THE IMPACT OF GENDER ON DOMESTIC HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE

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This study develops three models of human rights determinants with the inclusion an untested variable, women in parliaments. The research is conducted on pooled cross-sectional time-series data from 130 countries between 1978 and 1996. For the purpose of analysis the Prais-Winsten Regression method with Panel Corrected Standard Errors was used. The women in power variable is hypothesized to be significantly, positively correlated with a state’s propensity toward respect for human rights and is operationalized as percentage of women in parliaments. Three models incorporating as control variables previously identified correlates of human rights abuse were utilized to assess the impact of percentages of women in parliaments on two individual subsets of human rights: personal integrity rights and socio-economic rights. Two models were designed to measure the subset of rights categorized as personal integrity rights using two separate measures: State Department Scores and Amnesty International Scores. Model number three utilized the Physical Quality of Life Index to measure levels of socio-economic rights. Statistical significance was demonstrated by the women in parliament variable in all three models.
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A relatively recent proliferation of human rights scholarship has resulted in the examination of many possible causal factors of and explanations for the employment of human rights abuse as a tool of domestic control by regimes. But the literature to date has overlooked one important variable that has been shown to influence other areas of decision making including international policy choices. In studies addressing causes and explanations of other political behavior and phenomena gender has been considered as a possible factor. Nonetheless, even though a good deal of the human rights research has centered around attempts to identify and measure factors that might contribute to a state’s choices to employ repression and violence against its own population, gender has yet to be examined as a possible element of the explanation. Therefore, I will examine the impact of women in power on levels of domestic human rights abuse.

Studies suggest that women prefer diplomacy over violence with regards to international policy (Caprioli, 2000; Caprioli, 2001; Togeby, 1994; Wilcox and Allsop, 1996; Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986; Smith, 1984). It is logical to assume that domestic policy is subject to the same gender specific reasoning, preferences, and influence and therefore an important determinant of levels of domestic human rights violations not yet analyzed. Consequently, the questions remain, is there a correlation between the number of women policy makers in a state and that state’s levels of human rights

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1 This literature is vast and is detailed in the literature review.
abuse? And, do women in power impact one category of rights more than another? Those are the questions this thesis will address.

The omission of the gender variable in the study of human rights abuse may be a significant oversight by scholars because some would argue that gender differences and/or feminist ideology shape domestic political culture, and domestic political culture appears to be a key factor in foreign policy choices especially with regards to the use of aggression and violence. According to international relations literature a state’s preference for force and violence in international interactions is likely to be a reflection of the attributes of a state’s domestic political culture (Caprioli, 2000, 51; Doyle, 1986; Maoz & Russett, 1992; Russet, 1990).

As a result it seems safe to assume that the attributes of domestic political culture will influence policy choices and be determinants of whether violent and abusive measures are employed by a state to quell domestic unrest and conflict as well. Indeed, according to some studies, which assess predictors of militarism, domestic political values and attributes appear to have a greater predictive value than any of the other factors (Caprioli, 2000; Brandes, 1994; Fite et al., 1990; Forsythe, 1992; Iannello, 1992; McGlen & Sarkees, 1993; Peterson, 1992; Tickner, 1992; Togeby, 1994). And it is argued in the literature that women, if given power within a system, will greatly influence domestic political values and culture (Caprioli, 2000; Caprioli, 2001; Togeby, 1994; Wilcox and Allsop, 1996; Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986).

Scholars across several disciplines including international relations, feminism, sociology, and psychology, have conducted studies of what is termed, the “gender gap,” in the preferences of men and women for the use of violence in international conflict.
Context dictates the application of the term, “gender gap,” as it can be employed to describe a number of phenomena in many fields (Wirls, 1986), and a passionate debate continues across disciplines as to whether such a gap exists. But for the purpose of this thesis gender gap will refer to the moral orientation differences between the genders, whether genetic or socialized, that most likely influence policy decisions and state choices of methods for management of domestic affairs.

There is support for the contention that men are more likely than women to advocate aggression and force as a tool to accomplish a foreign policy goal (Caprioli, 2000, 2001; deBoer, 1985; Fite, 1990; Frankovic, 1982; McGlen & Sarkees, 1993; Mueller, 1973, 1994; Shapiro & Mahajan; 1986; Smith, 1984; Togeby, 1994). It is reasoned that in a political culture with more gender equality where women have obtained a degree of political influence diplomacy will be preferred over violent and aggressive foreign policy. It is realistic to expect that the same should hold true with domestic political behavior as well, resulting in less domestic repression and higher levels of human rights.

Public opinion research (GALLUP, HARRIS, NORC, NORC-GSS, ROPER & SRS, 1936-1983) conducted in the United States, and survey data collected in the Middle East (Tessler & Warriner, 1997) have been analyzed for the purpose of determining whether such a gap might exist and whether it shapes political culture. Data analysis from both seem to lend support to the contention that gender differences in thinking, with regards to moral, aggression and violence related issues, does indeed exist.
It also seems to suggest that perhaps that gender differences may be genetic and thus cross-cultural. But on the other hand, some sociologists would argue that any gender gap in attitudes exists due to cultural socialization (Hoyenga & Hoyenga, 1979; Geen Vol 2, 5), and many biologists would attribute differences to inherent gender specific characteristics that we are born with (Hoyenga & Hoyenga, 1979; Geen Vol 2., 5). Either or both could be strong determinants of the “ethic of caring” gender gap that appears to shape differences in preferences for types of crisis solutions. The question of which is the predominant factor is irrelevant; the important question not yet asked in the literature is whether those gender differences play a role in choices made by states for the use of either violent, aggressive or diplomatic solutions domestically when women have sufficient political power to influence and affect policy.

The answer to the question: Is the degree of state domestic terror influenced by the degree of political power and influence women have within that state?, is an important one that may provide insight for the future. If the assumption is made that gender differences result in policy differences, this ignored variable will become increasingly more important as women continue to gain political influence globally.

Consistent with cross-discipline\(^2\) theories of gender relevant differences in preferences for or against violent means of conflict resolution, I hypothesize that the higher the number of women there are in power in a state, the lower the levels of domestic human rights abuse there will be in that state. I will examine effects on two

\(^2\) Feminist scholars such as Pamela Conover who subscribe to the feminist theory regarding aggression would argue that it is not gender, per se, that influences preferences for either violence or diplomacy. Rather, they cite feminist ideology as the basis for less violent choices. Nevertheless, sociological, biological, and psychological theories, for the most part, concur (despite varying opinions as to what the causal factors might be) that differences do exist based on gender.
different categories of human rights, subsistence and personal integrity, with two separate measures being employed to assess the latter.

In order to determine the strength of any correlation between the independent variable, women in power, and levels of human rights I use the percentages of women in the parliaments of 130 countries regressed on the two subsets of human rights. Panel data compiled for the years 1978 through 1996 is analyzed using OLS regression with panel corrected standard error estimates.

For those subsets that are being considered as the dependent variables, levels of subsistence rights will be measured by the Physical Quality of Life Index (Morris, 1979; Calloway, 2001) while State Department and Amnesty International scores (Poe, Tate, 1994; and Poe, Tate, and Keith, 1999) will serve as indicators of personal integrity rights. A number of control variables are included in each of the models as they have been widely agreed upon in the literature as important determinants of human rights abuse. These will include levels of democracy, economic standing, active participation in international war, presence of civil war, presence of a leftist government, presence of a military regime, and population.

