

AN ANALYSIS OF TERRORIST RECRUITMENT BY OBSERVING THE
REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE'S LIBERATION PARTY/FRONT
(DHKP/C) TERRORIST ORGANIZATION IN TURKEY

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Thesis Prepared for the Degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS

August 2004

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Teymur, Samih, An Analysis of Terrorist Recruitment by Observing the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) Terrorist Organization in Turkey. Master of Science (Criminal Justice), August 2004, 86 pp., 28 tables, 1 figure, references, 36 titles.

Terrorism has been claimed to be a major problem by hundreds of thousands of people in the international arena for years. Either it has been very difficult to determine and understand the reasons for terrorism, or those reasons have never been studied because of the immediate threat of terrorism. This research analyzed the recruitment process of terrorists by studying the DHKP/C terrorist organization and by answering the following questions. The first is “What factors are correlated with joining a terrorist organization?” And the second is “What is the recruitment process of the DHKP/C?” IN the course of this research, I used specific reports written by DHKP/C members and personal experience to come to better understanding of the motivation behind terrorism and the process by which people are recruited in the terrorist organizations.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Throughout history, terrorism has been one of the most significant problems not only for governments but also for civilians. However, in the last three decades it has become a major problem; in fact, after September 11, terrorism has turned into an evil all over the world (September 11, 2003). Many academic studies have been done to understand the roots of the problem, but they offered only several short-term responses to terrorist act. In fact, they focused mostly on “being tough on terrorism” policies, which offer to use the army in order to defeat terrorists. However, the use of force may cause many casualties escalating the rancor among of the public, as well as the terrorists and helping terrorist organizations motivate the potential members to join them. Moreover, the use of force causes terrorists to justify attacking civilians. A terrorist, for example, who has lost one of his /her family members, may be eager to attack the random targets, which includes innocent civilians.

Terrorism doesn't cause as many casualties as traffic accidents do, but it spreads a massive amount of fear into the public. The FBI defines the terrorism as intimidating and coercing the government and the civilians in furtherance of political goals. Killing one of the top government representatives, terrorists show their power and threaten numerous people. They utilize high tech communication devices to send their message around the world in a very short time. The media is often eager to convey the horror of a terrorist attack and help them spread the fear.

On the other hand, a terrorist organization has a strict structure to control and to gather intelligence for the government. Most of the time, the body of a terrorist

organization is composed of two major components. The first one involves the legal part, which performs legitimate activities in the social groups under the name of youth associations, ethnic organizations, labor unions and publications of newsletters. The second part is the illegal part, which is composed of small cells that have no contact with each other and is accountable to one person at the top. Those two parts sometimes work interconnected, which is difficult to detect. However, the decisions are made by a central committee and executed by cells. The structure is so secret that any diffusion by police is very difficult. Members communicate face to face and try not to use technological devices. For all those reasons, it is difficult for the police to gather intelligence about the terrorists, especially about the illegal side of the organization, which performs the armed activities such as bombing, murder and kidnapping.

When we look at today's terrorism and past example of terrorism, we understand there have always been underlying reasons for the terrorism that took place. Even though the reasons are different, the outcome is always same. History teaches us that terrorism has always had reasons behind it. People usually facilitate terrorism and violence because they are not happy with some important aspects of their life. In addition, the social structure of a society is a key element for the terrorist organizations deciding to act. Generally, terrorists try to manipulate social problems for their goals and their propaganda. They never talk about violence at the very beginning; instead they protest poverty, inequity, and lack of freedom. Those problems are frequently emphasized in their propaganda so that justification for later violent terrorism acts is established. In fact, the social structure is a significant point for the integration of the society. Social disorganization and strain are assumed to be the major factors by some

theorists for the occurrence of crime in socially problematic societies, yet their assumptions need to be proven with respect to terrorism.

Because the terrorist organizations use problems in society to justify the use of violence, they have always been able to recruit new members. It has been almost impossible to destroy a terrorist organization by killing and arresting all of its members. In this regard, this study will focus on the underlying causes of terrorism. Also, this study will look at underlying reasons for an individual to join terrorist organizations so that we can understand the causes of terrorism better. If we can successfully understand the causes of terrorism, we can stop terrorist events before they occur.

In short, my first chapter will be about methodology with introduction, research questions, and limitation. Also, I will summarize the history of terrorism and give a definition of terrorism; therefore, chapter two, will be on those issues in order to better understand the problem. Moreover, because of having a primary source data from the DHKP/C, I will specifically discuss the structure, goals, and management system of the DHKP/C, as well as the operations of the terrorist organization. Chapter three will be about the DHKP/C. Furthermore, chapter four will be about my findings and deeper analysis of the data, and the last chapter, chapter five will include some recommendations for government, society, family, and law enforcement agencies, as well as the other institutions.

Methodology

Terrorism has been a major international challenge for hundreds of thousands of people in the international arena for years. It has often been either very difficult to determine and understand the reason for terrorism or those reasons have never been

studied because of the immediate threat created by terrorism. This research proposal tries to make an analysis of terrorist recruitment by observing the DHKP/C terrorist organization and answer following questions:

1. What factors are correlated with joining a terrorist organization?
2. What is the recruitment process of the DHKP/C?

According to Majchrzak (1984), policy research is a process of conducting research on a fundamental social problem to find the causes of the problem and to make recommendations. To find possible answers to those questions, formal sources, including articles from academic journals, administrative reports, and various types of observations, as well as interviews, and the interrogations in which the researcher was actively involved as an interrogator will be used. In addition, terrorist reports, which were written by DHKPC members to DHKP/C central committee, will also be analyzed. Furthermore, informal sources, such as newspaper articles and websites, will also be used.

The study will focus heavily on the identification of the underlying causes of becoming a terrorist. It specifically will focus on the recruitment process through which terrorist organizations gain new members. It will involve both the analysis of the problem and exploration of possible solutions. The study will propose solutions for the government agencies, in particular, law enforcement and other security agencies and institutions, including schools, family, and community. It is believed that these solutions will offer law enforcement agencies powerful tools to combat terrorism. In fact, this study may show directions for family, society and government to stop people from

joining terrorist organizations. Therefore, this study will take into account the cultural, political, social, economic, and ethical dimensions of the problem.

In order to conduct this study and get a general outline of the study, a preliminary literature review will be done. Qualitative data will be collected, including different definitions of terrorism, explanation of the structure of DHKP/C terrorist organizations, major tactics of the organization, and its recruitment processes.

This study will consist of two main parts and five chapters. The first part mainly discusses general background of terrorism and the structure of DHKP/C, and this part involves chapter two and three.

Major issues examined in accordance with the research objectives and questions are:

1. The history of terrorism will be explained.
2. The definition of terrorism, terrorist, terrorist group, and terrorist acts will be developed; it deserves a detailed analysis, yet it is not the major focus of the study.
3. The structure of DHKP/C terrorist organization will be described so as to clarify how it facilitates the recruitment process.
4. The goals of DHKP/C will be discussed to understand motivation factors for individuals.

The first part of the research involves literature review of the subject. In this context, much of the research will be library-based. This will need to start with a literature review, which outlines the state of knowledge and argument in this field. The University of North Texas (UNT) electronic research databases, which are EBSCO host, JSTOR, Military and Government Collection and ERIC, will be searched for books, articles, and administrative and legal documents on the subject. While searching UNT electronic sources, a website that provides access to legal sources-will be used to find

and read the articles and books. Due to focusing on the most relevant information, articles and books written about the specific field of responding to terrorism will be covered. The words are mostly used for search are “History of terrorism,” “What are the underlying reasons for individuals to join terrorist organizations?” and “Definition of terrorism, terrorist, terrorist group?”

The second part of the study involves the actual data description and analysis. In this part of the study, the researcher is going to use some reports, which were written by DHKP/C members. This part of the data is considered reliable for a number of reasons. First of all, those reports are very objective and sincere because the members of DHKP/C directly wrote them to the leaders of the organization. In fact, they are in the original handwritings of the individuals. The purpose of these documents is to facilitate the internal communication of the organization. Furthermore, the content of the documents involves straightforward self-criticism of the members, which makes them invaluable in terms of reliability. Finally, the coding system that was used to hide names and identities also reduced the bias in the terrorist reports.

Where Was Data Collected?

In this study the original data, which was collected from the DHKP/C terrorist organization between 1990 and 1996, will be analyzed. This data is derived from the original handwritten reports of the terrorists. These reports were submitted to the organization before the members were accepted as active participants. The data used in this research was collected as a result of operations by the Turkish National Police against DHKP/C cells in different cities around Turkey. In 1991, the police carried out the biggest operation against the central committee of DHKP/C in Istanbul, and the

police got possession of the archives of the organization; therefore, some of my data include documents from this operation. Also, some of them were acquired from terrorist cells, where terrorist members used to hide in Ankara and Malatya. The rest of them were gathered from people who were arrested as suspects and from their houses. These cities include Istanbul, the economic capital of Turkey; Ankara, the capital city of Turkey; and Malatya, one of the largest cities in eastern Turkey. These cities represent different social and economic backgrounds, with cultural and social diversity. For example, while Istanbul is located in the west part of Turkey, Ankara is located in the center, and Malatya is located in the east part of Turkey. This diversity is critical for the research because of the fact that it represents a wide variety of people. Therefore, the validity of the research can be considered significant.

The organizations had a system for internal communication requiring that each member write reports about all kinds of issues to inform the central committee. The DHKP/C terrorist organization used to communicate between central committee and their members by writing three different reports; intelligence reports, daily activity reports, and evaluation and recruitment reports.

Intelligence Reports

Members collected information about the potential targets of the terrorist organization. In other words, they gathered information about the current situation of their targets and their vulnerabilities before they would act. In fact, most of the terrorist actions were planned based on this information.

Daily Activity Reports

These kinds of reports include all regular activities, such as what they did, when they woke up, and what kind of difficulties they encountered.

Evaluation and Recruitment Reports

The terrorist organization asked 28 questions to their members about their purposes and reasons for joining the terrorist group. The questions are very useful in understanding the reasons they became members of the terrorist organization. There is every reason to believe that the terrorists responded truthfully. In other words, they did not believe that police would have access to those reports, so they wrote what they believed without any worry. During my twelve years of experience in the same field in the Ankara Anti-Terrorism Unit, I collected all the evaluation and recruitment reports.

How the Data was Collected

I was appointed to the Ankara Anti-Terrorism Unit in 1990. After one year, I became a member of the Investigation Unit, and most of the time, I tried to understand the underlying reasons why an individual became a terrorist, or the reasons for joining terrorist groups. Luckily, I had the access to read all the secret documents, which were written by individual terrorists to the central committee.

After gathering the documents, police decoded them. In order to better understand these reports, all of the documents were typed and duplicated. After that, police sent them to the criminal lab and the police archives. There were more than one hundred documents; however, only seventy-five of them were readable. Therefore, I took seventy-five documents to analyze. The original copies of the documents are in Ankara, Istanbul, and Malatya Anti-Terrorism Division's archive.

Research Questions

First, since we couldn't find the original questions, I looked over the documents and tried to recreate the questions, which had been asked to terrorist members by the central committee. I found that there were twenty-eight answers; however, one of them was only "yes" or "no." Thus, I was unable to formulate that question.

1. What is your name?
2. Where were you born? And what is your birth date?
3. What is your ethnicity?
4. What is your level of education?
5. How many brothers and sister do you have? And what is your family economic situation?
6. What is the current situation of your family?
7. What is your family's political background?
8. Do you have any relatives who work in the police or army force?
9. Do you have a significant relation with someone from opposite sex?
10. Do you have any job experience?
11. Do you have any special knowledge, such as computers or electronics?
12. Have you ever been abroad? And do you have any relatives who live abroad?
13. Can you speak any foreign language?
14. Do you know how to use a gun?
15. Do you have any health problems?
16. Have you ever been in (a relation with the) other terrorist organizations?
17. Could you briefly give information about your background?
18. How did you find out the organization?
19. What are your good and bad behaviors?

