THE SHIFT OF THE EGYPTIAN ALLIANCE FROM THE SOVIET
UNION TO THE UNITED STATES, 1970-1981

THESIS

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By

Abdelfattah A. Rashdan, B. S.

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The purpose of this study is to examine internal and external factors affecting the Egyptian-Soviet alliance during the period under investigation. Chapter I provides background information on Egyptian-Soviet relations, and in Chapter II important developments in those relations are outlined. Chapter III examines the October War of 1973 and Soviet policy during the war. Chapter IV traces efforts to reach a settlement in the Middle East, highlighting the role of the United States in the negotiations. Finally, Chapter V demonstrates that Egypt, like other small nations, has not surrendered its interests to the aims of either of the superpowers.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Egyptian foreign policy after World War II, particularly since the 1950s, has been shaped by three dominant issues: first, how the country could protect itself and its Arab neighbors from Israeli ambitions; second, how to settle the Palestinian question, which became one of the most important Arab crises; and, third, the need for an economic development strategy. Due to these changes and the circumstances of the Cold War during the early 1950s, the two major powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, were drawn into Middle Eastern affairs. Egypt's new and vigorous leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, seized power after the 1952 revolution, and he was quick to adopt these issues as key elements of Egyptian foreign policy.

President Nasser turned first to negotiations with the United States for military aid during 1954 and 1955, but he was frustrated in his quest. Subsequently, the West refused to grant aid to Egypt for the proposed Aswan High Dam.1 The U.S.S.R., in contrast, was ready to grant any

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type of aid to Egypt or any other country in the Third
World. The Soviets announced that they would support any
steps taken to strengthen national independence in the
Middle East and that they would cooperate with its peoples.²

Nasser therefore turned to the Soviet bloc with his
requests for military assistance. On September 27, 1955,
he announced an agreement with Czechoslovakia for purchase
of arms.³ This constituted the first step toward major
Soviet participation in Egyptian politics. Indeed, Egypt
became the first Arab country to establish diplomatic
relations with the Soviet Union.

The U.S.S.R. backed Egypt during the Suez War, an
operation launched by two colonial powers, Britain and
France, in retaliation for Nasser's nationalization of
the Suez Canal. In the years following this war, Moscow
established strong ties with Egypt by supplying weapons
and economic aid and providing financing to begin construc-
tion of the Aswan High Dam in 1958.

Egypt refused to join Western military pacts in the
1950s, and Nasser opposed the concept of the Eisenhower

²Karn Dawisha, Soviet Foreign Policy toward Egypt

³Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Red Star on the Nile: The
Soviet-Egyptian Influence Relation since the June War
(Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1977),
p. 7.
Doctrine. These decisions may have been influenced by the Soviet desire to block Western power in the region.

In the 1960s, Egyptian-Soviet economic, military, and diplomatic relations became extensive. As Rubinstein states, Economic aid was increased; high-ranking officials exchanged visits more frequently; major arms agreements were concluded in November 1964 and again a year later. Moscow increased the size of its military and economic assistance to Egypt and tried to persuade Nasser to grant the Soviet navy full and automatic access to Egyptian ports and permanent naval facilities.⁴

Between the death of Stalin in 1953 and that of Nasser in 1970, the Soviet Union became increasingly active in Egyptian affairs, and the West viewed the U.S.S.R. as one of the leading powers in the area.⁵ Yet, during these years the Egyptian-Soviet relationship faced many difficulties, although they did not reach the point of destroying the alliance.

When Nasser's successor, President Anwar El-Sadat, came to power in 1970, Egyptian-Soviet relations entered a new stage of development. Sadat's objectives differed from Nasser's, and one of them was to redress what he considered to be a basic imbalance in Egypt's foreign policy with the two major powers. As a consequence,

⁴Ibid.

Egypt's relations with the United States underwent a remarkable improvement, but those with the Soviet Union deteriorated.

Commenting on Sadat's presidency from 1970 to 1977, the well-known Egyptian journalist Mohamed Heikal stated that Sadat's relations with the Soviet Union can be seen to fall into five phases.

First, there was a period of uncertainty in which Sadat was occupied in trying to establish himself at home and he and the Russians were taking each other's measure. It was an easy period, and during it the seeds of later misunderstanding were sown. The next phase was one of growing tension, reaching a climax with the expulsion of the Soviet experts in July 1972. The third phase was the watershed—the October War of 1973. During it for a brief period Egyptian-Soviet relations reached a pinnacle or cordiality which had not been known since the days of Suez. But this interlude was quickly followed by phases four and five, in the first of which the Soviets were effectively excluded from the negotiations for a Middle East settlement and in the second of which the attempt was made by Egypt and America, working in harmony to exclude them from the Middle East altogether. 

Statement of the Problem

In the formulation of its foreign policy, Egypt, like any country, is seeking "first the preservation of its

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Mohamed Hassanien Heikal is a former editor-in-chief of the Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram (1957-1974) and has been a member of the Central Committee of the Arab Socialist Union.

independence and security, and second the pursuit and pro-
tection of its economic interest." 8 Egypt suffered in wars
with Israel several times, especially during the Six-Day
War of 1967 and the so-called "war of attrition" in 1969
and 1970. Egypt faced economic difficulties, breakdowns
in infrastructure and services, and inflation caused by the
war economy and further aggravated by worldwide inflation
following the rise in oil prices.

Regarding the problems that his leadership inherited,
Sadat stated in his book, In Search of Identity, "The eco-
nomic legacy Nasser left me was in even poorer shape than
the political. A free country's real independence is more
a matter of economic independence than political slogans." 9
Sadat also added,

In 1970 I read a report issued in the United States
which analyzed the economic situation in Egypt and it
said let Nasser shout as loud as he likes. He will
soon be down on his knees economically. At the same
time we were relying totally on our own resources,
there was no foreign aid of any kind, Soviet, Ameri-
can, West European, or Arabic. All that we received
from the outside world was abuse. 10

Egypt faced great obstacles in maintaining national
security. It did not have secure borders, nor did it have

8Karl W. Deutsch, The Analysis of International Rela-
tions (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1968), p. 87.

9Anwar El-Sadat, In Search of Identity (New York,

10Ibid., p. 214.
the strategic weapons that Israel possessed to use in protecting itself from attack.

In the context of these problems, on the one hand Egypt made moves toward a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict while on the other it was preparing for a new war. President Sadat visited Moscow several times between 1970 and 1972. The goals of his trips were to improve Egypt's economic situation, to obtain military assistance, and to acquire replacements for equipment lost during the previous wars. Sadat realized that he was not receiving sufficient assistance to enable him to make effective military decisions, and, at the time, he believed that the United States was sending Israel the military equipment that that nation requested.

Through the eyes of the Egyptian leader and on the international level, the United States appeared to be the only country capable of bringing peace to the Middle East. Heikal recalls,

I remember Kissinger telling me that the Soviets can give you arms and this means war, but only the United States can give you back your occupied territories and this means peace. At the same time that this conviction was growing, relations with the Soviets were deteriorating rapidly.\(^{11}\)

Faced with the problems described above, Egypt sought to protect its economy and national defenses while

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\(^{11}\) Mohamed H. Heikal, "Egyptian Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, LVI (July, 1978), 725.
simultaneously attempting to promote stability in the Middle East.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is to trace and analyze Egyptian foreign policy toward the Soviet Union during the presidency of Anwar El-Sadat, to examine internal and external factors affecting the Egyptian-Soviet alliance, and to determine how those factors influenced Egyptian decision-makers to shift from the Soviet Union to the United States.

Methods of Data Collection

This study utilizes primarily a historical-descriptive approach. The data were gathered through an extensive review of the literature on Egyptian-Soviet relations, incorporating primary and secondary sources available in libraries such as books, periodicals, newspapers, public documents, and other materials obtainable through interlibrary loan services.

Organization of the Study

This thesis is divided into five chapters. Following an introductory chapter, Chapter II surveys the events surrounding Nasser's death and Sadat's coming to power. Important developments in Soviet-Egyptian relations are outlined, particularly Egypt's adoption of a dual policy as
a way to achieve peace or to make war if peace efforts were unsuccessful.

Chapter III describes Egypt's attempts to end the no war-no peace dilemma and the failure of those attempts. It examines the October War of 1973, Soviet policy during the war, Egypt's response to that policy, and the results and changes brought about by the war on both the regional and global levels that affected Egyptian policy toward the Soviet Union.

Chapter IV traces efforts to reach a settlement in the Middle East and the role of the United States in the negotiations. It deals with Sadat's attempts to bring about peace, the difficulties he faced, and how his policy caused a shift of the Egyptian alliance from the Soviet Union to the United States.

Chapter V sums up the trends and tendencies that have affected the Egyptian alliance with the Soviet Union and demonstrates that Egypt, like other small powers, has not surrendered its interests to the aims of the superpowers.
CHAPTER II

TOWARD THE OCTOBER WAR OF 1973

The dominant features of the Egyptian political system between 1954 and 1970 were shaped by President Gamal Abdel Nasser. The era was given its highly distinctive imprint by Nasser's charismatic personality, and, consequently, with his death on September 28, 1970, a most significant chapter of Egypt's history came to a sudden end.

Nasser's death left Egypt facing many difficulties. The freedom and self-reliance he sought for Egypt were never fully achieved and, in fact, were compromised by the country's heavy reliance on the Soviet Union for arms and diplomatic support. The Egyptian territories occupied during the June, 1967 war were still under the control of Israel, and the Suez Canal was still closed. Egypt's economy depended on the support of moderate regimes in neighboring Arab nations.¹

On the global level, both of the superpowers continued to safeguard their political and strategic interests in the region through massive supplies of military and

economic aid. In addition, Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin and other high Soviet officials came to Cairo to do more than express their condolences and attend the funeral of Nasser. In Heikal's words, Kosygin "came to study, to consult, and to warn." After the funeral, Kosygin asked to meet with all of the leading figures in Egypt. Three meetings were arranged, the first dealing mainly with military issues and the second and third with political questions.

The leading Egyptian newspaper, Al-Ahram, reported that, in his meetings with Sadat and other Egyptian officials, Kosygin focused upon three principles:

1. Moscow would provide Egypt with full and continuous support; 2. the Soviet Union backed Cairo in its fight against imperialism in all its forms; 3. pressure must be applied against Israel to block its attempts to obstruct the settlement of the Middle East crisis, but a political solution must not be rejected.

During the meetings, Kosygin stated,

The imperialists were going to attack us now that Nasser was dead. They would try to exploit the vacuum he had left. Our responsibility was very great, because at any moment we might have to face a war. Opposed to us was not only Israel, but the

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3 Ibid.

United States. We must not let any influences, either from the right or from the ultra left, distract us.  

On the other hand, the attendance of the American delegation at Nasser's funeral, headed by Health, Education, and Welfare Secretary Elliott Richardson, was a matter of concern for the Soviet leadership since it appeared to be a sign from the Nixon administration of its desire for improved relations between Egypt and the United States.  

Sadat Consolidates Power  

President Nasser's death left an apparently unfillable gap in Egyptian political life. For eighteen years, he had been the central figure of the 1952 revolution and of the Arab world. No one in the Egyptian government seemed fit to follow him. Even Vice-President Sadat had little chance of moving into the vacant position; according to Burell and Kelidar, "The fact that Sadat was Nasser's vice-president is of little or no significance, for succession rarely moves in such ordered hierarchical ways in Egypt."  


Kamel Al Din Hussein, and Sami Sharaf--political contenders who had characterized themselves as having "power centers." These men reached a settlement by agreeing to choose Anwar El-Sadat as president. Sadat did not have a power center, but he had had a close relationship with Nasser, which created a feeling of succession within the public.

On October 15, 1970, although he was little known outside the Arab circle, Sadat was elected to succeed Nasser as president of Egypt. Heikal questioned Sadat's authority when he stated, "He was now master of Egypt, or was he?" As a result of this election, Egyptians, other interested nations, and the two superpowers were excited about Egypt's future and its new leader. Each of the superpowers feared that Sadat might reveal sympathies for the other, yet both also seemed to expect that he would prove to be a weak contrast to Nasser. Anxiously the Egyptian people watched to see how long their new president would be able to maintain control and wondered what the impact of his decisions would be.

Sadat began to consolidate his power. He was immediately faced with two challenges. According to Baker, "Not only did he come to power with an unheroic reputation, but he was to take charge of a stalled revolution. That

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9Heikal, The Road to Ramadan, p. 114.
combination gave Egypt's people little comfort." Sadat, however, surprised everyone with a series of astute political moves through which he was able to retain the presidency and emerge as a leader in his own right. Sadat chose Dr. Mahmoud Fawzi, a moderate, well-known, and respected man inside and outside Egypt, to be prime minister. Vice-President Ali Sabri and other officials who were Soviet supporters were viewed by Sadat as special friends of the Soviet Union. Because of their loyalty to the Soviets, they were strongly opposed to Fawzi's appointment.

To strengthen his domestic and international reputation, Sadat reached an agreement of federation with Libya and Syria in April of 1971. Sadat wished to appear to be following Nasser's policies, but the federation movement continued to arouse criticism in Egypt. Sadat faced his strongest opposition from a clique called the Ali Sabri group, whose members were Abdel Mohsen Abu-al-Nur, Secretary General of the Arab Socialist Union; Diaddin Daoud, member of the Higher Executive Committee of the ASU; Sharawy Gomaa, Minister of the Interior; Sami Sharaf, Minister of

\[ \text{References:} \]
\[ ^{10} \text{Raymond William Baker, } \text{Egypt's Uncertain Revolution under Nasser and Sadat} \text{ (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 124.} \]
\[ ^{11} \text{Heikal, } \text{The Sphinx and the Commissar}, \text{ p. 219.} \]
\[ ^{12} \text{Burrell and Kelidar, p. 16.} \]
Presidential Affairs; Mohammed Fayak, Minister of Information; and Mohammed Fawzi, Minister of Defense.\footnote{Karn Dawisha, \textit{Soviet Foreign Policy toward Egypt} (New York, St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1979), pp. 59-60.}

This group also criticized Sadat's peace initiative of February 4, 1971, for appearing to accept U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers' proposal to extend Egypt's ceasefire with Israel. Sadat stated,

\begin{quote}
It was a shock to the Soviet Union and its agents, particularly those working in Egypt for the Soviet Union. By then, both the Soviet power bloc and the other conspirators had come to realize that I was beginning to gain ground inside and outside Egypt. Their fight against me, though still underground, must now, they felt, be speeded up. The plan to get rid of me had to be carried out quickly.\footnote{Anwar El-Sadat, \textit{In Search of Identity} (New York, Harper & Row, Publishers, 1978), p. 222.}
\end{quote}

Sadat quashed the rebellion of the Ali Sabri group on May 2 by expelling his opponents after their abortive coup, thus demonstrating his complete understanding of the fundamental patterns in Nasser's Egypt. He dismissed Sabri as vice-president and ordered him held under house arrest pending trial. In the following weeks, Sadat's rivals were jailed.

