SELLING HUMANS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CONTEMPORARY GLOBAL SLAVERY

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Human trafficking is a growing illegal crime, both in terms of numbers and profits. Thus, important to consider, as it is a human rights, political, criminal justice, national security, and economic issue. Previous studies have these examined these human trafficking factors independently, yet none have really taken into account how they work simultaneously. This study examines why human trafficker continues to occur, particularly at the domestic and transnational level, and also why some countries are better able to effectively deal with this problem in terms of criminalizing human traffickers.

It is argued that at the domestic level, traffickers first must take into account the operating costs, illegal risks, bribery, and profits of the business. After considering these basic elements, they then need to consider the world, including economic, political, geographic, and cultural factors that may help facilitate human trafficking. However, human trafficking can occur across large geographic distances, though rare. This is more likely to happen based on the type of human trafficking group, available expatriate or immigrant networks, the origin-transit-destination country connection, or strength of the bilateral economic relationship between origin and destination countries. Finally, looking at why some countries are better able to criminalize traffickers helps us to better understand how human trafficking can be discouraged. In short, conformity of a country's domestic anti-human trafficking law, as well as the degree of enforcement, should increase the probability of criminalizing a human trafficker.

These three theoretical arguments help to better understand the nature of the business, and more importantly, why human trafficking continues.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

LIST OF TABLES

Page

LIST OF FIGURES

Page

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

"[Human] trafficking[1] is the fastest growing means by which people are forced into slavery" (Farr 2005; Anti-Slavery International 2007), with approximately 800,000 people trafficked across international borders each year. Eighty percent of these victims are female (U.S. Department of State 2007). The majority of them, an estimated 70%, are sold to the commercial sex trade, with the remaining proportion primarily destined for forced labor (U.S. Department of Justice 2004). In the United States alone, approximately 200,000 people are enslaved, with 17,500 trafficked persons brought into the country each year (Batstone 2007). Human trafficking is the third most profitable illicit trade after arms and drugs (Altink 1995; Miko 2003; Farr 2005; Obokata 2006), and brings in an estimated annual profit of $13 billion (Bales 1999; 2005). Some sources push estimates up to $32 billion a year, with profits of $15.5 billion made in industrialized countries (ILO 2005). Figure 1.1 presents estimates on the value of the human trafficking industry, which varies roughly between $6 billion and $32 billion, depending on the reporting organization (UNESCO 2013b). Human trafficking continues to thrive in virtually every country in the world, despite the official abolishment of slavery in most countries during the 19th and early part of the 20th centuries (Bales 1999; van den Anker 2004).

Overall, as Figure 1.2 shows, trafficking estimates vary widely - between 500,000 and 12 million people - depending on the reporting organization (UNESCO 2013b). These figures vary widely because trafficking in persons is an illegal activity, and its victims remain a largely hidden population. As a result, reliable figures on its scope are difficult to obtain (Kempadoo et

[1] Human trafficking is used interchangeably with the term "trafficking," and "trafficking in persons."

al. 2005; Garofalo 2006). In addition, different sources may report different incidences as trafficking, when they may or may not be the same.

There are an estimated 27 million slaves (Bales 1999; 2005), where the vast majority are forced labor in the agricultural sector of South Asia (e.g., Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh) (Bales 1999; 2005). To clarify, this figure represents the total number of slaves worldwide, whereas the figure pertaining to the commercial sex trade represents just a segment of slavery.

Human trafficking represents not only a sizeable illicit trade, but it is also a human rights problem that states have only relatively recently begun to confront. Unlike other illicit trades, where the commodity that is traded (such as weapons or drugs) is easily recognized, human trafficking is difficult to combat because a trafficked person is not as easily identifiable as a victim of trafficking, or, in political economic terms, as the "good" being traded. In addition, the victims often hail from marginalized groups that may not be a political priority domestically, and victims of transnational trafficking can easily be confused with illegal immigrants, which renders them problematic as a political priority as well. This is explored in greater detail later in this dissertation. It is important to point out here, however, that this makes it difficult for political decision makers to effectively address human trafficking. Why does human trafficking continue to occur? This overarching puzzle is best understood when we examine both the supply-side and demand-side of human trafficking. Although the media has portrayed human trafficking as primarily a transnational phenomenon, occurring across large distances, I theorize that it should be equally (or more) prevalent domestically and in border regions. Why would traffickers want to operate transnationally or across large geographic distances given the high costs and risks involved, versus within a country (nationally) or regionally, where they are more familiar with both the political, socio-cultural context and the physical terrain, and they can lower the risks

involved in their enterprise? It is important to ask under what circumstances does transnational human trafficking occur? In other words, when and why do traffickers extend their operation beyond national or regional confines? These puzzles examine the supply-side of human trafficking or those actors or factors that create an environment for trafficking to occur.

In addition, there remains a considerable gap in better understanding the demand-side of the business[2]. Why do some countries or regions deal with trafficking more effectively than others, and why are some countries more successful at capturing traffickers than others? Further, despite the adoption of numerous anti-human trafficking laws and treaties, as well as an international and universal definition of human trafficking, why do trafficking convictions remain so low and varied?

1.1 Significance and Importance of Human Trafficking

This dissertation seeks to address these research puzzles, as they are not only of scientific interest, but also have broader societal and economic policy implications. Human trafficking and slavery in general, are violations of a person's most basic civil, political, and human rights. At its root, the person no longer has any freedom, and is exploited in numerous ways for the financial gain of others, without compensation. Not only is this offense considered by some scholars to be a "crime against humanity" (Obokata 2005), but it is also an egregious crime. The people who serve as the "good" being purveyed by traffickers, and more generally, slavery, are extremely abundant worldwide: the constant fluctuations in migration, immigrants, and refugees from civil wars and from political unstable countries, travelers, and migrants looking to improve their economic prospects can become vulnerable to trafficking.

[2] To clarify, by "demand-side" I do not necessarily mean the actors that purchase these goods (people) and services, and/or the factors that "pull" people into the business. Rather, I broaden this definition to also include any actors that target the human trafficking enterprise as a whole, including those fighting against it (e.g. the legal and judicial systems).

FIGURE 1. Value of Human Trafficking Industry



FIGURE 1.2 Trafficking in Persons Worldwide Estimates 1997-2009



This notion of human security also spills over into the area of national and border security, including immigration, both legal and illegal. People who are smuggled (illegal immigration) can easily become trafficking victims, and people who have just emigrated with legal documents can face similar vulnerabilities. For smuggled people, especially women and children, the journey from their home country to the destination country is often uncertain and particularly dangerous as they are more susceptible to crime and violence. On the other hand, legal immigrants who have just arrived at their destination country face similar uncertainties (unless they already know someone or have family there), especially if they have moved to another country for a new job and do not yet know the language. Immigration then spills over into issues of economic security. People move around or migrate to other countries primarily for economic opportunities. Traffickers recognize this and are quick to take advantage of these people. In short, examining the supply-side issues of trafficking enable to us to understand why it continues to occur.

To understand how to mitigate the flow of human trafficking, we need to recognize the importance of the demand-side. Human trafficking is a crime in itself, yet involves various other crimes, like kidnapping, using fraudulent documents, etc. To effectively deal with a crime, we first need to be able to define it and know what it is. Although the Palermo Protocol set forth an international definition of human trafficking, countries have not been so systematic with incorporating this definition into their national anti-trafficking laws (if they have any). This is problematic for academic research because this makes data produced by different countries difficult to compare. In addition, this is also challenging for policy-makers because if definitions vary by country, then laws cannot be effectively enforced, traffickers apprehended, and victims protected.

In addition, trafficking takes many forms (sexual exploitation or labor), and without having a proper definition of what it constitutes as well as training on how to recognize a trafficked person, it can be difficult to identify a victim. For example, New York City has excellent anti-trafficking legislation, yet the police have had difficulty in identifying trafficked victims, and in particular, asking the right type of questions (Berger 2009). As a result, many known cases are conflated with other offenses, like prostitution, and traffickers get off on lower charges.

Despite the extensive knowledge we have learned about human trafficking over the past several decades, we have only examined the "tip of the iceberg" of this illicit industry. It is very difficult to even gauge or possibly imagine the full extent of trafficking due largely to the "hidden populations"[3] being dealt with (Laczko 2005; Parrot and Cummings 2006). The industry operates mainly underground, and the people involved – the traffickers and trafficked victims – are often very difficult to reach or to find. This makes it all the more important to consider such a multidimensional crime that affects human, national, and economic security, both within and to some extent, across countries.

Before looking at a summary of the three theoretical arguments presented in this dissertation, it is important to consider three things. First, a definition of human trafficking is provided, in order to understand how I define it in this research. Given the extensive conflation and confusion between human trafficking and smuggling (van den Anker 2004; Di Nicola 2007; Zhang 2007; Konrad 2008), a brief look at how these two are different but interrelated is warranted. Second, a very brief overview of five types of slavery are explored, including

[3] A hidden population is defined as "a group of individuals for whom the size and boundaries are unknown, and for whom no sampling frame exists" (Tyldum and Brunovskis 2005).

exploitation of children, debt bondage, forced labor, organ trafficking, and forced marriage. These are illustrated in order to demonstrate in the remaining chapters that human trafficking is not an isolated crime or type of slavery, but instead, often involves other forms of slavery. Thus, these forms may not always be mutually exclusive. Finally, the structure of this dissertation is such that countries are identified according to their role in the human trafficking process, and whether they serve as origin, transit, and/or destination countries. Knowing which one(s) a country is can be helpful in determining the direction or flow of human trafficking, and how traffickers operate.

1.2 Definitions

1.2.1 Human Trafficking

Modern slavery involves the control of one person over another for the purpose of economic exploitation (Bales 1999). But what is human trafficking more specifically?

According to the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (from the United Nations Convention Against Organized Crime, otherwise referred to as the "Palermo Protocol"), it is defined as the action of:

> recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs. (UNOHCHR 2000)

This was the first international instrument to really define what human trafficking is, and to broaden the scope so that it included various forms of exploitation (UNODC 2006). This definitional issue is discussed at greater lengths in Chapter 6, but is illustrated here so that the reader knows up front this is the way human trafficking is defined in this dissertation.

It should also be mentioned that these forms of exploitation as outlined above in the definition of the Palermo Protocol, are the focus of this study. That is, this study focuses only on the types of human trafficking where humans are treated as commodities in a market with buyers and sellers. Organ trafficking is considered a form of slavery within the Palermo Protocol, and takes a different nature, and involves slightly different dynamics than trafficking of people. Forced marriage is not specifically listed as a form of slavery within the Palermo Protocol, though other scholars have included this within their definitions of slavery (Kara 2009). Thus, organ trafficking and forced marriage are excluded from the theoretical and empirical chapters.

I employ the human trafficking definition set forth in the Palermo Protocol because it has received recognition as being the first international instrument to define what human trafficking was without bias toward gender, race, or age. In addition, I use data from the United Nations (UNODC 2006), and specifically consider the Palermo Protocol as an international framework and model.

1.2.2 Human Trafficking vs. Smuggling

It should also be mentioned that human trafficking and smuggling are not the same thing, although both terms are used interchangeably and often confused, (van den Anker 2004; Di Nicola 2007; Zhang 2007; Konrad 2008) especially in news media reports. According to the United Nations Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants By Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (or the "Smuggling Protocol"), smuggling is defined as "the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or permanent resident" (UNCJIN 2000). In short, a person pays someone to help them get through a border illegally. Three elements differentiate

smuggling from human trafficking. First, smuggling requires the crossing of an international border; trafficking does not (Obokata 2006; UNODC 2006). Trafficking can occur internally (within a country) or externally (between two countries). Smuggling can only occur externally, or between one country and at least another one. Both are interconnected and related as both involve migrants or people usually looking for a better life. Second, there is this notion of illegality that is always present with smuggling, but not necessarily with human trafficking. Regular and legal migration channels are off-limits for whatever reason, so people turn to illegal routes. This is a defining feature of smuggling because it is illegal. In human trafficking, however, migration can be legal and involve real documents. Finally, smuggling involves a financial payment, where the person to be smuggled essentially pays the smuggler for getting them to their final destination via an illegal channel. A key difference between this and human trafficking is that the person makes a payment but is not exploited for financial gain by the smuggler, though human rights abuses can occur (like sexual and physical abuse). In human trafficking, a person is exploited financially by the trafficker, and is usually abused in numerous ways.

A good example of a country known for human smuggling is neighboring Mexico. Many people from South America, and especially throughout Central America, illegally migrate into the United States via Mexico in search of better economic opportunities. They can do so alone, but sometimes paying someone to guide them through undetected, and through low-risk routes increases the chance of crossing the Mexican-United States border. Of course, this is not always the case. It can also be that the smugglers accept financial or material benefit without ever carrying out their intended plans of helping the migrant become smuggled. They may kill or leave a sick migrant along the route, thus gaining a profit.

Initially, or at the beginning of the process, an individual may want to only be smuggled into another country. Upon arriving to the destination country, they either go on their merry way, or they are duped and/or abducted by traffickers for exploitation (for financial gain). At this point, the individual is no longer a smuggled person, but a trafficked victim (Goodey 2005; UNODC 2006). Thus, a human smuggling victim has the potential to become trafficked if they fall into the wrong hands, or are intercepted before they arrive to their destination point.

1.3 Types of Slavery

There are many forms of slavery, including the exploitation of children (commercial sexual exploitation and forced labor), debt bondage, forced labor, organ trafficking, and forced marriage (UNOHCHR 1956; 1991; Skrobanek et al.1997; UNOHCHR 2000; Bales 2005; UNODC 2006). Traditional [chattel] slavery still exists, particularly in Africa, and, more specifically, Mauritania. Mauritania stands out as an exception, having abolished slavery in as late as 1981; not surprisingly, the legacy of slavery remains well entrenched within Mauritanian society and culture (BBC News 2002).

Each type of slavery is discussed to provide an overview.[4] Note that the different types of slavery are not mutually exclusive; they can overlap. A person can be forced into labor under a debt bondage scheme while being sexually exploited for financial gain at the same time, for example.

1.3.1 Exploitation of Children

The exploitation of children is usually considered a separate form of slavery because of the special status of the individuals involved. For clarification, and in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, a "child" is defined as "every human

[4] There are different types of slavery or forms of exploitation, but all rely on networks to connect the "supplier" with the different types of demand (i.e., the different forms of slavery). However, trafficking patterns can vary according to the type of slavery into which the victim is trafficked.

being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier" (UNOHCHR 1989). Children are usually the most vulnerable segment of society -- socially, physically, and emotionally, and are abundant and available everywhere. There are about 2.2 billion children under the age of 18 years, which makes up about 1/3 of the world's population (UNICEF 2009). Child exploitation takes two main forms: commercial sexual exploitation and forced labor. Each is discussed briefly, with an overview of what they are and what they include.

The commercial sexual exploitation of children includes, but is not limited to prostitution, pornography, sex tourism, sex rings, nude dancing or modeling, and sexual exploitation of child domestic servants (Campagna and Poffenberger 1988; Beddoe 1998). For sake of brevity, only child prostitution is discussed to provide an example. Child prostitution involves sexually exploiting the body of a child and using them to provide sexual services in return for monetary compensation (Gerdes 2006). What differentiates child prostitution from sexual abuse (i.e., incest or molestation) is that the former is commercialized. However, while one is an economic transaction and the other is not, Gerdes (2006) finds a high correlation between childhood sexual abuse and child prostitution in the United States and in Nigeria. One reason is that children from abusive households are likelier to run away from home, end up on the streets, and then fall prey to the hands of traffickers or other predators and pedophiles.

Gender bias and discrimination, poverty, human deception, and the demand for sex are factors that help to foster child prostitution (Awake 2003; Gerdes 2006). In Brazil, about two million children between the ages of 10 and 14, work as prostitutes (Farr 2005). In China, there are at least 250,000 child prostitutes, while in India's major cities there are 100,000 (Farr 2005). Southeast Asia has a well-established sex industry, which has helped it to become a major center

of the commercial sexual exploitation of children. Throughout the late 1990s, over one million children in this region provided sexual services to adults (Farr 2005). In all, there are about 10 million child prostitutes today worldwide (Gerdes 2006).

Children are also exploited through forced labor. This occurs worldwide, but is especially prevalent in the agricultural sector. Other areas where children are forced into labor include domestic servitude, carpet making, jewelry making, clothes making, camel jockeying, war (as child soldiers) and mining. The small stature of children (i.e., small bodies, tiny hands and feet as compared to adults) is exploited because they can perform many of these tasks more efficiently and easily. For example, a child's small body enables them to quickly maneuver themselves through narrow and tight mining tunnels, and a child's small hands are able to operate the loom or some other machinery used to make carpets, clothing, or jewelry at a much faster rate. While widespread, the trafficking of children for labor is a significant problem in Africa, especially in Benin, Togo, Botswana, Somalia, the Congo, Ethiopia, Zambia, and Nigeria (Troubnikoff 2003), where poverty is pervasive. In 2004, 218 million children were employed in some kind of job, with 126 million believed to be working in dangerous conditions (UNICEF 2006). While many children work (not the same as being enslaved), only 5.7 million children (about 40%-50%) are forced into labor (UNICEF 2006). A key difference between work and forced labor – a type of slavery – is that the latter is performed under duress, with little to no pay, and where the worker is controlled by another person. They cannot freely leave their situation, whereas a child that goes to work gets paid – albeit a menial wage – may be abused and/or exploited, but is free to leave the job when they want to.

1.3.2 Debt Bondage

The United Nations Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery of 1956 defines debt bondage as: “a situation in which debtors pledge their personal services against a debt they owe, but the person to whom they owe it fails to deduct the value of their services from the debt, or the length and nature of those services are not respectively limited and defined” (UNOHCHR 1956). A person (or family) pledges him/herself against a debt, or they can inherit the debt from their family (Bales 1999; 2004). This is the most common form of slavery today, and can comprise an entire family due to the hereditary nature (Bales 2004).

Bales (1999) estimates that there are more than 20 million bonded laborers in the world, thus comprising the vast majority of slaves today. While debt bondage exists worldwide, it permeates through South Asia (especially Southeast Asia and in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh) and South America (especially Brazil), and is not solely exclusive to labor (Miers 2003; Bales 2004; Van den Anker 2004). Indebtedness can also occur in the sex trafficking industry (van den Anker 2004), where victims “acquire” debt from their transportation, food, and shelter costs. They “work” to pay off this acquired debt, but in reality, the debit grows faster than the individual is able to pay off. In South Asia, debt bondage is prevalent in the agriculture, rural industry, service sectors, and in production of minerals for industry or construction (e.g., brick kilns) (van den Anker 2004). In South America, bonded laborers tend to work within the environment or with agriculture (e.g., charcoal burning, deforestation, or sugar cane plantation).

1.3.3 Forced Labor

According to Anti-Slavery International, forced labor “is any work or services which people are forced to do against their will under the threat of some form of punishment” (2011).

Most forms of slavery – including debt bondage and human trafficking – have an element of forced labor (ILO 2011). Generally, forced labor can be categorized into 3 types: state imposed, privately imposed, or mixed. About 20% of forced labor cases result from state imposition – that is, the government, penal systems, the military, or rebel groups force people to work. The majority of forced labor cases – 75% - are privately imposed by individuals for economic exploitation (i.e., commercial sexual exploitation). The remaining 5% of cases are mixed or undetermined (BBC News 2009).

The International Labour Organization estimates that 12.3 million people are confined within forced labor (2011), especially in labor-intensive and/or weakly regulated industries. These include agriculture, fishing, domestic work, constructing, mining, quarrying and brick kilns, manufacturing, processing, and packaging, prostitution and sexual exploitation, and market trading and illegal activities (Anti-Slavery International 2011). Most of these victims are minorities or marginalized groups facing discrimination. Forced labor occurs worldwide, although it is most widespread in Asia and the Pacific (77%), followed by Latin America (11%) (Anti-Slavery International 2011).

1.3.4 Organ Trafficking

Organ trafficking[5] or trade involves the removal, trafficking, and sale (for personal gain) of a bodily organ, with the seller earning an estimated $2,000 to $6,000 for each kidney

[5] While the Palermo Protocol considers the removal organs a form of exploitation, this form of slavery is often ignored. The removal of organs does not necessarily entail complete physical enslavement of the individual, but it does extend itself to a form of economic exploitation that unfairly targets vulnerable people (i.e., the very poor or the poorest among the poor), and that may [unknowingly] lead to death. If the organ is not removed in a sanitary way that prevents infection, it can lead to death. Many "donors," especially from very poor backgrounds, do not always realize that organ removal is not a simple procedure of "cut, open, remove kidney, back to work." If the operation is not done properly or is botched (especially if the surgeon is not medically trained), selling an organ for money can lead to eternal enslavement [death]. In essence, there are degrees of enslavement when it comes to organ trafficking, which can be

(excluding post-operative treatment) (Cholia 2009). This accounts only for the money they receive from the organ "donor", and not from the individual (usually wealthy) receiving the organ (i.e., the transplant recipient in need of the organ). This occurs worldwide, but is a major problem in countries like Moldova, the Philippines, Brazil, Israel, Egypt, South Africa, Indonesia, India, and Iraq, which suffer from extreme poverty and inequality, high unemployment, unequal development, and pervasive government corruption (McLaughlin et al. 2004; Cullen 2007; Ryan 2007; The Tiraspol Times 2007; Cholia 2009). Organ trafficking is illegal in most countries, but in Iran, selling a kidney for profit is legal (Cholia 2009). Since there are no waiting lists for kidney transplants, two organ associations in alliance with the government control the trade. Why is there such a demand for organs, especially kidneys? The World Health Organization claims that an increase in kidney diseases and the shortage of available kidneys is to blame; in 2005, only 10% of needed organ transplants were met (Cholia 2009). Buyers desperate for an organ, coupled with "donors" who are desperate to make money, help to foster this illicit trade.

In Moldova, for example, the registered daily income of 80% of the population lies below one dollar a day, and total unemployment reaches nearly one hundred percent (The Tiraspol Times 2007). It is said that "every 6 minutes, a human organ is being removed from a Moldovan and sold" (Ryan 2007). The Philippines parallels Moldova in that organ trafficking is one of the fastest growing illicit crimes in the country (Cullen 2007). Poverty creates extreme vulnerabilities, where some are so hungry they sell their organs to get money for food (Cullen 2007). Despite an anti-trafficking law that makes it a criminal offense to remove or sell a person's organ, there remain significant problems with legislative enforcement.

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permanent if the situation does not go well. For this study, organ trafficking is discussed solely for illustrative purposes. This study confines the theoretical and empirical chapters to the other forms of human trafficking, mainly those where humans are the commodity being trafficked within countries and across borders.

1.3.5 Forced Marriage

Forced marriage[6] is when a person does not have the free and full consent of one of the parties to a marriage (Hossain and Turner 2001). What differentiates this from an arranged marriage is that in the latter, both people freely consent to marriage[7]. While forced marriage affects some males, it predominantly concerns females. Generally, women who try to resist a forced marriage are held against their will in confinement; in extreme cases, if a woman tries to escape her situation or greatly resists the [forced] marriage, she may be killed by her own family (Hossain and Turner 2001). Apart from a cultural or societal context, forced marriages are also a major feature of armed conflicts around the world, including in Sierra Leone, Cambodia, Rwanda, and Uganda (Jain 2008).

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[6] To clarify, forced marriage (which the Palermo Protocol does not consider a form of exploitation, and hence, trafficking) can involve the selling and buying of people, particularly women, much like selling livestock. Buyers look for "premium" stock; that is, they look for certain cultural characteristics, including certain ethnic traits or marks, age, and physical appearance. In certain countries or regions, rural men looking for wives can bid on a wife by examining several and then purchasing one to bring back with him to his village (like in Mongolia). In other situations, when a girl or woman is raped, the rapist can ask the victim's family for permission to marry her. If the family says no, the girl or woman will more than likely be culturally ostracized or shunned in her community; if the family says yes, then the victim is forced to oblige and enter into marriage. Finally, marriage by abduction (i.e., "bride capture) can also occur where women are kidnapped and taken as brides in countries like Ethiopia (Hudson et al. 2012). This is a form of slavery (and again, like organ trafficking, the degrees of exploitation can vary), and in many ways, is one of the most horrific given the circumstance. For this study, much like organ trafficking, forced marriage is discussed solely for illustrative purposes. This study confines the theoretical and empirical chapters to the other forms of human trafficking, mainly those where humans are the commodity being trafficked within countries and across borders.

[7] In truth, the degree to which a woman freely gives her consent to an arranged marriage can vary dramatically. For example, a woman that truly wants to get married will give her complete consent, one that is pressured by family or societal factors may marry under these constraints, and finally, a woman that does not wish to enter into an arranged marriage but is forced with violence may seek alternatives, such as running away from her community. It is not uncommon for women and young girls to leave their rural homes to escape such marriages, as noted in places like the Middle East and China.

While forced marriage can occur anywhere in the world, it is most common in Pakistan and Bangladesh. However, there have been cases in Africa, China, Japan, and the United States as well (BBC News 2004). In the United Kingdom, for example, an estimated 1000 women are abducted each year by their families and taken back to their home countries and forced into marriage; the majority are Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh women from Pakistani, Indian, and Bangladeshi communities (Hossain and Turner 2001).

1.4 Types of Human Trafficking Countries

Trafficking may occur within countries (internal trafficking) or across countries (transnational trafficking) (Barry 1995). Poorer countries tend to serve as source or origin countries (where individuals are trafficked out of); others as transit countries (where individuals pass en route to their final destination); and some as destination countries (final stop for trafficked individuals) (Skrobanek et al. 1997). Yet, many countries serve as all three. For example, Thailand is an origin of human trafficking, a destination country, and a transit site for victims from neighboring countries who are being transported to third countries. Origin countries are usually poor, and experience limited development. Many of them are in Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia, and parts of Central and Eastern Europe. Together, these countries contain most of the world's population, and varying levels of political and economic development and opportunities.

Destination countries, on the other hand, are usually wealthier, and highly developed. Well-known countries include Belgium, Japan, Israel, Thailand, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Turkey, and the United States (UNODC 2006). Transit countries often encompass both types of countries (i.e., both rich and poor), and include South Africa, Mexico, and Israel. Mexico is a good example of a rich (relative to other countries in Latin America) country as well as a poor

country (relative to the United States and Canada) that serves as a transit country. Traffickers from Central and South America stop in Mexico before going onto the United States or Canada, or even Europe.

Trafficking routes are a function of what type of hosts these countries play. In general, human trafficking flows from poorer to richer countries. However, this does not necessarily mean trafficking from a poorer country to richer country. This can also mean trafficking from a 'poorer' less-developed country to a 'wealthier' less-developed country. For example, it might be expected for trafficking to flow from Bolivia (a poorer country) to the United States (a richer country). At the same time, though, trafficking can also occur between two 'poorer' countries (relative to richer countries), such as between Bolivia and Paraguay, or even Bolivia and Peru. As a result, trafficking directions and routes are not always as clear-cut and defined.

The direction and route of trafficking (origin to destination country) also depends on the type of exploitation (i.e., sexual exploitation, forced labor, or removal of organs, for instance). Certain countries (i.e., markets) have a greater demand for a certain type of exploitation than others. For example, men from the Northeast regions of Brazil are trafficked for forced labor inland toward the Amazon to help clear forests and burn charcoal. There is a higher demand for this in Brazil than say Argentina, due to the amount of land and jungle available. In this case, Brazil would serve as both an origin and destination country because people are trafficked internally. On the other hand, the sex market is a pretty robust and pervasive industry worldwide, both at the domestic and international level. Again, Brazil has a flourishing sex tourism trade, where women from neighboring countries, as well as from Brazil, are trafficked to fulfill this demand. In this case, Brazil serves as an origin country (as do the other neighboring countries), as well as a destination country.

1.5 Summary of Theoretical Arguments

After examining these basic elements of human trafficking, it is now that we turn to a brief look at the three theoretical frameworks presented in this dissertation. These three distinct yet interconnected puzzles revolve around the central question: Why does human trafficking occur, and most importantly, continue? Chapter 3 offers a political economy theory of human trafficking that considers not only the underlying economic structures of supply and demand, but also economic, political, geographic, and cultural factors that help foster human trafficking. First, economic factors that traffickers must consider include the cost benefit analysis of engaging in an illegal trade, including interception, capture, or worse, conviction. Moreover, traffickers must take into account inherent inequality structures of both origin and destination countries, as these factors help determine the right markets for their goods. Second, traffickers must also consider political factors, including corruption, political borders and whether they are porous or not, institutional strength of the country, political, economic, and environmental instability, and the regime. This is an area that warrants greater attention, as it has not been examined thoroughly within political science, and the impact it has on human trafficking. These factors all play a role together, and not independently, in allowing human trafficking to occur. In particular, the intersection of corruption with many of these political features facilitates this crime, but may be thwarted – regardless of corruption level – by the porousness and type of land borders. Further, the different types of instabilities – political, economic, and environmental – have not bee examined in relation to political institutions, such as regimes. In short, these political factors are important to consider as human trafficking occurs within a country's borders, but also has the potential to occur across borders. Fourth, traffickers also need to consider geographic factors, including geographic distance, terrain, and the mode of transportation they employ. Geographic

distance is a key feature in a trafficker's calculus, because it determines the route they take, and the mode of transportation. Traffickers should be inclined to traffic across shorter distances to keep costs and risks low, and to avoid passing through mountainous terrain or other such topographical features, due to the physical barriers they pose. However, passing through such terrain may be possible if there is an element of corruption involved that allow officials to turn a blind eye to them. Finally, traffickers must also consider culture. Shared or similar culture with the victim allows for greater trust and familiarity, especially in the recruitment and deception process. Someone who speaks the same language as you, and more importantly, comes from the same country or region, increases trust. At the same time, traffickers should be more likely to operate their business in the country(ies) they are most culturally familiar with, including language. This decreases costs of learning about another culture, their customs, and language, and increases the ability for them to do their job without these hurdles. These four factors thus dictate keeping human trafficking closer to home than far away.

However, there are instances – though uncommon – where human trafficking occurs over large geographic distances, or across transnational borders. Thus, why would human traffickers choose to operate outside of their home countries or geographic regions give these costs and risks? Chapter 5 considers cases of human trafficking that extend across such geographic distances, and argues that four elements enable for traffickers to do this: the type of human trafficking group, available expatriate or immigrant networks, the origin-transit-destination connection, or the strength of bilateral economic relationships. First, the type of human trafficking group is an important determinant and consideration for whether traffickers extend their operations across large distances. The more organized, connected, well endowed (in terms of finances, manpower, and resources), and institutionalized they are, the likelier they are to be

able to afford the costs and risks associated with transnational human trafficking. Thus, the type of trafficking group matters to the degree that they are sophisticated. Second, available expatriate or immigrant networks in destination countries should facilitate transnational human trafficking. Established transnational networks of people, provides them a link of contacts to potentially tap into. Third, the relationship between the origin-transit-destination countries, allow traffickers to expand their operations transnationally, by offering safe houses and sanctuaries en-route. Transit countries – particularly if the travel is long- act like rest stops for traffickers, and enable them to drop off or pick up new goods, as well as increase resources. The fourth and final element that aids traffickers across transnational distances is the strength of the bilateral economic relationship between the origin and destination country, particularly with trade. Both poorer and richer countries (though wealth is relative depending on the country) benefit from this economic relationship. Poorer countries are able to send a percentage or certain number of people to the richer countries under a contract agreement (directly through the government or third parties). Thus, both the origin and destination countries benefit in a symbiotic way: the destination country with an increased labor supply and profits, and the origin country with remittances. However, sometimes these contractual labor jobs lead to exploitation, which may be a function of the destination country itself. Women, who migrate to countries as domestic servants or nannies, have also been known to become exploited, enslaved, and even trafficked. In short, countries with strong bilateral economic relationships may increase incentives for traffickers to tap into these flows that are already traveling long distances. Overall, if trafficking groups have any of these elements, they may consider branching their operations beyond domestic confines.

The final theoretical framework in Chapter 6 also considers why human trafficking continues, but instead of examining the supply-side, it examines the demand-side and looks at why traffickers remain free as a result of low and varied convictions. Despite the adoption of an international and universal anti-human trafficking instrument, the Palermo Protocol, conviction rates remain paltry. I argue that conviction rates (proxied as the criminalization of traffickers) depend on whether the definition of human trafficking in a country's domestic anti-human trafficking law conforms to the Palermo Protocol's, and whether it is enforced. The Palermo Protocol was the first international instrument to define what human trafficking was at the international level, and as such, provides a model for countries to follow, especially in establishing their anti-trafficking laws. In addition, the degree to which these laws are being enforced dictates whether or not traffickers are prosecuted and convicted. Therefore, both laws and enforcement affect whether risks increase for traffickers: if laws do not exist or do not effectively target human trafficking as a crime, coupled with lax enforcement, trafficking is more likely.

1.6 Dissertation Roadmap

This dissertation proceeds in the following manner. Chapter 2 explores the literature that investigates why human trafficking has continued to persist, particularly through a supply-side and demand-side framework, including human rights, criminal justice, and political economy perspectives. Chapter 3 presents a political economy theory of human trafficking and briefly argues that human trafficking is primarily a domestic phenomenon due to various economic, political, geographic, and cultural factors. Chapter 4 presents the research design and empirical analysis, which tests the political economy theory of human trafficking. In Chapter 5, a theory of transnational human trafficking is presented, and argues that trafficking may occur across

large geographical distances (although not as common) due to the level of sophistication of the trafficking group, available expatriate or immigrant networks, the origin-destination connection, or the strength of bilateral economic relationships. This chapter is not empirically tested due to unavailable data. Chapter 6 offers a theory of why human trafficking convictions remain so low and varied. Specifically, it is argued that convictions (proxied as the criminalization of traffickers) remain problematic due to the lack of a standardized definition of human trafficking at the domestic level, and enforcement. Chapter 7 provides the research design and empirical analysis for the theory of why human traffickers remain free, and conviction rates (proxied by the criminalization of human traffickers) so low and varied. Chapter 8 concludes the dissertation, with a general summary of the theoretical arguments and results. The contributions of this dissertation to the fields of human trafficking, human rights, and more broadly, political science, are discussed. Finally, policy implications and future research are discussed.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

There has been an overall lack of academic research on slavery versus other illegal industries like drug trafficking, organized crime, and illegal immigration (Fiorentini and Peltzman 1995; Freeman 1999; International Organization for Migration 2001; Mahmoud and Trebesch 2009; Verma 2010). Within Political Science, the literature remains even more inadequate and scant. Here, I draw from research in several disciplines to develop a multi-layered explanation on why human trafficking occurs and how it is dealt with, both from a supply-side and demand-side perspective. Within the literature on the supply-side perspective, there are three broad approaches to explaining, dealing with, and understanding human trafficking: human rights, criminal justice, and economic factors. These categories are not mutually exclusive, and elements of one approach can also be present in another. The literature on the demand-side perspective focuses on why traffickers are still trafficking people, and why they have not been prosecuted or convicted in large numbers. Together, these two broad approaches help us better understand the dynamics of human trafficking.

2.1 Supply-Side: Why Human Trafficking Happens

The literature in the supply-side framework considers the factors that drive human trafficking, and more importantly, push people into the hands of traffickers, including human rights, criminal justice, and economic frameworks. All of these factors help explain why human trafficking continues.

2.1.1 Human Rights Approach

The human rights approach – supported by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations (IOs) - views trafficking as an inherent violation of basic human

rights and norms, examines the driving forces of trafficking, focuses on protecting, rescuing, rehabilitating, and reintegrating the trafficked person back into society, and emphasizes human security (Chuang 1998; Caldwell et al. 1999; Human Rights Watch 2001; Gallagher 2001, 2002, 2004, 2009; Anti-Slavery International 2002; Asian Development Bank 2003; Macklin 2003; van den Anker 2004; Corrin 2005; Esquibel 2005; Mertus and Bertone 2007; Ribando 2007; Konrad 2008; Hathaway 2009). Trafficking is considered to be a gross violation of basic human rights because of the physical, mental, and psychological violence, abuse, and stigma involved against the individual, especially in labor exploitation, and even more so in sexual exploitation (Caldwell et al. 1999; Gallagher 2004; Esquibel 2005; Ribando 2007). "To assist and protect victims – as is the duty of states and governments under human rights norms – is not only called for from the human rights perspective but would also be a major contribution to curbing this crime" (Konrad 2006). In short, human rights proponents argue that by focusing on the individual – specifically, the process of victimization and the factors that push people into trafficking, and finally and the post-trafficking environment and rehabilitation of the victim - we can then reduce human trafficking.

