MODERNIZATION AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY:
A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL
EXPLORATION

THESIS

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The present study is an effort to examine and understand the relationship between modernization and political instability. The following chapters focus on the effects of modernization on political instability. Data on twenty-four African nations are analyzed to test empirically the validity of the hypothesis.

This thesis has been divided into four chapters. Chapter I introduces the subject matter, states the purpose of the thesis, and presents some contending hypotheses that seek to explain various forms of violent political behavior. Consequently, it introduces the major concern of this study--the modernization-instability hypothesis. Lastly, the concept of modernization is defined and some indicators (characteristics) of modernization are presented.

Chapter II further discusses the relationship between modernization and political instability. It introduces the concept of political violence and reviews the literature concerning the hypothesized causal relationship between modernization and political instability.
Chapter III is an effort to study empirically the effects of modernization on political instability. To avoid the risk of over-generalization from one continent to another, only the African nations with adequate data are analyzed. Therefore, this empirical research only applies to the twenty-four African nations under study.

Chapter IV concludes the thesis by offering a general summary and conclusions.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>I. INTRODUCTION</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some Theories of Political Instability/Violence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Concept of Modernization/Social Mobilization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics of Modernization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>II. MODERNIZATION AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY</strong></td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anomie, Role Conflict, Group Consciousness and Political Instability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modernization, Rise of New Groups, Political Participation and Instability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modernization and the Origins of Conflict: Rapid Economic Growth and Instability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF MODERNIZATION AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY</strong></td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of Variables/Operationalization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statistical Method</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results and Findings</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IV. GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS</strong></td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFERENCES</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Patterns of Modernization</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. List of Countries, Variables and Data (N=24)</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Deaths From Domestic Political Violence (1948-1977) Regressed on Social Mobilization and Economic Development (N=24)</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Expected and Actual Relationships Between Modernization and Political Instability</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Need Satisfaction and Revolution</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Decremental Deprivation</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Aspirational Deprivation</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Progressive Deprivation</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Histogram of Frequencies of Deaths From Domestic Political Violence 1948-1977 (N=24)</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Scattergrams of Residuals Plotted Against Radios Owned Per 1000 Population (1975)</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Scattergrams of Residuals Plotted Against the Predicted Number of Deaths From Domestic Political Violence</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Histogram of Frequencies of Logarithmic Transformed Deaths From Domestic Political Violence 1948-1977 (N=24)</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This thesis is an effort to understand the hypothesis that modernization induces political instability (Huntington, 1968, pp. 40-41). In this thesis, I refer to this hypothesis as the "modernization-instability" hypothesis. To assess the status of this hypothesis, I review some competing theoretical perspectives about the relationship between modernization and political instability, then seek to test the hypothesis in an empirical study of twenty-four modernizing African nations. The proponents of the modernization-instability hypothesis are numerous. They include Huntington (1965; 1968, pp. 40-41), Pye (1962, pp. 54-55), Apter (1970, pp. 158-159; 1965, pp. 123-124), Weiner and Hoselitz (1961, pp. 173-174) and many others.

Nations "in the process of modernization" may also be referred to as "transitional" nations. Before going further, it is important to clarify what I mean by the term "transition." Influenced by Max Weber's ideal-type classification of society, LaPalombara posits that societies are categorized into three major types--"traditional", "transitional", and "modern" (1966). In traditional societies, politics is considered to be functionally
diffused, lacking structural differentiation and specialized structures for dealing with political decisions. Recruitment into the political system is mainly a function of ascription (by race, sex, religion) rather than merit or achievement (LaPalombara, 1966, p. 76). At the other extreme is "modern" society. Here, political roles and functions are very organized and specific, and political decisions are based on "universalistic criteria". Authority is exercised based on written documents and the society is guided by the rule of the law. The output of the system does not penalize persons because of race or sex, and does not reward them because of kinship or friendship (LaPalombara, 1966, p. 77). In addition, recruitment is based on merit as opposed to ascribed status.

Between the two extremes—"traditional" and "modern"—lies "transitional." Transitional societies are characterized by the coexistence of traditional and modern paradigms (LaPalombara, 1966, p. 77). At this level of development, a problem of instability caused by incompatibility between traditional roles and modern lifestyles arises (Apter, 1970, p. 158; Pye, 1962, pp. 54-55; Pye, 1966, pp. 123-124; Huntington, 1968, pp. 40-41). Why such a formulation (combination of modern and traditional values) necessarily induces political instability is the subject—matter of this study, and it will be explored in detail in later chapters.
The work of Samuel Huntington (1965, pp. 386-430; 1968, pp. 40-41, 59) constitutes the major focus of this research. The pages to follow are filled with his arguments and the arguments of other social scientists who tend to support or oppose his views.

Some Theories of Political Instability/Violence

"Modernization" and "Political instability" are concepts which have gained a general acknowledgment and acceptance in social science literature. Varied definitions and interpretations have been given to them and many factors have been addressed as preconditions for their occurrence. Political violence, as an aspect of political instability, has been of special concern to politicians, individual citizens and scholars. Violent behavior has been exhibited by those in the government, by those in the process of gaining power, and by some aggrieved individuals or groups in asserting their demands.

While the magnitude of overt conflict or violence in the United States, Great Britain, and other industrialized nations has been slight, many less industrialized nations, especially African nations, have been torn with strife. Since violent conflict has been so pervasive, many theories or hypotheses have been advanced to attempt to explain the root causes of violence. Before discussing some of those
theories, it is necessary to define "violence" as it will be used in this study.

According to Ted Gurr, "violence refers to all collective attacks within a political community against the political regime, its actors--including competing political groups as well as incumbents or its policies" (1970, p. 4). This definition includes, in a broader category, revolutions, guerrilla wars, coups detat, rebellions, and riots. It also includes the threat or use of force by any party or institution to achieve some end within or outside the political order.

However, Gurr maintains that this definition does not necessarily mean that all violent acts are bad. He argues that "limited violence can be useful for rulers and for a political system generally, especially as an expression of social malaise when the means for making demands are inadequate" (1970, p. 4).

For Jean-Marie Domenach, violence can be seen from three perspectives:

a) the psychological, from which violence is an explosion of force assuming an irrational and often murderous form;

b) the ethical, which sees violence as an attack on the property and liberty of others;
c) the political, in which violence is the use of force
to seize power or to misappropriate it for some ends
(Domenach, 1981, p. 28).

She argues that it is the third aspect, political violence,
that occupies the central concern of the students of
political instability. Domenach's definition of violence
includes such phenomena as riots, strikes, political
assassinations, deaths from political violence, protest
demonstrations, terrorism, coups, and revolutions (1981,
p. 29-38).

Many other social scientists have linked political
violence to economic conditions. Their primary argument is
that the distribution of wealth and status, and the general
state of economic development within a society are very
powerful preconditions for political violence. For
instance, James Davies argues that a rapid decline in
economic conditions triggers political violence (1962).

According to Davies, "revolutions" are apt to occur
when a long period of economic development is followed by a
short, sudden period of downturn (Davies, 1962). Davies
argues that the motivating force is not advancement or
decline, but both. Thus, he conceives of two types of
satisfaction: "expected need satisfaction" and "actual need
satisfaction" (Davies, 1962, pp. 7-8). The former is what
the social groups expect to achieve, and the later what they
are currently achieving. He points out that under normal
circumstance, there will be some gap between expectation and satisfaction. But the crucial question is how much gap?

![Diagram showing need satisfaction and revolution](image)

Fig. 1--Need Satisfaction and Revolution.
Source: Modified from J. Davies, 1962.

From Figure 1, a modified version of Davies' "expected need satisfaction" and "actual need satisfaction", one can see that when the gap is narrow, the society's groups can tolerate it, and so stability is ensured. But if the gap widens too much and too suddenly, it becomes intolerable and so "revolution" occurs. The intolerable gap occurs because of a short period of sudden economic downturn which makes the actual need satisfaction line drop sharply while the expectation line continues to go up. As he stated in his article:

Revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp
reversal. The all-important effect on the minds of people in a particular society is to produce, during the former period, an expection of continued ability to satisfy needs—which continue to rise—and, during the latter, a mental state of anxiety and frustration when manifest reality breaks away from anticipated reality (Davies, 1971, p. 179).

Davies argues that political stability and instability are a function of the state of mind, a mood, in a society (1971, p. 179). For instance, satisfied or apathetic individuals who are poverty stricken, lower in status and power can remain quiet politically, while those who are rich with high status and power can revolt. On the other hand, poor people can revolt while rich people remain quiet or tend to oppose revolution. It is, as he argues, the dissatisfied state of mind rather than tangible provision of sufficient or insufficient supplies of food, equality or liberty which induces revolution (1962, p. 6; 1971, p. 179).

Ted Gurr's theory of "civil violence" is very similar to Davies' theory of "revolution." Gurr addresses Davies' "gap" in the concept of "Relative-deprivation" (1970, p. 24). For Gurr, the most likely precondition of political violence is the perception of relative deprivation. Relative Deprivation (RD) is a state of discontent that develops when people perceive a discrepancy between what they think they
should have and what they actually have. Gurr believes that "the potential for violence varies strongly with the intensity and the scope of relative deprivation among the members of a collectivity" (1970, p. 24). This means that the more aspirations are thwarted, the greater the anger and the greater the agrieved's propensity toward violence. Gurr argues that when people feel thwarted in an effort to achieve something they want they become angry. The most satisfying response to anger is to strike at the source of the frustration. Thus, frustration normally leads to aggression (1970, esp. p. 24).

Three patterns of Relative Deprivation (RD) are specified by Gurr to demonstrate how RD leads to violence (1970, pp. 46-56). These patterns reflect how discrepancy occurs between value-expectations (what a group thinks it should have) and value-capabilities (what the group actually has), and how the discrepancy leads to frustration which in turn leads to violence.

The first pattern, "decremental deprivation," occurs when a group's value-expectations remain fairly constant over time but ruling political elite capabilities to meet those expectations are seen to decline (Gurr, 1970, p. 46). Figure 2, a modified graph of "decremental deprivation," depicts a situation where a "group consensus about justifiable value positions has varied little over time, but
in which the average attainable value position or potential is perceived to decline substantially" (Gurr, 1970, p. 46).

Accordingly, people in this situation are frustrated because they lost what they thought they once had or could have. The value position or capabilities may fall because of declining production of material goods or because of the declining capabilities of the ruling government to provide order or prevent crisis situations. Regressive taxation, loss of political influence by the ruling elites or the effect of opposition groups (especially political parties), can lead to a decline in capabilities of the group in question.

