METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN MALINGERING RESEARCH:

THE USE OF SIMULATION DESIGNS

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The accurate determination of malingering relies on the use of validated and clinically relevant assessment measures. Simulation design is the most often-used research design to accomplish this. However, its external validity is sometimes questioned. The goal of the thesis was to systematically evaluate these major elements: situation, incentives, and coaching. The situation in simulation studies can vary from relevant (academic failure in a college population) to irrelevant (capital murder) for the samples being studied. Incentives refer to the external motivation given to improve simulators’ performance and can be positive (extra credit and monetary reward) or negative (extra time and effort). Finally, coaching refers to whether the participant receives any information on detection strategies that are designed to identify feigners. Using a large undergraduate sample in a factorial design, results indicate that a scenario familiar to the participants generally improved the believability of their responses. Coaching also improved the ability to feign convincingly, while incentive type was not associated with any change in scores. The implications of these findings for future research designs and the connection to practice are discussed.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The accurate detection of malingered mental disorders is highly consequential in forensic and clinical settings. On the one hand, persons who feign symptoms can sometimes avoid criminal punishment in the case of insanity acquittal or have misdemeanor charges dropped. Malingers may also obtain disability payments or mental health services that are in short supply and urgently needed by those with real mental disorders. Both outcomes increase the burden on the legal system and society in general (Kucharski et al., 2006). On the other hand, defendants with genuine mental disorders can be wrongly classified as malingers and deprived of needed mental health treatment, lose an otherwise legitimate mental health defense, and be denied due process in the legal system (Kucharski et al., 2006; Kropp & Rogers, 1993). Wrongly classified patients in clinical settings may be denied the help they need and the classification of “malingering” may brand them as deceivers, destroying their opportunities to receive assistance in the future (Resnick & Knoll, 2008). Therefore, the accurate assessment of malingering is an essential part of all forensic and clinical evaluations. The establishment of valid and reliable measures to assist in this goal is vitally important.

This chapter introduces the topics of malingering and malingering research. Malingering is defined and differentiated from other response styles. The major findings regarding its prevalence and conceptual underpinnings are also reviewed.
The importance of detection strategies and their uses are highlighted as well. Finally, various research designs are reviewed with an emphasis on simulation design. Specifically, the methodological issues affecting the ecological validity of this design are discussed in depth, which leads into the current study.

Malingering and Other Response Styles

Terminology in malingering research has been problematic because terms having distinct meanings are sometimes used interchangeably. Before discussing malingering itself in depth, these distinctions must be clarified. *Malingering* is described in the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual- Fifth Edition, Text Revised* (*DSM-IV-TR*) as a response style that consists of the intentional falsification or gross exaggeration of symptoms, which is motivated by external incentives (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). In contrast, *dissimulation* is a general term used to characterize the deliberate distortion or misrepresentation of psychological symptoms (Rogers, 2008). Because of its general nature, dissimulation is most often used when a more specific response style is not applicable. Besides dissimulation, two other common response styles include defensiveness and irrelevant responding. *Defensiveness* is the deliberate denial of symptoms for external gain; it can be conceptualized as the polar opposite of malingering (Rogers & Bender, 2003). *Irrelevant responding* refers to responses that are not connected to the content of the clinical inquiries (Rogers, 1997). One variant of irrelevant responding is random responding, in which an individual simply responds haphazardly with no regard for content. This pattern most often occurs on forced-choice measures.
The term *feigning* is often preferred to malingering when reporting test results on psychological measures. Like malingering, feigning describes the deliberate fabrication or gross exaggeration of symptoms (Rogers, 2008a). However, it differs from malingering because it draws no conclusions about the presence of external incentives or any other goal. The reason for this distinction is that standardized measures are ill equipped to assess the complex interplay of external and internal motivations, thus, feigning is the most accurate term for such measures.

The definition of malingering set forth by *DSM-IV-TR* (APA, 2000, p. 739) is “the intentional production of false or grossly exaggerated physical or psychological symptoms, motivated by external incentives such as avoiding military duty, avoiding work, obtaining financial compensation, evading criminal prosecution, or obtaining drugs.” It can be differentiated from factitious disorder due to the presence of external incentives. In addition, it can be differentiated from conversion disorder by the intentional production of symptoms in addition to the presence of external incentives (North & Yutzy, 2005).

Malingering is not a diagnosable disorder; instead, it is considered a “V code” in *DSM-IV-TR*. V codes are classifications of circumstances or problems influencing an individual’s health status that are considered supplementary to any diagnoses (APA, 2000). While a V code does not have any inclusion or exclusion criteria, it still requires clinicians to make a categorical determination about the presence or absence of the condition.

As the *DSM-IV-TR* (APA, 2000) makes clear, malingering can occur in a number of contexts including medicolegal or forensic settings. In addition to occurring in a
medicolegal context, the *DSM-IV-TR* screening indicators include the following: (a) a marked discrepancy between the claimed disability and objective findings, (b) a lack of cooperation in assessment and treatment, and (c) the presence of antisocial personality disorder (APA, 2000). Importantly, the *DSM-IV-TR* indicators are meant only to raise the suspicion of malingering. Although these characteristics are common in medicolegal settings, these *DSM-IV-TR* screening indicators should not mistakenly be thought of as inclusion criteria or even discriminating characteristics.

In the assessment of malingering, a key distinction must be made between common and discriminating characteristics. Common characteristics describe features that are often observed in individuals with a given condition and are sometimes referred to as “clinical correlates.” They typically do not assist in classification. For example, “medicolegal contexts” are common to all forensic examinees; therefore, they do not help to distinguish between malingerers and genuine responders. In contrast, discriminating characteristics are specific features that reliably differentiate between groups (Rogers, 1997). Wrongly assuming that the *DSM-IV-TR* guidelines are discriminating characteristics can be quite misleading and dangerous. For instance, if we assume that antisocial personality disorder (APD) is a discriminating characteristic, it would mean that the rate of malingering in correctional settings is somewhere above 50%, the prevalence of APD in correctional settings. However, since the rate of malingering is estimated to be around 15% in this setting (Rogers, 2008; to be discussed later), more than 2/3 of those identified as malingering by this indicator would be incorrectly classified. In fact, studies suggest that *DSM-IV* screening indicators may produce false-positive rates around 80% (Rogers & Vitacco, 2002). Because *DSM-IV*
guidelines may represent common features of malingerers, at least in forensic settings, they cannot assist in the clinical classification of malingering. The possibility that these guidelines (e.g., presence of APD) would discriminate those in non-forensic settings has not been investigated specifically.

Simple categorical classifications (i.e., malingering or not) can lead clinicians to make difficult dichotomous decisions in every situation. Instead, malingering has been conceptualized based on severity, type (fabrication vs. exaggeration), and clinical relevance. Rogers (1988) identified three levels of severity for malingering. First, mild malingering consists primarily of exaggerations, with minimal distortion and only a moderate role in differential diagnosis. Second, moderate malingering consists of exaggerated or fabricated symptoms presented by the individual to make his/her condition more significant than it is. This level can include a mix of genuine and exaggerated or feigned symptoms. Third, severe malingering involves extreme fabrication of symptoms that makes the presentation absurd or incredible. An important contribution of this model is that mild malingering can be inconsequential to diagnosis and forensically-relevant issues. Using a different method of classification, Resnick (Resnick, West, & Payne, 2008), provided three categories. Pure malingering refers to the falsification of all an individual’s symptoms. Partial malingering involves the exaggeration of the extent of an individual’s deficits. Lastly, false imputation is the intentional attribution of real symptoms to a false cause for the purpose of personal gain.

Both Rogers’ and Resnick’s categories classify the method an individual is using to malinger in essentially the same way – levels of fabrication. Each model makes its
own valuable contribution. Resnick’s false imputation category is a type of malingering not explicitly included in Rogers’ categories; but the prevalence of this type of malingering is unknown and the question of whether it needs a separate category has yet to be addressed. On the other hand, as noted, Rogers’ mild category allows examiners to note the presence of an exaggeration, while leaving the ultimate forensic decision unchanged. This contribution may make the Rogers’ model more applicable to adjudicative settings.

Determinations of malingering and feigning can also vary by the confidence or certitude in these classifications (Rogers, 1988). Based on the development of the SIRS (Rogers, Bagby, & Dickens, 1992), examinees can be classified as Honest and Indeterminate and on two levels of feigning: Probable Feigning and Definite Feigning. The honest classification is reserved for those who have a very low likelihood of feigning (≤ 5.0%; Rogers et al., 1992). The Indeterminate category suggests variability in responding; no classification can be made regarding response style. Probable and definite feigning classifications differ in their levels of certainty. Based on original classification data, the probable range has a 90% likelihood of being correct (Rogers et al., 1992), while the definite range approaches a 100% likelihood of being correct. This system increases classificatory accuracy by avoiding dichotomous determinations. It also indicates genuine cases where the likelihood of feigning is very low.

The models above describe various subcategories of malingering but do not attempt to explain motivations for malingering. By definition, malingering is dependent on motivation by external incentives. However, the majority of persons do not choose to malingering irrespective of those incentives. Explanatory models vary both on their
hypothesized reasons for malingering and on the amount of support they have received from research.

Explanatory Models

Three explanatory models have been proposed to explain the primary motivation for malingering: (a) pathogenic, (b) criminological, and (c) adaptational (Ustad & Rogers, 1996). The pathogenic model, one of the earliest models put forward (Berney, 1973; Hay, 1983), posits that a mental disorder is the underlying reason for malingering. In an effort to control symptoms, an individual deliberately produces false ones and tries to portray them as real. As the disorder intensifies, the individual loses control over the symptoms and real symptoms emerge. For example, Hay (1983) argued that the simulation of schizophrenia is a prodromal phase of psychosis occurring in “extremely deviant premorbid personalities” (p. 8). This model has lost popularity because of its lack of empirical support; specifically, the predicted deterioration from voluntary to involuntary symptom production is not often observed (Rogers, Salekin, et al., 1998). In addition, the pathogenic model is subject to hindsight bias. While it may be easy to look retrospectively at a patient’s history of impairment and see an increase over time, it is difficult to predict this exacerbation at the beginning of the patient’s complaints. Conceptually, the pathogenic model has limited value in predicting further deterioration. As noted by Resnick (1988), once the external incentive to feign mental disorder is eliminated, malingerers tend to improve greatly, contrary to the prediction of the pathogenic model.

The criminological model posits that individuals mangle because they have antisocial and oppositional motivations (Rogers, 1984). It is consistent with the DSM-IV-
TR, which assumes that malingering will be found in forensic settings and that these individuals are very likely to have antisocial personality disorder (APD). Despite its promotion by DSM-IV, the criminological model has lost favor with some researchers (Rogers, 1997). Because most forensic studies occur in criminal settings, the co-occurrence of malingering and APD may reflect a sample characteristic rather than a causal relationship. Therefore, while those with APD may have a higher prevalence of malingering in criminal-forensic settings (Kucharski, Falkenbach, Egan, & Duncan, 2006), its use can lead to misclassification of genuine examinees. The criminological model and DSM–IV also assume that malingers are often uncooperative. Contrary to this claim, malingers often appear willing to report their symptoms, whereas those with many genuine disorders often conceal their symptoms (Resnick, 2008).

Due to the serious theoretical and empirical problems with the pathogenic and criminological models, Rogers and Cavanaugh (1983) advocated a third explanatory model that has since gained empirical support. The adaptational model asserts that individuals may malinger when (a) they have a substantial personal investment, (b) the context of the evaluation is seen as adversarial, and (c) the individuals see few alternatives to reach their goals. Research has supported the adaptational model over previous models. For instance, prevalence research indicates that higher rates of malingering occur when individuals have a lot to gain or lose and have few positive alternatives (Binder, 1993; Larrabee, 2005; Mittenburg, Patton, Canyock, & Condit, 2002; Rogers, 1997; Rogers, Salekin, Sewell, Goldstein, & Leonard, 1998). However, Rogers (1997) cautioned that the adaptational model is an explanatory and not a detection model. It would be a gross error to conclude malingering simply because an
individual is in an adversarial setting with a large personal investment and few alternatives. The combination of these factors may motivate small numbers to mangle, but prevalence rates alone provide no evidence of malingering.

Prevalence of Malingering

The prevalence of malingering is a very important question, yet for many years it went virtually uninvestigated (Rogers, 1997). Prior to research on prevalence, many professionals simply assumed that malingering occurred so infrequently that its investigation was unwarranted. However, two points are relevant here. First, as Rogers (1994) observed, infrequency does not equate with inconsequentiality; the social and monetary costs of misclassifying malingers are very high. Second, the assumption that malingering occurs infrequently also appears to be false. The rate of malingering varies markedly across settings.

The simplistic assumption that malingering occurs only in forensic settings has been effectively disproven. For instance, malingering in general clinical populations has been estimated to be around 7-8% (Rogers, 1997). A review by Fishbain, Cutler, Rosomoff, and Rosomoff (1999) of chronic pain patients in health care settings estimated the rate of malingering to be between 1.25% and 10.4%, while in military settings, the prevalence has been found to be between 2% and 7% (Viglione, Fals-Stewart, & Moxham, 1995).

Estimates of malingering are much higher in settings that can be considered adversarial. For general forensic populations, the average rate of malingering falls somewhere around 15.7-17.4% (Rogers, 1997; Rogers et al., 1998), while in personal injury cases estimates are higher, with 18-33% of clients feigning responses (Binder,
Cases of neurological deficits have evidenced similar rates, with some researchers estimating base rates of malingering at 16.3 to 26.7% (Bianchini, Curtis, & Greves, 2006).

Conceptually, prevalence rate findings lend support to the adaptational model because adversarial settings have higher rates of malingering than non-adversarial settings. While prevalence rates can provide some insight into when individuals are likely to malinger, they cannot predict who is malingering. The next section reviews the development and use of detection strategies designed to differentiate honest from feigned presentations.

Detection Strategies

Starting in the early 1800s, attempts to identify malingerers relied heavily on case studies that were of dubious quality with questionable generalizability (Geller, Erlen, Kaye, & Fisher, 1990). A review by Geller et al. (1990) indicated that early authors suggested a range of indicators of feigning, including (a) interview behavior, such as an inability to maintain eye contact, (b) feigned presentation, such as overacting symptoms, (c) areas of intact functioning, usually of symptoms that are less obvious or known to the public, and (d) atypical symptoms, such as rapid onset, rare symptoms, and absurd thoughts. Rogers (1984) observed that these methods derived from case studies have essentially gone unchanged to this day. In fact, nearly all methods used today were known 100 years ago, and some methods have even disappeared (Rogers & Correa, 2008).

Although case studies were a good first step, two major problems are found with this approach. First, the reasoning is circular. With unstandardized strategies derived
from case studies, salient characteristics are used to identify malingerers; these same characteristics are then used to characterize malingerers (Borum, Otto, & Golding, 1993, Rogers, 1997; Rogers & Correa, 2008). The second and related point is that common characteristics cannot be equated with discriminating characteristics (Rogers, 2008a). By relying on common characteristics, these case study-based methods can lead to high false positive rates in the classification of malingerers. As a result of these problems, studies relying on group differences were developed.

Systematic assessments using group differences were the next step and offered several advantages over the case study approach (Rogers & Correa, 2008). This assessment approach can be traced to the original Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI; Hathaway & McKinley, 1940), the first measure to use the standard approach, which paved the way for all other empirically supported methods for the assessment of malingering. Essentially, many studies focusing on group differences relied not on conceptually-based strategies, but on statistical differentiation. Two or more groups of feigners and genuine responders were given a standard series of questions via self-report measure or interview. Questions which differentiated feigning from genuine responders were then used as the method of determining malingering (Rogers, 1984; an in-depth discussion of how groups and scales are formed can be found later in this section).

While the development of the MMPI was an important step, little attention was originally paid to the detection strategies underlying its validity scales (Rogers, Harrell, & Liff, 1993). The majority of research was focused on individual scale development, while Rogers et al. (1993) were the first to focus on their explicit or implicit detection
strategies. Detection strategies have the advantage of being conceptually grounded and studied across different measures, lessening the chance that their effectiveness reflects idiosyncratic features of a particular scale.

Rogers and Bender (2003) proposed that a good detection strategy must be developed with five criteria. First and foremost, researchers should take care to define the detection strategy as specifically as possible. Second, strategies should be standardized to ensure that items are written and administered correctly each time, but also to allow for cross-validation. Third, the conceptual basis for a detection strategy should be well-formulated. The fourth and fifth criteria refer to considerations in initial testing of the strategy – each should be based on empirical validation and systematic differentiation.

The validation of detection strategies for response styles is a multi-step process (Rogers, 2008b). Researchers should use a variety of research designs to protect against the specific limitations of each individual design used for validation. Other methodological issues will be discussed later and are a major part of the current study. Beyond design and methodology, several important statistics should be included in the validation process. Validation studies should include effect sizes to indicate the magnitude of differences. Additionally, utility estimates measuring the rates of correct and incorrect classifications should be used to examine the accuracy of the detection strategies across measures. To establish each detection strategy, it should then be tested and validated across various scales and measures. If these criteria are not met, the detection strategy cannot be assumed valid and its use should be limited.

Common detection strategies
A detection strategy that is well-validated is only useful for a specific response style and intended domain. Generally, domains can be categorized into three broad areas: mental disorders, cognitive impairment, and medical presentation (Rogers & Bender, 2003). For malingering, strategies that are effective with mental disorders are often ill-suited for the other two domains. For example, the rare symptoms strategy, which focuses on the genuineness of symptoms associated with Axis I disorders, has little relevance to feigned mental retardation, which involves failure at simple cognitive tasks. In contrast, medical feigning detection strategies must focus on the severity or specific constellations of impairing medical conditions, which differs vastly from mental disorders. The present discussion focuses on detection strategies for malingered mental disorders and excludes feigning in the cognitive and medical domains.

Most modern validity scales now use established detection strategies. These strategies were first examined by Rogers (1984), who provided a basic description of how they were designed to work. With subsequent research, detection strategies for mental disorders were classified into two basic categories – unlikely presentation and amplified presentation. Unlikely presentation strategies measure the presence of unusual or atypical symptoms. These symptoms should be so atypical that genuine clinical populations report very few of them. Amplified presentation strategies, on the other hand, measure the frequency or intensity of psychopathological characteristics to an extent that is uncommon in clinical populations (Rogers, Jackson, Sewell, & Salekin, 2005). This categorization was supported in a confirmatory factor analysis of the SIRS, which classified scales on similar categories (Rogers et al., 2005). Rogers (2008b; Rogers & Bender, 2003) presents ten primary detection strategies that fit into these two
categories for the domain of feigned mental disorder (see Table 1). While other strategies have been devised and used, these ten represent the most common and best-validated detection strategies for feigned mental disorders.

Unlikely presentation strategies have proven to be very useful in the detection of feigned mental disorders. Under this general category, five major detection strategies are found, (a) rare symptoms, (b) quasi-rare symptoms, (c) improbable symptoms, (d) symptom combinations, and (e) spurious patterns of psychopathology (Rogers, 2008b; see Table 1 for brief descriptions of each strategy).

The first two detection strategies, rare symptoms and quasi-rare symptoms, share a common theme but with a critical difference. Rogers (2008b) operationalized rare symptoms as those reported by less than 5% of genuine clinical patients; however, this operationalization has varied over time. In the first basic description of rare symptoms, Rogers (1984) used the word “rare,” but did not specify its maximum criterion. Although they do not use the term “rare symptom,” Arbis and Ben-Porath (1995) operationalized this construct for the Fp scale as items endorsed by less than 20% of clinical populations, a less stringent standard than that proposed by Rogers (2008b). Rare symptoms is one of the most often used detection strategies and can often be found on multiscale and specialized malingering measures. Its frequent use is due to both its intuitive appeal and proven effectiveness. Empirically, the strategy has consistently evidenced large to very large effect sizes (Rogers, 2008). Examples of this detection strategy include the MMPI-2’s Fp scale and the SIRS RS scale.

Quasi-rare symptoms is similar to rare symptoms strategy; however, the criterion for the selection of items is infrequency in normative populations rather than clinical
samples. Because it is based on symptoms that are rare in normative populations, high false positive rates may occur in clinical or forensic populations where the symptoms are genuinely present more often. The distinction between rare and quasi-rare symptoms is very important. In a meta-analysis of the MMPI-2, Rogers et al. (2003) found that quasi-rare scales (i.e., F and Fb) produced high elevations in genuine patients with schizophrenia and PTSD. These quasi-rare scales have diminished discriminant ability for patients with severe Axis I disorders.

Improbable symptoms strategy is an extreme version of rare symptoms. These items are sometimes reported by malingerers, but are never encountered in patients with genuine psychopathology. It can be distinguished from the rare symptoms strategy because the items are not only infrequent, but preposterous in nature. Rogers (1984) did not originally differentiate between these two strategies; but in the development of the SIRS (Rogers et al., 1992) the authors used both strategies separately (i.e., Rare Symptoms and Improbable or Absurd Symptoms). One main limitation of this strategy is its potential transparency. Those individuals with experience in the mental health system may recognize improbable symptoms as clearly bogus and avoid detection on them.

Table 1

| Detection Strategies for Feigned Mental Disorder |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| **Strategy** | **Description** |
| **Unlikely Presentation** | Measures endorsement of symptoms that are very infrequently reported by genuine clinical populations. |
Table 1 (continued).