Chapter II will review relevant literature across disciplines. At this time there is no existing literature addressing any aspect of the impact of women on domestic repression although there has been some investigation into what the implications are for international dispute. More research has been conducted for the purpose of determining whether a gender gap does indeed exist and what the possible origins of that gap may be. And ample literature can be found documenting the human rights
research that has been conducted in an attempt to ascertain what the causal factors for human rights abuse may be.

The theories from which my hypotheses are derived for this research will be set out in chapter III along with the operationalization and discussion of all variables employed in the three models. A model will be formulated in chapter IV, the pooled cross-sectional time-series regression methods used to empirically test the models will be discussed, and the results will interpreted and analyzed. Chapter V summarizes the findings and research conclusions, discusses their implications, and addresses possibilities for further research.
CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter will survey the literature across several different disciplines as it is necessary first, to validate the assumption of a gender gap in values and cognitive reasoning with support from behavioral sciences as well as public opinion research. I then review how the behavioral studies have been utilized to assess the effects of gender related characteristics on political agendas and policy as documented in the international relations literature. Also included are previous empirical findings of human rights research as it has yielded other significant, widely accepted correlates of human rights, several of which are incorporated in my models as control variables.

Human Rights Research

Human rights literature points to several possible factors that are correlated with levels of repression and domestic political terror. Research thus far has focused on regime and state characteristics as well as a state’s level of involvement in conflict. None of the studies have explored the possibility that there might be a correlation between the characteristics of the policy makers and levels of human rights.

Many scholars have included levels of states’ democracy (Poe & Tate, 1994; Poe, Tate, & Keith, 1997; Zanger, 2000; Callaway, 2001; Sherborne, 2003; Harrelson-Stephens, 2003; Keith, 2004; Carey, 2004; Poe, 2004; Henderson, 1991, 1993; Davenport, 1995b, 1996a, 1996b), of development (Strouse & Claude, 1976; Mitchel & McCormick, 1988; Boswell & Dixon, 1990; Poe & Tate, 1994; Poe, Tate, & Keith, 1997; Richards, Gelleny & Sacko, 2001; Poe, 2004), of involvement in international war (Poe
& Tate, 1994; Poe, Tate, & Keith, 1997; Poe, 2004), and civil war (Poe & Tate, 1994; Poe, Tate, & Keith, 1997; Poe, 2004). However, there are possible explanations for domestic human rights abuse that may be tied to gender that have yet to be tested.

International Relations Research

Numerous studies within the international relations literature provide evidence that a state’s domestic political culture shapes its international political behavior and greatly influences foreign policy (Caprioli, 2000; Doyle, 1986; Maoz & Russett, 1992; Russett, 1990). Questions addressed in the literature have focused on the possible correlations between women with political decision-making power (percentage of women in parliaments) and foreign policy results with regards to the implementation of violent and aggressive means. Thus far, however, the research has not investigated whether there may be a correlation between gender related domestic values and power structures, and the levels of aggressive behavior implemented in states’ attempts to manage or squelch domestic crisis or dissent.

Empirical investigation into whether gender influences policy output has been conducted within various theoretical perspectives and within the framework of several fields, including international relations, feminist ideology, sociology, and public opinion studies. And Mary Caprioli’s work (2000, 2001) seems to indicate that gender does make a difference in foreign policy decisions and aggressive state behavior. The next logical step is to investigate whether this holds true for domestic policy as well thereby influencing whether a state adopts repressive measures as a means of maintaining control over its own citizens.
Cultural influences on behavior must be factored into any consideration of cross-cultural, cross-national study, but for the most part, for the purpose of this thesis the determinants of gendered moral reasoning differences are irrelevant. Scholars continue to debate which variables contribute to the differences, but regardless of the determinants of personality and response preferences, the general consensus, albeit controversial, from both the social constructivist and biological determinism perspectives is that women are more compassionate, and less likely to support violence and aggression as a means of justice or policy preference either for domestic or foreign problems (Gilligan, 1982; Caprioli, 2000). Once the assumption of gender differences is satisfied the origins and causes of those differences are irrelevant to the study of their influence on the choice of policy tools. Assuming there are gender differences we can begin to determine whether human rights abuse or attainment can be explained and/or predicted more efficiently by including the consideration of gender as a variable.

The influence of the female “ethic of caring,” if any, on a states’ aggressive or non-aggressive choices has been investigated to some extent within the context of international conflict and crisis. Although there is some disagreement among scholars about whether inherent gender cognitive and personality characteristics result in behavior and moral choice variances in all areas, with regards to foreign policy most studies have shown that women are less likely to support policy options that call for aggression or force (Caprioli, 2000; deBoer, 1985; Fite et al., 1990; Frankovic, 1982; McGlen & Sarkees, 1993; Mueller, 1973, 1994; Shapiro & Mahajan, 1986; Smith, 1984; Togeby, 1994). This should hold true for the use of aggression and force domestically as well.
Research findings documented within the international relations literature have provided evidence that there may be a correlation between a state’s domestic political culture and the degree to which it opts to pursue foreign policy matters with aggression and the use of violence (Caprioli 2000; Caprioli 2001; Doyle 1986, Maoz & Russett 1992; Russett 1990). Ample evidence supports the contention that the fundamental characteristics and norms that shape domestic political culture will naturally shape and influence the manner in which a state contends with international challenges.

Two recent studies by Mary Caprioli examine the affects of the varying degrees of gender equality and resulting political influence wielded by women on foreign policy matters. By testing the relationship between levels of domestic gender equality (argued to influence international behavior and increase women’s political power) and a state’s policy choices for dealing with international conflict and crisis, Caprioli investigates whether domestic gender equality may predict states’ behavior (Caprioli 2000; Caprioli 2001).

For her the initial study in 2000 Caprioli compiled data from 159 countries and 2187 incidences of international disputes. To measure gender equality, the independent variable--the social, political, and economic standing of women relative to men--was assessed by employing two indicators including suffrage, and an indicator of women in power--percentage of women in the upper house of parliaments. Length of suffrage was considered a reliable indicator of degree of political influence attained (Caprioli, 2000). The Militarized Interstate Dispute data (Bremer, 1996) were utilized for the measurement of levels of hostility exhibited by a country. (55)
According to Caprioli’s results an inverse correlation does exist between levels of
gender equality and militarism in international disputes (Caprioli, 2000; Caprioli, 2001,
515, 63). It was her conclusion that “even at the most basic level, women’s domestic
equality impacts foreign policy” (63); higher levels of gender equality result in lower
levels of the use of force and aggression (63). Her results also seem to support the
contention that, with regard to foreign policy, levels of gender equality can predict a
state’s propensity to use militaristic options for conflict and crisis resolutions (63).
Therefore, is could be reasoned that the same gender specific characteristics and
attitudes that influence international policy should also influence the determination by
state governments of whether or not to use violence to enforce control and advance an
agenda. Whether the contributing factor is the “ethic of caring” argued to be inherent in
women or the cultural characteristics of a society that has achieved a higher level of
gender equality, or both, if it is reflected in international policy it should be reflected in
domestic policy as well.

Public Opinion Research

Without a degree of confidence that gender impacts decision making, testing it as
an independent variable would serve no purpose. Public opinion studies provide support
for the contention that differences in reasoning and policy preferences exist relative to
gender. Analysis of survey data, compiled here and in the Middle East, seems to
suggest the existence of a “gender gap” in attitudes regarding the use of violence and
aggression.

