

THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND MILITARY DECLINE OF
VENICE LEADING UP TO 1797

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This thesis discusses the decline of the Venetian nobility, the collapse of the Venetian economy, and the political results of the surrender of the Venetian Republic to Napoleon Bonaparte in 1797. Topics include the formation of Venice, Venetian domination of trade, the class system in Venice prior to 1797, the collapse of the aristocracy, feudalism in Venice, Venice's presence in the Adriatic and Aegean seas, and the rise of the middle class within the provisional democratic government. Very few historians have attempted to research the provisional democracy of Venice and how the political and class structure of Venice changed as a result of the collapse of the Republic in 1797. Using primary sources, including government documents and contemporary histories, one can see how the once dominant noble class slowly fell victim to economic ruin and finally lost their role in the political leadership of Venice all together. During this same period, the middle class went from only holding secretarial jobs within the government, to leaders of a modern democratic movement. On top of primary research, several secondary sources helped in explaining the exclusivity of the noble class and their journey from economic dominance to economic ruin and the administrative consequences of this decline for the people of the Republic. This thesis aims to fill gaps in recent research concerning Venetian political history and specifically the period between the surrender of Venice on 12 May 1797, and the signing of the Treaty of Campo Formio, in which France awarded Venice to Austria, on 18 October 1797.

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CHAPTER 1

THE LION IS BORN: THE FOUNDATION OF A TRADING EMPIRE

1.1 War, Rebellion, and Overthrow

The French Revolution and Napoleon Bonaparte's campaigns across Europe led to the installation of new, supposedly democratic, governments in his path. One such example is the Provisional Democracy of Venice which began on 12 May 1797.¹ This new democratic government toppled a group of aristocratic families who governed the Republic, exclusively, since the closing of the Great Council on 29 February 1297.² While this provisional government lasted only five months, before Venice was handed over to Austria through the Treaty of Campo Formio, one wonders what happened to the native patrician families that ruled Venice for so long.³ How did these once powerful men lose all semblance of authority? Why did a state that had survived various attacks and stalemates between empires as far back as 421 CE, surrender only eleven days after Bonaparte declared war on the Republic? In order to answer these questions it is important to understand the early history of Venice. Its geographic location, economy, political structure, and system of socio-economic divisions were each important factors. All of these things contributed to its domination of world trade, subsequent collapse into debt, and the eventual end of the 1,071⁴ year old dogeship that ruled the vast Venetian empire. While these three factors led to the demise of a once invincible world power,

¹ James C. Davis, *A Venetian Family and its Fortune 1500-1900* (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1975), 125. This date marks a vote by the Great Council to abolish the Venetian government; the Democratic government did not technically take power until 16 May 1797 according to a manifesto published on that date.

² John Julius Norwich, *A History of Venice* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982), 183. The author includes a note stating that this date translates to 29 February 1296, according to modern date keeping.

³ George McClellan, *Venice and Bonaparte* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1931), 264.

⁴ According to John J. Norwich, the first Doge took office in 726 and the last Doge left office in 1797.

Venice was not always so fragile. Before every fall comes a rise and Venice experienced an amazing rise throughout the thirteen, fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries.

First, by examining how the Republic was able to establish an expansive government, merchant-naval fleet, and dominate trade in and out of Europe, one is able to understand how a changing maritime environment and changing Venetian attitudes towards wealth at the end of the fifteenth century, led to an economic collapse that would directly result in her political and military deficiencies, some 300 years later.⁵ After investigating the Venetian rise to dominance, it is necessary to show how the deterioration of the aristocracy affected Venice's political and economic policies in the eighteenth century. Emphasizing and investigating the Republic's long, slow decline allows for more clarity when considering the rapid fall of Venice in 1797. When Bonaparte and Austria agreed on a course of action that would lead to the end of Venetian sovereignty, via her absorption into the Austrian empire on 17 October 1797, there was no turning back. The economic, military, and political failures that emerged as early as the 1450s delivered their final blow on 18 January 1798, when the lioness of the Adriatic took her last breath and Austria began her initial occupation of the city.⁶⁷

⁵ While the maritime and trading environment in Europe began to change at the end of the 15th century, after several discoveries by notable explorers, James C. Davis asserts that profits did not decline until the latter part of the 16th century, even though nobles began pursuing different business ventures (mainly feudalism) during the 15th century; Davis, *A Venetian Family and Its Fortune 1500-1900*, 35.

⁶ The first Austrian government lasted from October 1797 to January 1806. Venice became part of the Kingdom of Italy from January 1806 to April 1814. Austria regained control and ruled Venice again from 1814 to 1866, with a brief interlude from 1848 to 1849 when a provisional independent government attempted to rule. From 1866 Venice has been part of united Italy.

⁷ One may wonder why the chapter titles revolve around the "lion". The lion became the symbol of Venice upon the dedication of the city to Saint Mark in 829, "The Lion became the theme of many political symbols. Thus: it was represented with wings to show that Venetians could strike with promptitude; sitting, as a sign of their gravity in counsel-for such is the usual attitude of sages; with a book in its paws, to intimate their devotion to commerce..." W.H. Davenport Adams, *The Queen of the Adriatic* (Boston: D. Lothrop and Co., 1869), 43.

1.2 The Historiography of the Decline of Venice

Within the study of the decline of the Venetian Republic, most scholars concentrate on the economic decline of the Republic as a whole, and its political and economic side effects for the patriciate. Most scholars provide a sweeping view of the chronology which indicates a slow economic decline or a scholar may concentrate on one area of the decline such as the shift away from mercantilism, the rise in popularity of the state as a welfare system, and the emphasis placed on luxury by the nobility. John J. Norwich's *A History of Venice* provides an in-depth chronology that shows the decline of the Venice through military failures and conflict between the Ottoman Empire and the Venetian navy. Norwich's text presents the chronological history of Venice and does not place a large emphasis on themes or historical arguments. This book is the definitive source for any historian of Venice, no matter his or her concentration. Norwich provides a chronology of Venetian history that stretches from the fourth century to 1797. This book provided dates and a framework for both the economic rise and fall of the Republic. The book ends with the fall of the Republic after the Treaty Passarowitz in 1717, but does not elaborate on the events leading up to Venice's surrender on 12 May 1797 and does not provide any information on Austria's role in the fall. To fill in the gaps in the last part of Norwich's chronology George McClellan's work was especially helpful in understanding the structure of the Venetian government and the prominent politicians that failed in their duty to protect Venetian interests in the last century of her existence.

Venice and Bonaparte by George McClellan addresses the social, political, and economic decline of the Republic. This text, although dated, provides a clear view of the socio-economic divisions, the political structure, and the state of the Venetian economy

leading up to 1797. As noted in the epilogue of this thesis, McClellan provides a complete narrative of the events leading up to the end of the Republic in March, April, and May of 1797, that is not present in any other English language source. One glaring weakness in this source is the fact that the author places a huge emphasis on Anglo racial superiority and asserts that racial inferiority was one of the main reasons Venice failed. If one ignores McClellan's social commentary, his historical methodology shines, especially when compared to his peers. This text was published in 1931, but McClellan makes great use of the Venetian archives and expertly cites his sources, which is rare for other books written in this period. Aside from his racial theories, the majority of the text places a great emphasis on political failures as the reason Venice succumbed to Napoleon, as well as the cultural shift away from shipping which I analyzed in detail for the thesis. McClellan explains that there were no men capable of leading Venice against Napoleon, and that the policy of pursuing armed neutrality while many men of the nobility were openly Austrophilic, only worsened the Republic's position in its relationship with Napoleon Bonaparte. Other than the archival sources McClellan used other primary sources, such as the personal memoirs of General Landrieux, to give a step by step view of the diplomatic failures of the Republic in the days before its fall. McClellan explains the events at Brescia, Bergamo, Verona and the Laugier Affair (which were each cited as causes of war in Napoleon Bonaparte's manifesto on 1 May 1797) and explains the subpar reactions of the Venetian state to those events. My analysis of the decline of Venice fits into McClellan's account, while I used several other sources to emphasize the importance of feudalism and the decline of the Jewish community in Venice as other reasons why the Republic failed.⁸ Leaving behind all of

⁸ One primary source used in my study of the Venetian community in Venice is *Venice: A*

the deficiencies present in McClellan's work, James C. Davis expands upon the topic of aristocratic decline both financially and socially.⁹¹⁰

The most notable and thorough scholar of the decline of the aristocracy as a socio-economic group is James C. Davis. His two texts, *A Venetian Family and Its Fortune, 1500-1900: The Donà and the Conservation of their Wealth* and *The Decline of the Venetian Nobility as a Ruling Class* provide both a micro and macro view, respectively, of the economic decline of the nobility and what effects that decline had on the government of Venice. *A Venetian Family and Its Fortune, 1500-1900* expertly traces the wealth of the Donà family through four centuries. The book begins by explaining how the Donà became wealthy through trade and then follows the loss of that trade revenue in the late sixteenth century and early seventeenth century, when the family began to turn to the *mezzadria* system to earn money. This book acted as a

Documentary History, 1450-1630 by David Chambers and Brian Pullan. This text provided excerpts from contracts extended to the Jews which I quoted at length in this thesis. Valuable secondary sources include *The Ghetto of Venice* by Riccardo Calimani, Translated by Katherine Silberblatt Wolfthal; *The Jews of Early Modern Venice* By Robert C. Davis and Benjamin C.I. Ravid; "The Legal Status of the Jewish Merchants of Venice, 1541-1638." *The Journal of Economic History* 1 (1975) by Benjamin C.I. Ravid; *Studies on the Jews of Venice, 1392-1797* also by Ravid; and *History of the Jews in Venice* by Cecil Roth. *A Separate Republic: The Mechanics and Dynamics of Venetian Jewish Self-Government, 1607-1624* by David Joshua Makiel acted as both a primary and secondary source for this topic, as he provides analysis of Jewish self-government, as well as record of that government within his text. Other primary sources include

⁹ While the Venetian military did not play a great role in the fall of the Republic, scholars of Napoleon Bonaparte's Army of Italy and its actions on the peninsula from 1796 to 1797 should consult *Campaign of General Bonaparte in Italy, 1796-7* by J. Chanut; *Recueil des Traités de la France* by Alexander de Clerq; Landrieux, Jean. *Mémoires de l'Adjudant-Général Jean Landrieux : Chef d'état-major de la cavalerie de l'armée d'Italie chargé du bureau secret* by Jean Landrieux; *Napoleon's Campaigns in Italy 1796-1797 and 1800* by Reginald George Burt; *The Campaigns of Napoleon Bonaparte of 1796-1797* by Gustav Joseph Fieberger; *Venice; The City of the Sea, from the Invasion by Napoleon in 1797 to the Capitulation to Radetzky in 1849; with a Contemporaneous View of the Peninsula* by Edmund Flagg; *The Italian Campaigns of General Bonaparte, in 1796-97 and 1800*. By George Hooper; *The History of Italy from the fall of Venice: With the Celebrated Campaigns of Napoleon I and the Chequered Story of the Peninsula up to the eve of the Renewed Struggle in MDCCCLIX* by Adolphus Lance.

¹⁰ *Raccolta Cronologico-Ragionata di Documenti Inediti che Formano la Storia Diplomatica della Rivoluzione e Caduta della Repubblica di Venezia: Corredata di Critiche Osservazioni* by Cristoforo Tentori is another valuable primary source for historians of Venetian political history. This text provides primary source documentation written by many major figures in Venice, including Francesco Pesaro, Captain Landrieux, General Balland and Francesco Battaja, each of whom played a large role in the events described in McClellan's narration.

case study for the examination of governmental decline which is presented in various secondary works. One of these works is Davis' own *The Decline of the Venetian Nobility as a Ruling Class* which is an extension of his examination of the Donà. This text shows the larger trends in decline of the entire aristocratic class. This text explains the decline of the noble population in both size and wealth, which Davis explains was the result of limiting marriages and births and investing money on the *terrafirma*.¹¹ Expanding on the topic of governmental collapse another work titled *The Venetian Patriciate: Reality versus Myth* by Donald Queller, juxtaposes the popular patriotic myth of the Venetian nobility with the reality of their mismanagement of the state. This book also examines political corruption as a side effect of a shift away from mercantilism and gives a very in depth analysis of the rise in dependence on state provided salaries for the nobility.

Another book that helps explain the social equilibrium in Venice that existed between the lower strata of society and the nobility is Dennis Romano's *Patricians and Popolani: The Social Foundations of the Venetian Renaissance State*. This text argues that geography, topography, a merchant economy, guilds, *scuole*, and parishes helped keep peace and build a level of respect between the different classes in Venice and in turn prevented political rebellions that plagued other states.¹² I agree with Romano that the lack of a feudal nobility in Venice allowed her to establish a powerful economy when other states that practiced feudalism were unable to. I extend this portion of his text and propose that while a lack of a feudal nobility did aid Venice in the early years, when the

¹¹ A valuable primary source for the study of Venetian feudal law and its changes over time is presented in *Codice Feudale della Serenissima Repubblica de Venezia*. This collection of laws aided in the analysis of Venetian feudal practices and the inner workings of the *mezzadria* system in Italy. McClellan also provides some information about the leadership structure of the Venetian government.

¹² *Rich and Poor in Renaissance Venice: The Social Institutions of a Catholic Sate, to 1620* expands Romano's arguments about guilds and *scuole*. This text provides in debt

patriciate became the feudal nobility in the late sixteenth century, this upset the social balance and fueled animosity within the lower classes. Also, using Davis' analysis of the feudal practices of the nobility helped to provide a unique argument which explains why the inheritance patterns associated with feudalism coupled with aristocratic cultural ideals, such as *fraterna*, crippled the aristocracy.

While Norwich, McClellan, Davis, Queller, and Romano's works each provide unique arguments and views regarding social, economic, and political forces that caused the decline of the Venetian nobility, primary sources provide direct examples of the structure of the Venetian government and military, as well as a type of census for office holders and births and marriages within the patriciate. The best sources for examining the structure of the Venetian government and military, written during the time of the Republic, are *Policy and Government of the Venetians, both in Civil and Military Affairs* and *The History of the Government of Venice: Wherein the Policies, Councils, Magistrates, and Laws of That State Are Fully Related, and the Use of the Balloting Box Exactly Described* by Abraham-Nicolas Amelot de la Houssaie these books from the 17th century aided greatly in presenting a picture of the organization of the Venetian government and military. While these books were written during the initial decline of the Republic, they are still useful because they are the only English language sources from the time period that are written by someone with direct contact with the Venetian government. Mr. de la Houssaie was the secretary to the French ambassador at Venice. His texts do not present an argument, but rather explain how each office within the Venetian government operated and what authority they had. These books were very instrumental in shaping my thesis because de la Houssaie explains how foreign

mercenaries were extremely important in the Venetian military, but hindered its performance during the decline.

Two other sources used for this thesis that are technically secondary source, but were also used for primary source documentation are *Storia Documentata di Venezia* by Samuele Romanin and *Venice: A Documentary History, 1450-1630* by Brian Pullan and David Chambers.¹³ It is safe to say that the text by Romanin is the most widely used source for Venetian history, as it is ten volumes which covers the early settlement of the islands in the fifth century all the way through to 1797. Romanin provides primary source documents in his chronology which also helped verify portions of McClellan and Norwich's works and also provided some of the only concrete figures regarding revenue for the Venetian state. While any scholar could use this source as a basis for his or her arguments regarding Venetian history, it is also useful as a research tool. In that same way, David Chambers and Brian Pullan's text provides a large amount of primary source documents, transcribed, compiled, and edited for scholars. This book was extremely useful for my analysis of the Jewish community's relationship with the Venetian government because I was able to directly read and analyze these contracts and significantly expand the thesis of this paper regarding Venetian dependency on Jewish financial contributions.

Other than the two sources explained above, several other books (sadly devoid of authors) deeply impacted my arguments in this paper and helped provide primary source documentation of the patriciate in Venice. These books are: *Libro dei Nobili*

¹³ As stated various times throughout this thesis, almost all of my citations from McClellan and Norwich could be replaced with citations from Romanin. These two authors cite Romanin at length and while I would have liked to do the same, my lack of fluency in Italian at the time I wrote this thesis prevented me from doing so.

Veneti Ora per la Prima Volta Messo in Luce; Nuovo Libro D'Oro che contiene Nomi e L'Età De'Veneti Patrizj, Abitanti nella Dominante; Raccolta di Carte Pubbliche, Istruzioni, Legislazioni Ec. Ec. Ec. Del Nuovo Veneto Governo Democratico. Without being able to travel to an archive, these sources were used to consult treaties, verify names of specific members of the nobility and or the political offices they held, as well as confirm details presented in Norwich, McClellan, Davis' and Queller's works. *Nuovo Libro D'Oro che contiene Nomi e L'Età De'Veneti Patrizj* is a book written by the *Avvogadori del Commun* which recorded the names of all noblemen both in office and eligible to serve in offices in the future. From the sixteenth century it also featured a list of all marriages and births within the noble class. The version used in this thesis is from 1797, but also contains information from many decades before. A book that complements *Il Libro d'Oro* is *Libro dei Nobili Veneti Ora per la Prima Volta Messo in Luce* which is an alphabetized list of the majority of the noble families in Venice, with a short paragraph explaining each family's history, how they arrived in Venice, and any notable accomplishments by members of the families. This genealogical record helps humanize the pages and pages of lists presented in *Il Libro d'Oro* and also provides primary source proof of the popularity of seafaring among the noble classes, before the decline of the Republic began. The last and most useful primary source document used for this thesis was *Raccolta di Carte Pubbliche, Istruzioni, Legislazioni Ec. Ec. Ec. Del Nuovo Veneto Governo Democratico.* This text is a compilation of primary source documents from 1797 including letters, treaties, decrees, and legislation from the Great Council and the provisional democratic government that took its place. This source

verifies details presented by McClellan in his account of the events at Brescia, Bergamo, and Verona, and also presents the treaties that resulted from those events.

While the historiography of the Republic as a whole is expansive in every sense of the word, not many scholars devote extensive research exclusively to the decline of the aristocracy leading up to 1797. Through the use of these primary and secondary sources, this thesis aims to present a clear picture of the rise of the Republic, its dependence on immigrant communities for financial and military support, the subsequent economic decline following the fall of the Byzantine Empire, and its effect on Venice's role as a major European power. Through the examination of contracts extended to the Jews of Venice and examination of feudal practices, as well as many secondary sources that provide extensive chronologies of Venetian economic history, I argue that Venice's dependency on Jews, and the replacement of mercantilism with feudalism and state funded salaries for the nobility caused the collapse of Venice and forced her to give up all sovereignty she had held since the fifth century.

1.3 A Mirror of the Future: Venetian Migration and Early Politics, 402-810 CE

The people of the Italian mainland began to migrate to the islands of present day Venice in the fifth century of the Common Era, from Illyria and Anatolia, and from the cities of Padua and Aquileia.¹⁴ In 402 CE Gothic forces under Alaric I (370-410) decimated Venetia and the inhabitants began to flee into the Adriatic.¹⁵ The city of Venice was formally created on 25 March 421 CE.¹⁶ While initial migration began during

¹⁴ Norwich, *A History of Venice*, 4.

¹⁵ Francis Cotterell Hodgson, *The Early History of Venice, from the Foundation to the Conquest of Constantinople, A.D. 1204* (London: George Allen, 1901), 14.

¹⁶ Norwich, *A History of Venice*, 5. This date is established in the *Altino Chronicle* and

this time, the new inhabitants often returned to their cities of origin after the invading forces moved on. This inconsistent migration meant that during the early foundation of Venice, settlement in the islands was sporadic and only a few families chose to permanently settle there.¹⁷ This pattern of migration continued until 452 CE when Attila and the Huns invaded northern Italy and decimated Aquileia, just as the Goths had done fifty years prior.¹⁸ After the Huns invaded, many of the immigrants in Venice decided to make the settlement permanent and sometime between 466 and 473 CE representatives from the various island settlements convened to form a new government made up of tribunes. During this time it was also decided that this new government would be elected annually.¹⁹ These tribunes proved very important in later Venetian history because the ability to prove that a member of one's family had participated in the tribunal government provided legitimacy for many noble families. According to John Julius Norwich, in *A History of Venice*, this marks the beginning of the political history of the future Republic of Venice.

Various invasions by Ostrogoth, barbarian, Lombard and Byzantine forces occurred throughout the sixth century, with changes in administration and government following each, but Venice was able to maintain a stable economy through the trade of

¹⁷ Ibid., 5. While most of the chronology throughout this thesis appears to come exclusively from Norwich's account, this information can be found in several texts: *Venice: A New History* by Thomas F. Madden, *The Early History of Venice* by Francis Cotterell Hodgson, *Napoleon and Bonaparte* by George McClellan, and the expansive 10 volume history *Storia Documentata di Venezia* by Samuele Romanin from 1853.

¹⁸ Hodgson, *The Early History of Venice, from the Foundation to the Conquest of Constantinople, A.D. 1204*, 5.

¹⁹ While John J. Norwich states that the tribunes were created in 466, Edmund Flagg asserts that these tribunes existed from 473 to 503 CE. Norwich, *A History of Venice*, 6; Edmund Flagg, *Venice; The City of the Sea, from the Invasion by Napoleon in 1797 to the Capitulation to Radetzky in 1849; with a Contemporaneous View of the Peninsula* (New York: 1853), 19. Norwich says the tribunes continued to govern Venice past 503, and says that the Byzantine Empire referred to Venice as a tribune as late as 523. One assumes that the tribunes remained an institution in Venice into the 8th century, at least,

salt, one of the islands' most abundant resources.²⁰ Despite the political upheaval on the mainland, by the sixth century Venice had a strong trading fleet and even created a navy.²¹ In 539 CE Italy became part of the Byzantine Empire under Emperor Justinian I (527-565) and by this time Venice possessed the most powerful fleet in the Adriatic region.²² Subsequently, in 553 the Ostrogoths were finally defeated by Byzantine forces and in 565 Venice signed its first contract with the Emperor in Constantinople.²³ This contract promised Venice would remain loyal to the Byzantine Empire, in exchange for military protection and trading rights throughout all of the territory owned or protected by the Emperor.²⁴ Yet another invasion occurred in 568 CE, when the deposed Byzantine general Narses invited the Lombards to invade Italy.²⁵ This point marks a change in the immigration patterns, from the intermittent migration of a few families in the wake of invading forces, to a wave of whole communities choosing to permanently settle in Venice.²⁶ The only link to the mainland that survived this mass migration were the saintly relics brought by bishops from the cities sacked by invaders, and these relics would eventually cause a temporary break with Byzantium.²⁷ By 639 there were communities permanently settled in Venice from the surrounding cities of Aquileia, Concordia, Padua and Oderzo.²⁸

The Byzantine Empire maintained governmental control over Venice and administrative offices were structured on the Byzantine model. Heraclea, also called

²⁰ Norwich, *A History of Venice*, 7.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 7.

