FRENCH STRUCTURALISM AND ITS CONTRIBUTION
TO SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

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By

Azzi Abderrahmane, B.A., M.A., M.A.

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This study delineates the basic concepts and analytical techniques of contemporary French structuralists, namely Levi-Strauss, Lacan, Barthes, Althusser, and Foucault, and critically examines the contribution of their formulations to sociological theory and the implication of such formulations on the methodological orientation in sociology.

This study suggests that the properties of structuralism constitute its contribution. These can be reduced to ten essentially: that cultural phenomena are systems of language and must be studied as such; that cultural phenomena are systems of signs whose signification remains to be discovered; that cultural phenomena are manifestations of structures that are characterized by totality, transformation, and self-regulation; that the underlying structures of cultural phenomena are unconscious; that structural analysis emphasizes the synchronical aspects of cultural phenomena; that historical transformations reflect shifts and discontinuities; that the object of study is not man the possessor of meaning, but structures of which man is the fabricator; that cultural phenomena are closely related to power; that the criteria underlying the study of cultural phenomena are universal; and that empirical observations are only a necessary bridge to
the unconsicous structures of cultural phenomena.

This study indicates that the structuralist perspective can be specifically applicable to the following domains of inquiry: (a) The study of myth, primitive and modern, using Levi-Strauss' mode of inquiry that seeks to uncover the structure of such myths with the aid of linguistics principles; (b) The analysis of discourse in clinical setting and practice using Lacan's techniques of speech analysis; (c) The study of madness and mental illness on the basis of Foucault assertion that the healing process and constructive dialogue with madness can be established only outside the context of mental institutions; (d) The study of criminology. This can be guided by Foucault's postulation that modern prison can only perpetuate crimes it sought to eliminate and, as such, there is a need for a social setting whereby the deviant can play a role in the community; (e) The study of art, comic strips, photojournalism, and literature as systems of signs using Barthes' insights on the link between art and literature and the social conditions of life; and (f) The study of texts to uncover the underlying problematic of such texts (Althusser) and the episteme of the historical period (Foucault).
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Structuralism, as a field of inquiry, encompasses a variety of theoretical and methodological orientations such as Marxism, psychoanalysis, linguistics, and philosophy. Structuralism, which is considered as a relatively recent French intellectual movement, now exerts influence on a number of disciplines, i.e., semiology, anthropology, literary criticism, psychology, philosophy, and to a lesser extent sociology (21, pp. 123-133).

Structuralism has been described as a method; a mode of thought; a meaningful category; a linguistic model; an intellectual movement; an intellectual fad; a formalism; a kind of armchair aesthetics; a mythopoetic mode of cultural investigation; a French fashion; an approach that would unify social science, art, and literature and put them on a scientific footing, much as the scientific method grounds and unifies the physical sciences; an ideology; and a medium of the left (10, p. xi; 26, p. 11; p. 14; 39, p. 244). The initial obscurity that accompanies the attempt to describe structuralism can be attributed in part to the type of obscurity that comes with any genuinely new mode of inquiry. As T. Kuhn puts it, revolutions in science have been characterized by "paradigm shifts"; until the view and the basis for
the new perspective are resettled and solidified, there remains an area of misunderstanding between those holding to the new paradigm and those holding to the old one (24, p. 18). The difficulty that arises in defining structuralism prompted J. M. Auzias to say, "Structuralism is Levi-Strauss," (1, p. 11) and J. M. Benoist to suggest, "Structuralism is analogous to Sartre's view of consciousness, it is what is not, and it is not what is" (2, p. 1).

The attempt to define structuralism cannot escape the problems of distortion and simplification. The field of structuralism includes a variety of distinctive properties and many contemporary structuralists do not consider themselves as being united by a solidarity of doctrine or commitment (10, p. xi). Nonetheless, many definitions have been advanced by authors who show interest in or are inspired by structuralism. The following definitions represent a sample of the variety of descriptions that are made in a number of articles widely dispersed in journals and other references:

A method whose primary intention is to permit the investigator to go beyond a pure description of what he perceives or experiences, in the direction of the quality of rationality which underlies the social phenomena in which he is concerned (12, p. 17).

A name of a scientific method (11, p. 77).

A form of empiricism (16, p. 623).

A neo-positivist approach (3, p. 10).

A systematic attempt to uncover deep universal mental structures as these manifest themselves in kinship and larger social structure, in literature, in philosophy
and mathematics, and in the unconscious psychological patterns that motivate human behavior (25, p. 1).

An approach that assumes that if cultural systems are treated as languages and systematically analyzed through methods borrowed from linguistics, then the covert meanings of the systems may be made explicit (8, p. 283).

A method of inquiry based on the concepts of totality, self-regulation, and transformation, common not only to anthropology and linguistics, but to mathematics, physics, biology, psychology, and philosophy as well (9, p. 2).

A rigorous approach to social phenomena and the analysis of the internal structure of social totalities (19, p. 173).

A theory of criticism par excellence, which not only analyzes the critic's relation to his subject, but works toward the collapsing of the distinction between criticism and its object (38, p. 760).

An epistemological break (2, p. 209).

A movement of the mind (33, p. 42).

An instance of that healthy theoretical pluralism that gives rise to a variety of new questions requiring investigation (4, pp. i-vii).

The structuralist debate dominated the French intellectual scene during the 1950's, the 1960's, and the 1970's (25, p. 227). The term "structure," however, is much older. The term derives from the Latin structura, from the verb struere, to construct. Its meaning was exclusively architectural until the seventeenth century when its use was extended to the study of biology (19, p. 17). The term entered the vocabulary of language, literature, and philosophy in the nineteenth century (6, p. 322). The concept "structure" was introduced into sociology from biology in the nineteenth century by Spencer (20, p. 209) and has been used widely by early sociologists such
as Weber, Durkheim, Marx, Pareto, to name only a few, to designate the social characteristics of human life (19, p. 1). The term has been, since then, one of the most basic and useful sociological terms; the concept "structure" is implicit in the analysis of social relations and social institutions, and any attempt to see social events as recurrent and interrelated is structural (20, p. 209). The argument was made that sociologists' assertion that such a society has such a structure of stratification tends to beg more questions than it answers and arouses more objections than it satisfies (26, p. 21).

The term "structure," however, has recently acquired new shades of meaning and new theoretical and epistemological significations. Piaget, a major figure who tried to apply structuralism to psychology, delineated the basic attributes of the new use of the term "structure"; attributes that came to be known as Piaget's "triangular basis." Piaget suggests:

A structure first of all implies a notion of totality, that is to say, of a unity of elements in which are operative both the laws governing this unity as well as the laws governing the individual elements comprising the unit.

A structure is a system of transformation, that is to say, it is not merely a static system or simply a form. A structure allows interaction of its elements by virtue of certain well-determined patterns. As a result, a structure is both structuring as well as structured. It is a perpetual movement of new combinations and alignments and it constantly generates new elements in its interior.

A structure is self regulated; it opens to our view the dynamism behind the observable (32, pp. 314-316).
Piaget says that the term "structure" should not be confused with what is directly observable nor with what is found in the immediate awareness of the subject. To Piaget, structure and observation are, in a sense, analogous to the distinction that classical philosophers make between essence and phenomena; structure "remains situated beneath the phenomena and remains unconscious while it makes comprehensible the observable" (32, p. 315).

Structure is not synonymous to form; form is defined by opposition to a content that is exterior to it whereas structure, in the structuralist sense, does not distinguish between form and content; it has no content; it is content itself apprehended in a logical organization conceived as a property of the real (8, p. 291).

There are probably no privileged entry into other basic properties of structuralism such as language versus speech, the signifier versus the signified, binary opposition, laws of transformation, deep versus surface structure, synchrony versus diachrony, the metaphor versus metonymy; particularly when no apparent attempt has been made to integrate and delineate the many basic tenets that unite contemporary structuralists. M. Lane, in his attempt to describe the relevance of structuralism, isolates several properties of the field of structuralism:

(A) a belief that all manifestations of social activity constitute languages in a formal sense;
(B) an emphasis on totalities and the relation of the parts of a whole;
(c) a search for structures "below" or "behind" empirical reality rather than at its surface;
(d) a belief that relations existing at the level of structure can be reduced to those of binary opposition;
(e) an "effectively anti-causal" [less deterministic] concern with synchronic rather than diachronic structure (20, p. 209).

The underlying properties of structuralism, however, have gone through many transformations; such transformations led many contemporary structuralists strenuously to deny that they are structuralists and a number of them have attempted to construct their own complete structuralist system (29, p. 297). What unites contemporary structuralists, however, is the attempt to uncover deep structures, unconscious motivations, and underlying causes that account for human action (10, p. vii).

Structuralism takes its starting point from language. It derives from linguistics a framework of concepts that it seeks to extend to other domains of inquiry such as myth, literary criticism, history, discourse, and philosophy. D. Hall, inspired by the structuralists' view that thought originates in words rather than the other way around, argued at the 1974 American Historical Association meeting that "the intellectual history should change its focus from ideas to language itself" (8, p. 283). Linguistics appealed to structuralists in part because of the belief that the study of language is the only social science that had attained the precision of the natural sciences and because language is the most fundamental and most universal cultural product (6, p. 327)
Language, as a social product of the faculty of speech and a collection of necessary conventions that have been adopted by a social body to permit individuals to exercise that faculty, is a self-contained whole. As there is a ground plan for language, there must be ground plans for other forms of cultural domains (23, p. 6).

The structure of language may reflect in some fundamental way the structure of mind; language, social organization, behavior, and other cultural domains are directly or indirectly a product of mind and a result of a limited number of inherent mental categories (23, p. 6). To the structuralists, a coincidence of structure is not to be wondered at and the reason human nature is unpredictable is that "we have not yet mapped the circuits" (23, p. 7).

The structure of mind, however, is not to be found in the conscious, but in the unconscious. The conscious is cultural whereas the unconscious is natural. Thus, there is nothing arbitrary in man (23, p. 4). Structuralists postulate that behind the manifest sense of a text, there must be another non-sense, a message, a code that reflects the unconscious. Thus, a myth expresses unconscious wishes that can be inconsistent with conscious experience (27, p. 56). The unconscious is structured as language and, as such, can be considered as a text to be unraveled. To one major structuralist, it is not the "I" that speaks exclusively but the "id" too, a notion that splits the subject. Thus, the
old Cartesian cogito "I think, therefore I am" should be replaced by a new cogito "I think where I am not, therefore I am where I do not think" (2, p. 17).

Structuralists argue that the so-called "primitive" mind is as complex as the modern mind; the complexity of ancient language is a manifestation of mental complexity, a complexity that shows the tendency of the primitive mind to build intelligible structures on more abstract levels such as totemism and myth. What distinguishes the modern mind from the primitive is not the structure of mind itself, but the artificial conditions of the social environment that face the mind. The primitive mind is only a reduced model of what is essential in all mankind, and its structure is present in modern mind (27, pp. 9-11).

Structuralism has been often labeled, perhaps correctly, (*ahumanistic in that it refuses to grant "man" any special status in the world. To structuralists, "man" is the subject and not the object of study; the subject "cannot be the object of science because it is its subject (7, p. 85). The object of structuralism, unlike that of other human sciences, is not man the possessor of certain meanings, but man the fabricator of sense. Man, as a subject, is not a thing, but an activity. The subject "produces itself by reflecting on itself, but when it is engaged on some other object it has no being apart from

(*) The term "man" is used here as an expression of the totality of human beings and is adopted merely for considerations of style.
the activity of being so engaged" (7, p. 85). Structuralism, in a sense, is oriented toward an engagement with the world, a shift from too much self-examination to an emphasis on some significative activity that, in structuring the world, will bring the subject into equilibrium with it (7, p. 87). Man, as it has come to be known in contemporary humanism, is a recent invention; man, as a subject of study, is a direct result of a particular epistemological orientation that came into existence in the eighteenth century with the success of science and the notion that man has a special kind of being (7, p. 82). To structuralists, man is destined to vanish as soon as these sciences realize that they are dealing with a superficial phenomenon whose explanation is to be found in a new form (16, pp. 629-630), and Nietzsche's "God is dead" may be replaced by "man's approaching end" (23, p. 7).

Structuralism has been described as ahistorical. History records structural transformation over the centuries whereas structuralism records structural transformation across the continent (27, p. 98). The focus of structuralism is upon relations across a moment in time (synchronically) rather than through time (diachronically). The synchrony-diachrony dichotomy, however, is often misunderstood (12, p. 22); structuralism probably does not withdraw history from the world, it seeks "to link to history not only certain content but also certain form, not only the material but also the intelligible, not only the ideological but also the esthetic"
Lane says structuralism is atemporal but not ahistorical, it attempts to demythologize the concepts of time, change, and history as active and inexorable forces.

Structuralism, as an approach, is multidimensional with a number of independent leaders who differ in tone as well as in content. The undisputed father of structuralism, however, is Claude Levi-Strauss and the major, dominant, acknowledged, first generation of structuralists are four: Jacques Lacan, Roland Barthes, Louis Althusser, and Michel Foucault.

Levi-Strauss, 1908- , was born in Brussels. He studied at the University of Paris, where he received an Agrégé in philosophy and a Docteur in literature. From 1935 to 1939 he was a professor at the University of São Paulo, and headed several anthropological expeditions in central Brazil. From 1942 to 1945 he was a professor at the New School for Social Research in New York. In 1950 he became director of studies at the École Pratique des Hautes Études, and since 1959 he holds the chair of social anthropology at the College de France. His major works are Les Structures Élémentaires de la Parenté, 1947, (English edition: The Elementary Structures of Kinship); Anthropologie Structurale, 1958, (English edition: Structural Anthropology); Le Totemisme Aujourd'hui, 1962, (English edition: Totemism); and La Pensée Sauvage, 1962, (English edition: The Savage Mind).

Barthes, 1915-1980, was born in Bayonne. He studied French literature and classics at the University of Paris. He taught in Bucharest and in Alexandria before joining the Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique. He was the director of studies at the VIth section of the École Pratique des Hautes Études and editor of Communications and Theatre Populaire. His major works are Le Degré Zéro de l'Écriture, 1953, (English edition: Writing Degree Zero); Éléments de Semiologie, 1953, (English edition: Elements of Semiology); and Éssais Critiques, 1964, (English edition: Critical Essays).

Althusser, 1918-, was born in Algeria. He received a degree in philosophy from the École Normale Superieure in 1948, and has taught there ever since. His major works are Lire le Capital, Vols. I and II, 1965, (English edition: Reading Capital); and Pour Marx, 1965, (English edition: For Marx).

Foucault was born in 1926 and died in 1984. He was a professor at the Centre Universitaire Experimental de Vincennes and held an appointment at the College de France. His major

**Background**

The concern with "structure" is no innovation in the history of ideas. The more proximate roots of structuralism, however, can be traced back to the nineteenth century. The major figures, who have clearly foreshadowed and made the greatest impact on today's structuralists, were Marx, Freud, and Saussure (10, p. xii). Marx (an economist and a philosopher), Freud (a psychoanalyst), and Saussure (a linguist) share in common a conviction that there is a deep structure beyond the manifest surface of a phenomenon such as superstructure and infrastructure, the conscious and the unconscious, and the signifier and the signified. Levi-Strauss said he was influenced by his "three mistresses": Marxism, psychoanalysis, and geology. From Marxism, he learned that coherence can be revealed among a variety of incidents. From psychoanalysis, he derived the notion that beyond the rational categories exist unconscious categories that are valid and meaningful. Geology provided him the example that science
can discover laws among disorderly elements of nature (23, pp. 10-11).

Marx argued that thought is closely related to social life (or structure in the sense of structuralism). Marx, in his analysis of economic and social processes of life, suggested, "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being but, on the contrary, their social being determines their consciousness" (33, p. 44). That is, man must live before he can think and what he thinks depends on how he lives. The extent to which economic structures are the basic foundations on which legal, political, and ideological processes arise and to which definite forms of social consciousness correspond is a matter of a deep controversy, particularly when one adds the distinction often made between the young-Feuerbachian Marx and the mature-materialist Marx. Nonetheless, Marx's view suggests, as M. Bober puts it, "there is a 'correspondence' between the two; at other times, he claims that the economic infrastructure determines or conditions the superstructure" (33, p. 46). The base-superstructure dichotomy probably is better reflected in Engels' formulation of historical materialism than in Marx's writings. Engels says, "there is an interaction of all elements and which all the endless hosts of accidents ... the economic movement finally asserts itself as necessary." The political and ideological processes exercise their influence and often preponderate in determining their form, but the ultimate determining element is the economic one (12, p. 88).
Marx's laws of transformation such as the transformation of slave into wage-earner and the transformation of latent class interests (lying in a state of false consciousness) into manifest class interests (class consciousness) inform many of structuralists' laws of transformation (12, p. 88).

Marx did not explicitly develop a theory of language. The Marxian perspective, however, implies that language plays a mediating role between reality (praxis) and consciousness (praxis reaches consciousness by way of language). Language is probably a form of superstructure that reflects the interests of a particular group in preventing consciousness from perceiving reality as is. The relevance of the Marxian notion of language to the field of structuralism, however, is probably the suggestion that praxis, language, and consciousness are interrelated.

Freud, like Marx, thought that there is a deep structure underlying the surface structure of a phenomenon. Freud's concern was not with the conscious reason given for conduct, but with the determining factors of the unconscious life of the individual. Thus, a dream, in all its facets and distortions, can reflect unconscious components of the individual's life.

Freud regards the analysis of the unconscious as necessary and legitimate in part because the data of consciousness, as he puts it, are exceedingly defective. The mental acts, in both healthy and sick persons, are "often in process which can be explained only by presupposing other acts, of which
consciousness yields no evidence" (15, p. 99). The analysis of the parapraxes (such as slips of the tongue and mislaying of objects), dreams of healthy persons, and mental symptoms of the sick, then, appealed to Freud in part because the critical censor, which inhibits certain wishes from entering the individual's consciousness, relaxes in these instances and allows unconscious impulses to achieve expression (10, p. xvii).

To Freud, mental acts are not accidental. The smallest detail of mental life is determined and the underlying determining psychical factors can be accounted for. Freud suggests:

All these conscious acts remain disconnected and unintelligible if we are determined to hold fast to the claim that every single mental act performed within us must be consciously experienced; on the other hand, they fall into a demonstrable connection if we interpolate the unconscious acts that we infer. A gain in meaning and connection, however, is a perfectly justifiable motive, one which may well carry us beyond the limitations of direct experience (15, p. 99).

Freud attempted to develop many techniques of analysis of dreams and others such as the technique of free association: that word associations are not arbitrary and can be used to uncover desires that are hidden in the individual's conscience. The technique, which probably inspired modern structuralists, is the law of transformation of dream experiences into the language of consciousness through condensation, displacement, representation, and transference.
Freud's theory recognizes the fact that slips of the tongue, puns, and dreams constitute a close relationship between language and the unconscious (2, p. 15). Language, in a sense, can be considered as a bridge to the unconscious, and to Freudian psychoanalysts, it is "the most common and precise means of interpsychic communication available" (31, p. 170).

Saussure, the first linguist to go beyond the study of grammar and comparative philology, is regarded as the most credited precursor of structuralism. Saussure, in his analysis of language, attempted to provide "a theoretical foundation to the newer trend in linguistic study" and was among the first to recognize that language is a self-contained system whose parts are interdependent and acquire value through their relationship to the whole (6, p. 324).

Saussure broke with the study of grammar because it was detached from language itself and its aim was simply to create rules for differentiating the correct from the incorrect. The author also broke with philology and comparative philology because the former was used primarily for the purpose of comparing texts of different periods and, thus, tended to emphasize written language and neglect the living language; and the latter because its main concern was to record similarities between and among languages on the assumption that languages belong to a single family. To Saussure, language is a self-contained whole and must be studied in itself, not in connection with any phenomenon or viewpoint. The internal and external
structures of language are analogous to the structure of the game of chess:

In chess, what is external can be separated relatively easily from what is internal. The fact that the game passed from Persia to Europe is external; against that, everything having to do with its system of rules is internal. If I use ivory chessmen instead of wooden ones, the change has no effect on the system; but if I decrease or increase the number of chessmen, this change has a profound effect on the 'grammar' of the game (6, p. 323).

Saussure argued that language contains two separate entities: language (langue) and speech (parole). Language is a social product, a collection of conventions and a principle of classification adopted by the society. Speech is an individual act; it is willful and intellectual. Language, as a subject matter of science, has many characteristics:

(A) Language is a well-defined object in the heterogeneous mass of speech facts ... It is the social side of speech, outside the individual who can never create nor modify it by himself; it exists only by virtue of a sort of contract signed by the members of the community.

(B) Language, unlike speaking, is something that we can study separately. Although dead languages are no longer spoken, we can easily assimilate their linguistic organisms.

(C) Whereas speech is heterogeneous, language, as defined, is homogeneous. It is a system of signs in which the only essential thing is the union of meanings and sound-images.

(D) Language is concrete, no less so than speaking; and this is a help in our study of it (35, p. 16).

Of Saussure's theory, the part that informs modern structuralists the most probably is his terms of "sign," "signifier," and "signified." To Saussure, language is a system of signs; a sign is a double entity formed by the associating of two terms: the signifier (the concept) and the
signified (the sound-image), the latter is not the physical sound but the psychological imprint of the sound, the impression that it makes on our senses (arbor is a concept and what is signifies "tree" is a sound-image). The terms "concept" and "sound-image" were replaced by "signifier" and "signified" because the last two terms have the advantage of indicating the opposition that separates them from each other and from the whole of which they are parts.

The bond between the signifier and the signified is rather arbitrary (based on convention). This arbitrary character of the linguistic sign is considered as prerequisite for the acceding of linguistics to the scientific level. The system that governs what the signifier signifies is that of relation of difference or of system of opposition; each element of language takes its value from its relationship of opposition to the rest of the system as a whole. The principle of relation of difference is best illustrated through the metaphor of the chessboard. The various pieces are related "not only in terms of their actual position, but also in terms of the potential moves offered by the rules of the game" (2, p. 3).

Rossi argued that Saussure's system of relations of difference represents a shift from the analysis of symbols as subjectively experienced or culturally defined to an analysis in which a sign is determined in terms of its position within a system of oppositions (33, p. 135). The value of
a linguistic sign such as a sentence can be determined by syntagmatic and associative relationships. In the syntagmatic relationships, the sign derives its value from its stands in opposition to what precedes or follows or both. In associative relationships, the sign acquires its value in terms of its difference from other terms that are not present in the discourse (33, p. 135).

Saussure made a basic distinction between the synchronic and the diachronic law of language. The synchronic law examines the way in which coexisting terms relate to one another and form a coherent system at a particular time. The diachronic law analyzes the evolution of linguistic signs through time. The synchronic law is general and can lend itself to scientific analysis whereas the diachronic law is particular and accidental. Saussure says:

The synchronic law is general but not imperative. Doubtless it is imposed on individuals by the weight of collective usage ... Diachrony, on the contrary, supposes a dynamic force through which an effect is produced, a thing is executed. But this imperativeness is not sufficient to warrant applying the concept of law to evolutionary fact; we can speak of law only when a set of facts obeys the same rule, and in spite of certain appearances to the contrary, diachronic events are always accidental and particular (35, pp. 92-93).

Saussure's theory seems to imply that the study of language should be based on the synchronic law. The theory, however, does not ignore the pre-eminence of history, it only suggests that history falls outside the domain of linguistic analysis.
The sources of influence of structuralism are not limited to Marx, Freud, and Saussure, particularly when one takes into consideration the fact that structuralism emerged as a reaction to an intense debate among diverse schools of thought such as existentialism and phenomenology. The different insights and traces of influence on structuralism can be found in the work of such diverse figures as Rousseau, Kant, Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Dilthey, Weber, Bourbaki, Jakobson, and Chomsky. Benoist says that one of the key matrices of contemporary structuralists, the nature of the relationship between culture and nature, can be traced back to as far as Plato's dialogue "The Cratylus." In that dialogue, Hermogenes argues that the association between nouns and names is a consequence of convention and, thus, the association is artificial and arbitrary. Cratylus, on the other hand, suggests that nouns and names are proper and that "they are modelled on the nature of things they imitate" (2, p. 58). The analysis of the work of major figures who exerted certain influences on structuralism is beyond the limitations of this study; any one of these figures is enough for many studies. Nonetheless, an attempt to delineate concepts cited frequently as most relevant to the study of structuralism can provide a general overview of the rise and development of structuralism and how it relates to schools of thought like the phenomenology of Husserl, the existentialism of Sartre, and the linguistic schools of Jakobson and Chomsky.
Husserl, reacting against the notion that natural and psychic phenomena possess similar properties, attempted to create "a presuppositional philosophy," a rigorous science that will return to the "things themselves." The starting point of such science "is given in the experiences of the conscious human being who lives and acts in a world which he apperceives and interprets, and which makes sense to him" (36, p. 5). The essence of a phenomenon can be grasped only by the intentionality of consciousness that transcends its presuppositions. To Husserl, the forms of consciousness are tied to the content of experiences; experiences are attention directed upon objects, real or imagined, material or real, and all such objects are intended. Hence, there is no phase of human consciousness that appears in and by itself; consciousness "is always consciousness of something" (37). The task of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and other phenomenologies is "to give direct access to the world of immediate experience in terms of intending the acts of consciousness and the objects intended ... through these acts" (33, p. 212). The part, in Husserl's phenomenology that relates to structuralism, is probably Husserl's notion of phenomena and essence which can be analogous to the structuralists' concept of surface and deep structure. The emphasis of structuralism, however, is not on the knowing subject of phenomenology but on structure. Rossi, in a rather controversial description, suggests that phenomenology
and structuralism concur in several methodological principles; anti-empiricist attitude, the notion that the object of study is not external to the mind, the surface and deep structure, the distinction between form and content, the importance attributed to the explanation of the particular, the essential relationships among essences versus the invariant relationships uniting its elementary constituents, and the consideration of the criterion of validity (33, pp. 214-218).

Edie argued that Husserl, in spite of his logical and universal grammatical invariante, probably is innocent of scientific linguistics and other phenomenologists like Heidegger and Sartre are equally innocent of scientific linguistics. To Edie, phenomenologists generally remained "uninterested in these development [development of scientific linguistics] except and to the extent that they have found themselves arguing points of the philosophy of language with Wittgensteinians" (13, p. 298). The major contemporary phenomenologist who developed a new and different attitude toward language is Merleau-Ponty whom the structuralists "are wont to treat with respect and whose authority and support they readily invoke" (13, p. 299). Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of language went through many transformations, but the relevance of his analysis of language to structuralism can be found in his interpretation of structural linguistics and its importance for a phenomenology of language, namely his treatment of the relation between speech and language,
the relation of words to syntax, and the problem of grammatical universals (13, p. 305).

Merleau-Ponty was impressed by Saussure's theory of linguistic sign and the necessity of shifting away from the study of man as the subject of experience and toward the objective structure of language. Structuralists maintain that the object of study should not be man who thinks, but "language that speaks in and through him" (13, p. 307). Edie summarizes the structuralist view that is quite acceptable to Merleau-Ponty:

It is not that the individual experience or consciousness is denied, but rather that the focus is shifted away from the "heroic" vision of man as the source and creator of his own history and of his social institutions to the supposedly infrahuman and "automatic" rules governing his behavior. Attempts to account for the structure of thought either by accounting for its historical genesis through a diachronic study of the processes of its development, or for its transcendental conditions through the logical analysis of the contents of consciousness as such, are abandoned in favor of a purely descriptive, nonhistorical, synchronic, study of its objectified forms. The methods of Kant and Husserl, no less than those of Hegel and Dilthey, are to be completely bypassed (13, p. 307).

Merleau-Ponty, similarly, suggests that "social facts are neither things nor ideas; they are structures" (13, p. 307). Merleau-Ponty retains the signifier-signified dichotomy, but argues that the relation of the word-sound to its meaning is not entirely arbitrary:

If we consider only the conceptual and delimiting meaning of words, it is true that the verbal form ... appears arbitrary. But it would no longer appear so if we took into account the emotional content of the word ... words, vowels and phonemes are so many ways of
"singing the world", and that their function is to represent things ... because they extract, and literally express, their emotional essence (13, p. 309).

Merleau-Ponty, however, recognizes the fact that there is a level of phonological meaning in language; phonemes are meaningful signs because they "can be 'opposed' according to rule of others," and "all the sematemes and words, all units of meaningful sound in a given language, have meaning only thanks to their possible opposition [in the same place in a given linguistic string] to others that could take their place" (13, p. 312).

Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of language, like Saussure's semiology, gave little consideration, if any, to the relation of words to syntax or the various abstract relations between the different components of a sentence that can be analyzed by a grammatical system that would go beyond the phonological surface to uncover the law of the deep structure. Merleau-Ponty, however, doubted that universal structures underlie all grammars and maintained that any particular language would be an imperfect realization (13, p. 316).

Phenomenology, however, was not the only school that provided a framework for debate with structuralists, i.e., the debate between Sartre and Levi-Strauss. The hermeneutic school, which emerged during the the Renaissance as a method of interpretation of sacred texts, was also a source of influence on structuralism. Dilthey, who insisted that human science should be hermeneutic in character and interpret
objectified meanings, through the method of Verstehen within a coherence of contexts, explains the hermeneutic tradition:

The hermeneutic standpoint acknowledges that the mind comes to know itself not by transparent self-consciousness or inward intuition but by indirect inference from its own concretely objectified operations in the world. The mind grasps itself not by privileged insight into its own immediate, evanescent being but by interpreting what it manifests in expression. Hermeneutic understanding is not introspective or self-notification but the interpretation of publicly manifest meaning (14, p. 211).

The interpretation of texts is of primary importance to the hermeneutic school and structuralism. The two schools, however, offer different answers to the problem of meaning. Ricoeur, a contemporary figure who was inspired by the hermeneutic tradition, argues that "the meaning of a sign does not derive only or mainly from its position within a system of signs," but it derives its meaning "principally from the intentionality of the subject who uses signs to refer to the outside world." Ricoeur argues that signs should be subordinated to their symbolic function since the essence of sign is to refer to external reality. To structuralists, however, the subject's use of signs "is conditioned by the syntagmatic and paradigmatic relationships which exist among signs and make of a set of signs a system" (33, p. 223).

