Battle for the Punchbowl: The U. S. 1st Marine Division 1951 Fall Offensive of the Korean War Page: 88
BLOOD FOR RIDGES
Close-in fighting decided the issue on every hill.
--1 Mar Div. Historical Diary
The division had to take some time out starting September 4 to move more
ammunition forward. Narrow roads, mud, and enemy mines as well as a shortage of
needed trucks caused the delay, and the fact that the division railhead was ninety miles
to the rear did not help. It took six days to build up a big enough ammo dump nearer the
front lines in order for the attack to resume, partly because of the "extraordinary"
amount of artillery shells the Marines had used up in the fight. A reserve supply of
ammo for at least ten days was needed (fifty to sixty trucks a day). This was because
trucks would be needed to rotate 2,000 Marines home by 15 September. (So in the
case of this battle, and at least in this one aspect, the rotation policy did interfere with
U. S. Pacific Fleet, "Third Interim Evaluation Report," 15-48; Gerald C. Thomas Oral Memoir, 896; 1st
Mar Div, "Historical Diary," September 1951, 7. "In fact, the estimates for shells fell short of the actual
expenditures, 24,000 tons (874,000 rounds) for X Corps in September 1951. Intelligence officers believed
that X Corps would need every shell it could find." --Allan R. Millett, Drive North, 43.
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Montandon, Joshua W. Battle for the Punchbowl: The U. S. 1st Marine Division 1951 Fall Offensive of the Korean War, thesis, August 2007; Denton, Texas. (digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc3938/m1/103/ocr/: accessed March 24, 2017), University of North Texas Libraries, Digital Library, digital.library.unt.edu; .