<table>
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<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>Quasi-rare symptoms</td>
<td>Uses symptoms and features that are not often found in a normative population. However, these items could be genuine or malingered.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Improbable symptoms</td>
<td>Similar to rare symptoms strategy, but with symptoms that have a preposterous quality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symptom combinations</td>
<td>Uses symptoms that may be quite common in clinical populations but that rarely occur together. Malingers are unlikely to know which combinations of symptoms are likely.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spurious patterns</td>
<td>An extended version of symptom combinations which relies on combinations of entire scales that are unlikely to occur in clinical populations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amplified Presentation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiscriminant symptom</td>
<td>Takes advantage of the fact that malingerers are very likely to endorse a large number of symptoms compared to genuine patients.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>endorsement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symptom severity</td>
<td>Relies on the finding that even genuine patients report few symptoms as unbearable or very intense. Malingers often report many symptoms as very severe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obvious symptoms</td>
<td>Items included on scales using this strategy are obviously indicative of mental illness. Malingers are likely to endorse these symptoms. This strategy is sometimes compared to subtle items, which malingerers are less likely to endorse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reported vs. Observed</td>
<td>Makes use of the marked discrepancy between an individual's report and the signs observed by the clinician.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erroneous stereotypes</td>
<td>Uses common misconceptions about the characteristics of mental disorders. Malingers are likely to endorse a large proportion of these erroneous stereotypes.</td>
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The last two detection strategies in the unlikely presentation category examine the relationship between scale items and the infrequency with which they occur together. Symptom combinations and spurious patterns of psychopathology make use
of the finding that even when malingerers endorse plausible symptoms, they are likely to endorse multiple symptoms that rarely occur together. An example of a rare combination might be grandiosity and increased appetite. Even those persons who are familiar with specific symptoms may be unlikely to know what combinations are plausible. Only a malingerer with a sophisticated understanding of psychopathology would be likely to foil this strategy (Rogers, 2008b). The SIRS Symptom Combination scale (SC) and M-FAST Rare Combinations scale (RC) use this detection strategy (Rogers, 2008b). Interestingly, this strategy has only been used in interview formats. The spurious patterns of psychopathology strategy is a more complex version of symptom combinations. Its complexity represents both its greatest strength and its greatest weakness. While difficult to foil because of its complexity, it is also difficult to validate because of the vast number of possible combinations. Investigators must be sure that results are not capitalizing on chance patterns of genuine psychopathology (Rogers, 2008b).

The second group of detection strategies, known as amplified strategies, contains real symptoms of mental disorder whose number, frequency, or intensity is exaggerated. While unlikely presentation strategies identify feigning based on the endorsement of symptoms, amplified strategies rely on the magnitude of reported symptoms. This category of detection strategies can be accomplished via single items or scales that capitalize on exaggerated frequency or intensity.

The first two strategies within the amplified category can be seen as measuring two aspects of the same symptoms. The strategy of indiscriminant symptom endorsement detects the tendency of malingerers to be unselective when endorsing
items. This strategy is easily incorporated into measures and scored because it often consists of the summing of reported items. However, care should be used to ensure that a wide range of symptoms is used; otherwise, the scale could capitalize on many real symptoms of the same disorder that would be seen in genuine cases (Rogers, 2008b). Symptom severity strategies detect the intensity of endorsed symptoms. Only a certain number of symptoms are considered unbearable by even the most severely impaired individuals (Rogers & Bender, 2003). When a larger number of symptoms are rated as “extreme,” it is very likely that the symptoms are being exaggerated if not fabricated. Malingerers are often unable to decide which symptoms, or how many, should be severe. While a number of common measures use these strategies, the SIRS provides an excellent example. A series of items containing a wide variety of symptoms are presented and answers are given for both the presence and severity of each item. In this way, each item loads on to both scales. These two strategies are widely used and have resulted in large effect sizes (Rogers, 2008b).

The next two amplified strategies involve misconceptions about symptoms of psychopathology. The obvious vs. subtle symptoms strategy has existed since Wiener and Harmon’s (1946) designation of obvious and subtle items on five of the original MMPI scales. They noted that malingering tends to endorse a higher proportion of obvious symptoms, neglecting those that may not be popularly known (Greene, 2008). For example, persons feigning psychosis often report positive symptoms (e.g., hallucinations and delusions) but omit negative symptoms (e.g., affective flattening and alogia). Erroneous stereotypes strategy takes advantage of the fact that malingeringers may erroneously assume that certain presentations are common in genuine
populations, while in fact they are not. This strategy is resistant to preparation, since even many clinicians are unaware of these stereotypes. The use of erroneous stereotypes strategy has produced very large effect sizes (Rogers, 1997).

Lastly, the reported versus observed symptoms strategy differs from all other strategies by using more than item endorsement. Instead, it examines patterns between endorsed items and observed behavior. However, caution must be used with this strategy, as many genuine patients lack insight and may not endorse items that are observed by the clinician. In addition, problems can arise when raters are not adequately trained in observing the behavior of the test taker.

Detection of Feigning on Multiscale Inventories

Multiscale personality inventories were the first standardized methods for the assessment of feigning and continue to be used most frequently (Greene, 2008). Most multiscale measures available today contain scales for directly assessing response styles (Sellbom & Bagby, 2008). This combination of validity and clinical scales provides the clinician the most information with relatively little use of professional time, making inventories a very important part of many forensic and clinical evaluations. This section will review the MMPI-2 and PAI, two of the most often used measures for malingering and other response styles. This review emphasizes their use of detection strategies.

MMPI – 2

The MMPI-2 (Butcher et al., 1989) is the most extensively researched measure for the detection of feigning (Rogers, Sewell, Martin, & Vitacco, 2003). Many studies have investigated its usefulness with feigned mental disorder, including two meta-analyses (Rogers, Sewell, & Salekin, 1994; Rogers et al., 2003). In addition to extensive
research, the MMPI-2 is the most commonly used instrument in forensic settings for the
detection of malingering. According to Lally (2003), nearly two-thirds (64.0%) of forensic
clinicians rate the MMPI-2 as “recommended” and almost all (92.0%) consider it
“acceptable”.

The effectiveness of the MMPI-2 feigning scales can be negated by incomplete
or inconsistent profiles. Effectiveness relies on the ability to score items accurately;
therefore, missing or inconsistent data will result in incomplete and inaccurate scale
scores. Greene (2008) points out that because malingersers are making an effort to raise
their scores on clinical scales to appear mentally disordered, they are unlikely to omit
any items. Nonetheless, inconsistent profiles lead to misclassifications of malingersers,
raising the number of false-positives.

Over time, many validity scales were developed for the MMPI and MMPI-2,
sometimes with little attention to the underlying detection strategy (Rogers et al., 2003).
Items for validity and clinical scales were chosen according to the frequency with which
certain populations endorsed them (i.e., empirical keying). While the reasoning behind
this empirical selection method was to reduce the face validity of items, it has created
problems with interpretation that will be discussed later. Current MMPI-2 feigning scales
with more rationally-based constructions rely on four strategies: (a) rare symptoms, (b)
symptom severity, (c) obvious versus subtle symptoms, and (d) symptom selectivity
(see Table 2; Rogers et al., 2003; Rogers, 2008b).

The MMPI–2 contains two traditional scales that use quasi-rare symptom
detection strategies. The Infrequency (F) and Infrequent Back (Fb) scales contain items
that were endorsed by less than 10% of the MMPI-2 normative sample (Clark, Gironda,
& Young, 2003; Greene, 2000). Because these items are rare only in normative, and not clinical populations, results are often difficult to interpret. As a result, 25% of clinical samples appear to elevate scale F due to genuine psychopathology (Greene, 1997). While MMPI researchers (Gough, 1947) recognized this problem early on, it should also be noted that the F scale was originally intended only to measure atypical responding, with no implied causal factor (Dahlstrom et al., 1972). The conceptual problems with the F and Fb scales led to the development of the more stringent Psychiatric F (Fp) scale. Specifically, Fp was developed using items that were endorsed infrequently in an inpatient population (Arbisi & Ben Porath, 1995). This scale development is consistent with Rogers’ (2008b) definition of a true rare-symptoms detection strategy.

Strategies using a rare or quasi-rare strategy have resulted in the best overall effect sizes among MMPI-2 feigning scales. A meta-analysis by Rogers, Sewell et al. (2003) found that F and Fp are effective scales ($M$ Cohen’s $d = 2.21$ and 1.90, respectively); however, due to its better conceptual basis, Fp is preferred. Its validation used clinical populations, resulting in fewer false positives for examinees with genuine psychopathology. The family of F scales is by far the most popular series of MMPI-2 scales for the assessment of feigning.

Beyond rare symptoms, effective feigning scales have been created using the erroneous stereotypes strategy, while scales using obvious vs. subtle symptoms, and symptom selectivity or severity strategies have been somewhat less effective. Erroneous stereotypes are used by two scales: Ds and FBS. The Dissimulation scale (Ds; Gough, 1954) and the shorter Ds-Revised (Ds-r; Gough, 1957) were developed using misperceptions of neuroticism and maladjustment (Gough, 1954). In contrast, the
Fake Bad Scale (FBS) consists of misconceptions of malingerers in a disability context (Lees-Haley, English, & Glenn, 1991). Similar to the populations on which they were developed, the Ds has been found to be useful with a wide range of feigned psychopathology (Rogers et al., 2003), while the effectiveness of FBS has been limited to the disability context.

Table 2

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infrequency (F)</td>
<td>F is the traditional scale of infrequency. It includes 60 items that were endorsed by less than 10% of the normative sample. Because validation did not include a clinical population, it uses a “quasi-rare” detection strategy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Back F (Fb)</td>
<td>The Fb scale was developed for the MMPI-2 using the same method as the traditional F scale. It includes 40 items, all of which occur in the last half of the measure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrequency Psychopathology (Fp)</td>
<td>Because F and Fb were often endorsed by patient populations, Arbisi and Ben-Porath (1995) created Fp to discriminate between feigners and those with genuine disorders. It was normed on an inpatient population. Therefore, it uses a true rare-symptoms strategy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fake Bad Scale (FBS)</td>
<td>The FBS is an infrequency scale that assesses erroneous stereotypes and atypical symptoms. Specifically, it includes 42 items related to disability contexts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gough’s dissimulation scale (Ds) and revised scale (Dsr)</td>
<td>Ds and Dsr utilize an erroneous stereotypes strategy. Its items address general misperceptions about maladjustment and neuroticism.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

To summarize, recent research (see Rogers et al., 2003) has highlighted the most effective use of the MMPI-2 in feigning detection. Generally, rare symptoms (Fp) and erroneous stereotype (Ds) strategies appear to be the most effective across diagnostic groups based on both their conceptual basis and empirical support (Rogers
et al., 2003). While F and Fb both employ a quasi-rare symptoms strategy, Rogers et al. (2003) questioned whether practitioners should rely on two scales using identical strategies. Overall, research on the MMPI and MMPI-2 has been invaluable by increased our understanding of feigning detection and contributing to the development of other feigning measures.

**PAI**

The Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI; Morey, 1991) is a new-generation multiscale inventory that uses validity scales to identify potential feigning and other response styles. Originally, the PAI consisted of four validity scales in addition to its clinical and treatment-based scales. Rogers, Ornduff, and Sewell (1993) noted two characteristics of the PAI that give it an advantage over other multiscale measures: (a) the use of a four point rating gradation, and (b) scales that do not overlap in their use of items. Unlike most MMPI-2 validation studies, the PAI scales were validated using both known-groups and simulation designs (Rogers & Bender, 2003).

The PAI uses three scales, Negative Impression Management (NIM), Malingering (MAL), and Rogers’ Discriminant Function (RDF; see Table 3 for descriptions) to measure feigned psychopathology. Morey (1996) noted that NIM was able to classify feigners fairly well, but like the F scale of the MMPI-2, also misclassified some genuine patients as feigners. Therefore, the MAL scale was created to more accurately differentiate between feigning and genuine patients using the more intricate spurious patterns detection strategy. Later, the RDF scale incorporated an even larger combination of clinical scores also using a spurious patterns detection strategy. Not
conceptually based, the RDF scale employed discriminant function analysis to
differentiate simulators and genuine patients.

All three feigning scales have been extensively studied with both known-groups
and simulation designs. Interestingly, the effectiveness of the three primary validity
scales has varied based on study design. Simulation studies (Bagby et al., 2002; Baity
et al., 2007) have shown the greatest effect sizes for RDF (mean \(d = 1.87\)). Conversely,
known-groups studies have shown NIM and MAL (\(d = 1.54\) and 1.10, respectively) to be
superior to RDF, with the RDF being unable to differentiate between groups (\(d = 0.21\);
Boccaccini, Murrie, & Duncan, 2006; Kucharski, Toomey, Fila, & Duncan, 2007). An
examination of the research designs may indicate a plausible reason for these
differences. The RDF was developed using a simulation design to maximally
differentiate between groups. This method perhaps accounts for its excellent effect
sizes in studies using simulation design; however, it may also explain its poor
performance when using a known-groups design (Sellbom & Bagby, 2008).

Table 3

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<tr>
<th>Personality Assessment Inventory Feigning Scales</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative Impression Management (NIM)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malingering Index (MAL)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rogers Discriminant Function (RDF)</td>
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\(table \ continues\)
Several studies have tested the PAI validity scales by correlating them with similar scales from other measures. MAL and NIM have been found to correlate with the SIRS Symptom-Combination scale, as well as the Improbable and Absurd Symptoms scales (Wang et al., 1997). While the RDF was designed specifically to help with the distinction between malingering and true psychopathology, it showed no correlation with any SIRS scales and poor classification rates. For this reason, Rogers et al. (1998) recommended it only be used as a screen in non-forensic cases.

In summary, the MMPI-2 and PAI serve as useful tools for the detection of feigning and other response styles. Their contributions have been augmented by specialized measures specifically validated for response styles. The next section reviews the most frequently used measures of this kind for feigned mental disorders, with an emphasis on their use of detection strategies.

### Specialized Measures of Malingering

While the standardized assessment of feigning was originally incorporated into general measures of psychopathology, more recently, measures have been developed specifically for this purpose. According to Smith (2008), specialized measures should be selected on the following parameters: (a) the type of symptomatology, (b) the relevant setting or population, and (c) the varied types of available measures and their relative strengths. Regarding symptomatology, the majority of modern measures focus on one

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAL</td>
<td>uses a spurious patterns of psychopathology strategy, though it was developed using a discriminant function analysis to maximize the difference between honest and simulation groups.</td>
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</table>
of two domains: feigned mental disorder or feigned cognitive impairment (Rogers, 2008b). At a more focused level, measures sometimes focus on a more specific area, such as mood disorders or PTSD (Smith, 2008). The clinical setting can also affect decisions because measures differ based on which populations they were developed and validated with.

Specialized feigning measures vary on administrative considerations as well as their use of detection strategies and psychometric properties. Administrative differences, such as the time, training, and materials needed, should be considered based on the available resources. For instance, measures requiring extensive training courses to ensure proper administration may be inappropriate in a setting where many individuals need to be tested quickly and professional practitioners are scarce. Additionally, depending on the primary purpose, the detection strategies may emphasize sensitivity or selectivity; these emphases also vary across measures (Smith, 2008). A screening measure designed to retain possible feigners for further evaluation must have high sensitivity, while a measure designed to make a final decision must have high specificity to minimize false positives. The M-FAST, SIMS, and SIRS represent three of the most frequently-used specialized measures.

M-FAST

The Miller Forensic Assessment of Symptoms Test (M-FAST; Miller, 2001) is a brief screen for feigned mental disorders, which was originally developed for use in forensic settings. The M-FAST uses seven separate detection strategies, four of which are modeled after those on the SIRS. Its strategies can be grouped into the two general categories – unlikely and amplified presentation. Scales using unlikely strategies include
Rare Combinations (RC), Unusual Hallucinations (UH), Suggestibility (S), and Unusual Symptom Course (USC). Those using amplified strategies are Reported vs. Observed (RO), Extreme Symptomatology (ES), and Negative Image (NI).

The M-FAST has become one of the most popular screens for feigned mental disorders due to its conceptual underpinnings and psychometric strengths. The test’s brief length and interview format make it easy to use in forensic and correctional settings where time is sometimes limited and literacy levels are low. Beyond these logistical considerations, the creation and validation of the M-FAST scales followed many of the recommendations made by Rogers (2008b) that were outlined above. The scales are rationally-derived and based on well-defined detection strategies (see Table 1; Rogers, 2008b). In addition to sound construction, the M-FAST scales have been well validated, with an emphasis on the magnitude of differences and classification rates.

The strong conceptual basis of the M-FAST is backed by its extensive empirical validation. The original validation studies used multiple research designs, with findings that have been replicated over time. While all of the scales except NI and S evidence large to very large effect sizes, the total score is especially strong (ds from 1.47 to 3.32; Miller, 2001; Guy and Miller, 2004; Jackson et al., 2005) and good Negative Predictive Power (.89 - .97; Miller, 2001; Guy & Miller, 2004). Lastly, studies have established its convergent validity with the SIRS and MMPI-2 F scale (Guy & Miller, 2004) and PAI (Veazey, Hays, Wagner, & Miller, 2005).

SIMS

The Structured Inventory of Malingered Symptomatology (SIMS; Widows & Smith, 2005) is a self-administered, true-false screen of both feigned mental disorders
and cognitive impairment. The SIMS items were developed in a unique two-step fashion. Items were first selected based on items from other measures used for feigning, notably the MMPI, SIRS, and WAIS-R (Smith, 2008). Next, items were generated by the authors according to characteristics of feigners found in the literature. Multiple detection strategies are used for detecting feigned mental disorders (rare symptoms, improbable symptoms, and symptom combinations) and cognitive impairment (performance curve and magnitude of error).¹ These detection strategies have consistently been shown to be effective across measures.

Despite containing similar detection strategies to the M-FAST and SIRS, the SIMS differs in two important ways. First, its formatting is different as a pen-and-paper measure instead of an interview. Second, its use of detection strategies differs (Smith, 2008). Unlike other feigning measures, the SIMS scales are not organized according to detection strategies but by content. Thus, detection strategies for feigned mental disorders are used in varying degrees for Affective Disorders (AF) and Psychosis (P) scales and detection strategies for feigned cognitive impairment are used on the Neurological Impairment (NI), Amnesia (AM), and Low Intelligence (LI) scales. This structure makes it difficult to study the effectiveness of the given strategies, but does not appear to reduce the test’s effectiveness.

The SIMS has proven to be an effective screen for feigned mental disorders and cognitive impairment. The Total Score has proven to be more efficient than the individual scales, correctly identifying 95.6% of simulators and 87.9% of honest participants, while the individual scales classified at a slightly lower level (74.6% to 88.3%; Smith, 1992). Since the original validation, all five scales have proven to
differentiate honest and feigning participants at similar rates (Lewis, 2001). Regarding its generalizability, the SIMS has also been investigated for use with adolescents (Rogers, Hinds, & Sewell, 1996), factitious disorder patients (Rogers, Jackson, & Kaminski, 2005) and coached simulators (Edens, Cruise & Buffington-Vollum, 1999).

SIRS

The Structured Interview of Reported Symptoms (SIRS; Rogers, Bagby, & Dickens, 1992) is a structured interview frequently used in the detection of feigned mental disorders. It is the most widely used and researched interview for this purpose (Archer, Buffington-Vollum, Stredny, & Handel, 2006) and demonstrates high reliability and validity (Rogers et al., 1992; Blau, 1998, Rogers, 2008d).

One of the major strengths of the SIRS is its use of multiple detection strategies relying on multiple inquiry types. While other feigning measures also use multiple strategies, the SIRS uses a total of 13, eight of which are considered primary and find empirical support in the literature (Rogers, 2008b; Vitacco, Rogers, Gabel, & Munizza, 2007). These scales can be divided into two general categories: those using unlikely vs. amplified detection strategies (see Table 4). In general, SIRS scales using unlikely detection strategies have low means and limited variability in honestly responding genuine patients. When administered to simulators or suspected feigners however, the means and variability are much higher (Rogers, Sewell, & Gillard, 2010). This pattern makes unlikely-strategy scales very effective, with average effect sizes of 1.54 for simulation studies and 1.90 for known-groups comparisons. In contrast to unlikely strategies, the means and standard deviations for amplified strategy scales are much higher for both genuine and feigning samples. Large to very large effects are also found
for these scales, with effect sizes only slightly below those for unlikely strategies ($M_d = 1.36$ for simulation and 1.85 for known-groups comparisons). Feigners may employ different strategies for accomplishing their goals and the variety of scales across these two categories acknowledges this fact.

Table 4

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Effect Sizes on the SIRS for Different Research Designs</th>
<th>$M$ Cohen’s $d$</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unlikely Detection Strategy Scales</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rare Symptoms (RS)</td>
<td>1.58 1.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symptom Combinations (SC)</td>
<td>1.41 1.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improbable and Absurd Symptoms (IA)</td>
<td>1.50 1.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reported vs. Observed (RO)</td>
<td>1.66 1.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amplified Detection Strategy Scales</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blatant Symptoms (BL)</td>
<td>1.63 2.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtle Symptoms (SU)</td>
<td>1.16 1.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selectivity of Symptoms (SEL)</td>
<td>1.35 1.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severity of Symptoms (SEV)</td>
<td>1.28 2.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Sim. = Simulation design, KGC = Known-groups comparison. Data in table based on Table 6.13 and 6.15 of Rogers, Sewell, & Gillard, 2010.

Research consistently shows that the SIRS is a highly reliable and valid measure for the assessment of feigned mental disorders. An important factor for all feigning measures is their ability to discriminate between groups. The SIRS consistently excels in this respect. Across all research designs, the SIRS reliably differentiates malingering from other response styles (Blau, 1998; Rogers, 1997; Rogers, 2008d). Importantly, effect sizes and classification rates remain high even when using inpatient or correctional populations, groups that often lead to higher false positive rates with other measures (Rogers et al., 2010).