The most immediate and direct source of influence on structuralists' use of the linguistic system can be identified with the Prague school of linguistics, namely the works of Jackobson, Chomsky, and Bourbaki.
Jackobson, unlike Saussure, gave primary importance to the diachronic law of language and thought that sound changes are related to the whole set of sounds in which the succession of whole stages of sounds is more significant than those of individual sounds. Jackobson introduced the concepts of linguistic code, morphemes, phonemes, binary opposition, and the acoustic and articulatory qualities of sound; many of which have informed contemporary structuralists such as Levi-Strauss' binary opposition (33, pp. 136-137).

Chomsky argued that the main defect in Saussure's linguistics is that of the relation of words to syntax. Saussure attempted to provide a "taxonomic" analysis of strings of sounds (from left to right in language and in temporal sequence in speech), but did not consider the abstract relations that exist between the different parts of a sentence. To Chomsky, such abstract relations (or the relation of words to syntax) is a key factor in any grammar that would go beneath the surface to the deep structure not reflected in the surface string (13, p. 314). Chomsky's formulations have undergone various phases of development, but his illustrations of transformative grammar, syntax, generative rules, and competence are still at the center of discussions among linguists and structuralists as well.

The outside sources of influence on structuralism are many, but structuralism, as a field of inquiry, was originally a French phenomenon. The question can be raised
as to why structuralism is a French phenomenon and not, say, German, or English, particularly when one tries to evoke the concerns of such discipline as sociology of knowledge. The authors who tried to provide an analysis of French structuralism did not specifically address such questions, and few authors have attempted to analyze French structuralism in the context of either French social thought or French society.

A number of explanations have been advanced by such authors as F. Furet, H. Gardner, E. Kurzweil, and G. Lemert; all of which, put together, provide an overview of the different factors that contributed to the rise of structuralism in France. The different formulations of modern structuralists such as the nature of human mind, the place of history, the concept of universalism, and the nature of social facts are probably not new in the history of French social thought. Descartes, the most influential philosopher in French intellectual history (18, p. 17), devoted a great part of his work to the study of the human mind. Descartes regarded the mind as an entity apart from the body, an entity that should be examined on its own. Language, reasoning, and originality are reflections of the mental power of the human mind. French thinkers since Descartes have been "fascinated with the human mind" and the interest in such issue has persisted for a number of centuries. Gardner suggests:

The primary concern of French thinkers in the succeeding centuries [since Descartes] has been, on the
one hand, to refine and elaborate those of his ideas they found most compelling and, on the other, to modify or shift out those tenets which seemed less palatable (18, p. 18).

Rousseau, whose influence is comparable to that of Descartes, introduces a number of concerns that informed contemporary structuralists, i.e., the affectional and sentimental aspects of the human mind, society's influence upon natural or "savage man," the relation of nature and culture, and the general will of the community. French social thought, however, went beyond Descartes and Rousseau. The major developments of the late eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries such as the success of science, the process of industrialization, and the French Revolution have in part shaped the focus of the direction of French social thought. The impact of such developments gave rise, among other things, to sociology, a consequence of the rise of positivism as a dominant mode of inquiry and the concern with social order. Comte's sociology certainly fits such description, although it "remained in suspense between its overwhelming ambitions and the fragility of its positive basis" (30, p. 503).

Like Comte, Durkheim, the first figure to introduce sociology to the university circle, adopted a positivistic approach such as his dealing with social facts as things. Durkheim's work, however, represented a definite advance over that of Comte. This can be seen in his theoretical formulation and his methods of data collection and statistical controls that were employed in his study of suicide. Durkheim argues
that the domain of sociological analysis is the internal structure of the group, structure that should be examined independently of its historical evolution (30, pp. 515-520). Durkheim, according to Levi-Strauss' interpretation, accepts the notion that "the primary origin of every social process of importance may be looked for in the internal structure of the social group." To Durkheim, "the laws of social processes should be drawn, not from the study of the 'historical societies' as Comte and Spencer wrongly tried, but from that of the 'species' or types." Thus, a theory of unilinear evolution of mankind is not possible (30, pp. 515-520). Yet, Durkheim did not dismiss the relevance of history, he only suggests that historical analysis falls outside the domain of his formulations. To Durkheim, "organ is independent from function; the causes which bring the former to being are independent from the aim it fulfills." Thus, "the historical and the functional approaches are equally important, but must be used independently" (30, p. 517).

Durkheim's method of analysis, however, was not limited to the immediate, observable, material entities. Durkheim, like many French thinkers who were trained in philosophy, did not hesitate to fall back on philosophical postulations. The French school of sociology "has sometimes felt a strong temptation to follow its methodologically impeccable analytical work with a less satisfactory attempt toward synthesis." Hence, Durkheim examined suicide rates to suggest
that they reflect the mores and culture in which a person lived, and analyzed the legal system and division of labor to discover such hidden and abstract categories as mechanical and organic solidarity (30, p. 525).

Durkheim's influence was disrupted in part by the fact that he had a few disciples who consisted mainly of a group of scholars he gathered around the bibliographic journal *l'Année Sociologique* (1898-1913, first series) such as M. Mauss, P. Fauconnet, G. Davy, and Halbwachs. None of these disciples was able to assume Durkheim's position; their situation, at the time of Durkheim's death, was one of "a high degree of recognized intellectual excellence and a measure of academic and social marginality" (29, pp. 35-36). Durkheim's disciples played a major role in the development of French sociology until World War II. Nonetheless, they did not succeed in passing the Durkheimian heritage on to their successors in the second half of the twentieth century (29, p. 34).

The other group that was inspired by Durkheim's sociology was the group of the École Normale Superieure, the breeding ground of young Durkheimians at the turn of the century. Many of these intellectually select such as R. Aron, G. Friedmann, J. Stoetzel, and J. Soustell carried on Durkheim's traditions, but did not claim Durkheimian identity.

A major figure who exerted a great influence on the young generation of intellectuals at the turn of the century was Bergson who questioned the validity of rational and
scientific inquiry and regarded intuition as the appropriate way of understanding the innermost qualities of life. Bergson called attention, in particular, to "the flux and flow of reality, the aspect of experience which he felt was central," and deplored "the isolated, cinematographic approach of science, which worked instead with discrete moments of time and substituted symbols for the ongoing, unceasing continuity of life" (18, p. 22).

French social thought, since World War II, has undergone many transformations, many of which did not escape the effect of the war, and rapid social change. The school of existentialism that centers upon such issues as being and personal engagement, and Marxism have preoccupied French intellectuals for a while. By the mid 1950's, the intellectual climate was characterized as one of "growing disillusionment" with Sartre's existentialism for being "too subjective and too bound up with individual freedom to carry the weight of the social burdens that had been placed upon it" and for its later association with Marxism (25, p. 24); and with Marxism for its class-oriented overdetermination of social existence and its identification with officialized and institutionalized ideology and the cult of personality (28, p. 13).

Thus, one may suggest that structuralism represents a synthesis of the intense debate between existentialism and Marxism, and the influence of these two schools is still evident in the work of many contemporary structuralists.
However, the factors that contributed to the rise of the field of structuralism are not limited to the debate between existentialism and Marxism. Other factors such as the influence of other schools of thought, the social and economic conditions at home, and world events abroad are also important.

A number of authors suggested (a) that structuralism was a reaction against the schools of existentialism and phenomenology in which "objective structures were deconstructed and subjectivized" (29, p. 24); (b) that structuralism provided the French left "with a pseudo-political theory that did not negate their socialist learnings, but removed them from the direct involvement with Marxism" (25, p. 3); and (c) that structuralism had wide appeal because it probably tended to avoid difficult political choices by searching for unconscious structure (25, p. ix).

The development of structuralism is related also to the postwar political and economic conditions, in particular rapid social change, industrialization, and political instability; just as Sartre's existentialism is often related to the Resistance experience of the war. The appeal of structuralism is, as Crozier puts it, a French fear of change; structuralism is ahistorical and is not threatening to social order (29, p. 25).

Furet related the rise of structuralism to a period that is characterized by the end of ideologies. The thesis relates the economic development, social integration, and prosperity
to the progressive extinction of political extremism. The car, the refrigerator, and television would have killed the revolution, says Furet who argues that French intellectuals, inspired by the universal appeal of the French Revolution and demoralized by history, have looked to other societies as models or ideal types (17, p. 3). They were first preoccupied with the experience of socialist societies, but the Stalin era has undermined the nature of justice and exposed the many contradictions of the socialist world. They, then, turned to embrace the causes of the nationalist movements in the Third World, but the experience of a number of these societies has proven to be a disappointment, i.e., their tendency toward totalitarianism. They, in seeking to find the truth of man, finally turned to the primitive man who became the subject of Levi-Strauss' analysis (17, pp. 3-10).

The factors that led to the development of structuralism are probably a combination of many elements and circumstances, some of which are not yet clearly delineated. Yet, regardless of such factors, structuralism is already a part of the intellectual history, and an attempt to delineate its basic tenets would help understand its formulations and its possible contributions to sociological theory.

Statement of the Problem

This study delineates the basic concepts and analytical techniques of contemporary structuralists, namely Levi-Strauss, Lacan, Barthes, Althusser, and Foucault; and critically
examines the possible contribution of their formulation to sociological theory as well as the implications of such formulations on the methodological orientation in the field of sociology.

Purpose of the Study

The purposes of this study are to (a) examine the major work of contemporary French structuralists, namely the major work of the father of French structuralism, Levi-Strauss, and those of the first generation of structuralists: Lacan, Barthes, Althusser, and Foucault; (b) make an attempt to clarify a number of basic tenets of structuralism, tenets that are the center of controversy and the subject of different analyses and interpretations such as the structuralists' view of the relative importance of history and their empirical orientation toward the analysis of language and other cultural domains; (c) provide more ground for a constructive dialogue between structuralists and sociologists, ground that was laid by few authors like M. Glucksmann, I. Rossi, and A. Schaff, and (d) present a critical evaluation of structuralism, taking into consideration insights advanced by many opponents of structuralism such as Lefebvre and Schaff.

Review of Literature

Goddard suggested that sociologists have paid relatively little attention to the emergence of French structuralism since the 1970's (21, p. 123). A review of American Journal
of Sociology, American Sociological Review, and American
Sociologist from 1963 to 1983 shows that few studies have
been done on structuralism. Goddard, in a short essay on
Levi-Strauss and sociology, questioned the relevance and the
possible application of Levi-Strauss' formulations in
sociology. Goddard argued that "it is not at all clear that
linguistics can be taken as a logical model for anthropology
and sociology," and that structuralism "does not easily
permit the formulation of an empirical method of analysis
applicable to wide ranges of social and cultural phenomena"
(21, pp. 124-128). Carpenter, commenting on Goddard's
assertions, suggested that structuralism has many assets to
offer and that instead of Goddard's claim that "it is not at
all clear that linguistics can be taken as a logical model
for anthropology and sociology," one can argue that "it is not
at all clear that it cannot be." Carpenter argued that
Goddard's views "neither explain the general absence of
structuralism from the pages of American sociology nor
represent a foundation from which to reject the perspective"
(5, pp. 133-137).

Rossi, one of the few who recently attempted to relate
structuralism to sociology, viewed structuralism as a challenge
to the empiricism of traditional sociology in that it refuses
to "consider 'experience' as a kind of 'recording' or
registering of what is immediately 'given' or accessible to
Structuralism ... offers the only viable alternative to the ever-lasting confrontation between the two predominant sociological versions of the objective versus subjective empiricist explanation, the 'natural science' and the 'interpretative' paradigms, to use Wagner's typology (34, pp. 5-10).

Rossi called for a dialectic mode of analysis that would incorporate the different elements of various paradigms such as the objective and empirical approach of Durkheim and Parsons; the objective and transformational approach of Levi-Strauss; the objective and Marxian approach of Althusser; the subjective and empirical approach of Weber, interactionists, and phenomenologists; and the subjective and the Marxian approach of Sartre (33, p. 312).

Methodological Orientation and Justification

The methodological orientation of this study consisted mainly of (a) reading and recording a maximum amount of information contained in the original French texts; (b) reducing observations and inquiries into manageable propositional form to permit easy understanding and interpretation; (c) synthesizing and relating these propositions to four major sociological perspectives: functionalism, Marxism, symbolic interactionism, and phenomenology; (d) advancing a structural critique of these different perspectives in sociology; (e) providing a critical evaluation of structuralism, taking into consideration the works of such authors as Lefebvre and Schaff; and (f) suggesting a new orientation of sociological
inquiry based on structuralist principles.

The greatest impact of structuralism in recent years has been in the field of literature. The influence of structuralism on sociology has been less pervasive. Social scientists, with the exception of anthropologists, have paid little attention to structuralist thought (25, p. 2). However, sociologists are becoming more and more aware of the importance of the many formulations of structuralists and many of them have exhibited interest in the relevance of structuralism to sociology (33, p. 1).

The interest in structuralism coincides with the period of declining credibility of conventional sociological approaches such as functionalism and orthodox Marxism. The field of sociology frequently has been regarded as a discipline in a state of crisis (22). Criticisms of the field have come from different circles, i.e., Schutzian phenomenology, Garfinkel's ethnomethodology, Cicourel's cognitive sociology, Gouldner's reflexive sociology, and Habermas' critical theory. Structuralism provides a new dimension in this ongoing debate and "gives hope for uncovering a common basic approach to the social sciences" (10, p. xi). Thus, the interest of sociologists in structuralism is not accidental, particularly when one takes into account the fact that sociology has been known as a field of multiple paradigms and perspectives. Yet, sociologists "have not produced any serious critical or interpretative monographs on structural thinkers" (33, p. 1).
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CHAPTER II

THE THEMES OF STRUCTURALISM

The major works of five structuralists: Levi-Strauss, Lacan, Barthes, Althusser, and Foucault are analyzed and summarized. The basic properties, propositions, principles, and insights of each figure are presented in a chronological order starting from their earliest work to the most recent one. This allows the reader to follow the development of the thought of each figure in question. The section subtitles referring to each work are alternative titles that better explain or reflect the content of the analysis and the summary. Thus, the original title "La Pensee Sauvage" (The Savage Mind) was substituted by "The Mind in Its Untamed State," which is closely related to the summary and the content of the work.

The present analysis and summary is based solely on the original works (the French editions). There are cases where a number of French terms appear to have no precise connotation in English or are ambiguous. Thus, references to the English editions are made to indicate the extent to which the translation reflects the meaning or the content of the French terms. The quotations in this analysis and summary are based on the French editions, and thus, are original for the present study. The terms in the English editions that do not reflect the meaning
or the content of the French terms are delineated, and substitute terms are suggested.

The reading of these major works is a sociological reading. Hence, an attempt, from the start, was made to focus on themes that have some relevance for sociological theory. This, at first, presented some difficulty, for most of these structuralists refuse to adhere to a particular field of inquiry, and quite often the author ventured into areas that are of particular interest to a psychologist, philosopher, political scientist, or artist.

The work of Levi-Strauss presents little difficulty, his clarity and consistency certainly make him an anthropologist par excellence. Levi-Strauss is probably the first seriously to attempt to apply certain principles of semiology (the study of signs) to the analysis of cultural phenomena. Thus, he studied such cultural phenomena as kinship structure, totemism, and myth as if they were languages. This makes him the founding father of structuralism. Levi-Strauss' commitment to the field of structuralism is straightforward and almost total. This is apparent in most of his work, particularly in his *Anthropologie Structurale* (Structural Anthropology).

Lacan's work, unlike that of Levi-Strauss, presents some difficulty. The characteristics of his writings are ambiguous and sometimes unpenetrable; to attempt to sum up his basic themes seems as impertinent an undertaking as to try to summarize certain poems. The technical concepts that he
introduces and reformulates are not simply available in a stable and precise form. This is complicated by Lacan's assertion that the use of concepts and words requires more vigilance in the science of man than in others, for such concepts and words touch the very being of their object. The apparent ambiguity of his writing, however, is not without justification. Lacan tends to discourage the reader from imposing simple and premature theoretical models upon the text (the work of the writer). Instead, he invites the reader to participate in the inventive work of language in the texts. Indeed, concepts and words do not have stable references for Lacan. Rather, concepts emerge in the text, undergoing many transformations depending on the intellectual context of the work. Lacan suggests that the question "what does it mean?" should be replaced by the question "what paths does it travel?" The attempt to grasp Lacan's theory is also made difficult by the fact that Lacan addresses a particular audience that is assumed to be familiar with diverse intellectual traditions.

Thus, the works of Lacan, in this study, are not presented in a chronological order (as with the other writers treated). Rather, they are presented on the basis of issues that he dealt with. It is not possible to summarize each work on its own, for Lacan's concepts and words seem to define each other within and between different works. In addition, some concepts were ambiguous in one work, but made clear in another.
Lacan's aim is to clarify and renovate the work of Freud; he calls for a "return to Freud." Lacan suggests that modern psychoanalysts not only misunderstood Freud, but have undermined the weight and the innovative power of Freud's theory. The concern of Lacan extends beyond the particular experience in a consulting room of the therapy of particular patients; he attempts to devise a general theory on the human subject based on Freud's theory of psychoanalysis.

Barthes' work, with the exception of Le Degré Zéro de l'Écriture (Writing Degree Zero), resembles the clarity of Levi-Strauss', although one is expected to be familiar with the literary work that Barthes analyzes, i.e., a play, a film, and an article in a magazine. Barthes, like Levi-Strauss, treats cultural objects such as cinema, advertising, comic strips, and press photography as if they were systems of significations. The difference between Levi-Strauss and Barthes is that the first focuses on cultural aspects of the so-called primitive society, while the second concentrates on cultural phenomena of complex society. Barthes' Mythologies can be considered as a major work on the cultural demystification of complex society. Barthes attempts to develop a "style" or a mode of writing that does not subscribe to the rituals of the literary establishment, for language of literature has been the product of a particular group who were closely associated with the interests of those in power. The style of his work probably makes it difficult for
"bourgeois critics" to penetrate. Yet, such work is able to articulate the different aspects of everyday life in complex society in a manner that is accessible to the reader.

The work of Althusser, like that of Levi-Strauss, is clear and straightforward. The work presents a new method of reading Marx, particularly Marx's *Capital*. Althusser, an advocate of scientific Marxism, is critical of Marxist humanists who emphasize the continuity between early and later writings of Marx. To Althusser, there is certainly an epistemological break between the young Marx and the mature Marx, and that humanistic interpretation of Marx is merely an ideology that is dangerous to scientific knowledge. The work of Althusser is mainly theoretical. However, Althusser exhibits great ability to handle technical and economic terms treated by Marx and classical economists. The work of Althusser is the only work of a structuralist who openly situates his thinking within Marxian thought.

The work of Foucault presents some difficulty, particularly *l'Archeologie du Savoir* (The Archeology of Knowledge) which constitutes the basis of Foucault's theory of historical analysis. This difficulty stems from the fact that his work, as he often suggests, is a discourse about a discourse. That is, such work is a discursive analysis of other texts at a given historical period. The work of Foucault, although not as ambiguous as that of Lacan, is nonetheless without a centre. The link between the different parts of his discourse often is
difficult to establish. The work of Foucault also seems to exhibit certain rebellion against the seemingly clear discourse of the Cartesian thinking and, as such, his discourse is presented in such a way as to make it difficult for critics who operate under principles different from his own. *L'Archeologie du Savoir* can be considered as his major work that outlines the basic themes of his theory, particularly his theory of discourse. The other works are practical illustrations that provide further elaboration of his discourse of other discourses.

**Levi-Strauss**

The works of Levi-Strauss presented here consisted of *Les Structures Élémentaires de la Parenté* (The Elementary Structures of Kinship), *Anthropologie Structurale* (Structural Anthropology), *Le Totémisme Aujourd'hui* (Totemism), and *La Penseé Sauvage* (The Savage Mind).

*Les Structures Élémentaires de la Parenté* (pp. 48-55) (*) is an attempt to present a general theory of kinship structure in the so-called primitive society. The work also provides an anthropological explanation of the origin of the incest taboo and the nature of the relation between nature and culture. The theory of the origin of the incest taboo probably is the one for which Levi-Strauss is known in the field of sociology. However, his theory incorporates a variety of intellectual

(*) These refer to subsequent pages in this study.
postulations on the nature of kinship and other cultural phenomena as well.

*Anthropologie Structurale* (pp. 55-66) can be considered as Levi-Strauss' most comprehensive work. Levi-Strauss outlines the relative importance of history in anthropological analysis, the nature of the relation between language and culture, and an attempt to analyze the phenomenon of myth on the basis of structural principles. *Le Totémisme Aujourd'hui* (pp. 66-74) further provides elaboration on some of the themes suggested in *Anthropologie Structurale*, particularly Levi-Strauss' theory of totemism and man's attempt to deal with the contradictions between nature and culture. *La Pensee Sauvage* (pp. 74-80) provides adventurous and provocative insights on the nature of primitive processes of thinking. Levi-Strauss presents a theory that questions the existing perception of the primitive thinking, and attempts to suggest how the properties of such thinking relate to those of the so-called civilized.

**The Problem of Incest and the Transition From Nature To Culture**

Levi-Strauss' inquiry into the problem of incest constitutes an introduction to a general theory of the kinship system. The theory articulates certain propositions that explain how man evolved from nature to culture, and how culture was able to transform what is natural into a social
organization that provides a basic for social solidarity and cultural integration.

The elementary forms of kinship are related to man's attempt to overcome the opposition between nature and culture. The distinction between nature and culture is logically justified; man is both a biological and a social individual; his interaction with external and internal stimuli is dependent on both nature and the social environment. This distinction, however, is not without difficulty. The question can be raised as to where nature ends and culture begins. The case of the child's fear of the dark illustrates such difficulty; this fear can be attributed to the child's animal nature, but can also be related to the influence of his nurse's stories. Yet, one must attempt to delineate the mechanisms whereby attitudes, which are cultural, are integrated with the type of behaviors, which are biological in nature.

The point of departure for such distinctions cannot be man himself, for everything man does is conditioned by culture; even the baby's initial reaction to outside stimuli is shaped by the social environment. The answer can be sought elsewhere. The contrast between human and animal behavior provides the clearest distinction between what is natural and what is cultural (23, p. 6). Human behavior pertains to the realm of law, whereas animal behavior is solely motivated by natural instincts. Thus, the presence of rules indicates that a level of culture is reached, while the absence of rules indicates
that a condition, whereby man's behavior was merely a reflection of his animal nature, hypothetically existed. Likewise, the criterion of universality versus relativism serves as a valid indicator of the distinction between nature and culture. The universal falls beyond the scope of cultural limitations, and thus, belongs to the realm of nature. The aspect of relativity is made possible by man's customs, traditions, techniques, and institutions, and thus, pertains to culture.

The above criteria permit one not only to make a distinction between nature and culture, but also to identify the level of transition from nature to culture. Levi-Strauss indicates that the first and most fundamental rule that represents a transition from nature to culture is the law of the incest prohibition (23, p. 29). Levi-Strauss suggests that the ambiguous and equivocal character of the incest problem has been a center of many speculations; the prohibition is viewed as physiological in nature or psychological, pertaining to the psychic processes in man. The incest prohibition certainly touches upon the domain of biology and psychology, but this prohibition is first of all a rule and a social phenomenon. This prohibition is often viewed as a protective measure designed to avoid the disastrous consequence of consanguineous marriage; a consequence that biologists regard as disruptive for social order. This, however, does not explain why society reacts strongly against anyone who deviates from the incest
taboo. The prohibition of incest is also viewed as a reflection of the psychic tendencies in man. This view asserts that familiarization that develops between two individuals of the opposite sex tends to bring a lessening of desire of one another. This explanation, however, can only be attributed to the rule of incest itself, Levi-Strauss suggests. The primitive conception of marriage disputes the view that physical and psychological proximity is the origin of incest prohibition. Cross-cousin marriage usually takes place at an early age, sometimes when the two future partners are still infants. The two partners grow together and develop strong ties that are often so strong that, when one passes away, the other dies from grief or commits suicide. The primitive's saying "the desire of a wife begins with a sister" indicates that long intimacy between two future partners can be a source of sentimental and sexual attraction (23, p. 20).

The closest sociological interpretation of the incest prohibition is Durkheim's theory that links this prohibition and the phenomenon of exogamy (a system whereby one is allowed to marry only someone outside his clan). This view suggests that the incest prohibition is only a small fraction of the different unions that the system of exogamy prohibits. Durkheim further suggests that the prohibition of women in a system of exogamy relates to a fear derived from the belief in the consubstantiality of the member of the clan and his
totem. The system of exogamy and the prohibition of incest are certainly interrelated, but this prohibition is only a distant consequence of the rules of exogamy, Levi-Strauss suggests. This prohibition is found in all groups, even in those without clans and moieties; its significance extends beyond the past of the system of exogamy, which cannot by itself guarantee that the mother will not marry her son, particularly in a patrilineal system. To Levi-Strauss, the origin of the incest prohibition is neither cultural nor natural; it is not also a combination of elements pertaining to both nature and culture. The prohibition is rather a stage of transition from nature to culture (23, p. 29).

The incest prohibition is a rule. Nature tends to leave the attachment between individuals of the opposite sexes to chance and arbitrariness. Culture intervenes in that process and replaces chance by a system of organization that prohibits marriage with one's close relatives. The incest prohibition is a social rule. The terms "father," "mother," "son," "daughter," "brother," and "sister" indicate the predominance of social relationships over any biological ties that exist between members of a kinship. This prohibition is closely related to the phenomenon of exchange that establishes alliances between different groups that constitute society. Levi-Strauss suggests that culture intervenes whenever the group perceives or faces possible disruption of the distribution of valuables that are critical to the survival
of the group, i.e., the distribution of food which reflects the primitive's contention that food is something that has to be shared. The most important element of the group's existence is the distribution of women. Levi-Strauss asserts that the exchange of women not only establishes alliances between groups and tribes, but sets a general rule that asserts the group's authority over what is considered an essential valuable. Thus, the incest prohibition reflects the pre-eminence of the organization over the arbitrary and the collective over the individual (23, p. 52).

The primitive's many aspects of social life are based on the notion of exchange. This exchange is not identical with economic exchange; it is merely based on the process of reciprocity whereby strong psychological and sensual values are attached to reciprocal gifts, i.e., the offering of food. The incest prohibition is itself a rule of reciprocity; it involves a process of give and take. The man gives his sister and daughter away and, in return, receives the sister or the daughter of another man. This establishes irreversible alliance among social groups, for giving one's sister and daughter away represents the most significant gift whose social value extends beyond the realm of the giver and the receiver. Levi-Strauss suggests that the system of kinship is based on the rule of reciprocity; a man obtains a wife only because her father or brother has given her away. Levi-Strauss' reference to women relates mainly to the condition of the so-called primitive
society where the exchange of women actually provides an alliance between different groups and tribes. This theory does not hold in complex society, although its premises of reciprocity and social bond are still apparent.

The kinship system is based on the notion of exchange. The prohibition of marriage with one's close relatives ensures the circulation of women, the group's most important asset. This circulation results in social benefits; it provides the means of binding people together, i.e., one cannot have a father-in-law or a brother-in-law without a kinship system.

The institution of marriage is a continuous process that is not limited to two isolated individuals; it incorporates relationships between these two individuals and everyone else. The position of motherhood does not merely relate to the mother's relationship to her child, but also to relationships to others as a wife, sister, and cousin. Levi-Strauss views the family not only as a union that consists of a husband and a wife, but also a social institution that consists of a triad of a husband, a wife, and a brother-in-law whose place is essential, for he symbolizes the process of exchange that is the basis of kinship structure.

Levi-Strauss' theory relates mainly to the elementary forms of kinship, although he suggests that elements of complex structure can be explained in part as the result of development or combination of elements of primitive kinship structure. Thus, the importance of sharing food and other material objects has
diminished through time, but the system of reciprocity involving women retained its basic role in complex society. This link between primitive and complex structure is not historical, for such interpretation implies a process of evolution that Levi-Strauss disregards in favor of a structural analysis that treats each culture as a self-contained entity that does not lend itself to the evolutionary process of development (23, p. 534).

Levi-Strauss makes reference to the possible use of techniques developed by linguists in the study of cultural phenomena, and suggests that the system of exogamy and language have the same function: communication and integration. The relations between the sexes can be viewed as a form of communication like language (23, p. 568).

The Place of History, Language, and the Unconscious in Structural Inquiry

Levi-Strauss maintains that structural analysis should not be confined to the synchronic dimensions of phenomena, but should make constant recourse to history that remains permanent throughout the succession of events. A study that limits itself to the description of the present conditions of a culture only creates a sense of illusion. Indeed, everything is history; what was said yesterday is history, and what was said a minute ago is history. The historical developments do not only suggest how things were, but also permit the evaluation of the relation between the different elements of
present-day society (21, p. 17). However, history has certain limitations. History deals mainly with systems of representations. Thus, the history of primitive society is mostly reconstruction and cannot be anything else. The mythology of the Revolution of 1789 lived through by an aristocrat is not the same phenomenon as the Revolution of 1789 lived through by a "sans-culotte," and neither would correspond to the Revolution of 1789 as thought by a Michelet or a Taine (21, p. 23). Nonetheless, little understanding of history is better than no history at all (21, p. 17).

To Levi-Strauss, structural analysis and history share the same subject (social life), goal (better understanding of man), and a general mode of inquiry that seeks to enlarge a specific experience to the dimensions of a more general one. The two disciplines differ primarily in their choice of complementary perspectives. Thus, "history organizes its facts in relation to conscious expressions, ethnology organizes its facts in relation to the unconscious conditions of social life" (21, p. 25). The ethnologist moves forward seeking to attain more of the unconscious, whereas the historical advances backward keeping his eyes fixed on concrete and specific activities that he would then analyze in a more complete and rich perspective (21, p. 32).

Levi-Strauss recognizes the complementary role history plays in the study of social life. However, he questions the validity of two approaches associated with historical analysis:
evolutionism and diffusionism. The evolutionist view regards one type of society as the most advanced expression of evolution, and another as "survivals" of earlier stages whose logical classification provides the order of appearance in time. This proclamation must be able to prove that one type of society is more primitive than the other; that the primitive type evolves necessarily toward the complex type; and that this law acts more rigorously in the center of the region than in its periphery. This presents difficulty that is quite impossible to overcome. The diffusionist view reduces cultures into isolated elements, and establishes relations not between cultures, but between elements of the same type cross culturally. This postulation, however, is more a result of the way in which such elements were selected than a reflection of the unity of the subject (21, pp. 5-12).

