

DEM SCHWERTE MUSS DER PFLUG FOLGEN: ÜBER-PEASANTS AND
NATIONAL SOCIALIST SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED
EASTERN TERRITORIES DURING WORLD WAR TWO

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German industrialization in the nineteenth century had brought forward a variety of conflicting ideas when it came to the agrarian community. One of them was the agrarian romantic movement led by Adam Müller, who feared the loss of the traditional German peasant. Müller influenced Reichsdeutsche Richard Walther Darré, who argued that large cities were the downfall of the German people and that only a healthy peasant stock would be able to 'save' Germany. Under Darré's definition, "Geopolitik" was the defense of the land, the defense with *Pflug und Schwert* (plow and sword) by *Wehrbauern*, an 'Überbauer-fusion' of soldier and peasant. In order to accomplish these goals, new settlements had to be established while moving from west to east.

The specific focus of this study is on the original Hegewald resettlement ideas of Richard Walther Darré and how his philosophy was taken over by Himmler and fit into his personal needs and creed after 1941. It will shed some light on the interaction of Darré and Himmler and the notorious internal fights and power struggles between the various governmental agencies involved. The Ministry for Food and Agriculture under the leadership of Darré was systematically pushed into the background and all previous, often publicly announced re-settlement policies were altered; Darré was pushed aside once the eastern living space was actually occupied.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Their sword will become our plow, and from the tears of war the daily bread of future generations will grow.

Hitler, *Mein Kampf*

National Socialist ideology was based on the doctrine of racial inequality. The National Socialist concept of race and living space, the preservation and the expansion of the Aryan people was directly linked to Nazi racial ideology via occupation and settlement. Adolf Hitler's focus was on the land. The nations that inhabited the soil played a secondary role in his plans; he was interested in exploiting the resources and raw materials for the greater German nation benefiting only Aryans. The nurturing and fostering of the Aryan tribe (*Sippenpflege*) cannot be separated from the idea of settlement.

Most often, occupied land is different from the homeland. The people, landscape, climate, natural resources, and industries have different characteristics. An occupying nation is able to enforce a one-way transfer or inflow of goods and services from the occupied land to the homeland through coercion. The objective was to make the occupier autarkic. Becoming autarkic was one of Hitler's goals for Germany. By making the nation independent of costly foreign imports and relying more on its own resources or those from the occupied territories, the Nazis wanted to secure a certain standard of living for the German people, as well as develop a strong military. However, autarky was not an original idea of the Nazis. For example, the economist Werner Sombart had represented the thought of an "enclosed national economic area" much earlier.¹ Hitler

¹ Werner Sombart. *Händler und Helden patriotische Besinnungen* (München: Dunker, 1915).

borrowed this thought but added a racial component to it. He was convinced that German survival, both racial and political, depended on the seizure of land in eastern Europe.² Thus, Germany would not only survive but emerge as the dominant power in the world.

In order to achieve this goal, functional settlements filled with carefully selected German people had to be established in the occupied territories and totally controlled by the Nazis, while the local economy had to be dominated and eventually absorbed into the German system. The East and especially the Ukraine, often called the bread basket of the East (*Kornkammer des Ostens*), would supply food and other riches to Germany, while itself staying predominantly agricultural. It would, however, take a special kind of man to settle under the conditions that existed there. The future settler, or *Wehrbauer*, had to be of solid racial stock, accept the Party program, live on the eastern frontier, and be willing to function as a soldier while at the same time cultivating and farming the soil. Since the East, according to Hitler's plans would stay primarily rural, German peasants were the ideal type of settler. Peasants, by nature, customarily have a closer connection to the soil and nature, and therefore to the German spirit.³

German industrialization in the nineteenth century had brought forward a variety of conflicting ideas when it came to the agrarian community. One of them was the agrarian romantic movement led by Adam Müller, who feared the loss of the traditional German peasant. Germany was threatened by rapid industrialization and urbanization.

² Henry Picker, et al. Adolf Hitler. *Table Talk 1941-1944: His private conversations*, (NY: Enigma, 2000), 32.

³ On the *Deutsche Geist* or German Spirit see Fritz R. Stern. *The Politics of Cultural Despair. A Study in the Rise of Germanic Ideology*. (Berkeley: University of California Press 1961).

Following Müller's ideas, organizations promoting colonial or settlement ideas became popular.

Richard Walther Darré was one of the men influenced by Müller and the agrarian romanticism. The *Reichsdeutsche* Darré had published a book in 1926 titled *Innere Kolonisation* (internal colonization) which caught the attention of the National Socialists.⁴ In this publication, Darré looked towards the eastern areas of Europe to expand, not to any overseas holdings, although he was 'colonial' trained at the German Colonial School in Witzenhausen. He argued that large cities were the downfall of the German people. Races mixed and intermingled there and only a healthy peasant stock, would be able to 'save' Germany. Gaining land became a primary goal in his writings. Under Darré's definition, "*Geopolitik*" was the defense of the land, the defense with *Pflug und Schwert* (plow and sword) by *Wehrbauern*, an 'Überbauer-fusion' of soldier and peasant. In order to accomplish these goals, new settlements had to be established while moving from west to east.

As Hitler's chief agronomist, Darré' was put in charge of the reorganization of the peasants with his *Reichsnährstand* (Reich Food Estate), and he drew up plans for the resettlement of peasants in the east. For Darré, who promoted a *Blut and Boden* or blood and soil philosophy, only peasants were true Aryans. They were the only ones who understood the connection between blood and soil. Therefore, they were the only ones qualified to fulfill the racial and ideological mission in the East.

From the beginning, Darré and his Reichsnährstand were in competition with other Nazi organizations over the issue of settlement or colonization. In 1935, the Reich

⁴ *Reichsdeutsche* was a term generally applied to German citizens either living abroad or children of German citizens born abroad.

Office for Land-Use Regulation (*Reichsstelle für Raumordnung*) was created, with the goal of restructuring German peasantry (*Neubildung deutschen Bauerntums*). The Reich Office for Land Acquisition and the Reich Office for Resettlement (*Reichsstelle für Landbeschaffung* und die *Reichsstelle für Umsiedlung*) were both associated with the War Ministry.⁵ However, there was also the SS with its leader Heinrich Himmler, who had plans of his own to settle the East. For many years, historians believed that the eastern settlement plans of Himmler were nothing more than utopian fantasies. Shortly after World War II, studies about the civil administration in the eastern territories appeared and historians looked during this period mainly at the documents used during the Nuremberg Trials. However, during the 1960s and 70s, the research on Nazi Germany shifted to the topic of the Holocaust and the role of the Wehrmacht.⁶ Karl Heinz Roth's study in 1985 reopened the discussion of imperialistic ideas and rationalizations of the social and economic structures.⁷ Most studies that followed have focused on the Generalgouvernement, the former Poland, and the Ostland. Little attention has been devoted to specific resettlement policies. A study on German peasants during the Nazi reign was completed by Gustavo Corni. Corni's monograph *Hitler and the Peasants* took a closer look at the *Reichsbauernführer* Richard Walther Darré. Although Corni does not go into details about the resettlement in the future *Lebensraum*, he is able to shed light on the overall structure of the *Reichsnährstand*

⁵ "Wissenschaft im Dienste der Raumordnung", *NS-Landpost, Hauptblatt des Reichsnährstandes*, (Berlin: Reichsnährstandverlag gmbH), Dec 11, 1936. from here on forward: NS-Landpost.

⁶ Jonathan Steinberg. "The Third Reich Reflected: German Civil Administration in the Occupied Soviet Union," *The English Historical Review*, 110, (June 1995): 622.

⁷ Matthias Burchard, "Der GPO, ein finsternes Kapitel Berliner Wissenschaftsgeschichte", Humboldt University Berlin: Working Paper 38/1997, 5. <http://gplanost.x-berg.de/sgplanost.html>.

and ideological thesis of Darré. Gustavo Corni then collaborated with Horst Gies on the book *Blut und Boden*, but although this book contains 173 primary sources, only three are devoted to the eastern settlement ideas of the Nazi.⁸ Wendy Lower's story of *Hegewald*, largely unknown to post-war scholars, casts new light on Nazi ambitions in the East.⁹ *Hegewald* foreshadowed the German *Wehrbauern* or 'Über-peasant' settlement that never actually materialized.

The specific focus of this study is on the original *Hegewald* resettlement ideas of Richard Walther Darré and how his philosophy was taken over by Himmler and fit into his personal needs and creed after 1941. It will shed some light on the interaction of Darré and Himmler and the notorious internal fights and power struggles between the various governmental agencies involved. The Ministry for Food and Agriculture under the leadership of Darré was systematically pushed into the background and all previous, often publicly announced re-settlement policies were altered; Darré was pushed aside once the eastern living space was actually occupied.

Previous studies have focused on the lives of famous Nazis: Hitler, Himmler, Göring, or Goebbels. In order to understand Darré and his resettlement ideology, the structure and developments of German agriculture during the early twentieth century must be briefly examined. Agriculture cannot be seen in a vacuum but only in connection with other factors such as *Landflucht* (flight from the land), and romantic agrarian movements such as the *Artamanen*, which developed especially after World War I.

⁸ Gustavo Corni and Horst Gies. *Blut und Boden: Rassenideologie und Agrarpolitik im Staat Hitlers*. (Idstein: Schulz-Kirchner, 1994).

⁹ Wendy Lower, *Nazi Empire-Building and the Holocaust in Ukraine*. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 165.

“Gläubig dienen wir der Erde und dem grossen deutschen Werde”¹⁰

One of the original, more ‘purist’ *Lebensraum* ideas originated in the Artamanen movement. While the term *Lebensraum*, which was made popular by Friedrich Ratzel, and originally only referred to biological theories, became popular after World War I, a new set of ideological expansionary political ideas was added in the mid-1920s. The Artamanen were a phenomenon that developed parallel to the *Wandervögel* movement in the 1920s¹¹. *Wandervögel* youth limited their meetings and gatherings mostly to weekends and time off school or work and had no political programs, “but were animated by youth’s determination to express itself unfettered by the older generation.”¹² The Artamanen movement tried, at least for a few years, to captivate the imagination of a wider circle of German youth. Some of Darré’s initial ideas of ‘blood and soil’ originated in the Artamanen movement and several future Nazi leaders were involved in Artamanen groups while growing up; the most famous being Heinrich Himmler.¹³ About 80% of the Artamanen were National Socialists, the rest came from smaller groups such as *Jung-Stahlhelm*, *Werwolf* or *Landbündler*.¹⁴ The idea behind the movement was that there should be no economic driving force behind a settlement, but a ‘*völkische*’ instead. Artamanen saw it as a necessity to develop a reassignment of

¹⁰ Artamanen slogan, from SS Hauptamt, Schulungsamt 1941, 94. “We are devoted serving the soil and the great Germanic coming”.

¹¹ Literally translated, *Wandervögel* means ‘Hiking or Walking Birds’.

¹² SHAEF evaluation and dissemination section, “The Hitler Jugend”, U.S.1944, 3.

¹³ For an account of Himmler’s earlier years and his involvement with the Artamanen see Bradley F. Smith, *Heinrich Himmler: a Nazi in the making, 1900-1926* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), 159ff.

¹⁴ “Die Artamanenbewegung”, *Völkischer Beobachter*, (June 22, 1927). from here on forward: VB.

German living space (“*die Notwendigkeit einer Neuordnung des bisherigen deutschen Lebensraumes wurde erkannt*”) without the stigma of annihilation of other races.¹⁵ It was during this time that Himmler and Darré became friends, but Corni believes this friendship was short-lived and superficial.¹⁶

With the end of World War I and Germany’s loss of overseas colonies, a close look must be taken at the “longing for the East”, peasants, and the rise of National Socialism. Analysis of the German demand for the East will demonstrate the close connection with the history of geopolitics and the rationalization for eastern settlements. Hitler was able to combine these elements and incorporate them into his policies. Considering that once the East was occupied, Poland in 1939, parts of Russia after 1941, time is spent on the topic of ethnic Germans, since they were the only ones who ever lived in *Hegewald*. The organization of these territories, the eastern plans and their implications on settlement policies were very important and played a crucial role during this time. Finally, the relationship and hierarchy between the agencies operating in the East and Himmler’s own ideas of the settlement of peasants as *Wehrbauern* is analyzed.

¹⁵ Alwin Rosenberg, *Bäuerliche Siedlungsarbeit des Bundes Artam*, Jahrbuch des Archivs der Deutschen Jugendbewegung, Vol 9, 1977: 202.

¹⁶ Gustavo Corni, *Hitler and the Peasant: Agrarian Policy of the Third Reich, 1930-1939* (New York: Berg, 1990), 246.

CHAPTER 2

GEOPOLITICS, HISTORY AND THE RATIONALIZATION FOR EASTERN SETTLEMENTS

In the strictest sense, geopolitics, a mixture of geography, political science, social-economy, and history is a sub-branch of political geography. While the Swede Rudolf Kjellen coined the term before World War I, the idea originated with his former teacher Friedrich Ratzel;¹⁷ and it was through his contribution that geopolitics and its wider field of geography received a Darwinistic undertone. Geopolitics was not a widely recognized field in Germany during the Wilhelmina era. There was no widely read literature available. It was a very specialized field and no continuous development was passed on from one social scientist to the next. Ideas and theories in this field were not passed on from one academic generation to the next, and even though geopolitical ideas existed, no “school” or similar body with common ideas existed.

After Versailles, geopolitics became a hot topic in the newly-formed Weimar Republic, and the two experts in the field were Otto Maull and Karl Haushofer. However, the topic was not limited to only Germany; Halford Mackinder and James Fairgrieve, two British social scientists, also published works in the field of expansion theory. Karl Haushofer published the journal *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*. One of his favorite topics was the critical look at the Versailles Treaty and the repercussions for Germany. Haushofer also believed that Germany was overpopulated and should be allowed to expand in order to survive, a theory later picked up by Hitler. Geopolitics, as advocated by the Nazis, was based on the presumed inferiority of the Slavs while highlighting German

¹⁷ Ratzel's original ideas never included race in expansion, but was limited to “die Lehre über den Staat als geographischen Organismus oder Erscheinung im Raum” (teachings on the State as a geographic organism or a feature in the space).

cultural superiority. Germany's interest in "nation ideas" manifested itself later in widely read publications such as *Volk ohne Raum* by Hans Grimm.¹⁸ Geopolitics moved into the mainstream in the 1930s, no longer limited to academia, while at the same time shifted its focus from colonial possessions in Africa and other overseas holdings to future settlements in the East.

Political geography and geopolitics were not seen as interchangeable terms, rather, geopolitics was seen as the "*Lehre von der Erdgebundenheit der politischen Vorgänge*" (teachings of the bondage of the soil with interrelationship of the soil and political events).¹⁹ Political geography looks at national borders: at their shape, length, development and many other aspects, at the relationship of border vs. economy and settlement structure, but also race, nation or cultural expanse.²⁰ The last parts of the definition, especially, overlap with geopolitics which looks at the overall standing of the border according to the needs of the State. Under the disguise of geopolitics, Hitler justified his settlement and expansionistic ideas when he claimed that Europe was not a geographic entity, but a racial entity.²¹ Otto Maull went one step further and subcategorized geopolitics into space, logistics and defense-geopolitics, colonial-geopolitics, economic-geopolitics, international-geopolitics and the *Volkstums-geopolitics*.²² Natural and cultural elements of the state are "political space organisms" and are clearly part of political geography. Geopolitics is influenced by space demands

¹⁸ Hans Grimm, *Volk ohne Raum* (München: Albert Langen, 1926).

¹⁹ Otto Maull, *Das Wesen der Geopolitik* (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1941), 27.

