TEXAS AND THE CCC: A CASE STUDY IN THE SUCCESSFUL ADMINISTRATION OF A CONFEDERATED STATE AND FEDERAL PROGRAM

THESIS

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Reacting to the Great Depression, Texans abandoned the philosophy of rugged individualism and turned to their state and federal governments for leadership. Texas's Governor Miriam Ferguson resultantly created the state's first relief agency, which administered all programs including those federally funded. Because the Roosevelt administration ordered state participation in and immediate implementation of the CCC, a multi-governmental, multi-departmental administrative alliance involving state and federal efforts resulted, which, because of scholars' preferences for research at the federal level, often is mistakenly described as a decentralized administration riddled with bureaucratic shortcomings. CCC operations within Texas, however, revealed that this complicated administrative structure embodied the reasons for the CCC's well-documented success.
According to several historians, the Civilian Conservation Corps was one of the New Deal's most successful programs. John A. Salmond argues that the CCC captured America's imagination by appealing to man's instinctive desire for outdoor living while providing clearly beneficial services to the nation, the states, and the individuals who participated.\(^1\) Kenneth E. Hendrickson, Jr. concludes that the CCC, despite its shortcomings, was widely popular and made significant and lasting contributions to the nation.\(^2\)

Since conventional wisdom accepts the CCC's success as a matter of fact, that need not be reproven. After all, the CCC was not created to solve the Depression nor to meet the needs of all Americans, but only to provide temporary work relief to a narrow segment of society. In accomplishing precisely that goal, there is no question regarding its success; arguable, perhaps, are only the degree and the meaning of that success.


Most studies about the CCC examine either specific work projects or the impact national politics had on its operations. While these approaches provide for necessary case studies and important program overviews, their scopes are limited and they fail to bridge the gap between national events and specific isolated occurrences. As a result, there appears to be a growing and necessary interest on the part of historians to fill this void by examining New Deal issues on the grassroots level.\(^3\) Since writing such studies remains relatively virgin territory, it is absolutely essential to weave new conclusions into related research in order to ensure credibility.

After selecting this project, this author confronted the dilemmas of choosing between reexamining issues about which most historians already agree, providing more evidence though of a local color to conclusions already well-documented, or enhancing conventional interpretations of CCC operations by addressing an often misrepresented phenomenon. Having selected the latter, the purpose of this study is to demonstrate that the CCC's bureaucratic structure, no matter how unwieldy it might have appeared, provided the operational dynamics that were necessary for administrative proficiency. In so doing, discussions regarding CCC activities and accomplishments in Texas are the laboratories chosen to test

\(^3\) Hendrickson, "Replenishing the Soil and Soul," 37.
the validity of this thesis. Failure to recall the perspective chosen from which to examine events will inevitably lead to questions beyond the intended scope of this study.

The Texas CCC succeeded in spite of a volatile and sometimes hostile political and economic climate during the Depression years due to the flexibility and the very nature of the Corps's bureaucratic structure. The Texas CCC was a loose union or confederation of multiple independent agencies brought together in common purpose, each with its specific domain of authority and none possessing so much power that it could seriously jeopardize the efforts of another. This organizational structure created a system elastic enough to meet a national agenda in a regional or local fashion and accept its limitations without endangering its objectives, while maintaining rigid enough guidelines to meet the variety of tasks assigned to it. Whether examining recruitment, enrollment, or day-to-day operations, it is clear that duties were more often divided between participating agencies than shared by them. Consequently, the CCC was not truly an autonomous agency of the national government, but a confederated agency composed of representatives from national, state, and local governments.
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INTRODUCTION

TEXAS AT THE CROSSROADS: THE WANING OF RUGGED INDIVIDUALISM

The Depression brought more than just hard times to Texas; it also brought pervasive changes that penetrated to the core of society and revolutionized the state's economic and political structure. Though part of these realignments reflected the gradual shift from a rural economy dominated by cotton farming to an urban one based upon industry and oil production, the impact of the Depression and subsequent attempts to harness it quickened the pace of this drastic upheaval and deepened its effects.\(^1\)

Not surprisingly, any society that undergoes such dramatic changes also experiences a philosophical revolution; so did Texas. In fact, in the process of attempting to give order to the chaotic political climate of the 1930s, it is evident that in the face of the demands the Depression forced upon public leaders, such academic terms as liberal and

\(^1\) The 1930's were years of transition for the Texas economy. As early as 1929 oil replaced cotton as the state's largest single industry; however, a glut resulting from overproduction in East Texas oil fields during the early 1930s gave it the appearance of being no more than a false prophet. Nevertheless, drilling continued and during the Depression alone, 35.9 percent of the wells in production in 1983 were discovered. See *The WPA Guide to Texas* (1942; reprint Austin: Texas Monthly Press, 1986), 62; Texas. Office of the Governor. Texas 2000 Project. *Texas Past and Future: A Survey, Economic Development Issues*, Austin, Texas, 1981, 83.
conservative essentially lost their meanings. For example, President Herbert Hoover, commonly labeled as conservative, experimented with such liberal ideas as the Federal Farm Board, which granted federal loans to ailing farmers, and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), which provided assistance to troubled banks, railroads, and insurance companies. On the other hand, Franklin D. Roosevelt sought to protect and preserve conservative business interests through liberal recovery and reform programs. Paralleling this national trend, but on the state level, Governor Ross Sterling (1931-1933) of Texas, a conservative Democrat and supporter of Hoover, also considered such liberal programs as crop reduction and oil conservation and became involved in state relief efforts. In addition, many Texas politicians who were liberal by Texas standards appeared conservative when compared nationally. Nevertheless, it suffices to argue that Texas conservatives favored less government interference in the marketplace while liberals favored more.

Sterling's activities in each of these areas are discussed below.

The Depression also challenged Texans' attitudes toward traditional values such as self-help and rugged individualism, attitudes which prior to 1932 were steeped in the frontier tradition and the agrarian myth. Historian Lionel V. Patenaude argues that by the mid-thirties the harsh conditions of the Depression slowly eroded the historic individualism that had resulted from the state's frontier experience. Historian Donald W. Wisenhunt corroborates Patenaude's interpretation and adds that Depression realities also weakened devotion to the agrarian myth, the belief in a rural and agricultural existence as the utopian way of life and the attitude that solutions to difficult problems rested in the hands of the individual. This philosophy so permeated Texas society that its effects went beyond the confines of agriculture. During the late 1920s prominent Texas businessmen and their lobbyists entered politics, further encouraging the state's evolution toward a mature industrial economy. Indeed, even Governor Sterling exemplifies these interests since he was the founder of Humble Oil Company. These businessmen, as much a product of rugged individualism as the Texas farmer, responded in a predictably conservative fashion to the initial trials of the Depression by echoing

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4 Patenaude, "Texas and the New Deal," 95.
5 Donald W. Wisenhunt, The Depression in Texas, the Hoover Years (New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1983), 156.
Hoover's philosophy that, given time, the business cycle would repair itself. In fact, as the Depression deepened, both Texas farmers and Texas businessmen placed still greater faith in rugged individualism. Nevertheless, as evident late in Hoover's administration, this philosophy failed to solve the national economic downturn. Understandably, as the Depression deepened, the public sought an explanation and a solution; both searches eventually produced new scapegoats and radically altered the state's philosophical orientation.

As early as 1929, though in action only and not in word, cracks in President Hoover's philosophy imperceptibly opened allowing government initiatives to slip through. In what Wisenhunt calls the "most ambitious program ever undertaken by the federal government" because of its radical break from accepted conservative doctrine, Hoover offered $500 million in loans to agriculture through the newly created Federal Farm Board for the purpose of withholding crops from market until market prices rose. Hoover's initiative failed, however, because: there were insufficient funds, an economic decline in Europe meant a further reduction in markets, and the program was unrealistic in the absence of production controls. Though nothing could be done regarding the second of these factors, Texas farmers were disillusioned by the

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7 Wisenhunt, Depression in Texas, 8-10.
8 Ibid., 158, 159.
first and eventually rallied around the third, likening it to a battle cry.

The farmers' disillusionment with the Farm Board rested upon dissatisfaction with its loan policies. Acting within conservative restraints, the Farm Board offered its loans through farm organizations in the state. Since big business and big agricultural interests dominated these organizations, they controlled the aid. Public opinion eventually turned on those responsible for the loans because the money failed to "trickle down" to the small farmers. Unfortunately for Hoover, corporate America, and conservative philosophy in general, the public eventually interpreted these efforts as part of the affliction rather than as part of the cure and thus rekindled the decades old distrust of big business nurtured by Texas's earlier Granger, Populist, and Progressive roots. Consequently, rugged individualism suffered its first blow as many Texans blamed moneyed interests for interfering between the people and their government, thus pitting one philosophy against another. After all, the agrarian myth also held that government must protect the farmer from those who might strangle him.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}}\footnote{Though a political history is not within the scope of this study, it bears noting that these early reform movements manifested themselves in Texas as a political phenomenon called "Fergusonism," which refers to the popular and anti-business administrations of Governors James E. ("Pa") Ferguson (1915-1917) and his wife Miriam ("Ma") Ferguson (1925-1927 and 1933-1935).} \footnote{\textit{Wisenhunt, Depression in Texas,} 156.}
Since agriculture virtually dictated the condition of the Texas economy, the failure of the Federal Farm Board sent Texans looking elsewhere for their salvation. In 1931 Louisiana Governor Huey P. Long received attention in Texas when he proposed the "Long Plan," which would prohibit cotton production in the South during 1932. Long argued that a one-year prohibition on production would certainly force the prices higher the following year. Naturally, for such a program to succeed Long needed the cooperation of all the cotton growing states, and Texas led the South with over one-fourth of the nation's total production. Though intending to encourage grassroots support in Texas, Long and his representatives doomed their own efforts by infuriating Governor Sterling and the state legislature through their propagandizing of the Texas public. Nevertheless, Long's campaign captured the imagination of many Texans, who responded by writing letters of support and appeal to Governor Sterling concerning the proposal. Of the 70,000 to 80,000 letters received in Austin, more than half called for either the adoption of Long's plan or a special session of the state legislature to propose a crop reduction plan of its own. The public's willingness to call on state government to provide relief from the Depression was an important first
step in transferring responsibility for the Depression's woes from the individual's shoulders to those of government.\textsuperscript{12}

Governor Sterling and the state legislature replied to the public's increasing expectations by proposing their own reduction plan. By 1931 Sterling accepted the premise that government had to take more aggressive action. The public apparently agreed with Sterling, but most state and local officials, who continued to represent conservative doctrines, did not. Though begun as a response to mounting public pressures, the state's crop reduction plan was never implemented. The plan proposed that no more than 30 percent of the previous year's acreage be planted, and that thereafter cotton would not be grown on the same land in simultaneous years. Although Sterling's plan appeared as an aggressive but necessary step in resurrecting the state's economy, because of its experimental nature Texans were hesitant to take such drastic action alone, for when other Southern states failed to enact either Long's proposal or similar reduction plans, Texans quickly lost faith in their own intentions. Apparently Southern legislatures and most Texans were still too conservative to take such philosophically drastic measures. Consequently, when Texans challenged Sterling's plan in court it was ruled unconstitutional on the grounds that it interfered with an

\textsuperscript{12} For a good discussion of Long's interference in Texas politics, see Wisenhunt, \textit{Depression in Texas}, 167-182.
individual's right to manage private property. Wisenhunt argues that the Texas political establishment's reluctance to cooperate resulted from both the belief in individualism and a practical realization that the state did not have the resources to handle the situation.13

Sterling's desire to cut oil production met the same fate as his crop reduction initiative. When East Texas oil fields saturated the market with oil causing the price to tumble, state oil interests pressured Sterling to take action. The governor responded by considering a bill to reduce East Texas oil production, a move that the oilmen would not have advocated in earlier years. Not surprisingly, since decreased production meant increased unemployment for the state's laborers during a time when finding employment was virtually impossible, labor opposed the proposal. Sterling reacted to the protest by ordering the National Guard into four East Texas counties.14 Some Texans suspected that the state's moves stemmed from mere self-interest. As mentioned earlier, Sterling was the founder of Humble Oil; in addition, General Jake Wolters, a lobbyist for Texaco, commanded the guard, and Wolter's personal aide was an employee of Gulf Oil.15 Though not occurring until after the

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13 Ibid., 141, 180, 182.
troops were withdrawn, state courts cited similar reasons when reviewing this case as they had when ruling on the earlier crop reduction scheme and declared the legislation unconstitutional. Thus, both proposals failed to meet their objectives and also widened the rift between the people and their leaders.

For all practical purposes, 1932 was the time of judgement for Hoover and the conservative approach to managing the Depression. With elections awaiting them in November, national and state politicians realized that it was time to produce or perish. As the Depression deepened and what was once public concern became desperation if not fear, Hoover authorized the RFC to distribute relief to the nation's indigent by depositing funds in private banks throughout the country for distribution by the states. Unfortunately, the RFC was already an unpopular agency in Texas because of its discriminatory policies in loaning capital to troubled industries. Of the $2 billion originally allocated to the RFC to bail out failing banks, $1.5 billion went into the coffers of the nation's larger institutions, a fact that was not then public information since the RFC maintained closed files. When John Nance Garner of Texas forced the RFC to open its records, however, the favoritism shown in its lending policies drew strong criticism from the
public and the Democratic party.\textsuperscript{16} Texans concluded that the RFC, like the Federal Farm Board before it, was an extension of class favoritism and doubted its integrity.\textsuperscript{17}

The intentionally covert lending policies which Garner exposed were not an isolated case of secrecy. By choosing not to inform the public of the severity of the situation, politicians hoped to avoid adding to the panic. This approach to crisis management only increased the public's distrust of its leaders. Historian Donald Wisenhunt contends that because conservative doctrine acted as the rudder used to guide the economy through the crisis, and because reality was at odds with the tenants of this doctrine and the official pronouncements from Washington, politicians intentionally withheld information. Naturally, as the people became more informed of the real situation through better press coverage, the public insisted that actions be taken to combat the crisis.\textsuperscript{18}

Had the government been more open about the situation, perhaps confidence in its efforts might have been established, but the government's relative inexperience in managing economic affairs meant even many public officials were not well informed about the seriousness of the


\textsuperscript{17} Wisenhunt, \textit{Depression in Texas}, 146.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 136, 139.
situation. Therefore, any criticism leveled at the government for failing to inform the public fully must be balanced with an appreciation for the age: in the early 1930s Texas governing bodies were not yet accustomed to tracking economic indicators, nor were they expected to do so. Wisenhunt admits that determining decisive figures for these years is virtually impossible since "no state agency was equipped or capable of compiling such figures."\(^{19}\) Even the Texas Planning Board, which coordinated relief efforts later during the 1930s verified the disappointingly poor statistical information in its 1935 report to the governor when it announced that there existed no unemployment figures prior to 1 August 1934.\(^{20}\)

Originally, the U.S. government also failed to collect definitive data on unemployment. In its 1930 census, the U.S. Department of Commerce released special supplements on unemployment and listed Texas as having 95,300 unemployed compared to 4,547,987 gainfully employed Texans.\(^{21}\) A review of the *Statistical Abstracts of the United States* for the years 1931 to 1942 revealed no useful figures other than those reported to the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) as receiving federal aid. Relief statistics are

\(^{19}\) Ibid., 135.
incomplete, but do reveal the following: for the years 1934, 1935, and 1936, there were 1,138,000, 789,000, and 44,000 individuals respectively who received said aid.\textsuperscript{22} In 1932 all Governor Sterling could do was estimate the situation, and in February his reckoning was 300,000 unemployed which, even if a conservative estimate, was triple the figure reported in the 1930 census.\textsuperscript{23}

Even though reliable information was virtually non-existent, local charity workers recognized that the crisis was growing. During the Depression's early years, Texans relied on private charitable organizations for aid. The needy and the amount of help they received was, therefore, a matter left entirely in the hands of these private organizations. Acting independently and with limited resources, these institutions could not pretend to offer significant relief from the lingering Depression. In Dickens County, Texas, for example, the local Red Cross reported that 3,000 of the county's 8,601 residents had requested aid, so with resources exhausted, it ceased operation. This depletion of resources in the face of increasing need created an unfortunate tendency to cut costs and conserve supplies at the expense of the indigent. Although conservation of


materials during overwhelming demand reflects good business theory, in this situation it made for miserable human conditions. In the fall of 1931, the Salvation Army in Galveston proudly announced its new austerity plan whereby "three men could be fed at the cost of feeding one the year before." In Plainview the local American Legion Post boasted that it had fed fifty men on 28 cents. To the public such declarations, which seemed more concerned with the bottom-line than with human suffering, appeared like an immoral morass of self-interests. The disappointments surrounding relief efforts and the injudicious actions taken on the part of many of its participants finally convinced Texans that federal involvement was unavoidable.²⁴

Armed with new directives and new funds from the already unpopular RFC, Governor Sterling entered this quagmire of failed philosophy and misguided efforts. Effective November 1932, Texas began distributing the first of its initial $4,135,133 RFC appropriations. Sterling's challenge was to deliver this aid to the needy without the benefit of an existing state agency to assist in the task. In 1933, testifying before the state Senate Investigating Committee reviewing earlier relief efforts, Sterling reflected: "I once thought of building up an organization to distribute these funds, but with an idea to have the work done quickly I then

²⁴ Ibid., 142, 151-153.
called the heads of three regional chambers of commerce in the State for a conference.” In an effort to disperse these funds quickly, Sterling gambled on the efficiency of the business community to distribute the aid. Additionally, since the chambers of commerce were organized from the grassroots level to the state level, they provided a seemingly effective bureaucracy and already were familiar with the local needy in the respective communities. In light of the public's growing anti-business sentiment, the business interests were pleased to be selected as the agent of relief for they hoped that this role could repair any previous damage done to their reputations.

Because needs varied throughout the state, Sterling believed that proportional allotments were inappropriate. In order to distribute the funds more effectively, he awarded each chamber of commerce allotments based upon the number of counties in the region, the number of large cities, and substantiated requests submitted by the regional chambers of commerce and verified by local state judges. Sterling created no specific guidelines for approving requests and, perhaps out of concern over how these efforts would be

27 Senate Investigation, 877.
received by the public, safely distanced himself from the operation by declaring that all accountability to Washington rested with the respective regional chambers of commerce. After allotments were granted the chambers of commerce were free to use local chambers of commerce or other private charitable organizations such as the Red Cross, Community Chest, Salvation Army, or local churches to distribute the aid. By the fall of 1933, the state Senate Investigation Committee labeled Sterling's method of distributing aid a failure because of the gaping holes in accountability that allowed for potential inequities and discrimination within local communities. Given the bad reputation of the RFC and the previously poor management policies of many of the private charities with which the RFC was eventually affiliated through the chambers of commerce, open skepticism was understandable. By January 1933 the RFC's initial allotment had been expended, but destitution still remained. Since Sterling accomplished precisely what Washington had requested, which was that RFC funds be distributed in Texas, it is erroneous to declare his efforts a failure, for the program was not expected to end destitution. Criticizing Sterling's choice of distribution is also unwarranted because in late 1932 there was no need to create a state bureaucracy for distributing aid. On 31 January 1933, the RFC made more funds available to the states, but Sterling had left office
on 17 January.\textsuperscript{28} It was not until immediately before FDR's inauguration that representatives of the incoming administration contacted the states to review relief needs. The issue of creating a bureaucracy to distribute this aid, therefore, fell to Sterling's successor, Miriam ("Ma") Ferguson.\textsuperscript{29}

President Hoover's decision to use the RFC in dispersing funds and Sterling's choice to draft the business community into the effort created a situation that destroyed the myths that the business community would repair itself and, until this was accomplished, the individual could provide for himself. The various national and state elections in 1932 indicated public disenchantment with this concept, a disenchantment that went beyond passing judgement on incumbent politicians. In pre-Depression Texas, claims Wisenhunt, accepting charity was a fate worse than death.\textsuperscript{30} This attitude was an obvious abbreviation of rugged individualism, and it suffered what appeared to be a permanent reversal. With business interests and conservative philosophy as scapegoats, the public selected a new president, a new governor, and a new philosophy. This combination enabled Texas to reject the previously tried and failed conventional wisdoms, including the conviction that

\textsuperscript{28} \textit{Austin American}, 1 February 1933.  
\textsuperscript{29} \textit{Senate Investigation}, 583.  
\textsuperscript{30} Wisenhunt, \textit{Depression in Texas}, 134-135, 149.
the individual must provide for himself. Thus, the state underwent a philosophical revolution that made it easier for the public to turn toward the federal government and participate in New Deal programs such as the Civilian Conservation Corps.
CHAPTER I

ESTABLISHING AND MANAGING THE TEXAS RELIEF COMMUNITY:
INSTITUTIONALIZING STATE ACCOUNTABILITY

By 1932 it was evident that a \textit{laissez faire} strategy for managing the Depression had failed to ease public suffering. Consequently, while the nation elected a new president in November, Texans resurrected a progressive voice from their political past and replaced Governor Ross Sterling with Miriam ("Ma") Ferguson, who had served as governor from 1925 to 1927. The Ferguson name carried significant appeal among Texas farmers because James ("Pa") Ferguson, whose popular pro-agriculture politics had earned him the nickname "Farmer Jim" during his own tenure as governor from 1915 to 1917 served as an advisor to Miriam Ferguson.\footnote{Paul Bolton, \textit{Governors of Texas} (Corpus Christi, Tx.: Corpus Christi Caller-Times, 1957), pages not numbered.} Together the two had authored a genre of populism commonly branded as "Fergusonism," which preached anti-business pulpitry and argued for reforms favorable to labor and the average Texan.\footnote{Ibid.} Because of loss of faith in conservative philosophies, business's unhappy new role as scapegoat for everything associated with the Depression, a demonstrated record of progressive politics, and a campaign platform which promised
to seek the repeal of prohibition, thwart the growing influence of the KKK, and combat the misfortunes of the Depression, a majority of Texans welcomed a return to Fergusonism. Although Ferguson's campaign hinted at a comparatively more active role for state government than her predecessor had practiced, the authority which state government gathered during her administration went beyond even the most liberal of her intentions. Two reasons for this are clear. From the moment she assumed office, events dictated policy, and, in an effort to battle the Depression, federal pressure eventually forced previously unimaginable bureaucracies upon the states. In response to these pressures and in order to maintain federal funds and manage burgeoning state agencies, Governor Ferguson fashioned administrative bodies which were the cornerstones of accountability to Washington for involvement in relief programs such as the CCC.

