INCREASING THE PLAYERS: EXPANDING THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Emily A Stull, B.S., M.S.

Dissertation Prepared for the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS

May 2014

APPROVED:

Ideen Salehyan, Committee Chair
Jacqueline DeMeritt, Committee Member
J. Michael Greig, Committee Member
T. David Mason, Committee Member
Richard Ruderman, Chair of the Department of Political Science
Mark Wardell, Dean of the Toulouse Graduate School
This research seeks to explore the behavior of international and regional organizations within conflict management. Previous research on conflict management primarily examines UN peacekeeping as the primary actor and lumps all non-UN actors into a single category. I disaggregate this category, examining how international and regional organizations interact when deciding to establish a peace mission, coordinate a peace mission with multiple organizations, and finally, how this interaction affects the success of peace missions.

I propose a collective action theoretical framework in which organizations would rather another actor undertake the burden and costs of implementing a peace mission. I find the United Nations is motivated to overcome the collective action problem through an increase in the severity of the conflict. Regional organizations are motivated to establish a peace mission as the economic and political salience of the conflict increases, increasing the possibility of the regional organization acquiring club goods for its member states.

The presence of a regional hegemon within a regional organization also significantly increases the likelihood of an organization both establishing a peace mission and taking on the primary role when coordinating a joint mission. I argue this is because a regional hegemon allows the organization to more easily overcome the collective action problem between its own member states due to the presence of a privileged actor.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

There are so many people to whom I am indebted and to whom I owe a great deal of my success. First, I want to acknowledge my advisor Idean Salehyan and my committee members Jacqueline DeMeritt, Michael Greig, and David Mason. Each of them have taught me, challenged me, and provided support throughout not only the dissertation process, but the entirety of my career at the University of North Texas. I owe them each a great deal.

I also want to acknowledge additional faculty members at UNT that generously donated their time and efforts, specifically Marijke Breuning, Andrew Enterline, and Paul Hensel. Each of them shaped my early academic career through classes inspiring excellence, for which I am very thankful. In addition, they have each offered guidance and training on professional matters related to academia and its requirements for success, which has proven to be truly invaluable. I am grateful to each of them.

Although I do not have enough space to name them all, I owe a great deal to my fellow graduate students at UNT. I want to give special recognition to Jeremy Backstrom, Christine Balarezo, Rosa Fonseca, Nick Higgins, Chris Linebarger, and Angie Nichols. I could not have asked for a better cohort with which to navigate the perils of graduate school. Without the willingness of each of you to always be in my corner in addition to the readiness with which you were brutally honest when necessary, I could certainly not have finished this degree.

Finally, my family has been there throughout this entire process, cheering me on from the sidelines. My parents and brothers number among my most ardent supporters in my pursuit of higher education. Their encouragement during each of my degrees and their attempts to at least be moderately supportive as I announced multiple travels and relocations all over the world in the process mean the world to me. In addition, I could not have done any of this without my husband, Kevin. His love, care, and good humor consistently bring me back to the truly important things in life.
### TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</th>
<th>iii</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF FIGURES</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1. The Importance of Studying International Peace Missions</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2. Previous Literature</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.1. Where Peacekeepers Go</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.2. Organizational Coordination</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.3. Peacekeeping Success - Preventing Civil War Recurrence</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3. Dissertation Outline</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1. Introduction</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2. Why Organizations Get Involved</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.1. The Collective Action Problem</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.2. Inter-actor Collective Action Problem</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.3. United Nations</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.4. Regional Organizations</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.5. Intra-actor Collective Action Problem</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.6. Capabilities</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3. Coordination of Missions</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.1. Collective Action</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.2. Salience and Capabilities</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.4. Peace Mission Efficacy
   2.4.1. Capabilities 46
   2.4.2. Collective Action Problem 46
   2.4.3. Disaggregating Peace Missions 48

2.5. Conclusion 49

CHAPTER 3 PEACE MISSIONS DATA COLLECTION 51
   3.1. Introduction 51
   3.2. Data Collection 52

CHAPTER 4 ESTABLISHMENT OF A PEACE MISSION 58
   4.1. Introduction 58
   4.2. Research Design 60
      4.2.1. Dependent Variable 60
      4.2.2. Independent Variables 61
      4.2.3. Control Variables 66
   4.3. Analysis 68
      4.3.1. UN Dyads 69
      4.3.2. Regional Organization Dyads 73
   4.4. Substantive Effects 77
   4.5. Robustness Checks 80
   4.6. Conclusions and Implications 84

CHAPTER 5 THE COORDINATION OF PEACE MISSIONS 88
   5.1. Introduction 88
   5.2. Research Design 91
      5.2.1. Dependent Variable 92
      5.2.2. Independent Variables 94
   5.3. Analysis 100
   5.4. Substantive Effects 106
CHAPTER 6 THE SUCCESS OF PEACE MISSIONS

6.1. Introduction

6.2. Research Design
   6.2.1. Model and Dependent Variable
   6.2.2. Independent Variables
   6.2.3. Control Variables

6.3. Analysis
   6.3.1. Peace Enforcement Missions
   6.3.2. Peacekeeping

6.4. Conclusion

CHAPTER 7 CIVIL CONFLICT IN SIERRA LEONE: AN INVESTIGATION OF CAUSAL MECHANISMS

7.1. Expected Findings

7.2. Conflict Background
   7.2.1. Pre-Conflict Onset
   7.2.2. Conflict Events

7.3. Organisation for African Unity - Low Capabilities, High Salience

7.4. UN Mission Establishment and Contributing Factors

7.5. Conclusion

CHAPTER 8 CONCLUDING REMARKS

8.1. Theoretical Summary and Contributions

8.2. Empirical Findings

8.3. Avenues for Future Research

8.4. Policy Implications

BIBLIOGRAPHY
# LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 2.1</td>
<td>Regional Organization Involvement</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3.1</td>
<td>List of Regional Organizations</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3.2</td>
<td>Azerbaijan Dyads</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3.3</td>
<td>Regional Organization Peacekeeping Missions by Decade</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3.4</td>
<td>Number of Missions Undertaken by ROs by Geographic Region</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4.1</td>
<td>Regional Organizations with a Regional Hegemon</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4.2</td>
<td>Rare Events Logit - UN Dyads</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4.3</td>
<td>Rare Events Logit - RO Dyads</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4.4</td>
<td>Results of Rare Events Logit; NATO Worldwide Jurisdiction 2000-2001</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4.5</td>
<td>Results of Rare Events Logit; NATO Jurisdiction Limited to Europe</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4.6</td>
<td>Results of Rare Events Logit: NATO Dropped Entirely</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4.7</td>
<td>Results of Rare Events Logit: Jurisdiction Limited to First Mission</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5.1</td>
<td>Peace Mission Dyads</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5.2</td>
<td>Peace Missions with Coordination</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5.3</td>
<td>Logit - RO Dyads</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5.4</td>
<td>Firth Logit - RO Dyads</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5.5</td>
<td>Logit - UN Dyads</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5.6</td>
<td>Firth Logit - UN Dyads</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6.1</td>
<td>Peace Enforcement Missions: Max and Average Capabilities</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6.2</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Missions: Max and Average Capabilities</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6.1</td>
<td>RO Solo Mission</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6.2</td>
<td>Maximum CINC Scores</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6.3</td>
<td>Average CINC Scores</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In February 2011, anti-government protests erupted in Libya. These protests were sparked when the Libyan government arrested a human rights campaigner, and they rapidly spread from Benghazi to other cities nationwide. Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, the military leader of the state for the previous forty-two years, refused to abandon his office and yield to the demands of protesters, vowing instead to fight the rebels. These protests in Libya were part of a larger social movement now referred to as the Arab Spring. Sparked by protests in Tunisia in December 2010, including the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, these protests spread rapidly to multiple Arab countries, including Libya and Syria, demanding political change.¹

Colonel Gaddafi gained office in 1969 after a military coup that deposed King Idris I. Although Gaddafi established quasi-democratic institutions, such as an indirectly elected legislature and a series of local governments run directly by residents, these structures were often used as a tool to ensure Gaddafi remained in power. In addition, human rights protections remained low throughout Gaddafi’s tenure. Because dissent was illegal according to federal law, dissidents were often executed in public hangings, and the footage was broadcast repeatedly on public television channels. Establishing an opposing political party also carried a sentence of public execution (Eljahmi 2006).

Protesters in Libya began staging demonstrations in mid-January of 2011, citing frustration over political corruption and the resulting delays in building new housing units for the population.² Protesters broke into the government housing projects in progress, and protesters in Bayda attacked government offices.³ In late January, activist and writer Jamal al-Haii called for citizens to increase their presence at demonstrations in an effort to force

²Libya Protest over Housing Enters its Third Day. Al-Ahram. 16 January 2011.
³Ibid
the establishment and protection of civil freedoms in Libya. His arrest in February prompted additional, more violent protests against Gaddafi’s regime.

The rapid spread of the anti-government clashes throughout multiple countries led many threatened political leaders to use state security forces to violently suppress protesters. Leaders such as Gaddafi, fearful of being deposed and subsequently killed, responded with violence. However, protesters continued fighting against security forces and many factions of the civilian populations began actively waging war against the government.

Only a month after clashes between Libyan rebels and the Gaddafi regime intensified, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution that authorized a no-fly zone over Libya. It also froze the assets of Colonel Gaddafi and other high-ranking officials in his regime and instructed the International Criminal Court to further investigate the clashes. The UN authorized the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to assume command over the no-fly zone. NATO went on to engage in military action within the state of Libya, involving other third parties and consenting regional organizations as well, such as the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council.

In June 2011, Gaddafi announced he was willing to hold elections and promised to step aside if the results did not emerge in his favor. NATO officials and the Libyan rebels rejected the offer, however, and NATO soon resumed its attacks on Tripoli. In August, rebels succeeded in occupying Gaddafi’s compound in Tripoli, although Gaddafi managed to go into hiding and remove his wife and children from the fighting. A few months later, in October 2011, rebels managed to capture and kill Gaddafi. Despite Gaddafi’s death, peace had yet to be established. Factions between the National Transitional Council (NTC), the formally recognized legitimate government of Libya, continued to experience conflict over the pace of reforms and institutional creation. At the time of this dissertation, it is still unclear whether the rebels will manage to establish a peaceful, democratic government in Libya, or whether another dictator will seize power.

The Libyan participation in pro-democracy protests during the Arab Spring prompted a great deal of international attention and military action. The UN passed resolutions, NATO
acted militarily, and several other third-party states joined NATO’s military actions in the country. However, other citizenries experienced a much different international reaction. One month after protests erupted in Libya, Syrian citizens began demonstrations to demand the release of political prisoners. The resulting clashes between Syrian citizens and government security forces led to a domestic conflict environment similar to that of Libya in many ways. However, Syrians were unable to attract the same international assistance to overthrow their own leader in the way that Libyans succeeded.

The Syrian government, as of the time of this dissertation, is led by Bashar al-Assad, leader of the Ba’ath Party. The Assad family has held the presidency since 1971 and comes from the minority Alawite religious group. The Alawites constitute an estimated 12 percent of the total Syrian population. The Alawites also comprise the majority of the Syrian security forces, allowing the small minority to maintain power over the Sunni population that measures approximately 75 percent of Syrians.

The lack of protection for human rights in Syria prior to the Arab Spring has been criticized by many global organizations. Due to the country’s extended emergency rule from 1963 to 2011, state security forces were granted wide authority to arrest and detain suspected dissidents and critics of the Assad regime. Detained dissidents were often subjected to torture in poor prison conditions. The Assad regime also banned the creation of additional political parties, similar to the anti-dissent laws in Libya, effectively dominating the regime through one-party elections. Furthermore, minorities were subjected to harsh discrimination. Thousands of Syrian Kurds were denied citizenship in the 1960s and subsequently labeled foreigners, despite residing in Syria, until Assad granted citizenship in 2011 in an effort to decrease the level of violence.

The poor record of the Assad regime combined with the momentum of the pro-democracy movement of the Arab Spring contributed to the outbreak of protests by Syrian

---

6 Ibid
7 Stateless Kurds in Syria granted citizenship. CNN. 7 April 2011.
citizens. In March 2011, protests in Damascus and Deraa demanded the release of political prisoners held by the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad. During the protest in Deraa, Syrian state security forces shot and killed several protesters. This triggered several days of violent protests that spread from Deraa and Damascus throughout the entire country. In an effort to quell the resistance, President Assad offered the protesters concessions. He released dozens of political prisoners, dismissed the Syrian government, and lifted the 48-year-old state of emergency.

However, in addition to providing concessions, Assad continued to engage in violence against demonstrators. In May 2011, military tanks entered four major cities in Syria with the intent to crush anti-regime protests. Hundreds of citizens were killed as the government continued to repress protesters. After Syrian security forces began actively engaging in repression, the similarities between Libya and Syria continued to emerge. However, despite the establishment of previous international peace enforcement missions in Libya, the same international and regional organizations declined to establish similar missions in Syria.\(^8\)

Not until October 2011 did the United Nations attempt to pass a resolution condemning the Syrian government for its role in the violence. However, the UN was unable to overcome the gridlock of the Security Council, and Russia and China vetoed the resolution. One month later, the Arab League officially suspended Syria’s membership and imposed sanctions, accusing it of failing to implement an Arab peace plan. This action by a regional organization was the first official action taken toward Syria, despite its steadily increase in violence throughout 2011. In December 2011, the Arab League sent an observer mission to the country with the consent of Syria. Although thousands of protesters gathered to greet them, the representatives were forced to suspend the mission due to worsening violence in the area.\(^9\)

In February 2012, Russia and China vetoed a second UN Security Council draft resolution that reported over 7500 civilian deaths since the protests began. One month

---

\(^8\)US will not intervene in Syria as it has in Libya, says Hillary Clinton. The Guardian. 27 March 2011.

later, the UN Security Council managed to endorse a non-binding peace plan drafted by UN Envoy Kofi Annan. The UN was unable to take firm action, however, until it was reported that the Syrian government was using chemical weapons to fight Syrian rebels. In May 2012, the Security Council strongly condemned the Syrian government for its use of heavy weaponry, and in August 2012, the UN General Assembly demanded that President Assad resign. The UN declined to become directly involved in forging an agreement in Syria, passing the authority to the United States and Russia to create an agreement regarding Syria’s chemical weapons.

Contrary to the quick and decisive international action in Libya, the Syrian conflict continued to escalate with little outside interference. The United Nations, due to internal gridlock within the Security Council, was unable to even pass a resolution condemning Assad’s regime. The Arab League, only one organization to which Syria belonged that maintained a peace mission mandate,\(^{10}\) attempted to establish a small observer mission but was unsuccessful due to inadequate resources to combat the worsening violence. However, neither the UN nor any regional organizations established a military peace mission of the same extent that intervened in Libya.

What explains the discrepancy in the response by the international community between these two similar conflicts? Both countries existed prior to the Arab Spring as authoritarian states (Marshall, Gurr & Jaggers N.d.), and both countries erupted in protests and violence during the same social movement only one month apart. Furthermore, both regimes engaged in extensive oppression, arrests, and torture of the protest participants. Therefore, why did Libya attract international attention and military involvement while Syria only attracted vague condemnations for several years until its use of chemical weapons in 2013 prompted threats of military intervention from the United States? Why was coordination within the Security Council easy to achieve to sanction action in Libya but so difficult to achieve for Syria that only a non-binding resolution was able to pass?

\(^{10}\)Syria also maintains membership in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Gulf Cooperation Council, both of which maintain jurisdiction in Syria to establish peace missions.
Although the individual interests of the Security Council states were certainly a major factor, and the difference in international relationships between the two leaders cannot be discounted, other variables likely influenced these decisions. For example, the presence and willingness of a regional organization to engage in a peace enforcement mission in the conflict may have exerted some effect on the actions of the UN. Was the willingness of NATO to carry out military actions in Libya a contributing factor to the UN’s approval of their actions? Did the disapproval by Russia and China prevent NATO from attempting to establish a similar mission in Syria, or did NATO’s lack of interest exert a stronger effect? Did the identity of the RO matter in Libya, whether NATO or the Arab League, and how did coordination between these ROs and the UN occur? I address these puzzles and others in this dissertation.

The internal process by which the UN determines where to send peace missions has been extensively studied (Fortna 2004a, Gilligan & Stedman 2003). However, a gap exists in the literature in relation to the effects that other organizations exert on UN decision-making. Furthermore, almost no quantitative studies examine the decision-making process of regional organizations in regards to where peace missions are established. These processes and the wide variety of resulting peace missions, specifically those of where international and regional organizations send peace missions and how coordination occurs between them, are the primary focus of this dissertation.

This study focuses on three related puzzles. First, why do international and regional organizations get involved in some conflicts and not others? What might prompt the decision to intervene militarily during a conflict rather than wait until the warring parties sign a ceasefire? Second, how do organizations coordinate different peace enforcement or peacekeeping roles within a mission? How do organizations assign themselves and each other tasks, and why do some organizations take on the primary role in some conflicts but not others? Third, why are some types of these peace missions effective at preventing civil war recurrence while others are not?
1.1. The Importance of Studying International Peace Missions

The study of peace enforcement and peacekeeping missions is important to all students of conflict, as civil wars decimate a state’s population and economy, as well as exerting a general negative effect on neighboring states. For this reason and many others, states experience a great deal of difficulty preventing another civil war from recurring (Collier, Elliott, Hegre, Hoeffler, Reynal-Querol & Sambanis 2003). This path dependency of the “conflict trap” rightly concerns the international community as well as the neighbors of the civil war state.

International and regional organizations establish and fund peace enforcement and peacekeeping missions in an effort to assist post-conflict states in escaping the cycle of civil war recurrence. Much of the scholarly literature focuses on independent variables that increase or decrease the likelihood of civil war recurrence, peacekeeping missions often just being one of these variables. However, despite the identification of numerous factors affecting the likelihood of civil war recurrence and the inclusion of these factors as controls, disagreement continues to emerge about the effectiveness of peace missions. I take an organization-focused approach to examine the different motivations of international and regional organizations when first establishing a peace mission, how they coordinate during the mission, and how these factors affect the likelihood of civil war recurrence.

Examining the specific organizations involved in peace missions is important for several reasons. First, the number of regional organizations that engage in solo peace missions or missions in conjunction with the UN or other organizations increased exponentially since the end of the Cold War (Mullenbach 2005). Regional organizations are often able to avoid the gridlock and disagreements that plague the United Nations Security Council due to less diversity in political preferences, which may increase the likelihood of establishing a peace mission (Howe 1996). However, many scholars remain skeptical regarding the ability of regional organizations to successfully manage peace missions (Diehl 1993a, Miller 1967, Gershoni 1997) with some going so far as to argue that the inexperience of ROs with peace missions and/or the selfish interests of member states that comprise an RO may actually prolong the civil
conflict (Howe 1996).

Current criticisms of RO peace missions echo previous statements applied to UN peace missions (Gibbs 1997, Bennis 1996). Prior to systematic analyses of UN missions, the UN was accused of using its status to further the interest of the Security Council members through strategically designed peace missions. However, later studies contradicted these accusations, finding that the UN sends missions to those conflicts that are the most difficult to solve (Gilligan & Stedman 2003).

The current literature on conflict management lacks systematic analyses of the peace missions of regional organizations in the same manner it formerly lacked analyses on UN peace missions. However, because of the increasing number of both regional organizations and their peace missions, it is important to examine these criticisms systematically in order to determine whether ROs do engage in self-interested behavior that might extend the duration of a conflict, or whether RO peace missions maintain a relatively equal success rate with UN missions.

1.2. Previous Literature

Systematic studies of conflict management comprise a relatively recent body of work. The majority of these studies focus on one of two areas: where peace missions are sent; and why or why aren’t peace missions successful at preventing civil war recurrence. Only very recently have studies examined the internal processes of the UN that determine the specific type of mission sent to a conflict state. In the following sections, I will discuss the previous literature on peacekeeping, focusing primarily on the two previously identified subgroups. I will also provide a more in-depth discussion of the emerging literature on UN internal coordination, as this informs my research question regarding the coordination of organizations.

1.2.1. Where Peacekeepers Go

The first subset of conflict management literature I will discuss examines where and why the UN and other interested actors send peacekeepers. Prior research on peace missions
focuses primarily on UN missions and operations, with a relatively recent increase in the study of third-party peacekeeping. Although systematic research on RO peacekeeping has been relatively sparse, several factors that affect the decision of the UN, third-party actors or ad hoc coalitions to engage in peacekeeping have been identified.

The UN’s decisions regarding the location of peacekeeping missions have historically been subject to harsh criticism. Although many of these critiques were founded in anecdotal rather than systematic evidence, critiques of UN peacekeeping decisions were much more common than praises (Gilligan & Stedman 2003). Scholars and journalists alike accused the UN of engaging in imperialistic peacekeeping that served the interests of powerful Western states, rather than choosing those cases that were in most need of peacekeeping (Gibbs 1997, Bennis 1996). Others present a slightly more nuanced and systematic approach, but still assert the role of powerful Western nations in dictating UN decision-making (De Jonge Oudraat 1996). Neack (Neack 1995) examines eighteen UN operations from 1948 to 1990 and concludes that “states whose interests were better served by the continuation of the status quo - that is, states of the advanced industrialized West and non-Western states that have enjoyed some prestige in the international status quo - have dominated UN peacekeeping” (Neack 1995). More recent studies, however, demonstrate that weaker states are the most likely to commit to peacekeeping (Victor 2011). Weaker states contribute to peacekeeping in an effort to win the favor of major powers, but this supply of peacekeepers from weaker states results in greater control over the peacekeeping processes.

Although the stigma of western-dominated UN decision-making certainly still exists, scholars began exploring new possible motivations for peacekeeping decisions, specifically humanitarian sentiments and the promotion of democracy. Jakobsen (Jakobsen 1996) found that national interests of powerful nations did not dictate UN decisions. Rather, he described two alternative processes: motivation by humanitarian sentiment and/or concern about the consequences of unhindered intrastate conflict. Jakobsen found evidence that states are willing to take on much greater risks when national interests are stake rather than solely humanitarian concerns. As a result, humanitarian missions generally only occur when the
risk is low and the probability of success high. States accept greater risks as the stakes of the conflict increase.

Andersson (Andersson 2000) proposes another alternative to the western-dominated UN decision-making model, noting that the broad geographic distribution of interventions suggests no such bias is present. Instead, he posits that the Security Council acts to promote democracy throughout the world. Andersson contends this ideological motivation is rooted in the democratic peace theory, which would encourage the UN to promote democracy in order to decrease the overall amount of conflict in the world.

Other research has identified several other factors that affect the decision of the UN, third-party actors or ad hoc coalitions to intervene. Most of these factors can be split into two different categories: the security interests of states and the linkages between states, whether they be social, economic or political (Rost & Greig 2011). Security interests affect the viability of the state itself, while linkages between states can be tangible or intangible.

Security concerns threaten most intensely the neighbors of the conflict state. States with shared borders have the highest likelihood of being negatively affected by the conflict because they have the highest number of interactions with the conflict state (Most & Starr 1989, Vasquez 1993, Vasquez 1995). Refugees are not only a humanitarian crisis, but a security concern as well, since the flow of refugees often is accompanied by the spread of conflict across borders.

Private concerns can also motivate third-party actors to engage in peacekeeping. Although peacekeeping is generally considered to be a public good, if a state or group of states maintain important interests in a conflict state, whether social, economic or political, they will be more likely to intervene to protect those interests (Regan 1998, Feste 1992, Morgenthau 1967, Khanna, Sandler & Shimizu 1998, Shimizu & Sandler 2002, Shimizu & Sandler 2003). Ethnic links between a potential intervener and the conflict state may also prompt intervention or peacekeeping. A great deal of literature provides evidence that ethnic groups regularly mobilize to support or even provide peacekeeping operations when their ethnic kin are threatened by conflicts (Austvoll 2005, Petersen 2004, Saideman 1997,
Humanitarian concerns also play a large role in prompting peacekeeping missions. The rise in importance of international human rights created an atmosphere in which large-scale human rights abuses generate calls for intervention, establishing a greater legitimacy to those missions that are created (Evans 2008, Donnelly 2003, Dowty & Loescher 1996, Weil 2001). Several scholars have empirically tested this new legitimacy, finding strong support of the link between humanitarian emergencies and where peacekeepers are sent (Jakobsen 1996, Gilligan & Stedman 2003, Finnemore 2004, Regan & Stam 2000).

In addition to large-scale human rights abuses, the intensity of the conflict may also play a role in prompting peacekeeping. While mediation may seem an option for most conflicts, and is much less costly for states to provide, the longer the war continues, the less chance potential peacekeepers see of resolving the war absent intervention (Doyle & Sambanis 2000, Fortna 2004a, Kressel & Pruitt 1989, Bercovitch 1997, Hartzell, Hoddie & Rothchild 2001). Therefore, as the duration of the war increases and the overall number of battle-deaths in a conflict increase, the likelihood of military intervention increases (Gilligan & Stedman 2003).

The type of conflict also exerts an effect on the likelihood of peacekeeping. Ethno-religious conflicts are more difficult to manage, as the stakes are considerably less tangible than some wars over territory (Hartzell, Hoddie & Rothchild 2001). Therefore, these types of wars are less likely to attract peacekeepers. Wars over territory or secessionist conflicts also seem less likely to attract peacekeepers, most likely because they tend to also center around ethnic cleavages (Durch 1993). However, when control of the government is at stake, peacekeepers seem to be the most likely to intervene (Andersson 2000). This is perhaps because reaching a conclusion in such wars may be much simpler than reaching a conclusion in ethno-religious wars, due to the tangible nature of control over the government.

Finally, previous literature demonstrates that peacekeepers are particularly interested in intervening at the time that provides the highest likelihood of resolving the conflict (Mullenbach 2005). This allows for both the provision of the public good of peacekeeping
and the possible securing of private benefits to those states that provided peacekeepers with relatively low cost and risk. This helps explain why most UN peacekeeping missions tend to intervene after a peace agreement has already been reached, rather than intervene in the middle of a conflict. However, Rost and Greig (Rost & Greig 2011) find that peacekeepers are actually motivated to go to the hardest cases to solve rather than those with the lowest risk or cost.

The literature on where peacekeepers are sent focuses on UN peacekeeping missions or third-party actors and ad hoc coalitions. While this information is certainly valuable, it ignores the large role that regional organizations play in determining when and where peacekeepers are sent. Regional organizations with greater capabilities than the United Nations, such as NATO, may send peacekeeping missions outside of consultations with the UN. As a result, the UN may not need to send peacekeepers to certain conflicts because NATO peacekeepers are already present. This interaction between international and regional organizations is crucial to understanding not only where peacekeepers are sent, it is also vital to understanding the different roles played by different peacekeeping groups in dual missions as well as the success and failure rate of peacekeeping missions.

1.2.2. Organizational Coordination

After an organization decides to establish a peace mission, it often faces the task of coordinating with other organizations, whether the UN or another regional organization. Unless it is the only organization that created a peace mission, it must coordinate to some degree with the other actors present. However, the current literature lacks empirical analyses of what occurs within the UN and between multiple organizations after a mission is established. As previously discussed, an increasing amount of literature analyzes the decisions made regarding where peace missions are sent. Furthermore, as I will discuss in the following section, perhaps an even greater number of scholarly work examines the success and effectiveness of peacekeeping missions. Only very recent studies, however, have begun to examine the coordination component.

One such study by Allen and Yuen (Allen & Yuen 2013) examines the amount of
oversight the UN exerts over various peacekeeping missions. Noting that some peacekeeping missions contain vague mandates that allow the commander of the mission broad authority to accomplish its goals while others are subjected to specific and strict limitations, Allen and Yuen use a principal-agent framework to discuss how the increased bureaucracy in the UN affects the mandate and independence of missions. Specifically, they test the claim that the permanent members of the Security Council continue to exert their preferences through the procedures and activities of peacekeeping missions. They find that although the UN “has yet to achieve such freedom from the influence of powerful states” (Allen & Yuen 2013, p.10), individual preferences of the Security Council are not exacted through peace missions. However, the main avenue through which preferences are enacted can be demonstrated by the scope of the mission. Those conflicts with high levels of salience to Security Council states receive peace missions with a wider scope and greater freedom for UN commanders to tailor their mission to a specific conflict. Those conflicts with lower salience receive peacekeeping missions with strict limitations on the activity of the mission and the peacekeepers themselves.

As the literature on intra-organization decision-making in reference to peace missions continues to expand, it will better inform studies that seek to unpack the “black box” of the organization. Currently, the literature examines where missions are sent based primarily on static factors specific to the conflict or the member states of the organization followed by an examination of whether these missions were successful. However, little room for dynamic decision-making is provided within the organization itself. As these studies grow, perhaps the link between where missions are sent and of what kind, along with their success rate, will become more clear.

1.2.3. Peacekeeping Success - Preventing Civil War Recurrence

An extensive collection of studies examine why some civil wars recur and others do not. Peace missions are only a small portion of that literature, however, as many studies have identified several other factors that affect the likelihood of a state experiencing civil war recurrence. Furthermore, when considering the relatively mixed findings of UN peacekeeping
success, it is important to put the peacekeeping literature within its broader context, namely the study of civil war recurrence. In this section, I will briefly discuss the trends in studies of civil war recurrence. As previously mentioned, this extensive literature is too large to provide an in-depth examination, and it is also intertwined with larger literature examining why civil war occurs originally. As a result, I will group studies by their primary independent variable they identify as affecting civil war recurrence, as these findings are those that inform my theory and empirical analyses in later chapters. I will then discuss the subsection of this literature that specifically examines how the presence or absence of peacekeeping missions, in addition to the type of mission, affects the likelihood of civil war recurrence.

The original occurrence of a civil war places a state into what we now refer to as a conflict trap (Collier & Sambanis 2002, Collier et al. 2003). This trap refers to the difficulty civil conflict states experience when attempting to rebuild after a civil war without experiencing its recurrence. After a country experiences one civil war, it is much more likely to experience additional civil wars than a state with no history of civil wars. As a result, many studies examine what factors increase the peace duration after the conflict in an effort to understand what paths are available to a state to break the conflict trap. However, only approximately 35 percent of states experience civil war recurrence (Walter 2004), and many of the post-conflict variables that might affect the likelihood of recurrence are still debated in the literature.

Many studies look to the causes of the original war to explain the likelihood of a second or third, arguing that some types of conflicts are much more difficult to resolve than others. For example, some find that ethnic conflicts are the hardest to solve and the most likely to revert back to civil war (j. Mearsheimer & Pape June 14, 1993, Kaufmann 1996, Licklider 1995, Doyle & Sambanis 2000, Gurr 2000). However, others find no difference between ethnic conflicts and other primary issues in a civil war (Hartzell, Hoddie & Rothchild 2001, Dubey N.d.).

Others examine the manner in which the original war was fought by the warring parties to determine whether civil war will recur. Wars that involve multiple factions are
harder to solve and more likely to recur than those conflicts with only one rebel group (Doyle & Sambanis 2000). Negotiations between multiple parties have lower success rates at producing an agreement than those negotiations that only involve two parties.

The costs inflicted upon the government and population during the war may also affect the likelihood of its recurrence. Some argue that higher death counts in a conflict increase the incentive for retribution, a key component in motivating the recurrence of war (Kalyvas 2006, Doyle & Sambanis 2000). Others, however, cite theories of war-weariness and argue that particularly costly wars exhaust and deplete both the government and the population. As a result, cooperation is more likely after costly wars (Hensel 1994, Werner 1999, Fortna 2004a).

The manner in which a conflict ends has received much attention from scholars. Several studies find that conflicts that end in military victories are much less likely to experience civil war recurrence than those conflicts that end in negotiated settlements (Maoz 1984, Kozhemiakin 1994, Licklider 1995, Stinnet & Diehl 2001, Dubey N.d., Toft 2003, Fortna 2004a). Military victories result in a more stable post-conflict environment because one warring party was presumably destroyed. Either the government or the rebels are able to claim victory and usually exert control over the entirety of the state institutions. This allows for consolidation of power in addition to the punishment of the other side, dismantling their mechanisms for restructuring (Zartman 1989, Zartman 1995, Wagner 1993, Wagner 1994). The winning party is therefore able to increase its relative power in relation to other warring factions, increasing the cost of any future rebellions. As a result, the losing faction is less likely to wage war again.