The conflict between Sadat and Sabri did not stem merely from objections to an extended ceasefire and a new Arab confederation; rather, the two men had different philosophies for governing Egypt. Sabri had long
advocated close relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union, and he had generally admired Nasser's conduct of Egyptian internal and external affairs. Sadat, however, could not endorse Nasser's means even when he shared Nasser's general principles: "I could not possibly do things the way Nasser did simply because we were different men. True, we never differed on general principles, but we did differ, completely, on the means of reaching our goals."\(^{15}\)

The events of May 15, 1971 and their aftermath represented a serious effort by Sadat to correct actions that were opposed to the principles of the revolution of 1952. Sadat called his success in May of 1971 the "Corrective Revolution." The purging of personnel was the first step taken in that revolution, but measures, not men, were what mattered most. The days of May established Sadat's position as head of state. He and his supporters sought to dismantle the power centers that had restricted the rights of the Egyptian people. The president told the people to rule their country and said that democratic institutions should replace the power centers of individuals. The Egyptian Constitution of 1971 symbolized the

\(^{15}\)Ibid., p. 206.
democratic goals that consecrated the primacy of law and
the inviolability of personal liberty.\textsuperscript{16}

Sadat wanted to govern Egypt in a different way than
Nasser. At home, he showed his displeasure with Nasser's
revolutionary socialist experiments. He tried to moderate
Egypt's foreign policy and liberalize its economic policy.
Internationally, he wanted to strengthen friendships with
the oil-rich conservative Arab regimes. In politics,
Sadat approached the Soviet Union with canny moderation.\textsuperscript{17}

In April of 1971, Sadat summoned Soviet ambassador
Vladimir Vinogradov to his office. They discussed several
matters. Then the ambassador said, "We hear a lot these
days about disputes inside the high Executive Committee.
Is this true?" Sadat acknowledged that it was and replied,
"Now I have some news for you. I am going to get rid of
Ali Sabri." Vinogradov was surprised and asked, "Why
are you telling me this?" The president said,

Because people will try to capitalize on it. They
will make a war of nerves out of it. They will
tell you that the Soviet Union's number one man
in Egypt has been liquidated. The Western papers
will dance in front of you with gagalas trying to

\textsuperscript{16}Felipe Fernandez Armesto, \textit{Sadat and his Statecraft}

\textsuperscript{17}P. J. Vatikiotis, "Two Years after Nasser: The
Chance of a New Beginning," \textit{The New Middle East}, XLVIII
(September, 1972), 8-9.
provoke you. But I assure you there is nothing directed against the Soviet Union in this. It is a purely internal dispute.\textsuperscript{18}

It was evident that the Soviets were disturbed about the changes that were taking place in the Egyptian government, especially the ousting of Ali Sabri and his group, who were considered Soviet agents in Egypt. But the Soviets showed no reaction towards these changes. During the first six months of Sadat's presidency the U.S.S.R. adopted a policy of "watchful waiting" in the Middle East. The Soviet leadership continued to support the principle of an Arab-Israeli settlement on the basis of U.N. Resolution No. 242 and the peace efforts of Gunner Jarring. Soviet policy during this period seemed to concentrate on combining relations with the new regime rather than instituting any new policy initiatives. High-ranking Egyptian and Soviet officials, including the leaders of the two countries, exchanged several visits.\textsuperscript{19}

In the first few months of his presidency, Sadat began to open channels of communication with the United States. While exchanging letters with President Nixon, he explained his peace initiative in order to bring American pressure to bear on Israel, and he expressed his

\textsuperscript{18}Heikal, \textit{The Road to Ramadan}, p. 128.

\textsuperscript{19}Freedman, \textit{Soviet Policy toward the Middle East since 1970}, p. 51.
willingness to settle disagreements that had prolonged Nasser's alienation from American support.\textsuperscript{20}

On February 4, 1971, Sadat announced that Egypt would reopen the Suez Canal so that U.N. emergency forces could cross over to the East Bank to maintain a truce with Israel for six months rather than three. Sadat wished to restore amicable relations with the United States and to sign an agreement for lasting peace with Israel, provided that Israeli forces retreated to the passes halfway across the Sinai.\textsuperscript{21} Only two days after Sabri's expulsion from Sadat's government, U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers arrived in Cairo. To vent their dismay at being excluded from the peace efforts, Soviet leaders complained to Henry Kissinger about "unilateral American diplomacy in the Middle East" and released public papers discrediting Rogers' Middle Eastern mission.\textsuperscript{22}

Beneath the stated purpose of Rogers' visit lay an interested motive that Moscow believed must prove destructive to peace in the region; according to Soviet dispatches, U.S. leaders wished

\textsuperscript{20}El-Sadat, \textit{In Search of Identity}, pp. 277-278.  
\textsuperscript{21}Ibid., p. 219.  
\textsuperscript{22}Henry Kissinger, \textit{White House Years} (Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1979), pp. 1285-1286.
to reaffirm support for the forces in the Arab countries that are opposed to cooperation with the Soviet Union and to progressive social reforms, and at the same time to strengthen the position of the conservative elements that Washington regards as its potential mainstay in that quarter. . . .

American diplomatic efforts to set Arab countries against one another and to drive a wedge between them and the Soviet Union can only aggravate the situation in the Middle East and hamper the political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, for which Washington itself is ostensibly striving.23

Rogers' trip to Egypt, however, did not increase Egyptian sympathies toward the United States, nor did it resolve questions crucial to a Middle Eastern settlement. Sadat had already eliminated programs created by Nasser and had overturned Nasser's political group. He had also revealed a disquieting willingness to conciliate and negotiate quietly with nations that Nasser had not hesitated to affront. Under its new president, Egypt treated vigorous anti-Communist Arab regimes with courtesy, entertained American arguments with respect, and even discussed Israeli conquests in a calm and flexible tone.

The Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of May 27, 1971

When the Twenty-Fourth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was held in Moscow on March 31, 1971, Sami Sharaf, Minister of Presidential Affairs, headed an Egyptian delegation carrying a message from Sadat to General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Leonid

Brezhnev. The message contained a new suggestion that the two countries' relationship should be formalized in a treaty. On May 1, a reply came from Moscow signed by all of the three top Soviet leaders--Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Nikolai Podgorny--stating,

We have studied with interest the suggestion made by you, and conveyed to us by Sami Sharaf, for a treaty of friendship and cooperation between us. We think such a treaty would be of great importance and would produce a profound impression in world public opinion. It would also be a significant means of pressure on Israel and the United States, who now confront Egypt in its struggle to achieve its legitimate rights and to liquidate the consequences of aggression. There is no need to emphasize the fact that such a treaty would bury forever the desire of our enemies to break the friendship between our two countries and peoples. We are prepared to sign such a treaty any time you wish, and if you have no objection, we can begin immediate consultations on the text of the treaty.\(^2^4\)

After the political upheaval in Egypt, Soviet ambassador Vinogradov asked Sadat to arrange for a high Soviet delegation to visit Cairo, and Sadat agreed to invite the Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet.\(^2^5\) Podgorny made a trip to Egypt because the Soviets felt that conditions in Egypt were unstable and that this instability might lead to problems for them.

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Podgorny urged that the Soviet-Egyptian treaty of friendship and cooperation be concluded. The treaty, which was to be in force for fifteen years, was signed on May 27, 1971. It was the first such treaty made between the Soviet Union and a non-Communist country in the Third World and included conditions that were advantageous to each side.\textsuperscript{26} The treaty aroused considerable speculation in international circles, much of it composed of opinionated phrases about Sadat placing Egypt under Soviet bondage and the Soviet cloak of the "Brezhnev Doctrine" being spread over Egypt.

Thus, irremediable restrictions on Egypt's freedom to act on the global level were emphasized, but, in reality, the treaty was not so binding;\textsuperscript{27} indeed, a close analysis of its articles supports quite a different conclusion. In actuality, Sadat did not sign any provisions granting the Soviets a dominant influence over Egyptian affairs.

Article 1 of the treaty encouraged the two countries to fortify their friendship, a provision that exemplified the objectives of the agreement. To meet the requirements for friendly relations, each country must abstain from intervention in the other's internal affairs. Article 2

\textsuperscript{26}Dawisha, p. 61.

\textsuperscript{27}Freedman, \textit{Soviet Policy toward the Middle East since 1970}, p. 51.
was concerned with the socialist reconstruction model, but it did not force Egypt to pattern its social or economic reclaim on the Soviet model for development. In Article 3, the treaty urged both nations to "continue with all determination to make efforts toward achieving and ensuring a lasting and fair peace in the Middle East in accordance with the aims and principles of the United Nations' Charter." In conjunction with this goal, Sadat had appealed for a just peace with Israel in his speech of February 4, 1971.

Articles 4, 5, and 6 of the treaty covered reciprocal economic, scientific, and technological help. Because Egypt would offer little expertise that might advance superior Soviet work in these fields, it courted small risk in promising such services to Moscow.

The treaty's chief provisions began in Articles 7 and 8. These paragraphs, along with Article 9, prompted observers' predictions that the agreement would cost Egypt sovereign control of its actions. Article 7 specified circumstances under which the signers should confer: "the high contracting parties will . . . regularly consult each other at different levels on all important questions affecting the interests of both states"; should "a danger

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid.
to peace or a violation of peace" occur, the two nations must "contact each other without postponement, in order to concert their positions with a view to removing the threat that has arisen or to reestablishing peace."\(^{30}\) The Soviets were very careful to limit their military commitment, as stated in Article 8 of the treaty:

> Such cooperation will provide specifically for assistance in the training of the U.A.R. (Egypt) military personnel, in mastering the armaments and equipment supplied to the United Arab Republic with a view to strengthening its capacity to eliminate the consequences of aggression.\(^{31}\)

In Article 9—which the Soviets regarded as the treaty's most important stipulation—it was stated that neither contracting party might "enter into an alliance directed against the other."\(^{32}\) Like Soviet hopes that this pledge might cheat the United States of an alliance with Egypt, however, observers' speculations that Sadat had signed away his chances with the West proved to be groundless suppositions.\(^{33}\)

In a communiqué issued on May 27, Egypt and the Soviet Union emphasized their commitment to place pressure on Israel for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arab lands, thereby reinstating an acceptable peace in the Middle East while giving lawful rights to the Palestinian people. In addition, the two sides stated their confidence.

\(^{30}\)Ibid. \(^{31}\)Ibid. \(^{32}\)Ibid. \(^{33}\)Ibid.
that the coming visit by President Sadat to the Soviet Union would contribute to the improvement of fraternal relations between the countries.\(^3^4\)

Rubinstein stated that Sadat's promptness in signing the treaty was understandable. Desirous of solidifying his position, he considered the treaty as an acknowledgment of his rule; hence, he sought the Soviet pledge not to interfere in Egypt's domestic affairs. At the same time, Soviet weapons and expertise were being readily accepted by the Egyptian military.\(^3^5\)

Sadat himself used the treaty to put pressure on Soviet leaders, thereby gaining weapons that Egypt had requested earlier. Of his conference with Podgorny, Sadat said,

> Although we were not happy in Egypt with the way they treated us, we were still concluding the treaty with them to prove our good intentions. Give me four days, and all the weapons you have asked for will be shipped to you including the retaliation weapon. That was in May 1971. I waited throughout June, July, August, and most of September for what Podgorny himself had promised, but to no avail. The Soviet leaders were in the habit of falling silent, as silent as the grave, for long periods of time which annoyed me, I suppose, more than anything else. I often summoned the Soviet ambassador. I wrote to him frequently, but the answer was invariably silence. It was as though one was communicating with imaginary people.\(^3^6\)

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\(^{3^4}\) Ibid., p. 41.

\(^{3^5}\) Rubinstein, *Red Star on the Nile*, p. 150.

According to Heikal, the Soviet-Egyptian treaty took Americans by surprise. When the news came that the treaty had been signed, President Nixon asked King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, who was making an official visit to Washington at the time, about its significance—did it mean that all the efforts Secretary of State Rogers had been making had gone for nothing? Faisal visited Cairo in June. The Soviets wanted to know the reasons behind his visit and to determine the strength of the relations among Cairo, Riyadh, and Teheran; at the same time, the Americans were trying to assess the significance of the Egyptian-Soviet treaty.37

The advantages and obligations embodied in the treaty and each country's interpretation of them became apparent in July of 1971, when a Communist coup d'état took place in Sudan against the government of Jaafar Nimeiry. The perpetrators of the coup were frustrated with the support that Sadat was giving to Nimeiry's regime. The Nimeiry government was able to return to power with the aid of Libya and Egypt, and the first action that Nimeiry took was to order the execution of the leading Communists in Sudan, including the General Secretary of the Communist Party, Abdel Mohgoub, and Lenin Prize winner Ahmed

37Heikal, *The Sphinx and the Commissar*, p. 228.
El-Sheick, who were blamed for instigating the abortive coup.\textsuperscript{38}

To worsen the situation, Heikal wrote a long article in Al-Ahram on July 30, criticizing both the Communist Party in Sudan and--indirectly--the Soviet Union. In the article, which was broadcast on Radio Cairo, Heikal declared that Communists should limit themselves to small cliques of intelligence so that their ideology might become "one of the elements of fertility in the national experiment" and that they must also realize that they could not be "the seed on the tree itself."\textsuperscript{39}

Soviet displeasure at the events of May-July, 1971 was soon evident. Arms deliveries from the U.S.S.R. to Egypt were delayed, although Sadat's demand for weapons increased in every month of his "year of decision." Soviet commitments for military assistance to Egypt made during Sadat's trip to Moscow in October, 1971 were left unfulfilled when the Indo-Pakistani War began; instead the Soviets delivered the weapons to India and Bangladesh.\textsuperscript{40}


\textsuperscript{39}Freedman, Soviet Policy toward the Middle East since 1970, p. 63.

\textsuperscript{40}Dawisha, p. 62.
Sadat made two trips to Moscow in February and April of 1972 in an attempt to negotiate military support for Egypt, but the Egyptians failed to obtain the Soviet offensive weapons they needed.

The Expulsion of Soviet Personnel from Egypt

At the beginning of 1972, Sadat proclaimed that he was postponing the zero hour to fight Israel until after his trip to the Soviet Union in February. During Sadat's visit to Moscow, the Soviets tried to persuade him not to take any military action until after the May Nixon-Brezhnev summit meeting. It appeared that the Soviets' new policy was directed toward seeking friendlier relations with the United States and Western Europe. To persuade Sadat to delay his military action against Israel, the Soviets promised to supply Egypt with new strategic weapons that would threaten the Israelis.¹

In March of 1972, the Al-Ahram Center for Strategic and Political Studies in Cairo invited important Egyptian and Soviet figures to participate in a seminar supporting their countries' friendly relations. The Soviet delegation was composed of Dr. Yevgeny Zhukov, a leading historian; Vasily Solodovnikov, Director of the Soviet Institute

for African Studies; and Viktor Mayevsky, a well-known writer for Pravda. The Egyptian delegates were Mohamed Heikal, editor of Al-Ahram; Lutfy Al-Kholy, editor of the journal Al-Tallah; Dr. Ism'Il Sabri Abdullah, Minister of State for Planning; Isma'il Fahmy, Deputy Foreign Minister; M. Awad Al-Quni, former leader of Egypt's delegation to the United Nations; and others.