2.1.1.1 International Ethics and Norms

Slavery has existed for centuries, and it was during the abolitionist movement in the 1800s that international ethics and norms regarding the structure of slavery were established, (van den Anker 2004) and in general, human rights norms (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Risse 1999; Risse et al. 1999; Thomas 2001; Cortell and Davis 2002; Cardenas 2004; Simmons 2009). Slavery and the violence it entailed were considered morally and ethically wrong, yet, despite anti-slavery instruments prohibiting it, it has continued to flourish. Picarelli (2009) argues that apart from the economic framework of understanding why traffickers do what they do (i.e., to

make a large profit), we should also consider how international rules and norms impact human trafficking. He claims that traffickers sustain their business by "…shaping and reproducing normative frames that promote, shield, and otherwise underwrite their market," thereby producing enabling norms (Picarelli 2009). These enabling norms of immorality and illegality were established during and after the abolition movement. This, coupled with the economic market of supply and demand, allow human trafficking to emerge. In Sweden, for example, traffickers tend to be more small-scale and entrepreneurial. Since Sweden's law criminalizes pimping and trafficking, some traffickers have taken a positive step forward, by offering concessions to the trafficked persons. They have split their profits equally with the trafficked persons, and have also allowed them to refuse clients. Traffickers are moving toward extending some degree of equality as another means to control the trafficked person.

2.1.1.2 Factors that Drive Trafficking

There are a variety of factors that have long been suspected of facilitating trafficking, most of which focus on socioeconomic, political, geographic, or cultural factors. These include discrimination and inequality, poverty, prostitution, corruption, globalization, institutional strength[8], political borders, economic, political, and environmental instability, regime type, geographic distance, terrain, and culture (Enloe 1990; Altink 1995; Gallagher 2001, 2002, 2004; Pearson 2002; Asian Development Bank 2003; Kelly 2002; UNICEF 2002; Goodey 2004; Haynes 2004; Kelly et al. 2005; Stoecker and Shelley 2005; Miko 2007; Dinan 2008; Parrot and Cummings 2008; Seelke and Siskin 2008; Kara 2009; UNODC 2009; World Bank 2009). This area is one of the few in the trafficking literature that has garnered the consensus among researchers, activists, and policy-makers. While this list is not exhaustive by any means, this

[8] This particular political factor is discussed within the demand-side framework as it also affects this aspect of human trafficking. However, institutional strength (or lack there of) can both push (supply-side) and pull (demand-side) people into human trafficking.

camp of human rights proponents argue that we need to focus on the underlying "push" factors of human trafficking in order to diminish its growth. A brief discussion of some of these important factors grouped by theme (i.e., socioeconomic, political, geographic, and culture factors) is discussed so as to gain a better and more in-depth understanding of how they predispose certain populations to trafficking. Note that many of these factors are not mutually exclusive, and can extend into other themes.

2.1.1.2.1 (Socio)economic

2.1.1.2.1.1 Discrimination and Inequality

Gender and ethnic discrimination, as well as gender and income inequality, are factors that have the potential to push people into human trafficking (Cullen-Dupont 2009; Kara 2009). Women and children, especially girls, tend to be disproportionately affected in human trafficking for sexual exploitation due to these factors (Kara 2009). For example, in South Asia, the worst forms of human trafficking are found to be related to the sexual exploitation of women and children, and child labor (Skeldon 2000). Usually gender discrimination and inequality coupled with poverty reinforce the low status of females in society today (Asian Development Bank 2003), and precludes them from certain social, economic, and political access (Hughes 1999). In some male-dominated cultures (e.g., where we see machismo), the status of women is further denigrated, resulting as a contributing factor to trafficking for sexual exploitation (Barry 1979; Barry et al. 1984; Hughes 2004).

On the other hand, men also face gender discrimination within trafficking. Women and children tend to be seen as "trafficked" victims, whereas men are seen as "migrants" (Asian Development Bank 2003), and may not receive the same attention or treatment as a result. This therefore suggests that human trafficking is largely a gendered crime due to social, cultural, and

political frameworks regarding the status and position of men and women in society (Cameron and Newman 2008; Kara 2009).

Furthermore, the extent to which race, ethnicity, and religion play a role in fostering trafficking is not well examined, but some scholars have suggested that certain countries factor into their business analysis the ethnicities certain prostitution markets demand (Kara 2009). Israel, for example, has a higher demand for Eastern European white woman, especially blonde, due to their different and exotic looks. Kara (2009) finds that discrimination in the origin country has the potential to adversely impact peoples' legal and political rights. For example, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Guatemala all have sizeable indigenous populations who are most at risk for human trafficking due to their marginalized status in society. Finally, in recruiting potential victims, some traffickers send a person of the same ethnicity or culture to the lure people. In Nigeria for example, women who are trafficked from the Edo tribe are generally recruited through fancy juju (religious) rituals, where they feel spiritually obligated to repay any debts they incur en-route to their destination. Failure to abide by these religious 'contracts' means spiritual suffering for the women as well as their family (Kara 2009).

2.1.1.2.1.2 Poverty

Poverty is the most cited factor contributing to human trafficking (Altink 1995; Bales 1999; Asian Development Bank 2003; van den Anker 2004; Parashuram 2006; Zhang 2007; Cameron and Newman 2008; Cullen-DuPont 2009; Kara 2009) due to the poor to rich country pattern trafficking involves. Here, both absolute and relative poverty are considered; that is, people who simply do not meet the basic level of subsistence, versus those who do, but still feel there is a discrepancy between what they have and what they really deserve. Though absolute poverty is real and does make people vulnerable to all sorts of crimes and exploitation, it appears

that relative poverty matters more for pushing people into human trafficking (Zhang 2007; Cameron and Newman 2008). Monzini (2005) introduced a concept to the human trafficking literature that has been already well established in the civil war literature: relative deprivation (Gurr 1970). He argues that it is not poverty that induces people to leave their homes, but this relative deprivation, or the discrepancy between what the person expects from life and what is actually available. They would like more or expect more in terms of their economic security and future, and migrate to look elsewhere for this. The higher this relative deprivation, the greater the propensity for migration (Zhang 2007).

Altink (1995) asserts that the [recent] wave of trafficking, especially after the collapse of the former Soviet Union, was driven mainly by poverty, where women began to migrate from rural to urban areas in search of better economic opportunities. The Asian Development Bank (2003) supports development of infrastructure in order to reduce poverty, and thus, diminish any vulnerability to trafficking. Parashuram (2006) argues that while poverty itself does not cause trafficking to increase, it is the exploitation of that poverty that does so. He advocates "social policing" to combat trafficking by establishing village committees that maintain registries of children in order to keep track of where they are and what they do. This solution assumes, however, that there are no other human rights constraints within the local community, such as forced marriages in the case of females, or primogeniture in the case of males. If they do exist in the community, they may push women to run away, increasing their potential to become trafficked. In the case of men and primogeniture, the eldest son inherits everything, and the remaining sons need to provide for themselves, which means their potential of migration increases if they cannot find ways to support themselves locally.

Poverty in relation to gender is also an important aspect to consider. The 'feminization of poverty' refers to how women make up a disproportional number of the poor today (True 2012), and this is similar in human trafficking, where sexual exploitation comprises mainly women. Today, women comprise nearly fifty percent of the world's population (CIA 2011), yet receive much lower wages than men in most of the former Soviet Union, Africa, Asia, and Latin America (Monzini 2005). Thus, the unequal gender dynamics coupled with discrimination can exacerbate those in poverty, and increase their vulnerability to human trafficking.

Much like the conflict literature has found poverty to not be the only cause for why people join rebel groups (Gurr 1968, 1970; Victoroff 2005), the same can be said of poverty in completely explaining why people become trafficked (Parashuram 2006). In 2008, there were an estimated 1.29 billion people living below US$1.25 a day (World Bank 2012), but only an estimated 27 million people enslaved worldwide (Bales 1999; 2004; 2005). If poverty and other socioeconomic conditions are important and relevant factors for human trafficking to thrive, that means only 2% of these impoverished people were enslaved. We do not know for certain the financial background of these people, and whether all were living in poverty before becoming enslaved, but this suggests that not all victims come from completely impoverished situations, and that there are other factors at to consider.

2.1.1.2.1.3 Prostitution

Prostitution and human trafficking for sexual exploitation are highly contested issues within the literature that are often conflated with one another (Kempadoo 2005; Miko 2007; Cameron and Newman 2008). In fact, human trafficking in general, is often biased toward sexual exploitation, and this relation with prostitution further compounds any efforts to differentiate between the other types of trafficking (e.g., forced labor, debt bondage, or organ trafficking).

One reason this conflation continues may have to do with the legal instruments put in place in the early-mid 1900s, which focused on females for the purpose of trafficking for prostitution. The Conventions for the Suppression of the Traffic of Women and Children of 1921, for the Suppression of the Traffic of Women of Full Age of 1933, and for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others of 1949 all linked human trafficking with prostitution (Ould 2004). Thus, establishment of early human rights instruments concerning human trafficking, centered on prostitution (Lee 20007), and have therefore predisposed trafficking to this stigma that is also attached to prostitution and other sex work.

Some scholars argue that the legalization (i.e., regulation) of prostitution decreases human trafficking by improving working conditions, and allows sex businesses to choose from a domestic labor pool of willing participants instead of (forced) trafficked women (Bureau of the Dutch National Rapporteur on Trafficking in Human Beings 2005; Limoncelli 2009; Seelke and Siskin 2008; Segrave 2009). Akee et al. (2010) find that the legalization of prostitution does not have any effect on the incidence of human trafficking between two countries.

Yes, a handful of scholars find that a positive effect between the legalization of prostitution and human trafficking does in fact exist (Poulin 2010; Cameron and Newman 2008; Cho et al. 2011a; Jakobsson and Kotsadam 2011; Marinova and James 2012). Poulin (2010) argues that violence is an inherent feature of prostitution of women, and that the legalization of prostitution has only institutionalized itself as an acceptable form of economic activity. This in turn strengthens those who own these sex markets, and overall, has done nothing to abate human trafficking. Cho et al. (2011a) extend Jakobbson and Kotsadam's (2011) study to 150 countries – both OECD and non-OECD – and find that the legalization of prostitution increases human trafficking inflows. Marinova and James (2012) also find that the legalization of prostitution is

linked with an increase in human trafficking, especially in Germany and the Netherlands where it is legalized, as opposed to Sweden (where it is illegal). After Sweden criminalized prostitution, they saw a reduction in the number of women in prostitution. However, it is not certain if reduced numbers resulted from this law, or if prostitution went deeper underground (Konrad 2008). This suggests that the legalization and permissiveness of prostitution allows for the same political and social attitudes toward human trafficking, especially if you cannot physically differentiate between someone trafficked for prostitution and someone who works in prostitution.

The expansion of prostitution due to militarization has also been an issue that some argue has led to the inflation of trafficking (Enloe 1990; Kelly et al. 2005). In areas where there were (and are) conflicts, like in South Korea, Vietnam, the Former Yugoslavia and Kosovo, it was not uncommon for prostitution to flourish and then become institutionalized as a result of international and regional peacekeeping and security forces and demand for sex. In Southeast Asia, particularly the Philippines and Thailand, military bases and war, as well as the influx of soldiers, helped establish a flourishing sex trade that continues today (Kelly et al. 2005). Although war has gone, the sex trade remained deeply entrenched, and the region remains a hotspot for sex tourism.

2.1.1.2.2 Political

2.1.1.2.2.1 Corruption

Corruption is considered one of the major threats to human trafficking (Craig 1983; Bales 1999; Agbu 2003; Finckenauer and Shrock 2003; Haynes 2004; Bales 2005; Batstone 2007; Shelley 2007; Zhang 2007; Seelke and Siskin 2008; Kara 2009; Guth 2010; Cirineo Sacco Studnicka 2010; UNGIFT 2010; UNODC 2011), if not the most significant predictor (Bales et al. 2009). It is so pervasive, that it can occur before, during, or after human trafficking, and in all

types of countries: origin, transit, and destination (UNGIFT 2010). Due to the involvement and complicity of many law enforcement officials, border patrol, and judiciary in the business, "… going to the police is rarely an option because in almost every country [the author] visited, the police were purchasers of sex slaves" (Kara 2009). This factor has led to not only distrust between trafficked persons and law enforcement, but has also hampered any efforts to reduce human trafficking. For example, in Moldova - despite establishing an anti-human trafficking law in 2003 that defines trafficking, and specifies penalties for both trafficking and pimping – more pimping prosecutions resulted (Kara 2009). In short, corruption helps reduce human trafficking charges to weaker and lower penalties, such as pimping, which may carry a lighter sentence and/or fine. One anonymous lawyer in the capital city, Chisinau, claimed that since the establishment of the anti-human trafficking law, more than half of the trafficking cases prosecuted were reduced to pimping due to corruption. Judiciary officials, including lawyers, are bribed and paid off by traffickers to reduce sentences, so traffickers end up paying measly fines and going free. Low wages appear to be tied to the systematic use of bribery and corruption. The average border guard or police officer in Moldova makes about US$100 a month, while the average judge makes anywhere from US$200 to US$250 per month (Kara 2009). On the part of the traffickers, monetary bribes make little impact on their budget, and for these officials, they provide an additional source of income to their already meager salary. Craig (1983) found that a number of judges in drug trafficking zones are directly involved in the business, and this may have a similar effect on human trafficking, especially if drug cartels are also involved in trafficking people. Due to fear and bribes, these judges fail to arrest known traffickers, thus failing to achieve convictions.

2.1.1.2.2.2 Globalization

There are some scholars who argue globalization to be a leading factor in human trafficking (van den Anker 2004; Kelly et al. 2005; Cameron and Newman 2008; Dinan 2008), particularly transnational human trafficking (i.e., human trafficking that occurs across countries instead of inside). Globalization can best be defined as:

> the closer integration of the countries and peoples of the world which has been brought about by the enormous reduction costs of transportation and communication, and the breaking down of artificial barriers to the flows of goods, services, capital, knowledge, and (to a lesser extent) people across borders (Stiglitz 2003).

With globalization, travel and communications have become much easier and cheaper by means of technology (e.g., Internet), and the establishment of free trade has allowed the withering of borders between countries to circulate goods, services, and peoples. At the same time, with technological, social, economic, and political advances, many former sources of income and rural employment have disappeared, leaving many people without an economic livelihood (Asian Development Bank 2003). Globalization may especially foster transnational human trafficking, or human trafficking across countries, due to these vast and interconnected global linkages. Acharya and Sánchez (2005) argue that globalization is a factor that has contributed to increasing trafficked women from Mexico into the United States due to the structural inequalities and discrimination between genders, unequal development between the two countries, and poverty. As evident, globalization is not just one factor, but an umbrella term for many – some already discussed and others to be discussed shortly - that are involved in the rapid political, economic, geographic, cultural, and technological changes taking place around the world. Globalization seems to have made a lot of things easier, especially migration, due to reduced costs of travel, reduced economic borders, and increases technological capabilities. Still, globalization alone

cannot explain trafficking without considering other factors such as immigration, border control, and enforcement.

2.1.1.2.2.3 Political Borders

Political borders, including weak and porous borders, coupled with lax or no surveillance of the border, easily lends itself to criminal activity, especially human trafficking. In addition, some borders have few official checkpoints that are not monitored often, and then there are areas that do not even have any checkpoints. Border patrols usually cannot differentiate between travelers, migrants, smuggled persons, or trafficked persons, even with false or real documentation. For example, the borders between Bangladesh and India (4156 km long), and Nepal and India (1850 km long), have relatively few, widespread checkpoints that are not monitored 24 hours. The Indo-Bangladesh border has 20 official checkpoints, and out of its 32 districts, 30 of them lie on the border (Asian Development Bank 2003). The Indo-Nepal border has 26 official exit points, 11 of which have traditionally been used for trafficking along the border of Nepal. It is said that many of these border patrollers know about the illegal and irregular migration, but they do not have the resources to differentiate between the different types (Asian Development Bank 2003), thus suggesting that there is little incentive for enforcement. Despite the surveillance of the borders, it is not possible for border patrols or local NGOs to enforce them. Furthermore, due to the 1950 Open Border Agreement between Nepal and India, people with either a Nepalese or Indian identity card can freely past through the border (Kara 2009), thus allowing traffickers to easily migrate through that route.

2.1.1.2.2.4 Instability

Instability can include political, economic, and/or environmental factors, which have all been identified as links to human trafficking (Grant 2007; Hysi 2007; Cameron 2008; Parrot and

Cummings 2008). Although economic instability is, of course, an economic factor, it is discussed here with the other two types of instability, for sake of convenience. First, economic instability can include recessions, depressions, and other economic cyclical fluctuations, unemployment, inflation, currency devaluations, and/or lack of or stagnated economic growth (Hysi 2007). When any of these increase, especially unemployment, there is greater potential for human trafficking (Chuang 2006). Unemployment or the general lack of economic opportunities can propel people to migrate (Chuang 2006). When the former Soviet Union collapsed, social and economic safety nets disappeared, and people, especially women, were left without any economic means of support, and waves of migration Westward followed (Kelly et al. 2005; Hysi 2007). When people cannot find jobs in or near their homes, the likelihood that they will seek options through migration increases (Stoecker and Shelley 2005).

Political instability can include regime changes (such as coup d'états or military takeovers) (Hysi 2007), varying levels of political violence, including protests, and conflict (Bales 1999; Cameron 2008; Newman and Cameron 2008; Parrot and Cummings 2008). Conflict has been found to be one of the most significant predictors of human trafficking (Troubnikoff 2003; Miko 2007; Mertus and Bertone 2007; Cameron and Newman 2008; Bales et. al 2009; True 2012). It can adversely and significantly impact a country, particularly governance, rule of law, capacity to provide for the people, and most importantly, the ability of the government to protect its citizens from human rights abuses (Cameron 2008; Parrot and Cummings 2008).

Depending on the severity and scale of the conflict, governance is disrupted, as are other security procedures, including border controls, protection in the form of law enforcement, etc. (Shelley 2007), which may facilitate crime like trafficking. During and after conflict, people

may become displaced – forcibly or by choice - as internally displaced persons (IDPs) or refugees, which means there is a greater supply of people to become trafficked (Hughes 1999; Bales 2005; Grant 2007; Shelley 2007; Kara 2009), as was the case in the Kosovo during the conflict (Seelke and Siskin 2008). Large population flows also reduce state capacity (or the ability of the government to provide goods and services to their citizens), which may exacerbate governance during and after conflict, promote more instability, and ultimately human trafficking (Grant 2007).

The human trafficking literature has not yet examined countries providing safe havens or sanctuaries to traffickers and how this plays into increasing trafficking. However, the conflict literature has examined this (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006; Salehyan 2007), which may provide insight into how traffickers can tap into these human flows. Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006) find that migratory flows – especially as a result of refugees from neighboring countries – help to establish rebel social networks during conflict. This supports research that finds a link between refugees and migrant workers, and human trafficking (Grant 2007). Salehyan (2007) also finds that rebel groups use external sanctuaries in other countries besides their own, in order to avoid state repression. This allows them to continue to operate at lower costs, and avoid punishment. These findings suggest that traffickers – much like rebel groups – may have sanctuaries afforded to them in either corrupt (regardless of the type of regime) or autocratic countries, or in countries where there is low risk for punishment (i.e., those with low levels of governance and/or decreased rule of law).

Recent works have only begun to examine the link between conflict and human trafficking, especially sexual slavery (Bales 1999, 2005; Rehn and Sirleaf 2002). Bales (1999, 2005) finds that slavery is linked to conflict, which oftentimes becomes enslavement for sexual

exploitation. This was seen during the conflict in Myanmar where the government and military enslaved its own people, but also in various conflicts across Africa – Rwanda, Uganda, and Sudan - where adults and children were enslaved as child soldiers, rebels, and/or sexual slaves. These types of countries are prone to becoming origin and destination countries for human trafficking due to the flow of people, and lack of infrastructure. This is precisely what happened in the Balkans conflict: decreased governance, lack of border controls, corruption, and porous borders helped institutionalize human trafficking for prostitution and other forms of sexual exploitation (Bales 1999; Mertus and Bertone 2007; Seelke and Siskin 2008). The need for domestic, regional, and international security forces (i.e., both military and peacekeeping troops) has also been associated with increased human trafficking for sexual exploitation (Cameron and Newman 2008). Thus, while human trafficking can arise out of conflict, due to instability and a general hostile environment, external intervention by third parties coupled with incoming migratory flows, have the potential to facilitate it as well.

Finally, environmental instability, usually in the form of natural disasters (True 2012) but also other biological, chemical, and climatological disasters, can also have the same adverse effects as economic and political stability. Natural disasters have been linked with increased migration (again, IDPs and refugees), which increases vulnerabilities to human trafficking because traffickers are often traveling among these flows (Grant 2007). Natural disasters, similar to conflict, can greatly disrupt governance and rule of law, especially when the disaster is catastrophic in size, and can also disrupt agricultural productivity (Grant 2007). These changes, coupled with heavier population flows, may also exacerbate state capacity by reducing resources, inducing further instability, and creating an environment for human trafficking.

What these three forms of instability have in common - despite how different they are – is that they induce insecurity, varying degrees of chaos, and potentially, (forced) migration. If any of these are severe enough, people may become displaced from their homes as IDPs or refugees, who are especially vulnerable to trafficking as they are without a home and are in a constant state of fluctuation (Asian Development Bank 2003). Migrating or floating people are like dollar ($) signs for a trafficker, because they can readily exploit or recruit them (Shelley 2007).

2.1.1.2.2.5 Regime Type

There is no literature that specifically examines the role regime type plays in fostering or deterring human trafficking, or more broadly, slavery (despite numerous incidences of war slavery or government-sponsored slavery). Nonetheless, the human rights literature has examined the impact different regimes, especially democracy, have had on respect for human rights. In general, it has been established that a strong relationship exists between democracies and political stability, equality, and development (Ember et al. 1997; Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Przeworski et al. 2000). Furthermore, democracies have consistently been found to have higher degrees of protection and respect for human rights (which means less human rights violations), and to simply repress less against their people (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe et al. 1999), even at different thresholds of democratization (Davenport 1999; Davenport and Armstrong 2004). Transitioning countries, however, have a greater susceptibility to human trafficking given the gap in political and state capacity, and especially how the transition was made (e.g., free and fair elections or a coup d'état) (Williams 2008). Given these findings, we should expect to see less human trafficking – a type of human rights abuse – in democracies versus autocracies (Poe and Tate 1994; Cingranelli and Richards 1999; Davenport 1999; Poe et al. 1999; Davenport 2007).

2.1.1.2.3 Geographic

2.1.1.2.3.1 Distance

Human trafficking occurs in nearly every country in the world, though most trafficking is said to be domestic or regional, with transnational trafficking being much more uncommon (UNODC 2013a). Europe holds the greatest array of destination countries for potential victims, while Asians are trafficked to the greatest array of destination countries (Kara 2009; UNODC 2013a). As Kara (2009) states:

> Of all the regions I explored, none was more complex than Europe. The flow of victims typically involved movement from poorer nations (Central and Eastern Europe) into richer nations (Western Europe, as well as Turkey and the Middle East), but the proximity of poor Europe to rich Europe and the ease of travel to almost any country in the European Union made the movement of sex slaves throughout Europe a high-frequency operation almost impossible to thwart (Kara 2009).

This indicates that geographic distance may not always be a primary factor for human traffickers, as is clearly the case with Europe. This region is strategically located, in that it geographically lies nestled and surrounded by other proximate regions, including Africa to the south, the Middle East to the southeast, and Asia to the east. Travel to the nearest country that is a part of the Schengen Area[9] facilitates even greater movement given the loss of internal borders.

According to IOM (2001), Moustgaard (2002), and UNICEF (2005), geographical proximity is one of the most important features in defining human trafficking routes. Similar to logistical issues drug traffickers face, shorter geographic distances allow for less organization and coordination, and reduces costs and risks associated with capture (Shelley 2007). Longer geographic distances entail greater logistical planning and organization, in addition to the necessary attention live cargo need (like food, water, shelter) (Shelley 2007). However, the

[9] The Schengen Area is an area that freely allows the movement of people within the European Union. There are currently 25 countries that adhere to the Schengen Agreement of 1985 *and* that have eliminated all internal borders in lieu of a single external border (Europa 1999). This agreement does not include all European Union countries.

shortest trafficking routes may not always be the most optimal due to geographical terrain (to be discussed shortly) (UNICEF 2005) or other factors. For example, the shortest trafficking route between Mozambique and South Africa goes through Kruger National Park, but because of the risk of wild animals, traffickers tend to bypass this in favor of a longer yet safer route (UNICEF 2005).

The method of transportation human traffickers use is a function of the geographic location of the origin, transit, and destination countries involved, as well as trafficking route. According to UNICEF (2005), human traffickers are more inclined to use existing transportation systems, unless hindered by checkpoints or border patrols. Still, even if they cannot travel their usual route, they evade risk by changing the route and/or bribing officials (Kara 2009). For example, trafficked women from Russia going to South Korea or Japan primarily travel through ships that leave the ports of Vladivostok and Nakholdka, or more commonly, by airplane (Erokhina 2005). Kara (2009) and Shelley (2007) find that nearly every form of transportation was used, including cars, buses, trains, planes, speedboats, ferries, rafts, and even by foot over mountainous borders coupled with corruption if necessary.

2.1.1.2.3.2 Terrain

Very few scholars, if any, have examined the impact terrain has on the human trafficking. UNICEF (2005) posits that terrain such as mountains, deserts, or forested areas can pose barriers for traffickers, who then find alternate routes. Borrowing from the conflict literature, we get a better idea on the impact terrain may have on conflict (which is important to consider, since rebel groups may encounter various types of terrain during conflict). Buhaug and Gates (2002) find that geographic features, like mountainous terrain and forests, do not have any impact on the scope of the conflict. Buhaug and Lujala (2005) discover that the location of the conflict matters,

as not all of these topographical features are located within the conflict zone. Though terrain has little impact on pushing people into trafficking, it does affect whether they are successfully trafficked and reach their destination point or country.

2.1.1.2.4 Culture

Not much has been said on the role culture plays in pushing people into trafficking. The literature on organized crime finds that being of the same ethnic group increases cultural familiarity and connectedness, which creates interpersonal trust (Finckanauer 1994). This trust is key for traffickers, as it enables them to deceive the trafficked person. Moreover, structural cultural factors, including machismo, have increased gender inequality and discrimination of women, and decrease the status of women overall, possibly leading to human trafficking (Acharya and Sánchez 2005). As Parrot and Cummings (2008) state:

> Communities that maintain social norms in which women are subjugated and discriminated against provide the foundation for the commodification of females. Education, religion, cultural values, and policies establish normative ideologies through which members of a community are viewed, and which determine how they are treated. These practices become entrenched in a community.

Note that many of these cultural factors, including ethnicity, gender, and religion, are discussed in the economic section above. Language has also been found to hinder a trafficked person's ability to escape (Dinan 2008), especially if they are in a region or country that does not speak their language. The Asian Development Bank (2003) finds that in communities that still practice dowry payments for marriage, women may be pushed into marrying a trafficker or leaving the community in search of a potential partner as a practical way to survive.

As far as traffickers, Monzini (2005) finds that while most come from the same country as the trafficked person, they are increasingly becoming more multicultural (Europol 2004).

United Nations reports indicate that the most common nationalities of traffickers are Russian, Nigerian, Ukrainian, and Albanian (Kangaspunta 2003).

In all, these socioeconomic, political, geographic, or cultural factors work alone and together to push people into human trafficking, yet do not individually or collectively help to explain completely why human trafficking continues. These underlying socioeconomic, political, geographic, and cultural features may not affect everyone that becomes trafficked all at once. The bigger message we learn is that human trafficking is a multidimensional issue, and as such, need to consider all push (and pull) factors, not just focus on one (Cameron and Newman 2008).

2.1.1.3 Victim Protection

The protection, rescue, rehabilitation, and reintegration of the trafficked person are of the utmost concern to human rights proponents (Pearson 2002; Goodey 2004; Haynes 2004; Konrad 2008; Rijken and Koster 2008; UNODC 2009). Proponents argue that human trafficking needs to be considered within a human rights-based approach (also known as a "victim-centered" approach) because we are dealing with human victims, and their rights should be of primary concern. "[…] The position of the victims, the violations of their human rights and their vulnerable position are the starting points for taking countermeasures against trafficking in human beings" (Rijken and Koster 2008). Unfortunately, many international legal instruments fail to address the human rights needs of victims (Gallagher 2001). Some scholars argue that states should protect and provide assistance to trafficked persons regardless of whether they provide witness testimony against traffickers (Konrad 2008), and that this should be independent of criminal proceedings or immigration law requirements (Rijken and Koster 2008). Trafficked persons are still, unfortunately, treated as perpetrators or criminals (e.g., for entering the country illegally), and continue to be placed in detention centers instead of shelters, or deported back

home immediately (Tiefenbrun 2006; Konrad 2008). Some scholars argue that states need to extend the trafficked person's stay in the destination country (e.g., so they can work or go to school legally) (Ould 2004), and offer them a period of rest, recovery, or reflection (Pearson 2002), which may increase the likelihood that they cooperate with prosecutors. This time allows for trafficked persons to regain their confidence and trust in themselves and in other people. Also, some trafficked persons do not want to return to their home countries for fear of retribution, retaliation, or stigma from their family or communities (Asian Development Bank 2003).

Some countries have instituted policies to support victims of trafficking. For example, in Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United States, provisions for such victim assistance are available, usually in alliance with local NGOs. These groups offer not only protection for the victim, but an array of services like educational training (e.g., learning the language), legal assistance, psychological treatment and counseling, and social programs, to name a few. In addition, the United States offers the T-visa, which is granted for temporary stays, is renewable for up to three years, and allows the individual to legally work. Other methods used to tackle other types or transnational crime (e.g., organized crime) like wire tapping, tracking down financial assets, and performing long-term undercover investigations and surveillance, are not commonly used in human trafficking cases due to the high costs and resources involved, but also the difficulty in tracking down the criminals involved (Konrad 2008).

Still, the human rights approach does not provide an entirely holistic understanding of human trafficking because it focuses mainly on the individual, and it fails to examine the demand-size, or why traffickers do what they do, and why consumers demand so much of trafficked people's services. There are other factors that have contributed to the rise and maintenance of human trafficking that the human rights camp cannot answer alone.

2.1.2 Criminal Justice Approach

The criminal justice approach places greater emphasis on “law and order”, national security, immigration, the establishment of anti-trafficking laws, the prosecution and conviction of traffickers, and aggressively ‘fighting’ trafficking as a crime (Lindstrom 2007; Shelley 2007; Limoncelli 2009; Segrave 2009; Akee et al. 2010; Smith 2010; Cho et al. 2011b; Jakobsson and Kotsadam 2011; McCarthy 2010; Smith 2010). Unlike the human rights approach, criminal justice proponents advocate for placing the state’s interest before the individual or trafficked person. Proponents include local and international law enforcement agencies, judiciary and legal officials, most governments, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and the International Organization for Migration. The general view of this camp is that human trafficking is a (transnational) crime, and should be treated as such. Some scholars also argue that this approach has largely been ignored in favor of the human rights approach (Barry 1979; Kempadoo et al. 2005), and greater attention is therefore needed on the demand-side of the business. Within this approach, there are several strains that focus on different aspects of the criminality of trafficking.

2.1.2.1 National Security and Immigration

Human trafficking is commonly understood and examined within a national security and immigration framework, especially post-September 11, 2011 (Doomernik 2004; Siers 2007). Many countries conflate human trafficking and illegal migration with one another (van den Anker 2004; Konrad 2008), and have thus tightened borders and increased restrictions on legal migration. However, these restrictive migration policies worldwide – especially among the developed countries – have prevented people looking for better economic opportunities from traveling abroad through legal means. As a result, many of these migrants have turned to illegal

means of migration (i.e., smuggling) in search of better economic prospects (Asian Development Bank 2003; Doomernik 2004; Lee 2007; Lindstrom 2007; Zhang 2007; Dinan 2008; Konrad 2008; Cameron and Newman 2008; Mahmoud and Trebesch 2009).

What starts out as (il)legal migration has the potential to turn into human trafficking en-route if the individual becomes trafficked. Mahmoud and Trebesch (2009) find trafficking to be highest in areas with high rates of emigration (i.e., out-migration), not where there is little to no migration. While human trafficking involves migration (where the distance itself does not matter), migration does not always involve human trafficking. This suggests that just traveling from an origin to destination point increases risks to becoming trafficked by criminals, particularly if the migration takes unconventional forms like smuggling (Lee 2007). Some scholars claim that restricting migration has not decreased human trafficking, but has only hampered any efforts (Kempadoo et al. 2005; Lee 2007; Seelke and Siskin 2008; Mahmoud and Trebesch 2009). In short, these increased restrictions on legal migration may push people to consider other (illegal) means due to desperation, and because many trafficked victims are illegal residents, it shifts the focus of the crime of being trafficked to one of immigration status (Seelke and Siskin 2008). A brief interview Zhang (2007) had with a Chinese smuggled migrant (note: he was not trafficked) suggests the desperation many people have to seek a more financially secure future for themselves and their families, even if it means engaging in a dangerous mode of migration. He smuggled himself from China-Mexico-United States:

> Back in China, even if you want to work hard, there is no place for you to work, because there are so many people out of jobs and waiting for employment. If you work in a restaurant in the United States, you can make $1500 to $2,000 a month. Here in this restaurant, the owner provides food and lodging. I have practically no other expenses of my own. So I can save all my money each month and send it home. One year's work in the United States equals ten years of work in China. The main problem in China is that there is no safety net. When there is no safety net, people are afraid of spending money. Once you are out of money, you are out of luck. The government is not going to save you

> when you have no money. The main reason people in the United States spend a lot of money is that they have a safety net. This is important. People in China have no sense of financial security. No one knows what's going to happen when they get old. If I work here for a few years, and even if my application for political asylum is not granted, I can still return to China with enough money to last the rest of my life. (Zhang 2007)

2.1.2.2 Anti-Trafficking Laws and Prosecution and Convictions

Despite the establishment of an international anti-human trafficking law – the Palermo Protocol – and some domestic anti-human trafficking laws (at the country level) combined with increased law enforcement and police, trafficking has continued to prosper (Kara 2009). Many scholars argue that there is a general lack of 'real' risk to apprehension due to: corruption in law enforcement, border patrol, and the judicial system, lack of international coordination and cooperation in investigations and prosecutions (which often span borders), lack of specific law enforcement focus on slave-related crimes (or underfunded units when it does exist), weak and ineffective law enforcement and minimal prosecution of traffickers, insufficient protection for victims, confusion for the definition of trafficking, and finally, ineffective laws (Gallagher and Holmes 2008; Kara 2009; Smith 2010). For example, an attorney in Italy asserts that the biggest obstacle she faces in prosecuting sex traffickers is the lack of cooperation between Italy and the origin countries where trafficked people come from, like Albania, Moldova, and Romania. Yet another in Moldova claims that when Russian traffickers were prosecuted in Moldova, they were sent back to Russia with no punishment because of the lack of a bilateral extradition treaty between the two countries.

Unenforced laws and lenient penalties are a significant hurdle in prosecuting and convicting traffickers. In India, for example, the Suppression of Immoral Trafficking Act of 1956 (renamed the Immoral Trafficking and Prevent Act in 1986) criminalizes pimping and running a brothel, yet these are seen in broad daylight without any consequences (Kara 2009). Even when

the law is enforced, traffickers receive small penalties, with brothel owners receiving a maximum of 3 years in prison, and a maximum fine of US$45; pimps receive half of this fine. On the other hand, Nepal has a more comprehensive anti-trafficking law (updated in 1999), the Human Trafficking Control and Punishment Act of 2043 (the year 2043 is similar to 1986 in the West). It criminalizes slavery or forced prostitution of women and children, and includes harsher penalties of up to 20 years in prison for trafficking or purchasing a women or minor, and up to 200,000 rupees (about US$2666) for this crime. However, much like its neighbor, India, there are very few prosecutions, mainly a function of underfunded anti-trafficking units. However, a drug trafficking unit in Nepal received complete funding from the government, had a staff of several hundred, and received the latest equipment, vehicles, technology, and training and facilities. The human trafficking unit did not. In certain countries, like Russia for instance, human trafficking is framed within the confines of organized crime (Shelley 2007; McCarthy 2010). As a result, there is a much heavier emphasis on fighting trafficking through a law enforcement approach, and then on prosecuting and punishing the offenders. In sum, while anti-trafficking legislation exists in most countries today (many of which contain different elements of human trafficking), lenient and weak penalties have led to a very low number of prosecutions in proportion to the number of slaves, like in India (with well over 200,000 slaves) (Asian Development Bank 2003; Kara 2009).

Overall, the criminal justice approach fails to consider the individual or trafficked person, nor does it really examine why human trafficking occurs, as it is, after all, a business. It also does not discuss the demand-side of the business, or effectively deal with corruption, a major problem that infiltrates and literally pollutes the legal and political system. Human trafficking – like many

other illegal businesses– is considered a (transnational) crime, yet no one appears to handle it as such, given the overall lack of cooperation and investigations between countries (Konrad 2008).