The most serious task confronting Ferguson following her election was helping Texans cope with the Depression, a task made more complicated by a state legislature not yet entirely impressed by liberal ideas, and, due to the remaining weeks of transition before FDR's inauguration, the unfortunate but unavoidable uncertainty of future federal policy. Nevertheless, a growing sense of urgency prevailed which insisted that measures be taken before the crisis worsened;
after all, *Austin American* staff writer Hugh Nugent Fitzgerald appealed, "Conditions demand decisive action."³

In late January, barely two weeks into Ferguson's new administration, the RFC granted its second relief package to the states. Having taken advantage during her campaign of public disillusionment with the RFC and the questionable manner in which aid was awarded during her predecessor's administration, Ferguson, trapped by her own rhetoric, was obligated to modify the state's method of distributing relief.⁴ As a result, she created the Texas Relief Commission (TRC) in February 1933 to manage all relief programs and distribute all relief funds throughout the state, whether those funds or programs were of federal or state origin.

On the surface the Texas Relief Commission seemed a compromise between public concerns over alleged favoritism in relief distribution and the need for continued business support.⁵ In accommodating apprehension over favoritism when the regional chambers of commerce granted aid while securing business's participation, Ferguson employed a recurring political tactic: while advancing her own goals, she acted out of deference to both sides of the issue and forged a compromise which allowed everyone to save face. In response

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³ *Austin American*, 11 February 1933.
⁴ A discussion of the public's dissatisfaction with relief efforts is found in the Introduction to this study.
⁵ Discussions of Governor Sterling's methods of relief distribution and the criticisms they evoked are found in the Introduction to this study.
to business's pique at its reduced role in relief distribution, Ferguson offered assurances to business when she announced the change and stated that it "should be understood that no criticism of the Regional Chambers of Commerce is to be implied" and then appointed the three heads of the Chambers of Commerce to serve on the TRC's governing committee. The compromise was evident in this seven-member governing committee ostensibly created to direct TRC activities and review requests for relief, but which more often than not simply advised the governor. This committee consisted of the governor, who served as chair, the aforementioned business representatives, and three former state judges which Ferguson appointed. Though assuming executive control over relief efforts, Ferguson also maintained the contacts and cooperation from business that she still needed without offending the Chambers of Commerce, yet allayed the fears of those who were concerned about favoritism when aid was handed out by the private sector.

The compromise, however, was more political than functional. Real authority rested with the governor and in the office of Executive Director of the TRC to which she

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6 Governor Ferguson to unspecified recipient, 15 March 1933, in Correspondence, Papers of the Governors, RG 301, Archives Division-Texas State Library, Austin, Texas.
7 The judges chosen were T.A. Low of Brenham, Tom King of Abilene, and William Cameron of Waco, Texas. Texas Senate. 43rd Legislature, Senate Investigation of Relief and Rehabilitation Proceedings, Austin, Texas, 1933, 582. Hereafter cited as Senate Investigation.
appointed Colonel Lawrence Westbrook, a recognized Waco businessman, former state legislator, and a leader in the Texas Rural Rehabilitation Program. By possessing business, political, and relief credentials, Westbrook appeared to personify the compromise Ferguson had designed. Nevertheless, Westbrook was an employee of the executive branch and remained directly responsible to the governor.

Though the governor assumed responsibility for the state's relief efforts, she exercised that authority through the director's office, consequently making him the real power-broker within the TRC. Westbrook managed the TRC's day-to-day affairs, periodically reported to the RFC in Washington, reviewed and approved or denied requests for aid submitted to him by the TRC's loosely constructed county apparatus, and coordinated the actions of all relief operations in the state. Without needing legislative confirmation, the director had power to select his own administrative staff. These subordinates managed the daily operations of the specific programs Westbrook assigned to them and coordinated their efforts through his office. As seemingly endless numbers of state and federal programs were

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8 Colonel Westbrook served as Director from February of 1932 until February 1934 when he went to Washington to work with the Roosevelt administration's Rural Rehabilitation program. Westbrook was replaced by Adam R. Johnson, a former Austin city manager.

9 Program supervisors relevant to the focus of this study are discussed below. Texas. Texas Relief Commission, Guide for Accounting of and Accounting for Relief Funds, 21 March 1933, RG 303, Archives Division-Texas State Library, 4. Hereafter cited as Guide.
soon organized, Westbrook's staff grew in importance. Until that time, however, and as long as the RFC granted cash appropriations to the states without specific guidelines for their disbursement, the director exerted a great deal of influence.

On the county level, the TRC authorized the state's commissioners courts to appoint workers to newly created County Committees of Welfare and Employment, which assessed requests for aid and represented the state's interests in the various relief programs. Under the TRC, the County Committees thus determined who was qualified for direct relief such as food, clothing, and, at least temporarily, cash. In addition, they qualified applicants for the various work relief programs which soon abounded.

Ferguson was cautious not to extend her authority too deeply into county affairs. Accepting that state and/or federal encroachment into local matters was a new and previously feared phenomenon, again Ferguson formulated a compromise: while the County Committees were responsible to the TRC, each county retained influence and significant control over its respective committee. For example, the county commissioners court determined the size and specific duties of each County Committee. Furthermore, since the state merely needed a public employee to disburse aid, precisely who served in this capacity was also left to the
commissioners court. Realizing that past efforts had been accomplished by local volunteers and choosing not to offend them as she had chosen not to offend the Regional Chambers of Commerce, Ferguson praised their work and recognized that "it is fully understood that most of the administrative work...has up until now been done by patriotic volunteers." Ferguson claimed, however, that while she preferred to continue using volunteers, she realized that the state should assume their salaries if local funds were not available for this purpose. Originally relying on volunteers, there had been no compensation for relief work other than increased prestige and the gratitude of the community, and as long as the chambers of commerce instead of local politicians handed out the aid, even prestige and gratitude were of limited value. The issue of renumeraton, however, created a source of future criticism, since a professional staff possibly meant professional favors. Nevertheless, Ferguson's offer to make state employees of local relief workers demonstrated a significant growth in the size and influence of state government. Though only an offer on the governor's part, it introduced a loose administrative hierarchy that reached from Austin into the counties and foreshadowed the direction in which governmental authority would soon move.

10 Ibid.
Governor Ferguson deserved credit for creating a state agency which improved accountability in public relief, but because of the uncertainty resulting from the freedoms allowed each County Committee, precise accountability did not yet exist. As it so happened, the TRC was a short-lived agency lasting only from February to May of 1933, so there was little opportunity to test the merits of Ferguson's compromises or the effects the TRC had upon relief distribution. In fact, from its second month of operation, most observers recognized that the TRC was soon to be an extinct agency, for in early March the incoming Roosevelt administration ordered the states to install truly authoritative bureaucracies. The TRC's brief existence, therefore, made it only a first step toward this goal. Thus, pressure from Washington interwoven with a timely series of events led to the establishment of a significantly more accountable relief agency, the Texas Rehabilitation and Relief Commission.

Federal intervention began on 3 March 1933, when Fred C. Croxton, Assistant to the Directors of the RFC in Washington, informed Governor Ferguson that three conditions needed attention before the further granting of RFC appropriations to Texas.\textsuperscript{11} Croxton's conditions were: (1) a satisfactory accounting system had to be enacted, (2) a statewide

\textsuperscript{11} Senate Investigation, 583.
administrative agency had to be established whereby counties could gain "skilled help and guidance," and (3) the state legislature had to assume more financial responsibility by contributing state funds for relief. Of these conditions, Croxton's final stipulation was potentially the most divisive, but before the legislature could consider the issue, a more immediate crisis presented itself as chaos spread in the nation's financial corners.

In the week preceding FDR's inauguration, Texas bankers, hoping for protection from the general bedlam spreading in their industry, traveled to Austin to meet with the governor. According to Ouida Ferguson Nalle, the governor's daughter and a colorful biographer of the Ferguson family, though "the moneyed interest [had] never supported the Fergusons," when confronted with reality the bankers realized that the governor "could save their bacon." In response to the bankers' concerns, Ferguson closed the state's banks on 2 and 3 March for Texas Independence Day; thus, she provided Texas with a buffer against the unfolding financial collapse and gained time to evaluate the efforts of FDR's weekend inauguration. Though unsuspecting at the time of her

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12 Ibid.
13 Ouida Ferguson Nalle, The Fergusons of Texas or "Two Governors for the Price of One": A Biography of James Edward Ferguson and his wife Miriam Amanda Ferguson, Ex-Governors of the State of Texas (San Antonio, Tx.: Naylor Co., 1946), 224, 225.
decision, Ferguson's actions proved marvelously opportune since on 5 March FDR announced his Bank Holiday, thereby closing the nation's banks and lifting the burden of responsibility for addressing the crisis off of Ferguson's shoulders and placing it squarely upon his own.

Although not overly concerned about Ferguson's closing of the state's banks, Texans watched with apprehension as FDR ordered the nation's banks closed. The governor certainly held the authority to close banks within the state, but the president's moves seemed a bit more brazen, perhaps even illegal. Before those who might have challenged the legalities of FDR's actions had time to form serious opposition, however, any moves to express dissent were stymied when the banks reopened a week later. The Bank Holiday was a coup for FDR with the public and the banking industry and caused a brief resurgence in national confidence. Quick to capitalize upon this new mood and thankful for their salvation, Austin area bankers ran a buoyant full-page advertisement thanking customers for their patience and noting that the unrest so common in the East was alien to Texas. It also proclaimed that the "public can now be assured that all reopened banks are safe banks." It was a glorious victory for assertive government action.

16 Austin American, 15 March 1933.
On 15 March, as the bankers ran their advertisement, Governor Ferguson tapped into this newly created support for assertive action and acted on Croxton's demands. In a letter to the County Committees she proclaimed that:

The use of government funds... was originally contemplated purely as an emergency measure, and the administrative machinery for distributing and accounting for these funds was, no doubt, set up under the assumption that the conditions creating the emergency would shortly cease to exist.

Unfortunately, however, this expectation has not been realized...

[therefore] My first step in carrying out [a relief program] has been to centralize the administration and accounting functions in Austin in order that direct supervision may be exercised and the needs of the state as a whole given coordinated attention.17

In this message Ferguson deftly fused together the pertinent issues into one neat package, which not surprisingly offered something for everyone. The first statement in her letter acknowledged existing criticisms of prior relief efforts without attacking either Sterling or the regional chambers of commerce and defended their actions by reminding people that the situation was once seen only as an emergency. The last statement justified the existence of the TRC but cleverly left the impression that the TRC wielded more authority than it did; perhaps this illusion was designed for Washington's benefit. It also intimated that a

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17 Governor Ferguson to County Relief Committees, 15 March 1933, Texas Relief Commission, RG 303, Archives Division—Texas State Library, Austin, Texas.
more powerful state government was ready to provide leadership in combatting the economic malaise. The disheartening statement, of course, was the second one in which she admitted what so many had avoided for so long: recovery was not imminent. This statement alone provided political and economic justification for action.

Ferguson used this justification when submitting her proposals to the legislature. Responding to Croxton's demands with two proposals rather than one, Ferguson requested that the TRC be redesigned and given more authority and called for a $20 million bond program to fulfill the state's new financial responsibilities. Separating the two issues was wise practical politics since any criticism of blossoming executive authority paled against the controversy of increasing state contributions for relief work. Ferguson's gambles succeeded when Washington accepted the proposals as acts of good faith and granted Texas its appropriations for March and April. By granting only two month's relief, however, arguments surrounding Ferguson's proposals still had to be settled.

Debate swirled in the state legislature as it considered the implications of Ferguson's proposals. Was long-term relief merely the institutionalization of the dreaded dole? Was a bond program prudent economic policy during a depression? Although rugged individualism had become much
less of an issue than it once was, it was not yet an entirely forgotten philosophy. Many continued to believe that relief was nothing less than an unwarranted dole and that doles demoralized society. The legislature also debated whether or not a market existed for the bonds, particularly since some saw those bonds as supplying government doles. In addition, the $20 million proposal contained an estimated administrative cost of $800,000, which was considered improper by some legislators. No one, they argued, should make a living supplying humanitarian aid; money was just too tight to waste it, they insisted. Fortunately for Ferguson and TRC relief efforts in general, before any legitimate opposition to the bond proposal could gain momentum, Washington soon intervened with what amounted to threats and ultimatums.

The Ferguson administration tried to silence the issue of doles by again walking the narrow path between opposing views in a TRC memorandum that acknowledged: "it was, and is, a well recognized fact that anything savoring of a dole will undermine the morale of a people." Nevertheless, the TRC argued in its operations manual, "these funds should in no sense be considered as a dole." It was as if saying so, made it so.

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18 Senator Holbrook before the Senate Investigation Committee, Senate Journal, 43rd Legislature, 1st Called Session, 688.
19 Untitled/undated memorandum, Texas Relief Commission, RG 303, Archives Division-Texas State Library, Austin, Texas.
In what was not then perceived as bearing any relevancy to the proposals, Washington moved forward with its relief innovations, including a series of work relief programs in which the recipient of aid repaid the government for said aid through his or her labor. In mid-March FDR proposed the Emergency Conservation Act, (enacted 31 March), which authorized federal spending for conservation-related projects. Austin was at least vaguely receptive to the proposal because on 22 March the *Austin American* reported the new measures without editorial comment. In fact, as the New Deal slowly took shape through this program and others similar to it, the press tried to pinpoint the administration's plans. The *Austin American* announced that the New Deal had three goals: reforestation projects, continued direct relief through strengthened federal programs, and various work projects, the nature of which was yet to be determined.

The Roosevelt administration was equally as cautious in announcing the conservation program as the Ferguson administration had been when implementing the TRC. Wary of possible criticism that Washington may have been acting too boldly by assuming unprecedented power through national programs and interfering in the private sector by offering

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21 Initial reporting of the CCC in the *Austin American* used such terms as "emergency conservation work force" and "tree army" until 1 May when it used CCC for the first time. See *Austin American*, 22 March 1933.

22 Ibid., 31 March 1933.
government subsidized employment, Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins announced that the program's administrative responsibilities would be subdivided between federal, state, and local governments, and that these jobs were not "jobs in the true sense of the word" since their longevity was temporary and non-competitive in nature. These jobs were for young men, not for the nation's primary labor force.\textsuperscript{23}

As indicated earlier, ultimatums and threats from the Roosevelt administration arrested any intentions of challenging either of Ferguson's proposals. Though FDR's newly created Federal Emergency Relief Administration removed a psychological obstacle to federal aid by assuming control over the RFC and its programs, it also raised the price for legislative hesitancy.\textsuperscript{24} Director Westbrook attested to Washington's pressure-laden tactics when he appeared before the Texas Senate Investigation Committee and revealed that "the Federal Emergency Relief Administration [would] provide funds for relief on the basis of one dollar of Federal money for each one dollar of State money."\textsuperscript{25} The bitter reality was that without state money there would be no federal funds, hence no significant relief program in the state. Immediately all other arguments became merely academic.

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 24 March 1933.
\textsuperscript{24} It should be remembered that the RFC had a seriously negative image among the Texas public, the reasons for which are explained in the Introduction to this study.
\textsuperscript{25} Senate Journal, 43rd Legislature, 1st Called Session, 678.
Washington applied still more pressure when Robert Fechner, the newly appointed Director of Emergency Conservation Work, threatened that unless the aforementioned bond proposal and a series of necessary enabling laws were passed, young men enlisted in Texas for conservation work would be shipped out of state and Texas would be denied future work projects.\(^2\) Thus, while Texans could continue participating in the work relief program, the fruits of their labor would benefit other states, an idea which held no appeal among state legislators.

Given the rising popularity of assertive government action as evident in the Bank Holiday, the public's growing enthusiasm for work relief projects such as the conservation program, the simple desperation of the times, and the unprecedented intervention from Washington, the legislature succumbed to the inevitable on 11 May and supported Ferguson's restructuring of the TRC.\(^2\)\(^7\)

With sufficient authority to satisfy Washington's demands for full accountability House Bill 897 (H.B. 897) replaced the TRC with the Texas Rehabilitation and Relief Commission to be effective 1 June 1933.\(^2\)\(^8\) House Bill 897 called for an accountable and highly centralized management


\(^{27}\) Ibid.

\(^{28}\) Ibid.
hierarchy within the relief community which stretched from the governor's office to the counties. The new Texas Rehabilitation and Relief Commission (TRRC) retained the governor's committee and the office of executive director, but through his administrative staff and powerful new middle-managers the director's authority grew at the expense of the committee's. The bill also created two new levels of assistants between the director, his support staff, and the county commissioners courts which ensured reasonable adherence to policy thereby supplying needed credibility within the system. The director appointed a staff of field representatives to supervise multi-county districts, guarantee the implementation of programs and policies within their district, and serve as liaison between the state and the commissioners courts. Since there were 254 counties in Texas, under the old TRC there were in essence as many mini-relief agencies that Westbrook had been expected to direct; the TRRC diffused responsibility for screening applications for direct aid and supervising the implementation of direct relief and work relief programs among its field representatives, thus making Westbrook's job more manageable.

Below the field representatives a staff of county administrators were appointed, one per county, who after

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being appointed by the field representative and approved by
the executive director, assumed responsibility for TRRC
operations within his respective county and through his field
representative advised the director of any problems which
arose. Thus, the combination of the field representatives
and the county administrators at least superficially
fulfilled Croxton's expectation that "skilled help and
guidance" be offered to the local communities.

Still careful not to go too far, Ferguson's
implementation of the county administrators maintained the
balance between rival concerns which she was always so
careful to respect by leaving some measure of control in the
hands of local officials. Though the county administrator
was responsible for implementing policy, he had little real
decision-making power. In fact, the administrator was a
"joint employee" of both the state and the county in which he
served, and was paid from the county funds on any salary
schedule which the commissioners court decided.30 Thus, the
administrator often found himself torn between those who paid
him and those to whom he was legally obligated.31 Locally,
newly organized County Boards of Welfare and Employment
replaced the TRC's County Committees of Welfare and

30 Director Westbrook to field personnel, 5 July 1933, Report of
the Texas Rehabilitation and Relief Commission, RG 303, Archives
Division-Texas State Library, Austin, Texas.
31 As will be shown, this fact resulted in occasionally sloppy
implementation of locally unpopular or impractical policies.
Employment. Despite the minor change in name there was a significant change in role at the county level. Whereas the TRC had allowed the County Committees to disburse relief, under the TRRC only the county administrator could do so. Consequently, while the commissioners courts continued to appoint members, their roles became merely advisory to the administrator. (See Figure 1 on page 37.)

