COMMUNITY IN JAPANESE POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

DISSERTATION

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The most important long-term political forces operative in the Japanese political system are the interplay of decentralized community authority and the consolidation of that authority toward the top. The mura kyodotai (village community) concept is representative of both types of authority, neither of which has defined boundaries. An examination of the nature of indigenous community authority may provide the broad context for a valid understanding of Japanese decision making.

Under the ideal of this order, Japanese political organization has valued the structure of Shinto: polytheistic local authority, plus conflated authority of church and state. Buddhism and Confucianism have provided direction and moral force to preserve traditional order.

Local authority, based upon place, remains strong, and political organization has legitimated the diverse and competitive small, community-like groupings in village and company. Higher authority assumes, because of group diversity, the necessity for constant compromise and fusion toward the top. For the individual, self is strong. "Ultimate concern"
is to the concrete group, with secondary orientation to the higher "universals."

Contemporary political organization under the kyodotai concept values small groupings—neighborhood associations—and their links to political support groups and factions. Mass political organizations assume secondary importance. Bureaucratic linkages stress a two-way flow of authority with competitive economic and social groupings represented through policy research groups delegated specific problems. Leadership and responsibility are, thereby, inclusive.

Governmental response to environmental demands, as in computer technology, is perceived as reactive, grievance-settling and inclusive, with general goal setting for continual negotiation—a model not readily applicable to most decision-making approaches.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The most important long-term political forces operative in the Japanese political system are the interplay of decentralized community authority and the consolidation of that authority toward the top. The mura kyodotai (village community) concept is representative of both types of authority, neither of which has defined boundaries.

This concept of Japanese political organization provides the context through which domestic Japanese decision making has been, and continues to be, conducted. Specific attributes, such as the term "groupism," or "long-range goal orientation," or the process of consultation before taking action (nemawashi and ringi-sei) have been cited as determinants in the context in which decisions are made.\textsuperscript{1} Dependency (amaeru) and the parent-child relationship (oyabun-kobun) theme in the analysis of Japanese politics,\textsuperscript{2} and competition\textsuperscript{3} among

\textsuperscript{1}See, for example, a summary of these ideas in Ezra F. Vogel, editor, \textit{Modern Japanese Organization and Decision-Making}, (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1975), pp. xx-xxiii.


\textsuperscript{3}Michio Morishima, \textit{Why Has Japan 'Succeeded'? Western Technology and the Japanese Ethos}, (New York: Cambridge
individuals and groups with implied "fair share" have been other ways of looking at Japanese decision making. Another approach in examining Japanese decision making has been what Ezra F. Vogel labels "bureaucratic elitism." The high status and competitive nature of Japanese bureaucrats, and resultant public respect for the bureaucracy, Vogel holds, have enabled the Japanese system to enjoy both continuity as well as highly qualified political leadership. Chalmers Johnson's study of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and its influence in the development of Japan is such an example of the elite bureaucratic leadership and decision making approach.

The "uniqueness" of Japan's world view," or "ethos," has also been employed to underscore the importance of consensus, compromise and the non-conflictual nature of Japanese

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5 Vogel, op. cit., pp. xxiv-xxv.


authority and decision making and the resulting differences with the West. But the essence of that "world view" in terms of political organization and decision making has not been thoroughly evaluated.

Depending upon one's approach to Japanese political organization, one may conceptualize the process of decision making within the system as taking place in the context of vertical, and, therefore, centralized authority structures. The elite bureaucratic models of decision making tend to support this thesis. On the other hand, through an examination of the competitive nature of Japanese corporations, especially in the automobile industry, and intra-agency

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11 See, for example, Michael Cusumano, Harvard Ph.D. dissertation, untitled, in progress on the history of the Japanese automobile industry. Several of the companies rebuffed MITI guidelines for restructuring the industry in the 1950's.
bureaucratic conflict,¹² may lead one to arrive at conclusions of system pluralism with near bureaucratic impotency. Neither view by itself provides an appropriate over-arching framework of Japanese political organization around which the context of Japanese decision making may be placed.

Purpose of the Study

Neither centralized nor pluralistic concepts offer adequate explanation of the context of Japanese decision making. The village community (mura kyōdōtai) ideal, as an indigenous concept, offers conceptualization of the fundamental, long-term nature of authority in the Japanese system that encompasses both consolidated and decentralized authority.

The purposes of this study are, therefore, two-fold. The first purpose is to set forth an appropriate context of decision making utilizing the parameters of the two long-term political forces operative in the Japanese political system (consolidated and decentralized authority) and demonstrate their applicability to contemporary political organization. The result may facilitate a more adequate conceptualization of the nature of decision making in the Japanese system.

The second purpose is to apply this context to a study of the initial phases of computer policy development to identify key linkages and concepts in Japanese decision

¹²Notes in Campbell, Contemporary Japanese Budget Politics, op. cit.
making. The state is not a sole actor in decision making across national boundaries. To the extent that there is competition and economic interdependence encompassing the multinational corporation, both as independent actor and as an instrument of government, it becomes necessary to understand the authoritative relationships and structures that exist between the relevant actors. The development of computer policy offers an opportunity for the identification of such relationships, which serve as the broad context of decisions.

Consideration of Decision-Making Analyses

A discussion of decision making analysis in the field of international politics, for purposes of this paper, may be divided into two broad areas: the processes of decision making, and the context in which decisions are made. I will examine here various theories of decision making. Two approaches that have had major impact on consideration of the processes of decision making have been those of (1) Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin (1962),

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and (2) Graham T. Allison. A third approach, which may be considered an articulation and application of Allison's rational actor model, is the cybernetic, or communications, approach to decision making.

The Snyder, Bruck and Sapin Approach

Drawing on their own earlier work, the organizational theories of Herbert A. Simon and the critique and proposals of Harold Lasswell of seven functional stages of decision-making phenomena, and other writers, Snyder, Bruck and Sapin present a framework of decision analysis that include four criteria. First, the perception by the decision maker of the operating environment and how the decision is defined helps to account for specific actions


and continuity of policies. Secondly, the foreign policy machinery is considered to mediate among internal and external demands as well as among decision makers themselves. Third, there are the interrelations of structure, process and decisional outcomes. The end product may be analyzed, the authors argue, independently of the processes involved. Finally, the combination of psychological/sociological levels of analysis in considering the interaction between personality and organizational role needs to be analyzed.\(^{20}\)

Though the above authors do not employ a rationality concept of decision making (discussed below), they do believe a "frame of reference" for empirical analysis of decision making may be established. Such a frame would consist of a "characterization of the range of empirical phenomena to be described and explained, along with the concepts which establish criteria of relevance. . . ." for specifying the determinants that are employed.\(^{21}\) There are, the authors assume, "multiple realities" where no one objective situation is common to all participants, and the views of individual participants overlap.\(^{22}\)

For Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, decision making is thus defined as

\[\text{a process which results in the selection from a socially defined, limited number of problematical,}\]

\[^{20}\text{Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, op. cit., pp. 4-9.}\]
\[^{21}\text{Ibid., p. 31.}\]
\[^{22}\text{Ibid., p. 30.}\]
alternative projects of one project intended to bring about the particular future state of affairs envisaged by the decision-makers.23

The following are assumed by this approach. First, decision making leads to a course of action based upon the particular objectives and techniques employed. Second, organizational decision making is a sequence of activities which may be considered an "event," and the event may be taken as a unified whole or separated into constituent parts. In making choices at each stage of the process, weight and priorities are assigned within a frame of reference, and that limits the range of alternative possibilities.24 A final assumption is that only government officials, and not private citizens, regardless of influence, are considered as decision makers or actors.25 The decisional unit thus becomes a governmental organization, and the analysis of decisions is governed by the state acting as a unit within internal and external environments.26

The Allison "Models"

The approach taken by Allison categorizes previous analyses of decision making into three models: the rational actor, organizational process, and governmental (bureaucratic)

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23 Ibid., p. 90
24 Ibid., pp. 90-92.
25 Ibid., p. 99
26 Ibid., pp. 62-63.
politics models. According to Allison each model provides a "conceptual scheme or framework" around which questions such as "What happened?," Why did it happen?" and "What will happen?" may be asked and answered. The rational actor model represents a collection of approaches that assume events may be understood as "the more or less purposive acts of unified national governments." The state is a single actor in the conceptualization. Included in this framework are the approaches of Hans Morgenthau and the rational statesman in power politics, deterrence theory that deal with strategic problem solving, economic rationality, game and decision-making theories. Each theory assumes that action is the chosen, calculated solution to a strategic problem and that explanation consists of showing a stated goal of government and how the action was a reasonable choice, given the stated objective.

27 Allison, op. cit., p. 4.
28 Ibid., pp. 4-5.
32 Ibid.
The basic concepts of the various different models of rational action are (1) goals and objectives are translated into "utility" or value payoffs, (2) the rational actor must choose among a set of alternatives, to each of which is attached, (3) consequences, and (4) the rational choice consists of selecting the alternative that ranks highest in payoff.\(^3^3\) The problems with the rational actor model, however, are that it neither explains the actions of bureaucracy nor shows that government policy is made by a conglomerate of organizations and political actors.

The second of Allison's grouping of models is the organizational process model, which characterized the acts and choices of governments as "outputs of large organizations functioning according to regular patterns of behavior."\(^3^4\) The analyst frames the puzzle in an organizational context and focuses on the strength, standard operating procedures and, by inference, continuity in organizational behavior. An event is explained when relevant organizations and patterns of organizational behavior are established.\(^3^5\) Characteristic of this approach is the work of Herbert A. Simon who stresses that administrative activity is group activity. As soon as a task is large enough that several persons are required to

\(^{3^3}\)Ibid., pp. 29-30.
\(^{3^4}\)Ibid., p. 6.
\(^{3^5}\)Ibid.
accomplish it, "it becomes necessary to develop processes for the application of organized effort to the group task." The techniques facilitating this application are administrative processes, and they become decisional processes. Some decisional autonomy is taken from the individual and decisions are made within the constraints of the particular organizational imperatives.

The decisional units are loosely allied organizations led by government leaders, but the size of organizations prevents any central authority from emerging and making all important decisions. Thus power is fractionated. Because the decisional unit becomes the organization, problem definition is confined to the perceived organizational imperatives necessary to maintain continuity and stability. Action, thereby becomes defined in terms of organizational output. Goals become sets of constraints that define acceptable performance. Characteristic of the organizational perspective is incrementalism in policy making, lack of interagency coordination and limited flexibility.

Allison's third grouping of models focuses on the politics of particular governments. Events are considered as neither

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37 Ibid.
38 Allison, op. cit., p. 80.
39 Ibid., p. 82.
40 Ibid.
choices nor outputs, but rather the result of bargaining among individual players in and among government agencies. The event is explained when it is ascertained "who did what to whom that yielded the action in question." There is no assumption of equality of bargaining position in rational deliberation within a unified group as the rational actor model assumes. Rather, relative influence is assigned individual governmental actors, each of whom has separate interests, priorities and perceptions which are shaped by their respective positions. Problems are more complex than single strategic issues, and piecemeal management of issues over the long term is more important than incremental decision making. There are a large number of autonomous and competing groups, with power widely dispersed among participants and drawn from independent sources. In sum, the pluralist model is applied to bureaucratic decision making, and the result is more often decisions based upon limited comparisons rather than rational choice. Means and ends become indistinct, value goals and empirical analysis are inseparable, and good policy is agreement on the most appropriate means to an agreed objective.

\[41\] Ibid., pp. 6-7.  \[42\] Ibid., p. 7.
\[43\] Ibid., p. 146.  \[44\] Ibid., p. 153.
In addition to Charles E. Lindblom's characterization of bureaucratic decision making as "muddling through," others utilizing the governmental politics approach to analyze foreign policy decision making include Morton H. Halperin. and Roger Hilsman. Halperin stresses the rules that structure the decision process. They do not dominate, but they structure the process, and changes in personnel "probably account for a substantial part of the changes in the rules of the game, even when this may not be the intention." Hilsman stresses the multiplicity of actors, their individual convictions, the lack of knowledge and the resulting conflictual nature of the process. Diverse goals and values must be reconciled before a decision can be reached, but it is reached primarily from within an inner circle of individual, higher-level participants, each of which is identified with different goals and policies. Allison summarizes the governmental politics paradigm as consisting of primarily the following.

46 Ibid.
50 Hilsman, op. cit., pp. 4-13.
51 Ibid., pp. 553-555.
1. Decisions and actions of government are the results of "compromise, conflict, and confusion of officials with diverse interests and unequal influence. . . ."

2. The governmental actor is neither a unitary actor nor a conglomerate of organizations, "but rather is a number of individual players. Groups of these players constitute the agent for particular government decisions and actions."

3. Each participant's stand is determined by his own perceptions and priorities. Goals and interests are different for each participant.

4. The effective influence on government decisions and actions by each participant is a blend of bargaining advantage, skill and will to use bargaining advantage.52

Critique of the Snyder and Allison Approaches

Miriam Steiner53 critiques both the Allison and Snyder approaches for inconsistencies and contradictions. Allison, she says, begins with a conception of decision making in which plans and purposes assume secondary import, yet when the frame of reference is implemented in discussing the Cuban missile crisis, plans assume center stage. Snyder asserts that decision making requires a phenomenological approach, but that approach is breached with operational methodology that constructs a classification system contrary to his own methodology.54 Efficient causal factors are the


54 Ibid., p. 391.
essence of Allison's conceptualization; Snyder emphasizes ideas and final causation. Snyder equates the state with its official decision makers, and situations exist in terms of the way individual decision makers define them. From Snyder's perspective state action is neither caused nor determined, but "flows" in a purposive manner from the individual decision maker's definition of the situation.

Allison, Steiner says, takes the position that decisions are rarely made; they happen. The dynamics of decision making within organizations often negate the best of intentions through bargaining and organizational imperatives. For Allison decision-making is not in itself an explanatory concept; it is a point of focus through which explanatory concepts can be related. Allison allows the analyst "to integrate the divergent matters of ideology, policy, organization, events, public opinion, law, and national character" within a decision making framework. For Snyder "decision-making is itself an explanatory concept," and the decision maker actively selects and interprets "inputs" into images or definitions of the situation from which policy is implemented. Snyder, Steiner says, believes that Allison's approach renders the concept of the responsible decision maker meaningless.

\[55\text{Ibid.} \quad 56\text{Ibid., p. 392.} \]
\[57\text{Ibid., p. 394} \quad 58\text{Ibid., pp. 394-395.} \]
\[59\text{Ibid., p. 395.} \]
Snyder was influenced by phenomenologist A. Schutz who held that the actors' "common sense knowledge of the world is a system of constructs of its typicality." The constructs are not privately contrived, but are "intersubjective or socialized." Therefore, theory needs to confront "the phenomena of social life." But Snyder, Steiner believes, ends up "in more or less the same place as Allison, with three separate foci or models of sorts—the organizational, represented by his classification system as he operationalizes it; the rational policy/international . . . and the bureaucratic/political." Both Allison and Snyder suggest that the frame of reference provided by the three separate foci constitute only partial models, "each alone incapable of providing adequate explanations, whatever the type of decision being studied. . . ." 

The Cybernetic Theory of Decision Making

The cybernetic theory of decision is a supplement to the rational actor model. It assumes simplicity and minimization in the calculations necessary to make complex decisions. Therefore a critical set of variables is monitored closely by the decision maker to minimize uncertainty. In complex problem solving, problems are broken

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61 Ibid., p. 418.
down into a large number of "limited-dimension problems," each confronted by a separate decision-maker or unit. Specialization in bureaucracy is thus achieved, but top management does not tend to integrate decisions across separate sub-units in its deliberations. Rather it focuses separately on issues raised by the sub-units. The values of the decision maker consist in keeping the set of "critical variables" within tolerable ranges. "The essential problem for the cybernetic decision maker is not to achieve some result in the external world. . . . Rather the essential criterion is simply survival as directly reflected in the internal state of the decision-making mechanism. . . ." The central theme of the cybernetic thesis, according to John D. Steinbrunner is "that the decision mechanisms screen out information which the established set of responses are not programmed to accept." Control of uncertainty means that response sequences are adjusted to a very narrow range of information. Steinbrunner relies on the organizational theses of Simon in particular, but

63 Ibid., p. 485.
64 John D. Steinbruner, op. cit., pp. 64-65.
65 Ibid., p. 67.
also upon cognitive theory which posits that a good deal of logical information processing is conducted prior to, and independent of, conscious direction.  

Context and Perception in Decision Making

The above analyses or approaches to the process of decision making make a common assumption: "that decision-makers act within a total perceived environment that includes their national political system as well as the international system as a whole--an internal environment as well as an external environment." The world as viewed by the decision maker is regarded by most decision making theorists as more important than objective reality, and the operational environment of the decision maker influences decisions insofar as it is perceived through images of the decision maker. Snyder and his associates (1962) make the distinction between "objective reality" which is knowable and describable by an investigator, and when described constitutes the "real" social world, and "multiple subjective realities" which assume no one objective situation common to all participants. "Rather, the views the individual participants have of their situation will overlap [that is, agree] and also will show discrepancies." Both the overlap and the discrepancies

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67 Ibid., p. 470.  
68 Ibid.  
69 Snyder, Bruck and Sapien, op. cit., p. 30.
are regarded as defining the situation, and anything the participants ignore is not part of the situation. The explicit revelation of the observer's general posture toward phenomena and how he chooses to handle the phenomena constitutes, for Snyder, the essence of a "frame of reference" within which decision making is conducted.

Snyder's frame of reference acts as a means of separating, describing and explaining phenomena. The frame of reference should also "make explicit the value clusters which govern the social and intellectual purposes of observers and teachers who employ it." Furthermore, a frame of reference may function as the basis for developing and applying theory that may make it possible to link "cultural differences" and other apparently unrelated data such as armaments. For that to happen though, there must be, according to Snyder, perception of either the objective reality or multiple subjective realities.

The models of Allison are premised upon perception of the operating environment, but the organizational and governmental politics models rely heavily upon the internal environment, or domestic systems, for shaping the processes of decision making. Domestic factors include such things as

70 Ibid. 71 Ibid. 72 Ibid., p. 27.
73 Ibid., pp. 31-32.
"national style in foreign policy, governmental structures, political party philosophies, bureaucratic roles, the personalities of decision makers...and public opinion."  
For Glen H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, such factors are not part of the process of decision making. "They constitute the context within which the process occurs, or they generate substantive variation in perception, values and influence that individuals and groups bring to the process."  
Such domestic factors, they believe, act as "sources of general compulsions and constraints that establish the range of choice within which the internal forces peculiar to each state combine to produce decisions." Decisions made by each state-actor are subject to peculiar substantive and structural domestic factors that may be difficult to separate from process.  

Robert Jervis considers the impact of domestic politics on governmental decision making in this light: "When all people would respond the same way to a given situation, it is hard to blame the decision-maker." For him such a situation reflects "moral implications" or beliefs. Such beliefs, Jervis cautions, may lead the decision maker to

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75 Ibid.  
76 Ibid.  
77 Ibid.  
78 Ibid.  
conclude that data obtained provides independent support for his own hypotheses and beliefs when that same evidence may be consistent with other views and hypotheses. "Because people do not understand the degree to which their inferences are derived from their expectations, they tend to see their interpretations of evidence as "compelling" rather than "plausible."80

The Context of Japanese Decision Making

Japanese decision making is conducted within a context in which the most important values in the system are centered around the maintenance of both decentralized, local authority and consolidated higher authority. Problems are defined implicitly and often explicitly with that end in mind. The nature of Japanese authority is such that intimate, small-group decision making is legitimated and linkage is maintained horizontally and vertically with other groups, organically, in a hierarchy toward the top that requires recognition of limited authority even at the apex. There is always higher authority.

Of importance is the primary value orientation of the individual to the group, for it is the small group, such as family or company that provides legitimacy and authoritative linkages to higher decisional units. The valuation of group

80 Ibid., pp. 181-182.
over individual and group linkages to higher authority have produced a decisional context that gives priority to harmony over conflict and nuance over the general principle. Lewis Austin contrasts these priorities to those of the West where the individual values general principle, and conflict "is open and is encouraged as long as it is carried on according to the rules."[81]

The following chapters elaborate the context of Japanese decision making stressing the vertical and horizontal nature of authority indigenous to the system. Concluding remarks suggest reasons for the limited applicability of most decision making models to domestic settings in the Japanese archipelago.

Scope of the Study

This study is divided into three parts. The first part seeks to establish what the Japanese view of the world is according to the community (kyodotai) ideal and how that view is perceived as contrasting to a Western world view. There are three major aspects of the concept important in political analysis: (1) the nature of order and values, (2) the individual's relationship to group, and (3) the nature of community. Each aspect is discussed separately. Part

II evaluates the nature of contemporary Japanese political organization in terms of the concept, particularly the two major forces of authority influencing political organization: decentralized village authority and consolidation of authority toward the top. Part III presents a case study of the development of computer policy between 1957 and 1971 based upon the basic premises of decentralized and consolidated authority embodied in the kyodotai concept.

In Part I, Chapter II discusses the nature of order and values that are most important in the Japanese system. The community, or village community (mura kyodotai), concept presupposes a core group of higher values that incorporates elements of indigenous Shinto as well as the influences of Buddhism and Confucianism. Historically, and to the present day, it is argued below, the primary religious influence on Japanese society and political organization has been Shinto, which, in contrast to many major religions, bases its concept of the way in which the universe should be ordered on polytheism and conflated authority (i.e.: a fusion of religious and political authority). There are over 80,000 different "gods" in Shinto which represent myriads of small community groupings, each with implied autonomy and equality. Yet, historically, there has been recognition of the need for consolidation of authority toward the top to maintain the system. Thus, the concept of order and authority
has been both vertical and horizontal, with preservation of the small village community ideal important down to the present. Shinto, it is argued, is representative of the dominant order and authority. It also incorporates the concept of growth and change, and the relationship of higher values and change in the Japanese system is examined at the end of Chapter II.

Chapter III analyzes the nature of community and authority in the Japanese system in terms of the village community (mura kyodotai) model. From this, however, the argument is made, contrary to some of the literature, that the system has a strong tradition of decentralized authority that is as strong as, if not stronger than, the centralization (or, consolidation) of authority that has taken place since Tokugawa (1600) and before. It is also argued that because of this the system is heterogeneous in terms of values—in contrast to much of the indigenous literature that seeks to promote the idea of "homogeneity." Chapter IV deals with the problem of conceptualizing the nature of the individual within an order that orients one's attachment primarily to his immediate, concrete group, such as family, local neighborhood group or company, and then secondarily to higher authority and values. Deviating from much, but not all, of the village community (mura kyodotai) literature, it is proposed that "self" and individuality are as important in
Japan as in any Western system. The only difference, albeit major, is that the Japanese individual is socialized to attach himself directly to a particular grouping, determined both by place (ba) and by family. This means that the values that are uppermost to the particular group ideally become those to which the individual is primarily attached. As a result, ultimate, higher universal values such as an absolute god, or justice, assume secondary importance. Also, this means that group values, and therefore organization, may vary widely from group to group, creating value diversity in the system.

In Part II, Chapters V, VI and VII assess contemporary Japan from the bias of the conceptualization presented in Chapters II, III, and IV. Chapter V examines postwar socio-economic changes and statistical survey data on Japanese characteristics and attitudes to show areas of possible misinterpretation of the data. While results of some survey data seemingly show movement toward greater "individualism," for instance, scrutiny of the data over time can also support the general theses of the mura kyodotai concept. Chapter VI examines the importance of small political groups in terms of political leadership and participation. In this conceptualization factions, their support groups, and traditional local neighborhood associations, not parties, become important. Participation is of a small, intimate, nature, without frequent resort to mass groups. The concept of modern "society" has not assumed import, and therefore
"class" is not an important element in political analysis. Because of that, political oppositions that appeal to mass societal and class values are not as successful as might be assumed. Chapter VII analyzes the bureaucracy and its relation to business in terms of the decentralized, yet consolidated, authority of the mura kyodotai (village community) concept. Decision making ideals under the mura thought is contrasted with Graham Allison's models of decision making to show the difficulty of applying either of his three models to Japanese decision making. The importance of small groupings such as policy study groups (shingikai) is discussed. Such study groups are formed by the bureaucracy with membership drawn from concerned business and societal circles for the purpose of maintaining linkage and participation in the process of consolidating authority toward the top. Decision making thus remains from the bottom up, as well as from the top down, an essential element in the maintenance of horizontal and vertical authority.

Part III (Chapter VIII) discusses the initial phase of computer policy making, from 1957 to 1971, based upon the ideal the model is supposed to represent. In terms of computer policy the organizational development is relatively consistent with the concept, with considerable competition and disagreement, yet general willingness to compromise and consolidate to achieve broadly defined goals. The broadly
defined goals are generally necessary to achieve the consensus on which consolidated authority is based.

Given the nature of the ideal concept of order and authority in the Japanese system, it is reasonable to assume the system should remain as it has. Problems should continue to be defined in terms of the traditional concept of order. Once the fundamental value orientation of Japan is more fully appreciated outside of the Japanese system, then the disputes that develop in international debate may be discussed with the appreciation that understanding and communication often go beyond language, and directly to the values that each deems most important. In the case of Japan, these core values are deemed, by many Japanese, to be fundamentally different from those of other systems.
PART I

ONE CONCEPT OF ORGANIZATION
CHAPTER II

ORDER AND VALUES

The village community (mura kyodotai) literature, as understood by this observer, presupposes a concept of order and values that incorporates some of the more important religious values of Shinto, Buddhism and Confucianism. The particular mix of these values, as they have been incorporated into the Japanese system, constitutes much of the foundation for the different "world view" perceived by Japanese observers. To understand the nature of the perceived view of the universe according to the Japanese village community (mura kyodotai) concept, a brief consideration of the nature of order and values and their relation to organization is deemed necessary.

The assumption in this thesis is that man has a need for order, or regularity, but the manner of expression of that need (or, values), is not universal. Karl Popper notes the "immensely powerful need for regularity [italics his]. . . ." It is a need which sometimes makes one experience regularities even where there are none; which makes them cling to their expectations dogmatically; and which . . . may drive them to despair and to the verge of madness if certain assumed regularities break down.¹

He thus accepts, as he says, Kant's view that the intellect imposes its own laws upon nature. But he adds that the intellect often fails in the attempt.

The regularities we try to impose are psychologically a priori, but there is not the slightest reason to assume that they are a priori valid, as Kant thought... The need to try to impose such regularities upon our environment is, clearly, inborn, and based on drives, or instincts. There is a general need for a world that conforms to our expectations; and there are many more specific needs, for example the need for regular social response.

In other words there is a common need for regularity, or order, but there is no reason to assume that the "laws" or belief patterns, which may be deeply ingrained, are in fact a reflection of truth or reality. They are, however, representative of systems of order. The "laws," belief patterns, and theories or concepts, held individually and in groups, comprise the values delineating the particular concepts of order. These values, in turn, have direct influence on the perception of external phenomena.

The essence of order according to the mura kyodai concept rests upon the notion of unity among diverse elements. There is diversity historically in the Japanese system, but at the same time there is recognition of the need for consolidation of authority at the top. Thus, there has been an attempt to balance the two forces of decentralized and consolidated authority. Especially since Tokugawa (1600) there has been recognition of the need for both types

\[\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 24.}\]
of authority so that a viable, integrated system could be maintained. The manner in which the balancing of these two forces has been accomplished, though, is perceived as unique in Japan as the following sections suggest.

Values

The Japanese concept of order is expressed by a set of core or fundamental values, of which aspects of its historic religions are an integral part. These highest values and aspirations do not change appreciably with time. Reinhold Neibuhr expresses the belief that,

Men's highest aspirations do not greatly change from generation to generation. . . . Human beings do not live in abstract universal societies. They live in historic communities; and the peace, order and justice of such communities, such as it is, is the product of ages of development. . . . It is the product of vast natural and historic forces.³

Another way to speak of values and their historical and unchanging character is through "symbols." Ludwig von Bertalanffy writes,

Man's unique position in nature is based upon the predominance of symbols in his life. Except for the immediate satisfaction of biological needs, man lives in a universe not of things but of symbolic stand-ins for things. . . . what we call human values are essentially symbolic universes that have developed in history. . . . These symbolic universes may be adaptive and utilitarian in the biological sense, as when technology allows man to control nature. . . . [In that respect] we have progressed in some five thousand years. . . .

But it would be a slightly optimistic view that general moral standards have progressed since . . . the Buddha, or Christ. . . .

Bertalanffy delineates at least two different levels of values—one set that adapts to the environment, and another "moral" or religious set that have not "progressed," or changed significantly over time. Parsons writes that, "Above all, values, as institutionalized in societies, are ultimately legitimized in religious terms." For Parsons, "society" does not necessarily carry the political implications of Western order expressed by Locke or Rousseau, but is rather order representing " . . . the highest level of self-sufficiency relative to its environments, including other social systems." "Self-sufficiency" he takes to be " . . . the degree to which the institutions of a society have been legitimized by the consensual value commitments of its members." In terms of self-sufficiency in its environment, Japan represents a system of long-established social/political order, and the role of religion in the establishment and maintenance of this order should not be minimized.

Durkheim sees religion as first and foremost a system of ideas by means of which individuals can envisage the society of

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6Ibid.
which they are members and the relations obscure yet intimate which they bear to it. That is the primordial task of a faith. And though it be metaphysical and symbolical, it is not therefore untrue. On the contrary, it conveys all that is essential in the relations it claims to portray.

Karl Jaspers, writing on change, notes that

Marxism has made it a commonplace that material conditions of our existence, our labor and economic systems, determine all human activity—that is but the super-structure of a material foundation. Not a commonplace, but no less true, is the complementary idea that labor, economic systems and social patterns, are in turn governed by moral-religious and spiritual motives. . . . The economy derives its meaning only from its uneconomic purpose. It is pervaded by the motives it serves; hence there are so many different possible and real patterns for one and the same technique of labor. . . . Each is state protected. . . . Their fundamental contrast affects the practice of work, the psychology of men and their way of life.

This no less true for Japan, which represents a distinct pattern of organization derived from its own value sources. "No organization," Jasper notes, "can produce reason and its conscience." Rather, he states, reason and conscience are the premises upon which organization is built. In other words, "... the realities on earth are covered with an abstraction, and this abstraction has engendered ways of speaking, arguments, and claims."

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9Ibid., p. 220.

10Ibid., p. 96.
Fact, then, becomes theory, as Goethe believes.

It is a basic fact of our existence that we are governed by abstractions, in other words, that which we call a fact is already seen and cannot help being seen on the conceptual premises of all our perceptions and definitions. Once we realize this, the forms through which we see become means of illuminating reality rather than deceptive spectacles that distort or disolor.  

Reality is perceived and illuminated in different form in Japan than in the U. S. and other Western nations. The values representing the essential forms in Japan, are embodied in its various religions, of which Christianity is, and will likely remain, a tolerated, largely uninfluential and peripheral element in the totality of representative values in Japan.

Shinto is the only religion indigenous to Japan. Some scholars believe that the peoples within this particular political system are not only religious, but that Shinto has perhaps more influence on Buddhism and Confucianism in Japan than vise-versa. Of these three religions Shinto may be said to represent the predominant ideology as well as system organization and structure, although some of the precepts of Buddhism and Confucianism have been incorporated into the core values representing the established system of order. Shinto is representative of a positive attitude toward growth and vitality. Buddhism, on the other hand, has provided direction—to please the souls of the dead.

Ibid., p. 213.
Confucianism, finally, has provided a social cement—a moral force—for the preservation and maintenance of order in the system.12

Shinto: Polytheism and Conflated Authority

From Shinto has come a high degree of concern for order and proper form for accomplishing goals.

At the time of the beginning of heaven and earth, there came into existence [3 deities]. These three deities all came into existence as single deities, and their forms were not visible.13

At this time the [three] heavenly deities, all with one command, said to the two deities (Izanagi-no-Mikoto and Izanami-no-Mikoto [his spouse]): "complete and solidify this drifting land!" Giving them the Heavenly Jeweled Spear, they entrusted the mission to them. Thereupon, the two deities stood on the Heavenly Floating Bridge [to earth] and, lowering the jeweled spear, stirred with it [and created] the island onogoro.14

After they had finished bearing the land, they went on to bear deities [representing various natural phenomena and physical features of the land].15

Izanagi, [after having borne "three noble children,"] removed his necklace ... and giving it to Ama-Terasu-Opo-Mi-Kami [his daughter], he

12From interview with Delmer M. Brown, 1982, Professor Emeritus, University of California, Berkeley, History, and Director, Inter-University Center for Japanese Language Studies. See also, Edwin O. Reischauer and Stuart D. B. Picken, cited later.


14Ibid., Book I, 3:1-3, p. 49.

entrusted her with her mission, saying: "You shall rule [meaning also, "to know"].16

The first mythical emperor, Jimmu, was a direct descendant of Ama-Terasu and the beads of authority she was given. Subsequent emperors are lineal descendants of Emperor Jimmu.17

These quotes from the Kojiki (Record of Ancient Things) in 712 A.D., represent the first written account of the inhabitation of the islands of Japan. Reportedly, the Kojiki was ordered compiled in 681 by Emperor Temmu in response to the introduction of Buddhism from China in order to "preserve the true traditions from oblivion." The intention most likely was "to strengthen the foundation of the state by showing that the various myths and traditions of the land were in reality centered in and based on the myths of the Sun Cult," which made the Emperors divine descendants of the Sun Goddess.18

There are two important concepts of order to be noted from the Kojiki. First, there are numerous kami, or divine beings. Current estimates range between 80,000 and 100,000, most with separate shrines, with each local area and family paying at least token homage to one or several kami


17Ibid., Book I, 46:1, p. 159.

representative of place, or territory, or authority. Thus, order and authority are localized and decentralized, which corresponds to the geographical characteristics of numerous mountains and isolated valleys in the Japanese archipelago. However, for there to be some form of integration, there is an orderly hierarchy of authority in Shinto with the Sun Goddess at the apex. Second, there is no dual authority with separation of church and state. Traditionally, the emperor has been representative of both. Authority is conflated, or fused. The basis of Sun Cult worship, thus placed the chief priest (emperor) as symbolic head of the Japanese nation. Later, this idea became known as State Shinto, and all major political changes since then have been made in the name of the emperor as the hereditary head of the state. These early myths became rationalized and extended until the Emperor became the center of a national entity (kokutai) in which all Japanese were to be his children and to have certain divine qualities. The religious element, in other words, has been so powerful in the emergence of Japanese national unity that [one] . . . is clearly justified in referring to Japanese nationalism as "Shinto nationalism." ¹⁹

The concept of a Japanese nation-state, thus, can be traced back to at least the eighth century A. D. and is coterminous with Shinto. Buddhism never has shared political power with Shinto. At this juncture two points are significant: first, authority has historically been conflated

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 8-9.
with no distinction between church and state; and second, the dominant religion is polytheistic. Both of these concepts continue to characterize the essence of political order and organization in Japan, Western influence and the Occupation notwithstanding.

The word kami is usually translated "god" or "spirit." but Stuart Picken notes, they "are not superhuman inhabitants of a distant heavenly realm. They are divine, yet close to the world of daily life." Kami is taken to be "anything that can inspire . . . a feeling of awe, reverence, or mystery." It is not primitive nature worship but rather it places in man "a sense of the divine at the heart of the universe." It embues a love of life and nature, particularly a reverence for the power and vitality of life. Japanese, thus, consider themselves to be blessed by nature in contrast to the Christian distinction between man and nature and the struggle with a hostile environment. This reverence for the power and vitality of life allows the incorporation of a quite important element in the preservation of a system—the natural assumption that life is dynamic and that growth and change are given in nature. Consequently, there is not the psychological struggle to


triumph over nature as displayed in Western architectural and environmental conceptualization.

Another important concept in Shinto belief is that man is not a "creature of the gods, but is as a child born of the kami." Therefore, there is no belief in the corruptness or even evil nature of man as has been expressed, for example, in the myth of the Garden of Eden in Christianity, or by Thomas Hobbes in political philosophy. In Shinto belief the given goodness of man and his close affinity with nature have provided the foundation for a pragmatic philosophy that, ideally, readily accommodates change and produces an order that emphasizes cooperation and trust. This belief system has also allowed the incorporation of elements of foreign belief systems—for example, Buddhism—without being absorbed by them.  

Reischauer says of Shinto,

It would be hard to image Japan without Shinto or Shinto anywhere but in Japan. . . . no element in Japanese culture has run so persistently through the whole history of the Japanese people from their earliest beginnings right up to the present day or so consistently colored their attitudes toward life and the world around them. Shinto has been an unchanging warp on which a rich and varied woof or other threads has been woven into the constantly changing patterns of Japanese civilization. These patterns can be brilliantly diverse and confusingly complex, but they are always subtly influenced by the constant, continuing threads of Shinto.

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22Picken, Ibid., p. 78.

23Introduction by Edwin O. Reischauer, in Ibid., p. 6.
In terms of order, Reischauer observes that, "Worship of the kami and the ordering of human affairs were seen as part of the same activity, and were supervised by hereditary sacred leaders. . . . What we would call government and religion were one and the same." The words for government, matsurigoto, and Shinto festival, matsuri, are derived from the verb, matsuru, to worship, for instance.\textsuperscript{24}

Shinto as a state religion assumed an increasingly important role from the time of the Meiji Restoration (1868) through World War II. The political change at that time came to be known as the "Restoration" because the symbolic leadership of the Emperor Meiji was given more than ceremonial recognition. The Imperial Court was moved to Tokyo, giving the impression that the Emperor was going to assume more direct control. The Sun Cult of Shinto, with the Emperor as hereditary head priest, was raised to the level of a state religion, a "Shinto Department" was included in the new Western-style government in 1868, and missionaries were sent throughout Japan to educate the populace. An Imperial rescript, issued in 1870, explained the program.

The Heavenly gods and our Heavenly Ancestor have constituted the highest principle, and upon it they founded the first undertakings of a great achievement. Ever since, the Emperors in line have acknowledged, inherited, and proclaimed it. The ideal of "the unity of religion and state" is held

\textsuperscript{24}Ibid.
by the whole Nation; the right ways in polity and education are clear to those on high, and the customs and manners of those below are in perfect order.\(^{25}\)

In addition to dispatching missionaries, the government required all persons to register at local Shinto shrines. It also reorganized the entire Shinto structure into a more manageable hierarchy and initiated government appointment of all Shinto priests.\(^{26}\) Though this initial program by the ruling clans of the Restoration movement was of limited success in enhancing national unity (education was seen to be a more efficient route), far more of the populace than before did become aware of the Emperor as ultimate symbol of national and spiritual unity.

The process of bringing Japan to a level equal with the Western nations was the underlying Meiji goal of [fukoku kyohei](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fukoku_kyohei) (the goal of a rich country and strong army), and there is general agreement that it has finally been achieved through economic means. It was done under the structural order of the indigenous religion, Shinto, though, and was not the result of radical changes in the core value system in Japan.\(^{27}\) In other words it was done through support of the existing essential value structure.

Influences of the Restoration and preceding Tokugawa Era (1600-1868) will be elaborated on in subsequent chapters.


\(^{26}\)Ibid., p. 102.

\(^{27}\)Ibid.
The present objective is to demonstrate the important role religion, particularly Shinto, has played, and continues to play, in the core values representative of the Japanese system of order. State Shintoism, representative of Meiji and excessive pre-War state and military authority and order, no longer exists in any legal manner. The ideology of the "family state" with the Emperor at the apex of authority (i.e., the word kokutai) is foreign to most young Japanese. Nevertheless, a related term embodying the idea of "family nation" (kazoku kokka) is a more familiar term, with the emperor as symbolic head of the nation. This idea is increasingly important in a political system that has been for the last several years trying to determine its own "essence" (nihonjin ron), while at the same time setting new goals consistent with its contemporary stature in the world community.

Buddhism

Buddhism was introduced to Japan in the eighth century and enjoyed popularity, perhaps because it was representative of a flourishing Chinese polity. It was viewed as no threat to the existing Imperial institutions which were based on Shinto. Rather, it was considered an additional force aiding the effort to unify the islands and increase channels of political control.28 There were attempts by

28Ibid., pp. 16-18.
Buddhist priests to supplant Shinto with Buddhism as the official state religion. However, such efforts have always failed.29

Buddhism has had little influence on political organization in Japan except as a means of promoting and enhancing unity, with occasional controlled participation in the affairs of government. To the Japanese populace Buddhism "was concerned with the relation of the individual soul to the limitless cosmos and the afterlife."30 Political leaders, though, likely have promoted Buddhism "quite consciously for the sake of the preservation of the state rather than from concern for the salvation of individual souls." Also, Buddhism may, according to Picken, have contributed the principle that it is the duty of government to promote collective well-being.31 Reischauer evaluates the influence of Buddhism in this manner:

Buddhism sought to incorporate Shinto into its all-embracing theology, but in the process was probably more influenced by Shinto than Shinto was by it. The nineteenth-century modernizers of Japan and the twentieth-century imperial expansionists both tried to shape Shinto to fit their needs, but they and their ideas have passed into history, while Shinto continues to be what it has always been, an unassertive but powerful current flowing below the surface turmoil of political and social change.32

29Ibid., pp. 18-29.
30Reischauer, in Pickens, op. cit., p. 8.
Though some authorities consider Buddhism to be more influential than Shinto on contemporary Japan, in terms of system and political organizational influence, Shinto may be considered the more influential of the two. The importance of Shinto in political thought and structure is developed further in subsequent chapters.

