TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11: THE STRUCTURE AND USE OF

INTELLIGENCE UNITS IN LOCAL POLICING

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The events of September 11, 2001 marked a paradigm shift in the strategy within all levels of law enforcement in the United States. Intelligence became the watchword of the day and with it, the movement to incorporate strategic and tactical information in daily policing. Yet while the philosophy was clear, the method and manner to which agencies were left to achieve these goals was much less designed. The federal government allocated funds to assist help agencies incorporate an intelligence function in their daily operations but which agencies and to what degree remains unclear even today. This study seeks to determine the current state of use of intelligence in municipal law enforcement agencies in the State of Texas ten years after 9/11. Through use of a survey, it assesses the frequency of use of intelligence units in local police departments in the State of Texas, identifies commonalities in their structure, and determines the state of their effectiveness.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The existence of intelligence units in state and local law enforcement agencies across

the United States is more common today than before the fateful events of September 11, 2001.

Terrorism and homeland security have become common topics in not only law enforcement

circles but among communities as well. The impact of those words are now felt and discussed

on a daily basis from the top level of the U.S. Government to every dinner table in the country.

It is difficult to discuss intelligence units without first understanding their evolution from

the 1930s to 2001. To the general law enforcement community, intelligence was not

something new. As early as 1931, the National Commission on Law Observance and

Enforcement Intelligence guidelines proposed the development of law enforcement

intelligence. As organized crime grew in the 1960s, the President's Commission on Law

Enforcement and Administration of Justice recommended in 1967 that every major city in the

country should have an intelligence unit specifically dedicated to organized crime. It further

recommended the development of regional information sharing between agencies. The law

enforcement community, however, was slow to react and intelligence remained in the realm of

the federal government or large local agencies.

By the 1980s, law enforcement was still unable to deal with the continued growth of

organized crime or to implement the recommendations for development of intelligence units

and information sharing, which local agencies complained was not happening with their federal

partners (Carter, 2009). In the 1990s, England brought the use of intelligence to the forefront

of local policing. It did so, however, in response to a growing societal dissatisfaction in England

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with increasing crime rates and the seeming inability of law enforcement to control it (Ratcliffe, 2003). The demands of citizens were not just limited to controlling and reducing crime. The ever increasing cost of crime control from previous decades pressured law enforcement to do so in a more cost-effective manner (Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2002).

In the U.S., however, terrorism was the catalyst that propelled intelligence units to the forefront of discussion in U.S. law enforcement circles and to the doorstep of every local agency in the country regardless of size. The attack of September 11, 2001 exposed gaps in the U.S. intelligence function that launched a flurry of executive directives and law enforcement committee recommendations to quickly, and understandably, fill the holes. Six weeks after the attack, the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) held a meeting at their annual conference to discuss how state, tribal, and local agencies (STLE) should develop their intelligence functions, establish minimum standards, and adopt the intelligence-led policing philosophy. That meeting began the formation of the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP) which was formally announced in 2004. Through this and subsequent meetings, the recommendation was made that all agencies, regardless of size, should develop an intelligence function (Carter, 2009).

The impact for the 18,000 state, tribal and local agencies across the United States is far-reaching. Suddenly recognized as the front line of homeland security, local agencies were asked to develop an intelligence function. However, the 2007 IACP Criminal Intelligence Sharing Summit recognized that many of the nation's law enforcement agencies do not participate in the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan which, at a minimum, should include: 1) formal intelligence training for at least one sworn officer, 2) training all levels of law

enforcement personnel to recognize criminal activity associated with terrorism, and 3) defined

procedures or mechanisms for communication with the nearest fusion center and/or regional

information sharing network (USDOJ, 2008). Among the recognized limitations to local

agencies is the fact that there are no best practices in establishing intelligence functions. While

this may be by design to give agencies the flexibility to develop intelligence functions according

to their individual amount of resources, the lack of commonality in structure creates problems

in measuring the frequency of use of intelligence units in state and local agencies and their

effectiveness (Loyka, Faggiani, & Karchmer, 2005).

<div align="center">Purpose and Hypotheses</div>

By specifically researching municipal agencies in the State of Texas, the purpose of my

research is to determine the current state in the use of intelligence in local police departments.

Through prior research, I will review three barriers of intelligence in police agencies including

difficulties in implementing an intelligence function to reduce crime, the difficulties of

structural change in police agencies, and communication. Finally, through use of a survey, the

objective of my research is to: 1) assess the frequency of use of intelligence units in Texas

municipal police departments, 2) identify commonalities in their structure, and 3) measure

their effectiveness through their perceived level of communication. This will test the

hypotheses that: 1) large agencies have made more advances in developing an intelligence

function than smaller agencies, 2) the structure of intelligence units in local agencies lacks

uniformity in smaller agencies, and 3) communication within municipal agencies and the

communication that they have with fusion centers and federal agencies is more frequent

among larger agencies.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

In reviewing the literature, I found three elements that are critical to the success of an

intelligence unit: structure, effectiveness, and communication. This chapter discusses each of

those elements. The first element, structure, was studied in the New Zealand Police Service by

Dr. Jerry Ratcliffe in 2003. The second element, effectiveness, relates to a study conducted by

doctoral student Daniel Marks and Professor Ivan Sun. Elements of the final element,

communication, are addressed in both of these studies. It is important to understand the prior

research of these elements because they are the same elements that I measured in municipal

Texas agencies.

Structure

One of the more obvious characteristics of intelligence units is the lack of a consistent

framework between agencies on which they are built (Loyka et al, 2005). In 2003, Dr. Jerry

Ratcliffe conducted a study of the New Zealand Police Service where a structured model of

intelligence-led policing is employed. Dr. Ratcliffe recognized from the outset that the police

profession is often resistant to change and, even when that resistance is not present, ill defined

goals and objectives must often be overcome (Ratcliffe, 2005).

Dr. Ratcliffe developed the 3i model, which bases a successful intelligence based crime

reduction program on three elements: interpret, influence, and impact. "Interpret" means that

the police system must be able to understand and identify the criminal element (Ratcliffe,

2005). One of the major differences of intelligence-led policing over other problem solving

models is that intelligence-led policing focuses on the offenders who commit the crimes, not

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crime trends themselves. It is based on the theory that police resources are more effectively used when focusing on a comparatively small group of recidivist offenders who are responsible for the majority of crime (Ratcliffe, 2007).

"Influence" refers to the perception that the policing culture is resistant to change. It focuses on the decision-makers of police agencies; the management or "upper brass," if you will. Their relationships to their intelligence units are critical to its success or failure. Executives that understand the purpose of these units and actively engage them in strategic planning set the example to others in their agencies of their importance and do much to ensure their success. Executives that are complacent in these things plant the seed of failure. Regardless of whether it is intentional or unintentional, not leading an agency in the direction of intelligence based policing may well lead to its failure (Ratcliffe, 2007).

As with correctly identifying the criminal element, "impact" on criminal environment is also something that intelligence units can directly control. It refers to legitimacy or the ability of intelligence units to make others, from field officers to chiefs of police, recognize the value of their work. It requires not only quality of work but the right balance of quantity as well. In this day and age of email, it is the delivery method of choice for most everything, including intelligence products, and it has contributed to the scourge of email overload. As a result, intelligence products that are too frequent and/or do not directly impact an officer or his work assignment are destined for the recycle bin without ever being read. The disturbing question here is how many of those trashed or unread intelligence products really did have relevance for the officer and the citizens that they serve (Ratcliffe, 2007)?

In his study, Dr. Ratcliffe conducted 50 interviews in February of 2003 with sworn and non-sworn staff members in three of twelve police districts in New Zealand. A semi-structured design was used to promote open discussion. Two different formats were used to accommodate those that were decision-makers, such as command staff, and those that were considered practitioners, such as intelligence officers or intelligence analysts. Despite the fact that New Zealand has a uniform and written policy of intelligence based policing that applies to all of its districts, his findings indicated many problems commonly associated with a lack of structure (Ratcliffe, 2007).