2.1.3 Economic Approach

The economic approach to trafficking takes a market- and business-oriented approach in that it "dehumanizes" the crime and diminishes the emotional, moral, and human rights issues (though it does not necessarily discount them) (Stoecker and Shelley 2005; van den Anker and Doomernik 2006; Cameron and Newman 2008; Fahey 2009; Kara 2009; Verma 2010; Belser 2011; True 2012). Human trafficking is seen as a business (illegal or not), and as such, seeks to quantify the actors, goods, and processes involves, and frame them within a market system framework of supply and demand. The traffickers and other criminals involved are seen as rational actors that are motivated by the goal of making large profits. Thus, supply and demand mechanisms play a big part in determining the prices, and thus profits. Proponents include primarily economists, researchers, and some NGOs and IOs. What follows is a discussion of different strains of this approach, including human trafficking as a business, profits, costs, and low risks and penalties.

2.1.3.1 Human Trafficking as a Business

Kara (2009) claims that to have a better understanding of the trafficking business and to curb its growth, we should not only consider the factors that cause trafficking, but also the main characteristics of the trafficking business. Like any business (legal or illegal), trafficking has four main features:

- A product (i.e., the trafficked person)
- A wholesalers (i.e., the traffickers)
- A retailer (i.e., the exploiter)
- A consumer (i.e., the person who purchases the service or good) (Kara 2009).

The main costs involved – apart from the start-up or initial costs – include transportation costs, which require moving the trafficked person from its origin to destination point for exploitation. Unlike the human rights approach, which focuses on the supply-side, namely the trafficked persons (i.e., the products), the economics approach argues that to counter trafficking, we should focus on the stakeholders or the actors involved in the trafficking business (i.e., wholesalers, retailers, and consumers). In short, to curb human trafficking, the business needs to be destroyed (Long 2007).

Not much research exists on the different types of human trafficking businesses, but Stoecker and Shelley (2005) argue that the type of business matters to the nationality that controls it. For example, in discuss Chinese and Russian human trafficking businesses, she finds they have two completely unique styles. The Chinese run a cohesive, tight, and unified operation, where they have direct control over recruitment of people as well as brothels in trafficking for prostitution. On the other hand, the Russians operate a more fragmented and loose operation, where they do not always keep control over the women they traffic into prostitution, but instead sell them to different nationalities. Thus, the Chinese tend to maintain complete control over every aspect of their trafficking business as a means of continued profits (akin to investments), and the Russians tend to sell their goods at cheaper prices for an immediate payoff (Stoecker and Shelley 2005). Moreover, while both engage in human rights violations, the Russians do so to a much greater degree than the Chinese, as the Chinese use word-of-mouth to get new recruits (for smuggling) (Stoecker and Shelley 2005).

2.1.3.2 Profits

The main goal of any business is to make large (tax-free) profits. This seems to be the motivating factor for traffickers, (Bales 2005; Stoecker and Shelley 2005; Miko 2007; Williams

2008; Kara 2009), combined with the low risks of capture. Human traffickers can make large profits in a relatively small window of time relative to other forms of transnational crime, like drug trafficking, because their product (i.e., trafficked persons) can be sold numerous times throughout the trafficking process, and then exploited repeatedly (Stoecker and Shelley 2005). It 2007, estimated profits generated by the sale of trafficked sex slaves to exploiters (i.e., brothel owners and pimps) was US$1 billion; after business costs were taken into account, 'sales' still remained at an astonishing US$600 million (Kara 2009). This only includes the initial transaction of selling the trafficked people. Profits generated by the exploitation of these sex slaves were about US$51.3 billion in 2007; after business costs, $35.7 billion. Thus, in 2007, total profits for all forms of modern slavery were estimated to be at US$152.3 billion (Kara 2009).

With regard to human trafficking for sexual exploitation, Kara (2009) finds that the average price of sex has slowly decreased over time as a consequence of the increasing use of slaves. This has enabled other poorer consumers to gain entry into the market due to lower prices. He found that sex services were very elastic[10], in that when prices increased, demand decreased significantly and that "if real-world prices could be doubled and achieve a decrease in demand by even one-half the amount predicted by the data [he] gathered, the profitability of the sex trafficking industry would be severely compromised." Thus, low prices for the services provided by sex slaves, increases the likelihood that traffickers engage in this business, motivated by the large profits this business can generate (van den Anker and Doomernik 2006).

[10] When examining the elasticity of demand, economists use these to figure out the demand of a product or service at a given price. This helps to determine how much of a product to make, or how much of a service to provide, because as prices increase, demand will fall, and vice versa.

2.1.3.3 Costs

Traffickers face three main costs:

- The initial or start-up costs of their business, including the acquisition of their product (i.e., the trafficked persons), a location (i.e., apartment or place where exploitation will take place), and infrastructure (i.e., beds, clothing, makeup, food, alcohol, drugs, condoms, etc.)
- The costs and risks of being caught (knowing that slavery is illegal); and
- If captured, associated costs of being prosecuted and convicted, including fines, prison time, and in some countries, asset forfeiture and restitution payments (Kara 2009).

Yet, despite these financial burdens and risks, traffickers still operate because they know they can incorporate financial bribes and other forms of corruption into their budget. Kara (2009) argues that to increase the likelihood of apprehension, penalties have to increase, there needs to be more investigations, corruption needs to be dealt with, and there needs to be a specialized court to deal with trafficking more effectively. Nepal, for example, has a court dealing just with human trafficking (and other serious charges), which was established in order to expedite cases using lawyers and judges that were familiar with the relevant laws. However, this court has proved of limited help given that it resides in Kathmandu and all involved parties would have to travel there to appear before the court (Asian Development Bank 2003).

Fahey (2009) claims that while many international instruments have been established that prohibit slavery and human trafficking, these have done little to deter traffickers from preying on people. Despite established domestic and international norms (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Risse et al. 1999; Cortell and Davis 2002; Simmons 2009), few repercussions exist apart from social ones, like naming and shaming, which have produced mixed results (Braithwaite and Drahos 2002; Robinson 2004; Hafner-Burton 2008; DeMeritt 2012; Heathcoate 2012; Krain 2012; Meernik et al. 2012; Murdie and Davis 2012; Ruggeri and Burgoon 2012). Still, countries can avoid this social disgrace by ratifying and adopting anti-human trafficking

legislation, but they are not sanctioned if they do not comply with them. Thus there are no real enforcement mechanisms. Fahey (2009) argues that to enforce these laws and thus discourage human trafficking, developed countries should impose a withholding tax on investment income. Apart from decreasing tax evasion and generating an additional source of revenue, this taxation system could act as an economic sanction.

Taxation is also another option reduce human trafficking. Dowling (2004) argues that similar to other forms of regulation, employing a currency transaction tax - the Tobin tax (an ad-valorem tax) - could lead to greater revenue for the state, which in turn increases economic growth and development for the benefit of the people, and this can reduce any form of currently instability and volatility, thus reducing the potential to human trafficking. She makes a normative argument in that if the country focuses more on human rights and needs, instead of profits, such a tax could help reduce trafficking.

2.1.3.4 Low Risks and Penalties

Some scholars believe human trafficking is growing as the "preferred" criminal activity because the low costs and large benefits provide a more attractive incentive for traffickers (Finckenauer and Schrock 2003; Fahey 2009). Compared to other transnational crimes, like organized crime and drug trafficking, the risks of being apprehended, prosecuted, and convicted remain low (Kara 2009). Penalties as well as fines are measly. In short, compared to drug trafficking and arms trafficking, human trafficking is seen as the least risky because laws on drug and arms trafficking have become harsher (Stoecker and Shelley 2005), especially for drugs, where individuals can be sentenced up to a life term in prison (Fahey 2009).

Consumers also have an incentive to participate in trafficking (even if they do not have knowledge that the individuals are trafficked persons), because of the low prices afforded to

them. In fact, some scholars argue that as human trafficking grows, and especially as women are trafficked for sexual exploitation into industries like prostitution, prices fall because of competition with domestic prostitutes in various destination countries. Kara (2009) claims that one way to target the demand of trafficking is to target consumers by raising the prices of sustaining the business and of the services provided. Traffickers then face a "human trafficking dilemma" where they can keep prices low and earn smaller profits, or, they can raise prices while increasing profits, but decreasing their consumer base. Either tactic will work to ultimately curb the demand for purchasing trafficked persons' services, because the higher costs of sustaining the business will outweigh any profit margins the traffickers hope to make. Yet, literature on substituting human rights violations for another when costs go up (Conrad and DeMeritt 2011), suggest that if consumers are slapped with price increases, they may turn to another form of human trafficking, or explore other prostitution markets that have lower prices. Instead of deterring consumers from trafficking, they may look for a substitution – similar to the act they were engaging in or the good they were purchasing - much like people do when prices increase on their favorite brands. Long (2007), for example, argues that trafficked women for prostitution are cheaper than local prostitutes of the country since costs associated with upkeep need to be recovered. This may indicate that trafficked women for prostitution are already at the lowest price ceiling, and thus prices cannot be as flexible due to competition.

In terms of prosecution and convictions, trafficking crimes are more difficult to prove than their criminal counterparts, like drugs. You can physically identify a drug, weight it, and attach fines to each ounce. However, it is not so easy to identify a trafficked person, especially when they are traumatized, in a state of shock, and will not cooperate with law enforcement officials. Few women in sex trafficking cases ever testify against their traffickers (Kara 2009).

Even when convicted, penalties still remain anemic. Kara (2009) suggests using drug trafficking laws as a point of reference for anti-trafficking laws because they are usually more aggressive. For example, in the United States, the 1966 Controlled Substances Act stipulates very harsh penalties for cocaine trafficking: a fine of up to US$5 million for the first offense for amounts under 5 kilograms, and as much as US$10 million for the first offense for amounts of 5 kilograms or more. The small number of prosecutions is said to be a function of numerous factors, including undertrained and underfunded law enforcement units, lack of financial, material, and physical resources, lack of cooperation between origin and destination countries, corruption, and insufficient witnesses to testify against trafficked (Kara 2009).

The economics camp focused on the business model and its components of cost, risk, profit, and supply and demand to better understand why human trafficking continues. Specifically, this approach examines the demand of trafficking, and argues that to reduce it, we have to intervene in the profit-motivated, incentive structure of traffickers (Bales 2005; Kara 2009), and further increase the risks and costs. Overall, there has been little research that focuses on the demand side of human trafficking, particularly for trafficked labor (Asian Development Bank 2003), and surprisingly, little empirical analysis from scholars in general, and more so, from economists.

2.2 Demand-Side: Why Human Traffickers are Still Free

The literature on the demand-side perspective focuses on why traffickers are still trafficking people, and why they have not been prosecuted or convicted in large numbers. First, a problem is that many states lack comprehensive anti-human trafficking legislation. Second, victims often are hesitant to cooperate with authorities. Third, weak and inefficient institutions make it difficult to prosecute (and convict) offenders. Finally, preconceived notions about

offender demographics may make it difficult to apprehend offenders. Note that many of these factors have already been mentioned in the supply-side literature and/or discussed at greater lengths – like the victim protection. For this reason, some aspects of the discussion may be shorter than others. Again, given the dynamic nature of human trafficking, many of the factors that push people to become trafficked also help allow traffickers to operate without fear, hence for any overlap.

2.2.1 Lack of Comprehensive Anti-Human Trafficking Legislation

Most anti-human trafficking legislation focuses on crime prevention – that is, to prevent trafficking from occurring – and/or law and order - to effectively deal with this crime after it does occur by arresting traffickers and getting them off the streets and out of society (Pearson 2002; Goodey 2004; Haynes 2004; UNODC 2009). Although this is useful, it does not effectively address the prosecution of traffickers, and the role victims play in convicting them. Victim cooperation (i.e., victim testimony) is key for convicting traffickers (Segrave et al. 2009); thus a greater focus on victim protection is needed. Victims should be granted benefits and protection, including a recovery or reflection period (Pearson 2002) and/or provisions for temporary residency (Ould 2004). By taking care of trafficked victims first, prosecutors and police officials raise the probability of gaining their assistance when it comes time to presenting witness testimony before a judge (and thus convicting the offender). For example, Belgium and the Netherlands (Anti-Slavery International 2002) are two countries that include some stipulation on victim protection and assistance within their anti-human trafficking legislation. This could be a possible reason why they have higher rates of human trafficking convictions versus other countries, although the literature does not specifically point this out. In all, a greater emphasis on

victim protection rather than prosecution may enhance prosecuting and convicting traffickers (Lusk and Lucas 2009).

2.2.2 Lack of Victim Cooperation

Victim cooperation with police and other authorities is essential in securing convictions (Seelke and Siskin 2008; Segrave et al. 2009). However, due to fear of reprisal, shame, embarrassment, lack of trust in those with power, or post-traumatic stress, victims often fail to cooperate (Goodey 2004; Gallagher and Pearson 2010). This taps into the first issues discussed regarding comprehensive anti-human trafficking legislation. If countries do not offer some type of protection or benefit to the victim, they are unlikely to receive any cooperation in return. Victim cooperation – in the form of testimony – is key to securing a conviction. Victims need to be able to have some time to reflect after a traumatic experience, as many are not in any shape to testify after being detained (Gallagher 2001; Anti-Slavery International 2002). In developing countries, victims are often treated as an immigration issue and usually deported back to their home countries (usually on charges that they entered the country on fraudulent premises and with fake documents) (Tiefenbrun 2006). Thus, victims may go from enslavement under a human trafficker, to detainment under law enforcement, and victimized twice, once as a trafficking victims, and a second time as an illegal immigrant. If they are deported back to their country of origin, this may even constitute a third victimization.

2.2.3 Weak and Inefficient Institutions

Having the institutional infrastructure and efficiency is one of many necessary components in curtailing human trafficking. When a country has the institutional capacity, resources, and means, it is better able to take care of issues that can adversely affect their citizens. Yet, even countries with the best institutions (or intentions), or those that have many resources at

their disposal, may not be the most efficient. Developed countries have some excellent institutions at their disposal, but bureaucracy coupled with corruption may derail efficiency. On the other hand, developing countries may have weak or poor institutions, or ones that are in transition from one regime type to another (e.g., authoritarian to democratic regime for instance), in addition to corruption and inefficiency (Haynes 2004; Guth 2010). Thus, institutional capacity plays an important role for countries fighting human trafficking, particularly its growth.

Still, while anti-trafficking legislation has become more prevalent around the world, the vast majority of countries in Africa and the Middle East have still not added such legislation into their domestic law (Haynes 2004; UNODC 2009). In addition, countries that have criminal codes - usually commonplace in those with civil law but not always the case – like Morocco and Sudan, list human trafficking as offences but do not define what it is within their anti-human trafficking legislation (UNODC 2009). Criminal codes are documents that include most if not all of a jurisdiction's criminal law, including recognized offences, penalties that may be imposed, and basic definitions and other generalities. If there is a disparity between how human trafficking is defined within a country's criminal code and anti-human trafficking law, it may be a possible reason for the low levels of human trafficking convictions. If the definition of human trafficking within a country's criminal code does not conform to the country's anti-human trafficking law, then a clear discrepancy exists. The degree of this discrepancy may either hinder obtaining a human trafficking conviction, or conviction of a completely different or lesser crime.

The lack of state resources is another major issue that contributes to weak and inefficient institutions (Welch 204; Guinn 2008). Excessive caseloads, lack of manpower, not enough prosecutors, too many clients, and the costs of identifying and protecting trafficked victims outweigh state resources. As a result, prosecutors as well as police, immigration and border

patrols, and government officials have an incentive to "look the other way" (Pearson 2002; Gallagher and Holmes 2008). Instead of burdening themselves and the state system with additional costs (i.e., offering and extending protection and benefits to the trafficked victim and then trying to prosecute the offender), they do nothing. For example, in Lithuania, police investigations are unusually slow, and court proceedings often take years (Gutauskas 2009). Consequently, traffickers are often dismissed (or run away) due to lack of sufficient evidence, thus resulting in zero to low convictions (Gutauskas 2009), and allowing for human trafficking to continue.

Corruption is pervasive and widespread in many countries, particularly developing ones (Haynes 2004; Guth 2010) and those in transition from one regime type to another. In fact, in examining the proximity of judges to drug trafficking zones, Craig (1983) found that judges were directly involved in the business, usually due to reasons of security, fear, and greed. Judges either received bribes to keep quiet, or they colluded with traffickers to gain profits. If judges and police fail to arrest these offenders due to fear or greed, then there will not be any convictions. Corruption is there for a supply-side and demand-side factor that pushes people into trafficking and also fosters its continued growth.

Finally, there is a general lack of training of all actors involved in human trafficking cases (UNODC 2009). Police officials have a difficult time identifying the characteristics of a trafficked individual, and oftentimes do not ask the appropriate questions to the victim. As a result, human trafficking is oftentimes conflated with other offenses, like smuggling or prostitution, and offenders receive lighter sentences (Berger 2009). New York (as well as about 30 other states in the United States) has an excellent anti-human trafficking law, but even that has not helped the state convict that many traffickers due to their lack of training and familiarity

with human trafficking victims (Berger 2009). In was only in 2010 that New York had its first human trafficking conviction.

2.2.4 Offender Demographics

In examining the sentencing of narcotics offenders in Canada, Mosher and Hagan (1994) claim that judges are biased and convict drug traffickers based on individual characteristics. For example, individuals accused of narcotics trafficking were seen as "villains" of the trade, while those convicted of drug possession were seen as mere "victims of addiction" (contrary to Reynolds' (2008) findings, which show no differences among offender drug sentencing). Also, they discuss disparities between age and gender of drug offenders. Younger offenders were more likely to be given lighter sentences than older offenders due to the assumption that they would be able to "reform" themselves more quickly (in other words, they would be able to rehabilitate themselves). Women were also more likely to receive lighter sentences because they were seen as playing secondary or ancillary roles in drug trafficking versus men.

In a Department of Justice report 2007-2008, Kyckelhahn et al. (2009) find that of the 871 traffickers arrested, 421 were male, 121 female, and 329 not identified, which supports research that men remain the key players. In terms of racial makeup, 158 were black, 134 Hispanic, 71 Asian, 57 white, 18 of other races (including American Indian, Alaskan Natives, Native Hawaiians, other Pacific Islanders, and persons of more than two races) (Kyckelhahn et al. 2009), and 433 with no data. It appears that traffickers are diverse groups of ethnicities and racial groups in the United States, though a human trafficking report by the UNODC (2006) points to most traffickers belonging to the nationality of the country they were arrested in, the destination country. In terms of age, 184 were over 35, 138 between 25-34, 128 between 18-24, 10 under the 17, and 411 with no data. The majority of traffickers were adults over the age of 24,

with relatively few minors involved as perpetrators. In terms of nationality, 20 were U.S. citizens, 10 U.S. nationals, 23 permanent residents, 57 undocumented aliens, 17 qualified alien, and 558 with no data. These figures point to a very diverse group of people that do not fit one mold, much like what has been found on rebel groups and terrorists.

While the role of individual characteristics has been more robust in the drug trafficking literature, there has been a growing strain in examining these features as well in the human trafficking literature. While the vast majority of traffickers are male (Kelley 2002), recent research has found that women are playing more prominent roles in human trafficking, and are actually the ones who traffic and exploit women (Shelley 2007; UNODC 2009; Denton 2010). Shelley (2007) finds that women tend to assume larger roles in human trafficking (and smuggling) versus other crimes, and serve in the recruitment stage, as madams (in prostitution), and even as top dogs in major smuggling operations (like Sister Ping in China). In a study examining media portrayal of human trafficking victims, Denton (2010) found that men were trafficked more than women (7% of men were exploited). This is contrary to the common conception that most trafficked victims are women. In addition, because of this gender difference, men often fail to receive the victim status women do. Thus, women may be just as likely as men to be traffickers, as men are to be victims.

This chapter offers a supply- and demand-side framework to better understand why human trafficking occurs, why it continues, and how it is dealt with, particularly in terms of capturing, prosecuting, and convicting traffickers. The human rights, criminal justice, and economic camps within the supply-side literature all address various factors that support and foster human trafficking. The demand-side literature emphasizes why human trafficking continues, and especially why human traffickers continue to elude punishment. Many of these

factors are not isolated, but instead work together and overlap to varying degrees. In addition, some factors in the supply-side camp also appear in the demand-side camp because these same factors that give rise to people become trafficked, also be the same ones that drive the demand for human trafficking itself.

The next chapter offers a political economic theoretical framework of human trafficking, and considers why it continues, with a special focus on human trafficking flows. It adds to this growing literature by providing an in-depth look at why traffickers do what they do, how they operate, and the incentive structure that motivates their business. Specifically, it contributes to research on human trafficking by bringing political economic factors into consideration, and marrying these into the human rights and criminal justice frameworks. Human trafficking is not just driven by one factor, and is therefore not unidimensional, but instead, a multidimensional, multifaceted, and inter- and multidisciplinary issue.

CHAPTER 3

THEORY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING

Human trafficking is generally seen as either a human rights issue or a criminal justice issue. Under a human rights framework, traffickers are viewed as downright "evil" and as committing monstrous crimes. The individuals trafficked are seen as victims that need to be rescued and protected. Thus, this approach is more victim-oriented, with greater emphasis on victim protection and rehabilitation. On the other hand, the criminal justice framework focuses more on the demand side – the traffickers who exploit people, and the buyers (i.e., customers) of these exploitative services. They seek to apprehend the "guilty" ones, while at the same time placing less emphasis on victim protection. Thus, the criminal justice approach is more about fighting crime than it is about assisting the victims (although a resulting goal of law enforcement is to prevent criminals from procuring new victims). Both frameworks, however, contribute to a better understanding of trafficking: one focuses more on the supply-side of the business (the human rights views of victim protection), while the other on the demand-side of the business (criminal justice view and punishing the traffickers).

While both remain important and should not be dismissed, a deeper look at the political economy of trafficking is also warranted in order to better understand how traffickers and the industry operate, the incentives that drive suppliers, and the conditions that define the pool of potential victims. This chapter contributes to the literature by building a theory of how traffickers operate at the domestic level (i.e., national or regional), and why they do so with special regard to the political, economic, geographic, and cultural context of their environment. Domestic trafficking is used as an umbrella term for national or regional trafficking. National trafficking is when human trafficking occurs within a country's borders, whereas regional

trafficking is when human trafficking can occur across different countries' borders, which are limited by geographic scope. Thus, these two types of trafficking are considered as domestic trafficking in this dissertation, and are contrasted with transnational trafficking, which occurs over larger, geographic distances (to be discussed in Chapter 5).

Although human trafficking can – and does - occur transnationally - that is, over large, geographic distances - I argue that it is mainly a domestic phenomenon due to a combination of political, economic, geographical, and cultural factors.

3.1 Economics

Human trafficking, much like any business, is guided by the invisible hand of the free market, with the additional consideration that traffickers have to deal with the risk of apprehension and conviction; self-interest, and supply and demand determine the dynamics of this industry. In this sense, human traffickers are more like drug traffickers, or part of a larger family of criminals who can either be domestic or international. While they do operate like business owners in terms of basic functions, they do so within the illegal domain. This entails factoring into their calculations the costs, or the risk of apprehension, incarceration, fines, and bribery. Since both their suppliers and their customers are also engaged in criminal activity, traffickers have to consider the additional risk that they will take action against them to protect themselves from criminal penalties. Traffickers seek to find a supply of a particular good (i.e., people) and/or service (i.e., sexual service or labor) to provide to their customers. Like any entrepreneur, their ultimate goal is to maximize their profits in these transactions.

Once human traffickers obtain their goods, they need to be able to somehow transport them to the desired market or destination point, sometimes via (a) transit country(ies). The main goal of traffickers (apart from maximizing their profits by enslaving and exploiting people) is to

minimize their risks (i.e., not get caught and/or lose their goods) while keeping costs down (i.e., not having to maintain their goods, or feed, shelter, or transport the people). This would then imply that traffickers have an incentive to traffic people from similar cultures as theirs, in geographical areas they are familiar with (so they know which trafficking routes to take and which to avoid), and to maintain familiarity with the political situation. Taking these factors into account, traffickers' ultimate goal is to get their good from the origin to the destination point by minimizing the number of border or waterway crossings they have to make. Thus, as discussed above, traffickers have strong incentives to confine their transactions within their home regions (or domestic locales), as traffickers are more familiar with those factors and economic structures (domestic market or demand). Human trafficking should therefore largely occur at shorter, geographic distances.

Apart from political, geographic, and cultural factors (to be discussed shortly), traffickers need to also consider the economics of the business, or the relative inequality structure from origin point to destination point. Traffickers must therefore consider how lucrative the destination market is, whether it is a city within the same country, or another neighboring country. For example, the borders into Bangladesh might be very porous and unpatrolled, which facilitates trafficking to a great extent, but the nation is so poor that there is no demand for trafficking victims there. However, cross-border trafficking is not uncommon between Bangladesh and India.

The above example leads us into the notion of income inequality. We would expect more trafficking to occur within more unequal societies (e.g., Brazil and India), but also in neighboring countries where there is a greater income disparity between the two nations (e.g., Mexico-U.S), and between regions (e.g., North-South or East-West). This could be modeled as "nested

inequalities" to generate predictions about where trafficking should be most likely to occur. In other words, traffickers' decision-making is embedded or influenced within national and structural constraints, specifically the existing political economic framework of inequalities. At the national level, traffickers must consider – in addition to cultural, geographic, and political factors – how lucrative the destination market is relative to the origin point. That is, the destination point (i.e., town or city) within the country should be richer relative to the origin point (i.e., where the trafficked people came from), otherwise the traffickers will not profit from their operation, and victims might not be as easily deceived into migrating. Thus patterns suggest human trafficking generally flows from developing (poorer) to developed (richer) countries (Miko 2003; Zhang 2007; Seelke and Siskin 2008; Bales et al. 2009; Kara 2009). At the structural level, traffickers must also consider the relative inequality of the destination market relative to the origin point for the same reasons. If the destination market is not lucrative, in that it is too poor to attract consumers or there is not sufficient demand for the good, then the business will not thrive. Thus, traffickers' decisions and calculus in where to traffic their victims must be placed (and understood) within the larger political economic framework of inequality. Therefore, we have the following hypotheses:

> Hypothesis 1. The more socio-economic inequality a destination country has relative to the origin country, the greater the flow of human trafficking.

The bottom line is that traffickers are constrained within a framework of incentives and disincentives that helps to structure their behavior and decision-making. As Figure 3.1 demonstrates, traffickers begin their business operation within their own culture or with one they are familiar with (as there may be "multicultural" traffickers). They then consider geographical factors like distance, with greater costs and risks associated with trafficking over long distances.

Political factors are also considered, where corruption and border patrolling (among other variables discussed earlier) are two factors that can help facilitate or dissuade traffickers. We would expect trafficking to occur in highly corrupt (or poorly patrolled) areas, regardless of the mode of transportation and type of border (i.e., land or water). Moreover, in areas where there are no borders (that is, within a country's own borders or in economic regions without internal border controls), regardless of the level of corruption, we would also expect trafficking to occur. Finally, where this is little to no corruption (or a high level of border patrolling and an increased risk of apprehension) coupled with trafficking over a land or water border, we would not expect much trafficking. As a result, traffickers take into account these constraints before determining the destination country for their goods.

FIGURE 3.1 Model of Human Trafficking as a Business Enterprise



But, the trafficking operation does not stop there. The next step traffickers consider is that of the destination market for their good, as Figure 3.2 illustrates. This is where traffickers take into consideration the political economic framework of inequalities. This means that their decision of where to traffic their goods is constrained not only by financial costs and risk of

apprehension, but also by the external environment or where the demand lies for these trafficked goods.

FIGURE 3.2 Model of Societal Inequalities of Human Trafficking



If the trafficker's origin point is poor or rich (in terms of GDP per capita) relative to the destination point, and their intended destination point is poorer, then human trafficking is not likely. There is probably not a high demand nor the financial means to even establish business there. Traffickers would lose money because of low prices, and the decreasing rate of return. Likewise, if the trafficker's origin point is poor or rich relative to the destination point, and their intended destination point is richer, then human trafficking is likely. This means that there is a greater likelihood of consumption of the trafficked good given the level of income; people have the money to buy the trafficked good and/or service. As a result, traffickers take into account societal inequalities (which dictate this supply and demand of the good) to determine the best market or destination point for the trafficked people. We therefore have a business model of human traffickers' decision-making (of how and where to traffic people) nested within a model of societal inequalities.

3.2 Political

Traffickers also need to consider the political climate or situation of the country they would like to traffic people to, as this could help permit such activity to thrive, or actually deter it. Such factors include corruption, political borders, institutional strength, the presence of instability, and the type of regime.

Corruption has long been cited within the literature as a contributing factor to human trafficking (Craig 1983; Agbu 2003; Haynes 2004; Bales 1999, 2005; Cirineo Sacco Studnicka 2010; Guth 2010; UNODC 2011), if not the main driving force irrespective of the type of trafficking involved (i.e., domestic versus transnational trafficking). Traffickers have been known to bribe law enforcement, judiciary, immigration, and border patrol officials with monetary rewards or even providing them services (such as sexual services from a trafficked victim) in order to obtain fraudulent travel documents or cross borders into another country. These officials' complicity in the business allows the traffickers to continue to operate, while at the same time, reducing their risk of apprehension and punishment. Therefore:

> Hypothesis 2. The greater the level of corruption in a destination country, the greater the likelihood of human trafficking to that country.

Borders are a significant factor for trafficking, as they can affect whether a trafficker can successfully get across the border or not. Traffickers need to consider not only the type of border (i.e., porous versus non-porous borders), but also how many borders a country has that could potentially be used to traffic victims. Countries within specific regions – such as the European Union - generally have more porous borders (where traffickers along with trafficked individuals can infiltrate) or waterways due to trade and the establishment of free trade areas or zones[11],

[11] Traffickers know the area and know whether border protection is weak, and where borders can be crossed without checkpoints. Thus, weak borders or locations with poor border enforcement,

which can render a friendly environment for trafficking to occur. An example is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which includes the countries of Brunei, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines or the Andean Community (CAN), which includes Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. [12] ASEAN emphasizes regional cooperation in the three areas of security, sociocultural, and economic integration (ASEAN 2009). They have made the most progress in economic integration, with hopes to create an ASEAN Economic Community by 2015 (ASEAN 2009). CAN is another trade bloc that has a free trade area with a common external tariff (i.e., a customs union). Their main working areas include social and environmental issues, political cooperation, foreign relations, economic development and trade, and management of the integration process and institutional administration (Comunidad Andina 2011). In short, they focus on deeper social, political, and economic integration. These blocs can make trafficking easier because of diminished or dissolved border controls.

Borders can also be porous due to lack of monitoring and patrolling (as a result of limited or no financial resources or lack of manpower, or in general, poor or low institutional capacity), corruption, economic integration, or all of the above. In poorer countries, government resources - specifically financial and physical ones - are often limited, and the many check points (both land and waterways) may not get the necessary supervision they need. In addition, even when there is a sufficient level of monitoring, immigration and border patrol officials may not be able

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coupled with integration (less border enforcement between countries that are party to an agreement) can serve to facilitate human trafficking.

[12] There exist many other regional trade blocs, including the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and the economic and political union, the European Union (EU). NAFTA, for instance, makes it easier to traffic goods and services from Mexico to the United States. The same is true for the EU: once you gain entry into the European Union, moving around becomes much easier due to the Schengen agreement.

to differentiate between the traffickers and trafficked victims from other travelers regardless of whether they have valid or fraudulent documents. On the other hand, countries with a greater institutional strength may have stricter and higher levels of border patrolling, thus making borders less porous and penetrable than others. Traffickers should therefore tend to look for areas where borders and/or waterways are poorly controlled or corrupt, which would then increase their chances of trafficking people across. Economic integration fosters the free flow of goods, services, and people, within certain areas, which has benefitted trade. At the same time, the elimination of border controls as a result of the establishment of customs unions (as in the case of the European Union) can increase negative aspects of trade, such as illicit criminal activity. Thus, areas or zones without border controls – regardless of the level of corruption – provide another easy flow from one neighboring country to another. Therefore:

> Hypothesis 3a: Destination countries with more porous borders (due to economic integrated areas), increase the likelihood of human trafficking to that country.
>
> Hypothesis 3b: Countries with more porous borders (due to lack of monitoring and patrolling) within a region increase the likelihood of human trafficking.

While penetrating through borders is certainly an important factor traffickers must consider, the number of borders a country has also affects their decision on what route to take, and in which direction. For example, Peru shares its land borders with five countries: Ecuador, Colombia, Brazil, Bolivia, and Chile, and lies along the Pacific Ocean. Thus, traffickers – depending on the destination country and which direction and route they would like to take – have several options. This provides greater options, as well as alternative routes for their trafficking operation. Countries that have more borders with other countries should have greater opportunities for trafficking because there are more choices for traffickers, which means more travel routes. Even

if the travel route is not in the direction of the destination country, the trafficker can bypass traditional trafficking routes in favor of more clandestine ones to avoid apprehension and minimize their risks. Therefore:

> Hypothesis 4. The greater the number of land borders an origin/transit country shares with a destination country, the greater the likelihood of human trafficking to that destination country.

Institutional strength or state capacity is a third factor traffickers consider when trafficking people. Countries that are poor generally have low institutional strength, in that they have limited to no financial resources to provide for the state welfare, including physical and human security. These are the countries traffickers tend to traffic victims out of, as there are relatively no security measures. Likewise, destination countries with a low level of institutional strength are not usually seen as attractive markets because of the low state capacity. If the state cannot provide for the people, or provide additional means of support in the form of insurance, subsidies, or financial assistance, there is a greater chance of unemployment, poverty, and other socioeconomic issues. Somalia is a good example of a country that has not had any official government representation since the early 1990s, and has been considered to be a failed state. As such, the country has a very low level of institutional strength, and would not be a prime market for traffickers (i.e., it would only be a place where people are trafficked from or through). At the same time, if the destination country has strong institutional strength relative to none, it means that the government is making efforts at providing public goods and services to its people, which means they have some level of financial and human security. Therefore, traffickers may find that countries with lower levels of institutional strength provide a good pool of potential victims because of the lack of governmental support in the form of public goods and services. These

people may be looking to find greater financial security and/or increase the security they have already. Thus:

Hypothesis 5. The weaker the institutional strength of a destination country, the greater the likelihood of human trafficking to that country.

Instability - political, economic, or environmental – has the potential to adversely affect a country, and is therefore a factor traffickers need to consider in addition to corruption, borders, and institutional strength. Countries that have experienced major instability, such as a conflict, are beneficial for traffickers because this instability usually produces a large number of internally displaced people as well as cross-border refugee flows. Traffickers can take advantage of people during these vulnerable times, and deceive them into thinking they have obtained valid employment, or are being helped. Instability in origin countries is therefore attractive to traffickers as a source of providing potential victims.

At the same time, however, instability in destination countries – the lucrative markets for traffickers – is a detriment to the trafficking operation because it negatively impacts the business. Akin to an economic recession or an increase in prices of a good (due to supply and demand or some type of economic shock), instability in the destination country can affect the consumer base or demand for the good (i.e., trafficked good and service), and therefore decrease supply and profits. For example, environmental disaster can occur in any country, and is not just limited to poorer or developing countries as conflict usually is. While these countries have greater institutional strength and capacity to deal with such issues, the consequences that environmental disaster brings can usually not be controlled or predicted. For example, the 2011 earthquake in Japan brought forth not only one disaster, but also two additional ones: a devastating tsunami, and a nuclear reactor explosion. These disasters had an adverse affect on the Japanese political

economy, the stock market plummeted (albeit short-lived), and certain parts of the country were in chaos. In destination points where instability occurs, traffickers are much more likely to substitute another market and/or temporarily close their market until production can resume again. This brings the next hypotheses:

Hypothesis 6. Origin countries with instability increase the likelihood of human trafficking.

Hypothesis 7. Destination countries with instability decrease the likelihood of human trafficking.

Finally, the type of regime matters for traffickers. It has been established that a strong relationship exists between democracies and political stability, equality, and development (Ember et al. 1997; Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Przeworski 2000). In fact, democracies have been argued to protect human rights more (which means less human rights violations) and to simply repress less (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe et al. 1999), even at certain thresholds of democratization (Davenport 1999; Davenport and Armstrong 2004). We should expect to see more human trafficking (generally, human rights abuses including human trafficking and slavery) in non-democratic and authoritarian countries (Poe and Tate 1994; Cingranelli and Richards 1999; Davenport 1999; Poe et al. 1999; Davenport 2007), holding all other factors constant. Yet, corruption can occur regardless of regime type, and the level of human trafficking in democratic countries is thus a function of this. Therefore:

Hypothesis 8a. Human trafficking should be more prevalent in non-democratic than in democratic countries.

Hypothesis 8b. Human trafficking should be more prevalent in democratic countries coupled with corruption.

In sum, political factors such corruption, borders, institutional strength, instability, and regime type all have to be considered in the decision-making framework of traffickers because they can either help or hinder their operations from origin to destination points.