The second pattern of Relative Deprivation is "aspirational deprivation". According to Gurr, it occurs
high

value expectations

aspirational RD that leads to violence

collective value position

value capabilities (potential)

low

Time

Fig. 3--Aspirational deprivation.


when the capabilities (potential) remain relatively static while expectations increase (1970, p. 50). The people in this situation are angered because they feel that they have no means of attaining the intensified expectations (Figure 3). The source of such intensified expectations may come from demands for new standards hitherto not enjoyed--political order, justice, liberty, equality. Modernization also increases such expectations because it exposes traditional people to knowledge and better material ways of life.

The last pattern of RD is what Gurr calls "progressive deprivation" (1970, p. 52). This model of RD depicts a situation in which there is substantial and simultaneous
increase in expectations and decrease in capabilities. This model is a generalized version of Davies' "expected need satisfaction" versus "actual need satisfaction" which assumes that revolutions occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal (previously discussed).

Figure 4 depicts a modified version of "progressive RD", where the long run improvement in the group's value position generates expectations about further improvement. However, if the value capabilities or potential decline remain static after a long period of improvement, "progressive RD" results. Economic depression in a growing economy is one of the factors that leads to progressive Relative Deprivation.

In sum, the RD models correspond in general terms to many preconditions for political violence. Gurr also believes that relative deprivation depends upon several factors. First, a group can control its discontentment when it has some alternative means of achieving its expectations (1970, pp. 73-79). The intervening factor (the alternative means) is what Gurr calls "Value Opportunities". The more opportunities a group believes it has or will have in the future, the less it feels relatively deprived. Such opportunities might include the chances for the group to get redress for its grievances.
James Davies lays emphasis on the difference between "expected need satisfaction" and "actual need satisfaction" while Ted Gurr emphasizes the "relative deprivation" gap between expectations and capabilities. In contrast, Chalmers Johnson argues that for a proper understanding of political violence, social context within which it occurs should be considered. For him, violence results from the "breakdown of consensual norms," "political alienation" and "erosion of legitimacy" (1966, p. 91). Johnson's argument is influenced by Aristotle's ideas concerning the causes of violence. Thus Johnson, in *Revolutionary Change*, cites Aristotle's
datum that "the seeds of instability and change are to be found in the form of the social structure itself" (1966, p. 5). Johnson claims that violence arises when and where there has been little or no adaptation to structural changes within the society. Structural changes produce pressures on the society, and when the society is unable to accommodate those pressures, violence abounds. To understand Johnson's view, we need to look at his four sources of pressures for structural change (Johnson, 1966, p. 106). They are:

a) "exogenous (foreign) value changing", the emergence of external reference groups, such as a neighboring society;
b) "endogenous (domestic) value changing", such as religious innovation or the secularization of ideas;
c) "exogenous environment changing", such as foreign conquest; and
d) "endogenous environment changing", such as technological change.

These environmental changes bring the introduction of technology, economic development, changing skills, and increasing knowledge among and within the domestic classes.

Transformations, especially in technology, reduce mortality rates and increase population. As the population increases, new people emerge with new demands and perceptions and different life styles which the young
government might be unable to shoulder. Such changes also usually produce migration from rural to urban areas. They expose a society to what Johnson calls "disequilibrium," i.e. a circumstance in which a society is changing and must change further if it is to continue to exist (1966, p. 91).

Johnson asserts that a "disequilibrated" society is characterized by some factors capable of inducing revolution during the period of change (1966, pp. 91-92). First, the society may suffer from "power deflation", the lack of capability or force to integrate the changes and aspirations of the society. For Johnson, the integration of the system depends largely on maintenance and deployment of force by the regime.

The second factor is what Johnson calls "the quality of the purposeful change" being undertaken in the disequilibrated society. By this he means that if the change being sought is not favored by the society, or if the regime is unable to come up with policies which will keep the confidence of the masses high, the result is "loss of authority or legitimacy." The loss of legitimacy leads to the "accelerators" (the final aggregate of pressure) which triggers revolution (1966, p. 92).

There are three kinds of "accelerators:"

1) break in the effectiveness of the armed forces;
2) an increase in the belief or the ideology of the protesting group that it will succeed in overcoming the elite's forces, and

3) some conspiracy (say, guerrilla warfare) launched against the elite's forces (Johnson, 1966, p. 99).

Johnson's argument can be summarized into this diagram (1966, p. 104).

Power deflation + Loss of + Accelerators = Revolution Authority

Johnson's arguments mesh well with the theory of the "revolution of rising expectations" (1966, p. 60-62). He cites De Tocqueville's study of the French Revolution of 1789 in support of this contention. After an analysis of economic and social decline in the seventeenth century and increase in the eighteenth, Tocqueville found that France was enjoying enormous prosperity on the eve of the revolution.

It was precisely in those parts of France where there had been most improvement that popular discontent ran highest. This may seem illogical--but history is full of such paradoxes. For it is not always when things are from bad to worse that revolution breaks out. It oftener happens that when a people which has put up with an oppressive rule over a long period without protest suddenly finds the government relaxing its
pressure, it takes up arms against it (Johnson, 1966, p. 60).

According to Johnson, the government of France was completely absorbed with a struggle for "medieval privileges" to such an extent that it forgot to fortify itself against "feudal reaction". Thus revolution resulted. Therefore "given the disequilibrated condition and the elites loss of power/authority, should some factor intervene to prevent the elite from maintaining its monopoly of force, a revolutionary insurrection will occur" (Johnson, 1966, p. 98).

Like Johnson's hypothesis of political violence, the modernization-instability hypothesis considers such factors as the breakdown of consensual norms, political efficacy, the cohesiveness of the elite and legitimacy as preconditions for political violence (Huntington, 1968, p. 47). In Chapter II the argument about this hypothesis will be explored further. But for now, the modernization-instability school is seen as positing that societies in transition experience economic development and social mobilization which are assumed to produce new social groups with different tastes, life styles, and demands that constitute an overload on the political system. For Huntington, Deutsch, Pye, Apter and others, such an overload incapacitates the controlling mechanisms of the young government and so violent behavior results.
The preceding discussions show, as a matter of fact, that there are different conceptual as well as theoretical orientations of the scholars of political violence in their explanations for the origin of violence. Given these different explanations, it becomes obvious that no one explanation offers a complete and exhaustive explication of violent behavior. At best, they are inter-related and therefore should be treated as such. Therefore, these explanations are meaningful and useful so far as they are considered as complimentary with regard to their utility in understanding the character and problems of political violence in developing nations. In African nations, as well as other nations in transition, violent behavior is often characterized or caused by a combination of factors suggested by social scientists.

Despite the usefulness of these hypotheses, most of them suffer some serious problems. For instance, it is not easy to measure such psychological factors--anger, frustration, discontent or the "mood of the society." In analyzing the character and pattern of political instability/violence, it is proper to look at the more encompassing explanation of violence, the modernization-instability hypothesis.

The Concept of Modernization/Social Mobilization

Most social scientists agree that the term "modernization" involves a transformation from old to new
ways of life. For example, Ward and Rustow in *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, define "modernization" as "a process with a long-range cultural and social change accepted by members of the changing society as beneficial, inevitable or on balance desirable" (1964, pp. 3-4). They argue that modernization includes such things as industrialization of the economy, secularization of ideas, increase in geographical and social mobility, the spread in scientific and technical education, and increase in standard of living, and a transition from ascribed to achieved status (1964, p. 4).

In *Revolution In The Third World*, Chaliand defines modernization as a complex process that denotes "upheavals aimed at more or less totally changing the traditional social, economic and cultural structures" (1978, p. 3). For Chaliand, economic modernization could be achieved by expropriation, redistribution, collectivization or by introducing new techniques of doing and organizing work, as long as the process is carried out "with thoroughness and determination" (1978, p. 3).

David Apter defines modernization as a process characterized by industrialization (1970, p. 157). For Apter, modernization is the emergence of industrial roles in nonindustrial societies. Thus "modernization represents the spread of roles originating in societies with industrial
infrastructure, serving functional purposes in industrial process, to systems lacking an industrial infrastructure" (1970, p. 58). Apter maintains that development means expansion of choices, and that choices expand as man increases his capabilities to understand nature. To understand and control nature, innovation is crucial. Development also means the ability to reduce scarcity and enlarge choice. For Apter, the realization of those ends is what modernization is all about (Apter, 1971, p. 18).

To Pye, modernization involves changes in three major areas of human engagement—political, economic and social (1962, p. 39). In the political domain, modernization involves producing organizations able to aggregate and articulate diverse interests into public policies and capable of guiding the organizations of the society. In the economic domain, modernization involves the creation of many organizations, such as firms, factories, industries, mass media, and transportation. Socially, modernization involves the creation of strong and adaptable organization to provide an individual with the necessary array of choices for association, so that whenever he leaves his family, he finds it easy to attach himself somewhere.

Special attention should be paid to Black's definition of modernization, because it is all-encompassing. For Black, modernization refers to "the process of rapid change in human affairs" (1966, p. 5). It is
the dynamic form that the age-old process of innovation has assumed as a result of the explosive proliferation of knowledge in recent centuries. It owes its special significance both to its dynamic character and to the universality of its impact on human affairs—it is a process by which historically evolved institutions are adapted to the rapidly changing functions that reflect the unprecedented increase in man's knowledge, permitting control over his environment, that accompany the scientific revolution. It involves political and social changes that accompany industrialization (1966, pp. 6-7).

Black discusses five levels of modernization: intellectual, political, economic, social and psychological (1966, pp. 9-26). At the intellectual level, modernization denotes the effort of man to understand the environment around him. Politically, modernization is concerned with the consolidation or aggregation and articulation of demands into public policy.

Economically, modernization involves efforts to save and invest. Traditional societies are little concerned with savings and investments. Economically, modernization also involves a shift from subsistence agriculture to commercialized agriculture, service corporations, manufacturing corporations and industries.
Socially, modernization involves increases in education and literacy, improvements in health, a struggle for a more equal distribution of income, and urbanization. Thus socially, modernization has broken the ties of tradition and so let loose the people to migrate from rural areas to urban areas. Finally, psychological modernization involves "the perception of individual human beings that everything depends"--norms and standards do change and such changes are brought about by modernization. In Black's words:

The norms by which parents live may be out of date by the time the children grow up, and behavior patterns are constantly changing as a result of altered social conditions and the influence of foreign ways of life (1966, p. 25).

For Samuel Huntington, modernization refers to a "multifaceted process involving changes in all (emphasis mine) areas of human thought and activity" (1968, p. 32). To Huntington, there are two levels of modernization--the psychological level and the intellectual level. At the psychological level, modernization means a basic shift in values, attitudes and expectations. For instance, while traditional man is hesitant in accepting changes, modern man, in contrast, embraces changes easily. At the intellectual level, modernization involves a great increase in man's knowledge about his surroundings through increased literacy, mass communications and education.
However, Huntington identifies two aspects of modernization most relevant to politics. The first aspect, economic development, refers to the growth in the total economic activity and output of a society (1968, pp. 33-34). The economic activity could be measured by such things as per capita gross national product and level of industrialization. The second aspect, social mobilization, fundamentally agrees with the definition of social mobilization offered by Karl Deutsch (Huntington, 1968, p. 33; Deutsch, 1961, p. 494).

