

# Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006: A Fact Sheet on Department of Defense Authority to Train and Equip Foreign Military Forces

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### Summary

Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2006 provides the Secretary of Defense with authority to train and equip foreign military and foreign maritime security forces. DOD values this authority as an important tool to train and equip military partners. Funds may be obligated only with the concurrence of the Secretary of State. Thus far, the Department of Defense (DOD) has used Section 1206 authority primarily to provide counterterrorism support. This authority expires in FY2011.

Section 1206 obligations totaled some \$100 million in FY2006, \$279 million in FY2007, and \$293 million in FY2008. As of mid-April 2009, FY2009 project approvals are being finalized. As of the date of this report, of FY2009 funds, only \$49.3 million has been approved and obligated for two programs in Lebanon.

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Section 1206 of the FY2006 NDAA (P.L. 109-163), as amended, provides the Secretary of Defense with a new authority to train and equip foreign military forces and foreign maritime security forces. This is the first major DOD authority to be used expressly for the purpose of training the national military forces of foreign countries. Generally, DOD has trained and equipped foreign military forces through State Department programs. The Bush Administration requested this "Global Train and Equip" authority because DOD viewed the planning and implementation processes under which similar State Department security assistance is provided as too slow and cumbersome.<sup>1</sup>

Section 1206 provides the Secretary of Defense with authority to train and equip foreign military forces for two purposes. One is to enable foreign military forces, as well as foreign maritime security forces, to perform counterterrorism (CT) operations. Nearly all Section 1206 assistance to date has been CT training and equipment (T&E). Most T&E has been provided by contractors, according to DOD officials. The other purpose is to enable foreign military forces are participate in or to support military and stability operations in which U.S. armed forces are participating. (DOD does not use Section 1206 authority for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, according to DOD officials.)

### Origins and Evolution of Section 1206 Authority

In the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, some DOD officials sought a means to increase U.S. support to foreign military and security forces in order to disrupt terrorist networks. Although "train and equip" authority had resided with the State Department since 1961, DOD submitted proposed legislation to Congress in early 2005 for authority and appropriations to train and equip foreign forces. As submitted to Congress, the DOD-proposed legislation differed in several important respects from the legislation that was eventually passed.

DOD's proposed authorization bill would have vested new authority with the President to "authorize building the capacity of partner nations' military or security forces to disrupt or destroy terrorist networks, close safe havens, or participate in or support United States, coalition, or international military or stability operations." The proposed legislation provided the Secretary of Defense the lead on implementation, but gave a veto power to the Secretary of State: "The Secretary of Defense may, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, implement partnership security capacity building.... " DOD could implement capacity building projects on its own, or by transferring DOD funds to the Department of State or to any other federal agency. The presidential and agency roles changed in subsequent versions.

The original authorization language would have allowed assistance to build up foreign military and security forces for purposes similar to but more specific than those ultimately enacted into law (Section 1206, P.L. 109-163). The types of forces that could be assisted were much broader, and included "armies, guard, border security, civil defense, infrastructure protection, and police

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> State Department programs under which foreign military forces are trained are the International Military Education and Training (IMET) and the Expanded IMET (E-IMET) programs. Equipment is provided to foreign governments through the State Department Foreign Military Sales/Foreign Military Financing (FMS/FMF) programs. According to DOD, this "traditional security assistance takes three to four years from concept to execution," while "Global Train and Equip authority allows a response to emergent threats or opportunities in six months or less." U.S. Department of Defense, *Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Request Summary Justification*, February 4, 2008, p. 103. Hereafter referred to as *FY2009 DOD Summary Justification*.

forces." The proposed annual cap on such assistance was \$750 million, much greater than that eventually approved.

DOD's proposed appropriations language would have provided for the appropriation of up to \$750 million of funds from operations and maintenance accounts to provide assistance to military or security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, and provide assistance to other military forces in friendly nations in the nearby region to enhance their capability to combat terrorism and to support U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Secretary of Defense could use those funds only with the concurrence of the Secretary of State.

