REFLECTIONS OF REVOLUTION: *Le Figaro, Le Monde,* AND PUBLIC OPINION
IN FRANCE DURING THE ALGERIAN CONFLICT (1954-1962)

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This thesis is an examination of the printed media in France (1955-1963), as represented by two mainstream newspapers: Le Monde (left-centrist) and Le Figaro (right-centrist). Using these newspapers, as well as Gallup polls recorded at the time, this study explores correlations of what was reported in newspapers and how French public opinion evolved during the course of the war. These two major sources of information are shown to have given contradictory information, thus accounting for some of the paradoxes found in public opinion polls. Specifically, the paradoxes analyzed in the study concern the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) and the Pieds-Noirs (the European population of North Africa).
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<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>Agence France-Presse</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALN</td>
<td>Armée de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Content Analysis</td>
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<td>CRUA</td>
<td>Comité Révolutionnaire d'Unité et d'Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>FLN</td>
<td>Front de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Front)</td>
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<td>GPRA</td>
<td>Gouvernement Provisionnel de la République Algérienne (Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNA</td>
<td>Mouvement Nationaliste Algérien (Algerian Nationalist Movement)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MTLD</td>
<td>Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratique (Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organisation Armée Secrète (Secret Army Organization)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OA</td>
<td>Organisation Spéciale</td>
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In the society of the spectacle, only what appears exists.

Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire*

Events matter as they are seen to matter and are seen as they are shown.

Pierre Cenerelli, *Revisions of Empire*
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The Algerian Revolution (1954-1962) remains a tumultuous and enigmatic chapter in modern French history. Consequently, the quantity of literature on this period is enormous. It is the aim of this study to provide a unique perspective by drawing upon both cognitive theory and content analysis techniques in an attempt to uncover underlying ideology present in two mainstream French newspapers, *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro*. In doing so, one may better understand the underpinnings of French public opinion vis-à-vis certain aspects of the war. In particular, this thesis explores public attitudes on the leading rebel group, the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), as well as attitudes concerning the European settlers of Algeria (Pieds-Noirs).

Although proving that an agenda-setting function of the media exists is not an aim of the study, seeking correlations between mass attitudes and what was presented in the press is nonetheless informative. Attitudes were slow to change, which, in turn, may have prolonged the conflict. Exploring this phenomenon of change via the press the fundamental goal of this study. To begin to understand the complexity of this press-

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1 These two newspapers were chosen, first, because of the predominance of the printed press in the 1950s and early 1960s. Second, they both enjoyed a wide circulation. Thus, they can be reasonably posited as influencing a wide swath of public opinion. However, *Le Figaro* was more conservative, pro-war and popular, whereas *Le Monde* was more liberal and even somewhat scholarly. Exploring their differences, then, can paint an interesting picture of the argumentative landscape at the time of the war, as well as shed light on the research questions posed. The choice is discussed in more detail in Chapter III.
public relationship during the revolution, a brief history and analysis of the conflict is given in Chapter II.

Several elements in particular drive this research on the Algerian war. First, how do *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro* differ, and how are these differences seen in the layout of the newspaper? The study approaches this question in Chapter III by outlining the two newspapers and the post World War II press system in France. This is done in order to determine how each paper ideologically relates to the other, and how these differences condition ensuing differences in coverage. The external, “phenotypical” differences are analyzed with tools from the domain of content analysis. Some of these tools were preexisting and others are techniques that were generated for the unique problems presented by quantitatively comparing two different newspapers. Chapter IV explains the theory behind the coding techniques.

From this theory, a perception index emphasizing the perceptive value of each story in each newspaper is generated. This index, explained in Chapter V, is necessary because measuring front-page space dedicated to the conflict alone, as is generally the case, is an inadequate basis for subsequent analysis. Essentially, this index serves to boil down stylistic differences in each newspaper to figures estimating the effect on the reader’s perception of the stories. The conclusion is that, despite a lesser amount of space accorded to the war by *Le Figaro*, other visual features of the newspaper render its effect on the reader similar to that of *Le Monde*. Because these newspapers had different views of the war, contradicting signals of similar strength were sent by the press to readers about the war. The result is that an insufficient quantity and quality of
information was available to influence the reader and lead opinion to favor independence for Algeria. Indeed, many years passed before such a notion of independence was even acceptable to Metropolitan French (residents of the "Metropole" or continental France), as will be shown by public opinion polls.

Also in Chapter V, there is a comparison of the types of stories each newspaper favored. In this respect, three different levels of stories are distinguished on the basis of the type of parties and action depicted in the story. Level 1 stories depict violent events; level 2 stories report political events within France and Algeria; level 3 stories depict third party involvement, such as with the United Nations. These differences are explored in terms of a quantity/quality necessity of information for opinion change. Chapter VI describes the mechanisms of this process.

Qualitative content analysis is performed after filtering the stories through certain categories used for the study, to paint a precise ideological landscape produced by the above-mentioned differences between the newspapers. For example, the number of stories relating violent events in each newspaper is compared. Additionally, however, a qualitative distinction is made as to the specific nature of violent events reported. Some violent events, for example, result from extremist elements in the French army yet others from Algerian terrorism.

In Chapter VI, the study focuses on cognitive theories and public opinion polls to establish links between what was being reported and where the French Metropole was ideologically situated during the war. The object here is to better understand the philosophical climate during the 1950s and early 1960s and how change came about in
the hearts and minds of a nation. While analyzing public opinion, questions were
generated concerning the French population of Algeria and the main opposition
organization on the Algerian side, the FLN. The two questions explored include the
following: the surprising lack of concern for the French population of Algeria and an
intriguing change in the esteem held for the FLN by the French over the course of the
war. Drawing from both the results of the quantitative content analysis set up in Chapter
IV, as well as the historical record, the possible reasons why this double paradox existed
as such are given in Chapter VII.
CHAPTER II
THE ALGERIAN REVOLUTION: ANALYSIS

Les peuples sont entraînés dans un flot d’événements tumultueux et tragiques dont tout homme, qu’il le veuille ou non, est l’auteur autant que le spectateur, le bénéficiaire, ou la victime. En acceptant passivement sa défaite, la France eut consommé sa propre perte.

(First post World War II issue of Le Monde, December 1944)

Nations are pulled into a series of tumultuous and tragic events during which each man, whether he wishes it or not, is the author as much as the spectator, the beneficiary as much as the victim. By passively accepting its defeat, France had absorbed its own loss.

The principal independent variable in my study is, of course, “la guerre d’Algérie,” or the Algerian Revolution, as it is more aptly known. A comprehensive look at the conflict would be optimal, but the crux of this paper is less historical (in the sense of adding new primary sources to the record) than analytical. For those less familiar with the historical aspects of the conflict, Appendix A outlines a chronology. In effect, the study aims to derive data with techniques not limited to this event, but applicable to other points in history and other forms of media than the printed format. So, a brief analysis of the Algerian Revolution will furnish some reference points without becoming too
encumbered by the enormous bank of historical facts that has been established by scholars in the years after the conflict.

One of the aspects that originally led me to study this bloody instance of decolonization was the socioeconomic complexity of Algeria itself. For example, by 1954, alongside Arabic and Berber populations, one million Pieds-Noirs (Algerian residents of European descent) lived and worked in Algeria, often in the same miserable conditions as their Arabic and Berber indigenous counterparts. This sort of cultural diversity and proximity has created challenges for many modern states, but in this case, the interests of the Metropole often did not coincide with those of many of the communities in Algeria, native and settler alike. Pacifying one side often led to angering the other. And the phenomenon of unchanging sides throughout the conflict, existing in bilateral or trilateral relation to one another, was rarely the case. Taking advantage of the army’s successes in 1957, most notably the Battle of Algiers (January-March 1957), General Salan took de facto control of the French government in Algiers. The weakened resident-général (a Metropole-appointed governor) Robert Lacoste was unable to resist. Later, the army itself fractioned into differing sides, one camp comprising Gaullist supporters and the other a more radical group, the Organisation Armée Secrète (OAS). The members of this latter formed a part of what are referred to as ultras or activistes. The OAS formed in opposition to de Gaulle after the French government appeared to be drifting closer to the idea of an independent Algeria in the middle stages of the conflict. But by 1961, after a failed putsch by the OAS generals, the army lost the confidence of many French citizens, and radical commandos continued to carry out terrorist activities.
against noncompliant Europeans. On different occasions even de Gaulle himself was targeted by the OAS.

By the same token the nationalist Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) and its armed branch, the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN), instituted a policy of eliminating those in opposition to their cause. Such opponents included both the Harkis, who were French-supported Muslim fighters, as well as French-sympathetic Caïds (community and regional leaders). Rival organizations were not spared either. The Mouvement Nationaliste Algérien (MNA) was targeted for some time before the FLN established itself as the premier independence organization. The Gouvernement Provisionnel de la République Algérienne (GPRA) came into existence later in the war, alongside the FLN, as the premier organization representing interests of the Algerian people. Benjamin Stora reports that as many as 10,000 casualties resulted from the MNA-FLN internecine power struggles alone (1993: 12). Strife was not limited to Algeria, and like the disagreements in the French army, the internal conflict of the Algerians landed explosively in France. This broadening of the war had the effect of increasing the sense of urgency of the war for the people of France.

Another unconventional feature of the Algerian Revolution concerns Ahmed Ben Bella, one of the founding FLN members and the first president of independent Algeria. Ben Bella was imprisoned for most of the war after having his plane hijacked by the French army, but still managed to control substantial movements, both ideological and material, of the independence cause. Linked to the FLN, the GPRA was presided over by the more moderate Ferrhat Abbas. Often this organization negotiated as the voice of the
Algerian side with the French. Thus, one can see that the landscape of those actively engaged in the conflict is littered with the irony and contradiction so often bred by war. The Metropolitan (continental France) interests clashed with both Pieds-Noirs and Muslims, with the latter two fighting fiercely against each other. These features worked to prolong the bloodshed and drive the conflict to its most gruesome and tragic moments.

Despite longstanding European and African interaction, the explosive cultural predicament in Algeria erupting in the initial uprising on All Saints’ Day in 1954 can be traced to the 1830s. Long before Bismarck’s carving of Africa in 1884, France began to pursue the doctrine of establishing a colonie de peuplement (settlement colony) whereby commercial links between the metropole and the colony were put in place and fortified (Reinhard, 2000: 13). Another feature of this type of colonization is that the metropole attempted to permanently establish an elite class of settlers to promulgate not only commercial interests but, implicitly, cultural interests as well. Perhaps a “clash of civilizations” was bound to arise with such a system in place but the historical humiliation the Algerians came to know was less a result of mere cultural differences than the system of socioeconomic subjugation that was present.

Algerian rebel action persisted throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, especially with the infamous and fierce al-Amir Abdel Kader, but insufficient material and ideological resources constantly plagued these movements. The asymmetrical nature of military resources was especially apparent, which perhaps influenced the other factor, that of lack of popular support. This disconnect between self-determination struggles and popular support was also caused by the educational deficit that the country as a whole
experienced, although this lack was unarguably felt more severely by the Algerians. The French administration realized the educational rift but the problem persisted, as is demonstrated by the unsuccessful attempts by France to placate the Algerians through reforms in the 1950s.

By the 1950s and 1960s, facilitating the independence of Algeria, in retrospect the most democratic solution, was complicated by two principal features. The first, of paramount importance, is that Algeria was considered by the French as an *indivisible* part of the Metropole. Inequalities were felt to be an internal problem to France, but there was much disagreement as to the resolution of social problems in Algeria. Indeed genuine attempts at reform were made by government officials throughout both the Fourth and Fifth Republics. As explained in Chapter IV with theories of perception, these reforms probably contributed to the cognitive balance carried by French citizens. This in turn led to a continuation of the status quo, and therefore the war. However, as is often the case in asymmetrical guerrilla or terrorist warfare (especially as is the case currently in Israel and Palestine, as well as in India and Pakistan), the no-holds-barred, tunnel-vision purpose held by radicals tends to sweep aside moderating elements. The fate of the GPRA leader Abbas is a classic example of this phenomenon—he even changed his ideology to accept more radical tenets over the course of the war, as his sway over the people become more unsteady. The *ultras*, too, ultimately eliminated the possibility for not only integration, as many French came to desire at one point, but also any potential for rapprochement between the two resident communities in Algeria after the conflict. By May 1962, thousands of Pieds-Noirs were leaving each day, despite coercive measures.
enacted by the OAS to keep them there. In July, those who remained paid with their lives in a tragic massacre.