The behavior of the government toward rebel groups also affects the likelihood of civil war recurrence. Some governments take steps to address the grievances of rebel groups, which decreases the likelihood of future war (For an in-depth examination of how grievances affect civil war onset, see Gurr (Gurr 1971) and Tilly (Tilly 1978)). If the original grievances of the rebels were resolved, the risk of war recurrence is low. However, if the grievances were not addressed by the government, it risks a return to conflict.
The length of the civil conflict also affects the likelihood of resumed fighting (Smith & Stam 2004). Shorter civil wars are more likely to experience recurrence than longer civil wars. After a relatively short civil conflict, one or more sides are left with unanswered questions regarding the strength of the opposing side(s). This lack of information can prompt a recurrence of war, as groups continue fighting until they gain certainty regarding whether the opposing side would be able to sustain fighting and/or achieve military victory.

Finally, the manner in which the warring factions are physically divided may affect whether fighting resumes. Kaufmann (Kaufmann 1996, Kaufmann 1998) argues that dividing the warring factions via geography decreases the likelihood of recurrence. Physical distance between warring factions creates homogenous regions in which little incentive for fighting exists. Furthermore, each side is able to relax its fear of surprise attacks, further decreasing the incentive for fighting. In contrast, Walter (Walter 2006) argues that geographic separation of the warring factions might actually contribute to additional fighting by sending a signal to rebel groups or potential rebels that the government is willing to provide conciliatory measures. This may prompt civil war recurrence.

Other post-conflict factors exert significant effects on the likelihood of recurrence. An increase in the level of economic development decreases the likelihood of civil war recurrence by providing opportunities for citizens outside participating in a rebellion (Walter 2004). Walter argues that citizens will only take up arms against the government again if no other economic alternatives are available. As a result, those peacebuilding missions that focus on economic policies designed to stimulate growth might exert the highest success rates.

The level of democracy of a state prior to a civil conflict exerts a positive effect on peace duration (Hartzell, Hoddie & Rothchild 2001, Dubey N.d., Walter 2006). The more democratic a state prior to the conflict, the more likely it will be able to return to those familiar institutions after the conflict. As a result, recurrence is less likely.

Finally, the amount of natural resources in a state exerts a positive effect on the likelihood of civil war recurrence (Collier & Hoeffler 2000, Elbadawi & Sambanis 2001). States rich in natural resources provide the opportunity for rebel groups to capture the
resource and exploit it for their own benefit. As a result, the reward of winning is much greater, and thus the likelihood of a warring party attempting to control the resources once again is more likely than those states that contain no natural resources.

Within the context of the civil war recurrence literature, peacekeeping missions provide an additional post-conflict variable that affects the likelihood of civil war recurrence. As the goal of peacekeeping missions is ultimately to prevent civil war recurrence, they are judged on the success of their ability to do so. In addition, like many other factors previously discussed, debate regarding the effectiveness of peacekeeping continues to occur. In the following section, I will discuss the subfield of literature that specifically examines peacekeeping within the context of civil war recurrence.

Prior research examining the effectiveness of peacekeeping has been somewhat mixed. Many scholars have questioned the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping (Fabian 1976, Diehl & Cho 2006), the effectiveness of peacekeeping in general (Dubey N.d.), and the effectiveness of peacekeeping in civil wars compared to inter-state wars (Diehl 1993b, Weiss 1995). The few studies that do compare peacekeeping in interstate wars with peacekeeping in civil wars find that there is no significant difference between the two types, as well as that peacekeeping in civil wars is at least as effective as peacekeeping in inter-state wars (Heldt 2001/2002).

More recently, studies noted that all UN missions cannot be judged in a similar manner, as the degree of difficulty of the cases must also be considered (Blechman 1997, Fortna 2004a). When controlling for the degree of difficulty and the selection mechanism evidenced by the tough cases to which the UN sends missions, scholars merge toward greater agreement that UN peacekeeping exerts a strong, negative effect on the recurrence of civil war (Fortna 2003, Fortna 2004b, Fortna 2008, Doyle & Sambanis 2000, Hartzell, Hoddie & Rothchild 2001, Walter 2002). Various dependent variables throughout these studies cause other scholars to question the generalizability of the results. Using the original dataset from Doyle and Sambanis (Doyle & Sambanis 2000), Dubey (Dubey N.d.) attempts to recreate the strong, positive effect exerted on peace duration using a duration model as opposed to the static measurement of two years after the end of the conflict. However, he finds no
statistically significant effect exerted by UN missions. Hartzell et al (Hartzell, Hoddie & Rothchild 2001) also find significant effects for UN missions but only examine those civil wars that end in a negotiated settlement rather than a military victory. While negotiated settlements are more difficult to solve, as previously noted, and this may actually result in an understatement of the UN’s effect, the different criteria for data in various peace studies contributes to the mixed findings.

Some scholars have distinguished between the ability of peacekeepers to forge peace while a civil war is occurring versus their ability to keep a previously established peace. They find that peacekeepers are effective at keeping a peace, but not effective at peace building when none had previously existed (Greig & Diehl 2005, Gilligan & Sergenti 2008). This important distinction is able to help explain a large portion of the discrepancy in the literature regarding peacekeeping missions.

The literature that compares UN missions with non-UN missions is decidedly mixed. Qualitative work that examines the effectiveness of non-UN peacekeeping has been somewhat supportive of the effectiveness of RO actors (Durch & Berkman 2006, Bellamy & Williams 2005). However, quantitative studies are much more varied. Some quantitative works find no difference in the success rate of UN and non-UN missions (Heldt 2004), while others argue that non-UN peacekeeping has no significant effect on war recurrence (Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl 2007). Much of these opposing results can be attributed to different coding schemes regarding what missions are considered to be UN missions and which are classified as non-UN. The primary dataset utilized for studies on non-UN peacekeeping is from Doyle and Sambanis (Doyle & Sambanis 2006), consisting of highly detailed data on UN missions. However, this dataset poses difficulties for those hoping to examine non-UN peacekeeping for two reasons.

First, it lumps all non-UN peacekeeping into a catch-all ‘other’ category discussed previously. This category includes regional organizations, ad hoc coalitions, unilateral actors, and any other groups that contribute to peacekeeping. Since third-party and ad hoc peacekeeping likely operate much differently than peacekeeping by regional organizations,
this aggregation will produce results that do not produce an accurate picture of non-UN peacekeeping. The second reason this dataset poses difficulties for those studying non-UN peacekeeping is the manner in which UN missions are coded. Any mission containing the United Nations as an actor is coded as solely UN, regardless of whether a regional organization or multiple regional organizations participated in the peacekeeping process. Thus, it is hardly surprising that many articles find non-UN peacekeeping to be ineffective, as a large portion of non-UN peacekeeping has been left undocumented. In following chapters, I describe an original dataset coded to include the contribution of regional organizations to both UN missions and solo operations.

1.3. Dissertation Outline

This dissertation proceeds as follows. In the second chapter, I propose a theory of organizational commitment to peace missions and their resulting effectiveness. I explain how the international collective action problem discourages states from contributing resources to peace missions and often results in collective failure. Furthermore, the collective action problem may contribute to organizations freeriding within peace missions off of other, more capable organizations. Based on this theoretical argument, I derive several empirical hypotheses.

In the third chapter, I describe the data collected to test my hypotheses. This data contains information on the peace missions of both international and regional organizations in addition to the specific roles and contributions each actor contributed within a mission. As these are original data, I describe summary statistics and other important information with regards to the regional organizations included.

In the fourth chapter, I analyze the empirical hypotheses derived in Chapter II with relation to the contribution and establishment of peace missions. In this section, I utilize a rare events logistic regression to test what independent variables exert a significant effect on the likelihood of the UN and regional organizations establishing a peace mission. I present results from this analysis and conclude the chapter with a summary and discussion of the relevancy of the findings.
In the fifth chapter, I analyze the empirical hypotheses derived in Chapter II examining the coordination problem of organizations when multiple actors commit to the same peace mission. Due to the small sample size of those missions involving multiple actors, I utilize a logistic regression in addition to a Firth logit as a robustness check to ensure the small number of observations do not disproportionately affect the findings.

In the sixth chapter, I test the hypotheses derived from Chapter II regarding the success of peace missions. I test how the different types of solo and joint missions affect the likelihood of civil war recurrence in conjunction with other known factors that make recurrence more or less likely. This provides an in-depth analysis of peace mission success, as it considers peace mission activity conducted by all types of organizations rather than only UN peacekeeping. I conclude this chapter with a discussion of the findings and their relevancy and policy implications.

In the seventh chapter, I conduct a case study of the Sierra Leone civil conflict. I utilize this case study to empirically examine aspects of my theory not easily testable by quantitative analyses. First, I examine what prompted both the UN and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to contribute to and establish peace missions. I provide evidence for the economic motivations of ECOWAS as well as concern over the deteriorating political stability of the region. In contrast, I provide evidence that the UN established a peacekeeping mission due to the deteriorating humanitarian concerns in the region, some to which ECOWAS contributed. I then use the case study to illustrate the coordination problem between the two organizations. ECOWAS coordinated with the UN mission in Liberia, but the UN hesitated to establish a mission in Sierra Leone despite repeated requests for funding and resources by ECOWAS. When the UN did send a mission, they sent only a small observer mission and left ECOWAS to continue to provide the majority of the resources.

In the final eighth chapter, I briefly restate the main theoretical arguments as well as the key findings from my empirical analyses. I discuss how this dissertation contributes to the conflict management literature and our current understanding of why peace missions
are established and why they might or might not be successful. Finally, I suggest potential application the findings in this dissertation might have for policy-makers in the international community that might contribute to different types of peace missions in the future.
CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Introduction

In the previous chapter, I discussed the trends in previous scholarly work on conflict management. I argued that this literature is incomplete, as the majority of scholarly work examines only the peace missions of international organizations, ad hoc coalitions and third-party actors, while failing to disaggregate the presence of regional organizations within the different categories of peace missions. In this chapter, I develop a theoretical framework to explain the actions of international and regional organizations in the context of conflict management. I address three primary research questions. First, I examine why international and regional organizations choose to become involved in civil conflict peace missions rather than free ride off of other organizations. Second, I turn to an examination of how international and regional organizations coordinate if multiple organizations choose to become involved in peace enforcement or peacekeeping. This concerns those international and regional organizations that have affirmatively decided to engage in peace enforcement or peacekeeping and find other organizations have done the same. Coordination must take place in order for duplication to be avoided, and this portion of the theoretical framework attempts to explain how that coordination might occur. Finally, I develop a theory regarding the efficacy of peace missions, specifically examining the organizational characteristics comprising peace missions are associated with a shorter civil conflict and greater peace duration.

In order to develop a theoretical framework, I must first define several important terms I will use throughout this chapter. Different portions of the conflict management literature utilize the various peacekeeping terms in conflicting ways, further cementing the importance of clearly indicating the manner in which I use them. Although many studies use peacekeeping as a broad term encompassing all missions, others disaggregate it further based on the timing of the mission, its activities, and its goals. I base my definitions on the usage adopted by the United Nations, drawn from information provided by the organization
regarding its own peace mission activity. I assign the term *peace enforcement mission* to the creation and deployment of a peace mission prior to any type of ceasefire being signed by the warring parties in the civil war state. This includes Chapter VII missions conducted by the United Nations with or without the collaboration of regional organizations as well as similar missions established solely by regional organizations. The purpose of a peace enforcement mission is to utilize military authority to force an end to the conflict. This can be accomplished through multiple means, such as supporting the rebels or supporting the government, but the goal of a peace enforcement mission is to force the two parties to end the war.

In contrast, I use the term *peacekeeping* mission to refer to the deployment of a mission after some sort of ceasefire has been reached by the warring parties or military victory achieved by one side over the other. The purpose of a peacekeeping mission is to keep a peace that has already been forged. Currently, some scholarship divides post-conflict missions into peacekeeping missions, which often include observer missions and other missions designed only to keep a conflict from recurring; and peacebuilding missions, which are designed to build a post-conflict environment that prohibits conflict from recurring. Peacebuilding missions are also often referred to as “multi-dimensional” UN missions (Dorussen & Gizelis 2013). Although the disaggregation of the various types of missions provides a greater richness to the findings, much work was devoted to coding the various types of UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions (Doyle & Sambanis 2000, Fortna 2004a). The separation of post-conflict missions conducted by regional organizations into specific types is outside the scope of this study and an avenue for future research. As a result, I use the term *peacekeeping* to refer to post-conflict missions of all types. When referring generally to missions of both types, I use the broad term *peace missions*. This term encompasses both peace enforcement and peacekeeping missions as well as the many categories of missions that comprise each individual mission.

2.2. Why Organizations Get Involved

In order to effectively model the decision of actors to engage in peace missions, I propose a theoretical framework in which each side faces a collective action problem in the effort to establish peace missions. This collective action problem exists not only at the international level between different international and regional organizations, such as the UN and various regional organizations, but also within the organizations themselves. The member states comprising these organizations face a collective action problem amongst themselves when faced with the desire to establish a peace mission. In this section, I first describe an overview of the multiple collective action problems; then I discuss how the provision of the public good of peace missions motivates some organizations to overcome the collective action problem (Olson 1965), while the acquisition of private goods for member states urges other organizations to engage in peace missions. Finally, I discuss how the relative capabilities of regional organizations, namely their military capabilities and ability to take on the heavy costs associated with peace missions, affect their likelihood to intervene.

2.2.1. The Collective Action Problem

In order to discuss the collective action problem between potential organizations, I must first identify the relevant actors in the international system. These relevant actors are any international or regional organization with the mandate to establish a peace mission in a conflict or post-conflict state. The first potential actor is the United Nations. The number of peace missions organized and funded by the United Nations has dramatically increased since the end of the Cold War (Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl 2007), as has the type of various missions the UN undertakes. Early UN missions were only sent after a peace had already been established between the two parties\(^2\), stemming either from a ceasefire or a negotiated settlement. However, more recent UN missions have been created and deployed to wars in which no prior agreement had been reached (Gilligan & Stedman 2003). The UN has also sent missions to a wide variety of geographic locations in accordance with its worldwide

The second potential actor relevant to international peace missions is the regional organization, or, in some cases, multiple regional organizations. The number of regional organizations in the world, both economic- and security-based, has increased substantially since 1980 (Fawcett & Hurrell 1995). As the number of ROs began to increase, so did the number of regional organizations that experienced one or more of their member states embroiled in civil conflict. Those organizations with the mandate to conduct peace missions were faced with the option of establishing a peace mission. Although some ROs have yet to establish a peace mission despite the presence of a mandate within their charter, many other ROs initiated their own peace missions or joined a mission conducted by the UN. As a result, the number of peace missions conducted by regional organizations has also increased dramatically (Mullenbach 2005). Regional organizations increased their actions both in conjunction with UN missions and by establishing solo peace missions in conflict areas within their geographic area.

Regional organizations, however, are geographically limited in ways that the UN is not. The UN maintains a worldwide mandate to intervene in conflicts in accordance with its charter. Although the UN is limited by other restrictions and problems with procedures and gridlock within the Security Council, its geographic mandate for peace missions covers every country. However, geographic boundaries often expressly dictate the limits of the potential peace missions of ROs. The charter or mandate of an RO may express limits on what kind of peace missions in which an RO can engage, or perhaps whether an RO is able to engage in any type of peace mission. Not all ROs have taken steps to establish a mandate to conduct a peace mission, and some expressly limit their scope to economic matters. For example, the South Asian Free Trade Association (SAFTA) works to ensure mutually beneficial economic policies between its member states. However, it currently has no mandate for conducting a peace mission. The Association of SouthEast Asian Nations (ASEAN) also began as a purely economic organization. However, it recently established the necessary mechanisms to conduct its own peace missions. For this dissertation, I am only interested in those
organizations that either began with a mandate to conduct their own military operations or, like ASEAN, established them explicitly at some point in their duration. I consider only ROs that either maintain a mandate in their charter or have taken obvious steps to implement procedures that provide the means to militarily intervene or engage in peace missions in their given region. As a result, this excludes any purely economic organizations that have no pre-existing structure to cooperatively engage in a peace mission, such as the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council or SAFTA.

Of those ROs included in the analysis with a mandate to conduct peace missions, I consider each to maintain jurisdiction in a certain geographic area of the world as previously described. I define jurisdiction as the organizational authority, generally self-defined, to establish a peace enforcement or peacekeeping mission in a geographic region. Sometimes the geographic boundaries are explicitly expressed and only apply to the actual member states of an RO, but other times they are merely implied. For example, if a conflict broke out in Morocco, its status as a non-member state of the African Union would not absolutely preclude the AU from intervening or engaging in a peace mission in that state due to the AU’s general geographic jurisdiction throughout the entire continent. However, the African Union does not maintain jurisdiction to intervene in a war in South America, nor does the Organization of American States have jurisdiction to intervene in an Asian civil conflict. If a regional organization comprises over seventy percent of a continent and does not expressly limit its jurisdiction to the member states, I consider it to have jurisdiction over the entire continent. This would extend the jurisdiction of the African Union to states like Morocco. However, if the regional organization consists of fewer member states than the seventy percent threshold and does not expressly state its jurisdiction extends beyond its member states, then its jurisdiction is considered to extend only to its member states.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the only regional organization I consider to maintain international jurisdiction. NATO has intervened in a wide variety of geographic locations, and its charter details its commitment to protect the interest of its member states, suggesting its self-defined jurisdiction to intervene worldwide were a threat
to occur. Furthermore, many areas of literature consider it to maintain a special relationship with the UN that allows it to intervene worldwide without said intervention condemned by the international community as illegitimate (Miller 1967, Dorn 1998). As a result, I consider NATO to maintain international jurisdiction. However, in an effort to ensure my later empirical results are not driven by NATO’s geographic expanse, I also consider scenarios in which NATO’s jurisdiction is limited to its member states as well as dropped from analyses entirely.

Although many other actors remain as potential contributors to peace missions, such as individual states, ad hoc coalitions and non-governmental organizations, these potential actors are outside the scope of this study. I am only concerned with the relationship between the United Nations and regional organizations. Although I do not contend that these actors’ choices are independent of decisions that the UN and relevant ROs make, nor perhaps are the decisions of the UN and relevant ROs independent of other peace mission actors, I do argue that the relationship between UN and RO peacekeeping is much different than the relationship between any other actors. The UN, as an international organization, will interact differently with regional organizations than when interacting with other types of potential actors due to the nature of the RO. Therefore, I choose to control for these actors’ involvement, if present, rather than include them as a dynamic part of my theoretical model.

It is possible, and often the case, that one civil conflict may possess multiple actors with the jurisdiction to establish a peace mission. For example, the 1992-1994 conflict in Azerbaijan could have seen peace missions deployed from the UN, NATO, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), or the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Each of these organizations expresses jurisdiction over Azerbaijan through Azerbaijan’s membership. Other conflicts occur in states that only fall within the jurisdiction of the UN and NATO, although the number of these conflicts continues to decrease as the number of ROs with a mandate to conduct peace missions continues to grow and geographically expand.

When multiple actors are present and maintain jurisdiction to establish a peace mis-
sion, each faces two different collective action problems (Olson 1965). The first is an inter-actor collective action problem between the various organizations with jurisdiction over the conflict state. The second is an intra-actor collective action problem within the organization. Organizations must collect funds from member states to establish and fund peace missions, which are costly endeavors, and they prefer to pass along those costs to another member (Sandler 1992). The following section will describe both of these collective action problems in greater detail and discuss the possible ways in which organizations overcome each type of collective action problem.

2.2.2. Inter-actor Collective Action Problem

The inter-actor collective action problem that exists between international and regional organizations stems from the provision of the international public good of peace missions. A public good is a non-rival and non-excludable good, indicating that one’s person enjoyment of it does not detract from another’s, nor can any individual be denied consumption (Olson 1965, Sandler 1992, Hardin 1982). Traditional examples of public goods include clean air and security forces. Global peace and the successful resolution of conflict is prima facie a public non-rival good. A lack of conflict can be enjoyed by any individual, state or group without detracting from the enjoyment of others. Since peace missions provide an international public good, their provision is subject to a collective action problem between the potential collaborators.

The literature on collective action and the provision of public goods is extensive and spans multiple fields, including economics, political science, and social psychology (Ledyard 1995). Public good provision is subject to collective failure due to its inherent nature as non-rival and non-excludable (Olson 1965, Warr 1983). Many studies that expand on Olson (1965) demonstrate the difficulty groups have when attempting to provide a public good through private means (Isaac & Walker Springer, Palfrey & Rosenthal 1988, Bergstrom, Blume & Varian 1986). This leads to collective failure, supported by demonstrating a Nash equilibrium of sub-optimum and inefficient public goods provision (M.V.Pauly 1970). Based on the previously derived collective action implications, I expect that both international
and regional organizations will suffer from collective failure when attempting to provide the
public good of peace missions. In the following sections, I derive a theory that explains how
organizations could overcome this collective action problem and establish a mission.

I begin by assuming that the preference of each potential actor is to end the conflict,
as civil conflict has well-documented negative effects on the stability and economic well-being
of the warring states as well as on the surrounding states (Murdoch & Sandler 2002, Murdoch
& Sandler 2004, Salehyan 2008). Furthermore, the presence of conflict anywhere in the world
exerts a general negative effect, regardless of the extent to which it reaches a state or organi-
zation. Therefore, I assert that all international or regional inter-governmental organizations
or security structures would generally prefer a conflict end rather than continue.\footnote{It cannot necessarily be assumed that all third-party actors prefer the conflict to end, as they may maintain a benefit that is produced only when the conflict is present. This is yet another reason why third-party unilateral actors should be treated separately than organizational actors.}

Although all actors prefer the conflict to end, each actor maintains a general preference
that another take on the primary role and costs of providing peace mission operations,
allowing an actor to freeride off of that organization (Kim & Walker 1984, M.V.Pauly 1970).
Peace missions are a costly and extensive undertaking, and there is no guarantee of success
(Mueller 2003). The risks of peace mission failure and subsequent consequences exist at both
the international and domestic level, as failed peace missions exert significant international
and domestic audience costs (Bennett & Stam 2000). Therefore, if an actor is able to end
the conflict without bearing the majority of the costs, it prefers to engage in this free-riding.
If all actors prefer to free-ride rather than engage in peacekeeping, the outcome is collective
failure (Olson 1965). This demonstrates the collective action problem between multiple
international and regional organizations.

I argue that actors overcome the collective action problem as the salience of certain
aspects of the conflict increase. Specifically, the UN will overcome the collective action
problem as the severity of the conflict increases, and an RO will overcome the collective
action problem as the political and economic salience of the conflict increases. This is
because the UN views itself as an institutional provider of public goods, whereas ROs are
motivated by the acquisition of club goods for their member states (Buchanan 1965).

2.2.3. United Nations

Much literature has been dedicated to determining whether the UN acts as an institutionalized provider of public goods, or whether it acts based on the private interests of its Security Council member states, specifically the permanent five members. As detailed in the previous chapter, more recent literature has empirically demonstrated that the UN sends peace missions to those conflicts most in need of them and those conflicts most difficult to solve. Gilligan and Stedman (2003) show that, although the UN does show a preference to Europe over Africa, and even a preference of Africa over Asia, one of the best predictors is the number of deaths in a conflict, supporting its mission to address human suffering. They find no relationship between whether the civil war state was a former colony of one of the Security Council members, and they also find no relationship between the levels of primary commodity exports and the likelihood of establishing a peace mission. This contradicts many previous claims that the UN was another means of imperialism for exploiting developing, resource-rich states. Although Gilligan and Stedman do not explicitly test for individual economic interests of the Security Council past the level of commodities in a conflict state, their strong findings suggest that these private interests do not play a significant role.

Furthermore, Allen and Yuen (2013) further examine the extent to which Security Council interests affect UN missions, but focus on the type of mission established rather than where the missions are sent. They do find an effect for Security Council interests, but only so far as missions in those conflict states with which the Security Council maintains preferences are established with a much wider authority to cater the mission to specific conflicts. Missions to states with which the Security Council has fewer interests receive much more limited mandates.

Based on these previous studies, along with several others detailed in the previous chapter that demonstrate UN action based on humanitarian crises, I assume that private interests of UN Security Council members do not exert a significant effect on UN decision-making. As a result, I expect the UN will overcome the collective action problem as the
severity of the conflict worsens and the humanitarian salience increases.

2.2.4. Regional Organizations

In contrast to the UN, regional organizations overcome the collective action problem through economic and/or political salience, which I will detail in later sections. Once the conflict reaches a threshold of salience to an RO, the preference of ending the conflict overcomes the preference to free-ride. The requirement of these extra incentives is due to the RO’s need to provide a club good or private goods to its member states (Buchanan 1965, Cornes & Sandler 1984) in order to overcome the collective action problem. However, as the number of potential interveners in a civil conflict increases, so does the severity of the collective action problem (M.V.Pauly 1970). Additional possible contributors to peace missions result in an even greater likelihood of collective failure, as the likelihood of an organization undertaking the costs and risks of a mission continues to decrease (Gruber & Krueger 1991). As a result, I hypothesize:

H1: The greater the number of potential interveners with jurisdiction over a civil conflict, the less likely an actor will be to establish a peace mission.

The expressed preferences of the United Nations in the mid-1990s illustrate the increased difficulty of overcoming the collective action problem as the number of potential interveners increases (Gershoni 1997). In 1993, the UN, the Organisation for African Unity (OAU), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) maintained jurisdiction to intervene in many African civil conflicts. However, the UN, based on the urging of the United States and other Security Council members, scaled back the total number of resources committed to peace missions on the understanding that regional organizations could now take on this responsibility and cost. The humanitarian conflicts in the region during this period (e.g. Rwanda), would likely have prompted additional and more intensive peace missions if the UN was not able to freeride off of the other organizations with jurisdiction.

Peace missions not only provide public goods to the international community, but they can also secure private goods or club goods that interest the relevant potential actors.
Prior studies have demonstrated that third party peace missions overcome the collective action problem when significant interests are at stake (Gaibulloev, Sandler & Shimizu 2009). Regional organizations operate in a different manner than third parties or ad hoc coalitions, but the motivation for regional organizations to engage in peace missions remains the same. In order for ROs to establish their own missions, high levels of salience must be present. Otherwise, the derived equilibrium results in the organization waiting for the UN to provide a peace mission.

Although reducing the level of conflict in the world is a public good, and certainly both types of actors are interested in achieving this good, I contend that regional organizations are also motivated by those private goods, or club goods, that can be secured for their member states, particularly economic and political goods. I argue that Private goods can be excludable and/or rival, and they might only benefit one individual country within the regional organization. Occasionally private goods might be available, possibly due to an extensive trade relationship between a single member state and the conflict state. Preserving this trade relationship would constitute a private good for the member state, and it may pressure the RO to establish a peace mission as a result. Alternatively, club goods are often available for the states that comprise the RO. Club goods are semi-excludable, in that they can be enjoyed collectively as a group, but their use and enjoyment can still be restricted to a select few (Buchanan 1965). A common example is that of a country club, in which multiple families can utilize its golf facilities, swimming pool, and other amenities without detracting from the use of other members, but one must first become a member to receive those benefits. Both private goods and club goods can be available to regional organizations in a civil conflict state. The acquisition of these goods can motivate an RO to overcome the collective action problem and establish a peace mission. These goods can be divided into two categories: political goods and economic goods. The presence of both political and economic private goods increases the salience of a conflict to a regional organization, which may prompt the establishment of a peace mission.
Political salience of a conflict can be defined as those factors that threaten the political stability of a state and/or region. For example, as a civil conflict’s intensity increases, it destabilizes the region. Although stopping the conflict and preventing destabilization also qualifies as a public good, some effects of destabilization may only be felt by other states in that geographic region. As a result, pursuing peace missions that mitigate these effects can also qualify as the pursuing of club goods, as the political destabilization affects states within a region collectively.

Slowing or stopping refugee flows also qualifies as a private good, as flows of refugees contribute to the destabilization of the region during civil conflicts (Salehyan 2008, Salehyan & Gleditsch 2006). Large numbers of refugees not only require resources from host states, but they also contribute to the spread of conflict across states. Since refugees generally flee to states contiguous to the conflict state, member states of an RO that border the conflict state are the most affected. Other aspects of civil conflict that contribute to destabilization include the number of battle deaths in a conflict and the duration of the conflict. As each of these factors increase, the region is further destabilized. As a result, the salience of a conflict increases and an RO is more likely to overcome the collective action problem and fund a peace mission.

H2: As the salience of a conflict increases with respect to political goods, the likelihood of an RO establishing a peace mission increases.

The acquisition of economic goods also increases the level of salience of a civil conflict. Economic goods can qualify as either private or club goods. A bilateral trade relationship between a member state and the conflict state would be considered a private good, as it benefits the member state. However, it is rare that only one state within a region maintains a large trade relationship with the conflict state. More often, economic incentives would qualify as a club good, benefitting multiple members of the regional organization. Because of the salience of these economic club goods, high levels of trade dependence and/or foreign direct investment between the member-states of an RO and the warring state can result in the establishment of peace missions to mitigate the conflict’s negative effects on the
member states of an RO. For example, the civil war in Nicaragua from 1978-1979 and again from 1983-1988 resulted in a continuous, significant decrease in the average levels of trade between Nicaragua and the member states of the Organisation of American States. After the conflict ended, the OAS established a peace mission. Although the primary exports prior to the conflict were agricultural, several other central American countries relied upon them. Furthermore, the potential for additional destabilization of the region increased the political salience of the conflict to other OAS member states. Although the role of the United States during the Cold War can certainly not be ignored, the OAS benefitted from providing a peacekeeping mission that attempted to ensure the civil war did not recur. Based on this example, I hypothesize:

\[ H_3: \text{As the salience of a conflict increases with respect to economic goods, the likelihood of an RO establishing a peace mission increases.} \]

The UN, in contrast to regional organizations, is motivated to provide the public good of international peace missions. As previously discussed, prior literature does not identify any significant relationship between the economic interests of the UN Security Council members and previously established missions. Furthermore, systematic analyses have demonstrated the UN’s likelihood of sending missions to those conflicts most in need that are also the hardest to solve. I assert that the UN does not seek to benefit any single state or group of member states and is only interested in reducing the overall amount of conflict in the world. As a result, its actions will reflect its desire to deploy missions to places most in need of peace enforcement missions, peacekeeping, and/or protection of civilians.

\[ H_4: \text{As the severity of a conflict increases, the likelihood of the UN establishing a peace mission increases.} \]

2.2.5. Intra-actor Collective Action Problem

In addition to the inter-actor collective action problem, in which actors must overcome the incentive to freeride at the expense of other international or regional organizations, regional organizations in particular face an intra-actor collective action problem. Within an
organization, either before or after an organization commits to establish a peace mission, member states prefer to freeride off of other member states and commit fewer or no resources to the peace mission. Few, if any, regional organizations maintain regular budgets for peace mission activities. Instead, once a decision has been made to engage in a peace mission, funds must be constructed in an ad hoc manner. This initial decision to establish a peace mission and the means by which this decision is funded demonstrates the different motivations between the UN and ROs for creating peace missions. The UN has established procedures through which it collects funds from its member states to establish peace missions. The annual peacekeeping budget is financed through contributions from member states according to a scale that assigns each member a certain percentage of the budget. Although not all members pay their allocated amount on time, few states whose assigned amount contains a portion of the peacekeeping budget delay so long as to fall into arrears. To do so results in a loss of voting privileges at the UN (Solomon 2007, Mills 1990).

In contrast, regional organizations generally fund peace operations ad hoc. For most peace missions, costs must be absorbed by the member states themselves, rather than by previously existing funds. As a result, the pursuit of the public good of peace missions within a regional organization will result in collective failure, as each member state prefers another RO or the UN bear the cost of a peace mission (Lichbach 1996). Furthermore, the costs of peace missions are concentrated to a much higher degree among RO members, while they are spread amongst several states in the UN. Therefore, member states of an RO will be reluctant to participate in a peace mission without the incentive of a club good or private good.

The potential acquisition of political and economic goods in a civil conflict may also be unevenly distributed among member states of an RO. Some states that border a civil conflict state may be heavily affected, while other states may feel few, if any, negative repercussions. This only further compounds the intra-actor collective action problem, particularly if those states suffering greater negative consequences are less influential states in the regional organization. I argue that the distribution of capabilities of a regional organization’s member
states plays a large role in determining whether the RO overcomes the intra-actor collective failure and establishes a peace mission.