²⁰ See also the essay on *Der Räumliche Aufbau der Grenze* on natural border vs. state border. *Odal*, Heft 8, August 1939, 665ff.

²¹ Picker, *Table Talks*, 24.

²² Maull, *Geopolitik*, 39.

of the State. The State also has to secure its space. Space-geopolitics is the foundation for the defense-geopolitics which developed from geography, geopolitics and defense elements.²³

Ratzel's earlier ideas included the idea that State borders were *not* fixed; they were only temporary, since nations are constantly growing. This thought was picked up again by Haushofer, who put a slightly different spin on it, which the Nazis welcomed; borders in their view became insignificant. However, Haushofer and Hitler differed on several points. Haushofer promoted in his writings a peaceful, non-violent expansion into the East, in addition to the notion that a nation needed both a navy and an army, whereas Hitler thought only a land army, but strong one, was necessary.

Germany's Past in the East, the *Ostsiedlung*

Germanic people such as the Goths or Vandals already had established settlements in prehistoric times in the areas around the rivers Bug and Dnjestr in eastern central Europe. Later, "Germania Slavica" was a part of Europe inhabited in the eighth century by Slavs, but Franks and Bavarians had also pushed their way into the region and established settlements among the Slavs. Charlemagne's empire had extended deep into the eastern pagan areas of Europe and fighting with various Slavic tribes occurred frequently. By sending missionaries with the settlers, the areas were slowly Christianized. Around the twelfth century, Germans began to push even further east and south and expanded into regions previously inhabited only by Balts or Slavs, as well as into the regions of present day Hungary and Slovenia. During medieval times,

²³ *ibid*, 48.

settlements east of the Elbe River were mostly conducted in a peaceful manner. However, in the beginning of the thirteenth century, Russia felt threatened by the expanding Germans from the West, especially the Teutonic Knights or *Deutscher Ritterorden*, who invaded Russia from Estonia but were ultimately defeated. Even though the knights' power declined over the centuries and they lost influence, especially in their secular holdings, the Nazis in the twentieth century revived the idea of cultural expansion to the east.²⁴ By the fourteenth century, most profitable areas along rivers, the coast and important trade routes had been settled. The new German settlers usually brought new technology, agricultural innovations and administrative improvements with them, and the native population assimilated quickly German culture and language. German influence and population in the region grew very rapidly during this time.

The next wave of settlers to the east started with the German-born Czarina, Catherine the Great. After the Seven Years' War, impoverished conditions existed in large parts of Europe, and Catherine started an aggressive campaign of immigration to Russia. Through a special manifesto, many Germans answered the call to "paradise." Between the years 1764 to 1767, Germans colonized 104 villages in the isolated Volga valley of Russia near the city of Saratov. Altogether, 6,433 families totaling 23,109 people migrated to Russia.²⁵ Foreign immigrants, especially Mennonites who originally came from Holland through Prussia, began to settle the region known as *New Russia* in 1787. Within twenty years, the German population in the Volga region grew to 27,000 colonists. This area, north of the Caspian Sea became an autonomous Soviet Republic

²⁴ In the section '*Raum und Volk*' in the NS-Landpost, a drawing of a knight dressed in full armor with the symbol of the Teutonic Knights, a single black cross, on his shield is standing on one side, while a blond peasant is standing on the other side.

²⁵ Karl Schoepke, *Deutsche Ostsiedlung* (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1941), 56.

in European Russia, with a population of 571,089. In 1926, 67% of the people claimed to be of German decent.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, historian Karl Adolf Menzel argued in his book *Die Geschichte der Deutschen (History of the Germans)* that because of this century-old influx and movement of Germans into the eastern regions of Europe, Germans had a legitimate claim to territories in the East.²⁶ This mostly Prussian concept of internal colonization was developed in the late 18th century. Members of the dominant nationality or race were settled into areas weakly held by the indigenous group and then strengthened their own group in the area.²⁷ The justification for this internal settlement was higher productivity by the German settlers compared to the native population.²⁸

Wherever National Socialism settles, it inspires happiness and satisfaction for the settler and in many ways an advantage for the State

Brekenfeld, *Wehrkraft und Siedlung*

Resettlement had many meanings and took on many forms in the Third Reich. German words which have similar meanings are *Neubesiedlung*, *Umsiedlung*, *Wiederansiedlung* but also *Wiedereingliederung*; equivalent English words are relocation or reintegration. Resettlement can be either voluntary or forced and can even include deportation. As Jürgen Zimmerer pointed out, the commonly used Eurocentric term “occupation” enforces certain restrictions and a better description of Nazi aims

²⁶ Karl Adolf Menzel. *Die Geschichte der Deutschen* (Breslau: Grass und Barth, 1823)

²⁷ Robert Lewis Koehl, *RKFDV: German resettlement and population policy, 1939-1945; a history of the Reich Commission for the Strengthening of Germandom* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 1957, 231.

²⁸ Maull, *Geopolitik*, 57ff.

would be “colonialism, since occupation is generally regarded as a temporary phenomenon.”²⁹

The Nazi rationalization for resettling people was not just to settle for social reasons, to make the un-propertied into landowners, but also for racial, national political and defense reasons. Therefore, a healthy settlement was never just for social motives; all reasons had to work together. By bringing the word “healthy” into the equation of settlement, the Nazis were able to justify the accompanying word, which was “racially.”

Denn ein Volk hat nur Anrecht auf den Raum den es sich durch Arbeit als Kulturraum erworben hat und auf die Raumreserve die es in absehbarer Zeit für seinen wachsenden Körper braucht.

Mauß, *Geopolitik*³⁰

Space or *Raum* was sub-divided by National Socialist thinkers into a natural (a geographic entity) landscape or *Naturlandschaft* and a man-made *Kulturlandschaft*. The first was seen as a specific piece of earth with all its natural factors such as hills, mountains or rivers. The latter was an outgrowth of the natural landscape, altered by humans. This outgrowth or difference between the two spaces was the one the Nazis were most concerned with, since a man-made cultural space projected the character and civilization of the local population. The cultural space was an emergence only of a creative population.³¹ This geographic space grew with political power. Both-natural

²⁹ Jürgen Zimmer, The Birth of the Ostland out of the spirit of Colonialism. *Patterns of Prejudice*, 39, (2): 199.

³⁰ A nation has only a right to space if they acquired it through their cultural work and if they need that space reserve in the near future for their growing population.

³¹ Hans Graul and Gisela Hildebrandt. *Beiträge zur Siedlungsgeographie des General Gouvernement*. Jahrbuch 1941 (Krakau: Burgverlag, 1943), 218.

and cultural-are just steppingstones to the ultimate goal of political space.³² To secure the soil in the East, settling culture and peasants in these regions were now seen as the prime tasks of the nation. Numerous articles and books pointed out the rundown, degenerate Slavic peasants in their shabby old huts, and the primitive methods they were using to work the soil. In the spring of 1935, the *NS-Landpost* ran a report titled *Land ohne Brot* (land without bread) in which Egon v. Lausser depicted the poor conditions in Russia among the peasants and workers. Once German peasants would settle these troubled regions, disorder and confusion would be replaced by order, the chaos and confusion eliminated down to the last details. New words in conjunction with settlements emerged now in publications such as *Neuordnung*, *Neuordnungsgebiet*, *Neuordnungsplan* (new order, new order territory, new order plan). The condition of the soil itself was also important in Nazi ideology. German scientists concluded that for centuries, the Slavs had aggregated the soil, and through unsystematic planning driven only by greed, deforestation of once fertile land, destruction of the soil, and disruption of the natural water flow had occurred. The result was an arid landscape.³³ This process was generalized into the term “*Veröstlichung*” (easternization) of the landscape, and the Nazi planners felt that they had a duty to stop this process. Hitler felt obligated to Europeanize the Asiatic steppe.³⁴

There was a wave of books and articles in the early 1930s on the topic of *Volkstum* in the East, the German culture, historical details on settlements, and the Teutonic Knights. Monographs like *Germanische Wanderung in den Südosten*

³² Ibid, 219.

³³ “Planung und Siedlung im Wartheland”, VB, Dec 8, 1942, 6.

³⁴ Picker, *Table Talk*, 68.

(Germanic migration into the Southeast) showed how Germanic people and their ancestors had moved peacefully into new eastern regions for centuries.³⁵ While individuals had a variety of reasons to leave their native countries, it was not the restlessness or the discontent for the homeland, but the hunger for one's own soil (*Hunger nach eigenem Boden*) that motivated people. Books appeared like the *Neue Deutsche Osten*, a bibliography about the newly acquired eastern regions, containing references on settlement, geography and economy, and reinforcing the Nazi picture of the East.³⁶ In the eyes of the Nazi administration, these books became a necessity; *Ostforschung* or eastern research and the analysis of war, as well as the reorganization of the East were top priorities. With materials like these, the Nazis were able to connect the general public the East with its past, and explain eastern European history to the common man. These publications increased the awareness of the future *Lebensraum* among the German public. Most of them started with a short general history of the East, migration, settlements of Germans, the innovations these early settlers brought to the regions, followed by the fragmentation and disintegration of the East, and the glorious Third Reich, uniting all Germans from the East and West for a thousand years to come.³⁷ Many Germans accepted the Nazi ideology of the specific role and responsibility the nation had to fulfill as the bulwark against Bolshevism.³⁸ When

³⁵ "Deutsches Volkstum in fremdem Raum", *NS-Landpost*, Jan 3, 1941, 15.

³⁶ Paul Ritterbusch, *Der neue Deutsche Osten, eine Bibliography. Berichte zur Raumforschung und Raumordnung* (Leipzig: Koehler Verlag, 1940)

³⁷ See on the Volkstums topic Karl Schöpke, *Deutsche Ostsiedlung*; Karl Thalheim und Hillen Ziegfeld, *Der deutsche Osten*; and more specific oriented Imma von Günther-Swart. *Grundlagen der Landwirtschaft im Reichsgau Wartheland und im Reichsgau Danzig-Westpreussen*. (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1941)

³⁸ Fritz Süllwold, *Deutsche Normalbürger 1933-1945. Erfahrungen, Einstellungen, Reaktionen*. (München: F.A. Herbig, 2001), 144.

German soldiers reached the East, their belief in a backward and ancient region was reinforced, and the years of propaganda coverage on the mismanagement of *kolkhoz* (Soviet Collecting Farm), their inadequate equipment, and the incompetent local municipalities paid off.³⁹ However, it was always the noble peasant, not the diplomat, nor the statesman, the bourgeoisie, or the worker who was tied with the East. It was always the peasantry who in the past and in the future would bring culture to the East.⁴⁰ In Hitler's view, the Ukrainian peasants, especially, had no notion of duty, but a German peasant was moved by a liking for progress: "He thinks of his children."⁴¹

Lebensraum had now become the new term for an old goal of colonial expansion: German superiority, cultural superiority, the "culture-bringer" to a benighted East, continuing the Imperial tradition of Germany to bring culture to Eastern Europe.⁴² In Hitler's mind, "Slavs are a mass of born slaves, who feel the need of a master."⁴³ In December 1940 it became clear that previous colonial politics had been officially replaced by settlement policies. The justification was simple: the Latin word "*colere*" meant to cultivate or work the fields and in medieval times, the term *colonia* was used to identify new settlements.⁴⁴

³⁹ "Deutsches Bauernleben in Russland", *NS-Landpost* (28), July 9, 1933; "Das sind die Kornkammern der Sowjetunion", *NS-Landpost* (30), July 1935; "Dr Raschle: Der Bauertod in der Sowjetunion", VB, Sep 12, 1936; "Sklaverei und Hunger bei den Sowjets", VB, Sep 14, 1936;

⁴⁰ "Bauern trugen deutsche Kultur nach dem Osten", *NS-Landpost*, June 23 1939, 20.

⁴¹ Picker, *Table Talk*, 33.

⁴² Koehl, *RKFDV*, 233.

⁴³ Picker, *Table Talk*, 33.

⁴⁴ Neue Kolonialpolitik, Raum & Volk, Jan 13, 1940, T-71, RWM, reel 138, frame 642162.

Besides reclaiming the East for settlement, Hitler's other goal was to exploit the local economies and natural resources for Germany's benefit.⁴⁵ His vision of the world power, Germany, included an autarkic country with millions of Aryans who eventually had to be fed. Therefore, it became necessary to approach the food question from a more scientific point of view.⁴⁶ Darré's agricultural specialists had collected voluminous data on harvests in the various sections in the East, comparing and analyzing their findings. One bad harvest could set back the goal for autarky for months if not years, and could have a negative effect on German society. Everything that could be controlled would be controlled, from the seeds to be used in a specific region and the germination period, to what fertilizer had to be applied for which crop, and under what soil conditions. Essay after essay, report after report by Hitler's agronomists proved the inferiority of the eastern peasants compared to their fellow Germans. The Slavic peasants were unable to get the maximum potential from their soil. Friedrich Christiansen-Weniser, head of the agricultural department in Pulawy, compared the harvests of cereal and grains of Germany to the Vistula region between the years 1934 to 1938, and concluded that the low output in the Vistula region was directly linked to collective agriculture. By applying a scientific approach to melioration and diversification of the fodder basis and change in agricultural structure (currently small farm which inhibit production) the crop yield could be increased over the next years.⁴⁷ However,

⁴⁵ USHMM, RG 31.002M, Reel 6. Allgemeines Ziel der deutschen Verwaltung 1942. "Die deutsche Verwaltung hat dafür zu sorgen dass durch die in der Ukraine vorhandene Arbeitskräfte und Produktionsmittel die Bodenschätze des Landes und die landwirtschaftlichen Produktionsfähigkeit in erschöpfendem Maße zu Gunsten der deutschen Kriegsführung ausgenutzt werden."

⁴⁶ Süllwold, *Normalbürger*, 190. He reported that 71% of Germans believed that the autarky policies were the right thing to do, while only 4% thought it was wrong. On the other hand 21% believed that Germany had to get space in the east to survive, while 26% said it was only propaganda, 198.

⁴⁷ Institute für Deutsche Ostarbeit, *Jahrbuch 1941*, (Krakau: Burg Verlag, 1941), 255.

before any of these goals could be accomplished, the East needed to be conquered, and millions of people, including ethnic Germans, had to be either resettled, removed, or in the case of the Jews, simply exterminated.

CHAPTER 3

MOVEMENT, SETTLEMENT, AND REPATRIATION OF ETHNIC GERMANS

The war between Germany and Poland began on September 1, 1939. Two days later, France and Great Britain declared war on Germany. Since Germany and the Soviet Union had signed a publicly announced non-aggression pact in August 1939, the Red Army crossed over into Poland after German troops had reached Warsaw. However, there was a secret clause attached to the treaty which provided for the division of Poland and the Baltic area into Soviet and German spheres of interest in which the two countries would exploit these regions.⁴⁸

After Hitler annexed the old provinces of West-Prussia, Upper Silesia and Posen, the German-occupied central region of Poland was renamed General-gouvernement. With these annexations and the occupation of Poland, hundreds of thousands of so-called ethnic Germans were now directly under German rule, and by bringing the ethnic Germans "*heim ins Reich*" (back into the Reich or their homeland) Hitler had completed his first step of uniting all Germans under one government. Thousands of ethnic German families followed the call of the *Führer* by giving up their homes in the outposts of the East and moving into the secure space of the new eastern territories.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Manfred Messerschmidt, in *Germany and World War Two*, vol I (Oxford: Clarendon Press: 2000), 708. see also Gerhard F. Weinberg. *Germany and the Soviet Union 1939-1941*. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1954).

⁴⁹ Konrad Meyer. *Bodenordnung*, (Berlin: Verlag Walter de Gruyter, 1940), 16.