In the first element of the 3i design for a successful intelligence function, the ability to interpret the criminal environment, Dr. Ratcliffe focused on two areas: structure of intelligence units and their ability to interpret and understand the criminal environment. In terms of structure, his interviews with staff members exposed several problems. The first was a lack of consistency concerning centralization versus decentralization of the intelligence units. There was evidence of either too much or too little staffing. Dr. Ratcliffe also discovered shortcomings that impact an intelligence unit's ability to create viable work products for their agency such as lack of analytical software and inconsistence levels of training for staff (Ratcliffe, 2007).

In assessing New Zealand's ability to influence the decision makers of their force, Dr. Ratcliffe addressed two areas: 1) their ability to identify who are the decision makers, and 2) the relationship between the decision makers and intelligence staff. The results of his study found confusion in New Zealand's force in identifying the decision makers. Both intelligence staff and command staff identified the line officers as the primary decision makers since they

were actually the "boots on the ground" and the most likely beneficiaries of tactical intelligence that is needed for daily operations. The problem, however, is that the primary responsibility of line officers is to answer calls for service which consumes that majority of their time. Typically, officers will only utilize intelligence that is provided to them when not in that role. First line supervisors, such as sergeants, will only use intelligence that is relevant to the problem that they are working on at that particular time. Command staff, however, looks at the broader picture. It is the command staff that sets the long-term goals and creates the accountability to achieve them. The problem is that line officers and intelligence staff both viewed command staff as too far removed from daily operations and unengaged due to roles, which are primarily administrative in nature. As a result, those that should be the decision makers were not viewed as such (Ratcliffe, 2007).

The last element of the 3i plan is the impact of intelligence units or their perceived impact. Dr. Ratcliffe found behavioral and organizational resistance, at both the line and supervisory levels, in embracing the role of intelligence units in operations. One possible reason for this is what was already discussed; a deluge of intelligence products that are not relevant to the person that is reading it. Dr. Ratcliffe also found, however, a perception from intelligence staff that administrators are not committed to the role of their units. Instead of having the staff work on intelligence related projects, many were assigned to complete administrative projects such as overtime reports (Ratcliffe, 2007).

The limitation to this research is that it pertains only to the police districts in New Zealand and was not intended to apply to intelligence units outside that country. It does, however, have relevance for continued research. Dr. Ratcliffe made a significant statement in

describing the structure of intelligence units in New Zealand. He said, "The lack of structure

meant that some intelligence units seemed in a continuous state of confusion, a situation

contributing to low morale" (Ratcliffe, 2007, p. 442). Although that may be by design so that

agencies have flexibility to design their intelligence functions as their resources allow, the fact

remains that intelligence units in the United States lack a consistent framework (Loyka, et al,

2005). That applies to this research because its purpose is to identity what is common in the

framework of existing intelligence units in the United States as a reference for agencies that do

not yet have that capability.

Effectiveness

The recommendation from the International Association of Chiefs of Police through the

National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP) is that all agencies, regardless of size,

develop their intelligence functions, establish minimum standards, and adopt the intelligence-

led policing philosophy (Carter, 2009). The first step in measuring the effectiveness of

intelligence units is to determine the extent of their existence in police agencies across the

United States since 9/11. In 2007, doctoral student Daniel Marks and associate professor Ivan

Sun, presented a study entitled, "The Impact of 9/11 on Organizational Development Among

State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, " which was published in the *Journal of

Contemporary Criminal Justice*. The purpose of their research was to assess the impact that

9/11 had on the organizational development of state and local agencies in the United States.

They also sought to understand how changes caused by 9/11 compare to pre-9/11 changes and

how those changes fit into organizational theory. They recognized two things in beginning this

research. First, that state and local agencies have the lion's share of law enforcement duties in

the U.S. but little research had been done on how they have changed post 9/11. Changes in federal agencies have been more pronounced and better documented. Second, changes in policing philosophy post 9/11 were largely not based on existing models or theories of organizational development.

Using content analysis, Marks and Sun researched articles from 1999 to 2004 from two magazine sources: *Police Chief* and *Sheriff*. The two years before 9/11 were included to form a baseline reference for the post years. They acquired electronic versions of those one-hundred eight magazines and downloaded them into a computer software program that allowed them to conduct key word searches pertaining to organizational change since the events of 9/11 (Marks & Sun, 2007).

Their findings were not surprising. In terms of organizational change, the content analysis of magazine articles suggests that only large metropolitan police departments have undergone internal restructuring to address the post 9/11 threat of terrorism. There was little or no information indicating that smaller agencies had enacted any structural change. There was, however, evidence of expansion in what Marks and Sun termed "organizational boundaries" at the federal and local level regardless of size. This includes such things as increased community interaction and information sharing between federal and local agencies. Answers on how changes caused by 9/11 impacted organizational change was less clear. The short answer is that funding was the biggest catalyst of organizational change. Change most commonly occurred in organizations that either had or were awarded funding to do so. Again this more commonly referred to large departments (Marks & Sun, 2007).

There are several limitations to their study. The content analysis was conducted on a relatively small body of literature and limited to an even smaller population of articles that were actually published. Although the validity of the results is relatively high, it is difficult to apply those results as a representative sample of all agencies in the United States. It is likely that the majority of published articles are written by representatives from large agencies. If so, this is an ineffective way to measure change in small agencies whose representatives are published on a less frequent scale. Second, there is no definition of what is considered a large or small agency. A uniform definition is needed so that data can be categorized and so that the terms can be understood by the reader.

Marks and Sun recognized two implications for future research. First, more research should be done toward change in the behavioral characteristics of police organizations such as the culture, strategy, mission, and leadership. This type of transformational change is different from transactional change which often includes physical changes such as organizational structure, policies and procedures, and management practices. Marks and Sun believe that this will allow better analysis of the demographic and geographic changes between agencies. They also recommend that different types of research methods be used to study the organizational changes of agencies since 9/11. They specifically mention the use of a survey which lends relevance to this study.

The second step in measuring the effectiveness of intelligence units deals with its practical application. The question is whether intelligence units exist in name only or if members of their agencies not only have an understanding of their purpose but also use them in a functional way. In 2010, Dr. Ratcliffe and Kyle Walden published an article in the IALEIA

Journal (International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts) entitled, "State Police and the Intelligence Center: A Study of Intelligence Flow To and From the Street." The purpose of the study was to determine the amount of information that was coming to and being provided by a fusion center located somewhere in the northeast portion of the United States. It also sought to provide recommendations on ways to improve the information flow.

To begin, a fusion center is within the same family as intelligence units but they are considered more of the big brother by providing analytical support for sheriff's departments and local agencies in their geographic service area (Carter, 2009). In the study, a survey followed up with a semi-structured interview was administered at two nearby state police barracks in the same state. Out of one-hundred eleven candidates, fifty-two troopers agreed to participate. Troopers with less than six months experience and those whose positions did not require regular contact with the fusion center were asked not to participate in the study (Ratcliffe & Walden, 2010).

The survey showed that nearly half of the troopers in the study had not communicated with the fusion in any fashion in the six months prior to the study. Of those that did, only twelve communicated with the fusion center three or more times. During the interview, troopers indicated that they did not understand the role or purpose of the fusion center and, therefore, did not use them. The survey also showed that only one-third of the troopers contacted the fusion center on an average of no more than once a month. When questioned about this during the interview, troopers expressed a lack of understanding of the capabilities of the fusion center and what they are able to provide. When asked how many times the trooper utilized information provided by the fusion center the six months prior to the survey,

more than half replied none. Only five, however, said that they do not read bulletins provided

by the center at all. When questioned, a common theme among the troopers was that they

read the bulletins for officer safety information, not intelligence. A notable reason was the

large volume of "junk email" that is sent to them from various sources. This is consistent with

Dr. Ratcliffe's findings in 2007. The final question assessed the troopers' perception of what

information source they deem most reliable. Forty-nine percent indicated that information

provided by other officers was most reliable followed by fusion centers with twenty-one

percent. The follow-up interview revealed confusion as to whether information that is

provided by fusion centers can be used in the troopers' reports. Some believed that it could

while others believed that it could not (Ratcliffe &Walden, 2010).