After his 1984 analysis of survey data (Gallup, Harris, National Opinion Research
Center, NORC-General Social Surveys, Roper, and Survey Research Center, Univerity
of Michigan) compiled in the United States from 1936 to 1983, Tom Smith proposed that the gender gap in popularity for President Regan may have been the result of inherent gender characteristics. He contends that gender specific morality and value differences were exhibited and exercised through the political process by women withholding support for policies that employed the use of aggression and violence (Smith 384).

Questions selected from several public opinion polls (Gallup, Harris, National Opinion Research Center, NORC-General Social Surveys, Roper, and Survey Research Center, University of Michigan) centered on the use of violence and aggression in a variety of situations. These were analyzed by Smith (1983) and others (Wirls, 1986; Fite, et. al, 1990) for the purpose of determining gender differences in attitudes across time as well as across circumstances.

For the purpose of analysis of gender attitudes toward violence in general Smith focused on questions designed to measure variances in opinion on issues such as international war, proposed future aggression, escalation of conflicts, defense spending, gun control, and the death penalty. Furthermore, additional questions were selected for analysis which were designed to determine under what circumstances women might find the use of force, aggression, or violence acceptable (Smith 1984). The selection represented a wide range of topics which reflected attitudes towards violence and aggression in both foreign and domestic matters.

Smith compiled 285 data points and found that in 87 percent of the readings men were consistently, over time, “more supportive of violent or forceful policy options” (Smith 384). In addition, contrary to some feminist thought (Conover, 1988), he contends that his results do not support the theory that feminist ideology, whether held
by men or women, is the contributing factor influencing gender gap attitudes towards violence; it is the gender difference itself (Smith 385).

Rather than side with either the biological or sociological explanations in the debate about which may account for differences Smith details arguments and analysis of both and reiterates the conclusion of much of the previous social science research that argues an “interplay,” or combination of the two possible factors that contribute to and are responsible for development of gender specific values and opinions. He enumerates many sociological and environmental variables which play key roles in shaping belief and value systems and also points out that abundant scholarship exists which seems to support the theories that men are inherently predisposed to aggression, use of violence and force (Smith 385; Seward and Seward, 1980; Davidson and Gordon, 1979; and Maccoby and Jacklin, 1974). His conclusion was that, regardless of the underlying causes, there did appear to be significant gender gap differences consistent over a period of decades. Differences were evident regarding violence related issues in both foreign and domestic policy. Women were opposed to violence perpetrated by states and individuals, and survey questions about policy options elicited preferences for compassion, compromise and diplomacy from women and more aggressive policy choices from men (Smith).

Additional surveys have been compiled and analyzed by other researchers for the purpose of investigating changing trends in gender differences. Robert Shapiro and Harpreet Mahajan (1986) analyzed 267 policy questions between the 1960s and 1980s in the United States. Their findings concur with those of Smith, that women are more supportive than men of “traditional, compassion” related issues and less supportive of
policy that calls for force as a method for dealing with domestic and foreign problems (Shapiro and Mahajan, 44).

For a more cross-national perspective, survey data collected from Israel, Egypt, Palestine, and Kuwait have been analyzed by Mark Tessler and Ina Warriner for the purpose of testing whether the theories of gender differences in attitudes about international conflict would hold up when applied cross-culturally, to diverse societies within that region (Tessler and Warriner, 1997). They argue that the societies chosen for analysis represent significant diversity because they “encompass almost all of the political, economic, and cultural diversity of the Middle East” (Tessler, 8), and as a result Tessler and Warriner express confidence in the generalizability of their findings (Tessler, 8).

They conclude that the results contradict much of the current literature because they appear to show that the women’s attitudes toward international conflict were not more pacifistic, and any differences were instead attributed to the diversity in politics, economics, and sociology of the region (Tessler, 25). However, they did identify a non-gendered feminist perspective, held by men and women, in all four countries which they assert correlates with the preference of compromise and diplomacy in lieu of force and violence. Therefore, their explanation for apparent differences in attitude toward force did not rest solely on the gender variable, but instead on the presence or absence of feminist ideology which advocates and supports more equality between men and women.

This is in agreement with the assertion of some feminist literature makes (Conover, 1988) that the important factor in the determination of levels of support for
force and aggression within a state is the degree to which a culture or citizens of that state value gender equality (Tessler, 25). Furthermore, their findings support the theory that the consequences for foreign policy of domestic gender equality in a less militaristic and more compromising intrastate agenda (Caprioli, 2000; Caprioli, 2001; Tessler & Warriner, 1997).

Several theories provide varying explanations for gender gaps in opinions toward the use of military and force as a means of dealing with international challenges. Lack of interest in foreign affairs is attributed to women’s lack of education, especially in developing countries (Wilcox, Hewitt and Allsop, 1996; Almond, 1950; Shapiro & Maharani, 1986). Women’s poverty in relation to men is attributed with women’s aversion to militaristic options due to the probable diversion of funds from social welfare to military spending (Wilcox, Hewitt and Allsop, 1996; Smeal, 1984; Welch, 1977). Explanations for the inherent value difference theory are varied as well. Gilligan cites the “moral principle of care” whereby she contends that women are more willing to cooperate than compete in order to “maintain connections and attachments” (Gilligan, 1982).

Other scholars subscribe to the maternalist explanation which attributes women’s preference for peaceful solutions as a factor of the reproductive capacity due to reluctance on the part of women to pursue any course of action that would put their children at risk of being killed (Wilcox, Hewitt and Allsop, 1996; Chodorow, 1978; Ruddick, 1980; O’Brien, 1981; Gilligan, 1982; Harsock, 1985). Ruddick goes so far as to theorize that the sheer act of mothering entails the necessity for learning and implementing peaceful conflict resolution (Conover & Shapiro, 1993; Ruddick, 1980).
Many other research findings concur that women tend to attempt to implement collective solutions or peaceful negotiation (Caprioli, 2001; Gidengil, 1995; Welch and Higging, 1992; Miller, 1988; White, 1988; Rosenthal, 1998). This would seem to indicate that women with political power would likely opt for nonviolent policy options both domestically and internationally. These studies provide support for the argument that there are possible gender differences in attitudes toward the use of violence as a means of state control or the accomplishment of state goals. This would seem to indicate that women with political power would likely advocate nonviolent policy options both domestically and internationally.

Sociological and Psychological Studies

The socialization debate centers around the question as to whether role and attitudinal differences are taught and transmitted to humans through an internalization of cultural norms whereby moral values as well as political beliefs are products of culture. This is an essential consideration when analyzing any behavioral phenomena cross-culturally.

If we were to subscribe to the social constructivist explanation of personality without consideration of biological factors we would expect foreign policy outcomes to be fairly consistent with the cultural norms and values of a society without much distinction between gender opinions. Smith (1983) addressed this in his public opinion study by analyzing each question on an individual basis while controlling for specific factors in an attempt to discern whether differences should be attributed to culture or gender.
Fukuyama (1998) cites numerous anthropological and psychological works to refute the feminist view that there are no inherent psychological differences relative to gender and includes an extensive empirical study conducted by two psychologists, Eleanor Maccoby and Carol Jacklin (1974), who investigated the possible origins of gender differences. Their empirical findings, after hundreds of tests, refute the existence of inherent stereotypical characteristics, which have been assumed gender specific, in all but one area—aggression. There was no question that when it came to levels of all types of aggressiveness boys always exhibited more violent and aggressive reactions and behavior than girls (Fukuyama, 1998, 6).