2.2.6. Capabilities

The distribution of capabilities of an RO plays a large role in affecting the decision to establish a peace mission. Regional organizations with a large distribution in capabilities often have one state with much higher capabilities than the other states. I refer to these states as regional hegemons. Regional hegemons are considered to be a privileged actor (Olson 1965) within the RO and are more accustomed to undertaking the bulk of the financial burden of maintaining the RO’s budget and contributing to obtaining its club goods (Buchanan 1965). Privileged actors, according to Olson, gain more utility from achieving the public good than from saving the costs necessary to provide it. A common example is that of an international hegemon and free trade throughout states. Although the hegemon may encounter costs when instituting free trade bilaterally, it gains greater utility from promoting free trade than the cost of each interaction. As a result, it continues to do so.

Regional hegemons within an RO also take this position of the privileged actor. A regional hegemon achieves greater utility through achieving the public good of peace missions and decreasing the overall conflict in the region than providing for the peace mission costs. Furthermore, regional hegemons also often have more economic incentives to gain from engaging in a peace mission, as a result of their status. As a result, those organizations that include a regional hegemon will be able to overcome the intra-actor collective action problem more easily.

However, regional organizations with a small distribution in capabilities are subject to a greater likelihood of collective failure when establishing a peace mission. No regional hegemon exists in these organizations to take on the role of the privileged actor, as all member states have more equal capabilities. As a result, no single state is considered to be the designated financial backer for these types of peace missions. Since no single state has exponentially large resources compared to another state, the likelihood of collective failure is higher, as states will look to each other to contribute funds. As a result, I expect to find:
H5: An increase in the distribution of capabilities of member states of a regional organization will also increase the likelihood of an RO peace mission.

An example of how the distribution of capabilities affects states can be found by comparing the Organization of American States to the Association of SouthEast Asian Nations. Although ASEAN has yet to actually establish a peace mission, it is comprised of member states of relatively equal capabilities. No regional hegemon or privileged actor is present. As a result, it is difficult for ASEAN to generate the resources necessary to formally establish a peace mission, despite multiple civil conflicts within its jurisdiction. In contrast, Brazil is the regional hegemon of OAS, and the RO has overcome the collective action problem to establish peace missions in Costa Rica and Nicaragua. Although neither organization would be considered a strong organization, in comparison with other ROs, the presence of the privileged actor in the OAS better equips it to overcome the collective action problem and decisively act.

2.3. Coordination of Missions

International and regional organizations face a collective action problem when making the decision to establish a peace mission. Each actor would prefer to end the civil conflict and restore peace, but they would also prefer another organization bear the costs necessary to accomplish this goal. As the conflict becomes more salient to organizations, they are able to overcome the collective action problem to establish a peace mission. Some actors find themselves to be the only organization which contain the capabilities or to which the conflict was salient enough to prompt a peace mission. In this case, no coordination is necessary or possible, and no inter-mission collective action problem exists. However, those missions in which multiple actors are involved are subject to additional collective action problems within the mission and between the different organizational actors.

In this section, I examine the behavior of organizations after multiple organizations overcome the intra-actor collective action problem. Specifically, how do organizations coordinate amongst each other and decide which organization will play which role in a peace mission after they decide to become involved? How do the indicators of the conflict itself,
Table 2.1. Regional Organization Involvement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low Capabilities</th>
<th>Low salience</th>
<th>High salience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No Intervention</td>
<td>Secondary Role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Capabilities</td>
<td>Secondary Role/Primary Role</td>
<td>Primary Role</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

along with the presence and actions of other organizations, affect coordination among the players? Why do some peace missions consist of regional organizations playing a primary role when partnering with the UN, while other missions utilize the UN in the primary role while partnering with a secondary regional organization? I argue that the behavior of regional organizations is driven by the salience of the conflict and the capabilities of the regional organization. Specifically, as the salience of a conflict increases and the capabilities of the regional organization increase in relation to the UN, the likelihood of the RO undertaking the primary role and committing the necessary resources to do so increases. If capabilities are low and/or salience is low, the likelihood of an RO maintaining the primary role decreases significantly.

What I expect to find in relation to coordination and the role of regional organizations can be described in Table 2.1.

In order to discuss primary and secondary roles of a peace mission, I must first detail how these roles are defined. Since virtually every peace mission, both peace enforcement and peacekeeping, has a different hierarchical structure, identifying which organization takes on the primary role and which organization takes on the secondary role can occasionally be difficult to determine. I consider several factors when determining if an organization has taken on the primary or secondary role. First, I consider the timing of involvement. Often, the organization that initially establishes and begins their peace mission first continues to coordinate the mission for the rest of its existence. For example, ECOWAS’s peace enforcement mission in Sierra Leone was established prior to the UN’s involvement in the conflict with an observer mission. As a result, ECOWAS is considered the primary actor for that peace mission. Generally, if an RO is the first to establish the peace mission with no
resource support from the UN, it maintains its role as the primary actor for the duration. I discuss later why this is the case, based on the high salience required for an RO to establish a solo peace mission.

Second, I consider the amount of resources put into the mission. Occasionally, the timing of the mission itself does not present a clear picture of true coordination. For example, the Organization of African Unity established a peace mission in Rwanda in 1992, followed by the UN’s presence in 1993. However, once the UN entered the mission, the OAU undertook the secondary role while the UN took over the primary role. As a result, the resources committed by each organization may provide a more accurate depiction of how the roles were divided. Finally, if no clear indicator can be found from the timing of the mission and the resources committed by those organizations involved, I examined specific documents from the mission itself in an effort to determine which organization was directing the majority of the mission and maintained organizational authority over the majority of the peacekeeping personnel.

2.3.1. Collective Action

Organizations face conflicting desires when coordinating with another organization in a peace mission. Organizations wish to both exert their own preferences on the peace mission goals and objectives and subsequently the post-conflict environment. They can do so by taking on the primary role in a peace mission. However, organizations also wish to minimize their costs in a peace mission, preferring instead to freeride off of the other organization(s). Unfortunately, this also decreases their ability to affect the direction of the mission. The extent to which an organization wishes to exert its preferences on the mission directly affects the likelihood it overcomes the incentive to freeride and takes on the primary role in a mission. In this section, I discuss what factors might lead an organization to do so.

I begin by assuming that, in an effort to maximize efforts and minimize the cost each organization will bear, organizations would prefer to partner with another organization rather than conduct the peace mission without any other involvement. While certainly there may be cases in which this is not true, perhaps due to poor relations between organizations
or a past history of disagreement, I base this assumption on a cost-sharing model (Moulin & Shanker 1992) and assume it true for most organizations. Secondly, I also assume that most organizations would prefer to take on a secondary role in most conflicts in an effort to minimize their own contributions. This creates a collective action problem between multiple actors engaged in a peace mission, as each would prefer to freeride off of the other actor.

In multiple-actor missions, the incentive to freeride within the mission off of other committed organizations remains strong despite an organization overcoming the inter-actor collective action problem of initially establishing a mission. Freeriding allows an organization to commit fewer resources to the mission while continuing to take credit for any success the peace mission may achieve. However, if the mission fails, this freeriding may also provide a barrier of protection for the organization’s international reputation. The secondary organization maintains the defense that it was not the primary organization directing the efforts of the peace mission and thus not as responsible for the failure. Because of these motivations, organizations face this additional inter-actor collective action problem after establishing a peace mission in which multiple actors are involved.

However, this incentive to freeride can be overcome by the desire of an organization to enforce its own preferences on the peace mission and the mission’s goals and objectives. Generally, the organization in the primary role that commits the most resources is able to exert a greater amount of its own preferences on the establishment, organization and goals of the mission. Those who commit the most are able to direct where those resources are utilized and for what purposes. For example, an organization may have a vested interest in establishing a specific post-conflict domestic climate. As a result, it may undertake the primary role in order to more influentially direct whether a peacekeeping mission attempts to forge a negotiated settlement that is inclusive of all parties or construct a settlement that only marginally includes the rebel group. However, freeriding organizations are able to take credit while committing fewer resources, but they may face restraints when attempting to exert their own preferences on the mission’s objectives. In order to play a greater role in directing the peace mission, an organization may need to commit more resources and
maintain responsibility for a larger role in the project. This leads to a conflicting preference in the organization between a desire to freeride and the desire to maintain a greater role in directing the goals and outcomes of the peace mission.

Each actor that engages in a joint peace mission is faced with these conflicting preferences. ROs are particularly subject to this intra-mission collective action problem, as the UN is historically more likely to take on the primary role and coordinate with the RO in the secondary role. As a result, the RO is more conditioned to support the UN’s peace mission and provide fewer resources. I argue that regional organizations overcome this incentive to freeride and take on the primary role when the conflict reaches a high level of political and economic salience. When the salience of the conflict increases to the point that the RO prefers to direct the objectives and actions of the peace mission over freeriding off of the other organization, it will take on the primary role in the peace mission.

2.3.2. Salience and Capabilities

Previously I discussed how an increase in the political and economic salience of a conflict can prompt an RO to overcome the international collective action problem and establish and fund a peace mission. However, this involvement of an RO in a peace mission takes on many different forms. Some RO involvement is minimal and might involve providing a few personnel for a small observer mission. An example of this would be the Organization of American States observer mission in Costa Rica in 1949. Other RO involvement might involve coordinating the entire mission, sometimes without any assistance from the United Nations. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s establishment of the peace missions in the former Yugoslavia demonstrates this, as does the Intergovernmental Authority on Development’s involvement in Sudan. While levels of commitment in single-actor missions might depend primarily on the capabilities of the RO, levels of commitment in multi-actor missions vary widely and are dependent on the extent to which the RO sees the conflict and its resolution as salient to its member states.

Although increased levels of salience of a civil conflict prompt RO involvement in a peace mission, it does not necessarily prompt an RO to take on the primary role of a peace
mission. A minor increase in salience may prompt an RO to join a mission as a secondary actor, while a much higher increase in salience may prompt an RO to take on the primary role of the mission in order to direct the specific goals and objectives of the mission. This increase in salience, whether political or economic salience, overcomes the desire of an RO to freeride and prompts it to take on the primary role in a multi-actor peace mission. As a result, I hypothesize:

H6: As the political salience of a civil conflict increases, the likelihood of an RO taking on the primary role increases.

H7: As the economic salience of a civil conflict increases, the likelihood of an RO taking on the primary role increases.

In addition to the political and economic salience of a civil conflict, the presence of a regional hegemon in an RO also exerts a strong influence on the organization’s likelihood to play the primary or secondary role. In order to overcome the inter-actor collective action problem within an already established peace mission, an RO must assign resource commitments from its own member states. This may lead to an additional intra-actor collective action problem for multi-actor missions. Regional organizations that overcame the international collective action problem to establish or join a peace mission may still face intra-organization difficulty when attempting to commit enough resources to take on the primary role. However, the presence of a regional hegemon may help overcome this intra-actor collective action problem. Similarly to the manner in which a regional hegemon increases the likelihood that an RO will establish a peace mission initially, its presence will also increase the likelihood that the organization takes on the primary role in a peace mission due to the hegemon’s privileged actor status. Therefore, I hypothesize:

H8: The presence of a regional hegemon will increase the likelihood that an RO undertakes the primary role in a peace mission.

Regardless of the salience of the conflict to an organization, occasionally the capabilities of an organization may mitigate the ability to take on the primary role or establish a
solo peace mission. A high level of salience for some organizations may still result in those organizations taking on the secondary role if the RO lacks the basic required capabilities and resources necessary to organize the primary role in a mission. Higher capabilities, however, increase the likelihood that an organization bypasses the secondary role in an effort to avoid involvement in a mission coordinated by an organization with low capabilities. These organizations with higher capabilities may prefer to organize the peace mission in the primary role simply because they prefer to commit the necessary resources rather than follow the lead of an organization they may view as less capable.

Organizations with high capabilities that are not affected as much by strained resources are less likely to play a supporting role to an organization that might be less organized. Engaging in this type of mission is often frustrating for these types of organizations, prompting them to rarely choose this route. For example, when NATO involves itself in a peace mission, it almost always takes on the primary role, as its capabilities allow it to do so with relatively low costs. It would prefer to bear the majority of the resource commitment rather than be directed by another organization. As a result, I expect to find:

H9: As the capabilities of an RO increase, the likelihood of taking on the primary role increases.

Civil conflicts with low salience will see no peace mission involvement from regional organizations with low capabilities, as discussed in previous sections. Not only is the conflict relatively unimportant to the RO, but low levels of capabilities and resources preclude most involvement regardless of its salience. Civil conflicts with low salience to those ROs that possess high levels of capabilities might see some minor involvement in an effort to increase international reputation or have some minor direction in the goals of the peace mission. However, they may also see the RO undertake the primary role as the levels of capability continue to increase, as the RO may wish to avoid committing resources to a peace mission it considers managed by less capable organizations.

Civil conflicts with high salience to those ROs possessing low levels of capability will only see secondary involvement due to limitations on the ability of the RO to take on the
primary role. Regardless of the level of importance, an RO without the necessary capabilities and resources will find itself unable to undertake the primary role. Finally, civil conflicts that are highly salient to ROs that possess high levels of capabilities will result in ROs taking on the primary coordinating role in a peace mission. In these conflicts, the RO not only contains the necessary levels of capability to coordinate a peace mission, but it also views the conflict as sufficiently important to warrant a considerable amount of its own resources.

This table depicts why the majority of previous peace missions consisted of the UN playing the primary role with the RO playing the secondary role when multiple actors were involved. Most often, ROs either do not view civil conflicts as highly salient or lack the resources necessary to take on the primary role. For example, the civil conflict in Sudan may register low salience to NATO, resulting in no peace mission despite its relatively high capabilities. It may also contain high levels of salience to the African Union, but relatively low capabilities and the absence of a regional hegemon preempt the organization from undertaking the primary role in a peace mission, leaving it only with the option of the secondary role. Only those ROs with high capabilities take on the primary role in those conflicts that are highly salient. In other conflicts, restrictions prohibit them from undertaking and coordinating in the primary role.

This can also explain why those ROs that establish a solo peace mission without any outside involvement are more likely to continue to play the primary role regardless of what other organizations become involved. If the conflict is salient enough for the RO to overcome the international collective action problem described previously and use its own capabilities to establish a solo peace mission, this indicates a very high level of salience for that particular conflict as well as relatively high levels of capability. Joining as a secondary actor to a pre-established peace mission, such as one established by the UN, does not require as great a commitment as establishing and funding one without any outside involvement.

2.4. Peace Mission Efficacy

After examining why international and regional organizations choose to become involved in civil conflict management as well as constructing a framework to explain how these
organizations coordinate when engaging in peace missions, I turn to the final research question. Specifically, why are some peace missions successful while others are not? Do specific factors and characteristics of a peace mission matter, or is it solely the post-conflict environment of the conflict state? Do all peace missions exert a significant effect on the likelihood of civil war recurrence, or just specific combinations? In this section, I develop a theoretical framework to address these questions. Although examining the different factors that prompt ROs and the UN to establish peace missions is certainly important, it is equally as important to then test the effectiveness of these missions at ending civil conflict and preventing its recurrence. Considering the significant resources contributed to peace missions by both the UN and ROs, testing the effectiveness of these missions at accomplishing their objectives is equally important as determining why these resources were initially contributed.

In order to do so, I must first define how I measure the success or effectiveness of peace missions. I define the success of peace missions as either the successful resolution of civil war or the prevention of civil war recurrence for peace enforcement and peacekeeping, respectively. If a peace enforcement mission is effective or successful, it significantly decreases the time from conflict onset to conflict resolution. If a peacekeeping mission is successful, it either increases the number of years until a civil war recurs, or it prevents a civil war from recurring entirely.

Although these definitions are not perfect or perhaps even optimal, they provide an easily identifiable measure of peace mission success. Ideally, a much more nuanced measure would be available that examines specific factors implemented by peace missions known to contribute to decreasing the likelihood of civil war recurrence, such as the specific types of missions and other various factors (Diehl & Druckman 2010). However, although some of these data exist for UN missions, they have yet to be collected for various peace missions involving regional organizations. Whether a solo RO mission was an observer mission, an enforcement mission, or some other type of mission remains out of the scope of this analysis. However, the current definition and usage of the word success remains justifiable for this particular study, as all peace missions maintain as their primary goal an effort to prevent
civil war from recurring. Although not all peace missions are equipped with the same resources, they can be evaluated by the overarching primary goal they each share. This does limit the conclusions that can be drawn, however, and future iterations of this theoretical component will greatly expand the explanatory power by including various mission-specific factors in the framework.

2.4.1. Capabilities

The structure of the peace mission, as discussed previously, is largely dependent on the salience and capabilities of the organizations involved. Increased salience and increased capabilities lead to a higher likelihood that an RO will take on the primary role in a peace mission. Furthermore, for those organizations that take on solo missions, the specific capabilities of the involved organization play a particularly important role, as those are the only resources available for the peace mission. That organization, whether the UN or another RO, bears the sole responsibility for funding and directing the peace mission. As a result, an increase in capabilities is likely to result in an increase in peace mission success due to the additional resources available.

Since the establishment and implementation of peace missions are a particularly costly endeavor (Mueller 2003, Gaibulloev, Sandler & Shimizu 2009), an organization will greatly benefit from an increase in the available resources. Regional organizations comprised of states with higher levels of capability will be more suited to bear the costs and commit the required resources to a peace mission. Although additional resources certainly do not guarantee peace mission success, they will increase the likelihood. Furthermore, poorly funded missions do show a low rate of success (Fortna 2003). Therefore, failing to contribute resources exerts a substantial negative impact on the likelihood of success. As a result, I hypothesize:

H10: As the capabilities of the organization involved increase, the likelihood of peace mission success increases.
2.4.2. Collective Action Problem

Although capabilities of states and the resources available may increase the likelihood of peace mission success, the provision of them continues to be subject to the collective action problem. Since most ROs fund peace missions in an ad hoc manner, member states would prefer to contribute fewer resources and freeride off of other member states. This freeriding can quickly decrease the effectiveness of a mission by decreasing its available resources.

Previous discussions regarding the intra-actor collective action problem suggest additional implications for the success of peace missions. In prior sections, I discussed how the presence of a regional hegemon substantially increases the likelihood that an organization overcomes the intra-actor collective action problem. Since the hegemon is able to act as a privileged actor and generates greater utility from achieving the public good than from saving the individual cost associated with contributions, the hegemon will contribute greater resources to ensure the public good is achieved (Olson 1965, M.V.Pauly 1970).

This regional hegemon presence will also increase the likelihood of peace mission success in those missions involving a regional organization. Regional hegemons will be able to contribute additional resources to the mission, increasing its chances of success when compared to those organizations without a regional hegemon. The likelihood of collective failure is much greater in organizations without a regional hegemon, because all member states maintain a high incentive to freeride off of the other member states. Contributions to peace missions will remain low, and the resulting mission may have much lower rates of success than if a regional hegemon were able to bear the brunt of the costs. As a result, I hypothesize:

H11: The presence of a regional hegemon increases the likelihood of peace mission success in those missions involving regional organizations.

In addition to the intra-actor collective action problem that member states face within an organization, organizations continue to face an inter-actor collective action problem. Peace missions in which only one actor engages in a peace mission is subject only to the availability of capabilities and the dependability of member states to overcome the intra-actor
collective action problem and provide them. However, for those joint missions, organizations face an additional possibility of collective failure.

As previously described, organizations face an incentive to freeride off of other actors when engaged in multi-actor missions. Although I argued that certain factors mitigate this incentive, specifically an increase in political and economic salience in reference to ROs and the severity of the conflict in reference to the UN, the equilibrium remains collective failure. The extent to which organizations are unable to overcome these incentives will affect their likelihood of success in a peace mission.

As the number of organizations involved in a peace mission increases, the more difficult it is to coordinate and the easier it is for an organization to freeride while going undetected. In missions involving only two organizations, the organization in the secondary role will find it harder to freeride without negative consequences on its relationship with the other organization. However, in those missions involving three or more organizations, freeriding while remaining undetected is easier for an organization. However, this exerts a negative impact on peace mission success, as the mission is deprived of needed resources that the freeriding organization could provide. As a result, I hypothesize:

H12: As the number of organizations cooperating in a peace mission increases, the likelihood of peace mission success decreases.

2.4.3. Disaggregating Peace Missions

The effect of peace missions, particularly those of the UN, on civil war recurrence have been examined in many previous studies and are thus outside the scope of this study. However, one specific aspect in which I am interested is the disaggregation of peace missions into peace enforcement and peacekeeping missions. Often, these missions are lumped into a single category to test their effects on civil war recurrence, or they are disaggregated into the category of the mission itself, with respect to observer, etc., without considering whether the mission was designed to force an end to the conflict or maintain a preexisting peace. The distinction between the two types of missions is substantial, however, demonstrated by the very goal the mission attempts to accomplish. Therefore, I consider the two types of
missions separately, testing the success of a mission intended to bring the conflict to an end on the likelihood that a conflict recurs.

I expect to find that the effects of peace enforcement missions are not limited to decreasing the length of a civil conflict’s duration. Peace enforcement missions are designed to both end the civil conflict as well as establish the foundation for a successful post-conflict environment. As a result, I expect that a peace enforcement mission present prior to the resolution of the civil conflict will also exert a positive effect on the length of peace duration.

H13: The previous presence of a peace enforcement mission prior to the conflict’s end will result in an decrease in the likelihood of civil war recurrence.

2.5. Conclusion

In this chapter, I developed a theoretical framework to explain why international and regional organizations choose to become involved in peace missions, how they behave and coordinate when multiple actors commit to a single peace mission, and what organization-specific factors contribute to the likelihood of peace mission success. I proposed a theoretical framework beginning with a collective action problem. In this framework, organizations face both an inter-actor and intra-actor collective action problem at each stage of action.

When originally deciding whether a civil conflict warrants an organization’s commitment to a peace mission, both international and regional organizations face an inter-actor collective action problem. Since multiple international and regional organizations maintain the jurisdiction to intervene in any given civil conflict, these organizations often experience collective failure when attempting to establish a peace mission, as they each prefer another organization undertake the costs. Organizations also experience an inter-actor collective action problem, as they must supply a mission with resources provided by individual member states. I argued that the collective action problem is overcome by the UN through a desire to provide the public good, and by ROs through an increase in political and economic salience. The presence of a regional hegemon also increases the likelihood of an RO to intervene, as the regional hegemon is previously conditioned to undertake a greater proportion of the costs in the RO.
Organizations also face an inter-actor and intra-actor collective action problem after an affirmative commitment to a peace mission. Organizations prefer to freeride off of others involved in the same peace mission, as it allows them to take credit for the mission’s presence and success while still committing few resources. As a result, the UN is more likely to play the primary role, since it is more motivated by the provision of the public good rather than the acquisition of private benefits. Organizations also face an intra-actor collective action problem at this point, as undertaking the primary role in a peace mission requires the contribution of a greater number of resources that must be provided by member states. I argued that organizations also overcome this incentive to freeride when the desire to exert a greater influence on the mission’s goals and outcomes as well as the post-conflict environment outweighs the desire to freeride. This increases with the political and economic salience of the conflict.

Finally, I argued that the capabilities of an organization affect the likelihood of success of any peace mission it establishes. Furthermore, the ability of an organization to overcome its own collective problem, mitigated substantially by the presence of a regional hegemon, will greatly affect the likelihood of peace mission success. Additionally, coordinating organizations must still overcome the incentive to freeride off of the other organization, and the ability to do this decreases as the number of organizations involved in the peace mission increases. As a result, I expect missions with more actors will be less successful. Finally, I expect that peace enforcement missions will have a positive effect on peace duration.

In the following chapters, I conduct empirical analyses of these hypotheses utilizing an original dataset detailed in the next chapter. This dataset contains peace missions conducted by regional organizations, collected in an effort to begin disaggregating the ‘other’ category of peace missions and investigating the means through which organizations establish peace missions and coordinate amongst each other.
3.1. Introduction

In order to test the hypotheses discussed in the previous chapter, it is necessary to gather new data on the peace missions conducted by regional organizations both with and without the involvement of the United Nations. In the following chapters, I utilize an original dataset containing this information. In this chapter, I describe the dataset and coding procedures as well as provide summary statistics for the dependent variable and key independent variables.

The analyses required the creation of a new dataset in order to specifically examine regional organizations. Current datasets on peace missions tend to separate peace missions into two groups: missions that involved the UN in any way and “other” peace missions, which could involve regional organizations, third-party missions or ad hoc coalitions. However, the “other” category is often not specified as to which type of organization conducted the mission. Furthermore, any peace operation involving the UN and any other regional organization is placed in the UN category with the possible effects of the regional organization’s presence left unknown. Because this other category is not clearly specified nor does it provide for examination of regional organizations, I undertook the data collection process.

I constructed an original dataset that contains information on all regional organizations with jurisdiction over conflict areas and their peace mission actions. I combined this information with data on UN peace missions, utilizing data on UN operations from Fortna (2004a) and Doyle and Sambanis (2006). I not only include information relating to the decision to engage in a peace mission, but also in the missions undertaken, the role of different organizations when more than one organization engages in a peace mission in the same conflict, and measures of peace mission success and failure. I utilize this data in future studies examining the coordination of multiple peace missions as well as a study that examines which organization or combination of organizations provide a peace mission with
the highest likelihood of success.

3.2. Data Collection

To begin the construction of my dataset, I first identified all relevant regional organizations that maintained in their charter or other relevant documents the ability and authority to engage in military intervention or a peace mission. This precludes any organizations based strictly on economic cooperation or integration, such as the South Asian Free Trade Association. However, if an organization originally established itself as an economic union but added a peace mission jurisdiction component at a later date, the date in which the organization created the peace mission mandate is coded as the origin date of the organization. Table 3.1 provides a complete list of regional organizations included in the dataset.

After identifying the relevant potential actors for each region, I created a dyadic dataset using data on civil wars from UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch, Eriksson, Sollenberg & Strand 2002, Themner & Wallensteen 2012). I then used this master list of civil wars to generate a dyadic data set, in which each conflict country is paired with each international or regional organization that maintains the ability to intervene in the conflict state. Because information on UN missions is only readily available until 2006, the dataset ranges from 1946-2006. However, several key independent variables do not extend to 2006. At the time of beginning this data collection project, the key variable measuring capabilities I will discuss later was only available until 2001. As a result, the data were collected and coded based on a cutoff of 2001. Currently, this variable is now available through 2007. As a result, I hope to soon extend the dataset to 2006, through which point data on UN missions are available. However, all analyses in this study utilize the years 1946-2001.

I defined the ability to intervene or engage in a peace mission as the jurisdiction of a regional organization over a conflict state. I determined the jurisdiction of a regional organization based on each RO’s self-reporting. Some ROs explicitly limit their jurisdiction to their own member states, while other ROs maintain a regional focus. To return to the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.1. List of Regional Organizations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Union (AU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation of American States (OAS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asian Association for Regional Security (SAARC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation of African Unity (OAU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union (EU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab League (AL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e.g. given in the theoretical framework, the African Union would not be precluded from engaging in a peace mission in Morocco despite its status as a non-member state. If a regional organization comprises over 70% of a continent and does not expressly limit its jurisdiction to its member states, I coded its jurisdiction over the entire continent. However, if the RO consisted of fewer member states than the 70% threshold and did not expressly state its jurisdiction extends beyond its member states, then its jurisdiction is considered to extend only to its member states.

To return to the example of Azerbaijan, each conflict year contains five organizational dyads paired with the conflict state. For each year of the civil conflict, five organizational
dyads with the potential to engage in a peace mission were assigned. At any point, either the UN, NATO, OIC, OSCE, or CIS maintained the jurisdiction to intervene in the conflict or establish a peacekeeping mission. In addition, I code five post-conflict years to account for the establishment of post-conflict missions. Table 3.2 provides an example of the Azerbaijan dyads and years, with the Conflict/Peace Year variable controlling for whether the civil war was ongoing or ended.

If any gaps occurred in the conflict as a result of a ceasefire or any other reason, I continue to code up to five post-conflict years. For example, if a civil war broke out from 1990-1992, paused from 1993-1994, then continued from 1995-1997, I created peace year dyads for the years 1993 and 1994 to capture any potential peacekeeping missions. However, if no civil war recurrence occurred for greater than five years, the inclusion of post-conflict dyadic years would end five years after the conflict’s resolution.

After generating dyads for the conflict state and each organization with jurisdiction, I turned to coding peace missions conducted by regional organizations. I gathered this data from a number of different sources. First, I utilized previously collected data from Mullenbach (2005) and the Dynamic Analysis of Dispute Management (DADM) data. Mullenbach collects data on third-party intervention in addition to data on RO peace missions. After inclusion of previously recorded RO missions, I then utilized various encyclopedias of peacekeeping and other historical accounts of peacekeeping (Mays 2004, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse 1999, DeRouen Jr. & Heo 2007) to search for other peace missions conducted by ROs not yet included in the dataset. Finally, I utilized information provided and distributed by each individual RO and/or the UN to code the specific actions of each. The UN often described any missions they undertook in conjunction with other groups, such as the African Union, and most ROs provide various levels of information on their own missions through their website. Missing information for those ROs that provided little detail was either gathered from news reports or other press releases from the RO itself, other international organizations or occasionally the conflict state or surrounding states.

The specific information regarding the missions undertaken by ROs includes the pre-
Table 3.2. Azerbaijan Dyads

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict State</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Dyad</th>
<th>Conflict/Peace Year (Dichotomous)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.3. Regional Organization Peacekeeping Missions by Decade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th># of Mission Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948 - 1959</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960 - 1969</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970 - 1979</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980 - 1989</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 - 1999</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000 - 2006</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

cise date in which they became involved in the conflict, including both the date the mission was authorized and the date the mission began, if both dates were clearly listed and available. If only the date authorized or the date the mission began was available, this is indicated in the dataset, and the only available date is considered the start date. This initial decision to become involved generates the dichotomous dependent variable for this analysis, indicating involvement (1) or non-involvement (0).

The overall number of missions conducted by ROs, either with or without assistance from the UN, has increased both in the overall number of missions as well as the difficulty of missions undertaken. ROs began to take on more prevalent missions, demonstrated by Table 3.3. This table counts the number of years per decade in which an RO was actively engaging in a peacekeeping mission. An example of this increased involvement can be seen in ECOWAS involvement in Sierra Leone. ECOWAS became involved in the conflict before a peace agreement was reached with the purpose of restoring the government to power. These types of missions combined with the general increase in number have raised many questions about how and why ROs engage in peacekeeping and demonstrate the importance of including these organizations in peacekeeping analyses.

Regional organizations also engage in peace missions in multiple geographic regions. Table 3.4 shows the number of missions undertaken by ROs in various geographic regions.
Table 3.4. Number of Missions Undertaken by ROs by Geographic Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th># of missions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This wide variation in the location and number of missions demonstrates the importance of examining puzzles regarding UN peace missions in the context of regional organization missions.

The following chapters utilize these data to empirically test hypotheses derived from the theory. I examine how organizations overcome the collective action problem, utilizing the collection of these data as my primary dependent variable throughout.
CHAPTER 4

ESTABLISHMENT OF A PEACE MISSION

4.1. Introduction

Previous chapters outlined the mechanisms by which international and regional organizations are prompted to establish peace missions. I expect that an increase in economic and/or political salience will motivate a regional organization, while an increase in the severity of the conflict will motivate the United Nations. The following chapter tests hypotheses derived in the first section of the theory, dealing with the research questions of who gets involved and why.

In the theory, the expectation for collective failure of establishing peace missions is explained. Both the UN and ROs would prefer that a civil conflict come to an end, but they would prefer another organization take on the costs associated with establishing a peace mission.\(^1\) This creates an atmosphere in which one organization freerides off of another. Furthermore, since many civil conflicts have multiple potential actors with jurisdiction to intervene in the conflict state, the likelihood of collective failure increases with the number of potential interveners (M.V. Pauly 1970).

Different types of organizations are motivated to overcome the collective action problem through different factors. I expect the UN, who sees itself as a provider of the international public good of peacekeeping, to divert its resources to those conflicts most in need of peace missions. Therefore, as the severity of a conflict increases, the UN will become increasingly more likely to establish a peace mission.