Karl Deutsch first introduced the concept of "social mobilization" into the social science literature. He defines social mobilization as "a process in which major clusters of old social, economical and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior" (1961, p. 494). He argues that social mobilization is something that happens to a large mass of people in the process of modernization, and that modernization is a process whereby advanced, non-traditional practices in culture and technology are introduced and accepted (1961, p. 494).

In addition, Huntington identifies four types of political modernization. They include political consciousness, increased political participation, rationalization of authority and differentiation of political functions (Huntington, 1968, pp. 32-39).
First, modernization brings industrialization which brings class consciousness as well as group consciousness of all kinds—tribe, region, clan, religion and occupation. According to Huntington, African tribal consciousness was almost nonexistent in traditional rural life. For him, tribalism was a product of the Western impact on traditional society.

Second, political modernization involves increased participation in politics by social groups or individuals throughout the society (Huntington, 1968, pp. 34-35). Mass participation in politics is assumed to enhance control of the people by the government because the people feel that their inputs are considered in the decision-making process.

Third, political modernization includes rationalization of authority. By "rationalization of authority," Huntington means that traditional family or ethnic political authorities are replaced by a unified or central political authority.

Fourth, political modernization also involves the differentiation of new political functions and the creation of specialized structures to perform those functions (Huntington, 1968, p. 34). For instance, legal, military, administrative and scientific functions should be separated from the political realm.
In summary, modernization is a term that generally describes a number of transformations in social organizations. Many of the interpretations assume modernization to be the embodiment of economic, social, psychological and political phenomena that are associated with an increasingly complex organization of industrial production. Economically, modernization presupposes the application of new technology to productive processes in order to bring about greater increases in human productivity. Sociologically, modernization connotes increased differentiation of social structures and the formation of new social institutions. Politically, modernization gives rise to the evolution of highly differentiated and specialized political institutions and greater demands for political participation. In all, industrialization is the substantive and vital component of modernization and provides an impetus for the transformation of subsistence agriculture to a commercialized one.

With the concept of modernization introduced, it is appropriate to identify the factors that characterize modernization. Or, how do we measure the term "modernization?"

Characteristics of Modernization

As the preceding discussion has indicated, modernization is a concept, and as a concept, it is a general
codification of experience and observations. It is one thing to demonstrate the importance of modernization in abstract or intuitive form. It is another to describe how it is introduced into a scientific language. And in fact, how modernization is introduced into a scientific language determines to a large extent its usefulness. As defined, modernization is a term that explains a great number of changes in all aspects of life—economic, social, political and psychological. With this definition, modernization must be operationalized into a set of observable variables. Thus, in this study, operationalization of modernization denotes a method for observing and recording those aspects of modernization that are relevant to testing our hypothesis—modernization induces political instability. In a research establishing connections between concepts and their empirical references are of utmost importance. Yet, not all suggested measures of a concept, as we will later see, lend themselves easily amenable to operationalizations.

This section, suggests a number of measures of modernization. To be sure, some of these operationalizations are used in Chapter III to test empirically the validity of the modernization-instability hypothesis. A number of social indicators have been suggested by some of the social scientists who argue that
modernization induces political instability. Two aspects of modernization are considered very crucial to politics and our operations are limited to them. They are economic development and social mobilization (Huntington, 1968, p. 33).

The concept of economic development could be operationally measured, according to Samuel Huntington, by the nation's growth in per capita gross national product, level of industrialization and level of individual welfare measured by such indices as life expectancy, supply of hospitals, and doctors (1968, pp. 33-34). The second concept is social mobilization which involves transformations in the aspirations of individuals, groups and societies. Karl Deutsch states that social mobilization is something that happens to a society undergoing modernization and that it could be operationally measured by such variables as exposure to technology and mass media, change in residence, urbanization, shift from agricultural to manufacturing or industrial occupations, increase in the gross national product, and increases in literacy and education (1961, p. 495).

There are, to be sure, other measures of modernization such as change from ascribed to achieved status, change from particularistic criteria to universalistic criteria and secularization of ideas (Ward and Rustow, 1964, p. 4). Samuel Huntington also argues that modernization breeds corruption
which breeds instability (1968, pp. 59-65). But these measures pose serious problems of measurements.

Given some major explanations or hypotheses about violent behavior, the concept of modernization, and its characteristics, it is therefore appropriate to examine in detail the effect of modernization on political stability. This is the subject matter of Chapter Three.
CHAPTER II

MODERNIZATION AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY

What effect does modernization have on political instability? This is the cardinal question of this thesis and it will be discussed in this chapter. To restate, the "modernization-breeds-instability" school posits that modernization with all its ramifications induces political instability, especially in developing nations in the process of transition.

Anomie, Role Conflict, Group Consciousness and Political Instability

One of the often cited arguments in support of the modernization-instability hypothesis links modernization with changes in norms and values, role conflict and group consciousness. The underlying argument is that modernization is a process characterized by changes in norms and values that invariably cause upheavals and disorientations within the society. These upheavals in turn weaken the solidarity that hitherto has tied the society together, thereby rendering the controlling mechanisms of the state incapacitated. Psychological stress emerges and this stress leads to political instability (Huntington, 1968, pp. 32-37).
At the psychological level, modernization calls for a shift in fundamental values, attitudes and expectations. To Huntington, the traditional man is very hesitant as regards to accepting technological innovations while the modern man, in contrast, accepts technological innovations and its desirability (1968, p. 32). The differences in values and attitudes are products of modernization and they tend to heighten conflicts within the transitional societies.

Again, Huntington argues that social change disrupts traditional, social and political groups and also breaks the hitherto growing loyalty to traditional authorities (1968, p. 37). The leaders (in fact the traditional leaders) do face the challenges from the new elite of civil servants, school teachers and other young school leavers whose skills, resources and aspirations are hardly met.

In many traditional societies the most important social unit was the extended family, which itself often constituted a small civil society performing political, economic, welfare, security, religious and other social functions. Under the impact of modernization, however, the extended family begins to disintegrate and is replaced by the nuclear family which is too small, too isolated and too weak to perform these functions (1968, p. 37). Modernization therefore produces alienation and anomie, normlessness generated by the conflict of old values and new
ones just like the biblical phrase which says that if one "puts new wine into old wineskins, the wine will burst the skins, and the wine is lost."

Huntington further argues that while modernization breaks up traditional institutions, it also creates new group consciousness such as tribalism and regionalism. He contends that the word "tribalism" was almost unknown in African nations until the advance of modernization forces from the Western World. For instance, in Southern Nigeria, "Yoruba Consciousness" was first used by Anglican Missionaries in the nineteenth century (Huntington, 1968, p. 38). One of the goals of modernizing nations, has been to achieve national integration. But in most, if not all modernizing nations, nation-building is very far fetched and sometimes the effort to achieve it leads to conflict--or civil war. One of the ways to test whether a nation has been built is to ask the citizens of that nation "what are you?" In the USA or Great Britain for example, the obvious answer would be "I am an American" or "I am British." But in Nigeria, a large proportion of the citizens will obviously answer "I am Ibo" or "I am Yoruba" or "I am Hausa" rather than "I am Nigerian." Accordingly, such groupings render the effort of creating strong political institutions nil.

In addition, group consciousness generates group prejudice which leads to group conflict. Such conflict
might be intensified if tribalism or regionalism has
destroyed the effectiveness of the political institutions.
According to Huntington, ethnic groups which once lived in a
peaceful coexistence in traditional society become aroused
to violent conflict as a result of the interaction, the
tensions, the inequalities created by social and economic
modernization (1968, p. 39). Modernization, therefore
enhances conflict among traditional groups, and also between
traditional groups and the modern ones. The new elites with
their acquired modern education come into conflict with the
traditional elites whose authority has rested on ascribed
status. These conflicts often find their expressions in
outright violence.

The Nigerian civil war which began in 1967 and ended in
1970 is a good example of a war generated by communal
divisiveness and prejudices, especially within the officer
corps (Nodlinger, 1977, pp. 41-42). According to Nodlinger,
the issue of tribal-regional representation generated mutual
resentments and fears within the army and eventually led to
civil war. The Hausa-Fulani tribes in the North favored
the use of a quota system as a standard for promotion within
the army. The Ibo tribe favored the use of a merit system.
As a result of this disagreement, Ibo tribe officers carried
out a military coup de'tat that ousted the previous civilian
government. But the Hausa and Fulani tribes in the North
and the Yoruba tribe in the West quickly took vengeance.
Ibos were massacred by the tens of thousands and their futile attempts to secede from Nigeria, under the name Biafra, were overcome by military force.

Modernization, according to Samuel Huntington, also breeds corruption which destabilizes the society (1968, pp. 59-64). "Corruption is a behavior of public officials which deviates from accepted norms in order to serve private ends" (1968, p. 59). Modernization breeds corruption; corruption breeds violence.

Why does modernization breed corruption? First, Huntington argues that modernization involves a change in the basic values of a society. Modernization brings with it the universalistic and achievement based norms, and the assumptions that individual citizens have rights against the state and equal obligations to the state (Huntington, 1968, p. 60). These new norms are first tapped by the students, educators and the new elites. These groups start, as a matter of modernization, to judge the society by these new norms; to call into question the old norms and standards which hitherto have been accorded legitimacy. For instance, some distinction begins to be made between the King's role as a King and his role as a private citizen. Thus the awareness of such distinction goes a long way to tag some usually accepted behavior as corrupt.

Second, modernization contributes to corruption because it produces new sources of wealth and power whose
relationship to politics is not clear-cut by traditional norms. Corruption develops because the newly-emerging groups want to use their new positions and wealth to gain access to politics (Huntington, 1968, p. 61). Thus corruption develops as a result of the rise of new groups with new resources and their efforts to make themselves effective within the decision-making apparatus.

Third, modernization breeds corruption by changes it produces in the output side of the political system—policies and laws (Huntington, 1968, pp. 61-62). Modernization with its ramifications involves many changes within the society, and as the changes multiply so do the activities of the government and the laws. According to Huntington, some of the laws put some people at a disadvantage and these people become a potential source of corruption. Thus the multiplication of laws, multiplies the possibilities of corruption. Why such multiplication of laws gives rise to corruption is debatable and this issue is addressed again in Chapter IV.