The conceptual strength and psychometric properties of the SIRS have led it to be considered the “gold standard” for malingering measures (Rogers, 2008d). In clinical
practice, it is the most widely accepted specialized measure for feigning (Lally, 2003), as well as the most frequently used specialized measure in forensic practice, with 86.2% of forensic psychologists using it (Archer et al., 2006).

Multiscale and specialized measures of feigning have become an important part of clinical and forensic evaluations. However, their usefulness depends on the adequacy of their underlying detection strategies. These detection strategies and the measures using them must undergo empirical validation to demonstrate their usefulness. This validation should be accomplished via multiple research designs to avoid capitalizing on the strengths and weaknesses of any one design. The next section examines the designs used in feigning research, as well as the major methodological issues involved.

Malingering Research

Dissimulation studies vary in their research designs, which differ markedly in their strengths and limitations. The vast majority of studies use a simulation design, while all other designs can be classified as quasi-experimental (Rogers, 1997). Strengths can be classified on one of two competing dimensions: clinical relevance and experimental rigor. These two dimensions are usually inversely related and must be balanced (Rogers, 2008). In this section, each design is analyzed in detail, with an emphasis on their appropriate applications.

Known-Groups Comparisons

Known-groups comparisons design involves the identification of a group of malingerers and the comparison of this group to genuine patients. Mental health professionals determine malingering and genuine groups independently or with
objective measures (Rogers, 2008c). With both methods, great care must be exercised
to use the best practices available, either experts on malingering or highly accurate
malingering measures.

The external validity of known-groups comparisons represents its greatest
strength. Since actual malingerers are being compared to genuine patients, external
validity is extremely good and the findings are clinically relevant (Rogers, 1997). The
use of clinically relevant comparisons is essential in establishing a measure’s ability to
differential true psychopathology from feigned presentations. Research with this design
is typically conducted in clinical or forensic settings where malingering is expected to
occur. Unlike simulation design, participants in the known group are typically in an
adversarial situation in which they are motivated to malinger.

Known-groups comparison has been criticized because of its weak internal
validity, which stems from the difficulty in establishing the criterion groups (Rogers,
2008). The reliability and accuracy of assigning individuals to the feigning groups is very
difficult and missteps can happen in at least four ways. First, extreme groups may be
used in which the participants are very easily identified as malingering, but are not
representative of the entire malingering population. Second, groups may be used that
are composed of individuals who do not fully meet the criteria for malingering (Rogers,
1997). This problem can happen if overly inclusive criteria are used to determine the
malingering group. For example, the DSM-IV indices for malingering, as discussed
earlier, result in false-positive rates of 80% (Rogers, 1997); therefore, they should not
be used to establish criterion groups. Third, questionable experts and methods can be
used to determine the groups (for an example, see Edens, Poythress, & Watkins-Clay,
2007). For these reasons, assignment should be left to highly trained experts, such as forensic psychologists, who use extensive evaluations. Other times, established measures of feigning are used as “gold standards” against which the researched measure can be compared. A measure such as the SIRS is appropriate for known-group comparisons because of its accurate classification. It has been used for this purpose in studies of multiscale and specialized measures (e.g., Lewis, Simcox, & Berry, 2002; Kucharski et al., 2007; Vitacco et al., 2007). The difficulty with establishing accurate criterion groups makes known-groups comparison costly and difficult. However, the known-groups design produces the most generalizable findings. When used in combination with the more rigorous internal validity of simulation design, it represents an important part of malingering research.

Differential Prevalence Design

In differential prevalence design, comparisons are made between individuals from settings assumed to have dissimilar prevalence rates of malingering. Forensic and clinical settings are often used, and this design is sometimes substituted for known-groups comparison (Rogers, Harrell, & Liff, 1993). The assumption of different prevalence rates is made based on the perceived motivation for deception, such as involvement in litigation or even simply presence in a forensic setting.

The differential prevalence design is not recommended for dissimulation research for a variety of reasons (Rogers, 2008c). The prevalence rate of each group is inferred but still unknown; it is based on the assumed motivation to feign but no attempt is made to ensure that this is, in fact, true in a particular sample. As mentioned before, the prevalence rate of malingering in forensic settings is estimated to be between 15
and 17% and lower for most other settings (Rogers, 1997). Therefore, the “high prevalence” group is composed of mostly non-malingers, thereby nullifying the comparison.

Bootstrapping Comparisons

Bootstrapping comparisons design uses multiple feigning measures to classify participants. Likely-feigning and likely-honest groups are formed using the results from the multiple feigning measures and these groups are then compared. It is a fairly recent development in dissimulation research and is similar to known-groups comparison in many ways. To maximize the design’s utility, the cut scores used to classify groups should minimize false positives and false negatives, which can be accomplished with stringent standards and the elimination of participants in the intermediate range. However, this design still leaves uncertainty regarding group membership (Rogers, 2008c). As an example of bootstrapping comparisons design, Rogers et al. (2007) conducted a study on feigned disability referrals. They tested the use of the SIRS in various groups and compared the results to multiple other indicators of feigned cognitive impairment, which established likely honest and feigning groups. Due to its stringent standards, Rogers (2008c) noted that this design is useful in the development and validation of feigning measures, especially when used along with other research designs that increase internal validity, such as simulation design.

Simulation Design

Simulation represents the only experimental design used in dissimulation research. A sample of non-feigning individuals is asked to feign and their data are typically compared to an accurately-responding control group. The majority of studies
use non-clinical participants that are randomly assigned to either a feigning or control group (Brennan & Gouvier, 2006). Therefore, a clinical comparison group representing relevant disorders should be included (Rogers, 1997). This component is important because the differences between simulators and non-clinical control groups may otherwise be attributable to true psychopathology. Due to its ease of use and excellent internal validity, simulation design is by far the most common design used for feigning research (Brennan & Gouvier, 2006).

Simulation design is often criticized for external validity concerns, specifically its unknown generalizability to actual malingerers (Haines & Norris, 1995; Rogers et al., 1992). Many early studies with a simulation design did not use a clinical comparison group; an omission that Rogers (2008) considered to be a fatal flaw because the findings might be equally present in genuine clinical samples. The development of the MMPI-2 F scale provides a relevant example. The F scale identifies items endorsed by less than 10% of the normative sample to indicate rare symptoms. Because items were selected using a normative and not a clinical sample, certain diagnostic groups (e.g., those with schizophrenia and PTSD) exhibit high scores on the F scale (Rogers, Sewell, et al., 2003). Similarly, college populations are very unlikely to exhibit high levels of psychopathology; comparing them to a simulation group feigning impairment is an irrelevant comparison. External validity can also be decreased because it is difficult for researchers to design studies with real-world circumstances. For instance, providing a well-adjusted, non-forensic college population with real-world motivation to feign can be difficult.
Besides motivation, simulation research differs from real-world feigning in another, more basic way. Feigners are going directly against what they are supposed to do, while participants are following instructions. Rogers and Cavanaugh (1983) refer to this problem as the “simulation-research paradox.” Participants are “asked to comply with instructions to fake to study patients who fake when they are asked to comply” (p. 447). This difference in reasoning brings the external validity of this design into question.

When correctly used, simulation design has the highest internal validity in response style research. As noted, its external validity is often called in to question due to the lack of significant motivation and use of simulators who may be quite different from most real-world malingers. To combat this problem, researchers who use simulation studies are putting emphasis on previously over-looked elements that are designed to improve the quality of such research and make findings more applicable to the real world. The instructional set is one key element in improving simulation design.

Instructions. Participants in simulation studies are asked to act as if the situation is real and as if the conditions are intrinsically motivating. Unfortunately, instructions for simulation research often focus more on conveying the task of feigning than on motivating the participant. The lack of focus on motivation may be exacerbating the poor external validity of simulation studies. To increase the motivation of participants, Rogers and Cruise (1998) outlined the major elements that should be considered when constructing instruction sets. Considering these elements, they found that studies varied widely in their instructional sets, with some studies offering only very general
instructions without presenting a specific context or providing any incentives to follow the instructions (e.g., Timbrook, Graham, Keiller, & Watts, 1993).

First and foremost, instructions should be comprehensible and communicate the expectations of simulation clearly. Comprehension can be increased with instructions that are written at an easily understood reading level and by avoiding jargon and technical words. For reading levels, tools include the Flesch-Kincaid Reading Ease and Grade Level tests (Kincaid, Fishburne, Rogers, & Chissom, 1975). Using a PsycINFO search of “MMPI-2” and “malingering,” 10 simulation studies were selected that included the full text of the feigning instructions. Across these studies, the mean Grade Level written was 11.54. In contrast, Rogers and Cruise (1998) developed highly specific instructions that were easily comprehensible with a Grade Level of 4.1. Considering that the reading level of participants in clinical and correctional populations is often below normal, this lower grade level is more realistic of typical participant abilities.

Specificity. Specificity refers to the level of detail provided by a set of instructions. In dissimulation research, the instructions must be explicit enough to conclude that participants are adequately prepared to do as instructed. Exactly how specific instructions should be depends on the research questions. For example, including a specified disorder in the instructions may be appropriate and necessary if the study examines a referral issue for which that disorder is common, such as feigned PTSD in disability evaluations. On the other hand, allowing the participant to choose a disorder may be closer to typical real-world situations. Regardless of how specific the instructions are, they should not come at the cost of comprehensibility (Rogers, 1997).
Despite the recent interest in specificity, early researchers were also aware of its importance. For instance, Walker (1962) questioned the adequacy of the instructions given by Wiggins (1959) in the original validation of the Social Desirability scale (Wsd) on the MMPI. In particular, Walker noted that the instructions were not specific enough and may not have maximized participants’ socially desirable responding. Wiggins (1962) responded to the criticism with a qualitative analysis of the instructions used in his and other studies. His review found that the instructions were adequate when compared to others at the time, although by today’s standards, they were quite minimal.

The role of motivation. Individuals feigning in real-life situations are often highly motivated to gain or avoid extreme financial or psychosocial consequences. In stark contrast, research participants are typically college undergraduates whose incentives are merely a few extra credit points. The vast majority of simulation studies on response styles have assumed that this symbolic incentive will be sufficient motivation (Rogers & Cruise, 1998). Although feigners have much to lose if their attempts are unsuccessful, ethical regulations prevent the approximation of these losses in research. Clearly, taking even a small amount of money from a participant or putting them in a jail cell would cross the boundaries of ethical research. Nonetheless, Rogers (2008) has argued that researchers should use multiple methods to try to come closer to real-world motivation, including challenging the participant to do well and making the simulated condition seem relevant to their own lives. Challenges attempt to motivate by referring to the test as something to “beat.” The participants should feel that they must be “good enough” to avoid being identified by the test. Moreover, malingering research can be made relevant to college students by framing studies as useful tools that may help to improve their
lives or society. For instance, information gained from a study can be framed as a way to prevent the wasting of millions of dollars in fraudulent claims by improving detection methods. A discussion of incentives to increase motivation occurs later in this section due to its relevance to the current study.

Using context to motivate. The situation, or context, given to simulators may affect investment in the task. Among studies with specific instructions, Rogers and Cruise (1998) observed that marked differences were found in the type of context used. They also hypothesized that an unfamiliar context would provide less motivation. As an example, it may be quite difficult for college students to effectively simulate in a highly improbable context, such as a first-degree murder trial involving the death penalty. This context is too far removed from most undergraduates’ reality to be relevant to the students’ lives. A context involving a less serious crime or a violation of university policies may be more relevant in a college sample. Elhai and colleagues (2005) provided an interesting alternative in which they provided multiple scenarios for the participants to choose from, assuming that they would choose the one that is most relevant to their personal experiences. Although the study attempted to increase external validity, it sacrificed some experimental rigor. The results may differ depending on the scenario chosen, making the true effects hard to interpret.

As one of the only studies to examine the effects of context, Rogers and Cruise (1998) provided a compelling argument for investigating it in simulation studies further. While the study did not find a main effect, context had an interaction effect with incentive that was significant. Specifically, it appeared that simulators with positive incentives and an applicable context were more successful at avoiding detection. When
given negative incentives, the opposite occurred: an inapplicable context or no context led to fewer elevations. The authors explained this finding as the result of a possible “reality check.” The applicable scenario or the threat of external sanctions caused them to use more caution. However, the possibility of a reward with little risk (positive reward and no negative sanction) led to less caution being used.

**Coaching.** Coaching, or preparing simulators for their role of feigning, is an important issue that sometimes arises in real-world evaluations. Coaching most likely occurs in many forensic evaluations, where it is possible for individuals to obtain information about psychological tests and assessment methods before they are evaluated. Information is obtained by reading articles or books about the measures or becoming familiar with the measures themselves (Nichols & Greene, 1997). In addition, individuals can easily read information on the diagnostic criteria of the disorder they are attempting to feign.

Coaching can be divided into two main categories based on the type of information given to the individual. The first involves information about the diagnostic criteria of a disorder, while the second consists of a warning or information about the use of detection strategies (Rogers, Jackson, Sewell, & Salekin, 2005). The first method does not increase one’s ability to avoid detection (Rogers, Bagby, & Chakraborty, 1993). In some cases, the diagnostic criteria may simply be too much information to remember and use. This type of information may help an individual choose which symptoms to report or endorse, possibly allowing them to avoid detection on unlikely detection strategies. However, it will do nothing to foil *amplified* detection strategies that
rely on exaggeration of real symptoms or combinations of symptoms. If fact, it theoretically may increase these methods of feigning.

Coaching participants about detection strategies, as opposed to providing information about actual disorders, appears to significantly enhance the ability to feign convincingly (Lamb, Berry, Wetter, & Baer, 1994; Rogers et al., 1983; Rogers et al., 1993). However, even when participants do not receive any coaching but are given a simple warning about the presence of detection methods, performance improves. As an example, Johnson and Lesniak-Karpiak (1997) demonstrated that simulators who were warned about detection methods were able to improve their performances on some neuropsychological tests. Forty-five percent of the warned simulators avoided detection as feigners. While the authors hypothesized that warning may actually decrease the prevalence of malingering, it is possible and perhaps more likely that it simply led many malingerers to go undetected due to more believable feigning. Similar results have been obtained in the domain of feigned mental disorders (Bagby et al., 1997; Lamb et al., 1994; Rogers et al., 1993; Storm & Graham, 2000).

Detection strategy coaching appears to work best when the information is simple enough to keep in mind throughout testing. Rogers and Bender (2003) report that when participants are informed about intricate detection strategies, as opposed to simpler ones, they are less likely to avoid detection. This finding is similar to that found when participants are coached about diagnostic information; this does little to enhance their ability to feign effectively.

The task of finding relevant material for coaching has become much easier in recent years. The internet has now become the largest source of immediately available
psychological information. Ruiz and colleagues (2002) found hundreds of websites that had the potential to inform individuals about diagnostic information and a more limited number that posed a direct threat to test security by providing actual test items or information on the detection strategies used. This number is likely even higher today. Individuals in forensic settings may have an additional resource at their disposal. Lawyers and psychologists may provide information, intentionally or not, that could be used to feign more convincingly (Youngjohn, Lees-Haley, & Binder, 1999). In fact, Wetter and Corrigan (1995) found that over 50% of lawyers believe it is not only permissible, but also appropriate to coach their clients about the presence of validity scales and how they work.

**Incentives.** Because real-world circumstances often provide considerable rewards for successful feigning, incentives are an important aspect of improving external validity in simulation research. While incentives have always been a part of most simulation studies, their actual effects have gone largely uninvestigated, especially in the area of feigned mental disorder (Rogers, Harrell, & Liff, 1993; Rogers, 1997). The first investigation, by Rogers and Cruise (1998), found that the presence of incentives had a significant effect on participants’ ability to avoid detection. In a more recent study, Elhai et al. (2007) found that rewards of $40 and $50, offered to top performing participants on a measure of PTSD feigning, also increased their ability to avoid detection. Like Rogers and Cruise, effect sizes were in the small to moderate range.

Five studies have investigated the effects of monetary incentives on cognitive and neuropsychological impairment, with their results generally showing small effects. Wilhelm, Franzen, Grinvalds, and Dews (1991) found that while a larger monetary...
incentive ($20 vs. $0) increased the self-reported motivation for feigning, it did not help participants avoid detection (i.e., their scores on detection measures were not significantly lower). Another early study (Bernard, 1990) found that incentives increased performance only on some feigning scales. More recent studies have found more consistent results. An incentive of $20 caused less detectable performance in one simulation study (Shum, O’Gorman, & Alpar, 2004) and two other simulation studies found that incentives of $20 and $25, respectively, had significant effects on performance for both standard neuropsychological and malingering-specific tests (Frederick, Sarfaty, Johnston, & Powel, 1994; Orey, Cragar, & Berry, 2000).

Research participants and would-be mali ngerers are likely affected by the magnitude of an incentive. This finding has yet to be investigated experimentally with strict control, but initial evidence has been provided by a meta-analysis of 17 studies on closed-head injuries (Binder & Rohling, 1996). These studies did not specifically investigate the magnitude of incentives, but included enough data to calculate effect sizes. While controlling for the severity of the injury, the researchers found that cases involving a higher possible monetary reward were moderately correlated with more abnormality and disability when tested ($d = 0.47$). In other words, even in cases with similar injuries (e.g., same amount of trauma, same medical findings), when the possible reward was higher, more impairment was reported. This finding supports a positive relationship between reward size and feigning but has not been tested in simulation research, possibly due to the relatively small size of these rewards compared to the large rewards found in compensation cases. Therefore, more research is needed to understand the effect that incentive size has on feigning.
The offering of large incentives is obviously limited by professional ethics and research funding. One potential solution is to offer a larger incentive to a small number of participants. As opposed to giving each participant a modest incentive of $5-$10, a system could be used in which only the “best” participants receive a much more substantial reward (Rogers, 2008c). Bianchini, Curtis, and Greve (2006) noted another potentially useful design. They noted that almost all investigations have made incentive a binary concept (incentive vs. no incentive), with no attention paid to the level of incentive. They recommended offering a moderate incentive to a small number of simulators while also offering a large incentive to the “best” simulator to increase motivation.

Malingers in real-world situations face severe negative consequences if they are detected. Detection means not only losing possible rewards, but also facing harsh penalties (Rogers, 2008a). Interestingly, the instructions of many studies inform participants of hypothetical negative consequences (e.g., if you were to be caught you would go to jail), but very few have implemented actual incentives besides low to moderate monetary rewards. Of course, ethically, many of these consequences cannot be recreated in simulation studies. It is largely unknown whether other types of incentives would change results (Rogers, 1997).

Negative incentives consist of (a) “taking away” a promised positive incentive or (b) implementing an adverse consequence. These incentives attempt to approximate what real-world malingers have to lose if they are caught feigning. However, real-world negative incentives may include far-reaching consequences such as guilty verdicts or a loss of disability payments. As with positive incentives, it is impractical and
unethical to recreate the negative incentives found in reality, which are too severe to enact in simulation studies.

Only two studies have investigated the effects of ethically-sound negative incentives on simulators’ ability to avoid detection. Patrick and Iacono (1989) examined prisoners’ ability to avoid detection on a polygraph test. Participants were informed that they would not receive their reward ($10) if a certain number of participants were unable to do the task; in addition, the names of those who failed would be posted for other prisoners to see. This study is difficult to compare to feigning studies because it investigated deception instead of feigning and polygraph tests instead of detection strategies. In the only other known example of negative incentives, Rogers and Cruise (1998) instructed participants in one simulation group that the names of failed malingerers would be posted on a bulletin board. Simulators in this group endorsed fewer symptoms and were more likely to avoid detection when compared to those who received only positive incentives. No additional studies have attempted to replicate the findings of Rogers and Cruise. Negative incentives are a promising alternative to the sole reliance on small positive incentives included in most studies.

Current Study

Simulation research design continues to be the most commonly used design in dissimulation research, but its external validity is potentially problematic. At present, most simulation studies follow general patterns without any systematic investigation of how elements of their design may improve experimental rigor and enhance external validity. For example, the scenario, or context, the simulators are given can potentially affect motivation. Rogers and Cruise (1998) found that familiar scenarios improved
feigning. While the results were modest, this variable needs to be investigated further. Likewise, two studies have analyzed the role that incentives play in the malingering of mental disorders (Elhai et al., 2007; Rogers & Cruise, 1998), with the latter providing an initial investigation of negative incentives. Given its potential as a useful research tool, the lack of incentive research is concerning. Finally, while studies exist that examine the effect of coaching on feigning, its combined effect when considering other variables is currently unknown. The current study seeks to investigate the methodological components of scenario, incentive, and coaching. These variables are involved in most dissimulation research using a simulation design.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

Research Question 1

The first research question investigates the effects of experimental condition on a group’s ability to avoid detection on the Structured Inventory of Malingered Symptoms (SIMS). As the scale with the best cut score (Smith, 2008), the SIMS Total Score will be used to classify individuals as “honest” or “feigning” on research questions requiring a classification.

- Hypothesis 1: Simulation groups will score higher on the SIMS total score than the control (standard instructions) group.
- Hypothesis 2: A greater percentage of the simulation groups will score above the SIMS cut score for feigning than the control group.
- Hypothesis 3: Simulation groups will produce higher SCL-90-R scores than the control group.

Research Question 2
Rogers and Cruise (1998) posited that a scenario that is more familiar to an individual will improve their performance (i.e., ability to avoid detection). The second research question examines the effect that the type of scenario has on individuals’ ability to avoid detection on the SIMS. Both groups are expected to endorse a significant amount of psychopathology, as measured by the SCL-90. As described further in the Methods, the familiar scenario involves feigning a “mental breakdown” in order to avoid a failing grade in college. The unfamiliar scenario involves feigning to avoid a criminal charge of aggravated assault. For this and all remaining research questions, analyses will be between simulation groups since the standard instructions group receives no additional instructions.

