Summary

Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted largely of isolating the communist nation through economic sanctions, which the Bush Administration has tightened significantly. A second policy component has consisted of support measures for the Cuban people, including private humanitarian donations and U.S.-sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba. As in past years, the main issue for U.S. policy toward Cuba in the 110th Congress has been how to best support political and economic change in one of the world’s remaining communist nations. Unlike past years, however, Congress is examining policy toward Cuba in the context of Fidel Castro’s departure from heading the government because of poor health. Raúl Castro, who had served as provision head of government since July 2006, was selected on February 24, 2008 by Cuba’s legislature to continue in that role officially.

In the 110th Congress, Congress fully funded the Administration’s FY2008 request for $45.7 million for Cuba democracy programs in the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2008 (P.L. 110-161). The act did not include provisions easing restrictions on U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba that had been included in H.R. 2829, the FY2008 Financial Services and General Government appropriations bill, or S. 1859, the Senate version of the FY2008 agriculture appropriations bill. In other action, on July 27, 2007, the House rejected H.Amdt. 707 to H.R. 2419, the 2007 farm bill, that would have facilitated the export of U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba in several ways. On May 21, 2008, the Senate approved S.Res. 573, recognizing the struggle of the Cuban people. On June 25, 2008, the House Appropriations Committee approved the FY2009 Financial Services and General Government Appropriations bill with provisions easing restrictions on family travel and U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba.

Several other legislative initiatives introduced in the 110th Congress would ease sanctions: H.R. 177 (educational travel); H.R. 216 (Cuban baseball players); H.R. 217 and H.R. 624 (overall sanctions); H.R. 654, S. 554, and S. 721 (travel); H.R. 757 (family travel and remittances); H.R. 1026 (sale of U.S. agricultural products); H.R. 2819/S. 1673 (sale of U.S. agricultural and medical products and travel); and S. 1268 and H.R. 3182 (development of Cuba’s offshore oil). S. 554 would terminate U.S.-government sponsored television broadcasting to Cuba. Several initiatives would tighten sanctions: H.R. 525 (related to U.S. fugitives in Cuba), and H.R. 1679/S. 876 and S. 2503 (related to Cuba’s offshore oil development). Two initiatives, H.R. 1306 and S. 749, would amend a provision of law restricting the registration or enforcement of certain Cuban trademarks; five initiatives — H.R. 217, H.R. 624, H.R. 2819, S. 1673, and S. 1806 — would repeal the trademark sanction. H.R. 5627 and S. 2777 would award the congressional gold medal to Cuban political prisoner Dr. Oscar Elias Biscet. H.Res. 935 would commemorate the anniversary of the 1996 shootdown of two U.S. civilian planes by Cuba.

For more information, see CRS Report RS22742, Cuba’s Political Succession: From Fidel to Raúl Castro and CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances.
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Major Developments in 2008

On June 25, 2008, the House Appropriations Committee approved its version of the FY2009 Financial Services and General Government Appropriations bill that includes provisions easing restrictions on family travel and U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba. The bill would liberalize family travel to Cuba by allowing for such travel once a year (instead of the current restriction of once every three years) and by allowing such travel to visit aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, and first cousins. It would ease restrictions on agricultural trade with Cuba through a provision prohibiting funds in the act from being used to administer, implement, or enforce an amendment to the Cuban embargo regulations from February 25, 2005, that requires that U.S. agricultural exports must be paid for before they leave U.S. ports. The House Appropriations Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government had approved the measure on June 17. (Also see “Restrictions on Travel and Remittances” and “Agricultural Exports and Sanctions” below.)

On June 19, the European Union approved the permanent lifting of diplomatic sanctions that it had imposed on Cuba in 2003. The action was largely symbolic, because the sanctions had been temporarily suspended since 2005. Cuban Foreign Minister Felipe Perez Roque welcomed the EU’s decision, which will be reviewed in 12 months. U.S. State Department officials looked positively at the benchmarks that will be used in the EU’s dialogue with Cuba, including Cuba’s release of political prisoners, implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, access to the Internet, and allowing all EU delegations to meet with members of the opposition as well as the Cuban government.

On June 13, 2008, Cuba’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that it deported a U.S. citizen wanted in the United States for sexual exploitation of a minor and for child pornography who had entered Cuba from Mexico in April.

On June 4, 2008, the State Department issued its 2008 Trafficking in Persons Report, with Cuba again placed on the Tier 3 list of countries that do not cooperate in the fight against trafficking. According to the report, Cuba is principally a source country for women and children trafficked within the country for the purpose of commercial sexual exploitation. Cuba rejected the report as distorting Cuban reality in an attempt to justify the U.S. embargo. Although countries on the list are subject to U.S. foreign aid sanctions, Cuba is already ineligible for most U.S. assistance because of other aid sanctions.

On May 21, 2008, the Senate passed S.Res. 573 (Martinez) by unanimous consent, which recognized Cuba Solidarity Day and the struggle of the Cuban people. On the same day, President Bush called for the Cuban government to take steps to
On May 19, 2008, Cuba accused the chief of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, Michael Parmly, of carrying mail to dissidents that contained private funds from Santiago Alvarez, a Cuban American currently jailed in Miami on weapons charges.

On April 2008, the Cuban government announced that it would be revamping the state’s wage system by removing the limit that a state worker can earn. (See “Economic Changes Under Raúl” below.)

In March 2008, the government announced the lifting of restrictions on the sale of such electronic consumer products as microwaves, DVD and video players, and on the sale and use of cell phones. It also began rolling out a reform of the agricultural sector focusing on decentralization in order to boost production. The government also lifted a ban on Cubans staying at tourist hotels.

On March 11, 2008, the State Department issued its 2007 report on human rights practices in Cuba, maintaining that the Cuban “government continued to deny its citizens their basic human rights and committed numerous, serious abuses.” See the full report at [http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100635.htm].

On March 7, 2008, President Bush asserted that in order to improve U.S.-Cuban relations, Cuba “must release all political prisoners...have respect for human rights in word and deed, and pave the way for free and fair elections.”

On March 5, 2008, the House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere held a hearing on Cuba in the aftermath of Fidel Castro permanently stepping down from power.

On February 24, 2008, Cuba’s legislature, the National Assembly of People’s Power, selected Raúl Castro as President of the Council of State, a position that makes him Cuba’s head of state and government. In a surprise move, the Assembly also selected José Ramón Machado Venture as the Council’s First Vice-President, making him the official successor to Raúl according to the Cuban Constitution. A physician by training, Machado is 77 years old and part of the older generation of so-called históricos, part of the 1959 Cuban revolution.

On February 19, 2008, Fidel Castro announced that he would not accept the position of President of the Council of State when Cuba’s legislature meets on February 24 to select from among its ranks the members of the 31-member Council of State.

On February 16, 2008, Cuba released four political prisoners — union activist Pedro Pablo Alvarez Ramos, human rights activist Omar Pernet Hernández, and journalists Jose Gabriel Ramón Castillo and Alejandro González Raga — but sent them into forced exile to Spain. The four had been imprisoned since March 2003.
On January 20, 2008, Cuba elected representatives to its 614-member legislature, the National Assembly of People’s Power, and Fidel Castro was once again among those elected. As in the past, voters were offered only a single slate of candidates.

**Political Conditions**

On February 24, 2008, Cuba’s legislature selected Raúl Castro as President of the 31-member Council of State, a position that officially made him Cuba’s head of government and state. Most observers expected this since he already had been heading the Cuban government on a provisional basis since July 2006 when his brother Fidel Castro, Cuba’s long-ruling communist leader, stepped down as President because of poor health.

For many years, Raúl, as First Vice President of the Council of State and the Council of Ministers, had been the officially designated successor and was slated to become chief of state with Fidel’s departure. Raúl also had served as Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) since the beginning of the Cuban Revolution. When Fidel stepped down from power in late July 2006 because of poor health, he signed a proclamation that ceded political power to Raúl on a provisional basis, including the positions of First Secretary of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC), Commander in Chief of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), and President of the Council of State.

Despite the change in government in February 2008, Fidel still holds the official title of First Secretary of the PCC. In late April 2008, Raúl announced that the PCC’s sixth congress would be held in 2009 (the last was held in 1997). Some observers speculate that Fidel Castro could officially be replaced as the head of the party at that time, and it is likely that some of the PCC’s 25-member Political Bureau (Politburo) will be replaced.

While it was not a surprise to observers for Raúl to succeed his brother Fidel as head of government, the selection of José Ramón Machado Ventura as the Council of State’s First Vice President was a surprise. A physician by training, Machado is 77 years old, and is part of the older generation of so-called históricos of the 1959 Cuban revolution. He has been described as a hard-line communist party ideologue, and reportedly has been a close friend and confident of Raul’s for many years. Machado’s position is significant because it makes him the official successor to Raúl, according to the Cuban Constitution. Many observers had expected that Carlos Lage, one of five other Vice Presidents on the Council of State, would have been chosen as First Vice President. He was responsible for Cuba’s economic reforms in the 1990s, and at 56 years of age, represents a younger generation of Cuban leaders. While not rising to First Vice President, Lage nevertheless retained his position as a Vice President on the Council of State, and also will continue to serve as the Council’s Secretary.

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Several key military officers and confidants of Raúl also became members of the Council, increasing the role of the military in the government. General Julio Casas Regueiro, 72 years of age, who already was on the Council, became one of its five vice presidents. Most significantly, Casas, who had been first vice minister in the FAR, was selected by Raúl as the country’s new Minister of the FAR, officially replacing Raúl in that position. Casas also is chairman of GAESA (Grupo de Administracion Empresarial, S.A.), the Cuban military’s holding company for its extensive businesses. Two other military appointments to the Council were Gen. Alvaro López Miera, the army’s chief of staff, and Gen. Leopoldo Cintra Frías, who commanded the Western army, one of Cuba’s three military regions.2

Since Fidel stepped down from power in 2006, Cuba’s political succession from Fidel to Raúl Castro has been characterized by a remarkable degree of stability. Although initially there were not any significant economic changes under Raúl, there were signs that changes could be coming. In July 2007 speech, Raúl maintained that structural changes were needed in the Cuban economy in order to increase efficiency and production. In his first speech as President in February 2008, Raúl promised to make the government smaller and more efficient, to review the potential reevaluation of the Cuban peso, and to eliminate excessive bans and regulations that curb productivity.3 Since March 2008, the government has implemented a number of economic changes that from the outside might not seem significant, but are significant policy changes for a government that has heretofore followed a centralized communist economic model. (See “Economic Changes Under Raúl” below.)

While additional economic changes under Raúl Castro are likely over the next year, few expect there will be any change to the government’s tight control over the political system, which is backed up by a strong security apparatus. Some observers point to the reduced number of political prisoners, from 283 at the end of 2006 to around 230 today, as evidence of a lessening of repression, but dissidents maintain that the overall situation has not improved. Some observers contend that as the new government of Raúl Castro becomes more confident of ensuring social stability and does not feel threatened, it could move to soften its hard repression, but for now the government is continuing its harsh treatment of the opposition. The selection of José Ramón Machado as First Vice President also appears to be a clear indication that the Cuban government has no intention of easing tight control over the political system.

For background, also see CRS Report RS22742, Cuba’s Political Succession: From Fidel to Raúl Castro, and CRS Report RL33622, Cuba’s Future Political Scenarios and U.S. Policy Approaches, written in the aftermath of Fidel Castro’s stepping down because of poor health in 2006.

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Background to the Succession

Until Fidel stepped down, he had ruled since the 1959 Cuban Revolution, which ousted the corrupt government of Fulgencio Batista. In April 1961, Castro stated that the Cuban Revolution was socialist, and in December 1961, he proclaimed himself to be a Marxist-Leninist. From 1959 until 1976, Castro ruled by decree. A Constitution was enacted in 1976 setting forth the PCC as the leading force in state and society, with power centered in a Political Bureau headed by Fidel Castro. In October 1997, the Cuban Communist Party held its 5th Congress (the prior one was held in 1991) in which the party reaffirmed its commitment to a single party state and reelected Fidel and Raúl Castro as the party’s first and second secretaries.

Cuba’s Constitution also outlines national, provincial, and local governmental structures. Legislative authority is vested in a National Assembly of People’s Power that meets twice annually for brief periods. When the Assembly is not in session, a Council of State, elected by the Assembly, acts on its behalf. According to Cuba’s Constitution, the President of the Council of State is the country’s head of state and head of government. Executive power in Cuba is vested in a Council of Ministers, also headed by the country’s head of state and government, i.e. the President of the Council of State. From the promulgation of the 1976 Constitution until February 24, 2008, Fidel served as served as head of state and government through his position as President of the Council of State.

Although National Assembly members were directly elected for the first time in February 1993, only a single slate of candidates was offered. Direct elections for the National Assembly were again held in January 1998 and January 2003, but voters again were not offered a choice of candidates. In contrast, at the local level elections for municipal elections are competitive, with from two to eight candidates. To be elected, the candidate must receive more than half of the votes cast. As a result, runoff elections between the two top candidates are common.

In 2007, the process of nominating candidates for the local municipal assemblies took place in September 2007. Municipal elections were held October 21, 2007 (with runoffs on October 28), and over 15,000 local officials were chosen. The new municipal assemblies then met on December 2, 2007 to nominate candidates for provincial assemblies and for the National Assembly of People’s Power.

National Assembly elections were held on January 20, 2008 (along with elections for 1,201 delegates to 14 provincial assemblies), and Fidel Castro was once again among the candidates elected to the now 614-member legislative body. As in the past, voters were only offered a single slate of candidates.

On February 24, 2008, the new Assembly was scheduled to select from among its ranks the members of the Council of State and its President. Many observers speculated that because of his poor health, Fidel would choose not be re-elected as President of the Council of State, which would officially confirm his departure from heading the Cuban government. Statements from Castro himself in December 2007 hinted at his potential retirement. That proved true on February 19, 2008, when Fidel announced that he would not accept the position as President of the Council of State, essentially confirming his departure as titular head of the Cuban government.
Before Fidel stepped down from power in July 2006, observers discerned several potential scenarios for Cuba’s future after Fidel. These fit into three broad categories: the continuation of a communist government; a military government; or a democratic transition or fully democratic government. According to most observers, the most likely scenario, at least in the short term, was continued leadership under Raúl. This was likely for a variety of reasons, but especially because of Raúl’s designation by Fidel as successor in the party and his position as leader of the FAR. The FAR has been in control of the government’s security apparatus since 1989 and has played an increasing role in Cuba’s economy through the ownership of numerous business enterprises. The scenario of a military-led government was viewed by some observers as a possibility only if a successor communist government failed because of divisiveness among leaders or political instability. For many observers, the least likely scenario upon Fidel’s death or departure was a democratic transition government. With a strong totalitarian security apparatus, the Castro government successfully impeded the development of independent civil society, with only a small and tightly regulated private sector, no independent labor movement, and no unified political opposition.

**Human Rights**

**Overview.** Cuba has a poor record on human rights, with the government sharply restricting freedoms of expression, association, assembly, movement, and other basic rights. It has cracked down on dissent, arrested human rights activists and independent journalists, and staged demonstrations against critics. Although some anticipated a relaxation of the government’s oppressive tactics in the aftermath of the Pope’s January 1998 visit, government attacks against human rights activists and other dissidents have continued since that time. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights maintains in its 2007 annual human rights report that the Cuban government’s “restrictions on political rights, freedom of expression, and dissemination of ideas have created, over a period of decades, a situation of permanent and systematic violations of the fundamental rights of Cuban citizens.”