At the seminar the Egyptian delegates presented a long list of grievances against the Soviet Union. Their complaints began with Moscow's insistence on a peaceful settlement irreconcilable with the Egyptian side of the dispute and the Soviets' apparent satisfaction to dally while Egypt endured the humiliation of the standstill. Pointing out convergence in American and Soviet policies, Egyptian representatives charged that Moscow was deceitfully adhering to a tacit agreement to restrain the protagonists in the Middle East conflict by promising and then withdrawing shipments of arms. Among other items of dissatisfaction, the Egyptians cited their discontent at Moscow's willingness to permit increasing numbers of Soviet Jews to emigrate to Israel and the Arabs' general resentment of Soviet attempts to promote Communism among the states in their circle.42

42Rubinstein, Red Star on the Nile, pp. 182-183.
Sadat visited Moscow again in April, 1972, at Brezhnev's request. Sadat stated in his book *In Search of Identity*, "I realized of course that they simply wanted to prove to the United States that their feet were planted firmly in the Middle East region; but despite being disgusted with the whole gesture, I accepted the invitation." Sadat's April trip did not satisfy all of Egypt's demands for arms, but it did garner Soviet approval for Egypt to use Soviet arms against Israel. This was the first time that the Soviets openly accepted Egypt's desire to use military force in order to recover its land, an objective that had proven to be unattainable by peaceful means. It should be noted, however, that the central issue in Sadat's four trips to Moscow from the time he became president until his last visit in April, 1972 was disputes concerning weapons and that, in the course of Sadat's visits to the U.S.S.R., these disputes were not resolved.

During the first Nixon-Brezhnev summit in Moscow in May of 1972, Henry Kissinger persuaded Brezhnev to agree to a joint statement advocating military relaxation in the Middle East situation that would lead Sadat to feel that Moscow had decided to place the policy of détente above any of the promises made to Egypt regarding military

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"El-Sadat, *In Search of Identity*, p. 228.
assistance. A small nation may expect to see its interests vindicated by a superpower only insofar as serving the small advances the great. Thus, the Soviet Union would not sacrifice its relations with Washington to serve the aims of Cairo. The attention given to détente was the main message to be read in the outcome of Nixon's visit to Moscow.

Sadat viewed the joint Soviet-American communique as a shock to Egypt because, since the Egyptian military was not as well-prepared as its Israeli counterpart, "military relaxation" would in effect mean Egypt's giving in to Israel. Sadat added,

The Soviet analysis following from the Moscow Nixon meeting reached me on July 6, in other words more than a month later. This analysis explained that no progress had been achieved on the Middle East Question in the Soviet-American talks--just as I had predicted during my Moscow visit late in April--in view of the fact that it was the U.S. election year. What was more odd, the Soviet analysis conveyed to me by the Soviet ambassador said nothing at all about the failure to ship the requested weapons. More than two and a half pages long, the analysis did not deal with our battle or the weapons needed for it (as agreed in April 1972), except in the last five lines, which said simply that we were unable to start a battle, that they had experience in this respect, and that they had made an unusual effort to persuade Nixon that Security Council Resolution 242 should be implemented.45


46El-Sadat, In Search of Identity, p. 229.
Sadat understood the Soviet message to Egypt: the Soviets would not tolerate militancy, and Moscow would hold back the weapons it had promised. Therefore, there could be no point in asking for further concessions to Soviet-Egyptian friendship. In response to the Soviet letter, President Sadat gave the Soviet ambassador his reply, commenting that he had reason to complain about the military assistance that the Soviets had failed to deliver. He added that "the Soviet Union has no confidence in the Egyptian leadership and fails to appreciate the dangers of the situation. While Egypt is anxious to maintain the friendship of the Soviet Union, she is unable to submit to a position of trusteeship to anyone, including the Soviet Union."  

Sadat's retaliation for the U.S.S.R.'s communiqué took place on July 18, 1972, in a decision conveyed privately to the Soviet ambassador and then announced to the Central Committee of the Arab Socialist Union.

(1) I have decided to dispense with the services of all Soviet military experts (about 15,000). They must go back to the Soviet Union within one week from today. I shall convey this order to the war minister.

(2) There is Soviet equipment in Egypt--four MIG 25s and a Soviet manned station for electronic warfare. You should either sell these to us or take them back to the Soviet Union.

(3) No Soviet-owned equipment should stay in Egypt. Either you sell it to us or withdraw it within a fixed date.

(4) All this should be carried out in a week from now. 48

Sadat's decision to dismiss the Soviet military advisors in Egypt was considered a sign that actions of classic imperialism had not proved justifiable in that the military presence of a major power no longer guaranteed political harmony. Instead small countries dealing with the major powers had developed a new approach, which involved taking free action while trying to apply balance of power politics. 49 In Sadat's words,

I wanted to put the Soviet Union in its place—in its natural position as a friendly country, no more, no less. The Soviets had thought at one time that they had Egypt in their pocket, and the world had come to think that the Soviet Union was our guardian. I wanted to tell the Russians that the will of Egypt was entirely Egyptian; I wanted to tell the whole world that we are always our own masters. Whoever wished to talk to us should come over and do it, rather than approach the Soviet Union. 50

Sadat had made a major decision, as Rubinstein observes.

Sadat demonstrated that Egypt retained an independence that belied oversimplified explanations of how a great power exercises influence over a military client state. Whatever merit there is to the argument that Moscow maneuvered Sadat into a situation where he acted the way he did, the crucial fact was that the actual decision had been

49 Rubinstein, Red Star on the Nile, p. 190.
50 El-Sadat, In Search of Identity, p. 231.
Sadat's. Subsequent Soviet policy and premises had to proceed from the new reality that he created by his action.\textsuperscript{51}

Sadat offered three reasons for his decision: 1) the Soviets did not want to supply Egypt with offensive weapons, 2) they failed to send the quantity of weapons agreed upon and to meet the due date for their delivery, and 3) they tried to place conditions on the use of the weapons that they gave Egypt. Sadat later gave two additional reasons in an interview with Arnaud de Borehgrave: 1) from his point of view, his decision allowed the Arab nations an opportunity to go to war, and 2) he wanted to have a free hand to attack Israel when he was ready to do so.\textsuperscript{52}

The literature on Egyptian-Soviet relations, of course, also suggests other reasons for the expulsion of Soviet personnel that Sadat did not mention in public. One complex reason behind Sadat's decision reflected his distrust of Moscow's objectives in the Middle East in general.\textsuperscript{53} In 1971, Ali Sabri's group of high-ranking pro-Soviet officials tried unsuccessfully to oust Sadat. Sadat suspected Soviet complicity in this action, but, because of Egypt's military dependence on the Soviet

\textsuperscript{51}Rubinstein, \textit{Red Star on the Nile}, p. 191.

\textsuperscript{52}Ibid., pp. 192-194.

Union, he decided not to pursue the issue. Nevertheless, he was concerned that the Soviets might try to replace him with a more pro-Soviet leader. Another factor was Sadat's concern over the presence of Soviet military advisors in Egypt. In view of the Brezhnev Doctrine, which justified Soviet intervention in the domestic affairs of other socialist countries, the Egyptians feared that, if friction developed with the Soviets,

they might repeat their Czechoslovak tactics. After all, they had their technicians and their own airport and could bring as many of their troops into Egypt as they wanted. There were plenty of stories of huge crates being unloaded from Soviet planes at Cairo West and these were rumored to be full of arms destined for unknown but nefarious ends.\(^5^4\)

The third and most important reason for the expulsion of Soviet personnel from Egypt was to ensure success in the war against Israel. Sadat needed to improve his relations with Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia. King Faisal was open to Sadat as he had never been to Nasser, but he was morbidly suspicious of Egypt's widening Soviet connection. Sadat believed that expulsion of the Soviets would be welcomed by Faisal, who was strongly opposed to Communism.\(^5^5\) The fourth reason, in the words of a well-informed Western diplomat in Beirut at that time, was that

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\(^5^4\) Heikal, *The Road to Ramadan*, p. 175.

\(^5^5\) Rubinstein, *Red Star on the Nile*, p. 126.
Sadat is taking a great big gamble that the United States now or after the elections in November, will pressure the Israelis to withdraw from territories in exchange for security agreements. He hopes he can now convince the U.S. what an Israeli withdrawal would not mean an extension of Soviet influence.\footnote{U.S. News and World Report, July 31, 1972, p. 30.}

Heikal summarized the situation thus: "In many ways Soviet obtuseness damaged their standing with the Egyptians and the Americans did what they would to exploit the Soviets' mistakes."\footnote{Heikal, The Sphinx and the Commissar, p. 239.} Despite their humiliation and losses in the Middle East, Soviet leaders could not do otherwise than comply with Sadat's order because to keep military advisors in Egypt by force would cost lives and political prestige. Moscow chose not to risk adding such losses to the mortification that the U.S.S.R. had already sustained.

The Egyptian Dual Policy

As mentioned previously, Sadat announced an entirely new peace initiative in the National Assembly on February 4, 1971, stipulating that Israel must withdraw its troops from Sinai in order to reopen the Suez Canal, that the ceasefire should be extended for six instead of three months, that Egypt's diplomatic relations with the United States should be restored, and that a peace treaty should
be signed with Israel, aided by the efforts of the Delegate of the Secretary General of the United Nations, Dr. Gunner Jarring. Such an initiative had not been taken by Arab leader since the creation of Israel in 1948. In pursuit of these goals, secret channels of communication were opened between Egypt and the United States. The United States proposed a trip to Cairo by Secretary of State Rogers, and Sadat welcomed his visit.

When Sadat expelled the Soviet experts from Egypt, it was a shock to the Soviet leadership and to the Egyptian officials and citizens who were pro-Soviet. In addition, the entire world had believed that Sadat would not go to war with Israel, but, in fact, Sadat began preparing for battle. He asked Egypt's National Advisor, Hafiz Ismail, to be ready for discussions with the United States since Sadat believed that the American government would inevitably be contacting Egypt. At the same time, Sadat told War Minister Mohammed Sadiq to notify the Supreme Council of the Army concerning the decision to prepare for war by November 15, 1972. Sadat chose this date so that the U.S. president-elect might have time to arrive at a peaceful solution to the Middle East dispute.

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58 El-Sadat, In Search of Identity, p. 219.
59 Ibid., p. 233.
After expelling the Soviet advisors from Egypt, Sadat made a confidential communication to the White House through a secret diplomat, and he proposed a secret meeting between Kissinger and Egyptian National Advisor Ismail. This meeting took place in Washington in February, 1973. Several more meetings were held during the next few months, focusing upon a possible interim agreement along the Suez Canal and other solutions to Middle Eastern questions. Unfortunately, the meetings were not very productive and did not arrive at any definite solutions.60

Heikal formulated six guidelines intended to influence American policy in the Middle East at that time.

1. They [the Americans] wanted to keep the Russians out of the area and out of active participation in its affairs. This was partly because of the risk of a collision between the superpowers which it involved.

2. They wanted to keep the various strands of negotiation separate, to negotiate a settlement between Israel and Egypt, between Israel and Syria, between Israel and Palestine, and so on, but all separately and not as part of an overall settlement.

3. Each separate settlement should be negotiated stage by stage.

4. Accepting the Israeli thesis, the Americans were convinced there could be no return to the 1967 borders.

5. The Palestine problem was to be looked at purely as a refugee problem.

6. The end result should be a pax America guaranteeing American interests in the area.61

60George, p. 145.

61Heikal, The Road to Ramadan, p. 203.
Sadat, who was becoming frustrated and impatient with Nixon and Kissinger when the meetings between U.S. and Egyptian officials failed to produce results, also faced economic difficulties without a suitable substitute for Soviet arms. He was convinced of the need to use the military option to break the Israeli logjam, and he returned to the Soviets once again to ask for military support.\textsuperscript{62} Sadat announced that good relations with Moscow were very important because he could not rely on Western Europe as an alternative source for weapons. Egypt felt that it had to keep its military and technological abilities parallel to Israel's.

In an attempt to clarify Soviet-Egyptian relations, Egyptian Premier Aziz Sidqi visited Moscow in October, 1972. There were many indications and various reports that the trip had been a success, even though Sidqi was not welcomed by Brezhnev. In his report to the Egyptian National Assembly, Sidqi said, "... the ice had been melted ... and relations would now become normal."\textsuperscript{63}

According to Rubinstein, Sadat applied a new strategy from late 1972 until the beginning of the October War of 1973. This strategy was based on four principles: 1) to


\textsuperscript{63}Ibid., p. 34.
motivate and prepare the Egyptian home front and military so that they would be ready for war, 2) to restore relations with the Soviets so that Egypt could acquire weapons and professional advice from them, 3) to obtain financial aid from the rich Arab countries and to coordinate Egyptian and Syrian military strategies, and 4) to reassure the Americans and the Israelis that Sadat would not, through purposeful but marginal diplomatic activity, obtain political and economic support from non-Arab countries. These months were the most important period for Egypt since 1954, when Nasser decided to end the British presence in the Suez Canal Zone.

Soviet leaders wanted to restore their position in the Middle East, so they sent a letter to Egypt with Ambassador Vinogradov in January, 1973, requesting that National Advisor Hafiz Ismail visit Moscow. Ismail made the trip on February 8, 1973, and was welcomed by Brezhnev. This visit signaled the end of a tense period between Moscow and Cairo. The talks reportedly touched on issues for further strengthening of Soviet-Egyptian relations, and they concluded that the political move of Israel's partial withdrawal from Arab territories was not acceptable. 64

64Rubenstein, p. 217. 65Glassman, p. 128.
In a message to the Egyptian National Assembly on March 26, 1973, Sadat announced that "The state of total confrontation has become inevitable, whether we like it or not. The military situation must be made to move, with all the sacrifices that this entails. We must tell the world that we are here and that we can dictate our will."66

At the June, 1973 summit between Nixon and Brezhnev in Washington, the two leaders appeared to pay little attention to the Middle East question, as they had in the Moscow summit a year earlier. The communique issued following the 1973 summit failed to mention U.N. Resolution No. 242, hitherto the basis of Soviet policy for settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The text of the communique stated,

The parties expressed their deep concern with the situation in the Middle East and exchanged opinions regarding ways of reaching a Middle East settlement. Each of the parties set forth its position on this problem.

Both parties agreed to continue to exert their efforts to promote the quickest possible settlement in the Middle East. This settlement should be in accordance with the interests of all states in the area, be consistent with their independence and sovereignty, and should take into due account the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people.67

The Egyptian reaction to the summit communique was quick and vigorous. On June 25, Ali Hamadie Gammal, the managing editor of Al-Ahram, stated, "Although we did not

expect the talks between the two leaders to produce a specific position with regard to the crisis, we never thought that the problem would meet this strongly negative attitude on their part."

In view of all these events, Sadat found the "no war-no peace" situation intolerable. He succeeded in mobilizing the Arabs for war against Israel, reconciled intra-Arab conflicts, and worked out a coordinated plan of attack with Syria. In so doing, Sadat confirmed himself as a state leader and a masterful practitioner of power politics.

Instead of relying only on Soviet goodwill for weapons, Sadat gained support from wealthy, oil-rich Arab leaders which enabled him to pay cash for military purchases from the Soviet Union and to use oil as a political weapon. He kept King Faisal of Saudi Arabia informed about the deteriorating Egyptian-Soviet relationship, and Faisal was ready to finance Egypt's purchase of weapons after the expulsion of Soviet advisors from Egypt. Saudi and Gulf money was made available to Egypt in late December, 1972, and early 1973. At a special meeting of Arab defense ministers in Cairo in January, 1973, Egypt was given the hard currency it needed to negotiate with Moscow for weapons. The transfer of funds from the Arabs to the

Soviets was arranged quietly, and the Soviets agreed to send arms to Egypt in return for the cash payment.69

Internationally, Sadat emphasized to other governments the dangers of the Middle East situation. He continued intense communication with most of the countries in the world while pressuring the superpowers to intervene. At the United Nations, Egyptian diplomats gained U.N. support and whittled away at the core of Israel's supporters. As for Western Europe, high-ranking Egyptians were sent to London, Paris, Rome, and Bonn, and Western European officials were invited to visit Egypt in return. The conclusion of the talks in which these officials engaged revealed Egypt's willingness to improve its political and economic relations with Western European nations.70

Egypt also sought African assistance. In May, 1973, Sadat carried his request for Afro-Arab solidarity to the Organization of African Unity Conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, for the Egyptians wished to negate the diplomatic achievements of twenty years of Israeli technical assistance and foreign aid in black Africa. Egypt's links to the non-aligned countries were strong, and at the Fourth Conference of Non-Aligned States in Algiers in September, 1973, Egypt

69 Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "Egypt's Foreign Policy," Current History, LXVI (January, 1974), 54.

