

TOWARD SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES IN HOSTAGE  
SITUATIONS: CASE STUDY APPROACH AND  
FUTURE RECOMMENDATIONS

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In the last four decades, hostage situations have rapidly increased in the world due to the threat of terrorism and other social problems. The goals of hostage takers are to achieve certain political, criminal, and/or social benefits through hostage situations. It is not only a police problem but also a governmental problem.

Police apply either negotiation or tactical intervention in hostage situations to recover hostages without bloodshed or loss of life. Success in this endeavor is based on effective negotiation. The purposes of this study are to analyze the major actors and their roles in hostage situations, to identify effective negotiation strategies and tools, and to provide some future recommendations for governments, police agencies, and researchers for peaceful resolutions in hostage situations.

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# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

### Introduction

A hostage taking incident is a common type of situation that police are forced to confront. In the past, the police most commonly used tactical operations to end hostage situations, often resulting the loss of lives of hostages, but in the last few decades there has been a change in favor of negotiation in hostage situations. This thesis, titled 'Toward Successful Negotiation Strategies in Hostage Situations: Case Studies and Future Recommendations,' will cover successful negotiation strategies that have been developed and are currently employed by modern police agencies.

### Purpose and Research Issues

The main purpose for this study is to make a contribution to police agencies' negotiation strategies as well as some critical recommendations for government policies in hostage situations and future studies in those situations.

Poor police applications in hostage situations are criticized by the media, the public, and the government, especially when the situation ends with deaths and/or injuries to hostages and police officers. Unfortunately, many people lost their lives during the poor police applications to situations in the past. According to Michalowski and his colleagues, the past experiences showed that police tactical team application to hostage situations is not a successful means of saving hostages' lives. However, there is one way, an effective negotiation strategy, to save people's lives (Michalowski, Kersten, Koperczak, Matvin, Szpakowicz & Connolly, 1988); as Gettinger mentions,

roughly 80% of the people killed in hostage situations lose their lives during police tactical team applications rather than negotiations. This shows that tactical team intervention is the last resort in situations, whereas negotiation is the best option to use in volatile hostage situations (As cited in Michalowski et al., 1988). Effective hostage negotiation techniques are implemented by professional and well-educated hostage negotiator teams in all types of situations, such as hostage, non-hostage-barricaded, hostage-barricaded, suicidal, and kidnapping situations. Fortunately, today police agencies are aware of negotiation strategies' value and importance in ending the situations without death and/or injury on the part of the major actors in the situations. Accordingly, this researcher examines the major actors and their crucial roles in typical hostage situations, identifying the dynamics of successful negotiation strategies of police negotiators. In addition, the uses of special skills, tools, and central strategies of police negotiators to promote effective resolutions are discussed.

Three principal points have been examined by the researcher to make useful recommendations for the future. First, historical analysis was employed to better understand hostage takers' approaches and police applications to negotiation. This gives a broader understanding of the components of hostage situations, based on a historical background. It has been reviewed carefully to enhance the negotiations of the police in the future.

Second, greater cooperation between police and researchers will help improve resolutions and cease situations without losing hostages. Unfortunately, the majority of researchers are not interested in hostage situations. Police lack vital research studies to

enhance their negotiating practices. One of the critical aims of this study is to encourage more cooperation between police and researchers.

Third, this study focuses on typical hostage-taking resolutions by police, particularly American police. It is hoped that Americans' broad perspectives can provide useful contributions to the Turkish National Police as well as many other countries' police agencies. Therefore, in order to show successful negotiation strategies, the researcher has used a case study approach to prove how a negotiation strategy is valuable and effective for saving lives. Especially, the researcher expects to enhance negotiation strategies of Turkish law enforcement agencies. In addition, the researcher recommends a one-week course schedule for Turkish police negotiators, taking into account their own cultural values and characteristics in this study.

There are two avenues to cover the research purposes:

1. Provide a comprehensive description of the major actors and their roles in hostage situations.
2. Identify successful negotiation strategies in a case study approach.

#### Overview of the Following Chapters

This research is composed of five chapters: introduction; definitions, history, and literature review; methodology, research issues, and limitations; successful negotiation strategies supported by five case studies; and a summary with recommendations for future studies.

The first chapter consists of the introduction of the research. It is the road map for the readers. This chapter gives the idea of the purpose of the research, what the research issues are, and the general overview of the following chapters.

The second chapter consists of the literature review. In addition, the definitions of some police terminology, the history of the general hostage situation concept, the major actors, and their roles in typical hostage situations are discussed. In the definition part, thirteen different police terms which are frequently used in this research are defined to promote understanding of the whole concept of the research. In the history part, there are three different generations of hostage resolutions. The first generation of hostage resolution is based on tactical team intervention, the second generation of hostage resolution on negotiation, and the current generation of hostage resolution on crisis negotiators' efforts. They are reviewed to standardize explanations in the literature review. In addition, they help to understand the evolution of police applications to hostage situations from the past to the present.

After explaining the history, the three major actors (hostage negotiators, hostage takers, and hostages) and their roles and associations are reviewed in considering a typical hostage situation. The first major actor is the negotiator team. They are the foremost actors in the situations. The negotiation team employs some special skills and tools during the negotiation, such as active listening skills, role playing, and external assistance from mental health professionals. The second major actor is the hostage taker. Their typologies are also considered. They consist of the five types: terrorists, criminals, inmates, the mentally ill and the emotionally disturbed. Each has different characteristics and distinct challenges for hostage resolution professionals. Finally, the last major actor is the 'hostage'. Hostages are taken and held against their free will by hostage takers in order to make demands and/or exact ransom. In many hostage situations, it has frequently been observed that hostages develop the Stockholm

syndrome, which is characterized by a close attachment by the hostages to hostage takers in order to survive during sieges.

In the third chapter, the research purposes, issues, methodology, and limitations of the study are analyzed. There are two issues that will aid police agencies' efforts in resolving hostage-related sieges and promote better cooperation between researchers and police agencies. This will facilitate further studies of hostage sieges. The methodology of the research is based on the literature review and the comparative case study approach. The limitations are based on the lack of involvement and interest of researchers in hostage related crisis.

The fourth chapter covers the successful negotiation concept and how it is employed by negotiators against persistent hostage takers. Actually, negotiation is the preferred tactic, whereas tactical intervention is the last resort for police agencies. In order to make sense and for consistency, rules of hostage negotiation are followed by all police negotiators. However, if negotiation does not work, or it becomes complicated, tactical team intervention has been used to bring these situations to an end.

In addition, the fourth chapter is also the examination of four important cases. Some of the cases are known as cornerstones due to their importance to police agencies. They are (1) the Munich Olympic Games hostage situation, 1972, (2) the Balcombe Street Siege, 1975, (3) the Iranian Embassy Siege, 1980, and (4) the Branch of Davidians Barricade-Standoff, Waco. In this chapter, every case is analyzed for its own characteristics and difficulties first. Later, the comparison table of the studies was developed by the researcher in order to evaluate them better in the light of the literature review's contribution to the study.

In the final chapter, a brief summary and some recommendations for police agencies, governments, and researchers are made by the researcher. Additionally, the researcher recommends a one-week schedule for an initial training course for the Turkish National Police. This schedule is based on the American and Canadian law enforcement agencies' practices and techniques taking into account the Turkish community, the Turkish National Police and hostage takers' characteristics.

## CHAPTER 2

### DEFINITIONS, HISTORY, AND LITERATURE REVIEW OF HOSTAGE SITUATIONS

The second chapter is comprised of the literature review. The chapter focuses on some terminology that police frequently use, the history of hostage incidents, the major actors, and their roles in situations. In a typical situation, there are three major actors: (1) hostages negotiators, (2) hostage takers, and (3) hostages.

#### Definitions

The most commonly used nomenclatures throughout the thesis are defined in the definition part of the second chapter. There are thousands of police agencies, in which different terminology might have been used to describe their own police activities in approaching hostage situations. In addition, some books and articles used by the researcher as sources were written three or four decades ago; it might be noticed by the reader that some of the terminology of these sources is no longer used in police literature. Therefore, the major aim of the definition part is to make clearer both the key concept of the argument and the recommendations for future studies.

#### *Hostage Negotiator Team (HNT)*

One of the crucial actors of a command post structure, which manages hostage situations, is negotiator team. This team initiates and maintains the verbal conversation with hostage takers through effective negotiation skills. Current negotiators employ their negotiation skills in all types of hostage, non-hostage and crisis situations to resolve



them peacefully. Negotiation art is not a task that can be handled through only one individual's skills and efforts; it is professional police teamwork (Noesner, 1998).

There are at least three negotiators in the command post structure, depending on a particular hostage situation's characteristics, and there might be the need for more than three negotiators for the command post to end a particular hostage situation successfully. The first negotiator initiates and operates the negotiation, and the second provides critical help and instructions to maintain the focus of the ongoing negotiation. The last negotiator serves as the negotiation team leader. The team leader provides coordination between the command post and his team. Consequently, the team's major aim is to convince hostage takers to surrender peacefully; additionally, the team has a second role, their tactical role. If the negotiation does not work and the use of deadly force is required, then the team's role is to make hostage takers less prepared and less careful by keeping them busy on the phone. The aim is to decrease their defenses and to prevent them from hurting any of the hostages. By being on the phone, the hostage takers are kept busy through the ongoing negotiation so that the tactical team can intervene unexpectedly (Noesner, 1998).

#### *Police Tactical Team (PTT)*

The tactical team is another crucial part of the command post. Sometimes its presence alone is a type of threat and intimidation for perpetrators. The perpetrators understand that if they harm hostages, they may be killed by the tactical team. The tactical team watches every movement of the perpetrators. If the mission requires it, the team attacks the perpetrators (McMains & Mullins, 1996). In other words, if a situation involves an extreme threat to the hostages, the PTT resolves the incident by using their

special techniques and devices/tools. The team consists of several units: the attack, arrest, rescue, sniper/observer and perimeter organizing units. The team leader controls each unit very carefully and provides the coordination between the command post and all the team units (Burns, Jones & Morris, 2002).

### *Incident Commander (IC)*

The incident commander is the most important actor in the command post structure. The incident commander is the central actor, whereas the HNT and the PTT leaders are the secondary actors in the command post structure. He has the final decision on any actions required to resolve the problem. Both teams work together and cooperate by exchanging information by way of the IC's organization and control; as a result, any probable conflict can be prevented before it happens. In order to make sure that everything is under control, the IC is informed about all information gathered by the negotiator team and every movement made by the tactical team or the hostage takers (Chavez, Canadian Police College Course Manual). The IC is in charge of the entire operation throughout the incident, including the coordination of the two teams, the relationship with media, and logistics.

### *Mental Health Professional (MHP)*

Psychologists/psychoanalysts have been frequently employed as consultants in police activities since the 1960s and 1970s. Important progress with employing them has been made in hostage incidents. The psychologists in situations might decrease the loss of life. They help police during situations by providing the negotiators with the hostage takers' psychological conditions, general pathologies, and characteristics. If they participate in a negotiator training course before they work in the field, they can

make valuable contributions to the police (Webster, Canadian Police College Course Manual). MHPs they share their therapeutic approaches with negotiators to handle unstable hostage situations peacefully (Slatkin, 1996).

#### *Command Post (CP)*

The command post, which is the command structure in a hostage incident, is comprised of the three foremost actors, the IC, the HNT leader, and the PTT leader (Burns et al., 2002). When the IC arrives at the incident, the command post is set up by the police to apply their techniques immediately (McMains & Mullins, 1996). Since it is the management unit in a hostage incident, its location must be very close to the scene. Moreover, its place must be suitable for electronic devices, and other equipments, such as police radios. It must be a safe location in terms of any possible attack, ambush, and other dangers. The command post location should have enough rooms for any other requirements, such as a lavatory (Iannone & Iannone, 2001).

#### *First Responding Officer (FRO)*

The first responding police officer is basically the individual who arrives at a hostage location and handles the situation first. The FRO usually holds his position, takes immediate measures, such as evacuating innocent people from the location, and calls the specialists to deal with the perpetrators. The beginning of every hostage situation is very critical and unsteady because hostage takers are usually very distraught, angry and expressive. Therefore, the police officers are trained in many police agencies to learn how to respond to situations and not to attempt any rescue until professionals arrive at the location (Dolan & Noesner, 1992).

### *Hostage Taker*

Knowing the general typologies of hostage takers is very important to professionals to establish a right process and strategy. There five types of hostage takers (Miller, 1980), such as terrorist, inmate, criminal, emotionally disturbed and mentally ill hostage takers ((McNeilly, personal communication). As Fuselier reveals, every hostage taker has some type of demand, and they might have different types of demands. Their demands might vary from escaping prison to demanding some concessions, such as money (As cited in Mc Mains & Mullins, 1996). In summary, the demands might have political, financial, or social aims (Regini, 2002).

### *Hostage*

In a typical hostage situation, hostages are held by hostage takers in a place against their will until some types of demands are met (Regini, 2002). In other words, captives are taken and frightened by their captors to compel either government officials, police, or third parties give in to their demands and/or provide ransom. In hostage situations, the threat level of hostage takers might change appropriate to the situation's own dangers and characteristics. For example, if a hostage taker is a husband who is angry with his wife and takes his own son as a hostage, he is probably going to be less dangerous to his hostage (Fuselier, Van Zandt & Lanceley, 1991). Unfortunately, any person might be a victim of hostage takers for any types of demands. Also, kidnapping and abduction are very frequent crimes today because these crimes have been accepted as usual events by some countries and their citizens (Katz & Caspi, 2003).

### *Suicidal Subject*

There are numerous causes and motivations for people to end their lives, such as miscommunication with other people, depression, medical problems, alcoholism, drug addiction, and/or other reasons (Greenstone & Leviton, 1979). Understanding suicidal situations is not easy due to the situations' complex structures. Therefore, hostage professionals study suicidal persons' characteristics and the proper handling of them. Fortunately, negotiators might see some indications that show a person will commit suicide, such as some special words and gestures. However, the best way to learn if he will commit suicide is asking the subjects directly whether he intends to commit suicide (Lanceley, 2003).

### *Barricaded Person*

As the Austin Police Department describes, a barricaded person locks himself in a place; he might have a weapon to frighten innocent people. A barricaded person might be a perpetrator who, during his criminal activity, ends up locking himself in because of various reasons, or he might barricade himself in a safe place against other people and police (As cited by McMains & Mullins, 1996). A barricaded person, either alone or with hostages, is usually more likely to commit suicide. Police always take this into consideration during negotiations (Divasto, Lanceley & Gruys, 1992). The barricaded person is more likely to have expressive feelings. He might want to commit suicide to create public awareness of his problems (McMains & Mullins, 1996).

### *Typical Hostage Taking Situation and Kidnapping*

The kidnapping and typical hostage situations are accepted as two general types of hostage situations. Both types have disparate purposes and motivations. The

captives are taken by kidnapers in secretive hideaways for some type of ransom in a typical kidnapping (Aston, 1982). Negotiation is possible only when kidnapers make initial contact with the police. This means that it can be started and terminated by the kidnapers at any moment; therefore, the negotiation usually proceeds slowly. In typical hostage situations, hostages, however, are held by hostage takers in a place surrounded by the police. Therefore, the negotiation can be directly initiated by the police. In some cases, a kidnapping might turn into a hostage situation. First, if the kidnapers' hideaway is found by police, then the kidnapping is converted into a hostage situation. Second, if the kidnapers are not successful in their abduction, the kidnapping might be unintentionally converted into a hostage situation. Third, if criminals do not have any plan to take hostages, but their intended criminal action fails, such as in a bank robbery, they might take hostages to make a safe escape (Jenkins, Johnson & Ronfeldt, 1977).

### *Terrorism*

Terrorism is the prearranged hostile and intimidation behaviors of a group of people who want to gain some political concessions from governments and/or innocent people (MacWillson, 1992). As Russell and his colleagues say, intimidation, threats, using fear and applying force against innocent people are some dominant strategies of terrorist organizations (As cited in Sandler & Scott, 1987). There are some key characteristics; (1) terrorists are more likely to have strong motivations as a result of their rational choices. They attempt to promote their ideologies by carrying out their criminal activities; (2) they might take advantage of international politics and strategies;

their actions are more likely to be based on global perception; (3) anybody might be used as their targets to get their political aims (MacWillson, 1992).

The crucial question is who they are or what types of people become parts of their organizations. Even though every terrorist individual might have a different type of motivation and/or social concepts that are part of their terrorist attacks, there are still some accepted general personality and character traits that characterize terrorists. First, terrorist organizations usually consist of young members. These adolescents and young people are trained by other senior members. Second, many of them are well-educated people. Third, interestingly, most terrorist organizations have female members. Today they are more likely to play crucial roles in terrorist activities. Fourth, terrorists enact their criminal activities in separated small groups; this is done to prevent arrest of the entire group (MacWillson, 1992).

Terrorists' purposes might be defined within some general classifications. Indeed, they might attempt to revolutionize or to modify governments' general policies (long term strategy). They attempt to get monetary gains to maintain future activities, or attempt to gain safe release of their captured fellow members from government prisons (short term strategies). Committing crimes, such as bank robberies and hostage taking/kidnapping situations, offers them the money to continue their future activities. In addition, terrorism has been defined as an international crime because it grows through terrorists' collaboration and networks (MacWillson, 1992).

## Historical Overview

Historically, the holding of hostages is a very old type of criminal behavior. In fact, it was described in the Old Testament that some groups of warrior people held captives to achieve their goals, such as defeating their enemies or getting more spoils of battle. In this century, nothing has changed about this crime. Indeed, the taking of hostages is still employed as an effective means to get some benefits by perpetrators (McMains & Mullins, 1996).

According to some police studies, roughly two thousand innocent people were taken as hostages by different types of hostage takers in the world in this century (Poland & McCrystle, 1999). Hostage taking incidents have dramatically increased in the last four decades in the United States (Hatcher, Mohandie, Turner & Gelles, 1998). Therefore, dealing with hostage incidents and persistent hostage takers has been one of the major focuses of police activities (Regini, 2002).

As Goldaber states, a number of terrorist hostage situations have happened, especially in the 1960s and 1970s. Hostage incidents were a major threat to public safety in those years. For example, hijacking was one of the common crimes committed by terrorist organizations in those years (As cited in Hatcher et al., 1998). Because of a number of either terrorism-motivated or other types of hostage situations, the criminal justice system in the U.S. has been obligated to do something about hostage situations (Poland & McCrystle, 1999). Moreover, in accordance with the directives of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice in 1967, police agencies increased their performance against hostage takers and their criminal activities (McMains & Mullins, 1996).



Consequently, in the first generation of hostage resolution, the tactical team intervention was more likely to be used by police agencies against politically motivated hostage takers in the 1960s and 1970s (Hatcher et al., 1998). On the other hand, negotiation was more likely to be used by police agencies in the second generation of hostage resolution. Crisis negotiators focus on a broad range of hostage situations, such as barricade, suicidal, hostage/barricade, and kidnapping situations in the current generation of hostage resolution (Call, 2003).

### *First Generation of Hostage Resolution*

The tactical team's presence is warning hostage takers. They think that if they harm their hostages, they might be killed by the tactical team. The tactical team observes every movement of hostage takers and/or attacks them if required throughout a situation (McMains & Mullins, 1996).

As a result of some recommendations and directives to police agencies, the paramilitary approach was developed against persistent hostage takers in hostage situations by police agencies in the 1960s. The first tactical police team/emergency response team was created by the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) to fight against persistent hostage takers in 1967 (Call, 2003). Using tactical police team intervention against perpetrators was the best and most familiar practice since the negotiation process was not effectively developed until the 1970s. In those years, when police officers faced hostage situations, three options were available. First, initiate the informal conversation with perpetrators to convince them to release the hostages unharmed. Second, leave hostage takers alone to allow them to escape from the

surrounded scene in order to save hostages' lives. Third, use effective tactical police team intervention (Hatcher et al, 1998; Call, 2003).

