AN ANALYSIS OF THE PARTICIPANT SELECTION PROCESS UNDER

THE COMPREHENSIVE EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ACT:

TEXAS AND LOUISIANA

THESIS

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By

William D. Drake, B.A., M.A.

Denton, Texas

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Federal guidelines required prime sponsors under
the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act, or CETA, to
serve the "significant segments" of the eligible popula-
tion. This study analyzes whether prime sponsors in Texas
and Louisiana correctly identified and served those seg-
ments. This study finds that eligible ethnic groups were
properly identified and were served equitably; age and gen-
der distinctions, however, were inadequately observed in the
providing of services.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In 1973 Congress created the Comprehensive Employ-

ment and Training Act, or CETA. In the decade or so prior

to 1973 Congress had passed such laws as the Area Redevel-

opment Act of 1961, the Manpower Development and Training

Act of 1962, the Vocational Act of 1963, the Economic

Opportunity Act of 1964, and the Emergency Employment Act

of 1971. The creation of CETA demonstrated Congress'

desire to consolidate these various federal job-training

programs. Under Title I, the Comprehensive Service Title,

CETA provided manpower services for the poor, the unem-

ployed, and the underemployed. Under Titles II and VI

Congress allocated funds for public service employment

(3, pp. 17-19).

Congress intended also that this act, though "com-

prehensive," avoid the hazard of centralized inflexibility.

CETA was designed to be decentralized in its planning and

administration. General guidelines for the use of funds

were established on the federal level, but decisions regard-

ing the funding of specific programs were left to state and

local officials (1, p. 533).

Background

The operation of CETA programs was entrusted to over four hundred "prime sponsors." Prime sponsors were units of state or local government that represented a population area of at least 100,000. These prime sponsors were empowered to operate all the local programs themselves or to subcontract to local community agencies.

CETA programs required planning: these local manpower programs had to be developed, administered, and evaluated. This planning was carried out by a council of representatives from community organizations, business, organized labor, and traditional deliverers of manpower services. So-called "significant segments" of the population were identified. These significant segments were economically disadvantaged population groups as identified by age, sex, or national origin. Two major criteria were used to determine service levels for the significant segments. The first was the size of that group proportionate to the eligible population. Generally the "eligible population" meant the members of families receiving public assistance, or welfare. The second criterion was that those individuals and population segments most in need were to be targeted for special emphasis. The plans were intended to be binding; prime sponsors were not to vary by more than fifteen percent the actual service (participation)

of any significant segment from the level of service adopted in the plan.

The planning function was separate from the actual administering of CETA funds; individuals such as the mayor, county executive, or city manager had final say on how the money was to be spent.

It is important when looking at CETA that three (overlapping) groups be identified: the eligible population of the economically disadvantaged, those persons or groups whom CETA prime sponsors planned to serve, and those persons or groups who were actually served.

At least one court case (National Congress of Neighborhood Women vs. New York) documents a prime sponsor's failure to carry out CETA planning and administration according to federal guidelines: in 1981 several women's groups won a settlement with the city of New York. These groups complained, among other things, of the city's failure in its CETA documents to provide adequate demographic data, to include certain groups of women in the eligible population, and to follow its planned level of service.

Purpose

This study focuses on the workings of CETA in Texas and Louisiana in fiscal years 1980 and 1981. While limited in scope, this study addresses several questions: (1) to what extent did CETA prime sponsors in these areas serve the

eligible population, and what criteria for service did they use, (2) did CETA prime sponsors in 1981 merely duplicate their service, equitable or not, provided in the previous year, and (3) was there a discrepancy (in excess of legal standards) in delivery of program services between those eligible for legal service and those actually served?