How does corruption induce violence or political instability? Samuel Huntington argues that the initial adherence to modern values and norms by a group in a transitional society often takes an extreme and radical form. The mad quest for modern standards (universalistic, achievement-based norms) leads to a denial and the rejection of bargaining and compromise or logrolling, which are
essential to smooth running politics (Huntington, 1968, p. 62). Thus in the extreme case the antagonism to corruption or the fanatical anticorruption mentality can take a radical form of revolution or pull the military to take over the government. In the words of Samuel Huntington:

The functions, as well as the causes, of corruption are similar to those of violence. Both are encouraged by modernization; both are symptomatic of the weakness of political institutions; both are characteristic of what we shall subsequently call praetorian societies; both are means by which individuals and groups relate themselves to the political system and, indeed, participate in the system in ways which violate the mores of the system. Hence, the society which has a high capacity for corruption also has a high capacity for violence (1968, p. 63).

Lucian Pye is another scholar who argues that modernization changes norms and values thereby rendering society unstable. Pye's argument runs thus:

First, there is the problem of certainty or predictability: people in transitional societies can take nothing for granted; they are plagued on all sides by uncertainty and every kind of unpredictable behavior. In their erratically changing world, every relationship rests upon
uncertain foundations. . . . Second there is a related problem of lack of trust in human relationships. Above all else, the individual cannot be sure of the actions of others because he cannot be sure about himself (1962, pp. 54-55).

Pye's argument rests on the fact that the breakdown of associational sentiments is the result of disorientations and uncertainty about behavior expectations which are associated with modernization. He emphasizes the fragmentary nature of the socialization process within a transitional society. For example, he asserts that in such societies, primary socialization imparts values which are more or less incongruent with the values from secondary socialization (Pye, 1962, pp. 54-55). The net result of such an uneasy marriage between primary socialization and secondary socialization is incoherence within attitudinal orientations which renders association sentiments in shambles. To Pye, associational sentiments make it possible for members of a society to have "considerable conflict without destroying the stability of the system" (1962, pp. 55). Thus when the association sentiments are weakened, conflicts become more intense and difficult to control.

Cyril Black is another social scientist who argues that modernization undermines traditional norms and values and thus destabilizing (1966, pp. 21-34). He identifies four phases which all modernizing societies must go through.
Unfortunately, these phases are fraught with problems that often culminate in violence.

It is possible to distinguish certain critical problems that all modernizing societies must face: 

a) the challenge of modernity--the initial confrontation of a society within its traditional framework of knowledge with modern ideas and institutions.  
b) the consolidation of modernizing leadership--the transfer of power from traditional to modernizing leaders in the course of a normally bitter revolutionary struggle.  
c) economic and social transformation--the development of economic growth and social change.  
d) the integration of society--the phase in which economic and social transformation produces a fundamental reorganization of the social structure throughout the society (Black, 1966, pp. 67-68).

These four phases are not easily traveled by modernizing nations. If individuals think of modernization as the integration of societies on the basis of new principles and new standards, they must also think of it as disintegration of traditional values that hold society together (Black, 1966, p. 27). Accordingly, in a reasonably well-integrated society, institutions work effectively and a larger proportion of the people generally agree on ends and means. Thus, violence and disorders are largely controlled. But when a significant and rapid change is introduced, no
two groups welcome them simultaneously and this disagreement might lead to disorder or outright violence.

Despite the thorny phases of modernization, and its automizing impact, Cyril Black argues that the process should not be necessarily associated with extensive violence. For instance, modernization in Europe (e.g., France) and in North America (e.g., the USA) did pass through these phases with relatively less violence than the nations of Africa, Asia and Latin America. The reason for such relative stability is because one issue or crisis was dealt with at a time. But in the nations of Africa, Asia and Latin America, such issues as centralization of authority, social mobilization, societal integration, and political participation are dealt with simultaneously (Black, 1966, pp. 90-94). The differences in the rate of change can be demonstrated in the lengths of time which countries required for the consolidation of modernizing leadership, economic and social transformation and integration of society (see Table I) (Black, 1966, pp. 91-94).

From Table I, a first pattern modernizer, France, and a second pattern modernizer, the USA, had 1789-1848 and 1776-1865 respectively to achieve consolidation in the area of leadership, while 1848-1945 and 1865-1933 were times when economic and social transformations were completed. Therefore, different crises were tackled at different times. Seventh pattern modernizer, independent African nations,
## TABLE I

**PATTERNS OF MODERNIZATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Pattern:</th>
<th>Second Pattern:</th>
<th>Seventh Pattern:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.K. 1649-1832</td>
<td>USA 1776-1865</td>
<td>Liberia 1847-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France 1789-1848</td>
<td>Canada 1791-1867</td>
<td>Ghana 1957-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Australia 1801-1901</td>
<td>Guinea 1958-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cameroon 1960-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Central Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Republic 1960-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chad 1960</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Congo (Bruzaville) 1960-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Congo (Leopoldville) 1960-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This is an abridged version of the table.


All started leadership consolidation, economic and social transformation and societal integration almost at the same time (1960+). Thus there arises conflicts in roles, norms and values.

In modernizing nations, eternal truths generally enshrined in religious dogmas come to be questioned and discarded as old-fashioned because they were expressed in a
way regarded as outdated (Black, 1966, p. 28). The net effect is a conflict between the fanatic, dogmatic religious elements and less orthodox ones. The desire to be modern has led to frequent and complete rejection of the fundamental norms and values which once have held the society together.

An inherent contradiction in the process of modernization is urbanization (Black, 1966, pp. 31-33). Urbanization brings atomization (a situation where individuals are not directly related to one another through a network of multiple independent associations) which alters the extended family structure and traditional cultural heritage. Under this circumstance, the individual is much freer, yet less certain as to his purpose. This isolation, inherent in atomization, is what Black calls alienation (1966, p. 32). To Cyril Black, alienation has a relation to violence, though its relation to violence is not very clear.

David Apter describes modernization as a process characterized by industrialization—the emergence of industrial-type roles in nonindustrial societies. In his words, modernization is the "spread of roles originating in societies with an industrial infrastructure, serving functional purposes in the industrial process, to systems lacking an industrial infrastructure" (1970, pp. 158-159). Apter dwells on the structural problems emanating from modernization. Modernization produces multiple roles in a
complex form which need to be managed. For instance, as modernization takes place, the norms which once held the society together begin to weaken and consequently broaden the area of public meaning and reduce the area of prescriptive values. There exists more ambitiousness and less predictability in social actions, and this gives rise to "greater uncertainty by individuals both of themselves and of the anticipated responses of others" (Apter, 1970, p. 159).

The effects of modernization on political stability are expressed more clearly in Apter's The Politics of Modernization (1965). In this book he asserts that the source of political problems and the conflicts resulting from modernization is the lack of fit or incompatibility between roles (1965, pp. 123-124). Societies in the process of modernization are said to have three basic roles: traditional, accommodationist (semi-new roles), and industrial (new roles). The cause of modernizing politics, accordingly, is the result of the conflict between these roles. Thus:

\[\ldots\] the substance of modernizing politics is in large measure the result of incompatibilities between these three types of roles. The effort to adjust and modify them is particularly difficult in the absence of an impersonal dynamic mechanism such as exists in industrial countries. \ldots The claims
put forward by competing political groups, each representing some portion of the total stratification system, are the means by which role malintegration is transformed into political conflict (1965, pp. 123-124).

In effect, not only do the roles become incompatible, but new groups emerge and make different claims on the political systems, which results in conflict (1965, p. 124). To conclude, he suggests that integration of various groups within the society is crucial and this requires a high degree of control on the part of the government (Apter, 1970, p. 158).

Modernization, Rise of New Groups, Political Participation and Political Instability

Another type of argument posited by the modernization-breeds-instability school is that the emergence of new groups into the society and political participation are intervening variables between modernization and political instability (Huntington, 1968; Deutsch, 1961; and Landsberger, et al., 1976). Huntington argues that rapid mobilization of new groups into politics coupled with the slow development of political institutions are the root causes of political instability and violence (1968, pp. 4-5). Accordingly, the resulting "political decay" or declining political order in the nations of Africa, Asia and Latin America, is because there is a lack of public spirit and
capable institutions to give meaning and direction to the public interest.

Huntington asserts that the relationship between social mobilization and political instability is direct (1968, p. 47). Social mobilization includes, among others, urbanization, increase in literacy, education and media exposure, and all give rise to heightened aspirations and expectations which, if unsatisfied, propel individuals and groups into politics. With the lack of strong and adaptable political institutions, such increases in aspirations and expectations express themselves in form of demonstrations, riots or even outright-violence. This formulation leads Huntington to conclude thus:

The higher the level of education of the unemployed, alienated, or otherwise dissatisfied person, the more extreme the destabilizing behavior which results. Alienated University graduates prepare revolutions; alienated technical or secondary school graduates plan coups; alienated primary school leavers engage in more frequent but less significant forms of political unrest (1968, p. 48).

Karl Deutsch, argues that social mobilization, one aspect of modernization, includes changes in roles, institutions and expectations of the individuals (1961, pp. 493-511). For him, social mobilization exposes the masses to
new ways of life, making them aware of such needs as housing, medical care, and even actual involvement in politics. Unfortunately, these needs may not be satisfied by traditional types of government. Therefore, for the uprooted and disoriented masses, it is untrue that "government is best that governs least" (1961, p. 498). He warns that if these urgent newly-recognized needs are not met, they may lead to riots or strikes.

To curb such political unrest and instability, Huntington advocates less mass mobilization (1968, p. 47). He sees mass mobilization as a threat to institutionalization ("the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability"). Institutionalization, according to Huntington is defined by "adaptability" and "complexity" (1968, pp. 13 and 17). "Adaptability" is characterized by the ability of an organization/political system to adjust to changes such as changes in personnel. For any organization to acquire such adaptability it must be flexible, and this flexibility is what young organizations lack (1968, p. 13). "Complexity", on the other hand, involves multiplication of organizational subunits, hierarchically and functionally organized. Huntington's main argument is that the more complex an organization, the greater the number of its subunits and "the greater the ability of that organization to secure and maintain the loyalties of its members." (1968, p. 18).
The argument of Deutsch and Huntington about the danger of mass mobilization is supported by the destabilizing effect of mass mobilization on political stability in Chile (Landsberger et al, 1976, pp. 502-541). This study reveals vividly the danger in mass mobilization when a growing (young) government is incapable of controlling such mobilization.

Landsberger et al., studied the effect of modernization on political violence in Chile from 1970-1973, when Salvador Allende was president of Chile under the banner of the leftist party called Unidad Popular (UP). The study describes the relationship that developed between the government of President Allende and the Labor group. The labor group constituted the main supporter of President Allende and he thought it wise to mobilize the group into politics (Landsberger et al., 1976, p. 502).