Opinions differ as to what physiological or biological factors are responsible for the “ethic of caring” believed by some scholars to be an inherent feminine trait. One debate focuses on the assertion that it is the result of a woman’s reproductive capacity and not part of a cultural or socialization process (Caprioli, 2000; Daly, 1984; Elshtain, 1986; Griffin, 1981; Rich, 1976; Rossi, 1970; Ruddick, 1987). Many researchers argue that biological characteristics unique to each gender such as reproductive capacity (Ruddick, 1987), hormones and genetically predisposed male/female chemistry better equip males for aggression and affect gender specific behaviors of response to stimuli (Hoyenga & Hoyenga, 1979; Geen Vol 2., 5). Regardless of the causes of differences, there is evidence to suggest that gender related pacifistic characteristics are relatively consistent across cultures and over time, and as a result, gender is an important variable that could explain variances in states’ human rights behavior.
Numerous theories have been generated through biological testing and social science research that try to identify and explain the causal factors which may be responsible for any gender differences in moral reasoning and decision making. Furthermore, there exists a tremendous amount of sociological, feminist, and international relations research and theory regarding gender differences as they relate to the use of violence and aggression in general as well as to the use of force in international affairs.

In this chapter I will first review the two contrasting theories that attempt to explain the foundation for any gender differences in behavior and/or attitudes. One is based on biology and the other on socialization. Second, I discuss theories regarding the attitudes of women towards violence, as well as the theories that address attitudes of women towards the use of violence as a means of advancing the agendas of regimes. Finally, I will derive testable hypotheses from the existing theories and discuss the elements of the models that will be utilized.

Theories of Gender Differences in Cognitive Decision-Making

There are two basic theoretical explanations for possible gender specific behavior, attitudes, responses, and decision making. Whereas biological determinism contends that differences stem from physiological characteristics—hormonal, innate maternal instincts, and genetic wiring (Beckman & D'Amico, 1994), social constructivism (social learning theory) asserts that gender differences are social constructs and the
result of a cultural socialization process. Social constructivists contend that the process begins at birth and that socially constructed gender roles are imposed upon us. They state that our behavior and moral reasoning are limited and shaped by society (Beckman & D’Amico, 1994). Some scholars subscribe to both theories, and both explanations have critics, but for the purpose of this paper it is not relevant which of the two account for differences. What is relevant is the apparent consensus that a gender gap in moral reasoning and decision makings does exist.

According to the domestic-international violence theory, domestic inequality is a symptom of some degree of intolerance (Caprioi, 2000), and psychological theories contend that men are inherently more violent and aggressive than women (Macoby & Jacklin, 1974). In cognitive decision-making, motivation, and moral reasoning, the predominant theory contends that women are more compassionate and less likely to support violence or aggression as a means of justice, crisis resolution, or policy preference in domestic or foreign affairs (Gilligan, 1982). “In practically all realms of foreign and domestic policy, women are less belligerent than men,” (Caprioli, 2000, 53; Page and Shapiro 1992, 295; Ford & Lowery, 1986; Brock-Utne, 1990). Caprioli (2000, 2001) found that domestic equality of women correlates with lower levels of international militarism.

Based on the theories covered in the chapter and the assumption that gender differences do exist in attitudes towards the use of violence and aggression as a means of political control and conflict dispute internationally, it is logical to assume that those same attitudes should influence domestic political policy and behavior in the same manner. Therefore, I will examine the possibility that there may be a relationship
between a state’s domestic human rights policies and domestic repression, and the
gender of its policy makers. The percentage of women in power is hypothesized to
influence the types of policies adopted and implemented with regards to the subsistence
and personal integrity subsets of human rights. Derived from the theories I have
detailed, my hypotheses are as follows:

H1: The greater the number of women in a state’s parliament
the higher the level of economic, cultural, and social rights attained
within that state.

H2: The greater the number of women in a state’s parliament
the higher the level of personal integrity rights within that state.

If there is a gender specific “ethic of caring” that is reflected in the policy
preferences of women, a larger number of women attaining political power through
seats in legislative bodies should result in higher levels of respect for human rights.
This should hold true for both personal integrity rights, and subsistence rights because it
is theorized that women, given the option, will choose non-violent conflict resolution
over force and aggression. An “ethic of caring” should also influence policy affecting
second generation rights.

Operationalizing the Dependent Variables

Human Rights

One of the problems of human rights research is the lack of a consensus on an
explicit, efficient, universal definition of the concept, “human rights.” The general
definition adopted here is that of Jack Donnelly who contends, “human rights are,
literally, the rights that one has because one is human” (Donnelly 2003). The broad
term, human rights, however, is an overarching label that encompasses a group of subsets of rights that are categorized by type. Categorizing into more specifically defined, smaller subsets allows for a more refined focus and more efficient, effective means of research on varying types of rights. I will investigate the possible effects of gender influenced reasoning of policy makers on two of those more narrowly defined categories of human rights. Included in this study as the two dependent variables, are and indicator of one aspects of subsistence (basic human needs) rights and personal integrity rights.

Personal Integrity Rights

Some of the worst physical abuse, cited in the literature as “the most severe crimes against humanity” and “the sort that usually can be avoided” (Poe, Tate 1994; Keith 2002), is what is characterized by Poe and Tate as “coercive activities on the part of the government designed to induce compliance in others” (Poe and Tate 1994), and includes murder, torture, forced disappearance, and imprisonment for political views. Violations such as those are considered to be abuses of the rights included in the category or subset identified as personal integrity rights.

The two separate, well established measures utilized here for this variable are the scales created from the collection and coding of country reports from both the U.S. State Department and Amnesty International. Individual ordinal scales were developed by Poe and Tate from each of the sources, standards-based data and represent a range from 1 to 5 with a 5 representing the highest levels of human rights abuse (Stohl, 1975, 21).

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3 Also termed second generation rights.
4 Also termed state terror.
1976; Gibney and Dalton 1992; Poe and Tate 1994; Gibney and Dalton 1997; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). However, in my dataset the numbers representing the rankings have been reversed therefore making a score of 5 an indication of the highest levels of respect for human rights.

These scales have facilitated testing that has identified a number of predictors associated with personal integrity rights (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Keith and Poe 2000; Poe, Tate Keith, and Lanier 2000; Zanger 2000). Six of the predictors shown consistently to be important indicators of human rights respect or abuse (democracy, economic standing, presence of a military government, involvement in civil or international conflict, and population) are incorporated into all three of my models as control variables.

The correlation between the independent variable and both indicators of the dependent variable are tested individually due to inherent differences in the scales resulting from differences in collection and reporting procedures of the State Department and Amnesty International (Poe, Carey, and Vasquez 1998). Amnesty International tends not to include reports from countries with no apparent serious human rights abuse, and the State Department reports have been criticized as being biased, prior to the end of the cold war, against leftist governments. Poe and Tate compensate for gaps in Amnesty data by substituting State Department scores (Poe and Tate 1994)

Subsistence Rights

These rights are categorized as second generation rights and include economic, social and cultural rights or what are considered basic, minimum human needs (Morris
Whereas economically developed states such as the United States, Japan and Canada (averaging around 91, 92, and 94 respectively on the PQLI scale) have for the most part, satisfied the demand for acceptable levels of subsistence rights they tend to be more concerned with maintaining personal integrity rights. Logically, for the less developed, poorer states, meeting basic, minimum human needs is the primary concern (Callaway and Stephens 2004). This subset of rights is gaining more attention and investigation as globalization continues to exert an impact economically, and it becomes more understood that the denial and/or scarcity of these needs are likely causes of domestic volatility, violence, and conflict (Krain, 1997; Homer-Dixon 1999; Callaway and Stephens 2004).

The Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI) initially devised under the direction of Dr. Morris D. Morris (Morris 1979) then expanded by Milner and Callaway, was created to provide a more accurate indicator of the physical well-being of a population (Morris 1979, Milner 1998, Callaway 2001). It was first developed in the late 1970s by the Overseas Development Council (OCD) after it became apparent that the limitations of existing measures, such as per capita GNP which according to Morris, “is an arithmetic mean that says nothing about the actual distribution of income in a country” (1979, 32), were not suitable for fully capturing more refined aspects of subsistence performance.

A predominant indicator of one aspect of subsistence rights, those very important to a country’s poor, PQLI is a composite index composed of the three components: life expectancy at age one, infant mortality, and basic literacy. Countries are ranked on a scale of 0 to 100 with 0 representing the lowest levels of subsistence rights. The three individual measures were chosen because they reflect the levels of the provision of the
most basic of human needs. Morris states, “The indicators do not in themselves explicitly identify how the benefits they reflect are distributed among social groups at any moment; an improvement in these indicators means that the proportion of the people sharing the benefit almost certainly has risen” (Morris 1979).

Operationalizing the Independent Variables

Women in Parliament

My intention is to test whether varying degrees of political power held by women result in varying degrees of human rights attainment or abuse. “Women in power” is, however, a very broad and ambiguous concept that necessitates a precise and practical operationalization—one that captures the dimension of power that is relevant to my purpose. Therefore women in power will be defined as women who have decision-making power (influence on policy preferences and implementation) within a government, and will be measured by using the percentages of seats held by women in each of the 130 state parliaments that comprise the sample. This is consistent with the operationalization of the concept in previous studies conducted by Mary Caprioli but for one modification. Whereas Caprioli used total percentages from uni-cameral legislative bodies and percentages from only the upper houses in bi-cameral and tri-cameral systems, I concluded that utilizing totals from both houses would provide a more accurate appraisal of the political power of a state’s women.

Caprioli reasoned that in systems with more than one house it is the upper house that has the most influence and decision-making power, especially in matters of foreign policy. But I think that the use of total percentages in some legislative bodies and only a portion of the percentages in others introduce an element of inconsistency and a
potential for skewed results. For example if the percentages used for analysis came just from the upper or, in the case of a unicameral system, the only house, it would appear that in 1994 Cuba’s legislative body consisted of substantially more women, 22.8 percent, than that of the United States with only 8 percent of the U.S. Senate being female. However, when the numbers of women from both the U.S. House and Senate are combined the total then becomes 19 percent.

Because this thesis attempts to explore the affects of the gender gap and gender specific characteristics on levels of human rights attainment, using female heads of state (who might have been forced to maneuver within the constraints of an environment that demanded the demonstration of masculine governing and leadership traits) as an indicator would not serve my purpose. Under those circumstances any evidence of a gender difference in reasoning disappears. Caprioli pointed out in her 1999 study of the relationship between women in power and a state’s propensity to resort to violence and force, the number of women leaders in the role of head of state cannot be employed as an indicator because there just haven’t been many women to hold those positions—twenty-four to date (Caprioli, 505). Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that within an intensely male dominated career environment or power role, in order to survive professionally, women must act and react as it is perceived and expected that men would under the same circumstances (McGlen & Sarkees, 1993). A woman must conform to and display what is traditionally considered the masculine characteristic of strength.

This phenomenon has been studied at the U.S. Defense Department where McGlen & Sarkees (1993) found that, with regards to the gender gap, that environment
differed greatly from the general population in that no gender gap existed within that symbol of traditional masculine strength and power (Caprioli 2000, 54). For that reason and the because of the limitations that would be placed on the scope of the study due to a limited number of cases, I have elected to use the total percentages of women in parliaments as the measure for this variable.

Parliament percentages were obtained from The Inter-Parliamentary Union publication, *Women in Parliaments, 1945-2003: A World Statistical Survey*, 2003, and from their website. The two combined provide an extensive historical and statistical dataset pertaining to women in all political positions. Data have been collected from 181 countries, and the database provides a detailed and disaggregated breakdown of numbers and percentages of women in each state’s parliamentary house or houses.

**Control Variables**

A great deal of research has been conducted for the purpose of identifying determinants of human rights attainment and human rights abuse. I have included as control variables six of those that have been found to have the greatest impact in a number of previous studies. They include levels of democracy, population, economic standing, involvement in civil or international war, as well as a dummy variable for the presence of a military government. There is a fair amount of agreement in much of the literature that these variables, discussed in detail below, are the primary determinants of human rights.
Democracy

The political democracy variable has consistently, through numerous empirical studies, been shown to be a strong predictor of levels of respect for human rights (Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1988; Henderson 1991; Fein 1995; Davenport 1995a, 1995b, 1996, and 1998; Poe and Tate 1994, Poe, Tata, and Keith 1999; Poe, Tate, Keith and Lanier 2000; Keith and Poe 2000; and Zanger 2000). As such it is an important control variable to be included here and is expected to be positively correlated with all three measures of human rights.

As reported in Poe and Tate (1994), the problem of tautology is inherent in this concept. Thus, in order to avoid the problem of tautology I will follow their lead and employ Bollen’s (1980) definition of democracy as it defines “in terms of procedures and rights that do not themselves preclude repression” (Poe and Tate 1994). Serving to narrow the description of the concept to its institutional structure and states (including institutional mechanisms such as elections), Bollen contends that political democracy is, “the extent to which the political power of the elite is minimized and that of the nonelite is maximized” (1980, 372). He emphasizes the importance of the role of free and fair elections that are “binding on all parties” and the political liberties or “the rights of all individuals and groups to protest or support freely government policies and decisions” (372). Both provide nonelites with mechanisms through which to oppose political elites (Bollen 1980; Poe and Tate 1994).

For the purpose of measuring levels of institutional democracy Polity III indicators, calculated as an eleven point additive index where the highest number on
the scale corresponds with the highest levels of democracy, will be used. The scale has been created using the following four dimensions:

*Competitiveness of Political Participation*: 3 – competitive; 2 – transitional; 1-factional.

*Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment*: 2 – elective; 1 – transitional.

*Openness of Executive Recruitment*: 1 – open election or dual (hereditary and election).

*Constraint on Chief Executive*: 4 – executive parity or subordination to legislative or judicial branches; 3 – intermediate constraints (constraints that fall between parity/subordination and substantial limitations); 2 – substantial limitations; 1 – intermediate constraints (constraints that fall between substantial limitations and slight to moderate limitations).

Population

Stress, in one form or another, is the causal factor common to four of the six control variables which cause a perceived threat and repressive reaction from a regime. All six either have the potential to cause stress in a system which results in instability or, in the case of regime type, the mechanisms with which stress induced threat and instability is managed. There is general consensus in the literature that population size, economic standing, and involvement in either international or civil conflicts all have the potential to create destabilizing stress due to the pressure brought to bear on regimes which in turn feel threatened (Henderson 1993; Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 1995a; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Keith 1999; Zanger 2000; Keith 2002).