House Bill 897 not only institutionalized accountability within Texas, but also met Fechner's demands that enabling laws be approved to allow for responsible cooperation between Texas officials and those in Washington. These laws permitted the federal government to operate relief programs within the individual states without having to create a bulky and expensive bureaucracy of its own. Through H.B. 897 the TRRC received the authority to negotiate directly with the federal government in matters concerning disbursement of funds for relief and its distribution, therefore removing day-to-day operations from the political arena and allowing greater freedom of management and creativity within each program.\(^32\) Specifically in preparation for conservation work, the legislation instructed the State Forester and other state executive bodies to cooperate with the National Forest Service and related agencies and ordered the TRRC to cooperate with the U.S. Departments of Labor, Agriculture,

\(^{32}\) Westbrook to field representatives, 5 July 1933.
---indicates advisory capacity
—indicates direct responsibility

FIGURE 1—Comparative superstructures of the TRC and the TRRC.

and the Interior, thereby allowing the executive branches of both the state and federal governments to operate in unison. In addition, H.B. 897 mandated that all state agencies such as the State Forest Service and the State Parks Board complete studies of the state's needs and submit their

---Texas. Texas Senate, General Laws of the 43rd Legislature, Regular Session, (S.B. No. 263), 15 April 1933, 175.
findings to the TRRC where decisions were made regarding requests for work projects. Without H.B. 897 installing accountability in the relief community and these enabling laws allowing for cooperation between the state and federal governments, Texas might not have been as active in FDR's New Deal.

Events that spring had unfolded so rapidly that their significances could not be assimilated before they gathered such momentum that they forced changes in Texas and across the nation. Changes in the philosophy of government at the national level were evident through legislation passed on the state level. By June 1933 the administrative machinery was in place to operate and supervise large-scale multi-agency relief programs in Texas. In creating this machinery the governor's authority, which had begun in January as simply the power to pass on funds to the counties for their discretionary disbursement, had resulted in previously unimaginable authority in local affairs accomplished through the hierarchy of executive branch employees in counties across the state. It was the advent of 'big government' in Texas, certainly bigger and more authoritative than most turn-of-the-century progressives had ever imagined.

House Bill 897 ensured Texas's participation in federally sponsored relief programs and dictated the nature of cooperative efforts between Washington and Austin.
Because the TRRC served as a clearinghouse for relief programs in Texas, its employees implemented CCC policies in the state making their roles at least as significant to an understanding of the CCC's successes as those of its national administrators. Consequently, it is not enough to examine CCC management at the federal level; it must also be studied at the state and grassroots levels, for whatever weaknesses may have existed within the TRRC automatically became weaknesses within the Texas CCC as well. This fact accounts for most of the irritating situations which Texas CCC administrators encountered, although these irritations never jeopardized the program and should not be overemphasized.

In truth, the only balanced approach to studying the CCC's administration is to examine both its routine procedures and existing challenges to its administration to observe how the various state and federal participants acted and reacted; only from this wider perspective can a complete picture be reconstructed and examples of the CCC's managerial style studied. Before these examples can be appreciated, however, the nature of the relationship between Texas and the CCC must be discerned.
CHAPTER II

WASHINGTON AND THE TEXAS CCC: A CONFEDERATED ALLIANCE

When FDR proposed the creation of a civilian conservation work force, he offered it as an emergency measure and demanded that a complex and sophisticated program be developed and fully operational by 1 July 1933. The President instructed the CCC's national administrators to enlist and train 275,000 men in three months, and in as little time as possible to build and supervise hundreds of work camps for their use. Since creating such an agency from scratch involved far too much time, FDR chose a technique that became a trademark of the New Deal: he ignored traditional administrative practices and combined the functions of several executive departments to form a new one, thus creating what one historian called "a bureaucratic monstrosity" because of its "exceedingly cumbersome" organization.  

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1 Austin American, 23 May 1933; Charles W. Johnson, "The Army and the Civilian Conservation Corps, 1933-1942," Prologue 4 (Fall 1972): 141.
2 For an evaluation of Roosevelt's management style, see William Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal (New York: Harper and Row, 1963); Kenneth E. Hendrickson, Jr., "Replenishing the Soil and the Soul of Texas: The CCC in the Lone Star State as an Example of State-Federal Work Relief during the Great Depression," Vertical File, Barker History Center, Austin, Texas, 37; Kenneth E. Hendrickson, Jr., "The Civilian Conservation Corps in the Southwestern States," in
Compounding an already difficult situation, the CCC cooperated with and operated within the unique patterns of relief distribution in the individual states. As in the case with Texas, ensuring that the internal administrative structures of state relief programs were responsive to federal needs was not always accomplished without applying significant leverage against the states. Since the Texas Rehabilitation and Relief Commission (TRRC) supervised the administration of relief efforts in the state, it naturally handled the affairs of the CCC as well. As a result, state employees rather than federal employees implemented policies that were devised in Washington. Limitations within the TRRC, therefore, quickly became limitations within the Texas CCC, complicating the situation still further.

The CCC's administration might have collapsed under the weight of its overwhelming bureaucracy considering how miscommunications, lethargic policy implementation, and petty bureaucratic rivalries often toppled such unwieldy organizations. Paradoxically, decentralization within the CCC was a most important reason for its success. With authority delegated across a broad spectrum of agencies, actual duties were not shared in ways that might promote destructive competition. Rather, they were divided among

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3 Federal pressure used against Texas to affect the state's relief community is discussed in Chapter I of this study.
participants in ways that demanded cooperation and coordination. In this respect, the Texas CCC was a loose union or confederation of multiple independent agencies brought together in common purpose, each with its specific domain of authority and none with so much power that it could jeopardize the efforts of another. Amazingly, this confederated-style of management proved proficient at the national and state levels, and in the relationship between the state, the TRRC, and the federal government.\(^4\) Before vignettes can be drawn to illustrate confederated management in action, however, the respective responsibilities of the participating state and federal agencies must be fused.

Historian of the CCC, John Salmond, argues that since the CCC was FDR's creation, Roosevelt sought to maintain significant control over its operations.\(^5\) Another scholar, Charles Johnson, believes that because of the escalating emergency, Congress deferred its usual interest in the operations of executive agencies to the President and allowed FDR unprecedented administrative authority over the CCC by permitting him the use of any federal agency and any non-obligated federal funds needed in its implementation.\(^6\) To avoid squandering precious time devising administrative

\(^4\) The organizational structure of the TRRC is discussed in Chapter I of this study.  
\(^6\) Johnson, "The Army and the CCC," 140.
machinery for this new agency, FDR diffused responsibilities among four existing executive departments: the Departments of Agriculture, Interior, Labor, and War. The Agriculture and Interior Departments chose work projects which fell within their jurisdictions and provided on-site supervision; the Labor Department selected candidates to serve in the CCC; and the War Department enrolled them, trained them, and provided for their supervision and welfare at the individual camps. By dividing responsibilities among existing departments already under his authority, FDR precluded his own involvement and that of Robert Fechner, his appointed Director of Emergency Conservation Work, in making broad program decisions and in settling disputes. Routine matters, however, were left to the individual departments.

Originally seen as playing a larger role in CCC operations than eventually transpired, the Department of Agriculture forfeited its intentions of operating the work camps to the War Department because it possessed neither the manpower nor the resources needed to manage such an extensive program. Consequently, it assumed the role of providing technical services to the CCC, which it fulfilled by selecting work projects within its jurisdiction, and through its component agencies such as the U.S. Forest Service, the Soil Conservation Service, and the Bureau of Biological.

7 Hendrickson, "Replenishing the Soil and Soul," 38.
8 Johnson, "The Army and the CCC," 141.
Survey, trained CCC selectees in the specific skills needed to accomplish their assigned tasks and supervised them during those tasks. Each individual agency within the Department of Agriculture met its objectives by cooperating with its respective state counterpart. In Texas, for example, this meant working with the Texas Forest Service and the Texas Soil Conservation Service.

The Interior Department also provided necessary technical services to the CCC. With responsibilities similar to those of the Department of Agriculture's internal agencies, the National Park Service, Bureau of Reclamation, Division of Grazing, and General Land Office cooperated with the states, provided technical training, and supervised specific work projects. The Department of Interior's Bureau of Indian Affairs, however, performed an additional task generally left to the Labor Department, for it selected Indian enrollees for CCC work as well as trained and supervised them.\(^9\)

The Department of Labor selected candidates for the CCC. Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins chose former Red Cross administrator Frank Persons to serve as CCC Director of Selection and coordinate the department's efforts. Caught in the extraordinary timetable FDR imposed, Perkins and Persons

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\(^9\) No Indian enrollees are known to have served in the CCC in Texas. See James Wright Steely, principal author, *The Civilian Conservation Corps in Texas State Parks*, Texas Parks and Wildlife, 1986, 3.
decided that necessity left no alternative to rapid
implementation other than calling upon existing state
agencies to serve as their representatives. 10 These agencies
screened applications submitted by interested young men and
determined which applicants were sent to enrollment stations
as candidates for final selection by the U.S. Army. The
Labor Department also supervised state adherence to the
qualifications for candidacy through direct contact with the
state's director of CCC selection and through special
investigators commissioned to make annual camp inspection
reports.

Perhaps the most complicated tasks and by far the most
controversial of roles befell the War Department. To achieve
FDR's expectation that 275,000 men be recruited and working
by 1 July 1933, the Army had to build appropriate facilities,
train, and transport 275,000 men in three months. This
represented 94,000 more men than it had handled in the first
three months of World War I. 11 Its tasks appeared all the
more difficult, argues historian Charles Johnson, in the face
of its own under-enlistment, shallow support among military
leaders, and frequent public outcries condemning military
participation in a civilian program.12

10 Salmond, Civilian Conservation Corps, 27.
11 Johnson, "The Army and the CCC," 147.
12 For a thorough discussion of contemporary enlistment problems
within the U.S. Army, see Johnson, "The Army and the CCC," 143-147; for
a good discussion of Congressional and public concerns, see Salmond,
Civilian Conservation Corps, 111-120.
Like each of the other executive departments, the military was assigned specific duties, but because of its unique organization, it implemented these duties differently. Possessing its own nationwide command structure, the Army was able to respond immediately to the CCC's needs. The administration sent the Emergency Conservation Work Act to Congress on 21 March, and FDR signed the bill into law on 31 March. Nevertheless, one week before the bill became law, the Army drafted regulations and prepared cost estimates for its role in the CCC, and on 25 March informed its nine Army Corps Area commanders across the United States that they would be participating in the program. Clearly, the military's initial reactions showed it to be suited for the harried implementation schedule that FDR had imposed.

Colonel Duncan Major handled the Army's involvement in CCC affairs at the national level. He served on the National Advisory Council and along with his staff drafted rules, regulations, and guidelines for every conceivable CCC operation within the military's jurisdiction from enrollment, to discipline, to the specific athletic equipment allotted to each work camp for recreation. Major then sent these guidelines to the Corps Areas, which wrestled with the details of building the work camps, enrolling selectees, transporting them from their enrollment site to a

13 Johnson, "The Army and theCCC," 141. Army Corps Areas consisted of several states each, with Texas in the Eighth Corps Area.
conditioning camp and then to a work camp, clothing and feeding them, providing them with health care, supervising them in the camp, transporting them to and from their project sites, and providing educational opportunities. Naturally, allowing Army Corps Areas a degree of flexibility in implementing policies meant CCC experiences were not uniform throughout the nation, but rapid implementation seemed of greater concern to CCC administrators than uniformity.

Both the Army and Congress voiced skepticism regarding the military's participation in the CCC. The military was concerned that committing men to its CCC duties at a time of low enlistment might jeopardize national defense. In August of 1933 the Army addressed this concern and ordered that reserve officers be used to fill leadership positions in the camps, but insisted that a Regular Army officer remain camp commander. Johnson asserts that Colonel Major was less than enthusiastic about the CCC's chances for success because of its "tripartite control" by the Army, the technical services, and the cooperating state agencies. Though concerned about possible administrative discord in the CCC's governing apparatus, Johnson argues, Colonel Major nevertheless served competently.14

There were also lesser concerns voiced in Congress and by the public. Congress entertained doubts that subjecting

14 Ibid., 142, 143, 147.
civilians to military leadership and discipline were blatant violations of the understood role of the military in a democracy. FDR addressed this criticism, however, when he created the CCC's National Advisory Council and the director's office. There also were claims such as those voiced by the American Federation of Labor's president William Green that military participation bordered on fascism. Charges such as these, however, neither hindered nor jeopardized implementation of the CCC.

For the CCC to survive its extensive decentralization, FDR formed a National Advisory Council and appointed a national CCC director to manage and facilitate its operations. The Council was composed of the director, a representative from the Roosevelt administration, and representatives from each of the participating executive departments. The latter routinely reported on their department's progress or problems, and listened to those expressed by the other departments. While possessing the power to develop policies and implement its decisions, standard operating procedure deferred policy decisions to the department most affected. The greatest advantages this council served were to bring the CCC's major participants together on a routine basis without need for administrative competition, since duties were divided between the

15 Ibid., 139.
departments rather than shared by them, and to foster a feeling of cooperation and common purpose.

The director's duties were much more complicated than those of the Advisory Council. To be director, FDR chose Tennessee native Robert Fechner, who, as a vice-president in both the AFL and International Association of Machinists, was expected to calm criticism of the military's participation by demonstrating civilian control over CCC activities. FDR also hoped that Fechner's appointment might secure organized labor's support in the face of opposition from skeptics like William Green.16 To a great degree, Fechner's appointment accomplished both of these objectives.

Hendrickson argues that Fechner was a "stolid and unimaginative man who viewed the mission of his agency in the narrowest possible context." Nevertheless, he maintains, Fechner was still an able manager, though not a particularly assertive one.17 Hendrickson's views offer one possible explanation for Charles Johnson's contention that beyond the CCC, Fechner had no significant influence upon the New Deal.18 Had FDR selected a more aggressive administrator with traits similar to those of Harry Hopkins or W. Averell Harriman, the CCC eventually might have assumed a different role in the

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16 Ibid., 141. According to Johnson, Fechner went to see Green to receive Green's approval before accepting the job of CCC Director.
17 Hendrickson, "Replenishing the Soil and Soul," 37-38.
18 Johnson, "The Army and the CCC," 144.
Roosevelt administration. Fechner proved, however, to be a wise choice because his experiences mediating labor disputes made him an adroit conciliator, a necessary skill when confronting such a diverse group of interests as those which governed the CCC.

Fechner's title is better described as CCC coordinator rather than CCC director, for his office was one of significant influence rather than broad personal power. He followed each department's operations, served as liaison among them, collected information for reports to the FERA and Congress, informed Roosevelt of CCC progress, and served as a public figurehead of authority within the CCC. Although each of the departments had been ordered to cooperate with him, he held no specific authority over anyone other than his own office staff. As the publicly recognized director of the CCC, it was common for complaints about policies written and implemented by individual departments to be addressed to

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19 Roosevelt's right-hand man was Harry Hopkins, whose career proved him a tough, aggressive administrator. As director of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, he supervised the earliest relief efforts during the Hundred Days, and sat on the CCC National Advisory Council temporarily. He also demonstrated his abilities to centralize control through his administration of the Civil Works Administration which was managed differently than the CCC, since it remained a federal program with federal employees throughout the nation. See Leuchtenburg, _FDR and the New Deal, 1900-1940_; Gaddis Smith, _American Diplomacy during the Second World War, 1941-1945_ (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), 22. W. Averell Harriman was a close personal friend of Harry Hopkins, represented FDR personally in Moscow on several occasions, and served as U.S. Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. from 1943 to 1946. He was considered an untraditional and creative administrator. See Robert E. Sherwood, _Roosevelt and Hopkins, An Intimate History_ (New York: Harper and Bros., 1948), 1, 266.
Fechner rather than to the departments responsible. In these situations Fechner had to inform the appropriate department of the complaint, allow them time to act if action was necessary, and then check upon progress. Such circumstances obviously demanded a diplomatic touch.

Through this brief recounting of the functions and administrative relationships between the President, his executive departments, the Advisory Council, and the director, an image emerges of the CCC as a confederated agency rather than an autonomous, self-contained unit possessing centralized, authoritative leadership. With very few exceptions, CCC participants enjoyed well-delineated duties that rarely overlapped with other administrative organs. Consequently, operations were divided among participants rather than shared by them. Since state agencies also functioned within similar management models, parallels between federal and state operations obviously existed. Thus, whether examining CCC management on the federal or state levels, or analyzing the cooperation between those levels, a loose union or confederation of participating agencies existed throughout CCC operations.

Implemented as hastily on the state level as it was on the federal level, the Texas CCC began recruiting in April

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20 The only significant example of shared responsibility within CCC administration is the manner in which educational opportunities were handled, and is briefly discussed in Chapter V.
and opened its first work camps in May. TRC Director Lawrence Westbrook, whose agency was responsible for relief programs in Texas, announced on 16 April that he would attend an 18 April conference with federal representatives, at which time decisions regarding Texas's participation in emergency conservation work would be made. On 19 April Westbrook held a press conference at Austin's Red River Park and announced that enrollment to meet Texas's quota of 11,750 selectees was to begin soon. In fact, enrollment began in twenty-two Texas locations between 23 and 25 April. On 15 May, only four days after the state legislature passed House Bill 897 and replaced the TRC with the modified and more accountable TRRC, the San Antonio Light reported that a state forester and four military officers were en route to Lufkin to select sites for the state's first conservation work camps. By 17 May, the Army prepared Fort Bullis, New Mexico, for the imminent arrival of 6,000 young men for CCC conditioning. Testifying to the speed with which participants at both the state and national levels responded to their tasks, on 27 and

21 Austin American, 16 April 1933.
22 Ibid., 19 April 1933. Washington determined state quotas which were based upon population.
23 Ibid., 23, 26 April 1933.
24 San Antonio Light, 15 May 1933. In the spring of 1933, traveling to Lufkin was symbolic to Texans because on 30 and 31 March tornadoes had descended upon East Texas killing twenty people. Lufkin was especially hard hit, and the city leaders filed for RFC aid but were denied since the month's funds had expired two days previous. Army and Forestry representatives brought a little hope that help might soon arrive. See Austin American, 29 March, 1 April 1933.
25 Austin American, 17 May 1933.
28 May the Texas CCC opened its first work camps, including one in Lufkin.26

Paralleling the operations of the Texas CCC to the national CCC was a relatively simple task since local administrative bodies functioned on behalf of their federal counterparts; however, analyzing state operations revealed what studying federal operations could only suppose, that is, the processes involved in implementing CCC policies at the grassroots level.

In the early years of the Texas CCC, the U.S. Department of Agriculture played a limited direct role in the state's affairs, but by the end of the decade saw its influence in the state greatly expanded. Although East Texas was heavily forested, none of the land was federally-owned and little was state-owned. Not until the mid-thirties did the U.S. Forest Service's role become more significant as the state acquired private land and began transferring parcels of it to the federal government.27 By the mid-thirties the effects of the Dust Bowl in the Texas Panhandle and the need for erosion control in the desert West and the farmlands of the north and northcentral prairies increased the number of soil

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27 Using Big Bend National park as an example, John Jameson provides and excellent discussion of the procedures and problems involved in federal acquisition of state and private land. See John Jameson, Big Bend on the Rio Grande: Biography of a National Park (New York: Peter Lang, 1987).
conservation camps, consequently encouraging still greater involvement in the state by the Department of Agriculture. Until that time, however, the Department of Agriculture practiced no direct control over projects in Texas, but represented its interests indirectly through the State Forest Service and the State Soil Conservation Service.

The State Forest Service, directed by E.O. Siecke, supervised forest-related projects on both privately-owned and state-owned lands. These projects included forest fire prevention, fire fighting, surface road construction, and the installation of rural telephone lines. Table I (page 55) illustrated the diversity and accomplishments of projects handled by the U.S. Forest Service and the Texas Forest Service.

