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INDIA'S NONALIGNMENT POLICY AND THE AMERICAN
RESPONSE, 1947-1960

DISSERTATION

Presented to the Graduate Council of the North
Texas State University in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements

For the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

By

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Denton, Texas

May, 1987

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Georgekutty, Thadathil V., India's Nonalignment policy and the American Response, 1947-1960. Doctor of Philosophy (American History), May, 1987, 316 pp., bibliography, 164 titles.

India's nonalignment policy attracted the attention of many newly independent countries for it provided an alternative to the existing American and Russian views of the world. This dissertation is an examination of both India's nonalignment policy and the official American reaction to it during the Truman-Eisenhower years.

Indian nonalignment should be defined as a policy of non-commitment towards rival power blocs adopted with a view of retaining freedom of action in international affairs and thereby influencing the issue of war and peace to India's advantage. India maintained that the Cold War was essentially a European problem. Adherence to military alliances, it believed, would increase domestic tensions and add to chances of involvement in international war, thus destroying hopes of socio-economic reconstruction of India.

The official American reaction was not consistent. It varied from president to president, from issue to issue, and from time to time. India's stand on various issues of international import and interest to the United States such as recognition of the People's Republic of China, the Korean War, the Japanese peace treaty of 1951, and the Hungarian revolt

of 1956, increased American concern about and dislike of non-alignment. Many Americans in high places regraded India's nonalignment policy as pro-Communist and as one that sought to undermine Western collective security measures.

Consequently, during the Truman and Eisenhower presidencies the United States took a series of diplomatic, military, and economic measures to counter India's neutralism. America refused to treat India as a major power and attempted to contain its influence on the international plane by excluding it from international conferences and from assuming international responsibilities. The Russian efforts to woo India and other nonaligned countries with trade and aid softened America's open resistance to India's nonalignment. As a result, although tactical, a new trend in America's dealings with India was visible during the closing years of Eisenhower's presidency. Therefore, America sought to keep nonaligned India at least nonaligned by extending economic aid.

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PREFACE

India, born in a bi-polar world of "frozen hostility" between two superpowers, sought to use nonalignment to establish a new order based on cooperation and equality. It offered an alternative to the existing system of confrontation and domination of the weak and the poor by the rich and mighty. Nonalignment, as an anti-war, anti-colonial, anti-racial movement, believed in reconciliation and co-existence, socially, economically, politically, and ideologically of divergent societies. A policy of friendship nonalignment posited neither allies nor enemies.

It attracted the attention of many newly independent countries of Asia and Africa because it provided an alternative to the Russian and American views of world reality. The advent of nonalignment and the adherence of more and more countries to it countered the possibility of bringing these countries under the control and influence of superpowers. As a result Russia and America were suspicious of and hostile to it. Despite occasional tactical changes in attitude toward nonalignment, superpower hostility continued unabated in the fifties and early sixties.

India's policy was anathema to the United States because India, a democracy, was expected to join the West in its fight against world Communism. India's diplomatic stand appeared to

many Americans in high places as pro-Communist and as one that sought to undermine Western collective security. The United States was concerned that other Asian countries would follow India's example and that India would take the lead to form an Asian bloc that excluded the West from the area. As a result American leaders vigorously opposed India's nonalignment and took measures to counter it. Despite this opposition India was given generous economic assistance by the United States.

Misunderstanding about nonalignment was widespread in East and West. America treated it as neutrality and expected India to maintain a diplomatic equidistance between the two power blocs. Nonalignment, however, meant only non-participation in military alliances and power bloc combinations. It expressed a desire to maintain independence and freedom of action on international issues. It also signified the right to decide each issue on its merits or in national interests, without outside influence or interference. India believed in peaceful settlement of issues as far as possible and practicable and sought to avoid war by creating a climate of peace.

India's nonalignment was the result of a desire to concentrate on domestic reconstruction and economic and industrial development. Important political, economic, geographic, ideological, and historical factors contributed to the program's growth. India's desire to preserve its newly won freedom, to improve its international standing, and to act as

a bridge between East and West strengthened its belief in the correctness of nonalignment.

India's position on international issues of concern to the United States increased its awareness of nonalignment and opposition to it. When in October, 1949, the Chinese Communists, after having defeated the Kuomintang forces, proclaimed the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), the United States refused to recognize it. Some Americans maintained that the Communists did not represent the people of China and that the Communists would soon pass into oblivion. The United States also had arrangements with the Republic of China that it felt must be honored. Thus did the United States try to discourage non-Communist countries, including India, from recognizing the PRC. India disagreed with the Americans analysis and recognized PRC on December 30, 1949. American diplomats were highly critical of this recognition and especially of subsequent efforts by India to have PRC seated in the United Nations.

There existed considerable disagreements between India and the U. S. on the Korean war. While both considered the North Korean invasion of the south as aggression, India held that the war should be localized (limited to North and South Korean forces) and that there should be a negotiated settlement of the Korean unification question among the United States, China and the Soviet Union with the help of other peace-loving nations. America considered North Korean aggression as part of an international Communist design to open up a

new front in Asia and as a test of collective security as provided in the U. N. Charter. It believed only a military solution was possible following the North Korean invasion. Consequently, the United States opposed India's efforts to mediate and localize the conflict. It feared that India's mediation would undermine free world unity as the militarily superior North Koreans won on the battlefield. Moreover, being a major Asian country, India's absence from the war efforts gave the U. N. forces a decidedly Western look. In fact, it was mainly an American war.

The Japanese peace treaty of 1951 became another issue between India and the United States. India did not attend the San Francisco conference and refused to sign its treaty. She objected to various provisions of the treaty mainly those clauses dealing with territorial issues, arguing that Communist China should have been invited to the conference. The United States, enduring what many considered excessive Indian moralizing, viewed India's abstention and public criticism of the terms of the treaty as an attempt to form an Asian bloc and exclude America from that continent.

India's and America's views converged on the Suez crisis. Both countries criticized Anglo-French-Israeli aggression against Egypt and worked together for the evacuation of foreign troops from that country. The Hungarian crisis, which occurred simultaneously to Suez, did not elicit the same type of response from India and America. India described the Soviet

Union's repression of the Hungarian revolt as a continuing intervention by the Soviets, whereas America treated Russian conduct as colonial aggression. The United States resented India's failure to react from the same principled position of self-determination in Hungary as she had shown in Egypt, and many American leaders accused India of hypocrisy.

Despite its opposition to nonalignment, America continued to hope India could be made an ally. Attempts to bring about a rapprochement between the two in October, 1949, in December, 1953, and in December, 1956, failed. India considered non-alignment sacred and expressed determination to remain an uncommitted state. If India did not align with the West, the United States maintained that India should at least remain neutral, something foreign aid was supposed to achieve.

Opposition to India's nonalignment by the United States was manifest in several forms. Excluding India from international conferences and responsibilities was one form of opposition. The United States sought to balance Pakistan and India by building Pakistan militarily as a reliable ally in South Asia. Resistance to nonalignment was not America's only response. Occasionally, its leaders tried to use nonalignment to their advantage by working with it.

The present study, therefore, attempts to examine in detail both Indian nonalignment and the official American reaction to it from 1947 to 1960. Because nonalignment has become a major feature of the foreign policy of more than one

hundred states, America's response to India's nonalignment should interest students of diplomacy. India's case is important in several other respects. It is still the most significant member of the nonaligned community and the largest democracy outside the Western alliance. It is the second most populous country in the world and the tenth most industrialized. Geographically, India occupies a strategically important position.

CHAPTER I

NONALIGNMENT: THE SUBSTANCE AND THE SHADOW

The Background: National And International

The coming of age of the United States in international affairs is in many respects the most remarkable event of the post-World War Two era. Side by side with American maturity, Soviet Russia emerged as a world power and America's primary adversary. Together they became the world's "superpowers." Once victorious allies, who defeated the Axis alliance, these erstwhile partners soon clashed over many international issues arising out of the recently concluded war.

The British empire, emaciated by the ravages of war, shortly thereafter lost a significant portion of the sub-continent of Asia, India and Pakistan. The communal violence and blood bath that attended the independence of India and Pakistan was unprecedented in the long history of India. But that internecine warfare paled and would be nearly lost to a world caught up in the acrimony that marred Russian-American relations. What followed was a "Cold War" and a search for allies, for military bases and military alliances. The super-powers asked or demanded the adherence of most European nations to one or the other side in the emerging power equation. India, viewed by many Indians as economically

crippled through years of British exploitation and broken by war and partitioning prior to independence, decided on an independent course in international affairs so that she could attend to reconstruction and rehabilitation at home. The basics of this decision "to go it alone" later became known as nonalignment and were officially enunciated almost a year¹ before Indian independence in August, 1947.

India's nonalignment has been controversial since its inception. The polarization of European countries into rival power blocs under the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and their increasingly hostile attitude towards each other provided the immediate context for nonalignment. Although nonalignment was in part a response to Cold War and power bloc rivalries, it was not confined to opposing superpower politics, but extended to the entire gamut of political and economic considerations in India's international affairs. Nonalignment, according to Saman Boutros Farajalla, an Egyptian political scientist, was "the expression of the drive towards political and economic emancipation in the context of [the] bipolar configuration of world politics."² The influence of domestic factors in its development was undeniable. It was not solely the product of domestic matters, but the international milieu influencing domestic developments.

Understandably, Indian nonalignment had its origins in the history of colonial India and India's struggle for freedom

from British rule. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (1947-64) during an interview with Norman Cousins, editor-in-chief of the Saturday Review, in 1951, said that "the present general policy [nonalignment] is the natural outgrowth of all our thinking during the last thirty years or more." That Indian foreign policy had its bases in various resolutions and pronouncements on foreign policy that the Indian National Congress passed during the British days is apparent. Thus, when the Congress Party, the nationalist party of Mahatma Gandhi, came to power in an independent India, it was natural for its leaders to practice that which they had preached.

From the beginning the Indian National Congress had taken an anti-colonial and anti-imperial stand. In 1892 Congress had warned that the colonial government should stop wasting Indian money and resources for imperialistic ends. The British-Indian military expeditions to Persia, Tibet, and Afghanistan were severely criticized, since in the opinion of the Congress they threatened to involve "India in foreign entanglements which cannot fail [but] to place an intolerable burden on Indian revenues and prove in the end disastrous to the best interests of India." With the end of the World War One, these resolutions became increasingly numerous and vehement and increasingly dealt with problems not directly related to India.

Greatly dissatisfied with the politics pursued by the Imperial Government, Congress passed a resolution in November,

1921, dissociating Indian opinion from its actions. This was part of a larger objective of establishing a separate identity for India in world politics. It was not a tendency towards isolationism, but a strong urge for pan-Asian unity. At the same time the desire for Asian connections did not express a wish to sever all ties with the Occident.⁷

Between 1927 and 1929 British actions and policies on the international scene made Indian nationalists restive. During this brief period Indian leaders became interested in freedom movements in other parts of Asia. Disapproval of alliances and pacts in general developed. Indians regarded British and French actions of this time as directed against Russia, a country viewed by many as a progressive world force. According to one Indian scholar, Professor Dev Narayan Mallik, there was a tendency to "assess Russia more in terms of her national interest than in those of international Communism."⁸ Congress treated alliances and pacts as "instruments of war in the employ of capitalism and imperialism."⁹ There was also a growing suspicion, or rather a premonition, of an Anglo-Saxon bloc seeking world domination.¹⁰

From 1930 onwards Indian nationalists emphasized Indian independence, even though there was no desire among most influential leaders for a total break with the British Commonwealth. From 1936 to 1939 the Congress ministries were in power in most provinces. Consequently, the struggle for independence was not intense. Not consumed with being rid of

England, Indian leadership could pay more attention to developments in the international field. They disapproved of the growing trends of imperialism, fascism, and militarism in world politics. The development of Indian attitudes regarding collective security and world peace took place during this era. Congress preferred economic sanctions to military actions as effective deterrents to aggression.¹¹

Beginning with the war in Europe (1939) and ending with the formation of an interim government consisting of Indian representatives (1946), an intense struggle occurred for independence. With the close of the World War Two, Soviet expansionism began to be noticed. In spite of this known Soviet indulgence in power politics, the desire for friendly relations with that country continued. With the coming of the war, many Indians came to admire the United States as a progressive leader of the democratic world. Gradually, however, a feeling developed that America might become a partner of Western imperialists opposed to the U. S. S. R. This feeling did not affect the hope for cordial relations with the United States.¹²

Congress had two views on free India's place in international relations--form an Asian federation or follow an independent course. By March, 1946, it was evident that India would follow an independent policy while attempting to maintain friendly relations with Russia, America, and Britain. This posture took final shape in nonalignment.¹³

The international setting for nonalignment occurred during the period immediately after the Second World War. The new world order that emerged from the war was entirely different from that which the allies had expected. The growing antagonism between the Soviet Union and its Western allies was the main feature of the postwar world. As the struggle between the one-time allies intensified, they attempted to influence the newly independent countries. As a result, Kallarackal George Thomas, an Indian scholar, says:

These two power concentrations drew into their orbits small and large states alike in their relentless struggle for world hegemony. Democracy versus Communism provided the ideological drive to the mutually hostile and irreconcilable blocs. This was accompanied by the policy of planned encirclement of one camp by the other by an interlocking system of military alliances, military bases and stockpile of atomic warheads.¹⁴

Concerned over what seemed to be a mad race towards disaster, smaller nations, militarily and economically weak, refused to join the two power constellations. India was foremost among those nations who sought an independent course.¹⁵

The atomic bombings of Nagasaki and Hiroshima had added a new dimension to international relations. The atom bomb was the ultimate weapon that man feared and would probably be used again if national survival were threatened. India reacted strongly to nuclear weapons. The message of death and destruction that "the bomb" brought into bold relief was such that war on a grand scale became unthinkable. In the evolving

international situation, India's leaders believed it logical to follow an independent policy and avoid entangling alliances.¹⁶

Nonalignment: "The Real Thing"

As leader of the Interim Government in September, 1946, Jawaharlal Nehru described India's policies in his first broadcast over All India Radio. "Independence in action," he said, is to be followed "in our domestic affairs and our foreign relations."¹⁷ Nehru outlined the nucleus of a world-wide movement known as nonalignment. Commenting on the essentials of India's relations with the outside world, he said:

We propose, as far as possible, to keep away from power politics of groups, aligned against one another, which have led in the past to world wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster scale. We believe that peace and freedom are indivisible and the denial of freedom anywhere must endanger freedom elsewhere and lead to conflict and war. We are particularly interested in the emancipation of colonial and dependent countries and peoples, and in the recognition in theory and practice of equal opportunities for all races. We repudiate utterly the Nazi doctrine of racialism, wheresoever and in whatever form it may be practiced. We seek no dominion over others and we claim no privileged position over other peoples. . . . India is on the move and the old order passes. Too long have we been passive spectators of events, the playthings of others. The initiative comes to our people now and we shall make the history of our choice. Let us . . . make India . . . great among nations, foremost in the arts of peace and progress.¹⁸

Nonalignment was not the only policy available nor the best permanent policy applicable, but, as Nehru said, there was "no other policy for this country to adopt with the slightest advantage" to India. According to Professor Sarveppalli Gopal,

the son of the late Indian President S. Radhakrishnan and one of Nehru's biographers, nonalignment was practiced not because it was morally right but because "it was of practical advantage."¹⁹ Rather than being idealistic, Nehru chose realism and national opportunism.

In the words of Michael Brecher, the Canadian educator and another biographer of Nehru, when India became independent it faced a world of "bipolarity, the cold war, ideological crusades, the arms race, military blocs, shrinking of distance as a result of technological change, and the relative weakness of India . . . to which policy must be adjusted."²⁰

This adjustment had to be in the interest of India. It, therefore, designed nonalignment to secure its national interests. According to Werner Levi, an American student of Indian foreign policy, the influence of humane ideals on nonalignment was undeniable, but more than anything else the country was "guided in the conduct of its foreign policy by the demands of national interest."²¹

G. H. Jansen, the Indian journalist and a student of Afro-Asian nonalignment writing in 1966, said:

The official reasons given by the Asians who have freely joined with non-Asians in military alliance is that by this means they are defending the "free world" against the threat of Communist domination. There is here the same degree of smurking hypocrisy as when others say they are nonaligned to save the world from war by enlarging the area of peace. In both cases the real reason is national interest.²²

Nonalignment was not to be a permanent foreign policy for

India. In 1947 her choices were limited and considered non-alignment as a compromise course. Whoever had come to power in India during the early national period would have pursued a similar policy. From the perspective of Indian self-interest, nonalignment was the most advantageous policy for India in 1947. According to Nehru a government "functions for the good of the country it governs and no government dares to do anything which in the short or the long run is manifestly to the disadvantage of that country."²³

Indian nonalignment gradually developed into a movement embracing more than one hundred countries, each practicing its own version. Although the concept is now almost four decades old, there is really no generally accepted definition of the term. The leading practitioners of the concept, coming as they do from different social, economic, and political backgrounds, give widely divergent explanations of it. Yugoslavian non-alignment, for example, believed in diplomatic "equidistance" between the superpowers. Cuba, on the other hand, regarded Soviet Union as a "natural ally" of nonalignment.

Membership in the nonalignment movement, in the words of J. W. Burton, an Australian political scientist, is:

on the basis that the participant belonged to neither the Communist nor the Western military blocs; that it had no bilateral military arrangement with a bloc country; that it either had no foreign military base on its soil or was opposed to those which were there; that it supported liberation and independence movements; and that it pursued an independence policy based on "peaceful co-existence."²⁴

The "core" of Indian nonalignment, according to P. N. Haksar, a retired Indian official, lay in its efforts "to retain an independence of thought, judgment and action under conditions of cold war which generated the military alliances and arrangements of all sorts." He added that "the main purpose behind the policy of nonalignment was to enlarge the areas of cooperation and peace for initiating the gigantic task of India's renewal--economic, social, political and cultural ."²⁵

Indian nonalignment may be defined as a policy of noncommitment towards the rival power blocs, adopted with a view to retain India's separate identity and freedom of action in international affairs and thereby influence the issues of war and peace to India's advantage. The policy operates from the conviction that Cold War was essentially a Western problem and that military alliances and power blocs would only add to tensions and chances of war that would destroy the objectives of socio-economic reconstruction in India.

Understandably, the power blocs were hostile toward the Indian decision to remain unaligned. Their hostility was in part due to their failure to understand the concept of nonalignment and, in part, to their desire for another ally. The Soviet Union was highly suspicious of Indian "neutrality" and regarded it as nothing but collaboration with Britain. According to information forwarded to the State Department by Henry F. Grady, the American ambassador in New Delhi, "Molotov . . . expressed to Mme. Pandit [Indian ambassador in Moscow] on

several occasions that the world is divided into two great camps the democratic and the imperialistic and it is now up to India to decide which side she is going to take." Grady added that Soviet Russia was "disappointed by the indecision of the Indian attitude."²⁶

The Russians were concerned that Indian neutrality favored the Western powers. The Russian hostility was partly responsible for India's decision to stay in the Commonwealth. Nehru's visit to the United States in 1949 also invited violent criticism from the Soviet Union, when it described him as a "spineless agent of Western imperialism in the garb of a peacemaker."²⁷ India seeing no immediate danger to its security from the Soviets decided to remain uncommitted and concentrate²⁸ on national military and economic development.

Another Communist power, Mao's China, was severely critical of an independent Indian foreign policy. The PRC, after assuming power in 1949, denied the possibility of a third path in international relations. Chinese history and Chinese experience, according to Mao, made it impossible for China to stand alone. Declaring his intention to support Russia, Mao in his famous pronouncement on foreign policy on July 1, 1949 said:

"you are leaning to one side." Exactly. The forty years experience of Sun Yat Sen and twenty-eight years experience of the Communist Party have convinced us that in order to attain victory and consolidate it, we must lean to one side. According to these experiences, the Chinese people must lean either to the side of imperialism or to that of socialism. There can be no exception, there can

be no sitting on the fence; there is no third road. We oppose Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary clique, which leans to the side of imperialism. We also oppose illusions about a third road not only in China but throughout the world, one must lean either to imperialism or socialism there is no exception. Neutrality is merely a camouflage; a third road does not exist.²⁹

The West considered nonalignment as a foreign policy aberration and a failure to understand the nature of Communism. Nonalignment, therefore, was immoral, sitting on the fence, an opportunistic policy aimed at getting aid from both East and West. Westerners wondered how a democracy like India could refuse to align with other democracies of the world. Consequently, says Cecil V. Crabb Jr., an American political scientist, their reaction was one of "irritation and pique, mystification and bewilderment, suspicion and mistrust."³⁰

In a sense nonalignment was not new to international politics. Although the term was not used, American statesmen practiced the idea behind the concept as early as the eighteenth century, soon after the War of Independence. George Washington, as the nation's first president under the Constitution of 1787, kept his country out of the entanglements of the French Revolutionary War to give the nation time for uninterrupted growth. In 1793 he proclaimed neutrality and supported the Neutrality Act of 1794. Comparing the early history of America and modern India, Shantilal Kothari, an Indian educator, wrote that "nowhere in the history of two countries do such striking similarities between the background, personalities, and policies come to light [as clearly]

as between modern India and the United States of America in
the eighteenth century."³¹

India's decision to stay out of power politics reflected the same desires as America in the 1790's. Although it may not be correct to say that there are more similarities than differences between the American and Indian experiences, there is close resemblance in the evolutionary process of both foreign policies in their early national periods. America was far removed from centers of conflict; although the British fleet was a potential threat, European troubles served to keep it harnessed even in the one instance of real danger, the war of 1812. India, on the other hand, was closer to the centers of conflict and was not as well protected by modern circumstances, facing twentieth century armies and navies. Notwithstanding this consideration, reasons for both national policies were same, peace for internal development and national unity. Much like India in the post-World War Two era, America in the early nineteenth century encouraged and supported national liberation movements.³²

Despite historical similarities a considerable gulf existed between the two countries on foreign policy thinking soon after Indian independence in 1947. India with its newly won status had limited interests and hardly any global responsibility. The history of the United states changed dramatically in the twentieth century. It became a recognized world power with legitimate interests across the globe.

"Neutrality Contra Nonalignment"

It is difficult to state precisely when or where the term nonalignment was first used. It gained currency in the fifties. V. K. Krishnamenon, Indian defense minister and chief delegate to the United Nations, in an interview with the Times of India on September 30, 1968, claimed that it was he who used the term for the first time. According to Menon he used it in the 1950's reacting to ridicule about the neutral stand taken by India and certain other countries.

Nonalignment was not the product of a well-thought-out policy. Leo Mates, a former Yugoslav diplomat and well-known authority on nonalignment, has written:

The new countries became nonaligned first in the consciousness of their political leaders and statesmen and only afterwards in the practice of their international behaviour. They were, in fact, nonaligned from the very first day of their real independence, but became known as such only later on.³³

Misunderstanding about the true nature and intentions of nonalignment and neutrality was widespread among the East and West blocs of the developed world. Jansen and Mates have asserted that most of the misunderstanding was willful and deliberate.³⁴

Nonalignment was mistaken for and often misrepresented as neutrality. Arnold Rivikin, who was associated with the American Department of State for several years, in a speech to a London audience dealt with "U. S. Policy in Africa."

Rivikin's speech was representative of this misunderstanding about nonalignment. Assuming that neutrality was nonalignment, he said:

The recent foreign-policy posture, however, of all self-declared neutrals in the Congo crisis cannot be meaningfully covered by any acceptable definition of neutrality. They were certainly not neutral toward one another nor toward the various factions in the Congo; and they were not neutral toward the West and the Communist bloc. Given the calculated Soviet introduction of Cold War into the Congo crisis, recognition and assistance to the Stanleyville regime by African states constitutes at a minimum de facto, if not deliberate, alinement with the Communist bloc on the Congo crisis and, sadly, on the Soviet intrusion of the Cold War and its anti-United Nations campaign into the Congo crisis. Recognition and assistance to the Leopoldville regime also constitutes at a minimum de facto, if not deliberate, alinement with the West on the Congo crisis and, happily, on the West's reistance to the intrusion of the Cold War and the Soviet's anti-United Nations campaign into the Congo crisis. Either way, pro-Stanleyville or pro-Leopoldville, neutrality or nonalinement for most, if not all, of the self proclaimed neutralist states is fictitious in so far as the major foreign policy issue in Africa of 1960 and 1961 is concerned.³⁵

Nonalignment and neutrality, as India's leaders maintained, were two entirely different concepts. According to Nehru, "neutrality as a policy has little meaning except in times of war."³⁶

Neutrality is an ancient concept recognized by states of antiquity. Under the Roman system, for example, neutrality was not favored, for in her view "those who were not for her were against her," and there was no middle ground between friend and enemy. Neutrality, however, gained respectability in the twentieth century but not respect. During the two world wars belligerents normally respected neutrality only if it served

their interests. Belligerents looked at neutrals from the angle of how neutrality would affect the outcome of war. In other words, as Hans J. Morgenthau, the well-known American political scientist says, "neutrals owe their status as neutrals to considerations of political expediency on the part of the belligerents, not to the latter's respect for legal principles."³⁷

Neutrality can be voluntary or imposed as in the case of modern Switzerland and Austria, respectively. Postwar Austrian neutrality is the result of an agreement among Eastern and Western bloc countries to restore Austrian independence, and for which Austria in return has agreed to remain neutral. Swiss neutrality, dating back to the sixteenth century, received the guarantee of the great powers at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Swedish neutrality has been a feature of its foreign policy since the nineteenth century, but without any legal support. Thus, its neutrality is a decision voluntarily and unilaterally achieved. Finnish neutrality, on the other hand, is an "asymmetrical neutrality" with its pro-Soviet bias achieved in a tenuous and quasi³⁸ voluntary manner.

In recent times belligerents have generally recognized and at times respected neutrality. Neutrals consequently have certain rights and duties they can and usually must exercise. These rights and duties become meaningful and operative only after the outbreak of fighting. A voluntary neutral by right

may abandon neutrality and join into war. A neutralized country like Austria (an imposed neutral) cannot abandon its neutrality when it wants or wishes, at least in theory. The main tenet of neutrality, however, is to keep out of war without being deprived of national security. Neutrals cannot allow foreign powers to maintain military bases on their soil; this of course, would drag them into a war. Permanent neutrals are under no obligation to remain ideologically neutral. Unless other parties underwrite a nation's neutrality, a neutral must always rely on its own strength for defense since military alliances are forbidden for it.

A prominent feature about neutrality is its passivity, the implicit refusal to take part in other peoples' quarrels. Neutrality, according to Burton, "is a studied impartiality, it connotes an overt attitude of indifference, even insensibility and lack of concern in respect to issues at stake." In neutrality there is no concern about the right and wrong of the issues involved. In this respect it is a negative concept.

Neutrality, of course, favors the status quo. Robert Ogley, a British political scientist, has noted that "neutrality is like virginity. Everybody starts with it, but some lose it quicker than others, and some do not lose it at all. Unlike virginity, however, neutrality once lost can sometimes be recovered, albeit with difficulty."

Nonalignment, on the other hand, is an active policy and a positive concept. It is a response to the atomic bomb and

the Cold War rivalries. How to avoid all war, rather than who should win a war, is the main concern. It does not mean that a country will remain neutral to the issues of war or peace. The nonaligned are unwilling to leave such an issue of international import--the issue of peace--in the hands of only the superpowers. The nonaligned are of the opinion that they should have a say on all matters that affect their fate. Non-aligned nations are actively interested and involved in international issues, especially the ones that they see endangering peace. They are prepared to take a diplomatic and at times moral stand on issues and are prepared to assume even military responsibilities in the international field.⁴²

To cite a few instances of this attitude, when North Korean forces invaded South Korea in June, 1950, India, along with the Western nations, considered it aggression and demanded cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of North Korean forces from the south. India also censured the Anglo-French invasion of the Suez Canal in 1956 as "naked aggression." And it criticized, though belatedly, the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolt in 1956. If India was apt to take a moral and diplomatic stand on these matters, it was equally prompt in assuming responsibilities. In 1953 India agreed to become chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission formed under the Korean armistice agreement; in 1954 it was named chairman of the International Control Commission for Indo-China, set up under the Geneva agreement on Indo-China; and in

1956 India sent troops to Egypt as part of the United Nations peace keeping forces in the aftermath of the Anglo-French-⁴³ Israeli invasion of Egypt.

The main thrust of nonalignment is the refusal to join military alliances. Non-participation in military alliances is purely a political decision. The nonaligned did not join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the South East Asia Treaty Organization, the Central Treaty Organization, or the Warsaw Pact. Their decisions were the result of a belief that military alliances increase the chances of war. Moreover, India's leaders believed that joining any bloc would upset the existing world balance of power and damage the cause of peace.⁴⁴

Unlike neutrality, nonalignment is opposed to the status quo, and it is revisionary, if not revolutionary, in doctrine. It is against the existing world order, which it wants to change in a way favorable to India. Nonaligned nations attempt to combat the entire system of traditional world politics, which they see as expansionist and belligerent by nature and which they view as promoting the concentration of power. Non-aligned leaders want the old order based on domination to give way to a new order based on cooperation. They envisage a world where war as an instrument of national policy is obsolete. Nonalignment, in the words of Leo Mates, "can be summarised to be a general political attitude of standing free from alliance obligations in order to strive for fundamental changes aiming at a world order without alliances and without dominance."⁴⁵

Since nonalignment is not a legally recognized status, its practitioners do not have any special privileges or rights in international law. It is not a state of affairs that comes into existence in the wake of a shooting war. Nonalignment, rather, is the product of an urge to avoid war. It is not an attempt to evade the ravages of war, but a more enlightened attempt to prevent war by creating a climate for peace. It is concerned not merely with the national interest of the country in view, but with the larger interests of humanity as a whole.⁴⁶

Freedom of thought and action are the indispensable ingredients of nonalignment. It means independence in external affairs and, according to Menon, nonalignment is "an extension of nationalism and of conflict between nationalism and military blocs."⁴⁷ Nonalignment is the right of a nation to make its own decisions without outside advice and influence, making the decision on the merits of each issue and in the national interests.⁴⁸

Alignment with a power bloc normally makes it impossible to consider the pros and cons of a problem and reach an independent solution. Interpretation of a problem reflects the interests, background, traditions, and policies of a power bloc member or leader. Canada, a member of the Western alliance, for example, opposed the United Nations forces crossing the thirty-eighth parallel into North Korea (1950). But when the United States pressed the advance into North Korea, Canada compromised its stand and supported the American move.

Likewise, Canadians opposed the American move to brand China an aggressor. Instead of joining the American move, Canada tried to arrange peace between the United States and China. According to the Canadian foreign minister, Lester B. Pearson, both China and America refused to make concessions, thus the Canadian peace initiative failed. Canada then found it necessary to give up its effort and joined the Americans in branding China an aggressor.⁴⁹

India, in making judgments on such problems, has said it wished to consider each question from all angles and take into consideration not only the immediate consequences of decisions but also the future consequences. The Indian stand against the division of Palestine in 1948, which created Israel, resulted from this attitude. India held the view that a nation based on religious exclusivism would excite the religious fanaticism of the Muslims. Moreover, India argued that it would create a new problem, the problem of Palestinian Arabs who were being displaced from their homes to create the Jewish state. Drawing on its own recent national experience India pleaded for a cantonal federation of Jews and Arabs. India opposed both partition and a unitary state. The major powers were bent on partition while the Arabs insisted on a unitary state.⁵⁰

A political concept without any legal sanctions behind it, nonalignment allows plenty of room for deviation and heresy. The nature of nonalignment is such that chances of protecting a nonaligned state from encroachment by either Cold

War bloc is much greater than that afforded the neutral. A neutral has to remain neutral under all circumstances, at least in theory. A nonaligned nation is under no compulsion to remain nonaligned, especially when its interests are threatened. Possible alignment with either side is a deterrent to encroachment by established power blocs who should be compelled by their own interests to treat the uncommitted with respect. According to George Liska, an eminent American political scientist, "the smaller the margin of power that favors either of two contending parties, the more relevant is the total power of an intrinsically weak third party."⁵¹

Nonalignment is not a "hands off" policy as India's national history amply demonstrates. If the outcome of the contest directly concerned India, it could be expected to side with the party that would serve the national interests of the country. In the Congo crisis of the early sixties, India was actively involved. Independence in 1960 did not bring political stability or national unity in the Congo; rather, it led to civil war. Russia and America sided with the contending Congolese factions. As requested by the United Nations secretary general Dag Hammerskjold, India sent troops to the Congo to maintain law and order. While India actively assisted the United Nations' efforts, Egypt, another prominent non-aligned country, sided with the faction that the Soviet Union supported.