3.3 Geography

Geographical features are significant factors that should be considered within a human trafficking operation. Traffickers need to take into account the distance between cities or countries (i.e., origin and destination points), as well as the type of terrain (mountainous or forested area), and method of travel (by land or water).

The longer the geographic distance between two countries, the longer it takes the trafficker to get their goods to the final destination, and the more likely they are to be intercepted. Distance also increases the cost or the investment on the trafficker's part because unlike drugs, which do not need much care en-route to their final destination, people need to be kept in "good condition" by being fed, clothed, and sheltered. This can lead to a major financial loss for the trafficker, or, at minimum, it requires the trafficker to keep on investing in the good before the profit can be realized at the endpoint (i.e., point of sale and delivery). Moreover, it can even present a deficit if an initial investment or start-up cost was made (e.g., paying for transportation, false documents, or bribing officials). On the other hand, the longer it takes for a trafficker to get their goods to the final destination, the longer it takes for them to start making profits, and the greater the risk of apprehension (despite increasing initial investment or start-up costs with no immediate rate of return)[13]. In fact, the longer length of time required to reach the destination will mean that the trafficker will have to invest more along the way to maintain their goods.

[13] There are different stages of trafficking, and therefore traffickers' duties vary along each stage. Traffickers may get involved in the criminal activities at the recipient end or may just be middlemen – it depends on the operation and how many people are involved (another reason

Traffickers want to minimize their costs and risks, so traveling great distances is counterintuitive to the operation of the business.[14] Consequently, the economics of human trafficking dictate keeping the business closer to home and not as far away. However, although longer distances between origin and destination points do matter, I hypothesize that this is a function of whether or not there is a transit country for the traffickers to stop in. Transit countries serve as resting stops along the trafficking route, much like rest areas do for long-distance drivers. In these countries, traffickers can drop off their goods, pick up additional ones (which might entail a more complex operation), and replenish their resources, such as food, water, money, etc. They also help to diminish any possible risk of interception by law enforcement due to the breakup of the trafficking operation en-route. Instead of making one, long trip, traffickers can split up their journey into different segments or "legs" (much like connecting flights for long-distance air travel). Therefore, longer distances matter only if the traffickers do not travel via transit countries. Thus:

> Hypothesis 9. The longer the distance between the origin and destination country, the lower the likelihood of human trafficking.

Second, the type of terrain (mountainous or forested area) is an additional important factor traffickers consider in their business. There is no literature to my knowledge that examines physical geography and its impact on human trafficking (except for UNICEF 2005, which finds that terrain can pose barriers to traffickers). Nonetheless, this has been examined to a greater extent in the conflict literature. Buhaug and Gates (2002) find when examining the geographic center of the zone of the conflict, geographic features, such as mountainous terrain

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why at the national or regional level, traffickers may do overlapping jobs vs. transnational trafficking operations where each trafficking operation member has their own assigned duties).

[14] This is true unless traffickers have an already existing, sophisticated network to operate across larger, geographic distances, something that is discussed in Chapter 5. However, while this can happen, this type of trafficking should be less prevalent.

and forests, do not have any impact on the scope of the conflict. Buhaug and Lujala (2005) extend this by examining mountainous terrain, forests, precious metals, and lootable resources in relation to the onset of conflict (as these factors have been argued to increase the likelihood of conflict). They argue that past studies have erroneously linked these geographic features to civil wars at the national level, where instead, most conflicts have been limited to a small area of the country. They find that location of the conflict does matter, and that conflict zones do not necessarily reflect the geographic characteristic of the state, as most are not located in these parts of the country that have mountainous or forested terrain.

Unlike geographic distance, which can exacerbate travel and increase the costs and risks of trafficking, the type of terrain can actually help or hinder traffickers. Trafficking is generally more mobile than conflict, and as a result, more geographically dispersed than concentrated. Still, if human trafficking occurs in certain parts of the country – like in urban cities or along coastal areas – geographic features may continue to have an effect on trafficking. It can limit itself to those areas that can be navigated with greater ease. Coastal areas make it easier for trafficking to go undetected because of the lack of substantial geographic features en-route (which decreases any potential obstruction to the destination point), and cities may make it easier for traffickers to hide among the crowds, where no one pays attention to what they are doing.

Mountainous and forested areas are oftentimes difficult to traverse – especially if one is not familiar with the geography or layout – can be dangerous, and present a host of other health and safety issues. Yet, because of these precise issues, traffickers can take advantage of the alternative terrain, and use them as backup or even main routes to traffic people. There is a lower risk of apprehension by law enforcement due to the hidden nature of the route and the cumbersome terrain. On the other hand, because of these same issues, traffickers are presented

with geographic areas that may be impenetrable, difficult to access and navigate, or completely unavailable to them. Traffickers can use these geographic features to their advantage to traffic people 'quietly' and quickly through hidden avenues, or completely avoid them due to the complexity and lack of knowledge of the route. Thus:

Hypothesis 10a. Mountainous or forested terrain should decrease (or increase) the likelihood of human trafficking in a destination country, holding all other factors constant.

Corruption allows traffickers to consider not only regular routes of migration or trade, but also irregular ones that may present a challenge to traverse, unless law enforcement, border patrol, or immigration officials are paid off. In an environment that is difficult to navigate, such as through mountains or forested terrain, traffickers would probably avoid these routes without the help of these officials. Therefore, I also expect the opposite to be true, in that these geographic features can hinder traffickers in their operation:

Hypothesis 10b. Mountainous or forested terrain should increase the likelihood of human trafficking, unless there is corruption in the form of cooptation (i.e., people to bribe or act as a guide).

Thus, GDP per capita of neighboring countries should affect the extent of trafficking from that country to those neighboring countries. Developed countries are usually better able to police and monitor borders and entry points for docking ships than developing ones. On the other hand, we would expect trafficking between the Netherlands and Germany because of their permeable land borders (along with other countries in the Schengen Area, which do not have internal border controls) even though both have low levels of corruption and high levels of institutional capacity relative to some developing countries.

Finally, the method of travel (whether by land or water) also has to be taken into account in the trafficking business, as traffickers prefer not to make a relatively cumbersome trip. Traveling by land or water has advantages and disadvantages. When traveling by land, traffickers can easily navigate by foot, car, bus, or train (among other options, like animals and bicycles). When traveling by water, traffickers are limited in their options, usually boat, ferry, cruise, sometimes train, or even physically crossing bodies of water by foot. Both methods of travel require extensive logistical planning and resources, but traveling by water requires even more due to the greater complexities of carrying human beings. Unlike inanimate goods (like drugs, for example), which do not require much care en-route, human beings require food, water, and some sort of shelter from the origin to destination points. Consequently, if traffickers opt to travel by water, they will either need to travel in a small group via a small vehicle, or find a larger vessel that will accommodate a larger group of people. For example, we would not expect a huge volume of trafficking to occur between the Netherlands and Great Britain, not only due to the sea that separates the two countries, but also due to the increased monitoring by immigration officials (especially post-9/11). Great Britain is not a part of the Schengen Area, thus they have greater monitoring over border and immigration issues, unlike other Schengen countries, which do not require any formal documentation while traversing throughout the region. Last, there is the option of air travel over land and water. However, this requires extensive logistical planning in that passports, visas, and other official travel documents will be needed to traffic the victims, and also requires an extensive trafficking network of contacts to make such travel possible.[15] Air

[15] This implies that traffickers have complete control of the trafficking process, from the recruitment of victims to the exploitation stage. However, in cases where people are smuggled, traffickers may intervene in their plans to get to their destination point by trafficking them. This decreases the costs for traffickers, since they do not have to pay for their travel.

travel usually entails traveling over longer geographic distances, and is therefore not considered in this chapter. Thus, generally speaking:

> Hypothesis 11. Traveling by land or crossing land borders should increase the likelihood of human trafficking, especially when there is corruption.
>
> Hypothesis 12. Traveling by water or crossing water borders/areas should decrease the likelihood of human trafficking, except when there is corruption.

Crossing bodies of waters should present some difficulties, as a water vessel of some sort will be needed to transport the people, unless the water level is not very high and people can easily walk across it. Still, seas, oceans, and rivers, among other bodies of water, are usually not easily crossed without some medium, and a group of people makes it more difficult to hide the operation. Thus, corruption should aide traffickers in that by paying off complicit law enforcement, border patrol, immigration, and port authorities, they will be able to traffic people. Still, the method of travel is a function of the geographic distance of the traffickers. We would expect that over longer geographic distances, traveling by either method should decrease the likelihood of human trafficking, and with shorter distances, increase this probability (this is similar to Hypothesis 9 but taps more into the specifics of the type of travel done over this geographic distance). Therefore:

> Hypothesis 13. Traveling by land/water or crossing land/water borders over a longer geographic distance should decrease the likelihood of human trafficking.

All in all, geography plays an important role for human traffickers in determining their route, and how they would like to go about trafficking people. They need to consider the distance, geographical terrain, and the method of travel in order to minimize their risk of apprehension by

law enforcement as well as their costs of travel, while at the same time increasing their chances for profit and success.

3.4 Culture

Countries within specific regions tend to be more similar in terms of culture including their traditions and values, history, religion, regard to the status of women, and language. These various features of culture can actually serve to aid traffickers because it allows them to operate within an environment(s) they are already familiar with, and to garner the trust of potential victims. Shared or similar traditions and values help to reinforce existing social inequalities and other social norms, with a similar history acting as a contextual background for this. Religion and the viewpoint on the status of women also share a part of this, in that these traditions and values and histories help to either positively or negatively reinforce them. Finally, a shared or similar language makes it easier to communicate, and thus build interpersonal trust between people, specifically the traffickers and trafficked people. When trust is built, especially with someone from the same culture, this can increase the trafficker's ability to potentially deceive a victim. Interpersonal trust has been argued by some scholars to be a part of civil culture, enhance social participation and association, and establish and solidify both social and political networks (Inglehart 1988; Putnam et al. 1993; Gibson 2001; Uslaner 2002).

These cultural features enable traffickers to bypass any cultural or societal "learning" or adaptation, and allow them to immediately begin their trafficking operations. They know about their good, which consumer base to tap into, and are also familiar with the demand of the local market. This, in short, can help increase the speed of the trafficking process because the trafficker does not have to learn anything new in order for the good to be adapted to the culture. For example, when a business moves abroad (or would like to), the business owners need to take

into consideration the country's cultural features (among other things, like the presence of similar goods and services already on the market, the language, consumer demand, etc.) in order to ascertain whether their goods and services will flourish. McDonalds is a prime example of a multinational corporation that has expanded its branches worldwide since its establishment in the 1950s. While beef hamburgers excel in the United States, the market for these items, in countries like India, has not been as successful. As a result, McDonalds has had to alter its menu to accommodate the population - largely Hindu – and serve vegetarian burgers in place of beef ones.

Thus, for the trafficker, culture is important because it lends this notion of "cultural competence" that enables them to recruit and gain the trust of the victim, as well as allowing them to navigate throughout the country(ies). The greater the level of cultural competence of a trafficker, the greater the likelihood of trafficking the victim, and the easier it is for them to culturally navigate throughout the country and/or region. On the other hand, for the victim, culture matters only to the extent that the trafficker is able to gain their trust, and thus recruit them into becoming trafficked. It is easier for someone from his or her cultural, ethnic, or religious group to gain the trust of the victim because of these shared similarities. Beyond this, the victims' cultural orientation should not matter much to the trafficker, unless the trafficker is looking to satisfy a demand for a "good" with specific features. On a holistic level, culture does not matter to the degree that it does for the victim because people are people regardless of where they come from, and exploitation should still render profits. Ultimately, the goal of the trafficker is to turn a profit. Therefore, the trafficker should try to find the easiest prey, unless there is an incentive (such as a substantially large profit) to try to identify victims with specific characteristics.

A country's culture is unique and special, but at the same time, it can be a detriment to the welfare of its citizens. For one thing, it can help traffickers secure their good and navigate through the country(ies) to traffic people as discussed above. On the other hand, culture can serve as a hidden tool that traffickers use to deceive their potential victim by gaining their trust, and then eventually exploiting them. Traffickers know this and should prefer to operate within a country(ies) with which they are familiar, so as to put in the least amount of time and cost, and gain the most by trafficking a person. In sum, when traffickers operate within a single, cultural environment (or ones they are familiar with), there is less likely to be "learning" and thus, greater ease of trafficking, yielding the final hypothesis:

> Hypothesis 14. Having a similar culture (ethno-linguistic) should increase the likelihood of human trafficking to the destination country.

3.5 Conclusion

The theoretical framework offered here on the political economy of human trafficking helps us to consider what economic, political, geographic, and cultural factors help to facilitate human trafficking. Economic factors, including the cost benefit framework of engaging in an illegal trade, as well as inequality, are more likely to increase trafficking to destination countries. Political factors such as corruption, porous borders due to economically integrated areas as well as lack of monitoring and/or patrolling, number of borders, institutional strength, various forms of instability, and regime type are also likelier to lead to an increase in trafficking to destination countries (except for instability, where we would expect a decrease in these countries). Geographic factors, like geographic distance, mountainous or forested terrain, and traveling by land or water are also expected to have positive or adverse impacts on human trafficking. Finally, cultural similarity is expected to increase human trafficking because at its very core,

familiarity leads to trust, which is based on shared values, histories, languages, and backgrounds. Together, these four features help to better understand the very dynamic yet complex factors that may give rise to human trafficking. The next chapter provides a research design and tests these theoretical assumptions providing for some interesting results.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING

In the previous chapter, I argued that traffickers consider not only the baseline business costs, risks, and profits, but also a set of economic, political, geographic, and cultural factors that they must incorporate into their decision-making in order to traffic people. These specific factors include income and gender inequality, corruption, porous and land borders, institutional strength, instability, regime type, distance, terrain, and culture. Together, these factors can help give us a better understanding of why human trafficking continues to occur, particularly at the domestic level. This chapter empirically tests the political economy theory of human trafficking, and discusses the research design parameters utilized in the analysis.

This cross-sectional, crossnational study employs 79 transit countries, 78 destination countries, and a total of 738 directed dyads, where the unit of analysis is country-country (dyad). For clarification, a directed dyad is a one-way relationship between two countries: Country A (transit) and Country B (destination). We are only interested in the human trafficking flow from Country A (transit) to Country B (destination), and not one country or the other. Data restrictions allow only one point in time to be examined: 2006. Several hypotheses are not tested in this model due to substantial missing data, collinearity, and/or complexities in the regression model.[16] This section discusses the dependent, independent, and control variables,

[16] Hypotheses 3b, 6, 8b, 11, 12, and 13 are not tested in this regression. Hypothesis 3b taps into the porousness of borders due to lack of monitoring and/or patrolling (and not just corruption, which considers bribery. Here I am interested in whether the country has enough people and surveillance to monitor the border, all things being equal). Starr's (2001) Ease of Interaction variable was going to be used as a proxy for this, and measures the existence of roads, railroads, and the steepness (or hypsography) of terrain as the movement of land-based military capability (and other goods). While not perfect, it gives us an idea of how easy it is to move across land, including borders. This directed dyadic dataset had substantial missing data, which automatically reduced the entire number of observations in the model to less than 100 (versus 738), and as a result, was dropped. Hypothesis 6 is not tested as the directed dyadic focus is on

model specification, and results. Table A.1 in Appendix A provides a list of included directed dyads in the regression model. Given the extensive list of directed dyads, Tables 4.1 and 4.2 present the transit and destination countries separately, respectively, and their frequency in appearing in a directed dyad.

Although there are 738 directed dyads, there are only 79 unique transit countries as shown in Table 4.1. Those bolded have appeared more than 20 times in a directed dyad, and indicate the most common transit countries in the estimation sample. Belarus in particular, has been cited as a major origin country in Europe (Seelke and Siskin 2008), along with other Eastern European countries. It is easy to notice that the vast majority of these transit countries are developing ones, with the exception of a few.

Table 4.2 shows that there are 78 unique destination countries. Those bolded have appeared more than 30 times in a directed dyad, and indicate the most common destination countries in the estimation sample, which is also supported by literature (Seelke and Siskin 2008). All of these destination countries lie in Europe, and all are part of the European Union with the exception of Norway and Switzerland. Italy is especially a hefty destination country appearing the most in 38 directed dyads, and is known to be a major destination country in Europe (Seelke and Siskin 2008).

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origin or transit and not destination countries. All hypotheses with interactive terms (8b, 10b, 11, and 12) are not tested due to substantial missing data and collinearity with the other independent variables, which caused several to drop from the model. For Hypotheses 10a and 10b, only mountainous terrain is tested in lieu of forested terrain due to the loss of too many observations. Hypotheses 11-13 are not tested primarily because individual-level data on the human trafficking event would be needed in order to examine travel by land or water, and such data does not exist at the moment. Finally, it should be noted that Hypothesis 13 is very similar to Hypothesis 9 (geographic distance), except that the former includes more details on the type of travel involved (e.g., land or water).

TABLE 4.1. List of Transit Countries in Estimation Sample by Frequency

Country	Frequency	Country	Frequency
Albania	16	Kazakhstan	18
Algeria	2	Laos	2
Austria	8	Latvia	13
Azerbaijan	11	Lesotho	2
Bangladesh	3	Macedonia	7
Belarus	25	Malaysia	1
Belgium	12	Mali	1
Belize	2	Mexico	2
Bosnia and Herzegovina	26	Moldova	12
Botswana	17	Morocco	23
Brunei	5	Mozambique	2
Bulgaria	30	Myanmar	3
Burkina Faso	1	Nepal	1
Cambodia	13	Netherlands	11
Cameroon	7	New Zealand	1
Canada	16	Nigeria	3
Costa Rica	2	Norway	2
Côte d'Ivoire	1	Pakistan	4
Croatia	1	Panama	4
Cyprus	19	Philippines	3
Czech Republic	18	Poland	17
Dominica	1	Romania	18
Egypt	3	Russia	14
El Salvador	6	Senegal	1
Equatorial Guinea	26	Serbia	16
Estonia	12	Singapore	2
Finland	4	Slovakia	16
France	2	Slovenia	15
Gabon	15	South Africa	26
Georgia	5	South Korea	2
Germany	5	Spain	1
Ghana	13	Sweden	3
Greece	14	Switzerland	1
Guatemala	2	Thailand	18
Hungary	16	Togo	1
India	8	Turkey	29
Indonesia	22	Ukraine	3
Ireland	2	United Kingdom	2
Italy	15	Uruguay	2
Jamaica	30		

Note: N=79.

TABLE 4.2 List of Destination Countries in Estimation Sample by Frequency

Country	Frequency	Country	Frequency
Albania	10	Malaysia	4
Argentina	1	Mali	3
Armenia	2	Mexico	3
Austria	30	Moldova	11
Bangladesh	4	Nepal	3
Belgium	30	Netherlands	31
Benin	4	Nicaragua	2
Brazil	2	Niger	2
Bulgaria	10	Norway	32
Cambodia	2	Pakistan	5
Cameroon	2	Panama	2
Canada	5	Paraguay	1
Chile	1	Peru	2
China	10	Poland	9
Colombia	2	Romania	17
Costa Rica	2	Russia	16
Croatia	8	Senegal	2
Dominican Republic	3	Sierra Leone	1
Ecuador	2	Slovakia	10
El Salvador	1	Slovenia	8
Estonia	9	South Africa	4
Finland	32	South Korea	2
Germany	32	Spain	32
Ghana	2	Sweden	30
Greece	31	Switzerland	31
Guatemala	2	Syria	10
Honduras	2	Thailand	8
Hungary	9	Togo	1
Indonesia	2	Turkey	9
Iran	3	USA	15
Ireland	31	Ukraine	16
Israel	13	United Kingdom	37
Italy	38	Uruguay	1
Kazakhstan	2	Venezuela	1
Kyrgyzstan	3	Yemen	10
Laos	3	Zambia	1
Latvia	10		
Lithuania	11		

Note: N=78.

4.1 Dependent Variable

4.1.1 Severity of Human Trafficking Flows

The dependent variable is the severity of bilateral human trafficking flows in destination country from origin or transit countries, though the vast majority of countries appear to be transit. This is coded as the "traffic-linkage" variable by Cho et al. (2012), using the United Nations Trafficking in Persons: Global Patterns (UNODC 2006). This ordinal variable originally ranged from 0 (no flows) to 9 (high flows), but missing categories (e.g., categories 5, 7, and 8) did not completely capture these vast rankings. As a result, this is collapsed into more meaningful, ordinal categories ranging from 0 (no flows), 1 (low flows), 2 (medium flows), and 3 (high flows) in order to take into account these missing categories.

4.2 Independent Variables

4.2.1 Economics

4.2.1.1 Socioeconomic Inequality

This is defined in terms of two types of inequality: income and gender. Thus, there are two measures for this variable. Income inequality is defined in terms of the Gini coefficient, and measures "the extent to which the distribution of income or consumption expenditure among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution" (World Bank 2006a). Information on how this index is calculated can also be found from this source. Data for this index vary by year for each country, so not all countries' Gini coefficients are from the same year due to unreported and/or missing data. If 2006 is not available, the year before is used as a proxy (2005); if that year is not available, then the closest year prior to 2006 is used, and is be noted for that country(ies). This variable ranges from 0 (perfect equality or

everyone has the same income) to 1 (perfect inequality or income is drastically different for everyone). Data come from the World Bank (2006a).[17]

At the same time, inequality also takes other forms, including gender. Income inequality does not take into account gender discrimination, which is an important consideration in human trafficking because females are disproportionately affected, especially in sexual exploitation. Gender inequality is measured in terms of the Gender Inequality Index (GII), and "reflects women's disadvantage in three dimensions – reproductive health, empowerment and the labour market – for as many countries as data of reasonable quality allow. This index shows the loss in human development due to inequality between female and male achievements in these dimensions. The health dimension is measured by two indicators: maternal mortality ratio and the adolescent fertility rate. The empowerment dimension is also measured by two indicators: the share of parliamentary seats held by each sex and by secondary and higher education attainment levels. The labour dimension is measured by women's participation in the work force" (UNDP 2006). This ordinal variable ranges from 0 (perfect equality or women and men are equal) to 1 (perfect inequality or women are not equal to men at all). Data come from the Human Development Report (UNDP 2006).[18]

[17] The following countries had figures for incoming inequality in years other than 2006 due to missing data: 2005 – Albania, Bangladesh, China, Republic of Congo, Gabon, India, Indonesia, Iran, Nicaragua, Niger, Senegal, and Yemen; 2006 - Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Maldives, Nigeria, Slovenia, Syria, Tajikistan; 2003 – Benin, Bhutan, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Gambia, Guinea, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Uzbekistan; 2002 – Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Laos, Sri Lanka; 2001 – Azerbaijan, Cameroon, Haiti, Israel; 2000 – Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, USA; 1999 – Belize, Netherlands, United Kingdom; and, 1998 – Singapore, South Korea, Turkmenistan.

[18] Alternatively, two other measures tapping into gender inequality were also considered for this model as robustness checks: the Women's Social Rights variable from Cingranelli-Richards (2010), and a literacy gender ratio created from female and male literacy rates from UNESCO (2006). The Women's Social Rights variable was retired from the CIRI Human Rights Dataset in 2005, and measures a more socially comprehensive form of gender inequality on whether

4.2.2 Political

4.2.2.1 Corruption

The level of corruption is measured by the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)'s governmental control of corruption variable. This "reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both pretty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests (Kaufmann et al. 2012). This continuous variable ranges from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong), and indicates the government's control of corruption (governance). Data come from the WGI Project (Kaufmann et al. 2012).

4.2.2.2 Porous Borders (Economics)

This is defined as an area(s) that can easily be penetrated due to some form of economic and/or political integration, such as the establishment of a free trade area, customs union, or common market. This variable measures how many free trade area agreements, customs unions, and/or common markets a country belongs to, and is a count ranging from 1 to 36. Data come from the Regional Trade Agreements Information System (RTA-IS) of the World Trade Organization (2013).[19]

4.2.2.3 Land Borders

The number of land borders a country has may determine which neighboring country and/or travel route(s) a trafficker takes. This variable is defined as the number of land borders a country has. If a country does not share any land borders with another country, it is coded as

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women were had social rights in various areas. The literacy gender ratio is simply a ratio of female to male literacy rates, and taps into how socially included females are in terms of education. Unfortunately, substantial missing data for both variables precluded their inclusion in the model.

[19] A secondary (binary) measure indicating whether or not a country belonged to a free trade area, customs union, and/or common market was also considered. However, there is no variation in the values of this variable, and every country was in fact a member of one of these entities. As such, this measure did not prove fruitful, and instead, the number of economic entities a country belongs to is used to allow for greater variation.

"0"; likewise, if a country shares 14 land borders with 14 other countries, then it is coded as "14." This variable is a count ranging from 0 borders to 14 borders (e.g., China). Data come from Borderbase (2013).

4.2.2.4 Contiguity

Land contiguity is defined as "the interaction of the homeland territory of the two states in the dyad, either through a land boundary or a river (such as the Rio Grande along the U.S.-Mexico border)" whereas water contiguity is based "on whether a straight line of no more than a certain distance can be drawn between a point on the border of one state, across open water (uninterrupted by the territory of a third state), to the closest point on the homeland territory of another state" (Stinnett et al. 2002). This is defined if two countries share a land/river border, or are separated by less than 150 miles of sea distance. This is a nominal variable, where "0" indicates the two countries do not share any land/river border, "1" that two countries share a land/river border, and a "2" that they are separated by less than 150 miles of sea distance. Data come from the Correlates of War Project, Direct Contiguity Data, 1816-2006, Version 3.1 (Stinnett et al. 2002).[20]

4.2.2.5 Institutional Strength

This is state capacity, which is defined as the ability of the state to secure payments for the provisions of goods and services. This is measured as the total tax revenue as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) in current US$. Data come from the World Bank (2006c).[21]

[20] The following directed dyads were not found in the above source, and were coded by visually assessing their geographic location on a map: Kosovo-Albania, Serbia-Bosnia, Bosnia-Serbia, Bulgaria-Serbia, and Romania-Serbia.

[21] The following countries had figures for state capacity in years other than 2006 due to missing data: Albania (2004), Argentina (2004), Azerbaijan (2008), Cameroon (1999), the Republic of Congo (2005), Costa Rica (2008), Ecuador (1994), Guinea (1999), Mexico (2000), Myanmar (2004), Panama (2001), Serbia (2007), Sudan (1999), Syria (1997), Tajikistan (2004), United Arab Emirates (1999), Venezuela (2005), Yemen (1999), and Zimbabwe (1997). No figures

4.2.2.6 Political Instability

This variable captures "the perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism" (Kaufmann et al. 2010). It comes from the Political Stability and Absence of Violence measure from the World Bank's World Governance Indicators. This continuous variable ranges from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong), and indicates the government's control (governance) over politically destabilizing events (Kaufman et al. 2010).[22]

4.2.2.7 Economic Instability

This variable captures any fluctuations in a country's economic growth and/or inflation rate. It defined the "annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based on constant local currency" (World Bank 2006d), and is measured using the GDP per capita growth (annual %) variable. Data come from the World Bank (2006d).[23]

4.2.2.8 Environmental Instability

This is defined as "any major natural disaster, man-made disaster (such as nuclear disasters) or weather phenomenon that destabilizes a country for any period of time" (EM-DAT 2013). Further information on the specific classifications of disasters (e.g., complex disasters, natural disasters including biological, climatological, geophysical, hydrological, and meteorological, and technological disasters), the methodology and criteria behind this, and definitions, can be found at EM-DAT (2013). In order to qualify as a "disaster," the event must have involved 10 or more deaths, affected 100 or more people, declared a state of emergency, or

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were found for: Brunei, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Haiti, Iraq, Kosovo, Libya, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan (does not exist in the dataset), Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, or Vietnam.

[22] Kosovo did not have a score until 2008.

[23] The figure for Myanmar is from 2004, and there are no figures for North Korea or Taiwan.

called for international assistance (EM-DAT 2013). This is a count of the number of disasters a country had in 2006, and ranges from 0-82. Data come from The International Disaster Database, Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (EM-DAT 2013).

4.2.2.9 Regime Type

This variable captures the regime type a country has (ranging from a full autocracy to a full democracy), and is a continuous variable ranging from -10 (full autocracy) to +10 (full democracy). Data come from Polity IV year 2006 (Marshall and Jaggers 2009).

4.2.3 Geography

4.2.3.1 Origin-Destination Distance

Given the dependent variable identifies the major origin or transit countries for each destination country, the geographic distance is therefore be calculated from each of these dyadic pairs. Geographic distance is defined in terms of the distance between capital cities in kilometers (km). This continuous variable ranges from 0 to 20085 km. Data come from the "Distance between Capital Cities Data" (Gleditsch and Ward 2001; Gleditsch 2013).

4.2.3.2 Mountainous Terrain

Mountainous terrain has the potential to deter human traffickers because of the lack of accessibility of navigating through such topography. There is no variable that provides data for both mountainous and jungle terrain together, so only mountainous terrain is examined. Geographer A.J. Gerrard's rough terrain measurement is used as a proxy for the percentage (%) of the country that is mountainous, the same one Fearon and Laitin (2003) employ. This measurement does not include swamps or jungles; only mountainous terrain, and is from 1999. Data come from Fearon and Laitin's (2003) replication data file.

4.2.4 Culture

4.2.4.1 Cultural Diversity

Cultural affinity – or operating within a similar or familiar culture - is important for human traffickers because it reduces costs to gaining the victim. If the human trafficker and the victim are of the same culture, this makes trafficking easier, due to shared language, customs, traditions, and other cultural barriers.[24] The cultural diversity variable from Fearon (2003) is used, and taps into the cultural distance (rather than ethnic fractionalization) between groups by "using the distance between the 'tree branches'[25] of two languages as a measure […] of the cultural distance between groups that speak them as a first language" (Fearon 2003). This cultural fractionalization measure varies from 0 (heterogeneous cultural resemblance) to 1 (homogenous cultural resemblance). Thus, the more languages spoken within a country, the

[24] There are several possible data that tap into culture. First, the ethnic linguistic fractionalization index (ELF) has variant forms and is an excellent measure for within-country variation of ethnic, linguistic, and religious heterogeneity. This does not, however, capture similarities in culture across countries, but instead focuses on differences between groups within each country. Second, The World Values Survey is another source that looks at people's societal and political beliefs, values, and attitudes, and how they change over time (World Values Survey 2006). These include waves of national surveys that have been conducted since 1981, and question individuals on a variety of topics, including culture. Yet, this measure focuses on the individual-level, and explores individual perceptions, which does not provide an accurate or holistic measure of culture. Third, a novel and under-used source is The Joshua Project, a research initiative of the U.S. Center for World Mission since 2006, which aims to "highlight the ethnic people groups of the world with the fewest followers of Christ" (Joshua Project 2013). Their Affinity Bloc measure is defined as "all people groups, who either live in a particular region or have similar cultural roots. Peoples are broadly grouped into 16 blocs with affinities based on language, culture, religion, and politics. In nearly every Bloc there are widely dissimilar and unrelated linguistic minorities, but often there is one particular culture that is dominant" (Joshua Project 2013). These Affinity Blocs include the Arab World, Deaf, East Asian Peoples, Eurasian Peoples, Horn of Africa Peoples, Jews, Latin-Caribbean Americans, Malay Peoples, North American Peoples, Pacific Islanders, Persian-Median, South Asian Peoples, Southeast Asian Peoples, Sub-Saharan Peoples, Tibetan-Himalayan Peoples, Turkic Peoples, and Unclassified, for a total of 16 blocs, and one unclassified bloc. Although this source provides an array of cultural measures, and even how culturally similar people are, the measures are largely independent and ethnic-oriented.

[25] Fearon (2003) is making reference to the tree diagrams used in the linguistics field to classify and show the relationships between languages.

likelier they are to be closer to "0" on this cultural distance scale. What is especially unique about this variable is that it goes beyond ethnicity as a measure of culture into a sub-component – specifically language – to refine what we mean by culture. Fearon (2003) cites an example where Latin America is heterogeneous under the ethnic fractionalization measure; however, it is more homogenous under the cultural fractionalization measure because of the common Spanish-language spoken across the region.

4.3 Control Variables

4.3.1 Population

The total population in each country is controlled for. Data come from the World Development Indicators, World Bank (2006b).

4.3.2 Wealth

Countries that are richer tend to have greater tools at their disposal in terms of resources and security. Thus, level of wealth is controlled for and is measured as GDP per capita in current U.S. dollars ($). Data come from the World Bank (2006d).

Table 4.3 provides a description of all variables in the model, as well as sources, and summary statistics.

TABLE 4.3. Variable Descriptions and Summary Statistics

Variable	Description	Coding/range	Source	Mean	Median	Standard Deviation
Human trafficking	Severity of human trafficking flows	0 (no flow) to 3 (high flow)	Cho et al. (2012)	1.46	1	1
Income inequality	Income inequality (GINI)	0 (equality) to 100 (inequality)	World Bank (2006)	34.18	34.10	6.41
Gender inequality	Gender inequality (GII)	0 (equality) to 1 (inequality)	United Nations (2006)	0.23	0.18	0.17
Corruption	Government's control over corruption	-2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong)	Kaufman et al. (2012)	0.87	1.07	1.12
Porous borders (economic)	# of FTAs country a part of	Count, 1-36	WTO (2013)	26.35	35	12.20
Land borders	# of land borders	Count, 1-14	Borderbase (2013)	4.61	4	2.76
Contiguity	Country shares land/water border?	0 (no), 1 (yes), 2 (water only)	Stinnett et al. (2002)	0.15	0	0.41
Institutional strength	State capacity	7.429-29.397, in US$	World Bank (2006)	18.62	17.86	6.15
Political instability	Government's control over political destabilization	-2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong)	Kaufman et al. (2012)	0.45	0.61	0.79
Economic instability	Annual % growth rate	-.235-13.650, in constant US$	World Bank (2006)	4.11	3.59	2.73
Environmental instability	# of disasters	Count, 0-82	EM-DAT (2013)	4.87	2	10.86
Regime type	Degree of democracy	-10 (full autocracy) to	Marshall and	8.27	10	4.07

Variable	Description	Coding/range	Source	Mean	Median	Standard Deviation
		10 (fully democracy)	Jaggers (2009)			
Origin-destination distance	Geographic distance of origin-destination country	0-20085 (km)	Gleditsch and War (2001)	3228.96	1851.50	3148.65
Mountainous terrain	% mountainous	0-73.7 (%)	Fearon and Laitin (2003)	16.16	7.49	19.83
Cultural diversity	Linguistic distance btw. groups	0 (different) to 1 (similar)	Fearon and Laitin (2003)	0.22	0.18	0.15
Wealth	Gross domestic product per capita	266.580-72959.770, in current US$	World Bank (2006)	27098.65	31776.98	19960.15
Population	Country population	1364726-1.34e+09	World Bank (2006)	5.3e+07	1.1e+07	1.6e+08

4.4 Model Specification

Since the dependent variable is an ordinal categorical variable with meaningful ranks, an ordered logit regression is used as opposed to an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression (Long 1997; Kennedy 2008). OLS regression cannot be used because the errors will be heteroskedastic (OLS assumes homoscedasticity), distances between each category are not known (and OLS assumes they are of equal distance), and probabilities can fall outside of the unit interval (from 0 to 1) (McKelvey and Zavoina 1975; Winship and Mare 1984; Long 1997). At the same time, while a multinomial logit regression could be used, doing so would mean losing information from our categories that are important and necessary to distinguish in this model.

4.4.1 Proportional Odds Assumption

Implicit in an ordered logit regression is the proportional odds assumption (also known as the parallel regression assumption), which assumes that each category's outcome (i.e., β coefficient) is the same. Thus, in this model, the relationship between low human trafficking flows versus the next category up (medium human trafficking flow) is the same as the category higher than this one (high human trafficking flow). As a result, the relationship between all of these categories is the same (i.e., we have the same β's across values of our outcomes), and we have one model. Note, however, that only $\alpha's$ can vary across values of each outcome. If not, we would need a different model to explain the relationship between each of the categories.

4.4.2 Testing the Proportional Odds Assumptions

Since this is a primary assumption underlying the use of ordinal logit regression, it is essential to test for whether this holds in the model. There are two ways to do this. First, using the omodel command in STATA, we perform a likelihood ratio (LR) test, where the H_0: no difference in the β coefficients between variables. With a X^2 of 298.89 (32 d.f.), and a p-value

of 0.000, the null hypothesis is rejected. This model has differences in the β coefficients between variables, and thus violates the proportional odds assumption. Second, a Brant test can be done, which estimates the coefficients from the three binary regressions (since have j-1 categories, or 4-1=3). With a X^2 of 153.84 (32 d.f.), and a significant p-value of 0.000, we find that the assumption has also been violated with this test. The Brant test indicates that the coefficients for several variables – income inequality, gender inequality, porous borders (economic), political instability, origin-destination geographic distance, and wealth – differ dramatically across the regressions, while the other coefficients for the other variables are relatively similar. Together, both of these tests indicate that the proportional odds assumption has been violated.