70 Rubinstein, Red Star on the Nile, p. 244.
tried to generate Arab support for the black African countries. For Sadat,

The conference's resolutions served two functions. 1) They reinforced the Arabs' belief that the overwhelming number of countries in the world supported them in the struggle against Israel. And 2) their moral injunctions could be translated into diplomatic action, and thus prove useful politically. The sum total of these diplomatic efforts was to deepen Israel's international isolation. A sudden blow is needed to drive home their full impact.\footnote{Ibid., p. 245.}
CHAPTER III

THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR OF 1973

Egypt's Attempt to End the No War-No Peace Dilemma

Several months before Sadat made the decision to go to war, Soviet leaders requested their military officials to warn both Egypt and Syria that their forces would not have the ability to subdue Israel and that a new war might lead to another Arab defeat like that of 1967. The Soviet Union was reportedly not ready to confront the United States over the Middle East conflict because of the probability that such a confrontation would lead to world war.¹ Nevertheless, Egypt chose to go to war with Israel. The initial decision was made in April of 1973 in a consultation between President Hafez Al-Asad of Syria and Egypt's War Minister, Ahmed Ismail Ali. Final plans were made in Cairo in late August.²

Sadat had several reasons for initiating a new conflict with Israel. First, the impasse between the Arabs


and the Israelis could be broken only if Israel and the major foreign powers seriously considered the Arab political situation, and this goal could be achieved—in Sadat's view—only through military action. Second, if the Arabs regained their lost territory, they would have demonstrated their military capability and would then be able to restore public morale and confidence. Third, military action would weaken Israel's power and would restore the use of the Suez Canal and the land adjacent to it to Egypt. Last, the major powers would intervene to impose a ceasefire upon the combatants.³

Sadat's decision to move toward military action was unacceptable to the Soviet Union. National Security Advisor Ismail went to Moscow in July, 1973 to affirm Egypt's determination to instigate a war against Israel, and his conversations with Brezhnev were considered to be frank and friendly. The purpose of Ismail's visit was to learn what Soviet views on Middle East issues were discussed with the United States during the Nixon-Brezhnev summit of June 1973. Brezhnev expressed to Ismail the Soviet commitment to upholding American-Soviet détente, which

was expected to last for twenty to thirty years." During the Politburo meeting in July, 1973, the Soviets discussed the results of Brezhnev's trip to the United States. According to the Soviet "Program of Peace," Israel was required to withdraw its forces from the occupied territories in the Middle East and respect the rights of all peoples and states in the region, but the Soviets found themselves in a dilemma because of Egypt's insistence on war. Beginning a war would jeopardize détente, a major goal of Soviet foreign policy. On the other hand, opposing Egyptian plans would lead to a renewed breakdown in Soviet-Egyptian relations. This breakdown would also damage the Soviets' position among radical regimes in Third World countries. Indeed, Chinese propaganda was already describing the Brezhnev-Nixon summit as part of a superpower plot to harden change. In addition, Sadat, supported by other Arab anti-Communists, had shown that he was prepared to deal with Western powers should the Soviets not be forthcoming with military assistance. "The Soviet Union, if it wants to maintain its image as a partisan of 'liberation struggles,' therefore, would have to back Egyptian ambitions, at least passively."


Many incidents urged Sadat towards war. First of all, in 1973 Egypt was plagued by economic problems. Slow industrial development, the cost of the High Dam project, the burden of the war in Yemen, the 1967 defeat by Israel, and the complete rebuilding and re-equipping of Egypt's army made this period an extremely difficult one for Sadat. Between 1968 and 1973, Egypt had spent between eight and nine billion dollars to prepare for the 1973 war. These years were a time of sacrifice for the Egyptian people, for the total expenditures directed toward building up the military since the 1967 war were tremendous.

Heikal stated that the Egyptian army had been ready for complete mobilization since 1967 and that officers received more training every year. Pictures of President Sadat "eating sand" with military officers who were training in the desert symbolized Egypt's readiness for war, and the army desired to prove itself. As Heikal observed,

By 1973 Egypt had almost become the laughing-stock of the Arab world. We claimed to be the leader and protector of the Arabs, but gave no lead to our own people and showed ourselves unable to protect our own territory. We asked others to use their oil weapons but showed no sign of using our own weapons. Each day that passed was a day of humiliation for Egypt.⁶

During the course of 1973, there were indications that Egypt was in fact preparing for war. On December 28, 1972,

⁶Heikal, The Road to Ramadan, p. 205.
Sadat created permanent war committees. On March 26, 1973, he assumed the additional title of prime minister and formed a new government designed to continue preparations for a confrontation with Israel; it was clear that Sadat would have to demonstrate some results from this policy.

Then, on October 6, 1973, the well-coordinated Egyptian and Syrian forces struck at Israeli positions in the Sinai and Golan Heights area, beginning the fourth armed Arab-Israeli conflict since the devastating Arab defeat in June, 1967. Egyptian forces launched a successful surprise attack across the Suez Canal, and the Syrians carried out an attack at the same time. The Egyptian offensive, later called "The Crossing," ranks in importance with the 1952 revolution in Egyptian history.

The war came to an end when a United Nations ceasefire was declared on October 22 as a result of negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Brezhnev and Kissinger reached a ceasefire agreement which was submitted to the U.N. Security Council as a jointly sponsored resolution on October 21. Resolution No. 338 was approved unanimously by the members of the Council, with

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7 For more details about the October 1973 War, see S'aad El-Shazly, The Crossing of Suez (San Francisco, American Mideast Research, 1980), pp. 221-270.

8 Glassman, p. 156.
the exception of China, which abstained after calling for the condemnation of Israel. Resolution No. 338 contained the following provisions.

1. A ceasefire should begin within twelve hours of the resolution's adoption, within the positions currently occupied.

2. The parties concerned should immediately start implementation of Security Council Resolution No. 242, calling for the return of occupied lands and recognition of secure borders for all states in the region.

3. Immediate and concurrent ceasefire negotiations should be undertaken "between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East."9

Neither side had won a clearcut victory, but the Egyptians regarded the outcome of the war as a victory for their country. In this conflict, the Arabs had begun the initial fighting and had proven that the Israelis were not indomitable. The effect of this success on the morale of the Egyptian military and citizenry was vast, and Sadat's prestige grew quickly. His firm political moves indicated that he was in complete charge and had the capability to accomplish his plans.

9Andre Deutsch, "Insight on the Middle East War," The Sunday Times (London), March 10, 1974, p. 188.
In addition, during the war Arab solidarity reached an unprecedented high. When the war began, the Arab oil-producing states carried out their threat to embargo all petroleum exports to the United States in retaliation for its support of Israel. Libya, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Dubai announced a cutoff of oil supplies on October 19-21, 1973. Furthermore, on November 4, after a four-day meeting in Libya, the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions called on all Arab nations to force a partial boycott of business dealings with the United States. The conference also proposed that all Arab nations dissolve diplomatic relations with the United States. Finally, several Arab countries sent military troops to support Egypt and Syria.

Sadat's decision to wage war against Israel demonstrated his pursuit of far-reaching foreign policy initiatives without evident consideration for Soviet interests or preferences. In Rubinstein's words, Egypt now felt confident about its abilities.

Sadat was about to demonstrate that a small nation can affect its own destiny, defy the preference of its patron, and in the process force upon him far-reaching decisions of enormous complexity and high risk. \(^{11}\)

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\(^{10}\) Sobel, pp. 110-111.

Egypt and Syria were informed by Soviet leaders that the U.S.S.R. should not be directly involved in any effort to return the territories occupied by Israel. They were fearful that the situation would be frozen, so they began their war with the aim of bringing attention to the impasse and pushing the superpowers to arbitrate. Instead, however, the war motivated the Arab oil-producing states to cut off supplies to the West. These events served as a strong incentive for the United States to support a ceasefire.\footnote{Abraham S. Becker, Arms Transfers, Great Power Intervention, and Settlement of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Santa Monica, California, The Rand Corporation, 1977), pp. 22-23.}

Egypt's Response to Soviet Policy during the War

The Arab-Israeli War of October, 1973 was a conflict that the Soviet Union apparently had neither sought to forestall nor deliberately encouraged. Although the war could not have been planned or initiated without the arms supplied by the Soviets, it seems clear that the initiative for the October 6 attack against Israel lay with Egypt and Syria, not with the U.S.S.R.

During the second summit meeting between Nixon and Brezhnev in Washington in June, 1973, Brezhnev warned Nixon about the risk of war in the Middle East and the necessity for the United States to take diplomatic action
by placing pressure on Israel in the interest of a Middle East settlement. The U.S.S.R. gave the United States what might be viewed as an indirect warning of the pending Arab attack on Israel three days before the war broke out by beginning to transport Soviet families out of Egypt and Syria.¹³

It has been asked whether the Soviets, if they knew about the war, would have shared their information with the United States. There are two possibilities: 1) Moscow informed the United States, assuming that the Americans would notify the Israelis, or 2) Moscow informed the United States but was assured that the Americans would not notify the Israelis. In view of the close relations that existed between the Americans and the Israelis, of course, the possibility of the second scenario was so low that it merits little serious consideration. As for the first alternative, it also seems unlikely that the Soviets would have informed Washington of Arab military intentions since they could gain little by doing so. On the other hand, the Soviets might have communicated certain danger signals to the United States in order to demonstrate their own concern over tensions in the Middle East, thereby placing

Moscow in the position of having warned Washington of the explosive situation in the region.\textsuperscript{14}

From the Soviet point of view, the instigation of the war against Israel had three advantages, as identified by Glassman: 1) the possibility for the avoidance of an abysmal defeat of "progressive" regimes would be enhanced if the Arabs resorted to war; 2) the attention of traditional nationalist, anti-Communist, and ultra-revolutionary elements in the world would be diverted from criticism of the Soviet Union to confrontation with Israel; and 3) an opportunity would be provided for the Soviet Union to increase its militancy, even in a period of détente, by endorsing Arab actions against expansional, oil-rich Arab kingdoms into an anti-Western orientation.\textsuperscript{15}

Heikal suggested, conversely, that the Soviets regarded a new round of warfare as offering an opportunity to restore their position in the Middle East. The probable Soviet rationale, according to Heikal, was to let the Arabs have sufficient arms to enable them to risk a battle. Had the Egyptians won, the Soviet Union would have gotten the credit. If they


\textsuperscript{15}Glassman, p. 119.
had lost or been stalemated, they again would have had to depend on the Soviet Union for help.\textsuperscript{16}

On October 3, 1973, President Sadat, in accord with Syrian President Al-Asad, summoned Soviet ambassador Vinogradov to his office to officially inform him of Egypt's and Syria's decision to initiate a war with Israel. Sadat wanted to know the attitude of the Soviet Union towards this decision as soon as possible. Vinogradov asked Sadat when the Egyptian and Syrian forces planned to attack, and Sadat answered that the specific date had not been decided but promised to give the ambassador that information on the following day. Vinogradov met with Sadat again on October 4 and told him that he had received an urgent message from the U.S.S.R. asking that Soviet families be transported out of Egypt. Sadat was surprised by this request but agreed to honor it. He then asked how the Soviet leaders had responded to his actions, but the ambassador provided no responses from them.\textsuperscript{17}

The Soviets' initial reaction to the October War seemed cautious, possibly because they doubted Egypt's and Syria's ability to win it and because they did not want to destroy U.S.-Soviet détente. Nevertheless, Soviet diplomatic


intervention began very early with efforts to bring about a ceasefire. According to Sadat, six hours after the war began, Ambassador Vinogradov called on him in pursuit of a ceasefire, stating the Syrian President Al-Asad had asked the Soviet Union to begin working on a ceasefire agreement. Sadat was disappointed in the Soviet request and rejected it with the declaration, "I won't have a ceasefire until the main targets of my battle have been achieved."¹⁸ Three days later, when it appeared that the Arab side was in fact prevailing in the conflict, the Soviet leaders intervened both diplomatically and militarily in order to preserve the U.S.S.R's credibility as a superpower patron of Egypt and Syria and to prevent a possible Arab defeat. At the same time, however, the Soviets were careful to keep their intervention from developing into a direct military confrontation with the United States.

On October 8, Brezhnev sent a note to President Houari Boumédiène of Algeria and other Arab leaders which stated,

I believe that you agree that the struggle waged at present against the Israeli aggressor for the liberation of Arab territories occupied since 1967, and the safeguarding of the legitimate rights of the people of Palestine affect the vital interests of all Arab countries. In our view there must be fraternal Arab solidarity, today more than ever.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 253.
Syria and Egypt must not remain alone in their struggle against a treacherous enemy.\textsuperscript{19}

Soviet military involvement in the conflict, in the form of a major arms resupply effort by air and sea, began on October 10, after the high consumption rate of arms and equipment in the early days of the war led to an Arab request for immediate replenishment.\textsuperscript{20} During the course of the fighting, a Soviet airlift, for which some contingency, planning, and prepositioning had evidently been carried out, flew over Hungary and Yugoslavia and parts of Iran and Turkey.\textsuperscript{21} After a brief stand-down in October, this airlift to the Middle East was resumed at the reduced rate with fewer flights carrying smaller cargos. By early November, approximately 950 to 1,000 flights had been made to the region,\textsuperscript{22} and the estimated tonnage carried was from 12,500 to 14,000 tons. In addition, a Soviet sealift, traveling from Odessa through the Bosporus to Alexandria, Egypt or Latakia, Syria with a naval escort, delivered about 63,000 tons of military materiel during the conflict.\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{20}Heikal, The Road to Ramadan, p. 245.
On October 10, the Soviets added their support to the ceasefire efforts, and President Sadat and Ambassador Vinogradov held a very stormy meeting on the issue. Vinogradov wanted to ascertain Sadat's position on the ceasefire so that the Soviets would know how to respond in the U.N. Security Council concerning Egypt's opposition to a ceasefire proposal. Sadat asked Vinogradov to stop talking about what Syria wanted, since Egypt had already been informed of Syrian opposition to a ceasefire. As a result of the meeting between Sadat and Vinogradov, Moscow also wanted to be informed of Sadat's expectations on the political front.24

Algerian President Boumédiennè visited Moscow on October 14. The Soviets assured him that they would support the Arab effort to liberate territories occupied by Israel. Boumédiennè, however, was unsatisfied with the Soviet response and asked for more military assistance. The Soviets demanded payment for this assistance, and Boumédiennè agreed to give them $200 million on behalf of Egypt and Syria. Egypt claimed that the Soviets refused to deliver the weapons until Boumédiennè agreed to pay for them.25

Soviet Premier Kosygin arrived in Cairo on October 16 to assess the situation and to press Egypt to accept an


immediate ceasefire. Kosygin met with Sadat for three days in an effort to persuade the Egyptian leader to agree to a ceasefire before Egypt's military position deteriorated. As the Israelis enlarged their West Bank salient, Sadat was easily convinced that a ceasefire was necessary, and on October 19 he agreed to allow the Russians to press for it. Subsequently, Kosygin left Cairo with a ceasefire formula. While Kosygin was in Cairo, President Nixon was in contact with Brezhnev. Following Kosygin's visit to Egypt, pressure was exerted by the superpowers to enact a ceasefire implementing U.N. Security Council Resolution No. 242. On October 20, Kissinger traveled to Moscow for direct talks with the authority and intention of reaching a binding agreement. Negotiations were undertaken at once, and President Sadat asked Ambassador Vinogradov to communicate to Brezhnev his acceptance of the ceasefire, on the basis of his talks with Kosygin while the latter was in Cairo. When Brezhnev received the message, developments began to occur rapidly. The Soviets and Americans reached a ceasefire agreement approved by Security Council Resolution No. 338 of October 22, 1973, which called for a ceasefire within twelve hours, and negotiations began immediately to implement the ceasefire, using Resolution No. 242.  