In contrast, regional organizations are motivated to establish peace missions in those conflicts that provide private goods to their member states, or a club good to the RO. As the political salience increases, meaning the conflict is contributing to the political destabil-

\(^1\)This assertion relies on the assumption that both the UN and ROs believe peace missions do exert a negative effect on the overall amount of civil conflict, either by decreasing the duration of the civil war or increasing the length of peace duration. Although it is possible organizations do not believe peace missions exert any effect and only implement them when succumbing to international pressure, I consider this possibility remote and outside the scope of this study.
lization in the region, and as the economic salience increases, referring to negative economic consequences experienced by the member states in an RO, the likelihood of a peace mission increases. Regional organizations are also restricted by their own capabilities in ways the UN is not. Although the UN is certainly subject to intra-organization coordination problems between its member states wishing to contribute less financial resources to peace missions, its potential capabilities of those resources remains very high compared to other ROs. Regional organizations, in contrast, are often not capable of intervening even in those conflicts with very high levels of salience. For example, the Organisation for African Unity attempted to establish a standing peacekeeping force in the early 1990s in an effort to better manage the highly salient civil conflicts within its jurisdiction. However, its low capabilities prohibited any decisive action regardless of the salience levels. As a result, the peacekeeping force was vetoed by its member states. Therefore, I expect to find that the capability levels of regional organizations will increase the likelihood of peace missions along with high levels of salience.

In previous chapters, I hypothesized that the likelihood of the UN establishing a peace mission will increase as the conflict’s severity increased. I also hypothesized that the likelihood of a regional organization establishing a peace mission would increase in conjunction with the political and economic salience of the conflict. Specifically, in this chapter, I test the following hypotheses utilizing an original dataset.

H1: As the number of potential interveners increases, the likelihood an actor establishes a peace mission decreases.
H2: As the salience of a conflict increases with respect to political goods, the likelihood of an RO establishing a peace mission increases.
H3: As the salience of a conflict increases with respect to economic goods, the likelihood of an RO establishing a peace mission increases.
H4: As the severity of a conflict increases, the likelihood of the UN establishing a peace mission increases.
H5: Regional organizations with a large distribution in capabilities are more likely to overcome the collective failure and intervene in civil conflicts than
regional organizations with a small distribution in capabilities.

4.2. Research Design

To construct a research design and test these hypotheses, I address the collective action problem, namely who gets involved in civil conflicts and why. I do so using a rare events logit model, in which the dependent variable is the decision of an actor to become involved in a peace mission in a given year. The unit of analysis is the dyad-year, in which the dyad consists of the conflict state and any international or regional organizations that maintain jurisdiction in the conflict state. I utilize my original dataset, accounting for the years 1946-2001.

I primarily utilize a rare events logit model to test my hypotheses (King & Zeng 2001). Theoretically, it is much more likely for an actor to not engage in a peace mission than to undertake the cost of such a mission, and my data demonstrate this well with only 3% of dyads affirmatively overcoming the collective action and participating in a peace mission. The rare events logit model corrects for the underestimation of Pr(Y=1) which occurs in logit models with very small means of the dependent variable. Therefore, the rare events logit is much more applicable for this model.

4.2.1. Dependent Variable

The dependent variable in the model is dichotomous, with 1 signifying a positive decision by an organization to establish or participate in a peace mission and 0 signifying no peace mission established by the organization. As described in the previous chapter, this variable captures any mission officially sanctioned by an international or regional organization, whether a small observer mission of only 50 unarmed personnel or a well-armed peace enforcement mission consisting of thousands of troops actively fighting one side of the conflict. The discrepancy between these types of missions and their differing motivations in establishing them is a source of weakness in this chapter. It has been demonstrated that the type of mission established is affected by the interest of the members of the Security Council (Allen & Yuen 2013), and its effectiveness depends on its type and size as well
(Fortna 2004a, Doyle & Sambanis 2006). However, much work has been devoted to disaggregating the types of UN peace missions. While this is certainly an avenue of future research I hope to pursue, the disaggregation of RO mission types is outside the scope of this study.

As a result, the dependent variable takes the value of 1 after that point at which an organization formally sanctions a mission and the mission is present in the conflict state. Both of these requirements must be met before the dependent variable is recorded as 1 for several reasons. For the UN, it occasionally sanctions and establishes missions, yet due to gridlock in the Security Council, the mission is unable to be deployed. As I will examine in greater detail in later chapters, this was the case in the Sierra Leone civil conflict. Regional organizations occasionally have the opposite problem. Due to close proximity of the member states to the conflict state, occasionally RO missions are sent prior to being officially sanctioned by the RO. Poor communication between the RO and its member states or possible grandstanding of army officials claiming their force is an RO force may lead to claims of official peace missions prior to their endorsement and funding by the RO itself. In order to avoid failed plans and falsely identified missions, both of these criteria must be met before I code the peace mission as 1.

4.2.2. Independent Variables

To test Hypothesis 1, I include a simple variable that captures the number of organizations that could potentially intervene and establish a peace mission in a conflict state in any given year. I defined jurisdiction in the theory as an organization that either includes in its original charter the ability to create peace missions or has taken direct steps to bestow upon itself the authority to do so at some point during its existence. This variable is measured regardless of whether the capabilities of a regional organization and its member states are high enough to realistically sustain and fund a peace mission. The primary interest in creating this variable is the theoretical ability to establish a peace mission. I expect to find that as the number of potential interveners increases, the likelihood of both the UN and an RO intervening will decrease.

To measure the political salience of the conflict to an organization and test Hypoth-
esis 2, I utilize a variety of measures that capture how a conflict spills over into neighboring countries and either places a burden on or destabilizes its neighbors. First, I include the number of refugees the civil conflict produces. This variable is taken from Doyle and Sambanis (2000). I distinguish between refugees and internally displaced persons in this variable, counting only refugees since refugees exert a much more direct cost on host states than internally displaced persons. Refugees increase the political salience of a conflict to member states for several reasons. First, they often bring conflict with them into the host state (Salehyan & Gleditsch 2006). This destabilizes the host state and often results in violence within its own borders. Second, even if refugees do not bring violence, they still exert a negative cost on the host state. The host state must provide resources for the refugees, diverting funds that could be used elsewhere. Even if other international organizations or non-governmental organizations assist with the funds and resources for these refugee camps, the resources required by the host state will still increase the political salience. This variable is coded in the same manner as trade values. The dyadic count for refugees between the conflict state and the member states of an RO is recorded, creating an average number of refugees for the regional organization. The maximum value of refugees for one of the member states of an RO is also recorded.

I also include a dynamic variable indicating the duration of the conflict in years to account for the increase in salience to the surrounding states. This helps capture the severity of the conflict as well as the destabilizing nature, as longer conflicts contribute to more destabilization. I expect both the UN and ROs to be more likely to intervene as the duration of the conflict increases. A count of battle deaths, taken from Lacina and Gleditsch (2005) also measures both the salience to ROs and the UN. Battle deaths can result in a destabilization of the region, increasing the political salience of the conflict and prompting intervention by an RO. Furthermore, a rise in battle deaths clearly indicates an increase in the severity of the conflict, increasing the likelihood of a UN peace mission. I expect both types of organizations to have an increased likelihood of intervention as the number of battle deaths increases.
To test Hypothesis 3, I must construct indicators that capture how economically salient a conflict becomes to a regional organization and its member states. I operationalize the economic salience of the conflict through two different variables: the change in total foreign direct investment (FDI) in a conflict state and the change in value of dyadic trade between a conflict state and the member states of the regional organization. The change in FDI is utilized rather than total FDI, because it indicates the extent to which the conflict is affecting the economic conditions of the country. Member states of a regional organization are likely to be more interested in the extent to which the FDI has changed rather than the current indicator. I take this variable from the World Bank. Since dyadic FDI data capturing the bilateral amount of FDI between all countries of the world does not exist, I utilize the total amount of FDI in a country. Although this does not capture the specific economic salience between the member states of an RO and the conflict state, it does provide an economic proxy, as decreasing amounts of FDI in a conflict state may also cause a decrease in FDI in neighboring member states that might belong to an RO. This economic destabilizing effect may prompt a regional organization to establish a peace mission to prevent further damage to the economies of its own member states.

I operationalize trade by utilizing bilateral trade data from Katherine Barbieri’s Correlates of War trade dataset (Barbieri & Keshk N.d., Barbieri, Keshk & Pollins 2009). I record the value of imports and exports for each member state in the RO with jurisdiction for each conflict year. For example, the trade values for each member state of ECOWAS would be recorded for each conflict year of Sierra Leone. I then average these amounts to create one measure that captures the amount of import and export in a year for the entire regional organization. For example, each member state of the African Union has a specific dyadic trade value with the conflict state of the Democratic Republic of Congo, both of imports and exports. I utilize both of these measures to calculate the member state-specific dyadic value. I then create a value for the African Union and the DRC by averaging the member state-specific values of trade. This average value is then used to measure economic salience. I also record scores for the maximum amount of trade between a member state-
specific value as well as a minimum value, which I also use in the analyses. This is to ensure that the average values are not driven by outliers, as well as to examine whether the state maintaining the maximum value of trade in an RO exerts a stronger effect in determining whether the RO engages in a peace mission. Since this variable is first differenced, it captures the loss of trade the regional organization directly experiences between its members and the conflict state. Therefore, if the variable on the coefficient is negative, a negative value for this variable (indicating a loss of trade) will actually increase the likelihood of intervention by that particular regional organization.

To calculate trade values for the UN, I consider the trade values of the members of the Security Council. The values of each member state (or member of the Security Council) are then averaged together and recorded, along with the minimum and maximum amounts of trade for member states in each regional organization. Although I do not expect to find that the UN is motivated by economic salience, I still include these variables as a control measure.

The capabilities of an organization are operationalized according to a simple coding scheme utilizing the Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) scores. Similar to the manner in which the trade variable was coded, the CINC score of each individual member state of an RO is calculated for each conflict year. These scores are then averaged to create a single capabilities score for the regional organization for each year. Minimum and maximum CINC scores are also recorded, capturing the member state of the RO with the smallest CINC score and the member state of the RO with the largest CINC score. This is to ensure that the stronger members of a regional organization are considered in the analysis.

Although I utilize the average CINC scores of an RO in my analysis as robustness checks, I also attempt to normalize CINC scores of each RO by comparing them to the CINC scores of the UN Security Council (Singer, Bremer & Stuckey 1972). This is to ensure that the calculation of the CINC scores is not driving the results. To code this variable, I create a ratio of the CINC score of a regional organization for a given year with the CINC score of the UN Security Council for the same year. The CINC score of the organization is divided by
the average CINC score for the Security Council. Although perhaps not ideal, this provides a normalization of the variable against the UN, an organization with the clear means and capability to establish peace missions. Since the variation of CINC scores is relatively small and would be difficult to discuss in a meaningful way, I utilize this procedure in an attempt to provide additional context. As a result, the capabilities of the UN when included in this model are 1, since the average is divided by itself.

Another variable included that capture the inter-actor collective action problem is the presence of a previously established peace mission by an organization. This differs from the variable described in later sections that captures third-party intervention. This variable takes the value of 1 if in a given year, the previous year (t-1) recorded a peace mission by another organization. This captures the motivation to freeride off of other organizations, in that an organization should be less likely to intervene if another organization previously established a mission.

To capture the intra-actor collective action problem within each organization, I use multiple measures. First, I code a measure that captures the distance between the most capable member state and the least capable member state. This variable is coded using a simple measure of the distance from the maximum CINC score of the member states to the minimum CINC score of the member states. I expect to find that the larger this measure, the more likely an organization will intervene as the salience increases, because the intra-actor collective action problem is relatively smaller and less difficult to overcome. In addition, I utilize another estimator that records the total number of member states in an organization, expecting the likelihood of the RO establishing a peace mission to decrease as the size of the RO increases.

The second measure I use to capture the intra-actor collective action problem is an attempt to capture whether a regional hegemon is present in the organization. Measuring the presence of a regional hegemon is primarily done through the loss-of-strength gradient, utilizing CINC scores (Lemke 2002). Studies most often code a regional hegemon present if no other state in the region measures 80 percent of its CINC score. For example, if a state
has a CINC score of .6, it would be coded as a regional hegemon if no other state had a CINC score higher than .48. This indicator is theoretically concerned with the extent to which a country’s domestic politics are conducted with the awareness of a potential nearby military threat, namely the regional hegemon (Lemke 2002).

I use a slightly stricter measurement for this indicator in an attempt to ensure that a regional hegemon is not just a military threat for a few states in the region, but that it exerts a significant amount of leverage in the political component of the RO itself. For example, the presence of a regional hegemon in my study is not limited by region, as in other studies, but rather limited by the membership of the regional organization. What may be a more capable state within a regional organization might not be considered a regional hegemon in the broader context. For example, based on the 80% scaling, Algeria would have been coded as a regional hegemon in the Arab Maghreb Union in 1989. Other member states consisted of Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. Libya’s CINC score falls just below 80% of Algeria for this year; however, few would consider Algeria a regional hegemon during this time in either the region or the organization itself. To ensure the membership of the RO is not driving the coding scheme, I utilize this stricter measure.

I code the presence of a regional hegemon as 1 if one member state in the organization has a CINC score of at least double the member state with the second highest value. If the highest CINC score of a member state is less than double the next-highest CINC score, I code no regional hegemon in that organization. I expect that ROs with a regional hegemon will be more likely to intervene, since the hegemon has already become accustomed to committing a disproportionate burden of the resources required by the RO. This previously established familiarity with the disproportionate expectations leads to an increase in the likelihood that the regional hegemon will commit the necessary resources to establish a peace mission. The regional organizations containing a regional hegemon can be found in Table 4.1.

4.2.3. Control Variables

Finally, I include several control variables to account for other factors that might affect the decision of the UN or an RO to intervene. I include reports of various models with
The first control variable I include measures whether an intervention by a third party was present in the conflict state. These data are taken from Mullenbach (2005). If a third party, whether a single state or an ad hoc coalition, sent in a peace mission to a conflict state unassociated with any international or regional organization, this variable takes the value of 1.

In analyses containing UN dyads, I include a dummy variable indicating the end of the Cold War. This variable takes the value of 1 for missions conducted after 1991 and 0 for missions conducted prior to 1991. This variable is not included in analyses with RO dyads, since a large majority of ROs were not established until after the end of the Cold War. The sharp increase in the number of potential interveners post-Cold War causes the variable to be negative and statistically significant. However, this is due only to the increase of possible interveners and its relation to the proportion of missions overall. The overall number of RO peace missions has increased substantially since the end of the Cold War. When the dyads are restricted to those dyads that had previously intervened in a civil conflict, the variable
is not significant, yet positive. This behaves as expected, since the number of dyads prior to the Cold War is so small. As a result, this variable is not included, but its inclusion did not alter the significance or substantive effects of any other variables.

I also include a variable measuring the infant mortality rate of a conflict state prior to the conflict outbreak. This variable measures the probability that a live birth survives to age 5. It is measured per every one thousand live births. This variable is taken from the World Bank.\(^2\) This measure provides one possible estimator for the level of development of a conflict state prior to conflict onset.

The timing of the conflict is controlled for as well, to account for whether the conflict is ongoing or a ceasefire has been reached. The dummy variable Conflict Year is coded as 1 if the conflict is currently ongoing at a given year and 0 if it has ended. As previously described in the chapter discussing the data, I code up to 5 post-conflict years for each conflict in an effort to account for post-conflict missions that may be established at a later date.

The log of the total population of a conflict state is included as a control variable as well. The total population of a state is included to account for the number of people at risk during the conflict. This variable is also taken from the World Bank.\(^3\)

Finally, I include the type of war as a control variable. The type of war exerts a significant effect on the likelihood of civil war recurrence (Hartzell, Hoddie & Rothchild 2001), so I expect that it may also impact whether an organization chooses to establish a peace mission or not. This variable takes on the value of 1 for territorial conflicts and 0 for conflicts over the control of government. It is taken from the UCDP/PRIO dataset of armed conflicts (Gleditsch et al. 2002, Themner & Wallensteen 2012).

4.3. Analysis

In order to examine the differing motivations that affect the UN and ROs, I begin by running separate rare events logit analyses on UN dyads and RO dyads. I separate

---


the two types of organizations in order to test how the primary independent variables affect international and regional organizations separately. The results of the analyses for UN dyads are reported in Table 4.2. Three models are reported including different measures for conflict severity along with a model including each measure.

4.3.1. UN Dyads

In Table 4.2, we see support for Hypothesis 4, as the severity of the conflict increases the likelihood of a UN peace mission. The dependent variable in this analysis is a dichotomous variable indicating whether an organization engaged in a peace mission in a given year. These results further indicate the concern of the UN with providing the public good of peace missions and decreasing the amount of conflict in the international arena. The variable indicating the number of refugees produced by the conflict is statistically significant and positive, suggesting a positive increase in the likelihood of UN peace missions. The variable for conflict duration is also statistically significant and positive, indicating that the longer the duration of the conflict, the more likely the UN will intervene. Furthermore, the UN is more likely to engage in a peace mission in a country with a high infant mortality rate, suggesting a lesser developed country. However, it is less likely to intervene as the population increases, as this variable is signed negatively. Finally, the UN is more likely to intervene in a civil conflict fought over territorial issues than over governmental issues, as indicated by the type of war variable. This variable is dichotomous, in which 1 indicates a territorial conflict and 0 indicates a governmental conflict.

The variables indicating the severity of the civil war in this model demonstrate the UN acting in an expected manner, namely toward those conflicts that are most severe. Interestingly, however, the collective action indicators affect the UN in opposite ways than expected. The results suggest that not only is the UN not subject to collective failure, but that it is more likely to overcome the collective action problem as it becomes more difficult. This is contradictory for how the theory expected the UN to behave. This could be a result of the UN desiring to play at least a minimum role in all peace missions by “bandwagoning” once an RO has already established a mission, or perhaps the UN is not subject to the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Duration</td>
<td>.36* (.21)</td>
<td>.45** (.178)</td>
<td>.356** (.181)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of War</td>
<td>5.92*** (2.03)</td>
<td>6.20*** (1.90)</td>
<td>6.21*** (1.94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous mission present</td>
<td>3.20*** (1.16)</td>
<td>2.87*** (1.07)</td>
<td>2.87*** (1.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality rate</td>
<td>.05*** (.015)</td>
<td>.046*** (.013)</td>
<td>.046*** (.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of potential interveners</td>
<td>1.79*** (.664)</td>
<td>1.72*** (.556)</td>
<td>1.72*** (.564)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees produced</td>
<td>.001** (.000)</td>
<td>.001** (.000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in FDI</td>
<td>-3.24e-10** (1.56e-10)</td>
<td>-3.13e-10** (1.41e-10)</td>
<td>-3.14e-10** (1.46e-10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of population</td>
<td>-3.71** (1.68)</td>
<td>-3.67*** (1.38)</td>
<td>-3.68*** (1.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third party intervention</td>
<td>-2.69* (1.49)</td>
<td>-2.94** (1.35)</td>
<td>-2.94** (1.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle deaths</td>
<td>-4.68e-06 (.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-4.95e-06 (.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Cold War</td>
<td>2.65*** (.722)</td>
<td>2.58*** (.871)</td>
<td>2.59*** (.716)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict year</td>
<td>-.516 (.814)</td>
<td>-.865 (1.09)</td>
<td>-.831 (.851)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>35.897* (20.64)</td>
<td>35.81** (17.05)</td>
<td>35.86** (17.46)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 428
collective action problem in the same manner of regional organizations. According to the theory, the UN should still prefer to freeride off other organizations, despite its status as a provider of public goods. However, not only is the UN more likely to establish a peace mission as the number of potential interveners increases, but it is more likely to establish a peace mission if another organization has already done so. This implies that the UN is not subject to freeriding in the inter-actor collective action problem.

One potential explanation for these results could be that the UN truly does view itself as the provider of public goods in the same manner as a state government. It is more likely to conduct peace missions in those conflicts that are least likely to see a peace mission established by another organization, namely those with a high number of potential interveners. Alternatively, it may be willing to assist regional organizations attempting to conduct their own peace missions, perhaps in a strategic effort to save resources in the future. If regional organizations can be trained now to manage conflicts, the UN will be relied upon less in the future. A more self-seeking view of the UN might prompt the interpretation that the UN seeks to maintain its current monopoly on peacekeeping, and therefore inserts itself into regional missions once they are established. This allows the UN to continue to gain credit for the success of the peace mission while saving it valuable resources and costs. The specific motivation of the UN to establish peace missions once others have been established certainly justifies further research into the mechanisms of the UN and the coordination patterns between multiple regional organizations. Although I explore this in the following empirical chapter, many additional puzzles remain and deserve attention.

Although it is unlikely that the finding regarding the UN’s increased likelihood to join previously existing missions can be explained away with data quirks, it must be considered that a correlation exists between the potential number of interveners and the severity of the conflict. Developing states often create regional organizations in an effort to spur economic development. However, many of these states also experience the most severe civil conflicts, and it could be possible that developing states are most likely to be involved in the most organizations, which would increase the likelihood of collective failure. This could account for
the appearance of the UN being more likely to intervene in those conflicts with the most potential interveners. However, no significant relationship exists between the potential number of interveners and the severity of the conflict, measured through conflict duration, number of refugees, and battle deaths. The correlation coefficient is actually negative between the number of potential interveners and the total number of refugees produced, and less than 0.10 between the duration of conflict and battle deaths. As a result, it does not appear this finding is driven by a spurious relationship. Although I will examine the coordination between organizations at the time of establishing peace missions in later chapters, exploring the extent to which the UN is subject to the collective action problem is outside the scope of this study. Future studies that delve deeper into the specifics of UN decision-making are certainly warranted, however, to further investigate the mechanisms within the organization.

It does not appear that the UN is unmotivated by economic indicators, as demonstrated by the significance of the change in FDI variable. The change in FDI variable is negative and statistically significant, indicating that a negative value of the variable and drop in overall value of FDI in a conflict state, results in an increase in the likelihood of UN peace missions. This initially appears to be contradictory to the expected finding that the UN would not be motivated by economic goods and suggests that economic indicators motivate UN peace missions in addition to the severity of the conflict. I will explore this specific finding later in detail, however, and show that only the most extreme drops in FDI exert any effect; these extreme drops are also correlated with conflict severity.

The variable measuring battle deaths, contrary to other variables indicating the severity of the conflict, is decidedly insignificant and has a negative coefficient, contradicting what the expected value would be. This is a surprising relationship, but perhaps one due to data constraints rather than reflecting a true lack of impact on the decision of the UN to intervene. The measurements from this variable, as previously stated, were taken from (Lacina & Gleditsch 2005). In this measurement, three values are presented. One which measures a low estimate of battle deaths, one that measures a high estimate, and one that is considered to be the best estimate for that year. If yearly data for battle deaths were available, specific
numbers were utilized. Otherwise, these variables were coded based on whether the original data indicated that deaths were between 25-999 or 1000-9999. In both cases, the low estimates were 25 or 1000 respectively, the high estimates were 999 or 9999 respectively, and the best estimate was coded as missing.

Despite utilizing each different measure as well as using an average to code the missing data (500 if the range was 25-999 and 5000 if the range was 1000-9999), the variable remained insignificant and negative. As a robustness check, I merged the data with the variable indicating battle deaths from the Correlates of War dataset (Singer, Bremer & Stuckey 1972). Since the COW variable counts the total number of deaths rather than just those of soldiers belonging to the government or rebel groups, I expected a greater impact from this measurement. However, no effect was found, as the variable remained insignificant and negative. This could be a result of missing data from both measurements, as a significant number of observations are coded as missing. Regardless, no conclusions can be reached regarding the relationship between the number of battle deaths in a conflict and the likelihood of UN intervention.

4.3.2. Regional Organization Dyads

After examining the results of the analysis of UN dyads, I turn to analyses utilizing RO dyads. The results of these analyses are reported in Table 4.3. I report both a rare events logit analysis as well as two firth logits. I utilize the firth logit models in order to include two key variables from the analysis with UN dyads: the variable indicating whether an organization had previously established a mission, and a variable indicating the type of war. Both of these variables predict the dependent variable in RO analyses perfectly and are therefore excluded from the analysis. The firth logit corrects for these exclusions by allowing for separation in the dyad (Heinze & Schermer 2002). I include each firth logit model with various indicators for economic salience to facilitate a comparison.

The results report the likelihood of regional organizations to intervene and provide an interesting account of RO decision-making and behavior. We see from the table that ROs are significantly affected by the collective action problem and are significantly less likely to
Table 4.3. Rare Events Logit - RO Dyads

Dependent Variable: Dichotomous Intervention (1 if yes, 0 if no)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Rare Events Logit</th>
<th>Firth Logit</th>
<th>Firth Logit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presence of regional hegemon</td>
<td>4.55***</td>
<td>2.92**</td>
<td>2.67***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.907)</td>
<td>(1.22)</td>
<td>(.916)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution of RO CINC scores</td>
<td>.0002***</td>
<td>-.000</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of average CINC to UN</td>
<td>-79.58***</td>
<td>-19.14**</td>
<td>-13.22***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(26.57)</td>
<td>(9.10)</td>
<td>(4.65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Average Trade</td>
<td>-.003**</td>
<td>-.001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in total FDI</td>
<td>-4.22e-10**</td>
<td>-3.05e-10**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.73e-10)</td>
<td>(1.51e-10)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of potential interveners</td>
<td>-1.221***</td>
<td>-.98*</td>
<td>-.109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.389)</td>
<td>(.57)</td>
<td>(.332)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous mission established</td>
<td>-2.90**</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.55)</td>
<td>(1.12)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle deaths</td>
<td>-.000***</td>
<td>-.000</td>
<td>.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict duration</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.054</td>
<td>-.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.053)</td>
<td>(.070)</td>
<td>(.104)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees to RO members</td>
<td>-2.67e-07</td>
<td>2.46e-06**</td>
<td>6.66e-07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.05e-06)</td>
<td>(9.30e-07)</td>
<td>(.511)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of War</td>
<td>-1.90</td>
<td>.264</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.59)</td>
<td>(1.999)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of population</td>
<td>-1.26</td>
<td>-1.52**</td>
<td>-.862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.30)</td>
<td>(.720)</td>
<td>.133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Year</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>-1.19</td>
<td>-.959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.10)</td>
<td>(.986)</td>
<td>(.952)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third party intervention</td>
<td>-.229</td>
<td>-1.375</td>
<td>-.451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.984)</td>
<td>(.996)</td>
<td>(.833)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>24.24</td>
<td>24.20**</td>
<td>10.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(21.86)</td>
<td>(11.32)</td>
<td>(8.81)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=586 1094 586
interact as the number of potential interveners increases. The coefficient for the number of potential interveners is both significant and negative. This supports Hypothesis 1, proposing that an increase in the total number of potential interveners will result in a decrease in the likelihood of RO intervention as the collective action problem becomes increasingly difficult to overcome.

The results appear to demonstrate support for Hypothesis 2 as well. The coefficient for the change in average trade is negative and significant. Although this appears at first to contradict Hypothesis 2, a negative trade value in one year indicates that the total value of trade between the first and second year decreased. As a result, the negative value of the variable and the negative value of the coefficient, when multiplied together, exerts an overall positive effect on the likelihood of intervention. It indicates that the larger the change in trade, or the further the overall value of trade drops from year to year, the more likely an RO is to intervene in the conflict.

In a similar manner, the variable measuring the change in the total levels of foreign direct investment in a conflict state also indicates an increased likelihood to intervene by ROs as the change increases. Although the coefficient is negative, a negative value of the observation indicates a decrease in the total levels of FDI from one year to another. Therefore, a negative value of this variable, representing a decrease from one year to the next in total FDI, exerts a positive effect on the likelihood of intervention by an RO.

Hypothesis 3, unlike Hypothesis 2, does not reach the level of significance needed to reject the null. The variables utilized to measure the political salience of a conflict are largely insignificant. The duration of the conflict does not suggest that additional destabilization increases the likelihood of RO intervention. Furthermore, the variable indicating the proportion of contiguous member states of an RO to the conflict state is also not significant and has a negative sign on its coefficient rather than a positive sign. This would suggest that as the number of member states in an RO that share a border with the conflict state increase, the less likely an RO will engage in peacekeeping in that conflict.

Interestingly, the number of battle deaths is significant but negative. This suggests
that as the number of battle deaths increase, the likelihood of an RO peace mission actually decreases. Although an interesting finding that might suggest ROs are less likely to involve themselves in particularly bloody wars, perhaps due to the large number of resources required to engage a peace mission in that type of conflict, this variable is subject to the same shortcomings previously discussed. Since the results of the variable in the analysis with UN dyads suggested a finding contrary to previous studies, I am hesitant to rely too heavily on this coefficient. In order to ensure the variable was not driving the findings, I also dropped it from the analysis entirely, and it did not affect the significance or signs of any other variable.

The variable that measures the distribution of capabilities of an organization supports Hypothesis 5 in the rare events logit model, but fails to maintain significance in the firth logit models. As a result, it is not entirely clear to what extent that an increase in the distribution of CINC scores affects the likelihood of an RO establishing a peace mission. In contrast, those organizations that contain a regional hegemon are significantly more likely to establish a peace mission, and this finding is constant throughout each model. The presence of a regional hegemon in an RO also exerts a significant and positive effect on the dependent variable. This supports the intra-actor collective action problem theoretical framework, suggesting that the regional hegemon acts as a privileged actor and is accustomed to undertaking a disproportionate burden of resources required by the RO and continues to do so in peace missions.

Interestingly, the ratio of the average CINC score of the RO to the average CINC score of the UN Security Council is significant yet negative in each model. This indicates that a higher average CINC score compared to the UN is actually less likely to engage in a peace mission. Although perhaps surprising, a large part of this variable might be driven by NATO’s international jurisdiction. I investigate this further in robustness checks by limiting NATO’s jurisdiction in the data later in this chapter.

To further examine the effects of capabilities on an organization’s behavior, I altered the variable measuring CINC scores and change it to a simple variable that measures whether a regional organization is conventionally strong or conventionally weak. I used a simple
dummy variable to code this variable, where (1) indicates an organization is strong and (0) indicates otherwise. The coding mechanism by which I measure this variable is a subjective one based only on traditional views of various regional organizations. I code NATO, the EU, and OSCE as traditionally ‘strong’ organizations, and the others as traditionally weaker organizations. However, the variable continued to be statistically significant and negative, while no other variables were affected. This suggests that more capable regional organizations are less likely to intervene in conflicts.

4.4. Substantive Effects

After considering the predicted effects of the coefficients in the previous models, I turn to examine the substantive effects. Berry, DeMerritt and Esarey (Berry, DeMeritt & Esarey 2010) show that in a logit model, a significant coefficient does not necessarily indicate meaningful effects. Therefore, I turn to a discussion of the change in predicted probabilities when the value of variables is changed in meaningful ways. I first turn to examining the analysis utilizing UN dyads. When the number of total refugees produced by the civil conflict increases from 100 to 1000, we see an increased likelihood of intervention of .34% with a 95% confidence interval of .0001% to 8.3%. When the number of refugees increases from 1000 to 10000, however, we see a change in predicted probabilities of 90.2%. This confirms Hypothesis 4, as an increase in the number of refugees greatly increases the likelihood of a UN peace mission.

The change in predicted probabilities when the number of potential interveners is increased from 1 to 2.4, which is the mean of the variable, the recorded increase measures .73% with a 95% confidence interval from .0002% to 11.85%. This value demonstrates that despite the positive effect that the total number of potential interveners exerts on the UN, the substantive effect from increasing the number of interveners from 1, indicating only the UN maintains jurisdiction, to the mean of 2.4 is quite small. However, increasing the potential number of interveners from 1 to 5 results in an increase of 39.5% with a 95% confidence interval of 12.67% to 67.89%. This suggests that although smaller numbers of potential interveners only increase the likelihood of UN intervention by small amounts, those conflicts
in which several ROs maintain jurisdiction over the conflict area see a much more substantive increase in the likelihood of UN intervention.

This could be a result of several differing motivations. Perhaps the UN becomes involved in a greater number of these conflicts because it is concerned that multiple regional organizations may face trouble coordinating amongst themselves and could potentially fail to establish peace or even unintentionally worsen the conflict entirely. Alternatively, perhaps the UN sees these conflicts as one of its few chances to freeride off of any potential ROs that get involved as it wishes to utilize the resources of ROs while maintaining a level of involvement that enables it to exert some of its own preferences on the objectives and outcomes of the peace mission. I explore this motivation in the following chapters.

The effects of the change in total FDI on the likelihood of UN intervention suggest the potential to contradict the UN’s primary desire of providing the international public good. Perhaps the UN, in addition to ROs, is also motivated by negative economic effects of its members, or perhaps the positive effect of this variable only captures the deteriorating conditions of a conflict state. The mean of this variable for all UN dyads is 47,200,000. Since this number is positive, it shows the average change in FDI from one year to the next is positive, rather than negative. Of the UN dyads, 199 values for the change in FDI are negative, and 293 values are positive. For those negative dyads, the mean is -382,000,000 with a maximum change of -25,500,000,000 and a minimum change of -9623.71.

