POLITICAL PARTIES IN CENTRAL AMERICA:
A REASSESSMENT

THESIS

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Studies of political parties in Latin America have often been descriptive and not directed to link a theoretical foundation about political parties with qualitative or quantitative empiricism. This was in part because parties in the region were usually perceived as rather unimportant in the political arena. This study attempts to correct this often unjustified proposition by focusing on the development of political parties in five Central American countries: Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. The analysis focuses particularly on the relationship between party fragmentation, party polarization, the level of democracy, and socio-economic modernization. The quantitative analysis uses a cross-national longitudinal research design and tries to overcome shortcomings in prior descriptive approaches based on case studies. The overall findings show that party fragmentation and party polarization are positively related to the level of democracy in Central America.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In the 1950s, the behavioralist revolution in political science greatly influenced the subfield of comparative politics. At that time, the so-called "traditional approach" of the "systematic comparative study of nations and their political systems" (Wiarda 1991, 4) was criticized as being too parochial, monographic, descriptive, excessively formalistic, legalistic, and concentrated on the "big four" [Great Britain, France, Germany, and the United States] (Macridis 1968). Due to this criticism, the field of comparative politics experienced a shift of emphasis to studying politics and political systems in other regions of the world and, in particular, less developed countries. Key contributions in this shift have been made by Almond and Coleman (1960), Huntington (1968), Verba and Pye (1965). Extraordinarily, Latin America and the Caribbean region, among others, have become a "Mecca" for many scholars interested in developing countries. One might even say that Latin American countries have been used as something of a laboratory to test hypotheses, formulate concepts, and apply theories of economic, social, and political processes. As Wiarda notes, after the Cuban
revolution scholars interested in the Western Hemisphere received massive support from the State Department's Office of Policy Planning, which allocated "a flood of grants and fellowships designed to channel some of our most able young scholars into Latin American development studies, a field that had traditionally represented a lacuna in comparative politics" (Wiarda 1991, 17). As a result, the region, -- plagued by coups d'état, national revolts, revolutions, and political instability -- became a focus for research that led to a large increase in studies of Latin America.

Unfortunately, the role of political parties and party systems in Latin America has been often neglected in the systematic comparative studies of the region. It seems that many scholars perceived the role of political parties in the political process as too trivial to be considered worth analyzing in more detail, because political parties were regarded as some of the weaker and less important political actors within Latin American political systems. Political parties have been viewed as exerting little causal effect on the system-maintaining or system-changing environment of Latin American countries.

In general, political actors such as the military, church, landowners, industrial elites, and the peasants have been characterized as more important and being worthy of analysis. Thus, the idea of the Anglo-Saxon style of political parties and party pluralism, with its notion of
power diversification within the legitimate boundaries of the political system, as a major political force has been generally discarded in the Latin American environment.

In my opinion, this oversight is particularly remarkable because of the argument that one major component of a modern political system and its political stability is the development of political parties (Huntington 1968). Furthermore, political parties have often been regarded by scholars as essential for modern democracy. Schattschneider argues that "...political parties created democracy and that modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties" (Schattschneider 1942, 1). Duverger argues that "on the whole the development of parties seems bound up with that of democracy" (Duverger 1967, xxxii). On the other hand, both scholars express some caution about the role of political parties as follows: "Democracy is not to be found in the parties but between parties" (Schattschneider 1942, 60). And, "the danger [for democracy] does not lie in the existence of parties but in the military, religious, and totalitarian form they sometimes assume" (Duverger 1967, 426).

Considering the arguments of Huntington, Duverger, and Schattschneider concerning the role of political parties in a political system, it is rather striking that the study of political parties in Latin American countries has been so neglected. This is particularly astonishing because of the
diversity of possible roles for political parties in the political systems, whether they provide the context for political stability and/or democracy or become the tool of a totalitarian regime. Indeed almost all of the possible roles for political parties within political systems are exemplified one way or the other in the Latin American region. Examples include the Partido de Liberación Nacional (PLN) in Costa Rica acting as the democratic savior, the Partido Institucional Revolucionario (PRI) in Mexico and the Partido Communista de Cuba (PCC) acting as vanguard parties for political stability, or the Partido Liberal Nacionalista (PLN) in Nicaragua acting as the used and abused tool of the totalitarian dictatorship under the Somoza’s "kleptocracy" (Close 1988). Political parties in Latin America have not been entirely ignored. Early efforts such as Fitzgibbon’s (1957) argued for a more detailed analysis of the diversity of political parties what he labels "party potpourri" in the Latin American region.

Nevertheless, until recently few efforts have been directed to improve the study of political parties and party systems in Latin America. In general, the studies of political parties and party systems in Latin America have been heavily skewed in favor of broader, seemingly more interesting topics like revolutions and political instability. Here some of the contributions are studies by Booth (1985), Morris (1984), Montgomery (1982), Wiarda
(1984). Usually, in these studies, political parties and party systems were treated as independent or intervening variables, but not as the dependent variable. Therefore, few such studies have even tried to relate their observations to a theoretical framework directed to explain the development and role of political parties in Latin America. Furthermore, due to the fact that parties and party systems were perceived as a less important factor in the political process in Latin America, studies have been often descriptive and did not link a theoretical foundation directed to the study of political parties with qualitative or quantitative empiricism.

As Kuhn (1970) argues, the theory ["paradigm"] sets the parameters of any particular problem under observation and permits the systematic accumulation of understanding of the analyzed subjects. Without theory, thus, the study of political parties and party systems in the Latin American region has been largely detached from any scientific context, is descriptive, historical, and based on case studies. Therefore, its scientific utility has been correspondingly small.

This is particularly noteworthy because political parties apparently provide a core factor of political stability in a modern, highly structurally differentiated political system. They help channel and regulate the demands of the society within a political system.
Surprisingly, only the recent re-democratization process in Central American and South American countries shifted the interest of some scholars to refocus their attention on the abandoned child of the role of political parties and party systems in the political system of these countries, see especially, (Dix 1992, Goodman, LeoGrande, Mendelson-Forman 1992, McDonald and Ruhl 1991, Nohlen 1993a, Remmer 1991). Only now are the shortcomings in the study of political parties in this region being recognized by scholars, who now argue that "their [the parties'] durability and lasting popular appeal suggests that parties are a more salient feature of the Latin American political landscape than many observers have previously recognized" (McDonald and Ruhl 1991).

Purpose and Significance of the Study

This study seeks to remedy some of the shortcomings in the study of political parties in the Latin American region. A first purpose of the study is, to apply certain theoretical concepts of party development in developing countries to a descriptive and quantitative analysis of political parties. The study focuses on the question of the development of political parties, in particular on party fragmentation, polarization (ideological party spectrum) from the 1950s until the beginning of the 1990s elections in Central America.

Second, by using a comparative cross-national analysis
of five Central American countries: Guatemala, Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, this analysis seeks to move away from the case study approach to political parties. Additionally, by focusing on only one specific area of Latin America this approach should prevent the comparative analysis from being too vague.

As part of Latin America, the Central American countries emerged out of the Central American Provinces (1820-1838) after independence from Spain and experienced over time a very similar political history. Only in the last four decades have the isthmian countries departeded from their common political characteristics and developed very dissimilar regimes -- from democracy in Costa Rica, despotism and tyranny in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, and a rather stable constant exclusionary authoritarianism in Honduras.

The existing similarities among these countries, which encompass culture, language, religion, and economic factors as well as the historical political characteristics, permit a longitudinal cross-national analysis using Przeworski and Teune’s "most-similar-system" design.

Furthermore, recent developments in regime consolidation in four of the Central American countries (Costa Rica not included) have set the parameters for the role of political parties in the political process of these nations. This may overcome the inherent inertia in these
countries and permit political change that could bring about 
"party pluralism" in the region. As Laguardia states:

Constitutions of Central America currently include norms 
that, to some extent, have produced exclusive political 
systems. There has been an effort to create a legal 
framework for political parties and to regulate the 
electoral system. Recognition of the classic functions of 
political parties regarding the articulation of social 
demands, as well as the subsequent responsible 
representation and mediation of these demands is central to 
this effort (Laguardia 1992, 86).

This study is organized according to the following 
systematic framework. Chapter 2 express why the role of 
political parties in Latin America was so often regarded as 
insignificant in studies of the political systems of that 
region. The chapter focuses upon political as well as 
cultural arguments about the inherently corporatist nature 
of the political systems in Latin America, and upon the 
importance of the role played by traditional 'power 
contenders' (the military, church, landowners) and political 
parties. The role of political parties in a pluralist 
political system is discussed for comparison. I will then 
argue that neither the historical development and current 
roles in the five Central American countries nor the 
corporatist approach to the region's politics permit further 
eglect of the study of political parties. By analyzing 
descriptive case studies of political parties in the 
isthmus, I will show that the role of parties in the 
political process is extremely diverse -- from party 
pluralism in Costa Rica and Guatemala (1944 to 1954), to
vanguard parties and "official" political parties in El Salvador and Nicaragua, to a rather unusual form of dominant political parties providing political stability in Honduras.

A theory is then developed which attempts to identify factors shaping the development of political parties, in particular the phenomena of party fragmentation and polarization in these countries. These factors include the level of democracy and the level of socio-economic modernization in a political system.

Chapter 3 tests the theory by using a quantitative cross-national analysis of the five Central American countries. The first part focuses on the relationship between the level of democracy of these countries and party polarization (ideological party spectrum) in the political system in the last 40 years. By using a 40-year period I hope to discern patterns in the development of party polarization in these countries that might not be apparent during a particular isolated moment. The second part of the analysis tests the theory of the emergence and participation of political parties in the five Central American nations. Here, the relationship between party fragmentation and the level of socio-economic modernization, and level of democracy in these political systems are analyzed.
Summary

This chapter has argued that little progress has been made in the study of political parties in the Latin American region. It has also argued in favor of a closer study of political parties in Latin America because they are diverse and undergo rapid change. One central aim of the study is to incorporate theory and empirical research into a cross-national analysis of the five Central American countries and hence to test theories of the emergence of political parties in developing countries using Prezeworski and Teune’s "most-similar-system" design. The study’s particular objective is to examine comparatively party fragmentation and party polarization in these countries.
CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

One of the central factors accounting for the paucity of studies of Latin American party politics, political parties, and party systems is the proposition that most Latin American nations have been governed in the "corporatist tradition" (McDonald and Ruhl 1993, 343). Costa Rica and Venezuela are often cited as exceptions. To begin it is useful to outline the core principles of corporatism and pluralism and to contrast their theoretical modelling of government. Phillipe Schmitter defines corporatism as

a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports (Chalmers 1991, 61).

Thus, the idea of corporatism is that specific political actors reserve a monopoly of political power over other political forces in society. These specific political actors develop a strong "structural-legal relationship," which links the state and dominant political actors within
the system. Therefore, corporatist regimes operate in a legal-structural framework which clearly defines the boundaries of the dominant political actors and other social forces within the state. One of the central features of corporatism is that the dominant political actors participating in the political system protect themselves from the possibility of a "constant redefinition of groups". Moreover, the state governs the status of these actors within the political system (Chalmers 1991).

One of the major explanations for this specific political behavior in Latin America is found in the political culture of these nations.

The notion of political culture assumes that the attitudes, sentiments, and cognitions that inform and govern political behavior in any society are not just random congeries but represent coherent patterns which fit together and are mutually reinforcing (Pye 1965, 7).

For Pye, political culture shapes society and contributes to the structure of the political process, which reflects and determines political outcomes in the system. Latin American political systems are often said to share political cultures based on corporatist principles rather than pluralistic principles of political behavior. This form of political culture in Latin America was established by the Spanish and Portuguese conquistadors in the fifteenth and sixteenth century (Morse 1974).

Students of Latin American political systems identify three main traditional corporatist political actors -- large
landowners, the military, and the Catholic church. Due to the social and economic modernization process occurring at the beginning of the twentieth century, new corporatist political actors evolved. The common practice in Latin America as it modernized was "to add on and assimilate the new corporate groups and power contenders that had begun to challenge the system (the middle sectors and trade unions) without necessarily repudiating or destroying the older center of the influence" (Wiarda 1990, 40). Thus, Latin American countries tended to allow power contenders to be permitted into the political arena if they proved willing to not hurt other contenders, yet could show their power capacity through their political strength. Anderson (1967; 1974) calls the latter the "power capability" of the political contenders, which forms the "imperative" necessary to be entitled to participate in the political system. Thus, there developed a dynamic corporatist system constantly trying to assimilate new groups -- a pattern not observed outside of Latin America. Anderson (1967) describes this Latin American phenomenon as a "living museum," and argues that Latin American countries have never experienced a "democratic revolution," which occurs, according to him, when some power contenders are successfully eliminated from political participation by new ones.

Many Latin American scholars argue that this
corporatist phenomenon leads to many of the peculiarities of Latin American political systems. In particular corporatism is one of the major causes for the inherent political instability of so many Latin American countries. The political phenomenon of corporatism is also used to explain why so many Latin American states have been unsuccessful in establishing democratic political institutions and democratic values in their environments, and thus have failed to establish liberal democracies.

In opposition to the corporatist approach, political pluralism focuses on "the diversification of power" among all groups in the political system and the demand that these groups that come into the system are "both independent and non-inclusive" (Sartori 1976, 15). The idea of political pluralism is derived from the rise of individualism and Liberalism at the end of the sixteenth century in Europe and discussed by philosophers like Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. Individualism and liberalism did not accept the traditional ties of government and called for the destruction of the "immobile corporatist structure," which was reflected in the relationship between church, kingship, and landlord in Europe (Sartori 1976, 14). A core principle of pluralism is the independence of the political actors from the state, and the continuous open power struggle among the contending groups to gain access and influence within the political system. Thus, the aim of legal competition for power among
groups and their acceptance of the principle of nonviolent alternation of power, through general elections, became the central principle of the Western model of pluralist democracy.

The socio-economic modernization process (industrial revolution) in the European political systems led to increasing demands by the masses for political participation and to more complex and diverse political systems. The emergence of the masses as a political actor and the acceptance of the principle of legal competition for power through electoral alternation led, over the last century, to the development of modern mass political parties in democratic countries. Political parties in modern democracies have replaced political cliques, factions, and other elitist groups in the struggle for power (Duverger 1967; Sartori 1976 chapter 1; Vanhanen 1990, 18-20). It has been argued that "in the contemporary world the competition between parties in elections represents the most significant form of legal competition and the sharing of power among people" (Vanhanen 1990, 19).

Therefore, mass political parties became the raw material of politics in modern democracies and are not "merely appendages of modern government" (Schattschneider 1942, 1). Schattschneider focuses on the role of these mass political parties in the light of James Madison’s theory that parties represent the tool of the multiplicity of
interests in a political system. This occurred because political disputes and diversity of interests are inevitable and inherent in free societies, and steadily increase with the expansion of the population in a society. Furthermore, he argues that "no public policy could ever be the mere sum of the demands of the organized special interests" in a modern society (Schattschneider 1942, 31). He further argues that political parties are different from interest groups in their synthesis of interests. Every individual is pulled in different directions by the diversity of his own interests and group memberships, which is "the law of the imperfect political mobilization of interests" (Schattschneider 1942, 33).