To Levi-Strauss, Marx's statement, "Men make their own history but do not know that they are making it," sums up the importance of history to structural analysis; the first part justifies history and the second ethnology, both of which are inseparable (21, p. 31).

Levi-Strauss regards linguistics as the social science that can claim the name of science, and formulate a positive method that can discover the nature of facts under analysis (21, p. 37). Levi-Strauss goes on to suggest that linguistics provides a common framework for social sciences, much as nuclear physics grounds physical sciences. Linguistics
appealed to Levi-Strauss because its phonological method
(a) passes from the conscious linguistic phenomena to their
unconscious infrastructure; (b) refuses to treat terms as
independent entities and instead bases its analysis on the
relations between terms; (c) introduces the notion of "system;"
and (d) seeks to discover general laws either through induction
or logical deduction that gives them an absolute character
(21, p. 40).

Language is the most qualified social phenomenon to be
susceptible to scientific analysis. Language reflects the
level of the unconscious thought. The speaker is usually not
conscious of the syntactic and morphological laws of language
and knowledge of such laws does not alter the fact that the
speaker remains dissociated from his experience as a speaking
agent. Language lives and develops as a collective elaboration.
The influence of the observer on the object of observation is
not relevant, for the observer cannot alter a phenomenon
simply by becoming conscious of it (21, pp. 64-65).

Linguistics provides a basis for the study and comparative
analysis of cultural phenomena. The linguist proceeds from
the smallest unit to a higher one. From words, he extracts
the phonetic reality of the phoneme, and from the latter, he
extracts the logical reality of distinctive elements. The
presence of the same phonemes in different languages does not
suggest that phonemes are independent entities subject to
comparative analysis. These phonemes rather are one and the
same phenomenon. The structuralist does not compare elements cross culturally as independent entities; it is "sufficient to reach the unconscious structure of institutions and customs to obtain a principal interpretation valid for other institutions and customs, on the condition that the study is carried far enough" (21, p. 28). The passage from the conscious to the unconscious relies on an analysis that proceeds from specific to general. Levi-Strauss suggests, "It is not the comparison that is the basis for generalization, but the other way around." The unconscious activity of the mind consists in imposing form upon a content; such forms appear to be the same for all minds, ancient and modern, primitive and civilized (21, p. 28).

Levi-Strauss favors F. Boas' argument about the nature of the relation between linguistic and cultural phenomena. The main difference, says Boas, is that linguistic "never emerges to the conscious level," while cultural phenomena "often rise to the level of conscious thought, giving rise to secondary reasonings and interpretations." The fact that linguistic categories remain unconscious gives rise to formulations that overlook the limitations of secondary interpretations that are associated with many fields of inquiry (21, p. 26).

The nature of the relation between language and culture, however, is a complicated one. Language is a product of culture that reflects the general beliefs of a society. Language is a part among other elements of culture such as
tools, institutions, and customs. Language also is a condition of culture because (a) language is a means through which the individual acquires the culture of the group, and (b) language has a similar architectural system as that of culture, such system is based on correlation, oppositions, and logical relations. To Levi-Strauss, the issue should not be set up in terms of which phenomenon influences the other: language or culture. Language and culture are interrelated and are the product of the human mind. Levi-Strauss says, "We are not sufficiently aware that language and culture are two parallel schemes of an activity that is more profound; I think here about this uninvited guest who is with us: the human mind" (21, p. 81).

Structural analysis cannot disregard the most highly conscious expression of social phenomena. The aim of such analysis is to attain the inventory of unconscious possibilities. The primitive man rarely presents a "rational explanation" of a custom or institution; his response is of the nature, "things were always that way." The civilized man rarely questions customs such as table manners, type of dress, and many of his religious and political attitudes; his conscious justification of such practices are secondary elaborations. To Levi-Strauss, "there is no question that the unconscious reasons underlying the practice of a custom or the sharing of a belief are far remote from those invoked to justify them" (21, p. 25).
Levi-Strauss regards myth as a social phenomenon structured like language. Myth is language, it is known because it is told. The fragmented explanations of myth offer little contribution to the theory of myth. The common interpretation maintains that myths of society express the fundamental sentiments shared by mankind, i.e., love and hate. The argument is also made that myths reflect attempts to explain phenomena that appear uncomprehensible such as astronomy and meteorology. A number of social scientists have found comfort with an interpretation that suggests myths describe the social characteristics of a society. Hence, a myth that cites a main figure, say an evil family member, is interpreted as a fact that reflects the actual social position of that family member in society. To Levi-Strauss, such first-hand interpretations remain in their speculative stage. The content of myths is not contingent, and myths cross culturally are similar and have the same universal structure. The study of myth requires an analysis that treats myth as language, and thus, provides an interpretation that goes beyond the manifest content of myth.

Myth is language, but myth is not precisely the same phenomenon as language. Myth is "in the language" and "beyond it." Myth is the same thing as language, but also something different from it. This complex nature of the relation between myth and language is not alien to linguistic analysis. Saussure made a distinction between language and speech and demonstrated
that language consists of two complementary aspects: one is structural and the other is statistical. Language belongs to the domain of reversible time and speech to the domain of irreversible time. Language comprises two interrelated levels, but a third level can be added; such level, although higher, combines the properties of other levels. Myth accounts for events that took place in the past, but the value of myth comes from the fact that events form a permanent structure. Myth simultaneously incorporates the past, the present, and the future. This is illustrated by the metaphor of political ideology in complex society. The historian who recounts the French Revolution refers to a sequence of past events, although their remote consequences can be felt in the present. The politician can view the French Revolution as having another order of reality. The series of past events permit the politician to interpret the present social conditions of a society, and extracts clues for future developments. This explains how myth, although pertaining to the realms of language and speech, forms a third level that is both distinct and part of language. Myth is language that operates at a higher level. Levi-Strauss maintains that "the substance of myth cannot be found in its style, its mode of narration, its syntax, but in the story that it tells" (21, p. 232).

Levi-Strauss suggests the structure of myth is not to be found only at the levels of phonemes, morphemes, and sememes that are necessary in the study of cultural phenomena, but
at the levels of gross constituent units that refer to a package of relations among different possible sentences of a given subject. This technique of analysis breaks myth down into a series of sentences that form gross constituent units of a type of relation. Levi-Strauss uses the metaphor of an individual with no knowledge of what is an orchestra trying to decipher orchestra scores. The individual may notice that certain notes recur at intervals and that certain melodic outlines offer some kind of analogy, all of which may reflect a principle of harmony and lead the individual to see that orchestra scores should be read diachronically along one axis (page after page, from left to right), and synchronically along another axis (from top to bottom).

Levi-Strauss applied his structural method to a variety of myths gathered from different cultures. The myth that is used here is the Oedipus myth which is well known and which was subject of philosophical and psychological elaborations. Levi-Strauss refers to the metaphor of orchestra scores to delineate the constituent units of myth. A myth can be manipulated and arranged the same way orchestra scores are. As such, a sequence of numbers like 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 1, 2, 5, 7, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8 can be rearranged in subgroups of 1's, 2's, etc.:

\[
\begin{array}{cccc}
1 & 2 & 4 & 7 \ 8 \\
2 & 3 & 4 & 6 \ 8 \\
1 & 4 & 5 & 7 \ 8 \\
1 & 2 & 5 & 6 \ 8 \\
3 & 4 & 5 & 6 \ 8 \\
\end{array}
\]
The same kind of operation is applied in the analysis of myth to extract not only the relation in each gross constituent unit, but also to determine the nature of the relation between gross constituent units of a myth. The Oedipus myth can be regrouped as follows:

Cadmos looks for his sister Europe, ravished by Zeus

Cadmos kills the dragon

The Spartoi exterminate one another

Labdacos (father of Laios) = lame (?)

Oedipus kills his father Laios

Laios (father of Oedipus) = left sided (?)

Oedipus kills the Sphinx

Oedipus = swollen-foot (?)

Oedipus marries Jocaste, his mother

Eteocle kills his brother Polynice

Antigone buries Polynice, her brother, breaking prohibition

This scheme contains four vertical columns, each of which groups several relations belonging to the same package. The first column on the left reflects all the incidents pertaining to a type of relation: overestimated kinship relations. The second column appears to have the same but inverted type of
relation: underestimated kinship relations. The third column mainly refers to the monsters and their destruction. The myth relates to the dragon, a monster that must be destroyed so that men can be born from the earth, and the Sphinx that strives to deny men the right to exist. The second part reproduces the first, and this mainly refers to the autochtomy of man. The fact that the two monsters are finally overcome by men suggests that the third column consists of negation of the autochtomy of men. The fourth column refers to a common universal feature in mythology: the difficulty to walk straight ahead. This reflects the persistence of the autochtomy of men. The overriding conclusion is that the relation between the fourth and the third column is the same as that between the first and the second. The difficulty of making connections between groups of relations is replaced by the suggestion that the two contradictory relations are identical (21, pp. 238-239).

The Oedipus myth expresses an attempt to overcome the contradictions between the belief in the autochtomy of man and the actual knowledge that man is born from the union of man and woman. Levi-Strauss suggests:

The Oedipus myth offers a kind of logical instrument to build a bridge between the initial problem: born from one or from two, and the derivative problem that can approximately be formulated, born from the same or from different? By this means, a correlation is formulated: the overestimation of blood relations is to the underestimated of these relations as the attempt to escape the autochtomy to the impossibility in succeeding in it. The experience can disprove the theory, but the social life verifies the cosmology inasmuch as one and the other conceive the same contradictory structure (21, p. 239).
Levi-Strauss maintains that the different versions of the Oedipus myth do not alter its substance. A myth tells a story and its different elements can easily be integrated in a structural analysis of myth.

**The Totemic Illusion**

Totemism, a concept taken from the Ojibwa expression "ototoeman" (he is a relative of mine), has been a subject of many interpretations, particularly in anthropology and sociology of religion. The term "totemism," however, is probably the least understood phenomenon of the so-called primitive society. This can be attributed to many factors. Totemism is not regarded as a distinct category with its unique properties, but a phenomenon whose reality is reduced to that of an illustration of certain modes of thought. Totemism, for instance, is treated as a magico-religious practice that presupposes certain forms of exogamy. Totemism often is confused with two other related problems: the identification of humans with non-human species, and the association of clan names with animals and plants. The different analyses of totemism do not address a fundamental question: whether totemism reflects a cultural reality or a logical mode of classification. Totemism also is treated as a particular belief system of the savage, and thus, an institution separate from that of the civilized. The limitations of the above formulations, however, can be overcome by a structural analysis that can identify the semantic field within which are found
the phenomena grouped under the term totemism.

Totemism is addressed by many theorists such as Frazer, Rivers, Boas, Durkheim, Bergson, and Rousseau. The naturalist view of Frazer uses nature to explain what Levi-Strauss calls "the totemic illusion." Totemism is viewed as a phenomenon that brings man closer to animals. The alleged ignorance of the role played by the father in conception leads the savage to the replacement of the human genitor by spirits closer to natural forces. Thus, a distinction between societies is made by classifying them on the basis of their attitudes toward nature. This is expressed by the alleged knowledge or ignorance of the mechanisms of procreation and the place assigned to man in the animal kingdom in general. To Levi-Strauss, this unqualified and radical distinction can only lead to a basic conclusion: the isolation of the savage from the civilized (24, p. 3).

Totemism plays a part in consolidating clans and strengthening the alliance in a large circle of tribes, but totemism should not be identified exclusively with the system of exogamy. As Boas puts it, exogamy has a historical priority over totemism, and the latter is not necessarily the result of the former. Exogamy can and does exist without totemism.

Rivers defines totemism as a combination of many elements: social, psychological, and ritual. The social element involves the connection between animals, plants, and objects, and the human group, clan or exogamous. The psychological element
pertains to a common belief in the relation of kinship between non-human and human species that often is expressed by the idea that man descended from such animal, plant, or object. The ritual element manifests itself in a number of prohibitions associated with non-human species. This attempt, however, does not reflect the complexity of totemism. Totemism is wrongly identified with any type of relationships between humans and natural species. Totemism can be viewed as such only if such relationships are of the same general kind. The actual data indicate a bewildering variety of relationships between humans and natural species. The description also lacks clarity: whether totemism implies that every member of the social group shares a totemic relationship with every member of the totem, and whether every social group has a certain relationship with a class or object, animate or inanimate. Thus, what Rivers describes as totemism may not actually relate to totemism.

Malinowski maintains that totemism centers around some questions easily answered when analyzed in the context of roles and functions of totemism in a society. Totemism relates to natural species because such species supply man with basic need for food that takes first place in the conscience of the primitive, giving rise to intense emotions. The affinity between man and natural species relates not only to the notion that animals resemble men in the act of moving, emitting sounds, and expressing emotions, but also to the
idea that certain animals possess more power than men, i.e., the bird flies and the fish swims. This evokes a variety of feelings in man, and such feelings constitute the basic elements of totemism. Totemism is considered both a social and religious phenomenon that permits man to deal with the environment in the struggle for existence. Malinowski's theory, however, remains naturalistic and fails to treat totemism as a cultural phenomenon. The theory is not at all consistent, particularly when Malinowski postulates that the assignement of animal ranks accounts for clan hierarchy. This is a cultural interpretation and not a natural one. Malinowski's theory is guided by a general principle that totemism has a practical and affective end. This argument, says Levi-Strauss, is tautological, for "it takes for a cause what, in the best of circumstances, is only a consequence or a concomitant phenomenon" (24, p. 99).

Radcliffe-Brown presents a more rigorous theory than that of Malinowski. Totemism takes many forms that are necessary to distinguish, i.e., sexual, local, individual, and moiety. Totemism should be restricted to a particular case of relation between man and animal species, for the ritualization of relations between man and animal species incorporates a wider and general frame than totemism. Radcliffe-Brown suggests:

It is an attested universal fact that everything or every event that exercises an important influence on the material and spiritual well-being of society tends to become the object of ritual attitude. If
totemism chooses natural species to serve as social emblems for segments of society, this is simply because these species were already the object of ritual attitudes even before the emergence of totemism (24, p. 88).

Radcliffe-Brown questions Malinowski's claim that totemism mainly meets certain needs and interests. The reverse is also true, it is the recourse to totemism that gives rise to these needs and interests. The argument can be made that "it is not because men feel anxiety in certain situations that they resort to magic, but because they turn to magic that these situations produce anxiety in them" (24, p. 98).

Radcliffe-Brown's formulations reaches maturity in his later writings in which his elaborations exhibit similarities with structural analysis of totemism. Radcliffe-Brown suggests that totemic myths are understood only when analyzed in the ethnographic context, and that comparative analyses reveal the same structure, although not the same content, in all myths. Radcliffe-Brown views totemism as a cultural phenomenon that reflects social relations. The Australian myth, whose principal theme is conflict between two protagonists, the eaglehawk (the mother's brother) and the crow (the sister's son), suggests a type of relation characterized by friendship versus conflict and solidarity versus opposition. The relation is a metaphor of a social group. The two natural species are classified into what linguists refer to as "pairs of opposites." The pair "eaglehawk-crow" is made possible because such
species share a common feature that makes comparison possible, i.e., both are two main carnivorous birds. The Australian myth is "a frequent type of application of a structural principle. This principle consists of the union of opposites" (24, p. 127). This opposition serves to produce integration instead of being an obstacle to such intellectual integration. The eaglehawk and the crow are not creatures that give rise to interests such as fear and admiration, but a type of reality that permits man to engage in theoretical speculations based on empirical observations. The natural species are not selected because they are "good to eat," but because they are "good to think" (24, p. 128). Radcliffe-Brown suggests:

The Australian conception of what we designate here as "opposition" is a particular application of association by contrariety, which is a universal trait of human thinking, and which induce us to think in terms of pairs of contraries, upwards and downwards, strong and weak, and black and white. But the Australian notion of opposition combines the idea of contraries with that of a pair of adversaries (24, p. 129).

Durkheim attempts to provide a sociological interpretation of totemism. To him, totemism is the sacred part of social life. The sacred is embodied in the totem that can degenerate in a number of emblems. Man approaches these totems through an elaborate system of rituals. These rituals reflects, by the emotions they evoke, the strength and influence of the social group. This leads Durkheim to suggest that men actually worship their own society. Levi-Strauss sums up Durkheim's theory as follows: the clan assigns itself a name that can be a sketchy figure reduced to certain traits. The clan
recognizes the animal figure and consequently modifies it. The figure finally becomes sacred. Durkheim's theory, however, is not able clearly to isolate totemism from other phenomena. The notion of the sacred does not provide a satisfactory explanation of totemism. The theory is simply an interesting element that relates to a wider problem of ritual relations. Durkheim attempts to incorporate totemism to social order and suggests that totemism serves to maintain social solidarity that, in turn, requires ritualized collective conduct. However, Durkheim gives only a contingent explanation of the process of selecting species, maintaining that animals and plants are recognized because they are there and are easy to signify.

Durkheim admits correctly that social life presupposes an intellectual activity whose properties are not necessarily reflections of social organization. Durkheim suggests:

Every time that we unite, by an internal link, heterogeneous terms, we clearly identify contraries. Without doubt, the terms we unite are not those that the Australians compare; we select them by other criteria and for other reasons, but the process by which the mind relates them does not differ essentially (24, p. 138).

The main themes of Durkheim's interpretations, however, tend to give primacy to the social over the intellect, it is the social factors that shape the intellect and not the other way around.

Levi-Strauss suggests totemism is an instance relating to two types of relations ideally constructed: the cultural and the natural. The cultural part consists of categories and individuals. The natural part consists of groups and persons.
These were arbitrarily selected to identify in each part two modes of existence: collective and individual. There are four combinations that can be formulated from categories—individuals and groups—persons; category-group, category-person, individual-person, and individual-group. Each combination corresponds to a phenomenon in a culture. The combination category-group relates to the Australian totemism that covers a relation between a natural category (natural species or class of objects) and a cultural group (moiety and cult-group). The combination category-person represents the totemism of North American Indians where the individual attempts to reconcile with a natural category. The combination individual-person corresponds to the totemism of Mota, the Banks Islands, where a child is believed to be the incarnation of an animal or plant found or consumed by the mother at the time of pregnancy. The combination individual-group refers to the totemism of Polynesia and ancient Egypt where certain natural species are subject of veneration and protection.

Levi-Strauss views totemism as a projection of mental attitudes "incompatible with the exigency of a discontinuity between man and nature" (24, p. 4). Totemism is a particular expression of relations characterized by correlations and oppositions that are formulated in other ways such as those in categories: sky-earth, war-peace, red-white, upstream-downstream, and Yang-Ying (male-female). Totemism not only expresses such relations, but makes opposition and correlation
a means of integration. Levi-Strauss suggests that such categories are the result of the activity of the mind. The logic of this classification is "a direct expression of the structure of mind ... and not a passive product of the action of the environment on an amorphous conscience" (24, p. 130).

The link between the orders of culture and nature is indirect, passing through the mind. Totemism is not fetishism, exogamy, or matrilineal filiation, but a reflection of an activity of the mind whose structure is the same for all man, primitive or civilized (24, p. 18).

The Mind in Its Untamed State

Levi-Strauss suggests totemism is a mode of thought characterized by a tendency toward classification. Totemism is a type of knowledge that does not merely relate to practical purposes or economic benefits, but also an elaborate system of classification that meets the intellectual requirements of the so-called primitive man. The traditional view regards the primitive as being governed by practical and economic needs. The same approach, however, can be leveled at the civilized. The primitive utilization of natural assets is balanced with the desire for knowledge, a fact that may not be advanced about the present commercial era whose highest priority is to maximized what is financially profitable. The primitive system of classification is not solely based on economic considerations, but also on carefully built-up theoretical knowledge (22, p. 59).
The primitive exhibits great interest in the richness and diversity of the biological environment. This is evident in the precise knowledge the primitive masters about the plant and animal worlds. This knowledge may appear incomprehensible not because of its exotic nature, but because such knowledge requires passionate interest in the environment. The primitive's system of classification is not impelled by arbitrary superstition. The system underlies facts of logical order and is comparable to scientific systems of classification, zoological, botanical, cosmographic, and occupational. The primitive observes, experiments, classifies, and theorizes. In doing so, he arrives at a system that permits him to grasp the different levels of mental activity, from the most abstract to the most concrete and from the most cultural to the most natural.

The primitive's preoccupation with the animal kingdom has been a source of many unqualified statements. The animal species are not known because they are useful, they are useful because they are first known. The thinking of the primitive is not based on the belief these species contain intrinsic physical or mystical properties, or are supernatural. This misinterprets the primitive's conception of classification. The animal species, like man, are part of the natural order and possess both emotions and intelligence. However, the primitive's relations with these species remain objects of thought. The primitive does not perceive them passively. Instead, he reduces them into concepts and then compounds them to form a
coherent system about the natural environment.

The primitive is a great classifier (22, p. 54). Classification, as opposed to non-classification, provides a higher degree of perceptual reduction of chaos and uncertainty. In fact, primitive thinking is based on this demand for order, a property common to all thought, i.e., science can tolerate frustration and uncertainty but not disorder. As such, every object occupies a certain place in the primitive's system of classification, and taking elements from their place would question the entire order of the universe. The system of classification serves to maintain order (as opposed to disorder) and make social life predictable. The notion of classification is not limited to species and objects, but includes a variety of systems such as that of color (the distinction between two axes, light-fresh and dark-dry) and naming (codes suitable for certain forms of communication).

Levi-Strauss suggests totemism is a broad phenomenon whose many facts are not well understood. The traditional view of totemism tends arbitrarily to isolate one level of classification, namely the level that relates to natural species and regard it as an institution. Totemism is a level of classification and should not be given a higher status than systems operating at the level of abstract categories. To Levi-Strauss, totemism is not even a system of classification, but a moment of it. Totemism is a conceptual system that serves to transcend and overcome the opposition and
contradiction between the realm of culture (men's relation with each other) and the realm of nature (men's relation with his environment).

The primitive system of thinking incorporates other independent and well-articulated systems such as magic and myth. Levi-Strauss suggests magical thought expresses unconscious apprehension of the notion of determinism and like science reveals a theory of causation (22, pp. 291-293). The primary distinction between magic and science is that magical thought is more deterministic than science. Magic advocates all-embracing determinism, but science admits only certain restricted forms of determinism. However, magic and science are direct products of the same mental activity, they differ not in kind but in the type of phenomenon to which they are applied. The two systems do not lend themselves to the evolutionary process of development, but are independent systems of thought. The primitive is not inspired by the spirit of the civilized. This explains the thousands of years of stagnation that occurred between the neolithic revolution and modern science. Levi-Strauss suggests:

This paradox lends itself only to one solution: that these are two distinct modes of scientific thinking, one and the other is a function, not of different stages of the development of the human mind, but of two strategic levels ... one approximately adjusted to that of perception of imagination and the other at a remove from it (22, p. 24).

Levi-Strauss suggests myth is far from an intellectual activity that provides an escape from reality. Myth is a
coherent system with value of its own. Myth preserves the remains of ways of observation and reflection concerning the natural and cultural environment. Myth attempts to build up structural sets only to be shattered again as new structural sets are built from the fragments. Levi-Strauss draws an analogy between myth and the function of "bricoleur." The term "bricoleur," which can be translated as "handyman," refers to someone who performs diverse tasks. The handyman masters a type of knowledge that is not specific enough to deal with all the requirements of an activity, but is able to handle a broad range of tasks. Myth is a type of intellectual "bricolage." The handyman uses whatever is at hand and tools are not specifically designed to execute a given task, but are defined in terms of potential use. In performing a task, the handyman relies on means of heterogeneous repertoire. The handyman, whose constitutive units are preconstructed, rarely relates each task to the availability of new material. Myth seeks to find order among the diversity of events and experiences. Mythical thought is inspired by the belief that everything is meaningful and nothing can escape intellectual speculations that are suggestive enough to serve as bases for further reordering and elaboration. The elements of myth are preconstructed, for myth uses language that already sets limits on what can be formulated. The handyman does not have or need the equipment and knowledge of all trades and professions. The handyman's knowledge relates to immediate practical purposes. The handyman, unlike the engineer, does
not work by means of concepts that are transparent to reality, but by means of signs directed toward something in the real world. Concepts can be distinguished from signs in that concepts imply a certain degree of remoteness from reality, whereas signs often address something (22, pp. 28-30). The elements of myth occupy an intermediary position between concepts (signifier) and images (signifying). Myth is not identical to concept, for this necessitates that projects of mythical thought be put in brackets, to use Husserl's term. Myth cannot be viewed as an image that is a fixed percept. Myth, instead, is a sign whose elements incorporate certain amounts of human culture into reality and whose structure allows for further rearrangement and reordering of its different elements.

Levi-Strauss does not employ the term "primitive" without qualification. The thinking of the primitive is not a stage of historical development, but a distinct system. As such, the system is as valid as that of the civilized and what is primeval is not inferior. The frequent reference to the primitive system is based on an error of judgment that views the primitive as inspired merely by immediate needs and incapable of abstract thought. Levi-Strauss maintains that the type of environment the mind faces differs, but the human mind is everywhere the same. The expression "la pensée sauvage" can be translated as "primitive thinking" or "untamed state of thinking." The translation "the savage mind," although a valid expression of
an informed reader of Levi-Strauss, can give the impression that the primitive mind is somewhat different, opposed, or inferior to that of the civilized. The word "sauvage" has a wider use in French than in English, i.e., the use of "sauvage" as "wild" such as "l'animal sauvage" (the wild animal). The expression "the savage mind" may violate the implication of "la pensee sauvage," for Levi-Strauss regards the human mind as a process and not an entity. The thinking of the primitive operates in an environment less restricted by technical rules, and thus, reveals properties of the human mind in its untamed state.

The properties governing the primitive and the civilized are the same, i.e., the insistence on differentiation and classification. Man is like a player. As such, he takes a place in a group, shuffles, and draws cards that he did not create, for they are the datum of history and civilization. The players take turns and each accepts the cards given to him. The player, like society, plays the game and makes his moves on the basis of a number of systems. The player plays the game in his own way, although the rules (society's norms and values) set the limits of the game. The primitive and the civilized play a similar game, but each plays the game on the basis of his particular system, i.e., totemism, religion, magic, or politics.
Lacan

Lacan's works presented in this study are *Écrits* (*Ecrits*) and *Les Quatres Concepts Fondamentaux de la Psychanalyse* (*The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*).

*Écrits* is Lacan's major work; it contains much of Lacan's writing on child development and the unconscious. *Écrits*, without doubt, contains many obscurities that Lacan regards as a characteristic of psychoanalysis. However, the line of argument is consistent throughout the work, particularly his theory of the unconscious and the role of psychoanalysis as a science of subjectivity. *The Language of the Self* is in part a reproduction of some material of *Écrits*. The part on "The Empty Word and the Full Word" and Symbol and Language" in *The Language of the Self* is the same material as the part "Empty Speech and Full Speech in Psychoanalytic Realization of the Subject" in *Écrits* (the English Edition), although the translation is not the same. The other part of *The Language of the Self* is an attempt by the translator to develop some of the basic tenets of Lacan's psychoanalysis.

*Les Quatres Concepts Fondamentaux de la Psychanalyse* is a further elaboration on Lacan's theory of desire, the Other, the unconscious, and language. This work in particular is less ambiguous and clarifies some of the ambiguity in *Écrits*.

The works of Lacan are not presented in a chronological order, but as was mentioned on the basis of issues: the unconscious as a structure, the three orders, the mirror
stage, and the place of language in the analytical discourse.

The Unconscious as a Structure

Lacan places the unconscious at the center of Freud's model of psychical apparatus. Freud advances a number of propositions about the unconscious. The first project provides only a sketchy description of the unconscious. The second project centers around the preconscious-conscious system, the preconscious being similar to the unconscious in the descriptive sense, but different from it in that preconscious is accessible to consciousness. The third project outlined in The Interpretation of Dreams presents an elaborate theory of the unconscious. In it, Freud introduces his triad "id-ego-superego" and suggests the unconscious refers to the id but that portions of the unconscious also exist in the ego and the superego. To Lacan, the unconscious, which is an independent system in Freud's third project, presents an important conceptual tool for further elaboration on Freud's psychoanalysis.

Lacan makes many attempts to define the unconscious. The unconscious is the elusive, the Otherness, and the pre-ontological. The unconscious is timeless, knows no negation, no doubt, and no degree of certainty. The unconscious is neither being nor non-being, but the unrealized. The status of the unconscious is not ontic, but ethical. The unconscious manifests itself as something that holds itself in suspense in the area of the unborn (99, pp. 33-36). This rather ambiguous description, however, is made comprehensible in what follows.
Lacan suggests, "The unconscious is that part of the concrete discourse, in its capacity as transindividual, which is not at the disposal of the subject in establishing the continuity of his conscious desires" (19, p. 258). The unconscious is "that chapter of my history that is marked by a blank or occupied by a lie, it is the censored chapter." (19, p. 259).

Lacan uses Plato’s allegory of the cave to describe the site of the unconscious. The locality is the entrance of the cave in which Plato is supposed to guide people toward the exit. The people at the entrance imagine that they somehow have a glimpse on a psychologist going inside (this is probably a reference to the illusion that the psychoanalyst knows everything). The entrance to the cave, however, is a complicated process, for one never reaches it until the very moment that they are about to close. This locality does not attract a lot of tourists (few would attempt to grasp the reality of the unconscious). The only way to open the gates is to call out from the inside. That is, the time necessary to reach the unconscious is always the closing time and the access to the unconscious requires being inside already. Lacan employs this analogy to demonstrate that the unconscious is accessible only to those who are able to go beyond the manifest content of discourse and recognize the unexhaustable capacity for displacement in discourse.

The unconscious can be rediscovered elsewhere, namely:

in monuments: this is my body, that is, the hysterical core of the neurosis where hysterical symptoms reveal the structure of language.
in the documents of archive: the souvenirs of my childhood which are as impenetrable as the document when I do not know their provenance.

in the semantic revolution: this is the stock and the acceptance of my particular vocabulary and also the style of my life.

in traditions and in the legends which, through a heroicized form, store my history.

in the traces which are conserved by the distortions necessitated by the connection of the adulterated chapter with the other chapters which surround it (19, p. 259).