#### **Congressional Action in 2005**

Neither DOD proposal for a global train and equip authority or appropriation was included in legislation reported that year by the Armed Services committees or the Appropriations committees. A modified version of the DOD authorization proposal was introduced by Senator Inhofe as a floor amendment (S.Amdt. 2432) to the Senate version of the FY2006 NDAA. (S. 1042) On November 8, 2005. the Senate approved an amended version of that amendment, supported by Senator Lugar. Both would provide authority for the purposes requested by DOD. Each version of the Inhofe amendment, progressively strengthened the State Department role compared to the DOD proposal. Conference committee negotiators made further changes, however, strengthening the DOD role, diminishing the State Department role, restricting the types of forces that could be supported, and lowering the funding cap.

The Inhofe amendment introduced on November 4, 2005, was similar to the DOD authorization request in that it would have conferred authority on the President to build partnership security capacity of foreign military and security forces on the President and authorized the use of up to \$750 million a year in DOD funds for the same purposes as the original DOD authorization request. A major difference was the role of the State Department. The Inhofe amendment made a request by the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense the trigger to initiate DOD support, a seemingly stronger role than that of the DOD proposed legislation which required the Secretary of Defense to seek the concurrence of the Secretary of State for any support. Like the DOD proposal, however, the Inhofe amendment left DOD free to implement programs itself, or to transfer funds to the Department of State or any other federal agency for implementation. (These funds would remain available until expended.) In introducing the amendment, Senator Inhofe indicated that the purpose of the new authority was to expedite train and equip assistance, and expressed displeasure with then-current arrangements for train and equip programs conducted through the State Department. For instance, he noted that assistance to train and equip Georgia forces for counterterrorism required that "Seven different authorities for funding and sources...be stitched together" in a process that took eight months. (Congressional Record, November 4, 2005, p S12395.)

The revised Inhofe amendment further strengthened the Secretary of State's role by making three changes. One change eliminated DOD's ability to implement proposals on its own. Another eliminated DOD's ability to transfer funds to any civilian agency other than the State Department. In short, the Secretary of Defense could provide partnership support *only* by transferring DOD funds to the Department of State. A third change made such support subject to the authorities and limitations in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and the FY2006 Foreign Operations bill. In a floor statement on November 8, 2006, Senator Lugar said that "the amendment as now written leaves the authority for deciding which countries, and when, how, and why foreign assistance should be provided, in the hands of the Secretary of State. The amendment does not provide

statutory authority to the Secretary of Defense to establish a new foreign aid program outside the purview of the Secretary of State. It does authorize the Secretary of Defense to provide funding to the State Department for a new train and equip foreign assistance program....<sup>2</sup> At the same time, Senator Lugar acknowledged DOD concerns that the "State Department oversight of these kinds of programs [is] cumbersome and slow." He stated: "These obstacles need to be overcome. State Department procedures should be streamlined and the two Departments should develop plans to push these important programs forward efficiently and quickly." (Congressional Record, Senate, S12495.)

A final version, as discussed elsewhere, emerged from the conference committee. There were four important changes from the Senate version. First, the conference committee version (Section 1206 of P.L. 109-163) stripped the leadership role from the Secretary of State and bestowed it on the Secretary of Defense. Section 1206 broadened DOD's role by providing authority for the President to direct the Secretary of Defense to conduct or support a program to build the capacity of a foreign military forces. It reduced the Secretary of State's role by providing that the Secretaries of Defense and State were to "jointly formulate any program directed by the President" and the Secretary of Defense was to "coordinate with the Secretary of State in the implementation of any program directed by the President...." Second, the conference committee version did not provide authority to assist security forces of any type. Third, it lowered the annual funding cap considerably, to \$200 million. And fourth, it broadened the purpose of the counterterrorism element of the assistance from enabling foreign forces to disrupt or destroy terrorist networks and to close safe to enabling them *to conduct counter-terrorist operations*.

In their explanatory statement (H.Rept. 109-360, accompanying H.R. 1815), the conferees described Section 1206 as a two-year pilot program, which would be reviewed at the end of that period. They noted that "under current law, foreign military training programs are conducted exclusively under the authority of the Secretary of State. The conferees believe it is important that any changes in statutory authorities for foreign military assistance do not have unintended consequences for the effective coordination of U.S. foreign policy writ large, nor should they detract from the Department of Defense's focus on its core responsibilities, particularly the warfighting tasks for which it is uniquely suited."