To mobilize the workers, Allede started the distribution of economic benefits among the working class. In addition, he created the Central Labor Federation (CLF) to control the workers and to mediate between the workers and the UP government. The result was the emergence of unionization as an index of mobilization. At the beginning, the process of unionization was working so well that the membership increased at a rapid rate. But soon the increased membership in the unions started showing its
destabilizing side. By 1971, the workers considered themselves part of the decision-making elements and started placing more demands on the government. The government was unable to meet all the demands and strikes resulted in almost all areas of labor as many started demanding more benefits (salaries, fringe benefits etc) (Landsberger et al., 1976, p. 523). For example, the copper miners went on strike for a wage increase of seventy percent and Allede called them the "Labor Aristocracy." The Central Labor Federation disintegrated and became unable to mediate between government and labor.

According to Landsberger et al., Chile was unlike other Latin American nations where workers were united and thus easy to mobilize under one ideology. The tumult in Chile became so great and uncontrollable that President Allede accused the whole labor group of being unable to understand "the process of change through which we are going" (1976, p. 525). In effect, the worker's participation in economic planning and general policy as a way of mobilization spelled failure for Allende in Chile. Lucian Pye also argues persuasively that the process of mass participation is fraught with dangers (Pye, 1966, pp. 39-40). Pye's central contention is that the major concern in some former colonial countries is "a political awakening whereby former subjects become active and committed citizens" (1966, p. 39). He asserts that this concern for
political commitment may be carried so far that some nations often stage demonstrations and protests in the name of "advancing national development."

Pye draws a comparison between what political participation means in the West and what it means in the new states. Mass political participation in the West means the broadening of the suffrage and the induction of new elements of the population into the political process. In some new states on the other hand, Pye argues, mass political participation means "a new form of mass response to elite manipulation." Pye argues that while "the process of mass participation is a legitimate part of political development, it is also fraught with dangers of either sterile emotionalism or corrupting demagoguery, both of which can sap the strength of a society" (1966, p. 40). Thus the concern for political awakening should not be carried too far or be made an end in itself if a society, especially a new society, is to be stable.

Huntington and Nelson, in their No Easy Choice (1976), agree essentially with Pye. They believe that the expansion of political participation is a valued goal in the development process. On the other hand, the costs and the benefits of political participation should be weighed against alternative means of achieving the same goal (Huntington and Nelson, 1976, p. 161). They maintain that expansion of political participation should be used as a last resort when
other means of achieving development fail. Why? Because what constitutes participation in one group within the society may not be what constitutes participation in another (1976, p. 164). For instance, social groupings vary in their demands. Caste associations in India may wish to improve their welfare and promote their status while labor groups might be interested in higher wages. Sometimes groups merge together and place heavy demands on the government. These heavy competing demands weaken the government. Their argument is well summarized in their statement: "The political essence of revolution is the rapid expansion of political consciousness and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics at a speed which makes it impossible for existing political institutions to assimilate them" (Huntington and Nelson, 1976, p. 162).

The danger of mass mobilization applies to societies undergoing change from traditional to modern ways of life (Huntington, 1974, pp. 163-191). The danger of mass participation, Huntington argues, could as well be applied to industrial societies on the road to the post-industrial era. In "Post Industrial Politics," Huntington broadens the definition of transitional societies to include any society in the process of transformation, whether from traditional to modern ways of life, or from industrial to post-industrial. According to Huntington
Social science analysis of the transition from agrarian to industrial society began with a clear-cut dichotomy between the modern and traditional. It soon became clear, however, that the process of modernization did not involve the displacement of the later by the former, but rather the addition of modern elements in a society which still retained many of its traditional components. . . . Just as this earlier transition produced neotraditionalism, so also the current transition may lead to neoindustrialism. The society of the future . . . is heavily weighted in the postindustrial direction, its politics will also be both different and unpleasant (1974, p. 191).

In this line of argument, every nation is in transition and problem of instability are likely to occur in both modernizing nations and post-industrial nations. For Huntington, post-industrial society is said to be characterized by "greater affluence and education in which theoretical knowledge and technology will have central roles" (1974, p. 166). He sees the problem of post-industrial societies stemming from mass mobilization or more democracy. He argues that higher socioeconomic status and a greater level of organizational involvement will give rise to more political participation. The post-industrial era is an era that will be rich with college educated people.
with more zeal for political participation and more diversity in ideology (1974, p. 190). These highly skilled and more educated people will be placing more demands on the government which might be difficult for the government to meet. Thus "... more active, participatory citizenry makes effective government action more difficult; ... innovation is easier when substantial portions of the population are indifferent" (Huntington, 1974, p. 77).

Huntington's suggested remedies to the dilemma of mass mobilization, especially for the nations in transition to the post-industrial end, are less democracy and more authoritative and effective patterns of decision making (1974, p. 190). In conclusion, he asserts that the merits of political participation be judged on the basis of its institutionalizing effect.

Modernization and the Origins of Conflict: Rapid Economic Growth and Political Instability

Let us examine yet another argument that the process of modernization induces conflict in the society. S. N. Eisentadt argues that the process of modernization intensifies conflict because it increases structural differentiation (1964, pp. 577-84). Eisentadt asserts that modernization has these structural characteristics:

... the development of highly differential political structure in terms of specific roles and institutions ... increased extension of the
central administrative legal and political activities and their permeation into all regions. . 
. continuous spread of potential political power to wider groups . . . weakening of traditional elites and legitimation of the rulers (1964, p. 577).

According to Eisentadt, increasing structural differentiation accounts for the continuous growth of new situations and problems. New groups emerge and within such new groups, different emphases are placed on different aspects of life. For instance, some groups will emphasize the problem of suffrage while others may emphasize the problem of inequality in income. Thus the problem becomes how to strike a balance between these various demands on the government. Hence, Eisentadt concludes that "Conflicts between groups are inherent in any social structure, and the more differentiated and variegated the structure, the higher the extent and the intensity of such conflicts; thus the very process of modernization necessarily creates high level of conflict" (1964, p. 584).

Some other social scientists have argued that modernization generates a revolution of rising expectations that becomes a revolution of rising frustrations because of the inability of the governments of modernizing nations to satisfy the increasing demands for goods and services (Olson, 1983, p. 533; Weiner and Hoselitz, 1966, p. 174).
Mancur Olson asserts that rapid economic growth tends to destroy traditional social groupings such as families, castes, manors, extended families and tribes, and thus increases the number of people who are declasse. These people (who are declasse) are more prone to join any mass movement or political extremist activities because of the relative absence of bonds that tie them to the established order (Olson, 1971, p. 216).

In addition, rapid economic growth gives rise to changes in income distribution. According to Olson, rapid economic growth creates two classes—the "gainers" and the "losers" and both are destabilizing because both adjust imperfectly to the existing order (1971, p. 217). Rapid economic growth increases the number of "nouveaux riches" who may use their economic power to change the social and political order to suit their interests. The "nouveaux pauvres", on the other hand, will be much more resentful of their deplorable condition "than those who have known nothing else." Thus rapid economic growth inherently contains what Marx would call "contradiction" between the "gainers" and "losers" that results in instability.

Olson also maintains that the number of losers is likely to increase in rapid economic growth. In rapid economic growth, there is the tendency for wages to be more sticky than prices. Thus "as the demand increases with economic growth, businessmen may raise prices 'pari-passu'
with the increase in demand, but wages may rise much more slowly" (Olson, 1971, p. 219).

Furthermore, rapid economic growth gives rise to an increase in geographical mobility and urbanization which undermine social ties and produce alienation and political extremism. For Olson

The man who has been tempted away from his village, his manor, his tribe or his extended family, by higher wages of burgeoning urban industry may well be a disaffected gainer from economic growth. He has been, albeit voluntarily, uprooted and is not apt soon to acquire comparable social connections in the city. He is, therefore, prone to join destabilizing mass movements (1971, p. 218).

Rapid economic growth also produces an increase in literacy, education, skill and technology which, in turn, produces a "revolution of rising expectations" which the government of modernizing nation might not satisfy. Since rapid economic growth leads to higher incomes for some people who were previously at a lower standard, it further stimulates and exacerbates the rising expectations of these people (Olson, 1971, p. 222).

Olson, while arguing that rapid economic growth produces instability, also maintains that rapid economic decline (e.g. depression) leads to political instability.
For Olson, the only guarantee for political stability is economic stability.

There is, accordingly, nothing inconsistent in saying that both rapid economic growth and rapid economic decline would tend toward political instability. It is economic stability—the absence of rapid economic growth and rapid economic decline—that should be regarded as conducive to social and political tranquility (Olson, 1971, p. 223).

As a means for controlling instability in a rapid economic growth, Olson suggests a more repressive measure. For instance, in a totalitarian regime, rapid economic growth may not lead to instability because the government controls the media in such a way that they only glorify the status quo and keep at bay those ideas likely to threaten the existing system (Olson, 1971, p. 222). Again, charismatic leadership can as well reduce the degree of instability in rapid economic growth (Olson, 1971, p. 223).

Samuel Huntington essentially agrees with Mancur Olson that rapid economic growth induces political instability (1968, pp. 49-59). According to Huntington, people who are poor are too poor to stage a protest. They are apolitical, and they lack exposure to media and other means that could awaken their aspirations in such a way as to propel them into politics. Thus "poverty itself is a barrier to
instability. Those who are concerned about the immediate goal of the next meal are not apt to worry about the grand transformation of society" (Huntington, 1968, p. 53).

Huntington further argues that rapid economic growth, especially in the short-run, often exacerbates income inequalities, thereby making rich to be richer and the poor poorer. Rapid economic growth frequently involves inflation, and in inflation, prices rise faster than wages thereby leading to an unequal distribution of wealth, which in turn leads to instability (Huntington, 1968, pp. 57 and 59).

Weiner and Hoselitz provide a case study that lends some support to the argument that rapid economic development induces political instability (1966, pp. 173-178). In their study of economic development and political stability in India, they argue that during the British rule in India, political violence was more pronounced and severe in economically developed areas (Jamshedpur, Calcuta, Jaipur) than in the more economically backward provinces.

Weiner and Hoselitz single out political participation as an intervening variable between economic development and political instability. In India, the nationalists infused political consciousness among the indigenous population. Apathy, isolationism and the concomitant political stability were broken (Weiner and Hoselitz, 1966, p. 174). In effect, economic growth made people more educated and more exposed to
mass media so that they became more conscious of their needs and agitated for a better government.

Weiner and Hoselitz go even further and argue that their case study should be generalized to other nations of Africa, Asia and Latin America. The citizens of these continents were very apathetic and politically quiescent during the colonial era. But as soon as the colonialists left, some economic development took place and the citizens started placing more demands on their political systems.