A second point blocking the path to independence, related to the first, includes the economic and security interests that France had in Algeria. Not only would the loss of many Pied-Noirs holdings probably be concomitant with the elimination of French authority in Algeria, but additionally the Sahara, desired for its oil reserves and status as nuclear testing grounds, rendered the French government increasingly reluctant to relinquish territorial claims. So, one can begin to see that, despite the proximity (thematic and temporal) to the conflict in Indochina, numerous factors still complicated the subsequent strife with Algeria. François Mitterrand, then minister of the Interior, summed it up best by saying: “l’Algérie, c’est la France” (Algeria is France), which is particularly fitting as this was indeed considered a purely domestic issue (Greilsamer 1990: 493).

Even in the newspapers, articles grouped specifically under the rubric of “foreign news” never included Algeria during the course of the conflict, and for some time after.

Thus only through steady indications as to the lost nature of Algeria and the cautious albeit ambiguous leadership of de Gaulle (who uttered the phrase “l’Algérie française” but once), did the tide begin to swing. Notable personalities on the left such as Simone de Beauvoir and Jean-Paul Sartre, as well as Albert Camus, joined in the tirade against French military action as spiritedly as they condemned terrorist activities. Henri Alleg’s book exposing systematic torture on the part of the French army, *La Question* (1958), was another important feature swaying opinion and the press. In September 1959, de Gaulle delivered a speech in favor of Algeria’s process towards self-determination.
Although leaving the how and when of the process essentially unanswered, de Gaulle’s words provoked the erection of barricades by the *ultras* in Algeria in 1960. Eventually, as mentioned above, statements and action by de Gaulle led to the putsch in April 1961, from which the prestige and privileged position of the army in Algeria would never recover. Finally, and highlighting a complex phenomenon to be explored in greater depth below, “pressée d’en finir, l’opinion publique désigne le FLN comme Interlocuteur Algérien” (Chatelain 1962: 42). To conclude, the relations between Algeria and France cooled somewhat quickly, as the French pulled out of their military bases years before the agreed date, and, as mentioned above, the Europeans emptied their homes and “returned” to France.

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2Pressed to be done with the war, public sentiment designated the FLN as the Algerian negotiator.
CHAPTER III
THE PRESS IN FRANCE

The Fourth Estate

Post-revolutionary France has seen a general trend towards an increasingly free press, though difficult moments were experienced by champions of press liberty during the Algerian Revolution. Modernizing, liberal press reforms were first instituted in France around 1789. Another landmark year for the press in terms of expanded legal rights was 1881 when progressive politicians such as Jules Ferry saw such change as vital to the continued vigor of France during this period of unparalleled external European expansion. Suffice it to sketch out, for the purposes of this study, some principal characteristics of the post World War II press in France.

As the Algerian problems became more pressing, some elements of the media began to clash more frequently with the government. The root of this friction is found in the differing expectations that each side carried regarding the wartime duty of the press. The interests of the government were in retaining French territory and maintaining the status quo; thus the government’s interest would implicitly be that the press and other potential opponents remain compliant during the war. However the interests of the press were, by nature, less material-bound. Newspapers such as Le Monde and Le Figaro were indeed patronized by French citizens living in the Maghrib (North Africa), but Pied-Noir
publications, such as *L’Echo d’Alger*, enjoyed closer connections to the European settlers in Algeria. As a result of being based physically and ideologically in the Metropole, as well as having to face competition from Pieds-Noirs publications, the link between *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro* and the settler populace was brittle. Certainly, the latter link was more brittle than that shared between the national government and the settlers. Indeed, this tenuous relation is emblematic of deeper problems of disconnect between the mainland and Maghribine French. These differing interests and associations (notably the lesser interests *Le Monde* carried vis-à-vis Algeria) are also why change could occur in a more rapid pace at *Le Monde* than government and military policy.

The press corps and public were undoubtedly conditioned by the previous prolonged imbroglio in southeast Asia, although if any anti-war sentiments were borne from Indochina, it took years to witness the fruition of them. Because of the brief interlude betwixt the conflicts, “the French could not profit from a calmer period to analyze more serenely the loss of their colonies in Indochina” (Cenerelli 17: 2000). So, in the nascent years of the Algerian conflict, as was the case with Indochina, mainstream editors clung to the idea of a French-held colony. In terms of historical and economic ties, in fact, more deeply rooted sentiments were probably evoked with the Algerian conflict than with Indochina.

Time was necessitated for change. Additionally, as was the case in Indochina, the press was relatively confined in its investigative leeway, both geographically and in terms of censorship. There was a general reliance on the Agence France-Presse (AFP), an agency akin to the Associated Press or Reuters, for receiving information from the
region. The implications of this reliance were rather problematic. First, AFP was a state-regulated organization (établissement public administratif) the financial dependency of which “weakened their ability to resist the government’s sometimes insistent incursions” (Cenerelli 2000: 3). The board of directors included many government bureaucrats until 1957 (Charon 1991: 120). And controlling the source of news played a major part in determining the selection of stories the newspapers could choose from. Even if there was a better worldwide infiltration of correspondents during the 1950s, one could suppose that such strong-arm tactics by the government paved the way normatively for subsequent interventions into individual publications. The Cold War, Algeria, and Indochina “ont entraîné un renforcement de la législation exceptionnelle permettant de suspendre la liberté de la presse en crise” (Bellanger et al 1975 : 247).3

Even the newspapers themselves were dependent upon aid from the government for years to follow. Aid included, according to Santini and government reports, reductions in telegrams (which began in 1886), long-distance telephone usage (from 1951), and postal usage. Basically, the brunt of aid was given through state-run agencies.4 Interestingly, Le Monde unilaterally attempted to hike the price of the newspaper in 1956, and was stopped only temporarily by a governmental decree. In any case, aid in France is more than in other countries in Europe (5.6 billion francs for 13,000 publications by 1985), yet prices for publications are relatively high (Goux and Forgues 1985: 22). The

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3 Caused an exceptional reinforcement of the press, allowing for a suspension of the liberty of the press during crises.
4 There is apparently even more of a tradition in this domain than one might think: “Le règne actuel des aides obliques à la presse est le résultat d’une évolution de près de deux siècles…l’État a été conduit à développer les avantages financiers spécifiques accordés aux entreprises de la profession.”
final analysis as to the actual benefit of this subsidization has, thus, given rise to polemics. The *Journal Officiel de la République Française* reports that in 1974 *Le Monde* would sell from 2.89 francs without aid, compared with the then price of 2.50 francs; it continues by saying that “l’aide n’est pas faite pour permettre des ‘superbénéfices’ mais pour maintenir une certaine diversité d’expression et favoriser le progrès de la presse” (653). Thus, the positive side of subsidizing the press includes the following: first, that profitable, maudlin displays of entertainment could be avoided; secondly, a greater variety of opinions could give the consumer a chance to better inform his or her particular political decision.

By contrast, the monies given imbue the state with a sort of interventionary authority. A government report states baldly that the idea of the independence of the press is clearly false (Vedel 1979: 84). Indeed during the war a flood of new laws appeared concerning the government’s powers in constraining the press, notably the April 3 law, which inaugurated formal government censorship. Government involvement generally increased throughout the years, with more laws that augmented the president’s ability to “black line” an article. One law, invoked 118 times, allowed him to do this if...

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(The current press subsidies are the result of two centuries of previous aid… the State has been driven to develop specific financial advantages accorded to press enterprises) (Goux and Fourgues 1985: 21).

5 Santini says that this aid was too much, and the capitalist proprietors were benefiting to an inordinate degree: “Pourquoi continuer à accorder une aide fiscale à ceux qui n’en ont guère besoin?” (Why continue to give aid to those who scarcely need it?) (1966: 10). Freiberg, writing from a neo-Marxist perspective, and those writing for the government reports throughout the 1970s and 1980s, disagree reasoning that the more independent the press was from forces of the free-market, the more genuine the news could be (1981).

6 Subsidies were not intended to create ‘superbenefits’ but to maintain a certain diversity of expression and to facilitate the progress of the press.
his honor and dignity were put into question. Another law bestowed upon the government the right to block press items questioning the administration’s Algerian policies. Interestingly, it has been observed that François Mitterrand, ranking highly in the government throughout the 1950s, instigated some of these rows. Seizures occurred regularly, and *L’Humanité*, the communist newspaper, was even banned altogether in 1959 (Freiberg 1981: 53). An especially wrenching year for the press was 1958, when an unprecedented number of newspapers were seized (Bellanger et al. 1975: 58). *Le Monde* was seized a stunning 37 times in 1958. The journalists, with better access to information (especially compared to Indochina), were increasingly put in positions of choice between the government’s interests and the hard truth that the events bespoke. The events in Algeria, recalls Pierre Limagne, “ont représenté un drame de conscience terrible pour la plupart des journalistes français qui eurent à les ‘couvrir,’” permitting the journalists to participate “aux angoisses et aux douleurs des populations musulmanes et européennes” (163-164).\(^7\)

*Le Monde*

*Le Temps* is often cited as the direct progenitor of *Le Monde*. It is probably more accurate, however, to describe *Le Monde* as a less-than-faithful reconstitution of *Le Temps*, generated from certain materials and personnel from before the war, yet irrevocably changed. To punish Nazi collaborators, the French government banned all

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\(^7\) The events in Algeria represented a terrible conscience crisis for the French journalists who had to cover them, allowing them to participate in the anguish and pain of both the European and Muslim populations.
newspapers still publishing a fortnight after the Nazi incursion into southern France in November 1942. It is generally accepted that this decree targeted *Le Temps* since publication had continued three days after the blackout period had passed (November 29th). Before the war, *Le Temps* was exposed as a proprietorship of the *Comité des forges* (the steel trust), which provoked chagrin on the part of those who wished the press to be free from bourgeois interests.\(^8\) *Le Temps* had earned a reputation as the unofficial mouthpiece of the quai d’Orsay, (the seat of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris) and was a moderate supporter of the government since the Third Republic; before, it was a liberal opponent of the Second Empire. Of course, this recessive trait of activism would again manifest itself as the director, Hubert Beuve-Méry (HBM), a former diplomatic correspondent of *Le Temps* (1934-1938), became a fiery critic of some Algerian policies later in the conflict. “Une chose est certaine : *Le Monde* n’est pas un journal officieux,” says Chatelain (1962: 176).\(^9\) After World War II, *Le Monde* became a self-described *maison de verre* (glass house) as Beuve-Méry made transparent financial materials of the financially struggling publication (Chatelain 1962: 26). In May 1956, Beuve-Méry gave the *Conferences des ambassadeurs*, displaying his belief that the press must independently inform the public.

Beuve-Méry, or “Sirius” (his preferred nom de plume) was a pillar of his organization, much like Pierre Brisson was at *Le Figaro*. Also like Brisson he was active in managerial as well as compositional aspects of the newspaper for several years after

\(^8\) After the war it became custom in the organization to horizontally pass controlling stocks from director to director, while the employees gradually held higher percentages of stocks.

\(^9\) One thing is certain: *Le Monde* is not an official publication (176).
the tenuous war period, until the next troubles in May 1968. In a rather bizarre episode, he was actually fired in 1951 and then recalled, though only through the good offices and wide support of his employees. With “des goûts modestes” (modest tastes) and “un mépris de l’argent” (contempt for money), Beuve-Méry was too good of a fit for the purist newspaper (Chatelain 1962: 189). Possessing a reputation for publishing the unpublishable at times, he offered to his readers such material as an International Red Cross-sponsored, confidential report on Algeria (Chatelain 1962: 189). Concerning the Algerian Revolution, however, Beuve-Méry’s views changed considerably in the course of the conflict. In the early years, like many French citizens, he was reluctant to radically alter the role of France in Algerian affairs. But after massacres of women and children in Phillippeville in August 1955, and continuing bloodshed, he became a prudent supporter of decolonization (Greilswamer 1990). The ensuing reports of torture hardened his position against the conflict, although he remained equally steadfast against many policies of the FLN, most notably the activities of terrorist nature. The study will investigate such trends as manifested in the newspaper later in this paper.