26 Glassman, p. 153.

27 Heikal, The Road to Ramadan, pp. 248-249.
The ceasefire was supposed to take effect on October 26, but fighting continued on the Israeli side in an attempt to improve Israel's position on both sides of the Suez Canal. Therefore, Soviet leaders decided to force Israel and the United States to put the ceasefire in action. Brezhnev sent a note to Nixon to clarify that the United States and the Soviet Union should work together to impose the agreement. The Soviet proposal for joint intervention somewhat resembled the Soviet proposal of November, 1956, during the Suez War, but the pressures on the Soviet Union to act unilaterally and its ability to do so were much greater in October, 1973, thus rendering the two situations hardly comparable. Brezhnev's threat to act unilaterally was much more credible, given the change in Soviet capabilities, than were earlier Soviet interventionary threats.

Precisely what unilateral steps the Soviet leaders were considering during the closing stages of the October 1973 War remain unknown. Soviet military measures known to have been in progress would have been compatible with the sending of a small Soviet peacekeeping force to Egypt and, beyond that, might have signaled possible Soviet commitment to a large-scale military intervention. The measures in question, which were much more extensive than those taken by the U.S.S.R. in the 1967 War six years
earlier, included increasing the size of the Fifth Eskadra from sixty to ninety-six ships and assigning anti-carrier groups to trail U.S. carriers in the Mediterranean Sea; dispatching a small naval combat force of about eight ships, including two amphibious landing craft, toward the Egyptian coast on October 25; placing seven airborne divisions on increased alert and standing down the cargo airlift to make transport aircraft available; and establishing an airborne command post in southern Russia.\textsuperscript{28}

The placing of American forces on a worldwide Defcon 3 alert in the early hours of October 25, 1973, and an American presidential communication to Soviet President Brezhnev that unilateral action by the U.S.S.R. would jeopardize détente and would be unacceptable to the United States had the effect of speeding an agreement later that day on another ceasefire resolution to be policed by a United Nations emergency force. The prospect of direct Soviet military intervention that could have easily led to a Soviet-American confrontation thus came to an end.\textsuperscript{29}

In his description of the Soviet Union's attitude during the October War, Heikal stated,


\textsuperscript{29}Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1982), pp. 589-599.
The Soviet attitude toward the Arabs was impeccable. They identified themselves wholeheartedly with the Arab cause, and did what they could to bring assistance to Egypt and Syria both at the local and at the international level— at the local level by the airlift of arms and supplies, and at the international level by acting as the Arabs' advocate with the Americans and at the U.N.\textsuperscript{30}

Soviet policy with regard to the October War was less intent on strengthening the Arab radical movement than on simply maintaining that movement's alliance with the U.S.S.R. Anti-Soviet feelings, spurred by Arab failure to gain a return of the territories occupied by Israel in 1967 and a belief that Moscow was sacrificing Arab interests in order to promote détente, were becoming current even in the leftist Arab states. There was no overall absence of restraint on Moscow's part in that Soviet supplies of potentially decisive arms, such as regionally strategic weapons and weapons permitting overwhelming offensive results on the ground, were often highly restricted. Furthermore, during the prelude to and the course of the various Middle Eastern wars, the U.S.S.R. made no attempts to directly confront the United States. Soviet intervention threats in the Middle East were made only when American and Soviet policy positions coincided.

The Aftermath

As Laqueur observes, a crisis in international politics casts a strong light upon the events of a given period.

All the quasi-problems suddenly disappear and . . . perception of the issues is sharpened . . . clears away the cobwebs of wishful thinking, of irrelevant theories and suprious explanations. The danger of distortion is greatest at a time of crisis . . . events which loom very large at the moment of writing may appear in a different perspective a few years later.31

Egypt had not won the October War in terms of forcing the Israelis out of its occupied territory, but it had gained a valuable political victory. The Egyptian attack had demonstrated to Israel and the United States that Egypt was in a position to impose heavy damage on Israel. For the first time, Egypt was able to place pressure on Israel to negotiate and urge the United States to push Israel toward the bargaining table.

By the end of the war, the Soviets had two choices. The first was to undermine the U.S. position in the Middle East, and the second was to improve relations with the United States by showing an interest in the advantages of arms limitation and trade arrangements. Relations could also be improved if the Soviets acknowledged the value of détente and the fact that it had probably prevented a nuclear war between the superpowers during the October conflict.

Instead, however, Soviet-American relations had suffered because of the war. The Soviet leaders chose to encourage the Arabs to continue their oil embargo against the United States, thus adversely affecting the American economy and causing dissension between the United States and the Western European members of the N.A.T.O. alliance, who felt that the embargo had been instituted against them due to the U.S. attitude toward the Arabs during the 1973 war. Therefore, the Nixon administration, although long an advocate of increased trade with the Soviet Union, decided to have Congress postpone consideration of a bill giving most-favored-nation trading status to the U.S.S.R.\textsuperscript{32}

An examination of the results of the 1973 war indicates that Egypt's foreign policy appears to have been framed largely on the basis of assumptions that Sadat drew from his reading of certain variables he saw on the domestic, regional, and global fronts. In the domestic context, the effects caused by the June War of 1967 were still making themselves felt. The Egyptian people faced economic difficulties because the war heightened the rate of inflation. The price of the oil that Egypt purchased increased, as did the cost of several of the basic food commodities that the country had to import. To avoid

\textsuperscript{32}Freedman, The Soviet Policy toward the Middle East since 1970, p. 152.
additional hardships, an economic "open-door policy" was implemented in hopes that Egypt's economic difficulties could be alleviated to some extent by injections of foreign capital and the activity of local private businesses.

On the regional level, both the economic and political power of oil-producing countries had increased as a result of the rise in oil prices after the October War. The solidarity of the Arab system that had been manifested during the war, however, weakened a few months later.

On the global level, from the Egyptian perspective the United States seemed to be the only country that could effectively persuade Israel to make concessions concerning occupied Arab territories. Heikal wrote, "I remember Kissinger telling me that the Soviets can give you arms and this means war, but only the United States can give you back your occupied territories and this means peace." The Egyptian view of U.S. persuasiveness increased rapidly while Soviet relations with Egypt worsened. There were many reasons for these two phenomena. For example, the Egyptians believed that the U.S.S.R. was restricting its supply of arms to them, whereas the United States was supplying large quantities of arms. Another major factor was the personal enmity between the Egyptian president and

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33 Mohamed H. Heikal, "Egyptian Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, LVI (July, 1978), 724.
Soviet leaders stemming from the damage Sadat had caused to the Soviets' position in the Middle East. A third reason was Egypt's avoidance of the role that the Soviet Union intended to take in the peace process by inviting the United States to play the sole part in that process.34

In short, by the end of the October War, President Sadat had established a new, more balanced approach in Egyptian foreign policy. Ismail Fahmy, whom the Soviets considered to be pro-Western, was appointed as a foreign minister, and, in November, 1973, Cairo proclaimed that it would reestablish diplomatic relations with the United States.35 The Soviet leadership was far from happy with the developments between Egypt and the United States. President Sadat decided to send Foreign Minister Fahmy to Washington on October 28, 1973, in order to explain Egypt's views on the ceasefire and the steps that should be taken to separate the Israeli and Egyptian forces. Fahmy's meetings with Secretary of State Kissinger helped to establish a direct channel of communication between Washington and Cairo. During the meeting, Kissinger commented that the Soviets had been representing Egypt in Washington since 1970, when Nasser had concluded that there was no

34Ibid., pp. 724-725.

possibility for communication between Egypt and Washington. In the talks, Kissinger assured Fahmy that the United States had decided to open a new page with Egypt and to improve a lasting friendship. He insisted that the Nixon administration was determined now to allow the situation in the Middle East to return to what it had been before the 1973 war and promised that the United States would pressure Israel to create a lasting peace. During his visit to Washington, Fahmy also prepared for a trip to Cairo by Kissinger.36

While Fahmy was in Washington, Moscow sent its Deputy Foreign Minister, Vasily V. Kuznetsov, to the Middle East, and on October 30 talks began between Kuznetsov and Egyptian officials. Following those talks, in a press conference Sadat publicly recognized the Soviet Union as a friend and a major power that had responsibilities to maintain world peace. Sadat's words were the last ones expressing the Soviet Union's commitments to Egypt. A hint of the further deterioration to come in Egyptian-Soviet relations appeared when Sadat characterized the United States' position as a constructive one up to that time. In his meetings with Kuznetsov, Sadat claimed that he had not received new arms shipments from the Soviets after the

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war, and he added that even pre-war arms agreements due for completion by the end of 1973 were never fulfilled.\(^{37}\)

Moscow began to be excluded from the Middle East negotiations upon Kissinger's arrival in Cairo on November 6. He held an initial three-hour meeting with President Sadat, and during that time the fate of the Soviet Union in Egypt was sealed. Sadat accepted Kissinger's six-point ceasefire agreement without modification. The strategy agreed upon by Sadat and Kissinger was to prevent the U.S.S.R. from playing any role in the Middle East settlement.\(^{38}\) The Soviet leaders were concerned about these events.

The United Nations held a peace conference in Geneva, Switzerland on December 21, 1973, led by the Soviet Union and the United States. This conference was unproductive, however, due to Syria's unwillingness to participate and Israel's refusal to negotiate with the Palestinians. Nevertheless, a bilateral venue involving Egypt and the United States was easily manageable. Kissinger flew to the Middle East in January, 1974, and Sadat suggested that he seek an immediate disengagement between the Egyptians and the Israelis. Kissinger's efforts succeeded on January 18. Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmy was sent to Moscow to explain


\(^{38}\)Heikal, *The Sphinx and the Commissar*, p. 263.
Sadat's decision for direct negotiations, but the Soviets believed that a step-by-step approach would have no result and that a comprehensive settlement of the conflict could not be attained without the full participation of all the parties involved, including the U.S.S.R.  

Because of the challenges that the Soviets faced in the Middle East, they adopted a comprehensive strategy in an attempt to maximize their influence and weaken that of the West. Their plan was to unify the Arab countries with Arab political organizations in larger Arab fronts which were directed against Israel and Western imperialism. Unfortunately for the Soviets, however, changes in Egyptian policy and Kissinger's diplomacy approach to arrive at a settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict caused this strategy to fail and further weakened the U.S.S.R.'s position in the Arab world.  

The Soviets believed that the Americans were entirely responsible for the changes in the Middle East, but it was difficult to find evidence to blame them. Kissinger's plan was obvious. He was seeking two goals: to remove the Soviet Union from the Middle East so that the region would

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not be an area of confrontation between the two superpowers and to ensure the security of Israel. Kissinger wanted both the Arabs and the Israelis to be able to look to Washington for economic and political support. ¹

As mentioned previously, Sadat reached a number of important conclusions, based on circumstances, that were to have far-reaching effects. In Heikal's words,

1. That the United States was the only power that could make Israel withdraw completely from the Arab territories occupied since 1967. I remember a conversation I had with President Sadat immediately after the October War during which he told me, "that man (Kissinger) is the only person who can order that woman (Golda Meier) to get out--and be obeyed." My view, which I expressed to him at the time, was that, however great America's influence on Israel might be, there was still a degree of independent Israeli will.

2. That on this basis the United States must be reassured, i.e., that the Soviet presence and influence must be removed from the region. The conservative Arab states fully supported this decision.

3. That the October War would be the last military confrontation in the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is often supposed that President Sadat's official declarations to this effect after his meeting with Menachem Begin in Jerusalem represented a new departure, but that is not so. I recall his saying in November 1973, only a few weeks after the ceasefire: "This will be the last war while I'm president." This further reinforced the logic that there was no place for the Russians in the region. After all, arms were the lever which had brought them there in the first place and arms would be a lever no longer.

4. That Egypt needed a new "Marshall Plan" to rescue its economy. Funds for such a project were

¹Heikal, The Sphinx and the Commissar, p. 265.
available from two sources only: U.S. government aid and investment by private American capital in Egypt was one; Arab oil money from the oil-producing states in the region was the other.

5. In the light of these conclusions, Egypt had to rearrange its alliances both in the region, where a Tehran-Riyadh-Cairo axis replaced the previous Cairo-Damascus-PLO axis, and on the global level, where the United States and Western Europe have replaced the Soviet Union and the Third World as Egypt's new allies.  

Egypt has committed itself to a search for peace and a cessation of its long-time close reliance on the Soviet Union. While quickly moving towards improving relations with the West, Sadat stated, "It is clearly in our interest to demonstrate that countries which pursue such policies can obtain the support of the United States."  

Nevertheless, despite the setbacks they had sustained, the Soviets were determined to continue their challenge to American influence in the Middle East, so they began attempts to restore their position and to limit any further damage. First, the Soviets stressed the importance of the Geneva conference and of their own major influence on the peace negotiations. Second, they tried to maintain direct contact with Egypt even though they criticized Sadat, for that contact could become stronger if Sadat or his successors became disillusioned with the United States.

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42Heikal, "Egyptian Foreign Policy," pp. 725-726.

Third, the Soviets played their traditional card in the region by supporting Palestinian demands to prevent a peaceful settlement and to establish a Palestinian state in the Middle East.44

During this period the Soviets' efforts to maintain their influence in Egypt failed as the Egyptian attitude toward the U.S.S.R. changed. Thus, the United States was enabled to gain greater influence in Egypt and to play a significant role as a mediator in the Middle East settlement.

CHAPTER IV

SETTLEMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

The United States as a Mediator

In 1969, the Soviet Union sent a large shipment of arms to Egypt, making it easier for the latter nation to escalate the war of attrition against Israel. All indications pointed to an increasing future Soviet presence in the region that would undermine the strategic position of the United States in the Middle East. In addition, the United States sensed that its allies in Western Europe were gradually moving away from U.S. policy in the Middle East conflict. These movements were the first evidence of U.S. awareness of the dangers threatening American interests in the region.

In dealing with these potential problems, the Nixon administration began to adopt a more flexible policy, beginning with new proposals for a peace settlement submitted by Secretary of State William Rogers on December 3, 1969. These proposals may be summarized as follows.