20. Have you ever been in police custody? Did you give any information about the organization to the police?
21. Do you know the purpose of the organization? Did you read the organization's written materials?
22. To you, what is the meaning of the organization?
23. Can you accept every kind of duty without questioning?
24. Why did you join the organization? What was the reason that you are a member of DHKP/C?
25. What is your area in the organization, or which part of the organization are you working in?
26. Could you make a judgment about your team leader?
27. Could you make a judgment about your subordinates?

Data Analysis

After getting the copies of the reports and identifying the questions, I created a code system and entered the information into an SPSS data program. After that, I realized that I had to translate some parts of the documents and put them into my findings. Therefore, I primarily translated answers, which were given to questions that related to the underlying motivation for joining the group and to the recruitment process.

Recruitment Process

To better understand recruitment, I am going to analysis the recruitment process. It is a fact that a person does not become a terrorist in one day. It takes a long process, and every part of the recruitment process has some underlying reasons. I have concluded that there are four areas that serve as motives for an individual to become a terrorist; therefore, as a result of my findings, I will explain how an individual becomes a

terrorist and under what kinds of circumstances, and what kinds of reasons lead people to join terrorist groups.

Limitations

There are limitations to this study. The prominent limitation of this study will involve the secrecy of the terrorist organizations and the investigation of such groups. The secrecy may result in several limitations. The first one involves the terrorist organization, and the second one involves the government side. The secrecy involves both the structure and the individual members of the organization. First of all, there will not be enough data regarding a specific terrorist organization and its members. Second, even though information is available, the accuracy of such information may be problematic given the fact that it is very difficult to check the accuracy of the information. The government side also involves secrecy. Sometimes because of the critical nature of an investigation, it may be dangerous to reveal some of the information gathered from an interrogation.

Given the fact that there are a number of countries which have been struggling against terrorism, it is difficult to be comprehensive. Therefore, the focus of the study will involve Turkey. In fact, most of the cases and documents are gathered from the terrorist group DHKP/C in Turkey.

The value of this study is that I am going to outline reasons people join terrorist organizations. If we find these reasons, we can work to stop the recruitment. In addition, if the terrorist organizations don't gain new members, they will not survive. This is the best way to stop terrorism. Although many studies have been conducted, this study is unique because the researcher uses reports which have been written by terrorist group

members in order to inform the central committee. For this reason, the researcher of this study believes that this study will be a powerful document in the sense that the data for the research reflects opinions of the members of the terrorist organization. These documents are written by the members of the DHKP/C as an evaluation about themselves. They also include the detailed explanation of the process through which these individuals become sympathizers and then members of the organization. These “reports” are self-written documents required by the central committee as an internal communication and evaluation system. Since these members write these documents voluntarily, and they are not written under coercion, such as interrogation by the police or any other law enforcement entity, they can be considered as unbiased, which makes the research relatively accurate and unique.

Terrorist groups are far different from other criminal groups in several ways. The most important is that they are well organized and structured to ensure secrecy and anonymity. Thus, it is very difficult to penetrate these groups let alone research them. However, the researcher has spent almost twelve years working, interviewing, observing, and interrogating terrorists. The result is findings which should be very useful to combating terrorism.

The researcher believes that any effort which aims at countering terrorism, should involve both short term and long-term solutions. Instead of focusing on only reactive strategies, it is critically important that the efforts also focus on proactive strategies. One of the vital aspects of proactive strategies is to focus on the underlying causes of the problem. With respect to terrorism, it is necessary to analyze the causes,

incidents, and problems that lead people to become terrorists. Therefore, it is necessary to focus on the recruitment process-taking place in terrorist organizations.

CHAPTER II

HISTORY AND DEFINITION OF TERRORISM

Introduction

This chapter consists of two main parts, which are history of terrorism and definition of terrorism. The history of terrorism includes differed eras: they are early terrorist organizations, French Revaluation and anarchism, colonial era, leftist terrorist groups, and radical religious terrorist groups. The second part covers the definition of “terrorism,” “terrorist,” “terrorist group,” and “terrorist activities.”

History of Terrorism

According to Martin, “Terrorism has been a dark feature of human behavior since the dawn of recorded history” (Martin, 2003, p, 2). However, terrorism is, today, different from former acts of terrorism. In the modern era, terrorism is a mobile and worldwide threat. Terrorists can easily spread the fear and anxiety they create through sophisticated communication technology. Today, terrorists are better positioned to benefit from technological developments than any other criminals. The tendency to use technology renders terrorism hard to defeat with conventional counter-terrorism techniques.

Modern terrorism started with the French Revolution. Today, the modern terrorist organizations cannot see themselves as powerful enough to go war with nations. Instead, they choose terrorism as the easiest way of struggle for themselves. Although some governments have suffered terrorism for a longtime, September 11th showed terrorism to be the biggest problem all over the world. In short, the history of terrorism

could be divided into five main parts: early terrorist organizations, French Revolution and anarchism, colonial era, leftist terrorism, and radical religious terrorism.

Early Terrorist Organizations

Sicari

“Terrorism is almost as old as the history of human beings (Martin, 2002)”. We see the first recorded terrorist events in the religious sources: the Bible, Torah and other religious writings. The first recorded terrorist groups and series of terrorist events took place in the beginning of the first century. One of the earliest known examples of a terrorist movement was the Sicari in what is known as Jerusalem today (Laqueur, 2002). At that time, Jerusalem was under the control of Roman Empire, The Syrian Governor; acting under the Roman Empire ordered a census in Jerusalem so that he could tax the people in Jerusalem.

At that time, compared with the other citizens of the Roman Empire the Jews who were living in Jerusalem had many privileges, including having their own court system and not paying taxes. Jews had special privileges because they helped Julius Cesar to become the Emperor. Not liking the idea of being taxed, Jews began to establish a group called “Zealots,” who openly opposed the Roman rule. They were against paying taxes and considered the Romans and other Jews who were helping the Romans as enemies. A small group called Siccaris among the group of “Zealots” decided that they had to extend the war and began to kill Romans and Jews who were supporting the Romans. Sicaris were basically stabbing people in the market place and running away. Their terror continuously increased and their enemies were eventually

afraid to go out of their homes. The Romans had to sign a treaty with the Jews because they wanted to stop the Sicari terror.

Assassins

“A similar mixture of messianic hope and political terrorism was the prominent feature of a much known sect- the Assassins” (Laqueur, 2002). They existed during the years 1090 and 1299 again in the same area. This time, it was in Iran just by the Caspian Sea, 90 miles north of Tehran. This time, the hero was an Ismaili leader called Hassan Sabbah. He established his own terror network to terrorize the region and beat his enemies. Hasan Sabbah was a minister of Ismaili, a Shiite sect. He decided that he had to demolish the surrounding powers such as Seljukee Turks so that he could rule the region. He built a castle called “Fake Heaven” to attract the young Ismailiis with the beautiful young girls in that castle and with the help of hashish. He would invite those youngsters and serve them lavish food, make women and hashish available to them. Those young men, after three or four months, were assigned to assassinate an important figure so that they would be allowed to stay in the “Fake Heaven.”

Being addicted to hashish and women in the castle, those young men would go after their targets just to make sure they were going to be able to go back the fake heaven. Sabbah’s group was called “Hashisheens.” This group was highly successful in terrorizing the region at the time. They even assassinated the Seljukee Vizier, what we now called a Prime Minister. The number of casualties rose every day. At its peak, the hashisheens were killing twenty-five people a day. It took over 200 years for the other countries to get rid of this terrorist network. These terrorists were so influential in history that today’s word “assassination” comes from this organization’s name “Hashisheen.”

French Revolution and Anarchism

French Revolution is one of the more recent examples of terrorism in the history. Mid-nineteenth century France was the first center of terrorism (White, 1997). During the three years of revolution, the chief revolutionist Maximilien Robespierre imprisoned over 170,000 people without any reason and guillotined almost one-third of those who were arrested. This era in history is called "The Reign of Terror." In this era the Committee of Public Safety of National Convention conducted terrorist acts in 1793-1794. Prior to 1792, the terror had been used to intimidate and put pressure on their political enemies by using unlawful acts of violence; however, after 1792 the government began using state terrorism. Under the state terrorism policy, in two months the revolutionary courts punished 1,515 people, sending them to the guillotine. (Crenshaw, M & Pimlott, J, 1997). Even though the reasons behind the French Revolution were democracy and human rights, it brought with it the bloodiest terror.

After the French Revolution, through the end of the 18th century, anarchism became the new terrorism for the world. The anarchists, demanding no authority at all, were able to terrorize many nations, including the United States. They would bomb and assassinate their targets just like they did in the Chicago Hayes Square bombing. They also successfully murdered the Russian Czar and the Italian Prime minister. The French Revolution marked the first wave of terrorism in modern history. Then anarchism was the second wave of terrorism until the beginning of the First World War (Anarchism-Marxism, 2004).

Colonial Era

As the colonial powers invaded countries such as India, Pakistan, Israel, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, the native people living in those countries began to rise up against the invading colonial powers. These movements started just before the First World War and continued until the independence of the colonized states. The native people who were fighting against the colonialism at that time were considered and named terrorists by the invading powers. However, they called themselves freedom fighters. The natives were basically terrorizing those in power because they did not have the means to conduct war or enough power to oppose the invading powers openly. Eventually, all of those invaded countries became independent and the so-called terrorist leaders became the presidents or prime ministers of newly independent states. This era was the third wave of terrorism in history.

Leftist Terrorism

With the beginning of the Vietnam War, a new kind of leftist terrorism emerged. This leftist terrorism has been the fourth wave of terrorism. Today, there are still some small leftist terrorist groups that are trying to survive. Seeing that the communists could resist the capitalists in the world, many small leftist terrorist organizations were established throughout the world. Those groups were relatively small, and they were only successful in the first place because of their organizational structure and strict organizational rules. Red Brigade, 17th November, Dev Sol and Tupamaros are good examples of these kinds of organizations. These organizations wanted nationwide communist revolutions just like in Russia. So far, only Fidel Castro's group has succeeded in achieving this goal. The governments either crushed the other groups

very harshly, or they were basically wiped out because the causes for the terrorism and new members ceased to exist.

Radical Religious Terrorism

The last (fifth) wave of terrorism has become from radicals. Religious fanatics have terrorized the world under the name of God for the last three decades. The common characteristics of those groups, from whatever religion they claim to be, is that they misinterpret the religious scripts and use those misinterpretations to manipulate mostly young people to go out and kill others. Unfortunately, with the help of technology and particularly the Internet, those people were able to spread their philosophies and attract members across the modern world. By using the modern conventional weapons, they usually bombed places such as abortion clinics and business centers. Among those groups, there are hate groups like the KKK (Ku Klux Klan) in the US or radical extremist religious groups like Al Qaeda in the Middle East.

Definition of Terrorism

Terrorism is a widespread problem, which threatens the modern world. It is a disease that attacks regardless of nation, religion, language, race and sect and kills innocent people in a way that cannot be justified by any religious, political, or ideological doctrine. Today no nation in our modern world can consider it self-safe against terrorism. International and national terrorism have gained their places in the world literature as the most basic and up-to-date concepts of the post-Cold War period. Unfortunately, terrorism is not only threatening the lives and safety of the citizens in countries where it spreads violence, but also it causes serious harm to the economy

and politics of the related countries; moreover, it may also create conflicts between the public and the state because of the security measures taken to combat terrorism.

The word “terror” has a Latin origin, and it was first used in its current form during the French Revolution. The term “terror” that we use today is derived from the Latin word “terrere” and it means to be filled with fear, to tremble with fear. (Juergensmeyer, 2003). The word “terrere” is derived from “tre”, which means to tremble in Latin. The word “terrorism” was first used in 1795 just after the French Revolution with the meaning “intimidation by state by means of creating fear,” and it was used as “terrorisme” in France. The concept of terrorism was introduced to world literature by the British in 1798 and was regarded as “the systematic use of terror.” The term “terrorist” in its modern meaning was first used in 1947 referring to the tactics used by the Jews against the British on Palestinian territory. In addition, the word “terrorist” was used for the Revolutionists in Russia in 1866 and for the radicals and reformists, who were called the “Jacobins,” during the French Revolution in 1790s (Online etymology dictionary, 2003).