Figure 1. Heinrich Himmler welcomes an ethnic German from Galicia in Przemysl, Poland⁵⁰

Agreements were signed between Germany and Russia on October 15, 1939 in Estonia, on October 30 in Latvia, as well as on November 3 concerning the eastern Polish areas and the ethnic Germans living in those places.⁵¹ By December of 1939, about 65,000 Baltic Germans were on the move. The Polish transfer was overseen by a joint German-Russian commission leading to another 130,000 ethnic Germans entering the Reich.⁵² The transfer was voluntary, but the Volhynia Germans, especially, left with enthusiasm since the Soviets had treated them badly. By February 1940, more than 120,000 ethnic Germans from Volhynia, Galicia and Bialystok had crossed the German-Russian border moving west.⁵³ Baltic Germans were moved by rail and ship during the winter 1939/40.⁵⁴ This group was also the most disappointed by the resettlement. The

⁵⁰ *Wissenschaft, Planung, Vertreibung, eine Ausstellung der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft.* (Bonn: Köllen Verlag, 2006), 18.

⁵¹ "15 April: wichtiger Umsiedler-Termin", *Ostdeutscher Beobachter*, March 28, 1940. According to the agreement, the resettlement had to be completed by May 31, 1940. from here on forward: OB

⁵² Consisting of 307 SS officials.

⁵³ "Der Marsch ins Vaterland", OB, Feb 14, 1940.

⁵⁴ "Die Vistula II ist in Ordnung", OB, March 27, 1940. on this topic see also Alfred C. Mierzejewski, *The Most Valuable Asset of the Reich.* vol 2 1933-1945. (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2000), 115.

majority of them had lived in cities, and were now settled in rural areas.⁵⁵ However, Hitler granted an exclusive status to some of the Baltic Germans who had owned large estates in the past.

Heinrich Himmler, already in charge of the German police and the SS, was named Reich Commissar for the Strengthening of Germandom (*Reichskommissar für die Festigung Deutschtums*) or RKFVD, headquartered in Berlin-Halensee.⁵⁶ With this move, Himmler and his staff became the most important think tank and planning authority in redesigning the conquered territories in the East.⁵⁷ This nomination was not without controversy among other Nazi leaders, and the old dispute between Darré and Himmler seemed to widen over the authority question of the ethnic Germans. Himmler felt that his SS was in charge because in his mind, these Germans were not to be settled, but only temporarily relocated. A permanent solution could only be found after the war with veterans and soldiers.⁵⁸

The RKFVD now ran the daily administration and the execution of the resettlement of the ethnic Germans. The first course of action of the RKFVD was to determine who was considered *Volksdeutsch* (ethnic German) and who was not. In order to determine the status of these people, it was decided that being ethnic German was defined as people claiming German descent, but who were not citizens of Germany. One of Himmler's first acts was the implementation of the German National List (*Deutsche Volksliste*, DVL) to determine officially the "true" nationality of an ethnic

⁵⁵ "Die Umsiedler werden immer seßhafter", OB, Jan 5, 1942.

⁵⁶ By the spring of 1944, the headquarters were moved to Vilshofen in Bavaria.

⁵⁷ Karl Ditt, The Perception and Conservation of Nature in the Third Reich. *Planning Perspectives*, 15 (2000): 174.

⁵⁸ Hans-Erich Volkmann, Zur Ansiedlung der Deutschbalten im Warthegau, *Zeitschrift für Ostforschung*. 30 (1981) 4: 539.

German according to the Nuremberg laws. Only ethnic Germans were guaranteed their civil rights.⁵⁹ The DVL was divided into four categories: Category I was reserved for the so-called “*Bekennnis-deutsche*,” (Germans by Commitment) Category II were people considered “*deutsch stämmig*,” but was also reserved for former Polish citizens who had renounced their Polish citizenship before September 1, 1939; these two groups were granted immediate citizenship and were also eligible to become members of the NSDAP. Families or persons with at least three German grandparents fell into these two categories. Category III was reserved for Poles with “Aryan” traits such as physical features (tall, blond, etc), and who would be capable of becoming German (*zur Eindeutschung fähig*). Persons in this category had to wait ten years to become citizens. In addition, persons who were 25-50% German were admitted into Category III, as well as persons living in so-called “*Mischehen*” (mixed-marriages) where “*Deutschtum*” dominated.⁶⁰ The third category was widely discussed and the most misunderstood.⁶¹ People of German decent who did not want to be assimilated fell into Category IV.⁶² Poles with relatives in the Reich, or those who had fought during World War I on the German side, and/or received medals could not be included in the list.⁶³ In other words, if one had no German blood, he or she could never become a member of the German “*Volksgemeinschaft*”. Besides registering with the DVL, it became mandatory from June

⁵⁹ German citizens living in the eastern occupied territories had the same civil rights and duties than Germans in the Reich. *Amtsblatt* 5, May 16, 1942, 116.

⁶⁰ *Anerkennung als Volksdeutsche*, T-175, roll 72, frame 2589012.

⁶¹ *Himmler Rede Posen 1943*, T-175, roll 17, frame 2520791-2520792.

⁶² *RGBl.* 2042, Oct 8, 1939; *RGBl.* I, 118, March 4, 1941.

⁶³ “Was der Hoheitsträger wissen muß”, *Hoheitsträger*, 4/1943, 9.

1942 for ethnic Germans over the age of sixteen to register with German government authorities.⁶⁴

To give the scheme of moving and resettling of people a legitimate appearance, several new organizations and corporations were founded. One of these organization was the *Deutsche Umsiedlungs-Treuhandgesellschaft m.b.H. Niederlassung Posen* (German Re-settlement-Trust Company Posen Subsidiary). This corporation acted as a middleman between the ethnic Germans and the government when it came to loans, but also to assess existing assets.⁶⁵ In addition, they kept meticulous records of every resettled ethnic German.⁶⁶ Ethnic Germans were able to register at their local municipalities, and most major newspapers in the East ran weekly *Amtliche Bekanntmachungen* (official announcements) on how to register.⁶⁷ Settlers who were officially recognized by Himmler could receive pension or retirement benefits from the Reich.⁶⁸

The *Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle*, Vo-Mi (Racial German Assistant Office), established in 1936, was in charge of the ethnic Germans, while the Foreign Organization of the NSDAP was in charge of Germans abroad.⁶⁹ However, when it came to administering the ethnic Germans in the Ukraine and especially in Hegewald, Winniza, Halbstadt and Kronau (Alexanderstadt), Himmler put his RKFVD over the Vo-

⁶⁴ Amtsblatt, 8, July 21, 1942, 129. Foreigners and stateless person also had to register. Foreigners were defined as non-ethnic Germans. Citizens of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania before Russian takeover were exempt.

⁶⁵ OB, Feb 5, 1940, 1; April 4, 1943

⁶⁶ "Umsiedler-Adressen sofort nach Berlin", OB, March 5, 1940 and April 6, 1940

⁶⁷ OB, Feb 14, 1940.

⁶⁸ RGBI I, no 66, July 6, 1943.

⁶⁹ Greifelt Vortrag Aufgabenkreis, Jan 23, 1939, T-175, roll 17, frame 250748.

Mi.⁷⁰ The second transfer of re-settlers started in the summer of 1940 and this time, close to 100,000 Germans from Bessarabia and 40,000 from North Bukovina were moved from their land. By the end of that year, another 30,000 Germans from the General Gouvernement were resettled. Several ministries in Berlin assumed the responsibilities for ethnic Germans, Reichsdeutsche, and Germans living abroad. The Vo-Mi administration called upon the resettled ethnic Germans to submit diaries, official papers, documents, pictures, and letters with the justification of collecting these sources for future generations to read.⁷¹

Everything changed on the 22nd of June 1941, when the German armed forces attacked the USSR. From August 23, 1939 until this day, the two governments had remained at peace due to the non-aggression pact that Ribbentrop and Molotov had signed in Moscow. However, now the General- gouvernement was no longer the buffer zone between Russia and Germany. Hitler's goal in this attack, named Barbarossa, was to accomplish the takeover of space in the USSR to the line of Astrachan-Arkangel, and therefore move Germany's border east to the periphery of her military field of interest.⁷² The Ukraine was to be converted into a protectorate, and while a military border at the Urals was to be built, the formation of a military power east of the Urals had to be prevented (*nur der Deutsche darf Waffen tragen, only Germans can bear arms*).⁷³

⁷⁰ Abschrift Dargel letter, USHMM, RG 31.002M, reel 6, folder 255.

⁷¹ "Rückwanderer-Dokumente gesucht", OB, Feb 5, 1940.

⁷² Speech Reichsführer Himmler in Posen, Oct 24, 1943; T-175, roll 17, frame 2520849.

⁷³ Arno Klönne, "Die deutsche Russland und Besatzungspolitik 1941-1945". *Stimmen der Zeit*, 158 (1955/56): 47.

There was no exact data available on how many ethnic Germans lived in the USSR, but the last population count executed by the Soviets estimated that 1,423,530 ethnic Germans lived inside its borders.⁷⁴ To plan better and efficiently manage the cluster of ethnic Germans living there, the Reich started to collect data and generated statistics on the groups.⁷⁵ This became more and more necessary since large groups of ethnic Germans from the “*altsowjet*” areas refused to settle in the Reich, but were now looked upon as a future labor force.⁷⁶ Additionally, wherever possible ethnic Germans were moved from their previous scattered settlements (*Streusiedlungen*) into built-up areas controlled and managed by the SS. Capital and goods needed for these movements came from confiscated Jewish estates.⁷⁷

In 1942, the Eastern Institute for National Education and Recreation (*Ost-institute für Volksbildung und Freizeitgestaltung*) was established. The goal of the institute was to support ethnic Germans in job searches. G. von Poehl researched the ethnic German population in Wolhynia in 1941 and according to his findings, 84.2% claimed German as their mother tongue.⁷⁸ Although many claimed to be “fluent” in German, language courses and seminars in race, space, and economic matters were also offered by the Institute.⁷⁹ Since the resettled Germans were expected to work predominantly in agriculture, another objective of the institute was to “sell” peasant life to them. Darré’s

⁷⁴ Deutsche Monatshefte, 8, July 1941, 2.

⁷⁵ Amtsblatt no 1, Jan 30, 1942, 25. Confiscated maps and other material were also collected by the Reichsminister.

⁷⁶ Amtliche Mitteilung Nr. 2, USHMM. RG 31.002M, Reel 6, fond 3206, opis 6, folder 1,.

⁷⁷ Memo Reichsminister to Generalkommissariat Nikolajew, USHMM, RG 31.002M, reel 6, folder 255.

⁷⁸ Deutsche Monatshefte, 8, July 1941, 73; see also: “Deutsche Bauern in Wolhynia”, *NS-Landpost*, Feb 21, 1936.

⁷⁹ “Ost-institute für Volksbildung”, *Hoheitsträger*, 10, 1942.

RNS had no input in these decisions or policy making. In order to educate the ethnic Germans in Nazi ideology and in the spirit of the *Führer* quickly, compulsory school attendance was implemented for all children. It was now mandatory to attend school for a total of eight years.⁸⁰

The support for the ethnic Germans was not limited to ideological schooling. The Party, through the help of various other governmental organizations such as the Reichsbund der Deutschen Schwestern, *Reichs-arbeitsdienst* (Reich Labor Service), League of German Girls (Bund deutscher Mädel), or the Red Cross, had set up an elaborate system of services to care for this group. It was expected that girls would serve their compulsory year in the East not only to help the ethnic Germans, but also to experience life in the occupied territories and to be prepared for a future in the East.⁸¹ The Reich's public welfare system stretched beyond its old borders. Apparel and other commonly used household items were dispensed and in "*Nähstuben*" (sewing groups) women came together and mended torn and worn-out clothes. One-hundred public day-care centers, run by the state, looked after more than 10,000 children in the region of Dnjepropetrowsk in 1943. One hundred more were planned. The six existing children's homes were furnished with crafts and toys made by wounded German soldiers in military hospitals.⁸² Himmler's *Hegewald* employed a *Kindergärtnerin* in June 1943, but they had openings for four more aides and two certified kindergarten teachers.⁸³ In

⁸⁰ Amtsblatt, no 16, Dec 31 1942, 252.

⁸¹ "800 Mädel werden Siedlerhilfe leisten", OB, March 3, 1942.

⁸² Deutsche Ukrainische Zeitung. July 31, 1943, USHMM, RG 31.002M, reel 6, folder 270. see also memo from the NSDAP Reichsleitung Berlin, Feb 13, 1943, reel 6, 10.

⁸³ USHMM, RG 31.002M, reel 6, list of job openings, Feb 2, 1943, 9; USHMM, RG 31.002M, reel 6 Arbeitsgebiet Kindertagesstätten, 93. Just six months later, Atrops as well as the second employee Else Fromme were ordered to leave the area for Rovno.

August of 1943, three women from the Reich worked in the Outreach Center for mothers and children (*Hilfsstelle für Mutter und Kind*) in the Zhytomyr district, with two vacant positions, while in the general district of Dnjepropetrowsk, four such centers already existed and thirteen more were planned. By the end of that month, a total of 222 German day care centers operated in the occupied Ukraine, with three in Hegewald alone.

By the end of 1942, the resettlement of ethnic Germans was more or less completed and emphasis now shifted to helping and supporting these people in their new homeland.⁸⁴ *SS-Gruppenführer* Ulrich Greifelt detailed the problems Germany faced during a settlement and trade show in Posen. The two most important issues were seen as repatriation of ethnic Germans and the settlement of *Reichsdeutsche* in the East. During the same event, Dr. Konrad Meyer-Hetling, the director of the Institute for Agrarian Policy at the University Berlin, highlighted the national socialist settlement plans and hoped to incorporate faculty of universities into his “Raum” research.⁸⁵ Meyer-Hetling was head of the planning office of the Reich Commission for the Strengthening for Germandom, the *Stabshauptamt*, and of the Central Land Office (*Zentralbodenamt*), and later became the head of the Committee for Resettlement in the occupied eastern territories. The universities eagerly answered the call to duty and offered the following 1942 winter semester classes and seminars with such titles as “*Landschaft und Bauten*” (Landscape and Buildings), “*Mensch und Klima*” (People and Climate), or “*Versandung Europas*” (Europe’s Sand Filling).⁸⁶ It appeared that the Nazis

⁸⁴ “Die finanzielle Betreuung der umgesiedelten Volksdeutschen”, OB, April 4, 1943.

⁸⁵ OB, Oct 24, 1941.

⁸⁶ OB, Nov 18, 1941.

had set up an elaborate system to help the resettled ethnic Germans, but during a conference in 1943, it became clear that the support had since broken down and all the efforts were short lived.⁸⁷ By 1944, the advance of the Red Army made it necessary to evacuate and move the ethnic Germans again.⁸⁸ The costs were paid by the *Reichsführer-SS* and his RKFVD.⁸⁹

⁸⁷ Aktenvermerk Besprechung Führerhauptquartier, T-175, roll 17, frame 2521076.

⁸⁸ Memo Greifelt to Himmler, T-175, roll 72, , March 23, 1944, frame 2589018; letter Reichsstatthalter Wartheland, frame 2589033.

⁸⁹ Telegrammbrief "Zieselmaus und Zwergmaus", from Reichsverkehrsminister, Jan 21, 1944; T-175, roll 72, frame 2589044.

