MUSICAL AESTHETICS: AN OBJECTIVE APPROACH TO "MUSIC APPRECIATION" FOR AMERICAN PUBLIC EDUCATION

THESIS

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By

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The specific problem prompting this investigation is the creation of a method of music criticism. The purposes for the investigation are three in number. First and foremost, the purpose of the investigation is to develop an unrestricted method of music criticism. The development of such a method fulfills the second reason for the investigation. Although Mortimer Adler and the Paideia Group have clearly stated the classes and pedagogy to be utilized in a Paideia curriculum, they have done little to suggest specific class content. This study resolves the content problem for one class. It is recommended that the music masterworks class be treated as a course in music criticism. Through such treatment of the class, students will meet the goals of the Paideia Group and develop the tools for societal reconstruction. Finally, the goal of establishing a method of music criticism harmonious with the educational philosophy of reconstructionism is the end to the previous two "means" purposes.
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... [M]usical training is a more potent instrument than any other ... because he who has received this true education ... will most shrewdly perceive omissions or faults in art and nature, and with a true taste, while he praises and rejoices over and receives into his soul the good, [he] becomes noble and good. . . .

Plato, The Republic

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

There exists in western verbal tradition a maxim which claims that the educated person is the happy person. If this is correct, it follows that the quest for a system of education which produces such an ideal remains to be realized, for it is obvious that the two adjectives, "educated" and "happy," have yet to become synonymous. The advantage in this present predicament is that failures are the materials of successes. The pedagogos of this world have as their materials for building an education system of worth all that has been tried in past centuries as well as the unique materials which they themselves produce. An educational creation built upon the classic pedagogic systems in combination with new advancements should be the goal of present day educators. The method proposed is in fact an example of recycling old ideas of education in combination with new ideas. In a single
word, the neo-classical system of education which is capable of salvaging the status quo is aesthetics.

With greater clarity, the basis of this writing may be stated as aesthetic education for societal reconstruction in the American public school system. The goal is to ascertain a method of criticism for understanding musical works of art that can be taught at any level, though for the purpose of the present discussion, only grades 6-12 will be considered. With this acquired ability, the students will be able not only to come to an understanding of art, but by so doing, have their lives in general enhanced. The enhancement of individual lives leads to the improvement of all society and thus, societal reconstruction.

While the intent is the improvement of society through the individual as evolved through the arts — music in particular — it is held that not merely the participation in the arts or just any method of criticism is acceptable. The end, in other words, does not justify the means. The method of developing musical understanding must not infringe upon the sanctity and integrity of the art if it is to be properly suited to the said end. The question, quite simply then, is: How does one come to an understanding of a musical work of art? The answer, not quite so simply, is by way of objective aesthetics. By "objective means" it is meant that any and all decisions about a work must be derived from the work.

The term "aesthetics" designates a system of education based on the etymology of the word. As Beardsley suggests "... aesthetics consist of those principles that are required for clarifying and
confirming critical statements. Aesthetics can be thought of, then, as the philosophy of criticism, or metacriticism."¹ The study of aesthetics generally connotes an attempt to explain the phenomenon art — the way one thinks and talks about creating, appreciating, and criticizing works of art. In short, and consistent with the original Greek aisthetikos (sense) and aisthanesthai (to perceive), the study of aesthetics addresses the training of the senses for the acute perception of art and life.

Aesthetics is not, therefore, the same as a traditional art appreciation class. Aesthetics is, in fact, the prelude to art appreciation. If one is not able to understand, one is certainly not able to appreciate. It is required, therefore, that that which is being appreciated is known — perceived and understood. "To appreciate a work," according to B. Othanel Smith,

is not only to make a decision about the work's value but also to give evidence in support of one's judgment. This requires . . . the stating of facts and rules or principles. Otherwise statements containing value judgments cannot be defended or justified. Appreciation, in other words, has a logical character.²

That "logical character" to which Smith refers, and requires of valid appreciation, is based in objective aesthetic analysis. The fundamental task of "aesthetics," then, is an attempt to establish a rational basis for the evaluation and then the enjoyment of the art phenomenon. As stated by Sparshott in The New Grove
Dictionary of Music and Musicians, "... the basic task of aesthetics must be to find principles that will make [art] intelligible."

In addition, it must be stated that this writer works from the stance that within the broader scope of the field of aesthetics, there fall a number of other domains. Fields of academic pursuit which can be considered directly affiliated with aesthetics include: physics, psychology, physiology, anthropology, sociology, philosophy and metaphysics. These areas of study are so interrelated and interdependent with the arts that in dealing with the subject of aesthetics all must be called upon. Aesthetics, it can then be said, is a compound field of study relating to the arts.

Historically, both aesthetics and reconstructionism (the said goal of aesthetic education) have their origins in the theories of Plato and Aristotle. With such an ancient tradition, both theories have been utilized throughout time with various distortions. As witnessed by their virtual extinction, it seems that none of the variations succeeded in their ultimate goal of improving the quality of life. With the latest deviation, however, there may be a change of pattern.

For a growing number of educators, as well as the public citizenry, the answer to resolving the unacceptable condition of public education, and thus ultimately the enhancement of life in general, has at last come in the theories of a group headed by Mortimer J. Adler — *The Paideia Group*. The group, comprised of learned individuals from across the United States, first proclaimed its agenda through a book entitled *The Paideia Proposal: An*
Educational Manifesto (1982). Since the initial writing, two sequels of theory expansion and clarification have been published: Paideia Problems and Possibilities: A consideration of questions raised by The Paideia Proposal (1983); and The Paideia Program: An Educational Syllabus (1984). In addition to these three books, written for the layman as well as the professional, the group has campaigned by means of periodicals, guest lecturing, radio broadcast, and television appearances. Through a system of education which is general, not specialized; liberal, not vocational; humanistic, not technical, the Paideia Group seeks to facilitate self improvement for participation in a democratic society and acquisition of career objectives.

Inherent within the Paideia Group's educational reform proposition, perhaps to their dismay, is the theory of reconstructionism. Although the term "reconstruction" has been utilized to label various trends in all aspects of life, the word has a definite denotation in the realm of American education. With its most well known proponents being George S. Counts and later Theodore Brameld, reconstructionism is perhaps best, although rather detrimentally, categorized as leftist — radically so by many.

According to the reconstructionist creed, the old is in a state of perpetual evolution. Because of this continuous becoming, philosophical theories of reconstructionism are rather eclectic and have fluctuated in supporters over the years. The ever continuing neo-classical rejuvenation has also made a steadfast credo difficult to deduce. Nonetheless, the following quote from Maria
Montessori is offered as an explanation of the reconstructionist philosophy. "We must," states Montessori, "have faith in the child as a messiah, as a savior capable of regenerating the human race and society." The attainment of the cultural goals which extend beyond the here-and-now is at the heart of the reconstructionist orientation toward the future. While reconstructionism is an "utopianistic" philosophy, it does not connote "a flight from reality." The vision of utopianism is one that can be and should be perpetually attained in order that all may be happier, more rational, and more humane than ever before.

Before proceeding further, a point elucidating a paramount difference between the Paideia Group and reconstructionism must be made. It must be made clear that neither Adler, nor his predecessors [Horace Mann, John Dewey, or Robert Hutchins], "who," as Adler writes, "would have been our [the Paideia Group] leaders were they alive today," are traditionally considered reconstructionist. Instead, Adler is viewed as a perennialist. The principle reasoning for considering Adler as reconstructionist in this writing stems from the three objectives which he and his group list as the ultimate goals of a Paideia education, as well as the belief in the development of the critical spirit. The principle difference between the Paideia Group and reconstructionism is the ultimate goal. For Adler's group, the re-establishment and maintenance of a Western democratic culture is desired; for the reconstructionist, the goal is not so tangible. Although dire supporters of democracy, the reconstructionist envisions an ever
evolving goal. The difference between the two camps might best be understood in terms of the number one objective of each. The common point of the Paideia Group and reconstructionism is the desire to facilitate self-actualization for participation in society. The Paideia Group, however, would conservatively state that self-actualization cannot be obtained outside the Western democratic culture; and people must only be guided toward that ideal. The reconstructionist, quite simply, would deny this. Reconstructionism not only recognizes that the individual may find self-actualization through other systems, but they are encouraged to do so. It could very well be that what an individual discovers through a system outside Western democracy will be a key to further societal evolution.

With the aforementioned stated as the general premise, the specific goal of this writing as a contribution to the advancement of the pedagogy of music criticism may now be introduced. While there does appear to be an unquestionable wealth of speculative philosophical writings in the fields of music education, aesthetic education, and the like, the health and pertinence of these writings are questionable. This work differs from others in that it presents a pragmatic case for musical aesthetics in the American public high school. By applying the philosophy of Mortimer Adler and the Paideia Group, the long-range objective is to establish a normative theory of music criticism. The need for such an undertaking is suggested not only by The Paideia Group, but The Getty Center has developed the concept of Discipline-Based Arts
Education (DBAE) to meet the same goals. "To teach less," according to the philosophy of the Getty Center, "is to seriously deprive America and its citizenry of fundamental skills in perception, creativity, comprehension, and judgment." The Getty Center professes further that, "Understanding art, separate from the ability to produce it, not only broadens an individual's intellectual and emotional life, it also enriches and enlivens the possibilities for an entire culture across many fields of endeavor." The importance of these and other issues surrounding DBAE is indicated by the amount of writing in professional journals. The Summer 1987 issue of The Journal of Aesthetic Education, for example, was a double issue devoted entirely to DBAE.

While both the Paideia Group and the Getty Center indicate that it would be desirable for individuals to developed a modest ability in producing works of art, both also stress that what is of most importance is that people develop the ability to understand works of art. The justification for including the arts in the Paideia curriculum, as stated by Van Doren, asserts that the arts serve real human needs - - for self-expression to begin with, and for the account they provide of the world we find about and within us (an account no less true, though in detail very different, from the one that science affords). The arts are, in short, "... something to know and something we ought to some measure be able to do." Van Doren contends that the knowledge acquired from the study of the fine arts will, and this is the heart of the matter,
... prepare the individual for whatever challenge society confronts him or her with. In addition to which, the trained mind is better able to keep its balance in a bewildering world and enjoy what good it has to offer. Human beings are not free without some real sense of their environment and some power to design their lives; they are prisoners of fear, incompetence, and ignorance — easy prey for the bigot, the exploiter and the tyrant who may at any time appear. A well-schooled population, aware of its human capacities and proud of its human distinction, is the best defense against such evils, indeed the only defense that in the long run has any chance of success. It is for the sake of such chance, and from a belief in its importance — for everybody — that Paideia schooling, in all its aspects, has been conceived.

The evolution of self-realization is the most important of the Paideia School's three lifetime objectives and cannot be achieved unless the fine arts (aesthetics) play a role in education.

Both the Getty and Paideia camps assert that for the majority of people, being able to understand a work of art as an audience member is more critical than being able to produce or understand as a creator. There are two primary reasons for this. The first and most obvious is that few will ever aspire to be creators of any degree of greatness. The second reason for the development of "audience understanding", is that the audience member is the most crucial point in the taxonomy of the three distinct roles in the musical event — composer, performer, listener. Both Percy
Scholes\textsuperscript{15} and Estelle Jorgensen,\textsuperscript{16} as well as Paul Hindemith\textsuperscript{17} and Roger Sessions\textsuperscript{18} stress the importance of the link between the audience as a part of the work of art and the work of art proper. To quote Jorgensen's reflection of Scholes' thought, "Just as composer-performer-listener are distinct roles requiring different musical skills, so they demand different musical education."\textsuperscript{19} It is this final link of audience participation in the creative act which is most often absent from music education. Nearly all public schools stress the performance aspect of the musical arts and many even the compositional (theory), but few and far between the listening. The goal of music educators should not be to make composers or performers out of everyone, or to vicariously develop listening skills through composition and performance, but rather to 
\textit{facilitate musical literacy and listening skills} which may evolve to higher aspirations. "Musical literacy" is defined by Jorgensen in complete harmony with the Paideia Group as "... that minimal level of musical skills which enables an individual to function with musical materials. Specifically the term refers to the intellectual or cognitive as opposed to the emotional or affective elements of appreciation."\textsuperscript{20}

Although researchers and philosophers alike have been battling over the position of the arts in education for centuries, music and its sister arts have yet to obtain the stronghold of the sciences and even the literary arts. It is for this reason that the battle continues here, and advances with a most promising proposition. To the knowledge of this writer, there is but one
writing which even considers the role of music in the Paideia school, that writing being the chapter by John Van Doren in *The Paideia Program*. Entitled "The Fine Arts," the chapter addresses the whole of the Paideia Groups concept of art in education. Due to the comprehensiveness of the chapter, the discussion of any one art is limited. What is to follow is an examination of but one aspect of what the Group suggests should be included as a part of music education — the masterworks class. The specific title "masterworks" in the Paideia arts curriculum outline is applied only to the plastic arts program. Its equivalent in musical studies is given no title and is simply described as one year listening to and discussing good music during grades 6 or 7 to 12. Although still far from comprehensive, the description of the plastic arts masterworks class is more beneficial and can easily be applied to the musical arts situation. The brief description of the masterworks class offered by John Van Doren on behalf the Paideia Group is, "one year's observation and discussion of great works of art, including trips to museums, study of art books, slides etc. [during grades 6 or 7 to 12]." An equivalent definition of the music masterworks class might be: one year's listening to and discussion of great works of music, including listening to live performances as well as recordings and the study of music history and analysis *etcetera* during grades 6 or 7 to 12. Needless to say, the depth at which all of this may be undertaken is dependent upon an endless number of variables, not least of which is at which of the six grade levels the experience is offered. One very feasible
answer to this problem is to have the year of study spread throughout the six years. One quarter of music masterworks might be required in grades 6, 8, 10, and 12 for example.23

The method of developing the proposed pedagogy will entail surveying and applying the writings of those philosophers, aestheticians and musicologists who are predecessors and heirs to the thinking of Oscar Wilde. Wilde suggested that the true aim of education lies in the aesthetic "... and the methods by which education should work are the development of temperament, the cultivation of taste, and the creation of the critical spirit."24 Under the single umbrella motif of aesthetics, the thesis considers the three separate topics of music education, musical taste, and music criticism.