In the 1960s, tactical intervention (the third option) was most commonly used in extreme situations. As Soskis and Van Zandt report, hijacking incidents were very frequent in the 1970s because of terrorist motivations. Unfortunately, many hostages, hostage takers, and police officers were killed in those incidents since the tactical team intervention usually involved violent confrontation. For example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) used the tactical team intervention in a hijacking incident in October 1971; as a result, both hostages and hostage takers were killed in this incident. Another example is the Munich Olympics situation in 1972. Unfortunately, 22 people, including hostages, hostage takers and police officers were killed in the resolution of this situation (As cited in Hatcher et al., 1998; Call, 2003).

After the tactical police team approach became popular with police agencies, it was known as the first generation of hostage resolution in the 1960s and 1970s. In other words, as McMains and Mullins report, the first generation of hostage resolution focused on the tactical team intervention against politically motivated terrorists in the 1960s and 1970s (Hatcher et al., 1998).

#### *Police Tactical Team Intervention*

Tactical team members are selected from among the volunteer officers who have worked as regular police officers for at least five years in the field. In the recruits' backgrounds, there shouldn't be police brutality, excessive use of force or abuse against citizens. However, they should be able to use deadly force if the team work requires it to be used against perpetrators in tactical operations. Recruits should be in

good shape and physical condition for a tactical team mission in the field. If recruits have these essential requirements, they are sent for psychological testing and an interview by police instructors. In conclusion, they perform their abilities in role playing scenarios in training courses in order to become a member of a tactical team. In addition, the sniper/observer unit works as a part of a tactical team in hostage situations. This unit consists of two SWAT team members trained as sniper and observer. In other words, they back each other up and they can switch their positions in accordance with the mission. A sniper/observer unit deploys in a good location to give important information about perpetrators or make a clear shot if required. Sometimes they wait for many days or hours to hear an order from the tactical team leader or incident commander (Poland & McCrystle, 1999).

A tactical team has many responsibilities in incidents. In fact, upon coming to the situation location, they make safe an inner perimeter by evacuating people from the location immediately and deploying the team members around the place, including sniper/observer units. They provide intelligence about perpetrators and the situation to the command post throughout the negotiation phase. Furthermore, they take measures to prevent the escape of hostage takers from the location and prevent any back up of families of hostages or released hostages. If it is an order of the command post, they deliver food, medical stuff and mobile phone lines for both hostages and hostage takers (Poland & McCrystle, 1999). Moreover, while the negotiation team has been working on a peaceful resolution, the tactical team has already devised its dynamic plan. If the negotiation does not work, or becomes stalemated, negotiation is abandoned

immediately and the tactical team uses deadly force against hostage takers. They use dynamic entry through their special skills and equipments (Burns et al., 2002).

On the other hand, there are some special issues in maintaining a tactical team for police agencies. Having a tactical unit is very expensive because of its special equipment and training. They employ a variety of equipment, such as night vision devices, communication tools, special weapons/ammunition, other devices, and of course very special vehicles. In addition, sometimes politicians might interfere because of media coverage. However, the police should be very confident with their command post strategy because either the negotiation or tactical team will be able to make a safe resolution for hostages in even more complex situations (Poland & McCrystle, 1999).

#### *Second Generation of Hostage Resolution*

In the 1960s and 1970s, some hostages and hostage takers were killed in hostage situations because tactical team intervention was frequently applied by police agencies. However, the general public was not happy with the number of deaths as a result of tactical team interventions (Hatcher et al., 1998; Call, 2003). As Bolz and Hershey mention, Lieutenant Frank Bolz, a psychologist from the New York Police Department (NYPD), suggested the verbal negotiation technique to replace tactical team intervention in 1971. Clearly, it was a new policy for all police agencies (As cited in Hatcher et al., 1998).

#### *Hostage Negotiation Practice*

The NYPD initiated employment of the new negotiation practice in 1972. After the NYPD pioneered its use, the negotiation approach, which is based on professional negotiation practice, was expanded by the FBI, and it is still being used today by current

negotiators (Noesner, 1998). As Hatcher as well as Doane & Hatcher mention, the New York, San Francisco and Los Angeles Police Departments made some noteworthy contributions from the science of psychology to the negotiation doctrine for using verbal hostage intervention practice in handling hostage incidents. Furthermore, as Bell et al., state, a similar method was launched in some European countries, such as the Netherlands and U.K. in those years (As cited in Hatcher et al., 1998).

In the 1960s and 1970s, terrorist and politically motivated hostage incidents were a major threat in communities. Therefore, the first generation of hostage resolution focused on the tactical team intervention against those persistent hostage takers (Hatcher et al., 1998). As Fuselier and Strentz state, mentally ill and domestically disturbed hostage takers, however, were more frequent than terrorist hostage takers in the 1980s. Therefore, the second generation of hostage resolution focused on negotiation. As Mohandie and Albanese indicate, using effective negotiation dynamics, applying active listening skills, and arriving at peaceful solutions were the dominant strategies in the second generation of hostage resolution (As cited in Hatcher et al., 1998). Fortunately, many hostages' and hostage takers' lives have been saved through police agencies' effective negotiation practices (Regini, 2002).

As a result, police agencies have two options to resolve hostage taking incidents: (1) the negotiation process, and (2) tactical police team intervention/use of force. Today, the negotiation process is the first resort, and the tactical team intervention is the last resort; therefore, all available communication tools and a full negotiation process should be used by negotiators before using tactical team intervention (Noesner, 1998). During the negotiation process, negotiators endeavor to build rapport between hostage takers

and themselves by using some special negotiation techniques. If the negotiation process does not work to release hostages without any deaths and injuries, the negotiation process is abandoned immediately, and the tactical team takes the responsibility for using deadly force against persistent hostage takers, such as the Munich Olympics (1972) and Waco/Texas (1993) hostage situations (Goodwin, 2004).

### *Current Generation of Hostage Resolution*

According to the Hostage Barricade Statistics of the FBI (HOBAS), the majority of hostage negotiators have some experiences with traditional hostage incidents rather than more complicated incidents. In traditional incidents, hostage takers usually are not terrorists; sometimes they do not have any demands and deadlines. Since the majority of hostage negotiators seldom face more complicated incidents, they cannot handle more complex incidents because those types of incidents require well-trained negotiators. Therefore, the Crisis Negotiator Team (CNT) under FBI jurisdiction was created in order to work on more complicated hostage-related crises nationwide. Today, negotiators respond to more complicated hostage, non-hostage/barricade and kidnapping situations (Regini, 2002).

### *Negotiation Practice in Crisis*

In the second generation of hostage resolution, negotiators describe themselves as hostage negotiators. In the current generation of hostage resolution, negotiators describe themselves as crisis negotiators due to the different hostage/crisis situations that they respond to, such as hostage and non-hostage crisis situations. Depending on the characteristics of crisis incidents, there might be a change in negotiation tools and the approaches of negotiators. Well-trained crisis negotiators take into account different

characteristics: (1) hostage takers (profiling), (2) type of demands, and (3) type of hostage incident in order to respond efficiently to each incident (Call, 2003).

In fact, (1) hostage takers might be terrorists, criminals, emotionally disturbed or emotionally upset people or prisoners. (2) Demands might be substantive or non-substantive depending on the type of hostage takers. (3) The type of hostage incident depends on characteristics of perpetrators and their demands. Overall, negotiation tools and techniques of current crisis negotiators might be required to larger or lesser degrees depending on a crisis incident's different key characteristics (Call, 2003).

As a result, in the first generation of hostage resolution, officers focused on the tactical team intervention against politically motivated terrorists in the 1960s and 1970s (Hatcher et al., 1998). In the second generation of hostage resolution, negotiators describe themselves as hostage negotiators because they focused on the verbal negotiation techniques; however, in the current generation of hostage resolution, crisis negotiators focused on a broad range of hostage situations, such as barricade, hostage, suicidal, hostage/barricade and kidnapping situations (Call, 2003).

### Major Actors in Hostage Situations

In every typical hostage situation, there are three foremost participants: hostage negotiators, hostage takers, and hostages. In this section of this chapter, those three actors in hostage situations are reviewed to better illuminate the case studies and future recommendations of the following chapters.

#### *Hostage Negotiators*

In the following sections, some special requirements, skills and tools of negotiators, their selection, training courses, negotiator team structure concepts,

dealing with stress on the part of negotiators, and their relationships with mental health professionals are reviewed in order to better understand the working aspects and components of professional hostage negotiators.

Negotiating with hostage takers has its own difficulties and requires very special police skills and experience. Therefore, negotiation with hostage takers is strictly a police task that should be executed by professional hostage negotiators (Wind, 1995). Sometimes psychologists, attorneys, hostages' families, lovers, employers, or friends may suggest that they negotiate with hostage takers. However, command post professionals should not allow them to do so because negotiation officers are well-trained professionals, negotiation is a professional hostage negotiator's task, and it is a part of police operations. Negotiation should be executed only by well-trained police negotiators. Hostages, hostages' families or others should not negotiate with hostage takers, but they can provide information to a negotiator team instead of directly communicating with hostage takers (Johnson, 2002; Wind, 1995).

The earliest negotiators in the past were senior patrol officers in their local areas rather than well-trained negotiators. Maybe they performed remarkably in their endeavors; however, they lacked a professional negotiator training course. The need for a regular training course was understood after several significant hostage incidents occurred, such as the Munich Olympics incident in 1972. In hostage and crisis situations, police officers negotiate either with extremists, mentally disturbed people or criminal and terrorist groups. Thus, they need a professional training course to gain effective negotiation practices and skills (Sherman, 2002). Since the negotiation process has successfully been used as a first response for the last four decades in



hostage incidents, a negotiation course is required for negotiators before they start to work as professional negotiators in the field (Borum & Strentz, 1992).

### *Selection and Training of Negotiators*

In every hostage situation, the major goal for negotiators is to learn more information about hostage takers and their demands in order to find a solution through sympathy rather than by threatening hostage takers. It is not an easy task to accomplish because of the very complicated nature of situations and prior experiences of hostage takers with police; in fact, the majority of hostage takers have prior criminal records. Therefore, negotiators are required to be trained in professional training courses so that they can deal with even more complicated situations and persistent perpetrators (Noesner, 1997). At this point, high quality negotiation team selection procedures and negotiator training courses are significant factors in getting successful outcomes as a result of the negotiation. Today all of the police agencies are more sensitive to the negotiator selection concept and their training programs (Regini, 2002), but unfortunately roughly less than half of the police agencies have negotiator selection programs and procedures (Hammer, Van Zandt & Rogan, 1994).

As Cooper states, recruits are required to show their problem solving approach, creative talent, and thinking ability when they face very complicated hostage situations. In order to measure all of these characteristics, recruits are subjected to a written statement, a psychological exam and a personal interview by a committee of police administrators and instructors (As cited in Poland & McCrystle, 1999). Furthermore, some experts propose employing role playing scenarios to measure recruits' capabilities, bargaining skills, and also personalities. As a result, current police agencies

use either one of these techniques or a combination of them to select the best negotiators from among the recruit police officers (Poland & McCrystle, 1999).

As McMains/Mullins and Fuselier mention, there are some unwanted characteristics of recruits. For example, recruits should not have poor communication and bargaining skills. They should not have dictatorial and macho characteristics. They should not have frightened and anxious behaviors. They should not believe in using excessive or deadly force and they should not lack the ability to withstand disappointment and aggravation. In addition to these undesirable characteristics, there are some characteristics which are important for a hostage negotiator. Recruits should be able to manage their anger, feelings, and thoughts toward hostage takers. They should know the general characteristics of terrorist groups and perpetrators (As cited in Poland & McCrystle, 1999).

Besides negotiator selection process, another important point is the training program structure for police agencies. There are two types of courses: (1) an initial training course for recruits to become negotiators and (2) in-service training courses for senior (working) negotiators from the field. In current initial training courses, the major aim is to teach primary techniques to recruits. They are trained to handle incidents and a full range of situations by using role playing scenarios. Therefore, recruits are trained in human behavioral science and alternative communication strategies. Course content is based on the interactive format. Recruits are trained in interdependence relationships. The traditional guideline prepares recruits to handle basic incidents, whereas the contingent guidelines prepare senior hostage negotiators to handle more challenging incidents. In other words, in addition to the initial training courses for recruits, senior

negotiators participate in in-service courses, which are advanced level training courses, some seminars, evaluation classes, and conferences to continue improving their skills and knowledge every year (Rogan, Hammer & Van Zandt, 1997).

In both types of courses, negotiator skills have been improved with regard to legal issues, working together, coordination with the tactical team, and communication with the command post. Negotiators are trained in active listening, using negotiation tools, taking notes, and asking open-ended questions by using actual incidents' video or audio tapes during training courses. They evaluate real crisis cases in training courses. They are trained in complex psychological characteristics, personalities, general criminal characteristics, threat assessment, and avoiding making judgments about hostage takers by acting out the real case scenarios (Rogan et al., 1997).

As a result, recruits and senior negotiators have been taught not only communication skills and how to use negotiation tools but also psychological and sociological concepts of human being so that they can apply negotiation dynamics to all types of hostage takers (Regini, 2002).

#### *Role Playing in Training Courses of Negotiators*

Role playing is one of the crucial dynamics of negotiator training courses in order to improve communication skills. Roughly 80% of all hostage negotiator training courses employ the role playing tool in their programs. Since the NYPD pioneered the negotiation technique instead of tactical team intervention over three decades ago, the role playing tool has been expanded by police instructors. Negotiators rehearse building rapport with hostage takers, extending the negotiation process, helping hostage takers, and using active listening skills in order to learn how to vent hostage takers' feelings.

The role playing tool is more useful than merely observing the negotiation in the field for recruit hostage negotiators (Van Hasselt & Romano, 2004).

Some of the role-playing scenarios are drawn from real cases, such as hostage, non hostage, suicidal, barricaded and kidnapping situations. Some others are created by police instructors that are based on the likelihood of incidents happening in the future. The role playing tool has been used by the FBI for recruit negotiator training courses for a long time. The scenarios are acted out by professional actors to make it real. The FBI administration uses a mock city and professional actors in those training courses. Everything is provided as in the real world in the mock city. In courses, participants do their best to work as a team, use negotiation skills, and exchange information in role-playing scenarios (Van Hasselt & Romano, 2004).

#### *Negotiator Team Structure*

One of the most important dynamics of hostage and crisis incident management is the negotiation team. Its value must be properly understood by police agencies. In each hostage incident, hostage negotiators work as a team. A hostage negotiation team consists of at least three negotiators. Sometimes there might be more than three because of the more complex constitution of hostage incidents. Each hostage negotiator has a unique task in the team. The first negotiator negotiates with the hostage taker, while the secondary negotiator backs him up by following their ongoing conversation. The second negotiator takes notes and provides some advice for the first negotiator. He makes sure that the first negotiator is in the right process. If it is required, the second negotiator can take the first negotiator's position. The third negotiator gathers information about hostage takers and the incident. Also he might be working as

the negotiator team leader, providing the coordination between the incident commander in the command post and the negotiation team (Noesner, 1998; Regini, 2002).

Since a negotiation team needs a very quiet area for negotiation, the team usually positions itself in a different place from the command post. However, this does not prevent the negotiator team from working together with the incident commander and the tactical team. In fact, the negotiation team tries to hear every sound, and the tactical team tries to observe every movement during a hostage incident. Each team has another part of the puzzle in the game. Lack of coordination can damage the development of trust between the foremost actors of the game, such as hostage negotiators and hostage takers (Noesner, 1998; Regini, 2002).

#### *Some Special Skills and Tools of Negotiators*

There are some special skills and tools that help negotiators to make peaceful solutions during volatile confrontations. Efficient communication strategies are required for negotiators to use the negotiation techniques, skills and tools in order to build rapport between perpetrators and negotiators. Police agencies can save innocent peoples' lives through these effective negotiation means. They allow perpetrators to vent their anger and frustration through these means. These means are (a) active listening skills, (b) bargaining utilities (electricity, food, water, and blankets), and (c) situation boards.

#### *a) Active Listening Skills*

Maybe the most important tool of the negotiator is employing active listening skills in the negotiation; using active listening skills is a very effective way to rescue hostages. Active listening techniques are effectively taught in initial negotiator courses.

Every well-trained hostage negotiator is able to use active listening skills rather than excessive talking. Negotiators encourage hostage takers to talk and explain their problems and demands so that negotiators and other command post professionals can think about and evaluate demands and situations. Active listening skills are based on some effective techniques, such as “minimal encouragement, paraphrasing, mirroring, emotion labeling, open-ended questions, and I message” (Lanceley, 2003; Noesner, 1997).

First, the minimal encouragement technique consists of some precise words which are used by a negotiator to learn what a hostage taker thinks and feels. Those words might be ‘okay’, ‘when’. A negotiator gradually takes control over a hostage taker by encouraging him to keep talking. Second, the paraphrasing technique consists of restatement by a negotiator after listening and understanding what the hostage taker says. The aim is to create empathy between the two parties. If a hostage taker says that he was fired by his boss and he cannot take care of his family, the negotiator repeats that you were fired and you could not take care of your family. Third, the emotion labeling technique consists of the emotional response of a hostage negotiator. A hostage negotiator focuses on a hostage taker’s feelings, and he tries to build a rapport between him and the hostage taker. The aim is to create personal interaction with the hostage taker (Lanceley, 2003; Noesner, 1997).

Fourth, the mirroring technique consists of repeating a hostage taker’s words. This technique helps a hostage negotiator to stimulate relaxing communication with a hostage taker. It is an effective way to get more information about a hostage taker and his actions. Fifth, a hostage negotiator uses open-ended questions because it makes

conversation more comfortable and trustful rather than stressful police interrogation. Sixth, “I” message technique helps a hostage negotiator to develop a personal communication with a hostage taker rather than a police-officer-and-criminal relationship. A good hostage negotiator never uses ironic, aggressive and argumentative approaches. For example, a hostage negotiator says, “I am trying to solve your problem, but if you yell at me, I feel bad and cannot help you” (Lanceley, 2003; Noesner, 1997).

Although the active listening of negotiators seems to be a passive behavior at first, it is not. The major aim is to learn more information about hostage takers and their demands and find a solution through sympathy rather than by threatening hostage takers. It is not an easy practice because of more complicated hostage incidents and hostage takers’ prior bad experiences with police officers; the majority of hostage takers have prior criminal records. But, it is very clear that professional police negotiators can deal with even more complicated hostage incidents through the contributions of a negotiator training course and its practical means (Noesner, 1997).

If time passes without any deaths and injuries, hostage negotiators continue to use active listening skills and tools. Sometimes a negotiation process takes days or weeks, but negotiators have time for that (Goodwin, 2004). Hostage takers believe that they have power over hostages and police agencies at the very beginning of the negotiation, and they see how they are wrong later. For example, hostage takers demand a million dollar to release hostages at the beginning of a situation. However, they consent to a blanket, some food, and maybe cigarettes as a result of the negotiation (Noesner, 1998).

### *b) Controlling Utilities*

Another dynamic of the negotiation is controlling utilities as a negotiation tool. Upon coming to the hostage incident location, the command post professionals decide whether they will cut off telephones and other utilities or not. Hostage takers are usually denied telephone availability to take control over them before starting the negotiation. Since it might be very risky on the part of police officers, the negotiation team usually avoids making face-to-face communication with subjects. Therefore, after the electricity is cut off, the tactical team provides a new and secure mobile phone-line to initiate bargaining. Later, the negotiation is initiated with hostage takers by the negotiation team. In that way, hostage takers will not be able to talk with their motivation sources, friends, media, and any other people. Moreover, they will not be able to know what is being done by the tactical team around the hostage taking location because they cannot watch TV or use any other electronic devices, such as radios, due to the lack of electricity (Wind, 1995).