Confucianism

Confucianism in Japan has provided moral authority for consolidation of power and effective administration within the existing conceptualization of order. It is primarily a system for "regulating the relations of men according to certain beliefs concerning the fundamental forces in nature and society. . . . [It is] primarily a social philosophy." It sets forth a system of order in which the ruler sets the example.

In his [the ruler's] deportment there is nothing wrong. He rectifies all the people of the state.

33Sen Nishiyama, for example, writes currently on the importance of Buddhist harmony and family worship in Japanese thought. A noted translator, Nishiyama believes wa (harmony, cooperation) is the "essence" of Japanese thought, and new technology is developed and introduced within an orderly framework of wa. (From interview, 1983). See also, Sen Nishiyama, "The Impact of New Electronic Technologies: Direction, Channels, Speed," in Herbert Giersch, Editor, Emerging Technologies: Consequences for Economic Growth, Structural Change and Employment, Symposium 1981, Institut fur Weltwirtschaft an der Universitat Kiel (Kiel: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) Tubingen, 1981), pp. 317-320.

Yes, when the ruler, as a father, a son, and a brother, is a model, then the people must imitate him. This is what is meant by saying "The government of his kingdom depends on his regulation of the family." 

First introduced to Japan in the fifth century, it has little influence. When the first constitution of 604 A.D. was written, however, it is said to have played "an important role in consolidating the position of the central government by emphasizing the duties of people towards their sovereign land and the need for harmony among inferiors and superiors." 

It became particularly popular among scholars, military leaders and even the general populace by the eleventh century. By the Tokugawa Era beginning in 1600, it had achieved independent status, was accepted by the Imperial Court, and was adopted by the ruling military Tokugawa as a way of keeping peace and establishing effective administration. It was a means of inculcating not simple obedience to family and local village, but also to higher authority, thereby helping to establish more firmly a concept of consolidation of power at the top through moral duty and obedience. As employed in Japan it provided moral authority and administrative organizational concepts to the "Way" of order prescribed by Shinto. It provided, for example, the rationality for education under Tokugawa.

35 Ibid., p. 4.
36 Ibid., pp. 6-7.
If the Way of human morality is not understood, society will not be at peace, and disorders will never cease. To bring forth an understanding of the principles of the Way, there is no better means than books. The printing and diffusion of books is the most important task of a benevolent government.\(^37\)

The "Way," according to Shinto, is not the other religions. But precisely what the proper "Way" is under Shinto is merely "the Way of the gods," a concept lacking in precise content. Therefore, it is difficult for the Western, scientifically-trained mind, which places importance on exact content, to fully comprehend a value system that stresses form over content as Shinto does.

In other words, the moral and ethical principles of Confucianism were employed by the Tokugawa administration to consolidate its rule and maintain a peace and order which has lasted with only minor interruption to the present day. "Duty" and "obligation" to higher authority have been the chief contributions of Confucianism. Rather than supplant Shinto, it has been employed to accommodate the ancient conceptualization of order to contemporary external environment.

Warren W. Smith, Jr. has this to say about the influence of Confucianism during Tokugawa:

It is little wonder that the Tokugawa Bakufu, in its attempts to perpetuate its rule in Japan, was drawn to such a philosophy that so logically and clearly related social stability, ethics and metaphysics. . . .

\(^{37}\)Ibid., p. 10.
It seems in its fundamental forms to have been accepted by the people as the basic pattern for social relationships and the regulation of family life, while for the government and ruling classes, it extended to all fields of intellectual and social activity.38

In terms of overall influence, however, he concludes:

On the surface, Confucianism was the dominant intellectual creed in [both China and Japan], serving to rationalize and help perpetuate fixed social relationships, and providing the training for government administrators. . . . In Japan, however, status and position were determined by birth without reference to beliefs. . . .[and] the equalitarian premises of the system were distorted to fit the hierarchical organization of Japanese society.39

Following an initial period of rejection after the Restoration in 1868, Confucian standards of conduct were revived by some government officials.

It was clear to them, as it was to the Tokugawa rulers before them, that a more widespread acceptance of Confucian principles of loyalty would help to create the kind of ideological unity they desired, and would tend to weaken the liberal Western principles that caused them so much anxiety. . . . The purpose was to strengthen the basis of the state by fostering Confucian thoughts.40

At this time there was renewed interest in the national "essence" of Japan. Revived interest in Shinto and the divine nature of the Emperor was a means of consolidating authority under new leadership, and the dogma was "heavily loaded with nation-oriented Confucian teachings." Evidence of this is demonstrated in the Imperial Rescript on


40Delmer M. Brown, op. cit., p. 117.
Education (1890) which based the school curriculum on Shinto traditions plus an acceptance of Confucian ethical principles.

Ye, our subjects, be filial to your parents . . .

bear yourselves in modesty and moderation; . . .

pursue learning and cultivate the arts, and there-

by develop intellectual faculties and perfect moral

powers . . . Should emergency arise, offer yourselves
courageously to the State; and thus guard and maintain
the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne coeval with
heaven and earth.41

The Rescript concludes with reference to the traditional "Way"
of Shinto:

The Way here set forth is indeed the teaching
bequeathed by Our Imperial Ancestors, to be
observed alike by the Descendants and to lay it
to heart in all reverence, in common with you, our
subjects, that we all may attain to the same
virtue.42

As nationalism grew, this rescript gradually assumed the
character of a sacred text.

Today, the educational system operates under an insti-
tutional and structural framework reorganized by the Occupa-
tional forces. It is outwardly similar to Western institu-
tions and structures. Yet as with Western educational
institutions, extensive curriculum socializing the student
to traditional values is included, such as duty and honor,
so that the Japanese student receives a socialization com-
patible with the traditional concept of order in Japan.43

Japan has reached the point of being able to participate
in the international community as an equal partner. At the

41Ibid., p. 118.  
42Ibid., p. 116.  
43Based on examination of selected elementary through
high school texts.
same time the system is asserting its uniqueness with the West. One lecturer, commenting on Prime Minister Nakasone's attendance at the Williamsburg Economic Summit in June, 1983, referred to Japan as a "special member of the West," not a "mere member of the West." The Prime Minister, he noted, spoke English, but could not converse well on the Middle East situation because the problem was put into religious context with reference to the Old Testament, Judaism and Christianity, of which Nakasone had little knowledge. The writer observes that Japanese should not be ashamed of this because Christianity is "foreign to them" and the fact that Japan is a special member of the West should be accepted.44

Values and Change

Ardath W. Burks recognizes the dilemma most students of Japan are cognizant of—"that Japan constantly changed and yet remained the same." The problem has been usually resolved with the argument that imports were "Japanized," or that Japanese are abnormally adaptive. Thus, Japan has "modernized," not "westernized." But he also aptly notes that "modernization" has implied a "patterned progress toward 'modern and Western,'" and tried to exclude traditional elements. Robert Ward has stated, for example, that traditional and modern elements have "coexisted" in Japan for substantial periods and that "traditional attitudes and practices can be of great

positive value to the modernization process."\textsuperscript{45} Tradition, as used here, encompasses norms and attitudes as well as "persistent values," and for Japan it was "troublesome" to think of Japan as progressing along a continuum from traditional to modern. To resolve this dilemma, Burks prefers to view contemporary Japan in terms of postindustrial society argument.\textsuperscript{46} However, he does not take up the argument of what values have changed or what still remains "traditional."

The theme of the Japanese system representing at once great change, yet retention, of traditional values underlies most contemporary literature on Japan.

Reischauer, writing on the results of the Occupation, observes:

The occupation helped make the alternative of dictatorship less likely and worked fervently to build up a parliamentary democracy. But even without this strong occupation leadership, it seems probable that the Japanese would have gone in this direction on the basis of their own experience with such a system prior to the 1930's. Probably the movement would have been slower and less certain.\textsuperscript{47}

In other words the system of order has demonstrated adaptive and accommodative abilities to its external environment and can learn from its previous excesses. The Occupation did


\textsuperscript{46}Ibid., pp. 49-52.

not, but could have, hindered Japan's recovery by being unwilling to "maintain orderly political procedures" or provide technology and capital to rebuild. Nevertheless, Reischauer believes that

[0]n the whole the Japanese political system some three decades after the occupation would probably have been much the same sort of parliamentary democracy it is today, even without the strong occupation efforts to produce this result. Certainly the way the political game is played in elections and in the Diet would have been much the same, for these are clearly the natural outgrowth of political habits already well established by the 1920's, and the contemporary parties are for the most part simply the continuation of prewar political groupings. . . . The Japanese judicial system . . . has largely returned to what can be considered a natural outgrowth of the prewar system, and the supreme court exercises its review powers with great circumspection.48

Reischauer sums up the results of the Occupation with these comments:

I contend that much if not most of what has developed within Japan during the past three decades would have come into being in broad outline even without the interference or guidance of the occupation. The occupation obviously speeded up many of these developments [in economic and social conditions and the political system] and gave them a certain coloration, but the results on the whole have probably been shaped more by Japanese characteristics, skills, and past experiences and by general world conditions than by American design.49

He concludes that the general position of Japan in the world today "is basically the product of Japanese experience and world conditions rather than occupation policy," and (Article 9 of the Constitution renouncing war notwithstanding) antiwar and antimilitaristic sentiments would be

48Ibid., pp. 338-339. 49Ibid., p. 336.
strong today. Furthermore, Japan's success in world trade is "almost entirely the product of Japanese attitudes and skills, responding to worldwide economic conditions." In other words, Reischauer argues, Japan has not shed, but rather, utilized its traditional value patterns to accommodate the demands of contemporary society.

The question of the degree of impact that Western values have had on the Japanese system over time goes to the heart of the discussion of change in a system. There is a feeling of confidence expressed today among many leaders in the Japanese political/economic system that Japan has and will continue to be able to import Western technology without effectively altering its basic core values. This confident predisposition implies the ability to manage and control changes that are deemed necessary for preservation of the system and maintenance of order.

The system of order in Japan is based upon a set of core values which are "realized in groups which are thought of as natural entities." For Robert N. Bellah, transcendence, or the removal of sacredness from the world and society, never took root in Japan. Neither Buddhism, nor

50 Ibid., p. 337.

51 Meiji leaders were confident that they could do this. See, for example, Delmer M. Brown, op. cit.

Christianity, nor popular rights based upon the ideas of Mill and Rousseau have created an "overall cumulative trend" of transcendence. Rather, Japan's core value system, he believes, is a "communal religion—functional, affirmative, this worldly." Bellah believes that a transcendental reference is necessary for the development of the styles of government found in the West. The "communal religion" Bellah refers to is Shinto.

Lewis Austin, in a 1976 study of political culture in Japan and the U. S., considers the problem of the group and the individual in Japan in terms of Parson's pattern variables and his requirement that "individualism" be extended if democracy were to be possible in that country. He finds that only on a few indicators, does Japanese political culture move in the direction of modernity. "Dogmatic and hierarchical values have declined in Japan," he concludes, "but not enough to keep pace with an even greater decline in the United States." Yet, he says, "It is unquestionable that the capacity and differentiation of the Japanese state apparatus has been increasing . . . since the Tokugawa

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53Ibid., pp. 41 and 50-51.  
54Ibid., pp. 50-51.  
56Ibid., p. 51.
settlement." Nevertheless, "the growth of authentic
democracy has been much less marked, even in the postwar
period."\(^{57}\)

Austin labels this "irony" an "ambiguity in the theo-
retical construct of political development." He resolves
this dilemma by suggesting that

Hence, that individualism, the acceptance of the
legitimacy of conflict, and nondogmatic egalitarian
openness do not increase at all, does not mean that
the Japanese polity is not developing. It means that
it is developing in its own way that state efficiency,
capacity, and differentiation can be achieved by more
than one route and with more than one set of value
orientations \(^{58}\).

Another suggestion Austin makes is that "the American ortho-
doxy of political development and cultural change is haunted
by the unacknowledged ghosts of Adam Smith and Voltaire."
He suggests that "value structures are almost infinitely
various" and "Rationality, affective neutrality, bureaucrati-
zeation, individualism, [and] competition \ldots are not the
image of an inevitable future, but the demands of a par-
ticular political and economic style." Both the group and
the rational-egalitarian-competitive-individual models, he
says, finally, "may entail some problems."\(^{59}\)

In historical perspective, Thomas P. Kasulis recently
expressed the following view of Japan.

At the foundation of any advanced civilization's
thinking is a generally unconscious world view or
value system that sets priorities about what is
most important or most desirable. It serves as

\(^{57}\)Ibid., p. 254.  \(^{58}\)Ibid.  \(^{59}\)Ibid.
the implicit ground of decision-making, motivation, and even taste. Such cultural world views are tenacious, usually managing to survive all but the most thoroughgoing upheavals. . . . In summation, Japan is indeed changing, but much of the change is in customs, not basic values. What looks like a deviation from tradition may sometimes be a return to older traditions, half-forgotten by the Japanese themselves.  

The following chapter elaborates on the traditional concepts of community and authority under the general body of literature labelled mura kyōdotai (village community).

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"To act realistically means to be tied to the past."\(^1\)

When one acts in accordance with the perception of order prevailing in the system in which one resides, that action is considered logical, rational, and proper. As Joseph Campbell has noted, one must act within a system's myth, or "public dream," in order to be "in good accord with your group," or else be considered "neurotic."\(^2\)

The mura kyodotai (village community) concept embodies the values considered fundamental and in good accord with the Japanese system's "public dream." This set of core values as it relates to community and authority, is elaborated upon in this chapter.

The precise influence of Shinto, Buddhism and Confucianism on the contemporary political system has yet to be


determined. Buddhism is often credited with reinforcing the ideal of wa (harmony) and peace and orienting the system toward a soft ("cultural") control of administration (yawala kozo)\(^3\) as opposed to the tension generated in Western legalistic control of political structures. Often, simply the concrete concept, "human relations" (kyocho-suru hito) implying the attempt to create harmony and cooperation is employed to distinguish Japanese from Western thought. A common theme in contemporary Japanese philosophical thought compares Western "universal ideology" to practical and opportunistic (benrishi) Japanese groupings.\(^4\) There is a general belief that the Japanese are not ideologically oriented as in the West, and that the system did and can import Western technology without the accompanying universality. The universality instrumental in creating Western civilization has not, under this conceptualization, contributed decisively to growth of the Japanese system. Therefore, some scholars conclude that Japanese freedom and equality are not the same as their Western counterparts, but rather derived from an aesthetic, emotional and historic "national equality" (kินitsu) that lacks "intelligence (chiseiteki) and rationality."\(^5\) As a result, many Japanese

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\(^3\)As in Yamamoto Shichihei, Gendai no Choukoku (Contemporary Resolution of Conflict), (Tokyo: Diamond-sha, 1977), p. 84.


\(^5\)Ibid.
are not "religious" and do not have strong ideological orientations. There is general agreement, however, that "form" is important.\footnote{Ibid.}

This concern with form, though, is an essential ingredient of Shinto, and as such, it is this author's contention that Shinto, and its organizational imperatives, form an essential part of the Japanese ethos which continues to the present. There is no body of data to support the degree of influence of Shinto on contemporary Japanese political organization, but the matter of the impact of indigenous Shinto on Buddhism and Confucianism is a subject of debate, with some, including Brown and Reischauer, concluding that Shinto continues to exert more influence on the other two than vice-versa.\footnote{Delmer M. Brown in interviews, 1982-1983, and Edwin O. Reischauer, previously quoted in Chapter II.}

Regardless of the specifics of influence of one religion on another in Japanese thought,\footnote{The sect of Shinto to which the Emperor belongs, Ise, has distinctive elements of Confucian doctrine in its dogma.} there is a means by which the historical imperatives of order can be linked to contemporary organizational demands on the system. The essential values held by a system change slowly and form the basis upon which external demands on the system are perceived, defined and resolved, and order maintained. The essence of
that order in Japan is discussed as a subset of a general body of literature reflecting on the nature of the Japanese themselves (nihonjin ron). Terms employed in this literature are varied: village community (mura kyodotai), community life together (kyodo seikatsu tai), cooperation theory (kyodo gensoku), and natural village (shizen mura), or administrative village (gyosei mura) for example. Though each of the above expressions and other similar ones carry somewhat different emphasis, there is a common theme in all of them—the attempt to link the historic concept of order with the contemporary external and internal demands on the system. The remainder of this chapter sets forth the essential elements of this body of literature as it particularly relates to the maintenance of community and authority in Japan.

The relationship of groupings to one another in the Japanese system of order involves the forces of both decentralization and centralization in the system. The following

9Sofue Takao, et. al., Bunka to Ningen (Culture and Human Beings), (Tokyo: Shogaku-kan, 1982), p. 244.

10Ibid.


12Zaidan Hojin Kobe Toshi Mondai Kenkyusho (Zaidan Association Kobe City Research Center), editor, Chikiki Junin Soshiki no Jitai Bunseki (An Analysis of Local Citizen's Association—Kobe City), (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 1980), pp. 3-4.

13Ibid.
section outlines the essential elements of the decentralized nature of the Japanese concept of order.

Village Community

Some Japanese scholars say currently that Japanese are not as homogeneous as much of the literature states, and that it is a mistake to so label them. Suzuki Hideo, for example, notes that there have been at least three major migrations of peoples to the Japanese islands: first from the mainland over ten thousand years ago, settling in the eastern region (Kanto) of Honshu, the main island; then from Korea about 3500 years ago and settling in the western portions; and, finally, from China in the fourth to fifth centuries, settling in the southern inland sea region (Kansai). Each migration brought with it differences in mentality that persist to today, according to Suzuki. Those in Kansai, Minami Hiroshi finds, are the more equalitarian, liberal and skilled in the arts, professions, and business. There is, however, a preponderance of farmers, a stronger military tradition, and more vertically oriented authority structure among those born and raised in the Kanto

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region. Minami believes that whatever change is occurring in Japanese society today is due to the growing influence of vertically over horizontally structured, cooperative relationships. This is because "household" (uchi), including but not limited to the nuclear family, has been expanded to the national level, and the traditional "house" (ie), meaning "place" or basic group, is also represented by the company and other larger groupings where the production and consumption functions have been separated. This has necessitated greater dependence upon vertical relationships.\(^{16}\)

Both Suzuki and Minami say differences between human beings can be traced to differences in natural and geographical features. Japanese, like other peoples, they believe, are controlled by their surroundings.\(^ {17}\) Komatsu Sakyo explains that the Japanese islands are mountainous, and heavily forested, with only 15.8 percent of the land available for cultivation.\(^ {18}\) The islands historically have been rather densely inhabited with a population of 35 million and an average density of 90 per square kilometer in 1872.\(^ {19}\)


\(^{16}\) Ibid., pp. 61-70.

\(^{17}\) Suzuki Hideo, op. cit., pp. 32-33.

\(^{18}\) "Nihonjin no Seikatsu Kankakau" ("The Japanese Attitude Toward Life"), in Ibid., pp. 25-27.

The population for centuries has been concentrated in small, narrow areas, such as valleys, that were isolated from one another. This environmental requisite produced geographically "islands," or virtually closed communities, which had to be essentially independent of one another.20

Because of the climate, rice, as opposed to wheat, cultivation was required. This necessitated intensive, small-scale group cooperation and "harmony" to achieve positive results.21 The basic life form was that of small communities which demanded, within their own "world," social order for survival.22 But, the important aspect of this order (and, also a disadvantage) for Minami is that morality within and without the group or community is different.23 Each isolated village or hamlet, though legally bound to higher political authority, has retained its own particular "kami" and values and concept of what it must do to remain a viable self-contained entity. Those outside the small community are rejected. As a result, Minami feels that the uchi (household) concept is not compatible with any real effort toward internationalism. However, rather than propose movement in the direction of a new order, he suggests continued improvement of the uchi concept.24

20Komatsu Sakyo, op. cit., pp. 25-27.
21Ibid., p. 30.  
22Ibid.
23Minami Hiroshi, Ibid., pp. 71-72.
24Ibid., pp. 71-72.
From the perspective of a number of Japanese scholars concerned with determining the "essence" of what it means to be Japanese, this is what has been done. Japanese society, down to the present day, can be viewed from the perspective of the "mura" (village) concept in which household (uchi) remains the basic social unit. Politics and economics may also be evaluated from this perspective. The natural village is a closed, self-contained entity, composed of only a limited number of different families with normally one being dominant socially and economically. Within this type of physical and social environment, dependent upon the intensive cultivation of rice as a staple, self-sufficiency can be attained, and a relaxed life-style achieved provided there is participation and cooperation of all members. Though the village may be closed, Nakamura Kikuo believes "there is a force pulling you back. People want to return."25

Nakamura points out that Shinto, as a polytheistic, national religion, continues to attract and influence to a degree that other religions do not. Each village, or even family, will have its own shrine and particular kami that, theoretically, protects village life and provides security.26 Ancient Shinto revolved around the mura and its inhabitants


26 Ibid., p. 182.
and maintained spiritual life. The "kami" is the most respected part of the kyodotai (village) concept, and according to Yanagida Kunio, "Worshipping 'kami' was our life and our seiji (government)." Though there is a Shinto hierarchy, and it has become something akin to a "national religion," Nakamura believes there is no transcendence in Shinto. If conditions are right, he says, anyone can become a god.

The lack of transcendence means that the only absolute that is developed is that among the inhabitants of the village themselves. Because Shinto is a religion of life, and the forces of life are undergoing constant change, "The Way" under Shinto remains ill-defined and imprecise, but above all, variable and adaptive to the requirements of particular environmental situations. This means, then, as stated above, that the moral imperatives of each village may be different.

This also means that with people placed in close proximity where intensive labor is required for survival, that development of a "group cooperative spirit" might be possible. That has been the case in Japan. As a result, the individual ego is based not upon a higher, ultimate, abstract but rather on the order established under the tradition of the


28Nakamura Kikuo, op. cit.
mura and its consciousness. Throughout Japanese history a continuous common thread can be traced. The mura concept is the embodiment of that common thread—the increasing legitimation of the mura as a fundamental political unit and basis of authority in the unification of the nation.

The individual ego has been oriented directly to the village, not to ultimate, higher authority. Shinto, as a religion, has provided the structural legitimation for the authority; and, as will be elaborated on below, Tokugawa (1600-1868) legally and administratively established the mura as the foundation of a vertically structured, yet decentralized, bureaucratic regime. Likewise, the succeeding Meiji regime, in an effort to instill national consciousness and patriotism, employed the mura concept—including the idea of family (uchi). A group cooperative spirit was promoted at the national level through the idea of kazoku kokka (one-family nation). The authority of the group can be transposed to that of the nation-state. According to Hegelian rationality, which was popular with some circles of Meiji leadership, the individual ego was the same as the patriotism that the citizen has for his nation, and it is the spiritual root of strength in the nation.

A number of Japanese and foreign scholars began to focus on the village as a fundamental element in the organization

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30 Ibid., p. 54.  
31 Ibid., pp. 46-47.
of the Japanese political system as early as the late 1950’s.\textsuperscript{32} As Japan changed from a largely rural, agricultural society toward greater predominance of the industrial sector in the 1960’s, however, a number of scholars have felt that the mura model could no longer solve the increased complexity of organization demanded in the nation’s drive to bring itself abreast of the Western nations.\textsuperscript{33} Though Japan has maintained essentially the same goal since Meiji (1868) of a strong military and a strong Japan (i.e., economy), there was some feeling that the Occupation had, indeed, drastically altered the fundamental concept of order in Japan and there needed to be a more universal model adopted to explain the system to the rest of the world.

In the last few years, however, some respected Japanese scholars have begun to re-examine the mura concept. Among these, some few are beginning to argue that Japan has never been, and can never be, a homogeneous society. Kamijima Jiro notes that it is only since World War II that researchers have begun labelling Japanese society "homogeneous." Prior to that, he says, Japan was unique among nations in its stress of kokutai with the accompanying association with

\textsuperscript{32}R. K. Beardsley, John W. Hall, and Robert E. Ward, Village Japan (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1959), was one of the first exhaustive studies in English to focus on the importance of the mura in Japanese political structure.

"family." Some, he says, argued that Japanese were descendants of the ancient Yamato race (Yamato minzoku) (from 600 A.D.). But Yamato, he argues, was a mixture of races and a mixed blood race, because Japan had several colonies with different races at that time. In order to bring such diverse races together and unite them for the effort during World War II, a komin (Emperor's children people) policy was adopted with the Emperor as the symbol of this unified authority. He believes that Japan can never be "homo-geneous," because, according to Darwin's laws, if diverse organisms are mixed together, the mixture does not become one (or, unified), it becomes more diversified. Kamijima believes that if a society consists of diverse elements, it is possible for a social tradition to seek consensus among its different elements.

Equality

There is no way to prove what caused the mura consciousness, but Nakamura Kikuo believes there is general agreement that it can provide important linkages from the present to the past that can not easily be explained in other more Western-oriented models. For example, the Western concept of political equality, with its corresponding

34 Ibid., pp. 137-138.
37 Nakamura Kikuo, op. cit., p. 186.
presupposition of existing inequality of potential abilities among peoples and the corresponding need for freedom from oppressive authority, is not well-comprehended in Japan. As the term is used in Japan it typically carries with it the idea that every person has potentially equal abilities with everyone else. Shinohara Hajime explains that the term carries with it the idea of "oneness of thought"—the ideal of each person in the group agreeing on basically the same ends as well as means to problem solving.38

Nakagawa Yatsuhiro, however, recognizes that the Japanese concept of equality is different from that in the West. He believes that the mura seiji (community, or village, government) principle is still quite strong, and the Japanese interpretation of this concept derives from the primitive animism of Shinto. In the West, he says, because each individual is considered to have different abilities, emphasis must be given to providing equal opportunity for all.39

38 Shinohara Hajime and Miyazaki Ryuji, "Sengo Kaikaku to Seiji Culture," ("Postwar Reform and Political Culture"), in Tokyo Daigaku Shakai Kagaku Kenkyusho to Sengo Kaikaku Kenkyukai (Tokyo University Social Science Research Association and Postwar Reform Research Group), Sengo Kaikaku No. 1: Kadai to Shikaku (Postwar Reform No. 1: Problems and Views) (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppansha, 1974), pp. 246-250, for example includes a thorough discussion of the concept of political equality as interpreted by many Japanese researchers. Chapter IV examines the contemporary concept of equality in further detail.

Japanese equality, however, is based upon equal ability—the assumption that everyone potentially has equal abilities and that they start from the same position, and that is why seniority is so important in Japanese organization. Seniority is based upon age as well as position, and, he believes, is rooted too strongly in the system to be revised.\textsuperscript{40}

To understand the nature of Japanese equality, he says, one must understand the nature of Shinto. Christianity, Mohammedism, and Judaism, he argues, achieve order in space through "God's Will," which is transcendent authority. Shinto does not carry this transcendent authority. In Shinto, an unlimited number of souls, or energy (tama) resides in all things, living and non-living. This energy, or tama, causes all things to exist and function, and they do not conflict with one another because they share tama equally. So, in the universe there exists complete harmony and order, and all things are given tama equally. All things are given tama equally from one mythical "mother" of existence, and as such there is no superior or inferior in all things. Therefore, as given, all human beings are equal.\textsuperscript{41} The idea that human beings are above nature and have the authority to control nature, Nakagawa believes "is far beyond the understanding of Japanese thought." The Christian community still represents a small one percent of the total population,

\textsuperscript{40}\textit{Ibid.} \hspace{1em} \textsuperscript{41}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 143-144.
he says, because the idea of an absolute God conflicts with animistic thought.\textsuperscript{42}

But this animistic concept of equality carries with it several important consequences. For one, because all humans are considered to have equal tama (soul or energy), the rice culture (based on the village community) does not require outstanding ability for leadership. Also, thought has become concrete, as opposed to abstract. Second, Western political equality as introduced by Yukichi Fukuzawa in Meiji, or by MacArthur after World War II, has not had much impact.\textsuperscript{43}

Western political equality, premised upon inherent inequalities in ability, does not carry much meaning in the Japanese system because it is related to ability and abstract thought.

Third, and perhaps most important, the Japanese idea of equality means that class, in terms of mass groupings of people of relatively the same economic status as understood in the West, carries no ultimate importance in this conceptualization. Japanese society may be labelled a "classless mixed society" (junsei shakai) where innumerable different groupings of people are born, all of potentially equal abilities, and the attention given to accommodating all of these different groupings into one "organic" whole creates a premise that necessitates a non-conflictual political

\textsuperscript{42}ibid.

\textsuperscript{43}ibid., pp. 144-145.
A class society, on the other hand, may be premised upon different "cultures" within the same society, and the result of the clash of "cultures" may result in conflict. In the West, Nakagawa argues, class distinctions make it difficult to move from the lower to the upper levels of society. This he calls a "horizontal society." Japanese society, on the other hand can be labelled vertical, and it is possible to move from lower to the upper levels. Equality is absolute and given. For different positions in society only the tools (means or instruments) are different. There is no superiority or inferiority in ability. Therefore, as Nakane Chie points out, emphasis in human relations is on place (ba) and not strictly on qualifications, as in the West. Position, then, comes before qualification. For instance, promotion in this system is based upon personality more than achievement. Furthermore, leadership can always be in a state of flux with no fixed ruler or ruled. Since the mura concept is based on consensus, strong leadership is not necessary.

The result of the emphasis on equality, harmony (wa), cooperation, and consensus within Japanese groupings means

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46 Nakagawa, op. cit., p. 149.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid., pp. 22 and 110.
that there is both horizontal and vertical relationships within and among groups. Minami Hiroshi distinguishes two major types of group structures in the Japanese system: horizontal and vertical. The Kansai region, which Minami believes has had a preponderance of merchants, skilled professionals and artisans, has emphasized the horizontal relationships within and among groups. In such a situation, the leader assumes less importance, and may easily be replaced. In Kanto, with a farming and samurai tradition, relationships have tended to be more vertical, which means the leader assumes somewhat greater importance and factions are more prevalent. Minami believes that both vertical and horizontal relationships are present in most groupings today; however, he feels that horizontal relationships are weakening. Horizontal relationships between groupings have historically been weak according to Minami, and if there has been a tendency toward greater vertical structuring between groups it has not diminished the intense competition generated among groups in the same market place. The vertical structuring of different groupings into an organic whole means to the Japanese the possibility of any person potentially being able to rise to the top. Tokugawa Iyesu (1600) and former Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei are cited as good examples.

49 Minami Hiroshi, op. cit., pp. 56-60.
50 Ibid., p. 61.
51 Nakagawa Yatsuhiro, op. cit., p. 17.
This classless, mixed society thesis of Nakagawa supports, then, the general proposition of equality and diversity in Japanese society, themes which are developed further in subsequent chapters.

Also, while there are definite distinctions and competition among groups—for example, between Hitachi and Toshiba—there is also intense rivalry within the group, or company, as might be the case. There is, however, not a clear division made between labor and management or leader and follower as in the West. While proud of their position, both would speak publicly of "my company." Unions, for instance, are typically company unions, with national affiliation either weak or non-existent and disputes resolved almost exclusively in-house.52

The result of this conceptualization of human relations is that groupings—small groupings where some concrete identity may be established—are important. The preservation of their independence and autonomy are of primary concern. Given that criterion, within each grouping or ranking, vertical structuring becomes important to maintain order. But for those in the same ranking, such as brothers in a family or college graduates joining a company in the same year, there is a strong horizontal attachment that is attempted. They are one's colleagues.53

52Ibid., p. 18.

According to Chie Nakane, this ranking within groups is extended to intergroup relations in Japan, and a vertical hierarchy is found in every field, or profession, and institution, with those of the same ranking in constant competition with one another. At the same time, the vertical nature of the organizational structure is typically characterized by a parent-child (oyabun-kobun) dependency relationship established among institutions in every function of society. Among corporations, capital and supplier dependency relationships are more the rule than the exception.

In sum, for the individual in Japanese society, his association with groups is based upon place, or location (ba) and not necessarily on attribute, such as family or class grouping. Such class or family basis for grouping implies homogeneity according to Nakane, Nakagawa and Minami, for instance. When groups are based upon physical location, in order to insure functioning of the group, the "frame" or the group itself must be promoted, and individual differences in attributes must be minimized, according to Nakane. It also means that one village or group will try to function as one clan. Tadashi Fukutake, in a comparison of Japanese and Chinese villages, for instance, notes that Chinese villages are organized according to household units, whereas in Japan

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54 Ibid., pp. 94-99.  
55 Ibid., pp. 99-100.  
56 Ibid., pp. 9-10.
village borders are clearly delineated for tax purposes. Furthermore, in the Chinese village the ancestral and local deities and shrines are separated, but "the Japanese village shrine is worshiped by villagers as if they all belonged to one clan, as the Japanese clan has always been considered a more important territorial [group] than kinship group."57

The autonomy of individual groups, without recourse to higher universals that this conceptualization of order generates, helps to maintain a strong decentralizing force in the system. Without any knowledge of how the Japanese system has consolidated authority at the top, the reader perhaps can understand Nakagawa's belief that, "Japanese do not like, nor do they want, authority."58

Development of Authority

With intergroup communication often difficult and dependent upon length of association and intensiveness, due to the exclusivity of the separate groupings,59 one may question how authority has been consolidated in the Japanese

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57 Tadashi Fukutake, *Asian Rural Society: China, India, Japan* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1967), p. 20. Fukutake believes that the class and clan structure of the Chinese villages promotes exploitation and hostility and hampers social integration, whereas the parent-child relationship established between landlord and tenant on a non-contractual basis promotes community cohesiveness. (pp. 19-20)

58 Nakagawa, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

Movement toward greater centralization of authority was accelerated during the Tokugawa Era (1600-1868), especially with the beginning of a movement in 1742 to restore political authority (if only theoretically) to the Imperial Throne. Tokugawa Ieyasu, following an internal struggle between three groups of clans in which his clan was victorious, instituted organizational measures designed to increase the central administrator's (bakufu) control over local mura with prefectoral governors (gunji) as intermediate levels of administration.

Much of the decentralized nature of authority remained, however. The mura was retained as the primary political unit under the bakufu and was standardized for the first time.\(^{60}\) The primary means for preserving the authority and supremacy of the bakufu was Confucianism. The ethical standards of duty and obedience were applied to create a hierarchical type of class system of merchants (at the bottom), farmers, or other commoners, and samurai who were considered "gentlemen." According to Ryosuke Ishii, this Confucian based "class" system helped generate and entrench a type of feudal order where local territorial and military rulers (daimyo) were, in large measure, independent rulers within their own

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domains. Whether the Tokugawa bakufu constituted a "feudal system" in the Western sense is a question left for later. Importantly, though, the Tokugawa did standardize a system of order based on the mura that can be traced back earlier than 1600, while at the same time enhancing central authority. Elements of national consciousness and identity and the beginning of the Japanese nation can be traced back to as early as the fifth century A.D. and the Yamato period when the idea of kokka (literally "kingdom house" but usually translated as "nation" or "state" today) first appeared in reference to the Yamato religious-political structure. Tokugawa, particularly through the consolidation of military power, brought peace, and thus enabled the consolidation of administrative authority under one, as opposed to several, clans.

Decentralized Mura Authority

But merely because there was political unification and gradual increasing centralization of authority, did not mean the mura lost significant independent authority of its own. There was, and remains, considerable local political consciousness at the community level—so much so, that one might argue that authority is nearly as decentralized today as in

61 Ibid., p. 71.

Tokugawa. In spite of the influence of Confucian codes of ethics and duty, there remained under Tokugawa a body of unwritten law (hogai no ho) which imparts the connotation of a basic dislike for authority. There were over 3711 cases of farmer's revolts during the Tokugawa Era—approximately one revolt a month. The revolts were not based upon starvation or unduly oppressive taxes in most cases. Rather, most disputes were over customary ways of administering control by the bakafu and other attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of the local community.

Tokugawa may generally be considered a period of law-abiding rule. Protest was allowed. But it had to be done within a proper hierarchy of authority. Characteristically, though, protests, as well as revolts, were carried out by the villages as a whole and not on an individual basis. The village headman would typically lead a whole village in revolt, as he was given responsibility for the welfare of the village as a unit, and it was he who was replaced as the need arose. The village unit remained intact. The legitimacy of the village and the "reasonableness" of village protest lay in the realm of an implied covenant between the lord and peasant," or in the existence of an

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63 Nakagawa Yatsuhiro, op. cit., p. 22
64 Ibid., pp. 20-21.
65 Ibid.
implied relationship of harmony and trust⁶⁶ and not in contractual relationship.

The Tokugawa bakufu did not dramatically transform the existing order. It simply standardized and legitimated existing structures, such as the autonomy of the mura, and unified authority under one clan, as opposed to several previously. But this change was significant. It was significant enough to cause some researchers to believe that the Meiji Restoration (1868) and the Occupation have been two highly overrated periods in Japanese history. Okano Kaolu notes that many have said that Japanese society changed considerably after each of these two periods.⁶⁷ He believes, however, that while great change took place during Meiji and after the Occupation, the taishitsu (or, physical constitution of Japan) has not changed since Edo (Tokugawa).⁶⁸

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Each village under Tokugawa had its own offices for governing its internal affairs. The three most important officials were the headman, sub-headman and a representative of the landowners. Most farmers in a village owned their own land at this time. The village headman was responsible for overseeing all aspects of village administration, but all village officials were responsible to the landowners, and all important matters were discussed at meetings of the village council (mura-yoriai). The council established the rules which governed village life, and those who did not follow the rules could be punished by ostracism or banishment from the community (mura-hachibu). The village collectively was responsible for making tax payments to the regional feudal lord (daimyo) based upon the mura as an organized body of inhabitants and as a standard unit of land. The village council was then responsible for apportioning the tax burden among the famers and, finally, collecting the taxes for the government.69

In contrast to the Chinese village, for example, local community autonomy in the Japanese system during Tokugawa may be characterized as more cooperative, economically viable, and, therefore able to exert greater unified control over village administrative affairs. Tadashi Fukutake believes this solidarity has been expressed symbolically

69Ryosuke Ishii, op. cit., pp. 74-75.
through the community Shinto shrine.\textsuperscript{70} The Chinese village chief was always selected among a smaller representative group of wealthy landowners without the consent of the poorer farmers. Given the nature of the patrilineal hierarchical structure of the Chinese village, the rule was often \textit{de facto} with administrative responsibilities delegated to positions below the level of the "gentry." For this reason there was a distinction between "the natural village and the administrative village" which still exists. In Japan, however, Fukutake notes that, "The real chief and the formal chief were usually the same person, since those with high social status always become village representatives." Thus, in Japan, he says, though leaders were ambitious, their ambition was tempered by responsibility to the villagers who regarded them more like parents. Therefore, he argues, "representatives and represented were bound by a parent-child relationship."\textsuperscript{71}

By standardizing and legitimating the autonomy of the traditional village organization, Tokugawa laid the foundation for an economically sound agricultural system, in which local administration could effectively initiate and institute community-wide projects such as road and irrigation construction.\textsuperscript{72} By promoting and legitimating the economic viability of the small administrative unit, such as the

\textsuperscript{70}Tadashi Fukutake, \textit{Asian Rural Society, op. cit.}, p. 22.
\textsuperscript{71}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 21-22.  \textsuperscript{72}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 23.
village, the Tokugawa bakufu created conditions which would promote prosperity (if not sustained economic growth—for that was not a policy objective) for the nation as a whole. There was no consciousness by the individual citizen of being a member of a "Japanese nation" at this time. The average individual may not have been aware of the existence of the Tokugawa Shogun (military ruler) or higher level bakufu (administration), nor the Emperor. Such identification did not begin in earnest until sometime after the beginning of Meiji. But, the individual was generally cognizant of his attachment to the regional daimyo, especially through taxes appropriated by the village council to the regional administration. Aware of the importance of primary industry, the bakufu never imposed overly debilitating taxes. Basic taxes were levied on surveyed lands in accordance with an officially designated productive value determined on the basis of annual surveys of the harvest. Actual collections, given liberal underassessment allowances, rarely exceeded 40 percent of the harvest. The koku (unit of rice) was the primary monetary unit, and under Tokugawa administration, local administrative communities generally did well.

Cities emerged largely under the protection of daimyo or other political leaders and received some autonomy in managing their own affairs. The larger ones, such as Edo (Tokyo), were administratively subdivided into machi.