Lacan places emphasis on the fact that the unconscious is accessible only through linguistically mediated forms. Language, without invoking Saussure's distinction between language and speech, is the sole medium of both the patient who speaks about his dreams and fantasies and the analyst who carefully examines and "punctuates" the patient's discourse. The unconscious reveals itself in many forms such as dreams and symptoms, but these appropriate forms can only be delivered and resolved through the medium of language. Lacan makes reference to a variety of techniques of analysis that can be extracted from close examination of Freud's texts such as impediment, failure, split, and discontinuity that go along with the patient's discourse. Freud seeks the unconscious when something stumbles in a spoken or written discourse (19, p. 27). The road to the unconscious is not paved, but as Freud puts it, the analyst must move forward for somewhere the unconscious reveals itself. To Lacan, the unconscious is like a bladder that can be lightened through a little light inside it and it takes some time for the light to come on.

Lacan's most revealing insight on the unconscious is the notion that the unconscious does not only exist, but it has a
structure. The unconscious is governed by the same rules that govern language. Lacan maintains that "the unconscious is structured like a language" (19, p. 23). This suggests the unconscious, although not identical to language, should be read like a language. The tools and rules used in the analysis of language must be applied to decipher the unconscious. Lacan places such revelation in the context of re-thinking Freud's texts. Freud reminds us that the dream has a structure of a sentence or a structure of a rebus. That is, dream has a structure of a form of writing (17, p. 267). The analyst delineates provocation, masked avowal, or diversion only in a context of analytic discourse. The elements of dream are reduced to a form of dialogue realized in the analysis. This is apparent in the treatment of symptoms, neurotic and others. The symptom is structured like a language, for it is delivered through language and resolves itself in the analytic discourse. Lacan regards the unconscious and spoken language as inter-related, but tends to give priority to speech over the unconscious. Lacan suggests the unconscious is formed by the effect of speech on the subject and this explains why the unconscious is structured like language (19, p. 137). Linguistic priority over the unconscious seems to be consistent with Lacan's theory that emphasizes the function of the symbolic order in the formation of the unconscious.

The element that received little attention in secondary sources is Lacan's assertion that the reality of the unconscious
is sexual (19, p. 137). The attempt to interpret such as assertion is not without difficulty. Lacan makes only fragmentary references to the relation between the unconscious and sexuality. Yet, an examination of Lacan's theory would provide some insights on the unconscious and sexuality. The subject is not motivated solely by his instincts. Indeed, the notion that the unconscious is merely the seat of instincts must be "rethought" (17, p. 267). Lacan admits knowledge of sex as such is not adequate and sex by itself does not solve anything. Lacan makes use of Levi-Strauss' elementary structure of kinship to explain the nature of sexuality. The most fundamental form of exchange (exchange of women) takes place not at the level of natural generation or biological lineal descent, but at the level of matrimonial alliance. This form of exchange occurs at the level of the signifier. The primitive's mode of thinking is based on such oppositions as ALLEKING and ALLEKANG (male and female), water and fire, and hot and cold, all of which are motivated by the sexual division in society. Lacan argues that one can venture to suggest primitive science is a kind of sexual technique (19, p. 139). The sexual division in society insures the survival of human species, but the question remains as to whether it is not in this way that the signifier came into the human world (19, p. 138).
The Three Orders

Lacan delineates three essential orders that are the bases for one's identity as a subject: the imaginary, the symbolic, and the real. This categorization is outlines for the purpose of simplification. The three orders are inter-related and the symbolic, the dominant order, represents and structures the others (20, p. 161).

The imaginary.--This order is a basic psychical process. The imaginary is the world, the stable collection of things, forces, faculties, the perceptions of the ego, and the succession of images, real or perceived. Lacan does not define the imaginary, but there is little doubt that the imaginary refers to the "imago" that develops during the mirror stage. The term "imaginary" is used because the ego relates to images, whereas the symbolic relates to the signifier. That is, the ego imagines while the subject signifies.

The imaginary is centered around the ego that refuses to insert itself in human subjectivity. The imaginary keeps symptoms in place, resists treatment, and leads to paranoid identification. The subject can come to terms with ambivalent reality in a higher order that provides a source of validation: the symbolic order. The study of the unconscious presupposes a thorough knowledge of the subject, his emotional development, sexuality and wishes, intellectual capacities, family relationships, and childhood experience. Lacan makes reference to a phase in human development that was never previously
distinguished in psychoanalysis. The phase is the mirror stage that Lacan regards as the source of all later identification.

The completeness and physical unity between child and mother occur in the womb of the mother. This unity, however, is soon ruined at birth. The child, separated from his mother, begins from the tenth day to acquire special interest in the human face. The child is irresistibly attracted to the fascination of the human face. The child during the first months of life extends this particular interest to the human form in general (17, p. 112). The child, having lost this unity, holds only fragmented body images about himself (such images are found in dreams of the psychotic). As such, he has a diffuse-fragmented appreciation of his reality and does not experience himself as a whole. This lasts until the age of six months when the child enters the phase of the mirror stage.

This phase occurs between the age of six to eighteen months when the child who still holds little control over his bodily activities and is outdone by the chimpanzee in instrumental intelligence sees his reflection in a mirror and is able to imagine himself as a coherent and self-governing entity. Lacan suggests:

What demonstrates the phenomenon of recognition (the recognition of his image), involving subjectivity, are the signs of triumphant jubilation, and the playful realization which characterizes, from six months on, the child's encounter with his image in the mirror.
The mirror stage manifests the affective dynamism by which the subject initially identifies himself with the visual Gestalt of his own body; it is in relation to the still profound incoordination of his own mobility that it represents an ideal unity, a salutary ego (17, pp. 112-113).

This stage is a crucial moment of self identification. The stage is a necessary condition for maturation and a source of all identification. This moment is significant not because it is a stage of transition from childhood to adulthood, but because it reflects a particular tendency of the individual: the tendency to look for and promote throughout life, an imaginary Gestalt of an ideal ego. The Mirror stage provides a sense of identification and a reference in dealing with one's environment. The child, having mastered this Gestalt image, produces a series of gestures in which he tries "to prove the relation of the movements assumed in the image to its reflected environment" (17, p. 93). The mirror stage is "a particular case of the function of the 'imago,' that attempts to establish a relation between the organism and its reality" (17, p. 96). This image of the human form dominates the whole dialectical process of the child's behavior with his playmates (17, p. 113).

Gestalt and the ego, as products of successive imaginary identification, are the very sources of alienation of the individual from himself. The unity the child develops during the mirror stage is a false unity that attempts to overcome the inescapable reality of lack and incompleteness in human living. The child sees himself "out-there" and perceives himself not as a reflection of himself, but as a reflection of that reflection in the mirror (17, p. 97). The mirror stage manufactures a
succession of phantasies that lead to an alienated identity. Lacan questions the relevance of "ego-psychology" that seeks to develop and stabilize that ghostly entity: the ego. This psychology further alienates the individual who is already alienated. The ego that ego-psychology regards as an entity that bears frustration is frustration in its essence and more elaborations on such ego lead to more profound alienation (17, p. 250).

The child may overcome this alienation. The inability to overcome such alienation manifests itself in the type of symptoms found in psychoses. The release from such alienating image occurs when the child appropriates the language of the Other and enters the symbolic order not as an ego, but as a subject.

The symbolic.—The child, to take his place as a subject, must free himself from this alienating ego and insert himself in the symbolic order. The symbolic order is the order that shapes and determines the subject. This order plays a crucial role in structuring normal development of the individual. The symbolic order incorporates a complex set of elements. The order is the law of the absence, that which mediates reality, what is not there, and a chain of signifiers. The child in early period of life maintains close physical proximity with the mother, but there are moments when the mother is not there. This absence in part introduces the child to the symbolic order (this is probably what Lacan calls the law of the
absence). The other parts of the description are analyzed in the context of Lacan's interpretation of the relation between the signifier and the signified.

The child takes part in the symbolic order through what Lacan calls the Other that is the father who is symbolic. The mother or any other figure can play the role of the Other, but the father is singled out because his person has been historically identified with the figure of the law (17, p. 278). The symbolic father represents a number of factors that make up the subject, the life of the group, the community, the cultural milieu, and law or language (17, p. 272). The subject is the effect of language. Man uses language, but it is the language that makes him a subject. The different forms of human living are primarily systems of language, i.e., the symbolic commerce that bonds the community and the matrimonial alliance governing the exchange of women and gifts. This is apparent in the code of justice, no one can claim ignorance of law that has been the law of language.

The child learns and acquires the law from the Other and learns what determines his identity as a subject and his sexuality as a man or a woman. Lacan suggests the child learns from scratch what he has to do as a man or as a woman through the Other. Lacan provides only fragmentary elaboration on the sexuality of the human subject. Yet, one can postulate that sexuality probably represents the other (missing) half of the subject, one can also see how this relates to the
physical separateness of the child from the mother at the time of birth. Lacan suggests the analytic experience shows what the subject seeks in what is called love is not sexual complement as such, but the other part that is lost forever (the child's separateness from his mother at birth) and that is made apparent by the fact the subject is (a sexed being). There is nothing in the psyche through which the subject locates himself and acts as a male or a female, what one has to do as a man or a woman is entirely placed in the field of the Other (19, p. 187).

Sexuality, the search for one's sexual other half, awakens desire in the subject. Lacan argues that Freud's term "Wunsch" refers not to wish (vœw) as translated, but to desire (desir). The term "wish" centers around the individual, i.e., my own wish, whereas the term "desire" is not limited to the individual. As such, desire is satisfied through the Other. Indeed, Lacan asserts that the desire of the subject is the desire of the Other. Lacan argues that the implication of this translation is so great that many assumptions of psychoanalysis must be "re-thought." Sheridan attempts to describe Lacan's use of the term "desire" and suggests what constitutes desire is the gap between need (besoin) that can be satisfied by certain objects and demand (demande) that presupposes the Other (18, p. vii). Muller and Richardson suggests, "The fundamental driving force of the subject is not his demand(s) but the desire that lies beneath (or within, behind, or beyond) this demand(s)" (15, p. 279). This is made complicated when
another term "drive" that is psychical is added, and distinguished from "instinct" that is biological. However, Lacan attempts to submit the term "desire" to the exigencies of the symbolic order.

Lacan asserts that man's desire is the desire of the Other. Lacan, however, is reluctant to provide a single description of the Other. The Other is the symbolic father, the other (small 'o'), the phallus, the need of recognition, the language, the unsatisfied desire, and simply the Other (capital 'O'). The Other probably is a combination of all these elements, but the question remains as to which element predominates in each stage of development of one's identity as a subject.

The child's desire probably is inspired by the initial incompleteness. This leads the child to claim something separate, but belongs to him: mother's breast that is necessary to complete himself. The child's desire also extends to what other (the mother) desires: the phallus. The child wishes to be the phallus in order to satisfy the mother's desire for this phallus. The child is not concerned with the fact that he may have what corresponds to this phallus (which he does), but with what satisfied the mother's desire: the phallus (which he does not have). Indeed, what is there is worth no more than what is not there as far as desire of other is concerned. Nonetheless, the desire of other is not whether the child learns that he has what corresponds to the phallus or the
phallus as such, but on the fact that the child recognizes that his mother does not have it. That is, the desire of the child is the desire of the mother (17, p. 264). The case of a female child is complicated. Yet, one can see how the act of the female homosexual corresponds to the desire of the father. This act is an attempt to defy the desire of the father (19, p. 38). This does not seem to apply to the male homosexual, for the mother is not a symbol of authority.

Lacan's ambiguous discourse does not specify the status of desire, but inserts such desire at different stages of development of one's identity. However, one can safely venture to suggest desire belongs to the realm of the imaginary. The formula that the child's desire is the desire of the mother suggests that one's desire is to be desired which, in turn, leads to the alienating trap of the imaginary. This desire, however, can be validated by the Other and becomes a perpetual effect of the symbolic order.

The subject's desire and the Other can be seen in a higher order: the use of language. The speech of the individual always presupposes the Other, to whom it is addressed. The speech is a demand that awaits a response. This response is a response to an appeal, a gift, and a representation of love, all of which are linked with the desire of the subject. Lacan situates love in the symbolic order. Indeed, "there are people who would never fall in love if they had never heard about it" (17, p. 264). Love is a part of language that seeks
recognition and finds location in the field of the Other. To Lacan, recognition presides over such elements as gifts and economic exchange, what the subject seeks in the Other is not love as such, but recognition. This is how one claims that love is situated in the field of the Other. Lacan suggests one learns nothing from the field of love as such. The so-called romantic love is certainly an imaginary realization of love (17, p. 264) and psychology of affection has failed because such endeavor omits the most constituent element of love: the Other (19, p. 176).

The Other is not only the symbolic father, language, and the need of recognition, but also a representation of the unsatisfied desire. Here, Lacan probably refers to the signifier of the desire of the Other: the phallus. This signifier degenerates into an endless chain of substitute signifiers, all of which displace the original desire. The desire to have unsatisfied desire (the representation of the phallus) is apparent in Freud's reference to the dream about salmon that displaces the original signifier: the phallus. This is also apparent in the desire of the hysteric who presents hysteric desire as unsatisfied desire. The hysteric, like the dreamer, does not recognize the position of the signifier that reflects the original desire of what the Other desires. The cure of the hysteric, like the analysis of dream, takes place when the hysteric is able to rearrange and reorder the chain of signifiers in relation to the original: the phallus.
The Other is a signifier. This can be analyzed in the context of Sussaure's formulation of sign, signifier, and signified. To Saussure, language is a system of signs. The sign is composed of signifier (the concept) and signified (sound-image), both of which are inseparable. Language is similar to a sheet of paper. The signifier is the front and the signified is the back, one cannot cut one part without at the same time cutting the other. Lacan went beyond Saussure and proposed the following formula: \( \frac{S}{\bar{s}} \) (signifier over signified). Here, two elements are emphasized: the supremacy of the signifier (capital letter) over the signified (small letter), and the fact that the place of the signified beneath the bar indicates that the signified is difficult to delimit and tends to hide underneath the signifier. The signifier (capital letter) is made visible because it reflects that part of language that is accessible to the analyst and serves as a bridge toward the signified. This signified, on the other hand, is not always apparent. Indeed, the signifier and the signified are separated by a barrier that resists signification. The nature of the relation between the signifier and the signified is illustrated as follows: a "tree" is a concept (a signifier) and the image of a tree is the signified. This can be complicated when the signified is not merely an image. The terms "ladies" and "gentlemen" on the twin doors of a bathroom are signifiers that signify the imperative that the civilized shares with the primitive, namely to subject his public life to law or urinary segregation (17, p. 500).
Lacan refers to the Other as the signifier. The Other is the locus in which a chain of signifiers is situated. This chain of signifiers is the field in which human being must appear as a subject. The signifier can be viewed as that which represents the subject. The signifier does not represent the subject for another subject, but for another signifier. This reflects the nature of intersubjectivity in communication. The way a signifier relates to another signifier is illustrated hypothetically in the example of a system of hieroglyphic writing where each element (signifier) is not addressed to the reader as such, but each element (signifier) is related to another (signifier). This relation is comparable to that between the subject (signifier) and the field of the Other (another signifier).

The Other is the locus in which the chain of signifiers is situated. The individual takes his place as a subject through a system of language that is a chain of signifiers. This signifying chain resembles rings of a necklace that is a ring in another necklace made of rings. That is, each element of the chain is without meaning in itself, but acquires value through its mutual relation with other elements of the chain. To Lacan, these signifiers are the determining factors of the subject. The signifier governs and constitutes the human subject. The nature of relations within the chain of signifiers is the most reliable guide to the structure of the human subject.
Lacan regards the domain of the signifier as an indispensable source for the analysis of the psychical structure of the subject. The act of the subject, his destiny, symptoms, and character are revealed through the way in which signifiers are ordered.

The Other pertains to the symbolic order that permits the individual to insert himself in human subjectivity and take his place in the community of language as a subject. The symbolic is the dominant order of the triad: imaginary, symbolic, and real. The symbolic, however, is not a stable and a firmly established process that insures the development of one's own identity. The subject, unlike the ego, is a subject-in-process. The subject is a set of tensions, conflicts, upheavals, and strains that structure and continue to structure the subject. The subject is not a stable entity, but a future-directed process who is mobile and without a centre. The symbolic is related to the imaginary and the real (the third order).

The real—This is the most undeveloped element of Lacan's theory. Lacan recognizes the obscurities associated with the real, obscurities that are a characteristic of psychoanalysis. Lacan provides only meager descriptions of the real. The real is what is neither symbolic nor imaginary. The real is that which always comes back to the same place, that which is never grasped, and that which is the impossible (19, p. 152). The ambiguity of such descriptions is difficult to overcome, particularly when one considers the real as the least important
of the triad. Hence, what follows is merely an attempt to situate the real in the context of Lacan's theory. The real probably is a collection of many properties, and most importantly, a property that is lacking in the symbolic order. That is, such property lacks a source of validation: the Other. This is probably what leads Lacan to suggest that only the paranoid knows he is real and that "gods belong to the field of the real" (19, p. 45). The real is that which comes back to the same place, but to which same place it is not clear. The real is the impossible, but Lacan makes only a hasty argument on the notion of the impossible. Lacan says the impossible is not necessary the opposite of the possible, and the opposite of the possible is the real. That is, the real is the impossible. Lacan makes hints to the fact that the real, in its raw state, includes biological needs and pleasure that presuppose the others. Thus, one can venture to suggest that the real is probably a type of "regression" to the imaginary. This is so because Lacan suggests the real coexists and intersects in the subject, and that the symbolic represents and structures the real and the imaginary. The real is not accessible to the analyst and can never be grasped.

The Place of Language in the Analytical Discourse

Psychoanalysis has at its disposal a single medium: the patient's speech. This speech represents the subject's whole
experience: its instruments, its context, its material, and even its uncertainties. The speech, even when subject to manipulation such as denial of evidence or attempt to deceive, represents the only source of communication in the analytic discourse. Lacan suggests that Goethe's assertion that "in the beginning was the act" should be reversed and "it was in fact the verb which was at the beginning" (17, p. 271). The term "verbe" was translated in English edition as "the Word," which is an acceptable translation, but the term "verbe" (verb), unlike "Word," relates explicitly to the action of the individual. That is, the verb as a language is prior to the action of the subject. Language "exists prior to the moment that the subject ... makes entry to the domain of language" (17, p. 495).

Linguistics occupies a key position in psychoanalytic theory. The different discoveries like the laws governing relations between signifiers serve as a main guide in the analytic discourse. Lacan regards the fact that Freud had no appreciation of laws of linguistics as a matter of historical chance. Freud's theory was being formulated at the time linguistic principles were being laid by Saussure, and thus, Freud was unable to draw useful inference from linguistics, although he made reference to early theories of language.

Lacan suggests, "There is no speech without a response even if it is met only with silence, provided that it has an auditor" (17, p. 247). The speaker seeks mainly the reply of
the other(s). Hence, one must speak to be recognized by the
other(s) and language aims not to inform, but to evoke.

Lacan's revealing insights on human speech are drawn from
clinical practice: the dialogue that takes place between the
analyst and the patient. The patient's symptoms are revealed
through language, and by the same token, cure occurs through
language. The analysis of speech occupies a central position
in any analytic discourse. Lacan suggests the object that
provides the initial link between the analyst and the patient
is the imaginary. The patient initially does not speak about
himself as such. Instead, he speaks about something else and
addresses his ego to that of the analyst. This link between
the ego of the patient and that of the analyst is pathological
and difficult if not impossible to eliminate. The analyst can
use this link to reach beyond the patient's speech, one has
ears in order to hear and extract what is to be heard, Lacan
suggests. Lacan's method is that of no intervention. The
patient's freedom is not dependent on the analyst's intervention,
for it is up to the patient to show what he is made of. The
relation between the patient and the analyst is analogous to
the process of exchange of coins that people pass from hand
to hand in silence. The analyst's abstention and his refusal
to reply must be viewed as an element of reality in analytic
discourse.

Lacan maintains that the patient's frustration in the
analytic discourse does not come from the silence of the analyst
but from a reply or an approving reply to the patient empty speech. The analyst's reply reinforces the patient's ego and further alienates the patient from himself. The danger involved is that the patient captures, through the analyst's imaginary objectification, new status as a substitute of one alienation for another. The analyst, without being disinterested, must refrain from an intervention that would provide the patient with a false imaginary identity.

Lacan advocates short sessions. The analyst must adjourn the session as soon as he realizes that the patient is unwilling to go forward and talk about himself. This prevents the development and the strengthening of the patient's ego. Lacan, however, refuses to adhere to clock time, for the analyst cannot determine when the patient is finally going to consume and exhaust all that relate to the imaginary identification. The art of analysis is not rigid and the analyst must accommodate every unique situation in the analytic discourse.

The role of the analyst is to help the patient pass from that empty speech where the patient talks about something else to full speech where the patient talk about himself. The analyst intervenes to help the patient situate himself in the symbolic order. The nature of the analyst's intervention is not well articulated. However, one can suggest that the analyst attempts to help the patient reorder and rearrange the chain of signifiers that makes up the subject.
Barthes

The works of Barthes presented in this study are: *Le Degré Zéro de l'Écriture* (Writing Degree Zero), *Éléments de Semiologie* (Elements of Semiology), *Mythologies* (mythologies), and *Essais Critiques* (Critical Essays).

*Le Degré Zéro de l'Écriture* (pp. 104-111) is an attempt to trace the historical development of bourgeois literature and underlie the limitations of the so-called neutral or "degree zero" writing of modern literature. The influence of Marx is apparent in this work, but Barthes maintains distance from orthodox Marxism that he regards as a reflection of petit-bourgeois thinking.

*Éléments de Semiologie* (pp. 111-115) is an examination of the possible use of some linguistic principles in literary criticism, particularly in the study of such systems as food and clothing.

*Mythologies* (pp. 115-120) is Barthes’ most comprehensive work. The work is a critical reflection on myths of everyday life in complex society. The work demystifies the cultural objects taken for granted and makes the reader less captive of his cultural assumptions.

*Essais Critiques* (pp. 120-127) is a critical analysis of modern literature, particularly modern theater. The work is Marxist in tone, although Barthes advocates a new understanding of Marx's thought. This work, like others, is often regarded as a form of new criticism.
The Disintegration of Bourgeois Literature

Barthes suggests literature and history are closely related. The basic value of a text such as poem, novel, and art in general is dependent on the historical situation that gives rise to such text. Literature is adequately understood when analyzed in the context of history. The history of literature is not that of meaningless chronicles of names and dates (positivistic history), but that which delineates the connection between literature and the exercise of power through time. Literature is a class literature. As such, there is no one type of literature, but a plurality of literatures: bourgeois, petit-bourgeois, and working-class literature.

The classical text remains a language of the privileged elite. The text circulates among individuals who share similar class interest. The text is a form of oral language conceived for a consumption dictated by the contingencies of social stratification. The term "écriture" probably has no equivalent in English. The term was translated in English edition as "writing" and "mode of writing," which are literally correct although "mode of writing" reflects better the meaning of "écriture." The term "écriture" is translated as "scripture" or more preferable "literary text," provided that "literary text" incorporates the value of personal history and social commitment. The term "text" (abbreviation of "literary text") is used to refer to "écriture."
The classical text is an instrument text whose form relates to a particular content. This text is a form of rhetoric ordered in such a way as to persuade. The text is a form of pragmatic bourgeois activity that does not disturb order. Indeed, this text represses activities that question order, for order always indicates repression (6, p. 26). The classical text looks upon its value as universal. The postulation is made that pure man existed and could acquire a sense of well-being in a society whose ideology is the only one that is valid and universal. The classical text is a form of realism (objects exist independently from the mind). This realism is far from being neutral, for such realism is made of "the most spectacular signs of fabrication" (6, p. 89). Thus, realism is a form of retarded or reactionary form of consciousness.

These descriptions of the classical text are well seen when one analyzes the history of French literature that did not surpass the problematics of language and was not aware of the element of text until about 1650 (6, p. 49). The classical period begins at the middle of the seventeenth century. The early founders of such literature were closely associated with the people in power. Thus, classical literature was from the beginning a class literature (6, p. 26). The classical writer elaborates a closed language separated from society by a body of literary myth. This writer "refined all grammatical practices forged by the spontaneous subjectivity of the ordinary man and followed merely the task of definition" (6, p. 51). This work is an expression of the privileged elite;
such expression remains uniform until the middle of the nineteenth century. The periods of short interruptions such as the Revolution of 1848 did not alter the norms of the classical text, particularly the feature of instrumentality. The Revolution strengthened the social and political power of the elite, although not the intellectual power.

The classical period is characterized by the emergence of one type of text that is linked to the political society. The varying rhythms of classical literature are not texts, but styles through which "man completely turns his back and confronts the objective world without going through any form of history of social life" (5, p. 46). This literature, with its different styles, starts to disintegrate around the middle of the nineteenth century. This disintegration relates to a general crisis in human history. The mid-nineteenth century witnesses population growth, the development of heavy industry, modern capitalism, and the division of French society into hostile classes, putting an end to the validity of the alleged universal character of the classical text.

This disintegration gives rise to a plurality of texts such as the populist, the colloquial, and the neutral, all of which question the classical text. Thus, the classical text appears as one type of text among many possible others and ceases to be universal. The proliferation of texts did not alter the position of the classical text that now is identified as the modern text. This text still retains the basic feature of instrumentality and occupies a high position in
contemporary capitalist society, although such text faces the problem of self-justification.

Barthes delineates basic features of modern text: the use of "preterite" (passé simple), and the third person "he" in narration in general, both of which reflect a certain mythology of typifying bourgeois society. The preterite is defined as "a verb tense that indicates action in the past without reference to duration, continuance, and repetition" (28, p. 240). This preterite is not merely a verb tense, but a ritual what constitutes the cornerstone of narration such as novel or history. The use of preterite makes the narration appear as a sequence of events each of which is related to another. This narration reduces reality to "a slim and pure verb" (6, p. 30), and such reality is "without density, volume, spread, and whose only function is to unite as rapidly as possible a cause and an end." Barthes suggests:

Its role [the role of preterite] is to bring reality to a point and abstract, from the multiplicity of the lived experience, a verb act detached from the existential roots of experience and directed towards a logical link with other acts ... it seeks to maintain a hierarchy in a vast realm of facts (6, p. 30).

The narration of modern text seeks to construct a world ordered and self-sufficient. The reality of such construction is "neither mysterious nor absurd," but "clear, almost familiar, and gathered up at every moment by its creator" (6, p. 31). The preterite is a closed and well-defined substantial act that operates as "the algebraic sign" of an intention through which society indicates possession of the
past. The third person, like the preterite, is a typical novelistic convention. The "he" plays a role of an actor in the novel, i.e., the use of "he" in the novels of Agatha Christie. The reader of the "I" looks for "he" in every incident of the story. The "he" provides the reader with a sense of security that is an illusion and a source of alienation. The third person is "the most obsessive sign of this tragic aspect of the text born in the last century when, under the weight of history, literature found itself separated from the society which consumes it" (6, p. 36).

The multiplicity of texts gives rise to colorless or neutral and zero degree text. This text seeks to achieve innocence and escapes the judgment and the secondary commitment present in other texts. The social and mythical aspects of language are excluded. The neutral text is apparent through a simile borrowed from linguistics that postulates the existence of two polar opposites, and another which occupies an intermediary position between the two sets of opposition. The neutral text occupies a third position between the subjunctive (verb forms that represent a denoted act or state not as fact but as contingent) and the imperative (grammatic mood that expresses the will to influence the behavior of another). The text takes the form of an indicative that denotes an act as objective fact. The neutral text seeks to transform language into a state of pure equal algebraic signs where mechanical habits are formed at the very place where freedom existed.
This tendency leads to a gradual destruction of literature. The neutral text establishes a negative mode that lends itself to instrumentality. This text is not an instrument of the dominant ideology, but a silent text that seeks to coexist with other texts in capitalist society.

Barthes questions the authenticity of Marxist text that has become a language expressing value judgment, almost every word has a value attached to it. The basic aspect of such language is that "there is no delay between naming and judging, and the closed character of language is perfected" (6, p. 25). The statement "a crime is committed against the state" is neither a Marxian perspective of a fact nor a revolutionary rationale of an action, but a reality in a prejudged form. The revolutionary text is founded on moral justification, but no text can be revolutionary that lasts for an indefinite period of time. Marxism is presented as a language of knowledge. The contemporary Marxist advocates a type of bourgeois text that bourgeois writers disregard. This Marxist addresses the preoccupations of the petit-bourgeois who finds this artistic and realistic text a type of literature that contains all the intelligible signs of identity. The Marxist text excludes the working class from the text of literature.

Literature and history are interrelated. The writer does not select a type of text from a non-temporal package of literary form, but operates under the influence of history. Thus, no text emerges from a vacuum. The text is full of
recollections of previous usage and language is never innocent, for words incorporate second-order memory that tends to persist in the midst of new meanings. The writer cannot advocate a particular type of text without becoming a prisoner of someone else's words or even his own.

The writer must make a choice. This choice is not a matter of efficacy, but of conscience. The French term "conscience" is often translated as "consciousness." This does not reflect the content of "conscience" (conscience), for consciousness is an individual awareness, whereas conscience implies one's ability to identify his interests with others' (The Webster's dictionary cites conscience in part as "that part of the superego in psychoanalysis that transmits commands and admonitions to the ego"). Hence, political conscience is a condition when one is aware of the interests of the group to which he belongs. The writer cannot escape the ethical and political responsibility of the text. The writer must neither be neutral nor an instrument of the triumphant ideology, but a writer who is socially committed.

The dualism of language and speech takes a particular dimension when applied in literature. Barthes reformulates such dualism and proposes a triad of language, style, and text. Language is a collective product which pervades the writer's expression, although language does not endow such expression with form or content. Language is social and historical. Language is a collection of necessary conventions
developed through the participation of a collectivity of individuals. Style is a characteristic of an individual. The style's frame of reference is biological (located within the individual) and biographical, but not historical. Style is "the 'thing' of the writer, his glory, his prison, and his solitude" (6, p. 14). Style is indifferent to society and is located beyond literature and outside the domain that binds the writer to society. Language and style cannot function as signs of one's history or freedom. Language and style are empty signs whose movement alone is significant and are "blind force" that do not lend themselves to commitment.