The results of the survey revealed several things that directly relate to the effectiveness

of the fusion center in this study. First, there was no indication that the troopers were aware of

their own responsibility to provide information to the fusion center. The success of any

intelligence center hinges on a two-way flow of information. The role of any intelligence center

to complete a puzzle using pieces of information that come from a variety of sources but,

predominately, from the officers in the field. The intelligence going out is only as good as the

information coming in. To strengthen the validity of intelligence products in the eyes of the

organization, a part of the solution is to limit the amount of intelligence products that are

disseminated and narrow the scope to make the information relevant to specific groups instead

a "one size fits all."

Second, there was a lack of understanding of the role of the fusion center and its real-

time capabilities. The responsibility here is not just on intelligence centers to develop those

capabilities. The burden is placed on both intelligence centers and management to put policies

in place that strengthen the relationship between intelligence and members of an organization

and move it in one direction.

Finally, there were no indications that intelligence was a factor in daily decisions that

impact operations. The entire agency, not just the intelligence function, must adapt to the new

age of intelligence-led policing. Agency-wide training is essential in the growth of agencies that

is both consistent and continual (Rattcliffe & Walden, 2010).

The 2010 study recognized three limitations. The fact that it was conducted in one

agency limits its scope to just the agency where the testing took place. For the results to be

applicable to other state agencies or beyond, the population and sample size will have to be

broadened. The test population also included only field officers and not members of the fusion

center which limited the data to a single perspective. Understandably, however, the purpose of

the study was to assess the views of just the officers in the field. The definition of "intelligence"

where the study took place also differs from the nationally accepted definition. What

difference this made in the results remains unclear (Ratcliffe & Walden 2010).

The relevance of Ratcliffe and Walden's 2010 research to this research lies in the fact

that the events of 9/11 marked a shift in the monopoly over crime control that law

enforcement once had (Ratcliffe & Walden 2010). That responsibility is now shared with a

chorus of law enforcement partners of which intelligence is only one. The heart of the issue is

how effectively police agencies are using intelligence units in controlling crime on both the local

and national levels. Ratcliffe and Walden's study seems to indicate that there is vast

improvement to be made at least in the agency that they studied. My research seeks to

determine if those results are replicated in municipal law enforcement agencies across the State of Texas.

Communication

The final element that this research will assess is communication and information sharing. During the 2002 IACP Intelligence Summit, participants stressed a need to improve the sharing of information and emphasized that local law enforcement should assume the primary role of generating information (USDOJ, 2002). Some research suggests that the flow of information has improved between local and federal agencies (Marks & Sun, 2007). Other research suggests that it has not.

The findings already discussed in Ratcliffe and Walden's research entitled, "State Police and the Intelligence Center: A Study of Intelligence Flow To and From the Street," as well as Dr. Ratcliffe's 2005 research, "The Effectiveness of Police Intelligence Management: A New Zealand Case Study," clearly contradict any notion that communication between line officers and intelligence centers is effective. Both studies, however, are limited in scope to the agencies where the study took place. My research surveyed agencies across the State of Texas to determine the level of effectiveness in communication in the agencies that have an intelligence function.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

The objective of my research is to: 1) assess the frequency of use of intelligence units in local police departments in the State of Texas, 2) identify commonalities in their structure, and 3) measure their effectiveness through their perceived level of communication. This will test the hypotheses that: 1) large agencies have made more advances in developing an intelligence function than smaller agencies, 2) the structure of intelligence units in local agencies lacks uniformity in smaller agencies, and 3) communication within municipal agencies and the communication that they have with fusion centers and federal agencies is more frequent among larger agencies.

Categories of Texas Agencies

The target population in this study consisted entirely of municipal police departments in Texas. Labels that categorize the size of police departments are difficult to consistently define but were needed to separate agencies to assess and compare the progress that each has made in the use of intelligence. For that reason the agencies were categorized in a manner similar to that which is used by the Texas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Education (TCLEOSE). That classification separates agencies according to the number of sworn officers on their force: 1-5 officers in very small agencies, 6-25 officers in small agencies, 26-50 officers in medium agencies, and 51+ officers in large agencies (Stewart, 2011). For purposes of my research, I added a very large category to further study the correlation of agency size and advances in developing an intelligence function. It stands to reason that the largest of the agencies have more resources to devote to developing that function. Based on this, I formed

the following categories of agencies: very small (1-5 officers), small (6-25 officers), medium (26-50 officers), large (51-149 officers), and very large (150+ officers). Figure 1 illustrates the categories of municipal agencies in Texas and the percentage and number of agencies that each represents.

Figure 1.

Percent of Texas Agencies by Size

Survey Sample

There are 680 municipal police departments in the State of Texas. This was obtained from safetysource.com which provides a list of agency names and mailing addresses for law enforcement agencies across the United States. Stratified sampling was used to produce a sample of agencies that was manageable yet accurately represented the total number. Simple random sampling was then used to select a sample of 40 agencies for each group with the

exception of the very large category. There are 31 agencies in that category, so the entire

group was used. Forty agencies were selected from each of the other categories in an effort to

obtain a survey return rate of at least 10% for each. A 10% return rate provided a sufficient

amount of data to form a representative sample of all Texas municipal agencies. Five agencies

returned surveys from the very small category; 13 from the small, 21 from the medium, 21 from

the large, and 14 from the very large. Seventy-four out of 191 surveys were returned for a 39%

return rate (n = 74/191).

<div align="center">Data Collection</div>

The method of data collection was a self administered survey (Appendix). A survey was

selected over other methods because it is self-explanatory and more cost effective than site

visits. Upon approval by the University of North Texas Institutional Review Board, the surveys

were mailed to each of the agencies with a letter explaining the purpose of the study, a request

for voluntary participation, and a date by which the survey must be returned. A short due date

was given for participating agencies to complete and return the survey. This allowed time for

the survey to be mailed to the agency, assigned to the appropriate respondent in the agency,

and returned. To allow more time than that would place the survey at risk of being lost or

forgotten.

A cover letter accompanied the survey that explained the purpose of the research and

the confidentiality policy. This was needed to lend validity to the research and to promote

accurate and uninhibited responses to questions. The identities of each participating agency

remained anonymous except to the research coordinator. Once the research was complete,

the control list was destroyed. Names or identifying information of agency representatives who completed the survey were not requested.

I designed the survey to measure three dimensions: structure and function, efficiency, and communication. Question 1 determined both the structure and function of each agency's intelligence unit. In terms of structure, the question asked the agency to state whether it utilized one person as its intelligence officer, or a unit consisting of two or more people. Its function was determined by asking the agency to state whether intelligence was the sole purpose of that officer or unit, or one part of a shared mission. The second part of the survey included four questions (2.A-D) designed to determine the level of efficiency of each agency's intelligence function. Questions 2.A and 2.B determined the frequency at which each agency's intelligence officer or intelligence unit aided the department through intelligence products or by assisting agency members. Questions 2.C and 2.D determined the frequency at which agencies use information provided by their intelligence officer or intelligence unit in planning crime reduction operations. The third and final part of the survey used two questions (3.A-B) to determine the frequency of communication that agencies have with fusion centers or federal agencies.

The results of each question were measured by assigning numerical values to a corresponding response. The results were then tabulated from a frequency distribution showing the numerical value and percentage that is associated with each response. The numerical value was then converted to a percentage so that the scores could be evenly assessed between the agency categories. A summary and analysis of the results are included in the next chapter.

Figure 2 summarizes the return rate of the surveys. The blue bar represents the

percentage of agencies in the category that were sent surveys (sample). The red bar represents

the number of agencies in the sample that returned the surveys. Of the 191 total surveys that

were sent, 74 agencies participated (39%, n = 74/191). Fourteen surveys were excluded

because they were either undeliverable, incomplete, or returned without the assigned control

number which was necessary to classify the size of the agency. Although the return rate was

low among very small agencies, the results of the survey will show that the majority of very

small agencies were consistent in one response that did not require them to complete the

entire survey.

|	Very Small	Small	Medium	Large	Very Large
■ Percent of Agencies Receiving Surveys	25.64%	11.26%	53.33%	63.49%	100%
■ Percent of Agencies Returning Surveys	12.50%	32.50%	52.50%	52.50%	45.16%

Figure 2.