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73 Ryosuke Ishii, op. cit., pp. 77-78.
74 Ibid., pp. 83-84.
(townships) which were designated semi-autonomous administrative units analogous to the rural murakata (village administration), and they remain so subdivided to the present day.

Each village has been subdivided historically into small administrative units. The purpose, according to Fukutake, has been to encourage cooperative agricultural endeavors. The kumi, a grouping of ten households, he believes, is more cooperative than its Chinese counterpart. He traces it to the Tokugawa five-man system (goningumi seido), but Irimoto Masuo has traced the concept back to 1595 to the juningumi, a ten-household association established by Hideyoshi which was later reduced to five by Tokugawa in 1615. The concept of the small grouping of households for administrative purposes has survived to the present in the form of chyonaikai (the general term for numerous formal and informal neighborhood associations that serve a variety of social and political community needs). Irimoto believes the goningumi and its descendants served as the fundamental organizational unit in a hierarchy of hamlet (buraku) and mura administration. The association of 10, or 5 members under Tokugawa, consisted of the head of each household, whether rich or poor, within a designated area. The purpose was to establish

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75Ibid., p. 76.
76Tadashi Fukutake, Asian Rural Society, op. cit., p. 23.
means for mutual help and security from theft. But it also worked to promote solidarity and joint responsibility—characteristics similar to the modern village.\textsuperscript{78} The system became more formalized during Tokugawa, and it was put to use as a type of "spy" network, in part against the advancement of Christianity. To insure compliance, if one member of the kumi did something wrong, all were punished. Importantly, though, these small associations came to be used for every administrative purpose.\textsuperscript{79}

As discussed above one of the Buddhist doctrines which was utilized to advantage in the Japanese system of order, was the concept of wa, or harmony. Tokugawa promoted this aspect of the doctrine particularly as it applied to relations between and among the small community groupings. It remains an important part of the community (mura kyodotai) concept today. Under the Japanese concept of community the effort to create and maintain harmony became an essential duty, particularly within the goneingumi. There was a distinction made between those inside and outside the 5-member association (hito nami v. soto nami). Excessive competition was discouraged, as was being under average. For instance, within the group one should agree to sell his products at the same price as his neighbor.\textsuperscript{80}

\textsuperscript{78}Ibid., pp. 306-309. \textsuperscript{79}Ibid., p. 309.
In contemporary rural society Fukutake finds the function of the kumi (or, kogumi, which are today called tonarigumi—neighborhood associations) even more important than in the past. In a survey of a typically economically developed village, Kawairi, near Okayama, he notes that the village is divided into three hamlets (buraku). There are a total of 153 households, an increase of 25 since Meiji, of which all but 20 are farming. The buraku each consist of 65, 44, and 24 households. In the largest hamlet, Kawairi-honson, there are 4 tonari-gumi (neighborhood associations), geographically organized. There is a clan arrangement with main and branch families in each of the hamlets, with the largest, Kawairi-honson, consisting of 23 households representing the main family name, Inukai, followed by 16 with the name, Takagi. There are other family names independent of these two lineages, and each has descent lines. Though the Inukai family is the dominant "clan" in its hamlet of 65 households, they are not physically located within the same tonari-gumi. The clan structure (dozoku) is a loosely organized kinship group without a tight hierarchical arrangement because of the practice of deeding a portion of land to new "branch" families. Fukutake, for this reason, argues that there has been no master-servant relationship established. There have been no large-scale landlords which would promote this type of relationship. There are cases,

81 Tadashi Fukutake, Asian Rural Society, op. cit., p. 197.
82 Ibid., pp. 189-190.
Fukutake notes, where clan hierarchy is more influential. This is true during elections when the village ruling group is determined to a certain extent by the status of one's house, although the position of village chief is not limited exclusively to the main families.\(^{83}\)

The four neighborhood associations in Kawairi-honson Hamlet, by contrast, are responsible for virtually all important community activities. There are regular monthly meetings of each association, and each is responsible for funeral and festivals, which are both generally village-wide and incorporate Shinto shrines and deities as well as the Buddhist temples.\(^{84}\) In addition each of the neighborhood groupings nominates one candidate for the offices of village chief and hamlet representative. Hamlet representatives serve concurrently as the kumi head.\(^{85}\) Fukutake observes that traditionally the three hamlets in Kawairi Village were relatively independent with each worshipping its own tutelary deities. Recently, he observes, this independence has become more apparent, partly due to the loss of influence of the village administrative management of collectively owned forests. The village dependence on the forest for resources has diminished, for instance. Fukutake concludes that "integration based on communal organization is becoming more significant." The social relationships of each household

\(^{83}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 192.\)  \(^{84}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 191-192.\)
\(^{85}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 193.\)
have expanded beyond the limits of the hamlet and village, but at the same time, he emphasizes, "the sphere of practical daily life is more and more confined to the immediate neighborhood." 86

One may argue then, that (1) the fundamental unit of authority has been the village community and its subdivided kumi, (2) authority within the village has not been exclusively that of master-servant, or patron-client, but considerably equalitarian—from the Japanese perspective—with much focus on place, as opposed to attribute and family lineage, and (3) by legitimating the mura logic through the centuries, the concept of local autonomy has been enhanced. This has resulted in a counterbalancing force to that of gradually improved abilities of central administration to consolidate authority toward the top. Nakagawa believes that sovereignty in the Japanese system of order is based upon the mura kyodotai concept. Sovereignty, he says, is derived from mura bito (village people), and order within the mura is dependent upon consensus. For that reason strong leadership is not necessary, and there is the attempt to develop an emotional consciousness of the group (ishin denshin) which will result in consensus being achieved through a "soft" rule, as opposed to a rule based upon law as in the West. 87 Order and authority in Japan has been,

86 Ibid., pp. 195-196.

87 Nakagawa, op. cit., p. 112.
and still is, ultimately grounded on the principles of giri (duty) and ninjo (human feeling and sympathy). Thus, Nakagawa contrasts the Japanese system with the West, as one founded on trust, as opposed to the mistrust assumed under Western law.  

Consolidation of Authority

There is no clear agreement among Japanese scholars as to the historical origin of authority, whether it resides in the emperor, or in the people. One may speak of both authority and also, influence, as flowing downward, as well as upward, depending upon the particular situation. This disagreement as to the nature of authority is demonstrated in the body of Japanese thought devoted to the mura concept. This author's observations are that both are equally valid and not in any substantive way, mutually exclusive, but that the dynamics of Japanese politics comes largely from the interplay of these two driving concepts.

Whether authority moves upward or downward, there is general agreement that Japan has never given absolute authority to any one person.  

88 Ibid., pp. 112-113.

authority of the emperor was promoted by many to be practically absolute. Takizawa Katsumi believes that the root of Japanese authority originates with the Emperor, but that his power to control is not autonomous. Authority, he believes has been divided from Tokugawa, with administrative authority (gyoseiken) in the hands of the bakufu. Ultimate authority, he argues, resides with the Emperor, and the bakufu never questioned this higher authority. This authority of the emperor, he says, is expressed in ceremony (sainiken) as the "right to do." Shinohara Hajime expresses this historical authority of the Emperor and the centralized administrative authority from the bakufu to the present as part of the "political culture" which does not change readily. Takizawa argues that from ancient times there has been a belief in a common equal foundation for life for each individual, and though Japanese have not always acted with equality in mind, there is a genuine dislike for "selfishness" on the part of individuals. If one is selfish [Takizawa is not referring to jibun, or self], one becomes a prisoner of watakushi ("I"). By downplaying the selfish

90 Ibid., p. 52.

91 Ibid.

aspect of human nature, Takizawa believes Japanese have been quite politically astute.\textsuperscript{93}

This does not mean that "human rights" has never existed. To the contrary, under the Japanese concept of order, it is given. Human rights are innate and have always existed. It does not need to be emphasized, as it is in the West. "Absolute right is not a thought that can be realized by human manipulation, and it's not necessary to realize it." Because human rights already existed when human beings came on the earth, what should be realized is the pacification of mood and the environment. Society, according to Takizawa, should be maintained and grow through cooperation and consensus. Decision making and productivity, according to the Japanese way of thinking, can not be realized through severe punishment, but rather through emphasis on pacific human relations.\textsuperscript{94}

Therefore, the purpose of government in Japan is not to realize "absolute rightness on earth," but rather to move toward economic security. Achievement of economic security is the basis of Japanese humanism founded upon religion (Shinto and Buddhism), economy (one's occupation) and entertainment (such as the matsuri, or festival).\textsuperscript{95}

\textsuperscript{93}Takizawa Katsumi, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 52.

\textsuperscript{94}Ibid., pp. 56-57.

\textsuperscript{95}Ibid., p. 57.
Authority, as with equality, has historically been a "given," taken for granted—an inalienable part of the natural order. As such, traditional authority has undifferentiated several different attributes that have survived in part to the present day. There has been a unity of "religious, moral, familistic, political [and] legal" authority in Japan. Distinctions among the various types have not emerged, and, furthermore, Robert N. Bellah argues, authority is not transcendent. Transcendence conditions ultimate legitimacy, because ultimate loyalty is to a higher god. This, he believes, promotes the rise of a type of individualism that is directly related to a god and can stand against society or a king. But, because such transcendence never became rooted in Japanese thought, Bellah believes, value has been realized in groups, which are considered to be natural entities.

For J. Victor Koschmann, this means that, whatever the centralizing forces of the bakufu, meiji, and the Occupation, "A pattern of political authority based on the sacred quality of group life and the special position of the group leader as link with the divine, remains influential to the

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present day." He argues that the relationship between the group and the group leader has assumed a sacred quality, and because of this Koschmann argues that the earliest groupings were the family household. Historically, then, he says, "the unification of ever larger areas under central control, culminating in consolidation of the entire nation under the emperor [in 1868], took place as an extension of that family authority rather than through the replacement of kinship by abstract notions of public or the people." Authority in Japan, which equates public (oyake) with the sacred, creates, for Koschmann and others, the kind of political culture where there is a rule through ideology (shiso) in which obedience is secured through trust and faith rather than fear. For Koschmann both the use of force and ideology are necessary for any government to rule effectively; however, he argues that in the West the former has predominated, while in Japan the latter has. This means that the unconditional obedience of subjects can be expected, because as Koschmann explains, "The laws issued in each age are the commands of the gods issued in that age." Therefore, "when all is said and done, to obey the laws of the day is to


99 Ibid., p. 9, defending a thesis of Aruga Kizaemon.

100 Ibid., pp. 9-10.

follow the true way of the gods." For the ruler, though, he says, "it is stupid in the extreme to think that the land can be governed by thrusting out one's elbows and glaring at the people, and by repressing the entire population by terrifying it with the threat of punishment." Rather, the ruler is obliged to promote participation and social mobility. 102

For some scholars, then, authority in Japan has been "soft" as opposed to the "hard" rule of the West which is tied to conflict resolution. Kamishima Jiro believes Japan is an "assimilating unitary society" (junsei tan'itsu shakai) as opposed to a Western "alienizing composite society" (isei fukugo shakai). There has been a continuous assimilation of foreign elements into a unitary whole in Japan, as opposed to a continuous process of conquest, subjugation and rebellion in the West. In Japan, this was made possible by the non-exclusive nature of Japanese animism. The "strange" outside influence, he argues, is adapted and absorbed, and gradually becomes part of the "relatively homogeneous, familiar culture." Because of the nature of the mura system with its individual kami, though, Japan was never a theocracy under the emperor. There has been respect (keishin), but not worship, or belief, (saishi). Any respect for new gods, including the emperor, has never been incompatible with belief in local deities. As a result, he says, serious

102 Ibid., p. 13, restating the ideas of philosopher Ogyu Sorai.
historical discontinuity has been avoided, and the historical patterns of authority have remained relatively constant.\(^{103}\)

**Prewar Authority**

The changes that took place during the Meiji Era beginning in 1868 were a response to external threats to the security of the Japanese system. They were institutional and not ideological. The only different ideological aspects of the state system that developed were those designed to protect the structure.\(^{104}\) The pattern of control continued to be based upon *mura* ideal and family.

External pressures on Japan necessitated responses that the Tokugawa leadership had been unwilling, and ultimately unable, to make. Opposition came not from the bottom, but from opposing clan leadership in the form of group dissent as well as from within the ranks of the Administrators. When a weakened Tokugawa government signed a treaty in 1865 allowing freer foreign access to Japanese commerce, the rival Western clans were able to coalesce around the emperor as a symbol. The slogan became, "Revere the Emperor! Expel the Barbarians!" Through the encouragement of strong anti-foreign sentiment, the rival clans were able to coalesce

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samurai sentiment against the moderate, but weak, Tokugawa regime. The slogan was adapted to what seemed a better expression of non-bakufu opinion: "Revere the Emperor! Down with Bakufu!" The transfer of actual power took several years, beginning in the early 1860's and was largely a peaceful transfer. The rival western clans, though, recognized the inevitability of intercourse with the outside world, and they thereby encouraged the adoption of Western institutions to build unity and strength in order to avoid foreign domination as well as gain respect from the West.\textsuperscript{105}

The opening of Japan to broader Western influence did not develop from altruistic Western liberal sentiments. The necessity of response to foreign pressures led to the realization of the need to learn more about the world in order to establish the foundations of an empire. In order to consolidate authority and gain the support of reluctant clans to the new Satsuma-Choshu western leadership, an "Imperial Oath" was issued in 1868 outlining major government reforms and the search for knowledge throughout the world, "in order to establish the foundations of the Empire."\textsuperscript{106} Likewise, in 1869 feudal lords were encouraged to hand over land and revenues to the Emperor so that a national military could be maintained by the central government. The reasons given were, "In this way both name and reality will be secured.

\textsuperscript{105}Delmer M. Brown, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 80-118.

\textsuperscript{106}Ibid., p. 94.
and this country will be placed upon a footing of equality with foreign powers."

The transfer of authority did not achieve substantial results, though, until the central government could receive a larger percentage of the tax revenues. To do this the modern prefectures (ken) were established in 1871, abolishing the Tokugawa clans (han). This was done to enhance national security at home. Abroad, in order "to maintain equality with foreign nations, words must be made to mean in reality what they claim to signify, and the government of the country must centre in a single authority."108

By 1873 conscription had been adopted and industry was encouraged to expand. A goal which has continued to the present in a modified form, became, "Rich country—Strong army" (Fukoku Kyohei). Today, the emphasis has been strictly on the economic part of the goal, but for the last one hundred years the long-range goals of the Japanese system have not changed. At the beginning of Meiji there was recognition of the need for a strong, well-integrated military as well as industry to gain respect from the West. This perception gave rise to economic expansion based upon centralized capital investment and thereby capital dependency of smaller to larger firms and the government, much as is found today.109

Meiji is called, "Restoration," because theoretical political control was restored to the Emperor. The Emperor was used as a symbol to achieve greater national unity than there had been under the latter years of Tokugawa. A Shinto Department was established in 1869 to promote the "unity of religion and state." Shinto priests for the first time were appointed by the state, and education was to stress "The Way" and the historical roots of Japan based upon Shinto. Confucianism standards of conduct and principles of duty and loyalty were also employed to help achieve ideological unity. Ito Hirobumi is given the major credit for fashioning the ideological foundations for Meiji. Under the label, kokutai (national essence, or polity), Ito placed both spiritual and political authority in the emperor and completely fused for the first time oyake (public) and watakushi (private) interests. Law, therefore, meant Imperial rescripts which meant the expression of kokutai. Second, according to Kuno Osamu, in order to encourage support for the new clan leadership, Ito took the Western concepts of equality before God and before the law in democracy and substituted them with equality before the Emperor.

For all of Ito's efforts, Osamu believes that the emperor appeared to have almost absolute authority to the masses. His authority and power were interpreted two ways.

110 Ibid., pp. 103-118.
111 Kuno Osamu, op. cit., p. 61.
There was an ideology for public consumption, kenkyo, or exoteric ideology, and the elitist belief in a framework of limitations on the emperor, mikkyo, or esoteric ideology. The latter was necessary for the functioning of the State. For the people the Emperor was to be considered publicly, at least, something of an absolute monarch. But for the ruling class there was a tacit understanding that he was similar to a constitutional monarch. Though some effort was directed in early Taisho, following Meiji, to promoting government based on the people (minponshugi), it was seen as incompatible with kokutai, which seemed to be more compatible with the past.

Some of those sent to study abroad became enthused with Western liberal thought, and they saw the problem of introducing liberal and Marxist doctrine into Japan as one of "modernizing man's spirit as opposed merely to modernizing his institutions." Debate centered around what constituted a "Subject." The awareness of the individual in the Western sense had not developed, and the prevailing ethos of Japanese "community" was described in terms of a group-based hierarchy beginning with the family and village and extending to all groups up to the emperor and state as a "family" in fictitious form. The critique of some liberals was that this small, group-centered life engulfed the individual "rendering

112 Ibid., pp. 64-66.  
113 Ibid., pp. 72-76.
him blind to the importance of class as a force permeating the world around him."114 This argument, though, has had little relevance because the concept of "community" and the individual's relation to it has not changed significantly. Furthermore, Meiji did not alter the basic mura concept significantly. Though the han were reorganized into prefectures, most of the boundaries remained the same. Controls were not extended directly to individuals. Rather, Meiji authority upheld and operated through the traditional personalistic hierarchies in local communities.115

Political parties, likewise, arose not out of a desire for liberalism, but rather from factionalism and rivalry among the four leading clans. Their perpetuation and growth from Meiji to the prewar period was predicated upon the argument that allowing "popular rights" was "the only path toward unified action and national strength." Through this process it anticipated that the "people of the whole country will be of one mind" [emphasis added.] In other words, "bind the people together, give them political power, and you create a wealthy country, powerful soldiery." Parties and programs that might have engendered social disharmony, though, were not allowed.116

114For example, see, Sakuta Keiichi, "The Controversy Over Community and Autonomy," in Koschmann, op. cit., pp. 220-249.

115Ibid., pp. 223-225.

Political parties at this time were dominated by business groups, and even though unionism was growing—to about 300,000 members in 1929—ultranationalism was also growing. Center to left parties such as the Labor-Farmer Party were factionalized over ideology and strategy, were organizationally unstable, and were largely unsuccessful at the polls. Labor was unable to organize more than 8 percent of all workers during the prewar period for its goals were seen as largely irrelevant to Japanese society, or perhaps its tacit support of business and socialization to indigenous values prevented success.

Prewar governments, though, were successful in promoting ethical and organizational links with the past. Brown believes this was successful, in part, because Japan had never been invaded nor defeated, and had been successful in the 1905 war with Russia. This military success, he believes "proved" the correctness of the kokutai concept. Dissent was permitted under the concept, but it could not take the form of antinationalism. As a result, it may be said that prior to 1945 there was "no transformation either of fundamental values or of social structure." In other words,

The Meiji Restoration appeared [emphasis added] to destroy Tokugawa feudalism, and the Taisho Democracy, but appearances in both cases were deceptive . . .


[both Christian and Western liberal and socialist logic] rejected the existing order of society and challenged the very core of the dominant traditional system.\textsuperscript{119}

The core of Japanese tradition is represented by the mura kyodotai ideal. Despite the emphasis on kokutai and the Japanese "family" nation, the village community with its sub-community buraku and neighborhood associations have been cherished and nourished as essential elements in the maintenance of order. Meiji did not formally include the buraku in its administration. It was maintained by tradition. But post-Meiji, Taisho included it in the administrative organization. In 1940 the Mayor for the first time was given the authority to take legal action against the burakukai (Hamlet association) or neighborhood association. Previously, they had been independent entities.\textsuperscript{120} In an examination of self governing assemblies in Kobe City, for example, a research group has determined that various types of neighborhood assemblies have been promoted since Meiji. In 1893, for instance, the Kobe health union established organizations according to block (cho) to administer injections, clean drainage ditches and streets and prevent contagious diseases. In 1933 this union was given lawful authority (it had been


\textsuperscript{120}\textbf{Zaidan Hojin Kobe Toshi Mondai Kenkyusho (Zaidan Association Kobe City Research Center), edited, Chiiki Jumin Soshiki no Jitai Bunseki (An Analysis of Local Citizen's Associations), (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 1980), pp. 3-4.}
technically informal, previously), and it prevailed throughout the city. In 1937 it was made an agency of the general community government, and in 1940 the national Internal Affairs Ministry combined the Health Union into one of the previously established chyonaikai (neighborhood association.)¹²¹

In sum the administrative community unit (gyosei mura), be it rural village or city, has continued to express its autonomy and independence throughout Japanese history. A key organizational element in this autonomy is the smallest branch of administrative organization, the buraku or chyonaikai, which has been in large measure informal and legally uninstitutionalized, but yet has been the means through which authority has been developed, utilized and consolidated. Authority has not been developed on the basis of an individual's personal relationship to higher abstract authority. Whatever "sense" the individual has today of being Japanese, does not come from his identification with the Emperor personally, or a "god" directly, or in the identification of the nation as the embodiment of such universals as "truth" or "justice." What it means to be Japanese today is defined first by the community, company, and family grouping to which one belongs. The individual group provides the primary orientation. That is the essence of the value structure.

¹²¹Ibid., p. 6.
CHAPTER IV

THE INDIVIDUAL

Japanese are expected to have a strong sense of individual identity and self. The individual in Japan is as "individualistic" as his Western or American counterpart. The only difference is that the individual is socialized within a system or order that values different priorities of attachment. Duties and obligations are such that the individual within the Japanese system of order ideally seeks to orient his action directly to smaller groups for problem organization and resolution. Within and among such groups, however, the individual normally exhibits a highly developed concept of individuality and self. Only the primary, or most fundamental, attachment of self in terms of responsibilities is different from that of the Western socialized individual.

An understanding of the social expectations of the individual in the Japanese socio-political system is necessary to develop a model representative of differences and similarities among the various systems. Before one can beneficially confront group interaction, some statement needs to be made about the individual's own ideal priorities and relationships to others and to groups. The foundation of any
system model is dependent ultimately on the individuals comprising the system and their interrelationships. The approach in this discussion suggests that the concept of "individualism" in the West and "group orientation" in Japan are part of a body of rather imprecise terminology that is used for generalization and/or ideological benefit, but which is misleading and inappropriate for analysis and model-building without more general agreement on precise denotation as well as connotation of terminology.

The uninitiated or casual observer from the West has been socialized to concepts such as "individual rights" and freedom and the ideal of self-reliance as a positive, fundamental value. The "I" in this system of order seemingly assumes primary importance. Because one has "individual rights," one also has individual duties and responsibilities, under law. The primary focus is on the individual and not directly on the groups, both large and small, to which one might associate oneself.

Because Japanese themselves emphasize the importance of the small group in interpersonal relations--their rights and duties to the group--the observer is prone to conclude that Japanese are "group oriented" and, therefore, not "individualistic" as in the West. Such conclusions are given further credence when the observer notices, almost without exception, that task organization invariably involves the attempt to create some form of group solidarity to solve
problems. The individual is expected to cooperate with others rather closely to resolve problems. Because of such expectations and observations of "group behavior" by researchers, there is a tendency to then further conclude that Japanese as a whole lack the individuality and self identity of the Western individual. Such a conclusion is not well grounded. This chapter attempts to clarify some of the incongruities resulting from conclusions which are based on assumption of Western priorities. The aim is to clarify the terminology and establish a framework for conceptualization of differences as well as similarities in an individual's relationship to others in Japan with contrasting remarks on the fundamental nature of such relationships in the West.

Evaluations of the Individual Japanese

A common explanation of the individual nature of Japanese and their relationship to groups is similar to the following:

"What makes Japan unique is the fact that this feeling [of accomplishment] comes not from individual, but rather group experiences. This sense of group accomplishment may well be the essence of the groupism often regarded as characteristic of Japan."

Of course, one might argue that Japanese society is such that it is precisely through group activity that a sense of accomplishment can be attained. In a Japanese firm, the individual's responsibilities for a given job are left vague, and an entire section or department works as a unit to meet a single goal. . . . 1

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Another way of characterizing personality of the individual socialized in the Japanese system is that of "role-playing and role-living [which] substitute for individuality of thought and action." In this conceptualization action is subordinated to the group.

Richard Halloran speaks of the individual's relationship to the group in terms of "We the Japanese." The subordination of the individual is generalized in first person in the following manner.

As I grew up, my parents taught me to keep my own thoughts to myself if I didn't agree with other people. It is very important, they said, that my actions and thoughts be in harmony with the actions and thoughts of other people with whom I have a personal relationship, and to subordinate myself to our family and the school and the company.

Ruth Benedict focuses on another aspect of the observed group behavior. She depicts the role of the individual within Japanese society as necessarily governed by self-discipline, and does not stress the subordination of the individual to the group.

Japanese of all classes judge themselves and others in terms of a whole set of concepts which depend upon their notion of a generalized technical self-control and self-governance. . . . No matter at what price of self-discipline, a man should manifest the Japanese spirit.

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Though she does not relate the individual to the group in discussing self-discipline, that is an important aspect of individual action in any social system, and she contrasts that with a supposed decline of self discipline in American society.

Chie Nakane, though, considers the problems of self discipline in Japanese society in terms of group organization. Among equals within any group, she believes there is no regulated pattern of discipline. However, Japanese group structure, both within and among groups, is hierarchically organized, and in the relationship of a junior to his superior "a junior takes every care to avoid any open confrontation with his superior." 5

The avoidance of such open and bald negative expression [as 'no,' or 'I disagree'] is rooted in the fear that it might hurt the feelings of a superior and that, in extreme circumstances, it could involve the risk of being cast out from the group as an undesirable. 6

That is why, she says, that at a group meeting a member "should put forward an opinion in terms that are safe and advantageous to himself, rather than state a judgement in objective terms appropriate to the point at issue. 7

6 Ibid., p. 37.
7 Ibid.
Such consciousness of ranking order and position in a group requires an emphasis on self discipline. Benedict addresses this aspect of the relationships that are formed. By so doing she does not suggest negative connotations that might be imparted by defining relationships in terms such as "subordination." Nor is there any implication in Benedict of the subjugation of individual thought or action through the exercise of self discipline. On the contrary, self discipline within the Japanese system of order implies forthright participation to maintain position and ranking within and among groups. Prior to discussing participation in greater detail, though, some further attention should be given to the various terminology that has been employed to discuss the individual's relationship to small groups—considered an essential element in the discussion of Japanese behavior.

Hajime Nakamura has a different way of characterizing the Japanese individual's relationship to the group from the other observers mentioned above. He emphasizes the overriding importance of a "limited social nexus" consisting of a "tight bond of limited social scope [which] is preserved through social rituals. . . sensitive observance of rules of conduct, [and] suppression of criticism. . . ." 8 Somewhat

differently, Kiyoshi Seike characterizes the Japanese
character as "other oriented," saying, "[The Individual]
does what he is expected to do, he says what he is expected
to say, he abides by an intricate code of etiquette." This
is in contrast to a self-oriented individual in the West
which many observers take to be a weaker concept of self
identity and thought in the Japanese individual ego than is
found in the Western counterpart. This observer suggests
below that there is no such weakness in awareness and ack-
nowledgement of self identity in the Japanese ego, vis-a-
vis the Western ego.

Reischauer, in commenting recently on Japanese culture,
attempts to explain the "group oriented" nature of Japanese.
For the uninitiated observer, however, the following termi-
nology might also lead to confirmation of the mistaken notion
that stress on close group cooperation likewise necessitates
a loss of self identity. The reasons for such close "group
cooperation," he astutely observes, are ecological and
historical.

A basic reason for the difference of Japanese cul-
ture from that of America is that it grew up in a
relatively small and heavily populated land, under
the influence of another country, China, which,
though large, had a similarly dense population.
The East Asian climate, because it encouraged the
cultivation of rice, helped produce these large
populations and also required close group coopera-
tion for the management of water supplies necessary
to this form of agriculture. The opening of new

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lands could not be accomplished by individual initiative but required group effort. People lived closely together in large numbers and in heavy dependence on one another. This required an emphasis on group interests, skills in group decision making and the avoidance of frictions between families who would be neighbors for generations.10

Because of a dense population and the environmental requirements of sustenance on islands of largely mountainous terrain, Reischauer concludes that other interests are placed ahead of "individual preferences."

Such conditions produced the remarkable group orientation that the Japanese people show today and their tendency to place the interests of family, community, business and company ahead of their own individual preferences.11

Thus, he says, "Although this system is irksome to many Japanese and intolerably restrictive to some, it characterizes Japan as we know it today." It is also different from any other advanced nation today, he adds. Furthermore, this system of organization has proved valuable to Japan as [T]he vast proliferation of personal choices, and the extraordinary complexity of social organization have thrown some other industrialized democracies into internal confusion and produced a marked lowering of social cohesiveness. Japan stands alone among the advanced nations of the world as relatively little affected by such divisive forces.12


11 Ibid., p. 24.

12 Ibid.
In other words, Reischauer argues that "group effort," where "individual preferences" are subordinated to other interests such as family, has helped Japan retain its basic system of order and "hold together in the past century and a half of rapid change."\textsuperscript{13} "Individual initiative," according to Reischauer, has not been a major factor in the growth of this particular political system.

The use of the terminology "individual initiative" to characterize differences in the two systems is potentially misleading, however. Such characterization could be interpreted to imply less individual thought and action than found in the West. Reischauer notes, however, that the Japanese have been lacking in "broad-ranging philosophic minds," and have, therefore, "preferred to turn inward, perfecting themselves through Zen or other practices... rather than working out through clear verbal analysis a pathway for all mankind."\textsuperscript{14} While turning inward has not encouraged the development of such natural law "universals" as human rights and equality in the Western sense, nevertheless, Reischauer's point is that the Japanese system has emphasized the "individual self over the generalized whole." Thus, he argues that, "The strength of Japanese character is closely linked with the tradition of self-cultivation and self-discipline."\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{13}Ibid. \hspace{1em} \textsuperscript{14}Ibid., p. 14 \hspace{1em} \textsuperscript{15}Ibid., p. 15.
Self-discipline is an important individual characteristic, then, for both Reischauer and Benedict. Seemingly, though, Reischauer's use of "self-cultivation" and "self-discipline" would be contrary to the idea of subordination of "individual and national interests ahead of individual preferences." Depending on the precise manner in which this terminology is interpreted, however, the statements may all carry extensive insight.

The problem with this particular terminology, though, in trying to distinguish Japanese from Western "culture" is that self-discipline and self-cultivation are important in both systems of order. Individual thought and action, that Reischauer attributes to Western individualism, also implies extensive self-discipline. It is this author's belief, elaborated on below, that the object the self-discipline is primarily directed toward is perceived as different. In the Japanese system one has primary responsibility to his own intimate small groups. In the West, responsibility may tend to be more directly oriented toward universals, such as justice and equality. Based upon this primary orientation to the abstract universals, then, Western man forms groupings. Such groupings, it may also be argued, were necessary for the opening of new lands on the continents, just as in the Japanese archipelago. Group effort, and not strictly individual initiative--the individual acting on his own--has
been required. The American frontier was settled largely by families and small groups of people advancing incrementally westward, not by individuals.

The question then, is how does one reconcile the repeatedly observed phenomena of "group orientation" and activity in the Japanese system of order with generally admitted differences found in oft-labelled Western "individualism," when both require a highly developed sense of self-cultivation and self-discipline. Murayama Motofusu prefers the term "cooperative individualism" (Kyojoteki kojin shugi) for the Japanese system, as opposed to "competitive individualism" for the West. Ideally, the Japanese under cooperative individualism maintains his self identity within the group. Because the self is retained there is heterogeneity as well as tolerance for dissent both within and among groups.16 The notion that Japanese are "homogeneous" is thus challenged by Murayama. If the heterogeneity of groups is valid, as Murayama suggests, then groups are highly competitive. That does not rule out, however, the idea that the individual may be competitive within groups. The only overriding consideration within, as well as among, groups is that competition be structured and controlled so that harmony and cooperation may be maintained.

Perceived Attachment to Group

The Japanese individual raised in Japan is, by and large, socialized to a different set of priorities than his counterpart in the U.S. Members of family, school, one's university club and company all constitute small groupings in which close, or even intimate ties, can be developed and maintained throughout life. Such small groups are concrete entities. That is, the individual either knows everyone in the group or is intimately familiar with, as in the case of the company or university, the function and physical proximity of the particular group. There is little abstract attachment that is required. In this system of order one's primary duty, obligation and loyalty is ideally to the group, not first to an abstract ultimate value. Once attachment is made to a group, either through choice or requirement, it is difficult to break that tie. Intimacy is cultivated, and the individual helps to mold and at the same time acquires the values of the particular group or groups of which he is a member.  

Importantly, in this system of order the values, and consequently organizational style, may vary from group to group within the same function. The organizational styles of Toyota and Nissan, for instance, are completely different.

17 Further consideration of the individual's perceived attachment to group is made in Chapter 6 in a discussion of survey data relating to Japanese national character.
Toyota relies upon a network of suppliers integrated in close proximity and financially to the main production facilities. Nissan's suppliers are widely dispersed, geographically and financially. Also, though school curriculums are standardized, each school assumes different characteristics and specialities, and loyalty is inculcated, not directly to an abstract "Japanese educational system," but to the particular schools which one attends. Likewise, families and local communities assume individual characteristics and values that are indeed quite different.

There are up to 100,000 different kami in Japan under several different sects of Shinto, as well as several different sects of Buddhism. The influence of Confucianism remains strong, and there is a constant one percent of the population that is Christian. Though data supporting this thesis is limited, this observer believes that there is considerable value diversity in Japan. There is no one set of higher abstract values to which the individual owes direct allegiance. Rather such allegiance or acknowledgement of higher abstract values comes as a secondary attachment—as a result of membership in a group. The individual is socialized to an order system that stresses membership in small groups, each of which establishes its own priorities.

and ways of organizing to achieve its tasks. This necessi-
tates tolerance for diversity and dissent, both within and
among groups. But it also necessitates the orderly arrange-
ment and control of the competition that naturally exists
between any two organizations attempting the same function.
Thus, a hierarchy of authority is established, similar to
that in Shinto. There is diversity of values and approaches
to organizational style among groups. But of necessity
there is acknowledged consolidation of authority as one
moves toward the top of the hierarchy.

The individual in such a system of order retains a
strong concept of self and individual thought as well as
action. In a survey question put to respondents in 1978
to determine aspects of Japanese national character by the
Institute of Statistical Mathematics, 74 percent thought
most people, "Think only of themselves" as opposed to trying
to be helpful to others. Self discipline is necessary, as
it is in other social systems. What is different, and the
only significant difference for the individual in the Japanese
system of order, as this observer believes, is that an indi-
vidual's primary concern or orientation is to the small
group to which he belongs. In that manner the most impor-
tant values can include emphasis on harmony and cooperation.

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19 Tokei Suri Kenkyuzyo (The Institute of Statistical
Mathematics), Nipponzin no Kokuminsei (4) (A Study of the
Japanese National Character), (Tokyo: Idemitsu Shoten, 1982),
p. 456.
(wa) as a means of resolving disputes, rather than appeal to higher, more abstract, absolutes such as "god" or "justice." Higher values are mediated and interpreted by the group and may vary from group to group. The individual's primary attachment is focused on the specific groups of which he becomes a member, and there is expectation that the individual will assume the value priorities as interpreted by the group. To be effective in this system of order, then, one must, and indeed is expected to, contribute to the group in terms of the specific value orientation that has been established for that particular group. For the continued survival of the group, changes in certain lesser values or ethics may occur. They are often incremental in nature, as the group as a whole must agree and abide by the changes. Nevertheless, rather rapid change is possible, as demonstrated in the case of computer policy development, when external conditions threaten the viability of the groups.

As the group confronts its environment, the overriding concern of all within the group is maintenance and preservation of the group. As there are innumerable small groupings in the Japanese system, competition among the groups is intense, yet controlled. Both Michio Morishima and Masanori Moritani, for example, attribute Japan's economic success to the peculiarities of the Japanese "ethos" that incorporates the values of harmony, but also duty and loyalty into groups that are small, exclusive and intimate. These groupings are
highly competitive, as evidenced by domestic economic competition, but there is normally willingness to accept compromise among groups to maintain viability of the system as a whole.\textsuperscript{20} As a result of inter-group competition, individuals within groups, then, of necessity must have strong self identity as well as discipline and cooperation to promote the preservation of the group. Without this, the group may not be able to survive. If the group does not survive, the individual finds it difficult to attach himself to another group. One can only speculate on the reason for the development of this strong attachment to groups. Some attention, however, was given to theories of the origin of such attachments in the previous chapter. Of importance in the immediate discussion, is that the individual perceives primary group attachment as an "efficient," "traditional," and "natural" way of organizing to achieve a given purpose.\textsuperscript{21} The manner in which activity is organized, then, is essentially given, with no means available to logically organize in another manner. The following diagram attempts to illustrate the nature of the ideal concept of individual attachment to groups in Japan.


\textsuperscript{21}One common response to queries of, "Why do Japanese perceive the group to be so important?" is, "We've always done it this way," or, "It's efficient."
A commonly accepted manner of diagramming the Japanese individual's relationship to group is to place the individual within the same plane and circumference as the immediate ultimate, universal values

![Diagram of Japanese Individual's Relationship to Group]

- Perceived ideal primary attachment
- Secondary attachments
- Concrete identification
- Concrete and/or abstract identification
- Abstract identification

Figure 1: Primary Orientation of The Japanese Individual group to which one is attached. While such a diagram serves to illustrate the importance of the group as one's primary concern, it does not readily convey the idea of development of self. By placing the individual outside of and below the immediate small group, the diagram illustrates the

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relationship of the single individual to group direct attachment that may be found in a Japanese hierarchical arrangement of order where the individual is associated firstly to household and local community and then to higher authority. Regardless of one's status in the system, there is always a higher authority to whom one owes obedience. Authority is analyzed in greater detail in the following chapter. But for the present the concept of obedience to an immediate higher authority for each individual, regardless of stature, is an important aspect of the Japanese system of order.

Certainly, the individual, and particularly the working male, becomes attached to more than one small group during his lifetime. Though the number of such groups may be several, they are rarely as societally broad based and as socio-economically varied in membership as those in the West. More often than not, if one participates in recreational or extracurricular activities, they are sponsored by the school or company to which one belongs. Though there are many exceptions, the purpose of keeping activities "in house" is to foster better understanding and communication among all participating members of the group. The ideal is to promote cooperation. It is reasonably assumed in this system that the most efficient way to promote such cooperation is to encourage common activity. One leading communications equipment manufacturer, seeing the need to improve communication among its own office personnel, adopted the slogan, "HiCom," for "high
communication." The way such improved communications was fostered within the office, though, was not through the introduction of on-line terminals and other sophisticated office hardware, but rather through the promotion of employee participation in after hours company-sponsored extra-curricular activities. By so doing, it was reasoned, there would be better understanding (and therefore, communication) among the employees.

This example is not necessarily political, but rather, more sociological in nature. It is representative, though, of the type of association occurring in a group activity where the individual is encouraged to work within and incorporate the particular value structure defined by that group. Secondly, it illustrates the influence of values over technology. Technology plays a secondary role. In spite of rapid changes brought about through the use of technology, the fundamental system of order and value structure has not changed significantly. The emphasis in contemporary Japanese group associations remains with the small group and the individual's direct attachment to it.

Self and Group

There is some, albeit limited, support for the thesis that the self in the Japanese system is, and must be, strong, and that considerable "individualism" is demanded. Takeo Doi has presented a widely recognized, though not universally
accepted, thesis supporting the Japanese affinity for small group attachment. He argues that the individual in Japan is socialized from birth to value a psychological trait in humankind not inculcated in the West and mentioned only in passing by Freud. The essence of the Japanese psyche, Doi argues, is what Freud labels "passive object love" (in Japanese, amaeru). For the Japanese, this concept connotes dependence. The closer and more intimate one becomes with others in a group, the more dependent one may be, and the freer one is to do and to be, in the existential sense.

Translated into political terms, within the group, or in the whole realm of human relationships, the closer the relationship one develops with another or others, the freer one is to express one's beliefs and to do as one wishes. Such freedom, for Doi and most other Japanese observers, is optimally accomplished in small groupings. For Doi, the greatest dependent relationship he observes is that between mother and child, with the child being the most dependent. This type of dependent relationship is nurtured throughout one's life. Politically, this concept of Doi's helps to explain much of the Japanese individual's relationship to group and the preference for organization into smaller groupings for task achievement. It also means that within

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the group the Japanese individual may experience his greatest freedom—the freedom to do and be. The next Chapter discusses more fully the theoretical linkage of traditional concepts of freedom and equality with contemporary political organization.

The individual in Japan, then, is reared to value freedom. But it is perceived as freedom within a different system of order, and, therefore, for the Western political observer, perhaps freedom of a different kind. The assumption that the strength of self in the Japanese psyche is comparable to that of the West is supported in part by Doi. He does not discuss the relationship between self and the group at length, but in his discussion of amae he notes briefly the need for a strong sense of self.

