Burma’s Political Prisoners and U.S. Sanctions

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Summary

The installation of a new quasi-civilian government in 2011 and the undertaking of a number of political reforms have raised the prospects for the resumption of a fully democratically elected civilian government in Burma after five decades of military rule. The release of Burma’s political prisoners has a central role in U.S. policy and Burma’s political future. Many of the U.S. sanctions on Burma were implemented after Burma’s ruling military junta suppressed protests and detained many political prisoners. In addition, the removal of many of the existing U.S. sanctions requires the release of all political prisoners in Burma.

Similarly, hopes for a democratic government in Burma—as well as national reconciliation—would depend on the release of prisoners associated with the country’s ethnic groups. Several ethnic-based political parties have stated they will not participate in parliamentary elections until their members are released from custody. Also, prospects for stable ceasefires and lasting peace with various ethnic-based militias may require the release of their members currently in detention.

Estimates of how many political prisoners are being detained in Burma vary. According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma), or AAPP(B), a non-profit organization dedicated to identifying and locating political prisoners in Burma, the Burmese government may be holding over 180 political prisoners in its 42 prisons and 109 labor camps scattered across the country. Other estimates range from 360 to 630 political prisoners.

Differences in the estimates of the number of political prisoners in Burma can be attributed to two main factors. First, Burma’s prison and judicial system is not transparent, making it difficult to obtain accurate information. Second, there is no consensus on the definition of a “political prisoner.” Some limit the definition of “political prisoner” to “prisoners of conscience” (people who are detained for peaceful political opposition). The AAPP(B) includes “anyone who is arrested because of his or her perceived or real involvement in or supporting role in opposition movements with peaceful or resistance means.”

Since his appointment in April 2011, President Thein Sein has granted amnesty to selected prisoners on nine separate occasions, the latest occurring on April 23, 2013. In total, the Union Government has released 29,449 prisoners, of whom 859 were political prisoners, according to the AAPP(B). In addition, President Thein Sein announced the formation of a Committee on Political Prisoners on February 6, 2013, to examine the cases of the alleged political prisoners in detention and to recommend ways of resolving the issue.

The State Department is actively discussing the political prisoner issue—including the definition of political prisoners—with the Burmese government, opposition political parties, and representatives of some ethnic groups. In these discussions, U.S. officials emphasize the importance of the release of all political prisoners for the further easing or removal of U.S. sanctions on Burma.

The status of Burma’s political prisoners is likely to figure prominently in any congressional consideration of U.S. policy in Burma. Congress may choose to examine the political prisoner issue in Burma either separately or as part of a broader review of U.S. policy towards Burma. Congress may also consider taking up legislation—on its own or in response to a request from the Obama Administration—to amend, modify, or remove some of the existing sanctions on Burma.

This report will be updated as circumstances require.
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Introduction

On March 30, 2011, Burma’s ruling military junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), formally transferred power to a quasi-civilian parliament, ending 50 years of military rule. The new Burmese government, headed by President Thein Sein, soon embarked on a series of political reforms ostensibly designed to continue the nation’s transformation to an elected democracy under the rule of law. These changes have led the Obama Administration to waive many of the sanctions on Burma, and initiated discussion in Congress regarding if and when to consider the possible removal of sanctions currently being imposed on Burma.

No single issue may play a more pivotal role in Burma’s possible transition to a free and democratic country than the release of its political prisoners. Several opposition parties have stated that they will not participate in parliamentary elections or hold discussions on national reconciliation until their members are unconditionally freed from detention. The status of Burma’s political prisoners is also a critical issue for possible changes in U.S. policy. The full removal of many of the U.S. sanctions on Burma is contingent on certain conditions, including the release of all political prisoners.

Achieving a common understanding of Burma’s political prisoner problem is critical for that country’s future political and economic development. U.S. economic sanctions that may limit Burma’s economic performance will remain in place until all political prisoners have been freed. Fully free and fair elections cannot be held in Burma without the participation of political parties who await the release from custody of their members. Similarly, important ethnic groups are unlikely to discuss terms for national reconciliation until their leaders are freed from jail.

At present, there is no consensus on how many political prisoners there are in Burma. Most estimates put the figure around 200. In addition, reports of new political prisoners being arrested and detained periodically appear in the press. One major reason for the discrepancy is the lack of transparency of the records of Burma’s 42 prisons and 109 labor camps. Another major cause for the large variation in the estimates is the use of different definitions of whom to include as political prisoners.

The importance of political prisoners for U.S. policy has been underlined by the U.S. response to past prisoner releases. During his brief visit to Burma on November 19, 2012—hours after meeting with President Thein Sein and the release of 51 political prisoners—President Obama mentioned the continued detention of “prisoners of conscience” in his speech at the University of Yangon. Following the January 2, 2012, prisoner release, the State Department issued a press statement in honor of Burma’s 64th independence day (January 4) repeating its “call for the release of all political prisoners, a halt to hostilities in ethnic areas and an inclusive dialogue with...
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ethnic minorities toward national reconciliation, space for all political parties to freely compete in April 1 by-elections, and the full implementation of legislation to protect universal freedoms of expression, assembly, and association.”5 The issue of the continued detention of political prisoners was raised by Deputy Secretary of State William Burns during his October 18, 2012, meetings with senior Burmese officials, including President Thein Sein.

State Department officials have held talks with senior officials of the Burmese government, representatives of Burma’s leading opposition parties, and major ethnic groups in an effort to move towards a shared understanding of the scope of the political prisoner situation in Burma. Despite past public denials by the Burmese government that it is detaining political prisoners, senior Burmese officials have reportedly acknowledged the existence of political prisoners in meetings with U.S. officials.