Hubert Beuve-Méry was, from a Marxist perspective, the “essence of non-socialist but progressive Christian Liberalism” (Freiberg 1981: 85). The same individual even went as far to say that *Le Monde* became “socialistic,” hence fulfilling the criterion of choice for analysis as a reasonable contrast to *Le Figaro*. Self censorship probably

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10 By no means does this signify a convenient coupling with interests on the left; attacks from the left were mounted as well, since HBM was suspicious of the supposedly communist-supported G.P.R.A.; l’Humanité, at different points in the conflict harangued and congratulated *Le Monde* for certain of its policies, especially later on (Chatelain 1962: 185).
also occurred, as it did in the 1970s when it resulted in the firing of a writer, Philippe Simmonot (who fired off a book of his own in response). Furthermore, Le Monde was attached to its independence as well as the concept of transparency, and avoided the grip of the publishing group Hachette. This independence permitted a certain flexibility for change and modification throughout the conflict, since the mandate of neither one man nor one party had to be attended to. Indeed Bellanger labels Le Monde of the era one of the “quatre grands de la contre-propagande française,” (four major propagators against the governement’s view) (1975: 451). The paper had indeed already adopted a reformist tone vis-à-vis the Union Française in course of the conflict in Indochina (451). In any case, the 37 times that the newspaper was banned in 1958 speaks well to this not so well received reformist quality adopted by the management. Some high-ranking government officials even called to suspend publication as early as 1956, as was done with L’Humanité. In January 1957, a high government official in Algeria, Robert Lacoste, seized Le Monde in Algeria. He then followed up with later seizures of the paper. More loudly, though, rang the menace that OAS plastiqueurs (or “la nouvelle Mafia” as HBM called them) presented to collaborators to the newspaper and HBM himself. These plastiqueurs, named for their preferred explosive materials and devices, would terrorize French leaders and society through the political conclusion of the Revolution in 1962.

Besides providing a good foil to the Figaro, other characteristics of Le Monde make it a good object of analysis for this study. Chatelain notes that “Après des années de lecture quotidienne du Monde, un grand nombre de lecteurs ne cessent encore de se poser des questions: ‘quelles opinions politiques représente le journal…des évolutions
peuvent-elles être constatées?’” (1962: 16). A study, therefore, is well invited to investigate this trend. The newspaper enjoyed in those years, as today, a top-notch reputation for objective reporting, becoming more objective as it became less afraid of legal consequences. Therefore despite the relatively small daily circulation reported as 230,000 in 1958 the influence extended widely, and to a younger, better-educated audience than *Le Figaro* (Andrews 1962: 22). Bellanger reports that although the *cadres* (upper-middle class) made up 14.1% of the population, this class made up 45.5% percent of the readership in 1960 (463). Thus, the audience was indeed large and because of its trusted reputation as a source for information, *Le Monde* probably swayed more people per individual newspaper than any other paper. The section on perception and public opinion will treat these aspects in greater detail.

*Le Monde*: Appearance, or “Phenotype”

The focus of the study is the change and comparison over time between the two newspapers. As for *Le Monde*, the most immediately noticeable characteristic is the simplicity of layout, a “genetically” inherited feature from *Le Temps*. Noticeably missing from the front pages are items like cartoons and photographs. The total pages, indicated at the top of each *dernière édition* (final print), generally increased over time. In 1955, 12-16 page editions were the norm, while in 1963, this total rose to 16-24 pages, with

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11 After years of daily subscription, a large number of readers still ask themselves: ‘What political opinions does the newspaper represent? Can evolutions of thought be observed?’

12 Hechter (2001) produced an interesting historical case study in this regard showing the greater editorial leeway of continental media compared to the United States.
consistently less during the sultry summer months of vacation. A sixth column was added in 1961. In a more precise fashion, Andrews notes that the average number of pages in Parisian newspapers in 1951 was around 8.7 and rose above 16 between 1962 and 1963. Throughout these pages, little regularity was noticed in regards to the order of subjects presented. Domestic and international news occupied the first few pages, with at least one page devoted to the events in the Maghrib, and later specifically Algeria; the closer to a heated episode the edition was temporally situated, the closer to the front this section popped up. The sections of business were next and the leisure sections followed (TV has its own page later on). The Parisian roots of *Le Monde* are especially evident here, as shown by the presentation of entertainment events like shows and theater. A last-minute news page always concluded each edition. Finally, throughout the paper, there is remarkably less advertising than in *Le Figaro*.

*Le Figaro*

Named after a character of Beaumarchais, *Le Figaro* came into existence around 1826, during the relatively repressive years of the Restoration of the French monarchy. The original editors, Maurice Alhoy and Etienne Arago, covered various subjects and, like succeeding directors, maintained close ties with Parisian literary circles. Although an outspoken critic of the reigning monarch, Charles X, the newspaper remained a part of the *petite presse* of Paris, limited in size and scope of coverage. It was only decades later,
with the coming of Villemessant in 1854, “l’inventeur incontesté de la presse moderne,”\textsuperscript{13} that the \textit{Le Figaro} began to resemble the modern versions in more than just name (Lacretelle 1966: 36). By 1866, the newspaper became an audacious quotidien and broke from the \textit{petite presse}. Again, as during its humble debut, the newspaper took a critical stance of the establishment. However, as Lacretelle notes, “on n’est à l’avant-garde qu’une fois dans sa vie,”\textsuperscript{14} as subsequent moderate positions taken during the popular uprisings of 1870-1871 and l’Affaire Dreyfus would demonstrate (42).

The “froid et brillant” (cold and brilliant) Pierre Brisson was the preeminent figure in the halls of \textit{Le Figaro} before and after World War II, and all throughout the Algerian Revolution (Greilsamer 1990:129). After cutting production with the Nazis’ arrival in the \textit{zone libre} for fear of being labeled a \textit{collaborateur}, Brisson eked out a single page edition on August 23, 1944. Characterized as part of the “\textit{presse d’information},” Lacretelle adds idealistically that “\textit{Le Figaro} se défend de suivre un parti ou un homme. Sa première règle est de donner à son public une large information … la seconde est de juger un gouvernement de ses actes et de barrer la route à l’intolérance d’où qu’elle vienne.”\textsuperscript{15}

By contrast, as the Algerian troubles worsened, \textit{L’Humanité} and others accused \textit{Le Figaro} of leading a campaign for the continuation and augmentation of hostilities in Algeria.

\textsuperscript{13} The incontestable inventor of the modern press. \textit{Le Figaro} rallied for Captain Dreyfus against anti-Semites.
\textsuperscript{14} One is at the avant-garde only once in life.
\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Le Figaro} keeps from following a party or a man. The first rule of \textit{Le Figaro} is to inform its public…The second is to judge a government by its acts and to bar intolerance, from wherever the
Admittedly, Lacretelle, a member of the prestigious Académie Française, is probably biased in his overall assessment of Le Figaro; it is difficult to imagine an avowed communist penning the same words since Le Figaro had been leery of communists for some time. Furthermore, Le Figaro has always “pris grand soin de s’entourer des plus grandes signatures littéraires,” with notable proximity to and affinity with the Académie Française.\textsuperscript{16} Nonetheless these quotations illustrate some reasons why Le Figaro was chosen for analysis. Le Figaro is indeed a “journal à grande vocation littéraire et politique” (a literary and political journal), sympathetic to concerns of the liberal bourgeoisie. Le Figaro’s stance on the Algerian Revolution is likely to differ with yet be as respected as Le Monde, in light of their differing backgrounds and philosophies. Despite a relative proximity to Le Monde in terms of general content and ideology, HBM and Brisson often had heated exchanges in such topics as France’s neutralism as well as the Algerian Revolution (Greilsamer 1990). The result and magnitude of difference is examined in this study.

Another motivation to study Le Figaro was the wide circulation it enjoyed. Andrews reports a daily circulation of 501,000 was reached in 1958 (1962: 27). A journal somewhat more oriented towards the masses than Le Monde (at least in Paris), it is probable that there existed a rather significant influence on the thought and opinion of French citizens all over France.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{16} taken great care to attach great literary names to that of the newspaper.\textsuperscript{17} Chatelain reports that three-fourths of the audience was Parisian in 1948 (1962: 10).
Also, unlike *Le Monde*, where the readers were 64% male, *Le Figaro* found greater popularity with females, who were 57% of the readership (Chatelain 1962: 10). *Le Figaro*, though aimed at an educated reader, found 39% of its readers as *cadres supérieurs* (upper class). *Le Monde*, however, boasted a figure of 50% for the same class, although it could be argued that these figures are statistically biased against women, who constituted a lesser number of such positions.

Another criterion for selection is, of course, that it is of the printed, and thus more retrievable, medium. On the whole, the printed press is more tactile, in-depth and able to be processed at one’s own pace, and thus can have an influence that goes further into and interacts more with the reader’s system of beliefs; the fleeting verbal nature of the radio cannot do the same. As for the television, the Algerian Revolution just precedes the onset of the Television Revolution.\textsuperscript{18} Public opinion polls demonstrate the reliance people had on the printed media for news during the 1950s. According to a January 1962 poll, 78% were reading newspapers at least several times per week (Gallup 1976: 310). Finally, described as moderately right of center politically, *Le Figaro* presents an appropriate foil to the more progressive instincts that *Le Monde* began to develop more thoroughly throughout the conflict.

\textsuperscript{18} Even as late as September 1962, only 25% of all households had a television. (Gallup 315)
CHAPTER IV

THEORETICAL BASES FOR ANALYSIS AND CODING TECHNIQUE

Content Analysis

The technique of systematically analyzing data in the mass communications has been used to broach a variety of questions; in this study, tools of Content Analysis (CA) are used to better understand, via an analysis of the differences between two newspapers, a lengthy war and paradoxes in public opinion. “Mass communications is the traditional domain of content analysis” states Krippendorf (1980: 25), and this study belongs to this domain. Naturally, CA is a post hoc exercise but can contain implications for future action because of a nature that could, depending on the design of the study, approach an objective purity. Krippendorf touches on this positivism noting that CA “seeks to understand data not as a collection of physical events, but as symbolic phenomena and to approach their analysis unobtrusively” (25). As for future guidelines, Tickner observes that “words have power, and, therefore, consequences; the way in which policymakers and scholars construct reality has an effect on how they act upon and explain that reality” (95). This statement is especially pertinent regarding the choice of these two newspapers, especially in the case of Le Monde.

The printed word has a belief-changing power in itself, but there is also potential energy inherent to these ideas that may create a ripple effect through other segments of
the population, acting as a sort of “opinion leader.”\textsuperscript{19} A example of the substantial number of CA studies was a case where Fico investigates the question of the agenda-setting aspect of the media by studying the attention devoted, with different levels of intensity, to various subjects. Again, although the aim of this particular study is not to establish an agenda-setting function of the media, Fico’s study would provide credence to my assumptions that a correlation exists between mass attitudes and the media. CA also has a linguistic nature, something important as I explore the methods of portrayal of the FLN and the Pieds-Noirs. In this respect, Cohn demonstrates, by analyzing the language of official government documents, that there is a gendered, sexist nature of politics (Tickner 2001: 85). CA studies can be described as either quantitative or qualitative. Weber notes, however, that “The best content analytic studies use both qualitative and quantitative operations on tests. Thus content analysis methods compare what are usually thought to be antithetical modes of analysis” (10). His maxim influenced the design of this study which contains both quantitatively and qualitatively collected data. By first establishing overall trends by the newspapers, with numbers, the study can show solid evidence over time of editorial differences in the newspapers, allowing conclusions to be made about the confused ideological landscape of the war. Then, specific questions about the FLN and the Pieds-Noirs can be approached by analyzing specific stories on these subjects in each newspaper.

\textsuperscript{19} Certainly, “opinion leaders” are reducible and concrete “go-betweens” (Weimann paraphrasing Lazerfeld, xi), contrary to the idea of a single mass media influencing an audience directly. But it is not altogether unreasonable to say that within the “society” of mass media, in a world where individual newspapers are reducible units of a system of information, certain perceptions can be biased by the reputation of a newspaper, and thus act as a certain opinion leader at the newsstand.
For the first part of the study, the nature of the questions asked permits a more objective, numerical basis of analysis. The second part involves a no less methodical but certainly more subjective approach to answering the questions of image portrayal and opinion linking, especially through framing. For the sake of clarity and consistency, further explication of the latter is saved until the qualitative section is reached. After a discussion on audience perception, the paper outlines some theory leading to an analysis in the quantitative section.

Perception

CA fundamentally implies a subject/object relation whereby the object involves the individual cognition of the destinataire. One aim of the study, as mentioned above, is to compare how different newspaper management teams interpret similar events during a given spread of years. Another aim of the study is, through the use of theories of human cognition and public opinion polls, to better understand and speculate on what correlations may exist between the press and its public. Ultimately, these links may form the foundations of the media’s agenda-setting ability. Of course, it would be unrealistic to expect that the beliefs of an entire country would be held hostage to the reporting habits of two newspapers. However, there was considerable respect accorded to these

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20 This term is employed by the literary theorist Jakobson to explain the subject/object relation in literature by which the writer, the destinateur, creates literature that will be consumed eventually by the destinataire or reader.

