a significant degree for the present peculiarities in its foreign policy.

\(^3\)The DPRK, faced with South Korea--U. S. "threat" in its southern border, shares over 800 miles of border line with the Chinese Communists in its northwestern most frontier along the Yalu, whereas it shares some 80-odd miles with Soviet Russia in its northern frontier along the Tumen River. There also are only 300 air miles between Pyongyang and Peking, whereas Moscow is in Europe and is considered "non-Asiatic."
Suppose we designate the DPRK's use of confrontation as a capricious policy style, concomitant with its northern allies. It is not illogical to assume that the regime's southern foes are equally responsible. In contrast to its northern frontier, the DPRK has Japan in the south. The United States as a world power is added on the side of Japan. This makes four powers which must be considered in the DPRK's policy formulations. Moreover, an important trend in the 1960's was the implication of the development of the tri-partite relations among the United States, Japan and South Korea, forming a Far Eastern community centering around Japan, in the face of the growing power of Communist China. Despite the Sino-Soviet dispute in the 1960's, the DPRK insisted on drawing a triangular policy bloc, linking Soviet Russia and the Chinese Communists into the DPRK's interests to counter-balance the U. S.-Japan-South Korea triangle.

This development indicates that the DPRK is repeating an historical precedent of Korean politics, that of always being dependent upon one neighboring power in order to defend a territorial independence from still another neighbor. In order to defend their security from the Mongols, the Koreans lived under semi-autonomy as a tributary state to the Chinese Empire until 1895. In an attempt to divorce themselves from the Chinese Empire, Koreans were subjugated by the Japanese as a result of the Sino-Japanese War of
1894-1895. Later they were rescued from Czarist Russia's intrigue to influence Korea in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Finally, Korea remained a Japanese military colony from 1910 until the end of World War II.

A Korean proverb says that "when whales fight each other, a shrimp is bound to be injured." If the maxim holds any degree of truth to describe Korean politics in terms of the boisterous power struggle among big powers of East Asia, it implies that Korea is too small to stand against these external giants. It appears that the DPRK's territorial size and its partial control of the Korean Peninsula are physical co-ordinates of its political action.

In this perspective, the Korean War of 1950 can be interpreted as a result of the DPRK's territorial ambition over the entire peninsula. Surrounded by neighboring big powers, the DPRK is but a small fragment facing the Pacific and the Continent. To its north is Russia, Mainland China to its northwest, and Japan in its southeast. There could be no question of annexing territory from these neighbors, because they are not only giant powers but also politically stabilized. If the limitations of North Korea's situation were to be overcome, the DPRK had no option but to invade South Korea in alliance with the external powers.

It is, however, not argued here that the necessity of territorial expansions do not always directly result in popular demand and support for policy. Moreover, neither
does it define the degree of external adaptability of the DPRK's politics. The point is that the necessity of territorial doubling is only one of many angles to view the regime's confrontation policy within the physical constants. Our brief review of the present DPRK's peninsular coordinates indicates that any move toward its territorial extension necessitates a confrontation with South Korea. Small and weak as it is, Pyongyang regime is inclined to act positively and, at the same time, tends to maintain its external alliance for this goal. An ideological consolidation with its continental Communist governments, in this respect, is considered temporary. The regime's political friendships with them may outlive the magnitude of Communist ideology.

In retrospect, an alliance with these major powers for a territorial unification of Korea is not unprecedented in the history of Korean politics. It appears that the so-called "great leaders" of Korean politics in her history of more than 4,000 years were those who successfully capitalized foreign allies for a domestic unification. For example, it was in the seventh century that the Kingdom of Silla, for the first time, had unified the entire Korean peninsula by inviting the T'ang ally forces of China into her northward expedition war against the kingdom of Koguryo.\footnote{When three kingdoms of Korea began to oppose each other in the seventh century, Sui Dynasty of China and Yamato warrior of Japan invaded Korea. After more than 70 years of war against Korea, the Sui's failure to subdue Koguryo (the northern kingdom of Korea) caused internal
As we can see, the DPRK's geographic location limited the nature of the regime's relations with its immediate neighbors and the United States to relationships of either hostility or friendship. Natural resources and economic life also limit policy orientation. Marxist theory as an external assistance or influence upon the DPRK's revolutionary base for a socialist economy was an example of the "emulative process" in terms of Rosenau's typology of linkage processes. That is to say, the DPRK's economic policy input was not only its response to the Soviet policy output but also took essentially the same form of policy formula. An equally important impact upon the DPRK's political practice is found in the peculiar nature of mass mobilization in planning and executing social change, which seems to have been emulated from the Chinese Communists.

If we believe that the external influences of the Marxist-Leninist theory of revolution and of Communist

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insurrections in China, which replaced the Sui with T'ang Dynasty of China (618). Silla kingdom of Korea, in alliance with the Sui, defeated the Koguryo and Paekche (the southern kingdom). Once the peninsula was unified, the opposition of Silla to China broke out in a six-year war. The T'ang invaders were finally forced to abandon their occupation of Korea and to withdraw from the country. Silla began her unified rule of Korea in 675. For details, see Bong-youn Choy, Korea: A History (Tokyo, 1971), pp. 24-32.

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Rosenau, Linkage Politics, p. 46. In his definition of possible types of linkage processes, Rosenau describes them as the penetrative, the reactive, and the emulative. According to him, the emulative process occurs when "the input is not only a response to the output but takes the essentially same form as the output."
China's political experience in social change have affected the DPRK's course of nation-building, we must also consider the DPRK's physical and natural condition, which accommodated itself to the external impacts.

In a discussion of the DPRK's natural resources in regard to the external circumstances, this section deals with those contributing factors which entailed foreign policy objectives couched in terms of economic necessity. Economic factors are not the primary forces which direct foreign policy objectives but, considering the DPRK's peculiar emphasis on industrial modernization, economic concerns must have had a decisive effect in any input of foreign policy coordinates within the range of the DPRK's natural resources. That is to say, the economic condition of the DPRK with regard to geopolitical restraints seems to be an important clue to an understanding of the regime's "Stalinistic" programs for industrialization in the spirit of China's "Great Leap Forward" movement.⁶

Due to the natural and physical shape of the country, the DPRK has less arable land by a one-to-three ratio as compared to South Korea. The DPRK is physically structured by rugged mountains and suitable land is almost entirely

⁶Communist China's the Great Leap Forward campaign was that "the idea of maximal utilization of labor became one of the leading policy themes" of the First Five-Year Plan period. See Franz Schurmann, "The Dialectic of the Economy," Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley, Calif., 1968), pp. 76-85.
lacking for agriculture in the northern mountain ranges which cover one-seventh of the country. Only 14 per cent of the area is as low as 300 feet. More than half of the mountainous area is 1,600 feet or more above sea level. But the unfavorable shape of the country for agriculture has been compensated for by forest land and mineral resources constituting a four-to-one ratio over South Korea.\(^7\) In short, food production in the DPRK is one of the regime's basic difficulties, whereas the DPRK's mineral stocks and energy power are plentiful enough for the cultivation of its industry on a modern scale.

We noticed that the DPRK proper occupies the northern part of a mountainous area of the Korean Peninsula. Within this physical setting, it is a land of cold winters and short summers, which limit food production. The general climate of Korea is one of monsoon, but the DPRK, being located further from the ocean, is a transitional area, halfway between the continental climate of Manchuria-Siberia and the maritime climate of Honshu, Japan. In other words, the DPRK is generally not blessed for agriculture due to climatic factors and geographic setting, a situation which precludes agricultural self-sufficiency.\(^8\)

\(^7\)A detailed study on "industrial north and agricultural south" has been made by Canada, Department of Mines and Technical Survey, Korea: A Geographical Appreciation (Ottawa, 1951), p. 18.

\(^8\)For a complete appreciation of the DPRK's physical and geographic condition in regard to its economic modernization,
The DPRK's economy, thus, faces problems that affect its goal of a high standard of living in many ways. These problems are the division of the economy (the industrial north and agricultural south) following the division of Korea in 1945 and the economic devastation caused by the Korean War of 1950. However, it seems that the DPRK's industrialization has been more or less successful due to its use of harsh methods of state control and economic planning. The method of mass mobilization, intensive training of technicians, as well as the potential stocks of natural resources, have all contributed to the DPRK's economic accomplishments. For example, a Korean counterpart of China's "Great Leap Forward" movement was the DPRK's implementation of "Chullima Undong" (or Flying-Horse movement) and its successive mobilizations like "Yukkae-Koji Chomyong Undong" (or Occupying Six-Hill Movement).

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read Andrew J. Grajdanezu, Modern Korea (New York: The John Day Company, 1944), pp. 8-18. Grajdanezu states that Korea can be economically modernized if the resources are wisely used to unite the southern rice with the northern iron in a unified economy for Koreans themselves.

9The Korean economy as a whole is divided into two parts. With the bulk of electric power, mineral resources and industrial facilities in the north, and agricultural and light industries in the south, neither the DPRK nor South Korea can attain economic viability by itself. In addition to economic division, the Korean War not only destroyed their economies but also distributed labor power unequally in the postwar period.

10The "Chullima Undong" is a political slogan for mass mobilization in economic movement. The regime has created this "over-working" movement from its historical legend in which a flying-horse travels a thousand li (or about 245
These movements for economic self-sufficiency, however, seemed not enough to solve the regime's fundamental problems resulting from the division of Korea. Whatever the results of the DPRK's economic planning had been, Premier Kim Il Sung himself repeatedly confirmed in 1960 that the government had to compromise industrial programs in order to provide more grain crops to meet demand. In other words, the DPRK is deeply troubled by food shortages, contrary to the regime's emphasis on economic self-sufficiency and a rapid growth in economy seems to have been impossible due to its loss of the southern granary.

Having already been subjected to a series of frustrations, culminating in depression, the DPRK was ripe for a leader who could direct and release the forces built up through frustration. Premier Kim Il Sung's constant reminding of the injustice of the colonial economy of Japan, and of humiliations suffered by losing southern Korea due to miles) at a stroke. The "Yukkae-Koji Chomyong Undong," too, was a mass movement. This particular campaign was considered as if it were a battle action taking the name of a guerrilla movement--Kim Il Sung's campaign against the Japanese during World War II on the Manchurian border. In short, this is a mentality of "guerrilla economy."

"United States imperialistic capitalists," served to increase the level of frustration.\textsuperscript{12}

These economic frustrations, coupled with the DPRK's physical and natural conditions, are directly reflected in the regime's foreign policy characteristics. The economic difficulties stemming from limited resources have been doubled due to the destructiveness of the Korean War. As a result, the loss of the agricultural south and the war damages to the economy of the DPRK are crucial factors, the leaders of the DPRK have formulated a policy of confrontation against South Korea and the United States as a means of justifying and overcoming the imminent difficulties in economic development by directly pointing at the external foes. Stated differently, Premier Kim Il Sung's hawkish challenge against South Korea and the United States definitely justified his leadership. Kim Il Sung, therefore, has taken advantage of the situation by directing and channeling economic frustration, playing the role of a "prophet" leading frustrated groups to economic renewal.

\textsuperscript{12}There is a theory of "frustration and aggression" which may be tested against the DPRK's economic frustration and its foreign policy aggression. According to the theory, frustration can be displaced with aggression in planning social movement. If such a theory of frustration-aggression correlation in a laboratory condition can be empirically tested against a social condition, it may be applicable to a study of the DPRK. See John Dollard, et al., \textit{Frustration and Aggression} (New York, 1939), p. 11; Norman R. R. Maier, "The Role of Frustration in Social Movements." \textit{Psychological Review}, XLIX, No. 6 (1942), 591.
The DPRK's confrontation with South Korea and the United States seems to be based on blaming the United States' "imperialism" for the miseries and frustrations facing the government. This strategy would seem, at least in part, to integrate the frustrated people into one socialistic camp in order to unite frustrated individuals and organize them into "work camps" under the slogan of forming the "eastern outpost of the socialist camp," all in opposition to South Korea. This strategy would also induce foreign aid from the Communist bloc.

As was the case with the geographic location which limited the range of the DPRK's foreign policy spectrum, the regime's limited resources and high expectations for economic independence provide the psychological foundation for the DPRK's confrontation policy. The conditions leading to confrontation may never be alleviated so long as the two Koreas exist economically independent from one another.

**Sociological Constants**

As we begin to discuss sociological constants of the DPRK as an external policy setting or environmental inputs to the political system, we encounter a domain prominently occupied by sociologists. However the discussion neither attempts to construe the social system of the DPRK itself nor expects to encompass the development, structure, and organizational patterns of the collective behavior of the DPRK. What it does here is to suggest social problems and social
changes of the DPRK related to certain functions of the political system. Stated explicitly, our objective here is to identify recurrent combinations of the regime's sociological antecedents and their political consequences. Thus, it only serves for understanding the political implications of the regime's developmental problems, its changes in social organizations and its modernizational ideals.

Throughout a history of more than 4,000 years, Koreans have made little contribution to the building of a foundation for a Korean national identity. Having repeatedly suffered from foreign intervention and colonial rule, Koreans literally did not develop a "national" society of their own. As the World War came to an end in 1945, Koreans were liberated from the colonial yoke but were again forced to remain divided in two separate societies. A consequence of this separate development precluded chances for redirecting the chronic plague of underdevelopment into a new era of the modern society. Thus, the social system of the DPRK was at the start beset by stagnation and an inertia of lost identity; the institutional conditions manifested themselves in a "soft state." That is to say, the DPRK

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13 For a detailed study of Korea under colonial politics and its search for national identity, see C. I. Eugene Kim and Han kyo Kim, Korea and the Politics of Imperialism, 1876-1910 (Berkeley, Calif., 1967), Chapter 1.

14 The term, "soft state," refers to institutions of a social system of underdeveloped nations that can hardly systemize ideals of modernization against the "underdeveloped reality," because the social conditions are too deteriorated
from its foundation had faced an almost impossible mission to overcome the state of social underdevelopment.

In its first year rule in 1946, the DPRK took a series of reforms for a societal reorganization. Conceived in Marxist dialectical materialism, the new regime had to embark itself in economic side for a battle against the social backwardness in order to reorganize the entire society. As a result of this change, the DPRK's socio-economic assets as well as labor were nationalized. All industries and lands, entire systems of transportation, means of communication, schools, and cultural institutions were to be confiscated without payment and declared the "property of the people."\textsuperscript{15}

Why is a social reform to the DPRK interpreted as a coercive measure, rather than a natural or rational equilibrium? The idea of a social system for Pyongyang leaders is not different from that of western interpretation. That is, society is "a congeries of people as a group in virtue of to implement necessary plans for modernization—unless the policy measure is oppressive and totalitarian. Therefore, many underdeveloped countries in their process of "democratic planning," failed to enforce the policy compulsion and remained in "soft state." For a further discussion on the dilemma between ideals and reality of the soft state, see Gunnar Myrdal, \textit{Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations}, I (New York, 1968), 66-67.

\textsuperscript{15}The conditions of an underdeveloped economy and the measures used to eliminate the "colonial structure" at this early stage of the DPRK are examined in Philip Rudolph, \textit{North Korea's Political and Economic Structure} (New York, 1959), pp. 33-35.
systematic types of relationships." However a Marxist view, attacking the notion of a systematic function of "natural" or rational division of labor, demands some men to carry out command and supervisory duties of assigning various roles and positions to different members of a social system. This explains why the Communist regime of the DPRK had to abolish the existing orders of social differentiation, including a system of private property.

A more detailed discussion of the impact of the DPRK's revolutionary change upon the political side is to be examined later. As a point of departure, a high degree of tension that is productive of violent change in regard to the regime's revolutionary mode must be discussed here. Our task is to trace the sources, directions, and impacts of change between the "parts" and the "whole" societal structure.

The DPRK's industrial centralization probably viewed as having an insignificant structural change from a small-scale privately operating system to a large-scale public operation. The change, however, became a substantial aggregate to the entire structure of the societal reorganization. For example, a change from a modal number of workers per factory of 20 to a mode of 200 was rather significant for managerial structure, but only at the level where the nuances of changes in the system are significant.

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inter-personal relations were to be considered. That is, such a change would not materially affect the structural and institutional characteristics of the traditional size of the "small factory system." The aggregate effect of such a change was to require collective living accommodations, a centralized school system, a community development of cultural and recreational centers, and, eventually, communalization in political channels.17

The Nationalization Law, promulgated on August 19, 1946, adapted by the Provisional People's Committee (most of whom were Communist returnees from Russia and China) nationalized more than 90 per cent of all industrial enterprises. The DPRK's land reform, on the other hand, came not until after the Korean War of 1950. An agrarian collectivization program took a series of different phases simply because the Communist leaders did not want to alienate a majority of the people by confiscating their lands. It was believed to be a wise decision, since Korea is traditionally an agrarian society.18 It first urged "progressive farmers" to organize

17 The traditional nature of Korean society is characterized by family as the basic political unit and the kinship is the decisive line of authority. These traditions have been changed by the DPRK. For a theoretical explanation of it, see Edward Shils, Political Development in the New States (Hague, 1968), Chapter II.

18 Operating within an agrarian society, the DPRK leaders seemed to have been cautious in their approach to the agricultural collectivization. It was during and after the Korean War that the regime began to propagate farmers technological and scientific methods of producing food supplies. The nation-mobilization campaign in the war-time
"co-operative farms" on a voluntary basis. Then, came a drive for "community farms." Finally, farmers were collectivized.

An example of the DPRK's agrarian reform and its social function may help to clarify the question of the linkage between a change in the society and its implication in the social control. By the end of 1957, it was estimated that 90-plus per cent of the farms were merged into 13,309 co-operative farms. The agrarian reform entailed a source of successive changes in many dimensions. What has happened to the Korean farmers in the co-operatives?

Before the co-operative was introduced, the average farming family in the traditional farm consisted of five working people owning less than three acres. Most of the small-scale farmers lived in isolated cultural pockets, having very little contact with the world outside their own village. Their occasional contact with the central government was not more than seeing governmental officials who often came to meet the village leaders for a collection of harvest-taxes. A normal size of the traditional village comprises fifteen to twenty households and of those, ten economy gradually induced farmers to join farmers co-operatives, due to a shortage in labor power and a need for more food supplies after the war destruction. For details, see "Information from the 1965 Korea Yearbook," U. S. Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS), No. 35,145 (April 21, 1966), pp. 121-131.

out of twenty families are members of the same family clan by the Korean kinship system. The dominant position of the Korean kinship system in the village communities stemmed especially from the immobility of the agrarian population.\textsuperscript{20}

In short, the traditional village life before the Communist "seizure" of Korea was a decentralized power structure diffused in numerous hamlets in terms of the kinship lineage.

When the Communists capitalized on the situation and seized power, they decisively replaced the kinship dominance of the community structure with the collective farm, and forcefully integrated it into the national economic and political structure. In the new structure, hitherto politically insignificant small peasant farmers became an aroused army for mass production and, still more, they became a forceful band of revolutionary vanguards for nation-building. The househead authority has thus been transfered to community cadres. The kinship relationship in the traditional peasant village is no longer true in a large

\textsuperscript{20}The traditional structure of Korean villages is very much similar to that of the Chinese tradition. Empirical studies done on the Korean village system are few. For the Chinese counterpart, see D. K. Yang, "A Chinese Village in Early Communist Transition" in \textit{The Chinese Communist Society: The Family and the Village} (1959), Chapters VI and VII. Also, for a comprehensive analysis on Korean village life, see Taik-kyoo Kim, \textit{Dongjok-Burak Ei Sanchwal-Kujo Yonku} (The Cultural Structure of Consanguineous Village of Korea) (Taegu, Korea, 1964), Chapter 7. Kim concludes that a village case study conducted by Asia Foundation in coordination with Silla-Kaya Cultural Research Institute of Korea field research team uncovered 33 households out of 97 belonging to the same family clan.
co-operative farm. Woman's status, too, changed from an inferior role to a "liberated status" equal to man.

What is being argued and illustrated here is that various forms of changes in one "part" of the DPRK's social sub-systems, that influence the exact ways in which social functions are fulfilled, are cumulatively fused into the "whole" system of the governmental tension. Any change is bound to produce a tension accompanied by incidental difficulties and frustrations. It is the tension which became a midwife for a new political order of the DPRK. The internal tension requires a technical exit otherwise it would collapse from within. The so-called Juche (National identity) idea, for example, was one of many cases typical of the DPRK to generate an anti-foreign sentiment. Explicitly stated, the regime's internal confrontation is systematically geared with its external counterpart as if they were a set of concave-convex gadgets.

In the discussion of the underdevelopment of the DPRK, we noted that underdevelopment is both economic and social. With the characteristic nature of the DPRK's initial setting, we are ready to examine the regime's programs for development.

Modernization in developing countries is essentially a developmental ideal of the economy for a welfare state.\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{21}Western scholars tend to argue that modernization as a concept is multidimensional. However, economic modernization seems to be the most burning ideal for underdeveloped
This is the case with the DPRK. Other ideals are considered minor to the economic sector. However, the more the DPRK pursues modernization through a revolutionary formula, the more the program contradicts the original aims of the welfare state. The revolutionary formula of the regime is directly related to "non-democratic" politics of authoritarianism which supposedly stands against capitalistic exploitation of working peoples. These are problems incidental to an application of Marxist-Leninism in modernization of the DPRK.

With regard to the problems of modernization in the practice of Communism, this section proposes three questions. First, what are the significant components of the DPRK's economic plan for modernization? Second, what can be said about the value of the DPRK's industrial resources in terms of potential stocks? Finally, if characteristic patterns are ascertainable, in what way does the modernization influence its foreign policy? Some answers to these questions may lead us to generalize the DPRK's developmental problems in reference to sociological constants which, in effect, will identify the foreign policy problems in terms of cause and effect.

countries. Deservedly, what could be more crucial for them than solving famine and poverty as the first priority of their modernizational ideals? For a fuller discussion on modernizational ideals, see Gunnar Myrdal, op. cit., Vol. 1, Chapter 3.
The regime's planning for modernization at this stage in its economic development is interpreted as a plan for accomplishing socialism at the national level. This social- istic structure in the Marxist-Leninist theory of Communist economy is not, in the first instance, about "property" any more that state socialism is about "equality." State institutions in this theory are not the only alternative; there are also possible sectors of public cooperatives and community institutions.\(^{22}\) If the planned economy of the DPRK is measured by this frame of reference, the objectives are the same among the socialists and liberals but the DPRK government argues over industrial "efficiency."

"Planning" or "planned" economy for modernization implies a general program structured by a governmental body. Planning an economy in the regime's socialist ideology is therefore believed to be the mission assigned to the Korean Worker's Party of the DPRK (Communist party of the DPRK--referred to henceforth as KWP). The KWP has described its mission in the first article of the 1946 party regulations. It says that "the immediate goal of the Korean Worker's Party is to complete the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal and

\(^{22}\) The thesis of a socialistic economy is based on works of V. I. Lenin, for example, "Fourth Anniversary of October Revolution," Selected Works, II (Moscow, 1952), 20-21. A further elaboration of the thesis is developed in Ota Sik, Plan and Market under Socialism (Prague, 1967), pp. 2-5. Also see L. Leontyev, "Planned Development of the Socialist Economy," A Short Course of Political Economy (Moscow, 1968), Chapter 11.
people's democratic revolution on a national scale; the final goal is the construction of a Communist society."

In reference to the Communists' objectives, the DPRK's modernization plans were tantamount to plans for establishing a socialist economy as opposed to South Korea's principle of market economy.

At the same time, this ideological ground for modernization explicated the theoretical components of a planned economy aiming at the construction of a Communist system through economic rearrangement. These are the DPRK's political characteristics at this stage of modernization.

With regard to the theoretical basis of modernization of the DPRK, the government's physical resources, which underlie the principal ideas of economic modernization, are crucial factors in realizing Communist modernization. Let us examine its industrial and agricultural sectors in the light of a modernizational ideal.

Basic resources which may lead to heavy industry are probably sufficient, if not abundant, in the DPRK. Korea's


24 The characteristics of modernization at an early stage of political modification for change is well described in Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow, editors, Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey (Princeton, N. J., 1964), particularly in the introductory chapter, pp. 5-7. It says that "commonly modernization begins under autocracy or oligarchy and proceeds toward some form of mass society."
coal deposits amount to 2,400 million tons and some 70 per
cent of them are known to be under the DPRK's jurisdiction
since the division of land in 1945. In 1944, the Japanese
produced four million tons of coal and one million tons of
iron ore, but there was no report on coal and iron ore pro-
duction before and during the Korean war under the DPRK.
However it is known that ferrous and coal production was
resumed by 1954 and, according to the source, the production
of iron and steel in 1954 was moderate despite the fact that
approximately 80 per cent of the productive capacity was
presumably destroyed during the Korean war years (1950-
1953).25

Assuming the DPRK's modernization plans are colored by
effective propaganda, an analysis of the industrial plan
must rest on its potential resources for modernization.
This belief is in fact consistent with our first assumption
that however the figures may have been distorted for the
purposes of propaganda, we can at least make an attempt to
analyze the regime's modernization effort in such a way as
to combine the potential variables on a co-ordinate scale in
order to make a check against error. In this manner, we
attempt to re-evaluate the DPRK's official data regarding

25These figures are based on a study by Theodore Shabad,
"North Korea's Postwar Recovery," Far Eastern Survey, XXV,
No. 6 (June, 1956), p. 84. In terms of records and statistical
reports, the period between the DPRK under the Soviet occu-
pation (1945) and end of the Korean war (1953) is a history
of dark age. No figures on the DPRK's economic activities
for this period thus can be absolute. They only imply approxi-
mates.
production in a meaningful picture. Its official claim for productivities will be screened later when we discuss the exogenous variables.

Apart from the DPRK's propaganda, we have relatively reliable information pertaining to the regime's industrial capabilities and resources. In other words, it is a widely accepted fact that the DPRK has important deposits of coal, iron, copper, lead, zinc, tungsten, magnesite and graphite. These natural resources led to the foundation of industry by the Japanese for metallurgical, chemical, cement and machinery manufacture designed to supplement those of the home country. Fortunately for the DPRK, those developments were virtually all located in the northern section of Korea because of natural and geological factors.

Energy for industrialization is another vitally important resource for the DPRK as compared to South Korea. In 1943, Korea's total electrical output was 5,688 million Kwh, of which South Korea generated only 122 million Kwh. Electric power generated in the DPRK was thus shared with South Korea until May 14, 1948, when the two governments became completely separated from one another. The DPRK has the bulk of Korea's hydroelectric resources and more than 90 per cent of the hydroelectric power generated by some 198 rivers including the longest, the Yalu, whose dam has a capacity of 2.5 million Kwh. A survey conducted by the Japanese in 1944 on sixty-four additional spots showed 200 suitable
rivers for dams with a potential capacity of some eight million Kwh.\(^{26}\)

The chemical industry, one of the leading branches of the DPRK's economy by 1945, was heavily damaged by the Korean war. The destruction was so great that the DPRK's figures showed relatively little production except in percentage and plan. In other words, the war was to leave the regime crippled and deeply dependent upon the Communist system for foreign aid in reconstruction. The gross industrial production by the end of the war was reported to be 36 per cent of what was in 1949. According to the report released by the Statistics Bureau of the regime, production after the war dropped to almost one-sixth of the pre-war capacity.\(^{27}\) The fact is that at the end of the war the DPRK did not manifest many of the benefits of the Japanese build up. The DPRK had lost much of its industrial installations as well as its trained labor force by the end of the war.

The DPRK's agricultural sector in its role as a supportive industry cannot be considered promising. Overshadowed

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\(^{26}\) The sources are based on a study made by Yoon T. Kuark, "North Korea's Industrial Development during the Post-war Period," *North Korea Today*, edited by Robert A. Scalapino, pp. 59-60. Some figures are revised in accordance with his recent study, "Economic Planning in North Korea," a paper presented at the Conference on Korea (Kalamazoo, Michigan, April, 1967).

\(^{27}\) The report said electric power was reduced to one-sixth, coal to one-fifth, steel to one-fourth, cement to one-eighth, and chemical fertilizer reduced to one-tenth during the war period. DPRK, Central Statistical Bureau, *Development of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea* (Pyongyang, 1960), pp. 30-31.
by the industrial drive from the earlier period of the Japanese colonial experience, agricultural improvements have been slow due to natural and climatic limits.

Before the Korean war of 1950, the DPRK's total sown area rose from 1,880,000 Chungbo (one Chungbo equals 0.99 hectares or 2.45 acres) in 1946 to 2,340,000 Chungbo in 1959, as compared with South Korea's 6,140,000 Chungbo in 1949. The DPRK's grain production is evenly divided between rice and dry-field crops, in contrast to South Korea's, where rice accounts for 70 to 75 per cent of total production. 28

As in the case of nationalizing industrial enterprises and factories at the beginning of the regime, the DPRK's program for land reform was considerably easier to carry out than in South Korea. The DPRK government had very little problem in confiscating land because there were not many landowners. By 1944, under the Japanese rule, some 75 per cent of the rural population was either without any land, or occupied only part of their land as either tenants or renters. The average rent was estimated to be between 50 and 60 per cent of their crops. The size of the average landholding in the northern section of Korea during the Japanese

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28An excellent comparative study of agricultural development between the DPRK and South Korea before the Korean War of 1950 and after is found in Yoon T. Kuark, "A Comparative Study of Economic Development between South and North Korea during the Post-Korean War Period," unpublished dissertation (University of Minnesota, 1966).
occupation was quite small, over 50 per cent of the owners having less than one Chungbo or 2.45 acres.29

The first measure of the regime in the area of agricultural policy was to grant land to the peasants, as was done in a number of the Eastern European countries. The 1946 Land Reform in the DPRK was the only reform carried out during the earlier period under the auspices of the Red Army during the Soviet Russian occupation, 1946-1948.

Plans for modernization in both industry and agriculture, if somewhat rudimentary, were introduced at an early date. Agrarian reform was the KWP's steppingstone toward a socialist economy. On the other hand, the industrial sector was already more or less socialized through the nationalization of the colonial enterprises. All of these reforms were structural changes in the economy carried through by the regime for the purpose of modernization.

However, modernization for the Communist regime was more or less equated with industrialization under state control. The primary reason for this was more political than economical. That is to say, the KWP's ideological ground for modernization was motivated by a desire for revolutionary social change. The important fact is that the regime's

29 According to one source, the DPRK occupies 47,097 square miles compared to 37,959 square miles for South Korea, whereas the DPRK's cultivated land was only 1.5 million acres compared to South Korea's 3 million acres. For details, see Shannon McCune, Korea: Land of Broken Calm (Princeton, N. J., 1966), p. 56.
industrial plans for modernization were completely destroyed by the Korean war. To some extent, the real plans were initiated in the aftermath of the war. In this sense, confrontation with South Korea and the United States might have been the regime's foreign policy plan with regard to economic plans in the postwar era. "Reconstruction and Confrontation" was the regime's consistent slogan in its policy position, explaining why modernization was necessary.

The DPRK expects economically to outgrow the south Korean economy. It further believes that modernization must be based on economic outflows. Means to reach this goal is confrontation. The war against South Korea and the United States has been its utmost experience. The regime, after the war, still acts in accordance with the experience. Throughout, the regime's campaign for industrial modernization has always been as if it were in battle with South Korea and the United States. If war is a part of the regime's "revolutionary way" to accomplish a socialist nation, the loss of the war and the destruction resulting from the war must have added to the reasons for being an anti-American regime. The psychology linking between the economic modernization and foreign bellicosity will endure until the regime reaches a stage of economic independence through industrial development.
Cultural Constants

It should be pointed out that the preceding accounts of the DPRK's geopolitical and sociological constants are by no means mutually exclusive or collectively exhaustive. A few features of those constants examined here are selective and of limited examples merely to sketch the regime's exogenous setting. Subsequently, next area to be assayed is what I designate as "cultural constants." Culture in relation to a political entity is undoubtedly a broad subject which encompasses the whole spectrum from ethics and moral faculties to behavioral style. The study, however, focuses on three kernel questions. They are "political culture," "national character," and "system of values."

The concept of political culture certainly did earn a public currency among students of comparative politics, particularly for those who experiment with psychological ties or communal factors which make the political process of "non-Western" political behavior different from the West. A pioneer of the concept explains that the cultural relativism of political difference into a consideration of comparative politics means that we are making some distinction between the "nature of cultural differences," not the

30 The reader may wonder whether these three terms could conceptually be separable from each other. Moreover, one may question whether the concept of political culture is inclusive of the rest. The author, however, contends that they are analytically independent. This point is to be self-explanatory as we proceed into the materials.
"differences of individual social character." It is essential to my purpose to elaborate on the nature of these cultural differences at some length. Lucian W. Pye expresses his fundamental idea in the following words:

We would like to suggest four particular attributes of groups which appears to be the most significant in producing different types of political process. We feel these four dynamic factors may be critical in shaping the future form of politics in most non-Western countries, and that an analysis of them can assist the researcher in foreseeing what are likely to be the rules of the games.\(^1\)

According to Pye, these four factors are composed of "interest," "issues," "values," and "styles." Among the four factors the most importantly treated factor was the political style. Elsewhere, Pye also states his assumption which led to a notion of the political culture as follows:

The notion of political culture assumes that the attitudes, sentiments, and cognitions that inform and govern political behavior in any society are not just random congeries but represent coherent patterns which fit together and are mutually reinforcing. The concept of political culture assumes that each individual must, in his own historical context, learn and incorporate into his own personality the knowledge and feelings about the politics of his people and his community.\(^2\)

It then includes the distinctive customs, habits, skills, and attitudes that individuals learn as the shared experience of their political community. It produces a particular orientation toward political affairs, a

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combination of information, feeling, and opinion, which vary sufficiently from country to country to produce distinctive political styles. In short, the concept of political culture cannot be defined precisely, but it is useful if we distinguish it into two separate analyses. On the one hand, we may be able to extract political aspects of culture and distinguish them as the realm of "macro-culture," wherein personal prepossessions are determined by the historical continuity of a nation's cultural background. And, on the other, we may also distinguish it from the realm of "micro-culture," wherein basic political orders are gauged in terms of the aggregate and process of individual and family socialization. 33

With these distinctions, this study restricts itself to the macro-culture for the analysis of the political culture of the DPRK. However, when we speak of "national character," it refers to the micro-culture of the DPRK. Now we can turn to the two influential patterns of thought which have prevailed in Korean culture--Buddhism and Confucianism--and in doing so, the analysis intends to demonstrate their impact on the attitudes, behavior, and life style of traditional Korea.

33 A similar analysis is proposed by Hitchner and Levine. For details, see Dell Gillette Hitchner and Carol Levine, Comparative Government and Politics (New York, 1971), p. 31. For "macro-micro" analysis of political culture, see also Lucian W. Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics: A Psycho-cultural Study of the Authority Crisis in Political Development (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), Chapter 1.
In terms of the political culture of Korea, Buddhism is the spiritual infrastructure functioning in dynamic equilibrium with the primitive Shamanism of Korea for a long period of Korean history. The Buddhist religion, which promotes a belief in man's immortal soul and his reincarnation, had long shaped the Korean people's spiritual world. Introduced from China during the fourth century, Buddhism has consistently influenced the destiny of life and prosperity of Koreans. Whatever it was, the fundamental understanding of life and human affairs has thus affected the political dimensions of Korea today.