The East and the West criticized the role of the non-aligned nations in Congo. Commenting on this a Western analyst, J. W. Burton, wrote:

that Asian and African nations should immediately become neutral and indifferent in a Congo situation just because rival powers chose to make it a cold war battleground is an expectation . . . with little understanding of nonalignment.⁵²

Nonalignment is professed to be a policy of friendship with all countries, as far as this circumstance is possible and practicable. Nehru, for example, declared that no country could live in isolation from the other and answered charges that Indian foreign policy was more in tune with the West and its interests by stating that because "some people . . . disapprove of our relations with the Anglo-American bloc is not sufficient reason for us to break any bond which is of advantage to us."⁵³ Nonalignment, therefore, is not against close relations with other nations, closeness being the product of various factors like necessary political and economic relations. As Nehru said on another occasion there will be, however, no lining up with other countries. Nehru believed that given the nature of relations with the West, development of friendly relationships were inevitable. Nonalignment, in short, was not "diplomatic equidistance" between power blocs.⁵⁴

The nonaligned believed in peaceful settlement of international issues. If there were only two power blocs there could be no peace. In order to establish peace, Indian leadership assumed that a third party was necessary. India, its

leaders hoped, would provide the missing component. In addition to being unaligned India expected to enlist other countries to nonalignment creed. Menon, speaking before the United Nations General Assembly on October 17, 1960, said:

We believe that in the circumstances, where the balance of power in the world unfortunately rests on . . . 'the balance of horror,' it is good for nations [to be nonaligned] . . . the greater the increase of the area of peace in the world, the greater the non-committedness, the more that the so-called committed nations have to canvass for the moral support of others, the greater are the chances of peace.⁵⁵

Despite what may seem obvious, nonalignment does not mean a third bloc in international relations. The nonaligned nations do not possess the military, economic, or nuclear strength to be an effective force in international politics. Moreover, a bloc means a leader or leadership core under whose banner other like-minded powers will be willing to rally. In nonalignment there is no such leader. Each nation is its own leader. Nonalignment is the result of desire to lead and not to be led. India was not opposed to the idea of nonaligned countries coming together to discuss problems of mutual interests and concerns, but India was unwilling to assume any leadership role. According to Nehru, a collection of states raising their voice in hostility to the great powers would only add to existing troubles. That condition would be in itself power politics, and India, said Nehru, did not believe in denunciations, condemnations and Cold War tones. Menon, in the course of his speech at the United Nations in 1960, declared

We are against the formation of isolated blocs in the United Nations, because it means that this Assembly has no capacity to decide in freedom; . . . my country does not stand for the formation of blocs, because blocs mean isolationism. We stand for a universalist world. 56

In April, 1950, G. S. Bajpai, the secretary general of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, declared that India was not interested in Pan Asianism or an Asian Bloc. 57

Nonalignment: The American View

The Indian decision to remain nonaligned with respect to Cold War blocs caused resentment in the United States. Consequently, nonalignment was subject to considerable speculation and interpretation in official and non-official circles. The Australian scholar Burton summarized these interpretations thus:

Nonalignment is due to lack of experience in international affairs, and in particular to lack of experience with Communist policies; that the new nations are showing themselves to be incapable of self-government, and their foreign policies are but evidence of this; that nonalignment is merely peace-at-any-price policy dictated by economic need and immature internal organization; that nonalignment savours of appeasement of Communists and antagonism to former colonial powers; that nonalignment is a policy of expediency as is evidenced by the "double talk" and "double standards" exhibited, and cannot be expected to survive Cold War; that there are no absolute principles involved in nonalignment and it cannot therefore be taken seriously as a long term programme; that nonalignment is function of bi-polarity, and not a system in itself which would be viable in the absence of major conflict . . . that nonalignment is a means of diverting attention from domestic problems, . . . that nonalignment is wholly anti-Western and anti-colonialist, and that this is its only foundation.58

In the American view nonalignment was nothing short of "appeasement" of the Communist powers. America regarded international relations as a question of struggle between forces of democracy and Communism, evil and good, right and wrong, darkness and light, and godly and ungodly. Therefore, many considered that only two systems existed in the world, and a middle course was impossible. Nonalignment as a result was an unacceptable stand. They feared that such a policy would weaken democratic forces and play into the hands of the Communist powers. Nonalignment was perforce an irresponsible posture because Soviet Union would "respect neutrality only as long as it serves Soviet interests."⁵⁹ American leaders wanted an alliance of all democratic and freedom loving states to carry on the fight against international Communism.⁶⁰

Vice-President Richard Nixon in July, 1956, speaking on the occasion of Philippine independence in Manila, argued that a nation that claimed to follow nonalignment because of its fear that alliance might impair independence "is not reading rightly the trends of modern history."⁶¹ The vice-president said:

[Some newly independent countries] have raised a question as to whether their countries can be truly independent and be allied with a free-world power like the United States. Through the years they have become suspicious of the Western powers, feeling that any alliance might jeopardize their hard won independence . . . alliance with an overseas power that holds the same standards of freedom and democracy can help both parties equally. . . It has far more to gain by standing together with free nations than by remaining aloof.⁶²

America was unhappy with the nonaligned, who, in Nixon's view, make "no distinction between the Communist world and the free world." He added, "How can we feel toward those who treat alike nations that believe in god and honor, religion and morality, and nations that boast of atheism and rule of force and terror alone?" The vice-president had no doubt in his mind that history would judge he who equates Communism and freedom. He reminded the nonaligned leaders of this and warned them that any who followed such a line was "endangering the security of his nation." There was a feeling that the nonaligned were nonaligned because of their inability to understand the fundamental difference between the two blocs.⁶³

If the nonaligned were able to differentiate between the two blocs, Communism, being what it is, they could not but join the Western alliance. The Cold War and conflict with the Communists was not something the United States desired or sought. Nor did it come because of any attempt on the part of America to expand beyond its borders or because the country faced danger from internal Communist sources. It came as a result of the United States' readiness to help the people threatened by Communism and because these people sought American help to fight Communist aggression. Airing these views on the occasion of the annual commencement exercises at Duke University, Walter S. Robertson, the assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs, wondered what would have been

the fate of neutralists had not America stood against Communist expansion and instead have let nature take its course."⁶⁴

The American leadership viewed nonalignment as a "balance or equidistance" between the aligned nations or superpowers. Nonalignment, according to this interpretation, should be a fixed position between two rival power blocs. It should be a policy of impartiality. According to Arnold Rivikin, neutralist proclamations of neutrality is a matter that needs to be tested. He has written:

in the real world of behavior and action. It seems appropriate to enquire of the self proclaimed neutral "Neutral for whom?" and "Neutral against whom?" If answer to both questions is "Nobody" their neutralism would seem to be an appropriate description of the foreign policy of those states.⁶⁵

Speaking before the Lebanese Political Science Society in June 1959, the American ambassador to Lebanon, Robert McClintock, suggested that the need of the day was for policies of "positive neutrality" to be "postively neutral"⁶⁶

There was always an attempt to divide neutrals into two categories. Vice-President Nixon, for example, in his Manila speech suggested that there were countries who believe that nonalignment was necessary for economic development and political stability. Yet others adopted nonalignment because of geographical position, because they did not want to provoke their Communist neighbors through an alliance with the non-Communist world. Nixon said that the United States did not agree with the stand nor accept the explanation of nonaligned

states but did cherish the friendship of those nations "who share our dedication to the principles of democracy and freedom even though they have not seen fit to ally themselves with us politically and militarily."⁶⁷ He was mindful of yet another type of neutralism that did not make any difference between Communism and democracy. He concluded that the United States could not sympathize with them.⁶⁸

Charles "Chip" Bohlen, special assistant to the secretary of state, in a speech in October, 1960, conceded that it was "up to each nation to decide the course of its policy." He said that "neutrality in the sense of non-participation in military alliances is a perfectly responsible posture and one which from our history should recognize as such."⁶⁹ But, he added, the other type of "neutralism in the sense of pretending to be indifferent to the gigantic struggle which is going on in the world today is quite another matter."⁷⁰ Neutralism, therefore, when adopted to insure economic and social development of a people, was understandable. If, however, as Rivikin said, "the purpose is to make use of privileged sanctuary of neutralism to manipulate or interfere in the affairs of other states, or to masquerade a partisan position, it is another matter."⁷¹

Given this response it became obvious that nonalignment was not a respectable foreign policy posture. According to Robert Scalapino, an American political scientist, "many Americans viewed 'neutralism' as a new type of social disease.

Its probable causes: intimacy in some form with Communism; its symptom: mental confusion and moral dereliction; its cure unknown.⁷² Commenting on Near Eastern neutralism, George McGhee, assistant secretary of state in the Truman administration, said that nonalignment was a "disturbing factor which was growing . . . despite the bold-writ lesson of history."

Commenting further on nonalignment McGhee opined:

[nonalignment's] causes were several: for some it is fear of Russia's proximity to their own ill-defined borders; for others it is bitterness and spite over what they think the West's faults and errors, for still others, it is ignorance of Russia's true designs and a misguided belief that U. S. S. R. is the champion rather than the foe of national sovereignty.⁷³

The truth of the situation, McGhee believed, was that "the Soviets are no respectors of neutralism. They know no gratitude. The weakness that flows from neutralism is to them an inevitable enticement."⁷⁴

American spokesmen who expressed their views on nonalignment did speak at times in different tones. In the mid-fifties changes in the international scene revived the American debate on the issue. The "Geneva spirit," the Russian Sputnik, and the crisis in the Middle East all contributed to this. The immediate context for the change, however, was Indonesian president Dr. Sukarno's visit to the United States in May, 1956. While in the United States, Sukarno made a spirited defense of nonalignment.⁷⁵

This led to public pronouncements by President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.

President Eisenhower viewed neutrality as a "refusal to take sides in any military line up of world powers." The president agreed that there are "ideological, geographical or other reasons making military alliances impractical for certain countries. In such cases neutrality was an acceptable alternative." Eisenhower, however, cautioned that nonalignment did not provide "immunity from attack."⁷⁶

The best way to ensure security, the president held, was for nations to come together and act in concert. The United Nations, he added, could hardly be expected to provide collective security because of the veto provision in its charter. The United States' sponsored defensive arrangements were designed to consolidate "world order within the framework of the United Nations Charter." Although special circumstances warrant political neutrality, the president was of the opinion that no "nation has the right to be indifferent to the fate of others or, . . . to be neutral between right and wrong or decency and indecency."⁷⁷

Eisenhower's statement on neutrality was not without repercussions. It alarmed allied countries like the Philippines, Pakistan, and Turkey. This prompted the White House to issue a qualifying statement on June 7, 1956, the day after his news conference, to the effect that the "greatest security for the whole free world is gained by the system of alliances." The statement reiterated the point that "no nation would lose its freedom of action by joining such alliances." The statement

attempted to reassure the smaller allies who instead of remaining uncommitted opted to join American sponsored alliances
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for one reason or another.

Dulles, in a speech at Iowa State University a few days after Eisenhower's speech, commented on the subject of neutralism to set the record straight. In his view neutrality was a pretension based on the assumption that the safety of a state could be assured by being indifferent to the fate of others. Dulles believed that the presence of mutual security pacts made neutrality untenable. Under the circumstances it was futile to expect that neutrality was enough to ensure security of a country. Neutrality, he asserted, "has increasingly become an obsolete conception, and except under very exceptional circumstances, it is an immoral and short-sighted conception."
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The Secretary's statement, coming as it did after Eisenhower's "friendly" attitude toward neutralism, gave rise to confusion everywhere. Three days after the Iowa speech, when questioned by reporters, Dulles asserted that there was no difference of opinion between the president and himself. When subjected to further questioning the secretary said that there could have been differences in language but no difference in
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view point.

In July, when he met reporters again, there were more questions on neutralism. Answering a reporter who asked if he believed that neutralism was immoral, Dulles said that the

type of "neutralism which was indifferent to the fate of others and which believes that security can best be sought in isolation and without concern for others . . . is immoral." A neutral who was a member of the United Nations and who was committed to collective security against aggression could not be regarded as immoral. Switzerland's neutrality in spite of its refusal to join the United Nations, being the result of "special circumstances," was also not immoral. The secretary concluded that there were very few if any neutrals who were immoral.⁸¹

In view of the concern expressed by America's allies about the Eisenhower statement, according to Walter Lippmann, the dean of American diplomatic correspondents and a writer for the New York Times, Dulles' early statement resulted from the "fear that if any concessions . . . are made to neutrality the whole fragile structure of the alliances will crumble."⁸² The reaction to Dulles statement by neutrals prompted the secretary to make amendments to the Iowa speech. As a result, an Associated Press report concluded that by his July statement Dulles "took United States policy on neutrality another vast turn . . . and it wound up in opposite direction from that which he had set for it."⁸³

Towards the end of his term as secretary of state, Dulles's view on neutralism had changed dramatically. This was evident in the Eisenhower administration's attitude towards neutrals. Commenting on Indian nonalignment in a broadcast on

October 23, 1958, the secretary said that India was "neutralist in only one sense of the word. India is neutralist in the sense that it was not joined up in any of the collective security organization. We don't quarrel with the Indian decision. India is not neutral in the sense that it is indifferent to the threat of Communism."⁸⁴

President Eisenhower's attitude toward Indian nonalignment was benevolent from the beginning of his presidency. Vice-president S. Radhakrishnan of India, who visited Eisenhower in 1954, had a discussion with the President about Indian nonalignment and the international situation. The president told Radhakrishnan that India was in a perfect position to adopt a neutralist stand, and that the United States "recognized this position of neutrality" and expressed the hope that "under the circumstances it was in the best interests of peace." Radhakrishnan believed that there would be a public statement to this effect from the American side.⁸⁵

Nonalignment, therefore, was open to all kinds of inferences, assessments, and pronouncements that varied from time to time and situation to situation. It was, as is evident in the American statements, a form of neutrality about which America at times seemed confused. Nonetheless, America regarded nonalignment as an undesirable foreign policy posture because it was irresponsible, misguided, and based on what American statesmen believed to be false premises.

Since it stood in the way of alliances and military bases, America feared that the Communist bloc would take advantage of the disunity in the democratic front. Despite statements which circumstances dictated, nonalignment was counted essentially as an "immoral and obsolete conception." In the late fifties there was a shift in the American government's public posture towards nonalignment. Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in May, 1958 Walter S. Robertson still assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs, said that since nonaligned powers were not allied with the Communist countries they were of some advantage to the United States.⁸⁶ Nehru's speeches and comments on American policy were still unwelcome in the United States. It considered Nehru's criticisms particularly damaging because he was an "outstanding leader of Asia." The American ambassador in India, Loy Henderson, described Nehru's public statements as "systematic undermining of U. S. prestige and character."⁸⁷

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CHAPTER II

THE RATIONALE OF INDIAN NONALIGNMENT

On becoming independent, after a long struggle against British rulers, India faced enormous problems. In addition to being poor and weak, it had to cope with problems created by partitioning, the sub-division of the land into two independent countries, India and Pakistan. Partitioning caused one of the biggest population movements in history. The socio-economic and political dislocation and the consequent human suffering that it caused became one of the tragic stories of recent Indian history. Constitution making, rehabilitation of refugees, dealing with famine, flood, and drought were no less serious.

The presence of European colonial powers like France and Portugal on isolated pockets of Indian territory constituted another problem for the new government. The integration of princely states into the Indian Union was a time consuming, risk-laden matter of tremendous magnitude. In the midst of confusion and chaos India with its newly formed government had a hard time keeping the machinery of government running. The economic and military strength of the country was not equal to the task of defending its borders. India, dependent on foreign supplies for arms and ammunition, food and fuel, and even some personnel, soon realized that its main concern should be

internal development. It could not wait to industrialize. India's leaders believed that the newly won freedom to be meaningful should bring food to their starving millions. Any attempt to indulge in the luxuries of international power politics would not help achieve domestic economic growth. The enormous problems of nation-building profoundly influenced Indian leadership in deciding foreign and domestic policies.¹

Nehru said that the imperatives of economic development and domestic reconstruction made it almost obligatory for the government of India to follow a policy of not wanting to "interfere with anybody or to be interfered with."² This did not mean that India desired to withdraw from international affairs. Its main concern was that it should not become seriously enmeshed in disputes outside its borders. To remain nonaligned and follow an independent path in the international field, Nehru added, was taken out of a conviction that "the problems of Asia and India are problems related to basic necessities of life--food, clothing, and housing."³ The people of India, he reasoned, "were too busy with these problems to be entangled in international conflicts."⁴

Economic development was important in another respect, for as Nehru once said, the "sin of backwardness has to pay the penalty by somebody pushing you about."⁵ An economically weak country could hardly be expected to maintain independence in an increasingly interdependent world. To avoid dependence

it was necessary to develop the resources of the country and create circumstances in which India could provide for herself. In colonial times the Indian economy had been subservient to England's, her industry designed to complement those of Liverpool, Birmingham, and Manchester. Surveying the economic scene after the British had left India, Professor Michael Brecher of McGill University concluded that its economy was stagnant, heavy industries were undeveloped, the standard of living low, agricultural growth arrested, supply of capital inadequate, and the population growth explosively high. These conditions naturally put a premium on economic development.⁶

Very early in the years of independence India's leaders realized that the superpowers were using India's backwardness to put pressure on their country. India, for example, was unable to procure military supplies in the United States in the aftermath of Indo-Pakistan war (1947-48). Between 1949-51, when Indian food supplies were drastically cut due to drought and crop failures, India had a hard time getting food grains from the United States. The American Congress, after long delay, finally decided to grant India's request but wanted to impose conditions that Indians considered unacceptable. This tendency of the superpowers to indulge in "subtle political manoeuvrings," according to Leo Mates, drove home to the non-aligned the need for self-sufficiency in economic matters.⁷

Growth was urgently needed to prevent the spread of Communism in the country. During the war years (1939-45), with

the help of British officials, Communists had established a small but well-organized party. With the onset of independence they had begun actively to spread the Communist "gospel" throughout India. They exploited the nation's poverty, its rising cost of living, mass unemployment, and ever-rising birth rate as issues to increase their party's stature with the Indian masses. Communism, India's leaders believed, fed on social and economic discontent. The success of the Chinese Communists in exploiting the socio-economic difficulties and corrupt political systems of Chiang Kai-shek's China clearly indicated this. Nehru, however, believed that Communism, in spite of its popular appeal in underdeveloped areas, was bound to fail because of its rigidity and its tendency to ignore certain essential needs of human beings. Although Communism spoke of contradictions in the capitalist society, he argued, Communist societies themselves were not free from contradictions. Communism's suppression of individual freedom, he thought, would bring powerful reaction. Communism, nonetheless, appeared attractive to many because of their disillusionments with India's existing socio-economic affairs. It was necessary, therefore, to satisfy material needs of India to keep Communism checked.

Many Indian officials believed that international peace and order was necessary for economic and military development. In a world troubled by wars growth would be difficult if not impossible. India needed peace for development. Presenting his

credentials as Indian ambassador to the United States B. R. Sen remarked:

In India we have a fifth of the world's population and we know that freedom that we have won after a long struggle will have no meaning for the vast masses of people if it does not bring with it promises of a better life.⁹

He added that because of this "the guiding purpose of our foreign policy is to strive for peace. . . ." The ambassador also stressed the need for peace for democratic freedom to survive and flourish throughout the world.¹⁰ The great powers so far had failed to function responsibly.

This, according to professor Crabb, made it clear to the nonaligned leaders that it was no longer possible to leave the resolution of international crises in the hands of the great powers. India wanted a share in deciding its destiny. Alignment would have made it difficult for India to exert whatever influence it possessed in the cause of peace. It "is only in these terms," argues Michael Brecher, "that Nehru's efforts to mediate in international disputes and to localize conflict, as in Korea and Indo-China, can be properly understood. Indeed, all other factors which shape India's view of the world are subordinate to this overriding consideration. . . ." ¹¹

The desire for peace, therefore, was strong. In 1950 the secretary general of the Ministry of External Affairs, G. S. Bajpai, said that India needed peace for the next fifty years "to transform the face of this country and the future of our people."¹² It was this desire for peace that prompted Nehru to

join Chou En-lai, the Red Chinese foreign minister, to proclaim the Panch Sheel or "Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence." These principles were first included in the preamble to the Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet, April 29, 1954. They were (1) mutual respect for each others territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2) mutual nonaggression; (3) mutual noninterference in each others internal affairs; (4) equality and mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful co-existence. The ideas underlying Panch Sheel, especially peaceful co-existence and non-interference, Nehru said, were important in the light of the big powers who pressured small countries to line up with them. Several countries, including the Soviet Union, subscribed to these principles, although China and Russia did not hesitate to violate these principles. When the Hungarian revolt was ruthlessly suppressed in 1956, India protested that it was a "violation of the Five Principles to which the Soviet Union, as well as India, had subscribed."¹³

The Bandung Conference (1955) of Asian-African leaders concerned with the problems of war and peace added five more principles to Panch Sheel and gave birth to the "Bandung Peace Declaration of Ten Principles."¹⁴

To avoid war Indian leaders believed that it was necessary to reduce tensions and that the formation of military alliances and power blocs only added to tensions and speeded up the chances of war. If India decided to join one of the blocs, it would worsen the situation. B. V. Keskar, the deputy

minister of foreign affairs, in a speech in Madras on July 22, 1951 remarked that "India's joining of any particular bloc is likely to worsen the international situation and precipitate global conflict, negating the very object of its foreign policy."¹⁵ He hoped that Indian nonalignment would reduce the chances of war with India acting as a bridge between East and West. If India were aligned it would not be able to play this¹⁶ role.

India, militarily weak in spite of its potential, caused its leaders to realize that it was not in a position to defend its own territory and independence if threatened by a major power. The only choice before the country, according to Mates, was to follow policies aimed at the creation of an atmosphere that would provide maximum safety for the country. Alignment would have possibly dragged India into unnecessary wars. Indian leaders did not see any reason to fight if the issues did not concern the country directly. In an alliance situation when partners went to war, India would have probably been compelled to join. Being militarily weak India may not have been able to influence a major partner's decision for war, and war, Nehru warned, would bring destruction of everything that mankind stood for. Thus, no attempt should be spared to prevent such an occurrence. India, the prime minister maintained, should use its position to contain the war with the help of like minded parties. He continued, "India can play a big part, and perhaps an effective part, in helping avoid war.

Therefore, it becomes all the more necessary that India should not be lined up with any group of powers which for various reasons are full of fear of war and prepare for war."¹⁷

There was yet another reason for nonalignment: a desire to keep India's options open in case of a war. While Nehru and his colleagues strove for peace, they did not rule out the possibility of war. Nehru believed that once aligned, India's position in case of a war by virtue of its alignment was predetermined. But, according to this logic, if India were not aligned it could join the side it wanted. Which side might be supported could not be determined until after the outbreak of hostilities. To quote Nehru on this matter, he wrote in 1947:

We have proclaimed during the past year that we will not attach ourselves to any particular group. That has nothing to do with neutrality or passivity or anything else. If there is a big war, there is no particular reason why we should jump into it. Nevertheless, it is difficult nowadays in world affairs to be neutral. The point is not what will happen when there is a war. . . . We are not going to join a war if we can help it; and we are going to join the side which is to our interest when the time comes to make the choice.¹⁸

Nehru added that alliances were sure to bring momentary advantages, but in the long run India and international peace stood to lose. Joining alliances, the prime minister believed, meant giving up "your view about a particular question [and] adopt[ing] the other party's view on that question."¹⁹ Membership in any power bloc was unattractive for a further reason. The leaders of the country were jealous guardians of

independence. They feared that alliance would impair the independence of the country. After long years of British occupation, when India became independent, the government put great emphasis on sovereignty. Even the decision to remain in the British Commonwealth was taken, according to Professor Gopal, only after it became clear that Commonwealth membership "while not limiting India's independence and freedom of action, appeared likely to promote stability and peace, and ensure the continuance of 'British connection' in a healthier context."²⁰ Indian leadership viewed every attempt to influence the country's policies as a possible attempt to undermine its independence and prompted leadership to turn down all overtures to join any alliance.²¹

Another strong element in nonalignment was the desire of the country to improve its international standing and gain respect as an equal among nations. Nonalignment would bring certain respect and recognition which was impossible under conditions of alignment. Before India became independent its contacts with the outside world were through the British foreign office. K. G. Thomas argues that although India was a member of the League of Nations and attended international conferences, Indian representatives were British appointees and acted like appendages of the British delegation. According to Robert C. Good, an American political scientist, when emancipated from British control India like other newly

independent countries wanted to "pick up its own franchise, speak with its own voice, and demonstrate its own capacity."²²

The Cold war, the Indian leaders maintained, had a European background. Although there were several things common to Asia and Europe, Nehru's India did not believe that the contending ideologies of Europe were fit for it. The prime minister once remarked that while India was not reluctant to learn from Europe and America, there was no reason why it "should give up its way of doing things." Therefore, India should not be asked to choose between differing European ideologies and isms. In the words of an unnamed "Indian official":

Being herself so different from the West in many respects, Asia can receive with only mild interest any arrangement that appears to carry with it a totalitarian implication that the world should forego its variety and the vitality that comes of peaceful intercourse between its component parts and adopt instead a conformity of belief and institutions originating in particular region or country.²³

K. G. Thomas, an Indian student of international affairs, endorsed this view stating that India viewed Cold War as a "power struggle between the two great powers and the invocation of moral principles . . . [served] only to justify their respective standpoints."²⁴ In India's view international relations were more than a question of struggle between Communism and democracy. Nor did India accept the explanation that the Cold War was a struggle between Evil and Good. According to an Indian political scientist, Suripada Bhattacharya, Indian traditions rejected "absolutes and extreme positions; on the

contrary, it . . . stressed philosophical relativity, intellectual catholicism, and coexistence of evil and good."²⁵

India, according to an "Indian official," was not indifferent to world conflicts and their solutions. But in making a decision, he maintained, India "cannot fail to distinguish between the elements of varying worth that enter into the complexity of each of those problems."²⁶

Indian leaders and their people believed that because of India's history, geography, size, population, and circumstances, it had an important role to play in Asia. As Nehru saw matters, India's emergence as a sovereign nation was "a fact which changes and is changing history." Accordingly, India expected to play an important role in international affairs. Even during the British days, India had participated in international affairs. Because of what Lord George Nathaniel Curzon, the viceroy of India, described as "India's vantage position" in the third most important part of the globe, it was not considered feasible for India to align with other powers.²⁷ In 1950 Nehru declared that India, in spite of its military weakness, was no small power but a potentially great nation and a big power. India, because of its position, he added, ". . . becomes a kind of meeting ground between what might roughly be called the East and the West."²⁸ Nehru held that many questions concerning Asia could not be discussed to the exclusion of India because of this geographical position. Discussing this factor, Nehru said:

If you have to consider any question affecting the Middle East, India inevitably comes into the picture. If you have to consider any question concerning South-East Asia, you cannot do so without India. So also with the Far East. While the Middle East may not be directly connected with South-East Asia, both are connected with India. Even if you think in terms of regional organizations in Asia, you have to keep in touch with other regions. And whatever region you have in mind, the importance of India cannot be ignored.²⁹

As a result he observed that Indians had become ". . . leaders of freedom movement of Asia . . .," and that India had "the responsibility of the leadership of a large part of Asia, the responsibility of being some kind of guide to vast numbers of people all over the world."³⁰

Europe, of course, had long been the dominant power in Asia and throughout most of the world. Speaking to the Constituent Assembly in March, 1948, Nehru remarked that industrialization in Europe and America had technologically far outstripped India and Asia and that because of this Asia fell under European domination and Asia's voices were not heard in the councils of the world.³¹

Now that Asia and India were independent, Nehru believed that the old order needed to be changed. The existing unequal relationship in his view was no more acceptable to Asia. These imbalances in relationships were visible even in the United Nations. Asia was given a back seat in international affairs, and its voice was not heard and seldom given due weight. Asia and India, Indian leaders repeatedly asserted, were concerned more with problems of food, shelter, clothing, and good health

while industrially developed Europe's main concern was power politics. Europe's problems, Nehru once opined, were the product of its conflict-ridden past. India could not be expected to show much interest in it. Therefore, according to Nehru, a readjustment of relations between Asia and Europe was necessary.³²

Europe had failed to take note of this change and realize its significance. Nehru in a broadcast from London in January, 1951, said that Asia was "proud and sensitive and very conscious of its newly won freedom It demands recognition of its new position in the world."³³ Commenting on Nehru's advocacy of Asia and its place in the world, the New York Times wrote:

He has an immense pride in India's ancient heritage, its ageless culture and thought. In his earlier years his interest in his country extended to lands nearby and he interprets history in the light of its impingement up on Asia. Inevitably he looks up on the present day world as a vortex with Asia somewhere near its center. It irritates and appalls him that Western statesmen subordinate the continent to Europe.³⁴

India, its leaders repeatedly declared, was decidedly against imperialism of all kinds. They believed that colonialism, being one form of imperialism, was a threat to world peace and order. India, these leaders maintained, opposed the continued existence of colonialism in Asia and Africa. Thus K. G. Thomas could correctly observe that for India colonialism was the burning issue of the day, and the fight against colonialism "overshadows all other world problems."³⁵ As a

result India stood for the independence of all countries. In Professor Shantilal's view this prompted India to organize the Asian nations conference on Indonesia in New Delhi in 1949. If colonialism did not end, Nehru and other Indian leaders believed that friendly relations between Asia and Europe would be difficult to realize.³⁶

Most of the colonial powers were members of the Western alliance, so India could not possibly join such an alliance. The United States, however, regarded European colonialism as a thing of the past. In the American view the new Communist colonialism of the East European type was more deadly and dangerous. India did not regard East European countries as Russian colonies or satellites, but rather as sovereign states.³⁷

Equally important was the Indian opposition to racism. India wanted it eradicated because, according to an "Indian official," it was "bound up with the major conflicts in the world today."³⁸ The racial discrimination that Indians faced in their own country at the hands of the British had served as an education for them. The treatment of the people of Indian origin in Africa, especially South Africa, was of concern to India. Consequently, India brought the matter of racism before the United Nations' General Assembly year after year because the Indian government believed that racism was "the negation of everything which the United Nations stand for and we (India) stand for."³⁹ South Africa asserted that its racial

policy was a domestic problem and the Assembly could not discuss it, while India contended that racism was a violation of human rights and an assertion of the false doctrine of racial superiority. South Africa had the support of its Western allies. Asiatics who had long suffered because of "diferential and discriminating treatment" resented this position.⁴⁰

Nonalignment was not expected to remain a permanent feature of Indian foreign policy. It was a stop-gap arrangement to ward off hostile acts from major powers or their allies. By not joining military alliances and keeping Cold War rivalries from India's frontiers the country hoped to develop into a strong power. Although the powers were suspicious of Indian nonalignment it soon became popular at home and in Asian and African countries. Since the mid-fifties the powers have changed their attitudes on nonalignment. Its success at home and abroad made Nehru feel that this policy was going to gain "national and international prestige" and that the global powers would respect the Indian stand and small powers would look to India for leadership. This factor contributed to the continuance of Indian nonalignment, and major powers acceptance of it, albeit reluctantly, has generally supported⁴¹ Nehru's hope.

Independence brought political emancipation to India but not complete emancipation from the West. Addressing the Bangalore session of the Indian National Congress in January, 1960, Nehru said that for emancipation to be complete the

political freedom that India gained must be followed by cultural as well as intellectual freedom. Westerners were under the impression that the new leaders of India were politically ignorant and needed guidance. The Indian leadership on their part wanted, as Nehru observed, to think for themselves. He added that India's leaders did not see any reason for "being told what to do and what not to do." When they were convinced of the rightness of an idea or a line of action they would cooperate. But, Nehru concluded that they had no intention to remain mere spectators and were determined "to be actors in it in our own way, actors with friendship for other countries. Where we do not agree, we express our disagreement but in friendly terms."⁴²

Geography, as noted earlier, has played an important role in Indian foreign policy calculations. The closeness of China and Russia to its borders must always be important in Indian thinking. The industrial, economic, and military might of these two nations are far superior to Indian capabilities in these fields. Therefore, as Professor Michael Brecher, a Canadian political scientist, suggests, it would be folly to invite their hostility. Situated as India is at the head of the Indian Ocean, the country is concerned with the developments in the littoral states as well. Since India's economic life is dependent on sea-routes, Brecher concluded that the country cannot be indifferent to the power political rivalries developing in the area. An American biographer of Nehru and

Mahatma Gandhi, Vincent Sheen, believes that an alliance with the West offers no guarantee of security for India. In case of a Communist attack, Sheen argues, the United States is not in a position to go to the aid of India "in valid quantity or quality, or in time." India's decision not to seek military alliance clearly recognizes these geographical realities.⁴³

This refusal to align with the power blocs had yet another aspect to it; the possibility that alliance would create difficulties inside the country. Alliance with either of the two blocs would have undoubtedly led to domestic conflicts. On foreign policy, L. K. Rosinger, an American political scientist, opined that the Communists wanted an alliance with the Soviet bloc. The industrialists and capitalists wanted at least a tacit alliance with the West. The socialists demanded that India initiate a "third camp" of neutrals in the world and completely dissociate with bloc politics so as not to give any side an advantage. The Congress party, the party in power, represented a spectrum of political, ideological, religious, communal and class interests. As the ruling party, unity in Congress's ranks was necessary to keep India a viable political entity. In this respect nonalignment was an attempt to forge domestic unity necessary for national survival. Nonalignment was generally acceptable to groups vying with each other for power and influence, and although the Communists regarded nonalignment, in Rosinger's words, as a "mask to cover collaboration with the Anglo-American imperialists," they were

willing to work with such a policy since relations with the Soviet bloc were not to be restricted. The pro-Western elements accepted nonalignment, according to Professor Crabb, because they were able to preserve their Western ties, get assistance from the West, and at the same time able to follow policies independent of the Western countries. Those who opposed alignment with blocs but stood for friendly relations with all also accepted it because nonalignment did not curtail their freedom of action while the benefits of friendly ties with other countries were secured.⁴⁴

India, as one of the original signatories of the United Nations Charter, wanted to strengthen that organization as an instrument of peace. Military alliances and bloc rivalries, Nehru said in a speech in January, 1947, would disrupt the normal functioning of the organization. The existence of blocs and alliances would create hostility between opposing groups. In a hostile atmosphere nations could not cooperate to strengthen the United Nations. Therefore, the formation of alliances were a disservice to the United Nations, at least so argued Nehru. Consequently, India declared its intention to remain independent of these alliances. The non-aligned countries were aware of the defects of the U. N. and unhappy about special privileges and veto power granted to big powers. The composition of the U. N., its General Assembly, and Economic and Social Council left much to be desired about them as far as Asian-African countries were concerned. In spite of its

flaws Nehru believed that the U. N. was the only hope of humanity. In a message broadcast by the United Nations Radio network from Lake Success, New York, in May, 1950 Nehru said:

It is true that the high hopes with which the United Nations was started have not been fulfilled. At the same time, there can be no doubt that the mere fact of its existence has saved us from many dangers and conflicts. Also, there is no doubt that in the world of today it is the only hope of finding a way for peaceful cooperation among nations. If the United Nations ceases to be or if it radically changes its position and nature, then there is nothing left which would inspire hope for the future. We shall have to go through terrible experiences and face disasters again before we return to something which offers a forum for all nations, even though they differ from one another 45

Indian foreign policy was mainly the work of Jawaharlal Nehru, its first prime minister and foreign minister. He regarded the Indian independence movement as part of a world wide struggle for freedom. During the struggle for independence, it was Nehru who shaped the views of the Indian National Congress on international affairs. His colleagues in the party had given him a free hand in this matter. Small wonder that his ideas came to influence the foreign policy of independent India. According to V. B. Karnik, an Indian critic of Nehru's policies, the framework of the Indian policy was "provided from time to time by Nehru; his ideas and ideology, his aims and aspirations, his judgments and impressions . . . constituted the timber which went into the building of that frame-work." ⁴⁶ The press was favorable to the policies that he pursued, and the Congress party had a clear majority in the Parliament giving Nehru enough latitude to follow policies he

desired. Nehru, being his own foreign minister, concentrated⁴⁷ on foreign policy pronouncements and decisions.

Nehru's position in the country and his role in making foreign policy need not mean that it was exclusively a Nehru policy, for according to Nehru economic factors determine foreign policy. Addressing the Constituent Assembly Nehru observed that "ultimately foreign policy is the outcome of economic policy and until India has properly evolved her economic policy, her foreign policy will be rather vague, rather inchoate, and will be groping."⁴⁸ The foreign policy of India that Nehru shaped and practiced, however, was not built solely on economic foundations. It was a product of various forces, ideas and compulsions. In reply to a debate on foreign policy in Lok Sabha, the lower house of the Indian parliament also known as the House of the People, in December, 1958, Nehru said:

It [Indian foreign policy] is a policy inherent in the circumstances of India, inherent in the past thinking of India, inherent in the whole mental outlook of India, inherent in the conditioning of the Indian mind during our struggle for freedom, and inherent in the circumstances of world today.⁴⁹

Under Nehru's leadership nonalignment became an important factor in international relations. Its growing popularity among newly independent Asian-African countries prompted the superpowers to review their attitude toward the nonaligned. As a result there was change in their initial suspicion and open hostility to nonalignment. Nevertheless, Prime Minister

Indira Gandhi, Nehru's daughter, said on the eve of the nonaligned summit meeting in New Delhi in March, 1983, that "the main feature of rival power blocs trying to assert and enlarge their spheres of influence at the expense of small and weak countries remain," a condition that led to the conception of nonalignment.⁵⁰

Nehru's obsession with his "Indianness" and his desire to secure a better deal for Asia and India in world affairs, his urge for peace necessary for growth at home, and his desire to play the role of peacemaker were important reasons for the development of Indian nonalignment. According to Professor Gopal, nonalignment "beyond its political and economic connotations was an attitude of mind."⁵¹ Internal unity and political stability necessitated a policy of not alienating powerful groups at home. The message of physical destruction brought home by atomic diplomacy had a debilitating effect on Indian calculations for domestic growth. This made alliances and membership in blocs inconceivable. Added to this, according to Professor Gupta, was the attitude of the power blocs in disputes which directly involved India, territorial disputes like Kashmir, Goa and Hyderabad and the apartheid controversy with South Africa. The attitude of the superpowers towards India's international disputes helped crystallize opposition⁵² to alliances and hence promoted Indian nonalignment.

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CHAPTER III

NONALIGNMENT AND THE QUESTION OF RECOGNITION OF COMMUNIST CHINA AND ITS ADMISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

The Indian decision to follow a course in international affairs independent of the two power blocs posed problems for American diplomacy in the post-World War II era. India's stand on various international issues added to the disenchantment in Washington with Indian nonalignment. One such issue that concerned both countries involved China.

The success of Chinese Communists under Mao Tse-tung in deposing Chiang Kai-shek in 1949 was a great disappointment to American government, which had spent billions of dollars to keep him in power. It was also a rude shock to the American people. A feeling was widespread in the United States that the Truman administration had improperly handled the Chinese Civil War and caused the "loss" of China. Subsequently, the question of recognizing the People's Republic of China and its admission to the United Nations became serious foreign policy issues.¹

Red China was one of the very first instances in which Indian nonalignment found itself at variance with the United States policy. The divergence in Indian and American approaches to the subject of recognition meant that the United

States recognition of P. R. C. would come thirty years and five presidents later than Indian recognition, which was extended on December 30, 1949. The United States for a variety of reasons considered the Nationalist Chinese in Taiwan as the legitimate rulers of China and defended them as such in the United Nations.²

Despite the ultimate result of deferring recognition for three decades, initial indications suggested to Indian officials that the United States would soon confer recognition. After the fall of Nanking in April, 1949, K. M. Panikkar, the Indian ambassador to China, 1949-52, said that he believed that although America did not immediately recognize the new regime, it was not opposed to other countries extending recognition. Panikkar, of course, incorrectly felt that Washington favored diplomatic recognition of the Red government. It was only later, Panikkar wrote in 1955, that Republican leaders began to wail over China.³

Soon after the fall of Nanking in April, 1949, Maoists approached the American ambassador in China, John L. Stuart, on the question of recognition. The ambassador replied that once a government that commanded the allegiance of all Chinese people and fulfilled China's international obligations came into existence, America would extend its recognition. Stuart, however, opposed hasty actions on the Communist government. In a telegram dated May 3, to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Stuart suggested that the North Atlantic community should not

grant immediate recognition. The administration, realizing that alternatives to its traditional Chinese policy were "sharply limited," continued to delay a decision on the question.⁴

Acheson in February, 1949, said that he was waiting for the "dust to settle" in China before deciding on a definite course, and the State Department engaged in discussions with the British government, hoping for a cooperative approach to the question. Since the United States decided to discourage hasty action, and because the British favored recognition, the talks ended without results. Britain with its economic interest in China and its situation in Hong Kong could not afford to prolong a decision indefinitely. The Indian government also pressed the British to extend recognition.