On February 6, 2013, President Thein Sein announced plans to form a committee “to scrutinize the remaining political prisoners serving their terms in prisons throughout the country so as to grant them liberty.”6 The original 16-member Political Prisoners Scrutiny Committee was chaired by Union Minister Soe Thein, and included representatives from opposition groups with a history of supporting the release of political prisoners, such as the 1988 Generation Students Group, AAPP(B), and the National League for Democracy (NLD). The committee has met several times, but significant differences have emerged regarding the definition to be used and, by extension, the estimates of the number of political prisoners in Burma. On May 8, 2013, President Thein Sein reconstituted the committee with 19 members and Soe Thein remaining as chair.

Defining Political Prisoners

As noted above, one major factor complicating the determination of the number of political prisoners in Burma is a lack of agreement on the definition of a political prisoner. While the concept of political prisoner—a person who is detained by authorities principally for her or his political opinions rather than the commission of a crime—has a long history, there is no international standard for defining political prisoners. Prisoners detained for political reasons are afforded some protection by international agreements such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The State Department has a general definition of political prisoner that it uses, but the Burmese government and other interested parties have their own, and differing definitions.

For Burma, one of the more critical issues in defining political prisoners is whether or not to include individuals who have been detained for their alleged association with Burma’s ethnic-based militias or their associated political parties. Because these militias have been periodically involved in armed conflict with the Burmese military, some analysts exclude detainees allegedly associated with the militias from their estimates of Burma’s political prisoners. In addition, certain groups being detained or subjected to serious oppression by the Burmese government or officials may also be considered “political prisoners.”

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6 President Office, Republic of the Union of Myanmar, “Committee to be Formed to Grant Liberty to Remaining Political Prisoners,” press release, February 6, 2013.
The Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma), or AAPP(B), an independent organization founded in 2000 by ex-political prisoners, and Human Rights Watch (HRW) use a relatively broad definition of political prisoners. The AAPP(B) defines a political prisoner as “anyone who is arrested because of his or her perceived or real involvement in or supporting role in opposition movements with peaceful or resistance means.” Other groups, such as Amnesty International (AI) and the International Crisis Group (ICG), seemingly prefer a narrower definition that only includes so-called “prisoners of conscience”—people who are detained for peaceful political opposition. According to one source, the Burmese government is restricting the definition of political prisoners to “prisoners of conscience.”

The State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor considers someone a political prisoner if:

1. the person is incarcerated in accordance with a law that is, on its face, illegitimate; the law may be illegitimate if the defined offense either impermissibly restricts the exercise of a human right; or is based on race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular group;

2. the person is incarcerated pursuant to a law that is on its face legitimate, where the incarceration is based on false charges where the underlying motivation is based on race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular group; or

3. the person is incarcerated for politically motivated acts, pursuant to a law that is on its face legitimate, but who receives unduly harsh and disproportionate treatment or punishment because of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular group; this definition generally does not include those who, regardless of their motivation, have gone beyond advocacy and dissent to commit acts of violence.

In applying this definition, the State Department recognizes that being accused of violent acts and committing violent acts are two different matters, and considers the circumstances pertaining to a particular person when determining if she or he is to be considered a political prisoner.

The AAPP(B) rejects the limitation of political prisoners to “prisoners of conscience” for several reasons. First, the AAPP(B) maintains that the Burmese government frequently detains political dissidents with false allegations that they committed violent or non-political crimes. Restricting the definition to “prisoners of conscience” would exclude many political prisoners. Second, the AAPP(B) maintains that the decision to participate in armed resistance against the Burmese government should be “viewed with the backdrop of violent crimes committed by the state, particularly against ethnic minorities.” In short, the AAPP(B) views armed struggle as a reasonable form of political opposition given the severity of the violence perpetrated by the Burmese military and police.

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9 Definition provided to CRS by the State Department.
The importance of the distinction between “prisoners of conscience” and a broader definition of political prisoners was highlighted by the sentence suspension of January 13, 2012. Only a few of the prisoners released on that date were associated with the ethnic militias or their affiliated political parties. Following his release, Min Ko Naing, a pro-democracy activist, stated many political activists associated with ethnic armed groups remained in custody. However, Home Affairs Minister Lieutenant General Ko Ko told reporters that some dissidents remained in detention because they had committed criminal acts or have links with the Taliban.

The plight of two segments of Burmese society has also been raised in association with the issue of political prisoners. First, local Burmese officials are notorious for corruption, and reportedly frequently use their official power to detain people on falsified charges in order to confiscate property or otherwise exact revenge on their opponents. In addition, local officials have reportedly used provisions in the 2011 Law Relating to Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful Procession to arrest and detain people protesting alleged violations of their legal rights. These abuses of power by local officials has been portrayed as creating a special group of “political prisoners.” Second, the Burmese government continues to single out the Rohingyas, a predominately Muslim ethnic minority residing in northern Rakhine State along the border with Bangladesh, and subject them to more extensive and invasive political repression. According to the Burmese government, the Rohingyas are not Burmese citizens, but illegal immigrants from Bangladesh and India. The Rohingyas are subjected to severe oppression, including restrictions on movement, employment, education, and marriage. To some observers, the Rohingyas are effectively political prisoners in their own country.

Current Estimates

Different groups provide varying estimates of the number of political prisoners being detained in Burma. The AAPP(B) published a list of 183 political detainees whose location has been verified as of May 11, 2013. The AAPP(B) previously published a list of political prisoners whose locations have not been verified, but that list is no longer included on the association’s webpage. The AAPP(B) is dedicated to identifying and locating political prisoners in Burma, and providing support for the prisoners and their families.