Unfortunately, a common definition of terrorism has not yet been accepted in either scientific terms or the international arena. One of the most significant reasons of this lack of definition is the fact that the social and political scientists and countries making the definition tend to take into consideration their own political and ideological interests. In addition, the complex structure of terrorism makes it difficult to have a single, widely accepted definition. The problem of defining terrorism is the main element in the fight against terrorism both in international and national terms. Although there have been various definitions of terrorism, the most frequently used definition contains

two basic elements; the use of violence and the desire to change the political system. Politicians, academicians, security experts, journalists and government representatives use various kinds of definitions in order to identify terrorism. While the definition of terrorism set forth by the governments is different from that of the scientists, it may also differ between different state institutions. For instance, the United States has been very cautious while defining terrorism so as not to include the IRA organization. The U.S did not include the IRA for many years in the list of terrorist groups throughout the world, which is declared every year. The underlying reason for this is considered to be due to the 50 million US citizens with Irish nationality living in the country. Then, the IRA was included in the list of terrorist groups declared by the United States in the year 2000; however, the US felt the necessity of making an explanation and stated the name of the organization as “the real IRA.” As this example illustrates, it seems difficult to attain a general definition of terror as of today. However, it depends on us to regard this difficulty as richness and to take advantage of this variety of definitions. In most basic terms, terrorism is the use of force with violence and threats in order to change the political system. Terrorism is a threat, a method of fighting or a strategy to achieve a particular target that absolutely includes use of “violence.” It aims at creating fear in the public by means of merciless and inhuman methods.

If we have a look at the definitions throughout the world, despite the fact that we face various and very different definitions, there are many common points. For instance, in the Encyclopedia Britannica, terrorism is explained as “terror, resorting to systematic violence acts against public or individuals with the aim to achieve a political target” (Terrorism, 2004).

In the Turkish Anti-Terrorism Act (April 12th, 1991) terrorism is defined as follows:

Terror is all kinds of activities attempted by a member or members of an organization for the purpose of changing the characteristics of the Republic which is stated in the constitution, and the political, jurisdictional, social, secular, economic system, destroying the territorial integrity of the state and the government and its people, weakening or ruining or invading the authority of the government, demolishing the rights and freedom, jeopardizing the existence of Turkish government and Republic, destroying the public order or peace and security (Law of Terror Prevention, 1991, p, 1).

The definition of the U.N is that " 'Terrorism' means any act of violence or threat thereof notwithstanding its motives or intentions perpetrated to carry out an individual or collective criminal plan with the aim of terrorizing people or threatening to harm them or imperiling their lives, honor, freedoms, security or rights or exposing the environment or any facility or public or private property to hazards or occupying or seizing them, or endangering a national resource, or international facilities, or threatening the stability, territorial integrity, political unity or sovereignty of independent States" (Freezing Funds, 2003).

In the British Anti-Terrorism Act (Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989) it is stated, "terrorism is the use of violence for political ends (including) any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public, or any section of the public in fear"(Prevention of Terrorism, 1989). On the other hand, France defines terrorism as "an act by an individual or group that uses intimidation or terror to disrupt public order" (How five foreign countries, 2000). Moreover, "In Germany, terrorism has been described as an enduringly conducted struggle for political goals, which are intended to be achieved by means of assaults on the life and property of other persons, especially by means of severe crimes" (Martin, 2002).

The FBI's definition of terrorism is "the unlawful use of force or violence against persons, or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives" (Terrorism in the United States, 1997). In addition, according to the definition formulated by the US, "terrorism is any violence perpetrated for political reasons by sub national groups or secret state agents, often directed at noncombatant targets, and usually intended to influence an audience" (Terrorism and America, 1998).

Different governments have different definitions; likewise, different federal institutions have their own definitions of terror. For instance, the definition used by the FBI is different from that of the U.S. State Department. According to the definition of the FBI, individuals, as well as groups, have the possibility to carry out terrorist actions. In addition to political aims, the FBI includes social aims as well. However, the U.S State Department's definition comes from its own field.

As it can be understood from all these definitions, the element of "violence" has a dominant role. Violence is the most common characteristic in all the definitions stated above. Just as we have listed the definitions here, Alex P. Schmid has made a study of about 120 different definitions of terror in his book titled Political Violence. He has tried to figure out the common points in the definitions and reach a general assessment. According to the results of this research, violence and use of force have been the most common element appearing in about 90% of the 120 definitions. Therefore, violence and the use of force turn out to be the element accepted in most general terms. After violence, ideological or political aim appears in 65%, and concepts such as fear, threat, or psychological impact are third following the ideological or political aim. As a result,

from all these studies and generally accepted definitions, it can be concluded that in general terms terror is: “all kinds of actions performed by a group and include violence and ideological/political aim.” (Schmid, 1988).

Today, one of the most important bases of democratic societies is the non-governmental organization. By means of these non-governmental structures, not only does the public find the opportunity to express itself, but also people can transmit their wishes to the political authorities, hence ensuring development of democracy. Non-governmental organizations carry out their activities so as to attain their demands only within a legal framework, and they never resort to violence. This is the clearest particularity that differentiates between non-governmental organizations and terrorist organizations. Although there are some similarities between terrorist organizations and non-governmental organizations in terms of structure and aim, the most significant characteristic of terrorist organizations is the fact that they take violence as the basis in achieving their goals.

In conclusion, although there are hundreds of different definitions of terror throughout the world are made by states, international institutions, or scientists, and although each one of these definitions seems to be different, there are two main elements in nearly all of the said definitions:

1. Violence and use of force
2. The goal of achieving an ideological change in the order as a result of this violence and use of force.

Therefore, violence and use of force has taken its place in the world of terror literature as the most significant element. As a result, today, it cannot be right to regard actions which do not include violence as terror; moreover, countries declaring an

organization as a terrorist organization in the international arena must be certain that this organization uses violence and force. If not, it is not a terrorist organization.

Who is a Terrorist?

The definition of terrorism is complicated. The judgment that “some people are terrorists, while some people are freedom fighters” is still an accepted opinion in some quarters. Answering the question “Who is a terrorist?” is so difficult that many academicians have not given a specific definition. According to Webster’s encyclopedia (2004),” The term ‘terrorist’ is a label for one who is an active participant in a ‘terrorist act,’ be it through direct personal action, or through direct funding or logistical support in the goal of executing a terrorist act -at times the tacit definition is generalized to include ‘moral support’ for a political agenda that can be associated with a ‘terrorist’ group.”

In addition, the definition of terrorist differs among the governments. For example, the U.S. government considers all terrorists as criminals, whatever their ethnic, religious, or other affiliations are. (Terrorism in the United States, 1997). On the other hand, The Turkish Law of Terror Prevention (12.04.1991) first defines the terrorism as following:

Terrorism is all kinds of activities to be attempted by a member or members of an organization for the purpose of changing the characteristics of the Republic which are stated in the constitution, and the political, legal, social, secular, economic system, destroying the territorial integrity of the state and the government and its people, weakening or ruining or invading the authority of the government, demolishing the rights and freedom, jeopardizing the existence of Turkish government and Republic, destroying the public order or peace and security (Resmi Gazete, 1991).

In the second article of the Law, referring to the first article, terrorist is defined as being a member of an organization which is aiming to realize the goals referred in the first article and to commit crimes for those ends (Resmi Gazete, 1991). In short, a

terrorist could be defined as a person who is a member of a terrorist organization and commits crime for the goals of that organization.

Terrorist Groups

Most of the terrorism definitions mention terrorism as a group activity. According to the Turkish anti-terror law, terrorist activity is defined as an activity which is done by two or more people who come together having political goals to change the democratic system to set up a new system by using violence (Terror Prevention, 1991) In addition, the E.U (European Union) defines terrorist groups as following: “The common position also defines ‘terrorist group’ as a structured group of persons, acting in concert to commit terrorist acts, regardless of its composition or the level of development of its structure” (Freezing funds, 2003).

As a result, if a group, an organization or an association uses violence against people and has political goals, the organization is a terrorist organization. In the world, there are a lot of different terrorist organizations. According to the U.S State Department records, there are thirty-six international terrorist groups, but some of them are not currently active (Pattern of Global Terrorism, April 2003). In short, if a group uses violence against innocent people and has political goals and brings fear and panic to a community, it must be accepted as a terrorist organization.

What are Terrorist Activities?

According to the E.U, terrorist acts are explained as “intentional acts which may seriously damage a country or international organization by intimidating a population, exerting undue compulsion of various types or by destabilizing or destroying its

fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures” (Freezing Funds, 2003).

However, terrorist activities differ with each terrorist group. Nowadays, most of the terrorist organizations use suicide bombings, and they also plant random explosives. Thus, they have captured more attention because these acts are almost impossible to stop. In addition, they are an easy method for the terrorists to receive “more bang for their buck;” that is, to receive maximum publicity with little financial investment.

The types of acts depend on the terrorist group’s ability and background. In 1996, Ankara, the capital city of Turkey, DHKP/C started to use a different kind of bomb, which the police had not seen before. After arresting some of the members, police realized that one of the DHKP/C members had had experience with those types of explosive.

Similarly, when we look at the recent El Qaeda attacks, we see that they are similar. The Istanbul Synagogue attack resembles the terrorist attack in Bali. In fact, most of the terrorist attacks which are related to El Qaeda have the same tactics and trademarks because the terrorists have been trained in the same way and in the use of the same materials.

The terrorist acts should be listed as follows:

According to Carlos Marighella (1974) terrorist acts are “assaults, occupation, ambushes, raids and penetrations, street tactics, strikes and work stoppages, desertions, diversions, seizures, expropriation of weapons, ammunition and explosives, liberation of prisoners, executions, kidnappings sabotage, terrorism, armed propaganda,

war of nerves.” Although this list has some limitations, his paper, entitled Mini-manual of the Urban Guerrilla, is a guideline for most of the leftist terrorists organizations.

The European Union has a slightly different list, which includes:

- An attack on a person,
- Hostage taking
- Destroying public and private properties,
- Destroying information and transportation systems,
- Use of weapons, explosives, nuclear, biological or chemical weapons,
- Destroying public water supply and power units,
- Supporting terrorist groups.

In the same way, the U.S State Department terrorist act list, which includes concepts from both Marighella and E.U terrorist acts, is the widest list of terrorist activity, and states terrorism as any of the following acts:

- Taking under control or detaining some one by intimidating to kill and injure.
- Highjacking or sabotage
- Attacking an internationally protected person
- Planning and preparation of terrorist attack
- Using any kind of biological and chemical agent (Pattern of Global Terrorism, 2003).

CHAPTER III

TERRORISM IN TURKEY

Introduction

Turkey has had a terrorism problem for more than fifty years. After the collapse of Ottoman Empire, Asala (an Armenian terrorist group) started terrorist activity against Turkey. At the beginning of the 20th century, a Communist revolution took place in Russia, and Turkey was affected because it is Russia's biggest neighbor and historical enemy. The Turkish Communist Party was founded in Baku, Azerbaijan, in 1920 and began spreading communist ideas to Turkish people. Another influence was the youth movement, which took place in Europe, and influenced students all over the world; so Turkish students were also deeply influenced by those activities (Historical development, 2004)

In 1968, the Turkish Student Federation was founded, and after that, terrorist organizations began to appear one by one by from this organization. In 1976, the Revolutionary Youth organization was set up, and two years later it divided into two parts, one of which was Devrimci- Sol (Revolutionary Left). (The student Movement, 1999). This organization is one of the bloodiest terrorist organizations in Turkey. In this study, I am going to give some brief information about history of the Marxist- Leninist movement in Turkey, the history of Devrimci- Sol, the evolution from Devrimci- Sol to DHKP/C, the strategies and goals of DHKP/C, and the organization structure of DHKP/C.

History of Marxist- Leninist Movement in Turkey

“The great irony of history is that Russian imperialism was often overlooked simply because Russians did not have to board ships to conquer Asia” (Czarist Origins of Communism, 2004). In 1917, a communist revolution took place in Russia. After that, a big communist movement began to influence the region. The Bolshevik Revolution encouraged the Turkish communists to start communist activities in Turkey. Mustafa Suphi (the first communist party founder in Turkey) and his friends went to Russia to join the Soviet Communist Party, and he set up the Turkish Communist Party in Baku, Azerbaijan, in 1920. (Beginning of the leftist, 2004).

