POLITICAL CULTURE IN THE UNITED STATES:
A REEXAMINATION OF ELAZAR'S
SUBCULTURES

THESIS

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By

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This thesis discusses the use of Daniel Elazar's theory of political subcultures in the United States. The first chapter is an introduction to the concept of political culture. The second chapter discusses Elazar's theory and method. The third chapter points out the problems in Elazar's theory and his method with a discussion of recent studies. The fourth chapter outlines the present analysis and the method used. The fifth chapter sets out the conclusions and offers avenues of new direction in the study of political culture.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL CULTURE

Differing attitudes and beliefs between and among countries are often explained by cultural differences (Almond and Verba 1963; Elazar 1972; Hartz 1964; Pye and Verba 1965). Yet, the term "culture" conjures up various meanings depending on the viewpoint employed. Kluckhohn defines culture as a "social legacy," a learned behavior resulting from the group of people that a person identifies and interacts with (1962, 25). Furthermore, he suggests that culture acts as a "conscious or unconscious pressure upon us to follow certain types of behavior that other men have created for us" and deemed appropriate (1962, 25). For purposes of simplification, culture can be divided into two prevailing categories; one encompasses "values, beliefs, norms, rationalization, symbols, ideologies;" the other suggests that it is a "way of life" (Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky 1990, 1). Culture is an important area of study; it is the underlying force driving the behaviors and socialization processes of peoples in varying nations (Devine 1972; Elazar 1972; Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky 1990). In relation to the political arena, "political culture" denotes those attitudes, patterns of orientation,
toward political actions or political objects within a society (Almond 1956; Almond and Verba 1963; Bluhm 1974; Elazar 1972; Pye and Verba 1965).

In step with Kluckhohn, Elazar indicates that there is a relationship between culture, in general, and political culture. Although the two are not identical, political culture "is the summation of persistent patterns of underlying political attitudes and values ... whose existence is generally unperceived by those who are part of that order and whose origins date back to the very beginnings of the particular people who share it" (1970, 256). Therefore, it is concluded that political culture is an autonomous set of values within the larger, more general, culture of a nation that is directly related to the political system (Almond 1956; Inglehart 1988). Likewise, Devine suggests that political culture explains the link between the values of the people and the system of government they choose to implement (1972, 3).

Hartz eloquently discusses the origins and conditions of culture founded in a European tradition. He suggests that the establishment of new, independent, nations is a result of the revolution of and migration from Europe; "the heroes they choose, the national symbols they support, arise in relationship to Europe out of a larger process of which they are unaware" (1964, 25). Furthermore, although there
are only slight traces of the European tradition, it is this tradition that forms the underlying cultures of each nation. Hartz uses the term "fragmentation" to describe the remaining cultural influence Europe has in several nations. Although it is in line with the theories of Kluckhohn, fragmentation moves beyond Kluckhohn's "social legacy" theory to explain a process by which certain cultural influences persist and others do not. An example of this process is the Lockean liberal tradition at the base of political culture in the United States resulting in the choice of a democratic government as opposed to a monarchy (Devine 1972). Initially, as the new society is removed further from Europe, the European past shrinks, as does its future (Hartz 1964, 8). In other words, upon relieving these nations from the governing pressure of Europe, the ideological pressure ceases as well; there is freedom within this process, freedom to acquire new rules or norms for society. The consequences of fragmentation do not have an immediate impact on the migrants as they develop a new society; it is made evident in their children. It is with them that lies the chance to realize goals for the society; the creation of a new nationalism out of the old. They are not forgetting their European background, but are rejecting and modifying it because they are not a physical part of that culture (Hartz 1964, 13).
Political culture's foundation is in the studies of national character (Ellis, Thompson and Wildavsky 1990; Wirt 1991). National character is defined as a relationship between culture and personality. More specifically, "it represents the modal personality produced in part by a particular political culture" (Center 1968a, II.B.1.). In other words, the modal personality denotes those attitudes, characteristics, or themes that are present in any individual in relation to the culture of that area. Once established, Devine describes the effects of political culture as a "shaping influence" (1972, 8). He considers it a screen that filters attitudes and shapes behaviors, thereby aiding in the decision-making process. Devine contends that the persistence of the Lockean liberal tradition in the United States is based on political culture. It is this group of core beliefs, subsumed by the term national character, that leads to the maintenance of the regime even in times of change. Devine states, "maintenance of the culture is maintenance of the regime" (1972, 347; c.f. Elazar 1970).

Elazar distinguishes between two schools of study in the area of political culture, one touted by Gabriel Almond and the other by Elazar himself (1982). Almond's approach, steeped in the comparative politics tradition, tends to concern itself with the "macro" areas of political culture
As a national approach, it does not consider the idiosyncracies of certain regions or groups within the nation as causes for the overall behavior of the nation. In *The Civic Culture* (1963), a comparative approach, Almond and Verba identify the civic or political cultures of five nations: Italy, Mexico, the United States, Great Britain, and West Germany. Their intent is to establish the conditions necessary for a stable democracy by analyzing citizens' attitudes about the system. This analysis laid the groundwork for various political culture studies. However, there are some criticisms: 1) they argue that democratic stability rests on a stable and unchanging political culture. However, the culture of the United States has changed and democracy is still sound; 2) the standards they use to define a stable democracy imitate the United States and Anglo-Saxon culture. This is a difficult task assuming one is expecting democracy to model the United States culture and example; and 3) their method of analysis covers one year and involves simple response distributions which do not take into account long term cultural trends (Abramowitz 1980; Inglehart 1988, 1204; Kavanaugh 1980).

Abramowitz notes that there has been changes in the civic or political culture of the United States. However, democracy remains intact. Such changes include decrease in trust, confidence and voter turnout from 1964 to 1974,
characteristics considered by Almond and Verba to be the most crucial in a stable democracy. It should be noted that though these characteristics indicate change, there has been no change in the basic governmental institutions (Abramowitz 1980). Furthermore, by stressing a cross-national study in the *Civic Culture*, many important variables that might have enhanced the understanding of political culture, such as race and region, underdeveloped versus developed regions, are omitted from the study (Abramowitz 1980).

Moreover, Kavanaugh questions changes taking place within society such as replacement, generational or attitudinal change (Kavanaugh 1980; c.f. Inglehart 1990). Kavanaugh does not view these changes as detrimental to a stable democracy. The changes questioned in society by Kavanaugh and Inglehart cannot lead one to conclude that the whole of the culture has changed. If political culture is a product of socialization, there should be evidence of the basic underlying political culture even if generations fade away and attitudes change. As the electorate becomes more issue oriented, Clarke and Dutt note that these changes could be short-term economic reactions (Clarke and Dutt 1991).

Presently, in the area of comparative politics, Inglehart is expanding the base of political culture with his questions in the Eurobarometer. He has augmented the
study of political culture since Almond and Verba's *Civic Culture* asserting that "interpersonal trust, life satisfaction, and support for revolutionary change" are measures of political culture (1988, 1219). Assessing materialist and post-materialist values across several nations he argues: 1) socialization is important in forming values; and 2) the amount of concern given material values is driven by the abundance or dearth of material goods in childhood. He hypothesizes that the materialists are those who experienced a lack of material goods in childhood. The post-materialists, interested in the quality of life, were fortunate enough to be socialized in a relatively prosperous time.

However, these assumptions are criticized by Clarke and Dutt who suggest Inglehart does not account for the effects of short-term change, especially when discussing economic factors. By omitting the unemployment variable from his battery of questions, Inglehart is measuring a different concept than that of value change. Furthermore, Inglehart lacks class-based comparisons from those classes that do not share in economic affluence; could this only be an upper-class phenomenon (Flanagan 1987)? With respect to the work of Elazar, Inglehart is concerned with individual socialization but does not consider subcultural variations.
Elazar, promoting a "micro" approach, derives his concepts from state and local politics in America. This approach considers subcultural differentiations within the United States and not blanket definitions for the whole of the American polity (Elazar 1982). Elazar outlines his theory of political culture in two main books: *The Cities of the Prairies* and *Federalism: A View from the States*. *Cities* examines political culture on the community level; in *States* Elazar discusses political culture at the state and regional levels. In both studies he relies on the same data to formulate his theories, only changing the level of analysis.

Elazar intimates that the United States has a political culture based on the language, religion, personality and "nature" of the earlier settlers (Center 1968a; Elazar 1970; Kincaid and Lieske 1991). Within the larger political culture, Elazar contends there are three subcultures, that is, areas that indicate subtle differences within the larger culture. These subcultures are products of the diverse people who settled America and their migration into different areas (Elazar 1970, 1972). Categorized as the traditional, moralistic, and individualistic political subcultures, Elazar asserts that these subcultures affect the development of public policy within the states and the nation. Kincaid and Lieske note that the subcultures have a
continuing influence for two possible reasons: "cultural habit and institutional constraint" (1991, 19).