CHAPTER 4

ORGANIZATION OF EASTERN TERRITORIES

In early March 1940, Hans Frank, the Governor-General of occupied Poland, declared that the former Poland would always stay under German jurisdiction. The Ukraine and the Baltic States would not be independent entities, therefore making it possible to implement long-term plans.⁹⁰ In just a few months, Germany had depleted the economy of the General Gouvernement, moving goods and raw materials back to the Reich. The Polish people were allowed only a reduced standard of living, much lower than their counterparts in the Reich.⁹¹ Frank also saw the General Gouvernement as the farthest outpost of an administration run using the Reich methods, since the colonial landscape only began further east in the Ukraine and Ostland.⁹² Hitler was thinking in terms of a German protectorate over the Ukraine for roughly twenty-five years.⁹³ The *Führer* summed up his ideas for the East in more simplistic words: “The Russian space is our India. Like the English, we shall rule this empire with a handful of men.”⁹⁴ The newly acquired eastern territories would replace former overseas colonial regions and become the European colonial lands of the future. The editor of the *Deutsche Monatshefte*, Victor Kauder, predicted that with the glorious victory over the

⁹⁰ Picker, *Table Talk*, 34.

⁹¹ Wolfgang Michalka. *Deutsche Geschichte 1933-1945. Dokumente zur Innen-und Aussenpolitik.* (Frankfurt: Fischer Verlag, 2002), 237.

⁹² David Furber. “Near as Far in the Colonies: The Nazi Occupation of Poland,” *The International Review*, vol XXVI, 3, (Sep 2004), 552.

⁹³ Documents of German Foreign Policy, Series D, 1937-1945, vol XIII, #372, Lammers memorandum.

⁹⁴ Picker, *Table Talk*, 33.

Bolsheviks, the final “order of the East” would be possible and the natural reorganization (Neuordnung) would also bring the longed-for European “*Grosswirtschaftsraum*.”⁹⁵

Most of the laws governing the Reich were simply applied to the East.⁹⁶ Some were as simple as restaurant and bar ordinances, regulations about fishing in municipal waters, or as complex as personal, family, or inheritance laws.⁹⁷ Civil marriages in the East (and the preferred ones by the Nazis) could only be performed by a German registrar. In addition, marriages between German citizens and non-citizens were declared void and were no longer performed.⁹⁸ Tax laws also applied to the East, the only exception being for Germans who settled there after June 22, 1941 and who were exempt from the supplemental war tax.⁹⁹ Russian law no longer applied once an area was occupied by German troops.¹⁰⁰ Jurisdiction in the occupied territories was divided between the Foreign Office, in charge of matters dealing with other countries, and the occupied areas in conjunction with the Reichsminister for Occupied Eastern Territories. The army represented the Reich in matters dealing with civilian issues until a civilian German administration could be put in place, while political leadership and all other matters, including settlement policies, fell under the jurisdiction of Himmler’s ministry.¹⁰¹ In 1943, the “*Verwaltungsführer*” (VF) were appointed by order of Himmler. The new positions were similar to those of civil servants (*Beamte*) in the Reich,

⁹⁵ Deutsche Monatshefte, 8, July 1941, 1.

⁹⁶ Amtsblatt #4, Nov 30, 1941, 34.

⁹⁷ RGBl. No 3, part I, 33, Jan 24, 1942. and RGBl. No 45, 255.

⁹⁸ Amtsblatt no 4, Nov 30, 1941, 28; RGBl. I, no 21, 255, April 27, 1942.

⁹⁹ “Die Besteuerung deutscher Volkszugehöriger”, VB, Oct 17, 1942, 4.

¹⁰⁰ Bürgerliches, Handels und Strafrecht im Reichskommissariat Ukraine, USHMM, RG 31.002M, reel 3 fond 3206.

¹⁰¹ Secret Memo Zuständigkeitsabgrenzung Reichsarbeitsminister, Sep 1, 1942; T-71, RWM, roll 5, frame 398560.

however, they did not pay into a pension plan and were required to wear a uniform.¹⁰² Again, the RNS, now under the tutelage of Herbert Backe had little or no presence in the eastern territories.

Generalplan Ost

Most historians date the first draft of the Generalplan Ost (GPO) around July 1941. However, the earliest time any plan was mentioned was in February 1940, when *SS-Brigadeführer* Ulrich Greifelt briefed party officials and others in the “*Zentrale Dienststellen*” (central offices) on a *Generalplan für den Osten* compiled by then *SS-Obersturmbannführer* Prof. Dr. Konrad Meyer-Hetling.¹⁰³ About a year and a half later and after being promoted to *SS-Oberführer*, Meyer-Hetling, head of the *Planungsamt* in the RKFDV, submitted another draft of the GPO.¹⁰⁴ The GPO was a long-term tool for the creation of settlements in the East which would be run by the SS under Himmler’s control. The main idea of the plan included agrarian settlements in the eastern territories with the establishment of a healthy peasantry. In order to succeed with the settlement in the occupied territories, it was proposed to establish a standardized authority under the auspices of the RKFDV. All future territories would also be subordinate to the *Reichsführer* SS. While the GPO is the best known proposal, other planning such as in the field of geopolitics, developed as parallels. Prior to Meyer-Hetling’s proposal, Heinrich Himmler even presented a six page, handwritten “*Denkschrift*” for the treatment of the people in the East to Hitler in May 1940. Himmler claimed that he had the best

¹⁰² “Das Verwaltungsführerkorps”, OB, Feb 3, 1943.

¹⁰³ OB, Feb 3, 1940, 1. see also: Mechthild Rössler, Sabine Schleiermacher, and Codula Tollmien, *Der Generalplan Ost: Hauptlinien der nationalsozialistischen Planungs-und Vernichtungspolitik* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1993), 12, and Czeslaw Madajczyk. *Der General Plan Ost. Polish Western Affairs*, (III), 1962, 391.

¹⁰⁴ By the end of the war, Meyer-Hetling held the rank of *SS-Obergruppenführer*.

interests of Germany in his mind and it would be best to split up the various groups and national factions in the East. People belonging to the smallest fractions would become mayor and police officers. This would prevent that a larger minority group would be in local decision making positions. At the same time, the national spirit of the various groups should be eliminated. Jews should be removed to Africa. People not belonging to the *Volksgruppe* would leave school after the fourth grade; simple math, such as counting to 500 and writing of their names would be tolerated, and reading would not be encouraged. Children with Aryan traits could receive schooling and education only in Germany, where they would have to change their names, become integrated, and would remain. Parents of such children would then have the options of either joining their offspring or not having any more children. The Nazis did not want to take a chance that a 'Slavic-gene' would dominate future children. A yearly evaluation to detect Aryan traits in all six to ten year olds would be conducted. Non-Aryans would become menial workers in construction or other hard labor jobs.¹⁰⁵

Meyer-Hetling's core idea, however, was to restructure the eastern territories, economically as well as demographically. More than thirty million inhabitants, 75% of the Belorussians, 80% of the Poles, and a little more than half of the Ukrainians would be forced to resettle east of the Ural Mountains, while a small percentage would stay behind and work as forced laborers in German settlements. The immediate settlement areas were *Ingermanland* (Petersburg area), the *Gotenau* (Crimea and the Cherson region), and Memel-Narew (Bialystock and Western Lithuania). Meyer-Hetling submitted

¹⁰⁵ Denkschrift Himmler über die Behandlung der Fremdvölkischen im Osten (Mai 1940). *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, Heft 2, April 1957: 194-198.

the GPO at a time when the German army had advanced quickly into Russia, and it was believed that it would only be a matter of weeks until the Red Army was defeated and the new territory would come completely under German control. This first draft also included a provision to remove about five million Jews and transfer them to Siberia. However, when the revised version of the plan was made public in the spring of 1942, the Jews, according to Alfred Rosenberg, would be exterminated. Therefore, no further planning for them became necessary. On May 28, 1943 a third version of the GPO was submitted, and this time it differed in a very important point from the previous ones. Meyer-Hetling had realized that because of the war, the group of potential settlers was getting smaller and smaller, and his newest proposal made concessions to the number of “true” settlers. In the regions furthest away from the Reich, the future *Gotenau* and *Ingermanland*, only 50% of the settlers had to fulfill the racial as well as the soldierly requirements. The numbers of future Über-peasants sank with every battle lost.

The Reichskommissariat Ukraine was established on September 1, 1941, bordering the Generalgouvernement in the west and the Ostland in the north.¹⁰⁶ The south followed roughly the Dnjestr and the eastern border stretched almost to the Pripjet marshes. Due to continuing fighting, these borders were re-drawn several times, first extending further into the eastern part of Europe, and later, with the Red Army advancing westwards, shrinking by the week. The last expansion was approved on September 1, 1942 when the region around Kiev, the areas around Dnjepropetrowsk, Nikolajew, and the Crimea were included. Divided into six general districts (Dnjepropetrowsk, Kiev, Crimea, Wolhynia, Nikolajew, and Zhytomyr), and further sub-

¹⁰⁶ Memorandum Reichsminister besetzte Ostgebiete to Reichskommissar Ukraine, Dec 17, 1941, “Grenzziehung Ostland und Ukraine”, USMHM, RG 31.002M, reel 3, folder 231.

divided into provinces (*Kreisgebiete*) or so-called oblasts and *Unterbezirke* called rayons, by 1943, the Ukraine had roughly about 6.6 million inhabitants. The last official population count from 1926 indicated 47.4% claiming Ukrainian ethnicity, 25.1% Russian and 22.8%

Jewish.¹⁰⁷ Erich Koch as *Reichkommissar* headed the civilian administration and reported to Rosenberg as the Reichsminister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. Kurt Klemm became *Generalkommissar* for the Zhytomyr district. All three positions were confirmed by the *Führer* and the function of these men was to represent the interests of the Reich in the eastern territories and not vice versa.¹⁰⁸

As head of the planning commission, Professor Meyer-Hetling was also the editor of the publication *Forschungsdienst* (Research Services), which became more and more an instrument of the RKFDV. It was around this time that the “Darré-istic” dreams of *Neubauern* and settlements were buried by Meyer-Hetling. No longer was it enough to be son of a peasant; what counted now was a combination of past and future, and the overarching idea was the realignment in the eastern parts for the strengthening and rearrangement of Germandom.¹⁰⁹ Nazi ideology was based on the fact that only races with a genetic predisposition to civilization could be civilized; trying to civilize lesser races was a waste of time.¹¹⁰ Meyer-Hetling needed to create a specific type of settler with three distinctive characteristics or qualities: descent, performance, and attitude. The new peasantry of the East had to have shown special

¹⁰⁷ “Aufbau und Aufgaben der Verwaltung der besetzten Ostgebiete”, *Hoheitsträger*, 2/1943, 7;

¹⁰⁸ “Aufbau und Aufgaben der Verwaltung der besetzten Ostgebiete”, *Hoheitsträger*, 2/1943, *Deutsche Monatshefte*, 9, September 1942.9.

¹⁰⁹ Meyer, *Bodenordnung*, 17.

¹¹⁰ Furber. *Colonies*, 545.

traits such as personal actions, operational readiness, and political combativeness (*persönliche Aktivität, Einsatzbereitschaft, politischen Kämpferschaft*), while having distinguished themselves with a sound racial pedigree. Meyer-Hetling believed that any settlement in the East would be dead capital (*totes Kapital*) if it would not contribute to the general racial struggle (*Volkstumskampf*).¹¹¹

The East had to Lure and Convince People!

In the January 1943 issue of the *Deutsche Agrarpolitik*, Meyer-Hetling explained that while the center of the eastern movement was still the German peasant, the future eastern settlement could only be carried out by the nation as a whole. Because of the war and the loss of life, the peasants were no longer able to supply all the settlers to the East. While this group would always have a special status within the Nazi movement, Nordic, pure Aryan blood from all walks of life must be attracted to the East. In times past, people left their homelands to better themselves, to gain wealth and prosperity. Every German, regardless of whether he was from the countryside or the city, would now have an equal chance to own land in the East. However, “*Frontkämpfer*” who fought with their lives for these lands, would receive preferential treatment. Young, fresh blood needed to be injected into the peasantry, and the youth from both the cities and the countryside would be united. Under the New Agrarian Order, new settlers would come from both experienced front-line soldiers and the German youth. The 1942 annual slogan of the German Youth titled *Eastern Commitment and Agricultural Service* was announced by Himmler, and he proclaimed that the wide open fields of the East, earned

¹¹¹ Irene Stoehr, “*Von Max Sering zu Konrad Meyer- ein machtergreifender Generationswechsel in der Agrar und Siedlungswissenschaft*”, in Susanne Heim. *Autarkie und Ostexpansion*. (Göttingen: Wallenstein Verlag, 2002), 78.

by German blood, were awaiting German youth to settle there as Wehrbauern.¹¹² The new lands between *Warthe und Weichsel*, the *Bug and the Dnjepr* would give hundreds of thousands of peasant sons the opportunity to own pieces of land. Plans were made to expand this resettlement effort even further east after the war. 1942 was also the year in which Darré retired from his position as head of the food and agriculture ministry. Ill health was given as the official reason. Herbert Backe, who officially replaced Darré in May 1942, was not only the head of the agricultural section of the Four-Year Plan, but possessed superb knowledge of Russian agriculture. His dissertation titled *Die russische Getreidewirtschaft* (The Russian Grain Economy) showed inside information on the Russian wheat crop. According to Corni, the difference between Darré and his successor Backe was that Darré was greatly interested in selecting a new peasant nobility; Backe placed the accent more on economic matters.¹¹³ Therefore, Corni arrived at the conclusion that Darré's blood and soil ideas conflicted with the economic plans of the Nazis. In Darré's opinion, a peasant always had to consider his activities as a duty towards his family and people and never simply as an economic venture.¹¹⁴

Efficient settlement required good planning, and for this purpose the "Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Ostsiedlung" (working group for Eastern Settlement) headed by *SS-Standartenführer* Prof Dr. Carstens was founded early in 1942. Other committee members included Meyer-Hetling and the vice-chancellor of the University of Posen, Walter Geisler, but no member of the Reichsnährstand was invited to serve. The

¹¹²SS-Hauptamt, Schulungswesen, *Bauerntum*. Berlin, 1941, 91.

¹¹³ Gustavo Corni. *Hitler and the Peasant*, 246.

¹¹⁴ Corni, *Hitler and the Peasant*, 250.

committee primarily focused on the questions of Germanization and settlement.¹¹⁵ With a high-ranking SS-officer heading the committee, it was obvious that soldiers, not peasants, had moved into the spotlight of the resettlement policies in the East. In this equation, the former front-line soldier, who transformed himself under Nazi ideology into the Über-peasant, now became the most important person. Not every veteran was made for this assignment. “*Es muss schon ein ganzer Kerl sein. Deutsch bis zum Kern, stolz, und seiner deutschen Verpflichtung bewußt*” (He must be a complete man: German down to his core and conscious of his German obligations). This new type of settler could and should not be afraid to work, but had to be ready for action every day as a soldier, and it was hoped that the longer this settler would live on his new lands, the more he would learn and love his new homeland. “Soldierly spirit of the German nation, its pleasure and joy of discipline; order is feared, but also admired by her enemies.”¹¹⁶ By receiving land in the East, the veteran would not only become a peasant but a frontier-guard. After 1943, the requirements of becoming a career soldier highlighted a variety of good prospects, including the future settlement possibilities in the East.¹¹⁷

The specific qualifications, which differed very little from the original RNS requirements, were listed in the *Hoheitsträger* as the *Neubauernschein* (New-peasant certificate), included a specialized knowledge in the area of agriculture.¹¹⁸ Applicants born after 1915 who lacked this knowledge were expected to gain experience through a

¹¹⁵ “Arbeitsgemeinschaft”, OB, Jan 20, 1942.

¹¹⁶ Heinrich Hoffmann. *Deutscher Osten, Land der Zukunft* (München: Hoffmann Verlag, 1942), 65.

¹¹⁷ “Wie werde ich Berufssoldat?”, OB, Jan 1, 1943.