To help the State Forest Service manage its projects, the Department of Labor encouraged each state to hire experienced local foresters to train and supervise CCC personnel on the project site. Persons intended this action to appease private timber interests and shore up support for CCC camps in local communities. He believed that CCC operations would suffer:

...if there is widespread public feeling that outsiders have been brought in to take the work which naturally and properly belongs to local residents who have been

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28 Persons to State Directors of Selection, 28 April 1933, in General Letters, Records of the CCC, RG 35, N.A.
Table I

WORK ACCOMPLISHED BY THE CIVILIAN CONSERVATION CORPS
ALLOCATED TO THE FOREST SERVICE
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Job</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>National Forest Land</th>
<th>State Forest Land</th>
<th>Private Forest Land</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle Bridges</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>6,838</td>
<td>7,355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lookout Towers</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone Lines</td>
<td>Miles</td>
<td>511.5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2,287.8</td>
<td>2,807.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck Trails or Minor Roads</td>
<td>Miles</td>
<td>571.2</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>2,828.7</td>
<td>3,470.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erosion Control</td>
<td>Acres</td>
<td>563.2</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>78,574.7</td>
<td>78,184.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Check Dams</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>10,203</td>
<td>11,059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Planting</td>
<td>Acres</td>
<td>67,674</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>67,868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest Stand Improvement</td>
<td>Acres</td>
<td>234,642</td>
<td>5,550.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>330,192.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighting Forest Fires</td>
<td>Man- days</td>
<td>21,130</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>117,979</td>
<td>139,175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveys</td>
<td>Man- days</td>
<td>10,258</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>95,062</td>
<td>105,320</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Records of the National Park Service, RG 79, N.A.

acustomed to making their living in that place and in that very way, and who have been utterly ignored, to their manifest disadvantage, in order to give an unmerited advantage to those who do not belong in the neighborhoods as residents.29

Specific procedures existed for Siecke and all other agencies to follow when submitting requests for new work projects to the federal government. Because only the names of the agencies and departments changed, the process Siecke

29 Ibid.
used to win a new project indicated the confederated relationship between all of the various state and federal CCC agencies, at least insofar as requesting work projects was concerned. Proposals for work projects might originate from the State Forest Service or the general public. If a request came from the public but was erroneously submitted to the TRRC or a local relief board, the request was rerouted to Siecke, who then determined if the project would benefit the area and if the work involved was within the limits of the resources of the CCC.\textsuperscript{30} If Siecke approved the proposal, he submitted it to the U.S. Forest Service, where the request was reviewed under the same vague criteria.\textsuperscript{31} Assuming the project was approved, the Department of Agriculture informed Siecke, the War Department, and the Labor Department accordingly. Siecke began devising specifications for the project; the War Department informed the Eighth Army Corps Area which selected the site for the camp, built it, and notified the TRRC of the men needed and the date the camp would begin operation; the Labor Department confirmed the new camp with the TRRC. Thus, a seemingly simple operation like approving a new project and preparing for its implementation involved three federal departments and the TRRC, but still did not include the process of enrolling the men.

\textsuperscript{30} Hendrickson, "Replenishing the Soil and Soul," 42.
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid.
The Department of Interior's primary effort in Texas was to build and improve public parks. In fact, on 25 April D.E. Colp of the State Parks Board commented that this was the CCC's major task in Texas.\textsuperscript{32} Like the Department of Agriculture, since there was no national park in Texas until the late thirties, the Department of Interior exercised only indirect influence in Texas through the State Parks Board and the state's land reclamation offices.

Wendall Mayes of the State Parks Board performed duties similar to State Forester E.O. Siecke's. Typical park projects included building a new park, constructing access roads, building facilities for public or park use, clearing brush, and blazing and marking trails.\textsuperscript{33} Local communities also benefitted by requesting CCC camps for county and municipal parks.\textsuperscript{34} Park projects revolutionized public recreation in Texas, the benefits of which the state continues to enjoy since the CCC built or improved most of Texas's larger state parks.

The most grandiose project undertaken by the Department of Interior was the construction of Big Bend National Park in the Chisos Mountains of Southwest Texas. Though it was

\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Austin American}, 25 April 1933.
\textsuperscript{33} For an exceptional account complete with pictures and illustrations of CCC work accomplished in Texas state parks with emphasis upon architectural design, see James Wright Steely, principal author, \textit{The Civilian Conservation Corps in Texas State Parks}, Texas Parks and Wildlife, 1986.
\textsuperscript{34} CCC Station and Strength Reports, Records of the CCC, RG 35, N.A.
officially a state park until the necessary land titles cleared and were transferred to the Department of Interior, the National Park Service remained involved in its planning. There even was talk of cooperating with Mexico and creating an international park along the Rio Grande.\textsuperscript{35} The Big Bend project brought publicity to Texas and the CCC and became a pet project of the National Park Service. Unfortunately, a scandal enveloped one of its camps in 1940, and tested whether the military or civilians were ultimately responsible for camp discipline. Because this case tested the confederated relationship between several branches of the CCC's administration, including the White House, it is studied separately.

Each CCC camp, whether assigned to the Interior Department or to the Agriculture Department possessed its own internal identification code. For example: camp NP-1-T stood for the National Park Service, Camp One, Texas, indicating that it was the first camp opened in Texas under the jurisdiction of the National Park Service, Department of the Interior. State park camps had the prefix 'SP.' The Department of Agriculture's camps were indicated by the prefixes: 'P' for private forest land; 'S' for state owned forests; 'F' for national forests; 'E' for an erosion control project on private land; and 'SCS' for the state's soil

\textsuperscript{35} Jameson, \textit{Big Bend}, 12.
conservation projects. The Army, however, referred to CCC units as companies and assigned each company a number. Hence, a complete identification of the CCC camp in the Big Bend was: NP-1-T, Co. 1856. Table II utilizes the prefix system of identification to illustrate the different types of camps active in Texas at any given time.

Table II

SAMPLE ASSIGNMENT OF CCC CAMPS*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Camp Prefix</th>
<th>August 1933</th>
<th>August 1934</th>
<th>December 1938</th>
<th>August 1941</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCS</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>34</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Station and Strength Reports, Records of the Civilian Conservation Corps, RG 35, N.A.

CCC Station and Strength reports confirmed what Table II suggested, that by the late 1930s project emphasis shifted away from parks and forests and to soil conservation. Furthermore, the frequency with which citizens availed themselves of CCC companies to improve conditions on privately-owned land is evident in the statistics for erosion control listed in Table I. In addition, comparing the field planting and forest stand improvement statistics in Table I
to the camp assignments in Table II indicates the enthusiasm with which the U.S. Forest Service managed its newly acquired lands.

The TRRC represented the Labor Department's interests in Texas and staffed these camps assigned to the technical services. House Bill 897 empowered its director, Lawrence Westbrook, to appoint an administrative staff to handle the affairs of individual relief programs. Westbrook selected Neal E. Guy to serve as his first assistant director of CCC selection. Guy served in this position until 1938 when Frank Persons hired him to serve in Washington on the national CCC selection staff. Hendrickson contends that Guy was chosen because of his exceptional performance as Texas's assistant director of selection. In 1938, C.J. Sweeney, a former TRRC county administrator and field representative, replaced Guy. Nonetheless, whether referring to Guy or Sweeney, the assistant director of selection's duties included reporting regularly to Westbrook, remaining current on all CCC policies, keeping TRRC field personnel current, maintaining the state's selection documents, and perhaps most importantly, cooperating with the Eighth Army Corps in preparing the quarterly "movement orders." Officially, Westbrook was

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36 Hendrickson, "Replenishing the Soil and Soul," 38.
37 Movement orders were quarterly assessments of the staffing needs of individual camps prepared by the U.S. Army's Eighth Corps Area Enrollment Officer. (Discussed below.) The TRRC Director of Selection broke this down by quarterly quotas per county.
in charge of CCC selection in Texas, but in reality the assistant director did the job under Westbrook's supervision.

Like the technical services, internal communication in the TRRC and the Labor Department was complicated but orderly. Washington's Director of CCC Selection, Frank Persons, notified Westbrook of new camps being built in Texas by either the Department of Interior or Agriculture, informed him of the state's quarterly enrollment quota, and communicated policy amendments to the TRRC. Westbrook passed the information on to Guy, who often communicated directly with Washington to speed the process along. Through his field representatives, Guy check upon operations in individual areas to see that the policies he had transmitted to the county administrators and relief boards were being enforced.\(^\text{38}\) Thus, the accountability forced upon the Texas relief community by the Roosevelt administration in the spring of 1933 became the vehicle for attaining reasonably effective communication between the CCC and the Texas public, for when a local citizen had questions about the CCC, unless he wrote to Austin or Washington, the county administrator was his source of information.

Within each county the TRRC accepted applications and screened applicants for enrollment in the CCC. Specific candidate qualifications are discussed elsewhere, but the

\(^\text{38}\) An explanation of the hierarchy and responsibilities within the TRRC is found in Chapter I of this study.
county administrator's role was to check the applicant's school and work records and conduct personal interviews with the candidate and his family. From all of this information the administrator prepared an economic profile of the family that had to show that the candidate's family budget consistently fell short of its monthly financial needs by $22 to $25, the amount of the monthly allotments awarded to the families of enrolled juniors.\footnote{State Selection Manual, Records of the CCC, RG 35, N.A., 2, 7.} After compiling this information, the county administrator awaited specific movement orders. Upon receiving these orders, he met with the County Board of Welfare and Employment and determined which applicants would be sent to the army for enrollment. This step was a concession Governor Ferguson made to local communities to appease their concerns over government encroachment in local affairs.

When a final list of candidates was prepared, the county notified the young men in question and told them where and when to report for selection. Transportation to the enrollment site was the responsibility of the individual, but counties frequently provided transportation to assure that their quotas were filled. Failure to fulfill quotas over long periods of time might mean a reduction in future quotas for the county. When quotas were not met, surplus candidates from other counties were substituted; therefore, the TRRC
instructed the county boards to send several additional candidates as alternates in case of a candidate's absence or rejection. Upon arrival at the enrollment site, the U.S. Army assumed that the candidate met the personal and financial qualifications, checked the paperwork, and sometimes provided a physical examination. Although these procedures were implemented hastily in 1933, there were no significant changes made to the process.

The estimated number of Texans employed by the CCC from 1933 to 1942 was 156,404. This total reflected only the number of junior enrollees and did not indicate the number of men who reenrolled immediately after their first six months of service or those who returned to the CCC in later years. The lowest monthly junior enrollment was March 1939, when a reported 10,166 men were in service; the month of greatest enrollment was October 1936, with a total of 21,724. The average monthly enrollment was about 16,000 men. Obviously, the Texas enrollment process handled an arduous workload.

As described above, although the TRRC selected candidates for the CCC, the Army made the official selection. This was indicative of a primary characteristic of confederated management; though each agency had specific responsibilities, they had to cooperate to accomplish the

40 Ibid., 12.
41 "Brief Summary of Certain Phases of the CCC Program in Texas," in Monthly Statistical Reports, Records of the CCC, RG 35, N.A.
42 Monthly Statistical Reports, Records of the CCC, RG 35, N.A.
total task of enrollment. Even at the enrollment site where the two agencies came into the closest contact, they divided duties rather than shared them. The TRRC delivered the candidates for selection; the Army selected. There was no overlap.

There were, however, difficulties with the Texas selection process which reflected weaknesses within the TRRC rather than weaknesses inherent in CCC policies. For example, under TRRC guidelines each county determined the composition of its own relief board. This caused wide disparities across the state and had at least a nominal effect on selection because of the workloads that fell to members of the relief board. Although the TRRC intended for these relief boards to be "well organized and staffed agencies with trained personnel," only in urban areas such as Dallas were such expectations met, where twenty-two members served on its board in 1940. Most relief boards consisted of only one to two members.43 Since these smaller boards administered an equal number of programs as the larger ones, there was less time to devote to time-consuming details such as interviewing candidate's families for possible CCC enrollment. In the sparsely populated Texas counties of Kenedy, Kendall, and Loving, where the locals preferred to

43 Form CCC S 201, in State Procedural Records, and General Letters of Instruction to Local Selection Agents, Records of the CCC, RG 35, N.A.
care for their own indigent, neither a relief board nor a county administrator existed.\textsuperscript{44} Despite these disparities, the TRRC handled the task of selection admirably.

Within Texas the Eighth Army Corps Area performed the tasks assigned to the War Department. These included enrollment, conditioning, and camp management. Enrollment occurred at a site specified by the military; these sites often included local communities, railroad stations, and military bases. At the selection site the officer in charge checked the candidate’s paperwork to verify age and address. Occasionally physicals were performed, but this procedure was not done routinely. The Army might reject a candidate because of age or concern over health, but the county board could appeal the Army’s decision through the TRRC. Generally speaking, the candidates sent by the county were accepted. CCC service began immediately upon acceptance. The Army moved the selectees to conditioning camps, which for Texas juniors were usually Forts Sam Houston or Bliss in Texas, Fort Sill in Oklahoma, or Fort Bullis in New Mexico. Conditioning included learning to function in a group and rigorous physical exercise. After conditioning, which often lasted for two weeks, the juniors went to their respective project camps, also assigned by the Army. Assignment depended on where positions were available and thus was

\textsuperscript{44} Plans of Operation, 1939, Records of the CCC, RG 35, N.A.
indiscriminate. To many juniors' disappointment and that of their families, they might be sent to any camp in the Eighth Army Corps Area, which included Texas, Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Wyoming, or to camps in other Army Corps Areas when their camps were understaffed.

To administer its affairs, the Eighth Army Corps Area delegated CCC responsibilities throughout its own internal organization. At the area level the Army created the positions of CCC Enrollment Officer, Motor Transport Officer, Liaison Officer, Corps Area Educational Advisor, and Executive Officer. The Enrollment Officer developed quarterly movement orders and coordinated these with the Motor Transport Officer and the TRRC Director of Selection; the Motor Officer guaranteed necessary transportation for all phases of CCC operations; the Liaison Officer handled public relations, complaints against military personnel made by civilians, and discipline problems; the Educational Advisor cooperated with the technical services to institute an education program; and the Executive Officer coordinated all of their efforts. The Army also subdivided the state into four geographic districts: East Texas, North Texas, South Texas, and the Fort Bliss region. Each district had its own officer who served as a facilitator between the area officers and the camp commanders. Within the camps a Regular Army

45 State Procedural Records, 1933-1942, Records of the CCC, RG 35, N.A.
Officer served as camp commander and was assisted by fellow officers and enlisted men until August 1933, when, because of the stress this placed upon manpower needed for national defense, reserve officers assisted the camp commanders and juniors fulfilled the positions once held by the enlisted men. To foster leadership among the juniors and award a sense of accomplishment, the company was divided into sections and subsections, each with an appointed junior as leader and assistant leader. Eventually, Roosevelt instructed the Labor Department that these juniors were eligible to keep larger portions of their monthly pay as extra-duty pay if they so chose.\textsuperscript{46}

Administrative structure aside, it was the Army which processed, trained, and supervised the men, duties which it clearly possessed the skills and resources to handle. Since the Army had experience in providing for and moving large numbers of men, it merely assimilated CCC needs into its own. No other branch of the government could have handled the job without months, perhaps years, of preparation and expensive program growth. The greatest challenge for the military, however, was to cooperate with civilian agencies.

At the federal level the CCC was a classic case of decentralized administration. Although the president had authority over the federal departments, he did not use his

authority on a daily basis, and once the CCC began operation, followed its progress through his assistants. The mechanics of the Advisory Council made Fechner a communicator, facilitator, and coordinator, rather than an authoritative leader. The CCC did not go where Fechner led, because he did not lead it; the CCC remained where FDR placed it.

FDR divided duties between his executive departments in ways that each department's experiences and resources could manage. The technical services of the Departments of Interior and Agriculture provided the project expertise. The Labor Department was the only department faced with the frightening possibility of creating a nationwide bureaucracy devoted to CCC duties. Perkins and Persons chose instead to use state agencies, thereby widening the dimensions of confederation. FDR recognized that only the Army could handle the needs of managing the men. Because each department possessed the expertise to handle its affairs and in order to implement the program swiftly, FDR delegated specific duties to each and did not permit administrative overlap. To be sure, cooperation was essential or else the program would be a failure; however, cooperation among peers, each with a specific role, was much more manageable than a bureaucratic free-for-all born of uncertain expectations. The decentralization that FDR imposed stifled this potential
threat to cooperative effort, thus reinforcing that the CCC was a confederated program.

The division of responsibilities at the national level mandated similar divisions within the states. Just as federal authority was divided among the president's executive departments, state authority was divided among the governor's executive agencies. As previously shown, H.B. 897 ordered the state's executive agencies to study Texas's needs and report them to the TRRC. Through this process the governor determined which projects would be financed with state funds and which would be submitted to Washington for federal funding. In later years the TRRC relinquished this function to the Texas Planning Board. With regard to CCC administration, the governor's executive agencies included many of the same divisions as the federal government: Forest Service, Soil Conservation Service, Texas Parks Board, etc. Without Governor Ferguson's creation of the TRC and its subsequent modification as the TRRC, however, there would have been no state vehicle for enrolling CCC candidates. Like their national counterparts, each state agency had narrow duties separate from the operations of the other agencies. Consequently, managing the Texas CCC was as much a confederated effort among the state's executive agencies as it was a confederated effort between the federal departments.
The most difficult relationship in the CCC's administration, but the one most necessary to its ultimate success, was that between the state and national governments. This country's federal system of government recognizes the states to be limited sovereign republics within which the national government's influence is restricted. For the CCC to succeed, this division of sovereignty had to be bridged; only then could a federal program supervised by Washington be implemented by state agencies.

Initially, this relationship between Washington and Austin evolved through desperation, threats, and ultimatums. Through the winter of 1932 and the spring of 1933, the Depression deepened and the lot of many Texans worsened. Because more citizens appealed for relief than ever before, and as funds became more scarce than ever before, Texas needed federal funds to keep a relief program operating. FDR was prepared to award unprecedented funds to the states for relief, but he did not intend to continue throwing money into the public sector in a haphazard fashion as had been done through the RFC. He wanted government programs and governmental accountability. To fulfill his campaign pledges to help the common man and to take swift action, FDR did not have the time to wait for Texas to debate the merits of doles or the economics of bond programs; therefore, from March to
May 1933, the Roosevelt administration forced changes that created a bridge between the state and federal governments.

By summer of 1933 the gap between the two governments had closed, but in the process Texas had not forfeited all of its authority. While the individual state agencies were instructed to cooperate with federal departments, they did not surrender their sovereignty to them.

Potentially the most complicated aspect of the CCC's administrative alliance was the relationship between the military and its cooperating civilian agencies. The military entered the program with skepticism, but did not become consumed by it. To accomplish its tasks, the military needed effective communication with the technical services so that it understood the nature of the projects and could coordinate daily routines between the project sites and the camps. It also needed healthy channels of communication with the TRRC. Hendrickson concludes that Texas benefitted from having one of the nation's most successful military/civilian relationships.\(^47\)

It is obvious that not only did confederated relationships exist within the federal and state administrative bodies respectively, but there also was an alliance among them. Because the relationships were new and untraditional, they also were somewhat experimental. Though

\(^{47}\) Hendrickson, "Replenishing the Soil and Soul," 38.
historians frequently praise the CCC's accomplishments, they seldom recognize that its accomplishments resulted from its unusual method of administration, one that clearly was imperfect, yet proved itself proficient. The CCC's administrative successes were not the results of luck alone, for once created its executory superstructure demanded specific modes of implementation within and among its members. This realization, in fact, underscores the reasons for its successes. Before those reasons can be appreciated, however, vignettes are needed which expose the CCC's internal operations and thereby support conclusions about its administrative proficiency.
CHAPTER III

ADMINISTRATIVE PROFICIENCY AND THE CONFEDERATED ALLIANCE:

ELIGIBILITY AND ENROLLMENT IN THE TEXAS CCC

Any manager or management team faces two classes of tasks, those which are routine and those which are reactions to something gone awry. The latter is crisis management and tests an administration's pragmatic flexibility; the former is wonted and tests its programmatic continuity. Before examining unexpected challenges to the CCC's administration, a clearer understanding of how its participating agencies managed routine operations is indispensable, for only after gaining an appreciation for how these agencies responded to customary procedures will conclusions about their reactions to anomalous situations be valid.