²² Thomas F. Madden, *Venice: A New History* (New York: Viking, 2012), 21.

²³ Norwich, *A History of Venice*, 9.

²⁴ Norwich, *A History of Venice*, 9.

²⁵ Madden, *Venice: A New History*, 21; Norwich, *A History of Venice*, 10.

²⁶ Norwich, *A History of Venice*, 10.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 10.

²⁸ Norwich, *A History of Venice*, 10.

Cittanova, was the Byzantine governmental capital of Venice, and Torcello was the hub for Venetian economic activity.²⁹ The see at Grado maintained religious authority over Venice, apart from the see at Aquileia and the see at Rome.³⁰ This lack of religious allegiance to Rome continued throughout Venetian history.

In 726 CE the Venetians decided to disobey an order by Byzantine emperor Leo III to destroy all religious icons.³¹ The Venetians were justifiably attached to their icons, as they were the only tie the people had to their old homes on the mainland. The Venetian tribunal government broke ties with the Exarch at Ravenna and voted to install Orso Ipato as their new provincial administrator or Doge.³² This began an unbroken chain of 117 Doges that would rule over a millennium. Although the tribunals successfully elected a new leader, Venice was still administratively tied to Byzantium. After a brief interregnum from 737 to 742 CE, Orso's son Teodato was elected as the second Venetian Doge. Venetian autonomy was cemented when Ravenna fell in 751 and no new empire immediately rose to claim it.³³

In 764 Maurizio Galbaio became the fifth Doge. This becomes important for later analysis of the noble social group in Venice, because Maurizio Galbaio and his descendants assumed the surname Querini, a very well-known noble family that became thoroughly entrenched in the political history of the Republic.³⁴ Maurizio Galbaio strengthened Venice's relationship with Byzantium and upon approval from the Emperor, he mandated that his son would succeed him as Doge, without a vote of the

²⁹ Ibid., 12

³⁰ Ibid., 11.

³¹ Ibid., 13.

³² Ibid., 13.

³³ Ibid., 16.

³⁴ Norwich, *A History of Venice*, 17.

people, as had been the custom with the four previous Doges. Maurizio is not only important as one of the founders of Venice, whose family maintained a political presence for centuries, he also established a new bishopric in Venice. In 775 Maurizio founded the cathedral church of Venice on the island of Olivolo at San Pietro di Castello, which was the official church of Venice until 1807, when it was replaced by Saint Marks.³⁵ Maurizio's son Giovanni took office in 796 and when Giovanni's son was subsequently installed as Doge, without an election, the government of Venice had effectively devolved into a hereditary monarchy.³⁶

By now Venice was making a fortune trading salt and slaves; she held a monopoly over the former which brought great revenue to the Republic from all of Europe.³⁷ Charlemagne was the acting king of the Franks and the Pope chose to use Frankish troops to secure his secular power in Italy. Charlemagne resented Venetian economic success, so upon his crowning as Emperor of the West on 25 December 800, by Pope Leo III, Venice was once again caught between two empires, as it had been from its foundation.³⁸ The Venetian populace was divided into three groups, the pro-Frankish clergy, pro-Byzantine citizens, and those citizens that supported complete independence.³⁹ After realizing that most of the clergy in Venice was sympathetic to Charlemagne, Doge Giovanni Galbaio orchestrated the death of the Patriarch of Grado, the spiritual authority of Venice. Galbaio hoped that in ordering the bishop's defenestration, he could have his own anti-Frankish bishop installed in the newly

³⁵ Ibid., 18.

³⁶ Ibid., 17.

³⁷ Norwich, *A History of Venice*, 18; Horatio Forbes Brown, *Venice: An Historical Sketch of the Republic* (London: Rivington, Percival & Company, 1895), 255. By the 1450s Venice was gaining 165,000 ducats a year from salt alone.

³⁸ Norwich, *A History of Venice*, 19.

³⁹ Norwich, *A History of Venice*, 19.

established bishopric on Olivolo.⁴⁰ This plan proved disastrous when the newly deceased patriarch's nephew, who was even more pro-Frankish than his uncle, immediately assumed the position of Patriarch of Grado upon his uncle's death.⁴¹ After this mishap, political dissent emerged in Venice and Obelerio degli Antenori was installed as Doge in 804 CE.⁴²

Despite passionate anti-Frankish sentiment among the citizenry, and in complete violation of Venice's agreement with the Byzantine Empire, two of the degli Antenori brothers, now sharing the title of Doge, agreed to pay homage to Charlemagne in exchange for military protection.⁴³ In 809 the Byzantines tried to negotiate a settlement with Charlemagne in order to regain control of Venice, but after a small scrimmage and defeat at Comacchio, the Eastern forces returned to Constantinople.⁴⁴ By 810 CE the Dogeship was shared among three of the degli Antenori brothers and the office of Doge was transferred from Malamocco to Rialto, where it remained until the end of the Republic.⁴⁵ Again, without knowledge or permission from the Venetian administration or citizenry, the brothers invited the Frankish leader Pepin to establish a military presence in Venice.⁴⁶ Just as Obelerio degli Antenori led an opposition force against the Galbaio administration in 804, Agnello Participazio⁴⁷ rose to lead a new opposition force against

⁴⁰ Ibid., 19.

⁴¹ Ibid., 19.

⁴² Ibid., 19.

⁴³ Ibid., 20.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 21.

⁴⁵ Dennis Romano, *Patricians and Popoli* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 14.

⁴⁶ Norwich, *A History of Venice*, 21. This should not be confused with Charlamagne's father Pepin, instead this was Charlamagne's son.

⁴⁷ Also spelled Particiaco according to Norwich. Similar to the assumption of Querini as a surname by the former Galbaio family, Agnello Participazio's descendants chose Badoer as a surname, and they would also be a staple in Venetian politics throughout the history of the Republic.

Pepin and the degli Antenori brothers in 811.⁴⁸ Pepin was immediately successful in taking territory around the lagoon, but was held off at Malamocco.⁴⁹ Unable to conquer the islands, Pepin established a land base opposite Venice and continued to fight for more than six months, while Venetian forces maintained control of the islands and asserted their allegiance to Constantinople.⁵⁰ Throughout this six month fight, Grado and Jesolo, as well as other territory around Venice fell, but Lido and the Rialto remained under the control of Venetian forces. The Venetian authorities eventually agreed to pay an annual tribute to Charlemagne and Pepin departed in the summer of 810 CE, without accomplishing his mission to establish a base in the islands.⁵¹

This short chronology of the political, naval, and economic foundation of Venice shows the migration of refugees to Venice from 402 CE and the emergence of a united Venetian population in 810 CE, even while in apparent limbo between the Franks and Byzantines. Norwich sums it up best, "...in a moment of real crisis they were capable of seeing themselves not as men of Malamocco or Chioggia, of Jesolo or Pellestrina, but as Venetians. Pepin had marched against a group of bickering communities; he had been defeated by a united people."⁵²

The Venetians established a government that lasted over 1000 years, as well as a navy and economy which would eclipse even the richest states of Europe for centuries. So, why were the men of medieval Venice able to unite in the face of multiple threats to establish a stable government and strong economic system, yet unable to maintain those institutions through the tumult of 1797? How and why did the Venetian

⁴⁸ Norwich, *A History of Venice*, 21.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 22.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 22.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 22.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 22.

state decline during a time when other European states were just beginning to expand their economies via seafaring? The answer is three pronged; political, social, and economic factors each played a part in the fall of the Lion of the Adriatic.

CHAPTER 2

THE LION RISES TO DOMINATION: THE VENETIAN ECONOMY, THE ARISTOCRACY, AND THE GOVERNMENT

2.1 Trade, Exclusivity, and Monopoly

As mentioned previously, very early on Venice established her economy by trading salt and slaves, depending upon her powerful navy, and geographic and political positions to trade throughout the known world. By the fourteenth century Venice was trading in gold, brocades, pearls, emeralds, crystals, perfumes, pharmaceuticals, spices, wool, and various luxury goods, to and from Constantinople, India, England, France, Spain, Asia Minor, Hamburg, Lübeck, and Bremen, with seventy-five percent of goods leaving Asia passing through her harbors.⁵³ “The six fleets traveled between: the Black Sea, to trade in skins; Greece and Constantinople, taking wood and bringing bales of English and Flanders cloth; the Syrian ports, trading in gums, spices, etc.; Egypt; the north coast of Africa; and England and Flanders. In England they exchanged glass, sugar, spices, silk, and wines, for tin, wool, hides, and broad cloth.”⁵⁴ The slave trade was also important to the Venetian economy and as far back as the 700s Venice received permission from Pope Zacharias to sell Christian men.⁵⁵ This was a lucrative business for the Venetians and most of the slaves came from surrounding areas like Hungary and Croatia. Although profitable, as early as 864 CE Doge Orso Participazio made a concerted effort to outlaw the practice, and in 959 Doge Pietro Candiano IV

⁵³ McClellan, *Venice and Bonaparte*, 68.

⁵⁴ Horatio Forbes Brown, *Venice: An Historical Scetch of the Republic* (London: Rivington, Percival & Company, 1895), 253.

⁵⁵ Brown, *Venice: An Historical Scetch of the Republic*, 150.

stiffened the penalties for engaging in the trade of people.⁵⁶ While space prohibits discussing every ebb and flow of the Venetian economy throughout her long history, there are two important factors that strongly contributed to her most prosperous period and subsequently led to the rise of the aristocracy as an absolute ruling group. The extension of contracts to Jewish bankers and merchants, and their role in the Venetian economy will be discussed later, but for now, understanding the rise of the Venetian economy, including her conquests, will show the wide and powerful grasp that Venetian shipping had throughout Europe and the Levant.

While the previous introduction to Venetian political and economic history ended in 821, this more in-depth discussion will begin in 1313 and trace the major economic developments that occurred throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, explaining how Venice came to dominate the lands and economies around the lagoon and throughout the Adriatic and Aegean seas.

In March 1313, when Venice was under the rule of Doge Giovanni Soranzo (1312-1328), Pope Clement V (1305-1314) lifted the standing trade interdict on Venice, which kick-started an epic period of economic prosperity and expansion for the Republic.⁵⁷ During Doge Soranzo's rule Venice signed treaties to resume and or begin trading with the Byzantine Empire, Sicily, Milan, Bologna, Brescia, Como, Tunisia, Persia, and Trebizond, while simultaneously taking over Genoese trade agreements with England and Flanders.⁵⁸ This expansion of Venetian trade and territory continued

⁵⁶ Hodgson, *The Early History of Venice, from the Foundation to the Conquest of Constantinople, A.D. 1204*, 99 and 118.

⁵⁷ Norwich, *A History of Venice*, 201.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 202. For the purpose of this thesis, it would be extremely helpful if access to primary or secondary sources concerning the volume of trade into and out of these locations was available, as well as the amount of revenue each colony generated, but as of now I have been unable to gain access to any

into the 1330s when Doge Francesco Dandolo (1329-1339) succeeded Soranzo. During Francesco Dandolo's rule of Venice, the *terrafirma* erupted into chaos, but this eventually proved to be a positive circumstance for the Republic. Can Grande della Scala, a self-made despot in Verona and his nephews, Alberto and Mastino della Scala used military force to expand the family's control of the *terrafirma*, and by 1329 they had beaten back many other powerful families in the region. From his seat of power in Verona, Can Grande and his nephews expanded the family's control throughout the Veneto and by 1329 they controlled Vicenza, Feltre, Belluno, Padua, and Treviso. This expansion threatened to cut off Venice from all mainland trade, and Alpine routes into the rest of the continent. Had the della Scalla succeeded, it would have been disastrous, both for trade and because Venice bought all of its grain, vegetables, and meat on the mainland. Even though the Republic did not yet control any large amount of the *terrafirma*, Venice had a vested interest in mainland political relations due to her dependence on the region. From the beginning of her history, Venice had a monopoly on selling salt in the region, which contributed a large amount of revenue to the Republic on top of trade, and this meant that the markets on the mainland were extremely important for the Venetian economy.⁵⁹ Upon the death of Can Grande in 1329, Alberto and Mastino took control of the family's newly captured territory. By 1332 the brothers gained control of four more important trading posts: Treviso, Brescia, Parma and Lucca, the last of which they took from Florence.⁶⁰ After allying with Pietro de' Rossi of Parma and several other powerful families that had been stripped of their

such resource. Other than the quote by Doge Mocenigo, there are few sources that give exact monetary amounts regarding trade.

⁵⁹ Hodgson, *The Early History of Venice, from the Foundation to the Conquest of Constantinople*, A.D. 1204, 341.

⁶⁰ Norwich, *A History of Venice*, 205-206.

power by the della Scala, an army was raised and the della Scala were ousted. By 24 January 1339 the della Scala brothers had been bested by the league of powerful noble families of the *terrafirma* and a treaty was signed that restored Venetian access to all its important trade centers.

The della Scala family was allowed to keep Lucca, but treaty restored other territory formerly belonging to Florence. The Rossi family regained its holdings in Parma and the Carrara family regained Padua. Although Venice gained some territory in this treaty, the fall of the Carrara family in the 1380s guaranteed Venetian control of the *terrafirma* until 1797. By 1400 Venice controlled Padua, Vicenza, Verona, and other large swaths of territory surrounding the lagoon.⁶¹ Similarly, after her victory over Genoa in 1380, Venice controlled the majority of the Adriatic and Aegean seas, save for Dalmatia, which Hungary controlled.⁶²

Throughout the end of the fourteenth and beginning of the fifteenth centuries Venice removed most of the obstacles that kept it from rising to dominance previously, and by 1420 the Republic controlled the entire Adriatic, even Dalmatia.⁶³ The fact that this was the height of the Republic is reflected in a speech by Doge Tomasso Mocenigo (1414-1423) to the Senate in March of 1423, which shows how far Venice had come and allows one to see how far she would fall over the next few centuries:

⁶¹ Norwich, *A History of Venice*, 280.

⁶² Similar to all of her colonies, Venice's control of Dalmatia was a complex one. She gained control of it for the first time in 1000 CE, although it was still technically owned by the Byzantines. Venice lost Dalmatia to the Hungarians in 1162 and control was volleyed back and forth until Hungary launched an offensive in 1356. Venice lost access to her ports again when a treaty was signed giving Dalamatia to Hungary on 18 February 1358. Hungary sold Dalmatia back to Venice on 9 June 1409. In 1413 a peace was signed with Hungary, but she reasserted her rights to Dalmatia shortly thereafter. By 1420 however, Dalmatia was under firm Venetian control and would remain that way until the Ottoman's brought down the Byzantine Empire. After many more fights to control the area, Dalamatia was eventually given Venice in 1718 and would remain in her control until 1797. Norwich, *A History of Venice*, entire.

⁶³ Norwich, *A History of Venice*, 296.

...During that time we have reduced our national debt, arising out of the wars of Padua, Vicenza and Verona, from ten million ducats to six...and now our foreign trade runs at another ten millions, yielding an interest of not less than two millions. Venice now possesses 3,000 smaller transports, carrying 17,000 seamen, and 300 large ones, carrying 8,000. In addition we have 45 galleys at sea, with crews amounting to 11,000; we employ 3,000 ship's carpenters and 3,000 caulkers. Among our citizens we number 3,000 silk-workers and 16,000 manufacturers of coarser cloth. Our rent amounts to 7,050,000 ducats...⁶⁴

This rapid expansion of the Venetian economy across the Adriatic and throughout the area surrounding the lagoon had direct effects on maritime technology and naval advances for the Republic. Venice depended on its navy and merchant ships to protect existing trade routes and to help protect the Republic's colonies in the Levant. John J. Norwich asserts that the Venetian trading fleet and the Venetian navy were never distinctly separate:

One of the secrets of Venice's rise to power lay in the fact that she never saw the twin necessities of defence and commerce as altogether separate. Her war captains...were never averse to trading on the side-a predisposition which meant that many of her military expeditions actually paid for themselves-while her merchant vessels had always to be ready to defend themselves against pirates or, occasionally, competitors. In feudal Europe, where the fighting nobility remained haughtily aloof from trade, such a system would have been unthinkable, but in Venice there was no separate military caste; the nobles were merchants, the merchants noble, and the interests of both were identical. Similarly, the warships produced by the Arsenal were endowed with as much storage space for additional cargoes as could be devised, and the merchantmen given plenty of provision for defence.⁶⁵

This latest rise in trade spurred technological innovation and the Venetian Arsenal expanded, causing the building and launching of vessels became a year-round enterprise. Designs for ships were improved and rudders were adapted for use. Also,

⁶⁴ Norwich, *A History of Venice*, 298. Summarizing, Venice was bringing in 12,000,000 ducats a year from trade and 7.5 million ducats a year from rents, totaling a revenue of over 19.5 million ducats annually, while supporting a joint naval-merchant fleet of around 3,345 vessels.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 85. This quote also reaffirms Dennis Romano's idea that the noble social group was solely made of up merchants and the lack of a feudal nobility helped Venice rise to power-both of these things will be explained in the proceeding pages.

the amount that a merchant ship could carry increased to 150 tons.⁶⁶ All ships belonging to the various trading fleets, six usually, were the property of the government and loaned out to private merchants for use in transporting merchandise. Every ship was housed in the government owned and operated Arsenal before it departed, and it was the responsibility of merchants to return the ships to the Arsenal when the voyages ended.⁶⁷ Another interesting side effect of this expanse in ship building was the increase in jobs for non-nobles in the maritime industry. Prior to the mid-sixteenth century, up to 200 freemen were employed on each vessel (depending on its size) leaving Venice, as oarsmen and in other positions.⁶⁸ The employment of non-noble freemen in the operation of the ships goes to show how the entirety of Venetian society was dependent upon overseas trade, in more ways than one. Also, during this time the Venetian government began constructing ships with a group of patterns which helped expedite production, since parts were uniform and could be interchanged from ship to ship; at its height the Arsenal employed 16,000 men for construction, 36,000 men for operation, and maintained over 330 ships.⁶⁹

As was explained earlier, when the economy was thriving the territory of Venice expanded, which goes hand-in-hand with expansion of the navy and army. When

⁶⁶ Norwich, *A History of Venice*, 202-203. Great strides in maritime technology were made from 1275 with the mariners' compass and Norwich explains that after the expansion of the empire in the 1300s the Arsenal began expanding and building more galleys to accommodate the larger amount of cargo flowing in and out of Venice. This is evidenced in the previous quote by Doge Mocenigo.

⁶⁷ Brown, *Venice: An Historical Sketch of the Republic*, 251.

⁶⁸ This expanse in military and shipping technology mirrors an earlier expansion in the 1100s under Doge Ordelafo Falier (1102-1118). During his rule he nationalized ship building and created the famous Venetian Arsenal which employed 16,000 workers at its climax. This period also marks the separate construction of vessels meant for military use and those meant for trade although Norwich points out that military and trade were inextricably linked in Venice as evidenced by the quote used to explain this relationship; Norwich, *A History of Venice*, 84-85. This will prove important in later sections when the decline in trade, decrease in noble patrimony, expansion of the government, and deterioration of the Arsenal leads to direct military and economic consequences.

⁶⁹ Brown, *Venice: An Historical Sketch of the Republic*, 205.

conflict arose Venice's merchant-naval fleet, and her army, operated by way of conscription. The heads of each district of Venice called all men between the ages of twenty and sixty and arranged them in groups of twelve, from which one individual was chosen and paid five *lire* a month by the state.⁷⁰ Not only did the noblemen depend on overseas trade to build their patrimony, but non-noble sailors were also allowed space to bring personal goods on board the ships they operated, in order to trade while overseas. This ability to trade while deployed often meant that military voyages were paid for before the men even returned to the lagoon.⁷¹ On top of trading items overseas, Venetians, noble and common, kept up stores, warehouses, markets and factories to finish and market their goods.⁷²

Other than a large and ever expanding navy that helped secure trade routes and maintain control of Adriatic and Aegean ports,⁷³ Venice used a conscription system in tandem with a large number of mercenary forces to obtain and defend the *terrafirma*. A large majority of the troops fighting for Venice were recruited from Dalmatia and Albania and were very undisciplined, no matter how effective they were as fighters.⁷⁴ When war occurred on land, Venice hired foreigners that held the title of Generalissimo or General of the Infantry, and these generals were under the direction of two members of the Venetian senate. The two senators assumed the role of Proveditors General and directed all military decisions based on senatorial guidance.⁷⁵ As mentioned previously,

⁷⁰ Brown, *Venice: An Historical Sketch of the Republic*, 153.

⁷¹ Norwich, *A History of Venice*, 202-203.

⁷² Brown, *Venice: An Historical Sketch of the Republic*, 81.

⁷³ The map on page 32 shows the extent of the Venetian colonies and how they dissolved beginning with the fall of Constantinople in 1453.

⁷⁴ Samuele Romanin, *Storia Documentata di Venezia* (Florence: 1853-186), 9:131.