The text, which is distinct from language and style, is neither historical or personal. The text occupies a middle position. This text is not an object, but a function and a morality of form through which the writer situates the nature of his language. The text permits the writer to identify himself as a committed individual. The text exists as an institution that incorporates one's past and social history, and allows for commitment. The text does not exist outside the realm of history and social institutions. Thus, there are different types of texts, each pertains to a regime and moment of history and each incorporates at once the reality and the appearance of power.

The Dialectical Process and Cultural Objects

Barthes proposes a number of analytic concepts that serve as a "priori" in the analysis of literature and cultural
phenomena. These concepts, drawn from linguistics, reveal the mechanisms of the signifying systems that confer particular relevance in modern civilization such as cinema, comic strips, advertising, press photography, fashion and food. The study of such systems necessitates constant reference to basic principles of the study of signs. Thus, Barthes makes use of such concepts as signifier, signified, system, syntagm, metaphor, and metonomy, and elaborates on Saussure's distinction between language and speech.

Language is a system of values and an institution that incorporates the physical, the psychological, the mental, the individual, and the social. Language is a set of conventions that makes communication possible. The individual cannot modify it, for language is a collective contract necessary for communication. Speech, however, is an individual act that is many-sided and heterogeneous. Speech is the executive part of language that accounts for the dynamic aspect of relation between the individual and the community. Language and speech are interrelated and dialectically united. Language is a collective mass of speech acts that make language evolve. This elaboration, so far, is a restatement of Saussure's theory. Barthes, however, makes reference to terms that reduce the ambiguity inherent in the distinction between language and speech.

Hjelmslev, a contemporary linguist, identifies basic segments of language: the schema, the norm, and the usage.
The schema is the pure form of language (Saussure's language) such as the letter 'r' as an element in a series of oppositions within a language. The norm, an intermediary concept, is the material form of language that is defined by some degree of social application but still independent from such realization; i.e., the letter 'r' in oral language without regard to the specific form of pronunciation. The usage is the prevailing habits of the application of language; i.e., the letter 'r' as pronounced in a community of language. The norm occupies an intermediary position between schema and usage. Hjelmslev's scheme can be reduced to the dichotomy: schema and usage. This introduces a new dimension: that speech is not merely a concrete speech, but a social one (usage). This new dichotomy replaces and removes the contradiction associated with Saussure's dichotomy. The introduction of the idiolect and the shifter add another dimension to the distinction between language and speech. The idiolect is language as spoken by a single individual at a given moment, and the shifter is a symbol that consists of double structure, the conventional and the existential (the personal pronoun I or Thou).

The extent to which Hjemslev's dichotomy reformulates Saussure's is questionable, but Barthes is able to show the relevance of such dichotomy in the analysis of such systems as food, fashion, furniture, and architecture.

The garment system articulates well the dichotomy of language versus speech or schema versus usage, although the
the garment is multi-dimensional system. The garment is language and consists of a set of pieces, parts, and details whose variation accounts for the change in meaning of clothing. The other part of the garment system is speech that is identified as the individual way of wearing. Language and speech are dialectically interrelated, although the garment as language precedes the way of wearing. The garment, however, is a multi-dimensional system. The garment system can be written about such as the type of descriptions printed in fashion magazines. The system as language is virtually without speech, for such language is an articulated and systematized set of signs that do not lend themselves to the individual use. The dialectical process is absent here. Language originates not from the speaking mass of individuals, but from a group that deliberately elaborates the code of such language, although clothes as verbal communication are speech in the garment system. The garment system can be photographed. Here, the code of language still issues from the group that makes decisions, but the garment is always worn by an individual who gives it a particular appearance that represents speech. The garment system can be worn. Here, language and speech are interrelated, although the garment is prior to clothing or speech (4, pp. 85-106).

The interdependence between language and speech is illustrated through reference to the food system that consists of rules of association and combination, rituals of use which
are rhetoric, and food taboos. The system as speech refers to personal variations of ways of preparation that are subject to a variety of habits (idiolect). The menu pertains to both plans: language and speech. The horizontal reading of the entrees (the order of food consumption) is language while the vertical reading of the menu (way of preparation) is speech. The food system, unlike the garment system, is similar to that of verbal language where speech is always present and language is not a product of a particular group, but of collective usage.

There are many prospects opened up by the distinction between language and speech. The method can be applied to other systems such as furniture, car, and even abstract systems such as press. The relative importance of such distinction relates to whether language is dominated by a particular group or whether such language is a product of participation of many groups that constitute society.

**Modern Mythology and Cultural Demystification**

The reality of everyday life is a myth, for such reality is neither arbitrary nor natural. This man-made reality is mystified to endow cultural phenomena with the appearance of natural ones. The notion of the natural is the source of alienation, for what is natural is ordained by some forces other than human. Alienation occurs when people are made to believe that their social arrangements and social institutions are created by forces of nature or God. This mystifies and
renders people indifferent to their social institutions. The ability of people to modify or transform their institution is taken away from them (26, p. 60). The aim of Barthes' literary work is to seize on the apparently neutral items such as trials, magazine pictures, child's toys, and traveler's tour guides and attempt to make apparent the hidden signification of such mythology. That is, the aim is to demystify the conspiratorial force of mystification.

The work of Barthes induces the reader to lose innocence towards what is taken for granted and become less captive of cultural assumptions. The following are some illustrations of Barthes' attempt to demystify some aspects of French daily life.

Barthes suggests the cinema of Chaplin tends to depict the worker as someone who is mystified and blind. The character of the worker is shaped by immediate needs and is always hungry. The worker is a kind of primitive worker who is below political awareness. This worker, blinded by his hunger, cannot achieve awareness of his condition or identify his interest with co-workers. A strike is a catastrophe that threatens the worker's needs and the worker's action is situated outside the revolution, although Chaplin's portrayal of the working man represents potential for change. Chaplin, by presenting the worker as blind, reveals the public blindness, for to see one who does not see is the best way to become aware of what he does not see (? , p. 40).
Barthes treats trials as a form of literature. The trial of Dominici (an old peasant from the Alps) represents a particular case when two mentalities (that of the old peasant and that of the judiciary) are enacted in a court system. These mentalities are identical. The language of each in impenetrable to the other, i.e., the language of school is not the same as that of concrete life. The Dominici trial is conducted on the basis of a universal psychology, a form of literature of the establishment. The material evidence is regarded as mental and the man is judged as a conscience, although he is defined as an object. This mental evidence is found in the mentality of the accuser. Dominici's and the judiciary's uses of language do not compete on an equal basis, for the judiciary's language has on its side honor, law, and force. Dominici is judged by an authority that wants to hear only the language it lends him. Here, justice and literature united against man. The individual is deprived of his language in the very name of language; such deprivation is a first step toward a legal murder (7, p. 46). (Dominici was convicted of murdering his wife and daughter whom he found camping near his land).

Barthes views the Blue Guide (a tourist guide) as a form of literature that promotes mountains and nature in general. This literature advocates a morality of effort and solitude. The country is reduced to an image of picturesque tunnels, Romanesque porches, lacunae, crucifixes, altra-curtains, spires,
sculpted groups, and churches. The human life of a country is excluded for the benefit of the moment that suppresses the reality of the people of the land and does not account for anything of the present.

Children's toys are another example of cultural mystification. Toys reflect a socialized and constituted mythology of adult life, i.e., post office and army. The child views himself as the owner and the user and not the creator. The child does not invent the world, but merely uses it without adventure or wonder. These toys are used quickly and the child develops little attachment to them. Toys are made of graceless and plastic material, and thus, are the product of chemistry and not of nature. The child misses the more pleasurable and the sweeter of the human tactile experiences.

Barthes' project of demystification covers a variety of other cultural objects such as the phenomenon of "Elle" (a French magazine) that creates a world without men, but constituted by the attention of men; the priest whose beard does not signify an identification with the poor, but an activity of a missionary; and drunkeness that is never seen as intention, but a consequence of an act of pleasure, all of which are not neutral objects but systems of signification.

Barthes regards everything that exists in a society as a myth, provided it is expressed through discourse. Myth is speech, language, system of communication, and most importantly system of signification. Myth is a tri-dimensional system
that consists of sign, signifier, and signified. Hence, a bunch of roses signifies one's passion, but one cannot confuse roses as signifier and roses as sign, for the signifier and the signified exist prior to the formation of sign. The roses cannot be dissociated from the message they carry on the level of experience, but one can analytically suggest that the signifier is empty whereas the sign is full of meanings.

Myth is not a neutral phenomenon. The signification of myth is revealed when treated as a system of signification. Thus, a picture of a black soldier giving French salute on the cover of Paris-Match is not a neutral object, but a sign. The picture signifies France as a great empire. The French, regardless of race, serve under one flag, and that a better answer to the supposed-opponents of such empire is expressed in the zeal this black exhibits towards the great nation of France (the picture appeared during the 1950's).

Myth is a depoliticized speech that does not question facts, but purifies them and gives them a sense of innocence. Myth simplifies the complexity of social life and structures a world without depth and contradiction. The picture of the black soldier presents a fact, but does not provide an explanation. This creates the impression that such fact is natural and means something by itself.

Myth is a depoliticized speech for the very reason that myth is something removed from the human act (Marx's theory of language and labor). Myth is not a "language-object"
that "speaks things," but "metalanguage" that speaks of things."
Thus a "tree" is something for wood-cutter (tree and wood-cutter
are united through labor) and something else for someone who
talks about it (the two are separated by labor). The "tree"
is not mythical in the first instance, but is a second-order
language without memory and historical quality in the second
instance. Myth is more a characteristic of capitalist society
than of any other society. This is why myth knows how to
proliferate in a society that is the privileged field of
mythical thought.

The left-wing myth (that of Marxist writers in France)
cannot develop beyond certain limits, for myth is an instrument
that empties reality. The notion of Marxian revolution abolishes
myth. Thus, almost everything one knows and does is a residue
of capitalist culture. The role of the literary critic is to
exhibit sensitivity towards modern mythology and adopt a method
of demystification as a technique of social and political
enlightenment.

Modern Literature and Nothingness

The essays of Barthes on modern literature can be classed
as "literary criticism" or "new criticism." This is so because
Barthes refuses to adhere to the customs and pieties of the
literary establishment and insists on taking literary work as
an object in the world, a text, and a human product. This
work is open to deciphering and reconstruction and not a
masterpiece of an author or a product of some literary heritage.
Literature is an activity. The writer does not create, but engages in an activity that is based on variation and combination. The writer has no ownership of language, but comes into a world full of language. Indeed, one can suggest there is no reality that is not classified. The writer is obliged to vary, for everything becomes a work only when it can vary. Thus, the writer cannot write without passionately taking positions in the social world. The joy and misery of human life provoke certain indignation, judgment, desire, and anxiety in the writer (5, p. xvii).

The writer cannot create a text as such, for the meaning of the text is not dependent on the work alone, but also on the social world. The text is a chain of meaning that remains unattached, although attachment can be realized. The writer produces, but does not reflect on the time and life and retrospection is viewed as bad faith. The process of writing goes in hand with silence. This process, however, has limitations, to write is to deny oneself the last word and offer others the same last word. The process of writing exhausts itself in a succession of operations. The writer actually never expresses, but either projects or terminates. The critical writer keeps writing and never has the last word (5, p. 9).

The focus of modern art is on the world of objects. The artist paints a landscape or a church interior where the human existence is absent and where one witnesses the expanses of
wood and plaster. The work hanging in museums reflects man's empire of things. This art is an art of meaningless surfaces and almost nothing else. Indeed, never has nothingness been so confident, Barthes suggests (5, p. 19). Man acquires a tendency to view cultural objects as signifiers only, and nothing else. This leads to alienation whereby the ability of people to question and transform their institution is taken away from them.

The phenomenon of nothingness is apparent in modern theater. This theater has been for many centuries an Aristotelian theater based on the notion that "the more the public is moved, the more it identifies with the hero; the more the scene imitates action, the more the actor incarnates his role; and the more magical the theater, the better the spectacle" (5, p. 51). The theater is viewed as the object of contract between the producer and the audience. The spectator pays and the other side presents a play that moves and impresses the spectacle. The play displays elaborate forms of costume. The costume is designed to blur the clarity between the theatrical scene and the corresponding social reality. The costume actually obscures and distorts "the external and material expression of conflicts to which society bears witness" (5, p. 53). This costume is without social value and becomes an end in itself. Modern literature, whether theater, painting, novel, or magazine, is an art of expression and not of explanation. The role of such literature is not intellectual, but one that reflects the superficial and plastic aspects of social
life. Barthes advocates a type of theater that is critical and political. The spectator is not the viewer who identifies with the hero, but one who critically evaluates the themes of the play. The theater is not only something to see, but something to read. The theater presents a message and tells a story. The scenery and costumes of the play must not be conceived as projections of details that absorb the spectator's full attention, but a medium that provides a total vision of social reality. The costumes must not overshadow the value of the play, a sick costuming is one which makes the servant appear more important than the master. The different element of costume such as taste, balance, felicity, and originality are not to be neglected, but the value of costume is undermined when these elements become an end in themselves. The audience can be distracted from the theater that become concerned merely with the plastic function of the theater. Hence, one no longer has a human theater (5, p. 56). The appropriate design of a costume is one which helps the viewer read the social value of the play. The costume can be taken as a basis for debate between the viewer and the play.

Barthes proposes a theater of consciousness that teaches the shortcomings of modern literature and helps restructure the norms inherent in such literature. The case of Brecht's play "Mother Courage" (5, p. 48) illustrates how one can reformulate the type of relation between motherhood and child's experience. The mother usually is viewed as a being of pure
instinct whose function is socialized in a particular direction: to raise and form the child. The mother not only gives birth to the child, but also to his mind. The relation between the mother and the child is unilateral and proceeds in one direction from the mother to the child. The mother is a teacher who shapes the child's consciousness of the moral world. This type of relation, however, is inverted in "Mother Courage." The mother, having given birth to the child, receives consciousness and once the child is dead, the mother continues him (he continues to live in her) as if the mother now is the new growth. Thus, the mother is transformed. The world progresses not only by the inevitable succession of generations, but also by the quality of experience. The mother becomes different and is not the traditional mother who does not understand, but the mother whose consciousness continues to flourish even though the child is dead. The relation between mother and child is not unilateral, for even love can be viewed as that force that brings facts into consciousness and action (5, p. 146).

Barthes views literature as a system of signification. The theater is not intended to express reality but to signify it. The theater is an arbitrary sign that consists of signifier (the theater) and signified (the content of that signification). The theater is a medium without value when viewed as a signifier without signification. This theater becomes art for the sake of art. Modern art dissolves and reduces the sign to a series
of details that do not relate to the content of signification. This practice diminishes the public's intellectual power to question and participate in the play. This art practices what Barthes calls the politics of the sign. There are as many languages as there are systems of signification, i.e., food, clothing, film, and literature that derive a signifying system per excellence: language. The process of signification must be at the center of literary criticism. The focus must not be directed to ideas and themes, but to the way society takes possession of them and presents them through systems of signification.

The critical writer must question and view his work as an object that is at once scrutinizing and scrutinized. This writer must make certain choices that involve some degree of morality and responsibility, for literature cannot only express reality, but must intervene in history as well. Barthes questions the relevance of the existing schools of literary criticism, namely the academic and the "avant-garde" schools. The academic and positivist school makes rigorous attempt to establish biographical and literary facts. The usefulness and the value of historical accuracy of the type of knowledge such as school provides cannot be denied. The academic school, however, operates without being aware of ideological and historical position relative to social structure and the distribution of power in society. This school claims to derive data and facts from an objective method and such data are not ideological
in character. This line of argument is an ideology, for not having an ideology is an ideology. The illusion that knowledge is objective and universal relates to the fact that knowledge closely depends on a social class of a society at a moment in history. The academic school limits the analysis to the different circumstances of a given literary work and fails to examine literature as such. This type of analysis studies the work in relation to outside factors such as the life of the writer and does not examine how the different elements are interdependent in a literary work. The academic school advocates a model of human personality and maintains that psychological elements and the life of the writer are related. The content of literary work reflects the life of its writer. This model, however, is of secondary importance. The relation between literary work and the writer is ambiguous and complex. Indeed, facts of psychoanalysis refute the model, for many factors such as desire and frustration provide contrary representation of writer's life. The academic school has to justify and not just impose this method of analysis (5, pp. 249-260).

Barthes questions literary criticism of the "avant-garde" and suggests that such criticism is a kind of vaccine designed to insert some subjectivity into the overwhelming character of bourgeois literature. This literary criticism is preoccupied with the manifestation of a political society and never addresses social structure. The "avant-garde" literary criticism remains a product of petit-bourgeois culture and does not address the concerns of the working class. The capitalist elite is able
to appropriate the language of the "avant-garde" into a particular purpose (5, pp. 80-83)

Althusser

The works of Althusser presented are: *Pour Marx* (*For Marx*) and *Lire le Capital*, Vols. I and II (*Reading Capital*).

*Pour Marx* (pp. 127-135) is an attempt to open new frontiers of the theory of dialectic. Althusser attempts to deliver Marxism from causalist scientism and mechanistic conceptions of base and structure. Althusser maintains that the base and structure act reciprocally upon one another and reflection that links culture to material conditions is neither simple nor univocal, but contains all the richness of overdetermination.

*Lire le Capital* (pp. 135-140) is a structural reading of Marx's *Capital*. Althusser suggests that Marx's epistemology in *Capital* is a critique of the very object of Classical political economy and that such critique constitutes a new object of Marx's philosophy of history.

**Economy versus Ideology and Overdetermination**

The work of Althusser represents an interpretation that suggests Marxism is not contained in Marx's early work (young Marx), but that the scientific basis of Marxism is in Marx's later work (mature Marx). The work seeks to demonstrate the epistemological break between Marx's early humanistic writings influenced by Feuerbachian philosophy and later scientific works that reject humanism and historicism. Althusser identifies
four stages in Marx's intellectual development: the early works (1840-1844), the works of the break (1845), the transitional works (1845-1857), and the mature works (1857-1883) that constitutes the basis of Marx's scientific work (3, p. 27). The period between 1840 and 1845 is dominated by rational liberalism i.e., Kant and Fichte, and Feuerbachian humanism. Here, Marx is critical of the Prussian absolutism and the feudal laws of the Rhineland. This critique is based on the conception of man's essence of liberty and rationality. Marx praises the state (French modern state) that exemplifies man's essence. Marx then abandons the state and appeals for an alliance between philosophy that affirms the essence of man and the proletariat. Then 1845 represents the period of break from conceptions of man's essence. Marx rejects humanism and outlines a new conception of philosophy, i.e., social formation, productive forces, determination by the economy, and ideologies. The period between 1845 and 1883 represents the transitional and the mature works of Marx that delineate the scientific basis of Marxism.

Marx was first a Kantian-Fichtean, then a Feuerbachian, and later Marx himself. Althusser attributes Marx's intellectual evolution to a double discovery that was alien to German ideology: French history exemplified by the organized working class, and the English economy that represented a developed capitalism. Marx is able to see that beyond an ideology removed from reality, there is a new reality that gives rise
to such ideology.

Althusser notes that the notion that young Marx is a Hegelian is a myth (3, p. 27) and that the thesis Marx sets the Hegelian system back on its feet is not an adequate description of Marx's dialectic. The attempt to identify Marx with Hegel stems from the following argument (the illustration on Hegel comes from secondary sources). Hegel suggests the real "truth" pertains to the real of ideas (27, p. 58). To him, thought does not consist of eternally fixed forms, but it is a process. Thus, any proposition (thesis) necessarily provokes an opposite assertion (antithesis), and this contradiction is reconciled at a higher level of truth in the form of a third proposition (the synthesis). This in turn becomes a new thesis in the next dialectical equation and so on ad infinitum (16, p. 67). This process is dialectical. To Hegel, there is an absolute reason that guides and governs history. History is the development of the consciousness of mankind and the realization of the absolute spirit in its dialectical struggle for freedom. Hegel sees nature as rational and the task of philosophy is to grasp the reason of such nature.

Hegel suggests the institutions embodying social ethics are family, civil society, and state (the absolute idea is only realized by the state). The family is a natural foundation for the order of reason that culminates in the state. Nonetheless, the family has eternal reality in property that ironically destroys the family, e.g., children grow up and establish
property-holding families of their own. The family unit breaks into a multitude of competing proprietors striving for their egoistic advantage. These groups prepare the way for civil society that is devoted to the satisfaction of economic needs. This society rests on principles that individuals aim only at their private interests, and that individual interests are so related that the satisfaction of one depends on the satisfaction of the other. As a competition of egos, the civil community appears only to disappear in a spectacle of excess, misery, and physical and social corruption (25, p. 15). The state is the highest of the ethical communities combining the essence of family and civil society. The state is the realized socio-ethical idea where spirit reaches its greatest perfection. The state is the progression of God in the world. Hegel once reported that he saw reason riding a horse when he had a glimpse of Napoleon, who manifested the state, riding a horse through a crowd. The assertion is made that Marx adopted from Hegel the fundamental processual orientation that the dialectic entails, and turned Hegel "right side up by giving priority to the material world" (27, p. 56). Marx thus viewed history as a dialectical process, but the moving forces are not ideas, as Hegel maintained, but economic conditions. The deepest causes underlying social change are the forces of production. These are reflected in the relations of production that in turn lead to the development of cultural superstructure consisting essentially of ideological justification for
economic relations. Marx took Hegel's dialectic and combined it with materialism to derive what came to be called "dialectical materialism," a phrase not used by Marx himself (27, p. 56). This argument, however, is both simplistic and misleading. Marx's dialectic is not merely an inversion of Hegel's, for a restoration of what has been upside down changes neither the nature nor the content of the object in question. The object regardless of whether it is on its head or on its feet is the same object. The thesis of inversion cannot conceive what is essential in Marx's conception of philosophy, particularly its problematic (3, p. 69). The basic unity of Marx's text indicates a double rupture with Feuerbach and Hegel. This rupture is problematic based on the abandonment of humanism.

Marx's dialectic is based on contradiction. The dialectic is the study of contradiction in the very essence of objects or the doctrine of the unity of opposites. The nature of contradiction is not a simple process with two opposites (Hegel), but a plurality of contradictions. Althusser makes distinctions between types of contradictions: the distinction between "principal contradiction" and "secondary contradiction;" the distinction between "principal aspect" and "secondary aspect" of each contradiction; and the uneven development of contradictions. These distinctions presuppose the existence of many contradictions in the process of development of a complex thing, but one is necessarily the principal contradiction. The primary contradiction between forces and
relations of production is embodied in the contradiction between antagonistic classes. The secondary contradictions are those which contribute to the accumulation of contradictions. These secondary contradictions are essential to the existence of the primary contradiction just as the primary contradiction constitutes their condition of existence.

The distinction between the principal and the secondary aspects of each contradiction indicates that within each contradiction, there exists a plurality of contradictions, but one is dominant. This is made clear in the case of the revolutionary situation of Russia.

The different contradictions do not develop absolutely evenly. Thus, at every stage in the development of a process, there is only one principal contradiction that plays a leading role (3, pp. 206-207). The fact one contradiction dominates others indicates a domination-subordination relation between contradictions, i.e., the spectator ahead seems taller than the others in the grandstand at the stadium. The complex whole of contradictions has a unity of structure in dominance. Thus, each contradiction with its history and time scale exists in a complex whole structured in dominance (3, p. 208).

Althusser sees the relation between forces and relations of production as complex. This relation is less predetermined because of the relative autonomy of all the levels including those of the superstructure. Marx quite correctly asserts the material life of people explains their history and that
consciousness is a phenomenon of their material life, but Marx never suggests the economic conditions are the only determining factors (3, p. 111). The economic conditions are the base, but other elements of social relations also exercise their influence and in many cases condition the existence of the economic base (3, pp. 111-112). The process of production cannot exist without social relations. Thus, there is a mutual influence between base and structure and the base is both determining and determined. This relation is identified as "the principle of overdetermination" (3, p. 100). The mutual conditioning of base and structure is in line with the principle of "structure in dominance." Althusser suggests the economic factor is a determining factor in the last instance (3, p. 111). The phrase "last instance" is interpreted as "in the final analysis" or "in the long run." That is, the economic factor should be brought to the analysis only when all other factors are taken into consideration.

Althusser formulates four spheres or levels of social formation: economic, political, ideological, theoretical or scientific where each has a certain autonomy and a capacity to influence independently within limits the reproduction and the transformation of social structure. The revolutionary situation is not a product of a simple contradiction between forces and relations of production, but a product of an accumulation of many contradictions such as the contradictions of a regime of feudal exploitation supported by a "deceitful priesthood" and
a mass of "ignorant" peasants, the contradictions of large-scale
capitalistic enterprises in large cities and suburbs (mining
regions and oil fields), the contradictions between advanced
capitalistic methods of production in regions with heavy
proletarian concentration and the medieval practice of rural
areas, and the class conflict not only between the exploited
and the exploiter, but within the ruling class itself, i.e.,
big feudal proprietors and militaristic police of the Tzar
versus lower nobility and conformists versus anarchists.

There were exceptional circumstances that added new
dimensions to the existing contradictions. The competition
between industrial and financial monopolies not only increased
exploitation of workers and colonies, but made World War II
inevitable. The capitalist nations, exhausted by the war and
inspired by the desire to eliminate the Tzar, provided
involuntary but effective support for the Bolshevick
revolution at the decisive moment. The advanced character of
the revolutionary elite, exiled by the Tzar, was able to
cultivate and absorb the political experience of the Western
working class. The rehearsal of the Revolution of 1905 tested
the strength and weakness of the regime and crystallized the
different social classes. Thus, the Russian situation was not
merely a product of simple contradiction, but a result of an
accumulation and exacerbation of a number of historical contra-
dictions that fused into a ruptured unity in an assault against
the system. Thus, the situation was a result of intense over-
determination of class contradictions (3, p. 103).

Althusser makes reference to the theme of the "weakest link" to explain the privileged situation of Russia. The theme is based on a metaphor that the strength and weakness of a chain depends on its weakest link. The control of the weakest link is the key to the control of a given system and an attack on the system presupposes the discovery of the weakest link that makes the system vulnerable. The situation of Russia, because of uneven capitalist development, represented the weakest link in a chain of capitalist nations. Russia, the most backward country in Europe, produced a revolutionary situation that would have been incomprehensible in other countries. This is because Russia was simultaneously more than a century behind other capitalist nations and at the highest level of its development. Russia was pregnant with two revolutions (capitalist and proletarian) and could not withhold the second by delaying the first. The revolutionary situation of Russia was exceptional, but all situations are exceptional. This leads Althusser to suggest that the exception is itself the rule, the rule of the rule. The old perception of exception can only be viewed as an example of this new rule. That is, the situation of Russia was not an exception to the rule, but the rule itself (3, p. 103).

The Problematic of Marx's Text

The work of Althusser presents a particular method of reading Marx's Capital. Althusser maintains that what is needed
is a new reading of Marx, for Marx's writings embody a distinctive epistemology of which he was more or less unaware and which was not presented as such. This is because thought structures do not necessarily contain their own principle of intelligibility and often cannot be understood on their own concepts. Althusser postulates that Marx's methodological reflections in Capital "do not give us a developed concept, nor even an explicit concept of the object of Marxist philosophy" (2, p. 88). Althusser suggests:

It is not possible to accurately read Capital without the aid of Marxist philosophy, which we have to read also, and at the same time in Capital itself. If this double reading and the constant reference from the scientific to the philosophical reading and from the philosophical to the scientific reading are necessary and productive, we can without doubt recognize the peculiarity of this philosophical revolution which inaugurates a new and authentic mode of thinking (2, p. 90).

Althusser proposes to fill this gap by providing concepts that express and reinterpret Marx's epistemology, and to show the significance of such concepts within the corpus of Marxist thought. The appropriate concepts to describe a particular thought, however, cannot be articulated in advance of textual analysis. The analysis itself is a theoretical production based on a dialectical movement between concepts of the text and the analyst.

Althusser postulates that every text or discourse has its own problematic. The theme of problematic designates the object of a text and manifests itself through a concept(s) that has theoretical significance in a text. There are key concepts in
every text and such concepts are theoretical. These concepts define themselves in relation to the object of their text. The concepts of a theoretical system are interrelated in a structured unity that grasps the global meaning of a text. The analysis that reduces a theoretical system into certain elements and compares them with other elements of another system in isolation from their own respective contexts is eclectic and unscientific (8, p. 38).

Marx not only criticizes but questions the very object of classical political economy. Marx reviews the concepts that constitute the theoretical structure of classical economy, particularly those of Smith and Ricardo who attribute economic facts to the needs or utility of the human subject. Here, the fact of exchange is reduced to use value, and the latter to human needs. The concepts of classical theory are based on a determinate relation with men who produce, distribute, receive, and consume. The human subject is an economic subject who produces use value, exchanges commodities, and consumes use value. Marx maintains that behind men and their needs, there is a whole economic phenomenon at work: the social system. Marx emphasizes the fact that scientific description of a society cannot rely on immediate observations. The conscious models of the workings of a society are often discrepant with reality (1, pp. 56-59). This reality is grasped through a theoretical discovery. Thus, social reality is not simple and social actors often do not have adequate concepts to describe such reality.
Marx is able to articulate the limits of classical conception of surplus which Smith and Ricardo analyze in the form of profit, rent, an interest. Marx argues that Smith and Ricardo confuse surplus with forms of existence such as interest. Marx discovers the missing word or what these classical economists are silent about: the surplus value. Althusser suggests:

The act of reestablishing the missing word may appear to be insignificant, but it has considerable theoretical consequences. This word in fact is not a word, but a concept and a theoretical concept, which is here the representation of a new conceptual system... If the word surplus value is at this point important, it is because it directly affects the object whose future is at stake in the simple act of naming (1, pp. 6-7).

The surplus value, a key concept of Marx's philosophy, provides an unprecedented dimension to the economic theory. The concept rests on the theory that surplus is created through such processes as the prolongation of the working day, the intensification of labor, and the existence of a relative surplus population, all of which are based on exploitation. Thus, Marx establishes a new object of economic analysis that signals Marx's epistemological break with classical economists. Marx changes the theoretical basis and the problematic and sets the object that divides him from classical economists (2, pp. 112-113).