Despite this initial set back in trying to achieve a cooperative approach, Acting Secretary of State James Webb, meeting with reporters during the last week of May, said that American policy was to keep in touch with friendly governments on the matter. Thus, the State Department, which at times appeared to be chasing its tail, entered discussions once more with Britain and this time consulted French, Dutch, Indian, Belgian, Thai, Australian, Canadian, New Zealand, and Filipino⁵ officials.

Although the Truman administration procrastinated over the recognition of Communist China, the takeover of the mainland by Maoist troops did prompt a State Department review of

American policy towards Asia. Phillip C. Jessup, American ambassador-at-large, 1949 to 1953, supervised this review. Begun in July, it was not complete until after the administration published a special volume entitled, United States Relations with China, which came to be described as the "White Paper on China."⁶

Increasingly, the Truman administration faced domestic criticism for its China policy, especially the failure to keep the Communists from defeating Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government. The administration believed that the publication of the White Paper would offset these verbal attacks. It purported to show that conditions in China and Chiang Kai-shek's government, not the Truman administration, were responsible for the Communist victory. Walton Butterworth, director of the Office of Far Eastern affairs, supervised the preparation of the White Paper. Ambassador Jessup, just prior to beginning the overall review mentioned above, edited the material that Butterworth and his associates collected. President Truman remarked that the primary purpose of having this "frank and factual" record released in August was to insure that American policy towards China and the Far East was based on informed, intelligent public opinion. The president added:

The role of this government in its relations with China has been subject to considerable misrepresentation, distortion, and misunderstanding. Some of these attitudes arose because this government was reluctant to reveal certain facts, the publication of which might have served to hasten events in China which have now occurred. In the present situation, however, the mutual interests of the

United States and China require full and frank discussion of the facts. It is only in this way that the people of our country and their representatives in Congress can have the understanding necessary to the sound evaluation of our policy in the Far East.⁷

In truth the White Paper was an attempt to relieve the Truman administration from repeated attacks by friends of the Nationalist Chinese. In this the White Paper failed, for criticism continued. When the paper itself came under fire, Acheson argued that attacks upon it were invalid. In a letter accompanying the document when transmitted to President Truman, the secretary wrote:

The unfortunate but inescapable fact is that the ominous result of the civil war in China was beyond the control of the government of the United States. Nothing that this country did or could have done within the reasonable limits of its capabilities could have changed that result; nothing that was left undone by this country has contributed to it. It was the product of internal Chinese forces, forces which this country tried to influence but could not. A decision was arrived at within China, if only a decision by default. And now it is abundantly clear that we must face the situation as it exists in fact. We will not help the Chinese or ourselves by basing our policy on wishful thinking.⁸

While the White Paper did not blunt criticism of Truman's alleged failure in the China war, it did increase the American public's opposition to Communism. Washington, therefore, refused to recognize Communist China and continued to deal with Chiang Kai-shek as its legitimate government. Moreover, America refused to let the P. R. C. become a member of the United Nations. Panikkar wrote that the United States regarded the civil war in China as not yet finished. Most Asiatic countries, including India, Panikkar opined, regarded the civil

war as a thing of the past and wanted to recognize the Communist regime as the legal government of China.⁹

In September, 1949, the People's Republic of China contacted the government of India seeking to establish diplomatic relations between the two countries. Even before the P. R. C.'s request, India was favorably disposed towards recognition. It, however, did not extend diplomatic recognition immediately, waiting for the Kuomintang to flee to Formosa. By November 20, acting President Li Tsung-jen left the mainland, and on December 8, the Nationalist government moved its headquarters to Taipei. On December 30, when Chungking fell into Communist hands, practically all of China was under Maoist control.¹⁰

Before recognizing Communist China, Indian officials consulted other British Commonwealth countries, and Nehru, while on a visit to the United States in October, sounded out the Truman administration on China. Meeting Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Nehru noted that his country favored early recognition. He expressed the view that since recognition was inevitable "there was little purpose in postponing it by diplomatic maneuvers."¹¹ Acheson did not agree.

When Nehru later met with the president, he reiterated India's desire to extend diplomatic recognition. Citing India's proximity to China's borders, Nehru told Truman that India's position on the subject had to be different from that of other countries. Truman countered by saying that so serious

a subject should be given full attention before a decision was reached. He added that non-Communist countries should consult and "if possible concert their action" on the recognition¹² question.

India recognized the P. R. C. on December 30, followed by Britain and other Commonwealth countries in January, 1950. According to New York Times, India based its decision on the following considerations: "the Communist Government controlled practically the whole of the country; there was no evidence that mass of the Chinese opposed the Communist regime; the new Communist Government had agreed to abide by China's international obligations."¹³

Nearly two thousand miles of common border that existed between the two influenced India's attitude towards China. Instead of antagonizing the Chinese by not extending recognition, Indian leaders decided to try to maintain a friendly neighbor. For this reason India did not help Tibet at the United Nations when Maoist forces attacked Tibet, an autonomous region under Chinese suzerainty. India did suggest the need for peaceful settlement, but, after inviting Tibetan representatives to Peking for talks, China, during the final days of October, 1950, invaded the province. Indian officials did describe the Chinese intervention as "deplorable" and protested it. China, however, answered by declaring that Tibet was a domestic matter and of no concern to outsiders. Although India remained silent and inactive in the United Nations

at the time of the Chinese attack, she eventually signed an agreement on Tibet with China in April, 1954. Later developments in conjunction with that ill-fated region led to the Sino-Indian war of October, 1962.¹⁴

India's decision to formalize relations with Red China was not based solely on geographical factors. India was not sympathetic to the fallen Kuomintang regime despite Chiang Kai-shek's support for Indian nationalism during the British days and his pressure on President Franklin D. Roosevelt to intercede with Prime Minister Winston Churchill on India's behalf. Indian officials did not like Chiang Kai-shek's government because of its corrupt and feudalistic nature. Moreover, India regarded the Kuomintang government as an "instrument of Western imperialist interests." To Indians the Chinese revolution was not merely a Communist victory but a victory for Chinese nationalism over imperialists. Nehru believed that the revolution was the culmination of a century-old struggle for emancipation from Western colonialism. Many Indians wrongly felt that Chinese Communists would be less dogmatic than Chiang and more in tune with Chinese history, culture, and traditions. India regarded the Communist victory as the re-emergence of China as an important factor on the international scene.¹⁵

Other practical considerations prompted India to follow a policy of peaceful co-existence with the Red Chinese. Nehru's policy of "cautious friendliness" was based on the

belief that any attempt to isolate China from the international community would drive that country more and more into the Russian camp. If, on the other hand, China were accorded diplomatic recognition and encouraged to work with other nations, he believed she could be brought out of the Russian alliance. Because of this belief India opposed any alliance directed against Red China. Consequently, Nehru rejected the Burmese suggestion for a defensive pact among India, Burma, Ceylon and Pakistan. Likewise, Nehru spurned all talk of a Pacific Pact, such as that suggested by Chiang and President Elpidio Quirino of Philippines. Nehru thought that the time was not ripe for a pact along the lines of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Before any talk of pacts, Nehru believed that internal problems in Asia should be solved.

Nehru held the position that Sino-Soviet cooperation would not last for more than a few years and that India should help it to a speedy dissolution. Summing up the logic of India's China policy and Nehru's attitude towards the new Communist regime, S. Gopal, one of Nehru's biographers, has written:

The acid criticism of him [Nehru] that poured out continually from Peking he charitably ascribed to the exuberance of a victorious revolution. In any event, this could not erase the need for a careful formulation of policy. The establishment of a new regime in China was obviously a world event of the first magnitude, and the reaction of other countries would determine the way in which this event would alter the world balance of forces. At the start China would generally support Soviet foreign

policy, but she was too large and distinctive to function merely as a camp-follower. The new rulers had come to power on their own way, without Soviet assistance; and what could be of importance was not that this regime was Communist but that it provided a strong central government. It had been welcomed by the Chinese people not for its ideology but because anything seemed better to them than the Kuomintang. There was little chance of internal upheaval, and so other nations would have to deal with the Communist government.¹⁷

Panikkar, who believed that by coming to power in China the Communists created a shift in the balance of power in Asia, greatly influenced India's China policy. He did not view Mao's China as a Soviet satellite nor, amazingly, did he believe the policies pursued by Mao differed greatly from his predecessors. Consequently, Indian officials desired to deal with China as an independent, major power in Asian politics.¹⁸

Opposition to China at this time might have had military consequences. At least Indian leaders feared this possibility and felt such a condition was beyond Indian capabilities to manage. India was still economically weak with a vocal Communist minority inside its borders. The refusal to grant diplomatic recognition was bound to force Indian resources and energy into military preparedness and effectively check the chance of economic growth. More than that it would have elicited hostility from the Soviet bloc and compelled India to rely on the West, thus endangering nonalignment and making India the center stage of Cold War rivalries. India wanted to avoid these undesirable consequences without harming its position in Asia.¹⁹

India's recognition of Communist China did not mean Indian approval of Communism. It was recognition that Communists were in control of mainland China. Although China sought and got India's recognition, the Chinese Communists still regarded India as a stooge of Western imperialism. Writing to Indian Communists, Mao expressed the fervent hope that "India will certainly not remain long under the yoke of imperialism and its collaborators."²⁰

In a similar vein, denunciations of the United States emanating from Peking convinced most American leaders that the Chinese Communists were not substantially different from their Russian counterparts. Red China's anti-American attitude was contrary to initial American expectation that Maoist China might follow a Titoist line in its dealings with the Soviet Union. Instead, Mao declared his opposition to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and affirmed his "intention to march hand-in-hand with 'our ally, the Soviet Union' in the event of war."²¹ This led Secretary of State Acheson to admit the failure of the traditional Sino-American policy of friendship for the Chinese people. Acheson lamented the coming of a new "foreign domination" of China under an ideological garb. The secretary did not mince words in warning the Chinese of dire consequences if they engaged in aggression against their neighbors.²²

By the end of 1949, recognition of the new China government had come to be impractical and inexpedient for the United

States. Although non-recognition was not expected to provide any long-range benefit, the decision on recognition had been kept pending until the pulls and pressures of domestic politics prompted the Truman administration to postpone the decision on recognition of Red China indefinitely. The Senate had already made it clear that its Foreign Relations Committee should be consulted before a decision was reached, and Acheson had deferred to the Senate's wishes. James Reston, perhaps the most knowledgeable newspaper columnist in America, writing in the New York Times on December 30, 1949, said that President Truman's decision not to recognize China was due to pressure from a considerable section of congressmen whose help the president needed to get the European Recovery program and the European Military Assistance program passed. Consequently, in response to Red China's request for diplomatic relations, Acheson put forward conditions which he did not expect the Communists would or could meet.

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Announcement of the decision not to recognize Red China came later, in May of 1951. Speaking at the China Institute dinner on May 8, 1951, assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern Affairs Dean Rusk declared:

We do not recognize the authorities in Peiping for what they pretend to be. The Peiping regime may be a colonial Russian government--a Slavic Manchukuo on a larger scale. It is not the Government of China. It does not pass the first test [for recognition]. It is not Chinese.

It is not entitled to speak for China in the Community of nations. . . .

We recognize the National Government of the Republic

of China, even though the territory under its control is severely restricted. We believe it more authentically represents the views of the great body of the people of China, particularly their historic demand for independence from foreign control. 24

John Foster Dulles, who was then consultant to the State Department, was present at the China Institute dinner. He had advocated in his book, War or Peace, recognition of China and its admission to the United Nations in 1950. But Dulles, sharing the platform with Rusk, now expressed the view that China had become subservient to Moscow and that even many Chinese Communists resented this development. He argued that the situation could be changed:

Unless and until actual conduct gives clear proof of change, our national self interest, our friendship for China, and the historic dedication of our Nation to the cause of human freedom combine to require that no act of ours shall contribute to a Mao Tse-tung success which could fasten the yoke of Moscow on the Chinese people.25

In the years that followed, when Dulles became secretary of state, the official American attitude towards Red China continued to harden.

The Eisenhower administration's attitude toward the Chinese recognition question was not substantially different from that of Truman's. Dulles in 1954, described the decision not to recognize China as "soberly rational." Recognition, he asserted in April, 1954, was a voluntary act, and nobody had the right to demand recognition. While conceding that "generally, it is useful that there should be diplomatic intercourse between those who exercise de facto Governmental

authority," the secretary reminded his audience that where "it [recognition] does not serve our interests, we are free to vary from it." He added that the Chinese regime was "consistently and viciously hostile to the United States."²⁶

By the late 1950's there was some change in a portion of the public's attitude on recognition. Some congressmen began to question the wisdom of the non-recognition policy. The administration's policy toward China, however, did not change, and no doubt most Americans supported it. The State Department's three thousand word memorandum entitled "The United States Policy Regarding Nonrecognition of the Chinese Communist Regime," sent to American embassies throughout the world in August, 1958, reiterated the U. S. government's stand on the issue. It claimed that "if the situation in the Far East were so to change in its basic elements as to call for radically different evaluation of the threat the Chinese Communist policies pose to the United States and free world security interests, the United States would of course readjust its present policies."²⁷

The memorandum confirmed that the United States did not believe that Communist rule in China was permanent and hoped that it would some day cease. Non-recognition, it stated, would deny China access to councils of the world. This would reduce China's prestige and influence in Asia, making it difficult for China to pursue its foreign policy objectives.

Moreover, recognition of the P. R. C. would be a blow to the Kuomintang. If Red China were recognized, the State Department memorandum contended, Chinese living outside of mainland China, especially those in Malaya, Singapore and Indonesia, would transfer their loyalty to the Peiping regime. This shift in loyalty would affect the ability of Southeast Asian nations to resist Chinese expansionist moves into the area. ²⁸

Closely connected with the question of diplomatic recognition was the issue of Red China's admission to the United Nations. The seizure of American property in China in January, 1950, followed by the Sino-Soviet treaty of February stiffened American stand against P. R. C. membership in the world body. When the matter was brought before the Security Council, the American delegation opposed it on "procedural" grounds but expressed the opinion that any proposal that secured seven votes would receive American endorsement. The Council in its January 13, 1950, meeting by a vote of six to three with three abstentions rejected a Soviet resolution providing for the exclusion of the Kuomintang from the United Nations. The Russians argued that the Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan did not represent China or the Chinese people. The Council's decision prompted the Russian delegate, Jacob Malik, to boycott the Council. The Soviet boycott continued until August 1, 1950. Russia's action did nothing to solve the question of Chinese representation. ²⁹

The coming of the Korean War in June of 1950 brought a halt to recognition of the Chinese Communists by states that had not yet recognized the regime, and it had an unsettling effect on the issue of China's admission to the United Nations. The U. N. Secretary General, Trygve Lie, concerned about the fate of the organization in view of the Russian boycott, attempted to break the deadlock in the Council. He met with the Council members on several occasions and tried to impress upon them, especially representatives from France, Egypt, Cuba, and Ecuador, that recognition and representation at the U. N. were two different issues. American determination not to admit Red China dampened Lie's efforts. After putting pressure on an unnamed Latin American delegation to keep China out of the U. N., the American administration returned to its earlier stand that it would abide by the will of the majority.³⁰

The Indian position on Red China's membership in the United Nations was in direct contradiction to the American policy. India wanted the People's Republic to be included and as a result championed its cause before the United Nations. The government of India believed that it would be a fatal error not to admit China. India contended that to be amenable to international pressure Red China should be a member of that organization.³¹

America based its case against China on Chinese seizure of American property in China and its refusal to fulfill international obligations as envisaged in treaties made between

the Kuomintang government and other countries. Communist China showed no inclination to respect these treaties. The United States demanded that China prove it was a peace loving-nation and that it was willing to live up to its international obligations. In addition, America feared that recognition of Communist China and its admission to the U. N. would add to China's prestige and give it a certain respectability while making it another source of opposition to American policies. ³²

In September, 1950, during the 277th plenary meeting of the fifth session of the General Assembly, India introduced a resolution providing for representation of Communist China in the United Nations. Moving the resolution, the Indian delegate, Sir Benegal Rau, argued that since the Peoples Republic of China was the one government that commanded the respect and obedience of the bulk of the population of China and since that government was in effective control of the country, the Communist government should represent China in the U. N. Unhappy about the Indian move, Acheson, who spoke for the American delegation, asked that the Indian resolution be "voted down." The manner and timing of the resolution irritated Acheson, who demanded an immediate decision on the Indian action. That the Indian resolution had been introduced before the U. N. Assembly elected the president or organized for the work of the session angered Acheson. In his argument against the Indian resolution, Acheson noted that forty-three countries still recognized the Kuomintang government as the

legitimate government of China and that only sixteen countries so far had recognized the Communist regime. The Assembly defeated the Indian proposal on a vote of thirty-two to sixteen. Ten members abstained.

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The war in Korea complicated the question of American recognition of Red China and its admission to the U. N. The Korean War also led to the reversal of the American decision against armed intervention in the Chinese Civil War. When North Koreans attacked South Korea, President Truman ordered the U. S. Seventh Fleet to move from the Philippines to near Taiwan to keep the island from being attacked by Red Chinese forces. He also ordered the fleet to prevent a Nationalist invasion of the mainland. The decision to use American forces in the waters near China hardened American determination not to recognize the Communist government or allow it to be seated in the U. N. Discussing America's China policy Tang Tsou, an American student of Chinese-American relations wrote:

Nonrecognition as a policy was born of the contradiction between the nation's reluctance to forsake an objective and her incapacity to achieve it by purposeful use of military power. The friends of the Nationalist's advocated non-recognition passionately. The administration adopted it without conviction as a temporary measure, partly in response to Republican pressure and partly in response to Mao's policy of deliberately provoking the Western powers. Mao's provocative actions and pronouncements stemmed basically from his Marxist-Leninist ideology. But the American policy of sustaining the Nationalist government reinforced his distorted view of the United States while the policy of limited assistance failed to impress on him American strength and determination.³⁴

The Chinese intervention in the Korean War caused the Truman administration to continue its policy of non-recognition of the Maoist regime. The administration took the position that to recognize China in the wake of Chinese action in Korea would be tantamount to rewarding aggression. Therefore, the administration was not even willing to discuss the question of Chinese recognition or its representation at the United Nations. In a memorandum of his conversation with Clement Atlee, the British prime minister, in December, 1950, Truman wrote:

This brought discussion back to specific points and first to the question of whether the seating of the Chinese Communists at the U. N. should be considered as a subject that might be included in negotiations with them.

Acheson took the position that we should not even consider it. If we did, we would in effect be saying to the Communists that they had won the game and could now collect the stakes; it would be like offering a reward for aggression. For that reason, if for no other, Acheson preferred that there be no negotiations at all, even if the Communists won and forced us out of Korea.³⁵

The Eisenhower administration adopted an attitude similar to that of Truman on China's admission to the U. N. Secretary of State Dulles maintained that the U. N. charter restricted membership in the world body to peace-loving nations and that by waging war against the United Nations Command the Red Chinese government had proven that it was not a peace-loving state. The Communist Chinese activities in Indo-China were further evidence, the secretary added, of a "lack of genuine will for peace." As a result, America continued to oppose

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China's admission to the U. N.

India, however, continued to harp on the theme of recognizing the reality that was Communist China and the need for its admission to the U. N. India's position failed to influence the American stand, but it did have visible effect on Indo-American relations. India, although not enthusiastic about the Communist character of the new Chinese regime, decided to co-exist with China. America, on the other hand, seeing no immediate advantage in recognizing Red China, hoped for its demise.

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CHAPTER IV

NONALIGNMENT AND THE KOREAN WAR

The Korean War of 1950-53 proved to be the most important test that Indian nonalignment faced in its formative years. It was the one case that helped popularize the concept of non-alignment among the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa. Her refusal to align with either side and her efforts to localize the conflict and establish peace through mediation improved India's standing in the international community. That she was named chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission for Korea was considered by many to be a sure mark of success for nonalignment. This "neutral" stand on issues arising out of the Korean war helped increase American awareness of and opposition to Indian nonalignment.¹

Having failed to come to an agreement with the Soviet Union on the future of Korea, the United States took the question of Korean unification to the United Nations in September, 1947. The U. N. General Assembly in a resolution on November 14, created the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, a move designed to facilitate effective Korean participation in the unification process. The Commission was expected to expedite elections in Korea for a National Assembly. This Assembly in turn was to form a National Government to administer the whole nation and to create a national militia to

relieve the occupying forces of their responsibilities.

India's involvement in Korea came as early as 1947 when an Indian representative, K. P. S. Menon, was elected permanent chairman of the Korean commission.²

Russian authorities in North Korea refused to cooperate with the commission or to admit it into the area. Unable to carry out its responsibilities in the face of Russian non-cooperation, the commission sought the advice of the U. N. Interim Committee which now considered the future course of action to be taken in Korea. The committee advised commissioners to carry out the General Assembly's directives in those parts of Korea that were accessible. India, however, had reservations about the formation of an independent state in the south.³

In spite of its disagreement with the Interim Committee's advice, India complied with the General Assembly's goal and on August 15, 1948, helped create the Republic of Korea. India was of the opinion that South Korea should be urged to negotiate with North Korea over unification. South Korea, like the puppet regime in the north, was unwilling. Because the hoped for cooperation did not materialize, India suggested that the South Korean government should not be recognized as the government of all of Korea. In fact she did not accept the Syngman Rhee government as the government of South Korea. India also opposed the withdrawal of allied occupation forces prior to a negotiated settlement with the north.⁴

In North Korea a Communist government under Russian tutelage came into existence on September 9, 1948. Division was now a reality. By June, 1949, all occupation forces were withdrawn leaving the two Koreas to face each other across their common boundary, the thirty-eighth parallel. With the departure of the occupation armies tension increased. Military clashes across the thirty-eighth parallel rose in number and frequency. This then provided the immediate background to the war.⁵

Several events conditioned the American reaction to North Korea's invasion of the south in June, 1950. At the Foreign Ministers Conference held in Paris in May and June, 1949, to resolve the outstanding issues remaining from World War Two between the Soviet Union and its former Western allies, nothing was solved. The Russian explosion of an atomic device in September, 1949, according to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, prompted America to go ahead with its plans to develop a hydrogen bomb. Meanwhile, the National Security Council, after reviewing American foreign and military policies, wrote Acheson, recommending "an end to demobilization and [calling] for an increased military force . . . and tightening of alliances." Acheson also noted about this time that the Berlin blockade of 1948 was an eyeopener for the West because it showed that "prevention of attack was better than remedying the mistakes after an attack." As a result, when the Korean war broke out, America reacted strenuously.⁶

On June 25, 1950, North Korean forces crossed the thirty-eighth parallel into the south marking the beginning of a war that lasted thirty-seven months. This aggression challenged the very idea of a United Nations, the notion that collective security could keep peace and protect nationhood. A Security Council decision of the same day recommended immediate cessation of hostilities and called upon North Korea to withdraw its forces back to the thirty-eighth parallel. The North Korean authorities paid little attention to the Security Council resolution. The Council in its meeting of June 27 requested all member nations to help South Korea repel the Communist invader. While India voted for a resolution on June 25 that branded North Korea the aggressor, the Indian delegate abstained on the June 27 resolution that called upon the member nations to extend military assistance to South Korea. On June 29 the government of India, however, accepted this resolution.⁷

The American press reported the Indian decision to support the second Security Council resolution on Korea as the result of American pressure. The government of India felt compelled to issue a statement denying external pressure on Indian foreign policy. On recommendation from its embassy in New Delhi, the American State Department also issued a statement rejecting the report.⁸

India had reservations about sending military help to South Korea to repel North Korean aggression. Girija Sanker

Bajpai, the secretary general of the Ministry of External Affairs, held the view that an Indian decision to send troops would lead to a "chain of events which would have unfortunate consequences in Asia." If, for example, India prompted Burma to send troops to Korea, Bajpai argued, China might use this action as a pretext to interfere in Burma. Moreover, America's decision to couple Indo-China and Formosa with events in Korea caused additional problems for Indian policy makers. Bajpai added that India did not want to extend help to the French in Indo-China and to Chiang Kai-shek on Formosa, "forces which millions of Asians including Indians considered to be imperialistic, colonial, or reactionary."⁹

The American ambassador to India, Loy Henderson, discussing the Security Council resolution with Bajpai, told him that supporting the Council decision did not mean sending troops. He made it clear that all nations supporting the Council decision "would not be expected to furnish armed assistance."¹⁰ Henderson stressed the American view that the "issue was not between two power blocs but [between] an aggressor and the U. N."¹¹ In his discussions with Bajpai, Henderson "gained the impression that India was relieved that the Security Council vote had been taken so quickly and decisively that there had been no need for India to take a stand." Clearly then India was having second thoughts about supporting the United Nations in its war efforts in Korea.¹²

Nehru and his cabinet were concerned about the implications of the June 27 resolution as it related to nonalignment. Nehru told ambassador Henderson on June 29, 1950, that nonalignment made it necessary to see that Indian actions did not give any impression of a change in policy. Domestic critics were already saying that Nehru and his cabinet were tools of Anglo-American imperialists. After much hesitation, when India decided to support the Council, the government announced that their "decision did not involve any modification of India's foreign policy."¹³

India believed that North Korea had committed aggression and that it should be resisted. But at the same time the government of India felt that the Korean war should be localized and efforts to bring about peace should be undertaken. Speaking to the Indian Parliament in August, 1950, Nehru said: "Our policy is, first, of course, that aggression has taken place by North Korea over South Korea. That is a wrong act that has to be condemned, that has to be resisted. Secondly, that so far as possible, the war should not spread beyond Korea. And thirdly, we should explore the means of ending the war."¹⁴ Supporting collective security measures and sending troops to Korea, India believed, would stand in the way of nonalignment. Participating in the Korean hostilities, India felt, would be tantamount to joining the West against the East. Consequently, India did not send any military assistance to South Korea. Justifying Indian action Nehru wrote

Benegal Rau, India's permanent representative at the U. N., on July 1, 1950, that "for a variety of reasons we cannot send any military, naval or air help for the Korean operation. Our moral help is a big enough thing, which outbalances the petty military help of some other countries."¹⁵ Nehru was concerned that supporting the Korean resolution would cost India what little influence it had with the Communists. Obviously, India's leaders did not feel force to oppose aggression was justifiable if it interfered with India's interests.¹⁶

Truman's decision to neutralize Formosa for the duration of the war made American intentions suspect in Indian eyes. According to two Stanford University scholars, Ross N. Berkes and Mohinder S. Bedi, American action in Formosa waters, when ships of the Seventh Fleet began to patrol the area, caused India . . . to see the Korean war less and less as a vital demonstration of collective security, and more and more as an American-Kuomintang threat to reopen the Chinese Civil War, and to resettle one of the greater stakes in the great power rivalry."¹⁷ Belma Steinberg, a Canadian scholar, suggested that linking Korea with the Chinese Civil War led India to reject attempts to resist aggression and to concentrate rather on ending the Korean War. Berkes and Bedi concur on this point. Like many scholars they accept Nehru's statements at face value.¹⁸

The Indian view of the Korean war differed considerably from the American estimate. America acted from the belief that

if North Korean aggression went unpunished Communist expansionism would soon pose a threat to other countries of the region. India did not view North Korean aggression as part of an attempt to expand world Communism. Rather, it regarded the American and Russian reaction to Korean events as motivated by Cold War considerations. The United States, of course, believed that the North Korean invasion would not have occurred without Soviet permission, a view that has considerable¹⁹ merit.

Although the North Korean invasion came as a surprise to the United States, it had taken steps to help South Korea before the Security Council met on June 27, 1950. The United Nation's action that created a unified command a few days later was, according to Canadian foreign minister, Lester B. Pearson, an attempt at "making the [American] action, in theory at least, a United Nations operation."²⁰ India abstained on the Council resolution creating the U. N. command under the American aegis. The government of India instructed its representative to abstain on the Council vote since Indian troops²¹ were not fighting in Korea.

India, averse to the idea of Asia becoming a battleground of diverging political ideologies and military blocs, wanted to localize the conflict. This, probably, would have meant South Korea's defeat, but India concentrated its efforts on mediating the war. In Moscow the Indian ambassador, Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, met with Deputy Foreign Minister V. A. Zorin

and asked the Russian government to use its influence to have North Korea withdrawn from the south and to stop fighting. On July 1, 1950, the Indian ambassador in Peking, K.M. Panikkar, met with Chang Han-fu, the Chinese vice-foreign minister, to suggest that the Korean problem be settled in the U. N. Security Council. Panikkar also suggested that China occupy her legitimate seat in the Council and that the Soviet Union end its boycott of the United Nations. Nehru had already discussed China's entry into the U. N. with Ernest Bevin, the British foreign secretary in London. On July 7, in a press conference, Nehru suggested that China's admission to the U. N. and Russia's return to the Security Council were required for a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem. The Chinese were in agreement with the Indian suggestion.²²

In July Nehru wrote a letter to Acheson expressing a desire to localize the war and to effect an "early peaceful settlement by breaking the deadlock in the Security Council." In Nehru's opinion a peaceful settlement was possible only with Russian cooperation. The Soviets had been boycotting the Security Council for several months on the question of Red China's representation at the United Nations. To facilitate Soviet participation Nehru suggested that China be admitted to the United Nations. Nehru promised that once these arrangements were made, the United States, the Soviet Union, and China, "with the help and cooperation of peace-loving nations" could work out a solution for the Korean question.²³

Acheson replied that although the United States desired the maintenance of international peace the present policy of the American government was to "repel the armed attack upon Korea and to restore international peace and security in the area." He further noted that "there could have long since been a restoration of peace and the saving of the lives of those fighting on behalf of the United States had not a small minority of the United Nations failed to meet their obligations under the charter and refused to use their authority and influence to prevent or stop hostilities." Acheson suggested that there could be no linking of the Korean question with other issues pending before the United Nations. The question of Chinese representation, the secretary added, should be settled by the U. N. "on its merits." The Russian boycott, he said, was of their doing and no one had put any obstacles in the way of their participation in the Security Council. The secretary asserted that Chinese entry into the U. N. could not be bought by aggression and he added that seating China in the U. N. would be "rewarding aggression."

Nehru wrote a letter similar to the one he sent Acheson to Joseph Stalin, chairman of the Soviet council of ministers and iron-fisted dictator of the U. S. S. R. Stalin accepted Nehru's proposals. Nehru then sent a second letter to Acheson reiterating his earlier position. On July 29, two days after Nehru's second letter, Russia declared an end to its boycott of the Security Council.

According to Panikkar fighting in Korea during the first few weeks did not give much concern to China. They were worried about Taiwan but did not publicly show their feelings. About the middle of July, Panikkar noted, the Chinese attitude suddenly changed; anti-American propaganda was increased and intensified. There were reports of war-like preparations in China to invade Taiwan. These reports prompted American officials to issue several statements indicating that the United States had no aggressive intentions against China and that "America would withdraw her protective hands from Taiwan" once the Korean war was over. This, Panikkar wrote, eased tensions.²⁸

Nehru's concern about the possibility of the Korean War escalating as a result of Chinese intervention remained. America had, however, asked India "to represent to Peking not to act sharply to the success of American forces in South Korea."²⁹ Panikkar did not follow the instruction to convey the message to the Chinese because he believed that they would not intervene in Korea. He informed the government of India that Chinese leaders were "determined to avoid a war unless they are forced into it by a direct threat to their authority on the mainland."³⁰ Nehru, however, instructed Panikkar to impress upon Peking that India would be opposed to China's use of force to take Formosa, for it would escalate the fighting. India confirmed that it recognized Chinese claims to Formosa. China's behavior in this issue, Panikkar was to inform Peking,

would be treated "as a test case" of its future conduct on the international plane. The Chinese had stated as late as July 28, 1950, that they had no intention of entering the Korean War "unless [it was] forced on them."³¹

In spite of the early military reverses, the United Nations operations soon began to succeed. With the Inchon landing by General Douglas MacArthur, a counter offensive broke the back of the North Korean forces south of the thirty-eighth parallel. MacArthur's forces recaptured Seoul on September 27 and reached the thirty-eighth parallel without much opposition. Acheson later wrote that the routing of the North Korean forces provided the "tempting possibility of achieving an independent and united Korea without more military effort [by] or risk . . . to the United Nations."³²

With the success of the Inchon operations, Panikkar noticed a change in Chinese attitude towards the war. There were already reports that Chinese forces were moving northward towards Korea. On September 25, 1950, General Nieh Yen-jung told ambassador Panikkar of the Chinese intention to intervene in Korea if American forces reached the Chinese border.

Panikkar, reminiscing over the meeting, wrote:

This was the first indication I had that the Chinese proposed to intervene in the war. I was taken aback a little by this statement, all the more impressive because it was said in a quiet and pleasant tone, as if he were telling me that he intended to go shooting next day. 33

That night Peking was under curfew in order to facilitate

troop movements towards the railway station. Once more Panikkar misread Chinese intention but continued to represent India in China.³⁴

Even as the Inchon operations were underway, the government of India had informed the American government, through its ambassador in New Delhi, that India opposed any move north of the thirty-eighth parallel. India maintained that military operations should end when U. N. forces reached the previously established border. Reporting this information, ambassador Henderson said, that the government of India believed that it was necessary to stop at the parallel to prevent the spread of war even though such a step was not feasible from a military point of view. Crossing the parallel, the government of India maintained, would bring China into the war. China had already informed India that the Chinese would not take such a "provocation lying down." Chou En-lai, who met with Panikkar on September 21, told him that "since the United Nations had no obligations to China, China had no obligations to the United Nations." This and his other talks with Chinese officials convinced Panikkar that China "was decided on a more aggressive policy."³⁵

The American ambassador in Moscow, Alan Kirk, confirmed reports from New Delhi regarding the Chinese threats to intervene in the Korean war. Kirk's source of information on Peking's plans was the Dutch embassy in Moscow. The Dutch embassy in Peking, according to Kirk, reported the possibility

of Chinese intervention. He added that according to Panikkar Chinese decision to intervene had "crystallized since mid-September and that it . . . [was] based on Chinese conviction that [the] basic aim of [the] U. S., if its forces enter North Korea, . . . [was] to carry war to Manchuria and China in order to return Chiang Kai-shek to power in China." Ambassador Kirk, however, believed that the Chinese were bluffing.³⁶

For the United Nations forces to cross the parallel and continue their northward march, a U. N. decision was required. Since the Soviets could check any such action in the Security Council, it became necessary that the General Assembly act. This prompted the United States to propose that states "turn to the General Assembly in cases of aggression should the Security Council be paralyzed by a veto."³⁷ Commenting on the the American approach, Secretary of State Acheson conceded that the action was not without consequences for the future, but he added that "present difficulties outweigh possible future ones, and we pressed on." Herein then lay the origin of the "Uniting for Peace" resolution of November 3, 1950.³⁸

October, 1950, brought even worse news. The director of the Asian affairs division of the Chinese foreign ministry came to Panikkar's residence at midnight, October 1, to take him to an important meeting with Chou En-lai, where the Chinese foreign minister solemnly warned Panikkar that "if Americans crossed the thirty-eighth parallel China would be forced to intervene in Korea." He expressed China's desire for

a peaceful settlement of the Korean issue and spoke approvingly of "Nehru's approach to the question."³⁹ Chou added that he would not be unduly concerned about the South Korean forces crossing the parallel for he did not consider them a threat to Chinese security. He told Panikkar that any Korean settlement without Chinese participation would be unacceptable to China.⁴⁰

On receipt of Panikkar's report from Peking, Nehru contacted Bevin. The British leader immediately dispatched a letter to Chou through Panikkar to assure that the "Korean commission would give the Chinese views their most careful consideration."⁴¹ By the time Bevin's letter reached Chou, Chinese soldiers were already in Korea. Panikkar's reports regarding Chinese intentions were also passed on to Washington. The Truman administration did not give much importance to the communication. Commenting on this, William Manchester, MacArthur's biographer, wrote:

In those intolerant years the American government regarded Indian neutralism with suspicion; Truman remarking that Panikkar had in the past "played the game of the Chinese Communists fairly regularly," concluded that Chou's message was probably "a bald attempt to blackmail the United States by threats of intervention in Korea." Accordingly, it was dismissed as a bluff.⁴²

Even though Chinese threats were described as a bluff, the Truman administration felt that the Chinese should be advised that the United States had no plan to threaten Chinese security. The U. S. government instructed its ambassador in New Delhi to confer with the Chinese ambassador there through

the help of Indian officials, but failing that, to convey the message that the U. S. planned no threat to China to the Chinese ambassador through Bajpai or the British high commissioner in New Delhi. The American attempts to see the Chinese ambassador in Delhi were unsuccessful, for the Chinese "considered it unwise to have even informal conversation" since the United States had refused to establish diplomatic relations with China and also because of American attitude on Formosa and Chiang Kai-shek.⁴³

China's threat to intervene in Korea seems to have stiffened Indian opposition to the U. N. force crossing the thirty-eighth parallel. Consequently, the government of India instructed its representative at the U. N. not to support a British resolution on Korea if the U. N. decided to cross the parallel. The government of India believed that the Chinese were serious and the Indians cited the fact that the Chinese had already massed forces on the Manchurian border. The government of India, Henderson reported from New Delhi, was of the opinion that it "could be more useful in maintaining peace if it did not participate in any plan connected with or flowing from crossing the thirty-eighth parallel by the U. N. forces."⁴⁴

The American government continued to believe that the Chinese threat was a ploy to dissuade the government of India and other states from actively supporting United Nations actions in Korea. That Chou En-lai opted to send his ultimatum

through Panikkar and not directly to the U. N. was given as evidence for this view. Although most officials in the State Department considered the Chinese threat to be a bluff, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern affairs Livy Merchant⁴⁵ warned that China's threats were not idle.