Political parties are not only a phenomenon of fully pluralistic societies. Rather, political parties are a common phenomenon; they occur in every modern or modernizing political system. Huntington states, for instance, that "traditional polities do not have political parties; modernizing polities need them but often do not want them" (Huntington 1968, 403). Thus, political parties are not only related to the principle of democracy but also are a phenomenon of "modernization" and "political development," whether they exist within democratic, authoritarian, or totalitarian systems. Political parties attempt to organize public opinion and communicate within the political process to secure the demands of modern society regardless the
regime constellation they have to operate in (LaPalombara and Weiner 1966). Or as Duverger states: "historically speaking parties were born when the masses of the people really made their entrance into political life; they provided the necessary framework enabling the masses to recruit from among themselves their own elites" (Duverger 1967, 426).

Thus, the central functions that modern political parties perform are (a) contending for power, (b) selecting political leadership through political recruitment, (c) allocating and aggregating of public interests, (d) coordinating mass popular participation into political action and into the political arena (Chambers 1966, 89-90, LaPalombara and Weiner 1966, 3-4). The only difference between political parties in liberal democracies from other political systems such as communist, military or bureaucratic authoritarian regimes lies in the political game in which parties have to operate. In liberal democracies "the principle of popular sovereignty prevails and the consent of the governed is expressed through elections and representation" (Wynia 1990, 29) and not by any other means.

With respect to Latin America political parties, scholars have argued that their nature and purpose has been shaped by the corporatist principle, which prevented the evolution of mass political parties in these political
systems. In Latin America, political parties have been regarded as a tool in maintaining the corporatist political order, which may partially explain the lack of interest in the study of political parties in that region. Moreover, the legitimacy of elections was often questioned by participating and nonparticipating power contenders, and thus not seen as the only form for exchanging or preserving political power. Examples of such political behavior can be seen in the electoral frauds in Guatemala and El Salvador during the 1970s. In these cases, the authoritarian regime changed electoral outcomes to eliminate or paralyze political contenders which disrupted the desired equilibrium (Baloyra 1982, 48-49; Inforpress 1985). This specific form of political behavior in Latin America is not only restricted to internal power contenders but has also been employed by external actors. An example for the involvement of an external power contender can be seen in the 1984 Nicaraguan election in which the United States, as the dominant external power contender, discredited the Nicaraguan election and "U.S. diplomats exerted systematic pressure upon each of the parties to the right of the FSLN drop out of the contest" (Booth 1986, 56; LASA 1984). These pressures had the effect that several parties -- the Partido Social Democrata (PSD), Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (PLC), and the Partido Social Cristiano Nicaragüense (PSCN), which were aligned in the Coordinadora
Democrática Nicaragüense (CDN) coalition -- did not officially participate in the general election. Thus, to preserve the entrenchment of the political status quo, political actors in Latin America have often used their power capabilities "to abuse or subvert the official rules of the [political] game" (Wynia 1984, 33) in favor of their quest for power.

In conclusion, it may be said that Latin American elections and their results were often perceived by all power contenders as "tentative" rather than definite (Wiarda 1990, chapter 4). Or, as Anderson argues, elections should not be seen as only "tentative" but also as "fixed", that is, having the purpose of demonstrating power capability rather than securing power in the political system (Anderson 1967, chapter 4).

Therefore, many scholars perceived the role of political parties in corporatist Latin America rather differently than that of their pluralist-democratic counterparts in North America or Western Europe. Political parties in Latin America have been generally regarded as a special tool of elite power contenders -- generating and pursuing specific interests of the corporatist groups rather than becoming political institutions that channel and organize the participation of the masses.

This view prevailed despite the emergence in Latin America of modern political systems characterized by a
relatively high degree of structural differentiation with modernized institutions like legislatures, political executives, bureaucracies, courts, political parties, and interest groups, as well as advancements in mass communication networks (Almond 1960). The roles and functions of political parties were perceived as bound to special interests and their functions were described as linked to particular interest groups rather than directed at accommodating increased political participation of the masses. Thus, the political interests in Latin America reflected the division of the class system. This left the illiterate lower classes, or masses without articulation in national politics, and provided the elitist groups, "creoles" and "whites" with representation in the national political arena (Blanksten 1960, 502-512). Thus, the existing political parties in the legislature were often referred to as "traditional parties."

By focusing more closely on one part of the region, Central America, one is able to describe the emergence of these corporatist parties more in detail. The first two political parties that emerged in Central America were the Conservatives and the Liberals. After gaining independence from Spain as part of Mexico in 1821 the isthmus became fully independent when it formed the United Provinces of Central America from 1823-1838. The collapse of this federation led to the creation of the present five
independent nations Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Honduras. Rivalry among landed elites led to the formation of these two different political groups. In the late nineteenth century the two groups could be described as political factions. They developed more clearly defined into political parties at the beginning of the twentieth century. At their origins, basic features of these parties were mainly shaped by economic ideas. Liberals stood for a laissez faire economy, open market policies, and were export oriented, while the conservatives took an opposite stand on these issues. Later, their differences in economic ideology diminished sharply. The development of Central America's corporatist political parties often had a regional basis. In Nicaragua, for instance, the Liberals were represented in the north-central region of León and the Conservatives came from around southern Granada. In Costa Rica, the basic regional division was between the two major population centers, San José and Cartago (Booth 1990; Booth and Walker 1989, chapter 2; Seligson 1990). Basically the same pattern occurred in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Baloyra (1990) summarizes this point in his analysis of the political groups and parties in El Salvador at that time: "As the case in the rest of the isthmus, liberals lined up behind free trade and anticlericalism, and conservatives insisted on tariffs and greater identification of church and
state" (Baloyra 1990, 485). Thus, the political parties of Central America, up to the middle of the twentieth century, represented a power configuration born out of the traditional corporatist groups operating in Central America such as the landowners, the Catholic church, and military.

This configuration of power changed rapidly between the 1920s and the mid-1950s due rapid national modernization. First, the new industrial middle class emerged as a new corporatist power contender and demanded representation in the political arena. Second, the masses also sought political participation and representation in the political system. Here the traditional elites of Central America learned that they had to react to the increasing demands of the masses for a role in the political process. Furthermore, the World Depression in 1929 and World War II had profound effects on the regional economies and put political systems under intense pressure to adjust and restructure the nature of the nations' economic systems. These economic constraints and the new demands of the masses had to be dealt with in order to prevent a potential breakdown of the political system that undermine the influence and role of some of the traditional power contenders.

One reaction to the increased pressure of the masses for political participation and representation can be seen in the measures that all five political systems took to
extend the rights of suffrage. In 1949, Costa Rica introduced universal suffrage for women and men 20 years of age or older. Honduras expanded suffrage by including women in 1954, Guatemala in 1945, Nicaragua in 1957, and El Salvador in 1939. But there remained some restrictions; for e.g., in 1939 El Salvador restricted the voting rights for women in the following way: "para mujeres casadas mayores de 25 años, o solteras de 30 años" (Krennerich 1993, 309) although this was finally changed in 1950 to include all Salvadorans 18 years or older.¹

More interesting here is that political systems reacted to these demands and pressures in two different forms: either by attempting to accommodate the new social forces inside the political arena, or by seeking to restrict and repress the new social forces in order not to jeopardize the status quo. These two choices had a profound influence on the emergence of a new political party spectrum as well as on the forms and roles of the political parties in those nations.

The most important change regarding a new role for political parties and the party spectrum in the political arena can be seen in Costa Rica. It opted to openly to

accommodate existing new political movements and political parties in the political arena. Thus, Carballo (1992) argues that the transformation of Costa Rica into a pluralistic democracy was only possible because the political power contenders in Costa Rica decided to use the institutions of political parties to channel the participation demands of Costa Rican society. Furthermore, he argues that the most important factor contributing to the new role of political parties "has been the ability of Costa Rican elites, despite their different interests, to compromise instead of becoming polarized" (Carballo 1992, 203).

The steps adopted by the elite groups in Costa Rica led to the appearance in the legislature of new political parties. The parties changed from personalistic or traditional parties to modern political parties with the new function of accommodating the masses. During this period the last great traditional party, the Partido Republicano Nacional (PRN) withered away. Newly founded or existing modern parties became dominant players in the political arena: The Partido Communista de Costa Rica (PCCCR), later recreated as the Partido Vanguardia Popular (PVP), represented the communist political ideologies. The newly created conservative party, Partido Unión Nacional, was formed by Otilio Ulate. The socialist movement, influenced by Peruvian Aprismo, was represented in the Partido
Socialista Democrata (PSD) founded by José Figueres. He later founded (1951) the Partido de Liberación Nacional (PLN), which would become the most dominant party in the new republic. These new parties developed into competitive political parties in the 1948 election and ousted the PRN from power. Nevertheless, to preserve the traditional elitist structure, the PRN in order to stay in power blamed massive fraud for the opposition victory and nullified the 1948 election. The opposition forces led by Figueres responded with violence, causing a civil war that brought the birth of the second republic of Costa Rica. This transformed Costa Rica to a pluralist democracy with modern party pluralism as one of its central features (Carballo 1992, McDonald and Ruhl 1989).

It is doubtful, nevertheless, whether Costa Rica would have experienced this transformation without one major component. Costa Rica's second republic arose from an example of Anderson's "democratic revolution." Costa Rica's new constitution of 1949 abolished the military and broke, for the first time in Central America, the thread of the corporatist tradition by successfully eliminating one of the traditional corporatist groups -- the military. This factor is one of the strongest explaining the latter success of the democratic regime in Costa Rica. Ironically, Costa Rica's abolition of the military, which led to the breakdown of the corporatist tradition, usually receives sparse attention in
studies of Costa Rica's transition to democracy (Seligson 1990, Winson 1988). Figueres also successfully eliminated the possibility of political polarization outside the official political arena by banning the Communist Party (PVP) and the Calderonista Republicans (PRN) from participating in the upcoming elections. He prevented such a possible polarization by being able to generate the support of the masses for the PLN through incorporating socialist ideas in the PLN platform. Thus, "'the midwife' of this program that would eventually set Costa Rica on the path to economic revitalization and liberal democracy was a regime without an organic relationship to either the traditionally dominant class or to the organized proletariat" (Winson 1988, 99).

The other four countries reacted to the pressures of modernization by attempting to preserve the old structure. They developed political systems using repression and exclusion rather than inclusion. Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua responded to modernization by creating bureaucratic authoritarian regimes, sometimes with massive repression and exclusionary measures, to prevent new political parties and political movements from emerging in the national political arena. These policies led to the creation of special types of political parties and party systems in these four states that did not reflect the general Western notion of modern, competitive parties.
Rather, most of the political systems of the isthmus responded in the opposite manner; they created what Sartori (1976) calls a monocentristic, non-competitive party system. These were hegemonic party systems with dominant personalistic or military parties. Furthermore, Sartori states that this form of a monocentric party system is characterized by a repressive, or coercive, potential, while, [...] pluralism (or polypartism) is characterized in terms of expressive capability. To be sure that, repression does not consist of sheer physical force; it should be understood as indicating, more broadly, high mobilization and extractive capabilities obtained via mass manipulation (Sartori 1976, 282).

These four Central American regimes created authoritarian political parties that were dominant in the legislatures. The aggregative function of such parties was reduced mainly to the aspect of "the formulation of policy alternatives within the authoritarian party and authoritative governmental structures such as the bureaucracy and army" (Almond 1960, 41), and was thus not directed toward accommodation of the demands of the masses. Therefore, the political systems and regimes in these four isthmus countries saw, during the first half of the twentieth century, the creation of personal-military political parties operating as "state" or "regime" parties. The absence of competition in the political forum stripped parties of the functions of allocation and accommodation of the masses.
In El Salvador, the end of direct oligarchic control came in 1930 through the military coup of General Maximiliano Hernández Martínez, who ruled the country until 1944. Martínez created El Salvador’s first official party and forbade all other political parties in the country. Martínez was ousted by a military coup in 1944, which introduced 31 years of institutional military rule in El Salvador. The military created a new official party, the Partido Revolucionario de Unificación Democrática (PRUD). This official party lasted only 10 years and was eliminated in 1960 by the creation of a new official party, the Partido Conciliación Nacional (PCN). The purpose of both parties was clearly not to accommodate the masses, but to control and channel together military and oligarchic interests. PRUD and PCN "did not thrive on mobilizing the population, except to express support for government policies. The party did not have a permanent organizational structure; nor did it have much to do between the elections" (Baloyra 1982, 35).

Opposition parties, which had been allowed to operate from 1948 onwards, were clearly restricted and their purpose was only to provide a facade of competition during the elections and nothing else. The two most important opposition parties have been the Partido de Acción Renovadora (PAR), and the Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC). Other parties included the Partido Popular
Salvadoreño (PPS), Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR), Frente Unido Democrático Independiente (FUDI), Partido Republicano de Evolución Nacional (PREN) and others. The PREN and FUDI were basically splinter parties that emerged from the official party, and the PPS was a splinter party emerging from the PAR. All of these parties were clearly restricted in their ability to compete against the official party. For instance, Danby (1982, 4) points out that the 1956 election "was a classically fraudulent election in which progressive candidates were arbitrarily disqualified and the campaigns of all but the official party severely restricted". If an ideological shift occurred inside these opposition parties, the usual response of the regime was to prohibit the party, as in the case of the PAR in 1967. Here "the scandalized oligarchy urged that the PAR be banned and, after the election, it was" (Danby 1982, 5).

Increasing demands by the masses led to the creation of strong clandestine political movements in the country. The increasing strength and independence of the PDC led to massive fraud in the 1972, 1974, and 1976 elections, which permitted the military regime in El Salvador to stay in power. The 1972 elections saw the official end of the "political intermediaries" (Baloyra 1982) in the one party state of El Salvador. "A pesar de los intentos de institucionalización y de legitimación de su participación a través de la creación de partidos políticos, el PRUD ... y
el PCN ..., las Fuerzas Armadas no lograron consolidar un régimen estable y legítimo" (Eguizábal 1989, 2). The opposition parties in El Salvador, representing the middle class, were willing to engage in this form of restricted political participation and operated within the rules set by the military-oligarchic system to keep the new socialist and communist political movements out of the political arena.

The last ritualistic election in El Salvador was held in 1978 with the PCN and PPS as the only contenders in the race. The final breakdown of the exclusionary authoritarian regime in El Salvador came with the 1979 coup. The 1980s saw El Salvador's attempt to move toward democracy, or at least inclusionary authoritarianism, in order to prevent another social revolution in the isthmus. The first election held in El Salvador after the 1979 coup was in 1982; it brought an end to the military-oligarchic dominance.

What makes the 1982 election different from previous Salvadoran elections is that there was no official party. The PCN remained and ran in the election, but it no longer dominated the scene: it no longer had the means of coercion and fraud that had guaranteed it victories in the past, when it ran the government. The PCN was now closest to the extreme right, with most of the oligarchy (Danby 1982, 12).

Since 1982 El Salvador has begun to approximate a partially pluralistic party system, which includes a party spectrum from the right to center-left. Among others, the most important parties are on the right the Alianza
Republicana Nacional (ARENA), for the center the Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC), and for center-left the Convergencia Democrática (CD) (Baloyra 1982, chapters 1-3; Danby 1982).