21 For this discussion, I rely principally on the work of Jervis, Weimann, Oskamp, Glasser. Admittedly, the work on psychological theories of perception and public opinion that was evaluated and adapted to my purposes here are not the result of a comprehensive sweep of the literature. Most of the concepts used, though, seem to be well accepted in this domain and quite adequate for the analysis of the two newspapers and speculation about their effect on the reader. The latter is really my primary purpose for entering into this discussion, in order that my assumptions that the press does indeed affect the individual are perceived as valid (Fico 1994).
newspapers by not only the decision-makers and opinion leaders in France, but also by the country as a whole. If the source is not trusted or disliked, the information offered will not be as accepted, and, accordingly, not as apt to influence an individual. Additionally, the worldview that an adult carries has been built with years of informational input from countless sources, which is a sort of “opinion acquisition.” Similar to processes of language acquisition, this “opinion acquisition” reaches a point of concretization, whereby further change is prompted only by considerable amount of quality information. For this reason, a discussion on the historical significance of the Pieds-Noirs is given before the relevant CA, for a certain stereotype had certainly been “acquired” by the French vis-à-vis the European settlers.

Both quality and sufficient quantity information could very conceivably originate from both of these newspapers, whose combined readership was reasonably large. Questions potentially compromising the legitimacy of this study about the effect of the other media such as television and radio naturally follow from this assertion of information quality. In response, one can reference the discussion in Chapter III on the choice of the newspapers, along with the pertinent polls.

In short, information from the radio would probably not be adequate to facilitate change in the same way as the newspapers. “Internalization,” as Oskamp describes the process of processing and adopting information, could not occur. The process of internalization would further explain why it is so difficult for the individual to change. Returning to the idea of language acquisition, there is an explicative metaphor which uses imagery of internally placed binary “switches,” set by virtue of sufficient input of a given
language (Radford 1998: 21). Likewise, if an “opinion switch” has already been set, then there is no longer an option to establish an “opinion primacy” and change thus becomes far more difficult, if not impossible—cognitive closure has occurred. Direct personal experience is the “earliest and most direct way to change,” states Oskamp, so future change is not out of the question, but is often done in some sort of relation to the previous philosophical paradigm the individual had in place. Another idea supporting the proposal that quality and quantity of information are prerequisite for change is the fact that predispositions not only reinforce existing notions but cause a misinterpretation of current information; only substantial evidence suggesting the contrary could incite change. An Eskimo visiting the southern United States during the lush moments of springtime cottonwood trees may first mistake the puffy detritus for snow, if viewed from afar. Dissonance theory, as Oskamp and Jervis explain, suggests that change must eventually occur with continued information as such because an individual instinctively wishes to enjoy ontological security (and maintain consistency), and information putting this in question will eventually have to be considered.

Finally, it is altogether possible that the information will simply be ignored to avoid dissonance and thus maintain internal consistency. In this case, the contrary information either lacks the necessary duration, quantity, or quality to be effective; the

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22 This model refers to the principle-and-parameters theory (PPT) whereby an innate grammatical ability is present cognitively in every normally functioning human being. According to the PPT, once sufficient input is introduced to specific regions of the brain dealing with grammar processing, the grammatical structure of a language is learned. Cognitive closure follows, rendering this process difficult to repeat past a certain point in time.

23 Change under these conditions involves what Oskamp terms “value-expressive attitudes,” which, in a hierarchy of different sorts of opinions hold the most onerous conditions that change would necessitate. The description of this category of opinions approximates the ideas.
source may also be mistrusted and the end result is that the new information glances off
the encased attitude of the individual, like a flimsy arrow against a thick castle wall. Or,
as in the case Francine Dessaigne and others in Algeria, who in the daily struggle have
become numb to the big picture: “La guerre n’est pas trop présente…nous y sommes
tellement habitués que nous n’y faisons plus attention” (1972: 9). 24

To employ a theoretical mathematical analogy with the above discussion on
perception and information in mind, there are two rough possibilities concerning change
that could be posited. Consider “I” as the information-time coefficient (information given
over time: i/t) with arbitrary values, where new information accepted must outpace the
time elapsed to remain greater than 1. Attitude change would then occur in a situation
that is greater than 1, and no change would be the case if the situation nets a number less
than 1. As explained in the conclusion and seen below, the “I” equation can work against
itself on multiple levels. 25

\[
\begin{align*}
I < 1; & \text{ or} \\
I & > 1 \\
where & I \text{ is sufficient to raise the original attitude to a different level.}
\end{align*}
\]

To summarize this point, which is of capital importance to the thesis: new
information must be of sufficient quality and quantity (over time) in order for opinion
change to occur.

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24 The war is only too present in ourselves, so much so that we are desensitized to its effects.
25 Determining an exact method for calculating I is not the purpose here; the equations are merely an
illustrative distillation of the above discussion.
Public Opinion

Scholars have problematized extensively the meaning of “public opinion,” in the end agreeing only on the fact that no commonly accepted definition is held (Glasser 1995: 15). Obviously this is not a fracas that needs to be entered at this point, so suffice it to say that Glasser’s observation that “public opinion has been used to refer to opinions affecting and being influenced in the public arena by major social and political institutions” describes the “artifact” indicative of public opinion that is used in this study: the Gallup International Polls (17).

Public opinion polls have reached a sort of cult status, at least in American society, gauging everything from political issues like presidential preference, to social issues like reproductive rights, to the seemingly mundane such as public fashion approval for movie stars. But what real effect do these indices have on decision makers? Agenda-setting by the media has been demonstrated, but the precise conditions under which this occurs, and the causal pathways (via the public) are territories for future research. Most elected decision makers, it seems, do not worry about unfavorable public opinion (in certain subjects) because they believe that: 1) opinion is prone to change with the wind, 2) they themselves can change opinion because of superior information or press manipulation ability that they might have in regards to a particular issue, or 3) the time needed for change is often significant. These are all probably reasons why de Gaulle acted so ambiguously at times concerning the Algerian issue.
Furthermore, the indices of public opinion, as much as they may measure the sentiments of a constituency, may not necessarily alarm the decision maker simply because many of these individuals are not politically active or effective. Indeed, as Glasser notes, like-membered groups tend to generate in response to a certain issue, a phenomenon that facilitates societal change. Other than somewhat fringe groups such as the communists behind *L’Humanité*, or intellectuals such as de Beauvoir, too few effective groups formed to demand innovative solutions to the Algerian conflict, even if considerable portions of the public opinion, at different times, would have been amenable to such change. Jervis notes the importance of personal risk to affecting change and action, and for much of the war, personal risk did not enter into the minds of many French citizens to the same extent as the Pieds-Noirs and *ultras* (1976: 266). This lack of personal risk undoubtedly prolonged the war and partly explains the protracted nature of the conflict in Vietnam that the Americans later undertook.

During the Algerian Revolution, public opinion polls show that the conflict rated high among the people’s concerns (see Appendix B). Ministers, presidents and prime ministers, and indeed the Fourth Republic fell victim to the people’s desires because of the war. Time was needed before the concept of independence was to be supported. The idea of independence was indeed complicated by the long, shared history between the nations. Since both individuals and governments can be “more concerned with reaching a goal than with the methods whereby a goal is reached” it is not logical that the

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26 An October 1959 poll shows that respondents no longer feel strongly about the idea of a French Algeria, yet a reluctance to renounce control remained evident.
government, primarily reactive to the wish of the people at this point, as shown by de Gaulle’s rise, would try innovative approaches (Gallup vii). Only when the war came to the Metropole, and the sense of personal risk increased, did opinion show a marked upswing as to the concerns of the people vis-à-vis Algeria, and more innovative approaches, such as the vote for self-determination in Algeria, were pursued in earnest. What interests me most are paradoxes that were discovered in public opinion concerning two groups, both closest to the conflict and often furthest from each other ideologically: the Pieds-Noirs and the FLN. Neither found a favorable French audience, and the one most proximal to the more militarily powerful Metropole vanished from Algeria, while the other, the FLN, eventually ascended into the political mainstream in Algeria. After discussing the methodology and tools used in this study, such tools will be applied to analyzing these paradoxes.

Codes

The concept of codes is important in this study. The process of coding resembles the digitization of information by computers. The raw information that a computer processes is in fact already encoded through language, the latter being the premier and enigmatic code of the human intellect. Rendering this data into binary digits, the computer encodes the raw information into manageable units. In the same way, the media (as a primary decoder/secondary encoder) draw from and make sense of the linguistically encoded discourse flooding the human perception. The primary decoder, a destinataire, then becomes the secondary encoder as the information is filtered and communicated to the attentive public (see Figure I). Of course, the information has
probably undergone multiple times the encoding/decoding process, which can affect the quality of information in terms of trueness to the original source, but for the purposes here, the model will be kept basic. The content analyzer then attempts, per research questions, to bring this information back to a more simplified, numeric form. Here we encounter the signifié\textsuperscript{27} encoded, the well of meaning we are trying to tap, for the quantitative rendering allows us to posit certain impressions the information might make on the destinataire. If conditions for change are satisfied, then the information is then encoded in the memory of the destinataire; otherwise, as Jervis would support, the information vaporizes and is lost. Also, conscious and unconscious elements of the encoders’ psyche (political leanings, etc.—the signifié) can be ascertained, especially when comparing two items such as different newspapers.

![Figure I Coding Scheme](image)

**Coding for this study**

These categories and rules were designed to allow a certain precision and accuracy in unearthing the signifié, while maintaining a somewhat broad delineation within the categories, so as to avoid the methodological problems that might follow from over-specificity. As aforementioned, the front-page material was the focus of the coding process. Previous studies treated the sole factor of front-page space dedicated to the

\textsuperscript{27} French Structuralist criticism speaks of the signifié, the internal, raw uncoded meaning, and the signifiant, the outer indices of the signifié, such as language.
subject in question. Categories were added in order to test and devise a system that weights the various aspects of transmittance techniques by the press. In analyzing change in perception, factors influencing perception should be taken into account. The point-system that was designed seems to depict a more accurate landscape of features that have the potential to affect perception. Rendering two stylistically different newspapers more comparable with the point system allows the study to posit equal (or nearly equal) effects on the reader. This is paramount to concluding that the press signals in France during the Algerian Revolution were so mixed that the result was inordinately slow opinion change.

Another difference of method, as opposed to Andrews, who used all the days in a five-month period, the sampling unit was randomly picked. In all, seven days from each month were chosen, spanning the odd years from 1955-1963 (N= approximately 840). Since the conflict erupted with the November 1, 1954 attacks, the measurements were begun in 1955, the first whole year. The official conclusion of the Revolution took place over the course of 1962, which hearkened the beginning of a still tenuous political system in Algeria. The analysis was extended one more year to analyze the effect on the output of stories.

Points were given on the merits of separate contribution of each category (see below criteria). Five categories or recording units were devised. While it is true that more could be distinguished, it was found that these five were separate enough to avoid the

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28 Epstein and Segal use the front-page material as establishing hierarchy of issue salience in relation to overall content of the newspaper (2000). Miller et al. also use the front-page as indicator (1979).
29 Like Andrews, all stories pertaining to the conflict were measured, as indicated by evidence in the titles. The general trends he found with the newspapers that he analyzed (L’Humanité, France-Soir, Le Monde) were the same as what was found in Le Monde and Le Figaro.
over-specificity criterion, yet powerful enough to work in concert, shading the reader’s perception. The categories included are distinguished by questions concerning:

1) **Title/subtitle:** An actor in the Revolution (i.e. Ben Bella or General Salan), an Algerian place (i.e. Algiers or Algeria itself), or organization (i.e. the FLN, or the OAS) connected to the Revolution. To be precise, it must be added that if this criterion was not filled, then no points were applied, which of course affected the overall average score. A further necessity for weighting the articles’ salience on the basis of these categories is that weighting an article for the amount of material that it would contain regarding the Algerian Revolution would become too subjective, complicated, and time-consuming.

2) **Advertisement space:** Generally, one or two advertisements are contained on the front-page. This is considered non-news space and therefore irrelevant to perceptions and opinions that might be affected based on the content of the front page. The total column space taken by the advertisement is subtracted when taking into account the percentage of front-page space that the relevant Algerian column occupies.

3) **Column Space:** This category is rather straightforward; space devoted to both the column and title was measured and figured as a percentage of the total front-page surface. Four levels are used, the points commensurate with the level number.

4) **Font size (title):** This element is important since an article with a large, projecting font may have less column space than another article with smaller font in the title.
Since human perception involves a process of simplification, and a projecting title may offer this option without the onerous task of reading every article, this category was weighted with the same number of possible points as category #3.