When increasing the value of the change in FDI from 0 to the minimum negative value of -9623, we see no significant increase. The first difference is .00000%, and the 95% confidence interval measures from .0000% to .0000002%. When increasing the value of the variable from 0 to its mean, -382,000,000, we see an increase in the likelihood of UN intervention of .15% with a 95% confidence interval from .004% to 1.2%. At its mean, the change in FDI still exerts a very small substantive effect on the likelihood of UN intervention. When the mean is doubled to 764,000,000, the change in likelihood increases to .324%, with a 95% confidence interval of .01% to 2.64%. At -3,600,000,000, the increase of UN involvement measures 2.46% with a confidence interval of .13% to 15.19%, and only the maximum value...
of negative change in FDI is larger than -3.6 billion. Therefore, despite its significance, we see that even the largest decreases from year to year in the levels of FDI in a conflict state only exert a small substantive effect on the likelihood of UN intervention.

Turning to the substantive effects of independent variables on RO dyads and their likelihood of establishing a peace mission, we see further support for Hypothesis 1, 2 and 5. If a regional organization has a regional hegemon present, we see an increase of 74.17% with a confidence interval of 26.76% and 93.87%. This demonstrates the extent to which the presence of a regional hegemon increases the likelihood of an RO becoming involved in the conflict. An RO in which a regional hegemon is present, defined by one state with a CINC score at least double the second-ranked state’s CINC score, is 74% more likely to become involved in a peace mission. Although certainly not a perfect definition of regional hegemon, this indicates a significant difference in the way that ROs with a regional hegemon overcome the intra-actor collective action problem compared to ROs without a regional hegemon.

The substantive effects also demonstrate support for hypothesis 2 regarding economic salience. A change in trade from 0 to -100, indicating a loss of 100,000,000 US dollars in the average value of trade between the RO member states and the conflict state, results in an increase in the likelihood of intervention of 5.4% with a confidence interval of .26% to 13.85%. Although this seems like a large amount, the mean value for negative changes in trade is 172 million, and the max value is over 6 billion. The specific predicted probability for the average value of trade with all other variables set to the mean is 89.58% with a confidence interval of 41.05% to 99.19%. Increasing the change in trade from 0 to the mean value results in an increase of 8.58%. This suggests a very strong effect exerted by losses in the average value of trade between member states and the conflict state.

The difference in predicted probabilities for the change in FDI follow the same pattern, although they do not exert as strong an effect. This is likely do to the measurement choice for this specific variable. Since dyadic levels of FDI are not available, only the total levels of FDI in a state can be utilized. Although this variable is still significant, it does not necessarily capture the specific motivations of an RO to intervene, as it cannot be assumed
that any of this value comes from the member states of an RO. However, since loss of FDI in a neighboring state can affect the loss of FDI in other member states of an RO, this contributes to a loss of economic security. A change from 0 lost dollars to 1 million lost FDI dollars results in an increased likelihood of 0.006% with a confidence interval of 0.001% to 0.013%. Substantively, this is not a particularly strong effect. However, the average value of this variable is 37.8 million. A change from 0 to the mean value results in an increased likelihood of 0.21% with a confidence interval from 0.04% to 0.52%. This again shows that the substantive effects of this variable are small, particularly compared to the levels of dyadic trade between the RO member states and the conflict state.

Finally, I examine the substantive effects of the number of potential interveners with jurisdiction over a conflict state. If only one RO has jurisdiction over the conflict state, the potential number of interveners will be 2, including it and the UN. Increasing this value to 4 results in a decrease in the predicted probability of intervention of -43.96% with a confidence interval of -77.81% to -13.78%. This accounts for the inter-actor collective action problem and exerts a large substantive effect on the likelihood of RO intervention. Adding two other ROs with jurisdiction over the conflict state appears to increase the difficulty of overcoming the collective action problem substantially. However, this effect is only present for regional organizations. As previously noted, the UN is actually more likely to become involved in conflicts that have a large number of potential interveners.

4.5. Robustness Checks

In order to control for the possibility that NATO’s dyadic format might be driving the results, I perform additional analyses in which NATO’s jurisdiction is limited only to European states as well as all states from 2000-2001. Since most ROs did not begin engaging in peacekeeping prior to 2000, it is more easily justifiable to model NATO with these dyads rather than all civil wars since 1945. I also conduct a test in which NATO’s jurisdiction is limited only to European states and one in which NATO is eliminated from the analysis entirely. No significant differences in variables can be detected across robustness checks. The results of these analyses can be found in Tables 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6.
Table 4.4. Results of Rare Events Logit; NATO World-wide Jurisdiction 2000-2001

Dependent Variable: Dichotomous Intervention (1 if yes, 0 if no)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>t-value</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Variance of an RO</td>
<td>.0001</td>
<td>6.78</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of Regional Hegemon</td>
<td>6.78</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2.24)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of RO CINC to UN CINC</td>
<td>-92.46</td>
<td>-4.75</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(17.71)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Average Trade Flows</td>
<td>-.004</td>
<td>-4.75</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in FDI</td>
<td>-4.70e-10</td>
<td>-3.58</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.31e-10)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>1.61e-06</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>.203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.26e-06)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of potential interveners</td>
<td>-1.20</td>
<td>-2.73</td>
<td>.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.441)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Duration</td>
<td>-.071</td>
<td>-0.42</td>
<td>.672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.168)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of contiguous states</td>
<td>-12.38</td>
<td>-0.88</td>
<td>.378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(14.03)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>-.001</td>
<td>-0.89</td>
<td>.374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle deaths</td>
<td>-.0001</td>
<td>-2.36</td>
<td>.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2.16)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n = 297
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>t-value</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Variance of the RO CINC</td>
<td>.0001</td>
<td>6.78</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of regional hegemon</td>
<td>6.78</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of RO CINC to UN</td>
<td>-92.46</td>
<td>-5.22</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in average trade</td>
<td>-.004</td>
<td>-4.75</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in FDI</td>
<td>-4.70e-10</td>
<td>-3.58</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>1.61e-06</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>.203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential number of interveners</td>
<td>-1.20</td>
<td>-2.73</td>
<td>.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of contiguous states</td>
<td>-12.38</td>
<td>-0.88</td>
<td>.378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle deaths</td>
<td>-.0002</td>
<td>-2.36</td>
<td>.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Duration</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-0.42</td>
<td>.672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>-.001</td>
<td>-.89</td>
<td>.374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>.011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n=290

Table 4.5. Results of Rare Events Logit; NATO Jurisdiction Limited to Europe

Dependent Variable: Dichotomous Intervention (1 if yes, 0 if no)
Table 4.6. Results of Rare Events Logit: NATO Dropped Entirely

Dependent Variable: Dichotomous Intervention (1 if yes, 0 if no)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>t-value</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Variance of an RO</td>
<td>.0001</td>
<td>6.77</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of a regional hegemon</td>
<td>6.78</td>
<td>3.02</td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.24)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of RO CINC to UN</td>
<td>-92.46</td>
<td>-5.21</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(17.75)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in average trade flow</td>
<td>-.004</td>
<td>-4.74</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in FDI</td>
<td>-4.70e-10</td>
<td>-3.58</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.31e-10)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of potential interveners</td>
<td>-1.20</td>
<td>-2.73</td>
<td>.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.442)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict duration</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-0.42</td>
<td>.673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.169)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>-.001</td>
<td>-0.89</td>
<td>.376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle deaths</td>
<td>.0002</td>
<td>-2.36</td>
<td>.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of contiguous states</td>
<td>-12.38</td>
<td>-0.88</td>
<td>.379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(14.07)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>1.61e-06</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>.204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.27e-06)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.17)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n=284
In order to ensure that my results are not driven by the dyadic composition of the data, I restrict an organization’s jurisdiction and subsequent dyadic years of jurisdiction to the first peacekeeping mission the organization enacts. For example, the jurisdiction of ECOWAS would begin in 1990, as the first peace mission ECOMOG established was in Liberia in 1990. This ensures that the results are not driven by the dyadic jurisdiction between each potential intervener and the conflict state. Some regional organizations are dropped from this analysis entirely, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, as no peace mission has been established to date by this regional organization, despite its maintaining the authority to do so. The result of this analysis is found in Table 4.7.

In this analysis, we see that the primary variables of interest remain unchanged. The presence of a regional hegemon and the variance of the CINC scores of an RO continue to exert a significant and positive effect on the likelihood of intervention. Furthermore, the change in average trade continues to exert the expected effect, as does the number of potential interveners. The variable measuring the change in FDI is no longer significant, but it is still signed negatively.

4.6. Conclusions and Implications

In this chapter, I attempted to determine what factors affect the decision of both international and regional organizations to engage in peace missions. I utilized an original dataset with information on peace missions and several other independent variables likely to affect this decision. I found support for both the inter-actor collective action problem between multiple international and regional organizations as well as the intra-actor collective action problem within each individual organization’s member states in reference to regional organizations. However, the UN does not seem affected by the collective action problem and is actually motivated in the opposite direction. Contrary to how the total number of interveners affects ROs, an increase in potential interveners actually increases the overall likelihood that the UN will intervene.

I also found, in reference to ROs, support for the intra-actor collective action problem. Specifically, those ROs comprised of member states with a tighter distribution of capabilities
Table 4.7. Results of Rare Events Logit: Jurisdiction Limited to First Mission

Dependent Variable: Dichotomous Intervention (1 if yes, 0 if no)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>t-value</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Variance of RO CINC</td>
<td>.0001</td>
<td>4.79</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of a regional hegemon</td>
<td>6.48</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.04)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of RO CINC to UN</td>
<td>-100.55</td>
<td>-4.07</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(24.73)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in average trade</td>
<td>-.005</td>
<td>-5.20</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in FDI</td>
<td>-3.37e-10</td>
<td>-1.32</td>
<td>.186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.55e-10)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential number of interveners</td>
<td>-1.27</td>
<td>-3.18</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.397)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>-1.58e-06</td>
<td>-2.65</td>
<td>.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.98e-07)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of contiguous states</td>
<td>-15.53</td>
<td>-.38</td>
<td>.708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(41.40)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict duration</td>
<td>-.114</td>
<td>-2.77</td>
<td>.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.041)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>-2.98</td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle deaths</td>
<td>-.0002</td>
<td>-1.41</td>
<td>.157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>7.87</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>.116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.01)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n=173
are less likely to overcome the collective action problem than those ROs comprised of member states with a wide variance of capabilities. Member states of relatively similar capabilities are less willing to provide the resources for peace missions since the other member states are of relatively equal capability and would be similarly affected by bearing the costs. However, those ROs that consist of member states of widely varying capabilities overcome the collective action problem more easily. States with higher capabilities might recognize that they enjoy a more privileged position within the RO, since providing the same number of resources would affect a lesser state considerably more. This variation results in more capable states providing resources for peace missions at a higher level.

Intensifying the effect of variance is the presence or absence of a regional hegemon. Similar to more capable states in ROs with a wide variance of capabilities, the regional hegemon maintains its status as the sole privileged actor of the RO. This presence substantially increases the likelihood of an RO engaging in a peace mission.

In regards to the UN, I found that the UN is motivated by the provision of public goods, specifically related to decreasing the overall amount of violence in the world. As a result, the UN is drawn to those conflicts waging the longest and producing the most number of refugees. This supports my hypotheses as well as previous research on UN peacekeeping. Although the UN is affected by a decrease in the levels of FDI in a country, the effects of this variable can only be found at the highest cases, suggesting the variable may also be capturing the general worsening conditions of the conflict state rather than sole economic interests of the UN.

I also found that, although regional organizations are also motivated by public goods, economic and political private goods available only to their member states exert a much stronger effect in prompting peace missions. As the economic salience of a conflict increases, measured by levels of trade between the conflict state and the member states of an RO in addition to total levels of FDI, the likelihood of RO intervention increases. This supports my hypotheses that RO member states are more likely to overcome the inter-actor collective action problem when the political and economic salience of a civil conflict reaches a certain
threshold.

Although the results of this study at first glance might appear to cast a negative light on the proliferation of ROs since 2000, the implications regarding the relationship between the UN and ROs is much more positive than it may initially appear. Although ROs are subject to the collective action problem, the UN is actually more likely to act when the collective action problem is the hardest to overcome. Furthermore, despite RO motivations to engage in peace missions, the more important implication for conflict states is whether regional organizations are more or less successful than the UN or joint UN and RO missions at either ending civil conflicts or preventing civil war recurrence. I explore these questions in later chapters.

Further research on regional organizations is certainly warranted. Better measures of salience can and should be constructed to capture the motivations of ROs to intervene. In addition, expanding my current dataset to include further information on regional organizations and their actions along with more information about how ROs and UNs interact with other actors, such as third-party actors, ad hoc coalitions and even non-governmental organizations will only help to provide an expansive view of how and why actors get involved in peace missions, and, more importantly, what types of peace missions conducted by which types of actors prove most effective at preventing civil war recurrence.
CHAPTER 5

THE COORDINATION OF PEACE MISSIONS

5.1. Introduction

The previous chapter examined what factors prompt an organization to become involved in a civil war through the establishment of a peace mission. Economic salience is particularly significant for regional organizations, while the severity of the conflict is important for determining whether the United Nations becomes involved. However, actors often face additional difficulties when implementing peace missions as a result of the continued tendency to freeride off of other organizations involved in the mission.

For some organizations, both international and regional, the inter-actor collective action problem ends after the decision to establish a peace mission occurs, since no other organizations become involved in the peace mission. If an organization is the only one funding and directing the peace mission, it is limited only by its own capabilities and resources it is willing to provide. However, some civil conflicts attract multiple organizational actors, as the level of salience reaches a critical point for more than one international or regional organization. Once these organizations decide to become involved in the same civil conflict through peace missions, a degree of coordination is required in order for this collaboration on peace missions to occur. In an effort to avoid duplication and waste of resources, organizations need to determine prior to the mission’s deployment the level of coordination the two organizations wish to take, and which organization intends to contribute the majority of the resources and direct the mission itself.

In this chapter, I examine this organizational coordination of peace missions. Specifically, why do some organizations choose to collaborate and coordinate peace missions? Why do some organizations undertake the primary role in a mission, contributing the majority of the resources and providing the support necessary to coordinate the various actors, while others freeride off of the primary organization and provide fewer resources? What factors explain why organizations take on different roles in conflicts at different times? After including
an examination of regional organizations into the previous chapter, examining where missions are sent, it is important to then determine how the organizations coordinate once missions are established. In this chapter, I disaggregate the dichotomous measure used previously of whether an organization established a peace mission or did not. For all organizations, both the UN and ROs, that engaged in peace missions that overlapped temporally, meaning their dependent variable value in the previous chapter simultaneously took the value of one, I determine whether an organization took on the primary or secondary role in the overlapping mission.

For example, to return to the peace missions of ECOWAS and the UN in Sierra Leone, ECOWAS originally undertook a solo role in its peace enforcement mission. However, once the UN established its relatively small observer mission, ECOWAS took the role of the primary organization in the mission. It committed the majority of the resources and directed the goals and actions of the mission, actually providing security for unarmed UN forces. In contrast, the Organisation of African Unity established a peace mission in Rwanda. However, when the UN became involved, the OAU took on the secondary role in this conflict, allowing the UN to direct the actions and goals of the peace mission. What explains the decision-making of these three organizations? Why was the UN willing to play a small role in Sierra Leone, but a large role in Rwanda? Despite both being regional organizations in the same geographic area, why did the OAU take on the secondary role in Rwanda, but ECOWAS took on the primary role in Sierra Leone?

In the theory, I predicted that organizations face competing desires to both freeride off of other organizations as well as influence the direction of the peace mission. The equilibrium is to freeride, but it can be overcome if conflicts become more salient to the organization involved. As salience increases, the desire of an organization to exert its own preferences over the peace mission and, by extension, the post-conflict environment increases as well. This can overcome the incentive to freeride within a mission and prompt an organization to take on the primary role. Differing areas of salience again apply to the different types of organizations. The UN will be motivated by highly salient humanitarian issues, while ROs
are motivated by political and economic salience.

The majority of previous literature in the field of conflict management has yet to examine the coordination of multiple organizations. This literature focuses primarily on United Nations peacekeeping, examining why it sends missions of different kinds to different conflicts. Much of this literature also focuses solely on where the UN sends peace missions, with little differentiation as to why the UN chose one type of mission over another. Furthermore, few studies examine how regional organizations coordinate missions or choose to forego cooperation entirely and conduct solo peace operations. Since regional organizations continue to become involved in peace missions, both as coordinating partners and as solo actors, it is important to understand what prompts organizations to coordinate and undertake certain roles in a peace mission in an effort to better understand the success of peace missions and the likelihood of civil war recurrence.

To examine these research questions, I utilize an original dataset with information on the different types of missions that the UN and ROs undertake in order to examine what factors motivate these organizations to coordinate and choose primary or secondary roles. Previous chapters have focused on what prompts an organization to become involved in conflict management initially. This chapter attempts to unpack the previously dichotomous decision of peace mission/no peace mission and determine what influences organizations to direct different amounts of resources toward different peace missions.

In this chapter, I am concerned only with the interaction between the two types of organizations and the relative role they take in relation to each other. I am not interested in an organization’s exact level of influence in a mission, but rather in only if it exerted more or less influence than the other organization with which it partnered. Admittedly, this leaves out a great deal of information regarding the specific decisions organizations make in regards to implementing peace missions, such as the type of mission created, the specific duties of peacekeepers, and many other important criteria. However, the more detailed aspects of multi-actor missions are outside the scope of this study, and a path for future research. This chapter will only examine the initial coordination of actors and whether an organization
viewed the conflict with high levels of salience needed to take on the primary role of the mission.

I originally hypothesized that the likelihood of an organization taking on the primary role in a multi-actor mission would increase as the salience of the conflict increased and the capabilities of the organization increased. Specifically, in this chapter, I test the following hypotheses:

H6: As the political salience of a civil conflict increases, the likelihood of an RO taking on the primary role increases.

H7: As the economic salience of a civil conflict increases, the likelihood of an RO taking on the primary role increases.

H8: As the capabilities of an RO increase, the likelihood of taking on the primary role increases.

H9: The presence of a regional hegemon will increase the likelihood of an RO taking on the primary role.

In this remaining portion of this chapter, I develop a research design to test these hypotheses. I then detail my analyses, followed by a discussion of the results and their substantive impacts. Finally, I provide a more detailed discussion of the data themselves, demonstrating broad patterns and behaviors of organizations. Since the number of observations in which two or more actors coordinated in a mission is particularly small, I include this discussion as an additional means to test my hypotheses.

5.2. Research Design

In order to test my hypotheses and address the question of coordination, I construct a research design utilizing an original dataset containing peace missions conducted by both IOs and ROs. Also included are indicators for what role each organization played in the peace mission. The primary roles, secondary roles, and the timing of the organizational
involvement in each mission are recorded. This allows me to test not only what factors influence an organization to play a primary or secondary role, but also how the timing of each mission and its establishment affects the behavior of other organizations when deciding to engage in a peace mission. The dependent variable in my analysis is what type of mission an organization chose to undertake in a conflict, whether a primary or secondary role. The analyses run from 1946-2001.

I primarily utilize a logit model to test my hypotheses, measuring whether an organization took on the primary role or secondary role in a peace mission. Organizations that established a peace mission without any other organizational involvement did not have the opportunity to choose the primary or secondary role and are excluded from this analysis. The dyads utilized in these analyses are those dyads in which the collective action problem has already been overcome and the decision made to intervene. Each decision of an organization to intervene is specified temporally in an effort to control for both the international conditions facing an organization as well as the actions of other organizations that also might potentially be engaging in peace missions. I also utilize both a Firth logit (Heinze & Schenper 2002) and an exact logit (Hirji 2005) as robustness checks, since the number of dyads in each analysis is very small. These analyses ensure the results from the logit model are not inaccurate or biased due to the small sample size. The Firth logit model addresses issues of separability and the small sample size, while the exact logit accounts for any possible bias in the parameters.

5.2.1. Dependent Variable

The dependent variable in the analysis is a dichotomous indicator measuring whether an organization took on the primary or secondary role in a peace mission. The point in the data at which I am interested is the specific point at which multiple organizations become involved. For example, an organization that establishes a solo mission may face additional organizational involvement one year later. At that point, a decision must be made between the organizations regarding whether the previously involved organization continues to direct the majority of the mission or whether it allows the new organization to take over. Both
organizations face a competing desire to freeride and commit fewer resources contrasted with the desire to exert the preferences of the organization and its member states in the conflict state. This moment of coordination is what comprises the dependent variable.

For some conflicts, the primary and secondary role of each organization is easy to determine. For example, all peace missions conducted with only the UN and the Organisation for African Unity clearly exhibit the UN in the primary role and the OAU in the secondary role. The OAU lacks the relative capabilities necessary to conduct a large peace mission without a more capable organization, usually the UN, providing additional resources. For other conflicts, particularly those conflicts that involve multiple regional organizations but lack UN involvement, determining the primary and secondary actor can be very difficult.

I code the primary and secondary role of each organization based on multiple factors. First, I consider the timing in which the organizations established the peace mission. For some missions, the organization that established the peace mission first continued to play the primary role through the remainder of the mission. Although certainly not always the case, this timing provides an easily identifiable first criteria.

The second criteria used to establish the primary or secondary role is the amount of resources an organization committed to the mission. Where possible, I record the total amount spent or committed by all organizations involved in the peace mission. I also try to record this by year if available, as it may provide a more accurate depiction of the initial decision of coordination rather than the total amount committed over the course of the entire peace mission. If an organization only provides an estimate, then that estimate is recorded. This measure is, however, almost entirely reliant on the self-reporting of regional organizations. Not all regional organizations make this information publicly available for several missions. Although budgetary analyses are easy to record for the UN role in peace missions, there are many missing data points for the resources committed by ROs.

The third criteria I utilize are available documents published by the UN or the RO as well as any relevant news articles containing official statements or reports from the UN or the RO about the conflict. Particularly for those peace missions in which the information
regarding resources committed by the RO is not available and the organizational hierarchy is not made clear by the timing, I rely heavily on outside sources. Official UN documents often offer valuable information regarding how involved the UN was in organizing the primary or secondary role, as they readily describe whether the UN is working in conjunction with an organization or sending a relatively small mission to support the preexisting peace mission established by an RO. Based on these sources, I code all peace missions including the UN.

The most difficult missions to code, as previously mentioned, are those missions in which the UN is not involved. Missions involving multiple regional organizations, such as the peace mission in Sudan that involved the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, present the most challenges when determining primary and secondary roles. Not only is information about the mission often not made publicly available by the regional organization, but many of the member states overlap. This may preclude a great deal of information released by the government of a member state from being utilized, as it is not clear to which regional organization the member state is referring. For these missions, I collect a variety of outside sources, including available statements from the regional organization as well as any relevant news sources. I base the primary and secondary role on which organization appeared to be playing a more active role in directing the objectives and operations of the peace mission.

5.2.2. Independent Variables

To operationalize economic salience, I utilize the same coding mechanism as described in previous chapters. I record the change in the total amount of foreign direct investment and the change in average bilateral trade values between the organization and the conflict state. The change in FDI is utilized rather than total FDI, because it indicates the extent to which the conflict is affecting the economic conditions of the country. Member states of a regional organization are likely to be more interested in the extent to which the FDI has changed rather than the current indicator. I take this variable from the World Bank. Since dyadic FDI data capturing the bilateral amount of FDI between all countries of the world does not exist, I utilize the total amount of FDI in a country. Although this does not capture
the specific economic salience between the member states of an RO and the conflict state, it
does provide an economic proxy, as decreasing amounts of FDI in a conflict state may also
cause a decrease in FDI in neighboring member states of an RO. This economic destabilizing
effect may prompt a regional organization to establish a peace mission to prevent further
damage to the economy of its own member states.

I operationalize trade by utilizing data on bilateral trade from Katherine Barbieri’s
Correlates of War trade dataset (Barbieri & Keshk N.d., Barbieri, Keshk & Pollins 2009). I
record the value of imports and exports for each member state in the RO with jurisdiction
for each conflict year. For example, the trade values for each member state of ECOWAS
would be recorded for each conflict year of Sierra Leone. I then average these amounts to
create one measure that captures the average amount of import and export in a year. For
example, each member state of the African Union has a specific dyadic trade value with
the conflict state of the Democratic Republic of Congo, both of imports and exports. I
utilize both of these measures to calculate the member state-specific dyadic value. I then
create a value for the African Union and the DRC by averaging the member state-specific
values of trade. This average value is then used to measure economic salience. I also record
scores for the maximum amount of trade between a member state-specific value as well as
a minimum value. This is to ensure that the average values are not driven by outliers, as
well as to examine whether the maximum value of trade in an RO member state exerts
a stronger effect than the average value of the entire organization. Since this variable is
first differenced, it captures the loss of trade the regional organization directly experiences
between its members and the conflict state. Therefore, if the variable on the coefficient is
negative, a negative value for this variable (indicating a loss of trade) will actually increase
the likelihood of intervention by that particular regional organization.

To calculate trade values for the UN, I consider the trade values of the members of
the Security Council. The values of each member state (or member of the Security Council)
are then averaged together and recorded, along with the minimum and maximum amounts
of trade for member states in each regional organization. Although I do not expect to find
that the UN is motivated to take on the primary role based on the economic salience of the conflict, I include the measure to control for the possibility.

I operationalize the capability of an RO by using the Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) scores for the member states of an RO. Similar to the manner in which the trade variable was coded, the CINC score of each individual member state of an RO is calculated for each conflict year. These scores are then averaged to create a score for the regional organization. Minimum and maximum CINC scores are also recorded, capturing the member state of the RO with the smallest CINC score and the member state of the RO with the largest CINC score.

Although I utilize the average CINC scores of an RO in my analysis as robustness checks, I also attempt to normalize CINC scores of each RO by comparing them to the CINC scores of the UN Security Council (Singer, Bremer & Stuckey 1972). This is to ensure that the calculation of the CINC scores is not driving the results. To code this variable, I create a ratio of the CINC score of a regional organization with the CINC score of the Security Council. The CINC score of the organization is divided by the average CINC score for the Security Council. Although perhaps not ideal, this provides a normalization of the variable against an organization with the clear means and capability to establish peace missions. Since the variance of CINC scores is relatively small and would be difficult to discuss in a meaningful way, I utilize these means.

To measure the political salience of the conflict to an organization, I utilize a variety of measures that capture how a conflict spills over into neighboring countries and either places a burden on or destabilizes its neighbors. First, I include the number of refugees as a result of civil conflict. This variable is taken from Doyle and Sambanis (2000). Refugees increase the political salience of a conflict to member states for several reasons. First, they often bring conflict with them into the host state (Salehyan & Gleditsch 2006). This destabilizes the host state and often results in violence within its own borders. Second, even if refugees do not bring violence, they still exert a negative cost on the host state. The host state must provide resources for the refugees, diverting funds that could be used elsewhere.
Even if other international organizations or non-governmental organizations assist with the funds and resources for these refugee camps, the resources required by the host state will still increase the political salience. This variable is coded in the same manner as trade values. The dyadic count for refugees between the conflict state and the member states of an RO is recorded, creating an average number of refugees for the regional organization. The maximum value of refugees for one of the member states of an RO is also recorded.

I also include a variable measuring whether a regional hegemon is present in the regional organization, as I expect this will increase the likelihood of a regional organization taking on the primary role. I use a dichotomous variable to indicate a regional hegemon, coding it as 1 if one member state in the organization has a CINC score of at least double the member state with the second highest value. For example, Nigeria has a CINC score greater than twice what the next highest-ranking member state of ECOWAS scores. As a result, I code ECOWAS as containing a regional hegemon. The African Union, however, does not have one single state with a CINC score of at least twice the score of the next-ranking member state. As a result, it is coded as containing no regional hegemon.

Also included in the analysis is a variable that captures how many organizations were present at the time of coordination. For example, if 3 organizations committed simultaneously to a peace mission, this variable would be coded 3. If an organization establishes a solo peace mission but is then joined by another organization, this variable would be coded 2.

Once the data are narrowed down to those organizations that overcame the collective action problem to engage in peace missions, only 105 total dyad-years remain. Fifty of these dyads are regional organizations, and 55 are UN dyads. This relatively small number of observations presents challenges that I must overcome, particularly since splitting up the dyads, as I did in previous chapters, results in a very small sample size. More information about the types of dyads can be found in Table 5.1.
As Table 5.1 indicates, a total of 35 UN dyad-years and 24 RO dyad-years see no coordination among organizations. However, this was not due to a conscious choice for these organizations, but rather to a lack of other organizations participating in the peace mission process in that given year. The UN also has 13 dyad-years in which it played the secondary role, and 7 dyad-years in which it coordinated the primary role, indicating a total of 20 dyad-years in which coordination was present. Regional organizations have 11 dyad-years in which they played a supporting role and 15 dyad-years in which they undertook the primary role. Those regional organizations that have taken on the primary role include the European Union, ECOWAS, and NATO.

It is important to remember that these dyad-years do not constitute individual missions, but rather are years in which multiple actors were participating in the same peace mission in a given conflict. The total number of conflicts in which missions were present represented for the UN in this sample include 13 individual missions, and the total number represented for ROs include 15 missions. The number of peace missions that involved coordination total only 6. These can be found in Table 5.2.

Each of these 6 missions required the coordination of multiple organizations at some point during the peace mission. None of these missions involved the establishment of a peace mission at the exact same time for each organization present, which reflects the dynamic nature of peace missions. Furthermore, many missions concluded with only one organization implementing the peace mission, as other organizations withdrew from the mission. Not only do organizations often join after missions are established, but some make early departures. Additionally, this can change the primary and/or secondary actor. For example, the peace
Table 5.2. Peace Missions with Coordination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil War</th>
<th>Potential Interveners</th>
<th>Primary/Secondary Roles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>OAU, UN</td>
<td>UN/OAU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>ECOWAS, OAU, UN</td>
<td>ECOWAS/UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>OAU, UN</td>
<td>UN/OAU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>ECOWAS, OAU, UN</td>
<td>ECOWAS/UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>EU, NATO, OSCE, UN</td>
<td>NATO/EU, UN; EU/UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>CIS, EU, NATO, OSCE, UN</td>
<td>OSCE/UN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The mission in Bosnia was originally led by NATO, during which the EU and the UN played supporting roles. However, after NATO’s departure, the EU took over the primary role with the UN continuing in the secondary role.

This small sample size presents obvious initial problems for quantitative analyses. Since I expect the UN and ROs are motivated to take on the primary and secondary roles by different factors, it is necessary to split the analyses into UN and RO dyads once again. This further shrinks the available observations and certainly limits what conclusions we can draw. As previously mentioned, I employ various robustness checks in an effort to ensure the small sample size does not bias the results, but additional peace missions need to be included in the analyses before more generalizable conclusions can be drawn. Additionally, I provide a brief discussion at the end of the chapter of the coordinated missions to demonstrate behavior patterns of the involved organizations and what it implies for future analyses with additional coordinated missions.
5.3. Analysis

In order to test my hypotheses, I begin by running a logit model on the regional organization dyads, in which the dependent variable is 0 if the organization plays the secondary role and 1 if it plays the primary role. This dependent variable is coded without regard as to which organization is playing the other role, whether the UN or another RO. Organizations that were the only actor in a peace mission are excluded from this analysis. The results are reported in Table 5.3.

This table presents several interesting results, not all of which confirm my original hypotheses. Although the small sample size limits what generalizable conclusions can be
made, the coefficient for the presence of a regional hegemon is statistically significant and positive. This suggests that the presence of a regional hegemon in an RO increases the likelihood of that RO taking on the primary role in a peace mission compared to an RO in which no regional hegemon is present. Since ECOWAS contains a regional hegemon (Nigeria), this likely influences this finding to a large extent. This supports Hypothesis 9, that expects a regional hegemon to assist an RO with overcoming the intra-actor collective action problem and increase the likelihood that an RO takes on the primary role. As mentioned in previous chapters, the regional hegemon can be considered a privileged actor within the RO, benefitting more from achieving the public good than from the costs associated with providing it (Olson 1965).