For this study the eligible population was divided into three broad categories: by sex, age, and ethnicity. These groups were further subdivided as follows:

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SEX:        female
AGE:        14-19
            20-21
            22-44
            45-54
            55 and older
ETHNICITY:  Black
            Hispanic
            White
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Hypotheses

Two opposing hypotheses were tested for each of the nine groups. The first hypothesis was that the selection of service recipients by CETA prime sponsor agents was essentially autoregressive. That is, the major factor in determining CETA service was neither the nature or makeup of the eligible population nor the prime sponsors' plans to serve that population; but instead the major factor was the type of group served in the previous year. The opposing hypothesis was that CETA service was based upon the eligibility of the population and only secondarily upon the prime sponsors' plans.

Limitations

The limitations of this study are several: first, it is based upon a convenience sample of CETA prime sponsors from the states of Texas and Louisiana. Second, the data are of a relatively short time span; data on which to base a long-term study are not available. Third, as is complained of by other researchers, CETA participants do not represent a true cross-section of the labor force. There is no experimental control group with which to contrast the experience of CETA participants. And finally, CETA no longer exists. However, it seems certain that federal participation in the labor market will continue in years to come.

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CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

The problem of planning and monitoring job-
training and public-service-employment programs is
addressed by several observers. Cavin and Maynard (1985)
attest to the difficulty of the short-term monitoring of
employment and training programs, "because these programs
by their nature are directed toward long-term goals"
(3, p. 331). Ashenfelter and Card (1985) echo that com-
plaint; "properly designed experimental tests for the
effectiveness of training are virtually nonexistent"
(1, p. 659). Congress passed CETA, they observe, without
clear evidence as to the effectiveness of the program it
replaced, the Manpower Development and Training Act of
1962. And then in 1982, without clear evidence as to the
effectiveness of CETA, they replaced CETA with the Job
Partnership Training Act.

McIntosh and Picou (1985) examine the effects of
CETA in the agriculture industry of Texas. They conclude
that in rural environments CETA actually competed with
the private sector for labor resources. And where farms
demanded much unskilled labor, "local CETA offices

achieved lower rates of participant training and placement
into full-time jobs" (6, p. 331). CETA on-the-job training
programs attained their best success during agricultural
off-seasons; many participants seemed therefore to regard
the paid, CETA-sponsored on-the-job training as "a form of
temporary welfare between agricultural seasons" (6, p. 341).

Hougland (1985) in general supports the theory of
economic dualism, the idea of there being two labor markets:
a primary or core sector and a secondary or peripheral
sector. The secondary sector is characterized by rapid
turnover of jobs, low wages, poor working conditions, few
opportunities for advancement, and poor fringe benefits or
none at all. The primary sector, on the other hand, offers
more stable employment, higher earnings, better working con-
ditions, opportunities for advancement, and better fringe
benefits. CETA and training programs like it are intended
to serve persons of the peripheral sector, to equip them, if
possible, with marketable skills that would enable them to
pass into the core sector of the market. Hougland con-
cludes, however, that the nature of the industry in which
CETA trainees were placed was more important to their long-
term success than whether they were placed in the primary or
secondary sectors.

McKinley (1979) acknowledges the conventional wis-
dom that planning is the bridge from the ideal to the
actual, and that "the world should be approached through a

comprehensive plan" (7, p. 532). She defends, however, the necessity for incrementalism, that is, for writing "plans" a posteriori for programs that already exist. Programs like CETA, she observes, "exist from one funding cycle to the next with little rational direction and no long-range plan" (7, p. 536). In order to retain their funding, local directors resort to recruiting what they perceive to be the "safest" clients for their training programs; frequently these clients are "white, male, non-economically disadvantaged students" who "demonstrate the highest rates for graduation, job placement, and job retention" (7, p. 535). This process is referred to by others as "creaming." One could infer that such "creaming" results in the awarding of benefits to those who need them the least and in the denying of benefits to those who need them the most.