The questions the proposed research will attempt to answer are: How can one validate their reasons for an aesthetic experience?; and to what extent can these experiences be revealed through evaluative criticism? As Gotshalk points out,

Since the essence of criticism is the evaluation of works of art as aesthetic objects according to an appropriate set of standards, the basic problem for a philosophical analysis of art criticism is to determine what the appropriate standards of art criticism are.25

As previously stated, the objective here is not so much to supply a teaching manual as it is to determine a philosophy upon which a sound music criticism pedagogy should be based.
Answering the question: "How does one come to an understanding and value judgement of a musical work of art?"; this writer will suggest that only by objective means is such an ideal possible. The proposed goal for the critical audience member when listening to musical works of art is to "plasticize" them — make them more unchanging, less dependent upon the performer(s).

Each and every presentation of a musical composition is different from that of its last due to the necessary evil of performer intervention. While varying performances may seem like a fault (or at least a drawback of the medium of music), they may sometimes be considered in a positive vein. Performance intervention is one of the many humanizing aspects of music and has been positively exploited in aleatoric compositions. The point to be made, however, is that one can only conclude that musical performance is but a symbol of the work of art. The musical work of art is plastic and the method of realizing that work is inexact. Coming to an understanding of the musical work of art is, then, especially difficult. The only method of ascertaining the correct understanding of a work is objectively, that is, by way of the object itself.

The phrase "correct understanding" is used because it is held that there does ultimately exist the definitive "meaning," or value of every work. The "meaning" may in fact be that there is no "meaning" or that the "meaning" does transform with each individual's viewing, but the work does have a "meaning." Furthermore, it is only upon ascertaining understanding that one
is able to properly formulate individual taste. Taste may (as it certainly does) differ, but taste must also be substantiated.

The recommendation that one is required to substantiate an opinion with objective reasoning may seem quite obvious and most elementary. It seems, however, that in the realm of American public education in general, and more specifically in the studies of music, such inquiry and dialogue is not the practice. The crux of the problem of people not being able, much less competent, in qualifying their thoughts lies in the predicament that people tend to want guidelines or rules controlling their lives.

The attempt will be to elucidate musical works of art by way of a four-tiered process as supported by objective reasoning: 1) describe and determine, 2) analyze, 3) interpret, and 4) judge. The reasoning in support of each step's conclusions are based on Beardsley's three primary canons of unity, complexity, and intensity. It is imperative not only that each of these steps be taken, but that they be taken in order. It must also be noted, that to a certain extent, none of the four steps are mutually exclusive.

Once the philosophical basis for musical aesthetics classes is made clear, and the objective method of criticism to which it leads explained and implemented, no doubt should remain in the readers mind that the establishment of such a class is essential to the education of all. The development of the individual cannot be achieved in full without an aesthetics program. The objective method offers the clearest manner of facilitating criticism in an aesthetics program for individual growth. Only when society
adopts the proposed theory of education will genuine learning occur and reconstruction begin. A catholic adoption of the proposed will all but ensure reconstruction for the individual good and the good of all the world.
CHAPTER 2

SUMMARY OF PAIDEIA PROGRAM

Educational reform: what more could possibly be said on the topic? In recent years it seems as though there has been more written on the topic than ever before. Never before, at least in American educational history, has the topic of educational reform been so much in the minds and actions of the populace. Over the decades, the American public education system has woven an inconceivably complex tapestry of pedagogy. There has been an unimaginable evolution in reference to who should be taught, what they should be taught, and how they should be taught. The citizenry of these United States has sought to reform public education under any conceivable means — from the exclusive education of the male elitist, to the seemingly impossible task of the equal quality and access education of the masses as well as exclusive private education or even, de-schooling; from education for the purpose of rendering the word of God as wrought in the holy scriptures, to schooling for occupation and the fear of communism, to an education for the liberation of the individual and the fulfillment of life. Along with each of these reasons to educate who in what, came reasons for the how. We have indoctrinated by way of rote memorization and lecture as well as
practiced educating by way of free and open dialogue. Where is the system now headed? At what point will the seemingly illogical evolution achieve maturation?

For a growing number of educators, as well as the general public, the evolution of the who, what and how of education has culminated in the theories of a group headed by Mortimer J. Adler — *The Paideia Group*. The basis from which The Paideia Group draws it's philosophy is succinctly stated in the third book of their trilogy, *The Paideia Program*.

>The basic pedagogical precept of the Paideia Program is that all genuine learning arises from the activity of the learner's own mind.

>Activity of the mind is occasioned or initiated by wonder, sustained by interest and excitement, and reinforced by the pleasure inherent in the activity itself and by delight in its success.2

>... the art of teaching is to hold and sustain attention, so as to give the pleasure of discovery and the delight of learning.3

The Paideia Group is most exacting in achieving a goal statement definition of education while allowing considerable space for variants. As also stated in book three, "The Paideia Program seeks to establish a course of study that is general, not specialized; liberal, not vocational; humanistic, not technical."4
Such an education has three direct goals and three primary methods by which to ascertain the objective of a properly educated individual.

The first goal of a Paideia Education, and unquestionably the most important and self-evident right of all persons, is that of self-improvement. Self-improvement, according to the Paideia Group's theory, is manifested in three forms: mental, moral, and spiritual. The second goal concerns the role of the self-improved individual's role as it relates to the society at large — the individual as an enfranchised citizen. The goal of education for occupation is last, and most emphatically, the least important in the Paideia school.

In more concrete terms, The Paideia Group mandates that a Paideia graduate will be able to:

1) understand a moderately complicated essay;
2) write clear and concise expository prose;
3) perform reasonably complicated mathematical operations;
4) sort out issues;
5) solve various types of problems;
6) think through and evaluate an argument;
7) formulate and deliver a persuasive argument;
8) listen and respond to a speech.

The three primary methods of accomplishing the said goals of a Paideia Education are presented by the Group as the three ways in which the mind can be improved — didactic instruction, coaching, and dialogue. Since a student's mind can be improved by
each of these methods, the Paideia Group expects that ". . . every teacher should be competent and comfortable in all three modes of teaching."7 As an introduction to each of the facilitating methods, consider the following brief descriptions and implementation suggestions.

"Didactic instruction," states Adler, "is either written or oral, addresses either to the eyes of the readers or the ears of the listeners."8 The most common tools of the didactic teaching method are the lecture and textbook. The goal of such instruction is the acquisition of organized knowledge — "factual" information. Because little one-on-one contact is required in didactic instruction, classes may be large. The Paideia Group suggests that the ideal class size is 35-40 or even larger.9 "[T]he chief difficulty of didactic instruction," Adler warns, "is to make it the cause of active learning."10

Recommendations for didactic instruction in the oral form offered by The Paideia Group include:

1) elicit active listening;
2) instructive speech must have a rhetorical as well as a logical dimension;
3) elicit lively interest;
4) teachers must find the middle ground and try to avoid:
   a) talking over the students' heads;
   b) talking down to the students.
5) The question and answer period should always be two-way discussion;
6) inform the students as to what they can expect to learn and why;
7) less is more — less may be covered, but more will have been learned.11

The didactic teacher's greatest role is oral instruction, which is intended to supplement and enhance the information ascertained by the student from either lecture or reading.12 The key to successful didactic instruction, and the only way this mode of instruction will be effective, is if students learn to read and listen actively.

Due to the simple fact that every skill, art, or technique consists of knowing *how*, the coaching mode of instruction is required.13 Coaching is the practice and development of intellectual skills. "The emphasis in a coaching situation," states Adler, "is on the student getting his ideas to work accurately and then practicing the skill."14 Coaching, then, is ". . . teaching by supervising performances to attain skills (for every skill is acquired by habit formation, and good habits, which skills are, result from repeated acts under the guidance of a seasoned performer who is a coach)."15

The essential conditions recommended by The Paideia Group in order to coach effectively are:

1) the teacher must know the students on a one-to-one basis;
   a) one-to-one individual tutoring;
   b) arrange the class and environment accordingly;
2) teacher model — the teacher coaches himself in public;
3) student to student coaching;
4) computer assisted instruction;
5) group coaching.
6) the material used is the student's own;
7) immediacy is crucial;
8) shrewd criticism is essential;
9) drill is necessary.  

Given this definition and list of recommendations for coaching, it is obvious that class sizes must be small. Ideally, the class size for coaching instruction should be 5-10 : 1.  

The goal of teaching by way of Socratic dialogue is the enlargement of understanding, insight, and aesthetic appreciation. In short, Socratic or "maieutic" (which denotes midwifery — bringing [ideas] to birth) dialogue is teaching by asking or questioning — not lecturing or coaching. Socratic teaching is most effectively done during seminars in which students engage in free discussion that is kept on track by a leader. The ideal class size for this pedagogy is 15-25 : 1-2. The materials discussed in this educational setting should be either books (books that are not textbooks) or productions of quality in other fields of art and thought. In the end, the goal of Socratic instruction is to bring out, clarify, and make clear that which is in question.  

The task of the leader or moderator in a Socratic dialogue seminar is threefold:
1) to give the discussion direction through asking questions that define the objective;
2) to examine or query the answers by trying to draw out the reasons for them or the implications they have;
3) to engage the participants in two-way dialogue to resolve conflict.

Through such discussion, students will become aware of the *whys* and *wherefores* of the subject matter.

Although neither the didactic instruction or coaching methods of educational facilitation should be neglected, Socratic dialogue does seem to be most beneficial. The reason the Socratic method is advantageous, as the Paideia Group sees it, is that information consumed through dialogue is most apt to be durable. The Paideia Group states that,

The Paideia Program aims at a degree of mastery in all subject and skills that is proportionate to the capacity of each individual student. A Paideia school will be therefore *less* ambitious about comprehensive coverage and *more* ambitious about every student's active engagement in learning.

Of all three kinds of learning, [Socratic] is the most durable. More than that, it is also *unconditionally* durable. Unlike verbal memories, something understood does not need to be exercised in order to be retained. This, then, is the kind of learning that lasts a lifetime and is of the greatest importance in the use of our minds and the conduct of our lives.
The curriculum outline for a Paideia school as suggested by Adler, et al., is comprehensive. The curriculum plan is not, however, comprised of electives. "All sidetracks, specialized courses, or elective choices must be eliminated," mandates Adler and the group. The reasoning for this is twofold. First, the group believes that "To give the same quality of schooling to all requires a program of study that is both liberal and general, and that is, in several, crucial, overarching respects, one and the same for every child." Secondly, it is feared that by allowing electives, a certain number of students will be led to voluntarily downgrade their own education. The only exception to this rule is the option to study a second language. The Paideia curriculum will, therefore, be comprised of:

- English (language and literature)
- Mathematics
- Science
- History
- Social Studies
- The Fine Arts
- The Manual Arts
- "Career Education"
- Physical Education
- Foreign Language

Figure 1 summarizes the curriculum and pedagogy of the Paideia program.
Fig. 1. Three Column Summary of the Paideia Program. Adapted from Mortimer J. Adler (on behalf of the members of the Paideia Group). *The Paideia Proposal: An Educational manifesto* (New York; Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1982), 23.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COLUMN ONE</th>
<th>COLUMN TWO</th>
<th>COLUMN THREE</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goals</strong></td>
<td>Acquisition of organized knowledge</td>
<td>Development of intellectual skills -skills of learning</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>by means of Didactic Instruction</td>
<td>by means of Coaching and Practice</td>
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<td></td>
<td>in three subject-matter</td>
<td>in the operations of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Areas, Operations and Activities</strong></td>
<td>Language, Fine Arts, Literature, Math, Science, History, Social Studies, Geography</td>
<td>Reading, Writing, Speaking, Listening, Calculating, Problem-solving Critical judgement</td>
</tr>
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The arts are of such great importance to the goals of the Paideia Program that they are directly involved in columns one and three of the curriculum and pedagogy framework columns, and strongly implied and applicable to the second column (reading, writing, speaking, and listening, as well as critical judgement are
all involved in the arts). Due to the arts playing such a strong role in the creed of the Paideia Group, the curriculum outline for arts education includes classes for both the practice and appreciation of all art forms for all students. The reason for this is simple: understanding is only possible through a combination of the practical experience and intellectual study. The scheme of the Paideia fine arts program presented by John Van Doren in book three is as follows.