As previously demonstrated, the CCC's administration was divided into three fields of operation. The first field was its federal administrative entities and included FDR, director Robert Fechner, the National Advisory Council, and the four executive departments. The second field was the participating state agencies such as the TRRC, the Texas Forest Service, and the State Parks Board. Within each of these two fields of operation, the traditional administrative
relationship existed: executive departments or state agencies regularly met and cooperated with their counterparts within their respective fields. The third field of operation, which was the active relationship between representatives of state agencies and representatives of federal departments, however, was one unaccustomed to mutual cooperation, particularly at low bureaucratic levels. Exemplifying this field was the TRRC's Assistant Director of Selection, Neal Guy, an appointed low level administrator who worked directly with federal bureaucrats such as Frank Persons, an assistant to the U.S. Secretary of Labor. This relationship subsequently created an administrative alliance between state and federal employees at a relatively unexplored bureaucratic level. The administrative machinery and necessary jurisdictions for this field of cooperation were so new that the Roosevelt administration of necessity coerced Texas to pass laws which bonded the two governments together. Because this was a new relationship, one that was untraditional and one that tested both state and federal sovereignties, this third field of operation was most vulnerable to administrative disharmony or failure. Examining a routine procedure that relied upon proficiency within this field, therefore, revealed the alliance's administrative weaknesses, underscored the Texas CCC's internal standard operating procedures, and

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1 See Chapter I of this study for an explanation of these events.
demonstrated how and why this "bureaucratic monstrosity" managed its routine operations so proficiently.

The process of enrollment clearly provided the best insight into the alliance's routine operations for several reasons. First, enrollment occurred quarterly, and if the confederated alliance was weak or ineffectual the enrollment process might collapse or need frequent revision; second, by utilizing the Army, the TRRC, and the U.S. Department of Labor, enrollment involved more agencies of the confederation at more active levels than any other single routine function; third, enrollment involved the military, which was certainly unaccustomed to cooperating with civilian agencies; and fourth, enrollment relied on grassroots cooperation, and thereby completed the study of the CCC's administrative operations from all possible perspectives.²

Enrollment consisted of two phases: selection and acceptance. The TRRC handled selection, which included accepting applications and verifying that a candidate met the eligibility requirements. The Army then performed acceptance, which was a candidate's formal enrollment into the CCC. Even though a candidate met all of the CCC's eligibility requirements and the TRRC approved his

² Submitting proposals for new camps was also a routine administrative function involving all levels of confederated administration. Because it involved so few participants, however, it was not an acceptable model from which to observe the alliance's functions. Nevertheless, it did exhibit a similar division of duties between state and federal agencies.
application, he was not enrolled until the Army accepted him. To appreciate the enrollment process, it is essential to review both phases.

The U.S. Department of Labor established four broad eligibility criteria governing CCC selection: the candidate had to be unemployed and unmarried, between the ages of seventeen and twenty-eight inclusive, have a family or dependent as recipient of the mandatory monthly allotment, and healthy enough to perform arduous labor.\(^3\) The TRRC's implementation of these requirements demonstrated the administrative flexibility that Washington allowed to the states, a practice that contributed to each state having a slightly different experience with the CCC. Obviously, the candidate could not have a job, but he also could not be enrolled in school nor be on vacation from it.\(^4\) In an attempt to fulfill Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins's pledge that the CCC would not interfere in the labor market (because participation in the CCC was not a job "in the true sense of the word"), the candidate had to be unmarried; he could be divorced or widowed, but not separated.\(^5\) Probability suggested that a married man belonged nearer to home and

\(^3\) Enrollees are most often described as being between ages 18 and 25; however, in this study the least restrictive age limits are used to accommodate the routine fluctuations in those requirements. Reasons for those fluctuations are discussed below.


\(^5\) *Austin American*, 24 March 1933. See Chapter II of this study for a further explanation of Perkins's comment.
either in the primary labor force where higher wages might be earned, or in another relief program altogether.

Besides being unemployed and unmarried, the candidate also had to be between the ages of seventeen and twenty-eight; no one served before his seventeenth birthday, nor on or after his twenty-ninth. Since actual acceptance date by the Army rather than application date determined official age, the Army might reject a candidate if he would turn twenty-nine during his service and select an alternate in his place. If an alternate were not available, the space often was filled with a surplus candidate from another county. Moreover, since the Army might also reject those who appeared underage, the TRRC advised its county agents to send proof of birthdate with younger or younger-looking candidates.6

CCC age limits frequently changed to reflect the number of projects in operation and compensate for the CCC's political implications. During the first few quarters of its operation, fewer projects existed than in the mid-1930s, so the CCC maintained more restrictive age limits. Later in its history, however, the CCC was committed to many more projects and also had to compete for candidates in a slightly improved economic situation and against other relief programs. Thus, to maintain a vigorous program with adequately staffed camps,

the CCC relaxed the age requirements to satisfy its immediate needs.\(^7\)

Politics also affected the CCC's age restrictions. Although local and state politicians often identified with the CCC because of its popularity and sought camps within their districts, since the technical services in Washington made the project decisions, a politician's immediate influence within the CCC was limited. Nevertheless, through their contacts with FDR politicians who wielded considerable clout in Washington secured new camps for their districts or prevented camps destined for termination from being closed.\(^8\)

While this was a relatively common occurrence, it did not make the CCC any less effective in providing work for unemployed young men. Though political interference might have hindered CCC operations by preventing more projects from being accomplished than actually was the case, preserving camps better transferred to another location, or simply failing to redirect public funds to more worthy causes, these arguments reflect philosophies which assumed that the CCC was

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\(^7\) In 1935 the Roosevelt administration created the National Youth Administration (NYA), which also competed for young Texans aged sixteen to twenty-five. CCC Station and Strength Reports are incomplete, but show the most Texas CCC camps operating during the given years as follows: 1933--34; 1937--75; 1938--57; 1941--55. CCC Station and Strength Reports, Records of the CCC, RG 35, N.A.

created to **produce** qualitative results, which it was not; it merely was created to **exist** and thereby provide jobs.

Election years also influenced enrollment quotas. Since most corpsmen were too young to vote, politicians were unable to buy their ballots, at least not until they turned twenty-one and recalled what the New Deal had done for them. On the other hand, families receiving dependent allotments and communities with young men enrolled in the CCC or with CCC camps in the vicinity saw visible signs of FDR's efforts, and those efforts certainly influenced voters on election day. Historian John Salmond argues that in 1936 FDR intended to reduce national quotas to show that recovery was underway, but that Congress both defied his wishes and increased the program in hopes of impressing constituencies.9 Prudence dictated that politicians avail themselves of the CCC's coattails during elections and support the program by approving more camps, which meant more corpsmen.10 Despite fluctuating age requirements, the vast majority of enrollees remained quite young, as Table III (page 80) depicts.

Table III also indicates that nearly two-thirds of those who served in the CCC were age twenty or younger. Since 64.9 percent of the state's population under the age of twenty-

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10 Texas enrollment statistics demonstrated that enrollment decreased from 21,724 in October 1936, immediately prior to that year's presidential election, to 18,585 the following year. In preparation for the 1940 election, enrollment rose from 14,810 in 1939 to 16,091 in 1940. *Monthly Statistical Summaries, Records of the CCC*, RG 35, N.A.
Table III
AGE DISTRIBUTION OF JUNIORS 1935*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age 18</th>
<th>Age 19</th>
<th>Age 20</th>
<th>Age 21</th>
<th>Age 22</th>
<th>Age 23</th>
<th>Age 24</th>
<th>Age 25</th>
<th>Age 26</th>
<th>Age 27</th>
<th>Age 28</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>74,155</td>
<td>40,289</td>
<td>26,718</td>
<td>20,423</td>
<td>15,090</td>
<td>11,707</td>
<td>8,982</td>
<td>5,516</td>
<td>4,003</td>
<td>3,792</td>
<td>2,702</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| | | | | | | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74,155</td>
<td>34.75</td>
<td>40,289</td>
<td>18.89</td>
<td>26,718</td>
<td>12.52</td>
<td>20,423</td>
<td>9.57</td>
<td>15,090</td>
<td>7.07</td>
<td>11,707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8,982</td>
<td>4.21</td>
<td>5,516</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>4,003</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>3,792</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>2,702</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>213,377</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Letters of Instruction to Local Selecting Agents, Records of the Civilian Conservation Corps, RG 35, N.A.

five lived in a rural environment, it is not surprising to find that a large percentage of Texas corpsmen were from rural areas.\textsuperscript{11} Though this did not alter age requirements, it did affect Texas enrollment. Historian Kenneth Hendrickson claims that 67 percent of the state's corpsmen were from rural Texas.\textsuperscript{12} This figure does not represent a significantly disproportional percentage of the state's rural population,


\textsuperscript{12} Kenneth E. Hendrickson, Jr., "Replenishing the Soil and the Soul of Texas: The CCC in the Lone Star State as an Example of State-Federal Work Relief during the Great Depression," Barker History Center, Austin, Texas, 43.
since the U.S. Census reported that in 1930 and 1940 the state's rural population was 59 percent and 54.6 percent respectively. Furthermore, 18.51 percent of the state's gainfully employed laborers toiled in purely agricultural jobs; the next closest single occupation was manufacturing with 7.56 percent of the state's labor force. A final contributing factor was Assistant Director C.J. Sweeney's insistence from 1937 to 1942 that farm boys possessed the best character, made the best corpsmen, and were to be selected at every available opportunity. The state selection manual, however, cautioned county agents to avoid selecting young men whose labors were essential to a family's survival: a young man might remain a candidate only if "his labors [were] not required in farming operations." In 1933 Harry Hopkins, director of the FERA, recognized agriculture as a significant factor in the Texas relief program and expressed his appreciation for the effect harvesting season had on the state's relief rolls and, more importantly, the demands placed upon those rolls at the end of the season.

14 Ibid., 63.
15 Form CCC S 205, State Procedural Records, Records of the CCC, RG 35, N.A.
17 Specifically, Hopkins was concerned about the stress placed on relief rolls in cotton producing counties. Texas. Texas Rehabilitation and Relief Commission. Minutes of the 5th Meeting of the Texas Rehabilitation and Relief Commission, 23 August 1933, RG 303, Archives Division-Texas State Library, Austin, Texas.
With a majority of the state's population living in rural areas and because of the importance of agriculture to the state's economy, Texas clearly benefitted from CCC enrollment policies that allowed some discretionary implementation.

Besides being unemployed and of age, candidates also had to have dependents to whom to send the monthly allotment of $22 to $25, which left the corpsman only $5 to $8 of his $30 a month wages. This allotment was important in the selection process because county agents often used it to determine the order of the candidate's selection. The higher the pledge, the greater the chance of early selection. Though most dependents were the corpsmen's parents, exceptions existed as long as the dependent was related to the candidate "either by blood or by obligation and [was] not a trustee."

Furthermore, at least until 1937, the candidate and his dependents had to be on the county's relief rolls.\(^{18}\) Such attention originally was assigned to a dependent's qualifications because of the CCC's goal of assisting entire families in need, not just their young men.\(^{19}\)

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\(^{18}\) *State Selection Manual*, 9, 2. Hendrickson reports that in 1937 the TRRC lifted this restriction, but by 1940 86 percent of the state's juniors remained from families on relief. Hendrickson, "Replenishing the Soil and Soul," 43.

\(^{19}\) The CCC estimated that by 1942 it had spent a total of $91 million on its Texas operations, $37 million of which was spent on dependent allotments. Using the maximum $25 allotment without allowing for leader or assistant leader pay, this indicated that the remaining junior allowances were about $7 million, making total cash payments to the state through the allotment allowance program nearly $44 million, or roughly half of the cost of the program in Texas. *Brief Summary of*
The final criterion for a candidate's selection was his health. The selection manual stated that "the applicant must be in such physical condition that he [was] able to perform hard manual labor without injury to himself." Because physical condition was such an important requirement, the manual provided more specificity about this subject than any other. County agents were advised to use "reasonable care" in sending only those candidates capable of hard labor and to arrange for a physical examination for the candidate before sending him to the Army for acceptance. The manual insisted, however, that this was done without cost to the state: "We believe that there are one or more physicians in each community who will do this as a patriotic duty to the boys."20

The general guideline for judging a candidate's physical fitness ruled that "selectees must be free from defects which through aggravation by service, [would] lead to ill health to the selectee and claims on the government." Under this guideline the manual listed the following as "defects" which constituted ineligibility: contagious or venereal diseases, loss of both thumbs, loss of more than two entire fingers on one hand, diseases infecting the joints, tuberculosis, recent fractures or dislocations, excessive curvature of the arms

Certain Phases of the CCC Program in Texas, Records of the CCC, RG 35, N.A.

and forearms, clubfoot, deformities which seriously interfered with labor and weight bearing, and amputations.\textsuperscript{21}

Although the manual expounded at great length as to what constituted ineligibility, it did not stipulate what determined that a candidate was in fact capable of hard labor. A reasonable result of this oversight was that some corpsmen were not quite so physically fit as others. Nevertheless, in 1935 Neal Guy, Texas's assistant director of CCC selection, surveyed the health of Texas corpsmen and concluded that "we have seen, time and again, a beaten undernourished young man accepted into the Civilian Conservation Corps and gain a distinctly new attitude and physique in an amazingly short time." Guy also observed that "the recently discharged enrollee is, without a doubt, more physically fit for a job than when he left home."\textsuperscript{22} In late 1941 the CCC in Washington released a report which corroborated Guy's conclusions; their research showed that the average weight gain per man between enrollment and discharge was 11.26 pounds, and that the average growth was .54 inches.\textsuperscript{23} In essence, these statistics admitted that though many corpsmen were in less than ideal condition when enrolled, they benefitted from their CCC service.

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{22} Neal Guy to Frank Persons, 7 November 1934, in Correspondence, Records of the CCC, RG 35, N.A.
\textsuperscript{23} Weight and Height Gain of CCC Enrollees, Division of Research and Statistics, Records of the CCC, RG 35, N.A.
The selection manual also contained a brief comment, which, like the awarding of preference to candidates who pledged the maximum allotment to dependents, was used to select enrollees:

There is no place in the Civilian Conservation Corps for a man without good character and moral background. This program is not intended to serve as a 'catchall' for undesirable men. Such men, even though selected, are soon detected and eliminated. Select purposeful, clean cut, and ambitious young men, the finest in your eligible group.\(^{24}\)

Unfortunately, neither good character, proper moral background, purposeful, clean cut, nor ambitious were defined anywhere in the manual. Interestingly, this advice was not included in that part of the manual devoted to eligibility; instead, it was located under the heading "Miscellaneous." The last phrase relayed an all-important message: regardless of the quality of a candidate's character, only those proven "eligible" could be selected.\(^{25}\)

Although the vast majority of the candidates were unskilled young men, there were four general categories of CCC employment: juniors, cooks, "LEM"s, and veterans. Juniors, a term which existed to differentiate them from veterans, met the eligibility requirements explained above.

\(^{24}\) *State Selection Manual*, 18.

\(^{25}\) Hendrickson faults the state's selection process for producing enrollees who "frequently did not meet the standards that had been set." Hendrickson clearly differentiates between eligibility requirements and established standards; however, other than physical fitness, the manual sets no standards. For a discussion see Hendrickson, "Replenishing the Soil and Soul," 41.
Although cooks were officially juniors and their numbers were included in the junior's enrollment statistics, a different set of restrictions applied to them. Because they possessed special skills and were difficult to enroll, there were no age restrictions so long as the candidate was at least seventeen years old; there also were no marital requirements and cooks could keep their entire wages if they so chose. "LEM"s were local experienced men recommended and selected by the CCC's technical services and enjoyed no special restrictions.26

The final category of employment in the CCC was not part of the original bill submitted to Congress, but was one that FDR created out of political opportunism. In May 1933 a group of veterans formed the Second Bonus Army and marched to Congress demanding their bonuses, which Congress had authorized for payment in 1945. Since a similar march occurred in 1932 and had resulted in a public fiasco for the Hoover administration, FDR intended to avoid repeating the disaster, especially in the early months of his presidency.27 Though Congress did not grant the veterans payment of their bonuses, FDR relieved tensions by offering the men special consideration in the newly organized CCC.28 Although paid the

27 For a discussion of the Second Bonus Army relevant to the top of the CCC, see Salmond, Civilian Conservation Corps, 36.
28 In 1933 veterans were considered servicemen who had participated in any of the following: the Spanish-American War, Philippine Insurrection, Boxer Rebellion, Morocco Expedition, or World
same as juniors, they usually were stationed in their own camps separate from the juniors. Veterans had no age or marital restrictions but were encouraged to send allotments home to their dependents. The TRRC selection manual informed its county apparatus to advise veterans of the proper application procedure, which was through the state's Veterans Administration, but emphatically stated that the TRRC had "no official connection or authority over veteran selection."  

Although each camp needed many cooks and was allowed several "LEM"s, the bulk of the Army's preferred company size of two hundred men was composed of juniors. The task of selecting junior candidates, therefore, was to a large degree the task of building the CCC at the ground level and rebuilding it quarterly from 1933 to 1942. Through this process the TRRC adapted national policies to Texas's needs by encouraging the selection of rural corpsmen and affected the efficiency of camp and project operations by the ages, abilities, and attitudes of the candidates it selected. Selection of candidates for service in the CCC fell to the lowest level of the CCC's administrative alliance, the TRRC's  

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War I. Letters to State Selection Agents, Records of the CCC, RG 35, N.A.  

29 A review of the CCC Station and Strength Reports for the state of Texas indicate the following totals of veterans camps in the years indicated. 1933--4; 1935--3 white, 1 black; 1936--7 white, 2 black; 1936 to 1941--6 white, 2 black. Despite the existence of separate veteran camps, these reports also demonstrated that small numbers of veterans frequently were placed in junior camps. For a discussion of race and the Texas CCC, see Chapter IV of this study.  

county apparatus, and while it would be interesting to examine the characteristics of the young men that it selected, such is not the purpose of this study. The operations of the administrative agencies which participated in enrolling them, however, is relevant to the objectives herein.

Neal Guy once advised his field staff that "to get a full benefit of the program it is necessary that selection and certification of eligible candidates be a continuous process, even though actual enrollments are conducted only quarterly." Two years later C.J. Sweeney noted:

We wish to emphasize to local representatives that the work of CCC selection is not an intermittent quarterly assignment. The success of the selection program depends in large measure on the understanding and interest of local selection agents and their willingness to regard CCC selection work as a day-to-day responsibility.

If properly conducted, selection certainly demanded almost daily attention, a luxury which many TRRC local agents frequently did not enjoy. Though the manual presented the preferred method of selection, it also stipulated that "it is expected that actual methods of selection may differ in some of the districts, but at the same time, it is directed that [the basic eligibility criteria] be uniform throughout the state." Consequently, a variety of abbreviated versions for

31 Ibid., 6.
32 C.J. Sweeney to district administrators, 10 August 1937, in General Letters, Records of the CCC, RG 35, N.A.
33 State Selection Manual, 1.
accepting and verifying the applications existed, thereby introducing flexibility and differentiation into the enrollment process.

Selection was initiated in one of two ways. Since the manual encouraged agents to seek out young men who might qualify even if they had never shown an interest in the CCC, either the agent approached the candidate, or vice versa. After initial contact the applicant completed a preliminary application that asked for only the most basic personal information. The county agent followed soon thereafter with a home visit, during which a formal application was completed and the agent explained the CCC to the candidate and his family. The formal application included questions regarding the family's financial situation and, until 1937, was used to determine the eligibility of dependents. If the proposed dependent dissatisfied the agent, the agent then "suggested another member of the group who [was] more qualified to serve as beneficiary." After the interview, the agent added comments to the application about the candidate's character for use later during selection. The county agent sent the completed application to his field representative for final approval, though the field representative merely reviewed the agent's paperwork. After approving the application, the

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34 Ibid., 7.
36 By 1935 the term field representative was replaced with that of district administrator, though duties remained virtually unchanged.
field representative returned it to the county, where it was filed pending quarterly enrollment.

When the Department of Labor in Washington released the state quotas, the state's assistant director of selection reviewed each county's population statistics and its history of cooperation with the TRRC to determine county quotas. If for some reason a county proved routinely uncooperative or repeatedly failed to meet its quota, subsequent quotas could be slashed and the difference awarded to other counties. The assistant director also included racial quotas that reflected fixed enrollment figures imposed by the federal government in the totals he sent to the counties. Upon receiving the quotas the county agent reviewed the pre-approved applications on file, determined if the county had a surplus or a shortage of candidates, and informed his field representative accordingly. The field representative collected this information for each of the counties in his district and relayed it to the assistant director in Austin, who adjusted county quotas to reflect the availability of candidates. By adjusting these quotas, the state guaranteed itself a larger enrollment. When Austin finished compiling

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Nevertheless, this study continues to use field representatives to avoid confusion with the Army district officers discussed below during the enrollment process.

37 No evidence suggested that this occurred often if at all, so this may have been merely an administrative ploy to reign in a maverick county.