⁷⁵ Abraham-Nicolas Amelot de la Houssaie, *The History of the Government of Venice: Wherein the Policies, Councils, Magistrates, and Laws of That State Are Fully Related, and the Use of the Balloting Box Exactly Described* (London: 1677), 51.

this system worked well, as Venice was able to raise upwards of 40,000 native militiamen to fight, on top of additional mercenaries, and three companies of cavalry.⁷⁶


Conquered territories, domestically and abroad, were extremely profitable for the Republic because they produced both manpower and natural resources that the government could and did exploit. "Wine and grain came from Apulia; wood from Dalmatia; gems and drugs from Asia; metal-work, silk, and cloth of gold from Constantinople and Greece."⁷⁷ Most of the timber for the expansive shipbuilding industry came from Istria and by the end of the Republic's history, deforestation was a serious problem.

Like other areas colonized by Venice, Istria was directly ruled by noble Venetians under the authority of a podesta. These podeste directed other Venetian nobles governing specific geographic areas. Using the model of Vicenza, the structure of the colonial governments was as follows: a podesta was in charge of justice and economic policies, a captain governed the local military forces, while Venice also sent three assessors, one chancellor, one chamberlain, constables and personal servants. The locals staffed the other administrative positions and governments operated on the Venetian model, including a Great Council made up of local patricians. While the access to men and goods was positive for the Republic, the local populations also had access to Venetian markets for their products and labor. The booming economy and flow of goods and money through Venice meant that other governments were forced to respect her out of their need and want for all of the goods she controlled. If the wealthy

⁷⁶ Abraham-Nicolas Amelot de la Houssaie, *Policy and Government of the Venetians, both in Civil and Military Affairs* (London: 1671), 166; For information on the organization of navy and army consult this source in its entirety. Although the above description of the military was brief, it is meant to show the height of the Venetian empire.

⁷⁷ Brown, *Venice: An Historical Sketch of the Republic*, 81.

members of a society use goods to display their wealth and live in luxury, they are naturally more than willing to make concessions to any group that can provide those goods. All of these factors and many more meant that Venice's possessions provided a large amount of profit for the Republic from the 1300s.⁷⁸



Map 1. Map of Venetian Territory in the 15th and 16th Centuries. Map from Wikimedia Commons, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Repubblica_di_Venezia.png. The labels were edited by Mike Hankins.

On top of expanding possessions on the *terrafirma* and managing colonies throughout the Aegean and Adriatic seas, all while expanding and establishing new trade relationships, several social factors helped Venice rise to prominence and eventual domination of trade between Europe and the rest of the known world. Petrarch stated that “[Venice is] solidly built on marble but standing more solid on a foundation of

⁷⁸ McClellan says that by 1797 Venetian holdings in the Adriatic and Aegean were a financial drain on the Venetian state.

civil concord.”⁷⁹ While, like any citizenry, Venice was fraught with disagreement, the myth of Venice and the cult surrounding her government were built on an idea that she was different; her population was made of a people completely united behind the common good, despite individual income level, profession, or ancestry. While these ideas are true in some respects, other factors contributed to the peaceful environment within the lagoons. The best resource in examining Venice’s domestic stability going into the sixteenth century is Dennis Romano’s *Patricians and Popolani*. Romano uses three criterion to explain why Venice was able to rise to prominence and maintain her level of success for so long: topography and geography, guilds and parishes, and the justice system.

The fact that early Venetian rulers did not have to fight a feudal nobility for control allowed the Republic’s government to expand its power and disenfranchise a large number of citizens. Venice did not have to maintain a *contado*, like other Italian states, until the height of her empire during the 1300s, and this allowed for a surplus of funds which could be used for Adriatic conquests.⁸⁰ This is supported by the fact that Venice lost much of her Adriatic territory, just as the noble caste began to buy land on the *terrafirma*, *en masse*. Although Venetians did not turn to feudalism until much later, Venice began expanding her territory on the *terrafirma* during a time when she was most prosperous economically. This expansion provided an expanded tax base from patricians and *popolani* on the *terrafirma*, increased the available number of militiamen

⁷⁹ Dennis Romano, *Patricians and Popolani: The Social Foundations of the Venetian Renaissance State* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 4.

⁸⁰ Romano, *Patricians and Popolani*, 6.

for defense of the new holdings, and most importantly provided a much needed domestic source of meat and grain for the island Republic.⁸¹

Another obvious way that Venice was able to establish a peaceful environment between social groups, was the geography and topography of the islands themselves. The fact that *palazzi* were naturally separated by canals, allowed for a certain level of privacy that was all but unknown in other urban landscapes of the time. Other than privacy, this geographic advantage also prevented the mobilization of large groups to one area and greatly hindered the ability of mobs to assemble and loiter at any one location. Although men of differing social groups were separated by canals, Romano points out that the way in which Venice divided her parishes also lent to the peaceful atmosphere. Although social groups were politically and economically separated, parishes were not exclusively divided among socioeconomic lines. Men of the nobility interacted with their *popolani* neighbors, creating an atmosphere of mutual respect.

The second way that Venice was able to thwart possible resistance from members of the middle and lower strata of society was through her use of guilds and scuole. Quoting Brian Pullan, Dennis Romano explains that while the *popolani* and *cittadini* were politically disenfranchised, those groups could use guilds and confraternities to exercise political ambition. The highest offices in the six largest scuole, or confraternities, were awarded exclusively to members of the *cittadini*. While it was no Great Council, these offices allowed middleclass men to exercise power over the men of the lowest stratum of society in Venice, the *popolani*, detracting from their lack of

⁸¹ James S. Grubb, *Firstborn of Venice: Vicenza in the Early Renaissance State* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1988), 113. Grubb says that Venetian holdings on the terraferma provided 464,000 ducats a year in tax revenue for the Republic, on top of the expansive amount of foodstuffs and timber previously mentioned. Another valuable contribution that the countryside provided the Republic were resources for the army including: men, minerals, wood, and horses,

power in the administration of the Republic.⁸² For the *popolani*, guilds provided this same opportunity and by 1350 there were more than fifty guild offices in Venice.⁸³ The *popolani* were often artisans who had no opportunity for socio-economic mobility and could not exert any political agency in their lifetime, so the guild system provided an outlet for this. Also, guilds provided insurance and dowries for poor members and this created a system of wealth redistribution within parishes. *Scuole* were closely related to guilds because they were made up of men who practiced the same trade and were therefore, members of the same guild. Rich and poor citizens gathered together to worship God and these organizations also acted as a charity system for members; the confraternities regularly collected alms to distribute to poor members.⁸⁴ While these organizations were dominated by rich *cittadini* and poor *popolani*, Venice was also unique because the most wealthy and powerful social group was made up of merchants and the government acted as proxy trade guild, which united these men under similar professional, economic and political goals. The fact that men of all income levels were able to participate in religious and trade-centered organizations contributed to the social equilibrium that persisted in Venice up to 1797.

Besides geography, parishes, and guilds, the justice system also created a somewhat egalitarian environment in Venice.⁸⁵ Prior to 1300 the Cinque alla Pace and the Signori di Notte were the only police forces in Venice. In 1310 the Republic created

⁸² Romano, *Patricians and Popolani*, 7. The Venetian chancery was also filled with middleclass learned men and provided yet another outlet for political ambition.

⁸³ In this same year there were only 21 guilds in Florence, the only other government that followed the Republican model.

⁸⁴ Brian, Pullan, *Rich and Poor in Renaissance Venice: The Social Institutions of a Catholic State, to 1620* (New York: Blackwell Publishing, 1971), 63. Again, this entire text deals with the topic and is a great resource for anyone studying the relationships between the nobility and the other social groups in Venice.

⁸⁵ For more information see Guido Ruggiero's work on criminal justice in Venice, *The Boundaries of Eros: Sex Crime and Sexuality in Renaissance Venice*.

the offices of the Council of Ten and it rapidly became the chief force of justice for the Venetian Republic. The Council of Ten gained power throughout the early part of the fourteenth century and on 10 August 1319 it created its own police force, called the Capi di Sestiere. The Capi di Sestiere was composed of six groups made up of one nobleman and four patrollers each. There were six of these units that patrolled the six political divisions, or *sestieri* of Venice, along with the two police forces that existed previously.⁸⁶ While rich and poor citizens were subject to the law and the government would pursue justice when a patrician wronged a member of the lower stratum, one should not discount the environment of sheer oppression from the courts, Council of Ten, and huge tax burden that also helped maintain the peace in Venice and keep the *popolani* from rebelling. The structure of the courts and their jurisdiction will be discussed in the next section.

Another important way in which the nobility insured the cooperation of the disenfranchised masses, was through the use of religious and civil rituals. These rituals, such as processions and meals, allowed members of the lower social strata to feel like they were part of the Republic, not only subjects of it. A civic myth which included a strong sense of patriotism and “republican, public piety” helped the lower social groups in Venice feel a sense of agency when in reality they had none.⁸⁷

On top of a vast trade economy, expansion on the *terrafirma*, a powerful navy, and the domestic factors explained previously, there was yet another factor that helped

⁸⁶ Guido Ruggiero, *Violence in Early Renaissance Venice* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1980) pp. 3-17.

⁸⁷ Edward Muir, *Civic Ritual in Renaissance Venice* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 41-44. This entire book is dedicated to the myth of Venice and the rituals and other social controls that the nobility used to help control the masses.

Venice maintain domestic, social, and economic stability. One of the main relationships that contributed to a prosperous Venetian economy leading up to 1500, and desperately aided her collapsing economy throughout the last centuries of the Republic, was the extension of contracts to Jewish bankers and merchants. These contracts benefited the aristocracy and common citizens alike.

An intricate part of Venice's long standing control of Levantine trade was the presence of Jewish merchants in the lagoon. Along with Venice's pursuit of dominance in shipping and receiving goods in and out of Europe, as well as maintaining its monopoly over trade to and from the east, Venice became dependent upon Jewish merchants. While Venice depended on Jews in the sphere of international trade, the state also became heavily dependent on Jewish pawnbrokers and secondhand dealers. While many Italian city-states passed the responsibility of charity and poor relief on to the Monte di Pieta system of charity, Venice chose to place this burden on the Jewish population of the city.⁸⁸

A system for taking advantage of the Jews of Venice was created; they were to be heavily taxed and progressively prevented from making a profit through pawn brokering. Beginning in 1513, Jews were allowed to lend money in Venice, only if the entire community agreed to provide loans to the government and paid a tax that would continue to increase with every future contract. In 1513, the Venetian government negotiated with the Jews of Mestre, a nearby city on the *terrafirma*, and allowed them to lend money in Venice for five years, if they agreed to pay 6,500 ducats a year in

⁸⁸ As discussed earlier, the *scuole* did participate in some philanthropy, but Jewish money lending at little to no interest was much more wide spread than the six *scuole* in Venice.

taxes.⁸⁹ In 1519 the Venetian government began to negotiate a new contract which assigned a 10,000 ducat tax to the Jews. This contract allowed Jews to lend money for ten more years at fifteen percent interest.⁹⁰ Another contract was negotiated in 1528 and permitted a five year extension of the previous contract.⁹¹ The Venetian government agreed to the 1528 contract only if the Jews provided a 7000 thousand ducat loan to the government and paid an annual tax of five thousand ducats; this charter remained in effect until 1538.⁹²

Upon negotiating a new contract in 1537, the Venetian government demanded a loan and gift equaling 12,750 ducats and an annual 7,000 ducat tax in exchange for a ten year extension to the Jews.⁹³ The charter of 1548 reduced the interest rate on loans to twelve percent and this contract became a pattern; the 1548 contract was renewed in 1553 and 1558.⁹⁴ Although the 1558 contract was not renewed until 1568, it was amended and the Jews were only allowed to charge ten percent interest and the annual tax was reduced to 5000 ducats.⁹⁵ In 1573, the government made the Jews loan money at five percent interest and in smaller increments, in order to support the poor.⁹⁶ This obligation forced the Jews to provide financial support to the poor, with no benefits for the Jewish community. The contract of 1573 was renewed in 1580, 1586, 1591, 1597 and 1607.⁹⁷ The charter was again renewed in 1618, 1624, 1629, and 1634.⁹⁸

⁸⁹ Robert C. Davis and Benjamin C.I. Ravid, eds, *The Jews of Early Modern Venice* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 8. The ducat was an increment of Venetian currency.

⁹⁰ Riccardo Calimani, *The Ghetto of Venice*. Translated by Katherine Silberblatt Wolfthal (New York: M. Evans and Company, 1987), 36.

⁹¹ Calimani, *The Ghetto of Venice*, 36.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 37.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 38.

⁹⁴ Davis and Ravid, *The Jews of Early Modern Venice*, 12.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 63.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 13.

⁹⁷ Davis and Ravid, *The Jews of Early Modern Venice*, 13.

Benjamin Ravid publishes the full charter from 1624, as well as its two renewals in 1629 and 1634 in his book *Economics and Toleration in Seventeenth Century Venice: The Background and Context of the Discorso of Simone Luzzatto*.⁹⁹ The second stipulation states the following:

For the greater convenience of the poor, the Jews shall be bound to provide them with loans of 3 ducats or less on each pawn ticket, upon interest of 1 *bagattino* per lire per month and no more...let it be clear that the Jews are not obliged to lend upon gold, silver, pearls, jewels, tapestries and silken cloths, with the exception of bracelets, silver plates, gold rings, and other rings set with false stones or no stones at all, on which they must provide loans, and they may not refuse, excuse themselves or delay making these loans on any account in dealing with any person whatsoever, on pain of a fine of 20 ducats for every time they fail. This fine must be exacted...and one half of it shall go to the accuser, who shall be kept secret, and the other half to the magistracy which enforces this decree.¹⁰⁰

This quote directly illustrates the responsibility of the Jewish money lenders for the care of the urban poor in Venice. The government forced the Jewish money lenders to loan money at very low interest and in small increments to remove the burden of poor relief from the state. The Monte di Pieta system of charity, in which the state loaned money against property, was established across Italy at this time. Venice was excluded from the Monte di Pieta after Doge Cristoforo Moro (1462-1471) received a legate from Pope Pius II to continue contracting money lending to the Jews.¹⁰¹ This development adds another interesting aspect to the relationship between the Jewish community and Venice.

⁹⁸ Benjamin C.I. Ravid, *Studies on the Jews of Venice, 1392-1797* (London: Ashgate, 2003), 105.

⁹⁹ Ravid, *Economics and Toleration in Seventeenth Century Venice: The Background and Context of the Discorso of Simone Luzzatto*, appendix.

¹⁰⁰ David Chambers and Brian Pullan, eds., *Venice: A Documentary History, 1450-1630* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 342. There were 12 *bagattini* to one *soldo* and 20 *soldi* to one *lira*. This means the rate of interest was %5 a year, according to Chambers and Pullan.

¹⁰¹ Pullan, *Rich and Poor in Renaissance Venice: The Social Institutions of a Catholic State, to 1620*, 454-455.

The Venetian government consistently focused on maintaining its political power, while also maintaining control of the population. Although Venice was a Catholic Republic, it did not allow the Church to control any aspect of life that may have interfered with citizens' allegiance to the state. By not allowing a Monte di Pieta system in Venice, the government cemented its control over the Jewish pawnbrokers, exacting financial aid from them, while maintaining care of the urban poor without being directly responsible for that segment of the population. Venice passed a law in 1524 that forbade any discussion of establishing a Monte di Pieta in Venice and continued to contract with the *Tedeschi* Jews for the purpose of poor relief.¹⁰²

In conjunction with freeing up government funds that would have been used for poor-aid, providing loans to the government, and paying an exorbitant amount of taxes, Jews in Venice also fostered an increasingly important trading relationship with the east. The Jewish diaspora in Venice was composed of many different groups of Jews, from Europe and the Levant. Levantine Jews, Iberian (*Ponentine*) Jews, and German (*Tedeschi*) Jews all played a vital role in the economic success of Venice. The first known official document establishing the presence of Jews in Venice dates from 1314, when a Jewish man petitioned the Doge in Venice on behalf of the entire Jewish community of Venetian-controlled Crete.¹⁰³ Venice maintained possession of several territories, including many islands off the coast of modern day Greece, and Jews were important to the local economies of those colonies, in turn contributing to the economy of the entire Republic.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰² Calimani, *The Ghetto of Venice*, 101.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 5.

¹⁰⁴ Calimani, *The Ghetto of Venice*, 10.

Levantines were the first group of Jews to visit and work in Venice. These Jewish merchants visited and traded in Venice centuries before the Venetians invited German Jews to lend money and deal in secondhand goods.¹⁰⁵ Although no exact date can be established, historian Cecil Roth believed Levantine Jews lived and worked in Venice as early as the twelfth century.¹⁰⁶ Benjamin Ravid contends that the Venetian government began to encourage Levantine Jews to bring goods to Venice from Adriatic ports only as early as the fourteenth century.¹⁰⁷ Jews positively impacted the Venetian economy in the city and its overseas territories prior to the early modern period, but the Venetian government did not pass legislation affecting the Levantine Jewish merchants specifically, until 1524. In 1524, the Venetian government passed a law allowing Ottoman merchants to enter Venice, including Levantine Jews.¹⁰⁸ This charter allowed Ottoman subjects to trade with Venetian merchants and dock in Venice, as long as the Ottoman Empire allowed Venetians to do the same. This group of Ottoman subjects included large numbers of Levantine Jews who migrated to the east from Spain and Portugal. Little literature regarding the migration of Levantine Jews to Venice between 1524 and 1541 is available, but a sizeable population of Jewish merchants decided to make Venice their permanent home. So many Levantine Jews migrated to Venice that the government expanded the original ghetto at San Hieronimo, established for the *Tedeschi* Jewish moneylenders in 1516.

On 2 June 1541 the Venetian government published a decree that established a ghetto for the Levantine merchants, and allowed them to avoid customs fees on goods

¹⁰⁵ Cecil Roth, *History of the Jews in Venice* (New York: Schocken Books, 1975), 61.

¹⁰⁶ Roth, *History of the Jews in Venice*, 12.

¹⁰⁷ Ravid, *Studies on the Jews of Venice, 1382-1797*, IV 204.

¹⁰⁸ Ravid, *Studies on the Jews of Venice, 1382-1797*, IV, 206.

coming from the Levant and some products coming from the West to be shipped to the Levant.¹⁰⁹ This charter was an open invitation to Levantine Jews, although they could not bring their families or stay in Venice for more than 4 months at a time because they were still considered visiting Ottoman subjects.¹¹⁰ Unlike the *Tedeschi* Jewish monopoly over money lending, the Levantine Jewish merchants were not the only people engaged in international trade. The Levantine Jews worked with noble Venetian merchants and merchants from other territories permitted to trade in Venice, in order to bring goods from the east to Venice, and from the west in exchange for eastern products. This relationship between foreign merchants and the Venetian government helped to maintain the Venetian monopoly over eastern trade that was being challenged by other Italian ports and European nations at this time. As the Americas were discovered and routes around Africa were increasing in popularity, Venice had to do something to remain competitive, and Levantine merchants appeared to be the answer. The government continuously renewed the customs exemption and passed legislation in 1549, 1551, and 1553 regarding how long the Levantine Jews could stay in Venice.¹¹¹ These updated contracts allowed the Levantines to stay in Venice for up to two years at a time and allowed their families to live in Venice as well.¹¹² The economic concessions granted in these charters affected all Ottoman subjects equally, except the provision providing space in a new ghetto for the Levantine Jews.¹¹³ It was not until 1589 that the

¹⁰⁹ Davis and Ravid, *The Jews of Early Modern Europe*, 81; Ravid, Benjamin C.I. "The Legal Status of the Jewish Merchants of Venice, 1541-1638," 275.

¹¹⁰ Davis and Ravid, *The Jews of Early Modern Europe*, 81.

¹¹¹ Ravid, *Economics and Toleration*, 29.

¹¹² Ravid, *Economics and Toleration*, 29.

¹¹³ Davis and Ravid, *The Jews of Early Modern Europe*, 81.

Venetians contracted the Jewish merchants as a group, independent of the Ottoman Empire.

With the emergence of other European shipping competition Venice extended an invitation to Levantine and *Ponentine* Jewish merchants to aid Venice in combating emerging economic adversaries, and to replace noble merchants that were now more interested in working in politics rather than trade. Negotiations to bring more merchants to Venice began in 1589 when a New Christian merchant named Daniel Rodriguez¹¹⁴ appealed to the Venetian senate.¹¹⁵ This petition asked the Venetian senate to allow fifty Jewish merchants and their families to come to Venice in exchange for a 5,000 ducat tax.¹¹⁶ Daniel Rodriguez' 1589 petition requested various concessions be granted to the Levantine and *Ponentine* Jewish merchants. One request featured in this petition asked,

...That the aforesaid merchants shall not by this agreement have any obligation to contribute to any tax or import to support the loans made by the Germanic Jews through the banks. They shall only be obliged to pay the normal duties and shall remain free of any other burden in that they have no other craft but that of a merchant...¹¹⁷

This portion of Rodriguez' request suggested that although the Venetian authorities exacted taxes from the Jews as one religiously homogenous group, the Jews did not regard themselves as a cohesive community at this time; different parts of the Jewish community had vastly different economic responsibilities within Venice. Rodriguez' petition succeeded and the invitation finally arrived in the form of a 1589 charter to the

¹¹⁴ Also known as Daniel Rodriga.

¹¹⁵ Calimani, *The Ghetto of Venice*, 107.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 108.

¹¹⁷ Chambers and Pullan, *Venice: A Documentary History, 1450-1630*, 348.

Levantine and *Ponentine* Jews.¹¹⁸ This legislation allowed Jewish merchants to engage in trade with the Levant immediately, bypassing the twenty-five year waiting period required of Venetian Christians.¹¹⁹ This invitation also allowed Levantine and *Ponentine* merchants to pay the same customs rates as Venetian nobles.¹²⁰ The Jewish population in Venice steadily increased and the Jewish community's economic responsibilities and prosperity continued to grow for several decades; in 1562 the Jewish population in Venice had reached over 4000 individuals.¹²¹

Eventually the Jewish communities in Venice joined together to create their own governing body to oversee tax collection, since the entire Jewish population was responsible for paying the tax, not just certain individuals. This governing body had various jobs: it contained a committee that assessed the amount of taxes each member of the community should pay, a small assembly in charge of communal administration, and a large general assembly of the community.¹²² The Jews created this body of government when Levantine and *Ponentine* merchants began to help fund the *Tedeschi* banks in 1598.¹²³ Although the Jewish self-taxation worked for a while, it could not help the community with the intense financial burden forced upon it by the Venetian state. Over time, communal wealth shrank and in 1722 the Venetian government investigated the financial position of the Jewish community; it was 1,200,000 ducats in debt.¹²⁴ After

¹¹⁸ Calimani, *The Ghetto of Venice*, 112.