Following the April 23, 2013, amnesty granted by President Thein Sein, a member of the newly established Political Prisoner Scrutiny Committee said that the number of political prisoners on lists being circulated within the committee ranges from 360 to 630 people, depending on the definition of political prisoner being used. The committee has not publicly released a list of political prisoners.

13 For example, U.N. Special Rapporteur to Myanmar Tomás Ojea Quintana has stated that the relocation camps in Rakhine State for Rohingyas displaced by the rioting in June and October 2012 “felt more like a prison than a camp.” (“Rohingya Camps ‘More Like Prisons,’ Says UN Envoy,” Mizzima, February 18, 2013)
14 The complete list of names is available online at http://www.aappb.org/Updated__PP_list.html.
15 The most recent list of this sort was published on September 15, 2012.
16 For more about the AAPP(B), see http://www.aappb.org/index.html.
The Burmese government has in the past given significantly different estimates of the number of political prisoners in custody. President Thein Sein told reporters in Bali, Indonesia, on November 20, 2011, that there were no political prisoners in Burma and that “all prisoners have broken the law.” His assertion was repeated on February 12, 2012, when Lower House Speaker Shwe Mann reportedly said, “The remaining political prisoners are those who have committed criminal activities in this country. Those who are on that list, if they have been involved in terrorist activities or harmed the public, they will not be included.” However, Ko Ko Hlaing, a close political advisor to President Thein Sein, estimated the number of political prisoners in detention in Burma at about 600 prior to an October 2011 prisoner amnesty. Following the January 13 release, Home Affairs Minister Lieutenant General Ko Ko told the press that 302 of the 651 people released were “prisoners of conscience,” and that 128 dissidents remain in detention.

Other interested organizations in Burma also have released estimates of the number of political prisoners in Burma, but these estimates generally reflect their focus on the detention of their own members and are not necessarily comprehensive tallies. Just prior to the January 13, 2012, release, the NLD reportedly provided the Burmese government with a list of 604 political prisoners. However, the NLD estimates are reportedly based on information obtained by NLD members, and are not generally viewed as an exhaustive list of political detainees in Burma.

A group of released political prisoners formed the Former Political Prisoners Society (FPPS)—also known as the Organization of Former Political Prisoners (OFPP)—and have surveyed Burma’s prisons and labor camps to compile a list of political prisoners still in detention. In April 2012, the FPPS released a list (in Burmese) of 345 political prisoners. It is not known what definition the FPPS used in determining who qualifies as a political prisoner.

Obtaining an accurate and current tally of the number of political prisoners in Burma is complicated by the lack of transparency of Burma’s judicial and prison system. Burma has 42 prisons and 109 labor camps scattered across the country, with no publicly accessible records of who is being detained and where they are being detained. To estimate the number of political prisoners, groups rely on a network of sources to provide information concerning each of the prisons and labor camps. The AAPP(B), for example, reports that it uses inside networks, confidential sources, court trial files, recently released prisoners, and families of prisoners to compile its list of political prisoners.

Maintaining an accurate tally of the number of political prisoners is also difficult because the Burmese government and military continue to arrest and detain new political prisoners, or otherwise infringe on their civil liberties. According to the AAPP(B), the Burmese government has arrested at least 120 people for political reasons since January 2012, generally without the submission of formal charges or access to court proceedings. Those people being detained

20 “Only 600 Political Prisoners in Burma; President’s Advisor,” Irrawaddy, October 18, 2011.
23 Individual in country.
24 AAPP(B), “Political Prisoner List is Now 1,572—Location of 918 Confirmed and Documented,” press release, December 23, 2011.
without charges have generally been either been engaging in public protests (supposedly legalized by Burma’s new Peaceful Demonstration and Gathering Law) or were suspected of having ties to ethnic resistance groups, particularly the Kachin Independence Army (KIA).

### Prisoner Releases

Since assuming power, President Thein Sein has pardoned or granted amnesty to prisoners on nine separate occasions, resulting in the release of 29,449 prisoners (see Table 1). According to the AAPP(B), 859 political prisoners were among those released, or 2.9% of the total. However, five of the last six prisoner releases included significant proportions of political prisoners.

The recent prisoner releases have generally occurred near the time of a major political development between the two nations. In some cases, the prisoners may have been released in an effort to obtain a desired response from the U.S. government. In other cases, the prisoners may have been released in response to an action by the U.S. government. The most recent prisoner release appears to have been timed to correspond to the European Union’s termination of its sanctions on Burma. This pattern is causing some concern at the State Department as it may imply that the prisoners are being used as political pawns.

**Table 1. Burma’s Announced Prisoner Releases**

((In reverse chronological order)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Prisoners Released</th>
<th>Political Prisoners Released</th>
<th>Percentage of Political Prisoners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 23, 2013</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>63.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 19, 2012</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>77.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 15-16, 2012</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 17, 2012</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 3, 2012</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>31.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 13, 2012</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>46.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2, 2012</td>
<td>6,656</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 11, 2011</td>
<td>6,359</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 16, 2011</td>
<td>14,578</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 17, 2009</td>
<td>7,114</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 20, 2009</td>
<td>6,313</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 23, 2008</td>
<td>9,002</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 3, 2007</td>
<td>2,831</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 6, 2005</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>75.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 3, 2005</td>
<td>5,588</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 13, 2004</td>
<td>5,070</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 29, 2004</td>
<td>5,311</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 18, 2004</td>
<td>3,937</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Reverse Chronology of Releases