A fifth recording unit (or sampling unit, owing to its separate treatment) is analyzed free from the above-mentioned connected categories and point system:

5) **Level of focus:** Depending on who the subjects presented in the title are (and thus what the subject of the article was) three different values differentiating actors involved were assigned, an aspect I hypothesize can be important in differentiating coverage between the two newspapers. Using a diagram of concentric circles is perhaps the best way of conceptualizing these three levels (Figure II):

![Figure II](image_url)
The outer, third party circle is mainly concerned with actors in the diplomatic scene such as the United Nations, Tunisia (through President Bourguiba), and less often, the United States and the Soviet Union. Stories reported concerning such an actor was given the rating of 3, expressing a more remote quality of the reported action, in relation to the conflict itself. Any action resting within circle two received a rating of 2. Action in Algeria, even for reports of domestic elections, is considered at level 2. These reports often depicted Muslim-Algerian absenteeism at the polls, in protest against French policies, but this form of protest did not manifest itself violently or cause social unrest as strikes often do. Editorial, fully opinionated stories received the rating of 2. Strikes and other such action (including violence) close to “ground-zero” in Algeria (and later France) were designated with the 1 rating. French internecine violence (especially concerning the OAS) and likewise FLN-MNA frays received the rating of 1. These designations are meant to show where the two newspapers differed in terms of the intensity of conflict portrayed. Additionally, one can discern qualitatively how “first-order” or “second-order” a media outlet may be; that is, what kind of self-conscious dialogue is presented so as to bring the reader to a greater degree of scrutiny of an issue.
The points concern categories 1, 3, and 4 can be summarized as follows:

*Category 1:* 4 points for title mention or
              2 points for subtitle mention

*Category 3:* 4 points for <80% of front-page space
              3.5 points for <70%
              3 points for <60%
              2.5 points for <50%
              2 points for <40%
              1.5 points for <30%
              1 point for <20%
              0.5 points for <10%

*Category 4:* 4 points for the largest size font, descending to 1 point for
              the smallest. 4 different levels for each newspaper.
CHAPTER V: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSES

FRONT-PAGE COVERAGE PERCENTAGE

From a simple glance of Le Monde, it is obvious that, compared to Le Figaro (which preferred more boasting titles and photos) there are significantly more words on the page and less photographs (if ever). So it may not be surprising that Le Monde enjoyed a superiority in terms of raw space of coverage throughout the period studied. This is the reason why the perception index was instituted. As shown by figure IV, an interesting phenomenon is noted: the rises and dips of one newspaper’s Algerian coverage from year to year remained roughly identical to the other, despite stylistic differences in usage of front-page space. A follow-up study on this phenomenon might measure more extreme newspapers to see how closely the editors’ selection of events to report resembles each other.
The dynamic of the coverage is probably as such for several reasons. The dip between 1957 and 1959 can be explained in part by the increasing importance of domestic issues, especially questions relating to economic conditions in France (see Appendix B). Other domestic events, although related to the Algerian problem, also competed for space on the front-page. De Gaulle’s second ascension to power, along with the birth of the Fifth Republic, took precedence for some time, at least until events heated up again. Additionally, the overarching influence that de Gaulle projected as one of the great statesman of the 20th century even extended to the Muslims of Algeria. The reconciliatory speech “Je vous ai compris” (I understand you) as well as his “Paix des braves,” (Gentlemen’s Peace) was aimed to convince all parties of the counterproductive and destructive nature of fighting. His speeches also worked to keep the violent activities
of the politically minded FLN at bay for some time. Additionally, de Gaulle purged the army of elements suspected of not being loyal and General Maurice Challe instituted a modern and targeted offensive in which the FLN was weakened further, in terms of materials and popular support. The army, mostly reverent of de Gaulle, and the state both lived a period of rapprochement. So on the whole, the situation was somewhat in control, stable and predictable, with fewer gruesome events that marked previous years. Coverage thus dropped. Only with the rise in tensions after the period of quiet did coverage shoot up.

The sense of urgency that the public felt for the Algerian war, as indicated by the Gallup polls, followed the trends of coverage. The opinion and coverage trends can be best understood in terms of the above-presented information/time constraint. The lesser amount of information circulating during the 1957-1959 years would have made the conflict seem less pressing to the French public, and therefore worry dropped. However, as the coverage shot up, so did the polls, as is evident in Appendix B. What changes are the “value-expressive attitudes” that the French held, as sufficient information is given over time.

Perception Index

As stated above, in order to facilitate a comparison of two stylistically different newspapers, three visual aspects of each story were weighted, each comprising one-third of the index value. In order to draw conclusions about the ideological landscape during the war as presented by Le Monde and Le Figaro, it must be shown that the potential
power to affect a reader’s perception is similar between the two newspapers. These numbers were averaged by seven (seven days each month were selected) after compiling each monthly calculation for the 120 months measured. The effect on each newspaper was to bring each percentage/numerical figure down, although this drop was more precipitous for *Le Monde*, as shown by figures V and VI.

![Figure V
Index Vs. % (*Le Monde*)](image)
Thus, as shown by figure VII, the perceptions of the newspapers were essentially equalized, both enjoying at times a slight advantage. This of course was not a principal intention in formulating the perception index. As emphasized above, facilitating a comparison between two unlike newspapers was the intended effect. In order to try to avoid circular reasoning, this is the basic conclusion that can be drawn from the exercise of attaching values to the perception potential of an article: despite greater figures of percentage, *Le Figaro*, through other means of attention-getting, managed to maximize its use of front-page space directed to the average, less-than-attentive reader. This index, of course, necessitates a test in the laboratory, with real readers. Today, however the use of the index for the printed media would be limited because of the greater pertinence of audio-visual media in our lives.
Levels of Presentation

This category of analysis also yielded intriguing data. Like the percentage similarity, the level 1 designations followed a similar pattern between the newspapers, with level 2 and level 3 following this pattern to a lesser extent (see figures VIII, IX, and X). The lack of interest and confidence is reflected in polls on the United Nations (see Appendix B). Thus both responded most similarly to hard events. The difference though, lies in what other stories accompanied the reports of first-order nature. For the most part, category 2 tended to collect the most stories for both newspapers (65.5% for Le Monde and 48.5% for Le Figaro overall). Level 1, as shown in both figures VIII and XI, was greater in Le Figaro than in Le Monde, whereas Le Monde favored category 2 more than its counterpart (compare figures VIII and IX). This is in large part due to the more significant number of editorials that one found on the front page, which became more and more critical of France’s actions in Algeria over the course of the conflict. Level 3
jumped in 1963 for *Le Figaro* due to greater coverage of incidents in the Maghrib, such as the friction between Morocco and Algeria.

What this suggests is that *Le Monde*, a newspaper more written for the literati, can be differentiated in terms of proximity to the conflict. Similar trends in both newspapers in space devoted to war coverage demonstrates like overall reaction to related events. In *Le Monde*, however, this is accompanied by a sort of discourse that is less present in *Le Figaro*. This latter paper concentrates more on the proximal events of level 1 nature. One might go as far as to say that this aspect might be a reason and/or indicator why it became a more left-leaning newspaper than in the pre-war years, as such dialogue is often characteristic of more progressive media sources. Later, a qualitative comparison will be given between the newspapers’ stories coded in either the 1 or 3 level.
On average, as is evident by figures XI and XII, level 1 events are nearly twice as evident in *Le Figaro* in relation to the proportion of level 1 events in *Le Monde*: 42.5% vs. 21.5% respectively. This highlights a major factor of coverage difference and perhaps
why *Le Monde* is intuitively considered as the newspaper of the educated, focused less on first-order issues and more on the gray areas that characterize the complexity of not only this conflict, but moreover of the swirl of events and social questions that we confront daily.
CHAPTER VI
TOWARDS QUALITATIVE ANALYSES:
FRAMING\textsuperscript{30}

As the journalists and editors re-code the information gleaned from reality, decisions are made as to the overall spin that a story will present to the reader. This process is known as framing, and a systematic approach to studying framing can yield insight about the true or apparent intentions of the management. Often, an organizational philosophy is already known, and few would be surprised about the partisan and outspoken coverage that the communist newspaper \textit{L’Humanité} gave during the Algerian Revolution. However, specific aspects of framing can lead to a better understanding of what perception the reader may have formed after reading a story. This in turn may have aggregating effects on public opinion. Furthermore, one can observe, through this approach to content analysis, the specific philosophical shifts that the management of the newspaper may have undergone over the life-cycle of a compelling issue.

Related to the concept of framing, an issue undergoes a process of what Anthony Downs calls the issue-attention cycle (1972: 38). He enumerates several stages of development of a specific topic. The first stage in the cycle is the pre-problem stage, when the problem is probably already present, but the public knows little of it. At this stage, the issue jockeys for distinction from other issues, competing for the limited space

\textsuperscript{30} Shanto Iyengar explores this concept as it relates to politicians ascribing blame in the media, and how the media thus presents or “frames” the politicians’ rhetoric.
on the front page. Questions, for example, relating to the status of sovereignty of other states in the Maghrib often pushed dialogue about and events in Algeria off the front page in the early stages of the conflict. As the conflict subsided at certain points (e.g., after 1957), one notices a drop in the front-page percentage dedicated to Algeria. This occurs until an increase in level 1 events in 1961 brought more attention to the Revolution. Both newspapers show decrease in level 1 percentage from 1957-1959, but an increase from 1959-1961, suggesting that level 1 reporting is a determining feature for overall coverage.

The ensuing stage is that of alarmed discovery by the media and constituency. In 1955, it took episodic, level 1 type events until a thematic story was published (see below for episodic/thematic distinction). Third is the moment of cost realization (what it would take to quickly remediate the dilemma). Throughout the stories, the true, irreconcilable nature of the FLN, went unrecognized as various reforms short of independence failed, one by one. Lastly, one observes the decline and post-problem stages of the cycle. In these final stages, mention by the press of the issue deescalates to the point or to the near point of nonexistence; already, by 1963, levels of coverage on Algeria dropped below the levels of 1955. The steepness of the drop in Algerian coverage is interesting, even if a drop would be expected.

This cycle is especially evident when there is clearly a David suffering in a David-Goliath dyad, since the press often projects that “the elite’s environmental deterioration is the common man’s improved standard of living” (Downs 1972: 37). This presents unique problems to the stability of a reader’s worldview when the population from which the reader hails, in a sense, is the “elite” in relation to another people. This
was, it can be argued, the case between the French and the Algerians during the Revolution. With de jure and de facto control over both native Algerians and the Pieds-Noirs, it is evident that Paris possessed substantial power in having the final word over Algiers. Similarly, in the Congo, between the 19th and 20th centuries, the exploitation effected by the Belgian King Leopold II against the native people was slowed and stopped only by movements in the press. In effect, the press was able to diffuse pictures and stories of this colonial subjugation to American and British publics, thereby enraging public opinion.31

An issue regarded in the macro can contain micro-levels. Many events and debates that so permeated the press during the conflict in Algeria can be studied as such; the question of l’Algérie française (French Algeria) is one such example. On the macro-level, the conflict itself could be treated as an issue, and the numbers for front-page attention devoted to the issue would mostly confirm this. Certainly a broader analysis including more years would yield stronger results, but trends can be investigated nonetheless. Though the coverage in 1955 was sparse, the conflict was indeed in full swing as clashes regularly resulted in casualties. Similarly, the coverage after 1962 dropped immensely as Algeria began to be treated as an external element to French society, with many micro-issues such as the FLN terrorism and the pied-noir predicament having dissipated. The focus was more on Ben Bella and his government, and the press presented Algerian struggles, such as the conflict with Morocco, as ultimately problems for Algerian policymakers.

31 See Adam Hochschild’s King Leopold’s Ghost.
Iyengar analyzed the framing of network news broadcasts using methods that can be adapted to the study of printed press media as well. Since most viewers have neither the means nor the desire to perform further research on every topic presented, a certain cognitive economy can be posited to exist. This can go one of two ways: either the destinataire will ignore information if counter to her beliefs, or he or she will change his or her perception. Since the Algerian conflict was of such a protracted nature, demonstrating modifications in opinions and policy throughout, it is assumed that the framing of the particular articles that are analyzed could affect individual perception of certain features of the conflict. This potential for change must be assumed because otherwise there would be no point to analyzing the framing of an event or issue in light of changing public sentiment.

