Battle for the Punchbowl: The U. S. 1st Marine Division 1951 Fall Offensive of the Korean War Page: 119

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would come out on top. The second day we had a little sporadic fire, but with the
planes overhead it was much calmer. They dropped ammo to us, but two-thirds
went into enemy occupied areas....
The Lieutenant was going to take one rifleman down the hill to try to make
it to headquarters. The company commander in his absence would be a corporal
from one of the rifle platoons. We still had a sergeant left in third section machine
guns, but they were only attached to the company so not in the direct line of
command. I must admit in my mind that I felt the Lieutenant was bugging out
while he still could and I didn't expect him to come back.15
Genrich related another experience:
I was sitting behind the gun [that] morning and the sun had been up about one
hour when I saw North Koreans jumping up and running. It had been so quiet
that I was very surprised and started shooting as two, then three more, jumped
up and ran toward the higher part of the hill . . . I hit four or five but it should
have been a dozen. Since I had been caught by surprise, my accuracy was not
as good as it should have been. Then I saw several more figures under a couple
of huge shade trees at the far end of the ridge where it had a steep drop off. I
turned and fired several bursts at the figures in the shadows and then I saw a
couple move into the sunlight. They were Marines and I stopped firing almost in
shock. I later found out that they were from George Company. We were on the
front perimeter and some of our troops hadn't been told that Marines were
coming up the other ridge on the attack. Richard got back and I told him what
had happened. He said, "You had no way of knowing." I prayed to myself that I
hadn't killed any Marines.16
Broken down by companies, that day's action for 3/7 against Hill 680 proceeded
as follows. The platoon George Company had left on 602 received orders at 0230 to
join the rest of the company to be prepared for the coming day's assault. George
stepped out in the assault at dawn and was almost at 680 by 0600, but did not make
contact with the enemy until 0830 that morning. George's commander maneuvered his
men in a double envelopment, which succeeded in moving his men up the final 500
yards of the hill in "fast moving attack that never lost its momentum. Expertly moving fire
teams and squads quickly reduced seven active bunkers by the use of organic weapons
and hand grenades." The left platoon's point fire team rushed a key machine gun
15 Oral memoir of Jon Charles Genrich.
16 Ibid.


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Montandon, Joshua W. Battle for the Punchbowl: The U. S. 1st Marine Division 1951 Fall Offensive of the Korean War, thesis, August 2007; Denton, Texas. ( accessed July 21, 2017), University of North Texas Libraries, Digital Library,; .