The most recent prisoner release occurred on April 23, 2013, when President Thein Sein granted amnesty to 93 prisoners using authority granted by Section 204(a) of Burma’s 2008 constitution and Section 401(a) of Burma’s Criminal Procedure. According to AAPP(B), 59 of those released were political prisoners. Also, included among the 59 political prisoners were 40 “Shan rebel soldiers,” according to the opposition publication, *Irrawaddy*.27

The latest prisoner release quickly became the source of some controversy for several reasons. First, the prisoner release was announced the day after the European Union voted to terminate all its sanctions on Burma, except for the arms embargo. The timing bolstered claims that President Thein Sein was using the political prisoners as pawns to obtain concessions from foreign governments.28 Second, the Political Prisoners Scrutiny Committee reportedly recommended a number of people to be released, but President Thein Sein apparently chose to release other individuals, raising questions about the influence of the committee.29 Third, the 40 “Shan rebel soldiers” were reportedly all from the Shan State National Army (SSNA), also known as the Shan State Army—South. None of the detained members of the Shan State Army—North were released. This has led to some debate among the ethnic militias who have members detained in Burmese prisons about President Thein Sein’s intentions and possible efforts to sow discord among the various Shan ethnic organizations and militias.30

Using the same powers granted by the 2008 Constitution, President Thein Sein granted amnesty to 66 prisoners on November 19, 2012, during President Obama’s visit to Burma. The AAPP(B) identified 51 of those released as being political prisoners. This prisoner release came just a few days after President Thein Sein granted amnesty to 452 prisoners using the same constitutional authority. None of the prisoners released on November 15 and 16 were identified as political prisoners by AAPP(B).

On September 17, 2012, shortly before President Thein Sein was scheduled to visit the United States to speak before the United Nations General Assembly. The AAPP(B) identified 88 political prisoners among those released. According to some observers, the prisoner release was intended to bolster the chances that the Obama Administration would announce a further easing of sanctions during President Thein Sein’s visit to the United States.

On July 3, 2012, President Thein Sein, using authority granted by Section 204(a) of Burma’s 2008 Constitution, granted amnesty to 46 domestic prisoners and 34 foreign nationals.31 The amnesty was reportedly granted “with a view of ensuring the stability of the State and making eternal peace, national reconciliation, enabling all to participate in the political process; on

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28 Ibid.
humanitarian grounds; and turning them into citizens who could participate in nation-building endeavours in whatever way they can after realizing the magnanimity of the State.”

On January 13, 2012, President Thein Sein suspended the sentences of 651 prisoners “who were serving their appropriate prison terms” using authority granted by Section 401 of Burma’s Code of Criminal Procedure. The prisoner release was done, according to the official announcement, “with the aim of ensuring stability and eternal peace of the State, fostering national reconciliation, enabling them [the released prisoners] to participate in the political process, and on humanitarian grounds.” The release came at the tail end of the fourth visit by U.S. Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma Derek Mitchell and a week after British Foreign Minister William Hague’s first trip to Burma.

The January 13, 2012, sentence suspension was notable for the inclusion of a number of prominent political prisoners, as well as ex-military officials. Among the noted dissidents released were:

- Min Ko Naing—a leader of the 1988 Uprising;
- Ashin Gambira—a Buddhist monk who helped organize the 2007 “Saffron Revolution”;
- Khun Tun Oo—a senior leader of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) party; and
- Sithu Zeya—a reporter for the Democratic Voice of Burma.

Also among the released prisoners was ex-Prime Minister and SPDC member Khin Nyunt, who was arrested in October 2004 and convicted in July 2005 for alleged corruption.

On January 2, 2012, President Thein Sein issued Presidential Order No. 1/2012, granting a partial amnesty to all existing Burmese prisoners “[a]s a gesture of hailing the 64th Anniversary Independence Day and for the sake of State peace and stability.” Under the terms of the presidential order, death sentences would be commuted to life imprisonment, sentences of over 30 years (but less than life) would be reduced to 30 years, sentences between 20 and 30 years would be reduced to 20 years, and sentences under 20 years would be reduced by 25%. By implication, prisoners with less than 25% of their term left to serve would be released from jail.

Given the nature of the amnesty, it was initially unclear how many prisoners would be released from detention. In the days following the issuance of the presidential order, sporadic reports of prisoner releases came in from across Burma, including information on previously identified political prisoners. Within a couple of days, AAPP(B) had compiled a list of 34 released political prisoners, including 10 who are reportedly members of the Kayan New Land Party and 3 NLD

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32 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
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members. On January 6, 2012, the government-run newspaper, the *New Light of Myanmar*, reported that 6,656 prisoners had been released as a consequence of the presidential amnesty.  

Presidential Order No. 1/2012 was the third such prisoner amnesty since President Thein Sein assumed power in April 2011. It came after months of speculation that the Burmese government would announce a broader amnesty that would include a significant number of political prisoners. As such, the United States, other governments, and various international groups have expressed disappointment about the scope of the January amnesty.

President Thein Sein had issued two prisoner amnesties prior to January 2012. Presidential Order No. 49/2011, issued on October 11, 2011, terminated the prisoner sentence for 6,359 individually named persons, including several of Burma’s more prominent political prisoners. Presidential Order No. 28/2011, issued on May 16, 2011, commuted all death sentences to life in prison, and reduced all other sentences by one year in duration (exclusive of remission days).

Suspensions or Pardons?