A feature of framing that Iyengar introduces is episodic presentation. Through this aspect of framing, a specific instance is depicted, often the story or individual account of a witness or expert regarding a particular event. Episodic framing “breeds individual rather than societal attributions of responsibility…[protecting] elected officials from policy failures” (Iyengar 1994: 62). Additionally, portrayal of tense conflict through a concrete framing of facts has been shown to provoke the greatest reaction from the destinataire (Wanta and Hu 1993). Oskamp notes that there is deeper comprehension of a story when the moral is stated explicitly. By contrast, thematic framing involves, for example, interviews or accounts that point to a particular theme, rather than corresponding to a single event. For the most part, thematic framing is more moderately presented than episodic framing but does not necessarily have to present a lesser interest.
on the part of an editor to see a policy changed or put in place. This is so because thematic framing could just as well be the cumulative result of previous episodic stories, providing an interior forum of reflection on a contemporary plight. These categories were analyzed quantitatively, although it can just as well be used for qualitative differentiation.

Thematic vs. Episodic

Comparing the thematic and episodic stories of each newspaper presents another angle of comparison, similar to the levels of analysis, but different in the sense that level 2 stories could be classified as either thematic or episodic. In this way, a precision can be made as to the extent to which a dialogue was fostered by each paper, above and beyond the quotidian reporting of events. Overall, Le Monde favored slightly thematic reporting (51.5%) while Le Figaro favored episodic stories (60%). As shown by figures XIII and XIV, except for a drop in Le Monde from 1955-1957, the newspapers hold to their preferences throughout the period of Revolution.
The result of this difference between the newspapers shows the extent to which the Intellegentsia reputation of *Le Monde* is manifested in the course of the war.

With thematic coverage, more abstract and general questions as to the grand question of the war were explored, unlike what is observed in the majority of coverage in *Le Figaro*. 
The latter newspaper chose to focus on the day-to-day clashes, focusing primarily on the tit-for-tat nature of the conflict, without a general questioning of military involvement consistently led by the editors. A definitive landscape of the war, incorporating both ideological dialogue as well as basic reflective journalistic coverage could never then be attained. The information requirement for the destinataire to effect a change in opinion was then not sufficient, as analyzed through this technique of thematic vs. episodic coverage.

Framing: Level 1 and Level 3 Comparison

*Le Figaro*, through its inclinations towards episodic and level 1 stories, is undoubtedly quite action oriented. This is exacerbated by the fact that accompanying the headlines, almost without fail, the reader immediately spies the quantified damage done with numbers of casualties listed. Contrasting with *Le Monde*, which listed such items less often in the headlines and indeed had less level 1 stories, this feature is yet another distinction between the coverage styles of the two papers. Another difference in level 1 stories is that a general Us/Them sense of justice seems to persist much longer than in *Le Monde*. By this, it is meant that though both newspapers used language for some time that imbued the Algerian fighters with pariah status. Terms such as *rebelles* (rebels) and *hors-la-loi* (outlaws) were often used. But even as early as 1955, *Le Monde*, as shown by a story about the woes of both an Algerian and a Pied-Noir, was balancing stories about the victims of violence from both sides (October 16, 1955).
Iyengar distinguishes between stories of a causal nature and those of a treatment
type, the former focusing on who or what provoked the events while the latter is more
second-order oriented, focusing on measures of alleviation or prevention for the problem.
This is a useful tool of distinction in analyzing these newspapers. In 1959, *Le Monde*
began reporting the violence of the *ultras* and accounts from the Algerian side, something
*Le Figaro* never fully caught on to. Stories (of a treatment nature) in *Le Figaro* that claim
the Algerian people as the sole *interlocuteur valable* (legitimate negotiator) were written
more in a spirit of opposition to the FLN’s status as negotiating party than anything else.
Causal responsibility of the assassination of the mayor of Evian during peace talks there
in 1959 and ensuing violence was explicitly directed towards the *ultras* in *Le Monde,*
whereas *Le Figaro* made no such mention of a connection. Finally, causal responsibility
was often clear in the headlines of *Le Figaro* when an FLN attack occurred, but later, as
activities of activists caused bloodshed (especially from 1961 on), little connection to
causal responsibility was made in the headlines. Words like *plastiqué* or *plastiquers* are
the sole signals of *activiste* malfeasance. *Le Monde* largely avoided this by limiting
attributions to causal responsibility in the headlines. Neither paper, though, had sympathy
for the OAS in late 1961, as is reflected by the fact that both papers attributed causal
responsibility to the exploits of that organization. Thus, one can begin to see that, with a
closer glance to these level 1 articles, more differences in potential perception shift (or
lack thereof) can be observed. Indeed ambiguously different signals are observed from
two press outlets hailing from somewhat similar, mainstream ideologies. The *quality*
of information diffused over time was inadequate for opinion change.
The articles from level 3 are less numerous, but several interesting details can be pointed out. First off, both newspapers were decidedly hostile to most forms of foreign intervention and interest in Algeria, especially vis-à-vis the United Nations, although *Le Figaro* employed more militant language—*demi-rupture* and *riposte*, highlighting the more intense attitude that *Le Figaro* harbored towards the U.N. Indeed, a Gallup poll from July 1957 shows only 18% of the respondents believing that France should follow the counsel given by the U.N. (see Appendix C). The overtures of President Bourguiba of Tunisia, as well as the royal family in Morocco, were also portrayed by *Le Figaro* as less helpful in abating the conflict, by contrast to the more objective presentation of *Le Monde*. In 1958, a mere 15% of respondents to a poll believed that France should act with Bourguiba in resolving the conflict (Gallup 1976: 238). *Le Figaro*, more negative to such concerted efforts, shows steeper decline in the level 3 category, while *Le Monde* persisted a bit more with level 3 stories. It is not mere chance, then, that in 1961, those trusting Bourguiba completely or partially were a more substantial 48%, while those trusting him only a little or not at all numbered around 30% (293). Overtures were certainly occurring, even if *Le Figaro* chose to ascribe a lesser importance to such events, so it was probably through the constant flow of information from such press “opinion leaders” as *Le Monde* that played a role in such opinion change.
CHAPTER VII

OTHER QUALITATIVE ANALYSES: PIED-NOIRS AND THE FLN

Analyzing the portrayal and change in portrayal of the European population in Algeria and the FLN will add some insight into certain aspects of Metropolitan public perception vis-à-vis both populations. First, an analysis of the settled Europeans will be given. Next, there is a brief introduction of the FLN, which took time for the press to even recognize as an entity to be reckoned with. This section concludes with analyses from the two newspapers regarding these subjects.

The Predicament of the Pieds-Noirs

“La masse nous ignora, ou pire, continua de nous enfermer dans le ghetto des étiquettes si nous étions les ‘colons, les petits blancs.’” (Dessaigne 1972: iii)

Most ignored us, or worse, they continued to shut us into the ghetto of labels so that we were the ‘colonists,’ or the ‘little whites.’

First to be explored is a question regarding a population involuntarily placed with one foot planted on either side of the steaming fault lines of two, irreconcilable worlds: between that of the Metropolitan French, and that of Algerians awakening from decades of unequal treatment by the authorities and settlers. While analyzing the opinion polls administered by Gallup during the war years, an interesting phenomenon becomes
apparent: precious little sympathy is observed on the part of the Metropolitan French regarding the Pieds-Noir population in Algeria.

In May 1959, for example, about the same number of Metropolitan French felt a sense of responsibility towards the French in Algeria, with nearly one quarter of respondents having no opinion. These sentiments continued into August 1961 when the overwhelming majority of respondents in the Hexagone (69%) stated that, if the Pieds-Noirs were expelled, then they would have no intention of helping them out. Over half felt no allegiance to the European population in Algeria (April 1962) and many felt, according to a poll led one month previous to the latter, that Europeans could still live there if independence came to pass (43% out of 69% responding, Gallup 308). Clearly, respondents held the notion that satisfactory conditions would be present in the case of Algerian independence. Furthermore, a large number of French also believed that French ties to Algeria would be closer and more secure than they were in the years following the conflict (260). This is so despite the fact that very few believed, as early as 1959, that a French Algeria would be possible or even desirable, and that sooner or later independence for Algeria was imminent (43% versus 36%, 250).

The conclusions to be drawn are that, first, not only were physical barriers separating these populations, but an ideological gulf was present as well; second, the French were not worried about possible fallout of losing the war after having won battles, and thus avoided worrying themselves (to dodge cognitive dissonance) about various scenarios ultimately detrimental to the Pied-Noir way of life in the Maghrib. Otherwise stated, recognizing Algerian independence would be a pre-requisite for considering what
must be done for the Pieds-Noirs. It must be added that the newspaper was one of the few media connecting and thus educating the Metropole on aspects of the life of Pieds-Noirs in Algeria. Therefore, it can be hypothesized that there should be a dearth of information on worst-case scenarios (for the Pieds-Noirs). Consequently one could surmise that would be a domination of information buttressing Pied-Noir stereotypes and assumptions about the continuation of their presence in Algeria. Such stereotypes and assumptions would be the result of a need to maintain cognitive assonance in light of the military activities of the government in Algeria.

Of course, to undertake a comprehensive sweep of all the newspaper articles dealing with such subjects would not be feasible methodology, so the study will remain faithful to the above argument on using the front-page stories to glean such qualitative information. Furthermore, the paper has neglected, to this point, historical features that also play a role in the Metropolitan perception of its emigrated kinfolk. With a people so long implanted in the Maghrib, it is inevitable that there were perceptions formed previous to the 1954 Revolution. The caveat is then proposed that what is shown with newspaper content analysis is information that reinforces rather than creates stereotypes. Before proceeding to this evidence, though, the reasons for the diminutive views of the mainland French will be outlined in a brief historical discussion.
There are few texts dedicated solely to the history of the Pieds-Noirs, probably because their existence was not even fully etymologically recognized until the struggles for independence in North Africa. The phrase, originally pejorative (literally meaning “black foot,” referring to the black shoes against the light-colored traditional maghribine dress), debuted in France around 1955 when the first waves of immigrants arrived from the Maghrib (Pichot). Before the Revolution, a cultural self-consciousness had yet to be formed, at least to the same extent that was apparent during and after the Revolution. The French had been officially colonizing there since 1830, so longstanding communities were certainly in place. But prior to the Revolution, with the extreme inequities in education, hiring and wage practices, one cannot posit that differences were not at least sensed unconsciously. Unlike the institution of segregation that plagued the American South for so long, though, “segregation” in Algeria was not a fixed, explicit institution. But socioeconomic and cultural differences were obvious to all inhabitants of Algeria. And such differences, when mixed with social unrest, often contribute to an ethnic awareness and imbalance that fractionalizes whole societies.\(^3^2\) The problem was, as we see in the press, the French society that thought itself as indivisible could not heal itself as a whole, because it was never really whole to begin with.

\(^3^2\) In Rwanda, the Belgian colonial powers essentially institutionalized the Hutus and Tutsi ethnic divisions which was perhaps the genesis of the tragically concluded conflict in 1994. Another example of social awareness provoking change against exploitation is found in the chaotic moments of desegregation in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s.
Indeed, the historical record implies a strong probability that the Pieds-Noirs were not simply a group perceived as being composed of mainstream, metropolitan elements abroad. Often times, the Maghrib served as the receptacle for excess labor during periods of economic hardship in Europe, for exiled political enemies, and finally for those seeking freedom of religious conscience.\textsuperscript{33} Certain religious and governmental figures even contemplated sending orphaned children to eventually serve as a source of labor, an idea which actually can be traced to an \textit{Edit royal} in 1670 (Merien 1998: 430). Therefore, one can easily remark that, like many socioeconomically deprived people, these unwanted elements sent to Algeria probably influenced negatively the stereotype the Metropolitan French carried of the Pied-Noir. These individuals were sent as labor and often worked alongside the autochthonous people, which additionally contributed to a more integrated, though no more just, society than what existed in the American South. Indeed many of the entrepreneurial minded also emigrated to Algeria on their own free will and carved out a lush existence from not only their own hard work, but additionally through exploitation of the native land and population; often the French government seized communal lands thus contributing to the pauperization of many Algerians (Bennoune 1988).

Eventually, in the course of the conflict, according to one Pied-Noir, “En Métropole, seuls quelques amis nous ont ouvert les bras” (Dessaigne 1972: ii).\textsuperscript{34} The

\textsuperscript{33} At times, the protestants at least equaled those Catholics among European immigrants in Algeria. Also, Pichot’s family fits in all three categories of immigrants. After the ateliers nationaux closed subsequent to the 1848 imbroglios, his ancestor included an out-of-work young protestant wife who, among other things, was exiled for smashing chairs over the heads of national guardsmen.