In some cases, other utilities, such as water and electricity, are not cut off by the police because they are used as a negotiation tool. For example, they start the bargaining and demand perpetrators release captives in exchange for not cutting the electricity off. As a result, hostage taking incident professionals decide if they will cut off utilities at the very beginning of the operation or during the negotiation (Wind, 1995).

### *c) Using a Situation-Board*

Negotiators execute several tasks during the negotiation with subjects, such as bargaining with perpetrators, implementing the orders of the command post, and providing important information to the rescue team. During the execution of these tasks,



they record what they hear from hostage takers and gather information from the tactical team and command post. Therefore, the negotiator team's success depends on the implementation of several tasks and how they use their negotiation tools and skills during incidents. In other words, the activity of finding and making available records and information is very critical for an efficient retrieval process; therefore, using a situation-board is a good solution for getting access to all collected information. Negotiators can access information through this retrieval device when they require it (Duffy, 1997).

A flip-chart or a large sheet of paper on the wall might be a good situation-board for the hostage negotiation team during the negotiation. A situation-board provides direct access to information for the team. In fact, a situation-board is created to record gathered information about (1) hostage takers, (2) hostages, and (3) the hostage incident. First, hostage takers' names, motivations, demands, weapons, psychological problems, criminal records, and their response to the communication are recorded on a situation-board. Second, hostages' names, medical records, relationship to hostage takers and other important information about hostages are recorded on the situation-board. Third, the hostage incident's characteristics, deadline, threat level, delivered food, telephone availability and other information are recorded on a situation-board by the negotiator team (Duffy, 1997).

What has been done and what may be done is also recorded on a situation-board by the negotiator team. To be avoided behaviors and words might be written on a situation-board for better resolution because it helps to keep the general regulations in the minds of negotiators. Sometimes a negotiation process takes time; a situation-board helps the negotiator team to organize the scattered information and dynamics of the

negotiation during the long hours and days. Another situation-board might be used by the tactical team. The tactical team can use a situation-board to make better deployment, surrender, delivery, dynamic entry, and also arrest plans. In all, a situation-board provides to both teams rapid coordination of information and knowledge of overall police operations. Hostage negotiators and tactical team members are trained in training courses how to use the situation board in field operations (Duffy, 1997).

### *Dealing with Stress for Negotiators*

Negotiators are more likely to feel high levels of stress and pressure during and after the negotiation phase of situations. There might be two types of pressure for negotiators: (1) external and (2) internal pressures. Because of excessive constraint from official parties, such as high-ranking officials and incident commanders, the negotiator team might feel pressure to cease the negotiation. For example, if the negotiation lasts too long, these parties might obstruct the negotiation, or if it looks as if the negotiation is not working to resolve an incident, the rescue team members usually become annoyed. All those types of constraints are defined as external pressures. Furthermore, there might be some internal pressures. For example, negotiators might fear that they can not handle persistent hostage takers and complicated situations. In other words, they might feel anxious about their skills. In some cases, negotiators' stress levels goes up if hostage takers are alcohol- or drug-addicted, or if they start to act illogically and erratically while they talk to negotiators. Especially, they feel a high level of pressure at the very beginning of the first contact because they do not know if the negotiation will work and how it will go (Bohl, 1992). For example, in one of the incidents in the past, a tactical team member initiated the first contact with a hostage

taker. After a while, the negotiator arrived at the location and took the responsibility to continue the negotiation; however, since the hostage taker wanted to talk to the first responding tactical officer again, he did not talk to the negotiator (Lanceley, 2003).

Since hostage takers might believe that they have nothing to lose, they can insist on extreme demands. However, demanding extreme things might worsen the ongoing negotiation. Therefore, under difficult bargaining circumstances, both parties, hostage takers and negotiators, feel stress and pressure during the bargaining. In other words, negotiators are stressed because of the responsibility for hostages' life. Hostage takers are stressed because of their political/terrorist or other types of social motivations and demands. On the other hand, hostage takers have no responsibility, while negotiators have a responsibility to create a peaceful resolution. It seems that negotiators might be more stressed because of public expectation and the media's judgment of their decisions and actions in situations. Negotiation with hostage takers under stress requires more specialized skills, negotiation techniques, and experiences. Of course, these can be learned through effective negotiator courses (Goodwin, 2004).

As a result, if negotiators feel stress and pressure during the negotiation or if they feel guilty after the end of the negotiation, they should learn how to show a positive response to stress. Moreover, they might receive professional instruction and help in reducing stress and pressure, not only during the negotiation but also after the situation (Bohl, 1992).

#### *Mental Health Professionals and Negotiator Team*

As Reese et al., mention, the NYPD initiated using negotiators with psychological expertise in hostage and non-hostage situations (As cited in Mc Mains & Mullins, 1996),

in fact, Lieutenant Frank Bolz, psychologist for the NYPD, was the first police officer to work as a psychologist in hostage situations (Hatcher et al., 1998). After this, many police agencies started to get help from psychologists in order to better understand not only criminal/terrorist but also emotionally upset/mentally disturbed hostage takers' personalities and behaviors during verbal negotiation in the beginning of the 1970s (McMains & Mullins, 1996). Furthermore, as Hatcher and Doane mention, the New York, San Francisco and Los Angeles Police Departments made some noteworthy contributions from the science of psychology to the negotiation doctrine of verbal hostage intervention in handling situations (As cited in Hatcher et al., 1998). Consequently, in order to better understand behaviors of perpetrators and key characteristics of hostage taking situations, many police agencies started to employ professional psychologists to work with negotiators (Mc Mains & Mullins, 1996).

Mental health professionals try to share their knowledge and information about hostage takers' behaviors with the negotiator team and incident commander to make the right decision. However, it must be stated that psychologists are not neither decision makers nor negotiators in hostage situations, but they provide crucial help to the decision makers and negotiator team (Mc Mains & Mullins, 1996).

#### *Special Negotiator Unit of the FBI: Critical Incident Negotiation Team (CINT)*

The FBI's primary negotiation team is a perfect example of why and how negotiation is valuable. It is a fascinating negotiation team model for local and state police agencies in the United States.

Although a number of negotiators join the initial (basic) and in-service (advanced) negotiator training programs, many incredibly complicated incidents challenged

negotiators' experience and skills. Therefore, the Crisis Management Unit (CMU) of the FBI established the Critical Incident Negotiation Team (CINT) in 1985 to handle more complex situations nationwide. Very well-trained negotiators of the CINT respond to a wide range of hostage situations. Furthermore, professional advice, support, and training courses have been given to all state and local police agencies by the CINT because the CINT is in charge of all hostage and non-hostage/barricade situations in the country. If a hostage incident occurs anywhere, the Hostage Rescue Team of the FBI and the CMU supervisor go to this hostage incident location; after evaluating the incident's key characteristics and level of danger, the CMU supervisor decides whether CINT members will respond to the particular incident or help local negotiators. The CINT either provides professional help to state and local agencies or directly responds to the hostage incident in the U.S. (Botting, Lanceley & Noesner, 1995).

CINT members are selected among FBI local negotiators according to their field experience, psychological exams and interviews. CINT members have high-quality experience in operational skills, hostage takers' profiles, anti-terrorism, and organized crime. Likewise, CINT members have been deployed for international hostage operations. Because of the overseas operations, they study nuclear, biological and chemical threats, different cultural customs, international terrorist organizations, Middle East history, religions, and politics in the courses (Botting et al., 1995).

### *Hostage Takers*

In order to better comprehend the major actors of hostage situations, some classifications of hostage takers must be understood very well. In other words, if negotiators are able to assess what types of hostage takers they face at the very

beginning of incidents, they are more likely to deal successfully with them. Every type of hostage taker has its own motivations, demands and special characteristics, such as nationality, relationship with hostages, medical and criminal histories. All this information can be learned through effective negotiation strategies in accordance with general characteristics and profiles of subjects. There are five types of hostage taker profiles in hostage taking and barricaded situations: mentally ill, emotionally disturbed, criminal, prisoner, and terrorist hostage takers (McNeilly, personal communication).

### *Instrumental and Expressive Behaviors of Hostage Takers*

In order to analyze key components of each situation, negotiators should be able to know general hostage taker profiles in advance (McNeilly, personal communication). Hostage negotiators meet either (1) instrumental or (2) expressive types of behaviors of hostage takers in hostage and barricade incidents. Instrumental action is based on a clear purpose, whereas expressive action is based on scattered thoughts and behaviors of hostage takers. A large number of hostage incidents are committed by expressive hostage takers. They usually present irrational behaviors. It might be very difficult to understand expressive hostage takers' feelings on the part of hostage negotiators because their statements are usually senseless. They might be an ex-husband, fired employee, or a suicidal lover. Although expressive hostage takers frequently need to talk, they cannot clearly express their feelings and thoughts. However, their anger and frustration can be reduced through active listening skills. In contrast, the instrumental hostage taker is generally clearer than an expressive type, and the motivation of these hostage takers can be understood clearly. In fact, both types of hostage takers can be handled by the hostage negotiation team if they use effective communication skills and

tools. Even though all hostage incidents have their own difficulties, instrumental hostage takers might be easier bargaining partners rather than expressive type for negotiators because expressive hostage takers usually have difficulties in expressing their demands and feelings (Noesner, 1997).

Emotionally disturbed and mentally ill hostage takers are more likely to show expressive behaviors during the negotiation; therefore, a more interdependent type of relationship is used by hostage negotiators. Criminal, prisoner and terrorist group hostage takers are more likely to show instrumental behaviors during the negotiation; therefore, more rational and concrete applications are more likely to be used by hostage negotiators (Gilliland & James, 1997; McNeilly, personal communication). Generally, well-organized hostage incidents are more frequently committed by terrorists and crime-motivated hostage takers because their actions are based on rational choices (Wilson, 2000).

### *General Types of Hostage Takers*

As stated earlier, there are generally five types of hostage taker profiles in typical hostage situations. They are (1) mentally ill, (2) emotionally disturbed, (3) criminal, (4) prisoner, and (5) terrorist hostage takers (McNeilly, personal communication).

#### *1) Mentally ill Hostage Takers*

In order to get more positive outcomes as a result of the negotiation process, negotiators should know the general classifications and profiling of perpetrators. In fact, each type of hostage taker has its own motivations and demands. Some hostage takers take hostages because of their frustration in life; some take hostages as pawns to be used for bargaining during the negotiation with negotiators (Gilliland & James, 1997). In

recent years, the number of expressive type hostage incidents, such as mentally ill hostage takers, has been greater than instrumental type hostage incidents (Noesner, 1997). As Fuselier notes, mentally ill hostage takers usually take hostages to show that they are important people. According to Donohue, negotiators try to build a rapport and interdependence between themselves and mentally ill hostage takers immediately. They encourage this type of hostage taker to talk about their problems and demands. Foreseeing what hostage takers can do to their hostages is very difficult for negotiators, but negotiators can learn psychological classifications of mentally ill hostage takers to better carry out negotiation applications (As cited in Gilliland & James, 1997).

The aim is not to compel negotiators to clinically diagnose behaviors of hostage takers. Rather, the aim is that hostage negotiators will become more familiar with general characteristics of hostage takers to handle hostage problems (Lanceley, 2003). In conclusion, basically, there are four types of disorders: schizophrenic, depressive, antisocial, and inadequate personalities (McNeilly, personal communication).

#### *a) Schizophrenic Personality*

As Strentz indicates, negotiators can recognize these types of hostage takers from their frustration, anxiety, and stressed personalities. They usually cannot accomplish what they want to do in life; thus, they take hostages to show they can do amazing work. They are managed by their hallucinations. For example, as Fuselier reports, they can say that they got an order from an important person to get hostages. They are usually on medication, but if they do not take their medicine, they can be a threat for hostages. As Strentz indicates, some important elements, such as their religious conviction and distrust, might worsen the relationship between hostage takers



and negotiators. Therefore, as Fuselier states, negotiators should not try to convince them that they are incorrect. This does not mean that they can agree with them. Effective negotiation skills, such as active listening strategies, will be more helpful to resolve the problem (As cited in Gilliland & James, 1997).

For example, a schizophrenic hostage taker may say, "I told people to turn off their radios because they send messages to me on the radio, but they do not listen to me". In this case, a hostage negotiator says, "I understand you; you are in favor of peace, but they do not understand you". Negotiators play up the idea that the hostage taker is in favor of peace (Gilliland & James, 1997).

#### *b) Depressive Personality*

As Strentz reports, this type of hostage taker has a confused personality. They usually have negative viewpoints about life. They might be having difficulty talking and negotiating with other people around them because they act more slowly in comparison with other normal people; they usually cannot make a decision on their own. They often take hostages among people who are known to them. Since they tend to show suicidal behaviors, they are an extreme threat to not only hostages but also themselves. They may want to kill hostages and want to be killed by police officers (suicide-by-cop). Negotiators should be familiar with manipulative communication tactics to shift their attention from suicidal ideas to another idea (As cited in Gilliland & James, 1997).

For example, a depressive personality hostage taker may say, "I have no idea what is going on, everything is really confusing". In this case, a hostage negotiator says, "In order to get away from the confusion, you should let hostages go, and then I want to

talk to you.” Negotiators should be unyielding against hostage taker instability (Gilliland & James, 1997).

*c) Inadequate Personality*

As Strentz reveals, this type of hostage taker usually has a narcissistic personality. They take hostages to show that they can do significant things if they want to. Their aim might be only to show that they are really important. At the beginning of the negotiation, they might make a number of demands, but later they reduce what they want, or they can provide some alternatives to make it possible. Sometimes they even apologize to negotiators and other people (As cited in Gilliland & James, 1997).

Negotiators use ‘problem-solving’ techniques to resolve this type of hostage incident. Negotiators take into consideration that this type of hostage taker should not think that they have failed one more time in their life because they release hostages. Hostage negotiators can flatter hostage takers in order to gain the release of hostages. Although they do not seem to be an extreme threat to hostages, they can become a threat to hostages anytime if their egos are not controlled during the negotiation (Gilliland & James, 1997).

For example, an inadequate personality hostage taker may say, “I have an important speech for the Channel ABA’ manager; hence, let me talk to him immediately.” In this case, the hostage negotiator says, “I understand that you have an important message for the manager, but you let the hostages go first, and then I promise that I will help you to talk to the Channel ABA manager immediately” (Gilliland & James, 1997). Additionally, some experts think that inadequate personality is a type of criminal hostage taker rather than mentally disturbed hostage taker.

#### *d) Antisocial Personality*

According to the American Psychiatric Association, antisocial personality hostage takers have usually failed to join any group of people in the community, but they blame other people rather than themselves for their failures (Gilliland & James, 1997). As Lanceley reveals, if antisocial personality hostage takers notice that hostages have greater well-being, they might be an extreme threat to hostages due to their jealousy (As cited in Gilliland & James, 1997). They usually do not have emotional feelings, or they can hide their true emotional feelings; they have narcissistic personalities. When they hurt hostages, they rarely feel sorry or take any responsibility; they do not have any empathy. They might be a real threat to hostages (Gilliland & James, 1997).

As Fuselier indicates, they are extremely keen on their freedom and freewill. Therefore, negotiators should not talk about crime, jail, or any other deterrent applications. Otherwise, they might harm hostages. It is possible that they might know some tricky negotiation techniques used in conversation with other people; indeed, negotiators should not try to use too many manipulative techniques. Unlike many other types of hostage taker characteristics, they cannot create the Stockholm syndrome with hostages because of their personalities (As cited in Gilliland & James, 1997).

For example, an antisocial personality hostage taker may say, "Do not tell me you need more time, just do what I am saying and get the car; otherwise, I will enjoy myself with this little lady". In this case, the hostage negotiator says, "I understand that you are very angry from your demands, but getting the car takes time because of logistical problems. I wonder whether you can do a favor for the hostage because your help is going to return to you as a favor" (Gilliland & James, 1997). Additionally, some

experts believe that the antisocial personality is a type of criminal hostage taker rather than an emotionally ill hostage taker.

*e) Borderline Personality*

In addition to the four types of mentally ill hostage takers that have been explained earlier, a borderline personality hostage taker might be accepted as a fifth important personality. However, some experts do not accept the borderline personality as a mentally ill hostage taker. It can be stated that this is open to discussion.

Borderline personality people have both rational and irrational behaviors in life. They have suicidal, moody, manipulative behaviors. They depend on somebody who is important to them. Therefore, they sometimes act as adolescents. Since they can never organize their life by themselves, they always want to be reassured by their friends, family members, or anybody. Indeed, during the negotiation in a hostage incident, they often ask hostage negotiators whether they are telling the truth and doing the right thing. Since their connections with other people are unstable, they have extremely fragile and sensitive moods, and they are more likely to have experienced some types of crimes, such as shoplifting, substance abuse, sexual harassment and reckless driving in their life (Borum & Strentz, 1992).

They experience some failures, such as marriage, school, and career. A borderline personality looks like an inadequate personality. However, people with borderline personality exhibit more severe and unstable behaviors than people with inadequate personality (Borum & Strentz, 1992).

Their aims are not material gains for taking hostages; in fact, they are more likely to take hostages for recognition. However, when they take hostages, they might be

extremely dangerous to hostages and themselves due to their suicidal ideas. Hostage negotiators ask them directly whether they will attempt suicide or not in order to make sure of their following reactions (Borum & Strentz, 1992).

Dealing with this type of hostage taker might be very difficult. During the negotiation with borderline personality hostage takers, negotiators can get help from psychologists in order to better understand situations. This type of hostage taking and barricade situation requires extreme caution on the part of negotiators during the negotiation. They should try to use some empathetic approach and avoid arguing with them. Although hostage takers may respond to negotiators with an outburst, negotiators stay calm because they know that borderline personality hostage takers are very confused; they are more likely to have unpredictable and volatile behaviors (Borum & Strentz, 1992).

*f) Suicidal Person and Suicide-by-Cop*

As Mc Mains says, according to the chief police agency statistics, suicidal person hostage situations are roughly 16% of all hostage situations in the U.S. As Schneidman point outs, there are some common characteristics found in the vast majority of suicidal people related situations. They usually experience frustrations in their life because of some common stressors or stimuli. They believe that they have intolerable psychical or psychological pain. They want to end their life for the reason that this is the only way to release them from unendurable pain. It is clear that they merely focus on their pain, frustration, loneliness and helplessness. Furthermore, they are more likely to have prior suicidal behaviors in their life because they usually solve their problems by escaping from distressful events and other things (As cited in Mc Mains & Mullins, 1996).

It seems that understanding suicidal people is a very significant point for negotiators. Upon facing suicidal persons, negotiators start to build rapport with them immediately to show that they understand that they feel bad and alone. Again, active listening skills and friendly behaviors are more likely to help to resolve the problem. Negotiators let them explain their problems first by encouraging them to talk and repeating their situations in different words by emphasizing that they understand their desperate situations. Negotiators should try to convince them about there are other ways to gain release from their painful situations (Mc Mains & Mullins, 1996).

After this beginning, in order to learn hostage takers' seriousness and capabilities of committing suicide, negotiators directly ask some detailed questions about the suicide issue, such as its time, method, and means. However, whatever negotiators hear, they should avoid criticizing their ideas and feelings. They try to collect more information about lifestyle, routine activities, job, possible alcohol and drug habits, psychological and psychical problems. Gathered information is evaluated with mental health and command post professionals to decide whether their potential suicidal behaviors are greater risks to themselves and hostages (Mc Mains & Mullins, 1996). Furthermore, if suicidal people claim that they have firearms, rifles, bombs or explosives, information gathering becomes more important for law enforcement agencies. In such situations, negotiators are required to get help from the explosives unit of the tactical team (Divasto et al., 1992) Negotiators usually use a checklist to make sure that they did not overlook any details with suicidal people. The checklist is a great help to remind them of some important tips and information because suicidal

persons might be dangerous not only to hostages but also to themselves (Mc Mains & Mullins, 1996).