¹¹⁹ Ravid, *Studies on the Jews of Venice, 1382-1797*, IV 210.

¹²⁰ Davis and Ravid, *The Jews of Early Modern Venice*, 88.

¹²¹ Awnsham Churchill and John Churchill, eds., *A collection of voyages and travels: some now first printed from original manuscripts, others now first published in English* (London: Royal-Exchange, 1732), 509.

¹²² David Joshua Malkiel, *A Separate Republic: The Mechanics and Dynamics of Venetian Jewish Self-Government, 1607-1624* (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1991), 61.

¹²³ Malkiel, *A Separate Republic: The Mechanics and Dynamics of Venetian Jewish Self-Government, 1607-1624*, 15.

¹²⁴ Calimani, *The Ghetto of Venice*, 226.

this initial investigation, the Venetian government greatly increased its involvement in governing the ghetto, specifically Jewish tax collection.¹²⁵ In 1732, the Venetian government and the Jews reached an agreement that would help pay back the debt, and the Venetian government ratified the charters it granted to the *Tedeschi* pawn brokers in order to reduce the Jewish debt burden in the future.¹²⁶ As the Venetian economy deteriorated and debt increased, the Jewish population dwindled down to 410 families in the final days of the Republic.¹²⁷

The last contract between the Venetian government and the Jews, negotiated in 1786 and lasting ten years, contained ninety-six clauses.¹²⁸ The Venetian government approved the last charter granted to the Jews in 1788. The final interaction between the Jews and the Venetian government exemplified the dependence of the government on the financial aid of the Jewish community. In 1796, the Jews gave a gift of 6,214 ounces of silver to the Venetian government to help defend against the advancing French forces.¹²⁹ Despite the gradual decline of the Republic, the basic relationship between the Jews and the Venetian government did not change. From the first money-lending contracts in 1513, to the charter inviting Iberian Jews and New Christians in 1589, the Venetian state depended on the Jews beyond measure. The government invited the Jews into the city and then forced them to take care of the urban poor, provide capital for wealthy nobles, sell clothes to the poor, provide gifts, loans, and taxes to the government, furnish government buildings, and foster trade between the East and West. As with any situation, dependency is a slippery slope. Jews were drawn to Venice with

¹²⁵ Ibid., 227.

¹²⁶ Ibid., 229-230.

¹²⁷ Ibid., 244.

¹²⁸ Ibid., 246.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 247.

the hopes of increasing their fortunes through shipping and pawn brokering, but as their revenue increased, so did the government's dependency. This eventually drove the Jews out of Venice and left the government without a previously lucrative source of revenue.

These two narratives, the rise of the Venetian economy and the role of the Jewish community, each help to show how wide the scope of Venetian shipping and military presence were, by the end of the fifteenth century, as well as the structure of the domestic economy in the lagoon. Hopefully these two descriptions have illustrated the many ways in which the Venetian government and nobility were completely dependent on two specific things: shipping and the Jewish community. The dangers of dependency and the lack of diversification of investments and economic activities will prove fatal in chapters to come. What these narratives do not show is how these two things affected Venetian society and politics leading up to 1797. After establishing a few ways through which Venice fostered and created a prosperous economy, a more detailed examination of the Venetian aristocracy and political system are necessary.

F A M I G L I E P A T R I Z I E.
Spiegazione dei segni marginali.

La Lettera C significa quei Patrizj che hanno già avuto ingresso nel Maggior Consiglio, o per aver cavato il Bolettino nell'Avogaria avendo compiuta l'età degli anni venticinque, o per essere estratti alla Barbarella prima di compiere l'età. Quelli che non hanno alcun segno sono mancanti dell'età, o dei sopra riferiti requisiti. La Lettera E significa gli Ecclesiastici, la S li Senatori, la Q li Titolati, ed attuali delle Quarantie, la P li Titolati di Pregadi, la K i Cavalieri, le due Lettere Pr. significano i Procuratori di San Marco. Il segno * indica le Dame di Casa estinta, come pure quelle che nel proprio Casato non occorre di porre, ciò pur s'intende di parecchi Patrizj. Li morti poi sono segnati con una Croce.

A C Q U I S T I A C A S T E L L O.

I Q F	703 30 Giug. Anz. F.M. } q. Z. Bat. 742 23 Ott. Filip. Beniz. } q. Anz. Z. B. } Fr. M. Cattarina }	743 Barb. Soranzo q. F 781 Fr. Foscolo q. Daulo Aug. 786 Ales. Balbi q. Ferig.
A L B R I Z Z I S. A P O L I N A R E.		
F S. F Pr. S. S. I I I	683 3 Dec. Z.B. Proc. } q. Ales. 706 17 Feb. Z. Batt. 1 } q. Z. B. 712 22 Ag. Z. Batt. 4 } Proc. Marino } 744 20 Nov. Z. B. 3 } Ales. Pr. } 747 12 Mar. Z. Batt. 4 } 750 9 Lug. Z. Batt 6 } q. Z. B. Chiara } Laura } Elena } Lugrezia M. } 785 14 Aprile Z. Batt. } di Z. B. 3 tista * } Proc. 795 1 Ott. Z. Batt. 3 }	703 Chiara Vend. q. Vic. f 740 Ter. Barbg. q. M. A. f Messio 724 Gi. Moros. q. And. f 783 Alba M. Zenob. q. Z. Carlo Vicenzo Iseppo 765 An. M. Cap. q. A. 3 F. f 774 Bert. Contar. q. Bert. 777 Giac. Diedo q. Bert. 780 Fr. Bembo q. Mco.

Figure 1. The First Page of Il Libro d'Oro. *Nuovo Libro D'Oro che contiene Nomi e L'Età De' Veneti Patrizj, Abitanti nella Dominante* (Venice, 1797), 79. This page begins the record of births and marriages in the aristocracy for the current members of the Great Council. For further information on the population changes of the nobility, see page 60.

How a person becomes part of the highest socio-economic group within a society differs from place to place. Is it strictly based on income, profession, ancestry, or something else entirely? In Venice it was a combination of all of these things. In order to be a member of the Great Council and become part of the hereditary oligarchy that

governed the Republic one had to be listed in *Il Libro d'Oro* or Golden Book.¹³⁰ This book, as well as its counterpart for recording marriages and births in the Venetian middleclass, The Silver Book, was maintained by the Avvogadori del Commun.¹³¹ The Golden Book is incredibly important in studying the aristocracy of Venice because in order to be a member of the Great Council of Venice and to enjoy other noble privileges, one had to be registered in this book. As will be seen later, hundreds of offices had to be filled by men of noble birth and only those men listed in the book were eligible. The original entrants in the book were descendants of the twelve tribunal families and descendants of men who were serving in the Great Council from 1293 to 1297, before it was effectively closed to non-nobles. Before the office of the Doge was created, *tribuni* ruled Venice. After the dissolution of that system, a “hereditary honorific title” was all that remained and was attached to some families that had provided tribunes.¹³² The tribunal families claimed that they were descendants of the original founding families of Venice. These tribunal families were: Badoer¹³³, Baseggio, Barozzi, Bragadin, Bembo, Contarini, Corner, Dandolo, Dolfin, Falier, Grandenigo, Memmo, Michael, Morosini, Polani, Querini,¹³⁴ Salomon, Sanudo, Soranzo, Tiepolo, Zane, Zen, Zorzi, and Zustinian.¹³⁵ Several founding members of the government later assumed different surnames, reflecting their family’s prior political service. Later, from 1645 to

¹³⁰ McClellan, *Venice and Bonaparte*, 27.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 27.

¹³² James C. Davis, *The Decline of the Venetian Nobility as a Ruling Class* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), 16.

¹³³ Formerly Partecipazio or Particiaco according to John Julius Norwich.

¹³⁴ Formerly Galbaio according to John Julius Norwich. It appears through example, that many of the Venetian families that traced their lineage back to the original *tribuni* changed their names over time. I have been unable to find any resources that explain why these name changes took place or a complete list of the family’s former names. It would be interesting to see the documents that verify the name changes and to analyze how and when these families chose their new names.

¹³⁵ McClellan, *Venice and Bonaparte*, 11. A list of Doges is provided in the appendix. In reading this list one can see that several tribunal families provided Doges for the republic, as well as several families that were not part of the original group of founders.

1718, the Venetian government became desperate to raise money for war and to pay the salaries of employed nobles, so new families were allowed entry, upon the payment of 100,000 ducats.¹³⁶ While from the mid-sixteenth century the Golden Book acted as an official genealogical record, part of the Golden Book was a list of offices and the people who filled them. As of 1797 the offices listed in the Golden Book included: couriers, consuls, clerics, members of the ducal chancellery, public notaries, members of the Avvogaria, noble leaders of army and navy forces in all Venetian territory, ambassadors, Knights of the Stolo d'Oro, senators, members of the Quaranta, and the members of Great Council, or "Famiglie Patrizie."¹³⁷

From its foundation in 421 CE, through the various political controversies of the first eight centuries of the Republic, Venice did not have a clearly delineated political nobility. Even though Roman officials fled to Venice in the wake of attacks by the Huns and Ostrogoths, once there, they no longer held on to their rank in the newly formed government.¹³⁸ It was not until the negotiations began regarding the closing of the Great Council,¹³⁹ in 1296, that the hereditary oligarchy was established in Venice.¹⁴⁰ Prior to the closing of the Great Council, special honor was placed on politics, but the title of noble was attached to the government offices themselves, not permanently assigned to

¹³⁶ Davis, *The Decline of the Venetian Nobility as a Ruling Class*, 106-127.

¹³⁷ *Nuovo Libro D'Oro che contiene Nomi e L'Età De' Veneti Patrizj, Abitanti nella Dominante*. The list of noble families along with birth and marriage records of those families begins on page 79. For this thesis I originally planned to pick five noble families from this registry and investigate what roles they played in the Venetian government during the various Austrian occupations. Due to my lack of fluency in German and Italian and my inability to travel to Venice for research, I was unable to complete this goal, but a great example of my plans for future research can be found in James C. Davis *A Venetian Family and its Fortune, 1500-1900: The Donà and the Conservation of Their Wealth* (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1975).

¹³⁸ Davis, *The Decline of the Venetian Nobility as a Ruling Class*, 16.

¹³⁹ The Great Council evolved out of the Consilium Spaiantum, created in 1144 (for unknown reasons). The Great Council is also called the Maius Consilium, the Maggior Consiglio, and the Greater Council (in comparison to the Minor Consiglio or Lesser Council); Davis, *The Decline of the Venetian Nobility as a Ruling Class*, 16.

¹⁴⁰ Davis, *The Decline of the Venetian Nobility as a Ruling Class*, 17.

a certain group of people.¹⁴¹ From the end of the thirteenth century the nobility of Venice, and therefore her administration, were closed to anyone that was not a member of a legitimate noble family. The closing of the Great Council began at the end of February 1297, with membership being restricted to anyone who had served during the previous four years and male members of noble families over the age of twenty-five; this included about 244 families.¹⁴² It wasn't until the end of the last war with Genoa in 1381, that a group of new families were allowed entry into the Golden Book.¹⁴³ Samuele Romanin provides an account and list of the new noble families that were inducted in 1381:

Solemnized with celebration and giving thanks to the Lord, the triumph of Venetian arms, concluded with the Peace of Turin, signed September 4, 1381. The Great Council in order to fulfill one of the most solemn actions that may honor the republic...was to reward those citizens who had shown the most generosity in helping the state and, just as had been decreed on December 10 of the previous year, thirty families were ascribed to the Venetian nobility. A nobility that had become so archaic, aristocratic and closed, that belonging to the nobility which was the ambition of many men, was the reward for services to the state. After a night of deliberating, the following day 30 names were published from San Marco and Rialto. The approved were: Marco Storlato da San Cassan, Paolo Trevisan, Giovanni Garzoni, Giacomo Condulmer, Marco Zaccaria, Marco Orso, Francesco Girardi, Marco Cicogna, Andrea Darduin, Rafain Caresini great chancellor, Marco Pasqualigo da Candia, Nicolo Polo q. Ermolao, Pietro Zaccaria, Francesco De Mezzo, nephew, di San Luca, Giacomo Trevisan di Giovanni, Nicolo Longo, Giovanni Negro, Andrea Vendramin, Giovanni Darduin, Nicolo Tajapiera, Giacomo Pizzamano, Nicolo de Garzoni, soldier, Pietro Penzin, Giorgia Calergi, Nicolo Renier, Bartolomeo Paruta, Alvise della Fornace, Pietro Lippomano, Donato da Ca Porto, and Paolo Nani q. Pietro.”¹⁴⁴

¹⁴¹ Davis, *The Decline of the Venetian Nobility as a Ruling Class*, 16.

¹⁴² Norwich, *A History of Venice*, 183; Davis, *The Decline of the Venetian Nobility as a Ruling Class*, 28.

¹⁴³ Davis also says that 127 new families were admitted to the Golden Book from 1645 to 1718, in exchange for a 100,000 ducat fee from each family. The last chapter of his book *The Decline of the Venetian Nobility as a Ruling Class* is devoted to the failure of the policy which allowed non-noble patrician families to purchase their way into the Golden Book.

¹⁴⁴ This paragraph is my personal translation from the original account. Romanin, *Storia Documentata di Venezia*, V.3, 301: “Solennizzato con feste e rendimenti di grazie al Signore il trionfo delle armi veneziane, conchiusa la pace di Torino, adunavasi il 4 di settembre 1381 il Gran Consiglio per dar compimento ad una delle più solenni azioni che onorar possano una repubblica. Trattavasi di

After the admission of these thirty families, only eight more families were ennobled by the Great Council over the next two centuries, making it a completely closed caste until 1645.¹⁴⁵

During the time following the closing of the Council, laws were passed concerning noble marriages and other aspects of life that could impact one's presence in the Golden Book. As early as 1276 bastards were restricted from admission into the Great Council, which was reaffirmed in 1376.¹⁴⁶ Noblemen could marry women who were the daughters of nobles from the *terrafirma*, doctors, goldsmiths, glass blowers, and grocers, as well as women of the *popolani*.¹⁴⁷ Recording of noble births began in September of 1506, and recording of noble marriages began in January of 1526, with a 500 ducat fine for failure to do so.¹⁴⁸ If a man married outside of these parameters and

ricompensare quei cittadini che si erano mostrati più generosi nel soccorrere alla patria e, giusta quanto era stato decretato il 10 dicembre dell'anno precedente, trenta aveano ad essere ascritti alla nobiltà veneziana, a quella nobiltà allora ormai fattasi tanto aristocratica e chiusa, a quella nobiltà lo appartenere alla quale era l'ambizione di tanti principi, la ricompensa de' più luminosi servigi. Durò la prescritta ballottazione tutto quel dì e gran parte della notte, al domani pubblicavasi a San Marco ed a Rialto i nomi dei trenta eletti. Restarono approvati: Marco Storlodo da San Cassan, Paolo Trevisan, Giovanni Garzoni, Giacomo Condulmer, Marco Zaccaria, Marco Orso, Francesco Girardi, Marco Cicogna, Andrea Darduin, Rafain Caresini cancelliere grande, Marco Pasqualigo da Candia, Nicolò Polo q. Ermolao, Pietro Zaccaria, Francesco De Mezzo, nipote, di San Luca, Giacomo Trevisan di Giovanni, Nicolò Longo, Giovanni Negro, Andrea Vendramin, Giovanni Darduin, Nicolò Tajapiera, Giacomo Pizzamano, Nicolò de Garzoni, milite, Pietro Penzin, Giorgia Calergi, Nicolò Renier, Bartolomeo Paruta, Alvise della Fornace, Pietro Lippomano, Donato da Ca Porto, Paolo Nani q. Pietro."

¹⁴⁵ Davis, *The Decline of the Venetian Nobility as a Ruling Class*, 18. Sadly, Davis does not list these 8 families, but does state that the 8 families that were ennobled received this privilege after aiding Venice during wartime-similar to the large group of families ennobled during the War of Crete and subsequent conflicts, after 1645.

¹⁴⁶ Laura Ikins Stern, review of *Esse de maiori consilio: Legittimita civile e legittimazione politica nella repubblica di Venezia (secc. XIII-XVI)* by Victor Crescenzi, *The American Journal of Legal History* XLII (1998): 289-291.

¹⁴⁷ McClellan, *Venice and Bonaparte*, 48-49.

¹⁴⁸ James Davis says that noble marriages began to be recorded in 1526, while George McClellan states that the recording of noble marriages did not begin until 1560. James Davis does not provide a citation for his dates regarding the Golden Book, while McClellan cites records directly from the Avvogadori del Comun and also provides an end date for both birth and marriage records-November 1801. Davis, *The Decline of the Venetian Nobility as a Ruling Class*, 19; McClellan, *Venice and Bonaparte*, 27; Laura Ikins Stern, review of *Esse de maiori consilio: Legittimita civile e legittimazione*

gave up his right to the Great Council, his male children could often gain membership through an uncle or other male relation that was in good standing with the Great Council.¹⁴⁹ Other contemporary Italian city states allowed citizens to enter into the nobility by buying their way in, but this was particularly difficult in Venice. In Venice, one's family name and presence in the Golden Book were the only way to assume the rights given to the nobility.¹⁵⁰ While "buying" ones way into the book was theoretically impossible in the early years of the Republic, a new family did have to possess a certain level of patrimony to be allowed into the book, so wealth obviously played a part.¹⁵¹

The idea that no one in Venice bought their way into the Golden Book is an area where argument erupts within the historiography of this topic. George McClellan, in *Venice and Bonaparte*, cites a specific case from 1668 when a certain Giovanni Andrea Giovanelli paid 100,000 ducats for entry into the Golden Book.¹⁵² The example from McClellan echoes Davis' account of 127 families paying 100,000 ducats each for entry into the Golden book, between 1645 and 1718. John Julius Norwich also relays another story of a family buying its way into the Golden Book. With this information it is clear to see that the aristocracy was not a monolithic group of rich, native Venetians who could trace their lineage back to 1297. Instead, to become part of the Venetian nobility one

politica nella repubblica di Venezia (secc. XIII-XVI) by Victor Crescenzi, *The American Journal of Legal History* XLII (1998): 289-291.

¹⁴⁹ Laura Ikins Stern, review of *Esse de maiori consilio: Legittimita civile e legittimazione politica nella repubblica di Venezia (secc. XIII-XVI)* by Victor Crescenzi, *The American Journal of Legal History* XLII (1998): 289-291.

¹⁵⁰ Davis, *The Decline of the Venetian Nobility as a Ruling Class*, 19-20.

¹⁵¹ Although families had to possess a certain level of patrimony to be allowed into the Golden Book, loss of that patrimony did not mean that a family was taken out of the book. Other than a family dying out, marrying below their caste, or committing grave crimes against the state, it was impossible to lose one's noble status. Later sections will show how the nobility was divided by income and how rich families and the state supported lesser fortunate nobles from the 1500s through the end of the republic. Also, although it is clear that families were buying their way into the book, the government of Venice always cited honorable deeds towards the state as reason for ennobling certain families.

¹⁵² McClellan, *Venice and Bonaparte*, 19.

could aid the state during times of trouble, trace his family lineage back to a member of the government from 1293 or prior, or be willing to pay 100,000 ducats to the Republic in exchange for the right to join the nobility.

These three factors created deep fissures in the seemingly harmonious noble strata of Venetian society. The original tribunal families played a huge part in these divisions. The Venetian government tried very hard to paint a picture of unity within the aristocracy in order to cement their control over the Venetian population, but the rulers of Venice were far from united. Not only was the aristocracy divided into subgroups based on patrimony, but it was also divided into new and old families.¹⁵³ The old families, those whose families could trace their lineage prior 1297, tried to keep power out of the hands of the large number of families that had only recently been ennobled; this attempt was futile as many of the old families died out overtime and were replaced by new families that could supply the government with a fresh source of taxes and forced loans.¹⁵⁴ The most important division within the highest stratum of the Venetian citizenry was based on a widening income gap among many of the old and new families, which will be examined in the proceeding chapter.

The preceding paragraphs were meant to establish the history and formation of a closed, patrician, oligarchical caste that had complete and total political control over the lower social groups. The next section will explain how the government was organized and the jobs these noblemen often filled, at the expense of the state.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵³ Old families are families that can prove their presence in the government before 1297 while new families are those that were ennobled later.

¹⁵⁴ Interestingly, the last Doge of Venice was part of new Venetian noble family that paid 100,000 ducats in 1651 for entry into the Golden Book.

¹⁵⁵ For a more in depth portrait of the social history of the aristocracy, including their diet, hobbies, customs, and other behaviors, the last 5 chapters of *The Venetian Republic, Its Rise, Its Growth and Its Fall: 421-1797* by William Carew Hazlitt is an excellent resource. Also, an informal genealogical survey

The vast expanse of the Venetian bureaucracy and the price it exacted on the revenue of the state will be discussed below, but just how large the administrative stratum of society in Venice was and the tasks it carried out, is important in analyzing the complete and total incompetence of the government in 1797. Venice was an oligarchy and all men over the age of twenty-five that belonged to the noble stratum of society, were eligible to work in the administration of the Republic.¹⁵⁶ The intricate structure of the Venetian government and the large number of offices which required nobles to fill them evolved out of an expansive noble need for state provided salaries after the economic decline of the mid to late 1500s. There were hundreds of offices to be filled and the only eligible candidates were wealthy aristocrats. Men of the middleclass worked in the government as notaries and secretaries, but were not eligible to hold political office by virtue of their birth.