The use of Section 401 authority for some of the more recent prisoner releases raises the issue of possible conditions on the prisoners’ sentence suspension. Burma’s Code of Criminal Procedure grants the president authority to suspend or remit sentences, with or without conditions, as well as cancel the suspension or remission if the person in question fails to fulfill the conditions for her or his release. As a result, a person released from detention under Section 401 may be required to serve out the rest of his or her suspended sentence if she or he is convicted of another crime or fails to fulfill the conditions of her or his release. At least one released political prisoner, Nay Myo Zin, has been sentenced to serve the rest of his previous sentence (six years), having been convicted of a crime after his release.  

Following their release on January 13, several former political prisoners indicated that they had been provided unconditional pardons, but a few said that they were instructed to limit their political activities. None of the prisoners released were placed under house arrest. However, Sithu Zeya said to reporters that he was told that if he committed any crime, he would have to serve the remainder of his 18-year sentence. “It is like we are being freed with leashes still attached to our necks,” he reportedly said.  

The use of Section 401 may also indicate some opposition to the release of political prisoners within the Union Government and/or within the Burmese military. Because President Thein Sein based three of the recent sentence suspensions on Section 401, he did not need to obtain the approval of Burma’s National Defence and Security Council (NDSC), a constitutional body with significant power, consisting of Burma’s president; its two vice presidents; the speakers for each

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38 Nay Moe Zin was released in January 2012, with six more years to serve on his sentence. He was originally sentenced to 10 years in prison in August 2011 for breaking the Electronic Transactions Act, a law that is highly criticized by free speech advocates. In May 2013, he chose to serve a three-month sentence for allegedly defaming a police officer. The Ministry of Home Affairs subsequently decided to reinstate his previous sentence. (“Burma Cancels Amnesty for Former Political Prisoner,” *Irrawaddy*, May 8, 2013)
chamber of its parliament; the commander-in-chief and deputy commander-in-chief of defense services; and the ministers of border affairs, defence, foreign affairs, and home affairs. President Thein Sein may have decided to use Section 401 authority to avoid NDSC review, given the reported fate of a previous proposed prisoner release.

**Continuing Arrest of Political Prisoners**

While President Thein Sein has been granting pardons and amnesties for some political prisoners in Burma, the Union Government reportedly continues to arrest and detain new political prisoners for alleged illegal activities. As previously mentioned, the AAPP(B) reports that over 120 people have been detained for what it considers to be political actions since January 2012. To many observers, the Union Government’s response to popular protests has raised questions about the sincerity of its support of democracy and human rights, and its rejection of Burma’s history of a culture of political repression.

One possibly troublesome trend has been a pattern of local officials using provisions in the 2011 Law Relating to Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful Procession to arrest and detain citizens protesting alleged violations of their rights. Under the law, persons wishing to hold a peaceful assembly must request a permit from local authorities. On several occasions, local authorities have denied permits to groups protesting land confiscations and other development projects, and then have arrested and detained the protesters after they hold their “illegal” assembly. The political prisoner issue also surfaced in the Burmese press in November and December 2012, following the detention of a number of people in the wake of incidences of civil unrest in different parts of Burma, including the re-arrest of prominent political dissident Ashin Gambira (a.k.a. Nyi Nyi Lwin).

On November 29, 2012, Burmese police reportedly used tear gas, water cannons, and some form of incendiary devices to suppress protests against a Chinese-financed copper mine near Monywa in Sagaing Division in northern Burma. At least 80 people were injured as a result of the police crackdown, including several monks who were seriously burned. The protest was one of many that have occurred over the last few months to oppose the Chinese-financed mine. On December 3, 2012, six protesters were charged with inciting unrest during a November 26 anti-Monywa copper mine protest in Rangoon. The six were detained without bail and sent to Insein Prison to await trial. While Religious Affairs Minister Myint Maung has apologized for the reported police assaults on Buddhist monks during the November 29 crackdown, he did not apologize for breaking up the protest. On December 12, 2012, thousands of monks organized rallies across Burma and were accompanied by an unknown number of lay people, demanding that the Union Government apologize for the violent crackdown on the copper mine protest.

A similar pattern of police violence and the subsequent arrest of protest organizers occurred surrounding a workers strike at the Moehti Moemi gold mine in Yamethin Township in the Mandalay Division. The workers strike began over the alleged failure of the Myanmar

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Prosperity Public Company to comply with a negotiated compensation agreement. On November 23, 2012, the police reportedly attacked and beat protest marchers, and arrested four of the workers. The four workers were subsequently charged with violating the Peaceful Gathering and Demonstration Law that was passed by Burma’s Union Parliament in December 2011.

Among the arrested protesters was Ashin Gambira, who had his 63-year sentence suspended by President Thein Sein on January 13, 2012 (see “Reverse Chronology of Releases”). Ashin Gambira was reportedly arrested on December 1, 2012, following his participation in a copper mine solidarity rally in Rangoon. He has reportedly been charged with trespassing, mischief, and “lurking house-trespass or house-breaking.” Ashin Gambira was released on bail (4 million kyat, or about $4,600) on December 11, and is awaiting trial. Eight other protesters were also reportedly released on the same day. If convicted, Ashin Gambira may have to serve out the remainder of his 63-year suspended sentence on top of any new sentence imposed.

**Political Prisoners Scrutiny Committee**

President Thein Sein’s decision in February 2013 to form a committee to advise his government on resolving the issue of the country’s alleged political prisoner was widely welcomed, but has become a source of some controversy during its short period of existence. The State Department and other commentators praised the creation of the committee and the selection of individuals representing a broad spectrum of organizations interested in the status of political prisoners in Burma. However, reports indicate that the 16 members have struggled to reach agreement of critical aspects of their committee’s mandate. In addition, it is unclear what influence, if any, the committee’s recommendations will have with President Thein Sein or Burma’s National Defence and Security Council (NDSC), which has the constitutional authority to recommend prisoner amnesties to the President.