38 The subject of race is discussed in Chapter IV of this study.
the information, it was wired to the Eighth Army Corps in San Antonio for preparation of the final movement orders.

The Army's enrollment officer (EO) prepared the movement orders by combining the Army's personnel needs in individual camps which camp commanders submitted through their district officers with the available county applicant pools as provided to him by the TRRC, and determined the number of men needed to bring each camp's enrollment as close as possible to the preferred benchmark company size of two hundred men. The motor transport officer assisted in the preparation of the movement orders so that transportation from enrollment to conditioning was within the Army's capabilities. The EO also cooperated with other Army Corps Areas to assist them in meeting their enrollment needs, again giving Texas more opportunity for greater enrollment.\textsuperscript{39} Table IV (page 92) reproduces a typical movement order.

The movement orders reproduced on Table IV represented three of fifty-eight such movement orders for Texas during that quarterly enrollment period. The disposition column indicated the quota and the manner in which the men were assigned. As the table indicated, the North Texas district not only shipped boys outside of Texas, but also out of the Eighth Corps Area. The "V" after Company 3818, which was

\textsuperscript{39} As is explained below, a significant number of Texans served in other Army Corps Areas, particularly in the Ninth Corps Area, which included the Northern Rockies and the West Coast.
TABLE IV
NORTH TEXAS DISTRICT
WHITE JUNIORS*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place to Report</th>
<th>Date to Report</th>
<th>Number of Juniors and County from which selected</th>
<th>Disposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recruiting July 19</td>
<td>7 Wichita</td>
<td>The total number of men to be enrolled in North Texas District is 595, including 33 cooks. Disposition as follows:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Station, Wichita Falls, Texas</td>
<td>5 Clay</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Archer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 Montague</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 Baylor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 Young</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Haskell</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Throckmorton</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co. 3818 (V) July 19</td>
<td>10 Brownwood</td>
<td>298 to be shipped to Ninth Corps Area- includes 17 cooks from Dallas railhead and 6 cooks from Ft. Worth railhead.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp SCS-21-T, Brownwood, Texas</td>
<td>5 Comanche</td>
<td>32 to be shipped to Carlsbad, N.M.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 Mills</td>
<td>12 to be shipped to El Paso.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 Coleman</td>
<td>3 to be shipped to Camp SP-47-T Balmorhea, Texas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 McCulloch</td>
<td>250 to be retained and assigned to camps in the North Texas District-includes 10 cooks as 595 indicated herein.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 Erath</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7 Eastland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>37 (Includes 3 cooks for SP-36-T Brownwood)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: State Procedural Records, Records of the Civilian Conservation Corps, RG 35, N.A.

assigned to Brownwood, indicated that the camp was a veterans camp; the other camp was for juniors. Camps listed in the left column were for enrollment purposes, since the selectees usually went elsewhere for conditioning. The procedures

40 When enrollees were accepted from remote counties, the motor transport officer occasionally determined that it was prudent to forgo
used to prepare these orders clearly demonstrated effective channels of communication between the Army and the TRRC, since such specificity in the movement orders required careful coordination of efforts.

After the EO returned the movement orders to the TRRC, the assistant director informed the county agents of the location, date and time of enrollment. The county agent reexamined the pre-approved applications, met with the local relief board, and assigned each candidate a priority selection number which was written on the application so that the military officer conducting enrollment understood the county's preferred order of acceptance. This priority number was ostensibly based on the allotment pledge, any personal information which the agent believed was relevant, or a simple personal judgement call. 41 The county agent then informed the young men that they were "selectees" and explained the acceptance procedures to them.

Acceptance into the CCC was an amazingly brief process. The selectee arrived between 8:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. or forfeited his selection; the Army was not obligated to accept late candidates. 42 The enrollee swore an oath to obey CCC rules and regulations, filled out final papers including the

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41 This procedure left the selection of candidates open to favoritism.
42 State Selection Manual, 12.
official dependent and allotment forms, then was shipped to conditioning camp. Although a representative of the TRRC often was present, he had no authority during acceptance proceedings. If the Army believed a candidate was too young or was physically unfit, it rejected him and chose an alternate if one were available. If no alternate was available, the enrolling officer contacted his district officer and informed him of the shortage.\textsuperscript{43}

On enrollment day the Army's enrollment officer (EO), together with the TRRC's assistance director of selection directed the process from San Antonio. The Army district officers reported all field proceedings to the EO. If a shortage existed for which no alternates were available, the EO informed the assistant director, who reviewed TRRC records in search of a county that had reported a surplus earlier in the process. The assistant director then contacted that county's field representative and requested additional candidates. If the enrollment site was nearby, the candidate might be accepted that day; otherwise, the motor transport officer had to arrange for transportation to a conditioning camp, or in light of the circumstances and expense of transporting so few individuals, directly to a project camp. Once again the system provided for the greatest enrollment possible. Enrollment was completed when all district

\textsuperscript{43} Again a judgement call was involved, which perhaps affected the quality of the candidates selected.
officers reported to San Antonio that the selectees were en route to conditioning.

Earlier in this chapter four reasons were listed to explain why the enrollment process was chosen as a forum from which to study the CCC's approach to managing routine tasks. Briefly restated, those reasons were that enrollment was a routine exercise, it involved several of the CCC's administrative organs, it relied on military cooperation with a state agency, and it demanded grassroots participation. Being a quarterly event, enrollment occurred routinely from the spring of 1933 to the summer of 1942 when the war forced the CCC's dismantling. The process involved several bureaucracies at different administrative levels: the U.S. Department of Labor prepared state quotas after the Congress established national manpower figures; the TRRC apportioned the state's quota among the counties; the county agents performed the selection; and the Army drafted the movement orders based on its needs and the state's supply of candidates, then accepted the men into the CCC. The preparation of movement orders and the procedures followed on enrollment day created a bond between the TRRC and the Army, thus establishing the third field of the CCC's confederated alliance, the active relationship between state and federal agencies. Finally, the role played by the county agents in selecting candidates for enrollment carried the process to
the grassroots level, which must be included in any study of
the CCC's administration or the picture remains incomplete.

The untraditional relationship between state and federal agencies had the potential to test their respective sovereignties and collapse from miscommunication or competition; however, neither of these materialized because standard procedures clearly defined the limits of each agency's jurisdiction. State and federal participants divided duties rather than shared them. The TRRC determined county quotas and informed the Army accordingly. The Army prepared the movement orders using the TRRC's information, but did not alter the statistics. Because men often were enrolled from parts of the state where less manpower was needed than in other regions of Texas, as in West Texas for example, the Army reserved the right to station corpsmen anywhere within the Army Corps Area and frequently stationed them outside of the area as well. The TRRC selected the candidates and sent them to the recruiting station specified by the Army; the Army accepted or rejected the candidates on the spot. If there was disagreement over a rejection, a situation which might have challenged the limits of jurisdiction and cooperation, the field representative filed a complaint through the TRRC's state office.\textsuperscript{44} A civilian agency clearly retained final authority in matters of

\textsuperscript{44} Local relief boards also were allowed to file complaints through the TRRC office in Austin.
enrollment, but that authority was not practiced in the field, thereby preventing clashes between individuals which might have eroded the process.

None of this presupposes that the process was implemented perfectly, for subsequent problems such as desertion and letters of complaint about CCC stationing policies revealed otherwise. Hendrickson contends that the state's desertion problems were probably the result of "poor camp conditions, homesickness, boredom and incompetent [camp] administration," which he claims were the causes of desertion in other states, but that Texas administrators never seriously investigated the problem to determine its causes.\(^45\)

Adding to this list of potential causes for desertion was dissatisfaction among enrollees and their dependents caused by out-of-state stationing.\(^46\) This aspect of the CCC was so vital to Texas that Neal Guy once estimated that although 50 percent of white Texas juniors already served beyond state borders, the program still faced significant expansion.\(^47\) Guy reasoned:

\begin{quote}
In the past, for purposes of economy, enrollees for out-of-state service have been obtained from West Texas and the lower Rio Grande Valley. Due to the fact that
\end{quote}

\(^{45}\) Hendrickson, "Replenishing the Soil and Soul," 41.

\(^{46}\) Numerous letters from families of enrollees are found in the "Correspondence," and "Model Letters" files of the National Archives in Washington, D.C.

\(^{47}\) As is explained in Chapter IV of this study, only white juniors were allowed to serve outside of state borders. Neal Guy to county administrators, 14 March 1935, in Letters to Local Selecting Agents, Records of the CCC, RG 35, N.A.
the proportion of out-of-state vacancies is so high, it will probably be necessary to ship men from North and East Texas to camps out of state.\(^{48}\)

Statistics supported Guy's contentions. In July 1937 the state's quota indicated that of the 1230 men enrolled, 448 were shipped to the Ninth Corps Area, 312 to Colorado, and 50 to Wyoming, leaving only 420 to serve in Texas.\(^{49}\) Because of the enormity of this aspect of the program, both Guy and Sweeney regularly reminded county agents to stress this policy during the family interview. Because county operatives frequently abbreviated the process, however, the interview often did not occur, causing many candidates and their families to overlook this possibility.\(^{50}\) In this case the flexibility allowed within the TRRC might have been the source of minor confusion at best, but probably caused many of its personnel problems.

The purpose of this study, however, is not to investigate the implications of these problems for camp operations, but to determine which administrative relationships within the CCC's confederated alliance assist the observer in explaining the program's accepted success, and which relationships included weaknesses that limited its

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\(^{48}\) Ibid.

\(^{49}\) Letters to Local Selecting Agents, Records of the CCC, RG 35, N.A.

\(^{50}\) C.J. Sweeney to local selecting agents, 16 July 1937, in Letters to Local Selecting Agents, Records of the CCC, RG 35, N.A. Oral histories located in the University of North Texas demonstrated a variety of selection experiences as individual corpsmen recounted their service in the CCC.
proficiency. To examine the enrollment process in light of its confederated attributes, it is necessary to first review it from that perspective. Federal departments set quotas, authored movement orders, and accepted candidates. Though politics clearly was a factor in establishing national manpower figures and in dictating the existence of certain camps, it was not a factor within the administrative alliance. Consequently, the CCC's federal administrative organs are absolved of any problems that fluctuating enrollment might have caused CCC operations.

The TRRC represented the second field of operations. Though Governor Ferguson created a reasonably accountable relief community through H.B. 897 in 1933, it was not a thoroughly accountable bureaucracy as the confusing relationships that existed between the county agents, the relief boards, and the TRRC evidenced.\footnote{The TRRC's internal structure is discussed in Chapter I of this study.} The state paid some local relief agents, and the counties paid others; some counties hired case workers, some could not. Furthermore, the size of relief boards varied across the state, yet the programs these boards represented remained the same. The TRRC's policy of allowing abbreviated selection procedures encouraged those county agents who felt pressured, were poorly informed, or who were less than enthusiastic about their jobs to cut corners, and probably affected the quality
of their performances and the "quality" of their selections. Again, however, since quality was not an eligibility requirement but only a matter of preference, the question of quality is separate from the issue of proficiency. Though it may be argumentative that the TRRC should have placed greater emphasis on a candidate's quality, its procedures were in keeping with the program's reason for existing, which was to put young men to work, and a program's proficiency must be judged by what it was intended to accomplish, not by what it might have accomplished if it had enjoyed different goals.

The third field of operation was the untraditional field represented by the relationship between the Department of Labor, the Army, and the TRRC. Had these bonds been characterized by uncertain expectations or ineffective channels of communication, this relationship surely would have experienced serious tribulations. Instead, these bureaucracies retained their individual jurisdictions, knew their specific tasks, were aware of the procedures to solve challenges to their efforts, and recognized that the nature of their relationships rested upon a series of progressive duties which collectively accomplished a common objective.

The enrollment process thus demonstrated the following attributes of the CCC's confederated alliance: first, that the necessary channels of communication not only existed within these three fields, but functioned adequately; second,
that allowing flexibility within the program did not interrupt the program's goal of putting young men to work; third, that the division of duties among the confederation's members was delineated well-enough to prevent bureaucratic competition and in case of disagreement, that clear and specific procedures existed for its resolution; and lastly, that the CCC's most vulnerable administrative relationship between state agencies and federal departments was resolute enough to manage a complicated logistical and communications nightmare for nearly a decade.

Despite what one scholar described as its "cumbersome" bureaucracy, enrolling men into the Texas CCC without suffering from afflictions born of its administrative relationships proved a degree of organizational proficiency within the confederated alliance's superstructure. Although weaknesses existed at the grassroots level, they did not impair the process. Despite its frequency and its complexities, however, enrollment alone can not provide enough examples from which to judge the alliance's administrative success. To gain a wider perspective its reactions to anomalous situations also must be observed, for proficient management demands the competent handling of pragmatic short-term situations as well as its long-term routine tasks.

52 Hendrickson, "Replenishing the Soil and Soul," 37.
Conducting the affairs of an organization is a relatively simple task when there exists uniformity of purpose, time for preparation and planning, and enough repetition to make even the most complex tasks seem routine if not banal; decisions progress orderly and implementation proceeds accordingly. Unforeseen events, however, whether or not they seriously endanger the organization's specific objectives, possess an uncanny ability to gather momentum of their own and become possible obstacles to effective management or at least burdens which slowly erode proficient administration. When this occurs methodical implementation deteriorates as management becomes defensive and reactionary and finds itself challenged to control its routine affairs and accomplish its primary objectives, while concurrently its fields of operation and administrative relationships become progressively less harmonious. Pragmatic situations truly test an administration's mettle, for they invariably threaten change and jeopardize the operational comfortability of continuity.
Like any organization, the Texas CCC experienced dissonant events that threatened its harmonious administration. Military misconduct in Camp NP-1-T, located in the Big Bend region of Southwest Texas, and tensions caused by strained race relations tested bureaucratic jurisdictions and the delineation of duties, both fundamental characteristics of confederated administration. Each of these examples in its own way revealed the alliance's internal system of supervision and accountability, further illuminated administrative aspects of the alliance's operations, and demonstrated its desire to prevent anomalous events from gathering damaging momentum.

While each agency involved in CCC operations performed some aspect of discipline enforcement and program accountability, the Army, which managed camp discipline, and the Department of Labor, whose special investigators performed annual camp inspections, played the most pivotal roles in enforcing CCC regulations.¹ When the CCC was created there were concerns over the meaning and the extent of military involvement in CCC operations and the authority it exercised over the civilian enrollees. As late as 1935 these concerns persisted, so the state's selection manual addressed the issue and stated that "when a man is selected and

¹ For a discussion of the military's procedures regarding routine camp operations, see Charles W. Johnson, "The Army and the Civilian Conservation Corps, 1933-1942," Prologue 4 (Fall 1972): 139-156.
enrolled in the Civilian Conservation Corps he remains a civilian employee throughout the term of his employment. He does not become a soldier or a part of the Army in any respect."  Nevertheless, although the Army was responsible for discipline in the camps, CCC guidelines limited its authority over the enrollees.

Characteristically, responsibilities for discipline management were divided between the CCC's various participating administrative entities. At the project site the responsible technical service exercised disciplinary authority over the men. The Army's liaison officer supervised the military's role in camp discipline and often dispatched investigating officers to interview enrollees who had filed complaints against military personnel, or to study camp problems which affected its general operation. The investigating officer exercised no immediate authority over the camp commander, but instead reported to the liaison officer at Corps Area headquarters, who reviewed the matter and when necessary solved it with the participation of the Area's CCC executive officer. In addition to military inspections of the camps, the Department of Labor also

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2 State Selection Manual, Records of the CCC, RG 35, N.A., 17. The underlined phrase is reproduced as it was printed in the original.
3 The technical services included the Departments of Agriculture and Interior, which approved the supervised individual CCC projects and offered advice on camp education.
4 For an explanation of the Army's hierarchy within the Eighth Corps Area, see Chapter II of this study.
inspected camp operations through its staff of regional special investigators whose multi-state territories did not correspond with Army Corps Areas. So that significant problems involving the complicity of the Army or the technical services might be addressed by the National Advisory Council, these investigators filed their reports with the Department of Labor in Washington; thus, a civilian agency retained the power of review over the military. Generally, routine disciplinary matters in Texas camps did not require such august procedures; however, problems in Big Bend and tense race relations in Texas camps tested aspects of this system of internal supervision.

In 1940 an informant alerted the White House to probable misconduct by the camp commander of Camp NP-1-T. The White House, either uncomfortable with a military self-investigation, or more likely because it and not the Army received the initial complaint, ordered a special investigation by the Department of Labor instead of the Army's liaison offices. Since Texans had fought long and

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5 The Department of Labor appointed the special investigators, whose territories fluctuated as camps opened or were relocated. Investigators based in Jackson, Mississippi, and Santa Fe, New Mexico, serviced the Texas area. See Camp Inspection Reports, Records of the CCC, RG 35, N.A.

6 Mrs. Roosevelt received this letter but refused to disclose its author for fear of reprisals against him. Eleanor Roosevelt to James McEntee, 16 August 1940, in Camp Inspection Reports, Records of the CCC, RG 35, N.A. "NP-1-T" referred to the first camp opened in Texas under NFS supervision. For an explanation of this system of referencing camps, see Chapter II of this study.
hard to win the project and because the project had gained national attention, problems in the Big Bend were particularly disconcerting. In 1932 no national parks existed in Texas, and there were no plans in Washington to develop any. Soon thereafter, however, the strenuous efforts of private citizens and West Texas congressmen convinced the Texas legislature and the Department of Interior that the Chisos Mountains in the Big Bend region of Southwest Texas offered an unique opportunity for a prominent park. Because of the area's flora and fauna and due to its spectacular geologic composition, the Texas legislature agreed to purchase private lands for future transfer to the State Parks Board. The park's supporters also obtained the assistance of U.S. Senator Morris Sheppard, who submitted the proposal to the Department of Interior for its review as a potential site for a national park. Unfortunately for Texans, Horace A. Albright, Director of the National Park Service (NPS) during the Hoover administration, remained unconvinced of the park's merits due to its remote location and uncertain land ownership. 7 The creation of the CCC, however, rekindled interest in the park, and Senator Sheppard convinced Harold Ickes, Secretary of the Interior in the new Roosevelt administration, to at least inspect the proposed site. Ickes

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dispatched Herbert Maier, an NPS employee and regional CCC representative for the Department of Interior, who reported to Ickes that the Chisos Mountains were indeed worthy of national attention, and unexpectedly proposed a cooperative enterprise with Mexico to establish an international park along the Rio Grande. This aspect of the proposal peaked FDR's interest, and the park project was approved pending proper land acquisition by the state. In October 1933 Governor Ferguson optimistically announced the creation of Big Bend National Park, although until all land titles cleared it remained a state park. Throughout the 1930s the Big Bend project often was used as an example of the splendid work accomplished by the CCC as it tamed and improved a relatively desolate area. Consequently, since the CCC was so proud of its efforts in Southwest Texas, rumors of misconduct demanded immediate attention.

On 16 August 1940 Mrs. Roosevelt informed the new director of CCC operations, James J. McEntee, that she had received a letter complaining of an abusive camp commander at

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8 Ibid., 10, 14, 15. Originally the state legislature referred to the park as "Texas Canyons State Park," but since the federal government referred to it regionally, the name was later changed to Big Bend State Park.

9 Ibid., 12. Letters filed in "Publicity Materials" and "Press Releases" in CCC records held in the National Archives in Washington, D.C., praised the park endlessly. Dr. Walter Prescott Webb, the NPS's consulting historian for Big Bend National Park, wrote for several of these releases that "the Big Bend would be for Texas what Yellowstone is for Wyoming; what Carlsbad Caverns is for New Mexico." Rough draft of unspecified press releases, 18 April 1937, in Press Releases, Records of the CCC, RG 35, N.A.
Camp NP-1-T, and demanded that McEntee launch an investigation.\textsuperscript{10} McEntee deployed special investigator James C. Reddoch, who traveled to the camp and conducted extensive interviews with the enrollees and the Army reserve officers serving under the camp commander.\textsuperscript{11} Reddoch's report recreated the incidents which precipitated the investigation. The crux of the problem involved two AWOL enrollees, Albert F. Fannin and Claude G. McKee. Later Fannin and McKee received counseling by the camp's education officer, who convinced the men to return to camp and promised them fair punishment for their offenses. Instead, however, camp commander Lieutenant Walter P. Scoggins assigned them severe labor and gave them such a harsh verbal reprimand that they became so discouraged that they refused to work, after which Scoggins presented them with a dishonorable discharge.