Somewhat surprisingly, the coefficient measuring the capabilities of an organization is negative and significant, directly contradicting Hypothesis 8. Not only does the average score of an organization’s capabilities not increase the likelihood of an organization undertaking the primary role, but it actually decreases the likelihood as an RO’s capabilities increase. Changing this measure from the average score of an RO’s capabilities to the maximum member state’s CINC score does change the coefficient’s value from negative to positive, but the measure is insignificant, and no other variables are altered. This suggests interesting conclusions. First, it is clear that the capabilities of an organization are not as influential on an RO when overcoming the collective action problem as whether a regional hegemon is present in the organization. The variable capturing whether a regional hegemon is present continues to be highly significant through various robustness checks, while the variable capturing an organization’s CINC score continues to suggest that more capable organizations are actually less likely to both intervene initially as well as take on the primary role. This has interesting implications for how ROs conduct their decision-making as well as for future research examining how those regional hegemons might exert their domestic preferences through the actions of a regional organization.

As a robustness check for the way capabilities are measured, I create a dummy variable for whether an organization is relatively strong or weak. These are relative terms, comparing
organizations against each other rather than including the absolute CINC score. I code the following organizations as stronger: EU, NATO, OSCE, UN; and the following nations as weaker: ECOWAS, OAU. However, although insignificant, the coefficient continues to be negative. The other variables do not change in any meaningful way, yet the variable indicating the capabilities of the RO continues to be in the opposite direction as expected.

Again, this is quite possibly driven by the tendency of ECOWAS to take the primary role in its peace enforcement missions in Sierra Leone and Liberia. The UN took the secondary role in these missions despite the lower capabilities of and the many requests for additional resources and assistance from ECOMOG (I will discuss this further in later chapters). However, the conflicts were highly salient to ECOWAS and its member states, providing significant club goods to ECOWAS members. As a result, perhaps the capabilities of an organization are less important, and the saliency exerts a larger influence.

Another possible explanation for the lack of findings regarding capabilities could be the influx of resources from the UN to those relatively weaker organizations willing to take on the primary role of a peace mission. Gaibulloev et al (2009) note that the UN has increasingly delegated its peacekeeping tasks to lesser developed countries. The UN no longer uses expensive soldiers from primarily Western states, but instead employs much cheaper troops from states like Pakistan and Bangladesh. However, coordinating a peace mission still inflicts costs on the UN when it takes the primary role. Similar to the more recent trend of delegating fighting to third-party mercenaries, to which states can simply write checks,\(^1\) perhaps the member states that comprise the UN prefer to delegate the peace missions to organizations such as ECOWAS, to which they can simply provide funding. Additional missions are necessary to investigate this further, as are additional indicators that can account not only for the role an organization played in the mission, but also for resources contributed to the mission by other organizations.

The coefficient measuring the effect of the change in the average value of trade for\(^1\)For example, the United States’ increasing use of these types of companies in both Afghanistan and Iraq, along with the use of the South African force Executive Outcomes by the Sierra Leonean government when fighting the civil war.
each is not significant and is also in the opposite direction as expected. This suggests that the change in the average value of trade between the member states of an RO and a conflict state does not affect which role an RO undertakes. Furthermore, when this measure is changed to the maximum value of change in trade, it continues to be both insignificant and positively signed. Therefore, I cannot provide any evidence to support Hypothesis 7. This null finding is still somewhat interesting, however, particularly when considering findings from previous chapters. Economic salience exerts a substantial effect on the likelihood of regional organizations to initially establish a peace mission. However, it has no effect on the likelihood of whether those same ROs undertake the primary or secondary role in the peace mission. Worsening economic relations are enough to prompt ROs to overcome the collective action problem initially, but not enough to overcome the incentive to freeride off of other organizations if the opportunity exists. Although these findings are somewhat limited based on the small sample size, this still depicts an interesting behavior pattern of regional organizations.

The number of battle deaths is also statistically significant, yet negative. This suggests a similar finding to that of previous chapters, namely that regional organizations are less likely to play the primary role in those conflicts with particularly high death rates.

In order to ensure the small sample size does not provide incorrect or biased results, I also ran the same model as a Firth logit as a robustness check. The results are reported in Table 5.4.

As the results in this table show, the primary finding regarding the regional hegemon still holds. This is perhaps the most robust finding of this study, supporting the concept of the privileged actor from Olson (1965). Regional organizations with a hegemon are not only more likely to establish a peace mission, but they are also more likely to take on the primary role in a peace mission.

After examining the regional organization dyads, I turn to examining the UN dyads that chose to partner with another organization. Table 5.5 reports the results of a logit model, in which the dependent variable measures whether the UN played the primary role
Table 5.4. Firth Logit - RO Dyads

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>t-value</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regional Hegemon</td>
<td>4.86</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.12)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average CINC</td>
<td>-506.86</td>
<td>-1.93</td>
<td>.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(262.85)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of battle deaths</td>
<td>-.733</td>
<td>-1.74</td>
<td>.081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.420)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Duration</td>
<td>-.167</td>
<td>-1.39</td>
<td>.165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.121)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Average Trade</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>.958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.004)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Interveners</td>
<td>.884</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>.259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.782)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>5.23</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>.077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.96)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=26
Pseudo R-squared = .2539
Penalized log likelihood = -9.47

(1) or a secondary role (0). Those peace missions in which the UN was the only actor are excluded from the analysis. Because the sample size is so small, only a small portion of independent variables are included.

This analysis indicates interesting results. The duration of the conflict is statistically significant and positive, indicating that the UN is more likely to take on the primary role in long-fought conflicts than shorter conflicts. This fits with the expected assumption that the UN considers those conflicts with the worst humanitarian crises the most salient. The total number of refugees produced by the conflict is not included in the model due to missing data, but I expect that an increase in the total number of refugees would also increase the likelihood that the UN takes on the primary role.
Table 5.5. Logit - UN Dyads

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>t-value</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Log of battle deaths</td>
<td>.817</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>.113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.515)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict duration</td>
<td>.788</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.378)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of interveners</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.681)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in FDI</td>
<td>1.52e-08</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7.56e-09)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-16.07</td>
<td>-2.31</td>
<td>.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6.96)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 20
Pseudo R-squared = .5267
Prob \( \chi^2 \) = .0004
Log likelihood = -9.64

Interestingly, the total number of interveners is positive and statistically significant. This indicates that the UN is more likely to take on the primary role as the total number of potential interveners increases. Although this could certainly be the result of a few observations driving the small sample size, this may indicate the preference of the UN to organize multiple organizations in peace missions. This is likely due to the dynamic nature of peace missions described in previous sections. In those peace missions that could potentially involve a large number of organizations, the UN may grow concerned that the number of contributors will prove unwieldy. Peace missions involving three or more organizations require complex mechanisms of communication between the various organizations in order to ensure success and efficiency, and the UN may grow concerned that regional organizations are not able to facilitate these missions. As a result, the UN may be more likely to take on the primary role when the potential for several ROs to become involved is present.
Table 5.6. Firth Logit - UN Dyads

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>t-value</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Log of battle deaths</td>
<td>.432</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>.242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.370)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict duration</td>
<td>.430</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.244)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of interveners</td>
<td>.988</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.465)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in FDI</td>
<td>8.28e-09</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>.085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.80e-09)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-9.38</td>
<td>-2.29</td>
<td>.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.10)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 20
Prob χ² = .28688
Log likelihood = 20.38

I also run a Firth logit as a robustness check for UN dyads to ensure the small sample size is not biasing the parameters. The results are reported in Table 5.6.

As the results above demonstrate, the duration of conflict is still positive, albeit only significant at the 10% level, and the total number of interveners continues to be positive and significant. This supports the previous finding that the UN is more likely to take on the primary role in those conflicts that contain a large number of potential interveners.

5.4. Substantive Effects

After considering the predicted effects of the coefficients in the previous models, I turn to an examination of the substantive effects. As Berry, DeMerritt and Esarey (Berry, De-Merritt & Esarey 2010) demonstrate, a significant coefficient in a logit model is not sufficient to indicate meaningful effects. Therefore, I turn to a discussion of the change in predicted probabilities when the value of the variables are increased or decreased in meaningful ways. However, it is important to first acknowledge the limits of any conclusions that can be drawn.
As previously mentioned, the sample size for these analyses is very small. The total number of dyad-year missions coordinated with other organizations is only 46, as 59 of the dyad-years involve no coordination with other organizations. Furthermore, I have divided these dyad-years into two categories and separated UN dyad-years from RO dyad-years. This further decreases the sample size in each analysis. Therefore, it is important to recognize that the small number of regional organizations involved in this sample exert a strong effect on the results. In particular, ECOWAS likely plays a large role, as previously discussed, in driving the results for peace enforcement missions. Furthermore, due to data constraints, the many secondary peace missions in which the African Union has engaged are not included in the analysis. Since these missions are post-2001, they are not included in the analysis. Further expansion of the data temporally may yield very different results as it would encompass several additional RO missions.

When examining the dyads consisting of regional organizations involved in peace missions, we see that the effect of the presence of a regional hegemon on the likelihood of an RO taking the primary role in a mission is quite substantively large. The presence of a regional hegemon increases the likelihood of an RO taking on the primary role by 45.6%, with a confidence interval of 12.7% to 77.88%. This provides strong support for Hypothesis 9. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, this is one of the most robust findings from all analyses. It is clear that regional organizations with a regional hegemon are more likely to both overcome the initial collective action problem to establish a peace mission as well as undertake the primary role in a mission. Although this could be driven by certain organizations, such as ECOWAS, future research is certainly warranted on how regional hegemons affect other behavior of regional organizations.

The average CINC score of an RO also exerts a significant effect, but in the opposite of the expected direction. The higher an RO’s CINC score, the less likely it is to play the primary role. When the CINC score is raised from the minimum to the maximum value, the change in the predicted probability of an RO taking on the primary role decreases by 56.06%
with a confidence interval from -2.23% to -94.68%. This finding is in direct contrast to what I expected to find in Hypothesis 8 and demonstrates that a higher degree of capabilities does not automatically decrease the incentive of organizations to freeride. Organizations may experience an even more difficult collective action problem as the average value of capabilities increases.

Turning to the UN dyads, we see that the duration of the conflict significantly increases the likelihood that the UN undertakes the primary role in a peace mission. When the duration of the conflict increases from 1 to 5 years, the likelihood of the UN taking the primary role increases by 18.36% with a 95% confidence interval of 1.64% to 46.08%. This supports the general theoretical framework that expects the UN to act in motivation to provide the public good and respond to conflicts as the severity increases. Although the variable for the log of battle deaths is not statistically significant in the original model, it does near significance and is signed positively, lending further support to the UN’s desire to provide the public good of peace missions.

The number of interveners is also statistically significant and positive, indicating that the UN is more likely to take on the primary role as the total number of organizations involved increases. The change in predicted probabilities when changing the number of interveners from the minimum of 2 to the maximum of 4 is 79.14% with a 95% confidence interval of 17.30% to 99.01%. Due to the small sample size, the generalizable conclusions are again very tentative, but this suggests that the UN strongly prefers to play the primary role as the number of potential organizations increases. This may be due to the freeriding of other organizations off of the UN, or it may be a result of the UN’s consideration of itself as a more experienced peacemaking organization. Perhaps the UN is more willing to allow other organizations to freeride off of it when multiple organizations are involved, as it expects a higher rate of success when it controls the majority of the mission’s goals and objectives. Further research into this specific pattern is certainly warranted.
5.5. Specific Peace Missions

Referring to the previous table detailing the specific peace missions coordinated by multiple organizations, the UN is much more likely to play the secondary role when partnering with traditionally strong regional organizations, such as NATO, the EU, and the OSCE. It takes on the primary role when coordinating with the OAU, a traditionally weaker organization. This lends some initial credence to the strategic management of the UN’s resources in regards to peace missions. The UN would rather contribute in a secondary manner to those conflicts in which other organizations can take on the primary role, while establishing solo missions in those conflicts more severe that have a low likelihood, if any at all, of an RO establishing a peace mission.

The explanation for ECOWAS in the primary can also be attributed to the presence of Nigeria, its regional hegemon. Since ECOWAS is not a traditionally strong regional organization, it would be expected to play the secondary role, according to the theory. However, its place in the primary role in both Liberia and Sierra Leone suggest a strong impact that the regional hegemon exerts on its likelihood to exert its own preferences on the conflict in the primary role. In contrast, the OAU took on the secondary role in both Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. No regional hegemon exists in the OAU, preventing it from overcoming the intra-actor collective action problem enough to take on the primary role in either of these missions.

Other independent variables of interest include the economic and political salience of conflict states to the regional organizations. This can also explain a portion of the behavior of the regional organizations. Georgia and Bosnia-Herzegovina maintain high political salience to the OSCE and NATO/EU, respectively, simply based on their location. Previous studies have shown that the UN does show a bias toward conflicts in Europe and tends to act more swiftly in those conflicts (Gilligan & Stedman 2003). As a result, it can be expected that regional organizations in the region will also act more swiftly as the salience of the conflicts increase, particularly since they are often able to avoid much of the gridlock that faces the Security Council.
Liberia and Sierra Leone also maintain high levels of both political and economic salience to ECOWAS member states. Their location and the substantial conflict spillover that erupted during these conflicts increased the political salience by contributing to destabilization in the region. Furthermore, both states are rich in natural resources and maintain large trade relationships with other member states of ECOWAS. These trade levels began dropping substantially during the conflict, increasing the economic salience and prompting ECOWAS to overcome the incentive to freeride off of the UN during the peace mission.

5.6. Conclusion

In this chapter, I tested how international and regional organizations coordinate with each other after choosing to engage in a peace mission. I found that regional organizations are more likely to take on the primary role if a regional hegemon is present in the RO. However, I did not find support for the expected impact of the economic and political salience on the likelihood of an RO undertaking the primary role. Furthermore, an increase in the capabilities of an RO did not result in an increase in the likelihood that an RO takes on the primary role, further contradicting an expected finding. I also found that the UN is more likely to take on the primary role in those conflicts with long durations. Furthermore, the UN is more likely to take the primary role as the total number of involved organizations increases. As additional regional organizations maintain the potential to join the peace mission, the UN is more likely to take control and organize the mission in the primary role.

The limitations of these findings are significant, however, and it is important to again recognize this. The sample size of dyad-years that experienced coordination between organizations is very limited, with only 46 total observations. I then divided these into UN dyads and RO dyads, further limiting the observations in each analysis. As a result, these findings are strongly sensitive to outliers and must be interpreted in this manner. Currently, regional organizations in the primary role are strongly influenced by organizations such as ECOWAS. In addition, the temporal range of the data favors the UN in the primary role, as regional organizations did not begin undertaking the primary role until a few years prior to the data ending.
The expansion of the data will add more generalizability to the results and provide more conclusive findings. Including peace missions conducted by both the UN and regional organizations from 2001-present will increase the number of missions in which both regional organizations and the UN play primary and secondary roles. This will also assist in further exploration of the effects the presence of a regional hegemon exerts on an RO’s decision-making.

In addition to the temporal expansion of the data, further research should examine the various types of missions organizations establish. Previous research that examines the types of UN missions often divides missions into various categories, such as observer, enforcement, etc. These categories are not included in this analysis, as no similar categories exist for the types of RO missions. Further disaggregation of RO mission types into similar categories as UN missions will increase the explanatory power of this analysis. Perhaps the UN is more likely to take on the primary role when an RO has previously engaged in an observer mission, but more likely to take the secondary role if an RO conducted an enforcement mission. The specification of these various types of missions will contribute a more complete picture of coordination.
CHAPTER 6
THE SUCCESS OF PEACE MISSIONS

6.1. Introduction

In previous chapters, I examined why organizations commit to some peace missions but not others, and which factors motivate both international and regional organizations to overcome the inter-actor and intra-actor collective action problem. I also tested how organizations coordinate with each other once multiple organizations choose to initiate a peace mission. I found that the United Nations engages in peace missions as a result of primarily humanitarian goals, motivated by factors such as battle deaths, refugees, and the duration of the conflict. Regional organizations, however, are primarily motivated through factors such as decreases in bilateral trade from the member states to the conflict state as well as a drop in overall FDI levels in the conflict state. This leads us to question the effectiveness of peace missions that both types of organizations might provide. Some civil wars with a peace mission experience recurrence, while others do not. Could the motivation of the actors contribute to this discrepancy? Perhaps peace missions conducted by or containing regional organizations are less successful due to the motivations prompted by the acquisition of club goods. Alternatively, perhaps the motivation that drives organizations to become involved in peace missions exerts no effect on the likelihood of peace mission success and other factors are the primary force behind civil war recurrence.

Although it is important to understand what prompts international and regional organizations to participate in and establish peace missions, it is equally as important to understand how peace missions affect the likelihood of civil war resolution and civil war recurrence. In this chapter, I examine how different categories of peace missions affect these durations. All peace missions are certainly not created equal, but I contend that the preference of all peace missions can be simplified to either resolving a civil conflict or prohibiting its recurrence. This common objective allows comparisons of multiple types and categories of peace missions and allows for the examination of other contributing factors to
peace mission success.

Previous research demonstrates mixed results regarding the effectiveness of peacekeeping conducted by the United Nations. Some scholars argue that UN peacekeeping exerts a significant negative effect on the likelihood of civil war recurrence (Fortna 2003, Fortna 2004b, Fortna 2008, Doyle & Sambanis 2000, Hartzell, Hoddie & Rothchild 2001, Walter 2002). Other research suggests that UN peacekeeping has no effect on the likelihood of civil war recurrence (Fabian 1976, Diehl & Cho 2006, Diehl 1993b, Weiss 1995). Scholars that examine both international and regional peacekeeping organizations provide mixed results as well. Some research shows that peace missions conducted by organizations categorized into an other category, a category comprised of all conflict management missions not involving the UN, provide the same significant and negative effect that UN peacekeeping shows. However, other research suggests that no significant effect can be found with non-UN missions. What explains the discrepancy of results, both in the literature and in actual conflict management missions? Why are some peacekeeping missions successful at stopping civil conflict and/or preventing its recurrence while others are not?

Discrepancies in the literature regarding the effectiveness of both UN and regional organization peace missions can be primarily attributed to differences in what data are used and how success of peace missions is coded. In regards to the discrepancies between whether UN missions are successful or not successful, a large portion of the variation can be attributed to the manner in which the dependent variable is coded. Doyle and Sambanis (2000, 2006), measure peacekeeping success at two years after the conflict ends. If a peace mission is present and the civil war did not recur, it is coded as successful. If a peace mission is present but the civil war did once again reemerge within two years post-conflict, it is coded as unsuccessful. However, using the same data, Dubey (N.d.) finds that no significant effect of UN missions can be determined when a duration model analysis is utilized instead of a two-year static measurement.

Other studies have found significant effects of UN peacekeeping missions when controlling for the tendency of the UN to send missions to those conflicts most difficult to
solve. When controlling for the severity of the conflict and this selection mechanism, findings suggest that UN peacekeeping does exert a strong, negative effect on the likelihood of civil war recurrence (Fortna 2003, Fortna 2004b, Fortna 2008, Hartzell, Hoddie & Rothchild 2001, Walter 2002). Although these results suggest positive implications for UN missions, the coding scheme that divides peacekeeping into UN and other missions may be biasing some of these results.

Most data consist primarily of information on UN peacekeeping missions (Doyle & Sambanis 2006, Fortna 2004a). These data are coded using a dichotomy of UN and other. Even if a regional organization was present and active in a conflict management mission, it will most often be coded and placed in the 'UN' category, essentially disregarding any involvement from the regional organization. The 'other' category consists of all peace missions that do not contain any UN involvement. This includes missions conducted solely by regional organizations, third-party states, and any ad hoc coalitions that choose to engage in a peace mission of any sort. Understandably, analyses including this 'other' group contain mixed results regarding their effectiveness, as these different actors possess highly variant levels of capabilities and motivations for engaging in peace missions. Although most research now agrees that UN peacekeeping does exert a significant, negative effect on civil war recurrence, it clearly does not do so in all conflicts. I argue that it is necessary to consider in which peacekeeping missions the UN partnered with other regional organizations as well as what the role of those other regional organizations was in order to gain a better understanding of what types of peacekeeping are effective and why.

I expect that the outcome of a peace mission will be a result of the incentive of organizations to freeride during both the establishment phase and the coordination phase of a peace mission. Organizations prefer to freeride off of others, but the acquisition of club goods can motivate ROs to overcome this incentive, while an increase in the conflict severity motivates the UN to overcome this incentive. This affects the outcome of the peace mission by affecting the contribution of resources to peace missions and potentially exerting negative consequences on the mission through excessive freeriding.
Specifically, I hypothesize:

H10: As the capabilities of the organization involved increase, the likelihood of peace mission success increases.

H11: The presence of a regional hegemon increases the likelihood of peace mission success in those missions involving regional organizations.

H12: As the number of organizations cooperating in a peace mission increases, the likelihood of peace mission success decreases.

H13: The previous presence of a peace enforcement mission prior to the conflict’s end will result in a decrease in the likelihood of civil war recurrence.

6.2. Research Design

To test my hypotheses, I construct a research design utilizing previously described data on peace missions conducted by both international and regional organizations. Included in this dataset are indicators for the role each organization played in the corresponding peace mission, divided into primary and secondary roles, discussed and defined in previous chapters. I utilize a Cox proportional hazard model to test both peace enforcement and peacekeeping missions and their effect on the duration of civil conflicts and the duration of post-conflict peace, respectively. I utilize my own dataset for peace enforcement missions, measuring the exit of an observation at the conclusion of the civil war indicated by PRIO. However, I combine my data on UN and RO peace missions with a dataset containing individual peace spells from Fortna (2003).

6.2.1. Model and Dependent Variable

In a Cox proportional hazards model (hereby referred to as a Cox model), the dependent variable of interest is time until the observation experiences a certain event, referred to in the model as event failure. The event failure in these analyses is respectively the conclusion of civil conflict and civil war recurrence.

The Cox model is a semi-parametric model that allows for estimation of slope parameters regardless of what the baseline hazard function looks like. Because it makes no
assumption about how the survival times of observations are distributed, it estimates these slope parameters through the use of partial likelihood models. These models work by examining the ordering of event failures. In other words, the Cox model examines the order in which observations experience event failure and utilizes pools of risk for each period of failure (Box-Steffensmeier & Zorn 2001). This cannot, however, account for observations that tie in their event failure, meaning observations that experience failure at the same time. This is inconvenient for peace mission analysis, as many observations experience event failure after the same number of months or years (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004).

To deal with tied data, I utilize the Breslow method (Breslow 1972). This handles the inclusion of ties by grouping all observations that experience a tie together, since the order of failure for tied events is unable to be determined. However, since Breslow methods are technically the least accurate way in which to deal with ties despite being the default method and most widely used by political scientists, I also check my models with with the Efron method (Efron 1977).

The analyses in this section must be split into two distinct sections, as they have different event failures. The event failure the first set of observations experiences is the end of a civil war. In these analyses, I am testing the hypotheses with respect to peace enforcement missions that are established prior to the end of a civil war. Therefore, when an observation experiences failure and exits the dataset, it indicates that the war ended, either through military victory or by the warring parties reaching a negotiated settlement.

The observations in the second set experience a different event failure, namely the return to civil war. These models test the effects of peacekeeping missions, missions established after a ceasefire or military victory occurred, on the duration of peace before civil war occurs. If a civil war experiences event failure, it indicates that civil war recurred, and the observation exits the dataset. Because the duration of post-conflict peace can extend past the end of the dataset, indicating a civil war never recurred, much of the data are right-censored. This is not a large problem in the first set of analyses examining civil war resolution, but many of the data are right-censored when the event failure is civil war recurrence, indicating
no civil war recurred.

The time periods into which data are divided include conflict years and post-conflict years. Peace enforcement missions are tested during all active conflict months. Time periods for conflict, as previously described, were taken from the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) (Gleditsch et al. 2002, Themner & Wallensteen 2012). Peacekeeping missions are tested in post-conflict dates that begin with the resolution of a conflict and extend until the observation either experiences failure (civil war recurrence) or is right-censored by the time frame, ending in 2001.

To return to the use of the phrase from Chapter 2, I define peace mission success as the ability of a peace enforcement mission to significantly decrease the duration of civil war, and I define the success of a peacekeeping mission as the absence of civil conflict, or the prevention of civil war recurrence entirely. This is an admittedly crude measure, as the specific goals and objectives of peace missions vary widely and can be disaggregated by the type of mission and what it aims to accomplish (Diehl & Druckman 2010). However, data that code these specific criteria for UN missions are still underdeveloped, and little to no mission-specific data for regional organizations exist. As a result, I asserted in Chapter 2 that regardless of those resources designated for peace missions or the expanse of the authority provided to them to engage in the conflict state, each mission’s goals can all be categorized under an overarching goal they each hope to accomplish: end the civil conflict and/or prevent its recurrence. Although I hope future iterations of this chapter will utilize more specified definitions of success, I currently measure each by this single common goal.

6.2.2. Independent Variables

In this section, I describe the independent variables utilized to test my hypotheses. Each of these variables will be included in both sets of analyses, testing both civil war resolution and civil war recurrence. However, the expected effect on event failure will be either positive and negative or negative and positive. I will discuss the specific expected effects of each independent variable on both sets of analyses, but it is important to remember that one model maintains as its event failure civil war resolution, by which an increase in the
hazard function results in a decrease in the overall duration of the civil conflict. Therefore, if an independent variable positively affects the likelihood of event failure in this model, it indicates that it is decreasing the length of the conflict.

In contrast, the event failure for the second set of analyses is civil war recurrence. An increase in the hazard function in these models results in a decrease in the duration of post-conflict peace. For example, I hypothesized capabilities of an organization increases peace mission success. This indicates that for peace enforcement missions during conflict years, an increase in capabilities increases the hazard, contributing to a shorter conflict. But for post-conflict years testing peacekeeping missions, an increase in capabilities decreases the overall hazard, contributing to a longer peace duration.

To test Hypothesis 10, which expects that an increase in capabilities of an RO increases the likelihood of peace mission success, I include the level of capabilities of organizations. I operationalize this measure in several ways. First, I use the average CINC score of the organization for the time it engages in a peace mission. For example, if an RO engages in a mission from 1995-1998, I calculate an average CINC score for each of those years. I also create a similar measure using the highest CINC score of a member state in each organization, as often these states are contributing the most resources to the peace mission.

I also normalize these variables against the UN CINC score in an effort to ensure that coding mechanisms within the CINC index do not drive the results. To achieve this, I average the yearly score of the ratio of the organization’s CINC score to the CINC score of the UN Security Council. The score for the UN, therefore, would be 1 for each year.

Finally, I consider multiple combinations of CINC scores for various joint missions. I code one variable in which only the CINC score of the primary organization is recorded, whether it is an international or regional organization. I also code a second variable in which the CINC score of both organizations is added together. I create each variable with both the average CINC score and the maximum CINC score as well to test whether it is the average capability of an organization or the most capable state that exerts the strongest effects on peace missions. I expect that an increase in the CINC score of an organization will result in
a negative effect on the duration of conflict and a positive effect on the duration of peace.

Another variable of interest is the number of organizations involved in a mission. I expect that the incentive to freeride as missions become larger will result in an decrease in the overall success of the peace mission. Therefore, I include the number of organizations involved in a peace mission at any given time during either a conflict or post-conflict period.

The presence of a regional hegemon is included in the analysis as well through a dummy indicator. For each regional organization with a regional hegemon, the variable is coded (1), and for each RO without a hegemon, it takes the value of (0). For the purposes of these analyses, the UN is also coded as containing a hegemon. In an effort to avoid splitting up the analyses and testing the success of all peace missions jointly, I code the UN as containing a regional hegemon. Based on the coding mechanisms utilized when the original presence of a regional hegemon was coded, the Security Council does contain a regional hegemon, as the United States has a CINC score of over twice the next-highest state in the organization. As a result, the value is coded (1).

I also include indicators that measure the specific type of peace mission present in the conflict, divided into four categories:

- Solo UN missions
- Solo RO missions
- Joint missions in which the UN is the primary actor and the RO is the secondary actor
- Joint missions in which the RO is the primary actor and the UN is the secondary actor

Dichotomous indicators for each type of mission are employed. Primary and secondary actors are coded based on factors such as which organization initiated the mission and which
organization provided the most resources, measured in both US dollars and number of troops (detailed in Chapter 5).

Finally, I include a dummy indicator in the second set of analyses testing peacekeeping missions that captures the presence of a peace enforcement mission prior to the end of the conflict. Measuring the success of peace enforcement missions only by whether the conflict was resolved at a significantly faster rate fails to acknowledge important implications. If the conflict quickly recurs again after a ceasefire, can a success label be theoretically justified? I argue that although peace enforcement missions are concerned with civil war resolution as a short-term goal, the long-term goal continues to be the prevention of civil war recurrence. Therefore, I also want to examine the effects of peacebuilding on the post-conflict state in addition to the length of the civil war. This variable takes on the value of (1) for those conflicts in which a peace enforcement mission was present prior to the end of the civil war and (0) for those conflicts in which no pre-resolution peace enforcement mission was present.

6.2.3. Control Variables

I utilize several control variables demonstrated by the literature to significantly affect the success of peace missions. First, I include how the conflict was resolved, namely if the conflict ended in a negotiated settlement or military victory. I take this information from Hartzell and Hoddie (2001). I expect that those conflicts ending in a negotiated settlement will fail at a higher rate than those conflicts ending in military victory.

I also include the total number of battle deaths that occurred as a result of the conflict, taken from Lacina and Gleditsch (2005). Current literature is mixed on what type of effect this cost actually enacts. Some scholars argue a higher cost of war results in an irreconcilable post-conflict environment, as bitterness continues to demand revenge. Others argue that a high cost creates a war-weariness effect, prompting populations to be more likely to cooperate after the conflict is over. Although the expected direction of the variable is in dispute, the presence of an effect remains supported, and thus it is included in my analysis.

In addition, I include indicators such as the number of displaced persons as a result of the civil conflict. This can exert a significant, negative effect on the likelihood of both
peace enforcement success and civil war recurrence. This variable is taken from Doyle and Sambanis (2000).

The type of war is included, measuring whether the war was fought over territory or the control of the government. This variable is taken from the Peace Research Institute Oslo civil war dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002, Themner & Wallensteen 2012). The level of ethnic fractionalization in a conflict state is also included as a control variable, taken from the Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Indices (ELF).

I include the level of democratization prior to the civil war onset, taken from the Polity index (Marshall, Gurr & Jaggers N.d.), expecting that an increase in the democratization prior to conflict onset will result in an increase in the duration of peace following a conflict. Finally, I include a dummy variable measuring whether the conflict state had previously experienced a civil war.

6.3. Analysis

In this section, I divide the analyses into those models that examine peace enforcement and those that examine peacekeeping. As previously mentioned, these types of missions not only differ both in motivation and in actions, but have separate dependent variables. In peace enforcement missions, the dependent variable is the length of time until civil war resolution, while in peacekeeping missions, the dependent variable is the length of time until civil war recurrence. This necessitates the separation of the two types of missions.

6.3.1. Peace Enforcement Missions

The first set of analyses examines the effectiveness and success of peace enforcement by different combinations of actors. In Table 6.1, I report the results of a Cox proportional hazard model testing the effectiveness of each category. I include four models total models. One model contains the maximum capabilities score of the primary actor, and the Breslow and Efron methods for ties are reported. The other model reports the average levels of capabilities for the primary actor. The Breslow and Efron methods for ties are also reported. Finally, a Weibull model is reported as a robustness check. I also conducted Schoenfeld
residual tests on each model to test for non-proportional hazards. For those variables that violated the assumption (indicating a p-value of less than .05, as the null hypothesis is no violation), I interacted the variable with the log of time in an effort to correct for non-proportionality. The interacted variable is reported in the analyses below. I also used Martingale residuals to test for the functional form of the hazard, particularly for the variable for battle deaths and polity, in an effort to ensure the form of the variable that models its relationship with the dependent variable is utilized.

Reported in Table 6.1 are the hazard ratios for each variable. These ratios are measured in relation to 1. A value greater than 1 indicates an increase in the hazard, while a value less than 1 indicates a decrease in the hazard. Compared to those civil wars in which no peace enforcement mission is deployed, only a peace enforcement mission conducted by a regional organization exerts a statistically negative effect on the duration of the civil conflict. Figure 6.1 demonstrates the difference in survival times relative to the presence of an RO mission.

The survival function indicating the presence of a solo RO mission clearly demonstrates the significance of this effect. This also supports other arguments made regarding the success, or rather the lack thereof, of the UN in forging a peace as opposed to keeping it post-ceasefire (Greig & Diehl 2005, Gilligan & Sergenti 2008). Although the UN may not have great success in bringing conflicts to a close, it appears missions conducted solely by regional organizations do. This has important policy implications, as the UN may be better served allowing regional organizations to engage in peace enforcement missions, preferring instead to provide peacekeeping after the RO forces a peace.