Summary of Samples and Returns

CHAPTER 4

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

This chapter of the study will discuss and summarize the results of the survey from

participating agencies. It begins with an overview of all of agency responses but then moves

into a deeper analysis of each question. Analyzing each question provides better insight into

the differences and similarities between the categories of agencies.

Structure

Question 1 of the survey asks all of the sample agencies to describe the structure of the

intelligence unit in their agency. The choices of responses were:

1. An established unit consisting of two or more people whose sole mission is to perform
    the agency's intelligence function.
2. An established unit consisting of two or more people who perform the agency's
    intelligence function but also perform another function in the agency either individually
    or as a unit.
3. One person whose sole mission is to perform the agency's intelligence function.
4. One person who performs dual roles in the agency, one of which is the intelligence
    function.
5. We do not have a designated intelligence unit or a person recognized as the agency's
    intelligence officer.

Figure 3 shows that nearly half of the agencies (43%, n = 32/74) responded that they did not

have a designated intelligence unit or person recognized as the agency's intelligence officer.

Response 4 and Response 2 were the next highest responses at 28% (n = 21/74) and 18% (n =

13/74) respectively. Those answers describe the agency's intelligence unit as either staffed

with one designated person, or a unit of two or more, but whose role is shared between

intelligence and another departmental function. Responses 1 and 3 were the lowest responses

at 9% (n = 7/74) and 1% (n = 1/74) respectively. These describe intelligence units as staffed

with one designated person, or a unit of two or more, but whose only function is that of intelligence.

Structure of Intelligence Units

Figure 3.

Brief Summary of Question 1

 Table 1 explains the results in more detail and gives a glimpse into the profile of intelligence units in municipal Texas agencies. The statistics show that 43% of Texas agencies do not have an intelligence unit of any kind (Response 5). This leaves 57% of the agencies in Texas that have intelligence units regardless of their structure. Notice that the rate of agencies without an intelligence unit increases as the size of the agency decreases. More simply put, larger agencies are more likely than smaller ones to have an intelligence officer or an intelligence unit.

Table 1

Brief Description of Question 1

Structure of Intelligence Unit					
Category	Response 1 Unit/Sole Mission	Response 2 Unit/Dual Mission	Response 3 One Person/Sole Mission	Response 4 One Person/Dual Mission	Response 5 No Intel Function
Very Small (5) returns)	0	0	0	20% (1)	80% (4)
Small (13)	0	15.38% (2)	0	23.07% (3)	61.53% (8)
Medium (21)	0	14.28% (3)	0	42.85% (9)	42.85% (9)
Large (21)	9.5% (2)	9.5% (2)	4.7% (1)	33.33% (7)	42.85% (9)
Very Large (14)	35.71% (5)	42.85% (6)	0	7.14% (1)	14.28% (2)
Total (74)	9.45% (7)	17.56% (13)	1.35% (1)	28.37% (21)	43.24% (32)

The category's second highest total response is somewhat split (Response 4). Very

small, small, medium, and large agencies selected the same structure, which consists of one

designated intelligence officer who performs a dual role of intelligence and another

departmental function. The frequency in the use of such a staffing structure increases from

small to medium agencies but decreases in the large and very large agencies. This is where the

transition from a single person to a unit of two or more people begins. Note that second

highest individual score for very large agencies transitions from one person (Response 1) to an

established unit (two or more people) with a dual mission of intelligence and another

departmental function (Response 2). There was no indication that the frequency increased or

decreased in relation to the size of the agency.

The structure with the third highest frequency is even further split (Response 2). Small

and medium agencies indicated that the staffing structure of their intelligence section is most

frequently an established unit (two or more people) that serves a dual purpose of intelligence

and another departmental function. This also ranked among the third highest frequency for large agencies. Large agencies, however, responded with equal frequency that they use an intelligence unit (two or more people) who serve a dual purpose of intelligence and another departmental function (Response 2), or a unit whose sole purpose is that of intelligence (Response 1). The third highest response for very large agencies was a structure consisting of a designated unit of two or more people who sole mission was that of intelligence (Response 1). Again, there was no indication that the frequency increased or decreased in relation to the size of the agency.

Agencies that indicated that they did not have an intelligence unit or person recognized as the agency's intelligence officer were instructed not to complete the remainder of the survey. The reason for this is twofold. First, the intent of the question is to determine the structure of intelligence units in municipal agencies. As was discussed in the limitations of this study, a person or unit would have to be in place to complete the functions described in the remainder of the survey.

The analysis of the remainder of the survey questions will include a figure and a table. The figure provides a summary or overview of all seventy-four survey responses, including the percentage of agencies that do not have an intelligence unit or a sole person designated as the intelligence officer. The table following each graph removes those agencies without intelligence units to allow for a narrow focus of the agencies that do. Very small agencies were included in the table but it is important to note that only one agency in the very small category indicated that they have intelligence unit or a person designated as the intelligence officer. All others respondents in the very small category did not. Although that single agency's responses

are included, those responses are not an adequate representation of an entire category. For

that reason, very small agencies will not be included in the discussion of trends. The decision

was made not to combine the responses of the very small agency with that of small agencies to

maintain the integrity of the data.

<p align="center">Efficiency</p>

The second section of the survey seeks to determine the level of efficiency of

intelligence units in municipal police departments across the State of Texas. There are four

questions in the survey, the first of which (2.A) asks agencies to state how many times in the

three months preceding the survey, their intelligence unit or intelligence officer disseminated

an intelligence summary to other members of the department.   The choice of responses was:

1. ___none
2. ___1-2
3. ___3-4
4. ___5 or more

Figure 4 summarizes the response to this question but includes all seventy-four agencies

that responded to survey. The figure shows that the highest rate (43%, n = 32/74) is for

agencies that do not have an intelligence function. For those that do, the majority of agencies

have produced or disseminated "5 or more" intelligence products within the previous three

months. The remaining responses ranging from "0", "1-2", and "3-4" are fairly evenly

distributed between 5% and 10%. The percentages in the graph include those agencies that do

not have a structured intelligence unit.

Dissemination of Intelligence Summaries

| Resp. 1 None (6.75%) | Resp. 2 1-2 (9.45%) | Resp. 3 3-4 (6.75%) | Resp. 4 5+ (33.78%) | No Intel (43.24%) |

Figure 4.

Brief Summary of Question 2.A

Table 2 breaks down the responses to Question 2.A for only those agencies with a structured intelligence unit consisting of a sole person, or two or more people. The statistics show that medium, large, and very large agencies disseminated intelligence summaries predominately "5 or more" times in the three months prior to the survey. For small agencies, the highest frequency was "1-2" times at the lower end of the scale. Note that, although the highest frequency of response for medium size agencies was "5 or more", their percentage (50%, n = 6/12) was less than smaller agencies whose most frequent response was "1-2" (60%, n = 3/5). This indicates that intelligence units of medium, large and very large agencies disseminated intelligence summaries to other members of their departments more frequently, but that frequency did not increase as the size of the agency increased.

Table 2

Brief Summary of Question 2.A

Dissemination of Intelligence Summaries					
Category	Response 1 None	Response 2 1-2	Response 3 3-4	Response 4 5 or more	Total
Very Small	0	100% (1)	0	0	(1)
Small	20% (1)	60% (3)	0	20%(1)	(5)
Medium	8.33% (1)	16.66% (2)	25% (3)	50% (6)	(12)
Large	8.33% (1)	8.33% (1)	8.33% (1)	75% (9)	(12)
Very Large	16.66% (2)	0	8.33% (1)	75% (9)	(12)
Total	11.9% (5)	16.66% (7)	11.9% (5)	59.52% (25)	(42)

Question 2.B asks, "In the past three months, how many times has your intelligence unit or the person assigned as the intelligence officer assisted anyone in your department with intelligence information at his or her request?" The choice of responses was:

1. ___none
2. ___1-2
3. ___3-4
4. ___5 or more

Figure 5 again rates the answer with the highest frequency as "5 or more" but only for those agencies with an intelligence function. Agencies without such a function remain at a higher response rate (43%, n = 32/74). The response rates for and "3-4" descend respectively but still range relatively evenly between 5% and 10%.