Furthermore, one of the most pressing problems in El Salvador just recently came closer to resolution. El Salvador’s strongest political movement on the ideological left, the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), was finally recognized as a political party in 1992. Thus, the possibility of increasing polarization between the El Salvadoran government on one side and the FMLN on the other might finally decrease. The role of the FMLN as a political party and its overall success in El Salvador’s political arena have yet to be seen. In general it can be said that the FMLN considers itself as a "party-front" rather than one party because the former political movement is "made up of five different parties" (Martinez 1992).

Nicaragua historical evolution of the role of political parties was long similar to El Salvador’s, but changed dramatically due to the successful social revolution that begun in 1979. Nicaragua today has moved closer to a democratic pluralist party system than either El Salvador or Guatemala.

In the 1920s and 1930s, Nicaragua experienced a transformation of its two traditional parties, the Liberals and Conservatives. Increasing social mobilization and
deteriorating social conditions for the working class gave birth to new socialist and communist political parties in Nicaragua. But rather than adjusting to the new pressures and demands in the political system, Nicaragua opted for the creation of a military-oligarchic regime as in El Salvador. In 1936 Anastasio Somoza García, the leader of the newly created National Guard, ousted Nicaragua’s liberal president. That event marked the beginning of forty-three years of the Somozas’ dynastic dictatorship. Somoza García renamed the existing Liberal party as the Partido Liberal Nacionalista (PLN); it became Nicaragua’s official party until the revolution of 1979. The Conservative party was the only legally recognized opposition party until 1979, with the exception of the Partido Conservador Nicaragüense, which "obtained legal recognition by the government in 1956, as an ad hoc alternating party, because of the abstention of the other 'principal' party" (Reyes 1992, 180).

Differences between the Conservative party and the PLN regarding political power and policy eased over time for two reasons. First, ideological differences between them had basically vanished. Second, the Conservative party was willing to cooperate within the parameters of the Somoza dynasty and hence only provided "a facade of electoral opposition" (McDonald and Ruhl 1989, 35). Due to immense corruption in the regime, Conservative party members were given important positions in the bureaucracy and public
offices. No other political parties were legal in Nicaragua until 1979. Their only possibility to gain access to the legislature was within the boundaries of a coalition among one of the two historical parties. Thus, groups like the Partido Liberal Independiente (PLI), which split from the PLN in protest over Somoza’s third time reelection in 1944, and the Partido Social Cristiano (PSC), aligned themselves with the Conservative party in the 1967 election to gain access to the political arena. Other political parties in Nicaragua operated illegally and became clandestine political movements seeking mass-support to overthrow the existing regime (Booth 1986; McDonald and Ruhl 1989, chapter 3; Reyes 1992). The most important of these were the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN), the Partido Socialista Nicaragüense (PSN), and the Partido Social Cristiano Nicaragüense (PSCN), all on the left side of the ideological spectrum. During the 1970s, due to steadily increasing corruption and repression used by Anastasio Somoza Debayle, new conservative political parties and movements emerged and helped create the reformist Democratic Liberation Union (UDEL), which demanded the alteration of political power in Nicaragua. After the successful overthrow of the Somoza regime, Nicaragua experienced a brief revival of one-party dominance with the FSLN as the hegemonic party in the new revolutionary government (Junta de Gobierno). Several other parties existed and even held
cabinet posts and seats in the Consejo de Estado (Council of State). They were, however largely marginalized from real influence in the revolution and soon assumed a posture of opposition to the FSLN. Nevertheless, the Sandinistas promised to hold the first pluralist elections by 1985, which were ultimately held in 1984. For the first time basic rights were established to allow the institutionalization of political parties with the purpose of strengthening party pluralism in Nicaragua (Jonas 1989, 142). Hence, the revolutionary government began to institutionalize democracy for the first time in the history of Nicaragua. There appeared twelve legal parties, of which seven took part in the 1984 election. Three parties boycotted, and two were organized afterwards. Furthermore, the National Directorate declared any attempt to establish an official party or 'vanguard party' as illegal in order to prevent a return to dictatorship (Lacayo 1988).

Guatemala’s development of political parties is also heavily influenced by the military. The Guatemalan armed forces, however, never tried to establish a truly official party. Thus, the country’s political party spectrum can be described as rather more open and more competitive than that in Nicaragua before 1979 and El Salvador before 1982. The increasing political participation and pressure on the system led to Guatemala’s revolution of 1944-1954. During this period party pluralism flourished in Guatemala and the
country tried to develop a pluralist model of democracy, or at least followed a very broad inclusionary authoritarianism, by opening the political system to the new emerging power contenders (political parties) in the political arena. This development in the political party landscape is reflected in the fact that a large group of different ideological political parties supported General Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán’s campaign for the presidency in 1951. The ideological spectrum of these parties ranged from business and industrial groups represented in the Party of National Integration (PNI) to workers and peasants represented by the Revolutionary Action Party (PAR), to the Guatemalan Communist party (PGT) (Inforpress 1985).

This opening came to an abrupt end with the ouster of President Arbenz in 1954 through international intervention by the United States and the refusal of the military to defend the Arbenz regime (Handy 1988). After the 1954 coup the country saw an increase in the establishment of right-wing parties, which played an important role in the new constellation of the new regime. Among them were the Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca (DCG) founded in 1955, the Partido Revolucionario (PR) founded in 1957, the Partido Institucional Democratico (PID) founded in 1965, and the Movimiento de Liberación Nacional (MLN) founded in 1956.

The political parties of the left such as the PGT were declared illegal and had to operate as clandestine political
movements. Furthermore, the new political leader backed by the military and the oligarchy constructed a "sanitized" party system (McDonald and Ruhl 1989, 279) with parties allowed to participate in a political process that would not endanger the established status quo. During the 1970s to the beginning of the 1980s there developed a dramatic confrontation between the established political system and repressed mass political movements which increasingly turned to guerilla activities. In this era, the "national leaders of the excluded political parties on the center-left, the Democratic Socialist party (PSD) and the United Revolutionary Front (FUR), were assassinated by death squads linked to the security forces" (McDonald and Ruhl 1989, 281). In this era, the military was the most powerful social force in the country and controlled other groups (Ebel 1990; Handy 1988; Inforpress 1985). Often the armed forces in Guatemala used their power indirectly and established what Nordlinger (1977) describes as a typical coup d'etat within the context of praetorianism in which the military tries to operate in the background and return to the barracks after the installation of a stable, effective military-civilian government within the parameters set by the military. So far, it is rather doubtful whether the democratization effort occurring in Guatemala is a true shift toward democratic pluralism or whether the recent changes amount to nothing more than a new adjustment to ease
the pressure of mass political movements by providing some relief to mass political participation by carefully including some new political parties in the legislature from the left side of the spectrum.

Honduras represents an unusual case in the development of political parties and party systems. The country has a strong bipartisan political system still composed of the two traditional political parties, which emerged in the late nineteenth century -- Liberals and conservatives. The Liberal party of Honduras is the Partido Liberal de Honduras (PLH) and the conservative movement has taken the name the Partido Nacional de Honduras (PNH). Both parties combined vote has yet to fall below 90% of all the votes in a parliamentary election. These two parties are among the most institutionalized in the isthmus, and are probably the oldest. The PLH has participated in general elections since 1902 and the PNH since 1923.

Two factors distinguish Honduras' party system: First, Honduras is definitely the poorest country of the whole isthmus and social and economic development has not affected the political system so deeply as in all the other countries. Second, the military and the political parties were willing to adjust to the political system gradually to the demands of the masses. Both political actors pursued in collaboration with each other a reformist style of military-civilian government. Rosenberg (1990, 525) states: "Indeed,
one of the distinguishing characteristics of Honduran political life is the fact that it has been the military, not the civilians, who have consistently been responsive to popular needs". Thus, the PLH and PNH still represent the military and oligarchic interests of the country, but they (and the armed forces) introduced reform programs to accommodate the masses. Fiallos states that

en Honduras los partidos políticos tradicionales han venido expresando las ideas políticas de la oligarquía nacional, han sido el brazo político del centro de poder capitalista, a quienes éstos ha señalado la tarea de promover su ideología en el seno del pueblo. No se debe olvidar que la oligarquía se apoya en las masas a quienes controla ideológicamente, política y sindicalmente (Fiallos 1986, 34).

Furthermore, the country has experienced the emergence of new political parties in the 1950s. These parties have been the Movimiento Nacional Reformista (MNR) founded in 1954 and the Partido Republicano Ortodoxo (PRO) founded in 1958. These parties were unable to gain mass support and basically faded away without any major political impact. In the 1960s, two new parties emerged in Honduras, achieving legal status in 1978 and 1980. The first was the Partido de Innovación y Unidad (PINU) the latter Partido Democrática Cristiano de Honduras (PDC). Neither has made a large impact on the domination of the two historical parties. The total vote for both parties in recent general elections has been less than 5% (Paz 1992; Fiallos 1986; Paz 1986; Rosenberg 1990).
As seen in the above case studies of Nicaraguan, El Salvadoran, and Guatemalan party development, exclusionary authoritarian regimes created political parties which clearly represented their interests and their particular ideological outlook and regulated, restricted, or repressed ideologically different political parties. This typically resulted in the repression of mass political participation in the political process of the particular country.

By focusing on Central America's political parties this review attempted to make clear that the rather broad generalizations of the role of political parties, so often used for all Latin American countries, are not sufficient. Many of the studies used in the literature review tend to over generalize and to underestimate the importance and diversity of the political parties in the Latin American hemisphere (Anderson 1967; Di Tella 1990; Scott 1966; Wiarda 1974; 1990; Wynia 1984). Furthermore, studies of Central American parties in particular tend to be descriptive and centered around case studies. However, the historical overview just presented demonstrates that the roles of political parties differ vastly from country to country as well as across time within countries. This very diversity within the region warrants further detailed analysis. Only with the recent democratization efforts in all five Central American countries has scholarly attention been redirected to the role of political parties in the isthmus. But even
the latest studies use a descriptive methodology and case studies (Goodman, LeoGrande and Mendelson-Formam 1992) and eschew theoretical implications to the analysis of political parties. Only a few recent studies concentrating on Latin America as one entity try to incorporate some quantitative analysis within the study of political parties (Dix 1992, McDonald and Ruhl 1989, Remmer 1991).

One major research effort has attempted to analyze the political party system and the resulting party fractionalization (McDonald and Ruhl 1989). However, this particular analysis is flawed in several ways. First, McDonald and Ruhl develop a table that describes the significance of the political parties for all Latin American countries from 1968 to 1988 in four categories. The four categories rank parties from dominant actors to marginal ones. In this analysis they rank the political parties in the isthmus as follows:

Table 2.1 Political Significance of Political Parties in the Isthmus, 1968-19881

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parties as dominant actors</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties as primary but non-dominant actors</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties as secondary actors</td>
<td>El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This classification seems in error on the grounds that
El Salvador, Guatemala, and particularly Nicaragua have experienced widely different developments in the role and purpose of political parties that are completely neglected in this categorical table. For instance, the most dramatic case can be seen in the change that political parties underwent in Nicaragua. As shown by the literature review above, one may argue that the political parties in Nicaragua have become the most dominant actors in Nicaragua since 1979, and particularly so since the 1984 elections. Thus, this classification is completely skewed and based on an arbitrary scaling system.

McDonald and Ruhl also use Rae's (1967) fractionalization index to determine the fractionalization of the party system in Latin American countries. This quantitative index is based on simple probability statistics and measures to determine the number of political parties in a system and to incorporate the competitive strength of each party. It seeks to determine whether the party system may be classified as a "one-, two-, or multi-party system". Basically, the measure reflects the probability of the diadic agreement of two voters voting for the same political party, which is converted in a scale ranging from 0 to 1 (Rae 1967). McDonald and Ruhl compute this index to determine the type the party system for each Latin American country. This measure is flawed for the following reasons: They compute the fractionalization index only for one
particular period, for instance, for the Mesoamerican countries the calculation was done for Nicaragua in 1984, Costa Rica in 1986, El Salvador in 1988, Honduras in 1985, and Guatemala in 1985. They state that the "fractionalization score for El Salvador does not reflect the existence of some important leftist parties that did not participate in elections. The apparent fractionalization of.. [the] Nicaraguan system is artificial given the actual dominance of the ruling parties in those two countries" (McDonald and Ruhl 1989, 11). I believe that McDonald and Ruhl should not have employed Rae's fractionalization index to classify the party systems. First, it is very temporally limited to show the fractionalization score for only one election in each country. Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua have been undergoing a major political transition, which is reflected in the formation and emergence of new political parties. Nicaragua's 1990 election rather produced what is properly called a multiparty system if one acknowledges that the UNO coalition actually was composed of over ten political parties representing an ideological spectrum from far left to far right. Hence, the 1984 fractionalization score is already obsolete for Nicaragua. Rae's fractionalization index would best be used in a possible comparison of several elections over time. Furthermore, the variables employed in this particular fractionalization index need further scrutiny. Sartori
(1976) argues that Rae "actually overvalues the larger parties and compresses too quickly the smaller ones - as obvious since the party percentage are squared" (Sartori 1976, 307).

Only two scholarly studies (Remmer 1991, and Dix 1992) employ a cross-national, longitudinal quantitative analyses of the development of political parties. Dix (1992) studies the prospects of the recent democratization efforts by examining the institutionalization of political parties in Latin America in two different time periods. To analysis party institutionalization he uses the four categories (adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence) suggested by Huntington to measure party institutionalization. Dix (1992) finds that "on the whole, Latin America party systems, as well as many individual parties, were somewhat more institutionalized as the 1990s began than they were during Latin America's previous democratic heyday around 1960s." The analysis has to be considered very carefully because he only includes parties winning 10 percent or more in the elections. This arbitrary cut off point has the effect that it excludes most new political groups, which seldom immediately generate mass support among the electorates. This problem is particularly noticeable in the cases of El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala. Therefore, I do not agree with Dix's overall findings.
Remmer (1991) focuses on the impact of the economic crisis in Latin America in the 1980s upon the electoral outcomes of political parties. To examine the impact of the economic crisis on the political process she studies 21 competitive presidential elections from 12 different countries. Remmer finds that short term economic factors -- exchange rate, inflation and immediate variances in GDP -- explain over 60 percent "of the variance in overall electoral discontinuity" (Remmer 1991) in the studied Latin American elections. Unfortunately, Remmer's findings have to be taken with considerable caution mainly due to limitation in the data. Her dependent variable "electoral change" is measured by the change in the incumbent vote from the previous election, even though it may not have been held under competitive and free conditions. Therefore, the findings may be flawed, especially because 12 of the 21 elections "occurred in the 'new' democracies that had emerged as part of the post-1979 wave of authoritarian breakdown" (Remmer 1991). Thus, the base value election performance against which change was measured may be a fraudulent or manipulated result. Furthermore, Remmer does not consider how the loss of the votes by the incumbent party is distributed among other participating parties. Nor does she consider whether the electoral change in the incumbent vote might be due to a greater party fragmentation derived from a higher level of democracy in these countries.
A critically important question is whether these political parties and political movements gain access to the political process in the political system, or whether they have to operate as clandestine movements, as seen in El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua. In focusing on this question one should ask what are the attributes and factors that account for the development of political parties in modern societies and facilitate the possibility of legal representation in the political system.