In the very early 1980s, a police officer pulled over a car for a routine traffic violation. After stopping the vehicle, the very angry driver left the car and told the police officer to kill him; otherwise, he would kill the officer. While they were scuffling around the patrol car, the back-up unit came to the scene and convinced him to calm down. After this incident, police agencies have known of the suicide-by-cop concept. In some situations, suicidal people can not kill themselves because of a number of reasons; as a result, they try to do some dangerous actions, such as attempting to harm or kill captives, officers, or spectators in order to be killed by police officers. There are a number of ways to attempt suicide-by-cop. (1) the suicidal person gives a deadline for him to be killed by police. (2) He gives negotiators his detailed plan of being killed by the police. (3) He provides some clues to negotiators, such as a last request. (4) He points out that “he will go out big”. It means that he will kill a police officer, and then police will kill him. It is a type of fantasy to him. (5) He attempts to kill or harm hostages in order to force the tactical team to kill him. (6) Since he has lost everything, such as job and family, he thinks that there is nothing left to live for. Therefore, he wants to be killed by a police officer. Negotiators describe this kind of situation as “double whammy” in their nomenclature (Lanceley, 2003).

Since dealing with suicidal people requires more caution, asking whether or not they intend to commit suicide is the best option to learn the real intention. There is no worry about whether this question will remind them to commit suicide if they are not thinking about suicide. Asking this question openly helps them to talk about their

problem and the suicide issue (Divasto et al., 1992). If they have any plan, such as suicide-by-cop, they usually tell officers their intention. For example, they might say that they won't kill anybody, but they will be killed by the police (Lanceley, 2003).

Of course, if there is no progress during the negotiation, tactical team intervention is used against this type of hostage takers/barricaded people. However, sometimes there might be some positive improvements, such as talking about future plans and a possible reason to stay alive rather than to die. Negotiators should talk to them frankly and let them vent their emotions and feelings; they are encouraged to talk about particular problems. However, negotiators should not act like psychologists because this is not therapy. They should stay away from moralizing. If negotiators tell them life is going to change, it is not a true way to build rapport with hostage takers (Lanceley, 2003).

Even though suicidal persons and suicide-by-cop concepts are reviewed under the heading of the mentally ill types of hostage takers, suicidal people could be defined as either mentally ill or emotionally disturbed types of hostage takers. Actually, it depends on hostage takers' motivation and potential intention to end their lives.

## *2) Emotionally Disturbed Hostage Takers*

Emotionally disturbed hostage takers might be a disgruntled employee (workplace violence), a divorced husband, and/or a student who looks for revenge (school shooter) or a suicidal lover. They usually take alcohol or drugs before taking their hostages. Therefore, negotiators should never forget that emotionally disturbed hostage takers might be under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs (McNeilly, personal communication). For example, a domestic fight is one of the reasons for taking



hostages by emotionally disturbed hostage takers, such as an estranged husband; their aims are usually to maintain their relationship. Since this type of hostage incident is based on the hostage taker's personal relationship, family support for negotiators is fairly important and helpful (Gilliland & James, 1997).

Workplace violence and school shootings shape the majority of emotionally upset hostage takers. In fact, workplace violence is the biggest reason for work-related murders among the female population. Negotiators encourage perpetrators to talk by using communication techniques and skills. For example, negotiators can ask hostage takers about how they resolved their problem when they faced a crisis in the past. The important thing is that negotiators never take sides when they listen to what hostage takers say. In other words, they do not tell them they are right or wrong. When emotionally disturbed hostage takers say that they are angry, mad and stressful, negotiators should offer to resolve the problem together (McNeilly, personal communication).

As a result, if this type of hostage taker is under the influence of alcohol/drugs, negotiators should consider the effects of substances and alcohol. Negotiators should not intimidate or argue with this type of hostage taker. In terms of appearing honest, negotiators should not tell them "I do not agree with you". It makes them more angry and dangerous. Furthermore, negotiators should know the side effects of a variety of drugs and alcohol on hostage takers because it may affect a positive outcome during the negotiation (Lanceley, 2003).

### *3) Inmate Hostage Takers*

This type of hostage taker usually takes other inmates or prison staff as hostages. The aim is either to get freedom or protest some conditions. They are more likely to have these characteristics. (1) Their behaviors are more likely to be observed as instrumental behaviors rather than expressive behaviors. They usually focus on their demands and needs in a clear way. (2) Negotiators should focus on interdependence rather than close attachment because inmates might tend to commit violent crimes. (3) Inmate hostage takers are more likely to know more about the process and tactics used by law enforcement agencies. Negotiators should be careful while using some negotiation tricks. (4) Usually, there is no one spokesman among the inmate hostage takers to contact negotiators. Dealing with inmate hostage takers requires more skill and experience to bargain with them (Gilliland & James, 1997).

For example, inmate hostage takers may say, "I do not want to negotiate; you do just what I told you. We will only talk to the warden." In this case, a hostage negotiator says, "I understand that you are very angry because people did not listen to you. I will definitely help you to talk the warden, but I want to make sure that all hostages and you are okay" (Gilliland & James, 1997).

### *4) Criminal Hostage Takers*

Basically, there are two types of criminal hostage takers. The first type of criminal hostage taker, such as a kidnapper, deliberately aims to take hostages to get his demands and ransom. In other words, he takes hostages to get monetary gains (McNeilly, personal communication). When kidnappers' secret places are sometimes

found by police agencies, the kidnapping can turn into a hostage taking incident (Jenkins et al., 1977).

For the second type of criminal hostage takers, the first intention is not to get hostages, but to take hostages because they have no other way to escape from the police. In other words, they do not plan to take hostages, but they take hostages because something goes wrong while they are committing a crime. For example, a group of criminals plan a bank robbery. The basic aim is to get money. However, something does not work very well, and before they leave the bank, the police arrive at the scene. As a result, they take bank customers or employees as hostages because they have no other choice to escape with money from the police. The real intention is to get monetary gains rather than take hostages. Taking hostages is an unsuccessful result, not the original goal (McNeilly, personal communication).

##### *5) Terrorist Hostage Takers*

Hijacking and taking hostages are very common criminal activities on the part of terrorist organizations. Its importance is taken into consideration in comparison with the other types of hostage taker typologies. Therefore, terrorism and terrorist hostage takers are reviewed in a comprehensive and extended evaluation in this study.

The hostage situation is merely one of the criminal activities of terrorist organizations. Terrorists face some cost, time considerations, and also the probability of face-to-face confrontation with the police during hostage situations in comparison with the other types of crimes that they commit (Mickolus, 1987). In order to extort money or concessions from governments, politically motivated terrorists use abduction as one of their most common methods (Friedland & Merari, 1992).

Terrorist hostage takers make their demands to change general public belief and the political process of governments by threats of violence (Sandler & Scott, 1987).

Terrorist hostage takers compel governments either to make concessions in favor of the perpetrators for the welfare of captives or to refuse to make any concessions because of government policies of no concession. Each alternative has difficulties and risks for governmental officials. In other words, politically motivated hostage situations can be described as one of the most effective tactics in most cases because there is no winner for governments. For example, if governmental officials make a concession, they will be criticized because they could not resolve a situation. However, if governmental agencies do not make any concession, they will be criticized because they did not take care about their citizens (Friedland & Merari, 1992).

#### *a) Negotiating with Terrorist Hostage Takers*

As stated earlier, terrorist hostage incidents have become one of the major tools of terrorist groups in the last four decades. Terrorist hostage takers usually have short-term and long-term objectives. The long-term objectives might include a variety of strategies from terrorizing society to compelling governments to change their policies. The short-term objectives might be monetary gains and gaining release of terrorist prisoners (Miller, 1993).

Although all terrorist hostage incidents have been treated in the same way by police agencies, it is clear that each hostage incident has its own difficulties. In other words, every case has different variables, such as disparate hostages, demands, motivations, and characteristics of terrorist hostage takers. Uniform strategies cannot be used against all types of terrorist hostage takers. However, every hostage taking

incident has three phases, (1) hostage-taking, (2) revealing demands and starting negotiations, and (3) termination of the operation (Miller, 1993).

First, in hostage-taking phase, terrorist hostage takers take hostages at an unpredictable time; their plans are based on preparation and rationality (Miller, 1993). Furthermore terrorist hostage incidents have a very different characteristic from other types of crimes. A terrorist hostage crime is usually committed by a group of people, and the group members might be influencing each other during a hostage incident. Since perpetrators usually take their actions as a result of choice, they usually act as a team. Therefore, terrorist hostage takers' behaviors during a hostage incident might be less predictable in comparison with other types of hostage takers (Wilson, 2000). Consequently, every movement of hostage takers must be carefully observed by the command post officials to make a correct decision in order to combat these extremists in this phase (Miller, 1993).

Second, after hostages have been taken by terrorist groups, demands are made by terrorists, and then the negotiation phase is initiated by the negotiators. Of course, demands are different in each hostage incident. The most important issue is that revealing demands is the sign of beginning negotiations with negotiators on the part of hostage takers because in some cases even terrorist hostage takers might not be making any demands (Miller, 1993).

Third, the termination of operation phase is the most important decision making process because this phase might be finished in either a peaceful or violent way. As killing hostage takers by police agencies is the last resort, killing hostages is the last resort for hostage takers (Miller, 1993); therefore, many hostage takers keep in mind

that they should keep hostages alive. Otherwise, they cannot get their demands, and police agencies will use deadly force against them (Noesner, 1998). On the other hand, hostage takers might kill hostages if they have suicidal ideas, or they do not care that police agencies will use deadly force against them (Miller, 1993).

In many terrorist hostage cases, a deadline is delayed at least one time by terrorist hostage takers. Additionally, a surprise attack by a tactical team frequently increases injury or death among hostages; as a result, it is clear that negotiation is the best option for terrorist hostage takers. However, a negotiation process cannot guarantee the favorable conclusion for hostages and negotiators. A successful negotiation is based on the idea that both parties will change their behaviors. For example, government agencies will deviate from their policies and hostage takers will decrease the amount of demands (Miller, 1993).

#### *b) Special Issues with Terrorist Hostage Situations*

Some terrorist organizations merely want to get international attention through hostage incidents. Therefore, they might take diplomats or government officials as hostages in order to get international attention. When diplomat hostages are taken by terrorists, hostage incidents become more complex and create four additional problems for hostage negotiation professionals (Jenkins, 1982).

The first problem is that terrorist hostage takers might be trying to manipulate the negotiation process by communicating with hostages' families and the media. The goal is to create public pressure on government agencies. Hostages' families might want the government to respond to hostage takers' demands to gain release of the hostages. If

terrorist hostage takers communicate with third parties, such as hostages' families or the media, rather than negotiators, it might worsen the negotiation (Jenkins, 1982).

The second problem is the U.S. government never makes any concession to terrorist hostage takers. Since every local government is in charge of diplomats' safety in their countries, local governments might be feeling a responsibility to gain the release of diplomat hostages. Some concessions to hostage takers might be made by local governments, or local governments might want to hide hostage situations. Those endeavors might cause some complications in negotiating with terrorist hostage takers (Jenkins, 1982).

The third problem is that terrorist organizations attract more attention worldwide by influencing the media. Some media publish hostage takers' demands and declarations giving terrorists influence over situations, governments, and official agencies in a crisis situation. However, the media might affect the ongoing negotiation. It is better for the media to have a limited role in terms of public safety and success of the negotiation (Jenkins, 1982).

The fourth problem is that sometimes government officials' remarks have an effect on the progress of ongoing negotiation between hostage takers and negotiators. For example, after the Black September Organization (BSO) took American Embassy employees in Saudi Arabia in 1973, President Nixon's statement was broadcast on the radio. After his speech on the radio, the hostage takers killed their hostages immediately. It is not correct to blame the President for the killing of hostages by terrorists. However, this type of action might complicate the professional hostage

negotiators' negotiation. Negotiation is a professional police task. There must be a single voice speaking to hostage takers to resolve the problem (Jenkins, 1982).

The government should never seem to be ready to agree to terrorist hostage takers' demands in hostage incidents because it encourages terrorist groups to select the same government as a new target for the next terrorist hostage situation. For example, unlike most other countries, the German and Japanese governments encouraged terrorist hostage takers between 1970 and 1977 by carrying out terrorist hostage takers' demands, such as releasing terrorist prisoners and giving terrorists money. This played an important role in attempts at new terrorist hostage incidents against them (Clutterbuck, 1992).

Even though the government has a no-concession policy against terrorist organizations in hostage taking incidents, the government can never leave innocent hostages and their families to their fate; otherwise, the government officials would lose their image and esteem. Therefore, professional hostage negotiators should always be allowed to negotiate with terrorist hostage takers. The government does not have to give any concession to terrorist hostage takers; however, it is an error to reject the negotiation on the part of government officials. Terrorist hostage takers usually reconnoiter to select their hostages in light of their past experiences. If they succeeded in previous actions against any particular government, they will probably take hostages from the same population again. Hostage negotiators and psychologists can learn more information about terrorist hostage takers, their demands, and their characteristics through the art of negotiation. They can use better judgment to gain release of hostages without death or injury. It is clear that terrorist hostage takers can be led to believe that



they will get their demands by negotiating with governmental officials because negotiating is a better way than killing hostages (Clutterbuck, 1992).

### *c) Religious Extremists*

Some religious extremists who have an uncompromising belief might take hostages to carry out their special missions. Their actions are fairly similar to terrorist hostage takers because both parties aim to get attention and promote their ideological beliefs. However, there is one significant difference between religious extremist hostage takers and terrorist hostage takers; terrorist groups are more likely to take hostages as an offensive action. Religious extremists are more likely to take hostages to sacrifice them for their sins. Hostages are chosen because they are unrepentant. Although religious extremist hostage takers deliver their demands to negotiators, they usually do not want to negotiate. They believe that this is not a negotiable issue (Gilliland & James, 1997).

Unfortunately, the Branch Davidians standoff ended with the tragic deaths of all followers and David Koresh because law enforcement agencies could not understand its unique nature. They approached this incident as a normal hostage/barricade incident, but it was not. It showed that agencies need to get additional insight into religion-related hostage taking incidents (Ammerman, 1995). The Waco situation will be reviewed and discussed by the researcher in the case studies section of chapter four, along with four other case studies.

### *Hostages*

While hostage takers focus on ransom and demand to release their captives, government officials try to ensure the safe release of hostages because this is the most

important priority of official agencies in these situations. Hostages are the most affected part of hostage situations. At this point, the most important question is how hostage takers choose their victims and what the criteria are for demanding something. Possible targets are companies, politicians, airlines, passengers, banks, rich people, or governmental representatives (Poland & McCrystle, 1999). The most popular targets are American diplomats/politicians and Israeli officials for terrorist organizations (Jenkins et al., 1977). There are some common psychological approaches for hostages to stay alive or to increase their survival chance in hostage incidents, such as promoting the Stockholm syndrome and/or the avoiding the London syndrome (Poland & McCrystle, 1999).

### *Stockholm Syndrome*

Every hostage incident has a unique trait. However, there are some common elements that can be discussed; of particular interest are relationships developed by different actors in hostage incidents. For example, hostages and hostage takers might have close attachments to each other (McNeilly, personal communication).

As Symonds indicates, hostages usually show a cooperative approach towards their hostage takers because of their desperate situations. As Fuselier states, some emotional and behavioral characteristics are identified among hostages that might bring positive or negative feelings towards hostage takers. The Stockholm syndrome is the most important one. It is considered to be a survival strategy on the part of hostages in situations (As cited in Call, 2003).

The Stockholm syndrome was seen first after a bank robbery turned into a hostage incident in Stockholm, Sweden in August, 1973. Two criminals took three

women and one man as hostages for 131 hours. The both parties developed a close attachment during this period (Lanceley, 2003; Fuselier, 1999; McNeilly, personal communication). In fact, in this very complicated hostage incident, negotiators found out that the hostages thought that the perpetrators defended hostages from police officers (Poland & McCrystle, 1999). Therefore, the hostages tried to protect hostage takers from the police officers. They accepted the perpetrators as their saviors (McNeilly, personal communication). After this incident, psychologists labeled this phenomenon the “Stockholm syndrome”. Since then, the Stockholm syndrome has been observed in many hostage incidents. The length of a incident and positive actions by hostage takers towards hostages encourage the development of this syndrome (Lanceley, 2003; Fuselier, 1999).

The Stockholm syndrome is based on one of the following components or a combination of three components. (1) Hostages have negative feelings towards police officers, negotiators, and other official authorities; therefore, they might have some positive feelings towards their hostage takers. (2) Hostages might have positive feelings towards their hostage takers because they do not hurt the hostages. (3) In addition to hostages’ positive feelings towards hostage takers, positive feelings are reciprocated by hostage takers towards their hostages (Fuselier, 1999).

As Turner notes, if there is no close attachment and relationship between hostages and hostage takers, or hostages are psychologically abused, tortured, raped, or beaten by hostage takers, the Stockholm syndrome can never develop between those two parties. Furthermore, there are some conditions that prevent development of the Stockholm syndrome between hostages and hostage takers. They include language

problems, racial, religious, and cultural differences, and negative interaction between those two parties (As cited in Call, 2003).

In summary, this syndrome has been seen by police agencies in the vast majority of hostage situations. Hostages might save their lives by this. If this syndrome develops, hostages are less likely to be harmed or killed by their perpetrators. This promotes the idea that a crisis team is less likely to use deadly force against hostage takers. In other words, the syndrome might save not only the hostages' lives but also hostage takers' lives. In order to foster this syndrome on the part of the two parties of incidents, negotiators can ask hostage takers about hostages' and hostage takers' health and other conditions during the negotiation (Poland & McCrystle, 1999).

In 1980, six members of the terrorist organization Democratic Revolutionary Movement for the Liberation of Arabia (DRMLA), captured 24 hostages in London (Moysey, 2004). Since one of the hostages was killed by the terrorists, the negotiation was abandoned by the police. The British Air Service (SAS), which is known as the best police tactical team in the world according to Thompson, decided to use deadly force (Poland & McCrystle, 1999). The tactical team killed five of the six hostage takers. However, when they came across the last terrorist, they observed that female hostages were protecting him against the tactical team. They said that he was a very nice person and he did not harm them. It was the Stockholm syndrome (Moysey, 2004).

### *London Syndrome*

Another concept, the London syndrome, was developed in the London siege in 1980. One of the hostages was killed by the terrorists while the negotiation phase was continuing because this hostage was quarrelling with hostage takers and threatening

them. In order to punish him and show who had the real power, terrorists killed him and threw his body from the building into the street. This syndrome shows that if a hostage threatens or quarrels to his hostage takers, hostage takers punish this hostage in their own way. The London syndrome was observed in many situations after the London siege, such as Leon the Klinghoffer hostage situation in 1989. In fact, he argued with his hostage takers and spit on them during the incident (Poland & McCrystle, 1999).

### *Surviving in Hostage Situations*

People always hear about hostage incidents from the news. Hostage takers, especially terrorist and criminal hostage takers, gather some information about their potential hostages by using some sources of information, such as surveillance, open-source information, or their supporters. Easy access to vulnerability of targets, and a cost-benefit analysis are significant factors for perpetrators to select their victims. Therefore, people who have been at risk for being taken as hostages should know how to avoid being hostages and how to survive in hostage situations. It is clear that either at the beginning of or during hostage/kidnapping situations, all victims experience some types of distress and suffering (Poland & McCrystle, 1999).

As Spear and Moak indicate, these are important recommendations for hostages during hostage/kidnapping situations. They should not complain about anything unless they have serious medical problems. They should not try to be brave by arguing and fighting with hostage takers. They are supposed to avoid promoting the London syndrome. As long as it is reasonable, they should try to follow the instructions of the perpetrators. They should not make an effort to escape from the location if there is no

real chance to do so. In addition, they should keep in mind that either negotiation or a tactical resolution is being pursued (As cited in Poland & McCrystle, 1999).