1. Egypt and Israel agree on a timetable for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from Egyptian territories captured in the 1967 War.
2. The state of belligerency between Israel and Egypt be terminated.
3. The parties agree on the location of secure and recognized boundaries between them; the
former international boundaries between Egypt and Palestinian territory to be secure and recognized boundaries between Egypt and Israel.

4. The agreement to include the creation of demilitarized zones, together with adopting effective measures at Sharm el-Sheikh to ensure freedom of navigation through the Tiran Straits, as well as security arrangements for final decision on the Gaza sector.

5. Egypt to guarantee the right of freedom of passage to all ships of all countries, including those of Israel, without distinction or interference.

6. The two parties agree to the terms of a fair settlement to the refugee problem; to be agreed upon in the final agreement between Jordan and Israel.

7. The two parties recognize each other's right of sovereignty and political independence, and the right to live in peace within secure boundaries, free of any threat of force.

8. The final agreement will be contained in a document signed by the two parties and deposited with the United Nations.

9. The two parties agree that the final agreement be deposited with the Security Council for ratification.¹

Egypt accepted Rogers' proposal, but that acceptance depended on the position of the United States on the Syrian and Jordanian fronts. Israel denounced the proposed settlement, and the Soviets sent their rejection of it to the United States.²

Diplomatic efforts, however, did not stop at that point. Joseph Sisco, Assistant to the Secretary of State, presented another peace plan focusing on the U.S. commitment


²Ibid., pp. 109-111.
to the pre-June, 1967 Israeli borders and showing marked concern for the rights and claims of the Palestinians. Within two weeks of the proposal, the Soviet Union, Egypt, and Jordan accepted the plan; Syria, Iraq, and Palestine rejected it. At that time, the Nixon administration was more interested in making a separate deal with Nasser in an effort to gain the major role in the peace settlement, thereby forcing the Soviet Union out of the negotiations.

During Nasser's last visit to Moscow at the end of January, 1970, he asked Brezhnev to give his public support to Rogers' initiative. As Heikal stated,

Brezhnev was not a little surprised; how could Nasser accept something which, as Brezhnev put it, had an American flag on it? Nasser explained that it was just because of the American flag on it that he thought it could be useful. He felt that a new stage was opening up for Egypt.

In 1971, Sadat was highly receptive to unilateral American diplomatic efforts to arrange an interim settlement along the Suez Canal, and Soviet leaders recognized that fact. The United States had avoided collaboration between the superpowers in favor of applying the Kissinger

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step-by-step strategy, which enabled them to play the sole role in the settlement and to create a rift between the Soviet Union and Egypt. Soviet leaders were informed of the new American policy by Egyptian officials.⁶

Time was quickly running out before the October War in 1972-1973, but no progress had been made in Egyptian-American negotiations. To resolve the no war-no peace dilemma, Sadat decided to prepare for an attack on Israeli forces. Guns used in the October War had barely been silenced when the United States chose to play the mediator role.

In the October War, the Arabs proved to everyone that they were not inferior and that with coherence they coulds master the enigma of technology. By destroying approximately a fourth of the Israeli air force and hundreds of Israeli tanks, the Arabs forced the world to take them seriously. The oil embargo compounded the rise in oil prices, costing the United States tens of billions of dollars and Western Europe an even greater measure of its oil affluence. The Arab oil producers at large emerged as a major source of world capital, and the Arabs in their collectivity joined the United States, the Soviet

Union, Western Europe, and Japan in the fellowship of global powers.  

The Nixon administration, particularly Secretary of State Kissinger, devoted a great deal of time and effort to resolving the conflict which had brought the two superpowers to a confrontation and altered the international balance of power. Kissinger was among the first to recognize this shift of power and began seeking ways to cope with it. Kissinger wanted the United States to play an active and effective role in containing the Arab-Israeli conflict, and he felt the necessity of breaking the world strain that had been created by the October 1973 War. In addition, he wanted to persuade the United States' allies to give him a free hand so that he could prevent the Soviets from playing any role in the negotiations, and he wanted to build support for the moderate Arab regimes among the U.S. allies. These new diplomatic initiatives, designed to establish peace in the Middle East and improve U.S.-Arab relations without losing Israel, were subsequently explained to Congress and to the American public.

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8 Ibid., p. 13.
9 Quandt, Decade of Decisions, pp. 209-212.
Kissinger spelled out the principles of his policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict as follows.

Our position is that the conditions that produced this war were clearly intolerable to the Arab nations, and that in the process of negotiations, it will be necessary for all sides to make substantial concessions.

The problem will be to relate the Arab concern for the sovereignty over the territories to the Israeli concern for secure boundaries. We believe that the process of negotiations between the parties is an essential component of this.

And, as the president has stated to the four Arab ministers, and as we have stated repeatedly, we will make a major effort to bring about a solution that is considered just by all parties. But I think no purpose would be served by my trying to delimit the exact nature of all of these provisions.\(^{10}\)

A prime characteristic of Kissinger's diplomacy was his "step-by-step" attempt to bring about a settlement. His previous negotiations with the Chinese, the Vietnamese, and the Soviets had convinced him of the possibility of successful negotiations in the Middle East.\(^{11}\)

Kissinger paid his first visit to Cairo on November 6, 1973. A meeting between him and Sadat was quickly arranged, and during the three-hour sessions the two men agreed on six points relating to Egyptian-Israeli disengagement of forces. Sadat took a major role in the negotiations with Kissinger and made the final decisions.

\(^{10}\)Ibid., pp. 199-200.

Sadat was willing to forge a close new relationship with Kissinger since he recognized the latter's influence on Israeli Premier Golda Meier and his ability to pressure her to remove Israeli forces from occupied Egyptian territories.\(^{12}\)

On December 21, 1973, the Geneva Conference was held under the auspices of U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, the United States and the Soviet Union acting as co-chairs, and representatives of Egypt, Jordan, and Israel. During the conference, Kissinger introduced his "step-by-step" diplomatic initiative and declared that the ultimate goal of the conference was peace but that the most urgent step was to accomplish a disengagement of forces.\(^{13}\) Consequently, the conference became "a forum that would provide the symbolic umbrella under which various diplomatic moves might be made."\(^{14}\) One of its major aims was to give the Soviets a sense of participation that would preclude their discontinuing the peace effort.\(^{15}\)

As noted in Chapter III, however, the Geneva Conference ended without having achieved an agreement. Egypt adopted the "step-by-step" diplomacy prepared by Kissinger, but

\(^{12}\)Heikal, \textit{The Sphinx and the Commissar}, p. 265.

\(^{13}\)Quandt, \textit{Decade of Decisions}, p. 224.

\(^{14}\)Ibid., p. 213.

\(^{15}\)Ibid.
the American position suffered great hardships because of the October War and the new military situation created by it—the oil embargo, for example, had deleteriously affected the U.S. economy. Washington had to recognize the crisis that was forcing the United States to improve its relationship with the Arab world, especially with Egypt. The United States' purpose in establishing direct contact with Arab countries was to change its image in their eyes without making commitments which might impair its relations with Israel. The United States concentrated on Egypt in order to weaken the Soviet position there and to establish a special relation with Egypt which would isolate it from the rest of the Arab countries.\(^6\)

In the light of these expectations, Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy commented on the situation to President Sadat. He stated that Egypt should not suddenly move away from the U.S.S.R. and advised that the Egyptian communication channel with Moscow should be maintained. The Soviets were upset about Egypt's shift toward the United States and as a result were attempting to strengthen their position in other Arab countries by increasing their presence in Syria, Iraq, Southern Yemen, Sudan, and Libya. Fahmy advised Sadat

to play the game of nations, maintaining a balanced relationship with both superpowers. Egypt could play the game and benefit from it because of its political and strategic position. The main emphasis was that Egypt should not completely destroy its bridges with either the United States or the Soviet Union.\(^{17}\)

In January of 1974, Kissinger returned to the Middle East, traveling between the front countries—Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Israel—in order to bring about a disengagement of Egyptian and Israeli forces. He shuttled between Aswan and Tel-Aviv, submitting the American proposal for the peace process to Egypt and Israel and hoping that the United States would be able to play the role of mediator between the two sides. The United States soon intervened to achieve a breakthrough and overcome the apparent impasse. The first disengagement of forces agreement was signed between Egypt and Israel on January 10, 1974, but several important events delayed the peace process. Among them were the Watergate break-in and its aftermath, which plunged the United States into political turmoil that lasted until 1976. Nixon's 1974 visit to the Middle East proved insignificant due to his involvement in the Watergate scandal and his subsequent resignation.\(^{18}\)

\(^{17}\)Ibid., p. 88.

Kissinger faced difficulties in his effort to reach a disengagement agreement between Syria and Israel; the Egyptian-Israeli agreement was easier for him to attain. Israeli Premier Yitzak Rabin had adopted a strategy that called for "a piece of territory for a piece of peace." Sadat was also seeking rapid progress toward a settlement. He wanted to fulfill his promise to improve the Egyptian economic situation through his new "open-door policy." Together, the United States, Egypt, and Israel all were willing the weaken the Soviet position in the region.  

In August, 1975, Kissinger began negotiation talks in order to reach another disengagement agreement. Unfortunately, the U.S. administration's position had been damaged by the Watergate scandal, which created an obstacle in the discussions. Nevertheless, Kissinger concluded the second agreement in his shuttle between Egypt and Israel, and it was signed on September 1, 1975. This agreement put an end to the "step-by-step" approach; Egypt was now looking for a comprehensive settlement that would eventually lead to a final agreement, ending the war situation and establishing a just and permanent peace.  

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20 El-Sadat, In Search of Identity, p. 296.
With regard to these settlement developments, the Soviet Union realized that its presence in the Middle East had been greatly weakened, not because of the United States' diplomatic initiative but because of the alignment between the pro-Western Egyptian-Saudi Arabian axis which supported that initiative in the region. To worsen the position of the Soviet Union, in March of 1976, Sadat announced to the Egyptian Parliament his unilateral abrogation of the Soviet-Egyptian friendship treaty, ten years before its scheduled expiration date. This step was a result of Sadat's belief that the problems of the Middle East were moving towards a solution and that this process could continue without the help of the Soviets. Several reasons led Sadat to abrogate the treaty. First, Soviet leaders were opposed to the recently implemented peace process and to the "open-door policy" which Egypt had hoped would change its economic, social, and political situation. Second, the Soviets refused to meet Egypt's military needs and were asking for interest on military loans. Third, Moscow was failing to build and strengthen Egypt's defenses. Following the abrogation of the treaty, Sadat

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announced that Soviet use of Egyptian naval facilities was to be terminated.\textsuperscript{22}

These events led to a worsening of Egyptian-Soviet relations during the period from October, 1973 to March, 1976. A consideration of these developments makes clear that improved relations between the United States and Egypt was one of the primary settlement issues originating in the Arab-Israeli conflict that ultimately resulted in a major disagreement between Cairo and Moscow. Since the end of the October War, Sadat seemed to have been searching for a balance in his relations with the United States and the U.S.S.R., but he did not accept Soviet conditions and demands. Hence, the Soviets lost much of their influence in Egypt, where they had spent so much time and effort. The superpower/client relationship between the U.S.S.R. and Egypt that had been so carefully and systematically designed was demolished.\textsuperscript{23}

Soviet leaders were split in their attitudes towards Egypt after Sadat abrogated the 1971 friendship treaty. One group considered the position of Egypt as a vital one in the Arab world. This group was concerned about Egypt's


increased need for allies and foresaw that this need would lead the Egyptians to the United States if the Soviet Union made any forceful gestures. The second group was aware of Egypt's importance in the Arab world and was worried about Sadat's anti-Soviet attitude. They believed that, if the Soviets took action—such as withholding military supplies—Egypt would return to the U.S.S.R. This group's policy revealed their misunderstanding of Egypt; they believed that the withholding of arms would create domestic pressure on Sadat, but this was not the case. In developing countries, while a leader is in power, people tend to support him without much question. Thus, Sadat, like leaders in other developing nations, could make major decisions without consulting the public. It was the Soviet misunderstanding of the Egyptian system which in the end led to the deterioration of Egyptian-Soviet relations.²⁴

President Jimmy Carter took office in January, 1977, by the time the second Egyptian-Israeli disengagement came to an end. He initiated a new policy toward the Middle East; avoiding the previous administration's "step-by-step" policy, the United States began to seek a comprehensive peace settlement. It was evident from President Carter's decisions that the United States planned to play an active role in the Middle East, particularly with regard

²⁴Fahmy, p. 186.
to the Palestinian issue. Carter's new ideas and new working team offered fresh hope to the Arab countries and suggested that the United States would take a more constructive approach than ever before.\textsuperscript{25}

The plan devised by President Carter and his foreign policy team--Vice-President Walter Mondale, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski--comprised three new strategies: 1) the United States would work for a comprehensive, final, and conclusive settlement; 2) the United States would try to bring all of the parties, including the Palestinians, to a Geneva conference where a settlement would be negotiated; and 3) the United States would act vigorously in advance of that conference to move the parties away from their entrenched positions and toward the American idea of a fair settlement.\textsuperscript{26}

The Road to Jerusalem

The Carter administration's efforts to bring about a settlement in the Arab-Israeli conflict began in February, 1977, with the first visit of Secretary of State Vance to the Middle East. The comprehensive political settlement sought by the Carter administration included three points: "1) Israeli withdrawal to approximately the 1967 borders;

\textsuperscript{25}Ibid., p. 190. \hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{26}Sicherman, p. 32.
2) creation of a 'Palestinian homeland,' probably the West Bank and Gaza Strip areas; 3) establishment of permanent peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors."\(^{27}\) According to the U.S. State Department, Vance concluded from his talks with Arab leaders that "In consideration of Arab acceptance of peace with Israel, Israel should withdraw from the occupied territories on all fronts and agree to formation of a Palestinian homeland."\(^{28}\)

In pursuing his peace effort, Sadat visited the United States to meet President Carter shortly after the latter's election. During his meeting with Carter, Sadat explained the stages that had been completed in the peace process and presented a new specific peace plan to the American leader. This new plan concentrated on the Palestinian problem. Sadat explained his peace strategy as follows.

Now in my first peace strategy--which I submit to the world today--I do not deny the state of Israel's right to be recognized by all countries of the region, provided that the whole situation is normalized. A peace agreement should provide for the establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank of Jordan and the Gaza Strip; and Israel should withdraw from the territories occupied in 1967, so that a formal declaration is made when we meet in Geneva, ending the state of war that has existed since the establishment of Israel.\(^{29}\)


\(^{28}\)Riad, p. 302.