First, let us consider the important Buddhist concept of rebirth. To Buddhists, the world which is to come after death is more important than the reality in which they now live. That after-world, they believe, is a real paradise; life and death are part of a continuous cycle, so there is nothing to be feared in death. This point is well expressed by Marshall Singer, as follows:

Birth is preceded by death, and death is preceded by birth. It is a continuous cycle that terminates only when a being has attained, through meritorious performance of the life experience, the highest possible state of existence. . . . The form of life into which a being is reborn is the result of his own past and present actions. . . . It is entirely dependent on the way one fulfills his earthly function. "The present is the offspring of the past and is the present of the future." 34

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Accordingly, the life of the Korean people was strongly influenced by the spiritual restraint imposed by Buddhism, and this was supplemented by the mysticism and superstition related to man's death and rebirth. What is significant about this spiritual restraint is that it encouraged the mass of the commoners to accept (1) no matter how difficult it is, the earthly life must be tolerated by subordinating themselves to their wise rulers and (2) that the life in which they now live is temporal and is thus dedicated to spiritual and eternal causes.

The effect of Buddhism on the social and political aspects of Korean culture cannot be overemphasized. Unfortunately, the contribution of Buddhist religion to Korean life and society came to be distorted. However, the present rulers of the DPRK seem to enjoy it. That is, the Buddhist tradition is so preoccupied with "death" that the people want to escape present reality; yet they practice many forms of sacrifice in religious form. The tragedy lies in one's emphasis upon death rather than life. At least this is the case for the ordinary people. On the side of the ruler, this provided a solid base for autocratic government. As a result, the relationship between the ruler and the ruled in the traditional culture was the one between the master and the servant.\\n
\[35\] For an excellent analysis of the Korean patriarchism, see Tae-Soo Han, "A Search for Leadership Fit for Korea," Korean Quarterly, Vol. 6 (Summer, 1964), 34-39.
If the Buddhist tradition were considered as a macro-cultural infrastructure of the Korean political culture which governs the spiritual world of the people, Confucianism, on the other hand, is a micro-cultural agent which cements individual ethics in the realm of "practical politics." Whatever it may be, I designate it Korean national character. Some may argue that the term, "national character" is an illusive and impressionistic generalization designed to undermine adversary governments. However, I believe, the utility of the concept of national character is, not to promote racial or ethnic fanaticism, but to detect a nation's cultural persistence over a long period of time. That is to say, we are interested in tracing the DPRK's present cultural environment in terms of its genesis. So to speak, the DPRK's "Communist political culture" itself is not considered here.

Confucianism became really dominant in Korean society with the birth of the Yi dynasty (1392-1910). While Buddhist religion had encouraged superstition and mysticism among the people, Confucianism was principally concerned with morals and ethics. Its real impact was upon practical social life as opposed to the religious implications of Buddhism upon

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the people's spiritual state. It was on this system of Confucian ethics that the behavior of the Korean people was essentially patterned.

The main theme of Confucian ethics is that society is and must be a series of social relationships consisting of five-fold loyalties, and the priority among these five loyalties must be in the ordering of numbers: (1) ruler and subject, (2) father and son, (3) husband and wife, (4) elder brother and younger, and (5) friends. In other words, there must be both loyalty and reverence between ruler and subject, between father and son, between husband and wife and so on, in order to gain a well ordered society. This point was well expressed in the writing of Jae-Kyung Oh:

Under his (Confucius') code the day's duties and the individual's station in life were carefully prescribed. To Confucius the whole duty of man consisted in preserving the right relationship towards his fellow human beings. He was intensely conservative, and inculcated a great respect for authority. He taught that life must be vigorous and positive, carried on with balance and moderation, and the avoidance of all extremes.37

Accordingly one's loyalty to the king is superior to the loyalty to one's father, and the loyalty to the king is supreme and absolute. The same order of relationship is applied to the family hierarchy. It says that there must be "proper relations" of superior-inferior status in the family hierarchy between husband-wife, father-son, older brother-younger brother, son-daughter, and so on. In the home, the

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father is the dominant figure to whom wife, sons, daughters and all family members should defer. In short all human relations in a society start in the same way that they do within the family, and thereby the entire society is welded by the Confucian "proper relations" of superior-inferior status.

In short, Confucian concept of family, society and governing had a profound impact on the daily life of the Korean people as a moral law as well as on the prolongation of the Korean version of social control and its political consciousness. The myths and realities of the society postulated a hierarchical chain of command, with orders descending from the top, through the ranks and files, to the lowest levels of society; while a chain of service and deference ascending from those lowest levels, again through the ranks and files, to the top. Tradition was the modus operandi that kept the system functioning.38

In view of the traditional political culture and national character of Korea, the author suggested earlier that, once such characteristics are recognized, they persist long after regime or passage of time. In Korea's modern age during thirty-six years of Japanese occupation (1910-1945), the Japanese rule could not change the fundamental factor of the Korean tradition. In their attempt to change, the

Japanese colonialists forced Koreans to use the Japanese language and to change their names and other proper nouns of towns and cities to Japanese, but they failed to change the attitudes, behavior, or values of a people in the society. Contrarily, the Japanese Governor-General in fact sought to take advantage of the wealthy tradition and its aristocracy.39

Either in the case of the Korean political culture exemplified by the Buddhist way of life, or the Confucian practice of Korean character, collectively suggests consistent themes which imply an image of the Korean characteristics. In terms of spiritual causes, "death" is honored and "life" is regarded as dispensable. With regard to human affairs, "loyalty and order" are a twin brother and the world outside them is a social "outcast." Stated in different words, the national characteristics of the Koreans seem to choose either one of two extreme positions (black or white) and not to choose a moderate middle way. The present social regimentation of the DPRK in this respect is nothing more than "new wine in the old bottle." Two decades after the beginning of Communist control, such practices as ethical piety and social radicalism (left-or-right) has not changed the

39A substantial number of Korean "loyalists" were recruited into the Japanese colonial government. For a statistical report on the cooperative Koreans, see George M. McCune, Korea Today (Cambridge, 1950), p. 25.
foundational myth. A point of the argument is reserved for later when we discuss endogenous constants. 40

Finally, we are about to deal with the DPRK's system of residual value. In a sense, we have discussed it in broad context when the national character and political culture of the DPRK were examined. Because the concept of values became thoroughly fashionable but still more intangible, a shift in the level of abstraction is necessary in order to talk about group values such as consensus and social censure. This becomes an important part of any structural study of political leadership. In order to pave the way to the leadership characteristics of the DPRK in Chapter IV, this section presents a latent value and examines it from different dimensions.

Traditionally, as we noticed, Korean leadership was considered to be of a charismatic type. This kind of cultural background is particularly traceable to the Confucian teaching and practice dealing with the subject-king relationship. It was modified during the more than thirty-five years of Japanese military rule. These two stages of modern Korea have characterized leadership as possessing

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40 Some attributes of cultural constants may very well be "variables." Majority opinions, for example, are variables. To say Korean cultural constants, as exemplified here, is not more than illustrating American counterparts such as the belief in God, faith and democratic way of life as the American "giveness." See Daniel J. Boorstin, The Genius of American Politics (Chicago, Ill., 1953), Chapter 1.
extraordinary wisdom and power to sway the subjects and to demonstrate the national path by positive means.41

As a result of these experiences, the people in general seem to expect and, thus, demand a strong leadership, and are less interested in the form of government. This kind of social consensus today forms the common sense basis of the political currents of both Koreas.42 Viewing the DPRK's policy of confrontation in relation to Korea's traditional culture, the masses' impatient expectations of revolutionary outcomes for a better livelihood is bound to produce a violent leadership.43

If we compare Marshal Kim Il Sung of the DPRK with General Park Chung Hee of South Korea, we become convinced that the militant leadership in modern Korea is directly

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41 The traditional leadership image to Koreans has been "the Omnipotent" in the form of dynastic and Japanese regimes. "Wang-do" or rulership in Yi Dynasty (1392-1910) and the monarchic rule of the "Tenno system" of modern Japan have shaped a kind of bureaucracy of the Korean elite.

42 Assuming that the basic attitude of people toward leadership is commonly shared both in the DPRK and South Korea, evidence for the charismatic practice is also found in South Korea. Undoubtedly Syngman Rhee was charismatic. Likewise, the military coup d'etat of 1961 has not been rejected by the people and was more strongly supported in the general election of 1967 than in 1963. Moreover, a survey showed that a "strong and decisive" leadership is more favorable than democratic principles. See Chick-hong Sung, "Political Diagnosis of Korean Society: A Survey of Military and Civilian Value," Asian Survey, VII, No. 5 (May, 1967), 337-339.

43 For an account of Korean militarism, see Tong-won Pak, "Authoritarianism and Democracy in Korea," Korean Affairs, III, No. 3 (December, 1964), 276-278.
responsible for the masses' impatient expectations and hasty conclusions concerning leadership. In other words, the fruits of modernization are eagerly expected by the people of the lower classes. For this reason, both the military leaders of the DPRK and South Korea are entitled to dictate tasks and are respected because of their powerful but simplistic manifestations of "modern Korea."

The rise of militarism in the DPRK substantiates the theories of militarism in developing countries. The theories hold that militarism emerges from an unorganized socio-political situation as an effective instrument to lead a crippled society into an organized political system as a necessary stage in order to provide a stable condition for civilian leadership. Moreover, militarism in the DPRK reinforced this demand by the readiness of the regime to express the nation's long-harbored resentment against American "imperialism" and its "clique regime in the south." Military heroes who fought against Japanese domination are highly respected as founders of the national liberation movement, as were the Chinese Communist guerrillas during the periods of anti-Japanese warfare. The experiences of the Korean Communist guerrillas during the resistance war have been well reflected in innumerable ways in the present

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government of the DPRK. The present head of state and all
the important cabinet members once served as political com-
missars or political officers and commanders of the guerrilla
regiments against the Japanese. Premier Kim Il Sung has
come to be called the hero and founder of the Korean People's
Army, and its 400,000 troops are the backbone of Kim's
political-military power. Furthermore, the present Communist
party (KWP) is also based on this tradition with its leaders
having the same military mentality as Kim Il Sung's faction,
known as the "Kapsan group."\footnote{Kapsan is a place where Kim's partisan forces was
first organized in the 1930's. In the era of the DPRK's
independence, the Kapsan group was organized in order to
protect Kim's faction in its competition with other Communist
factions. Accordingly, Kim's leadership in the KWP as well
as in the army (KPA) is organized by the Kapsan group, which
is a tripartite group among the government bureaus, the
party and the military in support of Kim Il Sung leadership.}

In conclusion, many aspects of the old social chain of
command are believed to be changing, but the persisting
emphasis on "stubborn loyalty" to individual leaders has
increasingly been playing a significant part in political
relationships. The people of the DPRK in general seem to be
relatively satisfied with their militant leadership, as com-
pared to the rule of the Japanese militarism, simply because
the present government is a regime governed by "Koreans
themselves." Besides, the ex-colonial people of the DPRK
is now better fed in comparison to their Japanese colonial
experience. Above all, this toleration of military
dictatorship might be attributed to the public's enthusiastic support of national re-unification in which Kim Il Sung had taken a strong initiative, even invading South Korea. The effect of the Korean war for the people of the DPRK was to provide them with a new image of "national pride" and a sense of "patriotic war," even though the war was disastrous. The militant expression of the DPRK's confrontation with its neighbours is thus a product of the mass expectations. Until the mass are materially pacified, a moderate leadership and its good neighbor policy is not likely to occur.

46 There is a good reason to believe that the mass morale is quite high although the war was not a total victory for the DPRK. The logic for the people seems simple: Kim Il Sung and his people fought a patriotic war against "American imperialism" and its "puppet regime," South Korea to liberate fellow Koreans. The war for them could have been successful and could have unified Korea, had there not been American interference in the war. However, they feel that the war gave them a sense of "pride" and international prestige among many developing nations for its brave challenge against America, "the home-country of international imperialism." This theme appears on almost all issues of Pyongyang Times and Rodong Shinmun.
CHAPTER III

EXOGENOUS VARIABLES

International Environment: The Cold War Impact

In terms of cause and effect, it is a hypothetical conception that the DPRK is a product of the Cold War. Simply stated, the separate occupations between the North and South Korea by the two opposing powers of the U. S. S. R. and the United States, at the end of World War II, ended in establishing two contending new states. Accordingly, it is equally logical to assume that the nature and changes in the DPRK's political development is inevitably linked with the degree and intensity of the Cold War variables within the contemporary international setting.

In retrospect, the contemporary international environment since 1945 witnessed at least three basic changes following directly after World War II. First, Western Europe withdrew, after several centuries of dominance, from the center of world politics. Second, the collapse of Western Europe and the victory of the war thrust the United States into world economic and military power, and into Western political leadership. Third, the confusion which tailed the wake of the war laid opportunities for an expanding Soviet foreign policy. The U. S. S. R. ascended to a world position and established a sizeable empire.
The wartime Russo-American cohesion against the Axis power died abruptly when it became clear to statesmen in both Moscow and Washington that such cooperation could not further separate interests. The history of East-West cooperation and its subsequent confrontation is yet to be clarified. Were Soviet moves in Eastern Europe parts of a deliberate Stalinist overture of Russian nationalism and Marxist-Leninist ideology? Was the Truman Doctrine of 1947 meant to contain Russia's hostility toward the capitalist world? Whichever was the case, the result was the same.¹

At any rate, the year of 1948 saw the birth of the DPRK under Kim Il Sung. A year later, the Eastern political theater witnessed the consolidation of the People's Republic of China under Mao Tse-tung. These new Communist states intensified the East-West struggle which was to dominate the following decades of Far Eastern politics after World War II. This post-war struggle has been described by Donald Puchala in this way:

It is unnecessary to go into great detail [here] in tracing the consolidation of the Western world in the face of Communist challenge. The American alliance system, the Korean war, Western containment policy, and Western political coordination during countless, and largely fruitless, encounters with the Soviet Union at diplomatic bargaining tables, are all well documented and thoroughly explained in most Cold War histories.²


It is said that the Cold War of the late 1940's and early and middle 1950's is largely over. This simply means that, because of the mutual capacity of reciprocal terror, both the powers yielded to psychological warfare. During the 1960's considerable degree of adjustment in the relationships between super powers and their allies changed hierarchical and monolithic structures of the East-West polar blocs, but continued the basic bipolar world system. A significant reshuffling in the international structure in the early 1970's suggests a break from the established bipolar system to a multipolar system. Because of the fact that the Cold War environment is fundamentally changing the tides of international currents, leaders of the DPRK are having to re-evaluate their position.

What has been described above is an "omniscient observer's" account of the Cold War variation over the past several decades in Sprouts' terms. What really matters in the analysis of the linkage between the domestic policy of the DPRK and its Cold War impact is how the milieu is perceived by the policy-makers.

3 It is an interesting fact to note that such modifications in the bloc ideologies, say Communism versus anti-Communism, from "monocentrism" to "polycentrism" in their nature ironically occurred at once. Contending that the Western bloc loosened its polar string more than the Soviet bloc is a matter of interpretation and yardsticks.

4 For the milieu-polity perspective, see pp. 2-4 and Figure 1.
Perhaps no other public statements can better outline the international situation and problems perceived by leaders of the DPRK than Premier Kim Il Sung's "The Present Situation and the Tasks of Our Party," an important speech reported at the National Leadership Conference of the KWP (Daipyoja Hoeui) on October 5, 1966. Kim in this speech exultantly expresses his comprehensive "image of the world" around him.

Several themes are readily identifiable by reading the speech text. At the outset of the report, Premier Kim drew a battle scene of the contemporary international arena between two ideological camps:

A fierce struggle is going on in the international arena today between socialism and imperialism, between the forces of revolution and of counter-revolution. The socialist forces and the national liberation, working class and democratic movements continue to grow on a worldwide scale.

... the revolutionary movement cannot be free from vicissitudes in the course of its development, but the general situation is developing in favor of socialism and the revolutionary forces to the disadvantage of imperialism and the reactionary forces. The victory of socialism and the downfall of imperialism are the main trend of our times that no force can check. ... But

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5See Rodong Shinmun, October 13, 1966. Rodong Shinmun (Labor News) is the organ of the Central Committee of the Korean Worker's Party. For an English translation of this speech, see Selected Writings of Kim Il Sung (New York, 1971), pp. 112-145.

6I deliberately chose the word "image" in this context of what Premier Kim believes to be true; "his subjective knowledge." According to Kenneth Boulding, "it is this knowledge" that largely governs one's behavior. See Kenneth E. Boulding, The Image (The University of Michigan Press, 1966), Chapter 1.
imperialism does not recede from the arena of history of its own will.

The aggressive maneuvers of the imperialists led by the United States have become more open in recent years. . . . The U. S. aggressors, occupying the southern half of our country, are making frenzied war preparations. . . . They have aligned the forces of Japanese militarism with the South Korean puppets and are scheming to rig up a "Northeast Asia military alliance" with this alignment as the backbone.

The basic strategy of the U. S. imperialists in their Asian aggression is to blockade and attack the Asian socialist countries, . . . Attention should be directed at the same time to the possible maneuvers of the U. S. imperialist to ease the situation or maintain the status quo in Europe temporarily in order to concentrate their forces on aggression in Asia. . . . In this case, the easing of tension on one front by no means contributes to improving the general international climate, but on the contrary, provides conditions for the imperialists to intensify aggression on the other front.

All events taking place in the international arena substantiate ever more clearly that U. S. imperialism is the main force of aggression and . . . target Number 1 in the struggle of the world peoples. . . . We must [also] be aware of the danger of Japanese militarism in Asia. . . . [They] have been revived rapidly under the active patronage of U. S. imperialism . . .

In terms of "friends-or-foes," the United States is yet the DPRK's common enemy Number One today. The month of July, 1972, was a historic epoch for the Pyongyang regime and the Seoul government to jointly agree on "refraining from slandering and calumniating the other side and from committing armed provocations." But the Pyongyang-Seoul thaw did not reveal a change in the DPRK's hostility toward the United States. Ironically enough, the same period was

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7 Selected Writings of Kim Il Sung, pp. 112-115.
set for "the month of struggle against U. S. imperialism."
Accordingly, tens and thousands of workers, students, and the
People's Army units held mass meetings and shouted anti-
American slogans: "U. S. imperialist aggressors, quit South
Korea at once; Let's shatter the Japanese militarists'
schemes for rearmament and reinvasion; Let's oust the
U. S. imperialists and reunify the fatherland; Hold high
the banner of the anti-imperialist, anti-U. S. struggle
everywhere in the world."  

In its obstinate choice of viewing the world in two
ideological camps, Pyongyang has reasons to slander Japan.
Perhaps Japan is the regime's sworn enemy, second only to
the United States. Above all, the DPRK hates Japan for two
primary reasons: first, the Seoul-Tokyo Normalization
Treaty of 1965 which made "South Korea second only to the
United States as a customer for Japanese products"; and,
secondly, Japan's economic power in a capitalist relationship
with the United States which reduced possibilities for
closer ties with Tokyo. In fact, the DPRK has tenaciously

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8 According to a Pyongyang source, more than a month
period between June 25 (the day of the Korean War of 1950
began) and July 27 (the day of the Korean Armistice agreement
was signed) is set as "the Month of Anti-U. S." See "On the
Occasion of the Month of Anti-U. S. Joint Struggle for the
Withdrawal of the U. S. Imperialist Aggression Army from
South Korea," The Pyongyang Times, July 1, 1972. The Pyong-
yang Times is the DPRK's only English-language newspaper as
an organ of the government.

9 Soon Sung Cho, "Japan's Two Korea Policy and the
Problems of Korean Unification," Asian Survey, VII, No. 10
(October, 1967), 717.
been approaching Japan expressing its desire to establish normal relations between the two countries. In his speech before the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK, Kim Il Sung publically explicated his desire for establishing a Pyongyang-Tokyo friendship in 1957.\textsuperscript{10} As B. C. Koh, one of the few "North Korea watchers" in the United States states:

If it had its choice, Pyongyang would undoubtedly welcome more amicable relations with Tokyo. The latter's strong ties with South Korea cannot but antagonize the former. What is more, Pyongyang's attempts to normalize relations with Tokyo have continuously been brushed aside by Japan. Japan's utility to North Korea is readily apparent. As the world's third industrial power, Japan can be an extremely valuable trading partner. Its geographical proximity to North Korea serves to enhance its attractiveness.\textsuperscript{11}

In short, the DPRK sees Japan as a potential enemy simply because of its friendly alliance with South Korea and the United States. There is a primitive instinct, if not a logic, at the center of Pyongyang's "image" of the world around it by linking Japan with its enemy Number One (the United States) and its "imperial satellite state" (South Korea). That is, "enemy's friend is an unequivocal enemy" whose behavioral motivation is always suspicious. Undoubtedly, Pyongyang claims that any nation's attitude toward "U. S. imperialism" is a major yardstick for verifying the position of Communist states. For the DPRK, the world is


two-sided and the Cold War environment, which divided the world into two sides, positively serves for its politics of perpetual confrontation in terms of "black-and-white" issues.

The next theme discussed by Kim Il Sung was relations between the DPRK and its "fraternal Socialist allies." Depicting one side of the Cold War (the Western bloc) as "imperialist forces," Kim's vision of the other side of the Cold War (the Eastern bloc) was not either wholly optimistic or unanimously cohesive as it should have been. By concluding his cautiously worded warning against polemics over the Vietnam question among Communist states, Kim proceeded to explain Pyongyang's reaction to the differences and widening gaps within the Socialist camp itself:

The socialist camp and the international Communist movement have been experiencing harsh trials in recent years. Modern revisionism and dogmatism have become grave obstacles to the development of the international revolutionary movement.

... modern revisionism distorts Marxism-Leninism and emasculates its revolutionary quintessence under the pretext of a "changed situation" and "creative development." It rejects the class struggle and dictatorship of the proletariat, preaches class collaboration, and gives up fighting imperialism. ...

We must fight "Left" opportunism as well as modern revisionism. "Left" opportunism takes no heed of the changed realities, recites individual propositions of Marxism-Leninism in a dogmatic manner, and leads people to extremist action under super-revolutionary slogans. It also divorces the Party from the masses, splits the revolutionary forces, and prevents a concentrated attack on the main enemy.

[However], relationships between fraternal parties should in no way be identified with the hostile
relations between us and imperialism. If the leadership of a fraternal party commits an error, the Communists should offer comradely criticism and help it to return to the right path. . . . One should not put any fraternal country on a par with the enemy or push it away to the side of the imperialists, even if it has some negative aspects. . . .

The socialist camp is in a complex situation now because of the differences, but its existence is a hard fact. . . . All socialist countries are in the socialist camp as equal members. . . .

Kim continues to explain how the monolithic Communism dictates by Moscow or Peking in the past years has done harm to the unity of the Communist revolution within its own bloc:

It is a matter of importance in the international Communist movement that the Communist and Workers parties maintain independence. Only when each party has independence can it carry on successfully the revolution in its country and contribute to the world revolution, and can the cohesion of the international Communist movement be strengthened.

. . . in recent years there have been incessant violations of the norms governing the mutual relations of the fraternal parties in the international Communist movement. . . . All parties must respect other parties on an equal footing and strive to maintain comradely relations with each other. There can be neither a senior nor a junior party, nor a party that leads and a party that is led among the Communist and Workers parties. . . .

The revolution in each country is carried out by its own people under the leadership of its own party, and not by a certain international "center" or by the party of any other country. Communists accept no "pivot" or "center" whatsoever in the international Communist movement. . . . Each party's guiding theory has significance only within the bounds of its country. Each country's realities being different from the others', the guiding theory of its party, however excellent, does not fit another country. . . .

12 Selected Writings of Kim Il Sung, pp. 127-132.
Our party, too, has had a bitter experience of interference by great-power chauvinists in its internal affairs. Needless to say, those great-power chauvinists met with rebuffs. At that time, in the interests of the revolution and proceeding from a desire to preserve unity, we settled the issue in confidence, though it was hard for us to endure. In the future, too, we should oppose all manner of interference in our internal affairs and guard against great-power chauvinism.

Great-power chauvinists and factionalists suspect others for no reason and like to separate people into "sides." We will not take any "side." If someone asks us which "side" we are on, we will answer we are on the "side" of Marxism-Leninism, on the "side" of the revolution . . . . Communists should not look at the independent activities of fraternal parties through tinted glasses and should not be too nervous about them.13

It goes without saying that the term "modern revisionism" was designed to slash the "Titoism of Yugoslavia," whereas "Left opportunism" meant to charge the KWP's factional challenge against Kim's leadership. Lastly, Kim's use of "great-power chauvinism" was carefully worded in order to show disapproval of Sino-Soviet competition over minor Communist nations, particularly over the Pyongyang regime.14

What is apparent from reading Kim Il Sung's situation report is that the Cold War environment for the DPRK is a dominant policy variable which persistantly supplies

13Ibid., pp. 133-144.

14With regard to the DPRK's stern effort to maintain a nationalistic line in the face of "big Communist" influences, see Kim Il Sung's earlier account made before the Supreme People's Assembly on October, 1962. "Premier Kim Il Sung Makes Speech on Immediate Tasks of DPRK Government," The People's Korea, No. 88, October 31, 1962. The People's Korea is a pro-Pyongyang weekly published by Koreans in Tokyo.
policy-makers of the DPRK with policy issues. Of course the Cold War variable changes, but the DPRK's interpretation of its change is negatively reinforced in domestic policy. For example, if Europe somehow eases its tension and maintains a status quo, Pyongyang would immediately remark it as an "U. S. imperialists' scheme" or policy maneuver in order to concentrate their aggressive forces in Asia. At the same time, whichever it may be, a Socialist nation, which is responsible in a talk with the United States for easing the Cold War situation, becomes a "revisionist." Likewise, anyone in the KWP who takes a "soft" position outlined by either Moscow or Peking with regard to the United States, is to be branded as a "Leftist opportunist." By and large, the Cold War is a "wonder drug" for the politics of the DPRK.

Contiguous Environments

In the post World War II period, the partition of Korea into rival states of North and South foreshadowed her future tragedy. The implication of hostile ideology in the wake of Soviet Russia's concern with the Korean War brought the

15Kim Il Sung, in his interview with Harrison E. Salisbury, Associate Editor of The New York Times on May 26, 1972, implicitly reiterated what the DPRK's interest from the "anti-American" sentiment is. He said that what attitude one takes to "U. S. imperialists" is a criterion that shows whether one is a "good citizen" or not. Thus, "we are now strengthening anti-U. S. education among the younger generation so it may not forget the enemy," he said. See "Talk of Respected and Beloved Leader Marshal Kim Il Sung with Reporters of The New York Times of the United States," in The People's Korea, No. 588, June 7, 1972.
Chinese Communists into the peninsula without offering any solution to the partition. In response to the DPRK's invasion of South Korea, United States supported the South Korean government against the DPRK's aggression.\textsuperscript{16}

As we noted in geopolitical constants, for the DPRK, the contiguous environment of East Asia consists of Mainland China, the Soviet Union, and South Korea. For the DPRK, these contiguous governments serve as external conditions for the DPRK's national existence.\textsuperscript{17} Of course, the DPRK's contiguous environment is definitely related to the regime's Cold War environment as a result of the Korean conflict and its impact upon Russia, China and the United States. However, our account of the contiguous environment excludes the DPRK's interactions with or attitudes expressed toward the Western systems. It only deals with two aspects: the DPRK's relations with the Socialist (or Communist) systems which border her, and during the Korean War, the alliance between South Korea and the United States, which caused the DPRK to turn to the Chinese Communists for military help.

\textsuperscript{16} For an excellent account of the United States policy toward Korea on the eve of American participation in the Korean war, see Glenn D. Paige, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 58-75.

\textsuperscript{17} In terms of the regional environment, we may add Japan and Taiwan to the DPRK's contiguous countries for the East Asian region. This study, however, excludes the latter and deals with the former in the DPRK's attitude toward her insular neighbor in the Cold War environment. For a justification, see footnote 4, p. 34.
In this system, any aid for South Korea, including military help as well as economic assistance from the United States, must have been a major threat to the DPRK. The more amicable the relationship between South Korea and the United States, the more the DPRK realized its necessity to retain good relations with the Chinese Communists and Soviet Russia as the regime's sponsoring neighbors in the face of the "threat" by the Western alliance system. The DPRK, therefore, diametrically counterbalanced the United States-South Korea Treaty of 1953 by signing the "Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Assistance" with Soviet Russia on July 6, 1961, and another treaty with the Chinese Communists on July 11, 1961.18

The contiguous factor of the DPRK conclusively suggests at least two possibilities that predetermine the range of foreign policy of the regime. First, bordered by big powers in its north and northeast, Pyongyang perceives it is almost impossible to shun the tug of war between Moscow and Peking over Korea. Secondly, contained by the South Korean foe and its allies in the south, Pyongyang perceives confrontation as the only alternative to Korean unification.

18The DPRK signed a treaty with Communist China immediately after the treaty with Soviet Russia. For a comparison of these treaties between the DPRK and Russia and China as compared to the South Korea-United States Treaty, see Woonsang Choi, "Causus Foederis of Mutual Defense Treaty: Legal Significance of Armed Attack," Korean Affairs, I (March-April, 1962), 44-61.
Because of its smallness, it is most unlikely that the DPRK should think about exercising influence over its continental friends. What the DPRK could do best in the face of pressures from its gigantic neighbors, was and still is dependent upon the skillful strategy involving the manipulation of its dependency in such a way as to capitalize upon this pressure in order to develop its political position. This strategy may be accomplished on the basis of ideological fraternity with the Chinese Communists and Soviet Russia.

The Soviet Union was, no doubt, a "benevolent" comrade to the birth of the DPRK in 1948. More importantly, Kim Il Sung and his party comrades could not possibly have made their way to the present throne of political power without Russian aid. Equally strong is the DPRK's tie with Communist China. Korean life is so deeply sinicized that no other country has earned its cultural influence in Korea as has China. By coming to bail out the DPRK in the Korean War, the Chinese earned the lofty status of a "benefactor" and "comrade-in-arms." Other factors that strengthened the sense of comradeship between Peking and Pyongyang is that both share an archenemy, "U. S. imperialism" and a common outlook of racial consciousness as "Asian." President

19 It is said that Kim Il Sung allied with the so-called "Soviet-Korean" Communists against the Yenan faction (Communist returnees from China), domestic Communist faction, and "non-Communist nationalist" group at the outset of the DPRK in 1948. For a further analysis, see Pyung Chul Koh, op. cit., Chapter 1.
Nixon's trip to Peking and the North-South Korean joint agreement for "national unity" apparently did not loosen the Peking-Pyongyang axis. 20

With regard to these two benefactors in its Continental border, the DPRK faced an uncertainty in the so-called Sino-Soviet controversy:

Here, then, is the crux of the dilemma: North Korea can ill afford to alienate the Soviet Union, its liberator, political and economic sponsor, and, above all, the leader of the socialist camp. Nor can it afford to antagonize Communist China, its cultural mentor, savior, erstwhile comrade-in-arms, and fellow Asian nation. The way out of this dilemma, as noted, is to be found in the policy of neutrality. If North Korea can manage to remain nonaligned, it may hopefully succeed in offending neither party. And this was precisely the policy followed by Kim Il Sung in the formative stage of the Sino-Soviet conflict. 21

In tracing the Sino-Soviet conflict from its origin of the Twentieth Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Congress of February, 1956, B. C. Koh made an outstanding survey of Rodong Shinmun, the KWP organ, for the period between 1956 and 1968, in order to disclose the DPRK's changing orientation towards Communist China and the Soviet Union. 22

20 Rodong Shinmun branded the United States view of a multi-polarized world as a "brainchild of the U. S.-Japanese reactionaries for joint Asian aggression." It argued that "the argument about the so-called 'poles' and the 'balance of forces' by 'poles' is nothing but a rehash of the counter-revolutionary global strategy and Asian strategy of the U. S. imperialists." Rodong Shinmun, May 18, 1972.

21 Byung Chul Koh, op. cit., p. 45.

Out of more than one hundred interactions with Moscow and Peking, Pyongyang's posture in the Sino-Soviet competition was identified into three phases: (1) "Ambivalent Neutrality, 1956-1961," (2) "Peking-Pyongyang Axis, 1962-1964," and (3) "Rapprochement with the Soviet Union, 1965-1968." (See Figures 4, 5, and 6.)


*The number of interactions indicates the DPRK's attitudes expressed related to its positive (or favorable) orientation toward the Soviet Union and Communist China. "R" represents the Soviet Union and "C" represents Communist China.

Fig. 4--Ambivalent neutrality, 1956-1961

*The number of interactions indicates the DPRK's attitudes expressed related to its positive (or favorable) orientation toward the Soviet Union and Communist China. "R" represents the Soviet Union and "C" represents Communist China.

**From 1962 through 1964, the DPRK sided with Communist China against the Soviet Union. Pyongyang consistently supported Peking's position in the Sino-India border clash and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. When the Soviet Union initiated the European Communist Party Congress in 1963, Pyongyang again sided with Peking in criticizing the Soviet Union. The DPRK's growing disenchantment with the Soviet Union reached a peak in 1964. Rodong Shinmun, the KWP organ, gradually dropped articles on the Soviet Russia. At the same time, Sino-Korean interaction became frequent in that year. For example, celebrating the fifteenth anniversary of Soviet-Korean agreement for cultural cooperation in March, 1964, a Rodong Shinmun unusually ignored the greatness of the Soviet Culture and spoke more of its similar cultural tie with the Chinese Communists.

Fig. 5--Peking-Pyongyang axis, 1962-1964
The number of interactions indicates the DPRK's attitudes expressed related to its positive (or favorable) orientation toward the Soviet Union and Communist China. "R" represents the Soviet Union and "C" represents Communist China.

The DPRK's closer partnership with Peking in 1964 had gradually withered away by 1965. Perhaps the leaders of the DPRK realized that too closely identifying with the Chinese side was inimical to Pyongyang's interest and that would be better served by a reconciliation with Moscow. Nineteen sixty-five was the inception year for the Seven-Year Plan which required more Russian money and additional technical aid. Communist China was plagued by its own economic problems, which were far more staggering than those of the DPRK. The year also witnessed active Russian aid for the Communist Vietnamese. Kim Il Sung, being anti-U. S. personally, was pleased to see the Russians come to the aid of North Vietnam's war against "the U. S. aggressors."

Fig. 6--Rapprochement with the Soviet Union, 1965-1968
In terms of the DPRK's positive interaction, an attempt is made here to enumerate the most significant transactions with the Soviet Union and Communist China. Those transactions recorded in number represent all types of input-output relations between Pyongyang-Moscow and Pyongyang-Peking. A sub-categorization of each transaction should have been desirable, but such an effort was not successful since the DPRK's interactions \textit{vis-a-vis} the Soviet Union and Communist China were conglomerate of all aspects (i.e., political, economic and socio-cultural) whenever an issue became controversial between Moscow and Peking.

However, Pyongyang's interactions with Moscow and Peking clearly indicated that the regime is not enthusiastic about any direct interference imposed by either Russia or China. In fact, Premier Kim passionately rejected "fraternal parties" participating in Pyongyang's decision-making process. In Rosenau's term, the DPRK's interaction with its fraternal countries categorically prevents "penetrative processes." On the contrary, Pyongyang's general line toward them is a combination of "reactive" and "emulative" processes.\textsuperscript{23} For example, the Soviet Union's economic aid to the DPRK normally produced a series of reactive responses, while the Communist

\textsuperscript{23}A "penetrative process occurs when members of one polity serve as participants in the political processes of other," whereas a "reactive process is the contrary of a penetrative one." An "emulative process is established when the input is not only a response to the output but takes essentially the same form as the output." See footnote 5, p. 46, and Rosenau, \textit{Linkage Politics}, p. 46.
China's economic mobilization drives echoed in a "learn from China" campaign in Korea.