Furthermore, hostages should be aware of the most critical moments of an incident: (1) the initial phase of being taken as hostages and (2) rescue team intervention time. These are very critical moments for hostages to stay alive. Therefore, they should be calm during the tactical intervention of police because the rescue team may not distinguish who the real hostages and perpetrators are during their entry into the building. The most critical advice is that hostages should try to build the Stockholm syndrome between their hostage takers and themselves (Lanceley, 2003).

## CHAPTER 3

### METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS

#### Introduction

In this chapter, the researcher examines (1) the research issues, (2) the research purpose and (3) the methodology and the limitations. In this chapter, the researcher shows how to answer the researcher issues.

#### Research Issues

The researcher has two avenues to review the dynamics and components of the major actors and the successful negotiation resolution of hostage situations.

1. Provide a comprehensive descriptive of the major actors and their roles in hostage taking situations.
2. Identify the successful negotiation strategies in a case study approach.

#### Purpose of the Research

The main purpose of this research is to make a contribution to police agencies' negotiation strategies, especially the Turkish National Police, as well as some critical recommendations for government policies in hostage situations and for future studies.

The hostage situation has been a frequent criminal activity in the last century. Since a number of deaths have occurred as a result poor applications of techniques by law enforcement agencies, police applications to situations are often criticized by the general public, the media and many other third parties, including government agencies. In this study, the researcher examines the major actors, their crucial roles in typical

hostage situations and the dynamics of the successful negotiation of police negotiators. In addition, the researcher discusses how to use special skills, tools, and central strategies of police negotiators in order to promote effective resolutions when professionals in crisis situations face different types of hostage takers.

Three principal focuses have been examined by the researcher to make useful recommendations for the future. First, the history was examined to better understand typical perpetrators' approaches and governmental agencies' applications of negotiating techniques and/or force against hostage takers. This historical background gives broader understanding of the components and dynamics of hostage situations. The first, second, and current generations of hostage resolutions have been reviewed very carefully to enhance the negotiation application of the police in future.

Second, it is a fact that greater cooperation between government agencies and researchers will help improve resolutions without losing hostages. Unfortunately, the majority of researchers show little interest in hostage situations. The police lack research studies to enhance their negotiating practices. One of the critical aims of the study is to encourage establishing more cooperation between police and researchers.

Third, this study focuses on the typical resolution strategies of the police, particularly those practices of American and Canadian police organizations. Their broad perspectives and resolutions through history can make useful contributions to not only the Turkish National Police but also many other countries' police officers. Since hostage situations are fairly rare in Turkey and Turkish police officers are relatively unfamiliar with hostage situations compared to the police of the United States and some European



countries, the researcher expects to provide more aid to Turkish law enforcement agencies.

Based on the historical background, the comprehensive literature review, the comparative case analyses, and the future recommendations, the researcher recommends a one-week course schedule for the Turkish police negotiators, taking into account Turkish cultural values and characteristics.

### Methodology

This study analyzes (1) the major actors of hostage situations, their roles and interactions during the resolutions of cases, and (2) the successful negotiation of hostage incidents. In order to completely cover two research issues, a thorough and comprehensive literature review is done as well as comparative cases studies by the researcher as a method. Therefore, not only library resources but also the Internet played a critical role in gathering the updated and significant information.

The UNT library catalogs and various electronic resource databases, criminal justice, social science, sociological and criminological abstracts have been searched to find books and articles on the subject. During these searches “hostage, hostage negotiation, hostage taking situations, police negotiation and hostage negotiator training” words have been used as key words.

Besides academic books, articles and other sources, some police notes, police magazines and police agency training course manuals have been used by the researcher in data collection. In addition, some interviews with senior negotiator Barney McNeilly, the president of the Canadian Critical Incident Association, provided invaluable data in this area. Before retiring from the Toronto Metropolitan Police

Service, Barney McNeilly formally worked as a deputy director and senior hostage negotiator of the Emergency Response Team Training Center. He was working as an instructor in the Canadian Police College, the Toronto Police College, the Ontario Police College and many other countries' law enforcement agencies' in-service training facilities, including the Turkish International Academy against Drugs and Organized Crime (TADOC), which was established by the United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP) in 2000. In addition, the researcher was one of the participants in the hostage negotiator training program conducted by the Turkish National Police at TADOC in 2002 through Barney McNeilly and his Canadian colleagues' instructions. Later, the researcher participated in the Basic Tactical Orientation Course conducted by the Emergency Task Force of the Toronto Police Service in 2002. As a result, these courses and the activities of the researcher facilitated the collecting and classification of data and the preparation of the thesis outline.

All of the information which was gathered here was carefully classified in order to prepare the thesis outline in accordance with the two research purposes. After that, all classified information and documents were analyzed to provide a comprehensive literature review and to better understand the four comparative cases studies of hostage situations. This analysis was carefully conducted to determine if more sources would be needed to cover the research questions. In order to avoid biased information, personal interpretation and other research-based problems, multiple sources that provide a broad range of viewpoints have been examined by the researcher in this study. In other words, information and documents on the research questions have been cross-verified through

the use of multiple sources to provide a neutral and valid study. Therefore, the cross validation in this study is made by the researcher.

In addition to the literature review, four case studies involving different police applications and methods were examined and compared to evaluate police negotiation techniques as well as some unwanted police responses that ended with many deaths and injuries of hostages, hostage takers, and even police officers.

In each case study, (1) facts of case, (2) hostage taker motivations and demands, (3) government and command post resolutions, (4) evaluation and summary were examined by the researcher. Importantly, there is a significant point to be made that every case has its own unique dangers, difficulties, and methods. Therefore, every case was evaluated first on its own merit and then in a comparative analysis with others.

Evidently, one of the additional important points is how the cases were selected from among the thousands of hostage taking situations and what the priorities to make the outcome successful were. Essentially, there are several critical points that have been taken into account by the researcher for choosing the cases. First, almost every case reflects different aspect(s) of hostage situation concepts in terms of movement, effectiveness, and resolution applications on the part of the major actors in situations. Second, almost every case is a cornerstone in hostage situation history because of its structure, motivation, resolution and notable results. These features help to better understand the major points to make valuable contributions and recommendations to hostage taking literature. Finally, each case has its own outcome that points to a

possible successful resolution even if such resolution was not achieved. In other words, every case has shown some effective methods to end cases peacefully.

During the analysis of the gathered data and information, the researcher did not consider the publishing date of the books, articles, and other sources in terms of getting up-dated information, the reason being that numerous important hostage incidents occurred between the 1960s and 1980s, and many important critiques and policies were published in those years. Moreover, some current programs and strategies for hostage incidents were shaped in those years. In order to address the research questions comprehensively, the researcher mainly examined the FBI negotiation doctrine since it is the dominant policy in the U.S. Therefore, FBI law enforcement bulletins provided the recent and more common policies in the area.

Hostage situations have been instigated by different types of hostage takers because of different motivations and demands. The researcher analyzed all types of hostage takers and situations under one umbrella regardless of their different motivations and demands. This was done because there is no critical difference in the applications of the negotiation practices. In fact, negotiators merely give more focus to some negotiation skills, tools, and techniques in terms of demands and motivations mentioned in chapter four. Some negotiation skills and tools are lessened or increased in accordance with hostage takers' profiles and hostage situations' key characteristics.

#### Limitations

There are a few limitations to this study. First, there are few academic studies of hostage incidents due to two major factors. First, for an academic study, researchers would have to be involved in a number of interactions and activities with crisis

management units of police agencies and should learn more information about the foremost actors of the situations, their roles, and some foundations of hostage situations as well as some general variables and characteristics of all types of hostage situations in order to contribute to effective qualitative and quantitative studies in the hostage taking resolution doctrine. However, in many cases, researchers' involvement is very limited due to typical hostage incidents' circumstances, such as dangers, difficulties, and limitations of conditions. There are some questions which can only be answered with empirical research data. Unfortunately, researchers can answer those questions only after a hostage incident ends due to its risks and dangers. However, a hostage incident is based on behavioral interaction among different parties, such as hostages, negotiators and hostage takers. Those parties are available to researchers only after a hostage incident ends if of course, those parties survived.

Second, before the establishment of the Hostage Barricade Database System (HOBAS) by the FBI in 1996, there was no data-base for researchers to research hostage and hostage-related situations. Today, it is the only database that can be used by researchers nationwide. Before HOBAS, there were merely some unofficial databases developed by some individual enterprises. As a result of this lack of statistical records, researchers could not give attention to hostage incident episodes. In fact, many books and articles are written by retired or current senior hostage negotiators, such as the FBI law enforcement bulletins' articles. Thus, the information in this study was provided through comparison and contrast of the information in those books and articles. The interpretation of the information of practitioners can affect the reliability of this study.

Third, as discussed earlier, there is no objective criterion to measure the effectiveness of hostage negotiations or other resolutions because each hostage rescue operation has its own unique characteristics and difficulties; therefore, each one is evaluated in terms of its own conditions whether or not it had a successful outcome since there is little empirical evidence on this area.

Finally, dealing with hostage and crisis situations is police work; police agencies usually do not want to share their information, knowledge, and records with researchers. They frequently reject any involvement in academic research, questionnaires, or other studies. Some very detailed, crucial, and up-dated information, knowledge, and techniques that police agencies employ during situations might not be available in this study. All of the gathered information was derived from the available sources in the public domain.

## CHAPTER 4

### ANALYSIS OF SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION PROCESS AND DISCUSSION OF THE CASE STUDIES

#### Introduction

Chapter four is comprised of (1) an analysis of the successful negotiation process, (2) a description and discussion of the case studies, and (3) an analysis and comparison table of the four cases. The researcher basically answered the research issues in this chapter. In other words, the researcher examined how to apply the successful negotiation process to the extreme hostage situations. Three out of four cases were terrorism motivated hostage situations, which means that the hostage takers in the cases were persistent and extremely dangerous individuals to the hostages and the police. It is a fact that these extremists challenged the negotiators' skills and negotiation tools. In the four cases, some police agencies did a good job through effective negotiation, whereas some agencies failed to resolve the sieges without bloodshed.

#### Successful Negotiation Process

As Albanese indicates, hostage incidents are resolved by either the negotiation team or tactical team practices. The first aim of the negotiators is to provide a situation in which the hostage takers allow the hostages to go free without any injuries because rescuing captives' lives is the first priority. The hostage takers' cooperative behaviors

can be increased and tension can be reduced through successful negotiation (As cited in Hatcher et al., 1998).

After the hostage situation starts, the command post makes an assessment of the threat level of the hostage situation. Then the negotiators initiate the negotiation with the hostage takers in accordance with the threat level of the situation. They try to learn the key characteristics of the situation and the demands of the hostage takers. This negotiation between the hostage takers and the negotiator is exactly the same as the regular negotiation practice that is used by every individual in their life. For example, every individual negotiates with friends, colleagues, and even opponents during life. Individuals usually know what they want in negotiation in regular life, and they negotiate over negotiable benefits. However, the demands of the hostage takers might not be negotiable in hostage incidents, or the hostage takers might not know exactly what they want. This key dissimilarity separates the hostage negotiation concept from regular negotiation in real life (Goodwin, 2004). The hostage negotiation concept requires that professional actors and the serious decision making process be implemented perfectly in field.

### *Major Actors in Decision Making Process of*

#### *Hostage Situations*

As mentioned earlier, the command post is the only decision maker in each hostage situation. The command post structure is composed of the three major actors: the incident commander, the negotiation team leader, and the tactical team leader. It must be kept in mind that the last word belongs to the incident commander (Noesner, 1998).



The decision making process is one of the important dynamics of the negotiation concept in situations. If at all possible, the negotiation should be ended by the negotiators. Implementing the tactical team intervention, deadly force, should be the last resort (Noesner, 1998). The most important difficulty is when to approve tactical team intervention in an incident. The hostage takers' behaviors should be effectively observed by the command post professionals to identify high risk factors (Fuselier, Van Zandt & Lanceley, 1991). In order to decide which practice, the negotiation team or the tactical team practice, will be used, the command post professionals take into consideration the threat level of the hostage takers and the key characteristics of the situation. For example, FBI agents consider applying deadly force to the hostage takers if their intervention is necessary, efficient, or satisfactory because they have responsibility for rescuing hostages. Since most deaths occur during the use of deadly force, the command post professionals should think very carefully before making a decision for tactical team intervention (Noesner, 1998).

If the threat level in the incident is low for the hostages, using deadly force is not the first option. If the threat level in the incident is moderate for the hostages, using deadly force can be contemplated. If the threat level in the incident is very high for the hostages, using deadly force is definitely required to save lives (Noesner, 1998).

In addition, there are some inner and outer perimeter factors that might affect the negotiation. They might be hostages' families, hostage takers' families, friends, bystanders, and, the press. However, these people are not supposed to be able to affect the negotiation and the decision making process. Therefore, crowds of people as

well as the press are kept away from the scene. The incident commander might decide how much information will be released to the press and the general public (Wind, 1995).

### *Indicators of Negotiation and Not Negotiation*

During the situations, the police might face some vital indicators that encourage the negotiators to negotiate with the hostage takers as much as possible: if there are no deaths and/or injuries; if the hostage takers do not resort to violence; if they become more logical; if deadlines have passed without any deaths and/or injuries; if the hostage takers want to cooperate; if they give up demands; if they allow the hostages to go free; if rapport can be built with the hostage takers; if they do any favor on behalf of the hostages. In sum, these indicators might show that there is clear evidence to continue the negotiation (Noesner, 1998).

On the other hand, there are some other vital indicators requiring deadly force (Noesner, 1998): if any suicidal signals are given to the negotiators by the hostage takers; if no attachment could be built between the hostage takers and the negotiators; if the communication process is getting worse; if the hostage takers are losing their rationality; if the risk level is increased by the hostage takers; if any damage and death have occurred despite the ongoing negotiation; if there is any hostile relationship between the hostages and the hostage takers (Lanceley, 1999). Of course, these indicators cannot be measured exactly, but they might help the negotiators to decide if they should stop the negotiation (Call, 2003). These are helpful for the command post to make a decision in situations if carefully evaluated. This careful evaluation can be executed only through effective methods, such as the phase-by-phase approach, which is a trusted and effective means for the police.

### *Phase-by-Phase Approach for Negotiators*

The police establish the negotiation means, such as mobile phones, to contact with the hostage takers. Then the negotiators try to communicate with them by telling their full name and task. However, they never tell them their rank to prevent their thinking that the negotiators have more power or no power in order to execute their demands. For example, the negotiator might start saying, “this is John Goodman. I am the negotiator. I am here to help you.” Additionally, he wants the hostage taker to give his full name. The negotiators usually avoid talking to the hostage takers face-to-face because they might have firearms and/or explosives. It is very dangerous for both actors. The negotiation is based on delaying tactics. The negotiators might not be able to use stalling tactics during face-to-face interaction. Nevertheless, sometimes face-to-face interaction might be useful to resolve some situations, such as with suicidal people (Lanceley, 2003).

Negotiators in hostage situations face two frequent problems. First, even professional negotiators might be daunted by hostage takers in some situations because convincing them to surrender is a very difficult and stressful task. At the beginning of the incident, sometimes the negotiators may ask themselves where and how to start (Fagan, 2000).

Second, although negotiation is implemented very carefully by the negotiator team, the incident commander might interfere in an ongoing negotiation. In other words, the incident commander can interfere with the negotiators by asking them too many stressful questions. Although police agencies know how valuable negotiation is, some incident commanders might not understand the value of negotiation in the same way.

For example, the incident commander may press the negotiators for information on 'how long the negotiation process will last', or 'why it lasts too long'. They ignore the idea that negotiation is based on the 'time-consuming' concept (Fagan, 2000).

One method can be consistently and effectively employed by the negotiators. This is the phase-by-phase approach. Since this approach is a very trusted method, nobody is concerned about the ongoing negotiation through its evaluation phases. The approach consists of six phases, and each phase is carefully evaluated by the command post whether to continue the negotiation or not (Fagan, 2000).

*In the first phase*, basically the negotiators start negotiation with the perpetrators. First, they find any available way to communicate with the hostage takers. It might be possible through existing phone lines or the mobile phone that the police provide. In this phase, the negotiators might have some difficulties and concerns. The negotiators usually do not know whether the hostage takers will accept their invitation to communicate with them. Additionally, the police might be concerned whether the hostage takers will try to communicate with the media, their motivation resources, and/or the hostages' families. These are the questions that should be answered by the command post in this phase. As a result, the length of the first phase is based on the key characteristics of each incident. The characteristics might be motivations, demands, deadlines, the number of hostage takers, their willingness to cooperate with the police, and the type of hostage takers (Fagan, 2000).

As Lanceley says, *in the second phase*, emotion is always very high, while rationality is very low on the part of the hostage takers. Many deaths and injuries might happen at the very beginning of incidents. The first hour is a very critical time. The

negotiators should carefully evaluate the emotional feelings of the hostage takers at the very beginning of the negotiation (As cited in Fagan, 2000). Since the hostage takers are more likely to be agitated at the beginning of the negotiation, the negotiators try to calm them by using negotiation skills and tools. Consequently, in this phase, the hostage takers are encouraged to talk with the negotiators because it usually helps them to release their pent-up feelings (Fagan, 2000).

*In the third phase*, after the hostage takers become more rational rather than illogical and sentimental, the negotiators ask them the direct and detailed questions to learn their motivations and demands. Sometimes, there might be more than one spokesperson on behalf of the hostage takers, especially among prisoner hostage takers; learning the motivation and demands might be very difficult. In those cases, the negotiators endeavor to cultivate one particular hostage taker who is the most reasonable man among the hostage takers (Fagan, 2000).

*In the fourth phase*, the hostage takers are supposed to be more rational and calm. At this point, the negotiators already know the motivations and demands. Each available option is carefully evaluated to find the best plan for the command post. As a result, the negotiators prepare their next plan and strategy to convince the hostage takers to release the hostages. The negotiators may use some items, such as food, drinks, blankets and cigarettes as bargaining tools. The most important point here is that the plan should be approved by the command post (Fagan, 2000).

*In the fifth phase*, the plan is implemented by the negotiators through their special negotiation skills and tools. They clearly express what they want the hostage takers to do. They usually demand they release hostages without any death and injury.


They try to resolve the situation peacefully. *In the sixth phase*, the negotiators want the hostage takers to surrender to the police. The last phase requires cooperation in the surrender plan on the part of the negotiation team and the tactical team. Both teams' members are supposed to be briefed by their team leaders (Fagan, 2000).

To make the phase-by-phase approach practical and to reduce the frustrations on the part of the police, this approach is rehearsed by both teams' members in training. The phase-by-phase approach makes the negotiation easy and helps the negotiators focus on what they will do in each phase. Additionally, since the incident commander is informed about each phase, he knows if the negotiation is going as they planned. Of course, it is possible that something might go wrong during the negotiation. Since the perpetrators are either criminal/terrorist or emotionally upset/mentally ill hostage takers, the situations are more likely to have volatile structures. For instance, if the hostage takers become angry and irrational in the fifth phase, the negotiators return to the second phase and apply active listening skills and other negotiation tricks one more time. The phase-by-phase approach is very flexible because each situation has its own difficulties (Fagan, 2000).

The command post timeline box will help to understand the phase-by-phase approach as well as how the command post works throughout the situations. The situation starts with the hostage takers taking hostages. After the first responding officer responds to the situation, the command post takes responsibility. They make the evaluation of the threat level by the hostage takers. The police apply either negotiation or deadly force. If the negotiation improves, the situation ends peacefully. If it does not improve, either the command post asks the negotiator to perform his tactical role to aid

the use of deadly force, or the command post asks the tactical team to raid the hostage takers without involving the negotiator. However, if there is no way to negotiate with the hostage takers because of a high threat level, the tactical team storms the building with the deadly force.

Figure 1: Command Post Timeline





Probably the biggest challenge that the police face during the phase-by-phase approach is to deal with the extreme demands and deadlines of the hostage takers. Dealing with the demands and deadlines of the hostage takers requires professional negotiation skills and tools on the part of the police.