Figure 5.

Brief Summary of Question 2.B

Table 3 analyzes the responses for only those agencies with intelligence units or a designated intelligence officer. In general, the highest frequency is in the "5 or more" category (57.14%, *n* = 24/42). The second highest frequency, however, is at the opposite end of the spectrum at "0" (16.66%, *n* = 7/42). The statistics show that the highest frequency for small agencies was "1-2" in the three months prior to the survey. For medium, large, and very large agencies, that increased to "5 or more" times. There is a slight indication that the frequency increased as the size of the agency increased. That increase, however, is only 1.66 percentage points between the small and medium size agencies. The frequency for large and very large agencies, which is equal, increases 33 percentage points compared to the medium agencies. This shows that the intelligence officer or intelligence units of large and very large agencies assist officers with more frequency but there is insufficient evidence to show that the percentage increases with the size of the agency.

Table 3

Brief Summary of Question 2.B

Intelligence Assistance					
Category	Response 1 None	Response 2 1-2	Response 3 3-4	Response 4 5 or more	Total
Very Small	100% (1)	0	0	0	(1)
Small	20% (1)	40% (2)	20% (1)	20% (1)	(5)
Medium	25% (3)	25% (3)	8.33% (1)	41.66% (5)	(12)
Large	16.66% (2)	0	8.33% (1)	75% (9)	(12)
Very Large	0	8.33% (1)	16.66% (2)	75% (9)	(12)
Total	16.66%(7)	14.28%(6)	11.9%(5)	57.14%(24)	(42)

Application

Questions 2.C and 2.D seek to determine the level at which agencies have incorporated

intelligence-based policing into their policing models. Question 2.C asked agencies to rate the

number of times in the three months prior to the survey they utilized products developed by

their intelligence unit or intelligence officer to plan crime reduction operations (Appendix A).

The choice of responses was:

1. ___none
2. ___1-2
3. ___3-4
4. ___5 or more

Figure 6 summarizes the responses for all of the agencies. While "no intelligence" remains

at the highest rate, agencies with an intelligence function show a relatively even response at

"0" and "1-2" times in the preceding three months. The rate drops significantly at three to four

times in the preceding three months but then climbs to its highest levels at "5 or more." The

combined scores indicate that, among agencies that have intelligence units or an intelligence officer, the majority utilize their intelligence products to plan crime reduction operations.


Use of Intelligence Products

| | Resp.1 None (14.86%) | Resp. 2 1-2 (16.21%) | Resp. 3 3-4 (5.4%) | Resp. 4 5+ (20.27%) | No Intel (43.24%) |

Figure 6.

Brief Summary of Question 2.C

Table 4 looks closely at those results. It shows that 73.8% (*n*= 12/42+4/42+15/42) of all agencies used intelligence products in the three months prior to the survey to plan crime reduction operations. This occurred anywhere from one to five times or more. Twenty-six percent did not. Of those that did use them, agencies responded with the highest frequency that they used intelligence products developed by their intelligence units "5 or more" times. The lowest frequency was "3-4" at ten percent (*n* = 4/42). The high frequency responses for small and medium agencies were at the lower end of the scale (0 or 1-2). The frequency for large and very large agencies, however, was highest at "5 or more." The percentage, however, did not consistently increase as the size of the agency increased. This suggests that the majority of agencies use intelligence products to plan daily crime reduction activities. While

larger agencies utilized intelligence products to plan crime reduction operations with more

frequency, there is no indication that the percentages increase as the size of the agency

increases.

Table 4

Brief Summary of Question 2.C

Use of Intelligence Products					
Category	Response 1 None	Response 2 1-2	Response 3 3-4	Response 4 5 or more	Total
Very Small	100% (1)	0	0	0	(1)
Small	40% (2)	60% (3)	0	0	(5)
Medium	33.33% (4)	33.33% (4)	8.33% (1)	25% (3)	(12)
Large	1% (1)	33.33% (4)	16.66% (2)	41.66% (5)	(12)
Very Large	25% (3)	8.33% (1)	8.33(1)	58.33% (7)	(12)
Total	26.19% (11)	28.57% (12)	9.52% (4)	35.71% (15)	(42)

    Question 2.D asks each agency to describe its intelligence capacity. The choices of response were:

1. Actively promote the development and use of intelligence with agency members and use intelligence to plan crime reduction operations.
2. Actively promote the development and use of intelligence with agency members but DO NOT use intelligence to plan crime reduction operations.
3. Rely on the intelligence capacity of other agencies such as police departments or fusion centers but use the intelligence to plan crime reduction operations.
4. Rely on the intelligence capacity of other agencies such as police departments or fusion centers but DO NOT use the intelligence to plan crime reduction operations.
5. Do not promote the development and use of intelligence in the department.

The most noticeable fact in Figure 7 is the absence of responses to answer 5, which would

indicate that the agency does not promote the development and use of intelligence. Keep in

mind, however, that 43% of the agencies that responded to the survey did not answer this

question because they do not have a designated intelligence unit or intelligence officer.

Figure 7.

Brief Summary of Question 2.D

Among the 57% of agencies with an intelligence capacity, Table 5 shows that 69% (*n* = 29/42) answered with the highest frequency that they promote the development and use of intelligence and use it to plan crime reduction operations (answer 1). Response 1 and Response 2 were designed to determine if agencies promote the use of intelligence regardless if they use or do not use it to plan crime reduction operations. The combined results of both answers show that 76% (*n* = 32/42) of those agencies that have an intelligence officer or an intelligence unit actively promote the development and use of intelligence. Response 3 and Response 4 were designed to the determine the extent to which agencies rely on the intelligence of other agencies regardless of whether or not they use such information to plan crime reduction operations. The combined results of both answers show that nearly 24% (*n* = 10/42) rely on the intelligence capacity of another agency regardless of how they use it.

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Table 5

Brief Summary of Question 2.D

Agency Self Description						
Category	Response 1 Promote and Use	Response 2 Promote without Use	Response 3 Rely and Use	Response 4 Rely without Use	Response 5 Do not Promote	Total
Very Small	0	0	0	100% (1)	0	(1)
Small	60% (3)	0	20% (1)	20% (1)	0	(5)
Medium	75% (9)	0	0	25% (3)	0	(12)
Large	75% (9)	8.33% (1)	8.33% (1)	8.33% (1)	0	(12)
Very Large	66.66% (8)	16.66% (2)	0	16.66%(2)	0	(12)
Total	69.04% (29)	7.14% (3)	4.76% (2)	19.04% (8)	0	(42)

The responses were also designed to determine the frequency at which agencies that have an intelligence capacity use the resulting intelligence in planning crime reduction operations. This is regardless of whether the agency has its own intelligence capacity (Response 1) or relies on that of another agency (Response 3). The combined results from both answers show that 74% (n = 31/42) of the agencies use intelligence when planning crime reduction operations. Conversely, the responses were also designed to show which agencies do not use intelligence to plan crime reduction operations regardless they have their own intelligence capacity (Response 2) or if they rely on intelligence from other agencies (Response 4). The combined results show that 26% (n = 11/42) of the agencies that do not use intelligence in planning crime reduction operations.

Communication

The final section of the survey looks at the frequency of communication that each category of agency has with fusion centers and federal agencies. Question 3.A asks agencies to provide the number of verbal, electronic contacts that they have had with their fusion center in the three months prior to the survey. The choices of responses were:

1. ___none
2. ___1-2
3. ___3-4
4. ___5 or more

Figure 8 shows that the majority of agencies who have an intelligence unit or designated intelligence officer have had communication with their fusion center "5 or more" times in the last three months. In fact, less than 10% have had no contact at all, which certainly seems like great progress.


Figure 8.