Hargrove (1980) chronicles a three-way dogfight from 1973 to 1975 between the staffs of CETA, the U.S. Department of Labor's (DOL) Office of Policy Evaluation and Research (OPER), and the DOL office of the Assistant Secretary for Policy Evaluation and Research (ASPER). Those agencies proved incapable of forming and following an effective plan for evaluating CETA processes and performance. The ASPER divisions were staffed by civil servants and directed by academic economists. The ASPER directors wanted to evaluate CETA by means of sophisticated econometric analysis. The OPER staff, on the other hand, lacked such technical skills

and were more inclined to study the managerial effectiveness of CETA administrators. There was therefore a clash between those who favored evaluation by means of impact studies and those who preferred the use of process analysis. The CETA administrators, meanwhile, wanted someone to tell them whether what they were doing was in accordance with federal guidelines. The lack of bureaucratic cohesion on that high level and the asperity of that fight would lead one to expect that local prime sponsors might also have trouble understanding and following federal guidelines.

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CHAPTER III

PROCEDURES

In 1981 a research team from North Texas State
University, under contract with the U. S. Department of
Labor, gathered data on the CETA planning process in Texas
and Louisiana. Sixteen randomly selected prime sponsor
groups were studied; in return for their cooperation, the
prime sponsors were guaranteed complete anonymity. Data
were drawn from official fiscal 1980 and 1981 plans for
Title IIB (primarily job training and public service employ-
ment) of the program and from the fourth-quarter Quarterly
Summary of Participant Characteristics. The researchers
also made independent estimates of eligible Title IIB popu-
lations for each prime sponsor area.

Federal guidelines permitted no variation (0%)
between the incidence of a "significant segment" in the
population and the percentage of that segment in the prime
sponsors' service plans. A variance of 15% was permitted
between the planned service levels and the actual number
served. For each significant segment of the eligible popu-
lation, the NTSU researchers calculated median variances for
fiscal years 1980 and 1981; standard deviations from the

mean were also calculated. The researchers found that in fiscal years 1980 and 1981 the mean variances between planned and actual service levels were significantly greater than 15% in every category except sex. The median variance in fiscal year 1980 also exceeded 15% in every category except sex and the 22-44 age group in fiscal year 1981.

Purpose

The purpose of this study is to analyze and interpret the researchers' data. It is thus explanatory in nature: What was the major determinant of CETA service among the sample group? Two models for CETA service determination, the "autoregressive" model and the "eligibility" model, were tested by means of multiple regression analysis. The test results are reported here along with the results of a machine-ordered regression.

Models

The name of the autoregressive model is perhaps misleading since this study is not a time-series analysis and so autoregression or autocorrelation as such is not measured. What is meant by the term here, and what is tested by the study, is the tendency of CETA prime sponsors to repeat their service of the year before, especially without regard to legal stipulations on serving or planning to serve the eligible population.

The dependent variable is abbreviated as ACT81, the

persons actually served by CETA in fiscal year 1981. The

independent variables are as follows:

ACT80   the persons actually serviced by CETA in fiscal
         year 1980,

PLA81   the persons planned or targeted for service by
         CETA in fiscal year 1981,

ELI81   the persons designated as eligible for service
         by CETA in fiscal year 1981, and

DEV80   the previous year's error, computed as (PLANNED
         '80 - ACTUALS '80) / PLANNED '80.

Included in the tabulation of correlation coeffi-

cients (see Appendix) but not included or used in any

multiple regression results reported here, is the variable

ELI80, or the persons designated as eligible for service by

CETA in fiscal year 1980.

The equation for the autoregressive model is

$$ACT81 = ACT80 + PLA81 + ELI81 + DEV80.$$

This equation was run for each of the nine population

groups identified in Chapter I.

The eligibility model was designed to test the

hypothesis that CETA service was determined first by the

eligible population and second, within legally acceptable

variance, by the prime sponsors' plans to serve that

eligible population. Only least of all, it was thought,

should consideration be given to the service of 1980 as a

factor in determining service for 1981. The equation for

the eligibility model is

$$ACT81 = ELI81 + PLA81 + DEV80 + ACT80.$$

This equation also was run for each of the nine population groups identified in Chapter I.