The Modernization and Political Development Approach

LaPalombara and Weiner (1966) argue that the emergence and formation of political parties is driven by the transformation of a traditional society into a modernizing one. The expansion of the flow of information available to the citizens, the expansion of infrastructure and transportation networks, and the growth of technology all augment internal markets. Such economic development has a profound effect on the socio-political development of the society. It leads to an increase in social mobility of the population and changes the perception of the citizenry, in particular, masses' perception of their relationship to authority (LaPalombara and Weiner 1966, chapter 1).

Huntington (1968, 1971) provides the best elaboration of this theory. He argues that political modernization and political change in a society are ultimately linked to the
relationship between political participation and political institutionalization. Huntington holds that the fundamental source of expansion in political participation can be attributed to nonpolitical socio-economic processes generally associated with modernization. They "focus on social processes -- such as industrialization, urbanization, commercialization, literacy expansion, occupational mobility -- which are presumed to be part of modernization and to have implications for political change" (Huntington 1971, 309). Political participation may be enhanced as economic modernization produces socially mobilized individuals. Socially mobilized individuals then confront mobility constraints that force many to abandon the traditional socio-economic structure, which in turn leads to social frustration and produces an increase in political participation (Huntington 1968, chapter 1). Thus, "the institutions of a modern polity must organize the participation of the mass of the population. ..., The distinctive institution of modern polity, consequently, is the political party" (Huntington 1968 p. 89). This argument is also advanced by LaPalombara and Weiner (1966), who assert that any possible internal political crisis [political instability] during the transition period of a political system leads also to the appearance and formation of new political parties and political movements. LaPalombara and Weiner list several possible instability
factors leading to the creation of new political movements and political parties: wars, inflation, depression, mass population movements, demographic changes, occupational patterns, agricultural or industrial developments, and the mass media.

As seen in the literature review, one of the key factors is the environment in which parties have to operate -- that is, how a particular regime reacts to increased political participation. Remmer (1989) argues that political systems, whether authoritarian or democratic, can respond to the demands for political participation in two different ways, which largely encompass the observed development of the political systems in Central America. Remmer, particularly focuses on the possible response of authoritarian regimes, which she divides into inclusionary authoritarianism and exclusionary authoritarianism. Thus, the political option for any authoritarian regime might be inclusionary -- to decrease possible political participation occurring outside governmental control by including new political forces (political parties and political movements) in the political system. Or it could use exclusionary behavior to repress the new political actors and might thus force the emerging political movements or parties into a clandestine role (Remmer 1989, chapter 1). Inclusionary authoritarianism integrates the new political forces in the political process, thereby decreasing the possibility of
political polarization and the threat of political instability by providing at least some access for political actors. This is usually achieved by permitting new political parties and movements to participate in the national legislative body. Inclusionary authoritarianism, however, should not be equated with true liberalization. Opening the political arena to new groups does not necessarily mean an immediate transition to a democratic competitive system. But even highly controlled inclusion certainly enhances the possibility of democratization and lowers the possibility of class polarization. Thus, it can avoid the alienation of the masses from the regime and increase the chances of a social revolution or national revolt in a country.

The emergence of a political party clearly implies that the masses must be taken into account by the political elite, either out of the commitment to the ideological notion that the masses have a right to participate in the determination of public policy or the selection of leadership, or out of the realization that even the rigidly dictatorial elite must find the organizational means of assuring stable conformance and control (LaPalombara and Weiner 1966, 5).

Based on the foregoing theoretical framework, the following hypotheses have been formulated:

H₁: The degree of party fragmentation [number of political parties] increases with higher levels of democracy [or inclusionary authoritarianism] within a political system, ceteris paribus.

H₂: The degree of party fragmentation increases with an increase in socio-economic modernization,
ceteris paribus.

H₃ Higher levels of democracy lead to greater diversification of ideology among parties participating in the political process as defined in terms of legislative representation, ceteris paribus.

The diverse development of the role of political parties in the political systems and of the established political party systems in the five Central American nations offers a remarkable opportunity, by using electoral and other data, to test these hypotheses on party fragmentation and party polarization with a quantitative cross-national time-series analysis.
CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH DESIGN, METHOD, AND ANALYSIS

Here I attempt to test the hypotheses through a quantitative analysis of the factors affecting political party fragmentation and political party polarization in the Central American nations. I will move away from the typical historical and descriptive case study that is so commonly used in the analysis of political parties in Central America. I believe that existing broad generalizations about the Latin American political parties and party systems are inadequate. The quantitative analysis will make use of multiple cross-sectional time series regression analysis, contingency tables and figures, all including time considerations, to explain the development of party fragmentation, and polarization. By incorporating time as a dimension of measurement it is possible to move away from the fallacies of McDonald's and Ruhl's static quantitative analysis of the Latin American countries. Further, it will expand Booth's argument (1989) that analyses concerned with political participation should not be taken out of their longer historical context and not studied as if static phenomena.
This analysis will encompass only the five Central American countries rather than focusing on Latin America as a whole. This has several advantages. By testing hypotheses on a cross-sectional analysis, every research design is faced with the problem of too many specific independent factors (variables) as well as structural and cultural differences among the countries chosen for the study. As a potential solution to this problem it is argued that "the area concept will be of great value, since certain political processes will be compared between units within the area against a common background of similar trait configurations" (Macridis and Cox 1953 in Lijphart 1971). One has to be aware that the comparability of the cases and their variables selected for the study in different countries is not always present, but as Lijphart notes "more likely within an area than in a randomly selected set of countries" (Lijphart 1971). Thus, quantitative analysis that uses a "most-similar-system design" has the advantage that "common systemic characteristics are conceived of as 'controlled for,' whereas intersystemic differences are viewed as explanatory variables" (Przeworski and Teune 1970).

Dependent and Independent Variables

The dependent variables in this model are political party fragmentation and political party polarization in the legislatures of the five Central American countries. For
the purposes of comparison, the dependent variables will be analyzed on a country by country basis. Furthermore, party fragmentation will be analyzed by using a multivariate cross-national times series regression analysis.

The independent variables used in the study are the level of democracy and socio-economic modernization. Note that this part of the analysis only employs variables derived from the theoretical framework. Other independent variables that may influence party fragmentation and polarization are excluded. It was decided not to include other variables in this study for reasons of simplicity. In Lijphart’s words,

comparative analysis must avoid the danger of being overwhelmed by large numbers of variables and, as a result, losing the possibility of discovering controlled relationships, and it must therefore judiciously restrict itself to the really key variables, omitting those of only marginal importance (Lijphart 1971).

Nevertheless, the exclusion of other factors from the quantitative analysis does not mean that these factors are necessarily perceived as unimportant. It was decided to discuss separately some of these factors later on.

Hypotheses

Based on the literature review in Chapter 2, the following hypotheses are examined concerning the relationship between the independent variables (level of democracy and socio-economic modernization) and the
dependent variables (party fragmentation and party polarization):

\( H_1 \): The degree of party fragmentation [number of political parties] increases with higher levels of democracy [or inclusionary authoritarianism] within a political system, ceteris paribus.

\( H_2 \): The degree of party fragmentation increases with an increase in socio-economic modernization, ceteris paribus.

\( H_3 \): Higher levels of democracy lead to greater diversification of ideology among parties participating in the political process as defined in terms of legislative representation, ceteris paribus.

Conceptual Definitions and Measurement

Before focusing on the specific conceptualizations and measurement of the dependent and independent variables, it is necessary to define the term "political parties" in this study. I employ Sartori's (1976) definition, which is generally widely recognized: "A party is any political group identified by an official label that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections (free or nonfree), candidates for public office" (Sartori 1976, 63). This definition has the advantage that other political movements or political parties which are not running in elections are excluded. One is thus able to precisely identify political parties through the use of election data.

Party fragmentation is defined quite simply as the
number of political parties participating in an election \( N_e \) (Rae 1967) and is measured by counting the number of political parties participating in each election. Thus, fragmentation is measured on a ratio scale, starting at 1 for one political party.

**Party polarization (ideological spectrum of political parties)** is defined in terms of the "ideological-patterning" (Sartori 1976, 137) reflected through the ideological party spectrum of the participating parties in each country. Party polarization is measured by coding each political party's ideological position at the time of an election. The applied categories are coded on a right-left continuum a.) right, b.) right-center, c.) center, d.) center-left, e.) left.\(^1\) Then the percentage of votes won by parties belonging to one specific category in a particular election are added together. Thus, the measured aggregates of each election can be compared in each individual country over the observed elections.

**Democracy** is defined in terms of the level of democratization of a country at the time of the election. Vanhanen's argument is followed, which asserts that to compare and measure particular characteristics of democracy "it is necessary to limit measurement and comparison to some particular characteristics that are empirically measurable

\(^1\) For the exact explanation of coding procedures of these categories see appendix A.
and comparable from one country to another and that can be assumed to indicate some crucial characteristics of a political system from the perspective of democratization" (Vanhanen 1990, 11). In this respect, Vanhanen argues that the two best indicators for a comparison of the level of democracy can be derived from Dahl's (1971) argument that the level of democracy in a country is determined by "public contestation and the right to participate" (Vanhanen 1990, 17). Vanhanen's formula is used to measure the level of democracy through the concept of public contestation, which is measured by "subtracting the percentage of the votes won by the largest party [in an election] from 100." Participation is measured by the percentage of the total population that actually voted in the election. Further, Vanhanen argues that "it seems plausible to assume that both of them [the indicators] are important to democracy". Therefore, the two indicators are weighted equally by multiplying both indicators and dividing the calculated number by 100 (Vanhanen 1990, 17-18). Thus, the level of democracy is measured on a ratio scale, starting at 0.

**Socio-economic modernization** is defined in terms of social and economic changes occurring within a political system. Huntington defines socio-economic modernization according to changes in industrialization, urbanization, commercialization, literacy, and occupational mobility (Huntington 1971, 309). Therefore, socio-economic
modernization is measured by combining an economic and a social indicator for each country during the time of an election. Due to data collection problems and measurement errors the most widely used and accepted indicators for measuring, the economic condition of a country over a certain period of time are either the Gross National Product (GNP) per capita or the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. The most commonly used social indicator, educational attainment, is measured by the adult literacy rate in a country. Due to advantages in the collection of GDP per capita data over the GNP per capita, the socio-economic modernization index is constructed by adding the z scores of the GDP/capita and literacy rate of each country during the year of the general election and dividing the results by 2. This is done by using the statistical tool of normalization, which allows the researcher to combine both indicators to create the desired socio-economic modernization variable.

Data

Data for the dependent variables (party fragmentation and party polarization) and for the independent variable (level of democracy) for all five isthmian countries have been collected from the Enciclopedia electoral Latinoamericana y del Caribe (ed. Nohlen 1993) IIDH. Data for the other independent variable socio-economic development were collected from the Statistical Appendix of

Analysis

The following quantitative analysis attempts to test the hypotheses stated above. The analysis consists of two separate parts because the quantitative analysis focuses on two different dependent variables (party polarization and party fragmentation). At the end of this chapter, the contribution of the quantitative analysis to the theoretical arguments concerning political parties and party systems in Central America is explored.

In order to test the hypothesis concerning the increase of party polarization in relation to the level of democracy, a figure is created for each Central American nation. The figure shows the ideological party-spectrum of the political parties participating in the election according to the percentage of votes received in the election.² The basic

² Appendix B lists all political parties in each country coded according to the ideological party continuum at the time of the election.
idea for using a graph to demonstrate the ideological party-spectrum of political parties in these elections comes from Sartori (1976). The analysis covers the period of parliamentary/legislative and general assembly elections for each isthmian country as follows: Costa Rica, 1953-1990; Nicaragua, 1947-1990; Guatemala, 1958-1990; Honduras, 1956-1989; and El Salvador, 1950-1991. Each graph is accompanied by a table listing the level of democracy score of each country at the time of each election. Then the results are analyzed. As shown in Figures 3.1-3.5 compared with Tables 3.1-3.5 the overall results for all five isthmus countries show that party polarization [ideological party-spectrum] of parties participating in the election increases with a higher level of democracy in the country. Furthermore, the results illustrate that the expansion in the party polarization comes from the center and left of the ideological spectrum, but not from the right particularly evident in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua.

Focusing on Nicaragua, Figure 3.1 and Table 3.1 show that the levels of democracy in all elections before the 1979 revolutions are rather low. This is illustrated by the fact that their range is between 3 and 9. Party polarization in that time is very narrow. Political parties of the center-left and left of the party-spectrum are not represented at all. The center of the party-spectrum is only represented in the 1967 election, which was a coalition
of three political parties -- the PCN, PLI, and PSC. Thus, Figure 3.1 shows the dominance of the right and center-right parties during this period with the dominant political party, the PLN, representing the center-right of the party-spectrum. The percentage of votes won by the PLN in the elections varies between 50% and 90%.

In contrast, the 1984 and 1990 elections in Nicaragua show a rapid increase in the level of democracy, which in 1984 was over 12 and for 1990 over 18.

Similarly, the level of party polarization broadly expands and shifts to the left. The right and center-right are not represented, but the party-spectrum is expanded to include the center, center-left, and left. Here, one has to say that the results for the 1990 election are probably distorted because the UNO coalition, which included thirteen different political parties, is ranked in the ideological center due to measurement problems. But UNO incorporates a wide range of political parties from right to left and was formed as an oppositional force against the FSLN. Therefore, the decision to rank UNO as a center party might be regarded as arbitrary, but can be defended because most dominant parties in this coalition are gathered around the center of the ideological party-spectrum.

In conclusion, it can be said that Nicaragua represents a unique case because of its social revolution, which saw the elimination of the traditionally recognized political
Table 3.1: Democratic Indicators for Nicaragua

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Dem. Ind.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>7.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>4.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>3.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>2.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>9.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>9.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>3.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>12.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>18.70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3.1:

**Party Polarization in Nicaragua**

(Ideological Party-Spectrum)

![Graph showing party polarization in Nicaragua from 1947 to 1990. The graph plots the percentage of votes in elections over the years, with markers for Right, Center-Right, Center, Center-Left, and Left political positions.)
parties the PLN and PCN that had long represented the right-wing of the party-spectrum. At this juncture it is assumed that the political party-spectrum regarding the center-right of Nicaragua will likely be occupied separately by various parties in the next election in 1996. This is because increasing differences within the UNO coalition, which could easily lead to its breakup.

Figure 3.2 and Table 3.2 show that El Salvador had particularly weak democracy levels up to 1982 and was basically dominated from 1950 to 1982 by the right and center-right of the party-spectrum. It should be noted that the democracy index for 1950 has to be regarded as an outlier, because both political parties (PRUD and PAN) that participated in the 1950 election were right-wing parties. Interestingly, Figure 3.2 and Table 3.2 reveal that El Salvador experienced a marked increase in the level of democracy in 1982 the date of the end of the official party in El Salvador. Furthermore, the increased level of democracy is accompanied by an increase in the party polarization of the participating political parties, which expands to the center-left and left in the ideological party-spectrum. The right wing of the party-spectrum loses its overwhelmingly dominant position mainly in favor of the center political parties.