Brief Summary of Question 3.A

Table 6 narrows the focus to those agencies with an intelligence function and separates those reponses by the size of the agencies. It shows that large and very large agencies had more communication with their fusion centers but the varying percentages do not support the notion that the frequency increases as the size of the agency increases. Interestingly, the answer with the highest frequency for small agencies was that they had no contact with their fusion center (Response 1). Their response was also the highest of all the agencies for answer 1. For medium size agencies, the highest frequency was "1-2" times progressing to "5 or more" times with large and very large agencies.

Table 6

Brief Summary of Question 3.A

Fusion Center Communication					
Category	Response 1 None	Response 2 1-2	Response 3 3-4	Response 4 5 or more	Total
Very Small	0	100% (1)	0	0	(1)
Small	60% (3)	40% (2)	0	0	(5)
Medium	8.33% (1)	50% (6)	8.33% (1)	33.33% (4)	(12)
Large	8.33% (1)	33.33% (4)	16.66% (2)	41.66% (5)	(12)
Very Large	0	8.33% (1)	0	91.66% (11)	(12)
Total	11.9%(5)	33.33% (14)	7.14% (3)	47.61% (20)	(42)

The final question (3.B) asks agencies to provide the number of times in the three months prior to the survey that they have been in contact with a federal agency to convey intelligence information. The choice of responses was:

1. ___none
2. ___1-2
3. ___3-4
4. ___5 or more

Although the frequencies differ, Figure 9 closely resembles those of Figure 8, which seems to indicate that the amount of communication that agencies have with their fusion centers and federal partners are very similar. Among agencies with an intelligence unit or designated intelligence officer, the highest frequency of scores behind those agencies without an intelligence function (nearly 30%, n = 22/74) shows that the majority of agencies have communicated with a federal agency to convey intelligence information "5 or more" times in the three months before the survey. The response with the second highest frequency was "1-2" times a month (16%, n = 12/74). Both figures still show, however, that just over 5% report no contact at all.

Federal Agency Communication

| | Resp. 1 None (8.1%) | Resp. 2 1-2 (16.21%) | Resp. 3 3-4 (2.7%) | Resp. 4 5+ (29.72%) | No Intel (43.24%) |

Legend: Q 3.B

Figure 9.

Brief Summary of Question 3.B

Table 7 shows that the majority of agencies that have an intelligence function report that they have communicated with federal agencies "5 or more" times in the three months prior to the survey to convey intelligence information (52.38%). Frequencies for small agencies

are evenly split at opposite ends of the spectrum ("0", or "5 or more"). The percentage of

frequencies for medium agencies drops, but is at its highest at "1-2" times. The frequencies

support the fact that large and very large agencies have more contact with federal agencies.

The frequency, however, does necessarily increase with the size of the agency.

Table 7

Brief Summary of Question 3.B

Federal Agency Communication					
Category	Response 1 None	Response 2 1-2	Response 3 3-4	Response 4 5 or more	Total
Very Small	0	100% (1)	0	0	(1)
Small	40% (2)	20% (1)	0	40% (2)	(5)
Medium	16.66% (2)	41.66% (5)	8.33% (1)	33.33% (4)	(12)
Large	2% (2)	33.33% (4)	8.33% (1)	41.66% (5)	(12)
Very Large	0	8.33% (1)	0	91.66% (11)	(12)
Total	14.28% (6)	28.57% (12)	16.66% (2)	52.38% (22)	(42)

Summary

The purpose of my research was to measure how far municipal police departments in

the State of Texas have advanced ten years after 9/11. The survey questions were designed to:

1) assess the frequency of use of intelligence units in municipal police departments in the State

of Texas, 2) identify commonalities in their structure, and 3) measure their effectiveness

through their perceived level of communication. The importance of the current research,

however, is not limited to just these elements. Understanding the relationship of these

elements to agency size is of equal importance.

Figure 10 provides a summary of the combined responses to each of the questions from the

participating agencies, regardless of size. In terms of structure it shows that nearly 45% of all

municipal Texas agencies do not have an intelligence unit or intelligence officer.   While that

means approximately 55% of municipal agencies have some sort of intelligence function, the

structure of that function is also what I sought to determine. Question 1 of the survey asked

agencies to identify the structure of their intelligence function in terms of number of people

and their function ("Structure" in Figure 10). The responses identified the most common

structure, which is that of one person who serves a dual, or shared, purpose one of which is

intelligence. What is more interesting, however, is not the number of people used to perform

the intelligence function, but the mission of the people in those positions. The two most

frequent responses to this question show that the intelligence officers or units of local agencies

in Texas perform a split mission; intelligence and another departmental function. Interestingly,

the survey results also showed that an intelligence function was more likely to exist in larger

agencies than smaller ones.

Figure 10.

 Summary of All Agency Responses

The four parts of Question 2 (A-D) sought to determine the efficiency of the intelligence capacity of agencies in Texas through services and communication. Questions 2.A ("Intel Dissemination" in Figure 10) and 2.B of the survey ("Intel Assistance" in Figure 10) asked agencies to rate the frequency of services that their intelligence function provided. The results in Figure 10 shows that agencies rated these services most frequently at the highest level of "5 or more" times in the previous three months. Those results, however, summarize the combined responses of all Texas agencies. A closer analysis of the survey provides a better understanding of whether the frequency of those intelligence services occurs with more or less frequency depending upon the size of the agency. The results indicate that the services occur with more frequency in larger agencies. Question 2.A pertained to the number of intelligence products that the intelligence function of agencies provided in the three months prior to the survey. The analysis showed that the response "5 or more" occurred with more frequency in medium, large, and very large agencies. Question 2.B referred to the number of times that it provided assistance to someone in their department during the same period.   The response "5 or more" occurred with more frequency in large and very large agencies.

Questions 2.C and 2.D centered on the second part of the efficiency of the intelligence function of local Texas police agencies, which is the application of intelligence in crime reduction. Again, Figure 10 summarizes the responses of all the agencies regardless of size. Keeping in mind that nearly 45%, of the municipal agencies in Texas do not have an intelligence function, the results showed indications that improvement is needed in the practical application of intelligence among agencies that have an intelligence function. Question 2.C ("Intel to Reduce Crime" in Figure 10) asked agencies to rate the number time in the three

months prior to the survey that they used products developed by their intelligence function to plan crime reduction operations. Just over 40% said that they have done so ranging from "1-2" to "5 or more" in the three months prior to the survey. Nearly 15%, however, replied "none." The surveys again showed a relationship between frequency and agency size in that the large and very large agency had the highest frequency of responses.

Question 2.D ("Self Description" in Figure 10) asked agencies to self-describe the intelligence capacity of their agencies. While none of the agencies said that they do not promote the use of intelligence, 42% said that they use it to plan crime reduction operations. Fifteen percent do not use intelligence to plan crime reduction operations. The frequency of responses to that question did not appear to be impacted by the size of the agency.

The final section of the survey tested the levels of communication municipal Texas police departments had with other agencies in three months prior to the survey to convey intelligence information. Question 3.A ("Fusion Communication" in Figure 10) asked agencies to rate the frequency of their communication with their fusion center and Question 3.B ("Fed. Communication" in Figure 10) asked agencies to rate their frequency of communication with federal agencies. Figure 10 shows that agencies rated their communication levels with both fusion centers and federal agencies at the highest level (5 or more). The survey results for Question 3.A, however, show a relationship to frequency and the size of the agency. The "5 or more" response, was highest among large and very large agencies. The highest frequency for medium sized agencies was "1-2" while small agencies reported no contact at all.

The survey results pertaining to the communication frequency of municipal Texas agencies with federal agencies to convey intelligence information showed a similar pattern. Thirty

percent of the municipal Texas communicated with their federal partners "5 or more" times in the three months prior to the survey, which was the response with the highest frequency. Again, however, the survey results showed that the large and very large agencies predominately indicated "5 or more" with the highest frequency when compared to agencies of other sizes.