CHAPTER IV

FINDINGS

The tables of findings for this study, reproduced

in full in the Appendix, show the multiple regression and

correlation coefficients for females and for each age and

ethnic group. Each table gives the results of the auto-

regressive model, the eligibility model, and the stepwise

regression. For each independent variable in the various

regressions, the incremental B and the incremental R^2 are

given. For the autoregressive model, the incremental stan-

dard error of B is given. Listed below that are the

simultaneous t and p values for each variable and for the

regression.

Within this chapter a summary table is presented

which shows the regression results, of the autoregressive

model only, for females and for ethnic groups.

Females

For females, the only variable demonstrating a sig-

nificant effect on the level of CETA service in 1981 is

ACT80, the variable indicating the service of the previous

year. It is noted that the explanatory power of the

equation is high ($R^2 = 0.89$), and that the equation is

Table 1

Regression Results, Autoregressive Model:
Females, Blacks, and Hispanics

Variables	Variables				Equation
	ACT80	PLA81	ELI81	DEV80	
Females: $\underline{B}$	1.031	0.035	0.020	0.013	$\underline{R}^2 = 0.89$
Std Error of $\underline{B}$	0.096	0.127	0.160	0.059	
$\Delta \underline{R}^2$	0.89	0.00	0.00	0.00	
$\underline{t}$	4.670	0.114	0.32	0.228	4.771
$\underline{p}$	<0.001	70.90	70.90	0.82	<0.001
Blacks: $\underline{B}$	1.042	0.174	0.017	0.069	$\underline{R}^2 = 0.99$
Std Error of $\underline{B}$	0.038	0.156	0.114	0.033	
$\Delta \underline{R}^2$	0.98	0.00	0.00	0.01	
$\underline{t}$	4.957	0.941	0.463	2.105	15.123
$\underline{p}$	<0.001	0.36	0.65	0.053	<0.001
Hispanics: $\underline{B}$	1.002	0.034	0.119	-0.015	$\underline{R}^2 = 0.997$
Std Error of $\underline{B}$	0.017	0.070	0.067	0.031	
$\Delta \underline{R}^2$	0.996	0.00	0.00	0.00	
$\underline{t}$	9.496	0.077	1.607	0.474	30.461
$\underline{p}$	<0.001	>0.90	0.14	0.64	<0.001
Whites: $\underline{B}$	1.002	-0.045	-0.393	0.128	$\underline{R}^2 = 0.99$
Std Error of $\underline{B}$	0.038	0.119	0.074	0.049	
$\Delta \underline{R}^2$	0.98	0.00	0.00	0.01	
$\underline{t}$	8.921	0.849	0.297	2.607	15.226
$\underline{p}$	<0.001	0.41	0.77	0.02	<0.001

significant at $\underline{p} < 0.001$. The variable ACT80 is the strong-est predictor of ACT81, significant at $\underline{p} < 0.001$; it is the only variable whose $\underline{t}$ and $\underline{p}$ values are significant. The $\underline{B}$ coefficients of ELI81 and PLA81 are much higher when entered first or second; entered after ACT80, they are statistically insignificant. In the autoregressive model, in fact, the absolute values of the standard error of $\underline{B}$ are greater

than $\underline{B}$ itself for those two variables. Multicollinearity is present to a degree: evidence of it is seen in the fairly high correlation coefficients between the explanatory variables; the highest correlation exists between ACT80 and ACT81. There is lower correlation between ACT81 and ELI81.

Ethnic Groups

The regressions for the three ethnic groups account for at least ninety-eight percent of the variance in each segment, and each equation is significant at $\underline{p} < 0.001$. That multicollinearity is present to a large degree is shown by the high correlation coefficients between the variables. In each ethnic group the correlation is highest between ACT80 and ACT81. The $\underline{B}$ coefficient of ACT80 remains high whether entered first (autoregressive model) or last (eligibility model). The coefficients of ELI81 and PLA81 register strongly when entered before ACT80; when entered after ACT80, however, they drop into insignificance.

Age Groups

The other results of this study concern the different age groupings. These results are reproduced in the Appendix.