By 1797 the total number of nobles who were members of the Great Council, the base of the Venetian government, included 1,189 men from 165 families.¹⁵⁷ Of these 165 families only sixty-eight of these families had a member in either the Senate or the Quaranta. Of those sixty-eight families, thirty-two held ninety-three votes in the Senate, an absolute majority. Twenty-nine families held no important offices and fifty-three other

about the origin of several Venetian noble families, was published in 1866 and provides invaluable information about the nobility.

¹⁵⁶ Davis, *The Decline of the Venetian Nobility as a Ruling Class*, 23.

¹⁵⁷ McClellan, *Venice and Bonaparte*, 15-28.

families held no votes in the senate and had no judges among their ranks.¹⁵⁸



The doge, councilors, and three chiefs of the major law court made up the *Signoria*. The *Pien Collegio* consisted of the *Signoria* and the *savi*.

The arrows in the diagram indicate which government bodies were responsible for the election of others.

Figure 2. The Structure of Power in the Venetian Government. Davis, *The Decline of the Venetian Nobility as a Ruling Class*, 95.

The government structure was very complex. The large pool from which officials were selected was the Great Council. The Great Council was created in 1142 and originally contained thirty-five members, then 100, then 470, and at its height in 1524, there were 2,100 members of the Council.¹⁵⁹ The closing of the Council in 1297 allowed anyone who had served during the previous four years automatic membership and took

¹⁵⁸ McClellan, *Venice and Bonaparte*, 12-13.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 16. Again, conflict arises between Davis and McClellan's figures, and once again favor goes to McClellan. While Davis says the height of the Great Council was in 1513 when membership reached 2,570, McClellan cites a vote of the Great Council in 1524, in which 2,095 ballots were cast. McClellan, 15. Thomas Madden extends this diagram even further and includes the *Arengo*, a body of all male citizens of the Republic—not limited by citizenship status or income level. While this body existed, it is seemingly inconsequential to the analysis of the Venetian government, since the vast majority of its members had no political or economic agency, what so ever.

away any limits on the future size of the Council.¹⁶⁰ As the population of nobles changed so did the total membership of the Great Council. This proved detrimental in the late 1700s when the patriciate shrunk to an alarmingly low level, leaving the power of governing in the hands of as little as thirty-two families, grotesquely smaller than the 244 families that had ruled a few centuries prior.¹⁶¹

The Great Council carried out various tasks, including electing fellow nobles to vacancies within the government, even the position of Doge; from a group of forty-one electors the Doge had to secure twenty-five votes.¹⁶² The task of electing nobles became important for the large number of *barnabotti* or poor nobles, because it meant that they could sell their votes in the Great Council in exchange for being elected to salaried positions. The impotence of a large portion of the patriciate, shows the absolute power held by the richest members of the nobility. Not only were they enfranchised by birth and possessors of extensive wealth, they were also able to subordinate members of their own socio-economic group. Thirty-two families were able to control the future of almost 3,000,000 people. On top of electing officials, the Great Council also met every Sunday to discuss governmental tasks, form alliances to help carry out their goals, and to consider potential candidates for offices. While the Great Council did not hold very much absolute power, it was the birthplace of every senator, judge, podesta, ambassador, and Doge in Venice, after 1297.¹⁶³

¹⁶⁰ Davis, *The Decline of the Venetian Nobility as a Ruling Class*, 16-17.

¹⁶¹ McClellan, *Venice and Bonaparte*, 32.

¹⁶² Amelot de la Houssaie, *The History of the Government of Venice: Wherein the Policies, Councils, Magistrates, and Laws of That State Are Fully Related, and the Use of the Balloting Box Exactly Described*, 12.

¹⁶³ Amelot de la Houssaie, *The History of the Government of Venice: Wherein the Policies, Councils, Magistrates, and Laws of That State Are Fully Related, and the Use of the Balloting Box Exactly Described*, 7.

To accompany the preceding chart of authority that Davis provides in his text, an explanation is necessary. The Doge was at the top of the pyramid, followed by six ducal councilors, and three chiefs of the Quaranta Criminale; this body was known as the Signoria.¹⁶⁴ The Signoria was always present at meetings of the Council of Ten, which was a body created in 1310 to "...preserve the liberty and peace of the subjects of the Republic and to protect them from the abuses of personal power."¹⁶⁵ The Council of Ten included three Capi, which were elected by the Great Council. This council pursued criminals and enemies of the state, in conjunction with two other police forces which were under the Avogadori di Comun. The Great Council elected the Senate, the most powerful body in the government. The Senate had 380 members, 185 of which could vote, including members of the Council of Ten, the Procuratori di San Marco, and forty members of the Quaranta Criminale.¹⁶⁶ The senate controlled the government-owned merchant-naval fleet and set down rules regarding appointments and routes, as well as most other legislation. A committee of the Senate known as the Collegio came next; it included: six savi grandi, five savi di terra ferma, and five savi ai ordeni. These two groups together formed the Pien Collegio which met every day to create a plan for the Senate. The Council of Ten consisted of ten elected members, the Doge, and six ducal councilors. According to Davis this last body fell outside of the pyramid of authority and worked to insure the security of the state by way of three elected inquisitors. Other offices included the three branches of the Quaranta: one branch for civil cases outside of the lagoon, one for domestic civil cases, and one branch for criminal cases, as well

¹⁶⁴ Davis, *The Decline of the Venetian Nobility as a Ruling Class*, 21; Donald E. Queller, *The Venetian Patriciate: Reality versus Myth* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1986), 347.

¹⁶⁵ Norwich, *A History of Venice*, 282.

¹⁶⁶ McClellan, *Venice and Bonaparte*, 11.

as the Avogadori di comun who referred cases to the Quaranta.¹⁶⁷ Rich and poor alike were under the law, and aristocrats were regularly prosecuted for crimes ranging from being pimps to selling their votes in the Great Council.¹⁶⁸

Another important part of the Venetian government was the Cancelleria Ducale, which provided employment to a large number of *cittadini*. The ducal chancellery consisted of 103 men of middleclass origin that acted as secretaries for any political office in need of its services, including the many consuls and embassies maintained in all areas of Europe and the Levant.¹⁶⁹ Unfortunately, it would be beyond the scope of this project to list every office in the Venetian government and its role in the administration of the state because all-in-all there were some 800 positions to be filled!¹⁷⁰ Although there were more than 800 offices, Davis believes that even at the height of her prosperity, Venice only needed 100 noblemen to run the state in an effective manner. This analysis becomes extremely important during later centuries when the employment of nobles swells to eight times that number.¹⁷¹

The Venetian government was theoretically a top down system, with the Doge at the top and every noble male over the age of twenty-five at the bottom. Although the government was organized in a hierarchical structure, legislation insured that the Doge was effectively powerless. Another interesting aspect about the Venetian government is that the division of power was not strictly vertical, but rather many areas of authority and

¹⁶⁷ McClellan, *Venice and Bonaparte*, 11.; Abraham-Nicolas Amelot de la Houssaie, *The History of the Government of Venice: Wherein the Policies, Councils, Magistrates, and Laws of That State Are Fully Related, and the Use of the Balloting Box Exactly Described*, entire.; Donald E. Queller, *The Venetian Patriciate: Reality versus Myth* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1986), 343-48.

¹⁶⁸ Queller, *The Venetian Patriciate: Reality versus Myth*, 172-246; Guido Ruggiero, *Violence in Early Renaissance Venice*, entire.

¹⁶⁹ McClellan, *Venice and Bonaparte*, 44-45.

¹⁷⁰ Davis, *The Decline of the Venetian Nobility as a Ruling Class*, 22. McClellan says there were 611 "important" offices to fill.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 23.

governance were shared linearly among several offices, as we see in the chart created by James Davis.¹⁷² This structure created problems in law making because several bodies had the authority to pass laws, yet there was no complete code used to record these laws, so they were often unenforceable. Even laws governing nobles were blatantly ignored.¹⁷³

Also, all aspects of the Venetian foreign services were tied to extremely wealthy members of the Great Council, because while the government did provide a stipend for holding these posts, the cost of upkeep, entertaining visiting politicians, and staffing the posts were left up to the office holder.

As one can see, this structure also left the vast majority of Venice disenfranchised. By 1797 the Venetian population was approaching three million, while the nobility had shrunk to 1000 men. Three percent of the population governed the Republic and as the proceeding chapter will show these men were often poorer than some of the wealthier, but disenfranchised, members of the lower strata of society.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷² Davis, *The Decline of the Venetian Nobility as a Ruling Class*, 20-21. This area could be greatly expanded through research of customary law. Since Venetians had so many different governing bodies that could legislate and enforce law, it would be interesting to see which laws were upheld and which were not, according to custom.

¹⁷³ The second law listed under the *Principal Laws of the Government of Venice* states that "No nobleman is permitted to trade..." Amelot de la Houssaie, *The History of the Government of Venice: Wherein the Policies, Councils, Magistrates, and Laws of That State Are Fully Related, and the Use of the Balloting Box Exactly Described*, 18-19.

¹⁷⁴ McClellan, *Venice and Bonaparte*, 45.

This section was meant to provide a diagram of the governing structure of Venice and to provide an image with which to contrast the revolution that would grasp Venice in 1797. By juxtaposing the prosperous and powerful years of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, with the decline of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, it is easier for one to understand why Venice so easily failed. To this point Venice used her geography, topography, law, immigrants, and trade economy to maintain a peaceful environment in the lagoons, so when the latter began to disintegrate Venice herself would do the same.

POPULATION CHANGES ²³							
Ven. Year	Noblemen Total	Pop. of Venice Year	Pop. of Venice Total	Percentage of Noblemen in Population ²⁴	Mainland Pop. Year	Mainland Pop. Total	
1513	(2,570)	1509	(115,000)	1509			
1550	(2,520)						
		1552	158,069	1552	1.6 pct.	1548	1,438,741
		1570	(170,000)				
(PLAGUE TOOK PLACE				1575 - 1577)			
1594	1,970	1581	134,871	1581	1.4 pct.		
1620	2,000	1624	141,625	1624	1.4 pct.		
(PLAGUE TOOK PLACE				1630 - 1631)			
1631	1,6660	1633	102,243	1633	1.6 pct.		
1645	(1,620)	1696	138,067				
(127 FAMILIES ADDED)							
1719	1,710						
1775	1,300						
(TEN FAMILIES ADDED)							
1797	1,090	1797	137,240	1797	.8 pct.	1790	2,225,335

Figure 3. Chart of Venetian Population. Davis, *The Decline of the Venetian Nobility as a Ruling Class*, 58.

CHAPTER 3

THE LION COWERS IN FEAR: THE DETERIORATION OF VENICE

3.1 A Bankrupt State: The Decline of the Aristocracy

While the second chapter explained the rise of Venice and the structure of her government, this chapter will show how the different factors that contributed to her rise, when they failed, became the same factors that paralyzed the state during a time when she needed power the most.

Two trends occurred in tandem in the last years of the Republic: the patriciate shrank and the once prosperous economy in Venice dried up. These two things had resounding consequences socially, politically, economically and militarily. As explained above, a prosperous shipping industry and various naval conflicts caused the expansion of the Venetian merchant-naval fleet from the 1100s through the sixteenth century. Since the Venetian shipping industry and its navy were completely intertwined, the decline of the former caused the deterioration of the latter. Before looking at the political and social environment of 1797, the decline of the military is an important starting point.

The land troops of the republic in the last decennium of the eighteenth century amounted to 13,000 men, of whom the majority were Slavonians, and the rest recruits from all countries of Europe, Spain alone excepted. They were badly paid, and were held in well-deserved contempt by all Venetians. The marine was held in greater honour, but at this time it had sunk to some ten ships of the line, a few frigates, and four large galleys. Against the ships of other nations, however, this fleet was powerless.¹⁷⁵

This quote shows the unfortunate decimation of the Venetian military and its inability to defend Venice from both foreign and domestic enemies. During the Scaligeri affair in

¹⁷⁵ Adolphus Lance, *The History of Italy from the fall of Venice: With the Celebrated Campaigns of Napoleon I and the Chequered Story of the Peninsula up to the eve of the Renewed Struggle in MDCCCLIX* (London, 1859), 15.

the early 1300s, Venice had 40,100 volunteers available for conscription to help fight off the della Scalla brothers and establish a permanent presence on the *terrafirma*. In the 1530s she had a provincial militia numbering 30,000 men, but by eighteenth century Venice could only muster a little more than 10,000 troops capable of defending her various holdings on the *terrafirma*.¹⁷⁶ The goal of this thesis has been to show how every aspect of the Venetian Republic was dependent upon the aristocracy and trade. Leading up to the sixteenth century the Venetian aristocracy dominated international trade and funded a booming shipping industry that fostered a very powerful navy. While the short example above does not provide a comprehensive view of the failure of the military, it does introduce a larger issue that was also mentioned above: the dangers of dependency. Rather than maintaining a separate military that could aid merchants when needed, the Venetian state became dependent on the patriciate, economically, politically, and militarily; as the patriciate failed, the economy, government, and military also failed. By the eighteenth century the Arsenal had not been updated in centuries and while other European powers were developing new ships to help foster their blooming sea-based trade, Venice was still using antique ships that were obsolete in every sense.¹⁷⁷ The deterioration of Venice's navy would have dire consequences in the centuries to come, as it was the only means for defending the overseas empire and domestic sphere.

After forty years of peace, Venice began to lose her monopoly over trade in the Adriatic in the 1500s, under Doge Andrea Gritti. As if the emergence of other European trading powers was not enough, by 1537 the government was on the verge of

¹⁷⁶ Norwich, *A History of Venice*, 206; Brown, *Venice: An Historical Sketch of the Republic*, 358.

¹⁷⁷ Norwich, *A History of Venice*, 589.

bankruptcy.¹⁷⁸ In August of 1537 Venetian forces were able to defend their holdings at Corfu against Sultan Suleiman, but subsequently lost Nauplia, Malvasia, Skiros, Palmos, Aegina, Ios, Paros, and Astipalia.¹⁷⁹ As mentioned earlier, only rich families were dispatched to rule foreign territory since the families themselves, not the state, were responsible for keeping up the posts. This custom caused severe problems when those posts were attacked since individual families, now in dire economic straits, were unable to independently raise an army to defend Venetian holdings.¹⁸⁰

After these initial losses of territory, Venice began preparing for war with the new Turkish Sultan, Selim, in 1570. Although the state had regained some financial stability, private citizens were still in grave financial distress as a result of the loss of Adriatic trading posts. Those families that still held on to their patrimony helped in the war effort by equipping their ships and raising private militias. In that year alone Venice was able to raise 144 ships, including 126 war galleys, but it proved futile against Ottoman forces and on 1 August 1570 Venice surrendered Cyprus, ending an eighty-one year occupation.¹⁸¹ Following this defeat, Venice managed to beat Turkish forces at Lepanto in 1571, but this victory was too little, too late. Continued aggressive action by the Ottoman Empire led to an ever present drain on the Venetian economy. Although Venice still held Crete, a twenty-two year siege beginning in 1647 ended with the Venetian surrender of Crete on 6 September 1669, in which Venice lost a trading post

¹⁷⁸ Norwich, *A History of Venice*, 453.

¹⁷⁹ These posts were Venice's last strongholds in the Peloponnese and after their loss she was only able to maintain a few Levantine trade routes.

¹⁸⁰ Norwich, *A History of Venice*, 453. The proceeding pages are only a summary of the military and naval exploits of Venice during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Again, my goal is only to show the deterioration of the Republic, not to give an in depth account of her actions and reactions to Ottoman incursions in the Adriatic and Aegean seas.

¹⁸¹ Norwich, *A History of Venice*, 468-478. The surrender of the territory was also coupled with a 300,000 ducat payment to the Sultan-yet another financial blow to the already fragile Venetian treasury.

she held for 465 years.¹⁸² Venice went on to lose Chios in February 1695, but through the Treaty of Karlowitz held control of the Morea and Aegina, and retained her holdings at Santa Maura and other locations on the Dalmatian coast.¹⁸³ Despite regaining some control in the Adriatic and Aegean Seas, after 158 years of war with the Ottomans and the passing back and forth of territory between the two empires, the recolonization of her once prosperous ports did not succeed. By 21 July 1718 when Venice signed the Treaty of Passarowitz she held: Bergamo, Brescia, Cremona, Verona, Vicenza, Rovigo, Treviso, Feltre, Belluno, Cadore, Friuli, Istria, Dalmatia, Northern Albania, Cattaro, Butrinto, Parga, Preveza, Vonitsa, Corfu, Paxos, Antipaxos, Santa Maura, Cephalonia, Ithaca, Zante, Strophades, and Cythera.¹⁸⁴ These holdings would be the only remnants of her once prosperous empire and Venice never gained any other territory before her ultimate demise.¹⁸⁵

A valuable chart is presented in William Miller's *The Latins in the Levant, A History of Frankish Greece (1204-1566)* which shows the Venetian rise to dominance in the Adriatic throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and the rapid loss of control at the hands of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁸⁶ By the time Venice surrendered to Napoleon Bonaparte, the Republic only possessed four colonies in the Ionian Islands and those were maintained at a high cost for the Venetian government and patricians that ruled them.¹⁸⁷ The loss of Venetian domination of the Adriatic after the fall of the Byzantine Empire, directly affected every area of Venetian life. Long before 1797,

¹⁸² Norwich, *A History of Venice*, 557.

¹⁸³ The treaty was signed on 13 November 1698. Norwich, *A History of Venice*, 573.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 582.

¹⁸⁵ While this may seem like an impressive amount of territory, Venice only held four of her former twenty-four colonies in the Levant, by 1797.

¹⁸⁶ See page 58.

¹⁸⁷ McClellan, *Venice and Bonaparte*, 67.

Venice was deteriorating economically due to the loss of her monopoly of Levantine trade networks.

VENETIAN COLONIES

Modon }	1206-1500
Coron }	
Argos	1388-1463
Nauplia	1388-1540
Monemvasia	1464-1540
Lepanto	1407-99
Negroponte	1209-1470
Pteleon	1323-1470
Ægina	1451-1537
Tenos	1390-1715
Mykonos	1390-1537
Northern Sporades	1453-1538
Corfù	1206-1214 ; 1386-1797
Cephalonia	1483-5 ; 1500-1797
Zante	1482-1797
Cerigo	1363-1797

Sta. Mavra	1502-3
Athens	1394-1402
Patras	1408-13 ; 1417-19
Naxos	1494-1500 ; 1511-17
Andros	1437-40 ; 1507-14
Paros	1518-20 ; 1531-36
¼ of Amorgos	1370-1446
Maina	1467-79
Vostitza	1470

Figure 4. List of Venetian Colonies. William Miller, *The Latins in the Levant, A History of Frankish Greece (1204-1566)* (New York: E.P. Dutton and Company, 1908), 654.

While the Venetian economy was vibrant due to shipping in her early history, later the Venetian economy became dependent on forced loans from the aristocracy, from the Jews of the city, and from other groups. These loans were used pay for the hundreds of salaries the government provided to nobles, which funded the increasingly popular custom of luxurious living. A large portion of this thesis was dedicated to

showing how dependent the Venetian society and economy was on the Jewish population. Another interesting side effect of this dependency was its effect on shipping. Beginning in the mid-sixteenth century, Venice began extending contracts to Jews that allowed them trading privileges, not given to native, non-patrician, Venetians. Beginning in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, as the remaining wealthy nobles invested in land on the *terrafirma* in an attempt to make money, Jews, Greeks, and Dalmatians became the sole demographics that profited from trade.¹⁸⁸ There was an uptick in trade revenues as late as the 1780s, but the Venetian nobility had long abandoned their original role as a merchants. This meant that in 1782 when Venice was importing a higher volume of goods than ever before, albeit from mostly Italian sources, the people benefiting from it were not noble Venetians.¹⁸⁹

As pointed out earlier, one of the key factors to which Dennis Romano attributed Venice's domestic tranquility was the fact that the aristocracy was married to trade and the government simultaneously served as a guild for merchants. As the aristocracy drifted away from trade, that void was filled by non-noble immigrants. Dalmatians, Greeks, and Jewish men became merchants and although shipping was no longer as prosperous as it once was, these men were making a profit, while the nobility was not. Explained earlier, while the nobility was no longer engaging in trade, the Venetian government did force loans and heavy taxation on the Jewish community, and these payments came directly from trade revenue. This shift in the trade environment caused one of the main factors which helped keep the social balance between the aristocracy and the lower socio-economic groups, to dissolve. By now it is easy to see that Venice

¹⁸⁸ Norwich, *A History of Venice*, 597.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 591.

was dependent on immigrants for many things, not just economically, but also militarily, since the vast majority of her land forces were made up of mercenaries.¹⁹⁰

We already examined how the Venetian presence abroad rapidly dissolved throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, but this occurred directly after other unfortunate and unforeseen events damaged her only source of wealth. Constantinople fell to the Ottomans in 1453, Christopher Columbus discovered America in 1492, and Vasco de Gama discovered a shipping route around Africa in 1497. By 1600 Venice lost the expansive revenue earned from trading spices, when the Dutch East India Company emerged. Each of these things greatly damaged the monopoly of trade in and out of Europe that Venice held for centuries.¹⁹¹ With the demise of trade one assumes that the wealthy nobles would seek profits through other avenues of business, but unfortunately that did not happen. The aristocracy sunk its money into land on the *terrafirma* and luxury goods.

After the brief sections regarding the bankruptcy of the Jewish community, the deterioration of the military, and loss of dominance in the Adriatic, the fall of the aristocracy will explain why and how Venice lost her political power in the 18th century. The most important factors in the decline include the shrinking of the noble population, an increased dependency on the state by the remaining nobles, and a turn to feudalism as a source of income.

One thing that greatly depleted the Venetian treasury was the expansive population of nobles that depended on the Venetian government as a source of income. This was not a new phenomenon, but the volume of the population using the state as a

¹⁹⁰ This is explained in section 2.1, page 24.