#### Subsequent Congressional Action and Concerns

Congress made further changes to Section 1206 authority through amendments in subsequent NDAAs, among them changes elevating the State Department's role but at the same time vesting authority for the program in the Secretary of Defense (with the concurrence of the Secretary of State), raising the funding cap, and extending the duration of the authority. Section 1206 of the John Warner NDAA for FY2007 (P.L. 109-364) eliminated the President's role in directing the Secretary of Defense to conduct or support such programs, and instead authorized "the Secretary

<sup>2</sup> Senator Lugar further stated that "The Secretary of State should retain full authority over decisions as to which countries should receive assistance, the timing of its provision, and the way in which it should be provided. The Department of Defense should continue implementing train and equip programs under the purview of the Secretary of State." He concluded: "All foreign assistance programs need to take place within a foreign policy context, with consideration of the traditional concerns---the recipient country's treatment of its own people, potential reactions from neighboring sates in the region, and the overall bilateral relationship with the recipient country, including the assistance in the war against terrorism. It is the Secretary of State's job to weigh such foreign policy issues and make recommendations to the President that strke the right balance for American interests. The amendment as now written meets the concerns I had and I would request that I be listed as a co-sponsor." (Congressional Record, Senate, S12495.)

of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State" to conduct or support those programs. It raised the authorized amount to \$300 million, and it extended the authority through FY2008.<sup>3</sup>

This amendment was the result of a conference committee compromise over a proposed Senate amendment that would have extended Section 1206 authority to combatant commanders. In their explanatory statement, the conferees stated that "the authorities provided in this section are provided in the spirit of a pilot program... . The conferees believe it will be important to demonstrate through experience that these expanded authorities can and will be exercised consistent with the effective coordination of U.S. foreign policy writ large. Furthermore, the conferees strongly believe that foreign assistance programs are more appropriately funded through the foreign assistance accounts, as administered by the Department of State, and urge the administration to request sufficient funding for foreign military assistance in those accounts in future years budget requests."<sup>4</sup>

Through the enactment of the Duncan Hunter NDAA for FY2009 (P.L. 110-417), Congress rejected the Administration's 2008 request to make Section 1206 authority permanent law under Title 10 (Armed Services) of the United States Code. Instead, it extended the temporary authority for three years (i.e., through FY2011). P.L. 110-417 also expanded Section 1206 authority to include the provision of assistance to maritime security forces,<sup>5</sup> and raised the spending cap to \$350 million.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The DOD proposal for FY2007 NDAA authorization language had requested that authority to direct Section 1206 programs be vested in the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, rather than the President, in order to "increase responsiveness by relieving the President of having to approve each Section 1206 program personally, while preserving important roles of both the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State in authorizing capacity-building programs under this provision. This would enable the Department of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to pursue time-sensitive opportunities to build capacity of partner nations." DOD also requested the expansion of the types of forces that could be assisted to include security forces ("specifically gendarmerie, constabulary, internal defense, infrastructure protection, civil defense, border protection, and counterterrorism forces..."), and an increase in the spending cap to \$750 million.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> These changes were the result of a conference committee compromise on a Senate amendment to Section 1206 in S. 2766, its version of the FY2007 NDAA. See H.Rept. 109-702, the John Warner NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007, Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 5152.