There are four options for dealing with the proportional odds assumption in various ways to (not) allow or partially allow these β coefficients to be different across the independent variables (Williams 2006). First, a multinomial logit regression can be used, but this would mean losing the ordinal rankings of the dependent variable, which means losing information. This is not useful for this model because each category means something and is not treated as a nominal variable. Second, a partial proportional odds logit regression is another model that considers the best of both worlds. The proportional odds assumption is relaxed only for those variables in violation, while the other variables in the model that did not have such drastically different β coefficients are to be held under this restriction. This is an attractive addition to the generalized ordered logit model given the use of fewer parameters - some which are still under the proportional odds assumption. Unfortunately, convergence is not achieved in the regression, and this is not a viable option. Third, a generalized ordered logit regression completely relaxes the proportional odds assumption, so that all of the variables have different sets of coefficients,

not just the problematic ones. I find this to be too flexible in that there are an increased number of parameters – far too many considering the model has 16 independent and control variables – and interpretation is cumbersome with a set of different coefficients for each outcome. The generalized ordered logit regression is presented in Table A.2 in Appendix A for comparison with the ordered logit regression. In line with common practice, the ordered logit regression is used[26], which constitutes the final and fourth option (Williams 2006).

4.5 Results

This section discusses the empirical findings of the effect of the various economic, political, geographic, and cultural variables on the severity of human trafficking flows. Before looking at the regression results, descriptive statistics are examined to highlight some findings not noted in the regression, particularly about those variables that do not result in any statistical significance.

4.5.1 Descriptive Statistics

TABLE 4.4 Frequency of Severity of Human Trafficking Flows in Estimation Sample

Flow	Frequency
None	18.43% (136)
Low	36.45% (269)
Medium	25.61% (189)
High	19.51% (144)

Note: N=738

[26] Still, given the violation of the proportional odds assumption, it is noted to proceed with caution in the results of the analysis.

Table 4.4 shows a basic frequency distribution for the dependent variable, the severity of human trafficking flows in the estimation sample. The bulk of directed dyads – a combined 459 or 62% of total directed dyads – have low to medium human trafficking flows, which a similar percentage of either no human trafficking flows between them (18.43%), or high human trafficking flows between them (19.51%). We cannot make any definitive conclusions from this bivariate correlation matrix alone, but an interesting inverted U-shape pattern emerges based on these frequencies. This suggests that the bulk of human trafficking flows in this estimation sample are low- to medium-level, while on the tail ends, we have no- and high-level flows.

TABLE 4.5 Relationship between Land Borders and Severity of Human Trafficking Flows in Estimation Sample

Number of Land Borders	Flow			
	None	Low	Medium	High
1	2	38	1	0
2	24	49	39	18
3	2	43	53	15
4	26	45	36	30
5	31	44	26	29
6	1	15	11	17
7	25	10	5	3
8	1	11	9	18
9	0	10	8	14
10	1	1	0	0
14	23	3	1	0

Note: a. N=738 b. X^2=282.8634 c. d.f.= 30, p<.05 d. the number of borders is based on the estimation sample and is not an arbitrary number.

Table 4.5 examines the relationship between the number of land borders a directed dyad has (specifically the destination country) and the severity of human trafficking flows, which is statistically significant at the .05 level. We see that countries that have less than 10 land borders, particularly between 2 and 5, have more active (or no) human trafficking flows across the different categories. Countries that have more than 10 but less than 14 land borders have little to

no human trafficking flows. Thus, while borders allow for trafficking transactions to occur with ease, having too many borders may not be as beneficial, perhaps due to the geographic distance between each one.

TABLE 4.6 Relationship between Political Instability and Severity of Human Trafficking Flows in Estimation Sample

Political Instability	Flow			
	None	Low	Medium	High
-2.5 to -1.6	6	3	1	0
-1.5 to -0.1	63	68	27	21
0 to 1.5	67	198	161	123
1.6-2.5	0	0	0	0

Note: a. N=738 b. X^2=758.6471 c. d.f.= 198, p<.05

Table 4.6 examines the relationship between political instability a directed dyad has, and the severity of human trafficking flows, which is statistically significant at the .05 level. Countries that have weak levels of governance with regard to political stability and violence do not have heavy human trafficking flows. On the other hand, as the absence of political instability and violence increases (i.e., government performance is becoming stronger as indicated in the positive numbers), we see a greater number of countries (N=482) that have some level of human trafficking flows. Although we do not know the magnitude and only that a relationship exists between these two variables, an interesting pattern emerges. Where there is no political instability or violence, there are greater flows of human trafficking, which is logical, particularly for destination countries. Human traffickers seek such countries that are free from any sort political instability, including war, in order to traffic people for financial gain. This suggests the political environment matters for economic incentives and markets to flourish.

TABLE 4.7 Relationship between Environmental Instability and Severity of Human Trafficking Flows in Estimation Sample

Number of Disasters	Flow			
	None	Low	Medium	High
0 to 25	128	259	183	143
26 to 50	0	10	6	1
51 to 75	0	0	0	0
75-100	8	0	0	0

Note: a. N=738 b. X^2=238.3910 c. d.f.= 48, p<.05

Table 4.7 examines the relationship between environmental instability a directed dyad has and the severity of human trafficking flows, which is statistically significant at the .05 level. Environmental instability is measured as the number of disasters for 2006. It can easily be seen that the bulk of countries that had 0 to 25 disasters were the ones that had some level of human trafficking flow, if any. Environmental disasters, like other forms of instability, like political, have the potential to disengage society and cause chaos. Human traffickers need an economic market that is not only profitable for them to sell their goods (i.e., humans), but also intact and functioning. On the other hand, countries that had between 0 to 25 disasters also had a high level of human trafficking flow. When there are disasters, people are usually affected in one way or another, including displacement, homelessness, or migrating to get somewhere safe. Human traffickers can take advantage of these disposable and migratory populations during any disaster.

These bivariate correlation matrices of land borders, political instability, and environmental instability, allow us to look at the interrelationship between each of these variables with the severity of human trafficking flows, which may highlight interesting patterns not made explicit in a regression. However, they do not tell us anything about the magnitude each of these independent variables has in relation to the severity of human trafficking flows, but instead allow us to see the interactions between them. The next section provides the regression

results, which will allow us to see the simultaneous effect these independent variables have – along with others – on the severity of human trafficking flows.

4.5.2 Regression

Table 4.8 presents the ordered logit regression results for the impact various economic, political, geographic, and culture variables had on the severity of human trafficking flows. Model 1 is the regression without robust standard errors (included as a baseline comparison), and Model 2 is the regression with robust standard errors. Results are very similar for both models, although a few variables were downgraded in terms of statistical significance. Overall, seven of the 14 independent variables were statistically significant at the .01 level, one at the .05 level, and three at the .10 level. Only three independent variables – land borders, political instability, and environmental instability – are not statistical significant (and is therefore not be discussed). Of the control variables – wealth and population – only wealth was statistically significant at the .05 level.

The results in Table 4.8 provide strong support for six hypotheses, including (contiguity) which taps into Hypothesis 4 but is not explicitly stated. In general, increased income inequality (Hypothesis 1), economic porous borders (the number of free trade agreements countries are members of, Hypothesis 3a), contiguity, and economic stability (Hypothesis 7), increases the severity of human trafficking flows. Increased institutional strength (Hypothesis 5), regime type (Hypothesis 8a), and geographic distance between origin/transit-destination countries (Hypothesis 9) decreases the severity of human trafficking flows. All are statistically and substantively significant at the .01 level, with the exception of contiguity (significant at the .10 level), and origin-destination distance (significant at the .05 level). These findings support previous research that shows the increased impact of these

TABLE 4.8 Ordered Logit Regression: Estimated Effects on the Severity of Human Trafficking Flows

Variable	Model 1	Model 2 (Robust SEs)
Income Inequality	0.061***	0.061***
	(0.017)	(0.018)
Gender Inequality	-7.007***	-7.007***
	(1.144)	(1.258)
Corruption	0.565***	0.565***
	(0.163)	(0.167)
Porous Borders (Economic)	0.047***	0.047***
	(0.011)	(0.012)
Land Borders	-0.059	-0.059
	(0.037)	(0.037)
Contiguity	0.397**	0.397*
	(0.195)	(0.210)
Institutional Strength	-0.044**	-0.044*
	(0.019)	(0.022)
Political Instability	-0.183	-0.183
	(0.181)	(0.192)
Economic Instability	-0.399***	-0.399***
	(0.042)	(0.049)
Environmental Instability	0.023	0.023
	(0.028)	(0.029)
Regime Type	-0.111***	-0.111***
	(0.034)	(0.037)
Origin-Destination Distance	-0.000**	-0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Mountainous Terrain	0.010**	0.010*
	(0.005)	(0.006)
Cultural Diversity	-1.824***	-1.824***
	(0.561)	(0.618)
Wealth	-0.000**	-0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Population	-2.64e-09	-2.64e-09
	1.99e-09	2.03e-09
N	738	738
Pseudo R^2	0.2029	0.2029
LR X^2 (16 d.f.)	403.38	272.94

Note: *** $p \leq 0.01$; ** $p \leq 0.05$; * $p \leq 0.10$, two-tailed tests. Standard errors in in parentheses. Model 2 has a Wald X^2 (16 d.f.) instead of an LR X^2.

independent variables on human trafficking. The remaining statistically significant variables, gender inequality (Hypothesis 1), corruption (Hypothesis 2), mountainous terrain (Hypothesis 10a), and cultural diversity (Hypothesis 14), are not substantively significant, and are in the opposite direction.

4.5.3 Predicted Probabilities

The interpretation of the ordered logit regression (and log-odds coefficients) is not as intuitive and straightforward as OLS regression, and we cannot say much about the magnitude or impact each of the independent variables has on human trafficking. Instead, several figures (Figures 4.1 through 4.11) are included that show how moving the main (statistically significant) independent variables from their minimum to maximum values changes the probability of being in each category of human trafficking flows (e.g., where 0 = no flow, 1 = low flow, 2 = medium flow, and 3 = high flow).[27] These predicted probabilities (first differences) allow us to get a better understanding of the substantive effects each of these variables has on different categories of human trafficking flows. The error bars in each figure denote 95% confidence intervals that frame each prediction, unless otherwise noted.

Figure 4.1 presents the predicted change in being in each level of human trafficking as income inequality increases from its in-sample minimum (0 = equality) to its in-sample maximum (1 = inequality). We see that increasing income inequality reduces the probability of no human trafficking flows by 14.8 %, and of a low human trafficking flow by 39.5%, and increases the probability of a medium and high human trafficking flow by 12.6% and 41.8%, respectively. Moreover, each of these substantive impacts is statistically significant given that the confidence intervals do not contain zero. Figure 4.1 highlights that increasing income

[27] All of the predicted probabilities were produced with CLARIFY (King et al. 2000; Tomz et al. 2001), and all variables are held at their means. I am very thankful to Jacqueline DeMeritt for her assistance with creating and interpreting these predictions.

inequality makes no- or low-level human trafficking flows less likely, and medium- or high-level flows more likely. In short, increasing income inequality (i.e., inequality worsens) leads to higher levels of human trafficking.

It is interesting to note that the effect of increasing income inequality is strongest in the upper bounds of the categories (i.e., 0 and 1, 1 and 2, 2 and 3). For example, the strongest impact of increasing inequality is to increase category 3, or high-level human trafficking flow, by 41.8%. This suggests that as income inequality worsens, it increases the probability of human trafficking when the flows are high. These results support Hypothesis 1, in that more socio-economic inequality (as measured by income) increases the likelihood of human trafficking to the destination country.

FIGURE 4.1 Predicted Effects of Income Inequality on the Level of Human Trafficking



Note: Reported values are predicted changes (first differences) in the probability of each level of human trafficking flow, given a min-max increase in income inequality. All other variables are held at their means.

Figure 4.2 paints a different picture than Figure 4.1 with a different type of inequality: gender. Here we see the predicted change in being in each level of human trafficking as gender

inequality increases from its in-sample minimum (0 = equality) to its in-sample maximum (1 = inequality). Increasing gender inequality increases the probability of no human trafficking flows by 78.8%, whereas this decreases the probability of medium- and high-level human trafficking flows by 36.1% and 28.8% each, respectively. Since the confidence interval for low-level human trafficking flows contains zero, this is not statistically significant. When gender inequality worsens, having no human trafficking flows is likelier, while medium- and high-level human trafficking flows are less likely. Overall, increasing gender inequality decreases the level of human trafficking. This is counterintuitive to what logic would posit, particularly as females are disproportionately affected by human trafficking, especially in sexual exploitation. Unpacking this aggregate index and focusing on a sub-index of gender may allow for a more precise look at this relationship, as well as using other proxies for gender inequality. As a result, the second component of Hypothesis 1 (that measures gender inequality) is not accepted.

FIGURE 4.2 Predicted Effects of Gender Inequality on the Level of Human Trafficking



Note: Reported values are predicted changes (first differences) in the probability of each level of human trafficking flow, given a min-max increase in gender inequality. All other variables are held at their means.

Figure 4.3 shows the predicted change in being in each level of human trafficking as the government's control over corruption increases (i.e., that is, corruption is reduced) from its in-sample minimum to maximum. Increasing governmental control over corruption reduces the probability of no- and low-level human trafficking flows by 20.9% and 12.3% each, respectively. On the other hand, increasing governmental control over corruption increases the probability of medium- and high-level human trafficking flows by 20.4% and 12.9% each, respectively. Each of these substantive impacts is statistically significant given that the confidence intervals do not contain zero. Worded differently, as corruption improves (i.e., we see less of it), the probability of having no- or low-level human trafficking flows falls, while increasing the probability of medium- or high-level human trafficking flows. In short, less corruption indicates higher human trafficking flows. Corruption has been referred to a main contributing factor to human

trafficking (Agbu 2003; Haynes 2004; Bales 1999; 2005; Cirineo Sacco Studnicka 2010; Guth 2010; UNODC 2011) regardless of the type of country (e.g., origin, transit, or destination). Yet, the results indicate the opposite. Still, corruption by itself may not be the only driving force for human trafficking to occur, and other interactive forces may be at play. One possibility of this unusual finding is that corruption may not play such a central role in medium- or high-level human trafficking flows as the literature leads us to believe (though corruption has never been examined according to human trafficking flows to my knowledge). Instead, no to minimal border controls and/or lack of monitoring and patrolling – usually tested under the guise of corruption due to lack of data – may foster these linkages given such heavier flows. For example, once a trafficker gains entry into the Schengen Area, s/he can easily enter into other countries without suspicion given the lack of internal border controls. This gives the trafficker a vast geographic distance to travel to free of restrictions, and no corruption is necessary. On the other hand, it could be that as destination countries are cleaning up their political environment – especially if they are politically transitioning – or increase their anti-human trafficking resources to snuff out trafficking, they are seeing greater incidences of human trafficking. It is not due to greater increases in human trafficking incidences, but rather the apprehension of traffickers, which makes the problem more visible. Hypothesis 2 is therefore rejected, that greater levels of corruption within a destination country lead to a greater likelihood of human trafficking to that country.

FIGURE 4.3 Predicted Effects of Corruption on the Level of Human Trafficking



Note: Reported values are predicted changes (first differences) in the probability of each level of human trafficking flow, given a min-max increase in corruption. All other variables are held at their means.

Figure 4.4 shows the predicted change in being in each level of human trafficking as the number of free trade agreements, customs unions, and/or common markets a country belongs (i.e., membership) to increases from its in-sample minimum to maximum. Increasing membership in these economic and/or political agreements reduces the probability of no- and low-level human trafficking flows by 20.9% and 12.3% each, respectively. Yet, it the probability of medium- and high-level human trafficking flows by 20.4% and 12.9% each, respectively. These substantive effects are statistically significant. Thus, increased membership in these agreements indicates no- or medium-level human trafficking flows. It is interesting to note that this occurs in the lowest and medium categories of human trafficking flows. It appears that increased membership in these agreements indicates some threshold level with regard to

human trafficking, and the probability of having such a flow. This variable served as a proxy for economic porousness or areas that can easily be penetrated due to some form of economic and/or political integration (e.g., like the Schengen Area in the EU). The greater the number of agreements in which countries are involved in means that countries have greater opportunities for trade, and thus allowing the free movement of goods, including people. Some of the areas – like the Schengen Area in the European Union include especially lucrative and rich destination countries coupled with more developing economies like in the European Union (especially with the continued expansion of EU membership, and the entry of Eastern and Baltic states). As these economic entities enlarge, they allow greater access into this 'market' (both formal and informal), increasing the potential for migration. Finally, trade is usually seen as a positive exchange between countries as it leads to increased foreign investment, and ultimately, economic growth. However, these results also suggest that increase membership in these economic agreements increase human trafficking, while may provide a look into the darker side of trade (Kelly et al. 2005). Since most democracies have market economies[28], the already established legal trade routes for the free flow of goods, services, and people also include some elements of illegality, like human trafficking. The trade structure could also make it easier for people to come into the country under the guise of a certain type of worker and/or under a certain type of visa. Yet, this goes contrary to literature that finds that preferential trade agreements actually improve respect for human rights through a material economic incentive structure positive structure (Hafner-

[28] Briefly, a market economy is one in which there is no government ownership of the means of production, and there is minimal to no involvement in the economic production, distribution, and consumption of goods. On the other hand, a command economy relies on government ownership of the means of production, and there is a lot to of involvement in to complete control over these economic activities. The vast majority of the world has a market economy (or a variation of the two, a mixed economy), and a select few, such as Cuba and North Korea, have a command economy. In the past, the former Soviet Union was considered a prime example that relied on a planned economic system.

Burton 2005, 2009), and specifically how regional trade agreements can help reduce trafficking by establishing international standards that dictate human rights while increasing economic growth (Chastain 2006; Richelson 2008). This is an area of research that requires further exploration. These results support Hypothesis 3a, in that destination countries with more porous borders in terms of economic integrated areas increase the likelihood of human trafficking to that country.

FIGURE 4.4 Predicted Effects of Porous Borders (Economic) on the Level of Human Trafficking



Note: Reported values are predicted changes (first differences) in the probability of each level of human trafficking flow, given a min-max increase in porous borders (economic). All other variables are held at their means.

Figure 4.5 shows the predicted change in being in each level of human trafficking as a state becomes contiguous. Increasing land/water contiguity reduces the probability of no- and low-level human trafficking flows by 5.2% and 14.1% each, while increasing the probability of medium- and high-level human trafficking flows by 8.3% and 10.9% each, respectively. These

effects are all statistically significant at the .10 level. In short, being a contiguous state versus a non-contiguous state generally increases the probability of human trafficking. This conforms to theoretical expectations that states which share land and/or water borders are more likely to see human trafficking because of geographic proximity and the convenience of nearby borders. Sharing a contiguous land or water border with a destination country is like having an open door into that trafficking market. This makes trafficking easier from the origin or transit country into the destination country because geographically, it is close by, (although this is also a function of the land area of the country itself). China, for example, has many contiguous neighbors, but depending on the origin and destination points, the distance can be extensive. Beijing, for instance, is closer to Mongolia than it is to certain points in India or Myanmar. Still, traffickers face fewer costs and risks traveling within their home country than across foreign ones, and the larger distance may not have such a detrimental effect. Though this is not made explicit in a hypothesis, contiguity taps into Hypothesis 4, which specifically focuses on land borders (and is not a statistically significant variable).

FIGURE 4.5 Predicted Effects of Contiguity on the Level of Human Trafficking



Note: Reported values are predicted changes (first differences) in the probability of each level of human trafficking flow, given a min-max increase in contiguity. All other variables are held at their means.

Figure 4.6 displays the predicted change in being in each level of human trafficking as institutional strength (measured by state capacity) increases. Increasing institutional strength increases the probability – although small – of no- and low-level human trafficking by 8.7% and 12.9% each, respectively, and decreases medium- and high-level human trafficking flows by 12% and 9.6% each, respectively. These substantive effects are all statistically significant at the .10 level. In general, what we see is that as institutional strength increases, the probability of human trafficking decreases. Governments that provide adequate provisions of goods and services, especially in the form of social welfare and insurance, help to protect their citizens during times of economic hardships. This conforms to theoretical expectations, that if a state has the necessary means to allocate goods and services to its people in the form of social welfare

benefits and other public goods to ensure their safety, this should decrease the probability of human trafficking. People do not have to look elsewhere for this security, or at least minimize their risks of engaging in illicit or potentially deceptive work. Hypothesis 5 is therefore supported.

Figure 4.7 presents the predicted change in being in each level of human trafficking as economic instability increases. Note that economic instability taps into any fluctuations in the economy by looking at the annual growth rate of GDP per capita (%). Thus, higher annual growth rates indicate less economic instability (i.e., economic stability increases as the scale increases). Increasing economic stability increases the probability of no human trafficking flows by 80.4%, and reduces the probability of medium- to high-level human trafficking flows by 34.7% and 41.4% each, respectively. Category 1 (low human trafficking flows) does not have any substantive impact due to the lack of statistical significant. Overall, as economic stability increases (that is, we see less economic instability), the probability of human trafficking decreases. This also lends support to theoretical expectations that when there is economic instability, this may adversely affect people's lives in the form of employment and/or the consumption of products (i.e., when there is inflation, prices increases, which means products become more expensive, holding everything else constant). Economic chaos has the potential to cause downturns and severe fluctuations in the economy, and can even lead to domino effects in a regional area, as was the case with the recent economic crisis in Europe. Moreover, during times of economic transition – such as when the former Communist states transitioned to market economies – or economic hardships – during the 1970s and 1980s in much of Latin America and Asia when hyperinflation and currency devaluations were the norm – people may seek alternative forms of financial security, by looking for work in the informal and/or illegal sector

(with or without knowledge of the job itself). This lends support to a component of Hypothesis 7 (which also tested political and environmental instability, which were found to be statistically insignificant).

FIGURE 4.6 Predicted Effects of Institutional Strength on the Level of Human Trafficking



Note: Reported values are predicted changes (first differences) in the probability of each level of human trafficking flow, given a min-max increase in institutional strength. All other variables are held at their means.

FIGURE 4.7 Predicted Effects of Economic Instability on the Level of Human Trafficking



Note: Reported values are predicted changes (first differences) in the probability of each level of human trafficking flow, given a min-max increase in economic instability. All other variables are held at their means.

In Figure 4.8, we see the predicted change in being in each level of human trafficking as a country becomes more democratic. Increasing democracy increases the probability of no- to low-level human trafficking flows by 9.7% and 32.1% each, respectively. On the other hand, increasing democracy decreases the probability of medium- to high-level human trafficking flows by 10.4% and 31.4% each, respectively. In general, we see that as regimes go from autocratic to democratic (i.e., become more democratic), human trafficking decreases. This strongly supports the literature that has found a positive relationship between democratic regimes and respect for human rights (and lower levels of repression) (Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 1999; Poe et al. 1999; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005). This provides support for Hypothesis 8a.

Figure 4.9 displays the predicted changed in being in each level of human trafficking as origin-destination country geographic distance increases. In other words, we are looking at the geographic distance between origin (or transit) countries, and destination countries (geographic distance for short). Increasing geographic distance increases no- and low-level human trafficking flows by 12.6% and 7.5% each, respectively, and decreases the probability for medium- and high-level human trafficking flows by 12.8% and 7.3% each, respectively. Overall, we see that as geographic distance increases, human trafficking decreases. This is in line with theoretical expectations: traffickers are more likely to refrain from traveling across long, geographic distances to traffic people due to the costs and risks, as well other factors in relation to the distance itself. Traveling across such long distances raises the risk of not only inception and ultimately capture, but it increases the costs for traffickers because they have to take care of their goods (i.e., the people), and any other logistical issues relating to travel (e.g., securing travel documents, making transportation reservations, etc.). This lends support for Hypothesis 9.

FIGURE 4.8 Predicted Effects of Regime Type on the Level of Human Trafficking



Note: Reported values are predicted changes (first differences) in the probability of each level of human trafficking flow, given a min-max increase in regime type. All other variables are held at their means.

FIGURE 4.9 Predicted Effects of Origin-Destination Distance on the Level of Human Trafficking



Note: Reported values are predicted changes (first differences) in the probability of each level of human trafficking flow, given a min-max increase in geographic distance. All other variables are held at their means.

FIGURE 4.10 Predicted Effects of Mountainous Terrain on the Level of Human Trafficking



Note: Reported values are predicted changes (first differences) in the probability of each level of human trafficking flow, given a min-max increase in mountainous terrain. All other variables are held at their means.

Figure 4.10 shows the predicted changed in being in each level of human trafficking as the percentage of mountainous terrain increases (mountainous terrain for short). Increasing mountainous terrain decreases no- and low-level human trafficking flows 5.7% and 13% each, respectively, and increases medium- and high-level human trafficking flows by 8.9% and 9.7% each, respectively. All substantive effects are statistically significant at the .10 level. In general, as mountainous terrain increases, human trafficking increases. As discussed earlier in Chapter 3, the type of terrain can help or hinder traffickers. Mountainous terrain can help traffickers by hiding the fact they are traveling with people, as well as act as inconspicuous routes hidden away from security and border patrols. In a nutshell, mountains can help hide traffickers and their goods, usually in combination with corruption. On the other hand, mountains are not easy to navigate across, especially if the trafficker is not familiar with the route and does not have the

physical capabilities to climb and traverse mountainous terrain, and as such, presents more of a danger than a service. Still, despite the dangers and unfamiliarity, mountains may be the next best alternative than crossing through formal, legal channels, such as borders, because they allow for hidden migration to occur virtually uninterrupted, as well as corruption. In some areas where border patrolling may be high, traveling through mountains to gain entry into other countries may be worth the risks and costs involved. Looking at other types of terrains, including deserts and forested areas, may help elucidate whether all terrains are as accessible and open to human trafficking, or if particular ones have greater utility for the business. As a result, Hypothesis 10a is not supported.

FIGURE 4.11 Predicted Effects of Cultural Diversity on the Level of Human Trafficking



Note: Reported values are predicted changes (first differences) in the probability of each level of human trafficking flow, given a min-max increase in cultural diversity. All other variables are held at their means.

Figure 4.11 shows the predicted changed in being in each level of human trafficking as cultural similarity increases. Lower values of cultural diversity indicate that the cultural distance

between ethnic groups are different, and high values mean that they are similar. Therefore in Figure 4.11, increasing values indicate cultural similarity. Increasing cultural similarity (or put another way, decreasing cultural diversity) increases the probability of no- and low-level human trafficking flows by 15.8% and 12.4% each, respectively, and decreases the probability of medium- and high-level human trafficking flows by 17.1% and 11.0% each, respectively. In short, as cultural similarity increases, human trafficking decreases. Cultural similarity helps a trafficker because of the familiarity with the customs, traditions, and language of the country, which makes it easy to blend into society, gain the trust of native people, and/or tap into resources that natives enjoy. Yet, this is not reflected for medium- or high-level human trafficking flows. This suggests that cultural similarity may not matter as much with heavier flows of human trafficking, perhaps indicating that a multicultural group of human traffickers is involved, traffickers are accustomed to more than one culture, and/or cultural homogeneity in this age of globalization may be a thing of the past. Like other entrepreneurs in the legal sector, traffickers may be recruited based on their multicultural competence, aptitude, and ability to navigate different cultures, thus reducing the need for cultural familiarity, but a more wider familiarity with different cultures. Alternatively, data limitations could also preclude the examination of human trafficking under conditions of cultural similarity because it is better hidden. These results do not support Hypothesis 14.

4.6 Conclusion

Chapters 3 and 4 sought to examine how human traffickers and the industry operate, the incentives that drive suppliers, and the conditions that define the pool of potential victims through a political economic framework. In other words, why does human trafficking continue to occur? Past research has often explained human trafficking in terms of two primary camps: a

human rights view of victim protection and a criminal justice view that emphasizes punishing the traffickers. While both contribute to a better and more holistic understanding of human trafficking, neither camp explores the political economic framework that is inherent in trafficking. I argue that in order to consider how traffickers operate and what fosters this trade, a set of economic, political, geographic, and cultural factors also need to taken into account.

Economic factors, including the cost benefit framework of engaging in an illegal trade, as well as inequality, should increase trafficking to destination countries. Political factors such as corruption, porous borders due to economically integrated areas, number of borders, institutional strength, economic instability, and regime type are also likelier to lead to an increase in trafficking to destination countries (except for instability, where we would expect a decrease in these countries). Geographic factors, like geographic distance and mountainous terrain, are also expected to have adverse (or positive) impacts on human trafficking. Finally, cultural similarity is expected to increase human trafficking because at its very core, familiarity leads to trust, something language can facilitate. I argue that together, these four groups of factors help to better understand the very dynamic yet complex nature that gives rise to human trafficking.

The results in this chapter support partial segments of the political economy theory of human trafficking. Specifically, regression results and predicted first differences provide strong support for six hypotheses, consistent with theoretical expectations and prior research. Increased income inequality, number of free trade agreements countries are members of, contiguity (not stated in a hypothesis but taps into Hypothesis 4), institutional strength, economic stability, and regime type all lead to increases in the severity of human trafficking flows, while increased geographic distance leads to decreases in the severity of human trafficking flows. On the other hand, gender inequality, corruption, mountainous terrain, and cultural diversity have the opposite

effect on the severity of human trafficking, contrary to theoretical expectations and previous literature. Though statistically significant, they were not in the expected direction. Instead, greater gender inequality, corruption, mountainous terrain, and cultural diversity (measured in terms of similarity) increase the severity of human trafficking flows. These findings suggest that the factors that give rise to human trafficking are not isolated or independent of one another, but instead work together in a dynamic, interrelated manner, something that is not captured in the model. Factors that harm human trafficking can also foster it (like mountainous terrain or corruption, for example), thus causal arrows can decidedly go both ways.

This chapter also has some inherent data limitations. First, not every country is included in the directed dyadic dataset as an origin/transit or destination country, yet others appear more than once. Missing observations for those excluded countries is most likely due to missing and/or unavailable data. Given this, there may be an unintended bias effect for most destination countries in the dataset to be developed ones, though literature does confirm this directed dyadic flow (i.e., going from poor or developing to developed countries). Second, though the theoretical argument focuses more on human trafficking being domestic than transnational in nature, national trafficking (i.e., trafficking within a country's borders) is not tested. There is no available data on origin/transit to destination points (or cities) that would help isolate each human trafficking event; only country-level data are available. Finally, due to substantial missing data, unavailable data, collinearity, and/or complexities in the regression model (from variables being dropped), the hypotheses on the porousness of borders due to lack of monitoring and/or patrolling, inequality in origin countries, forested terrain, the type of travel traffickers employed, and any interaction variables, were not tested. As a result, we only get a partial yet improved understanding of why human trafficking continues to prosper from a political

economic standpoint.

The next chapter presents a theoretical framework for why human traffickers might operate transnationally, or across large geographic distances, despite inherent costs and risks involved.

CHAPTER 5

TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN TRAFFICKING: WHY IT CAN OCCUR ACROSS REGIONS

> *"The transnational style of many modern crime organizations does not appear to have resulted from a conscious master plan concocted by some arch criminals. Rather, it emanates form the organizational flexibility of some groups to respond to nuances within the complex economic environment."*
>
> Robert J. Kelly, Jess Maghan, and Joseph D. Serio

One of the things we learned from Chapter 4 is that increased geographic distance between origin and destination countries decreases human trafficking. This conforms to the political economic theory of human trafficking, and supports the idea that high risks and costs, coupled with various economic, political, geographic, and cultural factors, makes transnational human trafficking much less likely. Traffickers should want to keep their operations closer to home versus far away. Yet, this does not always happen. There have been a few notable cases that have made New York Times headlines, including the group of women trafficked into prostitution from South Korea to the United States (Connecticut and New York) via Mexico and Canada (Vasquez 2006). Why would human traffickers choose to operate outside of their home countries or even geographic region given the costs and risks? In other words, why do human traffickers traffic people across large geographic distances? This chapter focuses on those rare cases when human trafficking does go beyond the confines of a country's domestic borders or region, and argues that traffickers extend their operations across such distances based on four factors: the type of human trafficking group, available expatriate or immigrant networks, the origin-transit-destination country connection, or strength of the bilateral economic relationship between origin and destination countries. Note that due to unavailable data, this chapter is not empirically tested. However, the data that are needed for future research are discussed.

5.1 Type of Human Trafficking Group

There are different types of human trafficking groups, which are a function of their level of sophistication: how well organized, connected[29], well endowed (e.g., financial, manpower, resources), and institutionalized they are. In general, the more sophisticated a trafficking group is, (e.g., organized criminal groups like the Russian Mafia, Italian Mafia, Chinese Triads, or Japanese Yakuza), the likelier they are to operate across greater geographical distances. They also have, overall, greater resources, a wider and varied network, and more established relationship to the economic market compared to their regional counterparts (i.e., junior traffickers).

It is important to note that not all of these criminal groups are the same (Shelley 2007; Stoecker and Shelley 2007). The Italian Mafia, for example, is really an umbrella term for the various crime group families that exist in Italy and in the United States today. In addition, criminal organizations from the same country do not necessarily share the same characteristics, engage in the same types of crime, and may or may not engage in human trafficking. Finally, human trafficking groups may not always be organized criminal groups. Most definitions of organized criminal groups do not stipulate specific attributes relating to the organization itself, but rather the types of illegal activities they are involved with. Thus, examining only organized criminal networks because of their increased levels of sophistication and capabilities may bias future work.

[29] How connected human trafficking groups are is mentioned here, as it is also a function of the type of group. However, since this taps into the second broad factor – available expatriate or immigration networks – it is only mentioned here briefly, and is discussed in much greater detail in that section so as to avoid any duplication.

5.1.1. Level of Organization

How well organized a trafficking group is depends on whether if functions as a vertical hierarchy, or a horizontal hierarchy. Groups with vertical hierarchies have one leader, and subsequent stratified layers of sub-leaders, etc. In groups with horizontal hierarchies, there are several leaders with equal power. In either case, having someone or a group to lead the trafficking group is important to the functioning and viability of the business. These leaders act, in essence, as "the parent" of the group. When the leader(s) has command and loyalty of his/her trafficking comrades, the business is able to runs smoother and better. Leaders, in turn, offer protection and a degree of security to the trafficking members. Thus, a symbiotic relationship on trust helps contribute to the functioning and organization of the human trafficking group. Moreover, information and knowledge about the business are important elements for the leader to share with his/her trafficking comrades, as this deepens the cohesiveness of the group. An organized business runs better when everyone involved knows what to do, what their role and duties are, and who is in charge of what, and more importantly, when there is a leader(s) who can oversee operations. When an international trafficking group is well organized, they are able to run more efficiently, which in turns means expanding or branching out into other potential trafficking markets outside of their home country.

5.1.2 Level of Endowments

How well-endowed a transnational trafficking group is, is also an important factor that determines whether or not they will traffic people across long geographic distances as opposed to domestic trafficking. Level of endowments include financial resources, manpower, and other logistical resources including networks and contacts. Greater financial reserves (capital) are at the heart of any business – they can be used to supplement worldwide trafficking operations of

the trafficking group, bribe government officials, law enforcement, and immigration patrols; pay wages of the trafficking comrades, etc. Without any money or with a very limited amount, traffickers are not able to expand the scope of their network as wide or as far away as they would like. Traveling long distances, eating, providing shelter, and paying off people along the way take substantial amounts of money (a function of the number of people involved in the operation, both traffickers and victims). In short, having the necessary capital enables traffickers to "invest" in, and expand to, other illegal markets.

Apart from financial resources, manpower is another essential ingredient to the trafficking operation. If a group is only able to mobilize five individuals, that group will more than likely not extend transnationally, or across large geographic distances. With so few traffickers, the potential risks for apprehension, and the number of trafficking victims needed, will exceed them. Therefore, the size of the trafficking group matters, and it is important for a transnational trafficking group to have enough traffickers. What enough constitutes, or what this threshold is, has yet to be determined. On the same note, if there are several human trafficking groups in coordination and cooperation with one another[30] – despite their size – this can facilitate transnational human trafficking.

Other logistical resources, which complement how well connected a trafficking group is, are also important. Having logistical support, human resources, and networks and connections in various points across the globe (e.g., the major "hubs" of the trafficking business as well as transit countries) are essential to transnational trafficking. Transnational human trafficking groups do not operate solely amongst themselves; rather, they operate in collusion with a wider

[30] Akin to American Airlines' Oneworld alliance network, which offers members the same benefits they would get flying with them on other airlines. This network of airline alliances enables members to receive greater perks, and enables them to fly to a wider range of countries than is possible with only American Airlines.

network of people in the tourism, hospitality, advertising/marketing, transportation, immigration, law enforcement, and government industries. Analogous to the African proverb, "It takes a village to raise a child," it also takes a "globalized family" of pro-human trafficking industries to raise a transnational human trafficking group. Without these resources and contacts, trafficking groups simply could not function at the transnational level and across vast geographic distances.