According to Manaz, (2004), the foundation of NATO in 1950 and Warsaw Pact in 1955 is regarded as the outset of cold war between the East and the West. Having a geopolitical position and being between two continents and two pacts, Turkey was the biggest target for Russia; therefore, TKP members and their activities were supported by Russia with the goal being to take Turkey under their control, like the other countries such as Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria.

However, when they came to Turkey, they faced opposition from the public and the government, so they decided to go back to Russia because of opposition. However, when Mustafa Suphi was sailing to Russia with his fourteen friends, their boats sank in the Black Sea.

In 1923 Ataturk founded the Republic of Turkey and became the first President of the new country. At that time, the TKP (Turkish Communist Party) was active and tried to spread their ideas across the country. Fortunately, Ataturk saw communism as a big threat for Turkey, so he banned all kinds of communist activities within the country. As

a result of this prohibition, Turkish communists went underground and began to act secretly until 1946. Zeki Bastimor, a member of Turkish Communist Party, escaped from Turkey to Russia, and opened a radio channel which was named “Bizim Radyo” in order to manipulate the Turkish people.

After World War II, countries in Europe and Asia were divided into two parts under the name of Eastern Block and Western Block. This occurred with the foundation of NATO in 1950 and Warsaw Pact in 1955, and is regarded as the outset of cold war between the East and the West. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was organized under the U.S. and the Eastern Block was organized under the leadership of The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) (Manaz, 2004).

The three factors influencing the Turkish leftists, who included students, university professors, workers, and some army members, are the Soviet Communist Party's activities in Turkey, the socialist wave in the world, and the illegitimate activities of Turkish Communist Party.

In 1956, some of the Turkish students who had been under influence of those factors founded the Federation of Thoughts Clubs. It was the major legitimate organization of Turkish Communists which organized all student uprisings in the universities until 1960. The federation also had strong impact on the 1960 army coup in Turkey.

On 27 May 1960, a group of commanders, who were known as National Union Committee, led an army coup against the Democrat Party, which held the power between 1950 and 1960. Turkish Marxist-Leninist groups influenced the members of the National Union Committee. The committee was so zealous that they strongly

influenced the Judges who presided over the trial of former Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and his cabinet. They urged the judges to decide on the death penalty. The court sentenced the Prime Minister and his two friends to death, and they were executed soon after the decision.

Some university professors who were deeply influenced by Marxist-Leninist ideas wrote the 1961 Constitution. The constitution allowed communist activities, which had formerly been prohibited by Ataturk. TIP (Turkish Worker Party) was the first communist party, which legitimately entered the Assembly after the 1961 election. The entrance of TIP into the Assembly encouraged the younger group to act in legal ways; however, it could not achieve a communist revolution in Turkey despite the fact that a considerable number of other countries had experienced revolutions under the influence of this socialist wave.

History of Devrimci-Sol

In 1966, Turkish communists, most of whom were university students, changed their minds about the way that they had attempted to bring about a Turkish socialist revolution. They founded The Federation of Revolutionist Youth Association to organize illegitimate communist activity among the university students. However, the debate about the way to achieve a Turkish socialist revolution caused a split within the association.

The group which was led by Mahir Cayan, was defined by the use of urban guerilla tactics, similar to those used by some Latin American groups, and took the name of THKP-C (Turkey Public Liberation Party-Front). Mahir Cayan and his friends were involved in many terrorism acts between 1968 and 1972, which ended with the

kidnapping of three English technicians in Ordu. They took them to a village in Tokat, where the troops killed them with those technicians on 30 March 1972. The killing of Mahir Cayan and seizure of many important members led to the end of the organization in 1972. However, in 1974 the government ruled a general amnesty, which resulted in the releasing of many terrorists. Some of the ex-members of the THKP-C started the reorganization of THKP-C in 1974. They accelerated the reorganization process with the foundation of Revolutionist Youth Association in 1976; however, a new debate emerged between Ankara and Istanbul groups within the association, which resulted in the separation of Istanbul group as Dev-Sol under the leadership of Dursun Karatas (History of Devrimci Sol, 1989).

Shortly after this, they changed structure of Dev Genc (Revolutionary Yought) and set up a new army division, which was named FTKME (Fighting Teams against Fascist Terror). They started to kill government members, police officers, army personnel, and civilians. In fact, in two years, they killed 35 security members, 23 army members and 240 civilians. The most well-known assassination was when they killed former Prime Minister, Prof. Dr. Nihat Erim, and his body guard Ali Kartal on July 10th 1980. (Sol Teror Orgutleri, 1994).

In 1980, the military took power and handled the government due to terrorism activity in Turkey. Most of the terrorists were arrested, but some of the leaders of terrorist groups escaped abroad. However, most of the members of Devrimci-sol were detained, including Dursun Karatas and his central committee members. The biggest case was opened against Devrimci-Sol in Istanbul; however, Dursun Karatas manipulated the prison as a propaganda and education place. In fact, during his prison

term, he reorganized Devrimci-Sol. Moreover, the second appearance of Dev-Sol and its new structure was planned in prison, especially Bayrampasa Prison, which was in Istanbul and which was where most of those people were detained. Based on their ideology, they were resistant to all government rules and principles, as well as court rules; for example, they boycotted court invitation. Dursun Karatas started an internal investigation and tried to find an answer to why they were arrested, what was wrong, and what would be done for future. In prison, they wrote a book, called "Hakliyiz Kazanacagiz", in which he listed his purpose and future plans, including lists of their enemies, some of whom were government officials in the security force and army members, as well as several judges.

In 1995 he decelerated activities; in other words, his new tactic was to stop all activities outside prison. While he reorganized his group, they continued to make passive resistance to government rules. At that time the prisons and court activities were the biggest activities of Devrimci-Sol, and in protest, many members did not join trials. They were often imprisoned in the same room with thirty or forty people together; therefore, they communicated easily and organized everything without detection or interference.

By 1989, some of the central committee members, including Dursun Karatas, escaped from prison, and because of insufficient evidence some other members were released. In late 1989 and early 1990, Devrimci-Sol started significant attacks against people who had been listed as their enemies in the book, Hakliyiz Kazanacagiz. Those attacks were carried out in big cities such as Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Adana, and Bursa. Due to a lack of knowledge regarding the new structure, tactics, and strategies of the

organization, the police were shocked and were caught unprepared. Devrimci-Sol killed seventy-five police, twelve members of the army, four national intelligence members, three Americans, two government attorneys, and thirty-five civilians; they also injured one hundred thirty six people (Sol Teror Orgutleri, 1994).

In 1990, Bedri Yagan, the number-two man in the organization, was sent to Lebanon to start a camp in order to organize guerilla training. July 12, 1991 was the end of the beginning of Devrimci-Sol because security forces had found four secret Dev-Sol cells, which were occupied by high level of organization leaders in Istanbul. Police and terrorists fought, and the police killed eleven terrorists and arrested others. Police found their secret documents, including contacts of local groups, and reports which had been written by their members about their daily activities. This operation gave the police unbelievable information, and the police learned about the structure, tactics, and system of organization. Police also learned of more members and where they lived. Police-led operations were carried out all over the country, and most of the underground units were discovered, and their members were arrested.

Although police were able to catch the top members of the organization, Dursun Karatas escaped to Europe. After the July 12th operation, the organization suffered a considerable blow, and this police operation was followed by another. In fact, this was the beginning of the end of the organization after 1980. It was not one year after 12 July when the organization took another significant injury by another police operation called 16-17 April. In this operation, Sabahat Karatas, the wife of Dursun Karatas, and Sinan Kukul, number three man at that time, were killed.

Those operations caused a big debate within the organization and Dursun Karatas was accused of being careless with his undercover contacts. Bedri Yagan and his two friends, all of whom were members of an international committee members of the organization, found and detained Dursun Karatas on September 13th, 1992 and interrogated him. However, Dursun Karatas managed to escape yet again from detention and contacted his friends in Turkey telling about the coup initiation of Bedri Yagan. This started a new debate within the organization and resulted in a new split in the organization. On March 6th, 1993, Bedri Yagan and his six friends were killed in a police operation in Istanbul, and his group was considerably weakened (From THKP-C to Devrimci Sol to DHKP-C, 1997).

From Devrimci-Sol to DHKP/C

Those operations and the betrayal of Bedri Yagan weakened the Dev-Sol, so Dursun Karatas needed to gather the top members to reorganize again. On March 30th, he held a new congress in Damascus. After this congress, he declared the foundation of a new organization under the name of DHKP-C (Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front). In his declaration, the foundation of Armed Propaganda Group, the military unit responsible for assassinations, was also announced. Since 1994 the organization has continued its activities across Turkey and Europe under the name of DHKP-C to achieve the aim of revolution.

Strategies of DHKP-C

DHKP-C's Political Army Fighting strategy specifies using rural and urban guerillas in order to weaken the authority and prepare the environment for a possible revolution. In 1992, Bedri Yagan was sent to the Bekaa Valley to start the guerilla

training of the organization. The party trained many of its members in this training camp to send to Turkey. However after the 1992 split, the activities in the Bekaa Valley stopped and then were closed down by administration. Nevertheless, the organization today has some small armed-cells in big cities to plan and carry out some sensational actions.

The strategies of DHKP/C are different from the other terrorist organizations because they tried to start a revolution in both the cities and countryside at the same time. There are five stages in this revolution:

1. Vanguard war
2. Increasing vanguard struggle and starting a guerilla war
3. Growing and spreading guerilla war out of the country
4. Connecting to local units
5. Victory of communist revolution (Political Program, 1995)

In this strategy, although they believe that public support is very important to be successful, the army is the key element of revolution.

They believe that the only way to strike down the imperialism and set up communism is an armed struggle. The strategy of Devrimci Sol is the strategy of the People's War, which means they achieve power directly from the working people. According to Mahir Cayan, the founder of THKP/C, this strategy can be defined as: "The strategy which takes armed propaganda as a basis and subordinates all other political, economic, and democratic forms of struggle to this basic form of struggle, is called the politicized-military war strategy" (Collected Works, 1995). Therefore,

DHKP/C depends on armed struggle; in other words, the army unit is the based organization of this terrorist organization.

The Goals of DHKP-C

The main goal of DHKP-C is to overthrow the existing regime in Turkey and in its place, to set up a new regime based on Marxism and Leninism. DHKP-C believes that the party is the pioneer organization that will lead the public on the way of Marxist-Leninist revolution.

According to Karatas, DHKP/C is a party of people who dedicate their life to fighting against imperialism and oligarchy to destroy the imperialist government and set up a communist government and system. DHKP/C plans to start a people's revolutionary war because of the belief that the only way to set up a communist government is through this war of the people to start to destroy the current government. They believe that if the current government were destroyed, the communist system may be founded easily.

Why Devrimci Sol (Revolutionary Left), DHKP/C: A Terrorist Organization?

Although there is no single definition in the world of terrorism, the common definition includes three important components, which are violence, political purpose, and organization. In fact, according to Turkish counter terrorism legislation (dated December 4, 1991 and numbered 3713), Terror is defined as follows: "Terror is all kinds of activities to be attempted by a member or members of an organization for the purpose of changing the characteristics of the Republic which is stated in the constitution, and the political, juridical, social, secular, economic system, destroying the territorial integrity of the state and the government and its people, weakening or ruining

or invading the authority of the government, demolishing the rights and freedom, jeopardizing the existence of Turkish government and Republic, destroying the public order or peace and security."

When we look at the activities of DHKP/C, this group fits all the components of a terrorist group definition. According to Dursun Karatas, DHKP/C is a Marxist-Leninist organization which has as its purpose of changing the Turkish political system and setting up a new communist country through revolution.(Revolutionary People's,2004). It is clear that DHKP/C is a one of the bloodiest terrorist organizations in the world. According to Turkish National Police official record from 1983 to 1994, the terrorist group had killed seventy-five police officers, twelve army members, four National Intelligence Agency members, two judges, three American citizens, and thirty- five civilians. In fact, during this time the organization had engaged in direct conflict with law enforcement one hundred and seventy one times (Sol terror orgutler, 1994).