### *Dealing with Demands and Deadlines in Hostage Situations*

The motivations of hostage takers might be different, such as the domestic fight, escaping from prison, protesting something, gaining some rights or merely drawing attention to something or somebody (McNeilly, personal communication). Additionally, as Fuselier points out, each type of hostage taker makes different demands. For example, the prisoner-hostage taker might demand safe passage from the prison or improvement in prison conditions. The terrorist-hostage taker might demand some concessions from the police. The mentally ill-hostage taker might demand the police leave him alone to commit suicide. The criminal-hostage taker might demand money (As cited in Mc Mains & Mullins, 1996).

As Miron and Goldstein state, the negotiators mainly face two types of demands; (1) instrumental or (2) expressive forms of demands. The instrumental type of demands refers to physical demands, while the expressive type of demands refers to emotional feelings and venting anger against others. The instrumental demands are based on a clear purpose of the hostage takers, whereas the expressive demands are based on the scattered thoughts and behaviors of the hostage takers (As cited in Mc Mains & Mullins, 1996).

As Biggs says, whatever the hostage takers demand is the key for the negotiators (As cited in Mc Mains & Mullins, 1996) because they initiate the

communication with the hostage takers about their demands. If the hostage takers make any demands, negotiation exists between the two actors (Mc Mains & Mullins, 1996). For instance, the hostage taker says, "I want you to give me a million dollars". The negotiators interpret this demand as he wants some food and water. The hostage taker says, "I want you to provide a car by 3 o'clock; otherwise, I am going to kill the hostages". The negotiators interpret these demands as now he has just started to negotiate (Wind, 1995). In order to cope effectively with the demands, the negotiators should make a careful analysis of the personalities and characteristics of the hostage takers. Professional negotiators know how to refuse demands or how to discuss demands without ignoring and angering the hostage takers (Mc Mains & Mullins, 1996).

Sometimes the negotiators make an agreement with the hostage takers or give a promise to them concerning the demands. In reality, they do not have to execute this promise because it was made under pressure. For instance, in *State v. Sands*, the negotiator made an agreement with the hostage taker to be lenient to him after he capitulated. Since he did not receive what he expected, he went to court to sue the negotiator. However, the court ruled that it was not a real agreement because taking hostages and threatening them are not legal. The agreement was not valid since it was signed under pressure regarding the lives of the hostages (Mc Mains & Mullins, 1996).

When the negotiators hear demands for the first time during the negotiation, they should not refuse the hostage takers immediately. The negotiators should react as if the demands are logical. Even if the demands are not negotiable, the negotiators never say 'no'. However, they might try to clarify how the demands are not negotiable without offending and angering them. If the demands are negotiable, then the negotiators start

to talk on each demanded item. For instance, if the perpetrators demanded a police car, \$10,000 and some other demands, the negotiators should focus on each item one-by-one. It might help to get the hostage takers to ignore or to forget their demands (Mc Mains & Mullins, 1996).

Some demands are negotiable, whereas some others are not negotiable on the part of the police. Every hostage case is unique; therefore, whether demands in a case are negotiable or not should be evaluated under its own circumstances. However, there are some guidelines about which demands are negotiable and which are not. For example, food, cigarettes, drinks, transportation, and money are negotiable demands, whereas weapons, drugs, explosives, exchanges of hostages and release of inmates are not negotiable at any time (Mc Mains & Mullins, 1996).

As a result, well-trained negotiators focus on the demands regardless whether they are negotiable or not. They try to take advantage of every demand in order to build a rapport and establish trust between the hostage takers and themselves. There are some common principles that must be considered by the negotiators in regarding each case's difficulties. First, negotiators never ask the hostage takers what their demands are. They never remind the hostage takers by asking them if they have any demands. Second, the negotiators never offer anything, but if the perpetrators offer something, they can use it as a negotiation tool. Third, if the hostage taker requests some food, the negotiators make a counter offer, such as food in exchange for the release of one hostage. If the perpetrator requests a cigarette, he is given one cigarette, not a package, and not a match because they are other negotiation tools (Mc Mains & Mullins, 1996).

Fourth, when they negotiate with hostage takers, they never ignore the personalities and characteristics of the hostage takers. For instance, the demands of the terrorist and the emotionally upset-hostage takers are not the same. Fifth, the negotiators always negotiate to release sick captives immediately (Mc Mains & Mullins, 1996). Sixth, the negotiators never remind the hostage takers of the deadline, and they never set a deadline for anything. For example, the negotiator never says, “your food will be delivered within 15 minutes” because they might not be able to deliver the food within 15 minutes. The perpetrators may think the police are not honest or they might be trying to trick them (Lanceley, 2003). This does not mean that the negotiators should ignore the deadline. However, amazingly, a few hostages have been killed because the police missed deadlines in situations (Wind, 1995). In sum, negotiators deal with the demands and deadlines through the effective use of time because, as McMains & Mullins (1996) claim, dealing with the situation is a time-consuming issue.

#### *Dealing with Time Issue in Hostage Situations*

Every situation consists of four phases. In the ‘*pre-crisis phase*,’ the hostage takers take hostages to assure that their demands are met. The emotions and irrationality of the hostage takers are very high in this phase. In the ‘*crisis phase*,’ they prepare to make their demands. The emotions and stress levels are still very high in this phase. In the ‘*negotiation phase*,’ they start to communicate with the police. The stress level, adrenaline dump and irrationality are lessened. They think and make more rational decisions. They are more likely to work with the negotiators to find a solution in this phase. In the ‘*resolution phase*,’ the hostage takers are expected to surrender to the police. The hostage takers usually become nervous and stressful, but since this is the

last term, the negotiators act as director and tell them how to surrender to the police. During these four phases, the negotiators act very slowly because they need time. The Stockholm syndrome is developed through a long period of time, and the time allows the negotiators to establish trust and build rapport between the two actors. Additionally, it allows the police better preparation and deployment at the scene. It allows the police to collect more information about the hostage takers. Also, it might decrease demands and anticipations (Mc Mains & Mullins, 1996).

### *Managing Media Influence in Hostage Situations*

The media are always interested in certain police activities, such as hostage situations. Upon hearing of a hostage situation, journalists arrive at the scene and want to have access to information. They are always part of the curious onlookers at the scene. Sometimes they might be a headache for the command post (Higginbotham, 1994). For example, they might broadcast artificial information about what the police are doing. They might try to enter the scene to get more information. They might interview the captives' families, released captives, politicians, and other people. Many people think this is correct. However, they sometimes might be critical of the police and the ongoing operation. They might not only increase the risk levels but also make the situation more complicated for the police (Mc Mains & Mullins, 1996).

Actually, the media are one of the crucial characteristics of the situations. They are a fairly effective means to shape general public opinion of hostage situations. The media can either assist or obstruct the police by publishing critical information about the situations. If they publish plans of the police, they might damage the ongoing operation of the police. Also, they might affect public policies and strategies (Crelinsten & Szabo,

1979). However, the police should know media members have a job to do. If they are provided information during the incidents, they should not create any problem for the police. They merely want to gather and spread the information immediately.

Consequently, the police should provide limited information for the media. Almost every police agency assigns a liaison officer for this job. Every command post unit gives the liaison officer sufficient information about the situation (Mc Mains & Mullins, 1996). The problems are resolved when both parties know their own responsibilities (Poland & McCrystle, 1999).

#### Description and Discussion of the Case Studies

Four case studies have been evaluated by the researcher to prove the importance of successful negotiation in hostage situations. The researcher focused on two significant points here. First, each case is evaluated on its own merits under four headings: (a) the facts of the case, (b) motivations, demands, and deadlines, (c) actions by the government the police, and (d) evaluation and summary.

Second, a comparative analysis is made through the comparison table to show the differences between successful and unsuccessful negotiation strategies and techniques the police apply. The major aim is to prove negotiation works to resolve volatile and extreme situations without bloodshed if it is taken seriously by the police and the government. The four cases are listed in terms of their chronologies since modification and improvement of the negotiation concept can be understood very clearly. General information on the four case studies is given in Table 1.

Table 1: Four Case Studies

Case Name	Target Country	Case Year	State	Police Agency
Munich Olympic Games Situation	German Government	1972	Munich	German Police
Balcombe Street Siege	British Government	1975	London	Metropolitan Police of London
Iranian Embassy Siege	British Government	1980	London	Metropolitan Police of London
Branch Davidian Barricade-Standoff	United States of America	1993	Waco, Texas	FBI and BATF

Source: Various resources cited in the case studies.

### *Case Study # 1*

#### *Political Hostage Situation of the Munich Olympic Games, 1972*

##### *a) Facts of the Case*

After the 20<sup>th</sup> Olympic Games started in Munich on 26 August, 1972 (Miller, 1993), around 4.00 a.m. on 5 September, eleven Israeli athletes were taken as hostages by eight terrorist-hostage takers of the Black September Organization (BSO) in the Olympic Village. Since the Israeli hostages resisted the hostage takers at the very beginning of the situation, two hostages were killed and three hostages were injured by the hostage takers (Aston, 1982).

During negotiation, the German government allowed the terrorists to believe they would be free to go to any Arab country. Therefore, they were allowed to go to the airport. The police used deadly force on the hostage takers at the airport because negotiation, which was the first resort, could not be improved between the police and the terrorists. The gunfight between the two parties was started by the police at the Furstenfeldbruck Airport, where the hostage takers were planning to leave the country with their hostages. After the first gunfire on the terrorists by the police, the nine Israeli hostages were killed by the hostage takers (Miller, 1993).

As a result of that gunfire, the nine hostages, five hostage takers, and one German police officer were killed. Seventeen people were killed, and three terrorists surrendered to the police in the Munich case (Aston, 1982). The essential information is given in Table 2.

Table 2: Munich Olympic Games Hostage Situation

Items	Munich Olympic Games Hostage Situation, 1972
Length of the case	17 hours: 15 hours for negotiation 2 hours for using deadly force
Motivation	Political motivations and objectives
Demand	Instrumental type of demands: Release inmates from the Israeli prison Safe exit from the country Some food
Deadline	Deadline was set by the terrorists first It was postponed 7 times during the negotiation
Type of hostage takers	Terrorist hostage takers of the Black September Organization (BSO)
Number of hostage takers	8 BSO members
Number of hostages	11 Israeli athletes
Stockholm syndrome	It was not there due to the cultural antagonism between the parties
Released hostages	None
Police Response	First response was negotiation; second response was using deadly force
Outcome	9 hostages were killed by the terrorists during the tactical intervention 5 terrorists were killed; 3 terrorists surrendered

Source: Various resources cited in case study # 1.

*b) Hostage Taker Motivation and Demands*

Upon taking the Israeli athletes as hostages, the terrorists made their demands. They wanted the Israeli government to release 200 Arab inmates from their prisons and wanted the German government to provide a plane to leave Germany because they wanted to go to Egypt with their hostages (Poland & McCrystle, 1999). Meanwhile, they



set a deadline. They threatened the government that if the demands were not met, they would kill the hostages one by one (Aston, 1982). The Israel government did not consent to release the inmates, and Egypt did not allow the hostage takers and hostages to come to their land (Poland & McCrystle, 1999). Also, the Israeli government believed that the German government would do their best to rescue the hostages. They did not want to interfere with the resolution of the German authority (Aston, 1982). The German government was left to launch its own planning in the situation (Miller, 1993).

Once the negotiation was started by the police, they followed a very flexible and conciliatory strategy to prevent loss of life throughout the negotiation. The police never refused demands during the confrontation with the terrorists; they wanted the terrorists to think that they would fly to Egypt. In the meantime, the German authority suggested the terrorists make payment or exchange the hostages. However, this was refused because the terrorists responded that money and their lives were not important to them anymore (Miller, 1993).

The deadline was postponed by the terrorists seven times through negotiation (Miller, 1993). In fact, the negotiators wanted the terrorists to give them additional time because the German government was still bargaining with the Israeli government on the demands (Aston, 1982). In the following days, the terrorists made some demands for food, and this was provided by the police. This showed that as long as the police acceded to the demands of the terrorists, they would not execute the hostages. Although the inmates were not released from the Israeli prisons, safe passage from the country became the first concern on the part of the terrorists. Despite what they said at the beginning of the negotiation, their lives were important to them (Miller, 1993).

Unfortunately, the Stockholm syndrome was non-existent due to the cultural antagonism between the two parties, the Israeli hostages and the Arab hostage takers (Aston, 1982). The length of the incident and the emotional strength of the relationship between the hostage takers and the hostages are the determining factors in the Stockholm syndrome (Fuselier, 1999). None of those characteristics was there to promote the Stockholm syndrome.

*c) Governmental and Command Post Resolutions*

As the first response from the police, negotiation was started with the terrorists. In the meantime, the government gave an order for TV and radio programs to stop their coverage of the siege. They did not want the terrorists to learn what the police were doing around them. While the police were negotiating with them, the government was taking into account some alternative means as well as negotiation, deadly force. However, it was unsafe for the hostages and the bystanders at the scene. They considered using chemical weapons against the hostage takers, but it was also unsafe (Aston, 1982).

Since the government decided to confront the terrorists at an isolated area, they gave the terrorists a helicopter to transport them to the Furstenfeldbruck NATO Airport. There were no bystanders, and it was very isolated area, which was an excellent location to confront the terrorists. The police snipers were to kill the terrorists when they walked towards the plane on the tarmac. Meanwhile, the terrorists wanted the government to give them a bus to transport them from the scene to the helicopter in the village; it was given to them. The terrorists were seriously trying not to make any mistakes. Finally, they arrived at the military airport with their hostages. Hence, the

fifteen hour bargaining phase was over; it was time to use deadly force to deal with the terrorists. Even though the police knew that the chance to achieve success was not high, they did use deadly force (Aston, 1982). In terms of the German government's international reputation and defense strategy, they wanted to resolve the case immediately. Since they could not achieve success from negotiation, they applied deadly force, their final option. However, it did not resolve the case without bloodshed (Miller, 1993).

After they landed to the airport, the terrorists approached the plane to check it out. In the meantime, a police sniper shot at them. The first shot of the police started the gunfight between the two parties. The police killed five hostage takers, and three others surrendered to the police. Some said that the innocent people were killed due to the police, while some others believed that the hostages were killed because the terrorists were smart and professional guerrillas (Aston, 1982).

#### *d) Evaluation and Summary*

The police attained partial success in this siege because they induced the terrorists to postpone the deadlines seven times through the negotiation. They captured three terrorists and killed five of them. However, they could not succeed totally by releasing the hostages without bloodshed. Their strategy caused the loss of all hostages and one police officer. Seventeen people were killed in the siege. Additionally, the German government lost its worldwide credibility (Miller, 1993).

The Munich Olympics were important in history because it was the crossroads that introduced political terrorism to the games (Reeve, 2000). The Munich case was also important to police agencies because after the Munich case, police agencies such

as the NYPD paid attention to the negotiation idea instead of deadly force in hostage situations. Dr. Schlossberg, a psychologist from the NYPD, argued that although negotiation was used in the Munich siege, but there were no specific negotiation techniques to use and apply it to the situation (Poland & McCrystle, 1999). In sum, in the Munich siege, the negotiation was unlike that now applied in hostage situations.

In considering the Munich siege's results, Dr. Schlossberg stated three important principles to develop the negotiation concept. First, the negotiation should be the first option the police apply. Second, the negotiators should try to learn the key characteristics and motivations of the hostage takers immediately through the negotiation. Third, the negotiators should use delaying techniques to slow down the situation. The third principle was known as a 'dynamic inactivity'. After the Munich siege, the NYPD started using these principles immediately (Poland & McCrystle, 1999).

In addition, terrorist blackmail was a serious crime in the 1970s. It increased the crime rate and bolstered terrorists terrorizing governments. In those years, it seemed that the German and Japanese governments were more likely to make concession to terrorists in hostage situations. For example, the German government released some inmates during the skyjacking at Dawson Field in 1970. They paid ransom to the terrorists in the skyjacking at Aden in 1972. They released inmates in the kidnapping of Peter Lorenz in 1975. The German government was more likely to be selected as a target in several politically motivated hostage situations. Only one month after the Munich siege, the German government was a victim in the Zagreb situation. Terrorists were released by the German authorities in this situation, too. The German government was an easy target for the terrorists (Clutterbuck, 1992). Making concessions and

paying ransom to the terrorists cannot be a reliable and consistent policy on the part of a government. If it makes concessions, it probably cannot prevent being a new target for terrorists later.

### *Case Study # 2*

#### *Balcombe Street Siege, 1975*

##### *a) Facts of the Case*

Four militants of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) assaulted Scotts Restaurant in London on 6 December, 1975. Since the same four men had assaulted the same place only one month earlier, the Metropolitan Police of London were chasing them. After the assault, hot pursuit started with the IRA in a stolen car. Later, the terrorists left the stolen vehicle and ran away on foot. They left a handbag full of ammunition that was used as evidence by the police. After a police back-up unit joined the chase, there was no way for the terrorists to escape from the police. They randomly selected a place to hide, the apartment of J. and S. Mathews family on Balcombe Street. The Mathews family was taken as hostages. The terrorists barricaded themselves in the apartment (Moysey, 2004).

After the perimeter was evacuated by the police, negotiation started. The terrorists stated they were IRA members. Then they set their demands and a deadline. They claimed that they would let the hostages free if the demands were met. The police followed a successful negotiation strategy to resolve the siege peacefully. Terrorists released the hostages and surrendered to the police on the sixth day of the siege (Moysey, 2004). The essential information is given in Table 3.

Table 3: Balcombe Street Siege

Items	Balcombe Street Siege, 1975
Length of the case	7 days
Motivation	Political motivations and objectives
Demand	Instrumental type of demands: Safe exit from the country Hot meals and drinking water
Deadline	Set by the terrorists
Type of hostage takers	Terrorist hostage takers from the Irish Republican Army (IRA)
Number of hostage takers	4 IRA members
Number of hostages	2 British citizens
Stockholm syndrome	Yes
Released hostages	Both hostages
Police Response	The only response the police applied was the negotiation
Outcome	2 hostages were released 4 terrorists surrendered

Source: Various resources cited in case study # 2.

*b) Hostage Taker Motivation and Demands*

The terrorist-hostage takers had basically one chief demand, which was safe passage to Ireland. They threatened the police by telling them they would kill both hostages if they were not allowed to leave the country. However, this demand was instantly refused by the police because it was unacceptable. In the following days of the siege, they demanded some hot meals and drinks from the police. This demand was gradually accepted by the police (Moysey, 2004).

At the very beginning of the situation, the terrorists were not planning to take hostages. However, something went wrong in their plan and they found themselves in the middle of a hot pursuit. They had to take hostages to escape. Their one chief demand, safe exit from the country, was as a result of the unexpected hostage situation.

### *c) Governmental and Command Post Resolutions*

The police applied negotiation first in the Balcombe siege. The siege was resolved through effective negotiation. In fact, there are four significant points that the police focused on in the course of the negotiation (Moysey, 2004).

First, in order to disconnect the terrorists from the world, the police cut off the availability of the phone line and the electricity of the apartment and offered them a mobile phone line to make contact possible between the two parties. There was no light, no regular phone line, and no heat in the room. The perimeter of the apartment was covered with a huge curtain from temporary scaffolding. The terrorists could not see or hear any movement around them. They had no idea what was going on around them. The major aim was that the terrorists would suffer because of separation and isolation from the outside. In addition, the police aimed to use cutting off the utilities as a negotiation tool. The terrorists were isolated from their motivation resource, too. However, they had a radio. Probably, they gained some hearsay from the radio that the Special Air Service (SAS) was already deployed on the scene. Their presence might have affected the terrorists' decision to release the hostages and to surrender to the police (Moysey, 2004).