I subsequently developed these studies [on amae-ru], seeking to examine all kinds of different pathologies of mind from the viewpoint of amae, and this led me in time to a realization of the close connection between amae and the awareness of self as expressed in the Japanese word jibun. . . . In a paper I read at the fifty-sixth conference of the Japanese Psychiatric and Neurological Association, I emphasized that this awareness of a jibun presumed the existence of an inner desire to amaeru, and made itself felt in opposition to that desire. To put it briefly, a man who has a jibun is capable of checking amae, while a man who is at the mercy of amae has no jibun. This is true of so-called normal people. Persons with schizophrenia, in whom the awareness of the self is abnormal, would seem to represent cases where there is a latent desire for amae but no experience of relations with others involving amae.24

24Ibid., pp. 19-20.
Universality and the Individual

Some writers base the individuality and strength of the Japanese self on religious and philosophical traditions. Nakamura Hajime notes that linguistic practice de-emphasizes the significance of the individual in ordinary situations by placing more stress on "conflation" and cooperation among different individuals than on confrontation as in the West. One means of doing this is by limiting the use of "I" in communication to only situations where it is necessary.

Japanese, he argues, are empirical and particularistic and oriented to the immediate experience. "The focus of the Japanese on the facts of life did not allow for the abstraction from experience of a concept of the individual 'as such,' in isolation," Nevertheless, there is an important corollary to this for Nakamura which promotes individuality.

Henceforth, it has often been said in the West as a cliche that Westerners tend to be individualistic and dirempitive, whereas Easterners tend to be monistic or all-embracing. But...this is wrong. Insofar as Japanese thought is concerned, we can say with certainty that the Japanese have tended to be individualistic, due to the attitude of focusing on immediate experience directly.

Japanese, he believes, have tended to focus on the concrete immediate experience, rather than the higher abstract universal as Western man has. In making valuative judgment of


26 Ibid., p. 155.
his analysis, he hopes that the importation of Western logic can make Japanese more aware of the universal. However, he concludes that such drastic change in attitude is not likely to occur readily.

It is important for the Japanese people as a nation to develop the habits and language tools of logically exact thinking. We cannot foresee the developments in the future, but industrialization, which is going on very rapidly in contemporary Japan, does not seem to change the above-mentioned features very much or easily, but to develop along the lines which have been long established and practiced among the people. It is natural that the Japanese do not want to lose their traditional aesthetic and empirical attitude.27

Japanese, in sum, for Nakamura, have a strong sense of self. However, it is not openly verbalized except when relevant to particular situations. There did not develop a clear-cut concept of the individual as an independent, objective unit. The individual, he believes, "is always found existing in a network of human relationships," which means location of the individual in experience, not the abstract. Emphasis in the Japanese system has always been on the "concrete immediacy" of the living being and not on the inanimate abstract being.28

Shinto, in that regard is considered unique, because it is a living, dynamic and, therefore, changing religion.29

Confucianism, Hocking believes, has also been important in promoting Japanese individualism. "Confucianism," he says,

27Ibid.
28Ibid., p. 146.
29William Ernest Hocking, "A Brief Note on Individuality in East and West," in Ibid., p. 94.
"has called on the individual worshipper to find in that relationship a specific 'calling' in which...he must succeed. He also notes that the individuality of Confucianism bestows uniqueness

not alone in what [the individual] is, but in what he does. His life may be expected to yield something significant—not only different—and something which no one else can do. In this deed, the individual is realized.\[31\\]

The peculiarity of the West, he says, is that it "assumes individuality as potentially present in the human infant...wholly apart from any manifestation of capacity to contribute an 'individual' point of view to the judgment of experience. This type of individuality Hocking labels, "non-differential," and Western institutions since early Christian and Roman times have given expression to this kind of demand for respect. "God's love for the soul," he believes,

established a norm to which the mores must conform; and non-difference has had no limiting effect on individuality, because mankind is in fact all alike in willing to be different.\[33\\]

From this non-differential background, then, Hocking argues that the "rights of man," the "rights to life," and personal liberties have arisen. Western individuality has strength, therefore, in potential—the potential of man—but not on

\[30\text{Ibid.}\] \[31\text{Ibid.}\] \[32\text{Ibid., p. 95.}\] \[33\text{Ibid., pp. 95-96.}\] \[34\text{Ibid.}\]
realization of individuality. "The West," he argues, "is full of hypocritical equalities and empty respect toward individualities not realized."\(^{35}\)

Not only Confucianism, but also Buddhism stresses pursuit of "realization." For Buddhism, "The essence of religion lies in the immediate experience of the divine." Thus, the West, by emphasizing scientific knowledge, knowledge of self, society and religion, is drawn toward objective truth. The East (including Japan), however, has emphasized a type of knowledge "in which the distinction between subject and object yields place to an experience of unity, an immediate awareness of its theme."\(^{36}\)

For Hocking, individuality, whether in the East or West, arises from social situations in which the ego, in dealing with others, realizes "it is also a thou." From such relationships, reciprocity is demanded and the notion of a "rule" arises which makes demands upon the ego, but which does not nourish the uniqueness of the individual ego. However, Hocking argues, such uniqueness is necessary for a society to sustain its life, and this creates a paradox: "for law-obeying cannot be universal unless law-making has in principle a corresponding universality. . .what we might define as a custom providing for the breach of custom."\(^{37}\)

\(^{35}\)Ibid., p. 96. \(^{36}\)Ibid. \(^{37}\)Ibid., p. 92.
Though Hocking does not consider Japan specifically in his analysis, the informal rules under which the Japanese system operates, such as "administrative guidance" by bureaucratic agencies, provides the means by which formal, restrictive laws may be broadly enforced with a minimum of conflict and inefficiency so that the system may sustain itself. Such informal decision making is considered in greater detail in Chapters VII and VIII. For the present, the nature of individuality and self has consequences for much contemporary political analysis of the Japanese system.

The Patron-Client Model

Japan at times presents a political anomaly for observers. Description of the system sometimes results in the use of terminology, that, taken on its own, without qualification and elaboration, appears self contradictory. The use of Japan as a "feudal democracy" to describe the "organizational ethos" of the contemporary political system is, to this observer, such a characterization. As a label it imparts little explanation. The term has been used, though, because observers seek to establish differences encountered between contemporary Western and Japanese systems. The Japanese system, many observe, has carried a large number of formal and informal structures and values down to the present.

For example, Japan is often pictured as a recently modernized country\(^3^9\) that is still reliant on many of the traditional organizational methods developed during Tokugawa. The building block of Japanese society it is observed, remains the group and not strictly the family or the individual. Loyalty and obligation remain dominant over the Western concept of individual human rights.\(^4^0\) Contemporary Japan, however, is as, and perhaps more, politically, economically and socially developed as any Western political system. It is simply organized according to a different concept of order than that of the West, and as such, is difficult to label.

In order to characterize the system for Western audiences, the patron-client model, often employed for developing countries, is frequently used.\(^4^1\) Yet, the Japanese system is challenging Western economic systems for economic supremacy.

Robert E. Gamer uses the patron-client model approach to explain the politics of the developing nations, hoping that future social and political structures may be


reintegrated as they have been under traditional patron-client systems.\textsuperscript{42} The concept of "patron-client" is defined in different ways,\textsuperscript{43} but Gamer employs John Duncan Powell's definition which (1) is a tie between two parties of unequal status and wealth, (2) establishes a relationship based on reciprocity, particularly in the exchange of goods and services, and (3) is maintained through personal face to face contact between two parties.\textsuperscript{44} Gamer does not apply this general model to Japan.

Nobutaka Ike, however, does speak of Japan in terms of a patron-client democracy.\textsuperscript{45} For Ike the model is of an elitist type with the predominance of vertical relationships on an individual basis between patrons and clients, as well as horizontal ties found in voluntary associations. Individuals, he says, tend to relate to the political system through their patrons, and they trade their votes for


\textsuperscript{44}John Duncan Powell, "Peasant Society and Clientist Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 64 (June 1970), pp. 412-413, as quoted in Gamer, op. cit., p. 103.

\textsuperscript{45}Nobutaka Ike, op. cit., Preface.
particularistic benefits. Ike notes, however, that "A logical extension of patron-client relationships into the larger political setting would be rule by a strong man, a kind of benevolent dictator. But it is evident that the Japanese have avoided rule by a strong man and have preferred to operate through groups." He astutely observes that the Japanese system cannot readily be compared with Western democratic counterparts. But, to apply the patron-client model as most commonly used does not carry the explanatory power for the Japanese system that a model might. Though it is a model that is designed to portray community boundings, the vertical ties formed by separate individuals directly to the patron are stressed. The importance of preservation of the group itself is not. Ike believes, for instance, that horizontal associations, especially within a group, are only voluntary and rudimentary.

This observer believes that the reason Japan has never achieved the logical extension of the patron-client model to that of a strong-man rule, benevolent dictator or king, rule has been due to the influence of horizontal relationships and the importance of the maintenance of the group itself.

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47 Ibid., p. 379.
The group, as an entity, acts as an intervening variable between the patron and client. Though there is direct contact between patron and client and because paternalistic ties are important, the system has never valued vertical ties to the exclusion of horizontal ones and the preservation of separate independent groupings such as the village or company. Elaboration of this theme is considered in the next chapter in a discussion of authority.

For Japan, the system of order is not dependent upon either the maintenance of one particular leader or the maintenance of particular individual ties to the leader. Emphasis is rather on the maintenance and growth of the group. It is through the preservation and promotion of group prosperity that each individual in the group, and likewise the leader, may prosper. The personal relations established between the leader and his clients are important. They are encouraged. But the nature of leadership expectations and decision making in the Japanese system is not that of the Western pattern. In the Japanese system, responsibility of the client as well as the patron is to the group and not to the respective individualities. When threatened, for instance, the group quite easily changes leaders. Leadership is dependent upon group support, and such support quickly erodes if there is any threat to the survival or integrity of the group.
The political influence of former Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka, for example, remains because his political supporters and constituency in Niigata in Western Honshu have enjoyed prosperity and have not been embarrassed as a group by the Lockheed scandals. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party also is a consolidation of factions under collective leadership, and as a political entity it is not dependent upon the success or failure of one person. Likewise, corporate heads must generally resign if the corporation faces any substantive public humiliation, whether illegal, per se, or not. 50

Further consideration is given the role of leadership in subsequent chapters, and the application of the patron-client model is discussed in Chapter IV. For the individual client in this model, though, his loyalty is to the group. His sacrifice is for the preservation of the group. Any attachment to a particular leader is ideally for the sacrifice of self for the prosperity of the group as a whole. The group attachment is primary, and final loyalty is owed to the group, not the leader.

50 As in the case of the forced resignation of the President of Mitsukoshi Department Stores for alleged irregularities. The prestige of the Company was the major issue forcing the resignation in 1983, despite the President's determination to remain in office.
Change and the Individual

Though structures and roles have changed to meet contemporary demands on the system, the ideal of the individual's primary attachment to group has not changed significantly. In other words, the fundamental concept of order has not undergone great change since Tokugawa. The result is that the concept of individual human rights, as it has been imported from the West, has not been internalized in the same manner as it has in the Western individual. Order and change in the system is discussed further in succeeding chapters. This section discusses changes in relation to the individual.

Traditionally, the individual in the Japanese system of order has been conceptualized within a framework of existence that emphasizes empirical immediacy received through the senses. This stands in contrast with the logical realism of the West. Nature and society to the Japanese individual are accepted as they appear to the senses. Therefore, they are indeterminate, and there is innumerable variety and subtle nuances in human interaction. Because of this, Kawashima Takeyoshi believes that social order in Japan has been based upon social obligation, the exact content of which is indeterminate. This indeterminateness is idealized in the concept of harmony, or concord (wa). Historically, this ideal was formalized in the "Seventeen-Article Constitution"
of Prince Shotoku in the Seventh Century. Because this ideal has been carried down to the present, Kawashima believes that "there has been no place for the concept of 'human rights'" within the Japanese system of order.

Where indeterminate social obligation exists, Kawashima notes in a discussion on individual rights, distinctions between "good" and "bad" cannot be made. If they are, then harmony cannot exist. Therefore, in the Japanese system of order there is no notion of the universal "right" of the individual that is distinct and fixed. The individual is not considered to be a separate entity as under Western positive law. "Rather, his interest is absorbed in the interest of the collectivity to which he belongs, and the interest of the collectivity is recognized as having primary importance."53

Prior to the outbreak of hostilities between Japan and China in 1937, the Ministry of Education stressed the theme of harmony in attempting to unify the nation toward a single ideological orientation. One statement contrasts wa with the Western notion of harmony and cooperation.

52Ibid.
53Ibid.
The wa of our country is not mechanical cooperation, starting from reason, of equal individuals independent of each other, but the grand harmony taiwa which maintains its integrity by proper statuses of individuals within the collectivity and by acts in accordance with these statuses. . . . Not conflicts, but harmony is final.54

Today, the concept of taiwa is not used, and Kawashima believes that the Japanese system is moving toward inclusion of the concept of "right" as a counterpart to social obligation. But this is only because of "industrialization and disintegration of traditional social structure." Community or Gemeinschaften, he states, is still a fundamental characteristic of the Japanese system in spite of the Occupation's attempt to create more "individualism" and instill the Western value of human rights.55 Essentially, the Occupation, as noted by Reischauer (above), changed little of the fundamental value structure of the Japanese system of order.

Where there is the indeterminateness of social obligations, for the individual

there is lacking the antithesis between the actual social world and legal rules which is characteristic of Western society. Given such an image, law is not expected to function with the precision of a machine. A lawsuit which in its nature makes distinctions between right and wrong, is a contradiction to the social order. . . .hence it is undesirable. . . .56

Kawashima argues in his presentation that the notion of human rights, as an ideal, has received more acceptance

54 Ibid.  
55 Ibid., p. 276.  
56 Ibid., pp. 274-275.
since the War, particularly through the increase in the number of lawsuits and growth in contemporary citizen activist movements (Jiyu Minken Undo). Nevertheless, he believes that the changes are being made within a framework of order that is distinctly Japanese, and that the key to understanding Japan is to understand the image that society has of the individual.

The case of Japan suggests that the image of the individual which a society holds is the key concept with which it is possible to understand the basic characteristics of legal thought and the structure of the law of the society.

The image of the individual in the Japanese system of order is an important element in understanding the nature of the value structure and what is most important to indigenous Japanese.

The terms under which Japan brought itself to a level equal to that of the Western nations without being dominated by them were accomplished through the particular perception of order peculiar to Japan. Western technology was imported, and Japan changed. Technological, economic and political development occurred. But it occurred through a traditional "Japanese spirit." Political institutions were borrowed, but they were more for appearance than substance. For the individual today, though he is quite aware of "individual rights,"

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57 Ibid., pp. 267-274.
58 Ibid., p. 275.
the expression of those "rights" is based on Western assumptions that he will likely not recognize nor be able to verbalize. Those assumptions are based upon what Margaret Mead and Ruth Benedict have called a "cultural unconscious."\(^59\)

Kazuko Tsurumi, in a study of child-adult socialization before and after World War II, has concluded that societies underestimate their potential for change, and that such a radical change in socialization occurred in Japan after the War as well as during early Meiji. Modernization, she argues, produces conflict, and little thought, she says, was given to whether traditional values at the time of the Meiji Restoration required changes.\(^60\) Likewise, changes in the immediate post-war period have led Tsurumi to conclude that Japan is being transformed from a pre-war "communal-totalitarian" society to a predominately "communal-mass" society.\(^61\) Japan, she believes, is tradition-directed (communal) but at the same time is becoming other-directed, characteristic of mass societies, with some individuals exhibiting more of one, or both, characteristics.\(^62\) As an example of post-war

\(^{59}\)Barnlund, op. cit., pp. 21-22.


\(^{61}\)Ibid., p. 212.

\(^{62}\)Ibid., p. 8.
change in values, Tsurumi cites the widespread feeling of betrayal by government as leading to an eclipse of the Emperor system.\textsuperscript{63}

In hindsight, though, the extension of this expression of despair following the war was perhaps premature. It led to the conclusion that the emperor system would decline, and that subsequent movement toward "mass" society would proceed. Polls show no current trend in that direction. According to a poll taken in 1975, 80 percent of those polled felt the emperor should remain as a symbol. Seven percent felt the emperor should have more power, and only 10 percent did not want the emperor retained as a symbol—virtually the same (11 percent) that felt that way in 1946. The general attitude was that the emperor symbolized the people's spiritual home.\textsuperscript{64} The polls are normally interpreted today as favoring retention of the emperor. While the environment within which the political system functions has changed, as well as structures within the political system itself, still the core values underlying the basic system of order have not changed. Furthermore, due to Japan's economic successes today, the basic system of order is justified and supported. There is no reason to seek drastic change in an order that has led Japan to the brink of a "Pax Japonica." The problem

\textsuperscript{63}Ibid., pp. 186-187.

\textsuperscript{64}Sofue Takao, et. al., Bunka to Ningen (Culture and Human Beings), Edited, (Tokyo: Shogaku-kan, 1982), pp. 178-179.
is that this system is not well understood, and that is why terminology describing the system appears contradictory and Japan and the individual are viewed as at once "traditional" as well as "modern."

Robert J. Lifton has made a study of historical change in imagery held by Japanese youth. Many college students in Japan have felt that traditional ideologies and family life were irrelevant and inadequate for contemporary life. In seeking a break in the connection with the past, though, Lifton concludes that the break is at best partial. Regardless of the political inclination behind the stated reasons for dissent, whether to the right, center, or to the left, there exists a strong underlying theme of restoring the principles of the past, to accommodate, or to be in symbolic spiritual harmony with, the past. What seems like a contradiction, where students may demand the most radical changes in society, while possessing a relatively unchanged character structure, is explained by Lifton in terms of the desire for "ultimate unity." Such ultimate unity is grounded for the Japanese youth in the mother-child relationship "prior to the child's sense of differentiation into a separate individual." This relationship is akin to Doi's amae-ru, though he does not mention this source. Lifton believes,

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66 Ibid., pp. 172-173.
however, that this relationship—this cultural model—is so commonly-held and enduring as an emotional-symbolic substrate "that we may well look upon it as a major psycho-biological universal underlying all historical change. . . ." The differences in imagery, or belief patterns, is then due to "accommodation," which, he feels, is "demanded by an advanced industrial society." Thus, "historical change," he believes, "cannot be generated without making use of the individual and cultural past. . . [through] the continuous process of fusion of symbols and reshaping of imagery. . . ." Change is constantly occurring, but the imagery employed by individuals to meet these changes come from the past—from one's genetic and sociological programming. Reality for the individual is thus defined in terms of the past.

Summary

To recapitulate, the ideas presented in the mura kyodotai concept of organization assume a set of "core values" that are perceived as indigenous only to the Japanese archipelago. The need for regularity, or order, has found expression in the highest values associated with Japan's traditional religions. Shinto, the only indigenous religion remains the most influential, providing the structure of authority upon

Ibid., p. 173.
Ibid.
which government, including both consolidated authority and decentralized, village community life, has been based. Buddhism has provided direction, particularly in worship of the dead and in the concern for harmony (wa). Confucianism has provided the social cement, or moral force, to maintain order in the system, with its instruction to duty and obligation to higher authority. These traditional values have not changed significantly over time and have provided the foundation upon which Japanese political organization has accommodated itself to environmental influences.

The *mura* (village) has been the fundamental political unit and basis of authority in the development of the Japanese political system. Two precepts of Shinto, polytheism and conflated authority of church and state, aided in the legitimation of small, intimate village and sub-village units through which problems of every nature are resolved. Authority is, thus, both decentralized, yet with the recognition of the need to consolidate local autonomous units in a hierarchy of authority toward the top. The retention of the small, intimate sub-municipal unit in decision-making has meant a group-oriented behavior that allows for diversity among the various groupings. It also implies extensive participation within and among groups, with emphasis on cooperation and consensus. This has meant that leadership historically has been collective with the absence of a single, absolute authority.
The individual in this concept retains strong concept of self. The only distinction perceived with other systems is that the individual is socialized to attach himself directly to group and the corresponding values and "gods that his own particular group reveres. The consolidation of authority in the system has respected this value diversity, and the system has moved into the twentieth century utilizing a particular perception of how accommodation to the environment should be accomplished, as succeeding chapters seek to demonstrate.
PART II

THE CONCEPT TODAY
CHAPTER V

SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS

Postwar Socioeconomic Changes

Government economic policy in the postwar period actively promoted the development of both secondary and primary industry. By retaining the economic viability of agricultural production on small acreage as a means to promote greater agricultural independence in the world economy, government policy, in effect, has provided an economic justification for the maintenance of the mura kyodotai concept. There were two reasons for promoting agriculture. First, there was the desire for food security and self-dependence in agriculture. Equally as important was the need to "maintain political stability [and] the underlying stability of rural life," which was the political basis on which Japan's rapid economic growth has been built.1

Japan has urbanized since the War, but that has not meant a corresponding change in the values it has held most important. Minami Hiroshi believes that postwar urbanization has not brought about a change to cosmopolitan thinking

or openness to outsiders. Furthermore, he says, although urban growth has caused increased confusion and insecurity, it has not brought about feelings of dissatisfaction, nor a Western type of individualism. Neither have widespread functionally differential relationships commonly associated with modernization theory developed appreciably. These functionally differential relationships, he believes, will not be developed, nor are they creatable under the mura shakai (village society) concept.

From the end of the War, the percent of those employed in primary industry (agriculture, forestry, fishing) has declined from 48.5 percent in 1950 to 10.9 percent in 1980. In 1961, Prime Minister Ikeda introduced an "incomes doubling policy" to double GNP every ten years. This led to an average 10 percent yearly increase in G.N.P. throughout the 1960's and early 1970's. The agricultural population by 1961 had declined to its prewar level of 30 percent of the total workforce. By 1980 the proportion of the population employed in agriculture represented 9.7 percent of the population—a considerable reduction in twenty years, but still

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3 Ibid.


5 Ibid., p. 23.
a substantial work force. For a farm to be economically viable, it was determined that each farmer needed approximately 2 hectares (approximately 5 acres). Migration from farm to city was to be done slowly, by attrition, which would cause a gradual displacement of approximately 1.4 million workers.\textsuperscript{6} Government farm policy, thus, aided the retention of a strong agricultural base and, at the same time, large numbers of small farming households. One of the major means of accomplishing this was by keeping the support price for rice well above the world market price, thereby supporting the rice farmer.\textsuperscript{7}

Moreover, while the population structure has changed dramatically in the last 20 years, Kenzo Hemmi and Yujiro Hayami argue that farmers have not really wanted to migrate, and that the employment figures by industry sector do not adequately represent the characteristics of the Japanese socio-economic system today. When the number of active "farming households" are examined, they argue, that figure has


remained essentially the same for the last ten years—about 5 million households (over 25 percent of the total), as opposed to 6 million in 1960. While the number of persons employed in agriculture declined by approximately half between 1960 and 1978, there was only a 20 percent decline in the number of farm households. The average size of the farm during this period has increased only 15 percent, to an average of 2.7 acres. Only 13.3 percent of all such households are classified as full-time farmers. The remainder, however, are part-time farming households with one or several members engaged in secondary or tertiary activities. Farmers, Hemmi says, are hesitant to sell their land and migrate, and they cultivate part of their land while holding outside part- or full-time jobs off the land. Hayami concludes that, "Agricultural production may generally be characterized as inseparable from family life." The adjustment from rural to urban resources, thus, requires measurement in generations.

As important as maintaining the economic viability of the small farmer is the philosophy under which secondary and tertiary industry has been developed. There are three significant aspects to this change. First, as is widely recognized, the Occupation did not permanently alter the consolidation

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9 Kenzo Hemmi, Lecture, op. cit.

10 Yujiro Hayami, op. cit., p. 375.
of some business into large conglomerates each of which might engage in many types of business activities (zaikai). The only difference today is that ownership is more diversified and not controlled by a single "family" as in the pre-war period. Control is still based on the general idea of parent-child relationship, with parent companies or their banks holding a controlling financial interest in smaller, branch companies which often need the financial and operational expertise of the parent firms.  

Second, the relationship between employer and employee is still based largely on loyalty, trust and wa, and not fundamentally on contract. Much of the management philosophy of Tokugawa is still considered relevant in today's contemporary business environment. In other words, the philosophy of the mura has shifted from the village to the company. The new president of CDC Japan Ltd., Yasuo Yokoyama, for instance, was chosen by former President David F. Gregg for "his ability to smoothly handle human relations" and a "strong personality which does not bend under pressure." Qualities such as strong leadership and recommendations from subordinates ranked below those first two qualities. Experience in the computer industry ranked last on his list of ten


prerequisites for top corporate executives.\textsuperscript{13} Gregg believes that the "individual oriented system of reward does not work in Japan," and that the traditional practice of rewarding workers on a "team" basis is more effective.\textsuperscript{14} By stressing "team" responsibility and effort, strict functional differentiation has been avoided. Tasks are most often assigned by section with the section as a whole bearing responsibility for a particular assignment. Though tasks are subdivided with individuals given more specific assignments, each person in the small section is obligated to assist others in task completion. The section as a whole, not one single individual, bears responsibility for its particular task. From this type of collegial effort the traditional concept of mura kyodotai, or derivatives thereof, have been perpetuated. Today, the term kyodo chowa (implying harmony) instead of the older "village community" is often heard in top business circles. The meaning and organizational imperatives are essentially the same, however.\textsuperscript{15}

A third trait representative of the small group ideal today is the abundance of small businesses. The proportion of workers employed in companies of 1000 or more employees

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{13} The Japan Economic Journal, November 16, 1982, p. 7.
\item \textsuperscript{14} Ibid. This observation is consistent with remarks made in interview by other business leaders, both Japanese and American, as well as scholars.
\item \textsuperscript{15} Based upon interviews and conversations with leading Japanese business executives and government administrators.
\end{itemize}
was only 15.6 percent in 1975—virtually the same in 1957 (14.6 percent). Those employed in companies of 49 or fewer employees was 44.6 percent in 1975 as opposed to 49.8 percent in 1957. Self-employed proprietors and family workers in 1980 constituted 28.1 percent of the total employed, as opposed to 60.5 in 1950. This means that the changes that have taken place since the end of the War have been organized to retain small business units, not toward strict oligopoly. Fukutake calls this feature of Japan's economy a dual structure. Japan, he observes, ranks second in the free world in G.N.P., yet it still remains a country of small and medium enterprises. Approximately 30 percent of all workers in the U.S., he notes, are employed in enterprises of 1000 or more workers, and only 25 percent are employed in firms of fewer than 100 workers. In Japan, however, 55.6 percent of all workers remain employed in firms of fewer than 100 employees. Joji Watanuki notes that the number of small and medium-sized manufacturers and retail shopkeepers increased during the 1960's from 4.6 million "self-proprietors in nonagricultural industries" in 1960 to 6.0 million in 1970. This group has remained politically powerful and supportive of the ruling Liberal Democratic

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16 Tadashi Fukutake, Japanese Society Today, op. cit., p. 84.
19 Ibid., pp. 84-85.
Party (LDP) in terms of votes and donations.\(^\text{20}\)

The reason, in this author's estimation, for the retention of a large number of small firms in the process of bringing Japan to a level comparable to that of the West, has been the perception of how the indigenous system should be organized. Rapid change has taken place, but it has occurred according to regularities consistent with the system's historical past. The mura principle dictates the primary orientation of the individual to a small grouping, and the small groupings are interrelated and connected both horizontally and vertically. There is the perception of an overriding need to maintain the concrete, intimate relationships that can only be achieved through long term association in small groupings. The small businesses are rarely entities unto themselves. The small business depends upon relationships, not only with clients, but also with suppliers and larger business for contracts, and banks for financing.

The financial dependency of businesses on banks and other businesses has been increasing since the War. In 1978 the ratio of corporate liabilities to total G.N.P. was 0.848, just something under twice that in the U.S.

When individual indebtedness is compared, though, the ratio for individuals is reversed in the two countries. In 1978 the ratios were 0.377 and 0.635 for Japan and the U.S. respectively. Ten years before, in 1968, the ratios were 0.231 and 0.574.  

As much as 60 percent of funds among all Japanese businesses come from external sources. By way of contrast, between 60 to 90 percent of corporate financing in the Western nations is accomplished through internal borrowing. This situation has been expressed as overborrowing and "over-loan" in Japanese corporate finance and is considered a relationship of dependency not only of companies on banks, but also banks and companies on the government. There has also been the historical practice of substantial intercompany borrowing. Recipients of corporate loans have often been the small businessman in service industries, such as agriculture and fishing. The financial corporate structure of Japan's economy may also be viewed, then, in terms of the interdependency of groups in a horizontal and vertical framework of

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22 Ibid., p. 13.


24 Suzuki, op. cit., p. 29.
authority representative of the mura kyodotai concept.

Watanuki believes that, in spite of the changes in composition of the labor force and rapid expansion of secondary and tertiary industry, the group solidarity concept has remained.

Certainly, group solidarity and loyalty to the organization have been the basic characteristics of Japanese employees, and these characteristics were maintained and even reinforced during the 1960's so that in terms of social values, it can be said that shrinkage of the rural world and its value patterns was compensated for by the spread of Japanese organizational ethics to employed people.

Watanuki notes that there is increased diversity of life styles and values in the postwar era in spite of similarities of organizational ethics to the rural village. He believes this has enhanced one's freedom of deviation. At the same time he implies that this diversity of values is not inconsistent with "postindustrial society" where knowledge and technology dominate. Such values as avoidance of conflict and emphasis on harmony are often mentioned as ideal values in a postindustrial society. But, he believes, this makes measurement of values in Japan difficult, because they can be interpreted as traditional values by survey respondents. A question in Ronald Inglehart's postindustrial values survey phrased as "move toward a friendlier, less impersonal society," he says, placed second next to "stability

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of economy" in a list of priorities of values. For Watanuki, such findings that may indicate the influence of traditional Japanese characteristics on survey data are labelled by him as uniquenesses in the system. One of the reasons for the "peculiar Japanese pattern," he says, is the traditional social structure, because

The long-established, historical social structure of the village, which still survives, communal in character, with a high density of social relationships, nourishing norms and exerting pressures for conformity in various areas of behavior, in which voting and other kinds of political participation have come to be included.

Another reason for the peculiar Japanese pattern of participation, he says, is the politicization of traditional sub-municipal neighborhood associations which are discussed in the next chapter. In sum, the unique features of contemporary Japanese society are frequently attributed to tradition, not simply peculiar contemporary environmental influences. The following section examines some of the national characteristics attributed to Japanese individuals today which may be representative of the mura kyodotai concept.

Some Aspects of Japanese National Characteristics

The following survey questions and responses as interpreted may show general support for the mura kyodotai concept.

\[\text{Ibid.}, \ p. 10. \quad \text{Ibid.}, \ pp. 74-76.\]
\[\text{Ibid.}, \ p. 74. \quad \text{Ibid.}, \ p. 75.\]
While change is occurring, the most important traditional values in the system appear to remain intact. The presentation of this survey data follows the division of Part I: (1) order and higher values, (2) the importance of community, and (3) the nature of the individual. The sources are drawn largely from "The 1967 Japanese National Election Study," by Robert Ward and Akira Kubota, and The Institute of Statistical Mathematics' study of the Japanese national character. The latter is a regular survey conducted every five years since 1953, the latest being 1978, to study Japanese "attitudes about human life."

Order and Values

The first question in terms of order and higher values and their influence on contemporary decision making is on religion. In response to the 1967 survey question, "Does the respondent believe in god(s)?" 70 percent responded in the negative. Only 28 percent responded yes. The Institute for Statistical Mathematics' surveys show a similar response to the question,


32 Ward and Kubota _op. cit._, Var 0673.
I'd like to ask you a question about religion. Do you, for example, have any personal religious faith?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Have</th>
<th>Have not</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The numbers followed by slashes are percentages out of 100 (with don't know's not included) by every 5 years beginning with 1953 (i.e.: 1953/1958/1963/1968/1973/1978).

In 1953, 65 percent responded, "Have not," and 35 percent, "Have." The attitude has remained relatively consistent, with 66 percent and 34 percent respective responses in 1978.

A follow-up question, however, seemingly contradicts the first one:

(To those who answered "Have not") Without reference to any of the established religions, do you think that a "religious attitude" is important, or not?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Not important</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>13%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

In 1953, 72 percent responded that it was important and 16 percent that it was not, virtually the same in 1978, with 74 and 13 percent, respectively.33

In the follow-question in the Ward and Kubota 1967 survey, the respondent was asked to name a particular sect or denomination as his "religion" (i.e.: What is respondent's religion?). Of the respondents who listed a specific sect or religion, only 12, out of 565, responded to one of the

33 Institute of Statistical Mathematics, op. cit., p. 457.
several sects of Shinto, fewer than the 23 who listed "Christianity." The respondents who listed Buddhism comprised 73 percent of the total, with "newly risen religions" (e.g.: sokagakkai—a conservative Buddhist sect) comprising 16 percent of the total.\textsuperscript{34}

In sum, these questions may be interpreted to show Japanese are not extremely "religious" minded. However, the Shinto kami (gods) are more like spirits or energy (tama), and that "religion" has not, historically, been separated from government (matsuru). The distinction between life, government and religion has not been made, and there is likely a conflation, or fusion, of the government and religious authorities that remains. It may be that Shinto has become so much a part of the "unconscious mind" of the nation that it is not thought of in terms of a particular "religion." Some of the particular precepts of Shinto, though, such as respect for nature, seem to survive over time. In response to the Institute of Statistical Mathematics' query about nature, few expressed the need to "conquer nature."

Here are three opinions about man and nature. Which one of these do you think is closest to the truth?

1. In order to be happy, man must follow nature,
2. In order to be happy, man must make use of nature,
3. In order to be happy, man must conquer nature.

\textsuperscript{34}Ward and Kubota, \textit{op. cit.}, Var 0673.
Responses remained fairly consistent from 1953 to 1978. Thirty-three percent in 1978 (27 percent in 1953) selected the first option in a card shown. For the second opinion, 44 percent in 1978 (41 percent in 1953) suggested that as the means to happiness. Only 16 percent in 1978 (23 percent in 1953) suggested it was necessary to conquer nature to be happy. This question may reflect simply an increased awareness of the importance of nature, but it also may be tied with Shinto precepts.

Filial piety, duty and repaying moral indebtedness continue to assume almost twice as much importance as respecting individual rights and freedom, and may be interpreted as a retention of Confucian precepts over the notion of individual rights and freedom.

If you are asked to choose two out of this list that are important, which two would you point out?

1953/58/63/68/73/78

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<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Oya-koko (filial piety, to be dutiful to one's parents)</td>
<td>....</td>
<td></td>
<td>/61</td>
<td>/61</td>
<td>/63</td>
<td>/70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) On-gaeshi (repaying moral indebtedness)</td>
<td>....</td>
<td></td>
<td>/43</td>
<td>/45</td>
<td>/43</td>
<td>/47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Respecting individual right</td>
<td>....</td>
<td></td>
<td>/48</td>
<td>/44</td>
<td>/45</td>
<td>/38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Respecting freedom</td>
<td>....</td>
<td></td>
<td>/40</td>
<td>/46</td>
<td>/43</td>
<td>/39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Filial piety and duty were considered more important in 1978 (70 percent) than in 1963 (61 percent) over individual rights.

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(38 percent in 1978 and 48 percent in 1963).\textsuperscript{36}

Also, the Buddhist doctrine of respect for ancestors remains important. The following query was elicited:

Would you say you were on the whole more inclined to honor your ancestors than the average, or less?

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{cccc}
1953/58/63/58/73/78 & Yes . . . & 77/67/72 & \\
2. Like the common . . . & 15/21/16 & \\
3. No . . . & 5/10/10 & \\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

The first "yes" response of 77 percent was in 1953. The last two "yes" responses were in 1973 and 1978 respectively.\textsuperscript{37}

These questions do not conclusively tie religious values with traditional and contemporary attitudes. As with the last question, though, there may be a strong indirect connection.

\textbf{Community}

In the following question of the Institute of Statistical Mathematics, 87 percent of respondents preferred to work for a department chief who demanded extra work, but looked after employees personally in matters not connected with work.


\textsuperscript{37}Ibid., p. 459.
Suppose you are working in a firm. There are two types of department chiefs. Which of these would you prefer to work under?

1. A man who always sticks to the work rules and never demands any unreasonable work, but on the other hand, never does anything for you personally in matters not connected with the work.

2. A man who sometimes demands extra work in spite of rules against it, but on the other hand, looks after you personally in matters not connected with the work.

The follow-up question is as follows:

Supposing there were two firms which differed in the way I am going to describe. Which would you prefer to work for?

1. A firm which paid good wages but where they did nothing like organizing outings and sports days for the employees' recreation.

2. A firm with a family-like atmosphere which organized outings and sports days, even if the wages were a little bit less.

In 1978, 78 percent (4 percent more than in 1973) responded that they preferred the second alternative. Only 18 percent (21 percent in 1973) preferred the first alternative.38

Another way to look at the need for family-type, intimate groupings is in the following query:

38 Ibid., p. 460.
Which do you think is the best way to make society run smoothly?

1. Everybody is likely to overlook his own faults, so we should help each other by pointing them out .... / / / /75/73

2. One should just look after one's own affairs properly, and refrain from offering advice to others .... / / / /22/25

In 1978, 73 percent of respondents selected the first alternative, as opposed to 25 percent choosing the second one.

Personal ties are still important, and the following question supports the expressed need to rely on others.

Which do you think human beings can best rely on through life: money or personal ties?

1. Money is more important than personal ties .... / / / / /23

2. Personal ties are more important than money .... / / / / /72

In 1978, 72 percent considered personal ties more important than money.39

Taken together these attitudes can be interpreted to show retention of the fundamental concepts of the mura kyodotai theme.

39 Ibid., p. 462.
The Individual

This observer's interpretation of the mura kyorudotai concept is that the individual, while orienting himself directly to smaller groupings, does not lose the strong sense of self (jibun) that Doi has said is necessary for there to be the passive object love (amaeru), which is important in Japanese group dependency. The Institute of Statistical Mathematics, for the first time in 1978, asked the following question:

Do you think that most people try to be as helpful to other people as they can, or do you think that most people think only of themselves?

1. Try to be helpful to others .... 1953/58/63/68/73/78
2. Think only of themselves .... 1953/58/63/68/73/78

This query adds support to Doi's argument of the need for a strong sense of self.

The Institute has, since 1953, asked several questions under the category of "Individual Matters."41

If you think a thing is right, do you think you should go ahead and do it even if it is contrary to usual custom, or do you think you are less apt to make a mistake if you follow custom?

1. Depends on circumstances .... 1953/58/63/68/73/78
2. Follow custom .... 1953/58/63/68/73/78
3. Go ahead .... 1953/58/63/68/73/78

40 Ibid., p. 456.
41 Ibid., pp. 455-456.
The percent preferring to follow custom has increased from 35 to 42 percent since 1953, while those preferring to "go ahead" has decreased from 41 to 30 percent. If the first two responses are taken together, there are a majority, 64 percent that may prefer to follow custom—in this instance, decision-making procedures previously established for one's own groups. There is also apparently greater respect for the person who is most concerned about willingness to compromise "to avoid ill-feeling" (50 percent in 1978), as opposed to one who is most concerned about "sticking to principles" (44 percent), although the difference does not appear to be great.

There is indication of greater satisfaction with family life than with society, as the following two questions indicate.

Are you satisfied with your family life? Or are you dissatisfied?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th>Rather satisfied</th>
<th>Rather dissatisfied</th>
<th>Dissatisfied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>/ / / /</td>
<td>/ / / /</td>
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<td>1958</td>
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</table>

And how do you feel about society?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th>Rather satisfied</th>
<th>Rather dissatisfied</th>
<th>Dissatisfied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
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<tr>
<td>1958</td>
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Most respondents, in sum, express greater satisfaction for family than society, a result that may be considered consistent with the traditional mura kyodotai concept and the importance of family, as opposed to larger, more abstract, societal groupings.

Ike (1978) cites the following question of the Institute to support Maruyama's belief that modernization leads to "individuation," by which is meant those living in "traditional" society become free of the "communal ties" that have bound them.\(^{42}\)

There are all sorts of attitudes toward life. Of those listed here, which one would you say come [sic.] closest to your feeling?