No attempt is made here to explain causes and effects of Pyongyang's shift of solidarity from Peking to Moscow in the 1960's. However, it seems to be that Pyongyang's past experiences with Peking based on emotional ties (i.e., friends of ex-colonies, fellow Asians, friends of "have-nots," comrades-in-arms against "U. S. imperialism," and so on) did not reward it with practical interests. Kim Il Sung needed Maoist stamina, but he soon realized that Russian technology was vital for his competition with Seoul. It became apparent that saving its own state was the first priority to all other causes for the Communist movement. Pyongyang's present rapprochement with the Kremlin, however, never exceeds more than what it takes to extract economic and military "rubles" of the Soviet Union. In short, the DPRK's over-all posture in the Sino-Soviet rift may be summed up as a kind of "pragmatic neutralism" laced with a nationalistic thread. 24

24 If we compare Figures 5 and 6 with Figure 4, we find that neither the DPRK's pro-Chinese stand nor its pro-Soviet inclination completely drops transactions with the reverse side more than "2." A total disassociation would have been "0." This indicates that the DPRK is maintaining a minimum contact or solidarity with the fraternal nations even if its attitudes sometimes side with one against the other. Simmons, another "Korea-watcher" in the United States, generally agrees with Koh's observation of the DPRK in this regard. See Robert Simmons, "North Korea: Year of the Thaw," Asian Survey, XII, No. 1 (January, 1972), 29-30.
The contiguous environment with Mainland China and the Soviet Union was a natural setting for the DPRK's geographic confinement. This setting also confined the DPRK to an amicable policy line with these contiguous countries. On the other hand, the DPRK's contiguous environment with South Korea is an artificial setting, which not only deformed the historical unity of the Korean polity, but also reserved for the DPRK a set of ready-made policy alternatives against South Korea. Korea divided through foreign interference poses for the DPRK at least two major tasks which Kim Il Sung has been insistently setting forth for more than two decades. 25

The aim of the Korean Communists is to unify the country, carry out the socialist revolution and socialist construction, and then build communism throughout the whole country. . . . Today the Workers' Party of Korea and the Korean people are faced with two revolutionary tasks. One is to build socialism in North Korea and the other is to liberate South Korea from U. S. imperialist colonial rule and unify the fatherland. These two revolutionary tasks are closely interrelated and the struggle for their fulfillment means to expedite the ultimate victory of the Korean revolution as a whole. 26

25 The DPRK's destiny in the postwar period had been closely connected with the foreign policies of the Big Powers during World War II. It might be said that the wartime secret agreements—the Yalta Conference of 1945, the Potsdam Declaration of 1945, the Moscow Agreement of December, 1945—on demarcation along the thirty-eighth parallel largely predetermined the subsequent course of events around Korea. See U. S. Department of State, The Record on Korean Unification, 1943-1960 (Washington, D. C., 1962), pp. 6-7, 57-77; U. N. General Assembly, Official Records, Part I, Resolution for Third Session, 1962 (New York, 1963), pp. 25-27ff.

Faced with the above tasks of the Communist party, "liberating" South Korea is the foremost issue which over-rides the slogan of building a "socialist state" in the north. It is no surprise to note that Premier Kim links the building of a socialist camp in the north with a life-long project of Communizing South Korea. The hostility toward the southern contiguous state no doubt served the ruler with every good reason to be oppressive and demanding. That is to say, the Communist leaders of the DPRK are free from public challenge, as long as the unification issue remains unsolved.27

The political division of the country therefore plays a fundamental role in the DPRK's national policy inputs. Pyongyang's concern over national unification is the source of both domestic and foreign policies. Psychologically, the

27We have no public opinion poll data to measure scientifically the public attitude of the DPRK toward the unification issue. However, it is the author's opinion that ordinary Koreans would tend to endorse the issue above all political ideologies. The public enthusiasm for the South-North Korean Red Cross conference in Pyongyang on August, 1972, turned out to be a testimony of such support. See Hankuk Ilbo, August 30, 1972. Perhaps the American mass public does not really understand what it is like for families being separated, except those wives and children of American prisoners in North Vietnam. A constitutional amendment, which allows South Korea's President Park almost unlimited power, has obtained 91.4 per cent of approval by the national referendum on November 22, 1972. This overwhelming public consent for his extreme measure taken under the martial law seems to have been legitimatized due to President Park's tactful appeal for the re-unification of the Koreas which has overshadowed other important issues. See "The People's Response to the National Unification," Hankuk Ilbo, November 23, 1972.
division of Korea by foreign powers has given rise to nationalism in the DPRK. This nationalism has been capitalized upon in order to mobilize the people into a ferocious hostility toward the South Korean government.

In terms of mass psychology, once the mass public is consentient by a certain common want, which the people realistically cannot accomplish in a given political setting, it is a golden opportunity for political leaders, if they wish, to redirect men's political want into a goal-substitute. Accordingly, the unification issue to the DPRK's leaders seems to serve as a symbolic cue for their political actions that would receive as equal supports from the people as the unification issue. It is therefore political actions that chiefly shape the public wants, not the other way around.28

What political actions do the leaders take in order to, at least in part, fulfill the public demand of national unification? An answer to this question requires a knowledge of the DPRK's political style mostly dramatized by Premier Kim Il Sung himself. Premier Kim may not be a political philosopher, but he deserves the title of a political "fabricator." The so-called Juche ideology of the DPRK was his creation in order to pacify the frustrated masses from

28For a theory of mass psychology and the role of symbolism, see Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana, Ill., 1967), Chapter 2.
war-torn demoralization to a new desire. By Juche, it simply means that the socialist construction in the north, as a revolutionary base to "liberate the south, must be embodied in "Korean way." Juche, as a nationalistic symbolism was presumably meant to imply a two-phase political action--one for external connections, the other for internal consensus. Our primary concern on Juche is with the latter implication.

The traditional character of Korean nationalism was, like any other new nation's history of colonial rule, anti-colonialism. In its post-independence era, the hatred of colonial rule became chauvinistic against all foreign interferences. The post-Korean War era, definitely after the withdrawal of "the Chinese People's Volunteers" army from the DPRK by the end of 1958, found no foreign "bosses" in the soil of the DPRK. This new development seems to have

29 The term, Juche, was first introduced by Kim Il Sung in his speech before the KWP cadres on December 28, 1955. Juche is translated as "Korean autonomy," "Korean subjective entity," or "Self-reliance." Yet the consistent theme is one--nationalistic identity. See Kim Il Sung Sunjip (Selected Works of Kim Il Sung), VI (Pyongyang, 1960), 326. The word Juche literally means "of self-entity" in a general sense. When it is applied to a person, it means of a man of self-control under any given circumstance or against external influences.

30 Juche ideology and its reaction to the "big power chauvinism" (Communist China and the Soviet Union) is only one aspect of the Juche symbolism. Students of Korean affairs in the United States exclusively tend to treat Juche in relation to the DPRK's nationalistic overtones against its fraternal states. Its domestic implication is yet to be explored.
weakened the nature of the traditional nationalism at the mass level. In this totally new setting, the Juche notion, as new nationalism, must have appealed to the people in the face of South Korea's national dependence of its security on the United States troops stationed in Korea.

The mass public does not study and analyze detailed data about the South Korean reliance on the United States defence support or the "dark side" of the U. S.-South Korea alliance system. It ignores these things until political actions and speeches make them symbolically threatening or reassuring, and it then responds to the cue furnished by the actions and the speeches, not to direct knowledge of the fact. The Juche symbolism, in this context, bought a great deal of loyalties from the people. In other words, the Juche appeal, something short of the unification, is bound to function for the tasks "in laying the foundations of socialism in the northern half" as long as Korea is in division. Under the Juche slogan, the people's support is not unexpected.

Non-political Variables

The preceding discussion is essential for an understanding of the DPRK's present-day politics in relation to the Cold War and contiguous environments in its attempt to build a socialist state. We must therefore supplement our description of the superimposed environment by noting briefly and in highly schematic form the effects of the
socio-economic changes on the politics of such a society. The impacts of industrialization as a modernizing movement is also to be considered. Following these two considerations, we shall look into changes in the belief system as well. All of these variables are by nature non-political, but their influence upon the political process is believed to be crucial.

The DPRK's changes in economic structure have gone through two different stages. The first stage was before the Korean war of 1950 and the second stage began after the war (1954). In the first three years (1948-1950), the Communist government nationalized more than one thousand industrial enterprises, eliminating the economic foundation of the colonial property and the "comprador" classes completely. The figures reported for 1949, compared with those reported for 1946, show that total industrial output increased 3.4 times and "state industry" grew 4.2 times, exceeding the 1944 production under Japanese rule by 24 per cent. The report also says that the gross national income had doubled by 1949 as compared with 1946. This includes

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31 The conditions of an underdeveloped economy and the measures used to eliminate the colonial economic structure during this early stage of the DPRK's economic restructure are examined in Philip Rudolph, *North Korea's Political Economic Structure* (New York, 1959), pp. 33-35.

32 The DPRK's industrial structure before the Korean war of 1950 consisted of the large "state industrial" establishments and small-scale "private cooperative" industries. The latter kinds were organized by amalgamating fragmented handicrafts outside industrial centers.
salary increases of 83 per cent, according to the report.33

These data with regard to economic changes are the figures released by the DPRK government to demonstrate its economic improvement in terms of percentages for the period immediately following the end of Japanese colonialism. These comparative figures, however, would be of little meaning to those who are not fully acquainted with the colonial economy as an index of underdevelopment, to which those figures can be compared. Therefore, any attempt to evaluate the DPRK's economy by utilizing available sources should correct the percentages to absolute terms and assess the actual progress of economic measures of the regime in its divorce from South Korea. Since we don't have the 1945 index in absolute figures, the study cannot present meaningful terms of economic changes for the period before the Korean war.

Before the war, private farming predominated, and the socialist sector constituted a small proportion. However, the Korean War of 1950 was a turning point for the socialist economy. Thanks to the war destruction of the farming population and a shortage of draught animals, the traditional basis of small-scale private farms were replaced by cooperative farms. The agricultural cooperatives at the initial stage after the

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33 Data presented in percentages are based on a study by Yoon T. Kuark, "North Korea's Industrial Development during the Post-war Period," North Korea Today, edited by Robert A. Scalapino (1963), pp. 51-52.
war were organized with no more than forty to one hundred poor peasant households, volunteering at the T'ong level. Gradually, the small-scale cooperatives were enlarged, by merging more than one hundred to three hundred households for each li by the end of 1958. As a result of the large-scale cooperatives, well-to-do peasants and rich farmers were forced to surrender their lands and thus became members of laboring peasants for the agricultural cooperatives. As far as grain production is concerned, the regime announced that grain output in 1946 was 2,870,000 tons, surpassing the prewar years, and 3,200,000 tons in 1958, almost double that of the first year after the end of Japanese colonial rule.

We have no other information to verify the production data and other claims of the Communist regime. It claims that the cooperative economy is the most rational and advantageous socialist economy in order to cope with specific conditions derived from the war damage. Our interpretation,

\[34\] A traditional Korean farming village in the rural countryside is called T'ong which usually represents forty to one hundred households. The next level of T'ong is a li which includes normally three to four T'ongs. A li is the smallest administrative unit in rural areas. Accordingly we can assume that the small-scale agricultural cooperatives were based on T'ong, and larger cooperatives were based on li. A li-based cooperative is known to operate about five hundred hectares. One hectare equals 2.471 acres.

\[35\] Data are based on Kim Il Sung's report to the National Congress of Agricultural Cooperatives on January 5, 1959. For a partial text, see Selected Writings of Kim Il Sung, p. 24.
at best, is that the rural economy was on the verge of a radical change in order to lay a groundwork for industrial economy by economizing farming manpower for industrial uses. As a result, a significant number of farmers became factory workers in the Five Year Plan for industrialization (1957-1961). According to statistical records, the urban population increased from 17.7 per cent of the total population, computed in 1953, to 44.5 per cent in 1963. Conversely, the rural population decreased from 82.3 per cent to 55.5 in the corresponding period. In mid-1963 the total labor force was estimated about six million. A statistical breakdown in comparative terms shows that the percentage of factory workers rose from 21.2 per cent in 1953 to 40.2 per cent in 1963. The percentage of peasants decreased from 66.4 per cent to 42.8 per cent for the same period.36 (See Table 1.)

Perhaps no other economic establishments of the DPRK were as severely damaged as its industrial facilities. The industry left by the Japanese masters did not help the post-war economy of the DPRK. Pyongyang's drive for industrial recovery manifested a clear preference for the Chinese style, of which the Great Leap Forward and the commune movement were most similar. However these “emulation movements” by

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36 Peasant population represented here indicates a total farming population including both "cooperative" peasants and individual farmers as quoted in Pukhan Chong-Gam 1945-1968 (General Survey of North Korea, 1945-1969) (Seoul, 1968), p. 35.
### TABLE I

POPULATION STRUCTURE AND OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTIONS,
SELECTED YEARS, 1953-1963*

(in per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Factory Workers</th>
<th>Peasants</th>
<th>Others**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>82.3</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>16.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>59.4</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>42.8</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**"Others" consist of office workers, handicraftsmen, entrepreneurs, and tradesmen. Among these other occupations, office workers consistently increased as 8.5, 13.6, 13.4, 13.7, and 15.1.

the DPRK's domestic economic policy has been differently described by W. G. Burchett in these terms:

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37 Glenn D. Paige seems to indicate that the DPRK's Chollima movement was a part of Pyongyang's general emulation of the Chinese campaign and particularly "to learn" from the Chinese Great Leap Forward movement. See Glenn D. Paige, "North Korea and the Emulation of Russia and Chinese Behavior," Communist Strategies in Asia, edited by A. Doak Barnett (New York, 1963), pp. 242-247. However, this author found the claim unconvincing. China's Great Leap Forward movement was officially adopted at the Second Session of 80th Congress of the CCP in May, 1958. Korea's Chollima movement was declared at the December Plenum of the Central Committee of the KWP on December 11, 1957.
A huge bronze statue of Chollima, a winged steed racing towards the future, with a youth and a maid on its back, atop a pedestal 150 feet high, dominates the Pyongyang skyline today. According to Korean legends going back for centuries, Chollima was capable of bearing those fortunate enough to clamber on its back a thousand li a day toward the "land of happiness." Chollima has been adopted as the symbol of the speed with which the country was to be rebuilt. Its name was officially given to a movement launched in 1957 to fulfill the five-year industrialization plan ahead of time. The Chollima spirit was around from the first days of reconstruction.\textsuperscript{38}

Another interpretation of the Chollima movement for the period of the Five Year Plan had a different view. The 1968 edition of the Area Handbook for Korea contained the following passage:

To insure the successful outcome of the plan, the Government set in motion a mass mobilization measure called the Chollima (Flying Horse) movement. The measure was designed to maximize production in all economic sectors by spurring the people to the limits of their physical endurance.\textsuperscript{39}

With the Chollima speed at which economic development plans changed, the Five Year Plan by the target year of 1961 indicated its significant accomplishment. As Table II shows, pig iron and fabric were slightly below the original target but moderately successful, whereas coal, fertilizers,

\textsuperscript{38}Wilfred G. Burchett, \textit{Again Korea} (New York, 1968), p. 71. Burchett is an Australian correspondent who has reported the Korean War and the Panmunjom truce talk for two years for the Paris journal, \textit{Ce Soir}. He visited the DPRK again in the spring of 1967. However, his sympathetic report for the DPRK has received a number of criticisms from Western scholars. Burchett is a Marxist himself.

### TABLE II

**SELECTED DATA ON TARGET AND PRODUCTION**

(Unit in 1,000 metric tons unless otherwise indicated)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pig iron</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>930</td>
<td>1,159</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>2,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>12,400</td>
<td>14,900</td>
<td>20,500</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical Fertilizers</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>853</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>1,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice and Grains</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>4,100</td>
<td>4,400**</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fabric</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric power</td>
<td>1,850</td>
<td>10,418</td>
<td>11,676</td>
<td>13,260</td>
<td>17,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: N.A. -- not available  
**-- estimated  
a-- 1,000 meters  
b-- million kilowatt/hours


Grains, and electric power were far above the target. The start of that race was set in April, 1955, when targets for the Five Year Plan were announced in the Chollima spirit. Statistics are an inadequate means of representing real economic changes and growth, but a minimum of numbers must shed the insight.
The Five Year Plan (1957-1961) was followed by the Seven Year Plan (1961-1967). In 1946 industry accounted for 28 per cent of the gross national product, agriculture and fishing 72 per cent. By 1967, the figures had been reversed, industry indicated for 76 per cent of the total. Machine building, together with steel output which provided the backbone of industrial expansion, accounted for over 25 per cent of the country's industrial output. Grain output in 1956 was 2,870,000 tons. In 1957 it was 3,200,000 tons, double that of 1946. By 1965, 4,500,000 tons were produced with all the prospects for further increase in 1967.

Although it was selective, our statistical review of the DPRK's economic output is too "fantastic" to be true. A rough estimate of the growth of the regime's national income indicates a more than 20 per cent per annum rate. Even if we make allowances for overrated uses of percentages, we still get impressive leaps which allegedly have been taken by the Communist regime during the post-Korean war construction.

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Yet, our primary concern is not with the actual output of the economic establishment. Instead, it is with the impact of the economic change caused by the economic growth. As a result of the agrarian collectivization, everyone in the system became a poor farmer. Well-to-do farmers and rich tillers were reduced to cooperative workers. The quick change to an industrial nation meant an injection of modernity to the traditional society as a stimulant. The communal means of production entailed a mass society, which is an ideal ground for political communications in terms of "organizational media."\footnote{42}

In contrast to the expanding economic conditions which prevailed during the post-war period, social conditions under the Communist system, which entailed "anti-family-ism," substantiated the fact of a revolutionary socialization of the DPRK. By social conditions I mean all of the "non-economic" forces, which could be any social form of institutional structures or organizational association that may play an important role in the formation of particular policies of the DPRK. In this frame of reference, we can

\footnote{42The term "organizational media" is used in the context of the DPRK's communal and regimented organizations (i.e., agricultural cooperatives and industrial cooperatives). According to Rosenau, "organizational media refers to those impersonal instruments intended only for, and made available only to, members or potential members of an organization or association who are able or want to utilize them." In the DPRK, everyone is an active member of more than one organization. See James N. Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (New York, 1961), p. 77.}
hypothetically state that the foreign policy of the DPRK is conditioned or limited by both the fact of the new revolutionary ways of life and its contingent change in social association.

Stories about life in the Communist society by 1960 always discussed workers' life in the cooperative farms and industrial cooperatives. That is to say, individual life is completely incorporated with collective life, which is indeed a revolutionary change from the tradition of family-based life. Accordingly a look at the Red Star cooperative farm is presented here to represent the characteristic life of the socialist system in all of the 3,843 cooperative farms in the DPRK as described by W. G. Burchett. 43

The Red Star farm is located at Hamheuing metropolitan suburb. Lady comrade Han made her present position as manager of the farm from a poor farmer's wife. The farm is a cooperative of 320 peasant households and six landlords who once owned 70 per cent of the cultivated land in the present cooperative. She lost her husband and two sons in the Korean war of 1950. Initially the farm was organized by thirty war-widows in the post-war year in order to pool farming implements and labor power. Within a few years five other farming pools were formed. In July, 1956, they were

43 This story on the Red Star cooperative farm and the Hamheuing machine-building plant is Burchett's eye-witness report of 1967. Hamheuing is the second largest metropolitan area with a population of about a half-million, located on the East coast of the DPRK.
merged into one. The size of the farm at the time of Burchett's visit was just under 400 households, comprising 400-plus working members and 483 hectares of arable land and orchards, 1,300 head of livestock and 4,000 poultry. The farm had five tractors and one truck. Fifty-five children of the farmers were university graduates, most of them back on the farm working as farming specialists and other professions related to the community. Ninety-eight were either at university or doing a university correspondence course at a higher technical school. There were 383 babies and small children in the farm's nurseries and kindergartens.44

At the Hamheung machine-building plant, Burchett found a similar story. Like almost every other director, the manager of the plant, comrade Kim Byong-han, came up from the rank and file of workers in the plant he is managing. The plant employed 6,500 workers, 35 per cent of them women. The plant had its own apartment facilities for those workers and their families. Schools, ranging from nurseries and secondary schools to a college and higher technical school, were inside the plant area. Nursery and kindergarten services are free and so is education and medical care. Once children start school, they get school uniforms free of charge. Outside working hours, workers are encouraged to

44Burchett, op. cit., pp. 86-88. Burchett's sympathetic story of the Red Star Farm no doubt exaggerates life of the cooperative farmers. However, we are only concerned with such changes taken place in the post-war year, not much concerned with his sympathetic stories.
attend the factory night school and directed to participate in public lectures and community meetings.\textsuperscript{45}

The new social structure leaves very little or almost no time at the disposal of the individual for family. If he has spare time he is expected to perform some service for the State and other public associations. Many factory workers and commune farmers are encouraged to take extension courses or attend factory colleges after working hours. As soon as he finishes his workday a worker is expected to participate in indoctrination lectures or to attend meetings, rallies or social services. As a rule, Sunday mornings are scheduled for military drill and the afternoons are spent in one of many "study sessions" guided by the Party cadres.

At social meetings and study sessions, the traditional patrilineal family system is criticized as "feudal and bourgeois" vestiges. Women and young people are being urged to assert their rights. Young men and boys are encouraged to join and be loyal to youth groups.\textsuperscript{46} In group activities, they are taught that the power of the State and the Party is superior even to that of the father. Thus, children have learned new social orders and relationships outside the family. They are expected to find the groups as a source

\textsuperscript{45}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 74-75.

\textsuperscript{46}To mention a few, the Socialist Working Youth League accepts young men from fourteen to thirty years of age. The Young Pioneers enrolls all children between nine and thirteen years of age.
of support and honored for defying or questioning parental authority. The fact is that the family system is being destroyed from within, when wives and children revolt against the househead authority. A Young Pioneer gets an honorary medal from the Party, if he publically defames his father's authoritative attitude toward him. Such incidents are not infrequent in the DPRK.

The next issue related to the DPRK's socio-economic changes is the question of changes in belief system. A careful scrutiny of the belief system of the regime would probably take an extensive study on both social and political values, but our scope in the belief system here is limited. By belief system, we mean a man's fundamental concern with his own life—the individual's understanding of what his own life is for. It is a generally accepted notion that personal existence could not be explained in individualistic terms; the worth of a person is measured by the extent of his sacrifice and service for common good as dictated by the regime. Such a totalitarian belief system is certainly foreign to people of a pluralistic society. We wonder just how true the "accusation" is. Yet, if it is true, we would like to know how such a belief system is systematically related to political values.

When we come to think about "thought reform," we recall the Cultural Revolution of Mao's China. One Sinologist has interpreted it as a violent means of creating "a new
generation of Maoist revolutionaries" and a thorough going "educational revolution." 47 Premier Kim's Korea did not need such a violent campaign to recruit militant revolutionary cadres, simply because a Korean counterpart of the Chinese thought reform processes has been taking place, not on the streets, but in indoor classrooms and social meetings. In other words, when China was on the verge of the Cultural Revolution in 1968, the DPRK's indoctrination programs for "socialist construction," "socialist patriotism," and the making of "a new Communist man" were about to be finished.

Because of the importance of education as a political, economic, and social instrument, the Government has given it highest priority. This emphasis is occasioned not only by the desire to attain immediate goals, but derives also from the fear of the revolutionary leadership that the youth, having had no direct experience with "capitalist exploitation," will not possess the fervor deemed by the leadership necessary to continue the Communist revolution or pass it on to future generations. This reflects an awareness by the leaders that goals of the revolution are unlikely to be achieved in their lifetime. 48

The DPRK's educational system is a 4-3-3-4(5). It means that the system is composed of a four-year People's School (primary) a three-year Junior High (or Junior Tech),

47 After all, it is still questionable whether the Cultural Revolution of China did really create the second generation of the Long March generation of die-hard revolutionary rebels in China. For details, see Jurgen Domes, "Some Results of the Cultural Revolution in China," Asian Survey, XI, No. 9 (September, 1971), 932-940.

48 Area Handbook for North Korea, p. 133.
a three-year Senior High (or Middle Tech), and a four or five-year college or university. The structure of the educational system has been revised several times, the most recent reform having occurred on July 1, 1972. By this reform, "Universal Compulsory Education" was extended from nine years of free education to ten years up to Senior High School. Under the system, a child goes to the four-year People's school (inmin hakkyo), starting at the age of seven, then goes to the three-year junior high (chung hakkyo), and then goes on to the three-year senior technical school (kisool hakkyo).

At any rate, formal education in the DPRK has two objectives. Its general purpose is to teach children the Communist morality, "to hate the enemy," and to learn the spirit of loving labor. Its special emphasis, on the other hand, is placed on technical education at higher learning institutions. The same function is implemented in adult education. Mothers are enlisted in the educational process by the Women's Union. For the workers, the labor unions play the role; for the peasants, the cooperative farms are the

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ideological tutors. Furthermore, parents are being instructed by the Party and the Government that their children are the sons and daughters of the Party and the Nation and not their offspring.

An optimistic judgment may claim that man's faculty of "free-will" or self-consciousness resists any indoctrination by the Party and the Government. Such a view, at the best, may find a degree of validity in the old generation who have had experiences other than the Communist system. However, the new generation, who were born in the system after 1945, were definitely vulnerable to the indoctrination. Surprisingly, the post-1945 generation in the DPRK comprises more than 65 per cent of the total population.\(^50\) (See Table III.)

After all these words have been said to describe the belief system remoulded by the Government and vested in the spirit of collectivism, we are not certain of the people's inmost feelings. Did the individual under the totalitarian system really give up control of his own destiny in favor of the people as a whole, as the Party claims? It is yet to be verified in terms of empirical means. However, one thing is clear. That is, as in the past, it has been a consistent and living philosophy for Koreans that loyalty to the State

\(^{50}\)Incidentally, the force of the population component is considered the most crucial factor for the unification of Korea. Our estimated trend for the next decade indicates that the present 65 per cent of the post-1945 generation will increase to more than 75 per cent. The distance between the North and South Korea is already too far to think in terms of "one people" in the younger generation.
TABLE III
ESTIMATED AGE AND SEX COMPOSITION
OF THE POPULATION, 1968*
(in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 5</td>
<td>1,167</td>
<td>1,130</td>
<td>2,297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9</td>
<td>967</td>
<td>940</td>
<td>1,907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-14</td>
<td>809</td>
<td>783</td>
<td>1,592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total under 15</td>
<td>2,943</td>
<td>2,853</td>
<td>5,796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-19</td>
<td>659</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>1,273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>1,147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>551</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>1,051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 20-29</td>
<td>1,148</td>
<td>1,050</td>
<td>2,198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-44</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-49</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-54</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-59</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-64</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 30-64</td>
<td>1,751</td>
<td>1,879</td>
<td>3,630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65-69</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70-74</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 75</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>6,703</td>
<td>6,650</td>
<td>13,353</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources: Chosun Chunggan Yongam (1964); Toitsu Chosen Nenkan 1967-1968; Pukhan Chonggam, 1945-1968 (General Survey of North Korea).
is a practical morality. Both the Confucian ethic and the ruling ethos of the Japanese occupation in Korea were mutually reinforcing and interdependent for the State power. The present change in the socialistic (or Communistic) regime had simply to replace the old family-based piety with the Commune-based piety for the State. The present political value (Marxism-Leninism) may disappear under certain circumstances leaving no traces, but the institutionalized belief of a "unitarism" will remain for sometime. Assuming this is a reasonable evaluation, if a one-third of the population becomes loyal to the regime's hostile ideology of revolution, the DPRK's confrontation policy is legitimatized for its function.

In conclusion, no political system can function in the absence of popular support. We assume that the DPRK, too, maintains a minimum support for its public policy. On the other hand, the public demands and supports are expressions relative to their experiences within a limited knowledge of their own life and the State. The regime's intensive indoctrination—to love Socialism and to hate Capitalism—is bound to give a policy support for the Communists' confrontation with South Korea, not because of the ideological

The author argues that Communism as well as Capitalism in Korea are foreign to average Koreans. They never had such a black-and-white distinction in their long history of 4,000 years. The present political ideologies of both Korea, in this perspective, are merely political instruments for those individuals in power.
difference, but because Koreans are born with a belief system of obedience to the superior.
PART TWO

ENDOGENOUS CONDITIONS

Exogenous constants and exogenous variables, as they have been explained above, set the conditions for the political consciousness of the North Korean people in terms of the supports and demands of the political system. But we cannot speak of the politics of the DPRK by considering exogenous factors alone. There exist conditions within the political system itself which determine the demands and supports of the people.

Among these endogenous conditions, there are those which are comparatively resistant to change and those which are rather susceptible to change. But actually it is impossible to separate the two definitely. In Chapter IV, we are to discuss some fundamental political institutions tentatively as endogenous constants. For example, the basic formation of the political elements, such as the principles in the DPRK's ideological foundation, the political structures of the "proletariat dictatorship," and the norms of charismatic leadership, are considered to be constants in a general sense, because all factions of the KWP have indicated that they have no intention of changing these existing fundamental structures. And more, though there are some elements of democratic segments found in the so-called
"people's democracy," it seems unlikely that the parliamentary system of the West will emerge within a foreseeable future by forces within the political system. However, if, for example, a coup d'état by the impact of international circumstances or by internal power struggles should occur, it would be another problem.

Now, assuming that these fundamental structures are constants, the most important problems are those concerned with a balance between the ideological foundation of Marxist-Leninist proclivity and the emergence of the Juche ideology. If the absolute dogmatism of Communism breaks down, and instead, a severe conflict between the two ideologies (the Communists versus the leftist new nationalists) arises, then there will possibly emerge a new national polity. But this possibility will not be merely prescribed directly by the existing politico-legal structures of the proletariat dictatorship, but will also be proved by endogenous variables.

In Chapter V, a consideration of three endogenous variables of the political system is made in terms of the single-party politics, political recruitment, and political institutions. The inveterate characteristic of the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) supremacy, which has been discussed frequently, is that of a supra-Constitutional structure which sponsors the governmental policy as well as recruiting political leaders.
Points in consideration other than the structure of the KWP are the political elites recruited in the case of the single-party politics and the governmental organizations existed in support of the party politics. The first is the KWP's complete dependence upon unions and the younger generation. The question is which path should the Party take in order to get the support of the diverse social classes which have appeared as the result of modern conditions, such as the development of industrialization and urbanization. These social groups consist of organized laborers, the urban lower class, the younger generation, white-collar workers, and professionals who show strong concern for special occupational systems. The second concern is the problems of intra-party leadership. Related to this phenomenon, the notorious factions of the KWP must be taken into account.¹

Political institutions are more technical and changeable than are fundamental political structures. These institutions include the election system, the reformation of administrative organizations, and the restriction of campaign eligibility. The actual powers of the Supreme People's

¹Factions existed in the KWP. The problems of leadership among the factional groups of the KWP will grow increasingly important, because, for one thing, it is expected that there will be more and more situations where intra-party leadership will play an increasingly important role in the destiny of the DPRK. For example, the DPRK's delegates to the North and South Korean talks must be those acceptable persons to South Korea. This will give rise to a new faction which may challenge the existing power structure of the KWP.
Assembly (the DPRK's legislative body) are limited within the present political structure, but it could be strengthened if the present election system changes. The Cabinet, on the other hand, is the highest decision-making body under Premier Kim Il Sung. The Cabinet, too, is viewed as a powerless institution unless the KWP's Central Committee and its Political Committee restrain their controls over the executive branch of the Government.

The above listing of the endogenous conditions (constants and variables) is suggested to be viewed as a set of polity indices of the DPRK which interprets policy sources (exogenous conditions) for policy-making purposes. Although no explicit indices of the endogenous and exogenous conditions are combined into a matrix, our discussion of endogenous conditions presented here are meant to follow an imaginative guideline which combines these conditions with the exogenous conditions examined in Chapters III and IV. (See Figure 7.) By doing so, we expect to pave the way to a conceivable framework of linkage between the DPRK's internal and external politics.

Figure 7 is a simplified matrix which represents the number of possible linkages within the framework of the two sets of policy conditions. However, an emphasis is not given to identifying kinds of linkage that thirty-six cells represent.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exogenous</th>
<th>Geo-Political Constants</th>
<th>Sociological Constants</th>
<th>Cultural Constants</th>
<th>The Cold War Variables</th>
<th>The Contiguous Variables</th>
<th>The Non-political Variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Endogenous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constants:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Ideological Foundation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Political Structures</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Political Leadership</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variables:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Political Parties</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Political Elites</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Political Institutions</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 7--A linkage index in group
Instead, our focus is placed on those possible fusions that may give rise to the input-output correlations with regard to the DPRK's policy saliency. Accordingly, our immediate task in Chapters IV and V is to identify those sub-categories of the DPRK's political system (Polity) as well as to clarify those "constants" and "variables" in order to suggest that the DPRK's national-international behavior consists of a two-phase operation.
CHAPTER IV

ENDOGENOUS CONSTANTS

Ideological Bases for Political Foundation

The DPRK's founding ideology is unequivocally based on Marxist-Leninist dogmatism of political apocalypse. It's basic tenet is a dogmatism because believers of such an ideology accept no other reasoning faculty other than its own philosophical tenets. It is also viewed as apocalyptic because it purports to explain man's "suffering and evil" and upholds a dualism of "good" and "bad" in a battleground. Thus it is prophetic in interpreting history in terms of a communist ending.

The history of the Korean Communist movement goes back to the early 1930's and the developmental stages are described in the rise and fall of different factions. However, the differences in faction were not fought on differences in the principle line of Marxist-Leninist ideology, but for differences in leadership and place where the Korean Communists

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1 Marxism-Leninism for communist revolution has been interpreted as a biblical tenet for political apocalypse. It means that communism has taken a form of religious movement as if it were to open a new era in terms of communist revelation or "revealing." For detail, see Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics: An Introduction (Chicago, 1952), pp. 107-189. Also see Ellis Sandoz, Political Apocalypse: A Study of Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor (Baton Rouge, 1971), pp. 97-100.
operated their revolutionary movements. Presumably, in the early stage of the revolutionary movement, the lack of proper ideological training and their inadequate tactics resulted in confusion, but the Korean Communists were circumstantially blessed for their revolutionary war against the Japanese colonialists till 1945. The early Korean Communists and their activities were merely a movement to liberate their fatherland from the Japanese yoke and they probably raised no question about the ideological origins of the revolution. Therefore it is safe to assume that most Korean Communists during the Japanese occupation (1910-1945), regardless of their revolutionary bases in China, Russia, Manchuria, or Japan, seem to have understood Communism in reference to the October revolution of Russia.

The major aspect of the revolutionary past of the Korean Communist movement to be considered is the role of external influences. To make our argument short, the author's position is that the linkage between the Korean Communist movement and foreign Communist Parties is not more than a case of "indirect" and "emulative" linkage. Although the Comintern was popular among the exile revolutionaries,

\[2\] A similar argument is made by Dae-Sook Suh, Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948 (Princeton, 1967), Chapter 1.

\[3\] Many Korean Communist leaders under the Japanese rule fled from Korea to safe places abroad and attempted to contact with the Comintern. Many of them indeed followed the guidance of the Comintern as well as following other advices of foreign parties. See Ibid., Chapter 2.
no evidence has been materialized to argue that the Koreans in exile did indeed align themselves with their hosts of the Communist parties of China or Russia. That is, Korean revolutionaries operating in these countries may possibly have accepted mutual cooperation with the Communist parties of China and Russia, but these Koreans were quite independent of these foreign Communists.