The survey proved to be a useful tool in studying the progress in the frequency and use of intelligence in municipal law enforcement agencies in the State of Texas. The resulting composite indicates nearly 45% of those agencies do not have an intelligence function. In those that do, the staffing model is predominately that of one person whose mission is not solely that of intelligence; it is shared with another departmental function. While the use of the intelligence products and services is spread among the categories of agencies, those products and services occur with more frequency in larger agencies. Of those agencies with an intelligence function, the majority actively promotes the use of intelligence to plan crime reduction operations, yet 15% still do not. Planning those operations occurs with more frequency in larger agencies as does communication with fusion centers and federal agencies. It is clear that a common theme has emerged. The elements that indicate the use of intelligence occur with more frequency among larger agencies. The reason behind that, however, is still uncertain.

Understanding these elements of structure, efficiency and communication would test three hypotheses, the first of which is that large agencies have made more advances in developing an intelligence function than smaller agencies. This hypothesis is accepted. The survey results show that larger agencies have, with increased frequency, established

intelligence functions. In fact, only one very small agency in the survey sample indicated that they have a designated intelligence officer or unit. The survey results also show that larger agencies have a higher frequency than smaller agencies in the disseminating intelligence products, providing intelligence assistance to members within their agencies, using intelligence in crime reduction operation, and communicating with fusion centers and federal agencies.

The second hypothesis that my research challenged was that structure of intelligence units in local agencies lacks uniformity in smaller agencies. This hypothesis is also accepted but needs discussion. The inconsistency that my research found was in the existence of intelligence functions in municipal Texas agencies. As was already mentioned, only one very small agency in the survey sample indicated that they have an established intelligence function. The statistics showed, however, that the existence of an intelligence unit increased as the size of the agency increased. The staffing model of the intelligence function was predominately that of a single person. That model began to change in the large and very large agencies where the staffing moved to a unit of two or more people. This seems normal since those agencies likely have more resources to devote to an intelligence function and the increased activity to justify it. Surprisingly, the survey showed an interesting and consistent pattern in the mission of the intelligence function in municipal Texas agencies. In all categories, the mission of the intelligence function in these agencies was split between intelligence and another departmental function. This finding was unexpected and begs to question the effectiveness of an intelligence function when it is done only part of the time. That question, however, is a topic for other research.

The final hypothesis of my research is that communication within municipal agencies and the communication that they have with fusion centers and federal agencies is more frequent among larger agencies. This hypothesis is accepted. The survey results showed that the intelligence function in medium, large and very large agencies disseminated intelligence products within their agencies with more frequency than very small or small organizations. The intelligence function in large and very large agencies also assisted members within their organizations with more frequency. Communication with fusion centers and federal agencies showed the same results in that the frequency was higher among large and vary large agencies.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Few would argue that the use of intelligence in policing has been a "hot-button" topic in

the United States since the days of 9/11. The question, however, is assessing how far police

agencies have advanced in that time. By analyzing municipal law enforcement agencies in the

State of Texas, the purpose of my research was to: 1) assess the frequency of use of

intelligence units in municipal agencies, 2) identify commonalities in their structure, and 3)

measure their effectiveness through their perceived level of communication.

The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP) of 2004 recommended that all

agencies, regardless of size, should develop an intelligence function (Carter, 2009). This

research surveyed municipal police departments in the State of Texas to test the hypothesis

that larger agencies have made further advances in developing intelligence units than smaller

agencies. The results proved two important points. First, 57% of the municipal agencies that

were surveyed have an intelligence unit, whether that unit consisted of a sole person or a unit

of two or more people. It stands to reason that those units are responsible for an agency's

intelligence function.   While that seems like significant progress, 43% of the agencies that

were sampled did not. If that sample is representative of all the agencies across the state, then

292 municipal agencies across the state do not have an intelligence function. That is short of

the 2004 NCISP recommendations that established the benchmark that 100% of law

enforcement agencies should develop an intelligence function. In light of that decision,

significant progress has yet to be made. Smaller agencies in the sample had higher frequencies

than larger agencies of not having an intelligence unit or intelligence officer. Conversely, the

larger the agency, the more likely it was to have such a unit. Since the percentage decreased as

the size category increased, there is an indication of an inverse relationship.

The second purpose of this research was to identify commonalities in the structure of

intelligence units in municipal law enforcement agencies in Texas and to test the hypothesis

that the structure of units lacks uniformity in smaller agencies. The results of this are significant

because the lack of structure creates a state of confusion (Ratcliffe, 2007). To determine the

uniformity of intelligence units in municipal agencies across Texas, my research focused on two

elements of any unit; staffing and purpose. With regards to staffing, the survey sought to

determine whether agencies use a single person to perform their intelligence function, or a unit

consisting of two or more people. In terms of purpose, it sought to determine whether that

intelligence unit or intelligence officer was responsible for the sole mission of intelligence or a

dual mission of intelligence and another departmental function.

The research found a common staffing structure among small, medium and large

agencies, which is a single person. This type of structure, however, did not hold true for very

large agencies, whose units most frequently consist of two or more people. Although the

reason why was not addressed in this research, the most obvious might be that very large

agencies have more resources to devote to such a unit and an increased workload to justify the

need. That, however, is a topic for additional research.

What was more interesting is the finding that police departments still struggle with a

common purpose or mission of their intelligence units. All agencies, regardless of size indicated

with the most frequency that their intelligence officer or intelligence unit serves a dual

purpose; intelligence as well as another departmental function. Interestingly, the only agencies

that showed any indication of having a designated person or unit whose exclusive purpose was that of intelligence were the large and very large agencies. This begs the question, "If the most common profile for intelligence units in the state is a single person who is doing two jobs, how effective can the level of intelligence really be?" This "identity problem" touches into three of the areas that contribute to such confusion: 1) the struggle with centralization versus decentralization, 2) too much or too little staffing, and 3) agencies that are not committed to the role of the unit (Ratcliffe, 2007).

The final purpose of my research was to measure the effectiveness of the intelligence capacity in municipal Texas agencies by looking at their perceived level of communication. It would test the hypothesis that internal and external communication was better among larger agencies. I found that the internal and external communication occurred with the highest frequency ("5 or more") in the large and very large agencies but that generally the frequencies of all the agencies did not increase or decrease in a consistent pattern.

I first focused on internal communication by studying the frequency at which the intelligence capacity of agencies provided intelligence summaries to their members or provided intelligence assistance. In terms of providing intelligence summaries (Table 2), The results showed that medium, large, and very large agencies were more efficient based on their higher response frequency of "5 or more," while very small and small agencies answered with the highest frequencies in the lower range of "None" or "1-2." The results, however, did not show a consistent pattern of frequency increases or decreases within each category (size) of agency. As the size of the agencies increased, I expected to find a similar and consistent increase in the number of communications as it rose from "None" to "1-2", "3-4" and finally "5 or more."

Instead of a steady climb, what I found was peaks and valleys within some categories of

agencies. Table 2, for example, shows that the frequency of responses for intelligence

assistance in small agencies started at 20% in the "None" category, peaked at 60% for "1-2,"

decreased to zero in the "3-4" category and increased again to 20% at "5 or more." The large

agency responses showed a similar fluctuation. I found a similar fluctuation patterns in the

topic of the frequency of assistance that intelligence capacities provided to their members

(Table 3). I then focused on external communication of the intelligence capacities of municipal

Texas agencies and again found the same patterns (Table 6 and Table 7). The conclusion is that,

while larger agencies have more effective intelligence capacities than smaller agencies based on

the finding that they communicate internally and externally with the highest frequency (5 or

more), there is not a consistent pattern of increase or decrease in the response frequencies.

To study their level of communication, the research first assessed the frequency at

which intelligence units disseminated intelligence summaries within their departments. The

finding showed that the intelligence units disseminated summaries with more frequency in

medium, large and very large agencies than in small but that frequency did not increase as the

size of the agency increased. The research found similar results in the number of times that

intelligence units assisted members of their departments with intelligence information at their

request. There was slight indication that such assistance increased as the size of the agency

increased.

In terms of external communication, the research first assessed the level of

communication that intelligence units had with their fusion centers. The results showed that

large and very large agencies had more communication with fusion centers than small or

medium size agencies. In looking at the frequency of communication with federal agencies, the

research found the same results. This seems to support research that the flow of information

has improved between local and federal agencies (Marks & Sun, 2007). In both cases, however,

the statistics failed to show that the frequency of communication increased as the size of the

agency increased.