Among the age cohorts, the 45-54 group is to be considered first. Of the nine equations, it is the only one that is not statistically significant. The correlation

coefficient between those eligible and those actually served is very low (0.03) in fiscal year 1980 and is negative in 1981. The B coefficients of ELI81 and PLA81 also are negative in all models.

The equations for other age groups are all significant at least at the 0.05 level; the lowest R^2 is 0.71. Of the independent variables, only ACT80 is significant in any of the groups except for PLA81 in the 22-44 bracket. In all groups the highest correlation coefficient between any two variables is the one between ACT80 and ACT81. The correlation coefficients between those eligible and those actually served are negative in both the 20-21 and the over-55 age groups; in the 22-44 group they are close to zero. Consistently the B coefficients for ELI81 are analytically and statistically insignificant; often they are negative.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This study has attempted to assess the process by
which prime sponsors under the Comprehensive Employment
and Training Act, or CETA, operated in Texas and Louisiana
in fiscal years 1980 and 1981. Broad guidelines were
established for the use of federal funds, but prime spon-
sors retained a great deal of freedom in the choosing of
particular programs. These funds fell into two major
categories: manpower training (Title I) and public-service
employment (Titles II and VI). In selecting the indi-
vidual recipients of CETA aid, prime sponsors were
required to determine the "significant segments" of the
eligible population in their area and to formulate a plan
to serve those who were eligible. In the delivery of
services, prime sponsors were allowed to deviate from that
plan by no more than 15 percent.

The purpose of this study is to examine the prime
sponsors' method of selecting the recipients of CETA aid.
Did the prime sponsors select CETA participants according
to legal guidelines? Or, once the program had been

initiated, was their selection simply based on what had been done the year before?

Manpower training is a long-term effort; bureaucratic necessity, however, requires short-term evidence of the effectiveness of a program. Even now, some five years after its demise, CETA and its effects are still being evaluated. The literature on CETA offers evidence that the selection process among prime sponsors was difficult to monitor. Offices within the Department of Labor itself were undecided on whether to evaluate CETA primarily on the basis of its long-term impact on individuals and their past and future employment, or to focus on prime sponsors and their methods of operation.

On the local level, it seems that in order to achieve fairly quick evidence of success, prime sponsors resorted to "creaming." That is, prime sponsors tended to select from the pool of CETA applicants those whom they believed had the greatest chance for success, and to exclude those whom they identified as perhaps more "hard-core" unemployed. Those applicants who were chosen to receive services, then, were by definition not necessarily those who had the greatest need for them. Participants also, at least those whose usual employment was in agriculture, seemed to view CETA not as an avenue to long-term economic advancement but as a temporary form of welfare during slack seasons in the agricultural calendar.

This study looks <u>a posteriori</u> at prime sponsors in Texas and Louisiana and attempts to evaluate their methods. A team of researchers from North Texas State University conducted confidential interviews with CETA officials in Texas and Louisiana and collected data pertaining to the CETA planning and selecting process. The following variable names were used:

ELI the part of the population eligible to receive CETA benefits,

PLA that part of the population which prime sponsors planned to serve,

ACT those persons who actually received CETA benefits, and

DEV an error term.

The variables were further identified by the year of the data; for example, ELI80 and ELI81 refer to the eligible population in fiscal year 1980 and 1981.

Two equations were tested in this research; they were applied not to the population <u>en masse</u> but to nine different "significant segments" of the population: females, blacks, Hispanics, whites, and the following age groups: 14-19, 20-21, 22-44, 45-54, and 55 and older. The first equation,

$$ACT81 = ELI81 + PLA81 + DEV80 + ACT80,$$

essentially asks whether CETA service in 1981 was based on the criteria established by law: eligibility first, the prime sponsors' plans, plus a legally allowed deviance. In this model, little or no significance should attach to the service of the year before.

The second equation,

ACT81 = ACT80 + PLA81 + ELI81 + DEV80,

tests whether, in fact, CETA prime sponsors gave less
regard to the eligibility of the population and to their
plan than to merely repeating the previous year's prac-
tice.