Another variable of interest that reaches statistical significance is the capabilities of the actor, measured in both the maximum capability score and the average capability score. This supports Hypothesis 10, which expects that an increase in capabilities will increase the success of the peace mission. The following figures illustrate the survival rates between a high maximum CINC score and a high average CINC score compared to a civil conflict with low CINC scores.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Breslow</th>
<th>Efron</th>
<th>Breslow</th>
<th>Efron</th>
<th>Weibull</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regional hegemon</td>
<td>.343</td>
<td>.346</td>
<td>.304</td>
<td>.306</td>
<td>.663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.472)</td>
<td>(.477)</td>
<td>(.420)</td>
<td>(.425)</td>
<td>(.685)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary UN</td>
<td>5.11</td>
<td>5.12</td>
<td>5.73</td>
<td>5.73</td>
<td>3.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7.23)</td>
<td>(7.24)</td>
<td>(7.74)</td>
<td>(7.76)</td>
<td>(4.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary RO</td>
<td>4.45</td>
<td>4.41</td>
<td>4.85</td>
<td>4.81</td>
<td>4.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7.33)</td>
<td>(7.29)</td>
<td>(7.48)</td>
<td>(7.45)</td>
<td>(5.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO Solo</td>
<td>4.88*</td>
<td>4.86*</td>
<td>4.74*</td>
<td>4.73*</td>
<td>3.63*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.41)</td>
<td>(3.40)</td>
<td>(3.13)</td>
<td>(3.13)</td>
<td>(2.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Solo</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>3.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.75)</td>
<td>(4.73)</td>
<td>(5.04)</td>
<td>(5.02)</td>
<td>(4.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum CINC</td>
<td>3.00**</td>
<td>2.99**</td>
<td>2.37*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.34)</td>
<td>(1.34)</td>
<td>(1.04)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average CINC score</td>
<td>3.05*</td>
<td>3.03*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.47)</td>
<td>(1.47)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of battle deaths</td>
<td>1.15*</td>
<td>1.15*</td>
<td>1.15*</td>
<td>1.15*</td>
<td>1.57*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.078)</td>
<td>(.078)</td>
<td>(.078)</td>
<td>(.078)</td>
<td>(.078)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic fractionalization</td>
<td>.377*</td>
<td>.378*</td>
<td>.377*</td>
<td>.377*</td>
<td>.394*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.161)</td>
<td>(.162)</td>
<td>(.161)</td>
<td>(.162)</td>
<td>(.160)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial war</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.241)</td>
<td>(.243)</td>
<td>(.240)</td>
<td>(.242)</td>
<td>(.240)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous War</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>1.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.286)</td>
<td>(.289)</td>
<td>(.283)</td>
<td>(.285)</td>
<td>(.300)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.017)</td>
<td>(.017)</td>
<td>(.017)</td>
<td>(.017)</td>
<td>(.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log pseudo-likelihood</td>
<td>-341.327</td>
<td>-340.88</td>
<td>-341.365</td>
<td>-340.918</td>
<td>-164.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prob &gt; χ²</td>
<td>.0000</td>
<td>.0000</td>
<td>.0000</td>
<td>.0000</td>
<td>.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = p < .05,  ** = p < .01,  *** = p < .001
Interestingly, the variable measuring the presence of a regional hegemon does not reach levels of statistical significance, and support cannot be offered for Hypothesis 11. This finding, combined with the previously discussed results regarding capabilities, suggests that regional hegemons only assist ROs in overcoming the collective action problem and joining a peace mission. However, they do not necessarily result in a more effective and successful mission. It is during the mission itself that the RO needs to ensure its capabilities are high enough to conduct a peace enforcement mission, regardless of the regional hegemon’s presence and contributions. This has further policy implications, as regional organizations may be undertaking missions despite low levels of capability. The international community should ensure that all missions have properly secured the necessary resources needed to increase the likelihood of success.

What cannot be directly tested in this model is the effect the number of interveners has on the duration of civil conflict. This is because the number of organizations present
is unable to be included in the same model as dummy indicators for each type of mission due to collinearity. However, based on these results, limited support for Hypothesis 12 can be found. The only variable reaching levels of statistical significance is solo RO missions, in which only one actor is present. This would suggest that solo RO missions are more successful, perhaps by being less subject to the collective action problem within the mission itself. However, this support must be viewed with caution, as these results are largely driven by ECOWAS, and the indicator for solo UN missions is not also significant, which would provide further support for this hypothesis.

Other control variables that reach levels of statistical significance include the log of battle deaths and the degree of ethnic fractionalization. The hazard ratio for the log of battle deaths indicates that an increase in the number of battle deaths will increase the duration of the overall civil conflict. Although the effects of battle deaths on civil war duration and recurrence have been debated, this appears to support the idea that bloodier wars reach a
stalemate more quickly and, as a result, end sooner.

The hazard ratio for the level of ethnic fractionalization is less than 1, suggesting the opposite effect of battle deaths. This indicates that the greater the degree of ethnic fractionalization, the longer the war will endure. This supports previous literature detailing how ethnic wars are the most difficult to solve and the most difficult to prevent their recurrence.

6.3.2. Peacekeeping

The second section of this analysis examines the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions by different combinations of organizations. The dependent variable in this analysis is civil war recurrence. I utilize a dataset of peace spells from Fortna (2003) and combine it with my data on UN and RO missions. This allows for the testing of peacekeeping effectiveness of both the UN and ROs on smaller ceasefires and peace spells. I disaggregate the UN missions into solo UN missions and primary UN missions and add in RO missions to the relevant peace spells as well. Table 6.2 reports the same set of models tested on peace enforcement
missions. The first model examines the maximum score of capabilities with Breslow ties, the second model does the same with Efron ties. The third tests average CINC scores with Breslow ties, and the fourth with Efron ties. Finally, the fifth column provides a Weibull model for a robustness check.

Hazard ratios for each independent variable are reported in this table rather than coefficients. However, since the hazard ratios are in respect to peace years, a ratio with a value less than 1 indicates that particular variable increases the overall number of peace years by decreasing the hazard. This is in contrast to the previously reported analysis, in which an increased hazard ratio decreased the duration of civil conflict. A variable with a hazard ratio greater than 1 increases the hazard, specifically civil war recurrence, contributing to a shorter peace spell. A hazard ratio less than 1 decreases the hazard, thus increasing the peace duration after the conflict is resolved.

The results from this analysis provide little support for my hypotheses, and a rather grim picture of the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions. None of the indicators for the individual types of missions reach levels of statistical significance, and some are signed incorrectly, suggesting the possibility that a mission of that type might actually increase the likelihood of civil war recurrence. However, there are several possible reasons for which this could be the case.

In order to gain significant results using the same dataset of peace spells, Fortna (2003) disaggregated the UN missions into specific categories. Although the initial effect of all UN missions was not statistically significant, the disaggregated effects did exert a significant negative effect on civil war recurrence. It is possible that the disaggregated nature of the categories contributes to the lack of significance found. Perhaps future iterations of this research that categorize RO missions through both peacekeeping and peacebuilding and compare with UN missions of the same category may show more significant effects.

Another possible explanation is the previous manner in which UN missions were coded. I ran a similar model using a dummy variable that was coded as 1 for all missions in which the UN was involved, whether a solo UN mission or coordinating with an RO
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Breslow</th>
<th>Efron</th>
<th>Breslow</th>
<th>Efron</th>
<th>Weibull</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regional hegemon</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>1.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.14)</td>
<td>(2.14)</td>
<td>(2.07)</td>
<td>(2.05)</td>
<td>(2.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary UN</td>
<td>.393</td>
<td>.393</td>
<td>.361</td>
<td>.361</td>
<td>.364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.682)</td>
<td>(.622)</td>
<td>(.622)</td>
<td>(.622)</td>
<td>(.512)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary RO</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>2.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.07)</td>
<td>(5.07)</td>
<td>(5.99)</td>
<td>(5.99)</td>
<td>(5.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO Solo</td>
<td>.441</td>
<td>.441</td>
<td>.458</td>
<td>.458</td>
<td>.494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.478)</td>
<td>(.492)</td>
<td>(.492)</td>
<td>(.547)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Solo</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>1.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.16)</td>
<td>(2.16)</td>
<td>(2.21)</td>
<td>(2.21)</td>
<td>(1.76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum CINC</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.978)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average CINC score</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>2.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.08)</td>
<td>(1.08)</td>
<td>(1.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacebuilding mission</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>1.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.677)</td>
<td>(.677)</td>
<td>(.677)</td>
<td>(.677)</td>
<td>(.752)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of battle deaths</td>
<td>1.16*</td>
<td>1.16*</td>
<td>1.15*</td>
<td>1.15*</td>
<td>1.17*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.081)</td>
<td>(.081)</td>
<td>(.08)</td>
<td>(.08)</td>
<td>(.082)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial war</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>1.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.437)</td>
<td>(.437)</td>
<td>(.458)</td>
<td>(.458)</td>
<td>(.532)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous war</td>
<td>.998</td>
<td>.998</td>
<td>.998</td>
<td>.998</td>
<td>.998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War ending in victory</td>
<td>.422*</td>
<td>.422*</td>
<td>.438*</td>
<td>.438*</td>
<td>.399*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.176)</td>
<td>(.176)</td>
<td>(.188)</td>
<td>(.189)</td>
<td>(.190)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n =</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prob &gt; χ2 =</td>
<td>.0008</td>
<td>.0008</td>
<td>.0009</td>
<td>.0009</td>
<td>.0001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001

128
in either the primary or secondary role. This particular variable reached almost statistical significance with a hazard ratio below 1. This might suggest that previous coding mechanisms of UN missions and the corresponding results were including contributions made by ROs in a category intended to only measure UN efforts. Perhaps the UN is most successful when working with regional organizations in certain categories of missions, whether peacekeeping or peacebuilding. In future studies, I intend to further investigate this particular relationship.

Also not supported in this analysis is Hypothesis 11, expecting the regional hegemon to exert a positive effect on success. As previously discussed, this chapter is the only one in which the regional hegemon does not exert a strong effect on the results through several robustness checks. Although regional hegemons are sufficient to bring ROs into peace missions, they do not necessarily guarantee success. However, capabilities are also not significant in this model. This could be a result of the expanded role the UN plays in peacekeeping missions as opposed to peace enforcement, as the capabilities score of the UN is 1. However, Hypothesis 10 cannot be supported with these results.

Another independent variable of interest produces contrary findings to what might be expected. I hypothesized that the presence of a peace enforcement mission prior to the resolution of the conflict would result in a longer peace after the conflict was resolved. However, the hazard ratio is higher than 1, indicating that a peace enforcement mission prior to the resolution of the civil war may actually decrease the post-conflict peace duration. This presents a rather troubling finding. Although some peace enforcement missions do significantly reduce the duration of the civil war, it is difficult to conclude their effectiveness is the peace produced is particularly unstable. Perhaps regional organization missions may be able to decrease the duration of conflict, but at the expense of a post-conflict environment conducive to long-term peace.

Although this finding seems somewhat troubling, the overall number of missions here is again small. Only 9 total civil conflicts in the data experienced a peace enforcement mission. Additional observations need to be included before any firm conclusions can be drawn, but these results do specify extreme caution on the part of organizations wishing to
engage in peace enforcement. Although the duration of the civil conflict is shorter compared to those in which no peace enforcement mission was present, peace enforcement missions contain no value if they increase the likelihood that civil conflicts recur again after resolution. It is likely that post-war peacekeeping missions must be carefully constructed so as to prevent the civil war from recurring.

A few other results in the model show more conformity with recent findings in the literature. Those civil conflicts ending in a military victory as opposed to a negotiated settlement are much less likely to recur. The hazard ratio is less than 1, and the variable is statistically significant. This is in conjunction with scholarly work such as Hartzell and Hoddie (2001), as military victory generally leads to the defeat and subsequent punishment of rebel groups, preventing their return to conflict.

6.4. Conclusion

In this chapter, I tested the effectiveness of different peace mission indicators on both peace enforcement and peacekeeping missions. I argued that after examining the factors that prompt an organization to establish a peace mission as well as those that affect whether an organization takes on the primary or secondary role in a mission, the next important study is whether these missions are successful. After testing what factors prompt organizations to become involved in peace missions as well as how they behave once they do so, the next and equally important step is to then examine which organizations provide the most successful peace missions.

Despite expecting both peace enforcement and peacekeeping missions to significantly reduce the conflict time and extend the peace respectively, I found little support for this expectation or for my formal hypotheses. My first hypothesis in this chapter expected that the capabilities of the actor involved would increase the likelihood of success. While this was true for peace enforcement missions, this was not true for peacekeeping missions. My second hypothesis expected that the presence of a regional hegemon would increase the likelihood of success for RO missions of both types. Despite the strong effects of a regional hegemon in previous chapters, there was no support for this hypothesis. As previously discussed, the
presence of a regional hegemon assists an RO in overcoming the collective action problem and committing to a peace mission. It also contributes to an RO taking on the primary role in a mission. However, it is not sufficient for peace mission success. This has important policy implications for the UN and the international community. As more ROs begin taking on peace missions, it is important to remember that those most likely to establish a mission are those with a regional hegemon. However, this does not mean those ROs will be the most successful at the implementation of a mission. The UN and other ROs with significant peace mission experience should ensure ROs attempting to undertake a peace mission are equipped with the necessary resources and information to carry out a peace mission that will achieve its primary goals.

My third and fourth Hypotheses in this chapter can also not be supported. I expected that the success of a mission would decrease as the number of actors involved in a mission increased. However, this is difficult to measure when few categories of missions have any significance. Models including a 'joint' and 'solo' indicator showed no significance in either variable, further showcasing the inability to reject the null hypothesis. Finally, I expected that the presence of a peacebuilding mission would exert a negative effect on the likelihood of civil war recurrence after the war had ended. However, not only was this hypothesis not supported, but the variable was signed incorrectly. It is possible that the success of ROs in bringing civil wars to a close may be overstated, as these constructed peace spells may be especially fragile and unlikely to continue to long-term peace. The UN should also carefully consider these implications when encouraging ROs to take on peace enforcement missions, as they may be unlikely to exert any long-term benefits.

Overall, more research is likely needed before true conclusions can be reached. The disaggregating of both UN and RO missions in the same model will allow us to compare the effectiveness of the different types of missions more accurately, particularly as previous research has demonstrated the need to disaggregate UN missions before statistical significance is reached. Further research on the effects of peace enforcement missions on post-conflict environments is also certainly warranted. Perhaps some kinds of peace enforcement mis-
sions create more stable ceasefires than others. If this might be true, this would provide policymakers with important information when considering the establishment of their own missions.
What are the primary motivators for organizations to establish a peace mission? Why do some organizations take the primary role in peace missions while others take a supporting role? The three previous chapters described quantitative analyses that demonstrated specific factors associated with the establishment of peace missions by the UN and regional organizations. Specifically, the United Nations establishes peace missions based on humanitarian concerns. As the conflict becomes more severe and continues to deteriorate, the likelihood of the UN establishing a peace mission increases. Furthermore, contrary to the expected incentive to freeride, the UN is actually more likely to establish a peace mission as the number of potential actors increases.

Regional organizations, however, are motivated to initially establish or join a peace mission by an increase in two factors: economic and political salience. As the conflict begins to inflict negative economic consequences on the member states of an RO, the likelihood of a peace mission increases. Furthermore, as a conflict devolves and contributes to destabilization of the region, the likelihood of a peace mission increases.

In this chapter, I present a case study to complement the preceding empirical analyses. I examine the Sierra Leone civil war from 1991-2000 and the resulting peace missions established by the United Nations and the Economic Community of West African States as well as the lack of mission established by the Organisation for African Unity despite its jurisdiction in the conflict state. Although previous chapters demonstrate a strong correlation that supports my theoretical framework, this case study will be directed at illustrating causality between the proposed mechanisms prompting the establishment of UN and RO peace missions and the coordination that occurs within.
7.1. Expected Findings

If the theoretical mechanisms I have proposed do exert the demonstrated effect on my dependent variable, then additional points from the theory can be derived and further explored in this chapter. Certain implications and expectations in the theory are not easily suited to operationalization and measurement and can be better examined through the use of a case study. It is in this chapter I explore the following points.

First, based on the theory, I expect that the UN will not establish a mission unless the humanitarian crisis becomes salient. The UN’s provision of the public good of peace missions leads it to distribute its resources to achieve the maximum utility, therefore it will not send a peace mission until the humanitarian crisis becomes particularly entrenched. Second, I expect that an organization with low levels of capabilities that considers a conflict highly salient will attempt to influence the conflict through other means, one of which may be attempting to establish a peace mission. I examine the actions of the Organisation for African Unity to demonstrate that capabilities prohibit organizations from acting through a peace mission, but were they capable enough, an increased level of salience would prompt the establishment of a peace mission.

Several other potential conflicts could provide an interesting case with which to demonstrate these points. Overlapping missions also occurred in Sudan, Kosovo, and Rwanda, all of which could be utilized to demonstrate the theoretical mechanisms. However, Sierra Leone provides an interesting case for several reasons. First, Sierra Leone provides a case that experiences multiple failed peace attempts. Sierra Leone experienced two peace agreements that failed to be implemented as well as three coup d’etats throughout the course of the conflict. Repeated peace failures provide for a closer examination of the coordination process between the relevant organizations. Organizations, secure in their success as peace enforcers, may panic when fighting resumes and turn to other organizations for assistance. Second, this is only the second peace mission ECOWAS established, the first established only a few years prior in the neighboring state of Liberia. Without a preexisting mechanism with which to recruit and send peace missions and existing processes through which an RO
can coordinate amongst its member states, ECOWAS had to rely upon other motives for justification of the peace enforcement mission. As a result, the identification of the specific motivating factors may be easier to identify.

Third, Sierra Leone is the first case in which the UN joined a pre-existing peace mission established by a regional organization. Although this has advantages and disadvantages regarding the generalizability of studying the coordination, I contend that the advantages are particularly strong. Since this is the first peace mission the UN joins, both the UN and the regional organization, ECOWAS, have not yet developed a more sophisticated means of bargaining and coordination in regards to the peace mission tasks. While some consider this to be a disadvantage, claiming that future coordination efforts might run smoother, I contend that this mission is particularly relevant because it will demonstrate the motivations of each organization in a clearer manner. Later peace missions may involve political and military leaders trained to carefully craft and guard remarks to the press, but newly established organizations are likely to have at least slightly less experience with what specific comments must be guarded with relation to the international community and peacekeeping.

The unit of analysis in this case study is the international organization, specifically the United Nations, ECOWAS, and the African Union. I also consider the effects that third-party actors might have had on the organizations, specifically major powers such as the United States and the United Kingdom. As third party military intervention is only accounted for as a dummy variable in my analysis, including the influence in this case study will provide a greater richness to my theoretical contribution. I analyze the specific actions of each organization in relation to the conflict, each other, and the international community. My primary method of analysis utilizes news articles collected from 1991-2003 and original documents released by both the UN and ECOWAS.

When collecting news articles, I utilized archived articles from the Associated Press and Agence France Press. I searched for Sierra Leone and “peacekeeping” or “peace” or “conflict” for all of 1991 through 2003. These articles contained a great amount of informa-

tion, including many press releases, press conferences, and interviews with leaders of the UN and ECOWAS as well as commanders of ECOWAS forces and UN officials in Sierra Leone. Since many of these documents are not available through the websites of the individual organizations, these sources provide a much more detailed account of the individual motivations and decisions of the organization throughout the duration of the conflict.

This chapter will proceed as follows. First, I will provide a background of the conflict, including information about the Liberian civil war in order to demonstrate how the spillover contributed to and affected the subsequent decisions by the UN and ECOWAS. Furthermore, since a great deal of the conflicts overlapped temporally, prior interaction between the UN and ECOWAS in Liberia almost certainly affected their interaction in Sierra Leone and is therefore important to also document. Second, I will provide an analysis of why ECOWAS established a peacebuilding mission in the Sierra Leone civil war after the RUF rebels staged a coup. Third, I examine the actions and decisions made by the UN in conjunction with the African Union and ECOWAS. Fourth, I examine the coordination issue between the multiple organizations, including the coordination issue with the African Union, despite its lack of contribution to the peace mission. Finally, I will conclude the chapter with a brief summary of my conclusions. I will also discuss what generalizations can be made from the conclusions regarding the organisations involved in these peace missions to all other organizations contributing to or considering contributing to peace missions.

7.2. Conflict Background

When it first erupted, the civil war in Sierra Leone appeared to be an offshoot of the neighboring civil war in Liberia waged by the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), backed by Charles Taylor. Beginning in 1989, the Liberian conflict decreased both political and economic stability in its neighboring states. Sierra Leone numbered among those states most negatively affected, as its shared border with Liberia prompted multiple cross-border violent attacks, resulting in the deaths of several hundred Sierra Leoneans.

Eventually, these increasing attacks pulled Sierra Leone into civil war, as Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels, led by Forah Sankoh began waging war within its own
borders against the government led by Joseph Momoh. The Sierra Leone civil war lasted from 1991-2000 and resulted in an estimated 50,000 fatalities. It also caused countless casualties, as the RUF rebels became known for their brutal yet non-fatal attacks on civilians. Several foreign actors found themselves drawn into the conflict, whether militarily or through contributing foreign aid. The United Nations, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Organisation for African Unity, the United States, the United Kingdom, and other third-party actors contributed to and/or attempted to influence the decisions made in the conflict. In an effort to provide context to the events surrounding the conflict, I will first provide a brief history of Sierra Leone and its leaders followed by a more detailed outline of the onset of conflict and the conflict itself.

7.2.1. Pre-Conflict Onset

In 1967, Siaka Stevens, leader of the All Peoples’ Congress (APC), won the general election to become the president of Sierra Leone. His election marked the first in which an incumbent government was voted out of office in sub-Saharan Africa (Thompson 1997). Although a series of non-violent coups followed that forced Stevens to flee to neighboring Guinea for safety, Stevens was returned to power in 1968 through a group of noncommissioned officers calling themselves the Anti-Corruption Revolutionary Movement.

Despite taking office in multiparty elections, Stevens transformed Sierra Leone into a single-party government by 1971 (Reno 1995). Along with the help of his deputy, S.I. Koroma, the APC used violence and intimidation to silence dissidents. The natural resources of Sierra Leone were also exploited by the APC to further the wealth of loyal supporters and high-ranking military officials. The survivor of multiple attempted coups, Stevens executed several military officers, opposing politicians, and opposing party supporters for alleged threats against the APC (Zack-Williams 1990, Zack-Williams 1992).

In November 1985, Stevens handed over power to Joseph Momoh, the Army Force Commander during Stevens’ tenure. Through an engineered election, Stevens was able to install Momoh over his former deputy, Koroma, based on fears that Koroma would deviate

from Stevens’ policies and possibly even put him on trial for crimes committed during his time in office (Zack-Williams 1999). However, the engineered elections and Momoh’s behavior in office led many to consider Momoh a relatively weak leader with little to no control over his ministers. In 1987, Momoh declared a state of economic emergency that allowed government officials wide authority to enforce government policies within the population. Levels of corruption continued to increase and human rights continued to deteriorate.3

Approximately one year before the outbreak of civil war, in response to growing unrest within the population, Momoh authorized the Secretary General of the APC to monitor the dissenting Southern and Eastern Provinces. Momoh warned that any talk of multiparty democracy, illegal under current laws, would be met with full punishment under the law. (Zack-Williams 1999). Furthermore, after Francis Minah, Momoh’s Deputy, used Momoh’s unpopularity to allegedly plan a coup, Momoh executed him for treason. The Southern Province, including the Puejhun District from where Minah stemmed, erupted in unrest (Zack-Williams 1995).

Unrest continued to plague both the Southern and Eastern Provinces and gradually spread to northern regions of Sierra Leone, in which citizens formerly supporting Momoh began questioning his style of governance and ability to rule the country. Meanwhile, the civil war in neighboring Liberia continued to rage. The military, intentionally weakened by Momoh to decrease the possibility of a coup attempt, was unable to adequately protect civilians from NPFL rebels. On March 23, 1991, the Revolutionary United Front officially declared civil war against the Sierra Leone regime.

7.2.2. Conflict Events

The rebels comprising the RUF included some cross-border rebels from the Liberian civil war, but the majority stemmed from Sierra Leone.4 Many of the rebels were trained in guerrilla warfare by Libya and subscribed to the ideals put forward by Colonel Muammar

3Derek Partridge, former British High Commissioner to Sierra Leone. Quoted in: Jane Knight. “Sierra Leone: will hope triumph over experience?” June 1996. One World Link Newsletter.

4Revolutionary United Front.
Gaddafi and his Third Way (Zack-Williams & Riley 1993, Richards 1995, Richards 1996). Fearful of Libyan influence in Sierra Leone, Nigeria sent soldiers to assist the military with guarding the Freetown airport and driving rebels into Liberia.\textsuperscript{5} However, these soldiers were not yet associated with an ECOWAS mission. Sierra Leone also requested the United States provide its military with resources and potential military assistance in an effort to halt cross-border raids by Liberian rebels.\textsuperscript{6} As these raids continued to increase in number and intensity and the RUF continued its attacks, the Sierra Leonian government struggled to fight both conflicts.

In September of 1991, the Sierra Leonian President ordered Liberian rebels to get out of Sierra Leone and requested that ECOMOG, the military wing of ECOWAS, establish a buffer zone in Liberia along the border.\textsuperscript{7} However, not until April of 1992 did the Major-General of ECOMOG, Ishaya Bakut, deploy troops to establish this buffer zone.\textsuperscript{8} Because this buffer zone was not yet in Sierra Leone, it was considered part of the previously existing ECOMOG mission in Liberia and required no extra coordination by the member states of ECOWAS.

By early 1992, over 10,000 Sierra Leoneans had been killed in the conflict. Over 300,000 were displaced, 200,000 in refugee camps in neighboring Guinea and 400,000 citizens were trapped in territory the RUF controlled (Zack-Williams & Riley 1993). Furthermore, the rebels had claimed control of large portions of territory in eastern and southern Sierra Leone, much of which were rich in diamonds and other natural resources. President Momoh had previously succumbed to domestic pressure to hold multiparty elections in an effort to quell RUF attacks. However, he attempted to use the deteriorating security situation to delay the scheduled elections. Infuriated, a group of military officers led by Army Captain Valentine Strasser ousted Momoh in a coup. The new junta government established the National Provisional Ruling Council, and Strasser repeatedly condemned the rampant corruption

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{5}Sierra Leone troops kill 27 rebels. Agence France Presse. May 9, 1991.
  \item \textsuperscript{6}U.S. Assails Liberian Rebel Attacks on Sierra Leone. The Associated Press. April 8, 1991.
  \item \textsuperscript{7}Sierra Leone tells rebels to pull out, requests buffer zone. Agence France Presse. September 19, 1991.
  \item \textsuperscript{8}Ecomog to deploy “shortly”. Agence France Presse. April 20, 1992.
\end{itemize}
throughout Momoh’s administration.

The Sierra Leonean Army succeeded in forcing the RUF rebels to the Sierra Leone-Liberia border by the end of 1993. However, due to overextended resources and a lack of contributions from other states and organizations, the rebels were able to regain their position and continue fighting. ⁹ To support the regime, Ghana joined Nigeria in sending forces to assist guarding the Freetown airport in October 1994. ¹⁰ These deployments continued to be bilateral agreements between Sierra Leone and the two countries and not peace enforcement missions sanctioned by ECOWAS.

By early 1995, the Sierra Leonean army began to quickly losing ground to the RUF. The government initially sought help form the British Army’s Gurkhas (for a more in-depth discussion of the Gurkhas, see Riley (1996)). However, the Gurkhas were the subject of a brutal ambush less than a month after deployment that resulted in the death of their Canadian commander. They abandoned the mission shortly thereafter. The Sierra Leonean regime then turned to the South African mercenary group Executive Outcomes (Harding 1997). Executive Outcomes (EO) was widely considered able to provide swift, effective action against the RUF while remaining free of accusations of looting and taking advantages of local populations, two constant criticisms of ECOMOG troops deployed in Liberia.¹¹

Although Executive Outcomes provide effective at fighting the RUF, the cost of EO placed enormous strains on the Sierra Leone regime. EO missions reportedly cost the government $1.7 million U.S. dollars per month (Riley 1997). With escalating costs and pressure from the United Nations, Sierra Leone chose to renegotiate its contract with the mercenaries at an earlier date. Although the RUF weakened significantly with the efforts of EO, their early departure of much of the group provided the needed opportunity for RUF to take back key portions of resource-rich territories.

Despite EO’s departure from Sierra Leone, many international actors maintained

⁹UNAMSIL.

¹⁰Ghana to send troops to Sierra Leone. Agence France Presse. October 6, 1994.

¹¹At one point, after excessive accusations of looting, ECOMOG was said to stand for ‘Every Commodity Or Movable Object Gone.’
cautious optimism for the emergence of democratic institutions. Multiparty elections were scheduled for March 1996, and despite a coup in January 1996 in which Strasser was ousted by his deputy Brigadier Julius Maada Bio, elections still took place. Ahmed Tejan Kabba, leader of the Sierra Leone People’s Party, won with almost sixty percent of the popular vote. (Zack-Williams 1995). The Security Council praised Sierra Leone’s elections, and newly elected President Kabba formed the National Coalition Government to continue Bio’s renewed engagement of the RUF in talks through a new medium: senior RUF official Agnes Deen-Jalloh, Bio’s sister (Gershoni 1997).\footnote{Sierra Leone peace talks reopen. Agence France Presse. February 29, 1996.} \footnote{Security Council hails elections, urges rebels to disarm. Agence France Presse. March 4, 1996.}

By November 1996, talks between the Sierra Leone government and Foday Sankoh, the RUF leader, had resulted in the signing of the Abidjan Peace Accord. One of Sankoh’s most adamant demand was the removal of all foreign troops, specifically those from Nigeria, and the establishment of a UN monitoring force to oversee the agreement’s implementation. The UN agreed, and the creation of the force was written into the agreement.\footnote{Abidjan Accord. This group was referred to in the agreement as a Neutral Monitoring Group. Article 11.} Executive Outcomes intended to withdraw the last of its forces after the neutral monitoring group formed. However, the UN was unable to establish its monitoring force, and the RUF began breaking the ceasefire.

The UN found itself bound by disagreements on how large the monitoring force should be. Kathy Jones, the assistant to the UN Special Envoy to Sierra Leone, stated that the Security Council could deploy up to 700 UN peacekeeping troops within weeks as per the agreement in the Abidjan Peace Accord.\footnote{Blue helmets could arrive in Sierra Leone “within weeks”: UN. Agence France Presse. January 23, 1997.} The US argued this force was too big, tying up Security Council negotiations until Britain managed to overrule their objections.\footnote{UN chief wants to send 800 peace-keepers to Sierra Leone. Agence France Presse. January 28, 1997.} In addition to in-fighting within the Security Council, the RUF stated it opposed a peacekeeping plan as large as 700-800 UN peacekeepers, suggesting a force of that size would not be able
Depleted and awaiting a UN peacekeeping force that seemed increasingly unlikely to materialize, the Sierra Leonean government began to rely on informal militias within its country to enforce order and fight RUF violations of the ceasefire. Specifically the Kamajors, a group of traditional hunters, played a large role in fighting the RUF (Zack-Williams 1995). Although the Kamajors proved moderately effective, the Sierra Leone army considered the extra-military force a threat to maintaining order. After a few clashes, the Kamajors began viewing the army in the same manner. Relations between the two groups continued to worsen, and the implicit support provided and failure of the Sierra Leonean government to discipline the Kamajors infuriated the army. On May 25, 1997, tensions boiled over, and Johnny Koroma led a coup to oust Kabba from office. Kabba escaped to neighboring Guinea, but not before specifically requesting that ECOWAS establish a mission to restore him to power (Zack-Williams 1999).

Three days after the coup, approximately 70 ECOMOG troops flew from Liberia to Freetown. ECOMOG commanders held talks with Johnny Koroma in an attempt to restore a civilian government. Despite vigorous objections to their presence from Koroma, the secretary general of the Commonwealth, the UN, and the Organisation for African Unity all gave implicit support to ECOWAS to use force to restore the civilian government.

As ECOMOG continued to fight the newly merged Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), formed when the junta government invited RUF into Freetown to form a single force, debates about who would continue to engage in peace missions were held. Some praised the quick action of ECOWAS while others, such as the European Parliament, condemned it. The Security Council and the rest of the international community continued

---

to put off requests from African countries to provide assistance. Eventually, ECOMOG troops were able to oust the AFRC from Freetown and reinstall Kabbah as President. In 1998, the Security Council established a small observer mission (UNOMSIL) to join ECOMOG and assist in disarmament.