5.1.3 Degree of Institutionalization

Lastly, institutionalized trafficking groups have experience on their side as well as deep roots and a host of [trafficking] supporters.[31] Usually the longer a trafficking group has been in existence indicates their ability to do their job well as a business. They also have greater stability in the transnational trafficking market, as they are the oldest, if not one of the oldest groups in the market. Entrenched and stable trafficking groups already have a place in the market as opposed to junior trafficking groups, which may have barriers to entry and/or competition. Consequently, one would expect that the older, deep-rooted trafficking groups are better equipped to traffic people transnationally. They are also often involved in other illicit activities, including the arms, drugs, and gambling industries. The Zetas, the Mexican drug cartel, is an example of a group that traffics people transnationally.

5.2 Available Networks

Second, trafficking can occur across regions due to available expatriate or immigrant networks in destination countries. This has been referenced above in regards to the network of contacts traffickers have in extending their operations transnationally. The degree of available expatriate or immigrant networks complements the level of sophistication of a trafficking group. Generally, organized criminal groups are larger, and thus more sophisticated than junior traffickers are. This means that they should have a larger network of contacts, including a large

[31] This institutionalization is similar to a political party in a country.

pool of their own people or members already living in the destination country. This essentially provides the necessary link for traffickers in the origin country to facilitate the trafficking of people in spite of large geographical distances.[32] For example, Paul and Hasnath (2000) claim that human traffickers in Bangladesh actually belong to a larger international criminal network. Much like drug traffickers, human traffickers also rely on a system of corrupt authorities (by providing financial incentives or sexual favors (in the case of human trafficking for sexual exploitation) in return for cooperation in order to traffic people out of the country.

When immigrants and expatriates migrate, they create these invisible transnational ties that connect their origin country to their destination country (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2000; Guarnizo et al. 2003). Guarnizo et al. (2003), for instance, found that immigrants who planned to return back to their origin country maintained political ties. Keeping such emotional and psychological attachments allows immigrants to remain connected, even if physically they are unable to be in their origin country, or more importantly, with members of their community. An alternative and more practical way some of these immigrant and expatriate groups maintain ties to their origin country has to do with economics. By sending money back home in the form of remittances, they maintain an economic link that is favored by the origin country. Waldinger and Fitzgerald (2000) extend this further, and claim that when immigrants migrate from their origin country to their destination country, they establish transnational ties that bind both countries, and in effect, create a multiplicity of "imagined communities." Thus, immigrants and expatriates create linkages that help create a network of contacts for their families, friends, and others with good intentions, to migrate to those destination points. However, traffickers also tap into the same immigrant and expatriate networks from their origin country, and can thus recruit fellow members and/or traffic people into those communities (who are later disseminated to

other destination points). Thus, those who immigrate unintentionally, create networks which may not always prove benevolent.

On the other hand, traffickers can also tap into other networks, including IDPs or refugees, in order to receive resources or sanctuary, much like rebel groups have in conflict (Gates 2002; Salehyan and Gledtisch 2006; Salehyan 2007; Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008). The negative externalities of such flows can provide traffickers with an additional network. By borrowing from the conflict literature on how rebel groups use IDP and refugee flows for sanctuary, and to also continue fighting in the conflict with impunity, we can apply a similar framework to transnational human traffickers. Gates (2002) finds that having a sanctuary within the country or in a neighboring country plays a big role in allowing rebel groups to develop and grow. In addition, Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006) find that these flows, particularly refugees from neighboring countries of the conflict country, help establish rebel networks, and that these rebel groups use these external sanctuaries in other countries to avoid punishment (Salehyan 2007). Thus, tapping into IDP and refugees flows allows transnational human traffickers to widen their range of networks and resources, and suggests that similar to rebel groups, affords them protection when needed, but also manpower to facilitate their criminal transactions. Shelley (2007) is one of the few scholars, to my knowledge, who claims that rebel groups may also engage in human trafficking, which indicates that these actors may not be as disengaged in their respective operations.

Liang (2001) finds that most Chinese immigrants to the New York City area have come from the Fujian province of China. This increasing trend prevails, as more and more Fujian immigrants have taken the same illegal migratory route (note, this is smuggling) as their predecessors. Apparently, Liang (2001) discovers that when Chinese immigrants arrive safely to

their destination, information is sent back to the community detailing of their success in migrating with that smuggler. This established transnational link further reinforces migration, and propels more people to travel along the same paths. The point here is that these transnational linkages allow for information and successful experiences to be passed on to more people, which increases the potential for migration.

Trafficking groups can easily tap into these networks for assistance and resources, especially if they belong to the same community (i.e., Chinese traffickers can tap into the Fujian-New York City network, but Fujian Chinese traffickers will have a greater advantage, as they are from the same region as the immigrants). When immigrants arrive to their destination country, they usually have a job lined up that was negotiated beforehand via a contact in the diaspora community, or, they arrive without any such plan. Having this knowledge, human traffickers might exploit these immigrant and expatriate communities to their benefit by recruiting or trafficking them. They might even offer them independent jobs to complete (like contracting), such as finding a certain number of people (with or without the full knowledge of the trafficker's intention) in exchange for money. Also, transnational traffickers, given their extensive pool of resources, are able to provide fraudulent documents for illegal immigrants (e.g., social security cards, residency permits, and/or passports) who do not otherwise have the means to acquire them (due to availability or access, as well as financial), both in the home and destination countries. China, for example, requires their nationals to obtain permission at the local level before emigrating; this may be difficult to obtain if the individual is not part of the group that can emigrate, or if they do not have the financial resources to do so. Moving is expensive - especially across large geographic distances - and bribes (guanxi) to local officials who sign these permission forms is not unheard of. Without this permission, Chinese citizens are not

allowed to leave the country. Transnational smugglers, and, later traffickers (who might work in unison) in the transit or the destination country, can recruit or deceive these vulnerable immigrants by offering them a viable way to remain in their new destination within a more "legal" framework (albeit with false documents or a trafficking job).

In short, the availability and expansiveness of immigrant or expatriate networks, as well as IDPs and refugee flows, allow for traffickers to increase manpower, extend their operations transnationally, and thus, increase human trafficking.

5.3 Origin-Transit-Destination Connection

Third, trafficking has the potential to cross regions over large distances due to the connection or relationship between the origin and transit countries, and transit and destination countries. Transit countries – similar to sanctuaries rebel groups may receive - serve as an intermediary between the origin and destination countries, and allow traffickers a point of departure to rest, recuperate, obtain additional resources (i.e., money, food, and travel documents), drop off people, and pick up more people. A transit country is a useful part of the supply chain when the traffickers are handling or transporting a large group of individuals, and to further minimize risk (especially if the site within the transit country has been well-established). They also allow traffickers to further reduce risks a long-distance journey would entail, by providing a buffer zone to temporarily seek shelter. For example, in the drug trafficking literature, Rosenberg (1988) found that Honduras served as a transit country for cocaine shipments between Colombia and the United States. Certain parts of the country - like the Caribbean coast – remain largely uninhabited, while other areas - like the Bay Islands – remain unregulated. This, coupled with a climate of "government permissiveness" (i.e., corruption, weak and poor institutions and political players) has allowed drug trafficking to penetrate deep into the

echelons of society. As it goes, this country has been able to effectively serve its role in the international drug industry by serving as a transit country.

5.4 Bilateral Economic Relationships

Finally, the strength of the bilateral economic relationship between the origin and destination countries, also has the potential to undermine the reduction in human trafficking, especially across regions. Paul and Hasnath (2000) find that Bangladesh's economic dependence on the Middle East (the latter is an important donor of aid) hampers any well-meaning efforts to tackle human trafficking. Thousands of Bangladeshis migrate to the Middle East each year as legal guest laborers. In return, they send millions of dollars (US$) in remittances back to Bangladesh. While this does not indicate human trafficking or slavery (yet), such legal and oftentimes, unequal relationships may increase the potential for human trafficking and/or enslavement. The legal framework in Middle Eastern countries may not afford these migrants the same rights as the native population, and women, in particular may be adversely affected due to the status of females in those countries, coupled with laws that favor males. However, the fact that this relationship is based on economics (i.e., money) allows both countries to benefit from this labor exchange in a symbiotic fashion. Poorer countries benefit from remittances they receive, and the richer countries benefit from an increased and cheaper labor supply, as well as economic growth. As a result of this win-win relationship, it may be easier for the origin country to turn a blind eye to any form of human rights abuses, especially human trafficking. One indication of whether origin countries ignore or dismiss potential human trafficking in such destination countries is the degree of human rights violations (or level of respect) in their own country, as well as the status of women. For example, we would expect origin countries that have a low status of women and greater gender discrimination to ignore any potential human

rights abuses of their citizens in destination countries that may exploit them. In short, countries with strong bilateral economic relationships may increase incentives for traffickers to tap into these flows that have already arrived to the destination country, thereby reducing costs.

5.5 Data Needed for Analysis

Data for the dependent variable, the severity of human trafficking flows, is the same one found in Chapter 4 (UNODC 2006). However, data for all of the independent variables - except the bilateral economic relationship between origin and destination countries - does not exist. Data for the bilateral economic relationship between origin and destination countries would come from the bilateral trade flows data (COMTRADE 2013), and alternatively, personal remittances received (World Bank 2013). Thus, this chapter is not empirically tested.

Despite this drawback, we can discuss what type of data are needed in order to examine why human trafficking may extend across large geographic borders in the near future. The unit of analysis for this future empirical chapter would be the human trafficking group-country. For the type of human trafficking group, this would require examining existing literature that categorizes human traffickers according to type of human trafficking group (UNODC 2002; Shelley 2010), legal cases and/or research that has begun to examine and create typologies of human traffickers (Busch-Armendariz et al. 2009), and new event stories from LexisNexis Academic that may contain demographic information concerning the trafficking perpetrators. Once they are located, a coding scheme that takes into account the level of organization (e.g., hierarchy versus horizontal leadership structure), level of endowments (e.g., financial, human, and logistical resources, which in effect equal the capabilities of a trafficking group), and degree of institutionalization (year the group was established or how long it has been operating) can be coded if relevant.

Busch-Armendariz et al. (2009) create a typology of human traffickers based on 67 prosecuted cases in the United States (thus, human traffickers vs. United States), as found in media or news reports. The methodological framework they created could be replicated and extended for a global study. Undertaking such an analysis would require time and foreign language abilities, unless the prosecuted legal cases are in English (which more than likely, they are not), but nevertheless, allow for the creation of this variable.

A report on the classification of organized criminal groups by the UNODC (2002) found that of the 40 groups examines across 16 countries, eight involved human trafficking as one of their commodities, and only two dealt exclusively with human trafficking. This is a viable and potentially useful data set for those specifically studying organized criminal groups. However, since human trafficking groups are of interest, employing this dataset would yield only 8 observations if we count those that did not engage in human trafficking fulltime. This reiterates the point made earlier that not all human trafficking groups are organized criminal groups. Still, this report did provide for classification of these groups as either a "standard hierarchy" (where one leader controlled a hierarchy of trafficking members) or "core group" (where there are several leading traffickers that form the inner school of the group, surrounded by trafficking 'associates') (UNODC 2002; UNODC 2006).

Data for the available expatriate or immigrant network would ideally provide the number of (apprehended) trafficked victims as a proportion of the size of the immigrant group. A more realistic proxy could include the percentage of the largest expatriate or immigrant community in the destination country to get a relative idea of how such a large group may increase the potential for greater incoming migratory flows due to an already large and established enclave.

Alternatively, a binary measure could be created that assesses whether the trafficking group's ethnic identity made up a large proportion of the country's population.

Data for the origin-transit-destination country connection would entail assessing the human trafficking reports (UNODC 2006, 2009), Trafficking in Persons Report (U.S. Department of State 2013), and country reports in order to establish each destination country's major transit points. Destination countries may have more than one transit country, which is a function of the origin country.

Overall, significant research and time, but more importantly unavailable systematic and crossnational data, precludes empirical testing of this theoretical framework on transnational human trafficking. Future work emphasizes the creation of a more expansive, crossnational and comparative typology of human traffickers.

The next chapter considers why some countries are better able to deal with human trafficking, namely in the form of apprehending, prosecuting, and ultimately, convicting human traffickers.

CHAPTER 6

THEORY OF THE LACK OF CONVICTION: WHY HUMAN TRAFFICKERS REMAIN FREE

There is a great deal of variation in the degree to which different countries prosecute those engaged in human trafficking, and in the rate at which those who are prosecuted for human trafficking are actually convicted. On average, about 65% of prosecuted cases among sampled countries resulted in a conviction.[33] What accounts for the variation in human trafficking rates? Despite the adoption of numerous international anti-human trafficking instruments, as well as an international and universal definition of human trafficking, why do convictions remain so low and varied in certain countries but not others?

There have been relatively few convictions worldwide in comparison to the number of traffickers apprehended (UNODC 2006, 2013a, 2013b). A few examples illustrate the point: Just seven years ago in September 2006, Nigeria sought its very first human trafficking conviction (FoxNews.com). In 2003, Lithuania prosecuted 24 people but only 8 were convicted whereas the Netherlands prosecuted 117 people, and convicted 106 of them that same year. Ukraine prosecuted 59 people but only had 11 convictions whereas the United States prosecuted 59 people that resulted in 43 convictions in 2004 (UNODC 2006). In India, 1,970 traffickers were arrested; only 30 were convicted (U.S. Department of State 2009). What accounts for this cross-national variation?

I argue that conviction rates are largely a function of the absence of a clear, legal definition of human trafficking at the domestic level (i.e., country level). An international

[33] To calculate this "average" of the number of prosecuted cases resulting in a conviction, I summed all of these sample countries' convictions rates (8 + 106 + 11 + 43 = 168), and then summed up these sample countries' prosecution rates (24 + 117 + 59 + 59 = 259). Finally, I divided the aggregate number of convictions by the aggregate number of prosecutions, to result in the proportion of prosecutions that resulted in convictions: 168/259 ≈ 65%.

definition of human trafficking exists, and I argue that domestic legal instruments are most effective when they conform to the international definition of human trafficking contained in the Palermo Protocol[34]. However, even if the domestic definition does not conform to the Palermo Protocol, the existence of a statute that defines human trafficking will influence whether or not human traffickers will be prosecuted and convicted. In other words, there are two issues to consider: 1) Does a country have an anti-human trafficking law? 2) Does that law conform to the definition contained in the Palermo Protocol?

Human trafficking depends not only on populations of potential victims, but also on those who make it their business. This chapter does not delve into why human traffickers are drawn into this illegal trade, but instead examines the demand-side of the business of why traffickers are so difficult to apprehend. To clarify, by "demand-side," I do not mean the actors that purchase these goods/services, or the pull factors. Ordinarily, “demand-side” is used to refer to those actors that engage or “demand” the exploitation of trafficked victims or the products that they make. I define “demand-side” to include actors that target the human trafficking enterprise as a whole, including those fighting against it (e.g., the legal and judicial systems).

In order to address these puzzles, I first take a step back to examine the legal frameworks that undergird enforcement, as well as additional factors that influence enforcement.
To investigate the conviction rates of traffickers (proxied as the criminalization of traffickers), it is important and necessary to examine whether domestic anti-human trafficking laws conform to the international one - the Palermo Protocol - and the degree to which the anti-human trafficking law is being enforced at the domestic level. These two separate but interconnected issues need to

[34] This is the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Due to its lengthy title, this instrument is referred to as the Palermo Protocol from hereon out as is commonplace in the literature.

be examined before focusing on the conviction rates of traffickers. Thus, both laws and enforcement affect the degree to which trafficking in humans is a risky business: if laws are nonexistent or if enforcement is lax, trafficking is much less risky than when laws provide guidance and enforcement makes apprehension more likely.

6.1 Human Trafficking Definition

There have been many international anti-human trafficking and slavery instruments that have sought to define trafficking; yet all have been replete with gaps (Ould 2004; van den Anker 2004). Many excluded males, children, non-Anglo races, and non-sexual exploitation. Table 6.1 lists the major predecessors of the Palermo Protocol, which have defined human trafficking within the confines of white slave traffic, slavery, servitude, forced labor, or even crimes against humanity. While broader in scope, they have failed to incorporate all segments of society, including males, children, non-Anglo races – and have, for the most part, focused on sexual exploitation in the form of prostitution or forced labor. Still, many of the earlier instruments served as a foundation for future instruments to build upon, and to gradually expand the scope of what human trafficking entailed.

It was not until 2000 that the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (i.e., the Palermo Protocol) broadened the scope of human trafficking to address all of these gaps. Most importantly, this instrument defines what human trafficking is, including the various forms of exploitation. This marked a turning point for the field, because this was the first definition at the international level that was widely supported by the United Nations member states. As a result, the Palermo Protocol helped to standardize and

make more uniform the definition of human trafficking, when it had previously excluded specific populations.

The Palermo Protocol was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/55/25 of 15 November 2000, entered into force on 25 December 2003, and currently has 117 signatories and 151 parties (UNODC 2012). According to the protocol, human trafficking is defined as the:

> recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs. (UNOHCHR 2000)

Figure 6.1 visually depicts this definition. Although this international anti-human trafficking instrument set forth an international definition of human trafficking, countries have not been so systematic with incorporating this definition into their anti-human trafficking laws. Table 6.2 lists all of the signatories to date to the Palermo Protocol. Initially, only 115 countries signed the Palermo Protocol, whereas 45 did not. However, some countries that did not initially sign the Palermo Protocol ratified it afterwards, and ten countries that did initially sign it, did not end up ratifying this instrument. To date, these countries have still not ratified the Palermo Protocol: Barbados, the Congo, Czech Republic, Japan, Republic of Korea, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Thailand, and Uganda.

TABLE 6.1 International Human Trafficking and Slavery Instruments

Instrument	Year	Focus
United Nations International Agreement for the Suppression of the "White Slave Traffic"	1904	Prostitution Females International trafficking
United Nations Slavery, Servitude, Forced Labor and Similar Institutions and Practices Convention of 1926 (Slavery Convention of 1926)	1926	Slavery Forced labor
International Labour Organization Forced Labour Convention No. 29	1930	Forced and compulsory labor
United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women of Full Age	1933	Females Children Prostitution International trafficking
United Nations Declaration of Human Rights	1948	Slavery Servitude
United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of the "White Slave Traffic"	1949	Females
United Nations Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others	1949	Prostitution
United Nations Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery	1956	Debt bondage Serfdom Marriage with dowry Exploitation of children International slavery
International Labour Organization Abolition of Forced Labour Convention No. 105	1959	Forced or compulsory labor
United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)	1979	Females Prostitution
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court	1998	Enslavement

Note: this list does not include instruments that focus on the trafficking and/or exploitation of children.

Figure 6.1 visually depicts this definition. Although this international anti-human trafficking instrument set forth an international definition of human trafficking, countries have not been so systematic with incorporating this definition into their anti-human trafficking laws. Table 6.2 lists all of the signatories to date to the Palermo Protocol. Initially, only 115 countries signed the Palermo Protocol, whereas 45 did not. However, some countries that did not initially sign the Palermo Protocol ratified it afterwards, and ten countries that did initially sign it, did not end up ratifying this instrument. To date, these countries have still not ratified the Palermo Protocol: Barbados, the Congo, Czech Republic, Japan, Republic of Korea, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Thailand, and Uganda.

FIGURE 6.1 Definition of Human Trafficking



Note: Definition comes from UNOHCHR (2000).

TABLE 6.2 Signatories to the Palermo Protocol

Signature	
Yes	No
Albania	Antigua and Barbuda
Algeria	Bahrain
Argentina	Belize
Armenia	Central African Republic
Australia	Chad
Austria	China
Azerbaijan	Democratic Republic of the Congo
Bahamas	Djibouti
Barbados*	Ethiopia
Belarus	Gabon
Belgium	Grenada
Benin	Guatemala
Bolivia	Guinea
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Guyana
Botswana	Honduras
Brazil	Iraq
Bulgaria	Jordan
Burkina Faso	Kazakhstan
Burundi	Kenya
Cambodia	Kiribati
Cameroon	Kuwait
Canada	Laos
Cape Verde	Liberia
Chile	Malawi
Colombia	Malaysia
Congo*	Mauritania
Costa Rica	Mauritius
Croatia	Micronesia
Cyprus	Mongolia
Czech Republic*	Montenegro
Denmark	Morocco
Dominican Republic	Myanmar
Ecuador	Nicaragua
Egypt	Oman
El Salvador	Qatar
Equatorial guinea	São Tomé and Príncipe
Estonia	St. Kitts and Nevis
Finland	Suriname
France	Tajikistan

Signature	
Yes	No
Albania	Antigua and Barbuda
Gambia	Tanzania
Georgia	Timor-Leste
Germany	Turkmenistan
Greece	United Arab Emirates
Guinea-Bissau	Vietnam
Haiti	Zambia
Hungary	
Iceland	
India	
Indonesia	
Ireland	
Israel	
Italy	
Jamaica	
Japan*	
Kyrgyzstan	
Latvia	
Lebanon	
Lesotho	
Libya	
Liechtenstein	
Lithuania	
Luxembourg	
Macedonia	
Madagascar	
Mali	
Malta	
Mexico	
Moldova	
Monaco	
Mozambique	
Namibia	
Nauru	
Netherlands	
New Zealand	
Niger	
Nigeria	
Norway	
Panama	

Signature	
Yes	No
Albania	Antigua and Barbuda
Paraguay	
Peru	
Philippines	
Poland	
Portugal	
Republic of Korea*	
Romania	
Russia	
Rwanda	
San Marino	
Saudi Arabia	
Senegal	
Serbia	
Seychelles	
Sierra Leone*	
Slovakia	
Slovenia	
South Africa	
Spain	
Sri Lanka*	
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	
Swaziland*	
Sweden	
Switzerland	
Syria	
Thailand*	
Togo	
Trinidad and Tobago	
Tunisia	
Turkey	
Uganda*	
Ukraine	
United Kingdom	
United States of America	
Uruguay	
Uzbekistan	
Venezuela	

Note: 150 out of 160 countries ratified the Palermo Protocol, including those that did not initially sign it. However, ten countries that initially signed the Palermo Protocol did not ratify it, as denoted by an asterisk (*).

This is problematic for law enforcement officials, as well as policymakers dealing with international human trafficking, because if definitions vary by country, then laws cannot be effectively enforced, traffickers apprehended, and victims protected. This is especially problematic for law enforcement dealing with cross-border or transnational human trafficking. If a Chinese trafficker is apprehended in Germany, for example, he/she can be prosecuted and convicted by the laws of Germany. What if China has a different human trafficking law? Will the Chinese trafficker be prosecuted and convicted under German or Chinese law (which may matter for imposed penalties depending on how human trafficking is defined), and/or will extradition treaties be taken into account? Some traffickers are deported immediately back to their country of origin and then dealt with under their respective criminal jurisdiction.

If a country is a member of the Palermo Protocol, then its domestic anti-human trafficking law should also adopt the same definition, otherwise there is a clear disconnect at both the domestic and international level as to what human trafficking means to the country. If there are two different definitions of human trafficking, this means the country is tackling two different problems, which creates inconsistent and contradictory results. Thus, a clear and standardized legal definition of human trafficking is needed. Even though the Palermo Protocol establishes an international definition of human trafficking, it does not mean countries do so as well. This disparity – what is defined at the international level and what is defined at the domestic level – is what leads to the ambiguity and confusion over what human trafficking is, especially with domestic laws. At the international level, there is some level of agreement via the Palermo Protocol; however, between countries (and even sometimes within), there is not.

Having a single, universal definition of human trafficking is important for three primary reasons. First, having a clear definition of what we mean when we say, "human trafficking," is important because it allows us to identify the attributes and characteristics associated with it. People know what an apple is because they can easily recognize it visually, even though there are different varieties. The same holds true for certain drugs (depending on the state), but even subsequent tests can prove what the drug is. However, with human trafficking – unlike drugs – victims cannot always be differentiated and identified. We cannot always "visually" see who is being trafficked, nor can we do a "trafficking test" them to see if the results indicate "trafficked" or "not trafficked." Part of what makes this process all the more complicated is the fact that trafficking is multidimensional, and encompasses a variety of criminal activities. Human trafficking is a crime in itself, but it often involves various other types of crimes as well, including kidnapping, abduction, use of fraudulent documents, money laundering, sexual and non-sexual assault, etc. Thus, having a clear, unambiguous definition of human trafficking can reduce confusion over whether it really is trafficking, or some other criminal activity like smuggling.

Second, apart form having a clear definition, there should be one standardized definition of human trafficking. Having one definition ensures that everyone tackling or working on human trafficking – scholars and researchers, activists, immigration and law enforcement officials, and government and policy-makers – knows what it is and can work within those parameters. This would aid not only in arresting traffickers (since police officials would know what human trafficking is, and would also know what to look for in a trafficked victim, which is a separate but related issue), but also prosecuting and convicting them, and enhancing collective efforts at the transnational level in terms of research and data collection. While this has been met

successfully at the international level, there still remain serious limitations of what human trafficking means at the domestic levels (i.e., with a country's own borders).

There is a general failure to distinguish between internal versus external trafficking – or trafficking that occurs within a country versus between two or more countries (Ould 2004). This is important to distinguish because while both are similar in being exploitative, they exhibit different dynamics, networks, and types of actors. Domestic anti-trafficking legislation may not consider trafficking if it occurs outside of its jurisdiction; and, media portrayal of trafficking as mainly a transnational phenomenon only serves to weaken this divide. Although human trafficking patterns are similar at both levels, there are other dynamics and different reasons for the two different levels of human trafficking. For the most part, internal human trafficking helps to feed a domestic market consuming services from sexual tourism to local prostitution, as well as forced labor for various commodities. It is likely to require less complex organization, and fewer skills and resources than international trafficking. External human trafficking deals with more organized criminal networks that traffic women for larger amounts of money and rake in greater profits (Bales 1999; 2005). Thus, the types of actors involved – individual to sophisticated group – may differ. Sometimes a country's government will not recognize a trafficked victim if they are outside of their "home" borders (Altink 1995), which means they may not receive the necessary benefits and assistance needed. Thus, if countries have signed onto the Palermo Protocol, it makes sense to amend their existing domestic laws so they are in agreement with one another, and, most importantly, do not contradict each other.

Some laws, especially those in Africa, give primacy to sexual exploitation (or younger age) and oftentimes ignore other forms of trafficking due to misconceptions (Bales 1999). Even though forced labor as a whole comprises the larger portion of the

industry, sexual exploitation has garnered greater media attention. Media portrayal of trafficking being largely sexually exploitative, coupled with how governments define trafficking, has helped place an emphasis on sexual exploitation and not other forms of forced labor, including debt bondage and forced labor into various industries. For example, Denton (2010) found that while most anti-trafficking laws target only sexual exploitation, her study discovered that a good number of trafficking arrests and prosecutions were not related to this type. As a consequence, the general public, government officials, and law enforcement fail to realize the broader and much larger picture that trafficking (and slavery as a whole) entails.

There is also a lot of confusion and overlap between forced and "free" prostitution[35] – that is, individuals who voluntarily prostitute themselves (Flowers 1998). This becomes even more confusing when there is legislation that criminalizes sexual services, acts, prostitution or clients versus those that permit prostitution (Flowers 1998). In countries where prostitution is illegal, or where the purchase of the sexual act is criminalized (like in Sweden), women who are trafficked for prostitution are seen as criminals given their engagement in the trade, while at the same time, being in the country illegally if they are foreign. Thus they are illegal residents in the country and have committed a crime by engaging in prostitution, even if trafficked. As a result, these individuals may be punished instead of protected depending on the emphasis of the human trafficking laws of the country (criminal justice- or victim-centered, and if they

[35] There is controversy as to what "free" prostitution means, and whether women (and men as well) really do voluntarily enter into the profession. While a small minority may choose this as their primary source of income, there may be others that "voluntarily" prostitute themselves under economic and security duress. That is, this may be their last resort or last economic option for attaining some type of income. This paper does not go into the pros and cons of prostitution, nor does it delve into the definitional issues surrounding "free" prostitution.

even have such laws in place) (Lee 2007). Although research has found a strong and positive link between the legalization of prostitution and human trafficking (Cho et al. 2011a; Jakobsson and Kotsadam 2011; Marinova and James 2012), they are different businesses that may not always overlap. How can countries differentiate between "free" prostitution and individuals trafficked for prostitution (i.e., forced prostitution)? This presents a major problem that many governments have failed to address. In fact, some governments do not even consider prostitution a form of labor or human trafficking (Altink 1995).

Third, there is a heavy emphasis on human trafficking for sexual exploitation over other forms, like forced labor (Bales 1999; Kristof and WuDunn 2009). Even though forced labor (especially in the agricultural sector) comprises a prevalent type of slavery where the vast majority of slaves are in, many governments fail to recognize or acknowledge this. It is not uncommon for anti-human trafficking legislation to only recognize human trafficking as a form of sexual exploitation as previous international instruments have emphasized. This means that those working in forced labor are not considered trafficked or enslaved, and males may not be protected or extended the same rights as their female counterparts.

Finally, human trafficking as well as slavery as a whole is constantly evolving with globalization (Bales 2005). New forms keep propping up, and new tools and technology are being used for expanding and facilitating this illicit industry (i.e. the Internet, cell phones, etc.). Given the constant changes and rapid growth, it is not surprising that governments have not been able to keep up with this and modify their anti-human trafficking legislation.

Overall, there remain significant difficulties standardizing what human trafficking means at the domestic level, despite the establishment of the Palermo Protocol. Different countries

have different definitions due to historical, cultural, religious, political, or economic reasons. Definitions vary by the actors involved (i.e., law enforcement officials and immigration officials, nongovernmental organizations and rehabilitation specialists like social workers, activists, academic scholars, etc.), and there is not a general consensus between or within countries (Laczko and Gramegna 2003).

Finally, a universal definition of human trafficking is important not only for identifying victims and traffickers, but also for arresting and convicting traffickers for their crimes. Human trafficking contains a multiplicity of crimes, which makes adhering to the Palermo Protocol all the more important. Instead of human trafficking comprising one crime called "human trafficking", it oftentimes entails other crimes as mentioned earlier. In fact, it is not uncommon for police to arrest traffickers (and victims) for other crimes involved in the process of human trafficking, but not charge them directly for trafficking in human beings. If traffickers are charged for prostitution instead of human trafficking, this means they receive a lesser sentence and fewer years in prison'. This also dramatically reduces the costs for those involved in the business, as penalties are not as harsh compared to those involved in drug trafficking, while simultaneously raising incentives to participate.

6.2 Enforcement of Anti-Human Trafficking Laws

Even if a country's anti-human trafficking law does conform to the international Palermo Protocol, the definition within their legislation is still a function of whether or not it is being enforced. There are numerous countries that have excellent anti-human trafficking laws, but in practice, they are simply not being enforced, and thus result in few convictions. Why is this the case?

This section argues that enforcement of anti-human trafficking laws is a function of two factors: 1) whether or not domestic laws conform to the Palermo Protocol, and 2) implementation of these laws.

6.2.1 Legislative Conformity to Palermo Protocol

For the Palermo Protocol to make any difference within a country's fight against human trafficking, the country needs to have an existing anti-human trafficking law (or one that could be amended to incorporate, if any, the tenets of the Palermo Protocol's definition. Without such a law in place, human trafficking convictions do not exist

For countries that already have such a law in place (or that established one already), it is important that their domestic anti-human trafficking laws conform to the Palermo Protocol. That is, how human trafficking is defined within their domestic law should also be similar to how it is defined within the Palermo Protocol. Efforts to modify existing laws – or to establish laws - indicate some level of commitment on the country's part because they are willing to take the necessary steps to align their country's domestic human trafficking policy with that of the international level.

Conformity of the domestic law to the Palermo Protocol is important for two main reasons: uniformity and consistency. First, uniformity means how human trafficking is defined within a domestic law is equivalent to how it is defined within the Palermo Protocol; there is no question about what human trafficking means at either the domestic or international level. Second, consistency means that human trafficking is defined in the same way repeatedly within the country, but also across countries. This not only reinforces the definition of what human trafficking means, but also increases multi- and transnational cooperation, which is essential for a crime that has the potential to spill into other countries' jurisdictions.

6.2.2. Implementation of the Law

There are numerous ways countries can show their commitment (or lack thereof) toward implementing an anti-human trafficking law:

- Have an existing law or be a signatory to the Palermo Protocol
- Ratify the Palermo Protocol with varying degrees of reservations
- Fully ratify the Palermo Protocol (accepting all provisions), or
- Not ratify or have an existing law in place.

First, if countries already have an anti-human trafficking law that predates the Palermo Protocol (2000), this denotes a stronger level of commitment versus countries that have established anti-human trafficking laws post facto. Examining whether a country's anti-human trafficking law pre- or post-dates the Palermo Protocol is an interesting way to not only ascertain the level of commitment, but also, the level of awareness about human trafficking. Human trafficking is, after all, a form of slavery and crime that spans thousands of years. As such, countries that have laws that predate the Palermo Protocol may already demonstrate a higher degree of respect, support, and commitment to international human rights norms. Thus, countries that have these pre-existing laws should have a greater propensity to prosecute and convict traffickers. Still, if countries do have laws that predate the Palermo Protocol, those laws should also conform to it. This means that countries will have to take action to make sure their older law conforms to the newer Palermo Protocol. Countries should take quicker action given their pre-Palermo Protocol commitment (which demonstrates a higher commitment) to an anti-human trafficking law.

Second, countries that have signed onto the Palermo Protocol exhibit a greater commitment (if the country has no preexisting law in place) to human trafficking, or increase their level of commitment if they already have a law in place. Countries that have signed on to the protocol despite already having an established law may do so because this may further

reinforce or legitimize their [established] commitment at the international level, or simply because they have met the minimum standards as outlined in the protocol, and there will be little to no change. This is a preliminary step countries can take toward fighting and implementing an anti-human trafficking strategy. However, signature does not lead to the establishment, implementation, or enforcement of a law, and as such, this is the baseline requirement for any general commitment. If countries only sign the protocol, this is considered, in effect, a symbolic gesture.

Third, countries can take the next step to ratify the Palermo Protocol, which increases the level of commitment again. It should be noted that existing literature has produced mixed results regarding the relationship between the ratification of various human rights instruments and the effect on human rights performance. Some scholars have found that ratification of such instruments is associated with a negative effect on human rights practices, particularly violations of individual human rights (Hathaway 2002; Neumayer 2005; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2007; Vreeland 2008), while others have found a weak but positive effect (Landman 2005), and still, others found inconclusive results (Landman 2006). However, ratification is not binary: ratify and countries fully commit, or do not ratify and countries do not commit. Rather, there is a spectrum or level of varying degrees of commitment that a country can make, which is contingent upon the number and type of reservations it makes. To clarify, reservations are stipulations that a country puts forth in choosing to accept or refute a particular provision within the instrument. In other words, it allows the country to tailor the instrument according to their preferences. If a country ratifies the Palermo Protocol and completely accepts all its provisions, this would indicate a very high level of commitment in terms of this particular instrument. On the other hand, if a country makes a significant number of reservations (which also depends on

which article or provision to which the reservation refers), this might signal a lack of seriousness in terms of committing to the Palermo Protocol, and thus, to fighting human trafficking within their own borders. The greater the number of reservations coupled with the type of reservations should decrease the probability of implementation and thus enforcement of the anti-human trafficking law.

Table 6.3 lists the 26 countries (out of 150 countries that ratified the Palermo Protocol) that had a total of 34 reservations, with an average of 1.3 reservations per country. While a few of these countries had either one or additional reservations about assistance to and protection of victims of trafficking in persons (Article 6), the status of victims of trafficking in persons in receiving States (Article 7), and the legitimacy and validity of documents (Article 13), all of the countries had a reservation about Article 15, paragraph 2, which discusses the settlement of disputes. Specifically, this paragraph states:

> Any dispute between two or more states Parties concerning the interpretation or application of this Protocol that cannot be settled through negotiation within a reasonable time shall, at the request of one of those States Parties, be submitted to arbitration. If, six months after the date of the request for arbitration, those States Parties are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one of those States Parties may refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice by request in accordance with the Statute of the Court. (UNOHCHR 2000)

Further inspection about why these reservations were made reveals that these countries did not want to delegate any disputes to the International Court of Justice. Why this reservation was made in regards to this paragraph is not be dealt with in greater detail since the reservation did not focus on the definition of human trafficking (or trafficking in persons as stated in the Palermo Protocol), and is therefore beyond the scope of this chapter.

Fourth, complete ratification of the Palermo Protocol (that is, the country accepts all of the articles or provisions within the protocol), as mentioned, indicates a very high level of

commitment to implementing the anti-human trafficking law. These articles or provisions within the Palermo Protocol are legally binding according to international law, and are not taken lightly. Thus, complete ratification signifies to the world that this particular instrument is important.