Three areas of study in political culture according to Elazar's theory are: 1) sources of culture such as race, ethnicity, religion, language and life experiences; 2) manifestations of culture, defined as political attitudes, symbols and style; and 3) culture's effects, seen in actions, institutions and policies (Center 1968a). Elazar suggests that the best way to measure political culture is through its manifestations as compared between subcultures. Furthermore, he divides the area of manifestations into two levels, individual and community (Center 1968a). The individual level defines attitudes and behaviors; the community level embodies symbols and style. Nardulli suggests that Elazar's theory is not thoroughly tested at the individual level and lacks validation (1990).

Concerning political behavior and attitudes, there is a lack of solid research; most of the work is in the area of voting behavior (Kincaid and Lieske 1991). Concerning attitudes, there is more evidence that elites adhere to Elazar's theory than that the public does so (Kincaid and Lieske 1991). However, most of the studies employing Elazar's political culture framework focus on the effects, i.e. public policy, of political culture.
Lowery and Sigelman suggest that the studies concerning public policy are based on two perplexing assumptions: 1) that each subculture has differing attitudes concerning mass participation and the influence of government; and 2) that these attitudes in each subculture toward participation and governmental influence are somehow motivating the direction of public policy in each state (1982, 377). They assert that the lack of concrete evidence concerning the distinct variations in participation and governmental influence leave the core of Elazar's theory unvalidated (1982).

Within both schools, the actual effect political culture has on the political processes of a nation is assumed in several instances but unknown (Devine 1972; Kincaid 1982b; Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky 1990). Furthermore, there is no substantial evidence pointing to the indicators of political culture (Devine 1972; Elazar 1972; Kincaid 1982a). Therefore, there is no accurate way to measure what culture is, political or otherwise. Hence, only indicators of culture can be employed. Some of the indicators include: voting patterns, public policy, quality of life, conventional and unconventional political participation, and campaign advertisements (Barnes and Kaase 1979; Hanson 1980; Josyln 1980; Kincaid 1980; Savage 1980). Yet, it is an arduous task to translate their meaning into cultural terms (Elazar 1982).
The present study, concerned with the political culture of the United States from 1968 to 1988, focuses on the 1968, 1976 and 1988 national election studies. One of the hypotheses for this analysis is that Elazar's theory is time-bound. These three years are chosen in accordance with this hypothesis. First, Elazar published the first edition of his States book in 1966 and the results of the National Election Study in 1968 most closely coincide with the publication. Second, 1976 serves as a type of midpoint in the twenty year span from 1968 to 1988. Last, Elazar's theory is the one most often cited to explain the political culture of the United States. In order to identify long-term shifts in the political culture, contrary to Elazar's theory, a larger time span is necessary, so as not to recognize only short-term shifts or temporary migrations.

It is important to understand Hartz's concept of culture to better understand the distinctive cultures present in the United States. His notion of fragmentation is significant to the basic idea of political culture because it implies an underlying set of principles developed as the earlier settlers, steeped in European culture, forged their own culture in the United States.

Kincaid states that although Elazar's theory bases itself upon "extensive . . . research; nevertheless, it is, to a certain extent, intuitive" (Kincaid 1982a). Thompson,
Ellis and Wildavsky contend there is no evidence to substantiate the assumption of Elazar's subcultures (1990). Likewise, they suggest that the subcultures are at best based on "regional variations" and not on cultural "dimensions" (1990, 241). Furthermore, Kincaid and Lieske suggest that cultural research using Elazar's theory has reached a "plateau" and there is a need for further definition of Elazar's theory and political culture (1991, 1). Conversely, Nardulli suggests that the persistent use, and therefore acceptance, of Elazar's theory has stifled the growth of new theories concerned with American political culture (1990, 290).

The goal of the present study is to test Elazar's theory by measuring the manifestations, that is, attitudes and actions of individuals within the subcultures, using confirmatory factor analysis. Whether the analysis substantiates or challenges Elazar's theory is not important. What is important is if the study of political culture is advanced by the analysis and if it opens new avenues of research. Confirmatory factor analysis is a relatively new research method in political science that is beneficial in areas such as political culture because of the inherent difficulty in treating it as a directly measurable variable.
CHAPTER TWO

DISCUSSION OF ELAZAR'S THEORY AND METHOD

It is essential to discuss the tenets of Elazar's theory before proceeding with the present endeavor. Elazar begins his study by exploring the concept of federalism. As defined, federalism is the process of national unity through subnational systems; a mode of cooperation between the national government and the states. The cooperation found between the national and state governments can be seen as extending itself to various groups, organizations, and interests; it bonds people in different states to the same ideals. Furthermore, the bond created between similar ideas can also be utilized to explain the differences of opinions within and among the states. Each state responds to the federal system differently. Each chooses to interpret and instigate various national policies based on mass or elite perceptions within the states. In many instances, contrasts are evident when reviewing policy implementation and can be found to be regionally specific according to the political culture of the states in the area (Elazar 1972).

Elazar designs his framework for political culture based on the concept of federalism and the unique interpretation of it by each state. Just as the states are
a part of an encompassing national entity, so too, are the subcultures a part of the larger cultural entity. Elazar suggests three concepts that influence the individual states' political processes be they structural, electoral behavior or organizational strategy: political culture, sectionalism, and the expanding frontier (1970, 1972). According to his theory, political culture refers to the historical experiences or socialization processes of various groups. It is the differing experiences, perceptions, and attitudes of these groups that form the three subcultures alluded to previously. Three influential aspects in the concept of political culture are: 1) the perceptions of the government held by the public and politicians; 2) the kinds of people, especially activists, involved in politics; and 3) the ways government is practiced by those involved (Elazar 1972).

Sectionalism characterizes those differences, geographical or ideological, that affect various states' responses to federal policies. Although it is most evident in the differences between states, sectionalism also reflects common ideologies and practices among states, especially those closely related geographically. Elazar divides the United States into three spheres and eight sections: the greater Northeast (near West, New England and middle Atlantic); the greater South (upper South and lower
South); and the greater West (Southwest, far West, and Northwest) (1970, 105).

Each sphere and section is a group of adjacent states not only physically joined but also historically related by "long-term common interests shaped by common historic patterns" (1970, 101). Furthermore, he states that the subcultures and these spheres are related, in that both exhibit the characteristics of the migrational patterns of earlier settlers (1972, 93). Sectionalism should not be confused with regionalism; regionalism joins states because of geographical proximity. They work together, at times, to solve common concerns. Sectionalism moves beyond geographical propinquities to tap the underlying political ties between states that remain in spite of temporary concerns or differences (Elazar 1972, 121).

The frontier is the driving force of change that influences various patterns within the national system, especially human organization and settlement (Elazar 1972, 84). The continuing frontier, focusing on migration patterns, is a dynamic process that is the basis of sectionalism. It is similar to Hartz's fragmentation in that, as the streams of migration take place, there is a sense of a new society being forged based on new goals. Although the migration takes place within the same country, each settlement reacts differently to the authority of the
national government as it implements policies. The continuing frontier can be divided into three movements: rural-land, urban-industrial, and metropolitan-technical (Center 1968b).

The rural-land frontier, characterized by westward movement and agricultural development, dominated the period between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries (Elazar 1972, 106). The establishment of the basic institutions of the American polity took place during this frontier stage (Elazar 1970, 26). In the early nineteenth century, the urban-industrial frontier took root and spread from the Northeast to the West, encouraging technological enterprises and industrial societies (Elazar 1972, 106). This frontier characterizes two conflicting processes, urbanization and suburbanization (Elazar 1970, 35). The last frontier, the metropolitan-technical, is currently a nationwide characteristic. Beginning in the late twentieth century, it moved East to West, encouraging new and advanced technology, creating a settlement pattern in large urban areas (Elazar 1972, 106).

Each frontier describes a stage of migrational dispersion and technological growth. Elazar points to three waves of migrational patterns that, in effect, shape his spheres and sections, thereby shaping his subcultures. As each migrational stream moved West, the characteristics of
its religious and ethnic backgrounds, together with the culture of the communities migrants lived in, formed the basis of the new areas settled; the three streams are the Southern, the Middle States, and the Yankee streams (Elazar 1970, 155).