\textsuperscript{34} In the Métropole, only a few friends opened their arms to us.
opinion polls reinforce such a sentiment as probably being representative of countless cases. Dessaigne continues: “nous sommes trop souvent douleureusement surpris par l’indifférence des Métropolitains.”35 In conclusion, the root of this disconnect with the European world is historically socioeconomic, with the Algerian Revolution only bringing to greater prominence the predicament of the Pied-Noir, and reinforcing stereotypes. Now the study will examine empirical data to see how this hypothesis bears out.

Analysis

“Pourquoi l’enfant de Paris a-t-elle droit au gros titre aux photos au long article alors que les journaux n’accordent que quelques lignes discrètes aux nôtres qu’on assassine depuis sept ans,” wrote Dessaigne in her diary in 1961 (146).36 It is unsurprising that the Metropolitan newspapers covered atrocities in France at times more fervently than events in Algeria, for reasons of proximity. Nevertheless, the space dedicated to both Pieds-Noirs and ultras was astonishingly slim, considering that Algeria was regarded as French by most of the French people prior to the conflict.

Consequently, the fate of the European Algerians was not frequently mentioned in the beginning years of the Revolution because the fact of a forced withdrawal did not become a reality in the minds of many French and politicians until the closing months of the conflict. In a sense, the fate of the Pieds-Noirs was intertwined with the fact of

35 We are too often surprised by the indifference of the Métropole French.
36 Why does the Parisian child have the right to big articles and photos in the newspapers, while our murdered children are given but a few discrete lines?
Algerian independence, and without a serious consideration of the latter, the former would remain inactive, like otherwise inert chemicals mixing with each other to produce a reaction. Thus, *Le Figaro*, which would be naturally more sensitive to the Pied-Noir plight, was never able to fully spark a dialogue about the Pieds-Noirs. This was a result of its more marked reluctance to cave in to the demands of the Algerian extremists.

Elected officials were seen as representative *interlocuteurs* (June 3, 1959). Both *Le Figaro* and *Le Monde*, as shown in level 3 analysis, held tightly to the notion that the Algerian problem was an internal affair, which pushed the Pied-Noirs question even further from editorial scrutiny: “En Algérie, il n’est pas question de lois discriminatoires ni d’offenses à des droits humains…l’Algérie fait partie du territoire métropolitain, ses habitants—musulmans, juifs, chrétiens ont les mêmes droits et les mêmes devoirs” (*Le Figaro*, January 23, 1957). And later (explaining as well the view the French had on the Algerian nation): “Il n’y a pas de nation ou de nationalité algérienne” but “une différence musulmane” (November 2, 1957).

Another interesting aspect was the issue of the Pieds-Noirs. When this issue was discussed later in the conflict, it was often relegated to a single mention in a list with material aspects such as concessions in the Sahara. Competition to become a prominent human-interest issue was too great, thus, to allow any sort of progress past that stage in Down’s issue cycle.

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37 In Algeria, discriminatory laws or human rights violations are not at issue…Algeria is a part of the French soil, and its inhabitants have all the same rights and duties.
39 There is no nation or Algerian nationality, simply a Muslim nuance.
Differences in coverage were also quite evident. Overt support, nonetheless for the Pieds-Noirs was more apparent in *Le Figaro* than in *Le Monde*. In a front-page, open letter to the French in Algeria, *Le Figaro* states: “votre cause est la nôtre” (October 27, 1959), a solidarity to which *Le Monde* never hinted at, even earlier in the war. On September 19, 1957, *Le Monde* prints: “La minorité activiste d’Alger a senti que la majorité des Européens de souche ne la suivrait pas dans une opposition violente.”

Though this quote represents *Le Monde*’s interpretation of reality, it is a highly subjective interpretation that *Le Figaro* never ventured into, until the augmentation in violence at the end of 1961 by the OAS, at which point *Le Figaro* was no longer decrying the status of the Pieds-Noirs. On January 16, 1959, *Le Monde*’s analysis of the violence was such that violence from activists was bringing nothing but tit-for-tat responses by Algerian nationalists. This served to reverse causal responsibility for the conflict and created a *psychose de peur* (psychosis of fear) in France (January 15, 1961). “De folles et vaines résistances doivent en être définitivement découragées,” prints *Le Monde* on January 10, 1961.

*Le Monde* does lament the situation of the Pieds-Noirs (October 15, 1959) and critiques de Gaulle for not mentioning the Pieds-Noirs in a speech (May 10, 1961). *Le Monde* also distinguishes much more between the *activistes* and the French residents of Algeria than *Le Figaro*. This is probably a large reason why, after the putsch there is a

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39 Your cause is our cause.
40 The activist minority has sensed that the majority of moderates will not follow it in its violent opposition.
41 Foolish and vain resistance must be definitively discouraged.
steep drop-off in mention of Pieds-Noirs in *Le Figaro*: cognitive balance would be difficult to maintain while supporting such marginalized (at least in the Metropole) activist groups. Accordingly *Le Monde*, benefiting from having already greatly criticized Pied-Noir activists, nor only continued mentioning the Pieds-Noirs but also portraying them as antipathetic, if not hostile to the French government (several articles in May 1961).

**FLN History and Analysis**

When students of history turn to the entity referred to as the *Front de Libération Nationale*, a reluctance is noted on the part of those originally involved to discuss the subject. Accordingly a relative dearth of primary source material is observed. Interestingly, this feature is in itself characteristic of the organization’s principles of “popularist socialism” that marked Algeria, both at the time of its independence and today. Avoiding any semblance of a “cult of leader,” the leadership made certain that no one person become the symbol *par excellence* of the Algerian revolutionary efforts. Not even Ben Bella approached this image, even if his name often turned up in the press. Even the groups themselves, despite exterior diplomatic ties, were decentralized and loosely organized.

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42 For the sake of balance, the following sources were used for the historical interpretations in this brief section: Stora (for the French perpective), Horne (for the non-French perspective) and Bennoune (for the Algerian perspective). Other historical references include both *Quid* (Frémy) and *Pour comprendre la guerre d’Algérie* (Duquesne).
Figureheads were of course present. Hadj Messali, through his organization *Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques* (MTLD) was an early ideological influence of many of the youthful leaders of the Revolution, and eventually became a sort of adversary with the successor of the MTLD, the MNA. One leader in particular, influenced by Messali, was again Ben Bella who founded the *Organisation Spéciale* (OS) in the same spirit of the MTLD. Following was the creation, with Ben Bella and the *neuf historiques* (original leaders from which the FLN would spring) the *Comité Révolutionnaire d’Unité et d’Action* (CRUA). This group, resembling a round table of leaders, brought together leaders at different times in the war for reasons of policy coordination but was not necessarily directly equipped with action and enforcement mechanisms. The first outbreak of war at 0100h on November 1, 1954 was coordinated by such a committee with leading Algerian operatives, the “committee of twenty-two,” in what was to be considered the first meeting of the FLN (October 1954).

Despite the other organizations, the FLN, through insistence and downright coercion of other Algerians in Algeria and in France, eventually sopped up other moderate elements of Algerian liberation (including Messali’s MNA), and declared itself the sole governing authority; the GPRA would act in concert later. Most visible to the French of this struggle was the aforementioned MNA-FLN rift, which suggests something of the French image of the FLN, explored below. In 1957, furthermore, successful French reforms earned the loyalty of some Algerians. These reforms served to spite the populist sentiments of the FLN and inspired internal bloodshed. Less visible were early negotiations held in secret with the FLN, which would have, in a sense,
legitimized the FLN as a representative body in the eyes of the French. Ultimately de Gaulle was forced to open more direct negotiations with the FLN as “the battle between France and the FLN began to depart from the blood-stained bled of Algeria for higher realms of politics and diplomacy” (Horne 1977: 397). He thus turned more towards the FLN as the sole *interlocuteur valable*, or representative negotiator between the French government and Algerian nationalists.

**FLN Portrayal**

The Gallup polls highlight some interesting features that were chosen to explore in the two newspapers. A poll taken in September 1957 inquiring to the French about whether or not they believed that the Muslims approved of the “rebellion” shows clearly that it was believed that they indeed did not: only 24% of Algerians, thought the French, approved of the rebellion (Gallup 1976: 211). Again, in February 1959, similar numbers are born out, with only 20% of Algerians (so believed the French respondents) supporting the rebels (250). By 1961, though, the FLN was believed to be much more representative, according to a poll taken in July: only 22% of the respondents believed that the FLN represented less than half of the population (291). By April 1962, 60% felt that the FLN represented half or more of the population (309). The questions pertinent to this study then unfold: how is this change manifested in the two newspapers examined, and why did it occur over such a relatively long period of time (at least five years)? The first question is, of course, answered through an exploration in coverage by the two newspapers, looking at both similarities and differences. The second is answered by
highlighting their differences; different signals sent out by both papers translated to ambiguous messages that did little to change the perception of the consumer (see section on perception), already hardened by years of violence at the hands of the FLN.

As shown above in the discussion of level 1, both newspapers marginalize the Algerian insurgents early in the conflict. *Le Monde* describes the rebel action as “l’entreprise d’un extrémisme révolutionnaire délibérément hostile à toute recherche d’une voie politique moyenne” (August 23, 1955). However, *Le Figaro*, also as shown above, remains more dedicated to an Us/Them concept through the advanced stages of the conflict. The editors at *Le Figaro* portrayed the Algerians insurgents as an opposition that continually gravitated towards conflict, possessing an “esprit incliné naturellement vers l’activisme et le non-compromis” (March 14, 1961). By then, dialogue about resolving the conflict through the GPRA and FLN had been flourishing on the pages of *Le Monde*, contrary to *Le Figaro*. This latter, of course, dedicated less space to second-order issues, and preferred (after the politicians were shown ineffective), somewhat ambiguously, the Algerian people as the sole interlocuteur valable: “Mais le peuple algérien veut la paix,” prints *Le Figaro* (May 25, 1961). And, to deflate the diplomatic importance of the FLN: “la réaction du FLN aux mesures libérales françaises en Algérie [est] sévèrement jugée par l’opinion mondiale” (May, 23, 1961). In retrospect this seems a tactic that probably avoided the accumulation of cognitive dissonance on the part

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43 The undertaking of a revolutionary extremism deliberately hostile to any moderate solution.
44 Spirit with natural inclinations towards the activism and non-compromise.
45 But the Algerian people want peace.
46 The reaction of the FLN to liberal French measures in Algeria is too severely judged by the world.
of the editors of *Le Figaro*; one can surmise, from the dismissive tone directed at the GPRA and FLN throughout the war by *Le Figaro*, that the editors were left without a truly democratic solution to propose. Certainly, neither the GPRA nor the FLN were technically democratic, but they were organizations that were accepted as approximating the nationalist Algerian voice. One can thus begin to sense the dilemma faced by the editors, and indeed France, in approaching the whole of this conflict.

The press portrayal of the GPRA itself represents an interesting phenomenon in terms of the differences between the two newspapers. At first, both were equally leery of this group, for some time placing GPRA in quotes as though not a “real” organization interested in conflict resolution. However, *Le Monde*, unlike *Le Figaro*, gradually warmed up to the thought that this solely political organization, acting with connections to the FLN but free from the violent implications that the FLN had in tow, could be an *interlocuteur valable*.47 Indeed, this represents the “PR” ingenuity of the creation of the GPRA by those struggling for independence in Algeria. On March 29, 1961, *Le Monde* reports, to the credit of the GPRA, that “Si le GPRA ne peut représenter la totalité du peuple algérien, il n’est peut-être pas utile de compromettre, par des initiatives importantes, les chances d’accord avec la majorité dont il se réclame.”48

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47 On November 11, *Le Monde* asks, clairvoyantly in retrospect, if it is possible that “d’ici quelques semaines ou quelque mois, le FLN aura cessé d’être une organisation insurrectionnelle vouée aux coups de mains sanglants et à l’action terroriste, pour se transformer en un parti politique?” (In a few weeks or months from now, will the FLN have ceased being an insurrectional organization, dedicated to bloody acts of terrorism, to transform itself into a political party?) Clearly, this speaks for the need of finding an *interlocuteur valable*, and thus, in a sense, cognitive balance.

48 Although the GPRA does not represent the totality of the Algerian people, it is perhaps unwise to compromise, by significant initiatives, the opportunity for peace with the majority that the GPRA claims.
The next month, a tone of empathy is even accorded to the GPRA by *Le Monde*, remarking that, like France having to restrain the *ultras*, so to does the GPRA face an onerous task in restraining certain extremists. Moreover, even if *Le Figaro* never really picked up on the GPRA in the same way that *Le Monde* did, one could conjecture that the existence of the GPRA eventually led the way for a greater dialogue between warring parties. The reason lies in the GPRA’s less tainted nature which could fulfill certain needs for cognitive balance in this bloody conflict. This balance ultimately allowed for more support of the FLN, by association to the GPRA.