According to the State Department’s human rights report for 2007, issued in March 2008, the Cuban government continued to commit numerous serious abuses during the year. Among the human rights problems cited in the State Department report were arbitrary arrest and detention of human rights advocates and members of independent professional organizations; harassment, beatings, and threats against political opponents by government-recruited mobs, police, and state security officials; beatings and abuse of detainees and prisoners (which led to the death of two prisoners in 2007); denial of fair trial; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions, including denial of medical care; and interference with privacy, including pervasive monitoring of private communications. As noted in the report, the government tightly controlled Internet access, with citizens only accessing it through government-approved institutions or through a few Internet facilities offered by foreign diplomatic offices. The government reviewed and censored e-mail, and forbade

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The government conducted a severe crackdown on activists in March 2003 and imprisoned 75 democracy activists, including independent journalists and librarians and leaders of independent labor unions and opposition parties. At present, 55 of the “group of 75” political prisoners remain incarcerated. The most recent release of the group of 75 occurred on February 16, 2008, when Cuba released four political prisoners — union activist Pedro Pablo Alvarez Ramos, human rights activist Omar Pernet Hernández, and journalists Jose Gabriel Ramón Castillo and Alejandro González Raga — but sent them into forced exile to Spain. Prior to that, Hector Palacios was released for health reasons in December 2006.

In 2007, the government released several other political prisoners, including prominent dissident René Gómez Manzano and two others in February, and Jorge Luis García Pérez and six others in April. Incarcerated for 17 years, García Pérez was one of Cuba’s longest serving political prisoners. In August 2007, two more political prisoners were released after serving much of their sentences: Francisco Chaviano Gonzalez, a leader of the dissident Cuban Civil Rights Council, was released on medical parole after serving 13 of 15 years; Lazaro Gonzalez Adan was released after serving three years in prison.

In January 2008, the independent Cuban Commission on Human Rights and National Reconciliation (CCDHRN) reported that the overall number of political prisoners was 234 (including a number of prisoners who have been released on medical parole). This declined to 230 in mid-February 2008 with the release of the four prisoners noted above that were part of the “group of 75.” This number reflects a decline from previous years when the number of prisoners was 283 at the end of 2006 and 333 at the end of 2005.

Despite the reduction in the number of prisoners, human rights activists maintain that the overall situation has not improved. Cuban human rights activist Elizardo Sánchez, the head of the CCDHRN, asserts that the government is still repressing dissidents, with threats, police searches of people’s homes, interrogations, and short detentions. Sánchez asserts that the police state is still in force in Cuba, reflected in almost every aspect of national life. In late February 2008, Cuba signed two U.N. human rights treaties: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. Some considered this a positive step, but others stressed that it remains to be seen whether the Cuban government will take action to guarantee civil and political freedoms. One significant step taken by the government in late March 2008 was the lifting of a ban on Cubans staying at tourist hotels. Although few Cubans will be

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able to afford the cost of staying in such hotels, the move is symbolically significant and ends the practices of what critics had dubbed “tourism apartheid.”

**Ladies in White (Damas de Blanco).** A human rights group known as the Ladies in White (Damas de Blanco) was formed in April 2003 by the wives, mothers, daughters, sisters, and aunts of the members of the “group of 75” dissidents arrested a month earlier in Cuba’s human rights crackdown. The group conducts peaceful protests calling for the unconditional release of political prisoners. Dressed in white, its members attend Mass each Sunday at St. Rita’s church in Havana and then walk silently through the streets to a nearby park. In October 2005, the group received the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought from the European Parliament. On April 21, 2008, ten members of the Ladies in White were physically removed from a park near the Plaza of the Revolution in Havana when they demanded the release of their husbands and the other members of the “group of 75” still imprisoned.

In December 2006, independent Cuban journalist Guillermo Farías Hernández received the 2006 Cyber Dissident award from the Paris-based Reporters Without Borders. Farías went on a seven-month hunger strike in 2006, demanding broader Internet access for Cubans.

In November 2007, President Bush awarded Cuban dissident Dr. Oscar Elias Biscet with the Presidential Medal of Freedom. Biscet, who has spent most of the last eight years in jail, was sentenced in 2003 to 25 years in prison. Legislation was introduced in the 110th Congress in March 2008 — H.R. 5627 (Diaz-Balart, Lincoln) and S. 2777 (Martinez) — to award the congressional gold medal to Biscet.

Since late 2007, Cuban Internet blogger Yoani Sánchez has received considerable international attention for her website, Generación Y, that includes commentary critical of the Cuban government. In May 2008, Sánchez was awarded Spain’s Ortega y Gasset award for digital journalism, but the Cuban government did not provide her with an exit permit to accept the award. (Sánchez’s website is available at [http://www.desdecuba.com/generaciony/]).

**Varela Project and the National Dialogue.** Named for the 19th century priest, Felix Varela, who advocated independence from Spain and the abolition of slavery, the Varela Project has collected thousands of signatures supporting a national plebiscite for political reform in accordance with a provision of the Cuban Constitution. The referendum, if granted, would call for respect for human rights, an amnesty for political prisoners, private enterprise, and changes to the country’s electoral law that would result in free and fair elections. The initiative is organized by Oswaldo Payá, who heads the Christian Liberation Movement.

In May 2002, organizers of the Varela Project submitted 11,020 signatures to the National Assembly calling for a national referendum. This was more than the 10,000 required under Article 88 of the Cuban Constitution. Former President

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8 The website of the Damas de Blanco is available at [http://www.damasdeblanco.com/].
9 For further information, see the website of Oswaldo Payá, at [http://www.oswaldopaya.org/es/].
Jimmy Carter noted the significance of the Varela Project in his May 14, 2002 address in Havana that was broadcast in Cuba. Carter noted that “when Cubans exercise this freedom to change laws peacefully by a direct vote, the world will see that Cubans, and not foreigners, will decide the future of this country.”\textsuperscript{10} In response to the Varela Project, the Cuban government orchestrated its own referendum in late June 2002 that ultimately led to the National Assembly amending the Constitution to declare Cuba’s socialist system irrevocable. The Varela Project has persevered despite the 2003 human rights crackdown, which included the arrest of 21 Project activists. In October 2003, Oswaldo Payá delivered more than 14,000 signatures to Cuba’s National Assembly, again requesting a referendum on democratic reforms.

Since December 2003, Payá has been involved in another project known as the National Dialogue with the objective of getting Cubans involved in the process of discussing and preparing for a democratic transition. According to Payá, thousands of Cubans have met in dialogue groups to discuss a working document covering such themes as: economic, political, and institutional changes; social issues; public health and the environment; public order and the armed forces; media, science, and culture; reconciliation; and reuniting with the exile community.\textsuperscript{11}

\textbf{Assembly to Promote Civil Society.} Led by three prominent Cuban human rights activists — Marta Beatriz Roque, René Gómez Manzano, and Felix Bone — the Assembly to Promote Civil Society held two days of meetings in Havana on May 20-21, 2005, with some 200 participants. The date was significant because May 20 is Cuba’s independence day. Many observers had expected the government to prevent or disrupt the proceedings. The Cuban government did prevent some Cubans and foreigners from attending the conference, but overall the meeting was dubbed by its organizers as the largest gathering of Cuban dissidents since the 1959 Cuban revolution.\textsuperscript{12} The Assembly issued a ten-point resolution laying out an agenda for political and economic change in Cuba.\textsuperscript{13} Among its provisions, the resolution called for the release of all political prisoners, demanded respect for human rights, demanded the abolition of the death penalty, and endorsed a 1997 dissident document on political and economic rights entitled the “Homeland Belongs to Us All.”\textsuperscript{14}


\textsuperscript{12} Nancy San Martin, “‘A Triumph’ in Cuba as Dissidents Gather,” \textit{Miami Herald}, May 21, 2005.

\textsuperscript{13} The full text of the resolution is available in Spanish from Cubanet: [http://www.cubanet.org/ref/dis/052305.htm].

\textsuperscript{14} See the full text of “The Homeland Belongs to Us All” online at [http://www.cubanet.org/CNews/y97/jul97/homdoc.htm].
Economic Conditions

With the cutoff of assistance from the former Soviet Union, Cuba experienced severe economic deterioration from 1989-1993, with estimates of economic decline ranging from 35-50%, but there has been considerable improvement since 1994. From 1994-2000, as Cuba moved forward with some limited market-oriented economic reforms, economic growth averaged 3.7% annually. From 2001-2006, economic growth averaged almost 5%.

Economic growth has been strong over the past three years, registering an impressive 9% in 2005 (despite widespread damage caused by Hurricanes Dennis and Wilma), 12% in 2006, and 6.5% in 2007. The forecast for 2008 is 6.4% growth. The economy has benefitted from the growth of the tourism, nickel, and oil sectors, and support from Venezuela and China in terms of investment commitments and credit lines. Cuba benefits from a preferential oil agreement with Venezuela, which provides Cuba with more than 90,000 barrels of oil a day. Some observers maintain that Venezuela’s oil subsidies amounted to more than $3 billion a year 2006 and could increase to $4 billion in 2007. Venezuela also helped Cuba upgrade an oil refinery in Cienfuegos, which was inaugurated in 2007. Two problems facing the Cuban economy that could affect growth are the declining price of nickel, which accounts for a major share of Cuba’s exports, and the rising cost of food imports.

Over the years, Cuba has expressed pride for the nation’s accomplishments in health and education. In 2005, according to the U.N. Development Programs’s 2007/2008 Human Development Report, life expectancy in Cuba was 77.7 years, adult literacy was estimated at almost 100%, and the infant mortality rate was 6 per 1,000 live births, the lowest rate in Latin America. For 2006 and 2007, Cuba has boasted an infant mortality rate of 5.3.

When Cuba’s economic slide began in 1989, the government showed little willingness to adopt any significant market-oriented economic reforms, but in 1993, faced with unprecedented economic decline, Cuba began to change policy direction. Beginning in 1993, Cubans were allowed to own and use U.S. dollars and to shop at dollar-only shops previously limited to tourists and diplomats. Self-employment was authorized in more than 100 occupations in 1993, most in the service sector, and by 1996 that figure had grown to more than 150 occupations. Also in 1993, the government divided large state farms into smaller, more autonomous, agricultural cooperatives (Basic Units of Cooperative Production, UBPCs). It opened agricultural markets in 1994, where farmers could sell part of their produce on the open market, and it also permitted artisan markets for the sale of handicrafts. In 1995, the government allowed private food catering, including home restaurants (paladares), in effect legalizing activities that were already taking place), and approved a new

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foreign investment law that allows fully owned investments by foreigners in all sectors of the economy with the exception of defense, health, and education. In 1996, it authorized the establishment of free trade zones with tariff reductions typical of such zones. In 1997, the government enacted legislation to reform the banking system and established a new Central Bank (BCC) to operate as an autonomous and independent entity.

After Cuba began to recover from its economic decline, the government began to backtrack on some of its reform efforts. Regulations and new taxes made it extremely difficult for many of the nation’s self-employed. Some home restaurants were forced to close because of the regulations. In 2004, the Cuban government limited the use of dollars by state companies for any services or products not considered part of their core business. Some analysts viewed the measure as an effort to turn back the clock on economic reform measures.18 Also in 2004, Fidel Castro announced that U.S. dollars no longer would be used in entities that currently accept dollars (such as stores, restaurants, and hotels). Instead, dollars had to be exchanged for “convertible pesos,” with a 10% surcharge for the exchange. Dollar bank accounts are still allowed, but Cubans are not able to deposit new dollars into the accounts. Beginning in April 2005, convertible pesos were no longer on par with the U.S. dollar, but instead were linked to a basket of foreign currencies. This reduced the value of dollar remittances sent to Cuba and provides more hard currency to the Cuban government.19

**Economic Changes Under Raúl**

When Raúl Castro assumed provisional power in July 2006, there was some expectation that the government would be more open to economic policy changes, and a debate about potential economic reforms re-emerged in Cuba. On July 26, 2007, in a speech commemorating Cuba’s revolutionary anniversary, Raúl Castro acknowledged that Cuban salaries were insufficient to satisfy needs, and maintained that structural changes were necessary in order to increase efficiency and production. He also maintained that the government was considering increasing foreign investment in the country. Some observers maintain that the speech was a forecast for economic reforms under Raúl, while others stressed that only small marginal changes had occurred in Raúl’s first year in power.20

In the aftermath of Raúl’s July 2007 speech, Cuban public expectations for economic reform increased. Thousands of officially sanctioned meetings were held in workplaces and local PCC branches around the country where Cubans were encouraged to air their views and discuss the future direction of the country. Complaints focused on low salaries and housing and transportation problems, and

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some participants advocated legalization of more private businesses.\textsuperscript{21} Raised expectations for economic change in Cuba increased the chance that government actually would adopt some policy changes. Doing nothing would run the risk of increased public frustration and a potential for social unrest. Increased public frustration was in evident in a clandestine video, widely circulated on the Internet in early February 2008, of a meeting between Ricardo Alarcón, the head of Cuba’s legislature, and university students in which a student was questioning why Cuban wages are so low and why Cubans are prohibited from visiting tourist hotels (a policy subsequently changed in late March 2008) or traveling abroad. The video demonstrated the disillusionment of many Cuban youth with the poor economic situation and repressive environment in Cuba.

Since Raúl Castro officially assumed the presidency in February 2008, his government has announced a series of economic changes. In his first speech as President in February 2008, Raúl promised to make the government smaller and more efficient, to review the potential reevaluation of the Cuban peso, and to eliminate excessive bans and regulations that curb productivity.\textsuperscript{22} In mid-March, the government announced that restrictions on the sales of consumer products such as computers, microwaves, and DVD and video players would be lifted. In late March, it announced that it would lift restrictions on the use of cell phones, and this officially occurred in mid-April.

One of Cuba’s major reform efforts under Raúl Castro in 2008 is focused on the agriculture sector, a vital issue because Cuba reportedly imports some 80\% of its food needs and is paying an increasing amount for such imports because of rising food prices. In an effort to boost food production, the government is giving farmers more discretion over how to use their land and what supplies to buy. Decision-making on agriculture reportedly has been shifted from the national government to the local municipal level, with government bureaucracy reportedly cut significantly.\textsuperscript{23}

In April 2008, the government announced that it would be revamping the state’s wage system by removing the limit that a state worker can earn. This an effort to boost productivity and to deal with one of Cuba’s major economic problems: how to raise wages to a level where basic human needs can be satisfied. Cuban state companies reportedly have until August to revise their salary structures in order to reward workers who work hard with more compensation.\textsuperscript{24} The problem of low wages in Cuba is closely related to another major economic problem: how to unify the two official currencies circulating in the country — the Cuban convertible peso (CUC) and the Cuban peso, which trades for about 25 to 1 CUC. Most people are paid in Cuban pesos, and the minimum monthly wage in Cuba is about 225 pesos.

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\textsuperscript{23} Marc Frank, “Raúl Castro Overhauls Cuba’s Farm Bureaucracy,” \textit{Reuters News}, May 1, 2008.
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(about $9 U.S. dollars\textsuperscript{25}), but for increasing amounts of consumer goods, convertible pesos are used. Cubans with access to foreign remittances or work in jobs that give them access to convertible pesos are far better off than those Cuban who do not have such access.

Looking ahead, several factors could restrain the magnitude of economic policy change in Cuba. A number of observers believe that as long as Fidel Castro is around, it will be difficult for the government to move forward with any major initiatives that are viewed as deviating from Fidel’s orthodox policies. Other observers point to the significant oil subsidies and investment that Cuba now receives from Venezuela that have helped spur Cuba’s high economic growth levels over the past several years and maintain that such support lessens the government’s impetus for economic reforms. Another factor that bodes against rapid economic policy reform is the fear that it could spur the momentum for political change. Given that one of the highest priorities for Cuba’s government has been maintaining social and political stability, any economic policy changes are likely to be smaller changes introduced over time that do not threaten the state’s control.