Second, after the police examined the fingerprints of the terrorists on the bag abandoned during the chase, they found that one of the terrorists was a dangerous murderer. The police had been looking for him for a long time. He had the potential to kill the hostages without hesitating. Meanwhile, the police were getting professional help from a psychologist, Dr. Peter Scott, during the negotiation because the terrorists were dangerous people who had previous criminal records. Dr. Scott recommended that

although the police refused the chief demand, the terrorists should believe they might get a concession from the police through the negotiation. The point was to make the terrorists believe that negotiation was the way they could get a concession (Moysey, 2004).

Third, according to the British government, the hostage takers were regular criminals rather than individuals fighting for their freedom because they were terrorizing and victimizing innocent people. In fact, in that room, they committed a new crime by taking and holding the hostages against their will. They might have killed the hostages in that room. Therefore, the British government never accepted the idea that they were freedom fighters. On the other hand, the terrorists understood that Mr. and Mrs. Mathews did not look like individuals who were being targeted by the IRA. They were ordinary people. In fact, Mr. Mathews was a poor worker. Living in a room with the Mathews for a week might have promoted the Stockholm syndrome (Moysey, 2004).

Fourth, when the terrorists made their demand, they were faced with a counter-demand from the police. For example, when they asked the negotiators to give them a hot meal, the police offered them to exchange one hostage for the hot meal. They did not accept that, and the police delivered them hot soup only. The negotiators were using even a small demand, including drinking water, as a negotiation tool. In the following days of the siege, the terrorists felt exhausted and abandoned. Their chief demand, safe exit from the country, turned into a small concession because they accepted exchanging Mrs. Mathews for a hot meal. Thereby, the hostage takers had already given the most important concession to the police. They attenuated their power



by releasing one hostage. There was no way to change the direction of the ongoing negotiation. The police did a good job during the entire negotiation (Moysey, 2004).

#### *d) Evaluation and Summary*

The successful negotiation strategy of the police was very worthwhile because the situation was resolved without tragedy. The philosophy of the police was based on the 'wait and see' technique during the course of the negotiation. The police launched a negotiation based on the isolation of the terrorists from the outside. However, the police never ignored their brutality and prior criminal records. The police would use the experience gained in the Balcombe siege in the Iranian Embassy siege (Moysey, 1994).

Unlike the Iranian Embassy Siege, the cultural background of the actors of the siege was the same. Therefore, there was no language barrier between them. It was an advantage to resolve the siege without violence. Additionally, the Stockholm syndrome might have helped to resolve the siege peacefully (Moysey, 2004).

The Balcombe siege occurred in 1975. The negotiation concept was gradually improving on the part of the police. The London police did a very good job through effective negotiation skills and tools. There was a perfect performance on the part of the negotiators. The spectacular outcome of the siege showed that all known and available negotiation techniques of the police were used by the negotiators.

### *Case Study # 3*

#### *Iranian Embassy Siege, 1980*

##### *a) Facts of the Case*

Six terrorists invaded to the Iranian Embassy in London on 30 April, 1980. They took and held twenty-four people, Embassy employees and visitors, as hostages during

the six days of the siege (Moysey, 2004). Fourteen captives were employees of the Embassy. The other nine captives were merely visitors; four visitors were Iranian citizens, whereas the remaining five visitors were not Iranian citizens. A police officer who was working as a security guard in the Embassy was the last captive. There were British, Syrian, and Pakistani correspondents among the hostages. In the following days, the correspondent-hostages would mediate between the terrorists and the police (MacWillson, 1992).

After the siege started, the Scotland Yard Metropolitan Police were in charge of resolving the siege peacefully. Superintendent Fred Luff was the senior negotiator during the entire negotiation. Luff started the communication with Oan Ali, the leader of the terrorist hostage takers. Luff stated that if they did not hurt any captives, they would not be hurt by the police. Oan Ali talked regretfully and expressed that they had no problem with the British people; they merely wanted to demonstrate against the Khomeni regime in Iran (MacWillson, 1992).

On the first day of the siege, the terrorists prepared a demand list thrown from the window and set a deadline. They let the correspondent hostages contact the media, TV, newspapers, and magazines, including the BBC, in order to spread the motivation and demands to the world. In the meantime, they wanted to talk to the Iranian Foreign Minister on the phone to convey their demand, which was the release of inmates from Iranian prisons. However, the Minister claimed that Oan Ali and his friends were spies of the U.S. Also, he invited the Iranian hostages to sacrifice their lives for the Iran regime in order to show their loyalty to Iran and to protest the terrorists (MacWillson, 1992). The

terrorists did not mention releasing inmates from the Iranian prisons again (Moysey, 2004). The reason might be the Minister's answer, which was no (MacWillson, 1992).

Since the police did not cut off the electricity and the telephone at the very beginning of the siege, the terrorists made phone calls to the media. However, later the police cut the telephone as well as other communication utilities. Although the terrorists refused to accept a mobile phone at the very beginning, they accepted a mobile phone later and started using it for the interactions with the police. Sometimes they negotiated face-to-face instead of using the mobile phone (MacWillson, 1992).

Meanwhile, the terrorists demanded a doctor for sick captives. Since it was not accepted, they released the sick captives. The negotiation was improving because they released a couple of hostages; the deadline was postponed a couple of times. Although the terrorists said that they were ready to die if their mission required it, they started to worry if the police would use deadly force. The negotiators built rapport with the hostage takers (MacWillson, 1992). However, on the sixth day of the siege, the terrorists killed one of the Iranian hostages (Moysey, 2004), claiming that their demands were not met and the deadlines were ignored (MacWillson, 1992).

As a result, the government allowed the SAS to use deadly force. While a negotiator was keeping Oan Ali on the phone to make him less prepared for the sudden attack of the police, which was the tactical role of the negotiator, the SAS did a perfect and clean unexpected entry to the compound. They killed five terrorists out of six because some female hostages were defending one from the police raid. They said that he had been gentle towards them. This was the Stockholm syndrome (Moysey, 2004). The essential information is given in Table 4.

Table 4: Iranian Embassy Siege

Items	Iranian Embassy Siege, 1980
Length of the case	6 days
Motivation	Political motivations and objectives
Demand	Instrumental type of demands: Release of 91 Arab inmates from Iranian prisons Safe exit from London
Deadline	Deadline set by the terrorists
Type of hostage takers	Terrorist hostage takers from the Democratic Revolutionary Movement for the Liberation of Arabistan (DRMLA)
Number of hostage takers	6 DRMLA members
Number of hostages	24 Iranian and non-Iranian citizens
Stockholm syndrome	Yes
Released hostages	Only a couple of sick hostages were released
Police Response	First, negotiation Second, deadly force
Outcome	5 terrorists were killed 1 terrorist surrendered

Source: Various resources cited in case study # 3.

*b) Hostage Taker Motivation and Demands*

The hostage takers were militants of the Democratic Revolutionary Movement for the Liberation of Arabistan (DRMLA) (Moysey, 2004). Twenty-seven-year-old Oan Ali led the group. They claimed that they were fighting for the independence of Khuzestan, a territory of Iran, (MacWillson, 1992).

The terrorists made four demands. First, they wanted the Iranian government to release 91 Arab inmates from Iranian prisons. Second, they wanted the British government to provide a bus to go to the airport and a plane to leave the country (Moysey, 2004). Third, they wanted one of the Arab ambassadors, such as one from Iraq, Jordan, Algeria, and/or Kuwait, to work as a mediator between the host government and them during the siege. If not, they agreed to talk with one from Pakistan, Nigeria, Malaysia, Indonesia, and/or Turkey as a mediator. Fourth, they

wanted to talk to the BBC executive director immediately. The aim was to ask him to broadcast their declaration on TV (MacWillson, 1992).

The negotiators recommended the terrorists use an interpreter to understand the demands clearly. Before the police cut off the phone line, the terrorists wanted the hostages to deliver their demands and intents to the media, newspaper, and the TV over the phone. Also, the hostages were allowed to talk to the police in order to convey the demands of the terrorists. Although the terrorists were being helped by the hostages in order to overcome the language barrier, they accepted an interpreter because Oan Ali spoke poor English and the others none (MacWillson, 1992).

### *c) Governmental and Command Post Resolutions*

During the negotiation phase, the hostage takers were more likely to focus on the two chief demands. First, they wanted the police to broadcast their message on TV, and second, they wanted to talk with an Arab ambassador to ask him to be a mediator between the British government and themselves (MacWillson, 1992). The newspapers published the police chief's response that it was impossible to guarantee their demands (Moysey, 2004).

For the first chief demand, the police asked the terrorists to release more hostages if they were to be allowed to talk to the executive director of the BBC. As a result, they released a hostage and they were allowed to talk to the executive director of the BBC to give him their message. It was broadcast on TV. For the second chief demand, Arab ambassadors were asked to mediate between the two parties. The ambassadors wanted the British to make a small concession, such as 'a promise' not to storm the building or 'consent' to allow the hostage takers to leave the country, in order

to convince them to capitulate. However, an agreement could not be reached. The negotiators began to stall for additional time to extend the deadline one more time, and they blamed the politicians for failing on the second chief demand. Meanwhile, the hostage takers allowed the hostages to talk to the police, and the hostages complained that the police did not do anything to execute this demand. Finally, the terrorists killed one hostage, Lavazani, on the sixth day of the siege (MacWillson, 1992).

After Lavazani was killed, the Police Commissioner, Sir David McNee, sent a written message to the terrorists. It said that the London Police were certainly against violence. The best way to resolve the siege was peacefully. After the message was delivered, the terrorists wanted the hostages to talk to the police to guarantee that the police would not use the deadly force. However, the British government had already sanctioned the use of deadly force because the mission required it (Moysey, 2004).

#### *d) Evaluation and Summary*

There are three of significant points to evaluate this siege. First, although there was no clear evidence why the terrorists selected the British government as a target, the terrorists might have selected the Iranian Embassy as a victim because there was no capital punishment in England as a result of taking people as hostages (Moysey, 2004). In fact, after the siege started, Oan Ali asked Faruqi, the Pakistani correspondent-hostage, if the statute in London was severe against the defendant who takes hostages (MacWillson, 1992). It seemed that he was thinking of surrender.

Second, the raid of the SAS on the terrorists was broadcast on TV (Billen, 2002). The aim was to show to the world how the British police responded to the terrorists.

They wanted to discourage terrorists from selecting the British land and its people as a target again (Moysey, 2004).

Third, according to the Geneva Convention, the British government should have asked either the Iranian government or the person in command of the Embassy of Iran in London if they could raid the compound. However, the person in command of the embassy mission was already a hostage, and the Iranian government had already said that if the hostages were killed by the terrorists, they were martyrs of the Iran revolution. The British government did not want to make any payment or concessions to the terrorists. They used deadly force as a last resort (Moysey, 2004).

#### *Case Study # 4*

##### *Branch Davidians Standoff in Waco, Texas, 1993*

###### *a) Facts of the Case*

The Branch Davidians were established by Victor Houteff in the 1930s. In those years, there were roughly nine hundreds followers. They supported the Seventh Day Adventist Church. After Houteff died, the number of supporters declined. In 1981, Vernon Howell joined the group. In a short period of time, he became the new leader. The group regained its power thanks to him. There were roughly 130 followers of the Branch Davidians in Waco. Howell changed his name in 1993. David Koresh was his new name (Poland & McCrystle, 1999).

Koresh told the followers there would be an 'end' very soon. They should prepare (Edwards, 2001) and protect themselves from their opponents (Ammerman, 1995). For the approaching end, the Davidians stored guns and weapons in their compounds (Poland & McCrystle, 1999). Officers of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms

(ATF) went to the compound with a search warrant to seize unlawful weapons on February 28, 1993 (Edwards, 2001). The Davidians did not allow the ATF officers to come into the compound and they fought with the ATF officers. In this battle, four ATF officers and six Davidians were killed; twenty ATF officers and a number of Davidians, including Koresh, were injured (Edward, 1993; Edwards, 2001). After the bloody gunfight, the FBI was in charge to resolve the standoff (Edwards, 2001). The FBI sent its best negotiators of the CINT, best experts of the National Center of the Analysis of Violent Crime (NCAVC), best agents of the Hostage Rescue Team (HRT), and a SWAT team to the Davidians' compound (Edward, 1993). All these units were under the command of Jeff Jamar, the incident commander of the standoff (Edwards, 2001).

There were approximately 668 FBI officers and 367 officers of other agencies at the scene. Once the negotiation was initiated, it lasted roughly 51 days from March 1 to April 19 (Poland & McCrystle, 1999). According to Jamar, the standoff was a typical hostage situation. He allowed agents to use some tactics, such as cutting off the electricity, using loud music and noise, and using tear gas (Edwards, 2001). He supposed that these tactics would work to resolve the standoff. The agents were not familiar with the Davidians' religious motivations (Barkun, 1993). The standoff did not look like a typical hostage incident. As Heyman believed, the followers were staying in the compound voluntarily, unlike a typical hostage incident (as cited in Edwards, 2001).

Even though a number of Davidians were released through effective negotiation at the very beginning of the standoff, the agents believed that the nature of the negotiation was getting worse in the following days (Poland, McCrystle, 1999) because Koresh was frequently breaking his word on capitulating. For example, he promised that



they would capitulate if the authorities broadcast his sermon on TV, but he broke his word and nobody capitulated (Edwards, 2001). Some negotiators, including Sage, the leader of the negotiation team, believed that if Koresh was a real psychopath, the negotiation would be fruitless and hopeless (Edwards, 2001).

After 51 days of negotiation, the agents became impatient. They determined to employ force to compel the Davidians to cease the Standoff. They shot CS gas into the compound (Poland, McCrystle, 1999). Since the Davidians had procured the gas masks in advance, they used the gas masks and started to fire on the tanks in the compound (Edwards, 2001). Soon the entire building was in flames (Poland, McCrystle, 1999). Fire fighting equipment was far away from the compound. The fire spread very fast in the compound (Edward, 1993). Roughly 75 Davidians died on that day. Some Davidians died from gunfire, some of them died from the flame (Edwards, 2001). The essential information is given in Table 5.

Table 5: Branch Davidians Standoff in Waco, Texas

Items	Branch Davidians Barricade-Standoff, 1993
Length of the case	51 days
Motivation	Religious motivations
Demand	-
Deadline	-
Type of participants	None: Voluntary Branch Davidians
Number of hostage takers	None: Roughly 100 volunteers Davidians
Number of hostages	None: Roughly 100 volunteer Davidians
Stockholm syndrome	-
Released hostages	Davidians were released
Police Response	First response was negotiation Second response was using force
Outcome	All Davidians in the compound died

Source: Various resources cited in case study # 4.

### *b) Hostage Taker Motivation and Demands*

Koresh told his followers the end of the world was very soon. They had to prepare for this battle (Edwards, 2001). He said that their opponents would encircle and try to kill them in this battle. They had to protect themselves (Ammerman, 1995). There were roughly 100 Davidians, including kids, waiting for the imminent battle (Edward, 1993).

According to the police, Koresh was a sociopath hostage taker and the Davidians were his hostages. The negotiators could not understand the religious beliefs and motivations of the Davidians. There are two important aspects here. First, the police overlooked the religious beliefs and motivations of the Davidians. Second, the police overlooked the experts' opinions of the consultants/psychologists (Ammerman, 1995).

Why did the police ignore the beliefs of the Davidians and the advice of the experts? The reason was the FBI's traditional command structure and police subculture. FBI agents were more likely to support using the force rather than negotiation (Ammerman, 1995). For example, Jamar was familiar with using force. He was not familiar with negotiation and its requirements. The tactical team members were willing to use force (Edwards, 2001). Unfortunately, some agents also wanted Koresh and the Davidians to pay for what they did (Ammerman, 1995).

### *c) Governmental and Command Post Resolutions*

After the first bloodshed tragedy at the compound, the FBI initiated negotiation first, and the negotiations obtained the release of a number of the Davidians. However, in the following days, some negotiators and agents did not believe that they would achieve further progress through negotiation. Since Jamar thought that negotiation

would not work anymore, he asked Sage to accept using force, such as the CS gas. Meanwhile, Koresh suggested that after typing the seven seals of his beliefs, he would surrender to the FBI. Some believed that this was clear evidence of willingness to surrender, whereas some believed that it was another part of the delaying tactics of Koresh. Finally, the command post, FBI Director William Sessions, and General Attorney Janet Reno agreed with the use of CS gas on the Davidians. The standoff ended with the second tragedy (Edwards, 2001).

#### *d) Evaluation and Summary*

The investigative arson report affirmed that the fire was started by the Davidians rather than the CS gas. However, there was no evidence if starting the fire was the idea of all of the Davidians or just a few Davidians (Edward, 1993). Roughly 75 Davidians died in the compound on April 19 (Edwards, 2001). Even though the Davidians shot at the FBI agents, the agents never shot at the Davidians on the last day of the standoff. The Davidians stated that suicide was impermissible in their beliefs. However, some released Davidians mentioned suicide preparation. Koresh told his followers they should follow him until the end, which might mean killing themselves (Edward, 1993).

Koresh and the Davidians knew that they had committed severe crimes: they had killed ATF officers. It seemed that the convincing Koresh to capitulate was not an easy task for the negotiators. Therefore, the negotiators talked to the followers to convince them to capitulate. The negotiators sent them the released followers' statements to convince them to capitulate (Edward, 1993). Actually, during the entire negotiation, 35 Davidians were released through effective negotiation (Poland & McCrystle, 1999). The

experts said that if the police had followed the recommendations of the experts, the consequences would have been better (Ammerman, 1995).

The tragedy and failure surprised even the FBI agents (Edwards, 2001). The two major factors, ignoring the religious motivations and the recommendations of the experts, affected their success. They failed to understand the religious extremists' motivations. They were not an ordinary group of people. The situation required more than understanding an ordinary group of people (Ammerman, 1995).

There were some other problems between the negotiation and the tactical teams (Poland & McCrystle, 1999). Even though both teams should have shared information, the negotiation team charged that the tactical team did not provide sufficient information, and the tactical team responded with the same charge (Edward, 1993).

#### Analysis of the Case Studies

Every hostage taking incident is unique because of its own difficulties and characteristics (Fagan, 2000). In this chapter, each case study has different actors, cultures, motivations, demands, and police responses. Therefore, each case is evaluated under its own conditions first. However, some general aspects of the four cases are compared by the researcher to see if the negotiation and other governmental applications were successful and appropriate. The aim is to aid governments, police, and future studies on hostage situations, which is the main issue of this research.

In the Munich Olympic Games Situation, there are the two main reasons why it ended in tragedy. First, as Aston stated, even though the police employed negotiation in the situation first (Aston, 1982), they could not gain the release of the hostages through negotiation. The police suggested the terrorists accept payment or exchange the

hostages during the negotiation (Miller, 1993) because the German government was more likely to make concessions to the terrorist hostage takers in those years (Clutterbuck, 1992). Probably it destroyed the ongoing negotiation because both making payments to the terrorists and exchanging hostages are totally against the negotiation philosophy. The negotiators should have used stalling and delaying techniques.

In addition, unlike the Balcombe Street Siege, the negotiation techniques that the police used in the Munich Olympic Games Situation were inadequate because of the lack of successful communication strategies. As Poland and McCrystle mentioned, the police agencies started to pay attention to the importance of the negotiation in order to improve and to modify the negotiation concept (Poland & McCrystle, 1999).

Second, according to Hatcher and others, in the 1970s, politically motivated hostage situations were a major threat to governments. The best known response was using deadly force rather than the negotiation concept because using deadly force was the chief idea of the first generation of hostage resolution (Hatcher et al., 1998). Probably, many governments wanted to prove they would make no concession to terrorists.

In the Branch Davidians Standoff, there are three significant points why the police failed to rescue the Davidians. First, negotiation was the first resort, while using force was the last resort. However, according to Ammerman, the FBI command post was keen on using force against the Davidians because they were more familiar with using force. Some agents wanted the Davidians pay the price (Ammerman, 1995). They thought that traditional techniques would work in the Davidians standoff (Barkun, 1993)

since they believed that the Waco standoff was a typical hostage situation. It did not work, and the standoff ended with bloodshed (Edwards, 2001).