As evening temperatures dropped below zero, the two discharged men left camp by foot en route to the nearest town, which was approximately eighty miles away. Although Reddoch's report indicated that Scoggins apparently did not

\textsuperscript{10} Eleanor Roosevelt to James McEntee, 16 August 1940, in Camp Inspection Reports, Records of the CCC, RG 35, N.A. Robert Fechner died of heart failure on 20 December 1939, and was replaced by his assistant James McEntee, who had also served with him in the International Machinist Union. "Biography of Mr. Fechner," in General Correspondence, Records of the CCC, RG 35, N.A.

\textsuperscript{11} A review of Camp Inspection Reports in the National Archives revealed that no other Texas investigation generated as much testimony and paperwork as the investigation of Camp NP-1-T. James C. Reddoch to the assistant director of selection in Washington Charles H. Kenlan, 28 August 1940, in Camp Inspection Reports, Records of the CCC, RG 35, N.A.
order the men to leave, the company generally believed that he had. The following morning, after Scoggins's military assistants reminded him that all dischargees had to receive a physical examination, Scoggins ordered the company truck and the "difference in the safe," which was his .45-caliber pistol, taken to retrieve them. Scoggins's subordinates declined the gun, left with the truck, and since Fannin and McKee refused to return to the camp, conducted the exam along the roadside.12

Unfortunately for Lieutenant Scoggins, Reddoch's investigation uncovered many examples of questionable conduct. Reddoch reported that Scoggins routinely issued severe "tongue lashings" (during which two men fainted), ridiculed the men in both English and Spanish, was clearly the source of numerous desertions and reserve officers' requests for transfers, and generally "made life unbearable" for those in his charge. Reddoch concluded that Scoggins abused his command by assigning unusually severe tasks and meting out unnecessarily harsh punishments and recommended that he be removed from command, which the Army accomplished soon thereafter.13 Although these events did not threaten to change any aspect of CCC operations, the response was a clear

12 Ibid.
and orderly example of how the alliance disciplined itself and also demonstrated civilian control over operations.

The situation in the Big Bend provided necessary insight into the CCC's internal system of checks and balances and was selected for initial review because it highlighted a relatively simple multi-departmental procedure, which in this case generated a clearly appropriate response.\textsuperscript{14} Not all incidents, however, were quite so easily solved; such was the case with race relations in the Texas CCC, which tested the alliance's uniformity of purpose and its abilities to control an escalating problem.

From 1933 to early 1935, most Texas CCC camps were at least superficially integrated. By 1935, however, what began as routine discipline problems between the races gathered momentum until they threatened normal camp operations and forced Texas to segregate its camps for the remainder of the program. Due to the impassioned nature of this issue, it is essential first to review the racial climates in Texas and in the CCC in general before recounting those events.

Texas's black population experienced a demographic metamorphosis in the early twentieth century. Population statistics revealed a marked decrease in the percentages of

\textsuperscript{14} Many letters on file in the "Model Letters" of the records of the CCC in the National Archives mentioned camp mismanagement as a reason for desertion, yet neither the Army nor the Labor Department responded to these charges as stringently as the Department of Labor did to the situation in Camp NP-1-T, a fact probably explained by Mrs. Roosevelt's intervention, the camp's notoriety, or both.
black population in Texas beginning in the late nineteenth century, which contemporaries explained as representative of black emigration out of Texas to the northern and eastern parts of the nation. The state's black population was 30.97 percent, 14.68 percent, and 14.4 percent in years 1870, 1930, and 1940 respectively. In addition, national population shifts into urbanized areas also affected Texas blacks, who rose to 27 percent of the state's urban population and fell to only 15.1 percent of its rural population. Furthermore, Texas blacks settled unevenly across the state, with most living in East Texas while "practically non-existent in the Western portion." Thus, black Texas decreased from nearly one-third of the state's population to little more than one-tenth, and began a rural exodus which has lasted to the present.

In view of these population statistics, and after comparing them to black participation in the CCC in 1933 as the program began and then again in 1935 when segregated camps became the standard, it is evident that blacks did not receive proportional representation. In August 1933 there were 6,137 corpsmen enrolled in the CCC; of these 257, or

17 Planning Board Report, 57.
roughly 4 percent, were black. In June 1935 records indicated 10,509 men enrolled with blacks comprising 998 or approximately 9.4 percent.\textsuperscript{18}

The era's pervasive racial prejudices might well explain this disproportional representation. Although some historians criticize the CCC's poor managing of racial issues, it must be recognized that the program was not designed to crusade for social justice through healthier race relations, and it certainly could not have accomplished such a lofty task in the prevailing climate of the day.\textsuperscript{19} This climate is readily apparent in a 1936 internal report by the Texas Planning Board which stated:

\begin{quote}
The proportion of whites to other races has an important bearing upon the future development of Texas. The white race by education and by environment is the leading race in the progressive development of nations; therefore, continued progressive development can be expected in all lines of human endeavor wherever the white race predominates.\textsuperscript{20}
\end{quote}

Apparently, as the statistics above confirmed, Texas intended that the white race receive favored treatment in its programs.

\textsuperscript{18} CCC Station and Strength Reports, Records of the CCC, RG 35, N.A.

\textsuperscript{19} For criticisms of CCC racial policies, see John A. Salmond, \textit{The Civilian Conservation Corps, 1933-1924, A New Deal Case Study} (Durham, N.C.: Duke University, 1967), 100; and Kenneth E. Hendrickson, Jr., "Replenishing the Soil and the Soul of Texas: The CCC in the Lone Star State as an Example of State-Federal Work Relief during the Great Depression," Vertical File, Barker History Center, Austin, Texas, 44.

\textsuperscript{20} Planning Board Report, 54.
Unequal inclusion of blacks in the CCC was not a situation limited to either Texas or the South; it was a national phenomenon.\textsuperscript{21} Although black Congressman Oscar De Priest (R-Ill.) succeeded in amending the Emergency Conservation Act to prohibit discrimination, in light of the Supreme Court's 1896 decision in \textit{Plessy v. Ferguson}, which ruled that separate facilities constituted equal facilities, the term discrimination did not mean legally in the 1930s what it has come to mean today. Consequently, though it might seem unusual it is nevertheless congruous that although the state's selection manual of 1935 stated that "there will be no discrimination because of race, color, creed or politics," it further indicated that "during the past year several colored CCC companies have been put into operation. This permits the complete segregation between whites and colored."\textsuperscript{22} The only reasonable conclusion is that white contemporaries believed that so long as blacks were allowed to participate, they were not being discriminated against. Although De Priest's amendment obviously failed to create fair representation in the program, historian William Brophy concludes that at least the CCC guaranteed equal pay, and

\textsuperscript{21} Letters from state selection agents in Ohio and Missouri to Frank Persons, discussed below, demonstrated similar inequalities in enrollment. Radiogram of R.D. Miles, Jr., the director of selection in Ohio to Frank Persons, 15 October 1935, and memorandum of Frank Persons to Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins, 14 August 1935, in Model Letters, Records of the CCC, RG 35, N.A.

\textsuperscript{22} \textit{State Selection Manual}, 3.
that while proportionately few blacks participated in New Deal programs such as the CCC, these various programs represented the beginning of government's commitment to a better life for American blacks.\textsuperscript{23}

It remains painfully evident, nevertheless, that by post-1960 standards CCC operations discriminated against blacks. Scholar John Salmond finds two reasons for this situation: first, that director Robert Fechner, a Southerner raised in Tennessee and Georgia, was prejudiced by his environment; and second, that CCC procedures, which permitted flexibility in local implementation, created opportunities for individuals to act out of personal biases.\textsuperscript{24} Salmond also observed that Fechner did not permit blacks to be stationed outside of their home state, a policy which apparently was uniform across the nation; refused to form integrated camps, which was not entirely true with regard to Texas; and sympathized with communities that appealed to have black camp's relocated, a preference which some but not all similar Texas decisions reflected.\textsuperscript{25} Although the Texas program included aspects of these characteristics, the second trait deserves careful scrutiny because it resulted in a significant change in operations.

\textsuperscript{23} Brophy, "Black Texans," 132.
\textsuperscript{24} Salmond, \textit{Civilian Conservation Corps}, 100.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid. Letters on file in the records of the CCC also demonstrated that many Texas communities were satisfied with and appreciated the efforts of black companies in their communities.
The change in Texas policy in 1935 regarding segregated camps resulted from a series of race-related incidents which occurred primarily in East Texas, some of which eventually became violent. Investigations of these incidents and letters referring to them outlined a generally tense racial environment. As early as December 1933, an incident occurred in a camp in Pineland when twelve black enrollees allegedly deserted the camp. When questioned by an Army liaison officer, the new camp commander replied that he would not tolerate "laziness, disrespect, or insubordination" as had his immediate predecessor. The liaison officer's report found that the twelve had become difficult to control because of being "too well treated....They believed that they were just as good as whites, were their equals in every respect." Although the officer's background was not specified, racial bias was evident throughout his report:

Most of the Negroes in the camp were a poor type of the lower class. Those that were good were influenced by the bad. Never having been shown such consideration before, they forgot their place. The kind treatment they had been receiving from Lt. Berrett [the previous camp commander] inculcated in them a feeling of overconfidence and superiority.

Though three of the deserters eventually returned, the CCC retained only one. The report observed about the one reinstated, "He knows his place and acts accordingly." The officer concluded that since the white men's morale had
returned after the blacks left, he saw no need for further action in this case.\textsuperscript{26}

The situation had not improved by early 1935. A letter from the U.S. Forest Service and the Texas Forest Service addressed to Major Carl S. McKinney, commanding officer of the East Texas district, acknowledged that black and white enrollees still worked together, but recommended cessation of the practice and black labor consolidated for "technical" purposes. The letter suggested:

\begin{quote}
The assignment of Negroes in various size groups to the East Texas Forestry camps constitutes a marked disadvantage to the technical service and no doubt also complicates the administration of such camps by the War Department. It is not practical to work Negroes in the woods unless a sufficient number are available to make a truck load, which comprises from 20 to 25 individuals.
\end{quote}

The letter continued that there "appears to be no logical reason" for stationing blacks with whites and advised that they be consolidated into one camp. The forestry service defended itself by suggesting that white and "colored" boys working together on the same project was hazardous and predicted that sooner or later "grave complications for which the War Department and the technical service will have to assume responsibility" might result.\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{26} Report of F.R. Undritz to Eighth Army Corps Area, December 1933, in Camp Inspection Reports, Records of the CCC, RG 35, N.A.
\textsuperscript{27} Unsigned letter from U.S. Forest Service and Texas Forest Service to Major Carl S. McKinney, Commanding Officer, East Texas District, Eighth Corps Area, 22 January 1935, in Camp Inspection Reports, Records of the CCC, RG 35, N.A.
Besides demonstrating a preference for segregated camps, this letter also underscored the Texas CCC's approach to integration, an approach which special investigator J.S. Billups from the Labor Department confirmed in his report that integrated camps caused technical hardships since they required special barracks, mess halls, latrines, and recreation halls; thus, even the state's "integrated" camps maintained a degree of segregation.28

The situation deteriorated further in the spring of 1935 when a series of unrelated citizen's groups complained about blacks in the CCC. After a murder in Rockport, a local judge telegraphed the governor and demanded the earliest possible removal of "this colored outfit."29 In response Governor James Allred ordered the Army to honor the request. Another appeal submitted on letterhead brandishing "Believers in Burleson, for the Unselfish Development of the County," requested that a local black camp be replaced with a white one. The writer revealed that:

After consulting with prominent citizens of Burleson county on the establishment of a Negro CCC camp here I have arrived at the conclusion that such a project is not advisable, because of the fear of our residents that Northern Negroes will be imported to this county. You know Burleson is primarily a Southern

28 Ibid., and Special Investigator J.S. Billups to James McEntee, 6 March 1935, in Camp Inspection Reports, Records of the CCC, RG 35, N.A.
29 Telegram from county judge to Governor James V. Allred, 29 April 1935, in Correspondence, Papers of the Governors, RG 301, Archives Division-Texas State Library, Austin, Texas.
community, likes and understands the Southern Negro, but will not take to their Northern brethren.\textsuperscript{30}

The governor's response was a reaffirmation that under no circumstances, regardless of Army Corps boundaries, were blacks transferred in or out of their home states. Nevertheless, future CCC Station and Strength reports listed the camp as white.

Apparently the issue of precise accountability for locating or relocating camps eluded many participants, but on the other hand, perhaps working in a large bureaucracy allowed participants an opportunity to pass-the-buck, as examples involving camp location and black enrollment quotas clearly demonstrated. A letter from CCC Director Robert Fechner to Governor Allred indicated that "responsibility for the assignment of Civilian Conservation Corps companies to approved camps rests solely with the Corps Area Commander."\textsuperscript{31}

On the other hand, an undated letter from the U.S. Adjutant General J.E. Wharton to the Eighth Corps, ordered that:

\begin{quote}
Should there be objections to the assignment of a colored unit in a specific location, the Governor of the State should be contacted and requested to designate the site to which the unit should be assigned.\textsuperscript{32}
\end{quote}

A letter from Governor Allred's office to a local community

\textsuperscript{30} C.C. Nelms to Governor James V. Allred, 2 July 1935, in Correspondence, Papers of the Governors, RG 301, Archives Division-Texas State Library, Austin, Texas.

\textsuperscript{31} CCC Director Robert Fechner to Governor James V. Allred, 13 September 1935, in Model Letters, Records of the CCC, RG 35, N.A.

\textsuperscript{32} Undated letter from U.S. Adjutant General J.E. Wharton to unspecified recipient in Eighth Corps Area, in Model Letters, Records of the CCC, RG 35, N.A.
responding to its request that a black camp be relocated indicated that he would "appeal" the matter to the Army, for it rather than he was responsible for designating companies.\textsuperscript{33}

Receiving a definitive answer about black enrollment quotas proved equally elusive for Neal Guy, the state's director of selection, who in 1935 informed Washington that there were 4,400 black applicants for CCC work in the state and requested permission to increase enrollment above the 3,200-man ceiling imposed by Fechner for Texas blacks. Guy's request went from Frank Persons to Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins, who consulted with Harry Hopkins after being unable to raise Director Fechner. Hopkins replied that "he [could] not sanction a curtailment on grounds of color or race, of the enrollment of eligible candidates whose families [were] on relief." Hopkins did not specify who he feared would be curtailed by increasing black enrollment, and since neither he nor Fechner could be reached for explanation, the period's quarterly enrollment proceeded with the original quota.\textsuperscript{34}

When both Missouri and Ohio reported similar problems in black enrollment, the Washington office responded that it made no sense to accept applications from men for whom no camps existed, and it advised these state agencies to

\textsuperscript{33} C.R. Miller, secretary to the governor to B.S. Fox, county judge, Rockport, 1 May 1935, in Correspondence, Papers of the Governors, RG 301, Archives Division-Texas State Library, Austin, Texas.

\textsuperscript{34} Frank Persons to Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins, 14 August 1935, in Model Letters, Records of the CCC, RG 35, N.A.
discontinue their enrollment.\textsuperscript{35} It added, "If statement of reason is required, the aforesaid official notice and that only should be cited. [This was a reference to the CCC's policy of non-discrimination.] Of course, standards of eligibility for selection as announced by the Department of Labor remain unchanged."\textsuperscript{36}

Obviously, one administrative response to uncomfortable situations was bureaucratic inertia. Such inertia was impossible following a violent clash between the races at Camp P-61-T in Livingston, after which both the Departments of Labor and War determined that segregated camps were best for Texas. A black man allegedly knifed four whites in retaliation for verbal abuse. The local sheriff reported that tensions in both the camp and the community were high, and that the situation would be affected by whether or not the victims lived. Investigator J.S. Billups, sent to the camp by the Department of Labor, concluded that East Texas being part of the "Old South" harbored serious reservations about the mixing of races. As an example, he observed that "sawmill people in days gone by would discharge any of their employees when caught drinking or associating with negroes."

\textsuperscript{35} Radiogram of R.D. Miles, Jr., the director of selection for Ohio to Frank Persons, 15 October 1935, and memorandum of Frank Persons to Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins, 14 August 1935, in Model Letters, Records of the CCC, RG 35, N.A.

\textsuperscript{36} Notes of telephone conversation between Frank Persons and R.D. Miles, Jr., 17 October 1935, in Model Letters, Records of the CCC, RG 35, N.A.
He advised that current problems were "worse than [they have] ever been," and that not only did such technical hardships as transportation exist, but also the most basic preparations needed to build a camp which housed both blacks and whites were continual annoyances. He also stated that "negroes prefer[red] to be separated" and concluded that segregated camps were in the best interests of the men and the program.  

The Army reviewed Billups's assessment and agreed that the only real solution to the problem was segregation. The War Department in Washington ordered that effective 30 April 1935, "segregation of colored men by company, while not mandatory, [would] be the general rule and earnest efforts [would] be made to reduce the total number of colored men attached to white units." CCC Station and Strength Reports confirmed the expediency with which the change took place; by July 1935 nearly all blacks were stationed in black camps.

Although Neal Guy once questioned Fechner's ceiling on black inclusion in the CCC, TRRC selection documents otherwise demonstrated a program compliant with Washington's wishes. From 1935 to 1942 the Texas CCC restricted black participation and retained racially segregated camps, thereby effectively creating two CCCs in Texas, one white and the other black. The size and scope of the program for whites

37 J.S. Billups to James McEntee, 6 March 1935, in Camp Inspection Reports, Records of the CCC, RG 35, N.A.
38 U.S. Adjutant General J.E. Wharton to Eighth Corps Area, 22 April 1935, in Camp Inspection Reports, Records of the CCC, RG 35, N.A.
fluctuated to meet project needs and political realities, but the program for blacks remained stubbornly unchanged. From 1935 until 1941, Texas averaged two black veteran camps in operation and six black junior camps, even though during the same period the numbers of white camps in operation varied dramatically from the mid-seventies to the forties. The Texas CCC controlled its black enrollment by selecting only enough blacks to fill existing vacancies in black Texas camps; since Fechner prohibited the stationing of blacks outside of their home state, Texas blacks could not share in what clearly was a monumental aspect of the state's program.\textsuperscript{39}

Numerous selection documents, particularly those from 1937 to 1942 during C.J. Sweeney's years as assistant director of selection, repeatedly demonstrated a preference for white selectees and reminded local agents that "only the number of colored shown will be accepted."\textsuperscript{40}

The outbreak of World War II and American involvement after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor forced modifications of the CCC's discriminatory policies, but because these changes occurred immediately before the program was cancelled, blacks reaped no particular benefit. As the war escalated throughout the spring of 1942, the numbers of young

\textsuperscript{39} For an explanation of the significance of out-of-state stationing to the Texas CCC, see Chapter III of this study.

\textsuperscript{40} The underlined phrase is reproduced as it was printed in the original. J.S. Murchison, Executive Director of the Texas Department of Public Welfare to all area supervisors, 12 January 1942, in Correspondence, Records of the CCC, RG 35, N.A.
men entering military service made it more difficult to select candidates for the CCC. In March 1942 the Texas Department of Public Welfare (DPW), which had assumed control for relief programs after a bureaucratic reorganization in 1939, ordered that "to prevent unjust, uncalled for and unnecessary criticism, care should be taken not to accept men who are needed: (1) for military service, (2) engaged in war industrial production, (3) engaged in war agriculture production," and it announced that "the CCC [was then] definitely a training program [for military service] and should be no longer considered a 'relief' measure or a 'program to conserve natural resources.'"  

By January 1942, the DPW informed its local agents to ignore quotas and send all eligible white men for acceptance, though it retained black quotas for a few more months. By April, however, the 'training' benefits apparently outweighed racial biases, and the DPW ordered the selection of "every boy eligible--both white and colored."  

From a post-1960s perspective the Texas CCC clearly discriminated against blacks; however, because of the era in which it operated and in the absence of specific objectives to the contrary, branding the CCC's handling of race

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41 J.S. Murchison to all area supervisors, 5 March 1942, in Correspondence, Records of the CCC, RG 35, N.A.
42 J.S. Murchison to all area supervisors, 16 March 1942, in Correspondence, Records of the CCC, RG 35, N.A.
43 J.S. Murchison to all area supervisors, 13 April 1942, in Correspondence, Records of the CCC, RG 35, N.A.
relations as a failure is unwarranted. In fact, though only temporary and with marked restrictions, the Texas CCC had experimented with integrated camps; for a Southern state this was a daring move, though one which prevailing public attitudes proved clearly impractical. The decision to segregate Texas camps certainly did not demonstrate managerial creativity, but it was a feasible and realistic solution for maintaining order and preserving routine operations. What began as discipline problems caused by mixing the races gathered momentum and so impaired normal operations that change was forced upon the Texas CCC; yet this change did not jeopardize operations. Instead, it guarded them. Therefore, from the strictest perspective of program self-preservation, the alliance proved itself capable of curbing damage to its operations.