Fig. 2. Schemata of Paideia Fine Arts Curriculum. Mortimer J. Adler (on behalf of the members of the Paideia Group). The Paideia Program: An Educational Syllabus (New York; Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1982), 146-147.

Grades K to 5 or 6

Music                      group singing and recorder playing;
Dramatics                  class plays; reading and production;
Dance                      rhythmic movement, simple exercises, folk dancing;
Drawing/Painting           both informal, but using as good as materials as possible;
Modeling                   objects in Plasticine or clay pottery;
Crafts

simple things of wood or other convenient material, textile, etc.

**Grades 6 or 7 to 12**

Music
two years, one of chorus, one of listening to and discussing good music;

Drama & Dance
a half year to each, ending in one substantial play, one group dance for the grade peers;

Drawing/Painting
one year of composition and design, with basic instruction in colors;

Modeling & Crafts
one year ending with an exhibit of some work by each child;

Masterworks
one year's observation and discussion of great works of art, including trips to museums, study of art books, slides, etc.

When all is said and done, the Paideia theory proposes an education system that will assist the individual in living the fullest and happiest life possible. A chief means of ascertaining this extraordinary goal is by way of aesthetic education. The making
of a good human life for oneself is the most important of the Paideia Program's three lifetime objectives and cannot be achieved unless the fine arts are emphasized.
CHAPTER 3

RECONSTRUCTIONISM IN EDUCATION

As previously noted, inherent within the Paideia Group's educational reform proposition is the theory of reconstructionism. Although the term "reconstruction" has been utilized to label various trends in all aspects of life, the word has a definite denotation in the realm of American education. With its most well known proponents being George S. Counts and later Theodore Brameld, reconstructionism is perhaps best, although rather detrimentally, categorized as leftist. Reconstructionism is an ever regenerating renaissance of thought. The philosophy of reconstructionism is renewed with every moment it is practiced. Reconstructionism is the old in a state of perpetual evolution — a neo-classical rejuvenation. The philosophical theories of reconstructionism are, therefore, rather eclectic and have fluctuated in supporters over the years. For this reason, a steadfast credo is difficult to deduce. Nonetheless, the following is offered as an explanation of the reconstructionist philosophy.

"We must," to reiterate Montessori's words quoted earlier, "have faith in the child as a messiah, as a savior capable of regenerating the human race and society."¹ In this statement, Montessori presents the basic premise of the reconstructionist in education — the future of a species and its society lies in the
offspring. Such an orientation toward the future for the attainment of the long term cultural goal is at the heart of reconstructionism. While reconstructionism is an "utopianistic" philosophy, it does not connote, as Brameld points out, a flight from reality into realms of totally unrealizable, fantastic perfection. The vision of utopianism, is rather, an expectable one — a vision of what can be and should be attained in order that man may be happier, more rational, more humane than he has ever been.2

The more than obvious question is: How is this utopia obtained? For the educational reconstructionist, the answer is simple — educate the children for utopia. As Montessori suggests, however,

An education capable of saving humanity is no small undertaking; it involves the spiritual development of man, the enhancement of his value as an individual, and the preparation of young people to understand the times in which they live.3

Man must be educated to realize his greatness and to become worthy of the powers that are his.4

Education points the way to a new world to conquer: the world of the human spirit.5

From Aristotle to Adler, this underlying goal of the development of the individual has, in basic principle, been understood and desired. That an education is the process by which men are able to
achieve happiness is, by and large accepted. As defined by Adler, "... education is a process which aims at the improvement or better-ment of men, in themselves and in relation to society." An education should guide the evolving dynamism through which man forms himself by way of knowledge and wisdom, good will and love, the stimulation of the will and feelings, and by allowing to form an individual character. Education is not meant to shape the will and directly to develop moral virtues, but to enlighten and strengthen reason, in this way preparing a good citizen and a man of civilization. These concerns include the intellectual, moral, and spiritual strengths of the people which knit together the very fabric of society. The ultimate goal is to achieve the highest good by creating a polis that is true to the best of which human beings are capable. As Maritain would profess, the goal of education is to realize human potential. In this way, the education system will be facilitating man in preparation for a self-sufficient adult life; an understanding of the world outside and within himself and a sense of control over it; a source of satisfaction of visceral, sensual and spiritual desires; options for a variety in life as some hope for escaping boredom, and encouragement in the face of ultimate darkness. In sum, the goal of education might best be stated as by the Paideia Group's reflection of Dewey's philosophy.

All the children . . . are destined for leisure and learning as well as for labor. All have the same three elements in their futures: the demands of work, the duties of citizenship, and the obligation of each individual to
make the most of [themselves] that [their] capacities allow — to lead rich and fulfilling lives. Their treatment in school should be such that it serves these three fundamentals purposes for all.11

According to Adler, education is for leisure activity satisfaction such as thinking and learning, reading and writing, conversation and correspondence, love and acts of friendship, and political, domestic, artistic, and aesthetic activity; it is general in character; it is for an intrinsic, not an extrinsic, end; and it is for the education of free men.12 These points are the essentials of life and thus the essentials of education. The ideal professed by the reconstructionist lies in the development of aesthetic perfection attained by human freedom and creative experiment. The full and harmonious development of all faculties, corporeal and mental, intellectual and moral, of citizens permits the harmonious, orderly, stable, unified society to manifest itself.13

Implied in the preceding discussion are the four basic points Pratte claims constitute the basic principles of reconstructionism. It is with respect to these points that the direct correspondence of the Paideia Group to reconstructionism can be easily drawn. The first point considers curriculum. In a school based on the reconstruction philosophy, students pursue a wide range of subjects with the central purpose of defining goals and the means of achieving them. The second point considers the role of the teacher. In a school of reconstruction, the teacher might better be referred to in Deweyian terms — as a facilitator. The "teacher's"
primary task is to act as discussion leader. The "teacher" must act as a participant within the group. The position is one of leadership, but still a member of the whole. The third and fourth basic principles concern the student. The third point is the insistence that the students develop methods of criticism — evaluating alternatives, clarifying values and priorities. The final basic principle is the primary point: the students must be enlightened to reconstructionism.14

Three points of clarification as to how a societal reconstruction is to occur through public education require mention. First, reconstructionism does not require a new beginning. The philosophy aims at a "re" construction, not a whole new construction. The reconstructionist does not denounce all that is and has been but grows out of the past. In fact, the past is the life blood of the philosophy of reconstructionism. Acknowledging that problems do exist, the reconstructionist accepts his imperfection and strives to overcome them. Most simply stated, the reconstructionist is a reformer — a concerned citizen — not a radical.15

A second point clarifying the implementation of reconstructionism is that it does not have to advocate the overthrow of present systems. Instead, reconstructionism encourages the evolution of systems. It is perfectly feasible, and unquestionably preferable, for societal reconstruction to be a metamorphosis in accordance with the democratic charter.
The democratic technique assumes gradualism as its procedure in social change. For if fundamental social change is urgent, if a legal majority is a pre-requisite to the realization of social change, if the building and organization of a majority opinion is in favor of fundamental social change is most unlikely to be realized within the near future, and if these changes cannot possibly be brought about in the absence of a legal majority in its favor, gradualism remains the only logical way out. If social change must result only from cooperative effort brought about by means of education, such change must inevitably be evolutionary. Education is an instrument which functions in an evolutionary manner and which repeatedly calls for compromise if it is to be at all functional and forward-moving. Thus, until an organized majority opinion in favor of fundamental social change is attained, social change must, according to the proponents of this technique, be piecemeal and gradual, and accomplished by means of collaboration and compromise with the dominant economic class.16

As stated succinctly by Kohl, "We have to live and struggle, win allies, and educate people before a whole society is willing to risk changing."17

The final, and perhaps most important point of clarification, is in reflection of Montessori’s "the child as messiah" theory. Kohl refers to such notions as the "pacifist fallacy." "We cannot," he mandates,

... give our children the responsibility for redeeming the world we either messed up or at least witnessed being destroyed.
We can hope that our children and our students will take up our struggles, but it is we, the adults, that have to be actively involved in the struggles and taking the risk if anything is to happen. I think the idea that the pupils of today's schools, as the citizens of tomorrow, will change society is part of what could be called the "pacifist fallacy."\(^{18}\)

It might appear Kohl's statement is backing down from the reconstructionist's original intention of the young changing society — not so. The philosophy maintains that the school is the agent for change. The school is comprised not only of students (the young messiahs), but also of teachers (the old prophets). As the future is born, moment by moment, it will in fact be the young realizing the "harmonious, orderly, stable, unified society," but the teacher must act as a catalyst. It is the teacher, insist Counts, that must become a social force of some magnitude.\(^{19}\) If the schools are to be really effective, they must become centers for the building, and not merely for the contemplation, of our civilization.\(^{20}\)
CHAPTER 4

MUSIC IN THE HIERARCHY OF ART

In the preceding chapters, the philosophies of the Paideia Group and reconstructionism have been explicated. The essential point of the preceding is how the two seemingly polar opposite philosophies of education are united. What follows is an explanation of the role of music in this unique union.

The fact that much of what is now considered music at one time would have been considered nothing more than noise, is proof that music has no clearly definable element which makes it what it is. Langer suggests that, "... all the arts are really just one "Art" with a capital A ...."\(^1\); and "where no more distinctions can be found among the several arts, there lies their unity."\(^2\)

Although that one quality which all works of art possess has yet to be delineated, it is possible to offer an acceptable definition. What this chapter seeks to accomplish is two things: first, art defined as consisting of a hierarchy of values; and secondly, music defined as to its position in the hierarchy of art.

The method to be implemented in deriving a definition of "work of art" is of the utmost importance if a worthy definition is to be ascertained. The process of delineating the method of defining art demands caution. The first concern is that the
definition offered should not merely be an over-simplified account of how the phrase "work of art" is used. Secondly, the suggested definition should not be so vague that it is of no help in coming to an understanding of the concept. The only reasonable method left is defining art as a phenomenon. The acceptance of this position offers not only a method of defining art, but also defines the first aspect of a work of art.

"Phenomenon," as used here, denotes an unusual or extraordinary thing, or occurrence, experienced by the senses that can be described and appraised. The manner in which an ordinary thing or occurrence becomes extra-ordinary is through manipulation. The three prime aspects of a work of art are, therefore, materials, process, and product. The materials are the ordinary thing or occurrence; the process is the manipulation of the ordinary; and the product is the extra-ordinary thing or occurrence experienced. The mandate that a phenomenon must be experienced, described, and appraised must not be forgotten, however. This is not to suggest that the laws of conservation are denied and the art object ceases to exist when not in view, but that the work is somehow incomplete. Art requires perception. Be it for one fleeting moment with only its creator as audience, or preserved on a museum wall for all of time, art addresses the senses and must, therefore, be directly experienced by an audience.

The evolution of art as portrayed above leads directly to the consideration of content-matter — that which is portrayed by
the extra-ordinary thing or occurrence. There are two types of content-matter. If an object is actually perceptible, the content type is manifest. The second type — when the general significance is not directly perceived — is called latent. These two points call attention to the fact that a work of art accomplishes one of four things:

1) It presents reality in a perceptible manner;
2) It presents reality in an abstract manner;
3) It presents non-reality in a perceptible manner;
4) It presents non-reality in an abstract manner.

Having clarified the methods of manipulating content, it may be further suggested that one can define a work of art as an object deliberately designed, or used as such, to be an object of aesthetic attention. Mundane objects and subjects may not seem suitable for the elevation to the status of high art; nevertheless, depending upon the perception of artist and audience even the mundane may be regarded as art. This definition of art introduces the concept of aesthetic attention or experience. It is with this concept of aesthetic attention that the fine tuning of the total picture of separating non-art from art takes place. In short, art demands sensitive perception and non-art does not.

For the full and proper experience of a work of art to occur, one must free perception from any ordinary classification and allow the perceived to bear a world of its own. One must become "disinterested" and "detached," meeting the work without any
preconceived notions or expectations. Expectations demand satisfaction, and in line with Tormey's thinking, this places unnecessary and "inhumane" restrictions on the art object.³ Works of art have a life of their own and should not be prejudged. The work of art must be judged for what it is, and not for what an individual hoped it to be.

Inherent in such "self-denial" approaches to art are two types of experience: logical and emotional. The logical experience (a conscious state) must act in co-operation with the emotional experience (an intuitive state) if the full and proper aesthetic experience is to be ascertained. As Blocker points out, "Ideally, everything you learn through logic eventually becomes intuitive, enriching aesthetic experience."⁴ When considered in this way, the ultimate aesthetic experience is autonomous (stressing the internal character of a work) rather than heteronomous (stressing external factors). When the experience is functioning freely, each order articulates the next lower order and therefore leads to the ultimate direct perception of the art work. The illustrations below may aid the comprehension of the interconnectedness and mutual enrichment of the logical and emotional roles in the proper aesthetic experience.
The objective side of defining art and art criticism, which reciprocally gives rise to the subjective, is based on the principle of hierarchy. The hierarchy of art styles and mediums is cyclic and consists of four levels. The fundamental premise is that the more abstract the work, style and medium, the better. The least of art styles, therefore, is imitationism, with the highest level being that of non-objective expressionism. In between lie the
levels of total abstraction (non-objective or non-representation) and objective expressionism. Music, save examples such as musique concrète, being a highly abstract medium, is rated highly. Non-programmatic music, which is completely devoid of any representational element or based on conventions, is rated as most high.