The Senate amendment would have permitted the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to authorize commanders of the geographic combatant commands "to respond to unanticipated changes in a security environment" within their area of responsibility (AOR) to spend up to \$50 million per year per commander for Section 1206 purposes, with total spending limited to \$200 million. In addition, the Senate Amendment would have permitted the Secretary of Defense to authorize geographic combatant commanders "to respond to urgent and unanticipated humanitarian relief or reconstruction requirements in a foreign country within the commander's AOR" if the commander determined that such assistance would promote the security interest of the United States and the recipient country, up to a total of \$200 million "in any country in a fiscal year." In response, the House, which had no similar provision, offered the amendment which was adopted. Although the proposed section to provide combatant commanders with funding for existing Section 1206 purposes was deleted, elsewhere in the bill the conferees included a provision to expand authority under the Combatant Commanders Initiative Fund to provide urgent and unanticipated humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> As passed by the Senate, S. 3001 would have extended Section 1206 authority to security forces, specifically "a foreign country's coast guard, border protection, and other security forces engaged primarily in counterterrorism missions in order for that country to conduct counterterrorism operations." The Administration had requested authority to train and equip a wide spectrum of security forces, including gendarmerie, constabulary, internal defense, infrastructure protection, civil defense, homeland defense, coast guard, border protection, and counterterrorism forces.

In their respective conference reports on the FY2009 NDAA, both the House and the Senate armed services committees expressed concern about whether Section 1206 funds were being appropriately used.

- The Senate Armed Services Committee report reiterated the committee's earlier position that Section 1206 was intended as a pilot program, "not intended to duplicate or substitute for other foreign assistance authorities, nor...intended to sustain train and equip programs over multiple years." It expressed the committee's concerns that Section 1206 funds were "being used for programs, particularly in countries where the terrorist threat is currently low, that primarily serve to build counter-narcotics capabilities."<sup>6</sup>
- The House Armed Services Committee report stated DOD had "pushed beyond the clearly articulated limits of this authority" in the case of Panama, raising concern "about the responsible execution of this authority in the future." In the report, the committee expressed its belief "that capable foreign partners play a vital role in the international security environment but remain unconvinced that this authority should reside permanently with the Department of Defense. The committee expects that, over the long-term, these 'train and equip'-type authorities, which appear to be migrating to the Department of Defense, might better remain within the Department of State's jurisdiction."<sup>7</sup>

### **Funding Provisions and Annual Obligations**

Section 1206 programs are funded from the DOD operations and maintenance account. During the first two years of the program, DOD transferred funds from lower-priority missions to fund activities under Section 1206, according to the Office of the Secretary of Defense/Policy [OSD/P]. For FY2008, Congress appropriated \$300 million for Section 1206 in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 [P.L. 110-161].) In its 2008 request for permanent Section 1206 authority, the Administration requested that spending authority be increased to \$750 million, but in its FY2009 budget request asked for \$500 million in spending authority for that year. Instead, in the FY2009 Duncan Hunter NDAA, Congress increased the authorized amount to \$350 million. In the same bill, Congress also provided authority for funds to be used in consecutive fiscal years (i.e., funds made available for a program begun in one fiscal year may also be used for that program in the next fiscal year). The table below provides data on Section 1206 FY2006-FY2008 programs. Total program obligations for FY2006 through FY 2008 were \$673.0 million: \$100.1 million in FY2006, \$279.5 million in FY2007, and \$293.4 million in FY2008.

FY2009 project approvals are pending. (See paragraph on the approval process, below.) As of the date of this report, of FY2009 funds, only \$49.3 million has been approved and obligated for two programs in Lebanon.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> S.Rept. 110-335 continued: "While recognizing a degree of overlap between counterterrorism and counternarcotics capabilities, the committee urges the Department of Defense to fund programs to build counter-narcotics capabilities using funds and authorities intended to support counter-narcotics activities, and if appropriate, seek any necessary modifications to existing counter-narcotics authorities to support these activities. The committee also indicated that it viewed U.S. Africa Command AOR counterterrorism needs as a priority for Section 1206 assistance.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> H.Rept. 110-652 also encouraged DOD "to use members of the United States military to conduct the training provided under this authority whenever possible."

## Conditions

Section 1206 of the FY2006 NDAA requires that programs conducted under its authority observe and respect human rights, fundamental freedoms, and the "legitimate civilian authority within that country." The authority may not be used to provide any *type* of assistance that is otherwise prohibited by any provision of law. It also may not be used to provide assistance to any *country* that is otherwise prohibited from receiving such assistance under any other provision of law. The legislation also requires a 15-day advance notification to the congressional defense, foreign affairs, and appropriations committees before initiating each program. This notification must specify, among other things, the program country, budget, and completion date, as well as the source and planned expenditure of funds.