The rest of this chapter will examine portions of the conflict in greater detail. Specifically, it will examine the initial establishment of an ECOWAS peace enforcement force in the country after the military coup in 1997 and why ECOWAS did not officially install its peace mission until after several years, when it established a peace mission quickly after the outbreak of conflict in Liberia. It will then discuss the actions of the UN. If the UN is motivated primarily by humanitarian concerns yet prefers to hold back its resources if another organization is capable of performing the same job, it should demonstrate its preference to rely on ECOWAS and perhaps even the OAU to manage the conflict. It will only become involved if other organizations show ineptitude and the conflict continues to worsen.

Throughout the analyses of ECOWAS and the UN, I will discuss the bargaining and negotiating between the organizations after decisions to establish missions were made regarding which organization would take on the primary role and which the secondary. Next, I will detail the actions of the Organisation for African Unity. An organization with relatively low capabilities, an increase in the salience of the Sierra Leone civil conflict should prompt the OAU to take any measures that are within its capability to affect the conflict and bring about peace. Finally, I will provide concluding remarks regarding the Sierra Leone case and its generalizability to other civil conflicts.

7.3. Organisation for African Unity - Low Capabilities, High Salience

The Organisation for African Unity repeatedly demonstrated its desire to contribute to the efforts dedicated to ending the civil conflict in Sierra Leone. Through offering assistance to ECOWAS and the UN, assisting with mediation and brokering agreements, to even attempting to establish its own peacekeeping force, the OAU attempted to exert all possible


influence available to bring the conflict to an end. However, why did the OAU do this? Troops from Nigeria and Ghana were already present in Sierra Leone, and an ECOWAS mission was close by in neighboring Liberia. Based on the collective action problem, the OAU should have considered the provision of peace missions by ECOWAS and its member states satisfactory and made the decision to freeride off of their contribution.

However, the conflict in Sierra Leone was considered highly salient to the OAU. The economic impact of deteriorating conditions in Sierra Leone exerted negative effects on several states in the region. By 1995, a large portion of foreign firms had decreased their activity in what the OAU considered economically vital mines.25 This increased the economic salience of the conflict to the OAU. Furthermore, the OAU considered the conflict to be of high political importance as well for reasons in addition to the destabilization of the region. The OAU was growing concerned about the increasing influence of third-party peacekeepers, or those states conducting peace missions outside of the OAU. Although not explicitly directed at ECOWAS, some thinly veiled criticisms of Nigeria were presented at the OAU summit in 1992. Held in Dakar, the OAU utilized this summit to establish a mechanism for preventing, managing, and resolving conflicts. The OAU wished to establish a standing peace mission force that would be able to deploy quickly to conflict areas. This standing force would be able to address conflicts much more quickly than those peace missions that required approval followed by the establishment of the required forces.

However, despite the created structure, the OAU was never able to implement it due to financial limitations of its member states. Leading officials noted that although the idea was noble, the capabilities of the OAU would never allow for its realization (Copson 1994, Cleaver & May 1995). The idea was officially vetoed at the OAU annual summit in June 1993. The concept was again broached in 1995 when Britain, Canada, France and the US began talks with twenty OAU member states. Both the Western states as well as the African leaders present favored a permanent command, but eventually ruled out a standing force based on the necessary costs and the amount of support the structure would need from the UN and

other developed states. Zimbabwean Defence Minister Malachi acknowledged that the OAU was currently incapable of running such a force, noting that several individual African states were currently involved in UN peace missions as supporting actors, but expressing doubt at the ability of the OAU to continue to engage in activities.  

Despite its failure at establishing a standing peacekeeping force, the OAU continued to try to exert its influence on conflicts it viewed as highly salient, specifically the conflict in Sierra Leone. It held summit meetings to discuss potential solutions to the conflict to which it could contribute, and it continued to engage in talks about the possibility of developing its peacekeeping ability. The OAU also explicitly sanctioned the actions in ECOWAS after the military coup. It gave an explicit mandate for ECOWAS to take whatever action was necessary to restore the civilian government. Through continued meetings and discussions regarding potential solutions for Sierra Leone, followed by recommendations to ECOWAS, the OAU attempted to influence the conflict and decrease its duration. In addition, the OAU provided mediation between the warring parties in conjunction with the UN, resulting in the Abidjan Accord and the Conakry Agreement.

The continued efforts and subsequent failures of the OAU to establish a peacekeeping force that would be able to conduct missions in the Sierra Leone conflict demonstrates the limitations of those regional actors with low levels of capabilities. It is difficult to quantitatively test a non-action, and the resulting mechanisms. However, this example makes it clear that the non-action by the OAU in the Sierra Leonean civil conflict is not a matter of freeriding or low salience, but rather strictly one of capabilities limitations.

This example corresponds in interesting ways with the lack of findings regarding the expected positive effect capabilities exerts on the likelihood of an organization establishing a peace mission. It may suggest that the primary mechanism through which capabilities

---

affect an organization is by limitations, rather than by enabling an organization. Perhaps a critical threshold of capabilities are required, but once an RO reaches this critical threshold, capabilities no longer exert any effect on their behavior. The efforts of the OAU to affect the conflict through multiple means but falling just short of establishing an actual mission suggests that this may be the case.

7.4. UN Mission Establishment and Contributing Factors

At the beginning of the Sierra Leone conflict, the UN Security Council took relatively little action. Both ECOWAS and the UN appeared focused primarily on Liberia, possibly because many international actors still considered the RUF an extension of the conflict in Liberia. However, as the war continued to rage and humanitarian conditions began to worsen, the UN continued to refrain from involvement. I argue that this is because the humanitarian crisis had not yet reached a high enough level of salience for the UN to establish a peace mission.

On January 25, 1995, Nigeria called for the Security Council to establish a peace initiative in Sierra Leone. Representatives from both Nigeria and Botswana informed the UN that the humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone was “alarming.” Emilio Cardenas of Argentina, the current chair of the Security Council, noted that the Sierra Leonean civil war “is still not a matter on our agenda, but because of the evolution of the facts on the ground there is concern among the members of the Security Council” 31. The UN had previously attempted to provide mediation in December of 1994, but these talks failed to produce an agreement between the warring parties.

In February of 1995, two special UN envoys arrived in Sierra Leone to again negotiate peace talks. They were expected to hold “exploratory talks” with the head of state Captain Valentine Strasser and his deputy, Captain Julius Maada Bio 32. The Special Envoy, Berhanu Dinka of Ethiopia, was instructed to try to negotiate a settlement in collaboration with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and ECOWAS. Much of this decision was made as a

result of the deteriorating humanitarian conditions in the state. Reports from other African countries warned the UN of atrocities committed by the rebels, such as beheadings and rough amputations. However, the UN chose to continue to rely on ECOWAS for military resources, committing only small observer missions and offering mediation. This supports the hypothesis that the UN appropriates its finite resources based on humanitarian goals. Since ECOWAS remained in the country supplying a peacebuilding mission, the UN remained free to commit only a small observer mission. This allowed it to commit other resources to those states with more severe conflicts and fewer intervening regional organizations, such as Somalia and Angola. Although the humanitarian concerns necessitated some sort of UN action, it was able to justify sending only a small mission.

In November 1996, the UN Special Envoy Dinka assisted in negotiating the Abidjan Peace Accord. The overall contribution to the peace mission at this point was still primarily diplomatic. After the coup in May 1997, a new Special Envoy, Francis G. Okelo of Uganda, attempted to persuade the junta to step down. The Security Council also imposed an oil and arms embargo on the junta government and authorized ECOWAS to ensure the agreement was implemented.

In October 1997, ECOWAS coordinated talks between the chairman of the junta and signed a peace plan that called for a ceasefire monitored by ECOMOG. In addition, the agreement called for the UN Security Council to send UN military observers to oversee the disarmament. The deposed Sierra Leonean leader, President Kabbah, agreed to the agreement in November and indicated his willingness to cooperate with the UN and ECOWAS.

Due to the peace agreement’s lack of implementation and the subsequent collapse of the junta under the military attack of ECOMOG, the Security Council strengthened the Special Envoy and added UN military liaison officers and security advisory personnel in March 1998. In June of the same year, the Security Council formally established the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone for an initial period of six months. The

---

34 UN Peacekeeping, Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL.
goal of this mission was to monitor “efforts to disarm combatants and restructure the nations security forces”. 35 The United Nations sent in unarmed observers with the understanding that ECOMOG troops would provide protection for UN officials.

Despite the presence of ECOMOG and a UN disarmament observer mission, fighting continued and the UN continued to document “on-going atrocities and human rights abuses committed against civilians” 36. When the rebel alliance once again took most of Freetown, UNOMSIL personnel were evacuated. ECOMOG troops remained and continued fighting, successfully retaking the capital and reinstalling the civilian government.

After the renewed attack, the Security Council received a request to expand the role of UNOMSIL from both the rebels and the government. This request came as part of a peace agreement signed in Lome 37. As a result, the Security Council authorized the establishment of UNAMSIL, which carried a mandate of a maximum of 6000 military personnel and 260 observers to assist the government in implementing the Lome peace agreement.

It was not until the Security Council considered the humanitarian crisis acute that they considered the establishment of a UN peace mission. The initial mission established was a small, unarmed, observer mission to assist in disarmament. According to the theory, the UN might have sent this mission in an attempt to assist ECOWAS in directing the disarmament mission in a way that would reduce the likelihood of civil war recurrence. This would be in conjunction with the UN’s desire to provide the public good, but it also allowed the UN to commit a relatively small amount of resources and divert other resources to those conflicts in greater need of peace missions. However, once the UN observer mission was able to view the extent to which human rights abuses were committed, the Security Council authorized a much larger, more extensive, and more militarily aggressive peace mission able to actively enforce a ceasefire.

This supports the theoretical framework regarding the UN decisions to intervene in

35Ibid.
36Ibid.
37Ibid.
conflicts described in Chapter 2. The UN did not consider the Sierra Leone crisis particularly salient with regards to humanitarian crises. Furthermore, another organization, namely ECOWAS, was present and capable of establishing a peace mission. In this situation, the UN was able to restrict its committed resources in the conflict. However, once the UN realized the severity of the humanitarian crisis firsthand and witnessed the capability with which ECOMOG was overseeing its mission, it established a much more extensive peacekeeping mission to address the increased severity.

7.5. Conclusion

In this chapter, I conducted a case study of the civil conflict in Sierra Leone, focusing on the specific organizations that maintain jurisdiction to establish peace missions in the conflict state. Specifically, I first examined the actions of the OAU outside the establishment of a peace mission. According to my theory, low capabilities prohibit an organization from establishing a peace mission regardless of its saliency. By examining the OAU’s attempts to influence the conflict through other means after repeated failed attempts to establish a force capable of conducting a peace mission, I can provide support for this aspect of my theory. Had the OAU contained higher capabilities, I assert the likelihood of an established peace mission would have been high.

I also examined the humanitarian motivations of the United Nations. According to the theory, the UN only sends missions to those conflicts it considers to be most severe. This was supported by the actions of the UN in relation to Sierra Leone. At first, the UN did not consider the conflict to be particularly salient, as the intensity of the conflict remained relatively low. As a result, the UN refrained from establishing a peace mission as the conflict raged for several years. Despite providing resources and assisting in mediation and negotiations, no official peace mission was established. However, the UN then established a small disarmament mission in an effort to prevent civil war recurrence. Only after it realized this mission was woefully inadequate and witnessed the severity of the conflict did it send a much larger mission better equipped to ensure its implementation.

The findings from Sierra Leone provide important implications for other civil conflicts
and organizations, as well as for the broader conflict management literature. Most importantly, organizations with low levels of capabilities that prohibit them from establishing peace missions are likely to attempt to influence the conflict in other ways. This may exert significant influences on the outcome of the conflict, both in its resolution and its likelihood of recurrence. As a result, it is important to continue the examination of regional organizations in future studies, both in relation to specific peace missions as well as the diplomatic efforts of ROs outside of peace missions in order to gain a comprehensive view of conflict management.
CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this chapter, I present a final discussion of the dissertation, along with concluding remarks regarding its contribution, potential policy implications, and areas of future research available to myself and other scholars. First, I provide a summary of the theoretical framework I presented and recap the ways through which this adds to current conflict management literature. Second, I summarize the empirical findings of my analyses, focusing on the major findings. Third, I discuss potential avenues for future research; and fourth, I provide a discussion of what policy implications these results provide.

8.1. Theoretical Summary and Contributions

This dissertation informs the current study of conflict management. It builds upon previous literature that examines peace missions conducted by the United Nations and questions the conventional view that the UN exerts the only significant effect on peace missions, irrespective of the involvement of any other organizations. Previous studies of conflict management divide peace missions into two categories: those with UN involvement and those without UN involvement. However, both of these categories have shortcomings.

Missions placed into the UN category are coded in this manner regardless of whether any other organization or group was involved in and/or contributed to the peace mission. As a result, all UN missions that received support and resources from regional organizations are considered by previous studies to be solo UN missions. This is the case whether the UN received assistance from NATO or from the OAS. This calls into question many previous findings regarding both where the UN sends missions as well as the rates of peace mission success. First, it is possible that the UN bases a large portion of its decision-making regarding where peace missions are sent on whether a regional organization is available to assist the UN with resources, information about the conflict, and any other number of cost-sharing mechanisms. Furthermore, this structure of peace mission categories cannot account for whether resources provided by regional organizations exert any effect on the likelihood of
peace mission success. Perhaps UN success is driven largely by resources provided by ROs, or perhaps the UN is rendered less effective when dealing with less-experienced ROs. These are important implications for understanding why UN missions succeed or fail, and the conventional structure of conflict management studies cannot account for them.

In addition to concerns in the category of peace missions that involve the UN, the “other” category contains shortcomings as well. All peace missions that do not contain any UN action are placed within this category. This includes peace missions conducted by regional organizations sans the UN, missions conducted by single states, and those implemented by ad hoc coalitions. However, a mission by an RO established in conjunction with the UN will likely not fall into this category, failing again to account for the RO contribution. This presents a clear bias in conflict management studies, as these missions are accounted for in neither category. Not only does this bias studies that analyze UN missions, as I previously described, but it biases any findings in reference to non-UN missions, as multiple RO missions are not included. Furthermore, as I argued in this study, missions established by regional organizations should be disaggregated from other types of non-UN missions. While I do not argue that RO missions are entirely different from other types of missions, the relationship of member states within an RO results in an intra-actor collective action problem not experienced by single states, and the shadow of the future results in effects not seen in ad hoc coalitions. As a result, the types of organizations and actors should be disaggregated and studied separately.

In my second chapter, I developed a theory based on the traditional collective action problem (Olson 1965) to explain the commitment of organizations to providing the public good of international peace missions. I focused on three specific aspects of each peace mission: its original establishment, the coordination of organizations when simultaneously engaged in a peace mission, and the success of peace missions. I proposed that under the collective action framework, organizations with the jurisdiction to engage in a peace mission will suffer from collective failure as they attempt to provide the public good of peacekeeping through private means (M.V.Pauly 1970). Both international and regional organizations
would prefer to freeride off of the other organization rather than bear the costs associated with implementing a peace mission (Gaibulloev, Sandler & Shimizu 2009).

In addition to a collective action problem between international and regional actors, organizations also face intra-actor collective action problems, particularly regional organizations. The intra-actor collective action problem occurs when the member states of an organization prefer to freeride off of other states rather than contribute to peace missions from their domestic budget. Since few ROs currently maintain a standing budget for peace missions, funding of these missions is subject to collective failure as member states prefer another state take on the majority of the costs. This results in the inefficient provision of the public good of peacekeeping.

Inter-actor collective failure can be overcome by organizations through an increase in a conflict’s salience. I proposed that, based on the UN’s propensity to provide the public good of peacekeeping and the several empirical studies that have demonstrated the UN’s tendency to send peace missions to those conflicts most in need and suffering the most severe humanitarian crises, the UN would be motivated by an increase in the conflict’s severity. Regional organizations, however, require additional incentives to overcome the collective action problem, specifically the acquisition of club goods (Buchanan 1965) or private goods for member states. As the political salience of a conflict increases and destabilizes the surrounding region, the RO is more likely to establish a peace mission. Additionally, as the economic salience of a conflict increases and member states of an RO begin suffering negative economic consequences as a result, the likelihood of a peace mission increases.

The intra-actor collective action problem can be mitigated and overcome by the presence of a regional hegemon. The regional hegemon is the privileged actor of the organization (Olson 1965, Lemke 2002). As a result of its status, the regional hegemon gains more utility from succeeding in the provision of public good than from saving itself the cost required in its provision. As a result, the regional hegemon is able to overcome the intra-actor collective action problem and provide the required resources at a greater rate than those organizations without regional hegemons.
In regards to the coordination of peace missions, I divided the different roles an organization could take in a peace mission into two categories: primary and secondary. I proposed that an increase in both salience and capabilities would again prompt an organization to take on the primary role, whereas a conflict with lower salience and/or an organization with lower capabilities would take on the secondary role in a mission. I also expected again that the presence of a regional hegemon in an RO would increase the likelihood of taking on the primary role due to its increased ability to overcome the collective action problem.

Finally, I considered the success of peace missions. I defined peace mission success simplistically, referring to either the resolution of conflict for peace enforcement missions, or the prevention of civil war recurrence for peacekeeping missions. I expected that the capabilities of organizations would again exert a significant effect, as more capable organizations would be better equipped to divert significant funds to peace missions and increase their chances of success. In multi-actor missions, alternatively, organizations continue to face an incentive to freeride off of the other partnered organization. This incentive is exacerbated in those conflicts with multiple coordinating actors, as freeriding may be more difficult to discover and punish. As a result, I expected that missions conducted with an increased number of interveners would be less likely to achieve peace mission success.

This framework explains the motivation behind the behavior of organizations in respect to peace missions and informs the current conflict management literature. Currently, the most studies of where peace missions are sent and how successful they are focus on observable conflict variables (such as battle deaths, refugees, etc.), and some disaggregate the types of peace missions into peacekeeping and peace enforcement. However, by examining the decision-making structure of organizations, a more complete understanding of success can be achieved.

8.2. Empirical Findings

The empirical analyses in this study can be presented through the following major findings. First, the most robust finding throughout the study is the influence of a regional hegemon within a regional organization. The presence of a privileged actor within the RO
increases the likelihood of peace mission establishment and of taking on the primary role in a peace mission. This finding continues to be robust through several checks and variations. The importance of a regional hegemon in an RO cannot be understated, as it clearly exerts a strong positive influence on the ability of an RO to overcome the intra-actor collective action problem. This examination was a focus throughout each quantitative chapter, as well as an important indicator in my case study of Sierra Leone.

Another important finding demonstrates the effects of economic salience on the likelihood of regional organizations establishing peace missions, and the lack of significant effect of political salience. Based on my theory, I expected regional organizations to overcome the collective action problem as both the economic and political salience increased. Variables capturing the economic salience, specifically a drop in trade levels and a drop in the total levels of FDI in a conflict state, supported this hypothesis in Chapter 4. As levels of trade decrease, an RO is significantly more likely to establish a peace mission in pursuit of the club good available to its member states, namely that of economic benefits or lack of economic negative consequences.

The political salience of a conflict did not exert the same effect. Regional organizations were not prompted to establish peace missions as the total number of battle deaths increased. Although occasionally significant, the levels of dyadic refugees between the member states of an RO and the conflict state were also not significant, measured in both an average and a maximum value for its member states. This suggests that although refugees might matter in some conflicts, the finding is not robust.

The lack of effects regarding political salience contains interesting implications for the behavior of regional organizations. ROs are not motivated by deteriorating political and humanitarian crises within a conflict state, as demonstrated by the analyses in Chapter 4, and are only occasionally motivated by an increase in the number of refugees. These results appear to show that ROs are not moved to act based solely on humanitarian crises, as long as the costs of the humanitarian crisis are contained within the conflict state. However, a large number of refugees can begin to exert costs on a member state, which might explain this
particular finding. Regardless, it is clear that the primary motivator of regional organizations is an increase in economic salience. The requirement of economic incentives for an RO to overcome the collective action problem is particularly important.

In contrast to the incentives of ROs, the findings in reference to the UN’s establishment of peace missions falls in line with much of the previous literature demonstrating the UN’s commitment to prevent human suffering. The UN establishes peace missions in those conflicts most severe, measured by the number of refugees produced and the duration of conflict. Furthermore, a particularly interesting finding deals with the relationship between the UN and the inter-actor collective action problem. I expected the UN to suffer from the incentive to freeride, which would result in a decreased likelihood of peace missions as the number of potential interveners increased. However, the UN is actually significantly more likely to intervene in a conflict as the number of potential interveners increases. Furthermore, it is more likely to send a peace mission to those conflicts in which one has already been established, further contradicting the expectation of freeriding. If the UN is not subject to the collective action problem as traditionally identified, this has important policy implications for how the UN might strategically manage its resources so as to exert as strong an influence as possible throughout worldwide civil conflicts.

In regards to coordination of missions, the important findings still center around the importance of the regional hegemon and the propensity of the UN to increase its role in the conflict when the humanitarian crisis worsens. However, the UN also exhibits interesting behavior in regards to its choice of primary or secondary roles. Although the number of observations in this chapter is particularly small and substantially limits what generalizable conclusions we can make, the UN tends to take on the secondary role when the joint organization is capable of handling the primary role, either through their own capabilities or through the contributions of the UN and third parties. By providing support for those missions with other interested interveners, the UN can then divert its resources to other missions (Gaibulloev, Sandler & Shimizu 2009).

Interestingly, a non-finding throughout the study fails to demonstrate any positive
effect that the capabilities of a regional organization exert on its likelihood to either establish peace missions or take on the coordinating role. I measured capabilities throughout in various ways, including both an absolute CINC average and maximum value of regional organizations in addition to a dummy variable indicating whether an organization would be considered generally 'strong' or generally 'weaker.' Despite various robustness checks of both average levels of CINC, max levels of CINC, and the dummy indicator, almost all models resulted in an increase in capabilities resulting in a strong, negative effect on the likelihood of the organization establishing a peace mission and taking on the primary role.

This is contrary to how I expected stronger organizations to behave, based on the theory. More capable organizations, particularly those very capable organizations such as NATO or the EU, could also be considered a privileged actor similar to the UN and able to provide peace missions at a higher rate. However, the results demonstrate this is not the case. Furthermore, the coding mechanism of CINC scores are not driving these results either, as the dummy variable indicator continued to be robust through various checks. This further supports two previously discussed findings. First, economic incentives are a necessary motivation for ROs to establish a peace mission. Even the most capable of regional actors is not able to provide a public good without the potential acquisition of economic club goods for its membership, despite its possible status as a privileged actor. Although UN action can be motivated solely by humanitarian crises, ROs require additional incentives.

Furthermore, this supports the previously discussed strategic motivation on behalf of the UN. The UN can partner with more capable organizations interested in economic club goods through secondary roles, while it can take on the primary roles or solo missions in those areas more in need. For example, the UN regularly partners with the Organisation for African Unity/African Union in the secondary role in particularly severe African civil conflicts. The UN may view this as increased cooperation between the two organizations, or perhaps the UN strategically views these partnerships as training for future missions in the hopes that the AU will soon be able to conduct its own peace missions. This would subsequently reduce the necessary costs to the UN.
Finally, my third quantitative chapter examines the success of peace missions. Of four hypotheses, none were fully supported in this chapter. Unfortunately, the indicators for the different types of missions also showed no significance on either the duration of civil war or the duration of peace, except for the effects of solo RO peace enforcement missions on civil war duration. Although capabilities do increase the likelihood that a mission is successful in peace enforcement, it exerts no effects on peacekeeping. Furthermore, the presence of a regional hegemon loses its robustness in this chapter, failing to reach significance in either set of missions.

Although the results appear to poorly reflect peace missions conducted by the UN and ROs, I argue some of these results can be attributed to data creation. Previous studies have disaggregated UN missions into several types, applying significant resources into properly coding the activities of each UN mission. However, no such disaggregation exists for RO missions. I was therefore only able to put indicators into the model for each category of mission based on who the actors were, rather than what the goals and activities of a mission were. As a result, although the effectiveness of peace missions appears low, further research is needed before more concrete conclusions can be reached.

8.3. Avenues for Future Research

This research conducted in this dissertation builds upon and challenges previous research to inform the study of conflict management, international organizations, and the broader field of political science. However, like any good scientific study, it proposes more questions than it answers. In this section, I discuss the specific avenues of future research proposed within this dissertation as well as what possible questions still remain within the broader literature of conflict management.

Perhaps the most glaringly obvious need in future research is to increase the number of years covered in the dataset. Recent updates to control variables, civil war datasets, and available information on UN peace missions make this task possible. Expanding the dataset through 2002-present will include additional missions by both the UN and other regional organizations, which will increase the generalizability of our claims. Although 'we cannot
add more wars,’ as a dear professor of mine used to say, a temporal expansion of the data will lend more support to our findings and implications. Specifically, the inclusion of post-2002 will include multiple missions conducted by the African Union, including both coordinated and solo missions. The increasing experience of the AU with peace missions will create an interesting dynamic with the UN to study in the future regarding the negotiations and bargaining during the coordination process.

In addition to the temporal expansion of the data, additional focus on the specific types of peace missions regional organizations implement would inform studies of conflict management. This study only disaggregates the missions into peace enforcement and peacekeeping missions based solely on the timing of the conflict at which they were established. However, as previously mentioned, much work has been devoted to disaggregating the types of UN missions into specific categories, dividing them according to their operations and objectives (Doyle & Sambanis 2000, Doyle & Sambanis 2006, Fortna 2003). Perhaps these same categories can be applied to RO missions, or perhaps the nature of ROs require a new set of criteria. Regardless, the disaggregation of regional organization missions will inform each aspect of the peace mission process.

The specific process of coordinating between multiple organizations in peace missions comprises another future area of research. This dissertation only touched upon the coordination of international and regional organizations, focusing primarily on whether an organization maintained within its own members a motivation to either take on the primary role or freeride off of the other actor in the secondary role. However, certainly many additional factors affect this process. At least two distinct pathways of research stem from this coordination process. First, future studies can examine the inter-actor negotiating process by which peace missions are established. Empirical findings from Chapter 4 suggest that the UN is more likely to establish a peace mission if a regional organization is already present. Perhaps in addition to humanitarian concerns, the UN agrees to enter the conflict and establish a peacekeeping mission so long as a regional organization first enforces an end to the conflict. This pre-mission process was outside the scope of this study, but a recent
example that could support this hypothesis would be that of Somalia. The AU established a small mission in Somalia with the expectation and agreement that the UN would soon send peacekeepers to take on the primary role once the conflict had lessened, yet no UN mission is yet present. The coordination process between organizations can be examined in much greater detail.

In addition to the coordination process between organizations, the decision-making of regional organizations in relation to conflict management can be further examined. Many of the decision-making processes of regional organizations were left unexamined in this study. However, intra-actor bargaining between member states, specifically in relation to club goods versus the acquisition of private goods that might only benefit one member state, can provide valuable insights into the actions of regional organizations. This intra-actor decision-making process can also inform studies that examine UN decision-making, as the decisions of regional organizations and those of the UN are inherently intertwined in regards to conflict management. If the UN knows certain types of ROs are subject to intra-actor collective failure based on processes in addition to the presence or absence of a regional hegemon, it may be more likely to establish a peace mission within that RO’s jurisdiction.

This study only disaggregated the types of regional organizations based on the presence or absence of a regional hegemon, the distribution of the capabilities of the member states, and the number of member states belonging to the RO. Outside of these factors, I assumed that each organization maintained equal mechanisms through which peace missions could be established. However, this is an over-simplification of the multiple types of regional organizations. As ROs continue to expand, both in size and in number, further identification of specific RO “regime” types will inform future studies of RO behavior. Voting mechanisms, specific information regarding meetings, and the frequency of member state interaction are only a very small list of the factors that might provide additional insight into explaining and predicting specific regional organization decision-making. Therefore, further research into RO types and mechanisms is certainly warranted.

Finally, this study prompts several additional questions regarding the implementation
and success of peace missions. Previous studies tend to focus on the bilateral relationship between the organization conducting a peace mission, whether a UN or third-party mission, and the conflict state. However, this bilateral relationship is built on a false framework. The increasing prevalence of regional organizations challenges these assumptions, as ROs are continually partnering with the UN in peace missions. Furthermore, as I discussed in the previous chapter with relation to Sierra Leone, the UN has demonstrated a preference to provide regional organizations or other actors with the resources and funds necessary to implement a peace mission rather than undertake the risk itself. This is in conjunction with the increased use of less costly troops from developing states to staff peace missions rather than more expensive soldiers from Western democracies (Gaibulloev, Sandler & Shimizu 2009). Although I argue that this is strategic behavior on behalf of the UN that allows it to send its own missions to those places most in need that have a low likelihood of an RO establishing a peace mission, the increased delegation of the UN in regards to peacekeeping cannot be ignored.

Finally, other regional organizations and third parties are continuing to support ROs engaging in peace missions. The United States, the United Nations, and the European Union all gave financial support to ECOMOG when it fought the civil conflicts in Sierra Leone and Liberia. The US also provided aid and non-lethal weapons to ECOMOG troops. These contributions will affect not only the success of peace missions and subsequently the conflict management literature, but the study of civil war recurrence as well. Additional research that expands the scope of the post-conflict environment and examines the actions of the international community as a whole will provide great levels of insight into peace mission success and civil war recurrence.

8.4. Policy Implications

In this section, I provide a discussion of the policy implications of the dissertation. I discuss two primary aspects of policies: those with respect to UN missions, and those with respect to RO missions, examining both the implications for the organization itself as well as for the international community. Many important policy implications can be derived
from the empirical results of this dissertation, particularly as the number of peace missions continues to grow along with the number of regional organizations.

First, UN policymakers can now better predict which civil wars might attract peace missions from regional organizations, and which will attract little to no international attention. As a result, the UN is better equipped to provide the public good of international peacekeeping and focus on those conflicts with a very low likelihood of any peace missions. By knowing the economic motivations of ROs, the UN will be better able to predict their decision-making and act accordingly.

In regards to the UN itself, it is important for the UN to examine its own peacekeeping mechanisms and ensure they are optimally designed for effectiveness in conflict management. The statistically significant effects of UN peace missions are not easily ascertained, which may call into question its true abilities as a peacekeeping organization. Furthermore, it is important for the UN to fully consider whether the trend of “outsourcing” peacekeeping to regional organizations is a sustainable one for the near future. If regional organizations prove to be as effective as the UN at forging and sustaining peace, then perhaps the UN will be able to effectively manage its resources. However, if ROs prove to be less effective than UN missions, then the UN may need to reevaluate whether it should continue pursuing this option. Perhaps substantial training for ROs interested in conducting solo peace missions might increase effectiveness, or perhaps a simple increase in resources could greatly increase the likelihood of success.

Finally, the UN must consider its current tendency to allow ROs to force a peace and follow it by taking over the peacekeeping portion. If the efforts of the RO during the conflict exert no significant effects after on the duration of peace, then the RO missions may be a significant mismanagement of resources. While I do not subscribe to the ’let them fight’ mentality, it may be necessary to restructure RO peace enforcement missions in an effort to create a post-conflict environment more equipped for a stable peace.

In relation to regional organizations, ROs should be mindful of the current tendencies of the UN to encourage non-UN peace missions. Without guarantees from the UN or other
outside actors about the contribution of resources, it is important for regional organizations to carefully consider whether their involvement will exert any significant effect on the civil war. Peace missions are particularly expensive for small regional organizations, which often consist of primarily developing states. Before committing a vast amount of resources, ROs should consider the likely outcomes.

Regional organizations should also take special care to construct their institutions in such a manner to guard against unilateral decision-making by a regional hegemon. As demonstrated in this dissertation, the presence of a regional hegemon significantly increases the likelihood of commitment to a peace mission. However, this does not increase the likelihood of success. ROs may face significant international audience costs if a peace mission ends in disaster. Therefore, it is important to carefully consider whether adequate resources are available to truly engage in a peace mission, or whether the mission is based on the economic incentives of the hegemon.


Barbieri, Katherine & Omar Keshk. N.d. Correlates of War Project Trade Data Set Codebook, Version 3.0.

URL: http://correlatesofwar.org


De Jonge Oudraat, Chantal. 1996. The United Nations and Internal Conflict. In *The Inter-