The hierarchy of art styles will be properly understood only after two major points are addressed: 1) resemblance versus imitation; and 2) the content, form, subject matter trichotomy. Along with these two points is the over-riding yet companion concern of objective and subjective perception. Yet, prior to developing either of these two points, one must first consider what is being perceived and imitated — reality. Realism, however, is culturally subjective. As Blocker points out, "The [arts] of a given society [are perceived as] realistic to that society not because they are realistic, but because they conform to the conventions which that society has adopted for depicting realism."5 This point must be realized by the audience so that a non-domestic work is not mistaken as fictitious and deprived of its appropriate meaning.

Although most cases of successful imitation involve, or presuppose, some sort of resemblance, imitation is not the same as resemblance. The sole objective in imitation is to create a replica; the product is to look exactly like the thing being perceived. To imitate is an accomplishment and is, therefore, judged as either a success or a failure. The ideal is for the viewer
to be fooled and then discover that one was fooled. The artist adds nothing, he merely mirrors the world. Resemblance, on the other hand, is perhaps most simply stated as a symmetrical relation. The subject and the art work hold similar characteristics but do not mirror one another. The artist's concern is not to duplicate reality, but to represent certain aspects of reality as perceived from their particular standpoint. The aim is to translate, not transcribe; transpose, not copy. In one-word definitions, imitation is heteronomous while resemblance is autonomous.

The second point to be understood if the hierarchy of art is to be comprehended is the content, form, subject matter trichotomy. Within an aesthetic experience of art, the perceiver is aware of two things: content (the object revealed) and form (the manner in which the object has been rendered). The precondition of the aforementioned is subject matter — the object outside the work; the model for either an imitative or resemblance rendering. What these points of content, form, and subject matter funnel down to is the supposition of "vision" being more than a "retinal image". "Vision," in any art form — audio or visual — must be understood in the full sense. Perception is a composite experience of both the objective (what is actually presented), and the subjective (what the viewer makes of what is actually presented). This concept of objective versus subjective perception is perfectly illustrated by Blocker when considering the differences of imitationism and expressionism.
While imitationist theories try to account for art in terms of the external, objective world imitated in works of art, expressionist theories direct attention to the inner, subjective world of human emotions, feelings, and sentiments.

The primary objective of the expressionist is a transformation of emotion. Art, for the expressionist, is not merely a mirror of reality or even a representation of the world; but is the "incarnation" of some feeling, emotion, or concept which has the power to induce the same feeling in the minds of the audience. The primary difference between imitationism and expressionism is congruent to that of art in general and life. Both contain emotive, aesthetic elements, but in art, the meaning becomes focused and clear — understanding is sharpened.

With the fundamentals of the hierarchy outlined, it is now possible to return to the central focus of deliberation. The reasons for a hierarchy in art can most simply be explained by defining each according to two criteria: 1) what is achieved; and 2) what is offered. Working from the lowest of the styles and mediums to those truly deserving of the title art, the case is plain.

Imitation is placed at the lowest rung of the ladder due to it achieving and offering the least. A mirror achieves what imitation sets out to do, and, without doubt, does it better. The ability to copy a subject is an art, but it does not achieve art. One must be aware that there is a great difference between the art of doing, and producing art. Although imitation may be the goal of
the artist, in reality it rarely (if ever) exists. Even in photography, the subject is changed (intentionally or not) when it becomes content. Imitation, it follows, is primarily a theory. In practice, what is achieved is resemblance. As for what the work of imitation offers, one can only conclude that it offers nothing that the subject does not offer and, therefore, is worth nothing more. In fact, due to it being a "cheap imitation," it is worth far less. Of course, one could argue that the great achievement of imitation is that it focuses attention.

Objective-expressionism goes one step beyond imitation. While objective-expressionism resembles "reality," it does not duplicate it. The goal for the objective-expressionist is to create a new view of a subject and thus offer a new view of the reality.

The remaining two styles of art to be defined and placed into the hierarchy are non-objective expressionism and total abstraction (non-objective and non-representational). First, total abstraction. It is with this style of art that the cyclic hierarchy is required. The point which has given rise to the whole of this chapter is that the more abstract the work (the more the content is removed from the subject — reality) the better. There is, however, a twist in this theory. The twist states that that which is didactic is ranked higher than that which is not. In short, that which offers something (a "lesson") is better than that which does not. Here, the terms didactic and lesson must not be misconstrued. These terms do not imply morality. Art may be "immoral." The analogy which may be best suited as
explanation of this concept is that art acts a dream. "A dream," states Jung,

never says: "You ought," or: "This is the truth." It presents an image in much the same way as nature allows a plant to grow, and we must draw our own conclusions. [We perceive meaning in a subtle way] when we are able to let the work of art act upon us as it acted upon the artist. To grasp its meaning we must allow it to shape us as it shaped him.

Although the following additional analogy may seem dehumanizing, and perhaps even bigoted, the parallels are obvious. The correspondence between the following analogy and the philosophy of reconstruction is obvious and essential to the comprehensive comprehension of this writing. The person who merely exists in society, contributing nothing to its welfare, is not worth as much as one who is actively striving to contribute all they can for the better of the group at large. The aspect of the total abstraction which allows it to be placed high on the ladder of art styles is that a work which is unique is brought into existence. Furthermore, just because the work does not "teach a lesson" does not mean that it does not offer something. What is offered is a new environment. One may be forced to ask: "Does imitation not do this?" The proper response to such a question is no. Imitation offers a displaced environment of conventions, not a newly created environment.
As for the ranking of the non-objective expressionist style of art being placed at the highest rank of the hierarchy, one should be able to deduce the reasoning from what has been previously stated. In this style of art, the artist is able to "teach" by way of a unique object. Because both of the criteria of ranking art are fulfilled, it is the non-objective expressionist style which is the only true art.

As a final note to the hierarchy of art styles and mediums, it should be mentioned that the four styles and mediums do not necessarily dictate the manner in which they should be experienced. It is quite possible, and in accordance with this writing desirable, to view an imitative work, for example, as objective expressionism or even total abstraction. This observation is drawn from a underlying concept presented throughout this chapter. It was noted that reality is inculturated or perhaps even completely individualized; if this is the case, then what is imitation for one person may not be for the next. Following this logic, the reality non-reality in combination with degrees of abstraction are obscured and perhaps even canceled out. It can be concluded, therefore, that the perception of a work is a part of its creation and thus a part of the work. The perceiver makes the work what it is by becoming a co-creator. It is only at this point that the work is experienced as an autonomous object, complete in itself, devoid of any heteronomous implications. This is the goal of the objective method of criticism to be investigated, and when made
obtainable, the sign of a true work of art.

As soon as people are educated to, and accept the notion that, the abstract is the greatest of all art, they will begin to innately react accordingly. Why the abstract is the highest of all the styles of art can be summarized in answering the question of why produce the abstract. The artist, according to Martin, employs

\ldots the principle of abstraction, the principle by which the essential qualities of an object or an experience or a concept could be abstracted from the mass of irrelevancies surrounding it and given more value than nature itself had given them. He is not mutilating outward reality; he is creating a new and independent object known as a work of art, an expression of his mind, in which he uses certain aspects of outward reality merely as a base of supplies.9

Paraphrasing Martin so as to reveal the heart of the matter, the point is: When, and only when, a subject is given more value than nature itself had given it, is it transformed to a new and independent object and a work of art is created. Langer agrees that, "All genuine art is abstract."10 Due to the abstract nature of the medium, aside from consideration of any particular employment of the medium, it can be concluded that the art of music is one of, if not the, highest form of art.
CHAPTER 5

THE LISTENER AS CRITIC

"We are frequently reminded and correctly told that one of the most precious privileges of a democratic state is the right to self-criticism. If we care, then, about the preservation of that democracy, our first duty is to discover how this right is, in fact, exercised."¹ These opening lines from Auden's 1941 article entitled "Criticism in a Mass Society," point directly to the problem of aesthetics — at least for aesthetics in a democracy. Auden continues, "... the great majority [of people] prefer opinion to knowledge, and passively allow the former to be imposed upon by a centralized few..."² Such a state of affairs is unhealthy in a democracy.

The same dilemma described by Auden may be said to exist in the democratic art world as well. As remedy for this undesirable condition, an education for music criticism is proposed. Harkening back to Plato, it is held that training in music criticism is a more potent instrument than any other to awaken the critical spirit in all facets of life.³ The method towards achieving the goal of music criticism education is aesthetic inquiry. Before discussing the method in detail, however, it is first necessary to consider what a music critic and
the act of music criticism should be.

As in so many other areas of life, there are essentially two types of critics: the professional and the lay. The difference between the professional and the lay critical response to art is one of degree rather than kind. Ideally, the professional critic differs from the layman merely in possessing greater artistic sensitivity, a more accurate and a richer historical orientation, and a capacity for more objective judicial appraisal. Likewise, according to Dahlhaus, there exist two kinds of aesthetics. Dahlhaus refers to the first type as being concerned with sensuous judgement, and the second as a scientific process. On the surface, the first of these may be equated with the lay critic, and the latter with the professional; but Dahlhaus states further that "... esthetic ideas form no hierarchical system, but rather coexist, heterogeneous and irreducible." This concept recalls the professional versus lay dichotomy suggesting, that these viewpoints are both required for a critic to properly function. What really separates the lay from the professional on this matter then is not the type of approach utilized, but the ability of the critic to employ both in discriminating lesser art works from greater art works.

Before critics are able to perform their duty, the object of subjection must be known; in this case, what constitutes art in music. In other words, just as one cannot judge a piece of furniture a good or bad chair when it is not a chair, one cannot judge music until they know what constitutes music. How could
one possibly suggest that an object is lacking in quality when the object has yet to be identified? The case is that one cannot properly determine the merits of music unless one is able to recognize music. Greene is in agreement that in order to perform the task of criticism, one must know what objects to investigate. "But how," she continues,

prior to critical analysis and evaluation, can [one] know what it is that makes an object a work of art? However paradoxical it may appear, it is the critic and the thoughtful art-lover who "make" objects "works of art" by deciding that they possess the requisite quality to merit inclusion in this class. Such recognition of artistic quality presupposes critical competence. . . . . . . how can he start his investigation without any critical knowledge of what it is that he is to investigate? 7

According to Greene, then, music is whatever one wishes to call music — given that it deals with the use of sound. But also implied in Greene's remark is the less troublesome question of: what should a critic know; or what are the characteristics of a good critic? In The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians, Dean suggests that before one is able to give criticism, there are eight qualifications which must be possessed.
1. A knowledge of the technical and theoretical principals of the subject matter;
2. A knowledge of history and scholarship of the subject matter;
3. A wide general education;
4. The ability to think straight and to write in a clear and stimulating manner;
5. An insight into the workings of the creative imagination;
6. An integrated philosophy of life;
7. An enduring inquisitiveness and willingness to learn;
8. An acceptance of his own limitations, individual and generic.

In a much broader concept of criticism, yet still in alliance with the democratic constitution set by Auden and Greene, Subotnik states that,

... criticism is an activity primarily concerned with the interpretation of meaning and, as such, depends heavily on the exercise of individual discretion for both its practice and its interpretation.

Criticism is, in fact, as many noted philosophers since Schlegel have observed, an essentially aesthetic undertaking, a counterpart to the work of art itself.

... expertise in criticism consists not in the mastery of any body of facts but in the refinement of an unquantifiable sensibility. The domain of criticism, moreover, is huge, potentially encompassing all of human experience and thought, for there is scarcely a culture, or discipline, or body of artifacts from
which the conscientious critic cannot derive means for refining his sensibility further. Mastering even a small portion of such a domain is quite obviously the work of a lifetime. . . .9

Gardner further clarifies what is expected of a critic mandating, "The kind of [knowledge] that is essential is merely sufficient immersion so that one can intuit how the medium is employed and discriminate between better and poorer exploitation of it."10 For Kerman, the intuitiveness is, or should be, so strong that "the distinction between 'objective' fact-digging and 'subjective' interpretation cannot in fact be sharply maintained."11 Kerman's definition of criticism further pleads for the proper balance of intellect and emotion. According to Kerman, criticism is "... the way of looking at art that tries to take into account the meaning it conveys, the pleasure it initiates, and the value it assumes, for us today. Criticism deals with ... fact and feeling ..."12 Gardner is somewhat more rigid than Kerman with his position on the role of fact and feeling.