As a final measure in determining the level of effectiveness of intelligence in agencies is

the level at which it is applied (Ratcliffe & Walden, 2010). This is an indication of the extent to

which agencies have implemented intelligence based policing. The survey results show that, of

the 57% of agencies that have intelligence officer or intelligence units, the clear majority

promote the use and development of intelligence in their own agencies as opposed to relying

on intelligence from other agencies. The majority also use it to plan operations to reduce

crime. While it may occur with more frequency in larger organizations, all actively

communicate with their fusion centers and federal partners. The frequency, however, is not

relative to size.

Limitations

This study only provides a glimpse into the use of intelligence into local law

enforcement in Texas. There are several limitations to this study. The first limitation centers

on the use of frequencies. The study asks agencies to rate the number of times that they

performed certain tasks. The size of an agency, however, is based upon the size of the

population that they serve. It stands to reason, therefore, that larger population centers may

have higher levels of activity than smaller ones.

The second limitation pertains to what the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan refers to as the intelligence "function." This study identifies the levels at which municipal agencies utilize their use of a person or a unit to perform that role. The belief is that an entity in an organization, individual or otherwise, has to be responsible for that function in order for it to exist. It is much like having a car with no wheels. Yes, it has everything that makes it look like a car but, without wheels, it is not going anywhere. Still, the NCISP only recommends that every agency, regardless of size, should have an intelligence function (Carter, 2009). What it does not say is how that function should take form or how it should be put into practice. What this research does not consider is each agency's interpretation of the term "intelligence function" particularly in agencies that do not have a designated person or unit responsible for it. In smaller agencies, for example, an intelligence officer may simply be the conduit to receive and submit information between the agency's officers and its assigned officers. The intelligence officer or unit of some agencies might work in the community to actively promote or gather information. Some large agencies may have what is termed as a "tactical" intelligence unit whose responsibility is to monitor "in-progress" calls and provide real-time information to officers who respond to them. In other agencies, the intelligence capacity may contain all or any combination of these. Each agency differs in the level of tactical versus strategic intelligence that their intelligence capacity provides.

This study is also limited in perspective. It reports the effectiveness of intelligence based on the answers given by the department, which is the source of the intelligence, and not the officer, who is the end-user of it. Further research must be done at the end-user level to

determine if the role of intelligence is clear among officers and if the products produced by their intelligence officer or unit are usable at their level.

The final limitation is geography. This research limited the sample group to municipal agencies only within the State of Texas. As such, the results of a study from one state are not sufficient to assess the progress of intelligence across the entire United States. The results of the current study, therefore, cannot be generalized to describe the intelligence functions of all the municipal agencies in the U.S.   In more narrow terms, this study separated agency responses by size without taking into consideration the region where the agency is located. Metropolitan areas may have greater intelligence needs than rural areas. That means that agencies of the same size may differ in terms of the levels of intelligence that they require as an agency and the level they provided to their officers.

Implications for Future Study

This study is the opening chapter of a body of research that contains many chapters. Each chapter provides an additional piece of information that contributes to our understanding of the progress that law enforcement has made in using intelligence throughout the United States. The study, however, must be first continued at the state level and begin with a better understanding of exactly what "intelligence capacity" means for each category of municipal agency. How agencies take that term and put it into practice must be identified in order to assess the differences and commonalities between agencies. Clearly, the fact that 80% of the very small agencies in this study said that they do not have a person or unit responsible for their intelligence function leaves a huge gap in our understanding of their intelligence capacity.

Either those agencies answered the survey erroneously and do have an intelligence function of some sort or they answered correctly and do not, which is of equally great concern.

Research must then determine how regional differences impact the intelligence capacity of equal size agencies. Do like-size agencies differ depending whether they are situated in a metropolitan or rural area in terms of the intelligence capacity? It should then narrow from the agency perspective to that of the end user. Research must determine if agency employees at the line-level understand their agency's intelligence capacity and if the information that they provide is usable to them. Research can then broaden to the fusion centers to determine their level of effectiveness from their own perspective as well as from that of the municipal agencies. The municipal agencies, after all, are the end-users of their products. The research can then broaden further and be replicated in a sample of states across the U.S. Although this idea is very ambitious, it will provide a greater volume of information from which to better understand how intelligence has progressed in our nation since September 11, 2001.

The practical application of my research for police administrators is to bring awareness to the needs of smaller agencies whose limited resources may not allow for the services that intelligence functions provide in their larger cousins. Whether terrorism or domestic-related, crime occurs where the opportunity presents itself. While it is more likely to occur in more densely populated areas, there is no place within the United States that has not been touched by crime. Intelligence is of equal importance to all agencies regardless of their size.

As a final note, this research provides input into the discussion in the law enforcement community on whether all agencies, whether federal, state, or local, are moving in a common direction in the use of intelligence. The hard fact is that agencies fight crime in accordance to

the limitations of their budgets. Tight fiscal budgets and disagreement on their effectiveness is

already threatening the existence of fusion centers who serve as a conduit in states for local

agencies and, in some, cases, the only source of intelligence for agencies who are too small to

have their own (Luthern, 2013). Every law enforcement agency varies in its application of

intelligence to reduce crime. The relevant question, however, still remains unanswered;

despite those differences, are we all moving in the same direction?

APPENDIX

SURVEY

<u>**Survey**</u>

Section I – Intelligence Structure and Function

Question 1. Which of the following best describes the structure of the intelligence unit of your agency?

1. ___An established unit consisting of two or more people whose sole mission is to perform the agency's intelligence function.

2. ___An established unit consisting of two or more people who perform the agency's intelligence function but also perform another function in the agency either individually or as a unit.

3. ___One person whose sole mission is to perform the agency's intelligence function.

4. ___One person who performs dual roles in the agency, one of which is the intelligence function.

5. ___We do not have a designated intelligence unit or a person recognized as the agency's intelligence officer.

<u>NOTE: IF YOU SELECTED #5 DO NOT COMPLETE THE REMAINDER OF THE SURVEY AND PLEASE RETURN AS INSTRUCTED ABOVE.</u>

Section II - Efficiency

Question 2A. In the past three months, how many times has your intelligence unit or the person assigned as the intelligence officer produced or disseminated an intelligence summary to other members of the department?

1. ___none

2. ___1-2

3. ___3-4

4. ___5 or more

Question 2B. In the past three months, how many times has your intelligence unit or the person assigned as the intelligence officer assisted anyone in your department with intelligence information at his or her request?

1. ___none

2. ___1-2

3. ___3-4

4. ___5 or more

Question 2C. In the past three months, how many times has your department used products developed by your intelligence unit or the person assigned as the intelligence officer to plan crime reduction operations?

1. ___none

2. ___1-2

3. ___3-4

4. ___5 or more

Question 2D. Which of the following statements best describes the intelligence capacity or your agency?

1. ___Actively promote the development and use of intelligence with agency members and use intelligence to plan crime reduction operations.

2. ___Actively promote the development and use of intelligence with agency members but DO NOT use intelligence to plan crime reduction operations.

3. ___Rely on the intelligence capacity of other agencies such as police departments or fusion centers but use the intelligence to plan crime reduction operations.

4. ___Rely on the intelligence capacity of other agencies such as police departments or fusion centers but DO NOT use the intelligence to plan crime reduction operations.

5. ___Do not promote the development and use of intelligence in the department.

Section III - Communication

Question 3A. In the past three months, how many times has your department been in contact with a fusion center in your state, either verbally or electronically, to convey intelligence information?

1. ___none

2. ___1-2

3. ___3-4

4. ___5 or more

Question 3B. In the past three months, how many times has your department been in contact with representatives from a federal agency, either verbally or electronically, to convey intelligence information?

1. ___none

2. ___1-2

3. ___3-4

4. ___5 or more

Thank you for participating in this research. This completes the survey. Please mail the completed survey and your signed Informed Consent form to the address provided on the enclosed, post paid, envelope.

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