As previously mentioned, President Thein Sein announced his decision to form the committee on February 6, 2013. In his announcement, he indicated that Union Minister Soe Thane would be the committee chair, and that the other members of the committee would be “representatives from government ministries, civil society organizations and some political parties.” The other 15 members were selected soon after the President’s announcement. The members are notable for the inclusion of representatives of three organizations known for their work to free Burma’s political prisoners.

The State Department welcomed the formation of the committee and pointed to its creation as evidence that the Union Government is taking serious steps to address the political prisoner problem. Domestic and international human rights organizations also supported the creation of the committee, although in some cases with some skepticism.

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47 Section 204 of the constitution grants the NDSC the authority to recommend prisoner amnesties to the President.
48 On February 11, 2013, the State Department issued a statement welcoming the formation of the committee, stating that the Union Government “has taken an important step towards national reconciliation,” and that the State Department looked forward “to supporting the implementation of this process.” (State Department, “Progress on Political Prisoners in Burma,” press release, February 11, 2013)
The committee first met on February 13, 2013, at the Myanmar Peace Center in Rangoon (Yangon). It has met several times since then, working on developing a common definition of political prisoners, compiling a list of possible political prisoners in detention, and drafting recommendations for President Thein Sein on how to expedite the release of identified political prisoners.

On May 8, 2013, President Thein Sein reconstituted the Political Prisoner Scrutiny Committee, expanding its membership to 19 people (see text box, “Members of Political Prisoners Scrutiny Committee”). The decision to augment the membership of the committee was reportedly not discussed with the original 16 members before the President’s announcement. Local activists have offered alternative explanations for the expansion of the committee, including an effort to deflect attention away from the re-arrest and detention of Nay Myo Zin and an attempt to improve Burma’s international image.

Among the difficulties the group has faced is developing a common definition of political prisoners. Sources indicate that some committee members prefer a narrow definition that would only include prisoners of conscience, while other members support a broader definition (see “Defining Political Prisoners”). On March 14, 2013, the FPPS gathered a group of Burmese political activists and lawyers to discuss the definition of political prisoner. It is assumed that Ye Aung, the FPPS representative on the Political Prisoners Scrutiny Committee, shared the results of the meeting with the other committee members. An agreement on the definition is critical for compiling a list of political prisoners in detention.

Another issue for the committee is its ability to work as a group. According to an FPPS spokesperson, his organization had submitted a longer list of people to be released prior to the April 23 amnesty, but the committee chose to ignore some of those on the list, and to include a

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number of people not considered political prisoners by the FPPS.51 Prior to announcing the amnesty, the committee members were reportedly asked to endorse the committee’s recommendations, but several refused to do so because many of the people recommended by the committee were not considered political prisoners and that many people who were political prisoners were not on the committee’s list. The FPPS spokesperson stated that the committee’s leadership was disinterested in the views of the civil society organizations, and was using the committee for political purposes, such as fostering better relations with the European Union.52

**Political Prisoners, Parliamentary Elections and National Reconciliation**

The release of political prisoners has potentially important implications for future parliamentary elections and prospects for national reconciliation. The NLD’s decision to participate in the April 2012 parliamentary by-elections was apparently based in part on the October 11, 2011, amnesty, which included 39 NLD members, according to the AAPP(B).53 At the same time, several political parties (including the Chin National Party, the Mon National Democratic Front, the Rakhine National Democratic Party, the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD), and the Zomi National Congress) said they would not participate in the by-elections because some of their members remained in detention.54 While the January 2012 prisoner releases included a significant number of NLD members and a few people associated with the SNLD, neither amnesty included members of political parties boycotting or barred from the April by-election. Regardless of how the elections are conducted, it can be argued that the parliamentary by-elections are not free and fair so long as some political parties are unwilling to participate because of what they perceive to be the detention of their members for political reasons.

The NLD decision to participate in the by-election gave rise to some tension with some ethnic groups, who saw the move as an abandonment of solidarity among opposition groups. One of the reasons the NLD and several ethnic political parties did not participate in the November 2010 elections which brought the Union Government into power was the continued detention of some of their party leaders and members. Some ethnic groups who still had members in detention at the time were unhappy with the NLD’s decision to participate in the by-elections. As such, Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD may be less able to play the role of intermediary in discussions between the Burmese government and various ethnic groups to forge a path towards national reconciliation.

It is unclear if the Burmese government and Burma’s military, the Tatmadaw, are actually interested in trying to pursue national reconciliation at this time. To some observers, their current strategy appears to be designed to improve relations with primarily Burman organizations, such as the NLD, while maintaining a more hard-line stance with Burma’s ethnic minorities, particularly those with active militias. Proposals to hold a third Panglong Conference have been

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52 Ibid.
53 Another, and probably more important, factor in the NLD decision was the amendment of election laws to allow Aung San Suu Kyi and other NLD members to run for office.
rebuffed by the Burmese government. Ceasefire talks with the ethnic militias frequently falter after initial success over such issues as release of detained members, disarmament of the militias, and preservation of the de facto autonomy of militia-controlled territory.