The Southern stream, consisting of Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia, brought with it a political culture based on "slavery, a plantation system, a radically individualist conception of social obligation, and gentry-dominated political order" (Elazar 1970, 155). This typifies the subculture Elazar terms traditionalistic. The Middle States stream, encompassing New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Delaware, had a political culture steeped in "commercial enterprise, ethnic and religious pluralism, freehold agriculture, and a political order . . . maintained by professional politicians" (Elazar 1970, 156). The Middle States' stream correlates, directly, with the individualistic subculture. The last migrational stream, the Yankee, associated with the New England states and based on Puritanism, established a political culture with an eye on "individual enterprise . . . dedicated to social improvement and individual redemption" (Elazar 1970, 156). This stream typifies the moralistic subculture.

Apart from the migrational streams, Elazar discusses two characteristics of political culture from which he
models his subcultures, that of a marketplace and a commonwealth. Political culture is a marketplace in a state if "the primary public relationships are products of bargaining among individuals and groups acting out of self-interest" (Center 1968b, I.B.1.). Similarly, a state's political culture can be characterized as a commonwealth if "the whole people have an individual interest, in which the citizens cooperate in an effort to create and maintain the best government in order to implement shared moral principles" (Center 1968b, I.B.2). Note that the definitions used to describe "marketplace" and "commonwealth" define a continuum of self-interest versus the collective interest.

The three subcultures can be distinguished in several ways. The individualistic subculture is based on the idea of a democracy as a marketplace. It advocates limited governmental or nongovernmental intervention into the private lives of the citizens. Furthermore, it views politics as a "business." That is, it is an avenue of economic and social improvement (Elazar 1972, 94). As a business, politics is considered a "dirty," yet necessary, business (Elazar 1972, 95). In this subculture, Elazar assumes there is a casual attitude toward politics, with easier voter registration regulations. Registration is easier since those making the laws exhibit influence over
the electorate, they want the electorate to vote. Activity is particularly significant in the case of special interests; once active, these citizens tend to remain active (Elazar 1972). Another stimulus to activity are the efficiently organized, competitive, parties present in this subculture. The middle states are generally characteristic of this subculture.

While the individualistic subculture utilizes the notion of government as a marketplace, the moralistic subculture conceptualizes the government as a commonwealth. Considered "one of the great activities of man in his search for the good society," every citizen, not just the active one, is encouraged to be involved in politics, since it should be an utmost concern of everyone (Elazar 1972, 97). Although characterized as the most politically active of the three, activity is irregular. Furthermore, the people associated with this subculture are more likely to run for office or serve in other civic duties. Citizens of the North, Northwest, and Pacific Coast are likely to be representative of this subculture.

The traditionalistic subculture employs neither the commonwealth nor the marketplace approaches; "there is an ambivalent attitude toward the marketplace and the elitist conception of the commonwealth" (Elazar 1972, 99). Political parties serve no great importance, as social and
family ties are more important. The lack of party importance may be directly linked to the lack of interparty competition. If there is political participation, it is among the elites rather than the non-elites. This is the least active of the three subcultures, usually found in one-party dominant states. In general, Elazar characterizes the South as an example of the traditionalistic subculture. Utilizing these characteristics, a model will be constructed that will attempt to tap the attitudes and behaviors basic to the subcultures.

As stated, sectionalism and the continuing frontier are dynamic processes in Elazar's theory. Elazar further employs them to explain the existence of dual subcultures. Although he contends that there is a dominant state political culture, he notes that dual subcultures exist within each state based on individual community differences (Center 1968b, II.E.5.). He contends that as a person moves from one subculture to the next, he or she maintains the previous political culture's characteristics, thereby facilitating the existence of dual subcultures. However, if there are changes in attitudes, they will not be evident for several generations.
Elazar's Method

Elazar employs traditional observation as his method of analysis. It should be noted that there is a problem with traditional observation because it can contain traces of judgment biases (Sharkansky 1969). Furthermore, his data are collected from published studies related to these questions; state histories; public pronouncements; newspapers; and selected voting data from selected states for selected elections (Elazar 1972, 13, note). The non systematic selection of elections, the use of newspapers for informal content analysis and the reevaluation of state histories can contain further biases not only from Elazar but also from the original authors.

Employing the characteristics of each subculture and collected data and observations, Elazar uses an eight point scale to assign each state a political culture score. It should be noted that at no time in his book American Federalism: A View From the States or elsewhere, does he describe the precise manner used in arriving at his conclusions concerning political culture scores or assignments, other than the migrational streams (Sharkansky 1969).

Elazar, in explaining his eight point scale, uses two maps of the United States, one to depict various subcultures
within each state and the other the dominant subculture of each state. Furthermore, his map of specific cultures within the states focuses on the data discussed previously, thereby possibly increasing the likelihood of biases.

Sharkansky attempts to validate Elazar's eight point scale. If it were not for his analysis and conclusions, Elazar's theory would have been relegated to mere speculation (Johnson 1976; Kincaid and Lieske 1991). After simple correlations, Sharkansky notes that the map depicting the several subcultures within each state reveals the strongest relationship with other variables (1969, 71).

Sharkansky endeavored to modify Elazar's eight point scale to include a ninth measure. He suggests that the dual subcultures that are present in the states should be placed on a linear continuum:

\[ M \, MT \, MI \, IM \, I \, IT \, TI \, TM \, T \]

as compared to the scale employed by Elazar,

\[ M \, MI \, IM \, I \, IT \, TI \, T \, TM \]

(see Table 1; Sharkansky 1969, 71; Elazar 1972, 110). The letters represent the subcultures, 'M' meaning moralistic, 'I' individualistic and 'T' traditionalistic. The use of these letters in conjunction with one another represents the dual subcultures present in the states. Sharkansky points out that Elazar does not include the MT classification in
his scale, even though California is evident of this particular subculture.

Notice that Sharkansky assumes that Elazar proposes his "scale" be treated as a "continuum." Elazar does not particularly agree with the treatment of his scale as a continuum. For him, the scale works much better if described by a triangle (Elazar 1982, 226; figure 1). While a continuum suggests a linear progression, a triangle would allow for a discussion of the "multiple interrelationships and the intersections between subcultures" (Elazar 1982, 226). Furthermore, the triangle would not limit the direction of the progression from one subculture to the next, but rather, would suggest a multi-directional progression.

Johnson reexamines Sharkansky's analysis and concludes that his nine point scale is a one dimensional measure concerned with "governmental intervention in social and economic affairs of the state" (1976, 499). Furthermore, Johnson asserts that Sharkansky's scale does not maintain Elazar's concept of three separate subcultures and that each state is a mix of the subcultures (1976). Sharkansky is not the only researcher who attempts to place Elazar's scale on a continuum (Hanson 1982a; Wirt 1982a). Some criticisms of this practice are: 1) Elazar did not intend the scale to be placed on a continuum; and 2) by placing the different
cultures on a continuum, one assumes that the differences between them are equal (Lowery and Sigelman 1982, 379; Wirt 1991, 10).

Schiltz and Rainey, using survey data rather than aggregate data as Sharkansky did, attempt to evaluate Elazar's theory. They employ data from the Comparative State Elections Project of 1968. The data only spans thirteen states and they find little validation for Elazar's theory. By not looking at the whole of the United States, there could be a problem with their conclusions. They note that the areas concerning participation patterns comply with Elazar's theory (1978, 412). However, there is a lack of evidence to support competition patterns among the parties, a significant area distinguishing subcultural differences in Elazar's theory. They question whether Elazar proposed a new theory or merely renamed previously accepted regional phenomena as in the case of the South (1978, 412). Although they clearly do not accept Elazar's theory in its entirety, they are unwilling to question the entire theory. They suggest that in its present form the theory is incomplete and needs to be adapted to fit the United States in a better fashion (1978, 415).

Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky, presently, are the most ardent voices in the arguments against Elazar's theory as they try to build their own cultural theory (1991). They
note that there is a problem with the subcultural labels, especially the traditionalistic and the moralistic. They contend that the term traditionalism suggests a link with past behaviors and beliefs (1991, 233). In labeling the traditionalistic subculture in this manner, there is no parallel between it and the individualistic subculture and does not agree with the characteristics outlined for this subculture. Likewise, with the term moralism linked to the moralistic subculture, Thompson, et al., believe it conveys the message that this particular subculture is more moral than the others (1991, 234). It, too, is vague and deceptive in its meaning because, like the traditionalistic, it does not adhere to the characteristics of the moralistic subculture as defined by Elazar.

Lastly, these terms, moralistic and traditionalistic, suggest two ideas on opposite sides of a spectrum. This could be why so many researchers insist on placing Elazar's subcultures on a continuum. However, using the subcultural classifications outlined by Elazar, the moralistic, described as a commonwealth, and the individualistic, described as a marketplace, could also be considered as two opposing ends of a spectrum. Like Schiltz and Rainey, Thompson, et al., believe that Elazar's categorizations are merely new names for regional diversity (1991, 241).
Moreover, there are criticisms of Elazar's theory from those researchers who support his theory. They include: 1) the descriptions of his subcultures lack definitive empirical data; 2) the designations of the states as exemplifying certain subcultures lack strict statistical techniques, thereby leaving them less than fully developed; and 3) because of the theory's circular nature, that is, present or future behavior relies on past behavior, it is not possible to treat political culture as a true independent variable (Kincaid and Lieske 1991).