- Hypothesis 4: The familiar scenario group will score lower on the SIMS than the unfamiliar group.
- Hypothesis 5: The unfamiliar group will indicate a significantly higher level of symptomatology, as measured by the SCL-90.
- Hypothesis 6: The familiar scenario group will put forth more effort (i.e., higher self-rated effort level on the manipulation check) than the unfamiliar scenario group.

Research Question 3

Investigations of the effect of coaching (Rogers et al., 1983; Lamb, Berry, Wetter, & Baer, 1994; Rogers, Bagby, & Chakraborty, 1993; Johnson & Lesniak-Karpiak, 1997) have consistently shown that coaching participants about the presence of detection scales improves their ability to present believably. The third research question investigates the role of coaching.
• Hypothesis 7: Among simulators, the coached group will score lower on the SIMS than those in the non-coached group.

Research Question 4

While studies of incentives in cognitive feigning cases have shown a strong correlation between incentive level and performance (Binder & Rohling, 1996), the role of incentives in the malingering of mental disorders has gone virtually uninvestigated (Rogers, 2008). Rogers and Cruise (1998) found that the participants receiving negative incentives were able to avoid detection better than those who received positive incentives. The fourth research question examines the relative effect of positive and negative incentives separately.

• Hypothesis 8: The positive incentive group will score lower on the SIMS than the “no incentive” group.

• Hypothesis 9: The negative incentive group will score lower on the SIMS than both the positive incentive and no incentive groups.

Research Question 5

The previous research questions have examined the effect that different levels of each variable have separately. The fifth research question investigates the relative importance of two of these variables: scenario and incentive. Coaching has undergone investigation before and its effect has been documented. Therefore, although it will be included in the following analysis in order to investigate interaction effects, the emphasis will be on the relative importance of incentive and scenario conditions.

• Hypothesis 10: Overall, incentive will have a greater effect than scenario on SIMS Total score results.
Supplementary Research Questions:

The SIMS includes five subscales that represent two domains of malingering: feigned mental disorders (psychosis and affective disorders) and feigned cognitive impairment (amnestic disorder, neurological impairment, and low intelligence). The instructions given to participants will refer to mental disorder, but do not describe a specific disorder. The manipulation check will ask participants to report their chosen disorder. The reported disorder will then be compared with individuals’ SCL-90-R scores to see if they are endorsing items relevant to their chosen disorder, or if they are feigning in a more generalized way.

- Supplementary Question 1: Which SCL-90-R scales will be most often elevated?
- Supplementary Question 2: Will participants endorse items that load onto scales similar to the disorder they are reporting, or will their feigning generalize and significantly raise scores on many different scales?
- Supplementary Question 3: Will simulators with the most extreme SCL-90-R elevations be more detectable than those with moderate SCL-90-R elevations?
CHAPTER 2

METHODS

Design

The present study used a between-subjects factorial design to investigate the differences in response style between groups of randomly assigned participants. This research design allowed the comparison of all possible combinations of the three variables, which formed a 2 (Scenario) X 3 (Incentive) X 2 (Coaching) factorial design, creating 12 combinations. The two scenarios were familiar (possible academic failure) and unfamiliar (assault charges). The three incentive groups were positive (extra credit and entry into a $50 drawing for successfully avoiding detection), negative (loss of extra credit and requirement of additional time and effort), and both (a combination of the positive and negative incentives). The coaching variable consisted of two conditions: uncoached (no instruction on how feigning measures work) and coached (information given on how the Structured Inventory of Malingered Symptoms (SIMS) detection strategies work). In addition to the 12 experimental groups, a control group was used in which participants were instructed to answer honestly.

This design is preferable to a within-subjects design due to the nature of the dependent measures. A within-subjects design would expose participants to the measures, leading to possible practice effects. In dissimulation research, this practicing could help participants make decisions about which items to endorse. Although practice effects are a potentially important part of real-world investigations, they would confound the effects of the current variables being investigated.

Participants
The participants consisted of 289 students recruited from undergraduate psychology classes at the University of North Texas via an online sign-up system. In accordance with Institutional Review Board requirements, written informed consent was obtained from all participants. The only inclusion criterion was to be enrolled as a current university student. For those who participated, all data were included in analyses unless the study instructions could not be recalled during the manipulation check.

Materials

Instructional Sets

Instructional sets are an integral part of all simulation studies because participants are asked to adopt a role and follow specific directions. As recommended by Rogers (2008c), all instructions in this study were written at a comparatively low reading grade level ($M$ grade level = 8.95, $SD = .94$, range 7.6-10.2) for college students.

All participants in the experimental groups were given a general set of instructions on the purpose of feigning psychopathology. These instructions were basic so that they would not interfere with the coaching condition. As such, the instructions included only a general statement as to why one would choose to feign psychopathology.

*General Instructions:* You will be asked to pretend that you have a mental disorder. You will be given a number of questionnaires that are designed to measure the type and level of mental disorder you are pretending to have. Do your best to fake in a believable way so that you are not caught.
In addition to the general instructions, specific directions were given to each participant depending on their experimental group. These instructions varied by scenario, incentive, and coaching.

**Scenario.** Simulators were assigned to one of two experimental conditions with regard to scenario: (a) familiar scenario, or (b) unfamiliar scenario. The “familiar scenario” involved the possibility of academic failure unless the individual could convincingly feign psychological impairment. Even though it is unlikely that this scenario has been experienced by many of the undergraduate participants, failing a class is hypothesized to be plausible and relevant because most participants are likely to know one or more students who have failed. The “unfamiliar scenario” involves aggravated assault charges because it is assumed that most students and their friends will not have encountered such a serious criminal charge. Care was taken not to make this condition too severe, which might make the study seem unbelievable (e.g., murder charges or pleading insanity; see Bagby, Gillis, & Dickens, 1990). Therefore, assault charges were chosen because they are unfamiliar to most students but not extreme. In addition, a manipulation check asked about participants’ experience with both scenarios.

*Familiar scenario:* Imagine that you are in the final weeks of a class that you need for graduation. You have not even started a major project that counts for 50% of your final grade. Without it, you have no hope of passing. The university makes special exceptions for dropping classes if a student experiences a mental disorder. You decide that you must fake a breakdown. A psychologist will give you a few questionnaires to decide if you are impaired. You can avoid failing only if you are able to convince
the psychologist that you really are impaired. Please take a minute to think about what type of disorder and impairment you would like to fake before completing the materials – remember, you must appear convincingly disabled.

*Unfamiliar scenario:* Imagine you were involved in a fight outside of a restaurant and you broke a bottle over the other person’s head. You escaped with a few cuts, but the other person was hospitalized. Felony Assault charges are now being filed against you. You decide you must pretend to have a mental disorder that explains your behavior outside the restaurant. A psychologist will give you a few questionnaires to decide if you are impaired. You can avoid a conviction and possible jail time only if you can convince the psychologist that you are mentally impaired. Please take a minute to think about what type of disorder and impairment you would like to fake before completing the materials – remember, you must appear convincingly disabled.

*Incentives.* Participants were provided with one of three incentive conditions – positive, negative, or both incentives. As mentioned earlier, the positive condition informed simulators that they would be entered to receive 50 dollars plus extra credit if they were successful at feigning psychopathology without detection.

*Positive incentive:* If you succeed at “faking out” the questionnaires without being caught, you will receive extra credit and be entered to win
$50. Remember, you must appear genuinely impaired and avoid
detection to win a chance at $50.

The negative incentive condition informed simulators that they would not
receive their extra credit if they failed to appear genuinely impaired. They would
also be required to complete an additional 20 minutes of measures to
understand why they failed. This type of negative incentive has never
undergone investigation and was chosen because it was expected to be
aversive in a college sample.

*Negative Incentives:* If you succeed at “faking out” the questionnaires
about your pretend mental disorder without being caught, you will
receive extra credit and complete the study early. However, if you are
cought trying to deceive the tests, you will not receive the extra credit. In
addition, you will be required to stay for an additional 20 minutes to fill
out more measures to find out why you failed.

Lastly, a third group of simulators received instructions about both the
positive and negative incentives. Therefore, this group, if successful, was told
that they would be entered to win $50, receive extra credit, and avoid the extra
time and effort of completing more measures.

*Coaching.* Participants were assigned to one of two coaching conditions.
The *uncoached* group received no additional instructions, whereas the *coached*
group was given the following information about how validity scales work.

*Coached:* There are scales on these tests that are designed to catch
those who are faking a mental disorder. These scales use several
methods to tell those with genuine disorders from those faking disorders. One method for identifying fakers is to ask about very strange or unlikely symptoms. For example, if you indicate that you are deathly afraid of flowers (almost never a real symptom), the test will see you are likely faking. Another way the test detects faking is by asking about symptoms that rarely happen together. For example, increased appetite and hearing voices are symptoms of different mental disorders. Therefore, they are unlikely to happen at the same time. Please watch for the items that are designed to catch you faking. Remember, you want to appear mentally disordered, but you want to be believable – otherwise you will be caught.

Measures

The study used measures covering two different purposes: (a) assessing reported symptoms and (b) testing whether or not participants were feigning. These measures are described in the following paragraphs.

Symptom Checklist-90-Revised (SCL-90-R)

The SCL-90-R (Derogatis, 1992) is a 90-question, self-report measure of psychological symptoms that has been validated for use with community participants as well as patients with mental disorders (Derogatis, 2000). It has been used extensively in clinical research, with Derogatis (2000) reporting its use in more than 1,000 studies. Each question asks the individual to rate how stressful an item has been in the last week. Each item then loads onto one of nine clinical scales (Somatization, Obsessive-Compulsive, Interpersonal Sensitivity, Depression, Anxiety, Hostility, Phobic Anxiety,
Paranoid Ideation, and Psychoticism). In addition, two measures of overall severity (Global Severity Index, GSI; Positive Symptom Total, PST) are also calculated. Raw scores are converted to gender-specific T-scores to enhance interpretability (Derogatis, 1992). Internal consistency and test-retest reliability have both been shown to be very good (mean alpha = .84 for each).

Structured Inventory of Malingered Symptoms (SIMS)

The SIMS is a 75-item true-false screen for feigning of both mental disorders and cognitive deficits. It is intended for use with adults in clinical or forensic settings who are not severely impaired (Smith, 2008). Validated across ethnicities (Alwes et al., 2006), the SIMS is composed of 5 scales: Low Intelligence (LI), Neurological Impairment (N), Affective Disorders (AF), Psychosis (P), and Amnesia (AM). Its internal reliability is good, ranging from .80-.88 for each scale. Initial research (Smith, 1992) suggested its potential utility for identifying persons feigning psychopathology. Since the original validation, both known-groups (Heinze & Purisch, 2001) and simulation studies (Edens, Otto, & Dwyer, 1999) have validated its use with clinical and forensic populations. The SIMS has been used with a narrow range of cut scores designed to maximize negative predictive power (≥ 14 to ≥ 16; Widows & Smith, 2005). Recent studies using forensic populations typically use a cut score of 16 (Alwes et al., 2006; Lewis et al., 2002), while studies with college students have tended to use a score of 14 (Edens et al., 1999; Jelicic, Hessels, & Merchelbach, 2006). A cut score of 14 will be applied because the current study uses an undergraduate sample.

In addition to the SCL-90-R and SIMS, a debriefing and manipulation check (Appendixes H and I) was distributed to evaluate participants’ involvement and effort.
Besides the manipulation check, the questionnaire included items to aid in analyzing the supplementary research questions.

**Procedures**

Participants were recruited from undergraduate classes in psychology via an online sign-up system. The purpose of the study was explained by the investigator on an individual basis and written informed consent was obtained from all participants. A packet including instructions tailored to the experimental condition, the SCL-90-R, the SIMS, and a debriefing questionnaire was distributed to each individual. The order in which control and experimental condition packets were distributed was randomized beforehand. Afterwards, completed packets were collected. The negative incentive instructions informed participants that they would be required to stay after and complete more paperwork if they were detected as feigning on the SIMS. Scoring of the SIMS did not actually take place at the time of testing; however, to convince participants of the reality of the instructions, each SIMS was "mock scored" upon being completed. In actuality, no participants were required to do any additional work and all received extra credit for their participation.
CHAPTER 3

RESULTS

General Manipulation Check

Participants were required to recall the basic instructions (i.e., respond honestly or feign) as well as indicate at least minimal effort. The data for the ten participants who were unable to recall the basic instructions and the fourteen who indicated that they “didn’t try at all” were removed from all subsequent analyses. However, demographically, these individuals were not significantly different from the final group of participants who remained.

Descriptive Data

The final sample was composed of 178 (66.8%) female and 87 (32.8%) male participants. As a college sample, most participants were young adults with an average age of 20.34 years ($SD = 2.96$) and age range from 18-42. Academically, all participants were current undergraduates, with an average of 2.11 years ($SD = 1.09$) of college at the time of testing. Likely due to the generally young age of the sample, 247 (93.6%) listed themselves as single, with less that 5.0% reporting to be married or divorced.

The ethnic composition of the sample was roughly equivalent to that of the United States in general, with 172 (65.2%) European American, 35 (13.3%) Hispanic, 29 (11.0%) African American, and 17 (6.4%) Asian American. An additional 11 (4.2%) indicated that their ethnicity was not listed or identified themselves as biracial. Predictably, the large majority of the participants (229 or 88.4%) listed English as their first language.
Participants were asked about their experiences with class failures and criminal arrests because the experimental scenarios involved these particular topics. Approximately one-third (81 or 30.7%) of the participants indicated that they had failed at least one class during college. Of those who had failed a class, 73 (91.3%) had failed less than three times, whereas six (8.9%) had failed between 3 and 6 classes, and one individual had failed over 10 classes. Of the 24 people (9.1%) who reported that they had been arrested, 12 (50.0%) were arrested for alcohol-related offenses; the remaining half were arrested for various crimes including property offenses, financial infractions such as writing hot checks, and traffic offenses. Importantly, none of the participants had been arrested for violent crimes such as the one described in the unfamiliar scenario.

Participants were asked whether they had even been diagnosed with a mental disorder. While 18 participants (6.8%) left this section blank, nearly all of those remaining (242 or 98.0%) reported no diagnoses. Reported diagnoses included mood disorders (2 or 0.8%), an anxiety disorder (1 or 0.4%), and ADHD (2 or 0.8%). It is possible that more participants had personal experience with disorders, such as ADHD, but did not classify them as “mental disorders.”

Specific Manipulation Checks

Besides recalling the general instructions about the honest or feigning conditions, the manipulation check also asked participants to recall the specific instructions they were given for each variable. Approximately 82.0% of all simulators accurately and completely recalled the scenario they were given; percentages were comparable for the unfamiliar (83.0%) and familiar (81.0%) groups. One hundred percent recalled at least
part of the details of their scenario. Failure to recall some of these specific instructions did not remove participants from analysis; only an inability to recall condition (i.e., feigning vs. honest instructions) or a self-report of poor effort were criteria for removal. This was done because we wanted to include as many simulators as possible without holding them to a standard of complete recall.

Participants were understandably better able to recall the realistic incentives – which applied to them directly – than the hypothetical incentives that had no personal bearing. More specifically, the realistic incentives provided direct benefits that were positive (i.e. extra credit and the possibility of money) or negative (removal of extra credit and the addition of extra time and work requirements). In contrast, the hypothetical incentives only involved the scenario (i.e., avoiding a criminal charge or class failure; see Table 5). Overall, there was a dramatic difference between the recall of real incentives (81.7%) and hypothetical rewards or punishments (45.0%).

Methodologically, an important finding was the stark differences between positive incentive (i.e., money and extra credit) and negative incentive (i.e., extra time and loss of extra credit) groups regarding the types of experimental incentives accurately recalled. For instance, nearly all (92.5%) of the positive incentive group recalled the real incentives (i.e., $50 and extra credit), which is dramatically higher than the negative incentive group’s recall of their extra requirements and loss of extra credit (53.8%; $\chi^2 = 55.70, p < .001$). At first glance, this disparity seems to indicate that the negative incentives were more difficult to recall. However, participants receiving both the positive and negative incentives had excellent recall (90.0%), suggesting that the presence of a
possible real reward, regardless of the possibility of punishment, increases participants’
ability to recall both incentives.

This pattern is quite different from that for the recall of hypothetical incentives
(i.e., failure of class or assault charge). Those who received either the negative or both
real incentives recalled the hypothetical incentive more often than those who received
the positive incentives (55.0% and 47.5% vs. 32.5%, respectively). Taken together, it
appears that although the real positive incentives were much easier to remember, this
recall was at the expense of the hypothetic incentives. The number of participants who
accurately recalled each aspect of the instructions can be found in Table 5.

Table 5

*Participants’ Answers to Manipulation Check Questions*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Familiar</th>
<th>Unfamiliar</th>
<th>( \chi^2 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do you recall the scenario given?</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>5.46*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you recall the hypothetical incentives given?</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>8.49*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you recall the incentives you will personally receive?</td>
<td>Complete</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>92.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coaching</td>
<td>Coached</td>
<td>Uncoached</td>
<td>( n ) %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was the information given useful?</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>83.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did you think about it while completing questions?</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>90.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did you know there were items to trip you up?</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>87.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(table continues)*
Table 5 (continued).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Success</th>
<th>Familiar</th>
<th></th>
<th>Unfamiliar</th>
<th></th>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do you believe that you were successful at deceiving the tests?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>2.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>1.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>1.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coached</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>1.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Complete = Complete list of possible incentives was given, Partial = Partial list was given.
Empty cells indicate that the item was not given to that group.
*p < .05, **p < .01.

The manipulation checks were used to evaluate the perceived relevance of the coaching instructions. A large majority of coached participants found the information useful (83.3%), with an even higher percentage taking the information into consideration when answering questions (90.8%). Of those who were not coached, a similar percentage reported that they were aware of items designed to detect them (87.5%), though their ideas about the underlying detection strategies varied widely (Table 6).

Specifically, it appears that the transparency of detection strategies may be an important consideration. A third of uncoached participants listed “inconsistency” as the only detection strategy in use, despite the fact that it is not used on the SIMS. This misplaced focus on inconsistency, noted by Rogers and his colleagues (2010), is a common finding even in highly functioning groups. Approximately another third listed other validated detection strategies that were outlined in the Introduction, while the final third listed non-descript terms, such as “trick questions” or “make you second guess” as the methods of feigning detection.
Table 6

| Detection Strategies Listed by Uncoached Participants |
|---------------------|---------------|----------|
| Strategy             | n  | %      |
| Validated Strategies |    |        |
| Inconsistency        | 34 | 33.3   |
| Rare symptoms        | 8  | 7.8    |
| Selectivity          | 6  | 5.9    |
| Stereotypes          | 6  | 5.9    |
| Severity             | 5  | 4.9    |
| Specificity          | 3  | 2.9    |
| Symptom combinations | 1  | 1.0    |
| Non-validated methods|    |        |
| “Used trick questions”| 12 | 11.8   |
| “Make you second guess” | 5  | 4.9    |
| Other                | 22 | 21.6   |

Note. Answers were free response and were grouped together by content. Answers not fitting any standard detection strategy are in quotes.

Research Questions

Research Question 1: Will the SIMS correctly classify participants according to their instructions to be honest or to feign?

The first step when classifying feigners was to ensure that individuals were attempting to fake symptoms and not simply avoiding detection by answering non-pathologically. To ensure this, the SCL-90-R scales were examined. For placement in the feigning group, participants had to have at least one clinical elevation (i.e., T-score ≥ 70; Derogatis, 1992) from the nine SCL-90-R psychopathology scales. Interestingly, no individuals were excluded based on this criterion. Thus, all participants included in the analyses endorsed a clinically significant level of symptomatology.

As the second step, differences in the SIMS were examined via a between-subjects Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with feigning and honest groups. The feigning group had a mean SIMS total score more than 20 points higher than the honest group.
(see Table 7), which resulted in a very large effect size \( (d = 1.58) \). Feigners scored significantly higher on all of the SIMS subscales, with effect sizes ranging from 0.85 to 1.67.

While all SIMS scale scores followed the same basic pattern, the specific scale elevations highlight the type of symptoms that feigners apparently found most relevant to their task. The SIMS scale measuring feigned mood symptoms (AF) yielded the highest scores and the largest effect sizes \( (d = 1.67) \), exceeding even the SIMS total score. This very high effect size is partially the result of low variation in the feigning group, indicating that mood disorder symptoms are feigned consistently. As a comparison, feigners were much more variable (i.e., had a comparably large \( SD \)) in their simulation of psychotic symptoms (P), leading to a lower effect size. In stark contrast to these scales, the feigning group reported very few symptoms of cognitive impairment (LI; \( d = 0.85 \)). This type of impairment was likely not seen as germane to the hypothetical situations in this study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Honest ( (n = 25) )</th>
<th>Feigning ( (n = 240) )</th>
<th>( F )</th>
<th>( d )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NI</td>
<td>( M = 0.76 ), ( SD = 1.36 )</td>
<td>( M = 5.13 ), ( SD = 3.81 )</td>
<td>32.34</td>
<td>1.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF</td>
<td>( M = 4.00 ), ( SD = 2.04 )</td>
<td>( M = 8.41 ), ( SD = 2.70 )</td>
<td>62.56</td>
<td>1.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>( M = 0.52 ), ( SD = 0.65 )</td>
<td>( M = 5.21 ), ( SD = 4.73 )</td>
<td>24.49</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LI</td>
<td>( M = 0.96 ), ( SD = 1.14 )</td>
<td>( M = 3.32 ), ( SD = 2.88 )</td>
<td>16.55</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM</td>
<td>( M = 0.88 ), ( SD = 1.09 )</td>
<td>( M = 5.33 ), ( SD = 4.56 )</td>
<td>23.62</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>( M = 7.12 ), ( SD = 3.31 )</td>
<td>( M = 27.35 ), ( SD = 13.41 )</td>
<td>56.32</td>
<td>1.58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* NI = Neurological Impairment, AF = Affective Disorders, P = Psychosis, LI = Low Intelligence, AM = Amnesia, Total = SIMS Total Score. All \( F \) ratios are significant, \( p < .0001 \).
For Research Question 1, the central focus was on the accuracy of the SIMS classification. As noted, Smith (2008) recommended a cut-score of $\geq 14$ on the SIMS Total Score for classifying feigners in college samples. Using this cut-score, most in the honest group (24 or 96.0%) were classified correctly (see Table 8). Of those in the simulation group, 197 (82.4%) were classified correctly as feigning, while 43 (17.6%) were incorrectly classified as honest. Predictably, simulators were significantly more likely that those in the honest group to be classified as feigning on the SIMS total score, $\chi^2 (1, N = 264) = 74.24, p < .001$.