**U.S. Policy Toward Cuba**

In the early 1960s, U.S.-Cuban relations deteriorated sharply when Fidel Castro began to build a repressive communist dictatorship and moved his country toward close relations with the Soviet Union. The often tense and hostile nature of the U.S.-Cuban relationship is illustrated by such events and actions as U.S. covert operations to overthrow the Castro government culminating in the ill-fated April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion; the October 1962 missile crisis in which the United States confronted the Soviet Union over its attempt to place offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba; Cuban support for guerrilla insurgencies and military support for revolutionary governments in Africa and the Western Hemisphere; the 1980 exodus of around 125,000 Cubans to the United States in the so-called Mariel boatlift; the 1994 exodus of more than 30,000 Cubans who were interdicted and housed at U.S. facilities in Guantanamo and Panama; and the February 1996 shootdown by Cuban fighter jets of two U.S. civilian planes operated by the Cuban American group, Brothers to the Rescue, which resulted in the death of four U.S. crew members.

Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted largely of isolating the island nation through comprehensive economic sanctions, including an embargo on trade and financial transactions. The Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR), first issued by the Treasury Department in July 1963, lay out a comprehensive set of economic sanctions against Cuba, including a prohibition on most financial transactions with Cuba and a freeze of Cuban government assets in the United States. The CACR have been amended many times over the years to reflect changes in policy, and remain in force today.

These sanctions were made stronger with the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992 (P.L. 102-484, Title XVII) and with the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-114), the latter often referred to as the Helms/Burton legislation. The CDA prohibits U.S. subsidiaries from engaging in trade with Cuba and prohibits entry into the United States for any vessel to load or unload freight if it has engaged in trade with Cuba within the last 180 days. The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, enacted in the aftermath of Cuba’s shooting down of two U.S. civilian planes in February 1996, combines a variety of measures to increase pressure on Cuba and provides for a plan to assist Cuba once it begins the transition to democracy. Most significantly, the law codified the Cuban embargo, including all restrictions under the CACR. This provision is especially noteworthy because of its long-lasting effect on U.S. policy options toward Cuba. The executive branch is circumscribed in lifting or substantially loosening the economic embargo without congressional concurrence until certain democratic conditions are met. Another significant sanction in the law is a provision in Title III that holds any person or government that traffics in U.S. property confiscated by the Cuban government liable for monetary damages in U.S. federal court. Acting under provisions of the law, however, both President Clinton and President Bush have suspended the implementation of Title III at six-month intervals.

In addition to sanctions, another component of U.S. policy, a so-called second track, consists of support measures for the Cuban people. This includes U.S. private humanitarian donations, medical exports to Cuba under the terms of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, U.S. government support for democracy-building efforts, and U.S.-sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba. In addition, the 106th Congress approved the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-387, Title IX) that allows for agricultural exports to Cuba, albeit with restrictions on financing such exports.

The Clinton Administration made several changes to U.S. policy in the aftermath of the Pope’s January 1998 visit to Cuba, which were intended to bolster U.S. support for the Cuban people. These included the resumption of direct flights to Cuba (which had been curtailed after the February 1996 shootdown of two U.S. civilian planes), the resumption of cash remittances by U.S. nationals and residents for the support of close relatives in Cuba (which had been curtailed in August 1994 in response to the migration crisis with Cuba), and the streamlining of procedures for the commercial sale of medicines and medical supplies and equipment to Cuba. In January 1999, President Clinton announced several additional measures to support the Cuban people. These included a broadening of cash remittances to Cuba, so that all U.S. residents (not just those with close relatives in Cuba) could send remittances to Cuba; an expansion of direct passenger charter flights to Cuba from additional U.S. cities other than Miami (direct flights later in the year began from Los Angeles and New York); and an expansion of people-to-people contact by loosening restrictions on travel to Cuba for certain categories of travelers, such as professional researchers and those involved in a wide range of educational, religious, and sports activities.
Bush Administration Policy

The Bush Administration essentially has continued the two-track U.S. policy of isolating Cuba through economic sanctions while supporting the Cuban people through a variety of measures. However, within this policy framework, the Administration has emphasized stronger enforcement of economic sanctions and has further tightened restrictions on travel, remittances, and humanitarian gift parcels to Cuba. There was considerable reaction to the Administration’s June 2004 tightening of restrictions for family visits and to the Administration’s February 2005 tightening of restrictions on payment terms for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba.

May 2004 Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba Report. In May 2004, President Bush endorsed the recommendations of a report issued by the inter-agency Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba, chaired by then-Secretary of State Colin Powell. The Commission made recommendations for immediate measures to “hasten the end of Cuba’s dictatorship” as well as longer-term recommendations to help plan for Cuba’s transition from communism to democracy in various areas. The President directed that up to $59 million be committed to implement key recommendations of the Commission, including support for democracy-building activities and for airborne broadcasts of Radio and TV Marti to Cuba. The report’s most significant recommendations included a number of measures to tighten economic sanctions on family visits and other categories of travel and on private humanitarian assistance in the form of remittances and gift parcels. Subsequent regulations issued by the Treasury and Commerce Departments in June 2004 implemented these new sanctions. (The full Commission report is on the State Department website at [http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rt/cuba/commission/2004/].)

In 2005, the Administration continued to tighten U.S. economic sanctions against Cuba by further restricting the process of how U.S. agricultural exporters may be paid for their sales. In July 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice appointed Caleb McCarry as the State Department’s new Cuba Transition Coordinator to direct U.S. government “actions in support of a free Cuba.” Secretary Rice reconvened the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba in December 2005 to identify additional measures to help Cubans hasten the transition to democracy and to develop a plan to help the Cuban people move toward free and fair elections.

July 2006 Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba Report. In July 2006, the inter-agency Commission for Assistance to Free Cuba issued its second report making recommendations to hasten political change in Cuba toward a democratic transition. The full report is available at [http://www.cafc.gov/rpt/].

The Commission called for the United States to provide $80 million over two years for the following: to support Cuban civil society ($31 million); to fund education programs and exchanges, including university training in Cuba provided by third countries and scholarships for economically disadvantaged students from Cuba at U.S. and third country universities ($10 million); to fund additional efforts to break the Cuban government’s information blockade and expand access to independent information, including through the Internet ($24 million); and to support international efforts at strengthening civil society and transition planning ($15 million). According to the Cuba Transition Coordinator, this assistance would be
additional funding beyond what the Administration is already currently budgeting for these programs. Thereafter, the Commission recommended funding of not less than $20 million annually for Cuba democracy programs “until the dictatorship ceases to exist.” This would roughly double the amount currently spent on Cuba democracy programs.

The report also set forth detailed plans of how the U.S. government, along with the international community and the Cuban community abroad, could provide assistance to a Cuban transition government to help it respond to critical humanitarian and social needs, to conduct free and fair elections, and to move toward a market-based economy. The report also outlined a series of preparatory steps that the U.S. government could take now, before Cuba’s transition begins, so that it will be well prepared in the event that assistance is requested by the new Cuban government. These included steps in the areas of government organization, electoral preparation, and anticipating humanitarian and social needs.

The Commission report received a mixed response from Cuba’s dissident community. Although some dissidents, like former political prisoner Vladimiro Roca, maintain that they would welcome any U.S. assistance that helps support the Cuban dissident movement, others expressed concerns about the report. Dissident economist and former political prisoner Oscar Espinosa Chepe stressed that Cubans have to be the ones to solve their own problems. According to Chepe, “We are thankful for the solidarity we have received from North America, Europe, and elsewhere, but we request that they do not meddle in our country.” Miriam Leiva, a founding member of the Ladies in White, a human rights organization, expressed concern that the report could serve as a rationale for the government to imprison dissidents. Leiva also faulted the Commission’s report for presuming what a Cuban transition must be before U.S. recognition or assistance can be provided. According to Leiva, “Only we Cubans, of our own volition ... can decide issues of such singular importance. Cubans on the island have sufficient intellectual ability to tackle a difficult, peaceful transition and reconcile with other Cubans here and abroad.”

U.S. Reaction to Fidel’s Ceding of Power. In response to Fidel Castro’s announcement that he was temporarily ceding power to his brother Raúl, President Bush issued a statement on August 3, 2006, that “the United States is absolutely committed to supporting the Cuban people’s aspiration for democracy and freedom.” The President urged “the Cuban people to work for democratic change” and pledged U.S. support to the Cuban people in their effort to build a transitional government in Cuba. U.S. officials indicated that there are no plans for the United States to “reach out” to the new leader. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice reiterated U.S. support

for the Cuban people in an August 4, 2006, statement broadcast on Radio and TV Marti. According to Secretary Rice, “All Cubans who desire peaceful democratic change can count on the support of the United States.”

Although there was some U.S. concern that political change in Cuba could prompt a migration crisis, there was no unusual traffic after Castro ceded provisional power to his brother. The U.S. Coast Guard had plans to respond to such a migration crisis, with support from the Navy if needed. In her August 4, 2006, message to the Cuban people, Secretary of State Rice encouraged “the Cuban people to work at home for positive change.” Department of Homeland Security officials also announced several measures to discourage Cubans from risking their lives on the open seas. U.S. officials also discouraged those in the Cuban American community wanting to travel by boat to Cuba to speed political change in Cuba. (For more, see “Migration Issues” below.)

Raúl Castro asserted in an August 18, 2006, published interview that Cuba has “always been disposed to normalize relations on an equal plane,” but at the same time he expressed strong opposition to current U.S. policy toward Cuba, which he described as “arrogant and interventionist.” In response, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Thomas Shannon reiterated a U.S. offer to Cuba, first articulated by President Bush in May 2002, that the Administration was willing to work with Congress to lift U.S. economic sanctions if Cuba were to begin a political opening and a transition to democracy. According to Shannon, the Bush Administration remains prepared to work with Congress for ways to lift the embargo if Cuba is prepared to free political prisoners, respect human rights, permit the creation of independent organizations, and create a mechanism and pathway toward free and fair elections.

In a December 2, 2006 speech, Raúl reiterated an offer to negotiate with the United States. He said that “we are willing to resolve at the negotiating table the longstanding dispute between the United States and Cuba, of course, provided they accept, as we have previously said, our condition as a country that will not tolerate any blemishes on its independence, and as long as said resolution is based on the principles of equality, reciprocity, non-interference, and mutual respect.”

On July 26, 2007, in a speech on Cuba’s revolutionary anniversary (commemorating the 1953 attack on the Moncada military barracks), Raúl Castro reiterated for the third time an offer to engage in dialogue with the United States, and strongly criticized U.S. trade and economic sanctions on Cuba. A U.S. State

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Department spokesman responded that “the only real dialogue that’s needed is with the Cuban people.”[^34]

In the aftermath of Fidel’s ceding of power to his brother, the Bush Administration established five interagency working groups to manage U.S. policy toward Cuba. The State Department led working groups on diplomatic actions, to build international support for U.S. policies; strategic communications, to ensure that Cubans understand U.S. government positions; and democratic promotion. The Commerce Department led a working group on humanitarian aid, in the event that a democratic transition government requests assistance. The Department of Homeland Security and the National Security Council headed a working group on migration.[^35] In addition to these working groups, in August 2006, then-U.S. Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte announced the establishment of the position of Mission Manager for Cuba and Venezuela responsible for integrating collection and analysis on the two countries across the Intelligence Community.

In September 2007, President Bush and other key Administration officials made several statements on Cuba. In a speech before the U.N. General Assembly on September 25, President Bush stated that “the long rule of a cruel dictator is nearing its end,” and called on the United Nations to insist on free speech, free assembly, and free elections as Cuba “enters a period of transition.”[^36] U.S. Commerce Secretary Carlos Gutierrez stated in a speech on September 17 that “unless the regime changes, our policy will not,” but indicated that the United States is “prepared to respond to genuine democratic change in Cuba.”[^37] In a speech on September 20, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Thomas Shannon contended that “there is a quiet consensus in the Americas and in Europe that Cuba’s future must be democratic.” He maintained that there are differences about “how to promote Cuba’s democratic future” and pointed out how “Latin America’s historic commitment to the principles of non-intervention and national sovereignty shape how many in the region are prepared to engage with Cuba.” He maintained, however, that “helping the Cuban people achieve their democratic destiny and re-integrate into the Americas will be one of the biggest diplomatic challenges we face.”[^38]

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October 2007 Policy Speech. On October 24, 2007, President Bush made a policy speech on Cuba that reflected a continuation of the sanctions-based approach toward Cuba. According to the President: “As long as the [Cuban] regime maintains its monopoly over the political and economic life of the Cuban people, the United States will keep the embargo in place.”

The President also proposed three new initiatives to provide support to the Cuban people. First, the President proposed allowing licensed non-governmental organizations and faith-based groups to provide computers and Internet access to the Cuban people if the Cuban government ends restrictions on public Internet access. Second, the President proposed inviting Cuban youths whose families suffer oppression to participate in the Partnership for Latin American Youth scholarship programs if the Cuban government allows them to participate. Third, the President announced a new effort to develop an international multi-billion dollar Freedom Fund for Cuba to help the Cuban people rebuild their economy and make the transition to democracy. The effort would be led by Secretary of State Rice and Secretary of Commerce Gutierrez and involve enlisting foreign governments and international organizations to contribute to the initiative. According to the President, monies from the fund would be available if the Cuban government demonstrates that it has adopted, in word and in deed, fundamental freedoms, including freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom of press, freedom to form political parties, and freedom to change the government through periodic, multi-party elections.

In the speech, President Bush also sent a message to Cuban military, police, and government officials that “when Cubans rise up to demand their liberty,” they have a choice to embrace the Cuban people’s desire for change or “defend a disgraced and dying order by using force.” The President conveyed to these officials that “there is a place for you in a free Cuba.”

The President also lauded the countries of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland as being vital sources of support and encouragement to Cuba’s democratic opposition. He called on other nations to make tangible efforts to show public support for the dissidents, by opening up their embassies in Havana to pro-democracy leaders, use the lobbies of their embassies to give Cubans access to the Internet and books and magazines, and encourage their country’s non-governmental organizations to reach out directly to Cuba’s independent civil society.

U.S. Response to Raúl’s Official Selection as President. In the aftermath of Fidel Castro’s February 19, 2008 announcement that he was officially stepping down as head of state, President Bush maintained that he viewed “this as a period of transition and it should be the beginning of a democratic transition in Cuba.” State Department officials made clear that U.S. policy would not change. On February 24, 2008, the day that Raúl Castro officially became Cuba’s head of state, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice issued a statement urging “the Cuban government to begin a process of peaceful, democratic change by releasing all

political prisoners, respecting human rights, and creating a clear pathway towards free and fair elections.”

In remarks on Cuba policy in early March 2008, President Bush maintained that in order to improve U.S.-Cuban relations, “what needs to change is not the United States; what needs to change is Cuba.” The President asserted that Cuba “must release all political prisoners ... have respect for human rights in word and deed, and pave the way for free and fair elections.” He reiterated these words again in a speech to the Council of the Americas on May 7, 2008. On May 21, 2008, President Bush called for the Cuban government to take steps to improve life for the Cuban people, including opening up access to the Internet. He also announced that the United States would change regulations to allow Americans to send mobile phones to family members in Cuba.

**Issues in U.S.-Cuban Relations**

**Debate on the Overall Direction of U.S. Policy**

Over the years, although U.S. policymakers have agreed on the overall objectives of U.S. policy toward Cuba — to help bring democracy and respect for human rights to the island — there have been several schools of thought about how to achieve those objectives. Some advocate a policy of keeping maximum pressure on the Cuban government until reforms are enacted, while continuing current U.S. efforts to support the Cuban people. Others argue for an approach, sometimes referred to as constructive engagement, that would lift some U.S. sanctions that they believe are hurting the Cuban people, and move toward engaging Cuba in dialogue. Still others call for a swift normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations by lifting the U.S. embargo.

Fidel Castro’s initially provisional, and now permanent, departure as head of government could eventually foster a re-examination of U.S. policy. In this new context, there are two broad policy approaches to contend with political change in Cuba: a status-quo approach that would maintain the U.S. dual-track policy of isolating the Cuban government while providing support to the Cuban people; and an approach aimed at influencing the Cuban government and Cuban society through increased contact and engagement. (For additional information, see CRS Report RS22742, *Cuba’s Political Succession: From Fidel to Raúl Castro*. Also see CRS Report RL33622, *Cuba’s Future Political Scenarios and U.S. Policy Approaches*, written in the aftermath of Fidel Castro’s stepping down from power in July 2006.)