El Salvador further saw, between the middle of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, a more modest increase
Table 3.2: Democratic Indicators for El Salvador

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Dem. Ind.</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Dem. Ind.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>15.30</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>7.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>7.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>5.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>1.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>19.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>5.52</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>10.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>4.51</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>11.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>5.84</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>12.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3.2:

Party Polarization in El Salvador
(Ideological Party Spectrum)
of the level of democracy. This increase reflects the development of the inclusionary style of authoritarianism in El Salvador, which resulted in a milder increase in party polarization, including the center and center-left ideological parties. This development was interrupted in 1974, and led to the use of massive fraud in the electoral results that marks the beginning of El Salvador's period of exclusionary authoritarianism. Thus, because of extensive fraud the electoral results cannot be analyzed for the 1974 and 1976 elections; and therefore are left out of the analysis. Nevertheless, it can be said that by focusing on the distribution of seats in the Salvador legislature the developing trend of party polarization was reversed. That is, in 1976, the "official" right-wing party PCN took all the legislative seats.

Figure 3.3 and Table 3.3 show the relationship between the level of democracy and party polarization in Guatemala. At the outset it should be mentioned that the elections in 1974, 1978, and 1982 were characterized by massive fraud; therefore, the results for these elections could not be utilized. One has to realize that during the late 1970s, Guatemala's political life was shaped and formed by political violence against left-wing guerilla groups and political movements (political parties, trade unions, and student associations, among others), that had tried to represent and accommodate the masses. Before this period,
Table 3.3: Democratic Indicators for Guatemala

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Demo. Ind.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>5.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>6.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>4.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>3.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>6.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>7.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>20.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>14.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>14.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3.3:

Party Polarization in Guatemala
(Ideological Party-spectrum)
Guatemala had a rather modest democracy index in comparison with El Salvador, ranking between 4 and 7, and a narrow ideological party-spectrum ranging in the 1960s only from right to center. By analyzing these democracy scores and party polarization, one has to bear in mind that the participating parties were closely scrutinized by the military. Ebel (1990) argues that the military "licensed" a political party system in Guatemala from 1963 to 1983, which incorporated the major traditions derived from the revolutionary decade of the country. In 1984, Guatemala experienced a sharp rise in the level of democracy as measured by Vanhanen's index, which fell slightly in 1985 and 1990, but still remained well above all pre-1984 elections. Figure 3.3 shows that party polarization in the legislature expanded in the 1980s to include center-left parties, and in 1990 even left-wing political parties. Furthermore, the right wing parties lost their dominance in favor of center and center-left political parties.

Costa Rica and Honduras constitute distinct cases, which is not surprising given their different development patterns outlined in the literature review.

The results for Costa Rica (Figure 3.4 and Table 3.4) show that it has the highest democratic indicators of all the isthmus countries ranging roughly from 8 to 25. Furthermore, due to Costa Rica's consistently high indicators of democracy, there is no clear expansion of the
Table 3.4: Democratic Indicators for Costa Rica

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Demo. Ind.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>7.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>12.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>16.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>15.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>16.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>21.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>23.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>20.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>23.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>25.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3.4:

Party Polarization in Costa Rica
(Ideological Party-Spectrum)
ideological party-spectrum in this country. Rather, Costa Rica's party-spectrum is relatively skewed in favor of center, center-left, and left-wing political parties. Thus, Costa Rica has virtually no political party representing the right wing of the party-spectrum. This situation might change in the near future because both major parties in Costa Rica the PLN and the PUSC are in the process of changing their party roles and ideologies. Thus, the PLN may have to be classified as a center party and the PUSC as a right-center party in future classification schemes. Nevertheless, if one were to extrapolate from the Costa Rican case, one might expect that with further democratization the extreme right wing of the political party-spectrum will eventually decline further. As noted in Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador, higher scores on the democratic indicator were accompanied by a decline of the percentages won by right wing political parties in the observed elections.

Finally, Honduras presents the most unusual case in the isthmus. As Figure 3.5 and Table 3.5 show, its results little resemble the previous observations on the other four nations. In general, the democracy indicators are relatively high in Honduras, ranking from over 7 to around 18 if one disregards the aberrant 1956 score of 3.35, which should be considered as an outlier. The 1956 elections were not free.
Table 3.5: Indicator of the Level of Democracy at the Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Dem. Ind.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>3.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>7.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>12.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>10.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>13.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>14.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>18.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>18.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3.5:

Party Polarization in Honduras
(Ideological Party-Spectrum)
The winning party, the Partido Unión Nacional (PUN), was a party created ad hoc for this particular election under the leadership of Julio Lozano Díaz, which "claimed to win with nearly 90 per cent of the 'vote'" (Bulmer-Thomas 1991, 207). Two weeks after the elections the military ousted Lozano and the PUN disappeared from the Honduran political forum. Interestingly, Honduras' relatively high levels of democracy are not mirrored by broad party polarization. Rather, the two dominant political parties, the PLH and PNH, are gathered in the center and center-right of the possible party-spectrum. Honduras' party-spectrum does not yet include an ideological right-wing (disregarding 1956) or left-wing party.

The lack of a left party will probably change in the 1997 elections, because recently the Honduran Congress legally recognized the Partido Unificación Democrática (PUD) as the country's fifth legal party. In general the recognition of the PUD is perceived as an attempt to accommodate the Honduran ideological left. The PUD in 1997 will participate for the first time in general elections. Honduras' current two minor parties, the PINU (ideological center) and the PDC (ideological center-left), have virtually no influence on the party system due to their weakness in general elections.

It seems that the democracy indicator for Honduras does not explain the weak party polarization in the country. Due
to the ceteris paribus clause applied in this analysis, one can say that the democratic indicator exerts almost no influence on party polarization in Honduras. Therefore, factors other than the democracy variable must have a stronger influence on the country's party polarization. Thus, political polarization in Honduran society, if it is occurring at all, may be taking place elsewhere than in political parties. This can be seen, especially in the 1970s, when the Honduran left was extremely active in grass roots politics. Rather than working through political parties they operated through worker and peasant unions. Such groups declined somewhat in the early 1980s when the military increased its repression of opposition groups (Morris 1984, Street 1985).

To summarize this part of the analysis, it may be said that the ceteris paribus hypothesis predicting an increase in party polarization [the ideological party-spectrum] of political parties participating in general elections due to an increase in the level of democracy of a country, is strongly supported in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Costa Rica. The analysis showed an increase in party polarization in the observed election in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala associated with an increase in the level of democracy in each country. The wide party polarization in Costa Rica stayed fairly constant as there persisted a high democracy index. Only the results for
Honduras showed a rather weak relationship between the two variables.

Furthermore, it should be noted that the observed rise of party polarization led to a decline of parties on the right wing of the ideological spectrum in favor of center and center-left parties.

This analysis supports the hypothesis that a higher level of democracy leads to greater diversification of ideology among parties participating in the political process as defined in terms of legislative representation. Unfortunately, the analysis does not reveal whether the growth of party polarization is somehow related to the absolute number of political parties participating in the elections. Therefore, the next step is to analyze the possibility of a change in the number of political parties participating in the elections in these countries. The problem for this analysis is that, due to the ceteris paribus clause employed in quantitative analyses, it is necessary to eliminate cases that may distort the results. This can be done "by selecting a set of homogeneous countries for which a ceteris paribus clause for the non-controlled variables can be presumed" (Sartori 1976, 309).

In spite of already applying a regional study for the five isthmus countries, one has to control for differences of electoral structure among the five countries, which may lead to a distortion of the results. Studies by Lijphart
(1985, 1990) and Rae (1967) suggest a relationship between the type of electoral system (whether a majority, plurality, or proportional representation) and the party system, as well as the number and strength of political parties in the political system. Thus, the intended quantitative analysis must take into account differences in the electoral systems among Central American countries in order to achieve greater likelihood of equality in the selected cases.

It should be noted that today's electoral systems in the isthmus are quite similar. All five Central American countries use proportional representation systems as the basic electoral system to distribute the allocated percentages of votes for each party in determining their share of seats in the national legislative body. Proportional representation was introduced in Costa Rica in 1913, Guatemala in 1946, Nicaragua in 1950, Honduras in 1957, and El Salvador in 1963. Due to differences in the electoral systems in three of the five countries for certain periods [Nicaragua (1947), Honduras (1956), and El Salvador (1950-1961)] these cases are excluded from the regression analysis. Therefore, the analysis covers all general elections to parliaments, legislatures, or general

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assemblies in the five isthmus countries during the following period: Costa Rica, 1953-1990 (10 cases); El Salvador, 1964-1991 (12 cases); Nicaragua, 1950-1990 (8 cases); Honduras, 1957-1989 (7 cases); and Guatemala, 1958-1990 (8 cases). Due to data problems [missing data] the dependent variables for the Guatemalan elections in 1974, 1978, and 1982 are excluded from the analysis. The data for the fraudulent El Salvadoran elections of 1974 and 1976 are included in the analysis because the number of participating political parties could be determined despite the falsification of results. Thus, all observations combined include 46 cases in the data set.

The following correlation and regression analysis includes two parts. First, a correlation matrix is employed to examine the relations between the dependent variable, number of political parties participating in the general elections (NPE), and the independent variables, level of democracy (DEMO) and socio-economic modernization (SEMI). The zero-order correlation matrix helps to illustrate the interrelationship among the variables in the study for each country and for the isthmus as a whole.

Concerning the correlation between the dependent variable NPE and the independent variables DEMO and SEMI Table 3.6 demonstrates a strong to moderate correlation between the number of parties (NPE) and the democracy index (DEMO) in all five countries: Costa Rica (0.84), El Salvador
(0.72), Nicaragua (0.89), Honduras (0.50), Guatemala (0.89), and for all five Central American countries (0.69).

Table 3.6: Matrix of Pearson Product Moment Correlations ($r$) of Number of Political Parties in Election (NPE), Democracy (DEMO), and Socio-Economic Modernization (SEMI), by country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NPE</th>
<th>DEMO</th>
<th>SEMI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Costa Rica:</strong> (10 cases)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPE</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMO</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEMI</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>El Salvador:</strong> (12 cases)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPE</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMO</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEMI</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nicaragua:</strong> (8 cases)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPE</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMO</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEMI</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Honduras:</strong> (7 cases)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPE</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMO</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEMI</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Guatemala:</strong> (9 cases)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPE</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMO</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEMI</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Isthmus:</strong> (46 cases)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPE</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMO</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEMI</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Furthermore, there is generally a positive correlation between NPE and the socio-economic modernization index (SEMI), which varies from moderate to strong: Costa Rica (0.87), Nicaragua (0.48), Honduras (0.67), Guatemala (0.96), and for all five countries (0.51). Only El Salvador holds a weak correlation between NPE and SEMI with (0.26).

The correlations between the dependent variable NPE and the independent variables DEMO and SEMI show generally the same pattern, which consists of a rather strong to moderate positive correlation of the variables. So far, the findings tend to confirm the hypotheses that the number of political parties participating in elections in a political system is positively associated with the level of socio-economic modernization and the level of democracy. Furthermore, it should be noted that due to the rather high correlations of both independent variables with each other in Costa Rica, Honduras, and Guatemala multicollinearity between the two independent variables may present a problem in multiple regression analyses.

Second, to assess the scope of the positive correlation between the dependent and independent variables, a multiple regression analysis is performed. It should be noted that the data gathered for this analysis are structured in space and time. Thus, the data represent a cross-sectional design of five countries combined with a longitudinal component of elections in different time periods of the five countries.
This constellation is an unusual case, as Stimson argues that scholars in comparative politics "do comparative analyses across space, dynamic analyses over time, but almost never do we do dynamic comparison" (Stimson 1985). The data in this analysis precisely represent such a case, which is commonly referred to as a panel design. Furthermore, Stimson (1985) argues that pooling data "across both units and time points can be an extraordinarily robust research design, allowing the study of causal dynamics across multiple cases, where the potential cause may even appear at different times in different cases." He points out that the problem of an analysis over space and time using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression is that OLS does not account for the problem of heteroskedasticity in the data and does not identify the structure of independent units (cross-sectional data) in the analysis. Thus, Stimson (1985) develops a so-called "covariance model" to account for the independent units by using dummy variables for the units and one unit as the reference case to control for structural differences in the cross-sectional analysis. Furthermore, OLS does not control for the problem of possible heteroskedasticity among countries. White (1980), Newey and West (1987) show that a basic test for heteroskedasticity is possible by comparing the consistent estimator of the OLS analysis with the covariance matrix estimator. These scholars argue that there is no
heteroskedasticity problem involved if the two different t-ratio estimators present the same or roughly the same results in both analyses. The t-ratio is computed through dividing the coefficient by the standard error. Therefore, to control for this kind of problem Newey and West's (1987) Robust Covariance matrix (CV) and OLS are employed in the longitudinal analysis.

Furthermore, in the discussion of the findings I concentrate on the t-ratio results computed by the CV matrix because Beck et al (1993) argue that the CV robust standard errors "are more accurate than the OLS standard errors" in a cross-national panel analysis. For this dynamic cross-national analysis the following covariance model is developed:

\[ NPE_t = \alpha + \beta_1 NPE_{t-1} + \beta_2 DEMO_t + \beta_3 SEMI_t + \beta_4 CTY1 + \beta_5 CTY2 + \beta_6 CTY3 + \beta_7 CTY5 + \epsilon \]

The following countries are chosen as dummy variables: Costa Rica (CTY1), El Salvador (CTY2), Nicaragua (CTY3), and Guatemala (CTY5). The reference unit is Honduras. Furthermore, the covariance model includes a lagged endogenous variable \( NPE_{t-1} \) to account for influences occurring in the past. Hence, the first case (election) of each country had to be dropped in this analysis because it was used for the first lagged endogenous variable for the analyzed dependent variable, reducing the data set to 41 cases.
The results of the Robust Covariance matrix (CV) and for Ordinary Least Square estimates are presented in Table 3.7 and Table 3.8. Note the OLS-results are written in brackets. Before discussing the results of the multiple regression, two further points should be mentioned. First, the results achieved within the covariance model illustrate how the dummy variables [countries] differ from the reference category, which in this analysis is Honduras. Therefore, dummy variables do not show "how each category [country] deviates from some meaningful norm" (Stimson 1985). Second, the panel data employed do not provide consistent longitudinal observations (i.e., uniform time intervals) because each case in the data set represents an election in one of the isthmus countries. Therefore, it may be argued that there are some difficulties with using the OLS regression with dummy variables. Nevertheless, this problem had to be disregarded because the data set represents a universal population of elections and cannot be modified or changed to account for such difficulties. Thus, the data set actually represents a longitudinal set of election cases and therefore each election is counted as the next case in time despite some variation in the periodicity of elections. Finally, to be consistent with the stated one directional hypotheses, a one-tailed probability test is employed in this analysis.

