Battle for the Punchbowl: The U. S. 1st Marine Division 1951 Fall Offensive of the Korean War Page: 38

This thesis is part of the collection entitled: UNT Theses and Dissertations and was provided to Digital Library by the UNT Libraries.

View a full description of this thesis.

(The resulting total is considerably more than 14,000, but 6,706 casualties returned to
duty.) To make up for the losses, the 1st Mar Div received 13,097 men as replacements.
That is a turn over rate of over 50 percent in five months. 1 (See Charts # 11, 12, and
Yet even so, the new men began to "belong" very quickly. "In mentioning the
reserves, they were very closely integrated into our organization and after they had
been with us for a few weeks, I can truthfully state that you could not tell a reserve from
a regular." And "almost two-thirds of the U. S. Marines in Korea were reservists," by
June, 1951. The fighting was to be done by what one historian called a "new division."
That did not mean it was a less effective or efficient outfit, however; the Marine Corps
did screen its reservists to ensure a minimum state of training before shipping them out,
and they had many from which to choose the cream of the crop.2
Jon Charles Genrich remarked:
The new men were all taking hold of their duties as they had all been through
advanced training in the states. Before this time half of our outfit had been
reservists, many of whom had never been to a summer camp for training. They
were good men, but I heard many stories about how some had never fire an M-1
rifle before coming to Korea. They had trained them by loading rifles and firing
them off the fan tail of the ship on the way over to Korea. Many did not even wear
their helmets when going into combat. The new men seemed more able to adapt
to rules and procedure. The older reservists were tough, hard-fighting men,
which sometimes was more important in battle than the type of weapons or
equipment being used.3
U. S. Pacific Fleet, "Third Interim Evaluation Report," 15-27; 1st Mar Div, "Historical Diary," August 1951,
3; Allan R. Millett, Many a Strife, 306; U. S. Pacific Fleet, "Third Interim Evaluation Report," 15-26 through
15-29. A Staff Non-Commissioned Officer was any enlisted man with a rank above Sergeant was a Staff
NCO, any enlisted man with a rank of either Corporal or Sergeant was referred to as an NCO or Non-
Commissioned Officer because they gave orders and led men despite not being a "commissioned" officer,
the ranks from Second Lieutenant through General.
Marine Corps Historical Section Interview with Captain Robert Barrow, October 8, 1951, Marine Corps
Korean War document collection CD# 14, part one of interview, page 1; Ronald J. Brown,
Counteroffensive, 68; U. S. Pacific Fleet, "Third Interim Evaluation Report," 15-27; Lynn Montross, et al.,
The East Central Front, 173.
3 Oral memoir of Jon Charles Genrich at Website last consulted April 2007.


Upcoming Pages

Here’s what’s next.

upcoming item: 54 54 of 415
upcoming item: 55 55 of 415
upcoming item: 56 56 of 415
upcoming item: 57 57 of 415

Show all pages in this thesis.

This thesis can be searched. Note: Results may vary based on the legibility of text within the document.

Tools / Downloads

Get a copy of this page .

Citing and Sharing

Basic information for referencing this web page. We also provide extended guidance on usage rights, references, copying or embedding.

Reference the current page of this Thesis.

Montandon, Joshua W. Battle for the Punchbowl: The U. S. 1st Marine Division 1951 Fall Offensive of the Korean War, thesis, August 2007; Denton, Texas. ( accessed April 22, 2018), University of North Texas Libraries, Digital Library,; .