This study had a very high base rate (90%) due to the need for simulators in the factorial design. This base rate affects positive and negative predictive power. Therefore, we calculated utility estimates at a lower base-rate and included them in Table 8. When base rate was reduced to the more realistic level of 20% that would likely be found in forensic settings (Rogers, 2008a), Smith’s (2008) cut-scores for college samples ($\geq 14$) and clinical samples ($\geq 16$) worked very well. Specifically, the standard cut-score (i.e., $\geq 14$) had excellent specificity and PPP, but lower sensitivity and NPP. This pattern was even more pronounced at the $\geq 16$ cut-score. Alternative cut-scores for suspected feigning were investigated in an attempt to improve sensitivity and NPP. Although this goal was accomplished, the negative effect on sensitivity and PPP was substantial. Smith’s original suggestion of $\geq 14$ was therefore supported.

Table 8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cut score ($\geq$)</th>
<th>Sensitivity</th>
<th>Specificity</th>
<th>90% Base-Rate</th>
<th>20% Base-Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>NPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard 14</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(table continues)
The clinical content of the SCL-90-R scales provided an opportunity to examine what type of impairment simulators chose to feign. Using separate between-subjects ANOVAs, simulators scored significantly higher than the honest group on all nine clinical scales as well as the two global indexes (see Table 9). The feigning group had scores that were an average of 33.68 greater on each scale, which indicated a substantial change in endorsement. Those differences are reflected in the moderate to large effect sizes ($M_d = 1.35$, range from 0.96 to 1.67).

Clinical scale endorsements by the simulation groups show that anxiety, psychosis, and interpersonal sensitivity exhibited the greatest differences ($d_s > 1.50$). Scales including depressive and phobic symptoms, as well as paranoia and hostility, also produced large effect sizes ($d_s > 1.25$). Given the nature of the scenarios in this study, these constellations of symptoms appear to be the most relevant to feign. In contrast, physical symptoms were less likely to be elevated by simulators. Beyond individual scales, the number and severity of symptoms appeared to be hallmarks of feigned presentations and produced very large effect sizes (i.e., $d$ for GSI = 1.74, PST = 1.73).

---

Table 8 (continued).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cut score (≥)</th>
<th>Sensitivity</th>
<th>Specificity</th>
<th>90% Base-Rate PPP</th>
<th>NPP</th>
<th>OCC</th>
<th>20% Base-Rate PPP</th>
<th>NPP</th>
<th>OCC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Optimized</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. PPP = Positive Predictive Power, NPP = Negative Predictive Power, OCC = Overall Classification Rate.
### Table 9

**SCL-90-R T-Scores by Response Style Condition**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Honest (n = 25)</th>
<th>Feigning (n = 240)</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>d</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>SD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOM</td>
<td>53.57</td>
<td>10.77</td>
<td>72.40</td>
<td>20.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-C</td>
<td>61.51</td>
<td>9.87</td>
<td>82.86</td>
<td>17.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-S</td>
<td>64.05</td>
<td>14.89</td>
<td>96.74</td>
<td>22.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEP</td>
<td>61.82</td>
<td>17.51</td>
<td>89.31</td>
<td>21.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANX</td>
<td>55.66</td>
<td>17.21</td>
<td>103.60</td>
<td>29.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOS</td>
<td>60.56</td>
<td>13.88</td>
<td>95.73</td>
<td>29.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHOB</td>
<td>50.99</td>
<td>6.97</td>
<td>95.96</td>
<td>36.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAR</td>
<td>61.69</td>
<td>14.45</td>
<td>90.33</td>
<td>22.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSY</td>
<td>62.40</td>
<td>23.14</td>
<td>116.77</td>
<td>35.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSI</td>
<td>61.91</td>
<td>14.73</td>
<td>100.50</td>
<td>22.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PST</td>
<td>60.15</td>
<td>10.68</td>
<td>80.58</td>
<td>11.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Indexes**

<p>| | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GSI</td>
<td>61.91</td>
<td>14.73</td>
<td>100.50</td>
<td>22.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PST</td>
<td>60.15</td>
<td>10.68</td>
<td>80.58</td>
<td>11.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note.** SOM = Somatization, O-C = Obsessive-Compulsive, I-S = Interpersonal Sensitivity, DEP = Depression, ANX = Anxiety, HOS = Hostility, PHOB = Phobic Anxiety, PAR = Paranoid Ideation, PSY = Psychoticism, GSI = Global Severity Index, PST = Positive Symptom Total.

All F ratios statistical significant at $p < .0001$.

**Research Question 2:** Will the familiarity of the scenario improve simulators’ ability to avoid detection of feigning on the SIMS?

Toward the goal of achieving ecological validity, the familiarity of the experimental scenario has been posited to play a key role in motivating participants to successfully feign disorders and concomitant impairment. For the current study, two related facets were examined: (a) scenario’s effect on the clinical presentation of symptoms, and (b) its impact on the capacity to avoid detection. Along with two other variables, incentives and coaching, this was investigated using Factorial (2 X 3 X 2) ANOVAs with all scales of the SCL-90-R and SIMS used as dependent variables.
Prior to examining differences in clinical presentation and detection avoidance, it was important to investigate whether self-reported effort via manipulation check could account for clinical differences. When asked directly about their level of effort during the current study, no significant differences were found between familiar and unfamiliar scenario groups using a five-point Likert-like rating scale, $F(1,239) = 1.18$, $p = .28$. The mean effort scores for both groups were above four, indicating “good effort.” Put another way, 89.20% of the familiar group and 84.20% of the unfamiliar group indicated at least a good effort. Importantly, the high average score for both groups likely indicates the presence of a ceiling effect.

The effects of familiarity on the SCL-90-R produced mixed results. Only three scales, all pertaining to hostility and psychosis, were affected in the predicted direction. Specifically, the unfamiliar group scored significantly higher on scales HOS, PAR, and PSY with effect sizes ranging from 0.27 to 0.47. Unexpectedly, the familiar group scored much higher ($d = -0.52$) on a scale measuring depression. However, given the nature of the two scenarios, this constellation of findings fits well with the demands of each: feigned depression when failing academically and feigned hostility and psychosis when faced with a violent criminal charge. All other scales evidenced no significant differences. However, many of these scales (e.g., those measuring obsessive-compulsive or phobic symptoms) were not expected to be affected by the scenarios, and the lack of significant differences reflects this.
Table 10

SIMS Scale Scores and SCL-90-R T-scores for the Familiar and Unfamiliar Simulation Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Familiar (n = 120)</th>
<th></th>
<th>Unfamiliar (n = 120)</th>
<th></th>
<th>F</th>
<th>d</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SIMS scales</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>25.23</td>
<td>13.13</td>
<td>29.22</td>
<td>13.82</td>
<td>5.45*</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NI</td>
<td>4.97</td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td>5.26</td>
<td>3.86</td>
<td>0.367</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF</td>
<td>7.92</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>8.61</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>4.51*</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>4.49</td>
<td>4.56</td>
<td>6.04</td>
<td>4.67</td>
<td>6.92**</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LI</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM</td>
<td>4.62</td>
<td>4.30</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>4.72</td>
<td>5.53*</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCL-90-R Scales</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOM</td>
<td>74.28</td>
<td>19.54</td>
<td>70.51</td>
<td>20.69</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-C</td>
<td>84.70</td>
<td>17.12</td>
<td>81.02</td>
<td>17.20</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-S</td>
<td>96.86</td>
<td>22.98</td>
<td>96.62</td>
<td>21.76</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEP</td>
<td>94.62</td>
<td>20.65</td>
<td>84.01</td>
<td>20.13</td>
<td>16.83***</td>
<td>-0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANX</td>
<td>104.23</td>
<td>30.83</td>
<td>102.98</td>
<td>28.66</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOS</td>
<td>89.03</td>
<td>26.67</td>
<td>102.43</td>
<td>30.28</td>
<td>13.48***</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHOB</td>
<td>97.23</td>
<td>39.66</td>
<td>94.69</td>
<td>33.18</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAR</td>
<td>86.12</td>
<td>22.21</td>
<td>94.55</td>
<td>21.46</td>
<td>9.22***</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSY</td>
<td>111.97</td>
<td>33.72</td>
<td>121.57</td>
<td>36.69</td>
<td>5.16*</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCL-90-R Indexes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSI</td>
<td>101.44</td>
<td>21.57</td>
<td>99.57</td>
<td>23.28</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PST</td>
<td>80.85</td>
<td>11.98</td>
<td>80.31</td>
<td>11.54</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Positive effect sizes indicate a larger mean for the “unfamiliar” group.
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

The type of scenario had a significant effect on the SIMS Total Score, with those
in the familiar scenario group achieving significantly lower scores (see Table 10). Based
on Cohen’s (1992) standards, the magnitude of this difference was moderate (d = .30).
At the subscale level, the familiar group scored lower on scales AF and P, which focus
on mental disorders, and AM, which measures feigned memory impairment. Scales AF
and P are of the most interest in the current study because they match more closely to
the type of impairment associated with the scenarios. These scales had effect sizes in
the low to moderate range (\( d_s = .24 \) and .34), as did Scale AM (\( d = .31 \)). The AM finding
suggests that amnesia may have been seen as a relevant impairment, especially in the
unfamiliar scenario involving violence, even though it was not specifically mentioned in
either scenario. Two other scales, addressing neurological impairment and low
intelligence, evidenced negligible differences (\( ds < .10 \)).

In conclusion, scenario had a significant effect on a number of scales of both
feigning and general clinical measures. As expected, participants generally responded
more believably (i.e., with lower SIMS scores), when given a familiar scenario. This
trend held true especially when dealing with scales that measure severe
symptomatology, such as psychosis, and when dealing with hostility. However, there is
also evidence that familiarity is not always associated with lower scores, especially on
the SCL-90-R. Specifically, the depression scale was found to be higher in the familiar
group. This finding likely reflects the different scenario demands associated with the
academic situation compared to the crime scenario, rather than the degree of familiarity.

Research Question 3: Will coaching improve simulators’ ability to avoid detection
of feigning on the SIMS?

The effectiveness of detection strategy coaching has been demonstrated in
simulation studies and in real-world cases of feigning. Rather than study coaching in
isolation, this study investigated both the main effect and interactions it might have with
variations in scenario and incentives. Towards that goal, it was included in the same
factorial ANOVA used to test the role of the scenario in the previous research question.
As predicted, members of the coached group were more successful at feigning than their uncoached counterparts (see Table 11).

The coached group scored lower on the SIMS Total score \((d = .42)\) and all individual scales except LI and AM. This lack of significance for LI and AM is not surprising given that these two scales address the domain of cognitive feigning. As stated by Rogers (2008b), detection strategies are domain specific; those used to detect feigned mental disorders cannot typically be used to detect feigned cognitive impairment. In the current study, the coaching warned participants of items based on rare symptoms and rare combinations detection strategies. Therefore, it provided no help for the cognitive detection strategies included on LI and AM, likely leading the groups to have similar elevations on these scales.

Table 11

**SIMS Scale Scores and SCL-90-R T-scores for Coached and Uncoached Simulation Groups**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Coached ((n = 120) )</th>
<th>Uncoached ((n = 120) )</th>
<th>( F )</th>
<th>( d )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SIMS Total</td>
<td>24.42 ± 13.16</td>
<td>30.03 ± 13.51</td>
<td>10.75***</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NI</td>
<td>4.38 ± 3.43</td>
<td>5.84 ± 4.04</td>
<td>9.16**</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF</td>
<td>7.63 ± 2.53</td>
<td>8.90 ± 3.09</td>
<td>11.98***</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>4.46 ± 4.56</td>
<td>6.08 ± 4.65</td>
<td>7.52**</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LI</td>
<td>3.10 ± 3.06</td>
<td>3.54 ± 2.67</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM</td>
<td>4.84 ± 4.57</td>
<td>5.79 ± 4.52</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCL-90-R Scales</th>
<th>Coached ((n = 120) )</th>
<th>Uncoached ((n = 120) )</th>
<th>( F )</th>
<th>( d )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SOM</td>
<td>68.20 ± 19.08</td>
<td>76.60 ± 20.43</td>
<td>11.07***</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-C</td>
<td>78.26 ± 16.57</td>
<td>87.46 ± 16.69</td>
<td>18.24***</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-S</td>
<td>91.40 ± 22.52</td>
<td>102.08 ± 20.90</td>
<td>14.62***</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEP</td>
<td>85.19 ± 21.98</td>
<td>93.44 ± 19.26</td>
<td>10.18**</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANX</td>
<td>98.82 ± 30.14</td>
<td>108.38 ± 28.60</td>
<td>6.20**</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOS</td>
<td>91.11 ± 30.16</td>
<td>100.35 ± 27.68</td>
<td>6.40**</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(table continues)*
The SCL-90-R scales followed the same pattern as the majority of SIMS scales, with the coached group feigning more successfully on all scales. This pattern was seen in the predominately moderate effect sizes ($d = .35$ to $.55$), while one SCL-90-R scale (PSY) and the two impairment indexes showed greater differentiation between the groups ($d = .58$ to .81). It is very interesting that the clinical scales of the SCL-90-R were equally, if not more affected by coaching when compared to the SIMS because the SCL-90-R scales do not make use of any detection strategies. This result may imply that many participants believed that the symptoms found on the clinical scales were rare or unbelievable when in fact they were not intended to be. However, the results could also indicate that coached participants exercised greater caution generally.

The critical issue in coaching studies is whether it allows more feigners to elude detection. For this comparison, false negative rate (i.e., $1 – sensitivity$) is the most appropriate utility estimate. The coached group, with a false negative rate of 0.14, improved only marginally ($\chi^2 (N = 240, 1) = 1.04, p = .31$) over the uncoached group, with a false negative rate of 0.21. This lack of a significant difference indicates that
although scale and T-scores differed between groups, this did not lead to a change in classification accuracy.

Coached feigning has been extensively researched but never in combination with familiarity of the scenario or the type of incentive. It was hypothesized that the combined effect of the variables would be above those of each alone. However, only one significant interaction effect was found between coaching and scenario on the NI (Neurological Impairment) scale of the SIMS. Specifically, under the familiar scenario, the coached and uncoached groups performed similarly ($M$ difference = .33), but when given the unfamiliar scenario, coached participants scored much lower, while uncoached participants’ scores were raised ($M$ difference = 2.58). Across all other scales, coached participants performed better (i.e., their scores decreased), regardless of the type of scenario or incentive they received. The meaning of this interaction is difficult to determine because it occurred on only one scale, which measured impairment not emphasized in this study.

Research Question 4: Will the type of incentive affect simulators’ ability to avoid detection of feigning on the SIMS?

The role that external incentives play in malingering is contained in the very definition of malingering. Via a between-subjects ANOVA, the effects of incentives were investigated with three levels: positive only, negative only, and both positive and negative. Because more than two levels of incentive were used, post hoc analyses using Bonferroni corrections were also applied. Unexpectedly, incentive level did not have a significant effect on any of the SIMS or SCL-90-R scales (Table 12). Even the “both” group did not produce any appreciable effect over either of the single incentive
conditions. Beyond non-significance, the effect sizes for the SIMS yielded negligible differences; for example, $d$ between positive and negative averaged 0.08, with a range from -0.14 to 0.06.

Table 12

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Positive $(n = 80)$</th>
<th>Negative $(n = 80)$</th>
<th>Both $(n = 80)$</th>
<th>$F$</th>
<th>$d$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SIMS Total</td>
<td>27.64, 12.74</td>
<td>26.91, 15.11</td>
<td>27.11, 12.99</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NI</td>
<td>4.93, 3.64</td>
<td>5.14, 4.05</td>
<td>5.28, 3.78</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF</td>
<td>8.46, 2.51</td>
<td>8.20, 3.52</td>
<td>8.14, 2.54</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>5.54, 4.85</td>
<td>5.19, 4.88</td>
<td>5.08, 4.30</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LI</td>
<td>3.31, 2.66</td>
<td>3.45, 3.26</td>
<td>3.20, 2.69</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM</td>
<td>5.58, 4.50</td>
<td>4.94, 4.70</td>
<td>5.43, 4.51</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCL-90-R Scales</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOM</td>
<td>71.04, 18.41</td>
<td>70.40, 19.69</td>
<td>75.75, 22.06</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-C</td>
<td>82.25, 17.24</td>
<td>83.58, 16.83</td>
<td>82.75, 17.78</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-S</td>
<td>99.37, 23.15</td>
<td>94.10, 22.26</td>
<td>96.77, 21.52</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEP</td>
<td>92.34, 21.13</td>
<td>87.25, 20.26</td>
<td>88.34, 21.61</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANX</td>
<td>104.69, 30.38</td>
<td>103.19, 30.27</td>
<td>102.93, 28.79</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOS</td>
<td>95.21, 27.12</td>
<td>95.73, 31.80</td>
<td>96.25, 29.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHOB</td>
<td>95.63, 34.87</td>
<td>96.44, 40.41</td>
<td>95.81, 34.39</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAR</td>
<td>91.18, 22.70</td>
<td>89.05, 23.27</td>
<td>90.76, 20.76</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSY</td>
<td>118.25, 34.89</td>
<td>113.35, 37.31</td>
<td>118.70, 34.39</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCL-90-R Indexes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSI</td>
<td>101.40, 21.51</td>
<td>99.01, 23.70</td>
<td>101.11, 22.18</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PST</td>
<td>81.04, 11.06</td>
<td>79.64, 11.87</td>
<td>81.05, 12.36</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. None of the $F$ ratios reached statistical significance.
Cohen’s $d$ calculated between the positive vs. negative incentive groups.

The level of incentive had virtually no effect on the SIMS scales, with no group achieving a mean difference over 0.73 (range 0.06 to 0.73 on a score range from 0 to 15; see Appendix J). Similarly, on the SCL-90-R scales, no incentive group pairing had a mean difference score over 5.35. Unexpectedly, the group receiving both incentives did not exhibit any additive effects.
Like scenarios, the most critical analysis involves feigners’ success at eluding detection depending on the type of incentive. Despite low effect sizes and similar mean scores, the negative incentive group was able to avoid detection more often than the other two groups. Specifically, the negative group had a false negative rate of 0.24, while those of the other two groups were 0.15 and 0.14, respectively ($\chi^2 (N = 240, 2) = 3.25, p < .05$). To achieve mean scores that are almost equal yet avoid detection more often, two things must occur. First and most obviously, more negative group participants were below the cut score. Second, since more people were below the cut score, others must have been high above it to balance out the mean and make it similar to that of the positive incentive group. This is also reflected in the higher $SD$ for the negative group on most scales. Taken together, this implies that the negative incentives were helpful and motivating for some, while others ignored those consequences and feigned in a very unbelievable (i.e., detectable) way. It is difficult to determine which individuals found the negative incentives to be motivating; there were no demographic or background characteristics that predicted these scores.

Research Question 5: What are the relative contributions of coaching, incentive, and scenario to differences in SIMS Total scores?

Research on methodological issues has traditionally focused on individual effects; the current study afforded an opportunity to compare across variables. The relative contributions of coaching, incentive, and scenario were investigated with the hope of giving future researchers guidance on which instructions to emphasize most heavily. Coaching has been found in the past to have a moderate to large effect on feigning scores and was therefore correctly predicted to have the largest effect in the
current study. However, while it was predicted that incentive would have a larger effect than scenario, the results support the opposite conclusion. On the SIMS total score, the $d$ between coaching groups was 0.42, while it was 0.30 for scenario, and 0.05 for incentive type. This same pattern was found for all SIMS subscales; the average $d$ for coaching was 0.32, 0.21 for scenario, and 0.04 for incentive.

A limitation of this analysis is that the type of levels used for each variable do not allow for a comparison of the relative contributions of each. The effect size for each component, to be truly comparable, would need to be between the presence and absence of that component rather than between varied levels of each component. Fortunately, this does not negate any of the other findings. We already knew that including a scenario, an incentive, and coaching would be helpful and the current study had the purpose of deciding how these variables are best used. Researchers should not conclude that scenario is more important than incentives, simply that familiar scenarios are more effective than unfamiliar, while positive and negative incentives may have similar effects to one another.

Supplementary Research Questions

*Supplementary Question 1: Which SCL-90-R scales will be the most often elevated in the feigning condition?*

Determining simulators’ choices of disorders has the potential to guide future scale content and to enhance our understanding of the perceived “feignability” of different disorders. Studies have rarely investigated what disorders are chosen most often. To answer this, the frequency of clinical elevations on each scale were analyzed (see Table 13). Overall, participants elevated the Psychoticism scale most often.
(81.7%), but the most telling finding was that only one scale was elevated less than 50% of the time (i.e., Somatic Complaints at 31.8%).

