Battle for the Punchbowl: The U. S. 1st Marine Division 1951 Fall Offensive of the Korean War Page: 324
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morning after the rooster crows so the rooster must be the cause of the sun coming up.
But like there is no direct evidence, per se, that the United states would have lost the
Civil War (or at least, not conquered the Confederacy, which is much the same thing) if
the British had come in on the side of the Confederacy, it is a reasonable and probable
conclusion to make. So, too, is this one.
That the infantry in this offensive showed the Communists determination and
tenacious aggression in the face of the most relentless counterattacks they could
muster, and that so many Communist soldiers were lost so soon after the rebuilding and
regrouping done in the period of the talks at Kaesong -- a period of respite wherein to
recover from the most staggering losses of the war, taken in the bitterly failed CCF
Spring Offensives - points to the conclusion that the Communists decided to resume
negotiating in October 1951 because of the Fall Offensive. Afterall, one of the "ten
principles of war by which the CCF fight," declared by Mao himself in 1947, stated:
"Avoid battles of attrition in which gains are not sufficient to compensate for losses, or in
which gains merely balance losses. We (Communists) are numerically inferior, but we
must secure local superiority in every section and every campaign."49
The American infantry showed the Communists resolve, improved the UN terrain
for the UN defensive line, and gained ground for South Korea, even in the offense
taking fewer casualties than an enemy on the defense (defense, noted Clausewitz, is
the stronger form of war) at a time when Washington and its allies like Britain and
France were showing weakness and wringing their hands in fear of Soviet intervention.
The infantry put the steel in what otherwise would be limp words at the negotiating
table, providing further evidence, if the Communists thought the truce talks signaled
49 Headquarter EUSAK, "Enemy Tactics," viii; Burton Kaufman, The Korean War, Chapter Five.
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Montandon, Joshua W. Battle for the Punchbowl: The U. S. 1st Marine Division 1951 Fall Offensive of the Korean War, thesis, August 2007; Denton, Texas. (digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc3938/m1/339/?rotate=270: accessed August 23, 2017), University of North Texas Libraries, Digital Library, digital.library.unt.edu; .