Assessing the Potential for Civil-Military Integration: Technologies, Processes, and Practices Page: III
logical and industrial prowess. Over the four-decade-long Cold War, the Nation's
defense technology and industrial base became largely isolated from the commer-
cial base, thus losing some of the benefits of the larger base. This isolation raised the
cost of many defense goods and services, reduced defense access to fast-moving commercial
technologies, and made it difficult for commercial firms to exploit the results of the Nation's
large defense science and technology investments.
Government officials and private sector executives have advocated the integration of the
defense and commercial sectors (often termed civil-military integration or CMI). The
claimed benefits of CM I include cost savings, increased technology transfer, and an increase
in the number of potential defense suppliers. A CM I strategy, however, demands extensive
modification of acquisition laws and regulations, and concerns over potential costs and risks
of such modifications have hindered change. Although several congressional and adminis-
tration initiatives have been launched to promote integration, to date, much of the defense
base remains isolated and the promised benefits of integration remain elusive.
This assessment found that greater CM I is possible. It confirms the potential for cost sav-
ings and increased technology transfer, but analysis indicates such savings are likely to be
less, and slower to realize, than many previous studies have suggested. Even so, cost savings
of even a few percent of total defense technology and industrial spending would amount to
billions of dollars in overall savings that might be used to meet other vital defense needs. The
most important benefit of increased CMI may be the preservation of a viable defense
technology and industrial capability in an increasingly fiscally constrained environment. In-
creased CMI appears essential if defense is to take advantage of rapidly developing commer-
This assessment identified no "silver bullet" policies that might easily achieve CM I
.goals. Some policies can have broad effects, but in most instances the barriers to increased
CMI are sufficiently intertwined to demand a comprehensive (and complex) set of policies if
the projected benefits are to be achieved.
In undertaking this assessment, OTA sought information and advice from a broad spec-
trum of knowledgeable individuals and organizations whose contributions are gratefully ac-
knowledged. As with all OTA studies, the content of this report is the sole responsibility of
the Office of Technology" Assessment and does not necessarily represent the views of our
advisors and reviewers.
ROGER C. HERDMAN
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United States. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. Assessing the Potential for Civil-Military Integration: Technologies, Processes, and Practices, report, September 1994; [Washington D.C.]. (digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc39728/m1/3/ocr/: accessed November 12, 2018), University of North Texas Libraries, Digital Library, digital.library.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.