In general, those who advocate easing U.S. sanctions on Cuba make several policy arguments. They assert that if the United States moderated its policy toward Cuba — through increased travel, trade, and diplomatic dialogue — then the seeds

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of reform would be planted, which would stimulate and strengthen forces for peaceful change on the island. They stress the importance to the United States of avoiding violent change in Cuba, with the prospect of a mass exodus to the United States and the potential of involving the United States in a civil war scenario. They argue that since the demise of Cuba’s does not appear imminent, even without Fidel Castro at the helm, the United States should espouse a more pragmatic approach in trying to induce change in Cuba. Supporters of changing policy also point to broad international support for lifting the U.S. embargo, to the missed opportunities for U.S. businesses because of the unilateral nature of the embargo, and to the increased suffering of the Cuban people because of the embargo. Proponents of change also argue that the United States should be consistent in its policies with the world’s few remaining communist governments, including China or Vietnam, and also maintain that moderating policy will help advance human rights.

On the other side, opponents of changing U.S. policy maintain that the current two-track policy of isolating Cuba, but reaching out to the Cuban people through measures of support, is the best means for realizing political change in Cuba. They point out that the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 sets forth the steps that Cuba needs to take in order for the United States to normalize relations. They argue that softening U.S. policy at this time without concrete Cuban reforms would boost the Castro regime, politically and economically, and facilitate the survival of the communist regime. Opponents of softening U.S. policy argue that the United States should stay the course in its commitment to democracy and human rights in Cuba, and that sustained sanctions can work. Opponents of loosening U.S. sanctions further argue that Cuba’s failed economic policies, not the U.S. embargo, are the causes of Cuba’s difficult living conditions.

**Restrictions on Travel and Remittances**

Restrictions on travel to Cuba have been a key and often contentious component of U.S. efforts to isolate the communist government of Fidel Castro for much of the past 40 years. Over time there have been numerous changes to the restrictions and for five years, from 1977 until 1982, there were no restrictions on travel. Restrictions on travel and remittances to Cuba are part of the CACR, the overall embargo regulations administered by the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).

Major arguments made for lifting the Cuba travel ban are that it contributes to the suffering of Cuban families; it hinders efforts to influence conditions in Cuba and may be aiding Castro by helping restrict the flow of information; it abridges the rights of ordinary Americans; and Americans can travel to other countries with communist or authoritarian governments. Major arguments in opposition to lifting the Cuba travel ban are that more American travel would support Castro’s rule by providing his government with potentially millions of dollars in hard currency; that there are legal provisions allowing travel to Cuba for humanitarian purposes that are used by thousands of Americans each year; and that the President should be free to restrict travel for foreign policy reasons.

Under the current Bush Administration, enforcement of U.S. restrictions on Cuba travel has increased, and restrictions on travel and on private remittances to
Cuba have been tightened. In March 2003, the Administration eliminated travel for people-to-people educational exchanges unrelated to academic course work. In June 2004, the Administration significantly restricted travel, especially family travel, and the provision of private humanitarian assistance to Cuba in the form of remittances and gift parcels. In April 2005, OFAC cracked down on certain religious organizations promoting licensed travel to Cuba and warned them not to abuse their license by taking individuals not affiliated with their organizations. OFAC’s actions were prompted by reports that groups practicing the Afro-Cuban religion Santería had been taking large groups to Cuba as a means of skirting U.S. travel restrictions. In 2006, the Administration suspended the licenses of several travel service providers, including one of the largest such providers in Florida, La Estrella de Cuba. Several religious organizations also had their licenses suspended, and church groups and several Members of Congress expressed concern about more restrictive licenses for religious travel.

Among the June 2004 restrictions that remain in place are the following:

- Family visits were restricted to one trip every three years under a specific license and are restricted to immediate family members, with no exceptions. Under previous regulations, family visits could occur once a year under a general license, with travel more than once a year allowed, but under a specific license. Previously travel had been allowed to visit relatives to within three degrees of relationship to the traveler.

- Cash remittances, estimates of which range from $400 million to $800 million, were further restricted. Quarterly remittances of $300 may still be sent, but are now restricted to members of the remitter’s immediate family and may not be remitted to certain government officials and certain members of the Cuban Communist Party. The regulations were also changed to reduce the amount of remittances that authorized travelers may carry to Cuba, from $3000 to $300.

- Gift parcels were limited to immediate family members and were denied to certain Cuban officials and certain members of the Cuban Communist Party. The contents of gift parcels may no longer include seeds, clothing, personal hygiene items, veterinary medicines and supplies, fishing equipment and supplies, or soap-making equipment.

- The authorized per diem allowed for a family visit was reduced from the State Department per diem rate (currently $179 per day for Havana) to $50 per day.

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43 Oscar Corral, “Is Santería Used as Ploy to Skirt Travel Rules?,” *Miami Herald*, February 27, 2005

With the exception of informational materials, licensed travelers may not purchase or otherwise acquire merchandise and bring it back into the United States. Previous regulations allowed visitors to Cuba to import $100 worth of goods as accompanied baggage.

- Fully-hosted travel, by a person not subject to U.S. jurisdiction, was prohibited as a permissible category of travel.

- Travel for educational activities was further restricted, including the elimination of educational exchanges sponsored by secondary schools.

There was mixed reaction to the tightening of Cuba travel and remittance restrictions. Supporters maintain that the increased restrictions deny the Cuban government dollars that help maintain its repressive control. Opponents argue that the tightened sanctions are anti-family and only result in more suffering for the Cuban people. There were also concerns that the new restrictions were drafted without considering the full consequences of their implementation. For example, the elimination of fully-hosted travel raised concerns about the status of 70 U.S. students receiving full scholarships at the Latin American School of Medicine in Havana. Members of the Congressional Black Caucus, who were instrumental in the establishment of the scholarship program for U.S. students, expressed concern that the students may be forced to abandon their medical education because of the new OFAC regulations. As a result of these concerns, OFAC eventually licensed the medical students in August 2004 to continue their studies and engage in travel-related transactions.

On July 19, 2007, the U.S. International Trade Commission issued a report, requested by the Senate Committee on Finance, maintaining that lifting travel restrictions would result in travel by U.S. citizens to Cuba rising to between 550,000 and 1 million from an estimate of 171,000 in 2005.

**Legislative Initiatives.** From 2000-2004, one or both houses of Congress approved amendments to appropriations bills that would have eased restrictions on travel to Cuba in various ways, but these provisions ultimately were stripped out of final enacted measures. The Administration regularly threatened to veto legislation if it contained provisions weakening Cuba sanctions.

In the first session of the 110th Congress, two Senate Appropriations Committee reported-versions of appropriations bills had provisions that would have eased restrictions on travel to Cuba for the marketing and sale of agricultural and medical goods, but ultimately these provisions were not included in the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-161). The Senate version of the FY2008 Financial Services and General Government appropriations bill, reported July 19, 2007, H.R. 2829, had a provision in Section 620 that would eased such travel restrictions, while the Senate version of the FY2008 Agriculture appropriations bill, S. 1859, reported July 24, 2007, had such a provision in Section 741.
In the second session of the 110th Congress, the House Appropriations Committee approved its version of the FY2009 Financial Services and General Government Appropriations bill on June 25, 2008, that includes provisions easing restrictions on family travel and U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba. With regard to travel, the bill would liberalize family travel to Cuba by allowing for such travel once a year (instead of the current restriction of once every three years) and allowing such travel to visit aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, and first cousins (instead of currently being limited to immediate family members). The House Appropriations Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government had approved the measure on June 17.

A number of other initiatives introduced in the 110th Congress would ease Cuba travel restrictions. H.R. 654 (Rangel), S. 721 (Enzi), and Section 254 of S. 554 (Dorgan) would prohibit the President from regulating or prohibiting travel to Cuba or any of the transactions incident to travel. Two bills that would lift overall economic sanctions — H.R. 217 (Serrano) and H.R. 624 (Rangel) — would also lift travel restrictions. H.R. 177 (Lee) would ease restrictions on educational travel to Cuba. H.R. 757 (Delahunt) would lift restrictions on family travel and the provision of remittances for family members in Cuba. H.R. 1026 (Moran, Jerry), which would ease restrictions on U.S. agricultural products to Cuba, includes a provision that would provide for general license authority for travel-related transactions for people involved in agricultural sales and marketing activities or in the transportation of such sales. H.R. 2819 (Rangel) and S. 1673 (Baucus), which would ease restrictions on U.S. agricultural and medical exports to Cuba, would also lift restrictions on travel to Cuba.

Agricultural Exports and Sanctions

U.S. commercial agricultural exports to Cuba have been allowed for several years, but with numerous restrictions and licensing requirements. The 106th Congress passed the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 or TSRA (P.L. 106-387, Title IX) that allows for one-year export licenses for selling agricultural commodities to Cuba, although no U.S. government assistance, foreign assistance, export assistance, credits, or credit guarantees are available to finance such exports. TSRA also denies exporters access to U.S. private commercial financing or credit; all transactions must be conducted in cash in advance or with financing from third countries. TSRA reiterates the existing ban on importing goods from Cuba but authorizes travel to Cuba, under a specific license, to conduct business related to the newly allowed agricultural sales.

In February 2005, OFAC amended the Cuba embargo regulations to clarify that TSRA’s term of “payment of cash in advance” means that the payment is received by the seller or the seller’s agent prior to the shipment of the goods from the port at which they are loaded. U.S. agricultural exporters and some Members of Congress strongly objected that the action constitutes a new sanction that violates the intent of TSRA and could jeopardize millions of dollars in U.S. agricultural sales to Cuba. OFAC Director Robert Werner maintained that the clarification “conforms to the
common understanding of the term in international trade.”

On July 29, 2005, OFAC clarified that, for “payment of cash in advance” for the commercial sale of U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba, vessels can leave U.S. ports as soon as a foreign bank confirms receipt of payment from Cuba. OFAC’s action was aimed at ensuring that the goods would not be vulnerable to seizure for unrelated claims while still at the U.S. port. Supporters of overturning OFAC’s February 22, 2005 amendment, such as the American Farm Bureau Federation, were pleased by the clarification but indicated that they would still work to overturn the February rule.

Since late 2001, Cuba has purchased more than $2.2 billion in agricultural products from the United States. Overall U.S. exports to Cuba rose from about $7 million in 2001 to a high of $404 million in 2004. U.S. exports to Cuba declined in 2005 and 2006 to $369 million and $340 million, respectively, but increased to $447 million in 2007. In the first quarter of 2008, U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba amounted to $258 million, far higher than the same time period in previous years, in part because of the rise in the cost of food prices.

On July 19, 2007, the U.S. International Trade Commission issued a report, requested by the Senate Committee on Finance, maintaining that the U.S. share of Cuba’s agricultural, fish, and forest imports would rise from one-third to between one-half and two-thirds if trade restrictions were lifted. See the full report available at [http://www.usitc.gov/ext_relations/news_release/2007/er0719ee1.htm]

Some groups favor further easing restrictions on agricultural exports to Cuba. They argue that the restrictions harm the health and nutrition of the Cuban population. U.S. agribusiness companies that support the removal of restrictions on agricultural exports to Cuba believe that U.S. farmers are missing out on a market of over $700 million annually so close to the United States. Some exporters want to change U.S. restrictions so that they can sell agriculture and farm equipment to Cuba. Agricultural exporters who support the lifting of the prohibition on financing contend that allowing such financing would help smaller U.S. companies expand purchases to Cuba more rapidly.

Opponents of further easing restrictions on agricultural exports to Cuba maintain that U.S. policy does not deny such sales to Cuba, as evidenced by the large amount of sales since 2001. Moreover, according to the State Department, since the Cuban Democracy Act was enacted in 1992, the United States has licensed billions of dollars in private humanitarian donations. Opponents further argue that

45 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Testimony of Robert Werner, Director, OFAC, before the House Committee on Agriculture, March 16, 2005.
47 World Trade Atlas, which uses Department of Commerce Statistics.
easing pressure on the Cuban government would in effect be lending support and extending the duration of the Castro regime. They maintain that the United States should remain steadfast in its opposition to any easing of pressure on Cuba that could prolong the Castro regime and its repressive policies. Some agricultural producers that export to Cuba support continuation of the prohibition on financing for agricultural exports to Cuba because it ensures that they will be paid.

**Legislative Initiatives.** In the first session of the 110th Congress, Congress approved the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-161) in December 2007, which dropped provisions easing Cuba sanctions that had been included in the House-passed and Senate-committee versions of H.R. 2829, the FY2008 Financial Services and General Government appropriations bill, and the Senate-committee version of S. 1859, the FY2008 agriculture appropriations bill. The House-passed version of H.R. 2829 had a provision in Section 903 that would have prevented Treasury Department funds from being used to implement the February 2005 tightening of policy requiring the payment of cash in advance prior to the shipment of U.S. agricultural goods to Cuba. The House had adopted the provision during June 28, 2007 floor consideration when it approved H.Amdt. 467 (Moran, Kansas) by voice vote. The Senate Appropriations Committee reported version of the bill included a similar provision in Section 619, and in Section 620 would have ease travel to Cuba for the marketing and sale of agricultural and medical goods. The Administration’s statement of policy on the bill maintained that the President would veto the measure if it contained a provision weakening current restrictions against Cuba. The Senate Appropriations Committee-reported version of the S. 1859 (S.Rept. 110-134) included a provision that would have authorized general licenses for travel to Cuba for the marketing and sale of agricultural and medical goods.

In other first session action, on July 27, 2007, the House rejected (by a vote of 182-245) H.Amdt. 707 (Rangel) to H.R. 2419, the Farm, Nutrition, and Bioenergy Act of 2007, also known as the 2007 farm bill. The amendment would have eased restrictions on the commercial sale of agricultural products to Cuba by clarifying the meaning of “payment of cash in advance” for the sale of such products; authorizing direct transfers between U.S. and Cuban financial institutions for such sales; and authorizing the issuance of U.S. visas for Cubans to conduct activities, including phytosanitary inspections, related to such sales.

In the second session of the 110th Congress, the House Appropriations Committee approved its version of the FY2009 Financial Services and General Government Appropriations bill on June 25, 2008, that includes provisions easing restrictions on U.S. agricultural exports and family travel to Cuba. With regard to U.S. agricultural exports, the bill has a provision that would prohibit funds in the act from being used to administer, implement, or enforce an amendment to the Cuban embargo regulations from February 25, 2005, that requires that U.S. agricultural exports must be paid for before they leave U.S. ports. The House Appropriations Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government had approved the measure on June 17.

Several other legislative initiatives introduced in the 110th Congress would ease restrictions on the sale of U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba:
H.R. 1026 (Moran, Jerry) would facilitate the sale of U.S. agricultural products to Cuba by providing for general license authority for travel-related expenses for people involved in sales and marketing activities or in the transportation for such sales; authorizing the issuance of a temporary visa for a Cuban national conducting activities related to the purchase of U.S. agricultural goods, including phytosanitary inspections; clarifying the “payment of cash in advance” term used in TSRA to mean that the payment by the purchaser and the receipt of such payment to the seller occurs prior to the transfer of title of the commodity or product to the purchaser and the release of control of such commodity or product to the purchaser; and prohibiting the President from restricting direct transfers from a Cuban financial institution to a U.S. financial institution for U.S. agricultural sales under TSRA.

H.R. 2819 (Rangel) and S. 1673 (Baucus), among other provisions, would clarify the meaning of “payment of cash in advance;” authorize direct transfers between Cuban and U.S. financial institutions for the execution of payments for sales pursuant to TSRA; establish an agricultural export promotion program with respect to Cuba; and increase the airport ticket tax for travel to or from Cuba by $1.00, with funds going to a newly established Agricultural Export Promotion Trust Fund. The Senate Finance Committee held a hearing on S. 1673 on December 11, 2007.