1. Work hard and get rich,

2. Study earnestly and make a name for yourself,

3. Don't think about money or fame; just live a life that suits your own tastes,

4. Live each day as it comes, cheerfully and without worrying,

5. Resist all evils in the world and live a pure and just life,


Ike notes that in the age bracket, 20-24, over 50 percent responded to the third choice offered—just living a life that suits one's own tastes. For respondents overall, this response is the largest category, growing from 21 percent in

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1953 to 39 percent in 1978 (39 in 1973, and 32 in 1968). The choices receiving the fewest responses, 4 and 5, with 11 and 7 percent overall response respectively, would apparently show duty and loyalty. However, the five choices from which the respondent is forced to select do not necessarily show desire to break "communal ties." The respondent was not asked that. It can, perhaps, demonstrate strength of self, but it does not show, to this observer, that "individuation is unmistakably present if it means a corresponding loosening of group ties." The use of the terms, "company," "community," or other specific references to smaller, concrete groupings in the last choice would probably have more meaning to respondents, than the term "society" which is somewhat more abstract. Also, the "never" and "all" in response 5 and 6 are absolutes that are infrequently used in Japanese.

Another question which Ike quotes from the Institute's survey to show the relationship between individual rights and public interest is the following.

Here are some opinions. Which one would you agree with? Of course, these opinions would depend on how strong they are or what circumstances surrounding them. But generally speaking, which one do you think should be put the greater emphasis [sic.]?

1. It cannot be helped if the public interest is somewhat sacrificed for the sake of individual rights,

43 Ibid., p. 111.
44 Ike, Japanese Democracy, p. 112.
2. It cannot be helped if individual rights are somewhat sacrificed for the sake of the public interest.

The responses for 1968, Ike believes, supports Maruyama's "privatization" as a part of "individuation" in which the privatized individual is "oriented towards the achievement of self-gratification rather than public goals." The responses for choice 1 (individual rights) are 33, 32, and 32 percent, for 1968, 1973 and 1978, respectively. For choice 2 (the public interest), respective responses were 57, 55 and 55 percent. The 20-24 age category scored the highest on "individual rights" (46 percent), and Ike believes this supports Maruyama's privatization thesis. Ike discounts the possibility that young people might be more idealistic, putting public over private interests. There is another possibility, though. Younger people are, Tsuneishi believes, more "individualistic." There is the possible interpretation of the young identifying with self more than community and the strong concept of self (jibun) is confused with the newer idea of "individual rights" (kojin no kenri).

In summary, this observer believes that there is no conclusive survey data in the Institute's questionnaire to support a definite trend toward acceptance of "individual rights." There is, however, reason to interpret much of the

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46 Ibid., p. 112.
data to support retention of traditional values of community, which also includes a strong concept of self (jibun).

By conceptualizing Japanese socialization in terms of group consensus in decision making but with the understanding that self remains strong, perhaps the seeming contradiction in the following two 1967 survey questions can be better explained. In the first question, the respondent was asked if he/she "makes decisions in terms of the family's interest?" Over 46 percent responded that they decided largely, or always in the family's interest. The question was to represent family, as opposed to "individual," basis for decision making. A second question sought to show continued importance of consensus in decision making. The respondent was asked, "Would you dare object to a unanimous local decision?" Fifty percent said they would not. Only 23 percent replied they would, and 14 percent didn't know. In terms of the first question, one might reasonably assume that the "family's interest" is not fixed, but that it is flexible and subject to change depending upon the husband's occupation or the wife's participation in local neighborhood associations. Therefore, it would be difficult for the respondent to make the kind of dichotomy that is assumed in the

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47 Ward and Kubota, op. cit., Var 0643, p. 401. The remaining percentages were "NA" and "INAP."

48 Ibid., Var 0637, p. 399.
question. The second question, likewise, may show "consensus" as the stated purpose of the question. However, when put in absolute terms of "dare to object" to a "unanimous" local decision, the respondent may have felt pressure to respond to a non-open ended question that he could not conceive as being relevant. The consensus process normally involves extensive deliberation and entertainment among all participants to achieve a modicum of understanding of every position, and the particular decision made normally represents a compromise of positions. This decision-making process is discussed further in Chapter VII.
CHAPTER VI

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND PARTICIPATION

The Japanese system may be likened to the human being—an organic whole with its parts interconnected and related. Of course, some parts are more important than others, such as the heart and the mind. . . . And they just happen to be toward the top.1

The most important values in the Japanese system of order today are represented in the village community (mura kyodotai) concept. It has been legitimated in the indigenous religion, Shinto, through a structural hierarchy of thousands of different kami that have been assimilated and unified into a whole, yet with each one retaining distinct elements. The Buddhist concept of wa (harmony and cooperation) has further promoted structural unity among diversity. Confucianism has provided the moral imperatives for consolidation of authority toward the top. These latter two bodies of thought have been assimilated into the traditional village framework, and employed to support village, and other, group solidarity. Likewise, Western influences from Meiji onward were transformed to meet the "reality" of demands on

the system, as perceived in Japan. Responses to demands on
the system have been conducted largely on the basis of what
has been thought to be the "essence" of Japanese thought.
Western institutions have been employed to support the
existing concept of order. The institutions themselves have
not radically altered the existing system of order, nor, it
is argued, are they likely to do so. One might say that
each political system has a "core personality" or character
that remains unchanged.2

The community polity principle (mura seiji) remains
strong today. Nakagawa Yatsuhiro believes that the per-
ception among most Japanese has been that there was no
problem that could not be solved through the mura seiji prin-
ciple.3 Nakamura Yuniro observes that the family structure,
built on the basis of the mura concept, was fully developed
by the end of Meiji through kokutai and today continues to
be expressed through the idea of a family nation (kazoku
kokka). Family style naturalism (ie-tekishizenshugi) in
Japan has stressed the idea of the home, in other words,
place, as the basic unit for social life, and the construction
of modern state theory has utilized this type of natural
family concept based upon household and physical location.

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2Ishida Eichiro, quoted in Kakamura Yujiro, Nihon no
Shisokai (World of Japanese Thought), (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo

3Nakagawa Yatsuhiro, Nihon Seiji Bunkaron (Japanese
The "good values" in Japanese life are naturalistic, he says, and therefore, "house" and "nation" pass through each other's domain, and family structure thought becomes the family nation's thought. 4

Nakamura believes that since the War some of the realistic foundation of the family and community concept has been lost with rapid urbanization. Nevertheless, he says, the value of the family and community has spread to all of Japanese society and has been legitimated to the point of being nearly "legal." Immediately after the War, he argues, the family structure was openly rebuked. Nevertheless, it remains today as a way of thinking prevalent in every aspect of life. The large corporation, as well as the small, has intuitively employed the idea of a "family corporation" (kinyoikka). Also, he notes the widespread popularity of "my home" ism. 5

Both Nakamura and Nakagawa believe Japan has gone through great change during the last 100 years from Meiji and the Occupation. Both believe, though, as do others that the perception of the fundamental essence of order in the Japanese system has not changed. Nakamura believes Japan has changed the most rapidly of any country. He adds, though, that if Japan accelerated the rate of its change, it


5 Ibid., pp. 231-232.
would destroy the foundations of its system. Nakamura speaks of the "house" while Nakagawa stresses the mura as a sovereignty principle (mura bito shuken shugi). Nakagawa believes that it has only been through the mura sovereignty principle that Japan has been able to change so rapidly, while at the same time accommodating needed changes in the system. Immediately after the War the mura principle was submerged, but it gradually re-emerged in the 1960's under the guise of "grass roots democracy" (a term borrowed from the U. S.) and the so-called "citizen's movements" (jumin undo). The latter is discussed in greater detail below.

Premises of Government

For Nakamura Kikuo, Japanese thinking is both horizontal and vertical. He believes that Shinto and the mura kyodotai concept are the keys to understanding the Japanese political system today. He notes that Shinto does not have a Bible or set of prescribed laws, nor is it monotheistic. Because it does not have a Bible, it can accept other cultures, assimilating them into the traditional order in Japan. This he calls horizontal thinking. Second, there is vertical thinking because there are numerous gods which are tied to

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6 Ibid., p. 261.
7 Nakagawa Yatsuhiro, *op. cit.*, p. 133.
8 Ibid.
the land and to which one may appeal for any purpose. But there is consolidation at the highest level, where many small things—people, factions, or gods—are consolidated into one. This means that there are always multiple dimensions and diversity of values, but the most important consideration is to maintain unity at the top. This always necessitates the ability to compromise and consolidate. There is never ultimate confrontation in Japanese politics because there is no absolute "god" or ideology behind groups or factions, only leaders. Therefore, strategy is the most important consideration in inter-group relations. For government this means that it must possess the ability to consolidate authority, ultimately being able to manage the complexity of diverse groupings and complex organization while at the same time preserving the autonomy of each group.

Japanese politics is characterized by factionalism, as are some other systems. But the difference in Japan, Nakamura says, is that political factions are centered around a leader [or, also this observer and Minami Hiroshi (above) believe, place (ba)] and not around any particular ideology.

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10 Ibid., pp. 134 and 152-153.

11 Ibid., p. 166.
or idea. For success in politics, though, the politician must develop a reciprocal trust relationship with his constituents. This means that the best leader is always one who has the ability to compromise and consolidate for the betterment of the group without interfering too much.

This type of thinking is embodied in the mura kyodotai concept, and people today still feel the kyodotai concept. The movement to the cities, he believes, has created an atomistic phenomenon only on the surface. Most of the migrants are from the local communities and still possess the kyodotai consciousness.

The mura concept, Nakamura feels, can explain all aspects of the Japanese system. Group-oriented life creates a relaxed environment, and, therefore, even if Western style individualism is introduced, it will be transformed. Japanese, as a result, can not really understand democracy based on Western-style individualism.

Nakagawa Yatsuhiro believes that a "mass sovereignty principle" (mura bito shuken shugi), which implied broad public participation, developed during the Edo (Tokugawa) period. The bakuhana structure which formally created the han, the forerunner of the postwar prefecture system, developed a "han consciousness" among the populace that was retained through the War. The economic and political changes

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made by Japan after World War II, he says, were possible because of the mura principle. Without it Japan could not have made the progress it has. Influences of the Occupation and Western thought have only "accelerated the dream" of the mura bito system of local participation. But the parliamentary system does not adequately reflect the "public voice." Because of the mura bito principle, he says, the "majority principle" is taken as "tyranny of the majority" in Japan, and the Meiji Parliament is often cited as interfering with the mura bito dream. In a poll conducted in 1973 on attitudes toward "democracy," 80 percent of the respondents wanted "Japanese-style democracy," not "American" or "socialist-style." Fully 70 percent thought that "democracy" meant "egoism" and a "demand for rights without the accompanying responsibility." This tends to support Ike's 1972 thesis that the Japanese system should be compared on its own terms.

Shinohara Hajime and Miyazaki Ryuji believe that in spite of post-war intellectual efforts, a "wall of culture" was hit, and efforts to instill Western concepts such as "respect for the individual" and "freedom of activity," notwithstanding, there was no widespread desire on the part of the populace to change. Without the concepts of respect


for the individual or freedom of activity as characterized in
the West, they believe, modern society is not formed. They
do not speculate, but there is the implication that Japan has
not developed a modern society such as that understood in the
West. Their preference, though, is to see Japan develop such
a society—one that approaches Dahl's concept of polyarchy.

By 1925, Shinohara and Miyazaki believe, the Japanese
system approached near polyarchy. Newly enacted general
election laws expanded the franchise and allowed the existence
of "socialist" parties. Participation was expanded; neverthe-
less, enactment of "Peace Preservation Laws" strengthened
police control and had the effect of limiting contestation.
Increased prewar influence of the military, coupled with
elite rule approaching "oligarchy" denied further movement
toward polyarchy. After the War, the system moved nearer to
a state of polyarchy due to postwar reforms. However,
Shinohara says that a "fundamental paradox existed in Japan"
after the War. GHQ tried to penetrate Japanese culture and
fill the gap between system and culture. But time is still
required to "make the system into part of the culture."

18Shinohara Hajime and Miyazaki Ryuji, "Sengo Kaikaku to
Seiji Culture" ("Postwar Reform and Political Culture"), in
Tokyo Daigaku Shakai Kagaku Kenkyusho and Sengo Kaikaku
Kenkyukai (Tokyo University Social Science Research Center
and Postwar Reform Research Group), Sengo Kaikaku No. 1:
Kadai to Shikaku (Postwar Reform No. 1: Problems and Views),

19Ibid., p. 245. 20Ibid., p. 243. 21Ibid., p. 245.
Shinohara and Miyazaki believe that there were three elements that come from the Occupation. The first was that "equality" (ichigyo) penetrated society and became part of the ideology, but without the existence of polyarchy. Second, the individual was given basic civil rights and sovereignty. It has become so in law (naru), although the political culture has not completely incorporated it (suru). Finally, there has been a trend toward ethnocentrism, or a centralized consolidation of administration (chuo shyuken). Such a centralized administrative culture, the authors believe, is contrary to the idea of polyarchy since it reduces both participation and contestation. They believe Dahl's polyarchy rests upon the notion of ultimate authority residing in the people, and their interpretation of this is the opposite of the Japanese concept of centralized administration. Decentralized authority, or separate authority and rights from centralized administration (chihobunken), is directly related to polyarchy, which they interpret to be "government from the bottom."22

In the late 1960's, Shinohara and Miyazaki believe, a substantial change took place in the political culture. For the first time student activism and local citizen's action movements (jiyumin undo) became a challenge to centralized

22Ibid., pp. 246-247.
authority. This, they say, was an expression of decentralized rights (chihobunken). From that time, they believe there has been the opportunity for greater participation and contestation. Japanese people, they argue, "have been so socialized to centralized authority . . . [that they] could not even think of change to decentralization."

Nakagawa Yatsuhiro, however, believes that the mura bito principle was hidden after the War, and the 1960's movement toward direct representation and participation as witnessed in the citizen protests (jumin undo) of the period, represented a re-emergence of a type of "grass roots democracy" that has historically been exercised in Japan.

After the War, he says, there was an "explosion" of "animistic freedom" characteristic of the mura bito sovereignty principle which incorporates "equality" derived from ancient Shinto concepts of the spirit, or tama. There has always been a natural desire for freedom, but it was never considered as a "political thought" until after the introduction of the concept of Meiji, Nakagawa argues. Buddhism and Confucianism, as well as Christianity, have imposed restrictions on this natural desire "to do what one wants to do," which is inherent in Shinto beliefs. This explosion of "animistic

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23 Ibid., pp. 247-250.


25 Elaborated on in Chapter III.
freedom" has become a political phenomenon, resulting in the reaffirmation of the mura bito sovereignty.26

There are several observations that may place the arguments of Nakagawa and Shinohara/Miyazaki into perspective. First, the Shinohara/Miyazaki translation of Western political equality (ichigyo) carries the meaning in Japanese of "oneness of thought or action." The Western concept of equality is not based on that ideal, but rather on the presumption of a given inequality in abilities. The Shinohara/Miyazaki translation carries the same implications of the mura bito principle—the given potential equality of all things and people, which is derived from Shinto spirit (tama). Such an idea is foreign to Western thought. Second, the increased participation and contestation that Shinohara/Miyazaki believe has taken place since the War through the expression of decentralized rights (chihobunken) has been more of a re-emergence of the traditional concept of local community solidarity and group action than the appearance of the Western concept of "individual rights and liberties." The two terms, chuc shyunken, and chihobunken are rough opposites expressed in the consideration of centralization (or, consolidation) and decentralization of authority. There is no indication that individuals, as opposed to groups, constitute the premise upon which this debate is based. The

debate has not often focused on particular mura administrative authority as opposed to centralized administrative authority. The "rights of the individual" being enhanced or lessened by the outcomes of such disputes has not been the foundation of the disagreements.

Finally, both decentralized and consolidated authority have been part of the mura thought since at least Tokugawa, and there is not necessarily a direct relationship between the degree of centralization or decentralization and Dahl's concept of "polyarchy." The degree of contestation or participation in a system does not depend upon the placement of ultimate authority in a system. While there is agreement on the need for consolidation of authority toward the top through cooperation and compromise in the Japanese system, there has never been a precise definition of where "ultimate authority" actually resides. Also, there is historical recognition that both decentralized village and consolidated national authority exist, regardless of whether decentralized authority is placed in a postwar constitution that was imposed from without. The patriotism developed from the Meiji drive to create a contemporary nation-state was founded on the basis of "love of hometown," the belief that one should protect the land he was born on (meaning the local hometown). The mura order was preserved, Tsuda Michio argues, through the family-nation
(kazoku-kokka and kokutai) idea. There has never been a precise delineation of the limits of either type of authority, and there is not likely to be, because the maintenance of the system depends upon the continued ability to integrate a myriad of diverse elements and values, much as might be found in a heterogeneous system. This author does, however, agree with Shinohara/Miyazaki in their assessment of a gradual trend toward a greater centralized administrative culture. Tokyo, today, is far more the center of industry, finance and administration than it was at the end of the War. The postwar reforms, may, in the long run, have contributed to this trend, and it is possible that Nakagawa's fears of the majority principle and parliamentary rule being taken as a guise for increased ethnocentrism (chuo shyuken) may be cause for concern.

From this author's perspective Shinohara/Miyazaki and Nakagawa are not that far apart. The only difficulty with the Shinohara/Miyazaki thesis is that they attempt to approach the centralization/decentralization debate from the

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28 Saburo Okita, in William W. Lockwood, op. cit., p. 627, notes that the share of industrial production in the four prefectures surrounding Tokyo increased from 24.5 percent in 1952 to 30 percent in 1961. It is still increasing, and Tokyo today is commonly referred to as the business, financial and cultural, as well as governmental, center of Japan.
perspective of a Western model based upon the individual. That does not fit the Japanese concept of order, which is based upon the consolidation and cooperation of groups. Otherwise, their translation of Western political thought more nearly approaches that of indigenous Japanese political thought, which is not the same.

Nakagawa believes there is a fundamental difference with the West in basic understanding of freedom and equality. Equality, he says, has not been imported. Nor has the idea of freedom. It is a part of animistic (Shinto) thought. In the West, he says, equality has meant to free one from slave-like inequality and to destroy the biases of inequality among the masses. Western "freedom," likewise, is freedom from oppressive authority. The reason Western-style "freedom" and "equality" have not been born in Japan is because slave-like "inequality," or "unfreedom," did not exist in Japan. The mura principle belied the potential for it. He notes that the argument many Japanese Marxists have made that Japanese farmers were the same as European Feudal "slaves" is a fallacy. He quotes a Belgian diplomatic observer in Japan in 1775 as saying that "as compared with Japanese, European people are just like slaves. Taxes in Japan are uncommonly low." Also, he says, the tendency to compare the Japanese farmer with the European feudal farmer is a mistake, because the landowner/tenant ratio has historically been high. In addition, there has been no concept of "slave"
(yahi) since 652 A.D. when the few yahi were given 2/3 of human rights and land--similar, he notes to the slave under eighteenth century American government.29

Political Leadership and Factions

Here in the Orient [Japan] we have political factions but no political party.30

Political parties after the Meiji Restoration arose not out of a desire for liberalism, but rather from factionalism and rivalry among the four leading clans. Their perpetuation and growth from Meiji to the prewar period was predicated upon the argument that allowing "popular rights was the only path toward unified action and national strength." Through this process it anticipated that the "people of the whole country will be of one mind [emphasis added]. In other words, "bind the people together, give them political power, and you create a wealthy country, powerful soldiery."31

As mentioned above, Western institutions were established during Meiji for strategic purposes to avoid foreign domination through the strengthening of national unity. By adopting Western institutions, respect, it was reasoned,


31 Ibid., pp. 12-13 and 48-50.
would be gained from Europe and the U. S., and the country might be considered on an equal footing with other powerful nations.32

Analyses of the postwar Japanese political processes have frequently focused on either an elitist or pluralist model of politics based upon Western institutions and political theory.33 Eisuke Sakakibara, Robert Feldman and Yuzo Harada make the following observation of the two approaches:

In recent years, a fairly large amount of political science literature has mushroomed criticizing the crudeness and over simplification of the elitist view of Japan, Inc., and offered an alternative pluralist interpretation. Indeed, the Japanese decisionmaking process is not as monolithic as it first appears, and the power is more widely diffused than depicted in the Japan, Inc., view. The dispute between the elitist and pluralist interpretations seems, however, somewhat futile since neither perspective offers sufficient generalization of the Japanese decisionmaking process.34

The mura sovereignty principle suggests, as do these authors, that Western-style ideology has not been a factor in political decision making. What has been important in decision making in the Japanese system is "that those vested with the burden of deciding about reforms [or, policy


34Eisuke Sakakibara, Robert Feldman, and Yuzo Harada, op. cit., p. 2.
changes] consider the alternatives with an eye to how reforms will affect the degree and efficiency of intermediation, not to how closely they conform to ideology."35

The system of political representation in the postwar period has been noticeably lacking in "ideology" as thought of in the West. There is characterization of parties as "leftist" and "conservative," but they tend not to carry the same meanings as in the West. The leftist parties have been labelled "conservative" (meaning unchanging) because they either have retained Marxist orientation without change since the War, or they have supported traditional business interests in local administration.36 The administration of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), on the other hand, is sometimes labelled, creative.37 With the exception of a couple of months after the War, the group of factions now known collectively as the "Liberal Democratic Party" (jumintō) has led Japan to the economic stature it now enjoys. Though labelled conservative, its policies and successes have been dynamic. An assessment of the reasons for the

35Ibid., p. 3.


continuing reign of the factions comprising the LDP and the consistent lack of success of the opposition follows, based upon the logic of the mura sovereignty principle.

Ruling Factions

The Japanese have always placed greater stress on personality in government than they have on institutions. Indeed, the institution has often been little more than an extension of personality.38 Nathaniel B. Thayer believes that the LDP represents "a balance between personal and institutional authority." He believes that there is a slow trend toward strengthening of institutional authority. But, he says, "The party has yet to achieve its most important goal: to secure the support and loyalty of the people."39

There is no indication that the LDP or any party in Japan has been able to achieve the "support and loyalty" Thayer would like to see. Party support in surveys conducted by the Asahi Chosa on a regular basis from 1960 show an increase in non-party support from 10 percent in 1960 to over 34 percent in 1978. Over 50 percent of the respondents in 1978 said they were not interested in government. Over three-quarters of the 34 percent who did not have a favorite party, however, did want to participate in the political process. But they have said they did not support a party.


because they did not trust government. Rather, what they indicated they wanted was a "return to traditional values and local authority." The Occupation stress on the value "respect for liberty" had fallen by 1978 to 39 percent from a high in 1968 of 46 percent. Likewise, the "respect for authority" [centralized authority] had fallen from 48 to 38 percent in the same period. There was, however, continued respect for parents and the traditional notion of obligation and duty.40

Joji Watanuki also reports a similarly high level of "no party support" in another poll taken in 1972. Those between the ages of 15-19 responded with the highest percentage of "don't know" (73.2 percent) in response to a question on "party preference." The percentage dropped to 50.8 percent for those aged 25-29, and the lowest, 34.0 percent, for those 50-59. The percent of "don't know"'s rose again for those over 60, to 40.6 percent. Of those who did support a party, though, support for the LDP increased steadily with age, from a low of 11 percent for those 15-19, to 46.9 percent for those over 60. The highest support any opposition party received was 23.8 percent for the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) among those aged 30-34. While support for the LDP increased with age, after age 34 support for the socialist

and communist parties showed a general decline. \textsuperscript{41} Watanuki, nevertheless, does not believe the young are "depoliticized," because they show knowledge of, and support for, the present constitution. \textsuperscript{42}

The results of these surveys are interpreted by Watanuki to mean that there is an increasing mistrust or lack of interest in government. This author, however, interprets these statistics to show, first, a lack of interest in central government, but not in the fundamental concept of the mura bito sovereignty principle, nor in traditional support for local administration. Support for local administration is examined in greater detail below. It may also be taken to mean the desire for the more traditional authority to that symbolized by the institutionalized party system. The parties today are institutions which are used, but not essential, in the consolidation of authority toward the top. Only a relatively consistent one-third of all voters have based their vote on a party. The remainder either have voted on the basis of candidate personality or did not feel they could make such a generalization. \textsuperscript{43} The parties are representative of groups of factions which have the tendency to fluctuate and change over time. The successful factions have not been ideologically oriented. The current LDP has

\textsuperscript{41} Joji Watanuki, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 140. \textsuperscript{42}Ibid., p. 141. \textsuperscript{43} Nathaniel B. Thayer, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 108.
not been. The unsuccessful socialist and communist parties have had inept leadership but also considerable ideological orientation.

The faction (habatsu) in Japanese politics, Kamijima Jiro believes, may be based on the mura concept. According to Kase Hideyake, they are united typically by an "unseen tie" or "fate" (en) rather than by idea, belief, policy, or ideology. The "idea" is dependent upon the group, and organizing is not dependent upon an idea. There is the tendency for a superficial parent-child relationship to form with the leader. But, he says, Japanese are attached to the group, and therefore, there is not a strong belief that if the leader is changed, the group's destiny will change.

Leaders must have the ability to manage people and translate ideas into terms meaningful to the group. A leader, he says, is expected to follow opinion from below.

Watanabe Tsuneo and Yuki Saburo emphasize the importance of the leader in maintenance of factions, pointing out that there is not necessarily a direct relationship of factions to the mura concept. They both, however, believe that the LDP is only a name for a collection of factions. Watanabe

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notes that a death or change in political fortune of a faction leader may mean the death of the faction. He cites the Kishi faction as an example of one that partially dissolved when he stepped down as prime minister.46

The Tanaka Kakuei faction of the LDP is the largest single faction in the Diet (Japanese Parliament) with 116 members in the upper and lower houses.47 Though he has not been prime minister since 1974 he continues to dominate LDP factional politics behind the scenes.48 Yuki Saburo calls his influence a "benevolent government." His support groups are primarily from western, rural Niigata Prefecture, his ancestral home, and business and financial groups from the southwestern region of Kansai. A large part of his following comes from direct and indirect blood relationships, former bureaucratic officials, second generation officials in the Diet, and from local bosses and actors.49 Tanaka commands the support of two other LDP factions and has been successful in determining the last three prime ministers since 1979:


48For a summary of factional strife within the LDP, see the October 24, 1982 editions of The Japan Times, pp. 1 and 3.

49Ibid., pp. 97 and 140-142.
Ohira Masayoshi, Suzuki Zenko, and currently, Nakasone Yasuhiro, who won a party primary following Suzuki's resignation in October, 1982.\textsuperscript{50} At the end of 1982, the LDP was split into 6 factions: three "leadership" factions represented by Tanaka, Nakasone and Suzuki, and three "non-leadership" factions. Four of the six are led by current and former prime ministers, and one of the three "non-leadership" factions is led by a leader loyal to former Prime Minister Miki Takeo. All faction leaders have held key cabinet and party positions, considered a prerequisite for the position of prime minister.\textsuperscript{51}

Of the 421 current LDP representatives in both houses of the Diet, 260 belong to the "leadership" factions of Tanaka, Suzuki and Nakasone. The three non-leadership factions led by former Prime Minister Fukuda account for 115 members. Only 46 LDP Dietmen (10.9 percent) are acknowledged independents within the party.\textsuperscript{52}

There is constant press coverage that details the intra-party factional rivalry as well as the need for greater unity.\textsuperscript{53} But since the current party's composition in 1954 it has held an absolute majority of seats in the lower

\textsuperscript{50}The Japan Times, November 25, 1982, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{51}See, for instance, The Japan Times, October 24, 1982, pp. 1 and 3.

\textsuperscript{52}Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Japan Economic Newspaper), June 28, 1983, p. 5.

\textsuperscript{53}Ibid., for example.
house of the Diet, with the exception of the elections of 1976 and 1979. In those two elections a small faction broke from the LDP. Labelled the "New Liberal Club," its members supported the LDP in the Diet but declared their independence from the Party. The following chart illustrates the support the LDP has received in national elections in the postwar period. From the end of the War to 1955 there was a fluctuating group of alliances of smaller, "conservative" parties that formed coalitions to rule with the exception of a brief few months in that year, as mentioned above.

The success of the postwar ruling factions in guiding the Japanese political economy to the level it is today is representative of the type of authority structure characteristic of the mura sovereignty principle. They are representative of the ideal of intense rivalry, yet they demonstrate the willingness for cooperation, compromise and consolidation of authority toward the top. Power has never been consolidated in one single individual, however, and leadership may be characterized as largely collective, with important party and Diet positions rotated among competing faction leaders or their followers. Postwar political leadership may be characterized as factional, fluid and dynamic—constantly changing—yet consistent and stable. Following the Occupation, leadership has been able to incorporate Western institutions into the historically proven
Notes: Combined by current "left," "center," independent and "conservative" labels.
a) LDP formed from conservative coalition in 1958; b) in 1952 - '60 the communists seated 0, 2, 1, and 3 members respectively; c) DSP split from Socialist Party in 1960. d) NLC (New Liberal Club) is a breakaway faction of the LDP; e) CGP ("Clean Government Party") is the English equivalent for Komeito; f) Ind.=Independent.

concept of order and to retain stability while guiding the system through the changes necessary to remain a viable economic and political entity in the world community.

Nathaniel B. Thayer's study of the LDP lists 13 separate factions in 1967, an increase over previous years. The largest faction, headed by then Prime Minister Sato Eisaku, had 111 members out of a total of 417 LDP members in both houses of the Diet. The number of factions is still large (6—but about the same as in 1955 when there were 8). The number represented in the largest single faction (116 in 1983) is essentially the same today as it was in 1967 (111 under Prime Minister Sato). Their function, likewise, remains much the same. Thayer felt that the factions helped achieve party as well as national goals. This observer, however, interprets them to be representative of a traditional style of collective leadership. Thayer notes that the party chooses leaders, raises and distributes funds, determines posts in government and aids individual candidates. This is all accomplished, however, through the factions and their leaders. Furthermore, he notes, party rules, such as those for party presidential elections, have stimulated the growth of factions. Prime Minister Miki's cabinet subsequently made efforts to reduce the number of factions,

\[54\text{Nathaniel B. Thayer, op. cit., p. 17.}\]
\[55\text{Ibid., pp. 16-20.}\]
\[56\text{Ibid., p. 21.}\]
but this was met with indifference and some hostility among the other factions.

A recent analysis of factions notes the same functions as Thayer, but stresses the importance of the flow of party funds and "power-brokers" operating behind the scenes to determine prime ministers. The behind-the-scenes brokering by factions for position has been traditionally characteristic of Japanese leadership. Study of LDP factions by Jo Du-Hum indicates they are important because a candidate is able to get election capital to supplement any that he is able to raise through his own support groups (koenkai). The support groups are territorially organized, but they may represent fairly equal support throughout an area, or, groupings of clusters, usually representing one's birthplace and family ties. Corporations donate funds not only to the LDP, but also to factions, which in turn allow the corporation certain "rights" in conducting business.

Faction leadership may come from one of three sources, Jo believes. First, those who have received an elite education and have worked either in business or the bureaucracy will wait for an opportunity to become a candidate from his own birthplace. The freshman candidate usually needs the ties and funding a faction can offer, and, once successful at the polls, he will normally spend many years building

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57 Nathaniel B. Thayer, Ibid., pp. 98-107, examines the koenkai system and concludes they can not be easily incorporated into the party system because they are formed through personalistic, not party, ties.
support within a faction. Succession to faction leadership may frequently be handed down by blood or family ties, but it is not automatic. A leader must possess his own power base.58

Much of former Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke's following did not remain intact, Jo notes, after his son-in-law, Abe Shintaro, inherited his faction along with much of the influence accompanying it.59 However, in the November 1982 party primary for the party presidency (and prime minister) he was one of four candidates. A second manner in which one might accede to a faction at the national level is through local assembly representation. Long-time local assembly representatives might be able to establish ties at the national level that would enable them to participate in national politics. Former prime ministers, Miki Takeo and Tanaka, are such examples. Finally, lengthy experience as secretary for a prominent politician might enable one to inherit a faction. Nakagawa Ichiro was such an example.60 He was considered a future candidate for the party presidency. However, in January 1983 he committed suicide.

A faction leader does not necessarily have to have a "clean" private life. He must, however, be able to

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59Ibid. 60Ibid., p. 176.
financially support those in his faction. Today, Jo points out, Tanaka has become the chief power-broker in determining prime ministers, because he has increased his ability to assist those in his, and other, factions in fund raising. In spite of Tanaka's continuing legal problems in the Lockheed scandals, his backing helped Nakasone, who heads his own faction, gain a majority of ballots cast on November 23, 1982, in the first round of balloting by all party members to elect a new party president, and thereby, retain his appointment as prime minister. The position of Tanaka, though, is not unique. Those who become prime minister are not necessarily the most capable. They are often placed in that position by power brokers behind the scenes. The Miki cabinet, and not just the position of prime minister, was established through negotiation, largely by the efforts of Shiina Etsaburo, a former foreign minister. The Ikeda cabinets were formed largely through the influence of Ohno Bamboku, another faction leader. The Sato cabinets of 1965 and 1966, likewise have been reportedly composed by the influence of then faction leader Kawashima Shojiro. Prime Minister Kishi was influential in establishing a formal "cabinet formation staff" to enhance the role of the party,

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61 Ibid., p. 178.
63 Ibid., p. 178.
but as Thayer notes, there have always been changes to the proposals made by that staff.64

There may be policy differences among the factions, but, according to Thayer, these predilections of the factions "are not pervasive, definite, or comprehensive enough to be called ideologies."65 Each faction has a "unique flavor," such as those of former Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato, and, more recently Fukuda Takeo. Both men were former bureaucrats and ministers of finance, and they have had strong views on economic and financial policy.66 The basic disagreements today between the "leadership" and "non-leadership" factions is largely over economic and financial policy. The non-leadership factions, of which former prime minister Fukuda is the most influential, seek a relaxation of both farm import quotas and international financial exchange transactions, which are opposed by the more rural dominated leadership factions of Tanaka, Suzuki and Nakasone.67

The factions are not built solely on interests. They are, former LDP Dietman Sakata Michita says, "gatherings of people with similar patterns of thinking." One is never sure, though, Thayer says, exactly where in the political

65Ibid., pp. 46-47. 66Ibid., p. 47.
67For an analysis of factional disputes at the time of the 1982 LDP party presidential elections, see The Japan Times, October 24, 1982, pp. 1 and 3.
spectrum of left and right a faction's position is. The Tanaka faction is successful because it derives support from a variety of socioeconomic groups, including businesses both large and small and their employees, as well as from regional Niigata and Kansai. For that reason, a faction's political leaning, and, consequently, that of the LDP can not really be labelled either "liberal" or "conservative." The policy outcomes are fluid and dynamic and not ideological in the Western sense. The personalities involved in political leadership are stable because seniority and longevity of association are important in determining political influence.

Yet, the personalities, and likewise the degree of influence of the factions represented, are constantly changing. Thayer notes that between 1945 and 1965 there were twenty-two different cabinets. During that same twenty-one year period, there were ten different prime ministers. He also notes that Meiji to prewar governments likewise produced a fluid cabinet environment. During Meiji, he says, there were an estimated three new ministerial changes a year, four new ministers a year under Taisho, and seven under Showa. Thayer estimated that this "mass production of ministers," had given more than one-fourth of the LDP members of the Diet in 1966

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68 Ibid., p. 46.

69 See, for example, Nathaniel B. Thayer, Op. cit., pp. 41-45, for an evaluation of the importance of national legislative experience and occupation in terms of political influence.
some ministerial experience.\textsuperscript{70} Not just cabinets, but the position of prime minister has been in a constant state of flux since the War. Between 1945 and 1983, a period of 39 years, there have been sixteen different prime ministers, for an average tenure of less than two years.

Such flux in leadership could seemingly cause political instability and, correspondingly, less than dynamic economic growth. Yet it has not. Japanese leadership represents a collective type of decision making where the particular leader and his abilities are not decisive. Faction leadership represents the faction and those association and support groups loyal to it. At the top there has been rivalry among the leadership factions but at the same time cooperation with rotation of political responsibilities and posts among the factions. Collective authority at the top means that decisions are reached through bargaining and compromise. The result is that responsibility is diffused, not only within but also among groups. To argue the importance of the party (LDP), though, in maintaining consistency of leadership and policy does not explain the longevity of the LDP's reign. It is the factions or groupings and their ability to compromise and consolidate under traditional concepts of authority that have maintained their preeminence, and not any particular ideological leaning on the part of factions or "party." Support is always based upon local

\textsuperscript{70}Nathaniel B. Thayer, \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 181-183.
needs and participation, and not upon abstract concepts of what should be. The LDP as a "party" is not important. Its composite groupings and their ability to consolidate and compromise, however, are important. To the extent the LDP "party" is able to accommodate diverse local needs, the current factions should remain viable. To the extent they do not meet local needs, other factional alignments (both intra- and inter-party) should likely assume positions of the "leadership" among the multiple factions. The party label, "LDP," then, may be more a symbol of ability to compromise and cooperate than one of single party domination and lack of contestation.

Shinohara Hajime, analyzing the success of the LDP since 1955, says that the political "structure" has not changed since then. Electoral results have shown "delicate changes" due to a changing political and economic environment. The major reason for the Party's continued success, though, he says, lies with "the unique characteristics of Japanese politics. For instance, Suzuki Zenko became prime minister after Ohira's death in 1980 largely because of the factional dissaray the sudden death caused. Suzuki had no political "ideas" or philosophy except what he called "the politics of wa," whereby "unification and harmony were given priority before everything." Shinohara quotes one influential business executive as stating that it didn't matter who would be prime
minister, so long as the LDP were unified. Shinohara notes that the election years of 1976 and 1979 were times of consideration of a coalition government by the opposition parties. The "New Liberal Club," a breakaway splinter faction of the LDP was gaining attention, and the so-called "center" parties (Komeito, or Clean Government Party, and the Democratic Socialist Party, DSP) had been gaining representation. But, he says, the trend toward a coalition government (i.e., fewer votes for the LDP) was reversed in 1980 with the "harmony and unity" theme. Opposition parties, he says, have not been able to pick up "floating" or independent votes. But also, he believes, Japanese basically do not like the notion of coalition government. Not only could the opposition parties not agree on a common idea or strategy, but, "in a homogeneous society" like Japan, "coalition" is an incomplete fusion under the harmony ideal and carries with it the implication of "confrontation" with the "premise of agreeing to disagree." This concept is foreign to both Japanese party and public psychology, he says, and as such "is thought to be suspicious." Though Shinohara analyzes data on the basis of a "one-party structure" dominant since 1955, his conclusions as to the importance of harmony and cooperation and a lack of desire for "coalition government"


72Ibid., pp. 46-49.
is an expression of the traditional concept of order, into which factions are more easily accounted for than are the institutions called "parties."

Opposition

To the extent that Japanese political parties may be called parties, one might view the opposition parties collectively as a "subparty," the JSP and JCP as groups of subfactions, and all of these "parties" experiencing gains and losses at each other's expense. Seen from this perspective, Gerald Curtis notes that the combined opposition increased its percentage of Diet seats only 6.5 percent from 1967 to 1976 while the LDP dropped 14.5 percent during the same period.73

The opposition parties find themselves operating today in a "system that has no tradition of 'his majesty's loyal opposition.'"74 Because the system has historically emphasized harmony and cooperation within and among small groupings, negotiated compromise is primary, and conflict is to be minimized.75 It is for this reason J. Victor Koschmann labels Japan an "assimilating unitary society" in which

73Gerald L. Curtis, op. cit., p. 44.


75Ibid.
unity is assumed and is not achieved through conflict.\textsuperscript{76} Also, the opposition, particularly the left, has been associated with the promotion of "ideology," or higher values, which under the \textit{mura kyodotai} concept is not of primary importance.

Much of the intellectual and mobilized dissent from Meiji onward has been inspired by pacifism,\textsuperscript{77} and many of the leftist intellectuals during Meiji were also Christian. Five of the six organizers of the first socialist party in 1901, for instance, were Christian, and members of the first socialist study group founded in 1898 considered themselves Christian Socialists. Up to 1945, however, there was "no transformation either of fundamental values or of social structure." The Christian and socialist logic "rejected the existing order of society and challenged the very core of the dominant traditional system."\textsuperscript{78} The logic held by these groups remains, however, and they are today, a tolerated minority.

Although the Communist Party (JCP) remains opposed to the U. S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, it now proclaims Japan's right to defend itself and believes it even has a


\textsuperscript{78}Bamba and Howes, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 255.
national and international duty to do so. It claims the other opposition parties have moved to the right in seeking a coalition either with or without the ruling LDP. However, the JCP's support for greater defense expenditures places it at odds with "leftist" factions of the socialist party. The Japan Socialist Party (JSP) continues to receive most of its support from organized labor. But it is still seriously factionalized over Japan's defense buildup, domestic policy reform and alignment with the "centerist" Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), Komeito (CGP--Clean Government Party--the political offspring of the Sokkagakai, a Buddhist social movement), and other minor parties and independents. A rightist faction split from the JSP in 1960 and formed the DSP with the purpose of working in coalition with other opposition parties to depose the LDP and achieve a "slow transformation of capitalism," which the leftist dominated JSP was unwilling to do. Although most DSP members of recent Diets are union leaders, nearly all have college educations, and the Party receives support from a large number of businessmen. The DSP seeks coalition with Komeito and some "non-leadership" factions of the LDP, and is


80 The Japan Democratic Socialist Party (Tokyo, 1960).

commonly labelled a center party.\textsuperscript{82} Therefore, for conceptual purposes, the DSP and \textit{Komeito} (CGP) in this discussion are termed center parties, while the JCP and JSP are the traditional left, at the same time being labelled "progressive" along with the two center parties.