Whereas feeling plays a constitutive role in the ... discerning of affect in aesthetic objects, the feeling system may be to some extent antagonistic to the scientific process. The scientist must be wary of his unsupported feelings and of the convincing but erroneous explanation, and must apply a cold and clinical eye to whatever properties or ideas he produces. . . . . The critic is thus placed in a delicate intermediary position. He must be detached from aesthetic objects while remaining sensitive to the variegated components of the aesthetic
communication. To the extent that the scientist-critic overemphasizes this detachment from objects, he may cease to be a relevant commentator in the arts.  

Thus, in line with Boethius and the later concepts of the Middle Ages of *musica speculativa* (the intellectual activities of music) and *musica practica* (the composing and performance of music), the critic must balance the intellect and sensual aspects of music. According to Boethius, the critic is the true musician he alone possesses the ability to judge. As stated in his *De institutione musica*,

... there are three classes concerned with the musical art. One class has to do with instruments [performer], another invents songs [composer], a third judges the work of instruments and song [critic]. But that class which is dedicated to instruments and there consumes its entire efforts... are separated from the intellect of musical science, since they are servants... nor do they bear anything of reason, being wholly destitute of speculation. The second class having to do with music is that of the poets, which is borne to song not so much by speculation and reason as by certain natural instinct. Thus this class also is to be separated from music. The third is that which assumes the skill of judging, so that it weighs... the whole of [music]. And seeing that the whole is founded in reason and speculation, this class is rightly reckoned as musical, and that man as a musician who possesses the faculty of judging, according to speculation or reason, appropriate and suitable to music...
The conclusion Boethius draws is unpretentious: if audience members are to fully appreciate a work, they must be able to subjectively experience feelings in relationship to the objective perception of the art object as well as objectively experience feelings in relation to subjective perceptions. Calvocoressi is firm in stating his view concerning matters of balancing roles. "So long as emotions, mind, and imagination agree," he purports,

the difficulties are reduced to a minimum. It is when a conflict arises that trouble begins. It may also have occurred, without one being aware of it, that either the mind or the imagination has failed to take part in the critical operation. This is inexpedient.

It is here that the critical operation proper begins.15

Calvocoressi's point of departure for this stance is derived from his belief that overemphasis on any precondition limits one's capacity for understanding. The ultimate objective is, he claims, "... the acquisition of that clear-sightedness, discipline, and freedom of outlook which will enable [one] to judge and enjoy musical works on their purely musical merits."16

In an essay entitled "The Name and Nature of Criticism," Beardsley contrasts two types of criticism related to the role of "fact and feeling" in the comprehension of music. Aesthetic criticism, on the one hand, is concerned with considering the
work with respect to the potential experience it offers. Cognitive criticism, by contrast, considers "... how good a work is as a bearer of knowledge or a source of insight..."17 Although Beardsley does suggest that a broad concept of criticism may include both the aesthetic and cognitive, he is not willing to let the matter be settled that easily. To quote Beardsley,

In so far as all ... works are aesthetically criticizable, but some are not cognitively criticizable because they contain no explicit general reflections about human nature or society or the universe, it seems that aesthetic criticism has a certain priority in ... criticism. And in so far as sound cognitive criticism of ... works presupposes that some aesthetic criticism has been done, that the work has been understood, aesthetic criticism seems again to be the more fundamental kind. A critic who give us aesthetic criticism of a work ... is recognizably doing his job, even if he is unable or unwilling to give us any cognitive criticism; but one who discourses on ... works and never gives us aesthetic criticism, but is solely concerned with the truth or falsity, verifiability or unverifiability, probability or improbability, of their implicit ideas, may be performing a very useful social function, but it is that of a philosopher or a social commentator, or preacher, or politician.18

Lanier points out, however, that there exist a series of nine "screens" which obscure the vision of a work of art. Comprised of matters concerning the observer's social attitude, cultural view, perceptual skills, recognition of qualities, knowledge of symbols, associations, historical identification, judgements, and relation of the work to life, these screens — factors influencing responses to
art—make the task of direct aesthetic criticism as Beardsley suggests extremely difficult.

Fig. 4. Factors Influencing Responses To Art. Adapted from Vincent Lanier "Talking About Art: An Experimental Course in High School Art Appreciation," *Studies In Art Education*, 9 (Spring 1968), 39.

Jorgensen is more precise concerning the effect external forces may have on one's understanding of a work. Working from a set of assumptions, Jorgensen presents a mathematical type of equation to formulate one's individual understanding, or in her terms (as borrowed from Scholes), appreciation of a work. The given is that the ability to appreciate art varies from
individual to individual. Consequently, it is assumed further that,

\[ \ldots \text{the ability to appreciate music at any given time (A_t) varies as a function of the "musical aptitude" level (MA), the intelligence level (I), the acquired taste in musical preference (P), the music being listened to (M_t), the emotional-psychological-physical state of the person before listening (S_{t-1}), and the environment in which the music is being listened to (N_t). This may then be summarized as follows: } A_t \propto f(MA, I, P, M_t, S_{t-1}, N_t) \] 19

Jorgensen goes on to list six more specific assumptions inherent in her formula.

1. This list is exhaustive and mutually exclusive.
2. It is appropriate to a single individual, as well as to groups and society.
3. The possibilities of weighting of factors exist.
4. Certain variables vary radically over time while others remain relatively constant. The subscript \( t \) denotes those variables which alter radically from time to time for any one individual or group.
5. Intelligence, aptitude, environment, and a person's emotional-psychological-physical state affect \( A_t \).
6. It is possible that self-other definitional conflicts may be possible, i.e., the person may interpret his own emotional-psychological-physical state differently than an observer.20

Although honorary in theory, Jorgensen's attempt at a scientific method of determining one's appreciative ability is a
misconception. The first two assumptions Jorgensen lists as being inherent in her formula gives support to this claim. Jorgensen first claims that her list is "exhaustive and mutually exclusive" and then goes on to claim that it is appropriate not only to individuals, but to society at large as well as its particular sub-cultures. Such a claim is not scientific (allowing for further investigation and development); it is religious dogma. The critic's task, according to Beardsley, is to invalidate the mathematics by overcoming the perceptual interference caused by the screens. Beardsley states that,

The critic's judgmental act is one of saying how good (or poor) the artwork is in a context in which the artwork is primarily to be considered qua artwork — whatever other kinds of consideration may be given it as well, then or later. It is an act of estimating the aesthetic value of the art work.21

Being more direct than Beardsley, Gardner claims that one must keep an aesthetic distance. An audience member must, Gardner mandates, ". . . renounce a part of himself so that he can enter into the world of the aesthetic object and appreciate the feeling and ideas contained therein."22 Accordingly, the critical act goes well beyond simple perceiving. Criticism is the endeavor to discriminate between experiences and to evaluate them.23

Gotshalk best summarizes the question of aesthetic distance when he states, "Since the essence of criticism is the
evaluation of works of art as aesthetic objects according to an appropriate set of standards, the basic problem for a philosophical analysis of art criticism is to determine what the appropriate standards of art criticism are."24 In the end, the problem of what constitutes proper criticism is resolved in the simple recognition that, as Beardsley states, "The act of judging — in the sense of appraising — works of art is certainly not a purely intellectual act. . . . But it is, in part, a rational act, for it involves reasoning."25
Even with the characteristics of the critic presented in Chapter 5, the ultimate question for this writing is still largely unanswered. What are, and how does one elucidate, those aspects of music which lead to an understanding of the work and substantiate an individual's standard of taste? The following portrayal between a composer and listener suggests the answer to this question.

Miss Taggart, how many people are there to whom my work means as much as it does to you? ... That is the payment I demand. Not many can afford it. I don't mean your enjoyment, I don't mean your emotion — emotions be damned! — I mean your understanding and the fact that your enjoyment was of the same nature as mine, that it came from the same source: from your intelligence, from the conscious judgment of a mind able to judge my work by the standard of the same values that went to write it — I mean, not the fact that you felt, but that you felt what I wished you to feel, not the fact that you admire my work, but that you admire it for things I wished to be admired. ...1

This excerpt from a conversation between Dagny Taggart, the heroine of the story, and Richard Halley, a great composer,
in *Atlas Shrugged* by Ayn Rand effectively explains the goal of the art critic. While Rand's character may seem to stress the intellectual comprehension in condemnation of the emotional aspects of music, he does not completely rule-out the emotional. Mr. Halley emphatically states, "emotions be damned!" yet dampens his commandment with the statement, "you felt what I wished you to feel."

Feelings do play a role in music; but the feelings must be rooted in the music itself and not in some extra-musical happening. In other words, one should not impose personal emotions on the emotion of the music. The music should affect the listener, not the listener the music. What should be felt is that which the composer (as manifested in the composition) intended to be felt. The only way to know what this original "meaning" of the composition is, is to have an intellectual understanding of the composition. The main objective of the critic is to *understand* the work of art as the artist created it. The critic, or anyone else aside from the artist, however, will never be able to apprehend the work of art for what it truly "means." However, every work of art is created under unique conditions — societal, psychological and philosophical — and unless one is familiar with those specific conditions under which the work was created, the work can never be fully understood. Realistically speaking, then, the goal of the critic is to *understand as fully as possible* the work of art. The key problem with this conclusion, however, is that it is still very idealistic.
It is evident that for a realistic interpretation of the critic's objective, one further annotation is required — *as experienced*. Due to the simple fact that no one can put themself in the context of the work of art, one can only "know" the work as experienced in performance. In toto then, the critic must come to understand, as fully as possible, the work of art as experienced. With this addition, there does, however, arise another problem. Is the critic commenting on the work of art or the presentation of the work? It is the contention of this writer that the answer to the preceding question is that the performance, and not the work, is being judged. The further contention is that what one should ultimately be concerned with is the work and not its performance. Performance criticism is not in the domain of aesthetics proper. Aesthetics is concerned with the work of art, not a particular presentation of the work. Any given performance of a work is not the work of art, but rather an interpretation of the work. Sessions writes in his book *The Musical Experience of Composer, Performer, Listener* with reference to the performer that, "The music is not totally present, the idea of the composer is not fully expressed, in any single performance, actual or even conceivable, but rather the sum of all possible performances."² The same ideas applies to the critical listener. The absolute goal of the critic, therefore, is to discover that which is the work of art. As Hindemith stresses in his book *A Composer's World*,
... music, whatever sound and structure it may assume, remains meaningless noise unless it touches a receiving mind. But the mere fact that it is heard is not enough: the receiving mind must be active in a certain way of transmutation from a mere acoustical perception [if] a genuine musical experience is to be accomplished.3

It is with this concept of the genuine musical experience, that the following should be considered.

It was suggested previously that the study of aesthetics generally connotes an attempt to explain the phenomenon art — the way one thinks and talks about creating, appreciating, and criticizing works of art. This task of understanding art brought about by the discipline of aesthetics is often approached through elucidating:

1. a definition of the phenomenon;
2. the relation of the phenomenon to the other fine arts;
3. the place and relevance of the phenomenon in human life;
4. the principles of the interpretation and appreciation;
5. the nature of and reasons for excellence.4

The most important of these five approaches to understanding works of art are numbers four and five. The reason numbers four and five are so critical is that the other three are implied within these two. Most plainly stated then, aesthetics is the study of art judgement — criticism. Beardsley
notes that "... aesthetics consist of those principles that are required for clarifying and confirming critical statements [in the arts]." 

Art criticism, therefore, is an act of estimating aesthetic value. But, as suggested earlier, the value ascertained by the individual critic is valid only if the particular claim is supported by evidence from experiencing the art object. Aschenbrenner refers to such evidence as material characterization.

The need for the practice of material characterization is based in two aspects of sound criticism: first one must always substantiate one's statements; and secondly, a work of art must always be able to substantiate itself. In other words, a work of art exists unto itself and, therefore, can only be understood with reference to it. Material characterization is quite simply, then, the support of critical commentary through direct reference to the art object. The reasonable critic, therefore, must offer support for the criticism. As Aschenbrenner so strongly states, "It is ... [a] principle [contention] that criticism, when it is taken as mere grading on a scale, mere distributing of diplomas and demerits without reference to success or failure ... is largely void of meaning." With reference to the second point, Dahlhaus asserts, "Aesthetically oriented analysis ... understands the ... [composition] as a work complete in itself and existing for it's own sake." Beardsley makes a similar claim when he states, "A reason is some descriptive or interpretative proposition about the work under consideration. ... Thus a reason always cites some property of a work, and we may say that this property is then
employed as a *criterion of value* by the critic who presents that reason.⁹

Because this autonomous reasoning aspect of music criticism is believed to be of great importance, one additional reflection on the topic is offered. Ingarden, with his phenomenological approach to criticism states (as quoted in translation by Kaelin),

The true aesthetic value [the object of criticism] of a musical work is not dragged in from the outside; it is also not an abstract form which merely corresponds to an intentional value judgment; it is something intuitively graspable within the work itself, a concretely-characterizing something.¹⁰

Kaelin supports this belief commenting that, "In music, the medium is composed of sounds and silences; anything that can be meaningfully said about music as an aesthetic expression must be traceable to sounds and silences."¹¹

The ultimate problem for the music critic, however, goes well beyond the mere perception of the sounds and silences. As stated by Calvocoressi, "What we want to know is whether a work . . . embodies a message worth conveying, and worth conveying in the medium and terms in which the artist elected to convey it."¹² If a musical composition meets both conditions as stated by Calvocoressi, critics must then discern a way to explain their personal interpretation of the collections of sounds and silences called music. The task is to understand and explain
this phenomenon called "music" as manifested, and not as how
the creator hoped it would be experienced. This is not to suggest
that any historical or biographical information might not
heighten the experience. Indeed, when one is having difficulty
understanding a work, historical information may aid the
process of understanding. In the initial stage, however, a work
of art must be comprehended without such herteronemous
knowledge.