Although Kincaid and Lieske note the criticism of employing political culture as an independent variable, they continue to use it as such based on a "traditional approach" (1991, 21). This is a contradiction in terms. If political culture is unreliable as an independent variable because of the nature of culture, why continue to use it as such? One might defensively argue that the very nature of culture has limited the variables or questions that can be asked to pinpoint certain cultural or subcultural differences. Therefore, several researchers conclude that in order to explain cultural differences it is necessary to use it as an independent variable (Kincaid 1982b; Kincaid and Lieske 1991; Wirt 1991).

There is another criticism that does not involve the labels or characteristics of the subcultures. It is
apparent in previous studies that there is a lack of uniform process in the research attempted when using Elazar's theory. Sharkansky notes that he found more adherence to Elazar's theory when using the dual subculture map. Remaining a predominant theme throughout the literature is that there is still a dominant subculture evident for each state.

Nardulli points out that Elazar, using the state of Illinois in the *Prairies* book, confirmed his theory from a single state analysis. He contends, as does the present study, that there is a lack of evidence to extend the conclusions of that study to the rest of the United States. Three hypotheses are tested in the present study. The first concerns the fit of the model to be tested. Confirmatory factor analysis assess the fit of the model based on a chi-square goodness-of-fit test. Because of the assumptions of confirmatory factor analysis, discussed later, chi-square tests the null hypothesis that the model possesses an acceptable fit or likeness of the observed data measured (Long 1983, 63).

The second hypothesis requires a group analysis to determine if the subcultures, as categorized by Elazar, are indeed different. The null hypothesis is that the subcultures are alike in their orientations to attitudes and behaviors. The last hypothesis pursues the time-bound
nature of Elazar's theory. It is hypothesized that Elazar's theory is, indeed, time-bound and that the fit of the model, based on the chi-square goodness-of-fit test, will deteriorate with each year tested. The null hypothesis is that the theory is not time-bound and the fit of the model does not deteriorate over time.
CHAPTER THREE

STUDIES EMPLOYING ELAZAR'S DATA: SOME DISCUSSION

There are difficulties with the application of Elazar's theory in past and present studies. The foremost problem in applying the theory is relying on the speculative nature of the method used by Elazar to construct his theory of subcultures. As previously pointed out, his theory is built on informal content analysis of published studies, state histories, public pronouncements, newspapers, and selected voting data. As mentioned, Kincaid considers the research based, to a certain degree, on intuition (Kincaid 1982a). Therefore, it appears that the validity of the studies employing Elazar's theory is questionable.

Sharkansky pointed out that Elazar's dual subcultures showed stronger relationship with the variables he used than did the use of dominant subcultures in each state. Elazar built his theory on the dominant subcultures, yet they did not correlate well with Sharkansky's variables. This might be explained because Sharkansky modified Elazar's scale and placed it on a continuum. If the dominant subcultures are difficult to determine, then how can there be dual subcultures with the same labels and meanings? Elazar gives no proof of their existence, except in the case of Illinois.
He suggests that duality is possible because of migration. He offers no proof of migration to justify the coexistence, for example, of moralistic and individualistic (MI) in a certain area of the state. He only suggests it based on content analysis of the past migrational streams and the initial settlers.

The second problem, as previously mentioned, is the debatable use of his "scale" as a continuum. This has misled researchers on the underlying relationships that might be present. In other words, researchers are accepting a theory based on unsubstantiated and incorrectly applied research. The last is the definitional incongruencies alluded to by Thompson, et al. Definitionally, they place the moralistic and traditionalistic subcultures on opposite ends of a spectrum. However, as mentioned, Elazar categorizes the moralistic as a commonwealth and the individualistic as a marketplace thereby placing them on opposite ends of the spectrum with the traditionalistic, indifferently, in between. Although Elazar does not want the subcultures placed on a spectrum or continuum, the very nature of his labels and categorizations almost forces the researcher to place them as such. Elazar's theory as is and as it is applied is a paradox.

Recent studies support Elazar's theory but simultaneously generate questions concerning the actual
subcultural differences resulting in an endorsement for advancing the theory. This is the paradox. They question the subcultural differences and advance the theory but fail to modify the dominant state subcultures. In some instances there is an attempt to reclassify the dual subcultures, but they appear as only minor suggestions. Although many of the studies only partially validate Elazar's theory, no one is willing to wholly reject the theory.

Johnson, employing data on religious affiliations for four census years based upon denomination, concludes, like Elazar, that popular participation is indicative of the individualistic subculture because of party competition (1976, 500). Yet, unlike Elazar's assumptions, Johnson finds neither encouragement nor discouragement for popular participation. This is very different from the idea of the marketplace in the individualistic subculture. For the moralistic subculture he finds that encouragement and actual popular participation are high in this subculture. These findings are commensurate with Elazar's theory of the moralistic subculture as a commonwealth. Lastly, in the traditionalistic subculture, Johnson finds popular participation discouraged and, therefore, participation is low. This is characteristic of the one-party dominant, elitist view of the traditionalistic subculture (Elazar 1972).
If one were to place Johnson's findings on a continuum, the moralistic subculture as the commonwealth, would be on one end, the traditionalistic subculture on the other, with the individualistic subculture based on the concept of the marketplace, would be in between. This follows Thompson, et al., more closely and their definitional categorizations, more so than Elazar's characterizations. This is an example of the definitional problem inherent in Elazar's theory.

Furthermore, Darcy, Welch and Clark (1987), in a discussion about women and representation in public office, hypothesize that the individualistic subculture is indifferent to women in the area of political participation or activity, that the moralistic subculture is favorable toward women in politics and representation and that the traditionalistic subculture is presumed to be unfavorable to women based on Elazar's characterization of the subcultures. They do not, however, perform an analysis to validate these hypotheses.

Jillson is successful in his analysis of congressional politics during the Articles of Confederation and the adherence of certain states to their dominant subcultures as determined by Elazar. Although this is a good study, it considers only the attitudes of congressional members and not the electorate. Maybe Elazar's theory is more applicable at the elite level of analysis rather than the
mass level. He indicates that the individualistic subculture encourages people to seek out public office as a road to private opportunities (1988, 6). However, the moralistic and traditionalistic subcultures indicate the what and who of political gain. In other words, these subcultures promote the 'what' as the "public good and stability" respectively, and the 'who' as the "society or the established elite," respectively (1988, 6).

This conclusion closely emulates Elazar's characterization of the subcultures: the individualistic subculture as a marketplace because of the underlying motivation of self-interest; the moralistic subculture as a commonwealth because it aspires to the good of society; and the traditionalistic subculture because its' elite orientation suggests that only the elites should participate (Elazar 1972).

Hanson, concerned with voter turnout based on political efficacy levels and interparty competition, uses loglinear analysis for congressional elections at the aggregate level. He concludes that although the preferred models derived from the analysis are different from Elazar's theory by one interactive term, he cannot conclude that Elazar's theory is wrong. He further states that by focusing on the differing interactive term, one can see that the preferred models are generally compatible with Elazar's theory. Thus, Elazar
predicted correctly the role of turnout, interparty competition and political efficacy in the subcultures (1982a, 33). However, by using loglinear analysis, Hanson is placing the subcultures on a continuum, a misapplication of the theory.

In a study looking at political attitudes and the effects of political campaign advertising in the different subcultures, Joslyn considers the following hypotheses: that state-wide attitudes concerning the role of government, the reason for government, the role of the citizen in government, political conflict, and conflict resolution will be correlated with Elazar's characterizations of the subcultures. There is a definite correlation between the dominant subculture in which a person grew up and his political attitudes. Furthermore, he states specific hypotheses about television and the impact of it concerning campaign commercials in each subculture (1982a, 39).

He concludes that his analysis validates Elazar's theory. People representing the moralistic subculture participate more, feel more efficacious, have more trust in government, and are more lenient toward government intervention (1980, 54). He does not evaluate the traditionalistic subculture and claims that the individualistic is somewhere between the two. Furthermore, as with the descriptions of the subcultures, the moralistic
emphasizes issue concerns, while the individualistic subcultures tend to accent the candidates' style (1980, 55). These conclusions follow Elazar closely because the moralistic subculture is a marketplace and issues are important for the good of society. On the other hand, the commonwealth nature of the individualistic subculture stresses the use of the political system for personal gain (Elazar 1972). However, note that the empirical results place the moralistic subculture on one end of the spectrum and the traditionalistic on the other, with the individualistic in between. Again, this follows the definitions of Thompson, et al., rather than the characterizations of Elazar.