Two broader bills that would lift economic sanctions on Cuba — H.R. 217 (Serrano) and H.R. 624 (Rangel) — would include lifting restrictions on agricultural exports to Cuba by amending TSRA. Three bills that would lift overall travel restrictions — H.R. 654 (Rangel), S. 554 (Dorgan), and S. 721 (Enzi) — would have the effect of lifting travel restrictions for those involved in travel related to agricultural sales.

**Trademark Sanction**

A provision in the FY1999 omnibus appropriations measure (Section 211 of Division A, Title II, P.L. 105-277, signed into law October 21, 1998) prevents the United States from accepting payment for trademark registrations and renewals from Cuban or foreign nationals that were used in connection with a business or assets in Cuba that were confiscated, unless the original owner of the trademark has consented. The provision prohibits U.S. courts from recognizing such trademarks without the consent of the original owner. The measure was enacted because of a dispute between the French spirits company, Pernod Ricard, and the Bermuda-based Bacardi Ltd. Pernod Ricard entered into a joint venture with the Cuban government.

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to produce and export Havana Club rum, but Bacardi, whose company in Cuba was expropriated in the 1960s, maintains that it holds the right to the Havana Club name. Although Pernod Ricard cannot market Havana Club in the United States because of the trade embargo, it wants to protect its future distribution rights should the embargo be lifted.

The European Union initiated World Trade Organization dispute settlement proceedings in June 2000, maintaining that the U.S. law violates the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS). In January 2002, the WTO ultimately found that the trademark sanction violated WTO provisions on national treatment and most-favored-nation obligations in the TRIPS Agreement.

On March 28, 2002, the United States agreed that it would come into compliance with the WTO ruling through legislative action by January 3, 2003. That deadline was extended several times since no legislative action had been taken to bring Section 211 into compliance with the WTO ruling. On July 1, 2005, however, in an EU-U.S. bilateral agreement, the EU agreed that it would not request authorization to retaliate at that time, but reserved the right to do so at a future date, and the United States agreed not to block a future EU request. On August 3, 2006, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office announced that Cuba’s Havana Club trademark registration was “cancelled/expired,” a week after OFAC had denied a Cuban government company the license that it needed to renew the registration of the trademark.

Two different approaches have been advocated to bring Section 211 into compliance with the WTO ruling. Some want a narrow fix in which Section 211 would be amended so that it also applies to U.S. companies instead of being limited to foreign companies. Advocates of this approach argue that it would affirm that the United States “will not give effect to a claim or right to U.S. property if that claimed is based on a foreign compensation.” Others want Section 211 repealed altogether. They argue that the law endangers over 5,000 trademarks of over 500 U.S. companies registered in Cuba. They maintain that Cuba could retaliate against U.S. companies under the Inter-American Convention for Trademark and Commercial Protection.

In the 110th Congress, five initiatives — H.R. 217 (Serrano), H.R. 624 (Rangel), H.R. 2819 (Rangel), S. 1673 (Baucus), and S. 1806 (Leahy) — have provisions that would repeal the Section 211 trademark sanction from law, while

51 “U.S., EU Agree on Deadline for Complying with Section 211 WTO Finding,” Inside U.S. Trade, April 12, 2002.
two other initiatives — H.R. 1306 (Wexler) and S. 749 (Nelson) would advance the narrow fix to Section 211 in order to comply with the WTO ruling. Similar legislative initiatives on both sides of the issue were introduced in the 108th and 109th Congresses, but no action was taken on these measures. The July 2005 EU-U.S. bilateral agreement, in which the EU agreed not to retaliate against the United States, but reserved the right to do so at a later date, reduced pressure on Congress to take action to comply with the WTO ruling.

**Offshore Oil Sector Development**

The issue of Cuba’s development of its deepwater offshore oil reserves in the Gulf of Mexico has been a concern among some Members of Congress. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, industry analysts maintain that there could be at least 1.6 billion crude oil reserves in Cuba’s offshore sector; the U.S. Geological Survey estimated a mean of 4.6 billion barrel of undiscovered oil.56 To date, Cuba has signed agreements for six concessions involving seven foreign oil companies for the exploration of offshore oil and gas. Repsol (Spain), Norsk-Hydro (Norway), and ONGC (India) are partners in a joint project, while Sherritt International (Canada), ONGC (India), PdVSA (Venezuela), Petronas (Malaysia), and PetroVietnam also have additional concessions.57 In mid-February 2008, the Brazilian state-oil company Petrobrás signed a wide-ranging agreement for potential exploration and production cooperation with Cuba’s state oil company, Cupet. Some Members have expressed concern about oil development so close to the United States and about potential environmental damage to the Florida coast. In April 2008, Cuba announced that drilling in its offshore oil sector would not begin until 2009.58

Although there have been some claims that China is drilling in Cuba’s offshore deepwater oil sector, to date its involvement in Cuba’s oil sector has been focused on exploring onshore/close coastal oil extraction in Piñar del Rio province through its state-run China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec).59 China does not have a concession in Cuba’s offshore oil sector in the deepwaters of the Gulf of Mexico.60

In the 110th Congress, two legislative initiatives — H.R. 1679 (Ros-Lehtinen), S. 876 (Martinez), and S. 2503 (Nelson, Bill) — would impose sanctions related to Cuba’s offshore oil development on its northern coast. H.R. 1679 and S. 876 would exclude from admission to the United States aliens who have made investments contributing to the enhancement of the ability of Cuba to develop its petroleum resources off its coasts; and require the President to impose sanctions on persons (including foreign subsidiaries) that are determined to have made an investment equal to or exceeding $1 million that contributes to the enhancement of Cuba’s ability to develop petroleum resources of the submerged lands off Cuba’s coast. S. 2503 would also exclude from admission to the United States aliens who have directly and significantly contributed to the ability of Cuba to develop its petroleum resources. The bill would also nullify a 1977 Maritime Boundary Agreement between the United States and Cuba.

In contrast, two legislative initiatives, S. 1268 (Dorgan) and H.R. 3182 (Udall), would allow U.S. companies to work with Cuba for the offshore exploration and extraction of oil along Cuba’s northern coast.

**Drug Interdiction Cooperation**

Because of Cuba’s geographic location, the country’s waters and airspace have been used by illicit narcotics traffickers to transport drugs for ultimate destinations in the United States. Over the past several years, Cuban officials have expressed concerns over the use of their waters and airspace for drug transit as well as increased domestic drug use. The Cuban government has taken a number of measures to deal with the drug problem, including legislation to stiffen penalties for traffickers, increased training for counternarcotics personnel, and cooperation with a number of countries on anti-drug efforts. Cuba has bilateral counternarcotics agreements with 33 countries and less formal arrangements with 16 others, according to the Department of State. For several years, Cuba’s Operation Hatchet has focused on maritime and air interdiction and the recovery of narcotics washed up on Cuban shores. Narcotics smuggling through Cuban territory deceased in 2006, according to both U.S. and Cuban officials.\(^6\) According to the Department of State, Cuba aggressively pursues an internal enforcement and investigation program against its incipient drug market with an effective nationwide drug prevention and awareness campaign, Operation Popular Shield.

Over the years, there have been varying levels of cooperation with Cuba on anti-drug efforts. In 1996, Cuban authorities cooperated with the United States in the seizure of 6.6 tons of cocaine aboard the Miami-bound *Limerick*, a Honduran-flag ship. Cuba turned over the cocaine to the United States and cooperated fully in the investigation and subsequent prosecution of two defendants in the case in the United States. Cooperation has increased since 1999 when U.S. and Cuban officials met in Havana to discuss ways of improving anti-drug cooperation. Cuba accepted an upgrading of the communications link between the Cuban Border Guard and the

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U.S. Coast Guard as well as the stationing of a U.S. Coast Guard Drug Interdiction Specialist (DIS) at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana. The Coast Guard official was posted to the U.S. Interests Section in September 2000, and since that time, coordination has increased.

The State Department, in its March 2008 *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*, maintains that narcotics cooperation occurs on a case-by-case basis primarily through the Coast Guard DIS, which increased in 2007. The report noted that Cuban authorities carried out some operations in coordination with the Coast Guard DIS in 2007. These included cooperation in the interception of a drug-laden aircraft destined for the Bahamas in February and a joint U.S.-Cuba container inspection at the port of Havana in June. The report also noted that Cuban authorities have provided the DIS more exposure to Cuban counternarcotics efforts, including investigative criminal information, debriefings on drug trafficking cases, visits to the Cuban national canine training center and anti-doping laboratory in Havana, and access to meet with the Chiefs of Cuba’s INTERPOL and Customs office.

Cuba maintains that it wants to cooperate with the United States to combat drug trafficking, and on various occasions has called for a bilateral anti-drug cooperation agreement with the United States. In January 2002, Cuba deported to the United States Jesse James Bell, a U.S. fugitive wanted on drug charges, and in early March 2002, Cuba arrested a convicted Colombian drug trafficker, Rafael Bustamante, who escaped from jail in Alabama in 1992. At the time, then Drug Enforcement Administration head Asa Hutchison expressed appreciation for Cuba’s actions, but indicated that cooperation would continue on a case-by-case basis, not through a bilateral agreement. In February 2007, Cuba extradited drug trafficker Luis Hernando Gómez Bustamante to Colombia, an action that drew praise from U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Anne Patterson. Gómez Bustamante was subsequently extradited to the United States in July 2007 to face drug trafficking charges.

In April 2008, John Waters, Director of the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy, lauded U.S. anti-drug cooperation with Cuba as a good
example of how cooperation has been achieved despite overall political differences between the two countries.65

**Legislative Initiatives.** Over the past several years, House and Senate versions of Foreign Operations appropriations bills have contained contrasting provisions related to funding for cooperation with Cuba on counternarcotics efforts. House bills have generally prohibited funds for such efforts, while Senate versions would have funded such efforts. Ultimately, none of these provisions were included in enacted measures.

This happened again in December 2007 when Congress approved the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-161). The act dropped contrasting provisions from the House and Senate versions of H.R. 2764, the FY2008 State, Foreign Operations and Related Agencies Appropriations Act. The House-passed version of H.R. 2764 contained a provision, in Section 673, that would have specifically prohibited International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) assistance to the Cuban government. In contrast, the Senate-passed version of the bill would have provided, in Section 696, $1 million in INCLE funding for preliminary work by the Department of State, or such other entity as the Secretary of State may designate, to establish cooperation with the Cuban government on counternarcotics matters. The amount would not have been available if Cuba did not have in place appropriate procedures to protect against the loss of innocent life in the air and on the ground in connection with the interdiction of illegal drugs, and if there is credible evidence of involvement of the Cuban government in drug trafficking during the preceding 10 years.

**Cuba and Terrorism66**

Cuba was added to the State Department’s list of states sponsoring international terrorism in 1982 because of its alleged ties to international terrorism and support for terrorist groups in Latin America. Cuba had a long history of supporting revolutionary movements and governments in Latin America and Africa, but in 1992, Fidel Castro said that his country’s support for insurgents abroad was a thing of the past. Cuba’s change in policy was in large part because of the breakup of the Soviet Union, which resulted in the loss of billions of dollars in annual subsidies to Cuba, and led to substantial Cuban economic decline.

Cuba remains on the State Department’s terrorism list. According to the State Department’s *Country Reports on Terrorism 2007* report (issued April 30, 2008), Cuba has “remained opposed to U.S. counterterrorism policy, and actively and publicly condemned many associated U.S. policies and actions.” The report also noted that Cuba maintains close relationships with other state sponsors of terrorism, such as Iran and Syria, and has provided safe haven for members of several Foreign

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66 For further information, see CRS Report RL32251, *Cuba and the State Sponsors of Terrorism List*, by Mark P. Sullivan.
Terrorist Organizations (FTOs): the Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA) and two Colombian insurgent groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). Colombia has publicly acknowledged that it wants Cuba mediation with the ELN.

The 2007 report also maintained that Cuba continued to permit U.S. fugitives from justice to live legally in Cuba. Most of the fugitives entered Cuba in the 1970s, and are accused of hijacking or committing violent actions in the United States. The State Department report noted that Cuba stated in 2006 that it would no longer provide safe haven to new fugitives who may enter Cuba. In 2006, Cuba returned a U.S. fugitive who had sequestered his son and flew a stolen plane to Cuba in September. In April 2007, Cuba returned another U.S. fugitive, Joseph Adjmi, who was convicted of mail fraud in the 1960s, but disappeared before beginning his 10-year sentence. On June 13, 2008, Cuba’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that it deported another U.S. citizen, Leonard Auerbach, wanted in the United States for sexual exploitation of a minor and for child pornography who had entered Cuba from Mexico in April.67

In the 110th Congress, H.R. 525 (King), would amend the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 to require that, in order to determine that a democratically elected government in Cuba exists, the Cuban government extradite to the United States individuals who are living in Cuba in order to escape prosecution or confinement for criminal offense committed in the United States. A similar initiative was introduced in the 109th Congress, H.R. 332 (King), but no legislative action was taken. In addition, Section101(1)(H) of House-passed H.R. 2601 would have authorized funds for the U.S. Interests Section in Havana to disseminate the names of U.S. fugitives residing in Cuba and any rewards for their capture, but action on the measure was not completed before the end of the Congress.

In general, those who support keeping Cuba on the terrorism list argue that there is ample evidence that Cuba supports terrorism. They point to the government’s history of supporting terrorist acts and armed insurgencies in Latin America and Africa. They point to the government’s continued hosting of members of foreign terrorist organizations and U.S. fugitives from justice. Critics of retaining Cuba on the terrorism list maintain that it is a holdover from the Cold War. They argue that domestic political considerations keep Cuba on the terrorism list and maintain that Cuba’s presence on the list diverts U.S. attention from struggles against serious terrorist threats.

Cuba as the Victim of Terrorism. Cuba has been the target of various terrorist incidents over the years. In 1976, a Cuban plane was bombed, killing 73 people. In 1997, there were almost a dozen bombings in the tourist sector in Havana and in the Varadero beach area in which an Italian businessman was killed and several others were injured. Two Salvadorans were convicted and sentenced to death for the bombings in March 1999, and three Guatemalans were sentenced to

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prison terms ranging from 10-15 years in January 2002. Cuban officials maintain that Cuban exiles funded the bombings.

In November 2000, four anti-Castro activists were arrested in Panama for a plot to kill Fidel Castro. One of the accused, Luis Posada Carriles, was also allegedly involved in the 1976 Cuban airline bombing noted above. The four stood trial in March 2004 and were sentenced on weapons charges in the case to prison terms ranging from seven to eight years. In late August 2004, Panamanian President Mireya Moscoso pardoned the four men before the end of her presidential term. Three of the men are U.S. citizens and traveled to Florida, where they received strong support from some in the Cuban American community, while Posada Carriles reportedly traveled to another country.

On April 13, 2005, Posada’s lawyer said that his client, reportedly in the United States after entering the country illegally, would seek asylum in the United States because he has a “well-founded fear of persecution” for his opposition to Fidel Castro. Posada, a Venezuelan citizen, had been imprisoned in Venezuela for the bombing of the Cuban airliner in 1976, but reportedly was allowed to “escape” from prison in 1985 after his supporters paid a bribe to the prison warden. He had been acquitted for the bombing but remained in prison pending a prosecutorial appeal. Posada also reportedly admitted, but later denied, involvement in the string of bombings in Havana in 1997, one of which killed an Italian tourist. Posada subsequently withdrew his application for asylum on May 17, 2005. Later that day, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) arrested Posada, and subsequently charged him with illegally entering the United States. A Department of Homeland Security press release indicated that ICE does not generally deport people to Cuba or countries believed to be acting on Cuba’s behalf. Venezuela requested Posada’s extradition and pledged that it would not hand Posada over to Cuba. On September 26, 2005, however, a U.S. immigration judge ruled that Posada likely faced torture in Venezuela and could not be deported in keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention Against Torture.