Weiner and Hoselitz' major argument is that "the stability of many economically backward societies is the by-product of political apathy among the masses and relative isolation of persons who would form the core of potentially strong organized groups" (1966, pp. 173-174). Furthermore, economic development improves educational infrastructures, gives rise to new groups that increase demands on government. These demands result in an overload on the government, thereby resulting in stress. Emphatically, they argue that economic growth is bound to generate some conflict no matter what actions the government adopts to ensure stability. Like Olson, they argue that in any economically developing society, some groups of people are bound to be placed in a disadvantaged position and these groups are the likely potential forces for violence (1966, p. 177).

The foregoing discussion of the theoretical literature shows agreement among scholars about the actual relationship
between modernization and political instability. There is a widely shared belief that a paradoxical relationship exists between modernization and political disorder where modernity is presumed to produce stability and modernization instability. In this line of argument, nations are classified into three—traditional, modern and modernizing. The latter are said to be in transition which embodies strains, tensions and crises.

Crucial in the argument is that modernization produces anomie, role conflict, and ethnicity and all induce political instability. Modernization also produces geographical mobility, urbanization, atomization and corruption which lead to instability. Political modernization calls for political participation and rationalization of leadership, and these changes are not easily and smoothly handled by young governments. Modernization also leads to rapid economic growth which in turn leads to instability by producing a revolution of rising expectations which leads to a revolution of rising frustration. The frustration is the product of the government's inability to satisfy the increasing aspirations of the people in the rapid economic growth.

All told, it is discernible that modernization in the developing nations of Africa, Asia and Latin America creates teeming economic, social and political upheavals. As a test of hypothesis that modernization creates instability,
twenty-four African nations (with adequate and available data) are used. This empirical study about the effect of modernization on the political stability of the twenty-four African nations is the subject matter of Chapter III.
CHAPTER III

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF MODERNIZATION
AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY

The role of modernization in inducing political instability in transitional societies has been theoretically explored in the preceding chapters, especially Chapter II. In this chapter, I assess empirically the argument presented by the "modernization-breeds-instability" school. I use data collected from twenty-four nations of Africa from 1948-1977 to explain why and how modernization (social mobilization and economic development) affects the level of political instability.

If the argument of modernization-instability thesis is correct, one should expect higher rates of social mobilization and economic development to correlate positively with political instability in modernizing nations. Thus the specific proposition to be tested in this research is: the greater the rate of social mobilization and economic development, the greater the political instability.

In this research, I estimate the dependent variable, deaths from domestic political violence, with an equation of the following form:
\[ D = B_0 + B_1 G + B_2 E + B_3 P + B_4 H + B_5 M + B_6 U \\
     + B_7 A + B_8 I + V_i \]

Where $D$ is deaths from domestic political violence,
$G$ is per capita gross national product,
$E$ is energy consumption per capita,
$P$ is physicians per million population,
$H$ is enrollment in higher education per million population,
$M$ is radios owned per thousand population,
$U$ is percentage of population in cities of 100,000 population or more,
$A$ is percentage of labor force in agriculture,
$I$ is the percentage of labor force in industry, and
$V_i$ is the stochastic disturbance term.

The data utilized in this research are collected from the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (1983a, 1983b) compiled by Taylor and Jodice. Table II provides a list of twenty-four nations and the variables. The data cover the years from 1948 through 1977.

Description of Variables/Operationalization

**Dependent Variable:** One measure of political instability is used in this study—deaths from political violence (see Table II). I choose deaths from domestic political violence because they are the most common and more dramatic violent events in all nations, especially those
nations undergoing modernization. For instance, other violent activities such as coups d'etat, guerrilla actions/warfare, terrorism, etc., are not so common as deaths from domestic political violence in African nations. In addition, the definition of deaths from domestic political violence is broader and more inclusive of other violent activities. According to Taylor and Jodice, deaths from domestic political violence "are coded as an attribute of other events rather than as events in and of themselves" (1983b, p. 43). Thus, political deaths occur in conjunction with violent events such as riots, armed attacks, and assassinations. The category also includes nationals who are victims of foreign attacks but excludes deaths in enemy prisons, political executions, deaths in international war and deaths in border incidents with other countries, as well as homicide victims. The number of deaths from domestic political violence is obtained by counting the number of deaths that occurred in the period 1948-1977.

Independent Variables: As already indicated in Chapter II, those aspects of modernization most germane to politics are social mobilization and economic development (Huntington, 1968, p. 33). Indicators of social mobilization, according to Karl Deutsh, are exposure to technology and mass media, change in residence, urbanization, shift from agricultural to manufacturing or industrial occupations, increase in gross
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*The original intent was to include all the African nations undergoing modernization, but due to some missing values (both on the dependent and independent variables) only twenty-four nations are analyzed. Data are from Taylor and Jodice (1983 a, b) World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators and are described in this thesis.*
national product and increases in literacy and education (1961, p. 495). The indicators of social mobilization considered in this analysis are taken from the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (Taylor and Jodice, 1983a) and include:

a) Enrollment in Higher Education Per Million Population (1975). Enrollment in higher education is used as a measure of education, and, as defined by Taylor and Jodice, it refers to enrollment in all degree-granting institutions of higher education, both private and public. Included in this category are "universities, higher technical schools, teacher-training schools, and theological schools" (Taylor and Jodice, 1983a, p. 168).

b) Radios Owned Per Thousand Population (1975). The number of radios owned per thousand population is used as a measure of mass media exposure. The data included "all types of receivers that are connected to a redistribution system" but excludes television sets (Taylor and Jodice, 1983a, p. 1980). The data is compiled by counting the number of licenses issued or sets that are declared (Taylor and Jodice, 1983a, p. 180).

c) The Percentage of Population of Cities of 100,000 Population or More (1975) is used as a measure of urbanization, and the data refers to "the percentage of total population living in cities of 100,000 people or more"
(Taylor and Jodice, 1983a, p. 202). The criteria for determining the point at which a concentration of people is urban is arbitrary. Yet "a city of 100,000 people is a metropolitan area and the quality of life for its inhabitants is certainly different from that in smaller places" (Taylor and Jodice, 1983a, p. 200).

d) Percentage of Labor Force in Agriculture (1977). The data include "the percentage of all employed and unemployed persons (including those seeking work for the first time) engaged in agriculture" (Taylor and Jodice, 1983a, p. 210). Also included "are employees, wage earners, unpaid family workers and producers' cooperatives" (Taylor and Jodice, 1983a, p. 210).

e) Percentage of Labor Force in Industry (1977). The data refers to "the percentage of all employed and unemployed persons (including those seeking work for the first time) engaged in industry" (Taylor and Jodice, 1983a, p. 213). The major problem with the percentage of labor force in agriculture and percentage of labor force in industry is that the age-limit for workers was not considered (Taylor and Jodice, 1983a, p. 210). This, in fact, means that age-limit of workers varies somewhat from nation to nation.

Economic development according to Samuel Huntington is "the growth in the total economic activity and output of a society" (1968, pp. 33-34). Economic development can be
measured by such variables as growth in per capita gross national product, level of industrialization, and level of individual welfare measured by such indices as life expectancy, supply of hospitals and doctors" (Huntington, 1968, pp. 33-34). To measure economic development three indicators are used in this study:

a) Gross National Product Per Capita (1978). Per capita GNP is expressed in estimated US dollars using an exchange rate conversion (Taylor and Jodice, 1983a, p. 108). The problem with this data is that the "estimates of GNP are subject to substantial variation in accuracy. In some countries, figures are put together from reliable components. In others, they based upon rough estimates and guesses" (Taylor and Jodice, 1983a, p. 109). The degree of accuracy is a function of the country's level of development and the structure of the economic system.

b) Energy Consumption Per Capita (1975). As a measure of industrialization, energy consumption per capita is used in this study. According to Apter, industrialization is an integral part of modernization (1965, p. 68). For Pirages, industrialization is based upon "substitution of inanimate forms of energy--wind, water, coal, petroleum, natural gas, etc.--for energy formerly supplied by man and beast" (1976, p. 47). In this analysis, energy consumption refers to "gross inland consumption of commercial fuels and water
expressed in terms of coal equivalent" (Taylor and Jodice, 1983a, p. 116). Included also are "coal and lignite, gasoline, kerosene and fuel oil, natural gas, and hydroelectric power" (Taylor and Jodice, 1983a, p. 116). Energy consumption per capita is derived by dividing the total consumption by total population.

c) Physicians Per Million Population (1975). As measured by Taylor and Jodice, physicians measure includes "all persons fully qualified or certified by a medical school, but auxiliary and assistant personnel are excluded" (1983a, p. 152). Included are "physician practicing privately and those on hospital staffs, in laboratories and in public health services" (1983a, p. 152). The problem with this measure is that qualification standards differ from nation to nation (Taylor and Jodice, 1983a, p. 150). Thus, some nations might reduce standards to have a large number of physicians. In effect, those nations with lower standards might have more, but less well-qualified, physicians than others.

These independent variables are the indicators of social mobilization and economic development aspects of modernization. I grouped the above indicators into two heading--social mobilization and economic development--for clarity purposes. As a matter of fact, they are not mutually exclusive but complementary to each other. As I argued in
Chapter II, one can expect that a higher level of economic
development and a higher level of social mobilization will
lead to higher levels of disorder and violence, specifically
deaths from domestic political violence.

Statistical Method

"Weighted regression" analysis is the method used here
to examine the central premise that modernization induces
political instability. Weighted regression uses a form of
data transformation which is "equivalent to multiplying the
original observations by a series of weights \( \frac{1}{\sqrt{e_1}}, \frac{1}{\sqrt{e_2}}, \ldots \frac{1}{\sqrt{e_N}} \)" (Frank, 1971, p. 284). The problem is how to
find a logical method of determining the weights. The method
used in this analysis in determining the weights will be
introduced later. But first let us consider why weighted
regression is better than ordinary least squares for this
analysis.

Weighted regression is more useful than ordinary least-
squares when the data is heteroskedastic (Johnston 1963, pp.
207-211). One of the basic assumptions of the linear model
states that the sample error terms \( e_1 \) are distributed with
the same variance \( e_1^2 \) (Frank, 1971, p. 273); Bowerman et
Thus the error term \( e_1, e_2, \ldots, e_N \) associated with the
independent variables should all have the same variance
\( e_1^2 = e_2^2 = \ldots = e_N^2 \). When this condition is met, the
data are said to be homoskedastic and ordinary least squares regression is appropriate. When the condition of homoskedasticity is not met, the data are said to be heteroskedastic and "weighted regression" becomes appropriate (Frank, 1971, p. 284; Gujarati, 1978, p. 196; Johnson, 1963, pp. 207-211). Heteroskedasticity is likely to result when a study is based on cross-sectional data rather than time-series data because the errors encountered in determining the number of, say, deaths in nations with large populations, are greater than those encountered in nations with small populations.