Second, they ignored the religious motivations of the Davidians because the police were not familiar with religious extremists. Third, they ignored the recommendations of the experts regarding the Davidians (Ammerman, 1995).

In summary, the Waco standoff showed that negotiation was abandoned by the police earlier than it should have been. Unlike the Munich Olympic Games, the Balcombe Street, and the Iran Embassy cases, the Waco case was a religiously motivated barricade-standoff and its length was much longer than the other three cases. Meanwhile, unlike the Munich and the Iran Embassy sieges, the cultural background of the two major actors, the police and the Davidians, was the same in the Waco standoff. There was no language obstacle between the two parties in the Waco standoff, which was also true in the Balcombe Street siege.

In the Iranian Embassy Siege, there is one significant point why the siege could not be resolved peacefully. As MacWillson stated, the police initiated negotiation first (MacWillson, 1992). When the hostage takers killed a hostage, negotiation became useless and hopeless. The police abandoned the negotiation immediately and used deadly force (Moysey, 2004). In spite of the fact that the police did a good job during the negotiation, the negotiation became unfeasible as a result of the hostage takers' volatile behaviors. It seems that the police's decision to abandon the negotiation and the use of the deadly force were correct because if they had insisted on maintaining negotiations, the terrorists would have killed more hostages. The timing of giving up the negotiation was perfectly accurate on the part of the police.

In hostage situations, although the negotiation techniques are correctly used on the hostage takers, sometimes they might not work. The point is to know when negotiation becomes hopeless and useless.

In the Balcombe Street Siege, the successful case, there are three significant points why the police did a good job through negotiation. First, unlike the other three cases, the IRA terrorists in this case were not planning to take hostages. Since the terrorists could not escape from the police, they had to take hostages to gain safe passage to their country.

Second, unlike two of the other three cases, as Moysey (2004) mentioned, the cultural backgrounds of both parties, the police and the hostage takers, were the same. Therefore, there was no language barrier between the two parties. It might have helped to promote the Stockholm syndrome between the two parties as well as helped promote negotiation.

Third, probably the police did not have as advanced negotiation techniques in those years as they have today, but they apparently used all available and known negotiation techniques successfully because unlike the other three cases, this case was resolved peacefully through negotiation.

The comparison table, Table 6, shows the differences and the similarities of the four cases. In order to better understand the four cases, Table 6 helps to see the major descriptive aspects, such as motivations, demands, deadlines, time lengths, major actors, target governments, police applications, and outcomes. In fact, the motivation was political objectives in three cases, whereas the motivation was religious beliefs only in the Waco case. The target was the British government in two cases, while the targets

were the U.S. and the German governments in the other two cases. The shortest case was 17 hours, whereas the longest case was 51 days. Three cases were resolved with tactical force, while only one case was resolved with negotiation. The most important difference in the four cases is that, unlike the other three cases, as Edwards stated, the police supposed that they faced a typical hostage situation in the Waco standoff (Edwards, 2001). But, it was not a typical hostage situation because there were not any hostage takers and/or hostages. (The researcher did a basic summary in the Table 6.)



Table 6: Comparison Table of the Four Cases

Comparison Table	Munich Olympic Games Situation, 1972	Balcombe Street Siege, 1975	Iranian Embassy Siege, 1980	Branch Davidians Standoff in Waco, 1993
Length of the case	17 hours	7 days	6 days	51 days
Motivation	Political motivation	Political motivation	Political motivation	Religious motivation
Demand	Instrumental demands	Instrumental demands	Instrumental demands	-
Deadline	Deadline was set	Deadline was set	Deadline was set	-
Type of hostage takers	Terrorist hostage takers (BSO)	Terrorist hostage takers (IRA)	Terrorist-hostage takers (DRMLA)	None: Voluntary Branch Davidians
Number of hostage takers	8 BSO members	4 IRA members	6 DRMLA members	None: Roughly 100 volunteers
Number of hostages	11 Israeli athletes	2 British citizens	24 Iranian and non-Iranian citizens	None: Roughly 100 volunteers
Stockholm syndrome	None	Yes	Yes	-
Released hostages	None	Yes	Yes	Yes
Police Response	First, negotiation Second, deadly force	Negotiation	First, negotiation Second, deadly force	First, negotiation Second, force
Outcome	11 hostages were killed 5 terrorists were killed 3 terrorists surrendered	2 hostages were released 4 terrorists surrendered	1 hostage was killed 5 terrorists were killed 1 terrorist surrendered	All Davidians died

Source: Various resources cited under 'the description and discussion of the case studies'.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RECOMMENDATIONS

#### Introduction

Chapter five has a brief summary of the hostage negotiation concept and some recommendations for three parties, (1) the police agencies, (2) governments, (3) and researchers. In addition, a one week schedule for an initial training course for the negotiators is recommended. The one week course is based on the American and the Canadian law enforcement agencies' negotiation practices and techniques. The course and its details are set at the end of chapter five.

#### Overview

The taking of people as hostages is a very common type of criminal act. Today, nothing has changed. Taking hostages is still employed as an effective means for criminals and terrorists to gain some benefits (McMains & Mullins, 1996). Since hostage taking situations have dramatically increased in the last few decades (Hatcher et al., 1998), dealing with hostage takers and hostage situations has become one of the major focuses of the police (Regini, 2002). In fact, a number of terrorist hostage situations happened in the 1960s and 1970s. They were a major threat to public safety (Hatcher et al., 1998). Therefore, in the first generation of hostage resolution, deadly force was more likely to be used by the police agencies against politically motivated hostage takers (Hatcher et al., 1998). However, studies showed that using deadly force in hostage situations is not a successful means for saving lives because roughly 80% of

the people killed in hostage situations lost their lives during use of deadly force by the police (Michalowski et al., 1988). Nobody was happy with the number of deaths as a result of tactical team interventions (Hatcher et al., 1998; Call, 2003). Therefore, in the second generation of hostage resolution, negotiation was more likely to be used by the police (Call, 2003). Fortunately, many hostages' lives were saved through the police's effective negotiation strategies (Regini, 2002). Today, negotiation is the first priority of the police agencies to resolve hostage situations without bloodshed.

#### Future Recommendations

As stated earlier, the major purpose of this thesis is to make contributions to the negotiation strategies of the police agencies as well as some critical recommendations for government policies and future research on hostage situations in the future.

#### *Recommendations for Governments*

Hostage takers victimize not only the hostages but also governments by taking and holding people as hostages because every government has to protect its citizens against the criminals and terrorists either in their land or abroad. During hostage situations, governments try to protect their citizens; however, sometimes it might be difficult because some hostage takers are professionals and have prior criminal records. There are five recommendations for governments to protect their people in hostage situations and to prevent possible hostage situations in future.

First, terrorist hostage takers make demands in the hostage situations to change the general belief of the public and the policies of government by using the threat of violence (Sandler & Scott, 1987). They compel governments either (1) to make concessions to them or (2) to refuse to make any concessions to them. Each way has

its own risks on the part of governments. For example, if the government makes any concession, it will be criticized because it could not resolve the situation without making a concession. If the government does not make any concession, it will also be criticized because it did not take care of its citizens (Friedland & Merari, 1992).

Although a government may have a 'no-concession' policy, it never leaves hostage citizens to their fate. Otherwise, the government would lose its esteem and image. Negotiators should always be allowed to negotiate with the hostage takers. A government does not have to give any concessions to the hostage takers during the negotiations. Therefore, a government should not reject the negotiation with hostage takers. Refusing negotiation or making payment for ransom never work to resolve these situations. Terrorist hostage takers usually select targets based on past experiences. If they have succeeded in gaining concessions from a target country in previous actions, they will probably take hostages from the same population again. Terrorist hostage takers should be led to believe that they will be able to get their demands by negotiating with the police because negotiating is a better way than killing the hostages (Clutterbuck, 1992). Negotiation means the police are stalling the hostage takers. As stated earlier, since negotiation is a delaying tactic, as long as the hostage takers do not kill or harm the hostages, negotiation should be maintained by the police.

Second, a government should never seem to be okay to agree to the hostage takers' blackmail in hostage situations because it encourages them to select the same government as a new target for the next hostage situation (Clutterbuck, 1992).

Third, a government should trust its own police units to take the responsibility to resolve the situation peacefully. The police are responsible for ending the situation and

making any announcements to the public and media if such is required. For example, as Herz stated, the members of the BSO took American Embassy employees in Saudi Arabia in 1973. After President Nixon's statement about the situation was broadcast on the radio, the hostage takers killed the hostages immediately. Of course, nobody blames the President for the hostages being killed by the terrorists. However, this type of announcement by politicians might complicate the ongoing negotiation. In sum, negotiation is a professional police task. Also, there must be a single voice speaking to the hostage takers to resolve the problem (Jenkins, 1982).

Fourth, although every government has its own policy to deal with criminal and terrorist hostage takers, unified international policies and commitments should be adopted in order to prevent future hostage situations. Unfortunately, every government works alone in hostage situations. However, governments should work together for better outcomes. Governments might have regional and international agreements and commitments that show consensus in the way to deal with criminal and terrorist hostage takers. Since most criminal and terrorist organizations work together abroad in their criminal activities, ignoring their cultures and ideas, the governments should build some international cooperation for reactive and proactive resolutions. The more governments cooperate, the less they fail in these situations.

Fifth, hostages are the most affected actors in hostage situations. The question is how the hostage takers choose their victims. What is the criterion for that? Some people are more likely to be selected as targets by hostage takers because of their status. These possible targets are companies, politicians, airlines, passengers, banks, rich people, or governmental representatives (Poland & McCrystle, 1999). In fact, the most

popular targets are American diplomats and politicians and Israeli officials abroad for the terrorist hostage takers (Jenkins et al., 1977). The people with their lives at stake should be trained to avoid becoming hostages and/or how to survive if they are taken as hostages. Personal security guidelines and some other key points must be taught to these people in some seminars and lectures by governmental agencies before they go abroad. Thereby, the governments can reduce the number of hostage situations and reduce the number of death in hostage situations. As Sandler and Scott stated, governments should encourage their people likely to be vulnerable targets for the terrorists to increase their security level to prevent becoming targets of terrorists (Sandler, Scott, 1987).

Especially terrorist and criminal hostage takers gather information on their potential targets through surveillance or open-source information. The accessibility and vulnerability of targets are significant factors for hostage takers to select victims. These groups of people mentioned above should know how to avoid being accessible targets for hostage takers (Poland & McCrystle, 1999). If they are taken hostage, there are some recommendations for them to survive during the incidents. They should not complain unless they have serious medical problems. They should not promote the London syndrome by arguing with the hostage takers. As long as it is reasonable, they should try to follow the instructions of the perpetrators. They should keep in mind that the police response, either negotiation or tactical resolution, will happen (As cited in Poland & McCrystle, 1999).

The hostages should be aware of the most critical moments of the incidents. The very initial phase of the situation and the phase of the use of deadly force by the tactical

team are very critical moments for the hostages to stay alive. They should be calm during the tactical intervention because the rescue team may not distinguish who the real hostages and hostage takers are. Meanwhile, the most critical advice is that hostages should try to build the Stockholm syndrome between the hostage takers and themselves (Lanceley, 2003).

### *Recommendations for Police Agencies*

Inefficient police responses to hostage situations are always criticized by the general public, the media, and the government because many people lose their lives. Therefore, using deadly force is the last resort, and negotiation is the best option in hostage situations (Michalowski et al., 1988). Today, negotiation is known as the correct response to the situations. Police agencies are aware of the negotiation strategies' importance to end the situations without tragedy.

In terms of improving police responses through the negotiation practice, there are four major recommendations for police agencies here. These recommendations might help increase the success of the police.

First, every police agency should have a hostage negotiation unit in its organization structure. Having such a special unit might require some additional expenses and responsibilities. As Perkins and Mijares mention, there might be staff and monetary shortages for small police departments to create and maintain a professional negotiation unit (Perkins & Mijares, 2004). However, if they can afford it, it works very well. To establish this unit, police agencies should have a written negotiator selection process to select the negotiators from among the volunteer police officers and training course activities to train the selected police officers as professional negotiators.

Negotiating with extremists has some difficulties and challenges. It requires very special police experience and skills. Negotiation with volatile extremists is professional police work (Wind, 1995). Therefore, before starting to work as a professional negotiator in the field, the basic negotiation course is definitely needed for police (Borum & Strentz, 1992). In the training programs, the officers should be taught not only communication skills and the use of negotiation tools but also psychological and sociological concepts of human behavior so that they can apply negotiation dynamics against the perpetrators (Regini, 2002). They should learn that religious extremists should be taken seriously when the police confront them. In addition to basic police training programs, some advanced training programs can be provided for special police units to handle the most extreme groups and situations in the future (Ammerman, 1995). They should be trained in complex psychological characteristics, personalities, general criminal characteristics, threat assessment and avoiding making judgments about criminals by acting out real case scenarios (Rogan et al., 1997).

Second, the negotiation team should be taught never to compete with the tactical team because the negotiation team is neither subordinate nor superior to the tactical team. Both teams try to get important information for the command post (Rogan et al., 1997). If the negotiation team, the tactical team, the incident commanders, and mental health professionals are trained within the same training programs, they can be better prepared to deal with the most extreme hostage takers and complex situations. This prevents misunderstanding among the major actors and helps the cooperation between these actors. Since they are professionals in their arts, they can give different viewpoints to each other by sharing their opinions and ideas.



Third, police agencies might establish some behavioral science units in their organization structures and should cooperate with experts and consultants to get better results (Ammerman, 1995). They can better understand and evaluate the expressive and volatile behaviors of hostage takers through cooperation with consultants. For example, if the police work together with mental health professionals, they can provide more reliable information for the command post professionals.

Fourth, terrorist organizations attract more attention worldwide by influencing the media. Unfortunately, some media publish the demands and declarations of the hostage takers to gain more influence in the situations and influence governmental agencies in a crisis situation. However, while the media are doing this, they might manipulate the ongoing negotiation process. Therefore, it is better for the media to have a limited role for the sake of public safety and the success of the police (Jenkins, 1982). The relationship between the media and the police must be well-established. Otherwise, journalists might manipulate the ongoing negotiation and other police activities to get more and fresher information by making direct contact with the hostage takers.

#### *Recommendations for Researchers*

Not many scholarly research studies on hostage situations exist. The reason is that the researchers would have to be involved in a number of interactions and activities with police. They would have to learn more information about the major actors of the situations and some foundations of the situations to contribute effective qualitative and quantitative studies to hostage resolution doctrine. In many cases, the researchers' participation might be difficult due to the hostage situations' circumstances, such as dangers, difficulties, and limitations of environment in the situations. However, there are

some questions that can only be answered through empirical research studies. Unfortunately, since there are risks and dangers at the scene, researchers can answer these questions only after the hostage incidents end. However, the hostage incident is based on behavioral interaction that is accounted for by different parties, such as hostages, negotiators, and hostage takers. These parties will be available for study only after a hostage incident ends if, of course, these parties survive.

On the other hand, one of the aims of this thesis is to encourage researchers to make more academic contributions to the literature of hostage negotiation resolutions. The researcher makes two important recommendations to researchers to encourage them to become involve in police studies of hostage situations.

First, HOBAS is the only quantitative database in which the FBI collects data and statistics from not only the federal police responses but also the state police responses to hostage and barricade situations in the U.S. HOBAS analyzes the information that comes from all over the country to make appropriate new guidelines and principles for policy makers and the police. In addition to HOBAS, some individual researchers gathered and analyzed the information on hostage situations in the past (Lipetsker, 2004). For example, Mickolus created a database, titled "International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events Database (ITERATE)", which was based on 3,329 international terrorism motivated hostage incidents outside the U.S. between 1968 and 1977. Friedland and Merari created a database based on roughly 70 international and domestic political hostage incidents between 1979 and 1988. Head created the Hostage Event Analytic Database (HEAD), consisting of 3,300 hostage incidents. Feldman developed a database based on 120 domestic hostage incidents. Negotiators can learn

more about the negotiation concept and better understand the behaviors of the hostage takers and assess the threat levels of the situations through hostage negotiation database programs (Call, 2003). The police can see and evaluate what was wrong and what was right in past situations through reliable database studies made by researchers. Looking at past hostage situations' classifications and evaluations in database studies to create new policies in order to deal with extremist hostage takers is the best practice for the police. In addition, negotiators are more likely to understand the general characteristics of the incidents and the perpetrators through databases.

Some believe that HOBAS does not characterize the American society because of its data selection and gathering strategy prejudices (Lipetsker, 2004). In addition to HOBAS, the individual enterprises mentioned above might be too limited to make significant contributions to police studies. However, it is the only option to increase the success of the police in hostage situation resolutions. Additionally, negotiation is based on the interaction between the police and the extremists, who are likely to have prior criminal records. Therefore, it requires more than the traditional approach of the police. In other words, the researchers' scholarly contributions enhance police activities. In summary, in order to promote new rules and guidelines for the police, the researchers should make more quantitative studies as well as qualitative studies to improve effective strategies for the police.

Second, greater cooperation between the police and researchers will help to promote advanced resolutions to cease situations without loss of life. Unfortunately, the majority of researchers are not interested in hostage situations. The only way to enhance the negotiating concept is for researchers to work together with the police.

Therefore, researchers must be encouraged to establish more association and cooperation with the police. In order to make this possible, not only national but also international training programs, conferences, and seminars for both parties should be established. This will help promote the bond between these parties in the future.

### The Bottom Line

Every hostage situation is sole because there are different motivations, demands, deadlines, and actors in each situation. Therefore, every situation might require a different resolution on the part of the police. However, past experiences proved that the formulating of negotiation strategies and the techniques of the negotiators to deal with volatile and extreme hostage situations without bloodshed are the only means on the part of the government. Unified resolutions for handling hostage situations increase the credibility and reliability of the police. The outcomes of hostage situations will be improved through the collective studies of the both parties, the police and researchers.

As stated earlier, there is a one week basic course schedule for the hostage negotiators here. The aim of giving the course schedule is to make a contribution to law enforcement enterprises and to encourage them to pay attention to negotiator training courses because negotiation requires well-trained and professional hostage negotiators.

Table 7: One Week Course Schedule Model for Hostage Negotiators.

Day	Time	Subjects
Monday (1)	08-12 a.m.	Introduction History: first/second/current generation of hostage resolutions Types of hostage situations: Hostage, non-hostage/barricade, kidnapping and suicidal etc.
	01-05 p.m.	Command post structure Major actors of hostage situations Tactical team, its response and relationship with negotiator team Hostage negotiation team
Tuesday (2)	08-12 a.m.	Special technique of negotiator team: active listening skill Special tools of negotiator team: situation board, controlling utilities Indicators to negotiate and not to negotiate for negotiators Phase-by-phase approach: decision making process
	01-05 p.m.	Dealing with threat, demand and deadline issues Dealing with stress, media, and other third parties Dealing with instrumental and expressive behaviors of hostage takers
Wednesday (3)	08-12 a.m.	Hostage Takers: Criminal, inmate, emotionally-upset, mentally ill Suicidal hostage takers and suicide-by-cop Terrorism motivated hostage situations and religious extremists Dealing with terrorist hostage takers
	01-05 p.m.	Hostages Surviving strategies, Stockholm and London syndromes Lecture by mental health professionals Lecture by mental health professionals
Thursday (4)	08-12 a.m.	Lecture by mental health professionals Lecture by mental health professionals Case study # 1: Munich Olympic Games Hostage Situation Case study # 2: Balcombe Street Siege in London
	01-05 p.m.	Case study # 3: Iran Embassy of London Siege Case study # 4: Branch Davidians Standoff in Waco Role playing scenario training # 1 Evaluation scenario training
Friday (5)	08-12 a.m.	Role playing scenario training # 2 Evaluation scenario training Course evaluation
	01-05 p.m.	Course questionnaire Certificate Ceremony

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