Not surprisingly, the processes for solving racial tensions and the questions surrounding Walter Scoggins's conduct in the Big Bend demonstrated a similar administrative feature: standard procedures for investigating dissonant events displayed a succinct division of duties between the responsible bodies. The military supervised general camp operations through its staff of liaison officers, and the Department of Labor relied on its special investigators to review camp operations. When seriously volatile situations erupted, as were the cases in the Big Bend and with racial
violence, the Department of Labor dispatched investigators to review the problem and make recommendations. In the process, a clash of departmental jurisdictions between the Departments of Labor and War might have disrupted operations had the investigator been allowed to make and enforce policy in the field. Instead, Washington received the reports and through the advisory council determined how the situation was resolved, which removed the decision-making process from the field and reinforced military command over immediate operations while accomplishing civilian review of military procedures. This division of duties combined with the existence of non-confrontational guidelines for enforcing program accountability prevented competition among departments and outlined specific administrative jurisdictions. Moreover, these channels of communication proved effective because the participants shared common goals. Proven military misconduct and racial violence in the camps were absolutely unacceptable since both wounded the CCC's reputation and interrupted operational continuity.

To evaluate the overall proficiency of the CCC's administrative superstructure, it first has been essential to examine both its routine functions and its reactions to the unexpected. Having diagramed the former in Chapter III and the latter presently, a model of proficient administrative procedures was uncovered upon which the confederated alliance
built its routine operations and guided itself through unpleasant situations. These procedures included the specific delineation of duties within and between the various fields of CCC administrative operations, effective channels of communication, and an uniformity of purpose.\textsuperscript{44}

Interestingly, however, in light of these procedures which explained administrative proficiency in so many aspects of CCC operations, these same procedures were noticeably lacking in at least one other CCC function: camp education. By contrasting the administrative characteristics of the education program to those of the enrollment process and crisis management, an opportunity arises to appraise the aforementioned characteristics of proficient administration in view of the alliance's operations when they were conspicuously absent.

\textsuperscript{44} For a discussion of the enrollment process and reasons for its proficient administration, see Chapter III of this study.
CHAPTER V

THE CONFEDERATED ALLIANCE AND PROFICIENT ADMINISTRATION: IDENTIFYING THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF SUCCESS

The CCC is remembered most often both for the favorable effects that the program had on the lives of its participants and for the innumerable physical improvements that it made to the nation's landscape. Because evaluations of the CCC are generally resplendent with lengthy lists attesting to these human and environmental improvements, scholars often cite the CCC as one of the New Deal's most successful programs. Historian John Salmond magnifies these credits by concluding that the CCC was a "successful experiment" in federally funded work relief and in early public efforts at resource conservation.¹ Drawing yet more attention to the CCC's successes, corpsmen continue to praise their experiences in the CCC and frequently call for a resurrection of the program.²

In addition to these orthodox interpretations, the CCC experienced at least one other noteworthy success, one that was no less experimental than the New Deal itself and one

² The CCC Lives Again in NACCCA, National Association of CCC Alumni (April, 1980).

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that becomes evident only after examining the dynamics of the
CCC's administration at both the national and the state
levels. By incorporating widespread state participation
within a federally supervised program, the CCC's
administrative superstructure explored new levels of state
and federal cooperation, an experiment that resulted in three
distinct levels of CCC administration: the chosen federal
departments, the appropriate state agencies, and the
untraditional and experimental working relationships that
developed among their employees at low bureaucratic levels.³
Consequently, insofar as the CCC was an agency at all, it was
a confederated agency composed of its state and federal
participants and the operational alliances that resulted.
This multi-departmental, multi-governmental approach to
administering a federal program proved as much a "successful
experiment" as any other aspect of the CCC.

Before exploring reasons for the CCC's administrative
success, criteria must be established for judging that
success. For the purpose of this study success means
proficiency, and an organization that fulfills its tasks in a
competent fashion demonstrates proficiency. Neither success
nor proficiency, however, should be interpreted as implying
problem-free operations, nor presupposing implementation
without room for improvement. To some degree lists of

³ For a discussion of each of the CCC's three administrative
levels, see Chapter II of this study.
accomplishments such as those mentioned above indirectly demonstrated administrative competency, an interpretation, however, which offers no insight into the procedures through which the CCC overcame its notably complicated, experimental, and "cumbersome" bureaucracy. After examining operations at all three of its aforementioned levels, the CCC's administrative design and the day-to-day dynamics that multi-governmental cooperation mandated clearly offer satisfactory explanations.

Because the U.S. Departments of Interior, Agriculture, Labor, and War each directed specific aspects of the CCC, the CCC often is described as a decentralized agency. This interpretation, while not a misrepresentation is, nonetheless, incomplete. If the CCC merely had been decentralized among the four federal departments, and if authority had been retained by those branches rather than delegated to the states, this description might suffice; but such was not the case. Instead, though the War Department retained direct control over camp operations, the remaining federal departments transferred the bulk of their CCC responsibilities to the individual states, keeping only so much supervisory authority as was necessary and practical to guarantee implementation. FDR's demand for rapid

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organization of the CCC clearly motivated this new administrative style. When Congress authorized the CCC in March 1933, FDR ordered 275,000 young men enrolled by and all requisite camps fully operational no later than 1 July. This narrow timetable for execution left little opportunity to organize, staff, and implement as extensive a program as its advocates envisioned. Assuming that the states already possessed bureaucracies capable of overseeing the program, the federal departments delegated portions of their responsibilities to state agencies, a solution that not only seemed functional but immediately responsive as well.

Since by spring 1933 Texas only had recently established a state-wide relief agency, assigning such responsibility to the Lone Star State was a daring and uncertain move. If not for the drastic changes in public opinion that occurred in Texas between 1931 and 1933, earlier laissez-faire attitudes and popular misgivings about powerful government certainly might have blocked efforts to create such an agency. The Depression, however, transformed both the public's earlier devotion to the philosophy of rugged individualism and its faith in the private sector's ability to provide sufficient relief into a readiness to accept government aid. Consequently, after assuming office in January 1933, Governor Miriam ("Ma") Ferguson, created Texas's first state-wide,
state-operated relief agency - the Texas Relief Commission (TRC).

Operating with minimal state financial contributions and periodic cash allotments from the soon-to-be defunct Hoover administration, the TRC was a comparatively primitive and short-lived agency. In March FDR began implementing his own relief programs. As Texas watched the new administration respond to the impending financial collapse and as the Hundred Days deluged Washington with legislative proposals, Governor Ferguson championed a reorganization of the TRC that satisfied FDR's recently communicated expectations for greater state accountability in relief work. While the Texas legislature debated Ferguson's proposals, Congress created the CCC. Federal officials forewarned Ferguson that Texas's future participation in the program hinged on whether or not the legislature enacted the appropriate laws that would enable Texas officials to cooperate with the federal government. The legislature subsequently passed these bills concurrently with Ferguson's proposals, thereby creating the administrative machinery necessary to participate in federally-sponsored relief efforts. Concomitantly, the Labor Department announced its intentions to use existing state agencies to enroll candidates for the CCC. Thus, state interests converged with federal actions in the spring of 1933, which, because of the intergovernmental relationship
inherent in these efforts, resulted in new and experimental levels of multi-governmental cooperation.5

With the exception of the Army, which cooperated with the states but did not transfer its assigned duties to the states, the participating federal departments fulfilled the majority of their CCC responsibilities through state agencies rather than through their own personnel. Technical service sub-agencies, such as the U.S. Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture, and the National Park Service within the Department of Interior interacted with related state agencies including the Texas Forest Service and the State Parks Board; similar collaboration was practiced in CCC project selection and supervision. Though Texas agencies remained under the state's jurisdiction, they submitted their CCC project proposals to Washington for approval. Since the federal government practiced final review, it retained ultimate authority over CCC operations. Furthermore, although state officials represented their federal counterparts on the project site, the technical services regularly inspected the sites. These routine inspections notwithstanding, this mode of implementation in selecting and supervising CCC projects granted the states significant autonomy in CCC work.

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5 For a discussion of the shift in the public's attitudes and Governor Ferguson's struggle to create a state-wide relief agency, see the Introduction and Chapter I of this study.
Despite the obvious significance of project selection and supervision to CCC accomplishments, the most complicated cooperative relationship, and the one that generated the most state autonomy in operations, existed among those state agencies and federal departments that participated in CCC selection and enrollment. As Chapter III of this study detailed, these processes tested the practical limits of multi-governmental and multi-departmental cooperation. The executory organization that emerged to coordinate these activities stretched from Washington to each Texas county, a fact that represented a significant increase in the size and influence of government. FDR and Congress determined national manpower figures; the Department of Labor allocated quotas to the states; the Texas Rehabilitation and Relief Commission (TRRC) portioned the state's quota to individual counties; and the local county administrator and county relief board selected candidates for enrollment. Moreover, enrollment demanded close collaboration between the Eighth Army Corps and the TRRC, thereby involving yet another federal department. This intricate process unfailingly served Texas's interests for nine years, as the Texas CCC employed in excess of 156,000 young men from across the state.6

Four reasons best explained the CCC's proficient recruitment as well as its other administrative successes.

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6 For a discussion of CCC eligibility requirements and a review of the enrollment process in Texas, see Chapter III of this study.
First, the participating members of the confederated alliance enjoyed considerable flexibility in implementing procedures, a fact allowing the states to take the fullest possible advantage of the program. Second, the alliance shared a uniformity of purpose, so its members presented a united administrative front. Third, a clear and precise division of duties prevented damaging administrative overlap. And lastly, this division of duties forced effective channels of communication among its members. Of these traits, possessing a common goal and adhering to well-delineated operational guidelines certainly contributed most to the CCC's administrative successes.

When the technical services and the Labor Department transferred responsibilities to the states, broad federal guidelines allowed individual states to enact policies that matched their own unique needs. Labor issued such general eligibility requirements and flexible state quotas that Texas fashioned its own selection practices. Consequently, the TRRC's Assistant Director of CCC Selection, C.J. Sweeney, demonstrated a preference for selecting rural applicants without violating federal policy. Although not a result of CCC direction, the TRRC also allowed its county representatives significant liberty. Even though the TRRC issued preferred selection procedures, counties molded those guidelines as they desired. Furthermore, since the TRRC
adjusted county quotas to meet manpower availability both during the initial selection process and then again during enrollment, allowing flexibility enhanced Texas's enrollment figures, thus aiding in successful enrollment.

Fortunately for the CCC, this flexibility did not generate competition among the alliance's members. Faith in a common mission generally prevented petty bureaucratic differences from hindering operations and made it possible for the CCC's administrators to weather crises, as the CCC's response to troublesome race relations in Texas indicated. Confronted with increasing interracial violence in 1935, both the Labor Department and the Army recommended that Texas segregate its camps in order to curb the discontent. Later, when Texas's Assistant Director of Selection, Neal Guy, attempted in a unrelated event to raise black quotas, Washington denied his requests. Although racial prejudice on the part of Fechner, his staff, and military and state officials easily explained both decisions, alternatives demanded both significant changes in procedures and the acceptance of a new and controversial administrative posture: a deference to black rights. In the face of the existing economic calamity and with its sustained popularity in public and political circles, the CCC had an opportunity to make a significant contribution to society by merely remaining in operation. Any dramatic change in goals risked damaging the
CCC's popularity and funding, thereby possibly placing its existence in jeopardy. Despite what might be labelled as a missed opportunity to cultivate racial equality, through maintaining racial quotas and promoting segregation the CCC's administrators safeguarded immediate operations, thus demonstrating proficiency in crisis management.\(^7\)

Because the CCC was so rapidly organized and involved such a diversity of agencies, a series of operational guidelines developed that compelled visible accountability for specific tasks. Labor conducted the selection process, but the states implemented it; the technical services selected projects, but again the states generally operated them. In order to coordinate these activities and ensure state compliance with federal objectives, a series of federal investigators periodically inspected the camps, thus clearly exhibiting where ultimate authority rested. Even when Labor reviewed the actions of other departments, as was the case at Camp NP-1-T in Texas's Big Bend region, investigators operated within specific limits, a trait that prevented them from transcending their assigned jurisdictions and interfering in the everyday responsibilities of another agency. Because multi-departmental and multi-governmental cooperation was essential in fulfilling the objectives that were diffused among the alliance's participants, each

\(^{7}\) Proficiency in crisis management is the topic of Chapter IV of this study.
agency's success plainly relied on the proficiency of another, thereby inducing effective communication within and among those participants. Consequently, this bureaucratic interdependence necessitated not only precisely defined accountabilities, but meticulously efficient channels of communication as well.

These four explanations for administrative proficiency were less a reflection of planning and forethought than they were the result of fortuitous implementation. In fact, concerned that such a complicated administrative superstructure so swiftly enacted might generate confusion and collapse under its own weight, Secretary Ickes originally forewarned of the potential for incompetency in its administration.8 Nevertheless, as long as the aforementioned characteristics guided operations, Icke's observations were unwarranted. By 1937, however, his reservations gained credibility as the National Advisory Council argued over the responsibility for and the goals of the CCC's education program. These debates damaged the harmonious relationship that had characterized the National Advisory Council during its first four years of operations, but since the dispute was isolated to Washington, the CCC as a whole was unaffected. Nonetheless, the impact these disputes had on administrative harmony in Washington emphasized what might happen to the CCC

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across the nation if the program's prior strengths deteriorated in the field.

From the beginning the CCC had failed to develop a clear role for education.³ The program originally was designed to stress fundamental literacy skills and technical/vocational training, but no early effort was made to further define that goal. Although the technical services managed many classes, the Army practiced predominant responsibility for the program and left specific course decisions up to the individual camp commanders. The U.S. Office of Education advised all departments in their efforts, but encouraged less emphasis on technical training and more on conventional academics. Historian John Salmond argues that the Army's dominant role entrenched the CCC's devotion to vocational training because the Army was conservative and distrusted "long-haired men" and "short-haired women." Furthermore, the Army discouraged courses that inspired social and political discussion.¹⁰ Nevertheless, Texas records indicated that each camp generally included an education advisor and demonstrated that a wide variety of courses were offered, ranging from vocational/technical courses, to those in basic literacy,

¹⁰ Salmond, Civilian Conservation Corps, 48-49.
and, in isolated camps, both American history and black history.\textsuperscript{11}

By 1937 the sense of urgency that had pervaded America in 1933 receded, resulting in a willingness by some to reevaluate existing federal programs and possibly modify their objectives. In 1937, recognizing that better trained dischargees might be more employable, Congress ordered a study to determine the possibility of a greater role for vocational training in the CCC. Fechner reviewed the possibilities, secured FDR's support for his conclusions, and then suggested that the role of education be significantly expanded to almost equal that of work relief. He also recommended that the Office of Education be incorporated as a fifth partner into the CCC's governing superstructure, that it assume control over education from the other departments, and that he be awarded the power of implementation and enforcement rather than merely drafting policies. Because these proposals represented a new and unpopular purpose for the CCC as well as a radical departure from earlier administrative procedures, Fechner's proposals drew strong criticism from the federal departments. Although FDR's staff eventually squelched Fechner's maneuverings because Congress had failed to specifically authorize and fund such a program, the mere proposals themselves and FDR's support for them

\textsuperscript{11} CCC Station and Strength Reports, Records of the Civilian Conservation Corps, RG 35, N.A.
ignited a bureaucratic squabble that persisted at the national level until 1942. Salmond believes that Fechner's startling change in managerial philosophy resulted from a sense of bureaucratic overconfidence since by 1938 the CCC was a well-established program, his failing health, and a newly found interest in consolidating the program under his authority. Thus, what began as a struggle for more vocational education evolved into a fight for a greatly expanded program and ended with a challenge to the CCC's previously accepted uniformity of purpose, while creating a bureaucratic war at the national level over centralization within the CCC.12

In November 1938, FDR continued to support Fechner's goals and authorized implementation of aggregate control over minor aspects of CCC operations, such as its vehicle repair shops. Though the federal departments were openly hostile to the move because it infringed on their jurisdictions, they were, nevertheless, powerless to prevent it. Rather than provide a remedy for the situation, Fechner's death the following month intensified debates as his successor, James J. McEntee, who had worked with Fechner in the Machinist's Union and as his assistant in the CCC since 1933, called for still greater consolidation. Salmond concludes that this

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12 For a thorough discussion of the arguments at the national level surrounding CCC education practices, see Salmond, Civilian Conservation Corps, 162-168.
quest "contributed to the decline of the Corps after 1940," although he also argues that by 1940 it was virtually impossible to change the CCC's objectives because "the CCC's identification with relief was too strong to permit any change in public attitudes." Thus, the public's continued perception of and support for the CCC as a relief measure shielded state and local CCC operations from the divisive debates that engulfed CCC administration at the federal level. Consequently, though challenged at the national level, uniformity of purpose was preserved and education remained merely a secondary goal.  

The aforementioned events virtually divided the CCC's national administrative history into two distinct periods. The first period reflected those administrative traits already identified as characterizing the CCC's harmonious operations, while the second suffered from the dissension mentioned above. Fortunately for the CCC, however, because dissension did not spread throughout the federal departments or to the states, individual programs such as the one in Texas continued to function unaffected.

The wide diversity of participants in administering the CCC make it difficult to profess general conclusions that might apply to each state's program. While Hendrickson appropriately labels the CCC's administrative machinery as

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13 Ibid., 175, 177, 201.
both "cumbersome" and as a "bureaucratic monstrosity," based
upon operations in Texas, it also must be recognized as
proficient. Salmond stipulates that though the CCC was a
successful program its superstructure never lost its
"temporary" appearance, and consequently failed to become all
that it eventually might have become. At least in the case
of Texas, the CCC achieved what it was expected to achieve.
Unfortunately, critical evaluations of the CCC's
administrative machinery that are based on either what the
CCC might have accomplished if the circumstances had been
different, or on the apparent logic or lack thereof in
designing the program detract from the CCC's administrative
successes. Evaluations must appreciate that the CCC's
"temporary" status and "cumbersome" design fundamentally
encouraged the day-to-day operational dynamics that
contributed to administrative competency, for its dynamics
clearly safeguarded the program by establishing and involving
a bureaucracy too weighty to change. Furthermore, had the
CCC's structure been less overwhelming and had Fechner's
desire to consolidate the program been successful, those
changes would have been at the expense of the existing
system. Any change to reflect a more organizationally
discreet program, therefore, certainly would have damaged, if
not destroyed, the future of the CCC, and thereby might have

14 See Hendrickson, "Replenishing the Soil and Soul," 37, and
Salmond, Civilian Conservation Corps, 218-220.
significantly limited its accomplishments. Besides, as long as the public supported the existing program, there was no real motivation to change. Perhaps the CCC might have accomplished more, or the "quality" of its enrollees might have been improved, but these arguments are irrelevant to an evaluation of its operations because the CCC accomplished its objective. Whether "temporary" in appearance or "cumbersome" in affairs, its participants consistently succeeded in offering healthy work-relief to unemployed young men.

Had the CCC been a centralized autonomous federal agency, dissension at the national level assuredly would have filtered down to lower levels, therefore having some negative impact on state and local operations or on the operations among state and federal employees. The virtually haphazard manner in which the CCC was implemented, however, delegated specific tasks to state governments, consequently awarding low level bureaucrats responsibility for operations and thereby forcing them to cooperate with federal officials in an untraditional administrative relationship that diffused authority so thoroughly among its participants that operations were shielded from such threats. The reasons for the CCC's successes, therefore, lie in the proficiency exhibited within the operational dynamics that the administrative superstructure mandated. While some might argue that this situation certainly was of great consequence,
but also was merely accidental because of the CCC's harried implementation, such arguments are misleading, for whether or not the CCC was fortuitously organized or intentionally designed, the system worked, the objectives were clear, the duties were specifically assigned, and the initial need was indisputable. Though administrative difficulties arose, the system allowed for their resolution. Rather than searching for additional goals that the CCC might have accomplished and then critically reviewing the CCC accordingly, historians need to appreciate that its administrative "shortcomings," the result of its experimental and unorthodox administrative construction were, in truth, the pivotal reasons for its successes.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
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