¹¹⁸ For a copy of a *Neubauernschein* see “*Siedlungs-Vertrag #3041*” in the appendix.

two-year apprenticeship following an exam. Older applicants could substitute the apprenticeship with continuing education courses. Political reliability, racial soundness determined through an examination by the local health department, a minimum age of 25 (maximum 55), and being married or engaged to a woman who was able to fulfill the same requirements was necessary. The application for the *Neubauernschein* would still be handled through the RNS and remain in their offices until a suitable farm was found. With this step, the RNS was reduced to handling the administrative component of the process. No funds to purchase the land were required. Additional information necessary for the eastern settlement included a resume, school transcripts, records of any agricultural education, report cards from children, birth and marriage certificates (including the ones from applicant's parents and grandparents), two passport photos, and two wedding pictures.¹¹⁹ The Baltic German, Karl Freiherr v. Manteuffel, went one step further when he proposed that not only could the future Erbhöfe in the East be bigger than previously planned under Darré's scheme ("*wir müssen mit dem Acker nicht geizen*", we don't have to be stingy with the land), but he also wanted to include persons who performed exceptional service for the Reich in the area of politics or business. In his opinion, it was not necessary for the future peasant to possess agricultural knowledge.¹²⁰ By leaving the administrative part of the application process with the RNS but the requirements with the RKFDV, it seemed that Darré's ministry was still in charge. Himmler issued a general directive number 14/V (*Allgemeine Anordnung*) on August 18, 1942 about the preferential settlement of disabled veterans and fighters for the national cause (*Freikorps* as well as Spanish Civil War veterans) in the eastern

¹¹⁹ "Was der Hoheitsträger wissen muß", *Hoheitsträger*, 2/1943, 29ff.

¹²⁰ "Fortbildung des Erbhofrechts", *Hoheitsträger*, 4/1943, 8ff.

territories. Persons belonging to these groups had the option of becoming peasants in the occupied eastern territories, Lower Styria, Upper Carniola, and Alsace-West Lorraine. To ease the settlement process, peasants would receive a completely equipped farm with inventory and harvest. However, non-party members as well as civilians, including peasants, needed an unobjectionable declaration or *Unbedenklichkeits-Erklärung*.¹²¹ Just prior to this announcement, Himmler had stopped all settlement applications from German peasants to the East in favor of the front-soldiers still engaged in battle reinforcing v. Manteuffel's stand. To make good on their promises, sixty disabled war veterans were settled by May of 1943 in the Wartheland by the SS.¹²² By November of that year, a total of 120 veterans had received their new farms.¹²³

However, the RNS still "advertised" the East as a settlement region for all German peasants. Furthermore, they now ignored the former front soldiers as possible candidates altogether. In an article titled "*Wer kann Neubauer werden?*" (Who can become a new peasant?), the only acceptable candidates for the RNS were peasants, pointing out the failure of the settlements before 1933. Although the RKFVD was not addressed directly, it was implied that settling any other group but peasants would have been seen as a mistake, by saying "*damals konnte jeder siedeln*" (back then everyone could settle).¹²⁴ The idea of resettling Reich peasants was still alive and pursued by the RNS even in 1942 after Germany's military had suffered high casualties. Herbert Backe

¹²¹ "Was der Hoheitsträger wissen muß", *Hoheitsträger*, 2/1943, 30.

¹²² "Kriegsversehrte als Bauern im Wartheland", *OB*, May 9, 1943.

¹²³ "So ehrt das Wartheland seine Frontsoldaten", *OB*, Nov 15, 1943.

¹²⁴ "Wer kann Neubauer werden?", *NS-Landpost*, Feb 21, 1941.

stressed the concept of putting peasant blood in the new spaces and by doing so, farmland in the Reich would become available for modernization and increased productivity.¹²⁵ Rudi Peukert, NSDAP-Chief of Staff for Agriculture and Politics admitted that the topic of peasant settlement had taken many paths in the past, but in the end, the pendulum would swing back to the original Darré idea of blood and soil because only German peasants were qualified to preserve the eastern living space.¹²⁶ Hans-Joachim Riecke, State Secretary in the Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture continued by advocating the mobilization of Reich peasants as late as the summer of 1943.¹²⁷ The same year, the *Reichsnährstandverlag* published the book “*Bauerntum*” by Johann von Leers in which he noted that the large eastern areas, although won by the heroic efforts of the military, could only be truly settled with German peasants.¹²⁸ *Jungbauern* (junior peasants) should think about the possibility of settling autonomously in the East.¹²⁹

Besides the opportunity for peasants to settle, skilled craftspeople also were welcomed in the Eastern territories. The positive developments in the East would produce great and attractive areas of operation like never before in German history.¹³⁰ It was estimated that there were openings for about 60,000 “*Handwerker*” (craftsmen) who could either take over existing shops or build their own, while at the same time

¹²⁵ “Ein Werk bauerlicher Selbsthilfe”, VB, Sep 29, 1942; “Starkes Leben im Bauerntum”, VB, Sep 25, 1942.

¹²⁶ “NSDAP und Bauerntum”, *NS-Landpost*.. Folge 5, Jan 30, 1942.

¹²⁷ “Die volkspolitische Gemeinschaftsaufgabe bäuerlicher Ostsiedlung”, *NS-Landpost*, June 25, 1943.

¹²⁸ Johann von Leers, *Bauerntum*. (Berlin: Reichsnährstand Verlags-ges.m.b.h., 1943), 157.

¹²⁹ *Ibid*, 170.

¹³⁰ Heinrich August Winkler, “Der Entbehrliche Stand,” *Archive für Sozialgeschichte*. Vol 27 (1977): 37.

acting as pioneers in their fields. The master craftsman exam was desired for those who applied, but not necessary; however, it had to be obtained within three years.¹³¹ A “*Reichsdeutscher*” master craftsman, based out of the same office as the *Gebietskommissar*, would advise the newly settled trades people. Applications were accepted at every Chamber of Commerce in the Reich.¹³² A craftsman had to fulfill the same racial requirements as the peasants.¹³³ In the spring of 1942, Germans prided themselves on the rebuilding of the Ukrainian trade and crafts economy.¹³⁴ Since the administration of these new villages would be mostly run on a voluntary basis, few civil servants were needed. Not to exclude this group from the opportunities in the East though, settlements mostly restricted to single-family houses were also planned in the Generalgouvernement.¹³⁵

Disagreements about who was in charge, when, and why extended far beyond the Nazi leadership. Once Germany started occupying territories in the East, companies or new associations sprang up all over Germany, mostly hiding behind colonial names or logos, but all with one goal in mind: to exploit the eastern territories. One of these was a governmental agency for colonial economic affairs which was founded in Bremen with the purpose of market analysis on the export and imports with the Reich.¹³⁶ The

¹³¹ Allgemeine Anordnung, no 15/III, Aug 10, 1942, 32.

¹³² “Deutsche Gebietsobermeister”, VB, Nov 18, 1942, 4.

¹³³ “Wer kann Neubauer werden?”, *NS-Landpost*, Feb 21, 1941.

¹³⁴ “Neuaufbau des Ukrainischen Handwerks”, OB, April 17, 1942; “Die Ukraine-Europas Zukunftsland”, OB, Aug 7, 1942.

¹³⁵ “Ostsiedlung für Beamte erleichtert”, OB, Nov 1, 1941.

¹³⁶ Staatliche Forschungsstelle, Kölnische Zeitung, June 12, 1941; T-71, RWM, reel 138, frame 642158.

Reichskommissar for the Ostland, Hinrich Lohse¹³⁷, announced the establishment of a trust company (*Treuhandverwaltung für das Ostland*) to administer confiscated capital.¹³⁸ New companies, such as the *Zentrale Handelsgesellschaft Ost für landwirtschaftlichen Absatz und Bedarf m.b.H.* (ZO), the *GW-Osteinsatz GmbH*, the *Gruppe Teepflanzer*, the *Pflanzen Kautschuk-Forschungsgesellschaft m.b.H.*, the *Tabak Gesellschaft Kaukasus*, and the *Tabak-Anbau GmbH*, as well as the *Versorgungswerk Ukraine GmbH* (Central Trading Company East for Agricultural Distribution and Demand, Tea-grower Organization, Rubber Research Association, Tobacco Association Caucasus, Public Utilities of the Ukraine), and the insurance agency *VAL*, registered in 1942 in Berlin with the sole purpose of doing business in the occupied eastern territories. For instance, *Kautschuk* or natural rubber, was an important raw material in war production. The Reichskommissar issued a data-sheet on how to detect, collect, secure, and store the plants as well as report any findings to the Plenipotentiary for Motor Vehicles in Berlin.¹³⁹ Tobacco farmers from the Reich were transferred to the Ukraine to help with the harvests on the almost 98,000 acres set aside for this crop.¹⁴⁰

A confidential report by the German Colonial Economic Association issued on January 30, 1943 underlined the work in the new cotton research center in Cherson, as well as a special report by *Sonderführer* Meyer Hetling about peanut farming in the southern Ukraine and the possibility of sesame cultivation. Both were viewed as future

¹³⁷ Lohse was appointed Reichskommissar Ostland Sep 30, 1941, see *Amtsblatt* no 1, 1941, 1.

¹³⁸ *Amtsblatt* no 1, 30 Jan 1942, 25. See also "Deutsche Kaufleute im besetzten Osten", OB, Aug 2, 1942.

¹³⁹ *Merkblatt Kautschukhaltige Pflanzen*, M1 (A), USHMM. RG 31.002M, reel 6, fond 3206, Opis 6, folder 4

¹⁴⁰ "Machorka und Papirossi", OB, Oct 3, 1943.

fat providers for the Reich.¹⁴¹ However, just five months later, agriculture in the Ukraine was in trouble. Due to a mild, dry winter, concerns were raised about the upcoming crop season, and it was suspected that the 1943 harvest would not fulfill German expectations.¹⁴² In order not to alarm the general public about these problems, magazines and journals were filled with misleading stories about the rich harvests, and pictures showed warehouses in the East full of wheat and cereals, fields filled with crop ready to be harvested, or shelves full of cheese.¹⁴³ The July issue of the *Deutsche Agrarpolitik* ran a report on agriculture in the frontline showing images such as a herd of fat hogs grazing on wide open fields, potato fields, and how German technology in agriculture increased output.¹⁴⁴ However, it was not just the image of the East portrayed in German *Wochenschau* movies that concerned the Nazis. A memo dated April 9, 1943 showed that the occupation costs for the Ukraine from June to December 1942 were 640 million RM.¹⁴⁵ In 1943, only 1.7% of all products imported into the Reich originated in the Ukraine; the share of food was even lower than this, running at 0.9%. Only 0.9% of all raw materials imported into the Reich came from the Ukraine. Altogether, during this time, the Reich imported roughly 43.8 million tons of goods, including food products from the Ukraine.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴¹ T-71, RWM, reel 100, frame 6001203

¹⁴² T-71, reel 66, frame 564685.

¹⁴³ See picture series: Landwirtschaftsführer im Einsatz, Deutsche Agrarpolitik, Jan/Feb 1944.

¹⁴⁴ Deutsche Agrarpolitik, July 1943.

¹⁴⁵ Table from Deutsche Reichsbank, Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung, Berlin, April 1943; T-71, RWM, 16/124, reel 60, frame 557678.

¹⁴⁶ Deutscher Aussenhandel 1943, Reiner Warenverkehr; T-71, RWM, reel 99, frame 600307.

CHAPTER 5

HEGEWALD: HIMMLER'S UTOPIAN SETTLEMENT

The German colonist ought to live on handsome, spacious farms.

Hitler, Table Talks

Hitler's plans for eastern settlements included small cities, surrounded by handsome villages, and connected by roads. While medieval villages in Germany had developed around families and kinships, this future village in the East would be carefully planned, with the strong concept of *volksgemein-schaftlicher Verbundenheit* (communitarian solidarity).¹⁴⁷ Since a village was seen as the first political core of the new *Volksgemeinschaft* in the East, it was important to break with the previously known landscape. Villages in the Reich were perceived as weak since they directly competed with cities. By not repeating mistakes from the Reich, there would now be a "main" village with amenities such as a school, bank, dairy, medical facility, and maybe even a movie theater.¹⁴⁸ These villages would maintain an independent existence with a voluntary (*ehrenamtliche*) administration. No more than 300-400 people would live in these planned communities. Buildings would not be "clumped" close together as in the old *Haufendorf* form or stretched as in a *Strassendorf* form. In these oftentimes several miles long village types, properties were no wider than towels or suspenders.¹⁴⁹ There was little interaction between neighbors on either end of the village and community

¹⁴⁷ Meyer, *Bodenordnung* 18.

¹⁴⁸ Meyer-Hetling, *Deutsche Agrarpolitik*, 116.

¹⁴⁹ "Landwirtschaftliche Grundstücke werden zusammengelegt", OB, Dec 3, 1942.

gathering places were non-existent. *Rundling* and Angerdorf forms were recommended.¹⁵⁰ A traveling exhibition under the heading “*Dorf und Hof im neuen Osten*” (village and farm in the new East) detailed future settlements, blueprints, maps, models, and pictures.¹⁵¹



Figure 2. Heinrich Himmler details his plans for the new settlements in 1941 to Rudolf Heß¹⁵²

However, these plans conflicted again with Darré’s original ideas of moving entire villages from the old Reich into the East. Under the SS scheme, the existing tundra or veldt would be integrated into the whole equation.¹⁵³ Therefore, it made no sense to the planners in Berlin to plough and grow on arid land and receive very little in return as under the Soviet system. Under the new order, the dry, barren and treeless landscape would be completely changed: forests would be planted, dams would be built

¹⁵⁰ “Rundling und Odalsdorf”, *NS-Landpost*, Aug 26, 1936.

¹⁵¹ “Dorf und Hof im neuen Osten”, *OB*, April 3, 1943.

¹⁵² *Wissenschaft, Planung, Vertreibung*, 24.

¹⁵³ Michael Hartenstein. *Neue Dorflandschaften: nationalsozialistische Siedlungsplanung in den eingliederten Ostgebieten 1939-1944* (Berlin: Köster, 1998), 16.

to collect the melting snow waters in the spring and “the East will become a paradise of fertility.”¹⁵⁴ Through timed fertilization, clearance of ravines, and weed control, even small farms could run efficiently.¹⁵⁵ Germany called the reforestation of the East the world’s largest undertaking.¹⁵⁶ Almost four million square miles of new forest was planned over a twenty-five year period since the Ukraine was one of the most sparsely wooded areas on earth.¹⁵⁷ In 1943, Germans operated 317 tree nurseries, growing both fruit trees as well as timber.¹⁵⁸ Certain parts of the Ukraine, especially the South and the Crimea, would become an exclusive German colony, populated only by Hitler’s *Über-peasants*: peasant soldiers who had been professional, front-line fighters with at least twelve years of duty. Former soldiers, who were also sons of peasants, would receive a completely equipped farm from the Reich with only one stipulation attached, that they were to marry Aryan women of peasant stock. Furthermore, these former soldiers would act as the local school teachers to educate Germany’s future elite.¹⁵⁹ To accustom the Germans to the wide open spaces of the East, trips from Germany would be arranged by the government. While the future railways were exclusively used for the transportation of goods, visitors would travel on new roads.¹⁶⁰ These roads would be

¹⁵⁴ Hans-Joachim Riecke, *Deutsche Agrarpolitik*, Oct 1942, 13.

¹⁵⁵ “Ordnung schafft Brot”, *VB*, Dec 25, 26, 27, 1942, 10.

¹⁵⁶ “Das grosse Siedlungswerk im Neuen Osten”, *OB*, Oct 26, 1941; “Wald und Holz im neuen Osten”, *OB*, March 5, 1940; Jan 29, 1942.