### Joint DOD-State Department Approval Process

As modified by the FY2007 John Warner NDAA, Section 1206 authority permits the Secretary of Defense to provide such support with the "concurrence" of the Secretary of State. According to DOD and State Department officials, that term has been interpreted to mean the Secretary of State's approval. Section 1206 requires both secretaries to jointly formulate any program and coordinate in its implementation. Their respective agencies have developed an extensive joint review process that some officials see as a potential model for other assistance programs. Section 1206 programs are developed under a "dual-key" authority (i.e., with the approval of both DOD and Department of State officials). U.S. embassies and the military combatant commands are encouraged to jointly formulate programs. Both parties "must approve each program explicitly in writing"<sup>8</sup> before the proposal is submitted to DOD and State Department staff in Washington, D.C., for their concurrence and, ultimately, the approval of the Secretaries of Defense and State.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> FY2009 DOD Summary Justification, p. 103.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> E-mail from the OSD/P, May 20, 2007.

Recipient	Program	FY2006	FY2007	FY2008	Totals
General		1	1	1	
Defense Institute of International Legal Studies	Human Rights/ Respect for Civilian Authority Training	_	_	0.6	0.6
AFRICA					
Chad	Light Infantry Rapid Reaction Force Establishment	_	6.0	_	
	Tactical Airlift Capacity Training	_	1.7	_	8.0
	Tactical Communications Interoperability Aid		0.3	_	
Djibouti	Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), Response, Interdiction, and Coastal Security Enhancement	_	8.0		13.1
	CT Communications Package	_		5.1	
Ethiopia	CT Communications and Combat Engineering Capability	_	_	13.3	17.7
	Night Vision Capability Package	_	_	4.4	
Kenya	Border Security Initiative	_	_	4.1	11.1
	Border and Coastal Security Enhancement			7.0	
Mauritania	Light Infantry Rapid Reaction Force Establishment		4.5	_	4.5
Tunisia	Suppressing Trans-Border Terrorist Activity		_	10.0	10.0
Chad, Mauritania, Nigeria and Senegal	Civil-Military Operations Training in Support of the TransSahara CT Program	_	3.4	_	3.4
Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania	East Africa Regional Security Initiative		14.2		14.2
Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe	Gulf of Guinea Regional Maritime Awareness Capability Aid	6.8		_	6.8
Chad and Nigeria	Multinational Information- sharing Network Aid	6.2	_	_	6.2
Algeria, Niger, Chad, Morocco, Senegal, Mauritania, Nigeria, and Mali	Partner Nation Intelligence Capability Aid	_	1.1	_	1.1
Algeria, Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Ghana, Gambia, Guinea, Liberia, Morocco, Mozambique, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Sao Tome and Principe	MDA and Territorial Water Threat Response Capability Establishment	_	5.7	_	5.7

#### Table I. Section 1206 Funding: FY2006-2008 Obligations

(\$ U.S. millions)

Recipient	Program	FY2006	FY2007	FY2008	Totals
Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Gabon, Ghana, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Togo	West and Central Africa Maritime Equipment Package	_		11.5	11.5
Cameroon, Gabon, Guinea, Senegal, Sierra Leone	Maritime Security Capability Enhancement	_		2.5	12.5
Total Africa		13.0	44.9	67.9	125.8
GREATER EUROPE					
Albania	CT Capability Aid	_	6.7	_	
	Maritime Coastal Patrol CT Capability Enhancement	_		5.5	12.2
Georgia	CT Capability Aid	_	6.5	_	17.9
	Special Forces T&E			11.4	17.7
Macedonia	CT Capability Aid	_	3.0	_	3.0
Ukraine	CT Capability Aid	_	12.0	_	12.0
Total Greater Europe		_	28.2	26.9	45.1
ASIA AND THE PACIFIC (Include	ing Central Asia)			1	
Indonesia	Integrated Maritime Surveillance System	18.4			
	Eastern Fleet Regional Command Center (FY07)/ MDA (FY08)	_	3.8	7.3	
	Celebes Sea and Malacca Strait Network	_	6.1		57.4
	Coastal Surveillance Stations	_	11.5	4.3	
	Western Fleet Command and Control (C2) Center and HQ	_		2.0	
	Command, Control, Communications and Computers (C4) Surveillance and Reconnaissance	_		4.0	
Kazakhstan	Coalition CT and Stability Operations Capacity Aid	_	19.3	_	31.8
	Caspian Security	_	_	12.5	
Kyrgyzstan	Increasing Armed Forces CT Capabilities	_		12.0	12.0
Malaysia	Eastern Sabah MDARadars	_	3.6	—	
	Strait of Malacca MDA Support	-	2.2	—	
	MDA Package	_	_	11.5	43.9
	CENTRIX Stations	_	0.5		
	C2 Center for Joint Forces Sabah HQ			7.1	1
	Maritime Interdiction Package	_		9.0	