U.S. Sanctions and Political Prisoners

Burma’s detention of political prisoners was a major reason for the United States to impose sanctions on Burma. The Customs and Trade Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-382), which required the President to impose “such economic sanctions upon Burma as the President determines appropriate,” was passed after Burma’s ruling military junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), refused to honor the results of May 1990 parliamentary elections and detained Aung San Suu Kyi and many other opposition leaders. Similarly, the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 (BFDA) (P.L. 108-61) was passed after the SPDC cracked down on opposition parties, and once again detained Aung San Suu Kyi and other opposition leaders. The Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta’s Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008 (JADE Act) (P.L. 110-286) was passed after the violent suppression of the autumn 2007 popular protests and the subsequent arrest and imprisonment of many of the protest leaders, including a number of Buddhist monks.

The release of all political prisoners is also one of the preconditions for the removal of many of the U.S. sanctions on Burma (see Table 2). The economic sanctions required by Section 138 of the Customs and Trade Act of 1990 are to remain in place until the President certifies to Congress that certain conditions have been met, including “[p]risoners held for political reasons in Burma have been released.” Section 570 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1997 (Section 570, P.L. 104-208) authorizes the President to ban new investments in Burma if “the Government of Burma has physically harmed, rearrested for political acts or exiled Daw Aung Suu Kyi or has committed large-scale repression of or violence against the Democratic opposition.” The BFDA requires a ban on all imports from Burma, a ban on the products of certain Burmese companies, a freeze of the assets of certain Burmese officials and U.S. opposition to “any loan or financial or technical assistance to Burma” until certain conditions are met, including the release of “all political prisoners.” Finally, the JADE Act bans the issuance of visas to certain Burmese officials and their supporters, freezes the assets of certain Burmese officials and their supporters, and prohibits the provision of financial services to certain Burmese officials and their supporters until specific conditions have been met, including the unconditional release of all political prisoners. In addition, the JADE Act’s ban on the import of jadeite and rubies from Burma and articles of jewelry containing jadeite and rubies from Burma is to remain in place until certain conditions have been met, including the release of all political prisoners.

55 The first Panglong Conference was held in March 1946, at which Prime Minister U Saw, on behalf of the British government, met with representatives of the Chin, Kachin, Karen, and Shan to discuss the status of the border areas in the future independent Burma. The second Panglong Conference was held in February 1947, at which Aung San (father of Aung San Suu Kyi) met with representatives of the Chin, Kachin, and Shan and signed the Panglong Agreement, which gave autonomy to the frontier states as part of a larger Union of Burma. The Panglong Agreement is seen as critical to the establishment of an independent and unified Burma in 1948.

56 For more about the history of U.S. sanctions on Burma, see CRS Report R41336, U.S. Sanctions on Burma, by Michael F. Martin.

<table>
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<th>Law</th>
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| Section 138 of the Customs and Trade Act of 1990 | (1) Burma meets the certification requirements listed in Section 802(b) of the Narcotics Control Act of 1986  
(2) The national government legal authority has been transferred to a civilian government  
(3) Martial law has been lifted in Burma |
| Section 570 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1997 | President determines and certifies to Congress that the Government of Burma has not physically harmed, **rearrested for political acts**, or exiled Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and has not committed large-scale repression of or violence against the Democratic Opposition.  
(A) The SPDC has made substantial and measurable progress to end violations of internationally recognized human rights including rape, and the Secretary of State, after consultation with the ILO Secretary General and relevant nongovernmental organizations, reports to the appropriate congressional committees that the SPDC no longer systematically violates workers rights, including the use of forced and child labor, and conscription of child-soldiers.  
(B) The SPDC has made measurable and substantial progress toward implementing a democratic government, including—  
(i) releasing all political prisoners;  
(ii) allowing freedom of speech and the press;  
(iii) allowing freedom of association;  
(iv) permitting the peaceful exercise of religion; and  
(v) bringing to a conclusion an agreement between the SPEC and the democratic forces led by the NLD and Burma’s ethnic nationalities on the transfer of power to a civilian government accountable to the Burmese people through democratic elections under the rule of law.  
(C) Pursuant to Section 706(20 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (P.L. 107-228), Burma has not been designated as a country that has failed demonstrably to make substantial efforts to adhere to its obligations under international counternarcotics agreements and to take other effective counternarcotics measures… |
| Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 | (T)he President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the SPDC has—  
(1) Unconditionally released all political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi and other members of the National League for Democracy;  
(2) Entered into a substantive dialogue with democratic forces led by the National League for Democracy and the ethnic minorities of Burma on transitioning to democratic government under the rule of law; and  
(3) Allowed humanitarian access to populations affected by armed conflict in all regions of Burma. |
| The Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta’s Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008 | Notes: |
Burma’s Political Prisoners and U.S. Sanctions

a. The law required the imposition of sanctions if the President determines and certifies to Congress that the Government of Burma has committed these acts. It is assumed that removal requires a presidential determination that the Government of Burma no longer commits these acts.

b. “Appropriate congressional committees” are Senate Appropriations Committee, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, House Appropriations Committee, and House Foreign Affairs Committee.

c. “Appropriate congressional committees” are Senate Finance Committee, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, House Ways and Means Committee, and House Foreign Affairs Committee.