Welch and Peters, interested in the attitudes of senators in four main issue areas, mailed questionnaires to senators in 1975. The issue areas included: "economic-welfare policy, the new 'social issues,' self-designated liberalism, and attitudes toward corruption at all levels of government" (1980, 60). Using factor analysis, Welch and Peters conclude that the attitudes of elites can be explained by political subcultures. However, note that Elazar does not make a distinction between the mass public and elites. In fact, much of the work with the mass public, when taken as a whole, does not show favorable
results on all points of Elazar's theory (Kincaid and Lieske 1991).

One interesting study conducted by Kincaid focuses on the relationship between Elazar's subcultures and the "quality of life" measures in the American metropolitan areas (1980). Using Q-factor analysis and Liu's Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA) of 1970, Kincaid concludes that moralistic subcultures had a high quality of life rating, traditionalistic scored low and individualistic was somewhere in the middle. Furthermore, he suggests that political culture is more strongly related to "political, social, health and education, and overall quality-of-life measures than with the economic and environmental measures" (1980, 102). He uses the dual political subcultures and calls for more use of Elazar's theory in the area of urban life studies.

Vandenbosch moves beyond public policy to test the influence of political culture on corporal punishment in schools (1991). She finds there is a higher instance of corporal punishment in traditionalistic states while the moralistic and individualistic states appear to have changed their manner of punishment in schools (1991, 119).

This examination of various studies of Elazar's theory brings us to the pertinent question that has not been answered. Does published research validate Elazar's theory
of dominant subcultures and the states he designated as representing each in 1966? Furthermore, one must ask how the presence of dual subcultures can be accepted if the dominant ones have not been fully validated? Wirt, an advocate of Elazar's theory, admits that the categorizations of the subcultures and the classifications of the states are a "given" (1991, 5). Nardulli is correct in assuming that the persistent use of Elazar's subcultural theory has stifled the search for other theories concerning the political culture of the United States.
Kluckhohn describes culture as "a blueprint for action" (1962, 53). Therefore, political culture could act as a shaping influence as suggested by Devine. The assumption in the present study is that political culture is an underlying force within the American polity. It is, however, another thing to assume that the subcultures exist as stipulated by Elazar’s theory. This study will test Elazar’s theory according to the modes of participation as outlined by Verba and Nie (1972). Furthermore, measures of political efficacy and attitudes toward government are considered because the level of a person’s participation could be based on whether or not an individual feels that he can make a difference in government (Verba and Nie 1972).

In their study, Verba and Nie focus not on the manner by which participation increases or decreases the stability of a democratic regime, but rather with the influence various modes of participation have on government (1972, 8). They state three determinants of individual participation: 1) party affiliation; 2) the nature of the community in which one lives; and 3) one’s political beliefs (1972, 14). If, as they contend, the "nature of the community" is an
important factor, then it can be inferred that political culture plays a role in determining levels of participation.

Participation is defined as ways people influence government. Verba and Nie discuss four modes: 1) voting; 2) campaign activity; 3) citizen-initiated contacts; and 4) cooperative participation (1972, 47). Voting is the simplest and most prevalent form of participation in the United States and does not warrant an explanation. Campaign activity, closely related to voting, is "working for a party or candidate, attending meetings, contributing money, and trying to convince others how they should vote" (Verba and Nie 1972). The other two modes of participation are at the other end of the continuum from voting and campaign activity. These acts take place after the election. Citizen-initiated contacts are instigated by the citizen alone, determining where, when, why and how the contact will take place (Verba and Nie 1972). This involves a greater commitment to participation than does voting or campaign activity. The last mode, cooperative participation, involves group activity on the part of the citizen. He no longer acts alone, but joins with other citizens with the same concerns to influence government (Verba and Nie 1972). This could be party-oriented or interest group-oriented. If it is party-oriented, it goes beyond the realm of the electoral process. It would be a grouping of people in the
same party to fight for a party belief, i.e. abortion and the Republican party. For campaign activity, only the question in the National Election Study corresponding to "working for a candidate" is used in this analysis because, compared to the other activities (wearing a button, displaying a bumper sticker, or giving money) it requires the most effort on the part of the citizen.

As mentioned in Chapter Two, there are three hypotheses that are tested in the present study. The first concerns the fit of the model to be tested. Confirmatory factor analysis assess the fit of the model based on a chi-square goodness-of-fit test. Because of the assumptions of confirmatory factor analysis, chi-square tests the null hypothesis that the model possesses an acceptable fit or likeness of the observed data measured (Long 1983, 63).

The second hypothesis requires a group analysis to determine if the subcultures, as categorized by Elazar, are indeed different. The null hypothesis is that the subcultures are alike in their orientations to attitudes and behaviors. The last hypothesis pursues the time-bound nature of Elazar's theory. It is hypothesized that Elazar's theory is, indeed, time-bound and that the fit of the model, based on the chi-square goodness-of-fit test, will deteriorate with each year tested. The null hypothesis is
that the theory is not time-bound and the fit of the model does not deteriorate over-time.

Confirmatory factor analysis is a submodel of the covariance structure or LISREL model (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1989; Long 1983, 15). As with factor analysis, confirmatory factor analysis uses observed variables or indicators as measures of latent variables to explain the covariances of the observed variables in terms of the latent variables (Long 1983, 15). In other words, latent variables or common factors are variables that cannot be directly observed. However, information can be gathered indirectly by measuring the effects of the latent variables on observed variables. Furthermore, unlike other statistical procedures, confirmatory factor analysis considers error measurement in the equation and in the observation (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1979). Therefore, there are three types of variables present in a confirmatory factor model: latent variables \( (\xi) \), observed variables \( (x) \) and error terms \( (\delta) \) (Figure 2).

As previously mentioned, measuring political culture is difficult because of its' illusive nature. How does one measure "patterns of orientation" (Elazar 1972)? Confirmatory factor analysis is beneficial to political culture studies because it attempts to measure political culture, a latent variable, using observed variables and
accounting for error in measurement. By considering measurement error, confirmatory factor analysis attempts to eliminate the "distorting effects" of measurement error (Long 1983, 17). In the present analysis, political culture is divided into two latent variables, attitudes and behaviors, that explain the manifestations portion of Elazar's theory.

A two ksi model is constructed with eight observed variables defining attitudes and behaviors. Figure 3 is the model used for the initial confirmatory factor analysis for each year. Note that the two ksi's are considered correlated and are joined by an arrow labeled phi (ϕ) 21. Each of the observed variables is correlated with one of the ksis and is joined by an arrow. The arrow is labeled with a lambda (λ) followed by the number of the observed variable and the ksi number leading from the designated ksi to the particular observed variable. Any variations on the model are specific to the year involved and are necessary to improve the fit of the model.

Verba and Nie's four modes of participation load on the "behaviors" ksi (ksi 1), and correspond to questions from the National Election Study (Appendix 1). The variables associated with voting, working for a party or candidate, contacting a public official, and community participation
are labeled "vote" (x1), "work" (x2), "conpof" (x3) and "copart" (x4) respectively. Kis two, labeled "attitudes," corresponds to questions in the National Election Study paralleling political beliefs concerning government (Appendix 1). The variables labeled "ptrust" (x5), "say" (x6), "care" (x7) and "gvtpow" (x8) correspond to questions concerning public trust in government, people's amount of say in government, whether public officials care, and the power of the government.

The hypotheses, stated above, will be tested using the LISREL program. For each year tested, the method is follows three steps: 1) the first analysis considers the fit of the model and modifications, when indicated, will be made to improve the fit; 2) a group analysis and a difference of chi-square test will be performed so as to compare the structures of the three subcultures and determine if they are different in their orientations to behaviors and attitudes; and 3) the results of the group analyses will be compared to see if the fit of the model deteriorates over-time.

To determine if the model maintains a good fit, the chi-square statistic (x^2) will be used, the lower the chi-square statistic, the better the fit of the model. The basis for this is that confirmatory factor analysis attempts to minimize the difference between the predicted model (Σ)
and the observed covariance matrix (S), therefore, chi-square equals $|\Sigma - S|$ (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1989; Long 1983). Identification of the model is also necessary to determine the fit. Identification must be achieved in order to estimate the model. Estimation is concerned with how close the predicted covariance matrix or model, $\Sigma$, is to the observed covariance matrix $S$. Identification is achieved if $q(q+1)/2$ is greater than or equal to the number of unconstrained, independent, parameters, where "q" equals the number of observed variables (Long 1983). In each test for the following years, identification will be achieved with the same numbers, because the number of indicators (q) and the number of parameters is the same for each year. The same will hold true for the modified models because only one parameter is added for each year.