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71 Although Posada was acquitted by a military court, a higher court ordered a new civilian trial. Reportedly a first set of prosecutors recommended against charging Posada, but a second set of prosecutors took the case to trial, and Posada escaped during that time in 1985. See Oscar Corral, “Debate Focuses on Escape,” Miami Herald, June 19, 2005.


74 Alicia Caldwell, “Judge Says Cuban Militant Can’t Be Deported to Venezuela,” (continued...
ICE reviewed the case and determined on March 22, 2006, that Posada would not be freed from a detention federal immigration facility in El Paso, Texas. In November 2006, however, a U.S. federal judge, who was considering Posada’s plea that he be released, ordered the government to supply evidence, by February 1, 2007, justifying his continued detention. On January 11, 2007, a federal grand jury in Texas indicted Posada on seven counts for lying about how he entered the United States illegally in March 2005, whereupon he was transferred from immigration detention in El Paso to a country jail in New Mexico near the Texas border. The Cuban government responded by maintaining that Posada needs to be charged with terrorism, not just lying about how he entered the United States. Another grand jury in New Jersey is reportedly examining Posada’s alleged role in the 1997 bombings in Cuba. Press articles in early May 2007 reported that the FBI has been gathering evidence in the 1997 bombing and that FBI agents have visited Havana as part of their investigation.

Posada was released from jail in New Mexico on April 19, 2007, and allowed to return to Miami under house arrest to await an upcoming trial on immigration fraud charges, but on May 9, 2007 a federal judge in Texas dismissed the charges. The judge maintained that the U.S. government mistranslated testimony from Posada and manipulated evidence. On June 5, 2007, Justice Department prosecutors filed a notice of appeal with the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in New Orleans and on November 6, 2007, federal prosecutors filed a brief requesting that the court reverse the lower court’s decision. On June 4, 2008, the appeals court heard arguments from both sides in the case; a ruling reportedly could take several months. Both Cuba and Venezuela strongly denounced Posada’s release, contending that he is a terrorist.

On November 15, 2007, the House Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight of the Committee on Foreign Affairs held a hearing focusing on the Posada case.

74 (...continued)


79 The federal prosecutors’ brief is available at [http://media.miamiherald.com/smedia/2007/11/06/20/Posada_5CA_07-50737_electronic_copy.source.prod_affiliate.56.pdf]

U.S. Funding to Support Democracy and Human Rights

Since 1996, the United States has provided assistance — primarily through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), but also through the State Department and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) — to increase the flow of information on democracy, human rights, and free enterprise to Cuba.

USAID’s Cuba program has supported a variety of U.S.-based non-governmental organizations with the goals of promoting a rapid, peaceful transition to democracy, helping develop civil society, and building solidarity with Cuba’s human rights activists. These efforts are largely funded through Economic Support Funds (ESF) in the annual foreign operations appropriations bill. In recent years, funding for such projects amounted to about $5 million for each of FY2001 and FY2002, $6 million in FY2003, $21.4 million in FY2004 (because of re-programmed ESF assistance to fund the democracy-building recommendations of the Commission to Provide Assistance for a Free Cuba), and $8.9 million in FY2005. In FY2006, $10.9 million in Cuba democracy funding was provided, including $8.9 million in ESF and $2 million in Development Assistance.

For FY2007, the Administration requested $9 million in ESF to support the recommendations of the President’s Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba, and to support USAID-administered democracy and human rights programs. The report to the House-passed version of the FY2007 Foreign Operations appropriations bill, H.R. 5522 (H.Rept. 109-486), recognized the work of USAID in promoting democracy and humanitarian assistance for Cuba and urged the agency to continue to promote its Cuba program. The report to the Senate version of H.R. 5522 (S.Rept. 109-277) recommended $2.5 million in ESF for Cuba democracy programs, $6.5 million less than the Administration’s request. Final action on H.R. 5522 was not completed before the end of the 109th Congress. Foreign Operations appropriations for FY2007 was funded by a series of continuing resolutions completed in the 110th Congress. Ultimately, the Administration provided $13.3 million in ESF for Cuba democracy programs in FY2007, $4.3 million more than it requested.

For FY2008, Congress fully funded the Administration’s request for $45.7 million in ESF for democracy assistance for Cuba in the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2008 (P.L. 101-161); an estimated $45.33 million, however, will be provided because of an overall 0.81% rescission. The amount is more than four times the amount provided in FY2006 and more than five times the amount requested in FY2007. According to the State Department’s FY2008 Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ), the increase in assistance is in order to fulfill the recommendations of the July 2006 report of the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba to provide support for Cuban civil society, expand international awareness, break the regime’s information blockade, and continue support for a democratic transition. That report, as described above, recommended $80 million over two years for a variety of measures to hasten Cuba’s transition to

81 See USAID’s Cuba program website: [http://www.usaid.gov/locations/latin_america_caribbean/country/cuba/].
democracy, and not less than $20 million annually thereafter for Cuba democracy programs.

Both the House- and Senate-passed versions of the FY2008 State, Foreign Operations, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, H.R. 2764, fully funded the Administration’s request for $45.7 million in ESF for Cuba democracy programs. The House committee-reported version of the bill would have provided just $9 million in ESF for such programs, but during June 21, 2007, floor consideration, the House approved H.Amdt. 351 (Diaz-Balart) by a vote of 254-170 that increased funding for ESF by $36.7 million in order to fully fund the Administration’s request. The Senate Appropriations Committee report to the bill would have provided $15 million in ESF for Cuba democracy programs. However, during September 6, 2007, floor consideration, the Senate approved S.Amdt. 2694 (Martinez) by voice vote that increased funding for Cuba democracy programs by $30.7 million to fully fund the Administration’s request.

With such a large increase in funding for FY2008, some press reports maintain that the Administration is trying to diversify its grantees by shifting funds to larger Washington-based organizations (rather than South Florida organizations) or even European and Latin American nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).82

For FY2009, the Administration has requested $20 million in ESF to continue to implement program recommendations of the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba. The money would assist human rights activists, independent journalists, Afro-Cubans, and women, youth, and student activists.

Until FY2008, NED’s democratization assistance for Cuba had been funded largely through the annual Commerce, Justice, and State (CJS) appropriations measure, but is now funded through the State Department, Foreign Operations and Related Agencies appropriations measure. NED funding for Cuba has steadily increased over the past several years: $765,000 in FY2001; $841,000 in FY2002; $1.14 million in FY2003; and $1.15 million in FY2004. For FY2005, NED funded 17 Cuba projects with $2.4 million. For FY2006, NED funded 13 projects with almost $1.5 million, including $0.4 million from State Department ESF. For FY2007, NED funded 12 projects with almost $1.5 million, which included almost $1.4 million funded by the State Department.

**Criticisms of U.S. Democracy Assistance to Cuba.** In November 2006, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report examining U.S. democracy assistance for Cuba from 1996-2005, and concluded that the U.S. program had significant problems and needed better management and oversight. According to GAO, internal controls, for both the awarding of Cuba program grants and oversight of grantees, “do not provide adequate assurance that the funds are being used properly and that grantees are in compliance with applicable law and

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Investigative news reports on the program maintained that high shipping costs and lax oversight have diminished its effectiveness. Representative William Delahunt, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight, had requested the GAO study along with Representative Jeff Flake.

In March 2008, a White House aide to President Bush, Felipe Sixto, resigned because of alleged misuse of funds when he worked for the Center for a Free Cuba, which has been a major recipient of U.S. democracy funding. USAID’s Inspector General is reportedly investigating the matter, while the Justice Department is reportedly looking into whether to prosecute.

The Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) released a report in May 2008 maintaining that a majority of the assistance for Cuba has been spent in operating expenses by U.S.-based grantees, transition studies, and U.S.-based activities. Among the recommendations in its report, the CANF called for USAID grantees to spend a minimum of 75% of government funds in direct aid to Cuban civil society. It also called for the assistance program to provide direct cash aid to independent civil society groups, dissidents, and families of political prisoners.

Radio and TV Marti

U.S.-government sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba — Radio and TV Martí — began in 1985 and 1990 respectively. As spelled out in the Broadcasting Board of Governors FY2009 Budget Request, the objectives of Radio and TV Martí are (1) to support the right of the Cuban people to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers; (2) to be effective in furthering the open communication of information and ideas through use of radio and television broadcasting to Cuba; (3) to serve as a consistently reliable and authoritative source of accurate, objective, and comprehensive news; and (4) to provide news, commentary, and other information about events in Cuba and elsewhere to promote the cause of freedom in Cuba.

Until October 1999, U.S.-government funded international broadcasting programs had been a primary function of the United States Information Agency (USIA). When USIA was abolished and its functions were merged into the Department of State at the beginning of FY2000, the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) became an independent agency that included such entities as the Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Radio Free Asia, and the Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB), which manages Radio and TV Martí. OCB is headquartered in Miami, Florida. Legislation in the 104th Congress (P.L. 104-134) required the relocation of OCB from Washington D.C. to south Florida. The move began in 1996 and was completed in 1998.

Radio Martí broadcasts on short and medium wave (AM) channels for 24 hours six days per week, and for 18 hours one day per week utilizing transmission facilities in Marathon, Florida and Greenville, North Carolina, according to the BBG.

TV Martí broadcasts daily from its facilities in Cudjoe Key Florida, on the Hispasat satellite, and is available on the Internet 24 hours a day. It is also available on 176 cable stations throughout Latin America, according to the BBG. Until July 2005, TV Martí had also been broadcast via blimps from facilities in Cudjoe Key, Florida for four and one-half hours daily, but the aerostats were destroyed by Hurricane Dennis. From mid-2004 until 2006, TV Martí programming was transmitted for several hours once a week via an airborne platform known as Commando Solo operated by the Department of Defense utilizing a C-130 aircraft. In August 2006, OCB began to use a contracted private aircraft to transmit pre-recorded TV Martí broadcasts six days weekly, and by late October 2006 the OCB inaugurated an aircraft-broadcasting platform known as Aero Martí with the capability of transmitting live broadcasts. Aero Martí transmits broadcasts five hours daily from Monday to Saturday during the evening. According to OCB, since mid-FY2007, it has had two contracted private aircraft transmitting the broadcasts.

In December 2006, the OCB contracted with two private U.S. commercial stations to transmit Radio and TV Martí.88 It provided a six-month contract with Radio Mambí (710 AM) in Florida, at a cost of $182,500, to broadcast one hour of Radio Martí programming five days a week from midnight to 1:00 am. Radio Mambí is a popular station in south Florida, with a 50,000 watt capacity, that is well-known for its strong anti-Castro stance. A second six-month OCB contract with WPMF (Channel 38) in Miami, known as TV Azteca, at a cost of $195,000, provided for two 30-minute TV Martí newscasts at 6 pm and 11:30 pm weekdays, along with one-minute news updates hourly over a 12 hour period weekdays. OCB chose the station because it is offered on DirecTV and because it has only a small audience in Miami. In June 2007, the two contracts were extended for an additional six months with similar terms. The contract with Radio Mambí subsequently expired in early 2008, whereas TV Martí continues to be shown on Channel 38.

**Controversies.** Both Radio and TV Martí have at times been the focus of controversies, including questions about adherence to broadcast standards. There

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over the years, there have been various attempts over the years to cut funding for the programs, especially for TV Martí, which has not had much of an audience because of Cuban jamming efforts. In December 2006, press reports alleged significant problems in the OCB’s operations, with claims of cronyism, patronage, and bias in its coverage. In February 2007, the former director of TV Martí programming pled guilty in U.S. federal court to receiving more than $100,000 in kickbacks over a three-year period from a vendor receiving OCB contracts.

Over the years, there have been various government studies and audits of Radio and TV Martí, including investigations by the U.S. Government Accountability Office, by a 1994 congressionally established Advisory Panel on Radio and TV Martí, and by the State Department’s and BBG’s Office Inspector General offices in 1999, 2003, and 2007.

The most recent State Department/BBG Office of Inspector General (OIG) report, issued in June 2007, maintained that OCB has significantly improved its operations under its current director, Pedro Roig, with an organizational realignment that has streamlined operations and has helped improve the quality of broadcasts. According to the report, “IBB quality reviews show that radio and television broadcasts have markedly improved over the past two years in production quality and content,” although the report also called for greater emphasis on internal quality control to ensure that editorial standards are followed. The report lauded the introduction of new technology allowing OCB to broadcast television signals live into Cuba using airborne platforms, and maintained that there are indications that more Cubans are watching TV Martí broadcasts. It recommended that the BBG’s International Broadcasting Bureau should review and assess the leases with Radio Mambi and TV Azteca at the end of the lease period to determine whether they provide additional listeners and viewers and are worth the cost, or whether they could be replaced with lease options for other stations. Looking ahead, the report

maintained that OCB needs a “long-term strategic plan that anticipates the future needs of the Cuban audience, provides a template on how to compete with commercial broadcasters, and addresses what to do with OCB and its broadcasting facilities if and when uncensored broadcasting is allowed inside a democratic Cuba.”

One of the most controversial aspects of the OIG report, and one that has often been at the center of past congressional debate over TV Martí, is the extent to which TV Martí can be viewed in Cuba. The report maintains that there is anecdotal evidence that the Aero Martí airborne transmissions have increased viewership. The report refers to a January 2007 survey of Cuban arrivals — commissioned by Spanish Radio Productions with the cooperation of Miami Dade College — that found listening rates for Radio and TV Martí within Cuba were significantly higher than previously reported, especially for TV Martí. Although specific survey figures are not cited in the OIG report, OCB officials maintain that the survey shows that 17% of recent Cuban arrivals had watched TV Martí. The OIG report also points to a February 2007 survey by the U.S. Interests Section (USINT) in Havana that reflected increased viewership. According to the BBG, that survey was completed by 500 Cuban visitors to the USINT (where TV Martí can be viewed) in January and February 2007, with 10% of the visitors indicating that they could watch TV Martí via UHF for brief periods.

Other observers contend that TV Martí can hardly be viewed in Cuba because of the government’s jamming efforts. John Nichols, a Pennsylvania State University communications professor, visited Cuba in late June 2007 on a factfinding mission sponsored by the Center for International Policy (a group that opposes U.S. policy toward Cuba), and concluded “that the signal from the plane is essentially unusable” and that there was “no evidence of significant viewership of TV Martí.” In interviews with the Associated Press, more than two dozen Cuban immigrants to Florida contended that while Radio Martí can be heard throughout Cuba, TV Martí can rarely be seen. Prior BBG commissioned phone surveys in Cuba from 2003, 2005, and November 2006 estimated past week TV Martí viewership between 0.1% and 0.3% of those surveyed and past month viewership of almost 0.5%. The November 2006 survey, reportedly designed to show the early effects of the Aero Martí transmissions that began in late October, showed no statistically significant change from the 2003 and 2005 surveys. In the same surveys, Radio Martí had listenership of between 1% to 2% in the past week and 4% to 5% in the past month.

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92 The State Department originally issued a two-page summary of the report on its website on June 5, 2007, and pointed out that the full report received only “limited official distribution.” On July 31, 2007, the State Department issued the entire 43-page report on its website, with certain sections redacted. That version is available at [http://oig.state.gov/libr/].


**Funding.** From FY1984 through FY2007, about $564 million has been spent for broadcasting to Cuba, with $28.6 million in FY2005, $37.5 million in FY2006, and $33.9 million in FY2007, and an estimated $33.4 million in FY2008. For FY2009, the Bush Administration has requested $34.4 million for broadcasting to Cuba. Until FY2005, the Administration provided funding information for Cuba broadcasting with a breakdown of the amounts spent for Radio versus TV Martí. Since FY2005, however, the Broadcasting Board of Governors has not made such a distinction in its annual budget request.