The results obtained from least-squares regression
are mixed. The results indicate that regarding ethnicity
prime sponsors very scrupulously followed federal guide-
lines for equitable service. Regarding blacks, for
instance, the correlation coefficients indicate that the
portions of the population that were eligible for service
(ELI81), that were designated to receive service (PLA81),
and that actually received service (ACT81) are nearly
identical. Correlation among those three variables is
nearly total; and that is what, if federal regulations
were being observed, one would hope and expect to see.
Similar effects may be observed for Hispanics and whites.

The second model provides a more accurate description
of the reality for females and for the different age
groups. There is little correlation between the persons
served and those who were of these eligible "significant
segments" of society. That is, prime sponsors in the
sample area seem to have administered CETA benefits with
little regard to the gender or age groupings of the

eligible population. This study offers no information on how CETA programs were first set up and how participants were chosen. It seems clear, however, that once the programs were in place the prime sponsors tended to duplicate the service of the previous year.

Since CETA was abolished by Congress in 1982, one might wonder as to the applicability of these results to anything that exists in the real world now. Two conclusions may be drawn.

The first conclusion is based on the assumption that federal participation in the job-training process is likely to continue. It has been seen that the prime sponsors studied here tended to duplicate the service of the previous year. It would seem wise therefore to monitor the beginnings of any future manpower programs with great care. The labor market changes, as does any other segment of society. But if manpower programs at least start with the proper focus and distribution of service, society will have been served better.

The second conclusion is based on the observation that prime sponsors in this study seem to have exercised great diligence to provide CETA services in a manner free from racial discrimination. The issues of discrimination on the basis of sex or age, however, have not so permeated our society--or at least our bureaucracy. It is perhaps

comforting or encouraging to find no statistical evidence of racial discrimination in this sample. Perhaps future researchers will find no evidence of discrimination on any other basis in studies to come.

APPENDIX

Table 2

Regression Results: Females

Models	Variables				Equation
	ACT80	PLA81	ELI81	DEV80	
Autoregressive Std Error of $\underline{B}$ ΔR^2	1.031 0.096 0.89	0.035 0.127 0.00	0.020 0.160 0.00	0.013 0.059 0.00	
Eligibility ΔR^2	0.999 0.21	0.823 0.39	0.481 0.29	0.020 0.00	$\underline{R}^2 = 0.89$
Stepwise ΔR^2	1.031 0.89	0.030 0.00	----- -----	0.016 0.00	
$\underline{t}$ $\underline{p}$	4.670 <0.001	0.114 70.90	0.032 70.90	0.228 0.82	4.771 <0.001

Table 3

Correlation Coefficients: Females

	ACT81	ACT80	PLA81	ELI81	DEV80	ELI80
ACT81	1.00	0.94	0.80	0.54	-0.01	0.121
ACT80		1.00	0.83	0.55	-0.04	0.18
PLA81			1.00	0.82	0.04	----
ELI81				1.00	0.25	0.31
DEV80					1.00	----

Table 4

Regression Results: Ages 14-19

Models	Variables				Equation
	ACT80	PLA81	ELI81	DEV80	
Autoregressive Std Error of $\underline{B}$ ΔR^2	0.745 0.123 0.72	0.134 0.133 0.02	0.123 0.164 0.01	-0.083 0.067 0.03	
Eligibility ΔR^2	0.730 0.39	0.489 0.28	0.304 0.11	0.008 0.00	$\underline{R}^2=0.79$
Stepwise ΔR^2	0.745 0.72	0.121 0.01	0.159 0.03	-0.070 0.02	
$\underline{t}$ $\underline{p}$	4.495 <0.001	0.716 0.49	0.657 0.52	1.251 0.23	3.171 0.007

Table 5

Correlation Coefficients: Ages 14-19

	ACT81	ACT80	PLA81	ELI81	DEV80	ELI80
ACT81	1.00	0.85	0.62	0.33	0.29	0.47
ACT80		1.00	0.60	0.19	0.48	0.54
PLA81			1.00	0.57	0.48	----
ELI81				1.00	0.17	0.41
DEV80					1.00	----