Electoral results from 1947 to 1975 show the leftist and center parties achieving moderate gains in both the national lower house and the local assembly elections, especially in the larger cities and a corresponding decline in conservative strength.\textsuperscript{83} The JSP alone, or in coalition, for example, has had governors and mayors and majorities in the assemblies of six of Japan's seven largest cities since 1963.\textsuperscript{84} This still has not precluded the ability of the LDP to maintain an absolute majority in the national Diet and control, either through support of independents or their own party factions, of a majority of Japan's local assemblies.\textsuperscript{85}

At the national level from 1972 to 1982 the JSP and JCP, respectively, lost 14 seats and 9 seats in the lower House of Representatives.\textsuperscript{86} As of December 1982 the JSP

\textsuperscript{82}Recent DSP policy can be found in Keigo Ohuchi, "Democratic Socialist Party in 1980's," IPSJ Papers, No. 23 (Tokyo: Institute for Political Studies in Japan, 1980).


\textsuperscript{84}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 55-56.  \textsuperscript{85}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 57.

\textsuperscript{86}Japan Statistical Yearbook, 1972-1982, Statistics Bureau, Prime Minister's Office.
held 104 of 506 seats in the lower house and 47 of 249 seats in the upper House of Councilors. The Communist Party held 29 and 12 seats, respectively, for a combined percentage for the two parties of 26 percent in the lower house and 24 percent in the upper house. The LDP had absolute majorities of 57 and 55 percent, respectively, in each house. The two center parties (CGP and DSP), though, showed gains in the lower house from 1972 to 1982 of 16 to 34 for the CGP and 4 to 32 for the DSP. In the lower house the combined JSP and JCP strength went from 30 to a maximum of 35 percent between 1947 and 1958, but strength has since shown a steady decline. Figure 1 shows this peak and decline in distribution of lower house seats for "leftist" parties as well as increasing influence of the "center" parties.

At the local level combined JSP and JCP support increased from 20 to 30 percent between 1947 and 1975 in prefectural assemblies but currently stands at only 19 percent. Out of a total of 2825 Prefectural Assembly seats the JSP and JCP, respectively, hold 406 and 138 seats. The DSP and CGP hold 110 and 195 seats, respectively, which is an increase of only 3 percentage points from 1967 when they held 7 percent of all prefectural assembly seats. The LDP holds an absolute majority of 1535 seats (as of 1982), or 54 percent of the total. This majority, however, is down from nearly 80 percent in 1953. Independents, from which all parties, especially

87 Ibid. 88 Compiled from Ibid., 1965 and 1982.
the LDP, draw support, stands at 12 percent at this level of
government.\textsuperscript{89}

There has been a tradition of non-partisanship at the
ward and city assembly level, however, and the ratio of
"independents" not officially tied to any party constituted
approximately 56 percent of the 21,112 total in 1982. The
figures do not offer a good basis for straight party analy-
sis, but of the remaining 44 percent, the number was fairly
evenly divided among the LDP (2572), JSP and JCP (3889) and
CGP and DSP (2651).\textsuperscript{90}

A preponderance of local prefectural governors and
mayors have also been independents. Only 9 of 47 prefectural
governors in 1982 were LDP members; the remainder were not
officially members of any party. Likewise, of 647 mayors,
620 claimed to be independents. The same was also true of
the 2603 heads of towns or villages--2574 were officially
independents. However, a predominance of local candidates
are tradition-oriented and receive electoral support through
a variety of community associations. They are elected in
the belief they will be effective in working for the benefit
of the community. The LDP has received the nominal support
of a majority of these independents through support groups
loyal to the LDP and these groups' ties to the diverse com-
munity associations.\textsuperscript{91}

\textsuperscript{91}\textit{Ibid.}, and Steiner, Krauss and Flanagan, \textit{op. cit.},
pp. 65-68.
Analyses of rural politics have shown that the rural areas are still largely "conservative," drawing support from such tradition-oriented independents. The leftist parties have drawn support from the urban areas, and it is here that conclusions have been reached regarding an end to national conservative dominance and a leftist or center coalition government. The June 1980 elections for both houses to the contrary, though, have been labelled a conservative resurgence. On the surface, at least, that might appear to be the case. The recent losses in leftist support with accompanying minimal gains of the center could be interpreted to represent a slight conservative re-emergence after a brief and gradual shift to the left in support of leftist and center candidates.

Factional dispute and the accompanying inability to compromise has been a major factor contributing to the lack of success of the opposition parties. Such factional disputes have centered around ideology as well as leadership personalities and qualities. This has been a recent criticism, particularly of the JSP. There has been so much factional strife within the JSP, combined with weak leadership, that it has never firmly regained its prewar stature as the leading opposition party. Issues are important to the JSP, but the public simply does not know where the Party stands on

various issues. In 1955 when the Party reunited it characterized itself as a "class-based mass" party. After the break with the DSP in 1960, the Party formulated a new doctrine and strategy which were incorporated in a document entitled, "The Road to Socialism in Japan." After revisions, its policy included such ideas as socialization of key industries and organization of cooperatives, a foreign policy contributing to peace, and, interestingly, "construction of a society bonded by solidarity and cooperation." This latter goal reflects much of the traditional value orientation of Japanese society, though they have not come near to achieving it.

A 1972 analysis of factional strife in the JSP measured the similarity of then existing factions to LDP factionalism in terms of ideological and personalistic factors. Every respondent indicated ideological factors had influenced his support of a faction, but when ideological factors were combined with personalistic ones, the leftist JSP faction placed more importance on ideology than on identification with personalistic ties to a leader. The JSP right also indicated that ideology was more important than personalistic factors, even though the latter also reportedly influenced their choice of factions. Independents in the party, who had increased from 3 to 22 percent in the decade preceding

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1972, indicated personalistic factors as having more bearing on faction choice than ideology. The LDP factions, in contrast, centered almost exclusively around the personality of a leader. The analysis concluded that the JSP is greatly preoccupied with an intra-party "struggle over ideological hegemony, since [it] cannot play a real power game as a governmental party." 94

Following upper house elections in 1977, gains by the center parties led to speculation of a possible move toward a "consensus" and even a future center coalition government. 95 Gains made by the LDP in 1980, though, have cast doubt on this thesis. Nevertheless, following the 1977 elections, the JSP and CGP agreed to form a "political power council" to discuss long-term strategy. 96 But disagreements have continued among the left and right factions of the JSP over the extent of cooperation and ideological compromises necessary for inter-party cooperation. The right succeeded (after threatening to leave the party) in ousting leftist union leader, Noboru Baba, from the post of Secretary-General in a December 1982 convention and installing Takeshi Hirabayashi along with a majority of right-wingers in the Executive Committee. Its new platform includes a vaguely


95 See Shiratori Rei, Ibid., No. 12, July 1977.

worded agreement that ostensibly replaces the traditional Marxist-Leninist ideology with a "socialism suited to Japan." The Party still opposes the Self Defense Forces, the Mutual Security Pact and rearmament, and takes the position of "unarmed neutrality." The disagreement within the party at the time of the convention centered around a possible coalition with the communists which was unacceptable to both the JSP right and the CGP. As of the end of 1982 the JSP right held a slight majority in the Executive Committee (14 to 11), but time does not appear to have diminished the ideological division. The left still looks to Marxist-Leninist doctrine and encourages ties with the communist nations, including Russia, while the right aspires to a Western European style of socialism. As a result, there was renewed speculation of a Party breakup at the end of 1982. Perhaps leadership from the right will elicit more extensive cooperation with center factions which would lead to greater electoral successes. As long as ideological controversy remains at the center of factional strife in the JSP, though, strong leadership is unlikely, as are major compromises and cooperation with the center parties. One Japanese political analyst observes that the JSP is really a conservative party since it still adheres to class doctrine when 90 percent of the Japanese people consider themselves middle class. Furthermore, he adds, "... what the Socialists have been

97Asahi Shimbun (Asahi Newspaper), December 18, 1982, p. 2.
doing remains a mystery to the public at large. This may be the reason for its perennial role as the party of the opposition." 98

The Communist Party ranks first among the parties in per-member party income and expenditures in some areas of the country. It has less factionalism than the JSP and has broken ties with the Russian party over recent Russian military expansion, in contrast to the JSP. It has developed links with the party of the Peoples Republic of China. Also, it has taken a more positive position with regard to self defense. However, unlike the JSP, it has no clear constituency, receiving only part of its support from unions. Its members usually bring limited group ties and leadership capabilities, and therefore, its membership remains small. Consequently, it has lost over half of its seats in the Diet since 1972. 99 Though the communists have consistently expressed a desire to form a coalition government with any of the other opposition parties, they remain opposed to the Security Pact which is supported by over 70 percent of the population, and they seek neutrality. 100 Also, in the minds of the voter, the JCP has been indirectly associated with Russian interference in Eastern Europe, Southeast Asia, and

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100 Fuwa Tetsuzo, op. cit., pp. 77-79.
Afghanistan, and this has likely contributed to an increasingly negative response at the polls. In short, the communists appear, more than ever, consigned to a very minor party status. More so than the socialists, the voting public appears disinterested in their dogmatic policy pronouncements. Those policies, along with continued emphasis on the "class struggle," fall largely on deaf ears because they are in contradiction to the prevailing political ethos in Japan.

Local Political Participation

As the individual is oriented directly to concrete small groupings, his participation, likewise, is focused on the community groups of which he is a member. As a result, a major focus of party organization has been at the local level. Electoral results tend to show this interest in community. An analysis of the vote in Oita Prefecture in 1963, for instance, shows a steady increase in voting rates in Upper House, Lower House, Prefectural Assembly, and City-Town-Village Assemblies of 74.01, 80.79, 87.67, and 90.79 percent, respectively.101 Watanuki attributes this greater interest in local, as opposed to national, elections to strong village solidarity and the traditional idea of obligation to community.102


Party Support and Organization

The opposition parties failed to gain strength at the national level and this has led to their concentration on local politics. There they have met with mixed success as already seen. Opposition strength has come largely from the metropolitan areas. Even there, though, success has been primarily at the mayoral and prefectural gubernatorial level and in the more populated areas. Strength in these larger city assemblies has been divided among all of the parties. The policies of "socialist" administrations in the larger metropolitan areas have been what might be labelled "progressive." But severe budget limitations in the past several years have dampened some earlier enthusiasm for liberally funded social welfare programs begun under those administrations. It seems likely that as long as leftist emphasis remains focused on the traditional policy proposals founded upon considerable Western idealism, voters will not likely gain enthusiasm for the candidates.

Another important area where the opposition parties could gain supporters, but have not done so consistently, is through recruitment of those in the "citizen protest movements." Various movements have been formed in recent years that were comprised of citizens who have common complaints--frequently concerning environmental pollution. Different types of such movements have been observed, some of which cut across neighborhood boundaries. Although
interest in these movements as potential precursors to broader citizen awareness at the national level has recently subsided, such movements do, nevertheless, appear.

The important point is, however, that organization and success of such movements have been at the local, not national, level. Ellis S. Krauss and Bradford L. Simocock have noted that many of these citizen movements have relied on established community organizations as an underlying basis for their activities. Their success, they argue, was not due to "the availability of an isolated and alienated 'mass' but the availability of an extensive web of community and associational organizations at the local level, together with the movement resources they can provide." The opposition parties, though, have been criticized for not taking full advantage of citizen grievances at the local level. Krauss and Simock observe, for example, that the JSP has not had strong grass-roots organization down to the community level. Furthermore, their ideological orientation has emphasized national, rather than local, issues.

Another problem for the opposition has been when such citizen protest groups have taken their complaints to local progressive administrations for adjudication and resolution,

104 Ibid., p. 206.
those administrations have faced the same dilemma in alienating such groups as their more conservative counterparts. This was the case with the long-term socialist administration of Asukata Ichio in Yokohama from 1963-1970. That administration found, for instance, that public works programs it promoted often necessitated purchases of property and created environmental problems which encouraged the rise of community protest movements against his administration. To maintain power, then, the administration often supported larger, more influential, business and labor groups, to the exclusion of the citizens groups. Furthermore, these groups, particularly as they cut across neighborhood boundaries, are temporary. Once a particular issue is resolved, there is no further need for the group, and it dissolves.

The opposition strategy of focusing on local political contestation to increase their representative strength has been prudent, if not entirely successful. Part of the reason is organizational. There is some structural difference in the way in which the parties are organized, although there is no indication that structure alone has made the difference between success and failure. James J. Foster has analyzed local party organization in one prefecture, Hyogo. All of the parties, he notes, had a prefectural office. The LDP has not had an intermediate office between

the prefecture and municipal level, although the other parties have. The DSP, JSP, and JCP all had local representative offices beneath their intermediate prefectural offices that were territorially organized, primarily according to company unions. The CGP in Hyogo, however, had neither a precise geographical nor functional definition, and it also had the "weakest" organizational ties.\footnote{James J. Foster, "Local Party Organization in Japan," Asian Survey, Vol. XXII, No. 9 (September 1982), pp. 843-857.}

The LDP, according to Foster, had the "lowest level of organization" for the prefecture. It has been backed, however, by a "myriad of commercial agricultural and professional groups," tied together by city level offices.\footnote{Ibid.} These ties, vertically and horizontally, have been the basis for historical authority. It might be suggested that the successful "party" in Japan is the one that is able to utilize traditional authority concepts for the benefit of the system. The opposition has largely limited its own constituency or "interest groups" by defining the ideology under which it wishes to exist. The LDP, as a group of factions, has not set limitations on its constituency. On the contrary, in recent years it has tried to broaden its appeal. More importantly, however, these factions collectively have shown that they have the ability to govern with a minimum of conflictual confrontation and acceptance
of the ideal of consolidation of authority toward the top that is consistent with traditional concepts of authority. The opposition has not been able to avoid such confrontation, largely because of its ideological orientations. Nor has it been able to demonstrate consolidation of authority toward the top. Further, it has not been able to gain broad-based support at the local municipal and sub-municipal level necessary for such consolidation.

The concept of order in Japan stresses resolution of problems at the local community level, and the opposition has not sufficiently concentrated its efforts on the historical sub-municipal organizations (chyonaikai) from which citizen participation has traditionally originated. For the opposition, particularly the left, it is likely to remain a group of "subparties." Matsuda Nichio sees the left, for instance, as a sect that has created its own mura kyodotai consciousness, that has "settled down according to Japanese tradition and [is] maintained in an exclusive and closed society."\(^{108}\) In other words, the left is tolerated, but because of its ideology it cannot be trusted with political power, nor does it act as if it wants to, under the order that is understood in Japan.

Self-Governing Associations

As discussed above, authority as understood in Japan has been decentralized as well as centralized—vertical, but also, strongly localized—as has been incorporated in the mura concept. The importance of the small (sub-village) self-governing units in the Japanese system was not understood by the Occupation. Participation historically had been conducted in small, intimate sub-municipal units of 5 to 10 or so households (goningumi, etc.). At the lowest level, participation was given and to be directed toward and through the small group. By the end of World War II, there were countless different groupings to handle virtually every community need. Some were officially established, such as the hamlet (buraku-kai) and neighborhood (chyonaikai) associations. A subset of these two organizations that was considered by the Occupation to be particularly repressive, though, was the tonarigumi, thought to be a direct descendant of the pre-Tokugawa goningumi, or 5-household unit. The Occupation felt that it was through these local associations that prewar "thought control" had been conducted successfully, and that by dissolving them "the individual would be free."\(^{109}\) The Occupation initially revoked the various associations collectively labelled jumin-soshiki (citizens associations), but under protest from Japanese officials

decreed that all chyonaikai and buraku-kai officials had to be elected in a general election.\textsuperscript{110} The Japanese argued that (1) the self-governing administrative branches had become part of the culture, (2) society as a whole approved of them, and (3) they were necessary for the government to function. These associations, today, are voluntary and are not all approved by the local government. However, if there were a dispute over the construction of a building, it would usually be resolved with the help of the particular self-governing associations that might be involved.\textsuperscript{111}

Nakagawa Goh traces the origin of the chyonaikai back to the seventh century where it was used for purposes of registry and security.\textsuperscript{112} By the end of the Occupation, the Kobe City Zaidan Hojin (Association) says, 98 percent of the communities had re-established either the chyonakai or buraku-kai. These latter two associations, for city and village respectively, came to be collectively known as jichi-kai, and they were considered voluntary, independent and self-governing bodies. Over two-thirds of the prewar chyonaikai were reorganized within their previously established boundaries, and total resident participation was approximately 81 percent

\textsuperscript{110}Ibid., p. 25.
\textsuperscript{111}Zaidan Hojin Kobe Toshi Mondai Kenkyusho (Zaidan Association Kobe City Research Center), editor, Chiiki Jumin Soshiki no Jitai Bunseki, (Analysis of Local Citizens Associations--Kobe City), (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 1980), pp. 11-16.
\textsuperscript{112}Ibid., p. 3.
of the population. Furthermore, 85 percent of all jichikai today have tonari-gumi.\textsuperscript{113}

Currently the jichikai do not exist under law and are independent of local administration, but they are used by local authorities for purposes covering every aspect of community association from public health and sanitation maintenance to collection of money for Shinto ceremonies, government welfare, fire prevention, self-protection, and, simply, mutual fellowship.\textsuperscript{114} Another important function, the Kobe City Zaidan Johin says, is that of "controlling conflict." There are clubs for the elderly and adolescent, as well as political and religious groups and hobby and merchant groups, with nearly all of them under a jichikai organizational umbrella. Only about 10 percent of these groups are independent, but even the independent groups reportedly desire close relationships with other jichikai.\textsuperscript{115}

Though unofficial and voluntary, the jichikai have direct links with local governments, and the particular function of each depends upon agency definition. Functions of the jichikai include those mentioned above plus (1) study, (2) recreation, (3) realizing a particular goal, such as training, inviting guest lecturers, and (4) the redress of grievances, such as the local citizen protest movements.

\textsuperscript{113}Ibid., p. 5. \textsuperscript{114}Ibid., p. 8. \textsuperscript{115}Ibid., p. 164.
(jumin-undo), considered important by some researchers as a forerunner to greater citizen participation.\textsuperscript{116}

Other citizen's organizations, thought to be representative of pluralistic participation at an open, societal level, such as the Boy Scouts, PTA, and Rotary Club, have become an important part of the local community in Japan today, and they are eligible for local government subsidies for various projects. For example, the Kobe City Zaidan Hojin cited that city where all of the different associations are grouped together under one municipal department called the "Community Promotion Association." The City would provide up to $50,000 for the construction of facilities in which 1000 households were involved. Typically, though, regardless of the type of group, exclusivity and intimacy are sought. Membership is most often according to place, or position (ba), and not simply interest.\textsuperscript{117}

The Kobe City Zaidan Hojin cites the PTA as an example of a jichikai. Another such example would be the government subsidized housing association (danchi jichikai) in Kobe City. This particular association at the apex consisted of a chairman, 5 vice-chairmen, treasurer, 3 auditors, 35 regular secretaries, and 110 standing secretaries (managers), the latter of whom are elected. All terms are for one year with the possibility of re-election.\textsuperscript{118} The Zaidan Hojin

\textsuperscript{116}Ibid., p. 9. \textsuperscript{117}Ibid., pp. 28-31. \textsuperscript{118}Ibid., p. 81.
notes a vertical and horizontal relationship between all of the various *jichikai* and other community groups within a recognized hierarchy of authority. That authority, though, is technically independent of Kobe City administration. Nevertheless, there are very few cases where such associations are set up completely independent of local administration because of the former's dependence on public facilities for meetings. It is difficult to avoid having relationships with the local administration, and nearly all *jichikai*, the Kobe City Zaidan Hojin say, want, at a minimum, to cooperate with the city authorities. Over 52 percent desire regular contact with the city. In a survey conducted in 1975, at about the peak of the *jumin undo* (citizen protest movement), Shinohara finds that only 13.7 percent of Tokyo's population would not want to participate in such a movement if it was in their local neighborhood. There was also the feeling that support for such movements should be accelerated. Only 5 percent felt that such protest movements were unnecessary.

Shinohara notes, however, that there is a discrepancy between support for the local protest movements and elections. He says there is a problem with the Japanese parliamentary system in that a majority of the people distrust elections as an effective means of resolving problems. Over 51 percent of those polled in 1975 distrusted elections. He believes,

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furthermore, that distrust in elections is increasing, but that the citizens' movements are "taking up slack in the parliamentary system."\textsuperscript{122} Shinohara does not believe that the protest movement is as "influential" as it could be, because in the areas of broader labor movements and environmental concerns the movements are still small. He believes, for example, that the movements should be permanent and institutionalized. What is most important, he says, is that "local public entities" (local self-government laws) must be adhered to.\textsuperscript{123} Nevertheless, he believes that the traditional value structure of "cooperation" should be attacked more because labor, for instance, is too loyal to the company.\textsuperscript{124}

From this observer's perspective, the protest movement has always been a legitimate part of the traditional concept of order in Japan since at least Tokugawa. It is not considered separated from the jichikai by the Zaidan Hojin, and the traditional concept of order has made it a given that participation occur. The entire system is founded upon a high rate of participation. Without it the system could not continue to function. The mode of participation, though, is through the small group. That is why Shinohara and other observers have focused on the local protest movements as a potentially hopeful sign of broader, societally-based,

\textsuperscript{122}Ibid., pp. 91-93. \textsuperscript{123}Ibid., pp. 112-125. \textsuperscript{124}Ibid., p. 114.
pluralistic participation of a kind similar to that in the West where there are accountability checks in the policy-making process.

The Japanese system has been termed "patron-client" because it has been assumed that there is a simple personal relationship between the citizen and his representative. It is said, "The voter extends his support in return for individual and local community benefits," and this model does not provide checks on actions of the Diet and cabinet.125 Scott C. Flanagan, Kurt Steiner, and Ellis S. Krauss believe that partisan politicization at the local level has been positive for postwar Japan because it "contributed to the re-socialization of citizens towards local government and local autonomy." Japanese, they say, "are by and large more aware of and concerned about local as opposed to national problems and take a more active, participatory role in local issues." They also find higher levels of distrust at the national level,127 as does Shinohara. The politicization, they argue, is helping to build support for the postwar political institutions and makes central decision making more pluralistic.128 The patron-client mode of representation,


126Ibid., p. 448. 127Ibid., p. 460.

128Ibid., pp. 452-453.
according to Flanagan, Steiner, and Krauss, only marginally integrates voters into the system, and the politicization of local politics is helping create greater political competition.\(^{129}\)

While it is acknowledged that local politicization creates greater political competition or contestation, there is no recent, strong evidence to suggest that there has been a significant increase in the level of local contestation along party lines since the 1960's. In the city assemblies the total number of "independent" candidates has increased slightly from 11,456 in 1967 to 11,818 in 1982, out of a total of 18,614 and 21,112, respectively. At the same time, the number of LDP assemblymen has dropped from 2,750 to 2,572 in the same period.\(^{130}\) As mentioned above, whatever voter preference movement that has been taking place has apparently been toward disregarding party label and examining organizational ties and personality. These tendencies are congruent with more traditional values and do not necessarily indicate movement toward greater contestation or confrontation.

Confrontation, as suggested above, is not as highly valued as a means to problem resolution as it is in the West. This does not mean that parties as institutions will disappear, but that they are not as important in the participatory

\(^{129}\)Ibid., pp. 457 and 459.

\(^{130}\)Japan Statistical Yearbook, 1965 and 1982 (Statistics Bureau, Prime Minister's Office).
process as in the West. Factionalism is the norm in Japanese political contestation, and the group of ruling factions has remained broad-based and inclusive, highly competitive. At the same time they have demonstrated the ability to compromise and operate within a system of order that values local ties and diversity, yet they felt need to consolidate authority at the top. There is no fear of authority in the Japanese system. The interpretation of polls showing greater dissatisfaction for elections (particularly, national) and greater support for the citizens’ movements are likely a reflection of the traditional need to resolve problems at the local level rather than to rely on higher, more abstract, authority which the citizen likely does not understand. There is perhaps dislike for centralized authority, but not fear.

Participation, likewise, is group-oriented. There are, of course, personalistic relations between patron and client within a hierarchy of authority, but the important consideration is always the group which is preferably small and intimate, and to which both patron and client owe their prosperity. For that reason the patron-client model, modified to incorporate a concept of direct small-group orientation, continues to influence the character of Japanese political participation. The importance of the unofficial local citizens’ associations should not be underestimated. They have been institutionalized and are an integral part of
the community authority structure. The citizen protest movement has also been part of the idea of local citizens' associations and a part of the historical institutionalized tradition of local community authority. The existence of such movements has not necessarily meant a movement toward pluralism based upon the individual. But, neither has Japanese-type, collective group action meant loss of individual strength and self. The competitiveness remains. Ike, in a re-evaluation of Japanese politics, said,

In Western democracies there is a certain conception of the individuals who make up the political system. It is often believed that every individual possesses innate capabilities and that these capabilities ought to be developed as fully as possible. It is believed further that a democratic society provides the best medium through which these capabilities ought to be developed under one's conscious control rather than at the dictate of another. It is probably in this sense that freedom and equality have been long considered essential in Western democratic theory, for without freedom and equality individuals cannot fully develop their capabilities.

The situation in Japan is somewhat different. Analysts of Japanese culture and society have pointed to the need for achievement that many Japanese exhibit. There is a strong competitive strain in Japanese culture. . . . Thus, like Americans, Japanese also believe that individuals have capabilities that ought to be developed. But in the West, the stress has been on self-realization in individualistic terms; in Japan it has been defined in social group terms. . . . Thus individuals in Japan are encouraged to develop their capabilities not as an end in itself, but to contribute more to the good of the family or group and, by extension, quite possibly to society.\textsuperscript{131}

\textsuperscript{131}Nobutaka Ike, \textit{A Theory of Japanese Democracy} (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978), pp. 4-5. Ike adds that, "Conceivably, one could take the position that only democracy based on individualism, the democracy found in the West, is genuine, but such a view would be rather ethnocentric." (p. 5).
To the extent, then, that any political faction is able to secure support of these local associations, they should be successful. There was no need for "resocialization" of citizens toward local government following the War. In spite of efforts by the Occupation to eliminate the tonarigumi and chyonaikai, they have remained, in much the same form as before. The only difference has been less direct interference by central authority. The animistic spirit was freed, and the mura bito sovereignty principle, following the Occupation, was allowed to function. This principle has meant given participation, but participation within a system that has prized value diversity at the neighborhood level.

Ike proposed a model of Japanese democracy in 1978 that was an attempt to synthesize his patron-client model of democracy with those of the rational choice type. He likens the voter to investors and the politician to entrepenuer. In return for benefits, the voter supports politicians—political parties. Ike recognizes the "overwhelming importance of small groups in Japanese society." He acknowledges the importance of Nakane's frame, or place, as a mediating variable and says that it has worked well for the LDP. Nakane's vertical society, he says, provides a favorable environment for the growth of factions through pyramids based on patron-client ties. Ike and this observer agree that the small

132 Ibid., p. 51.  
133 Ibid., pp. 49-50.  
134 Ibid., pp. 50-51.
group is important. Ike, however, has focused upon the importance of the leader in the small group, and his particular ties to higher authority. Because emphasis is on the leader, to the exclusion of the group itself, Ike looks to the party, not factions, for resolution of problems such as lower voter participation in urban areas.\textsuperscript{135} The 1970's increase in the number of citizen's movements (which are in gradual decline) is attributed by Ike to the decline in party identification.\textsuperscript{136} Likewise, the large number of voters who support "no party" is explained by a lack of confidence in the established parties.\textsuperscript{137}

These "problems" that are attributed to a lack of party ability to provide benefits may not be such problems at all. If factions, not parties, are more important, as Thayer suggests, then "party" may be a label under which any group of factions may work to maintain the system in the traditional manner through consolidation of authority toward the top, but with the inclusion of the small neighborhood association and their ties with political support groups. The history of the LDP as a party label has not been associated with any particular ideological orientation. It has a history prior to 1955 of being a consolidation of a number of other "parties" representing diverse factions, and there is no reason to believe factions within the current LDP will not break away.

\textsuperscript{135}Ibid., pp. 153-154.  
\textsuperscript{136}Ibid., p. 153.  
\textsuperscript{137}Ibid.
at some time. Ike suggests the possibility of a future coalition government. Rather than that possibility, long-term consolidation of authority under the *mura kyodotai* concept may mean a new ruling "party," completely different from any existing today.

By focusing on the individual and his particular relationship to a patron in his revised "investment model," Ike has the same problem with individual and collective "benefits" that Mancur Olson found with his ideas of collective action. Olson's model, as Ike's, is a derivative economic model based on individual "costs" and "benefits," and it is limited, Olson believes, when studying "noneconomic" or altruistic groups. Such an economic approach is not particularly useful, he says, in studying groups of "a low degree of rationality." Ike's focus on patron and individual client does not incorporate the value Japanese order has placed on small groupings. Therefore, the leader in his model has assumed more importance in vertical relationships. In political analysis, this has led to a focus on the leader and relation to the party, to the exclusion of faction and

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139Ibid., p. 161.

140Ike (1978), op. cit., Part II of the book utilizes class and party indicators, which are not traditionally important, to suggest social movement. Ike's working hypothesis recognizes the value of social networks as more
collective leadership when groupings of factions must compromise and cooperate to maintain the existing value of consolidated authority inherent in the mura concept.

An analysis of interviews of candidates in the 1968 General Elections from Hyogo Prefecture (Kyoto City) lends support to the importance of groups as opposed to party label. Sixty-three percent of all candidates thought party label to be of "little or no" importance in electoral success. Particularly in the rural areas, it was the support group (koenkai) and "organization" that was deemed important. For 63 percent of all candidates group affiliation was perceived as being important. Candidate personality was important, too, but the local influential (yuryokusha) was deemed important by only 38 percent of all candidates. The traditional "community ties" and intimacy with candidates, it was concluded, deemphasize the impact of issues and partisan politics.

significant in Japan than the U. S. because of the cultural bias against letting individual political decisions be influenced by outsiders. He quotes Angus Campbell to the effect that "recognition of group obligation and interests is thoroughly taboo to some Americans." (p. 27).


142Ibid., pp. 124-132.  
143Ibid., pp. 134-136.
The next chapter examines some aspects of Japanese policymaking in the postwar era that may possibly be interpreted to support the long-term continuance of the mura kyodotai concept of order within the Japanese system.
CHAPTER VII

POLICYMAKING AND COMMUNITY

In Japan, service in the Government bureaucracy is the most prestigious occupation.\(^1\)

Japanese think small. While the western democracies regard the formulation and decision of policy as a single function, the Japanese regard it as two. Formulating policy is one act. . . . Deciding policy is another act. . . .\(^2\)

The first quote is recognition of continued respect for, and obedience to, higher authority, and this recognition, Yoshizo Ikeda believes, has enabled business and government to reach consensus on major industrial trends.\(^3\) Nathaniel B. Thayer prefers the concept "consolidation of authority" toward the top in discussing the consensus process. In the second quote, Thayer has identified the two aspects of authority important in Japanese political organization, formulation and decision of policy, though he does not identify them in such terms, nor does he apply it to the bureaucracy. To summarize both Thayer and the major premise


\(^3\)Yoshizo Ikeda, op. cit.
of the mura kyodotai concept, there are two important political forces operative in Japanese political organization. The first force is the decentralized village and neighborhood authority, or place (ba), which is essential in the participatory process from the bottom to the top of the decision-making ladder. The second force is the recognition of the need for consolidation of authority toward the top. In other words, there is diversity within a hierarchical authority structure through which policy is formulated.

**Critique of the Bureaucracy**

The bureaucracy continues, as the Tokugawa bakufu did, to enjoy prestige and considerable "autonomy," according to Ike. The bureaucracy, he says, "has a long tradition of taking the leadership in developing the country. ..."\(^4\) Ike believes that "If there is one institution that looks upon itself as the guardian of the general interest, it is the bureaucracy," and its influence is sustained by an "underlying consensus regarding its proper role."\(^5\) The merit system, Ike believes, has sustained the influence of the bureaucracy. The maintenance of a large measure of autonomy from "spoils" influence has served as "a kind of 'frame' [Nakane Chie's

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term] for the political structure." According to Ike, the bureaucratic structure "gives [Japanese] society a sense of coordination and enables it to work toward its goals."

One reason for the continued influence of the bureaucracy, Ike speculates, is because there is a tendency for the electorate to distrust politicians. He cites the following Institute of Statistical Mathematics' survey question as suggesting this.

Some people say that if we get good political leaders, the best way to improve the country is for the people to leave everything to them, rather than for the people to discuss things among themselves. Do you agree with this, or disagree?

1. Agree ... / / / / / 32%
2. Disagree ... 38/44/47/51/ /58

The Institute interprets these results as movement away from authoritarianism and diffusion of democratic norms, but Ike

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8 Ibid.
suggests it is more "an indication of the growing distrust of political leaders."¹⁰ There may be distrust, but it also may show less interest in national affairs than in local affairs, as the mura kyodotai concept suggests.

In any case, though the ruling LDP factions have a policy affairs research council and an executive council for policy formulation and decision making,¹¹ the bureaucracy stands at least equal, Thayer says, in the process of policy-making due to its expertise and control of information.¹² He notes that the policy affairs research council has been criticized as weakly staffed.¹³ Ike believes that the operative force between the bureaucracy and party leadership is one of "accommodation." He cites two reasons for this. First, many bureaucrats retire and run for political office and rise to power because of their expertise, and, second, the vertical and horizontal (and often, blood) relationships established between business, bureaucratic and political leaders.¹⁴ Ito Daiichi believes that the principle of party government exists, but that in reality, the parties do not have the capability of policy decision-making.¹⁵

¹¹Thayer, op. cit., p. 207.
¹²Ibid., p. 228. ¹³Ibid., pp. 228-229.
Because the bureaucracy is taken to be so important in policy making, several studies by foreign researchers have recently been conducted on Japanese bureaucratic policy making. John Creighton Campbell, in a study of Japanese budgetary politics, notes that, unlike the U.S., appropriations precede authorization. New programs are approved by the Cabinet and submitted to the Diet "after the budget has been settled; such 'budget-related bills,' as they are called, are often thought of simply as routine implementation of matters already decided." 16 The party (LDP) routinely intervenes in the process, he says, with its most realistic function being to aggregate the various constituency interests. 17 These interests are representative of the various factions and the support groups (koenkai) loyal to the factions.

Campbell believes that the degree of consensus within the governmental system on broad social goals as well as many of the policy implications of those goals has meant that disputes have been over means rather than ends. 18 The consensus that exists, he says, does not pertain to the entire system, but rather to an "elite." Consequently, he believes, "direct participation in decision making is

17 Ibid., pp. 2 and 138-139.
18 Ibid., p. 278.
monopolized by a tiny portion of the citizenry and its relationships among the elite that determine both the methods by which issues are settled and their outcomes. He believes, for example, that many groups are excluded in the budget making process, including organized labor. The thesis is somewhat misleading. This observer disagrees with that conclusion to the extent that the traditional decision-making process, of necessity, is inclusive and characterized by both bottom-up and top-down decision making in which all concerned groups have at least some input. The policy study groups, elaborated on below, are a key linkage in the process of providing participation in policy formulation, if not final decision-making, authority.

T. J. Pempel believes that public policy determination in Japan is a blend of (1) "the conservative nature of the social support-base of government in Japan," and (2) "the relative strength and cohesiveness of the Japanese state apparatus." The strength of the "state apparatus" may be taken to be the recognition of consolidation of authority under the mura kyödotai principal. "At the same time," Pempel recognizes, "the Japanese regime is by no means fully homogenous, cohesive, or comprehensive. Divisions are

\[^{19}\text{Ibid., pp. 278-279.}\]
\[^{20}\text{Ibid.}\]
pervasive within the social groups that support the regime and within the various institutions that collectively constitute the state." He believes that "Unlike authoritarian or totalitarian regimes, Japan is pluralistic and democratic with all the complexity of bargaining and influence these terms imply." This recognition of diversity and complexity of bargaining is a fundamental part of the mura concept of local autonomy. The "democratic" and "pluralistic" concept, though, probably should be interpreted as Ike does, distinct from the Western definition. Though Pempel recognizes to some extent the diversity of Japanese society, he believes that the continued rule of the LDP has meant that "organized labor has been completely missing as a social support-base. . . ."  

The development of Pempel's thesis of strong state control, or "centralization," does not stress the other aspect of Japanese unification which has been important since Tokugawa—the legitimation of decentralized mura authority. He has noted some of the diversity of groupings and importance of bargaining, as well as the difference between authoritarian and the Japanese systems. He does not, however, stress the importance of company-based unions, nor the inclusion of labor in the various policy study groups, as determinant in the participatory and decision-making processes.

22 Ibid., p. 11.
23 Ibid.
He concludes, for example, that "The Meiji political system rested...on the principles of political centralization and the citizen's duties to the state rather than on popular sovereignty, local autonomy, checks and balances, or the rights of man." The Meiji political system did, as discussed earlier, stress centralization. But there is reason to suggest that it did not "rest" on centralization. As discussed above, the Meiji regime further legitimated the status of the hamlet and neighborhood association, and thereby, the legal status of local autonomy. Thus, "checks and balances" in the Japanese system have been of a factional nature at the top and a balancing of the two forces of consolidation (or centralization) and local mura autonomy (decentralization). The participation process in decision making includes both of these elements.

Chalmers Johnson says that Japan's "elite bureaucracy," in spite of being influenced by pressure groups and other political claimants, "makes most major decisions, drafts virtually all legislation, controls the national budget, and is the source of all major policy innovations in the system." Upon retirement, Johnson adds, bureaucrats may move from government to powerful positions in business, banking and politics--a process which is opposite that prevailing in the

\(^{24}\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 12.}\)
United States. Johnson, in a case study of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), likens Japan to a "plan-rational," as opposed to a "market-rational," system, whereby the state, following Meiji, adopted developmental goals (fukoku-kyohei) keyed to industrial policy. The market-rational state, like the U.S., Johnson says, does not have overarching goals for its economy, but rather stresses the regulatory function, since each man is responsible for himself. Individualism, he says, became a social principle, and the state was almost the sole regulatory authority. For Japan, however, development became a state function, and most of the ideas came from the bureaucracy.

The importance of the bureaucracy in development is well-illustrated in Cyril E. Black's collegial study of the modernization of Japan and Russia. For Japan, Black maintains, development could not have proceeded so rapidly following the 1868 Restoration if an elite and effective bureaucracy had not been developed under Tokugawa in the 17th and 18th centuries. The role of the bureaucracy, then, has long assumed import in Japan's political organization.

Johnson focuses on MITI because it is "the leading state actor in the economy." As a leading state actor, he notes, MITI feels that one of its primary duties is the creation of powerful interests in the economy that favor shifts of energy and resources into new areas of economic activity. Johnson says that MITI believes, like Robert Gilpin, that market forces alone never desired such shifts and, therefore, some form of state action may be warranted.

In a recent effort to explain its own approach to economic activity in the face of foreign criticism of Japan's industrial policy, MITI has said,

The primary role of the industrial policy of Japan is (a) to provide forecasts of emerging industrial structure trends in the form of a "vision", (b) to prime the economic pump when the market mechanism is in need of a "nudge" (e.g., the acceleration of basic research and development), (c) to furnish information to help industry adjust to the market environment, and (d) to coordinate industrial activity.

Johnson believes that there has historically been a separation in the Japanese political system between reigning and ruling, between authority and power. There is a discrepancy between the constitutional and actual locus of sovereignty. The formal powers of the Diet and the executive

29 Ibid., p. vii.
30 Ibid., p. 28.
31 Ibid.
branch notwithstanding, what is most important, Johnson believes, is that the system has persisted and become even stronger, even though it was abolished by the postwar Constitution. For that reason, Johnson believes that the various linkages with the bureaucracy, such as policy study groups (or deliberation councils, or shingikai) where bureaucratic officials and entrepreneurs formulate and coordinate policy, "are really covers for [bureaucratic—in this case, MITI's] 'remote control' of the industrial world." These policy study groups are discussed in greater detail below.

Bernard S. Silberman also ties the role of the bureaucracy to the concept of the developmental state and finds a theoretical paradox for Japanese modern political development. He finds it "puzzling" that, first, "The promulgation of the constitution in 1889 seemed to provide the formal capstone to what had already been achieved—a monopoly for the state bureaucracy in organizing society's wants. . . ."