For each year, the difference of chi-square tests is conducted in the same manner. The chi-square test involves four separate analyses with varying levels of constraints placed on the matrices: 1) only the patterns of the factor loadings are constrained; 2) the lambda matrices are fixed invariant or equal, thereby requiring identical factor structures and loadings; 3) both the lambda and phi matrices are held invariant, requiring identical factor structures, loadings and inter-factor correlations; and 4) all the
matrices are held invariant, thereby forcing error terms to be equal. This is the most restrictive comparison in the test (Clarke, Elliot and Roback 1991).

For the group analysis, the states, as listed in Table 1, are combined to reflect only the dominant subcultures present in each state (Table 2). The group analysis is labeled according to the subcultures: moralistic, individualistic, and traditionalistic. Note that when the first part of the analysis is performed to test the first hypothesis concerned with the acceptable fit of the model, the states are considered all together. It is not until the group analysis that they are aggregated to resemble Elazar's dominant subcultures.

Elazar suggests that there is more than one political culture present in each state, creating an over-lapping effect. This concept appears to increase the credibility of his theory because it allows for change within the state. However, the present study employs only the dominant state subcultures that Elazar states have developed over the course of time (Center 1968b; Kincaid 1982a). It is better to begin with a general picture before assuming there are several subcultures present within a state at one time (Kincaid and Lieske 1991; Wirt 1991).
Interpretation of the Data: 1968

In part one, a confirmatory factor analysis, conducted without a group analysis, is performed with the variables 'vote,' 'work,' 'conpof,' and 'copart' loading on the first ksi "behaviors," and 'ptrust,' 'say,' 'care' and 'gvtpow' loading on the second ksi, "attitudes." The results of the first analysis exhibit a $x^2$ with 19 degrees of freedom equal to 103.49 ($p=.000$), not a very good fit. However, the model does achieve identification with "q" equal to 36 which is greater than 17, the number of independent, unconstrained, parameters. Furthermore, a visual analysis of the residuals on the Q-plot do not show a tight fit around the 45° angle.

The t-values for the first analysis show strong correlations for 'vote,' 'work,' 'conpof' and 'copart' for ksi one; 'work' and 'copart' have the highest correlations. For ksi two, 'ptrust,' 'say' and 'care' have strong values, 'gvtpow' is very low (.501) and does not meet the standards set for t-value tests (2.0 or higher). However, 'gvtpow' will not be taken out of the analysis to insure the validity and integrity of the test.

One reason this variable scores low could be because it is a factor of party ideology since it asks an opinion pertaining to the strength of government, reflecting evaluations of the Democratic party favoring a more
pro-active government role than does the Republican party. A second reason could be found in the definitions of the subcultures. Each subculture maintains a distinct attitude about the strength of government. The moralistic subculture advocates limited governmental intervention, the individualistic appears to agree with a strong government based on the commonwealth description, and the traditionalistic is indifferent.

The modification indices suggest that the correlation of theta delta matrix (δ4,δ2) for ksi one would improve the fit of the model (Figure 4). The results of this examination improve the fit of the model, a $x^2$ with 18 degrees of freedom equal to 31.91 (p=.023). Identification is still acheived, 36 is greater than 17. Upon visual analysis of the fit, the residuals on the Q-plot have tightened around the 45° line. Again, the t-values for every variable except 'gvtpow' are strong; 'gvtpow' is .643. There is a failure to reject the null hypothesis, acceptable fit of the model, for the first hypothesis.

For the second hypothesis, concerning the difference between the groups, the analysis involves two steps: 1) including the subculture variable in the confirmatory factor analysis; and 2) using a group analysis, in the confirmatory factor analysis, to compare the three groups. As previously mentioned, a chi-square test is conducted to do the
comparisons. The results of the difference of chi-square tests are in Table 3. As each level of the test increases constraints on the model, the fit of the model deteriorates somewhat but remains satisfactory. When the patterns of the factor loadings are constrained, \( x^2 \) is equal to 50.54 with 54 degrees of freedom (\( p = .626 \)), a good fit. As the level of constraints increases requiring identical factor structures and loadings, the fit remains good with a \( x^2 \) equal to 55.84 with 70 degrees of freedom (\( p = .891 \)), suggesting that the factor structures and loadings are the same. At the third level, requiring identical factor structures, loadings and inter-factor correlations to be invariant, \( x^2 \) is equal to 56.75 with 72 degrees of freedom (\( p = .906 \)). The fit is still acceptable and the results appear to uphold the null hypothesis that the groups are invariant. However, when error terms are constrained to be equal, the fit of the model severely deteriorates, yielding a \( x^2 \) with 90 degrees of freedom and equal to 498.87 (\( p = .000 \)). This suggests that, at the strictest level of constraints, the groups are different.

Upon examination of the difference of chi-square test, it is concluded that the structures of the groups are different in their levels of participation and attitudes. This leads to a rejection of the null hypothesis that states that the groups are the same. Looking at the comparisons of
each test, it is determined that the structures are different especially in the final comparison, $x^2$ with 36 degrees of freedom equal to 448.78. The critical value is much smaller than the test statistic $a^2$ with 30 degrees of freedom or higher has a critical value of 47.962.

Visual analysis of the residuals on the Q-plot suggest the same results as the difference of chi-square test. As each level of constraints is imposed on the data, the residuals begin to loosen from the 45° line. They are tightest in the first test when no constraints are implied. It is interesting to note, however, that the traditionalistic subculture displays the loosest grouping of residuals throughout all levels of the constraints. Elazar considers the South to be representative of the traditionalistic subculture. Maybe the South is not as predictable as Elazar thinks.

In conclusion for 1968, two years after Elazar published the first edition of his *States* book, there is evidence of political subcultures in the United States, but only with the strictest level of tests for the group analysis. Furthermore, upon visual analysis, it appears that the moralistic and individualistic are more clearly characterized by Elazar's subcultural theory than the traditionalistic subculture. This implies that the cultural differences present between the subcultures are not readily
distinguishable and that the dimension of political culture is underlying at best, concerning participation and attitudes.

Interpretation of the Data: 1976

Again, as in 1968, a confirmatory factor analysis, conducted without a group analysis, shows the variables 'vote,' 'work,' 'conpof,' and 'copart' loading on the first ksi "behaviors," and 'ptrust,' 'say,' 'care,' and 'gvtpow,' loading on the second ksi, "attitudes." The results of the first analysis exhibit a $\chi^2$ with 19 degrees of freedom equal to 770.49 ($p=.000$), a terrible fit. A visual analysis confirms the deteriorated model, the residuals do not adhere to the 45° line of the Q-plot.

The t-values for the analysis show strong correlations for 'vote,' 'work,' 'conpof,' and 'copart' for ksi one; 'work' having the highest correlation. For ksi two, 'ptrust,' 'say' and 'care' have strong values, however, 'gvtpow,' again, is very low (.973) and does not meet the standards set for t-value tests (2.0 or higher). Again, 'gvtpow' will not be taken out because of the reasons previously mentioned.

The modification indices suggest that correlation of theta delta matrix ($\delta7,\delta6$) for ksi two would improve the fit
of the model (Figure 5). The results of the analysis do improve the fit of the model, a $x^2$ with 18 degrees of freedom equal to 163.24 ($p=.000$). Although the fit of the model is greatly improved, it is still not a perfect fit. A visual analysis of residuals on the Q-plot show a poor fit around the 45° line, there are several outliers.

The second part of the analysis involves two steps: 1) including the subculture variable in the confirmatory factor analysis; and 2) using confirmatory factor analysis to compare the structures of the three groups and their orientations to attitudes and behaviors, a difference of chi-square test is conducted. The results of the difference of chi-square tests are in Table 4. As each level of the test increases constraints on the model, the fit of the model deteriorates somewhat but remains satisfactory. However, as compared to the model and group analysis for 1968, the fit is not as good.

In the first analysis, the patterns of the factor loadings are constrained to be equal. As noted in Table 4, $x^2$ with 54 degrees of freedom is equal to 91.69 ($p=.565$). When factor structures and loadings are fixed as invariant, $x^2$ with 70 degrees of freedom is equal to 94.03 ($p=.029$). In the third analysis, the factor structures, loadings and inter-factor correlations are held invariant, $x^2$ is equal to 94.06 with 72 degrees of freedom ($p=.042$). From the results
of these three analyses it appears the groups are similar in their modes of participation and attitudes and the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at this point. However, as in 1968, when error terms are constrained to be equal, the fit of the model severely deteriorates, yielding a $x^2$ with 90 degrees of freedom equal to 1742.28 ($p=.000$). Again, it is only with the strictest of tests that the group analysis shows a trace of subcultural differences.