¹⁵⁷ “Ukraine-der grösste Acker der Welt”, *OB*, Feb 11, 1942.

¹⁵⁸ “317 Ukraine-Baumschulen in Betrieb”, *OB*, March 10, 1943.

¹⁵⁹ Picker, *Table Talks*, 16.

¹⁶⁰ Picker, *Table Talks*, 35. see also Karl-Heinz Roth, “Generalplan Ost”, in Rössler, et al, *Der Generalplan Ost*, 61 and Anton Joachimsthaler. *Die Breitspurbahn Hitlers: eine Dokumentation über die geplante transkontinentale 3-Meter-Breitspureisenbahn der Jahre 1942-1945*. (Freiburg im Breisgau: Eisenbahn-Kurier Verlag, 1981).

studded with German towns, and around these towns, colonists would settle.¹⁶¹ The East would be transformed by the Germans into a country in which humans would be able to live, implying that the region in February 1942 was still uninhabitable, and the people living there were not humans.¹⁶² Refineries were not planned in the East with the exceptions of keeping open existing plants in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. The East was only to supply raw materials to the Reich and would maintain its rural, agricultural character.¹⁶³

The “New” German East

The Hitler directive from October 7, 1939 named Heinrich Himmler the head of the Reichskommissariat for the Strengthening of Germanism. “Germanization,” as interpreted by the International Military Tribunal procedures, meant to assimilate those territories politically, culturally, socially and economically into the German Reich, and abrogate the rights of the local population, reserving this area for exclusive settlement, development, and ownership by Germans.¹⁶⁴ The operational staff of the RKFDV was not a new organization, but instead had been camouflaged as a development of the *Leitstelle für Ein und-Rückwanderung* (Office of Immigration and Returning Emigrants) and incorporated into Himmler’s personal staff. Its main functions were planning and preparing proposals, handling loss compensation, procurement, central real estate, and

¹⁶¹ Picker, *Table Talks*, 68.

¹⁶² *Ibid*, 290.

¹⁶³ Riecke, *Deutsche Agrarpolitik*, (October 1942), 8.

¹⁶⁴ International Military Tribunal. *Trials of Major War Criminals. Documents and Other Material Evidence*. English edition. Nuremberg: n.p., 1947. 56 and 63. from here on forward: IMT.

resettlement.¹⁶⁵ The Baltic German, Alfred Rosenberg, was nominated on July 17, 1941 to become Reichsminister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, but Hitler circumvented Rosenberg and his Ostministerium's (OMi) powers at the same time by putting Hermann Göring in charge of economic matters and making Himmler responsible for security. With this decision, in addition to the Koch nomination to Reichskommissar for the Ukraine, he contributed to the notorious arguments and power struggles that plagued the Nazi administration. Rosenberg, after receiving his new assignment, issued a memo to the Foreign Ministry as well as other ministries and departments, instructing them that "all publications planned in matters of the eastern areas, also all directives and orders.... are to be submitted to him for his opinion and approval."¹⁶⁶ Throughout the war, frictions between the different ministries existed.¹⁶⁷ It seemed to Corni that the demise of Darré was not, as some historians put it, due to the fact that he was not a true National Socialist, but rather to the polycentric, chaotic policy-making process in the regime.¹⁶⁸ In public, Rosenberg's OMi, nicknamed *Cha-Ostministerium*, had to compete for recognition and resources with other government and semi-private organizations.

While Rosenberg agreed to keep planning as well as the execution of resettlements with Meyer-Hetling in the SS, in July of 1942, he was pushing for immediate, concrete resettlement policies. It did not matter to him who was in charge as long as someone was pushing the issue (*"die Hauptsache sei, dass etwas geschieht,*

¹⁶⁵ Helmut Krausnick. *Anatomy of the SS State*. (NY: Walker, 1968), 279.

¹⁶⁶ Documents on German Foreign Policy, GPO 1964, series D 1937-1945, vol xiii, 28.

¹⁶⁷ Brief Berger to Himmler, T-175, reel 17, frame 2521119; Aktenvermerk Berger, frame 2521082; letter Himmler to Lammers frame 2521098; letter Rosenberg to Himmler, frame 2521101.

¹⁶⁸ Corni, *Hitler and the Peasant*, 250.

durch wen es geschieht wäre eine Frage zweiter Ordnung).¹⁶⁹ Several documents introduced during the Nuremberg Trials detailed the power struggle between the ministries in Berlin, but also the dislike on very personal levels. For example, Erich Koch, Reichskommissar for the Ukraine, complained to his boss, Rosenberg that the various ordinances issued by his (Rosenberg's) ministry criticized him personally.¹⁷⁰ In other "battles" with him, Koch, as an *Alte Kämpfer*, had direct access to Hitler; he closed schools when Rosenberg ordered them to open and made speeches rejecting any and all plans for even modest autonomy for the Ukraine.¹⁷¹

The conflicts lingered into 1943 and the dispute over the eastern territories was not resolved; Rosenberg was still insisting that his OMi was in charge since "*Gesamterschliessung umfasst politische, landwirtschaftliche, wirtschaftliche, technische und völkische Probleme die nur von einer zentralen Stelle aus überblickt werden können*" (the overall development included political, agricultural, economical, technical, and national problems which could only be supervised from one central office).¹⁷² On the day of his nomination, Himmler had released a decree for the purpose of obtaining land for ethnic German settlers (*Landbeschaffung zur Selbsthaftmachung*), and at the same time putting the RKFDV in charge, even though Rosenberg was head of the *Siedlungsausschuss* (settlement committee).¹⁷³ Under the Himmler directive, the

¹⁶⁹ Aktenvermerk Besprechung Himmler and Meyer, Berlin Aug 14, 1942; T-175, reel 17, frame 2521086.

¹⁷⁰ Letter Erich Koch to Alfred Rosenberg, IMT, vol xxv, 192-PS, March 16, 1943. In the same letter Koch expressed his view that he, as Reichskommissar should determine the toponymy of the Hegewald settlement.

¹⁷¹ Jonathan Steinberg, "The Third Reich Reflected: German Civil Administration in the Occupied Soviet Union, 1941-1944" *The English Historical Review*, vol cx, (June 1995): 639.

¹⁷² Memo Rosenberg to Lammers, Sep 21, 1942; T-175, roll 17, frame 2521093.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

heads of the individual departments or their deputies were allowed to acquire land for the purpose of moving and resettling people.

Himmler, who always considered himself a peasant first and soldier second, countered some of Darré's original terminology of "*Ackernahrung*" by introducing terms like "*Hufe*" for the size of eastern farms.¹⁷⁴ He believed that a Hufe-size farm was adequate for one family, but should vary from region to region. In the East, the size would be determined on political grounds, but would more likely be between 60 and 100 acres. The further east the settlement, however, the larger the farm would be.¹⁷⁵ Doppel-Hufe and Gross-Hufe farms would also be constructed, covering more than 620 acres.¹⁷⁶ Who would own these large estates was left in the dark. However, in a letter from December 17, 1942, *SS-Gruppenführer* Gottlob Berger complained to Himmler that Rosenberg's OMi issued deed certificates (*Landverteilungsurkunden*) to deserving persons without prior approval of the SS. These deeds bore a facsimile signature from either Göring or Keitel.¹⁷⁷ In February of the following year, Josef Goebbels issued a secret memorandum explaining the treatment of European people in the East. In it, he warned not to talk about the planned German settlements or taking land away under eminent domain.¹⁷⁸ All of these transformations and ideas would take time to implement

¹⁷⁴ The word *Hufe* originated in France in the 8th century; the Latin word is *mansus*, which was Germanized into *huba*. 1 Hufe was equivalent to 30 Morgen or 19 acres. Als eine Hufe wurde seit dem Frühmittelalter ein Bauerngut oder Gehöft mit ausreichenden Acker- und Weideflächen bezeichnet, die eine Familie bearbeiten und von der sie sich ernähren konnte. Gleichzeitig bezeichnete die Hufe auch die Vollbauernstelle an sich. Bauer auf einer solchen Stelle war als Hufner vollberechtigtes Mitglied der Dorfgemeinschaft und konnte im Rahmen des im Dorf geltenden Rechts eigenverantwortlich wirtschaften und sich an der bäuerlichen Selbstverwaltung beteiligen.

¹⁷⁵ Deutsche Agrarpolitik, Meyer-Hetling, Jan 1943, no 4, 114.

¹⁷⁶ Czeslaw Madajczyk, Generalplan Ost. *Polish Western Affairs*. Vol III, (1962): 437.

¹⁷⁷ T-175, reel 17, frames 252119 and 2521126. see also appendix I

¹⁷⁸ USHMM, RG 11.001M, fond 1323, reel 81, folder 264.

and to complete. In October of 1942, during a fiery speech at the *Odeonsplatz*, Goebbels warned that the space which the soldiers conquered must be given a “*Form*,” must be organized, and be made useful.¹⁷⁹

In 1941, the government ran an architectural contest in the Reich titled: *Schaffung neuer Dörfer im Oste* (Creating new villages in the East). Architects and planners could submit their visions of the “New East,” taking the goal of an organic connection to *Hof zum Acker* (farm to land) into account. The size of a single village would be approximately 2500-3000 acres, giving each family between 50 and 100 acres of land. Eight to ten of these small villages would then form a larger, main village with roughly about 800-1000 people, with not more than one hour or five kilometers’ walking distance between them. These village formations would then be grouped around a small town with not more than 10-20,000 inhabitants and none of the smaller villages would be more than twenty km away from the towns. Each village would have a community center, NSDAP house, health facility, day-care center, restaurant, marching and parade ground, a bell tower, and a sports complex, as well as warehouses and storage facilities. So-called *Trutzhöfe*, acting as meeting and gathering places, would emerge in each village. The name *Trutzhof* can be translated into a farmstead which “braves the elements” and is “defying the odds,” and these farms would be built in a classic Nordic style.¹⁸⁰ In the larger main village, one would find a gas station, barbershops, bakery, physician, dentist and vet, six married teachers and two unmarried teachers, as well as

¹⁷⁹ “Aus Habenichtsen wurden Besitzende!” VB, Oct 19, 1942, 1.

¹⁸⁰ “Trutzhöfe fördern Gemeinschaftsgedanken”, OB, March 1, 1942.

a few other stores.¹⁸¹ Specialized stores, craftsmen, the movie theater, and the *Gymnasium* would be found only in the towns. These small towns would also be built up like garrisons.¹⁸²

Due to the war, however, many if not all of these contests and visions had to be altered or modified and ultimately dropped. For instance, it became necessary to construct or repair farms now with clay instead of the desired wood and brick. These traditional building materials were either unavailable or too expensive to ship east.¹⁸³

Dr. Josef Goebbels wrote in his introduction to the booklet "*Deutscher Osten, Land der Zukunft*" (German East, Land of the Future) that amber waves of wheat were growing in the fields, providing bread for the nation. However, he vehemently rejected the notion that the East was the dumping ground for failed party officials or disgruntled army officers, the so-called *Ostnieten*, new economic theories or involuntary transfer of bureaucrats. Strong Aryan peasants would vigilantly guard the eastern border, ready with their swords and ploughs to keep the peace in a rich Germanic culture. Goebbels suggested that every young man should consider it an honor to serve at least a few years in the East. The East, as he put it, was no longer a yearning, but a fulfillment of the German nation. The SS-training manual *Bauerntum* educated the reader on the difference between living in the East and the West. "We can not use people in the East, who only come here to enrich their wealth and then want to move back to Germany, no we need German people who are happily securing the new German east."¹⁸⁴New

¹⁸¹ "Planung und Aufbau im Osten", OB, Oct 23, 1941; "Dorf, Hauptdorf und Kleinstadt im neuen Osten", OB, Jan 4, 1942.

¹⁸² Himmler speech Posen, T-175, reel 17, 1943, frame 2820806.

¹⁸³ "Lehmbauten im Gau", OB, June 14, 1942.

¹⁸⁴ *Bauerntum*, SS- Hauptamt, 86.

settlers would not just “go to the colonies,” but would be sent by the government or other agencies. This would not only eliminate adventurous types, but also give the government and Party the opportunity to look at the racial background of the applicant.¹⁸⁵ The public, on the other hand, still believed in the settlement opportunities in the East. Newspapers ran personal ads by people looking for mates who would build a future together with them in the East; women wanted to leave the Reich because their husbands were stationed in the East, and others followed the call to duty to find a significant other.¹⁸⁶

Germany was not the only nation expected to settle the newly claimed East. Other “Aryan” nations like the Danes, Swedes or Dutch were also welcomed. The new living space would become the meeting place for all capable and energetic men of Europe.¹⁸⁷ The Dutch, especially, were embraced because of a variety of factors. They not only had direct access to the Atlantic via the North Sea, were experienced colonizers, but had established trade ties to the Far East. The Nazi Party had created close ties to the National Socialist Movement in Holland and the first Dutch artisan settlement was established in Posen in November 1941.¹⁸⁸ Rost van Tonningen, CEO of the *Nederlandische Oost Compagnie* (NCO) or Dutch East Company, an overzealous Dutch Nazi, took several trips to Zhytomyr, Kiev, and Berlin to discuss the

¹⁸⁵ Rassische Ausrichtung der deutschen Kolonialpolitik, Dec 2, 1940; T-71, RWM, reel 138, frame 642162.

¹⁸⁶ Aktenvermerk Kindertagesstaetten, USHMM, RG 31.002M, reel 6, fond 3206, folder 269; OB, Heiratsanzeigen, March 22, 1940; NS-Landpost, April 1942; letter NSDAP Landesleitung Ukraine regarding Ilse Barisch, Sep 3, 1943, USHMM, RG 31.002M, reel 6.

¹⁸⁷ Felix Kersten, *The Kersten Memoirs*. (New York: Macmillan, 1957), 138.

¹⁸⁸ “Siedlung für holländische Handwerker”, OB, Nov 1, 1941; “Holländer ziehen nach dem Osten”, OB, March 17, 1942.

administration of large estates in the Ukraine by Dutch farmers in 1942.¹⁸⁹ A few months later, the NOC took over the administration of two large estates in Sskwira and Usin, both over 2500 acres in size.¹⁹⁰ Some historians considered the newest Dutch undertaking actually their fourth time of trying to get a foothold in the East.¹⁹¹

Himmler's goal was to fulfill Hitler's promise to bring the ethnic Germans back into the Reich, but more importantly to implement a redesign of the newly- integrated areas and all future areas to come in the East. The basic idea of Nazi ideology, that all politics only entail race and nation (*Rasse-und Volkspolitik*) moved now into the center of the expansion efforts in the East. This would be one of the greatest resettlement efforts of all time. However, party lines were divided on the subject. For years, Darré and his agricultural ministry had promoted the idea of a strong German peasantry in the East based on his *Blut und Boden* ideology. However, with Heinrich Himmler and the SS in charge of the eastern territories, new guidelines appeared which were often in stark contrast to Darré's philosophy. Darré's vision of the East entailed many, but smaller settlements.¹⁹²

Herbert Backe noted in the preface of his journal *Deutsche Agrarpolitik* that for centuries the plow of the German peasant had conquered the East.¹⁹³ Since there was supposedly no land available in Germany (*Landnot*), peasant families were forced to move eastward, acting as pioneers, taming the land, and bringing culture to the regions

¹⁸⁹ Rost Van Tonningen, M.M. Bericht von Dr. M.M. Rost van Tronningen der Nederlandische Oost Compagnie, NV. Staatsbedrijf der Algemeene Landesdrukkerij: Den Haag, 1943, 119.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., 49.