According to Gujarati,

It should be noted that the problem of heteroskedasticity is likely to be more common in cross-sectional than time-series data. In cross-sectional data, one usually deals with members of a population at a given point in time, such as individual consumers, firms, . . . etc. Moreover, these members may be different sizes, such as small, medium, or large . . . . In time-series data, on the other hand, the variables tend to be similar orders of magnitude because one generally collects data for the same entity over a period of time. Examples are GNP, consumption expenditures . . . etc. (1978, p. 196).
If the homoskedastic condition is met (i.e., if the error terms $e_1, e_2, \ldots, e_N$ have equal variance) ordinary least squares (OLS) regression will be efficient (have minimum variance). But if the data are heteroskedastic, misleading conclusions are likely to be drawn by the researcher about the population because the usual t and F tests of significance will tend to give incorrect results: the coefficients will be regarded as significant when in fact they are not.

Since the data are cross-sectional, it is necessary to test for the presence of heteroskedasticity before carrying out the regression. To do the test, two methods are used in this analysis and both methods confirm the presence of heteroskedasticity in the data. The methods include:

a) "Nature of the problem": According to Samodar Gujarati, often the nature of the problem under consideration indicates whether the data are heteroskedastic or not. According to him . . . "on family budget studies, it was found that . . . the residual variance around the regression of consumption on income increased with income . . ." (Gujarati, 1978, pp. 200-201). Similarly, heteroskedasticity is expected in our data since we notice that deaths from domestic political violence are higher in those countries that fought wars or have higher violent events as opposed to those that did not.
Figure 5 provides the evidence that those nations that had wars or higher incidence of violence display a greater number of political deaths than those nations that had no wars or less incidence of political violence. The histogram represents the absolute number of deaths from domestic political violence. From this figure (Figure 5), it is self-evident that Nigeria has the greatest number of deaths from political violence, followed by Burundi, because of civil wars. Other nations such as Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda and Kenya had higher incidence of political violence, and as such they also, logically, have greater numbers of deaths. Thus it is logical to conclude that the residuals $e_1$, $e_2$, ..., $e_N$, and hence the error terms $V_1$, $V_2$ ..., $V_N$, are likely to vary from nation to nation with regard to deaths from domestic political violence. Again, the twenty-four nations under study differ in size of population. Thus in using the above indicators of social mobilization and economic development, one is likely to encounter different magnitudes of errors. For instance, the errors in measuring per capita GNP, radios owned per thousand population, etc., for small countries are likely to be substantially smaller than for large countries. Thus, heteroskedasticity will be particularly prevalent especially when the data cover a large range of indicators of social mobilization and economic development, as in this analysis.
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Figure 5--Histogram of frequencies of deaths from domestic political violence 1948-1977 (N = 24).
b) "Graphical Method." Another method used to test for the presence of heteroskedasticity is to examine the scatter diagram of residual plots (Bowerman et al., 1986, pp. 547-549; Frank, 1978, pp. 287-288). To use this method, it is suggested that we plot the residual \( (e_i) \) against any of the independent variables or against the predicted value of the dependent variable. If a heteroskedastic condition is present, we should observe a fan-shaped pattern of residuals increasing with the increasing values of the independent variables (see Figure 6), or we will observe a funnel shaped pattern of residuals decreasing with the increasing values of the independent variable. On the other hand, if there is no heteroskedasticity (i.e., if the data is homoskedastic) we will observe a rectangular pattern of residuals which indicates that the residuals \( e_1, e_2, \ldots, e_N \), are relatively constant in absolute values as the values of the independent variable increase. Figure 6 demonstrates a fan-shaped pattern of residuals increasing with the increasing values of radios owned per 1000 population.

I also plotted the residuals \( (e_i = y_i - \hat{y}_i) \) against the predicted value of deaths from domestic political violence (Figure 7). From this graph (Figure 7), it is obvious that the residuals tend to increase as the predicted values of political deaths decrease. Thus there is a nonconstant error variance in the data which makes it inappropriate to use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
Figure 6—Scattergram of residuals plotted against radios owned per 1,000 population (1975)*

Unequal error variance: error variance increase with increasing values of the number of
radios owned per 1,000 population.
Figure 7 -- Scattergram of residuals plotted against the predicted number of deaths from domestic political violence.
To have valid hypothesis tests, it is necessary to equalize these variances of the error term or to correct the heteroskedastic condition. To do this, I transform the problematic variables in two ways:

a) One method of correcting for heteroskedasticity, especially when the variance of the error terms appears to be increasingly linearly with the predicted value of the dependent variable, is to transform the model by replacing the dependent variable by its logarithm (Gujarati, 1976, p. 210; Bowerman et al., 1986, p. 588). This is exactly what I did in Figure 8. Logarithmic transformation "compresses the scales in which the variables are measured, thereby reducing a tenfold difference between two values to a twofold difference" (Gujarati, 1976, p. 210). Figure 8 shows the natural logarithmic transformed deaths from domestic political violence. It clearly demonstrates the impact of transformation. The logarithm of political deaths (LD) will replace political deaths (D) in our equation.

b) Another method used to transform the data is to "weight" all the terms in the model using the variance of the error term \( \sigma^2 \). Since the variance of the error term is usually unknown, it is suggested that we assume that the variance of the error term is proportional to the square of one of the independent variables that is related to the error variance. When this is assumed, that very independent variable should be used as a "weight" to divide all the items
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<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>10.41790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>4.82831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>9.54952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>5.11199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>2.07944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>7.73936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>8.43815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>14.50636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>10.19687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>7.44249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>2.89037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>5.90808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>4.60517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>8.05484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>10.30942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>9.55521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>7.19893</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8--Histogram of frequencies of logarithmic transformed deaths from domestic political violence 1948-1977 (N=24).
in the model to correct for unequal variances (Bowerman et al., 1986, pp. 587-588; Gujarati, 1978, p. 209; Frank, 1971, p. 284). In this analysis, I plotted the residuals \( e_i = y_i - \hat{y}_i \) against the number of radios owned per 1,000 population (Figure 6). From Figure 6, it is observed that the residuals relate to the number of radios owned per 1,000 population. This suggests that the error variance \( \sigma^2 \) is increasing with increasing values of the number of radios owned per 1,000 population. Thus the square of the number of radios owned per 1,000 population \( (M^2) \) is assumed to be proportional (or related) to the error variance and so I divide ("weight") all the items in the model by \( M \):

\[
[2] \quad \frac{LD1}{M} = \frac{B_0l}{M} + \frac{B_1Gl}{M} + \frac{B_2E1}{M} + \frac{B_3H1}{M} + \frac{B_4M}{M} + \frac{B_5Al}{M} + \frac{B_6Al}{M} + \frac{B_7I1}{M} + \frac{B_8P1}{M} + \frac{V_i1}{M}
\]

where \( V_i \) is the transformed stochastic disturbance term and it is now equal to \( V_i1/M \) and \( LD \) is the logarithm of political deaths and is now \( LD1/M \).

Now that the variance of the error term \( \sigma^2 \) is homoskedastic, I can proceed with the normal OLS regression to estimate the dependent variable--deaths from domestic political violence. It is necessary to note that in this transformed model, the terms \( B_0 \) and \( B_1 \) are still the slope coefficient and the intercept in the original model. Therefore to get back to the original model (equation 1) we simply multiply the transformed model by the number of radios owned per 1,000 population \( (M) \).
Results and Findings

Table III presents the results of the weighted regression of deaths from domestic political violence on social mobilization and economic development. This table shows the regression coefficients of six independent variables to be statistically significant at the .05 level. They are: (1) GNP per capita, (2) energy consumption per capita, (3) urbanization (population in cities of 100,000+ people), (4) medical care (physicians per million population), (5) industrialization (percentage of labor force industry), and (6) education (higher education enrollment per million population) with p-values of .022, 0.044, .014, .013, .036, and .021 respectively, with an $R^2$ of .33 and $\overline{R^2}$ of .09. The six indicators jointly account for one-third of the variance in explaining political deaths in the twenty-four nations of Africa under study. Thus, the final predictive equation in this analysis is:

$$\hat{D} = 7.3906 + .000173G + .000106U - .001636P$$
$$+ .006204I + .000019H$$

From earlier discussion about the effect of modernization on political instability, it should be expected that the signs of the regression coefficients in equation 3 should be positive or greater than zero in all the independent variables (see Table IV). The validity of the modernization-instability hypothesis for this sample of
TABLE III

DEATHS FROM DOMESTIC POLITICAL VIOLENCE (1948-1977)
REGRESSED ON SOCIAL MOBILIZATION AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (N = 24)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Least Squares Standard Error</th>
<th>T-Values</th>
<th>P-Values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita GNP ($) 1978</td>
<td>0.000173</td>
<td>0.000079</td>
<td>2.180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy Consumption Per Capita (KGS) 1975</td>
<td>0.000106</td>
<td>0.000059</td>
<td>1.814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population in Cities of 100,000+ 1975</td>
<td>-0.004944</td>
<td>0.002053</td>
<td>-2.408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physicians Per Million Population 1975</td>
<td>-0.001635</td>
<td>0.000669</td>
<td>-2.444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Labor Force in Industry 1977</td>
<td>0.006204</td>
<td>0.003228</td>
<td>1.922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher School Enrollment Per Million Population 1975</td>
<td>0.000019</td>
<td>0.000009</td>
<td>2.189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>7.3906</td>
<td>0.933509</td>
<td>7.917</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( R^2 \) .33
\( \bar{R}^2 \) .09

* Significant at .05 level using one-tail test.
** Significant at .001 level using one-tail test.
*** Calculated using SAS PROC SYSREG, Version 5 Edition 1985
TABLE IV
EXPECTED AND ACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN MODERNIZATION AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Expected Relationship</th>
<th>Actual Relationship</th>
<th>P-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita GNP ($) 1978</td>
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<td>+</td>
<td>.0218*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy Consumption Per Capita (KGS) 1975</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>.0437*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population in Cities of 100,000+ 1975</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.0139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physicians Per Million Population 1975</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.0129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Labor Force in Industry 1977</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>.0358*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher School Enrollment Per Million Population 1975</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>.0214*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Significant at the .05 level using one-tail test.
twenty-four nations of Africa may be considered by looking at the signs and the significance of the regression coefficients for those variables.

First, the sign of the coefficient of the per capita GNP should be significant and positive. This is exactly what equation 3 shows: per capita GNP has a positive sign (+2.18) and is significant at the .05 level (p < .022). This finding supports the argument that rapid economic growth induces political instability.

Second, one of the measures of industrialization, energy consumption per capita, has the expected positive sign (+1.18) and is significant at the .05 level (p < .044). Also, another measure of industrialization, the percentage of labor force in industry, has the expected positive coefficient (+1.92) and is significant at the .05 level (p < .036). Thus increases in industrialization are shown to increase political violence, specifically deaths from political violence.