Accordingly various allegations that there were Korean Communist groups divided into "pro-Chinese" or "pro-Russian" factions in the post-1945's is no more true than an exaggerated assumption that the Korean revolutionaries in China and Russia during World War II were trained by those foreign Communist Parties. However, one point common to all factional groups of the Korean Communists is that they are all serious about their convictions and policies are motivated by Marxist-Leninist teachings. Even though the Korean Communists' understanding of Marxism-Leninism may be viewed as superficial in contrast to that of the Russian Communists, such an ideological tenet should not be taken lightly, simply because it is a set of axioms or a scheme of systematic ideas based upon a particular interpretation of observed phenomena.

A belief in Marxism-Leninism is not merely a political or economic theory; its fundamental attributes are those of a quasi-religious movement, as we previously noted. As a totally new world outlook, its system of thought seeks to
explain communist revolutions in terms of the salvation of mankind. Among the quasi-religious attributes of Marxism-Leninism (communism) are the reliance upon doctrine, catechism, conversion, and the notion of redemption. If the doctrine preaches salvation through the Party membership contingent upon the conversion of commoners into "Communist Man," the struggle between communism and its opponents is considered as inevitable and the victory of the former is viewed as the end of the struggle in the Communist utopia. The belief is comparable to aspects of religious thought known as eschatological—pertaining to the doctrine of final things.

What is the Marxism that the Korean Communists believe? They believe in communist doctrine developed and applied by Karl Marx (1818-1883). To be more specific, they adore the concept of historical materialism which is based on the assumption that thought, mind, and consciousness are reflections of the objective reality of the material, physical world. To Marx "consciousness does not determine life, but life determines consciousness." At the same time, the

4 The analogy between communism and religion has been systematically developed by Nicolas Berdyaev, The Russian Revolution (Michigan, 1961).

5 For more discussion on "eschatology," see Ellis Sandoz, op. cit., pp. 112-118.

6 This materialistic basis of life is reflected in his assertion that economics is the determining factor in the way men behave and always has been that determinant. For details, see Loyd D. Easton and K. H. Guddat, editors,
dialectical theory of history has become the Korean Communists' utmost vision. According to Marx, capitalism is the last stage of economic exploitation. It would be succeeded by the highest and next stage, socialism, which would also be the inevitable outcome of the historical development of political economy. Dialectical development is based on internal movement, self-generated as a result of the internal contradictions, which allegedly result from the struggle of opposites within a unity.

What is Leninism that the Korean Communists believe next to Marxism? They respect Vladimir Ilyich Lenin's teaching as the twentieth century doctrine of Marxism applied to Russian conditions as a proof of communism. According to Lenin, communist movements and revolutionaries require a unique type of political party and party cadres in their attempt to seize power. It is at this point that "the dictatorship of the proletariat" takes a major role in modern communist movements. It was also Lenin who conceptualized "imperialism".

Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society (Garden City, N. J., 1967), pp. 415-220. If a few words are to be added, a question arises concerning socialism as the last, crowning stage of human social development that does not seem to fit his dialectical method of progress. If all previous events have developed through thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, why all of a sudden should this movement cease at the stage of "communism"?

Although Marx originally employed this term, "the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat" in his Critique of the Gotha Program, it was Lenin who gave it practical expression by equating it with the role of the Communist Party. See Alfred G. Meyer, Leninism (Cambridge, 1957), Chapters 1, 3.
in terms of historical and dialectical materialism. Lenin contended that war resulted from the efforts of a "ripening" capitalism to cope with capitalists' internal contradictions and to forestall a revolution:

Imperialism is the highest stage of development of capitalism. Capital in the advanced countries has outgrown the boundaries of national states. It has established monopoly in place of competition, thus creating all the objective prerequisites for the achievement of socialism. Hence, in Western Europe and in the United States, the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat for the overthrow of the capitalist governments, for the expropriation of the bourgeoisie, is on the order of the day.  

In other words, Lenin's view on war is that, faced with declining profits and shrinking markets at home, a new kind of capitalism was said to export abroad to areas possessing raw materials and a cheap labor supply. On the basis of these dubious premises and very limited historical evidence, Lenin thus concluded that wars are inevitable so long as capitalism exists.

Korean Communism in the DPRK today is not solely based on the Marxist-Leninist theory of revolution. Korean Communism before and immediately after the Korean war of 1950, was established within the broad framework of the Marxist-Leninist fervor without a concrete ground. But the regime from the mid-1950's increasingly claimed that its Party's line and policies were "a creative application" of

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8 For a further account of Lenin's thesis of "imperialism" and the text, see Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, Critical Remarks on the National Questions: The Right of Nations to Self-Determination (Moscow, 1954), pp. 170-189.
Marxism-Leninism to suit the specific realities of Korea. A momentum was marked by the founding of the Juche idea, as we previously noted, side by side with the Marxist-Leninist ideology.  

The ideas of Juche in mid-1965, ten years after it was first introduced, already had learned its ideological status as equal to that of Marxism-Leninism. Thus Premier Kim, the founder of the Juche idea, was ready to export it to revolutionaries of other countries. In his speech before a group of Indonesian social scientists on April 14, 1965, Premier Kim bragged about Juche Korea:

All our victories and successes in the socialist revolution and the building of socialism are attributable to the Marxist-Leninist leadership of our Party and to the heroic struggle of our people for the thorough implementation of the Party's line and policies. What was most important for our Party in giving correct leadership to the Korean people in their revolutionary struggle and work of construction was to establish Juche firmly.

... the establishment of Juche means holding fast to the principle of solving for oneself all the problems of the revolution and construction in conformity with the actual conditions at home, and mainly by one's own efforts. This is a realistic and creative position, opposing dogmatism and applying the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism and the experiences of the international revolutionary movement to one's country in conformity with its historical conditions and national peculiarities. ...

9 Ever since the Communist Party's creation of Juche in 1955, it has gradually become a "catchword" among the communists. Juche is now a firmly established concept forcefully applied to all aspects. It is said that Juche is to be the bedrock of the ideology, politics, economy, education and national security of the DPRK.
we respect the experiences of other countries, but always take a critical attitude toward them. So, we accept experiences beneficial to us, but reject those which are unnecessary or harmful. When introducing the good experience of another country, we remodel and modify it to suit the actual conditions of our own.

If one fails to establish Juche in the ideological and political spheres, he will be unable to display any initiative because his faculty of independent thinking is paralyzed, and in the end he will even become unable to tell right from wrong and will blindly follow that others do. One who has lost his autonomy and independence in this way may fall into revisionism, dogmatism . . . and opportunism. . . .

As we noted earlier in footnote 29 (p. 106), the ideological concept of Juche was originally introduced to a KWP conference for political cadres on December 28, 1955. The Juche agenda in the conference was Premier Kim's serious plea for a creation of his own image in communist leadership, implying that Kim himself is the only living heir of communist leadership, third only to Marx and Lenin. Six months prior to the cadre conference, Premier Kim had tested the dramatic idea of Juche at the KWP April Plenary meeting on April 4, 1955. His theme before the Plenary meeting was something drastically new to the Korean Communists. Instead of praising Marxism-Leninism in the Korean communist movement as he always had, Kim was critical of "bookish" followers of the Marxist-Leninist ideology. Urging that these foreign origins must be selective in the Korean Communist revolution,

Kim announced *Juche* (be practical and realistic) ideology of the Korean Communist experiences.\(^{11}\) Contrary to Kim's expectation, the *Juche* ideology was not enthusiastically received by those communists at the meeting.

Surprised by a negative reaction from the Plenary floor, Kim again had to appeal to the Party cadre conference in December, 1955. This time, changing his tone from a severe criticism of the foreign elements to a compatible tone, Kim urged the need of a Korean counterpart of the Marxist-Leninist ideology:

The fact is that we cannot separate Korean nationalism from communist internationalism. Patriotism of Korean Communists toward their nation not only serves for Korean revolutions, but it also contributes to the cause of international communism. To love Korea means to love the Soviet Union and other socialist people as well. In short, an establishment of *Juche* ideology does not necessarily mean to antagonize foreign elements including the Soviet Union. Indeed, we need to learn from the Soviet friends, but what is most important is an establishment of *Juche* ideology of Korea paralleled to that of internationalism.\(^{12}\)

Judging from the above quotations, it appears that the *Juche* ideology is nothing more than an ideological fabric for Kim Il Sung himself. If Maoism is an adequate description of Chinese Communism, Communism in the DPRK can be represented in terms of *Juche* or "Kimism." A clear evidence is that Kim wants to educate Korean Communists with his

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\(^{11}\)For a partial text of Kim's speech, see *Kim Il Sung Sunjiip* (Selected Works of Kim Il Sung), IV (Pyongyang, 1960), 260-261.

writings and revolutionary experiences of his own. In practicing the Juche ideology of Korea, the Korean Communists are now forced to study writings of Kim Il Sung more than those of Marx and Lenin. For example, the Party's efforts to speed up publishing Kim Il Sung Sunjip, which started in 1954, resulted in the publication of six volumes by the end of 1960. Party libraries and numerous "study rooms" for workers and peasants were subsequently supplied with works of Kim. This movement was further accelerated by Kim's complaints about "surplus" influences of foreign elements in the Korean ideological revolution:

I, one day, had a visit to a military recreational center of the Korean People's Army. I found paintings of Siberian landscape on the wall. They may be beautiful pieces of living room decoration for Russians, but not for Koreans. What is wrong with hanging paintings of our own scenic beauties? My visit to a People's School (elementary school) was displeased by finding Aleksander S. Pushkin's portrait and other foreign figures on the school wall. A further dissident discovery was that most of the text books' cover jackets were designed by, or originated from, foreign.  

Juche is difficult jargon to precisely interpret the true intent of Premier Kim. However, it is clear that Juche is representative of Kim's communism in Korea scrambled with nationalism. At present, we cannot measure what proportions of communism and nationalism make up the Juche ideology. The compound mixture, however, is an outcome of Kim's tactful

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13 Kim's remarks are as quoted in In-Hoo Bang, Pukchosun Rodong-tang ui Hyongsung kwa Baljon (The Formation and Development of the Workers' Party of Korea) (Seoul, 1967), pp. 200-201.
balancing against an apparent surplus of the Marxist-Leninist ideology and against the revolutionary experiences of Russia and China. In terms of Juche, Premier Kim may earn his popularity not only from Korean Communists but also from other socialist Parties of the Third World. Conversely, a far reaching prediction as to the future direction of Korean Communism is dependent upon what Kim Il Sung believes. If he believes in Korea more than communism, all the exogenous policy conditions would be processed in terms of nationalism. A reverse situation may also occur if domestic conditions develop against Kim's Juche movement.

As Figure 8 shows the Juche ideology is a unique but understandable concept for Kim's political game. Under certain circumstances, the sphere and size of Marxism-Leninism, communism, nationalism, and the experiences of Russia and China are readjustable, since it is a dynamic structure for "Kimist" communism in Korea. (See Note on Figure 8.)

Political Structures

One of the kernel problems for Russian Communists after the October revolution of 1917 was how to systemize the revolution. Concerning tactics, the so-called "new constitutionalists" stood against the "popularists." The former insisted that a long period of parliamentary government was required to enable the proletariat to prepare itself for power, whereas the latter, led by Lenin, successfully asserted and called for the immediate establishment of a
Note: Juche is a sum of spheres A, B, C, and D. Suppose a perfect balance of Juche equals with A's, B's, C's, and D's even values of 25, we can say that Juche (100) = 25 + 25 + 25 + 25. From this index of 100 scale of Juche, A's, B's, C's, and D's respective value 25 may be increased or decreased under certain circumstances as, for example, 25 + 15 + 35 + 25. Accordingly Juche characteristics change, as these components change their qualities and quantities as well.

Fig. 8--The dynamic composition of Juche ideology
proletarian dictatorship. Accordingly, from the initial departure of the October revolution, the Bolsheviks led, not the peasantry as a whole, but the poor section of the peasantry toward the end of the revolution. Thus the history of Bolshevism was the history of the struggle the Bolsheviks waged against the "kulaks" (well-to-do peasants) and the middle peasantry in the name of a "revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasantry." Likewise, the socialist revolution in the DPRK also maintains this slogan of the dictatorship of proletariat as its revolutionary goal.

Like all the Communist leaders of the world today, Premier Kim Il Sung claims that he is the only one in Korea who truly understands the meaning of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The claim is, to some extent, reminiscent of what Mao Tse-Tung of China had said about the Chinese version of the dictatorship of the proletariat as a "united front of


15 V. I. Lenin, Selected Works, VI, p. 34, as quoted in Joseph Stalin, Leninism: Selected Writings (New York, 1942), p. 49. According to Lenin, bourgeois democracy is a democratic form of government for capitalists of the minor populace, whereas the proletarian democracy is for workers and the poor peasantry of the majority.
all revolutionary forces."\(^{16}\) Kim's ideas and theory were developed in his work, "On Questions of the Transitional Period from Capitalism to Socialism and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat":

As with all other scientific and theoretical questions, questions of the transitional period and the dictatorship of the proletariat should be solved on the basis of the Juche idea of our Party. We should never try to solve these questions dogmatically by becoming slaves to the classical propositions on this question, nor should we be influenced by subservient ideas and follow others in the solution of these questions.\(^{17}\)

According to Kim's interpretation of classical propositions concerning the proletarian dictatorship, it is essential to understand the historical circumstances and the premise on which the classical works were based.\(^{18}\) Subsequently, Kim claimed that only on this basis it is possible to understand

\(^{16}\)Mao's view is different from that of Lenin. Mao sees that China's "new democratic" revolution was characteristic of both the "democratic revolution" of the West and the so-called socialist revolution of the proletarian dictatorship. To be specific, Mao's revolution was not based on either the bourgeois dictatorship or the proletarian dictatorship. It was a dictatorship of "revolutionary federation of all progressive classes." For details, see Mao Tse-Tung Hsuanchi (Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung), Japanese edition, Vol. 4 (Peking, 1956), 191-193.


\(^{18}\)By "the classical works," Kim was presumably talking in reference to Lenin's theory of "the bourgeois revolution" as a transitional stage before the next higher stage of "the proletarian revolution." For details, see History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Moscow, 1960), p. 97. A further reference might possibly be made to refute Mao Tse-Tung's notion of "national bourgeoisie" as a class element in the stage of the bourgeois revolution for a transition to the socialist revolution. For a full account of
the content of classical propositions and to grasp meanings of the socialist revolution.

From the standpoint of productive forces of proletarian revolutionaries, Kim does not see that an establishment of the socialist system is followed immediately by complete socialist industrialization. Such a systematic change, for him, may occur in some developed capitalist countries, but not in Korean circumstances. Likewise, questions concerning the transitional period and the dictatorship of the proletariat, according to him, can be solved when the essential content of the transitional period and its basic characteristics of Korean Communism are understood from the standpoint of class struggle. The point that Kim tried to make with regard to the proletarian dictatorship applied to Korea is that the economic backwardness of Korea requires a "transitional stage" between bourgeois democracy and proletarian democracy.

What are the characteristics of the transitional period that Kim described in terms of the proletarian dictatorship? In the first place, Korea had to pass through a preparatory stage before going into the transitional period of socialism. In other words, upon gaining independence from Japanese colonialism, Koreans had to crush all resistance of foreign imperialists and domestic "reactionary" forces, laying the

"national bourgeois," see Mao Tse-Tung Hsuanchi (Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung), Vol. 1, pp. 90, 162.
foundations for an independent national economy. Kim refers to it as a "people's democratic system" under the leadership of the working class. To this end, the DPRK had to destroy Korea's old socio-economic basis by its programs of land reform and nationalization of key industries.

Thus, the so-called "dictatorship of People's democracy" occurred in the preparatory stage before the transitional period and the stage is known as the "people's democratic revolution." The pre-stage is based on a worker-peasant alliance led by the working class. In this sense, it may be said to perform essentially the same function of a dictatorship of the proletariat, relying on a broad united front, including even petty-bourgeois classes and other national capitalists.

In the second place, the dictatorship of the proletariat is established when all the tasks of the people's democratic revolution are fulfilled and new tasks to be carried out in the transitional period to socialism are posed. In this stage, national capitalists are to be educated and remolded into socialist working people. Private ownership of the means of production, including capitalist ownership, is to be completely abolished, as are distinctions between workers and peasants and between town and countryside. Needless to

\[\text{In the stage of the people's democratic revolution, liquidation of the capitalist class, unless this class is foreign, in general is not a prerequisite; the important task is elimination of the "comprador capitalists" who are in collusion with imperialist elements.}\]
say, the end of the transitional period does not immediately lead to socialism. Even after the end of the transitional period, Kim sees it is necessary to continue the revolution so that the state may pass on to the higher stage of communism. By the higher stage of communism is meant not only a classless society where class distinctions no longer exist between workers and peasants, but also a highly developed society where each person works according to his ability and each receives commodities and services according to his needs.

According to Kim, in a completely successful socialist society, a classless society, there still remain distinctions between mental and physical labor, and differences in the quality of labor between workers and peasants, although class differences between them have been ended. And these distinctions will disappear only in the higher stage of communism, when all branches of the economy have been mechanized and automated, and when all working people have achieved the levels of engineers and technicians and have been educated and remolded into highly cultured and conscious communists.\(^{20}\)

Assuming that the higher stage of communism will remain as merely a utopia or unrealizable dreamland, the so-called

The historical mission of the dictatorship of the proletariat is an unending political tactic of perpetual revolution. Thus, the questions of the transitional period and the dictatorship of the proletariat are closely related political "givens" for the DPRK's endogenous constants. Specifically, it is erroneous to believe that the transitional period ever comes to an end, since differences in modes of working and thinking in human affairs are not likely to disappear completely.

Related to the political structure of the proletarian dictatorship, a concept of the "people's democracy" as we noted in passing is another structural characteristic of the DPRK's political constant. Korean Communists in the DPRK understand democracy in terms of class struggle. Western democracy to them is democracy for the handful of people of the exploiting classes. In contrast to this, they see that their democracy (people's democracy) is for the exploited against the exploiters. In other words, democracy is essentially a form of dictatorship and the difference is based upon who dictates to whom.²¹

²¹According to their version of democracy, in any state, democracy is democracy for the class in power, and goes along with dictatorship against the enemy classes. Kim Il Sung has made this point clear in his thesis on "people's democracy": "There can be no pure democracy or complete freedom for all people. Bourgeois democracy is the freedom for millionaires to exploit and plunder the working people, . . . We are opposed to an abstract and supra-class interpretation of democracy." For details, see Kim Il Sung Sunjip (Selected Works of Kim Il Sung), Vol. 2 (Pyongyang, 1963), 25, 28.
Kim Il Sung's notion of "people's democracy" is derived from his belief in Marxism-Leninism. This may suggest that we do not need to inquire about the origin of "people's democracy." However, Kim's contradictory, or ironic philosophic position started with the term, "united national front" and rarely does he elaborate on this philosophy as much as Lenin did. Kim spoke of democracy in terms of "Party competition" on the one hand and "Party dictatorship" on the other. In fact, his thesis on democracy has been inconsistent and obscure. Furthermore, he is not slow to criticize the Communist Party's (KWP) predominance over other political parties:

... some of our comrades in the KWP are reluctant to discuss important issues for the Party and the people with other friendly political parties. They sometime even create unnecessary conflicts with the non-Communist parties. Such conflicts between our party and other political parties are undemocratic and will result in the breaking of the KWP's commitment for a "united front." We no longer can offer the antagonistic attitudes of the KWP members toward other democratic parties.22

Yet a hasty judgment of Kim's democratic statement is bound to fall into a deceptive conclusion that the "people's democracy" in the DPRK is basically democratic. A close look is therefore necessary if we are to give a better judgment on Kim's interpretation of democracy.

22 Ibid., pp. 25-26. In terms of "united national front" with other non-communist elements, Kim does not explain how the coalition can be reconciled with the dictatorship of the proletariat.
Upon his seizure of power in 1948 Kim first labelled his kind of democracy as a "progressive democracy," which is distinctive from the concept of Western democracy:

We hear quite popular terms such as "sovereignty" and "democracy" today. These terms are welcomed as long as sovereignty rests upon rights of the people and democracy is for the people. However, those democratic practices in America and England cannot be adapted to the principles suitable for the DPRK. Western democracy is not only an obsolete concept but also it will again colonize us, if we choose it. Thus, Koreans need a new type of democracy which would cope with the conditions in Korea. I designate it as a "progressive democracy."  

Again, Kim did not explain what "progressive democracy" is. He simply repudiated Western democracy as obsolete.

The term, "progressive democracy," was replaced by "people's democracy" in 1950. By "people's democracy," it was meant to create a hypothetical phenomenon equivalent to a capitalist stage. That is to say, the Korean Communist movement in its early stage was to pass through a capitalist stage which it did not have due to the fact that Korea inherited a backward economy. Thus, development of the revolutionary forces (mostly workers in highly industrialized countries), which would have taken place under capitalism, was to be undertaken by the socialist system. Because Korean Communists failed to experience the stage of capitalism in a normal process of communist revolution, they had to fulfill the task of developing a mock capitalist stage.

23Ibid., pp. 9-10, 315-320.
The plot to create an imaginary capitalism under the stage of "people's democracy" was neither to make their society capitalist nor to foster capitalists, but to ridicule the remnants of small-scale shop owners and moderate sized land-owners as bourgeois classes who barely passed the requirements for inclusion in the "people" category. Thanks to the bourgeois class, the stage of "people's democracy" was justified in the process of the communist transition.

In mid-1960, people's democracy was again renamed as "proletarian democracy." Premier Kim explained the structure of "proletarian democracy" in opposition to "bourgeois democracy." Compared to people's democracy, which allowed a minimum bourgeois class in support of the united front, "proletarian democracy" was meant to level down all the private structures to the workers' level. Stated differently, the mission of proletarianism lay in educating and remolding all working people to revolutionize and "proletarianize" the whole society. This is a democracy for the absolute majority of the working population. At the same time, a democratic practice of proletarianism is the function of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

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[24] The people's democracy is very complicated, if we are to interpret Premier Kim's thesis on it. For a further explanatory justification, see Kim Il Sung, On the Question of the Transitional Period from Capitalism to Socialism and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat (1969), pp. 14-41.

The dictatorship of the proletariat means on the one hand suppression of the few hostile elements, and on the other democracy for the absolute majority of the population—the working class, peasantry and other sections of the working people. To link correctly these two aspects of the proletarian dictatorship means to combine properly the work of uniting, through education and remolding, the masses of the people around the class struggle against the few hostile elements.

In this manner, everyone in the system is taught to distrust people, treat innocent people as hostile elements or potential enemies, look upon the Party as the bearer of the total movement, and cause unrest in society. All of these are in fact carefully planned political structures to expropriate the function of "enemy" in terms of the class struggle. Furthermore, the Communists believe that there can be no better democracy than proletarian democracy. Should there be any higher form of democracy than proletarian democracy, they said, it is no longer a democracy. Accordingly it is wrong to think that the dictatorship of the proletariat of the DPRK has become unnecessary even after class distinctions between the working class and peasantry are obliterated and after ideological survivals of the old society are eradicated, because the communists perceive that

26For the function of "enemy" as a principle for the structure of political confrontation, see David Finlay, et al., Enemies in Politics (1967), p. 9, and footnote 6, p. 4.
those internal forces continue to resist their revolutionary functions as long as external class enemies (capitalist systems) remain intact.\footnote{Kim links internal enemies with external enemies in his thesis on a war against all enemies. See Kim Il Sung, \textit{The Democratic People's Republic of Korea Is the Banner of Freedom and Independence for Our People and a Powerful Weapon for Building Socialism and Communism}, Japanese edition (Pyongyang, 1968), pp. 45-48.}

\textbf{Leadership Characteristics}

In view of the people's democracy and the proletarian dictatorship of the DPRK, if we are to understand the state of the general public in the regime, we must consider techniques which are used to maintain Kim Il Sung's charismatic leadership. In order to do so, we need to know the quality and personality of Kim Il Sung in terms of his political leadership of the DPRK. As we noted, the masses are always followers of the chosen leader in the structure of the people's democracy. In other words, the people seem to have become individual adherents of Kim Il Sung, because of his personal popularity. National policies are thus the products of Kim's political art, practiced in the name of the general public. His political decisions are sent not to the People's National Assembly, where there is opportunity to reject or examine them, but instead directly to the masses and military, where consensus is a foregone conclusion. This technique has been called manipulation of the "cult of personality" by
the mass media for a "Stalinistic" control over party, army and people. 28

We would now like to consider Marshal Kim Il Sung's personal background as it relates to his tactics in maintaining a "cult of personality" over the masses, as well as in his struggle for political power within the Korean Worker's Party (KWP).

Marshal Kim Il Sung was in 1972 sixty years old. 29 The son of poor farmers, with no formal education, and the leader of the Communist guerrillas along the Manchurian border, he presents many similarities to Chairman Mao Tsetung of Communist China. He went to Manchuria and at the age of nineteen became a peasant leader, so as to fight against both the Japanese and feudalism, and to gain experiences as a Communist revolutionary. 30 A great difference

28 The signs of "cult" appear in photographs, street names, nursery singing, and on the currency of the DPRK. Despite the use of some methods which seem to have been borrowed from Peking and Moscow, the state-party-military structures, terminology and tactics of control appear almost identical to those found in the hierarchical patterns of the pseudo-Confucian practice. For the political system of the DPRK in this respect, see Clarence Norwood Weems, Korea: Dilemma of Underdeveloped Country, Headline Series, No. 14 (New York, 1960), pp. 51-53.

29 Kim was reportedly born on April 15, 1912, at Mankyong-Dae, Pyongyang province.

30 In regard to Kim Il Sung's background and his revolutionary training, there are some conflicting reports among the sources. For further references, see George Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), pp. 325-326; Na-yang Yi, Chosen Minjoku Kaiho-si (History of the Korean People's Struggle for Liberation) (Tokyo, 1960), p. 20; Sul-ya Han, Hero General Kim Il Sung (Tokyo, 1962),
between the two leaders is that Kim Il Sung failed to accomplish his historic mission in an "offensive civil war" to unify Korea in 1950, whereas Mao Tse-tung did accomplish his mission in 1949.

Nevertheless, the failure of the Korean war did not reduce Kim Il Sung's popularity among the people of the DPRK. This failure can probably be attributed to the peculiar nature of the masses' attitude towards the civil war and "patriotism." Basically, the psychology of the people was such that the loss of the war left their fundamental attitudes unchanged. With the result, Kim Il Sung was on firm ground in expelling rival Communist factions within the DPRK's power structure. This aspect of the DPRK's leadership can be considered as being different from that of other Communist countries.

Following the Armistice in Korea, a severe purge took place. In 1953, more than ten prominent party members were executed and two were given long prison terms. These party members were Soviet-trained Communists and native Communists. However, this cannot be judged as an indication of Kim Il Sung's pro-Chinese policy, for there were several party purges, including many "Yenan factions" (or pro-Chinese

Communists) in 1955 and 1956. As a result of a series of internal purges, the remaining party leaders were those who had a long association with Kim Il Sung himself dating back to the early 1930's. In those days partisan activities in the Kapsan area, a Korean town near the Manchurian border, were led by Kim.

Before an examination is made of Kim's ascendency to power among Korean Communist factions, a brief description of Kim's revolutionary activities before the establishment of the DPRK government may be advantageous for perspective on subsequent developments in the DPRK's leadership.

There are no concrete facts known about Kim Il Sung's revolutionary background. However, publically known stories or rumors about his revolutionary life can be narrated without verification. In 1925 or before and after that period, Kim was believed to have been brought into Manchuria by his father, who had to flee from the Japanese police in Korea because of his revolutionary activities. Kim, between 1927

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31 Mu Chong, the Commander of Second Corps, was purged in 1951. He was an ex-artillery commander of the famed Communist Chinese Eighth Route Army. Also Vice-Premier Ho Ha-i, a prominent Soviet-Korean, was purged in 1951. For a further account of Kim's purge, see Chang-sun Kim, Pukhan sibonyon-sa (Fifteen-year History of North Korea) (Seoul, 1961), pp. 132-134, 150-160.

32 Because Kim's "revolutionary struggle" against the Japanese in Korea and Manchuria took place from Kapsan base areas, Kim's factional leadership in the KWP in the post-liberation era is known as the "Kapsan faction." B. C. Koh calls it the "soviet faction," whereas D. S. Suh refers to it as the "partisan faction."
and 1930 became a Young Communist League member, while he was in a junior high school in Manchuria. At the age of twenty, he was known to be a guerrilla leader in the Manchurian-Korean border area from 1931 to 1935, leading a small group of partisans against Japanese military bases. Till the outbreak of the Second World War, Kim was believed to have been responsible for guerrilla attacks on Korean villages along the Manchurian-Korean border areas in order to skirmish with the Japanese police stations. During and particularly near the end of World War II, Kim's military activities were, for some reason, carried out in coordination with the Soviet Union. At the end of the war, Kim's partisan group marched into Korea along with the Russians, entering Pyongyang in late August, 1945.

Even though the above account of Kim's revolutionary background lacks specific facts about his activities, at least two aspects are considered to be important in an understanding of Kim's present nationalistic position. First, his career as a communist has not been based on a systematic study of Marxism-Leninism. Communism for him was learned through revolutionary activities and experiences. Second, his partisan activities were not undertaken in subordination to either Chinese Communists or the Soviet Union. That is, Kim has always been independent of so-called pro-Chinese or pro-Russian stands.
As we noted in passing, Korean Communists in the post-liberation era were divided at least into four major factions. They were the Yenan (pro-Chinese) faction, the Soviet-Korean faction, the native communist faction, and the Kapsan faction (or partisan faction) led by Kim Il Sung. Kim, on his way to indisputable power, had to eliminate or neutralize the other three factional groups. Most native communist leaders were purged before and immediately after the Korean war. Prominent leaders of the Yenan and Soviet factions were believed to have been eliminated in the decade following the Korean war. By the end of 1968, the hegemony of the Kapsan group became crystal clear. The overwhelming majority of key party positions went to members of Kim's group. Top ranks were held by Kim Il Sung, Choe Yong-kun, Kim Il, Choe Hyon and so on. Needless to say, Choe Yong-kun, Kim Il and Choe Hyon were Kim Il Sung's Kapsan associates dating back to 1932.

The Kapsan faction emphasized Juche (or self-ism) as the expression of their political and ideological position. Our best interpretation is that it is nothing more than an expression of nationalistic sentiment in the interpretation of communist ideology and policy formula. This point has been mentioned in an earlier chapter. However, an important fact attached to the Juche ideology is the notion of nationalistic

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\[33\] For a complete list of the KWP's political committee members and their positions in order, see Area Handbook for North Korea (1969), p. 222.
leadership, manifested in Kim Il Sung's charisma, which is similar to the political leadership of most nationalistic movements in new nation-states. That is to say, Communism as a revolutionary ideology must be practiced within the Juche orientation of national concern that best serves Koreans rather than communists of other nationalities.

Kim continued to stress the "four principles" which the party had laid down as guidelines when the crevice between Moscow and Peking began to widen. These principles were designed to separate national identities from ideological questions, to keep independence in political matters, to build self-reliance in economic matters, and to provide autonomy in self-defense and other military operations. The Juche ideology has grown in stature as the power of Kim Il Sung's leadership has provided economic stability, benefiting Kim's power in the KWP.

"Charisma" or "charism" by definition, is a personal magic of leadership arousing special popular loyalty or enthusiasm for a statesman. Kim, in this respect, is capable of attracting public enthusiasm by creating "wild ideas" and doing extravagant things. Often his decisive and bold actions received a blind obedience and loyalty, much in the same manner which a witch-doctor receives among primitive people. For example, the so-called "Chongsanri spirit" or

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method and the "Daean work system" were examples of Kim's charismatic gestures in his leadership style.

The "Chongsanri method" was an on-the-spot guidance given by Kim Il Sung in person in February, 1960, at Chongsanri farm village, south Pyongyang province. It was said that Kim had personally come to the farm village, analyzed economic conditions and found a scientific method to effectively manage a new socialist system for the village. The masses were said to have followed Kim's method as an example and solved problems of agricultural management. The "Daean work system," too, developed by Kim Il Sung through his on-the-spot guidance in December, 1961, at Daean Electric Machine Factory, was an embodiment of the Chongsanri spirit and method in the area of industrial management. Likewise, factory workers were said to have followed Kim's Daean guidance and established a higher production record in industrial output.35

The magic of Kim's extraordinary power as such is constantly reinforcing whenever he does something new and unimaginative for ordinary people. The Juche was obviously one of those fabrics. The Chullima (Flying Horse Movement) was another. In this regard, Kim's plot to seize the U. S. S. Pueblo off Wonsan Bay on January 23, 1968, and

35For details about the Chongsanri and Daean movements, see Byong-sik Kim, Modern Korea: The Socialist North, Revolutionary Perspectives in the South, and Unification (New York, 1970), pp. 113-135. A further examination will appear in Chapter VII.
its subsequent negotiations and "apologies" made by the United States to the DPRK definitely should have added to Kim's charisma.

Kim's charisma is also incorporated in his military mentality as we mentioned in the last part of Chapter II. That is to say, Kim's charismatic exercises in politics are further shaped by his military background as a veteran guerilla fighter whose mental attitudes tend to treat political affairs in terms of battle actions. In fact, the Chullima (Flying Horse Movement) for economic development was practically carried out in terms of guerrilla traditions so as to link the masses of people to a kind of warfare action. The characteristics of the DPRK's military mentality under Kim Il Sung leadership was the mass mobilization of "guerrillaism" implemented in all activities of economic and social mass campaigns. Even school boys were taught to do their home assignments, for example, in memorizing certain mathematical formulas as if they were in position to "occupy strategic points" in the battle field, reminding them of Kim Il Sung's guerrilla activities.36

In the final analysis, the DPRK's leadership characteristics have had to do with technical matters concerned with furthering an atmosphere fermenting people's confidence in order to win over the people of South Korea by force or

36 For the military style in the DPRK's life, see Hankuk Ilbo (September 10, 1972), p. 5.
propaganda. This kind of political style also takes advantage of nationalistic sentiment which could be used against any form of direct interference from foreign countries. It is therefore a logical conclusion that the people of the DPRK in general would give full support to any powerful leader who challenged the powerful nations of Soviet Russia and the United States. Practically speaking, Kim Il Sung's political leadership remains firm as long as his public image leads people to worship him as the one who began the Korean war, who seized the Pueblo, and who will eventually reunite the Korean nation under his leadership. It is precisely at this point that cultism is an inevitable outcome in order to keep Kim's image on top of all political structures.
CHAPTER V

ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES

Single-Party Politics

In our study of endogenous constants, we have discussed the ideological foundations of the DPRK in terms of the Marxist-Leninist framework and the Juche considerations. The political structures of the Pyongyang regime have also been examined in reference to the proletarian dictatorship and the people's democracy. Likewise, Kim Il Sung’s charismatic leadership has been reviewed in light of the DPRK's uninterrupted leadership characteristics. They are treated as endogenous constants because those conditions of the political system were given factors when the DPRK government was founded. Of course these constants are by themselves quite static elements until activated and modified by variables. In this respect, Chapter V is provided for our consideration of endogenous variables.

First, let us examine the political party system of the DPRK. The political process in the DPRK, in its theory and governmental structure, allows the existence of political parties and maintains the separation of powers among such branches of the government as the Cabinet, the Supreme Court, and the Supreme People's Assembly. However, in practice, the political lines of authority were reserved for the
hands of Premier Kim Il Sung himself. Although the Constitution of 1948, still in force in 1970, states that the Supreme People's Assembly is the "exclusive source of legislative power at the national level and the highest organ of the state power," the real source of its political authority emanated from an extraconstitutional political body, the Korean Worker's Party (KWP), headed by Kim Il Sung.