¹⁹¹ McClellan, *Venice and Bonaparte*, 70; Norwich, *A History of Venice*, 591.

source of income increased rapidly, just as the state's revenue decreased. The nobility was divided between old families and new families, but it was also divided based on income level. There were three subgroups within the Venetian nobility: the higher ups that both possessed vast wealth and political power, the middleclass that was self-sufficient but lackluster in all other areas, and the *barnabotti*, or lowest stratum of nobility, which was completely dependent on the state and richer nobles to live and exercise political agency.¹⁹² As the government grew to accommodate the flood of nobles that were no longer participating in the shipping industry, the loss of revenue and increasing salaries that the state was responsible for caused direct consequences in every sector of Venetian society.

The decline of the nobility in Venice came as quickly as its rise. As far back as 1379, 1,211 nobles possessed a patrimony of more than 300 *lire a grossi*, with 917 *popolani* possessing more than 300 *lire a grossi*, but the great preponderance of these

	TABLE I	nobili	popolani
Sopra la 50.000	lire a grossi	1	
da 50.000 a 35.000	" " "	4	1
da 35.000 a 20.000	" " "	20	5
da 20.000 a 10.000	" " "	66	20
da 10.000 a 5.000	" " "	158	48
da 5.000 a 3.000	" " "	145	88
da 3.000 a 1.000	" " "	386	214
da 1.000 a 300	" " "	<u>431</u>	<u>541</u>
		1211	917

Figure 5. Venetian Wealth Distribution. Donald E. Queller, *The Venetian Patriciate: Reality versus Myth* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1986), 30.

¹⁹² McClellan, *Venice and Bonaparte*, 27.

nobles only possessed between 300 and 3000 *lire a grossi*.¹⁹³

With these statistics from 1379, as the fortunes of Venice grew poorer, one can only imagine how this percentage of poor nobles grew. Initially, after the decline of shipping, the nobility turned to the government for employment, but by 1797 the great majority of noble Venetians were financially entrenched on the *terrafirma*.

After assessing the various income levels of the patriciate, Queller explains how the ever-expanding bureaucracy of Venice acted as a charity system for many noble families that depended on the government for income. This again ties into the large network of dependencies that initially helped the Republic, but eventually crippled it. With the government exacting large revenues from the Jewish community and rich nobles, while hundreds of poor nobles were completely dependent on the government for survival, it is easy to see the link between the decline of the Jewish community and the aristocracy, and the inability of the Venetian government to maintain financial stability. Although it may seem like an over simplification, Queller agrees that the 200,000 ducats a year that the Venetian government paid out to nobles consumed all of Venice's "liberal income", which meant that the government depended on forced loans, often from Jews and rich nobles, when money was needed for other purposes.¹⁹⁴

The nobility of Venice was so divided based on income level that rich nobles and the government they ran, became a welfare state for less fortunate members of the

¹⁹³ Donald E. Queller, *The Venetian Patriciate: Reality versus Myth* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1986), 30.

¹⁹⁴ Queller, *The Venetian Patriciate*, 32-33. Queller only mentions the government exacting forced loans from the nobles, but several of the sources I cited in the earlier section about Jewish bankers and merchants explained that Jews were expected to pay a large amount in forced loans to the Venetian government-several exact amounts are listed in that section and help provide context to the idea of forced loans and how important they really were to funding the Venetian Republic.

patriciate.¹⁹⁵ This is evident in an act from 1490, which states that by this time a majority of nobles were dependent on holding public offices for subsistence.¹⁹⁶ Some existing government positions and many jobs created to employ nobles were often sinecures. This means the state was constantly paying a large portion of the population and getting absolutely nothing in return.¹⁹⁷ These sinecures even permeated the military and Queller uses the position of balestrieri della popa or bowmen of the quarterdeck, as an example. Records even show that the Venetian government appointed a woman, a blind man, and a large number of noble teenagers to this position, which included a stipend provided by the state.¹⁹⁸ While some of the balestrieri positions were sinecures, Queller points out that this position was originally created to train young, poor nobles in the art of seafaring, in order to prepare them for later merchant activities (although, as discussed earlier, the career of merchant was declining in popularity among nobles of all ages). The position of bowman of the quarterdeck came with a 60-ducat salary paid by the owner of the vessel, but also allowed bowmen a small amount of space on the vessel on which they were serving to store goods, which they could trade when they reached their destination. This opportunity to trade meant that bowmen could make up to 200 ducats per voyage, with the possibility of multiple voyages a year, thanks to the state mandated job.¹⁹⁹ So important were these positions that the Great Council often made them mandatory on vessels leaving Venice and nobles were also allowed to serve in this position multiple times a year. By the mid-1400s it was required that each

¹⁹⁵ As noted above, the government did not assume responsibility for poor common citizens, only poorer members of the nobility were seen to be the responsibility of the state.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 274. Queller discusses this at length in chapter 2 of his book, but also provides various primary sources in the notes, beginning on page 261. The discussion of poor nobles is also part of Samuele Romanin, *Storia Documentata di Venezia*, 6:450.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 34-35.

¹⁹⁸ Queller, *The Venetian Patriciate*, 35.

¹⁹⁹ Queller, *The Venetian Patriciate*, 35-37.

merchant ship employ a small number of “noble balestrieri” when leaving Venetian waters and by 1520, 200 nobles a year held these positions.²⁰⁰ This is only one example of sinecures and government offices that came to be filled by nobles.

Other positions filled by poor nobles included the Quaranta, the job of advocate or states attorney, as well as appointments to castellanies and other commands. The fact that many old, poor nobles were in charge of key ports and castles, again shows how ineffective the large bureaucracy of Venice was in the area of defense. A great example is Leonardo Donà who earned some 300 ducats a year from state provided salaries and allowances; he made more in two years than 972 of the poorest *nobili* and *popolani* ever possessed.²⁰¹ This trend towards government employment does not seem out of place, until one looks at hard figures. By 1790 almost 1,200 nobles were receiving a pension from the Venetian state, totaling 130,179 ducats annually, at a time when there were only 1090 noblemen in the Great Council.²⁰² As was seen with the example of the balestrieri della popa, men, women, and children received stipends for the government and this accounts for the discrepancy between the number of the men in the Great Council and the number of pensions being paid by the state during this time period.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., 36.

²⁰¹ Davis, *A Venetian Family and Its Fortune 1500-1900*, 41.

²⁰² Davis, *The Decline of the Venetian Nobility as a Ruling Class*, 51. See chart on page 54.

Pensions Paid by Venice, 1670-1790

1670	29,621	1760	93,039
1679	29,188	1765	81,706
1736	39,542	1770	88,285
1740	44,989	1775	102,604
1745	43,997	1780	114,298
1750	57,018	1785	121,752
1755	59,707	1790	130,179

Figure 6. Pensions Paid by Venice, 1670-1790. Davis, *The Decline of the Venetian Nobility as a Ruling Class*, 51.

While the example of balestrieri della popa provides evidence of the escalated dependence of the nobility on state pensions, it does not explain how the once prosperous noble merchants of Venice began to invest in less lucrative activities. Norwich also presents an example of the decline of maritime industry and states that by the mid-1500s Venice was no longer employing the large number of non-nobles to operate ships, as it had in its more prosperous years, but instead now used prisoners and slaves to operate galleys.²⁰³ Besides sinecures and other positions filled by nobles, all funded by the state, two other factors contributed to the decline of Venice leading up to 1797: feudalism and the shrinking of the patriciate.

Dennis Romano explains how the lack of a feudal nobility assisted the formation of the Venetian state in her early years, and throughout her most prosperous period, but he does not examine the fact that the nobility of the lagoons eventually became the feudal nobility of the *terrafirma*, when profits from trade dried up. Most Venetian nobles

²⁰³ Norwich, *A History of Venice*, 203. As one can imagine, the decline from a fleet possessing hundreds, if not thousands, of ships to a fleet of less than twenty ships had a horrid effect on the 16,000 men that were once employed at the Arsenal.

who had money to invest after the economy began to decline, chose to buy up land on the *terrafirma*, engaging in feudalism rather than investing in trade or industry.²⁰⁴ In the last census taken in 1789, the total population of all Venetian territory reached almost three million individuals, while only around 15,000 people participated in any industrial activities.²⁰⁵ What trade was occurring was maintained by foreign immigrants because native Venetians were more concerned with spending their family fortunes than working to build them through industry or other lucrative avenues. Had Venice maintained her domination of trade or had families used their remaining patrimony to invest in industry, rather than buying luxury goods and building new homes, revenue would have easily covered the more than 200,000 ducats a year in salaries and pensions that the state had to provide, but that was not to be.

Feudalism became a source of income for many nobles in Europe throughout the Middle Ages, but it was not until the 1500s that Venetians began to invest in land and create a *contado* on the mainland. Venice had holdings on the *terrafirma* as far back as the 1300s, but the aristocracy waited until the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century to devote their energy to buying up land, which they subinfeudated. This shift to feudalism also provides a great example of how ineffective the laws passed by the Great Council were. As explained earlier, many laws were passed that no one ever knew about and that were never enforced. As late as 1677 there was a law on the books that prevented nobles from participating in feudalism on the *terrafirma*:

The Nobles are not permitted to purchase Fiefs or Lordships upon the *terrafirma*, that there might be neither superiority nor dependence to destroy the equality among them. Besides, it would occasion jealousy and disorder between the

²⁰⁴ This was a pattern across Italy, as is seen with the Medici in Florence. Most nobles chose to invest their patrimonies in landed estates.

²⁰⁵ McClellan, *Venice and Bonaparte*, 72-77.

ancient nobility that are poor, and the new, who being generally rich, would in time buy the whole terra firma. Formerly they were not allowed Houses of Pleasure upon the Continent, but of late that has been indulged: so that in Venice it is quite otherwise than in Genoa, where particular persons are rich, but the Government poor; but here private persons are poor, and the public wealthy, having the propriety of all the lands, as in the Republic of Rome.²⁰⁶

This law was obviously not enforced and there were a large number of nobles that participated in feudalism.

Before moving on to the feudal practices of Venetian nobles and their effects on the Republic, one point should be made here: families conducted business as a unit. This custom was known as *fraterna*.²⁰⁷ This meant that while one brother may pursue politics as a profession, other brothers would pursue other complementary professions to help grow familial wealth, which would then be shared. The family unit would share the inherited patrimony and use it to reinvest in business ventures. Following the pattern of Venetian dependency on various factors, such as mercenary troops, forced loans, and shipping, this is yet another example. The idea of shared familial wealth is great in an abstract sense, but if one brother makes a poor business decision, it leads the entire family into abject poverty and dependence upon other rich nobles.²⁰⁸ This explains quite well how even in her most prosperous years, Venice was responsible for a great number of poor nobles.

A great way to explain the shift towards feudalism and the shrinking of noble families is to examine specific families. James C. Davis uses the example of the Donà family to illustrate how even the richest members of the nobility began to use farming to

²⁰⁶ Amelot de la Houssaie, *The History of the Government of Venice: Wherein the Policies, Councils, Magistrates, and Laws of That State Are Fully Related, and the Use of the Balloting Box Exactly Described*, 23.

²⁰⁷ Davis, *A Venetian Family and Its Fortune 1500-1900*, 7.

²⁰⁸ This was often the case for the *barnobotti* class which was described earlier.

grow their family patrimony. Just as they copied French fashions and other means of luxurious living, they also copied feudal practices of their European neighbors. Many historians see this trend as a side effect of a greater cultural shift. By the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Venetian aristocracy looked down on commerce and manufacturing and instead thought it more noble to receive wealth from a landed estate.

Venetian noble families thought of themselves in a different way, they thought of family as something that went historically into the past and went forward into the future. In every noble *piazza* there was a long hall with portraits hanging in it, these portraits showed important relatives going back into history and legitimizing the family's role in Venetian politics. The political history of a noble family meant that great things were expected of each future branch of the family. A nobleman was expected to live up to the achievements of past generations politically and financially. Consequently, in order to continue their families' legacies, nobles felt that they had to engage in politics and spend money like men of past generations. This was a fine custom until families were no longer making large sums of money through trade, but felt it necessary to continue spending money as though they were.

Venetian nobles were obsessed with luxury and while they were no longer receiving the same large returns they saw in the earlier centuries, they were still spending as though money flowed freely. This obsession with luxury was ingrained in Venetian aristocratic culture and caused problems for the government for centuries. As Dennis Romano stated, the geography and topography of Venice, as well as the urban design, meant that the *popolani*, *cittadini*, and *nobili* often lived side by side. In an attempt to maintain peace and rein in the outlandish customs of luxury and fashion, the

Venetian government passed sumptuary laws in 1504. Even as trade declined in the 1600s, the nobility still insisted on living luxuriously and eventually this led to an even more desperate economic situation, explained in previous pages.²⁰⁹ This craving of luxury and admiration of the landed nobilities of Europe, decline of trade, as well as a spike in grain prices in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries led to the transition from a merchant economy to a feudal one.

The *terrafirma* had always provided Venice with foodstuffs, but some scholars believe rising grain prices caused wealthy Venetians to buy land in order to secure their own food supplies while also collecting rents through the *mezzadria* system, even as far back as the fifteenth century. By 1750, less than a half century before the end of the Republic, Venetian nobles owned thirty-two percent of privately held land on the *terrafirma*. Even the last Doge of Venice depended on feudalism for income and his family owned twenty-three miles of land, in common.²¹⁰

An unfortunate side effect of this shift was ignorance in the area of agricultural practices. Venetians used the *metayer* or *mezzadria* pattern for the formation of their farms, similar to American share-cropping. This system was unlike the most common English system in which villagers held their fields in common. In *mezzadria*, each family farmed a piece of land to themselves, managed by a representative of the lord. Once the produce was harvested the family was given half of the crop and the other half went to the lord. Coming from a history of seafaring and international commerce, Venetians knew very little about farming and used no fertilizer and only plowed the land with

²⁰⁹ Davis, *The Decline of the Venetian Nobility as a Ruling Class*, 44. Again this describes the situation of many members of the *barnabotti* and also explains why pensions for nobles kept increasing over time.

²¹⁰ Davis, *A Venetian Family and Its Fortune 1500-1900*, 35.

primitive tools.²¹¹ This ignorance again proved disastrous when a family chose to invest all of its available money in land, but was then unable to adequately produce crops to sell, therefore reducing the return on its investment.

Since the majority of rich nobles only collected rents to fund their lavish lifestyles, this meant that no money was being invested in the future of manufacturing and industry that was soon to sweep Europe. Venice had a weak economy, because a large part of her nobility was too poor to live independent of the state, and the other part of her nobility was pouring revenue into the *terrafirma*, rather than the lagoon. The last factor that led to the imbalance of power and allowed the rich *cittadini* to assume power at the end of the eighteenth century came in the form of population control. As the nobility became poorer, they began to conserve their wealth. One should not mistake this for a practice of frugality, as thriftiness was not a Venetian virtue. Rather than save money and invest in more wise business plans, Venetian nobles began to limit how many of their children could marry and the average number of children produced in a marriage went down as well. This was a double-edged sword; not only were Venetians becoming poorer, there were not as many of them to run the plenitude of offices that had been created to fund them in previous centuries. As one can see from the population chart on page fifty-three, plagues obviously affected the population as a whole, at various times during the history of the Republic, but the nobility began to limit the marriages of younger generations, restrict inheritance to males (often the youngest son), and entail property.²¹²

²¹¹ McClellan, *Venice and Bonaparte*, 143.

²¹² Davis, *A Venetian Family and Its Fortune 1500-1900*, 129.

As any student of European history, or the history of law knows, feudalism affects every aspect of inheritance and marriage patterns. When an individual or family invests all of its money in a landed estate, it is important to make sure that land remains in the family for the profit of future generations. The importance of family and working as a unit was already addressed, but the inheritance and marriage patterns of the nobility leading up to 1797 are very important. Not only did rich families need to save money for future generations, they also needed money to fund their political careers, as they were often responsible for the costs of holding an office and may even maintain the status of patron for poorer members of the nobility (again, often in exchange for votes and power within the Great Council).

In later centuries Venetians both kept certain children in the household from marrying and limited the number of children of those that did marry. Using the example of the Donà family again, in the fourteenth century marriages from one branch of that family produced sixteen children, in the fifteenth century one branch produced eighteen children, in the sixteenth century one branch produced twenty-one children, but in the seventeenth century one branch produced only eleven children. James C. Davis conducted a vast amount of research on this topic and suggests that a “fertility transition” took place in the seventeenth century. Even if one cannot prove that families were consciously choosing to have fewer children, if these statistics are compared with the economic rise and fall of these centuries, coupled with the previously mentioned rise in food prices, it is probable that the nobility were, at least unconsciously, choosing to

have fewer children, in order to preserve their patrimonies.²¹³ The obvious side effect of producing fewer children in a ruling class is that there are fewer rulers in the future. Given the rule that males must reach twenty-five years of age before entering government service, it is quite likely that declining birthrates, even as late as 1750, would have contributed to the loss of population within the Great Council leading up to 1797.

On top of limiting births or lessening fertility within marriages, marriages themselves were limited. Considering that only legitimate children who were entered into the Golden Book were able to govern, reducing marriages had a direct consequence on the number of male nobles born in Venice. While consciously limiting births during this time period cannot be definitively proven, marriage restriction can be. Probably beginning around 1550, when trade went into sharp decline, Venetian nobles made it a policy to limit marriages, usually to one son. Sometimes exceptions were made if one son did not produce adequate heirs quickly enough, but all-in-all marriage restriction was the number one way that Venetian nobles began to conserve their wealth. Daughters, of course, were often sent to the convent if they were not married off. Even if they were married, women did not pose a threat to the family lands because they were not part of the entail. By limiting births and marriages, the number of nobles declined; yet, amazingly, the cost of keeping this nobility in power increased. One other custom is worth discussing before turning to the disaster of 1797, *fidei commissum*.

Within the study of English feudalism the historiography is dominated by the discussion of inheritance patterns. While sources concerning Venetian feudalism are

²¹³ Davis, *A Venetian Family and Its Fortune 1500-1900*, 129. While limiting births most likely occurred, Davis also points out a branch of the Donna family that produced 14 children in 16 years, between 1660 and 1676.

scant, there is some available information concerning the inheritance of property and patrimony. As discussed earlier, wealth was held in common among brothers and families spent and invested money as a unit; property was held similarly. *Fidei commissum* was the dominant inheritance pattern in Venice for immovable goods such as land. Venetian nobles forbid heirs from alienating their property. As Venetian wealth transformed from large sums of money and luxury items to large tracts of land and mansions on the *terrafirma*, it was important that nobles made sure a greedy, or wasteful heir was not able to sell the property in exchange for funds. This practice also encouraged *fraterna*, since heirs did not have access to liquid assets and were therefore dependent on one another. Another way Venetians insured that what little wealth they had remained within their family group, was dividing the property willed to heirs equally among the males, usually sons or nephews. This is to say, Venetians did not use primogeniture or ultimogeniture because that would discourage the maintenance of the family unit that was so dear to the nobility. Making all land inalienable and dividing it equally encouraged the men of the family to pool their land resources in order to turn a profit.²¹⁴ In summary, Venetian nobles that engaged in feudalism restricted inheritance of their lands to all male heirs over the age of twenty-five and made sure to make the lands inalienable in order to promote the conservation of patrimony and to promote unity among heirs. This system helped many rich families maintain their wealth throughout the generations, and as with the example of the Donà,

²¹⁴ Davis, *A Venetian Family and Its Fortune 1500-1900*, 129.

these practices helped sustain a few noble Venetian families into the twentieth century, and perhaps even the twenty-first.²¹⁵

The preceding chapter illustrated the decline of the Venetian nobility from the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries. Venice rose quite rapidly throughout the twelfth, thirteenth, and even fourteenth centuries as a dominating economic force. But her lack of economic diversity meant that the fall of the Byzantine Empire in 1453 would have disastrous consequences. By depending on immigrants for military force, forced loans, taxation, poor-aid, and even international trade, in conjunction with a cultural shift away from commerce and industry, towards luxurious living, government dependency, and feudalism, disaster became imminent.

“Unhappy Venice! thy melancholy fate might surely have drawn down upon thee the charity of the whole world! In any age but an age of selfishness and cold calculation, to have beheld thee alone, would have been sufficient to have called forth the indignation of mankind. But, unfortunately, thou hast partners in affliction, to divide with thee the compassions of philanthropy.”- Catherine de Govion Broglio Solari²¹⁶

²¹⁵ Davis, *A Venetian Family and Its Fortune 1500-1900*, entire. This entire book traces the wealth of the Donà family from the 1500s into the 20th century. The book provides an invaluable account, full of primary source reference that explains all of these customs and why and how they were practiced. Feudalism and its laws survived in Venice up until 1797 and many scholars suggest it was continued in one form or another until the 20th century. For primary source documentation on the feudal laws of the Venetian *terrafirma* see *Codice Feudale della Serenissima Repubblica de Venezia*. Venice, 1780.

²¹⁶ de Govion Broglio Solari, *Venice Under the Yoke of France and of Austria*, 2.

CHAPTER 4

EPILOGUE

4.1 War Between France and Austria: An Argument Erupts in the Venetian Senate

It would be foolish to assert that even in her most prosperous times Venice could have defeated Napoleon Bonaparte and the Jacobin ideals that permeated Venetian consciousness in 1797. Although the argument about military success is a futile one, fact stands that all of the things discussed in the previous chapters in no way aided Venice when the War of the First Coalition began on 20 April 1792. While it is true that both the navy and army declined as the aristocracy foundered economically, both were still in existence in 1797. Even as late as May of 1796 a new provveditor was assigned to Verona and a foreign general, Giovanni Salimbeni, was appointed to command the land forces.²¹⁷ Even though the Venetian state still directed the administration of its land forces, the forces numbered only somewhere between 3,500 and 7,000, scattered across the *terrafirma*.²¹⁸ Venice had no artillery, no munitions, and the existing fortresses were in deplorable condition, since the government had no income to keep them up. The leadership of the military was made up of Venetian nobles and foreign soldiers, so there was very little cooperation between the two.²¹⁹ Another weakness of the Venetian military structures was the age of its administrators; the only military leader

²¹⁷ McClellan, *Venice and Bonaparte*, 143. This general was Giovanni Salimbeni, The best primary and secondary source regarding the last years of the republic are volumes 9 and 10 of Samuele Romanin's *Storia Documentata di Venezia*. As I said in an initial footnote, all of the footnotes from secondary sources in this document could be replaced with citations from this 10 volume series. Unfortunately I had neither the time nor ability to translate each of the books, but I have checked most secondary source references against small portions of Romanin's series to confirm details. Both treaties I present at the end of this thesis come from his last volume.