For example, where population is concerned, if existing resources are not sufficient enough to accommodate the basic needs of the people a threat to the regime can arise in the form of popular unrest and demands which can trigger repressive measures by governments as a means to preserve the system.
However, there is some disagreement as to whether rapid population change is a significant correlate of repression. Although Henderson (1993) argues that rapid population change increases levels of repression, Poe and Tate, in both their 1994 study and the replication study conducted in 1999 with Keith, found that although the size of a population is significantly, positively correlated with abuse of personal integrity rights, population change does not appear to be significant. And their findings regarding the affects of population size are consistent with previous research, including Henderson's, therefore, my models will control for population size only (Henderson, 1993; Poe and Tate 1994, Davenport, 1995a; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Keith 1999; Zanger, 2000; Keith, 2002). The population variable is represented by the natural logarithm of population totals from each country.

Economic Standing

The same theory that is the basis for explaining the political strain and resulting repression caused by large populations (relative to resources) holds true for economic scarcity as well. Human needs go unsatisfied in the poorest countries where citizens may pressure the government, and by so doing exhibit what is perceived by regimes as threatening behavior. In order to maintain control regimes then become more repressive.

Extensive research supports the contention that repression is much more likely in less economically developed countries (Mitchell and McCormick, 1988; Henderson, 1991; Davenport, 1995; Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith, 1999; Poe, Tate, Keith, and Lanier, 2000; Zanger, 2000). Poe and Tate found that “economic standing is
negatively, but only rather weakly, related to regimes’ propensities to abuse of personal integrity rights,” but they found no support for links between economic growth rates and repression (Poe and Tate, 1994). To control for the affects of economic standing I follow the designs of previous research that has shown it to be a significant indicator and will utilize the same measure of per capita GNP.

Civil and International War

Both types of conflict are cited in the literature as having the potential to prompt repressive behaviors due to the perceived or real threat posed to a regime from either internal or external sources (Gurr 1968, 1970, 1986; Nieburg, 1969; Stohl, 1975, 1976; Skocpol, 1979; Tilly, 1978; Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith, 1999; Poe, Tate, Keith, and Lanier 2000). This has been shown to be the case in all types of regimes as Rasler reported in his 1986 study of the correlation between participation in international conflict and domestic repression in the United States (Poe and Tate 1994). Pennsylvania State University’s vastly cited operationalizations of both international and civil wars, Correlates of War Data 1816-1997, will be utilized. Furthermore, both war indicators are dummy variables indicating either involvement in a war during a specific year with a 1 or no involvement indicated by a 0.

As per the guidelines set by Singer and Small (1982), in order to be classified in the dataset as involved in civil war and to receive a 1, the government, as the central authority in a country, must be involved as a direct participant in the war. And there must be an effective resistance, that is, either both sides must be “organized for violent conflict” or “the weaker side, although initially unprepared able to inflict upon the
stronger opponents at least five percent of the number of fatalities it sustains” (Small and Singer 1982). Singer and Small set out the following criteria that must be satisfied to qualify a state as being involved in a “major civil war”:

(a.) military action must be involved,
(b.) the national government at the time was actively involved,
(c.) effective resistance (as measured by the ratio of fatalities of the weaker to the stronger forces) occurred on both sides, and
(d.) at least 1,000 battle deaths resulted during the civil war.

And for international war the criteria they set out is as follows:
(a.) there must be a total of a thousand or more battle deaths suffered by all of the participants in the conflict, and
(b.) the particular country suffered at least a hundred fatalities or had a thousand or more personnel taking part in the hostilities.

Military Government

Consistent with the conceptualization found in numerous previous studies, governments will be considered military regimes if they have come to power “as a consequence of a successful coup d’état, led by the army, navy, or air force, that remained in power with a military person as the chief executive for at least six months in a given year” (McKinlay and Cohan 1975; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Keith 2002) or regimes “with either a civilian as the chief executive and several military persons in the cabinet or military head of government who nominated a civilian as the head of government and himself worked behind the scenes” (Madam 1992). Military forces are created for the sole purpose of controlling circumstances and populations through the exertion of force if necessary. As force and violence are the
primary resources relied upon by the military for crisis resolution, it is only logical to conclude that by its very nature a military regime will be repressive and more prone to human rights abuse (Huntington 1964; McKinlay and Cohan 1975; Zwick 1984; Ziegenhagen 1986; Seligson 1987; Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 1995a).

Although preliminary studies yielded less than persuasive results linking military regimes with levels of human rights abuse (Poe and Tate 1994), later studies provided results that were statistically significant (Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). Therefore it is included here as a final control variable.

I have included the six predictors of human rights abuse or respect described in this chapter as control variables because they have been well established in the literature through numerous empirical studies. Three models will be constructed in the following chapter incorporating all of the variables detailed here due to the proven strength of their predictive value.
CHAPTER IV
STATISTICAL METHODS AND RESULTS

To test my hypotheses outlined in the previous chapter, a pooled cross-sectional time-series design employing Prais-Winsten regression methods allows both temporal and spatial multivariate analysis of the panel data compiled for the nineteen year period between 1978 and 1996. All countries on which sufficient data could be collected were included, and this yielded a sample of 130 countries.

Countries Included in the Sample

Countries included in the analysis were those with existing, accessible data as provided by the original and edited Poe, Tate, and Keith data (1999) and the statistical surveys compiled by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (1995-2003). All projects that undertake country analysis and data collection for a number of years face data inconsistencies and problems due to a number of factors, and this endeavor proved to be no different.

More recent data have been compiled, but political events in history render the use of some data problematic at times. In this case several of the former Soviet Bloc countries was excluded because data is available only for the years after the fall of the Communist regimes beginning in 1989 when some of those countries became individual

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5 This dataset is a composite of work contributed by several individuals. It originated with the work of Poe and Tate in 1994 after which new PQLI data were added by Wes Milner and later updated by Rhonda Callaway. The women in parliament data were then entered by the author. Here, for ease of analysis, the numerical ranking scheme is the reverse of that in the original dataset for the Amnesty International scores.
states. Analysis of those former Communist countries at a future time might provide further insight into the dynamics of gender influence on policy making as those countries are now in varying preliminary stages of democratization and attempting to build, with varying degrees of success, capitalist economic systems. But for this thesis data was not available for the all of the years under investigation.

There are also gaps in the parliament data where parliaments of various countries were suspended for varying periods of time. When these gaps occurred, a 0 was entered into the dataset for representation of women due to there being no representation of any kind at that time in those states. The structural changes experienced by some of the parliaments over time (a unicameral system might become bicameral or vice versa) did not pose a problem as the women in parliament variable is measured by total percentages of women holding positions in all houses.

Statistical Methods

Because autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity can present a problem for the accuracy of the results of ordinary least squares regression, the Stata 8.0 statistical analysis package was used which provides for analysis of these models using Prais-Winsten regression (to correct for autocorrelation) with panel-corrected standard errors. More precisely, with these functions of this statistical package:

produced are panel corrected standard error estimates for linear cross-sectional time-series models where the parameters are estimated by OLS or Prais-Winsten regression. When computing the standard errors and the variance-covariance estimates, the disturbances are, by default, assumed to be heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated across panels (Stata).