Althusser suggests Marxism is opposed to humanism and historicism. Althusser argues that the scientific writings of Marx reveal a profoundly anti-humanistic implication of Marxism. Marx's text lacks any notion of human essence or nature such as freedom and reason. The notion of humanism
is attributed to the confusion of Marxist humanists such as Gramsci, Lukacs, Sartre, and Goldman who see a direct continuation between Marx's early and later writings and who attempt to cultivate such concepts as alienation and praxis. Marx's analytic method does not start from man, but from the economic condition of a given historical period (3, p. 225). The unit of analysis of scientific Marxism is not man as such, but relations of production and structures. Thus, man's lived and subjective experience is of little interest and falls outside the Marxian domain of inquiry.

Althusser suggests Marxism is anti-historicism. History is the development of structures such as forces of production and superstructures and their transformations. Thus, each historical period is a distinct mode of production, i.e., ancient, feudal, and capitalist. History is not merely an accumulation of events, but a phenomenon that represents discontinuous successions of modes of production. The existing knowledge is a projection of the present into the past of the object in question. This retrospection, however, must run ahead of the present and be capable of self-criticism. Marx's analysis does not merely reflect the essence of the time, but is a critique that goes beyond the existing knowledge. The historicists maintain that there is a continuation between Marx's early and later work. This, Althusser suggests, is based on a superficial reading of Marx, for the scientific basis of Marxism embodies a clear rupture with the ideology of humanism and historicism.

*Histoire de la Folie* (pp. 1W-1^9) is a historical account of the mad during the classical and modern age. The history of the mad also is an analysis of the other form of madness: the way in which the mad were treated by the men of reason. The treatment of the mad led to the rise of houses of confinement and asylums that excluded the mad and denied them the right of discourse.

*Naissance de la Clinique* (pp. 1^9-152) is a study of the rise of modern clinic and medicine during the late eighteenth century, a development that eliminated the universality of medical knowledge and reduced it to mere observations where discourse of patient is absent.

*Les Mots et les Choses* (pp. 152-156) is an analysis of the emergence of social sciences such as biology, economics, and philology as a result of an episteme that made man the object of knowledge for the first time in history.

*L'Archeologie du Savoir* (pp. 156-161) delineates the principles of historical analysis. This work proposes a theory of discourse that serves as a basis of the analysis of history
and the exercise of power in society.

Surveiller et Punir: Naissance de la Clinique (pp. 161-167) provides an account of the treatment of the deviant and the different perceptions of discipline and punishment of the classical and modern age.

**Madness and Reason**

The aspects of madness are traditionally confined to the realm of mental illness as delineated by present-day psychiatry. However, there is another form of madness by which men confine neighbors under the guise of reason and through the language of non-reason. "Men are necessarily mad," Pascal once said, "that not to be mad would amount to another form of madness" (12, p. ix). This form of madness is the madness of reason or the madness of the men of reason. Foucault provides a historical account of that other form of madness that sought to isolate and exclude the mad from all visible aspects of life. The systematic attempt to separate the mad from men of reason took many forms, i.e., the "ships of fools" of the middle ages and the Renaissance, the houses of confinement of the classical period, and the asylums of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The science of psychiatry, developed in the asylum, has perpetuated the old asylum structure of non-reciprocal observation through a language without response. This psychiatry was reduced to a monologue of reason about madness, a monologue that is formed on the basis of such silence. The psychology of Freud, later, questioned the old perception of madness. Freud
attempted to demystify this old structure and to situate madness outside the mirror of its own spectacle. Yet, psychoanalysis, by not suppressing this old asylum structure, was not able to hear the voices of madness or decipher in themselves the signification of madness. Psychoanalysis can neither liberate nor provide an account of what is essential in the enterprise of madness (9, p. 530). Madness began to take a character of mental illness at the end of the eighteenth century. The constitution of madness as a mental illness gave rise to a broken language between the physician who represents the man of reason and the madman. Thus, there was no common language, or not any longer, between reason and madness (Here, Foucault's view implies that the mad were once part of the community).

The history of the other madness is classified into the phase prior to the seventeenth century (the middle ages and the Renaissance) and the modern phase of the seventeenth, the eighteenth, and the nineteenth centuries. Madness during the middle ages was identified with leprosy. The leper was given a place in the hierarchy of vices, and thus, was expelled from many aspects of social life including access to church. The leper was often allowed to wander in the open countryside, although there were places of detention reserved for the mad. Leprosy, however, would soon disappear and poor vagabonds, "criminals," and "deranged minds" would replace the leper. Thus, leprosy faded away, but its structure remained. The Renaissance
was characterized by an absolute rejection of the mad. Towns sought to exclude the mad from all visible aspects of life and drove them outside their limits. The mad were often put on ships known as "ships of fools" that crisscrossed seas and canals of Europe in an attempt to keep them away and purify them. The mad were confined on the ship where there is no escape and were delivered to the great uncertainty of the world of rivers and seas, all of which suggests that there was a mythical link between madness and water (found in the dream of European man).

The classical period gave rise to institutions, known as houses of confinement, whose function was to take charge of those undesirable elements, including the mad. Hence, exclusion was replaced by confinement. The mad were part of that prescription of idleness and were shut up along with the entire population of poor and unemployed. Here, madness took a new historical dimension. Madness was perceived as a social problem among others whose origins were linked to poverty. The poor and the mad were identified by their incapacity for work and inability to integrate with the group. The houses of confinement had little to do with a medical concept of madness or with a genuine effort to provide cure for the mad. These houses were instances of monarchical and bourgeois order organized under the authority of civil government and linked to royal power to suppress the undesirable on the basis of the "true reason of man." The houses of confinement served as a
measure to put an end to begging and unemployment, and to contain other dangerous elements of society. The ultimate purpose of confinement, however, was mainly to provide labor. The aim was not only to confine those out of work, but to give work to those who were confined and make them beneficial for society. The mad were subjected to hard labor and quite often distinguished by their inability to follow the rhythms of collective life. The houses of confinement served as a temporary solution to economic crises and as social protection against agitations and uprisings. There were moral values attached to the notion of confinement. The source of poverty was not linked to some economic factors, but to the weakening of discipline and the relaxation of morals. The undesirable groups were released from confinement not because they became useful, but because they seemed to subscribe to the ethical system of their society. The houses of confinement were prisons of moral order.

Madness had a particular place in the world of confinement. The mad were not hidden in the silence of confinement, but continued to be present on the stage and often were displayed. There were special windows to permit the public to observe the mad chained within. Later, an attempt was made to establish distance between madness and other forms of unreason. The segregation of the mad from the indigents and criminals was not motivated by a medical concept, but was required by the urgency to protect others. The mad were viewed as dangerous elements whose neurotic behavior threatens the lives
of other prisoners. The mad were isolated, but were not considered sick. The classical period did not provide a clear conception of madness, although some aspects of madness such as melancholia (a madness without fever or frenzy accompanied by fear and sadness) and hypochondria (weakness and loss of movement of the vital or animal functions) were delineated and later joined the domain of mental illnesses.

The middle of the eighteenth century was characterized by a great fear of madness, a fear generated by a medical conception and supported by a moral myth. The mad, it was said, were victims of a mysterious and contagious disease that spread from the houses of confinement to the residential quarters of the city. This fear animated a whole system of myths about madness. The wagons of undesirables, it was said, would pass through the city leaving disease in their wake. The air, tainted by disease, would corrupt the people of the city, and the prisons’ fevers would spread beyond the houses of confinement. This imaginary stigma of disease, which gave madness an additional power of terror, sought the initial birth of a medical concept of madness. Madness' attaining a medical status, however, was not a result of any progress or improvement of knowledge, but a result of this reactivation of images about madness. The medical conception and mythical thought about madness contributed to the birth of an asylum where madness would be contained. The risk of the perceived contagion would be reduced and madness would be offered as a
spectacle without threatening the spectators. Thus, the asylum restored the truth of madness as a cage and a sterilized confinement (9, p. 379).

The psychiatry of the nineteenth century emerged in the world of confinement. Thus, it is within the walls of confinement that psychiatry came upon the mad, and it is there it would leave them (9, p. 57). The science of medicine was not designed to grasp the essence of madness. Medicine suppresses the relation between man and his immediate environment, i.e., labor. The madman who entrusts himself to medicine "avoids the law of labor that nature imposes on him" and "drifts into the world of artifice and anti-nature of which madness is only one of the manifestation" Man is made to work and not to meditate, Rousseau once said. As such, one has to exercise his body and rest his soul and not the other way around (9, p. 355).

Madness is sustained by what is most artificial in society. Thus, the cure of the mad presupposes a return to the immediate that disregards from man's life anything that is artificial, unreal, and imaginary. The mad can succeed in being cured by ignoring his disease and resuming his place in the activity of natural beings. The cure involves an effort to liberate man from language that represents the form of human experience that gives birth to the unreason. Madness, without a return to the immediate, would continue to exist in a space so arranged that it will never be able to speak the language
of unreason. Madness is understood only in relation to unreason and it is this unreason that defines the locus of madness' possibility.

To Foucault, civilization creates a milieu suitable for the development of madness. This is apparent in knowledge that is far removed from the immediate world of human activity. The knowledge of abstract speculations that are difficult to grasp and the perpetual agitation of the mind without the exercise of the body create tension in the human mind and disequilibrates the body. Thus, the more abstract and complex the knowledge becomes, the greater the risk of madness. The sciences whose subject matters are difficult to grasp present the mind with an intellectual exercise that provokes tension the inner sense and fatigue in the body. This knowledge creates a milieu of abstract relations where man loses the sense of physical happiness in which his relation to the world is usually established. The risk of madness increases in a milieu where man's life constitutes a break with the world of the immediate.

The classical period first did not distinguish physical therapeutics from psychological mediations, for the reason that psychology did not exist. The classical age sought to make a distinction between madness as a disease and madness a phenomenon of unreason. The disease pertained to the organic and the unreason was psychological. This led to the birth of psychology as an attempt to deal with the madness of
unreason. The science of psychology did not emerge to reflect
the truth of madness, but was a sign that madness was removed
from its truth. The work of Freud was an innovative attempt
to situate madness at the level of its language and to
reconstitute the essence of experience (discourse of the case
patient-doctor) that was reduced to silence by what Foucault
calls "positivism." The contribution of Freud lies in his
insistence that medical thought reexamines its methods of
treatment and seeks the possibility of a dialogue with
unreason (9, p. 360).

The nineteenth century witnessed the end of confinement.
Here, many arguments were advanced about the place of madness
in social life; i.e., whether to situate madness in family,
prison, or hospital. The outcome of this was the birth of
asylums (mental institutions) that preserved the basis of
the houses of confinement under the mask of mental hospitals.
The history of psychiatry celebrated this development and
pictured this period as that happy age where madness was
finally recognized in its truth and was put where it ought
to belong. Yet, these institutions perpetuated the same old
perception of madness. The asylums instituted a language
that does not allow reciprocity and reduces any response to
silence. The mad were observed and watched from a distance
by the outsiders who represent the prestige of authority and
the power of reason. The asylums emerged as empty insti-
tutions, even the guards were often recruited among the
inmates themselves. The keeper, who intervened with weapons and other instruments of constraint, now observes and uses language. The outsider comes closer to madness only to move ever farther away. Thus, the birth of the asylum was not a celebration of the liberation of unreason, but of reason's victory over unreason. The mad were transformed into minors who were punished or rewarded under the supervision of men of reason who retained for them the aspect of fathers.

The science of mental illness, developed in the asylum, is of the order of observation and classification. This science is more a monologue about madness than a dialogue between medical thought and madness. The development of a theory of mental illness did not evolve in response to a humanitarian view that relates madness to madman's human reality nor did it emerge under the pressure of scientific progress. This theory was formulated within the artificial space of confinement. The science of mental illness can move in the appropriate direction only when it can substitute the silence of madness with a dialogue that reflects the language of unreason.

The Medical Discourse and Modern Clinic

The discourse of medicine, like that of madness, is dependent on the way in which the official discourse perceives, classifies, and distributes such substantial things as sanity, health, and knowledge. The distinction between sickness and health is less a product of an independent exchange between
theory and practice than a function of the modality of discourse in a culture at different periods of history. Modern medicine and man's will to knowledge are not merely results of a progressive development towards enlightenment, but products of a continuous interaction between desire and power within a system of exclusions that made different societies possible. The discourse of medicine is the history of the "Other," the silent body that is shut away from the dominant discourse.

The practice of medicine prior to the eighteenth century was "a universal relation of mankind with itself" (13, p. 54). Medicine consisted of an immediate relation (without the mediation of knowledge) between sickness and that which alleviated it. This relation, based on patient's sensibility and discourse, is observed by the healthy person and becomes a general form of consciousness of which each individual is both subject and object. Knowledge of medicine was universal. This knowledge that masked beneath speculation the purity of clinical evidence was the element of perpetual change and the clinic was its positive accumulation. The clinic of the eighteenth century was a complex setting of medical knowledge. Yet, such a clinic was considered of little value to the actual movement of scientific knowledge. This clinic was not merely a structure of medical experience, but a test of knowledge that time must confirm (13, p. 61). The medicine of the eighteenth century related more to health than to normality. This medicine referred to qualities of "rigour, suppleness,
and fluidity" that were lost in illness and which it was the task of such medicine to restore. The universality of medical knowledge and the privileged relation between medicine and health involved "the possibility of being one's own physician" (13, p. 35). This medical discourse, however, was soon to decline when modern medicine sought to confine medical knowledge to observation in isolated settings where the patient is reduced to an object of knowledge.

The modern clinic of the eighteenth century introduced files and secrecy. The medical knowledge became that of the privileged group. Thus, not everyone can practice medicine and a person's experiences are not communicated to other. The fact that medical knowledge developed at the bedside of the patient was not a recent phenomenon, but what has changed was the "fundamental perceptual codes that were applied to the patient's body as the field of objects to which observation addressed itself ... and the whole system of orientation" (13, p. 53). Modern medicine is observation detached from the theoretical context. The abolition of old hospitals and the silencing of universality of speech gave rise to a language that made the observations the essential part of medicine. This made hospitals the privileged institutions of medicine. The new medicine was not a result of progress, but an attempt to restructure scientific medicine that is "freed for the moment of discovery." The disease is observed in terms of symptoms (and not in terms of signs also). The symptoms are the visible
and the form in which the disease is presented. This empiricism is not merely based on a "rediscovery of the absolute value of the visible," but on restructuring of that "manifest and secret space that was possible through a millennial gaze paused over men's suffering" (13, p. 62).

**Man as the Object of Knowledge**

The periods of history are characterized by changes in the fundamental arrangement of knowledge. These changes neither proceed at the same pace nor obey the same rules. Thus, there are periods when a culture ceases to think the way it had been thinking until then and begins to think in a new way. The development of knowledge evolves through great discontinuities in the episteme of a culture. These epistememes set up the domain of knowledge, including the domain of human sciences. The concept "episteme" refers to the general epistemological orientation of knowledge and is translated as a mode of being that guides human knowledge. The episteme that underlies the knowledge of the seventeenth century differs from that of the eighteenth century and the latter is relatively unaffected by the former. The apparent continuity in the development of knowledge is a surface appearance that is limited and can be fanciful. The shifts in the development of knowledge do not manifest themselves at the conscious level, but at the archeological level that explains the way a particular knowledge or science produces new propositions, isolates new facts, builds up new concepts, and suggests new modes of inquiry. The analysis
of the manifest level gives the impression of uninterrupted development that does not account for discontinuities and revolutions in the development of knowledge. The archeological inquiry reveals major discontinuities in the episteme of contemporary knowledge: the first occurred at the beginning of the classical period (mid-seventeenth century) and the second, which witnessed the rise of the social sciences, took place at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century. The order that guides knowledge today is not the same as that of the Renaissance, the classical period, or any other period. Thus, contemporary social science can be viewed as an epistemological space that is peculiar to the modern age.

The major discontinuity in the episteme of contemporary knowledge inaugurated the modern age of the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. This discontinuity has made man the object of knowledge. The emergence of man was probably no more than a rift in the order of things and a configuration of a new mode of being that made man the center of focus in the field of knowledge (11, p. 15). The study of man did not evolve because reason made progress, but because things became reflexive seeking the laws of intelligibility solely in their own development, and thus, abandoning the space of representation. The second discontinuity occurred at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century. This introduced a new domain of inquiry centered around man's life, labor, and language. The concern with man as a living
being gave rise to biology. The emphasis on man's labor through which man can satisfy his needs gave rise to economics. The focus on man's words led to the development of philology. The sciences of biology, economics, and philology do not exhaust the whole range of social sciences, but constitute the epistemological regions that can be subdivided. The first discontinuity dealt with organism (Jussier), labor (Smith), and grammatical system (Wilkins), but such concepts were given a status as a system of representation. As such, organism, labor, and language were representations of life, exchange, and discourse. The concept of exchange was the basis for the analysis of wealth. The value was analyzed on the basis of the capacity things have of representing one another and of a total system of equivalence.

The second discontinuity brought irremediable modifications to knowledge. Man, the knowing subject, became the object of knowledge. This redistribution of the episteme of knowledge abandoned the space of representation and gave man a place in the specific depths of life, wealth, and words as the object of science. This episteme shifted the focus of biology (Cuvier), economics (Ricardo), and philology (Bopp). The concept of life had been redefined and the focus had been directed toward the relation of character to function. The notion of exchange had been replaced by labor that brought new knowable objects such as capital and production. The general grammar were replaced by the study of signs. This
shift is apparent in the work of Ricardo who was the first to give labor an important place in the economic process and to draw attention to the worker's energy and time as sources of economic value. The value of things is not determined by exchange, but by labor as a productive activity. The value ceased to be a sign of representation and became a product whose origin is labor. The value of things is created by labor that is more primitive and more radical of all representations, i.e., exchange. The value of things increased not with increases or decreases of wages, but with the amount of labor devoted to the production of things. That is, labor is analyzed in relation to man, the object of knowledge.

The previous fields of knowledge such as philosophy, political and moral theory, and empirical observation have never encountered man. The study of man did not exist anymore than life, labor, and exchange. There are many explanations on the emergence of man as the object of study. Foucault suggests the effects of industrialization upon the individual were necessary conditions for the rise of psychology, and that social turmoils and the impact of the French Revolution lead to a reflection of the sociological type. These explanations, however, are limited. The study of man is not a result of the increase in the objectivity, the precision of observation, or the rigor of reason of knowledge. Man requires an explanation that is profound and does not manifest itself at the surface level of knowledge. The study of man is the result of a mutation within
contemporary culture and of a shift in the episteme of knowledge. Man, however, occupies an ambiguous position, for he cannot be the object of knowledge because he is its subject. As such, man would disappear like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea (11, p. 398).

**Discourse and Power**

The history of ideas, philosophy, science, and literature is characterized by discontinuity. This history cannot be articulated through a seemingly slow process of development such as periods, stages, and centuries, but through shifts, ruptures, divisions, particular ways of looking at things, limits, thresholds, transformations, and series (10, p. 31). The forms of continuity and tranquility with which are accepted ought to be suspended and disturbed, for such forms cannot detect the incidence of interruptions that explain the episteme of a knowledge at a particular historical moment. The episteme of knowledge cannot be discovered by those who work under its aegis.

The phenomenon of discontinuity does not manifest itself at the surface level of knowledge, but is present beneath the homogeneous manifestations of such knowledge throughout history. The phenomenon of discontinuity involves an historical analysis that seeks to discover beyond a statement, a work, or a discourse the unconscious intention and activity that took place despite the author. This analysis attempts to reconstitute another discourse that redisCOVERS the silent
murmuring underlying the manifest discourse (10, p. 39) The process of reconstruction is based on what the text says and proceeds to delineate the presence of what is it does not say. The studies of life, economics, and language were first carried out almost in the dark, but later became known when they discovered the place of their historical possibility. These sciences did not evolve merely because their methods became more precise, but because they presupposed the same way of looking at things and forced knowledge to enter a new era. Hence, each knowledge at each period has a style that remains to be discovered despite the evolutionary influence of previous knowledge (10, p. 37).

The analysis of discourse occupies a central position in Foucault's theory. The concept of discourse refers to all forms of cultural life such as text, book, the work of an author, speech, document, science, novel, or any number of events in the space of discourse (10, p. 38). However, the term "discourse" extends to the episteme of knowledge. Thus, there is a discourse of medicine, social science, and language. The discourse of a particular knowledge involves the way in which the object of knowledge is perceived, classified, and distributed at a historical moment.

Discourse is closely related to power. Thus, there are types of discourse: the official that reflects the position of those in power and the unofficial excluded from the common discourse. Discourse itself may appear to be of little account, but the prohibitions and restrictions imposed on discourse
indicates such discourse is linked to desire and power. This is consistent with psychoanalytical theory that argues that "speech is the object of desire." The work of historians demonstrates that "speech is not merely a verbalization of conflicts and systems of domination, but it is the very object of man's conflict" (10, pp. 260-270). The case of madness illustrates the nature of a discourse based on a distinction between the man of reason and the man of unreason. The individual is categorized as such if his speech could not constitute part of the common discourse. The words of the mad are viewed as worthless speech incapable of substantiation and has no truth or significance. In short, such words are regarded as null and void. The words of the mad were ignored and excluded and the mad's right of discourse was denied in the name of insanity. The doctor who represented reason never attempted to listen to the speech of madness and how or why it was said. The words of the mad, even when purposefully taken as words of truth, were viewed as void. The man of reason often deciphered in them a naive reason, as being more rational than that of a rational man (10, pp. 260-270). Thus, the production of a discourse is controlled, selected, organized, and distributed in such a way as to ensure the continuous presence and dominance of the common discourse. Here, Foucault suggests there exists in contemporary society and in others a kind of fear of those mass of spoken things and events which could create discontinuity and disorder in the common discourse. The distinction
between madness and reason, sickness and health, and truth and error is a function of a discourse of a historical moment (the work of Foucault can be seen as an analysis of the unofficial or the other discourse that is shut away and stand against the common discourse).

The analysis of discourse is based on the study of texts or fragments of texts produced without concern for the biographies of the author of the text. The life of the author is contingent, but the work of the author is caught up in a system of references to other works, texts, and sentences as a node within a network (10, p. 34). This analysis articulates a distinctive episteme of knowledge that exists despite the author's intension and which is shared by other texts of an epoch. This seeks to free historical analysis from subjection to transcendence and anthropological theme (10, p. 26). The suspension of the speaking subject, however, is not motivated by the need to discover laws that could be used or to emphasize the universal discourse common to all authors of a period. The purpose of such suspension is to describe how it was possible for authors within the same field of inquiry at a moment of history "to speak of different objects, to maintain different positions, and to make contrary choices" (10, p. 261).

The analysis of discourse does not deny history, but holds in suspense those uniform models of temporarization. This is necessary to reveal the transformations that take place at different levels of knowledge. The philosophies of history such as economics (Marx and Hegel) sought to discover deep
unities through an evolutionary analysis. This approach, however, reveals neither the object nor the origin of such knowledge, but merely an infinite endless change.

The work of Foucault questions descriptions of the history of ideas, description whose methods lack vigor and stability. Foucault proposes points of divergence between archeological analysis and the history of ideas. Archeological analysis does not view discourse as a sign of something else, but as a discourse that can be analyzed in its volume. Archeological analysis does not seek to extract the continuous development of knowledge, but attempts to discover shifts and discontinuities. Archeological analysis does not relate a work to an author, but examine those rules that run through and govern the work. Archeological analysis does not claim the restoration of thought of a historical moment, but merely suggests a mode of inquiry that rewrites and transforms what is written (10, pp. 182-183).

The work of Foucault on discourse makes hints to the crisis in episteme of Western culture. The culture exists in a gap between epistememes of knowledge: one dying and the other not articulated. This is consistent with the view that man is approaching an end. Foucault does not suggest a possible solution to the crisis because the ability of language to express what is real is limited and words do not have all the power to express things or thoughts. Thus, discourse has its own form that obscures the content of reality; but because
discourse acquires a privileged position, reality takes the aspect of a linguistic form presented to consciousness.

Modern Prison and Rehabilitation of the Soul

Foucault, guided by the theory of archeology, attempts to provide an historical analysis of the birth of the prison as an institution of discipline and punishment in modern world. The modern prison is an institution that exemplifies the highest expression of discipline that extends to other institutions such as schools, the military, factories, and hospitals. This type of prison is an institution of punishment. The process of punishment is not merely a function of the prison, but a complex function distributed among different parts of the penal system such as technician-reformers, judges, psychiatrists, psychologists, and educationalists (14, p. 17).

The concern with discipline and punishment derives from an epistemology that seeks to acquire knowledge about the normal and the mad (this epistemology emerged with the rise of science that made man the subject matter of study). The phenomenon of punishment relates to a new strategy that seeks to exercise the power to punish through an elaborate and diffuse means of control. The strategy is not articulated to punish less, but to punish better and insert power into the social body. Hence, punishment is a regular function of modern society. The power to punish is an historical phenomenon shaped by events and developments of human history, particularly those of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. The system
of punishment can be viewed as dependent on systems of economic production. The system of punishment in a slave economy provides an additional labor force. The medieval economy gave rise to corporal punishment directed against the sole property accessible: the human body. The mercantile economy required mechanisms such as the penitentiary, forced labor, and prison factory. The industrial system de-emphasized these mechanisms of punishment and focused on corrective detention. The system of punishment is situated in a certain political economy, but this does not exhaust the complexity of punishment as a historical phenomenon.

Foucault identifies periods of history that are characterized by different perceptions of discipline and punishment: the period preceding the seventeenth century and the modern era of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. The penal system during the first period was based on the contention that the object of punishment is the human body (14, p. 14). The body was the target for repression. The body was condemned, imprisoned, displayed in public, and eliminated. This system was guided by certain strict procedures and conventions. The penal procedures up to the sentence were conducted without any apparent knowledge of the accused who had neither the right for a lawyer nor access to the documents of the case. The knowledge of the case was the absolute privilege of the prosecution. These procedures were merely designed to establish the fact a crime has been committed. The judge made the
decision on the basis of the crime without regard to the intentions of the accused. The accused, once convicted and sentenced, was displayed and punished in a ceremony to see the truth of the crime. The process of punishment was slow and tedious to let the condemned bear the condemnation and the truth of the crime. The great spectacle of physical punishment accomplished many purposes. The spectacle established the fact that the crime took place and that the condemned recognized the necessity of punishment. This made the spectator participate in punishment and served as a deterrent for future crimes. The act of punishment took a form of a theatrical representation of pain. At times, the condemned was made to reenact the crime. The condemned was taken to the site of the crime and made to carry the instrument with which he committed the crime. The condemned was tortured and executed. These descriptions, however, are probably ideal ones, for a considerable gap existed between the procedures of punishment and the actual penal system and practice. Furthermore, public punishment was by no means the most frequent form of punishment (14, p. 36).

The body of the condemned was the element of public punishment. The body was a manifestation of power relations and an integral part of the political society. As such, the body was invested, marked, imprisoned, made to carry out tasks, forced to perform ceremonies, and tortured. The body of the condemned was a property of the sovereign (the King) who made
his mark and brought down the effect of his power on the body of the condemned. The crime of the condemned was viewed as an offence which demanded reparation because it violated the alleged right of the man in power and offended the dignity of his character. The law reflects the will of power (14, p. 52).

The public opposition to the different forms of public execution was sporadic and minimal. There were public agitations against the punitive practice, but these were seldom spread beyond a town. Yet, these agitations attracted the attention of intellectuals and highly placed people who were instrumental in the creation of the new penal system.

The seventeenth century saw a major break with the old system. This period gave rise to a new theory of law and crime and a new justification of the right to punish. As such, old laws were abolished. The ceremonial aspects of punishment tended to decline and torture as a public spectacle was abolished. The public display of prisoners such as the case of cleaning city streets or repairing highways was maintained, but was downgraded through time. The target of punishment and repression shifted from the body to the human soul (14, p. 22). There were many factors that explain this mentality of crime and punishment. The act of crime moved away from violence. The crimes of violence such as murder and physical acts of aggression declined and crimes against property increased, a fact which is attributed to an increase in wealth
brought about by industrialization. The process of punishment reciprocally lost some of its intensity. This period saw a shift from a criminality of blood to a criminality of fraud, a shift that gave rise to a new technology of the power to punish (14, pp. 89-92).

This strategy falls into the general theory of social contract (i.e., Rousseau) of the eighteenth century. The members of society are guided by a general will and are presumed to have accepted the laws of society. The offender not only violated the law, but also broke the pact and became the enemy of society. The right to punish was not inspired by vengeance of the sovereign, but by the defence of society. The act of punishment in the old system was directed against the body of the condemned. Now, the condemned is the property of society and the object of useful appropriation. This accounts for the fact that most reformers advocated public work that provided labor and served as a sign of the outcome of those who break the contract. That is, public work was the focus of profit and signification (14, p. 111).

The process of punishment shifted from the body to the soul of the condemned. The emphasis is now directed toward rehabilitation that is carried out by technicians, reformers, warders, doctors, and chaplains. The object of penal practice is not crime as such, but the subject's intentions, will, thoughts, and inclinations. The judge judged something other than the crime. This provided a justification for making the
case that crime was committed as a result of insanity. Thus, one can be guilty and mad. The purpose of imprisonment was not to punish, but to supervise the individual and alter his criminal tendencies. That is, the purpose was to transform the individual into one who can function in society. The severity and the length of punishment could be altered depending on the changes in the prisoner's behavior. The body ceased to be the target of punishment and even executions were conducted in such a way as to inflict little pain on the body. The condemned were often injected with tranquillizers. The body now serves as an instrument. The law could reach and manipulate the body, but this occurred at a distance and with a much higher aim. Thus, imprisonment, confinement, forced labor, and penal servitude are not merely physical penalties, but measures to deprive the individual of a liberty that is the right and the property of society.