In addition, according to U.S State Department, there are thirty-eight international terrorist organizations and the DHKP/C is the one of them (State Department Identifies,2004). In fact, most countries, including the EU, consider it a terrorist organization.

Structure of DHKP-C

The Central Committee

Central Committee is the top unit that administers the entire organization between congresses. It implements the decisions of the congress and is made up of 10 to12 members. The Central Committee is divided into some specific task units, such as army unit, women's commission, worker and civil servant committee, and youth

committee. Each committee is organized as a cell. Central committee members are selected in the congress and take on some specific responsibilities in the sub-units of organization. They generally meet at least once every six months. The head of the politburo is also assigned as the leader of the organization. In order to understand structure of the organization better, we should study on the tasks of each unit. (Dilmac, 1997).

Regional Committee

This committee holds the responsibilities of all regional sub-units, such as city committees and their sub-units. The major role of this committee is to ensure the organization of the party in all parts of the society, such as universities, factories, labor unions, non-governmental organizations, neighborhoods, and civil associations. The committee implements its task through city committees.

International Committee

The main job of this committee is to take advantage of acting outside of Turkey. In this sense, the committee members are responsible to set up a contact between the Central Committee and cells, to organize and manage the abroad activities, and to obtain money for the party arranging some quasi-legal activities such as DHKP-C night. This committee became very active after Dursun Karatas had escaped to the Europe. It is believed that this committee directs the entire organization from Europe through courier who travels between Europe and Turkey using fake Identities.

Military Units

Che Guevera believes that the army is the only way to eliminate the brutality of imperialism and to make revolution. He states that people can obtain freedom and set

up their communist government by using arms. (Guevera, 1998). DHKP/C is the terrorist group which accepts PASS (the strategies of politicized armed war); therefore, the army units are the most important part of the organization. They are well trained and carefully chosen by central committee. In fact, these are the most difficult part of the organization to detect because they use secret cells which involve a strictly controlled number of people. DHKP/C has different kinds of military units, and each unit has its own army units. However, the main part of the army units can be divided into four types, which are Armed Propaganda units, Rural Guerilla, FTME (Fighting Teams against Fascist Terror) and Militia Forces.

In addition, the key motivation of the army is a hatred of the government and others seen as their enemies. Hatred fuels the motivation of the army, and as can be seen in any terrorist group, people can commit a lot of crimes due to hate. According to Che, "Hate will be an element of the battle, a merciless hate for the enemy that will inspire the guerrilla-soldier to superhuman efforts of strength and changes him into an effective, violent, selected, in cold blood killing machine. That is how our soldiers must be; a nation without hate can not triumph over a brute enemy" (Politicks grundlag, 2003).

FTKME (Fighting Against Fascist Terror)

FTKME (Fighting against Fascist Terror) was the first biggest armed unit of Devrimci-Sol that Karatas founded it after left from Devrimci-Yol in 1978. This unit had the responsibility for all armed actions. That is, all assassinations, bombings, and bank robberies were done by those people. However, after 1989 he set up new groups that

were called SDB (Armed Revolutionary Unit), and he ordered all armed activities to be controlled by this group.

SDB (Armed Revolutionary Unit) and SPB (Armed Propaganda Units)

Although the SDB (Armed Revolutionary Unit) and the SPB (Armed Propaganda Units) were founded in 1979, most of their activities took place between 1989 and 1994. They were the most dangerous units in Devrimci-Sol because when they started their activities police knew nothing about them. They were able to kill many people, including two retired generals, an active duty general and many police officers.

This was the special team that was directly tied to the central committee and used fake identification and code names so that police were not able to arrest them. They concealed themselves in a community and acted as if a part of it; therefore, police and people would not be suspicious about them. However, the July 12th operation helped the police to identify their names and their tactics; as a result of that, even though some of them were killed in several different operations, most of them were arrested.

After March 30, 1994 SDB was renamed as SPB, which means Armed Propaganda Units, and all duties, which ordered by the Central Committee, were carried out by SPB. The original structure is that the SPB live in cells of two or three people and that each unit consists of between five and eight people. This unit directly operates under central committee (Committee,cells,armunit, 2004)

Rural Guerilla

DHKP/C believes that using urban and rural guerillas will make the revolution possible; therefore, DHKP/C sent some militants to Bekaa Valley to get guerilla training

in 1991. After that, they started rural guerilla activities in some cities, which have mountains and places that guerillas could hide. They used these places as natural hiding places, benefiting from the geographical characteristics of those areas. Security forces face significant difficulties when trying to arrest them. However, DHKP/C had significant difficulties in those places because most of the guerillas had grown up in urban areas, and they could not adapt to rural areas.

In addition, public support is critical if a guerilla war is to continue, but DHKP/C guerillas did not find public support, which they had expected, so they were not successful. In fact, DHKP/C lost many members in the guerilla war; therefore, starting the guerilla war was the worst decision for DHKP/C. In sum, the guerilla army is a part of army unit of the organization, but they were not successful as they were supposed to be.

Internal Security Unit

Most of the terrorist organizations have internal security units in order to keep the organization safe from police operations. The Central Committee leads this unit, and its main duties are internal security. Some times this unit makes a decision and kills some one who has a relation with the police force, or if they are suspicious about the behavior of any member they will interrogate him/her. In fact, if they find some evidence, which shows that this person had shared some secret information about terrorist organization with someone, they will kill him/her.

DHKP/C's internal security unit has killed several ex-members, claiming that they leaked some significant information to police; for example, Latife Karaman, a regional committee member and a member of central committee, was killed in the prison by the

other DHKP/C prisoners for claiming that she had shared all information which she knew with Turkish government security forces.

Legal Units

The Legal unit is the other part of DHKP/C, which is not supposed to use any army activity unless in an emergency situation arises. The main duties of legal units are that they should find new members, join every kind of legal demonstrations or boycotts, and be involved in propaganda activities. In fact, they find new members and educate them, and replaced them legal unit to illegal unit. Every unit has their legal organization. These groups have their committees, cells, and organizations, which tie to the Central Committee.

Although they sometimes join illegal activities, such as throwing Molotov cocktails, most of their activities are legal demonstrations, boycotts, and meetings. These units are open to the public and are set up to attract the sympathy of ordinary people. Strategically, legal units function as the security of DHKP-C to legalize their activity. Legal units have some sub-units that are responsible for some specific area of the public such as workers, civil servants, and neighborhood relations (Political program of DHKP/C, 1997).

Workers and Civil Servants

Since the communist ideology aim is to realize a proletarian dictatorship, workers are thought to be the pioneers of possible socialist revolution. Likewise, workers tend to take part in the activities of terrorists since they are mostly promised to be freer after a socialist revolution. Therefore, DHKP-C organizes in some factories and labor unions by manipulating the legal rights of workers. For example, workers are encouraged to go

on strike in their factories so as to sabotage the routine activity of factories and to gain power against the authority. They are pushed to participate in big demonstrations by the labor unions to protest the general policy of authority. Thus, these situations can cause confrontation with the authorities in a public uprising. Workers and civil servants are organized under some sub-units.

Revolutionist Workers Movement

This is the illegitimate unit of DHKP-C, which is responsible for organizing the illegal activities. They organize in cells and transfer members from the legal units to train them according to the strategies of DHKP-C.

Revolutionist Civil-Servants Movement

DHKP/C also tries to organize civil servants; however, they have less freedom than other workers to be active in a civil organization. They don't have the right to establish a civil service union. However, under Turkey's economic conditions, they have a similar standard of living with the workers, which make them vulnerable to the agitation of terrorist groups. The unit acts as the workers' cells to organize illegitimate activity among the civil servants.

Neighborhood Units

The people who live in suburban areas have worse economic and social conditions than people who live in urban areas. Particularly the economic and resulting physical conditions, such as roads, water supply, electricity, building conditions, make those people frustrated with the authorities, which in turn makes them a natural target for the terrorist groups. DHKP-C has some sub-units to organize the illegal neighborhood units.

Poor neighborhoods are the part of every society that is most vulnerable to terrorist organizations, which use poverty as a propaganda tool. In their propaganda, DHKP-C always blames the authorities for the poverty to attract the attentions of poor people. Neighborhood cells are set up to organize the quasi-legal activities of DHKP-C. Those cells sometimes hang banners, hang posters, and hand out pamphlets, or throw Molotov cocktails in some special days for the organizations.

Within the neighborhood units, there may be some special task groups also, which are responsible for organizing groups, for example, the mothers of terrorists who are in prison. Those groups pioneer some legitimate activities and encourage confrontation with the police. Between 1995 and 1998, DHKP-C, for example, organized and urged the mothers of the terrorists to protest the prison policies of the government. Those mothers, called "Saturday Mothers," were involved with confrontations with the police many times.

Prison and Prisoners' Parents

DHKP-C organizes the terrorists in the prison also because under the intense police control, every active terrorist may easily be determined and imprisoned. Since the terrorists who are members of the same organization are housed together in the Turkish prison system, they easily organize and become a threat for the prison guardians. Moreover, DHKP-C administers some of its illegitimate units from the prison. The reason for this is that sometimes even the top members can be imprisoned and the organization cannot easily fill his or her position within a short amount of time. Ercan Kartal, for example, one of the top members of the DHKP-C, administered all the illegitimate units from the inside of the prison.

Turkey security forces have had significant success against terrorist organizations. In fact, most of the high level terrorists have been arrested and sentenced to lengthy terms. However, because of living in a same prison dorm with forty other people, they have changed prisons into terrorist training camps. Therefore, the prison and imprisonment are potential problems for the government.

Youth Units

Revolutionary youth is a university student organization. The main goals are to spread DHKP/C opinions among the university students in Turkey and to make new recruits. Their main way to make recruitment is that they start with small, legitimate ideals, which influence students. For example, sometimes they complain about overpriced tuition or some campus problems, so the other students may join their activities. Then the terrorist groups gain entrance into the students' activities and can later introduce their ideology. Then student activities may escalate and become confrontations between students and security forces.

According to Lenin, in order to make revolution, terrorist groups have to create conflict between government agencies and the public. This is the same principle when students are encouraged to fight against university administration and security forces (Lenin, 1908). Sometimes security forces arrest them; in fact, they may be taken into custody or sent to jail. This process causes them to become an enemy of the government; therefore, terrorist groups benefit from this situation, and recruitment becomes easier.

In addition, most of the Communist revolutions have been accomplished by workers and farmers; however, the story of Turkey's revolutionary Terrorist groups is

completely different than the other revolutionary groups. Turkey has a unique position because university students have started most of the terrorist organizations in Turkey. Therefore, DHKP/C has a university student organization federation, which is called TODEF (The Federation of Turkish Student Association). TODEF members participate in almost all anti-government demonstrations whether they are student-related or not.

Every university has a university committee, which is led by regional committee. Moreover, the university committees are supervised by the regional committee. In addition, TODEF organizes summer camps each year where the other unsuspecting students can join. In this way, the terrorist organization can attract new members.

Liseli Devrimci Genclik (LDG): High School Revolutionary Youth

The LDG has the same structure and a goal as TODEF has; however, its members are in the high schools. They are carrying out the same activities as the TODEF members do. Also, they have their own committee and management system just like TODEF. If their members graduate from high schools and get into the university, they would become members of TODEF.

In short, DHKP/C has lost most of its power because of police operations. Since July 12, 1991, and April 16-17 1992, most of high level of militants have been killed or arrested, or some of them have left the terrorist organizations. Therefore, although it was the most destructive terrorist group in Turkey, it has become a marginal terrorist group. However, the situation of DHKP/C is the same as the situation of Devrimci Sol between 1983 and 1989. If we cannot stop recruitment, we will see the same terrorist activity in the future. Therefore, in my study I am going to research how they recruit

new people. If we find the reasons, we will be able to stop them. Otherwise, we will see the same problems in the future.