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6 A balanced data set is more susceptible to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.
Preliminary Bi-variate Analysis

For a preliminary indication of the possible strength of the women in parliament variable, it was first regressed individually on each of the indicators of human rights--the Physical Quality of Life Index, the State Department Scores, and the Amnesty International Scores. Although it could be argued that without the consideration of the effects of control variables this procedure does not provide much insight into the statistical significance of just one independent variable, it does give us some inkling as to whether the independent variable could possibly be considered as one of the significant determinants of human rights levels. The results are as follows for each of the three measures of the dependent variable:

Table 1.
Bi-variate Analysis of the Impact of the Independent Variable\(^7\), Women in Parliaments, on the Three Measures of the Human Rights

| Dependent variable | Coef. | Std. Err. | P>|z|   | (95% Conf. Interval) |
|--------------------|-------|-----------|------|---------------------|
| PQLI               | .1477 | .0310     | 0.000| .0868               | .2086               |
| Amnesty            | .0154 | .0037     | 0.000| .0080               | .0228               |
| State Dept.        | .0073 | .0035     | 0.036| .0004               | .0142               |

PQLI \(R^2 = .720\); N = 127  
Amnesty \(R^2 = .224\); N = 127  
State Dept. \(R^2 = .284\); N = 127

These preliminary bi-variate tests indicate that there is possibly a statistically significant relationship between all three of the dependent variables and the percentage of women in parliaments. The weakest correlation appears to be a positive one.

\(^7\) These were analyzed as three separate models presented in the one table.
between women in parliament and the human rights levels as measured by the State Department scores. Furthermore, the results seem to suggest a stronger positive relationship with the Amnesty measures and an even stronger one between the independent variable and PQLI. However, whereas the coefficients of the Amnesty and State Department scores can be compared to one another as they are both ordinal scales ranging from 1 to 5, the PQLI ranges from 0 to 100. Thus the coefficient for PQLI displayed in the table above indicates that a relationship weaker than that for the other two measures exists between subsistence rights and the percentage of women in parliaments.

Nevertheless, in order to get an accurate assessment of the strength of any correlation, the models must incorporate as control variables other indicators of human rights previously shown to be significant. With the inclusion of the control variables my models will be structured as follows with the incorporation of three different measures of the dependent variable, human rights, deemed appropriate as indicators for the three separate subsets of human rights examined in this thesis:

Human Rights Abuse = a

\[ + B_1 \text{Percentage of Women in Parliament}_{ij} \]

\[ + B_2 \text{Democracy}_{ij} \]

\[ + B_3 \text{Population Size}_{ij} \]

\[ + B_4 \text{International War}_{ij} \]

\[ + B_5 \text{Civil War}_{ij} \]

\[ + B_6 \text{Economic Standing}_{ij} \]

\[ + B_7 \text{Military Control}_{ij} \]
Three models are designed to determine the impact of women in power on two separate subsets of human rights. Two models are necessary for the purpose of testing the strength of the relationship between the independent variable and the personal integrity category of rights as two different measures are utilized for that variable. Poe, Tate, and Keith (1999) provide ordinal scales as measures for both models as they have devised two separate sets of rankings—one based on Amnesty International country reports and the other on country reports from the U.S. State Department. Both ordinal ranking methods have a range from 1 to 5 with a 1 ranking representing those countries that meet the criteria designated to indicate the greatest respect for personal integrity rights (Poe and Tate 1994, Poe, Tate and Keith 1999). For example the United States, considered to have high regard for personal integrity rights, has consistently earned a high ranking of 5, whereas states such as Guatemala and Chile, during periods of domestic turmoil and conflict, have ranked as low as 1.

The third model tests the hypothesized relationship between women in power and subsistence rights using the PQLI scale (Morris 1979, 1996; Milner 1998; Callaway 2001). PQLI scores are calculated on a scale from 0 to 100 with the highest scoring states being those with the highest levels of subsistence rights. Demonstrated by the 130 countries that comprise my sample a wide range exists in levels of subsistence rights worldwide. Whereas democratized and highly industrialized Japan has a high mean average around 95 for the time period, a low of fourteen is calculated for Afghanistan.
Table 2 and table 3 display the results for models 1 and 2 which are designed to determine the effects of the independent variables on the same dependent variable, personal integrity rights, but with the two different measures. In model 1 I test with State Department scores, and utilize Amnesty International scores for testing model 2. Results for the third model, effects on subsistence rights, are presented in table 4.

Table 2.

Effects of the Independent Variable, Women in Power, on Personal Integrity Rights using the State Department Measure (1978-1996)

| Independent variables     | Coef. | Std. Err. | P>|Z|  | (95% Conf. Interval) |
|---------------------------|-------|-----------|-----|------------------------|
| Women in Parliament (%)   | .0058 | .0026     | 0.031 | .0005317       .0111096 |
| GNP per capita            | 3.26e-13 | 3.37e-14 | 0.000 | 2.59e-13        3.92e-13 |
| Civil War                 | -1.027 | .1561     | 0.000 | -1.333131     -.7208914 |
| International War         | -.1562 | .1024     | 0.127 | -.3569696     .0444452 |
| Military Government       | -.1419 | .0892     | 0.112 | -.3168343    .0330212 |
| Democratic Government     | .0803  | .0076     | 0.000 | .065354       .0952773 |
| Logged Population         | -.2440 | .0227     | 0.000 | -.2885778    -.1994447 |

$R^2 = .448$

N = 109 groups

Table 3.


| Independent variables     | Coef. | Std. Err. | P>|Z|  | (95% Conf. Interval) |
|---------------------------|-------|-----------|-----|------------------------|
| Women in Parliament (%)   | .0175 | .0026     | 0.000 | .0124249     .0226785 |
| GNP per capita            | 3.72e-13 | 3.16e-14 | 0.000 | 3.10e-13     4.34e-13 |
| Civil War                 | -.9833 | .1452     | 0.000 | -1.268047    -.698682 |
| International War         | -.3109 | .1101     | 0.005 | -.5269341   -.0950119 |
| Military Government       | -.1004 | .0802     | 0.211 | -.25785     .0568559 |
| Democratic Government     | .0749  | .0084     | 0.000 | .0583865     .0914558 |
| Logged Population         | -.2745 | .0261     | 0.000 | -.3258605   -.2231807 |

$R^2 = .355$

N = 109
Discussion of Findings

The models designed to measure variance in personal integrity levels present interesting results because they appear to differ with regards to the degree of influence exhibited by the independent variable, women in parliament. Whereas the Amnesty International model indicates a statistically significant relationship at the .0001 level, the State Department model does not find a lesser degree of statistical significance at the .05 level. Another unexpected result within that model was the finding of no significance between the State Department measure and two of the control variables: international war and presence of military regime. The military regime variable was not statistically significant in the Amnesty model either but the international war variable was at the .01 level. However, all of the other predictors in both models were found to have statistical significance and to be correlated in the hypothesized direction.

When taken into account that the Amnesty International scores are ordinal scales resulting in only 5 rankings, the coefficient for women in parliament in that model becomes much more impressive. Theoretically, this means that if women attain parity in legislative bodies and gain fifty percent of the seats, personal integrity rights abuse would be reduced enough for a country to move almost 1 point (.875) up the scale. Legislative bodies with an increase to fifty-seven percent women would have a reduction in abuse such that the ranking would jump a full point. This is a tremendous affect when one considers the vast difference in rights abuse represented by one ranking in either direction. A country could, in effect, go from a 2 ranking to a 1
indicating relatively total elimination of the preexisting abuses of personal integrity
rights.

Table 4.