**FY2007 Funding.** The Administration requested $36.279 million for Cuba broadcasting in FY2007, with $2.7 million of this to purchase an aerostat for broadcasting TV Martí. The request was slightly below the $37.129 million appropriated in FY2006 (when Congress funded the Administration’s request to acquire and outfit an aircraft for dedicated airborne radio and television broadcasts to Cuba), but almost $9 million above the $27.6 million appropriated in FY2005. On June 29, 2006, the House passed H.R. 5672, the FY2007 Science, State, Justice, Commerce and Related Agencies appropriations bill, that would fund Cuba broadcasting under the International Broadcasting Operations account. The report to the bill (H.Rept. 109-520) recommended $36.102 million for Cuba broadcasting, including $2.7 million to improve transmission capabilities via aerostat for broadcasting TV Martí. The Senate version of H.R. 5522, the FY2007 Foreign Operations appropriations bill, would fund Cuba broadcasting. The Senate report to the bill (S.Rept. 109-277) recommended full funding of the Administration’s request of $36.279 million. Final action was not completed on either bill before the end of the 109th Congress, but ultimately was funded by a series of continuing resolutions completed in the 110th Congress that provided $33.9 million for Cuba broadcasting for FY2007.

**FY2008 Funding.** For FY2008, the Administration requested $38.7 million for Cuba broadcasting, including $3.2 million to enhance programming to Cuba in support of the recommendations of the July 2006 report of the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba. According to the BBG’s FY2008 budget request, of the $3.2 million to enhance programming to Cuba, $1.2 million would be to improve programming and Radio and TV Martí program production in OCB’s Miami facility by adding a second television studio, virtual sets, and additional portable production capability. The remaining $2 million would be spent to continue and expand transmission leases begun in FY2007 for DirecTV and medium wave radio frequencies.

Congress provided $33.681 million for Radio and TV Martí in the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-161), while a 0.81% rescission brought the enacted amount to $33.408 million. This was about $5 million less than the Administration’s request and similar to the amount provided for FY2007. Both the House and Senate committee reports to the FY2008 State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Program Appropriations bill had recommended $33.681 million. S.Amdt. 2695 (Martinez), which was withdrawn from consideration on September 6, 2007, would have increased funding by $5.019 to fully fund the Administration’s request.
**FY2009 Request.** For FY2009, the Administration has requested $34.392 million for broadcasting to Cuba, slightly more than provided by Congress in FY2008. The request amount includes funding for the airborne platform that the Office of Cuba Broadcasting uses to broadcast Radio and TV Marti.

**Migration Issues**

**1994 and 1995 Migration Accords.** Cuba and the United States reached two migration accords in 1994 and 1995 designed to stem the mass exodus of Cubans attempting to reach the United States by boat. On the minds of U.S. policymakers was the 1980 Mariel boatlift in which 125,000 Cubans fled to the United States with the approval of Cuban officials. In response to Castro’s threat to unleash another Mariel, U.S. officials reiterated U.S. resolve not to allow another exodus. Amid escalating numbers of fleeing Cubans, on August 19, 1994, President Clinton abruptly changed U.S. migration policy, under which Cubans attempting to flee their homeland were allowed into the United States, and announced that the U.S. Coast Guard and Navy would take Cubans rescued at sea to the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Despite the change in policy, Cubans continued fleeing in large numbers.

As a result, in early September 1994, Cuba and the United States began talks that culminated in a September 9, 1994 bilateral agreement to stem the flow of Cubans fleeing to the United States by boat. In the agreement, the United States and Cuba agreed to facilitate safe, legal, and orderly Cuban migration to the United States, consistent with a 1984 migration agreement. The United States agreed to ensure that total legal Cuban migration to the United States would be a minimum of 20,000 each year, not including immediate relatives of U.S. citizens. In a change of policy, the United States agreed to discontinue the practice of granting parole to all Cuban migrants who reach the United States, while Cuba agreed to take measures to prevent unsafe departures from Cuba.

In May 1995, the United States reached another accord with Cuba under which the United States would parole the more than 30,000 Cubans housed at Guantanamo into the United States, but would intercept future Cuban migrants attempting to enter the United States by sea and would return them to Cuba. The two countries would cooperate jointly in the effort. Both countries also pledged to ensure that no action would be taken against those migrants returned to Cuba as a consequence of their attempt to immigrate illegally. On January 31, 1996, the Department of Defense announced that the last of some 32,000 Cubans intercepted at sea and housed at Guantanamo had left the U.S. Naval Station, most having been paroled into the United States.

**Coast Guard Interdictions.** Since the 1995 migration accord, the U.S. Coast Guard has interdicted thousands of Cubans at sea and returned them to their country, while those deemed at risk for persecution have been transferred to Guantanamo and then found asylum in a third country or eventually the United States. Those Cubans who reach shore are allowed to apply for permanent resident status in one year, pursuant to the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 (P.L. 89-732). This so-called “wet foot/dry foot” policy has been criticized by some as encouraging Cubans to risk their lives in order to make it to the United States and as encouraging
alien smuggling. Others maintain that U.S. policy should welcome those migrants fleeing communist Cuba whether or not they are able to make it to land.

The number of Cubans interdicted at sea by the U.S. Coast Guard has risen in recent years, from 931 in 2002 to 2,952 in 2005, almost twice the number interdicted in 2004. In 2006, Cuban interdictions drooped to 2,293, but 2007 saw a large increase with 3,197 Cubans interdicted for the year. As of late June 2008, over 1,000 Cuban migrants were interdicted at sea. In recent years, increasing numbers of Cuban migrants attempting to reach the United States have been intercepted in Mexico, with some 1,359 intercepted in 2007 and some 1,000 in the first four months of 2008. Cuba and Mexico are reportedly negotiating a migration agreement to curb the irregular flow of migrants through Mexico.

U.S. prosecution against migrant smugglers in Florida has increased in recent years with numerous convictions. There have been several violent incidents in which Cuban migrants have brandished weapons or in which Coast Guard officials have used force to prevent Cubans from reaching shore. In late December 2007, a Coast Guard official in Florida called on the local Cuban American community to denounce the smuggling and stop financing the trips that are leading to more deaths at sea. The Cuban government also has taken forceful action against individuals engaging in alien smuggling. Prison sentences of up to three years may be imposed against those engaging in alien smuggling.

In the aftermath of Fidel Castro’s July 2006 announcement that he was temporarily ceding political power to his brother, Department of Homeland Security officials announced several measures to discourage Cubans from risking their lives on the open seas. On August 11, 2006, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Deputy Secretary Michael P. Jackson urged “the Cuban people to stay on the island” and discouraged “anyone from risking their life in the open seas in order to travel to the United States.” At the same time, DHS announced additional measures to discourage Cubans from turning to alien smuggling as a way to enter the United States. The measures support family reunification by increasing the numbers of Cuban migrants admitted to the United States each year who have family members in the United States, although the overall number of Cubans admitted to the United States annually will remain at about 21,000. Cubans who attempt to enter the United States illegally will be deemed ineligible to enter under this new family reunification procedure. In another change of policy, Cuban medical personnel currently conscripted by the Cuban government to work in third countries are now allowed

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96 U.S. Coast Guard, Alien Migrant Interdiction, Coast Guard Office of Law Enforcement, “Total Interdictions, Calendar Year 1982 to Present,” June 20, 2008.


to enter the United States; their families in Cuba are also allowed to enter the United States.\(^99\)

In March 2007, some 50 federal, state, and local agencies conducted a two-day mass migration response exercise in Florida, dubbed Operation Vigilant Sentry, that was designed to prepare for potential mass migration from Cuba in the event of the collapse of the communist government. Coordinated by the Coast Guard, the exercise was designed to improve migrant-interdiction skills as well as skills to intercept vessels heading to Cuba.

**U.S. Travel Documents.** On July 17, 2007, Cuba’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement maintaining that the United States had only awarded 10,724 visas for permanent legal migration to the United States so far in FY2007 as of the end of June 2007, out of an annual minimum of 20,000 agreed to in the 1994 bilateral migration accord. The State Department subsequently responded that the United States was not going to meet its minimum quota because Cuba has impaired the ability of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana to operate in several ways. It maintained that Cuba has refused to allow the U.S. Interests Section to hire local staff to replace those who have resigned or retired; for over a year, has held at least 28 shipping containers with essential supplies and materials for the operation of the diplomatic facility; and has refused to issue temporary visas for U.S. technical personnel to visit Havana to maintain systems in the diplomatic facility.\(^100\) In early October 2007, an official at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana said that the United States had issued only about 15,000 of the 20,000 emigrant visas and blamed Cuba because of the inability to hire local personnel.\(^101\)

On November 21, 2007, the Department of Homeland Security announced that it was creating a new Cuban Family Reunification Parole (CFRP) Program that offers beneficiaries of approved family-based immigration visa petitions an opportunity to come to the United States rather than remain in Cuba to apply for a green card. According to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), the purpose of the program is to expedite family reunification through safe, legal, and orderly channel of migration to the United States and to discourage dangerous and irregular maritime migration.\(^102\) Those granted parole into the United States will count towards the annual 20,000 figure set forth in the 1994 migration accord.

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\(^101\) Anita Snow, “U.S. Says it Granted 15,000 of 20,000 Visa Quota for Cubans Last Fiscal Year,” Associated Press, October 1, 2007.

Migration Talks. Semi-annual U.S.-Cuban talks alternating between Cuba and the United States had been held regularly on the implementation of the 1994 and 1995 migration accords, but the State Department cancelled the 20th round of talks scheduled for January 2004, and no migration talks have been held since. According to the State Department, Cuba has refused to discuss five issues identified by the United States: (1) Cuba’s issuance of exit permits for all qualified migrants; (2) Cuba’s cooperation in holding a new registration for an immigrant lottery; (3) the need for a deeper Cuban port used by the U.S. Coast Guard for the repatriation of Cubans interdicted at sea; (4) Cuba’s responsibility to permit U.S. diplomats to travel to monitor returned migrants; and (5) Cuba’s obligation to accept the return of Cuban nationals determined to be inadmissible to the United States.103 In response to the cancellation of the talks, Cuban officials maintained that the U.S. decision was irresponsible and that Cuba was prepared to discuss all of the issues raised by the United States.104

Guantanamo Naval Base

The 45-square mile U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, has been a U.S. base since 1903, and under a 1934 treaty that remains in force, the U.S. presence can only be terminated by mutual agreement or by abandonment by the United States. When Fidel Castro assumed power in the 1959 Cuban revolution, the new government gave assurances that it would respect all its treaty commitments, including the 1934 treaty covering the Guantanamo base. Subsequently, however, as U.S.-Cuban relations deteriorated, the Cuban government opposed the presence as illegal.

The mission of the base has changed over time. During the Cold War, the base was viewed as a good location for controlling Caribbean sea lanes, as a deterrent to the Soviet presence in the Caribbean, and as a location for supporting potential military operations in the region. In 1994-1995, the base was used to house thousands of Cubans and Haitians fleeing their homeland, but by 1996 the last of the refugees had departed, with most Cubans paroled into the United States, pursuant to a May 1995 U.S.-Cuban migration accord. Since the 1995 accord, the U.S. Coast Guard has interdicted thousands of Cubans at sea and returned them to Cuba, while a much smaller number, those deemed at risk for persecution, have been taken to Guantanamo and then granted asylum in a third country.

Another mission for the Guantanamo base emerged with the U.S.-led global campaign against terrorism in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States. With the U.S. war in Afghanistan in 2001, the United States decided to send some captured Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters to be imprisoned in Guantanamo. Although the Cuban government has objected to the U.S. presence at Guantanamo, it did not initially oppose the new mission of housing detainees. Defense Minister Raúl Castro noted that, in the unlikely event that a prisoner would escape into Cuban territory, Cuba would capture the prisoner and return him to the

The Cuban government, however, has expressed concerns about the treatment of prisoners at the U.S. base and has said it will keep pressing the international community to investigate the treatment of terrorist suspects. In January 2005, it denounced what it described as “atrocities” committed at the Guantanamo base.

Some Members of Congress have called for the closure of the Guantanamo detention facility. S. 1249 (Feinstein) and H.R. 2212 (Harman) would require the President to close the detention facility at Guantanamo within one year, while S. 1469 (Harkin) would require the closure of the facility within 120 days. The final version of H.R. 1585, the FY2008 defense authorization bill, H.R. 1585, had a provision (Section 1067) requiring the Secretary of Defense to prepare a report within 60 days on transferring individuals detained at Guantanamo. (An earlier version of that provision was first added to the bill by H.Amdt. 297 (Moran, Virginia), approved during May 17, 2007 House floor consideration.) The President ultimately vetoed H.R. 1585 on December 28, 2007 for other policy reasons, but the new version of the FY2008 defense authorization bill, H.R. 4986, approved by both houses in January 2008 and signed into law on January 28, 2008 (P.L. 110-181) contains the identical provision on Guantanamo in Section 1067.

With regard to the future of the Guantanamo base, a provision in the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-114, Section 210) states that once a democratically elected Cuban government is in place, U.S. policy is to be prepared to enter into negotiations either to return the base to Cuba or to renegotiate the present agreement under mutually agreeable terms.

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Legislation in the 110th Congress

Approved Measures

**P.L. 110-161 (H.R. 2764).** FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act. H.R. 2764 was originally introduced and reported by the House Committee on Appropriations (H.Rept. 110-197) on June 18, 2007 as the FY2008 State, Foreign Operations, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act. The House passed (241-178) the measure on June 22, 2007. The Senate Appropriations Committee reported the bill on July 10, 2007 (S.Rept. 110-128), and the Senate passed (81-12) it on September 6, 2007. On December 17, 2007, H.R. 2764 subsequently became the vehicle for the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, which included 11 FY2008 appropriations measures. The President signed the measure into law on December 26, 2007.

As signed into law, Division J of the Consolidated Appropriations Act covers State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Agencies appropriations. The law has the following Cuba provisions:

- Similar to previous years, Section 607 of Division J would prohibit direct funding for Cuba. This provision had been included in both the House and Senate versions of the bill.

- Section 620 of Division J adds Cuba to the list of countries requiring a special notification to the Appropriations Committees for funds obligated or expended under the act. This provision had been included in the Senate version of the bill.

- Section 691(b) of Division J provides that Cubans who supported an anti-Castro guerrilla group in the 1960s know as the Alzados are eligible for U.S. refugee status. The Senate version of the bill had included this provision.

- As set forth in the joint explanatory statement, the measure provides $45.7 million in ESF for Cuba democracy programs as requested by the Administration. Both the House- and Senate-passed versions of H.R. 2764 fully funded the Administration’s request for $45.7 million in ESF for Cuba democracy programs. The House committee-reported bill would have provided $9 million in ESF for such programs, but during June 21, 2007, floor consideration, however, the House approved H.Amdt. 351 (Diaz-Balart) by a vote of 254-170 that increased ESF by $36.7 million in order to fully fund the Administration’s request. The Senate Appropriations Committee report to the bill would have provided $15 million in ESF for Cuba democracy programs, but during September 6, 2007, floor consideration, the Senate approved S.Amdt. 2694 (Martinez) by voice vote that increased funding for Cuba democracy programs by $30.7 million to fully fund the Administration’s request.
As set forth in the joint explanatory statement, the measure provides $33.681 million for Radio and TV Marti broadcasting to Cuba, $5.019 million below the Administration’s request of $38.7 million and identical to the amount provided for FY2007. Both the House and Senate committee reports to the bill had recommended $33.681 million for Cuba broadcasting. S.Amdt. 2695 (Martinez), which was withdrawn from consideration on September 6, 2007, would have increased funding by $5.019 to fully fund the Administration’s request.

The measure does not include contrasting provisions related to counternarcotics assistance for Cuba that were included in the House and Senate versions of the bill. Section 673 of the House bill would have specifically prohibited International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) assistance to the Cuban government. Section 696 of the Senate bill would have provided $1 million in INCLE assistance for preliminary work by the Department of State, or such other entity as the Secretary of State may designate, to establish cooperation with the Cuban government on counternarcotics matters.