Finally, if a country does not make any efforts to sign or ratify the Palermo Protocol, or does not have an existing anti-human trafficking law in place, this indicates a general lack of commitment and concern for implementing any sort of anti-human trafficking strategy. Without adherence to this international instrument (especially if the country does not already have an existing anti-human trafficking law), the country is not likely to establish and implement a national anti-human trafficking law.

Apart from the different levels of implementation, when the country ratified the Palermo Protocol could be an indication of how committed they are to adhering and implementing the Palermo Protocol within their own borders. Most of the countries that signed onto the Palermo Protocol did so within two years of its establishment (between 2000 and 2002); however, there were a few countries for which the year of signature is not available. Countries that ratified the Palermo Protocol within three years of its establishment (between 2000 and 2003) versus those that did so after three or more years should demonstrate a greater commitment and seriousness to human trafficking. For example, in Table 6.4, of the 150 countries that ratified the Palermo Protocol to date, only 48 did so within the first three years of its establishment (roughly one third of these countries).

Yet, this does not tell us the whole story about countries that did ratify the Palermo Protocol within a few years of its establishment, and whether or not they amended their existing anti-human trafficking laws (or even established one if they didn't have one before). Table 6.4 highlights countries that did take quick action to accept this international anti-human trafficking

instrument, which does signify a higher and serious level of commitment than those that waited ten years or more to ratify the Palermo Protocol. At present, ten countries have still not ratified the Palermo Protocol as previously mentioned. Further research is needed to assess whether the countries in Table 6.4 had an already established anti-human trafficking law in place before ratifying the Palermo Protocol, or if they immediately established one post facto.

TABLE 6.3 Countries with Reservations on the Palermo Protocol

Country	Total Number of Reservations	Average Number of Reservations (per country)	Type of Reservation
Bahrain	34	1.3	Article 6, paragraph 3 [2]
Bolivia			
China			Article 7, paragraph 1 [3]
Colombia			
Ecuador			Article 13 [1]
El Salvador			
Ethiopia			Article 15, paragraph 1b [1]
Greece			paragraph 2 [26]
Indonesia			
Laos			Article 15 (general) [1]
Lithuania			
Malaysia			
Micronesia			
Moldova			
Myanmar			
Qatar			
Saudi Arabia			
UAE			
USA			
Uzbekistan			
Vietnam			

Note: 26 out of 150 countries that have ratified the Palermo Protocol had reservations. Numbers in brackets under "Type of Reservation" represent the count or number of reservations that the country made.

TABLE 6.4 Ratification of the Palermo Protocol, 2000-2003

Country	Date of Ratification	Country	Date of Ratification
Cameroon	13 December 2000	Croatia	24 January 2003
Cape Verde	13 December 2000	Equatorial Guinea	7 February 2003
Canada	14 December 2000	Mexico	4 March 2003
Monaco	5 June 2001	Turkey	25 March 2003
Nigeria	28 June 2001	Gambia	5 May 2003
Serbia	6 September 2001	Lithuania	23 June 2003
Cambodia	11 November 2001	Belarus	25 June 2003
Bulgaria	5 December 2001	Armenia	1 July 2003
Peru	23 January 2002	Tunisia	14 July 2003
Spain	1 March 2002	Cyprus	6 August 2003
Mali	12 April 2002	Costa Rica	9 September 2003
Bosnia and Herzegovina	24 April 2002	Norway	23 September 2003
Venezuela	13 May 2002	Lesotho	24 September 2003
Burkina Faso	15 May 2002	Malta	24 September 2003
Philippines	28 May 2002	Mauritius	24 September 2003
Tajikistan	8 July 2002	Rwanda	26 September 2003
New Zealand	19 July 2002	Poland	26 September 2003
Namibia	16 August 2002	Belize	26 September 2003
Albania	21 August 2002	Laos	26 September 2003
Botswana	29 August 2002	Jamaica	29 September 2003
Ecuador	17 September 2002	Denmark	30 September 2003
France	29 October 2002	Kyrgyzstan	2 October 2003
Argentina	19 November 2002	Senegal	27 October 2003
Romania	4 December 2002	Azerbaijan	30 October 2003

Note: 48 out of 150 countries ratified the Palermo Protocol.

6.3 Hypotheses

Countries that not only sign but also ratify the Palermo Protocol demonstrate a greater level of commitment to fighting human trafficking versus those that do not. This is the first step toward making any anti-human trafficking law conform to the Palermo Protocol: signing and then ratifying it. In addition, the probability of obtaining a human trafficking conviction (proxied as the criminalization of traffickers), is a function of having a clear human trafficking definition, which in itself, is a function of the conformity of the domestic anti-human trafficking

law to the Palermo Protocol, and the degree to which this domestic law is being enforced. If a country's anti-human trafficking law does not conform to the Palermo Protocol and/or is not enforced, the law is said to not be in conformity. On the other hand, if a country's anti-human trafficking law does conform to the Palermo Protocol and/or is enforced, the law is in conformity. Therefore:

Hypothesis 1. Ratification of the Palermo Protocol should be positively associated with the probability of criminalizing a human trafficker.

Hypothesis 2. The more clearly the domestic anti-human trafficking law conforms to the Palermo Protocol, the higher the probability criminalizing a human trafficker.

6.4 Conclusion

Despite the adoption of numerous, international anti-human trafficking instruments, as well as an international and universal definition of human trafficking, the Palermo Protocol, conviction rates remain low and varied. The theoretical framework offered here helps us to consider the factors that contribute to this. Specifically I argue that conviction rates – as proxied by the criminalization of the trafficker - are largely a function of the absence of a clear, legal definition of human trafficking at the domestic level. Domestic anti-human trafficking laws are most effective when they conform to the international definition of human trafficking contained in the Palermo Protocol. The degree of enforcement and probability of criminalizing a trafficker are therefore a function of whether a country has an anti-human trafficking law in place, and more importantly, if it conforms to the Palermo Protocol. The next chapter provides a research design and tests these theoretical assumptions, and provides the results.

CHAPTER 7

ANALYSIS OF THE LACK OF CONVICTION: WHY HUMAN TRAFFICKERS REMAIN FREE

In the previous chapter, I considered why some countries deal with human trafficking more effectively, particularly in convicting human traffickers. Even though an international anti-human trafficking instrument – the Palermo Protocol – helped standardize the definition, convictions rates remain low and varied across countries. I argued that the criminalization of human traffickers is a function of countries' domestic anti-human trafficking laws conforming to the Palermo Protocol, and also, the degree to which the domestic anti-human trafficking law is being enforced at the domestic level. This chapter empirically tests this theory, and discusses the research design parameters utilized in the analysis.

This cross-sectional, crossnational study employs 122 countries, where the unit of analysis is the country. While the main objective of this study was to make a global comparison of the criminalization of human traffickers, the number of observations decreased from 179 to 122 due to missing data, lack of data reporting, and/or unavailable data. Thus, only one point in time is examined: 2007. Note that human trafficking offender demographics are not empirically tested in this model because such individual-level data do not currently exist. In addition, the volume of human trafficking, and the number of arrests of human traffickers is not controlled for (i.e., not empirically tested) simply because the data do not currently exist for each country, or is unreliable (i.e., the methodology for collecting such data is unclear and unsound). This section discusses the dependent, independent, and control variables, model specification, and results. Appendix B provides a list of included countries in the regression model.

7.1 Dependent Variable

7.1.1 Criminalization of Human Traffickers

The dependent variable is the probability of criminalizing a human trafficker. Note that this variable is different from the independent variable (anti-human trafficking legislation) in that the former captures the probability of criminalizing a human trafficker – or taps into whether a country has obtained a conviction(s) or has the possibility of doing so - whereas the latter focuses on the conformity and enforcement of an existing domestic anti-human trafficking law to the Palermo Protocol. There is not available data that aggregate each country's human trafficking conviction rates by count, and those reported in the United Nations Global Report on Trafficking in Persons (UNODC 2009) are directly from the foreign ministries and/or institutions themselves (and reported to the United Nations only, and therefore not released to academic scholars like myself). This is problematic for two reasons. First, the fact that only an international organization like the United Nations can gain access to such data is very limiting and biased because the United Nations' agencies may have agendas, and as such, the data may be used in ways that conform to those agendas. Second, not allowing academic scholars access to such data stymies human trafficking research (and the potential positive externalities that may come from such research in the form of policy prescriptions) in that it allows data to be manipulated, assessed, and reviewed within a few hands only. Thus, this measure acts as a proxy for human trafficking conviction rates, and focuses on the possibility of a country criminalizing human traffickers by assessing whether their laws criminalize human trafficking and/or have obtained a conviction(s) already.

The institutional frameworks and criminal justice responses within each country's profiles were read and assessed in order to determine the probably of that country obtaining a

human trafficking conviction. No calculations were therefore performed. If the text stated that the country has an anti-human trafficking law, has some or all provisions to criminalize human trafficking, and/or has obtained a human trafficking conviction (i.e., conviction against a human trafficking offense and no other crime), it was coded as "1"; if the country does not have an anti-human trafficking law that has some or all provisions to criminalize human trafficking, and/or has obtained a human trafficking conviction, it was coded as "0." The reason human trafficking is put in quotations is to emphasize this as a type of conviction, and not merely a broader crime. Offenders that are convicted are only considered if it is for the offense called "human trafficking" and not for some other offense (such as facilitating prostitution) when they are in fact traffickers. Some countries use other laws (like those that focus on sexual crimes or prostitution) to convict human traffickers. Here I focus on whether countries actually have provisions that deal with human trafficking as a crime, and if they have a measure in their domestic laws that specifically tackle "human trafficking" in its entirety as a crime and not something else. In addition, a conviction for sexual exploitation or prostitution is not the same thing as a conviction for human trafficking, though it may constitute a portion of this broader crime. Data come from the UNODC (2009).

7.2 Independent Variable

7.2.1 Anti-human Trafficking Legislation

The independent variable is whether or not a country has an anti-human trafficking law that conforms to the Palermo Protocol and is enforced. This is different from the dependent variable, in that the dependent variable attempts to capture the probability of criminalizing a human trafficker (i.e., whether the country's domestic law has obtained a conviction or has the possibility of doing so), and the independent variable attempts to capture conformity and

enforcement of an existing domestic anti-human trafficking law to the Palermo Protocol, if any should exist. A country's anti-human trafficking legislation is measured in accordance to the "Palermo Protocol's" three definitional elements of what constitutes human trafficking. This international framework creates a typology on the basis of which a country's domestic anti-human trafficking legislation can be compared to the universally agreed-upon international definition of human trafficking. To measure this conformity of domestic law with the Palermo Protocol's definition, I employ the Prosecution measure of the composite 3P Anti-trafficking Policy Index by Cho et al. (2011b), which aims to measure "whether the country has legislative and other measures to establish criminal offenses for trafficking in persons, in line with the definition provided by the Anti-trafficking protocol; and whether such legislative and other measures are appropriately and effectively enforced" (Cho et al. 2011b). This ordinal variable ranges from 1 (no compliance) to 5 (full compliance), where each indicates:

> Score 1: The country does NOT have a legislative measure prohibiting trafficking in persons and no other law is applied; and there is no evidence of punishment for such a crime at all.
>
> Score 2: The country does NOT have a legislative measure specifically prohibiting trafficking in persons; BUT applies some other related law to punish offenders of such crimes; the law is not adequately enforced in the form of investigations, prosecutions, convictions and punishment of such offenders. If the country has a legislative measure specifically prohibiting trafficking in persons but does not enforce the law at all (or there is no evidence that the country has conducted prosecution or conviction of such offenders it also receives score 2.
>
> Score 3: The country does NOT have a legislative measure specifically prohibiting trafficking in persons; but applies some other relevant laws (such as laws against rape, slavery, exploitation, abuse or human rights violation) to punish offenders of such crimes; and the law is fully or adequately enforced in the form of investigations, prosecutions, convictions and punishments of such offenders.
>
> Score 4: The country has a legislative measure specifically probating trafficking in persons; BUT the law is not fully enforced in the form of investigations, prosecutions, convictions and punishment of such offenders.

> Score 5: The country has a legislative measure specifically prohibiting trafficking in persons and; the law is fully enforced in the form of investigations, prosecutions, convictions and punishment of such offenders. Generally, the country should maintain a stringent level of penalty (either more than five years imprisonment or punishment equivalent to other related crimes such as rape or labor exploitation).
>
> (-999) Not mentioned. (Cho et al. 2011b)

See Cho et al. (2011b) for further details about this variable, guidelines, and methods for how each country is scored in terms of prosecution.

7.3 Control Variables

7.3.1 Inequity in Family Law

Disparity between a country's inequity in family law and anti-human trafficking legislation only hinders conviction rates (UNODC 2009). Inequity in family law/practice between men and women is used as a proxy[36] for criminal code to examine any underlying inequalities in a society's legal system. This measure "seeks to capture how inequitably family law is conceptualized according to gender" (WomanStats Project 2007). Inequity in family law is indicative of the underlying social and legal acceptance of inequality, and taps into how much value a society places on gender (i.e., woman versus men). Legal inequity between genders is also characteristic of how engrained or accepted legal inequality is within a society. Thus, legal inequality between women and men serves as a useful marker of a society's tolerance for legal inequality on the basis of descriptive characteristics of human beings, as well as gender. This taps more into a form of inequity that concerns individuals, rather than making direct

[36] Initially, I anticipated measuring this by directly examining different systems (e.g., civil, common, customary, Muslim or mixed law), and creating a dummy variable for each law. However, due to collinearity, these dummy variables were automatically dropped from the regression results, and were thus not able to be included in the model. The proxy, inequity in family law, taps into how the legal system sees the individual in society, particular women. If women are not seen as equal, then we have legal inequality, so gender inequality in the legal framework may indicates less respect for women.

assumptions about a society's legal system. Insomuch as this may signify high or low inequality regarding gender (as well as normative issues concerning "good" or "bad" treatment of women), this may also indicate institutional and well-established cultural norms inherent and persistent within a country, as well as how widely accepted such gender inequality practices may be. Therefore in some societies that accept more gender inequality, we might see a greater willingness to accept and/or condone human trafficking and enslavement (much the same way corruption may be accepted) (Hudson et al. 2012). Data comes from the Multivariate Scale #3 (Inequity in Family Law/Practice between Men and Women), Woman Stats Project (2007). The variable ranges from 0 (equity in family law) to 4 (no equity in family law), where each category indicates:

> 0: Legal age of marriage is at least 18, and most (>50%) marry over that age. Marriages younger than 16 are virtually unheard of. Polygyny is illegal and extremely rare. Women are free to choose their spouse. Women know their rights to consent and divorce and are free to exercise those rights without fear of reprisal. Marital rape is illegal and actively prosecuted. Women and men have equal rights to divorce. Woman can inherit property upon the death of a parent or upon divorce. Abortion is safe and legal and not imposed by the state on women (i.e. forced abortions are not an issue).
>
> 1: Legal age of marriage is 16 or higher and most (over 50%) marry over age 16. Polygyny is illegal and uncommon. Women are free to choose their spouse. Women know their rights to consent and divorce and are free to exercise those rights without fear of reprisal. Marital rape is illegal. Women and men have equal rights to divorce. Woman can inherit property, but laws tend to favor men in property rights, including asset division after divorce. Abortion is legal (although may not be available on demand (for the asking).
>
> 2: Legal age of marriage is 16 or higher, but girls marrying younger are common (up to 25%). There is often an age difference between the legal age of marriage for men and women, such that girls are allowed to marry at younger ages than males. Polygyny is legal but unusual (<5% of women). Girls may not have full rights to choose their spouse. Women may or may not know their rights to consent and divorce. Marital rape may be illegal, but is not prosecuted and practice often allows it. Generally speaking, the grounds for divorce for men and women are the same, although there may be exceptions (i.e., exempting infidelity on the part of the male, or infertility on the part of the female). Divorce laws systematically favor men, and women do not have equal rights in child custody

matters. Abortions may be restricted, but there are many reasons for permission to be given, including financial reasons.

3: Legal age of marriage is 15 or lower, but girls marrying younger are common (between 25-50%). Age discrepancies in the average age of men and women getting married is often greater than 7 years or more, with women often averaging less than 15 years old at time of marriage. Polygyny is legal and not uncommon (>5% but less than 25% of women). Girls often cannot chose their spouse. Although obstacles exist that force women to meet a higher standard of justification than men, women can seek divorce but are generally unaware of that right. Women in certain areas of in certain ethnic or religious groups may either be unaware of their rights to consent in marriage and to divorce, or may fear reprisals if they exercise those rights; such rights may be very limited. Marital rape is not acknowledged in law. Divorce laws systematically favor men, and women do not have equal rights in child custody matters, or in inheritance law. Abortions are severely restricted to cases where the life of the mother is at risk, possibly also rape and incest.

4: Legal age of marriage does not exist or allows girls younger than 12 to marry. Girls commonly (more than 25%) marry around the age of 12 or even before puberty. Women are rarely asked for consent before marriage, and women are often forced to marry much older men in this way. Polygyny is legal and common (>25%). Women must overcome tremendous legal obstacles to sue for divorce, while men can seek divorce for many reasons. Women may be unaware of their right to give consent in marriage or to divorce their husbands, may not legally possess such rights, or may feel that the exercise of those rights would bring dire physical or social consequences. Women are not awarded custody or inheritance. Marital rape is not illegal. Abortions are illegal (you may also take cases where states impose abortions on women, i.e., forced/coerced abortions).

See WomanStats Project (2007) for further details about how this variable is coded, guidelines, and methods.

7.3.2 Victim Assistance

Since victim cooperation is essential for convictions, a greater focus on victim protection is needed in the form of a recovery or reflection period (Pearson 2002) and/or provisions for temporary residency (Ould 2004). Victim cooperation also taps into this variable. I employ the Protection measure of the composite 3P Anti-trafficking Policy Index by Cho et al. (2011b), which aims to measure whether a country "protect[s] the human rights of victims of trafficking,

identifies them, and provides for the physical, psychological and social recover of victims of trafficking by legislative and other measures" (Cho et al. 2011b). The variable ranges from 1 (no compliance) to 5 (full compliance), where each indicates:

> Score 1: The country punishes victims of trafficking in persons for acts related to the situations being trafficked; and does not provide any assistance and support.
>
> Score 2: The country fails to ensure that victims of trafficking are punished for acts related to the trafficking itself or to the consequences of being trafficked; and there is limited assistance and support for court proceedings and the recovery of victims. Or, the country does not punish victims of trafficking in persons for acts related to the situations being trafficked; however, it also does not provide any assistance or support for recovery, rehabilitation and repatriation.
>
> Score 3: The country does not punish victims of trafficking for acts related to the situations being trafficked; does not impose the self-identification of victims; and exerts LIMITED efforts to give victims information on, and assistance for, relevant court and administrative proceedings, as well as support for the physical, psychological and social recovery of victims such as housing (shelter), medical assistance, job training, (temporal) residence permit, and other assistance for rehabilitation and repatriation. Or, if the country fails to ensure that victims of trafficking are never punished for acts related to the trafficking itself or the consequences of being trafficking BUT exerts STRONG/MODERATE efforts in protecting victims, the country qualifies for score 3.
>
> Score 4: The country does not punish victims of trafficking for acts related to the situations being trafficked; does not impose the self-identification of victims; and exerts MODERATE efforts to give victims information on, and assistance for, relevant court and administrative proceedings, as well as support for the physical, psychological and social recovery of victims such as housing (shelter), medical assistance, job training, (temporal) residence permit, and other assistance for rehabilitation and repatriation.
> Score 5: The country does not punish victims of trafficking for acts related to the situations being trafficked; does not impose the self-identification of victims; and exerts STRONG efforts to give victims information on, and assistance for, relevant court and administrative proceedings, as well as support for the physical, psychological and social recovery of victims such as housing (shelter), medical assistance, job training, (temporal) residence permit, and other assistance for rehabilitation and repatriation
>
> (-999) Not mentioned. (Cho et al. 2011)

See Cho et al. (2011b) for further details about this variable, guidelines, and methods for how each country is scored in terms of protection.

7.3.3 Ratification of Palermo Protocol

Being a signatory to an international instrument signifies a symbolic gesture, but ratification denotes a higher level of commitment. Thus, countries that have ratified the Palermo Protocol are coded as "1", and countries that have not ratified the Palermo Protocol are coded as "0." The data comes directly from the Palermo Protocol's "status of ratification" (UNODC 2012).

7.3.4 Corruption[37]

Corruption exacerbates weak institutions and promotes collusion with human trafficking due to fear or greed (Craig 1983; Agbu 2003; Haynes 2004; Bales 1999; 2005; Cirineo Sacco Studnicka 2010; Guth 2010; UNODC 2011). Therefore, the level of corruption is controlled for, and is measured by the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)'s control of corruption variable. This "reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both pretty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests" (Kaufmann et al. 2012). This ordinal variable ranges from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) and indicates the government's control of corruption (governance). Data come from the WGI Project (Kaufmann et al. 2012).

[37] Given the limited number of observations in the dataset and the continued decrease of observations as more variables are added, the rule of law variable is dropped due to high collinearity with the corruption variable (correlation coefficient = 0.9634). The strength of a country's rule of law reflects the most basic prerequisites for the protection of human rights in general, and taps more into the legal protection of people and their human rights. This variable is measured by the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), and "reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence" (Kaufmann et al. 2012). Corruption also taps into those that break the rules although not legal protection, and serves as a good proxy for this variable.

7.3.5 Wealth[38]

Countries that are richer tend to have greater tools at their disposal in terms of resources and security. Thus, level of wealth is controlled for and is measured as GDP per capita in current U.S. dollars ($). Data come from the World Bank (2007a).

Table 7.1 provides a description of all variables in the model, as well as sources and summary statistics.

[38] Given the limited number of observations in the dataset and the continued decrease of observations as more variables are added, the institutional strength variable is dropped due to its similarity to the wealth variable. Institutional strength taps into state capacity, defined as the ability of the state to secure payments for the provision of goods and services, and measured as the total tax revenue as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) in currant US$ (World Bank 2007b). This is more precise than just GDP per capita alone, as it allows us to see how much of a country's total GDP is allocated to providing goods and services for its citizens. Still, GDP per capita stands as a good proxy that captures a country's wealth.

TABLE 7.1 Variable Descriptions and Summary Statistics

Variable	Description	Coding/range	Source	Mean	Median	Standard Deviation
Criminalization of Human Traffickers	Proxy for probability of human trafficking convictions	0 (no) or 1 (yes)	UNODC (2009)	0.85	1	0.36
Anti-trafficking law	Conformity and enforcement	0 (no compliance) to 5 (full compliance)	Cho et al. (2011b)	3.98	4	1.18
Inequity of family law	Legal and gender inequality	0 (equity) to 4 (no equity)	WomanStats Project (2007)	1.87	2	1.17
Victim assistance	Victim protection in law	0 (no compliance) to 5 (full compliance)	Cho et al. (2011)	2.98	3	1.14
Ratify Palermo Protocol	Ratification of Palermo Protocol?	0 (no) or 1(yes)	UNODC (2012)	0.93	1	0.26
Corruption	Government's control over corruption	-2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong)	Kaufman et al. (2012)	-0.01	-0.32	1.03
Wealth	Gross domestic product per capita	171-1.1e+05, in current US$	World Bank (2007a)	13372.09	19622.76	4079.00

7.4 Model Specification

The relationship between a domestic law's conformity to the Palermo Protocol and the probability of criminalizing a human trafficker is examined via a logit regression because the dependent variable is binary. In other words, the dependent variable has only two possible outcomes: yes (there are chances of criminalizing a trafficker) or no (there are not any chances of criminalizing a trafficker). Using a logit is methodologically preferred over an OLS regression for primarily the same reasons stated in Chapter 4: OLS regression errors will be heteroskedastic, and probabilities can fall outside of the standard 0 to 1 probability range (Berry et al. n.d.; Long 1997; Kennedy 2008).

7.5 Results

This section discusses the empirical findings of how anti-human trafficking laws that conform to the Palermo Protocol and are enforced, increase the probability of criminalizing human traffickers. However, before examining the regression analysis, the relationship between the ratification of the Palermo Protocol and a country's domestic laws as well as criminalizing human traffickers is explored. These relationships have the potential to highlight important foundations a country must establish prior to conforming their domestic anti-human trafficking law to the Palermo Protocol, and/or enforcing it. In particular, Hypothesis 1 – that the ratification of the Palermo Protocol should be positively associated with the probability of criminalizing human traffickers – is discussed and tested via bivariate correlation matrices.

7.5.1 Descriptive Statistics

In order to examine whether ratification of the Palermo Protocol should be positively associated with the probability of criminalizing a human trafficker, we first need to look at whether a country's domestic anti-human trafficking law conforms to the Palermo Protocol. A

country may have ratified the Palermo Protocol, but if its domestic anti-human trafficking law does not conform to the Palermo Protocol, the probability of criminalizing a human trafficker should be minimal.

TABLE 7.2 Frequency of Human Trafficking Criminalization in Estimation Sample

Criminalization	Frequency
No	14.75% (18)
Yes	85.25% (104)

Note: N=122

Table 7.2 depicts a basic frequency distribution for the dependent variable, the probability of criminalizing a human trafficker in the estimation sample. The vast majority of countries – 85.25% - have either had a human trafficking conviction and/or the potential to convict a trafficker, whereas nearly 15% of countries have not had a conviction and/or the potential to convict a trafficker. This reveals that countries' anti-human trafficking laws may already contain other elements (not) included in the Palermo Protcool.

TABLE 7.3 Relationship between Ratification of Palermo Protocol and Anti-Human Trafficking Laws

Ratification of Palermo Protocol	Anti-Human Trafficking Laws (degree of conformity and enforcement)				
	1 (None)	2	3	4	5 (complete)
No	0	5	0	3	2
Yes	1	19	7	32	53

Note: a. N=122 b. X^2=7.3339 c. d.f.= 4, p<.05

Countries that have ratified the Palermo Protocol are associated with having domestic anti-human trafficking laws that conform to the Palermo Protocol and are enforced (i.e., as denoted by categories 4 or 5), which is statistically significant at the .10 level. Table 7.3 examines this relationship and finds that out of 122 countries, 85 have such laws (or 94.4%). Moreover, only 72 (or 84.4%) countries have ratified the Palermo Protocol but still do not have laws that conform completely to the Palermo Protocol (i.e., as denoted by categories 1, 2, or 3). What is unusual is that there are 19 countries (or 79.2%) that have ratified the Palermo Protocol but do not have any conformity of their domestic laws to the Palermo Protocol and are not enforced (i.e., as denoted by category 2).[39] The reason for this temporary bubble of countries in category 2 may have to do with the political and economic infrastructure within each of these countries. The bulk of these lie in Africa, and a few have had or are currently undergoing civil war and/or some sort of political instability. In addition, lack of resources (state, financial, and manpower), lack of commitment to the Palermo Protocol and fighting human trafficking, and/or any combination may not be available or a priority. As such, while they have ratified the Palermo Protocol, for some reason or another, they may not have the capacity to conform their domestic anti-human trafficking law to the Palermo Protocol and enforce it.

Going a step further, we can examine the relationship between the ratification of the Palermo Protocol and the probability of criminalizing a human trafficker, which is statistically significant at the .05 level. Overall, as Table 7.4 indicates, 95.2% of countries have that have ratified the Palermo Protocol have had or also increased their chances of criminalizing a human trafficker. This strongly supports Hypothesis 1, in that ratification of the Palermo Protocol

[39] These 19 countries include: Algeria, Bahrain, Botswana, Burundi, Chad, Djibouti, Egypt, Gambia, Haiti, Lesotho, Mali, Namibia, Niger, Oman, Rwanda, South Africa, Turkmenistan, Venezuela, and Zambia.

should be positively associated with criminalizing a human trafficker. Being a party to an international human trafficking instrument may increase the level and degree of commitment for some countries, as does international, regional, and social pressure. Yet, about 4.8% of countries that have ratified the Palermo Protocol have still not increased their chances of criminalizing a human trafficker. While being a party to the Palermo Protocol may help increase a country's level of awareness and/or commitment, it may not necessarily compel them to take further action apart from signing on and ratifying the instrument.

TABLE 7.4 Relationship between Ratification of Palermo Protocol and Criminalization

	Ratification of Palermo Protocol	
Criminalization	No	Yes
No	5	5
Yes	13	99

Note: a. N=122 b. X^2=10.7590 c. d.f.= 1, p<.05

TABLE 7.5 Relationship between Anti-Human Trafficking Laws and Criminalization

Criminalization	Anti-Human Trafficking Laws (degree of conformity and enforcement)				
	1 (None)	2	3	4	5 (complete)
No	1	12	2	2	1
Yes	0	12	5	33	54

Note: a. N=122 b. X^2=40.1372 c. d.f.= 4, p<.05

Finally, Table 7.5 examines the relationship between a country's domestic anti-human trafficking laws and the probability of criminalizing a human trafficker, which is statistically significant at the .05 level. About 96.7% of countries that have domestic anti-human trafficking

laws that conform to the Palermo Protocol have (had) increased chances of criminalizing a human trafficker. Clearly, conformity of the domestic and international instruments matter, and are associated with an increased probability criminalizing a human trafficker. Again, 50% of countries with no conformity of their laws to the Palermo Protocol (i.e., as denoted by category 2) have not yet obtained or increased their chances of criminalizing a human trafficker. Having the domestic legislative framework – especially one that is in conformity to the international Palermo Protocol and is enforced - appears to be a basic precursor for criminalizing a human trafficker.

7.5.2 Regression

Table 7.6 presents the logit regression results anti-human trafficking laws had on the probability of criminalizing a human trafficker. Model is the regression without robust standard errors (and is discussed solely as a baseline), and Model 2 is the regression with robust standard errors. Both models point to a similar picture, though statistical significance has slightly changed in Model 2.

The results in Table 7.6 provide strong support for both Hypothesis 1 and 2. First, countries that ratified the Palermo Protocol versus those that did not, increase their probability of criminalizing a human trafficker, which is statistically significant at the .01 level. Signing on to an international instrument may signal a level of commitment a country has to a particular issue, but international as well as domestic norms that predated this instrument may also increase such support (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Risse et al. 1999; Cortell and Davis 2002; Simmons 2009). Second, countries that have more stringent and clearer laws were more likely to criminalize human traffickers compared to countries that had more relaxed laws, which is statistically significant at the .05 level. In other words, countries that have laws prohibiting

human trafficking, conform to the Palermo Protocol, and are enforced, increase the chances of criminalizing human traffickers compared to countries that did not prohibit trafficking due to an unclear definition and lack of enforcement. This supports theoretical expectations that countries with laws that conform to the Palermo Protocol – those that have the similar human trafficking definition - and whose laws are enforced, are likelier to criminalize human traffickers.

Note that none of the other control variables - inequity in family law, victim assistance, corruption, or wealth – are statistically significant. We can attribute this lack of significance to two things in the model. First, the sample size (N=122) is low, which may make the regression model unstable, particularly since we are employing maximum likelihood estimation (Long 1997). Usually 100 is the minimum sample size needed for such estimation, with at least ten observations per variable (Long 1997). Though this model just meets this requirement, three of the total six variables are categorical, which may exacerbate computations. Moreover, the dependent variable, criminalization of human traffickers, has more 1's (N=104) versus 0's (18), which indicates the country has had a conviction and/or the possibility of obtain a conviction via laws that criminalize the crime of human trafficking. This means this variable requires even more observations than usual in order to accommodate the lopsided variable, according to Long (1997). Second, not including all relevant or necessary variables in the model can lead to misspecification. As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, offender demographics, volume of human trafficking, and the number of arrests of human traffickers, are not controlled for due to unavailable data. There are no alternative measures for these for which to use. Two control variables – institutional strength and rule of law – were dropped from the model because of collinearity and loss of observations (which put the model below 80 observations). In short, there are limited data on the different facets of human trafficking (i.e., conviction rates, arrests,

and volume), which means that not every variable is controlled for. When studying a hidden population, such as human trafficking, or any field in which systematic, crossnational, and methodologically sound data are limited, these issues are to be expected. As such, caution should be taken when considering these results as definitive; instead, these present a preliminary look of the criminalization of human traffickers.

TABLE 7.6 Logit Regression: Estimated Effects on Criminalization of Human Traffickers

Variable	Model 1	Model 2 (Robust SEs)
Anti-Trafficking Law	1.077***	1.077**
	(0.365)	(0.439)
Inequity of Family Law	-0.504	-0.504
	(0.415)	(0.549)
Victim Assistance	0.374	0.374
	(0.424)	(0.442)
Ratify Palermo Protocol	1.848**	1.848***
	(0.947)	(0.636)
Corruption	0.237	0.237
	(0.576)	(0.532)
Wealth	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
N	122	122
Pseudo R^2	0.4043	0.4043
LR X^2(6 d.f.)	41.28	28.39

Note: *** $p \leq 0.01$; ** $p \leq 0.05$; * $p \leq 0.10$, two-tailed tests. Standard errors in in parentheses. Model 2 has a Wald X^2 (6 d.f.) instead of an LR X^2.

7.5.3 Predicted Probabilities

Similar to Chapter 4, the interpretation of the logit regression (and log-odds coefficients) is not as intuitive and straightforward as OLS regression simply because we are not dealing with linear effects (i.e., a one unit change in the independent variable leads to a one unit increase in the dependent variable), and we cannot interpret the magnitude or impact each variable has on the criminalization of a human trafficker. A common practice is to explore other quantities of interest to better highlight and understand the results, including predicted probabilities (UCLA

Statistical Consulting Group 2013). Figures 7.1 and 7.2 show how moving these two variables from their minimum to maximum values changes the probability of criminalizing a human trafficker (category 1) versus not obtaining one (category 0) [40]. These probabilities allow us to visually depict and understand the substantive effects they have on criminalizing a human trafficker, something the logit regression is unable to do. The error bars in each figure denote 95% confidence intervals that frame each prediction.

Figure 7.1 presents the predicted change of criminalizing versus not criminalizing a human trafficker as anti-human trafficking laws increases from its in-sample minimum (0 = no compliance) to its in-sample maximum (5 = full compliance). Increasing stringent and clearer anti-human trafficking laws (i.e., which means they conform to the Palermo Protocol and are enforced) increases the probability of criminalizing a human trafficker by 52.7%. This substantive effect is statistically significant since the confidence intervals do not contain zero. In short, countries that have anti-human trafficking laws that are in line with the Palermo Protocol and that are enforced are likelier to criminalize human traffickers. This strongly supports theoretical expectations in addition to policy research that posits that human trafficking must be considered a crime in the offending country, and that the law must be enforced in order to have convictions (UNODC 2013a, b).

These results, overall, suggest that when a country's anti-human trafficking law conforms to the Palermo Protocol's definition of human trafficking and is enforced, criminalization of human traffickers is likelier. Human trafficking is a composite crime that is made up of many smaller crimes, and defining it – particularly in an instrument used to prosecute and ultimately convict traffickers – is important in order to curtail one slice of this business.

[40] The two predicted probabilities were produced with CLARIFY (King et al. 2000; Tomz et al. 2001), and all variables are held at their means.

FIGURE 7.1 Predicted Effects of Anti-Human Trafficking Laws on the Criminalization of a Human Trafficker



Note: Reported values are predicted changes (first difference) in the probability of criminalizing a human trafficker, given a min-max increase in anti-human trafficking laws. All other variables are held at their means.

FIGURE 7.2 Predicted Effects of Ratification of Palermo Protocol on the Criminalization of a Human Trafficker



Note: Reported values are predicted changes (first difference) in the probability of criminalizing a human trafficker, given a min-max increase in ratification of the Palermo Protocol. All other variables are held at their means.

Figure 7.2 illustrates the predicted change of criminalizing versus not criminalization a human trafficker as countries ratify the Palermo Protocol. Ratification of this international instrument increases the probability of criminalizing a human trafficker by 18.8%. In general, countries that have committed to the Palermo Protocol – the international instrument that defines what human trafficking is – increase their chances of criminalizing a human trafficker. Though the effect is not large, it is substantively and statistically significant. This supports theoretical expectations, but also past literature that has found a positive link between ratification of human rights instruments and human rights practices (Landman 2005), and also international and domestic human rights norm which compel countries to sign on and ratify these treaties (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Risse et al. 1999; Cortell and Davis 2002; Simmons 2009).

This does not provide a complete picture of how human rights instruments, particularly the Palermo Protocol, increase the probability of criminalizing a human trafficker. What it does suggest, however, is that if countries adopt the human trafficking definition set forth in the Palermo Protocol, and this is translated into their own domestic laws (which taps into whether they have stringent and clear anti-human trafficking laws), this should increase the probability of criminalizing a human trafficker, holding all things constant. A human trafficking conviction cannot be obtained if there is no law that stipulates human trafficking. This is a first step toward recognizing the importance of having a uniform and consistent definition, especially of a crime that has the potential to spill over into other borders. If countries do not agree on what human trafficking is, especially the home country of a trafficker, there is clear disconnect on what the crime is, and more importantly, reduced chances for conviction, or criminalizing a human trafficker.