Morgan supports the general notion that historical
information aids musical comprehension. In fact, he goes so far
as to claim that the knowledge of history is of such great
importance that it must be supplied to the audience. This is
especially true in the case of post-1950 music, which Morgan
claims is "music without history." Morgan believes that because
a great deal of twentieth-century music is unconventional, the
only way to judge such music is to rely on explanations supplied
by the composer. Accordingly, the critic (analyst) in
Morgan's view,

... must examine the composer's intentions in
relation to their compositional realization, must
discuss the implications of the compositional system
in regard to the music it generates, consider how the
resulting music relates to older music and the other
present-day music, examine its perceptual properties
and problems, etc. ...
The problem with Morgan's theory is that he rejects the notion of the intentional fallacy. That it is required, as the intentional fallacy suggests, for one to know the intent of the artist is not only an impossible task, but also an unnecessary task. The ultimate goal of the critic-listener is to know the work as perceived, not what the artist wished it to be. Morgan acknowledges falling prey to this seemingly innate desire to know the composer's intent and, therefore, rationalizes the situation. He claims that "... the intentional fallacy simply does not hold up — it is no longer a fallacy — when "conventions" are supplied individually for each separate work — which means that they are no longer conventions at all. On the contrary, the composer's intentions become an integral part of his overall conception." In the strictest sense, the words about a composition by its creator are equal to the work.

In the end, Morgan's proposition for approaching a work of art creates the two problems which, according to the objective method, are the things that are to be avoided at all cost. The first of the problems is that Morgan recommends a listener have prior knowledge of a composition. The second problem created by Morgan stems from the assumption that the composer's interpretation of the work is correct.

Baxter, in a rebuttal article entitled "Recent Music: The Intentional Fallacy Restored," argues that "... although the composer's statements are used by the analyst and may aid him greatly, the final authority for any interpretative or evaluative
decision is the piece itself, not the statement." Furthermore, Baxter concludes, "... the desire or wish per se of an artist or composer to have his works considered (or interpreted) in the light of his statements about them is not a necessary philosophical or compelling critical reason for doing so." The point is, what artists intend, or claim to intend, is irrelevant. What they actually do achieve, in the eyes of the individual critic, is all that matters. Ultimately, the basis of judgement in art, therefore, is supported by the theory that a work of art is only successful to the extent that it explains itself. Morgan does acknowledge this point when he quotes Cone, the author whose ideas served as an impetus for his thoughts on twentieth-century music criticism: "The good composition will always reveal, on close study, the methods of analysis needed for its own comprehension."  

Coming to an understanding of musical works by way of "hearing it explain itself" is indeed an ideal. A work of art is constantly struggling to be comprehended and reconciled with its listener. Countless listeners impose countless interpretations upon a composition. This problem is particularly the case in the recreative arts — e. g., music. In most cases, save that music which is not recreative (i. e., recorded music and computer music), the listener must be encouraged to "plasticize" the experience. The listener must go beyond the presentation of the work and hear the work — the non-recreated work. The objective is to experience the work of art, not a particular
presentation of it. Before further explaining the concept of "plasticizing," it will be helpful to summarize the main points covered thus far by considering Beardsley's six postulates of criticism as applied to music by Rowell. Points five and six are of particular significance.

1. The musical work is a perceptual object; that is, it can have presentations.
2. Presentations of the same musical work may occur at different times and to different people.
3. Two presentations of the same musical work may differ from each other.
4. The characteristics of a musical work may not be exhaustively revealed in any particular presentation of it.
5. A presentation may be truthful; that is, the characteristics of the presentation may correspond to the characteristics of the actual work.
6. A presentation may be illusory; that is, some of the characteristics of the presentation may fail to correspond to the characteristics of the musical work itself. 19

The concept of "plasticizing" stems directly from postulates five and six and might be best explained by way of analogy. A painting, for example, is for all practical purposes static. Whatever the environment, any two viewers of the same painting at different times are objectively perceiving the same work. In music, however, each presentation of a composition differs from that of all others. Paradoxically, the problem or
draw-back in dealing with the medium of music is one of the many humanizing aspects of music and has been positively exploited in improvisation and aleatoric compositions. The point to be made, however, is that a given musical performance is but a symbol of the work of art which exists only as an ideal. The musical work of art is plastic and the method of realizing that work is inexact. Coming to an understanding of a musical work of art, then, is especially difficult. The only method minimizing the difficulty of ascertaining the correct understanding a work is personal objectivity.

This point of personal objective "plasticizing" is so crucial to apprehending the musical work of art that Hindemith initiates his *A Composer's World* with a discussion of the enigma. He states that,

An individual piece of music, being many times reborn and going through ever renewed circles of resonant life, through repeated performances, dies as many deaths at the end of each of its phoenixlike [sic] resurrections....

And yet, there are in music certain values that are not subject to instability. If we want to recognize and understand such values, we must perceive music not as a mere succession of reasonably arranged acoustical facts; we must extricate it from the sphere of amorphous sound, we must in some way participate, beyond the mere sensual perception of music in its realization as sound; we must transform our musical impressions into a meaningful
possession of our own.20

In Hindemith's opinion, it is only through direct participation with the work beyond the sensual — its performance — that the correct understanding of the work is captured.

The phrase "correct understanding," as noted previously, is used because it is believed that there does ultimately exist the definitive "meaning," or value, of each work. The "meaning" may be that there is no "meaning," or that the "meaning" does transform with each individual's hearing; but the work does have a "meaning." To think otherwise is to accept the ancient adage De gustibus non disputandum. Claiming that matters of taste are not disputable, such an attitude amounts to nothing more than a anti-intellectual remark, "I don't know what art is, but I know what I like." Neither extreme is acceptable. Taste may vary, but taste must also be substantiated. If taste is not substantiated, judicial persons are negating their judgement by inadvertently saying that they in fact do not know what they like. What they in fact do know, or at least recognize in action, is that they have a sentiment — an innate fondness (tempered by their particular culture) — toward the given.21

The crux of the problem of people not being able, much less competent, to qualify their thoughts lies in the predicament that people tend to want guide lines or rules to control their lives. Dewey claims that, "Men . . . want the crutch of dogma, of beliefs fixed by authority to relieve them of the trouble of thinking and
the responsibility of directing their activity by thought." The only thinking people tend to do, Dewey continues, is "... consideration of which one of the rival systems of dogma they will accept." Even when dealing with such individual matters of taste as it pertains to making value judgements about works of art, man's condition is still one of disillusionment without guidepost. "It is natural," Hume states in his essay "Of the Standard of Taste," "to seek for a Standard of Taste; a rule by which the various sentiments of men may be reconciled; at least a decision afforded confirming one sentiment, and condemning another."23

The difficult and perplexing problem Hume claims is natural to desire is in no way unique, but the task has been compounded as people have become diversified to extremes. Although criticism may be tempered by particular humors and culture, criticism is an exercise of individual discretion. The importance of criticism as an individual act today, Subotnik maintains, is created by the fact that "... it takes place in a world that no longer provides rational support for beliefs in any single set of principles, values, or conceptions of truth as a basis for universal understanding. . . ."24 Since criticism is an individual act, and since people have become extremely diversified in their beliefs and values, the desire of resolving differences is extremely difficult and perhaps even undesirable.25

Subotnik's point, and the implication of Beardsley's — Rowell's — fifth postulate, is that truths must, in a free thinking society, be accepted on an individual basis. The over-riding
assumption here is that there are quality works of art derived from untruths. A work based on truth as seen by the individual observer is more likely to provide an aesthetic experience than one based on untruth, but it does not in any way make it a better work of art — just a better aesthetic experience. The qualification of art containing truth is not valid. The qualification of an aesthetic experience containing truth may have merit.

The objective of music criticism, and the over-riding goal of the thesis, is not to determine the truth of a particular work of art, but to determine a method of criticism for individualized comprehension of musical compositions. Based upon objective reasoning, the following four-tiered process is proposed: 1) describe and determine, 2) analyze, 3) interpret, and 4) judge. Because they are interdependent, it is not only imperative that each of these steps be taken, but it is necessary that they are taken in order.

The first of the four steps in judging the value of a composition calls for a description and determination of the work as a work of art. The initial step is critical to the whole process of criticism. It does little good to proceed when the object under investigation has not been designated a musical work of art and, therefore, suitable for consideration. One reaches this determination through identifying, describing, and naming the components of the alleged art object. Analysis of the now confirmed work of art is the second step in criticism. "The
activity of analysis, "Smith writes, "involves discerning much more closely the ways which elements noted in description dispose themselves into a variety of forms and patterns." Although, as Smith points out, there is no system of aesthetic arithmetic, the third step of music criticism may be summarized as $1 + 2 = 3$ (description plus analysis equals interpretation). It is essential that one's interpretation of the art object be consistent with the analysis of the work. Having completed steps one through three, it remains for the critic to judge the work of art. This, the goal of criticism, is far too often either arrived at in lieu of the first three steps, or ignored altogether. In the final act of judgement, any system of aesthetic arithmetic is absolutely and unquestionably inoperative. In art criticism the Gestalt notion of the whole being greater than the sum of the parts takes precedence in ruling the quality of a work. As was pointed out previously in discussing Jorgensen's "appreciation formula," the possibility of weighting of factors exists. In the act of final judgment then, two plus two may equal four, five, six, seven, or seven times seventy as long as the reasons for the sum may be qualified.

As has been maintained throughout the thesis, only objective reasons are qualified to support judgements of works of art. Beardsley suggests that there are three types of objective reasons or kinds of objective categories. Each of the categories is comprised of questions aimed at assisting the judgemental process. While certainly not an exhaustive listing, sample
questions and their respective categories are:

1. Unity:
   - Is it well organized/disorganized?
   - Is it formally perfect/imperfect?
   - Does it have/lack an inner logic of structure and style?

2. Complexity:
   - Is it developed on a large or small scale?
   - Is it rich in contrast or lacks variety and is repetitious?
   - Is it subtle and imaginative or blatant and crude?

3. Intensity:
   - Is it full of vitality or insipid?
   - Is it forceful and vivid or weak and pale?
   - Is it beautiful or ugly?
   - Is it tender, ironic, tragic, graceful, delicate, comic...?31

In examining the list of questions for deriving objective reasons, it is important to remember the words of Thomas Aquinas which Rowell uses to support Beardsley's theory of criticism.

This set of [reasoning] seems not only to be timeless but even universal, not limited by any conventions of style, period, genre, medium, or culture. Unity, complexity, intensity may be achieved by various means and present in varying degree from one culture or style period to another, but their existence as objective critical standards can scarcely be
In other words, a logical piece is not necessarily better or worse than an illogical one; nor is contrast better or worse than that which is repetitious; nor is the beautiful to be regarded better or worse than the ugly. What matters, is what the composer does with, and is achieved by, each of the characteristics. Rowell cites specific aspects of music which contribute to each of the objective categories. As elements of unity, Rowell mentions "melodic" and rhythmic motives, tonality, and large scale formal elements. Interplay, ambiguity, conflict, and deviation are listed as elements of complexity. Intensity, according to Rowell, is comprised of climax, growth, and athleticism (virtuosity).

It has also been advocated throughout this writing that the aspect of the work of art to which reasons must point are the essential elements of the medium — in the case of music to sounds and silence. The reason for this is seemingly simple, but tends to complicate the matter of criticism to the safety-net of De gustibus non disputandum. Music of the programmatic genre (by design or by the observer's psychological state) tends to influence one's judgement of a composition. Absolute music, on the other hand, creates no such interference. Any feeling or imagery experienced by an audience member of such music can only be explained by way of the music proper or syntactic elements. No text exists, either figuratively (i.e., tone poems) or literally (i.e., song), to explain the music. Works of art which do
contain such descriptive extras are judged largely from an emotive point of view and, as Meyer contends,

The sensuous-associative is of minor importance in the consideration of value.

The sensuous-associative may, however, be of importance in accounting for individual musical preferences.