In the press, the GPRA, even if not considered wholly democratic, was not considered a violent extension of the FLN or even an outright competitor of its disruptive partner. However the MNA was rather often portrayed as in conflict with the FLN (“lutte sanglante,” — bloody struggle—characterizes *Le Figaro* in June 1959 in typical vivid language), and though the MNA was certainly more often portrayed as embroiled in internecine fighting with the FLN than in negotiations or struggles against the French government, this struggle between rivals also contributed, it seems, to a lesser representative value accorded to the FLN by the French. This struggle is presented more often in *Le Figaro*, which brings to light another point of difference between the two papers: that *Le Figaro*’s portrayal of the FLN was more focused on moments of weakness experienced by the organization, which most likely served to heighten the readership’s sense that the FLN was not as representative of diverse peoples as it purported itself to be. Indeed, only 15% of French in 1957 considered Algerians as composing a single nation, so the notions held by the French people regarding the composition of
organizations such as the FLN are a priori biased against the efficacy of one single organization reflecting the interests of even a strong minority of Algerians (Gallup 1976: 211). The flat refusal of *Le Figaro* is thus understood: “Il n’y aurait rien à négocier, le préalable mis par le FLN à négocier était la reconnaissance d’indépendance…ce qui ne nous intéresse pas plus” (June 29, 1957).49

Weaknesses of the FLN were constantly highlighted by the *Le Figaro* and in another thesis, one could pursue this Us/Them, Strong/Weak dichotomy as gender bias in the media. Warlike language of *Le Figaro*, intended figuratively, such as “FLN décapité”—FLN decapitated (November 1957), adds a masculine air of aggression. For the purposes of the study, several examples will be illustrated from throughout the wartime period showing how the FLN held the attention of the press (1957-1961). In September 1957, the failure of a strike by the FLN is reported; in December of the same year, failures of diplomatic gestures abroad are emphasized; and finally in 1961, the failure of negotiations, with causal attribution directed at the FLN, is highlighted. Thus, not only is the FLN more prominently causally blamed for terrorist activities than in *Le Monde* (as shown above), but also, any formal, nonviolent maneuverings attempted by the FLN that fall short are emphasized overtly by *Le Figaro* as failures of the FLN.

The final feature that estranged the FLN from the Metropole, related to the French government’s assertion of sovereignty in this issue, is the fact that overtures to the East (USSR, China) and to Arab states were not highly considered by the newspapers. In

49 There is nothing to negotiate with the FLN, since the condition put forth by the FLN is the recognition of independence…which no longer interests us.
January 1961, *Le Figaro* rigidly stated that the FLN must choose between the Orient and negotiation, an attitude not leaving much room for compromise. It is quite likely that this attitude is linked to the reflexive distrust of the UN as a forum for debate about Algeria. States such as Syria often led tirades vilifying France, who often had to scurry about to keep diplomatic ties strong with other disapproving nations.
CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

Tools of content analysis, tempered with historical details, are useful in gaining access to the signifié, which is explicative of how people think (or do not). In the case presented, one observes two respected and seemingly similar newspapers in terms of philosophy and trends in raw space dedicated to the war. A closer analysis, though, yields points of distinction between the newspapers. One, Le Monde, is amenable to change, although the rate was undoubtedly affected by the government constantly tightening controls on the press. Nonetheless, we witness change in Le Monde through a qualitative analysis of violence-oriented level 1 articles over time. As we have witnessed, these articles slowly became more balanced in terms of recognizing the numerous parties implicated in the war and portrayal of the FLN. Furthermore, there are fewer level 1 articles in Le Monde than in its counterpart. Political level 2 articles and thematic stories are favored, which suggests that qualities of dialogue are present in the newspaper. This was confirmed by an analysis of the articles. Another change involves the perception of the FLN and GPRA as interlocuteurs valables. Though never supporting the acts of these organizations, per se, Le Monde was certainly progressive in the consideration it gave to these rebel groups.

Not only is the fact of what is reported salient, but the manner of how it is reported makes a difference as well; less total conflict portrayal in Le Monde and a less categorically negative framing of the FLN than Le Figaro are important distinctions. Furthermore, despite Le Figaro’s greater emphasis on the war, it is Le Monde which is
ensnared by a less than sympathetic government. The government certainly fostered a variety of perspectives through its subsidization of the press. But at the same time it could control the agenda in this tense decade when technology, increasing transparency and changing attitudes, caused government to be more liable for their action.

*Le Figaro* was a victim of its own propensities for cognitive balance and lack of second-order dialogue. The micro-issue of the Pieds-Noirs, who were essentially abandoned by the sympathizing paper, demonstrates this tension. Competing issues kept the Pied-Noir issue submerged. This contradiction is, moreover, emblematic of the conflict itself, where the average, peace-minded citizen was caught between a ferociously dedicated and single-platformed group, the FLN, and a reluctance vis-à-vis the *patrimoine* to renounce the residual interests in Algeria.

The result of both the panoply of opinions competing at the newsstand and paradoxes like the one illustrated above is that the consumer failed to fulfill the necessary information/time (“I”) obligations for “opinion acquisition” or modification. Urgency increased as suggested by the polls even through periods of lesser coverage, meaning that “I” in the sense of the overall issue was sufficient for change; therefore the problem grew as the options multiplied and became complicated, showing a multilevel cogency of “I”.

De Gaulle, in his politically brilliant manner, sensed the politically volatile situation and often remained ambiguous and mysterious in his policy declarations; perhaps, in retrospect, this was necessary for two nations so long attached based on terms of settlement, rather than on simple economic terms. Only when personal risk increased (mostly through the OAS) did both the newspapers and government accelerate the drive
to a satisfactory conclusion, no doubt seen as a sort of Nash equilibrium by those of France, especially those of the opinion of Brisson.

Thus viewing history and modern thought through the lens of press coverage and public opinion nets useful data not only in terms of speculating effects of the press on the destinataire, but also in the consideration of how this process affects subsequent events. More acceptance for the FLN by a war-weary people was facilitated by press coverage of the FLN, essentially the sole way of educating a people on such a new, secretive organization. Accordingly, the government could more openly pursue options for peace. CA of the press also results in an improved understanding of both the perpetuation and changing of stereotypes, which can often be difficult to comprehend in hindsight. Attitude perpetuation in this study is seen through the Pied-Noir coverage in Le Figaro and change is observed through FLN coverage in Le Monde.

To conclude, CA does not stop at a simple analysis of numbers of front-page coverage; doing so would ignore the rich, layered universe of approaches to dealing with the complexity of press coverage and the quantity of information. The perception index, levels of analysis, concepts of framing (such as episodic and thematic analyses) all play a role in harvesting data interesting in itself as well as in pursuing the micro-issues such as the Pieds-Noirs and the FLN. In a final word, the increasing transparency provided by the media today will do nothing but strengthen government accountability to its constituency. Being aware of these links and their ramifications is of paramount interest to a democracy where the government, like that of the Fourth Republic, may eventually be toppled by such issues as the Algerian Revolution.
APPENDIX A: SELECTED EVENTS OF THE ALGERIAN REVOLUTION

1954

November 1  Coordinated attacks on the French by Algerians across Algeria mark the beginning of hostilities

November 12  Mendès-France (President of the Council in France) declares “l’Algérie, c’est la France” (“Algeria is France”)

1955

January 26  Jacques Soustelle named gouverneur général of Algeria

May 11  The government of Faure in France decides to pursue a policy of neutralizing the leaders of the Revolution

August 20  Algerian insurrections north of Constantine with French civilian casualties; France responds by executing hundreds of Muslims

1956

February 2  Soustelle leaves Algeria

February 7  Robert Lacoste named ministre-résident (French government representative in Algeria)

March 11  Special powers accorded to French government by Parliament

April 4  Henri-François Maillot, a communist leader, deserts the French army and delivers arms to the Algerians

April 6  Battle of Djeurf

April 11  Algerian Assembly dissolved following the resignation of many Muslims

May 18  Palestro (French vessel) sinks

June  Members of the rebel group, the FLN, are executed; Muslim insurrection; Europeans storm Casbah in response

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50 Adapted from Quid 2001 (Frémy) pp. 938-939 (2000).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>Secret negotiations between French and Algerian leaders in Rome fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 30</td>
<td><em>Milk Bar</em> and <em>Cafeteria</em> bombings in Algiers by Muslims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 16</td>
<td><em>Athos</em> (carrying arms for Algerians) is sunk</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 22</td>
<td>Ben Bella and other revolutionary leaders captured when French government hijacks their plane</td>
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<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Battle of Algiers begins; numerous terrorist attacks and strikes roll across both Algiers and Constantine over next few months, with equally vicious counter-terrorist measures taken by the French army</td>
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<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>French intellectuals including Simone de Beauvoir protest against French involvement in conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 30</td>
<td>Reforms voted down by National Assembly in Paris; later amended and voted in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>Internecine fighting among Algerian rebel groups including the FLN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>Battles of Timimoun and Ain Tame</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Electric fence built along Tunisian frontier; petroleum exploration of the Sahara begins; Battle of Djebel Alahoun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>Air attacks by France stepped up, some effected by General Salan without the knowledge of Paris; Salan launches a “Vive de Gaulle”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>De Gaulle declares “Je vous ai compris” (I understand you) at Algiers and “Algérie française” (French Algeria) for the only time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 4</td>
<td>“Paix des Braves” (Gentlemen’s peace) proposed by De Gaulle rejected by GPRA who, with the FLN hardened in their condition of independence before any negotiations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
December 1959

Salan shares power with General Challe; Delouvrier, the civilian leader, is in tenuous charge of civilian Algeria

August 1959

De Gaulle’s tour in Algeria; declares “moi vivant, jamais le drapeau du FLN ne flottera sur l’Algérie” (As long as I am alive, the FLN flag will never fly over Algeria)

September 1959

De Gaulle proposes self-determination (will pass in January 1961), secession but association; Delouvrier: “nous nous battons pour l’Algérie française” (We fight for French Algeria)

1960

January 1960

Barricades and protests by Europeans in Algiers

March 1960

De Gaulle continues to insist on France’s right to stay in Algeria

December 1960

United Nations supports right of Algerian people to independence

1961

February-March 1961

Secret negotiations in Switzerland; Mayor of Evian is killed, probably by French extremists; creation of OAS by Lagaillarde

April 1961

Putsch of French Generals marks apogee of power struggle between the French government and French military; OAS attacks continue, OAS is now the primary opponent of FLN in France and Algeria

1962

March 1962

Evian Accords and cease-fire

July 1962

Self-determination referendum (less abstention and more favorable to Algerians than last referendum)
APPENDIX B: GALLUP POLLS (MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM)

Most Important Problem (top three answers given here)

October 1956
*In your opinion, what is the most important problem for France at the present time?*

Algeria………………63%
French Union………..20
Peace………………..5
etc.

September 1957
*What is the most important problem for France at the present?*

Algeria………………51%
Economic Situation…26
Domestic Situation….20
etc.

January 1958
*What is the most important problem for France at the present?*

Algeria……………………………………….37%
Problems with the financial situation/budget..31
Governmental Problems………………….10
etc.

August 1958
*What is the most important problem France faces at the moment?*

Algeria…………………40%
The Constitution…………19
Purchasing Power……….11
etc.

September 1959
*What is the most important problem for France at the moment?*

The Algerian problem……..64%
The standard of living……..10
Financial stability………….7
etc.
April 1960

*What is the most important problem facing France at the moment?*

Algeria............50%
Peace in Algeria..28
Prices............. 5
e tc.

April 1961

*What is the most important problem facing France today?*

Algeria................78%
Salaries................5
Stability of Government.4

May 1962

*What is the most important problem facing France today?*

Algeria............75%
Salaries.............7
Peace.................5
APPENDIX C: GALLUP POLLS (UNITED NATIONS)

September 1949
*Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the actions of the United Nations to the present?*

Satisfied…..13%
Dissatisfied 36
No opinion..51

July 1957
*Should France follow or not follow the advice of the United Nations concerning Africa?*

Should follow……18%
Should not follow 50
No answer………32

September 1957
*Do you have great confidence, some confidence little confidence or no confidence in the ability of the United Nations to maintain peace?*

Great…………..3%
Some………….19
Little………….34
None…………..40
Don’t know….14
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Dissertations


Government Documents


Primary Sources


Le Figaro. Selected dates, 1955-63, odd years.