7.6 Conclusion

This chapter sought to examine why some countries deal with human trafficking more effectively, particularly in terms of capturing human traffickers. Despite the adoption of an international anti-human trafficking instrument – the Palermo Protocol - that standardized the definition, trafficking convictions remain low and varied across countries. This is important because arresting traffickers is only one part of the larger piece of tackling this business; convicting traffickers recognizes that such a crime exists and that there are risks and costs associated with becoming involved in this illegal industry. I argue that the probability criminalizing a human trafficker is a function of countries' domestic anti-human trafficking laws conforming to the international one – the Palermo Protocol - and also, the degree to which the domestic anti-human trafficking law is being enforced at the domestic level. If countries do not

have an already-established anti-human trafficking law, or their existing one does not conform to the international one - that is, the definition of human trafficking is not the same - then the probability of criminalizing a human trafficker decreases. Thus, conformity and enforcement of the anti-human trafficking law is necessary for criminalization of a human trafficker to occur.

The existing literature has focused on the lack of victim protection, assistance, and cooperation being integrated within anti-human trafficking legislation, weak and inefficient institutions in the form of weak state capacity and corruption, and offender demographics for possible reasons why the probability of the criminalization of a human trafficker (proxied for convictions) remain so low and varied. While all of these factors are important and essential in examining the criminalization of human traffickers, they do not account for the disparity in language between a country's domestic anti-human trafficking law and the Palermo Protocol. Simmons (2009) finds that degree to which signing on to international treaties is done, is a function of the level of commitment to the issue or for diplomatic or ceremonial reasons. This demonstrates that international protocols are most meaningful within the context of domestic commitments. Still, the literature has not yet examined the degree of conformity between domestic anti-human trafficking laws and the Palermo Protocol.

Results in this chapter seem to suggest that countries where domestic anti-human trafficking laws conform to the Palermo Protocol and are enforced have an increased probability of criminalizing human traffickers by 52.7%. This matters so that we have a better understanding of the variation in enforcement – and criminalization – of traffickers. These findings also enhance our understanding of the interconnections between international and domestic law: First, signing and ratifying an international instrument (such as the Palermo Protocol) does not automatically translate into the country's domestic law, nor does it mean that

the country's policy behavior conforms to the international instrument. Among countries, there are varying degrees of integrating or translating the international instrument into the domestic law, which means there may be a disconnect between the two levels.

This chapter has shown that the lower the congruence between the domestic law and the international treaty, the less likely the country's policy behavior conforms to its treaty commitments. Further research is needed on how countries integrate, translate, and transpose international instruments or particular directives to the domestic level. Second, human trafficking must be defined as a crime in the country's laws in order to help arrest and convict perpetrators of such a crime. However, the analysis has shown that countries that have defined trafficking as an offense in accordance with the Palermo Protocol have a better rate of criminalizing human traffickers than countries that define human trafficking differently from the Palermo Protocol. This suggests that congruence between the international treaty and the domestic law facilitates enforcement. More research into this connection between domestic and international legal instruments is necessary to develop a deeper understanding of the reasons for this. Finally, corruption has been shown in the literature to be a major predictor or facilitator of human trafficking, and hampers efforts to obtain human trafficking convictions (Craig 1983; Haynes 2004; Bales 1999; 2005; Guth 2010). While the causal arrows between human trafficking and corruption are not known for certain, greater attention is needed in this area, as corruption has the potential to aggravate political structures and societies with even the most excellent anti-human trafficking laws, and resources.

Finally, this chapter also acknowledges data limitations. First, not every theoretical expectation is tested due to unavailable data. The volume of human trafficking, the number of arrests of human traffickers, and offender demographics are not included simply because they do

not exist in a systematic, crossnational manner. More importantly, individual-level data on human trafficking offender demographics do not exist for every country in the world, thus rendering examination of this impossible at the moment. Thus, results in this chapter, while strongly supporting the two hypotheses, should be considered as preliminary and a first step toward exploring this issue. Second, the dependent variable is coded as binary – criminalization or no criminalization of a trafficker – due to unavailable, crossnational data on human trafficking conviction rates. Ideally, a count on the number of human trafficking convictions for each country would allow for more information to be considered, and greater variation in terms of the outcome. Still, the binary measure serves as a good proxy for convictions.

The next chapter concludes the dissertation, and provides further discussion on the implications of these results, as well as policy implications for human trafficking.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

The continuance of human trafficking around the world today yielded three distinct but interrelated research puzzles: why would human traffickers want to operate transnationally or across large geographic distances given the high costs and risk involved, versus domestically, where they are more familiar with the area and they can lower the risks involved? Therefore, under what circumstances does transnational human trafficking occur? And finally, why are some countries able to deal with human trafficking - particularly convictions - better than others? On the basis of my political economic theory of human trafficking, I argue that human traffickers are more likely to stay closer to home after considering the underlying economic and market structures that inherently involve risks and costs, coupled with a set of economic, political, geographic, and cultural factors. Specifically, I explore how income and gender inequality, corruption, political borders, institutional strength, political, economic, and environmental instability, regime type, geographic distance, terrain, mode of transportation, and culture, affect human trafficking.

Yet, sometimes these factors are insufficient to keep traffickers in closer proximity to their home, and they venture across large geographic distances to traffic people. However, not all trafficking groups are capable of doing this type of human trafficking, and in general, I argue there are four factors that facilitate this. First, the type of group and its level of sophistication matter. More organized, connected, well endowed, and institutionalized groups are likelier to afford the costs and risks of extending their business. Second, available expatriate or immigrant networks, as well as other flows, like IDPs and refugees, increase the number of contacts and resources traffickers can potentially tap into. Third, the relationship between the origin-transit-

destination countries allow traffickers rest stops and further protection en-route to their destination. Transit countries act as safe havens or sanctuaries for traffickers to rest and recuperate. Finally, the strength of bilateral economic relationships between origin and destination countries increases the likelihood for trafficking due to the possibility of hidden exploitation. I argue that trafficking is largely ignored by origin countries who themselves commit human rights abuses and have a disregard for women, because they receive remittances. Rich countries also disregard trafficking as they benefit from increased and cheap labor, as well as economic growth, and politicians oftentimes do not have an incentive deal with a problem that is easily perceived as one of illegal immigration.

Still, regardless of the type of human trafficking, some countries deal with it more effectively than others. The final theoretical framework considers that despite the adoption of an international and universal anti-human trafficking instrument, the Palermo Protocol, criminalization of traffickers remain low and varied. I argue that conviction rates – proxied by the criminalization of a human trafficker - are a function of whether a country's domestic anti-trafficking laws are in conformity to the Palermo Protocol. In addition, the degree to which these laws are enforced determines whether traffickers are apprehended, prosecuted, and ultimately convicted.

The empirical analysis completed in this study lends strong, but partial support for the political economy theoretical framework on human trafficking. Increased income inequality and economic stability both increase the severity of human trafficking. Increased porousness of economic borders and being a contiguous destination country increase the severity of human trafficking. Greater institutional strength in the form of state capacity, and democratic regimes both decrease human trafficking. Finally, greater the geographic distance between origin/transit

and destination countries, decreases the severity of human trafficking flows. These results suggest that economic factors, particularly the unequal relationships in society and instability, as well as the expansion of trade, play key roles in facilitating human trafficking. Moreover, political factors, such as regime type and the provision of goods and services matter in creating some sort of stability to reduce the chances of trafficking. Geographic factors, such as distance, are considered by traffickers in their decision-making calculus of where to traffic their goods. This suggests that staying closer to home may not be such a bad idea after all.

Given data limitations, the theoretical framework for transnational human trafficking was not empirically tested in this study. However, the empirical analysis on why human trafficking conviction rates – in terms of criminalizing human traffickers - remain so low and varied strongly supports theoretical expectations. Countries that ratified the Palermo Protocol versus those that did not were more likely to criminalize human traffickers. Signing onto an international instrument signals interest on the issue, but ratification designates a much deeper commitment. More importantly, results indicate that countries that have domestic anti-human trafficking laws in line with the Palermo Protocol, and that are enforced, are likelier to criminalize human traffickers compared to those countries that did not. In other words, the strongest commitment is the combination of ratification of international law (the Palermo Protocol), plus domestic law (and enforcement of that domestic law). This suggests that conformity and agreement between domestic and international law may be a key toward effective enforcement, and thus, criminalizing human traffickers.

The two empirically tested, theoretical frameworks in this study contribute to the multidisciplinary literature on human trafficking, particularly political science. There have been two primary camps that have sought to explain human trafficking: human rights and criminal

justice. Within the human rights camp, human trafficking is seen as a major violation of a person's human right, and traffickers are viewed as perverse criminals. Human security is vital, with an emphasis on victim protection and rehabilitation (Chuang 1998; Caldwell et al. 1999; Human Rights Watch 2001; Gallagher 2001, 2002, 2004, 2009; Anti-Slavery International 2002; Asian Development Bank 2003; Macklin 2003; van den Anker 2004; Corrin 2005; Esquibel 2005; Chuang 2006; Mertus and Bertone 2007; Ribando 2007; Konrad 2008; Hathaway 2009). The criminal justice camp, on the other hand, takes a law and order approach that is focused on eradicating this crime through whatever means necessary, so long as the criminals are taken off the streets. There is a shift from victim protection to one on apprehending, prosecuting, and ultimately convicting traffickers. Thus, the focus here is on human traffickers (Lindstrom 2007; Shelley 2007a; Limoncelli 2009; Segrave 2009; Akee et al. 2010; Smith 2010; Cho et al. 2011a; Jakobsson and Kotsadam 2011; McCarthy 2010; Smith 2010). Both camps give us a better understanding of the supply-side of the business (human rights), while the other on the demand-side of the business (criminal justice view). Wedged in the middle of these two literatures is a thin layer of economic arguments that have largely remained isolated.

My study contributes to the political economy literature on human trafficking by considering how traffickers and their business operate, the incentives that drive suppliers, and the conditions that define the pool of potential victims. Specifically, I marry the scant political science literature on human trafficking with the economic literature, and combine these with geographic and cultural factors to get a better picture of why human trafficking still continues.

This study addresses research puzzles that are of human, national, and transnational security as well as importance. First, human trafficking, and more generally, slavery, are inherent human rights violations where the individual is entrapped against his/her will. Apart

from inanimate objects being hunted, like drugs and weapons, humans now join these illegal ranks, and are commodified and exploited in countless ways. What differentiates humans from these other objects is that they are exploited repeatedly, and are simply disposable to traffickers.

Second, this human security does not confine itself to one location, but has the potential to spill over into other parts of a country, neighboring countries, and to a lesser extent, across countries and regions. When people are trafficked, they automatically affect national security, and at times, border security. Trafficked people are oftentimes conflated with illegal migrants, because of their status (though not all enter a destination country illegally), and may not be afforded protection. Instead, misconceptions and stigma attached to illegal immigration and smuggling, have reduced the seriousness (and differences) of human trafficking.

Third, human trafficking is also a crime as much as it is a human rights issue and an illegal enterprise. Understanding the dynamics factors involved, the fact that human trafficking equals a multiplicity of crimes makes, will ensure that it is effectively dealt with. This taps into the importance of the definition of the crime. Even though the Palermo Protocol set forth an international definition of human trafficking, countries have not been so quick or systematic in updating their own anti-human trafficking laws, if they even have any. Human trafficking can take various forms as briefly discussed in Chapter 1, and improperly identifying a trafficking victim has the potential for negative ramifications on the legal system, but also on society if traffickers remain free.

There are inherent strengths and weaknesses in any research. My study had three important strengths and weaknesses, which I present. First, there has been a general lack of academic and empirical research on human trafficking versus other industries like organized crime, drug trafficking, and illegal immigration (Fiorentini and Peltzman 1995; Freeman 1999;

Mahmoud and Trebesch 2009; Verma 2010). I am not only making a contribution to the general human trafficking literature, but also to the field of political science. My study is scientifically rigorous, and offers two empirically tested theoretical frameworks that seek to better understand the causal mechanisms of human trafficking. Second, I have contributed to the scientific framework by offering three distinct yet interrelated, theoretical arguments, whereas the bulk of the literature remains descriptive and a-theoretical. Though the latter is very useful for providing background information and introducing a topic, theoretically grounded arguments help to tease out the factors that affect the human trafficking, and deepen our understanding of this persistent, but illegal phenomenon. Third, I utilize a multidisciplinary approach in analyzing human trafficking. The bulk of research promotes either a human rights, a criminal justice, or, to a lesser extent, an economic framework, without really considering the multidimensional nature of human trafficking (though Stoecker and Cameron 2007 acknowledge this).

The three major weaknesses in this dissertation revolve around data limitations. This is not uncommon given that human trafficking victims constitute a hidden population, and there has been a general lack of systematic, crossnational, and time series data collections. First, not every part of the theoretical frameworks set forth has been tested. Six hypotheses in Chapter 4 are not tested due to missing data in a proxy variable, as well as nonexistent, individual-level data on the modes of transportation traffickers use. In addition, there is no data on the amount of internal human trafficking in each country, thus this form of domestic trafficking could not be tested. Chapter 5 is not empirically tested at all due to nonexistent data for three of the independent variables, though what kind of data would be needed is described. Chapter 7 does not test for offender demographics due to the lack of crossnational data. Second, this taps into missing data as mentioned above. Proxies or alternative measures were use for some variables (like gender

inequality), but substantial missing data decreased the overall number of observations. Thus, these variables were dropped from the model in order to conserve observations. Finally, the dependent variable employed in Chapter 4, the severity of human trafficking flows from origin/transit to destination countries, does not include every country as a directed dyad. Thus, not every region is included, particularly Latin America and the Middle East, and the findings may not be completely generalizable. In Chapter 7, the binary dependent variable (criminalization or no criminalization of a human trafficker) provides a good proxy for trafficking convictions due to the lack of data for each country. Overall, missing or unavailable data has precluded the inclusion of several theoretical components in this study.

This study has many possible avenues for continued research. First, most aspects of the two theoretical frameworks empirically tested here resulted in strong support. However, in Chapter 4 on the political economy of human trafficking, four key independent variables – gender inequality, corruption, mountainous terrain, and culture – were found to be statistically significant, yet in the opposite direction from what was hypothesized. Increased gender inequality, corruption, mountainous terrain, and cultural familiarity were found to decrease human trafficking. This goes counter to the literature and to logic, and, suggests that deeper examination on each of these factors is needed. There are a variety of different types of gender inequality, thus future work would consider political, economic, social, cultural, and educational strains of gender inequality. Unpacking this effect may help elucidate which a particular aspect of gender inequality impacts human trafficking adversely. Corruption is cited as a huge contributing factor for trafficking, yet this also suggests that there may be other factors at play. The reduction of internal borders – like in the Schengen Area – may facilitate human trafficking regardless of distance and other factors. Identity documents, such as passport, are no longer

needed, and corruption may not play such a huge role as it once did. Terrain and culture are also factors that deserve untangling. The effects terrain has had on civil war, and that culture has had on democracy and political participation, are mixed, at best, and this too, may be similar for human trafficking. It could be that the causal arrows for these variables go in both directions.

Given data limitations, future research entails expanding data collections with special regard to the type of human trafficking group as discussed in Chapter 7, and human trafficking convictions. Offender demographics are limited, and creating a crossnational dataset on the characteristics of human traffickers will allow researchers to study the effects they may have on different facets of the business. Moreover, there is also something to be said about the differences in legal frameworks and systems around the world. Japan and China have very high conviction rates relative to other countries, but this has been attributed to the fact that lawyers bring their cases before the judge when they know their chances of obtaining a conviction are high. Thus, studying these legal parameters and variations may allow for additional factors to be uncovered relating to why some countries are able to convict traffickers at higher rates.

This study on why human trafficking continues, and why human traffickers continue to remain free, also has some important academic and policy implications. Something I have encountered in my years studying, and researching on this topic, is the lack or hesitation of information and data sharing between scholars at all levels, from academia to international organization. Given that human trafficking is a composite crime (i.e., a crime comprised of many crimes), that also contains dynamic and complex features, it would be unrealistic and foolish to think one entity or one field can solve this problem. Studying this sort of issue that encompasses human rights, criminal justice, economic, political, legal, sociological, and

anthropological viewpoints, requires greater coordination, cooperation, and transnational sharing of research and ideas.

Policy-wise, in order to reduce human trafficking, or really, any crime, countries should consider the political economic framework of criminals, particularly their incentive structures and cost benefit analyses of trafficking. This business is interrelated and tied to various factors, all of which feed into one another. Traffickers and other criminals may operate in the illegal industry, but at the end of the day, they are simply entrepreneurs looking to make a profit.

APPENDIX A

OTHER POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING TABLES

TABLE A.1 List of Directed Dyads in Estimation Sample

Transit Country	Destination Country
Belarus	Albania
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Albania
Bulgaria	Albania
Indonesia	Albania
Macedonia	Albania
Morocco	Albania
Romania	Albania
South Africa	Albania
Turkey	Albania
Jamaica	Argentina
Azerbaijan	Armenia
Bulgaria	Armenia
Albania	Austria
Belarus	Austria
Belgium	Austria
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Austria
Bulgaria	Austria
Canada	Austria
Cyprus	Austria
Czech Republic	Austria
Equatorial Guinea	Austria
Estonia	Austria
Gabon	Austria
Ghana	Austria
Greece	Austria
Hungary	Austria
Indonesia	Austria
Italy	Austria
Jamaica	Austria
Kazakhstan	Austria
Latvia	Austria
Moldova	Austria
Morocco	Austria
Poland	Austria
Romania	Austria
Russia	Austria
Serbia	Austria
Slovakia	Austria
Slovenia	Austria
South Africa	Austria
Thailand	Austria
Turkey	Austria
Botswana	Bangladesh
Cambodia	Bangladesh

Transit Country	Destination Country
India	Bangladesh
Pakistan	Bangladesh
Albania	Belgium
Belarus	Belgium
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Belgium
Bulgaria	Belgium
Canada	Belgium
Cyprus	Belgium
Czech Republic	Belgium
Equatorial Guinea	Belgium
Estonia	Belgium
Gabon	Belgium
Germany	Belgium
Ghana	Belgium
Greece	Belgium
Hungary	Belgium
Italy	Belgium
Jamaica	Belgium
Kazakhstan	Belgium
Latvia	Belgium
Moldova	Belgium
Morocco	Belgium
Netherlands	Belgium
Poland	Belgium
Romania	Belgium
Russia	Belgium
Serbia	Belgium
Slovakia	Belgium
Slovenia	Belgium
South Africa	Belgium
Thailand	Belgium
Turkey	Belgium
Cameroon	Benin
Equatorial Guinea	Benin
Gabon	Benin
Nigeria	Benin
Jamaica	Brazil
Spain	Brazil
Austria	Bulgaria
Belarus	Bulgaria
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Bulgaria
Czech Republic	Bulgaria
Equatorial Guinea	Bulgaria
Indonesia	Bulgaria
Macedonia	Bulgaria

Transit Country	Destination Country
Poland	Bulgaria
South Africa	Bulgaria
Turkey	Bulgaria
Botswana	Cambodia
Laos	Cambodia
Equatorial Guinea	Cameroon
Nigeria	Cameroon
Costa Rica	Canada
Philippines	Canada
Slovenia	Canada
South Africa	Canada
Uruguay	Canada
Jamaica	Chile
Belize	China
Botswana	China
Cambodia	China
Canada	China
Lesotho	China
Mozambique	China
Myanmar	China
Philippines	China
South Korea	China
Thailand	China
Jamaica	Colombia
Jamaica	Colombia
El Salvador	Costa Rica
Jamaica	Costa Rica
Belarus	Croatia
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Croatia
Bulgaria	Croatia
Equatorial Guinea	Croatia
Indonesia	Croatia
Morocco	Croatia
South Africa	Croatia
Turkey	Croatia
Dominica	Dominican Republic
Jamaica	Dominican Republic
Switzerland	Dominican Republic
Jamaica	Ecuador
Panama	Ecuador
Jamaica	El Salvador
Belarus	Estonia
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Estonia
Bulgaria	Estonia
Equatorial Guinea	Estonia

Transit Country	Destination Country
Finland	Estonia
Indonesia	Estonia
Morocco	Estonia
South Africa	Estonia
Turkey	Estonia
Albania	Finland
Belarus	Finland
Belgium	Finland
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Finland
Bulgaria	Finland
Canada	Finland
Cyprus	Finland
Czech Republic	Finland
Equatorial Guinea	Finland
Estonia	Finland
Gabon	Finland
Ghana	Finland
Greece	Finland
Hungary	Finland
Indonesia	Finland
Italy	Finland
Jamaica	Finland
Kazakhstan	Finland
Latvia	Finland
Moldova	Finland
Morocco	Finland
Netherlands	Finland
Poland	Finland
Romania	Finland
Russia	Finland
Serbia	Finland
Slovakia	Finland
Slovenia	Finland
South Africa	Finland
Sweden	Finland
Thailand	Finland
Turkey	Finland
Albania	Germany
Austria	Germany
Belarus	Germany
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Germany
Belgium	Germany
Bulgaria	Germany
Canada	Germany
Cyprus	Germany

Transit Country	Destination Country
Czech Republic	Germany
Equatorial Guinea	Germany
Estonia	Germany
Gabon	Germany
Ghana	Germany
Greece	Germany
Hungary	Germany
Indonesia	Germany
Italy	Germany
Jamaica	Germany
Kazakhstan	Germany
Latvia	Germany
Moldova	Germany
Morocco	Germany
Netherlands	Germany
Poland	Germany
Romania	Germany
Russia	Germany
Serbia	Germany
Slovakia	Germany
Slovenia	Germany
South Africa	Germany
Thailand	Germany
Turkey	Germany
Cameroon	Ghana
Togo	Ghana
Albania	Greece
Belarus	Greece
Belgium	Greece
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Greece
Bulgaria	Greece
Canada	Greece
Cyprus	Greece
Czech Republic	Greece
Equatorial Guinea	Greece
Estonia	Greece
Gabon	Greece
Georgia	Greece
Ghana	Greece
Greece	Greece
Hungary	Greece
Indonesia	Greece
Italy	Greece
Jamaica	Greece
Kazakhstan	Greece

Transit Country	Destination Country
Latvia	Greece
Morocco	Greece
Netherlands	Greece
Poland	Greece
Romania	Greece
Russia	Greece
Serbia	Greece
Slovakia	Greece
Slovenia	Greece
South Africa	Greece
Thailand	Greece
Turkey	Greece
El Salvador	Guatemala
Jamaica	Guatemala
El Salvador	Honduras
Jamaica	Honduras
Austria	Hungary
Belarus	Hungary
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Hungary
Bulgaria	Hungary
Equatorial Guinea	Hungary
Italy	Hungary
Morocco	Hungary
South Africa	Hungary
Thailand	Hungary
Turkey	Hungary
Botswana	Indonesia
Cambodia	Indonesia
Azerbaijan	Iran
Botswana	Iran
Cambodia	Iran
Albania	Ireland
Belarus	Ireland
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Ireland
Bulgaria	Ireland
Canada	Ireland
Cyprus	Ireland
Czech Republic	Ireland
Equatorial Guinea	Ireland
Estonia	Ireland
Gabon	Ireland
Ghana	Ireland
Greece	Ireland
Hungary	Ireland
Indonesia	Ireland

Transit Country	Destination Country
Italy	Ireland
Jamaica	Ireland
Kazakhstan	Ireland
Latvia	Ireland
Moldova	Ireland
Morocco	Ireland
Netherlands	Ireland
Poland	Ireland
Romania	Ireland
Russia	Ireland
Serbia	Ireland
Slovakia	Ireland
Slovenia	Ireland
South Africa	Ireland
Thailand	Ireland
Turkey	Ireland
Azerbaijan	Israel
Bangladesh	Israel
Botswana	Israel
Brunei	Israel
Cambodia	Israel
Cyprus	Israel
Egypt	Israel
Georgia	Israel
India	Israel
Kazakhstan	Israel
Pakistan	Israel
Russia	Israel
Turkey	Israel
Albania	Italy
Austria	Italy
Belarus	Italy
Belgium	Italy
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Italy
Bulgaria	Italy
Canada	Italy
Côte d'Ivoire	Italy
Croatia	Italy
Cyprus	Italy
Czech Republic	Italy
Equatorial Guinea	Italy
Estonia	Italy
France	Italy
Gabon	Italy
Germany	Italy

Transit Country	Destination Country
Ghana	Italy
Greece	Italy
Hungary	Italy
Indonesia	Italy
Italy	Italy
Jamaica	Italy
Kazakhstan	Italy
Latvia	Italy
Macedonia	Italy
Moldova	Italy
Morocco	Italy
Netherlands	Italy
Poland	Italy
Romania	Italy
Senegal	Italy
Serbia	Italy
Slovakia	Italy
Slovenia	Italy
South Africa	Italy
Thailand	Italy
Turkey	Italy
United Kingdom	Italy
Azerbaijan	Kazakhstan
Bulgaria	Kazakhstan
Azerbaijan	Kyrgyzstan
Bulgaria	Kyrgyzstan
Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan
Botswana	Laos
Cambodia	Laos
Thailand	Laos
Belarus	Latvia
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Latvia
Bulgaria	Latvia
Equatorial Guinea	Latvia
Finland	Latvia
Indonesia	Latvia
Ireland	Latvia
Morocco	Latvia
South Africa	Latvia
Turkey	Latvia
Belarus	Lithuania
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Lithuania
Bulgaria	Lithuania
Equatorial Guinea	Lithuania
Finland	Lithuania

Transit Country	Destination Country
Indonesia	Lithuania
Morocco	Lithuania
Norway	Lithuania
Poland	Lithuania
South Africa	Lithuania
Turkey	Lithuania
Botswana	Lithuania
Cambodia	Malaysia
Myanmar	Malaysia
Thailand	Malaysia
Algeria	Mali
Burkina Faso	Mali
Cameroon	Mali
El Salvador	Mexico
Guatemala	Mexico
Jamaica	Mexico
Albania	Moldova
Azerbaijan	Moldova
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Moldova
Bulgaria	Moldova
Czech Republic	Moldova
Hungary	Moldova
Macedonia	Moldova
Romania	Moldova
Russia	Moldova
Serbia	Moldova
Turkey	Moldova
Botswana	Nepal
Cambodia	Nepal
India	Nepal
Albania	Netherlands
Belarus	Netherlands
Belgium	Netherlands
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Netherlands
Bulgaria	Netherlands
Canada	Netherlands
Cyprus	Netherlands
Czech Republic	Netherlands
Equatorial Guinea	Netherlands
Estonia	Netherlands
Gabon	Netherlands
Germany	Netherlands
Ghana	Netherlands
Greece	Netherlands
Hungary	Netherlands

Transit Country	Destination Country
Indonesia	Netherlands
Italy	Netherlands
Jamaica	Netherlands
Kazakhstan	Netherlands
Latvia	Netherlands
Moldova	Netherlands
Morocco	Netherlands
Poland	Netherlands
Romania	Netherlands
Russia	Netherlands
Serbia	Netherlands
Slovakia	Netherlands
Slovenia	Netherlands
South Africa	Netherlands
Thailand	Netherlands
Turkey	Netherlands
El Salvador	Nicaragua
Jamaica	Nicaragua
Algeria	Niger
Cameroon	Niger
Albania	Norway
Belarus	Norway
Belgium	Norway
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Norway
Bulgaria	Norway
Canada	Norway
Cyprus	Norway
Czech Republic	Norway
Equatorial Guinea	Norway
Estonia	Norway
Gabon	Norway
Ghana	Norway
Greece	Norway
Hungary	Norway
Indonesia	Norway
Italy	Norway
Jamaica	Norway
Kazakhstan	Norway
Latvia	Norway
Moldova	Norway
Morocco	Norway
Netherlands	Norway
Poland	Norway
Romania	Norway
Russia	Norway

Transit Country	Destination Country
Serbia	Norway
Slovakia	Norway
Slovenia	Norway
South Africa	Norway
Thailand	Norway
Turkey	Norway
Botswana	Pakistan
Cambodia	Pakistan
India	Pakistan
Nepal	Pakistan
Ukraine	Pakistan
El Salvador	Panama
Jamaica	Panama
Jamaica	Paraguay
Jamaica	Peru
Panama	Peru
Belarus	Poland
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Poland
Bulgaria	Poland
Equatorial Guinea	Poland
Morocco	Poland
Slovakia	Poland
South Africa	Poland
Turkey	Poland
Ukraine	Poland
Albania	Romania
Austria	Romania
Belarus	Romania
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Romania
Bulgaria	Romania
Cyprus	Romania
Czech Republic	Romania
Equatorial Guinea	Romania
Hungary	Romania
Indonesia	Romania
Italy	Romania
Macedonia	Romania
Morocco	Romania
Poland	Romania
Serbia	Romania
South Africa	Romania
Turkey	Romania
United Kingdom	Romania
Austria	Russia
Azerbaijan	Russia

Transit Country	Destination Country
Belarus	Russia
Brunei	Russia
Bulgaria	Russia
Canada	Russia
Egypt	Russia
Finland	Russia
Georgia	Russia
India	Russia
Kazakhstan	Russia
Mexico	Russia
Romania	Russia
Sweden	Russia
Thailand	Russia
Ukraine	Russia
Cameroon	Senegal
Mali	Senegal
Cameroon	Sierra Leone
Austria	Slovakia
Belarus	Slovakia
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Slovakia
Bulgaria	Slovakia
Czech Republic	Slovakia
Equatorial Guinea	Slovakia
Indonesia	Slovakia
Morocco	Slovakia
South Africa	Slovakia
Turkey	Slovakia
Belarus	Slovenia
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Slovenia
Bulgaria	Slovenia
Equatorial Guinea	Slovenia
Indonesia	Slovenia
Morocco	Slovenia
South Africa	Slovenia
Turkey	Slovenia
Botswana	South Africa
Lesotho	South Africa
Mozambique	South Africa
Singapore	South Africa
Botswana	South Korea
Cambodia	South Korea
Albania	Spain
Belarus	Spain
Belgium	Spain
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Spain

Transit Country	Destination Country
Bulgaria	Spain
Canada	Spain
Cyprus	Spain
Czech Republic	Spain
Equatorial Guinea	Spain
Estonia	Spain
Gabon	Spain
Germany	Spain
Ghana	Spain
Greece	Spain
Hungary	Spain
Indonesia	Spain
Italy	Spain
Jamaica	Spain
Kazakhstan	Spain
Latvia	Spain
Moldova	Spain
Morocco	Spain
Netherlands	Spain
Poland	Spain
Romania	Spain
Russia	Spain
Serbia	Spain
Slovakia	Spain
Slovenia	Spain
South Africa	Spain
Thailand	Spain
Turkey	Spain
Albania	Sweden
Belarus	Sweden
Belgium	Sweden
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Sweden
Bulgaria	Sweden
Canada	Sweden
Cyprus	Sweden
Czech Republic	Sweden
Equatorial Guinea	Sweden
Gabon	Sweden
Ghana	Sweden
Greece	Sweden
Hungary	Sweden
Indonesia	Sweden
Italy	Sweden
Jamaica	Sweden
Kazakhstan	Sweden

Transit Country	Destination Country
Latvia	Sweden
Moldova	Sweden
Morocco	Sweden
Netherlands	Sweden
Poland	Sweden
Romania	Sweden
Russia	Sweden
Serbia	Sweden
Slovakia	Sweden
Slovenia	Sweden
South Africa	Sweden
Thailand	Sweden
Turkey	Sweden
Albania	Switzerland
Belarus	Switzerland
Belgium	Switzerland
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Switzerland
Bulgaria	Switzerland
Canada	Switzerland
Cyprus	Switzerland
Czech Republic	Switzerland
Equatorial Guinea	Switzerland
Estonia	Switzerland
Gabon	Switzerland
Ghana	Switzerland
Greece	Switzerland
Hungary	Switzerland
Indonesia	Switzerland
Italy	Switzerland
Jamaica	Switzerland
Kazakhstan	Switzerland
Latvia	Switzerland
Moldova	Switzerland
Morocco	Switzerland
Netherlands	Switzerland
Poland	Switzerland
Romania	Switzerland
Russia	Switzerland
Serbia	Switzerland
Slovakia	Switzerland
Slovenia	Switzerland
South Africa	Switzerland
Thailand	Switzerland
Turkey	Switzerland
Azerbaijan	Syria

Transit Country	Destination Country
Bangladesh	Syria
Botswana	Syria
Brunei	Syria
Cambodia	Syria
Cyprus	Syria
India	Syria
Kazakhstan	Syria
Pakistan	Syria
Turkey	Syria
Botswana	Thailand
Cambodia	Thailand
India	Thailand
Laos	Thailand
Malaysia	Thailand
Myanmar	Thailand
New Zealand	Thailand
Singapore	Thailand
Albania	Ukraine
Austria	Ukraine
Azerbaijan	Ukraine
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Ukraine
Bulgaria	Ukraine
Czech Republic	Ukraine
Egypt	Ukraine
Georgia	Ukraine
Hungary	Ukraine
Italy	Ukraine
Macedonia	Ukraine
Poland	Ukraine
Romania	Ukraine
Serbia	Ukraine
Slovakia	Ukraine
Turkey	Ukraine
Albania	United Kingdom
Belarus	United Kingdom
Belgium	United Kingdom
Bosnia and Herzegovina	United Kingdom
Bulgaria	United Kingdom
Canada	United Kingdom
Cyprus	United Kingdom
Czech Republic	United Kingdom
Equatorial Guinea	United Kingdom
Estonia	United Kingdom
France	United Kingdom
Gabon	United Kingdom

Transit Country	Destination Country
Germany	United Kingdom
Ghana	United Kingdom
Greece	United Kingdom
Hungary	United Kingdom
Indonesia	United Kingdom
Ireland	United Kingdom
Italy	United Kingdom
Jamaica	United Kingdom
Kazakhstan	United Kingdom
Latvia	United Kingdom
Moldova	United Kingdom
Morocco	United Kingdom
Netherlands	United Kingdom
Nigeria	United Kingdom
Norway	United Kingdom
Poland	United Kingdom
Romania	United Kingdom
Russia	United Kingdom
Serbia	United Kingdom
Slovakia	United Kingdom
Slovenia	United Kingdom
South Africa	United Kingdom
Thailand	United Kingdom
Turkey	United Kingdom
Belize	USA
Canada	USA
Costa Rica	USA
Cyprus	USA
Gabon	USA
Guatemala	USA
Mexico	USA
Panama	USA
Philippines	USA
Slovenia	USA
South Africa	USA
South Korea	USA
Thailand	USA
United Kingdom	USA
Uruguay	USA
Jamaica	Venezuela
Azerbaijan	Yemen
Bangladesh	Yemen
Botswana	Yemen
Brunei	Yemen
Cambodia	Yemen

Transit Country	Destination Country
Cyprus	Yemen
India	Yemen
Kazakhstan	Yemen
Pakistan	Yemen
Turkey	Yemen
Botswana	Zambia

Note: N=738.

TABLE A.2 Generalized Ordered Logit Regression: Estimated Effects on the Severity of Human Trafficking Flows

Variable

ts. Standard errors in in parentheses.

APPENDIX B

LIST OF COUNTRIES IN ESTIMATION SAMPLE

List of Countries in Estimation Sample

Country	Country	Country	Country
Afghanistan	Gambia	Nicaragua	Vietnam
Albania	Georgia	Niger	Zambia
Algeria	Germany	Nigeria	
Angola	Greece	Norway	
Argentina	Guatemala	Oman	
Armenia	Guinea	Panama	
Australia	Haiti	Paraguay	
Austria	Hungary	Peru	
Azerbaijan	India	Philippines	
Bahrain	Indonesia	Poland	
Barbados	Iraq	Portugal	
Belarus	Ireland	Qatar	
Belgium	Israel	Romania	
Benin	Italy	Russia	
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Japan	Rwanda	
Botswana	Kazakhstan	Senegal	
Brazil	Kenya	Serbia	
Bulgaria	Kyrgyzstan	Sierra Leone	
Burkina Faso	Laos	Slovakia	
Burundi	Latvia	Slovenia	
Cambodia	Lesotho	South Africa	
Canada	Liberia	Spain	
Chad	Lithuania	Sri Lanka	
Chile	Luxembourg	Swaziland	
Colombia	Macedonia	Sweden	
Costa Rica	Malawi	Switzerland	
Croatia	Malaysia	Tajikistan	
Cyprus	Mali	Tanzania	
Czech Republic	Malta	Thailand	
Denmark	Mauritania	Timor-Leste	
Djibouti	Mauritius	Togo	
Dominican Republic	Mexico	Turkey	
Ecuador	Moldova	Turkmenistan	
Egypt	Mongolia	Uganda	
El Salvador	Montenegro	Ukraine	
Estonia	Morocco	UAE	
Ethiopia	Mozambique	United Kingdom	
Finland	Namibia	USA	
France	Netherlands	Uzbekistan	
Gabon	New Zealand	Venezuela	

Note: N = 122.

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