²¹⁸ McClellan, *Venice and Bonaparte*, 143. McClellan quotes a letter from Francesco Pesaro at Vienna on 18 July 1797. Pesaro fought for a policy of armed neutrality, only to fail and watch Venice dissolve as she tried to maintain her place between Austria and France.

²¹⁹ The use of mercenary forces is explained in depth on page twenty-two of this thesis.

able to fight Napoleon on the *terrafirma*, General Silembi, was over seventy years old.²²⁰ The most important, and unfortunate, point to make is that the Venetian military played very little part in the fall of the Republic. There were no battles, no coups, and only one instance of violent resistance to French encroachment. This lack of military prowess led to a fatal mistake: pursuance of unarmed neutrality.

Venice's position of unarmed neutrality dates back to well before Napoleon rose to power, but this time the policy faced a challenge that caused the end to the Republic in a little over half of a decade. Venice pursued neutrality in the past, during more economically prosperous times, when she could threaten to cut off the flow of goods in and out of Europe in order to garner respect. After the signing of the Peace of Passarowitz in 1718, Venice would never fight again. Unfortunately for Venice, without a functioning military and with very little control over the Adriatic, the choice to pursue unarmed neutrality rather than armed neutrality was fatal. The Republic possessed absolutely no assets that demanded the consideration of other powers. After the economy crumbled and the navy and army lost what power they had in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, there was no respect given to the Republic.

Although Venice chose to continue pursuance of neutrality, she refused to ally with the other Italian powers in a neutral Italian league. In 1791 Sardinia, for the second time, asked Venice to join her in forming this league, but Venice refused.²²¹ This would have been an excellent option for Venice because with no military of her own, perhaps the threat of other Italian forces coming to her aid, if Austria or France entered her

²²⁰ Venice was always a gerontocracy and it was common for military leaders and politicians to be well past middle-age. For examples of this look at the age of the Doges upon appointment and the age of the general in almost any naval battle in Venetian history.

²²¹ McClellan, *Venice and Bonaparte*, 117.

territory, could have helped maintain her sovereignty. On 20 April 1792 France declared war against Prussia and Austria. To this point, Venice had maintained a position of unarmed neutrality in all conflicts over the past seventy years.²²² Although this policy was by now customary, an argument between pursuing armed or unarmed neutrality during the fight between France and Austria erupted in the Venetian Senate. According to the secondary literature, Senator Francesco Pesaro pushed diligently for armed neutrality, hoping that although Venice could defend herself against neither France nor Austria, the threat of combat would be enough to garner some semblance of respect from the two powers. Interestingly, one primary source, *Venice Under the Yoke of France and of Austria* by Catherine de Govion Broglio Solari asserts that Pesaro in fact wanted Venice to pursue a course of *unarmed* neutrality, as he was an Austrophile and fled to Austria after Venice fell.²²³ Whether Pesaro held sympathies towards Austria or not, according to several other sources, including Norwich and McClellan, he did fight for armed neutrality. His pursuance of armed neutrality was useless in the end, because even with control of the Senate, Pesaro was out politicked by his colleague Zaccaria Valaresso.²²⁴ The Venetian populace was divided between Francophiles and Austrophiles with the disenfranchised members of the middleclass and poor members of the nobility following the former, and the very rich and very poor following the latter.²²⁵ While some senators felt that Venice needed to arm herself while still

²²² Norwich, *A History of Venice*, 605.

²²³ Catherine de Govion Broglio Solari, *Venice under the Yoke of France and Austria: With Memoirs of the Courts, Governments, & People of Italy: Presenting a Faithful Picture of her Present Condition, and Including Original Anecdotes of the Buonaparte Family*. 2 Vols. (London, 1824), 1:188; McClellan, *Venice and Bonaparte*, 123; Norwich, *A History of Venice*, 608.

²²⁴ McClellan, *Venice and Bonaparte*, 122-23.

²²⁵ Gustav Joseph Fiebeger, *The Campaigns of Napoleon Bonaparte of 1796-1797* (West Point: U.S. Military Academy Printing Office, 1911), 1.

maintaining neutrality, and other senators believed she should remain unarmed and neutral, the latter won out and Venice decided to maintain unarmed neutrality. With an incompetent military, a near bankrupt state, and a government in stalemate, from October 1792 when the Senate finally voted on the issue, Venice became a sitting duck.

With no power to speak of, Venice should have perhaps allied with one of the powers and hoped for the best, but after four separate offers of alliance from Bonaparte, Venice had made an enemy of the winning side and many soldiers in Bonaparte's Army of Italy began scheming to overthrow the oligarchy.²²⁶

4.2 Brescia and Bergamo, Verona, Pizzamano and Laugier: Napoleon Declares War on Venice

While each of the things discussed in the previous chapters greatly damaged the Venetian economy and her political stability, without events in Venice's holdings on the *terrafirma* and the actions of Jean Landrieux and Domenico Pizzamano, perhaps the collapse of the aristocracy would not have cost the Republic her sovereignty. Although Napoleon did not declare war against Venice until May 1, 1797,²²⁷ his manifesto cited several causes for declaring war. Two specific incidences were especially influential in his decision and are the topic of this chapter: Anti-French attacks by peasants on the *terrafirma* meant that Napoleon could no longer continue to offer up an alliance with Venice, and the taking of the *Libérateur de l'Italie* started a chain of events that would bring an end to Venetian independence. The Veronese Easter and the Laugier Affair, in

²²⁶ McClellan, *Venice and Bonaparte*, 166. The Army of Italy offered to ally with Venice on 9 July 1796, 21 August 1796, 19 September 1796, and 31 November 1796. Only one time, on 22 March 1797, did the Senate vote on allying with France, but it was vetoed and a short time later the oligarchy fell.

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, 223.

conjunction with the previously discussed military, political, and economic issues brought Venice to her knees and her talent for avoiding war dissolved.

Even five years after deciding to continue pursuing unarmed neutrality, the Venetian population, in the islands and on the *terrafirma*, was once again divided. Some were pro-French, others pro-Austrian and this caused a very complicated series of events to occur in Verona. This dichotomy within the Venetian population was typical for this time, and mirrored the division within the population surrounding the early history of Venice, when she was often caught between warring empires. Gustav Joseph Fiebeger explains both the political and social situation in Italy in the late 1700s:

In 1792, Italy was divided into the kingdom of Sardinia with its provinces of Savoy, Nice, Piedmont and Sardinia; the republics of Genoa and Venice; the duchies of Parma, Modena and Tuscany; the Austrian province of Milan; the Papal states; and the kingdom of Naples. In 1796, Austria, Sardinia and Naples were at war with France. The dukes of Parma and Modena were under the influence of Austria. Because of the violence of the French Revolution, the rulers of the other states, although not actively hostile to France, were not friendly. In all these states there was a middle class of active French sympathizers.²²⁸

Interestingly, the decline of the economy coupled with the rising noble dependence on the state also affected middleclass Venetians of common birth, or *cittadini*. Jobs that were specifically reserved for the middleclass were often given to nobles, in turn angering the *cittadini*, who were often not permitted to perform, or could not find other suitable jobs in Venice.²²⁹ While this anger manifested itself in many ways, one important development was the emergence of Francophiles within the Venetian population. The French National Assembly, which took over after the fall of the Bastille on 14 July 1789, made it known to the world that they did not want to fight any offensive wars. Although, they were adamant about maintaining a defensive position,

²²⁸ Fiebeger, *The Campaigns of Napoleon Bonaparte of 1796-1797*, 1.

²²⁹ Queller, *The Venetian Patriciate*, 34.

the Assembly readily took advantage of French sympathies within the middle class of societies in other countries, and began spreading propaganda that they hoped would encourage rebellion. The Assembly set up secret societies, known as *Clubs de Propagande*, in every Italian state, led by members of said Assembly. The clubs took advantage of the anger towards the Venetian nobility held by the middleclass and nobles on the *terrafirma*.²³⁰ Nobles on the *terrafirma* held resentment towards the Venetian aristocracy for generations because it was so exclusionary. Other than the few times when men were allowed into the nobility for aiding Venice in war, men of the *terrafirma* had no hope of participating in the Venetian government that ruled their lands.

Despite these secret societies spreading French propaganda throughout Venice in hopes of sparking a revolution, it was none other than an officer in Bonaparte's own army that brought the first armed conflict to the Veneto.

Upon hearing about an the apparent Venetian violation of neutrality and the arming of civilians in Verona and surrounding areas, Napoleon sent a letter to the Doge of Venice, via his *aide-de-camp* General Andoche Junot. The meeting between Junot and Doge Manin is relayed in Norwich's *A History of Venice*. Junot read the letter from Napoleon aloud to the Doge:

All the mainland of the Most Serene Republic is in arms. On every side, the rallying-cry of the peasants whom you have armed is 'Death to the French!' They have already claimed as their victims several hundred soldiers of the Army of Italy. In vain do you try to shuffle off responsibility for the militias that you have brought into being. Do you think that just because I am in the heart of Germany I am powerless to ensure respect for the foremost people of the universe? Do you expect the legions of Italy to tolerate the massacres that you have stirred up? The blood of my brother-in-arms shall be avenged, and there is not one French

²³⁰ McClellan, Venice and Bonaparte, 115.

battalion that, if charged with such a duty, would not feel the doubling of its courage, the trebling of its powers.

The Venetian Senate has answered the generosity we have always shown with the blackest perfidy. I send you my principal *aide-de-camp* as bearer of this letter. Is it to be war, or peace? If you do not take immediate measures to disperse these militias, if you do not arrest and deliver up to me those responsible for the recent murders, war is declared.

The Turk is not at your gates. No enemy threatens you. You have deliberately fabricated pretexts in order to pretend to justify a rally of the people against my army. It shall be dissolved within twenty-four hours.

We are no longer in the days of Charles VIII. If, against the clearly stated wishes of the French government, you impel me to wage war, do not think that the French soldiers will follow the example of your own militias, ravaging the countryside of the innocent and unfortunate inhabitants of the *terra firma*. I shall protect those people, and the day will come when they will bless the crimes that obliged the Army of France to deliver them from your tyranny.²³¹

In reading this letter, one assumes that the Army of Italy was the victim of a Venetian violation of the agreement to maintain unarmed neutrality, reached months before, but that was not the case at all. George B. McClellan, in his book *Napoleon and Bonaparte*, relays a story directly from the memoirs of Lieutenant Colonel of Hussars, Jean Landrieux, whom Napoleon appointed as Chief of the Secret Service of the Army of Italy in May of 1796. It was not the government of Venice that instigated these rebellions against Napoleon on the *terrafirma*, but instead they were instigated by Landrieux as a way to make money for himself and a comrade.

This all began on the evening of 6 March 1797, only two months and a week before Venice surrendered to Bonaparte. Landrieux and his comrade and friend, General Charles Edward Kilmaine, met with a Chief-of-staff under Napoleon, Louis-Alexandre Berthier. Both Landrieux and Kilmaine were quite poor and were looking for a way to make money in Italy. Berthier suggested that the men create revolutions across

²³¹ The original letter is printed in *Raccolta di Carte Pubbliche, Istruzioni, Legislazioni Ec. Ec. Ec. Del Nuovo Veneto Governo Democratico*, 152-153. The translation was copied from Norwich, *A History of Venice*, 619.

the Veneto and help set up French satellite municipalities. This would provide Bonaparte with territory to trade with Austria and they could also use this cause to solicit money from Francophiles and Jacobins all around the area, under the guise of aiding the revolution. The plan was to convince Princessa Albani an influential noblewoman, secretary of the Venetian Senate Zuanne Vicenti Foscarini, and the Podesta of Bergamo, Ottolin, that Kilmaine and Landrieux received news of a potential rebellion and wanted to warn Venice of the potential unrest. While the Venetians were supposed to believe that Landrieux was on their side, in reality he would raise a few thousand troops and bring them to Bergamo and Brescia, after instigating a rebellion. Kilmaine issued an order that all troops in the Army of Italy should act as if a state of war existed between France and Venice, which gave Landrieux the authority to raise the few thousand troops he needed for his mission. While both men were collecting money from Jacobins,²³² Princessa Albani also began giving them money in hopes that they would aid Venice with more information about the potential uprisings. Albani told Ottolin about the potential problem and he wrote to the Provveditor of Brescia, Battaja, and to the inquisitors in Venice (the office in charge of intelligence) to relay the information, but both letters were ignored. On 9 March Ottolin's secretary was sent to Albani's house where he met Landrieux. Landrieux told him that French forces were planning to create a revolution in Brescia and that Venice would need to arrest the leaders of the movement and strengthen their garrisons in the area. The secretary again wrote to the inquisitors and was again ignored. Landrieux knew this was a lie, as he had been planning a rebellion in Bergamo (where Ottolin was governor), not in Brescia.

²³² Jacobins were supporters of the French Revolution and its ideals.

Landrieux ordered Porro and Salvatori, two officers of the secret policy, to organize uprisings in Bergamo and Brescia. Lhermite and Colonel Faivre were ordered to lead men in Bergamo, while Conte Lecchi, Captain Paimparey de Chambry, and Captain Pico were put in charge at Brescia. 12 March 1797 marked the beginning of the revolution in Bergamo, when French troops began patrolling the streets and placed artillery pieces at the entrance of Ottolin's palace. Ottolin sent a message to the French leadership, asking why they were occupying his city and they asserted that they were only reacting to increased Venetian troop movement; Ottolin immediately sent a reply. While waiting for another message, a group of citizens from Bergamo requested a meeting with Ottolin and told him that French commanders had ordered the people of Bergamo to sign a declaration stating that they wanted to become an independent city, free from Venetian rule. Ottolin ordered them not to sign anything, but shortly thereafter, with no way to defend against French forces, the Bergamaschi signed the document and Venice officially lost her first city to the Army of Italy. The leaders of this revolt escorted Ottolin to Brescia where Battaja ordered him to return to Venice. A few days later on 18 March 1797, three hundred Bergamaschi citizens with Conte Lecchi leading them, marched on Brescia and overthrew the Venetian government in that city. By 27 March Landrieux also created a successful revolution in Crema. As a result, Landrieux was promoted and Venice never caught on to his role; Foscarini even agreed to allow Landrieux to mediate between Venice and the three newly freed cities. In just 21 days since Kilmaine and Landrieux met with Berthier, Venice had lost three major cities on the *terrafirma* and a group of power hungry soldiers had carried out a plan to feed their own greed, right under the nose of General Bonaparte.²³³

²³³ McClellan, *Venice and Bonaparte*, 169-184. These event are summarized from McClellan's

While these three cities were taken seemingly without issue and Venice had no plans of reclaiming her lost territory, two other events would directly lead to Bonaparte's declaration of war, a little over a month after the fall of Crema. Although the Army of Italy had without a doubt violated Venetian neutrality by creating revolutions on the *terrafirma*, as of yet, no one knew who the instigators were. Two events would occur over the next few weeks that would provide an excuse for war: the Veronese Easter and the Laugier Affair.

After the revolutions at Brescia, Bergamo, and Crema, very strong anti-French sentiment began to emerge in some cities on the *terrafirma*, one of them being Verona. Venice, trying to calm its subjects and stop the revolutions, armed citizens in Verona. Save for Brescia and Bergamo, French troops in the region began looting property and raping women, which caused resentment. Bonaparte wanted to take Verona because it was the best strategic position for an attack on Austria, but the citizens there were very loyal to Venice. The French General Balland was placed in charge of French troops there, while Venetians were under the control of Provveditor Giovanelli, Battaja's replacement, and Vice-Podesta Alvise Contarini. In the face of the loss of Brescia and Bergamo, Venice chose to arm the Veronese militia. The Senate ordered the recruitment of peasants and its possible that with the addition of Dalmatian mercenaries who normally made up the main Venetian land force, up to 30,000 men enlisted.²³⁴ The Venetian authorities even asked General Balland if it was permissible to arm local forces for defense against domestic threats and he obliged. As mentioned earlier,

retelling of the story, translated from Landrieux's personal memoirs; Jean Landrieux, *Mémoires de l'Adjudant-Général Jean Landrieux : Chef d'état-major de la cavalerie de l'armée d'Italie chargé du bureau secret*. Edited by Léonce Grasilier. (Paris, 1893).

²³⁴ McClellan says that the number was most likely significantly less than 15,000 and probably closer to 5,000 or 10,000, at most.

Venice had very few munitions and no artillery, so the peasants were armed very lightly. On 20 March 1797 the peasants were ordered to only defend against Venetian revolutionaries, but not to attack any French forces, as this would violate Venice's neutrality. With intense Francophobia and the lingering bitterness of French looting and raping, the armed peasants ignored these orders and began to attack French soldiers. Hundreds of soldiers were killed and a guerilla war erupted.

Neither party anticipated the attacks on the French and after almost a month of violence Bonaparte sent his aide-de-camp Junot to meet with the Doge and deliver an ultimatum that all peasants be disarmed and French sympathizers released from jail. On 14 April Junot arrived in Venice and ignoring the observance of the Easter holiday, demanded and received a meeting with Doge Lodovico Manin (1789-1797). Junot delivered a letter sent by Bonaparte, including the demand for disarmament, and promptly left.²³⁵ The Senate drafted two letters, one to the French Ambassador at Venice, Lallement, and one to Bonaparte. The letter to Lallement denied violating neutrality and pledged friendship for France, while the letter to Bonaparte apologized for the illegal acts of the peasants, requested that former Venetian territory be restored, and agreed to release all political prisoners. Without authority, Junot read the letter addressed to Bonaparte and again requested full capitulation and did not accept any terms proposed by Venice. On 17 April the Venetian Senate again voted and agreed to disarm all citizens on the *terrafirma* and to release the French prisoners, as well as revert back to strict neutrality.

While the diplomatic business was being taken care of in Venice proper, Verona was becoming even more violent. In March, one of Landrieux's men had forged a

²³⁵ This letter is quoted on pages 80-81 of this thesis.

proclamation from the former Provveditor Battaja that sanctioned the killing of French soldiers. These proclamations continued to be posted around Verona and on Easter Sunday and the following Monday a gathering of celebratory, armed peasants and Dalmatian soldiers began to kill and beat any Frenchman they met within the city. The French forces that occupied the city were forced to congregate in the Citadel of San Felice to escape the violence. By noon when mass let out, the peasants and Dalmatians succeeded in ridding all of Verona of French troops, save for the citadel, and two castles. Giovanelli and Conatarini requested a meeting of the commander in charge of troops at the citadel, and General Beaupoil answered. Beaupoil went to the meeting and agreed to forget all of the events and resume relations as though nothing had occurred, but upon reporting this to his superior office Balland, he was overruled.

Balland ordered that all of the Veronese militiamen and soldiers be disarmed, that Venetian soldiers depart immediately, and that all hostages be released; the Venetian officials agreed. Upon hearing this the populace revolted and began a siege on the three locations that housed French troops: the Citadel of San Felice, Castel San Pietro and Castel Vecchio. Upon hearing of the increased violence, the Venetian officials fled Verona in disguise, doing nothing to attempt to stifle the intensified anti-French attacks. They were discovered by a Veronese gentleman named Augusto Verita, on his way into the city, and convinced to return. Upon arrival in Verona Verita took command of the Veronese and Venetian forces. Upon hearing of these events, the Venetian Senate offered no support for Verona and instead maintained its neutrality and friendship with France.

Eventually Verita and other leaders lost what little control they had of the forces and the militiamen and soldiers continued to massacre every French soldier they could find.²³⁶ A few days later the French General Chambran arrived at the city with reinforcements and requested that he be allowed entrance. The Venetian authorities allowed him in and once again ran out of the city in disguise. It was not until 20 April that the Veronese uprising ended, under the leadership of General Augier. Many of the Veronese leaders including Verita were sent before a firing squad in late May and early June of 1797.²³⁷

Despite this rapid narrative, a few points are important. Between 6 March when Landrieux had dinner with Berthier and 7 May when a provisional democracy was set forth in Verona, Venice had lost all of her authority. Although she initially tried to calm the revolts by arming a militia, the murder of hundreds of French troops was the fault of the Republic. Rather than taking responsibility when confronted about the violence, the Senate immediately surrendered to every demand made of them and the Venetian authorities in Verona fled in cowardice. Not only did Napoleon now control large parts of Venice's former holdings on the *terrafirma*, he was deeply angered by the death of his soldiers at the end of Venetian guns. The proverbial straw that broke the camel's back would come on 20 April 1797.

Disadvantage after disadvantage affected Venice leading up to 1797. Her loss of the monopoly of trade in and out of Europe, the fall of the Ottoman Empire, her loss of

²³⁶ Although McClellan is the only source that describes these events in detail. J. Chanut refers to the death of "hundreds of French soldiers..." as well as the forgery of the call for violence against the French by Battaja in his account. J. Chanut, *Campaign of General Bonaparte in Italy, 1796-7*. Translated by T.E. Ritchie (Edinburgh: Longman and Rees, 1800), 251-256.

²³⁷ McClellan, *Venice and Bonaparte*, 185-199. These sequence of events are summarized from McClellan's account, based on primary sources. Oddly, I was unable to find any other secondary accounts of the revolutions at Brescia, Crema, Bergamo, and Verona. If I continue studying this topic these events would be a great dissertation topic.

most of her overseas colonies, the loss of wealth for the only politically enfranchised social group in the Republic, and a shift to feudalism each had their own consequences. On top of these things Venice chose to maintain neutrality in the fight between France and Austria and was eventually bested by Lieutenant Colonel Landrieux in various cities on the *terrafirma*. All of these things were disastrous and would be cited by Bonaparte in his declaration of war, but none so much as the Affair of the Lido.