\(^{29}\)El-Sadat, In Search of Identity, p. 297.
Vance traveled to the Middle East again in August, 1977, in an effort to persuade the parties to the conflict to make expeditious arrangements for the Geneva Conference. Upon Vance's return, the State Department announced that the United States would support the participation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in the peace negotiations at Geneva if the P.L.O. accepted U.N. Resolution No. 242.30

On October 1, 1977, the United States and the Soviet Union issued a communique on the Middle East and invited all parties to the conflict to reschedule the Geneva Conference by December. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger criticized the communique, commenting that it was good to have the Soviets at the "beginning of negotiations and the end, but not in the middle."31 He did not appreciate the Soviets' intervention in the real negotiations between the conflicting parties. President Carter and his foreign policy team, on the other hand, were trying to bring all of the parties to the conflict to Geneva, where a settlement could be negotiated, with the aim of moving them toward the American idea of a fair resolution of the conflict.32

30Riad, p. 304.
31Heikal, The Sphinx and the Commissar, p. 267.
32Sicherman, p. 33.
The Middle East situation became more complicated in 1977. Carter's strategy for a comprehensive settlement including Syria, the Palestinians, and the Soviet Union did not satisfy Egypt's ambitions because the Egyptians did not want to take on any uncertain diplomatic efforts that might lead them into war. Sadat viewed the October War of 1973 as the last war between Egypt and Israel. He turned to the United States and became deeply dependent on that nation and on Saudi Arabia and widened Egypt's distance from Moscow. As yet, however, Sadat's peace initiative had not yielded any results, and, after Vance's second visit to the region in August, 1977, the Egyptian leader began to reevaluate the situation. An intermediary, President Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania, played a major role in facilitating an exchange of confidences between Sadat and the Israeli government. Secret negotiations were also held in Morocco between Egyptian officials and Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan.\(^3^3\)

Sadat himself said,

When I am faced with a problem, no matter how impossible a solution might seem, I am careful to avoid losing my temper and flaring up. More importantly, I do not limit myself to finding one solution to a problem but consider it essential to look for alternative solutions, so if the first fails, I can move on to the second, then to the third and so on. . . . this is what happened when

\(^3^3\)Ibid., pp. 65-66.
I began to think of how to solve the most difficult and complex problem we face: the Arab-Israeli conflict.\textsuperscript{34}

In his book \textit{Those I Have Known}, Sadat stated that he had in his mind a plan to call the "Big Five"--the United States, the Soviet Union, the Peoples Republic of China, France, and Great Britain--to meet in Jerusalem in order to guarantee peace and security for both parties in the Middle East conflict. There were several reasons why he decided not to carry out that plan.

First, that Brezhnev would be among the big five, and while Brezhnev was a friend and a reasonable man, he was nonetheless tied by a number of political considerations that would have hindered him from taking a positive stand. He was also restricted by the points of view of his Syrian and Palestinian allies. And could never forget my blow to the Soviets in the Middle East.

The second reason for abandoning this idea was the position of China. Though China supported the Arab cause completely, I felt she might abstain from coming to the meeting as she did in the Security Council.

The third reason was that some heads of state could have hindered their movement for six months or more, making it difficult for them to come to Jerusalem on the date proposed.\textsuperscript{35}

On November 9, 1977, in a speech to the Egyptian People's Assembly, Sadat addressed the form of his peace initiative, thanked President Carter for his efforts toward a comprehensive settlement, declared his wishes to bring


\textsuperscript{35}Ibid., p. 105.
about peace, and stated his willingness to go to the ends of the world to prevent another war. He said, "I am ready to go to their house, to the Knesset itself and to talk to them." An invitation from Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin arrived on November 17, and an official spokesman announced that Sadat had accepted the invitation and would visit Israel on November 19.

Before moving on to Jerusalem, Sadat stopped in Syria to explain the reasons for his trip to Israel to President Al-Asad. Sadat failed to convince Al-Asad of the validity of his visit, however, and an angry discussion ensued between the two leaders.

After four wars and thirty-four years of bloodshed and untold suffering, the unprecedented visit of President Sadat to Israel took place on November 12, 1977. Sadat and Begin met in Jerusalem after the Egyptian president's arrival. Sadat declared that the purpose of his visit was not to seek a separate peace but to discuss the Palestinian problem. He emphasized that both governments should go to Geneva with an "agreed program" and gave the impression that it did not matter who else came to the conference. The Egyptian leader's speech in the Knesset included several principles that he regarded as essential to any peace

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36 El-Sadat, _In Search of Identity_, p. 308.
37 Sicherman, p. 66.
38 Fahmy, p. 276.
settlement in Geneva: 1) an Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab lands, 2) a recognition of Palestinian rights to establish their state, 3) the right of all countries in the area to secure borders, and 4) an agreement among the front countries (Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Israel) to resolve the problem through peaceful means by observing the terms of the United Nations charter.\textsuperscript{39}

In his book \textit{In Search of Identity} Sadat raised two questions about his trip to Jerusalem; he asked, "But what of the outcome? Did my plan come off?"\textsuperscript{40} In answer to these questions he explained that his trip was intended to break down the barrier that had existed for so many years between Egypt and Israel. He believed that he had attained this goal since the response of both the Egyptian and the Israeli people to his trip was very favorable. Sadat added that he returned from Israel having agreed with Israeli officials on two main points: first, that the October War would be the last war between their two countries and, second, that both sides should directly negotiate the question of security. Sadat emphasized that he would stand by his peace initiative whatever the

\textsuperscript{39}"Israeli-Egyptian Treaty," p. 4.

\textsuperscript{40}El-Sadat, \textit{In Search of Identity}, p. 311.
circumstances and that he would not waste any chance that might lead to peace in the Middle East. 41

In contrast, Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy criticized Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, stating that his trip and his speech in the Knesset produced no miracles and elicited no concessions from Israel. Furthermore, Sadat's visit was viewed only with very guarded optimism by the United States and was received with outrage in the Arab world. 42

The Soviets' initial response to Sadat's visit to Jerusalem was to try to isolate him by encouraging the anti-Sadat alliance of Arab states. While the Soviet leaders were endeavoring to unite the anti-Sadat Arab forces into a cohesive and powerful anti-imperialist front, they were also working to destroy the American position in the Middle East. Soviet criticism of Sadat's peace initiative reached a climax on January 8, 1978, as Pravda attacked Carter's Middle East trip and his attempts to persuade the Arabs to agree to unilateral concessions with Israel.

Following the recall of an Egyptian delegation from Israel in mid-January, the Russians termed the bilateral Egyptian-Israeli talks a failure and called for a return to Geneva, once again emphasizing that the conference could not be used as a screen for separate deals with Israel. 43

41 Ibid. 42 Fahmy, p. 285.

President Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Begin agreed in Jerusalem to continue their meetings to discuss the details of the peace process, and Begin and several other Israeli officials arrived in Egypt in December, 1977. Their meeting with Sadat took place at Abu Sweir near Ismailia. The conference was not productive, however, especially on the Palestinian issue, although Sadat and Begin agreed that attempts to reach a comprehensive settlement should continue, based on U.N. Resolutions No. 242 and No. 338, and that the two sides would hold further meetings on the Palestinian question.4

The Camp David Accord

The lack of progress in Egyptian-Israeli discussions after Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November, 1977 prompted American policy-makers to push for a resolution of the conflict. Sadat's efforts to reach a comprehensive settlement by the fall of 1978 had been unsuccessful. In an effort to establish a partnership with Egypt and Israel, President Carter invited President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin to meet with him in Washington.

Sadat arrived in Washington on February 3, 1978. The purpose of his visit was twofold: 1) to discover whether Sadat

really wished to engage in direct continuous negotiations with Israel and 2) to discover whether Washington would reward such an initiative on Sadat's part through arms sales, if not through placing heavy pressure on Israel.\textsuperscript{45}

During their meetings, Sadat and Carter reached an agreement on several points which conformed with Sadat's goals. The first was American approval of Egyptian positions on two issues, one of which was Israeli settlement in the Sinai and the significance of Jordan's participation in the negotiations and the other of which concerned an American weapons deal to supply fifty F-5 jets to Egypt and sixty F-15s to Saudi Arabia.\textsuperscript{46}

Begin arrived in Washington on March 21, 1978. In his discussions with President Carter, he questioned the ambiguity of American action and interpretation of U.N. Resolution No. 242. The United States had disputed Begin's peace plan because his interpretation of Resolution No. 242 excluded the West Bank from the withdrawal clause. The Carter administration was opposed to the stipulations with which Begin was blocking the progress of the negotiations.\textsuperscript{47}

Relations between Egypt and Israel were rapidly deteriorating, and President Carter was concerned that the current deadlock would worsen relations between the two

\textsuperscript{45}Sicherman, p. 78. \textsuperscript{46}Ibid., pp. 78-81. \textsuperscript{47}Ibid., p. 80.
nations and eliminate any chance for peace in the Middle East. Thus, in an attempt to break the deadlock, he invited the Egyptian and Israeli leaders to Camp David for informal face-to-face negotiations. Both Sadat and Begin accepted the invitation.45

U.S. policy-makers approached the Camp David negotiations with caution. Carter, Sadat, and Begin met three times on September 6 and 7. During the first of these meetings, Sadat expressed extremist views toward an Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territories, the Palestinian right to rule in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and the redisjunction of Jerusalem. Begin rejected Sadat's position on all three of these issues, nor was any progress made during the following meetings on September 7.

The American delegation developed a draft proposal, focusing upon the future of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and submitted it to the Israeli delegation on September 10. According to this proposal, during a transitional period Palestinian self-government would replace the Israeli military administration of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Jordan would play a special role in the West Bank, and Israel would not be allowed to build any new settlements or to expand existing ones in the area.46

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45 "Israeli-Egyptian Treaty," p. 5.
46 Friedlander, pp. 213-214.
The American proposal was unacceptable to Israel. It required the Israelis to leave lands that they had occupied for more than eleven years, where many settlements and block defenses had been established. On the other hand, the Arab countries voiced their opinion that Egypt should not make a separate peace with Israel, and this caused difficulties for Egypt in the negotiations.\(^5\)

Two agreements were reached at Camp David, one dealing with the Sinai peninsula and the future peace treaty between Egypt and Israel and the other with a framework for the future of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Several other crucial issues, however, were untouched in the Camp David agreements, such as the position of East Jerusalem, the final date for the removal of Israeli forces from the occupied territories, and the future of Palestinian refugees.\(^5\)

The separate and unrelated characteristics of the two Camp David frameworks appeared to represent a concession to Israel to obtain the latter's acquiescence to the agreement; this may have been the price that the Egyptians--and possibly the Americans as well--had to pay in order to bring about at least a partial outcome of peace between Egypt and Israel. Sadat emphasized that his continued interest in the return of the Sinai and in reaching a peace agreement with Israel should lead towards Palestinian

\(^{50}\)"Israeli-Egyptian Treaty," p. 5. \(^{51}\)Ibid., pp. 7-9.
self-determination. The basic idea of Camp David had begun with the Egyptian and U.S. view of a comprehensive settlement to the Middle East conflict. The peace treaty issued in March, 1979, concentrated on a bilateral Egyptian-Israeli peace plan and did not specifically mention the Palestinian issue.⁵²

All of the secret verbal agreements concluded between Sadat and Carter at Camp David were now expected to yield results. Egypt planned to ask the United States for economic aid since its Arab supplies had been cut off in retaliation for Sadat's signing of the Camp David agreement. In addition, Egypt had lost all of the Soviet military assistance that it desperately needed. Therefore, within a few weeks of the signing of the peace treaty, Cairo and Washington signed a military agreement which provided Egypt with U.S. weapons worth two billion dollars. In return, Egypt gave the United States access to its military facilities. In short, within a few years Sadat had pulled Egypt out of the Soviet circle and placed it firmly in the U.S. camp. The Egyptian government celebrated the first anniversary of the Camp David accord by receiving seven

Phantom F-4 jets and fifty armored personnel carriers from Washington.\textsuperscript{53}

The Soviet media reaction to the Camp David agreement emphasized the U.S. desire to build a new military organization that would include Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. The Soviet leadership received the treaty with opposition. In a speech on September 22, Brezhnev denounced what he called an American effort to split the Arab ranks and force the Arabs to accept the Israeli peace plan. He stressed that the Soviet peace initiative focused upon Israeli withdrawal from Arab territories occupied in 1967 and recognition of the Palestinian right to found a state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Brezhnev again called for a Geneva conference with full P.L.O. participation.\textsuperscript{54}

Arab diplomatic criticism of the Camp David accord was very harsh. After the agreement was announced, most of the Arab leaders held a summit meeting in Baghdad, Iraq on November 5, 1979, and called for a political boycott against Egypt. Relations between Egypt and the other Arab nations had collapsed. On the economic front, Arab leaders decided that all loans and economic aid to the Egyptian government


\textsuperscript{54}Freedman, \textit{Soviet Policy toward the Middle East since 1970}, p. 346.
would cease and that boycott regulations would be applied to Egyptian companies dealing with Israel.\textsuperscript{55}

During the summit meeting between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1979, long and difficult negotiations took place between Moscow and Washington which resulted in a SALT agreement. As expected, the Middle East issue received little official attention in the communiqué issued after the summit, although both superpowers had much to say about it. Unfortunately, they found little to agree upon; the Soviets continued to attack the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, and U.S. involvement in the negotiation process made that process more difficult.

According to Radio Moscow, Brezhnev openly denounced the Egyptian-Israeli treaty. Following the Carter-Brezhnev summit, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko stated in a news conference,

\begin{quote}
The American side tried to prove that the Soviet Union would be better off supporting the separate treaty between Egypt and Israel, and that it should help to link the U.N. in one way or another, to the treaty and the mechanisms created in order to serve this treaty in the Middle East. Certainly I must say that no one had any doubt that the Soviet Union's principled position on the Middle Eastern affair was and remains the same as it was formulated many years ago. Namely, all the lands captured by Israel from the Arabs must be returned, the Palestine Arab people must be granted the opportunity to create its own, if only small independent state.\textsuperscript{56}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{55}Freedman, \textit{The Middle East since Camp David}, p. 176.

\textsuperscript{56}Ibid., p. 367.
Mohmoud Riad, the former Secretary General of the Arab League, described the Egyptian position after Camp David thus.

Egypt, who had led the Arabs, had been the protagonist for the aspirations of the Arab nation, had supported the liberation causes of the Third World, had confronted the military alliances and refused the establishment of military bases, was not isolated within its borders while the United States was busily working to establish its military presence there. With the exit of Egypt, the largest Arab country, from the consortium of nations that confronted Israeli ambitions, Israel was posing new threats and dangers by almost daily incursions into south Lebanon, threatening to attack Syria and casting greedy eyes on the Arab Gulf area with its oil riches. The inevitable conclusion must be that what had been achieved was not a step towards peace, but towards further instability and unrest and an invitation for renewed hostilities.57

The assumptions upon which Sadat based his strategy were not completely valid. He could not force the United States to apply pressure on Israel, nor could he persuade the Arabs to participate in the peace negotiations. Carter's strategy, too, had been based on some miscalculations or inaccurate assumptions. For example, Carter and some of his team members believed that Egypt could persuade Saudi Arabia and Jordan to join in the peace process and leave Syria and the Palestinians out in the cold, forcing them to seek the warmth of the American embrace. But, in fact, Sadat had no influence over

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the other Arab countries, and Jordan and Saudi Arabia followed their own courses.\textsuperscript{58}

Time passed, and the Camp David accord failed to achieve the comprehensive peace settlement which the Carter administration was seeking. Several difficulties in implementing the Camp David agreement emerged during the negotiations between Egypt and Israel: 1) scheduling the West Bank and Gaza elections for a Palestinian self-governing authority; 2) Egyptian demands to delay the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel until after the election of a Palestinian self-governing authority; 3) Egyptian demands to reevaluate the Israeli-Egyptian treaty because Egypt had become increasingly sensitive to Arab charges that the bilateral treaty abridged its sovereignty; 4) priority of obligations (Egypt desired an Israeli concession to hold the West Gank-Gaza elections by December 31, 1979); and 5) relationship of the bilateral treaty to the comprehensive peace—the dispute revolved around the issue that the parties undertake to fulfill their obligations in good faith under the terms of the treaty, without regard to action or inaction of any other party and independently of any other instruments external to the treaty.\textsuperscript{59}


\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{59}Michael Rubner, \textit{Camp David Aftermath: Anatomy of Missed Opportunities} (Los Angeles, Center for the Study of Armament-Disarmament, California State University, 1979), pp. 30-33.}
As a result of the Camp David accord, the Soviet Union appeared to have been engaged in a zero-sum competition with the United States for influence in the Middle Eastern comprehensive settlement.