The new penal system was part of that epistemological formation which was directed toward the humanization of the penal system and the knowledge of man. The modern prison has been the field of many projects, experiments, theoretical postulations, and investigations. There were models centered around the most appropriate and effective way of correction and rehabilitation, i.e., religious (conversion), medical (the effects of isolation), economic (the method that costs less), and architectural (the best form of surveillance). The target of these models was, however, the soul of the condemned. The
extent this morality of crime and punishment was to able to render the condemned useful in society is questionable, but it is clear that it did not eliminate the criminals.
CHAPTER BIBLIOGRAPHY


CHAPTER III

STRUCTURALISM: A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

The structuralist perspective drawing on modern linguistics, psychoanalytic theory, and Marxist epistemology, attempts to establish a new grounding for the aims of methods of the social science. The work of Levi-Strauss aims at articulating a distinctive character of social anthropology. The central themes of structuralism have more recently been reconstructed in the writings of post-structuralists, namely Lacan, Barthes, Althusser, and Foucault. The formulations of structuralism sparked serious debate within literary criticism, psychoanalysis, history, anthropology, Marxism, and philosophy. The field of sociology remained outside such debate and sociologists have not produced an adequate monograph about structuralism. This can be attributed in part to the fact that the work of a number of structuralists was not available in English until recently. The interpretations available were often carried out by individuals not trained in sociology, and thus, overlooked the relevance of the perspective to sociology. Structuralism was subject to a criticism that did not question the basic properties of the perspective as such, but engaged in discussions of categorizations such as whether the perspective is a form of neo-positivism or an ideology of the left, etc. Thus, the possible contributions of the structuralist perspective were disregarded.
before having established any solid roots in sociological analysis. The structuralist perspective, in addition to being what Merton calls another healthy paradigm, challenges the main thrusts of such theoretical and methodological orientations as empiricism, reductionism, historicism, and humanism and helps solve persistent theoretical problems in sociological inquiry. The present study sought to delineate the basic propositions of the structuralist perspective, and to examine the position of the perspective in relation to the different theoretical perspectives in sociology, namely the functional and the conflict perspectives. The work of structuralists, although it incorporates a variety of endeavors, is guided by common propositions. The following delineate propositions that constitute the main thrust of the structuralist perspective.

Proposition I

Cultural Phenomena Are Systems of Language; They Are Expressed in Language, and Are Guided by the Principles that Guide Language

The systems of representation such as kinship, myth (Levi-Strauss), discourse (Lacan), art, and literature (Barthes) are systems of language; to be known, they must be expressed through the medium of language. The priority of language stems in part from the fact that language acquired a privileged position and reality took the aspect of linguistic form. Thus, thoughts originate in words and not the other way around. Language is the most universal cultural
phenomenon. The content of language is contingent, but the structure of language is universal. The content of myths varies cross-culturally, but the structure of such myths is the same and universal. The arbitrary character of the linguistic sign made language an appropriate subject to scientific inquiry.

Language is a social product and a collection of necessary conventions adopted by the social body to permit individuals to exercise the faculty of speech. Language is a social institution. Language, however, must be studied in itself and not in relation to something else. Thus, a number of sociologists have suggested that language plays such and such role or relates to such and such content, but have not examined language in itself. Language is a self-contained whole subject to scientific inquiry. This is based on the view that each element of language has its place and relation to other elements within the system of language. Hence, the structure of myth can be understood in terms of how each element relates to other elements in a myth. The substance of myth cannot reside in the isolated elements that enter into the composition of a myth, but in the way those elements are combined. Myth resembles an orchestra score presented in a unilinear series and where the task of the performer is to establish the correct disposition.

The structuralist view maintains that cultural phenomena must be systematically analyzed through techniques and methods
borrowed from linguistics, i.e., syntax, phoneme, binary opposition, metaphor, and metonomy. This can make the covert meanings of phenomena explicit. The relations existing at the level of structure of such phenomena as the problem of incest and totemism can be reduced to those of binary opposition. The problem of incest, thus, is a cultural phenomenon that reflects an attempt to overcome the contradiction in the binary: nature and culture. Totemism similarly provides a logical model capable of overcoming contradictions between nature and culture. Here, Levi-Strauss is critical of the functional analysis of Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown and that of Durkheim that regard totemism as another phenomenon that serves to maintain social solidarity. This is a tautological argument that takes as a reason what, in the best circumstances, is only a consequence. Totemism instead is a phenomenon that represents a union of opposites: nature and culture. Totemism, reflecting on the nature of non-human species, is a type of reality that permits man to engage in theoretical speculations based on empirical observations; such speculations relate to two types of relations: one is natural and the other is cultural.

Linguistic techniques and methods opened the way to the scientific description of kinship in the so-called primitive society. The system of kinship, thus, can be analyzed on the basis of the rule of formal interdependence and within the syntax of such rule. The circulation of women through marriage between families and clans constitutes messages
the same way words circulate between members of the group.
The kinship system is communication that obeys the syntactical
rules of language. The relations between the sexes are a
form of communication like language. The structure of cultural
phenomena provides an understanding of the structure of the
human mind, for such phenomena are the result of a number of
inherent mental categories (Levi-Strauss). Cultural phenomena,
as systems of language, are not limited to kinship and myth,
but incorporate art and literature (Barthes), the patient's
speech (Lacan), and written texts (Althusser and Foucault).

Proposition II

Cultural Phenomena, Like Language, Are Systems of Signs,
Each Cultural Phenomenon Consists of Two Parts:
the Signifier (the Concept) and the Signified
(the Content of Signification).

The study of signs derives from Saussure's suggestion
that the linguistic sign unites, not a name and a thing, but
a signifier (a concept) and a signified (a sound image that
reflects the psychological imprint of the sound and the
impression that it makes on the senses). This provided a
basis for the study of different aspects of human culture in
so far as these, like language, can be viewed as systems of
signs. Thus, a cultural phenomenon is composed of a signifier
(that which is apparent and explicit) and a signified (that
which remains beneath the surface and implicit). As such, a
stone axe is not merely a thing, but a sign that stands for
something (Levi-Strauss), and a theatrical play is not only a
play, but a phenomenon that signifies something (Barthes). The signifier and the signified are interrelated. The analysis of the signifier permits one to discover the covert meanings underlying the overt content of cultural phenomena. The Oedipus myth is treated as a signifier that signifies man's reflection on the belief in the autochtomy of man and the actual knowledge that man is born from the union of man and woman (Levi-Strauss). The tourist guide can be viewed as a signifier that signifies an attempt to suppress the reality of everyday life of a given society and reduce such reality into monuments (Barthes). The patient's dreams are signifiers that signify needs and desires (Lacan). Modern culture sought to suppress the relation between the signifier and the signified. Thus, a novel is only a novel and a painting is made for the sake of art and cannot be related to any value system. This reduces cultural phenomena into nothingness. The aspect of nothingness in modern culture is not accidental, for such tendency serves to prevent individuals from critical evaluation and participation in the production of their own culture. The role of the critical writer and sociologist is to uncover the meaning underlying the manifest content of cultural phenomena, for these phenomena do not only express reality, but signify it as well (Barthes). Lacan carries the analysis of signs beyond that of the patient's speech and suggests individuals present themselves to one another as signifiers. Thus, communication takes place at the level of signifier, a level that reflects the diversity and complexity
of meaning inherent in human speech. The signifier does not manifest itself at the surface level, but remains underneath the conscious expression of cultural phenomena.

Proposition III

Cultural Phenomena Are Manifestations of Structures; a Structure Is Characterized by Totality, Dynamic Transformation, and Self Regulation.

The different cultural phenomena are manifestations of structures that do not manifest themselves at the surface level, but remains beneath the conscious expression, and thus, unconscious. Hence, a myth is not a structure as such, but a manifestation of deep and unconscious structure. The structuralist perspective maintains Piaget's triangular basis of structure: the structure as a totality, the structure as a system of dynamic transformation, and the structure as self-regulated.

The Structure as a Totality

The different elements of a structure are interrelated and governed by a unity of elements. Thus, each element cannot be understood in isolation from other elements comprising that unity. The structural analysis seeks to examine not particular elements, but the way in which such elements relate to one another in a structure (the syntactical rule of language). Thus, the presence of the dragon and the Sphinx in the Oedipus myth does not explain the myth. The importance of such figures resides in the way in which they relate to other
elements comprising the structure. The different elements of speech (Lacan), novel (Barthes), and written text (Althusser and Foucault) do not exist in isolation, but acquire their significance in relation to other elements of a structure and must be studied as such. This is apparent in the analysis of the patient's dreams in which the analyst attempts to establish the missing link between the different events of the dream. The analyst seeks to punctuate the patient's discourse and suggests the way events express the unconscious that is structured like language (Lacan). The study of art and literature indicates that elements of cultural phenomena closely relate to a structure. Thus, a particular character of a novel does not appear accidently, but represents the way a culture evaluates certain positions, i.e., the manual worker often is portrayed as someone who is merely motivated by economic need of immediate gratification. The analysis of written texts also indicates that the interdependence of various concepts of Marx's text reflects a problematic (Althusser).

The Structure as a System of Dynamic Transformation

The structure of cultural phenomena is not static. The elements and the structure are interdependent based on mutual influence, and as such, the structure is both structuring as well as structured. The structure of knowledge can be altered when the amount of change in elements is so great that it
amounts to a break with the previous structure. The different elements of the work of Cuvier, Ricardo, and Bopp have brought irremediable alterations to knowledge and gave rise to a new structure of knowledge centered around man as the object of study (Foucault).

The Structure as Self-regulated

The notion of self-regulation is interpreted to mean that the dynamism of the structure lies beneath the observable. The concept "structure" should not be identified with what is directly observable, for what is observable is a manifestation of a deep structure. This structure remains unconscious while it makes comprehensible the observable (proposition IV).

Proposition IV
The Underlying Structures of Cultural Phenomena Are Unconscious; The Unconscious Structures, However, Are Accessible Through Linguistically Mediated Form

The study of the unconscious traditionally identified with Freud's model of psychical apparatus, is a persistent theme in the structural analysis of such domains as mythology (Levi-Strauss), discourse (Lacan), literature (Barthes), and written texts (Althusser and Foucault). The structure of cultural phenomena can be explained and accounted for in terms other than those of the conscious level. The structure of myth cannot be explained as the surface content of the story it tells, for the conscious explanations are merely secondary elaborations. This explains why the native cannot provide
"rational" justification for his system of thinking and why the modern man does not question such rituals and customs as table manners, type of dress, and many of his religious and political attitudes (Levi-Strauss). Levi-Strauss suggests the unconscious activity of the mind appears to be the same for all minds, primitive and civilized. The structures of cultural phenomena are the product of the same instrument: the human mind.

The theme of the unconscious is also apparent in contemporary culture. The interest in a therapeutical situation is not to be directed towards the conscious reasons and rationalizations given for conduct, but to the determining factors that are found in the unconscious life of man. The conscious level of speech can hide the unconscious factors restricted or suppressed by the superego. Lacan provides a distinct insight on Freud's concept of the unconscious, an insight which places the unconscious in the domain of sociological inquiry. Lacan suggests the view that the unconscious is merely the seat of instincts must be "re-thought." This provides little understanding and even a misunderstanding of Freud's theory, a misunderstanding that is perpetuated by ego psychology. The unconscious underlies man's desires that pertain to relations validated by the community and the symbolic order in general. This is consistent with Backer's view who argued that the traditional view of the Oedipus complex leads to the death of meaning in human relations, and that such relations are guided by factors
other than instincts such as the desire for prestige and what Becker called "the desire to be noticed," both of which come from others.

The concept of the unconscious is necessary for the study of such phenomena as art and literature, for such phenomena tend to hide the link and connection between the physical conditions of life and the ideas and institutions prevalent in a society (Barthes). The unconscious also relates to history. The apparent continuity in the development of knowledge overlooks shifts or discontinuities that do not manifest themselves at the conscious level. These shifts can be articulated through the analysis of texts that suggest new propositions, isolate new facts, build up new concepts, and advocate new modes of inquiry. Thus, the seventeenth century sought a shift in the episteme of knowledge when man was made the object of study. This led to the rise of such sciences as biology, economics, and philology that relate to man's being, work, and language (Foucault is more interested in the work of Ricardo that constitutes a break with previous views of labor than in that of Marx). The unconscious also characterizes other texts. Thus, Marx's writings embody a distinctive epistemology of which he was unaware. The epistemology is critical of the problematic of the classical text and attempts to establish a new problematic of political economy through the discovery of missing words in classical text (Althusser).
The unconscious exhibits itself through language. The unconscious is present in myth, patient's speech, and written texts in general. The unconscious can be analyzed through principles borrowed from linguistics such as the syntactical relation that exists between the different parts of a dream, for the unconscious itself is structured like language. The structuralist view does not disregard conscious expressions of cultural phenomena, but uses such expressions as a necessary bridge to the unconscious.

Proposition V

The themes of synchrony and diachrony were introduced by Saussure who argued that language is not a text subject to comparative analysis through time (diachronically), but a self-contained whole and must be studied in itself (synchronically). This resembles the metaphor of a game of chess. The fact that the game passed from Persia to Europe is independent from the internal rules of the game. Thus, the structural analysis examines not the evolution of myth through time, but the internal structure of such a myth cross culturally. The structure of myth does not lend itself to the process of evolution and it is the same everywhere. The structure is the product of the same instrument: the human mind. The manifestations of cultural phenomena cannot be attributed to the mind, but to the artificial conditions of social environment.
Levi-Strauss questions the perceptions of primitive thinking which postulate that such systems of thinking relate to an elementary stage in the development of knowledge. This view is a misconception based on an evolutionary scheme that regards one society as the most advanced expression of evolution and others as merely survivals of earlier stages. The primitive tends to build intelligible systems of thoughts on more abstract levels such as myth and religion. These are self-contained systems which do not subscribe to the evolutionary process. The primitive like the civilized observes, experiments, classifies, and theorizes. Thus, primitive thinking is as valid as civilized and what is primeval is not inferior. The mental activities of the primitive and the civilized do not differ in kind, but in the type of phenomena to which they are applied (Levi-Strauss).

The structuralist view does not disregard history, but demystifies the concept of time, for little history in the study of such phenomena as mythology is better than no history at all. Yet, history falls outside the domain of structuralist inquiry. History records transformations over time (not structurally) and organizes its facts in relation to conscious expression, not just in relation to unconscious conditions of cultural phenomena. The synchronical analysis is apparent in the study of Marx's text. The economic, political, ideological, and scientific spheres of social life are understood when analyzed synchronically: the way in which they relate to one
another in a system. The ideological sphere, for example, cannot be analyzed in isolation, for it is defined in terms of its relation to economic, political, and scientific spheres of a system. The relation between spheres, however, is less determinant because of the relative autonomy of each sphere and the mutual influence that spheres exercise upon one another (Althusser).

Proposition VI

The Different Historical Transformations Reflect Shifts, Ruptures, Breaks, or Discontinuities, and Do Not Lend Themselves to Uniform Models of Temporarization.

The development of knowledge is characterized by shifts or discontinuities. Hence, each historical period has an episteme: a mode of being that guides knowledge at a period in history. The episteme of a period can be altered when the amount of change in elements is so great that it amounts to a break with the existing system. The limitations of the evolutionary scheme are apparent in historical analysis. The major break in the development of knowledge occurred in the seventeenth century with the rise of science which made man the object of knowledge. This in particular can be articulated through the analysis of madness and criminology. The seventeenth century witnessed a shift in man's perception of madness when the mad were isolated and confined. This shaped a whole range of man's thinking and dealing with madness, particularly the creation of houses of confinement and
asylums and the development of the science of psychiatry. The seventeenth century altered man's view of criminology. The emphasis shifted from the punishment of the body to that of the soul. This led to the birth of prisons as institutions that not only isolated the criminal, but also sought to rehabilitate his soul and make him able to function in society. Foucault maintains that such institutions, whether mental hospitals or prisons, cannot liberate man from madness or criminal tendencies, for such institutions categorize the mad and the criminal and deny them any status or identity in the community. The world of institutions gave rise to a broken language where the language of the outsiders predominates and that of those inside is reduced to silence. Hence, such institutions perpetuate what they sought to eliminate. The discontinuity in historical analysis is apparent in the work of Althusser. Marxism is anti-historicism, Althusser suggests. Thus, each historical period has a distinct mode of production that is not an accumulation of events, but a phenomenon separate from the previous mode of production. There are forms of superstructure whose elements are survivals of earlier stages, but such elements are secondary manifestations and have no privileged position in the system. Thus, the French Revolution was a historical break that gave rise to a bourgeois mode of production, and the Russian Revolution similarly was another break that set the conditions for a socialist mode of production.
Proposition VII

The Object of Structural Analysis Is not Man the Possessor of Meanings, but the Structure of Cultural Phenomena of Which Man Is the Fabricator.

The structuralist perspective does not grant man a special status in the social world, for man is not a thing, but an activity governed by structures. The perspective proposes a shift from too much self-examination and the heroic vision of man as the source and the creator of his own history and institutions to the rules governing his thinking and behavior. Hence, man as such does not possess meanings. The meanings rather reside in the activity of man that cannot be understood in isolation, but in relation to structures (Levi-Strauss), symbolic order (Lacan), power (Barthes), mode of production (Althusser), or episteme (Foucault).

The activity of the primitive such as his systems of myth, rituals, magic, and kinship relates to structures that remain unconscious. The patient's speech relates to unconscious desires that pertain to the symbolic order. The different forms of art and literature, an activity of man, are languages whose signification relates to power structures. The Marxist epistemology rejects man's essence of freedom and rationality, and as such, it is anti-humanism. Marx's analytical method does not start from man, but from social and economic conditions that give rise to his activity. The content of a text does not depend on the life of its author, such text rather is caught up in a system of reference to
other works that relate to a particular episteme. Thus, the works of Cuvier, Ricardo, and Bopp relate to an episteme that made man the object of scientific inquiry. The episteme remains to be discovered for it governs those who work under its aegis. Thus, the concern with discipline and punishment since the seventeenth century derives from an episteme that seeks to acquire knowledge about the human subject: the normal and the mad.

Proposition VIII

The Different Aspects of Cultural Phenomena Closely Relate To Power, but that Power at Times Is Both Structuring and Structured Due to the Complexity and the Mutual Influence That Exists Between and Among the Different Spheres of the Social System.

The relation between cultural phenomena and power is an integral part of structural inquiry. Cultural phenomena such as the processes of discipline and punishment, literature, speech, and ideology cannot exist outside the domain of the exercise of power. This relation often is obscured when the unofficial language, which resists the language of power, is reduced to silence and the different expressions of cultural phenomena are viewed as signifiers without signification. Power and language are interrelated. Speech is not merely a verbalization of conflict, but the very object of man's conflict (Foucault). Human speech is the object of man's desire (Lacan). The struggle for the control of language in particular gives new dimension to social control in that such control is carried out through the most diffuse and effective means that constitute
the core of cultural phenomena: language. Hence, the perceptions of madness are the result of a discourse closely related to the power of reason. The language of madness, as unofficial language, is excluded from the common discourse. The individual is mad if his discourse is not part of the common discourse. The man, once categorized as such, is isolated and confined and his discourse is treated as null and void. The process of punishment is part of the exercise of power. Thus, when the human body was the property of the sovereign, punishment was directed against the body of the condemned. Later, when the human body was the property of a society governed by a social contract, punishment shifted to the soul of the criminal in an attempt to resocialize him. Literature, whether it is art, novel, sport, or theater, is related to social class. The content as well as the style of literature relates to the interest of a social class. Thus, classical literature was a language of the elite. Modern literature, although a plurality of texts, is a reflection of what Barthes calls the "bourgeois condition" and retains the basic feature of a classical text: instrumentality (Barthes). Power is a major theme in Marx's text. The political, ideological, and scientific spheres of a system relate to the economic conditions that constitute the basis of power (Althusser).

The extent to which power is used is dependent on the object to which power is applied. The control of language is not always dominated by a group, but at times language can be
a product of many participant individuals. The distinction between language, as a collective contract, and speech, as an individual act, informed Barthes' analysis of such cultural objects as food, fashion, furniture, and architecture. These systems do not merely originate from a group that deliberately elaborates the codes of such systems, but also from individuals who give these systems a particular character (Barthes). The control of the economic sphere of a system does not necessarily translate into the control of the political, ideological, and scientific spheres because of the relative autonomy of each sphere and the mutual influence that these spheres exercise upon one another (Althusser).

Proposition IX
The Criteria Underlying the Study of Cultural Phenomena Are Universal in Character.

The expressions of cultural phenomena vary cross culturally, but the structures governing such expressions are the same. These structures, which remain unconscious, are not relative but universal. Thus, the structure of totemism and the Oedipus myth is the same: an attempt to overcome contradictions between nature and culture. Levi-Strauss makes a distinction between relativism and universalism, a distinction widely accepted in psychoanalysis. The relative, made possible by customs and traditions, is cultural and the universal is natural. The problem of incest is not merely a cultural phenomenon, but a stage that marks the transition from nature to culture, and as
such, it is a universal phenomenon (Levi-Strauss). The aspect of universalism also characterizes the study of the unconscious that underlies the manifest content of human speech. The nature of the unconscious is dependent on a symbolic order, but the unconscious as a structure is present in any discourse (Lacan). The theme of universalism is inherent in Barthes' analysis of the way cultural phenomena relate to power and in Althusser's postulation of the way different spheres of a system relate to one another. Thus, a cultural element cannot be studied in isolation, but in relation to other elements of a culture (Barthes and Althusser).

Proposition X

Structural Inquiry Is Based on Empirical Observations. However, the Observable Is Only a Necessary Bridge To the Unconscious Structures of Cultural Phenomena.

The study of cultural phenomena is dependent on observable facts such as the different elements of myths, novels, theatrical plays, and other texts. The observable, however, is not examined as an end in itself, but as a necessary step that uncovers the unconscious structure of the phenomenon in question. That is, the surface levels of phenomena are to be explained by unconscious structures. This becomes necessary in the light of the fact that the human subject cannot provide justification (which are unconscious) for his thinking and behavior. The subject may not have adequate concepts that constitute the basis of expression. The thoughts of the subject do not exist in
isolation. The separation of thoughts from society is an error that relates to the complexity of modern society that obscures the real link between the physical conditions and ideals prevalent in society. The structural analysis, however, is dependent on empirical observations. Thus, the different elements of a myth are necessary to uncover the underlying structure of such myth. Here, Levi-Strauss maintains that the different versions of a myth do not alter the main theme of myth, for such myth is governed by a structure. This eliminates the problem of the plurality of versions that has been the main obstacles of the progress of mythological studies (Levi-Strauss). The manifest content of speech is necessary to uncover the unconscious desires of the speaker. The analyst brings into light such facts as memories, childhood experience, emotional development, family relationships, life style, and intellectual capacities to help delineate those desires that remain beyond the conscious expression of the speaker (Lacan). The elements of literature are to be studied as signifiers whose signification relates to the distribution of power. Barthes questions objectivity in the study of cultural phenomena for such objectivity leads to a type of language whose dominant feature is instrumentality. The writer, rather, must be engaged in the social world and make a choice (Barthes). Marx's text is an attempt to construct theoretical concepts and general laws operating behind the economic scene (Althusser). The study of texts of periods of history is necessary to discover the
unconscious intentions and activities which take place despite the authors and which relate to a particular episteme (Foucault).

The properties of structuralism expressed in these propositions constitute its contribution. These can be reduced to four essentially: the study of cultural phenomena as systems of language using principles developed in linguistics; the thesis that the structures of such phenomena are unconscious; the analysis of the internal composition of phenomena as synchronic totalities containing their own means of intelligibility; and the postulation that sense data are only a necessary means to uncover the underlying structures of phenomena. These characteristics distinguish structuralism from other theoretical perspectives in sociology.
CHAPTER IV

STRUCTURALISM AND SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

Structuralism evolved in a particular cultural context. The perspective emerged in the midst of an intense debate among different schools of thought such as existentialism, orthodox Marxism, humanist Marxism, rational philosophy, and phenomenology. The domain of structural inquiry, however, incorporates such cultural phenomena as kinship, literature, speech and communication, and texts in general that fall within the framework of sociological analysis. The structuralist perspective, although developed independently from other perspectives, has nonetheless dealt with the concerns of such perspectives as the functionalism of Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski that informed the functional theory of Parsons and Marxism that constitutes the basic of the conflict approach.

Structuralism: A Critique

Structuralism has been the subject of many criticisms that not only engaged in an activity of categorization, i.e., structuralism is neopositivism, neo-Marxism, French fashion, and speculative orientation based on linguistics, but also suggested that the age of structuralism is over. These criticisms, however, lack the qualification of a coherent and systematic criticism in that the method of criticism is typically absent and the criticism itself is without substance.
The exception to this is the work done by a number of Marxists who found themselves in the midst of discussion with the structuralists' main orientation such as Lefebvre and Schaff.

Structuralism is not without contradictions. The contradictions, however, are mostly of secondary importance, for they do not alter the main thrust of the perspective in question. This is particularly the case of Barthes' and Althusser's works that contain a method of criticism. Thus, what follows is less a criticism than an attempt to outline some of the gaps underlying the works of such structuralists as Levi-Strauss, Lacan, and Foucault.

Levi-Strauss' theory of kinship, although based in part on a critique of the functional view of Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown, did not always escape the path of functionalism when Levi-Strauss suggests the distribution of women is a system of communication that serves to maintain alliance among tribes and clans. The structure of such system is independent from its function and, to use Levi-Strauss' own argument, must be studied as such. Levi-Strauss' work on mythology seems to suggest that the unconscious structure of myth (primitive and modern) pertains mostly to the contradictions between culture and nature. This, when reproduced at the level of the individual, seems to be consistent with Freud's use of the unconscious. Yet, it does not incorporate the complexity and diversity of the unconscious, particularly as the latter came into light.
during the modern era, i.e., Stivers' view of the unconscious and the disintegration of the community during the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries (10). Lacan's theme of symbolic order can be questioned on the account that such order does not exist in isolation from the dominant structure of society. The process of speech analysis, although it takes care of power associated with transference in individual cases, omits the possible link between the symbolic order and the distribution of power. The symbolic order can be consistent with the exercise of power, and thus, individual's integration can be problematic. Power, as Habermas points out, can alter the content of communication present in the language of the community. Foucault's analysis of history seems to exclude the diachronical aspect of cultural phenomena. The priority of the synchronical over the historical analysis is consistent with the structuralist inquiry, but the two types of analysis, as Saussure suggests, are interrelated. Further, Foucault's thesis of the current crisis of Western culture is not well articulated. The notion that man as an object of study is coming to an end is questionable because many social sciences are still in their infancy in their understanding of man and his behavior, unless what Foucault meant by such an end is the study of the manifest and conscious expression present in man's thinking and behavior that would be consistent with the structuralist mode of inquiry.

The works of Lefebvre and Schaff present a comprehensive critique of Althusser's method of reading Marx. However, such
criticism is presented in a greater length. The work of Lefebvre presents a type of interpretation that emphasizes the continuity between the early and later writings of Marx. Lefebvre views the present struggle with Marxism as between the dogmatists, advocates of officialized and institutionalized Marxism, and the critics of such dogmatism. Lefebvre suggests:

Dogmatism is strong, it can call on the force of authority, of the State and its institutions. Moreover, it has advantages: it is simple and easily taught; it steers clear of complex problems, this being precisely the aim and meaning of dogmatism; it gives its adherents a feeling of both vigorous affirmation and security (6, p. 13).

Lefebvre notes that there is a deep mistrust that prevails with regard to Marx's early writings. The dogmatists fear, not without cause, that Marx's thought would be understood quite differently if these newly published works were read, and thus, made their dogmatism more rigid so as to protect it against the impact of such writings. There are basic concepts such as alienation, praxis, the total man, and social totality that were being rediscovered and when "those who had read the young Marx were clearing the way for the rediscovery of Hegel, the dogmatists were moving in the opposite direction." The dogmatists became "more contemptuous than ever of Hegel and Hegelianism and rejected Marx's early writings" (6, p. 14).

Lefebvre suggests that there is a clear continuity between early and later writings of Marx. The Holy Family, the Jewish Question and the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right show that Marx's economic theory did not destroy his concrete
humanism but made it richer and explicit. Marx's inquiry into economics is an integral part of social practice and man's relation with each other. To Lefebvre, Marxism is far from asserting that the only reality is economic reality and that "there is an absolute economic fatalism." Marxism rather declares that an economic destiny is relative, provisional, and "destined to be transcended once men have become aware of their possibilities, and that this transcending will be the essential, infinitely creative act of our own age" (6, p. 16). Lefebvre suggests, "We can and must read Marx with fresh eyes, especially the early works, which it is wrong to call 'philosophical' since they contain a radical critique of all systematic philosophy." Marx suggests, "The becoming-philosophy of the world is at the same time a becoming-world of philosophy, its realization is also its destruction" (6, p. 19). The domain of Marx's philosophy is of a programmatic nature that provides man with a programme or a project. This project must be brought face to face with reality that is the praxis or social practice. This confrontation introduces new elements and poses problems other than those of philosophy. Lefebvre writes, "At a time when dogmatism is crumbling and dissolving, the early writings of Marx become of the first importance." These writings "enable us to reinstate the problems raised by his ideas and by Marxism, problems which are still fundamentally our own ones" (6, p. 19).
The dogmatists and formal logicians' interpretations of dialectical materialism are limited. Their analysis is based on the notion that Marx's early writings were tainted with idealism and as having preceded the formulation of dialectical materialism. This led to a simplified Marxism reduced to a recognition of the practical and material world "as it is," without additions or interpretations. The laws of the dialectic, by leaving out the mediation of logic and discourse, were reduced to the law of nature. This type of Marxism became an economism "deprived of any depth in the interests of a utilitarianism at once constricted and robust." The theories of the real, as Hegel remarked, have "always been much too soft-hearted towards things, they have busied themselves rooting out contradictions from the real only to carry them over into the mind and leave them unresolved" (6, p. 22). Lefebvre asserts that up to Leibinz, the Western mind was engaged in the heroic but vain attempt to extract the content from the form and pass logically from thought Being to existent Being. The relation between content and form in formal logic is therefore "ill-defined and debatable." (6, p. 25). Hegel, seeking to rescue logic, attempted to find the link between the form and reality fluid and diverse, and consequently, to transform the form of traditional logic. Hegel started not from the form, but from the content, that rich content that was so diverse and contradictory but that had already been worked on through thousands of years of human activity. To Lefebvre, "we must
start from the content." The content comes first and the real
being determines dialectical thought. The object of this method
is to "take possession of the matter in its detail, to analyze
its various forms of development, and to discover its inner
laws" (6, p. 25).

Praxis is where dialectical materialism both starts and
finishes. Praxis denotes in philosophical terms what common
sense refers to as real life that is at once more prosaic and
dramatic than that of the speculative intellect. Lefebvre
suggests:

The aim of dialectical materialism is nothing less
than the rational expression of the praxis, of the actual
content of life and, correlately, the transformation of
the present praxis into a social practice, that is,
conscious, coherent, and free. Its theoretical aim and
its practical aim cannot be separated (6, p. 112).