Third, the coefficient for physicians per million population (-2.44) does not have the expected positive sign. In fact, its negative relationship with political deaths would be significant at the .05 level (p < .013) if it had been hypothesized. Therefore, the argument stating that increase in life expectancy and decrease in mortality rate leads to strains in economic resources because of population
growth is not supported. In effect what we see is that increases in health quality (measured by number of physicians per million population) reduces deaths from domestic political violence, even though they are a mark of modernization. Thus Huntington's and Black's argument is not supported by the evidence.

Fourth, the measure of educational attainment, higher education enrollment per million population, has the expected positive coefficient (+2.19) and is significant at the .05 level (p < .021). This means that increases in educational level (measured by higher education enrollment) explain, in part, the higher rates of deaths from political violence in those twenty-four African nations. This would support the argument that increase in education produces more people who place more demands (especially demands for jobs) on government. Such people may be potential forces for violence when their demands are not met.

Lastly, population in cities of 100,000+ people, a measure of urbanization, surprisingly does not produce the expected positive sign (-2.41). Indeed, its negative sign would have been significant at the .05 level (p < .014) if it had been hypothesized. Thus the argument of Deutsch and Huntington that urbanization induces political instability is not supported in this analysis.
Overall, the above six indicators jointly account for 33 percent of the variance in deaths from domestic political violence \( (R^2 = .33) \), or 9 percent when the degree of freedom are considered \( (R^2 = .09) \). Thus much of the variations in political deaths which occurred in those twenty-four countries from 1948-1977 were not necessarily the function of modernization per se.

Conclusion

I have examined the impact of modernization (social mobilization and economic development) on deaths from domestic political violence. From the analysis and the findings reported herein, I conclude the following:

a) Social mobilization and economic development generally induce political instability/violence (deaths from domestic political violence) especially in those nations of Africa under study. I used the word "generally" because two of the measures of social mobilization and economic development considered in this analysis (Medical Care and Urbanization) did not produce the expected positive signs with deaths from domestic political violence. In addition, the overall result of the regression is less impressive because only 33 percent of political deaths in those nations are explained by modernization while 67 are unexplained (coefficient of nondetermination = 67%). Again, the
adjusted R squared for the degrees of freedom is only 9 percent.

b) Two variables—medical care (physicians per million population) and urbanization (population in cities of 100,000+ people) have a negative relationship with deaths from domestic political violence. Thus the findings are inconsistent with the argument of Deutsch and Huntington who posit that increases in medical care (measured by number of doctors) and urbanization are destabilizing. A possible explanation for this relationship might be that increases in medical care generate a sense of satisfaction and happiness, thus reducing the tension that produces violent activities. Instead of destabilizing, increases in medical care tend to stabilize. In the case of urbanization, I would argue that not all nations experience instability because of urbanization. This is so because in Africa, in general, the atomization impact of urbanization is little because of the so-called extended family system. In other words, the lifestyle of the urban dwellers is not so distinctly different from those of rural dwellers. Almost every African regards his village as the real home and hence the popular cliche "East or West, home is the best." Life style of rural dwellers thus does have influence on the life style in urban
dwellers. Thus urbanization tends to have negative relationship with political deaths.

c) The final conclusion is that my sample is relatively small because some nations of Africa do not have adequate and available data needed for this analysis. Besides, the sample is not random and thus the findings should be limited to those twenty-four nations under study and should not be generalized to all transitional nations and particularly not to those of Asia and Latin America.

In this analysis, I used the method of "weighted regression" in order to correct for a heteroskedastic condition clearly obvious in this cross-sectional study. This method is not the best, and as such, further research might think of employing "time series analysis" to know whether the results might be the same or not. Therefore, our conclusion on the effect of modernization on political instability might not be definitive and conclusive until we operationalize such variables as corruption and employ other methods to test empirically the validity of modernization-breeds-instability thesis.
CHAPTER IV

GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This study has brought the discussion of the effects of modernization on political instability of developing nations to an end. I have demonstrated, by empirical evidence, the effects of modernization (social mobilization and economic development) on political instability (deaths from domestic political violence). In this concluding chapter, I will attempt to bring the picture back into focus and end with some discussion which individuals, especially political scientists, may wish to ponder as they deal with the problems of instability prevalent in the modernizing nations, especially in Africa.

The major proposition of this analysis is that as nations modernize the rate of political instability increases. This central proposition is what I refer to as the "modernization--instability thesis." Basically I have explored the literature on this proposition and have done an empirical study using twenty-four African nations. The evidence, in a general sense, supports the proposition.

Chapter III focused on an empirical study of the effects of modernization (social mobilization and economic
development) on the political instability of twenty-four African nations. Cross-sectional data on deaths from domestic political violence experienced in the period 1948-1977 was used as the dependent variable measuring instability. Deaths from domestic political violence was related to a number of indicators of social mobilization and economic development intended to operationalize modernization. A "weighted regression" model was used to test the modernization-instability hypothesis when it was discovered that the data was heteroskedastic.

The first conclusion to be drawn from this study is that there is some evidence that modernization induces political instability. Several indicators of social mobilization and economic development were demonstrated to have linear destabilizing effects in the African nations undergoing modernization. This conclusion reinforces the argument of Huntington and other scholars that modernization breeds instability because these nations are "young" and are not well institutionalized to handle the mammoth demands coming from their citizens. Yet this conclusion cannot be carried very far since the above indicators accounted for only 33 percent of the variations in deaths from domestic political violence, and since two indicators of social mobilization were negatively related to domestic political violence.
The modernization-instability hypothesis is very plausible and intuitively appealing. Some empirical evidence does lend support to it as we have seen in Chapter III. But can one conclude that all political tumults in modernizing nations are related to social mobilization and economic development (modernization)? I think not.

Let us consider the effect of mass mobilization on political instability. For Samuel Huntington, mass mobilization is a threat to a young government that is not well institutionalized (1968, p. 47). The reason is that mass participation raises expectations which if not satisfied leads to disorder and instability. This is logical, and as we have seen in Chapter II, mass participation in the administration of President Allende spelled disorder for Chile.

However, there has been at least one case of mass participation where instability was not the outcome (Haywood, 1973, pp. 591-611). Haywood did a study of the effects of political participation and its role in development in Ghana in 1972 and discovered that mass participation in politics is stabilizing. He conducted a survey and questioned villagers as to which level of government they would like to handle their local development projects. He discovered that fifty percent of the people supported the national government (1973, p. 600). The reason, Haywood argues, is that some of
the villagers are involved in the national government decision-making process. He sees mass participation as stabilizing because it increases the number of politically relevant people in decision-making and reduces the opportunities of small factions to organize secretly in coups d'état or other politically violent activities (Haywood 1973, p. 600). Mass participation, therefore, ushers in national identity rather than separate identities which are likely to destabilize.

Haywood, in the same study, also discovered that there was no reason for the masses to raise their expectations, which might lead to instability. For instance, 72 percent of his respondents agreed that politicians do not fulfill their promises when elected (Haywood, 1973, p. 601). Since expectations are not raised, there is no cause for political instability. To be sure, Haywood does not disagree that modernization can induce instability. His concern is to what extent and in what nations will this occur (1973, p. 603). Sometimes, awareness of the governments' ineptitude reduces the chances of instability.

This conclusion reached by Haywood has a clear support from Chinua Achebe's novel, A MAN OF THE PEOPLE (1966). In this novel, which by implication applies to Nigeria, one man says (in referring to the politicians) "we know they are eating,--but we are eating too. They are bringing us water
and they promise to bring us electricity. We did not have those things before; that is why I say we are eating too" (Achebe, 1966, p. 117). This popular indulgence or apathy toward the politicians' corruption is summed up in the later chapter of the novel--"Let them ("them referring again to the politicians) eat, after all when the white men used to do all the eating did we commit suicide?" (Achebe, 1966, p. 136). While this novel was referring to the events six years after independence, as a citizen of Nigeria, I know that the situation is not any better today.

Ghana as we know it today might not be completely stable, but one could realize, as Haywood correctly points out, that expectations are not necessarily the reason for instability in Ghana. I strongly believe that his conclusion is still true today, especially in Nigeria. I know that we do not trust our politicians and neither do we believe that they are going to fulfil one-half of their promises when elected. Every Nigerian regards the unfaithfulness/insincerity of politicians as an allergy which we have learned to live with. In fact, the instability in Nigeria is not necessarily a matter of expectations being raised let alone being unsatisfied. The dispute and disorder are more a matter of representation and corruption as Alexander Madiebo clearly points out.
An average African politician regards politics as an enterprise. He takes a calculated risk by investing all his savings and loans in politics in order to get into parliament. Once there, his primary aim is to make sufficient money so as to meet his financial commitment to his creditors, family and clan, in addition to ensuring his own profits. When the ruling people is made up of such individuals you have a situation where the government cannot be removed through elections. At this stage a section of people complain to the army and the army intervenes, sometimes rather too readily (1980, p. 385).

Furthermore, Haywood correctly points out that sometimes the incumbent government is so strong that it can control the masses without violence. For instance, he argues that in some nations, e.g., Ghana, leaders do use their position to suppress oppositions or factions by imprisoning them (Haywood, 1973, p. 606). Sometimes opposition leaders are bought off. Under such circumstances, mass participation and its impact on political instability become meaningless.

This thesis affirms that violent political behavior is a result of many causal factors. Its varied sources or preconditions have been argued to include, among others, the perceptions of the differences between "expected need satisfaction" and "actual need satisfaction" (Gurr, 1970),
anomie or normlessness (Johnson, 1966), and modernization (Deutsch, 1961; Huntington, 1968; Black, 1966; Apter, 1970; etc.). While the argument of the modernization-breeds-instability hypothesis seems to be all-encompassing, it still fails to explain a large proportion of deaths resulting from domestic political violence (R=33). Thus it becomes obvious that no one explanation offers a general theory that explains and explicates violent political behavior. At best, all hypotheses of violent behavior discussed in the preceding chapters should be treated as complimentary to each other.

It is worth noting that modernization, as defined in Chapter I, means in part a shift from particularistic criteria to universalistic criteria. While these characteristics are true by definition, and are capable of inducing some conflicts, we are still faced with the problem of operationalizing them.

A final note is therefore in order. There is a serious problem of political instability in the new nations of Africa, Asia and Latin America. These new nations are modernizing and therefore are in transition. Our understanding of their political unrest cannot be complete unless we can empirically study the causes of violent behavior in those modernizing nations. Efforts should be made to collect enough and better data, either cross-
sectional or time-series so that social scientists can truly make an accurate investigation of the causes of violent behavior in modernizing nations. When this is done, I think we might have a hope of developing a general theory of instability as it affects developing nations.
REFERENCES