The results of the multiple regression in Table 3.7
show that the democracy variable (DEMO) is by far the most
significant variable with a CV t-ratio of 4.472 (p < .000)
in explaining the number of political parties participating
in elections. The socio-economic modernization variable
(SEMI) with a CV t-ratio of 1.026 is rather problematic, its
contribution is insignificant at the .153 level.

Furthermore, the analysis shows that the lagged endogenous
variable, number of political parties at the unit \(t-1\), is not
significant. Moreover, the dummy countries El Salvador,
Nicaragua, and Guatemala make a highly significant
contribution (p < .000) with CV t-ratios 3.895 for El
Salvador, 3.275 for Nicaragua, and 3.808 for Guatemala in
explaining variances in comparison to the reference case
Honduras. Only for Costa Rica is there no significant
effect in comparison to the reference case. Table 3.7 shows
that the independent variables account for 69% (Adjusted \(R^2 = .696\)) of the variance in number of political parties
participating in elections in the isthmus countries. The
estimated first order autocorrelation of the multiple
regression analysis is -.105. This indicates that
autocorrelation is not a problem for this analysis.

Because the applied lagged endogenous variable of the
past number of political parties in the political systems of
the countries in the covariance model has no significant
effect on the number of political parties participating in
elections I perform second multiple regression analysis for
the covariance model without the lagged endogenous variable NPE\textsubscript{t-1}.

Table 3.7: Number of Political Parties Participating in Election: Results of the Multiple Regression Analysis with Lagged Endogenous Variable (NPE\textsubscript{t-1}) using Robust Covariance (CV) matrix and OLS\textsuperscript{1}:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>t-ratio</th>
<th>Probability/t</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NPE\textsubscript{t-1} (Number of Parties at prev. Election)</td>
<td>.181745</td>
<td>1.107</td>
<td>.13418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMO (Democracy)</td>
<td>.711012</td>
<td>4.472</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEMI (Socio-Economic-Modernization)</td>
<td>.596074</td>
<td>1.026</td>
<td>.153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTY1 (Costa Rica)</td>
<td>1.69912</td>
<td>.913</td>
<td>.180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTY2 (El Salvador)</td>
<td>6.10800</td>
<td>3.895</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTY3 (Nicaragua)</td>
<td>6.92279</td>
<td>3.275</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTY5 (Guatemala)</td>
<td>8.94261</td>
<td>3.808</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of Cases: 41

R\textsuperscript{2} .749

Adjusted R\textsuperscript{2} .696

One-tailed test

\textsuperscript{1} Note: Main entries are Robust Covariance matrix t-estimates, based on Newey and West (1987), the OLS t-estimates are presented in brackets.
Therefore, the five cases excluded in the multiple regression in the first time are recovered in the analysis and the number of observations is 46. The applied covariance model for the second dynamic cross-sectional regression analysis is as follows:

\[ NPE_t = \alpha + \beta_1 DEMO_t + \beta_2 SEMI_t + \beta_3 CTY1 + \beta_4 CTY2 + \beta_5 CTY3 + \beta_6 CTY5 + \epsilon \]

The results of this analysis are shown in Table 3.8. Once again, the democracy measure DEMO is by far the most significant variable in the analysis, with CV t-ratio of 6.404 (p < .000) in the explanation for the number of political parties in the political system. The SEMI variable CV t-ratio of 1.391 is still not significant (p > .050). Interestingly, focusing on the OLS t-ratio of 1.964 for the SEMI becomes significant (p < .050). Nevertheless, this finding should be considered as very problematic because as noted above the robust standard errors are more accurate than the OLS standard errors. Furthermore, the pattern of the cross-sectional comparison of the countries with reference to Honduras stays virtually the same. Once again t-ratios of El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras are significant, but the results for Costa Rica are still not significant in comparison to the reference case. The \( R^2 \) remains 0.69. Finally, the Durbin-Watson statistics 1.71 with an estimated autocorrelation of .141 and the overall comparison of the CV matrix with the OLS results show no irregularities and thus do not indicate problems of
heteroskedasticity in the analysis.

Table 3.8: Number of Political Parties Participating in Election: Results of the Multiple Regression Analysis using Robust Covariance (CV) matrix and OLS;

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>t-ratio</th>
<th>Probability/t</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEMO (Democracy)</td>
<td>.728006</td>
<td>6.404</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEMI (Socio-Economic-Modernization)</td>
<td>.721770</td>
<td>1.391</td>
<td>.082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTY1 (Costa Rica)</td>
<td>2.05914</td>
<td>1.237</td>
<td>.108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTY2 (El Salvador)</td>
<td>5.74940</td>
<td>4.296</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTY3 (Nicaragua)</td>
<td>6.17978</td>
<td>3.282</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTY5 (Guatemala)</td>
<td>9.53508</td>
<td>5.682</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of Cases: 46
R² .731
Adjusted R² .690
Durbin Watson 1.72

One-tailed test

¹ Note: Main entries are Robust Covariance matrix t-estimates, based on Newey and West (1987), the OLS t-estimates are presented in brackets.

Thus, the results indicate that the democracy variable clearly accounts most for the tested ceteris paribus macro-hypotheses for the developed theoretical approach. Thus the
theory, derived mainly from Remmer (1991), holds for the isthmus.

Hence, if one combines the findings of the first analysis, which showed that party polarization (ideological party-spectrum) in the political forum of the isthmian countries increases with a higher level of democracy, with this finding one may further say that the five isthmian countries incorporate a higher level of party pluralism with an increase of the level of democracy.

In contrast the socio-economic modernization variable fails as a predictor of the emergence of political parties in the applied CV model in Central America for the period studied. This means that, because of political constraints inherent in less democratic regimes, the access for new political movements and parties is limited. Therefore political parties developing in response to the socio-economic modernization process do not necessarily become an immediate part of the political process in the political system of the isthmus countries. Rather, they tend to operate clandestinely or illegally and are not included in this analysis because they did not participate in general elections.

This finding supports the expectation that new political parties developing out of the socio-economic modernization process might be restricted in their access to the political system. Examples can be seen in the FSLN, and
communists, among others, in Nicaragua, the FUR in Guatemala before 1990, and the FMLN in El Salvador. It may be argued that the socio-economic modernization process in the isthmus leads to new political movements. Nevertheless, their appearance in the political arena is ultimately controlled and regulated by the level of democracy in each country. Hence, future quantitative studies focusing on the question of the relationship between the number of political parties and the socio-economic modernization process may have to expand the analysis to incorporate a variable that accounts for political parties outside the legal political forum (electoral arena) in the region.

Finally, the results of the cross-sectional analysis comparing the four isthmus countries with the reference category Honduras show that El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala achieved significant results in terms of the relationship of the dependent variable with the two independent ones. This finding shows that once again El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala are rather similar in the development of party fragmentation (was also observed in the previous analysis of party polarization). Costa Rica does not provide significant results in the cross-sectional comparison. Therefore, if one carefully examines this results by cautiously treating them as possible results for the deviation from a standard norm rather than from the reference category, the results reflect the same pattern as
recognized in the literature review. Costa Rica constitutes a distinct case that deviates from the others because of its democratic revolution in the early 1950s. Hence, the cross-sectional results illustrate that the development of political parties in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala closely resemble each other. They also reveal that Costa Rica and Honduras are rather distinctive.

The following discussion explores certain factors that may also affect party polarization and fragmentation in Central America in particular legal and constitutional regulations and restrictions. These factors have been so far disregarded in the performed quantitative analysis on grounds of Lijphart's argument of simplicity. Due to the paucity of quantitative data, the analysis is descriptive. Nevertheless, these issues deserve attention because of their apparent importance in shaping fragmentation and polarization.

These considerations are essential because restrictions in the regulations of political parties or regulations regarding the financing and equal access to campaign resources may affect party polarization and fragmentation and may account to a large extent for Honduras' atypical nature. First, specific constitutional articles, e.g., in Costa Rica (Article 98) and in Honduras (Article 48) exclude parties from the political process if they try to operate against the democratic political system and do not conform
with the constitutions of these countries. Nicaragua (Law of Political Parties of 17 August 1983) does not prohibit political parties on the basis of ideological orientation, but does ban parties that favor a return to the Somoza regime or similar regimes. Guatemala requires political parties "to submit their 'Declaration of Principles,' which must include the obligation to respect existing legislation; their ideological platform; and the 'economic, political, social, and cultural postulates they propose to accomplish'" (Laguardia 1992, 84-85). Therefore, these regulations somewhat restrict party pluralism in the isthmus countries according to the political commitment of the parties in each nation. One may speculate that this may lead in the long run to an increase in the polarization of political parties outside the legislative arena. This would occur as political parties and movements that represent ideological edges of the party spectrum in polity and society are pushed into illegality. Such groups would operate clandestinely and could hinder the democratic development process in these countries and hence could make matters worse on the already stony path of the transition to democracy. Democratic Costa Rica gives a perfect example of such a suspension. Costa Rica's most important communist party, the Popular Vanguard party (PVP), was outlawed from 1949 to 1975 in Costa Rica (McDonald and Ruhl 1989, 177). Hence the PVP had to operate clandestinely or participate indirectly in the general
election through the support of the Partido Acción Socialista (PAS), which was formed after PVP was declared illegal in Costa Rica (O’Maoláin 1985, 75, 82-3).

Thus, regulation of political parties according to their ideology can affect party polarization. This regulation also affects party fragmentation to the extent that these parties are not allowed to participate in the political process.

A second point concerning fragmentation of political parties is that Honduras and Guatemala have particular threshold regulations which determine whether a newly formed political party can obtain legal status. In order to achieve legal recognition in Honduras a party "must gather notarized signatures from 20,000 members, and then have that list of signatures published in the official register, La Gaceta, and in the two daily newspapers with the highest national circulation." Furthermore, Honduran electoral regulations "stipulate that a party which fails to win at least 20,000 votes in a national election... automatically loses its legal status" (Agencia Centroamericano de Noticias-Spanish news service EFE, Agence France-Presse, Notimex, 09/29/93 in Latin American Data Base ID 020676).

In Guatemala, in order to retain legal recognition, a political party has to win at least four percent of the vote in an election. If the party fails to generate the minimal requirement, it loses its legal recognition. Due to this
regulation five political parties lost their registration rights after the 1990 elections: These parties were the Partido Revolucionario (PR), Partido Democrático de Cooperación Nacional (PDCN), Partido Nacional Renovador (PNR), Frente Unido de la Revolución (FUR), and Partido Demócrata (PD) (Nuevo Herald, Miami 11/15/90).

Such regulations, I believe, reduce the possibility that smaller or new political parties may participate and institutionalize their organizations. Such discrimination for some political parties may eventually force a party to operate as clandestine political movements alienated from the political process of the country. This could well negatively affect the political stability and democratization process. Just recently, in anticipation of such problems the Honduran National Congress waived some prerequisites of the formal requirements and "legally recognized the Partido Unificación Democrática (PUD), thus making PUD the country's fifth legal political party. Nevertheless, PUD has to jump over the electoral limitations in 1997 to keep its status as a political party. The inclusionary move was generally perceived as "a political gesture aimed at accommodating the Honduran Left" in order to prevent the increasing alienation of new social forces from the political process (Agencia Centroamericano de Noticias-Spanish news service EFE, Agence France-Presse, Notimex, 09/29/93 in Latin American Data Base ID 020676).
A third factor that may affect party fragmentation is the allocation and distribution of resources among political parties -- that is, whether there is equal access to these domestic resources. It is particularly important here to discuss both the effect of the financial budget available to political parties, as well as of campaign regulations.

Regarding financial regulations, one must examine both the regulation of the funding and how regulations may affect party fragmentation and party pluralism. The following summary of the regulations of funding for political parties is drawn from Carbo (1993). Carbo divides his analysis between both direct and indirect public financial regulation of political parties. He also examines funding, specifically public financing, of electoral campaigns and permanent financial contributions.

Guatemala is the only country which provides permanent financial support for political parties. Nevertheless, to receive public funds, the parties have to fulfill the legal requirements that they be registered and officially represented in the parliament. Thus, public direct funding in Guatemala is limited to political parties receiving the required minimum of four percent of the vote in an election to retain their legal status as a political party. Public funds are distributed to these parties according to a proportional formula based on the number of votes received by the party in the election.
All other countries restrict direct public funding to the public financing of electoral campaigns. Costa Rica, El Salvador and Nicaragua regulate direct public funding according to the same principles as Guatemala in that parties have to be registered and obtain funding according to their electoral strength. Furthermore, Costa Rica has a threshold for political parties to receive public funds. Costa Rica requires a minimum electoral success of five percent for any political party to receive public funds. Nicaragua and El Salvador have no such threshold. Honduras has funding regulations similar to Nicaragua and El Salvador but also funds independent candidates. Furthermore, party resources are also regulated through indirect public subsidies concerning tax concessions and other services.

A fourth point concerns regulations providing access to media, intended to prevent domination of mass communications by some political parties during the campaign.

Su importancia se explica por la influencia central que estos empezaron a ejercer en los procesos de comunicación política y competencia electoral, a partir de la década de los cincuenta, implicando progresivamente mayores costos para las fuerzas políticas (Carbo 1993, 153).

Only Costa Rica and Honduras do not offer free access to radio and television time (espacios gratutios), but the latter subsidizes political parties through exemption from postal and telephone fees (franquicias). These regulations concerning the mass media -- or in the case of Honduras mail and communication exemptions -- do not exclude smaller
parties and would thus appear to provide all parties equal access to the communication network in Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala. In the case of Costa Rica it can be seen that smaller parties are disadvantaged because of possible limitations in their budget which restrict access to the communication networks, and because of not receiving direct public subsidies. Finally, none of the five countries provide exemptions for any personal or business donations to a political party (desgravaciones fiscales) (Carbo 1993).

In conclusion, it appears that the regulations concerning direct public financing and indirect governmental subsidies indirectly discriminate against smaller political parties. This is partly due to the proportional funding formula used by all five countries. This results in greater funding of larger political parties, which may originate in advantages in the electoral campaigns. Moreover, in Costa Rica political parties have to fulfill the five percent threshold to receive public funds. Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that the above discussion on resource disadvantages for smaller parties relates to party strength (fractionalization) rather than to fragmentation. A more detailed analysis of party fractionalization would go beyond the scope of this research project.

Honduras and Guatemala place smaller parties under
massive disadvantages in the form of "threshold" regulations that set tough requirements for a political party to achieve legal status. Interestingly, the different approaches to regulating legal recognition of political parties may help explain why Honduras is such an unusual case in comparison with the other countries. As seen, the Honduran regulations make it quite difficult for a party to gain legal status prior to an election. Guatemala's regulations on the legal status affect parties more harshly after election day. This may explain to a large extent the differences in party fragmentation between Honduras, Guatemala, and the other countries, despite the recent increased level of democracy in all countries.

Summary

This chapter has employed a quantitative analysis to test macro-hypotheses derived from the theoretical framework. By using a cross-sectional longitudinal analysis, the study aimed to depart from the favored descriptive case approach to political parties in Latin America, and in Central America in particular. The results showed that party polarization and the number of political parties participating in the legislature of a country is positively related to the level of democracy in a country. It was also shown that the socio-economic modernization process of a country does not necessarily account for an
increase in the number of political parties in the "legal" political process as measured. Furthermore, the analysis showed that El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala represent similar developments in party fragmentation and polarization regardless of whether the countries had or had not experienced a successful social revolution in their recent political histories. By using a lagged endogenous variable in the first covariance model it was illustrated that the number of political parties participating in the political forum of the isthmus countries is not significantly related to the past number of political parties in the political system.