Table 6

Regression Results: Ages 20-21

Models	Variables				Equation
	ACT80	PLA81	ELI81	DEV80	
Autoregressive	0.669	0.025	-0.091	0.000	
Std Error of $\underline{B}$	0.119	0.086	0.104	0.004	
ΔR^2	0.69	0.00	0.02	0.00	
Eligibility	0.617	0.244	-0.144	-0.002	$\underline{R}^2$=0.71
ΔR^2	0.43	0.22	0.05	0.00	
Stepwise	0.669	0.051	0.073	----	
ΔR^2	0.69	0.01	0.01	----	
$\underline{t}$	4.069	0.534	0.844	0.055	2.612
$\underline{p}$	0.001	0.60	0.41	70.90	0.02

Table 7

Correlation Coefficients: Ages 20-21

	ACT81	ACT80	PLA81	ELI81	DEV80	ELI80
ACT81	1.00	0.83	0.41	-0.23	-0.12	-0.14
ACT80		1.00	0.45	-0.14	-0.15	-0.14
PLA81			1.00	0.22	-0.08	----
ELI81				1.00	0.06	0.28
DEV80					1.00	----

Table 8

Regression Results: Ages 22-44

Models	Variables				Equation
	ACT80	PLA81	ELI81	DEV80	
Autoregressive Std Error of $\underline{B}$ ΔR^2	0.746 0.116 0.75	0.164 0.106 0.04	-0.047 0.105 0.00	-0.203 0.124 0.04	$\underline{R}^2=0.82$
Eligibility ΔR^2	0.498 0.16	0.496 0.31	0.047 0.01	0.058 0.36	
Stepwise ΔR^2	0.746 0.75	0.164 0.04	-0.075 0.01	0.188 0.04	
$\underline{t}$ $\underline{p}$	3.211 0.006	2.284 0.04	0.748 0.47	1.644 0.13	3.675 0.003

Table 9

Correlation Coefficients: Ages 22-44

	ACT81	ACT80	PLA81	ELI81	DEV80	ELI80
ACT81	1.00	0.86	0.52	0.07	0.11	0.36
ACT80		1.00	0.39	0.01	0.18	0.33
PLA81			1.00	0.51	-0.66	----
ELI81				1.00	-0.35	0.63
DEV80					1.00	----

Table 10

Regression Results: Ages 45-54

Models	Variables				Equation
	ACT80	PLA81	ELI81	DEV80	
Autoregressive Std Error of $\underline{B}$ ΔR^2	0.649 0.233 0.36	−0.045 0.095 0.01	−0.021 0.084 0.00	−0.005 0.013 0.01	$\underline{R}^2$=0.38
Eligibility ΔR^2	0.662 0.35	−0.063 0.02	−0.039 0.01	−0.002 0.00	
Stepwise ΔR^2	0.649 0.36	−0.020 0.00	−0.010 0.00	0.007 0.02	
$\underline{t}$ $\underline{p}$	2.485 0.03	0.141 0.89	0.110 >0.90	0.405 0.69	1.301 0.21

Table 11

Correlation Coefficients: Ages 45-54

	ACT81	ACT80	PLA81	ELI81	DEV80	ELI80
ACT81	1.00	0.60	−0.17	−0.12	0.05	0.01
ACT80		1.00	−0.11	−0.04	−0.15	0.03
PLA81			1.00	0.39	−0.44	----
ELI81				1.00	−0.42	0.51
DEV80					1.00	----

Table 12

Regression Results: Ages 55 and Older

Models	Variables				Equation
	ACT80	PLA81	ELI81	DEV80	
Autoregressive Std Error of $\underline{B}$ ΔR^2	1.062 0.133 0.82	-0.026 0.052 0.00	0.009 0.027 0.00	0.007 0.004 0.04	$\underline{R}^2=0.87$
Eligibility ΔR^2	1.092 0.71	0.057 0.02	0.075 0.13	0.003 0.01	
Stepwise ΔR^2	1.062 0.82	-0.055 0.01	-0.016 0.01	0.005 0.03	
$\underline{t}$ $\underline{p}$	7.636 <0.001	0.946 0.36	0.665 0.52	1.871 0.08	4.222 <0.001