The content (praxis) consists of multiple representations
of desire, material objects, impressions and intuitions, nature,
and human experience. From this raw material, the notions that
are immersed in it have got to be extracted. Lefèbvre suggests,
"We must tear away the veil from substantial life and raise it
to the highest degree of rationality" (6, p. 29). To this end,
reason must be defined by the movement of thought. The dialectic,
as the immediate relation between thought and its diverse
content, is no longer outside logic, but an integral part that
transforms by transforming itself. The dialectic becomes the
life and the internal movement of thought: both content and
form.
Hegelianism, however, is not without contradictions. Hegel speculative attitude is in an awkward position vis-a-vis content in that such attitude seeks to exhaust and define the content and introduces it into absolute knowledge. To Lefebvre, as content develops, it becomes richer and more profound. Indeed, "mind's life of discovery and creation did not come to an end with Hegel," says Lefebvre (6, p. 49). Lefebvre summarizes the relevance of Hegel:

Hegel's ambition remains valid and coincides with that of philosophy. A way has been opended. Perhaps it is possible to transcend Hegelianism on its own terms, from inside, by starting from its own contradictions and preserving what is essential in its mode of operation. Perhaps we must accept the 'rich content' of life in all its immensity: nature, spontaneity, action, widely differing cultures, fresh problems. It may swamp our minds, we may have to explore it and study it in greater depth without being able to exhaust it, but we must open our minds to it. Thought must accept the contradictions and conflicts in the content, it must determine their transcending and their solutions in accordance with the movement of that content, and not to impose a priori and systematic forms on it (6, p. 59).

Marx wrote to Engels:

I have thrown overboard the whole theory of profit as it has existed up until now. I have been greatly helped in working out my method because, purely by chance, I have been browsing through Hegel's logic again. When the time comes to resume this sort of work, I shall very much want to publish two or three papers which will render the rational element of the method which Hegel both discovered and turned into a mystery accessible to common sense (6, p. 82).

Engels articulates the elements of Marx's mature thought: the materialist conception and the Hegelian dialectic. The materialist conception asserts:

At a certain stage of their development the material forces of production come into conflict with the existing
relations of production ... Having been up until this time a form of development of the forces of production, these relations of property are transformed into obstacle ... A form of society never passes away before all the forces of production it may contain have been developed; superior relations of production are never substituted for this form before the conditions for their existence have been incubated in the heart of the old form of society. This is why humanity never sets itself problems it cannot solve (6, p. 83).

The other element is the method of Hegelian dialectic that was the only valid element in the existing logic. The method "started from the idea and we must start from the facts," says Lefebvre (6, p. 84). The aspects of idealism and materialism are not only united but transformed and transcended in Marx's dialectical materialism. This method forms the simplest fundamental relations (economic relations) one can find historically, but economic relations are not the only relations but the simplest ones, the ones found again as "moments" in complex relations. Dialectical materialism as currently interpreted looks on ideas, institutions and cultures as frivolous and unimportant superstructures above an economic substance that alone is solid. To Lefebvre, true materialism is quite different. This materialism determines the practical relations inherent in every organized human existence and studies them inasmuch as they are concrete conditions of existence for cultures or ways of life. The simple relations (economic relations) are involved in the richer and more complex determinations, but they do not exhaust them. The given content is always a concrete totality and dialectical materialism is not an economism in that it analyzes
relations and then reintegrates them into the total movement.

Schaff, in a well-documented essay on Marxism, denies Althusser's claim that Marxism is devoid of ideology and that Marxism is anti-empiricism, anti-historicism, and anti-humanism. This claim, Schaff argues, is outright dangerous and clearly in contradiction with universally accepted Marxist theses. Further, the ultimate error in Althusser's assertions do not reside so much in the version of Marxism he sought to advance, but in presenting what he did as a Marxist thing. Althusser, as Aron puts it, resorted to a well-know theological trick of "presenting one's own ideas as the orthodox ones" (8, p. 96).

Althusser asserts that what is ideological is erroneous and mystified, and what is scientific is identical with objective truth. Hence, Marxism is devoid of ideology and is purely scientific in character. The use of "ideology" in Althusser's work is extremely ambiguous. The concept is described as a phenomenon characterized by the fact "its own problematic is not conscious of itself"; as "what does not coincide with the actual realities of history, what is mystified, and what is alienated"; as something that designates "a certain reality, but does not enable us to know it"; and as a "system of representation" (8, pp. 43-47). The concept of ideology, Schaff suggests, has its own history and manifests itself and changes in a given social environment. The concept is attributed to Napoleon I who termed "ideologist" an intellectual who is dissociated from the practical policies and problems and
"fails to see facts and says things that do not make sense" (8, p. 57). Marx and Engels who inherited the concept with an established connotation questioned the Hegelians who engaged in speculations and confined themselves to interpreting the world instead of changing it. Marx and Engels viewed ideology as proper to the bourgeoisie that falsifies, through the intermediary of ideologists, the actual social relations and mystify them in the interest of the propertied classes. The ideology also is found in the workers' movement when the latter turns from "a class in itself to a class for itself" in which consciousness plays a decisive role (8, p. 58). Thus, ideology acquires a genetic element that refers to class interests and gives rise to certain views and attitudes. Mannheim maintains that the thesis of social conditioning of cognition is restricted to its system of reference. Thus, Marx can be blamed for "not having applied his correct theses on the social conditioning of cognition to his own theory" (8, pp. 59-60). Mannheim's view and Althusser's scientific Marxism, however, fail to grasp the difference in the social conditioning of cognition and the facts involved in the construction of ideology. The value system that every ideology must include can be based on various assumptions such as religious faith, socially accepted superstition, or pseudo-scientific theories like Nazi socialism, but it can also rest, as Marxist ideology claims, on the scientific analysis of social facts. The latter distinguishes Marxist ideology from other forms of unscientific ideologies.
The assertion that Marxism is anti-historicism is at variance with Marx's criticism of classical economics. Marx maintains that men who produce social relations according to their prevailing mode of material production also produce ideas, categories, and other abstract expressions of social relations. These expressions, however, are not eternal, but historical and transitory products. Marx bases his approach on the transitory nature of production and rejects the classical analysis that makes capitalism eternal by negating its historical and transitory nature. Marxism is not anti-humanism. The social structure contains an essential component that consists of human beings with their abilities and attitudes. The individuals are not merely agents of production, but instruments of production and the appropriate abilities to use them, for as Marx puts it, "men themselves make their history" (8, p. 117). The claim that Marxism is anti-humanistic seems to be advanced merely to support the thesis of an epistemological break that suggests the young Marx was ideologically minded and the mature Marx was scientific. This, Schaff argues, is an invalidate thesis, for all those problems found in the work of the so-called young Marx are also found in the works of the so-called mature Marx. There is not doubt that Marx's views were undergoing modifications, but this is rather a trivial fact as it is common knowledge that this is the case of every thinker of some significance.
A Structural Critique of Sociological Theory

The attempt to relate structuralism to other perspectives in sociology is suggestive and not exhaustive and a comparison even at the level of individual authors can be a subject for many analyses. This attempt sets some grounds for a constructive dialogue between structuralism and sociology through a contrast between structuralism and the perspectives of functionalism, conflict theory, symbolic interactionism, and phenomenology that incorporate the traditional and the contemporary approaches in sociology.

The works of a number of structuralists have directly or indirectly dealt with themes prevailing in functionalism (Levi-Strauss), conflict perspective (Althusser and Barthes), and phenomenology (Foucault). The work of Levi-Strauss in part is based on a critique of functionalism. The functional perspective, according to Levi-Strauss, can be questioned on two counts: (a) the assumption that every element of society has a function, and (b) the belief that the structure of society is to be observed directly as a surface phenomenon. The element, says Levi-Strauss, is independent from function. The cause that brings the element into existence is independent from the function of such element. The functional perspective does not distinguish between the function and the consequence of something and often takes for a cause who is only a consequence (? , p. 99). Thus, Malinowski and Durkheim analyzed totemism
in the context of the function of such phenomena and concluded that totemism exhibits a concern with natural species because the latter supply man with needs, giving rise to intense emotions (Malinowski) and maintaining social solidarity (Durkheim). This analysis, says Levi-Strauss, is tautological. A phenomenon exists because it has a function(s), and it has a function(s) because it exists. The functional perspective is deterministic. Thus, if a given mythology confers prominence to a certain character, say an evil grandmother, it will be claimed that in such a society, grandmothers are actually evil and that mythology reflects the social structure and social relations of that society. Levi-Strauss suggests to say that society functions is "a truism," and to say that everything in society functions is "an absurdity." The structure of cultural phenomena does not manifest itself at the surface level, says Levi-Strauss. The surface level is a manifestation of a deep structure that remains unconscious. Thus, totemism is a distinct phenomenon governed by an unconscious structure: the attempt to overcome contradictions between nature and culture. The field of functional anthropology tended to provide a conservative interpretation of cultural phenomena and lend support to the existing social arrangement with little regard to the influence of power and structure of domination (see next section for further elaboration on structuralism and the functional perspective).
Althusser and Barthes accept the main thrust of the conflict perspective: that cultural phenomena closely relate to the distribution of power and to the social and economic conditions of a society. Althusser, however, questions such perspectives on a particular thesis: the nature of the relation between economy and ideology. The conflict perspective asserts the moving forces of history are economic conditions. The deepest causes of social change are the forces of production that are reflected in the relations of production. The economic conditions give rise to cultural superstructures consisting essentially of ideological justification for the existing relations. This assertion is deterministic and based on a misunderstanding of Marx's text, says Althusser. The relation between the economic and the political, ideological, and scientific spheres of a system is less determinant because of the relative autonomy of each sphere and the mutual influence that these spheres exercise upon one another (see Althusser's analysis).

Symbolic interactionism presents some difficulty, for this perspective emerged in a different cultural milieu with interest in socialization and self-development and remained a distinct and independent perspective vis-a-vis structuralism. The exception to this is probably the work of Lacan that comes close to the concerns of symbolic interactionism, particularly his theory of the mirror stage and the three orders of self development (see Lacan's analysis). The structuralist
perspective and symbolic interactionism can be compared using as a frame of reference Lauer and Handel's assumptions of symbolic interaction. The following comparison and contrast is thus suggested: (a) Symbolic interaction emphasizes social interaction through which individuals construct social reality. The structuralist perspective emphasizes cultural phenomena such as myth, literature, art, and texts in general that have an independent existence and must be studied as such; (b) Symbolic interaction emphasizes interdependence between the individual and society. Thus, "the meaning of events can be changed by the creative actions of individuals and the individual may influence the complexity of meanings that comprise his or her culture as well as being influenced by it" (5, p. 16). The structuralist perspective de-emphasizes the importance of the individual. The distinction between language and speech seem to come close to symbolic interaction's assumption of the interdependence between culture and the individual, but structuralists maintain that the action of individuals is governed by unconscious structures of their cultural phenomena; (c) The concept of "meaning" in symbolic interaction is regarded as "the product of a continuous interpretive process" among individuals in social interaction (5, p. 16). The structuralist perspective suggests the object of analysis is not "meaning," but structures. The perspective postulates that the emphasis is on the relations among words, rather than the relation of each word to the object it
designates. That is, the emphasis is not on the meaning of
the word, but on the patterns the words form. Thus, if there
is a meaning to be found in myth, this cannot reside in the
isolated elements which enter into its composition, but in the
way those elements are combined; and (d) Symbolic interaction
suggests, "Social life is unique in that the use of symbols
has emerged within it" (5, p. 22). Thus, symbols, as repre-
sentations of something else that provide meanings, are
necessary for the process of communication and interaction. The
structuralist perspective views language as a system of signs
whose signification remains unconscious. Language is a chain
of signifiers. The signifier and the signified are interrelated
and the task of the analyst is to underlie what the sign
signifies. The one structuralist whose work comes close to
the concern of symbolic interaction is Lacan who argues that
the development of self depends on the extent to which the
individual becomes part of the symbolic order prevailing in
society. The symbolic order is validated by the community of
signifiers (individuals) or what symbolic interactionists would
call social interaction. Lacan brings the unconscious to the
domain of sociological inquiry and argues that the "id" does
not pertain merely to instincts, but also to the symbolic
order in society.

The field of phenomenology is questioned on its basic
assumption that the object of inquiry is man's subjective and
lived experience and on the attempt to account for the
transcendental condition of thought through the logical analysis of consciousness as such (Foucault). The object of structural analysis is not man who thinks, but the structure of language which "speaks in and through him." As Merleau-Ponty puts it, social facts "are neither things nor ideas, but structures" (2, p. 307). Merleau-Ponty probably is one of the few phenomenologists who recognized the necessity to shift away from the study of man as the subject of experience to the study of the objective structures of language.

Structuralism and Other Theoretical Perspectives: A Comparison

The attempt to advance a comparison between structuralism and the different perspectives in sociology is not an easy task. These perspectives not only pertain to a variety of intellectual origins and traditions, but also are less unified perspectives incorporating sub-approaches that often deviate from the path of the perspective in question. The different themes and concerns of structuralism often are not explicitly examined or made thematic by the perspectives in question. Here, an attempt was made to present the position of each perspective on the basis of its essential propositions and without violating its main thrust. The notion of comparison is possible at the level of generalization. The aspect of generalization often is made at the expense of detail and carefully delineated accounts. This generalization, however, is necessary, the more detail one seeks acquire, the more it is difficult to compare and generalize. Here, the basic assumptions of structuralism are used as a
frame of reference of such comparison. (Table One).

The functional perspective regards language as a part in a complex setting of social interaction, and not a distinct system of its own. The different cultural phenomena consist of social interaction that incorporates an interdependent mechanism of personality, system, and culture. These phenomena are "systems in which all the parts depend on each other and work together to create equilibrium" (12, p. 75). Cultural phenomena as structures in themselves are analyzed "in terms of the functions they perform in a social-cultural system" (12, p. 14). The perspective omits the analysis of the unconscious. Merton attempts to provide an account for the latent and manifest functions of institutions, but these remain consequences and not unconscious elements governing the institution. The perspective maintains that a social pattern is best understood not in terms of its historical origin, but on the basis of the function that such pattern provides in a society. The perspective disregards history. The process of change in any part "is seen as leading to a certain degree of imbalance" (12, p. 14). Power is "embodied in political institutions that solve 'the functional imperative' of goal attainment" and is necessary for the maintainance of social order (12, p. 122). The social forces in a society tend to determine the behavior of individuals. These forces vary cross culturally and are relative. These social forces exist to perform functions necessary for the existence of a given
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Column</th>
<th>Structuralism</th>
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<th>Phenomenology</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I.</td>
<td>Cultural phenomena (CP) are systems of language, language is an independent entity and is studied as such.</td>
<td>Language is an element of social interaction and a facilitating mechanism for &quot;real&quot; structures of society.</td>
<td>Language is necessary for both class and false consciousness, but not an independent structure.</td>
<td>Language is a system of symbols through which people construct social structures and social reality, but not a system of its own.</td>
<td>Language and speech in part explain intersubjective communication, but language is not a system of its own.</td>
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<td>II.</td>
<td>CP are systems of signs, a sign is a unit of a signifier and a significatum.</td>
<td>CP are products of social interaction in complex settings encompassing personality, system, and culture.</td>
<td>CP are closely related to the economic base of society.</td>
<td>CP are meaningful entities resulting from patterned symbolic interaction.</td>
<td>CP are typification resulting from the construction of meaning in everyday life.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.</td>
<td>CP are manifestations of structures, a structure is characterized by totality, transformation, and self-regulation.</td>
<td>CP are structures in themselves and are studied as such.</td>
<td>CP often reflect the relations and contradictions that exist in economic reality.</td>
<td>CP are dynamic processes whose content depends on a give-and-take relation between the individual and society.</td>
<td>CP are essential structures which are dependent on activities and meanings in the life world.</td>
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<td>IV.</td>
<td>The underlying structures of CP are unconscious, the unconscious however, is accessible through linguistically mediated form.</td>
<td>The perspective does not provide an explanation for the unconscious.</td>
<td>The closest concept which may relate to the unconscious is &quot;false consciousness&quot; or &quot;alienation&quot; which results from manipulation of power.</td>
<td>Unconscious aspects of interactions are viewed only tangentially as the absence of reflecting.</td>
<td>The perspective does not provide an explanation for the unconscious.</td>
</tr>
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<td>V.</td>
<td>Structural analysis emphasizes the synchronal aspects of CP.</td>
<td>The perspective emphasizes the interdependence of the different parts of the system, but disregards history.</td>
<td>The synchronal and the historical analyzer are equally important.</td>
<td>The emphasis is on the interdependence between the individual and society, but the position of the perspective in relation to history is not clear.</td>
<td>History exists as the performed typification resulting from the consciousness of pre-consciousness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI.</td>
<td>Historical transformations reflect units and discontinuities.</td>
<td>The perspective subscribes to an orderly process of evolution, i.e., from mechanical, structured to organically structured society.</td>
<td>The perspective advocates social change, but questions whether radical change is a logical process of development or a rupture with previous stages of development.</td>
<td>The process of social change takes place through social interaction between individuals in relation to institutions.</td>
<td>Social change results from changes in consciousness which in turn bring about change in social typifications.</td>
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<td>VII.</td>
<td>The object of study is not man the consumer of meaning, but structures of which man is the facilitator.</td>
<td>The objects of study are social institutions which mold and determine individual behavior.</td>
<td>The objects of study are dialectical processes between groups and major cultural elements.</td>
<td>The object of study is social interaction of which unique individuals construct their institutions.</td>
<td>The object of study is the world of experience constituted by consciousness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII.</td>
<td>CP are closely related to power.</td>
<td>Coercion is generally viewed as necessary for social control and the maintenance of social order.</td>
<td>CP are closely related to power.</td>
<td>The position of the perspective in relation to power is not clearly delineated, although the perspective often exhibits sensitivity to power.</td>
<td>Power is treated tangentially as effect of reification.</td>
</tr>
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<td>IX.</td>
<td>The criteria underlying the study and the structure of CP are universal.</td>
<td>CP are relative.</td>
<td>CP are both relative and universal.</td>
<td>CP are both relative and universal.</td>
<td>CP are both relative and universal.</td>
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<tr>
<td>X.</td>
<td>Empirical observations are only necessary to the unconscious structures of CP.</td>
<td>Empirical observations are often necessary for social control and the maintenance of social order.</td>
<td>Empirical observations are studied to account for the underlying relations that remain to the economic realm.</td>
<td>The empirical observation of symbolic communication is both the data and the end of the analysis.</td>
<td>Empirical observation can only occur as aspects of the consciousness of individuals, that is, from inside rather than outside the observed experience.</td>
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* Italics indicate limitations.
society. The empirical observations are studied in themselves and for the purpose of generalization that provides a macro-level interpretation of social structures.

The conflict perspective views language as necessary for the development of class consciousness or the creation of false consciousness, although the notion of whether language is a superstructure is a controversial theme within the perspective. The legal, political, and cultural "superstructures" are "ultimately a product and reflection of underlying economic relationships" (12, p. 94). The closest concept that comes close to the unconscious is false consciousness "whose main purpose and effect is to legitimize and maintain the position of those currently in control" (12, p. 94). The unconscious and false consciousness, however, are not identical. The concept of false consciousness refers to a system of thought developed to perpetuate and preserve the interests of the elite. This can ultimately be overcome when the powerless develop consciousness that discloses the true character of these obscure systems. The unconscious is broad and incorporates a variety of systems such as the contradiction between nature and culture, the "id," the signifiers, the episteme, and the problematic. The perspective regards the different spheres of social life such as the economic and the ideological spheres as interdependent (synchronously) that can be understood in terms of their historical position and origin (historically). The social system is characterized by conflict, competition,
opposition, and social change. The notion of whether radical change evolves as a logical development and an accumulation of contradictions or a rupture with previous stages of development is not clearly delineated. The objects of study are mechanisms such as power that underlies social relations among groups and between groups and other cultural elements. The different aspects of cultural phenomena, regardless of their cultural context, are closely dependent on the economic base, but the nature and the mechanism by which a social system is maintained very cross culturally and through history. The empirical observation are necessary accounts for social reality underlying economic relations in a society.

Symbolic interactionism maintains that language is a "vehicle of meanings" (1, p. 6). Language is "not only a means of communication (and thereby important in interaction), it is also a symbol system basic to human thinking" (1, p. 5). Language is a means of communication and a means of representing situations to and reflecting on them; mind and interaction are both symbolic processes. This language, as a vehicle of significant symbols, is not, however, a system of its own. The focus of the perspective is on social interaction, a phenomenon that links the person to others and to which one must look for the evidence of social structure. The perspective emphasizes the interdependence between the individual and society. This interdependence accounts for the dynamic aspect of social interaction and social change. The position of the
perspective in relation to history is not clear, although a suggestion is made that "roles are not to be viewed as the spontaneous creation of individuals at a given time, but the culmination of a long development" (1, p. 12). Power is present in social interaction, but often is not made thematic. The different social structures are constructions and, thus, are relative. The empirical observations are ends in themselves and mostly relate to symbolic communication and meanings.

Phenomenology postulates that language cannot be separated from consciousness nor can consciousness be separated from language (11, p. 21). Language is necessary for intersubjective communication based on "reciprocity of perspectives" (1, p. 24). Cultural phenomena are typifications resulting from the construction of meanings in everyday life. The process of social interaction involves taking the attitude of the other and this depends on the other acting in typical (i.e., typifiable, understandable) way." Typifications are "flexible, reflecting the specific, momentary interest of the participant, every shift entailing a change in typification" (1, p. 29). These typification are essential structures that are understood through phenomenological techniques such as epoch, bracketing, and imaginative variation. The object of phenomenolgical study is the life world "as given in the immediate experience." The life world designates a "total sphere of experiences of an individual ... encountered in the pursuit of pragmatic objective of living" (11, pp. 114-115). The aspect of history relates
to the performed typification resulting from the consciousness of predecessors. This aspect also relates to time as an experience (in contrast to clock time) and relevance that designates "the importance ascribed by an individual to selected aspects, etc. of specific situations and of his activities and plans" (9, p. 320). The empirical observation occur as aspects of the consciousness of the individual, that is from "inside" rather than from "outside" of observed experience.

The structuralist perspective is not merely an instance of that healthy theoretical pluralism, but a distinct perspective that questions basic tenets of functionalism, conflict theory, symbolic interactionism, and phenomenology and proposes a new orientation in the study of cultural phenomena. This orientation incorporates linguistic principles, psychoanalytic theory, and Marxism. The perspective in particular makes basic contributions to sociology: the postulation that cultural phenomena are systems of language and must be studied as such, and the view that the structures of such phenomena are unconscious. The structuralist examines process such as deep structure, power, myth, ideology, and historical shifts, all of which are sociological in character. The structuralist ought to take its place as a major theoretical perspective in that rich, and complex system of knowledge known as sociological theory.
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CHAPTER V

TOWARD A SYNCHRONICAL STUDY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS
STRUCTURES OF CULTURAL PHENOMENA

The structuralist perspective is a relatively recent phenomenon in the development of French intellectual history. The more proximate roots of the perspective can be traced to Saussure, a linguist whose *Course in General Linguistics* made him the most credited precursors of structuralism. The principles of linguistics were first applied in the study of cultural phenomena when Levi-Strauss sought to study kinship, totemism, and myth as systems of language guided by linguistic properties such as the principle of binary opposition. This made Levi-Strauss the undisputed father of structuralism. The central themes of structuralism, however, have more recently been reconstructed in the writings of post-structuralists, namely Lacan, Barthes, Althusser, and Foucault whose domain of inquiry incorporates psychoanalysis, literature, ideology, and history.

This study sought to examine and synthesize the major works of structuralists and suggest the contribution of structuralism to sociological theory. The works of each structuralist were presented in the order in which they were published. The section subtitles referring to each work are alternative titles that better explain or reflect the content
of the analysis and the summary. The basic proposition of structuralism were then presented. These propositions, which constitute the structuralists' contribution, can be reduced to four essentially: the study of cultural phenomena as systems of language using principles developed in linguistics; the thesis that the structures of such phenomena are unconscious; the analysis of the internal composition of phenomena as synchronic totalities containing their means of intelligibility; and the postulation that sense data are only a necessary means to uncover the underlying structures of phenomena. The attempt was made to compare structuralism to other perspectives such as functionalism and conflict theory. Here, a case was made that the structuralist perspective questions the basic tenets of such perspectives and proposes a new direction in the study of cultural phenomena, a direction that incorporates linguistic principles, psychoanalytic theory, and Marxism.

The field of structuralism, as a distinct perspective, has a contribution to make both as method and theory. The perspective manages to integrate the concepts developed in such diverse disciplines as linguistics, psychoanalysis, political economy, literary criticism, and philosophy and break down the barriers between such fields as sociology and other sciences in general. This is especially apparent when it comes to examining cultural phenomena such as kinship, art literature, discourse, and written texts where the structu-
ralist perspective is at its strongest. The perspective further can be specifically applicable to the following domains of inquiry.

1. The study of myths, primitive and modern, using Levi-Strauss' mode of inquiry that seeks to uncover the structure of such myths with the aid of linguistic principles.


3. The study of madness and mental illness on the basis of Foucault's assertion that healing process and constructive dialogue with madness can be understood only outside the context of mental institutions where the mad can take his place as a member of the community at large.

4. The study of criminology. This can be guided by Foucault's postulation that modern prison can only perpetuate crimes it sought to eliminate and, as such, there is a need for social settings whereby the deviant can play a role in the community where he is expected to function properly.

5. The study of art, comic strips, photojournalism, and literature as systems of signs using Barthes' insights on the possible link between art and literature and the social conditions of life.

6. The analysis of historical texts to uncover the underlying problematic of such texts (Althusser) or the underlying episteme of the historical period (Foucault).
Structuralism, as a distinct perspective, provides a new dimension of the study of cultural phenomena. The perspective in particular proposes a cultural interpretation of the domains of mythology, criminology, madness and mental illness, art, literature, theatrical play, mass media, speech in clinical setting, historical transformation, and the dialectical process of change. This interpretation incorporates principles of linguistics such as the theory of sign and the synchronical analysis of phenomena, psychoanalytic theory particularly the theme of the unconscious, and Marxist conception of power as it relates to the social and economic conditions of a society.

The most revealing aspects of the structuralist perspective is the attempt to apply the unconscious to the study of cultural phenomena. The theme of the unconscious, as developed by Freud, changed the episteme of psychological inquiry and made it possible to underlie the mental processes of which the individual is not immediately aware such as drives and desires, and what Whyte refers to as "organic or personal tendencies or needs, memories, motives, intentions, policies, beliefs, assumptions, thoughts, and dishonesties" (1, p. ?). The study of the unconscious, whether it manifests itself in the individual or in cultural phenomena, remained outside the domain of inquiry of the different perspectives in sociology, and was not made thematic. The theories of self associated with the field of symbolic interactionism
define self as "a conscious process," a theory that "fits the assumptions of the American ideology to see the self emerge in a rational way sensitive to one's family and peer groups." Here, sociologists, as Stivers puts it, "tended to shy away from the unconscious largely because it could not be directly observed and because they did not know how to study it sociologically" (1, p. 7). This, however, would now be difficult to justify. The study of the unconscious is based on inference that is no less scientific than the study that limits itself to the conscious expression of a phenomenon. The process of inference is not arbitrary, but it is guided by certain principles such as the presence of split, failure, displacement, impediment, transferance, etc., in a discourse (Freud and Lacan). The work of the different structuralists is based in part on an attempt to apply the unconscious to the study of cultural phenomena. Thus, Levi-Strauss examines the synchronical interdependence of various elements of myth and suggests that the myth of the so-called primitive society is guided by unconscious structure: the attempt to overcome the contradiction between nature and culture. Lacan attempts to ground the unconscious in a sociological type of inquiry and argues that the unconscious is not merely the seat of instincts, but also of elements pertaining to the symbolic order of a given society. The unconscious also characterizes the study of art and literature. Here, Barthes maintains that the different
forms of cultural expressions such as comic strips, press, novel, and poetry must be analyzed as systems of signs whose signification remains to be discovered in accordance with the way in which a given society is organized, the distribution of power, and the historical period in which such expressions emerge. The study of historical texts reveals that such texts reflect a particular episteme that manifests itself despite the author of the text (Foucault) and that such texts contain their own problematic of which the author is not aware (Althusser). The process of inference in the study of the unconscious structures underlying cultural phenomena is not arbitrary, but it is based on certain principles that can be called cultural and sociological such as contradiction, symbolic order, signified, episteme, and problematic.

The study of the unconscious acquires new signification in modern society, for as Barthes puts it, the complexity of modern society tends to hide the real link between the conscious expressions of cultural phenomena and the social conditions of life. Here, the study of mythology and literature is of particular importance, for such systems of representations can often escape the influence of power and, thus, reveal structures which could not be revealed through other conscious cultural expressions. The system of mythology and literature, particularly modern system, can also be used as means of social control (Barthes). As Stivers suggests,
"With modern instrumental rationality embedded in technology exist mythology and a system of rituals, which to a larger extent escape our conscious awareness" (1, p. 8). This mythology often addresses itself to the unconscious and irrational instincts as a means of social control (2). Hence, the study of the unconscious is indispensable for the study of cultural phenomena, primitive and modern.

This study sought to synthesize the principal themes of structuralism and suggest how structuralism as a perspective relates to sociology. Chapter I includes historical background and the major influences that gave rise to structuralism in France. Chapter II is a sociological reading and a synthesis of the major works of Levi-Strauss, the father of structuralism, and those of the post structuralists: Lacan, Barthes, Foucault, and Althusser. This part consists of the major themes which constitute the main thrust of structuralism. Chapter III is an outline of the basic assumptions of structuralism which presents structuralism as a distinct perspective. Chapter IV includes a structural critique of sociological theory, a critique of structuralism itself, and an attempt to provide a comparison between structuralism and other theoretical perspectives, namely functionalism, Marxism, symbolic interactionism, and phenomenology. Chapter V, lastly, suggests a new orientation toward the study of cultural phenomena. This study can serve as a basis for further analyses on structuralism and its application to inquiries of the sociological type, for
few if any analyses attempted to synthesize and articulate the basic properties of structuralism as a contemporary perspective whose subject matter fall within the domain of sociological inquiry.

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