A British-sponsored resolution introduced in the General Assembly on September 30, 1950 provided for the unification and economic rehabilitation of Korea. This resolution, co-sponsored by seven other nations and later described as the Eight power resolution, got the approval of the Assembly on October, 7. According to Secretary Acheson this resolution, drafted with U. S. cooperation, revived the 1947 U. N. plan for a "united, independent and democratic government of Korea." India, although in agreement with the main objectives of the Eight power resolution for the unification and economic rehabilitation of Korea, regarded the attempt to reunify Korea by force as unwise. The Indian spokesman at the U. N. reminded other members that the United Nations went into action in Korea against North Korean attempt forcibly to reunite the country. Therefore, India suggested that the British sponsored resolution should limit itself to reunification of Korea through election and economic rehabilitation. The North Koreans, India maintained, should be invited to lay down their arms and help in the unification of their country. If the North Koreans disregarded the offer, then the issue could be reviewed by the United Nations.⁴⁶

The question of crossing the thirty-eighth parallel had been a subject of discussion by the American administration since June, 1950. The secretary of state had emphasized the main objective of U. N. operation as restoration of the status quo and President Truman believed that nothing further should be said on the topic until the results of the war in Korea became clearer. By mid-July there were renewed discussions. The State Department's Far Eastern Bureau supported the position of U. N. forces crossing the parallel; but the policy planning staff opposed it. A Defense Department memorandum of July 31, 1950, on the "U. S. Courses of Action in Korea" concluded that "the establishment of a free and united Korea and the elimination of North Korean Communist regime . . . would be a step in reversing the dangerous strategic trend in the Far East of the past twelve months." In order to establish a free and united Korea the memorandum suggested that the "Commanding General of the Unified Command should be directed to take necessary action in Korea, without regard to the 38th parallel." By early September the National Security Council concurred with an invasion of North Korea, and Truman authorized the Joint Chiefs of Staff to draw up instructions for MacArthur directing him to put into action the Defense Department recommendation.

Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent MacArthur instructions on September 27, 1950, authorizing military operations inside of North Korea. On September 30, South Korean

forces crossed into the north and continued to advance for the next few days. A week later on October 7, the United Nations forces crossed the thirty-eighth parallel. They occupied Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, on October 19. Since China did not react, some officials, according to Panikkar, began to believe that the Chinese were, after all, bluffing. ⁵⁰

Despite the fact that State Department officials did not believe the warnings of Chinese intervention, American military leaders did make preparations to meet such an eventuality. By memorandum on October 7, Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett requested the president to authorize the Joint Chiefs of Staff to issue directives to MacArthur regarding actions to be taken in case China intervened. The memorandum reported that the Joint Chiefs believed that the Chinese entry into the war was possible. A draft message approved by Truman on October 8, authorized MacArthur to take action against covert or overt Chinese intervention in Korea. Truman's message informed that such action should be limited to that which offered a reasonable chance of success with forces at his disposal. According to these instructions the general had to get clearance from Washington to take any action inside Chinese territory. ⁵¹

It was during the first week of November, 1950, that the United Nations General Assembly passed the "Uniting for Peace" resolution. According to Acheson, when proposed early in October its "immediate purpose . . . was to lay a foundation

for a policy declaration by the General Assembly on the Korean situation." ⁵² Such a declaration would allow United Nations forces to cross the thirty-eighth parallel into North Korea. As circumstances developed the eight power resolution of October 7, 1950, providing for the unification and economic rehabilitation of Korea, met the purpose that the "Uniting for Peace" proposal was to serve. Nevertheless, the "Uniting for Peace" resolution when introduced in the Assembly got its approval over the objections of the Communist countries and India. The Soviet Union opposed the resolution on the ground that it was contrary to the U. N. charter. India resisted the resolution because Nehru saw it as an attempt at "converting the U. N. into a larger edition of the Atlantic Pact and making it a war organization more than one devoted to peace." ⁵³ Understandably, India's stand on the resolution disgusted some Americans.

While the General Assembly busied itself passing resolutions, the war in Korea entered a new phase. As United Nations forces marched northward toward the Yalu River, Chinese soldiers began to cross the Yalu into North Korea. As early as October 16 Chinese "volunteers" were inside North Korean territory. The Chinese forces destroyed the Seventh Regiment of the South Korean Sixth Division, which reached the Yalu on October 26. Between October 26 and November 5, the U. N. forces fought the Communist Chinese "volunteers" on twelve different occasions at various places inside North Korea.

Then, for a while, the secretary recorded, the Chinese disappeared from the scene. The full Chinese offensive was yet to come.⁵⁴

The deteriorating situation in the Far East, in Panikkar's view, prompted Ernest Bevin to send another letter to Chou En-lai assuring him that "Chinese boundaries would be respected." On instruction from Nehru, Panikkar met Chinese foreign ministry officials to endorse Bevin's assurances. The Chinese, Panikkar later reported, were not convinced, and neither was Panikkar.⁵⁵

China's all-out attack came during the last week of November, 1950. They came in such strength that MacArthur reported on November 28 that he faced an entirely new war with little hope of localizing the conflict to Korea. The situation created by China's entry into the war prompted President Truman in a news conference on November 30 to declare that America was not averse to using any weapon in its arsenal of war, including nuclear arms.⁵⁶

The possible use of the atomic bomb in Korea caused another flurry of activity in British Commonwealth countries. Concerned about such an eventuality, Foreign Minister Lester B. Pearson wrote that Canadians demanded that the bomb should be used only with Canada's knowledge and assent. Clement Atlee, the British prime minister, found it necessary to fly to Washington to get Truman to state that "it was his hope that world conditions would never call for the use of the

atomic bomb." The British worried that America would use the bomb without consulting them.⁵⁷

Allegedly, Indian officials at this time tried to dissuade the Truman administration from "any talk about the use of atom bomb."⁵⁸ Meanwhile, India tried to persuade the Communist Chinese regime to renounce any desire to push beyond the thirty-eighth parallel. Chou rejected the Indian plea and told ambassador Panikkar that the withdrawal of American forces from Taiwan, China's admission to the United Nations, and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea were needed to stop China's drive toward the south. Chou En-lai was in no mood to make concessions in this hour of victory, but he overestimated China's military strength.⁵⁹

The entry of the Chinese Communists into the Korean War created serious problems for the United States and the United Nations. The Chinese offensive increased the chances of a world war. If the Chinese were successful the idea of collective security would suffer a mortal blow. The Chinese intervention in the Korean War added to the already massive disunity among non-Communist members of the United Nations, and the intensification of the war sharpened domestic criticism of the Truman administration's Far Eastern policy.⁶⁰

The initial success of Chinese armies caused American generals to consider the situation hopeless and favor a cease-fire. Acheson, however, opposed such a move "until the need for it had become unmistakably clear." He opined that China's

leaders would ask too high a price for a ceasefire. He estimated that "the least they would ask would be withdrawal to 38th parallel, but more probably from all Korea, to which they might add abandonment of Formosa, and a demand that the Conference [sic Council] of Foreign Ministers, with Communist China added, take over negotiations of Japanese peace treaty to diminish our influence in Japan."⁶¹

Concerned about the turn of events in the Far East the Afro-Asian group in the United Nations became actively involved in peace efforts. Thirteen nations issued an appeal to China not to cross the thirty-eighth parallel. Chou En-lai rejected their appeal and insisted that the thirty-eighth parallel no longer existed. Soon afterwards Chinese forces⁶² drove into South Korea.

Meanwhile, India, on December 12, in a resolution in the General Assembly, proposed the creation of a Ceasefire Committee to arrange cessation of hostilities in Korea. The Indian resolution also included a call for a conference to consider all Far Eastern questions. The Assembly adopted this resolution, sponsored by thirteen countries, by a vote of fifty-four to five with one abstention. China, questioning the legitimacy of the ceasefire committee refused to cooperate with it. The committee consisted of Nazroliah Entezam of Iran, Lester B. Pearson of Canada, and Sir Benegal Rau of India. To begin with, the committee suggested a ceasefire, a demilitarized zone between the two sides fighting in Korea, a

U. N. commission to supervise the cease fire, and an exchange of prisoners "on a man-for-man basis pending final settlement." China turned down committee's suggestions on
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December 22, 1950.

Undaunted the committee continued its efforts. It developed a five point plan for a peaceful settlement of the Korean war. The committee's peace plan provided for : (1) a ceasefire; (2) a political meeting to restore peace; (3) withdrawal of all non-Korean forces; (4) temporary arrangement for the administration of Korea; (5) and a four power conference consisting of Russia, Britain, America, and Communist China to settle all Far Eastern problems. This peace plan included in a resolution introduced in the General Assembly on January 11 got its approval on January 13. The Assembly now invited Peking to respond to its resolution. The Chinese reply suggested the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea, the withdrawal of the United States from Formosa and the straits of Taiwan, China's admission to the U. N., and a seven-nation conference to be held in China. These terms were un-
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acceptable.

American officials argued that the Chinese refusal to approve the ceasefire proposal destroyed all chances of a negotiated settlement. India, as usual, did not subscribe to this view. Rau described the Chinese reply as "partly acceptance, partly non-acceptance, partly a request for elucidation, and partly a set of counter proposals." Nehru
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continued his efforts at the Commonwealth conference of prime ministers in London in January, 1951, when he suggested that the United States should be convinced that, rather than condemn China, she should accept China's claims to Formosa and membership in the United Nations. Nehru's entire position, that the Commonwealth states should not support the Americans on the China matter before the U. N., was unacceptable to other Commonwealth countries. They did, however, agree to press the U. S. for a four power conference to consider all Far Eastern issues. The Commonwealth leaders insisted on a ceasefire as a pre-condition for the proposed conference.⁶⁶

India, instead of cooperating with the Commonwealth states, continued attempts to achieve a negotiated settlement in Korea. Indian embassy officials in Peking met with Chinese officers on various occasions to work out proposals acceptable to both the Communists and the United Nations. America, meanwhile, pressed for a vote on its resolution branding China as aggressor. India maintained that branding China as an aggressor would end all attempts to reach a negotiated settlement. Moreover, India introduced to the General Assembly a resolution sponsored by Asian and Arab states that provided for a⁶⁷ a seven-nation conference to work out a ceasefire.

Meanwhile, Canada, already deeply involved in negotiations, sought through Panikkar in Peking additional clarifications on the Chinese counter proposals of January 17. Instead of replying directly to the Canadians, Panikkar sent China's

answers to Rau at the U. N. so that the Canadians could get the Chinese reply before the vote on the American resolution to brand China an aggressor. The Chinese reply reached Rau before the vote was taken. Since Chou En-lai's communication was not addressed to the U. N. directly, but rather to Rau, America's representative argued that the Chinese reply should not be treated seriously. Lester Pearson later wrote that the American objection resulted from the Americans not being kept informed of negotiations with China and that they believed that the efforts were "done behind their backs."⁶⁸ Consequently, the General Assembly rejected the Arab-Asian-Indian⁶⁹ resolution and branded China as an aggressor.

The United Nations action put a temporary halt to a negotiated settlement in Korea. China refused to continue peace talks because of what it termed an illegal U. N. resolution. Between February, 1951, and the summer of 1952, when the battlefield stabilized around the thirty-eighth parallel, India did not give much attention to the Korean problem. In view of the fate of its earlier proposals the government of India was not keen to make a fresh approach. India was also preoccupied with domestic problem such as Kashmir and the⁷⁰ general elections being held under the new constitution.

In July, 1951, the opposing sides did agree to negotiate, but after eighteen months of protracted negotiations an agreement still could not be reached because of issues concerning prisoners of war. In the summer of 1952 India resumed its

peace efforts. Nehru sent V. K. Krishnamenon to the U. N. to deal specifically with the Korean question. Having found most U. N. delegations receptive to an Indian proposal regarding repatriation of prisoners of war, on November 17, 1952, India introduced such a resolution in the U. N. Assembly's Political Committee, the first committee of the General Assembly dealing with political and security matters.⁷¹

Nehru maintained that the Geneva convention on prisoners of war was the basis for Menon's compromise proposals for repatriation of prisoners. He proposed that force should not be used in repatriating prisoners to their respective countries. He provided for a U. N. repatriation commission and an umpire to help the commission. These proposals, Menon hoped, represented each side's sentiments. Ambassador Panikkar, meeting with the Chinese leader Chou, suggested a neutral commission to take charge of the prisoners. He also suggested that the Communist side be given enough opportunity to interview prisoners. Panikkar found the proposals acceptable in principle to the Chinese.⁷²

At first Menon's views were not acceptable to the United States. It objected to the provision that made the umpire the chairman of the repatriation commission. America also objected to the provision that called for a political conference to decide the fate of prisoners who refused to be repatriated. Anthony Eden and Krishnamenon worked together to bridge the differences between the Indian proposal and the American

position. Secretary Acheson was unhappy with Britain for endorsing the Indian plan. With the majority of the delegation supporting the Indian resolution, America changed its attitude. Russia opposed the Menon program, and China, following the Russian line, later rejected the Indian plan and accused India of "hostile actions." Nonetheless, the resolution⁷³ passed with an overwhelming majority.

In the face of Russian and Chinese opposition, the resolution became meaningless. The Soviet Union explained that Menon's plan was contrary to the Geneva convention. The Indian ambassador to Russia, K. P. S. Menon, believed that Russia opposed because she could gain nothing through a ceasefire, but continuation of the war would keep America's "stew in the Korean juice of its own making." Dwight D. Eisenhower had won the presidential election of 1952 in part by promising to settle the Korean War, and Russia did not see any reason to make things easier for the new president. China stood to gain from a ceasefire but was under Russian pressure to continue the war.⁷⁴

The next phase in the armistice negotiations started with the Communist side replying favorably to the U. N. Command's letter of February 22, 1953, regarding sick and wounded prisoners. Subsequent negotiations led to an agreement for their repatriation. On April 26, full armistice negotiations resumed. By June 8, the U. N. reached an agreement with the Communists on the "contentious" question of repatriation.⁷⁵

While negotiations were in progress 27,000 North Korean prisoners escaped from their camps in South Korea. The incident extremely agitated the Chinese. India immediately conveyed China's indignation to the British government and sought its intercession to prevent negotiations from breaking down. The British assured the Indian government that the incident occurred without American knowledge. The Indian officials were able to convince the Chinese that the Americans were not responsible for the occurrence.⁷⁶

Consequently, they resumed negotiations on July 10, and signed an armistice on July 27, 1953. The armistice agreement provided for a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission consisting of India, Sweden, Switzerland, Poland and Czechoslovakia. India's role as chairman of NNRC was an arduous one. Both sides took turns criticizing Indian decisions. As the chairman of the NNRC India provided the custodial force that managed the safekeeping of prisoners. President Syngman Rhee's hostility prevented any strengthening of the Indian military contingent in Korea. Concern for Indian personnel prompted the United States to accept responsibility for all U. N. forces in Korea. The commission completed its work on February 21, 1954.⁷⁷

The commission was called upon to solve four major issues. Refusal of a considerable number of Communist prisoners to be repatriated was a major source of trouble for the commission. The desirability of dismantling the prisoner of

war organizations during the repatriation process was one of the issues that the commission had to solve. The prisoner of war organizations used coercive methods to keep prisoners from attending the explanation sessions. The Czech and Polish delegates on the commission objected to the methods adopted by the prisoner of war organizations. They believed that it was desirable to segregate the leaders of those organization to avoid trouble in the camps. A reorganization of the camp was necessary to effect the segregation. India sympathized with the Polish and Czech suggestion for dismantling of prisoner of war organizations and reorganization of the camps. Since the Indian custodian force was not strong enough to deal with possible resistance to reorganization of camps, the Polish and Czech suggestion could not be carried out. Therefore, it decided not to dismantle the prisoner of war organizations. Although the Swedish and Swiss delegations complained about a similar situation in the north, India did not accept their complaints for lack of evidence.

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Regarding the question of whether the NNRC should use force to carry out the commission's duties, India agreed with the Poles and Czechs that the commission was within its rights to use force if necessary. Nonetheless India argued that since the use of force was a major issue, a decision should be made only with the unanimous agreement of all members of the commission. The Swedes and the Swiss opposed force in carrying out the commission's work.

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The armistice terms specified that the length of the explanation phase was to be ninety days. The Polish and Czech delegates argued that since a great deal of time had been spent in reaching an agreement between the U. N. and the South Korean command, the prisoners did not get enough time for explanations. They argued that the explanation period should be extended to give prisoners a full ninety days. The Swiss and Swedes disagreed. They argued that the commission's terms of reference provided for only ninety days irrespective of what the commission was able to accomplish. America maintained that the ninety days started on September 24, the day after India took custody of the prisoners. The Communists took the stand that it did not start until the explanations were begun. The length of the explanation period as settled counted the ninety days as starting on September 24, 1953, the date initially agreed upon.

A political conference, according to the armistice terms, was to decide the fate of prisoners who refused repatriation. Because of disagreements among the Western and Communist leaders, the conference did not meet. The Polish and Czech representatives on the commission demanded that in the absence of a political conference the prisoners should remain in the compounds. The Swedes and the Swiss disagreed. The commission then decided to return the prisoners to their respective "detaining sides."

Despite the difficult and delicate nature of the task the commission carried out its work with efficiency. Commenting on Indian actions Michael Brecher of McGill university, wrote:

The Indian motive was clear, and . . . consistent with neutralism. It was mainly to keep the commission alive and to achieve the important objective of a Korean settlement. . . . By this unusual capacity to satisfy the four delegates to the Left and Right, India did bring off a Korean settlement. Not everybody was satisfied. But the record demonstrates that on the whole NNRC was a major success in mediation in difficult circumstances.⁸²

A desire to localize the conflict and effect a cease-fire at any price governed the Indian attitude throughout the Korean conflict. Early in the war India decided that the great powers were the major parties in the war and that the two Koreas were of subsidiary importance. Despite what may seem apparent, Indian actions in the U. N. were not in favor of the Communists or against the West. According to Chester Bowles, the American ambassador to India, 1951-53, "on crucial votes, India found herself voting with the American delegates far more frequently than against them."⁸³ The overall Indian approach to the U. N. operations in Korea did increase American opposition to Indian nonalignment. Convinced that India would not abandon its nonalignment, which often seemed to favor totalitarian states, and concerned that Indian determination would influence other Asian countries, America sought to counteract Indian nonalignment by building up⁸⁴ Pakistan as an alternative to India's neutralism.

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CHAPTER V

NONALIGNMENT AND THE JAPANESE PEACE TREATY OF 1951

The coming to power in China of the Communists in 1949 and the outbreak of hostilities in Korea in 1950 were two developments that upset America's plans for the postwar world. The aggression in Korea added to the apprehension American statesmen had regarding the nature and direction of Communist machinations in Asia. Believing that international Communism had opened a new and aggressive phase, America decided to resist its designs at all cost. Korea convinced American leaders of the need to conclude peace with Japan, rearm her, and keep her from becoming a Communist satellite. Consequently, the Truman administration decided to negotiate a treaty with Japan to restore normal diplomatic relations with her. India's stand on the Japanese peace treaty and its refusal to attend the peace conference in San Francisco became another irritant in Indo-American relations. It stiffened American opposition to Indian nonalignment and further encouraged American determination to counteract Indian neutralism.

The Chinese and Russians objected to the American decision to negotiate a peace treaty without their participation. The Russians wanted a four power agreement, a treaty written by France, Britain, the United States, and Russia. India, too, had reservations about the manner and type of

peace to be concluded with the Japanese. Ambassador-at-Large Philip C. Jessup on a visit to New Delhi in February, 1950, discussed the subject of a Japanese peace treaty with Girija Sankar Bajpai, secretary general of the Ministry of External Affairs. Bajpai informed Jessup that India was against a "four power approach" to the Japanese peace and expressed a desire to be included in deliberations leading to a treaty. As regards the terms of the treaty, he maintained that the "feelings of the Japanese people" must be taken into account. This exchange of views on the Japanese peace treaty was informal and inconclusive. Coming at the time of the Communist takeover of mainland China, the primary purpose of Jessup's visit to the Far East and Southeast Asia was to find ways and means to contain Communism in Asia.¹

The Soviet Union found unacceptable the American proposal for a preliminary conference of the countries represented on the Far Eastern Commission, an eleven-nation body sitting in Washington formally charged with occupation policy. The Russians insisted that the Council of Foreign Ministers--the U. S., Britain, Soviet Union, France and China--consider a peace treaty with Japan. Both sides refused to amend their stands, and there was no decision. Unwilling to take the matter to the Council of Foreign Ministers and wary of a peace conference where she could be easily out-voted by the victims of Japanese aggression, America decided to resort to

unilateral negotiations with Japan although she planned to² consult with other states during the peace process.

Failure to reach an agreement with Russia was not the only reason for delay in a peace settlement. The State Department was unable to agree with the Defense Department about the need for a treaty. The Defense Department maintained that a treaty then would be premature. By early 1950 the Truman administration realized that it could not delay a decision any longer. Concerning the urgency of the situation, Secretary of State Dean Acheson wrote:

The situation was deteriorating. The Japanese wanted a treaty; our allies wanted a treaty. Even the Sino-Soviet treaty had recited the need for a peace treaty with Japan. If we did not move swiftly to control and direct pressures at play, either our opponents would or the situation would get out of control.³

This changed international situation prompted the Defense Department to alter its views. The outbreak of hostilities in Korea brought home even more the need for a functional defensive arrangement in the Pacific. On September 7, 1950, the State and Defense Departments reached agreement on principles⁴ and general terms for peace.

Formal negotiations with Japan started soon after with John Foster Dulles, consultant to the secretary of state, being made America's chief negotiator. Acheson, commenting on the nature and type of peace treaty to be concluded, wrote:

The peace treaty itself would be a short and simple document re-establishing peace without punitive provisions or burdening Japan with reparation payments, foreign occupations, or arms limitations. A bilateral United States-Japanese defensive treaty would provide for such

U. S. military protection and facilities in Japan as might be agreed. Separate security arrangements between the United States and Far Eastern nations fearing Japanese aggression would be used if necessary. The treaties should all be negotiated by the United States diplomatically. When agreed, a conference of the co-operating states should meet to sign but not further negotiate the treaties.⁵

The first round of negotiations began when delegates from various countries convened in New York for the fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1950. Conferences with leaders at various capitals of states interested in the treaty was the next step in negotiations. Discussions that followed tried to find out if the time was ripe for a peace settlement and to establish, if necessary, what principles should govern the peace. The countries consulted agreed that a treaty should be concluded. They also agreed with the principles outlined by the United States.⁶

In January, 1951, America prepared the first draft of the treaty, and representatives of more than twenty countries studied it by March. Meanwhile, Britain, after consulting the Commonwealth countries, prepared a draft treaty of its own. In June, Britain and America combined their drafts and circulated the new composite treaty to other states for their comments in early July with a mid-August deadline for final comments.⁷

Throughout the negotiations, according to Acheson, the U. S. kept India and Russia informed of the developments and "extended ample opportunities for consultation." Early in the

negotiating process the State Department decided that for one reason or another neither India nor the Soviet Union would sign the treaty. Instead of being drawn into controversy with them and face further delay, the secretary noted that the U. S. "decided to go forward without them (and ultimately⁸ Burma and Yugoslavia as well), and made no concessions."

While the Japanese peace treaty was still in the drafting stage, the government of India suggested to American officials that "the treaty should be such as not to give offence to powers like the U. S. S. R and the Central People's Republic of China." India advised that the Chinese should be invited to offer their views on it. Regarding Formosa, India proposed that it should be transferred to China in a manner to be determined later. India further maintained that Japan should keep the Bonin and Ryukyu islands, while the Soviet Union should receive South Sakhalin and Kurile Islands in accordance with existing international agreements. This step should be taken even if Russia did not subscribe to the same treaty that⁹ the United States signed with Japan.

The treaty signed at San Francisco did not reflect India's suggestions. In its preamble Japan declared its intention to become a member of the U. N. and abide by its charter. Japan also agreed to adhere to those human rights and freedoms embodied in the new Japanese constitution and conform to international standards in trade and commercial practices.

Chapter one of the treaty ended the state of war between Japan and the allied powers and restored Japanese sovereignty. Chapter two limited the territory under Japanese sovereignty to Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and a few minor islands. Japan renounced the use of force, alone or collectively, against other states but retained the right to defend itself against aggression. Chapter four dealt with economic matters. The remaining portions of the treaty concerned reparations, security arrangements, and protocol. The treaty imposed reparations payments on Japan, but the terms were lenient. ¹⁰

According to the government of India, two fundamental objectives conditioned her stand in the treaty. First, she maintained that "the terms of the treaty should concede to Japan a position of honour, equality and contentment among the community of free nations." Secondly, she stated that the terms "should be so framed as to enable all countries, especially interested in the maintenance of a stable peace in the Far East, to subscribe to the treaty sooner or later." After examining the treaty the Indian government believed that the proposed peace did not "in material respects satisfy either of these two criteria." ¹¹

India objected to the American trusteeship of the islands of Bonin and Ryukyu, believing that an American trusteeship of these islands militated against the full restoration of Japanese sovereignty and that such an arrangement would be a

source of dissatisfaction and possible conflict.¹² A regional conference of American consular and diplomatic personnel in southern Asia believed that India's attitude resulted from its "opposition to colonialism, its antipathy for Western imperialism . . . and its belief in the nonaggressive character of international Communism."¹³

India also noted that the continuation of American troops in Japan after the conclusion of peace was contrary to Japanese sovereignty. The government of India was not opposed to a sovereign state entering "defensive arrangements with a friendly power,"¹⁴ but it maintained that stationing foreign troops in Japan should be "purely on the sufferance of Japan as a sovereign Asian nation under a separate treaty and not as a condition of a formal peace between the allied powers."¹⁵ Article five of the treaty granted Japan the right to negotiate a defensive arrangement with other countries. If Japan decided to take advantage of the clause, after it became sovereign, the Indian note maintained, nobody could object. But a treaty provision that converted occupation forces into part of Japan's defensive arrangement, India maintained, "does not represent a decision taken by Japan in full enjoyment of her freedom as a sovereign nation." Such an arrangement in India's opinion should have resulted from a bilateral agreement after Japan regained its full freedom and not part of the peace.¹⁶ India also objected to continued American "legislative and administrative controls"¹⁷ over Japan.

Additionally, India took exception to the provision for collective security in the body of the treaty because it "would offend Japanese sentiments as it implies limitation of Japanese sovereignty." Moreover, India feared that continued presence of American soldiers and American military bases on Japanese soil would be treated as being directed against China and Russia.¹⁸ India, her officials maintained, wanted friendly relations with all powers. While India had no desire to oppose Russia, China, Great Britain, or the United States, it was reluctant to become party to a treaty that forced Japan to permit bases on its soil against her wishes.¹⁹

As noted above, India disapproved of the treaty's territorial arrangements. America's retention of Bonin and Ryukyu was based on the Potsdam agreement that limited Japan to its four home islands. India objected because in its view Bonin and Ryukyu as minor islands could have gone to Japan under the same Potsdam agreement. The Indian note also protested that the treaty did not provide for the transfer of Kurile and south Sakhalin to Russia and Formosa to China as had been agreed at Yalta. Of course the Republic of China occupied Formosa at this time, and India wanted it given to the People's Republic of China. Despite these none too clear circumstances India complained that the United States should take into account international agreements in writing the treaty. That the proposed treaty attempted "to regulate Japanese relations with her World War Two enemies made it necessary

that international agreements be considered in framing the
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treaty.

India also felt that Asian nations were not properly consulted on matters affecting them and that their suggestions were not given due consideration. Although Asian states had been contacted through various diplomatic posts, India maintained that no actual consultation ever took place.
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Consequently, India declared that it was unable to sign the treaty or attend the peace conference at San Francisco. The Indian reply to the American invitation to the conference stressed that "since the statement of their views on the treaty contained in this reply should be adequate to clarify their own position," the government did not see any reason
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to send representatives to San Francisco.

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Cold War considerations conditioned the Indian decision. Werner Levi, an American student of Indian foreign policy, argued that India was loath to give the impression that her attendance at the conference meant alignment with one of the
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Cold War blocs. Moreover, Ambassador Vijayalakshmi Pandit, Nehru's sister and India's ambassador in Washington, was in Delhi at the time consulting with the government on the Japanese peace treaty. She suggested that if India could not support the American draft it should not send a delegation, since it would no doubt find itself in the embarrassing situation of helping the Soviets in their attempts to prevent
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the adoption of the treaty.

The Korean War and China's role in the war also influenced the Indian decision. China had already declared its opposition to the conference and announced that the treaty was illegal. Because of Korean peace negotiations India was probably unwilling to commit itself to the Japanese treaty and thereby weaken its influence in Peking. The Eastern Economist, an Indian weekly, suggested that although the Indian decision not to go to San Francisco appeared to be motivated by a strong desire to keep the Cold War out of Asia, it in fact resulted from a desire not to offend China.²⁶

That India was concerned about the spread of war to other parts of Asia was undeniable. Korea already made India aware of the perils of war on the continent. A Japan with its friendship for Chiang Kai-shek and with American bases on its soil would be considered an arch enemy in Peking. As a result, the Eastern Economist noted that "Asia would be provided permanently with one of the very hottest frontiers in the Cold War, hotter perhaps than Berlin itself." India was averse to such a development.²⁷

The American reply of August 25 was sharply critical of India's position. The Americans reminded India that American sacrifices made it possible for India to sign a separate peace with Japan. It further warned that "there can never be united action for peace unless the nations are willing to accept what to each may seem imperfections." Citing American policy to restore Japan "to a position of honor, equality and contentment

among the community of free nations," America rejected all of India's gratuitous assertions. It further pointed out that the treaty made it obligatory for Japan to sign treaties with countries who were not signatory to the central peace treaty. 28

As regards the Indian objections to American retention of Bonin and Ryukyu, the American reply noted that their transfer to Japan was contrary to the Potsdam agreement. Since the question of Formosa could not be settled then, the Americans deemed it unfair to postpone the treaty until an agreement could be reached on Formosa. With regards to ceding Kurile and South Sakhalin to Russia, America did not see how territory could be ceded to a country that was not party to the treaty. 29

The United States was unhappy about the Indian decision not to attend the peace conference. India being a major Asian state, her absence from San Francisco, America feared, would make other Asian countries want to follow the Indian example. The absence of a number of Asian countries, Acheson wrote Ambassador Henderson in New Delhi, would make the treaty "a peace of the Western powers with Japan." As a result, America decided to invite the associate states of Indo-China to the conference to maximize the number of Asian participants. Earlier, when the French pressed for inclusion of the Indo-China states, the United States did not agree for fear of Asian opposition, especially India's. 30

Disagreements regarding the terms of the treaty were not confined to India and America. The Soviet Union and China also

opposed the treaty. In spite of the apparent resemblance between Indian and Russian stands on the treaty, there existed considerable difference between them. India, for example, did not oppose Japanese rearmament but objected to its manner and timing. The Soviet note, on the other hand, insisted that "a Japanese peace treaty should include the anti-militarization principle stated in the Cairo Declaration (1943) and should be based on the Yalta and Potsdam agreements of 1945."³¹ The Soviet Union was not the only country concerned about proposed Japanese remilitarization. Australia and New Zealand were equally anxious about a rejuvenated Japan and sought protection through a defensive military pact with the United States.³²

Commenting on the final treaty and on the attitudes of various countries towards it, Acheson wrote:

Never was so good a peace treaty so little loved by so many of its participants in the weeks preceding its signing as was this one. Its co-sponsor, His Majesty's Government through its Minister of State, Kenneth Younger, thought it necessary, "little as one feels enthusiasm for it." The Australian government offered reluctant support, but the opposition expressed extreme objection. The Foreign Affairs Committee of the French National Assembly voiced regret at the lack of French participation in drafting of the treaty. The Netherlands government accepted the invitation but reserved the freedom of action on signature. Burma, India and Yugoslavia declined to attend. Neutralist elements in Japan were critical.³³

Burmese displeasure over the terms of the treaty caused them to suggest a separate peace conference before the San Francisco meeting was held. India, however, was cool to the proposal.

Nehru discouraged it, thinking that a conference held in India would be considered by the United States as an Indian attempt to dissuade other Asian countries from attending the San Francisco meeting. He suggested that if the Burmese were insistent about such a meeting and if such was feasible it could be held after the conference in San Francisco. There was
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no subsequent meeting.

India's absence in San Francisco and her criticism of the American pre-treaty further weakened relations with the United States. Since India not only objected to the proposed peace through diplomatic channels, but expressed opposition publicly, American discomfort with nonalignment heightened. These events in the Far East caused Indo-American relations to deteriorate during the Truman years. The Japanese treaty, recognition of the People's Republic of China, India's insistence that the P. R. C. be admitted to the U. N., and the Korean War, all hampered relations. As will be seen in the next chapters, differences over policy in the Middle East and Europe also contributed to the decline in Indo-American affairs.

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CHAPTER VI

NONALIGNMENT AND THE SUEZ CRISIS OF 1956

The Suez crisis of 1956 and the Hungarian revolt, which occurred at almost the same time, exacerbated Cold War rivalries between the East-West blocs and endangered international peace and order. Motivated by different national interests, foreign policy objectives, and propaganda considerations, the superpowers ranged themselves on the side of Egypt and against the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of its territory. Although sympathetic to the interests of the Suez Canal users who felt threatened by Nasser's nationalization of the canal, India, driven by a desire to support Egypt against its aggressors, worked closely with the United States both in and outside of the United Nations. In spite of this close cooperation, India did not join the West in opposing the Russian invasion of Hungary. India's refusal to join America against Russia in contrast to her unequivocal hostility towards the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression heightened American disillusionment with Indian nonalignment.

Although India and the United States regarded the aggression in Egypt as a classic case of colonialism trying to regain its foothold in the Middle East, the Suez crisis was part of the Cold War rivalries of the fifties. Egyptian leader Gamal Abdul Nasser's increasingly anti-colonial, anti-Western

rhetoric was responsible for the Suez crisis. The immediate reason for the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt was Nasser's decision to nationalize the canal in July, 1956.