At the superficial level, nominally there existed a few non-Communist political parties. The regime, in the 1950's, often claimed that there were more than seventy political parties besides the KWP. A more recent report in the 1960's revealed that these minor parties were reduced to less than five. Some of the well-publicized minor parties by 1970 were the Chondogyo Chungwa-tang (the quasi-religious Chondogyo Youth-Friends Party), the Chosun Minju-tang (Korean Democratic Party), and the Minju Dongnip-tang (Democratic Independence Party). These minor parties originally had local organizations and programs of their own. Now, due to the KWP's oppressive measures, they engage in no independent political activity other than keeping the national party offices in Pyongyang; they have no local party organizations. In fact, the remaining minor parties are treated as front organizations.

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1 As quoted in Dong Woon Park, Pukhan Tongchi Kikuron (The Government Structure in North Korea) (Seoul, 1964), p. 28.
for the KWP; what the Communist party calls "transmission belts for maintaining the ties between the KWP and the masses."²

It is no secret that the KWP is the plenary power structure not only over the Congress, the Executive, and the Supreme Court of the DPRK, but also over all social organizations and the life of individuals. In his report to the Fourth Party Congress of the KWP, General Secretary Kim Il Sung explicitly stated that "the government of the People's Republic at all levels and democratic social organizations including the unions of the working people of young and old or men and women are the KWP's policy implementing organizations."³ Furthermore, the October Party Conference of 1966 was important for reaffirming Kim's blueprint for creating a new inner council of power—a four-man Presidium within the Political Committee of the Party Central Committee—and the reinstitution, after a lapse of thirteen years, of a Party Secretariat. The two moves and the advancement of other followers of Kim within the Central Committee were apparently

² The KWP is the only party with nation-wide organization. Its organizational channel parallels that of the governmental administrative units from the national office to the lowest administrative branches. For details, see In-Hoo Bank, Pukch'oson Rodong-t'ang-ui Hwongsong kwa Baljon (The Formation and Development of the Workers' Party of Korea) (1967), pp. 205-208; Jae-Duk Han, Kim Il Sung ul Kobal Handa (The Indictment of Kim Il Sung) (Seoul, 1965), pp. 284-286.

meant to solidify Kim's control over the decision-making process in the DPRK government. Although the KWP pays lip service to the principles of "democratic centralism" and "collective leadership," the KWP's power by 1970 was in practice concentrated to Kim Il Sung's "Kapsan" clique in the all-powerful Political Committee of its Central Committee. This, it should be noted, is the prevailing pattern in other Communist systems including both the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party.

Before tracing the KWP's political role as the only policy-making "boss" in the DPRK's political process, we shall briefly consider the organizational structure of the KWP. At the national level, at the top, the National Party Congress in theory has been the DWP's basic decision-making organ which should be gathered every four years in accordance with Party rules. However, apart from its size of more than one thousand members, only five such congresses have been called by the Party Central Committee thus far. These have come at irregular intervals; the first KWP Congress in 1946; the Second Congress in 1948; the Third Congress in 1956; the Fourth Congress in 1961; and the Fifth in 1970.4 As Figure 9 indicates, the power of the Party National Congress is further narrowed to the Central Committee, the Political

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4The last Party Conference in 1966 was actually a "leadership Conference" of the KWP, not a National Party Congress. The Fifth Congress was held on November 2, 1970, and the 1966 Party Leadership agenda was formally accepted by it.
Legend:
--- Election and ratification
---- Nomination and command

Sources: Adapted from Pukhan Chonggam, 1945-1968, pp. 119-121; Toitsu Chosen Nenkan, 1967-1968, p. 305.

Fig. 9--Organization of the KWP
Committee, and the Presidium, respectively. If one is to climb in the Party hierarchy, he has to go through the pyramidal ladder.

In 1970 there were seventy-eight regular and forty-eight alternate members of the Central Committee. A further narrower circle of power had long consisted of thirteen regular and twelve alternate members of the Political Committee. Again, the innermost important decision-making organ of the Party is the Presidium: a four-man elite group. The Presidium is empowered with exclusive authority to "discuss problems of the Party and the State on a continuing basis." At the same time, members of the Presidium hold dual positions in both the Secretariat and cabinet seats responsible for "organizing the party activities and implementing the way, policies, and decisions of the party" through the State administrative channels.

When we list titles and positions of the top four in the KWP's Political Committee, the monopoly of power by the Kim Il Sung group becomes clear. Choe Yong-kun, Kim Il, and Kim Kwang-hypo are Kim Il Sung's long-time associates of the Manchurian-Korean border area partisan group. The number-one man, Kim Il Sung, is (1) General Secretary of the KWP's Central Committee; (2) Premier of the DPRK; (3) Commander in

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5 The Political Committee was enlarged after 1966 in order to accommodate several associates of Kim Il Sung. It consisted of eleven regular and five alternate members in the early 1960's. In 1961, the present Political Committee was called the Standing Committee of the Central Committee.
Chief of the Armed Forces; (4) Chairman of the KWP's Military Affairs Committee; and (5) Marshal. Choe Yong-kun, the number two man, is (1) President of Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly (Titular Head of State); (2) Secretary of the KWP's National Congress; (3) Presidium member of the KWP's Political Committee; (4) Defense Minister of the DPRK; (5) and Vice-Marshals. Kim Il, the number three man, is (1) First Vice-Premier of the DPRK; (2) Secretary of the KWP; (3) Presidium member of the KWP's Political Committee; and (4) Major General. Kim Kwang-hyop, the number four man, is (1) Deputy Premier of the DPRK; (2) Secretary of the KWP; (3) Presidium member of the KWP's Political Committee; and (4) General.6

All political activities are to be sponsored by the KWP or required its sanction. The Party's daily work is handled by thirteen executive departments under the directives of the Secretariat of the KWP.7 It is through these executive party departments that the KWP supervises policy implementation by the various government ministers.

In a real sense, they represent a government within the

6 This information was based on May, 1971, standings. Sources were not verified. However the listing showed very little change from that of 1968. See Pukhan Chonggam, 1945-1968, pp. 118-122; Toitsu Chosen Nankan, 1967-1968, pp. 304-305.

Government of the DPRK. Needless to say, the existing governmental apparatus is superfluous in terms of running the State other than echoing the KWP's directives.

Two other aspects of the KWP's political control besides the Party's national organization are the Party's local organizations and its influence over a number of front organizations. The KWP's local structure is composed of 10 Do or provinces, 2 special cities, 169 Gun or counties, 12 Si or cities, and 34 Jiku or district committees. The lowest party organizations are the Primary Party Committees at any level, organized with more than 100 party members. Below them are some 60,000 party Sepo or cells established wherever there are three or more party members such as a "factory or enterprise, transportation, state or cooperative farm, Government office, military unit or village." A cell with a range of 100 to 300 members in any occupational level could form a party committee subject to the city or county party committees. A party committee with more than 300 members has to be endorsed by the Party's Central Committee.

The KWP's Kanbu or cadres at all levels of the local committees are responsible for explaining the Party's program to cell members and non-party front organizations of the KWP as well. Actually the duties of the cadres are to organize the cell members for productive effort, to strengthen ties between the party and the people, and to improve the people's political, economic, and cultural life in the spirit of
loyalty to the party. To insure the local cadres' correct behavior in transmitting the national party policies, under-cover agents of the Central Committee of the KWP have been used to infiltrate every local and occupational party committee to survey the local cadres. Included in these agents' missions to the local committees is the recruitment of Party candidate-members from a number of front organizations.

As we noted in passing, many social and political organizations in the DPRK were important enough to be called "transmission belts" of the KWP. Through such potential political forces as students, workers, intellectuals, and religious groups, the KWP was able to materialize its policy goals. Among many social and political organizations, the KWP looks upon the Sachong (Socialist Working Youth League), Jikchong (General Federation of Unions), and Minju Yosung (Korean Democratic Women's Union) as the Party's army of auxiliary units.

The Socialist Working Youth League is composed of young men between the ages of fourteen and thirty, regardless of the members' affiliations with the KWP. Because of the organization's size (about 65 per cent of the population—see Table III), and its members' youthfulness, the KWP gives it special attention. The Youth League is even mentioned in the KWP's regulation (Article 62) that "it is the Party's second reserve army to do its share in support of the KWP." Likewise, the General Federation of Unions, encompassing
nine affiliated unions, functions to promote the ideological indoctrination of workers and is also used as an instrument to carry out the Party's economic policies. The Korean Democratic Women's Union is considered as a decorative front organization to create an illusion of women's equality in all areas, but the union is particularly important to the ideological nursery in the family life. Furthermore, it is said that the Women's Union members are in many cases members of both the KWP and the General Federation of Unions.

In short, the KWP's sole power in the DPRK seems to have been institutionalized. Unless the KWP's centralized power becomes more flexible, unless the Party employs a "collective leadership," unless those minor parties and other social and political organizations become independent of the KWP's control, Kim Il Sung's solitary policy line will remain unchallenged. However, his perception of the DPRK's national life is to be further examined in terms of political elites around him.

Elite Recruitment

We have tried to suggest the party variables of the KWP. The structure of the KWP is that of a practically

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6 Those unions under the Federation are: Metal Working and Chemical Industry Workers Trade Union; Machine-Building Industry Workers Trade Union; Fishing Industry Workers Trade Union; Transportation Workers Trade Union; Power and Coal Industry Workers Trade Union; Construction and Forestry Workers Trade Union; Light Industry and Commerce Workers Trade Union; Communications Workers Trade Union; and Education, Culture, Health, and Government Employees Union.
federated body of organizations which sponsor certain individual Communists or candidates. On the other hand, the minor political parties (i.e., the Chondogyo Youth-Friend Party, the Korean Democratic Party, and the Democratic Party) and other social and political front organizations (i.e., the Socialist Working Youth League, the General Federation of Unions, and the Democratic Women's Union) are completely dependent upon the KWP. In this respect, none of the non-Communist parties and social forces have succeeded in making a mass organization as the foundation of "opinion-making" institutions apart from the KWP's supervision.

It appears to us that the KWP does appeal only to certain limited kinds of people: in the case of the top rank of the Government, its supporters are mainly recruited from the veteran revolutionaries of the 1930's while in the case of the mass level, supporters are overwhelmingly recruited from the new generation of the post-1950's.\(^9\) The question is, how successful the Party has been in getting the support of the diverse social classes which have appeared, as

\(^9\)The revolutionary first generation, with common experiences of the national liberation from the Japanese, is about to fade away. The survivors of Kim Il Sung's purge of his rivals were furthermore eliminated in the course of the Korean war. In the absence of revolutionary war for more than twenty years since the Korean war, the revolutionary second generation in the DPRK seems to have presented Kim Il Sung with problems of the KWP's recruitment in the top positions. For details, see Robert A. Scalapino, editor, The Communist Revolution in Asia: Tactics, Goals, and Achievements (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1965), p. 1.
mentioned above, as the result of modern conditions, such as the development of industrialization and the growing size of the new generation. These new social groups consist of the younger generation, technicians, and the emerging professionals who show strong concern for special occupational systems.

Broadly speaking, the problem of recruitment of the political elite is included in that of the characteristics of the KWP. At present, the inner circle of the KWP has been recruited from the leaders of various revolutionary elements dating from the pre-independence period of the DPRK and from the top leaders of the partisan activities. Also, there are indications that the post-independence generation (1945) and the post-Korean War generation (1950) are two new sources from which the KWP can replace the leadership of the revolutionary first generation. At any rate, the problem lies in the limited basis of recruitment. In short, the KWP's present policy in recruiting and training new elites relies primarily on domestic resources. This is what I called the DPRK's elite domestication.10

10 The regime's general goal for education is to produce two kinds of elite groups. First and the fundamental objective is to train political cadres who would in return educate the people for "new Communist men." Second, the pragmatic objective is to train technicians, skilled workers and other professional scientists to meet the regime's economic goals. Both of these goals are pursued in the domestic market, except for a few fields which require a higher technology provided only by the Soviet Union. See Kulloja (Workers), April 30, 1970, pp. 5-16. Kulloja is the theoretical organ of the Central Committee of the KWP.
Elite domestication in the DPRK has been closely incorporated with the spirit of national identity, so-called Juche, stressed since 1955. Although the DPRK government at present does maintain a policy of sending students abroad for technical education, the regime is highly sensitive about acculturating the political cadres within the country.\textsuperscript{11}

Generally speaking, there are two categories in the higher educational system in the DPRK. The Government, on the one hand, supervises the formal educational system ranging from the People's Schools (elementary schools) to colleges. The Party, on the other hand, directly operates special schools. It is with the latter which we are concerned regarding the KWP's recruitment of political cadres. The Party's special school system is again divided between national and local levels.

At national level, there are many programs designed to inculcate Party loyalty, working zeal, "revolutionary class consciousness," "socialist patriotism" or hatred for enemies. Specifically, there are various kinds of special

\textsuperscript{11}Reportedly, Seoul sources estimated that more than eight thousand students had been educated abroad from 1948 to 1970, about six thousand of them in the Soviet Union. These students were expected to study subjects pertinent to the completion of the regime's series of economic plans. No estimate on these students in foreign countries in fields of study was made, but it is a reasonable assumption that they were mostly engaged in technical training for practical uses. For a further discussion on the student exchange program, see \textbf{Dong-A Ilbo}, September 10, 1970, p. 6.
institutions that the Central Committee of the KWP places a great emphasis on in-service training national party cadres, including the Revolutionary Schools for "children of martyrs and heroes." The most noted of these are the Man-gyongdae Revolutionary School in Kim Il Sung's birthplace, the Nampo Revolutionary School, and the Haeju Revolutionary School. These institutions, established respectively in 1948, 1958, and 1959 by the KWP, were intended to train orphaned children as professional revolutionaries who could be "nucleon pivots of the Party, the State and the Army." Other privileged schools in this category are the Pyongyang Foreign Languages Revolutionary School and the Pyongyang Revolutionary School for Economics and Commerce. Students in these schools are treated as an elite class in the Communist system, and they wear military-like uniforms and insignia.

At local and provincial levels, there are ten Kongsan Taehak (Communist Colleges) throughout the nine provinces which are managed by the Central Committee of the KWP and its provincial or municipal counterparts. Compared to the

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12 It seems to us that the KWP is deliberately choosing candidates for the top elites from those individuals of high ranking revolutionary families or those of no family background traceable to the traditional class society. For these reasons, the Party recruited in the past students of selected families of revolutionaries or whose present existence had no connection with all the previous "bourgeois elements" due to their being orphans. See Rodong Chongyon (Working Youth), October 20, 1970, p. 16. Rodong Chongyon is the organ of the Socialist Working Youth League daily.
Revolutionary Schools for political cadres, these Communist Colleges are the Party's training schools for administrative cadres and technocrats who at the completion of their training would enter channels of the Party command at local and provincial levels. It was reported in 1969 that these ten Communist Colleges were for the children of high officials of the Party and those with outstanding records, but commoners were still limited to a maximum of five per cent of the total admissions.

Our brief examination above suggests that the DPRK's program for recruiting elites is primarily done by its own educational arrangements rather than looking to the Soviet Union as a training base. Another readily identifiable aspect is that it is the Party, not the Government, which controls special education for elites. In this respect, we may say that the DPRK's policy for elite recruitment systematically falls within the KWP's party-line. The educational goals are entirely pragmatic; neither intellectual achievement for its own sake nor the enrichment of life through the advancement of learning is among them. In other words,

13 In a speech, Kim Il Sung severely criticized the lack of national identity in the DPRK educational programs which tended to blindly imitate and transplant the Soviet materials. See Kim Il Sung Sunjip (Selected Works of Kim Il Sung), Vol. 4 (1960), 326.
education is to serve concrete Party goals, such as creation of an army of skilled workers.14

Among many professional occupations (i.e., professor, actor, physician, technicians, and musician, et cetera), the most blessed career has been technical and other practical fields contributing to economic production. Economic underdevelopment was the stumbling block that stood in the way of organizing a modern society which could provide even a minimum standard of living. The DPRK's planning of economic development put a special emphasis on technical training. However, the basic philosophy of the regime's professionalism is based on "materialism." Indoctrination has been effectively mobilized to dignify labor and to identify the aim of the individual with the goals of the regime.

Specifically, the elites of the labor force have been the technicians, engineers, managers, and skilled workers. The reason for such a high priority for technicians and engineers in the DPRK is attributed to the regime's economic planning for industrialization. The primary concern of the DPRK government has been economic development. The situation was concisely stated by Premier Kim Il Sung when he complained:

Our ancestors used to wear the Kat (traditional Korean hat) and ride on the donkeys, and spend their time in drinking and making poems, while others have been

14 In the DPRK, the ideal man to be cultivated in the society is consistently described as the one who is armed with scientific knowledge and skill, and is politically disciplined. See Chosun Kyoyuk-sa (History of Korean Education) (Tokyo, 1963), pp. 156-255.
proceeding with the revolution against the bourgeois and establishing modern societies. Our ancestors still remained underdeveloped with farming, while others were establishing factories and producing commercial goods. Our ancestors left us underdevelopment and poverty. 13

In terms of professional elitism, a series of national economic plans demanded a "technical revolution." The revolution in turn required an increasing number of technicians. The Seven-Year Plan (1961-1967), for example, alone called for training 130,000 highly qualified engineers and technicians. The fact is that, at the end of the planning year, the regime claimed it had to train these needed technical professionals, not from "bookish" or "aristocratic" students of middle class "bourgeoisie," but from the proletariat. That is, the technical elites were recruited from either workers through factory colleges while they were working, or through work-study programs for higher technical students. According to the regime's policy, outstanding specialized workers were recommended to take specialized college courses in "after-work hours." Conversely, technical and other specialized students were, upon their completion of course requirements, recruited by firms and factories for a two-year field training-in-work program before receiving their status as professionals. As we noted elsewhere, the

15Kim Il Sung Sunjip (Selected Works of Kim Il Sung), Vol. 6 (1960), 117.
so-called "working-classization" at the elite level is also emphasized in the historic mission of the revolutionary regime.\textsuperscript{16}

The labor requirement for students prior to their practice of professions is not only for the purpose of repaying educational costs to the State under the free education system; it is further intended to teach the value of productive work and to eliminate any derogatory ideas concerning manual labor. According to regulations issued by the educational authorities in 1959, physical labor for students is a required assignment during and after their education.\textsuperscript{17} College students in general must work at least ten weeks per year while they are in school. Furthermore, college graduates are required to become manual workers for

\textsuperscript{16}It has been a common practice for all Communist countries to idealize manual work and honor the working classes. The DPRK government, too, loves to use the term, to "kullo-hwa" (or "working-classize") all the people to revolutionize them and eliminate all class distinctions.

\textsuperscript{17}Students in the graduating class of specialized schools work five and a half months. Those above the third year of four-year specialized schools work four and a half months. After the second year, the graduate of a three-year course must work two and a half months. Higher technical students have two sets of field training covering their first and second specialization for a year each internship. See \textit{Kodung Kyovyuk} (Higher Education), II (1959), 4. \textit{Kodung Kyovyuk} is an educational periodical issued by the DPRK Ministry of Higher Education. The factory college system was begun in 1960. These colleges are supervised by the Ministry of Higher Education and staffed with full-time teachers and part-time engineers and scientists from the factory or nearby research institutes. This system serves for the work-study programs for technical students and workers for a higher education as well.
two years in their related field before becoming managerial personnel.

With the scanty information about the DPRK's professional elites, it is almost impossible to assess their present standing. At best, our discussion has thus been limited to the industrial professionals to which group the Government and the Party have given a higher priority. The present trend is that knowledgeable persons in the middle leadership group are increasing at a rate of more than fifty per cent every year. On the other hand, we are not informed how influential these professional elites are vis-a-vis the political cadres.

Between 1960 and 1970, as reported by Premier Kim Il Sung, the number of universities and colleges increased from 78 to 129, and 378 new higher technical institutes were established. By 1970, there were more than 497,000 engineers and specialists, or four times the number in 1960. Furthermore, the regime's expected increase in training engineers, assistant engineers, and specialists will account for more than ten per cent of the labor force at all factories, enterprises and cooperative farms by the end of the Six-Year Plan (1971-1976). That is, the number of technicians and specialists should exceed one million in the near future.18

At the same time, the Party's control over these institutions' role of producing technical elites has been tightened. Along with the training of a large army of intellectuals, the KWP continued to play a decisive role "energetically to raise the level of the socialist and Communist knowledge" to the level of the technical knowledge. This is done by smuggling Party cadres into technical institutions as instructors. The intellectuals in all fields must justify their existence by promoting the revolutionary goals laid down by the Communist Party. Independent lines of research and thought are discouraged or prohibited. Intellectuals must accept the materialistic view of history if they are to act or survive as intellectuals under the DPRK government. Realizing that in another decade or less the bulk of the top Party leadership will have to be recruited from the current generation of youth, the regime is deeply concerned with the "futurism" of the Korean revolution at the second revolutionary generation.

Whether candidates are for political cadres who will work for propaganda, or for technical cadres who will work for scientific fields, they are recruited to study and carry on Kim Il Sung's revolutionary concept of creatively applying Marxism-Leninism to the "national peculiarities and historical conditions" of Korea. First of all, Communist education should be further intensified among the current generation of youth. The theme is "collectivism" which is
basically the idea of the working class as the foundation of life in socialist and communist society, where the working people are closely united and strive to attain the common goal.

In propagating the idea of collectivism, the Party tells the youth that an intensified struggle should be waged against individualism and egoism. Instead of seeking personal ease and comfort, all should work, study and live in the Communist spirit of "one for all and all for one." The official concern that the overwhelming majority of the youth who had "never known exploitation and oppression nor experienced the ordeals of class struggle" were unable to understand the meaning of revolution was as real in 1970 as it was in the early 1960's. This explains why the cultism of Kim Il Sung is becoming popular. His revolutionary experience is the image of the Korean revolution to the revolutionary second generation. 19

Political Institutions

In terms of political institutions, we will discuss only the functional aspects of the DPRK's political life. In order to do so, the process of electing the people's representatives, the role of the legislative body, and functions of the Cabinet must be separately treated. These

19 For the ideological revolution of the later year, see Kim Il Sung's speech before the fifth Party Congress, 1970, Ibid., pp. 203-211. The same problem in China led Mao to launch the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.
functional aspects of the DPRK government are treated as "variables" simply because they are forces of the political process through which the regime functions as a political system.

The Constitution in its Article 3 made a provision clear that "all representative organs from the highest organ of the Supreme People's Assembly down to the village people's assemblies, shall be elected through the people's free will and secret balloting, based on the principles of universal, equal and direct suffrage." Disregarding the Constitutional stipulation, the role of the "democratic" election in the DPRK, as in other Communist countries, is to provide a means whereby assent is registered to the policy and program of the ruling minority group rather than to provide a forum for the expression of free choice.

For example, candidates for the Supreme People's Assembly are allowed to be nominated by the KWP and other non-Communist organizations, but the selection process of the nominees is controlled by a joint nomination committee organized by the KWP and its front organizations in order to handpick well-known figures from the KWP, government, and various

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20Article 12, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that suffrage, as well as eligibility for office is extended to all people at age eighteen regardless of sex, racial or social origin, religion, residence, property ownership, or educational qualification. Armed forces personnel can also vote and run for public office. Persons excluded from electoral rights are mentally handicapped persons and pro-Japanese elements.
"hero" awards. The election of the nominee is always pre-determined by organs of the KWP. The proportion of the KWP members to non-Communist nominees is carefully regulated to give the appearance that elections are not dictated by the Communists.

This kind of nominating system appears to be democratic at a glance because every political organization has an equal footing to nominate its own candidate. However, due to the joint nominating committee system dominated by the KWP, the committee does have a practical power to eliminate non-Communist candidates before the voting stage. Accordingly, campaigning usually takes the form of propaganda by groups of the Communist agitators and voting is no more than a formality to ratify pre-decided candidates. So, in the political process, the nominating procedure is organized in such a way as to set up a practical approach which could exclude the pluralistic nature of the Constitution. As a result of the joint nominating committee system for the majority ticket, the usual rule is to select one remaining candidate recommended by the KWP.21

The same is true with the provincial, city, and county assemblies where candidates may be jointly nominated by the

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21In compliance with the Constitution, a Law of Election in its Articles 17 and 36, adopted in 1948, regulated delegates to the Supreme People's Assembly are elected at the ratio of 1 to 30,000 people, on the basis of single-member district system. For an analysis of the law, see Dong-Woon Park, Pukhan Tonchi Kiku-ron (The Government Structure in North Korea) (Seoul, 1962), pp. 42-45.
KWP, by non-Communist organizations, and by individuals who attend nominating conferences at government offices, factories, enterprises, cooperative farms, labor unions, or military installations. Again the selection of nominees is always predetermined by the KWP organs.

After thirty days of the election campaign, the people vote on the candidates. This vote approves the candidates through the presentation of a single-slate ballot, which theoretically may be either accepted or rejected by the voter. For many years the voter placed his ballot publically in a white box to signify "yes" or in a black box to signify "no." Since 1962 the "black-and-white ballot system" was replaced by a "marking-off system" for a single-ballot box, in which the voter was then requested to make a mark against the names of any candidates he opposed on the ballot before casting it. Even with the modified balloting system, the result was the same as long as a single-slate ballot system for one candidate remains unchanged.22

From the above observation, we may conclude that the principles of equal, direct and secret election as stipulated in the Constitution are not practiced in the electoral process. In fact, the electoral system in the DPRK exists just to serve the KWP's self-justification of the democratic choice of representation.

22The Election Law of 1948 provided that the voter is to cast "yes-or-no" in its Article 41 and the electoral supervisory committee counts the "yes votes" only.
Although the Pyongyang regime claimed that it had, in theory and structure, established a modern political system distinctive from the ideals of the traditional society, it still continues, in practice, modes that were familiar to Koreans, both from their early history and from the more recent Japanese occupation. That is, the present system repeats the highly concentrated and centralized tradition. If the present system under which the Pyongyang government operates represents elements of the totalitarian tradition, the role of the legislative body in the government must bear testimony contrary to its claim.

The Supreme People's Assembly, the highest organ of the DPRK's political power in theory, loses its primary position in the process of electing the representatives in the first place. Its policy-making power is further compromised by the KWP dominance.

In principle, the Supreme People's Assembly is granted "the power of the supreme national authorities" which include (1) the power to amend the Constitution and make laws, (2) the power to formulate the principle line of domestic and foreign policies, (3) the power to make its own rules

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23 Traditional concepts of government in Korea are first embodied in Confucian ethics, which were the official doctrines of the Yi dynasty (1392-1910). Government is viewed not as a contractual arrangement between the governing body and the people, but as a national institution designed to maintain a proper relationship among men in a hierarchical social order. Second, the Japanese rule of Korea (1910-1945) retained the authoritarian elements of government and added certain characteristics of colonialism.
and to elect the Presidium of the Assembly, (4) the power to formulate the Cabinet system, (5) the power to approve economic plans, (6) the power to elect the Supreme Court judges, and (8) the power to nominate the Supreme Procurator. However, the assembly's real power lies in a group of twelve persons in the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly. In other words, the power delegated to the assembly has now been delegated to the members of the Presidium, who are in turn members of both the KWP's Political Committee and members of the Cabinet. As we noted in our examination of the KWP organization, most of the Party's top officials concurrently hold additional positions in the executive and legislative offices or in the military. In 1969, out of twelve Presidium members of the Supreme People's Assembly, at least nine, including the President and Vice-President of the Assembly, were members of the Political Committee of the KWP.

The KWP control of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly has been further provided by the manner in which the assembly operates. That is, Article 49 of the Constitution stipulated that the elected Presidium is the supreme power and is empowered to supervise the Cabinet office and the Supreme Court in their daily operation, while the assembly is in recess. According to a South Korean

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24 The above listed enumerated powers of the Supreme People's Assembly are not exact wordings as they are listed in the Constitution. They are inferential interpretations of Article 37 of the Constitution.
source, the Presidium, by making a maximum extension of the clause, in fact has been the executing agency of the Supreme People's Assembly, which meets only for two to six days of short sessions twice a year. 25

The procedural arrangements manipulated by the Presidium are also functionally geared toward a linkage between the KWP's Political Committee and members of the Cabinet office. Due to the fact that members of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly, members of the Political Committee of the KWP, and members of the Cabinet are the same individuals, a decision made at the KWP's Political Committee is automatically conveyed to two additional channels simultaneously. Under such a tripartite system, decisions for domestic or foreign policy in general and economic planning in particular have been adopted in the Political Committee of the KWP prior to their formal approval in the Supreme People's Assembly without debates or questions.

It was on August 15, 1960, on the occasion of celebrating the fifteenth anniversary of national liberation from Japanese colonialism, that Premier Kim Il Sung announced to the public his scheme for the national reunification of Korea in "federal form." Three months later, the President of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly introduced the federal scheme to the assembly for formal approval. The assembly passed the unification bill with unanimous applause.

25 For details, see Pukhan Chonggam (1945-1968), pp. 126-127.
The Seven-Year Plan (1961-1967) and the extension of the plan for three more years (1961-1970) were likewise first adopted in the Fourth and Fifth Party Congresses of the KWP before they were introduced in the Assembly for legitimization. 26

In short, the role of the Congress (Supreme People's Assembly) in the DPRK was originally designed for superficial status inferior to the executive body (Cabinet office) and the KWP. The real function of the Congressmen in such a policy-making process lies in giving applause to policy speeches and in voting for the policy's adoption.

According to Article 60 of the Constitution, the Cabinet, in executing policies and enforcing laws or directives of the Premier, is normally responsible to the Supreme People's Assembly and to the Presidium when the assembly is in recess. But as we previously noted, the Cabinet is above the Assembly and a co-equal body with the KWP's Political and Central Committees in terms of extra-Constitutional structure. In fact, it often performs legislative functions by overruling any instructions issued by provincial people's committees which "contradict the Constitution, statutes, mandates, or Cabinet decisions or instructions." 27 A realistic

26 For a further comment on the KWP's control of policy-making in the DPRK, see Dong-woon Park, Pukhan Tongchi Kikuron (The Government Structure in North Korea) (1962), pp. 39-41.

27 Area Handbook for North Korea, p. 208.
evaluation is that the Cabinet is the policy-making organ together with the KWP's higher organizations.

The membership of the Cabinet clearly explains how the KWP is systematically intermeshed with the Cabinet. The Cabinet in 1970 was composed of the Premier (Chief Executive), the First Deputy Premier, the Deputy Premiers, the Ministers, and the Chairmen of the Committees and Commissions. The Premier was the chairman of both the Central and Political Committees of the KWP. The Deputy Premiers concurrently held positions in the Presidium of the KWP's Political Committee. Also the Ministers in charge of the executive departments were either members of the KWP's Political Committee or members of the Secretariat and the departments of the KWP.28

(See Figure 10.) This is what I call the dual power structure of the DPRK linking the Party and the Government.

One of the duties assigned to the Cabinet is to guide local administration. Local administration is part of a three-tiered structure. At the top, provinces and special cities are directed by the central government. The middle tier consists of counties and small cities. At the bottom

28 Of course all of these Deputy Premiers were hand-picked servants of Premier Kim Il Sung. In 1970 the executive establishment in the Cabinet consisted of more than thirty-five ministries and commissions, and committees. The Deputy Premiers held positions in the key ministries and other independent agencies or councils such as the Ministries of Defense, Social Security, and Inspection or the Military Affairs Council. The concurrent office system has been the DPRK's consistent trend in the past ten years as the Government became more and more politically integrated in leadership.
Legend:

- Election
- Inspection
- Indirect Guidance
- Supervision/Guidance
- Identical Persons

Source: Modified from Pukhan Tongchi Kiku-ron, p. 28.

Fig. 10--The dual power structure between the KWP and Government
are rural districts. Accordingly people's committees of these three levels are local executive-administrative organizations subordinated to the Cabinet.

On the other hand, the KWP's local organizations systematically parallel the administrative structure from top to bottom. Thus, as political commands at the national level flow in the parallel channels of the Party and the Government horizontally, political commands to local level likewise flow in the parallel channels of the Party and the Government vertically from top to bottom. Under these circumstances, effectiveness in political control and efficiency in political command are almost assured. As long as the people's loyalty to the present leadership remains unchanged, the Pyongyang regime's political capabilities are insured and reinforced to the maintenance of the present system.

In summary on the political institutions of the DPRK, the structure and role of the KWP can be singled out as the principle force among the regime's endogenous variables. In terms of endogenous constants, if the fundamental goal of the Pyongyang government is a Communist Revolution in Korea, the leadership structure of the KWP is the primary variable which determines the nature of the regime's domestic and foreign policies.
PART THREE

DOMESTIC-FOREIGN POLICY FUSION

By completing a rather long discussion of the structural components of the DPRK's external and internal settings as attributes of the regime's confrontation policy, we are now ready to combine these two sets of contributing factors in a systematic function so as to establish the mechanism of a mutually reinforcing relationship. Those exogenous conditions which appear outside the political system of the DPRK may not be systematically linked with political activities of the regime, but those endogenous conditions (the regime's political life) may conceivably be related to the regime's external setting in terms of fused linkages. Stated positively, our basic concern here is to narrate sequential interrelationships between a set of events taking place in the external setting and those of the internal setting. No attempt is made to measure just how influential foreign policy considerations are to domestic policy considerations. Instead, our underlining objective is to draw lines between the two.

In terms of fused linkage, the DPRK's confrontation policy is characterized as "circular confrontation." That is to say, the regime's confrontation with foreign countries has its domestic counterparts in reciprocal form. Conversely,
we also believe that the regime's internal policy reciprocates with external policies. With regard to the fused confrontation within and without, our analytical scope is juxtaposed by the DPRK's policy strategies of "extroversion" and "introversion" disguised in foreign and domestic issues.¹

It is now essential that the politics of "extroversion" and "introversion" be examined in terms of circular confrontation. First, we are interested in the dual characteristics of the regime's ambivalent policy orientation which may be manifested as extroversion or introversion. Second, we are interested in the DPRK's policy not only with regard to foreign policy but also for its effects on domestic behavior. We will, therefore, pay close attention to the claims and accomplishments of the regime in Chapters VI and VII primarily from these two perspectives. Due to the developmental sequence of the DPRK's confrontation policy, the politics of "extroversion" must be discussed first and the politics of "introversion" second.

Although we do not follow a chronological order of the two different confrontations, the politics of "extroversion" generally cover a period between 1953 and 1960. The

¹For our operational definition of "extroversion" and "introversion," see footnote 26, p. 23. The former was defined as a confrontation strategy which capitalizes on external issues in order to mobilize internal capabilities for the attainment of domestic objectives. The latter, on the other hand, was defined as a domestic policy which demands particular domestic issues in order to obtain external interests.
politics of "introversion" subsequently represent a ten-year period from 1961 to 1970.
CHAPTER VI

THE POLITICS OF "EXTROVERSION": 1953-1960

Probably due to the failure of the revolutionary war in 1950, a confrontation policy against South Korea and the United States was chosen after the Korean War. The politics of "extroversion," as part of confrontation policy is represented by the regime's hostile actions in the Tado Mije campaign (Crush American Imperialism) and in the Haebang Nambu campaign (Liberation of the Southern-half).