A descriptive analysis of the current regulations for legal recognition of parties in nation revealed that Honduras' low party fragmentation and polarization probably stems from tight regulations for parties to achieve legal status prior to elections. One may speculate that this could also account for Honduras' high rate of political participation outside the legislative arena, especially in the country's high level of unionization. This last part of the analysis should be seen as a starting point for future research, possibly in the field in Central America, to conduct interviews and collect documentary data not available here to test how these specific regulations affect party polarization and fragmentation in each nation.
CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

This study has explored the development of political parties in five Central American countries. The analysis focused on party fragmentation and party polarization in the isthmus during the last forty years.

The literature review summarized previous studies on political parties in Central America and discussed their shortcomings. Then it was argued that one goal of this study is to address some of the lacunae in the study of political parties in Latin America. A particular emphasis of the study was to link theory and analysis.

Furthermore, the study has attempted to overcome the typical descriptive case study approach of previous research on political parties and party systems by utilizing a quantitative analysis over space and time. This approach incorporated a cross-sectional area study of the isthmus' countries with a longitudinal approach to incorporate changes over time in the development of political parties.

The theoretical approach concentrated on the question of the possible emergence of political parties in the region due to an increase in the level of democracy (Remmer 1989) and to socio-economic modernization (Huntington 1968).
Integrated into the theoretical argument was the proposition that higher levels of democracy [or inclusionary authoritarianism] leads to increases in party polarization in this region.

The quantitative analysis revealed that the level of structural democratization of a country is by far the most dominant and significant factor to explain both party polarization and party fragmentation. Thus, the relationship between democratic development and both party polarization (ideological party spectrum) and party fragmentation stated in hypotheses one and three were confirmed. The hypothesized relationship between socio-economic modernization and party fragmentation could not be significantly confirmed. This failure may be due to limitations in the operationalization of the dependent variable. Recall that party fragmentation was measured by counting all political parties participating in the elections. Hence, the operationalization of political parties in elections only accounted for political parties officially participating in the electoral arena and thus excluded political parties that were not allowed or not able to participate and necessarily had to operate as clandestine political movements. This factor seems to be the most crucial explanation for the strong dominance of the democracy variable over the socio-economic modernization variable. Thus, it may be necessary to adjust for this
factor in future quantitative studies by creating a
dependent variable that accounts for political movements and
political parties outside the electoral arena.

The cross-sectional longitudinal analysis was able to move beyond descriptive case studies that have prevailed in party research on the region. It was shown that the influences and roles of political parties in the region vary country by country and within a country over time. The findings have several implications: First, the role of political parties in the isthmus is certainly not as momolthic as it is so often argued to be by Latin American scholars. Political parties have consistently operated as political actors in the political process, but with differing influences and emphases on the political systems in the region.

Therefore, the findings partially contradict the corporatist argument, which states that the Latin American regimes operate with a legal-structural framework that narrowly defines the boundaries of the dominant political actors and other social forces. Latin American corporatism does not provide an adequate explanation for the paucity of studies focusing on political parties in the isthmus. This is exemplified, as the analysis revealed, in the different histories of party polarization and party fragmentation in the five Central American countries. Regardless of whether a country had official political parties (such as El
Salvador's PRUD and PCN), other political parties constantly struggled to participate in the politics. Party fragmentation and party polarization varied over time in these countries, and were shaped by the countries' level of democracy. Thus, the analysis showed that political parties tried to participate in the electoral process, albeit with sometimes marginal success due to the low level of structural democratization. Their destiny and influence was often controlled by the particular authoritarian regime of these countries.

This point in itself provides fertile ground for future studies of the development and role of political parties in these countries. This is especially seen in El Salvador and Guatemala, where party fragmentation and party polarization occurred in two waves in the mid-1960s and in the 1980s. The first wave showed that both regimes clearly engaged in inclusionary authoritarian measures to curtail and manage the increase in the demand for political participation within the society, which was reversed in the 1970s. Thus, the analysis has illustrated that it is necessary to precisely study the different development of the role of political parties occurring in each countries over time. Particularly interesting may be the question of what kind of political behavior the particular political parties engaged in after the end of the inclusionary authoritarianism period in these countries.
Another noteworthy point is that Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala have had rather similar developments of party fragmentation and party polarization. In particular, the existing party fragmentation and party polarization in these political systems nearly matches one another. This fact may spark scholarly interest because Nicaragua was the only country which experienced a social revolution in the isthmus. However, it manifests the same general pattern of political parties as in Guatemala and El Salvador. This phenomenon, in my opinion, should receive more attention among Latin American scholars.

The quantitative analysis demonstrated that Honduras and Costa Rica are somewhat atypical in comparison with the rest of the isthmus countries. Costa Rica is, in general, perceived as the most democratic country in the isthmus. The analysis showed that Costa Rica has a rather broad party polarization since 1953. But a rather striking finding in the analysis of Costa Rica was the fact that Costa Rica’s party-spectrum does not include right-wing political parties. It was argued that Costa Rica in itself may provide a glimpse of the future development of political parties if the democratization efforts prove successful elsewhere in the isthmus. This would mean, if one may speculate, that dominant right wing parties still operating in the other countries could gradually lose their support in the upcoming years.
Honduras presented a unique case as well. Honduras is still dominated by the two traditional political parties, the PNH and PLH. The analysis revealed that the two political parties represent, probably together with Costa Rica's PLN, the most institutionalized political parties in the isthmus. Thus, it seems that over time both parties were able to adjust to the particular participation demands of the Honduran society.

Honduras' party fragmentation and polarization were not really influenced by the relatively constant moderate level of democracy (at least compared to Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador). Rather, it was shown that an explanation of the possible lack of party fragmentation and polarization in the Honduran political system probably lies in the fact that Honduras has rather severe regulations regarding the legal recognition of political parties, and these disadvantage new political parties on a broad scale. Guatemala also has rather strict regulations concerning the legal recognition of political parties. Interestingly, Guatemala’s recognition of political parties is closely related to the electoral success of a political party; Honduras has weaker restrictions based on the electoral success but much stricter regulations to require legal party status, which as already mentioned may provide some ground of the protracted dominance of the Honduran Liberal and Conservative party. Obviously, the strong traditional parties have sought to
make the entry of competitors in the electoral arena as
difficult as possible. This may partially explain the high
unionization of the Honduran society. This would mean that
new political issues and mass demands in Honduras are
directed through different forms of political participation,
which do not lead to the appearance of new political groups
in the legislature.

Prospects for Future Studies and Research

In conclusion, another aim of the analysis of political
parties was to raise questions and possibilities for future
research on political parties in Central America and Latin
America as a whole. It is hoped that future studies may
utilize some of the questions raised in this study. These
studies should attempt, as I have here, to combine theory
and analysis in the study of political parties.

It would be particularly interesting to analyze the
different strategies and behaviors of the political parties
in periods of exclusionary and inclusionary authoritarianism
as it was seen in El Salvador and Guatemala. A similar
study could focus on the political strategies of the
political movements of Nicaragua before the revolution.
Furthermore, this study was only concerned with party
fragmentation and polarization but fails to analyze the
specific question of the durability of particular political
parties as well their level of fractionalization. The
question is not only whether political parties have been a salient feature of the political landscape; rather, one could focus on parties' organizational strength and capacity for long-term survival, especially in light of the current democratization process in the isthmus. I believe that a particularly fertile ground for such an analysis is the problem of restrictions on the legal status of political parties in the isthmus. I was only able to address this question in passing. Other research efforts could focus on the impact of external actors on the development of political parties in Central America. This could be achieved through a closer study of the scope of the involvement of external actors and their effects upon party ideology, organization, institutionalization, and financing.
APPENDIX A

CATEGORIES OF IDEOLOGICAL PARTY-SPECTRUM:

DATA SOURCES AND CODING PROCEDURES
Coding Procedure:

To analyze the extent of party polarization in the political arena it was necessary to create categories which would allow an analysis according to the ideological spectrum of political parties. The author is aware that coding political parties on a right-left continuum according to their ideological position may be perceived as rather judgmental than empirical. Due to this criticism several sources were consulted to diminish chances of arbitrarily assigning a political party into a wrong category. Unfortunately, in the cases of Costa Rica and Guatemala it was not possible to assign to all minor parties their specific ideological party-spectrum. Nevertheless, this was not perceived as a real problem because these parties were only splinter parties gaining less than 1% in the election. The main data sources utilized for this part of the study are: Baloyra (1982), Goodman, LeoGrande, and Medelson Forman (1992), McDonald and Ruhl (1989), Nohlen (1993), Street (1985), and Wiarda (1990), among others.
APPENDIX B

THE IDEOLGOICAL PARTY SPECTRUM FOR THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES LISTED ACCORDING TO ELECTION YEAR AND PARTY
EL SALVADOR Political Parties: 1950-1991

ALIANZA REPUBLICANA NACIONAL: (ARENA)
CONVERGENCIA DEMOCRATICA: (CD:[PSD,MNR,MPSC)
FRENTE UNIDO DEMOCRATICO INDEPENDIENTE: (FUDI)
MOVIMIENTO AUTENTICO CRISTIANO: (MAC)
MOVIMIENTO ESTABLE REPUBLICANO CENTRISTA (MERCEN)
MOVIMIENTO NACIONAL REVOLUCIONARIO: (MNR)
PARTIDO ACCION DEMOCRATICO: (AD)
PARTIDO ACCION RENOVADORA: (PAR)
PARTIDO AUTENTICO CONSTITUCIONAL: (PAC)
PARTIDO AUTENTICO INSTITUCIONAL SALVADORENO: (PAISA)
PARTIDO DE ACCION NACIONAL: (PAN)
PARTIDO DE CONCILIACION NACIONAL: (PCN)
PARTIDO DEMOCRATICO CRISTIANO: (PDC)
PARTIDO LIBERACION: (PL)
PARTIDO ORIENTACION POPULAR: (POP)
PARTIDO POPULAR SALVADORENO: (PPS)
PARTIDO REPUBLICANO DE EVOLUCION NACIONAL: (PREN)
PARTIDO REVOLUCIONARIO DE UNIFICACION DEMOCRATICA: (PRUD)
PARTIDO SOCIAL DEMOCRATICA: (PSD)
UNIDAD POPULAR: (UP)
UNION DE PARTIDOS DEMOCRATICOS: (UPD:[PAR,PDC,PSD])
UNION DEMOCRATICO NACIONALISTA: (UDN)
UNION NACIONAL OPOSITORA: (UNO: [PDC,MNR,UDN])

EL SALVADOR:

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HONDURAS POLITICAL PARTIES: 1956-1989

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PARTIDO DE INNOVACION Y UNIDAD: (PINU)
PARTIDO DE UNIDAD NACIONAL: (PUN)
PARTIDO DEMOCRATICA CRISTIANO DE HONDURAS: (PDC)
PARTIDO LIBERAL DE HONDURAS: (PLH)
PARTIDO NACIONAL DE HONDURAS: (PNH)

HONDURAS:

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Nicaragua Political Parties: 1947-1990

Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional: (FSLN)
Movimiento de Accion Popular-Marxista Leninista: (MAP-ML)
Movimiento de Unidad Revolucionaria: (MUR)
Partido Conservador Democrita de Nicaragua: (PCDN)
Partido Conservador Nacionalista: (PCON)
Partido Conservador Nicaragüense: (PCONi)
Partido Communista de Nicaragua: (PC de N)
Partido Conservador de Nicaragua: (PCN)
Partido Liberal Independiente: (PLI)
Partido Liberal Nacionalista: (PLN)
Partido Liberal de Unidad: (PLIUN)
Partido Popular Social Cristiano: (PPSC)
Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores: (PRT)
Partido Social Cristiano: (PSC)
Partido Social Conservatismo: (PSOC)
Partido Socialista Nicaraguense: (PSN)
Partido Unionista Centroamericano: (PUCA)
Union Nacional Opositora (1967): PCN, PLI, PSC
Union Nacional Opositora (1990): APC, MDN, Pali, PAN, PC de N, PDCN, PLC, PLI, PNC, PSD, PSN, ANC, PIAC

Nicaragua:

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GUATEMALA POLITICAL PARTIES: 1957-1990

ACCIÓN DEMOCRÁTICA: (AD)
ALIANZA POPULAR 5: (AP-5)
CENTRAL AUTÉNTICA NACIONALISTA: (CAN)
DEMOCRACIA CRISTIANA GUATEMALTECA: (DCG)
FRENTE DE AVANCE NACIONAL: (FAN)
FRENTE DE UNIDAD NACIONAL: (FUN)
FRENTE REPUBLICANO GUATEMALTECO: (FRG)
FRENTE UNIDO DE LA REVOLUCIÓN: (FUR)
MOVIMIENTO DE ACCIÓN SOLIDARIA: (MAS)
MOVIMIENTO DE LIBERACIÓN NACIONAL: (MLN)
MOVIMIENTO DEMOCRÁTICO NACIONALISTA: (MDN)
MOVIMIENTO EMERGENTE DE CONCORDIA: (MEC)
PARTIDO AUTÉNTICO ANTICOMUNISTA: (PAA)
PARTIDO AUTÉNTICO DEMOCRÁTICO: (PAD)
PARTIDO DE AVENZADA NACIONAL: (PAN)
PARTIDO DEMOCRATA: (FD)
PARTIDO DEMOCRÁTICO DE COOPERACIÓN NACIONAL: (PDCN)
PARTIDO DE RECONCILIACIÓN DEMOCRÁTICO NACIONAL: (PRDN)
PARTIDO DE TRABAJADORES DEMOCRÁTICO: (PTD)
PARTIDO DE UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA: (PUR)
PARTIDO LIBERAL ANTICOMUNISTA GUATEMALTECO: (PLAG)
PARTIDO NACIONAL RENOVADOR: (PNR)
PARTIDO REVOLUCIONARIO: (PR)
PARTIDO REVOLUCIONARIO AUTÉNTICO: (PRA)
PARTIDO REFORMISTA INSTITUCIONAL: (PRI)
PARTIDO SOCIALISTA DEMOCRÁTICO: (PSD)
PARTIDO UNIFICACIÓN ANTICOMUNISTA: (PUA)
PARTIDO UNION LIBERAL NACIONALISTA: (PULN)
UNION DEL CENTRO NACIONAL: (UCN)

POLITICAL PARTIES PARTICIPATING IN ELECTION WITHOUT AN IDEOLOGICAL POSITION ASSIGNED DUE TO DATA PROBLEMS:

COMITE ZACAPA UNIDO: (COZAUN) -1984- 0.2%
COORDINADORA NACIONAL DEMOCRÁTICA: (CND) -1984- 0.9% WITH FDP
FUERZA DEMOCRÁTICA POPULAR: (FDP)
FRENTE CIVICO DEMOCRÁTICO: (FCD) -1985- 0.2%
ORGANIZACIÓN CAMPESINA DE ACCIÓN SOLIDARIA: (OCAS) -1984- 0.8%
PARTIDO POPULISTA: (PP)
UNION NACIONAL OPOSITORA: (UNO)