Upon examination of the difference of chi-square test, it is concluded that the structures of the groups are different in their levels of participation and attitudes, and we must reject the null hypothesis. It should be noted, though, that the tests are not strong in their conclusions but the final test does show a $x^2$ with 36 degrees of freedom and equal to 1650.59; the critical value of $x^2$ with 30 degrees of freedom or higher is 47.962, a value much lower than the test statistic. As in 1968, the model deteriorates with the strictest of constraints, suggesting that subcultural differences in the modes of participation and attitudes are very slight and possibly unidentifiable at the aggregate level of analysis.

Upon visual analysis of the residuals on the Q-plot, it is interesting to note that the only group with residuals that remain tight around the 45° line is the moralistic subculture through all levels of constraints. The
individualistic and the traditionalistic residuals deviate from the line as the levels of constraints are increased.

Again, 1976 is a very difficult year to use as a determinate of political culture because of the political mistrust and changes in voting behavior. The repercussions of the Watergate scandal could have affected attitudes and behaviors of the electorate. Abramowitz notes that between 1964 and 1974, there was a decrease in trust, confidence and voter turnout (1980).

Interpretation of Data: 1988

As with the previous years, a confirmatory factor analysis, conducted without a group analysis, loads the variables 'vote,' 'work,' 'conpof' and 'copart' on the first ksi "behaviors." The variables 'ptrust,' 'say,' 'care' and 'gvtpow' load on the second ksi, "attitudes." The results of the first analysis exhibit a $x^2$ with 19 degrees of freedom equal to 29.96 ($p = .052$), a good fit. A visual analysis of the residuals on the Q-plot show a good fit with the 45° line with only slight deviations.

The t-values for the first analysis show correlations above standard measures, but not as strong as in 1976. Again, 'vote,' 'work,' 'conpof' and 'copart' are significant for ksi one; 'vote' being the highest (6.039). For ksi
two, 'ptrust,' 'say' and 'care' are statistically significant. However, unlike the previous analyses, 'gvtow' meets significance standards for t-values (2.627). This could be an indication of generational change as discussed by Inglehart and Brown, but it cannot be concluded that this has taken place since this analysis is not an exploration into the types of change.

The modification indices suggest that the correlation of theta delta matrix (δ8,δ5) for ksi two would improve the fit of the model (Figure 6). The outcome of this improve the fit of the model, a $x^2$ with 18 degrees of freedom equal to 21.72 (p=.245). The t-values for gvtpow remain above 2.0. The residuals on the Q-plot show a tighter fit.

The second part of the analysis involves two steps: 1) including the subculture variable in the confirmatory factor analysis; and 2) using a group analysis in the confirmatory factor analysis to compare the structures of the three groups and their orientations to attitudes and behaviors. As before, a chi-square test is conducted to do the comparisons. The results of the difference of chi-square tests are in Table 5. As each level of the test increases constraints on the model, the fit of the model deteriorates. When the patterns of the factor loadings are constrained, $x^2$ is equal to 204.48 with 54 degrees of freedom (p=.000). In the second analysis, requiring identical factor structures
and loadings, $x^2$ is equal to 216.88 with 70 degrees of freedom ($p=.000$). The fit of the model significantly deteriorates suggesting that the factor structures and loadings are different. When factor structures, loadings and inter-factor correlations are held invariant, $x^2$ with 72 degrees of freedom equals 224.89 ($p=.000$). As in the previous test, it appears that the groups do not have the same factor structures, loadings and inter-factor correlations.

As compared to the models for 1968 and 1976, the fit of the model is not good. Because the fit of the model is not good for the group analysis thus far, it cannot be concluded that the groups maintain different behaviors and attitudes as described by Elazar's theory. As in 1968 and 1976, when error terms are constrained to be equal, the fit of the model severely deteriorates, a $x^2$ with 90 degrees of freedom and equal to 1936.05 ($p=.000$). Upon visual analysis of the residuals on the Q-plot, the moralistic and individualistic show the closest fit to the line for the level of analysis without constraints. However, the residuals severely deviate from the 45° line as the level of constraints increases. The traditionalistic subculture never achieves a good fit in the visual analysis of the residuals.

Upon examination of the difference of chi-square test, it appears that the structures of the groups are different
in their levels of participation and attitudes, leading to a rejection of the null hypothesis. It should be noted, though, that while the tests are not strong in their conclusions, the final test does produce a $x^2$ with 36 degrees of freedom equal to 1731.57. The critical value of $x^2$ with 30 degrees of freedom or higher is 47.962, a value much lower than the test statistic. Yet, as mentioned, the model does not produce an acceptable fit for the group analysis, suggesting that something other than the influence of Elazar's subcultures is taking place. This could be evidence of the migrational process that was a result of the late seventies and early eighties, contributing to the deterioration of Elazar's model in the 1988 analysis.

Conclusion

The second hypothesis is concerned with the differences between the groups, the null hypothesis would be that they are the same. From the results of the difference of chi-square test, the null hypothesis is rejected. However, it should be noted that Elazar's subcultures when divided for the group analysis show no substantial differences until the strictest level of constraints is placed on the model forcing the error terms to be invariant. Some serious considerations need to be discussed in order to decide
whether or not Elazar's theory is time-bound. First, the models without group analysis for the years 1968 and 1988 obtain good fits. However, 1976 is not as acceptable as the others when considering the fit of the model but this might be due to the effects of Watergate on citizens voting/participation patterns and their attitudes toward the government. Yet, as the group analysis is performed for each year, the fit of the models deteriorates. It is not only evident in the models with more constraints, but also in the models where no constraints or fewer strenuous constraints are applied. Therefore, this suggests that Elazar's theory, at least the one concerning dominant subcultures, is time-bound.

Steps need to be taken to remodel either the dominant cultures map, reexamining the possibility of dual subcultures, or move from the aggregate level to the individual level of analysis. Furthermore, Elazar's subcultures have shown better results when applied to smaller areas of states using dual and dominant subcultures (Dan, Alritton and Wyckoff 1991; Elazar 1970; Lovrich, Daynes, and Ginger 1980). It may be that there are subcultures present but that they are more evident within states rather than between states.
CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION AND DIRECTION

In the first analysis, a test of the first hypothesis, there is a failure to reject the null hypothesis, therefore, the model obtained an acceptable fit. The second hypothesis, concerned with the existence of differences between the groups as to their orientations to behaviors and attitudes, resulted in a rejection of the null hypothesis. As mentioned, it was only under the strictest level of constraints that the differences toward behaviors and attitudes are measurable. This suggests that there is something more than Elazar's subcultures involved in the orientations. The deterioration of fit in the models suggests that there has been a change in the subcultures as defined by Elazar. Therefore, concerning the third hypothesis, there is a rejection of the null hypothesis and acceptance of the hypothesis that Elazar's theory is time-bound.

It is assumed that much of the change is due to migration between states. Brown's research on migration, discusses several theories about the effects of political environments on migrants: socialization, adaptation, area change, selective exposure and psychological immunity.
Socialization theory asserts that during childhood, children, influenced by their parents, peers, teachers, and other prominent figures, hold certain values and beliefs as core values. As a political theory, socialization is thought to develop political continuities among choices and behaviors of the electorate (Brown 1988, 10). Furthermore, similar to Devine's suggestion (1972), these values behave much like a screening device, reinforcing or supporting values in the political environment.

The theory of political adaptation posits that in the absence of political socialization at an early age, a person may be influenced by experiences later in life. For example, Brown discusses the fact that many African-Americans, as they migrated to the North from the South, tended to display political behaviors much like those of the North rather than those of the South (1988, 11). He attributes this to the lack of socialization in childhood, and the influence of peers and the different political environment in the Northern areas as compared to the South. Adaptation can occur in one of two ways: 1) a perceptive person will recognize certain behaviors in the political environment and choose to modify his or her behavior to duplicate that of the environment; or 2) a person may be inclined to conform his or her political behavior to that of
peers, especially if the political environment is a new one (Brown 1988, 11).

According to the theory of area change, an area can change politically through redistricting, migration, and reapportionment (Brown 1988, 11). As these processes take place, different ideologies may be introduced into an area that may cause change within the area over time. Brown discusses several examples of this theory. One example suggests that in the early 1950's, as northerners moved South, the strong Democratic tendency of the South decreased as the migrants, usually Republican, maintained their party loyalty after migrating (1988, 13).