Second, there seemed to be wider participation of interests in determining the public wants. But, third, despite appearances of arbitrary state authority structures from Meiji, onward,

The bureaucracy continued to enjoy the highest status and the most powerful place in the formation

33 Johnson, op. cit., pp. 35-36.
34 Ibid.
of public policy, a place it continues to enjoy today under a quite different structure of authority. This paradox suggests what others have noted in somewhat different ways, that the state bureaucracy's claim to legitimacy was never seriously challenged.35

He suggests that part of the reason for this may be that there was no single principle of "institutional authoritativeness."36 Authority, he believes, was arbitrary because the basis of bureaucratic legitimacy "was itself a product of bureaucratic interest and development that was only an ex post facto constraint...changing as the bureaucracy itself faced new situations."37 He says this arbitrary, yet powerful, role of the bureaucracy caused concern for constitutional theorists and political activists in Japan.38 The bureaucracy, then, according to Silberman, sought to maintain itself through role rationalization and establishment of routine procedures for securing tenure. Authority, he says, was established and maintained through linkage with private elites and by cooption. Private interests were transformed into public ones, and by coopting predominately local autonomous interests the formation of class was eliminated. Groupings, such as those by age and occupation, were legitimated with ties to higher authority.39

36 Ibid., p. 232. 37 Ibid.
38 Ibid. 39 Ibid., pp. 242-245.
Silberman believes that Meiji constituted a "revolutionary condition" in which the rise of the bureaucratic state had problems with authority and legitimacy. As suggested above, however, Meiji was perhaps less the "revolution" that many interpret it to be. While there was dislocation within the bureaucracy at the beginning of Meiji, the question of authority and legitimacy of the bureaucracy was perhaps less a problem for those clans in leadership positions than for constitutional theorists trying to fit an alien system to the existing recognized order in Japan. The mura kyodotai concept recognizes the historical authority of the emperor. For those in Tokugawa and subsequent administrations, there was always a given higher authority. But traditionally, local autonomy based upon place (ba) has been important. Also, consolidation of authority among clans, later factions, was the dominant force, and accommodation to foreign influences was accomplished by incorporating some of those institutions into the prevailing core value system. The bureaucracy, then, is a part, albeit important, but not the only part in the consolidation of authority toward the top.

The Community Concept and Bureaucratic Decision Making

According to Ito Daiichi, Japanese bureaucratic structural characteristics complement the mura kyodotai concept.
They are also essentially the same as structure in business. Entrance to the civil service is by merit, based on entrance examination and interview by level. Successful upper level applicants receive management training in a variety of posts in their first several years. Agency organization, Ito says, is like a ladder (or, hierarchy), and training is necessary at each step. Workers climb from positions of lesser to greater responsibility. In this respect, Ito says, government employees (especially, the upper level employees) are "eternal apprentices." That means that administration is by "apprentices," a situation which, Johnson says, is often irksome to business executives who must deal with lower-level administrators of limited experience.

One notable method of Japanese decision making that has been cited as an example of bottom-up decision making is the ringi sei system in which documents are drafted at lower levels of organization and then circulated horizontally and vertically for approval. It has been interpreted as a means...

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41 Ibid., p. 37.

42 Johnson, op. cit., pp. 35-36.

of bottom-up decision making which is characteristic of Japanese organization. Ezra F. Vogel notes, however, that lower-level section members are usually aware of the wishes of superiors and documents are drafted within this context. Lower-level members then act "within the bounds of explicit or implicit trust placed in them by their superiors." 44

Howard F. Van Zandt confirms the top-down aspect of the ringi sei system and estimates that in large firms of more than 400 employees about one-third of new ideas originate in executive suites. 45

The general function of the ringi sei is to provide coordination and consensus among those who are involved in implementation of decisions. 46 The elements of decision-making in the ringi sei process as exercised in larger organizations similar to bureaucratic agencies are as follows, according to Ichiro Hattori. The function of top management is, first, to define the parameters of the existing problem. At this point it may be anticipated that top management, as a collective, has some idea of how the problem will be

44 Ibid.
45 In interview, University of Texas at Dallas, October 1980.
resolved, simply by defining the problem. Hattori says "the way the problem is recognized and presented to middle level managers for analysis and resolution" really determines the quality of the decision and the efficiency of decision making. A second step, called a "logical phase," is begun when middle-level managers or administrators receive general instructions and analyze the problem with staff personnel. Solutions are worked out largely by staff, and the ringi process is formally begun by the staff after internal consensus is reached. From there, paperwork is transmitted upward for "authorization" and implementation. Hattori believes that unilateral communication downward would likely create linguistic misunderstandings. Therefore, tradition operates to maintain a system that exerts a "soft rule" under "given" that attempts to assimilate foreign elements in a "non-conflictual" manner, as J. Victor Koschmann notes.

According to Ito, employee training and the educational structure within the bureaucratic agency is essentially the same as that found in larger businesses. He says that the purpose of the ringi sei in the bureaucracy is to broaden

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48 Ibid., p. 14. 49 Ibid.
the experience and training of those who do not have authority or experience. Though the ringi sei system may not be entirely unique to Japan qualitatively, as Vogel believes, this observer sees significant implications in the maintenance of authority that illustrates the mura kyodotai ideal. First, as leadership defines the problem, it is setting or reinforcing the value boundaries deemed appropriate for that particular group's decision-making process. Second, participation is encouraged at the smallest group level, the section, and its integrity remains intact by initiating the formal paperwork. Third, through the medium of established hierarchy within organization, which the ringi sei system represents, authority is maintained. All administrative officers and relevant staff are included in the decision-making process. Ito believes that through this process of decision making group solidarity is created. The decision does not come directly from the top, and consensus has been reached at all levels at the time decisions are implemented. Finally, as a result of group solidarity being reinforced, responsibility is not placed on any one single individual.

According to Ito Daiichi, authority is the "catalyst through which groups are brought into existence." Groups

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51 Ito Daiichi, op. cit., p. 37.
52 Ibid., p. 49.
53 Ibid., pp. 49-50.
are formed by "task," and those related to a particular task make up one group. In the performing of general tasks, however, work is subdivided. The subdivision of work, though, is not accompanied by corresponding division of responsibility. The *ringi sei* process which requires stamped approval of all who are authoritatively involved, produces "oneness" of group (*shudanteki itai-sei*) and reconfirms the legitimacy of the group.\(^54\)

Decisions are made on the basis of options that are left after options by all participants have been rejected as unworkable at the time. In that manner, consensus, Ito says, is easier to reach. Furthermore, it reinforces the effort at bottom-up decision making. So, the *ringi sei* performs a "structural role," Ito says, "in construction groups," and there is a "family-like relationship" (*kazoku seiteki kyodotai*) established in each administrative agency that is not based on *ringi sei* but is a result of it.\(^55\)

**Limited Authority**

Ito says that each ministry is virtually a "completely independent entity," but that bureaucratic decision making in Japan is supported by the concept of "limited authority" (*kengen*). There is always higher authority. Limited authority is not used as a "role, but it has a tendency to

\(^{54}\text{Ibid., pp. 49-50.}^{55}\text{Ibid., p. 51.}\)
become a mood or emotion." As a result policymaking is used as a means of confirming authority, not as a means of setting standards. It is "a means to realize one's own personal goals and reassure position." Therefore, official position and personality (as Thayer has noted above) are not separated.  

**Administrative Decision-Making Standards**

As a result of a fusion of individual personality and official position, decisions are not usually based on precedent, but rather on a purpose which permits, and even encourages, vagueness. "Standards" are utilized, but they are selected to allow for vagueness, rather than specificity, in intention. Therefore, law making, Ito believes, is something that is pleasing to the administrator, but enforcement may be arbitrary.

Evaluation of administrative decisions based upon objective standards is not necessary, according to Ito. After a law is passed and it becomes open to the public, there is often the feeling of accomplishment. But, he says, there may not be much effort devoted to enforcement, and it is likely to be selective and arbitrary.  

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56 **Ibid.,** p. 52.  
57 **Ibid.,** p. 53.
Policymaking as Grievance-Settling Mechanism

Changes in laws, then, only come from extreme pressure from without, and arguments for change must demonstrate destructive elements of existing procedures. No action is taken until pressure reaches a high level. After pressure from victims, defendants, protests, or after destruction, policy may be quickly formed. Pollution, such as the Minamata cadmium poisoning incident, is a case in point. There is, Ito says, no concept of "prevention." Rather, policy-making is likened to a "grievance-settling mechanism" in which various techniques are developed.

First, opportunism becomes a positive symbol. If Japanese industry cannot compete in world markets, for example, once the trouble becomes big—in other words, heavy pressure from without—then new policy is adopted that will seek to create opportunities under existing adverse conditions. In other words, there is the idea that adversity can create opportunities.

Second, there is the idea under the "grievance-settling mechanisms" that quick change is possible in response to existing external pressures. An example of this is the demonstrated ability of the Japanese economy to achieve positive growth following the Oil Crisis of 1973 more rapidly

58 Ibid. 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid., p. 54. 61 Ibid.
than other global economies. This idea of ability to make rapid changes does not agree completely with Campbell's analysis of the budget-making process. His thesis is that decision-making in the budgetary process is largely incremental with substantive change difficult to achieve. This conclusion differs somewhat from the position on budgeting taken in the following chapter. Some substantial yearly increases in agency allocations were noticeable in the development of the computer industry.

**Allocation of Tasks**

As mentioned above, tasks are not assigned directly to individuals. They are assigned either to sections or subsections. Such groupings are generally limited to 14, or fewer, personnel, and by allocating a task directly to such a small group, subdivision of labor can be, and usually is, flexible, depending upon the personnel and circumstances. By placing responsibility directly on the small group and not on the individual, Ito concludes that the group concept of cooperation and collective help is promoted.

So far as authority permits, Ito contends, responsibility is never extended to the individual. Therefore, the individual can not be evaluated on the basis of individual

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63 Ito Daiichi, op. cit., p. 57.
performance. The performance of an entire section, centered around a manager, is evaluated. Thus, Ito says, administration employs what he calls a "negative evaluation principle," where the individual is evaluated "on the basis of how much one contributes to the group and ensures oneness."\(^{64}\)

The manager's main function is to "put in order" a problem and "reach conclusions." His evaluation, likewise, is based upon how well his efforts contribute to solidarity of the group, and also how well he is able to ensure effectiveness of the group within its own environment.\(^{65}\)

**Meeting External Demands**

External demands within this process of decision making are met, Ito says, by limiting the number of alternatives presented from the top for approval. After policy has been formulated at the bottom levels, what emerges is usually only one original idea that is either approved or disapproved. Bills that are presented to the Diet, for example, have been drafted as a result of a process of "bottom-up" decision making that has informally incorporated possibilities presented by most of the major participants: agency clientele groups (discussed below), intra-agency as well as inter-agency collaboration, and agreement with the LDP party council. Lower level agency personnel are expected to use

\(^{64}\)Ibid. \(^{65}\)Ibid., pp. 57-58.
information networks established among their various clientele groups to measure anticipated reaction. Once a proposal is submitted, then, "the various demands of society are consolidated into one." Only slight alteration can be expected, and effectiveness of policy can be predicted beforehand. 66

Nucleus of Decision Making

Ito concludes that decision making in Japanese bureaucratic organization has the following characteristics. First, place (ba) is not fixed and depends upon the situation. Group membership and function may fluctuate according to the people involved and the particular task. Second, there is "informality" among leadership at the top, similar to that created at the bottom. Leadership tends to be collective, with a titular head, but with power dispersed among subordinates. Third, the main function of leadership is to define the boundaries of problems. Finally, the overriding objective, for leadership and staff alike according to training manuals, is to maintain harmony (wa) and respect for one's group. 67

Though such instructions are included in government bureaucratic training manuals, Ito says, the statements that Japanese are "homogenous" are there because of the

66 Ibid., pp. 54-55.  
67 Ibid., pp. 58-59.
desire to create such homogeneity. Respect for wa (harmony, cooperation), however, means "heterogeneity." "Actually," Ito says, those moral commandments (wa) came from a heterogeneous nation. For there to be order [in the Japanese political system], a bureaucratic system was necessary. The Meiji bureaucratic functions were based upon the Baku-han (Tokugawa bureaucracy) which represented a heterogeneous people. Because of this heterogeneous people, we could keep consolidated action, or power, or decision-making (i.e.: strength).  

Baku-han authority was transferred to government organizational authority under the emperor (kanseitaiken) at the time of Meiji, but Ito concludes that the traditional concept of order was retained, and the heterogeneous character of bureaucratic authority has remained to the present.  

Ito does not stress the inclusiveness of those affected by decisions in terms of participation. But the nature of the ringi sei and the informal decision making process that precedes the written internal document and subsequent stamps of approval up the organizational heirarchy mean that those responsible for the execution of policy have been consulted and a degree of consensus exists. The Cabinet, again frequently rotating in membership and representative of factions (habatsu), acts, in this process, as Pempel says, as a "force for unity and effective implementation."  

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68 Ibid., pp. 59-60.  
69 Ibid., pp. 60-62.  
70 Pempel, op. cit., p. 17.
as a means of further consolidation of authority of groupings toward the top, which is essential under the Japanese concept of order. The relationship between the bureaucracy and political leadership has been described the following way. Administrative decisions (gyosei-kei) are usually allowed by political leadership, and such procedure is not broken during times of prosperity. But, when outside political pressures require important decisions, political leadership becomes important.\textsuperscript{71} The case study in the following chapter represents such an example of the involvement of political leaders in important decision-making situations.

Policy Study Groups as Linkages

The linkage of the bureaucracy, and, consequently, to higher political authority, to its clientele groups is accomplished through various formal and informal policy study groups established by the ministries and agencies to debate and recommend (in Thayer's terminology, formulate) policy. Decisions are made within the bureaucracy, but there are over 250 formal "deliberation councils" (shingikai) formally listed in the government organization manual.\textsuperscript{72}


Their function is to represent the various client interests of each of the respective agencies. In addition to these formally established "councils" (shingikai), there are numerous informal groups established by the ministries and agencies to study problems of every conceivable nature, from consumer protection to industrial policy. Of course, some are more prestigious and important. The Industrial Structure Council (Sangyo Kozo Shingikai) is perhaps the most prestigious, but not necessarily the most important, as the following chapter will show. This particular "council," though, is charged with "consulting with MITI on important subjects related to industrial structure. Industrial structure problems are to be discussed and researched." Most shingikai are subdivided into committees (bukai), and membership in a shingikai may range from 12 to over one hundred, depending upon the purpose. In the case of the Sangyo Kozo Shingikai, there are over 20 subcommittees (bukai) with a total membership of about 130, serving 2 year terms. Subcommittees are divided into functional areas, and problems are referred to the subcommittees by the Sangyo Kozo Ka (Industrial Structure Section) of MITI. Membership is chosen by MITI based upon place (or, position) and knowledge and experience. Not only are leading companies of every major industry represented,

73 Gyosei Kanri Kenkyu Center (Administrative Management Research Center), Shingikai Soudan (Deliberation Council Consulting), (Okura-Sho (Ministry of Finance), 1975), p. 8.

74 Ibid., pp. 290-291.
but also university professors, a newspaper editor, and the vice-ministers from most of the other ministries.\textsuperscript{75}

Shinoda Nobuo, writing on the shingikai, believes that they are "a camouflage" and that the government "wants people to believe they were set up for representation, but they actually were not," because members are chosen by the ministries and "the public interest" is not included.\textsuperscript{76} He believes that the small companies, farmers and citizen's groups are not represented.\textsuperscript{77} In some of the more important shingikai, that may be true. Business groupings (gyokai) are normally given "reserved seats" on many of the shingikai. But there is also representation by "personal background" (gakushiki keiken-sha). The principle is, that wherever an interest is affected, there should be a random selection of people as representatives.\textsuperscript{78}

In practice, a balance of interests may not be achieved, and there is no indication of whether there is intentionally an effort to exclude certain interests. It may be seldom that a policy study group is established with an obvious attempt to exclude specified interests. A function of the shingikai considered important is to avoid "monopolistic decision making." To avoid this, consensus is necessary.

\textsuperscript{75}Ibid., pp. 291-296.
\textsuperscript{76}Shinoda Nobuo, \textit{op. cit.}, Preface.
\textsuperscript{77}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{78}Shingikai Soudan, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 291.
but in order for decision making to be effective, and at the same time achieve consensus, decision making must be based upon "professional knowledge," as well as "representation at each level." For that reason, representation on each of the various councils normally includes a broad selection of professional, academic, labor and media personnel that may have permanent or temporary representation.

The representatives selected by personal background are considered to be representative of various interest groups outside of business. Such representatives are included to balance the representation of the various business groupings (gyokai). Leadership of the shingikai are normally the designated ministry officials, and more attention (respect) is given these officials. Definite agendas, formulated by the ministries, are provided for consideration of the shingikai. The shingikai's function, then, is to give a stamp of authority for an idea or plan by suggesting more specific measures to be adopted, either by law or administrative decision. Such recommended measures normally reflect the general content of the administrator's intention. By placing selected notable persons on a committee—shingikai or bukai—the authority of the committee is usually not

79 Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Japan Economic Newspaper), November 11, 1982, p. 11.
80 Ibid.
questioned, and shingikai recommendations are normally followed by the ministries and agencies.  

Though not legally binding, the "advisory councils" collectively are given formal organizational recognition as "arms" of the various ministries and agencies. They may be created, dissolved and reorganized at the discretion of the bureaucracy, but the idea of place (ba) in the representation of all concerned interests is important in achieving and maintaining consensus. For this reason, under the Ministry of Labor there are advisory councils representing most aspects of labor problems. There are councils representing small business, wages, labor standards, insurance, women, employment security, vocational training and the physically handicapped, for instance. The criticism that Shinoda Nobuo and Pempel make that labor is not represented sufficiently in the consolidation of power may bear some merit. At the same time, though, the other means of representation--through the electoral process--has not brought about a shift in power or instability. The traditional means of resolving disputes through the interrelationship of groups within a hierarchy that may constitute effectively an

81 Compiled from interviews conducted with selected participants in shingikai and other informal policy study groups between September 1982 and July 1983.


83 Ibid.
organic whole has likely enabled the bureaucracy to retain authority. As Ito says, authority is the means through which groups are formed. The shingikai represent groups used for participatory and policy formation purposes—to reconcile grievances and disputes "informally," prior to the enactment of legislation, with the intention of keeping the level of open confrontation to a minimum.

In sum, the shingikai, and other informal study groups organized by the ministries, do, in this observer's estimation, form the key participatory link between the ministries and their clientele. This inclusiveness of client groups may be a major reason why the bureaucracy has been able to retain its authority and prestige in the long term, from Tokugawa to the present. These groups are also representative of the mura kyodotai concept of authority placed in the local, decentralized group. Such authority must also be represented as authority is consolidated toward the top. The representation, though, is by group, and individuals are not chosen for membership because of their individual noteworthiness, but because of the particular groupings that each represents. So, representation is premised upon the small grouping and not upon the individual.
The Allison Models and Policymaking

The Graham T. Allison models of bureaucratic decision making are widely known among Japanese scholars.\textsuperscript{84} Allison, in 1971, proposed three models of governmental decision making that were useful in analyzing a non-legislative, crisis situation. The results, or the different aspects of focus, he observes, vary, depending upon the "frame of reference," or "conceptual lens" employed for analysis.\textsuperscript{85}

The three models he chose in 1971 are (1) the rational actor, (2) the organizational process, and (3) the governmental politics models. When applied to the Japanese system, all seem lacking in the ability to comprehend and understand political forces underlying the institutions. When confronted with environmental pressures, especially those from without, the models offer limited conceptual lenses through which to view policymaking. Each model is briefly stated below, as Allison has explained them, and critiqued, according to the mura kyodotai concept, which should offer greater understanding of the contemporary context of Japanese policymaking.

The Rational Actor Model

The rational actor model treats the nation-state as a single entity. Policy in this model is treated as emanating


\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., p. v.
from strategic and calculated action, given a nation's goals or objectives. The model allows the observer to imagine what others would do based upon the observer's own concept of what would constitute a rational action.

Given external pressure on the Japanese system, the observer following this model would likely choose one or several individuals considered to have the most influence on Japanese policy and hypothesize their reaction to an external challenge, assuming their influence would be determinate in policymaking. The model was virtually unanimously rejected as representative of any measure of Japanese decision making because the model is perceived as representative of the power and influence of single, powerful, individuals, which is different from the necessity of group compromise.

The Organizational Process Model

The second model Allison suggests is the "organizational process paradigm." The assumptions of this model are, first, that "the decisions of government leaders trigger organizational routines" that are based upon previously established procedures. Second, these established routines limit the range of effective choice open to government leaders. Third, organizational outputs structure the limits within

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86 Ibid., p. 13.
87 Based upon interview with Japanese social scientists between September 1982 and May 1983.
which leaders must make decisions. There is assumed a "constellation of loosely allied organizations on top of which government leaders sit." Problems and power, under this concept, are "fractionated" and divided.\textsuperscript{88}

Power is dispersed in the Japanese system, but problems and decision making under the \textit{mura kyodotai} concept flow both from the bottom-up as well as top-down. At the top group decision making is more often the rule, so that leadership (in terms of influence and power) is characteristically more collective than singular. Leaders, themselves, are rarely in the position of making specific decisions. Rather, their function is to "define the problem," as Hattori says, so that policy may be formulated from below and final decisions come from negotiations and compromise of positions taken by the various ministries representing clientele groups below them. The necessity of consolidation of authority and near unanimous consent on major policy initiatives dictate the outcomes, and leadership, collectively, should act more as "conciliators" than individuals seeking power positions regardless of the cost. Organizational integrity is necessary, as the Allison paradigm states. However, according to the paradigm, both central coordination and decentralization of responsibility and power are required, which Allison believes, is not possible.\textsuperscript{89} The result is,

\textsuperscript{88}Allison, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 79-80.

\textsuperscript{89}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 85-86.
according to Allison, that leadership is constrained and "control over critical rewards and punishments is severely limited," and "Central direction and persistent control of organizational activity... is not possible. Under the mura kyodotai concept of authority, central direction and control of organizational activity is not only desirable, but it is also feasible under the concept of consolidated authority. The only reservation is retention of the integrity of the decentralized, small-group authority.

The Governmental Politics Model

The governmental, or bureaucratic, politics model, according to Allison, assumes neither a unitary actor nor a "conglomerate of organizations." It assumes, instead, groups of individual players. In this model, "Positions define what players both may and must do." Position determines priorities and perceptions, so that goals are identified with the health and vitality of the organization and his own personal interests. Governmental decisions are made and actions are taken, not on the basis of a unified group action, nor on the basis of leadership preferences, but rather on the basis of individual political discretion.

\[90\] Ibid.
\[91\] Ibid., pp. 164-165.
\[92\] Ibid., pp. 166-171.
From interviews with several Japanese social scientists in 1982-1983 who were familiar with the Allison models, there was general agreement that the organizational process model did not adequately describe decision making processes in the Japanese bureaucracy. If forced to choose among one of the three, the bureaucratic model was chosen because it represented divergent interests within organizations. There was dissatisfaction with that model, though, because it appeared from the Japanese perspective too oriented toward the individual and his own personal interests as well as his own conceptualization of what the national and organizational interests were. The interests of those of one's immediate section and the relationship of that section to the interests of the larger whole seemed excluded.

What appeared lacking in the Allison models, in general, is the orientation of the individual to small groupings in which intimacy, duty and loyalty are cultivated. Once the individual makes such a commitment, his position is secure. His personal growth and prosperity are determined by the extent to which he contributes to the growth of the group. Small groups, such as sections, are not thought of as independent entities, but as entities authoritatively connected in a hierarchy which attempts consolidation of authority through constant discussion and compromise. The *ringi sei* process is recognition of such authority.
The following case study examines the beginning stages of computer policy development from the perspective of the mura kyodotai organizational principles presented in this and previous chapters.
PART III

THE CONCEPT AND THE ENVIRONMENT
Traditionally, Japan has devoted itself to the import and consumption of all kinds of technology developed in advanced countries and has obtained very good results. However, in an era of capital decontrol demands, it is becoming more difficult to import excellent technology by itself without the foreign capital accompanying it. In order to advance intensive innovation of technology and information and to stand equal with other advanced countries, and furthermore, to exceed them, we [Japan] have to develop unique technology and management methods with a new sense of wisdom in all kinds of industries. As such the atomic power, information, and ocean development industries should be developed positively, and furthermore, new products developed in these fields should be promoted to meet trends in foreign and domestic demand.

Unique (creative) technology [or invention] and products are the key to industrial development; therefore, the business world should pay more attention to the development of technology, and the government will reinforce this policy through subsidization.¹

Perception of the Problem

The above statement was made by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) in 1970 in its own publicly

distributed, but nevertheless, narrowly consumed, Journal. Because such statements by bureaucratic officials do not include all of the knowledge pertinent to the statement—the facts considered relevant and the author's own value perception—the interpretation by the researcher of such statements becomes critical.

The quotation contains two statements that may not be particularly pleasing to the Western ear, in so far as governmental policymaking is concerned. First, the statement that Japan should exceed the West in the creation of new technologies has been interpreted of late as highly competitive, if not dangerously so. Second, the statement advocating the subsidization of industries by government to accomplish this has drawn increasing criticism from world business and government officials. Today, Japanese government and business representatives are responding to charges of government "targeting" of specific industries to keep out foreign competition and promote their own domestic industries. From the mid 1970's there has been increased attention given to such governmental practices, and there has been substantial debate on the "fairness" and practicality of industrial policy which supposedly "targets" and subsidizes specific industries to the alleged detriment of free trade
and international economic competition. For Lester C. Thurow, however, every political system has an industrial policy, and the question becomes one of effectiveness as opposed to whether or not there should be such policy.

One's frame of reference, or conceptual lens, as Graham T. Allison says, causes one to "worry about quite different aspects of events..." In observing an event, historical or current, the perspective or methodology necessarily establishes the boundaries within which a problem is analyzed. Whether there is an abundance or a paucity of information available on an event, or series of events, some "sense" must be made of it. In the case of the above high level statement, there is at one and the same time both an abundance and a paucity of information available. There are documents and accounts to aid the observer. Yet, as Allison reminds the reader, "The essence of ultimate decision remains inpenetrable to the observer."

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Newsweek, April 25, 1983, p. 52.


Ibid., p. vi.
Therefore, the problem of perspective and interpretation is central in collecting and summarizing information on decision making. When the state is taken as a unitary, rational actor, as in Graham Allison's first model, conclusions about Japan's industrial policy, for instance, may often be critical in nature, as in the 1983 Semiconductor Industry Association Report.\(^6\) When a combination of approaches is taken, as with Chalmers Johnson's 1982 case study of MITI, one may receive the impression that one agency, or a small group of people, are responsible for the development of industrial policy. Johnson uses the "plan-rational" model for the state, and includes the organizational imperatives of one agency, MITI, plus bureaucratic conflict as an approach to studying the development of industrial policy in Japan between 1925 and 1975.\(^7\) The focus is on one relatively small, but influential ministry, MITI, that is supposed to set forth the nation's industrial policy. Other actors and support clientele assume less importance in the decision-making process. The same conceptual limitation is evident in T. J. Pempel's study of Japanese policymaking.

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a conservative elite, he says, has produced "centralization," and the powers of the state have been used to "suppress labor." These studies do not emphasize the importance of groups, their linkages to the bureaucracy, and the participatory process represented in consolidation of smaller, authoritative units toward the top.

This study of the first steps taken by government to develop the Japanese information industry seeks not only to outline some of the major decisions made in the policy conversion process but also to describe the process within the context of the mura hito sovereignty principle—the legitimacy and participation of smaller groupings in bureaucratic decision-making processes. By so doing, potentially, some explanatory power may be added to the examination of a contemporary global industry which is at the forefront of human capabilities, and which has become the source of intensive international economic competition.  


9 The term "information industry" as used in Japan applies both to computer hardware, including integrated circuit manufacturing, as well as software, data processing, and information supply services, such as database services. See, for example, Computer White Paper: 1981, (English Summary), (Tokyo: Japan Information Processing Development Center, 1981), p. 12.

10 See, for example, Semiconductor Industry Association, op. cit.
Background

Terutomo Ozawa, as well as others, have written on the "epoch-making policy" conversion that took place beginning in 1971. Based upon the Ministry of International Trade and Industry's (MITI) 1971 report on international trade, most observers have located the policy shift away from "pollution-prone" and "natural-resource-consuming heavy and chemical industries," toward "clean" and "brain-intensive" industries in the early 1970's.

The 1971 MITI White Paper stated that MITI was reportedly working on a "blueprint to alter Japan's industrial structure with special taxes and other fiscal measures," and the development of such "brain-intensive" industries was to be an integral part of the policy shift. The

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13 Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, The World Challenge, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1980), implies that the interest of the Japanese government in "knowledge intensive" industries, such as computers began in the early 1970's with the ascendency of Doko Toshiwa to the position of Chairman of Keidanren, one of the more influential business associations representing major Japanese corporations, although he never precisely pinpoints the date. He does, however, quote Doko as saying "at the end of the '60's," that, "We have no natural resource, no military power. We have only one resource: the inventive capacity of our brains. . . . We must make use of it. We must educate, train, equip. In the very near future, this mental power will become the most creative common good of all humanity." (p. 139).

"blueprint," however, was virtually complete and was being implemented by the time of the release of the 1971 White Paper. The computer and related support services, such as software development were considered an essential part of the shift.

In 1964, IBM introduced the model 360 Series, the first computers to incorporate the integrated circuit (IC), and it was considered a "revolution" as the beginning of the "third generation" in computer development. It has been termed a "shock" to the Japanese, equivalent to an "awakening" in business and government circles as to the future importance of "information" industries in the world economy.15

The particular policy-making process relating to the development of "unique technology" (today, commonly termed, "high technology"), though, began in the late 1950's. A minority of businessmen and bureaucratic officials were expressing concern about a competitive lag in the fledgling information industry. The information industry was only part of a growing concern for (1) the development of indigenous technology and (2) less dependence on the import of foreign technology. At the same time, the development of indigenous

technology was part of a larger goal of developing domestic infrastructure and maintaining a strong international economic competitiveness.

Grievance Settling

According to the mura kyodotai sovereignty principle, as evaluated by Ito Daiichi,\textsuperscript{16} bureaucratic authority is limited, and it functions largely as a means of settling grievances. Pressures, when large enough, create situations for opportunism—seeking advantage from adversity—and correspondingly, create possibilities for rapid change. External, as well as internal, demands in the late 1960's generated demands on the system that were perceived, collectively, as requiring a fundamental shift in economic policy. By 1971, the basic framework for reorientation has been completed, and implementation of important policy measures had been ongoing for one or more years.

The formulation of these policy measures proceeded in much the traditional manner of limited authority. There was broad inclusion of, and lengthy discussion among, various ministries and their support clientele, such as business groups and ministry sponsored deliberation councils (shingikai) prior to final decision making.

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Pre-1964 Policy

The first legislation that specifically affected the development of computers in Japan was the Electronics Industry Development Provisional Act of 1957 prepared by the Heavy Industry Bureau of MITI after consultation with business and political leaders.\(^{17}\) This act was the result of concern expressed to MITI by Japanese electronics firms (including Fujitsu, Hitachi, NEC, Matsushita and Toshiba) of the possible domination of the domestic computer market by foreign firms. MITI established a research committee (kenkyu-kai)\(^{18}\) composed of "MITI officials, representatives of Japanese companies and university professors." It investigated the size and nature of the technology gap between Japan and other nations and recommended encouragement of Japanese computer development, limiting of foreign-made computer imports and the introduction of foreign technology through technical assistance agreements and patent licenses.\(^{19}\) The fledgling computer industry did not demand priority consideration, and there was no policy section in MITI specifically

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\(^{18}\) A common means of gathering initial opinion on a subject, informally, prior to a more formal submission of a problem to "deliberation councils" for discussion.

\(^{19}\) Lindamood, Ibid., p. 59.
designated to offer "administrative guidance" (gyosei shido), considered essential in the maintenance of the informal decision making and authority characteristic in the system.\textsuperscript{20}

The 1957 Act established, for the first time, an Electronics Industry Section (Denshi Kogyo Ka) within the Heavy Industry Bureau of MITI.\textsuperscript{21} It also allowed for the creation of an Electronics Industry Deliberation Council (Denshi Kogyo Shingikai), under the Electronics Industry Section, thereby establishing MITI's formal authority in the industry. The act also provided for governmental assistance to hardware manufacturers in the form of (1) direct R&D subsidies, (2) loans to begin production, and (3) accelerated depreciation programs for investment in plant and equipment. Finally, the law, as it related to the computer industry, gave MITI authority to selectively exempt portions of the electronics industry from the Anti-Monopoly Law, "thereby permitting the establishment of cartels for controlling R&D activity, purchase of raw materials, and production of goods."\textsuperscript{22}

By 1959 several Japanese companies had begun commercial production of computers, and both IBM and Sperry Rand sought

\textsuperscript{20}See, for example, Chalmers Johnson, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 243-274.

\textsuperscript{21}JECC, \textit{op. cit.}, 1982, pp. 149-150.

\textsuperscript{22}Lindamood, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 59-60. See also, JECC, \textit{op. cit.}, (1982), pp. 150-151.
to establish manufacturing facilities in Japan. Under the 1957 law and a 1951 Foreign Investment Law, investment could be permitted if it would serve some domestic interest. After lengthy negotiations, IBM was permitted to establish a wholly-owned manufacturing subsididary in 1960. In return, all Japanese manufacturers were given access to a number of IBM's basic patents for royalty payments.\(^\text{23}\)

With the establishment of the Electronics Industry Section (Denshi Kogyo Ka) within MITI, there was at least tacit recognition by some within the ministry that electronics was a future industry. There was also the growing belief that Japan should, and could, attain a level equivalent to those of foreign manufacturers by domestic production, thereby preventing an outflow of dollars.\(^\text{24}\) According to Minamisawa Noburo, who was involved in early Japanese computer development, it was difficult to persuade ministry officials as well as some computer manufacturers at that time of the future importance of the industry in terms of overall balance of payments and the need for long-range planning and guidance.\(^\text{25}\) There was recognition, and general consensus, though, that

\(^{23}\)Lindamood, *op. cit.*, p. 60.


\(^{25}\)Ibid., p. 100.
Japan needed to develop its own indigenous information industry and that foreign manufacturing facilities in Japan should be controlled.

To promote the development of the industry, the Japan Electronics Industry Development Association and the Information Processing Society of Japan were established in 1958 and 1960, respectively, by companies in the industry to coordinate activities within the industry. One of the most significant government actions at this time, though, was the establishment of the Japan Electronics Computer Company (Nihon Denshi Keisanki) in 1961 as a national policy company (kokusaku kaisha) to purchase and lease new computer equipment. Though not initially well-funded, the JECC provided legitimation and authoritative support for the encouragement of the fledgling domestic industry by allowing low cost diffusion of new products. Technological invention and innovation could thus proceed rapidly without extensive investment of government research and development funds. In 1961-1962, for example, JECC purchased only 11 computer systems for lease. By 1971, however, the yearly total had reached 4,350.

In the meantime foreign know-how was obtained largely through technical assistance and cross-licensing agreements

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27 Minamisawa, op. cit., p. 104.
with foreign manufacturers, as well as through selected joint ventures. In 1963, for instance, Oki Denki and UNIVAC reached agreement on a 51 percent Oki-owned joint venture. The degree of Japanese dependence on foreign know-how apparently was of some concern within the ministries and among those in the industry, because the size of the dependence amounted to 70 percent of the domestic market in 1961.29

**Information Awareness and Policy Formulation**

The announcement by IBM on April 7, 1964, of a "third generation" model 360 series, employing for the first time integrated circuits (IC), was apparently a "shock" to the industry and policymakers. In terms of hardware and supporting software, Japanese experts perceived Japanese technology to be behind IBM and in danger of being dominated economically by that company, and, by extension, other foreign countries.30

Prior to 1964 the industry had not expressed the need for administrative guidance in the direction of the particular structural development characteristics the industry would assume. The ministries, as a whole, including MITI, likewise did not envision a need to offer extensive guidance

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29Lindamood, op. cit., p. 61.

and assistance. The rationale appeared to be that "each company should focus on the direction they are going, and research development and production structure should center around the models each company produces best. In that way Japan can compete with foreign machine [computer] manufacturers and can win the international competition."\textsuperscript{31}

There was largely only an ill-defined goal, with no accompanying strategy, to compete in earnest with large foreign manufacturers such as IBM. After the introduction of the IBM 360 Series, however, MITI asked the Electronics Industry Deliberation Council (Denshi Kogyo Shingikai) to consider the international competition the industry would be facing. It was given the most important status,\textsuperscript{32} and is considered today "one of the most important documents in the industry's history."\textsuperscript{33} The report was submitted two years later, in 1966, and apparently contains specific recommendations for the strategic development of the information industry. Though not public, reportedly, it stated the following general objectives:

1. Technological excellence independent of any foreign interest,

2. Increased Japanese share of the domestic computer market, and


\textsuperscript{32}Uozumi Toru, op. cit., p. 123.

3. Increased profits by domestic manufacturers.

In order to meet these objectives, the council recommended the following measures, which were subsequently adopted:

1. Strengthening of JECC,

2. Initiating a new large-scale computer development project (in 1966-1971),

3. Establishing a peripheral equipment cartel (in 1969) to produce punched card and paper tape devices, and

4. Establishing the Japan Information Processing and Development Center (JIPDEC, in 1967) to train systems analysts.34

Uozumi is somewhat more specific about the contents of the 1966 report. He says the report's goal stated that two-thirds of the domestic market should be controlled by domestic manufacturers (the goal has largely been achieved with IBM's current share at 26 percent).35 To accomplish this, it was suggested, according to Uozumi, that Fujitsu, Hitachi, NEC, Toshiba, and Oki Denki participate in a joint project through 1971 to develop a large computer system (the ogata project). Also recommended was an independent project to develop a large CPU separate from the other project, with Fujitsu, Hitachi and Nihon Denki cooperating. A sum of 11.7 billion yen ($32.5 million) was suggested as a budget for both of these endeavors. From 1971-1978, it was suggested

34 Lindamood, op. cit., p. 61.

the project concentrate on voice pattern recognition. Three different research groups were suggested with a combined budget of 35 billion yen ($97.2 million) for the seven years. 36

The specificity of the 1966 report by the Electronics Industry Council (Denshi Kogyo Shingikai) plus the length of time required to prepare it, suggests several things about the nature of the decision-making process between 1964 and 1966. First, it was not public, but it was inclusive—for those who were most concerned. Second, it was of both a top-down and bottom-up authoritative nature, with MITI establishing the parameters of the decision process, but only after increased pressure had been placed upon the ministry by industry itself. Third, decisions that were made were apparently of a collective nature resulting from extensive discussion and negotiation among members of the Council. Finally, with consensus achieved from below (i.e.: the Council), that body retained its authority without dictating the precise solution to the problem.

While there was no precise goal nor structured strategy to achieve technological independence, there appeared to be growing public recognition that Japan would have to begin developing more of its own technology. At least one newspaper account in late 1966 stressed the need to develop
"unique technology" to enhance industrial policy and become internationally competitive in new industries. The year 1975 was suggested as a specific target for the development of technology that would meet world standards. From that time, the report suggested, Japan could "quickly pass the world standard." This was possibly the first time that publicly distributed newspaper accounts began speaking of the need to surpass the West in technological development.

In 1967 an Information Industry Subcommittee (Joho Sangyo Bukai) was established within the Industrial Structure Council (Sangyo Kozo Shingikai—established in 1964). It was, reportedly, "one of the most powerful advisory groups within MITI." At the same time, Keidanren (Federation of Economic Organizations—one of the most influential of the several business organizations with close relationships to political leaders and bureaucratic officials) established a committee to recommend policy measures to the government. The LDP leadership also became involved at this point and

37 Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Japan Economic Newspaper), August 2, 1966, p. 4.
38 Gyosei Kanri Kenkyu Center (Administrative Management Research Center), Shingikai Soudan (Deliberation Council Consulting), (Okura-sho (Ministry of Finance), 1975), p. 290.
39 Lindamood, op. cit., p. 61.
established a "diet Members Federation for Promotion of the Information Industry" consisting of 160 LDP members.\(^{40}\)

In November 1967 when the Information Industry Subcommittee was established, MITI requested that the subcommittee consider "appropriate measures to develop a healthy information industry."\(^{41}\) The preparation of the report took 1 1/2 years, and consultations were apparently conducted in close cooperation with the Keidanren committee, as the report was submitted in May 1969 by Uemura Koshiro, former president of Keidanren. Deliberations of these committees were not made public, nor was the final report itself, but legislation passed in 1970 is reportedly based specifically on recommendations made in this report.\(^{42}\) The summary of the report suggested that Japan's information industry (including software, which is termed "information processing") was lagging behind foreign competitors because

1. Government leadership was low,

2. Top corporate management lacked understanding and leadership in developing strategy.


3. Japan was lagging behind in systematic thought and industrial engineering,

4. There was a shortage of computer engineers and analysts, and therefore, a critical lag in software development, and

5. There were inconsistencies in hardware standardization, as well as accounting procedures.43

The report is credited with introducing to the Japanese media, for the first time, the words "information revolution" and "information society" to which Japan had to accommodate, and it stated that there should be "consensus as to what kind of society it should be."44 The report suggested that for there to be a smooth transition to this new "information society" immediate measures should be taken, and the main role for government was to accomplish the following:

1. Induce a national consensus and take the lead in setting up measures as a guidepost,

2. Set up an administrative structure to meet the demands of an "information age" and develop information systems through national projects,

3. The design of information networks and management should be delegated to public initiative, but the main role for government should be to provide a smooth transition where tradition and structure needs revision.45

Newspaper accounts of the report on May 31, 1969, the day following the announcement of the report, suggested the need

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43 Joho Sangyo Bukai, op. cit., pp. 3-20.
44 Ibid., p. 1.
for subsidies and the necessity for the government to function as a "guidepost" in pointing the way in all aspects of the new "information society."  