For who is to say which of two works has greater sensuous appeal or evokes more poignant associations? The matter is completely subjective.33

Furthermore, due to its low degree of abstractness or, in Meyer's terms, because it offers little information, music which is influenced by the extra-musical is likely to be of lesser value. In addition, Meyer claims the more one knows what to expect from a piece of music, the more probable it will have less to offer and the composition, therefore, is likely to be of lesser value. Value, to be more precise, "... has something to do with the activation of a musical impulse having tendencies toward a more or less definite goal and with temporary resistance of inhibition of these tendencies."35 When too much information (the unexpected) is offered, the music sounds unintelligible and the value of the composition is limited just as it is when not enough information is offered and boredom from the predictability (excessive expectantcy) of the work occurs. Stated by Meyer in economist
verbage, "Those works are judged good which yield a high return. Those works yielding a low return are found to be pretentious and bombastic." In the end, the basis of judgment stems from what the individual listener profits from the work.
CHAPTER 7

THE METHOD APPLIED: AN OBJECTIVE APPROACH TO IGOR STRAVINSKY'S SYMPHONIES D'INSTRUMENTS À VENT

The musical aesthetics class proposed in this thesis is concerned with the facilitation of musical comprehension outside the realm of the extra-musical through material characterization, or objective music criticism. The following interpretation of Igor Stravinsky's *Symphonies d'Instruments à vent* applies the objective method of criticism employing the four-tiered process. The purpose of the exercise is not merely to demonstrate the effectiveness of the method, but to come to a better understanding of a work by one of this century's most outstanding composers.

Stravinsky's *Symphonies* was chosen to illustrate the objective method for two reasons: first, because it is an example of absolute music; and second, because it presents what many lay listeners, as well as some professionals, would consider unconventional or atypical techniques. The demonstration of the objective method is initiated under the assumption that if the method is capable of dealing with an example of such pure music, it can most certainly deal with the less abstract.
To show the full impact the objective method of music criticism is capable of having on the comprehension of musical works of art, Stravinsky's *Symphonies* will be criticized from three distinctly different perspectives in relation to the four-tiered process. With all three of the perspectives being based on the objective concept of material characterization, there should be little doubt that the method does allow for the experiencing of both the objective and subjective aspects of music and is, therefore, comprehensively effective. The *Symphonies* will first be considered simply as a phenomenon of sound and silence. The second perspective treats the music as a solution to a specific compositional problem. Finally, the work as an organic whole personifying life will be considered.

Before applying the objective method to the *Symphonies*, it is first necessary to clarify and reaffirm the type of musical experience on which criticism should be based. Music is an art which is directed primarily toward the sense of hearing. It follows that any authentic experience with music is through contact with the actual audible creation of the composition — not merely score reading and analysis. It is suggested further that the experience should be live — not recorded. The obvious exceptions to the rule are examples of musical art which are composed as recorded or synthesized sound. Score analysis and extended experiences through recording technology may be beneficial toward the comprehension of music, but they are not the ideal way to experience the musical work of art.
A final warning to ensure the purity of the listening experience is that it is best if the audience has no knowledge of the music before it is performed. This is to ensure that the music reveals itself on its own terms. It is recommended, therefore, that no program notes, or even titles of works, be made available until after the performance. Only after listening to the music is it appropriate to aid the comprehension of the experience.

The recommendation that one should enter the musical experience with a "clean slate" should not be misunderstood or exaggerated. Of course some knowledge of the workings of music and its history is acceptable and perhaps desirable. The concern is that knowledge should not be permitted to impede the listening experience. Music is, in short, meant to be listened to and not read or read about. Any analyses, therefore, must originate as a result of the listening experience. As alluded to earlier with the presentation of the notion that music must explain itself, it is fair to conclude that any music which is not able to be comprehended through listening alone cannot be highly rated.

The general background for how a musical experience should be approached and had if a valid judgement of a work is to be apprehended is at this point sufficiently made. It is now possible to apply the method of objective aesthetic musical criticism as outlined in the preceding chapter to the Symphonies d'Instruments à vent by Igor Stravinsky.
The initial step in criticism as mandated by the objective method is to describe and determine the event experienced so as to deduce its qualifications as a musical work of art and suitable for criticism as such. As the first step "describe and determine" concerns the Symphonies, there seems to be no problem with accepting it as a musical work of art. The conclusion asserting the Symphonies' appropriateness for criticism as art is reached from the consideration of four points: 1) the materials used; 2) their manner of treatment; 3) what is achieved; 4) and what is offered by the materials and their treatment. Comprised of ten traditional western instruments in an ensemble of twenty-three performers, there can be little question that the materials of transmission are appropriate for the art of music. While exploitation of these instruments' ranges is extreme at times, and the "harmonies" they create are unnerving to some, all act within the confines of the conventional western tonal and rhythmic system.

The form of the Symphonies also qualifies the composition as a musical work of art. Because Stravinsky employs a number of rather short motivic gestures, the Symphonies may be heard merely as a collage of "melodies." While perhaps in some way interesting, such a tapestry of sound could validly be questioned as a work of musical art. A work of art, as noted previously, must possess an inner logic, be self explanatory and self functioning. True musical art, therefore, is not just a construction of sounds and silences. An analysis of the
Symphonies, the second step in the objective method of criticism, proves that the work is indeed coherent in form.

There are two readily conceivable ways in which the unfolding of the Symphonies may be perceived. Through measure 54, Stravinsky presents themes in a straightforward and easily discernible manner. The first theme is stated in measures 1-6; and in measures 7-13, a contrasting second theme is heard. A fragment of the initial theme (mm. 14-18) followed by a brief transition using new material (mm. 19-21) leads to a restatement of the second theme before two additional themes are presented in measures 30-39 by a flute and measures 40-46 by a bassoon. Following the presentation of these new themes, Stravinsky again restates the first theme along with a fragmented reminder of the second theme (mm. 47-54).

There is, however, another very feasible way to hear the form of the Symphonies. According to this interpretation, measures 1-29 function as an introduction. The first theme is sounded by the flute in measure 30-39 with the second theme, played by the bassoon, immediately following in measures 40-46. Measures 47-54 recapitulate the introduction to round-off the exposition of themes.

The complications of the Symphonies multiply after the opening fifty-four measures. From measure 55 until a definite change in mood in measure 271, the thematic material is developed in such a way that all internal logic seems to be
lacking. Stravinsky confuses the function of this developmental section in three ways. The first confusion the composer creates for the listener is caused by the introduction of a new theme (mm. 71-74 ff). Right at a point when the listener assumes the composer is developing the themes, Stravinsky causes the listener to question his thinking. The reappearance of the four principle themes with essentially no variation is a second method the composer uses to make the listener question his assumptions about the shape and progress of the work (mm. 125-129; 172-174; 175-181; 182-186; 189-195). It is in measures 208-270 that the third confusion occurs. It is in these measures that Stravinsky "pulls out all the stops" and incorporates a second development section based on a gesture discretely presented only once before in measures 19-21.

Stravinsky's use of rhythm, harmony, and texture are also essential to the comprehension of this music. Concentrating on these three elements of music, Stravinsky presents a kaleidoscopic view of his thoughts. Using a variety of meters, often in quick succession, Stravinsky leads the listener through a maze of rhythmic twists and turns. Even in legato sections, Stravinsky manages to successfully incorporate this rhythmic agitation (mm. 30-40). Stravinsky does not rely exclusively on meter changes, but at times (mm. 175-181) incorporates the use of syncopation within one meter to create a sense of agitation. The map charted by these techniques creates a colorful rhythmic array in "prism effect."
One of the most revealing examples of the "prism effect" in harmony is manifest in the final chord. Within the context of a stable C-Major triad, Stravinsky incorporates the two most unstable notes of the key center of C — B, the leading tone, and F#, the tri-tone of C. Additionally, the chord contains a D. Not only does this hiertertianary chord reflect the whole of the C tonal series, it also exhibits the nature of the entire tonal structure of the composition. This final C11 sonority is a polytonal construct implying the key centers of theme statements.

Stravinsky's treatment of texture is no less complicated than his handling of rhythm and harmony. Employing the full ensemble only four times (mm. 7-13; 22-27; 363-371, with three of the four being played piano and the fourth fff), Stravinsky reveals the nature of his work's texture and timbre in bits and pieces. Throughout the work, save the four places cited where the full ensemble is utilized, Stravinsky utilizes like instruments in small groupings. The groupings remain fairly consistent throughout the work, but there is a constant movement from one to another (mm. 55-70; 128-134).

Having completed the first two stages of the objective method of musical aesthetic criticism — the description of materials used and the analysis of their manner of treatment — it is now possible to consider the third stage, the interpretation of the information gained. One must, however, proceed with extreme caution. Two interpretations of the Symphonies are
offered in this critical analysis. One is totally objective and, therefore, poses no problem with regard to extra-musical allusions. The other interpretation, however, depends on extra-musical associations. When one attempts to figure out what the work "means," all sorts of heteronomous information can sneak in and pollute the comprehension of the composition. The problem of forcing a meaning upon a work is especially acute with the Symphonies.

There is no evidence to indicate that Stravinsky intended that the Symphonies be understood as a programmatic composition, but there does seem to be an option in this direction. As an organic happening, a musical evolution, the Symphonies may be comprehended as a personification of the life cycle. It is, perhaps, only coincidental that the composition which seems to personify life is offered in memory of the life of Claude Debussy. The work could have been dedicated to any other person or no one at all and the life cycle analogy would still be valid. Whether is was Stravinsky's conscious intent of or not, the life cycle analogy is a valid hearing of the composition and is a compelling interpretation of the work as the following analysis of the music's process reveals.

After the initial abrupt entry of birth into life (mm. 1-6), one is soothed and nurtured (mm. 7-14 ff), experiencing minor disturbances for quite some time. A second birth and soothing of sorts is experienced in an abbreviated form after measure 47. Equivalent to the entry into adulthood, this second period of life
goes through an extensive period of self-discovery and learning of what is important in life. Eventually discovering and developing the self and that of importance in life, life "comes together" and is lived fully and whole heartedly (mm. 258-270). Unfortunately for most, this period of "enlightenment" is often short lived. Ever so gradually, yet somehow suddenly, things begin to slow down (mm. 271) as one enters old age. This fading away finally culminates in death. Death marks a definite end to life as it has been known, and at the same time, represents the beginning of a new existence. The end is ambiguous — it contains evasive leads to possibilities of continuing.

An interpretation of the Symphonies as a solution to a specific compositional problem is of great historical significance. If the aim of a work of art is not didactic, if its content is not narrative, then the work either focuses on an intellectual problem or appeals to the senses. Although a objective narrative has been offered in this critical analysis, there is no historical evidence to assert that Stravinsky's Symphonies is didactic or contains a subliminal program. While the sensual appeal of the work cannot be denied, careful analysis will reveal a strong intellectual component. The intellectual intrigue of Stravinsky's manipulation of musical material as described previously is not, however, an end in itself. The full impact of the greatness of the composition is accessible only when these ideas have been fully comprehended.
Perhaps the most intriguing intellectual problem to be solved in the *Symphonies* is the creation of a musical equivalent to the plastic arts achievements of Cubism. The basic goal of the Cubist style is to portray all perspectives of a subject at once. The method by which the Cubist realizes this goal is through a deconstruction and re-arrangement of the subject. Essentially, Cubism is an artistic abstraction of the subject's blueprint. It is of great importance to realize that in no way is it meant to suggest that an "unscrambling" of a Cubist work will construct a traditional or recognizable form or that such undertaking should even be attempted. A restructuring of a work would deny the existence of a unique form and offering. Even if such an endeavor were desirable, there are two reasons this "puzzle theory" does not work with Cubism. First, it may be that the Cubist deconstruction is the deconstruction of a non-conventional, or even unique, form. The composer may have deconstructed his own invention. The second reason a reconstruction may not produce a complete construct of the original is that all of the original may not have been employed in the deconstructed version. The blueprint with which Stravinsky was dealing in the *Symphonies* is extremely complex. In simple terms, it can be seen as a deconstruction of the sonata form in western music.

Reflecting upon the analysis of Stravinsky's treatment of form, harmony, texture, and timbre all are consistent with Cubism. The deconstruction of the sonata form is most apparent
when considering the treatment of the development and recapitulation. What Stravinsky chose to do in lieu of the traditional sectional approach was to deconstruct the recapitulation and juxtapose it with the development — hence, the restatement of themes during the development (mm. 55-271). As Cubism concerns Stravinsky's treatment of rhythm, harmony, and texture, the "prism effects" previously described can now be understood as a view to the "back-side" of those elements. The full impact of Cubist music, and not merely Cubist treatment of certain elements, is made with the practice of simultaneously exploiting the different elements of music. Measures 208-216 contain a prime example of such simultaneous treatment. The "prism effects" of rhythm and harmony, as well as texture and timbre, all act in these nine measures for the presentation of all the essential elements of western music in one brief encounter.

Having considered the description, analysis, and interpretation of the Symphonies, it is now appropriate to enter the final task of the objective method — judging the work. According to the aims of the method, the judgement of a work of art should go beyond such superficial responses as "yes, it is art" and "yes, I like it" and evaluate the worth of the art object. If criticism is to be worth something, the work must be judged as to its degree of worth. Stravinsky's Symphonies d' Instruments á vent is indeed a masterwork. Stravinsky's use of the conventional in the Symphonies gives credence to both the ideal
of abstract art and the validity of traditional western conventions; and, though he did not go to the extremes of many of his contemporaries or later generations, the techniques used in the Symphonies represent a significant musical achievement by creating a counterpart to Cubism in the plastic arts.