These campaign slogans seemed highly political and ideological insofar as the regime's attitudes toward external enemies were concerned. However, these campaigns were more or less utilized towards internal economic and sociological ends in the regime's efforts to restructure its national institutions in the era following 1950. In short, as we stated earlier, the DPRK's external hostilities were primary forces in creating internal unity and political modernization in order to bring about an effective totalitarian control.¹

¹Political modernization in totalitarian states is commonly represented by a form of mass participation in elections in order to ratify the political power of certain elites. Such a form of political modernization is honored by the DPRK, in whose system the masses are emotional followers. The electoral process in the DPRK is, as we noted, one of "ratification," not decision-making; of "consensus," not choice. For a theoretical account of totalitarian
**Tado Mije Campaign**

The most conspicuous characteristic of the Tado Mije campaign was that of the regime's policy of "planning" for political centralization by means of directed economic activities. By this it is meant that political ends are to be attained through rearrangements of economic life in such a way as to lead to and reinforce political control. In this sense, the DPRK's Tado Mije campaign was a most powerful vehicle for those war weary masses of the DPRK. Therefore, we must consider that the regime's postwar measures in its economic planning are crucial factors for an analysis of the anti-American actions of the regime.

The characteristics of the DPRK's economic planning are not much different from any other country's developmental planning, whether it be socialistic or democratic. The main difference is that the basic feature of the DPRK's socialistic economy is aimed at bringing about political change. In other words, the DPRK government consistently changes its economic structures toward a tight political centralization via, for example, agricultural cooperatives and industrial nationalization. There is no system of private labor which can be sold or purchased. As a result of the economic plan, the masses are organized into units of an anti-American modernization, see Robert A. Scalapino, "Elections and Political Modernization in Prewar Japan," Political Development in Modern Japan, edited by Robert E. Ward (Princeton, N. J., 1968), pp. 249-251.
"army." The masses are asked to be good Tado Mije workers and peasants, and they are told that the "qualified people" of the proletariat are ones who voluntarily involve themselves in economic participation in the agricultural cooperatives and industrial state monopoly.

For those not familiar with the people of the DPRK and their experiences in the war against South Korea and the United States, this attitude of enthusiastic submission to strong central authority may be difficult to understand. The truth of the matter is that leaders of the DPRK capitalized on the social uneasiness resulting from the Korean War. The mobilization and organization of the population were also a part of particular processes. The processes, or programs, mentioned above, appear to have resulted in political and economic stability and, more importantly, the Tado Mije campaign has been part of the overall process of the Communist socialization.

Perhaps one reason for the general success of the politico-economic measures taken by the DPRK is the fact that they had had the example of the Chinese Communist movement and of the early anti-Japanese movement of the Chinese Communists in their struggle against imperial Japan. They undertook a stern policy of rectifying the masses' style of thinking and working in the name of the patriotic war against Japanese imperialism. By the policy of rectification, the Chinese Communists subjugated individual rights
and freedoms to the cause of Chinese Communism. The DPRK, too, enjoined economic plans as a means of political indoctrination under the slogan of the Tado Mije.

The DPRK's economic plan for a balanced and efficient economy has been aimed at producing a progressive socialist economic system. The socialist economy involves the control of mass labor. This controlled mass labor, in effect, lends itself to political control by the Communist elite of the KWP. The Communist regime in this respect enjoys a relatively stable status in politics as well as in economics. Certain political purges have been kept beneath the surface, but the central leadership of Kim Il Sung and his Manchurian comrades have remained unchanged. This political stability permitted the regime to carry out a continuous policy of economic planning aimed at self-sufficiency both in industry and agriculture.

From the beginning of the Three-Year Plan (1954-1956), the regime emphasized the establishment of a "balance" in the economy--that is, to make all sectors of the economy internally interdependent but externally independent. This program was preceded by political indoctrination of the

2 China's Communist movement and its anti-Japanese war during the early 1940's exemplifies the training of the Communist mentality in terms of "self-cultivation" and "self-criticism," which, in fact, required surrender of individual opinions to the central power of the Communists. This rectification was justified in the name of China's war with Japan. See Lie Shao-ch'i, How to be a Good Communist (New York, 1953), p. 19; Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, IV (New York, 1956), 29-31.
leadership of the DPRK government. In short, the relationship between political stability of organic control and successful planning for economic over-production seems to be a major element in the DPRK's Crush American Imperialism campaign. "Socialism" and "Reconstruction" were two most important accomplishments in the campaign.

**A Policy Toward Socialism**

Following the Korean war (1950-1953), Russia's hold on the DPRK was loosened and China's influence as well became diffused throughout North Korea. The DPRK had managed to gain a solidified position of respect in the Communist world and to begin postwar reconstruction. This postwar reconstruction was set forth in the Three-Year Plan. The aim of the plan was to restore the economy to the prewar stage while correcting the "imbalance" in the economy arising from the market economy that had been effective for the private sector until the Korean war and afterwards. By the end of the Three-Year Plan, the DPRK claimed that it had completed the goal of restoration after the war's devastation.

The plan and its basic data are found in the text of the "Law on the Three-Year Plan of Rehabilitation of the National Economy of the DPRK in 1954-1956." According to this text, the intensive socialist development of the DPRK was begun in the Three-Year Plan, from which time the regime
has continued its programs leading to socialism. Following the Three-Year Plan, reaching for prewar levels in industry, a Five-Year Plan was set for the general development of industry for 1957-1961. This outline for socialism was set forth by Kim Il Sung himself at the Sixth Plenum of the KWP Central Committee in September, 1953, at the end of the Korean war. In his speech, Kim declared that "we are all forces of Tado Mije, and with this spirit Socialism can be accomplished soon." In other words, the Three-Year Plan was a transitional period for the regime, from the prewar structure of "progressive democracy" to the building of a socialist "people's democracy" in the postwar era.

Theoretically, the DPRK's economic plans are structured by the State Planning Commission, which turns the plans over to the cabinet for approval. These plans are supposedly

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5 The term progressive democracy refers to a government of the people's will in terms of consensus, or progressive majority. In this form of government, a considerable individualism was allowed in order for people to possess their own property at the family level. Sometimes this term is used interchangeably with "national democracy." On the other hand, a people's democracy refers to a society with nationalized institutions in which people and properties are governed by the will of socialist classes on behalf of the people's will. In this way, Kim Il Sung's charismatic centralism was formed in the name of the "people's will." See Kim Il Sung Sunjip (Selected Works of Kim Il Sung), II (1963--some of them were published in 1954), 516-520, 536-538.
based on estimates of the production capacity of each plant made by the plant managers. The total estimates submitted by the ministries take into account these estimates, as well as available resources, overall budget expenditures, political considerations and many other factors. In practice, however, these plans are formed by the decisions of a few top policy-makers of the KWP and may not, therefore, be based on purely economic considerations as they pretend to be. The final decision is dependent upon Kim Il Sung and the KWP's political goals.

In the Three-Year Plan, along with collectivization of agriculture, the elimination of all private ownership in industry and trade was also completed. According to Premier Kim's report to the Third Congress of the KWP in April, 1956, the goals of the plan were fulfilled. As a result, the socialized sector accounted for 98.3 per cent of the total industrial output of 51.2 billion old Won in 1956: a state industrial income of 43.8 billion old Won, a provincial jurisdiction of 4.0 billion old Won, and a cooperative industry income of 3.4 billion old Won was shown as the regime's income distribution in the socialist economy.²

²Won is the currency unit for the DPRK. According to a British source, actual value computed for an exchange rate between the British pound and the DPRK's Won was 1:720 in 1956, which means 250 Won to a U. S. dollar before a currency reform in 1959. Accordingly, the Won before the 1959 reform is designated as "old Won" and after the reform is designated as "new Won." A 1971 publication in Pyongyang claimed that the exchange rate was U. S. $ .403 to the DPRK's one new Won. See footnote 15, p. 212.
One area stressed during the Three-Year Plan was an agricultural revolution. The destruction brought by the Korean war and the subsequent migration of people out of farming areas probably gave the Communist regime an opportunity to transform the agricultural sector into a collective system. During the first year of the plan (1954), half of the farmers were organized into cooperative systems, another thirty per cent were forced into the collective farms in 1955 and, by the end of 1957, ninety-five per cent of the farmers were thus reorganized into socialist cooperatives.

This collectivization for social change was known as the "people's economy" by the regime. In August, 1953, Kim Il Sung called for the collectivization of agriculture on a voluntary basis, while preserving the principle of private property. However, gradually the regime developed the collective system into "agricultural cooperatives" in which the system of private property remains only nominally.\(^7\) Considering the postwar situation, the agricultural sector had to bear many difficulties due to the regime's drive for

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\(^7\)The interpretation of the terms, "collectives" and "cooperatives," seems confused. Rudolph, in his study of the DPRK, distinguishes the collectives from the cooperatives; but McCune uses them indifferently, distinguishing their sizes only. However, in a strict sense, the DPRK's use of the two systems is clearly distinguished. That is, Jipdan is the term by which the regime refers to the collectives and means "collective teams," whereas Jiphap refers to the cooperatives and means "collective units." See Philip Rudolph, North Korea's Political and Economic Structure (1959); Shannon McCune, Korea: Land of Broken Calm (Princeton, N. J., 1966).
industrialization. As an alternative, in order to save and secure grain productivity while adhering to industrial ambitions, an agrarian reform in balance with the industrial reform was necessary. The process of collectivization had been oppressive and mandatory. Every time the regime was faced with difficulties in enforcing the rules for collectivization on a voluntary basis, rallies for Tado Mije were held. These rallies were mass assemblies which were organized to criticize individual opinions that opposed the guidelines of the KWP's collectivization. By such rallies, consensus was manipulated in the name of the "people's will" and the few courageous opponents of the movement were screened out for punishment. They were finally eliminated from the definition of "people" and branded as sympathizers of the "American imperialists."8

Now we come to the question of why collectivization was necessary for the regime's modernization plan. It seems that the labor shortage might have been the major reason for the demand for collectivization. In the face of an acute shortage, moderate mechanization and the collectivization of farm labor were the regime's best alternatives.9 There was


9The DPRK's loss of population during the Korean War was estimated to be about 2.2 million persons. For further data, see the DPRK, Facts about Korea (Pyongyang, 1961), p. 9. This figure presumably included not only war losses but also people who fled to South Korea at the end of the war.
a shift of approximately 20 per cent of the rural population, or 200,000 persons, from rural areas to the urban centers between 1953 and 1960. According to one source, 66.4 per cent of the total manpower was known to be involved in farming private farms in 1953, but by 1958, this had been decreased to 44.4 per cent of the total manpower. Thus, 22 per cent of all working people had been presumably transferred from rural areas to offices and factories in urban areas. If this figure has some degree of accuracy, it shows a drop of well over a million persons in the rural population during the war years. Other estimates give the decline in the rural population during the war years as 2,150,000. In the last analysis, we might assume that many had to join in the industrial and urban society as the result of collectivization for labor allocation. This rural reform for socialism is therefore considered as a major change in the process of nation-building of the DPRK in the postwar era.

**Economic Reconstruction**

In the postwar years, the DPRK's economic recovery for the decade depended greatly upon Soviet Aid. The Soviet Union provided the regime with at least 2.2 billion dollars in grants and credits, the services of 1,500 technicians and equipment for some forty industrial enterprises. However, it was reported that Soviet aid was drastically decreased from 12.2 per cent of the DPRK's total annual income in 1957 to 4.2 per cent in 1958.
On the other hand, the Chinese Communists' aid to the DPRK has been reported to equal that of the Soviets. The Chinese contribution of grants and credits to the Pyongyang government was estimated at 2 billion dollars as compared to Soviet Russia's 2.2 billion dollars. It was also reported that China's largest portion (an additional 105 million dollars) went to Pyongyang in October, 1960, at a time of increasing Sino-Soviet tension. According to the sources, more than 666 million dollars in grants from other Communist countries for immediate reconstruction after the Korean war went to the DPRK between 1953 and 1958.

The role of foreign aid in the DPRK's postwar recovery further suggests an interesting aspect with regard to the total state budget of the DPRK. The structure of the DPRK state budget indicates that "patriotic taxes" (income taxes on domestic silk production, sericulture, part-time fishing and so on) are becoming relatively less important as a source of revenue, while income from socialist industrial enterprise is becoming more important. This may be a sign of the decreasing importance of the individual sector of the economy. A comparison of the 1954 budget figure with the plan of 1957 reveals that while income from socialist enterprise increased from 62 to 80 per cent of the total revenues,

income from personal taxes decreased from 14 to 6 per cent. As state income enjoyed a steady increase, the dependence of state revenues on foreign aid steadily decreased. Foreign aid had accounted for 33 per cent of state revenues in 1954 but was only about 12 per cent in 1957. Moreover, the 1958 budget showed foreign aid as only 4.5 per cent of the total revenues.\textsuperscript{11} Whether or not the decrease in foreign aid was due to Korean or Russian initiative is not relevant here. What is important is that as foreign aid decreased the Korean economy developed sufficiently to offset the losses incurred by decreased foreign aid.

These accomplishments of the Three-Year Plan may be regarded as the result of a "life-and-death" struggle against "American imperialism." Had anyone picked up and read any publication of the DPRK during the Three-Year Plan, he would have found bold expressions, such as the one portraying the DPRK's farmers and workers as "a great army of Tado Mije." The spirit of the \textit{Tado Mije} among the peasants and workers was manifested by their devotion to economic rehabilitation and socialistic reform.\textsuperscript{12} In keeping with its militant attitude in the absence of real combat, the regime claimed that

\textsuperscript{11}Data on the DPRK's revenue sources and foreign aid accounts are based on a study in \textit{North Korea Today}, edited by Robert A. Scalapino (New York, 1963), p. 55.

\textsuperscript{12}The Pyongyang government publically stated that everyone in his work is a member of the \textit{Tado Mije} regiments. See Yun Baik Pak, \textit{The Struggle of Korean People for Peaceful Unification of the Country} (Pyongyang, 1959), pp. 54-55.
the Three-Year Plan had been successfully fulfilled earlier than its original time-span called for; and that the Five-Year Plan (1957-1961) was already in force to open a new stage in socialist construction.

An illuminating comment on the DPRK's militant attitude succinctly describes these term-year plans as "overtime work campaigns" in the name of war against foreign enemies. In order to avoid "trumped-up charges" of being called a reactionary or imperialist sympathizer, "A" must watch the conduct of "B," while "B" is spying on "C," and so forth.13 This interpretation might be exaggerated and biased, but the fact is that the people of the DPRK in their devotion to the struggle against "American imperialism" sacrificed many of their individual rights and showed a fanatical devotion to the national cause for confrontation. It was reported that farmers and factory workers volunteered to work more than fifty hours a week. For such an "overtime work campaign," the regime simply honored them as "vigorous and hardworking militants" in their struggle against enemies.14

It was also reported that the DPRK had declared several wage increases during the Three-Year Plan. These measures were the KWP's response to the people of the "working camps." The first increase was 25 per cent in 1954. The second

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14Foreigners' Impressions of Korea (Pyongyang, 1959), pp. 11-117.
increase was 35 per cent in November, 1956, and another increase of 10 per cent was granted in January, 1958. In this manner, the regime again increased salaries by about 40 per cent by January, 1959. Adding up all of the increases, there was more than a 100 per cent wage increase within the five years from 1954 to 1959. As a result, the average monthly salary for a factory manager was about 150 new Wons in 1959. The general worker's monthly wage was about 65 new Wons, while an average family of four had expenditures around 30 to 35 new Wons per month. If these figures are correct, we can assume that the worker's savings should have been quite high.

In contrast to the Three-Year Plan, the Five-Year Plan which started in 1957, was remarkable for its industrial measures. In order to create such an industrial emphasis, the first measure that the DPRK took in 1956 was to reshape the economic and administrative apparatus. The single Ministry of Industry, for example, provided for in the DPRK's Constitution was replaced by some nine ministries, such as those directing a major branch of the economy. While heavy industry is now controlled at the state level, light industry appears to be locally directed. These industries and the producer cooperatives generate most of the daily necessities. However, during the Three-Year Plan, the

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15 There was a currency reform in February, 1959, whereby one new Won was exchanged for 100 old Won. Thus, according to the reduced value, $1.00 is about 2.5 new Won, or 7.2 new Won for the British pound.
DPRK devoted its most energetic efforts to products such as basic materials for heavy industry. These materials were coal, iron, steel, and energy sources which were to serve as the bases for future development.

In 1957, the DPRK government spent 1,121 million old Wons on coal mining. The Three-Year Plan allocated to the iron mines 2,000 million old Wons in order to repair war damage. As a result, the regime reconstructed twenty-four major mining enterprises out of forty-six that were in existence during the prewar period. One interesting technique of the regime is the dispersal of machine industries throughout the countryside. The DPRK has no industrial centers as has South Korea; however, practically every province has some characteristic industrial machine-production. By 1956, the regime claimed that its machinery production exceeded that of the 1949 prewar level: mining lathes, 39 times; electric motors, 13.2 times; winches, 18.5 times; motor vessels, 10 times; pumps, 13.7 times; and farm implements, 16 times. However, we are not interested in the regime's claims. Rather, we are interested in the regime's style of industrial production. Of particular interest here is the formation of "work teams" among factory workers.


17 Kulloja (Workers) (April, 1958), p. 66.
From the beginning, the regime seemed to emphasize the "regimentation" of labor power. This regimentation was represented by the "cooperative reform" in the agricultural sector, as we noted. On equal footing with the agricultural cooperatives, there were the "Chullima work teams" of December, 1956, at every level of industrial organization. In the early stages, the organizers of the KWP cadres were dispatched to local firms and factories. The primary objective of the Chullima movement was to organize workers and to re-educate them into enthusiastic "armies of anti-capitalism." As a result, numerous "Chullima workers" and "Chullima teams" were organized into cooperative work-camps.

The Chullima Undong (movement) set a significant precedent for the DPRK's industrial mode of production. That "Chullima" became a motto for social movement is evident, because the slogan appeared not only in 1956 but also in 1959 and 1963; that is, it appeared whenever the regime initiated new term-plans, such as the Five-Year Plan and the Seven-Year Plan. The characteristics of the movement were much the same as those of agricultural "cooperatives," which emphasized (1) the increase of production beyond the assigned

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18 As we noted in footnote 10, p. 49, the Chullima Undong (or Flying Horse movement) became a great incentive for the DPRK's industrial designs. The regime at its transitional stage between the final year of the Three-Year Plan and the initiation of the Five-Year Plan, encouraged the Chullima spirit in order to mobilize workers into the industrial drive. For further information on the movement, see North Korea under Communism (Seoul, 1963), p. 31.
quota, (2) the importance of the people working as if they were soldiers on the battlefield fighting against "American imperialist capitalism," and (3) the necessity of working overtime in order to provide a revolutionary base for the socialist camp in the unification of Korea. Thus, all these changes which took place in the spirit of war mobilization were apparently connected with the regime's final goal of "liberation of the southern-half of Korea from 'American imperialism.'"

**Haebang Nambu Campaign**

The slogan of Haebang Nambu (Liberation of the Southern-half) did not appear during the Three-Year Plan period. The first sign of the liberation campaign appeared in Kim Il Sung's speech before the Third Session of the Second Supreme People's Assembly on January 11, 1958. Following Kim's directives, the Cabinet decision (Policy Order 96) declared a so-called "peace offensive" against South Korea. According to this decision, the government of the DPRK was to offer 150,000 bushels of rice, five million meters of fabrics, four million pairs of footwear, 10,000 tons of marine products, and other welfare services to the people of South Korea. The DPRK also requested various kinds of remuneration, including proposals for sharing electric power and an
immediate opening of cultural exchange between Pyongyang and Seoul.  

In fact the "offer" constituted a psychological offensive on the part of the DPRK. It offered not only rice, fabrics, and shoes, but continuous propaganda claims as well, to the effect that the Communist regime would provide jobs for the entire unemployed population of South Korea. At the same time the Pyongyang government continued to reject the role of the United Nations in the search for Korean unification. Moreover, the fundamental threat to South Korea was that the regime's socialistic reforms would continually widen the gap between the two governments. This was accelerated by the completion of the DPRK regime's regimentation of farmers and factory workers. The Haebang Nambu campaign may therefore be viewed from two perspectives. In the first place, the "peace offensive" of the DPRK was irrelevant to the people of South Korea; in the second place, the "liberation" campaign was intended to implement the DPRK's long term goal of overturning South Korea and bringing it under Communist control.

The liberation was a totally "subjective" expression in the sense that the Haebang Nambu campaign affected only the

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19 The DPRK's Cabinet Order 96 was formally declared in August, 1958. The "Order" was publicly declared on August 15, 1958, on the occasion of the twelfth anniversary of Korean liberation from Japanese colonialism. The content of the decree was reproduced in Foreigners' Impressions of Korea (1959), p. 18.
subjects of the DPRK. Therefore, our examination of the campaign of Haebang Nambu is focused on its effects upon the internal policy of the DPRK government. Specifically, the campaign seemed to have been useful as a way to arouse continuous public support for the regime's tedious long-term planning. However, this particular campaign started with the initiation of the Five-Year Plan. With regard to the character of the campaign, therefore, our exploration must examine closer the operation of the Five-Year Plan. It was claimed that the Five-Year Plan was successful in establishing Socialism and a "State Economy." We need to scrutinize the two accomplishments.

"Progressive Democracy" to Socialism

Ever since the beginning of the DPRK in 1946, the regime is known to have laid its foundation on a "democratic base." The regime's series of policies were always carried out forcibly, not under the name of the "proletariat dictatorship" or "socialism," but in the name of "democracy." It was sometime after the Korean war that the policy of Sahoechui-hwa (literally "to socialize") was openly carried out in keeping with the ideology of Marxism-Leninism. Socialism was more vividly expressed in the works of postwar reconstruction. In this manner, "socialism" became everyone's cliche in the regime's Five-Year Plan.

The Five-Year Plan, originally designed to cover the period from 1956 to 1961, was the first such plan to put
into practice a "socialist economy" in Korea. In the DPRK's brand of socialism, all means of production were put under the direct control and operation of the state. It was Kim Il Sung's wish to put an end to "progressive democracy," as the KWP's united front with non-Communist elements was designated, in the shortest possible time--much earlier than the regime originally had planned. It became the Party line to Communize all units of social-economic organization under control of the KWP's power structure. The Five-Year Plan, in this respect, was the particular vehicle for the campaign to terminate "progressive democracy." 20

The regime claimed a "glorious victory" for the plan after only three years of the Five-Year Plan--that is, by the end of 1959. The year 1960 was declared as a "buffer year" before entering the next long-term plan, the Seven-Year Plan, which would be initiated in 1961. Judging by steel underproduction alone, for example, the claims for industry in general seem dubious. Another reason for doubt lies in the currency reform of February, 1959, before the end of the Five-Year Plan. We assume that the currency devaluation was inevitable in order to alleviate the inflation resulting from the ambitious emphasis on vast capital

20 Kim Il Sung's speech at the Plenary Session, Central Committee of the KWP, April 4, 1955, revealed his socialist program. The text of the speech is reprinted in Kim Il Sung Sunjip (Selected Works of Kim Il Sung), IV (1960), 259. For "progressive democracy," see our earlier explanation in footnote 3, p. 204.
accumulation from the regime's over-expenditure, and this trend was worsened by an aid cutback from the Soviet Union.

In fact, the Five-Year Plan was no more than a slight indication of the regime's aspirations in experimenting with a socialist economy, the first in the nation's history. In this sense, the DPRK's industrial drive cannot be considered more than a tentative outline, especially when we consider the unexpected changes and the plan's revisions during the "buffer year."

What can be said of the meaning of the "buffer year" of 1960? Any attempt to answer this question must consider various aspects of the Five-Year Plan. It was to provide a brief recess, as well as the opportunity to revise the plan, which was no longer functioning. Due to production quotas and to the severe competition among factories and various economic sectors, workers were pushed to produce beyond their normal capacity. During the first three years of the Five-Year Plan, each worker and manager was "exhorted, coerced, wheedled, and beguiled" into producing more and more in excess of the goal set in the beginning. Such pressure for overproduction in one sector required overproduction in another to supply it. By the beginning of 1959, the delicate balance had broken down completely. All raw material production simply could not meet demand. Therefore, the buffer year of 1960 may have been allowed for repairs and replacement of the over-used machines while giving a breather to the tired workers.
Throughout the Five-Year Plan, the workers were constantly reminded of the task of Haebang Nambu. In other words, the harder the workers performed, the sooner unification would come. Under the political slogan of "peaceful unification," the working people of the DPRK were encouraged (or forced) to do their patriotic share in factory and farm. A great accomplishment in building industrial factories was symbolized in the Chullima movement, the movement for increased production, in the period of the Five-Year Plan. The practice of "peaceful unification" meant to the people of the DPRK that they were expected to prove their loyal spirit by fulfilling what the KWP had prescribed for them. The implication was that Chullima accomplishments were for all Koreans, including the people of South Korea, not for the people of the DPRK alone.\textsuperscript{21} In political terms, the Chullima movement implied a "liberation offensive" against South Korea by positing a "socialist base" for the national unification of Korea.

Rally after rally, meeting after meeting, the continual public criticism finally resulted in the acceptance of the Five-Year Plan by the people. The poor working conditions were justified under the blanket label of Haebang Nambu.

\textsuperscript{21}For further propaganda which related "overproduction campaigns" with the Haebang Nambu campaign, see Kwang-hyon Kim, \textit{The Chullima Korea} (Pyongyang, 1961), p. 172. It is also an interesting speculation to state that the Pyongyang-Seoul talks in 1972 should have a strong impact on the domestic front beyond its concern for national unification itself.
This slogan rationalized that hard work resulted in obvious profit, since the working people of the DPRK were able to produce twice as much in every field in order to supply goods to South Koreans.

Behind the external pretext, domestic accomplishments were sought. With all of its ambiguities, however, there is yet good reason to believe that the DPRK's Five-Year Plan did accomplish major public development. "Public" refers to those industries which are directly related to the people's living conditions, ranging from consumer items to housing facilities and public utilities. This public work sector in some cases becomes no more than the production of goods catering to the mechanization and technology of modern living.

The public work sector for the regime was to begin with housing improvements, and the Communist regime spent a considerable proportion of its total investment (an average of fifteen per cent of the total budget) for housing improvement. The objective was to modernize the workers' residential areas and the farmers' collective towns.22 This housing construction was basic to the regime's socialization process.

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22 "Cooperative farm" towns and "Chullima work teams" are collectively accommodated in accordance with community and township regimentation. This kind of community housing arrangement is considered an important element in changing the patterns and units of political loyalty from traditional kinship clan to central control. A similar socialization program is found in many other communist countries including Communist China in the 1950's.
and to the programs for regimentation of workers and farmers on the bases of community and township.

There is no information available as to what kind of housing projects have been constructed. However, judging from the related industries necessary for housing projects, we can assume the DPRK's ability to construct apartments. It is known that the industrial locations of the DPRK are more or less diversified, depending on physical and geographical conditions, and on whether resource and labor mobilization can be made effective. When a factory was built, a workers' housing project accompanied it as part of the construction.

In conclusion, we have said that the whole process of the DPRK's Five-Year Plan laid great emphasis on socialization. The emphasis had been tacitly implemented during the Haebang Nambu campaign. At the same time, the regime's economic accomplishments in the Chullima movement seemed to have doubled the regime's industrial output as compared to the Three-Year Plan. A report in the Chosun Chungang Yearbook states that by 1960 the government had reached an electric power capacity of 9,100 million kwh, with a total electrification of 92 per cent of the nation, of which 20 per cent was to be supplied to housing areas.²³ While there

²³See Chosun Chungang Yongam (Korea Central Yearbook) (Pyongyang, 1961), pp. 322-324. Another source indicated that North Korea produced 10.4 billion kwh in 1961, but failed to mention the percentage ratio of 20 for the residential use. See Area Handbook for North Korea, p. 338.
are no means to verify the figures at this moment, we may assume some validity for these claims in reference to the regime's emphasis on industrialization and on its energy capacity.

**Industrial State Economy**

The DPRK embraces the theory that national independence necessarily stems from economic self-reliance. Consequently, the regime is almost pathological about the industrialization on which national self-reliance depends. In practice, economic development in the direction of self-reliance has been dependent upon state control in the form of a state monopoly which, at least until recently, seemed to have produced quite impressive results. It appears from an analysis of economic data, even allowing for some exaggeration in the Communist claims, that the gross national income per person was about 73 per cent that of South Korea in 1949, but was over 150 per cent of that of South Korea by 1960. The DPRK has until recently saved upward of one-third of its GNP and invested most of this in industry. Two-thirds of its imports consisted of industrial machinery and raw materials, as contrasted with 20 per cent for South Korea.\(^{24}\)

It is again difficult to judge the validity of the regime's claim for industrial and public development. The glowing reports and speeches of the DPRK's leaders cannot be taken literally. But from the reports of outside observers who have travelled through the DPRK, we can better judge these claims. Observers who have travelled in the Pyongyang area say that there is no doubt that considerable advances have been made since its Three-Year and Five-Year Plans.

There are, at least, two factors which must have contributed to the accomplishment of the regime's industrial development plans. The first consideration is the large amount of foreign aid received from the Soviet Union and other Communist countries, including Communist China, which must have been one of the contributing factors to the regime's economic recovery from the war damage of the 1950's. The second consideration is the effective mobilization of labor under the banner of Haebang Nambu.

Taking the latter factor as a perspective for a consideration of the DPRK's industrial development, we would like to examine the Chullima Undong in relation to its attempt to shift toward an industrial "state economy."

The Five-Year Plan (1957-1961) was the period of the Chullima Undong. Intense efforts were made to socialize the

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structure of industrial economy in relation to labor mobilization programs which sought to create factory workers out of a farming population. Considering the intensive work programs, it may be reasonable to believe that the regime had more industrial output than South Korea because of its natural resources and electric potential. Also, due to its socialist structure, the regime was able to use manpower in accordance with its strict planning goals.

In general, the growth of industry during the Five-Year Plan, especially at the end of 1960, seemed to show a decline in dependence on foreign aid. At the same time, the regime had begun to diversify its trade patterns within and without the Communist world and had decreased the degree of reliance upon foreign technicians and on programs for training Koreans abroad. The DPRK's budgetary resources also showed that its state income came mostly from socialist enterprises. At the same time, that part of the state income represented by foreign aid has been gradually decreasing since 1958 to less than one-tenth. We can thus believe that the regime's movement toward a self-supporting economy, which the DPRK regime labeled "state economy," was made step by step during the Five-Year Plan.26

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26 According to the DPRK's word usage, the term "state economy" refers to the national socialist economy, as opposed to "imbalance economy," which the DPRK means as a colonial or market economy. The DPRK's use of such terms was argued by the Central Committee of the KWP in 1958. The argument was covered by Rodong Shinmun, June 6, 1960.
According to the DPRK's official report, the Five-Year Plan achieved its goal in industrial output by 1959--two years earlier than originally scheduled. As a result, the report shows that gross industrial output constituted a greater portion of the total national income every year. If the gross industrial and agricultural output of 1956 represented 100 per cent, that of industry was 60 per cent and that of agriculture 40 per cent; but in 1959 the difference increased to 76 per cent, with agriculture standing at only 24 per cent.27 Another source showed that in 1960, industrial output had tripled over that of 1956; electric capacity was up 170 per cent; coal was up 270 per cent; fertilizer up 290 per cent; cement up 380 per cent; and textiles up 250 per cent.28

If these reports and figures have any validity, the DPRK appears to have accomplished a remarkable change in the country, considering that only eight years elapsed between the end of the Korean War and the termination of the Five-Year Plan. These changes may have to be judged by historians

27Minju Chosun (Democratic Korea), November 23, 1960. *Minju Chosun* is the organ of the Cabinet of the DPRK published daily.

28In terms of concrete figures, the outputs in 1960 were as follows: electric capacity, 9,139 million kwh; coal, 126 million tons; iron ore, 1.18 million tons; pig iron, 872 thousand tons; steel, 861 thousand tons; fertilizer, 561 thousand tons; cement, 2.28 million tons; textiles, 1,896 million meters. They also claimed that 3,002 tractors and 3,111 trucks and cars were produced in 1960. See Kwang-hyon Kim, *The Chullima Korea* (1961), pp. 14-15.
of the next generation, but the characteristics of the regime's political and economic style seem to add up to "progress in instability." Frequent changes in political structure permit a characterization of the regime as "progressive" and "pragmatic." A consistent theme of modernization in the economic field represents almost a "routinized practice of mass mobilization."

However, "mass mobilization" seems more than a general assembly of people for a particular occasion. In the politics of the DPRK, the mass campaigns were appropriately capitalized upon as a great force for productive organization. Throughout the mass mobilization, the people were to adopt a military mentality as if they were in a war against South Korea and the United States. In production, workers identified themselves as members of Dolkyukdae (or shock troops). Working itself becomes a Jontu (or battle). In this manner, production quotas are described as "battle hills" to be taken. Required days set to accomplish such production goals are normally referred to as, for example, a "hundred-day battle" or a "thirty-day war" depending on the size of the projects. 29

In short, it was the "hatred" of America which legitimized the autocracy of Kim Il Sung and his policy of confrontation. It was "love" of Koreans as a whole which sanctioned Kim Il Sung's torture of individual people,

29 For more of such militant campaigns for working style, see Pukhan Chonggam (General Survey of North Korea) (1968), pp. 414-415.
forcing them into collective working camps. "Hatred" and "love" campaigns grew out of mass mobilization. The masses were directed in such a way as to be constantly concerned with an external threat and pressure. The Communist regime of the DPRK successfully exerted the politics of "extroversión" in order to force the success of difficult programs in domestic affairs. As a result of this policy, the DPRK now claims that the government is modernized politically and economically. Complete control over individual subjects so as to obtain a political and economic consensus seems to have been the major accomplishment of the Five-Year Plan.  

30 In the 1962 election for the People's Supreme National Assembly, the regime declared that the nominees obtained one hundred per cent approval by the electoral participants. In this manner, the DPRK regime is self-contented in political modernization backed by industrial modernization. See special article in Minju Chosun, October 11, 1962.
CHAPTER VII

THE POLITICS OF "INTROVERSION": 1961-1970

The Pyongyang regime has been consistently alert to extremely pro-Russian and pro-Chinese factions within the KWP. In an earlier period, during the Three-Year Plan, Kim Il Sung had eliminated some extreme factions of pro-Russian and pro-Chinese Communists from the KWP in the name of Juche identity. Between 1958 and 1961, Premier Kim Il Sung again eliminated the remnants of "Yenan groups" (pro-Chinese) and "bookro groups" (pro-Russian) in the name of Jaju (or self-determination) from foreign influence.¹ By 1961, Kim Il Sung had confirmed his "cultism," or one-man dictatorship. Under this circumstance, any criticism of the Kim Il Sung ideology was interpreted as a "plot of the imperialists," or "revisionism."² At the same time, the regime had achieved

¹Either Juche or Jaju implies nationalism. The term, Jaju (self-determination) became popular ten years after Juche. As we noted, Juche was first introduced in December, 1955 (see footnote 29, p. 106), whereas Jaju became popular by a Rodong Shinmun's special article in August, 1966, and a subsequent report of Kim Il Sung to the KWP October Conference of 1966. See Rodong Shinmun, August 12, 1966, issue on "Let's Defend Jaju Line." Ironically, all those purged from the KWP were accused of being "hireling spies of the United States imperialists." For a detailed description of the party purges, see Hun Ryu, Study of North Korea (Seoul, 1966), pp. 72-77.

²The extent of dedication to the personal cult of Kim Il Sung can be judged by the kinds and quantities of propaganda publications serving this purpose. For example, the
economic stability by the end of 1960. These accomplishments were relatively favorable for Kim Il Sung, and he launched another long-term plan in order to solidify the DPRK's status in the international theater.

