Battle for the Punchbowl: The U. S. 1st Marine Division 1951 Fall Offensive of the Korean War Page: 270
then army level (where the JOC was located) and have the strike preplanned. But it may
or may not even get approval depending on AF priorities for air power that day, and
when the strike arrived on station, the pilots would likely be from the AF (therefore
having little training in CAS) and would have little or no idea of the ground situation.
Then to top all this off, the ground commander would have no control over the strike; it
would be directed by a Mosquito flown by an AF officer (with no infantry training), and
the strike would certainly not be coordinated with artillery, NGF, and infantry action,
resulting in as little integration with the actions of the ground forces as could be
imagined and a subsequent degree of inopportunity and ineffectiveness with and on the
ground situation. In other words, the AF system directly reflected the AF and Army view
(official view despite many lower echelon Army officers' preference for the Marine
system) that "land power and air power are coequal and interdependent forces; neither
is the auxiliary of the other."30
This was in direct contrast to the Marine Corps/Navy view demonstrated in these
words by the Marine Corps Board Study:
The air operations are closely integrated with and a primary supporting arm for
ground force operations in the assault and seizure of physical objectives. The
plans for supporting air operations are determined . . . by the requirements of the
ground forces being supported [as opposed to the AF system where air
requirements determine the plans for ground support]. The assistance rendered
by air is not only general, but is also direct; it is made reliably available and is
closely integrated with fire and maneuver of the ground forces. The primary
measure of effectiveness of tactical air support is the amount of direct assistance
30 Allan R. Millett, " Korea, 1950-1953," 347 - Allan R. Millett was quoting Army FM 100-20, The
Command and Employment of Air Power (July, 1943) which established "several important doctrines" of
the Army/AF concept for air-ground operations. This manual, says Millett, was superseded by another
that maintained the same core concept down through the Korean War. This was: FM 31-35, Air-Ground
Operations (1946), which devised the JOC. Millett goes on to say that this manual was revised just prior
to the Korean war, and a new "Joint Training Directive for Air-Ground Operations" (September 1, 1950),
abbreviated JTD, was applied to how air-ground operations would be conducted in Korea, but, basically,
the doctrine remained that of FM 31-35 throughout Korea. (I have a copy of FM 31-35 in my possession.)
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Montandon, Joshua W. Battle for the Punchbowl: The U. S. 1st Marine Division 1951 Fall Offensive of the Korean War, thesis, August 2007; Denton, Texas. (digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc3938/m1/285/ocr/: accessed June 25, 2017), University of North Texas Libraries, Digital Library, digital.library.unt.edu; .