To understand which symptoms were endorsed, the scale elevations for each scenario were analyzed separately. While seven scales had similar elevations between groups, differences did occur on the depression and hostility scales, with those in the familiar group endorsing depression and those in the unfamiliar group endorsing hostility more often. Given the content of the two scenarios, depression appeared more useful when attempting to get out of a failed class and hostility applied more to the assault charge.

Table 13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Familiar</th>
<th>Unfamiliar</th>
<th>( X^2 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SOM</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-C</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>2.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-S</td>
<td>77.5</td>
<td>78.3</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEP</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>8.12**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANX</td>
<td>77.5</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>78.3</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOS</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>4.25*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHOB</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAR</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>3.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSY</td>
<td>81.7</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>82.5</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson chi-square between familiar and unfamiliar group.
**\( p < .01 \), * \( p < .05 \)

Supplementary Question 2: Will participants be able to target symptoms associated with their feigned disorders?

Simulators chose a variety of Axis I and Axis II diagnoses to feign, though their accuracy and selectivity indicated a lack of sophistication. Of the three quarters of simulators who picked a specific disorder to feign, responses covered nine distinct
disorders and “anger problems.” Not surprisingly, the majority chose schizophrenia, depression, and bipolar disorder, with all other disorders occurring infrequently (first column of Table 14). The most commonly chosen disorders are likely those that participants (a) have heard of most frequently and (b) believe are the most relevant. However, an unexpected finding was the presence of two personality disorders; these disorders have rarely been investigated in the feigning literature directly.

Table 14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Listed as feigned disorder</th>
<th>Endorsed Scale</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Familiar Unfamiliar</td>
<td>Corresponding Scale</td>
<td>Highest Elevation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disorder</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schizophrenia</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depression</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bipolar</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anxiety</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissociative Identity</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obsessive Compulsive</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Anger Problems”</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antisocial PD</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADHD</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borderline PD</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. Highest elevation = highest scale elevation was that of the scale corresponding to their listed disorder.

Comparison Scales Used: Schizophrenia = PSY and/or PAR scales, Depression = DEP scale, Bipolar = no equivalent, Anxiety = ANX scale, DID = no equivalent, Obsessive Compulsive = O-C scale, Anger Problems = HOS scale, Antisocial PD = no equiv, but at least HOS scale, ADHD = no equivalent, Borderline = no equivalent, Other = no equivalent.

Disorder choice was dependent on scenario, with those in the familiar scenario reporting depression and anxiety and the unfamiliar group reporting more “extreme” pathology. As presented in Supplementary Question 1 above, depression and anxiety
were reported most often by the familiar group (Table 14) and subsequently, DEP was the only scale elevated significantly more often by that same group (Table 13). In other words, the disorder picked ahead of time was also the most often elevated. For the unfamiliar group, the Hostility scale was elevated most often, while schizophrenia, dissociative identity disorder, and antisocial personality disorder were listed most often by the same group. It is clear that the unfamiliar group participants picked disorders commonly thought to be the most impairing or dangerous.

Simulators often feigned in a nonspecific way, endorsing many symptoms in addition to those of their listed disorder. While almost all (93.5% – 100.0%) were able to elevate the corresponding scale, fewer than half (47.2%) had their highest elevation on the correct scale. In addition, the sheer number of elevations per person ($M = 5.68$; Table 15) was very high. However, it should be noted that the SCL-90-R is not intended to be a diagnostic measure and assesses constellations of general distress (Caprarros-Caparros, Villar-Hoz, Juan-Ferrer, & Vinas-Posh, 2007). Due to strong interdependency among its scales, the number of scale elevations shows only that many feigners endorse a wide variety of symptoms, many of which have little to do with the disorder they are attempting to feign.

| Table 15 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Number and Type of Scale Elevations for Each Feigned Disorder |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feigned Disorder</th>
<th>Elevated scales</th>
<th>SOM</th>
<th>O-C</th>
<th>I-S</th>
<th>DEP</th>
<th>ANX</th>
<th>HOS</th>
<th>PHOB</th>
<th>PAR</th>
<th>PSY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Schizophrenia</td>
<td>$M (SD)$ 6.38 (2.11)</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>94.5</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>83.6</td>
<td>85.5</td>
<td>94.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depression</td>
<td>$5.74 (2.59)$</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>84.8</td>
<td>93.5</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>78.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(table continues)*
Table 15 (continued).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feigned Disorder</th>
<th>Elevated scales</th>
<th>SOM</th>
<th>O-C</th>
<th>I-S</th>
<th>DEP</th>
<th>ANX</th>
<th>HOS</th>
<th>PHOB</th>
<th>PAR</th>
<th>PSY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M (SD)</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bipolar</td>
<td>4.68 (2.79)</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>73.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anxiety</td>
<td>7.36 (1.80)</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>90.9</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>90.9</td>
<td>90.9</td>
<td>81.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissociative</td>
<td>4.13 (3.14)</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>62.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obsessive</td>
<td>4.57 (3.21)</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compulsive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Anger Problems”</td>
<td>6.17 (2.86)</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6.40 (1.88)</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>86.7</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>93.3</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>80.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note.** Disorders with n < 5 were not included. Bolded percentages indicate disorder-scale correspondence.

**Supplementary Question 3: Will simulators with the most extreme SCL-90-R elevations be more detectable than those with moderate SCL-90-R elevations?**

Simulators who elevated a large number of clinical scales were also the most detectable on the SIMS. Those with five or more elevations (<70T) were classified as feigning 92.2% of the time, while those with two or fewer elevations were caught only 50% of the time ($\chi^2 (N = 240, 1) = 34.14, p < .001$). Analyzed a different way, those in the top quartile of the Positive Symptom Total scale were classified as feigning far more often than those in the lower 3 quartiles ($\chi^2 (N = 240, 1) = 15.06, p < .001$). Clearly, the more focused the feigning, the less likely one is to be caught. This indicates a central problem for malingerers: severe symptoms are needed to appear impaired, yet this severity is also more detectable. As noted earlier, this was a problem for the majority of simulators; the average number of elevations was over 5, while only 26 simulators had two or fewer elevations. As discussed later, feigners who can avoid detection while still
raising one or more clinical scales past standard impairment levels are the most successful.
Psychological assessments and subsequent treatments are built on the presumption of accurate reporting, making it critically important to ensure that clients’ are as forthright as possible. However, clinicians have long recognized that naively assuming the accuracy of clients’ self-reports is untenable in most professional settings. This recognition does not indicate a widespread distrust of patients as much as a realization that less-than-genuine responses can occur for a wide variety of deliberate and unintentional reasons (Rogers, 2008a). As a classic example, this realization is reflected in the interpretation rules for the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) and MMPI-2. Before any clinical scales are examined, the validity of the protocol must be considered in terms of omissions, consistency and accuracy (Greene, 2000, p. 43). Other clinical measures, especially multiscale inventories, also consider these same issues. Evaluation of validity scales constitute a necessary first step prior to any clinical interpretations.

Malingering represents one inaccurate response style and involves conscious exaggeration or fabrication when motivated by external incentives (APA, 2000). It has been found to occur in almost all professional settings with varying frequencies; therefore, the assessment of malingering is recommended in most clinical contexts. Moreover, its evaluation is essential in forensic and correctional settings where (a) the incentives may be much greater and (b) the consequences of classification errors are more severe. As noted in the Introduction, past research has shown that adversarial settings with the potential for high gain or loss typically have higher rates of malingering.
than the general clinical population (Bianchini, Curtis, & Greves, 2006; Binder, 1993; Mittenburg et al., 2002; Rogers, 1997).

In the assessment of malingering, validity scales must find a way to address two types of inaccuracies: (a) missed malingerers, and (b) misclassified malingerers. Missed malingerers, those who are mistakenly classified as genuinely disordered clients, may avoid punishment or gain rewards that are a burden on the system (e.g., disability payments). Misclassified malingerers endure unjustified consequences as well; they are often denied needed treatment or sanctioned further for their “attempted” malingering. Misclassification deprives those with genuine disorders of help, creates long-lasting social stigma that will follow them in future professional services, and can even lead to unjust punishment.

The misclassification of genuine patients is not simply an academic interest. Recent research supports the position that misclassifications can happen easily even with modern assessment measures. While the exact number of falsely accused malingerers in forensic cases is difficult to determine, Rogers and colleagues (2003) found extreme elevations for genuine patients diagnosed with schizophrenia, PTSD, and major depression on the F scale of the MMPI-2 when scoring just one standard deviation above the normative mean. Such extreme scores indicate that a substantial number of genuine patients with these disorders are likely to be misclassified as feigners. Other researchers have obtained similar results. For example, Elhai, Frueh, Davis, Jacobs, and Hammer (2003) found that PTSD-diagnosed veterans were likely to be seen as having invalid profiles. Thus, the goal of developing better feigning
measures is not only to accurately classify feigners, but also to lower the number of false alarms.

The research to accomplish this goal of increased accuracy has evolved over time and includes many different factors. This evolution includes major developments such as new research designs and the use of relevant clinical comparison samples. Among these changes are methodological advances to increase ecological validity, such as the ones included in this thesis.

Research Design and Malingering

Methods for the detection of feigning have progressed over the last century from case studies to standardized measures with demonstrable validity (Rogers & Correa, 2008). Starting in the early 1800s, attempts to identify malingerers relied heavily on case studies that were of dubious quality with questionable generalizability (Geller et al., 1990). Despite their unsophisticated methodology, their conceptualization of malingering detection was both original and insightful. For instance, an 1843 paper on the detection of “feigned and factitious diseases of soldiers and seamen” gave “hints and rules for the detection of impostors” (Gavin, 1843, p. 1). While giving no standardized criteria, four of Gavin’s five “hints” have modern parallels with the SIRS primary scales, while the fifth hint corresponds to a supplementary scale.

Gavin’s seminal contribution also comes remarkably close to the DSM-IV-TR “screening criteria” for malingering by listing three of the four conditions for strongly suspecting the presence of malingering. Specifically, Gavin lists indicators that parallel the presence of a medicolegal context, a marked discrepancy in claimed distress and objective findings, and a lack of cooperation. Of those listed in DSM-IV-TR, he omits
only the idea of antisocial personality disorder (Gavin, 1843). This omission could be explained by his primary sample: soldiers who wish to avoid military service, which differs from a typical forensic sample. As noted, Gavin’s contributions are conceptual in nature; the methodology of his time was based on case studies with their inherent limitations (Borum, Otto, & Golding, 1993; Rogers, 1997; Rogers & Correa, 2008; see also the Introduction chapter for a further discussion on these points).

The development of the MMPI in 1940 ushered in a new wave of measures using group differences to evaluate response styles, including the assessment of feigning. In a major departure from case studies, scale items were chosen with the main criteria of differentiating groups, an approach described as empirical keying. While problems with the original MMPI became obvious over the years, especially with its exclusive reliance on empirical keying and absence of conceptually-based scales (Ben-Porath & Tellegen, 2008), its systematic use of group differences signified a watershed in the validation of feigning measures. Importantly, it avoided reliance on single case studies, with unknown generalizability to wider populations. It also adeptly side-stepped frequent misuses of common characteristics as discriminating characteristics (see Introduction). The MMPI-2 continues to be the most often-used measure for feigning (Lally, 2003), and its popularity has led to the development of other multiscale and feigning-specific measures.

Researchers have recognized an inherent conceptual problem with traditional feigning scales that focus on empirical keying. Starting in the 1980s, researchers began to turn their attention to the validation of specific detection strategies (Rogers, 1984). Until this time, group differences were exclusively emphasized, with success focused on
individual scales and measured by statistical significance and, to a lesser extent, effect sizes (Rogers & Correa, 2008). With detection strategies, the emphasis could be placed on the common strategies used across scales instead of relying on particular scales themselves. This improvement opened the way for the development of effective strategies and the differentiation of strategies across the varying malingering domains (see the Introduction chapter for a discussion of domains). Many of these strategies were first recognized over a century ago (see Gavin, 1843); but they are now being implemented with strong conceptual and empirical underpinnings.

Improved methods for evaluating detection strategies relied on four basic designs (i.e., known-groups comparisons, differential prevalence, simulation, and bootstrap comparisons). Of these options, simulation design has dominated malingering research for over fifty years in the creation and validation of feigning scales. This design has been used since around the beginning of standardized testing, with the earliest published example occurring more than six decades ago (see Goldstein, 1944). As evidence of its predominant use, a recent count of validation studies of the Structured Interview of Reported Symptoms (SIRS; Rogers, Sewell, & Gillard, 2010) found that 18 of the 22 group difference studies used simulation design. However, despite this, known groups and bootstrap designs have also played an essential role in feigning research. A detailed analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of these design options can be found by Rogers (2008) and the Research Design section of this thesis.

Comparison of Designs

Simulation and known-groups comparison designs have been investigated using the same feigning measure and clinical comparison groups in a handful of studies.
While cross-study comparisons are difficult due to methodological and scale development differences, each study provides an excellent internal comparison between simulators and suspected malingerers.

As the first example, Gillis, Rogers, and Bagby (1991) investigated the use of the M-Test in a clinical setting using both simulation and known-groups design (i.e., simulators and suspected malingerers). Across the three feigning scales of the M-Test, the average Cohen’s $d$ effect size was 1.40 for simulators, while the comparison between suspected malingerers and the same honest inpatients was significantly lower ($M_d = .80$). Although this is the only direct comparison using the M-Test in this manner, it suggests that real-world, suspected malingerers respond more carefully than simulators.

One additional study (Gothard, Rogers, & Sewell, 1995) used a similar design to Gillis, Rogers, and Babgy (1991) and provided similar results: simulators scored higher than suspected malingerers did on most feigning scales on the SIRS. Specifically, simulators scored higher than suspected malingerers did when compared to a group of genuine responders ($M_d = 2.21$ and $2.01$, respectively). In another comparison of the SIRS, a group of the test’s original validation studies (Rogers, Gillis, & Bagby, 1990; Rogers, Gillis, Bagby, & Monteiro, 1991; Rogers, Gillis, Dickens, & Bagby, 1991; Rogers, Kropp, Bagby, & Dickens, 1992) found that across primary scales, the mean $d$ was almost identical between the two comparisons. Differences in either direction depended on the specific scale. This final finding may reflect the fact that the SIRS was validated using both research designs, leading to a more balanced set of scores.
Taken together, two of the three groups of past studies indicate that simulators obtained more extreme scores than known malingerers, while the third had mixed scores that resulted in no difference on average. These studies highlight two important facts. First, simulators often do not respond in the same way as “known” malingerers. Second, the designs used to validate a measure’s cut scores can greatly affect that test’s accuracy in later studies. As noted, the SIRS was validated with both designs and is generally considered one of the best feigning measures available. On the other hand, the M-Test has more obvious items and the known-groups design was a more effective test of its utility. While this teaches us that we must work to improve the validity of simulation design, it also indicates a need to use multiple designs during validation.

Ecological Validity of the Simulation Design

Simulation design for malingering research allows for excellent internal validity, but its ecological validity has been questioned for many years (Haines & Norris, 1995; Rogers et al., 1992). As a major example, most early studies, and some current research, use non-clinical samples of convenience (Brennan & Gouvier, 2006). However, this approach represents a methodological problem. The most relevant comparison group is a clinical sample, allowing for the direct comparison of simulated mental disorders to genuine mental disorders (Rogers, 1997).

While this is an important improvement, it still does not address another relevant concern briefly outlined in the previous section: Do simulated feigners respond in the same way, or with the same sustained motivation, as feigners in the real world? Researchers have taken important steps to address this concern, namely the use of instructions to make the situation more relevant and motivating to the participant.
(Rogers, 2008c). But what types of instructions are needed, and exactly what should they say? Very few studies (i.e., Rogers & Cruise, 1998; Merckelbach, Smeets, & Jelicic, 2009) have examined the actual effect that instructional changes have on test results.

**Role of Scenario**

Simulation design creates an inherently difficult situation that was first defined by Rogers and Cavanaugh (1983, p. 447) as the *simulation malingering paradox*; specifically, “individuals are asked to comply with instructions to fake to study those who fake when asked to comply.” This situation is quite different from that of a true malingeringer, creating a major threat to external validity. To take an example from the deception literature, Miller and Stiff (1993) point out that the reason for lying during most deception experiments is to satisfy the requirements of the study. Since this type of lying is requested by the experimenter, it is called *sanctioned* lying. Feeley and DeTurck (1998) point out that people lie for a multitude of reasons in real life without being prompted. These prevarications are considered *unsanctioned* lies and the reasons for telling these types of lies differ greatly from sanctioned lying. Comparisons between the two types of lying show significant differences in the verbal and nonverbal behaviors that participants exhibit during questioning (see Feeley & DeTurck, 1998).

The Feeley and DeTurck (1998) findings underscore the general point that asking someone to deceive is not the same as when someone deceives for self-motivated reasons. Similar differences to those found between sanctioned and unsanctioned lying may be present in malingering research as well. Like the deception studies, malingering research using simulation design is conducted in a laboratory
setting; therefore, participants have no true reason to feign other than being told to do so (i.e., sanctioned deception). Absent is a situational motivation to feign. Rogers (2008c) noted that this lack of motivation could lead to poor effort, a hypothesis that fits well with the adaptational model (Rogers & Cavanaugh, 1983), which postulates that malingering is largely motivated by the presence of both difficult circumstances and valuable incentives. If we use the adaptational model, we cannot blithely assume that someone will feign adequately or believably without some extrinsic motivation.

Early studies of malingering placed little or no emphasis on participant investment or externally-relevant scenarios in the simulation condition. Instead, instructions were used simply to express the idea of malingering, with a statement to “fake,” and no further elaboration. As a rare exception, Crowley (1952) sought to motivate college students with a scenario in which they must avoid being drafted into the military by feigning “feeblemindedness.” Given that the Korean War began in 1950, this scenario was an excellent, and relevant, attempt to increase external validity.

More recently, simulation studies have attempted to engage and motivate simulators by providing familiar scenarios for the sample in question. The scenarios have covered broad domains including civil and criminal cases, insurance and disability compensation, treatment access, and academic failure. The SIRS provides an excellent illustration of this diversity, with 18 simulation investigations that provided a scenario description (Rogers, Sewell, & Gillard, 2010). Summarized in Table 16, the majority of simulation studies of the SIRS have been conducted in forensic or correctional settings, and 84% used forensically-relevant scenarios. Studies using academic and clinical samples have also used applicable scenarios, while those conducted in community
settings have generally used inapplicable scenarios or no scenarios. This set of studies illustrates two important points. First, a variety of scenarios are available that can easily be adapted to a given sample. Second, scenarios that are relevant to reality as well as familiar and motivating are easier to enact for forensic and correctional samples. However, even in community settings, where relevant scenarios are more difficult to choose, scenarios can still provide increased motivation. Studies should always include scenarios that are as relevant and motivating as possible.

Table 16

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Sample type for Simulators</th>
<th>Scenario description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rogers et al. (1990)</td>
<td>Correctional</td>
<td>Move to harsher unit in prison unless seen as impaired.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rogers et al. (1991a)</td>
<td>College</td>
<td>Expulsion from college for failing unless mentally disordered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rogers (1991b)</td>
<td>Community</td>
<td>No scenario reported in article.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cornell (1991)</td>
<td>Correctional</td>
<td>Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity or incompetence plea to avoid trial for serious crime. No specific charge given.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurtz (1992)</td>
<td>Forensic/Correctional</td>
<td>Move to a hospital that has good treatment, recreation and education options if seen as “insane” or “crazy.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rogers et al. (1992)</td>
<td>Forensic</td>
<td>No scenario reported in article. Instructed to feign one of three disorders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linblad (1993)</td>
<td>Forensic</td>
<td>Serious criminal charge, must “look crazy” to avoid conviction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gothard et al. (1995)</td>
<td>Forensic/Correctional</td>
<td>Serious criminal charge, want to look incompetent to stand trial.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rogers et al. (1996)</td>
<td>Correctional</td>
<td>No scenario reported, description of disorders only.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pollock (1998)</td>
<td>Correctional</td>
<td>Open ended, but given example – try to appear mentally disordered to be transferred to hospital.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodness (1999)</td>
<td>Forensic</td>
<td>Modified from Rogers et al., 1990 – while in prison, allowed to go home or to hospital if found legally insane at time of crime.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(table continues)*
Table 16 (continued).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Sample type for Simulators</th>
<th>Scenario description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jackson et al. (2005)</td>
<td>Forensic/Correctional</td>
<td>Incompetent to stand trial for crime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brand et al. (2006)</td>
<td>Community</td>
<td>No scenario, required to watch or read Sybil for information on Dissociative Identity Disorder and then attempt to feign.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green et al. (2008)</td>
<td>Community</td>
<td>On trial for robbery, feign incompetence to stand.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The majority of SIRS simulation studies use scenarios that pertain specifically to the given sample, but the case is quite different for more general, clinical measures like the MMPI-2. While the MMPI-2 has been used in a wide variety of samples, the vast majority of simulation groups (39 of 46) listed in a meta-analysis by Rogers, et al. (2003) consisted of student or community volunteers. As previously mentioned, these samples provide a challenge when choosing a scenario; for these groups, the use of hospital placement, criminal trial, or even disability evaluation scenarios may be much less relevant.