The Western powers worried about the growing relations between Egypt and the Communist bloc countries. The American State Department correctly viewed Russian meddling in Middle East as an attempt to secure a foothold. Nasser's decision to sell Egyptian cotton for Czech arms was evidence of this Russian maneuvering. The British wanted to use force to keep Nasser in line, but the United States desired a peaceful solution. The British prime minister, Anthony Eden, visited Washington in January, 1956, to discuss, among other things, the Middle East. Eden's visit did not change American views regarding the proper approach to Nasser because the United States was sympathetic to the anti-colonial attitude of the Arab countries, especially Egypt's.¹

Egypt's ambitious plan to build the Aswan high dam on the Nile required foreign assistance. The Cold War having entered a new phase, when both the East and the West tried to win the hearts and minds of the people of uncommitted lands with economic assistance, both Russia and America offered to help Nasser build the dam. Although President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles favored aid to the project, congressional leaders disagreed. Many congressmen believed that Egypt was already lost to Russia and questioned the need for large expenditures for aid to Egypt. Dulles,

however, believed that if Nasser were given aid he would stay on the Western side for at least a decade. When the aid was offered in 1956, there were conditions unacceptable to Nasser. He was told that there could be "no side deals between Egypt and the Soviets."² In response Nasser tried to break the Baghdad Pact and denounced British and the French colonial policies.³

By the time Nasser agreed to accept the American offer in mid-July, the American public and most congressmen were even more opposed to extending aid to him. Consequently, on July 19, the United States withdrew its offer to finance the Aswan dam. Soon afterwards Britain and the World Bank also withdrew their offers of aid. Nasser's reply to the Western decision was sharp and unequivocal; he nationalized the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956. Announcing his decision, he declared the formation of an Egyptian-run Suez Canal company and promised to pay compensation to the British canal company and its stockholders. Nasser kept employees of the canal company from leaving their jobs. The Egyptian takeover of the canal did not affect the flow of traffic through Suez; in fact, traffic increased when compared to the corresponding period of the previous year.⁴

France and England reacted quickly to Nasser's decision. They assumed Nasser would now attempt to subvert pro-Western Arab countries like Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Jordan. Moreover, they believed that if Nasser's violation of "international

goodfaith" went unpunished, it would lead to more flagrant violations. Because the canal was strategically and commercially important to the West, they felt it should not be in unreliable hands. As for the French, they worried about the future of their African colonies whose revolutionary leaders received help from the Egyptian dictator.⁵

Although the United States sympathized with Britain and France, she opposed Anglo-French military action to reverse Nasser's decision. President Eisenhower sent Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy to discuss the Suez question with them. Murphy advised the allies to be prudent in their actions, especially in view of world opinion. He told the Anglo-French leaders that drastic action should have the backing of all maritime powers. Murphy urged the European allies to exhaust all peaceful methods before resorting to force. Eisenhower believed that recourse to force without exploring all peaceful methods would weaken the U. N. and the Western cause. Consequently, the United States did not accept the Anglo-French legal explanations justifying the use of force.⁶

The Russians heartily supported the Egyptian decision to nationalize the canal. According to American ambassador in Moscow, Charles (Chip) Bohlen, Russia, however, did not fully approve of "Nassers's assertion that Egypt had the right to determine canal operating rules unilaterally." The Russian leader, Nikita Khrushchev, wanted to see that there was full

freedom of navigation. Bohlen added that "in all likelihood, the Soviets . . . did not want to see a precedent for unilateral control of an international waterway in view of Turkish ownership of Dardanelles."⁷

Nehru was in Cairo when the decision to nationalize the canal was taken, but Nasser did not inform him of it. Thus when Nehru returned to New Delhi the news surprised him. Nehru believed that Egypt had every right to nationalize the canal but did not approve of the way it was done. On receipt of the report about nationalization, he promptly despatched messages to Nasser, Eden, and Eisenhower suggesting moderation in settling the dispute.⁸

England soon made military preparations. Concerned about the British military action, Eisenhower sent Secretary of State Dulles to London on July 31 to advise patience. Dulles's discussions with French and British leaders concluded that Egyptian action jeopardized the freedom and security of the canal as guaranteed by the Constantinople Convention of 1888. He persuaded the allies to postpone military action then and got them to convene a twenty-four nation conference on Suez in London.⁹

The conference met from August 16 to 22, 1956. Britain, France, and the U. S. took the lead among the twenty-two nations that attended. Eighteen of the conferees were principal users of the canal with the other four being original signatories of the 1888 convention on Suez. Greece was

invited but did not attend. Yugoslavia, a successor state to the Austrian Empire which signed the convention of 1888, and Burma, a principal user, were not invited. Egypt refused its invitation because it had not been consulted beforehand. Instead, Egypt proposed a forty-five nation canal users conference to confirm and guarantee freedom of navigation through the canal.¹⁰

India attended the conference on condition that its presence did not mean an automatic commitment to decisions reached at the conference. It also made clear that any conference action impinging on Egyptian sovereignty would be unacceptable to India. According to Subimal Dutt, foreign secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs, India stipulated a condition for its attendance at the conference because it did not want misunderstanding in Egypt or in any nonaligned country. India's representative, Krishnamenon, proposed an international control board with advisory powers. The Western powers refused acceptance of the proposal, but Russia, Ceylon, and Indonesia supported it.¹¹

The London conference adopted a set of recommendations supported by eighteen of the twenty-two nations present. The draft, proposed by Dulles, "asserted the principle of international control, recognized the sovereign rights of Egypt, guaranteed her a fair return for the use of the canal, and proposed negotiation of a new convention." Attempts to persuade India to support the eighteen nation declaration failed.

The conference then elected a five nation committee headed by the Australian prime minister Robert Menezies to carry the conference proposals to Cairo.¹²

Nasser, concerned about adverse popular reaction in Egypt, rejected the conference's suggestions. Chancellor of the Exchequer Harold MacMillan later wrote that the Menzies mission was torpedoed by President Eisenhower. While the Menzies mission was in Cairo, Eisenhower declared American determination to find a peaceful solution to the Suez problem. MacMillan believed that this statement compromised the mission. The president later said that the Anglo-French governments were either not sure of the success of the mission or did not want it to succeed. Consequently, England and France ordered their nationals to leave all Arab countries. Regardless of Western powers' views, Nasser refused to accept international supervision of the canal.¹³

The failure of the Menzies mission prompted Dulles to propose creation of a Suez Canal Users Association to operate it. According to MacMillan a users association was an attempt to deny Nasser the benefits of nationalization through a concert of European states to organize ships, operate the canal, and engage pilots.¹⁴ India opposed the move to establish users association because it violated Egyptian sovereignty. Egypt, too, rejected the proposed association. Nehru was concerned that any Western attempt to operate the canal would lead to war.¹⁵

A second Suez conference convened in London on September 19, 1956, and adopted the users association scheme. Fifteen of the eighteen conferees joined the association. A section of the conference supported an Anglo-French move to take the Suez question to the U. N. Security Council. Dulles, did not favor the move, nor was he prepared to support Britain and France fully in the Council. According to Eden, America did not support this tactic because the United States believed that Britain and France were trying to "force a new treaty on Egypt which would bestow new rights on the users of the canal."¹⁶

With the failure of Menzies mission, Britain and France decided on September 23 to place the Suez question before the United Nations. The U. S. was unhappy with the Anglo-French decision. MacMillan later wrote that Dulles in view of past Anglo-French colonial experience wanted the U. S. to show independence on Suez. Following the Anglo-French appeal to the Security Council, Egypt filed a complaint with the U. N. charging that Anglo-French moves threatened international peace and order. On September 26, the Security Council decided to give priority to the Anglo-French request. From September 26, until October 13, the Council held seven open meetings and three closed meetings on the subject. On October 13, Russia vetoed an Anglo-French resolution that reiterated the proposals adopted at the first London conference.¹⁷

Meanwhile, the U. N. secretary general Dag Hammarskjold started discussions with the representative of France, Britain, and Egypt, hoping to reach a negotiated settlement. As a result of these discussions the foreign ministers of these countries were able to come to an understanding concerning principles that should govern negotiations. They also agreed to meet on October 29 in Geneva for further discussions. Unknown to America and rest of the world, while these discussions were progressing, Eden was working on secret plans with the Israelis.

As a result of the secret deals and on the day the Geneva discussions were to begin, Israel invaded Egypt, accusing the Egyptian Fedayeen of spreading terror in Israel. It invaded Egypt, it said, to destroy Fedayeen bases in the Sinai peninsula. The Israeli invasion resulted in an emergency cabinet meeting in Washington where it was decided to take the Middle East crisis to the Security Council. The U. S. had already made clear its decision to support any victim of aggression in the Middle East. If the United States did not keep its promise, the president believed that Russia would champion the Arab cause. Therefore, the president suggested that U. S. should move to the Security Council before the Russians did. Eisenhower suggested that the situation in Egypt would provide a "great chance to split the Arab world."

Consequently, America requested an emergency session of the Security Council to discuss Israeli aggression. After the

British refused to join the Americans, they acted alone. The United States resolution called for a ceasefire and for withdrawal of Israeli forces to the 1948 armistice line. The resolution also requested member nations to "refrain from the use of force, or even the threat of force, in the area and avoid giving any assistance to Israel so long as she did not comply with the resolution."²⁰ According to Eden this last mentioned provision was a measure to bind the hands of the British and the French. France and England vetoed the American resolutions²¹ and the Russian one that followed.

An Anglo-French ultimatum asking Egypt and Israel to cease hostilities within twelve hours and withdraw their forces to a distance of ten miles from the Suez Canal followed the Israeli advance into Egypt. It rejected the ultimatum; in its view it was a "violation of Egypt's rights and dignity" and a breach of the U. N. charter. The Egyptian reaction signalled the way for Anglo-French forces to invade Egypt. On October 31, 1956, Britain and France started air raids against military targets inside Egypt, and Egypt responded by closing²² the canal to traffic by sinking ships in the passageway.

The government of India sharply criticized Israeli's invasion of Egypt and the Anglo-French ultimatum that followed. In a statement on October 31, India declared:

The Government of India have learnt with profound concern of the Israeli aggression on Egyptian territory, and the subsequent ultimatum delivered by United Kingdom and France to the Egyptian Government, which was to be followed by an Anglo-French invasion of Egyptian

territory. They consider this a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and opposed to all the principles laid down by the Bandung conference. This aggression is bound to have far reaching consequences in Asia and Africa, and may even lead to war on an extended scale.²³

The United States was distraught with the turn of events. Dulles believed that Israel acted on the belief that America would not intervene in the Middle East because of the upcoming American presidential election in November. As for the Russians, they were preoccupied with troubles in Poland and Hungary. President Eisenhower, however, suggested that America should keep its pledge to help the aggrieved party and added that he did not "care in the slightest" whether he was re-elected. The president also suggested that the British should be told that "we recognize that much is on their side in dispute with the Egyptians, but that nothing justifies double-crossing us." The president was unhappy with both the British and the French for taking action unilaterally and for violating understandings such as the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, which provided that they would act together against any move to change existing borders.²⁴

There was another reason for American concern, namely that Russia would take advantage of the Suez crisis to advance its interests in Asia and Africa. In a memorandum on the Middle East war Eisenhower told Dulles that the immediate American objective in the area should be a ceasefire. He wanted the United States to take the initiative in the Security Council "to prevent immediate issuance by the United

Nations of a harshly worded resolution that would put us in an acutely embarrassing position, either with France and Britain or with all the rest of the world." Secondly, the president said that the United States should take the lead to prevent the U. S. S. R "from seizing a mantle of world leadership through a false but convincing exhibition of concern for smaller nations." He was of opinion that America provided "the West's only hope that some vestige of real political and economic union can be preserved with the Moslem world, indeed, possibly also with India."²⁵

The Anglo-French veto paralyzed the Security Council and made necessary an emergency session of the General Assembly. An emergency session of the Assembly could be convened either through a Security Council resolution supported by seven Council members or through a petition by a majority of the Council members. The petition method would take more time. Initially, America, in an apparent attempt to give the French and the British time to act before the Assembly met, wanted to follow the petition method. In case Russia introduced a resolution condemning American allies, before the submission of a petition, America decided to ask for a Security Council vote to convene the Assembly.²⁶

Since Russia agreed to hold its resolution, Yugoslavia moved to call a special session of the assembly. America, Russia, Cuba, the Republic of China, Iran, Yugoslavia, and Peru voted for the resolution. On November 2, the emergency

session of the Assembly passed an American resolution by a vote of sixty-four to five, with six abstentions. The action attempted to stop the movement of arms and ammunition into the area. It asked Israel to withdraw its forces behind the armistice line.²⁷

The Egyptian government gave its acceptance of the General Assembly resolution the next day. Israel too stated that it was ready to halt hostilities if Egypt agreed to end the war. In the face of non-compliance by all combatants, India presented a resolution in the Assembly calling upon the belligerents to adhere to the Assembly's November 2 resolve. A Canadian resolution of the same day requested Secretary General Hammarskjold to plan for the creation of an international emergency force to secure and supervise a ceasefire in Egypt.²⁸ This step was to be taken with the consent of all nations involved in the matter. On November 4, the assembly passed the Indian resolution, co-sponsored by eighteen other countries, and the Canadian resolution. Only Egypt accepted the resolutions without qualifications.²⁹

On the afternoon of November 4, Hammarskjold reported progress in negotiations leading to the formation of the international police force. He asked the Assembly to adopt plans for the proposed police force without waiting for his final report. He recommended that Major General E. L. M. Burns of the U. N. Truce Supervisory Organization be appointed to lead the new command. The secretary also requested the

Assembly to provide General Burns with the authority to organize the staff of officers for the new force from the Truce Supervisory Organization. Accordingly the assembly passed a Canadian resolution that created an emergency U. N. police force with permanent members of the Security Council excluded. 30

Instead of complying with the Assembly resolutions, England and France busied themselves with events in Hungary, where its people rose in revolt against the Communist regime. The American delegation in the U. N. was unwilling to follow the Anglo-French line on Hungary, regarding their move as an attempt to divert attention from Suez. 31

Despite mounting international pressure, Anglo-French military operations in Egypt continued. The United States demanded that Israel withdraw from Egypt. Meanwhile, Russia called for a second Bandung conference to demand withdrawal of invading forces. Communist China and Egypt favored the Russian proposal. Nikolai A. Bulganin, Russia's prime minister, wrote Nehru expressing his hope that the conference would be convened immediately, but Nehru considered a conference impractical. 32

The Western powers continued their military operations, arguing that Israelis and Egyptians were not yet ready to cease fighting. They expressed determination not to stop their own military action until "the Israeli and Egyptian governments signify acceptance of, and the United Nations endorses,

a plan for an international force" to separate the two belligerents and supervise an armistice.
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The failure of France and England to comply with the Assembly resolutions prompted the Russian foreign minister Dimitry Shapilov to ask Hammerskjold to convene a special meeting of the Security Council. He proposed that if France and Britain refused to comply with the Assembly resolutions, the U. N. should authorize member nations, especially the U. S. S. R. and the U. S., to help the Egyptian government repulse aggressors. The Soviet proposal demanded a ceasefire within twelve hours of a Security Council resolution and complete troop withdrawal in three days afterwards. The Soviets declared their readiness to supply military forces. After a brief discussion the Council rejected the Soviet move.
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The day after the U. N. passed a resolution asking Russia to withdraw its troops from Hungary, Bulganin, citing "loftiest moral principles" and the possibility of the Suez crisis "turning into a third world war," wrote Eisenhower suggesting joint Soviet-American action to implement the U. N. resolutions against France and England. Eisenhower rejected the Russian proposal and asked Bulganin to comply with the General Assembly resolution on Hungary. Bulganin also sent messages to Israeli prime minister Ben Gurion, French premier Guy Mollet, and Eden, threatening Russian intervention if they failed to end hostilities. He wrote Eden that his country's conduct in Egypt was "barbaric." He told Mollet that French

aggression was "bandit like." He reminded them that Russia possessed rockets with which they could be attacked. Bulganin asserted that his government was "full of determination to crush the aggressor and re-establish peace in the East by using force."³⁵

On November 5, Egypt accepted the proposal for the creation of an international police force. The Canadian resolution of November 4 had already created a United Nations Command. India agreed to contribute troops to the police force. Israel also confirmed its acceptance of the ceasefire without conditions. By then the entire Sinai peninsula, Gaza, and the Egyptian side of the entrance to Gulf of Aquaba were under Israeli control. On that day, however, Anglo-French forces landed at Port Said.³⁶

Britain and France informed Secretary General Hammar-skjold that they were prepared to end hostilities only under certain conditions. They demanded the interposition of the proposed U. N. force between Egypt and Israel, removal of obstructions to traffic through Suez, and withdrawal of Israel from Egypt in a way that would result in a general settlement in the area. Other members of the United Nations Assembly wanted a ceasefire without conditions, and they refused to accept the Anglo-French demands.³⁷

Bulganin's letter to Eisenhower suggesting joint Russo-American intervention prompted the president to seek Nehru's help in restraining the Soviets. Nehru, in his reply to

Bulganin on November 5, praised Russia for its defense of the Egyptian cause but suggested that since the U. N. had made considerable progress in solving the Suez crisis it would be unwise to take steps that would lead to war. Nehru agreed that the situation was serious and required urgent steps to keep it from deteriorating more, but he cautioned that the steps taken should be "aimed at restoring and insuring peace and not at widening the hotbed of war and catastrophe." 38

The Russian threats were not without effect. Although the United States warned Russia against any adventurism in the Middle East, it put increased pressure on the French and British to withdraw. The Russian claim that its "volunteers" were ready to move in to help Egypt caused concern in Western capitals, for the role of Chinese "volunteers" in Korea was still fresh in Western minds. Ambassador Bohlen in Moscow thought that the Russians were bluffing. He cited Khrushchev's statement to Scandinavian diplomats expressing regret for Russian threats as evidence that the Russians were bluffing. 39

MacMillan in his memoirs conceded that Russian threat of providing 250,000 "volunteers" did have an effect although Britain was not unduly concerned about it. Eden and Mollet wanted to visit Washington to discuss the matter, but Dulles was opposed because in his opinion it would give the impression that the United States was acting in concert with the aggressors. As a result, Eisenhower discouraged the allied leaders from making the trip. Eisenhower told Eden that the

visit might throw the U. N. secretary general's plans for the
Middle East off balance.⁴⁰

On November 6, with the Canadian resolution as the basis for a ceasefire England and France agreed to end hostilities. They held that their military operations accomplished their objectives. The Times reported that the fear of decisive Russian interference led to a sudden decision, for there was growing concern that Russia would aid Egypt in the form of aircraft and pilots. The Times said that the two governments reached the conclusion that "the risk was not worth taking and that it would be better to curtail military operations, even if it meant leaving a part of the canal in Egyptian hands."⁴¹

The fear of Russian intervention was not the only reason for the British and French decision to end hostilities. British finances suffered as a result of the war. America was unwilling to support Britain financially. Nor would the United States allow Britain to draw funds from the International Monetary Fund. Opposition to war was also mounting in Britain. Even members of the ruling party refused to support the government. But cessation of hostilities in Egypt was not enough to satisfy the United States. It demanded that Anglo-French forces leave Egyptian soil before any money could be drawn from the IMF. In the final analysis American pressure was probably more decisive than Russian threats in causing the English and French to end the war.⁴²

Although England and France agreed to end hostilities, they were in no hurry to withdraw their forces from Egypt. Instead, they proposed that their military be allowed to begin clearing the canal for navigation. The General Assembly refused to accept the proposal. Thomas Eayr, a Canadian scholar has noted:

Though committed to withdrawal, they were committed as yet to no date by which to withdraw; and they were determined to postpone it until such time as conditions judged by them to be satisfactory had been imposed by the arrival and deployment of U. N. E. F. and by simultaneous political negotiation. 43

India strongly objected to what it deemed to be a British attempt to act "as trustee for the international community" and delay troop withdrawal. The Afro-Asian group in the General Assembly proposed a draft resolution demanding immediate withdrawal of occupation forces from Egypt. Belgium moved to amend the resolution by providing that the occupying powers decide the time-table for withdrawal. The Assembly passed the Afro-Asian resolution without the amendment. As a result, Britain decided to withdraw its forces without delay and by December 22, 1956, was out of the area. Israel did not complete its withdrawal until the following March.

Nehru regarded the Anglo-French invasion as a case of powerful countries directing their power against a weak and defenseless country. Such invasion, according to Nehru, put "every militarily weaker country in peril, its independence

in danger and more particularly every country in Asia and Africa must feel this danger."⁴⁵

The Anglo-French intervention also did not bring about the downfall of Nasser or the exclusion of the Russians from the Middle East. Instead the situation seems to have been as described by Chip Bohlen, who later wrote:

Indeed Suez was a sorry affair. Great Britain and France suffered a resounding defeat. The policy was bad and the execution deplorable. The invasion brought about the downfall of Anthony Eden's government in England and Guy Mollet's in France. Despite its best efforts United States gained no friends. The Arabs were not grateful, even though there is no doubt it was American opposition that helped London and Paris abort the operation. . . . The only country that benefited from the Suez affair was the Soviet Union. Without firing a shot or taking any action at all, Moscow was credited in large measure, particularly by Arab countries with stopping war.⁴⁶

Although India reacted strongly to the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt, none of the resolutions that India supported or sponsored was condemnatory in nature. India tried to discourage Soviet adventurism in the region and worked closely with America throughout the crisis. This Indo-American cooperation, however, did not lead to improved relations with the United States because India's attitude towards Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolt failed to meet American expectations of a non-aligned state's position.

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CHAPTER VII

NONALIGNMENT AND THE HUNGARIAN REVOLT OF 1956

The Hungarian revolt of October–November, 1956, and its ruthless suppression at the hands of the Soviet Union evoked powerful reaction around the world. Although both the Suez crisis and the Hungarian revolt had a common Cold War background, Hungary's Cold War coloration was more pronounced. Both superpowers were on the side of Egypt during the Suez crisis. In Hungary the power blocs were decidedly ranged against each other.

Indian criticism of Anglo–French–Israeli aggression against Egypt was immediate, sharp, uninhibited, and forcible. On Russian conduct in Hungary Indian reaction, while unequivocal, was slow, cautious, and restrained. Criticism of India's stand on Hungary was widespread both within and without India. Official and unofficial America resented India's attitude towards Hungarian issue. This resentment, however, was not allowed to embitter Indo–American relations. Instead another attempt was made to bring India into the Western alliance, albeit without success.

The de–Stalinization and consequent liberalization of the post–Stalinist Soviet system was given approval at the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February, 1956. This action was not without consequences. According to

Indian foreign secretary Subimal Dutt, the liberalization of the Soviet system offered the "possibility of peaceful co-existence of countries with different political ideologies and . . . the achievement of socialism by peaceful methods." Nehru welcomed the new trend. Therefore, a revolution in Hungary's neighbor, Poland, in 1956 did not surprise the government of India. In June, 1956, 50,000 workers joined by students revolted against the government. The revolt broke out in Poznan. It led to important changes in the Polish Communist party and government. Stalinist Konstantin Rokossovsky was forced to resign as party secretary along with several other Russian officers, and Poland secured a measure of independence from Russia. Wladyslaw Gomulka, who had been isolated politically since 1948, became general secretary of the Communist party. He denounced past errors and abuses and revealed mismanagement by the government. According to Dutt "it was hoped that this would set new pattern for the changes which would inevitably follow in other socialist countries in Europe."

The de-Stalinization process likewise created powerful political currents in Hungarian society and hastened its revolt in 1956. Figuratively, the fire that lit the embers of the revolution were taken from the pyre of Laszlo Rajk, Hungarian minister of home affairs, who was executed in 1949 as part of an anti-Titoist Stalinist strategem. By 1954, it was known that the real reasons for Rajk's execution were not treason, conspiracy, or war crimes as alleged but his

potential threat to the leaders of the Hungarian Communist party. As a result, the anti-Stalinist forces in Hungary began to use his name against the government. A funeral procession for Rajk on October 6, 1956, was attended by 150,000 to 200,000 people. A week later he was given a public burial. Rajk became a national hero around whose coffin the dissidents raised the banner of revolt.²

The anti-Stalinist faction of the Hungarian Communist party was against Erno Gero, Stalinist first secretary of the party. In an apparent bid to strengthen his position, Gero sought the help of Yugoslavian dictator, Marshall Tito, godfather of anti-Stalinist forces in Eastern Europe. Gero and Nikita Khrushchev met with Tito early in October, 1956. Tito found Gero's earnestness impressive and his intentions good. To cement this relation Gero visited Yugoslavia during the last week of October. His anticipated return to Budapest, the success of the Polish revolt, the Rajk affair, and unrest among Hungarian students now converged to cause the Hungarian revolt.³

American policy towards East Europe helped bring the revolt. According to Miklos Molnar, a Hungarian scholar and an eye-witness to the revolt, American policy "created a kind of pre-insurrectional psychosis in People's Democracies, which was nourished to a considerable extent by the propaganda of the American Radios, such as the 'Voice of America' and 'Free Europe'.⁴" Istban Bibo, a state member of the Petofi

party and minister in Imre Nagy's 1956 cabinet admitted that the American policy influenced the Hungarian rebels. He warned President Dwight D. Eisenhower that failure to help Hungary against Russia would "bankrupt the ten year old American liberation policy which . . . [had been] pursued with much firmness and wisdom. It would create a crisis in the confidence of all East European people in the USA and the other lands."⁵

Although Secretary of State John F. Dulles denied charges of a liberation pledge in the Republican platform of 1956, he told President Eisenhower that American policy did influence East European yearnings for freedom. On September 5, 1956, in a letter to Eisenhower, Dulles wrote:

Certainly you and I have consistently made it clear and you notably at the Geneva Summit Conference, that we seek the genuine independence of the captive peoples. Also I believe this administration, through the Voice of America etc., has done much to revive the influences which are inherent in freedom, that we have thereby contributed toward creating strains and stresses within the captive world, such as are manifested by the East German outbreaks of 1953 and the Poznan outbreaks of this year.⁶

The Hungarian revolutionary spirit reached a feverish pitch on the evening of October 23, when a large number of students, professors, and writers met at the Polytechnic University in Budapest and drew up a list of fourteen demands upon the Hungarian government. On October 24, authorities imposed a ban on all demonstrations to be lifted later in the day. People belonging to all walks of life participated in the silent demonstrations that remained peaceful.⁷

The next day peaceful demonstrations turned into an armed revolt. As a result the Communist party recalled Imre Nagy and appointed him prime minister, proclaiming martial law at the same time. Meanwhile, Russian tanks started rolling towards Budapest. The demonstrators demanded that Hungary follow the Polish model in its domestic affairs. Security forces answered with shots fired into the ranks of the demonstrators. Russian military operations were limited to tanks without supporting infantry. On October 25, Gero lost his job as party first secretary to Janos Kadar.⁸

The initial American response to developments in Hungary was to assure the Russians that the United States did not have any design on Hungary. Harold Stassen, head of the mutual security program, wrote Eisenhower that he should assure Russia that Hungary would not be taken into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization if Hungary detached itself from the East. Stassen stated that Hungarian association with NATO "would be a great threat in the Soviet eyes to their own security." He suggested that it would be wise for the United States to "make clear that we are willing to have Hungary be established in the Austrian basis--independent--and not affiliated with NATO."⁹

Consequently, the State Department instructed the American ambassador in Moscow to inform Russian authorities that "the U. S. has no ulterior purpose in desiring the independence of satellite countries. Our unadulterated wish is that

these peoples from whom so much of our national life derives, should have sovereignty restored to them, and that they should have governments of their own choosing. We do not look upon these nations as potential military allies." ¹⁰ Ambassador Bohlen was to communicate this assurance to the highest Soviet authorities. The State Department also instructed him to renew the American proposal for a "treaty of assurance," an agreement that first had been proposed in connection with the German unification question. The Department instructed Bohlen not to leave the impression that the assurances "should emerge publicly as a de marche attributable to Washington." ¹¹

Initially the U. S. only expected to make use of the Hungarian revolt to settle disputes with Russia. The president and the secretary of state agreed that "we had to take advantage of that." The president said that "now is the time to talk (more) about reducing tensions in the world." Dulles agreed but cautioned that "we would have to be very careful not to do anything that would look to the satellite world as though we were selling them out." Eisenhower felt that the United States should wait "until the present thing [Hungarian revolt] ¹² had settled down."

On October 27, Britain, France, and the United States jointly requested a U. N. Security Council meeting for the following day to consider the Hungarian situation. The Hungarian government protested claiming that the revolt as a purely domestic matter. The Soviet Union also objected to

any discussion in the Council, stating that it would be interference in the internal affairs of Hungary. On October 28, the Security Council decided to include the Hungarian item on its agenda. Because of the Russian announcement to withdraw her troops from Hungary, the Security Council did not take any action on the issue.¹³

Meanwhile, on October 29 Nagy negotiated a ceasefire with the revolutionaries. The following day Soviet troops left Budapest. Russia also agreed to start negotiations for a total Russian troop withdrawal from Hungary. The dissolution of the much hated Hungarian political police occurred the same day. The Hungarian army did not join the fight against the revolutionaries, rather it became part of the revolutionary crowd.¹⁴

Mikhail Suslov and Anastas Mikoyan, itinerent Soviet ambassadors, visited Budapest on October 30 and held discussions with Nagy, Kadar, and other Hungarian leaders. The Russians promised to withdraw their troops from Hungary. The announcement to re-examine Russia's relations with East European countries was made in Moscow the same day. From Budapest came news of the formation of a coalition government, recall of the Hungarian permanent representative at the U. N., and the dissolution of the Hungarian Communist party.¹⁵

Contrary to the Russian promises, Soviet troops began to reenter Hungary on October 31. The next day Nagy informed the U. N. secretary general, Dag Hammarskjoldi, that Soviet troops were entering Hungary and that he had protested to the Russian

ambassador in Budapest, Yuri Andropov. Nagy also informed the secretary general that Hungary demanded the total withdrawal of Soviet troops, repudiated the Warsaw Pact, declared Hungarian neutrality as of November 1, 1956, and requested the protection of the U. N. and the four great powers for Hungarian neutrality. Nagy also asked Hammarskjold to include the question of Hungarian neutrality and its defense in the agenda of the forthcoming General Assembly session.¹⁶

Negotiations for Soviet troop withdrawal started on November 2, and the Hungarian delegates agreed to the terms that the Russians offered. Hungary was averse to give the Russians any pretext for delaying their departure. Negotiations were resumed on the evening of November 3, and while negotiations were in progress, on the morning of November 4, Russian forces attacked Budapest. They suppressed the revolution with complete ruthlessness.¹⁷

The British and the French criticized the United States for slow reaction. They believed that America was trying to "get them [England and France] on the dock and drag on Russia." Dulles was critical of the Anglo-French attempt to become part of the United States efforts against Russia's invasion of Hungary. He believed that "it would make a mockery for them to come in with bombs falling over Egypt," and condemn Russians for "perhaps doing something that is not quite as bad." The secretary believed that he should not react to the Hungarian situation without adequate information. He told

the American delegate to the U. N., Henry Cabot Lodge, that "we don't have any hard info as to what is going on in Hungary--[but we have] no doubt re Egypt."¹⁸

On November 3, however, the United States introduced a draft resolution in the Security Council that called upon the U. S. S. R. to desist from armed intervention in Hungary. The resolution demanded the immediate withdrawal of Russian forces from Hungary and asked the Soviet Union to affirm the right of the Hungarian people to a government of their choice. The Hungarian delegate to the U. N. assured the Security Council that Russia and Hungary were discussing technical questions relating to Soviet troop withdrawal. He also informed it of the Soviet promise not to send any reinforcements into Hungary until negotiations were completed. The Russian delegate confirmed the statement of his Hungarian counterpart.¹⁹

When the Security Council reassembled for business the next day it heard reports of renewed Soviet intervention in Hungary. The Soviet delegate requested the Council to postpone discussion of the Hungarian issue because he did not have enough information on developments in Hungary. Nonetheless, the Council continued to discuss the U. S. draft resolution, although the Soviet Union later vetoed it. Consequently, America introduced a resolution that called for a special emergency session of the General Assembly to discuss the affairs in Hungary.²⁰

The Soviet government opposed this move and argued that the legal government of Hungary opposed discussion of the events there by the United Nations and that Nagy's communications to the contrary were invalid. The Russian delegate further pointed out that Hungary had formed a new government under a new leadership. The Russian arguments were not acceptable to the Assembly.

The United States introduced a draft resolution condemning Soviet action in Hungary and demanding withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary. The resolution urged the Soviets not to send additional troops to Hungary and authorized the U. N. secretary general to investigate the situation in Hungary and report to the General Assembly. The Assembly adopted the resolution by a vote of fifty to eight with fifteen abstentions. Several Afro-Asian countries including India
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abstained.

India's abstention on the American resolution was the subject of censure in the West and India as well. India, foreign secretary Dutt noted, was "accused of following double standard between Western imperialism and Soviet domination of a similar kind." Dutt explained that India abstained the vote because the events in Hungary were not clear. He added that Western newspaper reports were unreliable and that Hungarian radio broadcasts were infrequent. Moreover, India did not have a resident ambassador in Budapest. Because of the breakdown in communications, reports from the Indian charge d'affaires took

several days to reach New Delhi and were "not adequate for a total picture of the situation." Dutt added that Nehru was careful not to offend the Soviet Union "without being sure of the facts" because "the Soviet Government had taken a firm line against the Anglo-French aggression in Egypt."²²

Explaining India's conduct on Suez and Hungary, Nehru, in a speech on November 19, 1956, said:

We in India have been intimately associated with the events [in Egypt] during the past few months. . . . Even our relations with Egypt are intimate, and we are in constant touch with what happens there. Ever since the nationalization of the Suez canal we are in very intimate touch [with Egypt] so that what happened did not come to us without foreknowledge of events preceding it. That is we are in a position . . . to judge the situation. . . . Later, things have happened in Egypt which were rather confusing . . . but broad facts were clear to us and therefore, we ventured to express very clear and definite opinion about it.

In regard to Hungary there was the difficulty that broad facts were not clear to us. . . . Therefore we were a little cautious in the expression of our opinion. . . . We were not cautious about expressing our opinion in regard to general principles that should govern conditions there . . . foreign forces should be removed both from Egypt and Hungary. 23

The Hungarian crisis, Nehru maintained, was quite different from the Suez crisis. Concerning Hungary he inaccurately said that "there was no immediate aggression there in the sense of something militarily happening as there was in the case of Egypt. It [Soviet action in Hungary] was really a continuing intervention of Soviet armies in those countries based on the Warsaw Pact."²⁴

Nehru's friendship with Nasser and Egypt's importance as a nonaligned country were responsible for Egypt getting most

of India's attention at this time. Moreover, India viewed the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt as an attempt to re-establish colonialism in the Middle East. Dutt argued that if the Western powers were successful it would have meant serious consequences for other newly independent countries. ²⁵

Consequently, Nehru did not give public expression to his views on Hungary until November 5. Nehru, according to the London Times, was waiting for a reply to his letter to Russian prime minister N. A. Bulganin before giving expression to India's views on Hungary. When the reply came, Nehru found Bulganin's explanations unsatisfactory. Nehru, in a speech at the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization meeting in New Delhi on November 5, delivered after he received Bulganin's letter, declared that "both in Egypt and Hungary human dignity and freedom were today being outraged." Nehru deplored the tendency to "suppress peoples." Such tendencies he added, would destroy the ideals of organizations like UNESCO. ²⁶

On November 5, the Indian ambassador in Moscow, K. P. S. Menon, visited the Russian foreign ministry to express his government's concern about developments in Hungary. The ambassador told Deputy Foreign Minister V. A. Zorin that India always sympathized with nationalist movements and opposed stationing of foreign troops in a country without its approval. He also told the Russian that events of the past few days in

Hungary were a clear violation of the Panch Sheel subscribed
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to by both India and Russia.

Zorin explained that Hungarian emigres in Western countries with the support of Western powers and the assistance of reactionaries inside Hungary fomented the trouble in Hungary. Russia's initial intervention was a response to Hungary's request for help to restore order. Once Prime Minister Nagy assured the Soviets that the Hungarian government could control the situation, Russian troops withdrew from Budapest. But Nagy had failed to contain the revolt, and events got out of
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hand.

Nagy's action repudiating the Warsaw Pact without reference to the parliament, Zorin added, was unconstitutional. Later, with Nagy's removal from office, Janos Kadar formed a new government. He sought the help of Russian troops to restore law and order. As a result, Russian troops returned to Budapest. Zorin assured the Indian ambassador that the troops would withdraw as soon as normality was reestablished in Hungary. The ambassador regarded the Russian explanations as unsatisfactory. He reported to his government, however, that Russia's concern about an anti-Russian government on its
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borders should not be overlooked.

Meanwhile, the U. N. General Assembly busied itself by passing a series of resolutions on Hungary. On November 9, Italy introduced a resolution that asked for the withdrawal of Soviet forces and elections in Hungary under the supervision

of the United Nations. This resolution requested the secretary general to investigate the Hungarian situation and report to the Assembly on compliance with its resolution by the concerned parties. Pakistan was one of the sponsors of the resolution.³⁰

V. K. Krishnamenon, India's representative to the U. N., objected to the provision for U. N. supervised elections. He opposed the United Nations conducting elections in a sovereign country that was a member of the world organization. The Assembly passed the resolution by a vote of forty-eight to eleven. Sixteen countries abstained. India voted against the resolution. According to Dutt, Menon made the decision without instructions from New Delhi, "in anticipation of Nehru's approval."³¹

Indians and Westerners, especially Americans, criticized Menon's vote on the resolution. Even Indian cabinet members were unhappy with the decision. Strong feelings in the country prompted Nehru to have copies of the Assembly resolution and Krishnamenon's speeches circulated among members of the parliament. In a speech to the parliament Nehru defended Menon's vote and said that the resolution "was contrary to the U. N. Charter and would reduce Hungary to less than a sovereign state." More importantly, he believed that the Italian resolution would create a bad precedent. India was concerned that the resolution would be used in the future in other countries to justify U. N. intervention. A mere resolution was not

enough to make Russia withdraw its troops from Hungary. Moreover, it would have been a first step to armed intervention by the U. N. on the Korean model.³²

The Kashmir question and Pakistan's sponsorship of the resolution clearly influenced India's decision. Commenting on Nehru's speech the London Times wrote that, "the emphasis with which Nehru repudiated the principle of election and the applause with which this passage of his speech was greeted, are a striking illustration of how far the issues involved in Kashmir dispute still dominate Indian political thinking."³³

Nehru maintained that India desired Soviet withdrawal from Hungary and did not wish to give the Soviets any pretext for a continued presence in Hungary. He said that Yugoslav evaluation of the events influenced India's views on Hungary. He argued that events in Hungary and Suez "marked an intensification of the Cold War and [that] the Soviet government appeared unwilling to take any risk on the Hungarian border." Because of popular feeling in India in favor of the Hungarian revolutionaries, Nehru instructed Menon not to oppose any more resolutions on Hungary "without specific instruction from the government."³⁴

The United States resolution of November 9 dealt with the humanitarian aspect of the Hungarian situation and the need for assistance to refugees. The resolution provided for emergency assistance to people of Hungary. It also condemned

Soviet aggression in Hungary. Consequently, India, Ceylon, and Indonesia moved amendments to the resolution. The General Assembly rejected these amendments and passed the resolution. India abstained from voting. She supported the Austrian resolution that provided for immediate assistance to the affected areas. This resolution passed without a negative vote but with eight abstentions.³⁵

With the special emergency session of the Assembly coming to a close, America introduced another resolution on November 10 to have the Hungarian issue placed on the agenda of the eleventh regular session of the General Assembly. Despite Russian objection the Assembly accepted the resolution.³⁶

Nehru was now convinced that the Hungarian revolt was a movement of the people against foreign domination. As a result his criticism of Russian intervention in Hungary became more pronounced and more vehement. The Colombo powers, India, Indonesia, Ceylon, and Burma (Pakistan was deliberately absent), therefore, raised their voices against Russian violence in Hungary. They described the events in Hungary as tragic and declared that every nation should be free to develop its own destiny without foreign intervention or influence. They proposed that Russia withdraw from Hungary and let the Hungarians decide their future.³⁷

Meanwhile, Hammarskjold continued efforts to persuade Hungary to allow U. N. observers into the country, but Hungary refused. A Hungarian statement transmitted to Hammarskjold

maintained that the Hungarian problem was purely domestic. The statement added that the U. N. General Assembly's resolutions contravened the U. N. charter. Withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary was a subject for Hungary and Russia to decide. Hungary argued that the idea of U. N. observers for Hungary was unwarranted; holding elections in Hungary was a matter within the competence of the Hungarian government. The statement maintained that the Hungarian government was ready to take back its citizens who went abroad as a result of the revolution. The Hungarian government accepted the U. N. offer of emergency help for the people affected by the recent fighting.³⁸

The General Assembly resumed discussion of the Hungarian question on November 19, 1956. That body passed a Cuban resolution calling upon Hungary to comply with previous Assembly resolutions on Hungary and asking the U. S. S. R. and Hungary to stop deportation of Hungarian citizens and bring back those already deported. India once again abstained.³⁹

India, Ceylon, and Indonesia jointly introduced a resolution on the reported deportation of Hungarian nationals from the Soviet Union. After recalling the conflicting claims of member nations about the deportation of Hungarian citizens, the resolution urged Hungary to accede to the requests of the secretary general and requested him to report to the General Assembly without delay on the Hungarian response to the Assembly resolution. Hungary's opposition did not keep the Assembly from passing the resolution.⁴⁰

On November 30, Hammarskjold submitted his report on "aspects of the present situation" in Hungary to the Assembly. He stated that he sought Hungarian compliance with Assembly resolutions. As a first step he tried to secure Hungarian permission for U. N. observers to enter into the country, but Hungary refused. The Hungarian foreign minister in a cablegram to the secretary general on December 3 maintained that U. N. observers in Hungary would violate the nations sovereignty and was contrary to the U. N. charter. The foreign minister, however, welcomed the secretary general to Budapest at a later date that would be "appropriate for both parties."⁴¹

Confronted with the Hungarian refusal to accept U. N. observers, the United States and thirteen other countries introduced a resolution in the Assembly calling upon Russia and Hungary to comply with Assembly requests. It also required that the Soviet Union and Hungary communicate their consent to take observers by December 7. The resolution recommended that the secretary general despatch observers to Hungary and other appropriate countries and asked all member nations to cooperate with the secretary's representatives as they fulfilled their responsibilities. Fourteen nations, including India, abstained on the resolution but it passed by the General Assembly.⁴²

The Hungarians, after refusing to accept observers into their country, agreed to meet Hammarskjold to discuss the issue. He met the Hungarian foreign minister and asked to

visit Budapest on December 16. The Hungarian agreed to recommend to his government that it make arrangements for the secretary's visit. Later, the Hungarian government cancelled the visit and suggested that the secretary meet with the Hungarian agents in Rome or New York.

As Hungary failed to comply with the General Assembly's December 3 resolution, the United States and ten other countries introduced another resolution on December 9, 1956. The preamble of the draft resolution expressed concern over the tragic events in Hungary, recalled the provisions of the previous General Assembly resolutions that sought Soviet withdrawal, and reminded Hungarians of earlier resolutions while expressing concern that no reply had ever been given to the Assembly's last resolution on the revolt. In the body of the resolution the U. N. declared that the U. S. S. R. violated Hungary's political independence and asked Russia to desist from further action in Hungary. It also demanded a withdrawal of Russian troops immediately in order to permit Hungarian political independence.

India, Indonesia, and Ceylon jointly submitted amendments deleting paragraphs that condemned Soviet conduct in Hungary. They also declared that use of force did not help the Hungarian situation but aggravated it and resulted in manifold problems for the Hungarian people and loss of their freedom. It expressed conviction that Hungarian freedom could be

furthered only in the absence of foreign intervention and
pressure and requested the secretary general to visit Moscow. ⁴⁵

Participating in the discussion on the twenty power resolution Krishnamenon said that condemnations would not be enough to bring the desired changes. He maintained that Soviet withdrawal could be effected only with their cooperation. Therefore, he continued, condemnatory resolutions followed by a "declaration of who is aggressor and who is not . . . are not the elements that would assist in a solution." India found the phraseology and implication of the resolution objectionable and worried about precedents that it would create and how these proposals would be applied to other people. Menon also pointed out that "we have not in the least shifted our position of independence and objectivity, we have not aligned ourselves with one power bloc or another and we bear no animosity either toward Hungary or its government or towards the Soviet Union."⁴⁶

On December 12, the General Assembly rejected the amendments to the twenty power resolution and passed it as introduced. Russian officials described the resolution as provocative. They said that it would harm the honor and authority of the U. N., and undermine its foundations, and make it a narrow group of states headed by the United States.⁴⁷

The last of the several resolutions on Hungary was introduced in the General Assembly in January, 1957. This

twenty-three nation draft resolution sponsored by the United States sought to establish a five power special committee "to investigate, to establish and maintain direct observation in Hungary and elsewhere, taking testimony, collecting evidence and receiving information to prepare reports for the information of members." The resolution called upon the U. S. S. R. and Hungary to cooperate with the committee, requested all member nations to assist the committee and invited the secretary general to continue efforts to solve the Hungarian problem. Once more, India refused to vote.

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On March 8, the General Assembly adjourned temporarily after authorizing its president and the U. N. secretary general to reconvene the Assembly if the situation in Hungary or the Middle East demanded it. The U. N. resolutions did not end Russian intervention in Hungary nor did it restore Hungarian independence.

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India's stand on the Hungarian issue caused much resentment in the United States. John Sherman Cooper, the American ambassador in New Delhi, reported that according to Nehru colonialism was a system where the subjugated country had no national government or international identity. As for the East European countries, they had "organized governments which have been recognized by other countries, that diplomatic relations were maintained with them and they are members of the United Nations." For Nehru, Russian domination was not colonialism but interference in the affairs of another country.

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Nehru could not see any reason for concern about India's stand on Hungary, India's U. N. delegation, or Krishnamenon. Nehru said that certain parties at the U. N. took advantage of the opportunity that Hungary afforded to divert attention from Suez. It was these people, he believed, who carried on a "barrage of propaganda" against India. Nehru added that "each group is attempting to lay stress on what has happened in the other place so as to hide its own misdemeanour." He was not talking about India.

According to Indian leaders a singular desire to promote the cause of peace and effect the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary governed India's policies throughout the crisis. Nehru realized that the government imposed on Hungary after the Second World War was unpopular and that the majority of the people wanted a change. When they rebelled against the existing government Russian troops and tanks suppressed them.

Consequently, Krishnamenon stated in the General Assembly on Hungarian debate that the government of India stood for the "right of a people to have a form of government that they desire and to order their own affairs in their own way without any external pressures." He added that India would stand "unqualifiedly by the sovereignty of Hungary" and would do nothing that would lead to dismemberment or intervention there. Menon continued that the only way to alter the situation in Hungary was for the U. N. to intervene militarily.

Since military intervention was a dangerous step, he added that persuasion rather than condemnation of the parties involved was the best policy.

Menon based his arguments on the belief that the Hungarian problem should not be approached "merely from the point of view of invectives." He said that a "large volume of opinion, especially of countries which are not involved in the great power groupings of the world, should be thrown behind the request, the urging, that we are making to the Hungarian government." He hoped that "the people and Government of Hungary, and those who are responsible for the state of affairs there and for the conduct of the government, will listen to the voice of those countries and not say that they will take upon themselves the grave responsibility of not listening to the appeal."

The government of India viewed the emerging liberalization of post-Stalinist Russia as a positive factor in international relations, one that should be encouraged and fostered. Krishanmenon opined that the changes in Russia were "calculated to assist in the progress of humanity and in the enlargement of human liberty." He added that "we should like to see that expansion of this trend not only in Soviet Union, but also in other areas in which Soviet Union has influence . . . and we would not do anything to thwart that progress."

India viewed Hungary as a Cold War issue, while the West pictured Hungary as a form of colonialism. Even in the West, Hungary's implications as a Cold War issue were clearly recognized. The Toronto Star, for example, in an editorial entitled "Where is the Line to be Drawn Against Tyranny," wrote:

In Europe the line is already drawn through the middle of Germany. It was drawn in the first place by the Russians, but the West has accepted it. The Soviets know that if they cross the line with force, we will fight and take a chance on survival. And we know that if we cross the line with force it will almost certainly mean the beginning of the World War III. Hungary lies on the wrong side of the line. It is a heart-rending fact, a fact that ought to be faced, to put an end to bitter self-condemnation and the tirades against the UN that are being heard so often in the West in these days. 56

Krishnamenon said that India opposed the use of the U. N. as a "forum for the Cold War." Nor did India want to jeopardize her nonalignment by taking sides on the Hungarian question.

According to the London Times this desire to protect nonalignment prompted India to avoid supporting either power bloc. The Times maintained that a "tacit Indo-British entente" was the "sheet anchor" of Indian nonalignment. The Suez crisis, the paper maintained, destroyed Indo-British understanding and India as a result stood alone between the two major powers. The paper added that "it is possible that Nehru may well have felt that if, with his visit to the United States in the offing, he broke or came near to breaking off ties with Russia over the repression in Hungary, he might find he had destroyed at a blow the uncommitted position for which he has always worked. There is much to commend in the Times analysis, but

the Commonwealth relations were not the "sheet anchor" of non-alignment, because nonalignment promoted India's national interests.⁵⁷

That India did not wish to endanger nonalignment was clear from her voting record at the United Nations. Gertrude C. Boland, an American student of India's diplomacy at the U. N. wrote:

A close look at India's voting record indicates that the issues which have caused India to evidence the greatest degree of nonalignment have related to questions involving not so much charges of aggression, but the pitting of the USSR versus the United States in situations that hold the possibility of a world conflict developing should the matter "be pushed too far".⁵⁸

In any case the Eisenhower administration was unhappy with India's failure to condemn Soviet conduct in Hungary while acting as she did on the Suez crisis. President Eisenhower hoped that India would realize that America and not Russia was the real friend of the newly independent countries in Asia and Africa. Hungary having proven that the Soviets did not respect national independence, Eisenhower expected India to make that long awaited move to give up nonalignment and align with the West.

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CHAPTER VIII

INDIA'S NONALIGNMENT POLICY: THE AMERICAN RESPONSE 1947-52

Occasional tactical deviations aside, the main feature of the American response to India's nonalignment policy was unmitigated opposition. The sub-features of the response varied from time to time, from president to president, and from issue to issue and alternated between hostility and reliance, indifference and support, rebuttal and recognition.

The official American reaction to nonalignment until the mid-fifties was summed up in the phrase "those who are not with us are against us." In the late fifties and the sixties America took the stand that it was far better for India to be nonaligned than to be on the Communist side. During the administration of President Richard M. Nixon, the United States maintained that "in the present world it is for nations such as India an altogether understandable and practical position. The United States accepts nonalignment."¹ On the eve of the New Delhi summit of the nonaligned leaders in 1983, an American official said that "we're past the point of thinking if you are not with us, you're against us."² More recently, Under Secretary of State Michael Armacost declared that "we support India's unity, territorial integrity and nonalignment and

recognize its pivotal role and its special responsibilities for regional peace and stability."³

Changes in American reaction to nonalignment were tactical and not the result of any change of convictions about nonalignment. Even when India's nonalignment was an unacceptable foreign policy posture for America, she was not prepared to write off India as a lost cause. The success of democracy in India and the political stability that she achieved showed that her continued existence as an independent entity was in Western interests. As a result, as President Dwight D. Eisenhower noted in his memoirs, "it was an obvious fact that India--an announced neutral in the polarized power struggle--should never be allowed, with its 400 million people, to fall within the Communist orbit."⁴

According to T. J. S. George, one of V. K. Krishnamenon's biographers, this contradiction between opposition to India's nonalignment and the desire to keep her as a democratic ally "has determined the main course of Indo-American relations from 1947 up to the present time."⁵ America extended economic assistance to India to influence her foreign policy and to develop her economically to prevent the growth of Communism in India. Nevertheless, Indo-American relations of the past forty years have been a continuing story of ups and downs.

When India became independent, the United States was concerned mainly with developments in Europe and the Far East. Understandably, the Truman administration did not plan any

major involvement in India; moreover, the State Department regarded South Asia as a British responsibility. As American ambassador Loy Henderson noted in April, 1950, Asian relations were developed and Asian problems were analysed in the context of America's general policies.⁶

Although unable to concentrate on India, the U. S. government was interested in her policies. According to a State Department policy statement in 1948, America desired the "orientation of the Government and the people of India toward the United States and other Western democracies and away from the U. S. S. R." The State Department believed that American interests in India would be best served by friendly Indo-British relations and decided that nothing should be done to upset Anglo-Indian relations. The department was determined to prevent formation of an alliance between India and Russia since it would be detrimental to America's interests.⁷

India's nonalignment hindered realization of the U. S. foreign policy objectives vis-a-vis India. The State Department viewed nonalignment as an unrealistic foreign policy posture. It feared that if India was not given economic aid she would adhere more firmly to nonalignment or fall into the Russian orbit. If India came under Soviet influence, the West would be denied the vast military potential of India. Therefore, a coordinating committee of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and Air force recommended that "if we are to lose access to Chinese territory, it is the more important for us

to prevent the extension of Communist influence in South Asia and retain this area as a Western salient on the Asian continent." ⁸

While India was eager to maintain independence and non-alignment, Pakistan looked for American support in struggles against India. The United States preferred India as an ally, but because nonalignment stood in the way of an alliance, Washington cultivated Pakistani friendship. According to Assistant Secretary of State George McGhee, the United States early recognized Pakistan's importance to American policy. The United States supported Pakistan for one of the vice-presidential positions at the U. N., included her in the Far Eastern Commission, and helped her to secure membership on the U. N. Economic and Social Council. Discussing Pakistan's significance to American policy McGhee added:

U. S. relations with Pakistan were at this time on the upswing. Pakistan particularly because of the presence of its rivalry with India, was courting us assiduously. In seeking aid, particularly arms aid, Pakistan took pains to dissociate itself from Indian neutralism, and promised that its forces would be at our side in the event of Communist incursion into South Asia. They offered for us an attractive alternative to somewhat truculent Indian neutralism. Their spokesmen . . . were persuasive. 9

America's position on the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan undoubtedly resulted from this desire to cultivate Pakistani friendship. Indians believed that the American attitude was inimical to their interests and increasingly

suspected that the American stand was a response to India's
10
nonalignment.

In January, 1948, India took the Kashmir dispute to the Security Council. India charged Pakistan with aggression and sought Security Council help to secure withdrawal of Pakistani supported raiders from Kashmir. Instead of addressing the more important question of aggression, as India saw it, the council discussed a plebiscite in Kashmir to determine the question of its accession to India. The Security Council's decision on Kashmir disappointed India. India's unhappiness resulted from her feeling that the Council equated the aggressor with the aggrieved and rejected India's conditions for a plebiscite. Consequently, India took the position that she would agree to
11
a plebiscite only after Pakistan vacated the region.

The Security Council created a United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan to secure and supervise a ceasefire between the two countries. The commission's report that Pakistani soldiers were fighting in Kashmir prompted Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to demand their withdrawal. Pakistan denied that her soldiers were participating in the hostilities. Nehru's letter to Pakistani Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan prompted the U. S. charge d'affaires in Pakistan, Charles Lewis, to come to Pakistan's defense. Lewis suggested that the United States warn India against any action against Pakistan
12
territory or any attempt to evict her from Kashmir.

Lewis believed that India would likely heed an American warning while she might not treat an admonition by the U. N. with equal concern. He suggested that the department should disregard Pakistan's stand on Palestine, where "our policies were divergent," and added:

Pakistan is a sure friend of the United States and would prove itself a faithful and active ally should the occasion ever arise provided only today the United States government exercises its voice in favor of Pakistan, coupled with a firm resolve to see that Pakistan is not made an object of attack by a nation which, in time of need, would probably be an uncertain friend.¹³

Lewis admitted that the American embassy in New Delhi would not agree with his assessments. He stated that a departmental telegram to Ambassador J Klahr Huddle, U. S. representative on the U. N. Commission for India and Pakistan, "and other recent communications relative to [the] Kashmir question convince me that the department is fully conscious of Pakistan's difficult position and is not unsympathetic with it."¹⁴ As a result of these messages the department advised the American consulate in Geneva to request the United Nations Commission to include in its report an "admonitory statement" that the commission's "preliminary findings should not be interpreted as justification by either party for military action which might jeopardize eventual peaceful solution of the problem."¹⁵

In May, 1949, the State Department instructed its ambassador in India, Loy Henderson, to discuss the Kashmir question with Indian officials and impress upon them the need for a

settlement. State told him to warn India that while the U. S. was not using its credit granting powers against India, if hostilities resumed between her and Pakistan, it would be difficult to extend assistance to India. The State Department held the view that in case of war the Indian subcontinent would not be the best place for the effective use of American economic assistance. It maintained that the Kashmir dispute was a serious obstacle to development of friendly relations between India and the United States. Resumption of hostilities between India and Pakistan would make it difficult to sell the American press and public the idea that India and Pakistan believed in peaceful settlement of Kashmir problem. The department advised Henderson to warn the government of India that its emphasis on military positioning "may be construed as indication that GOI [India] expects resumption of hostilities."¹⁶

In December, 1949, the United Nations proposed a plebiscite in Kashmir preceded by the withdrawal and disarmament of armed forces on both sides of a cease-fire line. A U. N. representative was to interpret and administer the proposal and ultimately conduct the plebiscite. Nehru told Henderson on December 26, that the U. N. recommendations were unacceptable because they "placed India and Pakistan on the same footing in Kashmir." Nehru expressed disappointment with the Western leaders, whom he saw as formulators of the proposals, for having made these suggestions after having heard his

explanations during visits with them in London, Ottawa, and
Washington in October, 1949.¹⁷

From the start Nehru was unhappy with the Anglo-American position on Kashmir. He believed that their recommendations had ulterior motives and were not based on the merits of the issue. In February, 1948, he wrote his sister Vijayalakshmi Pandit that "I could not imagine that the Security Council could possibly behave in the trivial and partisan manner in which it functioned. These people are supposed to keep the world in order. It is not surprising that the world is going to pieces. The United States and Britain have played a dirty role, Britain probably being the chief actor behind the scenes."¹⁸

The Anglo-American moves in the U. N. made them suspect in Indian eyes. Ambassador Henderson reported from New Delhi that Indians believed that America was pro-Pakistan with regard to Kashmir and other Indo-Pak differences. A feeling was widespread that America in search for bases to operate against Russia was interested in Kashmir.¹⁹ Surjit Mansingh, an Indian scholar, has suggested that America because of Kashmir's strategic importance was probably opposed to its absorption in India.²⁰

The next important Security Council move on Kashmir was in February, 1951, when the council discussed an Anglo-American resolution. It provided for creation of a neutral force to conduct a plebiscite in Kashmir. India opposed this proposal.

Consequently, the council dropped reference to a neutral force but recommended arbitration to settle the question of a plebiscite. The Security Council approved the suggestion. Nehru declared that the Security Council's decision was wrong and distorted. Significantly the Kashmir resolution came on the heels of an Indian vote in the General Assembly against the American sponsored resolution that sought to brand China as
21
the aggressor in Korea.

Three months later Pakistan again sought Security Council intervention on Kashmir. She complained about India's decision to create a constituent assembly to draw up a constitution for Kashmir. India, of course, opposed the Council's move to discuss the question. She promised that the proceedings of the assembly would not prejudice the Council in dealing with the Kashmir dispute. Despite India's assurances the Security Council passed a resolution drawing attention to India's promises regarding the constituent assembly. Nehru described the Anglo-American resolution as exceedingly unfriendly and charged that
22
it was based on extraneous considerations.

In November, 1952, Kashmir was once again the subject of the Security Council deliberations. The discussions centered around an Anglo-American resolution that asked India and Pakistan to come to an agreement about the number of troops to be maintained in Kashmir by both sides during a plebiscite. India informed the U. N. that it would agree to a force of 21,000 on its side if Pakistan would settle for a civilian armed force

of 4,000 men on her side of the ceasefire line. Pakistan refused the Indian suggestion. The council passed the resolution by a vote of nine to zero, with Russian abstention. Nehru commented that "powerful countries seem to have delighted in putting forward propositions to which we cannot agree."²³

The Anglo-American joint sponsorship of the resolution was in the face of known Indian opposition. The New York Times reported that India, being committed to nonalignment, viewed the American move on Kashmir as an attempt to "force India away from her pre-determined course." India viewed America's part in the resolution with suspicion. Coming at a time when rumors of an Anglo-American plan to bring Pakistan into the Middle East Defense Organization and allow American military bases in Pakistan abounded, the Indians believed "Washington had an ulterior motive in taking a stand . . . favorable to Pakistan."²⁴

Whatever the merits of the American position on the Kashmir dispute and however India interpreted it, the United States did not go beyond words to alter the status quo that favored India in Kashmir. Its strategic importance notwithstanding, the American desire to secure Pakistan as an ally probably influenced the American stand. The merits of the case did little to move the United States, India, Pakistan or Britain. Assistant Secretary of State George McGhee's discussion in London in April, 1951, seems to bear this out in regard to America. His talks with H. R. Scott, the British

assistant under secretary of state, touched on Middle East defense, Pakistan, and Kashmir. McGhee suggested that Pakistani participation in the Middle East Defense Organization should be secured with an Anglo-American assurance to Pakistan that "we would not recognize a fait accompli in Kashmir brought about by the unilateral action of India."²⁵

Despite various efforts to cultivate Pakistani friendship, America still hoped to make an ally out of India. In fact the Communist victory in China diverted American attention to India. The failure of Kuomintang forces in China was a defeat for the American foreign policy that "had emphasized Japan and China as possible eastern bases of the United States." The developments in the Middle East and in Southeast Asia were also unfavorable to the West. As a result the United States desired an Indian alliance.²⁶

The Truman administration was unwilling to let India go the way of China. Instead the administration hoped to develop India as a counterweight to Red China. State Department officials believed that India, because of her political stability and economic and military potential, was capable of assuming the "leadership against Communist expansion in South and Southeast Asia." According to State Department officials, Nehru's suspicions and distrust of the United States kept India and America from coming together.²⁷

The State Department believed that Nehru's misconceptions about the United States were responsible for his refusal to

ally with the West. Because Department officials thought that a visit to the United States would end many of Nehru's misunderstandings about America, they invited Nehru to visit the United States in October, 1949.²⁸

Truman administration officials expected to persuade Nehru to change his attitude towards Red China and join the West against the Chinese Communists. A State Department memorandum on Nehru's visit maintained that the basic objective of the visit was to persuade India to give up her nonalignment and join the U. S. in its fight against Communist imperialism.²⁹

Nehru's visit and his talks with the Washington officials did not alter his belief in nonalignment. He made clear that India was committed to democratic ideals and institutions and declared that "where freedom is menaced or where aggression takes place, we cannot be and shall not be neutral." But he asserted that India would continue her policy of nonalignment because it was advantageous to her. In an address to the House of Representatives on October 3, 1949, he said:

We have achieved political freedom but our revolution is not yet complete and is still in progress, for political freedom without the assurance to right to live and pursue happiness, which economic progress alone can bring, can never satisfy a people. Therefore, our immediate task is to raise the living standards of our people, to remove all that comes in the way of economic growth of the nation. . . . We shall, therefore, gladly welcome aid and cooperation on terms which are of mutual benefit. But we do not seek any material advantage in exchange for any part of our hard won freedom. 30

Nehru's visit failed to bring the desired results for both sides. President Harry S. Truman disagreed with Nehru's assessment of the developments in China and he counselled against India granting Communist China recognition. He suggested that non-Communist nations should concert their actions on Red China. Nehru disagreed with the president and indicated that he would grant early recognition. Nehru believed that the United States government wanted him to agree with it on all issues. He thought that America would not help India unless she followed the American lead. There was considerable delay in acting upon an Indian request for a wheat loan made during Nehru's visit. Contrary to what Nehru believed, however, the U. S. Congress passed the grain loan for India in June, 1951.³¹

Nehru's China policy and the decision to recognize Communist China added to America's opposition to nonalignment. Having found Nehru unamenable to American persuasion, it decided to turn to Pakistan and her prime minister, Liaqat Ali Khan, to lead an anti-Communist Asian counterpoise against neutralist India. According to Gopal, the Truman administration hoped to create this counterbalance by building up Liaqat as a great Asian leader against Nehru.³² Pakistan, too, saw an opportunity to secure American support because of India's neutralism. Assistant Secretary of State George McGhee said that Nehru was unwilling to compromise his nonalignment although he wanted the American grain. Consequently, McGhee went to Karachi, to invite Liaqat to visit Washington. He was

promised the type of reception given to Nehru. Liaqat, after cancelling his planned visit to Moscow, accepted the American invitation. Commenting on the invitation McGhee later wrote:

After Nehru's visit the previous October we felt under certain obligation to balance with a Liaqat visit. . . . He was a big, strong, confident man with considerable international stature. We wanted him as a strong anti-Communist ally in the subcontinent, for his country had strategic territory on both the northwest and the north-east borders of India. 33

Pakistani leaders impressed McGhee. Commenting on his meeting and many talks with them he wrote that "they openly sought our aid on our terms; promising support in our efforts to build a defense against the Communist threat. Compared to the wishy-washy neutralist Indians they were a breath of fresh air." Understandably, America was willing to help Pakistan. 34

Liaqat visited the United States in May, 1950, and received a hearty welcome. Nehru saw in it an attempt to build up Pakistan against India. In a letter to his sister Vijaya-lakshmi Pandit on May 29, 1950, he observed that "it does appear that there is a concerted attempt to build up Pakistan and build down, if I may say so, India." 35

Despite what seemed to Nehru as an unfriendly disposition of the United States toward India, he had no desire to move over to Russian side. He had already made clear that India was not interested in an alliance with Russia. In April, 1948, Nehru sent the secretary general of the Ministry of External Affairs, Girija Sankar Bajpai, to the United States. He told the State Department officials that India's basic orientation

was towards the West. In case of war India would be on the side of the democracies. Bajpai, however, was unable to make public declaration of India's position because she could not withstand Russian aggression or internal difficulties that might follow such a pronouncement. Consequently, when the Indian ambassador in Moscow, Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, proposed a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union, Nehru was cool to the suggestion.³⁶

American concern about and opposition to India's non-alignment intensified during the Korean war. Her refusal to become involved in the war and her attempt to localize the conflict were major reasons for America's objection to the policy. American leaders viewed India's actions with apprehension. They believed that India's moves ran counter to American policies and that India sought to undermine American efforts to develop collective security measures against Communist aggression.³⁷ The State Department thought that India wielded considerable influence on smaller nations and feared the trend towards neutralism because it detracted from the strength of the free world.³⁸

The U. S. resolve to counteract nonalignment led to a decision to supplant British influence in India with American. Before the outbreak of the Korean War, America was content to leave India as a British responsibility. The new policy was contrary to the stated American desire of supplementing British efforts in India. The shift in American attitude followed

the Communist takeover of China, the Korean War, and suspicion that British policy only encouraged Indian neutralism.³⁹

A State Department policy statement in 1949 recommended that the U. S. should collaborate with Britain in India. America, it was suggested, should discuss with Britain the possibility of coordinated economic policy for India, "it being understood that no delimitation of spheres of influence or division of markets is contemplated." Extension of military assistance to South Asian countries was to be undertaken only after consulting with the British to make sure that her strategic interests were not affected by American military assistance to the countries of the area.⁴⁰

The attitude of Commonwealth countries concerning the events in China and Korea led to a reversal in U. S. policies towards India. The United States believed that the British and the Canadians, who were critical of American policies in the Far East and thought that those policies would lead to a war, influenced Nehru's views on Korea and China. The department also felt that Britain was unhappy with the growing American involvement in South Asia. Acting Assistant Secretary of State Burton Berry expressed the State Department's apprehensions on Anglo-Indian attitude towards the U. S. when he said:

If Mr. Nehru is making a deliberate attempt to drive a wedge between the U. S. and Great Britain, he is following an alarmingly shortsighted policy, and any efforts which the British may be making to exacerbate relations between the U. S. and the Indian government are even more

deplorable. . . . However bitter the British may be over the fact that they are no longer a first class power, and are dependent on the U. S. for their survival as an independent nation, their dog-in-the-manger attitude in South Asia is inexcusable.⁴¹

The British took an uncharitable view of American efforts to extend her influence in India at the expense of Britain. Hitherto consultations with India were done through the medium of the British. In March, 1951, George McGhee visited New Delhi as part of a new policy of direct consultation with India on international issues. He told Nehru that the U. S. "did not wish whatever difference of view might exist between India and the U. S., centering around Communist China, to affect our basic understanding or impede full consultation with each other on matters of common interest."⁴²

After having met with Nehru and other Indian officials, McGhee visited Sir Archibald Nye the British high commissioner in New Delhi to apprise him of the various talks McGhee had with the Indian leaders. Discussing his meeting with Nye, McGhee wrote:

Following my meeting with Nehru, I called on U. K. High Commissioner, Sir Archibald Nye. I told him the substance of my various conversations with Indian officials, including Nehru. The British, I thought bore their changed position very gracefully. As long as they are advised, and not subjected to surprises, they do not contest our new role with India. I tried to make it clear that we had no desire to replace them, or assume any responsibilities that they were willing and able to fulfill. Indeed we were happy that we were shielded from so many of India's needs and growing pains.⁴³

The American decision to consult directly with India was a response to India's nonalignment. Nehru had repeatedly

complained that Asia's voice was not heard in settling Asian issues. The State Department felt that India's lack of appreciation for and criticism of American policies resulted from what India considered insufficient consultation. To strengthen relations, the department decided to establish high level contacts between India and American officials.⁴⁴

As early as August, 1950, America consulted Indian officials on issues of mutual concern and interest. As a result, during August, American contact with the Indian delegation in United Nations increased considerably. The Americans consulted India "as much as possible" on Korea and related matters. Consequently, the leader of India's delegation, Sir Benegal Rau, was under instruction to support the U. S. in the Security Council on any vote there. As American contact with the Indian delegation increased, the Russians also began to court the Indians. Rau wrote Nehru that both the superpowers were "anxious for India's moral support and were treating him with so much courtesy and consideration that he sometimes found it unpleasant to take sides."⁴⁵

The State Department suggested that special machinery for consultation with India be created. Ambassador Henderson opposed the proposal but suggested that India should be consulted more regularly and with greater frequency through normal diplomatic channels. He believed that Washington should inform India well in advance of any moves by the U. S. on issues affecting Asia. He objected to a special apparatus

because in his view it would emphasize rather than smooth differences between the countries. Moreover, once India was consulted and her advice was not taken, she would be resentful. Henderson argued that Nehru would consider a special consultative set up as an attempt to undermine his nonalignment and not as recognition of his country's importance. Henderson added that if Asian problems were solved exclusively by Asians, it would be to the disadvantage of the United States.⁴⁶

With a view towards placating Indian opinion, the State Department maintained regular contacts with Indian officials. The Department planned frequent meetings between Indian and American diplomats at the U. N., the State Department, the Indian embassy in Washington, and the American embassy in New Delhi. Assistant Secretary of State George McGhee told Indian ambassador Vijayalakshmi Pandit of these plans in September, 1950. He informed Mrs. Pandit a bit later that the department desired to "discuss important world questions and particularly Asian questions in advance of our taking action on them," with Indians.⁴⁷ The Department hoped that these consultations would blunt Indian criticism of U. S. policies.

In addition to direct consultation the State Department felt effective propaganda in India and other South Asia countries would dispel misunderstanding of American foreign policies. In July, 1950, a private citizen, Victor Hugo Sword, wrote the State Department expressing concern about

Indo-American relations. McGhee replied that it was the United States' entirely impartial attitude on the Kashmir question that was responsible for India's aloofness towards the United States. Explaining the need for propaganda in India McGhee wrote:

These and other factors inevitably lead one to conclude that there must be more effective representation to Indians of the policies of the United States and of our purposes and objectives, not only towards India but toward other nations of the world. This is a matter which has caused us all very good concern. The department hopes to embark up on a greatly expanded information program in South Asia with which we hope to present our views to a much larger segment of the populations and effectively counter Communist propaganda.⁴⁸

The Psychological Strategy Board coordinated U. S. propaganda work abroad. An executive order on June 20, 1951, created the board and directed it to provide more effective planning, coordination, and conduct of psychological operations.⁴⁹ The PSE reported that the official American programs designed to influence Indian opinion were limited to the United States Information Service work. Because the USIS had a small staff to cover a large area, the report concluded that in India the agency could reach only the literate and sophisticated groups in political, economic, or social power.⁵⁰

Ambassador Chester Bowles, who was popular with Indian people and officials, gave the USIS program in India a new direction. He visited several parts of the country and through speeches and public statements improved Indo-American relations. In addition to his visits, there were American cultural

programs and lecture tours featuring eminent Americans. Cultural officers at American embassy visited universities throughout India explaining American policies to Indian students and faculty. Senior staff members at the PSB, however, warned against these cultural programs from becoming too "formalistic, unimaginative and obvious." In a memorandum to the director of the PSB, they added:

The lecture program should be thought of as mainly a cover or pretext for establishing personal contacts with Indian intellectuals. Quality should not be sacrificed to quantity. We must recognize that there are not many American intellectuals capable of making a good impression on Indians. The glib journalist, the narrow academic specialist, "fractional barbarian" type of social or natural scientist, the professional anti-Communist, etc., will do more harm than good. 51

Opposition to nonalignment and measures to influence or counteract it were not the only American responses to India. Occasionally the United States made use of nonalignment to influence the behaviour of the Communist states. Although America opposed Indian neutrality and Indian mediation efforts in Korea the State Department sought India's help to influence Red Chinese conduct in Korea and Formosa.

The Chinese Communists were greatly agitated about U. S. protection for Kuomintang forces on Formosa, while America was concerned that the Maoist forces would try to attack Formosa. The president and the secretary of state made statements explaining the temporary nature of the American naval presence in the straits of Formosa, and they added that America did not have aggressive designs on mainland China. Secretary of State

Acheson sought Nehru's help to convince Red China that it was in her interest not to intervene in Korea. Acheson requested that the Indian ambassador in Peking transmit to the Chinese government President Truman's statements on Formosa. India's help, the secretary said, was necessary because she was the only country, outside the Soviet bloc, with effective diplomatic relations with Peking. India acceded to the American request and conveyed messages to the Red Chinese. According to K. M. Panikkar, India's China representative, these messages had a tempering effect on China.

Similarly, in September, 1950, America was concerned that success of her Inchon counter-offensive would prompt Red China to intervene in Korea. Consequently, Acheson instructed Loy Henderson to seek India's help to advise the Chinese that it was in their interest to keep out of Korea. The Chinese were to be told that a change in military situation in favor of the U. N. would help restore peace and that U. N. would view Chinese intervention with grave concern. Henderson was to request the Indian secretary general of the Ministry of External Affairs Bajpai to pass this information on to China through Panikkar. Acheson suggested that the message could be conveyed as Indian, or India could "associate" with it.

Henderson found Bajpai favorable to the American request. He was reluctant, however, to give the impression that India was acting in concert with the United States. Thus he agreed to convey the message as Indian communique. He said that since

India had been working to localize the conflict in Korea all along, the message would not be interpreted as American sponsored.⁵⁴

Consequently, Panikkar was to impress upon the PRC the need for restraint in the face of recent U. N. successes in Korea. He was to assure the Chinese that if the war proceeded according to the U. N. plan there would be no threat to China and that military operations would be limited to reunification of Korea. Panikkar reported that Chinese intervention in Korea would occur only if Russia entered the war with the U. N. forces crossing the thirty-eighth parallel. He held the view that Russia did not greatly influence Chinese policies and that China was not a Russian satellite.⁵⁵

Despite this apparent attempt to use nonalignment American opposition to it continued unabated. A regional conference of American diplomats in Ceylon during February and March, 1951, discussed India's nonalignment and the war in Korea. Summing up views expressed on nonalignment, McGhee wrote:

The United States should maintain a policy of patience built on firmness in its relations with the government of India. However, whenever the Indian government policy has the effect of undermining maintenance of peace through collective security, the United States should challenge it vigorously, both at home and abroad through the press, radio, and other media, but always avoiding the appearance of moral or political expediency.⁵⁶

The conference recommended that diplomatic representatives of NATO countries stationed in Asia should emphasize the fallacies of Nehru's policies. The conferees suggested that at

the U. N., the United States should be firm but friendly to India and that the mistake of nonalignment be explained to friendly states. Another recommendation of the conference was that attempts to form an Arab-Asian bloc at the U. N. should be thwarted. The diplomats present at the conference concurred that Arab-Asian unity was responsible for factionalism at the United Nations.
57

Similarly a State Department briefing paper prepared for a meeting of the foreign ministers of France, England, and the United States in September, 1951, suggested that Nehru's foreign policy was contrary to collective security and favored the Soviet Union. India's adherence to nonalignment, the paper said, would make other South Asian countries follow India's lead. The paper maintained that the short term policy of the West should be to expose the errors inherent in neutralism but that propaganda campaigns in South and Southeast Asia that explained the error of neutralism and the value of collective security should be begun.
58

In order to combat neutralism, the State Department paper suggested that non-Communist nations in South Asia be cultivated in such a way that they would offer leadership in organizing collective security measures. The conference in Ceylon had reached a similar conclusion earlier. India and Pakistan, the conference held, were strategically important with their populations and strategic materials. State worried that the loss of these two countries to Communism would mean

the loss of the whole of Asia. To prevent such a development the erection of effective military barriers against Communism was suggested. Pakistan was to be one of the military flanks thus created. In order to do this Pakistan's military strength was to be given a boost. As for India, the diplomats assembled at Nuwera Eliya in Ceylon suggested that India's neutralism should be vigorously challenged whenever necessary. 59

Economic relations between India and America contrasted sharply with their political differences. Between 1949 and 1951, natural calamities brought India to the brink of famine. The government of India requested American help in the form of a long-term, low-interest grain loan. Nehru made the request when he visited the United States in October, 1949. The food crisis in India was the occasion for the American Congress to react sharply to India's independent foreign policy. Despite congressional criticism of India's position on China and other issues arising out of the Korean war, Congress after considerable delay extended aid to India. 60

Although Truman favored aid he was reluctant to make a clear request for it lest Congress refuse because of the expense. Therefore, the president did not take the initiative in approaching Congress. According to Congressman Jacob Javits (Republican, New York), when a bi-partisan group from the House and the Senate asked the president to send a message to the Congress, Truman acted. 61

In a message to Congress on February 21, 1951, Truman recommended food aid, claiming that natural calamities impairing grain production had reduced India's ability to feed her population. The president stated that India, because of her attempts to shape a democratic pattern of society, deserved a "special claim upon our sympathies at this time." He conceded that there existed important differences between the two countries on foreign policies but these differences "should not blind us to the needs of the Indian people." ⁶² In a follow-up statement on March 29, 1951, Truman reiterated his desire to extend emergency aid to India. He recommended that the proposed aid be a grant and stressed the need for prompt ⁶³ action.

Congress acted slowly upon the president's request. In addition to India's actions and pronouncements on important international issues, two other incidents delayed congressional action. An Indian member of the U. N. Economic and Social Council, Dr. Kumaran Bharatappa, in a speech in Austin, Texas, remarked that the major problem in the Far East was "not Communism but Western imperialism." The government of India dissociated itself from his remarks. Bharatappa's statement, the government maintained, was made in a private capacity while he was in the United States on a lecture tour. ⁶⁴ American congressmen were nonetheless unhappy.

Nehru's criticism of Indian parliament members for sending cables to the presiding officers of the American Congress

was the other issue. While upholding the freedom of expression of the parliament members, Nehru said that, "for the members of the house to send direct messages to foreign governments is a practice which, I submit, is to be deprecated and which can only lead to confusion and embarrassment." Nehru's criticism of parliament members earned the ire of the Congress. ⁶⁵

Although the president and the State Department wanted to provide emergency assistance through a grant, several congressmen opposed it. A minority report of the House Foreign Affairs Committee concluded:

India needs grain immediately; we have the grain. We need strategic materials from India over a period of years; India has these materials; manganese, mica, burlap, monozite sands. . . . We should make India a loan which can be repaid in strategic materials. We should not make the government of India a gift it has not asked for. ⁶⁶

Several congressmen were critical of India's ban on the exportation of strategic materials. Chester Bowles, who succeeded Loy Henderson as ambassador to India, said that some congressmen tried to kill the aid bill with amendments that asked India to agree to American demands. Henderson, supporting the Indian case before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said that the "Indian people would probably prefer to starve rather than sacrifice their political and economic independence." He added that Indians "do not wish to feel that their right to formulate and carry out internal and foreign policies of their own choosing in any way [are] curtailed because of obligation toward a foreign country." ⁶⁷

When the bill came before the Congress, there was a good deal of support for it. The Senate passed the bill on May 16, and the House did likewise on May 24, 1951. Many congressmen shared the views expressed by critics of Nehru's policies. Senator Guy M. Gillette (Democrat, Iowa), who supported the aid bill, said that "we must make a special effort and take special pains to link ourselves in friendship with the people of the largest, and most populous, and potentially most powerful country in that vast area."⁶⁸

Congressman E. E. Cox's (Democrat, Georgia) views on the aid bill were representative of the feelings of many opponents:

Is India our friend? If so, why is the press of India so violently anti-American? If India is our friend, why are anti-American meetings held all over India at this very moment. Look at the record made by Nehru in the United Nations, where he has uniformly taken Russia's side whenever controversy between Russia and the United States has arisen. . . . He refused to join with her associates in the United Nations in declaring China the aggressor in Korea. He refused to join in the laying down of an embargo against Communist China. He protests our resistance to Chinese Communism. And India, although a member of the United Nations under whose flag the war in Korea is being fought, has not furnished one soldier to defend the free world.⁶⁹

The bill as passed did not contain any clause objectionable to India. It directed the Economic Cooperation administrator to procure strategic materials from India. As a result of diplomatic discussions between the two countries, India agreed to ban the export of tires and tubes to China. India also agreed to stop the sale of strategic materials to other

countries including China. She agreed to ship 500 tons of thorium nitrate, a strategic material, to the United States. These arrangements made India exempt from the provisions of the Kem amendment. This amendment named after James P. Kem (Republican, Missouri) banned economic assistance to countries exporting strategic materials to Communist bloc countries. ⁷⁰

The American decision to extend the grain loan did improve relations between India and America. India's refusal to attend the Japanese peace conference in San Francisco and her criticism of the peace terms were temporary set backs to what the state department described as "a favorable trend in U. S. India relations begun in mid-1951." ⁷¹

Chief architect of the Japanese peace treaty, John Foster Dulles, said that India's refusal to sign the treaty was a major disappointment. He added, however, that the U. S. did not expect India to sign the treaty for "that might have involved a departure from a policy which the Indian Government, within its rights, has judged will best serve its national interests." The explanation offered by India for its absence from San Francisco, Dulles said, "seemed at the time to give encouragement to the Chinese Communists who had revived . . . the old battle cry of 'Asia for Asiatics.'" ⁷²

Since India refused to attend the peace conference, no major Asian country was present in San Francisco. According to the Eastern Economist, an Indian weekly, it was for propaganda purposes that treaty was signed in public and with ceremony.

The absence of important Asian countries damaged the propaganda value of the conference.⁷³ Dulles speaking to a meeting of state governors at Gatlenburg, Tennessee, in October, 1951, said that America wanted to present a free world united front at San Francisco. Explaining American objectives at the peace conference Dulles further stated:

While free world unity is no insurance against general war, free world disunity probably increases the risk of general war. . . . That is the additional reason why we sought a peace which would win general support and why we negotiated patiently and in simplicity in an effort to consolidate that support into a climatic demonstration of world unity. . . . We wanted the Russians to hear what they heard, and to see what they saw, and to fail as they failed.⁷⁴

Ambassador Henderson reported from New Delhi that Nehru's decision to abstain from the peace conference was prompted by a desire to exclude Western presence and influence from Asia. By detaching China from Russia and Japan from America, Nehru, Henderson believed, was trying to complete his plans for a united Asia with himself as a leader. Henderson added that Nehru might not work openly to achieve these goals since he needed economic assistance, the kind only the West could provide.⁷⁵

Consequently, the State Department instructed Henderson to warn Nehru of the consequences of the foreign policy he was following. Henderson told Nehru that India's rejection of the peace with Japan, particularly the manner in which it was carried out, added to American concern about India's nonalignment. Henderson maintained that India's stand strengthened

the American impression that India in an attempt to establish full Asian cooperation opposed the development of Japanese-American relations. He expressed his apprehension that India might follow a quiet policy to draw Japan away from her close relationship with the United States, just as India was trying to separate Red China from her association with Russia.⁷⁶

Henderson argued that this attempt would be contrary to world peace and order. He suggested that India's public refusal to attend the San Francisco conference was an attempt to strengthen isolationist elements in Japan. He advised Nehru of the inexpediency of an Asian bloc outside the United Nations and expressed the view that regional groupings would not help world peace. Nehru denied any knowledge of an Indian attempt to form an Asian bloc.⁷⁷

John Foster Dulles, who met the retiring Indian ambassador Vijayalakshmi Pandit in October, 1951, reiterated Henderson's statements. He, too, discounted the possibility of an Asian bloc and expressed his belief that the slogan "Asia for Asiatics" was not necessarily an anti-colonial movement or mood. He advised Mrs. Pandit that India should work for East-West cooperation and give up all thoughts of an Asia bloc. He warned that America had no plans to withdraw from the Western Pacific and leave a power vacuum there.⁷⁸

Congress was also critical of India's position on the Japanese treaty. American resentment, however, did not crystallize into definite action against India at that time. The

decision to build up Pakistan militarily, taken during the Eisenhower presidency, was a cumulative response to India's policies and pronouncements which the U. S. considered inimical to her interests.

The Truman administration found India's nonalignment a major stumbling block in the conduct of American diplomacy in Asia. Confronted with India's growing tendency towards neutralism, the administration decided to oppose neutralism lest it become widespread and destroy free world unity. Opposition to nonalignment, however, did not deter the United States from working with India and helping her economically. But aid did not blunt India's criticism of American policy or turn her away from nonalignment. As a result, steps to develop Pakistan as an alternative to India's nonalignment were beginning during the Truman presidency.

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CHAPTER IX

INDIA'S NONALIGNMENT POLICY: THE AMERICAN RESPONSE 1953-60

The Dulles-Eisenhower diplomacy constituted an epoch in American foreign relations with nonaligned countries. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles believed in the efficacy of military alliances to contain Communism and regarded nonalignment as shortsighted, immoral, and obsolete. Consequently, the Eisenhower administration opposed the nonaligned countries which America considered indifferent to the fate of others. This outright opposition to nonalignment did undergo a tactical change during the closing years of President Dwight D. Eisenhower's term in office.

American awareness of India's nonalignment increased with the formation of military alliances like the South East Asia Treaty Organization and the Central Treaty Organization. India opposed these alliances because of her concern that they would bring the Cold War to her borders. Attempts to persuade India of the shortsightedness of nonalignment having failed, the United States decided to build up Pakistan militarily as a counterweight to India. Despite opposition to nonalignment, the United States extended generous economic aid for India's development programs and various five year plans. Explaining the reasons for American assistance to India, Vice-President Richard M. Nixon said that, "what happens in India will . . .

have tremendous impact on the decisions made in other countries in Asia, in the Near East, in Africa, and even in the Americas. So this indicates the tremendous stake that the free world has in the economic problems of India.¹

Dulles came to office determined to correct the flaws and the imbalances of American diplomacy. He was critical of the preceding Democratic administration for neglecting Asia, informing Eisenhower that "such neglect hurts the pride and dignity of the Asians" and "is one of the matters to be promptly corrected."² Eisenhower suggested that "we must work hard to restore much of the damage that has been done to our friendship with the Arab and Indian world."³ Later in his administration Eisenhower told Dulles that "he looked upon India and Mexico as being two countries which in a sense had a status of their own and toward which he was particularly anxious that we should have wise policies and good relations."⁴

Despite good intentions the Eisenhower administration followed policies towards the Arab and Indian worlds similar to those of the Roman emperors, i. e., divide et impera. Non-alignment and anti-colonial policies of the prominent Arab and Asian countries proved to be a problem for the United States. Gamal Abdul Nasser in the Middle East, Achmed Sukarno in Southeast Asia, and Jawaharlal Nehru in South Asia opposed military alliances and colonialism in Asia and Africa.

American officials believed that the effective way to counter the influence of these Arab-Asian leaders was to build

up their regional opponents. Eisenhower argued that Nasser's arrogance was due to Russian support and arms. He believed that Nasser should be isolated in the Arab world by winning over Saudi Arabia and Libya and signing a treaty with Israel. Once isolated and increasingly dependent on Soviet Russia, Eisenhower felt that Nasser would come to terms with the United States. He added that as a bonus Egypt would no longer be regarded as a leader in the Arab world. Consequently, on March 28, 1956, Eisenhower directed the State Department to take steps "to build up some other individual as a prospective leader of the Arab world . . . in the thought that mutually antagonistic personal ambitions might disrupt the aggressive plans that Nasser is evidently developing. My own choice of such a rival is King Saud."⁶

Early in December, 1953, Vice-President Nixon recommended a similar action towards Sukarno of Indonesia. After a Far Eastern tour Nixon told a National Security Council meeting that the Philippines President "Magsaysay could have a great influence for good on Sukarno if we build him [Magsaysay] up." Sukarno, an untiring champion of nonalignment, opposed military alliances. A similar consideration reportedly prompted⁸ Nixon to recommend a build up of Pakistan against India.

American opposition to India's nonalignment came in various forms and measures. Because of her nonalignment the United States objected to India's participation in international conferences and her assuming international

responsibilities that would enhance her influence and standing in the councils of the world. As a result, in 1953 the State Department and the secretary of state opposed the candidacy of India's Vijayalakshmi Pandit for president of the U. N. General Assembly. Dulles favored Prince Wan of Thailand for the post. Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., America's permanent representative to the U. N., believed that Mrs. Pandit was the ideal candidate, and Eisenhower thought that the U. S. should appeal to world opinion by supporting India's nominee. Dulles however, reminded the president that the "country and the Congress was [sic] not happy with India," and pointed out that the Congress was already displeased with India's chairmanship of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and questioned the political wisdom of supporting the Indian candidate. But Eisenhower did not agree with his secretary's assessment of anti-India feeling in the country, nor did he see any political reason for withholding support from Mrs. Pandit. He suggested that "we should bow to India if we expect them to live up to our expectations." Dulles yielded and the Assembly⁹ elected Mrs. Pandit as its president.

The government of India believed U. S. opposition was responsible for India's exclusion from the U. N. political conference on Korea in 1953. India's attitude towards the Korean War made her suspect in American eyes. Foreign Secretary Subimal Dutt observed that to exclude India America suggested that only countries who participated in the war

should attend the conference. North Korea and Communist China wanted neutrals like India, Indonesia, and Burma to participate. Even American allies like England, Canada, and Australia favored India's presence at the conference.¹⁰ They introduced a resolution in the Political Committee of the U. N. General Assembly providing that India attend the meeting. Although the resolution was passed in committee, opposition from the United States kept the proposal from getting the needed two-thirds votes in the General Assembly. Consequently, India suggested that the resolution be withdrawn "so that purposes of peace would best be served by not forcing a resolution."¹¹

The American attitude offended British because Britain had already promised India a berth at the conference. Sharply rebuking the United States, British ambassador Sir Roger Makins said:

My government believed, and still believes that India could play a helpful role in that conference, and had an interest which justified her inclusion. You thought otherwise. . . . But we continue to think that you tend to underrate the importance of India's attitude in the Far East and the valuable role which she is destined to play in that area of the world where she is one of the two largest and strongest powers. ¹²

Unhappy with the controversy over India's attendance, President Eisenhower suggested to Dulles that all five members of the NNRC be invited to the gathering. Dulles objected because such an invitation would include Communist delegates from Poland and Czechoslovakia.¹³ The United States, of course, was not enthusiastic with the idea of the political conference

in the first place. Lodge commented that if the U. S. "pulled this conference off, General Eisenhower would never be put out of office,"¹⁴ but Dulles, in a memorandum to Under-Secretary of State Walter Bedel Smith, wrote that it was "not the type of conference with which U. S. itself believes in."¹⁵

Discussing reasons for America's opposition to India's participation, Dulles said that the armistice agreement provided for a "conference of the two sides and India did not fit into either side." Dulles argued that "abstention was India's privilege, but like most privileges it . . . [had] a price." He said that because of India's non-participation in the hostilities South Korea did not trust India and she should not be a participant.¹⁶

Lodge believed that India's admission would create demands by other countries to participate, especially Japan. He suggested that if and when other Far Eastern questions were discussed, India should play a central role in it. India's inclusion, Lodge feared, would lead to a discussion of Formosa and other extraneous subjects. According to a Brookings Institution study, discussion of Far Eastern questions like Formosa or Communist China's admission to the U. N. was neither advantageous nor desirable. Such a move would reopen the "debate in the United States about a correct policy for the Far East,"¹⁷ and that the administration wanted to avoid.

Russia and Communist China maintained that neutral participation was necessary for the success of the conference. The

Soviet Union hinted that there was little chance of a conference without neutral participation. The United States maintained that United Nations participants were already selected, and it remained for the Communists to name theirs. During the eighth session of the U. N. General Assembly, Russia attempted to put the question of the conference's composition on the Assembly's agenda but was defeated. Thus the United States blocked India's presence at the conference. ¹⁸

While the United States was trying to detract from India's status as a leader in Asia, the Soviet Union apparently attempted to build up India, especially as a counterforce to Communist China. In the summer of 1958 the Middle East was once again in turmoil. With the American marines in Lebanon, British soldiers in Jordan, and an anti-Western revolution in Iraq, the Middle East was tense. The Soviet Union proposed an international conference of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and India to discuss the world situation and to curb military conflict that the Russians believed had already started. Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev's letter to Nehru praised India's stand for peace and sought support for the proposed conference. Nehru promised India's services in the cause of peace. ¹⁹

The United States opposed a conference because it would weaken the United Nations. The British prime minister, Harold MacMillan, proposed a Security Council meeting attended by heads of governments of the countries represented on the

Council. President Charles De Gaulle of France was for a summit but did not plan to attend the Security Council meeting in New York. Khrushchev agreed to a Council meeting but suggested that "we consider it essential that the representative of India in the person of Mr. Nehru should take part in the Security Council meeting."²⁰

Eisenhower refused to accept Indian participation because he held that it was against the U. N. Charter. Pakistan had already declared her opposition to India being invited to the meeting. The Security Council meeting did not materialize, and De Gaulle proposed a summit meeting at Geneva which Khrushchev and Eisenhower agreed to attend. According to Indian foreign secretary Subimal Dutt, Eisenhower did not expect Russia to propose Indian participation. He, however, expressed his appreciation for services rendered by smaller nations like India.²¹ Dulles also opposed the move to invite India, arguing that India's presence would require invitations to other countries. He added that it would not be possible to invite all interested parties because such a meeting would be unmanageable.²²

In response to India's policy of nonalignment, the Eisenhower administration decided to strengthen Pakistan militarily. Although Eisenhower took the decision, preliminary negotiations were undertaken by Truman administration officials. Rumors of a secret deal between Pakistan and the United States were current as early as August, 1950.²³ A regional conference of American diplomats stationed in South

Asia, held in March, 1951, had recognized the "importance of Pakistan with respect to the defense of South Asia and the Middle East." The conference recommended that the "United States military authorities should consider on an urgent basis the desirability of the United States entering into an early understanding with Pakistan which would provide for equipping and building up Pakistan's military forces and ensure the availability of Pakistan's ground forces."²⁴

While the United States appreciated India's position in Asia, the State Department officials believed that her attitude toward Asian problems, especially Korea, left much to be desired. An informal discussion between department officials and their counterparts in Britain reached the conclusion that Pakistan's attitude "toward the UN, Korea and other problems of concern to us had been on the whole helpful."²⁵ A quarterly survey of American relations for July to September, 1951, with Pakistan by the State Department noted certain significant developments in Pakistan's attitude helpful toward the achievement of the U. S. objectives in the area.²⁶

The survey found that developments in the Indo-Pak relations helped Pakistan realize "its material and moral dependence on the West." Pakistan continued to solicit American support by remaining useful to the United States in attending the Japanese peace conference at San Francisco and by acting as the spokesman for non-Communist Asia. Unlike other Asian countries, Pakistan agreed to the presence of the three

associated states of Indo-China at the conference. These actions caused the United States to look favorably upon Pakistan while India's nonalignment caused disenchantment in Washington.²⁷

As early as 1951 American and Pakistani officials discussed Pakistan's participation in an American defensive alliance. Henry Byroade, who became the assistant secretary of state in 1951, was the main proponent of military aid to Pakistan. The American ambassador in New Delhi, Chester Bowles, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, and Chief of the Policy Planning Staff George Kennan opposed the proposal. Because Truman was about to leave office, there was no decision on the aid issue.²⁸

The new administration under Eisenhower was aware of the importance of South Asia to the United States. Consequently, the President sent Dulles on a visit to the area in May, 1953. Dulles reported that the United States should pay more attention to South Asia, which had been neglected in the postwar years as America concentrated on Europe. Although Dulles's visit to India and his talks with Nehru helped clear up misunderstandings, Dulles did not expect any long-term change in Indian policies. In December, 1953, Eisenhower asked Nixon to visit South and Southeast Asian countries.²⁹

Advising Prime Minister Nehru of Nixon's visit Eisenhower wrote that the purpose of the trip was to allow Nixon to "familiarize himself with conditions in a vast and critically

important part of the world." He added that Nixon's trip to India would be of particular importance "because of India's growing responsibilities and influence in world affairs." Eisenhower suggested that increased understanding between the United States and India was of primary importance. Commenting on the differences between the two countries, he added that "no two free men, much less two free nations, can be expected always to view every problem in the same light."³⁰

The talks between Nehru and Nixon were described as "completely friendly, cordial and frank." The Christian Science Monitor reported that Nehru ruled out the possibility of "any closer Indian-American political alignment."³¹ He later wrote Eisenhower that India wanted peace and desired to cooperate with America, but had no inclination to get involved in the Cold War struggles. Nehru stated that "having achieved independence after long years of struggle, we consider it our primary task to preserve our freedom and bring the benefits of that freedom to our people. We are at present engaged in this great adventure which absorbs our mind and energy."³²

With Nehru having rejected an American alliance and Pakistan anxious to enter an arrangement with the United States, Nixon recommended a military aid program for Pakistan. He told a meeting of the National Security Council that "Pakistan is a country I would like to do everything for. The people have less complexes than the Indians. . . . It will be disastrous if the Pakistan aid does not go through." He acknowledged that

Pakistan would not become Communist even in the absence of the
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American aid.

On December 16, 1953, the National Security Council discussed military assistance to Pakistan. Nixon, on the basis of his recent talks with Nehru, confirmed that the Indian prime minister strongly opposed the extension of United States military help to Pakistan. The vice-president held that it "would be a fatal mistake to back down on this program solely because of Nehru's objections. Such a retreat would cost us our hold on Pakistan and on many other areas in the Near East and Africa." He added that the professed reason for Nehru's opposition was that Pakistan might "use its added strength in [the] Kashmir dispute, or even resort to measures against India itself." Nixon argued the the real reason Nehru opposed the aid program was his fear that "by building up Pakistan, Nehru's leadership in Asia and portions of Africa would be challenged. . . . He does not wish to lose this position of leadership. . . . If we at this point back down on our program of assistance to Pakistan, we can count on losing most of the
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Asian-Arab countries to the neutralist bloc."

During the next meeting of the NSC Nixon elaborated on the reasons for Nehru's dislike of the proposed military aid to Pakistan. Dwelling on Nehru's fears, Nixon said:

It is a threat to neutralist theory and a threat to Nehru's own thirst for power over Southeast Asia, the Near East, and Africa. He is a great leader for India in India. . . . I think Nehru likes nobody but Nehru, but that may be a prejudiced opinion. I cannot

overemphasize that a policy of flattery is a great mistake. This should be reversed and changed. If we do not give aid to Pakistan, we've got to find a way not to give it without giving Nehru the victory.³⁵

A decision to give aid was not taken immediately. On January 5, 1954, Eisenhower "agreed in principle to proceed with the military aid to Pakistan, subject, however, to our capacity to present this in a reasonable way, which would allay the apprehension of reasonable people that we are trying to help Pakistan against India." The State Department suggested that aid should be presented as part of a regional security pact.³⁶

A State Department study conducted prior to the decision to grant military aid to Pakistan suggested that India would not compromise her independence and make major concessions to the Communist side, nor would India's indignation over American aid cause major alteration of Indian foreign policies. The study concluded that "as long as India continues its basic policy of independence and nonalignment in the Cold War, it has little additional room for maneuver."³⁷

The professed objective of the military build up of Pakistan was to contain global Communism, but according to an American journalist, Selig Harrison, who was writing in Harpers, Nixon's off-the-record comments indicated that the military alliance sought to build a "counterforce to Nehru's neutralism in the Indian leader's backyard." Nixon's voice was powerful in the decision to help Pakistan militarily. Ralph

Toledano in his biography of Nixon asserted that the vice-president recommended aid not for its defense value, but as a "counterforce to the confirmed neutralism of Jawaharlal Nehru's India."³⁹

Ayub Khan, the Pakistani leader, later noted in his memoirs that Pakistan was not motivated by any anti-Communist policies in seeking American aid.⁴⁰ Military assistance, he maintained, was only expected as a "deterrent force" against India.⁴¹ Explaining Pakistan's participation in various military alliances, Ayub Khan wrote that India's hostility made it inevitable for Pakistan to seek allies to secure Pakistan's interests.⁴² He added that the Indian factor determined Pakistan's membership in CENTO. Ayub Khan observed that "the objectives which Western powers wanted the Baghdad Pact to serve were quite different from the objectives we had in mind. But we made . . . [no] secret of our intentions or interests."⁴³

India's foreign secretary Subimal Dutt observed that India viewed the American military alliance with Pakistan as an attempt to establish a balance between India and Pakistan.⁴⁴ India's ambassador to Russia, K. P. S. Menon, described military aid to Pakistan as an attempt to "drive a wedge between two sister states in the subcontinent which, though politically divided, has been [sic] trying to evolve a common outlook on international affairs."⁴⁵ Nehru strongly opposed American military aid to Pakistan because he regarded

it as directed against India's nonalignment and against her refusal to accept America's offer of joint leadership in the region. Moreover, it was viewed as a Western attempt to bring colonialism once more into the area through the back door while bringing the Cold War to India's borders. On November 12, 1953, while commenting on American plans to arm Pakistan, Nehru wrote:

In effect Pakistan becomes practically a colony of the United States. . . . The United States imagine by this policy they have completely outflanked India's so called neutralism and will thus bring India to her knees. Whatever the future may hold, this is not going to happen. The result of all this will be an extreme dislike of the United States in India. As it is our relations are cool. 46

Although this coolness in relations concerned both countries there was little effort to improve relations. Three factors contributed to this situation: (1) India's action of shipping thorium nitrate to Red China which violated a provision of the American government's Battle Act of 1951 that provided for termination of aid to countries selling strategic materials to Communist powers; (2) protracted negotiations by the United States for the purchase of thorium nitrate from India; and (3) disagreements over the renewal of the 1946 air transportation agreement between India and America. All three issues were ultimately resolved, but coming as they did in the wake of an American decision to supply military assistance to Pakistan, they strained Indo-American relations.

Attempting to improve relations President Eisenhower sent Nehru a personal letter on November 30, 1954. Eisenhower praised Nehru for his efforts to promote world peace and suggested that differences in policies need not come in the way of good relations. He wrote:

The policies of states vary as their views concerning their security requirements differ and as their peculiar circumstances warrant. This is natural and proper. I know India is confronted with enormous problems, which sometimes cause you to see things differently from ourselves, but . . . you have my sympathy and understanding in the tasks that are before you. . . . I do not consider that our differences in approach constitute any bar to growing friendship and cooperation between our two countries. 48

Eisenhower's letter was the result of a realization that South Asia had become a "major battleground in the Cold War, and that area's importance in world councils was growing." A National Security Council policy statement of March 4, 1954, stressed India's importance to the United States and maintained that her pretensions to Asian leadership should be thwarted. It was decided that America should "seek to develop India's eventual participation in a common front against Communism." The policy paper suggested that America should accept India's nonalignment for the present and "use India as a mediator when it is in U. S. interests."⁴⁹

Between the Korean armistice of 1953 and the Suez-Hungarian crises of 1956, no major international development arose to becloud further Indo-American relations. Indo-China was relatively calm after the Geneva agreement of 1954, which

provided for an International Control Commission to supervise ceasefire. India was made the chairman of the commission, a move the United States opposed. According to Norman Palmer, an American scholar, America objected to India's participation because of her nonalignment that the United States suspected of being pro-Communist.

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Meanwhile, the Soviet Union found virtue in nonalignment. Khrushchev told the twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party that there existed "identity of views" between Russia and the nonaligned countries.

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According to M. S. Rajan, an Indian student of international affairs, with the European situation having come to a standstill, the Russians wanted to fight the Cold War on a different plane and at different locale. They selected Asia as the new battleground with goodwill tours and economic aid as their weapons. In June, 1955, Nehru visited the Soviet Union where he was given the "reddest of red carpet" welcomes. Nehru's visit was followed with visits

to India by N. A. Bulganin, the Russian premier, and Khrushchev in December, 1955. The Russian leaders were given a "tumultuous" welcome, inviting the ire of Western leaders. Commenting on their reaction Rajan has written that the press, diplomats, and leaders gained the impression that "India had compromised her policy of nonalignment."

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Many in the West were concerned with growing Indo-Soviet relations. Indira Gandhi, Nehru's daughter, in a letter to an American friend, Dorothy Norman, asserted that all fears of

India going to the Communist side were misplaced. She said that the Americans misread the Indian temperament, that Indians had not changed because of the Russians' visit, and that India's main concern was her domestic problems. As for the tremendous welcome given to the Russian leaders, Indians were reciprocating the warm welcome the Russians had given Nehru when he visited their country. She added that neither the Indians nor the Russians thought that India was aligning with the Communists. On the contrary Nehru used every opportunity to make India's position clear.

Russian attempts to cultivate Indian friendship only added to the American concern with the state of Indo-American affairs. Dulles wrote American ambassador John Sherman Cooper that India was a "difficult and sensitive problem." Cooper replied that despite India's nonalignment improvement was possible in the two state's relations. On December 28, 1955, Cooper in a letter to Dulles wrote:

Upon issues which we believe are vital to our security India takes positions which oppose our views, and when expressed in conjunction with the Soviets or Chinese Communists, it appears to support them before the world. . . . Nevertheless, I believe that he [Nehru] does not intend to depart from a position of nonalignment, and as long as he does not so intend I believe there is hope for the betterment of our relations. . . . I believe it of tremendous importance that a country of nearly 400 million people shall not become a Communist nation, and to put it more affirmatively, that it will be drawn to the West. 54

The possibility that India might one day abandon its non-alignment and join the Western camp was always at the bottom

of American policy towards India. In pursuit of this policy the United States sought to keep neutral India at least neutral. Consequently, America extended economic assistance to India and aid was not cut off even when political relations were at their nadir. The policymakers in Washington realized that denying aid would not soften India's nonalignment and that if neutrals went Communist bringing them back to the Western side would be impossible. As Hamilton Fish Armstrong suggested in Foreign Affairs, America hoped that one day the neutrals might be "provoked by the arrogance of a foe, as we were, into abandoning neutrality willy-nilly. That course and that possibility should be kept open."⁵⁵

With the Suez and Hungarian crises at hand, President Eisenhower believed that the moment had arrived when India was ready to give up nonalignment and join the Western camp. The United States, having taken an unequivocal stand on Anglo-French colonialist policies in the Middle East, and Russia, having soaked her hands in Hungarian blood, the United States hoped that Third World countries would look to her for leadership. Commenting on events in Hungary, Vice-President Nixon said that Hungary would have far reaching consequences for people all over the world. Russia's conduct in Hungary showed clearly what it meant to seek Communist friendship. Speaking of the effect the tragic fate of Hungary had on leaders everywhere, Nixon stated that "they know that Communists would bring with them, not the independence, the freedom, the

economic progress, and the peace that they promise, but Communist colonialism, slavery, economic exploitation, and war."⁵⁶

President Eisenhower expected that developments in Hungary might cause Nehru to think "about Soviet colonialism and imperialism in slightly different terms." Eisenhower suggested that it would be a good idea to draw Nehru into the Hungarian situation because he might "want to strengthen his ties with the West." In Eisenhower's opinion all that was required for Nehru to make the move was to give him "some face saving device."⁵⁷ In a letter to Dulles on October 29, 1956,

Eisenhower wrote:

I have been wondering whether the present situations in Eastern Europe and in the Middle East might not be creating in Nehru the feeling that he might, very wisely, begin to strengthen his ties with the West and separate himself more distinctly from the Communists. If he has any such feeling, of course, we would want to nurture and promote it.

It just might be possible that by writing him a very serious letter speaking of our deep regret that so many innocent people had to suffer at the hands of Russian imperialism and so forth, and without asking him to do anything except to counsel with us, we might make some progress in this direction.⁵⁸

When the Hungarian issue came before the U. N. General Assembly, India abstained on the United States resolution condemning Soviet conduct. The Arab and Indian positions on the resolution disappointed the State Department officials. Nixon found India's abstention inexplicable and said that if India had stood with the United States "Russia would be ruined in Asia." He suggested that Nehru's proposed visit to the United States should be expedited.⁵⁹

Eisenhower explained that Nehru's overriding concern was colonialism "by which he means the white over colored people." Nehru did not view Russian domination of East European countries as colonialism. In response to Nixon's suggestion of a Nehru visit to the United States, Eisenhower said that it would be difficult for Nehru to leave India at that time, but he agreed to extend the invitation.

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The failure of leaders in the Far East to consider Russian domination of East Europe as colonialism disappointed the president. Eisenhower expressed his unhappiness with the Asian leaders' positions on Hungary when he met the newly appointed British ambassador Sir Anthony Caccia on November 5, 1956. The president was baffled "that the Russians, as cruel and brutal as they are, can get away with murder, domination etc. However, if we breach the smallest courtesy, the whole world is aflame." He explained that the high standard of living the West had achieved created "unconscious jealousy on the part of the others."

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In fact, Eisenhower had doubts about the correctness of the American policy towards Hungary. He told Dulles that "we have excited Hungarians for all these years, & now [we are] turning our backs on them when they are in a jam." Dulles strongly disagreed and asserted that the United States was always against violent rebellions by the captive people of Eastern Europe and added that only the British and the French

would think that the United States turned her back on the
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Hungarians.

Notwithstanding these doubts about the correctness of America's own policy and the criticism of Indian and other Arab-Asian policies on Hungary, America's leaders believed that the tragic events in Hungary demonstrated to nonaligned nations "why United States believes so strongly in collective security." Nixon said that "to protect weaker nations from a fate similar to that of Hungary" the United States entered into alliances. He added that Eastern bloc countries that joined Russia's alliance system were not free, but states that joined Western alliances "have found that their indepen-
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dence has in no way been compromised by this association."

The United States regarded nonalignment as a way station to alignment with either the East or the West. Nixon, speaking at the dinner of the National Automobile show in New York, suggested that the "struggle for [the] world will be finally determined by what happens to millions of people now neutral who are trying to decide whether they will aline themselves with the Communist nations or the free world." He added that if Americans "practice at home what we preach abroad, then
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these nations could be won for the West."

Consequently, Nehru's visit to the United States in December, 1956, was expected to produce changes in the direction of India's foreign policy. The American embassy in New

Delhi in a cablegram on December 7, 1956, predicted that a time had arrived "which if seized and exploited, can give us much firmer anti-Communist and anti-Red China counterpoise in India. We can, as it were, redress our emphasis in Europe and on the periphery of Asia by more firmly consolidating our position with the Indian land power."⁶⁵

A briefing paper jointly prepared by Senator John S. Cooper (Republican, Kentucky) and the embassy staff in New Delhi, maintained that Nehru was more amenable to U. S. leadership than ever before because of recent international developments. The paper stated that because of the Suez crisis and consequent set back to India's ties with Britain, India stood almost alone in the international community. Hungary having damaged the prestige of the U. S. S. R., a Russian alliance was not at all attractive. Moreover, the "uneasy political, social and economic rivalry with Red China" was having its effects on India. The domestic economic crisis, the briefing paper said, already belied the assertion "that India can achieve a democratic Asian counterpoise to Red China without resort to authoritarian techniques which could progressively shift India into the Communist orbit."⁶⁶

Cooper and Bartlett, who prepared the briefing paper, argued that if the economic crisis was not solved it could erode India's democratic institutions and faith in Nehru's leadership. To avoid such a development India needed economic

assistance. They advised Eisenhower that he should frankly inform Nehru that no long term economic aid could be expected unless it could be proved to the Americans that "India and U. S. are somewhat closer together on political problems and objectives."⁶⁷

A State Department briefing paper on Nehru's visit listed the American objectives in his trip as follows:

1. To develop goodwill and increase the Prime Minister's understanding of our foreign policies: These include our support of the standards of international conduct laid down in the U. N. Charter and firm opposition to the Communists disregard of those standards; our conception of the role of collective security, including regional security; our conviction that Communist China has not purged itself of aggression against the U. N. or demonstrated its willingness to abide by the Charter; and our disarmament policy which is both sincere and sound.
2. To bring about broad and significant areas of agreement between the United States and India. . . .
3. To "agree to disagree" with Prime Minister on those specific foreign policy issues such as Goa, Kashmir and the United States military aid to Pakistan. . . .
4. To . . . make . . . [Nehru] feel he has been consulted on the problems discussed. . . .
5. To establish closer personal relationship between the President and the Prime Minister. . . . 68

Nehru visited the United States between December 16 and 20, 1956, and held extensive talks with Eisenhower on bilateral issues and international events. Nehru's visit did not change India's position on the East-West conflict. He and Eisenhower agreed to disagree, and thus the talks failed to produce "broad and significant agreement" between the two leaders. The communique issued at the end of the visit, however, stated:

The talks confirmed the broad area of agreement between India and the United States, which are bound together in strong ties of friendship deriving from their common

objectives and their adherence to the highest principle of free democracy. The principles and policies the Government of India and the United States have evolved on the basis of respect for the dignity of man and of the need to improve the welfare of the individual.⁶⁹

Contrary to American expectations Hungary did not produce converts to the Western camp from the nonaligned countries. Suez, in spite of America's stand on the side of Egypt, failed to give the West any advantage with Egypt in the Middle East. According to Cecil V. Crabb, an American student of Afro-Asian nonalignment, Western attempts to punish Nasser for his non-alignment only enhanced Russian influence in Arab countries. Failure of open opposition to nonalignment prompted the United States to adopt a new attitude towards neutrals.⁷⁰

The Soviet Union, as mentioned earlier, having given up her hostile attitude towards the nonaligned, began to court them assiduously. The new Russian tactic was adopted soon after the Bandung conference of Afro-Asian statesmen in 1955. India's ambassador to Moscow observed that the Soviet government systematically courted the countries that attended the Bandung conference.⁷¹ Moscow made efforts to befriend the neutrals with economic and military assistance. V. P. Dutt, an Indian scholar, has argued that Russia by supporting non-alignment sought to keep the neutrals from joining the Western alliance. He further pointed out that Russians soon found out to America's chagrin that nonalignment's anti-colonialism could be used against the West. Consequently, Russia supported the neutral nations on colonial issues at the United Nations.

In addition she intensified her cultural and propaganda work
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in the nonaligned countries.

The launching of the satellite Sputnik, in October, 1957, enhanced Russia's prestige in Third World countries.

Eisenhower noted in his memoirs that the Russian scientific feat "precipitated a wave of apprehension throughout the free world. Newspaper, magazine, radio, and television commentators joined the man in the street in expression of dismay over this proof that Russians . . . have even 'beaten' the United States in a spectacular scientific competition." The failure of an American attempt to launch a satellite added to the public's uncertainty about American defense preparedness. Success of the Soviet Union with the Sputnik, Eisenhower commented, gave the impression that the Soviets were ahead of America in all fields. Sputnik gave the Russians an additional weapon in
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their propaganda against the West.

America viewed Russian attempts to cultivate friendly relations with nonaligned leaders with suspicion and concern believing that the Soviets were trying to subvert uncommitted nations. Russian conduct in the nonaligned countries prompted the United States to take diplomatic efforts to counteract Russian influence. S. P. Varma, an Indian scholar, has observed that "this change in attitude on the part of the great powers was not so much a result of a fuller appreciation of the merits of the policy as one of accepting the facts of the
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situation and consequently adopting a new tactical line."

Nonaligned leaders went to Washington and Eisenhower visited India and several other Asian countries in December, 1959. This visit was indicative of the new attitude towards neutrals because in 1955, when Nehru invited Eisenhower to India, the president had declined. In his reply then he had written:

You were good enough to suggest that I might visit India as your Government's guest. I can assure you that there are few things which I would rather do. Sentiment carries me far toward acceptance of your invitation. However, I have after deliberation concluded that I cannot accept because that would open up a new scope of responsibility for the President which could not be adequately discharged with those already appertain to the office. . . . None of these can be delegated. . . . This characteristic of our Government has created a situation such that Presidents of the United States have never left this hemisphere except for matters of utmost emergency relating to war and peace. Indeed, it would not be compatible with our form of Government for me to get into the practice of making state visits abroad, however, personally tempting this prospect is. 75

The new conciliatory attitude towards neutrals resulted from a feeling that the Communists were making an all out effort to win uncommitted nations. If the Communists succeeded in capturing India and other parts of Asia, Nixon argued that the "balance of power in the world in people and resources will be on their side, and the free world eventually will be forced to its knees."⁷⁶

Assistant Secretary of State Robert Murphy suggested that the short-term Russian objective in the uncommitted nations was to disrupt free world cooperation. The long-range Soviet aim was to subjugate underdeveloped areas. He added that they

hoped to achieve this by taking advantage of "local disputes and economic problems and the use of trade and technical assistance."⁷⁷

Murphy argued that as collective resistance offered by free world nations checked postwar Soviet expansionism, the Russians resorted to economic penetration of weaker countries. He said that it was essential for Americans to understand how to deal with this new threat. The pressure for economic development among nations was great, and the Russians were trying to take advantage of economic backwardness. Murphy added that American interests necessitated the continued independence of neutral nations. He concluded that it was in the national interests of the U. S. to help these nations remain free.⁷⁸

This shift in superpower attitudes towards neutrals was clearly visible in Russo-American dealings with India. Every attempt was made to woo India, and the quantum of aid increased more than ever before. Commenting on the super power rivalry to win India, the New York Times wrote that "a bloodless battle between Russians and ourselves is going on within the world's largest population mass next to China--the people of India."⁷⁹

India was following a democratic path in raising the living standards of her people. Being the most populous non-Communist country in Asia, the West believed that it was essential that India succeed in this effort. Senator Cooper suggested that a "watchful Asia and Africa . . . {would||

compare results in free India and Communist China to see whether living conditions of millions of people are improved through India's voluntary methods or through coercion of Chinese Communism, backed by massive Soviet aid." The argument used by most official advocates of aid to India was that since China was being helped by the Russians, the United States should help India.⁸⁰

The Dulles-Eisenhower diplomacy sought to contain India's influence. Her exclusion from the Korean political conference, opposition to India's appointment as chairman of the International Control Commission for Indo-China, objection to India's presence at the proposed big power summit in 1958, and, above all, the decision to build up Pakistan against India were all responses to India's nonalignment. America attempted to bring India into the Western alliance but failed. It was only towards the end of Eisenhower's presidency that America's open opposition to India's nonalignment changed. Dislike for and distrust of nonalignment continued, but at the same time the United States believed that if India did not align with the West she would at least remain a neutral. America extended economic aid to India to influence her foreign policy or at least to keep her uncommitted and counter Russian attempts to cultivate her friendship with aid and trade.

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At the end of the session, a delegate who had voted against India was asked what his reason had been. He grabbed his wrist, gave his arm a twist, and walked away. The little pantomime expressed a fact that was common knowledge at the U. N. last week; the United States had brought heavy pressure to block the resolution on India.

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CHAPTER X

INDIA'S NONALIGNMENT POLICY AND ECONOMIC AID

Ironically, vigorous opposition to India's nonalignment did not deter the United States from extending economic assistance. The American aid to underdeveloped areas like India and Burma prompted the Russian prime minister Nikita Khrushchev to suggest that "you should thank us Russians not only for the aid that we give you, but also thank us for the aid the Americans give you because they themselves say that they would not give this aid if it was not for us Russians."¹ Khrushchev's statement was an exaggeration, but Russian efforts to woo India with trade and aid did contribute to the volume of aid given by Americans. India began receiving American aid in June, 1951, two years before Russia extended help. America started its program to influence India's foreign policy and keep her democratic institutions intact. Of course, in these years of the Cold War the Americans were interested in preventing an Indian alignment with the Communist bloc.

Initially, the question of American economic aid was considered in relationship to the Korean war. Concerned about Communist aggression in Korea, the State Department felt that important areas of the world should be strengthened to meet immediate and future emergencies. Assistant Secretary of State

George McGhee wrote Ambassador Loy Henderson (1948-51) in New Delhi that in view of the events in Korea the State Department was considering measures to strengthen important areas of the world that could play a key role in present or future exigencies.²

Economic aid to India was one course of action that the department proposed. McGhee told Henderson that before making a decision the State Department wanted his views on the subject of aid. McGhee stated that the "purpose of aid will be to strengthen orientation of key areas to Western Democracies and assist them [in] build[ing] economic and indirectly military strength. Justification to Congress and U S public will be based on necessity [and] encourage populations [to] defend independence and build defensive and offensive forces against Commie threats."³

Henderson discussed American economic aid for India with Deputy Prime Minister Sardar Patel. Henderson told Patel that aid could come only if "Governmental officials, businessmen and [the] general public of the U S should become convinced of the inherent friendliness of India towards U S and of the desire of the people and the Government of India for loyal cooperation with the U S in world affairs." With the creation of a cordial atmosphere "the movement of capital towards India in the form of private investment or Governmental assistance would, in my opinion, follow as a matter of course unless a continued deterioration in the world situation would act as a

deterrent." Henderson explained that his government did not expect India to follow blindly the U. S. on all issues. In his opinion what was wanted was a "higher degree of understanding of the motives responsible for our various foreign and international policies, and a greater readiness to give us credit for sincerity in the conduct of our international relations."⁴

The United States considered the continued existence of a non-Communist government in India in America's interests. She wanted to see an India that was politically stable and economically progressive. A State Department policy statement maintained:

We desire also access to the resources and markets of India and the development of an attitude which would tend the Government of India to cooperate in denying resources to Soviet Union and its satellites . . . and allowing us the use of its facilities if necessary in the event of war.⁵

In order to secure India's cooperation with the West, the continuance of the Nehru government, which "was more favorably disposed toward the U S than any probable successor," was deemed necessary.

State realized that Nehru could stay in power only if the economic condition of the Indian people improved. India's economic backwardness was reason for concern because it could result in political unrest. Therefore, it concluded that American aid was necessary to prevent political instability. The State Department believed that, with China having gone

Communist and with the Soviet Union sitting along the Indian border, "India has become a pivotal state in the non-Communist Asia by virtue of its relative power, stability and influence." Consequently, it was important for the U. S. to keep India from becoming a Communist state.⁶

The wheat loan of 1951 was the first U. S. economic aid for India. Because of India's neutral stand on the Korean war, the Truman administration, with a view to influence India's international conduct, wanted to give the emergency assistance as a grant. The Congress was unwilling and agreed to extend aid as a loan. The food grain loan improved Indo-American relations, but India's criticism of American foreign policy continued.

Although Ambassador Chester Bowles (1951-53) vigorously argued for an aid package styled on the Marshall Plan, the wheat loan did not lead to such an assistance program. Bowles believed that any attempt to make India align with the West against China would result in alienating India. He suggested that America should deal with India in patience and with respect and accept her as the most important Asian nation. Any attempt to impose American views on India, he warned, was bound to fail. Bowles argued that "for the time being we should be less concerned with Indian statements and attitudes, and more concerned with crucial importance of her present Government's efforts to build an economically stable, confident,

democratic society. India's success will buttress every free Government in Asia."⁷

Fearing Republican opposition to a Truman sponsored aid program, Bowles later argued that because of the magnitude of the nation building task India faced, there should be bipartisan American policy towards that country. It would be difficult to predict the outcome of American efforts in India. America must understand the various forces at work in Asia and seek to strengthen the forces of freedom and democracy. Bowles argued that strengthening India was important because the Communists attempted to project themselves as the torch bearers of revolutionary change in Asia. He regarded it unwise to belittle the effectiveness of Communist propaganda, adding that they had concentrated their attention on India because of her strategic position, her economic and industrial potential, and her large population.⁸

Bowles asserted that if Asia became Communist it would "mean not only a drastic shift in physical power between the Soviet bloc and Western democracies, but the broad deterioration of democratic morals in all parts of the world." If, on the other hand, the Indian experiment succeeded and other Asian countries were encouraged to follow a course that suited their interests and helped by "understanding policies on the part of the West," that would help swing the balance of power in favor of the free world. In order to achieve this shift,⁹ Bowles counselled imaginative American policies in Asia.

The State Department received Bowles' arguments with considerable interest but did not believe that Congress would approve assistance on a scale that Bowles recommended. In anticipation of congressional opposition, State informed him that aid such as he proposed would be hard to come by. The department did not deny that aid was necessary to "prevent subversion of a strategic region containing nearly half a billion people and natural resources which play an important part in our defense program."¹⁰

Undaunted this lack of enthusiasm, Bowles appealed directly to President Truman. He told the president that imagined congressional opposition, should not stand in the way of bold action and that if the "Republican party refuses to support this program for India then the basic political motivation and dishonesty of their criticism of past Chinese policy will be dramatically evident to all concerned."¹¹ As a result of Bowles's approach Truman raised the amount of aid proposed for India.

Despite Truman's request, Congress drastically reduced the amount of aid earmarked for India. In June, 1952, Bowles returned to Washington to plead his case before the Congress and the president. He achieved nothing save a promise from Truman that "we will be working at it as long as I am here."¹²

In October, 1952, Bowles wrote Secretary of State Dean Acheson a letter discussing in detail the need for American

help to insure Indian democracy. In his reply of January, 1953, Acheson answered:

In the best interests of the United States, India must be encouraged and helped to remain in the democratic free world. Such encouragement can best be given by an acceleration in the rate of Indian economic development, with the consequent rise in the standard of living of the Indian people; to help accomplish this, substantial funds must be made available in the next few years from the United States for technical and economic assistance. . . . Our duty to the American people requires us to take a very positive step to avert India's being lost to the free world through default.¹³

Acheson promised to make available Bowles' letter to new Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.

Despite the State Department's sympathetic attitude towards aid, many members of Congress still objected. Congressman John Martin Vorys (Republican, Ohio) opposed Bowles' billion dollar aid program for India; Congressman E. E. Cox (Democrat, Georgia) objected to aid to a country "where Russian influence holds them within a firm, iron grip." Vorys in general disagreed with the Cox's assessment but did mention that India's representative in the U. N. "was not neutral, he was hostile, and at times insulting to my country and to me, and voted with the Soviets."¹⁴

Although critical of India's nonalignment, the Truman administration extended economic aid. In 1951 the U. S. provided a wheat loan of \$190 million. Later the U. S. provided technical and economic assistance to India for various projects. In 1952 America loaned \$52 million and in 1953, \$44 million. The criticism that the administration had to face in the wake

of the Communist takeover of China was such that President Truman was unwilling to risk the chance of India going the way of Communist China. Moreover, once China had become Communist, there was the desire to keep India as a counterweight against her. India's unwillingness to support America's stand against Communist China made America more determined in her opposition to nonalignment.¹⁵

Although opposed to India's noalignment, President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles believed that India should be given economic assistance. Arguing that freedom accepts diversity, Dulles suggested that India's foreign policy orientation should not prevent the United States from tendering assistance. Noting that India was carrying out an experiment in free government, unlike neighboring China where internal policies were repressive and undemocratic, Dulles said that it was in the interest of the United States that India's five year plans succeed.¹⁶ Other State Department officials expressed similar views on aid. Assistant Secretary of State John D. Jernegan, for example, said:

What the Government of the United States wants above all is a free, independent, and democratic India. If it is an India which also agrees with the American outlook on international affairs, so much the better. We shall certainly work hard to reconcile our respective points of view, but it is the freedom, the independence, and the democracy of India that we consider essential and that we shall strive to support to the best of our ability.¹⁷

Early in 1954 the Battle Act became an issue between India and America. An annual report of the Technical

Cooperation Administration in India noted that the Battle Act "appeared as an issue on which the entire United States aid program to India might well have foundered." India's decision to ship thorium nitrate to Red China was against a provision of the Battle Act that provided for the termination of American aid to countries shipping strategic materials to Communist countries. United States embassy officials in New Delhi demanded that the thorium shipment to the Peking government be off-loaded at Colombo, Ceylon. India refused to submit to the American demand, maintaining that off-loading the thorium nitrate would be contrary to her stated policy that prohibited destination discrimination. India also contended that unloading would invite public attention and "reveal the existence of political strings to U S aid," that would be embarrassing to the government of India.

Ambassador George V. Allen (1953-54) met Nehru to warn him of the consequences of shipping a strategic material to China. Nehru told Allen that India "would never submit to derogation of its national sovereignty in permitting the United States law to determine with whom and in what commodities India could trade." He added that "India had never agreed to attachment of political strings to aid and repeated that he could not accept conditions of Battle Act as binding on India." He expressed inability to off-load the commodity shipped.

Officials of India's Ministry of External Affairs hinted that the government would enforce control over future shipment of strategic materials but said an open ban was difficult to make. The Americans for their part wanted a written promise but India was prepared to give only oral assurance. Deteriorating relations between India and America concerned the State Department. As a result it decided to accept Indian assurances²⁰ and not insist on written agreements about future shipments. Secretary of State Dulles in a telegram to the American ambassador in New Delhi said:

In addition to probable effect on mutual understanding and regard are the other unfortunate results which would likely take place in connection with discussions of Asian problems, U N debates and resolutions, and India's work as chairman NNRC. In fact we are likely in a position, as a result recent vote in U N on India's participation in Korean political conference, that our action terminating aid would be interpreted as punitive not only in India but elsewhere.²¹

As a result aid was not cut off and India did not ship any more thorium nitrate to China.

Meanwhile, Russian economic activities in India caused concern to American diplomats. In a confidential paper prepared by Ambassador Allen, he noted that there "has been increasing evidence that Soviet Russia is attempting to penetrate India by economic aid and technical assistance as well as traditional methods." Allen argued that "Soviet bloc countries have adopted a new weapon and that we must be prepared to thwart its success as we are prepared to thwart their military capabilities. This would seem to require a 'new look' at

our economic arsenal and our foreign economic strategy." He added that even if economic aid was a tactical weapon of the Communists it was in American interests to help India economically because "the free world cannot afford to lose India with all the consequences which might follow."²²

In response to the Russian economic offensive in underdeveloped countries, British prime minister Anthony Eden and President Eisenhower issued the Washington Declaration on February 1, 1956. The declaration made clear Western intentions to help countries that needed help. Expressing determination to extend support Eden and Eisenhower declared :

Political independence cannot alone assure men and nations full opportunities to pursue happiness and fulfill their highest destiny. There is likewise need for economic sustenance and growth. . . . We seek through technical assistance, the Colombo plan and other programs we support, to help economic progress in the less developed countries and to raise the living standards of their peoples. . . . The purpose is not to dilute, but to enrich and secure their freedom. 23

When the second five year plan ran into financial difficulties, India sought American help. Foreign exchange reserves were inadequate to meet the needs of the plan and India needed one billion dollars to cover deficits. Dulles recommended that India should receive substantially large amounts of aid, arguing that if the second plan failed it would cause grave consequences for India and the free world. He cited a national intelligence estimate that concluded:

[Failure of the plan would] hasten the disintegration of the Congress Party and threaten the continuance of

democratic government. There is no other coherent opposition force except the Communists and they would stand to make important political gains from the collapse of the Congress Party. Success with the plan would probably permit the Congress Party to retain power in the 1962 election and would provide the kind of environment in which a moderate conservative party could emerge when and if present Congress Party breaks up. 24

Dulles pointed out that if the plan failed the Communists would have an opportunity to come to power in India. He added that the "loss of this area would undermine the West's position throughout free Asia. . . . This is the risk that the United States would run in not extending adequate assistance to India."²⁵

President Eisenhower was sympathetic to India's financial needs. In October, 1957, when India's finance minister T. T. Krishnamachari visited Eisenhower, he was told that the success achieved during the first plan was admirable and that India should go ahead with the next plan. Eisenhower reminded Krishnamachari that it was not easy to impress upon the Congress and the people how important it was for the United States to help other countries that needed help and added that India's "success was not purely a national affair for India,²⁶ but that it would affect the whole free world."

America's new Ambassador in New Delhi, Ellsworth Bunker (1957-61), advised the president that "we have come to a moment in history when it is within our power significantly to influence the choice that a great part of the world's population will make between the democratic and totalitarian way

of life." He said that with adequate help from America India would follow the democratic path. Bunker added that "if this takes place in India the rest of . . . uncommitted Asia will follow her example. I am satisfied that India is a good risk and that the money will come back to us with interest."²⁷

Foreign aid was unpopular with the American people, the press, and Congress. Successive administrations had difficulty selling the Indian aid package. Proposals for aid led to criticism of India's policies. Congressional critics of Indian policies were against aid. In 1953, during the first session of the Eighty-Third Congress, Congressman Alvin Bentley (Republican, Michigan), who was critical of Nehru's statements, said:

We can understand the desire of that government to be neutral in the Cold War. Perhaps we can realize this desire to have their Chinese neighbors admitted to membership in the United Nations. . . . We might even perceive the reason behind the criticism of the United Nations for maintaining the struggle in Korea.

But when, in return for the generous and unstinting help we have given to the Government of India over the last few years, the head of that Government criticizes our President for his so called military mentality . . . it is too much . . . American people will not stand for an indefinite policy of tremendous foreign assistance, especially when our thanks for such aid only consists in slanderous remarks concerning our chief executive.²⁸

Although opposed to India's nonalignment, many congressmen believed that giving economic aid to her was in the best interests of the United States. In 1954, during the second session of the Eighty-Third Congress, Congresswoman Frances P. Bolton (Republican, Ohio) acknowledged that the statements

that India's leaders made shocked her. She considered those statements as attempt to play "upon the prejudices and fears of their people." She argued that most of Asia looked to India for leadership. Since the United States did not want Red China become the spokesman for Asia, it was necessary to help India develop economically.²⁹

During the debate on the Mutual Security Act of 1956, Senator Henry Styles Bridges (Republican, New Hampshire) opposed aid to India because of nonalignment. He said that "foreign aid, military, economic and technical, is an instrument of foreign policy. Our aid should be employed to build and nurture those allies and alliances necessary to protect us and to assure our safety." He declared that neutrality was untenable in the contest between Russia and America because the rivalry was not over dynasties or colonies or territories. He added that "it is at this point that I lose patience with those nations which are not only neutralist in their military position, but insist on neutralism in their moral position. I know no worse offender than Nehru, who proclaims himself the moralist of Asia."³⁰

Senator Howard A. Smith (Republican, New Jersey) argued that it was unwise to deny India aid because she was neutral. He said that "a nation which wants to be neutral, in the sense that it does not want to join any military alliance with other countries, should be entitled to take that position. . . . I think we would be making a mistake if we were to say,

unless you join our military alliance we cannot give you any
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further aid."

In the late fifties Senator John F. Kennedy (Democrat, Massachusetts) was a vigorous supporter of aid for India. He suggested long-term assistance and argued that there was a struggle between India and Red China for Asian leadership. If India failed to make economic growth, her role as a counterweight to China would be lost and "Communism would have won its greatest bloodless victory." Kennedy proposed that the U. S. should be willing to join the other Western nations in "serious long term loans . . . designed to enable India to
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overtake the challenge of Communist China."

Despite the opposition of several congressmen to extending economic aid to India, she was given help. As a result, between 1951 and 1960, U. S. economic assistance to India totalled \$3,682.5 million. The aid consisted of both loans and grants. While grants were gifts, loans involved repayment. Grants amounted to \$1,072.2 million, whereas the total amount of loans granted was \$2,510.3 million. In 1958 America prompted the World Bank to form an Aid India Consortium that helped underwrite India's foreign exchange needs during the third five year plan. Thus the Indian aid program begun during the Truman presidency grew in size under President Eisenhower and became an important factor in India's developmental efforts.

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CONCLUSION: INDIA, AMERICA AND NONALIGNMENT

India and the United States since Indian independence have had a love-hate relationship, a condition described by an Indian journalist as the affairs of "unfriendly friends." Although the United States strongly resented India's international policies and pronouncements, she was unwilling to let India, a potentially powerful country, become an ally of the Soviet Union. India, suspicious of both the super powers, sought to maintain her independence and freedom of action within the limitations imposed by the the political, diplomatic, economic, and military pressures that the super powers exerted.

Although commercial contacts between India and America dated back to 1785, and an American consul was appointed in India as early as 1792, political relations between the two countries began only in 1946. The United States had shown considerable interest in India even before her independence. During these years of the British Raj in India, there was no need for an American policy towards India.

More than 100,000 American soldiers stationed in India during the World War Two increased American interest. Washington regarded India as important for the successful completion of the war against Japan. When, without consulting the nationalist leaders, the British government declared India

a party to the war, the Indian National Congress refused to support British war efforts. India's refusal was a source of concern to President Franklin D. Roosevelt. His interest in Indian political developments generated considerable goodwill for the United States among Indians. The support of noted Americans like Wendell Willkie, Louis Fischer, Henry Wallace, and Pearl S. Buck, for India's nationalist movement enhanced India's appreciation of America. Nevertheless, American knowledge of India and India's knowledge of America were limited.

Both in India and America the early images of each other were unrealistic. According to an Indian journalist T. V. Kunhikrishnan, Americans "have cherished a romantic image of India--the image of an exotic land of maharajas, magicians and mystics, of a caste-ridden, poverty stricken, backward people." On the other side of the globe, the Indians were equally unenlightened in their view of America and Americans. In their mental picture America was a "land of crime and sex, of romance and adventure, of the Wild West, of unlimited opportunities." ¹ Despite the existence of these images, there was considerable goodwill between the two peoples on the eve of Indian independence.

India and America failed to turn this sentiment into a sound relationship. The initial emotional attachment soon gave way to disillusionment. In the escalating power bloc rivalry of the post war years, India believed that her interests would be best served by a policy of nonalignment.

India's decision to follow an independent course was unwelcome in the United States, where many people believed that the Russian policies imperiled free world security.

The United States believed that India's nonalignment was a cover for the formation of an Asian bloc under her leadership and was aimed at the exclusion of Western influence from Asia. The United States was concerned that India's stand against military alliances and her attempt to create an area of peace would undermine Western collective security measures and destroy free world unity. Disunity in democracy's ranks, America claimed, would expose weaknesses and invite Communist exploitation. America also believed that nonalignment would cause factionalism at the U. N. and that the Soviet Union would take advantage of it. Therefore, the United States strongly detested nonalignment.

In the United States nonalignment was often portrayed as neutrality. While part of this misrepresentation was the result of misunderstanding, much of it was deliberate. For example, a national intelligence report of June 30, 1953, showed that the State Department clearly understood the imperatives of India's nonalignment. The intelligence estimate stated:

India has pursued a policy of nonalignment in the struggle between the Soviet bloc and the West. . . . it has firmly dissociated itself from many of the diplomatic and military policies of the U S and U K, and has laid great stress on preserving its independence of judgment and action. It vigorously opposes Western domination over colonial areas and is a leader in the Arab-Asian bloc in

the U. N. It has also sought to reduce existing East-West tensions, which it fears may result in a war that would eventually engulf India. Indian efforts in these directions also reflect a desire to exercise leadership and influence in world affairs.

Indian leaders believe that India has little to gain by taking sides in the quarrels of the great powers and much to lose if the quarrels led to another world war. Although India's leaders generally recognize that Soviet policies are aggressive, they believe that under the present circumstances the subcontinent itself is not a likely target of Communist military aggression and that West overemphasizes the danger of such aggression elsewhere. . . . India will almost certainly maintain its present position of nonalignment in the East-West struggle, regardless of Western action, so long as it does not believe its own interests to be directly threatened.²

As early as May, 1951, Assistant Secretary of State George McGhee stated that India's nonalignment was the result of a desire for peace which could be used for economic and political development. He added that India believed in moral suasion in achieving her foreign policy objectives, whereas the United States sought to achieve them through collective security.³

India's nonalignment did not mean a fixed diplomatic middle course between Russia and America. India was nonaligned only on Cold War issues where super powers were directly involved, such as Korea, Hungary, and Berlin. On issues where American and Russian positions would have led to a world war, India sought to mediate the conflict. Where India's interests were not directly involved, decisions were taken on the merits of the issue, but when the issue concerned her, the decisions were made purely from the perspective of national interest. Consequently, in Korea and Hungary, India did not join either

of the two contending power blocs. During the Suez crisis which she considered as a case of colonial aggression, India stood solidly behind Egypt. On Kashmir, India refused to follow the U. N. directives that she felt were contrary to her national interests.

Initially, India was not opposed to defensive military arrangements like NATO, but when members of the organization, e. g., the Netherlands in Indonesia, used the protection it offered as a cover to further colonial interests, India objected. She opposed SEATO and CENTO because they threatened to infringe upon her area of peace, an area she defined as free of Cold War tensions, in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Pakistan's membership in them was another reason for opposition. India feared that military alliances would bring the Cold War to her borders.

The Russo-American explanation for the Cold War did not appeal to India. She rejected their assertions that international relations involved choosing between Moscow and Washington. India, prompted by a desire to preserve her newly won freedom and identity, decided to follow a third path in her diplomatic dealings. Freed from Western domination, India, inspired by visions of her past, was determined to secure her rightful place in the comity of nations. Alignment would have done damage to her plans for a major power status.

Between 1947, when India became independent, and 1949, when Communists came to power in China, the United States,

engrossed in European problems, did not give much attention to India and nonalignment. The defeat of Kuomintang forces in China turned America towards India. The United States sought to develop India as a "bulwark of democracy" against Chinese Communism. India rejected American overtures for an alliance and established diplomatic relations with Red China.

Resentment caused by India's recognition of Communist China turned into hostility with India's decision to remain neutral in the Korean War. As the number of Americans soldiers killed and wounded in Korea grew, America became bitter toward the countries that failed to assist United Nations efforts. Having refused to send troops to Korea, India adopted a posture at the U. N. that the United States considered pro-Communist. India's refusal to attend the Japanese peace conference in San Francisco or sign the peace treaty convinced the United States that India's nonalignment was unfriendly to her.

Faced with India's reluctance to follow America's lead and India's growing commitment to nonalignment, Washington decided to oppose neutralism. Various diplomatic and military measures that the Truman and Eisenhower administrations adopted sought to counter India's nonalignment by containing her influence. The American decision to strengthen Pakistan militarily against India was in response to her nonalignment. Although the Truman administration did not make a decision on military aid to Pakistan, it attempted to build up Pakistani

prime minister Liaquat Ali Khan as a great Asian leader against India's Jawaharlal Nehru.

The American leaders found Nehru a difficult man to deal with. The State Department held that "major obstacle to the improvement of Indo-United relations . . . [was] Nehru's own prejudiced attitude toward the United States." A State Department analysis of Nehru maintained:

As a socialist, he has deep-rooted suspicions of our capitalist economy and its intentions in Asia. As an Asian nationalist, he resents our support of European metropolitan powers which retain colonies in Asia. As leader of an impoverished people, he is aggrieved by our failure to offer large scale economic aid to his country. As a patrician Asian of some color, he is repelled by the existence of racial and color discrimination in the United States and fancies that this discrimination is reflected in our foreign policy. As a hypersensitive egoist, he is quick to take offense at our slights, real or imagined, and reluctant to appear subject to our influence.⁴

Secretary of State Dean Acheson, after meeting Nehru, wrote that "I was convinced that Nehru and I were not destined to have a pleasant personal relationship. . . . He was one of the most difficult men with whom I have ever to deal."⁵ Dulles considered Nehru as an "impractical statesman," even though he was realistic with regard to Indian needs and interests.⁶ Eisenhower observed that Nehru was an "inexplicable" and "occasionally exasperating personality."⁷

Suez and Hungary were two important international crises during the Eisenhower presidency. India's stand on Hungary drew American criticism. Although critical of Russian conduct in Hungary, India did not join the Western powers against

Russia in the United Nations votes. True to her record on condemnatory resolutions India abstained on such resolutions related to Hungary. There was one exception when she voted against a Pakistan-sponsored resolution that India felt had a direct bearing on her position in Kashmir. Eisenhower, wary of alienating India further, sought to make her an ally, but he failed.

Meanwhile, Russian efforts to cultivate the friendship of the uncommitted nations drew American attention. The United States suspected that Russia was trying to infiltrate and subvert the nonaligned nations with trade and aid. Consequently, there was a competition between the two super powers for India's favor. While both Russia and America wanted India as an ally, America hoped to keep India at least neutral.

It was with the advent of the Russians on the Indian scene that America softened her stand on nonalignment and adopted a flexible position that a nonaligned India was more acceptable than a Communist India. Until then, the United States was suspicious of the motives, intentions, and rationale behind nonalignment and was concerned that it operated against American security interests. To counteract Indian nonalignment Washington pursued a series of political, diplomatic, economic, and military measures. America refused to consider India as a major power and sought to exclude her from international conferences and from assuming international responsibilities. American measures were calculated to contain

India's growing influence and prestige in the international community. Cultivating Pakistani friendship with an attitude favorable to her on the Kashmir issue, America attempted to develop Pakistan as a spokesman for Asia. In order to strengthen Pakistan the United States extended military help to that country. This effort to maintain parity between India and Pakistan continued at least until 1971 when India defeated Pakistan during the Bangladesh war.

American attempts to direct India away from nonalignment having failed, she sought to keep India at least neutral. To facilitate this objective America extended generous economic assistance to India. Nevertheless, opposition to Indian non-alignment and efforts to undermine it continued. India's minister of state for foreign affairs Ram Nivas Mirdha observed in September, 1984, that the superpower opposition to nonaligned countries has "taken much more sinister dimensions. The designs remain the same, only the methodology has become more sophisticated."⁸

NOTES

¹ T. V. Kunhikrishnan, The Unfriendly Friends, India and America (Thompson, Connecticut: Interculture Associates, 1974), pp. 117-118.

² FRUS, 1952-54, XI, pt. 2, 1085-87.

³ George McGhee, "Tasks Confronting Indian Government," DSB, XXIV (May 15, 1951), pp. 892-93.

⁴ Memorandum, George McGhee to Dean Acheson, November 3, 1950, Analysis of Nehru's Attitude Toward the United States, General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, 611.91/ 11-350, National Archives, Washington, D. C.

⁵ Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1969), p. 336.

⁶ National Security Council Summaries, NSC Series, NSC 147th Meeting, June 1, 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President of the United States, 1953-61, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Ks.

⁷ Kunhikrishnan, Unfriendly Friends, p. 148.

⁸ The Decan Herald, September 2, 1984.

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