Recipient	Program	FY2006	FY2007	FY2008	Totals
Philippines	Maritime T&E for Interdiction Purposes	_	2.9		
	Coast Watch South High Frequency Radios (FY07)/		1.8		
	Radars for Sulu Archipelago (FY08)		1.0	11.1	32.4
	Maritime Interdiction Capability	_	6.4	_	52.7
	Interdiction and Offensive Capabilities Improvement (of UH-1 Huey helicopters)	_	4.4	_	
	Border Control Interdiction	_	—	5.8	
Sri Lanka	Maritime Security T&E for Interdiction Purposes	10.9			
	Aircraft C2 Integration	—	6.0	—	18.3
	Maritime Security and Navy Interdiction Capability	_	1.4		
Total Asia and the Pacific		29.3	79.9	86.6	195.8
MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH/SO	UTHWESTERN ASIA				
Azerbaijan	Naval Commando CT Training	_	_	1.7	1.7
Bahrain	Patrol Boats	5.3	_	_	34.1
	Coastal Patrol Capability Development	_	24.5	_	
	Defense Force Counterintelligence Analysis Center Development	_	0.04	_	
	Defense Force Special Operations T&E	_	_	4.3	
Bangladesh	Maritime Patrol and Interdiction Initiative	_		7.2	7.2
Lebanon	Military Assistance to Lebanese Armed Forces	10.5	30.6		
	Special Operations Forces T&E		—	7.2	61.7
	Secure Communications for Special Operations Forces	_	_	9.2	
	Logistics Support System			4.2	

Recipient	Program	FY2006	FY2007	FY2008	Totals
Pakistan	Border Area T&E/ Marines T&E	23.3	5.7	_	
	Enhance Shared MDAand Cooperative Maritime Security Aid	_	8.1	_	92.9
	Helicopter CT Capability	—	_	20.9	
	Special Services Group COIN Kick Start Initiative	_		17.9	
	Mi-17 Support to 21st QRS (?)	—	_	17.0	
Yemen	Cross Border Security and CT Aid	4.3			
	Yemeni Special Operations Capacity Development to enhance border security	_	26.0		30.3
Total Middle East and South Asia		43.4	94.9	89.6	227. <b>9</b>
WESTERN HEMISPHERE					
Mexico	CT Capabilities (FY07)/ CT Capability Package (FY08)	_	1.0	12.9	3.9
Dominican Republic and Panama	Joint Maritime CT Capability Aid	14.4	_		14.4
Bahamas, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Jamaica, and Nicaragua	Caribbean Basin Maritime Security Aid (radios and boats)	_	23.3		23.3
Bahamas, Belize, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Jamaica, and Panama	Carribean Basin Capability Enhancements	_		12.0	12.0
Belize, Guyana, Honduras, and Suriname	CT Unit T&E for participation in Operation Enduring Freedom	_	_	I 3.8	13.8
Total Western Hemisphere		14.4	24.3	38.7	77.4
Totals		100.1	279.5	293.4	673.0

**Source:** Office of the Secretary of Defense. FY2006-FY2007 figures verified May 2008. FY2008 figures made available November 24, 2008.

Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.

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