The summary of the report, released sometime later, suggested as a first priority that education in the information sciences be initiated at all levels of the system. (At the time, there were virtually no college courses offered in computer science). It was suggested, for instance, that at least one computer science college be established in each prefecture within the next two years and that computer science education be given top priority. Other suggestions indicated the need for coordination and standardization in the promotion and development of both hardware and software. The reported stressed, however, that the role of MITI "should be minimized in order not to destroy individual creative management."  

Two days before the release of the report the Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Japan Economic Newspaper) dedicated a feature story to the importance of the new "information society" for Japan and the need to promote the development of indigenous technology, including computer hardware and

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48 Ibid., p. 23.
software. The newspaper also placed the problem in larger perspective, tying the development of the information industry with the need to regulate the outflow of foreign currency as well as the need for special tax considerations. 49

The same day the report was released, the press reported that a cabinet level meeting had been held to review the report from the Electronics Industry Subcommittee. The Nihon Keizai Shimbun (The Japan Economic Newspaper) suggested that as the cabinet was "the main agent to execute information industry policy, it is necessary to establish a supreme information processing conference, and the cabinet plans to urgently concentrate on that industry." 50 MITI, it was reported, sought capital financing for development of software and special tax incentives. Standards for both hardware and software development were also to be reviewed, and an information subcommittee was set up within the Japan Industry Standards Investigation Committee (Nihon Kogyo Hyojun Chosakai). 51

Toward Consolidation of Authority

By September 1969, MITI had largely completed work on specific legislation to legitimate general consensus that

51 Ibid.
had been achieved through the past years of negotiations. The consensus that had been achieved by that time had apparently been accomplished largely through a bottom-up process of decision-making, with MITI, or specific sections within MITI, functioning largely as arbitrator, with no specific goal or direction around which it could exert concerted authority. The perceived enormity of the problem, though, necessitated extensive funding as well as inter-ministry cooperation. The 1969 Subcommittee report pointed to the lack of, and need for, government leadership—conceptually important in a system of order in which higher authority is given. Secondly, the report suggested the need for a "national consensus" to enable the government to act as a "guidepost." Whether the ideal was ever achieved, the conceptualization and resolution of problems were perceived to be best resolved through the traditional concept of order—decentralized mura authority accompanied by consolidation of authority toward the top as the need arises.

In July 1969 responsibilities for electronics policy within MITI were subdivided and expanded, reflecting the increased importance of information policy. At the end of September the Ministry had reached internal agreement.

on guidelines for legislation that was submitted to the Diet and was passed the following year in May 1970. The precise relationship between the LDP's Diet Members Federation for Promotion of the Information Industry (Joho San'yo Shin-ko-gin Remmi) and the sections within MITI and the Information Industry Subcommittee are not known. Most likely, the cabinet as a collective was responsible for making final determination on legislation that represented initial consensus among all concerned on the general direction policy should take.

The 1970 Information Management Promotion Law (Joho Shori Shinko Ho) recognized the importance of software, and focused on three areas: software development, training, and time-sharing. It created the Information Technology Promotion Agency (IPA), temporarily called the Information Processing Promotion Enterprise (Joho Shori Shinko Jinogyodan), whose main purpose was to aid in the financing of information processing (software) development through low-interest loans. Also, it was to conduct market research into advanced software systems, designate specific companies for the development of such systems, and then lease the software.

When the law took effect in July of 1970, an initial government capital fund of 4 billion yen ($11.12 million) had been established for low interest loans to computer-related firms for software development to be handled by the two long-term credit banks. 56

The Ministry of Education, as one of the initial steps to promote consciousness of, and training in, software design, established a national examination for the licensing of an "information management engineer" (programmer). 57 The first examination was held in November of 1970, four months after the law took effect, and 32,000 people took the examination, of which 5,000 passed. The examination, by itself, was not considered sufficient to meet the expected shortage of personnel, and in March of 1970 a 5 billion yen ($13.9 million) foundation was set up to establish a graduate school for training of systems engineers and researchers. The near-term goal was to train some 1,300 people, including 200 advanced researchers. 58 The next year it was determined by the Ministry of Education that the nation would need at least 500,000 trained programmers by 1980, and it decided to encourage computer science training in every university. 59

56 The two banks established after World War II to handle long-term industrial financing were The Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan and the Industrial Bank of Japan. Ibid., 1971, p. 422.


The time sharing provisions of the 1970 law apparently did not resolve a growing dispute between MITI and a number of large businesses desired time-sharing provisions outside of the state-owned Nippon Telephone and Telegraph Co. (NTT). The 1970 law encouraged MITI sections to promote public awareness of, and private initiative in, data communications. NTT, through the MPT, controlled the communications networks. A 1972 law provided for some liberalization of telephone circuits for data communications. However, there is reason to believe that general agreement was never quite achieved, neither with the 1970 law, nor with the 1972 revision in the specific areas of time-sharing. This delay is viewed as having hampered the growth of computer utilization.  

The creation and functioning of the IPA, along with other provisions of the 1970 law, were apparently more successful. The IPA is structured similar to the JECC. Requests for loans are submitted to MITI, and approval is sent to the IPA. From there funding may be obtained directly from IPA funds as well as from development banks.  

The funds available for loans have grown some ten-fold since 1972 with over 2.78 billion yen ($1.12 million) in direct

60 Lindamood, op. cit., p. 62.

subsidies, plus an undisclosed amount in long-term credit bank loans.

In addition to the creation of the IPA, four other associations, three private and the other government sponsored, were created concurrently with the enactment of the 1970 law to promote development of software, training, research, and coordination facilities. To reflect the increasing importance of information processing (software), the Electronics Industry Deliberation Council (Denshi Kogyo Shingikai) was reorganized to include representation of those specifically concerned with the development of software. The name was changed to the Electronics and Information Processing Deliberation Council (Denshi Joho Shori Shinko Shingikai).

The 1969 report and subsequent law in 1970 provided some strategy for the development of the information industry.

62 Ibid., p. 36.


64 JECC, (1982), op. cit., p. 150.

65 Later, in 1978, in conjunction with a 1978 law (Kijoho), the Council was split into two separate councils (Joho Shori Shinko Shingikai and Denshi Kikai Kogyo Shingikai) to separate the two areas of hardware and software development. Ibid.
However, it did not provide the "guidepost" around which overall consensus could be achieved. There needed to be some "goal" orientation that was neither too specific, nor too general, around which those involved could agree. MITI, for example, was still divided internally over the extent to which new industries, such as computers, would be profitable to Japan. MITI policy was still tailored largely to heavy industry, and there was no general agreement on the urgency of promoting the development of the so-called "knowledge" industries.66

**Goal Setting**

To offer some direction in an era that a growing number of Japanese officials and businessmen perceived to be increasingly dependent upon newer technologies, Amaya Naohiro, then head of the Planning Office of MITI's Secretariat, was designated to head a policy research group (seisaku kenkyukai) composed of younger members of the business and academic community to study the transformation of industrial policy. Amaya had previously been outspoken on the need for reform of the industrial structure,67 and the appointment of younger executives to this policy research group signalled recognition that some restructuring was

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66 Shinoda Nobuo, op. cit., p. 150.
needed, particularly in the area of international trade which had been neglected up to then.\footnote{68}{Shinoda Nobuo, op. cit., p. 149, and Johnson, op. cit., p. 290.}

The subject of the research group was the revaluation of the yen, until then a subject that was considered taboo\footnote{69}{Shinoda Nobuo, op. cit., p. 149.} because exporting firms desired a weak yen (then, 360 to the dollar) to sell abroad cheaply.\footnote{70}{Ibid., p. 148.} Reportedly, members of the research group were free to write on any aspect of the international trade and finance situation they desired, and the report that was submitted in 1970 was "large in volume."\footnote{71}{Ibid., p. 149.} In this report entitled "MITI Policy in the 1970's," the expression "knowledge-intensive" appeared for the first time. Though the report was not made public, those knowledgeable of it believe that it marked the beginning of the policy shift from heavy industry to the current focus on "knowledge intensive" industry.\footnote{72}{Ibid., pp. 149-150.} The research group's report was submitted to the Industrial Structure Council for discussion material, and initially the entire Council, including 21 separate subcommittees, were to discuss the subject and offer some form of final report on a "vision"
by 1975. Following the Oil Crisis of 1973, however, the Council was requested to schedule its final report one year earlier, for 1974. An interim report, however, was requested in 1971, and in May 1971 the Council released a brief report that outlined what the Council had done in terms of organizations and meetings. Four small committees had been set up consisting of a total of 35 scholars and other experts (gakushiki keikensha), and 40 meetings had been held to consider "what the 1970's industrial policy should be." The interim report stressed the importance of new "knowledge-intensive" industries as the focus around which industrial policy should be centered. It considered the 1970's "an era of great risk" in which Japan could either "fall" or "leap ahead in the race." Because of the changing international environment, pollution and the need to further develop the domestic infrastructure,

This report is not necessarily within the domain of MITI. Not only MITI, but also other government ministries, local self-governing bodies, corporations, labor, consumers and local residents need to have a broad vision, and create common goals with multiple linking relationships.

Similar to the statement in the Tsusan Journal in 1970, this interim report suggests that the problem of


[74] Ibid., p. 10.

[75] Ibid.
international economic competition was perceived as more complex than merely the development of the computer industry and MITI "guidance." Total industrial and competitive economic development would involve the whole of Japanese society but would also include a commitment to "an improvement in the security and quality of life."\textsuperscript{76}

The term "knowledge intensive" comprised computer hardware and software, as well as integrated circuits, airplanes, atomic power and communications equipment. Also, included, interestingly, was "high fashion" (including furniture).\textsuperscript{77}

A direct result of this report was a law passed six months later, in November 1971, which superceded the 1957 law. Entitled the "Law for Extraordinary Measures for Specific Electronics and Machinery Industries" (abbrev: "Kidenho"), it created a new Machinery and Information Industries Bureau (as opposed to previously established "sections") to oversee electronics, computers, automobiles and general machinery. As a result, the former Machine Industry Deliberation Council (Kikai Kogyo Shingikai) assumed new responsibilities, becoming the Electronics and Machine Industry Deliberation Council (Denshi Kikai Kogyo Shingikai). It further provided the authority for restructuring the computer industry to develop large-scale computer

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., p. 12.

\textsuperscript{77} Shinoda Nobuo, op. cit., p. 150.
systems. In order to do this there needed to be some standardization within the industry and with foreign computer manufacturers. Under general guidelines established in the 1971 law, MITI actively sought standard classification of parts and data codes in its support of large-scale computer development.

According to Japanese sources, IBM's introduction of its "3.5 generation" 370 Series in July 1970 caused almost as much concern among policy makers and industry manufacturers as did the 360. Whether from MITI or industry suggestions, it was determined that the best way to compete with the IBM 370's was to develop models of equal capacity and speed rather than create a new "4th generation" through heavy R&D subsidies. To be competitive with the 370, MITI attempted to reorganize the information industry and its associations (gyokai) to promote competitive postures with IBM.

"Consensus"

While MITI was attempting to exercise authority by "goal setting," through which it was hoped consensus could be achieved, the independence of the various companies involved apparently tempered the achievement. The new "vision"

80 Uozumi Toru, op. cit., p. 127.
of the 1970's issued in May 1971 "was popular," according to Shinoda Nobuo, "but consensus was not achieved and individual companies went their own way." For that reason, he says, Keidanren set up its own economic research organization to collect information from all of the various industrial structures (a function of MITI). Mitsubishi research organizations, likewise, had numerous inquiries and concerns expressed over the economic advisability of the "vision." According to Shinoda, most businessmen felt that the most important consideration for the economy was "to have monetary reserves (dollars) to import natural resources, and the question was, how can Japan get dollars through knowledge intensive industries." For that reason, he says, the policies of the Ministry of Finance and the decisions made by the cabinet as a whole, were just as important as those made by MITI.

MITI's purpose, according to Uozumi Touru, was to promote cooperative development plus competition among the various companies in the industry. So, in proposing reorganization of the industry, it considered three criteria: (1) the best possible combination of groupings to promote competition, (2) the competitive power of IBM, and (3) the fate of those companies which would lose in the competition

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81 Shinoda Nobuo, op. cit., p. 186.
82 Ibid., p. 186.
83 Ibid.
and be forced to retreat from the computer business. MITI, he says, considered not only production grouping, but marketing grouping. He adds, however, that the manufacturers were mainly concerned with subsidies, not cooperation, and this created dissention between MITI and the industry gyokai.84

With the publicizing of MITI's "vision" for a new industrial structure that would encompass every aspect of life and involve all ministries, the consensus process had been broadened. According to the mura bito sovereignty concept, consolidation of authority toward the top necessitates the inclusion of a broad range of groups and their interests before final decisions can be made. This also means that problem definition and resolution generally become broad based and inclusive, encompassing long-range planning, as environmental demands and the requirement of inclusivity increase. The Tsusan Journal article of 1970, prior to the release of the May 1971 "vision," sought the "positive cooperation of the other ministries in carrying out concrete plans" for "a new policy direction." The need for such an extensive restructuring of the economy was brought about not only by "international demands for yen revaluation and import and capital decontrol measures," but also by domestic "voices for improved housing, prevention of

84 Uozumi Touru, op. cit., p. 127.
pollution, stability of consumer prices and enrichment of individual lifestyle." In addition, the article suggested that Japan was "lagging behind in technological creativity [invention] essential for future development." The report concluded that, "unless we [Japan] attempt to solve these demand problems, we can't forsee an increased jump in Japan's development." The need was not only to realize an affluence in the quality and quantity of life but also to "establish a firm position in international society."^85

With the 1971 vision of the Industrial Structure Council reaffirming the same position, a large measure of consensus should have been reached. However, the Council's report was not representative of every MITI division, nor did it represent the views of all of the other ministries and agencies that would be involved. The public positions taken subsequent to the "vision" report may not fully represent the positions of the ministries and the industry. Chalmers Johnson has noted that there is a widely held belief in Japan that many public statements by businessmen protesting governmental interference are more for public consumption to "preserve a facade of competition."^86

^85Tsusan Journal, op. cit., p. 42.

sovereignty principle suggests that there is inherently extensive competition in the system, but the nature of authority in the system does not always generate extensive media coverage. In the case of this policy conversion process, public discussion and media coverage were likely deemed essential in inducing broad-scale consensus. Such widespread consensus could not be attempted, though, until general decisions had been reached by discrete, but inclusive, participation of the groups most concerned with the decisions.

**Capital and Import Decontrol of the Information Industry**

Any consideration of the structure of the Japanese economy necessarily must include international trade. In the summer of 1971 Japan would have to decide what concessions would be granted in the forthcoming fourth round of General Agreement on Trade and Tariff (GATT) foreign investment agreements scheduled for August 1971. Prime Minister Sato Eisaku, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Finance, and publicly, MITI Minister Tanaka Kakuei, took the position that computers should be included in the package of trade concessions. There was an indication that MITI was split, with the domestic policy sections favoring continued long-term controls, and the international trade section, a
smaller one at the time, favoring more rapid decontrol. Keidanren, as an association, took the position that Japan should undertake decontrol in the upcoming fourth round "to mitigate foreign pressure on it" and to "carry out its responsibilities as a major economic power." The substantive industry position in this matter, though, was probably closer to that stated by MITI's Enterprise Bureau Chief, Morozumi Yoshihiko. He felt there should be no further foreign investment liberalization, and that it should be kept, in principle, at 50 percent. For import controls, a "negative list" would be drawn up for certain critical industries such as computers and petrochemicals, as well as film.

The domestic electronics firms had been organized into a private association, the Japan Electronics Industry Development Association (organized in 1958), headed by Doko Toshiiwo, then president of Toshiba (Tokyo Shibaura Electric Company, and later president of Keidanren). The Association acted as primary spokesman for the industry and took the position that they could not change their previous views on decontrol and did not want any government action liberalizing imports.

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89 Ibid.
until some years in the future. The feeling was that it would take "a while for computers to be Japan’s main industry, and it should be protected until then."90

MITI’s public position at the time was supportive of free trade, and it publicly wanted decontrol as soon as possible. However, MITI indicated that it was necessary to "subsidize and support the computer industry," while at the same time it offered some import and capital liberalization concessions to ease foreign tensions. Therefore, the ministry announced it would support partial decontrol, with computer hardware, particularly smaller computers, being decontrolled first. In that way there would be less impact on the domestic industry.91 Accompanying that decision, however, was the provision that "Full-fledged decontrol will be instituted when and if such a reorganization of the industry setup [sic.] is completed."92

On July 9, 1971, Prime Minister Sato directed MITI to examine the impact of "intensified decontrol," both of capital and imports, and made it clear to the industry that if they did not submit a specific reorganization plan to MITI soon, the ministry itself would decide on a policy of decontrol.

91Ibid.
Tanaka at that point, reportedly met Doko on the 14th and announced that MITI, in cooperation with Doko and the industry, would derive a "concrete plan."

Nagano Shigeo, president of the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, told a press conference on July 16 that Japan should accept some form of import decontrol with the provision that import control measures could be reinstated, or voluntary U.S. import restrictions could be instituted if the foreign market share in Japan reached 50 percent. Foreign demands should be balanced with the needs of industry, and he urged the government to expand the scale of financing through the Japan Development Bank and to increase subsidies for the development of both hardware and software.

Leaders of the six principal domestic manufacturers (Fujitsu, Hitachi, NEC, Toshiba, Mitsubishi and Oki Denki) met the same day and decided in principle on partial decontrol, with peripheral devices to be decontrolled first, followed by CPU's and parts later, with software to be delayed. However, consensus from the industry was needed.

The industry in the following days asked for more time to formulate a final proposal. By July 21, 1971, it was

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95 Ibid.
decided to make an "individual classification of items" which would remain controlled rather than a previously considered "negative list" which might be interpreted by OECD countries as implying "permanent control." \(^97\)

On the following day it was announced that the lengthy and "troubled" negotiations among all parties concerned with computer decontrol had achieved a consensus. Capital decontrol measures would be sent to the Foreign Investment Council under the Ministry of Finance, and final decisions on those measures would be made after the 29th. Import as well as capital decontrolled items would be decided on individually. Certain peripheral equipment, including card readers and line printers with less than 1,500 line per minute capability, would be capital decontrolled. Decontrol of CPU's and certain higher technology peripheral devices would be decontrolled three years after the fourth round of decontrol, and most software would come under individual scrutiny during the fourth round of capital decontrol. Import decontrol would be carried out for peripheral equipment with the exception of memory and terminal devices, and importation of CPU's and related hardware would be delayed. High level integrated circuits (IC's), including Large Scale Integration circuits (LSI's), would not be capital decontrolled until three years after the fourth round (in 1974). Finally, a

special countermeasures account was to be established, structural and capital reorganization were to be carried out, and subsidies were to be provided to counteract the negative effects of the partial decontrol measures.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, July 22, 1971, p. 1.} An August 3rd cabinet meeting formally approved this compromise.\footnote{\textit{Asahi Nenkan, op. cit.}, 1972, p. 502.}

A tentative conclusion regarding the nature of the decision-making process among all parties at this point was that the industry position which expressed opposition to extensive government control, particularly through legislation, was not a key issue. The key issue for the industry seems to have been continued, and even increased, government protection so that it could effectively compete on a worldwide scale with IBM and other large foreign manufacturers. As an arbiter and spokesman for the industry, as well as Japanese industry as a whole, MITI was split, particularly between those in the domestic and international policy sections.

\textbf{Restructuring}

Three months later, in October 1971, it was announced that industry reorganization had been determined (prior to passage of the 1971 law allowing reorganization). The six groups for purposes of sharing marketing and financing capabilities into three groups: (1) Hitachi and Fujitsu would
form a purely domestic group, (2) NEC, which already had a tie-up with Honeywell, and Toshiba would form the second group, and (3) Mitsubishi and Oki Denki would form the third group. Oki Denki already had a limited working relationship with UNIVAC.  

The importance of this grouping is that the two smaller companies—Fujitsu and Oki Denki—were aligned with larger zaikai (industrial, trading and banking conglomerates) which had extensive financial reserves as well as marketing capabilities. It was hoped that this alignment would "intensify competitive capabilities against IBM."  

Hitachi and other IC makers had been complaining that inclusion of IC's in capital decontrol would hurt the domestic industry, particularly at a time when sales of IC's had temporarily slowed, so MITI announced in August that it was considering establishment of a firm for the joint design of LSI's for computers. Later that year the IPA announced that it was planning to establish a cartel to govern the production of various IC's. This was partly to offset an agreement that Texas Instruments had reached for direct investment in a joint venture with SONY for IC manufacturing facilities.  

100 Ibid., October 21, 1971, p. 1.  
103 Ibid., December 14, 1971, p. 9.
Financing

Published accounts do not focus on the role of the Ministry of Finance during the period immediately prior to July 22, 1971. There was a brief mention of negotiations between MOF and MITI, however. Along with the agreement on decontrol of specific items, a request was made to MOF of 139 billion yen ($386.4 million) over the next five years for subsidies for hardware development. MOF did not meet that specific request. However, it did set up a "New Computer Model Promotion Enterprise Plan" through which it decided to funnel 34.1 billion yen ($95 million) over the next three years from the General Account Budget to the industry.\(^\text{104}\) Increased funds were anticipated for this special account through anticipated revenue from import tariffs on computer-related goods, estimated at up to 157 billion yen ($436.5 million) over the next five years. MITI anticipated that as much as 75 percent of the total cost for educational training and facilities would come from the special fund in the general budget.\(^\text{105}\)

The distribution and marketing of new computers being developed were essential, and it was decided on July 27, 1971, that support for that government corporation would be expanded substantially in the coming years. Initially, an additional 20 billion yen ($55.6 million) would be provided


\(^\text{105}\) Ibid., p. 9.
by the two development banks to fund the purchase of new computer systems.\textsuperscript{106} A few days earlier, on the 21st, MITI decided to create a national computer rental insurance system to strengthen the reserve fund used for losses accrued in JECC's repurchase of used computers.\textsuperscript{107}

In addition to funds from the general budget, MOF decided to allocate funds from the Second Budget (consisting of funds derived from government savings, life insurance and retirement funds, which are channelled to government agencies and the two development banks mentioned above). In 1970 MOF authorized a total of more than 30 billion yen ($83.4 million) for the development of particular types of computers as against almost nothing the previous year. In addition, 3 billion yen ($8.34 million) was granted for pure research as against nothing the previous year. The Small-Medium Business Finance Corporation under MOF also provided loans of up to 1 billion yen ($2.78 million) for marketing and development when in the previous year they had allocated nothing. Four large projects for development of LSI and other high level technology were allocated 2.3 billion yen ($6.4 million) from the Second Budget, as against nothing in 1969. Also, the Information Management Promotion Enterprise was granted 300 million yen ($834,000) from the general budget and 3 billion yen ($8.34 million) from the Second

\textsuperscript{107}Ibid., July 21, 1971, p. 1.
Budget as against nothing previously. In addition it was loaned 8 billion yen ($22.24 million), as opposed to nothing in 1969.108

Substantial increases in all areas were planned in succeeding years, and though the Ministry of Finance was not giving MITI a "blank check" to promote the computer industry, certainly allocations in the 1970 budget make it clear that it, as well as MITI, had already determined the basic course of policy to be followed in the 1970's and had begun to act. One might suspect from this that the MOF had as much to do with determining the direction of overall economic policy as MITI.

One MITI official, for instance, in reply to criticism that MITI's policies were too controlled and restrictive, stated that the Ministry of Finance controlled the overall economic policy (the macro-economy) and MITI controlled only the micro-economic policy.109

Summary

Despite the public announcements of disagreements between the ministries and the information industry, there was, during this period of policy transformation, apparently effective cooperation between MOF and MITI. MITI, also, is

109 Ibid., p. 28.
perhaps not as totally influential as some would say. The public disagreement between MITI and the information industry is likely more of a disagreement over extent of government subsidies and protection than a specific argument over decontrol since the industry reportedly determined itself what specific items it desired excluded from capital and import decontrol measures.

Cooperation among the ministries and companies within the same industry is not uncommon. In 1962, MITI's first subsidy to the infant industry went to a consortium of three companies (Fujitsu, Oki Denki, and NEC) to develop Japan's first large-scale computer system. Such cooperation, though, is always tempered with rivalry and competition. The "marriage" between Hitachi and Fujitsu, for example, broke after three years when both Fujitsu and Hitachi announced models competitive with the other. The other two cooperative relationships were more fruitful in the development of large models.

The "vision" announced in May 1971 and the law authorizing restructuring of the industry appear to be more after-the-fact than significant in coalescing industry opinion. A large measure of consensus as well as government funding had already been reached before the disclosure of the Industrial Structure Council's report in May 1971. Trends in funding appeared in

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110 Uozumi Touru, op. cit., p. 122.

the 1970 budget, and general agreement among the industry for restructuring was reached within two months of the issuance of the 1971 Council Report.

At the same time, agreement was not reached in a brief period of time. The questions submitted to the Councils generally required a year or more for response, as well as extensive numbers of meetings. The system was largely able to respond to the demands placed upon it.

Consensus is the ideal. Within the ideal, there is expected differences of opinion and independent group action. Authority is maintained, though, through group linkages. The more informal kenkyukai (research groups) and the more formal shingikai (deliberation councils) established by the ministries maintain broad, but generally discrete, authoritative links to clientele groups, as well as to other ministries.

These linkages perhaps provided means for the ministries, including MOF and MITI, to agree on specific avenues for promotion of the industry in the 1970 General Account and Second Budgets, despite the enactment of related laws that would come later (i.e.: in 1971). The 1966 Electronics Industry Council report and the 1969 Information Industry report apparently provided enough consensus within the industry to move forward. The 1971 "vision" report appears largely for public consumption to orient the general public
toward future directions the economy and information industry should take. It also served to maintain authority from the top.

In conclusion, the mura bito sovereignty principle, as a major subset of the mura kyodotai concept, appears relevant in the analysis of computer policy development. An essential ingredient of the mura bito sovereignty principle is flexible, "soft" management (yawala kozo). This principle functioned to encourage input and innovative organizational procedures from those competing economic entities directly concerned. The deference of MITI to other ministries in the statement of a "vision" for the 1970's was a recognition of the principle of limited authority (kengen) of the ministry. Goals and directions were established, but not before extensive direction and negotiation from below.

The ministries appear to function much as Ito Daiichi suggests: as agents to settle grievances and demands rather than as authoritative units of government that have near absolute authority. The linkage that maintains the flow of authority both from the bottom-up and the top-down is the deliberation council, as well as other informal group associations that maintain close contact with the ministries. Through such deliberative bodies as these the mura bito sovereignty principle of decentralized local authority, represented by companies or other groups, and consolidated
authority toward the top may be maintained. There is no fixed concept of the limits of either authority, though there is apparently a constant state of flux between the two. By such means, the system remains highly competitive internally, with companies seeking individual stature and prominence as separate, yet well-represented and integrated collective entities within the existing order.

Because of the mura bito sovereignty principle decisions are never made solely from the top-down. Leadership at the top is expected, but it must be of a limited, collective nature with the dominance of group preservation and integrity over individual leader. There was no single individual credited with guiding the development of the computer industry. Higher authority is expected to offer "guidance" in arriving at mutually agreeable solutions. Such higher authority and guidance is often maintained by appointing experienced ministry, or other prominent leadership (amakudari),\textsuperscript{112} to positions of leadership on the various policy research groups and councils. Nevertheless, the legitimacy of representative groups means that policy may always be in a constant state of flux, and negotiation and deliberation must be a constant, never-ending process to achieve and maintain the ideal of consensus. Policy formulation in the

\textsuperscript{112}Literally, "descent from heaven."
case of the information industry was, thus, largely reactive to the perceived environmental demands upon the system, such as the diffusion of new technology and the need of Japanese industry to respond.
CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

The approach presented in the above chapters has attempted to examine underlying long-term forces that are operative within the Japanese system, to show that they are slow to change, and to show that the basic concepts may be applied to contemporary Japanese society. The core values as explained by the *mura kyodotai* concept, though, imply certain conclusions to this observer that contradict some of the indigenous *nihonjin ron* (Japanese thought) literature. At the same time it is hoped that some clarity and explanatory power may be added to Japanese studies through this particular perspective. Further, perhaps some potential misunderstandings have been avoided. In this observer's opinion, Japan is not a "paradox." It is, however, perceived from different perspectives.

The assumption in this analysis has been that Japan holds fundamentally different values because a major portion of the system seems to perceive itself as different. Many values and actions may be similar, but the most important values that a system holds enables that system to define problems and organize accommodation to environmental demands,
both internal and external to the system. This assumption is
 similar to Adda B. Bozeman's thesis that "differences
 between . . . political systems are functions primarily of
different modes of perceiving and evaluating reality." 1
Bozeman believes that the different "modes of thought" are
not easily transferable among systems, 2 and that a society
is, primarily, its past. 3 The author suggests that

The successive generations of any given society will
be inclined to think in traditionally preferred
grooves, to congregate around certain constant,
change-resistant themes, and to rebut, whether
intentionally or unconsciously, contrary ideas
intruding from without. And it is just this way
that the signature of a civilization becomes gradu-
ally fixed and legible to others. 4

Bozeman does not write of Japan. There is little ques-
tion but what Japan is a major civilization with a fixed
"signature." In Japan's drive to be recognized and stand
equal among the great civilizations of the world, it has
borrowed institutions. Bozeman reminds the reader, though,
that "cultural borrowing does not necessarily lead to inter-
cultural understanding." 5 While the most important values
underlying the Japanese civilization are relatively fixed,
there is no assurance, despite the thousands of publications

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1 Adda B. Bozeman, The Future of Law in a Multicultural
in English on Japan,\textsuperscript{6} that its signature is adequately legible.

Analyzed on its own terms, the system suggests an order that has its own logic, its own concept of freedom, and its own equality that are not easily transferable. For that reason, Nobutaka Ike has suggested that the Japanese political system not be analyzed according to the "norms and standards derived from Western experience."\textsuperscript{7} When analyses of the Japanese system state the goal of examination on its own terms, then, for consistency, conclusions should be within the framework established. Otherwise, misunderstandings and misrepresentation may occur.

This analysis assumes a system's need for order, or regularity.\textsuperscript{8} The expression of order constitutes the values a system holds. The most important values comprise the "lens" through which a system accommodates itself to its environment. Values, as Parsons says, are ultimately legitimized in religious terms.\textsuperscript{9}

For the Japanese, the village community (\textit{mura kyodotai}) concept embodies essential elements from three traditional


religions: Shinto, Buddhism, and Confucianism. Shinto, the only indigenous religion, probably has had more influence on the other two historic religions than vise-versa. Shinto has two distinct characteristics: polytheism and conflated authority. It has been representative of a system of order that embodies diversity, with over 80,000 different kami (gods) representing tama (spirit, or energy). The foundation of Japanese equality rests upon this idea. Every person and thing has been given an energy, derived from one or more higher sources, and, therefore, should be treated with equal respect. Every person, then, may be said to possess equal abilities. From the "given" nature of equality, authority may be exercised. As "gods" in Shinto are descendant from other "gods," authority may be said to be consolidated toward the top. Shinto has provided the authority structure and legitimation of both decentralized village authority and consolidated higher authority. Buddhism has provided direction, reinforcing the need for cooperation among diverse smaller elements and a reverence for family and tradition. Confucianism has provided a moral force to preserve the existing concept of order—a respect for authority, duty, and honor.

The individual, it was suggested, owes a primary allegiance or attachment to immediate or concrete, small groupings, such as family or company. The relationship becomes one of dependence (amaeru) both for leader and
individual member. The system of order demands the ideal of solidarity and integrity of the smaller group. For that reason, the patron-client model, when applied to Japan, is perhaps best expressed with the idea of group as an intervening variable between the patron and his individual clients. Because of the importance of smaller group solidarity, obedience to higher, abstract values, and perhaps also to high governmental authority, assumes a secondary importance in the value structure. The abstract "universals," such as "god" or "justice," are of less importance than the maintenance of family and place (ba). Therefore, expressions like "human relations" or "cooperation" assume more import. Whatever is necessary to maintain this should be done. The individual, however, does not, nor is he expected to, lose sense of self or ego. The individual must have a strong sense of self or ego. The individual must have a strong sense of self in order to express dependence.10 This strong sense of self accounts for the competitiveness within and among groups. In this sense the Japanese individual should be as "individualistic" as his counterpart in the other civilizations.

What sets the Japanese system apart from some other systems is the notion that order—including problem definition, organization, and resolution—is most logically

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conducted through smaller, more intimate groupings. The legitimization of the smaller grouping in the kyodotai concept, though, is perceived as distinct from gemeinschaft. The latter denotes separation, hierarchy, and duty, whereas the former denotes unity, fusion, and fulfillment through village or company. Because of the myriad of smaller groupings there is recognition of the "given" nature of higher authority. Yet, authority is always limited. No matter how high the authoritative position is, there is always higher authority.

Governmental authority is indistinct from the religious. Thus, to ask the Japanese individual if he is religious, especially in regard to Shinto, may be analogous to asking if one is Japanese. The nature of authority in the system, though, is derived from two essential elements of the mura bito (village sovereignty) principle. Sub-municipal authority in the form of neighborhood associations (chyonaikai) and household groupings (tonarigumi) have been traditional, and have become legitimated as a means of organizing political and communal activity. Because organization is based as much upon place (ba) as upon familial ties, the ideal of decentralized authority has been easily transplanted to the present-day company and other economic activity.

Today, political authority and legitimacy rest upon two counterbalancing forces: decentralized mura (village, company) and consolidated, higher authority. The latter authority grew in importance under Tokugawa. But the administrative authority that evolved during Tokugawa utilized and further legitimated decentralized mura authority, as did Meiji. There has been a conclusion reached by students of Japan that efforts to "create local autonomy had failed and that centralization persisted" after the War. The mura bito sovereignty principle, though, has remained and apparently strengthened in recent years, albeit in somewhat different form from that of the West.

Resolution of demands upon the political system virtually necessitates recognition of the need for the interplay between these two forces—the need for relevant groups involved in decisions to be included in the decision-making process. Therefore, for the politician political support groups (koenkai) and their connections to local interest groups are crucial to success at the polls. For the bureaucracy, the various informal, but for practical purposes, institutionalized policy study groups (kenkyukai and shingikai), for example, may be considered key participatory

12 Sometimes called kazoku kokka (family-style nation).

links to the administrative agencies. Without these group linkages, higher authority could not be maintained, nor could the legitimacy of the decentralized mura unit. Because of the nature of authority in the system, it is suggested, as Ito Daiichi has, that higher authority is limited and the smaller group is legitimated, but authority is not extended to the single individual. For those reasons, collective decision making, as well as responsibility, has been characteristic of Japanese political leadership. There has never been a single individual attempt to seize "absolute authority."

The mura kyodotai logic, though, also implies for Ito and this observer the need to characterize Japanese society as more heterogeneous than homogeneous, due to the myriad of small organizations, each with its own value patterns.

As a context for decision making in the Japanese system, the mura kyodotai logic carries implications that make applicability to many decision-making models difficult. The Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin approach stating the necessity of perception of the operating environment and how situations are defined as accounting for specific actions and policy continuity may be applicable at that level. However, a major assumption of the approach is that only government officials and not private citizens are considered actors. The nature of Japanese authority tends to diminish the

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distinction between governmental and private. The private individual is oriented to the group and group is legitimated to the extent that it becomes an integral part of the decision-making process. The shingikai, ringi-sei system and the practice of nemawashi (consultation), for instance, have become institutionalized means of maintaining the orientation of the individual to group and group to other groups in a hierarchy of authority. Another problem with the assumptions of Snyder and his associates is that events are rarely divided into a number of constituent parts as authority moves toward the top. Rather, the nature of consolidated authority means that more than one event may be considered simultaneously at the top, as the development of computer policy was integrated with balance of payments and trade liberalization. The Japanese decision maker must be a generalist. Specialized knowledge is valued, but not at the expense of placing expertise in an exclusive realm divorced from the concrete realities of group interaction.

The three models of Allison each show problems in applicability. The rational actor model assumes individual actors acting in the role of the state. The Japanese context dictates groups, not individuals as actors, and private as well as government actors. Goals are not based solely on "utility" but on grievance settling as a means of uniting competing group interests. Rational choice, with the highest payoff, is rarely selected. The long-range goals adopted
in the development of the computer industry did not yield immediate utility.

The organization model presupposes competing organizations with limited, or no, central authority. The consolidation of authority toward the top necessitates cooperation and compromise. That does not mean that power is not fractionated and interagency rivalry exists, but the internal environment demands ultimate compromise. Goals, contrary to the organizational paradigm, are not necessarily limited to "acceptable behavior." The goals adopted in computer development were rather inventive and far-reaching, with considerable risk involved. Incrementalism exists, but not at the expense of flexibility.

The bureaucratic politics model is perceived by many Japanese as coming closest to the situation in the bureaucracy; however, that model focuses on individual players, not the groups themselves. There is no assumed equality of bargaining in Japanese bureaucracy because of hierarchy established within groups, yet individual views are expected in group discussion. A study by Lewis Austin of American and Japanese elites found that the "good subordinate" in Japan was principally to be "original, creative, with ideas of his own," (31.0 percent out of 100). Only 11.9 percent of executives surveyed listed "respectful and obedient" as primary virtues. American elite counterparts, however, considered that the highest virtue in subordinates (42.9 percent). Only 9.5
percent desired originality and creativity over respect and obedience.\textsuperscript{15} This expectation of individual performance in groups is likely due to the given equality and horizontal authority in groups. Pluralism exists, but it is based upon groups, not the individual. The rules that Halperin says change with the individual, do not change so significantly in Japanese organization. The formal and informal conditions governing group interaction provide continuity, because orientation is to the group, not the individual.

Bureaucratic politics models assume polycentric groups and competition within and among groups. But because of conflict developed in bargaining processes, organizations may not be fully directed or controlled, and conflict may be detrimental in creating schisms that can not be bridged.\textsuperscript{16} The Japanese context values non-conflict. Disagreement is expected, but the nature of authority dictates management of disagreement within a framework of negotiation and compromise.

The cybernetic approach presupposes "limited-dimension problems," specialization and the non-integration of decisions across separate sub-units. Just the opposite appears more

\textsuperscript{15}Lewis Austin, Saints and Samurai: The Political Culture of the American and Japanese Elites (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975).

the case for Japan, as stated above. The generalist tends to weigh a greater number of complex variables, rather than focusing on a narrow set of "critical" variables.

In sum, Japanese tend to consider their own domestic factors unique. They are perceived to be unique, and, therefore, the context of decision making, according to Snyder and Diesing, may be different. The compulsions and constraints are different, and decisions may be reached differently.

Suggestions for future research, utilizing the parameters of the mura kyodotai concept, would likely prove most beneficial in the area of small-group behavior. In-depth analyses of political support groups and their institutional and traditional links to neighborhood associations and other local interest groups should help to show the extent to which Japanese "think small," as Nathaniel B. Thayer has written. In the area of administrative decision making, more research needs to be conducted on the relationships between the ministries and their shingikai (deliberation councils), kenkyukai (research groups) and the various gyokai (business associations). The nature of authority and participation in Japanese political organization may perhaps be better explained by empirical and historical analyses of selected groups, the personnel involved, and an estimation of the effectiveness of this means of decision making.

Such studies would be consistent with the traditional concept of order in the system. The balance of higher and local authority within the Japanese system has not been expressly delineated and is subject to continual negotiation. Of final importance in this interplay of authoritative forces, though, is the effectiveness of the system. Examined within its own terms, to what extent is the system able to accommodate itself to environmental demands and grow utilizing its own perceived concept of order and higher value imperatives.
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