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COSTA RICA POLITICAL PARTIES: 1953-1990

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PARTIDO ALIANZA NACIONAL CRISTIANA: (PANC)
ALIANZA POPULAR: (AP)
FRENTE NACIONAL: (FN)
FRENTE POPULAR COSTARRICENSE: (FPC)
MOVIMIENTO DEMOCRATICO OPPOSICION: (MDO)
MOVIMIENTO NACIONAL: (MN)
MOVIMIENTO RENOVADOR NACIONAL: (MRN)
MOVIMIENTO REVOLUCIONARIO COSTARRICENSE: (MRC)
ORGANIZACION SOCIALISTA DE LOS TRABAJADORES: (OST)
PARTIDO ACCION DEMOCRATICA: (PAD)
PARTIDO ACCION LABORISTA AGRICOLA
PARTIDO ACCION SOCIALISTA: (PAS)
PARTIDO ACCION SOLIDARISTA: (PASo)
PARTIDO DEMOCRATA: (PD)
PARTIDO DEMOCRATICO AUTENTICO: (PDA)
PARTIDO DEMOCRATICO CRISTIANA: (PDC)
PARTIDO INDEPENDIENTE: (PIn)
PARTIDO LIBERAL NACIONAL: (PLN)
PARTIDO NACIONAL DEMOCRATA: (PND)
PARTIDO NACIONAL INDEPENDIENTE: (PNI)
PARTIDO RENOVACION DEMOCRATICA: (PRD)
PARTIDO REVOLUCIONARIO DE LOS TRABAJADORES: (PRT)
PARTIDO REPUBLICANO: (PR)
PARTIDO REPUBLICANO INDEPENDIENTE: (PRNI)
PARTIDO REPUBLICANO NACIONAL: (PRN)
PARTIDO SOCIALISTA COSTARRICENSE: (PSC)
PARTIDO UNIDAD: (PU)
PARTIDO UNIDAD NACIONAL: (PUN)
PARTIDO UNIDAD SOCIAL CRISTIANA: (PUSC)
PARTIDO VANGUARDIA POPULAR: (PVP)
PUEBLO UNIDO: (PUn)
UNIFICACION NACIONAL: (UN)
UNION CIVICA REVOLUCIONARIA: (UCR)
UNION GENERALENA: (UG)

POLITICAL PARTIES PARTICIPATING IN ELECTION WITHOUT A IDEOLOGICAL POSITION ASSIGNED DUE TO DATA PROBLEMS:

MOVIMIENTO NACIONAL INDEPENDIENTE: - 1978 - 0.8%
PARTIDO AGRARIO NACIONAL: - 1990 - 0.3%
PARTIDO CONCORDIA COSTARRICENSE: - 1978 - 0.3%
PARTIDO DEL PROGRESO: - 1990 - 0.6%
PARTIDO LABORISTA NACIONAL: - 1978 - 0.1%
PARTIDO OBRERO CAMPESINO: - 1982 - 0.1%
UNION REPUBLICANA: - 1978 - 1.0%
REGIONAL POLITICAL PARTIES PARTICIPATING IN ELECTION WITHOUT A IDEOLOGICAL SPECTRUM ASSIGNED DUE TO DATA PROBLEMS:

PARTIDO ACCION DEMOCRATICA ALAJUELENSE: -1982/1986- 1.6%/0.3%
PARTIDO ALAJUELENSE DEMOCRATICO: -1962- 0.5%
PARTIDO ALAJUELENSE SOLIDARIO: -1986/1990- 0.3%/0.6%
PARTIDO AUTENTICO LIMONENSE: -1986- 0.3%
PARTIDO AUTENTICO PUNTARCENSE: -1978- 0.2%
PARTIDO NACIONAL DEMOCRATICO: -1986- 0.3%
UNION AGRICOLA CARTAGINESA: -1970- 0.5%
UNION GUANACASTECA INDEPENDIENTE: -1966/1970- 0.2%/0.4%.

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APPENDIX C

GLOSSARY FOR POLITICAL PARTIES PARTICIPATING
IN PARLIAMENTARY AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY ELECTION

IN CENTRAL AMERICA:

COSTA RICA : 1953-1990
EL SALVADOR : 1950-1991
HONDURAS : 1956-1989
NICARAGUA : 1947-1990
GUATEMALA : 1958-1990
ALIANZA REPUBLICANA NACIONAL (ARENA)
CONVERGENCIA DEMOCRATICA (CD: [PSD, MNR, MPSC])
FRENTE UNIDO DEMOCRATICO INDEPENDIENTE (FUDI)
MOVIMIENTO AUTENTICO CRISTIANO (MAC)
MOVIMIENTO ESTABLE REPUBLICANO CENTRISTA (MERESEN)
MOVIMIENTO NACIONAL REVOLUCIONARIO (MNR)
MOVIMIENTO POPULAR SOCIAL CRISTIANO (MPSC)
PARTIDO ACCION DEMOCRATICO (AD)
PARTIDO ACCION RENOVADORA (PAR)
PARTIDO AUTENTICO CONSTITUCIONAL (PAC)
PARTIDO AUTENTICO INSTITUCIONAL SALVADORENO (PAISA)
PARTIDO DE ACCION NACIONAL (PAN)
PARTIDO DE CONCILIACION NACIONAL (PCN)
PARTIDO DEMOCRATICO CRISTIANO (PDC)
PARTIDO LIBERACION (PL)
PARTIDO ORIENTACION POPULAR (POP)
PARTIDO POPULAR SALVADORENO (PPS)
PARTIDO REPUBLICANO DE EVOLUCION NACIONAL (PREN)
PARTIDO REVOLUCIONARIO DE UNIFICACION DEMOCRATICA (PRUD)
PARTIDO SOCIAL DEMOCRATACA (PSD)
UNIDAD POPULAR (UP)
UNION DE PARTIDOS DEMOCRATICOS (UPD: [PAR, PDC, PSD])
UNION DEMOCRATICO NACIONALISTA (UDN)
UNION NACIONAL OPOSITORA (UNO: [PDC, MNR, UDN])

FRENTE PARTIOTICO HONDURENO (FPH)
MOVIMIENTO NACIONAL REFORMISTA (MNR)
PARTIDO COMMUNISTA DE HONDURAS (PCH)
PARTIDO COMUNISTA DE HONDURAS MARXISTA LENINISTA (PCH-ML)
PARTIDO DE INNOVACION Y UNIDAD (PINU)
PARTIDO DE UNIDAD NACIONAL (PUN)
PARTIDO DEMOCRATICA CRISTIANO DE HONDURAS (PDC)
PARTIDO DEMOCRATICO REVOLUCIONARIO HONDURENO (PDRH)
PARTIDO LIBERAL DE HONDURAS (PLH)
PARTIDO NACIONAL DE HONDURAS (PNH)
PARTIDO REVOLUCIONARIO HONDURENO (PR)
PARTIDO SOCIALISTA DE HONDURAS (PASO)

NICARAGUA POLITICAL PARTIES: 1947-1990

ALIANZA NACIONAL CONSERVADORA (ANC)
FRENTE SANDINISTA DE LIBERACION NACIONAL (FSLN)
MOVIMIENTO DE ACCION POPULAR-MARXISTA LENINISTA (MAP-ML)
MOVIMIENTO DE UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (MUR)
PARTIDO CONSERVADOR (PC)
PARTIDO CONSERVADOR DEMOCRATA DE NICARAGUA (PCDN)
PARTIDO COMMUNISTA DE NICARAGUA (PC de N)
PARTIDO CONSERVADOR DE NICARAGUA (PCN)
PARTIDO DE ACCION NACIONAL (PAN)
PARTIDO DEMOCRATICO DE CONFIANZA NACIONAL (PDCN)
PARTIDO LIBERAL CONSTITUCIONALISTA (PLC)
PARTIDO LIBERAL INDEPENDIENTE (PLI)
PARTIDO LIBERAL NACIONALISTA (PLN)
PARTIDO LIBERAL DE UNIDAD (PLIUN)
PARTIDO NEO-LIBERAL (PALI)
PARTIDO POPULAR SOCIAL CRISTIANO (PPSC)
PARTIDO REVOLUCIONARIO DE LOS TRABAJADORES (PRT)
PARTIDO SOCIAL CRISTIANO (PSC)
PARTIDO SOCIAL DEMOCRATA (PSD)
PARTIDO SOCIALISTA NICARAGUENSE (PSN)
PARTIDO SOCIAL CONSERVATISMO (PSOC)
PARTIDO UNIONISTA CENTROAMERICANO (PUCA)
UNION NACIONAL OPOSITORA
(UNO=APC, MDN, PALI, PAN, PC DE N, PDCN, PLC, PLI, PNC, PSD, PSN, ANC, PIAC)
GUATEMALA POLITICAL PARTIES: 1957-1990

ACCION DEMOCRATICA (AD)
ASSOCIACION NACIONAL DEMOCRATICA (ANDE)
ALIANZA NACIONAL PROGRESISTA (ANP)
ALIANZA POPULAR 5 (AP-5)
CENTRAL AUTENTICA NACIONALISTA (CAN)
CENTRAL ARANISTA ORGANIZADA (CAO)
COMITE ZACAPA UNIDO (CZA)
COORDINADORA NACIONAL DEMOCRATICA (CND)
DEMOCRACIA CRISTIANA GUATEMALTECA (DCG)
FRENTE ANTICOMMUNISTA NACIONAL (FAN)
FRENTE CIVICO DEMOCRATICO (FCD)
FRENTE DE AVANCE NACIONAL (FAN)
FRENTE DEMOCRATICO POPULAR [FUN, PID, PR]
FRENTE DE UNIDAD NACIONAL (FUN)
FRENTE REPUBLICANO GUATEMALTECO (FRG)
FRENTE UNIDO DE LA REVOLUCION (FUR)
MOVIMIENTO DE ACCION SOLIDARIA (MAS)
MOVIMIENTO DE LIBERACION NACIONAL (MLN)
MOVIMIENTO DEMOCRATICO NACIONALISTA (MDN)
MOVIMIENTO EMERGENTE DE CONCORDIA (MEC)
ORGANIZACION CAMPENSIA DE ACCION SOLIDARIA (OCAS)
PARTIDO AUTENTICO ANTICOMMUNISTA (PAA)
PARTIDO AUTENTICO DEMOCRATICO (PAD)
PARTIDO DE AVENZADA NACIONAL (PAN)
PARTIDO DEMOCRATA (PD)
PARTIDO DEMOCRATICO DE COOPERACION NACIONAL (PDCN)
PARTIDO DE RECONCILIACION DEMOCRATICO NACIONAL (PRDN)
PARTIDO DE TRABAJADORES DEMOCRATICO (PTD)
PARTIDO DE UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (PUR)
PARTIDO GUATEMALTECO DEL TRABAJO (PGT)
PARTIDO INSTITUCIONAL DEMOCRATICO (PID)
PARTIDO LIBERAL ANTICOMMUNISTA GUATEMALTECO (PLAG)
PARTIDO LIBERAL DE GUATEMALA (PLG)
PARTIDO LIBERAL NACIONALISTA (PLN)
PARTIDO NACIONAL REIVINDICADOR DEL 44 (PNR 44)
PARTIDO NACIONAL RENOVADOR (PNR)
PARTIDO POPULISTA (PP)
PARTIDO REVOLUCIONARIO (PR)
PARTIDO REVOLUCIONARIO AUTENTIC0 (PRA)
PARTIDO DEMOCRATICO NACIONALISTA (PDN)
PARTIDO REFORMISTA INSTITUCIONAL (PRI)
PARTIDO REPUBLICANO (PRp)
PARTIDO SOCIALISTA DEMOCRATICO (PSD)
PARTIDO UNIFICACION ANTICOMMUNISTA (PUA)
PARTIDO UNION LIBERAL NACIONALISTA (PULN)
UNION DEL CENTRO NACIONAL (UCN)
UNION NACIONAL OPOSTOR (UNO)
COSTA RICA POLITICAL PARTIES: 1953-1990

PARTIDO ALIANZA NACIONAL CRISTIANA (PANC)
ALIANZA POPULAR (AP)
FRENTE NACIONAL (FN)
FRENTE POPULAR COSTARRICENSE (FPC)
MOVIMIENTO DEMOCRATICO OPOSICION (MDO)
MOVIMIENTO NACIONAL (MN)
MOVIMIENTO NACIONAL INDEPENDIENTE
MOVIMIENTO RENOVADOR NACIONAL (MRN)
MOVIMIENTO REVOLUCIONARIO COSTARRICENSE (MRC)
ORGANIZACION SOCIALISTA DE LOS TRABAJADORES (OST)
PARTIDO ACCION DEL PUEBLO
PARTIDO ACCION DEMOCRATICA ALAJUELENSE
PARTIDO ACCION DEMOCRATICO (PAD)
PARTIDO ACCION LABORISTA AGRICOLA
PARTIDO ACCION SOCIALISTA (PAS)
PARTIDO ACCION SOLIDARISTA (PASO)
PARTIDO AGRAIO NACIONAL
PARTIDO ALAJUELENSE DEMOCRATICO
PARTIDO ALAJUELENSE SOLIDARIO
PARTIDO AUTENTICO LIMONENSE
PARTIDO AUTENTICO PUNTARCENSE
PARTIDO CONCORDIA COSTARRICENSE
PARTIDO DEL PROGRESO
PARTIDO DEMOCRATA (PD)
PARTIDO DEMOCRATICO AUTENTICO (PDA)
PARTIDO DEMOCRATICO CRISTIANA (PDC)
PARTIDO INDEPENDIENTE (PIn)
PARTIDO LABORISTA NACIONAL
PARTIDO LIBERAL NACIONAL (PLN)
PARTIDO LIBERALISMO NACIONAL REPUBLICANO PROGRESISTA
PARTIDO NACIONAL DEMOCRATICO (PND)
PARTIDO NACIONAL INDEPENDIENTE (PNI)
PARTIDO Obrero CAMPESEO
PARTIDO RENOVACION DEMOCRATICA (PRD)
PARTIDO REVOLUCIONARIO DE LOS TRABAJADORES (PGT)
PARTIDO REPUBLICANO (PR)
PARTIDO REPUBLICANO INDEPENDIENTE (PRNI)
PARTIDO REPUBLICANO NACIONAL (PRN)
PARTIDO SOCIALISTA COSTARRICENSE (PSC)
PARTIDO UNION (PU)
PARTIDO UNIDAD NACIONAL (PUN)
PARTIDO UNIDAD SOCIAL CRISTIANA (PUSC)
PARTIDO VANGUARDIA POPULAR (PVP)
PUEBLO UNIDO (PUn)
UNIFICACION NACIONAL (UN)
UNION AGRICOLA CARTAGINESA
UNION CIVICA REVOLUCIONARIA (UCR)
UNION DE CARTAGO
UNION GENERALENA (UG)
UNION GUANACASTECA INDEPENDIENTE
UNION REPUBLICANA
BIBLIOGRAPHY