Table 13

Correlation Coefficients: Ages 55 and Older

	ACT81	ACT80	PLA81	ELI81	DEV80	ELI80
ACT81	1.00	0.90	0.08	-0.37	0.01	0.01
ACT80		1.00	0.15	-0.35	-0.17	-0.20
PLA81			1.00	0.13	0.27	----
ELI81				1.00	0.26	0.38
DEV80					1.00	----

Table 14

Regression Results: Blacks

Models	Variables				Equation
	ACT80	PLA81	ELI81	DEV80	
Autoregressive Std Error of B ΔR^2	1.042 0.038 0.98	0.174 0.156 0.00	0.017 0.114 0.00	0.069 0.033 0.01	R^2=0.99
Eligibility ΔR^2	0.809 0.03	0.785 0.07	0.906 0.88	-0.089 0.01	
Stepwise ΔR^2	1.042 0.98	0.169 0.00	0.047 0.00	-0.067 0.01	
t p	4.957 <0.001	0.941 0.36	0.463 0.65	2.105 0.053	15.123 —0.001

Table 15

Correlation Coefficients: Blacks

	ACT81	ACT80	PLA81	ELI81	DEV80	ELI80
ACT81	1.00	0.99	0.97	0.94	-0.47	0.96
ACT80		1.00	0.97	0.94	-0.41	0.95
PLA81			1.00	0.94	-0.40	----
ELI81				1.00	-0.35	0.92
DEV80					1.00	----

Table 16

Regression Results: Hispanics

Models	Variables				Equation
	ACT80	PLA81	ELI81	DEV80	
Autoregressive Std Error of $\underline{B}$ ΔR^2	1.002 0.017 0.996	0.034 0.070 0.00	0.119 0.067 0.00	-0.015 0.031 0.00	$\underline{R}^2=0.997$
Eligibility ΔR^2	0.880 0.02	0.418 0.02	0.944 0.96	0.056 0.00	
Stepwise ΔR^2	1.002 0.996	------ ------	0.119 0.00	-0.015 0.00	
$\underline{t}$ $\underline{p}$	9.496 <0.001	0.077 >0.90	1.607 0.14	0.474 0.64	30.461 <0.001

Table 17

Correlation Coefficients: Hispanics

	ACT81	ACT80	PLA81	ELI81	DEV80	ELI80
ACT81	1.00	0.99	0.97	0.98	-0.16	0.99
ACT80		1.00	0.97	0.97	-0.15	0.99
PLA81			1.00	0.96	-0.19	----
ELI81				1.00	-0.19	0.98
DEV80					1.00	----

Table 18

Regression Results: Whites

Models	Variables				Equation
	ACT80	PLA81	ELI81	DEV80	
Autoregressive Std Error of $\underline{B}$ ΔR^2	1.002 0.038 0.98	−0.045 0.119 0.00	−0.393 0.074 0.00	0.128 0.049 0.01	
Eligibility ΔR^2	1.300 0.09	0.771 0.13	0.669 0.76	−0.143 0.01	$\underline{R}^2=0.99$
Stepwise ΔR^2	1.002 0.98	−0.112 0.00	−0.018 0.00	0.118 0.01	
$\underline{t}$ $\underline{p}$	8.921 <0.001	0.849 0.41	0.297 0.77	2.607 0.02	15.226 <0.001

Table 19

Correlation Coefficients: Whites

	ACT81	ACT80	PLA81	ELI81	DEV80	ELI80
ACT81	1.00	0.99	0.94	0.87	−0.84	0.89
ACT80		1.00	0.96	0.89	−0.89	0.88
PLA81			1.00	0.91	−0.82	----
ELI81				1.00	0.80	0.86
DEV80					1.00	----

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