The theory of selective exposure suggests that the electorate actively solicits information that reinforces their beliefs or chooses to bypass information that is not reinforcing in nature (Brown 1988, 13). A distinction can be made between this theory and that of socialization. Selective exposure requires initiative on the part of the electorate, socialization does not. Brown suggests that this is possible if a migrant specifically moves into a political environment analogous to his or her previous one. Selective occurrences, a corollary of selective exposure, relies on values gained through the socialization process.

Psychological immunity occurs when a person becomes immune to nonsupportive information because of continuous
exposure to these ideas (Brown 1988, 14). Presumably, the person is active in the political process and his or her strong ties to certain ideologies facilitate the immunization process. However, as Brown points out, the level of psychological immunization may depend on past experiences and can influence people differently (1988, 15). It is difficult to decide where one theory begins and the other ends. It appears that all can be utilized to explain the realm of political culture. As a dynamic process, the political culture of an area changes as people and viewpoints change. Because no two people are alike, no one theory can explain every decision or action. While socialization may explain one situation, it cannot explain all the changes within a political culture. Hence, Elazar's approach essentially ignores individual differences, and assesses a direction in aggregate effects.

In his book, Brown tests a theory of social and political change that is an amalgam of the previously discussed theories (1988). He argues that internal migration, crossing a county boundary, can affect a migrant depending on the influence, ideologies or patterns of behavior of the previous environment as compared to the new or current environment. He suggests that this could be an opportunity for political change (1988, 7). Using party identification as an indicator, Brown categorizes three
types of migration effects: congruent, incongruent and mixed (1988, 82).

The congruent effect reinforces previous political environments. That is, the migrant receives continual exposure from the new environment as he did in his previous one. The incongruent effect is opposite to the congruent effect, since the previous and current political environments are different. Brown notes that there is a tendency for the migrant to replicate the political attitudes of the new environment. This supports the importance of socialization in the construction of an environment's political culture.

The mixed environment denotes a move from an environment with diverse political commitments to a similarly diverse environment. Because of the diversity found in both the previous and current environments, there is no positive link between the environment and party identification (1988, 99). Brown concludes, contrary to previous studies, that there is a relationship between the current political environment and presidential and congressional votes of migrants (1988, 95). Brown's findings concerning migration may prove to be explanatory in the present study. If there is evidence of political subcultures in the United States, any changes over time may be explained with Brown's findings.
In effect, Brown fills some of the gaps in Elazar's theory. Elazar contends that the subcultures, although separate, tend to overlap in some states, therefore, creating a dual culture in some instances. However, in general, there is a tendency for a state to maintain one dominant subculture despite local tendencies toward a different subculture (Center 1968b). Brown's theory would explain this occurrence by suggesting that this is because of the influence the current environment has on previously held beliefs of the migrants.

As mentioned, this study is not designed to determine the types of changes taking place, but rather to determine if Elazar's theory is still viable. This study has several drawbacks that could have influenced the statistical conclusions. First, the indicators used from the National Election Study are not designed, specifically, to detect cultural differentiations. Second, since the data are not so designed, the LISREL method, operating on the pretext of determining latent characteristics based on measurable variables, could have distorted the statistical results. And, third, the concept of "manifestations" is a vague and untested area in Elazar's cultural theory. Therefore, the model could be incorrectly defined.

It is apparent, however, that the political culture of the United States is a dynamic phenomenon and has undergone
changes since Elazar's theory, thereby calling for a reexamination of his theory. In 1965, Pye and Verba suggested that in "any particular community there is a limited and distinct political culture that gives meaning, predictability and form to the political process" (7).

Community is the key word. Although criticized, Sharkansky and others have found support when looking at the dual subcultures of the states. However, the dual subcultures are sometimes based on state aggregate data and do not consider the community or area differences with the state. The theory needs to move into the community level and away from the state level.
APPENDIX A

QUESTIONNAIRE
## National Election Survey Questions Used

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Percentages for</th>
<th>1968</th>
<th>1976</th>
<th>1988</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

1) **vote:** vote

In talking to people about the election we find that a lot of people weren't able to vote because they weren't registered or they were sick or they just didn't have time. How about you, did you vote this time or did something keep you from voting?

| yes, voted | 68  | 60  | 61  |
| no, didn't vote | 22  | 24  | 26  |

2) **work:** work for a party or candidate

Did you do any other work for one of the parties or candidates?

| yes | 5  | 4  | 3  |
| no | 81 | 80 | 84 |

3) **copart:** community participation

Do you belong to any political club or organizations?

| yes | 3   | 21 | 25 |
| no | 83  | 57 | 60 |

4) **conpof:** contacted public officials

Have you ever written to any public officials giving them your opinion about something that should be done?

| yes | 17  | 23  | 10  |
| no | 69  | 60  | 71  |
Percentages for 1968 1976 1988

5) gvtpow: government power

Some people are afraid the government in Washington is getting too powerful for the good of the country and the individual person. Others feel that the government in Washington is not getting too strong for the good of the country. Have you been interested enough in this to favor one side over the other? (if yes) What is your feeling, do you think...

(Yes) the government is getting too powerful
40 49 29
(Yes) other, depends
3 0 1
(Yes) the government has not gotten too strong
30 19 32

6) ptrust: people's trust in government

Over the years, how much attention do you feel the government pays to what people think when it decides what to do: a good deal, some, or not much?

a good deal 20 9 11
some 36 45 50
not much 5 27 24

7) say: say in government

Now I'd like to read some of the kinds of things people tell us when we interview them and ask you whether you agree or disagree with them. I'll read them one at a time and you just tell me whether you agree or disagree? People like me don't have any say about what the government does...

agree 35 34 43
disagree 50 47 38

8) care: public officials care

I don't think public officials care much what people like me think...

agree 37 42 54
disagree 47 37 33
APPENDIX B

TABLES
TABLE 1

STATES CATEGORIZED ACCORDING TO ELAZAR'S SUBCULTURES*

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<tr>
<th>Subculture Type</th>
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<td>M (oralistic)/I (individualistic)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>I (individualistic)/M (oralistic)</td>
<td>Connecticut, Rhode Island, Ohio, Nebraska, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Ohio, Nebraska, New York, New York, Illinois, Illinois, Massachusetts, Massachusetts, Maryland, Wyoming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I (individualistic)</td>
<td>Pennsylvania, Indiana, Alaska, New Jersey, Indiana, Nevada, Nevada, Alaska</td>
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</table>
| I (individualistic)/T (raditionalistic) | Delaware, Missouri, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, West Virginia, Texas, Oklahoma, Oklahoma, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, West Virginia, 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EVALUATION OF THE GROUP ANALYSIS - 1976

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APPENDIX C

FIGURES
FIGURE 1
ELAZAR'S TRIANGULAR SUBCULTURE MODEL

MORALISTIC

INDIVIDUALISTIC

TRADITIONALISTIC

MT
TM
MI
IM
IN
IT
TI
FIGURE 2
TWO KSI MODEL FOR CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS

$\xi_1$ = Latent Variables

$X$ = Observed Variables

$\delta$ = Error Terms
FIGURE 3

TWO KSI MODEL FOR POLITICAL CULTURE USED IN INITIAL CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS FOR 1968, 1976 AND 1988
FIGURE 4
MODIFIED MODEL FOR 1968

$\phi_{21}$

BEHAVIOR
\[ \xi_1 \]

$\lambda_{11} \quad \lambda_{21} \quad \lambda_{31} \quad \lambda_{41}$

\[ X_1 \quad X_2 \quad X_3 \quad X_4 \]

\[ \delta_1 \quad \delta_2 \quad \delta_3 \quad \delta_4 \]

ATTITUDES
\[ \xi_2 \]

$\lambda_{52} \quad \lambda_{62} \quad \lambda_{72} \quad \lambda_{82}$

\[ X_5 \quad X_6 \quad X_7 \quad X_8 \]

\[ \delta_5 \quad \delta_6 \quad \delta_7 \quad \delta_8 \]
FIGURE 5
MODIFIED MODEL FOR 1976

\[
\begin{align*}
\phi_{21} & \\
\text{BEHAVIOR} & \quad \xi_1 \\
\lambda_{11} & \quad \lambda_{21} & \quad \lambda_{31} & \quad \lambda_{41} \\
X_1 & \quad X_2 & \quad X_3 & \quad X_4 \\
\delta_1 & & & & \\
\text{ATTITUDES} & \quad \xi_2 \\
\lambda_{52} & \quad \lambda_{62} & \quad \lambda_{72} & \quad \lambda_{82} \\
X_5 & \quad X_6 & \quad X_7 & \quad X_8 \\
\delta_5 & \quad \delta_6 & \quad \delta_7 & \quad \delta_8
\end{align*}
\]
FIGURE 6

MODIFIED MODEL FOR 1988
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Clarke, Harold D., Euel Elliott, and Thomas H. Roback. class paper.


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