The Assassination of Sadat

Sadat faced most of his greatest challenges near the end of his life. His self-confidence and reputation were hurt because of the failure of his peace initiative. Sadat's reputation had been threatened in several ways: the Camp David accord had not been as effective as had been hoped, the negotiations with Israel had produced no harmony, and negotiations on Palestinian self-determination and the future position of Jerusalem had resulted in a deadlock.

The slow collapse of the Camp David agreement began in May of 1980, and at the same time the Palestinian self-determination negotiations ended without progress. In order to reactivate momentum, in September Sadat sent Egyptian Vice-President Hosni Mubarak to six European countries to put pressure on Israel. Mubarak's visits, however, failed to achieve their intended objective.60

In the last months before he died, Sadat faced opposition from fundamental Islamic groups in Egypt and other

60Felipe Fernandez Armesto, Sadat and His Statecraft (London, the Kensal Press, 1982), pp. 157-158.
Arab countries. In 1980, he assumed the leadership of the National Democratic Party (formed three years previously) in order to combat this opposition and consolidate his personal political power. In the same year, he arrested more than 1,500 Moslem and Christian extremists, politicians, journalists, and lawyers and dissolved thirteen Egyptian religious groups.

Egypt had accepted a separate peace with Israel, which infuriated the rest of the Arab world. Therefore, these nations cut off economic assistance and supplies to Egypt, which caused serious difficulties for the Egyptian economy. Especially missed was aid from Saudi Arabia.\(^6^1\)

Opposition within Egypt increased to the Camp David peace process and to the Israeli-U.S. alliance. Several Middle Eastern analysts observed that the United States had underestimated the depth of Egyptian opposition to Sadat's diplomatic initiative. The circumstances surrounding Sadat's death and the subsequent arrest of numerous military officers increased doubts about the loyalty of the Egyptian military to Sadat.\(^6^2\) Sadat's assassination was a major setback for the supporters of his regime outside Egypt.


\(^{6^2}\)Ibid.
Sadat's death brought with it relief from the multitude of Egypt's serious economic and social problems caused by his "open-door policy." Since 1977, this policy had throttled the public sector and slowed industrial growth by shifting the country's economic focus from domestic production to import of goods and thus increasing Egypt's indebtedness in foreign trade.

In addition, the social and political bases in Egypt had become separated from Sadat's regime between 1979 and 1981, and the Camp David agreement, which had helped to create that separation, was unsuccessful. The Arab boycott interrupted joint undertakings between Egypt and other Arab countries as well as aid from those countries. Trends of Islamic opinion swung toward anti-Sadat policies. As Sadat's regime found itself increasingly isolated, it resorted to repression. In the opinion of one writer, "It soon came to light that the Camp David agreement merely substituted American occupation for Israeli occupation."6

Two major demands were voiced by the opposition; the first was for the establishment of a national reconciliation government in Egypt headed by the opponents of the Camp David agreement, and the second called for a National

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Assembly election within the next three months. Three objectives were established for the proposed national reconciliation government:

1. Suspend the Camp David agreement and reopen negotiations on the more comprehensive basis of "Palestine is an Egyptian problem and Egypt an Arab problem";
2. Suppression of the "open-door policy" and reinstatement of the planned development policy; and
3. The setting up of a democratic government which would allow for establishment of political parties and ensure trade unions' independence.64

Sadat's assassination shattered the assumption that peace could be achieved either by a partial, step-by-step approach or by a comprehensive one. Circumstances have now demonstrated that the partial approach, even if it included the two most powerful parties in the Middle East conflict, could eventually backfire and make a comprehensive settlement more difficult.

The backlash of the separate peace was not only confined by secular political issues but also took the form of a cultural religious reaction. Sadat's assassination proved that these two aspects are linked. Indeed, Western negotiation with the Arab element was regarded by the West as having been responsible for the secular political backlash in the Middle East. However crucial the Palestinian issue may be to the settlement of the Arab-Israeli

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64 Ibid., pp. 37-40.
conflict, peace cannot easily be achieved without meeting the growing challenge of cultural identity in the region.\textsuperscript{6,5}

What policies should the United States pursue in the light of these realities? The United States should press Israel to agree to a workable plan for Palestinian autonomy. The United States is obliged, moreover, by its serious commitment at Camp David to uphold its role as a "full partner" in the peace process. Peace in the area is in the U.S. interest, although the United States does not hold 99 per cent of the cards, as Sadat once claimed. Rather, the United States has the opportunity to exert a tremendous influence upon Israel. The U.S. role in the Palestinian autonomy negotiations is crucial and will greatly affect the quality of Israel's peace with Egypt as well as the prospects for extending that peace to the rest of the Middle East.\textsuperscript{6,6}

The attraction of the superpowers to the Middle East has no analogy in any other region. As Fahmy stated,

This may be due to the fact that the Middle East crisis is not yet settled or to the strategic importance of the area, which encourages the superpowers to play their game of chess at the expense of this troubled region. I will not go so far as suggesting that the superpowers have deliberately


prevented the chronic Middle East crisis from being solved. However, there is no doubt that both Moscow and Washington are trying to derive the greatest possible advantage from the instability of the area, competing with each other to establish their political and strategic influence.  

The United States adopted a new political strategy toward the Middle East in 1981. This strategy was described by Richard Burt, Director of the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Political Military Affairs, as follows:

1. Demonstrate the ability to counter the influence of the Soviets and their allies;
2. Ensure continued Western access to the oil of the Persian Gulf in adequate quantities and at a reasonable price;
3. Ensure the continued existence and strength of U.S. friends in the region; and
4. Continue to work for peace between Israel and her neighbors.

He added that the United States' plans would enhance those nations' [in the Middle East] ability to counter a Soviet threat and that the promise of increased United States assistance might in turn make them more receptive to providing bases and other facilities to the United States.

Under its new president, Hosni Mubarak, Egypt proposed to pursue negotiations and efforts to achieve a comprehensive peace settlement. According to Foreign Affairs Minister Boutros Ghali, the Mubarak government expected the United States to continue to play a positive role in seeking a just and lasting solution to the Palestinian issue, which formed the core of the problems in the Middle East. Egypt felt strongly the common goals that it shared with

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67 Fahmy, p. 320.  
68 The Middle East, p. 7.
the United States for a stable peace in the region, leading ultimately to international cooperation and security.69

After Sadat's death, Egypt began to disregard its earlier disputes with the Soviet Union and found grounds for a friendly relationship with Moscow based on principles of respect for the sovereignty and independence of nations. A positive Soviet contribution to the Camp David agreement would be welcomed and might help to overcome the numerous difficulties which had posed continuing barriers to a comprehensive peace in the Middle East.70

The cooperation that had previously been established between Egypt and the United States in the political, economic, and military spheres, in the opinion of Egyptian leaders, did not conflict with the country's established commitments to non-alignment. To protect those commitments, however, the Egyptian government declared that the United States was not to establish military bases in Egypt or in any way to place restrictions on Egypt's freedom to analyze and respond to Eastern and Western behavior.

69Boutros Boutros Ghali, "The Foreign Policy of Egypt in the Post-Sadat Era," Foreign Affairs, LX (Spring, 1982), 777-778.

70Ibid., pp. 786-787.
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

According to one writer in the field of political science,

Alliances are instruments of statecraft; as such, they are morally neutral. The decision to ally rarely stems from principle. In the normal course of events, it simply reflects the expediential calculations at the root of nearly all decisions concerning the use of one means rather than another.¹

In fact, with regard to alliances the differences between the concerns of small powers and those of great ones are matters of emphasis rather than substance. The most important of these differences concern two issues: preference of alliance and preference of precise type of alliance. The search for the best ally and the best type of alliance cannot be carried out without an examination of the nature of the environment in which the preference has to be decided. The alternatives for small powers have changed as a result of changes in the international system, and those alternatives have differed, to some extent, from the options available to great powers.

The circumstances of a small power oblige it to take into consideration certain factors that need not affect a great power, and a small power may experience inherent difficulties emerging from the extent of its interests. A great power tends to enter into an alliance in response to a threat to an international political system; a small power, in response to a threat to its local balance.

The relationship between a superpower and a small country is unequal. Although a superpower may not be able to impose its preference on the domestic or foreign policy behavior of a smaller nation, it may be satisfied with their relationship because of the regional and global advantages that it gains from influencing the smaller country's general policy orientation.

When a small power is allied with a great one, it may commit a proportionately larger amount of its available resources to the goals of the alliance. A small power must seek a commitment that is broad enough to defend it from the threats to which it might be exposed. In other words, a small country cannot afford to invest a great deal of its power in a single alliance unless that alliance promises complete protection. The small power with limited abilities but total commitment must seek an alliance in which its ally closes the gap between concern and abilities, whereas a great power with large abilities
but limited commitment tends to seek an alliance in which the gap between concern and abilities is narrowed, but not to the detriment of its other interests.\(^2\)

In the light of these facts, Soviet policy in Egypt can be characterized as an attempt to secure maximum control with minimum responsibility. Moscow could not have achieved the degree of influence it did in Egypt without the active cooperation of Presidents Nasser and Sadat. On the other hand, however, in some ways the Egyptian regime raised obstacles to Soviet ambitions in Egypt. For example, President Sadat sought to saddle the Soviet Union with maximum responsibility for Egypt's defense but was unwilling to surrender Egyptian interests, either directly to Moscow or indirectly to a Moscow-oriented party within Egypt.

Egypt and other small states have not given over their interests to the aims of the postwar superpowers. Maneuvering for ends that they themselves dictate, these "weaklings" have resisted the pressure, rejected the authority, defied the power, and even injured the reputations and interests of much mightier nations. In 1972, Cairo issued a challenge to Moscow by expelling thousands of Soviet personnel residing in Egypt. In 1979, Iran held an entire American diplomatic mission hostage. Other examples of the self-interested politics of small states may be found

\(^2\)Ibid., pp. 59-62.
in Albania's and Yugoslavia's stubborn pursuit of independence from Soviet leadership and in Cuba's success in flouting the power of the United States.

Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union has lacked the military strength to coerce small states into submission, nor have they lacked the economic resources to coax or to reward the cooperation of smaller countries. The bitter rivalry of the two superpowers, however, has blunted the effectiveness of their military might and devalued the allure of their wealth. Dissatisfied with one superpower's lukewarm political backing, suspicious of its lean economic support, or disgruntled by its scolding or threats, a small state may seek what it wants in the comforts offered by the other side.

Force cannot make a friend of a small nation to the greater power that applies it. Thinking always of the rival that may capitalize on punitive action, each superpower has dismissed its arsenal as a resource on which to draw to correct waywardness or disobedience on the part of smaller countries. Were it to use even a part of its vastly superior force against a weak opponent, a superpower might drive that opponent into its rival's camp, or, worse, its action might arouse opposition among small states and thereby enhance its rival's influence among Third World nations.
Aware of the limits of their influence in small countries, a superpower's policy-makers are prone to exaggerate that of their adversary. Utterly fascinated by each other, the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States tend to slight the element of choice available to smaller nations; the case of Egypt is a particularly persuasive example of the superpowers' futile attempts to translate aid into influence.

Despite Moscow's eagerness to see Egypt imitate the socialist pattern of Soviet devising, Egypt's domestic reforms were instituted to fit its own requirements. Sadat saw no possibility of coincidence between Marxism and Egyptian socialism, so he did not support the growing role that former Communists and other left-wing elements were playing within the Arab Socialist Union. In 1971, Sadat's triumph over the Ali Sabri group gave evidence of Moscow's powerlessness to mold a ruling elite sympathetic to its hopes for Egyptian policy.

Egypt maintained its own course in foreign affairs as well. In issues fundamental to Egypt's interests Cairo's conduct diverged widely from the line Moscow wished it to adopt. Sadat made it clear that the U.S.S.R. could not always rely on Egypt either as an unquestioning ally in Soviet calculations of the correlation of forces between East and West or as an open door for spreading Communist
influence in the Arab world. This stance on Sadat's part was made obvious when he supported President Jaafar Nimeiry of Sudan against an attempted Communist coup in that country in 1971.

Israel posed the major question on which Egypt declined to defer to Moscow's guidance. The Soviets could not prevent Sadat from seeking peace in discussions with Washington. Then, when the futility of these discussions prompted Sadat's decision to go to war, detained shipments of Soviet arms prevented Egypt's return to military action in 1971. However, for its success in balk ing his militance, Sadat made the Soviet Union pay bitterly by expelling its personnel from Egypt in July, 1972. In October, 1973, Sadat challenged the U.S.S.R. again with a war supported by Soviet arms and waged over the objections of Soviet policy.

Cairo's striking use of its power virtually eliminated Soviet influence from Egyptian politics, although Henry Kissinger's visit to Moscow after the October War of 1973 and the joint role played by the United States and the U.S.S.R. in presiding over the Geneva peace conference confirmed the importance of the Soviet position on Middle Eastern problems. Warming U.S.-Egyptian relations, however, gradually permitted Washington to attain the cordiality that Moscow had formerly enjoyed with Egypt. After Sadat visited Jerusalem to appeal for peace, American negotiations
with Egypt and Israel excluded Soviet representatives, and none of the bargaining parties solicited Soviet opinion in discussions that led to agreements disengaging Israeli, Egyptian, and, later, Syrian forces. Finally, the U.S.S.R. played no part in the deliberations that culminated in the Camp David accord.

Both Soviet and Western leaders tend to view the Middle East as what political scientists call a "zero-sum game" contest for influence in which, when one side wins, the other must lose an equivalent amount. This view is somewhat ironic since, without the sanction of armed force, the ability of a great power to influence a smaller state is marginal at best. In fact, the provision of either economic or military assistance is not sufficient to effect such influence, as the Soviets discovered in their attempt to change Yugoslavian, Albanian, and Chinese policy. Following the October War of 1973, the position of the U.S.S.R. in Egypt suffered new setbacks. Although the Soviets had vast resources and an enormous arsenal at their disposal, they could not translate their power into political influence or diplomatic achievements.

Moscow never attained the kind of relationship with Cairo that it has with its Warsaw Pact Eastern European allies. One scholar observed of Soviet policy,

The Soviet Union wants its client states to be strong enough to stand on their own, but weak
enough to take orders. Throughout much of the period examined, Egypt was not strong enough to refuse to take orders. On no major issue in Soviet-Egyptian relations was Moscow able to make Egypt do something against its will, although it was occasionally able to restrain what Egypt did or wanted to do.³

However, the U.S.S.R. learned a great deal from its experience of Egypt's discomfiting independence. Its recent successes in Angola and the Horn of Africa could not have been achieved if it had not been for the lessons the Soviets learned in the Middle East during the period covered by this thesis.

A small power like Egypt could not attain the goals it wished to reach in an alliance with a superpower, for the superpower is always pursuing its own interests first. Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States worked a miracle to solve Egypt's problems. Even in his shift to the United States, many of the objectives that Sadat was seeking could not be achieved. In short, the influence of one superpower should not and perhaps cannot be replaced by that of the other, but Egypt should not break its ties with either the United States or the Soviet Union.

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