As we noted in the previous chapter, the DPRK's "state economy" also requires ideological independence from other socialist countries. Therefore, the ideology of the DPRK was being recast in an independent mold during the Five-Year Plan. Tactically sensitive Kim Il Sung and his "Kapsan" party circle modified their ideological stance according to the climate of continental pressures from Moscow and Peking. However, the Juche ideology of nationalistic assertion had been rising in political and social importance with respect to the regime's reliance on Soviet Russia and the Chinese Communists. Pyongyang's ideological game of playing off Communist China against Soviet Russia may be considered as part of a process of transition of the regime from a Communist "satellite state," or a "party state" of the Communist bloc, to an independent Communist nation-state. Even though the Juche ideology did not attain full bloom until

table of contents of Jidoja-wa Kungmin (Leader and People) shows that all the authors are dedicated to the notion of idolizing Kim Il Sung. See Jidoja-wa Kungmin, I (Pyongyang, 1962).

3For a full analysis on the transition from a "satellite state" to "nation-state," see John Bradbury, "Sino-Soviet Competition to North Korea," The China Quarterly, No. 6 (April-June, 1961), p. 16.
the latter part of the 1960's, it was one of the major products of the Five-Year Plan.

We also mentioned earlier that the politics of "introversion" is necessarily preceded by the state of "extroversion," because the former is based on political and economic stability established in the stage of "extroversion," and upon the overall structure of internal balance. We also conceived the idea that the politics of "introversion" has a dual purpose. The politics of "introversion" refers specifically to a nation's overt concentration on internal affairs in order to gain some external policy goals. This type of policy may, then, be used to disguise actual policy goals. As we will note, the politics of "introversion" disguises external policy objectives in the shade of internal affairs.

Practicing the politics of "extroversion," the DPRK had launched long-range programs of internal development on the pretext of thwarting foreign aggression. Practicing the politics of "introversion," the DPRK simply inverted this technique. This time, the programs for the opening of doors to foreign friends were being carried out by way of an Jaju (or independent policy) of nationalism in domestic affairs, as well as by political and economic programs.4 In this

4 Jaju literally means "self-determination or independence. In relation to the use of Juche, which refers to an independence from all big powers including Communist China and Soviet Russia, Jaju is more or less concerned with domestic propaganda for nationalism at work. For a further explanation, see Pukhan Chonggam (General Survey of North Korea) (1968), p. 245.
sense, the Juche and Jaju campaigns have been powerful bait used to woo many Afro-Asian nationalist states. At the same time, these campaigns were also effective at the domestic consensus policy level, because such campaigns coincided with the peak of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Seizing upon the opportunity offered by the dispute, the DPRK undertook to assert its greater independence, by launching a Seven-Year Plan (1961-1967).

The DPRK regime launched the Seven-Year Plan one year before the Five-Year Plan was to end, saying that the Five-Year Plan had been completed within two-and-a-half years, and that the remaining time was a transitional period known as the "buffer year." With these aspects of the DPRK's campaigns in mind, we shall begin to examine the politics of "introversion," in close conjunction with the description of the Seven-Year Plan. In order to do so, we must take a look at the campaigns of Juche and Jaju in terms of their effects on the foreign policy of the DPRK, for these campaigns were major components of the Seven-Year Plan, which practically ended in 1970.

Juche Politics

The most remarkable characteristic of the Seven-Year Plan, in contrast to other plans, is found in the regime's attempt to create its own style of planning in every field of political and economic change. This style was directed toward something characteristically "Korean." Much new
vocabulary was created to express the regime's interpretation of the socialistic economic structure and the political practices of Communism. There was a reappearance of the Chullima Undong, but this differed from the previous movements in the Five-Year Plan. According to an escapee from the DPRK, mass rallies were held to initiate the Seven-Year Plan from August of 1958 through September of the same year. As a result of these mass assemblies, some fifty per cent of the office workers volunteered to participate in factory and farm work. Students also contributed their labor to production on a weekend basis. Accordingly the slogan "Run with the Vigor of Chullima" was at the peak of its realization during the period of the Seven-Year Plan.

However, attention to external concerns was considerably decreased during the Seven-Year Plan. Instead, the DPRK regime placed emphasis on Juche and Jaju as the means for carrying out the tasks of national consolidation. One conspicuous change in the regime's attitude was signaled by the adoption of the slogan "co-existence with countries which have different social systems." In an attempt to explain

5For an eye witness report on the mass movement, see Dong-jun Lee, Hwansangqwa Hyonshil (Fantasy and Fact) (Seoul, 1961), p. 218. Lee reported facts about the DPRK after his escape from the north.

the principle of peaceful co-existence, the DPRK commended the principle of reciprocity and, at the same time, denounced subordinate relationships between nations. It seems that the former action was directed at the Afro-Asian nations of a "non-Communist" persuasion, and the latter was directed at the arrogant attitudes of Moscow and Peking in their roles as communist big brothers. In fact, this is interpreted as the DPRK's attempt to gain independence from the Sino-Soviet dispute. More specifically, Kim Il Sung, in calling for Juche identity in Korea, pronounced that "No party of other socialist countries is entitled to interfere with the internal problems of fraternal parties." All this evidence signified that the Seven-Year Plan period emphasized domestic issues as interrelated with communist allies, rather than exclusively emphasizing external concerns, such as the Tado Mije or Haebang Nambu campaigns had done. In short, it was a time for the DPRK to find a sense of nationalism through which the DPRK's international status was sought.

**Attaining Nationalism**

Much of the credit for the DPRK regime's success in its Seven-Year Plan was given to what is called the Chungsan-ri spirit and method for effective uses of labor. It is said

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7Categorical analyses of movements related to Juche nationalism are found in Pukhan Chonggam (1968), pp. 75-77. Kim Il Sung's speeches connected with Juche nationalism are reproduced in Collections of Documents on the Sino-Soviet Conflict (Seoul, 1963), pp. 474-477.
to date from the month of February, 1960, when Premier Kim Il Sung devoted himself, for fifteen days, to the solution of the problem posed by Chungsan-ri, a small cooperative farm town located south of Pyongyang. Kim Il Sung's idea of Chungsan-ri was that enterprising leaders and community people would mingle with the workers to study conditions and give "on-the-spot guidance." Office workers and students at lower levels as well as KWP committee members and military officers at higher levels, were ordered to participate in the Chungsan-ri movement in compliance with Kim Il Sung's crude "scientific method" as a guiding spirit for solving problems of underdevelopment.

What can be said about the nature of the DPRK's Chungsan-ri movement? No speculation seems possible, until we find some other factors relevant to the movement. Perhaps an attempt to examine the manpower situation of the DPRK will provide us with a clue in uncovering the nature of the movement, because the movement was a measure designed to create effective labor power.

We hear that unemployment has long been abolished in the DPRK. By mid-1959 there were 1.3 million workers and office employees, as compared with 730,000 in 1949. Demand

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8 For a further explanation on the Chungsan-ri method, see The People's Korea (February 26, 1969), p. 2. The paper carried a great deal of propaganda on the Chungsan-ri spirit, thusly: "Great Chungsan-ri Method Created by Marshal Kim Il Sung and Its Victory." However, the movement has been upheld as being not only the great "spirit," but as the great "scientific method."
for labor power had reached its peak by 1960, as the DPRK regime expanded its industrial build-up. At the same time, there was an attempt to import labor power. On August 13, 1959, the DPRK concluded an agreement with the Japanese Red Cross to repatriate Korean minorities into its factories and farms in order to provide more manpower. This repatriation still continues to be effective, with over 38,531 workmen repatriated by 1960. Of the 850,000 Korean nationals in Japan, the DPRK was enabled to repatriate about ten per cent from Japan by 1965. Another source says that the DPRK has repatriated nearly 100,000 Koreans from Japan and is still seeking to repatriate more. This maneuver has caused a diplomatic confrontation between South Korea and the Japanese government.

If we consider both the Chungsan-ri movement and the "repatriation movement," we can safely say that the DPRK was definitely successful in influencing the Korean minorities in Japan, overriding Seoul's every effort to stop the Koreans from being influenced by Pyongyang. By this repatriation, the DPRK certainly earned two significant goals. It imported labor and, at the same time, helped Pyongyang's overseas image as a "socialist paradise in the north" as opposed to South

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Korea's "starving unemployment camp under foreign imperialism." More than anything else, the Korean minorities in Japan were highly obsessed by the fact that the DPRK was taking a nationalistic posture in its attempt to solve the country's developmental problems. The Chungsan-ri movement and the "repatriation" were products of the DPRK's nationalistic implementation of the Juche ideology. In other words, instead of depending on aid from Moscow or Peking, the Pyongyang regime created a new work style to confront the problems of its implementation of socialistic economics. The Chungsan-ri methods may be nothing more than common sense, i.e., the utilization of an empirical approach for collecting data and for analyzing economic problems in order to find solutions. The regime, however, claimed that it was a unique Korean discovery, and more specifically, the product of Juche Kim Il Sung.

Regardless of whether the Chungsan-ri was the product of Kim Il Sung's innate genius or nothing more than the application of empiricism and technology to pressing problems, the method and the spirit it has generated have enabled the people of the DPRK to solve some of their most urgent problems.

By way of the movement, the Communists perhaps sought to

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11 Most Koreans living in Japan are those of a second generation of Korean laborers forcefully mobilized by the Japanese during the Japanese occupation of Korea. Because of their having been in Japan and of having been discriminated against by the Japanese, their present state of mind is highly susceptible to any hand of rescue extended by either the North or South Korean governments.
affect the basic pattern of life, and to put Communist education into practice. The material incentives, according to the regime, were to be provided by the first part of the Seven-Year Plan.

The first three years of the Seven Year-Plan were directed toward industry and rural economy in order to raise the national living standard at the level of the individual. During this period, "do things ourselves" was a nation-wide cliché throughout the country. In the field of economic campaigns, light industry, which has direct influence on individual living conditions, seemed to have been emphasized so as to partially please the hard-working people. Cynical responses from the Soviet Union to the "Korean style of industrialization" for this period were, in fact, advantageously utilized for the regime's campaign in building nationalistic sentiment. In October, 1963, Rodong Shinmun carried a long article, which denounced Russian criticisms of Pyongyang's "primitive mentality for industrialization," in the name of national pride and self-determination.12

Another source says that the change from heavy industry to light industry was designed to make up for the failure of the previous plan so that the Seven-Year Plan featured the

spirit of the "double Chullima." In any case, whether or not the Seven-Year Plan was launched as a cover-up for the failure of the Five-Year Plan, it must be noted as remarkable, for the regime skillfully adjusted to the changing socio-political environment. This new plan can also be interpreted as an explicit expression of a desire for neutrality in the Soviet-Chinese competition over the DPRK. As we noted earlier, the Seven-Year Plan period was a time of difficulty for Pyongyang in balancing itself against the magnitude of Peking and Moscow. (See Figures 4, 5, and 6.)

A brief look at the regime's educational system in 1961 also supports our belief that a plan for nationalistic consolidation in terms of cultural life was taking place. The regime's educational system, usually thorough and extensive, was further developing a nine-year compulsory system and was establishing an extremely large system of tuition-free universities. It was reported that 97,000 university students in 78 universities were either technical or engineering students. The number of students per 10,000 population by 1963 was about 90, compared with 57 for South Korea, 73 for Japan, 13 for Communist China, 107 for the Soviet Union, and 180 for the United States. On the other hand, the number

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14 These data are based on a study done by George Henderson, op. cit., p. 327.
of students abroad since 1962 has been drastically decreasing, while the number of domestic educational institutions trebled. However, we have no sources at this time to enable us to investigate further. In general, it seems correct to say that the leaders of the DPRK gradually have "begun to manifest more and more confidence, even arrogance, about their abilities, and to pursue more nationalistic politics." 15

**Active Role in Far Eastern Politics**

After 1960, the DPRK seemed to play a more important role in Far Eastern politics than in previous years. This ambitious attitude has been described as the "emergent Korean self-image." 16 During the Three-Year Plan (1954-1956), the DPRK slogan was "Learn from the Soviet Union." A theme in the Five-Year Plan (1957-1961) was "Learn from the Chinese brothers." However, as the DPRK's politics and economics became more stable, the Pyongyang government seemed to have abandoned all its major efforts of emulation of Moscow or Peking, except in those matters at the mass level. Rather than praising the Soviet army as their benefactor and the Chinese as their "brothers," the DPRK showed a new nationalistic desire for identity and independence.

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The contemporary image the DPRK leaders have of themselves is a definite influence on their role and status in the socialist camp, particularly among the underdeveloped countries of Africa and Asia. In particular, Kim Il Sung's myth of Korean guerrilla experience seems to be replacing that of Mao Tse-tung as the most "communist" leader in Asia. The self-definition of Kim Il Sung's leadership as the only "true communist" implicitly denies all other leadership in the "liberation war" and excludes both Communist China and Soviet Russia.  

The DPRK's self-image emphasizes the theme of Juche in industrial modernization. In particular, the DPRK Communists view their regime as the most modernized socialist nation in Asia, next to Soviet Russia, and demand the role of leadership as the "eastern sentinel of the Socialist Camp." They wish to make an independent contribution to the military defense of both China and the Soviet Union. The

17A recent publication on Kim Il Sung's revolutionary leadership purported the Korean Communist movement to be independent of all external influences. To mention one among others, Na-yang Yi, Chosun Minjok Haebang Tuaeng-sa (History of the Korean People's Liberation Struggle) (Tokyo, 1960), pp. 41-42. This account of Kim Il Sung's revolutionary experience disregards the Korea's relationships with the Chinese Communists and Soviet Russia. In fact, this book and Sul-ya Han's Hero General Kim Il Sung (1962) purport to construct the "Korean communist movement independent from the Chinese and Russians." Recently these two books have been combined into a book and have been translated into English by the "Association of Korean Residents in Japan." This new edition has been advertised in the New York Times, October 27, 1969, as well as in The Times (London), November 4, 1960.
Communist regime further declares that it plays a leading role in assisting the "development of international proletarian socialism." The "internationalism of socialist development" means to the DPRK that the Pyongyang government is now able to aid other nations economically in order to fulfill communist internationalism, so that it can help to bring about a world Communist revolution.18

The DPRK's wish to play an important role in Far Eastern politics can be compared with the desire of contemporary Japan. We hear all too frequently that modern Japan is willing to give aid to other nations to build a democratic model based on Japanese modernization. The communist counterpart to this is the DPRK's desire to help other nations accomplish "socialistic" modernization.

There is little doubt that the DPRK leaders view their own accomplishments in nation-building as suitable for emulation by other emerging nations of Asia and Africa. Particularly in the latter part of the 1960's the DPRK was "bragging" about its industrial modernization. As Professor Jerome Cohen of Harvard Law School reported upon his return from Pyongyang in October, 1972, the DPRK does "plainly want the world to see (the regime) as modern."19


19Jerome Cohen and his family were invited by the Pyongyang government for two weeks in the midst of the regime's
We may say objectively that, except for North Vietnam and some other minor socialist countries, the DPRK offers the only case of a former colonial nation building socialism. However the DPRK leaders take pride in their accomplishments and claim that the leaders of other developing nations should take an interest in these accomplishments. This was demonstrated by the celebration of the fifteenth anniversary of the founding of the DPRK. Many foreign delegations were invited to celebrate the anniversary in 1963. They were from Indonesia, Cuba, Guinea, Mali, Algeria, Burma, the U. A. R., Yemen, Cambodia, Iraq, and individual visitors from Japan and Ceylon. These officials were escorted to the Museum of the Korean Revolution, to the Fatherland Liberation War Memorial Hall, and to the Industrial and Agricultural Exhibition Hall. They were, reportedly, all convinced that the "experiences of Korea are of international significance." The delegates felt, it was reported, that the Korean experience showed the practical possibilities for development "to other Afro-Asian peoples, affecting particularly the newly liberated peoples" of the Third World. 20

"Anti-American Month" in July, 1962. He was the first American scholar to visit the Communist government since the end of World War II. His visit was preceded by selective journalists from the New York Times and Washington Post in early 1972. For further information, see Jerome Alan Cohen's article, "A Window Half-Opened on North Korea," The Christian Science Monitor, October 31, 1972, p. 9.

20 "Friendship and Solidarity: Splendid Achievements, Sagacious Leadership," Korea Today, No. 81 (November, 1963), pp. 18-26. Of course, such conciliatory reports made by
Another factor which supports the DPRK in its desire to play a significant role in Asia is the Japanese response to the growth of the DPRK's independent industrial complex. Ever since the DPRK's attempt to approach Japan in 1955, the DPRK has accepted the Japanese policy of a strict separation of politics and economics. Ironically enough, the two newest candidates for Asian leadership, the DPRK and Japan, displayed a significant amount of cooperation. As a result, the Japanese-DPRK Trade Association played an active role in associating the interests of the two countries. Another byproduct of this cooperation was the DPRK's victory in gaining control over most of the Korean minority in Japan, which numbers about 600,000. In the campaign to attract Koreans in Japan, the DPRK issued a series of statements, declarations and suggested activities in connection with the "General Association of Korean Residents in Japan" (Chongryun—pro-DPRK Korean organization in Japan).

The Chongryun's biggest achievement in the 1960's was the Korean repatriation. Thus the DPRK was able to repatriate some 84,000 Korean residents from Japan through the Korean association's arrangement. 21 It was through the

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honored guests of the DPRK cannot be accepted on face value. A point to be considered here is to make a simple recognition that the DPRK's contact with non-Communist countries tends to accomplish propaganda purposes more than anything else.

Korean association in Japan that the Japanese government cautiously approached the Pyongyang government for its cultural and economic exchanges. It was also this organization through which Pyongyang has been making contact with the Japanese government as well as with the West. In short, with regard to the Chongryun activities in Japan, the important fact is that many non-Communist Koreans in Japan became members of the organization primarily because of Pyongyang's Juche articulation and its considerable accomplishments in industrial modernization. As the size of the organization grew and its members outnumbered the Seoul-sympathizers, the Japanese government accepted the organization as a de facto spokesman for the Pyongyang government.

It seems that Japanese policy toward South Korea always takes DPRK pressure into consideration. On the other hand, the DPRK may be considered to have established a de facto agreement with Japan for cooperation in furthering the DPRK's positive role in Far Eastern politics, as long as Japan's interests are also served.

The contemporary international environment also can be considered favorable for providing the DPRK with a role in the Asian theater. Having Japan as its only reliable ally in

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22 The Chongryun (General Association of Korean Residents in Japan) has been quite active in the past half-decade for transmitting Pyongyang's policy line to the West. It not only publishes the English version of Kim Il Sung works and the People's Korea (weekly paper) but also arranges Western contacts such as American visitors to Pyongyang or Western journalists' interviews with DPRK dignitaries while they are in Japan.
Asia, the United States may have to depend on the Japanese in bringing about the settlement of any Far Eastern crises which may arise. With regard to this possibility, it will be the DPRK, perhaps, not the Chinese nor Soviet Russia as intermediaries, with whom the United States must talk about peace in the Far East. This is not to minimize the role of China and Russia in that area's international affairs, but merely to point out that the DPRK has joined these great powers as a significant political player in the conduct of Far Eastern affairs.

The Jaju Revolution

The DPRK's KWP organ, Rodong Shinmun, carried a special article on the Jaju spirit on June 12, 1962. It said that "the revolutionary spirit of Jaju (self-determination) is an unbending spirit of confrontation until victory is achieved, in spite of all adversity, in making all the things one needs by one's own strength." When it comes to the practical application of Jaju, the DPRK implies that revolutionary self-reliance involves economic self-reliance and the principle of proletarian internationalism. By the former is meant that every underdeveloped country must strive hard to provide social change in such a way as to lay out its own

23The article on Jaju is reprinted as a special article in Korea Today, No. 86 (July, 1963). The English version of this article is covered under the sub-title of "Self-reliance and the Construction of an Independent National Economy," in the appendix.
economic foundation, in order, of course, to become a truly independent nation. By the latter is meant that an individual nation's struggle must lend itself to an international perspective so as to provide a revolutionary "base" on an international scale.

In the spirit of Jaju, production plan targets displayed a tendency to elevate light industry to the level of heavy industry. At the same time, much criticism was directed at correcting theoretical interpretations of Marxism-Leninism in the regime's implementation of working styles. In the following year, Rodong Shinmun referred to the Soviet Union's interference in the DPRK's domestic issues as "imperialistic preconception."24

The fact is that the DPRK in the latter part of the 1960's gradually dropped the regime's stereotyped slogans such as Tado Mije or Haebang Nambu. These slogans were gradually replaced by Juche and Jaju, which were contrastingly confined to criticisms by the Communists themselves and were oriented toward other Communist nations rather than against South Korea and the United States.

Significant progress was made during this period. Besides the increase in grain production, the generating

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24Rodong Shinmun, September 7, 1964. A series of articles of the paper from October to September, 1964, carried out a vigorous campaign against Soviet interference in the DPRK's internal affairs, particularly its article on September 7, titled "Why Speak Ill of the Achievement of the Economic Conference in Pyongyang?"
capacity of electrical plants was set to reach 33,000 million kwh by 1967, as against a capacity of 11,800 million for 1963. The coal target was 23 million tons in 1967, as against production of 14 million tons in 1963. In the period between 1946 and 1963, electrical production increased from 5,000 million kwh to 11,800 million kwh and coal increased from 4 million tons to 14 million tons. The Five-Year Plan laid more emphasis on coal production, aiming for an increase of more than 300 per cent, whereas the Seven-Year Plan showed less than a 200 per cent increase. In other words, the Seven-Year Plan was more or less balanced between heavy and light industry, and an emphasis was placed upon improving living conditions.25

A significant move toward balancing the economy is to be noted in the steel industry and in textile production. Steel production, while enjoying an absolute increase, was also decreasing relative to textile production during the years between the Five-Year Plan and the Seven-Year Plan. In other words, the differential growth rate was decreasing while the absolute rate of growth for both industries was increasing. However, in the latter part of the Seven-Year Plan, from 1964 to 1967, the regime gradually shifted

25 The statistics of the Seven-Year Plan relating to production goals are based on a study done by P. H. Jones, "North Korea's Balanced Progress," Far Eastern Economic Review, XXXIII, No. 12 (September 21, 1961), 607. The Jones study was continued in Vol. XXXIII, No. 13 (September 24, 1961), 635-636.
emphasis to heavy industry. This occurred because the DPRK felt challenged by South Korea's first Five-Year Plan, initiated in 1961 by its military government.

After the revolution on May 16, 1961, the military government of South Korea hesitantly introduced a planned economy by setting up two Five-Year Plans for 1962-1966 and 1967-1971. Thus, the first Five-Year Plan of South Korea ironically corresponds with the Seven-Year Plan of the DPRK.

In response to this new challenge, the DPRK might have made a quick shift from incentives for light industry to those for heavy industry, resuming the spirit of the Chullima Undong. Beginning in the fall of 1962, the DPRK did indeed start to emphasize the importance of "defense strength by economic means," as well as the importance of defense industry. Even in the Fifth Plenum of the Fourth Party Congress of the KWP, on December 10 through 14, 1962, concern over South Korea's Five-Year Plan and defense measures were the primary topics on its agenda. It suggested an increase of heavy industry in order to provide for defense measures.

26 For the Military Government of South Korea and its programs for a planned economy, see Park Chung Hee, Our Nation's Path: Ideology of Social Reconstruction (Seoul, 1962), pp. 3-9.

27 The agenda pertaining to the discussion of South Korea's planning economy is found in Joungwon A. Kim, "The Peak of Socialism in North Korea: The Five and Seven-Year Plans," Asian Survey, V, No. 5 (May, 1965), 260.
Drive for Self-Defense

Earlier we noted that the drive for self-reliance was the DPRK regime's primary objective on an economic as well as on a political level. Within this frame the Communist regime by 1964 claimed that it had accomplished ideological independence with the Juche identity, and political independence with the Party consolidation along the "Kapsan" line of the Kim Il Sung faction. In addition, the DPRK claimed that it had established economic independence by way of the Chullima and the Chunqsan-ri methods. Subsequently, the regime has declared that "self-defense in military matters" will be completed by 1970.

That these military measures are to be accomplished in the same way that industry achieved self-reliance, means that the socialist economy must set up in the production of military hardware the same spirit as had been demonstrated in machinery production. This movement seemed to be more than a verbal threat to South Korea. An Asahi Shinbun reporter from Japan said there was an impressive feeling of tension at the National Day celebration of 1967, which caused the whole city of Pyongyang to be engulfed by numbers of soldiers. The People's Army in civilian clothes marched in formation through the heart of Pyongyang, singing songs. The reporter said that it was a "war-time atmosphere," and this view of a militaristic movement taking place in the
DPRK backed up South Korea's reports about the DPRK's war preparations.28

The Pyongyang government's defense expenditures, which had decreased steadily from 8.9 per cent of the total budget in 1954 to 2.8 per cent in 1963, rose again in 1964 approximately 4 or 5 per cent. There is no way of ascertaining precisely how the armament industry is currently being expanded. However, it is known that the DPRK is manufacturing a wide range of weapons, from 120 mm mortars to small arms ammunition. At least two ordinance repair shops, seventeen machinery factories, automotive plants, and shipyards are readily convertible to military purposes. Inferring from the regime's greater emphasis on heavy industry in about 60 per cent of all plants, we can assume, at the very least, that its defense industry is relatively more organized than any of the minor nations in Asia.29

Premier Kim Il Sung said in his report to the KWP on April 24, 1968, that "the whole of the armed forces has been turned into cadres for military industry," while the entire country is being mobilized. Coinciding with Kim Il Sung's statement, the military budget was increased to 17 per cent of the total budget in 1968. At the same time, Finance


Minister Yoon announced that 1,617 million new Wons (or about $648 million) were appropriated for 1969's national defense project, specifying that it was an increase of 31 per cent over the appropriations for 1968. 30

Evaluating the information regarding the DPRK's industrial drive for military purposes in the latter part of the Seven-Year Plan, we come to the conclusion that the regime is a "restless devil" whose economy seems "to be one of the best managed and most successful in Asia." 31 This quotation is a phrase from an article written by the Australian journalist, Wilfred Burchett, after his visit to Pyongyang in 1967, confirming the regime's extension of the Seven-Year Plan to 1970. According to him, the Seven-Year Plan's goals were all met. He reported further that defense allocations would be raised to 30.2 per cent of the total budget by 1970. In the mid-June, 1971, a French writer, upon his return from Pyongyang, confirmed Burchett's earlier report and described the regime as "industrially significant" both in civilian industry and in military industry as well. 32

30These statistical sources are based on a study made by Ministry of Public Information (South Korea), Intensified Aggression in Korea (Seoul, 1968), pp. 23-25.


Originally Kim Il Sung had revealed that the Seven-Year Plan was being extended until 1970 in October, 1966, "in view of the need to concentrate on defense production in the face of growing American aggressiveness."\textsuperscript{33} The real reason for the extension of the plan is impossible for us to know at this stage. Some are interpreting it as a sign of the Plan's failure. Our guess is about as vague as the others, but it is also just as possible. That is to say, we believe the regime had to extend the Seven-Year Plan because the second Five-Year Plan (1967-1971) of South Korea was already in effect in every industrial activity, and was demonstrating that "democratic capability" was preferable to the DPRK's socialist economy.

Bearing these internal developments in mind, our interest in the DPRK in the 1960's is, above all, centered on the regime's steady growth as a significant voice within the communist bloc, speaking for its own interests in the face of external pressure. This development may not be a sign of peace and prosperity in the process of reuniting Korea in terms of an "amalgamated security community," but it could very well have been the signal of a trend toward a reasonable contact with South Korea in the early part of the 1970's. Indeed, the Pyongyang-Seoul talks in 1972, which might lead to a "pluralistic community" of the two Koreas, was possible

partly because of Pyongyang's *Jaju* attitude developed in the process of nation-building in the 1960's. If the present line of reasonableness keeps expanding in range and in dimension, the regime, in the future, may liberate itself from Communist dogmatism and devise a new economic structure compatible with South Korea.  

Another report on the DPRK says that the urgency for change either by war or by peace is an acute issue among leaders of the DPRK. The report says that "the leaders seem aware that the economy of South Korea is no longer stagnating as it was until the mid-1960's." In other words, the DPRK's planned economy with its socialist structure seems no longer useful as effective propaganda among the general public of South Korea. The so-called "economic war against South Korea" has been diminished in significance by the

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34 Such a possibility may occur in the latter part of the 1970's because there is an increasing number of "white-collar workers," who constitute the intelligentsia, in the middle ranks of the Communist cadres. Also the regime's economic development will require a wider contact with the West "in an effort to acquire high-level technology for their labor-short economy without increasing their reliance on the Soviet Union." For more on this point, see Jerome Alan Cohen, "A Window Half-Opened on North Korea," *The Christian Science Monitor*, October 31, 1972, p. 9.

35 Benjamin Page, "Signals from North Korea," *The Nation*, Vol. 208, No. 20 (May 19, 1969), 624. Ben Page is a graduate student studying the socialist economy and was the first American student ever to visit Pyongyang, in mid-1968. His views on the DPRK's war preparation are negative, stating that "precisely because of the progress it has made in the last sixteen years, it seems doubtful that the DPRK would initiate any military activity--except to attract world attention to the increasingly dangerous situation along the armistice line."
improvement in economic stability in South Korea since the mid-1960's. Perhaps the economy of the Communist regime at this stage must willy-nilly find a political alternative for nation-building. In short, assuming the DPRK's growing economy will modify some aspects of external expectations, we intend, in our analysis, to examine the DPRK's international activities in this light.36

Aspiring International Community

We have noted that at the start of the Seven-Year Plan in 1961, the DPRK was willing to lessen pressures for industrialization in the light of the people's welfare after their "long march" for heavy industry. However, the regime resumed the campaign for heavy industrialization in the latter part of the Seven-Year Plan, extending the plan for three additional years until 1970. The extended three-years' plan was designed to increase industry gradually, with a concomitant increase in military expenditures. During the period of the DPRK's economic growth and a demand for a defense build-up, the Pyongyang government was talking about its independent political and economic roles in international relations. As the Communists' official newspaper, Rodong Shinmun said,

36 The DPRK's present standard of living may not bring about production of consumer goods on a higher level, but it has curtailed starvation among the population. If a rise in living conditions is correlated with the people's natural desire for peace, then the people of the DPRK may sooner or later reject all possibility of being dragged into another war with South Korea. Simply stated, they have too much to lose, should war come again.
increased political autonomy is contingent upon the DPRK's ability to establish an economic base, for "economic independence is the basis of political independence." It also said that "economic dependence on foreign allies entails political dependence on those forces, and economic subordination leads to political subordination." 37

Whatever its intentions concerning political independence, the DPRK's economic development seems to have enhanced its relative independence within the Communist world, particularly through its remarkable recovery from the destruction of the Korean war. The Pyongyang government's diplomatic and other contacts with non-Communist countries grew along with the growing pride in its economic development. Although the DPRK's international activities received little publicity in the West, they became quite popular among the third world countries.

The DPRK today maintains diplomatic and consular relations with more than thirty-five non-Communist nations, and the number is likely to increase in the near future. This is a considerable change from 1953, when the regime had not a single relationship with non-Communist countries. The

37 A consistent theme of the KWP organ during the latter part of the 1960's was a "national pride through economic miracle." Almost every issue of the paper in that period urged the people to arm themselves with Juche and Jaju consciousness. With regard to the theme, see Rodong Shinmun, April 11, 1969.
Pyongyang government did not establish relationships with non-Communist European nations until 1960.38

Many non-Communist nations that have no diplomatic relationships with Communist countries seem to maintain trade relationships through special missions. Although the DPRK has no formal diplomatic relationships with Western European countries, Pyongyang's trade missions have been active in their attempts to buy heavy industrial equipment from the West. The amount is still small but the DPRK bought equipment from the Netherlands, West Germany, France, and Italy. The Pyongyang government negotiated to buy steel plants from Austria, with costs amounting to $50 million. The DPRK also sent business delegates to the United Kingdom in 1964. Vice Minister of Trade, Kim Chai-sun, made a long trip through Yemen, Austria, and Cuba to woo foreign trade in 1964. This tendency toward trade relationships with non-Communist nations (except for Cuba) can be interpreted as a grand shift away from a stubborn "Party State" position adhered to during the days under Kremlin influence. The separation of economic policy from political influence resulted from the DPRK's more realistic attitude concerning its real interests. This may be viewed as a significant

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shift toward modernization, divorced from ideological sentimentality.

The DPRK's trade with the non-communist world was still in its beginning stages. However, with ambitions such as the expansion of its industrial capacity, the Pyongyang government was vigorously seeking trade alternatives in the Kingdom of Yemen and had signed a contract with a Hong Kong firm to buy 11,000 tons of wheat from Australia. The most significant trade agreement in the regime's history was the Austria-DPRK agreement of 1960.

The Austria-DPRK trade agreement was signed in Vienna on December 7, 1960, between Secretary General Karinek of the Federal Economic Chamber of Austria and Vice Chairman Kim Chai-sun of the "Korean Committee for the Promotion of International Trade of the DPRK." The agreement is considered highly significant by virtue of the exchange list of the two parties. According to the agreement, the DPRK was able to obtain a wide range of machinery, heavy electric locomotives, electric generators, and marine diesel engines. By 1968 the agreement has been concluded. Meanwhile, a trade mission was opened in France in April, 1967, and a permanent agency of the Committee for the Development of

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International Trade in France was introduced in September, 1968.40

Following the Austria-DPRK trade agreement, there was still another trade agreement with a non-Communist country. Following Kim Chai-sun's trip to Europe, Vice Premier Lee Joa-yun led a DPRK trade delegation to Burma and offered to construct a 500,000 Kwh hydroelectric system. The mission also proposed that the DPRK should purchase between 20,000 and 50,000 tons of rice in 1962, together with other Burmese products such as rubber and minerals. The trade agreement was to supply machinery equipment, chemical goods, food stuffs, and light industrial goods for the Burmese, in exchange for Burmese minerals and sericultural products. This agreement was finally signed on May 8, 1961.41

The fact that the DPRK has approached the non-Communist world by way of special economic missions is further exemplified by the increase of its trade relationships with Japan. The Pyongyang regime has always bitterly criticized Japan's political collusion with the United States and South Korea. Yet the regime always seems concerned over its

40 Many of the trade relations proceeded without benefit of formal agreement. Among the trading partners at various times were Australia, Belgium, West Germany, Switzerland, Austria, and Finland. In addition to governmental contacts, trade with private Western business firms included Canada, Sweden, Denmark, France, Spain, Italy, Greece, and Hong Kong.

41 For the text of the trade list, see Colin Garratt, "A Dam for Burma?" Far Eastern Economic Review, XXXII, No. 8 (May 25, 1961), 362.
economic relations with the Japanese government. The Japanese-DPRK Trade Association has been active ever since 1961. It was reported that the DPRK exported a great number of mineral products, including 30,000 tons of iron ore, while it imported items such as electric plant equipment, motor car parts, tractor parts and tires, and fishing nets. In short, the DPRK has no official relations with Japan but does have trade amounting to $9 million in 1962, $30 million in 1964, $36 million in 1966 and about $41 million in 1970.\(^42\)

By the end of 1969, the DPRK increased the number of its consulates and trade offices. They were found in Indonesia, Singapore, Cambodia, Burma, Iraq, the U. A. R., Yemen, Somali Republic, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, India, Ceylon, Australia, Nepal, Switzerland, Uruguay, Algeria, Nigeria, Congo, Tanzania, Mauritania, Syria, Pakistan, Austria, Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, Morocco, Iran, Lebanon, Sierre Leone, Mexico, Jordan, Malaysia, and Sudan.\(^43\) Furthermore, Mali, the Congo, and Tanzania received aid from the DPRK in 1961, 1963, and 1967 respectively. As part of the aid, the DPRK constructed agricultural refinery and safety-match factories, and other construction materials were given to these countries. Burma in 1962 was aided by the DPRK in building a $15 million chemical factory. Cambodia

\(^42\)The volume of trade abounts varies according to sources reporting. For comparative figures, see The People's Korea (March 16, 1965); Orient Press report from Seoul, December 27, 1968; Pukhan Chonggam (1969), p. 373.