The final enacted measure does not include provisions easing Cuba sanctions that had been included in the House and Senate-committee versions of the FY2008 Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act or the Senate-committee reported version of the FY2008 Agriculture Appropriations bill.

**P.L. 110-96 (S. 1612).** International Emergency Economic Powers Enhancement Act. Introduced and reported by the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on June 13, 2007 (S.Rept. 110-82). Senate approved, amended, by unanimous consent on June 26, 2007. House approved by voice vote October 2, 2007. As approved, the bill amends the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to increase the potential civil penalty imposed on any person who commits an unlawful act under the act to not exceed the greater of $250,000 (from $50,000) or an amount that is twice the amount of the transaction. The bill also increases a criminal penalty to not more than $1 million and/or 20 years imprisonment.

**S.Res. 573 (Martinez).** Celebrates Cuba Solidarity Day, recognizes the injustices face by the Cuban people, and stands in solidarity with the Cuban peoples as they continue to work towards democratic changes in their homeland. Introduced and passed by the Senate on May 21, 2008, by unanimous consent.

**Additional Legislative Initiatives**

**H.Res. 995 (Diaz-Balart, Mario).** Commemorates the 12th anniversary of the 1996 shooting down of two unarmed U.S. civilian aircraft by the Cuban regimes. Introduced February 25, 2008; referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

**H.R. 177 (Lee).** Pursuit of International Education (PIE) Act of 2007. Prohibits the use of funds available to the Department of the Treasury to implement regulations
from June 2004 that tightened restrictions on travel to Cuba for educational activities. Introduced January 4, 2007; referred to Committee on Foreign Affairs.

**H.R. 216 (Serrano).** Baseball Diplomacy Act. Waives certain prohibitions with respect to nationals of Cuba coming to the United States to play organized baseball. Introduced January 4, 2007; referred to Committees on Foreign Affairs and Judiciary.

**H.R. 217 (Serrano).** Cuba Reconciliation Act. Lifts the trade embargo. Removes provisions restricting trade and other relations with Cuba, including repeal of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, and provisions of Section 211 of the Department of Commerce and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999 related to transactions or payments with respect to trademarks. Introduced January 4, 2007; referred to the Committees on Foreign Affairs, Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce, Judiciary, Financial Services, Oversight and Government Reform, and Agriculture.

**H.R. 275 (Smith, Christopher).** Would promote freedom of expression on the Internet, and protect U.S. businesses from coercion to participate in repression by authoritarian foreign governments. Introduced January 5, 2007, and referred to Committees on Foreign Affairs and on Energy and Commerce. Reported by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs December 10, 2007 (H.Rept. 110-481, Part 1).

**H.R. 525 (King).** Amends the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 to require that, in order to determine that a democratically elected government in Cuba exists, the government extradite to the United States convicted felon William Morales and all other individuals who are living in Cuba in order to escape prosecution or confinement for criminal offense committed in the United States. Introduced January 17, 2007; referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.


**H.R. 757 (Delahunt).** Cuban-American Family Restoration Act. Would lift restrictions on family travel and the provision or remittances for family members in Cuba. Introduced January 31, 2007; referred to House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

**H.R. 1026 (Moran, Jerry).** Agricultural Export Facilitation Act of 2007. Would facilitate the sale of U.S. agricultural products to Cuba by providing for general license authority for travel-related expenditures for persons engaging in sales and marketing activities for agricultural products or in the transportation by sea or air of such products; authorizing a consular officer to issue a temporary visa for a Cuban
national conducting activities related to the purchase of U.S. agricultural goods, including phytosanitary inspections; clarifying the “payment of cash in advance” term used in the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA) to mean that the payment by the purchaser and the receipt of such payment to the seller occurs prior to the transfer of title of the commodity or product to the purchaser and the release of control of such commodity or product to the purchaser; and prohibiting the President from restricting direct transfers from a Cuban financial institution to a U.S. financial institution for U.S. agricultural sales under TSRA. Introduced February 13, 2007; referred to House Committees on Foreign Affairs, Judiciary, Financial Services, and Agriculture.

**H.R. 1306 (Wexler)/S. 749 (Nelson).** Identical bills would modify the prohibition on recognition by U.S. courts of certain rights relating to certain marks, trade names, or commercial names. H.R. 1306 introduced March 1, 2007; referred to House Committee on the Judiciary. S. 749 introduced March 2, 2007; referred to Senate Committee on the Judiciary.

**H.R. 1679 (Ros-Lehtinen).** Caribbean Coral Reef Protection Act. Would exclude from admission to the United States aliens who have made investments contributing to the enhancement of the ability of Cuba to develop its petroleum resources off its coast; require the President to impose economic sanctions on persons (including foreign subsidiaries) that are determined to have made an investment equal to or exceeding $1 million that contributes to the enhancement of Cuba’s ability to develop petroleum resources of the submerged lands off Cuba’s coast. Introduced March 26, 2007; referred to House Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition to the Committees on Foreign Affairs, Financial Services, and Oversight and Government Reform. Similar, but not identical, to S. 876 described below.


In the Senate, S.Amdt. 3660 (Baucus), which would have eased restrictions on U.S. agricultural sales to Cuba, was proposed on December 11, 2007, but subsequently withdrawn the same day. Several amendments regarding Cuba were submitted, but never proposed: S.Amdt. 3668 (Baucus), would have eased restrictions on U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba; S.Amdt. 3796 (Nelson, Bill), would have required a certification of certain human rights conditions in Cuba before restrictions on U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba would be eased; S.Amdt. 3792 (Martinez), would have expressed the sense of the Senate regarding the human rights situation in Cuba; and S.Amdt. 3793 (Martinez), would have prevented the easing of restrictions on U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba as long as the country is identified by the Secretary of State as a “state sponsor of terror.”
H.R. 2819 (Rangel)/S. 1673 (Baucus). Promoting American Agricultural and Medical Exports to Cuba Act of 2007. H.R. 2819 introduced June 21, 2007; referred to the Committees on Foreign Affairs, Ways and Means, Judiciary, Agriculture, and Financial Services. S. 1673 introduced June 21, 2007; referred to the Committee on Finance, which held hearings on December 11, 2007. Among other provisions, the bills would clarify the meaning of “payment of cash in advance;” authorize direct transfers between Cuban and U.S. financial institutions for the execution of payments for sales pursuant to the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act; establish an agricultural export promotion program with respect to Cuba; repeal the so-called Section 211 Cuba trademark sanction; lift restrictions on travel to Cuba; repeal an onsite verification requirement for the commercial sale of medicines and medical devices to Cuba; and increase the airport ticket tax for travel to or from Cuba by $1.00, with funds going to a newly established Agricultural Export Promotion Trust Fund.

H.R. 2829 (Serrano). FY2008 Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act. Introduced and reported by House Appropriations Committee (H.Rept. 110-207) June 22, 2007. Reported by Senate Appropriations Committee July 13, 2007 (S.Rept. 110-129). House passed (240-179) June 28, 2007. As approved by the House, Section 903 would have prevented Treasury Department funds from being used to implement a February 2005 regulation that requires the payment of cash in advance prior to the shipment of U.S. agricultural goods to Cuba. The House adopted the provision during June 28, 2007 floor consideration when it approved H.Amdt. 467 (Moran, Kansas) by voice vote. The Senate Appropriations Committee version had a similar provision in Section 619, as well as another provision in Section 620 that would have allowed for travel to Cuba under a general license for the marketing and sale of agricultural and medical goods. The Cuba provisions of both the House and Senate versions of the bill were not included in the final enacted version of the measure, which was included as Division D of the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-161, H.R. 2764).

H.R. 3161 (DeLauro)/S. 1859 (Kohl). FY2008 Agricultural, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act. H.R. 3161 introduced and reported by House Appropriations Committee July 24, 2007; House passed August 2, 2007. S. 1859 introduced and reported by Senate Appropriations Committee July 24, 2007 (S.Rept. 110-134). Section 741 of the Senate bill would authorize travel to Cuba under a general license for the marketing and sale of agricultural and medical goods to Cuba. The Cuba provision in the Senate version was not included in the final enacted version of the measure, which was included as Division A of the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-161, H.R. 2764).


H.R. 5627 (Diaz-Balart, Lincoln)/S. 2777 (Martinez). Similar bills to award the congressional gold medal to Dr. Oscar Elias Biscet, in recognition of his courageous and unwavering commitment to democracy and human rights in Cuba.
Both bills were introduced March 13, 2008, with H.R. 5627 referred to the House Committee on Financial Services and S. 2777 referred to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.

**S. 554 (Dorgan).** Act For Our Kids. Title I, Section 101 would terminate U.S. government-sponsored television broadcasting to Cuba and prohibit funding. Title II, Section 254, the Freedom to Travel to Cuba Act of 2007, would prohibit the President from regulating or prohibiting travel to or from Cuba by U.S. citizens or legal residents, or any of the transactions ordinarily incident to such travel. Introduced February 12, 2007; referred to Senate Committee on Finance.

**S. 721 (Enzi).** Freedom to Travel to Cuba Act of 2007. Would prohibit the President from regulating or prohibiting travel to or from Cuba by U.S. citizens or legal residents, or any of the transactions ordinarily incident to such travel. Introduced March 1, 2007; referred to Committee on Foreign Relations.

**S. 876 (Martinez).** Would exclude from admission to the United States aliens who have made investments contributing to the enhancement of the ability of Cuba to develop its petroleum resources off its coast; require the President to impose economic sanctions on persons (including foreign subsidiaries) that are determined to have made an investment equal to or exceeding $1 million that contributes to the enhancement of Cuba’s ability to develop petroleum resources of the submerged lands off Cuba’s coast. Introduced March 14, 2007; referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. Similar, but not identical, to H.R. 1679 described above.

**S. 1268 (Dorgan).** Would provide for the development of certain outer Continental resources. Amends the Cuba embargo regulations to provide for general license authority for travel-related expenditures by persons engaging in hydrocarbon exploration and extraction activities. Introduced May 2, 2007; referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.

**S. 1806 (Leahy).** Would repeal the so-called Section 211 Cuba trademark sanction provision of the FY1999 Department of Commerce and Related Agencies Appropriations Act. Introduced July 17, 2007; referred to Senate Committee on the Judiciary.

**S. 2503 (Nelson, Bill).** Would nullify the 1977 Maritime Boundary Agreement between the United States and Cuba, and would exclude from admission to the United States any aliens who have directly and significantly contributed to the ability of Cuba to develop its petroleum resources. Introduced December 18, 2007; referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.
Legislation in the 109th Congress

The following listing consists of enacted appropriations measures with Cuba-related provisions, FY2007 appropriations bills with Cuba provisions that were not completed by the end of the 109th Congress, and human rights resolutions that were approved. For a complete listing of legislative initiatives in the 109th Congress, see CRS Report RL32730, Cuba: Issues for the 109th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan.

Appropriations Measures


H.R. 5384 (Bonilla). FY2007 Agriculture Appropriations bill. Introduced and reported by House Appropriations Committee May 12, 2006; passed House May 23, 2006. Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version June 22, 2006 (S.Rept. 109-266). The Senate version contained a provision, Section 755, providing for travel to Cuba under a general license for travel related to the sale of agricultural and medical goods to Cuba. Currently such travel is provided under a specific license issued by the Treasury Department on a case-by-case basis. Final action was not completed by the end of the 109th Congress.

H.R. 5522 (Kolbe). FY2007 Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs. Introduced June 5, 2006, and reported by the House Appropriations Committee (H.Rept. 109-486); House passed (373-34) June 9, 2006. The Senate Appropriations reported its version of the bill July 10, 2006 (S.Rept. 109-277). With regard to Cuba democracy programs, the Senate-reported version recommended $2.5 million in ESF, $6.5 million less than the request, while the House report to the bill recognized the work of USAID in promoting democracy and humanitarian assistance for Cuba and urged the agency to continue to promote its Cuba program. With regard to counternarcotics cooperation with Cuba, the House-passed bill, in Section 570,
would have provided that no International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds may be made available for Cuba, while the Senate-reported version, in Section 551(e), would have provided $5 million in INCLE funds for preliminary work to establish cooperation with Cuba. The money would not be available if the President certified that Cuba did not have in place appropriate procedures to protect against the loss of innocent life in the air and on the ground in connection with the interdiction of illegal drugs and there was evidence of involvement of the Cuban government in drug trafficking. The Senate-reported version also would have funded Cuba broadcasting, with the Senate report to the bill recommending full funding of the Administration’s $36.279 million request. The House would have funded Cuba broadcasting in H.R. 5672, the FY2007 Science, State, Justice, Commerce and Related Agencies appropriations bill, described below. Final action was not completed before the end of the 109th Congress.

H.R. 5576 (Knollenberg). FY2007 Transportation, Treasury, Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary, the District of Columbia, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act. Introduced June 9, 2006; reported by House Appropriations Committee (H.Rept. 109-495). House passed (406-22) June 14, 2006. Reported by Senate Appropriations Committee (S.Rept. 109-293) July 26, 2006. Both the House and Senate versions of the bill include a provision (Section 950 in the House version and Section 846 in the Senate version) that prohibits funds from being used to implement tightened restrictions on financing for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba that were issued in February 2005. In the House bill, the provision was added by H.Amdt. 1049 (Moran, Kansas), approved by voice vote during floor consideration on June 14, 2006. Final action on the measure was not completed by the end of the 109th Congress.

H.R. 5672 (Wolf). FY2007 Science, State, Justice, Commerce and Related Agencies appropriations. Introduced June 22, 2006; reported by House Appropriations Committee (H.Rept. 109-520). House passed June 29, 2006. As approved, Cuba broadcasting is to be funded under the International Broadcasting Operations account. The report to the bill recommends $36.102 million for Cuba broadcasting, including $2.7 million to improve transmission capabilities via aerostat for broadcasting TV Martí. Final action on the measure was not completed before the end of the 109th Congress.

Human Rights Resolutions


H.Res. 388 (Diaz-Balart, Lincoln). Expresses the sense of the House of Representatives regarding the Cuban government’s extreme repression against members of Cuba’s pro-democracy movement in July 2005; condemns gross human rights violations committed by the Cuban regime; calls on the Secretary of State to initiate an international solidarity campaign on behalf of the immediate release of all Cuban political prisoners; calls on the European Union to reexamine its current policy toward the Cuban regime; and calls on the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations and other international organizations to work with member countries of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) to ensure a strong resolution on Cuba at the 62nd session of the UNCHR. Introduced July 26, 2005. House passed (393-31) September 29, 2005.

S.Res. 140 (Martinez). Expresses support of the Senate for the May 20, 2005 meeting in Havana of the Assembly to Promote Civil Society. Introduced May 12, 2005; Senate approved by unanimous consent May 17, 2005.


For Additional Reading


CRS Report RL33551, Transportation, the Treasury, Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary, the District of Columbia, the Executive Office of the President and Independent Agencies (TTHUD): FY2007 Appropriations, coordinated by David Randall Peterman and John Frittelli.

CRS Report RL32905, Transportation, the Treasury, Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary, the District of Columbia, the Executive Office of the President and Independent Agencies: FY2006 Appropriations, coordinated by David Randall Peterman and John Frittelli.

CRS Report RS20450, The Case of Elian Gonzalez: Legal Basics, by Larry M. Eig.

CRS Report RL33622, Cuba’s Future Political Scenarios and U.S. Policy Approaches, by Mark P. Sullivan.

CRS Report RS22742, Cuba’s Political Succession: From Fidel to Raúl Castro, by Mark P. Sullivan.

CRS Report RL32251, Cuba and the State Sponsors of Terrorism List, by Mark P. Sullivan.

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CRS Report RS20468, *Cuban Migration Policy and Issues*, by Ruth Ellen Wasem.


CRS Report RL31258, *Suits Against Terrorist States by Victims of Terrorism*, by David M. Ackerman.