Previous research on the effect of scenario. Two investigations (Rogers & Cruise, 1998; Merckelbach, Smeets, & Jelicic, 2009) have provided initial evidence for the influential role that relevant scenarios play in affecting feigning measure scores. However, the two studies contained methodological variations that led them to draw separate conclusions about why the effects took place. First, Rogers and Cruise (1998) found that the familiarity of the scenario (referred to as “context” in their article) interacted with the type of incentive given and the relevance statement given to the
participants. While a significant interaction was found only for the Low Intelligence scale (LI) on the Structured Inventory of Malingered Symptoms (SIMS), the authors hypothesized that the combination of different variables led to a type of “reality check” (Rogers & Cruise, 1998, p. 281). These findings provided some initial evidence that a familiar scenario could improve the believability of feigning measure responses. As discussed later, the details of the scenarios used in Rogers et al. may have contributed to a lack of main effects.

Merkelbach et al. (2009) used three different scenarios (personal injury, manslaughter, and wrongful death cases), which produced significant differences in feigning scores. Specifically, the researchers found differences between the personal injury case and the other two cases involving the death of another individual, with no differences between the latter two cases. Unlike Rogers and Cruise, Merkelbach and colleagues varied the type of feigning along with the scenario. For instance, simulation in the personal injury case involved toxic encephalopathy, while in the two other cases, it was a “serious psychological condition” or mental retardation, each expected to diminish responsibility. While very interesting, it is difficult to separate the effect of the scenarios from the varied disorders participants were asked to feign.

The current study provides evidence that scenarios that are more familiar to participants will lead to more believable scores. The type of scenario contributed to differences in scale elevations in two major ways. First, participants given the familiar scenario had lower scores on a number of scales on the SIMS and SCL-90-R. Second, a different pattern of scale elevations emerged for each scenario, indicating that the
type of impairment relevant to each scenario was perceived to be different. These
differences are examined in subsequent paragraphs.

Based on self-reported motivation and effort, simulators in both the familiar and
unfamiliar scenario groups attempted to feign convincingly. However, the unfamiliar
group produced less believable results with their extreme endorsement of symptoms.
This result is an important combination of points: both groups attempted to feign by
increasing symptom endorsement, but the familiar group endorsed fewer symptoms
than the unfamiliar group. Put a different way, the familiar group was more believable
than the unfamiliar group in its endorsement of symptoms. This result is markedly
different from the findings of Rogers and Cruise (1998). While they also found that both
feigning groups scored much higher than honest responders did, they found only
modest differences between scenario types. Moreover, in that study, there were no
scale differences based on scenario alone. As discussed in depth below, this is a
function of the types of scenarios used in each study.

Scale differences in the current study did not occur in a uniform fashion, and
these variations likely reflect the type of impairment groups thought was relevant to their
scenario. Aside from a few exceptions noted below, the unfamiliar group scored higher
than its familiar counterpart on mood and psychotic symptoms. This is interesting
because both scenarios asked the participant to fake the same thing: complete
impairment.

Scales with cognitive and somatic content were an exception in the previous
analysis; they did not show group differences. These types of impairments were likely
seen as less relevant to the scenarios and the goals given for feigning. It appears that
familiarity alone is not an effective tool; a familiar scenario alone will not lead to improved feigning across all impairment types. Familiarity must occur with symptomatology that participants also feel is relevant. In the current study, participants did not feel that somatic and cognitive complains were relevant to either scenario; therefore, the scenarios did not result in any differences on those scales.

Feigning across domains may complicate the assessment of scenario effect. Differences between this study, with its focus on mental disorders in both scenarios, and Merckelbach et al. (2009), highlight this complication. In Merckelbach et al. (2009), the scenario changed (i.e., civil vs. criminal proceedings), but participants were also given the freedom to focus on physical and cognitive complaints if they felt that they would be more useful. Specifically, those in the “civil” scenario were asked to feign toxic encephalopathy, which is associated with neurological and personality changes, depression, and a host of physical symptoms. Not surprisingly then, effect sizes were smaller for this group when measured on the Wildman Symptom Checklist (WSC; Wildman & Wildman, 1999) than were the two other groups feigning a “serious psychological condition to minimize criminal responsibility” and “insufficient cognitive capabilities” (Merckelbach et al., 2009, p. 381). As Rogers (2008) noted, the areas of medical and cognitive feigning are quite different from mental disorder feigning and therefore require different detection strategies. Clearly, a scenario focusing on physical complaints will elicit a different type of feigning, making the difference impossible to impute to the situational aspect of the scenario alone. With the type of impairment kept consistently within the realm of feigned mental disorder, the current study showed that
using a more relevant, familiar scenario can lead to more believable feigning across measures.

One scale measuring depression broke the general pattern of lower familiar group scores in the current data. The only scale across both measures that had a higher mean score in the familiar group was the Depression scale of the SCL-90-R ($d = .52$). This finding was opposite all other scales and may indicate that depression was seen as a very relevant problem in the academic failure situation. It appears that familiarity not only led to more believable scores in the form of lower scores, but to more directed responding. Those in the familiar (i.e., academic failure) group chose depression and those in the unfamiliar (i.e., criminal assault) group chose psychosis and hostility most often and other symptoms to a lesser extent. However, participants in each group still elevated close to six scales on average, indicating that some major elevations were directed, but overall feigning was still quite general.

Memory impairment on the SIMS Am scale exhibited unexpected differences, with higher scores in the unfamiliar group. This difference was unexpected because the scale focuses on cognitive impairment. This suggests that memory impairment may have been considered relevant to the unfamiliar scenario involving violence. However, it is also possible that this is another indication of less selective feigning, given that the unfamiliar scenario group also elevated scales related to psychotic and mood symptoms. One study (Rogers & Cruise, 1998) has examined this scale previously. However, since simulators were asked to feign major depression specifically, there were no significant differences between groups on this scale.
The familiarity of the scenario in the current study affected symptom endorsement more than in previous research. The difference may be attributed to the specific “unfamiliar” scenarios in each investigation. For instance, Rogers and Cruise (1998) used a minor drug charge, specifically possession of marijuana; in contrast, the current study used a much more severe charge of felony assault. According to 2006 data from the FBI, the number of arrests for drug possession alone was 340% higher than that for aggravated assault (FBI, 2007). While most college students have not been arrested for drug possession, it is still likely that this is a more familiar scenario than aggravated assault. A Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA; 2005) study spanning 2002 to 2004 found an average annual “past year drug use” rate of 37.5% for full-time college students. According to the Office of Postsecondary Education’s (n.d.) data on campus crime from more than 6,000 postsecondary schools, 23,632 arrests and an additional 58,075 disciplinary actions occurred in 2008 related to drug use (not including alcohol). For the same year, only 3,647 arrests for aggravated assault were recorded, with no evidence of non-criminal disciplinary actions.\(^6\) Looking at arrest rates alone, drugs were responsible for 6.5 times more arrests that aggravated assault in college populations. The drug charge used in Rogers and Cruise (1998) may have been familiar to many students, while the current investigation’s use of an aggravated assault charge was unfamiliar enough to produce an effect.

Role of Coaching

Coaching likely occurs in a majority of real-world forensic cases and is often endorsed by attorneys as a legitimate practice (Wetter & Corrigan, 1995; Youngjohn,
Lees-Haley, & Binder, 1999). For self-coaching, examinees can obtain information from readily available sources including articles and books written about feigning tests, or even the tests themselves (Nichols & Greene, 1997). Outside of these published materials, finding information has become much easier in the last decade as access to the internet has greatly expanded (Ruiz, 2002). As an example, a quick Google search on November 13, 2009 of the key word “MMPI” elicited detailed information on scale content and cut scores as well as direct tips for attorneys to give to clients and to use against professionals on cross-examination. Given its ease and the real-world implications, the effects of coaching must be considered for the ecological validity of simulation research.

The inclusion of coaching is a relatively modern methodological advance in feigning research. Early research with the MMPI (for an example, see Goldstein, 1944) and other standardized psychological measures simply gave a warning to “be believable” but did not provide coaching regarding how this might be accomplished. However, in the last three decades, coaching has appeared more frequently in malingering research (e.g., Albert, Fox, & Kahn, 1980).

There is an important difference between symptom and detection strategy coaching. Early coaching studies focused on symptom coaching, a method which has since been proven to be ineffective. Rogers (2008c) pointed out that this method is fatally flawed for multiple reasons. Briefly, symptom coaching can be unhelpful because there is no “correct” pattern or codetype on multiscale inventories; therefore, this is a distraction. An evaluee may also focus exclusively on symptom endorsement and neglect the possibility of detection. Many studies (Edens, Otto, & Dwyer, 1998; Rogers,
Bagby, & Chakraborty, 1993; Wetter, Baer, Berry, Robison, & Sumpter, 1993), with a vast array of settings and disorder types, have concluded that this type of coaching leads to little or no decrease in detection rates.

Studies on detection strategy coaching have proven it to be effective at reducing detection (Lamb, Berry, Wetter, & Baer, 1994; Rogers et al., 1993; Storm & Graham, 2000). For example, Rogers et al. (1993) found that most feigners (78.6%) coached on detection strategies alone avoided detection on the MMPI-2 F scale. In contrast, combined coaching (i.e., symptom and strategy) was less effective (53.3%), whereas symptom coaching (26.6%) was the least successful. These data suggest that symptom coaching can be a major distraction, even when detection strategy coaching is also included. In some cases, non-specific warnings, or cautions, about the presence of detection strategies have been effective, even when no further information on how they work is provided (e.g., Suhr & Gunstad, 2000).

The current study found that detection strategy coaching worked better than these caution statements, in agreement with past research. Specifically, the coached simulators had significantly lower scores on all SCL-90-R clinical scales and all except two SIMS scales. These results are supported by all but one past study. Bagby, Nicholson, Bacchiochi, Ryder, and Bury (2002) found no significant differences between coached and uncoached groups on the clinical or validity scales of the MMPI-2 and PAI. However, the authors note that differences in design may account for these conflicting findings. Specifically, they used a more general statement to “feign a mental disorder,” while the two previous studies that found differences used specific disorders (i.e., schizophrenia and closed head injury). Interestingly, the current study also used a
general statement with no specific disorders noted and found significant effects for coaching. These results were found not only for the SIMS, but for a general clinical measure as well.

While the SCL-90-R is not designed to detect feigning, it appears that individuals who were coached responded to its items in a more credible manner, with fewer extreme elevations. Lower SCL-90-R scores were not expected because these scales do not contain items that the coaching would seemingly affect. The coaching instructions included information on the three SIMS detection strategies for mental disorders – rare symptoms, improbable symptoms, and symptom combinations, all of which are classified as “unlikely strategies” (see Introduction). The SCL-90-R does not contain any identified unlikely strategy items and contains only a small number of items that could be seen as “rare” according to the description given in the coaching instructions. With its existing items, the SCL-90-R would only be able to use “amplified” strategies, which were not coached. The results therefore suggest that coaching may motivate responders to be more careful about their presentation in a generalized way.

Coaching has also been found to affect clinical elevations in two past studies (Rogers, Bagby, & Chakraborty, 1993; Lamb, Berry, Wetter, & Baer, 1994.) Rogers, Bagby, and Chakraborty (1993) found that coached participants not only scored significantly lower on MMPI-2 feigning scales, but on the clinical scales as well. While effect sizes cannot be calculated for this study, detection strategy coaching resulted in 29.78% fewer participants elevating scales to a clinical range (defined as 65T in this study). Similarly, Lamb, Berry, Wetter, and Baer (1994) concluded that detection strategy information exhibited the largest effect ($M d = .40$) on clinical scales when
coached closed-head injury patients were compared to uncoached simulators. This
effect is similar to that in the current study ($M_d = .47$). A third study (Bagby, Nicholson,
Bacchiochi, Ryder, & Bury, 2002) using the MMPI-2 and PAI found that coached and
uncoached groups did not differ significantly on any clinical scales or validity scales.
Bagby et al. (2002) is one of the few studies to find no coaching effect. Interestingly, this
study included similar detection strategy coaching to the other studies discussed above
and used a similar sample of college or community non-patients. An examination of the
mean elevations in each group shows that both groups had substantially lower T-scores
than the other studies. The authors suggest that this was due to a higher incentive,
which may have erased the effect of coaching.

In summary, detection strategy coaching appears to decrease scores more than
simply cautioning about the presence of detection strategies or symptom coaching.
Specifically, those who were coached had mean SIMS Total scores almost six points
lower, with an effect size of 0.47 when compared to those who received only a caution.
Similar results have been obtained in past studies (Rogers, Bagby, & Chakraborty,
1993; Lamb, Berry, Wetter, & Baer, 1994), but were questioned by one more recent
study (Bagby, Nicholson, Bacchiochi, Ryder, & Bury, 2002). Rogers (2008c)
recommended that simple cautionary statements be included in all studies; however,
researchers should consider including detection strategy coaching in all simulation
design research to increase ecological validity.

Role of Incentives

According to the adaptational model, malingering is more likely to occur when an
individual has a substantial personal investment (Rogers, 2008a). Indeed, past meta-
analytic data (Binder & Rohling, 1996) shows that in disability cases, the amount of the possible monetary reward is positively correlated with the reported impairment. When controlling for injury severity, this correlation suggests that some examinees exaggerate their impairment more when presented with a high potential reward. In the realm of neuropsychological feigning, litigants have been found to perform more poorly than non-litigants with similar injuries (Meyers & Volbrecht, 1998). Specifically, 4.1% of the non-litigants compared to 48.9% of the litigants were classified as malingering. These real-world examples suggest that greater potential rewards increase investment in the evaluation.

Past experimental research has shown some evidence that larger monetary incentives increase both the self-reported motivation to feign convincingly (Wilhelm et al., 1991) and performance on feigning measures (Elhai et al., 2007; Bernard, 1990; Shum, O’Gorman, & Alpar, 2004; Frederick, Sarfaty, Johnston, & Powel, 1994; Orey, Cragar, & Berry, 2000). In many of these investigations, the effect sizes between incentive levels have been quite small, and in many cases, only certain scales, and not entire measures, were affected. The small effects are likely a product of the modest size of “larger” rewards in experimental settings, typically ten to twenty dollars. Such modest rewards can hardly be expected to have the same effect as real-world disability cases, often with thousands or millions of dollars as a potential incentive.

The body of literature on incentives in simulation research can be broken into two domains: feigned mental disorders and feigned cognitive impairment. Two studies, by Elhai and his colleagues (2007) and Rogers and Cruise (1998) have specifically examined the effect of incentive level on feigned mental disorders. Rogers and Cruise
(1998) offered the possibility of a $50 reward to the “most successful” feigner in addition to extra credit and recognition via a posted list. Elhai et al. (2007) offered a similar monetary reward to the top three feigners in their study. Effect sizes in the Rogers and Cruise study (.18) and the Elhai study (.19 on the main outcome scale) were almost identically small. The current thesis provides a good comparison to the earlier study by using the same measure with a similar comparison (positive vs. negative incentive). However, unlike the earlier study, no significant differences were found.

In general, the five published experimental studies on feigned cognitive impairment indicate that incentives as small as $20 are associated with a decrease in the number of participants who are detected by feigning measures. A detailed discussion of these studies’ methodologies can be found in the Introduction of this thesis, but across three of the five studies, incentive groups produced more credible results. Shum, O’Gorman, and Alpar (2004) found that an incentive of $20 improved scores on a memory task ($d = .44$), while another study (Frederick, Sarfaty, Johnston, & Powel, 1994) found that a $20 incentive lowered the detection rate from 84.2% to 65.4%. Orey, Cragar, and Berry (2000) studied a group offered $25 that was asked to feign head injury and found that they performed better on a varied of cognitive tasks (MD = .94). A study by Wilhelm and colleagues (1991) was the only exception to this pattern: they found increased scores (i.e., an increase in impairment instead of believability) for a group offered a larger incentive.

The generalizability of incentive results across domains is inappropriate due to both conceptual and methodological differences. First, the task of cognitive feigning involves tactics unlike those used when feigning mental disorders. Second, the
incentives in the cognitive research have generally been given in a different manner. Specifically, most studies have used rewards of $20-$25, given to all feigners, with an additional reward sometimes offered only to the successful feigners or those that win a lottery. In the feigned mental disorder studies to date, rewards were given only to the best feigners. It is possible that simulators were not as motivated by this, feeling that their chances for reward were quite low, including in the current study. Alternatives to simple monetary incentives may be needed to motivate simulators.

Negative incentives can be seen as ecologically-valid additions to the typical monetary incentives, but research on them is necessarily constrained by ethical considerations. As noted in the Introduction, two previous studies using negative incentives are available to compare to the current study, with promising results that suggest increased credibility in simulators’ responses (Patrick & Iacono, 1989; Rogers & Cruise, 1998). Rogers and Cruise investigated the effect that a threat of posting the names of unsuccessful feigners would have ($d = .18$ on the main outcome scale) while Patrick and Iacono (1989) also used a negative incentive involving a loss of money in an inmate population (effect sizes not available). While it is difficult to compare Patrick and Iacono (1989) to Rogers and Cruise (1998) because the former used polygraph results and not feigning measures, both studies provide excellent examples of the use of negative incentives. Both investigations used incentives that were sufficiently motivating to their samples. Specifically, Rogers and Cruise (1998) used the threat of embarrassment with undergraduates, while Patrick and Iacono (1989) used not only the loss of money but the retribution of other inmates as motivation. It should be noted that this may not pass some Institutional Review Boards today.
While the current study did not find any differences between groups of feigners based on the incentive given, a methodological difference may be hiding a true effect. The study does not contain a “no incentive” group; therefore, a comparison between the presence and absence of incentives is impossible, just as was the case in the Rogers and Cruise (1998) study. However, that study did find that negative incentives lowered scores more so than positive incentives for scales AM and LI ($d = .36$ and $.26$, respectively, Total score $d = .18$), while the current study found a negligible effect in the same direction (i.e., no significant differences, Total score $d = .05$). It is possible that Rogers and Cruise’s threat of posting the names of failed feigners was seen as a more serious consequence than having to stay late in the laboratory, as in the current study.

Putting Instructional Changes in Perspective

Those familiar with the feigning literature may note that the effect sizes in the current study are very small when compared to those obtained when comparing feigners to honest responders. When making this extreme comparison, a moderate effect size is considered $\geq 0.75$ (Rogers, Sewell, Martin, & Vitacco, 2003). However, clearly we should not expect to find similar effects when looking at the differences between subtle subsets of feigners (i.e., those given varied instructions) as when we are comparing extreme groups, such as feigners and genuine responders. When considered in this context, the current results are quite promising.

The use of relevant and motivating instructions is clearly associated with more successful feigning in simulation studies. The Cohen’s $d$ effect sizes for the three instructional variables in this study were all in the low to low medium range according to Cohen’s (1992) standards. Specifically, the use of a familiar scenario produced more
believable scores than the unfamiliar scenario ($d = .30$), while coaching had a predictably larger effect ($d = .42$). No differences were found between the two types of incentives investigated, possibly indicating that positive and negative incentives are equally efficacious. The use of these instructional variables in the current study served to test the measure in a more realistic manner, one that attempted to recreate some of the motivation that real-world malingers may actually have. When using simulation design, researchers are likely to find that effective scales will differentiate genuine responding from feigning to a considerable degree whether or not the most effective variants of instructions are used. But using the best possible instructions will provide a more stringent test of the scale. It will also provide further evidence that that scale is likely to be effective when used in research with a known-groups comparison or in clinical practice.

Simulators’ Choice of Feigned Disorders

When given a specific disorder to feign, participants are quite successful at elevating the intended scales (Rogers, Ornduff, & Sewell, 1993; Rogers, Sewell, Morey, & Ustad, 1996; Edens et al., 1999). For example, participants feigning schizophrenia in Rogers et al. (1993) almost never (90.9%) avoided detection, while those feigning major depression (55.9%) or generalized anxiety disorder (38.7%) were less likely to be detected. These differences likely reflect both the content of the PAI feigning scales (Rogers, et al., 1993) and participants’ understanding of the symptoms characterizing these different disorders.

An oft-overlooked question is whether feigners succeed at simulating the disorders they intent to when the choice is left to them. Some researchers instruct
participants to think of a disorder to feign before testing, while others ask them to feign “impairment.” Real-life examples would likely indicate that the choice of disorder depends on the setting and the goal for that particular feigner. For example, Cornell and Hawk (1989) reported that feigned psychosis was attempted by 8% of pretrial defendants being evaluated for competency to stand trial, but they did not report percentages for any other feigned disorders.

In the current study, three-quarters of participants instructed to “think about what disorder and type of impairment you want to fake” reported that they had a specific disorder in mind. Of these, more than 70% reported they had attempted to feign schizophrenia, depression, or bipolar disorder, while the remaining participants listed a variety of other disorders in small numbers. These numbers differed by scenario: those in the familiar scenario feigned depression and anxiety more, while those in the unfamiliar scenario chose schizophrenia more often. The participants concentrated on only a few diagnoses, leading to two major observations about what guides this choice. First, the type of scenario may affect the type of impairment participants think is necessary or the most severe. Second, undergraduates may be more familiar with several disorders through popular media and may attempt to use this knowledge. With the knowledge of which disorders are being feigned, we were able to examine whether participants were able to present themselves as such on clinical measures.

Participants were able to endorse the scale corresponding to their disorder, but were often not selective in their symptom choices. Almost all participants were able to elevate at least the SCL-90-R scale associated with their disorder, even if others were raised as well, while very few (4.0%) were successful at elevating only the clinical scale.
corresponding to their disorder. Participants’ selectivity of endorsement is also questioned because (a) less than half of the participants had their highest elevation on the scale corresponding to their disorder and (b) the mean number of elevated scales was over six.