U.S. Efforts Regarding Political Prisoners

U.S. officials have consistently called for the release of all political prisoners in Burma. As previously mentioned, President Obama spoke of the continued detention of prisoners of conscience during his speech at the University of Yangon. National Security Advisor Tom Donilon stated in a presentation in Washington prior to the President’s trip to Burma that:

The President’s meetings—as well as his speech to the people of Burma—will also be an opportunity to reaffirm the progress that still must be made. This includes the unconditional release of remaining political prisoners [emphasis added], an end to ethnic conflicts, steps to establish the rule of law, ending the use of child soldiers, and expanded access for humanitarian assistance providers and human rights observers in conflict areas.58

During her December 2011 trip to Burma, Secretary Clinton emphasized the importance of the release of all political prisoners for the possibility of normalizing relations between the two nations.59 The State Department press statement cited above reiterated the call for the release of all political prisoners. In addition, during the State Department’s daily press briefing on January 3, 2012, Spokesperson Victoria Nuland said:

[O]ur view is that even one political prisoner is one political prisoner too many. The Secretary was very clear about that when she was in Nay Pyi Taw and in Rangoon.... [W]e remain concerned about the more than a thousand political prisoners that remain in custody. So we will continue to make the case to the government in Nay Pyi Taw that it is a full political prisoner release that the international community wants to see.60

The State Department is also reportedly raising the issue of political prisoners with other governments. U.S. Ambassador to Burma Derek Mitchell traveled to China, Japan, and South Korea following Secretary Clinton’s trip to Burma to discuss the status of U.S. policy towards Burma during his time as U.S. Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma. The issue of political prisoners was reportedly raised during his meetings on that trip. Similar discussions have been held with other governments and the European Union. Following his visit


59 For examples of Secretary Clinton’s statements on political prisoners, see Department of State, “Press Availability in Nay Pyi Taw, Burma,” press release, December 1, 2011; Department of State, “Press Availability in Rangoon, Burma,” press release, December 2, 2011; and Department of State, “Remarks with Aung San Suu Kyi,” press release, December 2, 2011.

to Burma, British Foreign Secretary William Hague told reporters that EU sanctions on Burma should not be lifted while political prisoners remain in detention.61

In addition to leading an international campaign for the release of all political prisoners in Burma, senior U.S. officials indicate that the State Department has also had talks with senior Burmese officials, Aung San Suu Kyi and other NLD leaders, several opposition parties, and representatives of some ethnic groups about compiling a complete and accurate list of political prisoners currently in custody.62 One of the key factors in these discussions is finding a common understanding of who is to be considered a political prisoner. Such discussions are reportedly ongoing.

The discussions with the Burmese government were being led by Ambassador Mitchell and Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Michael Posner. The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor has compiled and continues to update a list of all known political prisoners in Burma based on non-government organization (NGO) and government sources, which forms the basis of the State Department’s ongoing engagement with the government of Burma on political prisoners.

**Issues for Congress**

The continued detention of political prisoners in Burma—as well as the state of human rights in general—are likely to figure prominently in congressional consideration of U.S. policy towards Burma. In the coming months, Congress may decide to examine the status of the implementation of existing U.S. sanctions on Burma. It may also assess the political prisoner issue, either in isolation or as part of a broader consideration of human rights in Burma and sanctions policy. Congress may take up legislation to amend or alter U.S. sanctions on Burma, depending on the evolving conditions in the country. In addition, the Obama Administration may ask Congress for additional funding for humanitarian programs in Burma to address the serious humanitarian needs of Burma’s internally displaced people (IDPs), refugees, and other vulnerable populations.

Existing U.S. sanctions on Burma are based on several laws specifically focused on the country, as well as other laws that sanction nations that fail to comply with U.S. standards of conduct related to specific issues. The changing political situation in Burma may warrant congressional consideration of whether alteration or removal of sanctions should be considered under current law. Similarly, the President has the authority—which he has used several times—to waive or suspend some of the existing sanctions on Burma if he determines that the necessary conditions have been met. If the President were to once again exercise this executive authority, Congress may choose to review the President’s determination.63

Congress may also choose to monitor and evaluate the Obama Administration’s efforts to address the political prisoner and human rights situation in Burma. In June 2012, the Senate confirmed

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62 Interview with CRS, January 2012.
63 The current U.S. sanction laws specifically focused on Burma provide for a presidential waiver of some sanctions, generally if the President determines that it is “in the national interest of the United States.” In most cases, the President also has to “determine and certify” to Congress or the specified “appropiate congressional committees” that the waiver is in the national interest of the United States.
the first ambassador to Burma in 20 years after a confirmation hearing in which the nominee, Derek Mitchell, was asked a number of questions about U.S. policy in Burma. The JADE Act explicitly requires that the Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma “consult with Congress on policies relevant to Burma and the future and welfare of all the Burmese people, including refugees.” The nomination of a new Special Representative could provide Congress with an opportunity to weigh in on the conduct of U.S. policy in Burma and the issue of political prisoners. In addition, Congress may decide to consult with non-Administration sources and/or hold hearings to ascertain the human rights situation in Burma, including the issue of political prisoners.

Beyond its oversight function, Congress may decide that circumstances warrant consideration of new legislation related to U.S. policy towards Burma. Such legislation could reflect a determination that Congress wishes to play a more active role in the formation of U.S. policy towards Burma. Alternatively, legislation may be considered in response to a request from the Obama Administration to amend existing laws to facilitate an adjustment in U.S. policy.

Congress may also be called upon to consider additional funding for humanitarian assistance to Burma. During her December 2011 trip to Burma, Secretary Clinton signaled that the United States would provide additional humanitarian assistance in the future, and announced several specific initiatives. Some of those initiatives are to be funded out of existing appropriations; others are financed by contributions by other countries. On April 5, 2012, USAID formally notified Congress of its intention to reopen its mission in Rangoon, operating out of the U.S. embassy. The projected operating expense for FY2012 was $598,000, and the requested operating expenses for FY2013 was $1.7 million. It is possible that the Obama Administration may request additional funds in FY2014 for humanitarian projects inside Burma.

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64 JADE Act, Section 7(c)(4).
65 U.S. Agency for International Development, Congressional Notification, CN #38, April 5, 2012.