The Affair of the Lido occurred on 20 April 1797 when the commanding officer of a fortress at San Andrea, named Domenico Pizzamano, fired on a French vessel entering Venetian waters. In his account, the French ambassador at Venice, Lallement, asserts that this ship, the *Libérateur de l'Italie* was being pursued by an aggressive Austrian vessel and was headed for the safety of theoretically neutral waters. The *Libérateur* was commanded by Jean Baptiste Laugier, his lieutenants were Michel Alexis Gauthier, and Antoine Pigeon, plus twenty-seven sailors, a sergeant, a corporal, and twenty other crew members from Ancona, fifty-two men in total. The *Libérateur* left Lago di Garda on 18 March and was ordered to protect French ships in the Adriatic and molest Austrian vessels when possible. The accounts of the following events differ between Venetian and French records, but on 13 April two other French vessels joined Laugier and he hired a fisherman at Verona to pilot his boat through the islands. French sources say on 20 April he headed for Trieste, while Venetian documents say the boat was on its way to attack Venice. It should be known that only three days prior (directly after Junot left Venice), the Council of Ten passed a law disallowing any foreign, armed ships into Venetian waters, although it would have been impossible for Laugier to know this. Upon seeing the *Libérateur* approaching the Lido, Pizzamano fired on the ship. In

its retreat the French vessel collided with a Venetian galliot commanded by Captain Viscovich. While Viscovich's crew boarded the ship, Pizzamano continued firing and five Frenchmen were killed and eight wounded. The surviving members of the crew were taken hostage and the vessel was towed to the Arsenal. Upon hearing the news Lallement relayed the information to Bonaparte and immediately called for a meeting with the Venetian senate.

A few days prior, on the same day the law was passed outlawing foreign vessels, Venice sent Francesco Donà and Lunardo Zustinian to deliver a letter to Bonaparte concerning the recent developments in Verona, and asking his future course of action. Immediately after the killing of the French sailors, the Senate sent a message to the two men, requesting they do whatever they could to placate Bonaparte. The two men met Bonaparte at Gratz on 21 April 1797 and requested a meeting; it became immediately clear that nothing could be done to fix Pizzamano's mistake. Bonaparte told the men he planned to become "...an Attila for the Venetian state", and so he did.²³⁸ The consequences of the deterioration of Venice over the past three centuries would claim the Republic as a victim only twenty days later, when the Great Council and Doge Lodovico Manin would depart Saint Marks for the last time.

4.3 The Surrender of a Doge: Democracy Comes to Venice

After the events in March and April of 1797, Napoleon Bonaparte declared war against Venice on 1 May 1797. Only fifteen days after Napoleon Bonaparte declared war on the Republic, a surrender was agreed upon, the Doge left office, the Great

²³⁸ McClellan, *Venice and Bonaparte*, 216. Again, this account is relayed in pages 209 to 223 and in no other source have I been able to find even a *mention* of Laugier or Pizzamano. McClellan used documents in the Venetian archive in 1930 to tell the story, so I presume they are still extant. Irony abounds, if one remembers that Attilia's invasion was a major catalyst in the creation of Venice.

Council met for the last time, and a new democratic government was installed.²³⁹ The administration that took the place of Doge Lodovico Manin and the Great Council lasted from 16 May 1797 until 17 October 1797.²⁴⁰ A large number of *cittadini* that were once relegated to positions in the ducal chancellery, were now the founding members of the provisional democratic government, sanctioned by Bonaparte.²⁴¹ Since it consisted of men that were on the cusp of disenfranchisement for centuries, this new democracy chose to make immediate changes that helped empower the masses. Although short-lived this government was active in trying to establish a more equal society than had existed in Venice since 1297. The democratic government succeeded in abolishing entail and other restrictive inheritance patterns. These inheritance patterns dominated Venice in the last few centuries of her existence, when feudalism became the preferred source of income, and also shaped the way in which the collapsing aristocracy protected its remaining wealth.²⁴² Interestingly inheritance law swayed back and forth between more liberal and conservative policies throughout the eighteenth century.

²³⁹ See Appendix C for the full treaty of surrender signed in Milan on 16 May. An entire thesis could be written on the events of 16 May, but for secondary and primary source information on these events, see volume ten of Samuele Romanin's *Storia Documenta di Venezia* and *Raccolta di Carte Pubbliche Istruzioni ed Altro Stampate, ed Esposte ne' Luoghi piu Frequentati della Citta di Venezia. In Comincia il giorno 13 Maggio* published by Silvestro Gatti in Venice in 1797.

²⁴⁰ The manifesto creating the Provisional Democratic government of Venice is printed in full in *Raccolta di Carte Pubbliche, Istruzioni, Legislazioni Ec. Ec. Ec. Del Nuovo Veneto Governo Democratico* (Venice, 1797), 8-11. If one examines the names attached to the manifesto and compares them to the list of the Ducal Chancellery in *Il Libro d'Oro*, it is clear that McClellan was right in his assertion that many middleclass men rose to power in the new Provisional Democracy.

²⁴¹ For a list of the Ducal Chancellery from 7 June 1784 see *Il Libro d'Oro* pages 41 and 42. For legislation, decrees, and instructions to the public by the Provisional Democratic Government see *Raccolta di Carte Pubbliche, Istruzioni, Legislazioni Ec. Ec. Ec. Del Nuovo Veneto Governo Democratico*. Venice, 1797. Again, this entire chapter is based on information from Samuele Romanin's volumes, but cited from secondary sources.

²⁴² Davis, *A Venetian Family and its Fortune 1500-1900*, 140-41. Davis points out that while inheritance was now equal among men, it was not so for women. It wasn't until 1806 when Venice became part of the Kingdom of Italy and subsequently fell under the jurisdiction of the Napoleonic Code, that women were allowed to inherit. This was severely limited during the second Austrian rule, but allowed again when Venice joined United Italy in 1866. Another area in which further research of primary sources would benefit this subject, would be the examination of land rights for women under Austrian rule of Venice and how they were carried out.

During this time, the Jews were also freed from a ghetto they had inhabited since the sixteenth century, and the once powerful aristocracy was nowhere to be found. Many members of the aristocracy fled to Austria, only to return when the provisional democratic government was abolished and the Austria began its occupation.

Despite the diligent work of the new middleclass administration, democracy in Venice was short lived. France and Austria signed the Treaty of Campo Formio on 17 October 1797, which effectively ended the existence of Venice as a sovereign state.²⁴³ The Treaty of Campo Formio was only a confirmation and formalization of the articles agreed upon by France and Austria on 17 April 1797, at Léoben.²⁴⁴ Although the final treaty was not ratified until October, France had already agreed to award Venice to Austria. Before the surrender of the Doge occurred, the democracy and all of the men who were finally enfranchised after 500 years, were doomed from the start.²⁴⁵ This chain of events provides direct evidence that Napoleon Bonaparte knew he was going to award Venice to Austria, before he allowed the newly enfranchised middleclass to form a democratic government. George McClellan confirms this, stating that after Venice refused to ally with France, Napoleon no longer regarded it as a neutral power, but as an enemy.

With this treaty, centuries of socio-economic inequality, a defunct military, a stagnant economy, cultural shifts away from commerce and industry, and dependency on immigrants and the state, led to the end of a government that had survived

²⁴³ McClellan, *Venice and Bonaparte*, 264.

²⁴⁴ See Appendix D for the five secret articles which cede Venice to Austria at Leoben on 18 April 1797. To read the entire provisional peace treaty from Leoben, later ratified at Campo Formio, see pages 379 to 385 in volume ten of Samuele Romanin's *Storia Documentata di Venezia*.

²⁴⁵ For information on the Franco-Austrian rule of Venice and the Veneto after 1797 and before Italian independence, one should consult *Venetia Redeemed: Franco-Italian Relations 1864-1866* by John W. Bush and *Daniele Manin and the Venetian Revolution of 1848-1849* by Paul Ginsborg.

numerous similar situations. Within half a decade 2,921,011 people went from subjects of a 1000 year old aristocratic oligarchy to the subjects of the Austrian crown.²⁴⁶

Venetian political and economic independence was born out of conflict between empires and died in the same fashion.

²⁴⁶ Romanin, *Storia Documentata di Venezia*, 9:534.

APPENDIX A
GLOSSARY

GLOSSARY

Arsenal: The government owned and operated ship yard for the Republic.²⁴⁷

Avvogadori del Commun: A board of 3 magistrates that held various responsibilities, including acting as the state's attorneys.

Cittadini: A member of the middleclass that is registered in the Silver Book. This group often included members of the chancellery, notaries, and secretaries. Many cittadini played a part in the provisional democracy.

Confidenti: Spies employed by the Venetian government to follow and report on foreigners in Venice as well as citizens that were suspected of harming the state.

Ducat: The largest denomination of the Venetian currency. The ducat consisted of 24 *grossi*, a *grosso* was divided into 12 *grossetti* or *denari*.

Fraterna: A cultural practice in which Venetian noble families operated as a unit, sharing patrimony and honor.

Il Libro d'Oro: The registry for every nobleman in Venice. One had to be listed in the Golden Book to hold any government office.

Oltremare: Venetian controlled territory in the Adriatic or Aegean seas. Different from the lagoon and the *terrafirma*.

Palazzo: A Venetian residential building, often inhabited by several branches of one noble family. Sharing a *palazzo* was usually a requirement of living out the practice of *fraterna*.

Pien Collegio: A senatorial cabinet composed of Signoria and the Collegio proper.

Podesta: A provincial governor. These men were sent from Venice to govern territory on the *terrafirma*.

Procuratori di San Marco: 9 men, elected for life, who were responsible for the Basilica of St. Mark, treasurers of the Republic, and in charge of private trusts.

Provveditor: Another type of provincial governor, similar to the *podesta*. These men often controlled military forces on the *terrafirma* as well.

²⁴⁷ Most definitions come from an amalgamations of descriptions present in a multitude of secondary sources, listed in the bibliography, as well as Donald Queller's glossary in *The Venetian Patriciate*.

Quarantia Criminale: The Council of 40 or criminal court of Venice. This court was divided in to three units. One unit controlled domestic civil crimes, one controlled domestic criminal cases, and the other controlled nondomestic criminal cases.

Savi: Member of a senatorial committee, of which there were several.

Signoria: A group made up by the Doge, six ducal councilors, and three chiefs of the Terrafirma

APPENDIX B
VENICE SURRENDERS TO BONAPARTE

The transition from hereditary oligarchy to democracy was facilitated by a treaty between the Great Council and the Director of the French Republic, which was signed on 16 May 1797. The treaty was made up of six known articles and five secret articles:

Il Direttorio esecutivo della Repubblica francese e il gran Consiglio della Repubblica di Venezia volendo stabilire prontamente il buon accordo e le buone intelligenze tra loro in addietro esistenti, convengono nello stabilire gli articoli seguenti:

The Executive Director of the French Republic and the Great Council of the Venetian Republic wish to stabilize immediately the good accord and good intelligence that existed between them before, convene to stabilize the following articles:

1. Saranno pace ed amicizia fra la Repubblica francese e la Repubblica di Venezia, e da questo momento cesserà ogni ostilità fra di loro.

There will be peace and friendship between the French Republic and the Republic of Venice and from this moment any hostility will cease between them.

2. Il gran Consiglio di Venezia avendo a cuore il bene della sua patria, e il ben essere de' suoi concittadini, e volendo che gli odi verificatisi contro i Francesi non abbiano più a rinnovarsi, rinunzia ai suoi diritti di sovranità, ordina l' abdicazione dell' aristocrazia ereditaria, e riconosce la sovranità dello Stato nella riunione di tutti cittadini; però a condizione che il governo abbia a garantire il debito pubblico nazionale, il provvedimento dei nobili poveri che non tengono possidenza (*qui ne possèdent aucuns biens-fonds*), e le pensioni vitalizie accordate col titolo di provvisioni.

The Great Council of Venice having at its heart the good of the people wants the hate that existed against the French should not renew itself, the Great Council renounces all rights of sovereignty and orders the abdication of the hereditary aristocracy and recognizes the sovereignty of the state under a reunion of all of the citizens. Under the condition that the new government has to guarantee the public debt of the nation, the provision of the poor nobles that don't hold any real property and the enacted pensions accorded with the title of provisions.

3. La Repubblica francese di ciò ricercata, volendo contribuire per quanto è in lei alla tranquillità della città di Venezia e al bene de' suoi abitanti, accorda una divisione di truppe francesi per mantenervi l'ordine e la sicurezza delle persone e delle proprietà, e sussidiare i primi passi del governo in tutte le parti della sua amministrazione.

The French Republic wanting to contribute as much as they can to the tranquility of the city of Venice and the good of its inhabitants accord a division of French troops to maintain order and the security of persons and property, and sustain the first steps of the democratic government in all the parts of its administration.

4. La presenza delle truppe francesi a Venezia non avendo altro scopo che la protezione dei cittadini, esse si ritireranno tosto che il nuovo governo sarà stabilito, e ch'esso dichiarerà non aver più bisogno della loro assistenza. Le altre divisioni dell'esercito francese sgombereranno egualmente tutte le parti del territorio veneziano che occuperanno nella Terraferma alla conclusione della pace continentale.

The presence of the French troops in Venice does not have any other aim other than the protection of the citizens and the division will be retracted immediately as soon as the new government is stabilized and the democracy declares it no longer needs French assistance. The other divisions of the French army will leave all parts of the *terraferma* at the conclusion of a continental peace.

5. La prima cura del governo provvisorio sarà di condurre a termine il processo degl'Inquisitori e del Comandante del Forte del Lido, imputati di essere stati autori e istigatori delle Pasque veronesi e dell'assassinio commesso nel Porto di Venezia, e dovrà mostrare la sua disapprovazione di questo fatto nel modo più acconcio e più soddisfacente pel governo francese.

The first care of the provisional government will be to conduct to its end the trial of the inquisitors and of the Commandant of the Fort of the Lido, imputed to have been the authors and instigators of the Veronese Easter of the assassination commenced in the port of Venice and it should demonstrate the disapproval of this fact in a manner more suitable and more satisfying to the French government.

6. Il Direttorio esecutivo, dal canto suo, accorda, col mezzo del generale in capo dell'esercito francese, perdono ed amnistia generale a tutti gli altri veneziani, che fossero accusati di aver preso parto a qualche cospirazione contro truppe francesi, e dopo la ratificazione saranno posti in liberta tutt'i prigionieri.

The executive director of the democracy accords with the means of the general and the head of the French army to pardon and give general amnesty to all the other Venetians that were accused of having taken part in some conspiracy against the French troops and after the ratification they will be put in liberty all of those who were accused of having taken part of conspiracy against French troops and upon the ratification will be freed.

Così fu stabilito e convenuto in nome della Repubblica francese dai cittadini Bonaparte generalissimo dell'esercito d'Italia, Lallement ministro plenipotenziario della Repubblica francese appresso a quella di Venezia, e in nome del Maggior Consiglio di Venezia, dai signori Francesco Donà, Leonardo Giustinian e Luigi Alvisè Mocenigo deputati muniti di pieni poteri, di cui si annette l'originale alle presenti, le quali dovranno essere ratificate dalle alte potenze contraenti nel più breve termine possibile, affinché abbiano la loro piena esecuzione. Fatto e sottoscritto a Milano il 27 fiorile anno V della Repubblica francese (16 maggio 1797). Seguono le firme.

Therefore it was established in the name of the French republic by the citizens that general Bonaparte of the army of Italy, Lallement minister of the French republic near Venice, and in the name of the Great Council of Venice, the signori Francesco Donà, Leonardo Giustinian, e Luigi Alvise Mocenigo, deputed with full power...made and underwritten in Milan on 16 may 1797.

ARTICOLI SEGRETI

SECRET ARTICLES

1. La Repubblica francese e la Repubblica di Venezia si accorderanno fra di loro per lo scambio dei territori.

The French republic and the Venetian republic accord between them for the exchange of territory.

2. La Repubblica di Venezia verserà nello cassa del pagatore dell'esercito d'Italia tre milioni di tornesi in numerario, cioè un milione nel mese prossimo pratile, un secondo nel mese di messidoro, ed il terzo milione quanto il governo provvisorio sarà compiutamente ordinato (sera entièrement organisé).

The Venetian republic with deposit in the treasury of the payer of the army of Italy three million Tornesi numbered, that is one million in the next May, a second in the month of June, and the third million when the provisional government is entirely organized.

3. La Repubblica di Venezia somministrerà pel valore di altri tre milioni di tornesi in canapi, cordaggi, arredi ed altri oggetti necessari alla marina a richiesta dei commissari che saranno nominati dal generalissimo dell'esercito, e in quanto questi oggetti esisteranno effettivamente nei magazzini e depositi dell'Arsenale.

The Venetian republic, will administer for the value of another three million Tornesi in hemp, cords, furnishings and other necessary objects to the marine at the request of the commissary that will be named by the General of the Army and in as much these objects exist they exist in the storehouse and depot of the Arsenal.

4. La Repubblica di Venezia somministrerà inoltre tre vascelli di linea e due fregate in buono stato, armati e forniti di tutto il necessario, senza comprendere l'equipaggio, e a scelta del generalissimo, che dal canto suo promette al governo la mediazione della Repubblica francese per terminare prontamente le differenze insorte tra la Repubblica di Venezia e la reggenza d'Algeri.

The Venetian republic administers three warships of the line and two frigates in good condition, armored and furnished with all necessities without including the equipment and by the choice of the general that on their part promises to the government the mediation from the French republic to terminate immediately the differences that have arisen between the Republic of Venice and the regency of Algeria.

La Repubblica di Venezia consegnerà infine ai commissari a ciò destinati venti quadri e cinquecento manoscritti a scelta del generalissimo.

The Republic of Venice will consign finally to the commissaries to which are destined twenty paintings and 500 manuscripts by the choice of the general.

Ratified on 16 May by General Bonaparte in Milan

APPENDIX C
FIRST FIVE SECRET ARTICLES OF THE PRELIMINARY PEACE
SIGNED AT LÉOBEN

Cessione di una parte della Lombardia austriaca per una parte degli stati veneziani.

Art. I. Che, malgrado il disposto dall' articolo VII dei preliminari di pace stipulati fra le potenze contraenti sotto la data di questo giorno, S.M. l'imperatore rinuncia alla parte de 'suoi stati in Italia al di la della destra dell'Oglio, e alla riva destra del Po, a condizione che S.M imperiale sarà indennizzata di tale cessione, come di quelle fatte all' articolo VI dei preliminari, per la parte della terraferma veneziana compresa tra l'Oglio, il Po il mare adriatico e gli stati ereditari, come per la Dalmazia e l'Istria veneziana; e per tale acquisto gl'impegni contratti dalla Repubblica francese dinanzi a S.M. imperiale, coll'articolo VI dei preliminari, l'estano soddisfatti.

Ceding a part of Austrian Lombardy for a part of the Venetian state.

Art I. That despite the disposition of article 7 in the preliminaries of peace stipulated between the powers contracting on this day, the Emperor renounces the part of his state in Italy from the Oglio to the right bank of the Po on the condition that the Emperor will compensate this cessation as it was made in article 6 of the preliminary peace for the part of the Venetian *terrafirma* between the Oglio, the Po, the Adriatic sea, and the hereditary states through Dalmatia and Venetian Istria and through such acquisition the Emperor satisfies article 6 of the preliminary peace.

La Francia rinunzia alle legazioni, ma acquista una parte degli stati veneziani.

Art. II. La Repubblica francese rinuncia per sua parte ai suoi diritti sulle tre legazioni della Romagna, di Ferrara e di Bologna cedute alla Francia col trattato di Tolentino riservandosi tuttavia la fortezza di Castelfranco con un circuito la di cui area che non potrà esser minore della portata del cannone, sarà eguale dalle sue mura sino ai confini dello stato di Modena. La parte degli stati della Repubblica di Venezia, compresa tra l'Adda, il Po, l'Oglio, in Valtellina ed il Tirolo apparterrà alla Repubblica francese.

France renounces the legation, but acquires a part of the Venetian state.

Art. II. The French republic renounces for her part to all rights to the three legations in Romagna, from Ferrara and from Bologna ceded to France with the treaty of Tolentino reserving to themselves however the Fort of Castelfranco with the surrounding areas that shouldn't be less than the course of the canons. It will be equal from its walls to the confines of the state of Modena. The part of the state of the republic of Venice included between the Adda, Po, Oglio, in Veltellina and the Tyrol will belong to the French republic.

Guarentigia degli acquisti nel Veneto.

Art. III. Le due parti contraenti si riservano e garantiscono l'una all'altra i detti stati e paesi acquistati sulla terraferma veneziana.
Guarantee of the aquisition in the Veneto

Of the two parties contracting, one reserves and guarantees one to other the said states and lands acquired on the Venetian *terrafirma*.

Tre legazioni cedute a Venezia.

Art. IV. Le tre legazioni della Romagna, di Ferrara e di Bologna cedute dalla Repubblica francese, saranno accordate alla Repubblica di Venezia come indennizzo di quella parte dei suoi stati di cui si è parlato nei tre articoli precedente.

The three legations of Romagna, from Ferrara and from Bologna ceded to the French Republic will be accorded to the republic of Venice as compensation for that part of its states concerned in the previous articles.

Commissari per l'accordo con Venezia

Art. V.: S.M. l'imperatore ed il Direttorio esecutivo della Repubblica francese andranno di concerto per togliere tutti gli ostacoli che potessero opporsi alla pronta esecuzione degli articoli precedenti, e nomineranno a questo effetto dei commissari o dei plenipotenziari che saranno incaricati di tutti gli accomodamenti necessari per mettersi in accordo colla Repubblica di Venezia.²⁴⁸

Commissioner for the accord with Venice

Art. V: The Emperor and the Executive Director of the French republic will come together to remove all obstacles that may inhibit the prompt execution of this treaty and will appoint commissioners and plenipotentiaries who will be responsible for all of the accommodations necessary to put in accord with the Venetian republic.

²⁴⁸ Romanin, *Storia Documentata di Venezia*, 10.

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