Limitations

The current study had several methodological limitations. The first involved the choice of clinical and feigning measures. Although the SCL-90-R is a widely used measure to access the features of major Axis I disorders, it cannot be used for DSM-IV-TR diagnostic purposes. As the first study to examine selectivity across scales, the current investigation provides some interesting initial information about the disorder choices of simulators. However, the use of a structured clinical interview or other diagnostic tool would allow for a clearer comparison. With diagnostic information, direct comparisons could be made between the self-reported choice of simulated disorder and the resulting responses. In addition, a more valid estimate of how accurately participants are able to simulate a disorder when given varied instructions could be obtained. Future research may consider the use of measures such as the SADS or SCID-I to obtain this information.

Replication of the current study should be completed with a variety of feigning measures, including those most frequently used: the SIRS and MMPI-2. Although the SIMS has undergone adequate validation and is one of the most frequently used screens for malingering, a more stringent measure like the SIRS would provide the best possible data. However, one advantage of the SIMS that would be lost is its organization based on item content, allowing comparisons to clinical measures.
The second set of limitations concerns the exclusion of “absent” conditions from each independent variable. “Absent” refers to a condition in which the variable is not given (e.g., no scenario or no incentives). In the current study, only coaching included such a condition. The main drawback of excluding this circumstance for all variables is the inability to analyze whether such an absence affects results. For example, we cannot ascertain whether a moderate incentive is better than no incentive at all. In addition, the relative contribution of each variable in indeterminable; an effect size between positive and negative incentives means something quite different from one between a familiar and unfamiliar scenario. Ultimately, the reason for choosing to exclude absence conditions was based on the enormous sample size that would be needed when adding levels to our factorial design. Even the inclusion of two more levels (i.e., a 3 x 3 x 3 design) would lead to a need for at least 300 additional participants, assuming a cell size of at least 20. The supplementary question about the relative contribution of each variable was considered secondary to the main objective of investigating differences between levels of the same variable (e.g., familiar vs. unfamiliar scenarios).

The purpose of the current study was to investigate various methodological factors used with simulators, making the use of a clinical comparison group of secondary concern. While clinical comparisons are a key element of simulation design research, they were not used here primarily because this study was not comparing honest to feigning groups. This also allowed for a cleaner design that put the focus on the relevant instructional variables. However, this limits the comparisons that can be drawn between these findings and those of studies that do use clinical participants.
Future Directions

The current study was one of the first to address the integrated examination of familiarity, coaching, and incentive levels and it provides some initial evidence for the most effective levels of each. Future research should further elucidate the most effective levels of each of these variables (i.e., those that cause feigners to report the most motivation and result in scores that are more believable). For instance, this investigation found evidence for the use of a familiar scenario; however, the most fitting scenario will vary based on the setting of the sample and the specific characteristics of the participants. Future research should investigate various scenarios to find those that appear to be the most motivating to that specific population. This research would then be available to future researchers using simulation design, who could use the most effective scenario in similar samples.

Future research should also investigate alternate levels of positive and negative incentives that correspond to real-world circumstances. Although we found no evidence that negative incentives were more effective than positive ones, a study by Patrick and Iacono (1989) provided a completely different example of such incentives, which were quite effective (see Discussion). Creating negative incentives that comply with ethical guidelines, yet motivate participants to feign in realistic ways, is important. However, researchers must keep in mind that effectiveness will vary by setting, and incentives will need to be devised based on sample-specific considerations. What is motivating to a college student may not be to a correctional inmate or inpatient. Given the small number of studies on this subject, replication is needed before definitive guidelines can be made about negative incentives.
Although only supplementary questions in the current study, simulators’ choices of disorders and their ability to accurately portray those disorders deserves further investigation. Common disorder choices will help to structure the content of future feigning scales. Most feigning measures do not base scales on content, but rather on the feigning strategies. For example, scales using a rare symptoms strategy contain items with content that may span psychotic, dissociative, anxiety, and affective disorders. The emphasis is on the fact that the items are rare in any case. Feigning scales based on content may be developed for settings where specific disorders are being attempted. Alternatively, patterns of clinical elevations may provide evidence of generalized feigning, as the PAI’s RDF scale does, though with an empirical development (Rogers, Sewell, Morey, & Ustad, 1996).

Most feigning studies use one research design – known groups comparisons, simulation, or bootstrapping. Rarely are two designs used in the same investigation (i.e., one or more genuine, known, and simulation groups), which would allow for direct comparisons of the two designs (see Gothard, Rogers, & Sewell, 1995; Rogers & Bagby, 1991). More combined studies are needed to understand the extent to which suspected malingerers differ from simulators in their responses.

Conclusions

Feigning research using simulation design has grown drastically in the last thirty years. Only recently have concerns about ecological validity being given more attention. For years, little attention was paid to who the participants were or what their motivation was for completing the study. In the last two decades, many methodological changes have been implemented, but few studies have investigated how well these factors work.
Given the predominate use of this research design and the drastic implication of malingering in practice, clinicians have a substantial investment in both the accuracy of the measures they are using and the methods used to validate them.

The current study provides evidence for the inclusion of a familiar scenario, detection strategy coaching, and incentives. Scenarios should be designed that are relevant and familiar to the sample. No longer should murder charges be used with college students or irrelevant civil charges with psychiatric inpatients. Additionally, incentives should be included in investigations. Given the low cost and relative ease of implementing negative incentives, they should always be included in studies. Lastly, this study, as well as others before it, support the sole use of detection strategy coaching. The use of these variables will increase ecological validity while costing little extra. Instead of considering them optional, they should be framed as any other methodologically sound practice would be: necessary. The greater the ecological validity of our feigning studies, the more accurate our measures and understanding of feigning will be.

Endnotes

1. Because this study does not examine feigned cognitive impairment in depth, its detection strategies were not discussed in the Major Detection Strategy section. Briefly, Performance curve detects malingerers’ failure to tailor their incorrect responses to the level of difficulty of the measure. Magnitude of error analyzes the chosen incorrect responses of malingerers. Often times, malingerers’ do not focus on which incorrect answers should be chosen. These answers often vary from the predictable pattern of genuine patients (Berry & Schipper, 2008).
2. Studies used in the sample were as follows: Arbisi and Ben-Porath, 1998; Arbisi, Ben-Porath, and McNulty, 2006; Bagby, Rogers, Nicholson, Buis, Seeman, and Rector, 1997; Iverson, Franzen, and Hammond, 1995; Storm and Graham, 2000; Wetter, Baer, Berry, Smith, and Larson, 1992. Some studies included two simulation groups, in which case both instructional sets were averaged.

3. Two of these 18 studies used other designs as well, but all used simulation design.

4. Not all of these simulation studies were conducted exclusively with students or community volunteers. The comparison, or honest group is often from a clinical, forensic, or correctional population. However, the simulators, the participants assigned to feign with the scenario, are from student or community populations.

5. Merchelbach et al. (2009) classify wrongful death as a criminal charge. However, this is technically a civil charge involving death.

6. These numbers reflect arrests on-campus and in resident halls only.

7. Scales 6, 7, 8, and 9 were the only clinical scales reported in this study.

8. Dissociative identity disorder and antisocial personality disorder were also chosen by the unfamiliar group more often, but these frequencies were too small to draw firm conclusions.
APPENDIX A

INFORMED CONSENT FORM
Before agreeing to participate in this research study, it is important that you read and understand the following explanation of the purpose and benefits of the study and how it will be conducted.

**Title of Study:** Methodological Issues in Malingering Research: The Use of Simulation Designs.

**Principal Investigator:** Nathan Gillard, a graduate student in the University of North Texas (UNT) Department of Psychology.

**Purpose of the Study:** You are being asked to participate in a research study which seeks to understand better how individuals respond to questions when they are trying to fake a mental disorder for their own gain.

**Study Procedures:** You will be asked to follow the instructions given to you and fill out two questionnaires about symptoms of a mental disorder that will take about thirty to forty minutes of your time. In certain conditions, you may be asked to complete an additional questionnaire if you were unsuccessful on the first two measures.

**Foreseeable Risks:** The potential risks involved in this study are very minimal. You will be asked general questions about mental disorders, some of which may bring about thoughts that may be uncomfortable, such as questions about depression.

**Benefits to the Subjects or Others:** While we do not expect this study to benefit you directly immediately, we expect the project to provide us with valuable information about individuals who may be seeking to fake mental disorders. Individuals who do this can cost taxpayers money by taking funds from those who are experiencing true mental disorders. In addition, individuals may seek to avoid punishment such as prison or gain rewards such as disability payments unfairly.

**Compensation for Participants:** Everyone who completes the task, or an alternative assignment, will receive extra credit. Further compensation for this task will be discussed later in the study.

**Procedures for Maintaining Confidentiality of Research Records:** Once you sign this consent form, it will be removed from all other testing material and be stored in a separate, secure location in the department of psychology. All testing materials will include only a participant number, which after the completion of the task today will not be linked to your name in any way. The confidentiality of your individual information will be maintained in any publications or presentations regarding this study.
Questions about the Study: If you have any questions about the study, you may contact Nathan Gillard at telephone number (940) 565-2671 or the faculty advisor, Dr. Richard Rogers, UNT Department of Psychology, at telephone number (940) 565-2671.

Review for the Protection of Participants: This research study has been reviewed and approved by the UNT Institutional Review Board (IRB). The UNT IRB can be contacted at (940) 565-3940 with any questions regarding the rights of research subjects.

Research Participants’ Rights: Your signature below indicates that you have read or have had read to you all of the above and that you confirm all of the following:

- The researcher has explained the study to you and answered all of your questions.
- You have been told the possible benefits and the potential risks and/or discomforts of the study.
- You understand that you do not have to take part in this study, and your refusal to participate or your decision to withdraw will involve no penalty or loss of rights or benefits. The study personnel may choose to stop your participation at any time.
- You understand why the study is being conducted and how it will be performed.
- You understand your rights as a research participant and you voluntarily consent to participate in this study.
- You have been told that you will receive a copy of this form.

________________________________
Printed Name of Participant

________________________________                                ____________
Signature of Participant                                     Date

For the Principal Investigator or Designee: I certify that I have reviewed the contents of this form with the participant signing above. I have explained the possible benefits and the potential risks and/or discomforts of the study. It is my opinion that the participant understood the explanation.

________________________________________                ___________
Signature of Principal Investigator or Designee  Date
APPENDIX B

GENERAL HONEST INSTRUCTIONS
Today you will be asked to complete a number of short questionnaires. These questionnaires ask about your psychological health. Your goal is simply to be open and honest. It is important that you tell us the way it really is—please don’t hide your problems or exaggerate your symptoms. You will receive 2 research credit points for your cooperation.

As the Consent form you signed said, some people are being asked to “fake” a mental disorder. However, we need you to be completely honest so we can compare their fake results to your honest results.

Remember, just answer all the questions completely honestly.
APPENDIX C

INSTRUCTION SHEET 1: GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR FAKERS
You will be asked to pretend that you have a mental disorder. You will be given a number of questionnaires that are designed to measure the type and level of mental disorder you are pretending to have. Do your best to fake in a believable way so you are not caught.
APPENDIX D

INSTRUCTION SHEET 2a: FAMILIAR SCENARIO AND

INSTRUCTION SHEET 2b: UNFAMILIAR SCENARIO
Imagine that you are in the final weeks of a class that you need to graduate. You have not even started a major project that counts for 50% of your final grade. Without it, you have no hope of passing. The university makes special exceptions for dropping classes if a student experiences a mental disorder. You decide that you must fake a breakdown. A psychologist will give you a few questionnaires to decide if you are impaired. You can avoid failing only if you are able to convince the psychologist that you really are impaired. Please take a minute to think about what type of disorder and impairment you would like to fake before completing the materials – remember, you must appear convincingly disabled.

Imagine you were involved in a fight outside of a restaurant and you broke a bottle over the other person’s head. You escaped with a few cuts, but the other person was hospitalized. Felony Assault charges are now being filed against you. You decide you must pretend to have a mental disorder that explains your behavior outside the restaurant. A psychologist will give you a few questionnaires to decide if you are impaired. You can avoid a conviction and possible jail time only if you can convince the psychologist that you are mentally impaired. Please take a minute to think about what type of disorder and impairment you would like to fake before completing the materials – remember, you must appear convincingly disabled.
APPENDIX E

INSTRUCTION SETS 3: POSITIVE, NEGATIVE, AND BOTH INCENTIVES
**Instruction Set 3a: Positive Incentive**

If you succeed at “faking out” the questionnaires without being caught, you will receive extra credit and be entered to win $50. Remember, you must appear genuinely impaired and avoid detection to win a chance at $50.

**Instruction Set 3b: Negative Incentive**

If you succeed at “faking out” the questionnaires about your pretend mental disorder without being caught, you will receive extra credit and complete the study early. However, if you are caught trying to deceive the tests, you will not receive the extra credit. In addition, you will be required to stay for an additional 20 minutes to fill out more measures to find out why you failed.

**Instruction Set 3c: Positive and Negative Incentive**

If you succeed at “faking out” the questionnaires without being caught, you will receive extra credit and be entered to win $50. Remember, you must appear genuinely impaired and avoid detection to win a chance at $50. However, if you are caught trying to deceive the tests, you will not receive the extra credit or the money. In addition, you will be required to stay for an additional 20 minutes to fill out more measures to find out why you failed.
APPENDIX F

INSTRUCTION SET 4a: COACHING
There are scales on these tests that are designed to catch those who are faking a mental disorder. These scales use several methods to tell those with genuine disorders from those faking disorders. One method for identifying fakers is to ask about very strange or unlikely symptoms. For example, if you indicate that you are deathly afraid of flowers (almost never a real symptom), the test will see you are likely faking. Another way the test detects faking is by asking about symptoms that rarely happen together. For example, increased appetite and hearing voices are symptoms of different mental disorders. Therefore, they are unlikely to happen at the same time. Please watch for the items that are designed to catch you faking. Remember, you want to appear mentally disordered, but you want to be believable – otherwise you will be caught.
APPENDIX G

DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE
Demographic Information

Current Date:

Gender:  M  F

Age:

Ethnicity:
   European American
   African American
   Hispanic American
   Asian American
   Other __________

1st Language:
   English       Other ______________

Year in College:
   Freshmen      Sophomore      Junior      Senior

Major in College:

Marital Status:
   Single      Married      Divorced      Other

Have you ever failed a course in college?
   Yes  No
   If yes, how many times______

Have you ever been arrested?
   Yes  No
   If yes, please specify the charge:___________________

Have you ever been diagnosed with a mental illness?
   Yes  No
As a participant in this study, you were randomly placed in one of a number of possible groups. Each group received slightly different instructions. For some, these instructions stated that failure to fake out the tests would result in having your extra credit taken away. However, this was done only to motivate you to try your best on the tests. In reality, everyone who participated in the study will receive 2 research credit points.

Please keep this a secret. Other friends or students may participate in this study at a later date and we do not want them to know this beforehand. Thank you for your cooperation and participation!
APPENDIX I

MANIPULATION CHECKS
Honest

ID # ______

The study you just participated in asked you to follow the instructions you were given.

Please briefly describe what your instructions asked you to do.

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

How hard did you try to follow the instructions?

1. Didn’t try hard, its just a study ______

2. Tried a little bit _____

3. Gave a medium effort _____

4. A good effort, I tried hard _____

5. Excellent effort, I really tried to do my best _____

Thank you for your participation. Your help in this study is greatly appreciated.
The study you just participated in asked you to follow the instructions you were given.

Please briefly describe what your instructions asked you to do.

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

What situation were you asked to pretend you were in?

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

What were the reasons given for following the instructions? In other words, what would a happen if you did not do well?

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

How hard did you try to follow the instructions?

1. Didn’t try hard, its just a study ______

2. Tried a little bit _____

3. Gave a medium effort _____

4. A good effort, I tried hard _____

5. Excellent effort, I really tried to do my best _____

Do you think you were successful at deceiving the tests?

   Yes   No

When faking, did you have a particular disorder in mind?

   Yes   No
If yes, what was it?

__________________________________________________________

Were you aware that there were items designed to trip you up?

    Yes    No

How do you think those items were supposed to work?

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

Thank you for your participation. Your help in this study is greatly appreciated.
Feign-Positive-No coach

ID # _______

The study you just participated in asked you to follow the instructions you were given.

Please briefly describe what your instructions asked you to do.
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

What situation were you asked to pretend you were in?
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

What were the reasons given for following the instructions? In other words, what would you receive for doing well?
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

How hard did you try to follow the instructions?

1. Didn’t try hard, its just a study ______

2. Tried a little bit _____

3. Gave a medium effort _____

4. A good effort, I tried hard _____

5. Excellent effort, I really tried to do my best _____

Do you think you were successful at deceiving the tests?

Yes ☐ No ☐

When faking, did you have a particular disorder in mind?

Yes ☐ No ☐
If yes, what was it?
__________________________________________________________

Were you aware that there were items designed to trip you up?

Yes  No

How do you think those items were supposed to work?
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

Thank you for your participation. Your help in this study is greatly appreciated.
Feign-both-No coach

ID # _______

The study you just participated in asked you to follow the instructions you were given.

Please briefly describe what your instructions asked you to do.
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

What situation were you asked to pretend you were in?
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

What were the reasons given for following the instructions? In other words, what would you receive for doing well? What would happen if you did not do well?
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

How hard did you try to follow the instructions?

1. Didn’t try hard, its just a study ______
2. Tried a little bit _____
3. Gave a medium effort _____
4. A good effort, I tried hard ______
5. Excellent effort, I really tried to do my best _____

Do you think you were successful at deceiving the tests?

Yes   No

When faking, did you have a particular disorder in mind?

Yes   No
If yes, what was it?

__________________________________________________________

Were you aware that there were items designed to trip you up?

Yes  No

How do you think those items were supposed to work?

______________________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________________

Thank you for your participation. Your help in this study is greatly appreciated.
The study you just participated in asked you to follow the instructions you were given.

Please briefly describe what your instructions asked you to do.

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

What situation were you asked to pretend you were in?

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

What were the reasons given for following the instructions? In other words, what would you receive for doing well?

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

How hard did you try to follow the instructions?

1. Didn’t try hard, its just a study ______
2. Tried a little bit _____
3. Gave a medium effort _____
4. A good effort, I tried hard _____
5. Excellent effort, I really tried to do my best _____

Do you think you were successful at deceiving the tests?

Yes    No

When faking, did you have a particular disorder in mind?

Yes    No
If yes, what was it?

__________________________________________________________

You were given information on how some items were supposed to “catch” you. Do you feel like this coaching was useful?

   Yes   No

Did you think about the advice given when answering questions?

   Yes   No

Thank you for your participation. Your help in this study is greatly appreciated.
The study you just participated in asked you to follow the instructions you were given.

Please briefly describe what your instructions asked you to do.

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

What situation were you asked to pretend you were in?

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

What were the reasons given for following the instructions? In other words, what would a happen if you did not do well?

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

How hard did you try to follow the instructions?

1. Didn’t try hard, its just a study _____

2. Tried a little bit _____

3. Gave a medium effort _____

4. A good effort, I tried hard _____

5. Excellent effort, I really tried to do my best _____

Do you think you were successful at deceiving the tests?

Yes   No

When faking, did you have a particular disorder in mind?

Yes   No
If yes, what was it?

____________________________________________________________________________________________

You were given information on how some items were supposed to “catch” you. Do you feel like this coaching was useful?

Yes  No

Did you think about the advice given when answering questions?

Yes  No

Thank you for your participation. Your help in this study is greatly appreciated.
The study you just participated in asked you to follow the instructions you were given.

Please briefly describe what your instructions asked you to do.

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

What situation were you asked to pretend you were in?

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

What were the reasons given for following the instructions? In other words, what would you receive for doing well? What would happen if you did not do well?

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

How hard did you try to follow the instructions?

  1. Didn’t try hard, its just a study ______
  2. Tried a little bit _____
  3. Gave a medium effort _____
  4. A good effort, I tried hard _____
  5. Excellent effort, I really tried to do my best _____

Do you think you were successful at deceiving the tests?

  Yes    No

When faking, did you have a particular disorder in mind?

  Yes    No
If yes, what was it?

__________________________________________________________

You were given information on how some items were supposed to “catch” you. Do you feel like this coaching was useful?

Yes    No

Did you think about the advice given when answering questions?

Yes    No

Thank you for your participation. Your help in this study is greatly appreciated.
APPENDIX J

ABSOLUTE MEAN DIFFERENCES BETWEEN INCENTIVE GROUPS TABLE
### Absolute Mean Differences Between Incentive Groups

| Scale | |Pos – Neg| |Pos – Both| |Neg – Both| |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **SIMS** | Total | 0.73 | 0.53 | 0.20 |
| | NI | 0.21 | 0.35 | 0.14 |
| | AF | 0.26 | 0.32 | 0.06 |
| | P | 0.35 | 0.46 | 0.11 |
| | LI | 0.14 | 0.11 | 0.25 |
| | AM | 0.64 | 0.15 | 0.49 |
| | Mean | 0.39 | 0.32 | 0.21 |
| **SCL-90-R** | SOM | 0.64 | 4.71 | 5.35 |
| | O-C | 1.33 | 0.50 | 0.83 |
| | I-S | 5.27 | 2.60 | 2.67 |
| | DEP | 5.09 | 4.00 | 1.09 |
| | ANX | 1.50 | 1.76 | 0.26 |
| | HOS | 0.52 | 1.04 | 0.52 |
| | PHOB | 0.81 | 0.18 | 0.63 |
| | PAR | 2.13 | 0.42 | 1.71 |
| | PSY | 4.90 | 0.45 | 5.35 |
| | GSI | 2.39 | 0.29 | 2.10 |
| | Mean | 2.46 | 1.60 | 2.05 |

*Note.* Pos = Positive Incentive, Neg = Negative Incentive, Both = Both Incentives.
REFERENCES


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