¹⁹¹ "Naar Oostland Willen wij rijden", OB, July 12, 1942.

¹⁹² Odal, Monatsschrift für Blut und Boden, Heft 8, Aug 1939, 648.

¹⁹³ *Deutsche Agrarpolitik* was first published in the fall of 1942 by Herbert Backe, with Hans-Joachim Riecke as general editor. VB, Nov 11, 1942, 3.

and acting as mentors to the Slavs. Because of these heroic acts by Germans, the East was now considered the *Kornkammer* or bread basket of Europe. The fight against Bolshevism made it clear again that “*freies und wehrhaftes Bauertum*” were identical terms. Therefore, the German peasant in the East was always considered a *Wehrbauer*.¹⁹⁴ Around 1942, it became clear that the term “internal settlement” or colonization was inappropriate since the previous forms of settlement could not be applied to the East. The new settlements needed to have their own requirements according to the new demands. Since the settlers were now in new territories and living under different conditions far from the homeland, the settlers needed reliable help. In none of the writings was the help clearly defined, but it was implied that the SS as well as the Party would play a great role.¹⁹⁵

Infrastructure and Agriculture in the Ukraine

When the Wehrmacht crossed the border into the Ukraine, they moved into a region that bordered the Black Sea and Sea of Azov in the south, and in the north a region with few forests. However, swamps and marshes, nestled between Romania, Poland and Byelorussia. The Ukraine, a republic of the USSR since 1922, was roughly about 3.6 million square miles, but the region had been larger before 1918. At this time it had included territories east of Poland, including Wolhynia, Lemberg, Krakow and Bialystok. In 1941, 83% of the land was used for agriculture.¹⁹⁶ In the view of German planners, this region, particularly in the south, had a good transportation system since

¹⁹⁴ Herbert Backe, *Deutsche Agrarpolitik*, no 9, June 1943, 258.

¹⁹⁵ Zimmer, *The Birth of the Ostland*, 205.

¹⁹⁶ “Landwirtschaftsgesellschaften in der Ukraine”, OB, April 21, 1943.

most rivers emptied into the Black Sea with further connections to the Mediterranean. Through the rivers Dnjepr and Bug and many smaller canals and lakes, the region was connected to the Baltic Sea and the relatively flat landscape did not exceed 650 feet in height. The Dnjepr, Europe's second largest river system and at some locations up to 1900 feet wide, was strategically important to the Germans.¹⁹⁷ The climate was considered "*Pontisc*," a more temperate, marine climate: dry but warm with an average temperature of 50°F, with Yalta slightly higher at 60°F and a July average of 68°F. Fertile *Schwarzerde* soil (*black humus soil*) and other mineral resources (coal, oil, gas, peat, iron ore, salt, potash and phosphor) were found throughout.¹⁹⁸ However, German scientists were looking into ways to influence and control the climate in the Ukraine. For example, it was considered that by adding sand to existing heavy wet soil, heat would then be transferred faster to the root system of plants.¹⁹⁹ The SS had also established a *Sammelkommando* (collection squad) under the command of *Untersturmführer* Heinz Brücher for the sole purpose of gathering native plants and seeds.²⁰⁰ The existing Russian railroad system was poor in comparison to German standards; it not only used unfamiliar technology, but was outdated and inadequately maintained. Difficulties ranged from reading the Cyrillic letters identifying the trains to destroyed tracks. Since one of the goals of the Nazis was to exploit the natural resources for the benefit of the

¹⁹⁷ "Der Dnjeper und seine Tücken", OB, June 14, 1943.

¹⁹⁸ Deutsche Monatshefte, 9, Sept 1942, 76.

¹⁹⁹ "Die Beeinflussung des örtlichen Klimas", OB, July 25, 1943. see also Kersten on the transformation of land and climate, 137.

²⁰⁰ Uwe Hossfeld and Carl Gustav Thomeström. *Rasches Zupacken*, in Susanne Heim. *Autarkie und Ostexpansion*, (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2002), 125.

Reich, a sound working rail system was crucial, and by the fall of 1942, trains were rolling toward the Reich.²⁰¹

The agricultural system in the Soviet Union differed also from that of the Reich. The sovkhoz was a state farm, completely organized by the state. The agricultural workers were paid salaries by the state. In comparison, the mostly smaller kolkhoz farms, while also under state rule, paid their workers a share of the farm products. A kolkhoz peasant was allowed to own one cow and pig and little more than an acre of land for his family to farm.²⁰² In 1939, the areas later occupied by Germany had contained 57,000 kolkhozes with 6.3 million horses, 16.4 million cows and 14.8 million pigs, although in some areas all livestock had disappeared.²⁰³ Siegfried Medrow, from the Reichsministry for Food and Agriculture, noted that while peasant cooperatives in the past had worked well in the Reich, their existence no longer could be applied in the East.²⁰⁴ He asked for the foundation of a “*besonders Traegerinstitut*” (special agency) that would assist with technical matters in constructing the new villages. When the Nazis looked at the importance of production efficiency vs. “*völkisch*” mentality, the later was always seen as more important.²⁰⁵ Both the sovkhoz and the kolkhoz systems were hated by the Russian peasants, and Rosenberg found it necessary to announce a “new

²⁰¹ “Die Deutsche Reichsbahn im Osten”, VB, Nov 12, 1942, 6. on the exact numbers see Mierzejewski, *Valuable Asset*, vol 2, 98ff.

²⁰² “Wirtschaftswerte des ukrainischen Raumes”, OB, Jan 13, 1942.

²⁰³ “Landwirtschaftsaufbau in den besetzten Ostgebieten”, VB, Oct 16, 1942, 4. The *Ostdeutsche Beobachter* ran an article titled “Wirtschaftswerte des ukrainischen Raumes” with much lower numbers: 5.5 million pigs and 4.5 million cows in 1939, OB, Jan 13, 1942; Meldungen aus den Ostgebieten #22, T-175, reel 17, frame 2520350.

²⁰⁴ “Die Ostsiedlung als Gemeinschaftsaufgabe des Landvolkes” *Deutsche Agrarpolitik*, June 1943, 268.

²⁰⁵ “Siedlung im Warthegau”, OB, Feb 14, 1940.

agrarian” order for the occupied eastern territories.²⁰⁶ Propaganda pamphlets and newspapers called the kolkhoz system “*Fabriken zur Unterdrückung des freien Bauerntums*” (factories to oppress the free peasants).²⁰⁷ Dr. Otto Schiller, who was the agrarian advisor for IG-Farben and later professor in Hohenheim, wrote after the war that the shortage of equipment and qualifications, or complete lack thereof, of kolkhoz farmers for an immediate shift to individual management made it impossible to replace the collective system with individually-operated family farms. The system was replaced by a new one of farm management which Schiller called “farming co-operative.”²⁰⁸ A pro-active German peasant was to be the goal in the future, but until then, the kolkhoz system would remain. In addition, Germany would build up co-operatives in the East, contradicting the agrarian side represented by Medrow. Under the co-op system, soil would be worked together and each peasant would receive tax-free land for his own benefit.²⁰⁹ The rebuilding of agriculture was handled by the *Landwirtschaftsführer* or district agricultural leader, (LWF) who were mainly recruited from the ranks of “*reichsdeutsche Bauern und Landwirte*” (German peasants and big farmers), civil servants, and sometimes ethnic German peasants. Their responsibilities were to inventory the assets and crops in the regions. It was expected that they would overcome any difficulties and make decisions independently and on the spot. The LWFs were on the payroll of Göring and his Four-Year Plan, not Darré, Backe, or Rosenberg.

²⁰⁶ “Neue Agrarordnung im besetzten Osten”, OB, Feb 28, 1942; T-175, reel 17, frame 2520093ff.

²⁰⁷ “Kolchosen und Sowchosen”, OB, Feb 28, 1942.

²⁰⁸ Otto Schiller. The farming Co-operative. *Land Economics*. University of Wisconsin, vol xxvii, 1, Feb 1951, 2.

²⁰⁹ “Freie Bauern im Kaukasus”, OB, Jan 9, 1943. Die neue Agrarordnung, T-175, reel 17, frame 2520093.

It was proposed that all *Neubauerndörfer* should be run as universal agricultural co-operatives.²¹⁰ It appeared that the “New Agrarian Order” was more effective than its predecessor. Reports from the *Heeresgruppe Mitte* indicated that peasants made a greater commitment now toward their fields than under the Soviet collective system.²¹¹ However, signs of the war could be seen everywhere, weed instead of wheat, meager livestock looking for food, but the deep, rich, black soil was waiting to support wide areas of Europe.²¹² Berlin believed that this was just temporary and the Ukraine was in a transition period, which, under German direction, would turn into the promised *Kornkammer*.²¹³ Dr. Karl Stumpp, appointed by Rosenberg to handle ethnic questions, traveled the Ukraine extensively in 1941 and 1942. In his third report, dated September 30, 1941, Stumpp said that he was impressed with the fruit orchards around Zhytomyr. He believed that with good planning, the unused slopes in the countryside could be transformed into orchards and planted.²¹⁴ Although by September 1942 German troops had advanced all the way into the Caucasus, the promised raw materials, food and other riches had not materialized. The *Völkischer Beobachter* tried to explain away the failure blaming Bolshevik lies about the economic development before German occupation.²¹⁵ A study compiled by the SS specified that Ukrainian agriculture was

²¹⁰ “Universalgenossenschaften für die Neubauerndörfer des Osten”, OB, March 13, 1942.

²¹¹ Meldungen aus den Ostgebieten #16, T-175, reel 17, frame 2520174; “Erfolg der Agrarordnung”, *NS-Landpost*, Feb 1943.

²¹² “Was wir von der Ukraine erwarten können”, *Hoheitsträger*, 9/1942, 39.

²¹³ “Die Landwirtschaft in den besetzten Ostgebieten”, VB, Dec 21, 1942; Staatssekretär Backe vor den Landesbauernführern, Dec 11, 1942.

²¹⁴ Stumpp Report No 3, USHMM, RG 31.002M, reel 11, folder 4.

²¹⁵ “Wirtschaftszentrum Kaukasus”, VB, Sep 22, 1942, 4.

dependent on the oilfields in the Caucasus. Without fuel, it would be impossible to deliver the expected yearly crop of cereal to Germany.²¹⁶

“The Happiest Day of my Life,” Himmler and his *Hegewald*

Himmler considered 16 July 1942 “the happiest day of his life.” He had previously spoken to Hitler and everything he had considered and planned on a small scale could now be realized.²¹⁷ Peasants again would become Germany’s everlasting fountain of youth, and villages inhabited by an armed peasantry would form the basis of settlements in the East.²¹⁸ The Zhytomyr region where Himmler’s *Hegewald* was located was about ninety miles to the west of Kiev and on the Narew River. The Nazis created the Zhytomyr general district from parts of the Vinitza and the Kiev regions. As Wendy Lower described it, this region became the hub of elite activities in the Ukraine and a laboratory for Heinrich Himmler’s resettlement activities.²¹⁹ Both Hitler with his secret headquarters *Werwolf* and Himmler with his *Hegewald* compound maintained bases in the Ukraine. The actual “village” of *Hegewald*, just southwest of Zhytomyr, was a group of settlements and was a fully functioning community by September 1942.²²⁰ *Hegewald* was not just a single village or settlement; it was part of a larger group of master planned communities and symbolized the other planned localities. Racially selected ethnic Germans were the first to resettle around the headquarters, and once

²¹⁶ T-175, roll 17, frame 2520065. see also “Das Erdöl im Sowjethaushalt” ,VB, , Sep 29, 1942 and “Die Reichtümer Kaukasiens”, VB, Oct 11, 1942.

²¹⁷ Kersten. *Memoirs*, 132.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 133.

²¹⁹ Lower. *Nazi Empire-Building*, 3.

²²⁰ Witzleben report, USHMM, RG 31.002M, reel 6, opis 6, fond 3206.

Hegewald reached its full population capacity, it was declared an ethnic German district, to be governed not by Rosenberg's commissars but by Himmler's SS.²²¹ In order to accomplish this, the 486 settlements in the area were consolidated into 100 villages around Hegewald.²²² Meyer-Hetling was put in charge of merging existing settlements in and around Hegewald.²²³ In the general district of Zhytomyr, the area commissariats were combined and the compound and its twenty-eight surrounding settlements were declared a distinct administration unit.²²⁴ Kurt Klemm became *Regierungspräsident*, Drs. Zagel and Knust *Landräte* (county commissioners) and the position of *Gebietskommissar* (regional commissar) Zhytomyr was given to *Regierungsrat* Kamm. All civil service appointments as well as administrative positions had to be approved by the Reichskommissar, Division 1.²²⁵ In the "old" Reich, the SS competed with traditions of a powerful and proud bureaucracy. In the Ukraine, there was, as Steinberg put it, "an administrative vacuum."²²⁶ It was understood that the Reich inheritance law was to be applied to all eastern settlements.²²⁷ Himmler spoke of villages of thirty to forty farms, each farm with roughly 300 acres of land, and with the above-mentioned Party and meeting facilities, he wanted, at least for the East, to achieve the complete fusion of Party and State.²²⁸

²²¹ Lower, *Nazi Empire-Building*, 172.

²²² Treffen Rosenberg with Meyer, T-175, reel 17, frame 2521082, Aug 14, 1942.

²²³ Aktenvermerk, T-175, reel 17, frame 2521083.

²²⁴ Lower, *Nazi Empire-Building*, 177.

²²⁵ Einstellung von Beamten und Angestellte, USMHM, RG 31.002M, Fond 3206, reel 3, folder 4.

²²⁶ Steinberg, 632.

²²⁷ Meyer-Hetling, *Deutsche Agrarpolitik*, 1943, no 4, 116.

²²⁸ Kersten, *Memoirs*, 134.

With these moves, Himmler placed himself at the forefront of the Blood and Soil movement; Hegewald became “his” colony.²²⁹ Yet, on November 12, 1943, with Red Army soldiers nearby, Himmler’s *Hegewald* and the military base were burned down by the SS.²³⁰ No German peasant family ever lived in *Hegewald*.

²²⁹ Lower, *Nazi Empire-Building*, 172.

²³⁰ Bericht der SS-Standortkommandatur, T-175, roll 72, frame 2589091 and 2589101.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

Race, Culture, and a Nation can only exist if they are anchored in the Soil.
Brekenfeld, Wehrkraft und Siedlung

Not only did the SS have interests in the settlement and therefore Germanization of the East, but Rosenberg's OMi and Darré's agricultural ministry were also actively working toward settlement policies in that area. This thesis has focused on Richard Walther Darré, Heinrich Himmler, and to a lesser extent, on Alfred Rosenberg. Himmler's subordinate, Konrad Meyer-Hetling, is also highlighted. Serious differences of opinion about how the East should be restructured existed among these men.