\(^43\)For the text of individual trade and cultural exchange programs, see Pukhan Chonggam (1969), pp. 267-269.
in 1965 also received thirty tractors and other farming machinery from the DPRK, on a grant basis. It is also known that the DPRK has been offering Syria guns and ammunition since 1967.

The DPRK is not only committed to trade relations with the third world countries, but also to exporting guerrilla activities. The guerrilla group arrested in Mexico on March 16, 1971, were known to have been trained in the DPRK. A month later, the DPRK embassy in Ceylon was closed due to Pyongyang's aiding Ceylon guerrillas with arms. It was also reported that Pakistan in September, 1971, was buying small arms and ammunition from the DPRK.44

As we noted, the DPRK's relations with non-Communist nations seem to support our assumption that the regime is vigorously seeking to find its role in the international community. Moreover, the Pyongyang regime in June, 1964, hosted an international economists' seminar which the regime is proud of.45 In 1967, the DPRK sent nine special envoys to Pakistan, Nepal, Sudan, Lebanon, Tunisia and four other African nations.

In summary, we are convinced that the DPRK's claim of an "independent policy for the economy as well as in foreign

45 More than forty non-Communist delegates were known to have participated in the economists' seminar. See Rodong Shinmun, September 7, 1964. In this issue, the paper was critical about Soviet Russia's low posture for the conference.
relations" in the latter part of the Seven-Year Plan and for its three-year extension until 1970 is substantiated as far as its trade and cultural relations with non-Communist countries are concerned.

All grant-type aid to the DPRK was suspended by 1961 and economic help for the Seven-Year Plan period came solely in the form of loans and trade. While we could not obtain concrete data pertaining to trade volume, there are many reasons to believe that the DPRK in the 1960's attained economic independence and sought to open up trade with non-Communist nations. According to British businessman Ronald H. Smith, who visited both the DPRK and South Korea in 1967, the DPRK's claims of economic independence were reasonable. In his visit to Pyongyang he was "impressed by the cleanliness of the city and people." His report said that people seemed to be "well-fed and well-dressed. . . . If there is little wealth and its associated fleshpots, there is no evidence of poverty on the Asian scale." A Filipino reporter in 1971 confirmed this and reported:

Adequate provisions appear to have been made, however, for the necessities of rice, vegetables, coal and housing. Rice costs a little more than one cent a pound. Coal is cheap. Housing rental amounts to about two per cent of a family's income. Clothing is quite expensive. Medical expenses are practically nil because the employer pays the bills. The worker gets an

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annual vacation at a government resort. There are no private cars, and cities lack adequate public transportation. Most people live near work or school.47

PART FOUR

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

The analytical objectives of this part are (1) to generalize about the DPRK's politics of "circular confrontation" and (2) to present some modest empirical propositions about fused linkage phenomena that have been derived from the Korean case. The generalization is to be made in terms of linkage conditions (constants and variables) of both the exogenous and endogenous elements, so that theoretical propositions link those conditions of exogenous-endogenous linkage groups and provide a set of linkage hypotheses that can be applied in future case studies.

At least a few points about this analytical strategy needs to be stated at the outset. First, the generalization to be made here cannot be claimed to be a complete coverage of the DPRK's policy mechanism. Since there can be an indefinite number of analytical aspects for any political regime, this generalization cannot exhaust remaining possibilities for analytical linkages between the DPRK's foreign policy and the polity's internal policy resources.

Second, the basic intellectual technique employed in the theoretical propositions, as we stated in the beginning, has been what might be called "Referential Co-ordinate." It neither anticipates a deductive set of hypotheses from
observable behavior patterns nor seeks to induce propositions by arraying causal facts ("independent variables") against consequential events ("dependent variables"). Rather, with the linkage framework as a guide, it approaches elements of the case as factors that can function as referents of correlated conditions. Thus, the question is put, "In terms of fused linkages between national and international politics, what might have been the coordinates of the exogenous and endogenous conditions of the confrontation policy?"¹

¹An explanatory note is in order to clarify the relationship of this study (as it comes to theoretical considerations) to the linkage framework of Rosenau. Professor Rosenau in Linkage Politics and elsewhere presents the national-international linkages in structural terms. Rosenau's collaborators elaborate the linkage framework in their attempt to ensure the usefulness of the linkage concept as an analytical framework. Admittedly these proponents are still working toward the construction of a workable model for the theory of linkage politics. In view of this embryonic stage of linkage politics, this study simply accepted the idea of such a linkage framework and developed its own analytical structure for the study of the DPRK linkage politics. Theoretical findings and insights of this case study thus clarify the linkage framework on the one hand and present additional linkages on the other. However, the "fused linkage" has been the most relevant phenomenon found in the case of the DPRK linkage politics. Since the case study emphasized the DPRK polity as the focus subject, the regime's policy outputs to the international environment have not been explained in terms of feedback processes. Instead, such international linkage inputs have been treated as reciprocal variables against the polity's domestic determinants. No attempt is made to systematically relate this study to Rosenau's discussions in Linkage Politics. A study as such would have been a critical essay on linkage politics per se.
CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

Empirical Findings

In an attempt to investigate the DPRK's linkage politics, we established "circular confrontation" as a working model for the investigation of policy formulation. We surveyed the broad range and recent history of the modern period of Korean politics in the context of the regime's environmental conditions. In the context of the DPRK's multifaceted nature, we conceived of the DPRK as a political entity confronting South Korea and the United States. We further proceeded to investigate this concept of "confrontation" in order to develop the mechanisms of the DPRK's confrontation policy.

We found that the DPRK's policies of "circular confrontation" have been carefully chosen policy formulae which were most expedient in bringing the war-torn country to recovery and development.

As we noted, the progress of the DPRK for the past twenty years can be divided into the two periods falling before and after 1960. In the former stage, the regime's programs for postwar reconstruction and socialistic change required a forceful mobilization at a mass level. In this sense, no other campaign slogan would have given the leaders
of the Communist regime more freedom to dictate the path of the nation than the "hatred of enemies." Young or old, Communists or non-Communists, workers or intelligentsia, all were united in one discipline under the banner of Tado Mije and Haebang Nambu.

In the post-1960 period, these ten-year-old slogans were no longer useful. In the first place, the people's memories of the Korean war of 1950 were gradually disappearing as their living conditions improved. "Anger" and "hatred" were intensified by being kept in constant contact with confronting opponents. In this way, the effects of confrontation produced a tremendous upsurge in production. But, by 1960, the war cleavages were gone and no one could see the "ugly Yankee" face. Thus, domestic issues at this point became major tools to serve in place of foreign enemies. The Juche and Jaju campaigns supplemented Tado Mije and Haebang Nambu. We classified this stage as "introversion" in contrast to the pre-1960's "extroversion." However, the term serves to indicate more than a simple reversal of "extroversion."

Of course, there is no doubt that the DPRK attracted many minor Afro-Asian states by taking the line of nationalism in its implementation of Communism. The politics of "introversion" also served as a tool to combat the Jingoistic attitude of Soviet Russia and Communist China. As a result of the Juche and Jaju campaigns, the DPRK in the post-1960
period was able to sign diplomatic and trade agreements with dozens of non-Communist countries.

One may consider the DPRK's policy of confrontation as "an indirect approach" to major national policies whether they are concerned with internal or external issues. The indirect nature of the DPRK's "politics of extroversion and introversion" was an inevitable consequence of the regime's national circumstances during the past twenty years. The circumstances were also by nature problems with an intermix-ture of domestic and international factors. The economic problem, for example, was not only a domestic issue concerned with how to industrialize the economy, but also a matter of where to get the needed foreign aid. This concern over importing foreign capital was involved with the processes of external affairs.

The function of "extroversion" as a policy technique was to solve both the problems of domestic and external difficulty. The symbolic nature of foreign enemies was the most useful resource in the DPRK's effort to reach the two objectives at one stride. On the other hand, the roles of Juche and Jaju seemed the most appropriate policy techniques in the era of "introversion." This politics of "introversion," at first glance, might be interpreted as a domestic campaign, but it apparently obtained objectives significant for external purposes. The Korean version of Communism, which the DPRK government refers to as the "revolutionary
base of Korea," originally stemmed from domestic campaigns but eventually gained international significance. This Korean revolution is thus distinguished from the models both of Soviet Russia and Communist China.

If we are to attempt to generalize about the DPRK's policies of "circular confrontation," we may characterize them in the following ways:

(1.) The DPRK's philosophy of social progress rests upon confrontation. This is the philosophical foundation of the Communist politics and has long historical precedence. It is not an impetuous result of the Communists' hostility. The political history of Korea suggests that subjugation and constant confrontation with the subjugating powers developed a die-hard spirit in Koreans. This experience was hardened in the course of the anti-Japanese movement and further steeled in the Korean war of 1950.

(2.) The DPRK's geographic location and its physical setting within the contemporary international environment affects the government in its foreign policy choices leading to possible confrontation with its neighbors. Confined to an area smaller than the size of a moderate Chinese province, and located among hostile powers, any move for Korean national interest was bound to entail confrontation with the powers.

(3.) With regard to the objects of the confrontation policy, the DPRK's target for confrontation always has been
selected from among those most hated by the people. The "hatred objects" have been targets which were certain to last long and to serve as constant reminders of the causes behind the people's misery.

(4.) The form of confrontation used by the DPRK has been circular in nature. The publicly exposed "enemies," in fact, were imaginary targets which only served as a means for consolidating public opinion for particular purposes. These purposes have been reflected in numerous accomplishments in economic and political unification. In this sense, the confrontation policy takes the form of "a loop line" circuit bridging policy objectives and external and internal interests.

(5.) The mechanism of confrontation initially required an external enemy whenever the confrontation was to the achievement of a national task. Once the confrontation was initiated against an external enemy, the vicious circle of "opposition" necessitated improvising issues not only from external, but also from internal concerns such as correcting ideology and working styles.

(6.) In the successive stages of confrontation with external powers the DPRK found a "new nationalism" (or Juche) of sorts. The nationalistic sentiment in turn changed the direction of confrontation from the previous pattern of "anti-West" to anti-Communist "revisionists." In this stage of confrontation, the targets were the chauvinistic directives
issued by the big Communist powers, and the issues of this campaign were a matter of domestic consolidation rather than of opposing the "capitalistic powers."

(7.) The DPRK's confrontation policy was flexible enough to readjust itself to differing circumstances in the political environment. In order to provide legitimacy for policy change, the leaders of the government were in constant contact with the organizations of the masses whose loyalty allowed the government decision-makers a free hand in operating according to their pre-established policy.

(8.) The ideology of the DPRK's confrontation policy rested on a militant spirit. The militance was aided by the "justice" of the revolutionary spirit, in the Communist view of political and social change. This ideology as a practical working model for revolution has been demonstrated by the DPRK's radical changes in economic and social structure. Revolutionary practice, defined as a desire to change the existing order of things, has forced the DPRK to adhere to the fundamental spirit of militancy in its implementation of foreign policy.

(9.) Jumping on the bandwagon of the confrontation, the KWP's internal power has been consolidated under Kim Il Sung's leadership. Any opposition to his hawkish line was sacrificed to confrontation campaigns in the name of national salvation. The Party purges were calculated expectations which, in fact, justified Premier Kim's internal confrontation paralleled to its external confrontation.
(10.) The DPRK's confrontation policy has been the primary vehicle in pursuit of whatever national interest was deemed vital to the survival of the nation as a political entity. As we noted, the DPRK's achievement of "independence" in economics and politics seems attributable to the confrontation policy.

(11.) The DPRK's confrontation policy consisted of a series of general campaigns and specific actions which served to keep the people in a positive and alert state of mind. The DPRK's restless planning for industrialization has been successful due to the psychological effects of the confrontation policy.

(12.) In the final analysis, the confrontation policy has been the most powerful mechanism for the control of the people. The KWP's systematic and indisputable control over mass organizations was conveyed to the masses by the Party's cadres. Any opponent was quickly spotted and disqualified from inclusion within the regime's definition of "people."

To some extent, the foreign policy of the DPRK can be considered as the product of interaction between its institutional setting and the course of the nation's history, operating within an international environment. In the post-Korean war period political attitudes in South Korea opposed the building of a socialist country. For North Korea, however, being confined within the polarized international environment, the confrontation policy seems a natural consequence. Viewed
as a means of pursuing the national interest, the DPRK's foreign policy took the form of "circular confrontation" as a working model.

Some characteristic patterns of the regime's confrontation policy suggest two stages of confrontation. The politics of "extroversion" was initiated at the beginning of the era of confrontation in an attempt to bring about social change and unity. The politics of "introversion" succeeded the previous movement in an attempt to re-define the regime's identity and ideology. In either stage, confrontation objects were defined, and the forces generated by the campaigns against these confronting objects were directed toward constructive programs fundamentally required by the leaders of the regime.

The timing of the transition from "extroversion" to "introversion" depends on the degree of utility of the chosen symbol, because such a symbol must yield the greatest energy for national mobilization. The transition is also sensitive to the domestic and international environment. It is, in fact, much more concerned with the changing environment of international politics than with the modified conditions in the internal situation.

Confrontation policy to some extent can be considered the sign of a "new challenge" by emerging nations whose national interest can be enhanced by resorting to international crises. The DPRK's leaders had to create new sources
of tension and new foci for attention, if they felt that tension and world attention were being diverted from them. They seem to have taken a chance of creating tensions because they had very little to lose from such risks.

Theoretical Propositions

As a result of these generalizations, we are able to consider further the significance of the confrontation policy in light of some propositions. However, due to our incomplete knowledge of the variables indicative of and necessary for any conclusive evidence, we are reluctant to propose any definite model for the confrontations of the DPRK.

Leading toward some theoretical propositions, the linkage frame of reference pertaining to the Korean case singles out a "circular confrontation" as a policy typology. Stated explicitly, the Korean linkage case was a two-phase confrontation both within and without. Each of these two referents was mutually interdependent and collectively reinforcing as if they were a pair of the same policy structure called "confrontation." In practical terms, they were both political capability referents composed of exogenous and endogenous conditions.

**Exogenous Referents**

Each of these two sets of referents must be analytically separated in order to provide corresponding propositions.
First, let us deal with exogenous referents. Exogenous referents are identified with SUBJECTS and MODIFIERS of confrontation. The former refers to those linkage groups of constants and the latter represents those linkage variables. Thus, the effect of confrontation upon some structural conditions is summarized in Figure 11. Here conditions for confrontation (i.e., constants and variables) are conceptualized as fused referents. Specifically, SUBJECTS themselves are considered more or less potentials for confrontation policy, whereas MODIFIERS are viewed as activating agents for those potentials which modify and define functions of the SUBJECTS.

*As we made clear in the beginning, structural conditions are analytically divided as "constants" and "variables"; they are now functionally differentiated as SUBJECT and MODIFIERS. Variables imply modifiers in that variables are changeable factors. Variability implies the ability to modify. Constants imply subjects in that constants are factors which can be acted upon by variables resulting in change.

Fig. 11--Confrontation and Exogenous Referents
In order to arrive at certain propositions about confrontation policy relevant to environmental factors, let us identify each of those exogenous referents. The identification is made in order to simplify the linkage groups of SUBJECTS and MODIFIERS in relative terms.

(A1) Geopolitical Linkage Constants of the DPRK are identified as highly Restricted for its choice of policy alternatives. The national location is analogously described as the caudal fin attached to gigantic body of China and Russia. The physical size of the DPRK is too small to maintain an equal footing with these neighbors. Its natural resources, without a high degree of utilization, are poor and limited for an independent national economy.

(A2) Sociological Linkage Constants of the DPRK are identified as reasonably Impatient. The regime's economic backwardness is characterized as a transitional stage from tradition to modernity. Its societal setting likewise is overwrought with new orders. The national ideal is unmistakably dramatized by developmental expectations.

(A3) Cultural Linkage Constants are identified as completely Unitary. Its political culture has been authoritarian throughout its history. The national character is extraordinary in its blind loyalty. Its system of values upholds individual sacrifices for social cause.

These three classifications of the DPRK's SUBJECTS as physically "restricted," sociologically "impatient" and
culturally "unitary" relate to MODIFIERS. These characteristics of constants in group accompany variables as their modifiers. In contrast to SUBJECTS, MODIFIERS are referred to functions of variables as modifying agents, which activate those SUBJECTS under certain circumstances.

(a1) International Linkage Variables are grouped as Passive, Adaptive, or Initiative, depending upon the regime's perceptiveness of the Cold War environment as well as its ability to resist it.\(^1\) In the course of confrontations, the DPRK's response to the Cold War impacts was different in every different stage. Specifically, a combination of "Passive" and "Adaptive" process was dominant during the stage of "extroversion," whereas a combination of "Adaptive" and "Initiative" responses ruled the "introversion" stage.

(a2) Contiguous Linkage Variables are identified as Congenial-or-Hostile. The regime's hostile relations with South Korea and its allies relate inversely to its relations with China and Russia. That is, its southern hostility is

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\(^1\) These three linkage processes (Passive, Adaptive, and Initiative) represent the characteristics of linkage processes from the standpoint of view of the DPRK's polity vis-à-vis incoming impacts. A Passive process signifies the polity's lack of resistance to incoming influences but to be commanded by them. It is similar to a "penetrative" process defined by Rosenau. An Adaptive process signifies selective adoption of external influence which may be in part similar to "emulative" process defined by Rosenau, but different from it because an Adaptive process is an adoptive behavior with critical reservations. An Initiative process is the nation's creative or autonomous response to external impacts for its policy consideration. It is different from Rosenau's "reactive" process.
in reverse proportion to its northern concert in the Communist bloc.

(a3) Non-political Linkage Variables are identified as **Radical**. The regime's socio-economic change is characterized as revolutionary. Its industrial growth is extremely dynamic. The belief system became more and more militant and unstable along with the current of the revolutionary tempo.

Thus, these two sets of exogenous referents as simplified in Figure 11 indicate that certain policy conditions indicative to confrontation policy may be drawn from associative linkages between SUBJECTS and MODIFIERS. A simplified matrix of the linkage combinations is suggested in Figure 12. The matrix in turn suggests that there are nine associated referents representing each cell. Let us call them exogenous referents 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 respectively.

Whatever these nine referents may be, the DPRK's confrontation policy with regard to its exogenous conditions can be perceived as follows:

Referent 1A = A1 (Restricted) + a1 (Passive, Adaptive or Initiative)

Referent 2A = A2 (Impatient) + a1 (Passive, Adaptive or Initiative)

Referent 3A = A3 (Unitary) + a1 (Passive, Adaptive, or Initiative)

Referent 4A = A1 (Restricted) + a2 (Congenial or Hostile)

Referent 5A = A2 (Impatient) + a2 (Congenial or Hostile)

Referent 6A = A3 (Unitary) + a2 (Congenial or Hostile)

Referent 7A = A1 (Restricted) + a3 (Radical)
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**Note:** Figure 12 should be read in conjunction with Figure 11 for clarity.

**Fig. 12:** Exogenous determinants for confrontation

Referent 9A = A22 (Impatient) + a3 (Radical)

Referent 9A = A3 (Unitary) + a3 (Radical)

The first proposition to be considered is Referent 1A (Al + a1): Lying at the boundary of the East-West confrontation, the DPRK, with its physically Restricted situation, was
more sensitive to the hostile impacts of the Cold War than countries which did not have physical restrictions. Thus, the DPRK, at best, was able to maximize its national security by playing one power against the other. The hostility seems to have been eased according to the regime's sensitivity to the gradual thaw of the Cold War polarity in order of Passive, Adaptive, and Initiative responses. Technically, Referent 1A is designated as HIGHLY COMPRESSED.

The second proposition is Referent 2A (A2 + al): If we defined the general condition of the DPRK's societal order as Impatient, such a condition was most likely to accept a new order of the Communist militant ideology for want of a quick settlement. As we saw earlier, the DPRK's sociological situation has been in perfect congruence with the Communist militancy articulated in connection with the Cold War confrontation. The intensity of the militancy does not seem to have been affected by Passive, Adaptive or Initiative responses. Accordingly, Referent 2A is designated as CONSISTENTLY MILITANT.

The third proposition is Referent 3A (A3 + al): The more culturally Unitarian, the greater the freedom of commandability in the policy change. Simply because the DPRK regime was identified as highly regimented, the regime's policy response to the Cold War as Passive, Adaptive, or Initiative was easy in terms of obtaining public support. This has been demonstrated in the Tado Mije and Juche
campaigns. Thus, Referent 3A is designated as TOTALLY COLLECTIVE.

The fourth proposition is Referent 4A (A1 + a2): Physically restricted in its choice of friend-or-enemy, the higher the degree of congeniality between the DPRK and its Communist allies, the higher the degree of hostility with South Korea and its Western allies. Given this circumstance of a friend on one hand and an enemy on the other, the DPRK's choice in international relations has been confined to one-or-the-other. Referent 4A is therefore designated as EXTREMELY CONFINED.

The fifth proposition is Referent 5A (A2 + a2): Defining the DPRK's sociological factors as Impatient, if there is an increase in congeniality toward its allies by the members of the society, then there is always an increase in the hostility of the populace toward foes. The effects of such a dichotomy in the minds of the people of the DPRK has been reinforced by psychological frustrations stemming from a war of nerves situation. Thus Referent 5A is designated as PSYCHOLOGICALLY FRUSTRATED.

The sixth proposition is Referent 6A (A3 + a2): Defining the DPRK's cultural factors as Unitarian, the greater the unity of positive reinforcement, the less the risk for

\[\text{\textsuperscript{2}}\text{As illustrated by Professor Joseph de Rivera, a relationship between sociological emotions and external social psychological effects here is viewed as a chain of frustrations. See Joseph H. de Rivera, The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy (Columbus, Ohio, 1968), Chapter 2.}\]
political leaders in making progressively more costly responses to allies and foes. Given that "the people" in Communist ideology is intended to mean those who support the main thrust of history in a Marxist sense, then "the people" acting as a manipulative yet voluntary unit, representing the total society, become a potent and positive means of gaining general public support. This suggests that the analysis of reinforcement patterns between Congenial and Hostile responses may be a fruitful approach to what might be called "potentiality analysis" of political energies. Thus Referent 6A is designated as POSITIVELY ARTICULATED.

The seventh proposition is Referent 7A (A1 + a3): Geopolitically Restricted in insecure situations, the more the felt need for immediate action and (a) the less costly the movement or (b) the greater the anticipated acceptance of a costly movement, the greater the radical tendency for want of change. A hungry rat in a confined cell may be a similar situation to what is being described for the DPRK in this regard. In short, Referent 7A is designated as NOTORIOUSLY COVETOUS.

The eighth proposition is Referent 8A (A2 + a3): Pressures arising from sociological Impatience tend to evoke a simplistic solution complex (i.e., Radical change) that persists as an explicit or implicit guide to problem-solving. An end-product of this sequential relation between them has been illustrated in cooperative farms and their subsequent
effects upon changes in social structure. Referent 8A is thus designated as CONSTANTLY EVOKED.

The ninth proposition is Referent 9A (A3 + a3): In the DPRK's stream of revolutionary movement, the greater the sense of loyalty embedded in Unitarian culture, the less the effectiveness of negative values (loyal opposition) as inhibitors of positive response. It will be recalled that an element of charisma in the DPRK has been a product of such an urgency backed by the cultural tradition. In other words, Referent 9 is designated as PASSIVELY CONTROLLED.

Endogenous Referents

In the same manner by which exogenous referents were identified, endogenous referents are to be identified in terms of SUBJECTS and MODIFIERS of confrontation. They are summarized in a simplified way in Figure 13.

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**(I) SUBJECTS**

- (B1) Ideological Linkage Constants
- (B2) Political Linkage Constants
- (B3) Leadership Linkage Constants

**(II) MODIFIERS**

- (b1) Party Linkage Variables
- (b2) Elite Linkage Variables
- (b3) Institutional Linkage Variables

*Refer to a note in Figure 12.*

Fig. 13—Confrontation and endogenous referents
(B1) Ideological Linkage Constants of the DPRK are identified as exclusively Nationalistic in its attempt to establish an independent identity. Although Marxism-Leninism has been the regime's revolutionary dogma, the nationalistic articulation of Juche Koreanism suggests a jingoistic attitude. As noted, nothing seemed to disturb the Pyongyang leaders more than identifying Korean Communism with that of Peking or Moscow. Such exclusiveness is calculated to obliterate Korea's history of being the client of other countries.

(B2) Political Linkage Constants of the DPRK are identified as fundamentally Spartan. The government's adamant goal for "working-classization" (or the mentality of a victorious working class) seemed to have been accomplished by the processes of "People's Democracy" and "Proletariat Distatorship." It meant to level all the feudal and other traditional socio-economic and political classes down to a working class. The literati, gentry, or all other leisure classes have fallen to the level of the commoners. The DPRK's Spartan spirit requires the people to think, eat, wear, and work like a manual laborer.

(B3) Leadership Linkage Constants of the DPRK are identified as Despotic. The present system of dictatorial leadership built on charismatic cultism has been in the tradition of oriental despotism. For Koreans, strong leadership is not only desired but also expected, since a benevolent
tyrant is believed to be the most ideal form of governance in a paternalistic society. This has been further mingled with religious thought. The leadership is an object of worship. The various modes of worship which prevailed in traditional Korea were all considered by the people as equally true in modern Korea.

These are the most conspicuous characteristics of the DPRK's endogenous constants viewed as policy potentials (SUBJECTS). In the manner in which we have identified them as Nationalistic, Spartan, and Despotic, endogenous MODIFIERS are classified as Centripedal, Pyramidic, and Superfluous.

(b1) As we discussed the dominant place of the KWP in the politics of the DPRK, Korean politics can be viewed as the function of the KWP to the extent that the political power is monopolized. The KWP's supra-constitutional role also encompasses all the other socio-political organizations in a federated manner. Thus, the KWP Political Linkage Variables are identified as politically Centripetal.

(b2) In terms of elite recruitment, the DPRK's emphasis on training cadres seems to have been effective in providing a selective corps of would-be revolutionaries. Specifically, political cadres have been carefully screened from the lower class people "without colonial vestiges." They had to be young Korean natives. Technical elites, on the other hand, have been recruited from the offspring of workers and peasants. These men were placed as "middle men" between the
Government and the people parallel to the KWP hierarchy. The Elite Linkage Variables are therefore identified as **Pyramidal**.

(b3) Finally, formal governmental institutions of the DPRK are identified as functionally **Superfluous**. As we learned from the functions of the Supreme People's Assembly (Congress) and the Cabinet, they are neither policy-making institutions nor program-constituting agencies, but are merely policy legitimizing and implementing institutions which existed for the assistance of the KWP. The Party leaders' dual positions in the Congress and Cabinet made the Institutional Variables functionally superfluous.

These two sets of endogenous referents as identified above thus suggest a matrix of nine associates out of three **SUBJECTS** and three **MODIFIERS**. Accordingly we may designate them as endogenous referents 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 respectively. (See Figure 14.) These nine referents are regarded as endogenous conditions which permeate the confrontation policy together with those nine exogenous determinants. (See Figure 12.) The following summary gives the necessary information as to how these nine referents are interpreted:

Referent 1B = B1 (Nationalistic) + b1 (Centripetal)
Referent 2B = B2 (Spartan) + b1 (Centripetal)
Referent 3B = B3 (Despotic) + b1 (Centripetal)
Referent 4B = B1 (Nationalistic) + b2 (Pyramidal)
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Note: Figure 14 should be read in conjunction with Figure 13 for clarity.

Fig. 14--Endogenous Determinants for Confrontation

Referent 5B = B2 (Spartan) + b2 (Pyramidic)
Referent 6B = B3 (Despotic) + b2 (Pyramidic)
Referent 7B = B1 (Nationalistic) + b3 (Superfluous)
Referent 8B = B2 (Spartan) + b3 (Superfluous)
Referent 9B = B3 (Despotic) + b3 (Superfluous)
The first proposition relates Bl and bl as Referent 1B: Given a condition of the KWP's nationalistic ideology, if the degree of the Party's Centripetal power increases, the degree of the Nationalistic attitude toward its external environment will increase, and vice versa. Here Bl (Nationalistic ideology) and bl (the KWP's Centripetal role) are both considered interdependent determinants mutually reinforcing each other in a combination of "reversible" and "sequential" propositions.³ The DPRK, being a nation with a long colonial past and experiences with foreign intervention, displays strong aspirations for a national identity. The ironic flaw in Korean nationalism lies thus in the fact that the KWP has gradually instilled the Jaju notion to further political centralization and public support. Thus, Referent 1B designates a NATIONALISTIC PROTAGONIST.

The second proposition draws a hypothetical statement linking B2 (Spartan life) and bl (the KWP's Centripetal role) as Referent 2B: Defining the KWP's role as Centripetal in inducing man to a Spartan life, if a person must choose between conforming to the Party norm and taking a risk, he is likely (or probably) to choose conformity. There are of course many who would choose to deviate from

³"Reversible" and "sequential" propositions are meant to indicate that between property X and property Y, they are reversible (if X, then Y; if Y then also X) and are sequential (if X then later Y). For details, see Hans L. Zetterberg, On Theory and Verification in Sociology, 3rd edition (New York, 1965), pp. 69-72.
the norm, but in any given group of individuals a majority is expected to conform to the norm rather than risk their lives. Referent 2B designates SPARTAN CONFORMITY.

The third proposition correlates B3 (leadership Despotism) and b1 (the Party's Centripetal roles) as Referent 3B: The Party's Centripetal leadership is positively related to political Despotism. In the Despotic versus Centripetal leadership proposition, the despotic leadership within the Party is consolidated and supported by the Centripetal leadership through the system of positive reinforcement; that is, the greater the degree of positive reinforcement, the greater the degree of expectation for agreement of the Centripetal leadership with the Party policies. Concomitant with this is the corollary--the less the degree of expectation of negative reinforcement, the less the degree of expectation to abandon the Party's Despotic leadership. Accordingly Referent 3B designates PROGRESSIVE DESPOTISM.

The fourth proposition assumes some kind of intra-relationship between B1 (Nationalistic ideology) and b2 (Pyramidal elite structure) as Referent 4B: A Nationalistic ideology gives rise to a role of a Pyramidal elite to sustain the present system; but if either factor of the relationship is changed, the other will be affected. In other words, the exclusivist Nationalism of the DPRK is contingent upon the elite structure parallel to the KWP structure. This proposition thus assumes some kind of intra-personal
contact between the Party and elite groups of Nationalists. Thus Referent 4B designates CENTRIFUGAL INFRASTRUCTURE.

The fifth proposition is a relationship between B2 (Spartan life) and b2 (Pyramidic elite) which constitutes Referent 5B: If the Spartan life in the DPRK is to be voluntary, the function of the Pyramidic elite system must be centralistic in order to provide a chain of examples from top to bottom. That is, comfort-seeking human nature requires a systematic control from the elites. In this regard, the role of hard-working elites in the DPRK is to display the virtues of a Spartan life. Referent 5B thus designates VOLUNTARY CENTRALISM.

The sixth proposition delineates B# (Despotic leadership) in reference to b2 (Pyramidic elite) as Referent 6B: Despotic leadership in the Party functions best when the rank and file tend toward a Pyramidic beauracracy, wherein the rank and file assume the role of "transitional belts." In the DPRK, the higher the ranking given to autocratic leadership, the more readily the secondary elites tend to stratify under an "umbrella-shape of authority. Accordingly Referent 6B designates ORGANIZATIONAL UMBRELLA.

The seventh proposition links a complementary relationship between B1 (Nationalistic ideology) and b3 (Superfluous institution) as Referent 7B: The greater the degree of expectation of a certain policy ideals (i.e., a high degree of exclusivist nationalism), the less the necessity of
institutions (i.e., the Congress and Cabinet) in maximizing "tactical" decisions. That is, the DPRK's high degree of power centralization with respect to "strategic" decision is conducive to a low degree of effectiveness with regard to "tactical" decisions.\(^4\) Thus, Referent 7B designates POLICY INFLEXIBILITY.

The eighth proposition organizes two categories dealing with consequences for primary and secondary groups in terms of B2 (Spartan politics) and b3 (Superfluous institutions) as Referent 8B: (1) The greater the confidence in policies of downward mobility, such as Spartan politics in the name of "working classization," the greater the reliance upon the central themes of mass mobilization. (2) The more the social mobility of masses becomes the center of the people's will, the more the importance of governmental institutions becomes Superfluous as the top of the legitimizing hierarchy. This phenomenon has been proved, for example, by the Chul-lima and Changsan-ri movements in the establishment of which the top official decision-units were by-passed. Referent 8B accordingly designates MASS POLITICS.

The ninth proposition deals with B3 (Despotic politics) and b3 (Superfluous institutions) as Referent 9B: "The

\(^4\)Strategic and tactical decisions are defined by Alfred Chandler in this manner: "... strategic decisions deal more with the long-term health of the enterprise. Tactical decisions deal more with the day-to-day activities necessary for efficient and smooth operations. ..." Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Strategy and Structure (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), p. 13.
greater the threat existing in the external environment, the greater the propensity for a Despotic ruler to receive positive reinforcing responses to his hostile actions from individuals and groups within the system." As a result, those supportive institutions (i.e., Congress and Cabinet) are superfluous in a crisis situation. The propensity to express approval of Kim Il Sung's cultism has been heightened by a series of purges within the leadership groups. Referent 9B designates DICTATORIAL MANIPULATOR.5

**Linkage Proposition in Chain Patterns**

The above linkage of eighteen propositions of exogenous and endogenous determinants, which are believed to be conditions of confrontations, suggest some relationships between the policy-making units and their internal and external setting. However, we might want to reduce the size of the matrix by an analysis of the key terms. In order to facilitate references to the data, the referents of the key terms are summarized in Table IV.

If we want to deal with those eighteen propositions, in which a result in one reappears as a determinant in another, we can order them as a chain. However, we also must make a reasonable assumption that each of these eighteen key terms

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5 Dictatorial inverter may be defined as the practice of a political system's Messianic dictator who defines political means and ends in accordance with his perceptions of external and internal environments and manipulates such conditions in a manner conducive to his popularity.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exogenous Determinants</th>
<th>Endogenous Determinants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1A)* Highly Compressed</td>
<td>(1B)* Nationalistic Protagonist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2A) Consistently Militant</td>
<td>(2B) Spartan Conformity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3A) Totally Collective</td>
<td>(3B) Progressive Despotism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4A) Extremely Confined</td>
<td>(4B) Centrifugal Infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5A)* Psychologically Frustrated</td>
<td>(5B)* Voluntary Centralism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6A) Positively Articulated</td>
<td>(6B) Organizational Umbrella</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7A) Notoriously Covetous</td>
<td>(7B) Policy Inflexibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8A) Constantly Evoked</td>
<td>(8B) Mass Politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9A)* Passively Controlled</td>
<td>(9B)* Dictatorial Manipulator</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Keys of 2A, 3A, 4A, 6A, 7A, and 8A of Exogenous Determinants and those of 2B, 3B, 4B, 6B, 7B, and 8B of Endogenous Determinants are treated as secondary factors, whereas those of 1A, 1B, 5A, 5B, 9A, and 9B are treated as primary factors.

Those "Determinants" with "*" marks represent Primary Factors and others are considered as Secondary Factors.

derived from respective propositions are reducible to limited co-determinants. This reduction of a matrix through the manipulation of the key terms can illustrate that all the propositions are possibly correlated. The task of the reduction thus separates those propositional key terms into secondary and primary factors: