THE NATIONAL DEFENSE COLLEGE OF THAILAND AND ITS ALUMNI
IN THE CONTEXT OF THAI POLITICS

DISSERTATION

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by

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This study deals with the National Defense College of Thailand and its alumni, who are senior military and civil service officers of the government of Thailand. The study examines the proposition that the political attitudes of military and civil service officers in developing countries are likely to be similar and negative. The second proposition examined in this study is that the attitudes of government officials toward the people are likely to be similar and negative. The study also attempts to examine the official attitudes on the basis of cluster. Each of the three clusters consists of seven classes of the National Defense College. It is argued that the political contexts of each cluster were different and that these differences may result in the different attitudes of officials in each cluster.

The study found that military and civil service officers in Thailand hold similar attitudes toward politics and that the attitudes are predominantly negative. Official attitudes were similarly negative. Attitudes toward politics vary, depending upon the time in which the
officials were in government service. Officers who worked within the environment of the military government are the most distrustful of politics while officials who worked under a more relaxed, more democratic political system are not as distrustful of politics. Attitudes toward the people are not significantly different among officers from different political environments.

It was found that the number of alumni of the National Defense College who were able to reach the three highest ministerial positions in the Thai government has declined over the years. These positions are minister, deputy minister, and undersecretary. One cause of this decline is the increasing politicization of the country or the decreasing role, activity, and involvement of the military in politics. The second cause is the relatively stable number of the members of each class of the National Defense College. As the overall number of government officers of the country has steadily increased over the years, this stable number has put these officials at a disadvantage.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

One general problem confronting many developing countries is the need to have a viable, efficient, and effective administrative apparatus to handle the growing needs of the populace and developmental problems. Although it is a country that falls into this category, Thailand is different from other countries in many respects. The country has never been under control of colonial powers and, as a result, foreign influences were not imposed from outside, and no distinct foreign bureaucratic pattern is found in the country. The development and modernization of the country's bureaucratic institutions have been carried out by indigenous political leaders, by the various kings up until 1932, and by prime ministers after that time.

The bureaucracy in Thailand can be broadly divided into two categories, the military and the civil service. Although there have been a number of coups-d'état after the Second World War resulting in the military becoming ostensibly the major political leader or actor, the actual task of running day-to-day administration of the country has been left in the hands of professional bureaucrats.
From the late 1950's on, the country has inaugurated a series of five-year plans to modernize and to improve the social and economic well-being of the people. After the Geneva Conference of 1954, the threat of Communist subversion was taken seriously by Thailand and earnest efforts were made to insure the country's sovereignty. In the process, the military and the civil service were given the prime responsibility in trying to achieve the twin aims of national security and national development.

Up until 1955, both military and civil service personnel had to deal with their tasks more or less from their own distinct perspectives: the military perceived the national problem from a predominantly military point of view while the civil service concerned itself principally with domestic issues. Subsequently, the nature of the job of bureaucrats from the late 1950's reflected the dual requirements mentioned above. This fact necessitated increased cooperation between the civil service and military personnel. However, there was no institution or unit that could provide the kind of training that was required for the bureaucrats who were responsible for the policies of national security and national development. It was on this premise that the National Defense College of Thailand (NDCT) was founded in 1955. According to the institution's motto, knowledge, understanding, cooperation, and coordination are the ultimate objectives of the NDCT.
Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is twofold. The first is exploratory in nature in the sense that the study will try to discover the attitudes of NDCT graduates regarding the institution and its activities. Alumni of the school were asked to respond to a number of questions that were designed to elicit an evaluation of the institution's curriculum, activities, effects, and usefulness to the country and to the graduates themselves. The NDCT has been operating for over thirty years now, but there has been no attempt to survey alumni about the institution. To continue operation of the NDCT by relying mostly on past orders and precedence is to ignore reality since the justification and the conditions surrounding the establishment of the NDCT have greatly altered since 1955. Responses from former students are an excellent form of feedback that may be very useful for the future operations of the institution.

The second purpose of the study is also exploratory. It attempts to examine the attitudes of the alumni on the basis of two considerations, occupation and cluster. Occupation is divided broadly into two types, military and civil service. Within each, a subdivision is possible. The military consists of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. The civil service consists of twelve subcategories divided along specific functional responsibility. Cluster is used
to designate each group of seven NDCT classes. Cluster one consists of classes one to seven; cluster two, eight to fourteen; cluster three, fifteen to twenty-one. The first cluster corresponds to the years from 1955 to 1965; the second cluster 1966 to 1972; the third cluster, 1973 to 1979.

The rationale for selecting occupation and cluster as the basis for consideration was based on one aspect of the arguments of writers in the field of civil-military relations. The first proposition of this study is that government officials in Thailand possess similar attitudes toward a specific set of political issues regardless of the difference in background and occupational orientations. The second proposition was partly an extension of the first. That is, officers from the three clusters are not different in their attitudes toward a similar set of political issues. Theoretical considerations on which the propositions were based will be found in the section on related literature.

The objective of this inquiry is to find out about the attitudes of officials toward elements of politics and people. Attitudes toward politics and people are significant in the sense that they can be used to indicate the likelihood of whether the public bureaucracy will contribute to the development of a democratic system of government in Thailand. Although the bureaucracy is not the
only actor in Thai politics, it has been a very important and influential one. Attitudes of military and civil service officers can suggest a picture of the types of bureaucrats that the country has relied on. Together, an examination of these attitudes will provide a better understanding of key elements of the Thai bureaucracy and how they may affect the future course of politics and administration. Specific propositions can be stated as follows:

1. Military and civil service officers have similar attitudes about politics, and their attitudes are likely to be negative.

2. Members of the three clusters are likely to have different attitudes toward politics, with members of the earlier clusters being more negative in their attitudes toward politics than members of later clusters.

3. Military and civil service officers hold similar attitudes toward the people, and the attitudes are likely to be negative.

4. Members of the three clusters are likely to have different attitudes toward the people, with members of the earlier clusters being more negative in their attitudes toward the people than members of later clusters.

In addition, an attempt will be made to classify the senior government officials of Thailand on the basis of their attitudes according to the "models" of modern
bureaucratic officials of Robert Putnam. In a study of senior civil service officers and members of the parliaments of Great Britain, West Germany, and Italy, Putnam classified these officials according to their attitudes toward statements about different aspects of politics. If the officers express favorable attitudes toward the activity of political parties and interest groups, they would be classified as "political bureaucrats," for example.

Significance of the Study

The present study is significant for a number of reasons. First, it can be regarded as an initial attempt to fill a research gap. There are studies about the National Defense College as an institution in general and about Colleges in the United States, Great Britain, and Canada but no study on the institution in Thailand exists. Because the NDCT is a unit within the Royal Thai Armed Forces, records and documents relating to the institution and its activities have not been made available to the public. Mainly because of this reason, no one outside the institution has tried to study it. With regard to former students and officers and staff of the institution, none has previously attempted to do a study. Thus, the results may help fill a research gap that has existed for quite some time.

Second, studies on the bureaucracy and the military are solely from an institutional perspective. There has been no
empirical investigation of the attitudes of both the high-ranking military and civil service officers of the same generation. This is the first empirical study of these two main components of the Thai bureaucracy.

The third reason for focusing on this topic is because it involves an influential and critical population. For a country that has been characterized as "a bureaucratic polity," the bureaucrats, both civil service and military, are certainly influential in politics and administration of the country. By examining their attitudes toward various important political issues, it will be possible to offer a general observation about the implications for Thailand's politics and administration.

The fourth reason is practicality. This study is aimed at getting responses to various specific questions and general suggestions and recommendations about the institution in the hope that they can be submitted to the appropriate authority at the NDCT for consideration. As will be shown, the NDCT needs to take a fresh look at itself and to take certain steps if it is to be as effective as during the early days of its existence. If the result of this study can contribute to some adjustments and ultimate improvement of the institution and its programs, this reason alone is perhaps worthy enough for undertaking this study.
As of October 1985, the NDCT has had twenty-seven classes, but only members of the first twenty-one classes were asked to respond. Because many members of classes twenty-two to twenty-seven are still in government service, they may not respond so candidly as earlier graduates now retired from active service. Another reason for omitting the last six classes has to do with the rate of nonresponses. People in government service, especially those at the upper echelon, tend to be very busy and cautious about their expressions. Thus, it is very likely that they would not have responded to the questionnaires at all, or that they would have asked their subordinates to complete the survey. For these reasons, only the first twenty-one classes are included in the study.

Data Collection and Analysis Procedures

Definition of Terms

The term "bureaucracy" is defined as the corps of nonelective civil and military administrative officials. The term officer denotes that a person is a career government officer of the Thai government. This term includes both a military and a civil service officer. When the term is used in connection with cabinet posts, it means that a career government officer is also a member of the cabinet. When the term "non-officer" or "non-official" is used in conjunction with the cabinet positions, it means a
person can be a politician, doctor, businessman, or anybody from outside the government who is not a career government employee of the Thai government. The term "non-career cabinet officer" also has the same meaning as the terms non-officer and non-official. The same is true with the term "non-bureaucrat." "Quasi-democratic period" refers to a time in which some form of political activity was permitted under the general supervision of the government in power. "Non-democratic phase" means a time when political activities are not permitted.

Contents of the Questionnaire

The questionnaire consists of seven main sections, and it can be found in the Appendix. The first two subsections seek information on two characteristics, the respondents' regions of origin and their language ability. The third subsection seeks to determine the most important factor, according to the respondents' perceptions, that determined their decision to attend the institution. Because a major premise for the founding of the NDCT was to create future cooperation and coordination among government officials at the highest level of each ministry, the findings here may provide a clue as to the changing stature of NDCT graduates over the years.

The second section encompasses items designed to allow the assignment of priorities to the various activities and
situations at the NDCT. Respondents were asked to rate six items according to their significance from least to most. If lectures, which are regarded as a vital part of the curriculum at the NDCT, are not rated very high, a basic flaw may exist in the previously accepted philosophy and practice of lecturing. If individual research reports are regarded as a very productive and effective exercise at the NDCT, this part of the curriculum may be judged as sound.

The third section involves a general evaluation of the effects of education and experience at the NDCT on the graduates in their official capacity. If the respondents think that their experience at the NDCT has been positive, it may be inferred that the NDCT has been an effective institution over the years. In contrast, if the respondents do not think this way, the time and money spent over the past thirty years may not have been worthwhile.

The fourth section attempts to discover the reactions of respondents to statements about various systems of government. At present, the country has a mixed system of government: representatives are elected by the people on a popular basis similar to the system found in countries with a democratic form of government; these elected representatives are then appointed to become political heads of most of the ministries. There is one difference, however. In other systems, the leader of the winning party
becomes the prime minister, and the posts of ministers are then distributed to leading members of the winning party or coalition of parties. In Thailand, this system was in operation between 1973 and 1976, but after the military coup in 1976 the nature and composition of government have become a mixture of the earlier systems of military-dominated government of the years 1957 to 1973, and parliamentary democracy from late 1973 to October, 1976. This is a system in which the prime minister is appointed by the King with the consent of all involved political parties. In addition, the politically sensitive posts such as Ministers of Defense and Interior are headed by non-elective officers. In the case of Defense, the prime minister usually assumes the position himself, with the posts of deputies going to former military officers on the basis of appointment. For the remainder of the ministries, the elected representatives, or members of the lower house of parliament, are given the posts based on the number of seats each party has. The party with the largest number of seats get control of more ministries.

The fifth section consists of five statements designed to explore the attitudes of the respondents toward the people. As a group, these items will help distinguish the kind of attitudes a person has. If respondents from different occupational backgrounds or from different
clusters express sharply divided responses to this group of statements, one may draw certain inferences about the possible influences of a particular time period or of being a member of a profession.

The sixth section involves attempts to discover respondents' attitudes toward political parties, the parliament, and pressure groups. These are institutions and elements of politics. If a respondent is receptive to activities and roles of political parties in society, it can be suggested that that person favors the type of political system in which political parties can compete without restraint. Likewise, a person's view of politicians is an indicator of his thinking about a political system.

Thailand's senior civil servants are a key element in the process of economic, social, and political development. In the economic and social spheres, officers from the National Economic and Social Development Board in the Office of the Prime Minister and from other ministries have been at the forefront of this developmental effort from 1960 on. To accomplish development in a democracy, they must take into consideration the views and opinions of elected representatives so that government policies and programs conform to the wishes of the people, rather than to those of government planners. The survival of democracy in Thailand depends a great deal on government officials, especially
military officers. As long as these career government officials maintain negative perceptions of politicians, interest groups, political parties, and other phenomena of politics, it is highly doubtful whether a system of political democracy will ever take root in the country.

The next set of statements is aimed at uncovering the pattern of thought and ideas of government officials about the general administrative situations within the environment of the Thai bureaucracy. One of the most persistent problems in the day-to-day operations of the public bureaucracy in Thailand has been the practice of having to wait for a decision from the top, usually from the level of undersecretary and above. Another problem has been relationships between the superior and subordinates: the popular view holds that it is the duty of subordinates to obey unconditionally orders from above. By arranging the statements into a set that aims at discovering a pattern, ranging from agree to disagree, in the reaction of respondents, it is possible to classify the respondents.

The last part of the questionnaire contains open-ended questions that were designed to elicit three broad types of answers. The first item concerns the mission and goals of the NDCT. Although every respondent should be familiar with NDCT purposes, asking them to express them in their own words may make possible an insight into their thinking on
this point. The second item asks about the contributions that the NDCT has made to the administration of the country. The majority of the respondents are highly qualified to comment on this point since they had been at, or very near, the top of their respective bureaucratic establishments. Finally, the last open-ended question seeks to solicit the suggestions and recommendations about the NDCT in general and about ways to improve its services and to make it function better in the future.

Survey Administration and Response

Data collection was carried out in Thailand. First the questionnaire was translated and carefully checked by a highly qualified person with a Ph.D. in Linguistics to prevent variations in the substantive meaning between the English and Thai versions of the questionnaire. The Thai version was then professionally printed and sent to each respondent along with cover letters and stamped envelope. Eighty-two original envelopes were returned because of various delivery problems. Fifty potential respondents had moved without leaving a forward address, twenty-two were not living at the location addressed, and for ten there was no residence as indicated on the envelope. In addition, twenty-five respondents had died, and the letters were returned with this information from their relatives. The original population of this study was graduates of the NDCT.
from classes one to twenty-one totalling 1,387 persons. The 1980 directory of NDCT students revealed that of the 1,387, 1,219 were listed. Subtracting the returned envelopes from this total left the population (N) at 1,112 (1,219-107).

Three hundred and sixty-one questionnaires were returned. Fifteen of these had to be dropped because of two reasons. First, there were five returned letters with the accompanying information that the respondents were willing to provide information, but were too ill to do so. Second, ten of the returned questionnaires had to be discarded because there was strong evidence that they were not filled out by the intended respondents. If these fifteen were included in the calculation, the return rate would be 32.61 percent (361 divided by 1,112). Because they had to be dropped, the adjusted return rate can be obtained by dividing the usable responses by the population (N) to produce a response rate of 31.11 percent, (346 divided by 1,112).

To find out whether the response rate of the present study is sufficient for generalization, the author presumed that the returned responses constitute a sample. The acceptability of the sample size of responses was determined by using the figures provided by Krejcie and Morgan (11); the methods for arriving at the figure were provided by Babbie (1, pp. 150-158). According to them, an acceptable
sample size for a population of 1,100 is 285, and 291 for a population of 1,200. The calculation for these numbers was based on a 95 percent confidence level. For the present study, the response size is 346 from a total of 1,112. Thus, the response size for this study is acceptable at the 95 percent confidence level.

In terms of representativeness, the make-up of the military and civil service officers among respondents is very similar to the make-up of the NDCT classes one to twenty-one. In the first cluster, the original make-up had 49.31 percent military and 50.66 percent civil service. The response group has 41.38 percent military and 58.62 percent civil service. In the second cluster, the comparison between the two was 52.04 percent and 47.96 percent to 55.07 percent and 44.92 percent military and civil service. For the third cluster, the comparison was 52.39 percent and 47.61 percent to 49.15 percent and 50.84 percent military and civil service, respectively.

Data Analysis

For the most part, the results of the survey are presented in the form of contingency tables. The sections dealing with indexes on attitudes toward the people, politics, and administration will be treated separately. In each of these three sections, two tests of item reliability and internal consistency were carried out to see if all
items in each section should have been included for calculation. The first method (21; 22, pp. 321-326; 182-186) of testing item reliability and internal consistency can be briefly summarized. One may suppose that a list of six questions is presented to a respondent. Each statement from this list has five choices. Each choice has a score ranging from one to five. The total score of each respondent can be calculated by summing up the scores from all the statements in a given index. This process is carried out for all the respondents. The next step is choosing respondents whose scores' values are in the top 25 percent bracket, and those whose scores' values are in the lower 25 percent. After these two groups are chosen, the total scores are calculated from each group based on each item. The total mean score on a particular item of the lower 25 percent group is then subtracted from the total mean score on the same item of the top 25 percent group. If the difference is greater than one, that item is kept as a valid part of the index. All the statements from the fifth section of the survey instrument were kept. So were the statements from the sixth section. For section seven, only six of ten items were kept. This method can be illustrated in the following example.

The second method for calculating the reliability of an index is called Cronbach's Alpha (2 ; 16, pp. 360-362;
Fig. 1--An example of the method of calculation to insure internal consistency and reliability. From this example, items B, C, and E are discarded.

278-280). According to this method, alpha for the index on politics is .702; on people, .507; on administration, .669. Since alpha has a range from zero to one, the value of each of the three indexes is in acceptable range. By relying on these two methods for testing the reliability of the indexes, one can interpret the results without the problem of whether the two or more statements being used in the same index actually measure the same thing.

Each index puts each person along a dimension. For example, if a respondent scores very high on the index of political attitudes toward the people, he can be regarded as being sympathetic and favorable in his feelings as far as the common people were concerned. If a person has low scores on this index, it would indicate that that person maintains a kind of elitist view or low regard for the people. A respondent can be regarded as having negative attitudes toward politics if he consistently agrees with
Statements in the political index. To find out about a person's position on each scale, the lowest and highest scores are used as the upper and lower limits for each. From these scores, a comparison can be made between military and civil service personnel, and among the three clusters. To reiterate, cluster one means classes one to seven, two means classes eight to fourteen, three means fifteen to twenty-one.

**Advantage over Previous Study**

In a pioneering study on the Thai bureaucratic elites, Dhiravegin (4) selected a total of ninety-five officials for his study on the basis of "availability." Of this number, only fifty-six agreed to cooperate even though this study was carried out with the support of the John F. Kennedy Foundation of Thailand, Brown University, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Asia Foundation, and the Fulbright-Hays Scholarship. In terms of ministries, respondents were from only three--Interior, Education, and the Office of the Prime Minister. In terms of positions, respondents for that study were undersecretary, deputy undersecretary, director general, deputy director general. Respondents for the present study were from every ministry, including Defense. They ranged in official positions from the prime minister, deputy prime minister, minister, deputy minister, undersecretary, deputy undersecretary, and officials of
level seven and above. The Defense respondents included a considerable number of former Commanders-in-Chief of the three services plus a large number of former high ranking military officers. Thus, in terms of both quality and quantity, respondents of this study represent the critical element of the Thai bureaucracy, both civil and military. In this sense, the data derived from this study are significant because they reflect the opinions of the former top members of the Thai bureaucratic hierarchy.

Limitations

This study’s limitation lies in the nature of Thai politics since 1932. As von der Mehden has observed, "clear delineations between civilian and military policies since the absolute monarchy are made difficult by the mixed government that ruled the Kingdom...(26, p. 37)." Another source of difficulty is "the common background of the military and their civilian bureaucratic counterparts, combined with extensive periods of administration cooperation leads to difficulties in differentiating military from civilian bureaucratic thinking...(26, p. 40)." With this difficulty in mind, the years 1932 to 1957 were regarded as comprising the first phase of modern Thai politics. The year 1957 was chosen as the cutting point because the original members of the coup group of 1932 lost power to the new group of military officers who had no roles
in the event of 1932. The second phase, 1957 to the present, is the focus of the present study. The use of key positions in government as a basis for considering the effects of NDCT graduates on politics and administration has been attempted before. One doctoral dissertation used the percentage of military men in high policy positions to compare two military-led governments in terms of gross national product, per capita income, and the gross fixed capital formation to study the roles of the military in Thai politics (25).

The survey administered for the present study did not include age, educational level, and family backgrounds because of the limitation of time and resources. The results of the survey may have less potential for generalization due to this lack of information on the respondents' general characteristics. Since data of this type are useful in a study of attitudes of government officials, their absence restricts the scope of the present study's explanation. However, directory data on age, educational level, and family backgrounds are included.

The study covers the difference in attitudes of government officials from different time periods or clusters, but it does not differentiate between military and civil service officers within each of the three clusters. Therefore, the study is limited by an inability to examine
the the differences in official attitudes within each cluster on the basis of the military and civil service officers dichotomy. The study does include cross-tabulations between official attitudes and occupation and cluster. There is, however, a limitation to this approach. The use of only two variables may not be as meaningful as the use of the method of multiple cross-tabulation in the sense that the latter may yield additional useful information about relations among variables under investigation.

Although the make-up of military and civil service officers who responded to the questionnaire does not differ a great deal from the total student body from classes one to twenty-one, there is a possibility of the existence of a systematic bias in the sample. This may occur because it was not possible to carry out a follow-up mailing of the questionnaire, and to determine with certainty if respondents truly represent the entire members of the NDCT from classes one to twenty-one. Certain factors such as self selection might distort the sample. This is a limitation on the representativeness of the respondents. The results of this survey can be regarded as meaningful because this is the first time this type of study was carried out in Thailand. However, from a strict statistical standpoint, there is a limitation because the analysis does not include a test of statistical significance.
Studies on the National Defense College and Thailand

Three studies are available on the subject of national defense colleges. The first by Michael A. Freney, "The Political Element in Military Expertise," dealt with the political dimension of military professionals in three countries, Great Britain, Canada, and the United States. It examined the factors that are common and/or unique to the Royal College of Defence Studies, the National Defense College, and the National War College. These factors included the rotation of the position of Commandant among the three services, the use of an appointive advisory body for advising the school's authority, and the composition of students. The selection of students was based on future policy-making potential, previous job performance, and membership in particular units of government. The selection process was carried out by individual units of government that were given seats in each particular year. The allocation of seats was the result of a committee type of decision making involving the representatives of the schools and the ministries that were primarily involved with the matter of national security such as the Department of Defense, the Department of External Affairs, and the State Department (7, p.45).
Two common objectives of these institutions were a broadening of general knowledge through the use of class lectures, and the social interaction process that was expected to be beneficial to the government through informal contacts among former students at the institutions. The author suggested that belonging to the same institutions was valuable because it provides insights into the nature of the political-military educational process. Other activities and experience such as study trips and seminars were less useful. While conceding that many of the activities were similar, the author pointed out variations that were peculiar to each country's unique historical and political context such as an emphasis of greater depth versus greater breadth in the curriculum.

An individual examination of each school was made and a summary of distinguishing features was provided. In the case of the Royal College of Defence Studies, for example, the following conclusions were offered. Member of the RCDS staff included both junior and senior officers, and an emphasis on the input from civilian sector was considered welcome. An in-depth approach to the study of an issue was employed rather than considering all the issues or emphasis in the breath type of study. In the case of the National Defense College of Canada, domestic concerns were emphasized to a greater extent than at the other two schools. The
Canadians employed the group problem-solving approach and the acceptance of consensus in dealing with their problems. The American National War College was not open to officers from other countries, and this feature set it apart from the other two schools. The NWC’s course was the most structured of the three and the demand on the students’ time was the highest.

The study examined the curricula contents of the three schools and the students’ attitudes, and produced the following results. First, entering officers were so very different in their backgrounds and outlook that they were not expected to be very much alike after their graduation. The schools’ influences were not making a lasting imprint either in terms of personal behavior or the level of academic competence. Attendees were not a cross-section of the overall military personnel because they were selected in the anticipation of being given subsequent assignments of a policy-making nature. Civilian control of the military was overwhelmingly accepted by the students surveyed in this study. These officials felt confident that the type of education they received through various courses in different training institutions along the path of their careers was useful in preparing them to deal not only with their own professional military subjects, but also the general political topics as well.
The scope of the second study by Sturton Mathwin Davis, "Development and Characteristics of National Defence College as a World Phenomenon (3)," was worldwide while the first study was limited to only three countries. The Davis study tried to differentiate all the existing colleges according to which of the three categories—national security, national endeavor, and national reform—the college emphasized. As the names of these categories imply, the activities of the colleges in each group were perceived to be geared toward national security, national endeavors, and national reforms. Countries in the first category included the United States, Portugal, Greece, the Republic of Korea, Israel, Finland, and Sweden. The national endeavors category included Japan, the United Kingdom, and Thailand. The last group had France, Brazil, Indonesia, and Peru. In addition, Yugoslavia, the Netherlands, and Austria were selected to be included under the rubric of "Extended Sphere of Influence." These countries were trying to expand their influence to encompass more than the limits of normal course offerings. The colleges of NATO (The North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and IDAB (The Inter-American Defence Board of the Organization of the American States) and a brief mention of the Soviet Union and the communist bloc were added to the main groups for the purpose of comparison and contrast.
The study tried to compare the general characteristics of all the institutions by looking at such features as size, character of membership, and the practices of assessment and mandatory attendance. The Davis study also listed a number of observations such as the impact of nations on colleges, the influences of the colleges on the nations, the colleges' effects on their members, and proposals for enhancing the colleges' endeavors. These observations were made by using individual countries as examples. For instance, under the listing of the impact of "Nation on College," Brazil, Peru, and Indonesia were cited as using their respective Colleges to "assist the military to participate directly in government (3, p. 24)." In the case of Thailand within this same listing, the author argued that it was "to facilitate the operation of a bureaucratic/military continuum of power (3, p 34)." Since this study is the only one dealing with the subject of the National Defense College that had Thailand under consideration, it is necessary to briefly reiterate this part.

Most of the discussion of Thailand was devoted to an explanation of the country's political development since 1932. This study used a response from the questionnaire sent to the NDCT as a primary source of information. By relying on this type of information, the author naturally tended to portray the institution in a positive light. The
The author also indicated that he had visited the NDCT in Bangkok and had the following observation:

The writer had visited the majority of the Defence Colleges dealt with in this study, most of which are somewhat humdrum in appearance. (Exceptions must be made of course, in regard to the ducal mansion of the Royal College of Defence Studies and the somewhat majestic edifice of the U.S. National War College). In the writer's view, however, nothing can surpass the elegance of the Thai NDC standing in its 15 lush acres outside Bangkok; a handsome building of marble and exotic woods, replete with open courtyards, rippling fountains and tropical plants...(3, p.208)

This impression of the institution's physical appearance aside, the study asserted that "the College's mandate is primarily that of enhancing military-civilian relations (3, p. 206)." In comparison with former colonial countries, there was no need for the college to play a role in building up "the Ideology and Sense of National Purpose (3, p. 207)." In the view of this study, another important role of the College had been the development of the country's senior executives. Nevertheless, the study questioned the stated purposes and utilities resulting from study trips abroad in North America and Europe in the sense that it was difficult to see how visits to these countries could be linked to the purpose of the College. In overall estimation, the study concluded that:

the potential for effectiveness of a National Defence College appears to be very high indeed. In fact, by providing a mechanism through which senior officials (military and civilian) who are going to rule can effectively come to know and understand each other, its role seems essential...It is judged therefore, that the College does indeed have a high rating in the function
of developing Senior Executives...Thus the Thai NDC becomes a mechanism of closer association where the military-bureaucratic ties can be nurtured and enhanced...It is the writer's judgment that in Thailand's College at present, we see one of the strongest and more effective examples of the mandate for enhancing military-civilian relations (3, pp. 210-211).

The third study by Vernon Eugene Johnson, "Development of the National War College and Peer Institutions: A Comparative Study of the Growth and Interrelationship of Military Senior Service Colleges," tried to find reasons for the establishment of the National War College, its relations with other U.S. Senior Service Colleges, and for the coexistence of these similar institutions. The study traced the origins of these colleges by considering the influencing factors and the roles and the attitudes of key individuals involved in the formation of these institutions. The development of curriculum and instructional methods at each institution was examined in order to provide additional evidence of the changing requirements that were made upon the schools as they passed through different historical stages.

Three main conclusions were offered. It was anticipated that the National War College was going to be at the top of the U.S. military education system. This anticipation has never been realized. Instead it had to share that position with the other four Senior Service Colleges, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and the
three Services' War Colleges. Secondly, from an institutional mission standpoint, each was unique and this was one crucial reason that prevented the emergence of one as the preeminent senior military education institution. Finally, there was no clear reason that could be used to account for the existence of multiple institutions. The overall judgment of the author was that "all the Senior Service Colleges are required, and the present arrangement appears to be the best for military higher education given the current state of desires of military officials and indifference to military advanced graduate education by the civilian sector (10, p. 165)."

Two additional studies deal with the subject of the senior civil service officials in Thailand, and both were written by the same author, Dhiravegin (4, 5). The first (4), "Political Attitudes of the Bureaucratic Elites and Modernization in Thailand," was an attempt to measure and classify the bureaucratic elites' political attitudes based on a survey that was carried out in Thailand in the 1971-1972 period. This study proposed four hypotheses. First, liberalism and conservatism are related to age. The younger elite are likely to be more liberal and less conservative. Second, liberalism and conservatism are associated with the level of education. The more educated are likely to be more liberal and less conservative. Third,
liberalism and conservatism are related to places of training. Foreign-trained (mainly Western) elite are likely to be more liberal and less conservative than the elite who are domestically trained. Fourth, conservatism is associated with intergenerational mobility. Elite member whose fathers' occupations are substantially different from their own will tend to be conservative (4, pp. 5-6).

The terms "liberal" and "conservative" were operationalized and measured by using a questionnaire that was aimed at capturing three components of political attitudes, which were "attitudes toward change, equalitarianism, and tolerance toward unconventional practices and idea (4, p. 36)." The total number of questions was twenty-four, but responses to only twelve were retained as the other twelve could not meet the requirement of internal consistency (4, p. 37).

The original aim of this study was to cover ninety-six senior civil service officials. Of these, fifty-six consented to the request for either an interview or filling out a questionnaire. All these officers were either in level seven or above in the civil service's position classification system. In terms of positions, thirty-five were deputy director general, fifteen were director general, four were deputy undersecretary, and two were undersecretary (4, p. 5).
This study provided a brief historical background of the Thai bureaucracy from the thirteenth century up until 1972. It showed that nearly half (48 percent) of the respondents' fathers were former government officials. The other occupations of the respondents' fathers were businessmen (21 percent), peasants (18 percent), and lawyers (4 percent), with about 9 percent providing no answer. The study next compared the occupations of the respondents' fathers based on the three ministries under consideration, the Ministries of Interior and Education, and the Office of the Prime Minister. Again, government was the most frequently mentioned parental occupation. The Office of the Prime Minister led the responses with 61.1 percent, followed by Interior (45.8 percent), and Education (35.7 percent). From these figures, it was concluded that "there is an appreciable degree of inbreeding in the government service career" which "led to the development of a self-perpetuating elite (4, pp. 10-19)."

With regard to geographic distribution, it was found that the majority of respondents (68 percent) were from the central region while about 9 percent each came from the north, northeast, and south regions. The educational backgrounds examination yielded that 46 percent had bachelor's degrees, 32 percent had master's, and 16 percent had doctorates. About 46.5 percent received their education
and training outside Thailand and within this group, a large majority (73 percent) went to the United States, followed by the United Kingdom (11 percent), France (4 percent), and Japan (4 percent). About 53 percent went to school in Thailand and of this number about two-thirds (66 percent) graduated from Thammasat University, with the rest scattered among other universities. In terms of association, it was found that 21 percent identified themselves as being affiliated with the government's political party, while the rest (79 percent) gave no answer (4, pp. 18-35). These were the general characteristics of the fifty-six senior civil service officers chosen for the study.

The political attitudes of these officials, according to the author's liberal-conservative scale, consisted of 40.4 percent classified as liberal, 38.4 percent as intermediate, and 21.2 percent as conservative. The study then cross-tabulated political attitudes by age and found that younger officials (defined here as 56 or younger) were found more in the liberal category. That is, 54.2 percent of those under 56 were liberal while 29.6 percent of people who are 56 or over identified themselves in this category. At the other end of the scale, 37.1 percent of people age 56 or over were found to be conservative while only 4.2 percent of age 56 and under were so identified. The educational factor was then used and it was found that 63 percent who
had graduate degrees were found to be liberal while 16 percent with bachelor's degrees or less were found there. Only 7.4 percent of the best-educated were found in the conservative group while 36 percent of the less-educated officials were found in this group. The liberal group included 33.4 percent of domestic-trained and 48 percent of foreign-trained officials. About 25.9 percent of the domestic-trained and 16 percent of the foreign-trained were found in the conservative group. In terms of intergenerational mobility, 46.7 percent of officials whose fathers were also government officials and 33.3 percent whose fathers were non-government officials were found in the liberal group. The comparison between the two groups for the conservative category was 16.7 percent to 22.2 percent. When a comparison was made according to ministry, 30.43 percent from the Interior Ministry, 57.14 percent from Education, and 40 percent from the Office of the Prime Minister were found in the liberal classification. For the conservative classification, there were 30.43 percent from Interior, 14.29 percent from Education, and 13.33 percent from the Office of the Prime Minister (4, pp. 36-50).

In view of these findings of political attitudes of senior civil service officers, Dhiravegin identified four problems facing the government: communist insurgency, political unrest in the four southern provinces, economic
decline, and the problem of legitimacy of the military regime. To be able to meet the requirements of modernization, which was defined as "a systematic process of complimentary changes in the political, economic, and social structures of a society, with political participation, economic efficiency and social equality as the core criteria (4, p. 51)," the study identified two conditions that must be met. The first condition was that "there must be a coalition of the political elite (the military and civil bureaucrats, politicians and business) with ideological commitment toward modernization, especially political modernization, eventually in the form of a competitive party system (4, p. 68)." The second condition was the need to have a strong and charismatic leadership. With these two conditions in mind, the author believed that a strong charismatic leader can act as a catalyst by guiding the nation through a period of perhaps a decade for the purpose of political tutelage during which time the infrastructure of democracy would be firmly established.

The second study by Dhiravegin, The Bureaucratic Elite of Thailand: A Study of the Sociological Attributes, Educational Backgrounds and Career Advancement Pattern, dealt with the same subject, but in a somewhat different light. The study examined the sociological attributes, educational background, and mobility and career advancement
patterns of senior civil service officials. It also touched on the role of these officials in political offices and their activities after retiring from government service.

The subjects of this study comprised two categories of civil service officers. The first category consisted of all the special grade officers, level seven and above in the civil service's position classification system, totaling 2,160 officers. The second category consisted of a 20 percent sample of all level five and six officials, who are called first grade officers, from all ministries, totaling 2,394 persons. The officers from the Ministry of Defense were not included. Even though this study was different from the previous work by the same author, the chapter dealing with the development of the bureaucracy was little changed except for a minor addition to account for events after 1972.

This larger study, like one with only fifty-six participants, found that officials came largely from government officials' families, followed by business families, with a small number having a peasant background. In considering this aspect by ministry, the Ministries of Justice and Public Health had high-level officials with a business family background, rather than official backgrounds. In terms of places of origin, the majority of both level seven and above officers (68.19 percent) and
level five and six officers (63.07 percent) came from the central region of the country. From the perspective of gender, there were 10.84 percent female officers in the special grade category and 22.64 percent in the first grade group. The number of female special grade officers was high in the Ministry of Education (40.82 percent female against 59.18 percent male) and University Bureau (29.59 percent female against 70.41 percent male). For first grade female officers, the figures were rather impressive in three agencies: the University Bureau, which has 51.44 females and 48.56 percent males; in the Ministry of Education, 46.9 percent females and 53.09 males; and in the Ministry of Public Health, 37.67 percent females and 62.33 percent males. In terms of religion, 92.73 percent of special grade officers and 86.01 percent of first grade officers were Buddhists (5, pp. 50-60).

The large majority of the study's subjects had college degrees. For those who went to school abroad, the majority studied in the United States, and Thammasat University was the place where the majority of the local-trained officers went to school. In comparing educational qualifications among all ministries, the University Bureau, the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had the best educated personnel in terms of possession of higher degrees and foreign training. Officers from the Ministries of
Interior, Justice, and Public Health were mostly trained in the country, and were lower than officers from the previously mentioned three ministries in terms of educational qualifications.

A definite pattern of career advancement was not found with regard to promotion. Since a substantial number of officials pursued advanced study after they were already in government service, the study was not able to determine if a chance to go abroad to get advanced degrees was related to one's relation to his or her superior, his personal and academic ability, or the combination of both factors. It meant that if a person was able to go abroad for further schooling on the basis of favoritism, the advancement in his career was due to both favoritism and educational achievement. In another sense, it was suggested that promotion did depend on the level of educational attainment and the quality of education. In the final analysis the study concluded that promotion in the Thai bureaucratic system was the result of a combination of favoritism and the merit system (5, pp. 132-184).

The study examined the role of career government officials in political offices by looking at cabinet members, or heads of each ministry, according to three types of political environments—democratic, quasi-democratic, and non-democratic—that existed in the 1958 to 1977 time frame.
The non-democratic interval lasted about fifteen and a half years. The other two phases were interspersed into the dominant non-democratic periods. The quasi-democratic phase was between February, 1969 and November, 1971. The democratic phase lasted about eighteen months between February, 1975 and October, 1976. In essence, during only 8.37 percent of the total time of eighteen years was the country under a real democratic system. About 91.67 percent of the time the country was under the quasi-democratic and non-democratic systems, with the latter clearly dominant.

Based on this framework, Dhiravegin concluded that non-bureaucrat, or non-career, cabinet members outnumbered the military and civil service officers during the democratic phase. The pattern was the opposite for the quasi-democratic and non-democratic phases when the career officials clearly dominated the cabinets. The study also examined the composition of the legislature and found the same pattern. When the legislators were appointed during the non-democratic and quasi-democratic years, their members were drawn heavily from the ranks of military and civil service officers. When the legislators were elected during the democratic phase, the number of career bureaucrats in that body was greatly reduced. Because of this finding of the pattern and persistence of dominance of military and civil service officers in the political offices in the
government, the study concurred with the argument of Professor Fred Riggs characterizing the Thai system of government as a "bureaucratic polity (20, pp. 185-218)."

The study devoted the last section to life after retirement of government officials. Those who had exceptional academic backgrounds were usually invited to teach at universities on a yearly contractual basis. In addition to teaching, retired officials could be invited by the government to serve in an advisory capacity to the prime minister, the cabinet, and the ministry with which he was formerly affiliated. These officials could also become advisors or board members of private companies because their expertise and connections might prove invaluable. Bureaucrats who were well disposed toward business matters could set up their own companies or enter professional practice in the fields of medicine and law. Another activity could be entering politics either on an elective or appointive basis, depending upon circumstances of a particular time frame.

These five studies are the only ones that examine the National Defense Colleges as a major national institution and high-level government officials in Thailand. They bear directly on the subject of the present study, and for this reason considerable space was given to their review. In addition, there are numerous books and articles that touched
on various aspects of Thailand and the National Defense College. Only the ones which are related to the aims of the present study will be mentioned briefly in this section.

One of the most widely read and highly regarded books on the Thai bureaucracy is Fred Riggs’ *Thailand: The Modernization of A Bureaucratic Polity*. Riggs coined the term "bureaucratic polity" to describe the Thai governmental system from 1932 to the early 1960’s. The main thesis was that in Thailand the government had been run by and for bureaucrats due in large part to the absence of any tradition of popular political participation on the part of the masses, and the inability of organized interest groups to present themselves as an alternative countervailing power to the weight of the military and civil bureaucracy. This study used the number of career government officials who were appointed to political positions as an indicator of bureaucratic control of politics. It was suggested that foreign observers may find this system hard to understand. The system was a product of the country's historical and political evolution in which one set of power holders, the monarch and his court members, was replaced with another set of power holder, the military and civil bureaucracy.

The other two studies of the Thai bureaucracy by William Siffin (23,24) treated the subject from a structural point of view by tracing its development from the nineteenth...
century through the early 1960's. Although dated, they are still regarded as standard works on the subject. Other books and articles on Thai politics touch on the Thai bureaucracy in many different ways, and references to them may be found in the bibliography section.

**Studies on Civil-Military Relations**

There are many "models" in the study of civil-military relations. In a pioneering study on the subject, Lasswell (14) equated military government with the system of totalitarianism. In another context, Lasswell was said to have argued that "political power would tend to become concentrated in a skill elite-largely administrators-who are masters of the instruments of communication and violence (12, p. 282)." Finer (6) argued that an examination of civil-military relations can best be carried out by relying on the basis of the strength and weakness of civilian political institutions. According to Finer, if civilian political institutions are weak and lacking in legitimacy, the military is likely to intervene in politics, and the degree of difference between the military and civil government depends largely on levels of political culture.

Huntington attempted to classify military governments by the nature of the policy adopted by them. According to Huntington, "in a world of oligarchy, the soldier is a radical. In a middle class world, he is participant and
arbiter; as mass society looms on the horizon, he becomes a conservative guardian of the existing order (8, p. 221)." In this case the army acts as a modernizing agent in a developing society and a supporter of a status quo in a developed society.

In the view of Janowitz, in comparison to other elite groups, the military has a tendency to get involved in politics because it has a higher degree of national consciousness. Further, the military officers have distinctive martial values and techniques and they tend to look at civil and military problems from a military point of view (9).

Luckham tried to create a "comparative typology" of civil-military relations (15). Luckham justified his study by arguing that:

the main weakness of existing theories...is that they still either concentrate on the characteristics of civilian politics and their influence on military intervention and civil-military relations, to the exclusion of the organizational and professional qualities of the military itself; or they give emphasis to the latter, to the exclusion of the social and political environment (15, pp. 8-9).

To compensate for these defects, Luckham proposed nine types of comparative military roles in politics (15, p. 22). Thailand was classified as having the features of the "guardian state", type 7(a), in Luckham's classification scheme. The political role of the "guardian state," according to Luckham,
is to uphold and extend support to 'The State' internally as well as externally. Ideologically, therefore, it is disposed to regard itself as the Platonic custodian of a vaguely defined 'national interest.' On those occasions that it does put coercion to political use, this occurs because of dispute with other elites as to the definition or methods of pursuit of the national will, rather than because it acts as the agents of particular interests or pressure groups (15, p. 27).

Perlmutter tried to study civil-military relations by creating a "taxonomy." A modern praetorian state, according to him, "is one in which the military tends to intervene and potentially could dominate the political system (18, p. 382)." Two models of the praetorian state were advanced by Perlmutter, "the arbitrator type" and "the ruler type." This latter type is relevant to the present study and it has the following characteristics, according to Perlmutter;

1) The officer corps rejects the existing order and challenges its legitimacy; 2) no confidence in the civilian rule and no expectation of returning to the barracks; 3) political organization and tendency to legitimize and maximize army rule; 4) conviction that army rule is the only alternative to political disorder; 5) the politicization of professionalism; 6) operation in the open; 7) high level of national consciousness; 8) little fear of civilian retribution (18, pp. 397-403).

One major aim of studies on civil-military relations is to have a generalization about many countries in a wide variety of social, economic, and political settings. Many studies have succeeded admirably in this task such as those of Huntington, Lasswell, Janowitz, and Finer. When it comes to applying the generalization to a specific case or country
such as Thailand, however, only the works of Perlmutter and Luckham are relevant while the others are too general. The quotations from these two authors reflect fairly well the conditions of civil-military relations and characteristics of the military in the Thai society. One exception, however, concerns Perlmutter’s point on the politicization of professionalism as it relates to the case of the Thai military. According to Perlmutter:

The Thai Army, which is rooted in the traditional bureaucracy, challenges the thesis that army rulers’ political involvement diminishes the professional integrity of the army. Since 1932, army officers have led the ruling group, dominated the institutions of government, and set the style of Thai politics. But the style of Thai politics is bureaucratic. Thus Thailand, whose politics and social structures are bureaucratic and patterned on subordinate-superordinate lines, mixes well with the professional norms of the officer class (18, p. 402).

Although the arguments of Perlmutter and Luckham seem to be supported by characteristics of the army and the general civil-military relations situations in Thailand, it is very difficult to empirically verify their generalizations. That is, there seems to be a similarity between generalizations and actual situations, but it is not possible to relate them in an empirical fashion.

Perlmutter and Luckham did not use the term “Grand Theory” but the difficulties in trying to find enough evidence to square with their arguments seem to suggest that their pieces are of this nature. A practical alternative is
the consideration of only certain parts or elements of the "Grand Theory" of civil-military relations. The reason for focusing on partial-system analyses is that such foci better lend themselves to the articulation and testing of middle-range propositions (13, p. 137)." Further, according to LaPalombara, "for any of the institutions normally accepted as intimately involved in the governmental process, we can produce a large number of interesting and important propositions, which, while not designed to validate general theory, would permit us to make more universally applicable generalizations... (13, p. 137)." With regard to public administration in particular, LaPalombara argued that it "is one of the areas in which our empirical research can be fruitfully guided both by very important public policy concerns and by theoretical propositions of the middle range (13, p. 139)." LaPalombara stated in another context that an analysis "that proceeds on the basis of middle-range theories is the most promising approach to the study of politics (12, p. 65)." Presthus also called attention to the need for more restricted and middle-range theories as follows:

Middle-range theory...attempts to abstract from the whole social context some limited but, hopefully, meaningful segment for analysis...The need for middle-range theory and systematic public research—in which premises, theories, working hypotheses, definitions, and findings are explicitly stated so that the research can be judged and built upon by others—is greater in comparative administration than elsewhere because consensus about the impact of cultural forms
and values upon administrative systems is otherwise almost unobtainable (19, p. 26).

By focusing attention on a particular aspect of the whole relationship in the field of civil-military relations, it may be possible to make a connection between a generalization and the actual situation. After this attempt is successful, it can be used as a starting point of a hypothesis, or as a supplement to other aspects of the study of civil-military relations as a whole. The present study can be related to one aspect of the general study of civil-military relations in that one argument of several scholars in this area can be empirically verified by the actual responses of officers in Thailand. Further, responses from Thai officers can be used as a basis for considering bureaucratic behavior in the comparative administration setting.

Within the general framework of the topic of civil-military relations, one important aspect involves the notion that the military and civil bureaucracy are drawn to each other as opposed to politicians, political parties, and other elements and institutions of politics. This is one argument in Nordlinger's Soldier in Politics: Military Coups and Government. Although the book did not directly touch on Thailand and its bureaucracy per se, the pattern of military involvement in politics fits the book's generalizations on this topic. Detailed argument of this
generalization will be found in the section pertaining to the propositions. Further, "models" of modern bureaucracy of Robert Putnam and his associates will be used as a basis for comparison and explanation of senior government officials of Thailand.

Organization

Since the subject of this study, the National Defense College of Thailand and its graduates, is about a public institution and public officials, chapter II examines public bureaucracy as it relates to politics. After discussing the composition of public bureaucracy, the chapter turns to its political significance. The third chapter deals with the National Defense College of Thailand and its alumni. Starting from a general description of the institution, the chapter will present the goals, curriculum, and activities/experience at the College. This chapter also compares the NDCT with three Western institutions. Further, it describes the composition of the students and their characteristics. It concludes with a consideration of NDCT alumni and their involvement in government as heads of ministries.

Chapter IV is devoted to a presentation of estimated effects of the NDCT based on survey responses on activities/experience at the NDCT, assistance from other students, contribution to performance, and contribution to promotion. Effects of the NDCT at the personal and
institutional levels are suggested. This chapter concludes with the perceptions of NDCT alumni on the objectives of the NDCT and its contribution to the general administration of the country. Chapter V presents the attitudes of alumni toward politics and people. These findings will be used in the examination of this study's propositions. Models of modern bureaucratic personality and behavior of Robert Putnam are used as the basis for comparing and considering the Thai military and civil service officers. According to Putnam, officers who express negative attitudes toward political parties, interest groups, and other elements of politics are classified as "classical bureaucrats" while officers who express positive attitudes toward politics are called "political bureaucrats." Chapter VI shows the study's contributions, a basic summary of the main point, conclusions, recommendations, and implications for further research.

Summary

The first part of this chapter provides a general introduction to the National Defense College of Thailand, its alumni, the military and civil bureaucracy, and their relationships to the social and political developments of the country. The purpose of the study is exploratory in nature in the sense that it tries to examine the NDCT as a major institution, its contributions to governmental
operations, the attitudes of alumni toward the utility of the institution, and the possibilities of improving the institution's curriculum, services, and activities. The study also tries to focus on one particular aspect of the general theory of civil-military relations by examining the attitudes toward politics and people of the senior Thai civil and military officers, and of officers from the three clusters of classes. Each cluster includes seven NDCT classes from the first to the twenty-first. In addition, an attempt is made to determine the type of Thai officers on the basis of two models of modern bureaucratic personality of Robert Putnam. Definitions of major terms, along with a brief mention of the contents of the questionnaire, are provided. The next two sections cover the details of survey administration and responses, and of data analysis. Limitations of the study are then provided. The section on related literature covers studies on the National Defense College, Thai politics, and the various models and explanations of the theory of civil-military relations. The organization of the study is then given.
CHAPTER BIBLIOGRAPHY


CHAPTER II
PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY IN THAI POLITICS

The Thai Public Bureaucracy

As an institution, the bureaucracy is generally recognized as a crucial part in the functioning of modern governments. Max Weber, for example, "stressed the great importance of institutions like the bureaucracy as a key to how political power and influence are organized and exercised in society (4, p. 65)." This statement is particularly relevant to Thailand because the bureaucracy has been recognized as a prominent institution in the evolution of the social and political systems in the twentieth century.

This distinct feature of the Thai bureaucracy has been recognized by a number of scholars. Heady classified Thailand as "a bureaucratic elite regime." This is a system in which political power is concentrated in the hands of "career government officials—military or civilian (2, p. 72)." Apter (1), using the structural and behavioral approaches in constructing models of government, called Thailand "modernizing autocracy." The distinguishing features of this system of government is a high degree of control and the secular ends of the system, in contrast to
sacred ends. According to Neher, "for the most part, Thailand is a bureaucratic polity—that is, a society in which the arena of politics lies within the bureaucracy—and there are only a few influential extrabureaucratic institutions (5, p. 419)."

Prior to the change in 1932 in which a system of absolute monarchy was replaced by constitutional monarchy, the Thai bureaucracy had contributed to the country's stability by performing its duties according to the wishes and commands of the monarchs. Even after 1932, the bureaucracy has been successful for the most part in keeping out of the political fray. As Shor perceptibly observed:

The tradition of a neutral instrumental bureaucracy, absent or abandoned in many non-Western countries, is relatively well preserved in Thailand. The permanent administrative officials function essentially as subservient instruments of the political leadership. While political leaders have occasionally manipulated sectors of the public service for political ends, the civil service as a whole has been permitted to remain on the sidelines of the power struggle arena. The Thai bureaucracy thus retains functional distinctness and institutional integrity. A stable corps of neutral career officials has loyally placed its services at the disposal of successive transitory political regimes. Throughout the mutations and occasional lapses of political leadership, these officials have maintained the continuity of the nation's public administration. In a nation buffeted by turbulent political currents and shifting constitutional tides, the Thai bureaucracy has provided an anchor of stability (4, p. 71).

This particular contribution of the Thai bureaucracy was echoed by another scholar. As Neher put it, "on the one hand, the bureaucracy is the bedrock of Thai stability; on
the other hand, the same bureaucracy must provide change and growth (5, p. 419). As Shor put it in another context:

the bureaucracy has performed a vital role in mediating the society’s transition to modernity. The higher civil service, in particular, performs a crucial role in variously generating, transmitting, and accommodating pressures toward modernization...When ideas from abroad have been introduced by political leaders, the bureaucracy has also served as a "shock absorber," attending to the difficult tasks of reconciliation with existing patterns and limitations (7, p. 39).

On the whole, the Thai bureaucracy has contributed relatively successfully to both stability and change.

Patterns of Bureaucratic Operations

At present the Thai bureaucratic system operates in a manner similar to the bureaucratic system in the West as the result of a combination of two major factors. The first was a reaction on the part of the monarchs to the threatening advances of Western powers in the nineteenth century. To be able to preserve her independence and sovereignty, the country had to transform and modernize. The lessons of Burma, India, Cambodia, and Vietnam made it clear to the Thai rulers in the nineteenth century that a way out of being subjugated to a colonial status was to conduct relations on the basis of the Western standards, and not on the indigenous standards. Learning the Western knowledge and practices of various kinds thus became a necessity for survival as a free and independent nation. The need to
create and maintain a modern administrative system was a part of this overall pattern of reaction to Western imperialistic encroachments.

The second factor was the need to expand and consolidate control over the country's territory which up until the early part of the present century had been governed rather loosely from the capital. To be able to oversee the administration of the country in a more orderly and effective fashion, the Thai rulers needed help from officials who could act in all areas of the country. The need was most urgent in the field of provincial administration, and later in other fields as well. The first major effort to achieve the aim of central control was the establishment of the Interior Department in 1892. In addition to Interior, many other departments can trace their origins to within a decade or two after 1892. Thus, the development and modernization of the Thai bureaucracy had been carried out in order to protect the country from growing Western threats, and to extend and consolidate the power of the central government to the entire geographical areas of the country.

Ever since 1892, the structures and procedures of the Thai bureaucracy have been modified and adapted to meet the changing needs of the public and the changing political and social circumstances. The major political event of 1932 did
not substantially alter the basic framework and functions of the bureaucracy. As Shor put it, the Thai bureaucracy has been modernized and has managed to withstand the strains of recurrent political upheaval in the constitutional period. The organization and procedures of personnel management have been patterned largely on the English model. Unlike the latter, however, Thailand's civil service is governed mainly by legislative enactment, rather than by executive order. The basic legal framework of the system is established by the national civil service act and amendments. The act prescribes basic personnel policies, fixes government-wide rank and salary schedules, and organizes the career corps...the act promulgates policies and procedures of recruitment, promotion, transfer, and discipline (7, p. 28).

The respondents of this study worked for the Thai government under this general framework and procedures. It must be pointed out that there were numerous changes and adjustments to the bureaucratic system throughout the time these officers were in government service and there is no doubt that there will be more changes in the future. Nevertheless, it is possible to mention briefly the components, elements, processes, and regulations of the Thai bureaucratic system. The areas to be covered are recruitment, rank and level classification, salary, promotion, and personnel management. As the subjects of this study consist of military and civil service officials, there is a need to note differences between the two in each area where they exist.

The recruitment system for civil service officers follows the guidelines of the National Civil Service
Commission. Each unit within a particular ministry can set up its own specific requirements commensurate with the functional nature of a particular position to be filled, but that unit must follow the general examination guidelines of the Commission. For example, the Rice Department in the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives stipulates that an applicant for a position of agricultural extension officer must possess a bachelor's degree with a major, or a concentration, in horticulture. To become an officer, applicants must pass the Rice Department's own examination and the Commission's.

For a more specialized position, the hiring unit may devise an examination on an ad hoc basis without the direct involvement of the Civil Service Commission, as long as the general examination guidelines are observed. The basic requirement for entering the public service is educational attainment, and the minimum requirement is usually the bachelor's degree or its equivalent. Advanced degree holders enjoy an advantage since they would be assigned to a position at a higher level of the position classification system, which has eleven levels. University graduates start at level three and above while high school or technical school graduates would start at the first level or the second level depending upon the Commission's regulations and the nature of the job to be filled.
The basic educational requirements for applicants to positions in the Ministry of Defense follow the general guidelines of the Commission. To become a commissioned officer, an applicant must have at least a bachelor's degree from an educational institution that is recognized by the Commission. An applicant must present the approval to this effect from the Commission to the officer in the personnel section of the military in order to be eligible for consideration. Applicants with advanced degrees seeking to enter the military will be given the ranks in accordance with the type of degree. For example, a person with a bachelor's degree is given the rank of second lieutenant while the rank of captain is for a person with a doctorate or an M.D. degree.

In addition to accepting graduates from approved universities, the services get officers from the three military academies. For noncommissioned officers, the military relies to a lesser extent on the guidelines of the Commission regarding their educational qualifications. One similarity between noncommissioned officers in the military and officers at the first and second levels of civil ministries is that once they acquire at least a bachelor's degree, they can start a process of rank and position adjustment that would lead to a promotion to the rank or level prescribed for that degree by the Commission.
The rank and level classification system for the military and the civil service are alike in general, but the similarity ends when one considers each in detail. The civil bureaucracy used to have five official levels arranged in a hierarchical pattern but it was changed in the 1970's to the present position classification system. The former system had the entering person with less than a university education classified as a first grade officer and a person with a university degree as a second grade officer. In the present system, entering persons with university degrees automatically become third level officers. There are gradations within each level and a normal advancement in a government career is based on these.

In practice, the position classification system has created dissatisfactions for many government officials because it is not possible to compare accurately and fairly the significance of a task or responsibility associated with a position in a ministry to another position in another ministry with the same hierarchical ranking at a particular position classification level. The difference in the nature of each specific task serves as a reminder of the shortcomings of the system. For example, a district officer, who is nominally responsible for all the administrative matters within a given district, does not like it when a school superintendent in that district, who
is supposedly under his authority in the overall territorial administration configuration, is ranked at the same level. As the government services expand, there are pressures to upgrade and reclassify positions so as to make room for more people at the higher levels. To cite the district officer example again, a district may be designated as a place for a level six officer one year but that same district can be upgraded so that in the next year only a level seven officer is entitled to the post.

The change in the rank and classification systems of the military has been less noticeable than in the civil bureaucracy because on the surface it still retains the same ranking system that has been operating from the end of the Second World War. This ranking system is similar to the one used in the West and in other non-communist countries. The army officer’s ranks begin with second lieutenant and end with full general. The only major difference brought about in the Thai Army that makes it different from other countries was the abolition of the rank of brigadier general, and the creation of the rank of special colonel in its place. Within each rank, however, there have been numerous changes. There may be three gradations for the rank of second lieutenant in a particular year, but four years later there might be five gradations or steps within that rank. The change in the ranking and classification
systems in the military has created less debate than the adoption of the present position classification system in the civil service.

The level of salary for both military and civil service officers has been low even by the standards of Southeast Asia. A military or civil service officer in Malaysia is substantially better off than the one with the same rank in Thailand, for example. The same salary structure covers all government officials and this consists of a base pay plus a cost-of-living allowance. The military officers get special benefits of combat pay when working in sensitive assignments. Both the base pay and the allowance have been adjusted several times in the past twenty years to meet the steady increases of the cost-of-living. These actions seem to fall short of the desired result. The usual situation has been that, as the previous adjustment ends, pressures start to build up for the next round of adjustment. In addition, there are other benefits to being government officials such as subsidized medical care, financial assistance to meet educational expenses for children of officers wishing to go to private schools, special rates for the uses of services of various state enterprises such as the railway system, and assistance in the area of housing.

The promotion system is officially based on merit. In practice, it is a combination of the superior’s discretion
and merit which means that a promotion can be obtained on the basis of favoritism as well as merit. The normal practice prescribes for automatic advancement of one step within each rank for the military or within each level for the civil service officer unless an officer has seriously misbehaved or incurred a serious government infraction in which case the promotion would be suspended pending an official investigation. If an officer has done an outstanding job for a particular fiscal year, he or she is entitled to be given a two-step promotion instead of the usual one. The civil service officer has a greater chance of receiving a two-step promotion within one year than the military officer because he can take a competitive examination set up by the Civil Service Commission which, if passed, enables him to be given an extra step promotion for that particular year. There is no comparable examination for the military officer. The only way he can get a two-step promotion in a given year is from the recommendation of his superior.

The creation of the rank of special colonel, or the abolition of the rank of brigadier general, may be explained as the military's response to the pressure for promotion to a general rank within the three services. It is useful to draw an analogy here to the U.S. military services. The normal alternative for a colonel after having been passed
over for promotion to the rank of general twice or three times is retirement. This has not always been so as the case of Admiral Hyman Rickover, who was passed over twice before being promoted to Rear Admiral, can be used as an example. On the whole, however, this practice has in effect been institutionalized and accepted by most U.S. officers at that particular stage in their careers. There is no such practice in the Thai military with the result that the number of colonels eligible for promotion to a general rank had reached an alarming proportion by the late 1960's. There was no pressure for colonels who were passed over for promotion to retire. On the contrary, this fact seemed to increase these officers' determinations to stay on in the services. The situation facing the military decision makers in the late 1960's was the swelling in the number of colonels, and the need to keep the overall population of officers holding the general rank at a reasonable proportion with the total manpower of the armed forces. At that time Thailand already had too many generals and admirals compared with most other Asian countries, not to mention the Western countries. To let the situation continue would seriously impair the image of the Thai military in the sense of having too many generals for a relatively small armed services. The solution to this promotion problem was to devise a new rank of special colonel whereby more colonels could now be
promoted, and at the same time the number of officers at the general rank could be kept at a reasonable level.

In the area of personnel management, there are no marked differences between the military and the civil service, except by the titles each employs. For the former, the set-up is similar to the U.S. services in which there are specialized units within the division or any other command group down to the company level. In the Thai army, for example, there is a directorate of personnel overseeing all matters about personnel. At the next level, the army region level, there is a similar set-up for dealing with personnel. This pattern continues down to the company level. For the civil service, the highest body of officers dealing with this matter is a body consisting of the prime minister and all ministers. This body, with the assistance of a special commission from the Civil Service Commission, promulgates government-wide civil service rules. These rules are applicable to all civil ministries. Within each ministry, a similar body consisting of ranking members of that minister has the responsibility to ensure that the rules are observed and followed. Similar set-ups are found at the next levels within each ministry, from the department down to the section levels.
Composition of the Thai Bureaucracy

The significance of public bureaucracy in the evolution of Thailand from the thirteenth century on can be seen in the kind of positive comments made by Western scholars. Commenting on this point, Kingbury observed that "Thailand is more fortunate than most of its neighbors in having had hundred of years of relatively peaceful development and in possessing a stable and relatively well-trained bureaucracy (3, p. 194)." The Thai bureaucracy as a whole has been a major part of the total social system. The upper echelon of the bureaucracy in particular had been a crucial link between the monarch on the one hand, and the rank-and-file of the bureaucracy and the people on the other. These officials were already significant prior to 1932 and they have become even more so afterwards.

At present, the Thai government comprises fourteen ministries. At the top of the structure are the prime minister who acts as leader in the day-to-day functioning of government through the council of ministers or the cabinet. The fourteen ministries are as follows:

1. Office of the Prime Minister
2. Ministry of Interior
3. Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives
4. Ministry of Education
5. Ministry of Finance
6. Ministry of Defense
7. Ministry of Industry  
8. Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
9. Ministry of Science and Technology  
10. Ministry of Commerce  
11. Ministry of Public Health  
12. Ministry of Justice  
13. Ministry of Communications  

The structure of a Thai ministry can be seen in the following diagram.

Fig. 2--An illustration of a Thai ministry's structure.
This structure is applicable with minor variations to all but the ministry of defense which is different in terms of function and composition. In the West, the position of Minister of Defense belongs to a civilian who is appointed by the head of government. In Thailand this practice had occurred only very briefly during the democratic phase (1973-1976). Even when it was headed by civilian politicians, the ministers were former high-ranking officers who left the services to form their own political parties. For most of the time, this ministry has been led by either former or current high-ranking military officers. The Ministry of Defense's structure can be seen in the following diagram.

Fig. 3--An illustration of the Thai Ministry of Defense's structure.
In addition to the fourteen regular ministries, there are five independent public agencies and sixty-two state organizations and enterprises which function in various capacities as the agencies of government. Of the five independent public agencies, three—the Royal Institute, the Office of His Majesty’s Principal Private Secretary, and the Bureau of the Royal Household—deal exclusively with the affairs and the activities of the royal family. The other two independent public agencies are the Audit Council of Thailand and the Secretariat of the National Assembly.

The origin and purposes of state organizations and enterprises can be roughly arranged into two categories. The first was established in order to counter the growing roles and domination of the Chinese in the economy. These agencies and organization were created during the leadership of Marshal Phibunsongkram between 1938 and 1957. It was argued that these agencies could be used to help reduce the economic domination of the Chinese by ways of teaching and training indigenous Thais in the fine arts of commercial undertakings. This goal had not been realized by the time Phibun went into exile in 1957 because powerful governmental leaders used these organizations to enrich themselves. As a result, these earlier state enterprises were modified or abolished to meet another goal.
Many public services, as this argument goes, are so vital to the well-being of the people that they must not be left in the hands of private companies. With this notion as the basic premise, the number of state organizations and enterprises began to expand from a handful in the 1950's into over sixty by 1986. Some of these organizations such as the Bank of Thailand, the Metropolitan Electricity Authority, and the Electric Generating Authority of Thailand meet the original objective. However, a large number of these organizations such as the Bangkok Mass Transit Authority, the Playing Card Factory, the Public Warehouse Organization, and many others plainly do not meet this criterion. A good example from this group is the Bangkok Mass Transit Authority, which was created during a democratically elected government by consolidating all the previously privately owned bus companies in the Bangkok metropolitan area into one state enterprise. Financially, this organization has been in the red from the first day of its operation. It has to be continuously subsidized by the government despite the fact that it provides services only to people living in the capital. Thus, the argument that state enterprises serve the vital needs of the public is not very convincing in this case since the rest of the population outside Bangkok do not receive the benefits of this service, and yet they have to help subsidize its operation through taxes.
The functions and characters of each ministry can usually be discerned from the official objectives, organization charts, and titles. Older ministries handle traditional functions of government. Of the present fourteen ministries, half can be traced back to 1892. These are Defense, Finance, Interior, Justice, Foreign Relations, Agriculture and Cooperatives, and Education. Other ministries of recent origins include Communications, State Universities, Commerce, Public Health, Science and Technology, and Industry. The Office of the Prime Minister, which is ranked as a ministry, is the only one responsible for many different major functions simultaneously.

The Political Significance of Public Bureaucracy

Public bureaucracy in Thailand has been regarded by Fred Riggs (6) and William Siffin (9) as a powerful force in modern Thai politics. Their conclusions were based on field work done in the country in the 1950's and early 1960's. Thus, their explanations, descriptions, and arguments about the characters and roles of the bureaucracy and bureaucrats reflect the conditions of that time. Nevertheless, their writings were useful in describing the situation until the early 1960's. In the two decades after 1965, the political significance of the bureaucracy has clearly been less pronounced. Evidence will be drawn from the number of career government officials who assumed the political posts of ministers.
The justification of the action of the civil service and military officers that ended the system of absolute monarchy in 1932 was to introduce democratic ideals, principles, and practices to the country. This was a view that the coup makers presented to the public. According to Riggs, the assumption of most people about the event of 1932 was that:

the goals of the revolution were democratic and popular, including at least the establishment of a constitutional monarchy under the domination of an elected assembly, which would enhance the welfare of the people. In such a polity, the bureaucracy would serve primarily as the administrative arm of the government to implement responsibly formulated public policies (6, p. 311).

What actually happened after 1932 was very much different from this popular perception. For four decades, the elected national assembly played a very limited and ineffective role in the governance of the country. For most of the time governmental power was in the hands of two groups of career officers which in turn were dominated by military officers. The first group of officers was led by Marshal Phibunsongkram who had been a member of the coup group of 1932. From that year until 1957 he had been in the position of prime minister in eight administrations for the total time of fourteen years. In this time span, there were a total of twenty-seven administrations. Nineteen administrations were headed by other people but the length of time in office for most of them was so brief as to make
the effects of their administrations insignificant and inconsequential. For example, in the sixteenth administration under Luang Pridi, a civilian leader of the 1932 coup, the government was in office for only two days. Indeed the majority of governments led by men other than Phibun had been in office for less than one year before being replaced. In comparison with other political figures of the first twenty-five years of supposedly constitutional monarchy, Marshal Phibunsongkram had clearly been a dominant power.

Phibun and his associates were ousted from power in September, 1957, by another, younger group of military officers led by Marshal Sarit Thanarat. Although Sarit himself died in 1963, his deputy, Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn, and associates continued to be the leading powers in Thai politics until they were toppled from power by a student uprising in October, 1973. Although Phibun had been in and out of office many times, no opposition politicians or other forms of political dissension were allowed in the years that were ruled by the Sarit-Thanom clique. There was no distinction between politics and administration and cabinet members and other important government officials were appointed by or with approval of the ruling military group. In fact, the domination by the military over politics and administration was greater than
it had been during the Phibun years in the first phase of modern Thai politics.

In view of what actually happened in Thailand from 1932 to the early 1960's, as opposed to the popular view of the cause of the change that brought in the system of constitutional monarchy, Riggs has argued that "the goal of the revolution was not to establish a popular constitutional government but rather to place common officials in the cockpit of power and to organize a polity that would rule on behalf of the bureaucracy... (6, p. 312)

Similarly, Wilson has provided the following explanation about the ways politics and administration intertwined as a result of the coup in 1932:

The ruling clique seizes the seat of power by sudden coup and then use these positions to establish and maintain its power. But the constituencies of the members of the clique are of the bureaucracy itself. These are primarily the military...but also, to a greater or lesser extent, all agencies. A minister, when he steps into his ministry, possesses the traditional authority of the office, and he can expect to get the deference, respect, and obedience from his subordinates which tradition demands. He is obligated by tradition to look out for these subordinates, however. In order not to disturb his authority and perhaps that of the whole clique, he must look to this obligation. His ministry then becomes his constituency, and he represents it in the cabinet. He fights for its budget, and he protects its employees. The success with which he does this depend upon his relative position within the ruling clique, although the best he can expect is a compromise with his fellow ministers. (10, p. 161)

According to this view, the Thai public bureaucracy is seen as a major element in the interaction of dominant
political actors which were limited to a few members of the coup group of 1932 from 1932 to 1957, and to certain army officers subsequently. In this system, the bureaucracy is insulated from the pressure of popular demand of the public because the head of the bureaucracy, the minister, comes from the ranks of the professional bureaucrats themselves. A ministry headed by a powerful figure or with connection to the politically powerful is then expected to be dominant vis-a-vis other ministries. And if the minister wants to maintain support from his constituency, his own bureaucracy, he must be able to get a larger share of the national budget in relation to other ministries. It is possible to depict the domination of the bureaucracy over politics. That is, as long as the public bureaucracy was headed by career government officials, both civil and military, the polity must be characterized as "bureaucratic." If a ministry is headed by a non-career individual or an elected representative, whatever the case may be, it may be described as being less "bureaucratic" and more "democratic."

Riggs (6) has attempted to demonstrate the domination of career officials over the various ministries by comparing them with politicians and other non-career personnel who were appointed to cabinet positions. The following table was adapted from Riggs.
TABLE I
COMPOSITION OF THAI CABINETS, 1932-1957

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<th>Total</th>
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*M.-Offic. refers to military officers and C.-Offi. to civil service officers. Non-official means persons other than career government officials.

According to Table I, military and civil service officers outnumbered non-officials in the twenty-seven cabinets from 1932 to 1957. During the first ten cabinets, the inclusion of non-officials was minimal. The rise in the
number of non-officials in the cabinets reflected the time of civilian domination in politics. This pattern of limited non-officials' involvement reappeared in cabinets twenty-four to twenty-six under Phibun. Despite slight variation in the number of non-officials in the cabinets, the overall pattern was clearly the domination of career government officials, both civil service and military. Thus, the public bureaucracy, through the assumption of ministerial posts by career government officials wielded inordinate influence in the total political situation. One may agree with Riggs that the term "bureaucratic polity" fairly accurately described the country during this twenty-five years.

Table II covers the years from 1959 to 1977. From September 1957 to January 1959, there were two prime ministers, one civilian and one army officer. These two governed the country on behalf of Marshal Sarit who was out of the country for most of the time to receive medical treatment. Upon his return near the end of 1958, the Marshal staged a coup against his appointed lieutenant, and assumed direct personal control of the reign of government until his death in 1963. Marshal Sarit's successors ran the country until they went into exile following an uprising in Bangkok in October, 1973. From that year until October, 1976, an appointed civilian prime minister and two popularly
elected civilian prime ministers alternately ran the government.

It is beyond dispute that career bureaucrats are a very significant part in running a government. To make sure that bureaucrats act in the interests of the people, political appointees are put into cabinet positions mainly for this reason. These political appointees in fact may or may not be able to carry out their objectives through career officials, but the mere fact that they are given command of various arms of government at least constitutes an acceptable relationship in principle between the governor and the governed. Indeed one major aim of seizing power from the absolute monarch was to give it to the people. This lofty and idealistic aim is reached if elements and manifestations of democracy are visible. One element of democracy is elected representatives and one democratic manifestation is for the people to have a chance to influence the government through these representatives acting as heads of various government ministries. Using these as a basis, it can be judged whether the aim of giving political power to the people has been achieved. It was shown in Table I that throughout the first phase of modern Thai politics, elected representatives were seldom given a chance in running the country as can be seen in the fact that the overwhelming number of cabinet posts was under the
control of career government officials, both civil and military. Table II attempts to use the same method in finding out if the early part of the second phase of modern Thai politics shows any sign of improvement over the first phase as far as the previously mentioned democratic element and manifestation are concerned.

TABLE II

COMPOSITION OF THAI CABINETS : 1959-1977

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thanom2</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thanom3</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanyal</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanya2</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senil (Feb.-Mar.) 1975</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kukrit (75-76)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seni2 (Apr.-Sep.) 1976</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seni3 (Oct.5-Oct.6) 1976</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thanin (76-77)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In comparing Table I and Table II, one similarity stands out. It is the overwhelming domination of career government officials over non-officers in the cabinets. Again, it is necessary to briefly outline the political situations for the post-Sarit period. The Thanom I and III governments were without any political opposition. The Thanom II period allowed a limited form of political activity with the government party with the support of several minor parties forming the ruling government. The Sanya I and II governments were formed as a result of the student movements that led to the ouster of the Thanom government in 1973. The Seni and Kukrit administrations were popularly elected. The Thanin government was an appointed group following a military coup in October, 1976.

According to Table II, from February, 1959 to February, 1975 when the term of the appointed government ended, there were only four non-officials being represented in the six cabinets for a total number of sixteen years. For the next year and nine months, the non-officials dominated cabinet posts in four administrations. This was the time of electoral politics and the emergence of politicians as ministers clearly reflected this fact. Because of the short duration of the period under the leadership of non-officials in government in this total time span of about nineteen years, control over the initiation, deliberation, and
implementation of public policies had clearly been in the hands of career government officials. Those who conceived of a policy and carried it into operation were one and the same persons in the governments. From this perspective, both politics and administration were under the control and supervision of career bureaucrats for most of the time from 1932 to 1978.

Summary

The Thai bureaucracy has played a significant role in the evolution and development of Thailand by contributing to both stability and change. Unlike the bureaucracy in many developing countries, the Thai bureaucracy has maintained its sense of professionalism and its commitment to providing stable administrative services in the face of changing political demands. The structures and rules of the Thai bureaucracy have been modified constantly and continuously ever since the establishment of the first modern ministry in 1892. At present the Thai bureaucracy consists of fourteen ministries, each is responsible for a task along a specific function. The elements and patterns of the Thai bureaucracy covered in this chapter include recruitment, rank and level classification, salary, promotion, and personnel management. Similarities and differences between the military and the civil service are explained in each area. The structures of a typical civil ministry and the Defense Ministry are shown
in the diagrams. The chapter then touches on the political significance of the Thai bureaucracy. One distinct manifestation of this is the overwhelming number of career government officials, both military and civil service, who were appointed to head the ministries from 1932 onwards.
CHAPTER BIBLIOGRAPHY


CHAPTER III

THE NATIONAL DEFENSE COLLEGE OF THAILAND

Introduction

The National Defense College is a unit within the Ministry of Defense of the government of Thailand. The college was officially established in 1955 as an institution of higher learning in which both civil service and military officers have the chance to study together a number of important subjects that are considered to be highly relevant to the concepts of national security and national development.

During the course of one year students listen to lectures by distinguished speakers from various fields, participate in group discussions, travel extensively within and outside the country to examine at first hand the problems relating to national security and national development, and submit individual final reports to the college. In case a report is considered to be highly innovative and useful, the college will submit it to the government, which may adopt it as official policy. To be eligible for enrollment, an officer must be between forty-five and fifty-four years old. A civil service officer must be in at least level seven of Thailand's
position classification system, which has eleven levels ranging from the lowest, one, to the highest, eleven. For military personnel, the rank of senior colonel is the minimum requirement. Enrollment is open to officers from every ministry.

Having the rank and age qualifications, however, does not mean automatic admission. Therefore, a quota system has been used to help in the selection process. For example, a larger and more important ministry is given more seats than a smaller one. The selection process within each ministry is carried out through a special committee, which is normally appointed and chaired by the top career officer of the ministry, the undersecretary. After each ministry's nominees have been selected, their names are submitted to the full cabinet of the government for final approval. Almost without exception, nominated officials are approved by the prime minister and the full cabinet. The incoming NDCT student usually has at least six years left in government service. The total number of nominated officials varies between sixty-five and seventy-five each year.

Goals, Curriculum and Activities

At present, the NDCT follows the 1976 directive of the Ministry of Defense regarding its mission which is to provide general knowledge about national defense to senior military, civil service, and state enterprise officials in
order to achieve a common understanding on the responsibility for the establishment, planning, and maintenance of national security (4)." The original mission of the NDCT, as expressed in its first official yearbook in 1955, was stated as "The National Defense College is an institution of education and research in the field of national defense. It aims to coordinate national defense tactics between senior officials both military and civilian, and to generate the appreciation and understanding of joint responsibility in defense, the organization of administration, and the maintenance of peace (1, p. 363)."

The NDCT curriculum has two parts, the orientation session and the main course. The orientation session was designed in such a way so as to help prepare and familiarize civil service officers with terms, concepts, and other military-related subject matter. This session begins in August and lasts five weeks. It usually ends one week before the beginning of the main course in September. The format follows that of the regular course. Lectures run from eight in the morning until noon. Trips to military installations are arranged for the purpose of familiarizing civil service officers with military subjects. It is expected that by the end of this orientation course the civil service and military officers are ready to begin the regular course of study.
Specifically, the goals of the main course can be briefly summarized into four points. The first is to provide students with knowledge about national defense in the areas of politics, economics, socio-psychological behavior, and military affairs. The second is to encourage the students to study the duties and functions of key administrative units of the country in order to be able to formulate national security policy and national strategy. The third goal is to help students to understand their common responsibility in the maintenance of national security. The fourth is to promote a common bond of mutual understanding among students from different ministries for the purpose of producing coordination and cooperation among various segments of government.

To achieve these goals, the NDCT allocates approximately nine months to class lectures and group discussion sessions. For the remainder of time, about fifty days are devoted to study trips inside the country, and about one month to travel abroad. Each class takes one year to complete the course.

Lectures are formally divided into nine topics. These are:

1. World Situation and Thailand's National Interests.
2. Internal Security Situations.
5. Free World and Non-Aligned Nations.

Lectures on these nine topics are the main component of the activities at the NDCT, and last from nine to noon each day. There are two subjects per day; each is alloted one and a half hour for the lecture and a brief question and answer session immediately following the lecture. Most lectures are delivered by invited speakers from state universities, and various government ministries such as Defense, Interior, and Foreign Affairs. A portion of the lecture is the responsibility of the NDCT staff. In addition to lectures on these nine topics, distinguished guest speakers are invited to deliver talks on other subjects of interest from time to time. Students are encouraged to undertake additional individual investigations as a supplement to formal lectures.

In addition to lectures, from eight to nine o'clock each day, students are divided into groups for discussion and problem-solving purposes. Each group is called a committee and is concerned with one of the following problem
areas: strategy, politics, economics, social-psychology, and military. Selection to a committee is based on each person's background, academic and technical expertise, and preference. Each committee consists of ten to fifteen members.

Within each committee, a chairperson and other officers of the group are selected by fellow committee members. Attached to each committee is a staff member of the college who acts as a liaison officer between this group and other groups. Each committee will be scheduled to present periodically the results of its study and deliberation of a particular problem to the whole class. The topic chosen is usually within the general boundaries of a particular committee's expertise, i.e., economic topic for the economic committee. A more specific topic within a particular area is determined by members of the committee themselves. After the presentation of each committee, the results are presented to the NDCT, which will formally forward them to the Minister of Defense, and to other appropriate units of government, both civil and military.

One of the most important assignments is the writing of an individual research report. Although each class member has the option of choosing a topic, a common denominator and requirement of all is that each topic must be related to national security. Each student is required to submit the
topic of the research report by the end of October, a little over one month after the class begins. The date for the submission of the final individual report is the following April. All the students are required to present the results of the report in person to the whole class. The final reports are considered by the NDCT before being sent to other units of government to be examined and adopted as official policy, if they are deemed useful to the involved units.

In addition to lectures, group discussions and recommendations, and individual research reports, the NDCT organizes study trips so as to familiarize the students with problems and personnel at the operational level. Each trip inside the country lasts between five days to two weeks. There are five domestic trips to the East, Northeast, North, South, and West, respectively. The trips cover all the provinces, major districts and sensitive districts in each region. Sensitive districts are classified according to the problem of communist insurgency. Students travel together in one group during the domestic trip. Overseas trips last about three weeks in May. The students are divided into five groups for overseas trips. The countries to visit are not fixed, but, in general, the trips are organized according to the following regions, North Asia, South Asia, Australia and the Pacific, Europe, and North America.
The social aspect of activities is emphasized by the NDCT. In fact, the process of social interaction between the military and civil service officers has been emphasized as one of the major goals, besides academic pursuit. To achieve this interaction, an annual meeting is held at the beginning of each academic year. This occasion serves as a welcoming and greeting party for members of the incoming class, and as a reunion for members of all the previous classes. The NDCT also sponsors various kinds of sporting activities for its alumni and current students such as tennis, golf, and bridge tournaments. A reception is arranged for each graduating class, and for members of the National Defense College of other countries during their visits to Thailand.

Comparison with Western Institutions

In order to gain a wider perspective, it may be useful to compare certain features and characteristics of the NDCT with similar institutions in Great Britain, Canada, and the United States. The reason for using these three schools is because they are the leading institutions of this kind in the world.

The first point to be considered is the composition and function of the staff of the institutions. In Great Britain, Canada, and the United States, the position of Commandant or Superintendent is rotated among the three
services. Of the three, Great Britain can be singled out as unique because the Royal College of Defense Studies had two civilians serving as heads from 1960 to 1961 and from 1969 to 1971 (3, p. 43). Each institution's staff consists of both military and civil officers. Military officers were selected from the three branches of services. Civilians came from ministries that have national security responsibility such as Foreign Affairs and Defense. In the United States and Canada, at least one senior diplomat is assigned to serve as Deputy Commandant.

There are three top officers at the NDCT, the Commandant, and two Deputies, one for administration and the other for academics. All these positions have always been filled by military officers, and the position of Commandant has been the preserve of the army. The same had been true for the positions of Deputies until 1982 when a Rear Admiral was appointed Deputy Commandant for administration for the first time. There are no civil service officers serving in the staff capacity at the NDCT even though all branches of services are represented. While the NDCT staff members do teach various courses, their counterparts in Canada and England handle strictly administrative matters. This situation was true of the U.S National War College only until 1971. Since that date the staff members of the U.S. National War College have been active in teaching as well as
handling administrative responsibility. With this
difference in teaching assignment aside, administrative
responsibilities are very similar between the NDCT staff and
those of the three Western institutions. These include:

determining the topic emphases during the course of
study; the development of course outlines; the
preparation of written instructions to various
subjects; the selection and acquisition of readings
dealing with the various subjects emphasized; the
screening, selection, invitation, and escorting of
lecturers; the administration of student assignments;
the administration of field trips; and the provision of
counsel and assistance to students doing individual
research (2, pp. 47-48).

Activities of these institutions can be compared along
several dimensions. In all, lectures are regarded as the
major activity comprising the main part of the course.
Another common activity was committee meetings and seminars.
Only the U.S. National War College offers elective courses.
All the institutions structure their curriculum and main
activities in the first half of the day. The absence of
activity in the afternoon in the case of the NDCT has not
gone without notice among the institution's graduates.
Their comments and suggestions will be presented in a later
chapter. Another common activity is field trips or study
trips which is used as a vehicle for social interaction
among students, and as a source for providing supplemental
information to the formal lectures and discussions at the
schools. With regard to the three Western institutions,

emphasis is placed upon the beneficial impact of the
interaction of these experienced military and civil
servants, both because of its educational impact and because the cross-socialization which occurs is regarded as a device for oiling the wheels of bureaucracy through informal contacts on the job after graduation (3, p. 46).

The length of time for each institution's program varies slightly, with the U.S. War College having a ten-month course, the Canadian College eleven months, and the Royal College of Defence Studies the whole year. The NDCT has a twelve-month program but it uses only half a day. Thus, in comparison, the NDCT's overall academic thrust is clearly less rigorous than the other three.

With regard to student composition, the British school accepts British military and civil service officers and officers from the Commonwealth, non-aligned, and neutral countries. Slightly over half of the total of seventy-five students in each class are British. The total enrollment at the Canadian school is about forty, comprising Canadians, Americans, British, and Australians, with the host students being in the majority. The U.S National War College has the largest student body, about 140 officers for each class. Of these, a quarter are federal civil servants and the rest from the military services (3, pp. 61-90). The NDCT and the U.S. National War College are alike in accepting only their countries' citizens into the programs. On the basis of military to civilian ratio the British and American institutions are alike. The ratio for the Canadian school
is about 50 to 50 percent. The NDCT is closer to the Canadian institution in the military-civilian ratio.

Students in Canada do not have to submit individual reports. Instead they are asked to participate in a group effort to solve a particular national problem assigned by the school. In contrast to this approach, the British and American institutions require the students to write a formal individual research report. The length of the paper for the British school is twenty-five to forty pages while the American institution requires a twenty to twenty-five pages paper. The requirement for the NDCT student's research report is at least fifty typewritten pages. Another method of study at the three Western institutions is simulation of real situations with the aid of computers. The NDCT does not employ this method. Another activity which is lacking at the NDCT is evaluation by the students of the lecture, course arrangements, and other academic and social activities organized by the staff of the institution. In the three Western schools:

each has an elaborate system of self evaluation which involves, among other things, a daily commentary on the adequacy of the speakers; solicitation of student and faculty opinions regarding the quality of individual portions of the course, and summary evaluation device administered at the end of the course and, in the case of the United States, to alumni. The Directing Staff and faculty administer these programs, poll the results, and make detailed recommendations for improvements where appropriate (3, p. 48).
The shortcoming in this respect at the NDCT may be remedied by the recommendations and suggestions of the alumni on a number of points. The study reported here is not, however, comprehensive and can be regarded only as a beginning of an evaluation process of the NDCT which should be carried out on a continual basis as practiced by the three Western institutions.

Composition of NDCT Students: Classes One to Twenty-One

For the NDCT classes one to twenty-one, the ratio between military and civil service officers is roughly about the same with some minor variations. Table III shows the composition of respondents from classes one to twenty-one.

These figures, reflecting responses to the survey, provide a breakdown between military and civil service officers by number and percentage for each of the twenty-one classes. As was pointed out in Chapters I and II, the characteristics of respondents who completed and returned the questionnaire vary little from the make-up of the total student body with regard to those who were military and those who were civil service officers. In this sense, these 346 respondents fairly well represent the former NDCT students from classes one to twenty-one, and any inference and conclusions drawn from the survey data may be regarded as valid for the population as a whole.
Table III

COMPOSITION OF NDCT RESPONDENTS, CLASSES 1-21*  
N=346

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Civilian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>71.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>71.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: NDCT Class Directory, 1981.

Selected Features of Respondents

One may expect that in Thailand, a country with a unitary system of government, nearly all major decisions of national importance usually emanate from the center. This bias toward the center suggests that, in practical terms, people in the central region have an advantage over people from other parts of the country, as far as the ability to
get and hold administrative positions is concerned. In essence, it means that people from the central region dominate in most governmental bureaucracy. Table IV shows the places of origin of all special grade civil service officers in comparison to the breakdown of the population by regions.

**TABLE IV**

PLACES OF ORIGIN OF THE SPECIAL GRADE OFFICERS AND GENERAL POPULATION BY REGION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>% of Officials</th>
<th>% of Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(n=2,160)</td>
<td>(n=41.3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>68.19</td>
<td>38.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>10.84</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>9.44</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>11.02</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No information</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Dhiravegin (2).*

Table IV was adapted from a study of the Thai bureaucratic elite in which 2,160 special grade civil service officers constituted one part of the population of that study (2, p. 81). About two-thirds of these officers were from the central region while the rest were distributed almost equally from the other three regions. In terms of ratio between the percentage of officers and people in a
region, the central region has more than its share of the ratio of the population in the number of officials. The northern people are underrepresented in the number of special grade officers and those from the northeastern were underrepresented even more. Only in the south is the ratio between officers and population close.

It is possible to compare the places of origin of respondents to those of the civil bureaucratic elites reported by Dhiravegin in order to find out if there is any variation between the two groups. Table V shows places of origin of respondents from classes one to twenty-one.

### TABLE V

PLACES OF ORIGIN OF NDCT STUDENT CLASSES ONE TO TWENTY-ONE BY REGION

| Regions       | Number of NDCT Students |  
|---------------|--------------------------|---
|               | N = 346                  |   |
|               | No.                      | %  |
| Central       | 233                      | 67.3 |
| North         | 39                       | 11.3 |
| Northeast     | 33                       | 9.5  |
| South         | 27                       | 7.8  |
| No information| 14                       | 4.0  |

*Source: Questionnaire mailed to respondents, Winter, 1986.*
Table V shows the distribution of the NDCT respondents according to their regions of origin. To ascertain this information, respondents were asked to indicate the dialects that they could use comfortably in their daily life. A usual way of trying to get this type of information is to ask from which region a person came. However, a problem with this approach is the way an official advances through his career, a progression that obscures the region of origins. If he is from outside of the capital, the official typically went to primary and secondary schools in his hometown. But after this stage, it was almost without exception that further schooling at the university level had to be obtained in the capital. This situation had been true up until the mid 1960's when regional universities were being added to the country's university system. The subjects of this study were educated either at universities in the capital or abroad. Upon becoming government officials, these people customarily try to settle in the vicinity of the capital. While they may retain a tie to the provinces, many would become residents of the capital region. Thus asking a question directly about a person's original region may not get the real answer. To avoid this pitfall, dialects were used instead as a basis for determining a person's region of origin. If a person was born and reared in the central region, the central dialect...
would be the only one he knew. For respondents from other regions, they would indicate their native dialect along with the central dialect, which is the official means of communication. In this case, it was the dialect from the other three regions that indicated the region from which they came.

In comparing Table IV and Table V, there are both similarities and differences. The data in Table IV are limited to individuals who were level seven and above civil service officers while Table V data concern both civil and military officers. In overall terms, it can be said that the distributions of region of origin are similar between the subjects of this study and members of the civil service officers of the other study (2). The conclusion that pertains to both is that people from the central region are predominant in the upper echelon of the government bureaucracy.

The following Table provides a breakdown among the respondents into the military and civil service groups. It is done in order to find out if there is any difference in the distribution of the region of origin between the two groups.
TABLE VI

PLACES OF ORIGIN OF NDCT STUDENTS BY OCCUPATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Origin</th>
<th>Military (n=164)</th>
<th>Civilian (n=168)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>67.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Questionnaire mailed to respondents, Winter, 1986.

Table VI displays places of origin of NDCT students by military and civil service occupations. As in the previous two tables, central region is predominant. Southerners are somewhat underrepresented in the military while those from the central region are a bit overrepresented, using the figures from the previous two tables as the basis for comparison. On the civilian side, the figures resemble those in Table IV, a similarity which means that no significant difference in the region of origin exists between NDCT students and the total special grade officers of the other study.

Another dimension of language proficiency was probed by asking respondents to indicate foreign languages that they could use with ease. English was mentioned by 82 percent of the respondents. French was mentioned by 4.3 percent, and
German and Chinese were mentioned each by 1.2 percent of the respondents. The remainder of the respondents provided either "other category" response without mentioning the name or no answer. It can be seen that English is the most important foreign language for the great majority of NDCT students. This finding should not come as a surprise since Thailand has had extensive relations with England and, after the Second World War, with the United States.

Political Significance of NDCT Students

In terms of numbers, the NDCT graduates comprised a very small fraction of total government employees. Nevertheless, in terms of their effects on the politics and administration of the country, these officers were at the center of power. One can explore this assertion using two approaches. The first is from a purely administrative perspective and the second from the political one. An examination of official positions of members of the the NDCT classes one to twenty-one will verify this assertion.

Civil Administration Positions

The top officers of a civil ministry are the minister, the deputy minister, the undersecretary, the deputy undersecretary, the division chief, and the section chief, respectively. The first two positions are filled by non-career personnel or elected members of parliament. The
other posts are reserved for career officials. The Ministry of Defense follows the same pattern, but the "pecking order" of the military itself requires further elaboration. In Thailand, especially after the military seizure of power in 1957, the army is the most powerful of the three armed services. Within the army, officers who command troops in the field are deemed to be more powerful than officers of the same rank who do not command troops. A field general has more clout than a headquarters general. Relations in the navy and air force follow the same pattern, but to a lesser extent. Thus, field officers, especially army field officers, dominate the Ministry of Defense.

As stated earlier, only career government officials with certain qualifications are admitted to the NDCT. The progress of these officials' career may be measured by looking at their last official position before retirement. By looking at the final positions that these officials had reached, it is possible to project the general influences of the NDCT and its graduates on the politics and administration of the country.

The highest political and administrative position in the Thai government is the prime minister. Between September, 1957 and 1986. Thailand has had nine premiers, four of whom were career army officers before assuming the post. In this time span of twenty-nine years, the civilian
prime ministers were in control of the government for four years and one month. Of the four prime ministers with military backgrounds, all were graduates of the Royal Thai Army Academy, and three were also graduates of the National Defense College. Of the five non-military premiers, one was a graduate of the NDCT. Thus, of the nine prime ministers in twenty-nine years, four were graduates of the NDCT. It is even more striking if the years in power of these officers are considered because the duration of government under civilian leadership had been rather brief. Thus, graduates of the NDCT have occupied the highest position in the Thai government for about twenty years out of the past twenty-nine years, starting from 1957 which was the last year of the first phase of modern Thai politics. For example, Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn, NDCT Class one, was in the post for ten years. Another alumnus of the same class, Prime Minister Sanya Thammasak, who was appointed by the King following the student uprising that drove Thanom and his clique into exile in October, 1973, was in office for one year and four months. The third alumnus was General Kriangsak Chomanan, NDCT Class Five, who was the head of government for two years and three months. The current prime minister, General Prem Tinsulanonda, NDCT Class Nine, has been in office since March, 1980. The number of premiers, and especially the number of years they were heads
of government, make it clear that NDCT graduates have had significant influence on the overall directions of politics and administration of the country.

At the level below the prime minister, NDCT graduates have occupied a number of important posts in government over the years. The first class was the most illustrious by having ten of its members as ministers, in addition to two premiers. The ministries that were under the direction of graduates of class one were Communications, Foreign Affairs, Economic Affairs, Defense, Agriculture and Cooperatives, Interior, and Cultural Affairs. Class Two had four ministers in Interior, Finance, and Communications. Two members of this class led the same ministry at different times. Two members of Class Three became deputy prime ministers. Of these, one later became head of Interior, and subsequently, Defense. Another two became ministers of Defense in two governments. There were also two more who became ministers of the Office of the Prime Minister, and Commerce. Altogether, members of Class Three reached the top posts in four ministries.

One member of Class Four became deputy prime minister. Eight were ministers in six ministries—Foreign Affairs, Office of the Prime Minister, Industry, Communications, and Defense. One member of Class Five became head of three ministries—Finance, Agriculture and Cooperatives, and
Defense. The Ministry of Science and Technology and the Office of the Prime Minister had two members of this class as chiefs. Three members of Class Six headed the Ministries of Education, Foreign Affairs, and Industry. Three officers from Class Seven ran Finance and the Prime Minister Office. Similarly, Class Eight had three members running Education, Justice, and Communications. Class Nine was the last group that had a large number of its members appointed to run ministries. Five ministries were under the leadership of members of this group, namely, Justice, Premier Office, Defense, Public Health, and University Affairs. For the remainder of the classes under consideration, only four had their members appointed as ministers. Classes Ten and Fourteen each had one member as head of Interior and Foreign Affairs, respectively. Two from Class Fifteen headed Interior and Commerce. One from Class Eighteen ran the Ministry of Education.

The information is summarized according to each position in Table VII. The table shows the class number of individuals holding the position, including a repetition of the class number when two or more alumni from a given year held the position. For examples, two members from Class One became Prime Ministers. They are represented by the numbers 1 and 1.
# TABLE VII

NUMBER OF NDCT ALUMNI IN IMPORTANT GOVERNMENT POSITIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Number* of NDCT Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>1-1-5-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Prime Minister</td>
<td>1-3-3-4-6-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Defense</td>
<td>3-3-3-4-5-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Interior</td>
<td>1-1-2-3-5-10-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Communications</td>
<td>2-2-4-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Commerce</td>
<td>1-3-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of the Prime Minister</td>
<td>3-4-4-4-4-5-7-7-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>4-6-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
<td>2-5-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Industry</td>
<td>4-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
<td>1-6-8-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
<td>1-1-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Public Health</td>
<td>1-1-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
<td>1-8-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of State Universities</td>
<td>1-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Science and Technology</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Minister of Defense</td>
<td>1-2-2-2-4-4-4-5-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Minister of Interior</td>
<td>3-4-6-6-9-11-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Minister of Communications</td>
<td>4-7-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Minister of Finance</td>
<td>1-2-5-11-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Minister of Industry</td>
<td>2-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Minister of Agriculture</td>
<td>5-8-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Minister of Public Health</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undersecretary of Defense</td>
<td>1-1-2-2-2-2-3-5-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undersecretary of Interior</td>
<td>1-4-9-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undersecretary of Communications</td>
<td>1-3-3-8-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undersecretary of P.M. Office</td>
<td>8-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undersecretary of Commerce</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>1-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undersecretary of Finance</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undersecretary of Industry</td>
<td>1-2-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undersecretary of Education</td>
<td>2-2-3-4-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undersecretary of Agriculture</td>
<td>1-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undersecretary of Public Health</td>
<td>3-6-7-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undersecretary of Justice</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undersecretary of State University</td>
<td>11-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undersecretary of Science</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undersecretary of Cultural Affairs</td>
<td>1-1-1-3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Repeated number indicates that more than one alumnus of the class held the position.
Altogether, four former NDCT students became prime ministers, six became deputy prime ministers, fifty-three reached the post of minister, and thirty-one, the position of deputy minister. In other words, ninety-four former NDCT students took control of the positions which are normally occupied by civilian politicians in other parliamentary democracies or in Thailand itself during the democratic regimes in a quarter of a century. For the position of undersecretary, the one normally occupied by career officers, forty-six were able to achieve that post.

In order to see the change that occurred to the pattern of the NDCT students' influence over the government, an examination of the ratio of those officials who became leaders of the government among the three clusters is necessary. The positions which will be used for this purpose are minister, deputy minister and undersecretary. The ratio among the three clusters for the the first cluster consists of classes one to seven, the second cluster eight to fourteen, and the last cluster fifteen to twenty-one. The number among the three clusters for the position of minister is, clusters I:II:III = 41:10:3. In terms of ratio, the numbers are 13.6:3.3:1.

The number of NDCT graduates who had risen to the position of minister drops steadily from clusters one to two to three. From the total of forty-one ministers in cluster
one, the number drops to only ten from cluster two, or only about 25 percent of the number in the previous cluster. Using cluster one as the base, members of cluster three constitute only 7.5 percent of members of the first cluster. Members of cluster three constitute 30 percent of members of cluster two, using the latter cluster as the base. In other words, there was a reduction of 75 percent between members of cluster one and two, 70 percent between two and three, and 92.5 percent between one and three.

The comparison of the number of members of the three clusters for the position of deputy minister is, I:II:III = 22:7:2. In terms of ratio, the figures are 11:3.5:1.

The reduction in the number of NDCT graduates who reached this post followed the same pattern. That is, while twenty-two were able to reach this post from the first cluster, only seven from cluster Two and two from the third cluster were able to do so. When a comparison is made between members of the first and second clusters who had reached the position of deputy minister, there were twenty-two persons from the former and seven from the latter. Seven is 31.8 percent of twenty-two. Based on cluster one, there is a reduction of 68.2 percent in the number of members of cluster two. Between members of the first and third clusters, twenty-two were from the former and two from the latter. Two is 9.1 percent of twenty-two.
Based on the number of members of cluster one, there is a reduction of 91.9 percent in the number of members of cluster three. A similar comparison can be made between members of the second and third clusters. Two is equal to 28.6 percent of seven. Using cluster two members as the basis for comparison, there is a decrease of 71.4 percent in the number of members of cluster three.

The number of members of the three clusters who became undersecretary is thirty-two, twelve, and one for the first, second, and third clusters. On the basis of ratio, the relationship among I:II:III is 32:12:1.

A similar pattern can be seen in the number of NDCT graduates who became undersecretaries. The number declined from thirty-two to twelve, and then to one. In percentage terms and based on the first cluster, 36.36 percent were found in the second cluster, and only 3.03 percent were left in the third cluster. Based on the second cluster, only 8.3 percent remained. In short, a reduction of 63.64 percent occurred between one and two, 91.67 percent between two and three, and 96.97 percent between one and three.

A summary of this total is in the following figure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ratio</td>
<td>92.5 %</td>
<td>75.0 %</td>
<td>70.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MINISTER</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>91.9 %</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 92.5 % | 75.0 % | 70.0 % |
From Figure 4, one can see that the first seven classes of NDCT graduates made the strongest imprint on the politics and administration of the country in the sense of being able to direct official actions from the three most important posts in each ministry, namely, the minister, the deputy minister, and the undersecretary positions. It also worth repeating that four prime minister, including the present one, in the past twenty-nine years were NDCT graduates. These were the years from 1957 to 1965 in which the military completely dominated the political and administrative arenas. Even though Marshal Sarit died in December, 1963, this era clearly reflected his desire to put competent technocrats in charge of administering the country. In the sense that the NDCT graduates represented the cream of the career military and civil bureaucrats, this elevation to strategic posts in most ministries fulfilled one wish of the military leader of the period regarding the aims and objectives of the NDCT.
According to an authority on Thai politics during this period:

through socialization at the Defense College, Sarit was able to persuade most top echelon civilian bureaucrats of the urgency of national development and the linked problems of national security, which had to be handled primarily by the armed forces supported by a loyal civil service (1, p. 364).

In comparison to subsequent classes, the first one was the most illustrious. According to one author, "reading the name-list of the first graduating class is like reading from Who's Who in Thailand (1, p. 368)." A closer examination and analysis may yield some clue as to the reasons for the declining stature and influence of later classes in the sense that they were not able to reach the same bureaucratic plateaus, both in number and significance, as the members of the first class.

On the military side, it is clear that the majority of officers selected to attend the first class were loyal supporters of the prime minister. For example, Field Marshals Thanom Kittikachorn and Prapas Charusatian were the leader's trusted lieutenants. Other lesser military officers were almost without exception members of the core group that helped Sarit seize power in 1957. Another factor that accounted for the remarkable record of this group of military officers was their age. Thanom and Prapas were forty-four and forty-three years old when they graduated from the class. Air Chief Marshals Dhawee Chulasap and
Kamol Dechatungka, who were later to become Deputy Prime Minister and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, respectively, were forty-one and thirty-eight years old. In contrast, the overwhelming majority of the military members from subsequent classes were over fifty years of age when they finished the course. Thus, age and connections appear to be the two main reasons explaining the apparent career success of military officers from the first class.

On the civil service officer side, the career progress of these people was indicative of their capabilities. Since it was the first class and the selection process had not been firmly established, many of these officers were probably selected by the prime minister himself on the basis of their intellectual and technical ability, and their potential as future leading bureaucrats. Indeed the civilian members of the first class turned out to be outstanding leaders of government in later years. In fact, this is the only class from which both a military and a civil service officer later became prime ministers.

In addition to age, connection, and technical expertise as factors explaining the success of the first class in their careers, the increase in the overall number of government officials in comparison to the number admitted to the NDCT can be regarded as a crucial factor. While more and more officials became qualified to be selected to attend
the institution, the quota allotted to each ministry had remained virtually the same as in the earlier years. To illustrate this point, one can presume the existence of six equally qualified officers in a ministry that had a quota of two seats. The following scenario then develops. The ministry made its choices, and, as a result, two qualified officers of that ministry graduated from the NDCT while four did not. Despite the lack of experience, credentials, and prestige normally associated with NDCT education, the four not selected had all other necessary qualifications comparable to the other two and, therefore, had an equal chance of being promoted to the top position in his ministry. For this particular ministry, the NDCT graduates had a one to two chance of getting to the top post in that ministry over the non-graduate. However, as qualified officers increased over the years, the reverse became the case. Ultimately, there were ten qualified persons, but only the same two seats were allotted to this ministry. The situation then was that eight non-graduates were vying for the top post against two NDCT graduates. This situation was occurring in every ministry. As the overall number of qualified government officials increases, the chance of NDCT graduates reaching the top of the ministry is becoming more and more remote. Thus, this is one explanation for the progressive decline in the number of NDCT graduates who made it to the top of their respective ministries.
There is also the factor of the changing political situation in the country. An NDCT graduate of the first cluster had a much better chance of being selected minister, deputy minister, and/or undersecretary because the practice of appointing career officers to head a ministry was still acceptable. For those in the second cluster, chances of rising to the top were still quite good, though not as good as people in the first cluster, since this was the time in which the military still dominated politics, albeit to a lesser extent than the time of the first cluster. The general climate of the third cluster was one of lessened military involvement in politics and administration.

In essence, the career success of alumni from each cluster suggests that the influence of the NDCT alumni was strongest, as expressed in the total number of them being appointed to the three highest positions in each ministry, during the time when the military almost totally dominated both political activities and the administrative system of the country, that is, roughly from 1957 to 1965. As the leader of the 1957 coup passed from the scene, political power became less concentrated. As this process was occurring, the influence of the NDCT graduates over the government was correspondingly reduced. When the leading faction of the army was driven into exile and political power became available to students, politicians, and other
non-military groups, the influence of the NDCT graduates, as expressed in the number of the top posts in government, had reached a very low level.

**Military Positions**

On the military side, the most important post was the position of Commander-in-Chief. Fourteen members of the first cluster became chiefs of the three services, five in the army, five in the navy, and four in the air force. From the second cluster, four graduates reached the top of the services: two in the army and one each in the navy and air force. In the last cluster, there were three: two navy and one air force. The comparative number of members of the three clusters is 14:4:3. The ratio for this is 4.7:1.3:1. Based on the first cluster, 28 percent reached the same position for the second cluster, and 21 percent the third cluster. Based on the second cluster, only 75 percent of the third cluster reached the same position. The reduction can be illustrated in the following figure.

![Figure 5](image-url)

Fig. 5--A reduction by percentage in the number of NDCT alumni for the position of Commander-in-Chief of the three services among the three clusters.
In comparison with the earlier considerations of the positions of minister, deputy minister, and undersecretary that members of the three clusters of NDCT alumni were able to reach, attention is now given to the positions of chiefs of military services in each branch that were occupied by alumni of the NDCT. The difference in number of alumni reaching these positions is not as great as the difference among alumni reaching the top post of civil ministries. While fourteen members of the first cluster made it to the top of each service, only four of the second cluster and three of the third cluster did so. Four is 28 percent and three is 21 percent of fourteen. Based on the number of members of the first cluster, there was a decrease of 72 percent for members of the second cluster, and a reduction of 79 percent in the number of members of the third cluster. A notable difference between the civil ministry and military ministry occurs in the comparison of the second and the third clusters. For the position of military chief, there is a reduction of 25 percent. For the positions of minister, deputy minister, and undersecretary, the reductions are 70 percent, 71.4 percent, and 91.6 percent respectively.
Summary

This chapter attempts to examine the NDCT in terms of its missions, goals, curriculum, and activities. A comparison with similar institutions in the United States, Great Britain, and Canada puts the NDCT in a broader perspective in the sense that one can discern strong points, as well as shortcomings, in the operations of the institution. From this comparison, it is found that one weakness of the NDCT has been the lack of an evaluation system. From the institutional standpoint, attention shifts to the NDCT alumni. Efforts are made to compare regions of origin of respondents with those of the senior officers in all the civil ministries. There are no noticeable differences between respondents and senior officers of the civil ministries. This comparison suggests that the NDCT selection process, varied though it was from one ministry to another and from one year to the next, pretty much reflected the distribution of regions of origin among senior government officers as a whole. Attention is then shifted to the consideration of the possible involvement of NDCT alumni in politics. One way of finding out is to consider the number of NDCT alumni who occupied the highest positions in each ministry. Being at the helm of government means having control over the processes of administration and, at least until the early 1970's, of politics. From an
examination of the number of NDCT alumni who occupied top posts in all the ministries, it is evident that the influence of NDCT alumni over the government has been declining.
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CHAPTER IV

PERCEPTIONS AND ESTIMATES OF NDCT ALUMNI

This chapter deals with estimates and perceptions of the NDCT graduates in various aspects. The first part is the alumni's perception of the factors that helped in their selection. Effects of the NDCT on its graduates at the institutional and personal levels are then considered next. These include alumni estimates of the NDCT in terms of the activity/experience, assistance from other students, contributions to official performance, and contribution to promotion. This chapter will conclude with alumni perception of the institution's goals, and of the institution's contributions to the administration of the country.

The respondents were asked in the first part of the questionnaire to indicate the most important factor that determined their selection to attend the NDCT. These factors are, quota, seniority, ability, personal support from superior, and other factors. The results are shown below on the basis of occupation and cluster. Table VIII shows the results according to occupation.
TABLE VIII

FACTORS THAT HELPED IN THE SELECTION PROCESS, BY OCCUPATION*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(n=172)</td>
<td>(n=162)**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quota</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniority</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>41.9</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Support</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Questionnaire mailed to NDCT alumni, Winter, 1986.

**Missing cases = 12.

A larger percentage of military personnel indicated that quota and seniority were important factors determining their selection than did civil service officers. This seems to show that the military profession put more emphasis on this kind of consideration when it comes to the matter of selection to attend the NDCT. The civil service group had slightly more people expressing the opinion that ability was the most important factor. Twice as many civil service respondents as military personnel felt that personal support from one's superior was the deciding factor. Within each category, seniority was regarded as the most important factor determining the selection. For the civilian group, the next most important factor was ability, followed by
quota and personal support from superior. For the military, the next most important factor was quota, followed by ability, and personal support. Thus, both civil service and military officers regarded seniority as the most important factor that determined their selection to attend the NDCT.

One can also consider factors on the basis of cluster to find out if graduates from three environmental contexts attach the same level of significance to similar factors.

TABLE IX

FACTOR THAT HELPED IN THE SELECTION PROCESS, BY CLUSTER*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Cluster I (n=82)</th>
<th>Cluster II (n=133)</th>
<th>Cluster III (n=119)**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quota</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniority</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>44.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Support</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Questionnaire mailed to NDCT alumni, winter, 1986.

**Missing cases = 12.

Within each cluster, seniority was regarded as the most important factor that determined the selection to attend the NDCT. For cluster one, the other factors that were considered to be significant in descending order from
seniority were ability, quota, and personal support. In the second cluster, quota was picked by the same percentage of respondents, 33.8, as seniority. Ability and personal support were chosen by 22.5 percent and 7.5 percent, respectively. In the third cluster, the factors were quota, ability, and personal support, in descending order.

In both the ability and personal support factors, the percentage of respondents decreased from the first to the third clusters. For the personal support factor category, the percentage declined between the first and the second, but stayed the same between the second and the third. It can be observed here that the members of the first cluster put more value on the significance of this factor than members of the other two clusters because connection with and support from one's superior were not regarded in the same way among members of the three clusters. The members of the first cluster were more confident of their ability than those in the second and the third cluster. The level of confidence in one's own ability as the most important factor that determined one's selection declined over three clusters. This finding may be interpreted to mean that, according to the perceptions of these officials, the selection of government officials to attend the NDCT over the years was carried out with increasing emphasis on the basis of seniority, while the factor of ability declined in significance.
Estimated Values of NDCT Programs and Activities

Several types of programs were arranged by the NDCT as parts of the overall effort at providing the best possible educational, social, and practical environment for the students. Over the years, however, improvements and adjustments were made with only minimal and informal feedback from the students. The alumni were never asked to make suggestions and recommendations about the NDCT to NDCT staff members. The present study asked alumni to provide their evaluations of the activities and programs associated with the course. The respondents were given a list of activities from which they were asked to rate the value of each. Each of these activities was aimed at achieving the long-term and short-term goals of the NDCT. A brief mention of each item should make clear its nature and how it fits in with the overall plans of the NDCT. The assessment and evaluation of each activity/experience provides a good indicator of the extent to which the goals of the NDCT have been reached. The statements about NDCT activities and programs can be found in section B of Appendix A.

One item, "the experience of being in an academic environment, away from everyday routine and stress," is not really the aim of the institution per se. It was included with other items in order to find out whether the respondents would recognize that this statement has very
little to do with the other items on the same list. If many respondents found this to be the situation during their pilgrimage at the institution, it would mean that the NDCT experience may have contributed to a reduction from the worry and weariness of routine job obligations and other task-related stress.

"The opportunity to listen to and meet with authorities in various fields" means that students were able to broaden their perspective on the problems of national security and development. This statement really encompasses the experience of lectures, study trips, and associations with other students.

"Association with other students" is straightforward as it pertains to one specific occurrence. Social interaction is one of the main goals of the institution to bring high-ranking officials from various ministries together in the hope that future cooperation and coordination can be achieved. Although this aim was not explicitly stated, it is nevertheless one of the most important among the overall plans.

"Overseas and domestic trips" are organized for each class so that a student can have a first hand and fresh look at the problems facing the country at a particular time. Since the NDCT is directly responsible for the planning, organization, and execution of these trips, this activity
has been rather costly in comparison with other programs. A more serious concern to the NDCT than the cost has been the charge from critics of the school that these are nothing more than a government-sponsored junket for the high-ranking government officials. A number of respondents have alluded to this activity in the recommendation and comment sections of the questionnaire and their remarks will be discussed in the last part of this chapter.

"Individual research project" is the one major requirement that each student has to meet before graduation. Ideally, this requirement has been regarded as very useful to both the student and the government. For the former, this paper is a good chance to express the views and ideas on a particular topic or area of interest. For the latter, these project results are a source of possible solutions to different kinds of national problems. Moreover, the value of these projects can be readily appreciated when it is realized that people who wrote them were the ones who had to face these problems, not as an abstraction, but in reality. In comparison to other activities and requirements, this one requires active participation on the part of the student.

"Prescribed course work" refers mainly to lectures delivered by knowledgeable people from many fields during the lecture period portion of the course. Specific contents of the lecture may vary from one year to another but the
major thrust has been to expose the students to a wide array of topics relating to national security and national development.

The respondents were asked to indicate or designate a value to each of these activities/experience at the NDCT. The most valuable experience was to be given a numerical value of six. The next most valuable experience in a descending order would be assigned the value of five, and so on. The least valuable experience was to be given the value of one. These designations were used for the construction of a priority of value index for these six experiences/activities. If the study trip is regarded as extremely valuable by thirteen persons, for example, the scores for this first value will be thirteen multiplied by six, which is equal to seventy-eight. For the next value, very valuable, if sixty people made this choice, the scores for this value would be sixty multiplied by five, or 300. If there were five people selecting the least valuable option, the total scores for this one would be five. Table X shows the frequency of values given to each experience/activity by the respondents.

According to this table, VI has the numerical value of six and is called the most valuable experience/activity, V has the numerical value of five and is called the very
TABLE X
FREQUENCY OF VALUE FOR EACH ACTIVITY/EXPERIENCE*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity/Experience</th>
<th>Range of Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom from Routine Work (F)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meet Experts (M)</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know Other Students (K)</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study Trips (S)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Research Report (I)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lecture at NDCT (L)</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Questionnaire mailed to NDCT alumni, winter, 1986.

valuable experience/activity, and so on to I which has the numerical value of one and is called the least valuable experience/activity. The missing cases for each category are: (F)=27, (M)=37, (K)=49, (S)=51, (I)=52, and (L)=57. By summing up the values for each experience/activity, a comparison can be made about their priority as indicated by respondents. The results can be arranged in the order from the most to the least valuable as indicated by the total scores given to each experience/activity as follows:

(1) Lecture  = 1044 + 240 + 176 + 87 + 78 + 5 = 1590
(2) Know Other Students = 528 + 455 + 248 + 144 + 132 + 4 = 1231
(3) Meet Experts  = 294 + 465 + 248 + 129 + 90 + 5 = 1059
(4) Study Trips  = 78 + 300 + 336 + 243 + 90 + 12 = 1059
(5) Individual Research Report = 48 + 145 + 120 + 168 + 240 + 51 = 772
(6) Freedom From Routine Work  = 6 + 45 + 64 + 69 + 18 + 211 = 453
In terms of priority of value, the first on the list among the six items is "lecture." It means government officials believed that they had been able to broaden their knowledge as a result of listening to lectures. As this was one important objective of the institution, it can be interpreted that this aim was achieved as planned. The next most valuable experience/activity was the chance to meet other students. This goal was listed under the social activity heading, but in reality it was a very important, albeit implicit, aim of the NDCT. If the graduates did not feel that they were meeting people with high potential and bright future prospects, and that their contacts did not really mean much to them, this implicit aim would not have been realized. So the placement of this experience as the next most valuable on the priority of value list indicated that another aim had been achieved. The next item, meeting experts, really was a combination of the previous two and it can be taken to mean a reaffirmation of their values. "Study trips" received the same points as "meet experts." This was a major part of the activity of each NDCT class, but the relatively low value accorded to it may lend some justification to the critics' charges that the costs for the trips do not justify the results.

"Individual research report" was rated next to the least valuable activity/experience. This was a rather
serious verdict on perhaps the most important requirement of
the school. Since this was the first time a survey was
carried out, this low opinion of the value of the individual
research report indicates that this activity needs to be
reviewed and, if possible, an action should be taken to
remedy the situation. More detailed views of respondents
about this requirement will be considered subsequently,
together with observations about the other
activities/experiences on the list. "Freedom from routine
work" is last on the list of priority of value and this
shows that NDCT students did not consider this type of
freedom to be of any significant value.

Effects of the NDCT at the Institutional Level

The effects of the NDCT can be perceived at the
institutional level. As a group of senior government
officials, NDCT graduates can make a concerted effort in
tackling problems that are not confined to only one
ministry's jurisdiction and responsibility. To cite one
example, the problem of communist insurgency cuts across the
line of responsibility of both the military and many
departments within the civil service sector. If those
insurgents posed a threat to the well-being of the
population in an area, the military was responsible for
trying to neutralize such a danger. Once the immediate
danger was gone, it became necessary for the government to
try to correct the underlying causes that may be contributing factors to the problem in the first place. These may range from the unavailability of irrigated land, to poor health among the people, lack of roads and other public facilities, and a whole host of other causes. Before the establishment of the NDCT, the Thai bureaucracy in the late 1950's "was a fragmented institution whose support for the regime was channeled through particularistic ties to specific representatives in the top echelon of the government (1, p. 361)." The NDCT was set up as a place in which government officials have a chance to broaden their approaches to national problems, and later on these officials would use the knowledge and contact gained at the NDCT to cooperate and coordinate in performing their duty.

One basic aim of the NDCT has been to get the prospective leaders of government to know each other in the hope that, after returning to their ministries, any national policy that requires interministry cooperation will be easily accomplished through personal contacts among people at the top echelon of government. If alumni agreed that their colleagues had been helpful to them in performing their official duties, it would mean that the NDCT has contributed something to the government operations. In short, the effects of the NDCT at the institutional level have been positive. Respondents were asked to estimate the
value of contact with other students both from the same class and other classes in terms of their contributions to the performance of official functions. Their responses are summarized in Table XI.

TABLE XI

ESTIMATES OF ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER NDCT ALUMNI, BY OCCUPATION*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Military (n=170) (%)</th>
<th>Civilian (n=171) (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Highly helpful</td>
<td>27.05</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helpful</td>
<td>68.82</td>
<td>57.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion/Undecided</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Helpful</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Questionnaire mailed to NDCT alumni, winter, 1986.

**Missing cases = 5.

From Table XI, one can see that both groups rated the value of contacts with other students as positive. Because this statement on which this table is based specified the official nature of the task that would be assisted, it suggested that the objective of getting officials to know one another so that they can be of mutual assistance has been achieved as far as the first twenty-one classes were concerned. There is one qualification, however. People at
different levels of government have different effects on the performance of the system; i.e., those at the higher level have more than those at the lower level. In this sense, if NDCT graduates of later classes were not reaching the same posts in comparable number with those from earlier classes, the intensity of influences over the operation of government would be less despite the expressed feeling that contacts made at the college were helpful in the official capacity of the respondents.

Another way of looking at the effects of the NDCT at the institutional level is through the following outline. The school could be judged to be running successfully if graduates later became chiefs or leading members of their respective ministries or armed forces. In this sense, the objective was reached with regard to the first cluster since a large number of graduates did become leaders of most ministries. But the effects at the institutional level were being steadily eroded as fewer and fewer graduates were able to reach the top. If this trend continues, the effectiveness of the NDCT in this sense will be increasingly reduced. In the following figure, each X represents a government officer who graduated from the NDCT while each 0 represents a person who did not. The first three rows represent the three top positions in each ministry, the minister, the deputy minister, and the undersecretary. The
next three rows represent the next three positions in descending hierarchical order below the post of undersecretary. This figure depicts the institutional effects of the decreasing number of NDCT graduates at the top positions in all the ministries over the years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster I</th>
<th>Cluster II</th>
<th>Cluster III</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>XXXXOOXOXOXOOXXX</td>
<td>XXOOXOXOXXOOXXOOXO</td>
<td>OOOOXXOOOOOOOOOOOOXO00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXXXXXXXXOOXOXOX</td>
<td>0000XXOXOOXXOOXO00</td>
<td>X00000000000000000000000000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXXXXXXXOXOXXXXX</td>
<td>XX00XXOXOOXX00XO0</td>
<td>O00000X00000000000000000000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000000000XXO000</td>
<td>0000000000XX00XX0X</td>
<td>XXXXXXXXX0000XX00XX0X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>000000000000000000</td>
<td>000000000000000000000000000000</td>
<td>OOOOOOOOXXXX00XX00XX0X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>000000000000000000</td>
<td>000XXXXXX00XX00XX0X0X</td>
<td>XXXXXXXXXXX0XX00XX0X0X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6--Relative positions of NDCT graduates in government over the years.

From Figure 6, each cluster represents one time period, 1957-1965, 1966-1972, and 1973-1979. It attempts to graphically display the changing roles and effects of the NDCT graduates in the bureaucracy. For the first cluster's time span, this figure depicts that NDCT graduates hold the top three positions in large number. From these they were able to get in touch directly with one another before sending their well coordinated orders and directives down the line. The number of NDCT graduates in the three next lower positions was small in the first cluster. In the second cluster's environment, the number of NDCT graduates at this level begins to decrease. This reduction causes a
corresponding loss in the lines of communications among ministries. Within the third cluster environment, most NDCT graduates now occupy the positions at the lower level in the hierarchy and the effects of their joint efforts are now confined to this level. The fruits of the cooperation and coordination of NDCT graduates now have a greatly reduced overall effect. Thus, the institutional effects of the NDCT are less than they had been in the past.

Effects of the NDCT at the Personal Level

The effects of the NDCT on its graduates at the personal level can be estimated from the attitudes and reactions of respondents over a wide range of issues. For example, a civil service officer may increase his understanding of military subjects while military officers may become more familiar with a topic such as the balance of trade and its effects on the country’s security position. Moreover, it is possible to estimate the effects of the NDCT on the basis of each respondent’s perceptions of his career advancement in comparison to his colleagues, and on the basis of his perception of the contribution of the NDCT to the promotion consideration.
Estimates of NDCT Contributions to Career Progress

In the following table, respondents were asked to compare their career progress to colleagues of comparable rank, educational backgrounds, and professional qualifications from the same or similar governmental units who had not been selected to attend the NDCT. This statement can be found in Appendix A, section C, number eight.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Military (n=169) (%)</th>
<th>Civil Service (n=170) (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Career Progress</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Helpful</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helpful</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>39.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Helpful/No Effect</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>52.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cause Damage</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Questionnaire mailed to NDCT alumni, winter, 1986.

**Missing Observations=7.

Table XII reveals a difference in the perception of civil service and military officers with regard to the contributions of the NDCT to career progress. Although the
exact figures are not available, the officers who meet the minimum requirement for admission to the NDCT must number in the thousands each year. For example, there were 2,160 civil service special grade officers surveyed by Dhiravegin (2, p. 12) in 1974 alone. This figure does not include members of the armed forces at the rank of special colonel and above. Of course, the number of retiring officers must be taken into account. However, the yearly addition to the number of special grade officers, those at level seven and above, as a result of the adjustment in the personnel system must be taken into account also. As was pointed out in Chapter II, a level six officer may be assigned to a post in a year while, in the next year after the position adjustment, only level seven officer is eligible for assignment to the same position. According to a report in a local newspaper (5), 172 level six officers of the Ministry of Education were adjusted en masse in August, 1986, to become level seven officers. This is only one example from one ministry. If the data from the adjustment in every ministry could be compiled, it certainly would have meant that in each year there are several thousands level seven civil service officers who meet the NDCT requirements. When the number of military officers is added to this, it should become obvious that there must be a large number of government officials who meet the minimum requirements for admission to the NDCT each year.
Since the number of officials actually selected each year was very small, there must have been many non-graduates with which the comparison can be made. The majority of military officers thought that the NDCT experience had been helpful or very helpful to their career progress: 11.8 percent in the very helpful category and 46.2 percent in the helpful category. However, 42.0 percent thought that it was not helpful or had no effects. The civil service officers had 7.6 percent in the very helpful and 39.4 percent in the helpful categories, for the total of 47.0 percent. The majority of 52.9 percent, however, indicated that they did not think having been the NDCT graduates had been a helpful factor in their career progress.

One reason for this disparity between the two occupation groups with regard to their estimation of the assistance of NDCT education and experience to the career progress relative to their non-NDCT colleagues lies in the nature of the promotion criteria of the two groups. For the civil service system, promotion depends largely on merit, seniority, educational background, and competitive examinations (3, pp. 338-346). The last requirement applies mostly to the lower and middle levels of the classification system. Educational background is an essential requirement for promotion at all levels, i.e., the more advanced a person received his education, the greater is his chance for
promotion. Merit and seniority are also significant factors in the promotion consideration for this group (4, pp. 173-175).

For the military, merit and seniority are the two crucial considerations for promotion. Like armed forces personnel in most countries, participation and experience in combat count a great deal. However, since the country has not had major external conflicts, combat activities center around efforts at suppressing communist insurgency. With regard to educational background, the possession of advanced or graduate degrees does not carry the same weight as in the case of the civil service officer. In the military, it is an accepted fact that graduates of the service academies, especially the army’s, are given primary consideration in areas ranging from choices of assignment to promotion. Further, the military treats the notion of competitive examination in its own way. For commissioned officers to be considered for promotion, in addition to the previously mentioned requirements, graduation from technical training courses and the services’ basic and advanced schools are a prerequisite. These courses range from the most basic such as a company commander’s training course up to the joint staff college. In between, there are numerous courses and/or training programs that an officer usually goes through. Graduates of most or all of these prescribed
courses are given priority when the time for promotion consideration comes. Thus, the military puts a premium on the value of this type of educational endeavor, which is not comparable to the competitive examination of the civil service officer group or directly comparable with advanced academic study.

In addition to these technical courses, senior military officers have a chance to be selected to attend the course at the NDCT. This, for all practical purposes, is the ultimate prerequisite to the chance of moving up to higher ranks and greater responsibility. Indeed the military system depends on this kind of educational achievement in the absence of major wars as a basis for promotion consideration, in addition to other factors already mentioned. Even though it is extremely difficult to determine exactly how much weight each factor carries in the process of promotion deliberations, the fact that each NDCT class includes thirty to forty military officers certainly cannot be dismissed lightly. Accordingly, if the figures in Table XII are considered in the light of differing perceptions of the significance of the NDCT education between the two groups, it becomes apparent why the military respondents considered this factor in a more favorable light than did civil service officers.
In addition to considering the contributions of the NDCT to an officer's career progress on the basis of occupation, it is possible to look at the responses on the basis of cluster. This is a comparison of the value of NDCT education and experience according to the perceptions of officers from the three consecutive clusters. It may be recalled from Chapter III that a larger number of alumni from the first cluster held positions of minister, deputy minister, and undersecretary than alumni from the second and third clusters. The same thing can be said for alumni of the second cluster when compared with the third. Since officers from the first cluster were able to attain the three top ministerial positions in a greater proportion than officers from subsequent clusters, it can be expected that they would regard the NDCT in a more favorable light as far as their perceptions of career progress and the NDCT contributions in this respect are concerned. Table XIII summarizes the responses on the basis of cluster.

A look at the responses on the basis of the three clusters offers a pattern that requires elaboration. The percentage of respondents expressing the "very helpful" judgment, although small in all three cases, decreased steadily from the earlier to later classes. A similar decrease, at a greater degree, is found in the percentage of respondents indicating "helpful" opinion. The reverse is
TABLE XIII

PERCEPTIONS OF NDCT CONTRIBUTIONS TO CAREER PROGRESS BY CLUSTER*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NDCT Contribution</th>
<th>Clusters</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I (n=83)</td>
<td>II (n=136)</td>
<td>III (n=120)**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Helpful</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helpful</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not helpful</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cause Damage</td>
<td>0.</td>
<td>0.</td>
<td>0.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Questionnaire mailed to NDCT alumni, winter, 1986.

**Missing cases = 7.

the case for the judgement of "not helpful/no effect". The percentage indicating this sentiment increased steadily from the first to the third clusters, 37.3 to 47.8 to 54.2 percent. One way of explaining this trend is to consider the positions of members of a cluster vis-a-vis members of the other clusters. As was indicated in Chapter III, the ratio of NDCT graduates who held the position of minister among the three clusters was 41:10:3. For the post of deputy minister, the ratio was 22:7:2. And for the position of undersecretary, the ratio was 32:12:1. These positions are the numbers one, two, and three in each ministry and surely these are the type of milestone a serious and ambitious government official wants to achieve.
Each government administration from 1932 on has had between twelve to fourteen ministries. For the purpose of illuminating a possible connection between a positive perception of NDCT contributions to career progress of officers and the holding of the top three ministerial posts, the following scenario will be used. Suppose that fourteen ministries were used as the basis for calculating the number of ministries for the duration or time span of each cluster. During the time of the first cluster, there were four administrations. All were under the military control and the last two were under the leadership of the same person. The total ministers for the duration of the first cluster under this scenario would be sixty-four. The actual number was either greater or lesser than this number, but not by many. The number of NDCT alumni who actually became ministers in various ministries was forty-one. They were all graduates of the first seven classes of the NDCT. That is, 64 percent of all ministers during the time of the first cluster had one thing in common, they were all NDCT graduates.

The time span for the second cluster was from 1965 to 1972. There were three administrations during the time of the second cluster, all of which were headed by one person. By using fourteen as the number of ministries again, the total number of ministers came to forty-two. Again the
actual number of ministers may vary from this, but not by many. The actual number of NDCT alumni of the second cluster who became minister was ten or 23.8 percent of the total.

The third cluster of NDCT classes ran from 1972 to 1979. The number of administrations during this time span increased considerably from the previous two clusters. In the third cluster, there were seven administrations, thereby increasing the total number of ministers to ninety-eight. The trend in the number of NDCT alumni becoming minister continues along the same path. There were four members of NDCT graduates from the third cluster who reached the position of ministers, or 4.1 percent of the total.

By the same method, the positions of deputy ministers and undersecretaries can be calculated. Although the actual number of deputy ministers for each administration tends to fluctuate, for the purpose of the present scenario there were two deputy ministers for each of the four administrations during the time of the first cluster. This brings the total of deputy minister to 128. There were twenty-two NDCT alumni from the first cluster who reached the position of deputy minister or 17.2 percent. By the same token there were eighty-four deputy ministers during the time span of the second cluster, seven or 8.3 percent of whom became deputy minister. There were 196 deputy
ministers during the 1972-1979 period, two or 1 percent of whom reached that position.

With regard to the post of undersecretary, the arrangement is similar to the position of minister. There were sixty-four undersecretaries for the first cluster's duration, thirty-two or 50 percent came from the members of the first seven classes of the NDCT. For the second cluster, there were forty-two undersecretaries, twelve or 28.6 percent were NDCT graduates. For the third cluster, there were ninety-eight undersecretaries, one or 1 percent was a graduate of the NDCT. From the number of NDCT alumni who actually reached the three highest positions in all the ministries during the duration of each cluster out of the total number in each position, the same pattern is found. For each position of minister, deputy minister, and undersecretary, the percentage of NDCT alumni reaching each position decreases as one moves from the first to the second to the third clusters.

When the figures from Table XIII are considered under this framework, a pattern clearly emerges when comparisons among the three clusters are made. Although not all alumni in the first cluster had become ministers, deputy ministers, and undersecretaries, a large number of their friends had assumed these three posts. This success rate may explain the higher percentage of first-cluster alumni selecting the
"very helpful" response. In the second cluster, the percentage expressing this sentiment decreased, but the number was still greater than in the third cluster. Comparing all three clusters, the rate of decrease in the "very helpful" and "helpful" category was very small. The decrease was steeper in the "helpful" category. The percentage declined from 51.8 to 42.6 and finally to 36.7, or a 29 percent rate of decrease from cluster one to cluster three. The same logic can be applied to the "not helpful/no effect" grouping. With so many of their colleagues in the top three ministerial positions, only slightly more than one-third of respondents of the first cluster thought that their career progress had not gone further than their friends and colleagues who were not selected. For members of the second cluster, almost half, 47.8 percent thought that being NDCT graduates did not help them relative to their non-NDCT friends. This reduction in the belief that experience at and association with the NDCT helped, or an increase in the feeling that there was no positive effect, corresponds with the decreased number of the three highest ministerial posts occupied by NDCT graduates across the board.

Respondents from the third cluster had even a harder time finding their colleagues who were able to rise to the top of the bureaucratic structure because from this third
cluster there were only three ministers, two deputy ministers, and one undersecretary. In short, this increase in the percentage of respondents who expressed the opinion that the NDCT education and experience did not give them an edge over their non-NDCT colleagues has a clear connection with the general decline over the years of the number of NDCT alumni reaching the positions of minister, deputy minister, and undersecretary. If one aim of the NDCT is to encourage graduates to cooperate and coordinate policies and programs by bypassing the usual bureaucratic channel of communications, the most effective place to carry it out is at the highest level. Because graduates have progressively failed to reach these posts, this aim is being realized to a lesser extent in proportion to the reduction in the number of NDCT graduates at these top posts.

Estimates of NDCT Contributions to Promotion

Respondents were asked to indicate their estimates of the effects of the NDCT on the chance for promotion. Again, responses can be analyzed on the basis of both occupation and cluster. Table XIV shows the responses to this statement, which is in section C, number five, of the questionnaire, on the basis of occupation.

According to Table XIV, both groups had similar reactions to the suggestion that the results of the NDCT
TABLE XIV
ESTIMATES OF NDCT CONTRIBUTIONS TO PROMOTIONS BY OCCUPATION*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NDCT's Contributions</th>
<th>Military (n=159) (%)</th>
<th>Civilian (n=159)** (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>15.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>64.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Questionnaire mailed to NDCT alumni, winter, 1986.

**Missing cases = 28.

education contributed to promotion. Less than one-fourth in each group thought that this factor helped. Roughly one-fifth to a quarter were undecided. In terms of disagreements, over half the number in each group thought that the NDCT factor did not contribute to promotion in their official careers, although the civil service officers expressed this sentiment in a greater percentage than military officers, 64.3 to 57.6 percent. This slight disparity between the military and civil service officers over their estimates of NDCT contributions to promotion in the disagreement category may be attributed to the different nature of the two groups' promotion criteria. As noted earlier, military officers depend on the NDCT experience more than do civil service officers in the overall process
of promotion. Similarly, a slightly larger percentage of military officers expressed agreement with this statement than did civil service officers, 18.2 to 15 percent. The responses can be considered on the basis of cluster as well. The following table shows the results based on cluster.

### TABLE XV

ESTIMATES OF NDCT CONTRIBUTIONS TO PROMOTION, BY CLUSTER*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster</th>
<th>I (n=77) (%)</th>
<th>II (n=126) (%)</th>
<th>III (n=115) (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>58.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Questionnaire mailed to NDCT alumni, winter, 1986.

**Missing cases = 28.

When this factor was considered from the standpoint of the three clusters, the results were similar to the ones based on occupation. While less than one fifth agreed with this statement, over half of clusters two and three and two-thirds of the first cluster expressed disagreement.

From these figures, the NDCT graduates as a whole thought that the experience at the college, in terms of increased knowledge and contacts with officers from other ministries,
did not contribute to the advancement in their careers. But in terms of increasing overall ability in the job-related tasks, the officials indicated that the NDCT experience had been a contributing factor. This assessment is found in the next two tables.

Contributions to Performance

The first four questions of the questionnaire's section C were aimed at eliciting the respondents' estimates of the effects of NDCT education and experience. This is a general estimate of the NDCT effects on the respondents's official capacity and performance both at their units and in connection with other ministries. Table XVI provides estimates of NDCT contributions to the overall official performance on the basis of occupation.

TABLE XVI

ESTIMATES OF NDCT CONTRIBUTIONS TO OFFICIAL PERFORMANCE BY OCCUPATION*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Military (n=160) (%)</th>
<th>Civilian (n=158) (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Helpful</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>70.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Helpful</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Opinion</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Questionnaire mailed to NDCT alumni, winter, 1986.

**Missing cases = 27.
Table XVI summarizes the results of NDCT graduates' responses. In both occupations, the respondents expressed almost the same positive reaction about the effects of the NDCT. Even those who disagreed provided similar responses. Thus, both groups thought that the NDCT had positive effects on their capacity in general, and on official performance in particular. It is also possible to find the estimates of NDCT contributions to official performance on the basis of the three clusters. Table XVII shows the responses to the same four items in section C of the questionnaire, by cluster.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster</th>
<th>1 (n=77) (%)</th>
<th>2 (n=129) (%)</th>
<th>3 (n=113) (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Helpful</td>
<td>79.2</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>65.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Helpful</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Opinion</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Questionnaire mailed to NDCT alumni, winter, 1986.

**Missing cases=27.
Figures from Table XVII are similar to those in Table XVI, but one trend seems to emerge, however. The first seven classes expressed the opinion that the NDCT experience was helpful more than the second cluster which in turn found it more helpful than the third cluster, or 79.2, 68.2, and 65.5 percent respectively. This trend also held true in the "not helpful" category, although the degree of difference was rather slight. The second and the third clusters indicated both negative feelings and ambivalence ("no opinion") to a greater degree than members of the first cluster regarding the contributions of the NDCT. Thus, although differences are small, alumni overtime were less confident about the positive effects of the NDCT on their official performance.

Alumni Perceptions and Suggestions about NDCT

Perceptions of Goals of NDCT

At this point, attention will be given to NDCT graduates' perceptions of the institution's goals. Members of the first class graduated in 1957 while class twenty-one left in 1979. These officials may come from different educational, social, and professional backgrounds, but they all shared one thing in common. Thus, it is useful to try to find out about their perceptions of the NDCT's goals. Respondents were asked to write what they considered to be the most important goals of the institution. Although the
wording varied, the responses can be presented according to
the frequency a particular type of response was mentioned.

The most frequently mentioned goal of the institution,
according to the respondents, was "to provide an
opportunity and environment in which leaders from all units
of government can come to know one another, and to
understand the aim, purpose, and plan of each different
governmental unit so that smooth and successful cooperation
and coordination among them will be possible in the future."
A total of 174 respondents were of this opinion.

Another goal mentioned by 142 graduates was "to enable
a student to become proficient in the subjects in which he
formerly had no knowledge, or knew very little about, or had
a distorted view, and to have a better understanding of the
national security situation."

"To create unity among government officials and between
different units of government" was a goal mentioned by
sixty-four graduates. The fourth goal mentioned was to
"unite ideas, knowledge, and experience of government
officials in order to solve national or international
problems for the purposes of national security, national
survival, and/or national development, or for finding ways
to solve problems that are expected to arise." Forty-six
mentioned this goal. Less frequently mentioned were the
following goals:
5. To help in the development of initiatives and to arrive at a correct decision.

6. To let civil service officers spend time with military officers in order to study and socialize.

7. To let government officials from the capital know about conditions and problems in various parts of the country.

8. To achieve national development and defense.

9. To create qualified personnel to work as top-level executives.

10. To learn about the best method in reaching a decision.

Perceptions of NDCT Contributions to Administration

The next open-ended question asked respondents to list the contributions the NDCT had made to the administration of the country. The following comments are listed according to frequency, with the number of times it was mentioned in parentheses.

1. Contribute to closer relationship and cooperation among governmental units. Because one particular unit of government can not successfully accomplish a task, cooperation and coordination among all concerned units are necessary. (92)

2. Help increase the knowledge, ability, and experience of government executives, and to help create unity and a better coordination which will be useful and beneficial to the country (80).
3. Collect the ideas and suggestions from students or from NDCT's own research efforts and present them to the government. NDCT may also bring important problems confronting the government to let the students try to find solutions. (37)

4. Help officials to understand the operations, problems, and missions of other units of government. (35)

5. Help set direction so that administration can be carried out correctly, and along the same path. (19)

6. Be useful to the administrative process if the government used the ideas and recommendations from its students. (18)

7. Create unity among military personnel, civil service officers, and between civil service officers and military officials so that the military can get in touch with the civil service officers more easily and with successful results. (18)

8. Be Helpful in the sense that graduates are key personnel of the government that can use knowledge gained at the NDCT for administration. (17)

9. Indirectly it may help a great deal or a little depending on whether graduates can adapt the knowledge to make it useful in their work, although not useful in a direct way. (11)

10. Provoke useful suggestions from students. However, respondents indicated that governments have not paid adequate attention to ideas presented. After their suggestions were introduced to the cabinet members so that each ministry could determine their usefulness, subsequent results were usually
unknown. (11)

11. Contribute very little, not really worth the large expenses for the efforts. (10)

12. Contribute to an understanding about national security matter, resulting in national stability. (8)

Comments and Suggestions

This last section deals with the last part of the questionnaire which asked respondents to provide additional comments and suggestions about the NDCT. Although the respondents provided a wide range of opinions, their suggestions can be grouped into a number of main points. These are the age requirement, composition of coursework and curriculum, duration of study time, evaluation, lecture and lecturers, total student body, quota, students' output, NDCT staff, and study trips.

With regard to the age requirement, respondents were of three opinions. Fifteen alumni indicated that the suitable maximum age for an incoming student is fifty years old, not fifty-four as the current limit stipulates. Their reasons for advancing this argument were simple, logical, and almost unanimous. Graduates who have at least ten years left in government service simply will be able to do more and be more useful to the government than people who have less time in the service. They indicated that NDCT alumni should have at least ten years left in the service after leaving the
college. Five suggested that age differences for people in
the same class should not be too large. Only two persons
wanted to see the minimum age requirement set at fifty, and
the maximum at fifty-five.

Many alumni touched upon the composition of course work
and curriculum as the second point. There are four lines of
thoughts on this point. The majority, or fourteen alumni,
were of the opinion that the curriculum always has to be
revised, updated, and improved. The second group consisting
of eight officers mentioned specific additions to the
curriculum. They wanted the inclusion of actual practical
problems facing the government such as border disputes,
balance of payment, government price support for
agricultural products, and the like into the course so that
the government can use the outcomes from the students'
analysis, solutions, and recommendations. Another three
respondents pointed out that the current curriculum contains
unnecessary subjects and/or topics that government officials
at this level already knew. A reduction in time spent on
these subjects means greater attention can be given to
specific national security and national development
problems. By focusing attention on a problem-solving
approach, the NDCT would be able to provide a more relevant
and timely advice for the government. One person said that
the curriculum and course composition were entirely
appropriate.
The third point was the duration of study time in each day. Almost everybody in this group of ten thought that the present arrangement of half-a-day activity was inadequate, and that the afternoon hours could be more properly used by adding other assignments to the present agenda. They felt that, by adding the afternoon session, it would be possible to shorten the course to less than one year. Although in principle they did not have to return to work in the afternoon, many officials who worked in the capital area usually did so, with the result that they thought that they could neither perform their duties well nor pay enough attention and give sufficient time to their obligations as an NDCT student. Two persons suggested that the length of study time should be cut short to between two and four months.

The idea of conducting an evaluation was advanced by seven respondents. One suggested a systematic evaluation of NDCT graduates with the results to be forwarded to the cabinet or a select government board/authority so that the overall aim and activity of NDCT will be continually in harmony with reality. Another recommended regular tests and examinations.

Another point involves lectures and lecturers. Some lecturers were not of the caliber that should be invited to speak at the institution. Respondents suggested that the
selection of speakers be made on the basis of a person's academic and practical distinctions and achievements, not on the basis of that person's rank and position. Those who had only theories, but no practical experience, to offer in their lectures are to be avoided. Speakers from the private sector should be invited in the future. Even though these speakers may not agree with the government positions on many issues, their ideas and suggestions are useful in the sense that they will broaden the discussion and point to the things that may have been overlooked or neglected by people in government. Another respondent suggested that half of the lecturers ought to be invited from universities while the other half should be composed of people with practical experience in important government positions.

One respondent provided a concrete example on this point. According to this person, lectures on the topic of Thailand national security and how it relates to activities of other countries have not been very effective after 1973. Prior to that year, lecturers were invited strictly on the basis of their expertise on a particular country's security relations with Thailand. If the topic was Vietnam and Thailand's national security interests, and an NDCT graduate was a specialist on this subject, he would be invited to deliver lectures since he knew the subject matter and the kind of information the NDCT was looking for because he was a former student at the institution himself.
This practice of inviting specialists and/or an NDCT graduate with strong interests in a subject was changed in 1973. The new method was to invite a Thai ambassador to these countries to travel to the NDCT for the purpose of giving a lecture on the topic of that country's relations to Thailand's national security interests. These ambassadors have tended to provide general information about the history, geography, social and economic conditions, and tourist attractions of these countries rather than the information about what the country was doing to harm the security interests of Thailand. A specific example of Singapore was given in connection with the ongoing conflicts between Thailand and Vietnam in which Singapore bought strategic goods from Thailand and then sold them to Vietnam. Singapore did this knowing full well the nature of the conflict, and while being a member of ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, whose members are Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Brunei, and the Philippines. Further, the cost of travelling from the countries to which these ambassadors were stationed just to give lectures was a waste of the already strained national budget.

The next point was about the number of students for each class. One suggestion was that the NDCT can double the number of students each year by adding the afternoon session. Instead of having only between sixty to eighty
officers in each class, the number could be doubled by this method. In addition to this suggestion of having another group in the afternoon, a general feeling among respondents who touched on this point was that the present number of students was too limited, and that more officials should be allowed to attend.

The quota given to each government unit is somewhat related to the number of students for each class. Respondents tended to agree on the necessity to let more officials attend in numbers greater than the ones presently being allotted to each unit. In addition to the need for an increase in quota for each ministry, one person suggested that officials from certain professions such as law and medicine should not be selected because these officials already had full responsibility as judges, prosecutors, and doctors. Their inclusion would do more harm than good to the government. Officers with direct responsibility over the field of national security policy should be given a greater share of the seats in each class.

The output of the NDCT students can be separated into two types, individual research reports and committees' recommendations. As was mentioned earlier, a student's research report has been a major requirement for each class, but its usefulness has never been appraised. One aim of this requirement was to prompt each officer to integrate the
knowledge gained at the NDCT with his experience as a career government officer and be able to develop a fresh idea or suggestion in the form of a report on a particular aspect of the problem of national security. The benefit or usefulness of this activity would occur if it is adopted by the government as national policy.

One way of evaluating this report is through the consideration of its usefulness and the requirements of the report writing itself, although the two are related. As stated earlier, each person is required to write at least a fifty-page report and the topic must be submitted no later than the second month of study. One theme that regularly surfaced in the comments on this point was that the research report was not very useful either to the person writing it or to the government for which it was supposed to be written. The causes of the report's limited usefulness were many. First, the requirement itself was not realistic. Most students had neither the time nor the inclinations for such an enterprise. As senior government officials, there were simply many other important matters that had higher priority than writing a research paper for the NDCT. In addition, the tradition and popularity of writing a research paper were simply not very strong among Thai officers. Second, the end of the writing process, to be adopted by the government, has not been realistic. According to their
comments, respondents thought that the government has never paid serious attention to their writings. This expectation led to the conclusion that it is futile and a waste of time to try to write a meaningful research report. Third, no mechanism exists to handle each year's voluminous outputs. The NDCT staff itself was not equipped to deal with the report: not enough qualified personnel are available to sift through them in a systematic manner in order to categorize, classify, and forward them to the appropriate units where they may be of some value.

The requirements and the difficulty involved in the writing process could be partly blamed for the low value given to this activity. Respondents complained that the length of the paper was too excessive while the time given for preparing and writing it was too restrictive. These complaints, plus the realization that the government is not serious about the result, have led many students to adopt the tactic of assigning subordinates to do the actual preparation and writing of the report. As this practice became known from one class to the next, the value of the research report progressively depreciated. Many respondents expressed their dismay that a person's report was deemed to be of so little value that even their classmates were not interested in reading it. Respondents argued that, by requiring everyone to write a report, there were simply too many of these reports to be of any real value.
In short, the respondents were practically unanimous in their negative evaluation of the research report as required in the present form. Their suggestions on this point can be divided into three types. In the first type, respondents accepted the premise that each person would be required to write a report, but they wanted to see a modification in the requirement schedule. The dateline for submission of a topic needs to be extended, and ample time needs to be allowed before students turn in the final reports. The NDCT would have to allow the reports to be turned in after the end of a formal academic year for each class.

The second type of recommendation also assumed the retention of the individual research report, but it was different from the previous one in that the students are required to submit the reports as scheduled by the NDCT. Moreover, it assumed a much more active posture on the part of the NDCT staff. This recommendation argued that there must be a strict standard in considering the acceptability of a research topic to avoid the duplication that occurs as a result of the laxness in scrutinizing topics. Strictness in accepting topics should assure that the reports would display the results of new research efforts rather than be a recitation of past documents by different names. Closely related to a strict standard for the acceptance of a topic, the NDCT staff must be able to assist the students in the
research and writing process. After the completion of each academic year, the NDCT staff or another governmental body set up specifically for the purpose must be able to screen, classify, and recommend reports to the appropriate authority. The point here is that the NDCT must make sure that the reports are brought to the attention of leaders of government, and the records of rejections and acceptance, and their reasons, of the works of each class member should be kept so that they can be used as a basis for the following year's reports.

The third type of recommendation was to do away with the research report altogether. Those who suggested this alternative came to the conclusion after listing the various defects of the system. Many of their charges were listed earlier. Instead of an individual research report, each year's reports should be written as a group effort. For example, the committee on military affairs would be responsible for the submission of a report dealing with military aspect of national security. In the process, each committee's member would contribute his effort, but in the end the final product would be the result of a joint endeavor. The assignment of a topic, according to this arrangement, would be on the basis of the expertise of each committee. Other proponents of this approach suggested that, in addition to or instead of considering the problem
based on traditional topics assigned by the NDCT, the committees be given actual problems confronting the government at a particular time. The committee's conclusions and recommendations could be considered and carried out by the government if they are deemed to be useful.

This problem-solving approach, it was argued, will directly benefit both the students and the government. For the students to see their recommendations adopted by the government is a boost to their confidence and a reaffirmation of the value of education at the NDCT. The government would enjoy a better way of solving problems than the current practice of appointing a new commission of experts every time a new problem of intractable proportions crops up. Even though a report of this type is the result of a group's effort, proponents did not rule out the writing of individual research report. If a person wants to write a report, he will be able to do so and his work will be mentioned in the final report of the class's study result along with the committees' reports. According to this recommendation, an element of flexibility is introduced that will allow the students to have more leeway in their study. Because past individual research reports were not very highly regarded, even by the NDCT alumni themselves, the introduction of a new research report requirement as outlined here would improve the usefulness of the NDCT.
Comments on the selection process reflected a dilemma: although the respondents all wanted to see that the most qualified persons are chosen, they did not agree as to the definition of the term "qualified person." One respondent suggested that the selection process based on quota and seniority must be changed, but did not provide an instruction on how it might be changed. Another suggested that an officer should be selected on the basis of ability and the significance of official position rather than seniority and intimacy with superiors. As was pointed out in the discussion of factors respondents thought were responsible for their selection to attend the NDCT, quota and seniority were ranked as the two top choices. One suggestion was to have the NDCT refuse to accept incoming students who are thought to be unsuitable. Many other suggestions pointed in the same direction. The problem here has to do with selection by individual units rather than by the NDCT. In effect, the suggestion of rejection was not applicable since the NDCT has no authority in this respect. It should be noted that despite the suggestions that only the most qualified persons be allowed to attend, and that the NDCT be able to reject those considered to be unsuitable, none of the respondents wanted the NDCT to have the power to make the selection in the first place. The only practical suggestion on this point was that a person
must have many years left in government service to be eligible for consideration.

The next major point raised by a sizable number of NDCT alumni was the quality and qualifications of the NDCT staff. Many staff members were not academically qualified, according to many respondents. The college has to be able to find and retain qualified personnel who are willing and able to work with students during every phase of their study, from providing sound lectures to ably advising them on the nuts and bolts of the research report preparation and writing. Respondents charged that many staff members wanted to be assigned to the college mainly because it gave them a chance for promotion even though they were not academically suitable to the tasks required there. This emphasis on the need for the upgrading and improving of NDCT personnel can be regarded as a reflection on the caliber of the NDCT students themselves. They were the leading members of the bureaucracy and, as such, their expectations of the staff's capacity was correspondingly high. What needs to be done about the upgrading of the NDCT staff is to find personnel with at least a master's degree to fill the staff positions. In addition, respondents suggested that the NDCT will be better served if qualified persons from the civil service sector could be assigned to serve along with military staff. In short, the respondents wanted to see a thorough
overhauling and upgrading of the NDCT staff so that these officers can assist and advice the students in every phase through the duration of their study. Second, the ranks of the NDCT staff need to be filled with academically qualified people from both the military and civil sectors of the bureaucracy. The personnel in the latter category can be drawn from universities and from ministries that deal with the matter of national security such as the Ministries of Interior and Foreign Affairs.

In terms of study trips, many respondents felt that the schedule was too tight, with too many places to visit, but with too little time. The domestic trips need to be rearranged so as to make it unnecessary to go to every province and major district by assigning each group of students to go to only one region. After the trips, these groups can come together and exchange information. The same suggestion can be made about the trips abroad. Respondents suggested that the number of places to visit should be reduced so that more time is given to each place. In so doing, the trips abroad will be more effective at less costs.

In addition to these twelve main points, respondents also provided other suggestions. Many thought that, as a high-level educational institution open to both the military and civil service officers, the NDCT should be given more
freedom in both academic and administrative matters. To accomplish this, the NDCT can be staffed with more civil service personnel and/or the unit itself be transferred from the Ministry of Defense to the Office of the Prime Minister, which already has the responsibility for coordinating tasks among different ministries. Some respondents complained about the rather loose study regulation which resulted in many instances of absents without any effects on a student's standing. Another suggestion was that meetings among various classes should be arranged at a more frequent intervals than has been the case in the past. Finally, some respondents suggested that the NDCT can take the initiative in providing advice and counsel to the government on various problems, in addition to its normal responsibility.

Summary

The first part of this chapter deals with estimates of NDCT alumni regarding various factors that were considered to be significant in helping them to be chosen to attend the NDCT. The responses are considered from the standpoints of occupation and cluster. On the basis of occupation, both civil and military officers regard seniority as the most important factor that determined their selection. According to cluster, seniority is again selected as the most decisive factor. Values of different types of experience/activity offered at the NDCT are evaluated by alumni. Of the six
items on the list, the lecture is regarded as the most valuable. The next section focused on possible effects of the NDCT at the institutional level. Effects of the NDCT may be considered at the personal level as well. These include perceptions of NDCT alumni about their career progress, promotions, and official performance. The last part of this chapter provided general suggestions, comments, and recommendations of alumni about different facets of the NDCT.
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CHAPTER V

POLITICAL ATTITUDES OF NDCT ALUMNI

Introduction

In Chapter II, it was argued that the bureaucracy is a crucial element in any consideration of Thai politics. At first political power flowed from the kings and later from the civil service and military officers who took control of the country in the 1932 coup. In contrast to Western democratic countries where the bureaucracy is headed by officers selected by the people, or officers nominated by elected representatives, the Thai bureaucracy had been under the control of professional or career government officials for most of the time during the first phase of Thai politics, from 1932 to 1957.

The formulation and execution of national policy was carried out by career government officials, with limited participation by elected representatives from time to time. For the most part, the country had been operating as a "bureaucratic polity." If a common denominator was to be assigned to the group of officers who dominated politics and administration in the first phase, this was the fact that the leading governmental personalities of the period all had a hand in the planning and execution of the successful plot
to wrest political power from the king. That is, a large number of cabinet members, or ministers, of the first phase were affiliated with the event of 1932 in one way or another.

If affiliation with the 1932 incident was a common characteristic among the majority of cabinet members of the first phase, being graduates of the NDCT can be used as a common denominator for a large number of cabinet members in the early years of the second phase of Thai politics. Although the numbers of NDCT graduates who were appointed to the three top positions in each ministry began to decrease steadily from the first to the third cluster, it is beyond dispute that these officers were the critical element in any consideration of the overall political situation in Thailand.

Past studies of the Thai bureaucracy were of two types. The first focused attention on legal and institutional arrangements and their effects on the evolution and development of politics and administration. The second type, a more recent one, was more analytical in attempting to describe the attitudes of government officials toward various issues. This second type provided empirical data of the attitudes of bureaucrats. The first type of study included works by Riggs (14) and Siffin (18) and the second type can be found only in the writings of Professor Likhit
Dhiravegin (4; 5) of Thammasat University. These studies covered only the civil service officers, however. No previous study has attempted to study empirically the attitudes of both civil service officers and military officials on a comparative basis. Because of their political significance, as discussed earlier, graduates of the NDCT were prime candidates to be investigated because they represented key elements of the "bureaucratic polity" in the second phase of modern Thai politics.

There is no denying that definitions of politics vary a great deal. For the present purpose, politics "is the striving by groups and individuals for control of the legitimate power of the state so that favorable allocative decisions can be made (10, p. 36)." According to this definition, politics requires various elements or actors to interact in order for the system to function properly. These elements usually include political parties, interest groups, and participation by citizens in the political process. Consensus, compromise, and conflict are normal in the operation of the system of politics in this sense. To a large extent these features of politics are characteristics of the political system of most Western democratic nations.

The practice of politics of this type had been introduced to non-Western countries mostly after the Second World War with disappointing results in most instances.
Analysts often argued that these countries lacked the necessary prerequisites to make the system of politics work in the Western sense. Factors often mentioned in this connection include lack of education, low level of income, deficient system of communications, and weak administrative framework. In addition, there is a lack of tradition of civilian control of the military in most of these countries, with the usual results being military assumption of political power. The standard reasons given for military control are the failures of civilian politicians to act legally and properly, to provide for an adequate economic condition, and to maintain peace and order in society (12, p. 56). Although the military governments for the most part turned out to be no more successful than civilian politicians in ending the country's problems, the point of interest here is how way the military people regard the idea and practice of politics in the Western sense. Closely related in significance is the view of civil service personnel toward politics because the military tend to rely on these officials in the actual administration of the country.
Civil-Military Relations Study and Thailand

It was argued in Chapter I that using the "middle-range theory" approach in the study of a subject may make it possible to make a connection between a generalization of a phenomenon and the actual situation. The generalization may be generated from one aspect of the larger body of arguments, propositions, and hypotheses about that subject. When one can empirically verify the generalization by using the data gathered from the situation from which that generalization was purportedly to have been drawn, a contribution has been made toward the building up of a part of the "middle-range theory" in a given area.

The argument to be examined in this study is drawn from a number of scholars in the field of civil-military relations namely, that military and civil service officers have similar, negative views toward politics. This argument may be regarded as a part of the overall theory of civil-military relations. Despite the popularity of this argument, as the number of scholars propounding it is rather considerable, there is no empirical evidence either against or in support of it. Thus, there is no way of verifying the validity of this argument, either as a general proposition or as a specific description of a situation in a particular nation.
The present study attempts to fill this research gap by providing empirical evidence that can be used in the examination of the argument proposed by scholars in the field of civil-military relations. The result of this study may be used as a starting point for other similar studies or as a supplement to the ongoing investigation of other aspects of the study of civil-military relations.

**Attitudes of Bureaucrats toward Politics**

At first glance, the military officers exhibit characteristics that seem to be unique only to the profession of arms. They were socialized and conditioned in an environment in which hierarchy, order, and cohesiveness are highly valued. Because of this background, military officers tend to have certain definite attitudes toward various aspects of politics. Political attitudes of military officers may be considered on the basis of three salient features. According to Nordlinger, these are "political order, political activity, and the governing of states (12, p. 53)." With regard to political order, "officers are so sensitive to the possibility of disorder that even in the absence of deep societal divisions, a raucous or highly competitive politics is viewed as undesirable and threatening (12, p. 54)." With regard to the other two features, according to Nordlinger:

The soldiers' attitudes toward political activity as the more or less strenuous pursuit of group interests
are decidedly negative. Political activity tends to be seen as excessively self-serving, as well as harmful in its exacerbation of societal differences...Officers have an apolitical vision of the governmental process, a nonpolitical conception of how society can and should be governed (12, pp. 56-58).

The similarity in the observations of many scholars about the relationship between the military and civil officers in developing countries is rather striking. Feit, for example, argued that:

It does not take much imagination to understand why the top and middle ranks of military and civilian hierarchies are drawn to each other. Not only do they operate in a similar organizational milieu, but since both are involved in administration, they also tend to see the world in a somewhat similar way (6 p. 11).

Feit is not alone in harbouring this view. According to First, "the soldiers and the administrators persuaded themselves that they were the agents of rational 'development' and 'efficiency' in management. Civil servants have always nursed a deep resentment of the politicians (7, p. 113)." Along the same line, Welch observed that:

similar technocratic orientation and organizational hierarchy of army officers and civil servants bring both groups into natural alliance. Their concerns with state building, with rational use of resources, with complex bureaucratic surveillance, with governmental efficiency more than effectiveness-testifies to an affinity of outlook. Much of this affinity, arises from distrust of politicians (21, p. 48).

Similarly, Nordlinger argued that the military and civil servants thought of politicians as "devoid of expertise, their decisions are the product of a continuous
search for party advantage, they are inherently corrupt, and they sometimes stir up an unhealthy ideological and emotional fervor (12, p. 122).

According to these arguments, it may be presumed that civil service officers possess a similar type of political attitudes as military officers. The same argument can be used at a more specific level as well, in addition to this general level. In the case of Thailand, according to Von der Mehden, Thai government officials expressed "their distrust of civilian politicians, impatience with parliamentary democracy, and intolerance of what is believed to be disintegrative impact of party politics (20, p. 34)." Von der Mehden was not alone in reaching this conclusion. Two prominent observers of modern Thai politics asserted that "most of the bureaucratic elite, military and civilian alike, strenuously resist parliamentary and pressure-group politics. They view democracy as a destabilizing factor causing confusion, instability, and delay in government administration (11, p. 47)."

Despite the uniformity in the views of these scholars, all the arguments seem to have one common weakness in that they did not have the support of empirical data in the form of these officers' opinions and attitudes toward politics. Conclusions to this effect were reached on an impressionistic basis. This lack of empirical support for
the argument that military and civil service officers in developing countries in general, and in Thailand in particular, hold similar attitudes toward politics, may lead one to question the validity of this type of argument.

One reason for the similarity in attitudes is that both groups of officers have really been created only in the past century. For many centuries prior to that, civil and military functions were exercised by the same person at the operational or field level even though a division between the military and civil duty did exist at the central level. That is, provincial governors, who were under direct control of the Ministry of Interior, had control over both military and civil functions until 1903 when the Military Conscription Act was promulgated and the military establishment subsequently took its modern form (14, p. 143). Even after this formal demarcation, the leading members of the two groups had not been very far apart in terms of social background and outlook. For both groups, a large "percentage of higher officers came from bureaucratic (military and civilian) families which often have sons in both camps (20, p. 33)." Leading members of the group that ended the rule of absolute monarchy in 1932 were from both camps. Despite the outward appearance of military domination, the actual situation had been that the civil officials were especially busy behind the scene in running the country.
As Riggs has observed, "although military officers tended to gain greater power through participation in coup d'etat, a relatively larger number of civil servants managed to hold office repeatedly in the Thai cabinets (14, p. 317)." This conclusion was reached after an examination of the composition of the two groups. 237 positions, military personnel held 84 posts in the cabinets, or 35.4 percent of the total, in the years from 1932 to 1958. Within this same time span, civil service officers held 100 posts or 42.2 percent of the total.

Using these arguments as a basis, it is proposed that the Thai military and civil officers hold similar attitudes toward political parties, pressure groups, and parliamentary practices. Moreover, these attitudes are likely to be negative.

**Political Environment of the three Clusters**

The second proposition about the attitudes of military and civil service personnel deals with three time frames roughly of two decades from 1958 to 1979. Within this time span, the political environment in which the three clusters of NDCT classes found themselves varied considerably. For the first cluster, classes one to seven, the military maintained firm and complete control over every facet of the political sphere. Any movement or action that might be construed to be against the policy of the military was not
allowed. A large number of civil service officers with exceptional academic credentials were recruited by the military in the efforts to modernize the nation. If these officers had been functioning under some form of parliamentary democracy, they would have had to follow the general policy directives of elected representatives as heads of ministries. However, in this first frame (1957-1965), these officials did not have to follow orders from any politicians. The military gave them virtually complete control over the administration of their respective ministries. One may reason that government officials of the period had little respect for the system of parliamentary democracy with its accompanying features of party competition, interest group activities, and political demands from the masses. These officers ran the country by relying on their own judgement of what was good and proper for the country and the citizenry. The only person they had to listen to was Marshal Sarit who had strong faith in the ability of civil service officers with distinguished academic credentials, or technocrats. As Sarit's comments on the significance of economics in the processes of national development and administration made clear:

> a new method in the revolutionary system is the prestige given to academicians/experts...In former times, academics received little status; economics was taken as common sense and those who never studied economics could talk about the subject...which led them to believe that they did not have to rely upon academic expertise. I have no such belief (3, p. 355)."
When officers worked under this system, they would be highly suspicious of attempts by outsiders to intrude into their own domain. Politics, in the sense of a system with elected representatives having control over the career officer in running the government, represents a threat to these officials. Consequently, these officials are likely to hold a negative view of politics.

The second cluster consists of classes eight to fourteen from 1966 to 1972. The strong man of the military had died near the end of 1963, and power was subsequently shared among his trusted subordinates with one, Field Marshal Thanom Kitikachorn, being put forward as the nominal leader of the group. Compared to the first cluster, military control was relaxed considerably to the point that political opposition was allowed to crystalize. The military formed a political party to run in the general elections in 1968. The government was run by the same leader, but the system had become more open to elements other than the military and civil service officers. Opposition politicians could then express their views despite the fact that the government party was able to maintain the majority in the parliament.

Until the military seized power again in 1971, the leaders of the government had to take the views of outsiders into consideration in determining national policies and
programs. This limited political activity no doubt affected the ways that concerned officials considered and thought about politics.

In summary, the environment in which the officials had to operate was different for each of the three clusters of classes. For the first cluster, 1958 to 1965 or classes one to seven, politics and administration were under complete control of the military with assistance from civil service officers. For the second cluster, senior government officials were given considerable autonomy but not to the same extent enjoyed by their colleagues in the first cluster. They had to be accountable for their actions by answering questions and inquiries from opposition politicians. They had to deal with politics and politicians and to accept the fact that they could no longer ignore the forces of politics as they were able to do in the past. The introduction to the intricacy and complexity of politics was missing for officers from the first cluster.

The third cluster, classes fifteen to twenty-one, consists of officers who were exposed to the full force of politics in a way that those officers in the first and second clusters had never experienced. Following the topple of the military government in 1973 by student demonstrations, the government officials were under unprecedented political pressures. Many ministers and
deputy ministers were elected representatives from various political parties instead of career government officials as in the past, although not all positions were given to elected representatives. When a comparison is made between the environment of cluster three and the political context of the other two clusters, it can readily be seen that politicians were gaining ground. A comparison of the ratio of officials and non-officials in the different administrations from military-dominated to democratic regimes illustrates this point in the following table.

### TABLE XVIII

A COMPARISON OF THE RATIO OF OFFICIALS AND NON-OFFICIALS IN CABINET POSITIONS BETWEEN MILITARY-DOMINATED AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military-dominated Governments</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ratio</td>
<td>14:0</td>
<td>18:0</td>
<td>28:0</td>
<td>17:1</td>
<td>27:1</td>
<td>29:2</td>
<td>16:2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democratic Governments</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

In the military-dominated governments, the number corresponds to the following governments, 1 = Sarit, 2 =
Thanom 1, 3 = Thanom 2, 4 = Thanom 3, 5 = Sanya 1, 6 = Sanya 2, 7 = Thanin. For democratic governments, 1 = Seni 1, 2 = Kukrit 1, 3 = Kukrit 2, 4 = Seni 2. The difference in the number of career officials as cabinet members between these two types of governments is very plain. The maximum number of non-officials in the group of military-dominated government is only two. In the four democratic governments, non-officer cabinet members outnumber career officers by two to one in one government and the pattern is similar in the other three cabinets.

The senior government officials in the third cluster experienced the effects of politics in a way that was unimaginable from the standpoint of members of the first cluster. From the perspective of members of the second cluster, their own experience with politics was rather mild compared with their successors. Like it or not, officers in this last cluster had to face up to the fact that competitive politics was a reality. They had to accommodate and adjust their views to this new reality in Thai politics. The military attempted to stage a comeback in 1976, but their leaders were wise enough to accept the fact that the epoch of military control was over. Subsequently, the governments, with the exception of the one from 1976 to 1977, have been operating with the active participation of civilian politicians.
In 1976 the military staged a coup following the inability of a civilian prime minister to control a crisis arising out of the confrontation between student activists and right-wing militant groups. A former judge was picked to head the new government but he turned out to be so repulsive and unpopular that the same military men deposed him by another coup almost exactly one year later. The leader of the military coalition then assumed the premiership himself but he did so in a manner consistent with the spirit of parliamentary democracy. That is, he paved the way for elections of representatives to the parliament and later resigned when he was unable to command the majority of votes in the parliament.

At this point, it is appropriate to compare the three environments of the three clusters. The first can be characterized as being under complete domination of the military, and the second was under partial military control. The third environment is the one with the least control from the military and the one pervaded by politics. The force of politics was minimal in the second and practically nonexistent in the first environment. The varying influence of politics can be gauged by the attitudes of officials in each cluster.
Attitudes toward Politics

It was proposed that both the military and civil service officers have similar attitudes toward politics and such attitudes are likely to be negative. According to the argument that politics affected officials of the three clusters to a varying degree, the second proposition is that officers in the three clusters should express differing degrees of reaction in their attitudes toward politics. The first cluster officials lacked any contact with elements and forces of politics so they were expected to be highly critical and negative in their attitudes toward politics. The officers in the second cluster were less critical in their attitudes toward politics but more so than those in the third cluster.

An examination of the response of officials from these three clusters will reveal their attitudes toward politics. For the present purpose, attitudes "are made up of beliefs, values, and norms-beliefs about the nature of reality, values regarding the kind of reality that is desired, and norms about what reality out to be like (12, p. 53)." Attitudes can also be perceived as "relatively enduring orientations toward objects...that provide individuals with mental frameworks for making economic sense of the world (8, p. 27)." Attitudes about politics can be revealed by looking at the way a person expresses his agreement or
disagreement with statements about different components of activities that are commonly regarded as being political or having political properties.

The problem of excessive bureaucratic power is found in both the Western and non-Western nations. As Rourke has succinctly observed:

Perhaps the truest kind of "inner check" upon bureaucratic power...is restraints which operate within the personalities of bureaucrats themselves-preventing them from unlawful or excessive use of the power placed in their keeping...If bureaucrats themselves feel it is necessary to defer to the preferences of citizens in framing public policy, or regard it as reprehensible to use power in ways that infringe upon the liberties of individuals subject to their jurisdiction, then the problem of controlling bureaucratic power is very largely solved at the source (15, p. 145).

In the case of Thailand, if an official does not think that a citizen has a right to try to influence the actions of government, it can be taken to mean that the officer disagrees with the idea of popular participation, which is regarded as one cornerstone of participatory democracy. This is one component in the survey instruments that indicate whether a person has a positive or negative view about politics.

Another section of the questionnaire contains questions that ask about the effects of interest groups on the general welfare of the country. Those who thought that interest groups have no place in Thai society were clearly comfortable with the system of government that characterized
the first cluster's environment. In other words, these were people who had a negative view of politics.

In addition, there are statements about the appropriateness and roles of political parties, public opinion, mass media, parliamentary activity, and politicians that will help determine a person's attitudes and outlooks about politics. Taken together, these statements provide information so that empirical examination of the two propositions can be made.

Table XIX is based on a comparison of the total scores of all respondents. Individually, these ranged from a low of seven to a high of thirty-one. Between these two scores, five intervals can be constructed, 7-11, 12-16, 17-21, 22-26, and 27-31. The low score (unfavorable) group falls into the 7-11 and 12-16 ranges, the high score (favorable) group in the 22-26 and 27-31 ranges, leaving the scores 17-21 (intermediate) in the middle category. These scores indicate attitudes toward politics of the NDCT alumni according to their services. Table XIX shows the attitudes toward politics of military and civil service officers.

From Table XIX, it was found that 8.5 percent of the military and 12.9 percent of the civil service officers express favorable attitudes toward politics. For the intermediate category, 48.4 percent of the military and 38.0 percent of the civil service officers were found. In the
TABLE XIX

ATTITUDES TOWARD POLITICS OF MILITARY AND CIVIL OFFICERS*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes toward Politics</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mil. (n=153)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favorable</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>48.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfavorable</td>
<td>43.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source: Questionnaire mailed to NDCT alumni, winter, 1986.**

**Missing cases = 30.

next category, 43.1 percent of the military and 49.1 percent of the civil service officers expressed unfavorable attitudes toward politics.

The first part of the first proposition was that both the civil service and military officers would express similar attitudes. It can be seen from Table XIX that the results support the proposition as the differences between the two groups' opinions about politics are rather small in both the favorable and the unfavorable categories. The second part of the proposition argues that the dominant attitudes of the two groups would be negative. This argument is supported by the results of the survey since 43.1 percent of the military and nearly half the total number, or 49.1 percent, of the civil service officers expressed negative attitudes about politics. Thus, the
first proposition is supported by the data. Both the military and civil service officers hold similar attitudes toward politics, and the attitudes are negative.

The next proposition has two parts. The first is that attitudes toward politics varies from cluster to cluster. The second is that people from the first cluster are more negative in their attitudes about politics than those in the second and third clusters. Similarly, the members of the third cluster are less negative in their political attitudes than members of the second cluster. The same calculation procedure is used for Table XX.

TABLE XX

ATTITUDES TOWARD POLITICS OF OFFICERS BY CLUSTER*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clusters</th>
<th>1 (n=76)</th>
<th>2 (n=128)</th>
<th>3 (n=112)**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes toward Politics (%)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favorable</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfavorable</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>38.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Questionnaire mailed to NDCT alumni, winter, 1986.
**Missing cases = 30.

The results of Table XX indicate that the second proposition is verified. The percentage of respondents
expressing a favorable view of politics nearly doubles as one moves from the first to the second clusters, but decreases slightly between the second and the third clusters. The notable difference here is between the percentage of responses in the favorable and the unfavorable categories. Over half of respondents in the first cluster, or 55.3 percent, express unfavorable views of politics. Responding to the same statements, 47.6 percent of members of the second cluster and 38.4 percent in the third cluster expressed negative attitudes about politics. The decrease from the first to the second and then to the third cluster of the percentage of officers expressing negative views of politics verifies the argument of the second proposition. That is, attitudes toward politics differ among NDCT alumni members of the three clusters. Further, members of later clusters are likely to be less negative in their attitudes toward politics than members of earlier clusters.

The results of Tables XIX and XX do not contradict the argument of many scholars in the field of civil-military relations that military and civil service officers in developing countries tend to hold a negative view of the process, participants, and other elements of politics. One reason for this similarity of views between the two groups of government officials is that "a country's political, bureaucratic and military elites share some combination of
class, ethnic, regional, religious and racial affiliations (2, p. 570). This is especially true for Thai officials. There has never been a class differentiation that put groups of citizens in separate categories such as the caste system found in India, for example. It was true that people who could claim some form of lineal relationship to the royal family were regarded as somewhat above the average populace. However, the change in 1932 brought an end to this distinction, which in practical terms meant little since only a tiny minority of royal family members worked for the government. In terms of ethnic consideration, the government officials have always been staffed with native people. It is true that a considerable number of younger officials can not claim to be pure Thai, but the process of assimilation between the Chinese, the most influential ethnic group in the country, and local people has been so thorough that it is practically impossible to tell a pure Thai apart from a Chinese-Thai.

The composition of government officials has been heavily dominated by people from the central region. This fact has not created a kind of division among people from different parts of the country as in many other countries. As was pointed out earlier, upon becoming government officials, instead of remaining in their hometowns, the trend has been a move to settle in the capital and its
vicinity. The practical effect of this is the absence of regional conflicts. In terms of religious and racial affiliations, Thai officials are homogeneous: Buddhism is the standard religion, and the mingling of native Thais with other nationalities in the country is regarded as normal. Thus, the similarity in views about politics of military and civil service officers can be explained in part by these background characteristics.

The difference in attitudes about politics among officials of the three clusters may be explained partly by two factors. The first is the effects of belonging to a particular group working under a particular political system. Members of the first cluster worked under the system of complete military domination of politics, and many members from this group worked as heads of ministries, which were positions normally reserved for politicians. The second cluster's members came into limited contact with the forces of politics as the government of the period allowed limited form of political expression and participation. Members of the last cluster were the ones who felt the full effects of politics as politicians came to occupy the posts of ministers in increasing number. From this it may be argued that people with the least contacts with politics and politicians would be the most distrustful of politics. The more an official has a chance to listen to and work with
politicians, the less suspicious he would be of what politics and politicians stand for.

In addition, it is possible to explain the difference on the basis of age. In his study of political attitudes of Thai bureaucratic elites, Dhiravegin found that "there is an association between age and the elite's political attitudes (4, p. 40)." A younger officer is more "liberal" in political attitudes than an older official. Putnam, in his study of political attitudes of senior government officials in Western Europe, suggested that older officers tend to be more hostile in their attitudes toward politics than younger officers. The factor of age was used by Putnam to explain the difference in his and another scholar's findings of German official political attitudes in which Putnam found that they are tolerant of politics while the other study came to an opposite conclusion. Despite this, Putnam cautioned that "correlations between attitude and age are, of course, ambiguous, for normally we cannot distinguish the permanent effects of being in a given historical generation from the temporary effects of being a particular age (13, p. 283)."

The results of Table XIX and XX may be explained by the "effects of being in a given historical generation" and by the age factor although these two are admittedly not the only ones. Since other explanations are not readily
available, it is these two that are most appropriate for the present purpose. An older officer who worked under the first cluster's environment is thus more distrustful of politics than a younger officer working within the environments of the second and the third clusters. A similar argument can be used to describe members of the second and the third clusters.

The results of the survey of attitudes toward politics of Thai government officials can be used as a point of reference for assessing future political development. If the civil service and military officers do not believe in a democratic system of government, they can always use one pretext or another to seize power. One of the most commonly used excuses is the inability of the people to exercise their political rights correctly so that "good" politicians get elected. As long as this belief persists in the minds of government officials, bureaucratic dictatorship and tutelage democracy are more likely than a system of full democracy. Another indicator of an officer's willingness to let go of political power is his attitude toward interest groups, party competition, and parliamentary politics. As long as the officers, especially military officers, still hold a highly negative view of politics, the chance for democracy to grow is very slim. Even if a democratically elected government is allowed to function, the chance for
its successful operation may be low because career government officials do not believe in competitive politics. Since the military has been a major actor in Thai politics after 1932, a look at their attitudes may shed further light on this problem of military involvement in politics.

**Attitudes toward Politics by Ministry**

It is possible to consider attitudes toward politics on the basis of an individual ministry. The next three tables show attitudes toward politics of military officers according to the type of service, and of civil service officers of three selected civil ministries. Table XXI shows attitudes toward politics of officers from the three branches of the Thai armed forces.

**TABLE XXI**

**ATTITUDES TOWARD POLITICS BY SERVICE***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes</th>
<th>Army (n=93) (%)</th>
<th>Navy (n=31) (%)</th>
<th>Air Force (n=29) (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Favorable</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfavorable</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>58.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Questionnaire mailed to NDCT alumni, winter, 1986.*
It can be seen from Table XXI that respondents from the Navy stand out as being the most negative in their attitudes toward politics even though the percentage of navy and air force respondents in the unfavorable category is almost the same, 58.1 to 58.7 percent. However, none of the Naval officers expressed a favorable view of politics while 4.3 percent of army officers and 17.1 percent of air force officers do so. Over half of the officers from each service expressed unfavorable attitudes about politics. A tentative explanation may be offered for this phenomenon. By its nature, the Royal Thai Navy has been the unit that resembles armed services in the West where the majority of service personnel live in a different world from civilians. Army and air force personnel are in closer contact with the civilian sector than naval officers. Bangkok International Airport, for example, is located in an area next to the headquarters of the air force. In comparison to the other two services, the navy has been known as the most conservative in the sense that discipline and regulations are enforced to a greater extent. This rigidity suggests that naval officers are likely to be distrustful of political phenomena since politics entails compromise and negotiations. Although the navy was directly involved in an abortive coup in 1951, the service for the most part has been highly professional in the sense of not intervening in
areas which are not its proper responsibility. In contrast, the army and the air force have had extensive involvement in Thai politics since 1932. Especially after the military seizure of power in 1957, the army leaders, with the support of leaders of the air force, have been prominent and forceful participants in politics.

Attitudes toward politics of civil service officers can also be considered. Since the respondents from each ministry are similar in their overall responses, it is not necessary to consider every ministry. The only other study of similar nature (4) picked three ministries for consideration, Interior, Education, and Office of the Prime Minister. Although that study's definition and use of the concept of political attitudes were limited to the kind of questionnaire employed in that research, a broad comparison with the present study can be made. Table XXII is taken from the study on attitudes of government officers undertaken by Professor Dhiravegin.

The Ministry of Education respondents are more liberal than those from the Office of the Prime Minister and officers from the Ministry of Interior, 57.14, 40.0, and 30.43 percent, respectively. In the conservative category, the largest percentage was from Interior, followed by Education and Office of the Prime Minister, 30.43, 14.29, and 13.33 percent. It was asserted by Professor Dhiravegin that this finding was expected because he has:
found that there is an association between age, level of education and political attitudes—the younger and the better educated are more liberal. It is logical to argue that the Ministry of Interior should have fewer liberal and more conservative officials than the Ministry of Education and the Office of the Prime Minister (4, pp. 47-48).

To repeat, although the questionnaire used in the Dhiravegin study is different from the one emphasized in this study, it is possible to make a comparison by approximating the liberal category with the favorable category of attitudes toward politics. Likewise, the conservative orientation can be compared with the unfavorable view of politics. Table XXIII shows the results of the attitudes of the present study's respondents from the Ministries of Interior and Education and the Office of the Prime Minister.
TABLE XXIII

ATTITUDES TOWARD POLITICS, BY MINISTRY*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes</th>
<th>Ministry</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interior (n=20)</td>
<td>Education (n=17)</td>
<td>Off. P.M. (n=29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favorable</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>55.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfavorable</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>34.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Questionnaire mailed to NDCT alumni, winter, 1986.

A preliminary look at this table reveals that respondents from the Ministry of Education expressed their attitudes differently from Professor Dhiravegin's respondents. In that study there are more Ministry of Education officers expressing "liberal attitudes" than respondents from the other two ministries. In the present study, the percentage of respondents from the Ministry of Education expressing a favorable view of politics was smaller than those from the other two ministries. Also from that study there are fewer Education Ministry officers expressing "conservative attitudes" than those from the Ministry of Interior but more than officers from the Office of the Prime Minister. In the present study the largest percentage of respondents expressing an unfavorable view of politics is from the Office of the Prime Minister, followed by Interior and Education. The discrepancy may be explained
in the following way. The Dhiravegin study was carried out in the early 1970's and respondents were from a generation of government officials who reached senior levels in the 1970's. The present study covers officials from a broader time perspective, from 1957 to 1979.

In addition to these three ministries, the comparison can be made among the other eleven ministries. Of the total of fourteen ministries, only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs respondents expressed a markedly different view of politics. That is, respondents from the other thirteen ministries expressed similar views with less than 20 percent of the respondents from each ministry found in the favorable category. Over 40 percent of the respondents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed a favorable view. Of all fourteen ministries, respondents from the Ministry of Education are the smallest group in terms of percentage of officers with a favorable attitude toward politics.

The dominating view of the majority of members of the civil ministries is clearly a distrust of politics. An analogy may be drawn between the military and the fourteen civil ministries. In the military category, the navy has the largest percentage of its officers expressing unfavorable attitudes toward politics because of the nature of its service, its geographical location, and its lack of a continuing political role. These factors help explain why
naval officers in this survey stood apart from officers from the army and the air force on this indicator.

If naval officers stood out as highly distrustful of politics, foreign service officers would be at the opposite end with regard to their views of politics. It can be argued that officers from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are different from their fellow government officials in the other thirteen civil ministries for two reasons. By the nature of their jobs, foreign service officers spend considerable time in other countries. As Thailand has been an opponent of Communism, these officers are usually posted in Western democratic and other non-communist countries. As a consequence of having been in an environment in which politics is not under control of one group, these officers are exposed to the kinds of ideas and practices that have been missing in Thailand for most of the time. This breadth of exposure helps explain why officers from this ministry stand out alone among the fourteen ministries in having a high percentage of officers showing favorable attitudes toward politics. The second reason is the high level of education of officers in this ministry. According to one study (5, pp. 116-117), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is staffed with a large number of people with graduate degrees from abroad and is second only to the Office of the Prime Minister in the number of officers with doctorates. This
finding is consistent with the finding of Almond and Verba regarding the correlation between a person's level of education and his political attitudes (1 pp. 380-381).

Attitudes toward the People

Political attitudes of government officials have a bearing on the notion of the proper position of the population in a society. Official attitudes are a significant determinant of the way the government operation is carried out. By looking at official attitudes, one can test the next two propositions. Members of the military and the civil service officers maintain similar attitudes toward the people, and their attitudes are likely to be negative. Members of the three clusters of officials hold a negative view of the people, with members of the earlier clusters being more negative than members of later clusters.

The population of Thailand has been described for the most part as being "politically passive (9 pp. 355-371)." The root cause of this behavior is complex and beyond the scope of the present study. Investigations into this area can be found in studies done by Wit (23), Wilson (22), Siffin (18), Sutton (19), and Sensenig (17). For this study, it is sufficient to isolate those elements of social relationships that can be used in connection with an examination of the attitudes of officials toward the common people. The system of cultural values in Thailand has a
basis in the people's popular conception of the nature of reality. One of the best descriptions of this perception is that of David Wilson. According to Wilson:

The position of a being, human or otherwise, in this universe may be measured by the degree to which he is subject to the will and power of others. This conception is the one which must be referred to throughout this discussion of Thai politics, i.e., the necessary and just unity of virtue and power. Those who have power are good and deserve their good fortune. Power justifies itself. This idea is not to be understood in the cynical sense which would lead to the view that might is right. It is rather a magico-religious view that right is might (22, p. 74).

In this system of social relationship based on power, government officials are to be accorded deference and respect by the populace. Government officials have the power of the state. The bureaucracy, however, is not to act capriciously to the detriment of the people. According to another commentator, "the superior in Thailand has been described as unquestioned and domineering. Inferiors stand in awe of the superior. Yet, the superior is expected to act to his inferior in a concerned and benevolent fashion (16, p. 425)."

This type of obligation between the more and the less powerful had normally been an unwritten rule in Thai society. The rulers and the powerful before 1932 had been the monarch and court officials. With the political change government officials took their place in the hierarchical order. The interval from 1932 to 1957 represented a
broadening of the ruling group, but for those outside the immediate circle of coup-makers and their associates, the superior-subordinate relationship system remained largely intact. The intermittent involvement of politicians from time to time may be taken to indicate a beginning of the change of this system of social relationship in the sense that the people could now have a say in selecting the leaders of government. For the most part, however, the chances for politicians to play a significant role in the political process were too few to make any lasting impression.

The rise to power of the army under one person in 1957 left no doubt as to who held actual political power in the country. The political philosophy of this person was reminiscent of the edicts of the benevolent kings of the past. David Wyatt has aptly summarized this doctrine by drawing on the work of Thak Chaloemtiarana (3) as follows:

ideology or philosophy was based on indigenous principles of authority, on a traditional type of social and political hierarchy, and on old paternalistic style of rule, all expressed in terms of traditional Thai values...The social hierarchy, building up from the masses through the bureaucracy and government to the king, was stressed at the expense of democratic egalitarianism...The society's leaders were to act toward members of the society as a father toward his children, solicitous of their welfare and stern in maintaining discipline (24, p. 281).
The society's leaders in this description included both the military and civil service officers. In a situation "where the armed forces take over governments, the collaboration of the civil service is vital since no military-dominated government, not even one as entrenched as that in Thailand...can administer a country solely with military manpower (2, p. 571)." The 1957 coup leader understood the value of the civil bureaucracy by giving them full support. The government leaders of this generation which approximates the members of the first cluster of NDCT classes, were thus expected to be kind to the general population and yet to be distrustful of their political judgment and ability. Since the civil bureaucrats were given an even greater share of responsibility in running the government, this expectation was applicable to them as well as to military officers.

In trying to empirically verify the proposition that military and civil service officers have a similar view of the people and this view is likely to be negative, respondents were asked to indicate their choices from a set of statements about the ability of the common people. These statements can be found in section E of the questionnaire, attitudes toward the people, in the appendix. Respondents were grouped according to their total scores. Between the lowest and highest scores, five intervals with each having
the same range of values can be constructed. The distribution of respondents between military and civil service officers can be made according to these five intervals. Respondents with the lowest scores were put into the highly distrust category. Those with highest scores were placed in the highly trust category. Those with scores between these two extremes were put into the intervening categories depending on the value of their scores. The results are found in the following table.

TABLE XXIV

OFFICIAL ATTITUDES TOWARD THE PEOPLE BY OCCUPATION*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes</th>
<th>Military (n=158) (%)</th>
<th>Civilian (n=166) (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High Trust</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral/Undecided</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distrust</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>44.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Distrust</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Missing cases = 22.

Table XXIV summarizes the responses of both groups of officers from the high trust category to the opposite extreme. The notable difference between the two groups is in the distrust category in which the civil officers exceed
the military by almost 10 percent. The percentage of respondents indicating trusting attitudes is about the same for both groups of officials. From this table it can be seen that the first part of the proposition is supported by the findings. That is, both groups of officers hold similar attitudes toward the people. This similarity is clearly shown by the number of respondents in both groups expressing an attitude of trust for the people. In the distrust categories, the civil service officers are more distrustful of the people than military officers. The proposition also maintains that the dominant attitudes of these officials are likely to be negative. The results support the proposition because almost half, 48.7 percent, of the military group and over half, 56.1 percent of, the civil service group express distrust or high distrust in the people.

In addition, it is possible to compare response according to clusters. On one side, it may be argued that while the attitudes toward politics may vary depending upon the type of political environment in which an official finds himself, attitudes of government officials toward the people should be the same for all members of the three clusters. While the political environment may change from one system to another, the only notable difference about the people in the environment of the three clusters is a steady increase in the size of the population. On the other hand, the next
proposition to be examined is that the attitudes toward the people of officers from the three clusters are likely to be different, with members of the earlier clusters being more negative than officers from later clusters. The method for the calculation is the same as in the previous table. Table XXV summarizes officials' attitudes toward the people on the basis of the three clusters.

TABLE XXV

OFFICIAL ATTITUDES TOWARD PEOPLE BY CLUSTER*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clusters</th>
<th>I (n=78)</th>
<th>II (n=131)</th>
<th>III (n=113)**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes</td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Trust</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral/Undecided</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distrust</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Distrust</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Questionnaire mailed to NDCT alumni, winter, 1986.
**Missing cases = 23.

There are many ways of looking at Table XXV. From the high trust category, it appears that NDCT officers become more trusting of people as one moves from the first to the second and third clusters. This trend is not the same as responses in the trust category, however. The percentage of officers expressing this sentiment increases slightly
between the first and the second clusters, but the percentage decreases between the second and the third clusters, 22.1 percent to 17.4 percent. If these two categories are combined, the percentage increases from the first to the second and third clusters, 26.9 to 29.7 to 33.0 percent. A tentative conclusion may be drawn by relying on the same kind of argument used in the explanation of the effects of being in a particular political environment and of being in a particular age group. Officers of the first cluster did not have to deal with the elements of politics. This situation is less true for members of the second cluster while members of the third cluster had to deal with political effects, influences, and activities. As political activity increased, government officials had to take the needs and demands of the people into consideration as the political environment changed from the time of the first to the third clusters. It is possible to suggest that officers from the second and third clusters came to take the people's political rights and aspirations somewhat more seriously than members of the first cluster.

In the high distrust category, the percentage of officers expressing their views in this fashion decreases steadily as one moves from the first to the third clusters, 16.7 percent to 14.5 percent to 8.7 percent, respectively. This pattern points in the same direction as in the high
trust category and the collapsed category combining the high
trust and trust categories. That is, younger officers and
officers who worked in the environment of limited and full
political activity tend to be more trusting of the people
than older officers who worked in the environment of limited
or no political activity.

When the distrust and high distrust categories are
combined, the results seem to contradict the argument that
officers from later clusters have more trust in, or are less
distrustful of, the people than officers from earlier
clusters. The percentage of officers in this new collapsed
category is similar among the three clusters. The first
cluster has 53.9 percent of its members expressing this view
while the second has 51.9 percent, and the third has 52.2
percent. That is, in each cluster the percentage of
officials expressing a lack of trust in the people comprises
the majority. Thus, the figures from this distrust category
suggest that officers from the three clusters hold a similar
view, which is negative, of the people. When the collapsed
trust category, combining the high trust and trust
categories, is considered, the argument that officers from
the three clusters hold a similar view of the people is not
supported by the figures from Table XXV. In this new
collapsed category, the percentage of the officers in the
three clusters from the first to the third is 26.9, 29.7,
and 33 percent, respectively. That is, officers from the third category put more trust in the people than officers from the first and the second categories. Similarly, officers from the second category trust the people more than officers from the first category. However, differences are small.

Another way of looking at this pattern is through a comparison of the ratio between those expressing the attitudes of distrust and the attitudes of trust among the three clusters. The ratio of the attitudes of distrust to trust among officers in the first cluster is 2:1 (53.9 divided by 26.9), 1.74:1 (51.9 divided by 29.7) for the second cluster, and 1.57:1 (52.2 divided by 33.) for the third cluster. This points to the conclusion that officers of the second and third clusters are not as distrustful of the people as officers from the first cluster and those from the second cluster are less distrustful than those from the first.

**Attitudes Toward People's Political Judgment**

In addition, there is another question in another section, question one in Section D, that deals with officials' attitudes toward the people. This question is different from the previous set of statements in that it sought the judgments of officers regarding the ability of the people to express their political point of view through
elections of representatives. Specifically, respondents were asked to decide whether an average Thai citizen is capable of expressing his political judgment by electing members of parliament who will act on his behalf to protect his interests. Respondents were presented with three choices, able, not able, and no opinion. The results are presented in Table XXVI according to occupation.

**TABLE XXVI**

OFFICIAL ESTIMATES OF POLITICAL JUDGMENT OF PEOPLE*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Military (n=170) (%)</th>
<th>Civil Service (n=169)** (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Able</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Opinion</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Able</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>50.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Questionnaire mailed to NDCT alumni, winter, 1986.

**Missing cases = 7.

From Table XXVI, the military and the civil service officers express their trust in the political judgment of the people in similar number, 35.9 percent to 36.1 percent. When this finding is compared with the data in Table XXIV, both the military and civil service officers express more confidence in the political ability of the people than they
express a general trust in them. When a comparison is made between the percentage of officials showing a feeling of distrust toward the people (Table XXIV) and the percentage expressing the view that the people are incapable of expressing themselves politically in selecting their representatives (Table XXVI), the military group shows a similar reaction, 48.8 percent and 47 percent. The civil service group shows that their members have more confident and belief in the people's political judgement than their basic trust in them, 50.2 percent expressing the view that people are not able politically versus 56.1 percent showing that they basically do not trust the people. In addition, it is possible to try to find out about official views of the people's political judgment based on the three clusters. Table XXVII provides the responses for each of the three clusters.

The percentage of officers expressing confidence in the people's ability decreases between the first and second clusters, but increases slightly between the second and the third. The percentage of officers in the "not able" category increases from the first to the third clusters, 42.2, 47.4, and 54.6 percent, respectively. This finding seems to suggest that as officers became more involved with politicians, they tended to transfer the dissatisfactions and frustrations arising from this relationship to the
TABLE XXVII

OFFICIAL ESTIMATES OF POLITICAL JUDGMENT
OF PEOPLE BY CLUSTER*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Cluster I (N=83) (%)</th>
<th>Cluster II (N=137) (%)</th>
<th>Cluster III (N=119) (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Able</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Opinion</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Able</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>54.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Questionnaire mailed to NDCT alumni, winter, 1086.

**Missing cases = 7.

people who were responsible for the selection of these politicians. This pattern is not the same as the one found in Table XXV in which the percentage of officers expressing attitude of trust toward the people increases from the first to the third clusters, and the percentage of officers displaying an attitude of distrust decreases slightly among the three clusters. The trust of the opinion in Table XXVII is the reverse, whereby officials of later clusters show less confidence in the political judgment of the people. One may interpret the increasing percentage of respondents expressing negative views toward the people from the first to the third cluster to mean that, in the eyes of these officers, the people are not capable of making appropriate
political decisions. To these officers, "politics is dissension; political parties are factions; politicians are scheming or corrupt; and the expression of public opinion is insubordination (12, p. 56)."

For members of the first cluster, there was no instance in which the people could exercise the right to select representatives. Members of the second cluster experienced the effects of politicians' actions who were selected by the people. For them, the people were partly responsible for the appearance of these politicians. Thus, any resentment they might harbour against politicians appears to be directed toward the people. By the same token, members of the third cluster saw a great deal of political activity, so their animosity toward politicians appears to be directed toward those who made the selection, the people.

Official Attitudes in Comparative Perspective

To put the present study's findings in a proper context, a comparison will be made with the research results of a study of senior civil servants in Great Britain, West Germany, and Italy by Robert Putnam and his associates at the University of Michigan. By using the Putnam study as a frame of reference, it will be possible to suggest the implications of the present study for politics and administration in Thailand.
In a study of political attitudes of senior government officers in three Western European countries, Robert Putnam argues that "bureaucrats' beliefs and values are a powerful determinant of the extent to which bureaucracy can be made compatible with democracy (13, p. 259)." Respondents for this study were drawn from civil servants and members of parliaments in the three countries. This study divides government officials into two types, "classical bureaucrats and political bureaucrats." The definition, description, and differences of these two types of officials, according to Putnam are as follows:

The classical bureaucrat distrusts or rejects the institutions of politics, such as parliaments, parties, and pressure groups. To the classical bureaucrat the noisy, incompetent, partisan practices of politicians seem at best senseless, at worst positively inimical to the permanent interests of the State...

The political bureaucrat operates with a much more pluralistic conception of the public interest. He assumes that there can be legitimately differing interpretations of the public interest, and even genuinely conflicting interests among different groups in society...Whereas the classical bureaucrat views the politicians as a troublesome or even dangerous antagonist, interfering with the efficiency and objectivity of government, the political bureaucrat sees the politician instead as a participant in a common game, one whose skills and immediate concerns may differ from his own, but where ultimate values and objectives are similar. The political bureaucrat understands and accepts the role of such institutions as parties and pressure groups. He is likely, as well, to understand and endorse the values of political liberty and equality (13, pp. 259-260).

By examining an officer's attitudes toward various aspects of politics, Putnam could determine with which of
these two types of bureaucrats a person was likely to identify, according to his beliefs and values as expressed in his response. Many of the present study's questions are similar to the ones used by Putnam. Thus, it is possible to compare the results of the present study and the results of Putnam's study.

The comparison will be made on the basis of each item or statement. The first five statements of the Putnam study were collectively included in a section called "the Index for Tolerance of Politics (ITP) (13 p. 270)." These same items are included in the present study's section on attitudes toward party, parliamentary, and pressure group politics. The sixth item was called an indicator of the "support for political liberty" by Putnam. This item is part of the present study's section on politics as well. The next five items were part of Putnam's "Elitism Index." The first four of these items are included in the present study's section about attitudes toward the people. The fifth item in this group is included in the section on politics of this study. The comparison of these eleven items will be carried out on the item by item basis. After each comparison, a brief explanation will be given. When all the comparisons are completed, a general observation will be offered.
The first item states that "basically it is not the parties and parliament but rather public administration which guarantees reasonably satisfactory public policy in Thailand." The Putnam study used "civil service" instead of "public administration." Before presenting the table, it is necessary to point out certain wording differences between the present study's questionnaire and Putnam's. In the latter study, the middle choice, no opinion/undecided, was not available to respondents. For the two choices expressing agreement, Putnam used the terms "agree" and "agree with reservation." The present study uses "strongly agree" and "agree." The same wording applies to the disagree categories. Putnam used "disagree" and "disagree with reservation" while the present study uses "strongly disagree" and "disagree." The inclusion of N/A indicates that no data are available for a category. "Mil." refers to military officers and "Civ." means civil service officers. "S. Agree" means strongly agree while "S. Disagree" means strongly disagree. Table XXVIII presents a comparison of attitudes toward party and parliament among officers in Thailand, Italy, England, and West Germany.

From Table XXVIII, the contrast in percentage of officers expressing agreement between officers of Thailand and of England and Germany is rather striking. Over 80 percent of Thai military and civil service officers
TABLE XXVIII

A COMPARISON OF ATTITUDES TOWARD PARTY AND PARLIAMENT
BY OFFICERS OF FOUR COUNTRIES*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Civ. (n=163)</th>
<th>Mil. (n=169)</th>
<th>Italy (n=102)</th>
<th>England (n=12)</th>
<th>West Germany (n=134)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Agree</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Opinion</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Disagree</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Questionnaire mailed to NDCT alumni, winter, 1986 and Putnam (13, p. 270).

displayed an attitude of distrust of political parties and parliament. Only 16 percent of German officers and 21 percent of British officers showed such distrust. At the other end of the spectrum, the English, 79 percent, and German respondents, 84 percent, indicated unambiguously that they did not agree with the statement. Between 8 and 10 percent of Thai military and civil service officers disagreed with the statement. Thus, the German and English government officials place a great deal of trust in the institutions of political parties and parliament with regard to satisfactory public policy.
Another key element of politics is the politician. The attitudes of public officials toward the politician in these four countries are displayed in Table XXIX.

**TABLE XXIX**

A COMPARISON OF ATTITUDES TOWARD POLITICIANS OF SENIOR OFFICIALS IN THAILAND, ITALY, ENGLAND, AND WEST GERMANY*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Thailand</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>England</th>
<th>Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M. C. (n=168)(n=174)</td>
<td>(n=102)</td>
<td>(n=121)</td>
<td>(n=134)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Agree</td>
<td>45.2 (n=168)</td>
<td>59.8 (n=174)</td>
<td>49 (%)</td>
<td>7 (%)</td>
<td>12 (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>45.2 59.8</td>
<td>31.0 49 (%)</td>
<td>35 (%)</td>
<td>43 (%)</td>
<td>37 (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Opinion</td>
<td>3.0 59.8</td>
<td>2.9 31.0 (%)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>3.0 59.8</td>
<td>5.7 31.0 (%)</td>
<td>10 (%)</td>
<td>41 (%)</td>
<td>44 (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Disagree</td>
<td>3.6 59.8</td>
<td>.6 31.0 (%)</td>
<td>6 (%)</td>
<td>9 (%)</td>
<td>7 (%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Questionnaire mailed to NDCT alumni, winter, 1986 and Putnam (13, p. 270).

The statement from which responses in Table XXIX were obtained reads "many who enter politics often think more about their own welfare or that of their party than about the welfare of the citizen." In the Putnam study, "often those" were used in place of "many." In the "strongly agree" category, a large number of Italian and Thai officers took this position—45.2 percent Thai military officers, 59.8 percent of Thai civil service officers, and 49 percent of Italian respondents. A comparison across the row for the
"agree" category reveals a similar reaction to this statement. The percentage of Thai military and civil service officers and officers from Italy, England, and West Germany responding in this category is 45.2, 31, 35, 43, and 37. When all four countries are compared, a clear distinction emerges between England and Germany as one group, and Thailand and Italy as the other group. Officers in the first group can be found almost equally between those expressing trust in politicians and those who were suspicious or distrustful of them. In contrast, between 80 to 90 percent of Thai and Italian officers viewed politicians as self-serving. Thus, a large majority of Italian and Thai officers have a disparaging view of their countries' politicians while officers in England and Germany were divided almost equally between those expressing negative and positive views of politicians.

In Table XXX, respondents were asked to express their views about the involvement of politicians in the administration of government.

The statement reads "the influence of politicians in affairs which are properly the business of administration is a disturbing feature of contemporary public life." The Putnam study used "interference" instead of "influence" and "civil servants" for "administration." The results of Table XXX unequivocally show the depth of the feeling of
TABLE XXX

A COMPARISON OF ATTITUDES TOWARD THE INVOLVEMENT OF POLITICIANS IN ADMINISTRATION AMONG OFFICERS IN THAILAND, ITALY, ENGLAND, GERMANY*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes</th>
<th>Thailand (n=165) (%)</th>
<th>Italy (n=171) (%)</th>
<th>England (n=121) (%)</th>
<th>Germany (n=134) (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S. Agree</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Opinion</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S, Disagree</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


government officials in the four countries toward the involvement of politicians in affairs which are regarded as belonging to the administrator's turf. Over 50 percent of Thai and Italian officers strongly agreed with this view. When the strongly agree and agree categories are combined, over 80 percent of Thai and Italian officers expressed agreement while 9 percent of British and 43 percent of German officers did so. The reverse is true for the percentage of disagreement. The overwhelming majority of British respondents, 91 percent, disagreed with this statement while 57 percent of German officers did so. Less than 10 percent of Thai respondents and 17 percent of Italian officers disagree with the statement.
The British bureaucrats accept the involvement of politicians in the administration of government with hardly any doubt as over 90 percent of them expressed disagreement with the statement. The Germans do not refute the legitimacy of the politicians' involvement in government administration but they show their displeasure in the sense that 43 percent of the respondents indicated agreement with the statement. Thai and Italian officers leave no doubt about their disdain and distrust of politicians when it comes to the area which they regard as properly theirs.

Another element of politics is interest groups and their activities. Table XXXI shows the responses of officials to statement about the roles and activities of interest groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes</th>
<th>Thailand (n=163)</th>
<th>Italy (n=102)</th>
<th>England (n=121)</th>
<th>Germany (n=134)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S. Agree</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Opinion</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Disagree</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Questionnaire mailed to NDCT alumni, winter, 1986 and Putnam (13, p. 270).
Table XXXI summarizes responses to a statement "the general welfare of the country is seriously endangered by the continual clash of particularistic interest groups." Over three-fourths, 88 percent, of Italian officers expressed their agreement with this statement, followed by Thai military and civil service officers, 87.8, and 86.3 percent, respectively. For the German and British officers, 19 percent and 18 percent agreed. The pattern is reversed for the disagreement categories. A very small percentage of Thai (3.1 military, 4.2 civil service) and Italian (12 percent) officers, and a large percentage of British (82 percent) and German (81 percent) officers expressed disagreement with this statement. Again, Italian and Thai respondents expressed less confidence in political activities than did their British and German counterparts.

Another crucial part of politics is political party and the officials' attitudes toward parties are shown in Table XXXII.

The statement for this table is that "although parties play an important role in a democracy, often they uselessly exacerbate political conflicts." The thrust of this statement is similar to the previous one. Again, a large majority of Thai military and civil service officers and Italian respondents voiced agreement with this assertion, 95.7, 94.1, and 85 percent, respectively. This reaction is
TABLE XXXII
A COMPARISON OF ATTITUDES TOWARD POLITICAL PARTY OF THAI, ITALIAN, BRITISH, AND GERMAN OFFICERS*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes</th>
<th>Thailand M. C. (n=164)(n=169)</th>
<th>Italy (n=102)</th>
<th>England (n=121)</th>
<th>Germany (n=134)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S. Agree</td>
<td>38.4%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>57.3%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Opinion</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Disagree</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>.6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Questionnaire mailed to NDCT alumni, winter, 1986 and Putnam (13, p. 270).

consistent with the way officers of these two countries expressed themselves over other political items. A rather surprising finding occurs in the British case in which over half, 53 percent, of the respondents agreed with this statement about political parties, while only about one-third, 30 percent, of German officers agree. Fully 70 percent of members of the latter group expressed disagreement in contrast to 47 percent of the British officers. Of the four countries, it seems only German officers place a large measure of trust in political parties.

The thrust of the item for the following table is similar to the previous four statements. Table XXXIII shows
the responses of officers to the statement about political liberty.

**TABLE XXXIII**

A COMPARISON OF EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT FOR POLITICAL LIBERTY OF THAI, ITALIAN, BRITISH, AND GERMAN OFFICERS*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Thailand M. C.</th>
<th>Italy (n=101)</th>
<th>England (n=119)</th>
<th>Germany (n=133)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expression of Support (%)</td>
<td>(n=163)</td>
<td>(n=166)</td>
<td>(n=119)</td>
<td>(n=133)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Agree</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Opinion</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Disagree</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Questionnaire mailed to NDCT alumni, winter, 1986 and Putnam (13, p. 276).

The statement is "the freedom of political propaganda is not an absolute freedom, and the state should carefully regulate its use." The majority of Italian and Thai officials again expressed support for the idea that the state should limit the freedom of political propaganda which, according to Putnam, was an indication of the willingness of support for political liberty (13, p. 275). The difference between the Thai and Italian respondents in their choices of response is greater than in the previous statements. Over 80 percent of Thai military and civil
service officers and 57 percent of Italians agreed with the argument that the state should regulate freedom of political propaganda. The difference here is over 20 percent. Again, the German and British officers did not agree with this argument, with the latter expressing stronger objections to the state's involvement in this area. Some 78 percent of British respondents indicated disagreement with the statement while 67 percent of the German officers disagreed.

Table XXXIV shows the results of the officers' perceptions of leaders and their relations to the people and government.

**TABLE XXXIV**

A COMPARISON OF PERCEPTIONS OF LEADER OF THAI, ITALIAN, BRITISH, AND GERMAN OFFICERS*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>M. C.</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>England</th>
<th>Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thailand (n=162)</td>
<td>(n=169)</td>
<td>(n=102)</td>
<td>(n=121)</td>
<td>(n=134)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Agree</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Opinion</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Disagree</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Questionnaire mailed to NDCT alumni, winter, 1986 and Putnam (13, p. 277).

This study's statement is that "certain people are better suited to lead Thailand because of their social
backgrounds" differs from Putnam's after the word "better" in that he used "... qualified to lead this country because of their traditions and family backgrounds" to finish the statement. This statement tries to find out if a respondent has an elitist attitude and outlook. The results from Table XXXIV reveal for the first time the similarity in attitudes among the Italian, German, and British respondents. Fewer than half of the respondents from these three countries agree with the statement, although the percentage of Italian responses in this category is considerably higher than for England and Germany, 48, 14, and 25 percent, respectively. The majority of Thai military and civil service officers agreed with this statement, which suggests that they tend to have an elitist attitude and orientation. For Thai officers, 53.8 percent of the military and 58 percent of the civil service agreed with this statement. On the other hand, over half of Italian, British, and German respondents indicated their disagreements with this statement, 52, 86, and 75 percent, respectively.

Closely related to this statement about elitist attitudes of officials is perception of the ability of the people to influence the affairs of the state. Table XXXV shows the respondents' expressions in this regard.
TABLE XXXV

A COMPARISON OF ATTITUDES TOWARD CITIZENS’ INFLUENCE OVER GOVERNMENT OF THAI, ITALIAN, BRITISH, AND GERMAN OFFICIALS*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes</th>
<th>Thailand M. C. (n=163)</th>
<th>Thailand M. C. (n=167)</th>
<th>Italy (n=102)</th>
<th>England (n=121)</th>
<th>Germany (n=134)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S. Agree</td>
<td>22.1 25.7</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>49.7 46.7</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Opinion</td>
<td>13.5 10.2</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>11.0 15.0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Disagree</td>
<td>3.7 2.4</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Questionnaire mailed to NDCT alumni, winter, 1986 and Putnam (13, p. 277).

This study uses the statement "in a world as complicated as today's, it makes little sense to speak of increasing the common man's influence over governmental affairs." In the Putnam study it was stated that "in a world as complicated as the modern one it doesn't make sense to speak of increased control by ordinary citizens over governmental affairs." The similarity between the Thai and Italian officials in their attitudes reemerges in this table. Over half of these two countries' respondents expressed agreement with the statement. Percentages for Thai officers are 71.8 military and 72.4 civil service; for Italian officers, 63 percent for the combined "strongly agree" and "agree" responses. The percentage of British and
German officers in this combined category is 44 and 38 percent. On the other hand, the British and German officers have faith in the ability of a common man to have some control over the affairs of government as can be seen from the fact that over half of the members of each group disagreed with the statement, 56 and 63 percent. This statement distinguishes the type of attitudes toward the people and their possible influence over government that a particular officer holds. The results are consistent with the pattern found in the previous seven tables.

The next table involves a statement about the need for a strong leader. The responses of officials are shown in Table XXXVI.

TABLE XXXVI

A COMPARISON OF ATTITUDES TOWARD THE NEED FOR A STRONG LEADER OF THAI, ITALIAN, BRITISH, AND GERMAN OFFICERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes</th>
<th>Thailand (n=168)</th>
<th>Italy (N=174)</th>
<th>England (n=102)</th>
<th>Germany (n=134)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S. Agree</td>
<td>67.3 70.7</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>30.4 25.3</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Opinion</td>
<td>1.2 2.3</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>1.2 1.7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Disagree</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Questionnaire mailed to NDCT alumni, winter, 1986 and Putnam (13, p. 277).
The statement for this table is that "it will always be necessary to have a few strong, able individuals who know how to take charge." In comparison to the previous eight tables, the results of Table XXXVI shows respondents from all four countries indicating their views in a similar way. Over 90 percent of the Thai respondents expressed agreement with the need to have a strong leader. This agreement points to a common desire to have a strong leader in all four countries. For Thai and Italian officers this finding is not surprising given their responses to the foregoing eight statements. That is, Thai and Italian officers favor a concentration of power in the government in contrast to the system of checks and balances in which powers of government are more decentralized. An unexpected finding is the agreement from the majority of German and British officers who consistently took an egalitarian position in responding to earlier statements. A conclusion here is that, despite the difference in the attitudes regarding other issues, the need for a strong leader is universal in the opinions of respondents from all four countries.

Another question deals with the ability of a common man. Table XXXVII shows officials' estimation of this ability.
The statement is that "few people know what is in their real interest in the long run." A similar reaction is evoked from respondents in all countries as over half the officers in each country agree with it. The extent of this agreement differs considerably, however. In the combined category of "strongly agree" and "agree", there is a large majority of Thai and Italian respondents, 81.1 percent military, 78.2 percent civil service, and 92 percent Italians. The British had 57 percent and the German 59 percent of their officers in this same category. Thus, officers from all four countries had the same opinion that "very few people know what is in their real interest in the long run."
Officials' opinions of the people's ability to perceive their own best interests are related to the next statement about the right of citizens to influence public policy. Table XXXVIII summarizes the responses from officials of the four countries.

### TABLE XXXVIII

A COMPARISON OF OFFICIAL ATTITUDES TOWARD THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS TO INFLUENCE PUBLIC POLICY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Attitudes</th>
<th>Thailand</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>England</th>
<th>Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M. C.</td>
<td>(n=163)(n=169)</td>
<td>(n=102)</td>
<td>(n=121)</td>
<td>(n=134)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Agree</td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>16(18.3)</td>
<td>64(44)</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>33.1(44.4)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Opinion</td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>9.8(9.5)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>38.7(26)</td>
<td>9(21)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Disagree</td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>2.5(1.8)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Questionnaire mailed to NDCT alumni, winter, 1986 and Putnam (13, p. 277).*

The wording of this study's statement is "every individual citizen has a perfect right to attempt to influence decisions of public agencies," while the Putnam statement reads "all citizens should have the same chance of influencing policy." From Table XXXVIII, only the Thai military respondents are different from the remainder, who strongly expressed agreement with the statement. That is,
less than half of Thai military respondents, 49.1 percent, agreed with the combined category of "strongly agree" and "agree." In the same combined category, there are 62.7 percent of Thai civil service, 87 percent of Italian, 69 percent of English, and 94 percent of German officers. Responses to this item constitute instance in which the Thai military and civil service officers have a marked different in their attitudes toward an issue.

The responses to these eleven statements are of two types. The first one has the Thai and Italian officials expressing similar attitudes toward statements in Table XXVIII to Table XXXV. The majority of officers from these two countries always agreed with each statement, while the minority disagreed, although the degree of agreement and disagreement varies. The second type has the majority of British and German officials consistently expressing their disagreements with the statements from Tables XXVIII to Table XXXV. Only to statements in Tables XXXVI, XXXVII, and XXXVIII do the majority of respondents in all four countries indicate agreement with the statements.

In general, those who disagreed with these statements can be tentatively labeled as "political bureaucrats" while those who agreed may be called "classical bureaucrats." From the results of these eleven tables, the Thai and Italian officers clearly have the characteristics of the
"classical bureaucrat." Although the British and German officers agree with statements in Tables XXXVI, XXXVII, and XXXVIII, in overall terms they must be characterized as the "political bureaucrat" type.

In his explanation of the difference among officers from the three countries, Putnam argues that it was the "historical explanation" that could be used in the British case. According to Putnam, "the modern British Civil Service was created after, not before representative institutions had been firmly established (13, p. 214)." As a result, "there was no opportunity to create a defensive myth against representative political institutions in Britain, since those institutions had greater historical legitimacy than the bureaucracy itself (13 p. 214)." Thus the British officers are labeled "political bureaucrats."

If the historical explanation seems straightforward in this case, the finding for the German case was different from what had been expected. Traditionally, the German officers are thought of as being "classical" in nature. The finding that German officers were of the "political" orientation contradicts both the popular image of German bureaucrats and prior research cited by Putnam. The explanation offered was that the majority of officers in his survey were fifty years old or younger. Thus age was one major explanation for the conclusion that German officers were of the "political bureaucrat" type.
The Italian respondents are the "classical bureaucrat" type due to "the realities of Italian politics (13, p. 278)." Putnam thought this explanation was too general and added elaboration to further refine and illuminate this point. The first point, according to Putnam, was that "many of the views expressed by Italian bureaucrats... make it clear that it is not merely Italian politics, but democratic politics per se which they find uncongenial (13, p. 279)." Further, "the second reason that the classical views of most Italian Bureaucrats cannot be explained away as mere reflections of reality is precisely that not all their colleagues share these views (12 p. 279)." Italian respondents of younger age were more "political" than "classical" in their outlooks because they "are systematically less hostile to pluralist political institutions, more liberal and less elitist, more committed to programmatic politics and less legalist in their interpretation of their own role (13 p. 279)." Despite this difference among segments of Italian respondents, they were classified as a whole as the "classical" type. The British and German respondents were the "political" type. To reiterate the general characteristics of the "classical bureaucrat," according to Putnam,

they are distrustful of political institutions and resentful of political pressures. They disapprove of the practices of pluralism and political liberalism. They are deeply skeptical about political equality and
mass political participation. They define their role as civil servants as guarantors of the permanent interests of the State, though they tend to interpret their role relatively statically and legalistically, reluctant to become actively and openly involved as program advocates, bargaining with other participants in the policy process (13 p. 278).

The Thai respondents, both civil and military, in the present study fit the description of the "classical bureaucrat" as outlined by Putnam. Italian officials were called "classical bureaucrat" by Putnam because of their responses to statements about different aspects of politics. Responding in the positive to the statements, except the statement in Table XXXVIII, indicates that officers have the characteristics of the "classical" type, while those responding in the negative can be called the "political" type. Since data for Italian respondents were not available in Table XXVIII, a comparison between Thai and Italian officials is possible from Table XXIX to Table XXXVII. For the collapsed category combining the "strongly agree" and "agree" categories in all nine of these tables, Italian respondents outnumber Thai respondents only in Table XXXI dealing with official attitudes toward interest groups. The responses of Thai military officers, civil service officials, and Italian officials are 87.8 percent, 86.3 percent, and 88 percent. From these figures, the results are almost identical for all practical purposes. The Thai respondents, however, expressed themselves in greater
percentage in the combined agree category in the other eight tables in this group. The Italian respondents were called "classical bureaucrats" because the majority agree with the statements in these eight tables. A larger number of Thai respondents not only agree with these statements, but they also express their agreement more strongly than the Italian respondents. Therefore, the Thai respondents must be called "classical bureaucrats" as well.

Summary

This chapter deals with attitudes of NDCT alumni toward various aspects of politics. The study uses the respondents' attitudes toward politics and people to empirically verify an argument of scholars in the field of civil-military relations that military and civil service officers in developing countries possess similar political attitudes. Because the argument of these scholars was generally stated without empirical evidence, the results of this study can be regarded as a contribution to one aspect of the study of civil-military relations. In addition to using the Thai government officers' responses to verify the above argument, this study tried to examine four propositions. The first proposition, military and civil service officers have similar attitudes toward politics and their attitudes are likely to be negative, is supported by the results of the survey of attitudes of officials.
Similarly, the second and third propositions are not refuted by the data. The second proposition states that members of the three clusters are likely to have different attitudes toward politics, with members of earlier clusters being more negative in their attitudes toward politics than members of later clusters. The third proposition argues that military and civil service officers hold similar attitudes toward the people, and the attitudes are likely to be negative. The fourth proposition is that members of the three clusters are likely to have different attitudes toward the people, with members of the earlier clusters being more negative in their attitudes toward the people than members of later clusters. Differences among the clusters are small. Thus, this proposition is not supported by the finding. Further, the study examined attitudes on the basis of ministry and found that naval officers are highly negative, while foreign service officers are positive, in their attitudes toward politics. A consideration of officers' attitudes toward the people's political judgment yields the same negative results. Finally, the study compared the political attitudes of Thai officials with the Putnam study of political attitudes of government officers from England, West Germany, and Italy. It was found that the Thai and Italian bureaucrats share the characteristics of the "classical bureaucrat" type, while the English and German
Officers have the characteristics of the "political bureaucrat" type.
CHAPTER BIBLIOGRAPHY


CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Assessment of the Study

A study of the National Defense College of Thailand, the NDCT, and its alumni is useful for four reasons. As a high-level educational institution, the National Defense College plays a crucial role in providing an environment and an opportunity for learning and social interaction for selected members of the national bureaucracy. Existing studies on National Defense Colleges deal with the institutions from a comparative perspective, including the world view (1); the political element of institutions in the United States, Great Britain, and Canada (4); and the senior service colleges in the United States (5). A study of the mission, functions, contributions, and activities of the NDCT thus provides an addition to the available information on this subject.

The NDCT alumni, or respondents of this study, were high-ranking military and civil service officers of the government of Thailand. An examination of certain characteristics and attitudes of these officials contributes to a better understanding of the system of politics and administration in Thailand, a country that has been under
the control of the civil-military bureaucracy for most of
the time after 1932. In the past, studies of Thai politics
and administration were carried out for the most part within
the institutional framework. Only two studies (2,3) focused
attention on political attitudes of senior civil service
officers of Thailand. However, an examination of the
attitudes of high-ranking military officers has never been
attempted. As long as this type of study is not available,
a crucial piece of information about Thailand is missing
because the military has played a significant role in the
evolution of Thai politics from 1932. This is the second
reason for the usefulness of this study: to provide the
results of the survey of attitudes of high-ranking military
officers of Thailand.

Theoretically, one argument of many scholars in the
study of civil-military relations is that in developing
countries, the attitudes toward politics of military and
civil service officers are likely to be negative. Despite
the widespread acceptance of this theoretical observation,
there has been no empirical evidence to either refute or
support it. The results of this study's survey of attitudes
of Thai government officials provide empirical evidence in
this regard. Although Thailand is only one case, the
results can be used as a basis for further study of this
particular aspect of the subject of civil-military
relations. This is the third reason for the usefulness of the present study.

In addition, the study attempted to gather feedback from respondents regarding the mission, programs, operations, and activities of the NDCT. The observations, comments, suggestions, and recommendations will be used as a part of the report to be submitted to the NDCT for consideration. In case an official action is later taken on the basis of the contents of the present study, it will have meant that this study has made a positive and practical contribution to the operation of the institution. This indeed can be regarded as another reason for the usefulness of the present study.

Thus, the present study is useful for both practical and theoretical reasons. The study's contributions include a better understanding of Thai politics and administration, a possible improvement in the operation of the NDCT, and empirical evidence in support of one aspect of the study of civil-military relations.

Summary of Findings

Chapter I

Chapter I has seven sections. In the introduction section, the purpose of the study, along with its significance, provides the reader with the direction of this
The study examined the NDCT and its alumni by focusing on the various activities and services and how these are viewed by the alumni. Four propositions were advanced. The first was that military and civil service officers in Thailand have similar attitudes toward politics, and these attitudes are likely to be negative. The second proposition stated that members of the three clusters of NDCT classes are likely to have different attitudes toward politics, with members of the earlier clusters being more negative in their attitudes toward politics than officials of later clusters. The first cluster consists of NDCT classes one to seven, 1957-1965. The second cluster has classes eight to fourteen, 1966-1972. The third cluster consists of classes fifteen to twenty-one, 1973 to 1979. The third proposition argued that both military and civil service officers have similar attitudes toward the people, and the attitudes are likely to be negative. The fourth proposition was that each cluster's members have different attitudes toward the people, and members of the earlier clusters are more negative than members of later clusters. The study also attempted to classify and consider the Thai government officials on the basis of the "models" of modern bureaucratic officers of Robert Putnam.

The next two sections of the first chapter dealt with data collection and analysis procedures, and the study's
limitations. The related literature section provided background information. The last two sections were organization and summary.

Chapter II

The public bureaucracy in the context of Thai politics constitutes the subject matter of this chapter. The Thai public bureaucracy and its patterns of operations were described in general. The operations of the bureaucracy were examined in the areas of recruitment, rank and level classification, salary, promotion, and personnel management. The Thai bureaucracy consists of fourteen ministries. Each ministry performs its responsibility along a specific function, with the exception of the Office of the Prime Minister which is primarily responsible for coordinating and dealing with several tasks and ministries simultaneously. In addition to the fourteen ministries, there are a large number of state organizations and enterprises that were set up at different times and for different purposes.

The last part of the second chapter dealt with the public bureaucracy's political significance. Thai public officials have been a major force in Thai politics from 1932 when the system of absolute monarchy came to an end after a group of Western-educated military and civil officials staged a successful coup. From 1932 to 1957, the governments for the most part were under control of officers
who were members of the 1932 coup. The extent of career officers' control over the government can be seen in the make-up of cabinet members. Most governments from 1932 to 1957 were comprised of cabinet members who were career government officials. When there were non-career cabinet members, their number tended to be small. The maximum number of non-career cabinet members in one administration during this period was nine out of twenty-five, or 36 percent. This pattern of career officials' domination of cabinet composition continued after 1957. The bureaucratic control of government came to an end following the 1973 demonstration which drove the military leaders into exile.

Chapter III

In this chapter, the goals and activities of the NDCT were examined, following a general introduction. The NDCT aims at providing knowledge about national defense and other related matters to civil service and military officers in order to "achieve a common understanding on the responsibility for the establishment, planning, and maintenance of national security." The institution aspires to bring potential leaders of government together in the hope of future cooperation in discharging their responsibilities. Because civil service officers lack knowledge of military subjects, the NDCT has set up an orientation session especially for them for five weeks,
beginning in August. The regular or main course begins in the second week of September, and runs for one year. Activities at the college begin at eight and end at noon. The first part of each day's activity, from eight to nine o'clock, is devoted to group discussions and committee meetings. There are two one-and-a-half hour lecture sessions each day. There are nine lecture topics. In addition to listening to lectures and participating in group discussions and committee meetings, each student is required to write an individual research report which is to be presented orally and submitted to the NDCT at the end of the course. Students are also required to present the results of their committees' assignment to the whole class. Each class spends about nine months on lectures, discussion, meetings, and presentations of research. About two months are devoted to study trips both inside and outside the country.

The next section of Chapter III compared the NDCT with similar institutions in the United States, Great Britain, and Canada. Differences and similarities were pointed out as each school operates in different environments. One major activity that is found in all three Western institutions, but is lacking in the case of the NDCT, is students' evaluation of the institutions' programs and activities of each year. The composition of this study's
respondents did not differ very much from the original composition of NDCT classes one to twenty-one. In terms of the region of origin, the civil service respondents were similar to the total number of special grade officers. Using this total number of special grade officers as a basis for comparison, the author found that the military respondents were overrepresented by people from the central region, and underrepresented by southerners. Because Thailand has been an ally of Western-English speaking countries for a long time, English was regarded as the most popular foreign language for most Thais. This included NDCT respondents as 82 percent of them selected English as the first choice of the foreign languages that they could use with ease.

The number of NDCT alumni was small in comparison to the total government employees, but their effects on the course of politics and administration of the country have been considerable. Four NDCT alumni became prime ministers, and fifty-three became ministers. Another thirty-one assumed the post of deputy minister while forty-six reached the position of undersecretary. Because these are the four top positions in the Thai government, the fact that this rather large number of NDCT alumni were able to reach them means that these officers exercised considerable influence and control over the operation and administration of
government for most of the time between 1957 and 1973. However, it was found that the number of these officers in the top three ministerial posts had decreased from clusters one to two to three. This decrease meant a reduction in the influence of NDCT alumni in running the government. An examination of the number of NDCT alumni in the positions of chief of the three military services revealed a similar pattern, but to a lesser extent.

Chapter IV

This chapter dealt with the respondents' estimates of the values of various programs and activities at the NDCT. It was found that both the military and civil service officers regard seniority as the most important factor that determined their selection to attend the NDCT. Similarly, seniority was regarded by the majority of respondents from all three clusters as the most important factor. Respondents rated lectures as the most valuable activity/experience at the NDCT. "Know other students" were rated second and "meet experts" and "study trips" were rated third. "Individual research report" was more valuable than "freedom from routine work," which was rated as the least valuable experience/activity.

The section attempted to estimate the contributions of the NDCT. The overwhelming majority of both military and civil service officers thought that contacts with other NDCT
students from the same and from the other classes were very valuable in terms of their contributions to the performance of official functions. Despite this expression, the constant reduction in the number of NDCT alumni at the three top ministerial posts actually meant that the institutional effects of the NDCT also decreased. The continuation of this trend would mean that one goal of the NDCT, to facilitate the operation of government through closer contacts and cooperation among NDCT alumni, was not being reached.

An examination of the effects of the NDCT at the personal level revealed that military personnel thought their careers were helped more by the NDCT than did the civil service officers. On the basis of cluster, the percentage of officers expressing the sentiment that the NDCT experience had been a contributing factor to their career progress decreased from the first to the third clusters. Similarly, the percentage of respondents expressing the view that the NDCT had not been helpful to their career increased from the first to the third clusters. Both views point to the same conclusion that the NDCT alumni of later clusters put less value on the NDCT because the NDCT graduates of later classes did not achieve the same kind of bureaucratic prominence as members of the earlier clusters.
In their estimates of the effects of the NDCT on the promotion consideration, the majority of both military and civil service officers did not think that the NDCT had been a helping factor, although the civil service officers disagreed in a larger percentage than military officers. The military officers agreed that the NDCT was a positive factor in greater number than civil service officers. This finding confirmed the earlier argument that the military placed a higher value on the effects of the NDCT education and experience. On the basis of cluster, the majority of each cluster's members thought that the NDCT experience was not a contributing factor in their promotion consideration.

Both the military and civil service officers indicated that the NDCT had made contributions to their overall official performance. The responses on the basis of cluster showed that the percentage of officers expressing a positive sentiment decreased over the three clusters. Another interesting result was that the percentage of respondents expressing a negative sentiment increased from the first to the third clusters. The results of both the positive and negative sentiments pointed in the same direction. Officers from earlier clusters regarded the NDCT contributions more highly than members of later clusters.

The last part of Chapter IV presented the perceptions and suggestions of alumni about the NDCT. The goals of the
NDCT, as expressed by respondents in their written comments, were the same as the official pronouncements. The respondents also presented comments and suggestions on various aspects of the NDCT and how the existing operation and services may be improved.

Chapter V

The results of the survey of attitudes of Thai military and civil service officers were used to judge the argument of scholars in the field of civil-military relations that government officials, both civil and military, are likely to have negative view of politics. The results were used to examine the study's four propositions about the official attitudes about politics and the people. The consideration of attitudes was based on the civil-military basis, and the three clusters of classes.

It was found that a large number of civil service and military officers hold unfavorable attitudes toward politics, 49.1 percent civil service and 43.1 percent military officers. Only 8.5 percent of military officers and 12.9 percent of civil service officers expressed favorable attitudes toward politics. The result supported the first proposition of this study. In addition, the finding agreed with the argument of scholars in the field of civil-military relations that both civil and military officers in developing countries hold a similar, negative view of politics.
On the basis of cluster, it was found that the percentage of officers expressing positive sentiments toward politics was rather small in all three clusters. The percentage almost doubled as one moved from the first to the second clusters, but dropped off slightly in the third cluster. The percentage of officers expressing unfavorable attitudes toward politics showed a consistent drop from the first, second, and third clusters. This pattern of decrease was explained by the different nature of each cluster's political environment. The first cluster, 1957-1965, was the period in which politics was completely dominated by the military, with support from the civil service. The military's grip on power was somewhat lessened during the time of the second cluster between 1966 and 1972. The last cluster, 1973-1979, was the time in which political activities were possible and the ratio between the career and non-career cabinet members was in favor of the latter for the first time after 1932. It was concluded that officers of the first cluster expressed unfavorable attitudes toward politics in largest number because of the lack of contact with the ideas, practices, and practitioners of democratic politics. The percentage of respondents expressing unfavorable attitudes toward politics was less in the second than in the first clusters because it reflected the effects of the limited political activities on attitudes
of officers of the second cluster. In comparison with members of the first two clusters, the percentage of the third cluster's members expressing unfavorable attitudes toward politics was the smallest because at various times during this time span the governments were set up on the basis of the results of popular elections, and career government officials had to work with elected representatives as heads of government ministries. Thus, increased contacts between career government officials and the ideas and practices of democratic politics resulted in the different expressions of attitudes toward politics of officers from the three clusters. This finding also supported the second proposition of this study.

Attitudes toward politics of Thai government officials are negative in general. When this issue was considered on the basis of each ministry, it was found that respondents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed favorable attitudes toward politics in the largest numbers. The reasons for this were the nature of the job and the educational backgrounds of foreign service officers. They were the only group of government officers who spent a good part of their working life outside the country. The effects of having lived in various democratic countries were visible in their favorable attitudes toward politics. The foreign service officers were better educated than officers from the
remainder of the ministries, with the exception of officers from the Office of the Prime Minister. Among military officers, the naval officers were the most negative in their attitudes toward politics.

With regard to official attitudes toward the people, the finding supported the other two propositions of this study. The third proposition was that attitudes toward the people of Thai military and civil service officers are similar and are likely to be negative. The majority of both military and civil service officers expressed attitudes of distrust toward the people. Civil service officers expressed attitudes of distrust toward the people in larger percentage than military officers. Thus, the third proposition was supported by the finding.

The study's fourth proposition was not supported by findings. The proposition stated that members of the three clusters are likely to have different attitudes toward the people, with members of the earlier clusters being more negative in their attitudes toward the people than members of later clusters. The finding of this study was that members of the three clusters expressed attitudes of distrust toward the people in similar numbers. On the other hand, the percentage of officers expressing attitudes of trust toward the people increased slightly from the first to the third clusters. However, the differences were small
and, therefore, could not be used to support the fourth proposition. Another finding was that both the military and civil service officers did not trust the people's political judgment. Officers of later clusters expressed their distrust of the people's political judgment in larger number than officers of earlier clusters.

The last part of Chapter V compared the attitudes toward various issues of this study's respondents with the results of Robert Putnam's study of political attitudes of senior civil servants of Great Britain, Italy, and West Germany. The results showed that Thai and Italian officials were similar in their attitudes toward politicians, politicians' involvement in the government administration, interest groups, political parties, political liberty, leadership, and citizens' influence over government. The British and German officers were also similar in their attitudes toward the same issues but their sentiment ran in the opposite direction from that of Thai and Italian officials. For example, the British and German officials expressed favorable attitudes toward the activities of interest groups while Thai and Italian officials showed unfavorable attitudes. Officers from the four countries were similar in their attitudes toward the need for a strong leader, the people's self interests, and rights of citizens to influence public policy. According to the Putnam's
classification, the British and German officers were called the "political bureaucrat" and the Italian officials the "classical bureaucrat." Because of the similarity in the attitudes of Thai and Italian officials, the former could be classified as "classical bureaucrats" as well.

Conclusions and Recommendations

One way of finding out about the success of government officials is to consider the position they have reached in the hierarchy of the bureaucracy. In the case of the NDCT alumni, members of the first cluster were more successful than members of the second and third clusters. Similarly, members of the third cluster were less successful than members of the second cluster. That is, members of later clusters had not been able to reach the three top ministerial positions, minister, deputy minister, and undersecretary, the way members of the earlier clusters were able to.

There are two reasons for this increasing lack of success of NDCT students. The first reason is political. Members of the first cluster had a better chance of being appointed to the top ministerial posts because the decision makers were career government officers like themselves. As the political environment changed and the monopoly of the military over political power was broken, the chances for career government officers to become minister or deputy
minister were severely limited as these two posts were generally regarded as political offices in nature. As such, they were supposed to be filled by elected representatives, and not by career government officials. The reduction in the number of NDCT alumni in these two positions could be attributed to the increasing politicization of the country.

The increasing politicization of the country, or the declining role of the military in politics, can be used in explaining the increasing lack of success of NDCT alumni in reaching the two top ministerial positions. This reason, however, cannot be used to explain the similar lack of success of NDCT alumni with regard to the position of undersecretary. The number of NDCT alumni in this post declined from the first to the third clusters. By the same method of reasoning, it may be argued that NDCT alumni in the positions immediately below undersecretary must have declined as well over the years. The increasing lack of success with regard to the post of undersecretary and other positions immediately below this level was due to another reason. The number of NDCT students have remained relatively stable while the number of government officials who are eligible for admission to the NDCT has progressively increased.

If the NDCT continues to operate on the basis of accepting between sixty-five to seventy-five officers each
year, the following consequences can be anticipated. First, the NDCT effect will be felt most at the personal level. However, the finding in Chapter IV revealed that respondents of this study did not think the NDCT experience had helped a great deal either in promotion consideration or in the pattern of career progress. The only effect would be that NDCT alumni will be distinguished from other non-NDCT officials in the sense that their career records are enhanced as a result of having been NDCT students. Second, as far as the NDCT is concerned, there will be no need to adjust the structure, curriculum, administration, and programs at the NDCT. The third consequence is that relations between the NDCT and its parent unit, the Supreme Command Headquarters, Ministry of Defense, and other units within the armed forces are not disturbed. The fourth consequence of operating on the same premise and method is perhaps the most serious. That is, the influence of the NDCT graduates over the execution and administration of public policy will progressively diminish. As this occurs over time, the usefulness of the NDCT in helping to create a bond for future cooperation and coordination among high-ranking government officials will decrease. The NDCT graduates may come to know each other well, but this does not mean much to the effectiveness of government operation because these officials, as a whole, would not be able to reach strategic positions in government.
Recommendations

To help alleviate the problem of growing lack of success of NDCT alumni, it is recommended that the number of NDCT students in each class must be adjusted to reflect the increased number of level seven and above civil service officers and military officers at the rank of special colonel and above. This adjustment of the incoming NDCT students can be done on a year-by-year or five-or ten-year basis. Preferably the yearly adjustment is the best method.

A number of consequences may be anticipated as a result of this increase in the number of NDCT students. First, relationships among students may not be as close as before since more officers are involved. Second, the move will dilute the elitist character of the institution and its graduates. The third consequence will be the need for a larger NDCT staff, an expansion of the physical facility, and an increase in its budget to cover its expanded scope of operation. The fourth consequence is that the chances of NDCT graduates reaching the upper level of the bureaucratic hierarchy will be improved. When that happens, the NDCT will have been more useful because it contributes to government operation through cooperation and coordination among its graduates.

In addition to the need to adjust the number of NDCT students, this author recommends another course of action.
As comments of the respondents make clear, the research report requirement needs to be evaluated. In essence, this activity has not been useful to the student or the government. A better and more practical alternative is the requirement of a group report. This approach will bring the students together and the end result will be a document of which students will be proud. These two recommendations, one major, one minor, are deemed essential if the NDCT is to continue to function as an effective institution according to its official mission and goals. Other suggestions, such as the lowering of the maximum age for the incoming students, of NDCT alumni in this study are also worth serious attention.

Political Implications

Attitudes toward politics and the people are one indicator of the prospects of democratic developments in Thailand. The findings from Table XXVIII to Table XXXV showed that Thai military and civil service officers of the 1960's and 1970's held negative attitudes toward various elements of politics and the right of citizens to exercise control over the government. In terms of attitudes toward the people and their political judgment, the majority of military and civil service officers expressed their distrust on both counts. This finding, in one sense, means that the career government officials are not enthusiastic about working for and
supporting the democratically elected governments. Two possible consequences can be envisioned as a result of these attitudes. The officers may not work as hard if they do not accept the legitimacy and qualifications of government leaders. For example, 36 percent of the members of the Thai parliament who were elected in 1969 had bachelor's degree while 5 percent had master's, doctoral, or medical degrees. The educational backgrounds for members of parliament elected in 1975 were 35 percent with a bachelor's degree or its equivalent, and 11 percent with degrees above the bachelor level (6, p. 116). Educational backgrounds of Thai public officials are above this level, especially officials at the higher echelon. If their level of dissatisfaction with elected government leaders rises above a certain limit officers might conspire to stage a coup to end their displeasure. Both consequences are harmful to the country. The first consequence has the effect of a loss of effectiveness in government operation since the career officers do not trust the elected leaders of government. The second consequence is more serious because it would bring the country back under the old system of military control of society.

The attitudes toward politics and the people can be considered from another perspective. Putnam characterized Italian officials as "classical bureaucrats" because the
respondents expressed negative sentiments toward statements about different elements and components of politics. The Thai respondents of the present study responded to practically the same statements in a similar manner so that they may be called "classical bureaucrats" as well. The Italian respondents were both older and younger officials. Despite the overall responses of Italian officials reflecting the philosophy and thinking of the "classical bureaucrat," Putnam was able to make a distinction on the basis of age with regard to future developments of Italian bureaucracy. Putnam found that the "younger Italian respondents are systematically less hostile to pluralist political institutions, more liberal and less elitist, more committed to programmatic politics and less legalist in their interpretation of their own role (7, p. 279)." Based on this distinction between older and younger Italian officials, Putnam concluded by predicting that "over the next decade Italian politicians will find the Italian bureaucracy imperceptibly, but gradually becoming more responsive to social needs and public demands (7, p. 281)."

Attitudes toward politics and the people of respondents in this study varied on the basis of cluster. Each cluster represents a group of officers from different age groups who had been working as government officials under different political environments. According to Table XX, there were
more officers showing favorable attitudes toward politics in cluster two than officers in cluster one, although the percentage of officers in cluster two and three are similar in this category. In the category of unfavorable attitudes toward politics, the percentage of officers consistently decreased from clusters one to two to three, 55.3, 47.6, and 38.4 percent, respectively. According to Table XXV, the percentage of officers expressing attitudes of distrust toward the people was similar in all three clusters, 53.9, 51.9, and 52.2 percent. However, the percentage of officers expressing favorable attitudes toward the people increased from the first to the third clusters, 26.9, 29.7, and 33 percent.

From these figures, it seems that the Thai military and civil service officers were becoming less negative over time in their perceptions of and attitudes toward politics. Although the percentage of officers expressing distrustful attitudes toward the people was about 50 percent for all three clusters, the percentage of officers expressing attitudes of trust toward the people showed a small increase over the three clusters. This finding can be used as a basis for arguing that officers of later generations were somewhat more receptive to the ideas and practices of democratic, competitive politics than officers of earlier generations. That is, younger officials were more positive
in their attitudes toward politics than older officials. The same thing can be said about the official attitudes toward the people, but with less confidence.

Therefore, on the basis of attitudes toward politics of Thai officers of the three clusters, it may be argued that the future does not look bleak for the prospects of parliamentary democracy and competitive politics in Thailand. This assertion is supported by three incidents. In 1979, 1981, and 1985 three military coups were attempted and all failed. If the military officers of the late 1970's and 1980's had the same mentality as officers of the 1950's and 1960's, the chances for these coups' success would have been much greater. The three coups failed largely because the majority of military officers were not highly anti-politics in their attitudes, and saw no need to bring back the old system of military dictatorship to Thailand.

Prospects for Future Research

Using this study as a starting point, one may suggest avenues for future research. In the field of civil-military relations, an investigation of the political attitudes of military and civil service officers in developing countries may yield additional evidence regarding the argument that these officers are likely to coalesce about politics. The results of this type of attitude measurement can be used to classify officials on the basis of Putnam's notion of "classical bureaucrat" and "political bureaucrat."
Additional research on the NDCT students from classes twenty-two to twenty-eight would reveal whether the trend of official attitudes toward politics and the people reported in this study would continue. An examination of officers' estimates of NDCT programs and the effects on their careers would add useful information to the present study. A study of attitudes of military and civil service officers who were not selected to attend the NDCT, but otherwise had the same qualifications, would add insights to the ongoing study of the attitudes of Thai government officials.

Implications

A number of implications for further study may be advanced. The inclusion of age, educational level, and family backgrounds will provide a similar study in the future with a more complete profile of the respondents. For example, it may be possible to find out if there is any difference in political attitudes between younger and older officials. Because a variation in age of officials within a given time period can have effects in the outcome of the study, knowing the exact age will enable a researcher to study the respondents with more confidence. Level of education may be used to test the effects of education on political attitudes of officials. Similarly, differences in family backgrounds may produce different attitudes toward politics even among officers of the same occupation and the same time span.
Any further study of the attitudes of military and civil service officers must be done with the representativeness of respondents in mind to insure that they reflect the make-up of the total officials. In so doing, the generalizations and conclusions of such a study can be regarded with more confidence as representatives of the total officers being studied. In addition, the future study needs to focus on the attitudes of military and civil service officers within a given time period, such as the use of cluster of the present study. In using the military and civil service as the basis of considering official attitudes within a particular time span, the result can be compared to the official attitudes of the whole group without regard to any time frame. By relying on the use of different time period and the difference in occupation within each time period, a future study will yield further and more fruitful information than the one based on cluster alone.

The use of a statistical test of significance will add confidence to the results of any future examination that the result of the study is not by chance. That is, the future study of a similar nature will be justified on the statistical basis. Further, the employment of the method of multiple cross-tabulation may uncover patterns and relationships among variables being studied that the use of simple cross-tabulation is not able to produce.
CHAPTER BIBLIOGRAPHY


Appendix A

QUESTIONNAIRE
Instruction

Please answer all of the following questions according to each category's specific instructions. Most can be answered by simply checking (X) the appropriate item. Do not write your name on the form. The results of this survey will be examined and written in general terms. Your cooperation in this survey of graduates of the National Defense College of Thailand is greatly appreciated.

A. General Information.

1) Which language can you comfortably use? Please check all that apply.
   1( ) English
   2( ) French
   3( ) German
   4( ) Chinese
   5( ) Other. Please specify.....................

2) Which dialect can you fluently use? Please check all that apply.
   1( ) central Thai
   2( ) northern Thai
   3( ) northeastern Thai
   4( ) southern Thai
   5( ) Other. Please specify.....................

3) Which factor was the most important in determining your selection to attend the NDCT?
   1( ) quota
   2( ) seniority
   3( ) ability
   4( ) superior's personal recommendation
   5( ) Other. Please specify.....................

B: Value of Experience at the NDCT

Please fill in the number that best indicates your estimation of the value of experience at the NDCT. For example, write 6 if you believe the prescribed course work (item 1) was the least valuable experience

Priority of Value

1.Prescribed Course Work (NDCT Lecture)............( )
2.Individual Research Project..........................( )
3.Help Boost Career...................................( )
4.Association with other Students...................( )
5.Opportunity to Listen to and meet with Authorities in Various Fields...................( )
6.Being in an Academic Environment, Away from
C: Please CIRCLE the number that best indicates your answer to each statement below. For example, circle 1 if you strongly agree with the statement, 2 if you agree, 3 if you are undecided or have no opinion, 4 if you disagree, 5 if you strongly disagree with the statement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Increasing your ability to understand and grasp the operations, problems, and objectives of those with whom you came in contact there or in general.</td>
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<td>2. Enhancing your ability as an officer and individual in self-expression, communications, in debate, etc.</td>
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<td>3. Contributing, in a direct way, to your understanding of, and your ability in your particular line of work.</td>
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<td>4. Contributing to your awareness and understanding of your function within a broad organizational context.</td>
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<td>5. Achieving promotion.</td>
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<td>6. Achieving more challenging work.</td>
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<td>7. How would you rate your contacts at the NDCT (your classmates and graduates from other classes) in terms of their being able to help you in your official capacity?</td>
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<td>1. ( ) help a great deal</td>
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<td>2. ( ) helpful</td>
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<td>3. ( ) no opinion/undecided</td>
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<td>4. ( ) do not help a great deal</td>
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<td>5. ( ) not helpful</td>
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<td>8. Please compare your career with your colleagues' who had the same level of education and rank as you at the time of your selection to attend the NDCT, but who had never been selected to attend the NDCT, do you think being NDCT graduates helped your career progress?</td>
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<td>1. ( ) helped a great deal</td>
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<td>2. ( ) helped somewhat</td>
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<td>3. ( ) made no difference</td>
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<td>4. ( ) did not help (did some harm)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

D: Opinion about Administration and Politics

1. Do you think an average Thai citizen has the ability in expressing political opinion and in selecting members of parliament that act in the interests of the people?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ability</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Has the ability</td>
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<tr>
<td>Does not have the ability</td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
2. Do you think the present parliamentary system is appropriate for Thailand?
   1( ) appropriate
   2( ) not appropriate
   3( ) no opinion/undecided

3. Do you think the republic system of government is appropriate for Thailand?
   1( ) appropriate
   2( ) not appropriate
   3( ) no opinion/undecided

4. The present administrative arrangement of the Thai government system has the concentration of power at the center, do you think there should be a decentralization of this power by delegating greater power to the regional and local level?
   1( ) yes
   2( ) no
   3( ) no opinion/undecided

E. Attitudes Toward the People

Please CIRCLE the number that best indicate your answer to each statement below. For example, circle 1 if you strongly agree with the statement, 2 if you disagree, 3 if you are undecided or have no opinion, 4 if you disagree, 5 if you strongly disagree with the statement.

1. Certain people are better suited to lead Thailand because of their social background. 1  2  3  4  5
2. It will always be necessary to have a few strong, able individual who know how to take charge. .............................. 1  2  3  4  5
3. Most important questions are too complicated for the public to understand... 1  2  3  4  5
4. Few people know what is in their real interest in the long run...................... 1  2  3  4  5
5. In a world as complicated as today's, it makes little sense to speak of increasing the common man's influence over governmental affairs...................... 1  2  3  4  5

F. Attitudes Toward Party, Parliamentary and Pressure Group Politics

Please CIRCLE the number that best indicates your answer to each statement below. For example, circle 1 if you strongly agree with the statement, 2 if you disagree, 3 if you are undecided or have no opinion, 4 if you disagree, 5 if you strongly agree with the statement

1  2  3  4  5
1. Every individual citizen has a perfect right to attempt to influence decisions of public agencies......................... 1 2 3 4 5
2. Many who enter politic often think more about their own welfare or that of their party than about the welfare of citizens.... 1 2 3 4 5
3. The interference of politicians in affairs which are properly the business of administrators is a disturbing feature of contemporary public life.................. 1 2 3 4 5
4. The general welfare of the country is seriously endangered by the continual clash of particularistic interest groups.... 1 2 3 4 5
5. Although parties play an important role in a democracy, they often uselessly exacerbate political conflicts.............. 1 2 3 4 5
6. Basically it is not the parties and parliament but rather the public administration which guarantees reasonably satisfactory public policy in Thailand............ 1 2 3 4 5
7. The freedom of political propaganda is not an absolute freedom, and the state should carefully regulate its use............. 1 2 3 4 5
8. Public Opinion or mass media seldom contributes much to the solution of complicated political problems.................. 1 2 3 4 5

G. Attitudes Toward Administrative Principles and Practices

Please CIRCLE the number that best indicates your answer to each statement below. For example, circle 1 if you strongly agree, 2 if you agree, 3 if you are undecided or have no opinion, 4 if you disagree, 5 if you strongly disagree with the statement.

1. A good subordinate is one who takes his orders, works hard, and does not say anything that disagrees with his superior's ideas..... 1 2 3 4 5
2. Subordinates have to be closely supervised or else they will not do their work properly. 1 2 3 4 5
3. Most subordinates try to "please" their superiors rather than be honest with them.... 1 2 3 4 5
4. Very few people take initiative; most have to be led or given orders before they do something.............................. 1 2 3 4 5
5. In order to get work done, a superior has to satisfy his subordinates rather than order them............................... 1 2 3 4 5
6. In the Thai administrative system, all change comes from the top.................... 1 2 3 4 5
7. In his work a state official should
always follow well-proven methods............ 1 2 3 4 5
8. A senior civil servant should limit
his activity to the precise application
of the law................................. 1 2 3 4 5
9. One of the most positive aspects of an
administrative career is the opportunity to
work with colleagues of high quality........... 1 2 3 4 5
10. The basic obligation of a state official
is to serve the public interest the way
elected representatives (members of
parliament) define it..................... 1 2 3 4 5

11. How many of these descriptions fit or characterize the
units of government that you have worked with? Please check
all that apply
1( ) close supervision
2( ) failure to delegate
3( ) heavy emphasis on regulation
4( ) Quantitative norms, precedent, and the accumulation
of paper to prove compliance
5( ) cold aloofness
6( ) insistence on office protocol
7( ) fear of innovation
8( ) restriction of communication
9( ) none of the above applies

12. Do you remember or know about any of the individual
research reports of your class or other classes at the NDCT
that have been adopted by the government as national policy?
1( ) no
2( ) yes...please describe briefly the name of the report,
its author, and its contribution and significance below

13. What do you consider to be the most important goal(s)
of the NDCT?

14. In your opinion, what general contributions has the NDCT
made to the administration of the country?

15. Please provide additional comments and suggestions about
the NDCT
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