Effects of the Independent Variable, Women in Power, on Subsistence
Rights (1978-1996)

| Independent variables | Coef. | Std. Err. | P>|Z|  | (95% Conf. Interval) |
|-----------------------|-------|-----------|------|-----------------------|
| Women in Parliament (%) | .1769 | .0304 | 0.000 | .1172142 | .2366048 |
| GNP per capita | 6.08e-12 | 6.51e-13 | 0.000 | 4.80e-12 | 7.35e-12 |
| Civil War | -.9979 | .8146 | 0.221 | -2.594548 | .5987265 |
| International War | -.2629 | .5042 | 0.602 | -1.251301 | .7254762 |
| Military Government | -1.322 | .7178 | 0.065 | -2.729487 | .0842432 |
| Democratic Government | .5732 | .1041 | 0.000 | .3691418 | .777394 |
| Logged Population | -.7237 | .2480 | 0.004 | -1.209878 | -.2375506 |

R² = .7656
N = 109 groups

The findings of the third model that tests the influence of women in parliament on
subsistence rights are not quite as impressive as those found in the Amnesty model. As
stated previously the PQLI is a ratio measure from 0 to 100; Japan has attained the
highest ranking out of the 130 countries analyzed here with a 95 but has had a range
from 91 to 95. Afghanistan has ranked the lowest with a 17, and Niger’s lowest ranking,
27, represents a 10 point increase over that of Afghanistan. With that vast a range,
significant changes in the attainment or abuse of these subsistence rights must occur to
then be reflected by a significant increase in the PQLI score. Nevertheless, the results
indicate that an increase in women in a state’s parliament would result in increased
respect for subsistence rights within that state.

Consistent with the first two models, international war and presence of a military
government were not found to be statistically significant. In addition the civil war variable
in this model appeared to have no statistical significance. The remaining control variables however, were shown to be statistically significant and correlated in the predicted direction.

The two hypotheses proposed in the previous chapter were tested by implementing three models, the results of which seem to support the hypotheses that gender gap reasoning, when allowed to influence policy, can reduce the levels of state sponsored domestic violence. Reaffirmed also is the theory that women prefer less violent policy options. In the following chapter I will draw conclusions derived from the testing of these hypotheses and discuss possible implications as well as ideas for further research.
In this study I sought to evaluate whether the gender of policy makers might be a significant predictor of human rights abuse. The literature reflects a general consensus among researchers from several disciplines that gender differences in policy preferences, with regards to the use of violence and aggression by a state, do indeed exist. Women have been shown to prefer diplomacy over violence. But testing to ascertain how state behavior might be altered as a result of more women gaining power and to determine whether policy preferences for either aggression or diplomacy reflect the degree to which women have decision making positions has been limited in scope. Two studies conducted by Mary Caprioli provide persuasive support for the conclusion that having more women in power will result in lower levels of aggression and violent conflict resolutions in matters of international conflict. However, prior to this study, no previous research had investigated the effects of the influence of women in power on the choices of methods employed by states for the purpose of domestic conflict resolution.

After a review of the literature it was apparent that extensive cross-discipline research has been conducted in order to tests theories of differences in cognitive and moral reasoning relative to gender. Survey research of public opinion supports the contention that the differences not only exist, but that they are cross-cultural. And
researchers from various fields provide explanations for the causes of gender differences from their own unique perspectives.

Within the field of international relations it has been shown that the levels of women in power can influence the levels of aggression utilized by states as a means of coercion, conflict resolution or the implementation of an agenda internationally. Furthermore, a substantial amount of the human rights literature is devoted to identifying the major determinants of levels of domestic human rights abuse. I have raised the question as to whether an important variable has been overlooked in the literature, and by testing the resulting hypotheses I have built on previous work by expanding the list of possible determinants of domestic human rights to include women in power.

Hypotheses tested in this thesis are derived from basic gender gap theories tested in both the behavioral and biological sciences. The former theory holds that gender differences are transmitted through a socialization process and are a product of the culture in which one lives, and the latter contends that the differences are genetic and inherent from the time we are born. Furthermore, public opinion survey research can be employed to bolster either of the basic theories as it provides support to the contention that differences are gender specific and similar cross-culturally. However, it only reports apparent differences, and its purpose is not to determine casual factors.

Within an international relations context hypotheses are derived from the basic theories of gendered moral reasoning differences. The theories are applied and expanded to encompass explanations of state behavior through the investigation of the impact women have on levels of violent and aggressive foreign policy. I take the
research one step further and expand the literature by applying the previous theories to domestic policy in an effort to explain variances in domestic human rights abuse relative to the degree of power women have within a state’s legislative bodies.

The results of my quantitative analysis are consistent with previous findings that have provided evidence of a gender gap in reasoning whereby women are more pacifistic. Furthermore they provide support for the two hypotheses posited in this thesis because they appear to demonstrate that respect for human rights is significantly, positively correlated with the number of women in power. Through multivariate analysis I was able to determine that although other previously identified predictors of human rights, such as democracy, demonstrate a stronger correlation, there is evidence that the women in power variable is, in at least two categories of human rights--personal integrity rights and subsistence rights—an important determinant and one that deserves consideration in the future. A higher degree of the statistical significance of personal integrity rights over subsistence rights provides solid support for the theories that attribute differences to the more pacifistic nature of women. The PQLI correlation supports the suggested “ethic of caring” characteristic in women but to a lesser degree.

This research suggests that a new factor of variance, the influence of women in power, shown to contribute to a state’s propensity toward less violent domestic policy options, provides an additional perspective through which previous and future policy and state behavior can and should be investigated and examined. In also contributes to the human rights literature a potentially strong, heretofore untested determinant that can be researched and examined from many, unexplored angles and under a multitude of varying circumstances. I would propose for further research the investigation of the
effects of women in power on violence with the consideration of regional differences, cultural differences, and ideological differences.

In a rapidly globalizing political world where the potential for violence and aggression increases daily the findings of this research could certainly offer support to the argument for equal decision making power shared by both genders and parity in policy making bodies. Anytime we can understand and identify a cause of or remedy for domestic human rights abuse a step has been taken toward a possible future reduction in incidences of state terror. I have provided support for the argument of parity as well as evidence that gender equality in policy making bodies could possibly make the world a less violent environment.
APPENDIX A

LIST OF ALL COUNTRIES INCLUDED IN ANALYSIS
COUNTRY LIST

Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
Angola
Argentina
Australia
Bahamas
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belgium
Benin
Bolivia
Botswana
Brazil
Bulgaria
Burundi
Cambodia (Kampuchea)
Cameroon
Canada
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chile
China
Colombia
Comoros
Congo
Costa Rica
Côte d'Ivoire
Cuba
Cyprus
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
Djibouti
Dominican Republic
Dominica
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Equatorial Guinea
Fiji
Finland
Gabon
Gambia
Germany
Ghana
Greece
Grenada
Guatemala
Guinea
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kenya
Kuwait
Laos
Luxembourg
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Maldives
Mali
Malta
Mauritius
Mexico
Morocco
Mozambique
Myanmar (Burma)
Nepal
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Niger
Pakistan
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Rwanda
Senegal
Seychelles
Singapore
Solomons
Somalia
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Suriname
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland
Syria
Thailand
Togo
Trinidad
Tunisia
Turkey
UAE
Uganda
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Vanuatu
Venezuela
Vietnam
Zaire
Zambia
REFERENCES