CHAPTER IV

DATA AND EXPLANATION OF RESULTS

Introduction

After analyzing the questions, we realized that the question should be divided three main categories, which are family condition, respondent condition, and respondent relation with terrorist group. The first part consists of two main areas, which are the economic and the political condition of the respondent's family. Also, the second part consists of two main parts. They are general information of respondent and social status (social bonds) of respondents. In addition, the last part should be divided into two main parts, which are general information, which related terrorist group, and reasons to join the terrorist group. As a result, chapter four is mainly about the data and explanation of results.

Family Condition

Economic Condition of Family

Father Work Status

There is an obvious trend that the terrorist organization members to come from lower class families. Almost half of the terrorist's fathers are farmers (table 1). Additionally, 10% of the fathers are laborers and over 12% of the fathers are reported as self employed. On the other hand, only 5% of the fathers are reported to hold official jobs, which would be considered as middle class. Also, 10% of the fathers are reported as retired, which accounts for an apparent reduction in the salary. Therefore, the research shows that most of the terrorists come from considerably poor or lower class families.

FATWORK Father's Occupation

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	2 Farmer	28	37.3	46.7	46.7
	3 Laborer	7	9.3	11.7	58.3
	4 Officer	4	5.3	6.7	65.0
	6 Self Employed	12	16.0	20.0	85.0
	7 Retired	9	12.0	15.0	100.0
	Total	60	80.0	100.0	
Missing	System	15	20.0		
Total		75	100.0		

Table 1 Father's Occupation

Mother Work Status

In addition to the father's work status, mother's work status (table 2) also is consistent with the notion of lower class as three quarters of the mothers are reported to be homemakers who do not work at all and, who stay at home. Among the mothers, there was only one officer-worker and one worker. It is clear that the families lack a second income from the mothers. Consequently, the parents' work status clearly indicates that the families of the terrorist organization members are relatively poor and lower class (table 4).

MOTWORK Mother's Occupation

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	2 Homemaker	61	81.3	92.4	92.4
	4 Farmer	1	1.3	1.5	93.9
	5 Worker	2	2.7	3.0	97.0
	6 Officer	1	1.3	1.5	98.5
	7 Self Employed	1	1.3	1.5	100.0
	Total	66	88.0	100.0	
Missing	System	9	12.0		
Total		75	100.0		

Table 2 Mother's Occupation

Number of Brothers and Sisters

An additional negative factor affecting the economic status of the families in this research tends to be the number of siblings that need to be taken care of by the family, which puts extra burden on the fathers, most of whom are the only moneymakers for the families. The research shows that over 95% of the families have at least three children (table 3). Among those families, 13% have three; 16% have five and another 16%, six children. In the study, there are families with up to twelve children. Not only do children create economic burdens, but also the number of the children in the family reduces the attention that parents can give each child. The resulting lack of parental control, along with the limited resources for each child, creates stress in the family. These conditions are also positively correlated with a low level of education, as most of the families cannot afford to send all of their children to schools.

SIBLINGS Number of Brothers and Sisters

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	1	1.3	1.6	1.6
	2	2	2.7	3.3	4.9
	3	10	13.3	16.4	21.3
	4	9	12.0	14.8	36.1
	5	12	16.0	19.7	55.7
	6	12	16.0	19.7	75.4
	7	4	5.3	6.6	82.0
	8	4	5.3	6.6	88.5
	9	5	6.7	8.2	96.7
	11	2	2.7	3.3	100.0
		Total	61	81.3	100.0
Missing	99 NA	14	18.7		
Total		75	100.0		

Table 3 Number of Siblings

Family Economic Situation

SOCCLASS Respondents Subjective Social Class

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Upper middle class	9	12.0	13.8	13.8
	2 Lower middle class	20	26.7	30.8	44.6
	3 Working class	10	13.3	15.4	60.0
	4 Working poor	5	6.7	7.7	67.7
	5 Underclass	21	28.0	32.3	100.0
	Total	65	86.7	100.0	
Missing	System	10	13.3		
Total		75	100.0		

Table 4 Respondents' Subjective Social Class

All of the data in this section indicates that the majority of terrorists and their families had financial difficulties (figure 4). As a result, the data in this section shows that most of the terrorists tend to have financial problems either through their families or through their own work status.

Political Background of Family

Ethnicity of Respondent

The respondents are evenly distributed on their ethnicity. Half of the respondents are Turkish and the other half is Kurdish.

ETHNIC Ethnicity

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Turkish	38	50.7	50.7	50.7
	2 Kurdish	37	49.3	49.3	100.0
Total		75	100.0	100.0	

Table 5 Ethnicity of Respondents

Political Party Affiliation of Family

The majority of terrorists surveyed indicated having leftist backgrounds (table 6). When the terrorists were asked whether they had any relations with a political party before they became terrorists, almost all of them stated that they had connections with either leftist parties or radical leftist parties. Thirty-one out of seventy-five stated that they had political affiliation with at least one leftist political party. Another twenty-five claimed to be affiliated with more radical leftist parties, most of which are the political arms of the terrorist organizations. This data indicates the terrorists' strong relationship with leftist political parties, whether be regular leftist or radical leftist parties.

PARTYID Political Party Affiliation

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	2 Left	31	41.3	54.4	54.4
	3 Right	1	1.3	1.8	56.1
	4 Radical Left	25	33.3	43.9	100.0
	Total	57	76.0	100.0	
Missing	System	18	24.0		
Total		75	100.0		

Table 6 Political Party Affiliation

Relationship with Terrorist Organization: Family Members

Another variable consistent with the two variables stated above is the relationship of a terrorist's family with a terrorist organization (table 7). When the terrorists were asked whether their families' had relations with terrorist organizations or not, almost seventy percent of them stated that their families were somehow related with a terrorist organization. According to the data, there is a strong relationship between family connection with a terrorist organization and becoming a terrorist.

BCKGRNDF Ever been in relationship with a terrorist group? (FAMILY)

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 No	25	33.3	37.3	37.3
	2 Yes	42	56.0	62.7	100.0
	Total	67	89.3	100.0	
Missing	System	8	10.7		
Total		75	100.0		

Table 7 Relationship with Terrorist Organization: Family Members

Arrest and Conviction: Family Members

One of the other aspects that should be considered significant in this study is the number of the terrorists who have a family member who had prior a arrest due to terrorism related activities (table 8). Thirty-six terrorists out of seventy-five stated that at least one of their family members was arrested once because of a terrorist activity. This number corresponds to almost 70% of the surveyed terrorists had somebody in their family who had been arrested before. There is a strong relationship between the prior arrests of a family member and being a terrorist

FARREST Ever been arrested or sentenced? (FAMILY)

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Yes	36	48.0	61.0	61.0
	2 No	23	30.7	39.0	100.0
	Total	59	78.7	100.0	
Missing	System	16	21.3		
Total		75	100.0		

Table 8 Arrest and Conviction: Family Members

The data in this section (tables 1-8) presents a strong relationship between becoming a terrorist and political party affiliation, prior arrest or sentencing a family member for terrorist activity, and the families' relationship with terrorist organizations.

This relationship is so strong that most of the time the relation rate is over seventy percent. Therefore, it can easily be claimed that people who have strong leftist political party affiliation, prior arresting or sentencing in the family, and whose families' have a relationship with a terrorist organizations are more likely to become terrorists.

Respondent Situation

General Information about Respondent

Gender

Two thirds of the respondents are male and one third is female (Figure, 2.A.a)

SEX Respondent's Gender

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 1 Male	50	66.7	66.7	66.7
2 Female	25	33.3	33.3	100.0
Total	75	100.0	100.0	

Table 9 Respondent's Gender

Date of Birth

At the time of the survey, most of the terrorists were around twenty-five years old (table 10). Seventeen of them were born in 1972, 9% were born in 1978, 8% were born in 1970, 7% were born in 1973, another 7% were born in 1969, and another 7% were born in 1975. The oldest respondent was born in 1952 and the youngest one was born in 1979. The mean was 1970 and the median and mode was 1972. Terrorists tend to be between the ages of 21 and 27 and most of them are around the age of 25.

DOB Date of Birth

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1952	1	1.3	1.4	1.4
	1953	1	1.3	1.4	2.8
	1954	1	1.3	1.4	4.2
	1956	2	2.7	2.8	6.9
	1957	1	1.3	1.4	8.3
	1962	3	4.0	4.2	12.5
	1965	1	1.3	1.4	13.9
	1966	3	4.0	4.2	18.1
	1967	2	2.7	2.8	20.8
	1968	1	1.3	1.4	22.2
	1969	5	6.7	6.9	29.2
	1970	6	8.0	8.3	37.5
	1971	3	4.0	4.2	41.7
	1972	12	16.0	16.7	58.3
	1973	5	6.7	6.9	65.3
	1974	4	5.3	5.6	70.8
	1975	5	6.7	6.9	77.8
	1976	4	5.3	5.6	83.3
	1977	4	5.3	5.6	88.9
	1978	6	8.0	8.3	97.2
1979	2	2.7	2.8	100.0	
	Total	72	96.0	100.0	
Missing	System	3	4.0		
Total		75	100.0		

Table 10 Respondent's Date of Birth

Type of Place Respondent was Born

Almost half of the respondents were born in villages or farms (table 11). Little over 25% were born in small cities or towns, 15% were born in cities and another 15% were born in big cities.

BORN Type of Place Respondent was Born

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Village or Farm	36	48.0	48.6	48.6
	2 Town	16	21.3	21.6	70.3
	3 City	11	14.7	14.9	85.1
	5 Greater City Suburbs	11	14.7	14.9	100.0
	Total	74	98.7	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.3		
Total		75	100.0		

Table 11 Type of Place Respondent was Born

Health

The question which related respondents' health situation is if they had ever had health problems. The result seems very high (table 12). In fact, it does not mean that 54% of them unhealthy. It means they have had some health problem in their lives, so more than half of the respondents reported yes, and 45% reported no.

HEALTHR What kind of health problems do you have?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Healthy	21	28.0	45.7	45.7
	2 Unhealthy	25	33.3	54.3	100.0
	Total	46	61.3	100.0	
Missing	System	29	38.7		
Total		75	100.0		

Table 12 Types of Respondent's Health Problems

Social Situation of Respondent (Social Bonds of Respondent)

Marital Status of Respondent

It is expected that the social status of the people have an undeniable affect on people's becoming terrorists. In the data, only 10% of the respondents were married, and there was only one person who was divorced (table 13). The rest of the

respondents, 87%, have never been married at all. As a result, 94% of the respondents did not have any children. Therefore, most of the respondents openly did not have family responsibilities. In one sense, they considered themselves free, as they did not have any responsibilities for anybody else; that is they did not have to take care of spouses or children.

MARITAL Respondent's Marital Status

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 1 Married	8	10.7	10.7	10.7
3 Divorced	2	2.7	2.7	13.3
5 Never married	65	86.7	86.7	100.0
Total	75	100.0	100.0	

Table 13 Respondent's Marital Status

Respondent Number of Children

Almost 95% of the respondents reported that they do not have any children (table 14). Only 5% reported that they have children.

CHILDS Respondent Number of children

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 0	70	93.3	93.3	93.3
1	4	5.3	5.3	98.7
2	1	1.3	1.3	100.0
Total	75	100.0	100.0	

Table 14 Respondent's Number of Children

Education of Respondent

Education is certainly an important factor in socialization. Our data presents an important aspect of the terrorists with regard to their education status (table 15). First of all, only around 7% of the respondents are university graduates. Only five out of

seventy-five had a bachelor degree. Sixteen out of seventy-five (21%) were university dropouts. It is quite possible that those sixteen had to drop out because they had affiliation with terrorist organizations. Only 23% graduated from high school and a 14% were high school dropouts. Of the respondents, 8% graduated from middle school, and 12% graduated from primary schools. Another important finding from this data is the fact that only 33% of the respondents were able to make it through high school. The rest of them were either dropouts or graduates of middle or primary schools.

This data shows us that most of the terrorists who were surveyed here were under educated. Most of them even could not make it through high school. Therefore, we can conclude that there is a strong relationship between the education status of the terrorists and becoming a terrorist organization member. It is probably correct to assume that the more educated people are, the less they are influenced by terrorist organizations.