The goal of this study was to illustrate the settlement plans of German peasants in the conquered eastern living space using the example of *Hegewald*, and to show how these settlement policies shifted from Darré's original blood and soil ideology to Himmler's *SS Über-Peasants* concept. It also showed the often times chaotic decision that were made, the lack of coordination among the ministries involved, but more important the personal creed and ambition of men in power. In order to accomplish this, several topics were addressed. According to Himmler, it was impossible to "become" a German; one had to be born of German blood. Monkeys could be trained to do tricks, but feelings of belonging can never be taught. Therefore, only Germans could settle in the East since they were the only race which truly understood the responsibility "of that burden." The space also had to be secured, not only through the sword, but also through the plow. "*Wir haben den besten Soldaten der Welt, der im Osten deutschen Boden zurück erobert hat, und es keine Aufgabe die wichtiger wäre als den besten*

Kolonisten der Welt zu erziehen der für alle Zeiten diesen Raum deutschen Volkstums sichert (We have the best soldier in the world who re-conquered German soil in the East. There is no bigger responsibility than educating this colonist to be the best on earth and to secure the living space for all times to come).²³¹ With these words, Theodore Oberländer, who later became minister of Displaced Persons and Refugee Affairs under Konrad Adenauer, concluded his essay in the *Deutsche Monatshefte*. He certainly echoed Heinrich Himmler's idea of settling former soldiers, equipped with helmets, guns and plows, in the East, and not pure peasants as originally advocated by Darré. With the settlement policies of German peasants in the East, the Nazis abandoned previous colonial settlement ideas. Under traditional colonial policies, settlers moved into an acquired territory and the occupier lived either among or in close proximity to the native people. This traditional concept was not followed by the Nazis in the eastern territories occupied during World War II. The native population was either moved or annihilated, and it was planned to settle these regions with a selected racial population. Himmler and the RKFDV denied the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, first Darré and later Backe any participation in the settlement of German peasants in the occupied territories.

In the early years of Nazi rule, Richard Walther Darré had proposed the building of a peasant nobility that would understand hard work and the concept of being one with the soil. His theories were appealing and sounded good, but as soon as the Nazis occupied large parts of Eastern Europe, other, more selfish plans came into place. The East was seen as a big cake, and every minister in the Reich, as well as private and

²³¹ Theodor Oberländer. *Deutsche Monatshefte*, (7, March 1941), 369.

other government entities, wanted not only the biggest slice, but also wanted to be the first one “to cut the cake.” Himmler and his RKFVD saw a great opportunity to expand their power by demonstrating the core racial project of the Nazis. Himmler repeatedly stressed the fact that he was not a soldier but a peasant first. Darré, the peasant ideologist, but never the politician, was eventually replaced by Herbert Backe, someone with much less influence and more modest ambitions. By the end of 1943, with the advance of the Red Army, all dreams and aspirations of settlements in the East burst like a bubble.

The East was Germany’s destiny, but not the land of the future.

APPENDIX A
ABBREVIATIONS AND TRANSLATIONS

AA	Auswärtiges Amt, Foreign Ministry
DAF	Deutsche Arbeitsfront, German Labor Front
DAI	Deutsches Auslands-Institute, German Foreign Institute
DUT	Deutsche Umsiedlungs-Treuhand-Gessellschaft m.b.H. in Berlin German Resettlement Trust Company
DVL	Deutsche Volksliste, German National List
GG	Generalgouvernement, part of Nazi occupied Poland
GPO	Generalplan Ost
HTO	Haupttreuhandstelle Ost, Main Trust Office East
LBGU	Landwirtschaftungsgesellschaft, Agriculture Association
LVL	Landwirtschaftliche Vertrauensleute, Agriculture Ombudsman
LGF	Landwirtschaftlichen Gaufachberater, Agriculture Territory Advisor
LBF	Landesbauernführer, District/Regional Peasant Leader
LWF	Landwirtschaftsführer, District Agricultural Leader
NCO	<i>Nederlandische Oost Companie</i> , Dutch East Company
NSF	Nationalsozialistische Frauenschaft (Nazi Women's Group)
NSV	Nationalsozialistische Volkswohlfahrt, NS-Welfare Agency
Oblast	Russian term for Administrative Province
OKW	Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Army High Command
OMi	Ostministerium, Ministry of the East
OVF	Ostinstitute für Volksbildung und Freizeitgestaltung (Eastern Institute for National Education and Recreation)
RAD	Reichsarbeitsdienst, National Labor Service
Rayon	Russian term for Administrative District

RBF	Reichsbauernführer, Reich Peasant Leader
RKFDV	Reichskommissariat für die Festigung des Deutschen Volkstums, Reich Commission for the Strengthening for Germandom
RKU	Reichskommissariat Ukraine, Reich Commissariat Ukraine
RMEuL	Reichsminister für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft, Ministry for Food and Agriculture
RMfdbO	Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete, Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories
RNS	Reichsnährstand,
RSHA	Reichssicherheitshauptamt, Reich Security Main Office
RuSHA	Rasse und Siedlungs-Hauptamt, Race and Settlement Office
SS	Schutz-Staffel, Protection Squad
VF	Verwaltungsführer, Administration Leader
VoMi	Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, Ethnic German Liaison Office

APPENDIX B

SS RANK

Reichsführer	Commander in Chief
Obergruppenführer	General
Gruppenführer	Lieutenant General
Brigadeführer	Major General
Standartenführer	Colonel
Obersturmbannführer	Lieutenant Colonel

APPENDIX C

KEY PLAYERS IN RE-SETTLEMENT OF GERMAN PEASANTS

Dr. Herbert Backe, State Secretary Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture 1933; Reich Peasant leader (*Reichsbauernführer*) and Reich Minister 1943.

Born May 1, 1896 in Batum (Kaukasus), World War I veteran and Russian POW. Field of interest: agrarian politics, considered himself *Landwirt alter Schule*²³²

Gottlob Berger, *SS-Obergruppenführer*, head of the Chief Command Office of the SS, Liaison Officer Ministry of the East, Head of Police Division in Reich Ministry for Eastern Territories, SS-Hauptamt (SS-HA)

Dr. Otto Bräutigam²³³, Abteilung I/1, assistant to Georg Leibbrandt, head of the Eastern Political Department. Head of the *Haupttreuhandstelle Ost* Nov 1939-Mai 1940.

Dr. Richard Walther Darré, Reich Minister of Food and Agriculture 1933-1942, Reich Peasant Leader 1933 to 1945, founder RuSHA 1931, head of RuSHA 1931 to 1938. Born July 14, 1893 in Argentina. Schooling in Argentina, Heidelberg, Great Britain and Colonial School, Witzenhausen. World War I veteran in a field artillery detachment. Stationed in Frankfurt/Main during the 1918 revolution. Member of *Stahlhelm* 1923. Worked after the war in Bavaria as a farmer; received 1925 his diploma. Worked in Finland and Estland, member NSDAP 1930. Meet Hitler in 1930 and received 'orders' to organize the peasants.²³⁴ Field of interest: animal husbandry, genetics, race, geo politics. Editor *NS-Landpost*

Werner Daitz, Nazi economist and head of the Central Research Institute for National Economic Order and Larger Area Economics who proposed German expansion politics within Europe under German leadership.

Dr. Hans Ehlich, *SS-Standartenführer*, head of the III B at the Chief Security Office

Franz Ritter von Epp, head of *Reichskolonialbund*, Reichsstadthalter in Bavaria (district 24)

Dr. Hans Frank, head of the occupational authorities in the General Government. Born May 3, 1900, studied law and economics in Munich, Kiel and Vienna. World War I veteran, member Freikorps Epp and Reichswehr.

Ulrich Greifelt, head of the Stabshauptamt, Head of the Office for Immigration, Personal Stab RfSS June 1939 renamed Dienststelle des RKF. *SS-Obergruppenführer Reinhardt Heydrich*, *SS-Obergruppenführer*, Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, joined the NSDAP and SS in 1931, became head of the Chief Security Office 1932, President of the International Criminal Police Commission 1940; head of the *Reichssicherheitshauptamt* (RSHA), born March 1904, joined the Freikorps after WWI,

²³² OB, July 2, 43

²³³ Otto Brautigam. *So hat es sich zugetragen*. Würzburg 1968.

²³⁴ Das Deutsche Führerlexikon, 32.

joined German navy but was dismissed in 1930, considered the 'architect' of the Holocaust, chaired Wannsee conference, assassinated June 1942.

Richard Hildebrandt, SS-Obergruppenführer in the RuSHA.

Heinrich Himmler, Reichsführer SS and Chief of German Police, joined the NSDAP 1925, from 1929 to 1945 Reichsführer SS, Gauleiter Bavaria 1925, Assistant Reichspropagandaleiter 1926, member Reichstag 1930, Police President Munich and head of Political Police 1933, Commander Prussian Police and Gestapo, Reichskommissar für die Festigung des deutschen Volkstums (RKFDV) 1939 to 1945. Editor of *Volk und Rasse*. Committed suicide.

Otto Hoffmann, SS-Gruppenführer, Chief of the Rasse und Siedlungshauptamt from 1939 to 1943. Born 1896, died 1982. joined NSDAP 1923, *Alter Kämpfer*, joined SS in 1931

Dr Kleist, head of the Ostland section.

Kurt Klemm, General district Zhytomyr (till 1942), born January 1894, died Nov 1973, lawyer. Membership NSDAP since 1931, police chief in Recklinghausen 1932.

Erich Koch, Reichskommissar for the Ukraine, Born June 19, 1896, World War I veteran and Freikorps member. Membership NSDAP 1922; Gauleiter in East-Prussia 1928 and member of the Reichstag since September 1930. SA Obergruppenführer 1938, *Reichsverteidigungskommissar* in East-Prussia 1939, head of the civil government in Bialystock, since Sep 1941 Reichskommissar for the Ukraine.

Hellmut Körner, Agriculture and food expert, subordinate of Koch. Born February 16, 1904, World War I veteran, 3-year apprenticeship in agriculture, studied agriculture in Leipzig, diploma as *Akademisch Gebildeter Landwirt*²³⁵, member of the Reichstag.

Wilhelm Koppe, *SS-Gruppenführer*, General der Polizei, SD Hauptamt 1938, HSSPF XXI Wartheland 1940, HSSPF Generalgouvernement 1943.

Dr. Georg Leibbrandt, Director of the Eastern Division of the NSDAP Foreign Office, Director of Political Development in the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories

Hinrich Lohse, *Reichskommissar für das Ostland*. Born Sep 2, 1896, World War I veteran, party member since 1921, Gauleiter in Schleswig-Holstein since 1925, member Reichstag since 1932.

Werner Lorenz, head of the Vo-Mi, *SS-Obergruppenführer*, born Oct 1891, General of the Police, head of the Foreign Volksbund.

²³⁵ Das Deutsche Führerlexikon, 247.

Waldemar Magunia, SA-Oberführer, generaldistrict Zhytomyr, (after 1942), born December 1902, died February 1974, Freikorps member, party member since 1921, SA-leader in East Prussia, Chief DAF in East Prussia 1937-1941

Prof. Dr. Konrad Meyer-Hetling, Leiter Hauptabteilung II, Planung (later Amt VI), Director Institute of Agrarian Affairs and Agrarian Policy, Universität Berlin, SS Standartenführer, Beauftragter für die Siedlung und Landesraumordnung beim Reichsleiter für Agrarpolitik (Ministry of Food and Agriculture), Bauernführer of the Reich, born May 1905.

Alfred Rosenberg, Nazi ideologist, Born 1893 in Estonia, member of the Thule-sect and since 1921 member NSDAP. Publisher of the Protokoll of Zion in 1923, editor-in-chief of the *Völkischer Beobachter* from 1925-1945. Took part in the march to the Feldherrenhalle 1923, member Reichstag 1930, head of the Aussenpolitische Amt NSDAP 1933, Reichsbeauftragter für weltanschauliche Schulung und Erziehung NSDAP from 1934-1941, head of the ERR (Einsatzstab Rosenberg) 1940 in charge of confiscation of art objects and pictures in the occupied territories; 1941 *Reichsminister for the Occupied Eastern Territories*, died 1946.

Dr. Karl Stumpp, Chief Sonderkommando Ukraine, *Referent für Volksdeutsche Fragen* (ethnic German questions)

Dr. Erhard Wetzel, born 1903 in Stettin, studied law, *Amtsgerichtsrat* (counsel to the magistrate), Ministerialrat, member NSDAP May 1933 (*Maikäfer*), joined OMi in 1941, Gruppe III B RSHA, worked in Kurfürstenstrasse.

Werner Willikens, born 1893 in Bienenburg; Field Artillery Regiment 24, *Alter Kämpfer*, member NSDAP, member of Reichstag since 1928, Reichslandbundpräsident, Stellvertreter Darre's.²³⁶

²³⁶ "Vorkämpfer", VB December 25/26/27, 1932.

APPENDIX D
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

APPENDIX E
NEUBAUERNSCHEIN

Siedlerschein

Dem Kleinsiedler

Josef Hauger

auf der Siedlerstelle Walkebuck 11
Grundstück Nr. 219 wird hiermit die

Figung als Siedler

zuerkannt. Die Stadt wird die
Übergabe der Stelle zu freiem
Eigentum auf den 1. Januar 1938
erwirken. Des zur Beglaubigung
ist diese Urkunde ausgestellt und
dem Siedler ausgehändigt worden.

Billingen, den 24. Dezember 1937

Der Bürgermeister.

APPENDIX F
HEGEWALD SETTLEMENT STATISTICS

Reichskommissariat Ukraine Villages	Towns	Ethnic Germans
Zhytomyr	1	43.988
Kiev		15.706
Nikolajew		27.078
Dnjepr		76.737
Crimea		5565
	Total	169.074

Zhytomyr²³⁷

Settlement Area	Villages	Town	Ethnic Germans
Hegewald	28		8915
Försterstadt	24		9036
Zwiahel	23		4493
Pulin	22		4517
Goroschki	48		8327
Zhytomyr Stadt	27	1	5666
Tschepetka	6		1818
Tschudno	15		1216
TOTAL	193	1	43.988

The 28 settlements of Hegewald had 1663 children attending 24 schools, with 43 teachers, 2 childcare centers, 1 physician, 3 German grocery stores, and 8 meeting facilities. Neither a drugstore, nor nursing facility or ambulance services were available.²³⁸

Table 1. Hegewald Settlements²³⁹

²³⁷ Fernschreiben Höhere SS, Rußland Süd and Reichskommissar Ukraine, March 28, 1943T-175, roll 72, frame 2589160

²³⁸ Fernschreiben Höhere SS, Rußland Süd and Reichskommissar Ukraine, March 28, 1943T-175, roll 72, frame 2589170

²³⁹ Fernschreiben Höhere SS, Rußland Süd and Reichskommissar Ukraine, March 28, 1943, T-175, roll 72, frame 2589158

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		Reel 60
		Reel 66
		Reel 99
		Reel 100
		Reel 138, Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemische Industry
Record Group 242		Records of the National Socialist German Labor Party (NSDAP)
	T-81	Reel 24, NSDAP, Gauleitung Baden
		Reel 117, Beauftragter des Reichsschatzministers, Gau Baden, Gau Hessen-Nassau
Record Group 1035		Records of the National Socialist German Labor Party (NSDAP)
	T-81	Deutsches Auslands-Institute, VOMI
Record Group 242		Records of Nazi Cultural and Research Institutions
	T-82	Reel 92
		Reel 104
		Reel 147
		Reel 148
Record Group 1010		Records of the Reich Leader of the SS and Chief of the German Police
	T-175	Reel 17, Persönlicher Stab Reichsführer SS, Schriftgutverwaltung
		Reel 72, Persönlicher Stab Reichsführer SS
		Reel 92, Persönlicher Stab Reichsführer SS
		Reel 85, Persönlicher Stab Reichsführer SS

Record Group 1008	Records of the Reich Ministry for the occupied Eastern Territories 1941-1945
T-454	Reel 42, Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete
Record Group 1030	Records of German Field Commands: Rear Army, Occupied Territories and others
T-501	Reel 6, Befehlshaber der rückwärtigen Heeresgebiete

Holocaust Museum, Washington, DC (USHMM)

Record Group 31.002M	Reichskommissariat für die Ukraine und Einsatzstab Rosenberg records, Archive of the October Revolution Kiev, Fond 3206, 1993.A.0084
	Reel 3
	Reel 6
	Reel 11
Record Group 11.001M	Osobyi Archive, Moscow, records 1932-1945, Fond 1323, 1993.A.0085
	Reel 81
	Reel 83

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