The unity, complexity, and intensity of the Symphonies, as determined through the three perspectives from which this aesthetic inquiry developed, all enhance the meaning of Stravinsky's musical work of art. Through the manipulation of all aspects of musical material, Stravinsky has created a unique musical offering. The Symphonies' unity is achieved through the consistent use of instrumental groupings, thematic reiterations, and its organic narrative form. By the nature of its Cubist style alone, the Symphonies is rich in contrast and imaginative in employment without being overwhelming. Stravinsky's employment of silence serves as an excellent example of contrast. Toying with this antithesis to sound throughout the work, Stravinsky fully utilizes "negative sound space" in measure 362. Gradually prepared and comprised of a tutti measure of rest, the silence in measure 362 is highly effective and a welcomed relief from the complex sounds and rhythms that pervaded the work. Although handled in various ways during the course of the composition, the intensity of the work is invigorating. The intensity of Stravinsky's work is created through the manipulation of three elements of music: pitch range, dynamic contrast, density. All three of these
elements come together in full force to create the most intense section of the work (mm. 258-270). With the pitch range of low C in the tuba and bassoon to high a in the flute at a dynamic level of ff and fff in close voicing, this section of the work is the climax of the musical evolution.

Although considered by many in wind ensemble circles to be one of the great works in the literature, it is fair to state that most would not consider the Symphonies a great work unto itself or in comparison to works beyond the band repertoire. Considering the revelations reached through permitting the work to "speak for itself" by means of an objective aesthetic analysis, the Symphonies d'Instruments à vent has proven itself nothing less than a great work in any company.
CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

In 1928, an article by Percy Scholes was published in the monthly journal *The Dominant*. In the course of the article, Scholes offered a modest five pound prize to the person who could coin a term to replace the then current "music appreciation." By his own report in *Music: The Child and the Masterpiece*, Scholes received a number of suggestions. All of the recommendations were considered either too "far-fetched," or overly logical and etymological. None of them, therefore, were deemed appropriate.¹

Scholes would doubtlessly have objected to the term "musical aesthetics" as a designation for the non-performance music class, yet judging from the alternatives submitted for Scholes consideration, it seems the best alternative to the term music appreciation which still prevails today. Consider the suggestions Scholes received and his reasons for not accepting them.

Musical Knowledge (but the knowledge we give is more than an imparting of knowledge; it is largely a training in perception); Musical Perception (but the training we give includes the imparting of a considerable body of knowledge); Musical
Imagination, Musical Sympathy (but these do not cover the ground and, moreover, would look very self-conscious in a school time-table); Musical Culture (too wide; it might seem to include performance [also too "high-brow"]); Musical Understanding (but is it any better than 'Musical Appreciation'?); Musical Intimation (sounds odd but came from a professional psychologist and editor of a general educational journal, and he gives grounds for his choice); Musical Receptibility, Musical Assimilation (we can see what the proposers of these terms are driving at, but do they meet the case? Can you see them on the time-table or the published curriculum of the school?); Musical Enjoyment, Enjoyment of Music (sound enough suggestions in their way way, perhaps, conveying the very idea of 'appreciation' without its ambiguity, but should we get value for the effort necessary to float the new name?); Joy in Music, Pleasure in Music, Love of Music, Loving Music (not possible time-table terms, surely); Musical Listening (the best yet, perhaps); Musical Initiation (perhaps still better); Musical Cognition (but fancy a child saying "I'm going to the Musical Cognition Class"!!); Musical Self-Assertion, Musical Educement (the sort of terms that came supported with clever argument, but, inasmuch as the argument could not accompany them in daily use, unsuitable, I think); The Architecture of Music (does not by any means cover the ground); Light for Listeners (to cheaply journalistic); Concert Training (one of the better suggestions, since it does indicate the goal fairly well); Creative Insight (nothing about music in this name); Critical Listening (too philosophical, however accurately it may describe our aim); Recreative Listening (gives the idea that the appreciation class is a mere playground).2
The two terms Scholes regards as most fitting to describe his concept of a course in "music appreciation" are embedded in "musical aesthetics" — the training of sensitive sense perception for the understanding of musical works of art. Scholes argues that neither "musical knowledge" nor "musical perception" are suitable designations since the former does not indicate the role of perception and the latter does not acknowledge the role of knowledge. The term "musical aesthetics," however, fills both bills. "Musical cognition" was dismissed by Scholes on the grounds that it is overly philosophical and, therefore, inaccessible to the child. While "aesthetics" also is a word unfamiliar to most children, the concept is easily grasped when presented as has been endorsed in the thesis. Finally, it is believed that the title "musical aesthetics" is acceptable not only as a "time-table" or curriculum plan term, but if used, it would enhance the professionalism of such documents. Thus, the term "musical aesthetics" is the most appropriate choice to replace the outmoded term "music appreciation." More important, however, it would restore a concept central to the philosophy of American public education as envisioned in this thesis.

Though the best term, it is likely that Scholes would have rejected the title "musical aesthetics." Since circa 1750, the term "aesthetics" denoted reference to the beautiful, the sightly. It was probably because of the misconception concerning the word aesthetics that no suggestion incorporating the term "aesthetics" was even offered. Had Scholes and his colleagues been aware of
the correct meaning of the term, they certainly would have chosen the label "musical aesthetics" to replace the objectionable label "music appreciation."

The conclusion of Scholes condoning the proposed title is, however, based on more solid ground than speculation on how he and his colleagues might have interpreted the term "aesthetics". In response to "critical listening," the one suggestion received in the 1928 campaign which seems most akin to musical aesthetics, Scholes suggested that the title was "too philosophical, however accurately it may describe our aim." While "aesthetics" might easily be perceived as an even more "philosophic" proposal, it is also a more accurate designation. Our aim goes beyond listening critically, it includes concern for perception and what is done with the information received from the experience — interpretation. The major draw-back to the title "critical listening," as Scholes reasoned with other suggestions, is the absence of a reference to music. What is being listened to critically? By adopting the title "musical aesthetics," it is plain that the concern is the sensitive perception of music.

It is clearly evident that both Scholes' and Adler's conception of music education act in harmony. The use of such terms as masterpiece (Scholes) and masterworks (Adler) to denote the substance of the class material point to their compatibility. The more important concern shared by both men, as well as the reconstructionist, is the emphasis on cognition. Through cognition, experiences are made known. With each
experience, one moves further toward self realization and is better able to fulfill his role in improving society.

As stated at the outset of the thesis, the ultimate goal of a musical aesthetics program is facilitating the growth of an individual's critical listening skills for the development of a musical person. Contrary to popular belief, a person is not musical simply because he is a competent performer or composer. To be musical is to be sensitive to musical stimuli. Musical sensitivity is required of the listener as well as the composer and performer. Révész goes to great extents in defining the musical person. He claims that,

The musical person possesses a deep understanding of musical forms and the structure or movement plan of the work. He has a finely developed sense of style and of the strict organization of musical processes of thought. He is able to follow the composer's intentions, even at times to anticipate them. It is also characteristic of the musical person to sink himself into the mood of the music and achieve a relation to it that has an affect on his whole spiritual being. He experiences the art work so inwardly and so profoundly that he feels as though he were creating it. This "creative" act is peculiar to the musical person not only during the mere aesthetic assimilation, but also in the interpretation of musical works. The possession of these qualities express itself in the ability to judge and evaluate the artistic quality of musical works. Musicality... irradiates the whole individual, and accordingly forms a characteristic trait of the personality as a whole.3
It is from such a conception of what it means to be musical that the musical aesthetics class should be founded and offered in the American public schools. Without such courses, the people's education will be shortchanged. For if students are left to acquire understanding vicariously, the whole domain of music may remain for them as distant as a star. As a consequence of their alienation from music, the full potential of each student is never realized. The principal goal of education, as a result, has failed. The failure to develop the individual brings with it the failure of education's second goal — education for active participation in society. The incomplete individual is not able to participate in society fully and will thus be a detriment to reconstructionism. The only goal that has even the slightest chance of being fulfilled is the third and least essential — education for the purpose of earning a living. Yet, it can be argued that not even this goal is attainable if a person's musical sensitivities are not sufficiently developed. When an individual's potential is not realized, he may not be employed in an occupation that is appropriate for him. Such situations have obvious consequences to one's mental health. A dampening of the possibility for further individual growth and apathy toward an active role in society are inevitable.

The situation of the populace being comprised of a citizenry unfit for proper criticism does not change the requirements demanded of an individual and his role as a critic. It is only through the development of humanistic criticism as offered by
objective musical aesthetics that this problem will be eradicated and societal reconstruction occur. Ideally, then, the individual should be a liberally educated person. As recently suggested by Eisner, and centuries ago by Plato, criticism as employed with and through aesthetics, expands perceptual habits and teaches one how to look that more might be seen and seen accurately. The result is that people develop both the attitudes and the skills to experience, analyze, interpret and describe, enabling and encouraging students to join in the continuing conversation about the nature and meaning of art and life.5
NOTES

CHAPTER 1


10Wood, 19.

11Adler, *Program*, 141-142.

12Adler, *Program*, 142. In this statement, a very interesting question arises: Does one not come to know by doing? The answer for most is obvious — yes, of course. This is especially true for the Paideia Group whose guardian (John Dewey) is the father of experience education in the United States. The point the Paideia Group is making is that some (those without a talent in the production of art) still need to know art, and those that can produce, need to know from other perspectives. Furthermore, without going to far afield into matters of prescriptive pedagogy, the Paideia Group maintains that learning through critical analysis (the Socratic method) "... is the kind of learning that last a lifetime and is of greatest importance in the use of our minds and the conduct of our lives" (*Program*, 182).


14Adler, *Program*, 151.


21Adler, *Program*, 146.

22Adler, *Program*, 147.

23One small and easily reconciled problem this writer has with an indirect suggestion from the philosophy of the Paideia Group in relation to what should be covered in the masterworks class stems from the use of the descriptor "great works." With their perennialist tendencies, the Group is based largely on the time honored "great works" in all facets of study. In fact, as an appendix to the third book (*The Paideia Program*), there is a list of recommended readings for seminars and other discussions comprised of nothing but such writings. The complaint here is not that these writings or great works of other sorts are not "great" and worthy of study, but that there also exist a wealth of great contemporary works which are worthy of consideration. It is, after all, the new that one must learn to judge. The old has, for better or worse, already been so judged. It is to a great extent, within this point that the perennialist and reconstructionist part company. Do we learn by hashing through what was and learn from our successes (the "great" works) only; or do we approach the unknown (be they of the past or the present) and experience failures (the "not-so-great" works) as well as successes?


26See Adler, *Proposal; and Problems; and Program.*


CHAPTER 2


2Adler, *Program*, 47.

3Adler, *Program*, 55.


11Adler, *Program*, 51-54.

12Adler, *Program*, 51.

13Adler, *Program*, 51.

14Adler, *Program*, 35.

15Adler, *Program*, 17.

16Adler, *Program*, 17.

17Adler, *Program*, 17.


19Adler, *Program*, 17.

20Adler, *Program*, 17.


30 Adler, *Program*, 151.

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CHAPTER 3


3 Montessori, 34-35.

4 Montessori, 30.

5 Montessori, 35.


9Maritain, 1-28 passim.


15For a well deduced explanation of the reformer versus the radical see Pratte, 209-217.


18Kohl, 60.

19George S. Counts, Dare the Schools Build a New Social Order? (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1982), 25.

20Counts, 34.

CHAPTER 4

1Susanne K. Langer, Problems of Art: Ten Philosophical Lectures (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957), 75.

2Langer, 79.


5Blocker, 42-43.

6Blocker, 95.

7Blocker, 136.


10 Langer, 163. In the terms of this writing, objective expressionism — not total abstraction. For a further understanding of Langer's use of the term abstract see her Problems of Art, 163-180 passim.

CHAPTER 5


2 Auden, 127.


5 Carl Dahlhaus, Esthetics of Music, Translated by William Austin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 84.

6 Dahlhaus, 88.

7 Greene, 12-13.


12Kerman, 123. Italics mine.

13Gardner, 328.


18Beardsley, "Name and Nature," 159.


22 Gardner, 324.

23 Gardner, 326-328.


CHAPTER 6


7Aschenbrenner, 2.


11Kaelin, 101.


14Morgan, 40.

15Morgan, 40.

16Lincoln A. Baxter, "Recent Music: The Intentional Fallacy Restored," *Journal of Aesthetic and Art Criticism* (Fall 1980), 78.

17Baxter, 79.

18Morgan, 172-188.

20. Hindemith, 1; 2.


25. It is suggested that the reader consider the writings of F. S. C. Northrop with this matter of truth.


29Smith, *JAC*, 41.

30Smith, *JAC*, 43.


33Rowell, 184.

34Meyer, 36.

35Meyer, 28.

36Meyer, 37.

CHAPTER 7

1Igor Stravinsky, *Symphonies of Wind Instruments* (*Symphonies d'Instruments à vent*), 1947. (New York: Boosey & Hawkes, Inc., 1952) Stravinsky composed two versions of the *Symphonies d'Instruments à vent* — one in 1920 and the other in 1947. The criticism to follow concerns the latter of the two versions.
CHAPTER 8


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