EDUC Education Status

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	2 Primary School Dropout	1	1.3	1.4	1.4
	3 Primary School Graduate	9	12.0	12.2	13.5
	4 Middle School Dropout	8	10.7	10.8	24.3
	5 Middle School Graduate	6	8.0	8.1	32.4
	6 High School Dropout	10	13.3	13.5	45.9
	7 High School Graduate	17	22.7	23.0	68.9
	8 University Dropout	16	21.3	21.6	90.5
	9 University Graduate	5	6.7	6.8	97.3
	10 Master	1	1.3	1.4	98.6
	11 PhD	1	1.3	1.4	100.0
	Total	74	98.7	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.3		
Total		75	100.0		

Table 15 Education Status

Respondent Job Status

In addition to the father and mother' work status and the number of the siblings, most of the terrorists who were included in this research lacked proper financial support (Figure, 2.B.c). Only eight percent of the respondents had full time jobs to support themselves. Over fifty percent reported either not working or being laid off. Thirty percent of them responded as temporarily not working and around five percent worked part time jobs. Therefore, the research shows that the most of the respondents lacked proper jobs and had financial problems

RWRKSTAT Respondent Job Status

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Working Fulltime	6	8.0	8.1	8.1
	2 Working Parttime	4	5.3	5.4	13.5
	3 Temp. Not Working	22	29.3	29.7	43.2
	4 Unempl, Laid off	38	50.7	51.4	94.6
	6 Student	4	5.3	5.4	100.0
	Total	74	98.7	100.0	
Missing	9 NA	1	1.3		
Total		75	100.0		

Table 16 Respondent Job Status

Kind of Job

Almost 70% of the respondents reported that they were working at jobs that required physical labor (table 17). On the other hand, 30% reported that they were working at office jobs.

RJOBKIND What kind of job

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Physical Labor	29	38.7	69.0	69.0
	2 Office Work	13	17.3	31.0	100.0
	Total	42	56.0	100.0	
Missing	System	33	44.0		
Total		75	100.0		

Table 17 Job Type

Residential Movement of Respondent

Movement or immigration is another important factor. The data presents that 60% of the respondents moved to another city, mostly from the villages or suburbs to the bigger cities, once in their life (table 18). This migration between the small and bigger cities seems to have affected the outcome. It is safe to assume that the terrorists can develop easier and better connections with the people who moved from somewhere else and who are looking for new social contacts.

MOBILITY Did you move from your hometown to a bigger city?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Yes	45	60.0	61.6	61.6
	2 No	28	37.3	38.4	100.0
	Total	73	97.3	100.0	
Missing	0	2	2.7		
Total		75	100.0		

Table 18 Respondent Move to Bigger City

Respondent's Parent Alive or Deceased

When we look at the families of the terrorists from the point of whether their parents are alive or not, the rate corresponds with the general population in Turkey (table 19). Almost 80% of the parents were alive at the time of the survey. The only significance here seems to be the death of the father with the rate of 13%. We can conclude that lack of parental supervision may contribute to joining terrorist organizations. However, this correlation is not significant.

PRNTDETH Parent Alive or Not

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Both Alive	57	76.0	85.1	85.1
	3 Father Deceased	9	12.0	13.4	98.5
	4 Mother Deceased	1	1.3	1.5	100.0
	Total	67	89.3	100.0	
Missing	System	8	10.7		
Total		75	100.0		

Table 19 Respondent's Parent Alive or Deceased

Marital Status of Respondent Family

Three quarters of the respondent families reported to be married and living together (table 20). Twenty-one percent of them are separated; almost 5% of the respondent's fathers live with another woman.

FAMMARST Family Marital Status

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Married and together	53	70.7	74.6	74.6
	2 Separated	15	20.0	21.1	95.8
	4 Father with another woman	3	4.0	4.2	100.0
	Total	71	94.7	100.0	
Missing	System	4	5.3		
Total		75	100.0		

Table 20 Marital Status

Respondent Relation with Terrorist Organization

General Information

Date of Report

Most of the reports were written in 1995 with the ratio of 33% (table 21). Seventeen percent of them were written in 1994 and 14% of them were written in 1996. Even though the reports are around ten years old, the facts studied in this research

should not be considered out of date, as most of the responses to the questions would be the same if the respondents were surveyed today.

DATE Date of report

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1991	3	4.0	8.3	8.3
	1992	4	5.3	11.1	19.4
	1993	5	6.7	13.9	33.3
	1994	6	8.0	16.7	50.0
	1995	12	16.0	33.3	83.3
	1996	5	6.7	13.9	97.2
	2002	1	1.3	2.8	100.0
	Total	36	48.0	100.0	
Missing	System	39	52.0		
Total		75	100.0		

Table 21 Date of Report

How Long a Member of this Organization

The mean of the membership is 9.28 years on average; the respondents were member of a terrorist organization for over 9 years. (Figure, 3.A.b). The median was 8 and the mode was 7. The highest numbers of years was 27 and the least was 1 year.

MEMBER How long have been a member of this organization? (In years)

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 1	3	4.0	4.0	4.0
2	4	5.3	5.3	9.3
3	4	5.3	5.3	14.7
4	7	9.3	9.3	24.0
5	7	9.3	9.3	33.3
6	2	2.7	2.7	36.0
7	8	10.7	10.7	46.7
8	7	9.3	9.3	56.0
9	3	4.0	4.0	60.0
10	6	8.0	8.0	68.0
11	2	2.7	2.7	70.7
12	7	9.3	9.3	80.0
13	3	4.0	4.0	84.0
14	2	2.7	2.7	86.7
15	1	1.3	1.3	88.0
21	3	4.0	4.0	92.0
22	1	1.3	1.3	93.3
24	1	1.3	1.3	94.7
25	3	4.0	4.0	98.7
27	1	1.3	1.3	100.0
Total	75	100.0	100.0	

Table 22 How Long a Member of the Organization?

Type of Respondent's Birthplace

The birthplace of the terrorists also presents a very important factor (table 23). Almost half of the terrorists were born either in a village or a farm. Another 22% were born in towns. Fifteen percent of them were born in cities and another 15% of them were born in suburbs. Therefore, only 15% of the respondents were actually born in the cities where the amenities are expected to be better when compared with the rest of the respondents. Also, the percentage of those born in villages or farms is three times greater than any of other places equaling to almost half of the group.

In Turkey, village or farms are small places which the population is less than one thousand. Also, the towns are mostly small places. Although some of towns' populations are greater than 100,000, most of the towns are also small places.

BORN Type of Place Respondent was Born

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Village or Farm	36	48.0	48.6	48.6
	2 Town	16	21.3	21.6	70.3
	3 City	11	14.7	14.9	85.1
	5 Greater City Suburbs	11	14.7	14.9	100.0
	Total	74	98.7	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.3		
Total		75	100.0		

Table 23 Type of Birthplace - Respondent

Prior Arrests - Respondents

A little over 70% of the respondents reported that they had at least one prior arrest (table 24). Almost 28% reported that it was their first arrest.

RARREST Ever been arrested or sentenced?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Yes	52	69.3	72.2	72.2
	2 No	20	26.7	27.8	100.0
	Total	72	96.0	100.0	
Missing	System	3	4.0		
Total		75	100.0		

Table 24 Prior Arrests

Prior Relationship with a Terrorist Group

Thirty percent of the respondents reported that they had been in a relationship with a terrorist group when they joined the terrorist organization (table 25). Seventy

percent of the respondents on the other hand reported that they had not been in a relationship with a terrorist organization when they joined the terrorist group.

BCKGRNDR Ever been in relationship with a terrorist group?

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 1 No	49	65.3	69.0	69.0
2 Yes	22	29.3	31.0	100.0
Total	71	94.7	100.0	
Missing System	4	5.3		
Total	75	100.0		

Table 25 Prior Relationship with Terrorist Group

Reasons to Join

Underlying Reasons for Joining this Terrorist Organization

According to the data, there are three important factors in joining terrorist organizations. The first one is loss of a family member or friend due to a terrorist-related incident. The second factor is political closeness of a terrorist organization. The next factor is injustice. Another significant factor is family problems.

REASON What is the underline reason behind becoming terrorist?

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 1 Injustice	9	12.0	14.1	14.1
2 Loss, Arrest or Imprisonment of people close to you	23	30.7	35.9	50.0
3 Military Oppression	2	2.7	3.1	53.1
4 Police Oppression	2	2.7	3.1	56.3
5 Detention	1	1.3	1.6	57.8
6 Family Problems	7	9.3	10.9	68.8
7 Political Closeness	20	26.7	31.3	100.0
Total	64	85.3	100.0	
Missing 9	1	1.3		
System	10	13.3		
Total	11	14.7		
Total	75	100.0		

Table 26 Underlying Reasons for Joining the Organization

Losing a close one to a terrorist-related incident, where the lost close one happens to be the terrorist, emotionally drives the relatives and friends of the killed terrorists into the hands of the terrorist organizations. Our data indicates that 40% of the respondents lost somebody in a terrorist-related incident where the person they lost happened to be a terrorist (table 27). When compared with the whole population, it is obvious that this rate is significantly high. Consequently, there is a strong relationship between losing a close friend or family member in a terrorist incident and joining a terrorist organization. Therefore, we can make the following assumption in regard to our data: the death of a terrorist brings more members to the terrorist organization due to the emotional condition of the close relatives and friends.

DEATH Loss of a friend or family member in a terrorist related incident

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Yes	30	40.0	44.1	44.1
	2 No	38	50.7	55.9	100.0
	Total	68	90.7	100.0	
Missing	System	7	9.3		
Total		75	100.0		

Table 27 Loss of Friend or Family Member in Terrorist-Related Incident

Initial Contact with Terrorist Organization

When the terrorists were asked about their initial contacts in the terrorist group, thirty-five (33%) responded that their friends dragged them into the terrorist organization (table 28). One quarter of them claimed that it was a relative who introduced him or her with the terrorist organization. The third significant element by which the terrorists were introduced to the terrorist organization was the publication of the terrorist organization with the ratio of over 16%. Prison related introductions follow the publication. Another

important factor was the umbrella associations that were established by the terrorist organizations for a variety of reasons.

FIRSTTIM How did you become a member of this organization?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Friend	24	32.0	35.3	35.3
	2 Relative	18	24.0	26.5	61.8
	3 Prison Related	5	6.7	7.4	69.1
	4 Organizational Publ.	11	14.7	16.2	85.3
	5 Demonstration	1	1.3	1.5	86.8
	7 Loss/Arrest of Close Circle	1	1.3	1.5	88.2
	8 Organizational Assosiation	4	5.3	5.9	94.1
	9 Social Problems / Unhealthy Mental Stat.	2	2.7	2.9	97.1
	14 Sympathy or Idealism	2	2.7	2.9	100.0
	Total	68	90.7	100.0	
	Missing	System	7	9.3	
Total		75	100.0		

Table 28 Initial Contact with Terrorist Organization

Conclusion and Summary

In conclusion, this data is composed of mainly two parts. The first part addresses the underlying reasons which influence individuals towards terrorism. When family, social, and political reasons pressure people, they become angry, unhappy, and discontented. This process makes the individuals potential targets for the terrorist organization. At this point, terrorists use propaganda by employing the most effective figures on the individuals. Friends, family members, and relatives are the most effective propogandists of terrorist organizations. Once the individuals are convinced, they are taken into a training program, which is broken down into two different parts. The first and the very effective is the political training in which the individuals practice some

illegitimate acts and confront police. At this point, the likelihood of being arrested and imprisonment is very high. These experiences provide individual a prestige in the organization and make him appointed to some significant positions in the organization. Terrorist organizations want to utilize those individuals in their military wing and take them into military training programs. They train their members on how to use certain weapons and how to maintain a professional terrorist life.

CHAPTER V

RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

Overall, this study had tried to understand the underlying reasons that individuals join terrorist groups and the recruitment process of DHKP/C terrorist organization. The first chapter focused on the methodology of the study. The second chapter focused on the history of terrorism and the definition of terrorism, terrorist, terrorist group and terrorist activity. The third chapter mainly focused on the DHKP/C terrorist organization, especially, history, structure, goals and political background of DHKP/C. The fourth chapter focused on my data analysis, which consists of three main areas. They are family condition, respondent condition, and respondent relation with terrorist group. Therefore, my last chapter is going to be focused the recommendations.

Turkey has suffered from a terrorism problem for a long time. The first terrorism wave took place from 1968 to 1972. The second wave occurred between 1974 and 1980, and the last wave started in 1984. The first two waves were stopped by military coup. In fact, the last one was stopped by law enforcement especially the TNP (Turkish National Police) and the Turkish army. As shown in figure 1, terrorism in Turkey has been decreasing since 1993.

Prior to 1974, most of the terrorist militants had been captured. However, in 1974 the government declared a general amnesty, which ended with the release of many terrorists from prisons. After 1974, terrorist activities started to increase. Similarly, the 1980 army coup stopped virtually all terrorist activity and, once again most of the

terrorist groups members were captured, but in 1984 with the release of terrorists from prison, the number of terrorist incidents began to rise (Sayari, 1987).




Figure 1 Terrorist Incidents in Turkey Jan '84 to Dec '03 (Statistic, 2004)

Figure 1 shows that even though terrorism activities almost were stopped between 1980 and 1988, they had increased from 1984 to 1993, after which there was a decline until 1999 and again in 2003. In fact, there are different reasons for the increase in terrorist incidents during those two years. In 1999, the leader of the PKK was captured, and PKK militants increased their terrorist activity briefly. Likewise, in 2003 the (first) Iraq war happened, and many demonstrations took place in Turkey, terrorists took advantage of these demonstrations to carry out their illegal activities.

Now the situation is better; however, if the government does not find solutions for the underlying problems of terrorism, Turkey may see a new terrorism problem arise. This study is very important to understanding the underlying reasons of terrorism, and leads the researcher to conclude that if the government can resolve the problems that create discontent and even desperation among their citizens, particularly young people, it will stop recruitment by terrorist groups; in other words, the government will stop

terrorism. Hopefully, the Turkish government can achieve this goal and prevent future outbreaks of terrorism. Otherwise, Turkey will lose people and money in the fight against terrorism as it has three times since 1968.

As we see from this study, an individual becomes a terrorist in several steps. Each step has different problems, and different social and political institutions play different roles in this process. The roots of the problems are social, economic, and familial. Therefore, solutions should focus on those problems. Some of the root problems come from government actions or non-actions, so the government and politicians must work to solve the problems, which make their citizens susceptible to recruitment by terrorist organizations. Government should work on providing equal opportunity in education; on solving social and economic problems; and on shifting central power to local governmental agencies. Government should also reorganize its counter-terrorism methods as well as the structure of anti-terrorism units. A terrorism research center should be established and an annual terrorism report which should be released and analyzed every fiscal year.

Recommendations

Education

The first and most important area is education. It can be divided into three main categories: regular education, public education, and religious education. Regular education, in turn, covers three main areas: primary-secondary school, high school, and university education.

Primary-Secondary Education

First is the primary school education, especially in village and town schools. As seen in the data, 50% of the respondents were from villages and farms; additionally, 25% of them were from small towns (tables 11 and 23). Therefore, government educational policies should be redesigned and some of the best teachers sent to those schools. In addition, the government should start in-service training for teachers who are working in those schools. The training programs should focus on democratic principles and values, the culture of living together, and how students may achieve future success.

In the same way, all villages have primary and secondary schools. People trust and believe in their teachers; however, because of a lack of opportunity, most teachers do not like to work in those rural schools, so the quality of education decreases. Therefore, the government should work on that problem and keep good teachers in those schools. If people in those villages have good teachers, they will trust them and learn a lot, and those teachers will become respected and will have a deep but now positive influence on the public and the youth. It is a clear that the PKK, another terrorist organization in Turkey, killed many teachers because of that reason. The teachers are critical to the education of people who live in villages.

High School Education

The second part of education programs should be focused on high schools because as we see in the data the mean terrorist age was 25; however, the mean number of years of being of being a terrorist was 7 (table 10). Therefore, most of the terrorists had initial contact or become sympathetic to terrorist groups in high school or

at the beginning of their university education. Terrorist groups may not recruit students if teachers and families work together because at this age their parents and teachers can still influence students. If these responsible adults learn to recognize the beginning of recruitment, they would be able to stop the process. Furthermore, terrorist groups benefit from school problems because they use these problems to incite students to react against the authorities rather than to act constructively to solve the problems. For example, when some unexpected situation happens and affects students, they demonstrate and come face to face with authorities. If the situation escalates, it may result in direct confrontation between students and authorities. To stop those kinds of problems, school administrations should create a system that gives students the chance to express their opinions and become a part of the solutions. Schools and parents should build good relations based on communication and mutual respect. Also, they should share their observations with each other. In my experience I know that if parents and teachers work together, they may observe the changes in students' behavior and be better able to intervene and stop the students before they become members of terrorist organizations.

University Education

The third part of the education programs should be focused on university education. One of the biggest differences between Turkey's universities and those of the U.S is that during my studies for the Master's degree, I have never seen a strike among university students. Also, I have not seen a demonstration by university students on campus. However, in Turkey almost every day fights and demonstrations are a part of higher education. Although fights and demonstrations occur at public universities in

Turkey, they do not occur at private universities. Each fight or demonstration ends with casualties, injuries, arrests, and increased hatred. Therefore, especially public universities should work on those problems and find some solutions to students' problems before they cause fights and demonstrations. The recommendations made above for high school administrators to find a way of engaging students in the constructive solution to problems may offer solutions to university administrations as well.

Public Education

As we see in the recruitment map some of the underlying problems are coming from family and social environment; therefore, the public, especially families, should be educated about terrorism, and they should learn how to act when their children or relatives join terrorist organizations. For example, one of my respondents' fathers realized that his son was reading a DHKP/C magazine, and he explained that this is a terrorist group magazine and asked his son not to read this magazine. Therefore, if the government educates family about terrorism, they may realize what is going on, and they will stop their children before they join terrorist groups.

Religious Education

In addition to secular education, religious education should be organized or at least observed by the government. People get need to get education about values, and for most cultures that education comes from religion. If the government does not create or support opportunities, people try different ways. By inaction, a government creates opportunities for terrorist groups. In fact, some radical religious based terrorist groups benefit from these situations. Therefore, the government should supply religious

education in the public places, mainly at school, to stop terrorist groups' recruitment. Moreover, summer courses should be conducted at schools because it is easy to monitor them, and terrorist groups may not reach students to influence them.

Furthermore, the fact that religion and religious education play an important role in countries such as Turkey needs to be considered. In the future, Turkey probably will not see much leftist terrorism because, after the SSCB collapse, leftist terrorist groups have decreased. However, religion based terrorist groups may replace those groups as a potential source of terrorism. Ninety percent of the villages have mosques. It appears that religious and ethnic based terrorism may become a serious problem if the government does not take some actions. To stop religious-based terrorism, the biggest responsibility lies with Diyanet Islari Baskanligi (Religion Affairs Directory) because they have 76.445 mosques around the country (Statistic, 2004). If they educate their Moslem clerics, they will educate the public about terrorism. Fortunately, religious based terrorist groups have not been influenced by Turkish religions and attitudes; however, terrorist groups from outside of Turkey have significantly influenced them. As a result, if government educates people about true religion, terrorist groups will not find place make recruitment. If the government does not support religious education, people especially in east part of Turkey are more likely to become potential targets for terrorist groups.

Shift of Power from Central to Local Governmental Agencies

Turkey is a centralized government, so the distribution of government services is difficult, and people must try to find the solution for their problems in Ankara, the capital city of Turkey. Therefore, it causes problems and wastes time and money. People

become angry with the government. Knowing this problem, for the last ten years, all governments have tried to shift much of the central government's authority to the local authorities; however, none of them has been successful, but the government should do this as soon as possible.

Academic Research Needed

A terrorism research center should be established and an annual terrorism report should also be produced every fiscal year. In addition, although Turkey has suffered from the terrorism problem for more than four decades, the academic world in Turkey has ignored that problem. As the recruitment process outlined by the researcher shows, terrorism is primarily a social problem, not a job for law enforcement. In fact, it is clear that without solutions for social problems being found, terrorism will not be stopped by law enforcement. As a result, universities should focus on these major problems and open research centers in order to further explore the underlying causes of terrorism.

On the other hand, Turkey has a national police force, which serves as very good connection between local and central agencies, so it is easy to collect data about terrorism. In fact, local police sends every kind of information, which related to terrorism to the headquarters of TNP. The academic and police experts should develop a new data collection method based on the underlying reasons for terrorism, should prepare an annual terrorism report each fiscal year in order to predict future trends in terrorism, and should make recommendations to the government.

In order to get help from the academic world, METU (the Middle East Technical University) should join with TNP to establish the International Human Rights and Security Research Center as soon as possible. In 1999, as a team leader of the Ankara

Anti-Terrorism Unit, I first conceived the idea to open a research center to study human rights and international security, and was appointed by the General Director of TNP to work on this issue. After several meetings with Professor Omer Saatcioglu, the former president of METU, and Prof.Dr. Yusuf Ziya Ozcan, the current chair of the Social Science Department, the idea was accepted by the METU administration and the General Director of Turkish National Police and Prof. Dr. Ural AKBULUT, the President of METU, signed the protocol. Unfortunately, after some political changes, it could not be established. However, not only public universities but also private universities should open institutes to study the problems underlying terrorism.

Government Reevaluation of Counter-Terrorism Methods and Structure

Government should re-evaluate their counter-terrorism methods as well as the structure of anti-terrorism units. Since 1994, terrorism has been decreasing in Turkey. In 1993, people could not travel safely in south east part of Turkey because of terrorism; however, right now, Turkey is safer than ever before. When we look the statistics, level of terrorism is significantly low. Based on the information gathered, law enforcement should not focus on arresting terrorists but focus on preventing terrorism as well as stopping recruitment. They have to work with families to stop their children from joining terrorism organizations.

Appointment of City and Town Governors and Police Chiefs

City and town governors and police chiefs should be appointed based on public needs and relations. In the cities, the governors are the representative of the government. Their behavior may deeply influence the relationship between the public and the government. Turkey has been fighting terrorism for forty years, so the relation

between the public and the government has been adversely affected. Therefore, the main problem is how to fix those relations. The success for Turkey depends on how fast the government creates well-designed public relations. For example, Gaffar Okkan, who was the police chief in Diyarbakir, the biggest city in the east part of Turkey, created an excellent relationship between the people and the Diyarbakir police. For that reason, Hizbullah, a Turkish religious based terrorist group, killed him. They knew that, because of him, they would not be successful. As a result of their potential for building solid relationships between the public and the government, the city governor, the town governor, and the chief of city police should be appointed with this goal in mind.

In conclusion, although Turkey has had a terrorism problem since 1970, right now Turkey is safer than ever before. However, if the government does not find solutions for social, political, economical problems, Turkey will see terrorism in the future. Therefore, the actions, mentioned above should be taken by Turkish government in order to prevent future terrorist activities.

APPENDIX

Research Questions

1. What is your name?
2. Where were you born? And what is your birth date?
3. What is your ethnicity?
4. What is your level of education?
5. How many brothers and sister do you have? And what is your family economic situation?
6. What is the current situation of your family?
7. What is your family's political background?
8. Do you have any relatives who work in the police or army force?
9. Do you have a significant relation with someone from opposite sex?
10. Do you have any job experience?
11. Do you have any special knowledge, such as computers or electronics?
12. Have you ever been abroad? And do you have any relatives who live abroad?
13. Can you speak any foreign language?
14. Do you know how to use a gun?
15. Do you have any health problems?
16. Have you ever been in (a relation with the) other terrorist organizations?
17. Could you briefly give information about your background?
18. How did you find out the organization?
19. What are your good and bad behaviors?
20. Have you ever been in police custody? Did you give any information about the organization to the police?
21. Do you know the purpose of the organization? Did you read the organization's written materials?
22. To you, what is the meaning of the organization?

23. Can you accept every kind of duty without questioning?
24. Why did you join the organization? What was the reason that you are a member of DHKP/C?
25. What is your area in the organization, or which part of the organization are you working in?
26. Could you make a judgment about your team leader?
27. Could you make a judgment about your subordinates?

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